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It features the letters "lte" in a bold, lowercase font. Above the "e" is the word "Advanced" in a smaller font, and above that is the word "Pro" in a red font. To the left of the text is a green signal icon consisting of three curved lines. + +LTE Advanced Pro logo + +![3GPP logo](5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg) + +The logo for 3GPP. It features the letters "3GPP" in a stylized, bold font. Below the "P" is a red signal icon consisting of three curved lines. Below the logo, the text "A GLOBAL INITIATIVE" is written in a smaller, all-caps font. + +3GPP logo + +The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP. The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organizational Partners and shall not be implemented. This Specification is provided for future development work within 3GPP only. The Organizational Partners accept no liability for any use of this Specification. Specifications and Reports for implementation of the 3GPP™ system should be obtained via the 3GPP Organizational Partners' Publications Offices. + +## **3GPP** + +--- + +Postal address + +--- + +3GPP support office address + +--- + +650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis +Valbonne - FRANCE +Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 + +--- + +Internet + +--- + + + +# --- **Copyright Notification** --- + +No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. +The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. + +© 2020, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC). +All rights reserved. + +UMTS™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members +3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association + +# Contents + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 9 | +| 1 Scope..... | 10 | +| 1.1 References ..... | 11 | +| 1.2 Abbreviations ..... | 12 | +| 1.3 Definitions..... | 13 | +| 2 Design objectives ..... | 13 | +| 3 Restoration indicators in location registers and in GPRS support nodes..... | 13 | +| 3.1 Restoration Indicators in the VLR ..... | 13 | +| 3.2 Restoration Indicators in the HLR ..... | 15 | +| 3.3 Restoration Indicators in the SGSN ..... | 15 | +| 3.4 Restoration Indicators in the MME..... | 17 | +| 3.5 Restoration Indicator in the ProSe Function ..... | 18 | +| 3.6 Restoration Indicator in the V2X Control Function..... | 18 | +| 4 Restoration of data in the VLR ..... | 18 | +| 4.0 VLR Failure with Restart ..... | 18 | +| 4.0a VLR Failure without Restart..... | 19 | +| 4.1 Restart of the VLR ..... | 20 | +| 4.2 Restoration Procedures..... | 20 | +| 4.2.0 General ..... | 20 | +| 4.2.1 Incoming Call ..... | 20 | +| 4.2.2 Mobile Terminated Short Message ..... | 21 | +| 4.2.3 Mobile Terminating Location Request (MT-LR)..... | 22 | +| 4.2.4 Incoming LCS Information Request (GSM only) ..... | 23 | +| 4.2.5 Outgoing MS request..... | 23 | +| 4.2.6 Outgoing LMU Request (GSM only)..... | 24 | +| 4.2.7 Location Updating or IMSI Attach..... | 24 | +| 4.2.8 Use of TMSI ..... | 25 | +| 4.2.9 SGSN associations..... | 25 | +| 4.2.10 MME associations ..... | 25 | +| 5 Restoration of data in the HLR/HSS..... | 25 | +| 5.1 Restart of the HLR/HSS ..... | 26 | +| 5.2 Procedures During Restoration ..... | 26 | +| 5.2.1 Mobile terminated call..... | 26 | +| 5.2.2 Mobile Originated Activity for CS..... | 26 | +| 5.2.3 Mobile Originated Activity for ProSe ..... | 26 | +| 5.2.4 Procedures in the SGSN ..... | 27 | +| 5.2.5 Procedures in the MME..... | 27 | +| 5.2.6 Mobile Originated Activity for V2X..... | 27 | +| 6 Periodic location updating ..... | 27 | +| 7 Periodic routeing area updating ..... | 27 | +| 8 Stand-alone operation of the VLR ..... | 28 | +| 9 Stand-alone operation of the SGSN ..... | 28 | +| 9A Stand-alone operation of the MME..... | 28 | +| 10 Restoration of data in the GGSN ..... | 28 | +| 10.0 GGSN failure..... | 28 | +| 10.1 Restart of the GGSN ..... | 29 | +| 10.2 Restoration Procedures..... | 29 | +| 10.2.0 General ..... | 29 | +| 10.2.1 Mobile terminated transmission ..... | 29 | +| 10.2.2 Mobile originated transmission ..... | 29 | + +| | | | +|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| 11 | Restoration of data in the SGSN ..... | 29 | +| 11.0 | SGSN Failure ..... | 29 | +| 11.0.1 | Gn/Gp SGSN failure..... | 29 | +| 11.0.2 | SGSN Failure using S4..... | 30 | +| 11.1 | Restart of the SGSN ..... | 30 | +| 11.2 | Restoration Procedures..... | 31 | +| 11.2.1 | Mobile terminated user data transmission..... | 31 | +| 11.2.2 | Mobile terminated services requested by the MSC/VLR..... | 31 | +| 11.2.3 | Mobile terminated SMS over GPRS ..... | 31 | +| 11.2.4 | Mobile originated Routeing Area Updating or Attach ..... | 32 | +| 11.2.5 | Mobile originated LLC frame ..... | 32 | +| 11.2.6 | Mobile originated Service Request ..... | 32 | +| 11.3 | Use of TLLI..... | 33 | +| 11.4 | VLR associations..... | 33 | +| 11.5 | Restart of a peer node..... | 33 | +| 11.5.1 | SGW failure ..... | 33 | +| 11.5.2 | MBMS-GW failure..... | 33 | +| 12 | Restoration of Data in an SMLC (GSM only) ..... | 34 | +| 12.1 | Restart of an SMLC..... | 34 | +| 12.2 | Data Restoration for a Specific LMU ..... | 34 | +| 13 | Restoration of Data in an LMU (GSM only) ..... | 34 | +| 14 | Restoration of data in the MME..... | 34 | +| 14.1 | Restart of the MME..... | 34 | +| 14.1.1 | Restoration Procedures ..... | 34 | +| 14.1.2 | Mobile originated Tracking Area Updating or E-UTRAN Attach..... | 35 | +| 14.1.3 | Mobile terminated services requested by the MSC/VLR..... | 36 | +| 14.1.4 | Mobile terminated user data transmission..... | 36 | +| 14.1.5 | Mobile originated Service Request ..... | 36 | +| 14.1.6 | Mobile Terminated NIDD procedure ..... | 36 | +| 14.1A | Restart of a peer node..... | 37 | +| 14.1A.1 | SGW Failure ..... | 37 | +| 14.1A.2 | MBMS GW failure ..... | 37 | +| 14.1A.4 | UCMF Failure ..... | 37 | +| 14.2 | VLR associations..... | 37 | +| 14.3 | Partial Failure Handling at MME..... | 37 | +| 14.3.1 | General ..... | 37 | +| 14.3.2 | Procedures during PDN Connection Establishment..... | 37 | +| 14.3.3 | Procedures during MME Partial Failure..... | 38 | +| 14.3.4 | Procedures during a Peer's Partial Failure ..... | 38 | +| 14.3.5 | Procedures during PDN Connection Removal or Modification..... | 38 | +| 15 | Restoration of data in GERAN/UTRAN ..... | 39 | +| 15.1 | BSS Failure (A/Gb mode)..... | 39 | +| 15.2 | RNC/BSC Failure (Iu mode)..... | 39 | +| 15.3 | RNC/BSC Failure (Iu mode) using S4..... | 39 | +| 15.4 | Other RNC functionality for MBMS restoration..... | 40 | +| 15.5 | Iu path failure using S4 ..... | 40 | +| 15A | Restoration of data in E-UTRAN..... | 41 | +| 15A.1 | eNodeB Failure ..... | 41 | +| 15A.1.1 | General ..... | 41 | +| 15A.1.2 | PWS restoration..... | 41 | +| 15A.2 | S1-AP path failure ..... | 42 | +| 15A.3 | MCE Failure..... | 42 | +| 15A.4 | M3AP path failure..... | 43 | +| 15A.5 | Other MCE functionality for MBMS restoration ..... | 44 | +| 15A.6 | Other MME related functionality for MBMS restoration ..... | 44 | +| 16 | Restoration of data in the SGW ..... | 44 | +| 16.1 | Restart of the SGW ..... | 44 | +| 16.1.0 | SGW Failure ..... | 44 | + +| | | | +|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| 16.1.1 | Restoration Procedures ..... | 45 | +| 16.1a | Restart of the SGW-C ..... | 45 | +| 16.1a.1 | SGW-C failure ..... | 45 | +| 16.1a.2 | Restoration procedure ..... | 45 | +| 16.1b | Restart of the SGW-U ..... | 45 | +| 16.1b.1 | SGW-U failure ..... | 45 | +| 16.1b.2 | Restoration procedure ..... | 45 | +| 16.1A | Restart of a peer node ..... | 46 | +| 16.1A.1 | MME/S4-SGSN Failure ..... | 46 | +| 16.1A.1.1 | General ..... | 46 | +| 16.1A.2 | PGW Failure ..... | 46 | +| 16.1A.3 | SGW-C Failure ..... | 47 | +| 16.1A.4 | SGW-U Failure ..... | 47 | +| 16.2 | Partial Failure Handling at SGW ..... | 48 | +| 16.2.1 | General ..... | 48 | +| 16.2.2 | Procedures during PDN Connection Establishment ..... | 49 | +| 16.2.3 | Procedures during SGW Partial Failure ..... | 49 | +| 16.2.4 | Procedures during a Peer's Partial Failure ..... | 49 | +| 16.2.5 | Procedures during PDN Connection Removal or Modification ..... | 50 | +| 17 | Restoration of data in the PGW ..... | 51 | +| 17.1 | Restart of the PGW ..... | 51 | +| 17.1.0 | PGW Failure ..... | 51 | +| 17.1.1 | Restoration Procedures ..... | 51 | +| 17.1a | Restart of the PGW-C ..... | 52 | +| 17.1a.1 | PGW-C failure ..... | 52 | +| 17.1a.2 | Restoration Procedures ..... | 52 | +| 17.1b | Restart of the PGW-U ..... | 52 | +| 17.1b.1 | PGW-U failure ..... | 52 | +| 17.1b.2 | Restoration Procedures ..... | 52 | +| 17.1A | Restart of a peer node ..... | 52 | +| 17.1A.1 | SGW/ePDG/TWAN Failure ..... | 52 | +| 17.1A.2 | PCRF Failure ..... | 53 | +| 17.1A.3 | PGW-C Failure ..... | 53 | +| 17.1A.4 | PGW-U Failure ..... | 53 | +| 17.2 | Partial Failure Handling at PGW ..... | 54 | +| 17.2.1 | General ..... | 54 | +| 17.2.2 | Procedures during PDN Connection Establishment ..... | 54 | +| 17.2.3 | Procedures during PGW Partial Failure ..... | 54 | +| 17.2.4 | Procedures during a Peer's Partial Failure ..... | 55 | +| 17.2.5 | Procedures during PDN Connection Removal or Modification ..... | 55 | +| 17A | Restoration of data in the MBMS GW ..... | 55 | +| 17A.1 | Restart of the MBMS GW ..... | 55 | +| 17A.2 | Restart of a peer node ..... | 56 | +| 17A.2.1 | MME failure ..... | 56 | +| 17A.2.2 | SGSN failure ..... | 56 | +| 17A.2.3 | BM-SC failure ..... | 57 | +| 17B | Restoration of data in the ePDG ..... | 57 | +| 17B.1 | Restart of the ePDG ..... | 57 | +| 17B.1.1 | ePDG Failure ..... | 57 | +| 17B.1.2 | Restoration Procedures ..... | 57 | +| 17B.1A | Restart of a peer node ..... | 57 | +| 17B.1A.1 | PGW Failure ..... | 57 | +| 17B.2 | Partial Failure Handling at ePDG ..... | 58 | +| 17B.2.1 | General ..... | 58 | +| 17B.2.2 | Procedures during PDN Connection Establishment ..... | 58 | +| 17B.2.3 | Procedures during ePDG Partial Failure ..... | 58 | +| 17B.2.4 | Procedures during PGW Partial Failure ..... | 58 | +| 17B.2.5 | Procedures during PDN Connection Removal or Modification ..... | 59 | + +| | | | +|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| 17C | Restoration of data in the TWAN ..... | 59 | +| 17C.1 | Restart of the TWAN ..... | 59 | +| 17C.1.1 | TWAN Failure..... | 59 | +| 17C.1.2 | Restoration Procedures..... | 59 | +| 17C.1A | Restart of a peer node..... | 59 | +| 17C.1A.1 | PGW Failure ..... | 59 | +| 17C.2 | Partial Failure Handling at TWAN ..... | 59 | +| 17C.2.1 | General ..... | 59 | +| 17C.2.2 | Procedures during PDN Connection Establishment..... | 60 | +| 17C.2.3 | Procedures during TWAN Partial Failure ..... | 60 | +| 17C.2.4 | Procedures during PGW Partial Failure ..... | 60 | +| 17C.2.5 | Procedures during PDN Connection Removal or Modification..... | 60 | +| 17D | Restoration of data in the BM-SC..... | 61 | +| 17D.1 | Restart of the BM-SC..... | 61 | +| 17D.2 | Restart of the GCS AS ..... | 61 | +| 17E | Restoration of data in the GCS AS ..... | 61 | +| 17E.1 | Restart of the GCS-AS ..... | 61 | +| 17E.2 | Restart of the BM-SC..... | 61 | +| 17F | Restoration of data in the UCMF..... | 62 | +| 17F.1 | Restart of the UCMF..... | 62 | +| 17F.2 | Restart of the MME..... | 62 | +| 18 | GTP-C based restart procedures ..... | 62 | +| 19 | PMIPv6 based restart procedures..... | 63 | +| 19A | PFCP based restart procedures..... | 63 | +| 19B | URCMP based restart procedures ..... | 64 | +| 20 | Path management procedures..... | 65 | +| 20.1 | General ..... | 65 | +| 20.2 | Signalling path failure detection and handling..... | 66 | +| 20.2.1 | General ..... | 66 | +| 20.2.2 | SGW functionality ..... | 66 | +| 20.2.2.1 | S11/S4 path failure..... | 66 | +| 20.2.2.2 | S5 path failure..... | 66 | +| 20.2.3 | MBMS GW functionality ..... | 67 | +| 20.2.3.1 | Sm path failure ..... | 67 | +| 20.2.3.2 | Sn path failure ..... | 68 | +| 20.2.3.3 | SGmb path failure ..... | 69 | +| 20.2.4 | MME functionality ..... | 69 | +| 20.2.4.1 | Sm path failure..... | 69 | +| 20.2.4.2 | S5 path failure..... | 70 | +| 20.2.5 | SGSN functionality ..... | 71 | +| 20.2.5.1 | Sn path failure ..... | 71 | +| 20.2.5.2 | S5 path failure..... | 72 | +| 20.2.6 | BM-SC functionality ..... | 72 | +| 20.2.6.1 | SGmb path failure..... | 72 | +| 20.2.6.2 | MB2-C path failure..... | 74 | +| 20.2.7 | PGW functionality ..... | 74 | +| 20.2.7.1 | S5 path failure..... | 74 | +| 20.2.8 | GCS AS functionality ..... | 74 | +| 20.2.8.1 | MB2-C path failure..... | 74 | +| 20.2.9 | Sx interface functionality ..... | 75 | +| 20.2.9.1 | Sxa path failure ..... | 75 | +| 20.2.9.2 | Sxb path failure ..... | 75 | +| 20.3 | User plane path failure detection and handling..... | 75 | +| 20.3.1 | General ..... | 75 | +| 20.3.2 | MBMS GW functionality ..... | 75 | +| 20.3.2.1 | SGi-mb path failure ..... | 75 | +| 20.3.3 | BM-SC functionality ..... | 76 | + +| | | | +|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 20.3.3.1 | SGi-mb path failure ..... | 76 | +| 20.3.4 | With Control and User plane Separation of SGW or PGW nodes ..... | 76 | +| 20.3.5 | SGW functionality ..... | 76 | +| 20.3.5.1 | S1-U path failure..... | 76 | +| 20.3.6 | MME functionality ..... | 77 | +| 20.3.6.1 | S1-U path failure..... | 77 | +| 21 | Error Indication handling ..... | 78 | +| 21.1 | General ..... | 78 | +| 21.2 | GGSN ..... | 78 | +| 21.3 | Gn/Gp SGSN ..... | 78 | +| 21.4 | S4 SGSN ..... | 78 | +| 21.5 | RNC or NodeB ..... | 79 | +| 21.6 | eNodeB..... | 79 | +| 21.7 | SGW ..... | 80 | +| 21.8 | PGW ..... | 81 | +| 21.9 | MBMS GW ..... | 81 | +| 21.10 | ePDG..... | 81 | +| 21.11 | TWAN..... | 81 | +| 21.12 | MME ..... | 82 | +| 22 | Downlink Data Notification Handling at MME/S4 SGSN ..... | 82 | +| 23 | General partial failure handling procedures..... | 82 | +| 24 | Restoration of data in the PCRF ..... | 88 | +| 24.1 | Restart of the PCRF..... | 88 | +| 24.1.0 | PCRF Restart..... | 88 | +| 25 | Network triggered service restoration procedure..... | 88 | +| 25.1 | General ..... | 88 | +| 25.2 | Network triggered service restoration procedure without ISR..... | 88 | +| 25.2.1 | General ..... | 88 | +| 25.2.2 | SGW procedure ..... | 89 | +| 25.2.3 | MME/SGSN procedure ..... | 90 | +| 25.3 | Network triggered service restoration procedure with ISR..... | 90 | +| 25.3.1 | General ..... | 90 | +| 25.3.2 | SGW procedure ..... | 91 | +| 25.3.3 | MME/S4-SGSN procedure..... | 92 | +| 26 | Mobile terminated CS service delivery via an alternative MME in MME pool..... | 92 | +| 27 | Restoration of PDN connections after an SGW failure ..... | 94 | +| 27.1 | General ..... | 94 | +| 27.2 | Restoration of PDN connections after an SGW failure for UEs without ISR..... | 94 | +| 27.2.1 | General ..... | 94 | +| 27.2.2 | MME/S4-SGSN triggered SGW restoration ..... | 94 | +| 27.2.2.1 | General ..... | 94 | +| 27.2.2.2 | MME/S4-SGSN procedure ..... | 95 | +| 27.2.2.3 | PGW procedure..... | 97 | +| 27.2.2.4 | PCRF procedure..... | 97 | +| 27.2.2.5 | SGW procedure..... | 97 | +| 27.2.3 | PGW triggered SGW restoration ..... | 98 | +| 27.2.3.1 | General ..... | 98 | +| 27.2.3.2 | MME/S4-SGSN procedure ..... | 98 | +| 27.2.3.3 | SGW procedure..... | 99 | +| 27.2.3.4 | PGW procedure..... | 99 | +| 27.3 | Restoration of PDN connections after an SGW failure for UEs with ISR..... | 100 | +| 27.3.1 | MME/S4-SGSN triggered SGW restoration for UEs with ISR ..... | 100 | +| 27.3.1.1 | General ..... | 100 | +| 27.3.1.2 | MME/S4-SGSN procedure ..... | 100 | +| 27.3.2 | PGW triggered SGW restoration for UEs with ISR ..... | 101 | +| 27.3.2.1 | General ..... | 101 | +| 27.3.2.2 | MME/S4-SGSN procedure ..... | 101 | + +- 28 Restoration of data in the CSS ..... 101 + - 28.1 Restart of the CSS ..... 101 +- 29 MBMS Heartbeat procedure ..... 102 +- 30 Restoration of the SCEF ..... 102 + - 30.1 Restart of the SCEF ..... 102 + - 30.1.1 Mobile Originated NIDD procedure..... 103 +- Annex A (informative): Change history ..... 104** + +## Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings: + +- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something +- shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something + +The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports. + +The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document. + +- should** indicates a recommendation to do something +- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something +- may** indicates permission to do something +- need not** indicates permission not to do something + +The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended. + +- can** indicates that something is possible +- cannot** indicates that something is impossible + +The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not". + +- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +In addition: + +**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements. + +--- + +## 1 Scope + +The data stored in location registers are automatically updated in normal operation; the main information stored in a location register defines the location of each mobile station and the subscriber data required to handle traffic for each mobile subscriber. The loss or corruption of these data will seriously degrade the service offered to mobile subscribers; it is therefore necessary to define procedures to limit the effects of failure of a location register, and to restore the location register data automatically. The present document defines the necessary procedures. + +The basic principle is that restoration should be based on radio contact to avoid faulty data being spread in the system. + +Subscriber data for supplementary services must also be correctly restored, although the impact on service of corruption of supplementary service data is less severe. + +Procedures for supporting these functions are defined in 3GPP TS 29.002 [6] and 3GPP TS 29.060 [8]. + +The MAP operation "IMSI Attach" is used only in MAP version 1; in MAP version 2 the same function is performed by the MAP operation "Update Location Area". References in this specification to IMSI attach apply only to MAP version 1 network entities. + +If the restoration of subscriber data in the VLR is triggered by Location Updating or IMSI Attach, the VLR retrieves subscriber data from the HLR by sending an "Update Location" request, which triggers one or more "Insert Subscriber Data" operations from the HLR. The "Update Location" request may also be used to send the LMSI to the HLR. + +If the restoration of subscriber data in the VLR is triggered by a "Provide Roaming Number" request, the behaviour of the VLR depends on whether it is implemented according to MAP version 1 or MAP version 2. For MAP version 2, the VLR retrieves subscriber data from the HLR by sending a "Restore Data" request, which triggers one or more "Insert Subscriber Data" operations from the HLR. The "Restore Data" request is also used to send the LMSI to the HLR. For MAP version 1, the VLR retrieves subscriber data from the HLR by sending a "Send Parameters" request with parameter type "Subscriber Data", which cannot be used to send the LMSI to the HLR. + +The VLR number and MSC number in the subscriber data in the HLR are updated by the "Update Location" procedure. + +The GGSN (Gateway GPRS Support Node) is the point of PDN interconnection with the GSM PLMN supporting GPRS. The GGSN contains routing information for GPRS users with a PDP context active. The necessary procedures needed to restore GGSN data information after a restart are described in this document. + +The SGSN (Serving GPRS Support Node) is the node that is serving the MS. The SGSN stores information regarding e.g. mobility management, routing and security. The necessary procedures needed to restore this SGSN information after a restart are described in this document. + +The MME (Mobility Management Entity) is the node that is serving the UE when attached to E-UTRAN. The MME stores information regarding e.g. mobility management, routing and security. The necessary procedures needed to restore this MME information after a restart are described in this document. + +A Type A LMU (Location Measurement Unit) is a network node, accessed over the GSM air interface, that is functionally similar to an MS. All requirements associated with a non-GPRS MS in this specification apply also to a Type A LMU except where specified otherwise. + +## 1.1 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary of 3GPP Specifications ". +- [2] Void +- [3] Void +- [4] 3GPP TS 23.040: "Technical realization of the Short Message Service (SMS)". +- [5] 3GPP TS 23.060: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service description; Stage 2". +- [6] 3GPP TS 29.002: "Mobile Application Part (MAP) specification". +- [7] 3GPP TS 29.018: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) - Visitors Location Register (VLR); Gs interface layer 3 specification". +- [8] 3GPP TS 29.060: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP) across the Gn and Gp interface". +- [9] 3GPP TS 43.005: "Technical performance objectives". +- [10] 3GPP TS 23.071: " Location Services (LCS); Functional description; Stage 2". +- [11] Void +- [12] 3GPP TS 23.246: "Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS); Architecture and functional description". +- [13] 3GPP TS 29.274: "3GPP Evolved Packet System (EPS); Evolved General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) Tunnelling Protocol for Control plane (GTPv2-C); Stage 3". +- [14] 3GPP TS 29.118:"Mobility Management Entity (MME) – Visitor Location Register (VLR) SGs interface specification". +- [15] 3GPP TS 23.401: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access". +- [16] 3GPP TS 29.275: "Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) based Mobility and Tunneling protocols; Stage 3". +- [17] 3GPP TS 29.281: "General Packet Radio System (GPRS) Tunneling Protocol User Plane (GTPv1-U)". +- [18] 3GPP TS 23.402: "Architecture enhancements for non-3GPP accesses". +- [19] 3GPP TS 24.301: "Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for Evolved Packet System (EPS); Stage 3". +- [20] 3GPP TS 24.008: "Mobile radio interface Layer 3 specification; Core network protocols; Stage 3". +- [21] 3GPP TS 29.213: "Policy and charging control signalling flows and Quality of Service (QoS) parameter mapping ". +- [22] IETF RFC 5847: "Heartbeat Mechanism for Proxy Mobile IPv6". + +- [23] 3GPP TS 23.018: "Basic call handling; Technical realization". +- [24] 3GPP TS 23.236: "Intra-domain connection of Radio Access Network (RAN) nodes to multiple Core Network (CN) nodes". +- [25] 3GPP TS 29.212: "Policy and Charging Control (PCC); Reference points". +- [26] IETF RFC 7077: "Update Notifications for Proxy Mobile IPv6". +- [27] 3GPP TS 23.122: "Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) functions related to Mobile Station (MS) in idle mode". +- [28] 3GPP TS 36.444: "EUTRAN M3 Application Protocol (M3AP)". +- [29] 3GPP TS 25.413: "UTRAN Iu interface RANAP signalling". +- [30] 3GPP TS 23.041: "Technical realization of Cell Broadcast Service (CBS)". +- [31] 3GPP TS 29.061: "Interworking between the Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) supporting packet based services and Packet Data Networks (PDN) ". +- [32] 3GPP TS 36.300: "Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN); Overall description; Stage 2". +- [33] 3GPP TS 23.303: "Proximity based Services; Stage 2". +- [34] 3GPP TS 29.344: "Proximity-services (ProSe) Function to Home Subscriber Server (HSS) aspects; Stage 3". +- [35] 3GPP TS 29.468: "Group Communication System Enablers for LTE (GCSE\_LTE); MB2 Reference Point; Stage 3". +- [36] 3GPP TS 29.468: "Group Communication System Enablers for LTE (GCSE\_LTE); MB2 Reference Point; Stage 3". +- [37] 3GPP TS 29.303: "Domain Name System Procedures; Stage 3". +- [38] 3GPP TS 23.682: "Architecture enhancements to facilitate communications with packet data networks and applications". +- [39] 3GPP TS 23.161: "Network-Based IP Flow Mobility (NBIFOM); Stage 2". +- [40] 3GPP TS 23.285: "Architecture enhancements for V2X services; Stage 2". +- [41] 3GPP TS 29.388: "V2X Control Function to V2X Control Function to Home Subscriber Server (HSS) aspects (V4)". . +- [42] 3GPP TS 23.214: "Architecture enhancements for control and user plane separation of EPC nodes; Stage 2". +- [43] 3GPP TS 29.244: "Interface between the Control Plane and the User Plane of EPC Nodes; stage 3". +- [44] 3GPP TS 29.674: " Interface between the UCMF and the MME; Stage 3". + +## 1.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations listed in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] apply. + +## 1.3 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]. + +**PDN Connection:** "PDN Connection" in this specification only refers to the PDN connection through the SGW and PGW. + +**SCEF PDN Connection:** The PDN connection to the SCEF. Unless otherwise indicated in a clause or clause, "PDN Connections" do not refer to any SCEF PDN Connection. + +--- + +## 2 Design objectives + +To avoid loss of all the data stored in a location register when part of the equipment of the location register fails, a regime must be implemented to secure the data. This regime can include replication of volatile storage units and periodic back-up of data to non-volatile storage. If the data security regime ensures the integrity of the data in spite of failure of part of the location register equipment then there will be no impact on service. This Technical Specification describes the procedures to be used when the integrity of data in the location register cannot be ensured; that situation is referred to below as "failure". + +The VLR and SGSN shall erase all IMSI records affected by the failure when it restarts after a failure. The GGSN shall erase all non-static PDP records affected by the failure and restore static PDP records when it restarts after a failure. + +For the HLR/HSS or CSS, periodic back-up of data to non-volatile storage is mandatory. + +The reliability objectives of location registration are listed in 3GPP TS 43.005 [9]. + +The MME, S-GW and P-GW must similarly have a regime to secure the PDN connection and bearer data at failures. When an MME, SGW or PGW has a full node restart or fails all PDN connections and bearer records associated with the failing node shall be erased and any internal resources released. + +Clause 18 "GTP-C based restart procedures" specifies how a GTP-C entity restart is detected and handled by the peer. + +--- + +## 3 Restoration indicators in location registers and in GPRS support nodes + +### 3.1 Restoration Indicators in the VLR + +Three restoration indicators are provided in the VLR for each IMSI record: "Confirmed by Radio Contact", "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" and "Location Information Confirmed in HLR". + +The indicator "Confirmed by Radio Contact" indicates whether the VLR's record of location area identity and MSC number for the mobile station is confirmed by radio contact. + +The indicator "Confirmed by Radio Contact" in an IMSI record is set to the initial value "Not Confirmed" when the VLR receives a "Provide Roaming Number" request, an "Update Location Area" request or an "IMSI Attach" request for an MS for which the VLR does not have an IMSI record. The indicator "Confirmed by Radio Contact" in an IMSI record may also be set to the initial value "Not Confirmed" when the VLR receives a Reset indication message from the SGSN serving the MS if the MS is attached to both GPRS and non-GPRS services (see 3GPP TS 29.018 [7]), or a Reset indication message from the MME serving the UE if the UE is attached to both EPS and non-EPS services or for SMS only (see 3GPP TS 29.118 [14]). + +The indicator "Confirmed by Radio Contact" is set to "Confirmed" when the radio contact that has been established with the MS is authenticated. + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" indicates whether the subscriber data set for the mobile station held by the VLR is consistent with that held by the HLR. + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" is set to the initial value "Not Confirmed" when the VLR receives a "Provide Roaming Number" request, an "Update Location Area" request or an "IMSI Attach" request for an MS for which the VLR does not have an IMSI record. + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" is set to "Confirmed" at either of the following events: + +- The VLR successfully performs an "Update Location" to the HLR; +- The VLR successfully performs a "Restore Data" operation to the HLR. + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" indicates whether the HLR's record of VLR number and MSC number for the mobile station is confirmed by radio contact. + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" is set to "Not Confirmed" at any of the following events: + +- The VLR receives an "Update Location Area" request or an "IMSI Attach" request for an MS for which the VLR has no IMSI record; +- A VLR which serves two or more MSCs receives a "Provide Roaming Number" request for an MS for which the VLR has no IMSI record; +- The VLR receives a "Reset" message from the HLR with which the MS is registered; +- The VLR in a Super-Charged network receives a Send Identification message from the serving VLR; +- The VLR in a Super-Charged network receives a Cancel Location message that indicates an "updateProcedure". + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" is set to "Confirmed" at either of the following events: + +- A VLR which serves only one MSC receives a "Provide Roaming Number" request for an MS for which the VLR has no IMSI record; +- Successful completion of the "Update Location" procedure triggered by authenticated radio contact. + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed in SMLC" indicates whether an SMLC's record of MSC number for a particular LMU is confirmed by radio contact. + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed in SMLC" is set to "Not Confirmed" at any of the following events: + +- The VLR receives an "Update Location Area" request or an "IMSI Attach" request for an MS for which the VLR has no IMSI record. The indicator, in this case, becomes valid only if HLR subscriber data later indicates an LMU; +- The VLR receives an "LCS Reset" message from an SMLC where the message is targetted to either a specific LMU or all LMUs registered with the SMLC; +- The VLR receives an "IMSI Detach" from an LMU that is registered with an SMLC. + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed in SMLC" is set to "Confirmed" at the following event: + +- Successful completion of the "LCS Registration" procedure triggered by a successful location update; +- Successful transfer of an LCS Information message from an SMLC to the LMU. + +Also the following two restoration indicators may be provided in the VLR for each IMSI record: "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" and "Location Information Confirmed by CSS". + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" indicates whether the CSG subscriber data set for the roaming mobile station held by the VLR is consistent with that held by the CSS. + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" is set to the initial value "Not Confirmed" at the following event: + +- The VLR receives a "Provide Roaming Number" request, an "Update Location Area" request or an "IMSI Attach" request for a roaming MS for which the VLR does not have an IMSI record. + +- The VLR receives a "Cancel VCSG Location Request" message from the CSS after the VLR restart if the roaming MS attached to the macro cell after the VLR restart. The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" is set to "Confirmed" at the following event: + - The VLR successfully performs an "Update VCSG Location" to the CSS. + - The VLR receives an "Insert/Delete VCSG Subscription Data Request" message from the CSS after the VLR restart if the roaming MS attached to the macro cell after the VLR restart. + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" indicates whether the VLR number for the roaming mobile station registered is confirmed by the CSS. + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" is set to "Not Confirmed" at any of the following events: + +- The VLR receives an "Update Location Area" request or an "IMSI Attach" request for a roaming MS for which the VLR has no IMSI record; +- The VLR receives a "Reset" message from the CSS with which the roaming MS is registered. +- The VLR receives a "Cancel VCSG Location Request" message from the CSS after the VLR restart if the roaming MS attached to the macro cell after the VLR restart. + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" is set to "Confirmed" at the following event: + +- Successful completion of the "Update VCSG Location" procedure to the CSS. +- The VLR receives an "Insert/Delete VCSG Subscription Data Request" message from the CSS after the VLR restart if the roaming MS attached to the macro cell after the VLR restart. + +## 3.2 Restoration Indicators in the HLR + +As an implementation option, one restoration indicator may be provided in the HLR for each IMSI record: "Check SS". + +The "Check SS" indicator is set to "Check Required" when the HLR restarts after a failure. + +The "Check SS" indicator is checked whenever the HLR receives an "Update Location" request from a VLR. If it is set to "Check Required", after successful completion of subscriber data retrieval that ran embedded in the "Update Location" procedure the HLR sends a "Forward Check SS Indication" request message to the VLR and sets the "Check SS" indicator to "Check Not Required". + +## 3.3 Restoration Indicators in the SGSN + +Two restoration indicators are provided in the SGSN for each IMSI record: "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" and "Location Information Confirmed in HLR". + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" indicates whether the subscriber data set for the mobile station held by the SGSN is consistent with that held by the HLR. + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" is set to the initial value "Not Confirmed" when the SGSN receives a Routing Area Update request or an IMSI- and/or GPRS Attach request for an MS for which the SGSN does not have an IMSI record. + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" is set to "Confirmed" at the following event: + +- The SGSN successfully performs an Update GPRS Location to the HLR; + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" indicates whether the HLR's record of the SGSN address for the mobile station is confirmed by radio contact. + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" is set to "Not Confirmed" at any of the following events: + +- The SGSN receives a Routing Area Update request or an IMSI- and/or GPRS Attach request for an MS for which the SGSN has no IMSI record; + +- The SGSN receives a "Reset" message from the HLR with which the MS is registered; +- The SGSN in a Super-Charged network receives a Send Identification message from the serving SGSN; +- The SGSN in a Super-Charged network receives a Cancel Location message that indicates an "updateProcedure". + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" is set to "Confirmed" at the following event: + +- Successful completion of the Update GPRS Location procedure to the HLR. + +The indicator "VLR-Reliable" indicates whether the VLR serving the MS has performed a restart. + +The indicator "VLR-Reliable" is set to the value "false" when the SGSN receives a Reset indication message from the VLR serving the MS if the MS is attached to both GPRS and non-GPRS services. The indicator "VLR-Reliable" is set to the value "true" when the SGSN receives a confirmation from a VLR that a location update procedure to the affected VLR has been successfully performed. + +The indicator "SGSN-Reset" indicates whether the SGSN has recently experienced a restart. + +The indicator "SGSN-Reset" is set to the value "true" when the SGSN suffers a restart. This indicator is unique per SGSN. The indicator "SGSN-Reset" is set to the value "false" after a certain time specified by the operator. The value of the timer controlling the reset of the "SGSN-Reset" indicator shall be longer than the periodic routeing area update timer value used by the MSs. + +Also the following two restoration indicators may be provided in the SGSN for each IMSI record: "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" and "Location Information Confirmed by CSS". + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" indicates whether the CSG subscriber data set for the roaming mobile station held by the SGSN is consistent with that held by the CSS. + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" is set to the initial value "Not Confirmed" at any of the following events: + +- The SGSN receives a Routing Area Update request or an IMSI- and/or GPRS Attach request for a roaming MS for which the SGSN does not have an IMSI record. +- The SGSN receives a "Cancel VCSG Location Request" message from the CSS after the SGSN restart if the roaming MS attached to the macro cell after the SGSN restart. + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" is set to "Confirmed" at the following event: + +- The SGSN successfully performs an "Update VCSG Location" to the CSS. +- The SGSN receives an "Insert/Delete VCSG Subscription Data Request" message from the CSS after the SGSN restart if the roaming MS attached to the macro cell after the SGSN restart. + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" indicates whether the SGSN address for the roaming mobile station registered is confirmed by the CSS. + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" is set to "Not Confirmed" at any of the following events: + +- The SGSN receives a Routing Area Update request or an IMSI- and/or GPRS Attach request for a roaming MS for which the SGSN has no IMSI record; +- The SGSN receives a "Reset" message from the CSS with which the roaming MS is registered. +- The SGSN receives a "Cancel VCSG Location Request" message from the CSS after the SGSN restart if the roaming MS attached to the macro cell after the SGSN restart. The indicator "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" is set to "Confirmed" at the following event: + - Successful completion of the "Update VCSG Location" procedure to the CSS. + - The SGSN receives an "Insert/Delete VCSG Subscription Data Request" message from the CSS after the SGSN restart if the roaming MS attached to the macro cell after the SGSN restart. + +## 3.4 Restoration Indicators in the MME + +Two restoration indicators are provided in the MME for each IMSI record: "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS" and "Location Information Confirmed in HSS". + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS" indicates whether the subscriber data set for the mobile station held by the MME is consistent with that held by the HSS. + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS" shall be set to the initial value "Not Confirmed" when the MME receives a Tracking Area Update request or an Attach request for an UE for which the MME does not have an IMSI record. + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS" shall be set to "Confirmed" at the following event: + +- The MME successfully performs an Update Location to the HSS; + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HSS" indicates whether the HSS's record of the MME address for the UE is confirmed by radio contact. + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HSS" shall be set to "Not Confirmed" at any of the following events: + +- The MME receives a Tracking Area Update request or an Attach request for an UE for which the MME has no IMSI record; +- The MME receives a "Reset" message from the HSS with which the UE is registered; + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HSS" shall be set to "Confirmed" at the following event: + +- Successful completion of the Update Location procedure to the HSS. + +Also the following two restoration indicators may be provided in the MME for each IMSI record: "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" and "Location Information Confirmed by CSS". + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" indicates whether the CSG subscriber data set for the roaming UE held by the MME is consistent with that held by the CSS. + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" is set to the initial value "Not Confirmed" at any of the following events: + +- The MME receives a Tracking Area Update request or an Attach request for a roaming UE for which the MME has no IMSI record; +- The MME receives a "Cancel VCSG Location Request" message from the CSS after the MME restart if the roaming UE attached to the macro cell after the MME restart. + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" is set to "Confirmed" at the following event: + +- The MME successfully performs an "Update VCSG Location" to the CSS. +- The MME receives an "Insert/Delete VCSG Subscription Data Request" message from the CSS after the MME restart if the roaming UE attached to the macro cell after the MME restart. + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" indicates whether the MME address for the roaming UE registered is confirmed by the CSS. + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" is set to "Not Confirmed" at any of the following events: + +- The MME receives a Tracking Area Update request or an Attach request for a roaming UE for which the MME has no IMSI record; +- The MME receives a "Reset" message from the CSS with which the roaming UE is registered. +- The MME receives a "Cancel VCSG Location Request" message from the CSS after the MME restart if the roaming UE attached to the macro cell after the MME restart. + +The indicator "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" is set to "Confirmed" at the following event: + +- Successful completion of the "Update VCSG Location" procedure to the CSS. +- The MME receives an "Insert/Delete VCSG Subscription Data Request" message from the CSS after the MME restart if the roaming UE attached to the macro cell after the MME restart. + +### 3.5 Restoration Indicator in the ProSe Function + +One restoration indicator is provided in the ProSe Function for each IMSI record: "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS". + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS" indicates whether the subscriber data set for the user equipment held by the ProSe Function is consistent with that held by the HSS. + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS" shall be set to "Confirmed" at the following event: + +- Successful retrieval of ProSe subscriber information from the HSS. + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS" shall be set to "Not Confirmed" at the following event: + +- The ProSe Function receives a request for ProSe Service from an UE for which the ProSe Function does not have associated UE context; +- The ProSe Function receives a "Reset" message from the HSS with which the UE is registered. + +### 3.6 Restoration Indicator in the V2X Control Function + +One restoration indicator is provided in the V2X Control Function for each IMSI record: "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS". + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS" indicates whether the subscriber data set for the user equipment held by the V2X Control Function is consistent with that held by the HSS. + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS" shall be set to "Confirmed" at the following event: + +- Successful retrieval of V2X subscriber information from the HSS. + +The indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS" shall be set to "Not Confirmed" at the following event: + +- The V2X Control Function receives a request for V2X Service from an UE for which the V2X Control Function does not have associated UE context; +- The V2X Control Function receives a "Reset" message from the HSS with which the UE is registered. + +--- + +## 4 Restoration of data in the VLR + +The effect on service of failure of a VLR is different from the effect of failure of an HLR. The procedures for restoration of a VLR and an HLR are therefore different. + +### 4.0 VLR Failure with Restart + +When a VLR fails, all its associations with SGSNs affected by the failure become invalid and may be deleted. Based on configuration data, the MSC/VLR sends a BSSAP+ Reset message to each of its associated SGSNs. The SGSNs mark all associations containing the restarted VLR as invalid. For an MS that is both GPRS-attached and IMSI-attached, the SGSN may then: + +- upon reception of a combined routing area update request, perform immediately the location update for non-GPRS services procedure towards the VLR; or. +- upon reception of a periodic routing Area update request, dependent on network configuration and operator policy, + +- return a Detach Request (Detach Type) message with the Detach Type set to IMSI Detach immediately after the completion of the periodic routing area update procedure, in order to request the MS to perform a combined routing area update, , or +- perform immediately the location update for non-GPRS services procedure towards the VLR. + +When a VLR fails, all its associations with MMEs affected by the failure become invalid and may be deleted. The VLR and MME shall behave as per clause 4.2.10. For a UE that is attached to both EPS and non-EPS services, the MME may then: + +- upon reception of a combined tracking area update request, perform immediately the location update for non-EPS services procedure towards the VLR; or +- upon reception of a periodic tracking area update request, dependent on network configuration and operator policy, + - request the UE to re-attach to non-EPS services immediately after the completion of the periodic tracking area update procedure; or + - perform immediately the location update for non-EPS services procedure towards the VLR. + +## 4.0a VLR Failure without Restart + +If the VLR serving a MS that is attached for non-GPRS services is no longer in service, the SGSN may: + +- upon reception of a combined routing area update request, perform immediately the location update for non-GPRS services procedure towards an alternative (available) VLR; or +- upon reception of a periodic routing area update request, dependent on network configuration and operator policy, + - request the MS to re-attach to non-GPRS services immediately after the completion of the periodic routing area update procedure and then select an alternative (available) VLR to serve the UE for non-GPRS services during the subsequent combined routing area update procedure; or + - perform immediately the location update for non-GPRS services procedure towards an alternative (available) VLR. + +See 3GPP TS 29.018 [7]. + +If the VLR serving a UE that is attached for non-EPS services is no longer in service, the MME may : + +- upon reception of a combined tracking area update request, perform immediately the location update for non-EPS services procedure towards an alternative (available) VLR; or +- upon reception of a periodic tracking area update request, dependent on network configuration and operator policy, + - request the UE to re-attach to non-EPS services immediately after the completion of the periodic tracking area procedure and then select an alternative (available) VLR to serve the UE for non-EPS services during the subsequent combined tracking area update procedure; or + - perform immediately the location update for non-EPS services procedure towards an alternative (available) VLR. + +Upon reception of an Uplink NAS Transport message from a UE that is attached for non-EPS service, if the VLR serving the UE is no longer in service, the MME may request the UE to re-attach to non-EPS services and then select an alternative available VLR to serve the UE for MO SMS and other CS services during the subsequent combined TA / LA update procedure. + +See 3GPP TS 29.118 [14]. + +NOTE: How an SGSN or MME detects that a VLR is no longer in service is implementation specific, e.g. if there are no more SCTP associations in service with that VLR for a given period. + +## 4.1 Restart of the VLR + +When a VLR restarts after a failure, all IMSI records affected by the failure are erased. + +There will be no subscriber data or location information stored for an affected mobile station until after the VLR has received either a "Provide Roaming Number" request or an "Update location Area" request for that mobile station. + +The VLR causes all affected TMSIs and all affected LMSIs to become invalid. "Invalid" in this context means that the TMSI and LMSI can no longer be regarded as accurate. The term is used to avoid unnecessary constraints on the implementation. + +On receipt of either a "Provide Roaming Number" request or an "Update Location Area" request, restoration of subscriber data in the VLR is triggered individually for each IMSI record as described below. + +## 4.2 Restoration Procedures + +### 4.2.0 General + +The objective of the restoration procedure is to handle all traffic for each mobile subscriber correctly. In order to meet this objective, the procedure must make the subscriber data in the VLR consistent with that in the HLR or in the CSS, and make the location information in the HLR and VLR or the location information in the CSS and VLR reflect accurately the current location of the MS. + +#### 4.2.1 Incoming Call + +a) Send Routing Information (GMSC->HLR): + +The HLR sends "Provide Roaming Number" to the VLR as for normal operation. The LMSI is updated by the VLR when the VLR requests the transfer of subscriber data from the HLR using the "Restore Data" operation. + +b) Provide Roaming Number (HLR->VLR): + +- Regardless of whether the VLR has an IMSI record corresponding to the IMSI in the "Provide Roaming Number", it returns an MSRN. If no IMSI record exists, the VLR creates a skeleton IMSI record, sets the indicators "Subscriber Data Confirmed by Radio Contact" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" to "Not Confirmed" and (if IMSI Attach is used) marks the IMSI as attached. If the VLR serves two or more MSCs, the VLR sets the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" to "Not Confirmed". Otherwise, if the VLR serves only one MSC, the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" is set to the initial value "Confirmed". Also the VLR may set the indicators "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" and "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" to "Not Confirmed". +- If the indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" is "Not Confirmed" the VLR requests authentication data, if required and still not available and subscriber data from the HLR. When the dialogue that covers the subscriber data retrieval procedure is completed successfully, the VLR sets the indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" to "Confirmed". The indicators "Confirmed by Radio Contact" and "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" remain unchanged. + +- If the IMSI record for the MS is marked "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" but "Not Confirmed by Radio Contact" the operator may choose an appropriate method to limit the number of "Search for MS" procedures for that MS. + +c) Send Information for I/C Call Setup (MSC->VLR) + +- If the VLR has no IMSI record, or if the record is marked "Subscriber Data Not Confirmed by HLR" the VLR returns a "System Failure" error. +- If the VLR has an IMSI record marked "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" and "Not Confirmed by Radio Contact", the VLR handles the request in the normal way, except that the "Search for MS" procedure is used instead of the "Page MS" procedure. + +- If the VLR has an IMSI record marked "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" and "Confirmed by Radio Contact", the VLR handles the request in the normal way; for this MS, VLR restoration is complete. + - The state of the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" does not affect the "Send Information for I/C Call Setup" procedure. +- d) Process Access Request in Response to Search (MSC->VLR): +- If the MS responds to paging, the MSC sends a positive response to the search request and a "Process Access Request" to the VLR. After successful authentication, if required, the VLR sets the indicator "Confirmed by Radio Contact" to "Confirmed", sets the location area information for the MS, and handles the request in the normal way. + - The VLR checks the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR". If it indicates "Not Confirmed" the VLR starts an "Update Location" procedure to the HLR. When this procedure is successfully completed the VLR sets the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" to "Confirmed". + - If the MS is roaming, the VLR checks the indicators "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the corresponding valid CSG subscription data and "Location Information Confirmed by CSS". If either of them indicates "Not Confirmed" the VLR shall start an "Update VCSG Location" procedure to the CSS if the roaming MS is still in the CSG cell. When this procedure is successfully completed the VLR sets the indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the corresponding valid CSG subscription data and "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" to "Confirmed". + +For this MS, VLR restoration is complete. + +## 4.2.2 Mobile Terminated Short Message + +- a) Send Routing Information for MT SMS (SMS-GMSC->HLR): + +The HLR returns the MSC number as for normal operation. + +- b) Send Information for MT SMS (MSC->VLR) - MAP version 2: + +- If the VLR has no IMSI record, or if the record is marked "Subscriber Data Not Confirmed by HLR", the VLR proceeds as follows: + - the VLR returns an "Unidentified Subscriber" error. This causes the MSC to report a short message delivery failure, with cause "Unidentified Subscriber", to the SMS gateway MSC. The Gateway MSC sends a "Report SM Delivery Status" request, with a cause of "Absent Subscriber", to the HLR. This causes the HLR to set the "Mobile Station Not Reachable Flag" for the MS, as described in Technical Specifications 3GPP TS 23.040 [4] and 3GPP TS 29.002 [6]; or + - the VLR performs the data restoration procedure as specified in clause 4.2.1 for an incoming call and delay the mobile terminating SMS until the data restoration procedure is complete. During the data restoration procedure, the HLR shall send to the VLR the MME name or/and the SGSN Number if the subscriber is registered on this VLR and is registered to EPS or/and GPRS services respectively. +- If the VLR has an IMSI record marked "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" and "Not Confirmed by Radio Contact", the VLR handles the request in the normal way, except that the "Search for MS" procedure is used instead of the "Page MS" procedure. +- If the VLR has an IMSI record marked "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" and "Confirmed by Radio Contact", the VLR handles the request in the normal way; for this MS, VLR restoration is complete. +- The state of the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" does not affect the "Send Information for MT SMS" procedure. + +- c) Send Information for I/C Call Setup (MSC->VLR) - MAP version 1: + +- If the VLR has no IMSI record, or if the record is marked "Subscriber Data Not Confirmed by HLR", the VLR proceeds as follows: + - the VLR returns a "System Failure" error. This causes the MSC to report a short message delivery failure, with cause "System Failure", to the SMS gateway MSC; or + +- the VLR performs the data restoration procedure as specified in clause 4.2.1 for an incoming call and delay the mobile terminating SMS until the data restoration procedure is complete. During the data restoration procedure, the HLR shall send to the VLR the MME name or/and the SGSN Number if the subscriber is registered on this VLR and is registered to EPS or/and GPRS services respectively. + - If the VLR has an IMSI record marked "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" and "Not Confirmed by Radio Contact", the VLR handles the request in the normal way, except that the "Search for MS" procedure is used instead of the "Page MS" procedure. + - If the VLR has an IMSI record marked "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" and "Confirmed by Radio Contact", the VLR handles the request in the normal way; for this MS, VLR restoration is complete. + - The state of the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" does not affect the "Send Information for MT SMS" procedure. +- d) Process Access Request in Response to Search (MSC->VLR): +- If the MS responds to paging, the MSC sends a positive response to the search request and a "Process Access Request" to the VLR. After successful authentication, if required, the VLR sets the indicator "Confirmed by Radio Contact" to "Confirmed", sets the location area information for the MS, and handles the request in the normal way. + - The VLR checks the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR". If it indicates "Not Confirmed" the VLR starts an "Update Location" procedure to the HLR. When this procedure is successfully completed, the VLR sets the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" to "Confirmed". + - If the MS is roaming, the VLR checks the indicators "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the corresponding valid CSG subscription data and "Location Information Confirmed by CSS". If either of them indicates "Not Confirmed" the VLR shall start an "Update VCSG Location" procedure to the CSS if the roaming UE is still in the CSG cell. When this procedure is successfully completed the VLR sets the indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the corresponding valid CSG subscription data and "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" to "Confirmed". + +For this MS, VLR restoration is complete. + +### 4.2.3 Mobile Terminating Location Request (MT-LR) + +Receipt of an MT-LR for a target MS identified by its IMSI in a serving MSC during VLR restoration is supported by the procedures below. + +- a) Provide Subscriber Location (GMLC->MSC/VLR): +- If the VLR has no IMSI record, or if the record is marked "Subscriber Data Not Confirmed by HLR" the VLR returns an "Unidentified Subscriber" error. This causes the MSC to report a location failure, with cause "Unidentified Subscriber", to the GMLC. + - If the VLR has an IMSI record marked "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" and "Not Confirmed by Radio Contact", the VLR handles the request in the normal way, except that the "Search for MS" procedure is used instead of the "Page MS" procedure when paging for the MS. + - If the VLR has an IMSI record marked "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" and "Confirmed by Radio Contact", the VLR handles the request in the normal way; for this MS, VLR restoration is complete. + - The state of the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" does not affect the "Provide Subscriber Location" procedure. +- b) Process Access Request in Response to Search (MSC->VLR): +- If the MS responds to paging, the MSC sends a positive response to the search request and a "Process Access Request" to the VLR. After successful authentication, if required, the VLR sets the indicator "Confirmed by Radio Contact" to "Confirmed", sets the location area information for the MS, and handles the request in the normal way. + +- The VLR checks the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR". If it indicates "Not Confirmed" the VLR starts an "Update Location" procedure to the HLR. When this procedure is successfully completed, the VLR sets the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" to "Confirmed". +- If the MS is roaming, the VLR checks the indicators "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the corresponding valid CSG subscription data and "Location Information Confirmed by CSS". If either of them indicates "Not Confirmed" and the roaming MS is still in the CSG cell, the VLR shall start an "Update VCSG Location" procedure to the CSS. When this procedure is successfully completed the VLR sets the indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the corresponding valid CSG subscription data and "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" to "Confirmed". + +For this MS, VLR restoration is complete. + +#### 4.2.4 Incoming LCS Information Request (GSM only) + +Receipt of an incoming BSSMAP-LE LMU Connection Request from an SMLC directed to a specific Type A LMU is supported by the procedures below. + +a) Request associated with an LMU (SMLC->MSC/VLR): + +- If the VLR has no IMSI record, or if the record is marked "Subscriber Data Not Confirmed by HLR", the VLR returns an "Unidentified Subscriber" error. +- If the VLR has an IMSI record for an LMU marked "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" and "Not Confirmed by Radio Contact", the VLR handles the request in the normal way, except that the "Search for MS" procedure is used instead of the "Page MS" procedure when paging for the LMU. +- If the VLR has an IMSI record marked "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" and "Confirmed by Radio Contact", the VLR handles the request in the normal way. For this LMU, data restoration is complete. +- The state of the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" does not affect the incoming LMU Connection Request. + +b) Process Access Request in Response to Search (MSC->VLR): + +- If the LMU responds to paging, the MSC sends a positive response to the search request and a "Process Access Request" to the VLR. After successful authentication, if required, the VLR sets the indicator "Confirmed by Radio Contact" to "Confirmed", sets the location area information for the LMU, and handles the request in the normal way. +- The VLR checks the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR". If it indicates "Not Confirmed" the VLR starts an "Update Location" procedure to the HLR. When this procedure is successfully completed, the VLR sets the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" to "Confirmed". +- If the MS is roaming, the VLR checks the indicators "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the corresponding valid CSG subscription data and "Location Information Confirmed by CSS". If either of them indicates "Not Confirmed" and the roaming MS is still in the CSG cell, the VLR shall start an "Update VCSG Location" procedure to the CSS. When this procedure is successfully completed the VLR sets the indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the corresponding valid CSG subscription data and "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" to "Confirmed". + +For this LMU, VLR restoration is complete. + +#### 4.2.5 Outgoing MS request + +An outgoing request (MS originated call, mobile originated Short Message or call-independent supplementary service activity) from the MS causes the VLR to check its IMSI record for that MS. + +- If the MS is unknown in this VLR (i.e. the VLR has no IMSI record for the MS) or there is an IMSI record marked "Subscriber Data Not Confirmed by HLR" the outgoing request is rejected with error cause "Unidentified Subscriber". This causes the MS to initiate the location registration procedure described below. + +- If the VLR has an IMSI record for the MS marked "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" the request is handled in the normal way, and after any necessary authentication and/or IMEI checking the record is marked "Confirmed by Radio Contact". +- The VLR checks the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR". If it indicates "Not Confirmed" the VLR starts an "Update Location" procedure to the HLR. When this procedure is successfully completed the VLR sets the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" to "Confirmed". +- If the MS is roaming, the VLR checks the indicators "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the corresponding valid CSG subscription data and "Location Information Confirmed by CSS". If either of them indicates "Not Confirmed" and the roaming MS is still in the CSG cell, the VLR shall start an "Update VCSG Location" procedure to the CSS. When this procedure is successfully completed the VLR sets the indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the corresponding valid CSG subscription data and "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" to "Confirmed". + +For this MS, VLR restoration is complete. + +#### 4.2.6 Outgoing LMU Request (GSM only) + +An outgoing request (CM ServiceRequest) for LCS from a Type A LMU causes the VLR to check its IMSI record for that LMU. + +- If the LMU is unknown in this VLR (i.e. the VLR has no IMSI record for the LMU) or there is an IMSI record marked "Subscriber Data Not Confirmed by HLR" the outgoing request is rejected with error cause "Unidentified Subscriber". This causes the LMU to initiate the location registration procedure described below. +- If the VLR has an IMSI record for the MS marked "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR", the request is handled in the normal way, and after any necessary authentication and/or IMEI checking the record is marked "Confirmed by Radio Contact". +- The VLR checks the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR". If it indicates "Not Confirmed" the VLR starts an "Update Location" procedure to the HLR. When this procedure is successfully completed the VLR sets the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" to "Confirmed". +- If the MS is roaming, the VLR checks the indicators "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the corresponding valid CSG subscription data and "Location Information Confirmed by CSS". If either of them indicates "Not Confirmed" the VLR and the roaming MS is still in the CSG cell, may start an "Update VCSG Location" procedure to the CSS. When this procedure is successfully completed the VLR sets the indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the corresponding valid CSG subscription data and "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" to "Confirmed". + +For this LMU, VLR restoration is complete. + +#### 4.2.7 Location Updating or IMSI Attach + +A location registration request (location updating or IMSI attach) from an MS causes the VLR to check its IMSI record for that MS. + +- If the MS is unknown in this VLR (i.e. the VLR has no IMSI record for the MS) the VLR creates a skeleton IMSI record for the MS and sets the indicators "Confirmed by Radio Contact", "Location Information Confirmed in HLR", "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR", "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" to "Not Confirmed". If authentication is required, the VLR retrieves authentication data. When the radio contact with the Mobile Station is authenticated, the VLR sets the indicator "Confirmed by Radio Contact" to "Confirmed". The VLR then performs an "Update Location" to the HLR. If this is successful, the VLR sets the indicators "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" to "Confirmed". For this MS, VLR restoration is complete. If the VPLMN supports Autonomous CSG Roaming and the HPLMN has enabled Autonomous CSG Roaming in the VPLMN, the VLR may perform an "Update VCSG Location" to the CSS if the requested cell is a CSG/hybrid cell. If this is successful, the VLR sets the indicators "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" to "Confirmed" if the CSS has the corresponding valid CSG subscription data. +- If the VLR has an IMSI record for the MS, after successful authentication, if required, the VLR sets the indicator "Confirmed by Radio Contact" to "Confirmed". If the record is marked "Location Information Not Confirmed in + +HLR" or "Subscriber Data Not Confirmed by HLR" the VLR performs an "Update Location" to the HLR. If this is successful, the VLR sets the indicators "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" to "Confirmed". For this MS, VLR restoration is complete. If the record is marked "Location Information Not Confirmed by CSS" or "Subscriber Data Not Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the valid CSG subscription data, and the VPLMN supports Autonomous CSG Roaming and the HPLMN has enabled Autonomous CSG Roaming in the VPLMN, the VLR may perform an "Update VCSG Location" to the CSS if the requested cell is a CSG/hybrid cell. If this is successful, the VLR sets the indicators "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the valid CSG subscription data and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" to "Confirmed". + +#### 4.2.8 Use of TMSI + +After the VLR has restarted but before the next authenticated radio contact the TMSI known by the MS is invalid, as it was allocated before the VLR restarted. The VLR therefore uses the IMSI to identify the MS on the first radio contact during restoration. + +- A VLR which initiates a "Search for Subscriber" procedure uses the IMSI to identify the MS. +- If an MS identifies itself by a TMSI in a "Location Registration" request, the VLR proceeds as follows: + - a) The VLR checks the location area identity (LAI) of the previous location area sent by the MS. If this LAI is in a VLR different from the current one, the request is handled in the normal way. + - b) If the LAI is in the current VLR, the status of the TMSI is checked: + - If the TMSI was allocated after the VLR restarted, and corresponds to a valid IMSI record, the request is handled as described in clause 4.2.7. + - If the TMSI was allocated before the VLR restarted, or does not correspond to a valid IMSI record, the VLR requests the IMSI from the MS. If the MS returns an IMSI the VLR proceeds as described in clause 4.2.7. If the MS does not return an IMSI the network aborts the location registration procedure. + - If an MS identifies itself by a TMSI in an outgoing MS request, the VLR proceeds as follows: + - If the TMSI was allocated after the VLR restarted, and corresponds to a valid IMSI record, the request is handled as described in clause 4.2.5. + - If the TMSI was allocated before the VLR restarted, or does not correspond to a valid IMSI record, the VLR requests the IMSI from the MS. If the MS returns an IMSI the VLR proceeds as described in clause 4.2.5. If the MS does not return an IMSI the network aborts the outgoing request. + +#### 4.2.9 SGSN associations + +Based on configuration data, "Reset" messages are sent on the Gs-interface to the SGSNs in the Location Areas served by the VLR as described in the 3GPP TS 29.018 [7]. The SGSNs mark all associations with the VLR as unreliable by setting the restoration indicator "VLR-Reliable" to "False" for the UEs served by that VLR. The associations will be re-initiated one by one by the SGSN at the next Routing Area update or combined RA/LA update from each UE. + +#### 4.2.10 MME associations + +Based on configuration data, "Reset" messages are sent on the SGs-interface to the MMEs by the VLR as described in the 3GPP TS 29.118 [14]. The MMEs mark all associations with the VLR as unreliable by setting the restoration indicator "VLR-Reliable" to "False" for the UEs served by that VLR. The associations will be re-initiated one by one by the MME at the next Tracking Area update or combined TA/LA update from each UE. + +--- + +## 5 Restoration of data in the HLR/HSS + +The loss or corruption of subscriber data in the HLR/HSS has an impact not only in the HLR/HSS's own PLMN but also on the service for its mobiles in other PLMNs. Restoration of the data in the HLR/HSS requires co-operation from all the VLRs, SGSNs and MMEs at which its mobiles are registered. + +## 5.1 Restart of the HLR/HSS + +The periodic backup of HLR/HSS data to non-volatile storage is mandatory. + +When an HLR/HSS restarts after failure it shall perform the following actions for the subscriber data records that have been affected by the HLR/HSS fault: + +- reload all data from the non-volatile back-up; +- reset all "MS Purged" flags; +- mark each subscriber record "SS Check Required" by setting the "Check SS" indicator if the "Forward Check SS Indication" service is implemented; +- send a "Reset" message to each VLR where one or more of its MSs are registered. This causes each VLR concerned to mark each relevant subscriber record "Location Information Not Confirmed in HLR", and +- send a "Reset" message to each SGSN where one or more of its MSs are registered. This causes each SGSN to mark each relevant MM context "Location Information Not Confirmed in HLR". +- send a "Reset" message to each MME where one or more of its UEs are registered. This causes each MME to mark each relevant MM context "Location Information Not Confirmed in HSS". +- send a "Reset" message to each ProSe Function (see 3GPP TS 23.303 [33]), where one or more of its UEs are registered for ProSe Services. This causes each ProSe Function to mark each relevant UE context "Subscriber Data Not Confirmed by HSS". +- send a "Reset" message to each V2X Control Function (see 3GPP TS 23.285 [40]), where one or more of its UEs are registered for V2X Services. This causes each V2X Control Function to mark each relevant UE context "Subscriber Data Not Confirmed by HSS". + +## 5.2 Procedures During Restoration + +### 5.2.1 Mobile terminated call + +If the VLR receives a "Process Access Request" request in response to a "Page" or "Search for MS" operation, after successful authentication, if required, it checks the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR". If this indicates "Not Confirmed" the VLR triggers an "Update Location" to the HLR as described in clause 4.2.1.d). + +When the HLR receives the "Update Location" request it stores the VLR number, MSC number and LMSI in the subscriber record as for normal operation. + +If the "Forward Check SS Indication" service is implemented, the HLR checks the indicator "Check SS". If this indicates "Check Required", after successful completion of the subscriber data retrieval procedure that ran embedded in the "Update Location" procedure the HLR sends a "Forward Check SS Indication" to the VLR and marks the subscriber record "Check Not Required. When the VLR receives the "Forward Check SS Indication" request it forwards an indication to the MS to alert the user that supplementary service parameters should be checked. + +### 5.2.2 Mobile Originated Activity for CS + +When the VLR receives a request from an MS (MS originated call, mobile originated Short Message, call-independent supplementary service activity or location registration request) whose IMSI record is marked "Location Information Not Confirmed in HLR", it will perform an "Update Location" to the HLR as described in clauses 4.2.5 and 4.2.7 above. + +When the HLR receives an "Update Location" request from the VLR, it proceeds as described in clause 5.2.1. + +### 5.2.3 Mobile Originated Activity for ProSe + +When the ProSe Function receives a request for ProSe Service from a UE whose associated context is marked as "Subscriber Data Not Confirmed by HSS", it shall initiate a "ProSe Subscriber Information Retrieval" request to the HSS as described in the 3GPP TS 29.344 [34]. + +When the HSS receives a "ProSe Subscriber Information Retrieval" request from the ProSe Function, it shall proceed as described in the 3GPP TS 29.344 [34]. + +## 5.2.4 Procedures in the SGSN + +Upon receipt of a HLR/HSS reset, the SGSN shall mark each relevant MM contexts as invalid and shall set the Non-GPRS Alert Flag (NGAF) if an SGSN - MSC/VLR association exists. After detection of any activity (either signalling or data) from a marked MS or any other implementation dependent trigger for a marked MS in PMM-CONNECTED state with Direct tunnel, the SGSN performs an update location to the HLR/HSS as in the attach or inter-SGSN RA update procedures and, if NGAF is set, the procedure of "Non-GPRS Alert" is followed (see clause 7 in 3GPP TS 29.018 [7]). + +The update location procedure and the procedure towards the VLR may be delayed by the SGSN for a maximum operator configuration-depending time period to avoid high signalling load. + +## 5.2.5 Procedures in the MME + +Upon receipt of a HSS reset, the MME shall mark each relevant MM contexts as invalid and shall set Non-EPS Alert Flag (NEAF) if an MME - MSC/VLR association exists. After detection of any activity (either signalling or data) from a marked UE or any other implementation dependent trigger for a marked UE in ECM-CONNECTED state, the MME performs an update location to the HSS as in the attach or inter-MME TA update procedures and, if NEAF is set, the procedure of "NON-EPS Alert" is followed (see clause 5.3 in 3GPP TS 29.118 [14]). + +The update location procedure and the procedure towards the VLR may be delayed by the MME for a maximum operator configuration-depending time period to avoid high signalling load. + +## 5.2.6 Mobile Originated Activity for V2X + +When the V2X Control Function receives a request for V2X Service from a UE whose associated context is marked as "Subscriber Data Not Confirmed by HSS", it shall initiate a "V2X Subscriber Information Retrieval" request to the HSS as described in the 3GPP TS 29.388 [41]. + +When the HSS receives a "V2X Subscriber Information Retrieval" request from the V2X Control Function, it shall proceed as described in the 3GPP TS 29.388 [41]. + +--- + +# 6 Periodic location updating + +The time taken to confirm the location of an MS after location register failure is governed by the frequency with which the MS establishes radio contact with the network. The location information for an MS which remains silent for a long time will remain doubtful for a long time. + +A method of reducing this time is to require the MS to establish radio contact with the network at intervals, purely to confirm its location, if the MS does not move to a new location area (which would lead to a normal location registration) or respond to paging for a mobile terminated call or request a mobile originated call or call-independent supplementary service activity. + +The interval between successive periodic location updatings is controlled by a timer in the MS; this timer is reset to its initial value at the end of each successfully established radio contact between the MS and the network. + +The use of the periodic location update timer is described in 3GPP TS 23.122 [27]. + +--- + +# 7 Periodic routeing area updating + +All GPRS-attached MSs, except MSs in class-B mode of operation engaged in CS communication, shall perform periodic RA updates. For MSs that are both IMSI-attached and GPRS-attached, the periodic updates depend on whether the Gs interface is installed or not: + +- If the Gs interface is installed, periodic RA updates shall be performed, and periodic LA updates shall not be performed. If the SGSN has the indicator "VLR-reliable" set to 'false' the SGSN shall perform a location area update procedure towards the VLR +- If the Gs interface is not installed, both periodic RA updates and periodic LA updates shall be performed independently. RA updates are performed via the Gb interface, and LA updates are performed via the A interface. + +The periodic routeing area update is described in 3GPP TS 23.060 [5]. + +--- + +## 8 Stand-alone operation of the VLR + +In a 2G authentication regime, triplets, regardless of its nature (generated in a 2G AuC or derived from quintuplets in a 3G VLR or a 3G HLR), may be reused when no unused authentication triplets are available in the VLR for an IMSI record. It is an operator option to define how many times an authentication triplet may be reused in the VLR. + +In a 3G authentication regime, quintuplets, regardless of its nature (generated in a 3G AuC or derived from triplets in a 3G VLR), shall not be reused when no unused authentication quintuplets are available in the VLR for an IMSI record. + +If the Update Location response contains an error different from "Unknown Subscriber" or "Roaming Not Allowed" or if there is a parameter problem (e.g. no HLR number included), no error shall be indicated to the MSC and the IMSI record in the VLR shall not be affected, provided that the associated "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" indicator is in the "Confirmed" status. + +--- + +## 9 Stand-alone operation of the SGSN + +In a 2G authentication regime, triplets, regardless of their nature (generated in a 2G AuC or derived from quintuplets in a 3G SGSN or a 3G HLR), may be reused when no unused authentication triplets are available in the SGSN for an IMSI record. It is an operator option to define how many times an authentication triplet may be reused in the SGSN. + +In a 3G authentication regime, quintuplets, regardless of their nature (generated in a 3G AuC or derived from triplets in a 3G SGSN), shall not be reused when no unused authentication quintuplets are available in the SGSN for an IMSI record. + +--- + +## 9A Stand-alone operation of the MME + +In a E-UTRAN authentication regime, EPS authentication vectors shall not be reused when no unused EPS authentication vectors are available in the MME for an IMSI record. + +--- + +## 10 Restoration of data in the GGSN + +### 10.0 GGSN failure + +When a GGSN fails, all its PDP contexts affected by the failure become invalid and may be deleted. GGSN storage of subscriber data is volatile. + +When the GGSN receives a GTP-U PDU for which no PDP context exists, it shall discard the GTP-U PDU and return a GTP error indication to the originating node (the SGSN or, if Direct Tunnel is established, the RNC). + +The GGSN should ensure as far as possible that previously used TEID values are not immediately reused after a GGSN restart, in order to avoid inconsistent TEID allocation throughout the network. + +## 10.1 Restart of the GGSN + +After a GGSN restart, all the PDP contexts, the MBMS UE contexts, and the MBMS Bearer contexts stored in the GGSN and affected by the restart become invalid and may be deleted. + +When the SGSN detects a restart in a GGSN (see clause 18 "GTP-C based restart procedures") with which it has one or more PDP contexts activated, it shall deactivate all these PDP contexts and request the MS to reactivate them. When the SGSN detects a restart in a GGSN with which it has MBMS Bearer context(s) and/or MBMS UE context(s), it shall delete all these MBMS Bearer context(s) and/or MBMS UE context(s). + +## 10.2 Restoration Procedures + +### 10.2.0 General + +The GGSN will receive the SGSN restart counters in GTPv1 echo response from the SGSN. When a GGSN detects that a peer SGSN has restarted it shall delete all PDP context(s), MBMS UE context(s), MBMS Bearer context(s) associated with the peer node that failed as well as freeing any internal GGSN resources associated with those PDP context(s), MBMS UE context(s) and MBMS Bearer context(s). The GGSN may optionally perform other implementation specific actions such as messages to clear other external resources (e.g. PCC messages). + +If the GGSN needs to send a request for IP-CAN Session Modification procedure towards a PCRF which is known to have restarted since the IP-CAN session establishment, the GGSN may discard the request and may tear down all the PDP context(s) associated with the PDP address of the IP-CAN session, based on operator policy, by initiating a PDP Context Deactivation procedure towards the SGSN with the cause set to "Reactivation requested". This leads the UE to initiate PDP Context Activation procedure for the same APN. Emergency sessions should not be torn down. + +NOTE: The procedure above just enables to clean up all the PDP Context(s) associated with the PDP address of the IP-CAN session, affected by the PCRF failure when a specific interaction with the PCRF is required. Prior to that interaction, PCC controlled services can not be provided to the UE. + +### 10.2.1 Mobile terminated transmission + +When the GGSN receives a mobile terminated PDU for which no valid PDP context exists the GGSN discards the received PDU and may also return an appropriate Error message depending on the protocol used. No further actions are performed by the GGSN. Alternatively, if the GGSN has static PDP information about the PDP address, the GGSN may try to deliver the PDU by initiating the Network-Requested PDP Context Activation procedure (see 3GPP TS 23.060 [5]). + +### 10.2.2 Mobile originated transmission + +When the GGSN receives a tunnel PDU for which no PDP context exists it discards the tunnel PDU and sends an Error indication message to the originating SGSN. The SGSN deactivates the PDP context and sends an Error indication to the MS. The MS may then re-activate the PDP context. + +--- + +## 11 Restoration of data in the SGSN + +### 11.0 SGSN Failure + +#### 11.0.1 Gn/Gp SGSN failure + +When an SGSN fails, it deletes all MM and PDP contexts affected by the failure. SGSN storage of subscriber data is volatile. Based on configuration data, the SGSN may send a Reset message to each of its associated VLRs. If a Reset message is sent, the VLR may mark all associations containing the restarted SGSN as unreliable. See 3GPP TS 29.018 [7]. In the case of optional CAMEL interaction the failing SGSN shall invoke the CAMEL-GPRS-Exception procedure towards the GSM-SCFs. + +If data or signalling, except GPRS attach and RA update, is received in an SGSN from an MS for which no MM context exists in the SGSN, the SGSN shall discard the data or signalling. + +If an RA update request is received in an SGSN from an MS for which no MM context exists in the SGSN, or in the old SGSN for the inter-SGSN RA update case, the SGSN shall reject the RA update with an appropriate cause. In order to remain GPRS-attached, the MS shall then perform a new GPRS attach and should (re-)activate PDP contexts. + +If a service request is received in a 3G-SGSN from an MS for which no MM context exists in the 3G-SGSN, the 3G-SGSN shall reject the service request with an appropriate cause. In order to remain GPRS-attached, the MS shall then perform a new GPRS attach and should (re-) activate PDP contexts. + +NOTE: In some cases, user interaction may be required, and then the MS cannot (re-)activate the PDP contexts automatically. + +When the SGSN receives a PDU Notification Request message for which no MM context exists, the SGSN returns a PDU Notification Response message to the GGSN with an appropriate cause (see clause "Unsuccessful Network-Requested PDP Context Activation Procedure" in 3GPP TS 23.060 [5]), and the SGSN may search the MS by paging with the IMSI in the SGSN area. An MS that is paged for PS services with IMSI as the identifier shall perform a new GPRS attach and should (re-)activate PDP contexts. + +When the SGSN receives a GTP-U PDU from the GGSN for which no PDP context exists, it shall discard the GTP-U PDU and send a GTP error indication to the originating GGSN. + +When the SGSN receives a GTP-U PDU from the RNC for which no PDP context exists, the SGSN shall discard the GTP-U PDU and send a GTP error indication to the originating RNC. + +When the SGSN receives a mobile-terminated SM from the SMS-GMSC for an IMSI unknown in the SGSN, it rejects the request. + +When the SGSN receives a paging request over the Gs interface for an IMSI unknown in the SGSN and the SGSN has not completed recovery, the SGSN may page the MS for packet services with IMSI as identifier in the area specified by the location information provided by the MSC/VLR. If no such location information is provided, the SGSN may page the MS in the routing areas corresponding to that MSC/VLR. After the MS performs a combined GPRS attach, the SGSN may continue serving the Gs interface paging request. + +## 11.0.2 SGSN Failure using S4 + +When the SGSN receives a GTP-U PDU from the Serving GW for which no Bearer context exists, it shall discard the GTP-U PDU and send a GTP error indication to the originating Serving GW. + +When the SGSN receives a GTP-U PDU from the MBMS GW for which no MBMS Point to Point Bearer context exists, it shall discard the GTP-U PDU and send a GTP Error Indication to the originating MBMS GW. + +An S4-SGSN and an SGW supporting the optional network triggered service restoration procedure shall behave as specified in clause 25. + +When the S4-SGSN which does not support the optional network triggered service restoration procedure as specified in clause 25 receives a Downlink Data Notification message for which no MM context exists, the S4-SGSN returns a Downlink Data Notification Acknowledge message to the Serving GW with an appropriate cause. The Serving GW shall delete the related Bearer context related to S4-SGSN; and if there is no ISR associated MME recorded on the related Bearer context the Serving GW shall also notify the PDN GW to delete the Bearer context. + +## 11.1 Restart of the SGSN + +After an SGSN restart, the SGSN deletes all MM, PDP, MBMS UE, and MBMS Bearer contexts affected by the restart. + +When the GGSN detects a restart in an SGSN (see clause 18 "GTP-C based restart procedures") with which it has PDP context(s) activated and/or MBMS UE context(s), it shall delete all these PDP context(s) and/or MBMS UE context(s). When the GGSN detects a restart in an SGSN with which it has any MBMS Bearer context, it shall not delete the MBMS bearer context unless all SGSNs connected to the GGSN restart. + +When the MBMS GW detects a restart in an SGSN (see clause 18 "GTP-C based restart procedures") with which it has at least one MBMS Bearer context, the MBMS GW should re-establish the active MBMS bearer services affected by + +the SGSN restart by initiating MBMS Session Start procedure(s) towards the restarted SGSN (or an alternative SGSN in the same SGSN pool). The MBMS GW shall encode the contents of the MBMS Session Start Request with the same contents as in the original MBMS Session Start Request (or as per the last MBMS Session Update Request received from the BM-SC if the original parameters were updated) with the following exceptions: + +- the MBMS GW shall set the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag to signal that this message is used to re-establish an MBMS session; +- the MBMS GW may change the relative start time ("time to MBMS data transfer" parameter) to fasten the restoration of the MBMS service in UTRAN; +- the MBMS GW should set the estimated session duration to a value corresponding to the remaining duration of the session. + +NOTE: If the MBMS GW receives an MBMS Session Update Request from the BM-SC during the SGSN restart, the contents of the MBMS Session Start Request sent to the SGSN after the SGSN restart can also differ from the parameters sent to the SGSN before its restart for the parameters that can be modified by the MBMS session update procedure (i.e. MBMS Session Area, MBMS Time to Data Transfer). + +The MBMS GW shall not delete the MBMS Bearer context unless all SGSNs/MMEs serving the MBMS bearer service and connected to the MBMS GW have restarted and the MBMS-GW does not support re-establishing MBMS bearer services after an SGSN restart. + +## 11.2 Restoration Procedures + +### 11.2.1 Mobile terminated user data transmission + +When a Gn-SGSN receives a tunnel PDU for which no PDP context or MBMS Bearer Context exists it discards the tunnel PDU and sends an Error indication message to the originating GGSN. + +An S4-SGSN and an SGW supporting the optional network triggered service restoration procedure shall behave as specified in clause 25. + +### 11.2.2 Mobile terminated services requested by the MSC/VLR + +When the SGSN receives a request for CS paging from an MSC/VLR for an IMSI unknown by the SGSN, if the "SGSN-Reset" indicator is set to "true", the SGSN sends the paging request with the location information provided by the VLR. If no such location information is provided, the SGSN should page for the MS in all the routeing areas corresponding to that SGSN. + +If the "SGSN-Reset" indicator is set to "false" and the IMSI is unknown or the MS is marked as GPRS or non-GPRS detached by the SGSN, the paging request is rejected. + +If the "SGSN-Reset" indicator is set to "false" and the IMSI is known and the MS is marked as GPRS and is non-GPRS attached by the SGSN, the paging request shall be sent to the MS. + +### 11.2.3 Mobile terminated SMS over GPRS + +- a) Send Routing Information for MT SMS (SMS-GMSC -> HLR): + +The HLR returns the SGSN number as for normal operation. + +- b) Send Information for MT SMS: + +- When the SGSN receives a mobile terminated SMS for an unknown MM context for the MS, or if the SGSN indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" is marked "Not Confirmed" it rejects the SMS request and returns a failure report with cause value "Unidentified Subscriber" to the SMS gateway MSC indicating unsuccessful delivery of the SMS. The Gateway MSC sends a "Report SM Delivery Status" request, with a cause of "Absent Subscriber", to the HLR. This causes the HLR to set the "Mobile Station Not Reachable for GPRS Flag" for the MS, as described in the Technical Specifications 3GPP TS 23.040 [4] and 3GPP TS 29.002 [6]. + +- If the SGSN has the indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" set to "Confirmed", the SGSN handles the SMS request in the normal way. + +The state of the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" does not affect the Mobile Terminated SMS procedure. + +#### 11.2.4 Mobile originated Routeing Area Updating or Attach + +For attach, where the MS is unknown in the SGSN (i.e. the SGSN has no MM context for the MS) the SGSN creates an MM context for the MS and sets the indicators "Location Information Confirmed in HLR", "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR", "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" to "Not Confirmed". If authentication is required, the SGSN retrieves authentication data. The SGSN then performs an "Update GPRS Location" to the HLR. If this is successful, the SGSN sets the indicators "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" to "Confirmed". If the VPLMN supports Autonomous CSG Roaming and the HPLMN has enabled Autonomous CSG Roaming in the VPLMN, the SGSN may perform an "Update VCSG Location" to the CSS if the requested cell is a CSG/hybrid cell. If this is successful, the SGSN sets the indicators "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the valid CSG subscription data to "Confirmed". + +For routing area update, where the MS is unknown in the SGSN (i.e. the SGSN has no MM context for the MS) or for inter-SGSN routing area update, where the MS is unknown in the old SGSN, the SGSN shall reject the RA update with an appropriate cause. In order to remain GPRS-attached, the MS shall then perform a new GPRS attach and should (re-)activate its PDP contexts. + +If the SGSN has an MM context for the MS, and the indicators "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" or "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" is set to "Not Confirmed" the SGSN performs an "Update GPRS Location" to the HLR. If this is successful, the SGSN sets the indicators "Location Information Confirmed in HLR" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" to "Confirmed". If the indicators "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" or "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the valid CSG subscription data is set to "Not Confirmed", and the VPLMN supports Autonomous CSG Roaming and the HPLMN has enabled Autonomous CSG Roaming in the VPLMN, the SGSN may perform an "Update VCSG Location" to the CSS if the requested cell is a CSG/hybrid cell. If this is successful, the SGSN sets the indicators "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the valid CSG subscription data to "Confirmed". + +If the SGSN has an MM context for the MS with the indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HLR" marked "Confirmed" the originated transmission is handled in the normal way. + +The SGSN retrieves subscriber data from the HLR by sending an "Update GPRS Location" request, which triggers one or more "Insert Subscriber Data" operations from the HLR. + +The SGSN retrieves CSG subscriber data from the CSS by sending an "Update VCSG Location" request, which triggers one or more "Insert Subscriber Data" operations from the CSS if the CSS has the valid CSG subscription data. + +#### 11.2.5 Mobile originated LLC frame + +If an SGSN receives an LLC frame for which no MM context exists in the SGSN, and if the LLC frame does not contain an Attach Request or a Routeing Area Update Request signalling message, then the LLC frame shall be discarded. The MS may determine that the network is not responding and attempt to re-attach or eventually a periodic Routing Area Update message is sent by the MS which initiates the attach procedures. + +#### 11.2.6 Mobile originated Service Request + +For service request, where the MS is unknown in the SGSN (i.e. the SGSN has no MM context for the MS), the SGSN shall reject the service request with an appropriate cause. In order to remain GPRS-attached, the MS shall then perform a new GPRS attach and should (re-)activate its PDP contexts. + +If the SGSN has an MM context for the MS, and the indicators "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" or "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the valid CSG subscription data is set to "Not Confirmed", and the VPLMN supports Autonomous CSG Roaming and the HPLMN has enabled Autonomous CSG Roaming in the VPLMN, the SGSN may perform an "Update VCSG Location" to the CSS if the requested cell is a CSG/hybrid cell. If this is successful, the SGSN sets the indicators "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the valid CSG subscription data to "Confirmed". + +The SGSN retrieves CSG subscriber data from the CSS by sending an "Update VCSG Location" request, which triggers one or more "Insert Subscriber Data" operations from the CSS if the CSS has the valid CSG subscription data. + +## 11.3 Use of TLLI + +After the SGSN has restarted but before the next authenticated radio contact the P-TMSI and TLLI known by the MS are invalid, as the P-TMSI was allocated before the SGSN restarted. The SGSN may request the MS to identify itself with the IMSI in order to make a relationship between the IMSI and the received old TLLI. The SGSN shall allocate a new P-TMSI for that MS. + +If an MS identifies itself by a TLLI in an MS originating transmission, the SGSN proceeds as follows: + +- a) The SGSN checks the routing area identity (RAI) of the previous routing area sent by the MS. If this previous RAI belongs to a different SGSN, the request is handled in the normal way. +- b) If the previous RAI belongs to the current SGSN, the status of the TLLI is checked. + - If the P-TMSI derived from the TLLI was allocated after the SGSN restarted, and corresponds to a valid IMSI record, then the request is handled in the normal way. + - If the P-TMSI derived from the TLLI was allocated before the SGSN restarted, or does not correspond to a valid IMSI record, then the SGSN requests the IMSI from the MS. If the MS returns an IMSI the SGSN proceeds in the normal way. If the MS does not return an IMSI the network aborts the originating transmission request or location registration procedure. + +## 11.4 VLR associations + +All associations with VLRs affected by the restart of an SGSN are marked as unreliable and may be deleted. Based on configuration data, Reset messages may be sent on the Gs-interface to the VLRs served by the SGSN. If Reset messages are sent, the VLRs may mark all associations with the SGSN as unreliable by setting the restoration indicator "Confirmed by radio contact" to "Not Confirmed" for the MSs served by that SGSN. See 3GPP TS 29.018 [7]. The associations will be re-initiated one by one by the SGSN at the next Routing Area update, or combined RA/LA update from each MS. + +## 11.5 Restart of a peer node + +### 11.5.1 SGW failure + +When an SGSN detects that a peer SGW has failed with or without restart (relying on restart counter as specified in clause 18 "GTP-C based restart procedures" or implementation e.g. preconfigured path failure timer) it shall either: + +- as a default delete all PDN connection table data/MM bearer contexts associated with the peer node that has failed as well as freeing any internal SGSN resources associated with those PDN connections. The SGSN may optionally perform other implementation specific actions such as to clear external resources (e.g. Iu messages to clear UTRAN resources) or more advanced forms of restoration; + +or + +- follow the procedures specified in clause 27 to restore the PDN connections affected by the SGW failure, if the SGSN and the PGW support these procedures. + +NOTE: The SGSN will have the identity of the PGW and SGW currently in use for a PDN connection available in the SGSN's PDN connection table as part of existing EPC procedures as well as other peer state data. + +### 11.5.2 MBMS-GW failure + +The behaviour of an SGSN when it detects that a peer MBMS GW has restarted is described in clause 17A.1. + +--- + +## 12 Restoration of Data in an SMLC (GSM only) + +### 12.1 Restart of an SMLC + +When an SMLC restarts after a failure, it performs the following actions for those of its associated LMUs whose records have been affected by the fault: + +- Reload all administered LMU data from non-volatile back-up; +- Reinitialize other temporary data for each LMU to indicate no ongoing measurement or diagnostic activities; +- Perform data restoration for each affected Type A and Type B LMU as described below. + +### 12.2 Data Restoration for a Specific LMU + +An SMLC may restore data for a specific LMU when the data in the SMLC or LMU is considered unreliable (e.g. if there is no communication between the SMLC and LMU for a long time or if messages received by the SMLC are inconsistent with the LMU state kept by the SMLC). To restore data for a specific LMU, the SMLC shall open a signalling connection to the LMU if this is Type A, as described in 3GPP TS 23.071 [10]. For both a Type A LMU and a Type B LMU, the SMLC shall then send an LLP Reset message to the LMU. On receiving an LLP Reset, an LMU shall cancel any LCS measurement and O&M tasks previously ordered by the SMLC and shall return an LLP Reset acknowledgement to the SMLC. + +--- + +## 13 Restoration of Data in an LMU (GSM only) + +When an LMU restarts following a failure, it shall reinitialize all data concerning LCS measurement and O&M tasks to indicate that no tasks ordered by an SMLC are active. A Type A LMU shall then perform an "IMSI Attach". A Type A LMU shall then open a signaling connection to its controlling SMLC as described in 3GPP TS 23.071 [10]. Both a Type A LMU and a Type B LMU shall send an LLP Status Update message to their controlling SMLC containing an indication that the LMU has restarted following a failure. The SMLC shall update its data regarding the state of the LMU and shall return an LLP Update Status acknowledgment to the LMU. + +--- + +## 14 Restoration of data in the MME + +### 14.1 Restart of the MME + +#### 14.1.1 Restoration Procedures + +After an MME restart, the MME shall delete all MM Bearer contexts affected by the restart that it may have stored. + +When the MBMS GW detects a restart in an MME (see clause 18 "GTP-C based restart procedures") with which it has at least one MBMS Bearer context, the MBMS-GW should re-establish the active MBMS bearer services affected by the MME restart by initiating MBMS Session Start procedure(s) towards the restarted MME (or an alternative MME in the same MME pool). The MBMS GW shall encode the MBMS Session Start Request with the same contents as in the original MBMS Session Start Request (or as per the last MBMS Session Update Request received from the BM-SC if the original parameters were updated) with the following exceptions: + +- the MBMS GW shall set the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag to signal that this message is used to re-establish an MBMS session; +- if no absolute start time ("MBMS data transfer start" parameter) has been received, the MBMS GW may change the relative start time ("time to MBMS data transfer" parameter) to fasten the restoration of the MBMS service in E-UTRAN; + +- the MBMS GW should set the estimated session duration to a value corresponding to the remaining duration of the session. + +The MCE shall be able to accept MBMS session requests with an absolute start time ("MBMS data transfer start" parameter) in the past. + +NOTE: If the MBMS GW receives an MBMS Session Update Request from the BM-SC during the MME restart, the contents of the MBMS Session Start Request sent to the MME after the MME restart can also differ from the parameters sent to the MME before its restart for the parameters that can be modified by the MBMS session update procedure (i.e. MBMS Session Area, MBMS Time to Data Transfer, MBMS Data Transfer Start). + +The MBMS GW shall not delete the MBMS Bearer context unless all SGSNs/MMEs serving the MBMS bearer service and connected to the MBMS GW have restarted and the MBMS-GW does not support re-establishing MBMS bearer services after an MME restart. + +If the MCE receives an M3 Reset message from the MME (i.e. in case the restart event has resulted in loss of some or all M3 transactions reference information) with which it has at least one MBMS Bearer context, the MCE shall deactivate all the related MBMS Bearer contexts locally and towards E-UTRAN within which the MBMS bearer service is active, either immediately or after a pre-configured time period if the corresponding MBMS Bearer contexts are not re-established via any MME. + +An MME and an SGW supporting the optional network triggered service restoration procedure shall behave as specified in clause 25. + +When the MME which does not support the optional network triggered service restoration procedure as specified in clause 25 receives a Downlink Data Notification message for which no MM context exists, the MME returns a Downlink Data Notification Acknowledge message to the Serving GW with an appropriate cause. The Serving GW shall delete the related Bearer context related to MME; and if there is no ISR associated S4-SGSN recorded on the related Bearer context the Serving GW shall also notify the PDN GW to delete the Bearer context. + +## 14.1.2 Mobile originated Tracking Area Updating or E-UTRAN Attach + +For attach, where the UE is unknown in the MME (i.e. the MME has no MM context for the UE) the MME shall create an MM context for the UE and shall set the indicators "Location Information Confirmed in HSS", "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS", "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" to "Not Confirmed". If authentication is required, the MME shall retrieve the authentication data. The MME then performs an "Update Location" to the HSS. If this is successful, the MME shall set the indicators "Location Information Confirmed in HSS" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS" to "Confirmed". If the VPLMN supports Autonomous CSG Roaming and the HPLMN has enabled Autonomous CSG Roaming in the VPLMN, the MME may perform an "Update VCSG Location" to the CSS if the requested cell is a CSG/hybrid cell. If this is successful, the MME shall set the indicators "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the valid CSG subscription data to "Confirmed". + +For tracking area update, where the UE is unknown in the MME (i.e. the MME has no MM context for the UE) or for inter-MME tracking area update, where the UE is unknown in the old MME, the MME shall reject the TA update with an appropriate cause. In order to remain attached, the UE shall then perform a new attach and should (re-)activate its EPS Bearer contexts. + +If the MME has an MM context for the UE, and the indicator "Location Information Confirmed in HSS" or "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS" is set to "Not Confirmed" the MME shall perform an "Update Location" to the HSS. If this is successful, the MME shall set the indicators "Location Information Confirmed in HSS" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS" to "Confirmed". If the indicators "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" or "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" is set to "Not Confirmed", and the VPLMN supports Autonomous CSG Roaming and the HPLMN has enabled Autonomous CSG Roaming in the VPLMN, the MME may perform an "Update VCSG Location" to the CSS if the requested cell is a CSG/hybrid cell. If this is successful, the MME shall set the indicators "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the valid CSG subscription data to "Confirmed". + +If the MME has an MM context for the UE with the indicator "Subscriber Data Confirmed by HSS" marked "Confirmed" the originated transmission shall be handled in the normal way. + +The MME retrieves subscriber data from the HSS by sending an "Update Location" request, which triggers an "Update Location" answer which contains the subscriber data. + +The MME retrieves CSG subscriber data from the CSS by sending an "Update VCSG Location" request, which triggers an "Update VCSG Location" answer which may contain the valid CSG subscription data. + +### 14.1.3 Mobile terminated services requested by the MSC/VLR + +An MME and a VLR supporting mobile terminated CS service delivery via an alternative MME in MME pool shall behave as specified in clause 26. + +When the MME receives a request for CS paging from an MSC/VLR for an IMSI unknown by the MME, if the "MME-Reset" indicator is set to "true", the MME sends the paging request with the location information provided by the VLR. If no such location information is provided, the MME should page for the UE in all the tracking areas corresponding to that MME. The MME may support and apply this procedure to a UE using extended idle mode DRX for MT-SMS service. + +NOTE: How the restarted MME knows the UE's DRX parameter or the extended DRX parameters to page the UE is implementation dependent. + +If the "MME-Reset" indicator is set to "false" and the IMSI is unknown or the UE is marked as EMM-DEREGISTERED by the MME, the paging request is rejected. + +If the "MME-Reset" indicator is set to "false" and the IMSI is known and the UE is marked as EMM-REGISTERED by the MME, the paging request shall be sent to the UE. + +### 14.1.4 Mobile terminated user data transmission + +An MME and an SGW supporting the optional network triggered service restoration procedure shall behave as specified in clause 25. + +### 14.1.5 Mobile originated Service Request + +For service request, where the UE is unknown in the MME (i.e. the MME has no MM context for the UE), the MME shall reject the service request with an appropriate cause. In order to remain attached, the UE shall then perform a new attach and should (re-)activate its EPS Bearer contexts. + +If the MME has an MM context for the UE, and the indicators "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" or "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" is set to "Not Confirmed", and the VPLMN supports Autonomous CSG Roaming and the HPLMN has enabled Autonomous CSG Roaming in the VPLMN, the MME may perform an "Update VCSG Location" to the CSS if the requested cell is a CSG/hybrid cell. If this is successful, the MME shall set the indicators "Location Information Confirmed by CSS" and "Subscriber Data Confirmed by CSS" if the CSS has the valid CSG subscription data to "Confirmed". + +The MME retrieves CSG subscriber data from the CSS by sending an "Update VCSG Location" request, which triggers an "Update VCSG Location" answer which may contain the valid CSG subscription data. + +### 14.1.6 Mobile Terminated NIDD procedure + +During the Mobile Terminated NIDD procedure, if the SCEF receives a MT-Data-Answer from the MME/SGSN with a failure cause that UE cannot be found, the SCEF shall delete all the bearer contexts of this UE and may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. + +NOTE: After that, if the SCEF receives a following NIDD Submit request from the SCS/AS for the deleted bearer, the SCEF behaves as specified in clause 5.13.3 of TS 23.682[38] step 2. + +## 14.1A Restart of a peer node + +### 14.1A.1 SGW Failure + +When an MME detects that a peer SGW has failed with or without restart (relying on restart counter as specified in clause 18 "GTP-C based restart procedures" or implementation e.g. preconfigured path failure timer) it shall either: + +- as a default delete all PDN connection table data/MM bearer contexts associated with the peer node that has failed as well as freeing any internal MME resources associated with those PDN connections. The MME may optionally perform other implementation specific actions such as to clear external resources (e.g. S1-MME messages to clear eNodeB resources) or more advanced forms of restoration; + +or + +- follow the procedures specified in clause 27 to restore the PDN connections affected by the SGW failure, if the MME and the PGW support these procedures. + +NOTE: The MME will have the identity of the PGW and SGW currently in use for a PDN connection available in the MME's PDN connection table as part of existing EPC procedures as well as other peer state data. + +### 14.1A.2 MBMS GW failure + +The behaviour of an MME when it detects that a peer MBMS GW has restarted is described in clause 17A.1. + +### 14.1A.3 MCE Restart + +When the MME detects a restart in an MCE (i.e. when the MME receives an M3 Reset or M3 Setup Request message from the MCE) with which it has at least one MBMS Bearer context, the MME shall behave as specified in clause 15A.3. + +### 14.1A.4 UCMF Failure + +When an MME detects that a peer UCMF has failed with or without restart (relying on restart counter as specified in clause 19B "URCMP based restart procedures" or implementation e.g. a preconfigured path failure timer as specified in clause 20 "Path management procedures"), it shall consider the dictionary mapping information received from the failed UCMF is deprecated, the subscription to get notifications from the UCMF become invalid; the MME may retrieve such mapping information upon subsequent UE - AMF signalling e.g. at registration procedure. + +## 14.2 VLR associations + +All associations with VLRs affected by the restart of an MME are marked as unreliable and may be deleted. Based on configuration data, Reset messages may be sent on the SGs interface to the VLRs served by the MME. If Reset messages are sent, the VLRs may mark all associations with the MME as unreliable by setting the restoration indicator "Confirmed by radio contact" to "Not Confirmed" for the UEs served by that MME. See 3GPP TS 29.118 [14]. The associations will be re-initiated one by one by the MME at the next Combined TA/LA update from each UE. + +## 14.3 Partial Failure Handling at MME + +### 14.3.1 General + +See Clause 23. + +### 14.3.2 Procedures during PDN Connection Establishment + +If the MME supports the feature, the following procedures apply. + +During a PDN connection establishment, the MME shall provide one MME FQ-CSID containing exactly one CSID for that particular PDN connection to the SGW in the S11 Create Session Request. The MME shall store the Node-ID and CSID values from the FQ-CSID provided by the SGW and the PGW in the S11 Create Session Response in its PDN Connection table maintained as part of MME MM and EPS Bearer Contexts as specified in Table 5.6.2-15.7.2-1 in 3GPP TS 23.401 [15]. + +The MME should ensure as far as possible that previously used FQ-CSIDs are not immediately reused after a partial/full failure of an MME. + +The MME determines that the SGW supports partial failure handling by the presence of the SGW FQ-CSID in the S11 Create Session Response. + +### 14.3.3 Procedures during MME Partial Failure + +If the MME supports the feature the following procedures apply. + +When an MME detects that it has undergone a partial failure, it shall verify that one or more corresponding CSID(s) are present for the component(s) undergoing a partial fault. If there is no such CSID, then the following does not apply. When one or more CSIDs are currently assigned, the MME shall perform the following. + +The MME may perform implementation-specific operations to clean up any residual state associated with the CSID(s). + +The MME shall send a GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request containing all the MME CSID(s) of the component(s) failing in MME FQ-CSID(s) to the SGW peers that support the feature. + +Upon receiving a GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Response message with Cause value "Success", the MME shall conclude that the SGW peer has initiated the internal deletion of the PDN connections corresponding to the FQ-CSID(s) present in the GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request message. + +Regardless of the "Cause" value in the response, the MME is not required to perform any further recovery actions towards SGW and PGW peers for PDN connections in the connection set identified by the MME FQ-CSID(s). + +### 14.3.4 Procedures during a Peer's Partial Failure + +If the MME supports the feature, the following procedures apply. + +When an MME receives a GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request message from an SGW, the MME shall retrieve all the PDN connections corresponding to each of the FQ-CSID(s) present in the message. The MME shall delete all the retrieved PDN connections and the associated resources. Other implementation-specific actions may be performed. + +As a response, the MME shall send a GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Response message with appropriate Cause value immediately to the SGW. + +### 14.3.5 Procedures during PDN Connection Removal or Modification + +If an MME and an SGW support the feature, the following procedures apply. + +During an S11 procedure, impacting an existing PDN connection removal or modification the following apply: + +- 1) If the SGW is being relocated then the MME shall clear the currently stored SGW FQ-CSID . +- 2) If an MME relocation occurs (for example, TAU with MME change), or if an SGW relocation occurs, (for example, TAU with SGW change), the MME shall include its MME FQ-CSID in the S11 Create Session Request for SGW change and the S11 Modify Bearer Request for MME change without SGW change. +- 3) Additionally, if MME decides to change own FQ-CSID, the MME shall include MME FQ-CSID in other S11 messages. +- 4) If the MME receives a FQ-CSID value of an SGW over S11, the MME shall overwrite the current stored SGW FQ-CSID value with the received value. +- 5) If the MME receives a FQ-CSID value of a PGW over S11, the MME shall overwrite the current stored PGW FQ-CSID value with the received value. + +- 6) During a S11 procedure removing an existing PDN connection the MME removes the PDN data as well as any stored FQ-CSID values(s) of the PGW FQ-CSID and SGW FQ-CSID. The same actions are done on the old MME if there is an MME relocation. + +The MME determines that the SGW supports partial failure handling by the presence of the SGW FQ-CSID in the S11 Create Session Response with SGW change; and S11 Modify Bearer Response without SGW change. + +--- + +## 15 Restoration of data in GERAN/UTRAN + +### 15.1 BSS Failure (A/Gb mode) + +When a BSS fails, all its BSS contexts affected by the failure become invalid and shall be deleted. BSS storage of data is volatile. + +### 15.2 RNC/BSC Failure (Iu mode) + +When an RNC/BSC fails, all its RNC/BSC contexts affected by the failure become invalid and shall be deleted. RNC/BSC storage of data is volatile. An SGSN that recognises unavailability of an RNC/BSC or receives a Reset from an RNC/BSC, shall locally release the RABs for all affected PDP contexts. + +Any affected PDP contexts that use Direct Tunnel and have an invalid tunnel in GGSN will be recovered when the SGSN receives an Iu connection establishment request from the MS or when the GGSN informed the SGSN that the GGSN has received a GTP error indication from RNC. + +When the RNC/BSC receives a GTP-U PDU for which no RAB context exists, the RNC/BSC shall discard the GTP-U PDU and return a GTP error indication to the originating node that may be SGSN or GGSN if Direct Tunnel is established. + +The RNC should ensure as far as possible that previously used TEID values are not immediately reused after an RNC restart, in order to avoid inconsistent TEID allocation throughout the network. + +### 15.3 RNC/BSC Failure (Iu mode) using S4 + +When an RNC/BSC fails, all its RNC/BSC contexts affected by the failure become invalid and shall be deleted. RNC/BSC storage of data is volatile. An SGSN that recognises unavailability of an RNC/BSC or receives a Reset from an RNC/BSC, shall locally release the RABs for all affected PDP contexts. If ISR is activated or direct tunnel is established, the S4-SGSN shall initiate release of the access bearer for all bearers towards the Serving GW as defined in Iu Release Procedure Using S4 in 3GPP TS 23.060 [5]. For the other cases, the S4-SGSN may send the Release Access Bearers Request message to the Serving GW to remove the downlink user plane address and TEID as specified in 3GPP TS 23.060 [5]. In addition, based on operator policy, the SGSN may initiate the Dedicated Bearer Deactivation procedure for bearers using streaming or conversational traffic class. Any affected EPS bearers contexts in Serving GW are recovered when the SGSN receives an Iu connection establishment request from the MS or when the Serving GW initiates the Network Triggered Service Request procedure as specified in 3GPP TS 23.060 [5]. + +When the RNC/BSC receives a GTP-U PDU for which no RAB Context exists, the RNC/BSC shall discard the GTP-U PDU and return a GTP Error Indication to the originating node that may be SGSN or Serving GW if Direct Tunnel is established. + +An S4-SGSN that recognises unavailability of an RNC (e.g. no more SCTP association in service) or receives a Reset message from an RNC shall maintain the related MBMS bearer contexts but shall locally delete the RNC related information (i.e. Iu related resources) for all MBMS service association(s) or those indicated in the Reset message. See clause 8.26 of 3GPP TS 25.413 [29]. + +Upon receipt of a Reset message from the RNC, the S4-SGSN should then subsequently re-establish the MBMS bearer services affected by the RNC failure by initiating MBMS Session Start procedure(s) towards the RNC. The S4-SGSN shall encode the contents of the MBMS Session Start Request with the same contents as in the original MBMS Session Start Request (or per the last MBMS Session Update Request received from the MBMS GW if the original parameters were updated) with the following exceptions: + +- if the S4-SGSN has received recently an MBMS session re-establishment indication from the MBMS GW (i.e. within a past short period covering the time during which the same MBMS session may exist simultaneously in two S4-SGSNs of the S4-SGSN pool), the S4-SGSN shall set the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag to signal that this message is used to re-establish an MBMS session. Otherwise, the S4-SGSN shall not set "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag; +- the S4-SGSN should set the estimated session duration to a value corresponding to the remaining duration of the session. + +NOTE 1: During an Sn path failure when the MBMS GW moves the control of an MBMS session to an alternative S4-SGSN in the S4-SGSN pool (see clause 20.2.3.2), the MBMS session can exist in the old and in the new S4-SGSN for a short period of time. This time period is not bigger than the value of the maximum Sm path failure timer configured at the S4-SGSN. If an RNC happens to restart during this time, both S4-SGSNs will try to re-establish the MBMS session. In this case, it needs to be ensured that the control of the MBMS session remains at the new S4-SGSN, whatever the order of the MBMS Session Start Request messages the RNC will receive from both S4-SGSNs. The setting of the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag by the new S4-SGSN as specified above ensures that the new S4-SGSN, which has acquired the control of the MBMS session in the recent past, will get the control of the MBMS session. + +NOTE 2: If the S4-SGSN receives an MBMS Session Update Request from the MBMS GW during the RNC failure, the contents of the MBMS Session Start Request sent to the RNC after the RNC recovery can also differ from the parameters sent to the RNC before its failure for the parameters that can be modified by the MBMS session update procedure (i.e. MBMS Session Area, MBMS Time to Data Transfer). + +## 15.4 Other RNC functionality for MBMS restoration + +The RNC should accept an MBMS Session Start Request received for an ongoing MBMS session (i.e. with the same TMGI) + +- from the same or a different SGSN than the SGSN that currently controls the MBMS session, if the message contains the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag; or +- from the SGSN that currently controls the MBMS session, if the RNC supports the option to maintain MBMS bearer contexts during a pre-configured time period after an Iu path failure and the message is received during that period without the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag. + +If it accepts the request from the SGSN, and if the message contains the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag, the RNC shall: + +- replace the Iu related resources for this MBMS service associated to the previous SGSN by those assigned in the MBMS Session Request (if different) and consider that the MBMS session is now being controlled by the new SGSN (if different from the previous SGSN); for IP Unicast over Iu, the RNC receives the user plane data for this MBMS session via the new SGSN (if different from the previous SGSN); +- the RNC shall leave the former M1 transport network IP multicast address and join the new M1 transport network IP multicast address (including the IP address of the multicast source) if the MBMS Session Start Request contains a different transport network IP multicast distribution address and/or a different IP multicast source address; the RNC shall also use the C-TEID received in the MBMS Session Start Request + +NOTE: This can also result in a change from IP Multicast to IP unicast or vice versa for the Iu userplane. + +## 15.5 Iu path failure using S4 + +Upon detection of an Iu path failure (i.e. no more SCTP association in service), + +- the RNC shall release all the MBMS services affected by the Iu path failure either immediately or after a pre-configured time period if the corresponding MBMS bearer contexts are not re-established via any S4-SGSN; +- the S4-SGSN shall maintain the related MBMS bearer contexts but shall locally delete the RNC related information (i.e. Iu related resources) for all MBMS service association(s). + +Upon recovery of the Iu path, the RNC should initiate a Reset procedure towards the related S4-SGSN. Upon receipt of the Reset message from the RNC, the S4-SGSN should behave as specified for RNC failure in clause 15.3. + +## 15A Restoration of data in E-UTRAN + +### 15A.1 eNodeB Failure + +#### 15A.1.1 General + +An MME which does not support UE context retention at SCTP recovery and recognises unavailability of an eNodeB (e.g. no more SCTP association in service) or an MME which receives a Reset or a S1 Setup message with UE Retention Information not set to "ues-retained" from an eNodeB, shall locally delete the eNodeB related information ("eNodeB Address in Use for S1-MME" and "eNodeB UE S1AP ID"). In this case, the MME initiates release of all S1 bearers towards the Serving GW by sending a Release Access Bearer Request message as defined in the S1 Release procedure in 3GPP TS 23.401 [15]. The MME shall initiate the Dedicated Bearer Deactivation procedure to deactivate the GBR bearers in the packet core; as an option, the MME may defer the deactivation of the GBR bearers for a short period (e.g. in the order of seconds) so as to allow the re-establishment of the corresponding radio and S1 bearers and thus avoid the GBR bearers deactivation if the MME receives a NAS Service Request or a GTP-C Downlink Data Notification message as a result of the SGW having received an Error Indication message from the eNodeB (see clause 22). + +If the Serving GW receives Release Access Bearers Request message, the Serving GW shall release all eNodeB related information (address and TEIDs) for the UE, but other elements of the UE's Serving GW context shall not be affected. Any Bearer contexts affected by eNodeB failure that have no valid S1-U tunnel in Serving GW are recovered during the UE Triggered Service Request or during the Network Triggered Service Request procedure as specified in 3GPP TS 23.401 [15]. + +An MME, which supports UE context retention at SCTP recovery and recognises unavailability of an eNodeB (e.g. no more SCTP association in service), shall keep the UEs in ECM-CONNECTED and suspended UE Context data for UEs in ECM-IDLE, which have used the S1 signalling connection before it was broken. Upon the subsequent S1 Setup procedure, the MME and the eNB may agree that UE-related contexts and related signalling connection that have been existing before the S1 Setup shall not be affected as specified in the clause 19.2.2.8 of 3GPP TS 36.300 [32]. + +The eNodeB should ensure as far as possible that previously used TEID values are not immediately reused after an eNodeB restart, in order to avoid inconsistent TEID allocation throughout the network. + +#### 15A.1.2 PWS restoration + +After an (H)eNodeB has restarted, it shall delete all its warning message data. If the warning message service is operational in one or more cell(s) of the (H)eNodeB, the (H)eNodeB shall send a PWS Restart Indication message, which shall include the identity of the (H)eNodeB, the identity of the restarted cell(s), and the TAI(s) and EAI(s) with which the restarted cell(s) are configured, to the CBC to request the CBC to re-load its warning message data if applicable. + +The (H)eNB should send the PWS Restart Indication message via two MMEs of the MME pool, if possible, to ensure that the CBC receives the message even if one MME can not propagate it to the CBC (e.g. due to an SBc path failure). + +For HeNBs, the HeNB GW (respectively the MME) shall check the cell identity (respectively the HeNB identity) received in the PWS Restart Indication, as specified in clause 4.6.2 of 3GPP TS 36.300 [32]. + +Upon receipt of a PWS Restart Indication message, the CBC shall consider that the warning message service is restarted in the reported cell(s), i.e. the service is operational and no warning messages are being broadcast in the cell(s). The CBC shall then re-send the warning message data (with the same message identifier and serial number) to the (H)eNodeB for these cells, if any. When doing so, the CBC: + +- shall include the identity of the (H)eNodeB received in the PWS Restart Indication into the Write-Replace-Warning-Request message(s) to enable the MME to forward the message(s) only to the (H)eNodeB (or HeNB GW) involved in the restart; +- should set the warning area list to the identities of the cell(s) to be reloaded which are relevant to the warning message data being reloaded; and +- may update the number of broadcasts requested, if necessary. + +NOTE 1: Setting the warning area list to the identities of the cell(s) to be reloaded enables, for example, the HeNB GW to forward the message only to the involved HeNB when the restarted HeNB is connected to a HeNB GW. + +The CBC shall consider a PWS Restart Indication message received shortly after a preceding one for the same cell identity as a duplicate restart indication for that cell which it shall ignore. + +NOTE 2: The broadcast of warning messages can be configured in the network per individual cell, TAI and/or EAI. The CBC can use the list of cell(s), the TAI(s) and EAI(s) received in the PWS Restart Indication to derive the list of warning messages to be broadcast in the respective cell(s), TAI(s) and EAI(s). + +Likewise, in other scenarios where the (H)eNodeB may need to reload its warning message data (e.g. when an individual cell is restarted), the (H)eNodeB shall send a PWS Restart Indication message (including the identity of the (H)eNodeB, the identity of the restarted cell(s), and the TAI(s) and EAI(s) with which the restarted cell(s) are configured) to the CBC to request the CBC to re-load its warning message data if applicable. The (H)eNodeB, MME and CBC shall then proceed as specified above for an (H)eNodeB restart. + +## 15A.2 S1-AP path failure + +Upon detection of an S1-AP path failure (i.e. no more SCTP association in service), + +- the eNodeB shall either release the RRC connection of the affected UEs, or if UE context retention at SCTP recovery is supported, the eNodeB shall keep those UEs in RRC\_CONNECTED and suspended UE Context data for UEs in ECM-IDLE, which have used the S1 signalling connection before it was broken; +- the MME shall proceed as specified for the eNodeB failure in clause 15A.1. + +The eNodeB shall continue to broadcast warning messages, if any, during an S1AP path failure. Upon recovery of the S1AP path, the eNodeB shall proceed as if no S1AP path failure had occurred. + +During an S1AP path failure, the warning message data stored in the eNodeB may become desynchronized with the CBC, e.g. if the CBC attempts to modify the warning message data during the S1AP path failure. The CBC and MME(s) should support the Write-Replace-Warning-Indication and Stop-Warning-Indication procedures (see 3GPP TS 23.041 [30]) to keep the warning message data synchronized in the eNodeB and the CBC. + +## 15A.3 MCE Failure + +When an MCE fails, the MCE shall release all the MBMS services affected by the failure locally and towards E-UTRAN within which the MBMS bearer services are active, either immediately or after a pre-configured time period if the corresponding MBMS bearer contexts are not re-established via any MME. + +An MME that recognises unavailability of an MCE (e.g. no more SCTP association in service) or receives a Reset or a M3 Setup Request message from an MCE shall maintain the related MBMS bearer contexts but shall locally delete the MCE related information (i.e. M3 related resources) for all MBMS service association(s) or those indicated in the RESET message. See clauses 8.5 and 8.7 of 3GPP TS 36.444 [28]. + +Upon receipt of a Reset or M3 Setup Request message from the MCE, the MME should then subsequently re-establish the MBMS bearer services affected by the MCE failure by initiating MBMS Session Start procedure(s) towards the MCE. The MME shall encode the contents of the MBMS Session Start Request with the same contents as in the original MBMS Session Start Request (or per the last MBMS Session Update Request received from the MBMS GW if the original parameters were updated) with the following exceptions: + +- if the MME has received recently an MBMS session re-establishment indication from the MBMS GW (i.e. within a past short period covering the time during which the same MBMS session may exist simultaneously in two MMEs of the MME pool), the MME shall set the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag to signal that this message is used to re-establish an MBMS session. Otherwise, the MME shall not set "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag; +- if no absolute start time ("MBMS data transfer start" parameter) has been received, the MME may change the relative start time ("time to MBMS data transfer" parameter) to fasten the restoration of the MBMS service in E-UTRAN; + +- the MME should set the estimated session duration to a value corresponding to the remaining duration of the session. + +The MCE shall be able to accept MBMS session requests with an absolute start time ("MBMS data transfer start" parameter) in the past. + +NOTE 1: During an Sm path failure when the MBMS GW moves the control of an MBMS session to an alternative MME in the MME pool (see clause 20.2.3.1), the MBMS session can exist in the old and in the new MME for a short period of time. This time period is not bigger than the value of the maximum Sm path failure timer configured at the MME. If an MCE happens to restart during this time, both MMEs will try to re-establish the MBMS session. In this case, it needs to be ensured that the control of the MBMS session remains at the new MME, whatever the order of the MBMS Session Start Request messages the MCE will receive from both MMEs. The setting of the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag by the new MME as specified above ensures that the new MME, which has acquired the control of the MBMS session in the recent past, will get the control of the MBMS session. + +NOTE 2: If the MME receives an MBMS Session Update Request from the MBMS GW during the MCE failure, the contents of the MBMS Session Start Request sent to the MCE after the MCE recovery can also differ from the parameters sent to the MCE before its failure for the parameters that can be modified by the MBMS session update procedure (i.e. MBMS Session Area, MBMS Time to Data Transfer, MBMS Data Transfer Start). + +## 15A.4 M3AP path failure + +Upon detection of an M3AP path failure (i.e. no more SCTP association in service), + +- the MCE shall release all the MBMS services affected by the M3AP path failure locally and towards E-UTRAN within which the MBMS bearer services are active, either immediately or after a pre-configured time period if the corresponding MBMS bearer contexts are not re-established via any MME; +- the MME shall maintain the related MBMS bearer contexts but shall locally delete the MCE related information (i.e. M3 related resources) for all MBMS service association(s). + +Upon recovery of the M3AP path, the MCE should initiate a Reset or M3 Setup Request procedure towards the related MME. Upon receipt of the Reset or M3 Setup Request message from the MCE, the MME should then subsequently re-establish the MBMS bearer services affected by the M3AP path failure by initiating MBMS Session Start procedure(s) towards the MCE. The MME shall encode the MBMS Session Start Request with the same contents as in the original MBMS Session Start Request (or per the last MBMS Session Update Request received from the MBMS GW if the original parameters were updated) with the following exceptions: + +- if the MME has received recently an MBMS session re-establishment indication from the MBMS GW (i.e. within a past short period covering the time during which the same MBMS session may exist simultaneously in two MMEs of the MME pool), the MME shall set the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag to signal that this message is used to re-establish an MBMS session. Otherwise, the MME shall not set "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag; +- if no absolute start time ("MBMS data transfer start" parameter) has been received, the MME may change the relative start time ("time to MBMS data transfer" parameter) to fasten the restoration of the MBMS service in E-UTRAN; +- the MME should set the estimated session duration to a value corresponding to the remaining duration of the session. + +The MCE shall be able to accept MBMS session requests with an absolute start time ("MBMS data transfer start" parameter) in the past. + +NOTE 1: During an Sm path failure when the MBMS GW moves the control of an MBMS session to an alternative MME in the MME pool (see clause 20.2.3.1), the MBMS session can exist in the old and in the new MME for a short period of time. This time period is not bigger than the value of the maximum Sm path failure timer configured at the MME. If an M3AP path failure and recovery happens during this time, both MMEs will try to re-establish the MBMS session. In this case, it needs to be ensured that the control of the MBMS session remains at the new MME, whatever the order of the MBMS Session Start Request messages the MCE will receive from both MMEs. The setting of the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag by the new MME as specified above ensures that the new MME, which has acquired the control of the MBMS session in the recent past, will get the control of the MBMS session. + +NOTE 2: If the MME receives an MBMS Session Update Request from the MBMS GW during the M3AP path failure, the contents of the MBMS Session Start Request sent to the MCE after the M3AP path recovery can also differ from the parameters sent to the MCE before the M3AP path failure for the parameters that can be modified by the MBMS session update procedure (i.e. MBMS Session Area, MBMS Time to Data Transfer, MBMS Data Transfer Start). + +## 15A.5 Other MCE functionality for MBMS restoration + +The MCE should accept an MBMS Session Start Request received for an on-going MBMS session (i.e. with the same TMGI) + +- from the same or a different MME than the MME that currently controls the MBMS session, if the message includes the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag; or +- from the MME that currently controls the MBMS session, if the MCE supports the option to maintain MBMS bearer contexts during a pre-configured time period after an M3AP path failure, MME restart or MCE failure, and the message is received during that period without the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag. + +If the MCE accepts the request from the MME, and if the message contains the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag, + +- the MCE shall replace the M3 related resources for this MBMS service associated to the previous MME by those assigned in the MBMS Session Start Request (if different) and consider that the MBMS session is now being controlled by the new MME (if different from the previous MME); +- the eNodeB(s) involved in the broadcast of the MBMS session shall leave the former M1 transport network IP multicast address and join the new M1 transport network IP multicast address (including the IP address of the multicast source) if the MBMS Session Start Request contains a different transport network IP multicast distribution address and/or a different IP multicast source address; the eNodeB(s) shall also use the C-TEID received in the MBMS Session Start Request. + +The MCE shall be able to accept MBMS session start/update/stop requests with an absolute start time ("MBMS data transfer start" or "MBMS data transfer stop" parameter) in the past. + +## 15A.6 Other MME related functionality for MBMS restoration + +When establishing MBMS bearer services in an MCE to ensure the distribution of content from ongoing MBMS sessions to an MCE which modifies the lists of the MBMS Service Areas it serves via the MCE Configuration Update procedure (see clause 5.9.2 of 3GPP TS 23.246 [12]), the MME shall encode the MBMS Session Start Request as specified in clause 15A.3 upon receipt of a Reset or M3 Setup Request message from the MCE. + +--- + +# 16 Restoration of data in the SGW + +## 16.1 Restart of the SGW + +### 16.1.0 SGW Failure + +When a SGW fails, all its Bearer contexts affected by the failure become invalid and may be deleted. SGW storage of subscriber data is volatile. + +When the SGW receives a GTP-U PDU for which no Bearer context exists, it shall discard the GTP-U PDU and return a GTP error indication to the originating node (the PGW, the eNodeB, the S4-SGSN, or if Direct Tunnel is established, the RNC) or follow the procedures specified in clause 27.2.2.5 if the restoration of PDN connections after an SGW failure is supported. + +The SGW should ensure as far as possible that previously used TEID values are not immediately reused after a SGW restart, in order to avoid inconsistent TEID allocation throughout the network. + +## 16.1.1 Restoration Procedures + +After an SGW restart, the SGW shall delete all MM Bearer contexts affected by the restart that it may have stored. + +During or immediately after an SGW Restart the SGW shall place local SGW restart counter value in all GTPv2 Echo requests/responses messages and PMIPv6 heartbeat responses the SGW sends. + +## 16.1a Restart of the SGW-C + +### 16.1a.1 SGW-C failure + +When a SGW-C fails, all its Bearer and Session contexts, Sx Association(s) affected by the failure become invalid and may be deleted. + +If F-TEID allocation is performed in the SGW-C, the SGW-C should ensure as far as possible that previously used F-TEID values are not immediately reused after a SGW-C restart, in order to avoid inconsistent TEID allocation throughout the network. + +NOTE: This is to ensure that F-TEIDs are not reused until earlier PDN connections using them are released e.g. in eNB or PGW. + +### 16.1a.2 Restoration procedure + +During or immediately after an SGW-C Restart, the SGW-C shall place local SGW-C Recovery Time Stamp value in all Heartbeat Request/Response and Sx Association Setup Request/Response Messages. + +## 16.1b Restart of the SGW-U + +### 16.1b.1 SGW-U failure + +When a SGW-U fails, all its Sx session contexts and Sx Association(s) affected by the failure become invalid and may be deleted. + +If F-TEID allocation is performed in the SGW-U, the SGW-U shall ensure that previously used F-TEID values are not immediately reused after a SGW-U restart, in order to avoid inconsistent TEID allocation throughout the network and to enable the restoration of Sx sessions affected by the failure. How this is ensured is implementation specific. + +NOTE: As the user plane F-TEID pool is partitioned in the SGW-U across the multiple SGW-Cs controlling the SGW-U, the SGW-U does not need to wait for the re-establishment of all the Sx associations from all SGW-Cs to start assigning new F-TEID for new Sx sessions for a particular SGW-C. + +### 16.1b.2 Restoration procedure + +During or immediately after an SGW-U Restart, the SGW-U shall place local SGW-U Recovery Time Stamp value in all Heartbeat Request/Response and Sx Association Setup Request/Response Messages. + +## 16.1A Restart of a peer node + +### 16.1A.1 MME/S4-SGSN Failure + +#### 16.1A.1.1 General + +The SGW will receive the MME/S4-SGSN restart counter in GTPv2 Echo requests and Echo response messages that the SGW receives from the MME/S4-SGSN. + +When an SGW detects that a peer MME /S4-SGSN has restarted (see clause 18 "GTP-C based restart procedures") it shall either: + +- delete all PDN connection table data/MM bearer contexts associated with the peer node that fails as well as freeing any internal SGW resources associated with those PDN connections. The SGW may optionally perform other implementation specific actions such as messages to clear other external resources (e.g. PCC messages to clear the resources in the PCRF or GTP/PMIP messages to release the corresponding PDN connection in the PGW); + +or + +- follow the network triggered service restoration procedure as specified in clause 25 if the MME, the S4-SGSN and the SGW support this procedure. + +### 16.1A.2 PGW Failure + +The SGW will receive the PGW restart counter in GTPv2 Echo requests/ responses and PMIPv6 heartbeat responses that the SGW receives from the PGW. + +When an SGW detects that a peer PGW has restarted (see clause 18 "GTP-C based restart procedures") it shall delete all PDN connection table data/MM bearer contexts associated with the peer node that fails as well as freeing any internal SGW resources associated with those PDN connections. In addition, if the optional feature PGW Restart Notification is supported by the SGW and MME/S4-SGSN as specified in clause 8.83 in 3GPP TS 29.274[13], the SGW shall initiate the cleanup of the hanging PDN connections associated with the SGW and the restarted PGW at the corresponding MMEs/S4-SGSNs by sending GTPv2 message(s) PGW Restart Notification, with the control plane IP address of the restarted PGW and the control plane IP address of the SGW on the S11/S4 interface included. The SGW may optionally perform other implementation specific actions such as messages to clear other external resources (e.g. PCC messages). + +If an SGW detects that a peer PGW has failed and not restarted, it may delete all PDN connection table data/MM bearer contexts associated with the peer node that fails as well as freeing any internal SGW resources associated with those PDN connections. In addition, if the optional feature PGW Restart Notification is supported by the SGW and MME/S4-SGSN as specified in clause 8.83 in 3GPP TS 29.274[13], the SGW may also send a PGW Restart Notification message to the MME or S4-SGSN. The PGW Restart Notification message shall include the control plane IP address of the PGW, the control plane IP address of the SGW on the S11/S4 interface and the cause value "PGW not responding". It is an implementation matter how an SGW becomes aware that a PGW has failed and has not restarted, e.g. the SGW detects a signalling path failure with the PGW for a duration exceeding the maximum path failure duration timer (see clause 20.2.1). + +When the MME/S4-SGSN receives this message, according to the control plane IP address of the restarted PGW and the control plane IP address of the SGW on the S11/S4 interface included in the message, the MME/S4 SGSN should delete all PDN connection table data/MM bearer contexts associated with the SGW and the restarted PGW as well as freeing any internal MME/S4-SGSN resources associated with those PDN connections. Additionally the MME/S4-SGSN may decide to restore certain PDN connections based on operator's policy e.g. based on the QCI and/or ARP and/or APN. If so, + +- the S4-SGSN shall deactivate the corresponding PDN connections using the "reactivation requested" cause value as specified in clause 9.2.4.2 of 3GPP TS 23.060 [5]; +- the MME shall deactivate the corresponding PDN connections using the "reactivation requested" cause value as specified in clause 5.10.3 of 3GPP TS 23.401 [15] if only a subset of the PDN connections of the UE need to be restored or if the UE has a SCEF PDN connection or if the UE supports Attach without PDN connectivity as specified in clause 5.3.8.3 of 3GPP TS 23.401 [15]; if all the PDN connections of the UE need to be restored and the UE does not have a SCEF PDN connection and the UE does not support Attach without PDN connectivity, + +the MME shall initiate the "explicit detach with reattach required" procedure as specified in clause 5.3.8.3 of 3GPP TS 23.401 [15]. + +The MME/S4-SGSN may prioritize the PDN connections to restore based on operator's policy e.g. based on the QCI and/or APN. Besides, the MME/SGSN may use the subscribed Restoration Priority per APN, if received from the HSS, and if permitted by service level agreements for in-bound roamers, to determine the relative restoration priority among PDN connections to the same APN. The MME/SGSN may use a locally configured value as default restoration priority if the restoration priority for a user's PDN connection is not received from the HSS or not permitted by service level agreement for in-bound roamers. + +NOTE 1: The Restoration Priority can e.g. allow to restore with a higher priority users with an IMS voice subscription over IMS users without an IMS voice subscription. + +The MME/S4-SGSN may optionally perform other implementation specific actions such as to clear external resources (e.g. S1-MME messages to clear eNodeB resources or Iu messages to clear RNC resources) or more advanced forms of restoration. + +NOTE 2: The SGW will have the identity of the MME/S4-SGSN and PGW currently in use for a PDN connection available in the SGW's PDN connection table as part of existing EPC procedure. + +If PMIPv6 based S5/S8 interface is used and if the SGW needs to send a request for Gateway Control and QoS Policy Rules Provision procedure towards a PCRF which is known to have restarted since the Gateway Control Session Establishment, the SGW may discard the request and may tear down the associated PDN connection, based on operator policy, by sending a Delete Bearer Request message for the default bearer towards the MME/S4-SGSN with the cause set to "Reactivation requested". Additionally, SGW initiates an SGW initiated PDN Disconnection procedure towards PGW. This leads the UE to initiate a UE requested PDN connectivity procedure for the same APN. Emergency and eMPS sessions should not be torn down. + +NOTE 3: The procedure above just enables to clean up the PDN connection affected by the PCRF failure when a specific interaction with the PCRF is required. Prior to that interaction, PCC controlled services can not be provided to the UE. + +For a split SGW, if the SGW-C detects a PGW failure, it shall initiate a Sx Session Deletion procedure towards the SGW-U. + +### 16.1A.3 SGW-C Failure + +The SGW-U will receive the recovery time stamps of the PFCP entity(ies) in the SGW-C in PFCP heartbeat request/response messages. + +When an SGW-U detects that a peer PFCP entity in the SGW-C has restarted, the SGW-U shall delete all its Sx session contexts affected by the restart. When the SGW-U receives a GTP-U PDU not matching any PDRs, it shall discard the GTP-U PDU and return a GTP error indication to the originating node (the PGW, the eNodeB, the S4-SGSN, or if Direct Tunnel is established, the RNC); as an exception, if the restoration of PDN connections after an SGW failure is supported as specified in clause 27, the SGW-U shall not send Error indication message for a configurable period after the restart in the SGW-C. + +NOTE: The period needs to be longer than the time required for the peer node to detect the restart of the SGW-C, e.g. the interval between two echo request messages. This ensures that the MME/SGSN or PGW does not deactivate the bearers before it detects the SGW-C failure and triggers the restoration procedure. + +When a SGW-U detects that a peer PFCP entity in the SGW-C is not reachable for a preconfigured time, the SGW-U shall delete all session contexts affected by the unreachability of the peer PFCP entity in the SGW-C that it may have stored. + +### 16.1A.4 SGW-U Failure + +The SGW-C will receive the recovery time stamps of the PFCP entity(ies) in the SGW-U in PFCP heartbeat request/response messages. + +After an SGW-U restart, the Sx association between SGW-C(s) and the SGW-U has to be re-established. + +NOTE: The SGW-C can determine to reestablish the Sx Association if it receives the cause code "No established PFCP Association" in a response message, or if it detects all peer PFCP entities in the SGW-U have restarted. + +Restoration of Sx sessions includes: + +- if re-establishment of Sx association is required, the SGW-C may start immediately the Sx association setup procedure, and then; +- when re-establishing a Sx session and if F-TEID allocation is performed in the SGW-U by network configuration, the SGW-C shall include a restoration indication in the PFCP Session Establishment Request message to indicate to the SGW-U it is for a restoration of an existing PFCP session and the SGW-U shall accept SGW-C allocated F-TEID if possible. +- if the restoration is supported in the SGW-C on a proactive basis, the SGW-C may start re-establishing Sx sessions matching any PDRs. +- if the restoration is supported in the SGW-C on a reactive basis: + - the SGW-C shall establish an Sx session with a wildcarded PDR to instruct the UP function to forward G-PDU packets which are not matching any other PDRs to the CP function (to a F-TEID uniquely assigned in the CP function for this Sx-u tunnel); + - upon receipt of G-PDUs from this Sx-u tunnel, the CP function shall then check if it has an active session for each received G-PDU packet: + - if so, the CP function shall perform Sx Session establishment procedures to re-establish the corresponding Sx sessions in the SGW-U; + - otherwise the CP function shall generate a GTP-U Error Indication with a destination address set to the source IP address of the received G-PDU, and send it to the UP function. The UP function shall forward this GTP-U Error Indication transparently. The CP function shall delete the G-PDU after the check for active sessions. + +NOTE 1: The SGW-U can filter the G-PDU packets with same target F-TEID and send only one such G-PDU to the CP function. + +NOTE 2: Such Sx-u tunnel to forward GTP-U Error Indication can be established per UP function and can also be used to send End Marker packets generated by the CP function. See clause 5.3.2 of TS 29.244 [43] + +The SGW-U shall not send Error indication message for a configurable period after a PFCP entity restart in the SGW-U when the SGW-U receives G-PDU not matching any PDRs. + +NOTE 3: If restoration on a reactive basis is used, the period needs to be longer than the time required by the SGW-C to detect the SGW-U restart, establish the Sx association and provision the wildcarded PDR. Otherwise, the period needs to be longer than the time required by the SGW-C to restore all the Sx sessions on a proactive basis. + +When the SGW-C detects the failure of an SGW-U without a restart, the SGW-C may select an alternative SGW-U which can take over the IP addresses of the failed one to restore the Sx sessions in the UP function. How this is performed is implementation specific. + +## 16.2 Partial Failure Handling at SGW + +### 16.2.1 General + +See Clause 23. + +In addition, the following applies. If an SGW, which supports the feature receives Delete PDN Connection Set Request/Reply messages from MME or the PGW it shall forward the messages to the appropriate peer. + +If the SGW does not support the feature then partial failure handling does not apply to that specific PDN connection. + +## 16.2.2 Procedures during PDN Connection Establishment + +If the SGW supports the feature, the following procedures apply. + +During a PDN connection establishment, the SGW shall provide one SGW FQ-CSID for that particular PDN connection to the PGW. Similarly, the SGW shall provide one SGW FQ-CSID for that particular PDN connection to the MME if the MME supports partial failure handling. The SGW shall store the Node-ID and CSID from the FQ-CSID provided by the PGW and the MME respectively for that particular PDN connection in its PDN Connection table maintained as part of "EPS Bearer Contexts" table as specified in Table 5.7.3-1 in 3GPP TS 23.401 [15]. + +The SGW shall forward the MME FQ-CSID provided by the MME on S11 to the PGW in the S5/S8 Create Session Request (Proxy Binding Update for PMIPv6) for that PDN connection. Similarly, the SGW shall forward the PGW FQ-CSID provided by the PGW on S5/S8 to the MME in the S11 Create Session Response for that PDN connection if the MME supports partial failure handling. + +The SGW determines that the MME supports partial failure handling by the presence of the MME FQ-CSID in the S11 Create Session Request. + +The SGW determines that the PGW supports partial failure handling by the presence of the PGW FQ-CSID in the S5/S8 Create Session Response for GTPv2 based S5/S8 and the Proxy Binding Acknowledgement for PMIPv6 based S5/S8. + +## 16.2.3 Procedures during SGW Partial Failure + +If the SGW supports the feature, the following procedures apply. + +When an SGW detects that it has undergone a partial failure, it shall verify that one or more corresponding CSID(s) are present for the component undergoing a partial fault. If there is no such CSID, then the following does not apply. When one or more CSIDs are currently assigned, the SGW shall perform the following. + +The SGW may perform implementation-specific operations to clean up any residual state associated with the CSID(s). + +The SGW shall send the GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request containing all the SGW CSIDs of the component(s) failing in SGW FQ-CSID to MME peers supporting the feature. The SGW shall send the GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request (or PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Indication with G bit set) message containing the equivalent SGW FQ-CSID(s) to PGW peers supporting the feature. + +Upon receiving a GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Response message with Cause value "Success", the SGW shall conclude that the PGW (for GTPv2 S5/S8) or the MME (for S11) has initiated the internal deletion of the PDN connections corresponding to the FQ-CSID(s) present in the GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request message. Similarly, upon receiving a successful PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Acknowledgment message with G bit set, the SGW shall conclude that the PGW has initiated the internal deletion of the PDN connections corresponding to the CSID(s) present in the PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Indication message. + +The SGW is not required to perform any further recovery actions towards MME and PGW peers for PDN connections in the connection set identified by the SGW FQ-CSID(s). + +## 16.2.4 Procedures during a Peer's Partial Failure + +If the SGW supports the feature, the following procedures apply. + +When an SGW receives a S11 GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request message from an MME, the SGW shall retrieve all the PDN connections corresponding to each of the FQ-CSID(s) present in the message. The SGW shall send a S5/S8 GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request (or PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Indication with G bit set) message containing the FQ-CSID(s) provided by the MME to PGW peers supporting the feature. The SGW shall delete all the retrieved PDN connections and the associated resources. Other implementation-specific actions may be performed. + +As a response, the SGW shall send a S11 GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Response message with an appropriate Cause value immediately to the MME. + +When an SGW receives a S5/S8 GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request (or PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Indication with G bit set) message from a PGW, the SGW shall retrieve all the PDN connections corresponding to each of the FQ-CSID(s) present in the message. The SGW shall send a S11 GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request message + +containing the FQ-CSID(s) provided by the PGW to MME peers supporting the feature. The SGW shall delete all the retrieved PDN connections and the associated resources. Other implementation-specific actions may be performed. + +As a response, the SGW shall send a S5/S8 GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Response message with an appropriate Cause value to the PGW. On PMIP6-based S5/S8 interface, the SGW shall send a PMIP6 Binding Revocation Acknowledgment message with G bit set. + +If the SGW detects the full/complete failure of an MME or PGW, e.g., through the Echo Request/Echo Response procedure, it may send a Delete PDN Connection Set Request (or PMIP6 Binding Revocation Indication with G bit set) message, containing all of the FQ-CSIDs of the associated hanging PDN connections of the failed node, to the corresponding remote node (MME or PGW). + +## 16.2.5 Procedures during PDN Connection Removal or Modification + +Only if the SGW supports the feature, the following procedures apply. + +During a S11 or an S5/S8 procedure, impacting an existing PDN connection removal or modification the following apply: + +- 1) If the MME is being relocated then the SGW shall clear the currently stored MME FQ-CSID value (if any). + - 2) For inter MME and intra SGW HO/TAU, and if the new MME supports the feature, then the SGW shall: + - include SGW FQ-CSID in the S11 Modify Bearer Response. If PGW supports the feature, the SGW shall also include PGW FQ-CSID into the message. + - inform the feature supporting PGW about the change of FQ-CSID values with the following messages: + - Modify Bearer Request, when Modify Bearer Request message needs to be sent to the PGW as specified in the 3GPP TS 23.401 [15], e.g. if the sending of this message is triggered by user location reporting procedure. The message shall contain both SGW FQ-CSID and MME FQ-CSID. + - Update PDN Connection Set Request message, only if Modify Bearer Request is not sent. The message shall contain both SGW FQ-CSID and MME FQ-CSID. + - Proxy Binding Update (if PMIPv6 is used). The message shall contain both SGW FQ-CSID and MME FQ-CSID. + - 3) For inter MME and intra SGW HO/TAU, and if the new MME does not support the feature, then the SGW shall: + - not include any FQ-CSID in the S11 Modify Bearer Response. + - inform the feature supporting PGW with the following messages: + - Modify Bearer Request when Modify Bearer Request message needs to be sent to the PGW as specified in the 3GPP TS 23.401 [15], e.g. if the sending of this message is triggered by user location reporting procedure. The message shall contain only SGW FQ-CSID. + - Update PDN Connection Set Request message, only if Modify Bearer Request is not sent. The message shall contain only SGW FQ-CSID. + - Proxy Binding Update (if PMIPv6 is used). The message shall contain only the SGW FQ-CSID. +- NOTE: The partial failure handling is not supported by the S4-SGSN, therefore, during the RAU/HO to S4-SGSN procedure, the SGW can behave in the same way as the TAU/HO to a MME which does not support the feature. +- 4) For inter SGW HO/TAU, if the new MME supports the feature, then the new SGW shall: + - include SGW FQ-CSID in the S11 Create Session Response. If PGW supports the feature, the SGW shall also include PGW FQ-CSID into the message. + - inform the feature supporting PGW about the change of FQ-CSID values with the following messages: + - Modify Bearer Request. The message shall contain both SGW FQ-CSID and MME FQ-CSID. + +- Proxy Binding Update (if PMIPv6 is used). The message shall contain both SGW FQ-CSID and MME FQ-CSID. +- 5) For inter SGW HO/TAU, if the MME does not support the feature, then the SGW shall: +- not include any FQ-CSID in the S11 Create Session Response. + - inform the feature supporting PGW about the change of SGW FQ-CSID value with the following messages: + - Modify Bearer Request. The message shall contain only SGW FQ-CSID + - Proxy Binding Update (if PMIPv6 is used). The message shall contain only the SGW FQ-CSID. +- 6) If the SGW receives a FQ-CSID value of a PGW over S5/S8, or a FQ-CSID value of a MME over S11, the SGW shall overwrite the current stored FQ-CSID value with the received value. +- 7) During the PDN connection removing procedures, a PGW removes the PDN data as well as any stored FQ-CSID values(s) of the MME and SGW FQ-CSIDs. +- 8) For the following procedures, if the procedures as specified in 3GPP TS 23.401 [15] e.g. Location Change reporting is enabled, the SGW shall send its own FQ-CSID and the MME FQ-CSID in Modify Bearer Request and Proxy Binding Update across S5/S8 interface to the respective PGW even if the MME did not update its FQ-CSID, e.g.: +- X2-based Handover without SGW relocation + - TAU without MME and without SGW relocation + - UE Triggered Service Request + +During a S11 or S5/S8 procedure removing an existing PDN connection the SGW simply removes the PDN data as well as any stored FQ-CSID values(s) of the PGW FQ-CSID and MME FQ-CSID or pointers to such data. The same actions are done on the old SGW if there is an SGW relocation. + +An SGW determines that the MME supports partial failure handling if MME FQ-CSID is present in the received S11 Modify Bearer Request or S11 Create Session Request (with both MME and SGW change) messages. + +A new SGW determines that the PGW supports partial failure handling if PGW FQ-CSID is present in the S5/S8 Modify Bearer Response for GTPv2 based S5/S8 or in the Proxy Binding Acknowledgement for PMIPv6 based S5/S8. + +--- + +## 17 Restoration of data in the PGW + +### 17.1 Restart of the PGW + +#### 17.1.0 PGW Failure + +When a PGW fails, all its Bearer contexts affected by the failure become invalid and may be deleted. PGW storage of subscriber data is volatile. + +When the PGW receives a GTP-U PDU for which no Bearer context exists, it shall discard the GTP-U PDU and return a GTP error indication to the originating node i.e. the SGW/ePDG/TWAN. + +The PGW should ensure as far as possible that previously used TEID values are not immediately reused after a PGW restart, in order to avoid inconsistent TEID allocation throughout the network. + +#### 17.1.1 Restoration Procedures + +After a PGW restart, the PGW shall delete all MM Bearer contexts affected by the restart that it may have stored. + +During or immediately after a PGW Restart, the PGW shall place this PGW restart counter value in all GTPv2 echo requests/responses and PMIPv6 heartbeat responses the PGW sends. + +## 17.1a Restart of the PGW-C + +### 17.1a.1 PGW-C failure + +When a PGW-C fails, all its Bearer, session contexts and Sx associations affected by the failure become invalid and may be deleted. + +If F-TEID allocation is performed in the PGW-C, the PGW-C should ensure as far as possible that previously used F-TEID values are not immediately reused after a PGW-C restart, in order to avoid inconsistent TEID allocation throughout the network. + +NOTE: This is to ensure that F-TEIDs are not reused until earlier PDN connections using them are released. + +### 17.1a.2 Restoration Procedures + +After a PGW-C restart, the PGW-C shall delete all MM Bearer and session contexts, and Sx Associations affected by the restart that it may have stored. + +During or immediately after a PGW-C Restart, the PGW-C shall place local PGW-C Recovery Time Stamp value in all Heartbeat Request/Response and Sx Association Setup Request/Response Messages. + +## 17.1b Restart of the PGW-U + +### 17.1b.1 PGW-U failure + +When a PGW-U fails, all its Session contexts and Sx associations affected by the failure become invalid and may be deleted. + +If F-TEID allocation is performed in the PGW-U, the PGW-U shall ensure that previously used F-TEID values are not immediately reused after a PGW-U restart, in order to avoid inconsistent TEID allocation throughout the network and to enable the restoration of Sx sessions affected by the failure. How this is ensured is implementation specific. + +The PGW-U shall not send Error indication message for a configurable period after an PGW-U restart when the PGW-U receives G-PDU not matching any PDRs. + +### 17.1b.2 Restoration Procedures + +During or immediately after an PGW-U Restart, the PGW-U shall place local PGW-U Recovery Time Stamp value in all Heartbeat Request/Response and Sx Association Setup Request/Response Messages. + +Immediately after the re-establishment of an Sx association between the PGW-C and the PGW-U, the PGW-C may start restoring Sx sessions in the PGW-U. + +NOTE: Restoring Sx sessions in a PGW-U on a reactive basis (like defined for an SGW-U restart in clause 16.1A.4) is not supported in this release. In some cases, a restarted PGW-U cannot determine from the UE IP address the CP function responsible for an incoming packet for which no session exists, e.g. when a UP function is controlled by multiple CP function for the same APN and when the UE IP address was assigned by the PDN. + +## 17.1A Restart of a peer node + +### 17.1A.1 SGW/ePDG/TWAN Failure + +The PGW will receive the SGW/ePDG/TWAN restart counters in GTPv2 echo requests/responses and PMIPv6 heartbeat responses that the PGW receives from the SGW/ePDG/TWAN. + +When a PGW detects that a peer ePDG/peer TWAN has restarted it shall delete all PDN connection table data/MM bearer contexts associated with the peer node that fails as well as freeing any internal PGW resources associated with + +those PDN connections. The PGW may optionally perform other implementation specific actions such as messages to clear other external resources (e.g. PCC messages). + +When a PGW detects that a peer SGW has failed with or without restart it shall either: + +- proceed as specified above when the PGW detects that a peer ePDG/TWAN fails; or +- follow the procedures specified in clause 27 to restore the PDN connections affected by the SGW failure, if the MME/S4-SGSN and the PGW support these procedures. + +NOTE: The PGW will have the identity of SGW/ePDG/TWAN currently in use for a PDN connection available in the PGW's PDN connection table as part of existing EPC procedure. + +For multi-access PDN connection in the Network-initiated NBIFOM mode, when the PGW detects ePDG/TWAN has failed, the PGW may: + +- maintain the PDN connection on the 3GPP access and notify the PCRF the removal of Non-3GPP access. Then the PCRF can determine to move the affected traffic to the 3GPP access by updating the PCC rules as specified in the clause 5.8 in the 3GPP TS 23.161 [39]. + +For multi-access PDN connection in the Network-initiated NBIFOM mode, when the PGW detects that the SGW has failed, the PGW may: + +- maintain the PDN connection on the Non-3GPP access and notify the PCRF the removal of 3GPP access. Then the PCRF can determine to move the affected traffic to the 3GPP access by updating the PCC rules as specified in the clause 5.8 in the 3GPP TS 23.161 [39], if the SGW restoration procedures as specified in clause 27 are not supported; or, +- follow the SGW restoration procedures specified in clause 27, e.g. maintain the PDN connection on both non-3GPP access and 3GPP access without notify the PCRF about SGW failure, if the SGW restoration procedures are supported. + +## 17.1A.2 PCRF Failure + +If the PGW needs to send a request for IP-CAN Session Modification procedure towards a PCRF which is known to have restarted since the IP-CAN session establishment, the PGW may discard the request and may tear down the associated PDN connection, based on operator policy, by initiating a PGW initiated bearer deactivation procedure for the default bearer towards the MME/S4-SGSN with the cause set to "Reactivation requested". This leads the UE to initiate a UE requested PDN connectivity procedure for the same APN. Emergency and eMPS sessions should not be torn down. + +NOTE: The procedure above just enables to clean up the PDN connection affected by the PCRF failure when a specific interaction with the PCRF is required. Prior to that interaction, PCC controlled services can not be provided to the UE. + +## 17.1A.3 PGW-C Failure + +The PGW-U will receive the recovery time stamps of the PFCP entity(ies) in the PGW-C in PFCP heartbeat requests/responses. + +When a PGW-U detects that a peer PFCP entity in the PGW-C has restarted, the PGW-U shall delete all session contexts affected by the restart that it may have stored. + +When a PGW-U detects that a peer PFCP entity in the PGW-C is not reachable for a preconfigured time, the PGW-U shall delete all session contexts affected by the unreachability of the peer PFCP entity in the PGW-C that it may have stored. + +## 17.1A.4 PGW-U Failure + +The PGW-C will receive the recovery time stamps of the PFCP entity(ies) in the PGW-U in and PFCP heartbeat requests/responses. + +The PGW-C may start restoring Sx sessions in the PGW-U and it may: + +- if re-establishment of Sx association is required, immediately re-establish the Sx association between the PGW-C and the PGW-U; +- re-establish Sx sessions affected by the PGW-U failure. . +- when re-establishing a Sx session and if F-TEID allocation is performed in the PGW-U by network configuration, the PGW-C shall include a restoration indication in the PFCP Session Establishment Request message to indicate to the PGW-U it is for a restoration of an existing PFCP session and the PGW-U shall accept PGW-C allocated F-TEID if possible. + +NOTE: The PGW-C can determine to reestablish the Sx Association if it receives the cause code "No established PFCP Association" in a response message, or if it detects all peer PFCP entities in the PGW-U have restarted. When a PGW-C detects the failure of a PGW-U without a restart, the PGW-C may select an alternative PGW-U to restore the Sx sessions in the UP function. How this is performed is implementation specific. + +## 17.2 Partial Failure Handling at PGW + +### 17.2.1 General + +See Clause 23. + +### 17.2.2 Procedures during PDN Connection Establishment + +If the PGW supports the feature, the following procedures apply. + +During a PDN connection establishment, the PGW shall provide one FQ-CSID containing exactly one CSID for that particular PDN connection to the SGW, the ePDG or the TWAN. The PGW shall store the FQ-CSID provided by the SGW and the MME in the PDN Connection table maintained as part of P-GW Context as specified in Table 5.7.3-1 in 3GPP TS 23.401 [15]. Similarly, the PGW shall store the FQ-CSID received from the ePDG or the TWAN. + +The PGW should ensure as far as possible that previously used FQ-CSIDs are not immediately reused after a partial/full failure of a PGW. + +PGW determines that the partial failure handling does not apply to this PDN connection if it does not receive an SGW FQ-CSID in the S5/S8 Create Session Request (for GTP based interface) or in Proxy Binding Update (for PMIPv6 based interface), or if it does not receive a TWAN FQ-CSID in the S2a Create Session Request (for GTP based S2a) or in Proxy Binding Update (for PMIPv6 based S2a), or if it does not receive an ePDG FQ-CSID in the S2b Create Session Request (for GTP based S2b) or in Proxy Binding Update (for PMIPv6 based S2b). + +### 17.2.3 Procedures during PGW Partial Failure + +If the PGW supports the feature, the following procedures apply. + +When a PGW detects that it has undergone a partial failure, it shall verify that one or more corresponding CSID(s) are present for the component(s) undergoing a partial fault. If there is no such CSID, then the following does not apply. When one or more CSIDs are currently assigned, the PGW shall perform the following: + +- The PGW may perform implementation-specific operations to clean up any residual state associated with the CSID(s). +- The PGW shall send the GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request (or PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Indication with G bit set) message containing all the PGW FQ-CSID(s) of the component(s) failing to the SGW, the TWAN or the ePDG that support the feature. + +Upon receiving a GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Response message with Cause value "Success", the PGW shall conclude that the SGW, the ePDG peer or the TWAN peer has initiated the internal deletion of the PDN connections corresponding to the FQ-CSID(s) present in the GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request message. Similarly, upon receiving a PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Acknowledgment message with G bit set, the PGW shall conclude that the SGW, the ePDG or the TWAN has initiated the internal deletion of the PDN connections corresponding to the CSID(s) present in the PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Indication message with G bit set. + +The PGW is not required to perform any further recovery actions towards SGW, MME peers, an ePDG peer or a TWAN peer for PDN connections in the connection set identified by the PGW FQ-CSID regardless of the "Cause" value in the response. + +## 17.2.4 Procedures during a Peer's Partial Failure + +If the PGW supports the feature, the following procedures apply. + +When a PGW receives a GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request (or PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Indication with G bit set) message from an SGW, an ePDG or a TWAN, the PGW shall retrieve all the PDN connections corresponding to each of the FQ-CSIDs present in the message. The PGW shall delete all the retrieved PDN connections and the associated resources. Other implementation-specific actions may be performed. + +As a response, the PGW shall send a GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Response message. On PMIPv6-based S5/S8 interface, the PGW shall send a PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Acknowledgment message with G bit set. + +## 17.2.5 Procedures during PDN Connection Removal or Modification + +If the PGW supports the feature, the following procedures apply. + +During a S5/S8 procedure, impacting an existing PDN connection Removal or Modification the following apply: + +- 1) If an SGW is being relocated then the PGW shall clear the currently stored MME and SGW FQ-CSID values. +- 2) If the SGW includes a SGW FQ-CSID in the S5/S8 Modify Bearer Request (Proxy Binding Update for PMIPv6), or Update PDN Connection Request message, then the PGW shall include PGW FQ-CSID in the S5/S8 Modify Bearer Response (Proxy Binding Acknowledgement for PMIPv6), or Update PDN Connection Response message. +- 3) If the new SGW does not include a SGW FQ-CSID in the S5/S8 Modify Bearer Request (Proxy Binding Update for PMIPv6), then the new SGW does not support the feature and the feature does not apply for this PDN connection. In such case, PGW shall not include PGW FQ-CSID in the S5/S8 Modify Bearer Response (Proxy Binding Acknowledgement for PMIPv6). +- 4) If the PGW receives an SGW FQ-CSID and/or an MME FQ-CSID value of a SGW over S5/S8 then the PGW shall overwrite the respective stored FQ-CSID value with the received value. +- 5) If the PGW receives an Update PDN Connection Request, a Modify Bearer Request or Proxy Binding Update with an SGW FQ-CSID but without an MME FQ-CSID then the PGW shall erase the MME FQ-CSID value (i.e. the current MME does not support the feature). +- 6) During a S5/S8 procedure removing an existing PDN connection the PGW simply removes the PDN data as well as any stored FQ-CSID values(s) of the MME and SGW or pointers to such data. + +During an S2a/S2b procedure, impacting an existing PDN connection Removal or Modification the following apply: + +- 1) If the PGW receives a TWAN or an ePDG FQ-CSID value then the PGW shall overwrite the respective stored FQ-CSID value with the received value; +- 2) During an S2a/S2b procedure removing an existing PDN connection, the PGW removes the corresponding PDN data as well as any stored FQ-CSID value of the TWAN or the ePDG FQ-CSID. + +--- + +# 17A Restoration of data in the MBMS GW + +## 17A.1 Restart of the MBMS GW + +When a MBMS GW fails, all its MBMS Bearer contexts affected by the failure become invalid and will be deleted. MBMS GW storage of subscriber data is volatile. + +After a MBMS GW restart, all the MBMS Bearer contexts stored in the MBMS GW and affected by the restart become invalid and will be deleted. All the SGmb Diameter sessions affected by the restart are also lost in the MBMS GW. + +When the SGSN/MME detects a restart in a MBMS GW (see clause 18 "GTP-C based restart procedures") with which it has MBMS Bearer contexts activated, it shall deactivate all the related MBMS Bearer contexts locally and towards E-UTRAN/UTRAN in which the MBMS bearer service is active. The MME shall initiate a M3AP Reset procedure (see clause 8.5 of 3GPP TS 36.444 [28]), or an MBMS Session Stop procedure per affected MBMS service (see clause 8.3 of 3GPP TS 36.444 [28]), towards the MCE(s) to deactivate the related MBMS services in E-UTRAN. The SGSN shall initiate an MBMS Session Stop procedure per affected MBMS service (see clause 8.38 of 3GPP TS 25.413 [29]), towards the RNC(s) to deactivate the related MBMS services in UTRAN. + +If the MBMS GW receives a non-initial message (i.e. MBMS session update or MBMS session stop request) from the BM-SC for which no SGmb Diameter session exists, the MBMS GW shall discard the message and return a Diameter error indication to the originating BM-SC. + +In deployments without a Diameter Agent between the BM-SC and the MBMS GW, the BM-SC shall detect a restart in the MBMS GW using either: + +- the Diameter Origin-State-Id AVP as specified in the Diameter Base Protocol. To enable fast detection of restart, the Diameter Origin-State-Id AVP shall be included (at least) in Capabilities-Exchange-Request and Capabilities-Exchange-Answer commands; or +- the Diameter Restart-Counter AVP as specified in the MBMS Heartbeat procedure (see clause 29), if this procedure is supported. + +In deployments with a Diameter Agent between the BM-SC and the MBMS GW, the BM-SC shall detect a restart in the MBMS GW using the Diameter Restart-Counter AVP as specified in the MBMS Heartbeat procedure (see clause 29). + +NOTE 1: The intermediate Diameter Agent can remove or update the Diameter Origin-State-Id AVP, e.g. if it needs to modify the Origin-Host-ID. Thus the Diameter Origin-State-Id AVP, if received by the BM-SC or MBMS GW, does not reflect the state of the remote MBMS peer but the state of the Diameter Agent. + +When the BM-SC detects a restart in a MBMS GW with which it has at least one MBMS Bearer context, the BM-SC shall maintain the related MBMS bearer context(s), assume that all related SGmb Diameter session(s) have been terminated and clean-up internal resources associated with these lost session(s). The BM-SC should then re-establish the active MBMS bearer services affected by the MBMS GW restart by initiating MBMS Session Start procedure(s) towards the restarted MBMS GW (or an alternative MBMS GW). The BM-SC shall encode the MBMS Session Start Request with the same contents as in the original MBMS Session Start Request (or per the last MBMS Session Update Request sent by the BM-SC if the original parameters were updated) with the following exceptions: + +- the BM-SC shall set the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag to signal that this message is used to re-establish an MBMS session; +- if no absolute start time ("MBMS data transfer start" parameter) has been sent, the BM-SC may change the relative start time ("time to MBMS data transfer" parameter) to fasten the restoration of the MBMS service in E-UTRAN; +- the BM-SC should set the estimated session duration to a value corresponding to the remaining duration of the session. + +NOTE 2: If the BM-SC is instructed to modify an MBMS Session during the MBMS GW failure/restart, the contents of the MBMS Session Start Request sent to the MBMS GW after the MBMS GW restart can also differ from the parameters sent to the MBMS GW before its restart for the parameters that can be modified by the MBMS session update procedure (i.e. MBMS Session Area, MBMS Time to Data Transfer, MBMS Data Transfer Start). + +## 17A.2 Restart of a peer node + +### 17A.2.1 MME failure + +The behaviour of an MBMS GW when it detects that a peer MME has restarted is described in clause 14.1.1. + +### 17A.2.2 SGSN failure + +The behaviour of an MBMS GW when it detects that a peer SGSN has restarted is described in clause 11.1. + +### 17A.2.3 BM-SC failure + +In deployments without a Diameter Agent between the BM-SC and the MBMS GW, the MBMS GW shall detect a restart in the BM-SC using either: + +- the Diameter Origin-State-Id AVP as specified in the Diameter Base Protocol. To enable fast detection of restart, the Diameter Origin-State-Id AVP shall be included (at least) in Capabilities-Exchange-Request and Capabilities-Exchange-Answer commands; or +- the Diameter Restart-Counter AVP as specified in the MBMS Heartbeat procedure (see clause 29), if this procedure is supported. + +In deployments with a Diameter Agent between the BM-SC and the MBMS GW, the MBMS GW shall detect a restart in the BM-SC using the Diameter Restart-Counter AVP as specified in the MBMS Heartbeat procedure (see clause 29). + +NOTE: The intermediate Diameter Agent can remove or update the Diameter Origin-State-Id AVP, e.g. if it needs to modify the Origin-Host-ID. Thus the Diameter Origin-State-Id AVP, if received by the BM-SC or MBMS GW, does not reflect the state of the remote MBMS peer but the state of the Diameter Agent. + +When the MBMS GW detects a restart of the BM-SC with which it has at least one MBMS Bearer context, the MBMS GW shall assume that all related SGmb Diameter session(s) have been terminated and shall deactivate all the related MBMS Bearer contexts locally and towards E-UTRAN/UTRAN in which the MBMS bearer service is active by sending MBMS Session Stop messages to their controlling MME/SGSNs. + +--- + +## 17B Restoration of data in the ePDG + +### 17B.1 Restart of the ePDG + +#### 17B.1.1 ePDG Failure + +When an ePDG fails, all its Bearer contexts/PDN connections affected by the failure become invalid and may be deleted. ePDG storage of subscriber data is volatile. + +When the ePDG receives a GTP-U PDU over GTPv2 based S2b for which no Bearer context exists, it shall discard the GTP-U PDU and return a GTP error indication to the originating node (i.e. the PGW). + +The ePDG should ensure as far as possible that previously used TEID values are not immediately reused after an ePDG restart, in order to avoid inconsistent TEID allocation throughout the network. + +When the ePDG receives a user packet with an unknown GRE Key over PMIPv6 based S2b, the ePDG shall discard the packet and optionally response back with an ICMP message, as specified in Clauses 8.2 and 8.3 of IETF RFC2473 [31] for the node unreachable error case. + +#### 17B.1.2 Restoration Procedures + +After an ePDG restart, the ePDG shall delete all MM Bearer contexts affected by the restart that it may have stored. + +During or immediately after an ePDG Restart the ePDG shall place local ePDG restart counter value in all GTPv2 Echo requests/responses messages and PMIPv6 heartbeat responses the ePDG sends to the PGW. + +### 17B.1A Restart of a peer node + +#### 17B.1A.1 PGW Failure + +The ePDG will receive the PGW restart counter in GTPv2 Echo requests/ responses and PMIPv6 heartbeat responses that the ePDG receives from the PGW. + +When an ePDG detects that a peer PGW has restarted (see clause 18 "GTP-C based restart procedures" and clause 19 "PMIPv6 based restart procedures") it shall delete all PDN connection table data/MM bearer contexts associated with the peer node that fails, free any internal ePDG resources associated with those PDN connections and initiate the release of the corresponding SWu instances (i.e. IKEv2 tunnels). + +## 17B.2 Partial Failure Handling at ePDG + +### 17B.2.1 General + +See clause 23. + +The partial failure feature is optional for ePDG. + +If the ePDG does not support the feature then partial failure handling does not apply to that specific PDN connection. + +### 17B.2.2 Procedures during PDN Connection Establishment + +If the ePDG supports the feature, the following procedures apply. + +During a PDN connection establishment, the ePDG shall provide one ePDG FQ-CSID containing exactly one CSID for that particular PDN connection to the PGW. The ePDG shall store the Node-ID and CSID from the FQ-CSID provided by the PGW for that particular PDN connection in its PDN Connection table. + +The ePDG determines that the PGW supports partial failure handling by the presence of the PGW FQ-CSID in the Create Session Response for GTPv2 based S2b and/or Proxy Binding Acknowledgement message for PMIPv6 based S2b. + +### 17B.2.3 Procedures during ePDG Partial Failure + +If the ePDG supports the feature, the following procedures apply. + +When an ePDG detects that it has undergone a partial failure, it shall verify that one or more corresponding CSID(s) are present for the component undergoing a partial fault. If there is no such CSID, then the following does not apply. When one or more CSIDs are currently assigned, the ePDG shall perform the following. + +The ePDG may perform implementation-specific operations to clean up any residual state associated with the CSID(s). + +The ePDG shall send Delete PDN Connection Set Request containing all the ePDG CSIDs of the component(s) failing in ePDG FQ-CSID over the GTPv2 based S2b interface or PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Indication with G bit set message containing the equivalent ePDG FQ-CSID(s) over the PMIPv6 based S2b interface to PGW peers supporting the feature. + +On the GTPv2 based S2b interface, upon receiving a GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Response message with Cause value "Success", the ePDG shall conclude that the PGW has initiated the internal deletion of the PDN connections corresponding to the FQ-CSID(s) present in the GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request message. Similarly, on the PMIPv6 based S2b interface, upon receiving a successful PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Acknowledgment message with G bit set, the ePDG shall conclude that the PGW has initiated the internal deletion of the PDN connections corresponding to the CSID(s) present in the PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Indication message. + +The ePDG is not required to perform any further recovery actions towards PGW peers for PDN connections in the connection set identified by the PGW FQ-CSID(s). + +### 17B.2.4 Procedures during PGW Partial Failure + +If the ePDG supports the feature, the following procedures apply. + +When an ePDG receives a GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request or PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Indication with G bit set message from a PGW, the ePDG shall retrieve all the PDN connections corresponding to each of the FQ-CSID(s) present in the message. The ePDG shall delete all the retrieved PDN connections, free the associated internal resources and initiate the release of the corresponding SWu instances (i.e. IKEv2 tunnels). Other implementation-specific actions may be performed. + +As a response, the ePDG shall send a GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Response message with an appropriate Cause value or a PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Acknowledgment message with G bit set to the PGW. + +## 17B.2.5 Procedures during PDN Connection Removal or Modification + +For the modification of an existing PDN connection established over 2b, if the corresponding ePDG and PGW support the partial failure feature, when the ePDG receives an FQ-CSID value of a PGW over S2b, the ePDG shall overwrite the currently stored FQ CSID value with the received value. + +For the removal of an existing PDN connection established over S2b, if the corresponding ePDG and PGW support the partial failure feature, an ePDG removes the corresponding PDN data as well as any relevant stored FQ-CSID value of the PGW FQ-CSID. + +--- + +# 17C Restoration of data in the TWAN + +## 17C.1 Restart of the TWAN + +### 17C.1.1 TWAN Failure + +When a TWAN fails, all its Bearer contexts/PDN connections affected by the failure become invalid and may be deleted. TWAN storage of subscriber data is volatile. + +When the TWAN receives a GTP-U PDU over GTPv2 based S2a for which no Bearer context exists, it shall discard the GTP-U PDU and return a GTP error indication to the originating node (i.e. the PGW). + +The TWAN should ensure as far as possible that previously used TEID values are not immediately reused after a TWAN restart, in order to avoid inconsistent TEID allocation throughout the network. + +When the TWAN receives a user packet with an unknown GRE Key over PMIPv6 based S2a, the TWAN shall discard the packet and optionally respond back with an ICMP message, as specified in Clauses 8.2 and 8.3 of IETF RFC2473 [31] for the node unreachable error case. + +### 17C.1.2 Restoration Procedures + +After a TWAN restart, the TWAN shall delete all Bearer contexts affected by the restart that it may have stored and place local TWAN restart counter value in all GTPv2 Echo requests/responses messages and PMIPv6 heartbeat responses the TWAN sends to the PGW. + +## 17C.1A Restart of a peer node + +### 17C.1A.1 PGW Failure + +The TWAN will receive the PGW restart counter in GTPv2 Echo requests/ responses and PMIPv6 heartbeat responses that the TWAN receives from the PGW. + +When a TWAN detects that a peer PGW has restarted (see clause 18 "GTP-C based restart procedures" and clause 19 "PMIPv6 based restart procedures") it shall delete all PDN connection table data/bearer contexts associated with the peer node that fails, and may free the associated internal TWAN resources. + +## 17C.2 Partial Failure Handling at TWAN + +### 17C.2.1 General + +See clause 23. + +The partial failure feature is optional for TWAN. + +If the TWAN does not support the feature then partial failure handling does not apply to that specific PDN connection. + +## 17C.2.2 Procedures during PDN Connection Establishment + +If the TWAN supports the feature, the following procedures apply. + +During a PDN connection establishment, the TWAN shall provide one TWAN FQ-CSID containing exactly one CSID for that particular PDN connection to the PGW. The TWAN shall store the Node-ID and CSID from the FQ-CSID provided by the PGW for that particular PDN connection in its PDN Connection table. + +The TWAN determines that the PGW supports partial failure handling by the presence of the PGW FQ-CSID in the Create Session Response for GTPv2 based S2a and/or Proxy Binding Acknowledgement message for PMIPv6 based S2a. + +## 17C.2.3 Procedures during TWAN Partial Failure + +If the TWAN supports the feature, the following procedures apply. + +When a TWAN detects that it has undergone a partial failure, it shall verify that one or more corresponding CSID(s) are present for the component undergoing a partial fault. If there is no such CSID, then the following does not apply. When one or more CSIDs are currently assigned, the TWAN shall perform the following. + +The TWAN may perform implementation-specific operations to clean up any residual state associated with the CSID(s). + +The TWAN shall send Delete PDN Connection Set Request containing all the TWAN CSIDs of the component(s) failing in TWAN FQ-CSID over the GTPv2 based S2a interface or PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Indication with G bit set message containing the equivalent TWAN FQ-CSID(s) over the PMIPv6 based S2a interface to PGW peers supporting the feature. + +On the GTPv2 based S2a interface, upon receiving a GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Response message with Cause value "Success", the TWAN shall conclude that the PGW has initiated the internal deletion of the PDN connections corresponding to the FQ-CSID(s) present in the GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request message. Similarly, on the PMIPv6 based S2a interface, upon receiving a successful PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Acknowledgment message with G bit set, the TWAN shall conclude that the PGW has initiated the internal deletion of the PDN connections corresponding to the CSID(s) present in the PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Indication message. + +The TWAN is not required to perform any further recovery actions towards PGW peers for PDN connections in the connection set identified by the PGW FQ-CSID(s). + +## 17C.2.4 Procedures during PGW Partial Failure + +If the TWAN supports the feature, the following procedures apply. + +When an TWAN receives a GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request or PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Indication with G bit set message from a PGW, the TWAN shall retrieve all the PDN connections corresponding to each of the FQ-CSID(s) present in the message. The TWAN shall delete all the retrieved PDN connections, and may free the associated internal TWAN resources. + +As a response, the TWAN shall send a GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Response message with an appropriate Cause value or a PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Acknowledgment message with G bit set to the PGW. + +## 17C.2.5 Procedures during PDN Connection Removal or Modification + +For the modification of an existing PDN connection established over S2a, if the corresponding TWAN and PGW support the partial failure feature, when the TWAN receives an FQ-CSID value of a PGW over S2a, the TWAN shall overwrite the currently stored FQ CSID value with the received value. + +For the removal of an existing PDN connection established over S2a, if the corresponding TWAN and PGW support the partial failure feature, a TWAN removes the corresponding PDN data as well as any relevant stored FQ-CSID value of the PGW FQ-CSID. + +## 17D Restoration of data in the BM-SC + +### 17D.1 Restart of the BM-SC + +When a BM-SC fails, all its MBMS Bearer contexts affected by the failure become invalid and will be deleted. + +After a BM-SC restart, all the MBMS Bearer contexts stored in the BM-SC and affected by the restart become invalid and will be deleted. All the SGmb Diameter sessions affected by the restart are also lost in the BM-SC. If Group Communication Service (GCS) is supported, the BM-SC also loses the knowledge of the TMGIs it had allocated to the Group Communication Service Application Server(s) (GCS AS) before restarting. + +When the MBMS GW detects the restart of a BM-SC, it shall behave as described in clause 17A.2.3. + +When the GCS AS detects the restart of a BM-SC, it shall behave as described in clause 17E.1. The restoration of MBMS services by content providers other than GCS AS after a BM-SC failure or restart is out of scope of 3GPP. + +NOTE: The reference point from content providers other than GCS AS to the BM-SC is not standardised by 3GPP. + +### 17D.2 Restart of the GCS AS + +In deployments without a Diameter Agent between the GCS AS and the BM-SC, the BM-SC shall detect a restart in the GCS AS using either: + +- the Diameter Origin-State-Id AVP as specified in the Diameter Base Protocol. To enable fast detection of restart, the Diameter Origin-State-Id AVP shall be included (at least) in Capabilities-Exchange-Request and Capabilities-Exchange-Answer commands; or +- the Diameter Restart-Counter AVP as specified in the MBMS Heartbeat procedure (see clause 29), if this procedure is supported. + +In deployments with a Diameter Agent between the GCS AS and the BM-SC, the BM-SC shall detect a restart in the GCS AS using the Diameter Restart-Counter AVP as specified in the MBMS Heartbeat procedure (see clause 29). + +NOTE: The intermediate Diameter Agent can remove or update the Diameter Origin-State-Id AVP, e.g. if it needs to modify the Origin-Host-ID. Thus the Diameter Origin-State-Id AVP, if received by the BM-SC or GCS AS, does not reflect the state of the remote MBMS peer but the state of the Diameter Agent. + +When the BM-SC detects a restart of the GCS AS, the BM-SC shall deallocate (locally) all the TMGIs that had been assigned to the restarted GCS AS and the BM-SC shall stop all the related MBMS bearers to free the corresponding resources in E-UTRAN. + +## 17E Restoration of data in the GCS AS + +### 17E.1 Restart of the GCS-AS + +After a GCS AS restart, the GCS AS loses its MBMS bearer contexts and the knowledge of the TMGIs it had been allocated by the BM-SC(s) before restarting. + +When the BM-SC detects the restart of a GCS AS, it shall behave as described in clause 17D.2. + +### 17E.2 Restart of the BM-SC + +In deployments without a Diameter Agent between the GCS AS and the BM-SC, the GCS AS shall detect a restart in the BM-SC using either: + +- the Diameter Origin-State-Id AVP as specified in the Diameter Base Protocol. To enable fast detection of restart, the Diameter Origin-State-Id AVP shall be included (at least) in Capabilities-Exchange-Request and Capabilities-Exchange-Answer commands; or +- the Diameter Restart-Counter AVP as specified in the MBMS Heartbeat procedure (see clause 29), if this procedure is supported. + +In deployments with a Diameter Agent between the GCS AS and the BM-SC, the GCS AS shall detect a restart in the BM-SC using the Diameter Restart-Counter AVP as specified in the MBMS Heartbeat procedure (see clause 29). + +NOTE: The intermediate Diameter Agent can remove or update the Diameter Origin-State-Id AVP, e.g. if it needs to modify the Origin-Host-ID. Thus the Diameter Origin-State-Id AVP, if received by the BM-SC or GCS AS, does not reflect the state of the remote MBMS peer but the state of the Diameter Agent. + +When the GCS AS detects a restart of the BM-SC, the GCS AS shall assume that all the TMGIs that had been assigned by the restarted BM-SC have been de-allocated and that all the related MBMS bearers have been deactivated. + +The GCS AS may restore the MBMS delivery using the MB2-C procedures specified in 3GPP TS 29.468 [35]. + +--- + +## 17F Restoration of data in the UCMF + +### 17F.1 Restart of the UCMF + +The UCMF is assumed as a front-end application function with a persistent database connected. The UCMF may restart but all dictionary mapping information between UE Radio Capability and UE Radio Capability IDs can be retained, hence, in this case, a UCMF shall not update its Recovery Time Stamp if the UCMF has restarted. + +**Editor' Note:** The handling of Version ID within PLMN assigned UE Radio Capability IDs at UCMF Restart is ffs. + +### 17F.2 Restart of the MME + +When a UCMF detects that a peer MME has failed with or without restart (relying on restart counter as specified in clause 19B "URCMP based restart procedures" or implementation e.g. a preconfigured path failure timer as specified in clause 20 "Path management procedures"), it shall delete the subscription created by the failed MME. + +--- + +## 18 GTP-C based restart procedures + +Across GTP-C based interfaces an SGSN, GGSN, MME, SGW, PGW, TWAN, ePDG and HRPD Access Node utilize either GTPv1-C or GTPv2-C Echo Request and Echo Response messages or GTP-C messages containing the Recovery Information Element to detect and handle a restart. + +A GTP-C entity shall maintain two Restart counters: + +- in volatile memory a remote Restart counter of a peer with which the entity is in contact; +- in non-volatile memory own, or local Restart counter that was sent to a peer. + +After a GTP-C entity has restarted, it shall immediately increment all local Restart counters and shall clear all remote Restart counters. + +A GTP-C entity may have a common local Restart counter for all peers, or it may have a separate local Restart counter for each peer. + +A GTP-C entity may probe the liveliness of each peer with which it is in contact by sending an Echo Request message (see clause 20 "Path management procedures"). The presence of the Restart counter in Echo Request or in a GTP-C message depends on the GTP-C version and therefore is specified in 3GPP TS 29.060 [8] and 3GPP TS 29.274 [13], respectively. The restart counter signalled in the GTP-C message is associated with the GTP-C entity identified by the sender's F-TEID or SGSN/GGSN IP address for control plane if present in the message, otherwise (e.g. in echo request message) it is associated with the GTP-C entity identified by the source IP address of the message. + +The GTP-C entity that receives a Recovery Information Element in an Echo Response or in another GTP-C message from a peer, shall compare the received remote Restart counter value with the previous Restart counter value stored for that peer entity. + +- If no previous value was stored the Restart counter value received in the Echo Response or in the GTP-C message shall be stored for the peer. +- If the value of a Restart counter previously stored for a peer is smaller than the Restart counter value received in the Echo Response message or the GTP-C message, taking the integer roll-over into account, this indicates that the entity that sent the Echo Response or the GTP-C message has restarted. The received, new Restart counter value shall be stored by the receiving entity, replacing the value previously stored for the peer. +- If the value of a Restart counter previously stored for a peer is larger than the Restart counter value received in the Echo Response message or the GTP-C message, taking the integer roll-over into account, this indicates a possible race condition (newer message arriving before the older one). The received new Restart counter value shall be discarded and an error may be logged. + +Based on operator's policy, when a Recovery IE is received in an Echo Request or in any incoming GTP-C request message (which includes a Recovery IE) from a peer GTP-C entity, with a Restart counter value larger than the value of the Restart counter previously stored for the peer GTP-C entity, the GTP-C entity may verify whether the peer GTP-C entity has really restarted by: + +- sending one or more Echo Request message(s) towards the peer GTP-C entity, or by monitoring other GTP-C request messages it may have sent for any PDN connections (e.g. Update Bearer Request message) towards the peer GTP-C entity; and +- determining that the peer GTP-C entity has restarted if the value of the restart counter received in the Recovery IE in the Echo Response message or in the corresponding GTP-C response messages (e.g. Update Bearer Response) is larger than the value of the Restart counter previously stored for the peer GTP-C entity. + +NOTE: This can be used e.g. when two GTP-C entities are connected via a roaming interface and Network Domain Security (e.g. IPsec ESP) is not applied or may not provide sufficient protection of the GTP-C signalling, e.g. against IP address spoofing. + +--- + +## 19 PMIPv6 based restart procedures + +Across PMIPv6 based interfaces, SGW, PGW, TWAN and ePDG utilize PMIPv6 Heartbeat mechanism for node restart detection as specified in 3GPP TS 29.275 [16]. + +A PMIPv6 entity shall maintain two restart counters: + +- in volatile memory a remote restart counter of a peer with which the entity is in contact; +- in non-volatile memory an own, or local restart counter that was sent to a peer. + +After a PMIPv6 entity has restarted, it shall immediately increment all local restart counters and shall clear all remote restart counters. + +A PMIPv6 entity may have a common local restart counter for all peers, or it may have a separate local restart counter for each peer. + +--- + +## 19A PFCP based restart procedures + +Across PFCP based interfaces, an SGW-C, SGW-U, PGW-C and PGW-U Node shall utilize PFCP Heartbeat Request and Heartbeat Response messages to detect and handle a peer PFCP entity failure or restart. A PFCP entity shall be prepared to receive a Heartbeat Request message at any time (even from unknown peers), and it shall reply with a Heartbeat Response message. + +A PFCP entity shall maintain two Recovery Time Stamps: + +- in volatile memory a remote Recovery Time Stamp of a peer PFCP entity with which the entity is in contact; + +- in non-volatile memory own, or local Recovery Time Stamp that was sent to a peer PFCP entity. + +After a PFCP entity has restarted, it shall immediately update all local Recovery Time Stamps and shall clear all remote Recovery Time Stamps. When peer PFCP entities information is available, i.e. when the PFCP Association is still alive, the restarted PFCP entity shall send its updated Recovery Time Stamps in a Heartbeat Request message to the peer PFCP entities before initiating any PFCP session signalling. + +A PFCP entity may have a common local Recovery Time Stamp for all peer PFCP entities, or it may have a separate local Recovery Time Stamp for each peer PFCP entity. + +A PFCP entity may probe the liveliness of each peer PFCP entity with which it is in contact by sending a Heartbeat Request message (see clause 20 "Path management procedures"). + +The Recovery Time Stamp signalled in the PFCP Heartbeat Request and Response messages is associated with the PFCP entity identified by the source IP address of the message. + +The Recovery Time Stamp signalled in the PFCP Session Establishment Request messages is associated with the IP address in the CP F-SEID IE. + +The PFCP entity that receives a Recovery Time Stamp Information Element from a peer PFCP entity shall compare the received remote Recovery Time Stamp value with the previous Recovery Time Stamp value stored for that peer PFCP entity. + +- If no previous value was stored, the Recovery Time Stamp value received in the Heartbeat Request or Response messages or the PFCP Session Establishment Request messages shall be stored for the peer PFCP entity. +- If the value of a Recovery Time Stamp previously stored for a peer PFCP entity is smaller than the Recovery Time Stamp value received in the Heartbeat Request or Response messages or the PFCP Session Establishment Request messages, this indicates that the entity that sent the Heartbeat Request or Response messages has restarted. The received, new Recovery Time Stamp value shall be stored by the receiving entity, replacing the value previously stored for the peer PFCP entity. +- If the value of a Recovery Time Stamp previously stored for a peer PFCP entity is larger than the Recovery Time Stamp value received in the Heartbeat Request or Response message or the PFCP Session Establishment Request messages, this indicates a possible race condition (newer message arriving before the older one). The received Sx node related message and the received new Recovery Time Stamp value shall be discarded and an error may be logged. + +A PFCP function shall ignore the Recovery Timestamp received in PFCP Association Setup Request and PFCP Association Setup Response messages (see clause 6.2.6 of 3GPP TS 29.244 [43]). + +When a NAT device is deployed between PFCP entities, e.g. between the CP function and UP function, the following requirements shall apply in addition to the above requirements: + +- the Heartbeat Request message may include a Source IP Address IE; +- when the Source IP Address IE is present, the Recovery Time Stamp signalled in the Heartbeat Request message shall be associated with the Source IP Address IE, instead of the source IP address of the message. + +--- + +## 19B URCMP based restart procedures + +Across URCMP based interfaces, an MME and UCMF Node shall utilize URCMP Heartbeat Request and Heartbeat Response messages to detect and handle a peer URCMP entity failure or restart. A URCMP entity shall be prepared to receive a Heartbeat Request message at any time (even from unknown peers), and it shall reply with a Heartbeat Response message. + +A URCMP entity shall maintain two Recovery Time Stamps: + +- in volatile memory a remote Recovery Time Stamp of a peer URCMP entity with which the entity is in contact; +- in non-volatile memory own, or local Recovery Time Stamp that was sent to a peer URCMP entity. + +After a URCMP entity has restarted and if it loses all dictionary mapping information between UE Radio Capability Information and UE Radio Capability IDs, it shall immediately update all local Recovery Time Stamps and shall clear all remote Recovery Time Stamps. + +A URCMP entity may have a common local Recovery Time Stamp for all peer URCMP entities, or it may have a separate local Recovery Time Stamp for each peer URCMP entity. + +A URCMP entity may probe the liveliness of each peer URCMP entity with which it is in contact by sending a Heartbeat Request message (see clause 20 "Path management procedures"). + +The Recovery Time Stamp signalled in the URCMP Heartbeat Request and Response messages is associated with the URCMP entity identified by the source IP address of the message. + +The URCMP entity that receives a Recovery Time Stamp Information Element from a peer URCMP entity shall compare the received remote Recovery Time Stamp value with the previous Recovery Time Stamp value stored for that peer URCMP entity. + +- If no previous value was stored, the Recovery Time Stamp value received in the Heartbeat Request or Response messages shall be stored for the peer URCMP entity. +- If the value of a Recovery Time Stamp previously stored for a peer URCMP entity is smaller than the Recovery Time Stamp value received in the Heartbeat Request or Response messages, this indicates that the entity that sent the Heartbeat Request or Response messages has restarted. The received, new Recovery Time Stamp value shall be stored by the receiving entity, replacing the value previously stored for the peer URCMP entity. +- If the value of a Recovery Time Stamp previously stored for a peer URCMP entity is larger than the Recovery Time Stamp value received in the Heartbeat Request or Response message, this indicates a possible race condition (newer message arriving before the older one). The received Sx node related message and the received new Recovery Time Stamp value shall be discarded and an error may be logged. + +--- + +## 20 Path management procedures + +### 20.1 General + +This clause specifies path management procedures for GTP-C based, PMIP and PFCP based interfaces. + +For GTP based interfaces, Echo Request / Response procedure is used. The usage depends on the GTP-C version in the following way: + +- GTPv1-C entity may periodically send an Echo Request message as specified in 3GPP TS 29.060 [8]. +- GTPv2 entity shall probe the liveliness of each peer with which it is in contact by sending an Echo Request messages (see TS 29.274 [13]). When and how often a GTPv2 Echo Request message may be sent is implementation specific but an Echo Request shall not be sent more often than every 60 s on each path. This does not prevent resending an Echo Request with the same sequence number according to the T3-RESPONSE timer. + +It is recommended that GTPv2 Echo Request should be sent only when a GTP-C entity has not received any GTP response message for a previously sent request message on the GTP-C path for, an implementation dependent period of time. + +A GTP-C entity (both GTPv1-C and GTPv2) shall be prepared to receive an Echo Request message at any time and it shall reply with an Echo Response message. + +For the PMIP based S5/S8 interface, the SGW and PGW shall detect respectively a peer PGW and SGW as currently unavailable by sending a series of PMIPv6 Heartbeat Request messages, and not receiving within a period of time respectively a PMIPv6 Heartbeat Response message (see 3GPP TS 29.275 [16]). + +For PFCP based Sxa/Sxb/Sxc interfaces, the CP function shall detect a peer UP function (or vice versa) as currently unavailable by sending a series of PFCP heartbeat Request messages, and not receiving within a period of time respectively a PFCP Heartbeat Response message (see 3GPP TS 29.244 [43]). + +For URCMP based S17 interface, the URCMP entity shall detect a peer URCMP entity as currently unavailable by sending a series of URCMP heartbeat Request messages, and not receiving within a period of time respectively a URCMP Heartbeat Response message (see 3GPP TS 29.674 [44]). + +## 20.2 Signalling path failure detection and handling + +### 20.2.1 General + +GTP-C entities shall support detection of path failure by using Echo Request / Echo Response messages in the following way. A peer's IP address specific counter shall be reset each time an Echo Response message is received from that peer's IP address and incremented when the T3-RESPONSE timer expires for an Echo Request message sent to that peer's IP address. The path shall be considered to be down if the counter exceeds N3-REQUESTS. + +PMIP entities shall support detection of path failure as specified for Failure Detection in IETF RFC 5847 [22]. + +Upon detecting a path failure, the network node should notify the failure via the Operation and Maintenance system and may either: + +- delete the PDN connections (EPS bearer contexts) or PDP contexts associated with this peer's IP address; or +- maintain the PDN connections (EPS bearer contexts) or PDP contexts associated with the peer's IP address during an operator configurable maximum path failure duration. The network node shall delete the maintained resources if the path is still down when this duration expires. The network node may delete the maintained resources if control/user plane signalling is received across other interface(s) during the path failure and before the maximum path failure duration timer expires. + +NOTE 1: During transient path failures (e.g. path failures not exceeding few minutes at most), maintaining the EPS bearer contexts or PDP contexts associated with the peer's IP address enables the delivery of end user services (when the path is reestablished again) and also avoids unnecessary signalling in the network for restoring those connections. + +NOTE 2: It is not intended to maintain PDN connections during long path failures (e.g. exceeding few minutes at most) as this would imply undesirable effects like undue charging. + +The following clauses specify further specific network element requirements. + +### 20.2.2 SGW functionality + +#### 20.2.2.1 S11/S4 path failure + +It is optional for the SGW to maintain the S5/S8 bearer contexts when the SGW detects a path failure to the MME/S4-SGSN (see clause 20.2.1). However upon detecting a path failure to the MME/S4-SGSN, an SGW that supports the network triggered service restoration procedure (see clause 25) should maintain the S5/S8 bearer contexts eligible for network initiated service restoration and proceed with the network triggered service restoration procedure with the following modification: + +- if the path to the MME/S4-SGSN is down for a duration exceeding the maximum path failure duration and if there is no alternative reachable path, e.g. another MME/S4-SGSN in the same pool or another control plane IP address belonging to the same MME/S4-SGSN, the SGW should locally delete the maintained PDN connections associated with the failed path. + +In addition, for UEs in connected state associated with the failed path, the SGW should continue sending downlink packets to the eNodeB/RNC as long as the impacted PDN connections are maintained, regardless of whether the SGW supports the network triggered service restoration procedure or not. + +#### 20.2.2.2 S5 path failure + +The SGW may support the PGW triggered SGW restoration for an S5 path failure. If so, then the SGW should support the PGW Restart Notification procedure. After detecting a path failure to the PGW, the SGW may delete all the PDN connections affected by the path failure and should also send a PGW Restart Notification message to the MME or S4- + +SGSN if the the PGW Restart Notification procedure is supported by the SGW and MME/S4-SGSN (see clause 16.1A.2). + +NOTE: The PGW Restart Notification procedure can help the MME to restore the PDN connections earlier since the SGW will detect the S5 path failure and send PGW Restart Notification triggering a PDN connection restoration at the MME, before the PGW sends the PGW Downlink Triggering Notification. + +The SGW should proceed with the PGW triggered SGW restoration procedure (see clause 27.2.3.3) with the following modification: + +- The SGW shall include the PGW F-TEID or PGW IP address and GRE key for control plane in the PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message that it sends to the MME/S4-SGSN, if this information is present in the PGW Downlink Triggering Notification/PMIP Update Notification message received from the PGW. + +## 20.2.3 MBMS GW functionality + +### 20.2.3.1 Sm path failure + +The MBMS GW may be provisioned with the list (or a sublist) of the MMEs pertaining to the MME pool. + +NOTE 1: The MBMS GW expects only one MME of the MME pool in BM-SC requests received across the SGmb interface. + +Upon detecting an Sm path failure, the MBMS GW should maintain the MBMS bearer contexts associated with the peer's MME IP address. + +During a transient Sm path failure (e.g. before the maximum path failure duration timer expires), the MBMS GW may process MBMS requests from the BM-SC and intended for the MME for which the Sm path has failed as follows: + +- for new MBMS Session Start Request, the MBMS GW may select an alternative MME in the same MME pool and send the MBMS Session Start Request to this alternative MME; +- for MBMS Session Update Request or MBMS Session Stop Request, the MBMS GW may select an alternative MME in the same MME pool, send a MBMS Session Start Request message to this alternative MME and, if successful, send subsequently the MBMS Session Update Request or MBMS Session Stop Request to this alternative MME. + +After having selected an alternative MME, the MBMS GW shall consider the MME answering to the MBMS Start Request as the controlling MME for the MBMS session and send any subsequent MBMS Session Update or MBMS Session Stop for this MBMS Session to this MME. + +NOTE 2: Each MME of the MME pool provisioned in the MBMS GW supports an M3 interface with the MCE(s). + +When detecting a non-transient Sm path failure at the MBMS GW (e.g. the maximum path failure duration timer of the MBMS GW expires), the MBMS GW may move the control of all the affected active MBMS sessions to another MME in the same MME pool (if any other MME is reachable by the MBMS GW) by initiating new MBMS Session Start Request(s) to alternative MME(s). + +NOTE 3: This allows to re-establish the MBMS sessions when a MME fails without restart. + +The maximum path failure duration timer of the MBMS GW should be configured with a shorter value than the maximum path failure duration timer of the MME to avoid interrupting active MBMS sessions upon a non-transient Sm path failure. The MBMS GW timer should be shorter than the MME timer by at least the period between two Echo Request messages sent by the MME, to avoid that the MME timer expires before the MBMS GW timer if the MME starts its timer before the MBMS GW. + +NOTE 4: This enables the MCE to receive a MBMS Session Start request from the new MME controlling the MBMS session before the MCE receives a request to stop the MBMS service from the previous controlling MME. + +When sending an MBMS Session Start Request sent to an alternative MME, the MBMS GW shall encode the contents of the request with the same contents as in the original MBMS Session Start Request (or per the last MBMS Session Update Request sent by the MBMS GW if the original parameters were updated) with the following exceptions: + +- the MBMS GW shall set the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag to signal that this message is used to re-establish an MBMS session; +- if no absolute start time ("MBMS data transfer start" parameter) has been received, the MBMS GW may change the relative start time ("time to MBMS data transfer" parameter) to fasten the restoration of the MBMS service in E-UTRAN; +- the MBMS GW should set the estimated session duration to a value corresponding to the remaining duration of the session. + +NOTE 5: Per the requirements above, if the MBMS GW had started an MBMS session within an MME with the MBMS Service Area (1, 2, 3) and receives during an Sm path failure (towards this MME) an MBMS Session Update from the BM-SC modifying the MBMS Service Area to (3, 4, 5), the MBMS GW will encode the original MBMS Service Area (1, 2, 3) in the MBMS Session Start Request sent to the alternative MME and subsequently send an MBMS Session Update Request with the MBMS Service Area (3,4,5) to the new MME controlling the MBMS session. + +NOTE 6: If the previous MME received an MBMS Session Update Request from the MBMS GW but could not propagate it to the MCE due to a M3AP path failure, the contents of the MBMS Session Start Request sent to the MCE via the new MME can also differ from the parameters sent to the MCE via the previous MME for the parameters that can be modified by the MBMS session update procedure (i.e. MBMS Session Area, MBMS Time to Data Transfer, MBMS Data Transfer Start). + +After detecting an Sm path failure, the MBMS GW shall determine whether the failure is transient or non transient from the perspective of the MME (e.g. the MBMS GW is provisioned with the maximum path failure timer of the MME). The MBMS GW shall assume that the failure is non transient from the perspective of the MME if the Sm path recovers after a period longer than the maximum path failure timer of the MME plus the period between two Echo Request messages sent by the MME, to ensure that the MME also determines this is a non transient path failure if the MBMS GW starts its timer before the MME. The MBMS GW shall consider that the MBMS session has been released by the MME if the Sm path failure is non transient for the MME. If the Sm path failure remains transient for the MME, the MBMS GW shall behave as follows upon detecting the Sm path recovery: + +- if the MBMS GW has already moved the control of the MBMS session to an alternative MME(s), the MBMS GW shall send an MBMS Session Stop Request message to the MME previously controlling the MBMS session with a "Local MBMS bearer context release" indication to instruct that MME to release its MBMS bearer context locally, without sending any message to the MCE(s). +- if the MBMS GW has not yet moved the control of the MBMS session to an alternative MME (e.g. if the MBMS restoration procedures are not supported in the network), + - if the Sm path failure is transient from the perspective of the MBMS GW, the MBMS GW shall consider that MBMS session is still controlled by the related MME and proceed as if there had been no Sm path failure; + - if the Sm path failure is non transient from the perspective of the MBMS GW, the MBMS GW shall send an MBMS Session Start Request to the MME for the session and encode it as specified above (for a message sent to an alternative MME). + +NOTE 7: The MBMS GW cannot know whether the MME will see the Sm path failure as transient or non transient if the Sm path recovers in the period between the maximum path failure timer of the MME plus and minus the period between two Echo Request messages sent by the MME. This can possibly lead the MBMS GW to send an MBMS Session Stop request to the MME for a session that has already been terminated by the MME (if the MME determined the failure is non transient) or to send an MBMS Session Start request (with the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag) to the MME for a session that is still alive at the MME (if the MME determined the failure is transient). + +### 20.2.3.2 Sn path failure + +The MBMS GW may be provisioned with the list (or a sub list) of the SGSNs belonging to the SGSN pool. + +NOTE: The MBMS GW expects only one SGSN of the SGSN pool in BM-SC requests received across the SGmb interface. + +An MBMS GW and SGSN shall handle Sn path failure similar to the Sm path failure as described in clause 20.2.3.1 For IP Unicast over Sn/Iu when the SGSN changes the MBMS GW has to move the user plane which is affected by the Sn-path failure additionally. + +### 20.2.3.3 SGmb path failure + +In deployments without a Diameter Agent between the BM-SC and the MBMS GW, the MBMS GW shall detect an SGmb path failure using either: + +- mechanisms as specified in the Diameter Base Protocol (e.g. transport connection failure, BM-SC peer not responding, Diameter Device-Watchdog-Request and Device-Watchdog-Answer messages during periods when there is no need for other MBMS signalling); or +- the MBMS Heartbeat procedure (see clause 29), if this procedure is supported. + +In deployments with a Diameter Agent between the BM-SC and the MBMS GW, the MBMS GW shall detect an SGmb path failure using the MBMS Heartbeat procedure (see clause 29). + +NOTE 1: A transport connection failure does not allow to identify a failure of the remote MBMS peer. Likewise, it is not possible to rely on Diameter Device-Watchdog-Request / Answer messages to test the responsiveness of the remote MBMS node during periods when there is no need for other MBMS signalling as these messages are only exchanged between Diameter peers with a direct transport connection. + +Upon detecting an SGmb path failure, the MBMS GW should maintain the MBMS bearer contexts associated with the peer's BM-SC during an operator configurable maximum path failure duration. + +If the SGmb path to the BM-SC is down for a duration exceeding the maximum path failure duration, the MBMS GW should deactivate all the related MBMS Bearer contexts locally and send MBMS Session Stop Requests towards all MME/SGSNs in which the MBMS bearer services are active. + +NOTE 2: This enables to free corresponding radio resources in E-UTRAN/UTRAN for MBMS services if the BM-SC has failed without restart. + +The MBMS GW shall pass on the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag in the MBMS Session Start Request it sends to MME/SGSNs if received from the BM-SC. + +The MBMS GW shall pass on the "Local MBMS bearer context release" indication in the MBMS Session Stop Request it sends to MME/SGSNs if received from the BM-SC. + +The MBMS GW shall accept an MBMS Session Start Request received for an on-going MBMS bearer service (i.e. with the same TMGI and, if provided, MBMS Flow Identifier) from the same BM-SC that currently controls the MBMS session if the message includes the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag. The MBMS GW shall replace the SGmb related resources for this MBMS service by those received in the MBMS Session Start Request (if different). The MBMS GW should not send MBMS Session Start Request message(s) towards the involved MME/SGSN(s) if no parameters other than the estimated duration and relative start time have changed. + +## 20.2.4 MME functionality + +### 20.2.4.1 Sm path failure + +Upon detecting an Sm path failure, the MME should maintain the MBMS bearer contexts associated with the peer's MBMS GW IP address during an operator configurable maximum path failure duration. + +The MME should behave as specified for the case of an MBMS GW restart (see clause 17A.1) if the Sm path to the MBMS GW is down for a duration exceeding the maximum path failure. + +NOTE 1: This enables to free corresponding radio resources in E-UTRAN for MBMS services if the MBMS GW has failed without restart. + +The MME shall pass on the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag in the MBMS Session Start Request it sends to MCEs if received from the MBMS GW. + +The MME should accept an MBMS Session Start Request received for an on-going MBMS bearer service (i.e. with the same TMGI and, if provided, MBMS Flow Identifier) from a different MBMS GW than the MBMS GW that currently controls the MBMS session if the message includes the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag. If it accepts the request from the new MBMS GW, the MME shall replace the Sm related resources (i.e. TEID-C) for this MBMS service associated to the previous MBMS GW by those associated to the new MBMS GW and consider that the MBMS session is now being controlled by the new MBMS GW. The MME shall then send an MBMS Session Start Request message including the "MBMS session re-establishment" flag (and the new M1 transport parameters) towards all involved MCE(s). + +The MME may accept an MBMS Session Start Request received for an on-going MBMS bearer service (i.e. with the same TMGI and, if provided, MBMS Flow Identifier) from a different MBMS GW than the MBMS GW that currently controls the MBMS session even if the message does not include the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag. If it accepts the request from the new MBMS GW, the MME shall replace the Sm related resources (i.e. TEID-C) for this MBMS service associated to the previous MBMS GW by those associated to the new MBMS GW and consider that the MBMS session is now being controlled by the new MBMS GW; the MME shall then either: + +- stop the on-going MBMS bearer service and then start the new MBMS bearer service (without including the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag in the MBMS Session Start Request sent to the MCE(s)); or +- behave as if it had received an MBMS Session Start Request including the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag (i.e. include the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag in the MBMS Session Start Request sent to the MCE(s)). + +The MME shall accept an MBMS Session Start Request received for an on-going MBMS bearer service (i.e. with the same TMGI and, if provided, MBMS Flow Identifier) from the same MBMS GW that currently controls the MBMS session if the message includes the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag. The MME shall replace the Sm related resources (i.e. TEID-C) for this MBMS service by those received in the MBMS Session Start Request (if different). The MME should not send MBMS Session Start Request message(s) towards the involved MCE(s) if no parameters other than the estimated duration and relative start time have changed. + +The MME shall reject an MBMS Session Stop Request received for an on-going MBMS bearer service from a different MBMS GW than the MBMS GW that currently controls the MBMS session. + +NOTE 2: Upon a non-transient SGmb path failure, if the BM-SC moves the control of an MBMS session to an alternative MBMS GW, the same MME can receive an MBMS Session Stop Request from the old MBMS GW after an MBMS Session Start Request from the new MBMS GW. + +The MME shall release the MBMS bearer context resources locally without sending any message to the MCE(s) if it receives a MBMS Session Stop Request with a "Local MBMS bearer context release" indication for an on-going MBMS bearer service from the MBMS GW currently controlling the MBMS session. + +## 20.2.4.2 S5 path failure + +The MME may support invoking the PGW triggered SGW restoration (see clause 27.2.3) upon receiving a PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message when the S11 path for the related UE is still available (see clause 20.2.1). If so, upon receiving a PGW Downlink Triggering Notification while the S11 path for the related UE is still available, the MME should proceed with the PGW triggered SGW restoration procedure (see clauses 27.2.3.2 and 27.3.2.2) with the following modifications: + +- if the PGW F-TEID or PGW IP address and GRE key for control plane received in the PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message does not match the stored PGW F-TEID or PGW IP address and GRE key for control plane of any PDN connection(s) for that UE, the MME shall not proceed with the PGW triggered SGW restoration procedure but just respond to the SGW with a PGW Downlink Triggering Acknowledge message with an acceptance cause code; + +NOTE 1: This can happen e.g. if the PDN connection has already been restored by the MME upon receipt of a preceding PGW Restart Notification message. In this case, the PDN connection remains hanging in the PGW until the timer monitoring the maximum duration to restore the PDN connection expires in the PGW. + +- if the PGW F-TEID or PGW IP address and GRE key for control plane received in the PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message matches the stored PGW F-TEID or PGW IP address and GRE key for control plane of any PDN connection(s) for that UE, the MME shall proceed with the PGW triggered SGW restoration procedure. + +- if the related UE is in connected mode, the MME may restore the PDN connection(s) of that UE by performing the MME triggered Serving GW relocation procedure as defined in clause 5.10.4 of 3GPP TS 23.401 [15]. + +NOTE 2: This avoids to tear down the S1 connection of the UE and thus to negatively affect other PDN connections of that UE that would not be impacted by the S5 path failure. + +## 20.2.5 SGSN functionality + +### 20.2.5.1 Sn path failure + +Upon detecting an Sn path failure, the S4-SGSN should maintain the MBMS bearer contexts associated with the peer's MBMS GW IP address during an operator configurable maximum path failure duration. + +The S4-SGSN should behave as specified for the case of an MBMS GW restart (see clause 17A.1) if the Sn path to the MBMS GW is down for a duration exceeding the maximum path failure. + +NOTE 1: This enables to free corresponding radio resources in UTRAN for MBMS services if the MBMS GW has failed without restart. + +The S4-SGSN shall pass on the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag in the MBMS Session Start Request it sends to RNCs if received from the MBMS GW. + +The S4-SGSN should accept an MBMS Session Start Request received for an on-going MBMS bearer service (i.e. with the same TMGI and, if provided, MBMS Flow Identifier) from a different MBMS GW than the MBMS GW that currently controls the MBMS session if the message includes the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag. If it accepts the request from the new MBMS GW, the S4-SGSN shall replace the Sn related resources (i.e. TEID-C) for this MBMS service associated to the previous MBMS GW by those associated to the new MBMS GW and consider that the MBMS session is now being controlled by the new MBMS GW. The S4-SGSN shall then send an MBMS Session Start Request message including the "MBMS session re-establishment" flag (and the new M1 transport parameters) towards all involved RNC(s). + +The S4-SGSN may accept an MBMS Session Start Request received for an on-going MBMS bearer service (i.e. with the same TMGI and, if provided, MBMS Flow Identifier) from a different MBMS GW than the MBMS GW that currently controls the MBMS session even if the message does not include the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag. If it accepts the request from the new MBMS GW, the S4-SGSN shall replace the Sn related resources (i.e. TEID-C) for this MBMS service associated to the previous MBMS GW by those associated to the new MBMS GW and consider that the MBMS session is now being controlled by the new MBMS GW; the S4-SGSN shall then either: + +- stop the on-going MBMS bearer service and then start the new MBMS bearer service (without including the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag in the MBMS Session Start Request sent to the RNC(s)); or +- behave as if it had received an MBMS Session Start Request including the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag (i.e. include the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag in the MBMS Session Start Request sent to the RNC(s)). + +The S4-SGSN shall accept an MBMS Session Start Request received for an on-going MBMS bearer service (i.e. with the same TMGI and, if provided, MBMS Flow Identifier) from the same MBMS GW that currently controls the MBMS session if the message includes the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag. The S4-SGSN shall replace the Sn related resources (i.e. TEID-C) for this MBMS service by those received in the MBMS Session Start Request (if different). The S4-SGSN should not send MBMS Session Start Request message(s) towards the involved RNC(s) if no parameters other than the estimated duration and relative start time have changed. + +The S4-SGSN shall reject an MBMS Session Stop Request received for an on-going MBMS bearer service from a different MBMS GW than the MBMS GW that currently controls the MBMS session. + +NOTE 2: Upon a non-transient SGmb path failure, if the BM-SC moves the control of an MBMS session to an alternative MBMS GW, the same S4-SGSN can receive an MBMS Session Stop Request from the old MBMS GW after an MBMS Session Start Request from the new MBMS GW. + +The S4-SGSN shall release the MBMS bearer context resources locally without sending any message to the RNC(s) if it receives a MBMS Session Stop Request with a "Local MBMS bearer context release" indication for an on-going MBMS bearer service from the MBMS GW currently controlling the MBMS session. + +### 20.2.5.2 S5 path failure + +The S4-SGSN may support invoking the PGW triggered SGW restoration (see clause 27.2.3) upon receiving a PGW Downlink Triggering Notification and the S4 path of the related UE is still available (see clause 20.2.1). If so, S4-SGSN shall proceed as defined for the MME in clause 20.2.4.2, with the following modification: + +- if the related UE is in connected mode, the S4-SGSN may restore the PDN connection(s) of that UE by performing the S4-SGSN triggered Serving GW relocation procedure as defined in clause 9.2.2.4 of 3GPP TS 23.060 [5]. + +## 20.2.6 BM-SC functionality + +### 20.2.6.1 SGmb path failure + +In deployments without a Diameter Agent between the BM-SC and the MBMS GW, the BM-SC shall detect an SGmb path failure using either: + +- mechanisms as specified in the Diameter Base Protocol (e.g. transport connection failure, MBMS GW peer not responding, Diameter Device-Watchdog-Request and Device-Watchdog-Answer messages during periods when there is no need for other MBMS signalling); or +- the MBMS Heartbeat procedure (see clause 29), if this procedure is supported. + +In deployments with a Diameter Agent between the BM-SC and the MBMS GW, the BM-SC shall detect an SGmb path failure using the MBMS Heartbeat procedure (see clause 29). + +NOTE 1: A transport connection failure does not allow to identify a failure of the remote MBMS peer. Likewise, it is not possible to rely on Diameter Device-Watchdog-Request / Answer messages to test the responsiveness of the remote MBMS node during periods when there is no need for other MBMS signalling as these messages are only exchanged between Diameter peers with a direct transport connection. + +Upon detecting an SGmb path failure, the BM-SC should maintain the related MBMS bearer contexts. + +During a transient SGmb path failure (e.g. before the maximum path failure duration timer expires), the BM-SC should consider all related MBMS bearer contexts as active in the MBMS GW. The BM-SC may initiate new MBMS sessions via an alternative MBMS GW (if available). The BM-SC should defer any MBMS session update or stop procedure for on-going MBMS sessions in the MBMS GW affected by the SGmb path failure until the transient path failure ends. + +NOTE 2: Re-establishing an MBMS session via an alternative MBMS GW can generate network signalling over many interfaces and interrupt transiently the delivery of the MBMS data stream due to the need for related eNB/RNCs to switch to the new IP multicast group over M1. Thus during a transient SGmb path failure it is recommended to defer any MBMS session update or stop procedure for on-going MBMS sessions in the MBMS GW affected by the SGmb path failure. However if the MBMS session update or stop procedure is for time critical services, the BM-SC can immediately re-establish the active MBMS bearer services affected by the SGmb path failure by initiating MBMS Session Start procedure(s) towards an alternative MBMS GW (if available) as specified below, and subsequently send the MBMS Session Update or Stop message. + +When detecting a non-transient SGmb path failure (e.g. the maximum path failure duration timer of the BM-SC expires), the BM-SC should re-establish the active MBMS bearer services affected by the SGmb path failure by initiating MBMS Session Start procedure(s) towards an alternative MBMS GW (if available) or towards the same MBMS GW (once the SGmb path is recovered). If the MBMS session is not re-established and if it was activated by a Group Communication Service Application Server(s) (GCS AS), the BM-SC shall notify the GCS AS that the MBMS session has been deactivated. + +NOTE 3: This enables to re-establish the MBMS sessions when a MBMS GW fails without restart. + +The maximum path failure duration of the BM-SC should be configured with a shorter value than the maximum path failure duration timer of the MBMS GW to minimize the interruption of the active MBMS sessions upon a non-transient SGmb path failure. The BM-SC timer should be shorter than the MBMS GW timer by at least the period between two Diameter Device-Watchdog-Request messages or MBMS Heartbeat Request messages sent by the MBMS + +GW, to avoid that the MBMS GW timer expires before the BM-SC timer if the MBMS GW starts its timer before the BM-SC. + +NOTE 4: This enables the MCE/RNC to receive a MBMS Session Start request from the new MME/SGSN (and MBMS GW) controlling the MBMS session before the MCE/RNC receives a request to stop the MBMS service from the previous controlling MME/SGSN (and MBMS GW). + +When re-establishing the active MBMS bearer services affected by the SGmb path failure, the BM-SC shall encode the MBMS Session Start Request with the same contents as in the original MBMS Session Start Request (or per the last MBMS Session Update Request sent by the BM-SC if the original parameters were updated) with the following exceptions: + +- the BM-SC shall set the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag to signal that this message is used to re-establish an MBMS session; +- if no absolute start time ("MBMS data transfer start" parameter) has been sent, the BM-SC may change the relative start time ("time to MBMS data transfer" parameter) to fasten the restoration of the MBMS service in E-UTRAN; +- the BM-SC should set the estimated session duration to a value corresponding to the remaining duration of the session. + +NOTE 5: If the BM-SC is instructed to modify an MBMS Session during the SGmb path failure, the contents of the MBMS Session Start Request sent to the MBMS GW after the SGmb path failure can also differ from the parameters sent to the MBMS GW before the SGmb path failure for the parameters that can be modified by the MBMS session update procedure (i.e. MBMS Session Area, MBMS Time to Data Transfer, MBMS Data Transfer Start). + +After detecting an SGmb path failure, the BM-SC shall determine whether the failure is transient or non transient from the perspective of the MBMS GW (e.g. the BM-SC is provisioned with the maximum path failure timer of the MBMS GW). The BM-SC shall assume that the failure is non transient from the perspective of the MBMS GW if the SGmb path recovers after a period longer than the maximum path failure timer of the MBMS GW plus the period between two Diameter Device-Watchdog-Request messages or MBMS Heartbeat Request messages sent by the MBMS GW, to ensure that the MBMS GW also determines this is a non transient path failure if the BM-SC starts its timer before the MBMS GW. The BM-SC shall consider that the MBMS session has been released by the MBMS GW if the SGmb path failure is non transient for the MBMS GW. If the SGmb path failure remains transient for the MBMS GW, the BM-SC shall behave as follows upon detecting the SGmb path recovery: + +- if the BM-SC has already moved the control of the MBMS session to an alternative MBMS GW, the BM-SC shall send an MBMS Session Stop Request message to the MBMS GW previously controlling the MBMS session with a "Local MBMS bearer context release" indication to instruct that MBMS GW to release the MBMS bearer context locally in the MBMS GW and in the associated MME/SGSN(s) without sending any message to the MCE/RNC(s). +- if the BM-SC has not yet moved the control of the MBMS session to an alternative MBMS GW (e.g. if the MBMS restoration procedures are not supported in the network), + - if the SGmb path failure is transient from the perspective of the BM-SC, the BM-SC shall consider that the MBMS session is still controlled by the related MBMS GW and proceed as if there had been no SGmb path failure; + - if the SGmb path failure is non transient from the perspective of the BM-SC, the BM-SC shall send an MBMS Session Start Request to the MBMS GW for the session and encode it as specified above (for a message sent to an alternative MBMS GW). + +NOTE 6: The BM-SC cannot know whether the MBMS GW will see the SGmb path failure as transient or non transient if the SGmb path recovers in the period between the maximum path failure timer of the MBMS GW plus and minus the period between two Diameter Device-Watchdog-Request messages or MBMS Heartbeat Request messages sent by the MBMS GW. This can possibly lead the BM-SC to send an MBMS Session Stop request to the MBMS GW for a session that has already been terminated by the MBMS GW (if the MBMS GW determined the failure is non transient) or to send an MBMS Session Start request (with the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag) to the MBMS GW for a session that is still alive at the MBMS GW (if the MBMS GW determined the failure is transient). + +## 20.2.6.2 MB2-C path failure + +In deployments without a Diameter Agent between the BM-SC and the GCS AS, the BM-SC shall detect an MB2-C path failure using either: + +- mechanisms as specified in the Diameter Base Protocol (e.g. transport connection failure, GCS AS peer not responding, Diameter Device-Watchdog-Request and Device-Watchdog-Answer messages during periods when there is no need for other MB2 signalling); or +- the MBMS Heartbeat procedure (see clause 29), if this procedure is supported. + +In deployments with a Diameter Agent between the BM-SC and the GCS AS, the BM-SC shall detect an MB2-C path failure using the MBMS Heartbeat procedure (see clause 29). + +NOTE 1: A transport connection failure does not allow to identify a failure of the remote MBMS peer. Likewise, it is not possible to rely on Diameter Device-Watchdog-Request / Answer messages to test the responsiveness of the remote MBMS node during periods when there is no need for other MB2 signalling as these messages are only exchanged between Diameter peers with a direct transport connection. + +Upon detecting a non-transient MB2-C path failure, the BM-SC shall deallocate (locally) all the TMGIs that had been assigned to the GCS AS and the BM-SC shall stop all the related MBMS bearers to free the corresponding resources in E-UTRAN. + +## 20.2.7 PGW functionality + +### 20.2.7.1 S5 path failure + +The PGW may support invoking the PGW triggered SGW restoration procedure (see clause 27.2.3) when detecting a path failure to an SGW (see clause 20.2.1). If so, after detecting a path failure to an SGW, the PGW should maintain the S5 bearer contexts eligible for restoration and proceed with the PGW triggered SGW restoration procedure with the following modifications: + +- for GTP-based S5, the PGW shall include the PGW F-TEID for control plane in the PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message; +- for PMIP-based S5, the PGW shall include the PGW IP address and uplink GRE key for control plane in the PMIP Update Notification message; + +## 20.2.8 GCS AS functionality + +### 20.2.8.1 MB2-C path failure + +In deployments without a Diameter Agent between the BM-SC and the GCS AS, the GCS AS shall detect an MB2-C path failure using either: + +- mechanisms as specified in the Diameter Base Protocol (e.g. transport connection failure, BM-SC peer not responding, Diameter Device-Watchdog-Request and Device-Watchdog-Answer messages during periods when there is no need for other MB2 signalling); or +- the MBMS Heartbeat procedure (see clause 29), if this procedure is supported. + +In deployments with a Diameter Agent between the BM-SC and the GCS AS, the GCS AS shall detect an MB2-C path failure using the MBMS Heartbeat procedure (see clause 29). + +NOTE 1: A transport connection failure does not allow to identify a failure of the remote MBMS peer. Likewise, it is not possible to rely on Diameter Device-Watchdog-Request / Answer messages to test the responsiveness of the remote MBMS node during periods when there is no need for other MB2 signalling as these messages are only exchanged between Diameter peers with a direct transport connection. + +Upon detecting a non-transient MB2-C path failure, the GCS AS shall assume that all the TMGIs that had been assigned by the BM-SC have been de-allocated and that all the related MBMS bearers have been deactivated. + +The GCS AS may restore the MBMS delivery e.g. via a different BM-SC using the MB2-C procedures specified in 3GPP TS 29.468 [36]. + +## 20.2.9 Sx interface functionality + +### 20.2.9.1 Sxa path failure + +If the path to the SGW-U is down, the SGW-C should handle this as SGW-U Failure without Restart, see clause 16.1A.4. + +If the path to the SGW-C is down, the SGW-U should handle this as SGW-C Failure without Restart, see clause 16.1A.3. + +### 20.2.9.2 Sxb path failure + +If the path to the PGW-U is down, the PGW-C should handle this as PGW-U Failure without Restart, see clause 17.1A.4. + +If the path to the PGW-C is down, the PGW-U should handle this as PGW-C Failure without Restart, see clause 17.1A.3. + +## 20.3 User plane path failure detection and handling + +### 20.3.1 General + +GTP-U entities shall support detection of path failure by using Echo Request / Echo Response messages in the following way. A path counter shall be reset each time an Echo Response is received on the path and incremented when the T3-RESPONSE timer expires for any Echo Request message sent on the path. The path shall be considered to be down if the counter exceeds N3-REQUESTS. + +Upon detecting a path failure, the network node should notify the failure via the Operation and Maintenance system and may either + +- delete the bearer contexts associated with the path in failure; or +- maintain the bearer contexts associated with the path in failure during an operator configurable maximum path failure duration. The network node shall delete the maintained resources if the path is still down when this duration expires. + +An MME may also perform relevant restoration procedure(s) if the S1-U path failure notification feature as specified in the following clause(s) is supported. + +NOTE 1: During transient path failures (e.g. path failures not exceeding few minutes at most), maintaining the bearer contexts associated with the peer's IP address enables the delivery of end user services (when the path is reestablished again) and also avoids unnecessary signalling in the network for restoring those bearers. + +NOTE 2: It is not intended to maintain bearer contexts during long path failures (e.g. exceeding few minutes at most) as this would imply undesirable effects like undue charging. + +### 20.3.2 MBMS GW functionality + +#### 20.3.2.1 SGi-mb path failure + +An MBMS GW may support the detection of an SGi-mb path failure. + +NOTE 1: How an MBMS GW detects an SGi-mb path failure is implementation specific. E.g. an MBMS GW can monitor the receipt of downlink user plane from the BM-SC (synchronization sequences are transmitted continuously e.g. in case of MBSFN transmissions, even if there is no MBMS user data to be sent). + +Upon detecting a non-transient SGi-mb path failure (operator configurable maximum path failure duration), based on operator's policy, the MBMS GW may tear down the affected MBMS sessions by sending MBMS Session Stop Request message(s) to the MME/SGSN(s) serving the MBMS sessions and Session Termination Request message(s) to the BM-SC with a terminating cause signalling a user plane failure. + +NOTE 2: This enables to free corresponding radio resources in E-UTRAN/UTRAN and to attempt to re-establish the MBMS session(s). + +### 20.3.3 BM-SC functionality + +#### 20.3.3.1 SGi-mb path failure + +Upon receipt of a Session Termination Request message from an MBMS GW with a terminating cause signalling a user plane failure, the BM-SC may attempt to re-establish the MBMS session via the same MBMS GW (using different user plane resources over SGi-mb) or an alternative MBMS GW. + +When re-establishing the MBMS session, the BM-SC shall encode the MBMS Session Start Request with the same contents as in the original MBMS Session Start Request (or per the last MBMS Session Update Request sent by the BM-SC if the original parameters were updated) with the following exceptions: + +- the BM-SC shall set the "MBMS session re-establishment indication" flag to signal that this message is used to re-establish an MBMS session; +- if no absolute start time ("MBMS data transfer start" parameter) has been sent, the BM-SC may change the relative start time ("time to MBMS data transfer" parameter) to fasten the restoration of the MBMS service in E-UTRAN; +- the BM-SC should set the estimated session duration to a value corresponding to the remaining duration of the session; +- the BM-SC shall provide the new user plane resources assigned to the MBMS session over SGi-mb. + +If the MBMS session is not re-established and if it was activated by a Group Communication Service Application Server(s) (GCS AS), the BM-SC shall notify the GCS AS that the MBMS session has been deactivated. + +### 20.3.4 With Control and User plane Separation of SGW or PGW nodes + +With a split SGW or PGW (see 3GPP TS 23.214 [42]), user plane path failure detection and handling shall be supported as specified in clause 20.3.1 with the following additional requirements: + +- upon detecting a GTP-U user plane path failure, the SGW-U or PGW-U shall report the user plane path failure to the SGW-C or PGW-C respectively, by sending an Sx Node Report Request (see 3GPP TS 29.244 [43]) including a User Plane Path Failure Report with the IP address of the remote GTP-U peer(s) towards which a failure has been detected; +- upon being notified about the user plane path failure, when deciding to delete the bearer contexts associated with the path in failure, the SGW-C or PGW-C shall modify or delete the affected Sx sessions in the SGW-U or PGW-U. + +NOTE: The SGW-C and PGW-C need to take care to smooth the signalling load towards the SGW-U and PGW-U if a large number of Sx sessions are affected by the user plane path failure. + +An SGW-C may support S1-U path failure notification feature as specified in clause 20.3.5. + +### 20.3.5 SGW functionality + +#### 20.3.5.1 S1-U path failure + +An SGW, with or without CUPS support, may optionally support the following S1-U path failure notification feature. + +If the feature is supported and deployed in the network, after detecting a S1-U user plane path failure: + +- If the SGW decides to keep the bearer contexts associated with the failed path (e.g. when the operator configurable maximum path failure duration timer has not expired), the SGW shall notify the MME of the S1-U path failure in subsequent signalling procedures associated with those PDN connections that are affected by the failed S1-U path as follows: + - when the SGW receives a Create Session Request message with eNodeB F-TEID(s), e.g. in an S1/X2 handover with SGW relocation procedure, or a Modify Bearer Request message or a Modify Access Bearer Request message, e.g. in a Service Request procedure: + - if all default bearer contexts are associated with failed S1-U paths, the SGW shall reject the request messages with the cause code "S1-U Path Failure" at the message level; + - if the bearer context(s) associated with the failed S1-U path(s) is not the default bearer context, the SGW may partially accept the Create Session Request or the Modify Bearer Request message and shall include the cause code "S1-U Path Failure" at the bearer context level for the bearer context(s) associated with failed S1-U path(s); + - if at least one of default bearers among multiple PDN connections from the same UE is not associated with the failed S1-U path, the SGW may partially accept the Modify Access Bearer Request message including the cause code "S1-U Path Failure" at the bearer context level for the bearer context associated with failed S1-U path; + - at reception of downlink packets to be sent towards an S1-U bearer associated with a failed S1-U path, the SGW shall send a Downlink Data Notification message with the cause code "S1-U Path Failure". +- If the SGW decided to delete the bearer contexts associated with the failed path, the SGW shall include a cause code "S1-U path failure" in the Delete Bearer Request message. + +## 20.3.6 MME functionality + +### 20.3.6.1 S1-U path failure + +An MME may optionally support the following S1-U path failure notification feature. + +If the feature is supported and deployed in the network, after receiving the cause code "S1-U Path Failure" in a Create Session Response or a Modify Bearer Response or a Modify Access Bearer Response or a Downlink Data Notification or a Delete Bearer Request message: + +- the MME shall derive the S1-U path information (e.g. the eNB F-TEID and the SGW F-TEID) from the UE Context and mark it as failed, and the MME shall store such information for a configurable period, and before the configured period is expired; +- the MME should avoid selecting the SGW with a failed S1-U path towards the eNB for subsequent PDN connection establishment procedures and mobility procedures with SGW relocation; +- if an alternative SGW without an S1-U path failure is available, the MME shall perform an SGW relocation procedure at a Service Request procedure for the PDN Connection(s) where the default bearer is associated with a failed S1-U path as specified in clause 5.10.4 of 3GPP TS 23.401 [15]. +- if an alternative SGW without an S1-U path failure is available, the MME should perform an SGW relocation procedure for all active PDN connections where the default bearer is associated with the failed S1-U path as specified in clause 5.10.4 of 3GPP TS 23.401 [15]. +- the MME should deactivate the corresponding PDN connections using the "reactivation requested" cause value as specified in clause 5.10.3 of 3GPP TS 23.401 [15] if it receives a Delete Bearer Request with the cause "S1-U Path Failure" for deleting the PDN connection; +- the MME shall deactivate the corresponding E-RAB for the bearer context(s) associated with failed S1-U path(s) if it receives a Delete Bearer Request message with the cause "S1-U Path Failure" for deleting dedicated bearer context(s). + +## 21 Error Indication handling + +### 21.1 General + +The following clauses specify a network element behaviour, if it receives a GTPv1-U Error Indication message. The reception of the message triggers a node internal procedure and/or a Control Plane procedure (GTPv1-C, GTPv2, RANAP, S1-AP). + +For the PMIP based S5/S8 interface, an error in the form of an ICMP message is used instead of a GTPv1-U Error Indication message for the Error Indication handling. + +### 21.2 GGSN + +GTP error indication message shall be handled as follows: + +- If the GGSN receives a GTP error indication for a PDP context that has the DTI flag set (i.e. from an RNC), the GGSN should not delete the associated PDP context but mark it as invalid. Any subsequent packets arriving for an invalid PDP context should be discarded. The GGSN shall inform the SGSN that the GGSN received a GTP error indication from RNC. The SGSN shall re-establish the tunnel between the SGSN and GGSN as specified in 3GPP TS 29.060 [8], which sets the related PDP context as valid again in the GGSN. The GGSN then forwards any subsequent downlink packets to the SGSN. +- If the GGSN receives a GTP error indication for a PDP context that has the no DTI flag set (i.e. from an SGSN), the GGSN shall delete its PDP context and may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. + +### 21.3 Gn/Gp SGSN + +GTP error indication message shall be handled as follows: + +- If the SGSN receives a GTP error indication from a GGSN, the SGSN shall delete its PDP context and may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. Additionally it shall send a Deactivate PDP Context Request message to the MS with cause "re-activation required" +- If the SGSN receives a GTP error indication from the RNC it shall locally release the RAB. The SGSN should preserve the associated PDP context. The SGSN may initiate the RAB Assignment procedure in order to re-establish the RAB. +- For MBMS, when an Error Indication is received from an SGSN, the receiving GGSN shall delete all information associated with the relevant SGSN in its MBMS Bearer Context and the GGSN may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. In addition, for broadcast mode the GGSN may request the re-establishment of the MBMS Bearer Context by sending an MBMS Session Start Request message (see clause 7.5A.2.5 of 3GPP TS 29.060 [8]). Furthermore, if the GGSN serves only one downstream SGSN for MBMS data transfer and the GGSN does not support the re-establishment procedure, the GGSN shall delete its MBMS Bearer Context together with the affected MBMS UE Context(s). + +### 21.4 S4 SGSN + +GTP error indication message shall be handled as follows: + +- If the S4-SGSN receives a GTP error indication from a SGW, the S4-SGSN shall delete its Bearer context and may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. Additionally it shall send a Deactivate PDP Context Request message to the MS with cause "re-activation required" +- If the S4-SGSN receives a GTP error indication from the RNC it shall locally release the RAB. The S4-SGSN should preserve the associated Bearer context. The S4-SGSN may initiate the RAB Assignment procedure in order to re-establish the RAB. + +## 21.5 RNC or NodeB + +GTP error indication message shall be handled as follows: + +- When the RNC receives GTP error indication from the SGSN, it shall initiate the RAB Release procedure with the error cause "GTP Resources Unavailable" and shall immediately locally release the RAB (i.e. without waiting for a response from the SGSN). +- If the RNC receives a GTP error indication from the GGSN (i.e. if Direct Tunnel is established), it shall initiate the RAB Release procedure with the error cause "GTP Resources Unavailable" and immediately locally release the RAB (i.e. without waiting for a response from the SGSN). The SGSN shall delete the related PDP context at the SGSN and send a Deactivate PDP Context Request message to the MS with cause "re-activation required". +- If the RNC receives a GTP error indication from the SGW (i.e. if Direct Tunnel is established), it shall initiate the RAB Release procedure with the error cause "GTP Resources Unavailable" and immediately locally release the RAB (i.e. without waiting for a response from the SGSN). The SGSN shall delete the related PDP context and send a Deactivate PDP Context Request message to the MS with the cause "re-activation required". If the deleted PDP context is a primary PDP context, the SGSN shall set the "Tear down indicator" bit in the Deactivate PDP Context Request message. The SGSN may also optionally send a Delete Bearer Command or a Delete Session Request message to the SGW if the deleted PDP context is a secondary PDP context or a primary PDP context respectively. + +NOTE: Sending a Delete Bearer Command or a Delete Session Request message to the SGW can help the SGSN to determine whether the GTP error indication was due to the release of the bearer context or the release of the UE context in the SGW. + +## 21.6 eNodeB + +GTP error indication message shall be handled as follows: + +- If the eNodeB receives a GTP error indication from the SGW over an S1-U tunnel not doing indirect forwarding, it shall initiate the E-RAB Release procedure and immediately locally release the E-RAB (i.e. without waiting for a response from the MME). If the MME receives the E-RAB Release Indication for a default bearer that is not the last default bearer of a UE or that the UE has a SCEF PDN connection or that the UE supports Attach without PDN connectivity as specified in clause 5.3.8.3 of 3GPP TS 23.401 [15], the MME should send a Delete Session Request to the SGW. Additionally the MME may also send a Deactivate EPS Bearer Context Request to the UE with the ESM cause set to "Reactivation Requested" if the MME has decided to restore the PDN connection based on operator policy, QCI and/or ARP and/or APN. If the MME receives the E-RAB Release Indication for the last default bearer of a UE and the UE does not have a SCEF PDN connection and the UE does not support Attach without PDN connectivity as specified in clause 5.3.8.3 of 3GPP TS 23.401 [15], the MME shall initiate a MME initiated Detach procedure with the detach type "re-attach required". If the MME receives the UE Context Release Request from the eNB, the MME shall send a Release Access Bearers Request to the SGW but if the SGW responds with a "context not found" cause and the UE does not have a SCEF PDN connection and the UE does not support Attach without PDN connectivity, then the MME shall initiate a MME initiated Detach procedure with the detach type "re-attach required". +- If the eNodeB receives a GTP error indication from a peer eNodeB over an X2-U direct forwarding tunnel or from an SGW over an S1-U indirect forwarding tunnel, the eNodeB may ignore the error indication received over the forwarding tunnels or delete the forwarding tunnel context locally without deleting the EPS bearers. +- For dual connectivity case as specified in 3GPP TS 36.300 [32]: + - If the MeNodeB receives a GTP error indication from the SGW over an S1-U tunnel, it shall initiate the E-RAB Release procedure and immediately locally release the E-RAB (i.e. without waiting for a response from the MME); + - If the MeNodeB/SeNodeB receives a GTP error indication from the peer SeNodeB/MeNodeB, the MeNodeB/SeNodeB shall delete the X2-U tunnel locally; + - If the SeNodeB receives a GTP error indication from the SGW over an S1-U tunnel, it shall delete the S1-U tunnel locally; + +- The MeNodeB and SeNodeB may initiate an additional dual connectivity procedure(s) as specified in 3GPP TS 36.300 [32]. + +## 21.7 SGW + +GTP error indication message shall be handled as follows: + +- For an 'Active' mode UE having a user plane connection with an RNC, i.e. SGW has F-TEIDs assigned by RNC for user plane for the UE, when the SGW receives a GTP Error Indication for a Bearer Context that has the DTI flag set (i.e. from an RNC), the SGW should not delete the associated Bearer Context but delete all the RNC GTP-U tunnel TEIDs for this MS and sends a Downlink Data Notification message to the SGSN (the complete behaviour is specified in clause 22). Then the SGW starts buffering downlink packets received for this MS. +- For an 'Active' mode UE having a user plane connection with an eNB, i.e. SGW has F-TEIDs assigned by eNB for user plane for the UE, when the SGW receives a GTP Error Indication for a Bearer Context from an eNodeB, the SGW should not delete the associated Bearer Context but delete all the eNodeB GTP-U tunnel TEIDs for this UE and sends a Downlink Data Notification message to the MME (the complete behaviour is specified in clause 22). Then the SGW starts buffering downlink packets received for this UE. +- For a UE having an S11 user plane connection with an MME, i.e. SGW has S11-U F-TEIDs assigned by MME for user plane for the UE, when the SGW receives a GTP Error Indication for a Bearer Context from an MME, the SGW may: + - delete all the Bearer contexts associated with the PDN connection (identified by the default bearer) and notify the Operation and Maintenance network element, or as an alternative, + - delete the MME GTP-U tunnel TEID for this UE and send a Downlink Data Notification message to the MME to re-establish the user plane path without deleting the PDN connection (the complete behaviour is specified in clause 22). Then the SGW starts buffering downlink packets received for this UE. +- If the SGW receives a GTP error indication from S4-SGSN for a Bearer Context other than the default bearer when S4-U is used, the SGW may delete its Bearer context and may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element, or as an alternative, the SGW may send Downlink Data Notification message to the S4-SGSN to re-establish the user plane path without deleting the bearer context. +- If the SGW receives a GTP error indication from S4-SGSN for the default bearer when S4-U is used, the SGW may delete all the Bearer contexts associated with the PDN connection (identified by the default bearer) and may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element, or as an alternative, the SGW may send Downlink Data Notification message to the S4-SGSN to re-establish the user plane path without deleting the PDN connection. +- If the SGW receives a GTP error indication from a PGW for the bearer other than the default bearer, the SGW shall delete its Bearer context and may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. +- If the SGW receives a GTP error indication from a PGW for the default bearer, the SGW shall delete all the Bearer contexts associated with the PDN connection (identified by the default bearer) and may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. The SGW may send the Delete Bearer Request for the default bearer to the MME/S4 SGSN to delete the associated PDN connection. + +PMIP error indication message shall be handled as follows: + +- If the SGW receives an ICMP message from a PGW that indicates the UE specific error indication, as specified in the 3GPP TS 29.275 [16], the SGW may delete the associated PDN connection (identified by the GRE key included in the ICMP message) and may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. In this case, the SGW may also: + - send the Delete Bearer Request for the default bearer to the MME/S4 SGSN to delete the associated PDN connection, and/or, + - perform other implementation specific actions, such as: sending messages to release other external resources (e.g. PCC messages). + +## 21.8 PGW + +GTP error indication message shall be handled as follows: + +- If the PGW receives a GTP error indication from a SGW/a TWAN /an ePDG for the bearer other than the default bearer, the PGW shall delete its Bearer context and may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. +- If the PGW receives a GTP error indication from a SGW/a TWAN /an ePDG for the default bearer, the PGW shall delete all the Bearer contexts associated with the PDN connection (identified by the default bearer) and may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. + +PMIP error indication message shall be handled as follows: + +- If the PGW receives an ICMP message from an SGW/an ePDG/a Trusted Non-3GPP IP access node that indicates the UE specific error indication as specified in the 3GPP TS 29.275 [16], the PGW may delete the associated PDN connection (identified by the GRE key included in the ICMP message) and may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. + +## 21.9 MBMS GW + +GTP Error Indication message shall be handled as follows: + +- If the MBMS GW receives a GTP Error Indication from a SGSN, the MBMS GW shall delete its Bearer context and may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. + +## 21.10 ePDG + +GTP error indication message shall be handled as follows: + +- If the ePDG receives a GTP error indication from a PGW for the bearer other than the default bearer, the ePDG shall delete its Bearer context and may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. +- If the ePDG receives a GTP error indication from a PGW for the default bearer, the ePDG shall delete all the Bearer contexts associated with the PDN connection (identified by the default bearer) and initiate the release of the corresponding SWu instance (i.e. IKEv2 tunnel). The ePDG may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. + +PMIP error indication message shall be handled as follows: + +- If the ePDG receives an ICMP message from a PGW that indicates the UE specific error indication as specified in the 3GPP TS 29.275 [16], the ePDG may delete the associated PDN connection (identified by the GRE key included in the ICMP message) and initiate the release of the corresponding SWu instance (i.e. IKEv2 tunnel). The ePDG may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. + +## 21.11 TWAN + +GTP error indication message shall be handled as follows: + +- If the TWAN receives a GTP error indication from a PGW for the bearer other than the default bearer, the TWAN shall delete its Bearer context and may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. +- If the TWAN receives a GTP error indication from a PGW for the default bearer, the TWAN shall delete all the Bearer contexts associated with the PDN connection (identified by the default bearer) and may initiate the release of the corresponding WLAN specific resource. The TWAN may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. + +PMIP error indication message shall be handled as follows: + +- If the TWAN receives an ICMP message from a PGW that indicates the UE specific error indication as specified in the 3GPP TS 29.275 [16], the TWAN may delete the associated PDN connection (identified by the GRE key + +included in the ICMP message) and may initiate the release of the corresponding WLAN specific resource. The TWAN may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. + +## 21.12 MME + +GTP error indication message shall be handled as follows: + +- If the MME receives a GTP error indication from an SGW, the MME shall delete its Bearer context and may notify the Operation and Maintenance network element. Additionally the MME shall deactivate the corresponding PDN connection towards the UE with the cause "re-activation required", or initiate an explicit detach with reattached required procedure, as appropriate, see 3GPP TS 24.301 [19]. + +--- + +## 22 Downlink Data Notification Handling at MME/S4 SGSN + +If the MME/S4 SGSN receives a Downlink Data Notification message from the SGW as a result of the SGW having received an Error Indication message from the eNodeB/RNC or S4-SGSN over S4 User Plane, the MME/S4 SGSN should perform the following: + +- If the UE is in IDLE state, upon receipt of the Downlink Data Notification message, the MME/S4 SGSN shall perform the Network Triggered Service Request procedure as specified in 3GPP TS 23.060 [5] and 3GPP TS 23.401 [15]. +- If the UE is in CONNECTED state, upon receipt of the Downlink Data Notification message, the MME shall perform S1 Release procedure and perform Network Triggered Service Request procedure as specified in 3GPP TS 23.401 [15]. +- If the UE is in CONNECTED state, upon receipt of the Downlink Data Notification message and Direct Tunnel is used, the S4-SGSN shall perform Iu Release procedure and perform Network Triggered Service Request procedure as specified in 3GPP TS 23.060 [5] if the cause value included in Downlink Data Notification is "Error Indication received from RNC/eNodeB/S4-SGSN", +- If the UE is in CONNECTED state, upon receipt of the Downlink Data Notification message and Direct Tunnel is not used, the S4-SGSN should re-establish all of the S4-U bearers of this UE if the cause value included in Downlink Data Notification is "Error Indication received from RNC/eNodeB/S4-SGSN". + +Upon receipt of a Downlink Data Notification message from the SGW, caused by an Error Indication message received from the MME over the S11 User Plane, the MME should perform the following if the UE is known by the MME: + +- If the UE is in IDLE state, the MME shall perform the Network Triggered Service Request procedure as specified in 3GPP TS 23.401 [15]. +- If the UE is in CONNECTED state, the MME may perform an S1 Release procedure and a Network Triggered Service Request procedure as specified in 3GPP TS 23.401 [15], or as an alternative, the MME may keep the existing S1 signalling connection and just send a Modify Bearer Request message to the SGW to re-establish the S11-U tunnel. + +If the MME receives a Downlink Data Notification message from the SGW as a result of the SGW having detected a S1-U path failure, and if the MME supports S1-U path failure notification feature, the MME shall behave as specified in clause 20.3.6. + +--- + +## 23 General partial failure handling procedures + +The partial failure handling is an optional feature for MME, SGW, ePDG, TWAN and PGW. Partial failure handling is an optional feature between SGW-C, PGW-C, SGW-U and PGW-U for split SGW and PGW (see 3GPP TS 23.214 [42]). + +For split SGW and PGW, the description in this clause related to SGW applies to SGW-C and PGW applies to PGW-C as well. + +A partial failure handling feature may be used when a hardware or software failure affects a significant number of PDN connections while a significant number of PDN connections are unaffected. This feature may also be used for the degenerate case of a full/complete failure of a remote node (MME or PGW) in order to cleanup hanging PDN connections associated with the failed node. When it is impossible to recover the affected PDN connections (for example, using implementation-specific session redundancy procedures), it is useful to inform the peer nodes about the affected PDN connections for recovery on the peer nodes. Such a notification could be performed using an identifier that represents a large set of PDN connections rather than on individual PDN connection basis. + +NOTE 1: If a hardware or software failure happens to impact only an insignificant number of PDN connections the node experiencing the fault need not treat the failure as a partial fault but may tear down connections one by one. + +For the purposes of partial fault handling the term "node" refers to an entity that takes the role of an MME, PGW, ePDG, TWAN or SGW as defined in an SAE network. + +A PDN Connection Set Identifier (CSID) shall identify a set of PDN connections within a node that may belong to an arbitrary number of UEs. A CSID is an opaque parameter local to a node. Each node that supports the feature maintains a local mapping of CSID to its internal resources. When one or more of those resources fail, the corresponding one or more fully qualified CSIDs are signalled to the peer nodes. + +The fully qualified CSID (FQ-CSID) is the combination of the node identity and the CSID assigned by the node which together globally identifies a set of PDN connections. + +NOTE 2: The node identifier in the FQ-CSID is required since two different nodes may use the same CSID value. A partial fault in one node should not cause completely unrelated PDN connections to be removed accidentally. + +The node identifier shall be globally unique across all 3GPP EPS networks. Its format is defined in 3GPP TS 29.274 [13] + +For the purposes of partial fault handling the term peer is used as follows: For a particular PDN connection two nodes are peers if both nodes are used for that PDN connection. For a PDN Connection Set the nodes are peers if they have at least one PDN connection in the PDN Connection Set where both nodes are used for that PDN connection. In particular PGW and MME are generally peers for the purposes of partial fault handling. + +An FQ-CSID is established in a node and stored in peer nodes in the PDN connection at the time of PDN connection establishment, or during a node relocation, and used later during partial failure handling in messages defined in 3GPP TS 29.274 [13] and 3GPP TS 29.275 [16]. Each node that support the feature, including the MME, SGW, ePDG, TWAN and the PGW, shall maintain the FQ-CSID provided by every other peer node for a PDN connection. The FQ-CSIDs stored by PDN connection are later used to find the matching PDN connections when a FQ-CSID is received from a node reporting a partial fault for that FQ-CSID. + +With the exception of the GTPv2 Delete PDN Connection Set Request and PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Indication BRI messages, each feature supporting MME, SGW, ePDG, TWAN or PGW shall assign only one FQ-CSID for itself in messages and each FQ-CSID shall have exactly one CSID within the FQ-CSID. + +Following rules shall apply for all the nodes: + +- 1) If a node (MME, SGW, ePDG, TWAN or PGW) supports the partial failure handling feature, it shall generate and include its own FQ-CSID during the PDN connection establishment, node relocation procedures. Explicit list of the relevant GTPv2 messages is given in the respective clauses (14.3 "Partial Failure Handling at MME", 16.2 "Partial Failure Handling at SGW", 17B.2 "Partial Failure Handling at ePDG", 17C.2 "Partial Failure Handling at TWAN" and 17.2 "Partial Failure Handling at PGW"). A node that supports partial failure handling feature shall also store peers' FQ-CSIDs. +- 2) Additionally, if an SGW supports partial failure handling feature, it shall forward the peer node's (of an MME or of a PGW, depending on the direction) FQ-CSID and also Delete Connection Set Request/Response messages. Also, if the SGW detects the full/complete failure of an MME or PGW, e.g., through the Echo Request/Echo Response procedure, it may send a Delete PDN Connection Set Request (or PMIPv6 Binding Revocation Indication with G bit set) message containing all of the FQ-CSIDs of the associated hanging PDN connections of the failed node to the corresponding remote node (MME or PGW). + +- 3) If a node that supports partial failure handling feature receives peer node's FQ-CSID during the procedures, which are specified in Rule 1, it shall conclude that the peer node supports the feature. Subsequently, the node shall store the peer node's FQ-CSID and shall send appropriate partial failure handling messages to the peer. +- 4) If a node that supports partial failure handling feature does not receive the peer's FQ-CSID during the procedures, which are specified in Rule 1, it shall conclude that the peer node does not support the feature. +- 5) A node that supports partial failure handling feature shall not send any FQ-CSID IE or any partial failure handling specific messages to the peer node if the sender is aware (see Rule 4) that the receiver does not support the feature. +- 6) If a node does not support the partial failure handling feature, it shall ignore any received FQ-CSID IE or any partial failure handling specific message. +- 7) During session management procedures as specified in 3GPP TS 23.401 [15] and 3GPP TS 23.402 [18] (such as a dedicated bearer activation/deactivation/update), a node supporting the partial failure handling feature may update its FQ-CSID to the supporting peer node(s) in the Create Bearer Request/Response, Delete Bearer Request/Response or Update Bearer Request/Response. + +NOTE 3: FQ-CSID handling for the Initial Attach and various handover cases are addressed in clauses 14, 16 and 17. + +In addition to the above requirements, for split SGW and PGW, the following applies: + +- 1) If a node (SGW-C, SGW-U, PGW-C or PGW-U) supports the partial failure handling feature, it shall generate and include its own FQ-CSID during the Sx Session Establishment procedure. +- 2) The SGW-C shall initiate Sx Session Modification procedure to update the SGW-U with the MME FQ-CSID, PGW-C FQ-CSID if changed; +- 3) The PGW-C shall initiate Sx Session Modification procedure to update the PGW-U with the MME FQ-CSID, SGW-C FQ-CSID, TWAN FQ-CSID, or ePDG FQ-CSID if changed; +- 4) The SGW-C and the PGW-C may change its FQ-CSID during a Sx Session Modification procedure if its SEID is changed; +- 5) When the node (SGW-C, SGW-U, PGW-C or PGW-U) detects that it has undergone a partial failure, it shall send a Sx Session Set Deletion Request message containing all the its CSIDs of the component(s) failing to its peer node; +- 6) For a SGW-C or a PGW-C, it shall also send Sx Session Set Deletion Request to the SGW-U or PGW-U respectively containing MME FQ-CSID, ePDG FQ-CSID, TWAN FQ-CSID, PGW-C FQ-CSID or SGW-C FQ-CSID if it receives the corresponding GTPv2 message Delete PDN Connection Set Request message containing those FQ-CSID. +- 7) The SGW-C and the PGW-C shall initiate the restoration procedure to restore the Sx Sessions affected by the partial failure in the SGW-U or the PGW-U in the same way as specified in the clause 16.1A.3 for the SGW-U failure and 17.1A.3 for the PGW-U failure respectively, when receiving an Sx Session Set Deletion Request message including a SGW-U or a PGW-U FQ-CSID(s) which is associated with the partial failure from the SGW-U or the PGW-U. + +Figure 23-1 illustrates FQ-CSID establishment during the Attach or PDN connection establishment procedures for 3GPP E-UTRAN access as specified in the above rules. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating FQ-CSID establishment during the Attach or PDN establishment procedure for 3GPP E-UTRAN access. The diagram shows four steps: 1. MME sends Create Session Request (MME FQ-CSID) to SGW; 2. SGW sends Create Session Request (MME & SGW FQ-CSIDs) to PGW; 3. PGW sends Create Session Response (PGW FQ-CSID) to SGW; 4. SGW sends Create Session Response (SGW & PGW FQ-CSIDs) to MME.](c07e21a8d65991db04263322f859c94f_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant MME + participant SGW + participant PGW + Note left of MME: + MME->>SGW: 1. Create Session Request (MME FQ-CSID) + Note right of SGW: + SGW->>PGW: 2. Create Session Request (MME & SGW FQ-CSIDs) + Note right of PGW: + PGW->>SGW: 3. Create Session Response (PGW FQ-CSID) + Note right of SGW: + SGW->>MME: 4. Create Session Response (SGW & PGW FQ-CSIDs) + Note left of MME: + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating FQ-CSID establishment during the Attach or PDN establishment procedure for 3GPP E-UTRAN access. The diagram shows four steps: 1. MME sends Create Session Request (MME FQ-CSID) to SGW; 2. SGW sends Create Session Request (MME & SGW FQ-CSIDs) to PGW; 3. PGW sends Create Session Response (PGW FQ-CSID) to SGW; 4. SGW sends Create Session Response (SGW & PGW FQ-CSIDs) to MME. + +**Figure 23-1: FQ-CSID establishment during the Attach or PDN establishment procedure for 3GPP E-UTRAN access** + +1. If an MME supports partial failure handling, the MME shall send own FQ-CSID to SGW with a Create Session Request message across S11 interface. + +The MME's FQ-CSID indicates to the SGW that MME supports partial failure handling. If the SGW does not receive MME's FQ-CSID, then the SGW shall never send partial failure handling related messages or IEs to the MME. + +If the SGW does not support partial failure handling, then the SGW shall silently discard MME's FQ-CSID. + +If the SGW does support partial fault handling it shall store the MME's FQ-CSID in its PDN connection table. + +2. If the SGW supports partial failure handling, the SGW shall forward MME's FQ-CSID to PGW with a Create Session Request message or a Proxy Binding Update message across S5/S8 interface. The SGW shall also include own FQ-CSID into the message. + +The SGW's FQ-CSID indicates to the PGW that the SGW supports partial failure handling. + +If the PGW does not support partial failure handling, then the PGW shall silently discard both FQ-CSIDs. + +3. If the SGW has indicated the support for partial failure handling to PGW, then the PGW, which supports the feature shall send own FQ-CSID back to the SGW with a Create Session Response message or a Proxy Binding Acknowledgement message across S5/S8 interface. PGW's FQ-CSIDs in the S5/S8 Create Session Response or a Proxy Binding Acknowledgement message indicates to the SGW that PGW supports partial failure handling. + +If the SGW has not indicated support for partial failure handling, then PGW shall never send partial failure handling related messages or IEs to the SGW. + +4. If the MME has indicated the support for partial failure handling to SGW, then the SGW, which supports the feature, shall forward PGW's FQ-CSID to MME with a Create Session Response message across S11 interface. The SGW shall also include own FQ-CSID into the message. + +Figure 23-2 illustrates FQ-CSID establishment during the Attach or PDN connection establishment procedures for untrusted non-3GPP access as specified in the above rules. + +![Sequence diagram showing FQ-CSID establishment between ePDG/TWAN and PGW. Step 1: ePDG/TWAN sends a Create Session Request (ePDG/TWAN FQ-CSID) or Proxy Binding Update (ePDG/TWAN FQ-CSID) to PGW. Step 2: PGW responds with a Create Session Response (PGW FQ-CSIDs) or Proxy Binding Acknowledgement (PGW FQ-CSIDs) to ePDG/TWAN.](9c45844d796e85ae05505870a54e4eb4_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ePDG/TWAN + participant PGW + ePDG/TWAN->>PGW: 1. Create Session Request (ePDG/TWAN FQ-CSID) or +Proxy Binding Update (ePDG/TWAN FQ-CSID) + PGW-->>ePDG/TWAN: 2. Create Session Response (PGW FQ-CSIDs) or +Proxy Binding Acknowledgement (PGW FQ-CSIDs) + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing FQ-CSID establishment between ePDG/TWAN and PGW. Step 1: ePDG/TWAN sends a Create Session Request (ePDG/TWAN FQ-CSID) or Proxy Binding Update (ePDG/TWAN FQ-CSID) to PGW. Step 2: PGW responds with a Create Session Response (PGW FQ-CSIDs) or Proxy Binding Acknowledgement (PGW FQ-CSIDs) to ePDG/TWAN. + +**Figure 23-2: FQ-CSID establishment during the Attach or PDN establishment procedure for non-3GPP access** + +1. If an ePDG/TWAN supports partial failure handling, the ePDG/TWAN shall send own FQ-CSID to PGW with a Create Session Request message across GTPv2 based S2b/S2a interface or a Proxy Binding Update message across PMIPv6 based S2b/S2a interface. + +The ePDG's/TWAN's FQ-CSID indicates to the PGW that ePDG/TWAN supports partial failure handling. If the PGW does not receive ePDG's/TWAN's FQ-CSID, then the PGW shall never send partial failure handling related messages or IEs to the ePDG/TWAN. + +2. If the PGW supports partial failure handling, it shall store the ePDG's/TWAN's FQ-CSID in its PDN connection table and it shall send own FQ-CSID back to the ePDG/TWAN with a Create Session Response message across GTPv2 based S2b/S2a interface or a Proxy Binding Acknowledgement message across PMIPv6 based S2b/S2a interface. PGW's FQ-CSIDs in the Create Session Response or Proxy Binding Acknowledgement indicates to the ePDG/TWAN that PGW supports partial failure handling. The ePDG/TWAN shall then store the PGW's FQ-CSID in its PDN connection table. + +If the PGW does not support partial failure handling, then the PGW shall silently discard ePDG's/TWAN's FQ-CSID. + +Figure 23-3 illustrates FQ-CSID establishment during the Sx Session Establishment procedure for 3GPP access, with a split SGW, as specified in the above rules. + +![Sequence diagram showing FQ-CSID establishment between SGW-C and SGW-U. Step 1: SGW-C sends an Sx Session Establishment Request (MME FQ-CSID, SGW-C FQ-CSID) to SGW-U. Step 2: SGW-U responds with an Sx Session Establishment Response (SGW-U FQ-CSIDs) to SGW-C.](7b18671bc31881a5c474883bf6a300fd_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant SGW-C + participant SGW-U + SGW-C->>SGW-U: 1. Sx Session Establishment Request (MME FQ-CSID, +SGW-C FQ-CSID) + SGW-U-->>SGW-C: 2. Sx Session Establishment Response (SGW-U FQ- +CSIDs) + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing FQ-CSID establishment between SGW-C and SGW-U. Step 1: SGW-C sends an Sx Session Establishment Request (MME FQ-CSID, SGW-C FQ-CSID) to SGW-U. Step 2: SGW-U responds with an Sx Session Establishment Response (SGW-U FQ-CSIDs) to SGW-C. + +**Figure 23-3: FQ-CSID establishment during the Sx Session Establishment procedure** + +1. If an SGW-C supports partial failure handling, the SGW-C shall send its own FQ-CSID and MME FQ-CSID to the SGW-U in the Sx Session Establishment Request. +2. If the SGW-U supports partial failure handling, it shall store the SGW-C FQ-CSID and MME FQ-CSID for the related Sx Session and it shall send its own FQ-CSID back to the SGW-C in the Sx Session Establishment Response message. The SGW-U's FQ-CSID in the Create Session Establishment Response implicitly indicates to the SGW-C that SGW-U supports partial failure handling. The SGW-C shall then store the SGW-U's FQ-CSID for the related Sx Session. If the SGW-C does not receive an SGW-U FQ-CSID from the SGW-U, then the SGW-C shall not further send partial failure handling related messages or IEs to the SGW-U. + +If the SGW-U does not support partial failure handling, then the SGW-U shall silently discard the SGW-C's FQ-CSID and MME FQ-CSID. + +Figure 23-4 illustrates FQ-CSID establishment during the Sx session Establishment procedure with a split PGW as specified in the above rules. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 23-4: FQ-CSID establishment during the Sx session establishment procedure. The diagram shows two vertical lifelines: PGW-C on the left and PGW-U on the right. Step 1: A solid arrow points from PGW-C to PGW-U with the text '1. Sx Session Establishment Request (MME FQ-CSID, SGW-C FQ-CSID, PGW-C FQ-CSID)'. Step 2: A solid arrow points from PGW-U back to PGW-C with the text '2. Sx Session Establishment Response (PGW-U FQ-CSIDs)'.](49fe8fe978c0f7e73112d231feb377eb_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for Figure 23-4: FQ-CSID establishment during the Sx session establishment procedure. The diagram shows two vertical lifelines: PGW-C on the left and PGW-U on the right. Step 1: A solid arrow points from PGW-C to PGW-U with the text '1. Sx Session Establishment Request (MME FQ-CSID, SGW-C FQ-CSID, PGW-C FQ-CSID)'. Step 2: A solid arrow points from PGW-U back to PGW-C with the text '2. Sx Session Establishment Response (PGW-U FQ-CSIDs)'. + +**Figure 23-4: FQ-CSID establishment during the Sx session establishment procedure** + +1. If a PGW-C supports partial failure handling, the PGW-C shall send its own FQ-CSID, SGW-C FQ-CSID, TWAN FQ-CSID, ePDG FQ-CSID and MME FQ-CSID to PGW-U in the Sx Session Establishment Request. +2. If the PGW-U supports partial failure handling, it shall store the PGW-C FQ-CSID, SGW-C FQ-CSID, TWAN FQ-CSID, ePDG FQ-CSID and MME FQ-CSID for the related Sx Session and it shall send its own FQ-CSID back to the PGW-C in the Sx Session Establishment Response message. The PGW-U's FQ-CSIDs in the Sx Session Establishment Response implicitly indicates to the PGW-C that PGW-U supports partial failure handling. The PGW-C shall then store the PGW-U's FQ-CSID for the related Sx Session. If the PGW-C does not receive a PGW-U FQ-CSID from the PGW-U, then the PGW-C shall not further send partial failure handling related messages or IEs to the PGW-U. + +If the PGW-U does not support partial failure handling, then the PGW-U shall silently discard PGW-C's FQ-CSID. + +Figure 23-5 illustrates FQ-CSID establishment during the Sx Session Establishment procedures to provide the PGW-C FQ-CSID to the SGW-U after receiving a PGW-C FQ-CSID in Create Session Response from PGW-C on the S5/S8 interface. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 23-5: FQ-CSID establishment to provide a PGW-C FQ-CSID to the PGW-U. The diagram shows two vertical lifelines: SGW-C on the left and SGW-U on the right. Step 1: A solid arrow points from SGW-C to SGW-U with the text '1. Sx Session Modification Request (PGW-C FQ-CSID)'. Step 2: A solid arrow points from SGW-U back to SGW-C with the text '2. Sx Session Modification Response'.](0cc154cbdde7cc6c39f394597c7aca0c_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for Figure 23-5: FQ-CSID establishment to provide a PGW-C FQ-CSID to the PGW-U. The diagram shows two vertical lifelines: SGW-C on the left and SGW-U on the right. Step 1: A solid arrow points from SGW-C to SGW-U with the text '1. Sx Session Modification Request (PGW-C FQ-CSID)'. Step 2: A solid arrow points from SGW-U back to SGW-C with the text '2. Sx Session Modification Response'. + +**Figure 23-5: FQ-CSID establishment to provide a PGW-C FQ-CSID to the PGW-U** + +1. If an SGW-C supports partial failure handling and the SGW-U has indicated its support of partial failure in the Sx Session Establishment Response, the SGW-C shall send PGW-C FQ-CSID received on S5/S8 interface to the SGW-U in an Sx Session Modification Request. +2. If the SGW-U supports partial failure handling, it shall store the PGW-C FQ-CSID for the related Sx Session and send a reply to the SGW-C. + +If the SGW-U does not support partial failure handling, then the SGW-U shall silently discard the PGW-C's FQ-CSID. + +--- + +## 24 Restoration of data in the PCRF + +### 24.1 Restart of the PCRF + +#### 24.1.0 PCRF Restart + +PCRF storage of PCC contexts is volatile. When a PCRF fails, the PCC contexts and Diameter sessions affected by the failure are lost in the PCRF. + +When a PCRF receives a non-initial message for which no Diameter session exists, it shall discard the message and return a Diameter error indication to the originating PCRF client. + +--- + +## 25 Network triggered service restoration procedure + +### 25.1 General + +The network triggered service restoration procedure is an optional feature for the MME, S4-SGSN and SGW. A node that supports this feature shall support the network triggered service restoration procedure without ISR as specified in clause 25.2 and the network triggered service restoration procedure with ISR as specified in clause 25.3 if it supports Idle mode Signalling Reduction (ISR) (see 3GPP TS 23.401 [15] and 3GPP TS 23.060 [5]). + +The network triggered restoration procedure without ISR shall apply to UEs for which ISR is not active at the time the ISR associated node fails. The network triggered restoration procedure with ISR shall apply to UEs for which ISR is active at the time the ISR associated node fails. Both procedures may run in parallel if there is a mix of UEs with ISR and without ISR at the time the ISR associated node fails. + +For the PMIP based S5/S8 case, the terminology "S5/S8 bearer" used through clause 25 shall be read as "S5/S8 IP traffic flow" within the GRE tunnel. The detailed concepts of the "IP traffic flow" are specified in 3GPP TS 23.402 [18]. + +### 25.2 Network triggered service restoration procedure without ISR + +#### 25.2.1 General + +The following requirements shall apply if the MME or S4-SGSN and the SGW support this feature. + +If an SGW detects that an MME or S4-SGSN has restarted (see clause 18 "GTP-C based restart procedures"), instead of removing all the resources associated with the peer node, the SGW shall maintain the PDN connection table data and MM bearer contexts for some specific S5/S8 bearer contexts eligible for network initiated service restoration, and initiate the deletion of the resources associated with all the other S5/S8 bearers. + +NOTE 1: This enables the SGW to still receive downlink user plane or control plane data from the PGW or from a PCRF (PMIP based S5/S8) for the maintained S5/S8 bearers. + +The S5/S8 bearers eligible for network initiated service restoration are determined based on operator's policy, e.g. based on the QCI and/or ARP and/or APN, and such operator's policy shall be applicable for both the SGW and the MME/SGSN. The Delay Tolerant Connection Indication (DTCI), if set, may also be used to determine that the S5/S8 bearer is not eligible for network initiated service restoration, based on operator's policy when using QCI and/or ARP and/or APN is not sufficient, e.g. for Home routed roaming scenario. + +Emergency PDN connections for users without authenticated IMSI do not need to be maintained by the SGW and cannot be restored at the initiative of the network. + +NOTE 2: Users with an emergency call in progress can re-attach and re-establish the emergency PDN connection after detecting the loss of the signalling connection with the RAN. IMS Emergency PSAP callback is not supported for unauthenticated users with an emergency registration but without an emergency call in progress. + +If at least one S5/S8 bearer needs to be maintained, the SGW shall also start a timer controlling the maximum duration during which those bearers shall be maintained. There is one operator configurable timer per SGW. The timer value may be equal to the periodic tracking area update timer (timer T3412) as specified in 3GPP TS 24.301 [19] or the periodic routing area update timer (timer T3312) as specified in 3GPP TS 24.008 [20]. This timer ensures that the S5/S8 bearers eligible for network initiated service restoration are maintained until the corresponding UE reattaches to the network. If the timer expires, the maintained resources shall be locally deleted assuming that the corresponding UE might have reattached to the network via a different SGW. + +The SGW shall not release the default bearer of a PDN connection for which one or more dedicated bearers are maintained. Any downlink user plane or control plane packet received on a default bearer which is not eligible for network initiated service restoration but which is maintained for dedicated bearer(s) eligible for such procedure shall be silently discarded by the SGW. + +When releasing the maintained S5/S8 bearers, the SGW may optionally perform other implementation specific actions such as messages to clear other external resources (e.g. PCC messages to clear the resources in the PCRF or GTP/PMIP messages to release the corresponding PDN connection in the PGW). + +If the SGW receives a Create Session Request message for a UE for which some S5/S8 bearers are maintained, the SGW shall delete all the bearers for this UE and proceed with the Create Session Request message handling as specified in 3GPP TS 29.274 [13]. + +## 25.2.2 SGW procedure + +Upon receipt of the first downlink user plane or control plane packet on a maintained S5/S8 bearer or PCC signalling from PCRF, the SGW shall immediately send a Downlink Data Notification message including the IMSI to the respective MME or S4-SGSN. In addition, depending on the received downlink packet type the SGW shall proceed as follows: + +- if the received downlink packet contains user plane data, the SGW shall silently discard it but the SGW shall continue maintaining the corresponding bearers. If the SGW receives another downlink user plane packet for an ARP value other than the ARP included in the Downlink Data Notification sent before, it shall proceed as specified in clause 5.3.4.3 "Network Triggered Service Request" of 3GPP TS 23.401 [15] with the exception that the packet shall be discarded by the SGW. +- For the S5/S8 GTP case: + - if the received downlink packet contains a control plane message other than a Delete Bearer Request message then the SGW may reject the message and shall continue maintaining the corresponding bearers. If the SGW receives another control plane message for an ARP value other than the ARP included in the Downlink Data Notification sent before, it shall proceed as specified in clause 5.3.4.3 "Network Triggered Service Request" of 3GPP TS 23.401 [15] with the exception that the message may be rejected by the SGW. + - if the received downlink packet contains the Delete Bearer Request message, the SGW shall accept the message, and shall release the corresponding S5/S8 bearer(s) immediately. +- For the S5/S8 PMIP case: + - if the received packet contains a control plane message other than the message of the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision procedure as specified in 3GPP TS 29.213 [21] clause 4.4.3 which results in the SGW to decide to deactivate an existing dedicated bearer, then the SGW may reject the message and shall continue maintaining the corresponding bearers. If the SGW receives another control plane message for an ARP value other than the ARP included in the Downlink Data Notification sent before, it shall proceed as specified in clause 5.3.4.3 "Network Triggered Service Request" of 3GPP TS 23.401 [15] with the exception that the message may be rejected by the SGW. + - if the received downlink packet contains the message of the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision procedure as specified in 3GPP TS 29.213 [21] clause 4.4.3 which results in the SGW to decide to deactivate an existing dedicated bearer, the SGW shall accept the message, and shall release the corresponding S5/S8 bearer(s) immediately. + +The SGW may send the Downlink Data Notification message including the IMSI to the respective MME or S4-SGSN, if there is some DL data buffered for a UE when detecting the MME or S4-SGSN restart. + +NOTE: For a UE using a power saving feature, DL data can be buffered for an extended duration in the SGW. The above requirement can allow the MME or S4-SGSN to restore the service to such a UE at the next occasion the UE becomes reachable. The SGW needs to pace the sending of Downlink Data Notification to the MME or S4-SGSN to avoid signalling storms over S11 and S4. + +The SGW may send the Downlink Data Notification message to another MME or S4-SGSN (the same type of mobility node as the failed one) located in the same pool as the failed node if the SGW can not send it to the failed MME or S4-SGSN (e.g. because it did not restart). It is an implementation/deployment matter how an SGW becomes aware that an MME/S4-SGSN has failed and has not restarted. + +## 25.2.3 MME/SGSN procedure + +Upon receipt of a Downlink Data Notification message including the IMSI, the MME or S4-SGSN shall respond to the SGW with a Downlink Data Notification Acknowledge message and should page and force the UE to re-attach to the network. The paging area and subscriber's identity i.e. IMSI or S-TMSI/P-TMSI used during the paging procedure is implementation dependent. The MME or S4-SGSN may support and apply this procedure to a UE using extended idle mode DRX, and if so, they shall page the UE with the S-TMSI/P-TMSI. + +NOTE 1: Upon receiving a page message with + +- the IMSI, the UE starts the reattach procedure as specified in clause 5.6.2.2.2 of 3GPP TS 24.301 [19] and clause 4.7.9.1.2 of 3GPP TS 24.008 [20]; +- the S-TMSI, the UE starts the service request procedure which is rejected by the MME with Cause #10 – Implicitly detached; the UE then re-attaches to the network as specified in clause 5.6.2.2.1 of 3GPP TS 24.301 [19]; +- the P-TMSI, in case of Iu mode, the UE starts the service request procedure which is rejected by the S4-SGSN with Cause #10 – Implicitly detached; the UE then re-attaches as specified in clauses 4.7.9.1.1 and 4.7.13 of 3GPP TS 24.008 [20]; +- the P-TMSI, in case of A/Gb mode, the UE sends any LLC frame and subsequently re-attaches to the network as specified in clause 8.1.4 of 3GPP TS 23.060 [5]. + +NOTE 2: Paging in the MME or S4-SGSN serving area will cause excessive use of radio resources. How to reduce the paging area is implementation dependent. + +NOTE 3: It is the responsibility of the MME/S4 SGSN to avoid unnecessary IMSI Paging. + +NOTE 4: How the restarted or alternative MME/S4-SGSN knows the UE's DRX parameter or the extended DRX parameters to page the UE is implementation dependent. + +NOTE 5: A restarted MME will not receive S1AP UE Context Active message as part of UE initiated Connection Resume procedure, since the eNB would have deleted the AS context for all UEs associated with this MME after detecting the MME restart. + +The MME or S4-SGSN may request the SGW to immediately release the maintained S5/S8 bearers by sending the "Downlink Data Notification Acknowledge" message or a "Downlink Data Notification Failure Indication" message with the specific cause "UE already re-attached", e.g. if the UE has already re-attached to the network. The Downlink Data Notification Acknowledge and Downlink Data Notification Failure Indication shall include the IMSI to identify the UE context in the SGW. + +## 25.3 Network triggered service restoration procedure with ISR + +### 25.3.1 General + +The following requirements shall apply if the involved MME, S4-SGSN and SGW support the ISR feature and the network triggered service restoration feature. + +NOTE: The procedure in this clause does not consider the case where one of ISR associated nodes, i.e. the MME or the S4-SGSN, does not support the network triggered service restoration procedure. + +In the rest of this clause, the term "non-failed" node refers to the CN node (MME or S4-SGSN) that remains in normal operation during this procedure, as opposed to the "restarted" node which refers to the CN node (MME or S4-SGSN) that has failed and restarted. + +The procedure in the SGW towards the restarted node differs from the procedure towards the non-failed ISR associated node (see clause 25.3.2). + +## 25.3.2 SGW procedure + +If an SGW detects that an ISR associated CN node (i.e. MME or S4-SGSN) has restarted (see clause 18), the SGW shall maintain all the PDN connection table data and MM bearer contexts associated with the non-failed and the restarted ISR associated nodes, and start a timer controlling the maximum duration during which the SGW shall consider that ISR is still active. There is one operator configurable timer per SGW. The timer value may be set to a value that is the greater value of the periodic tracking area update timer (timer T3412) as specified in 3GPP TS 24.301 [19] and the periodic routing area update timer (timer T3312) as specified in 3GPP TS 24.008 [20]. This timer ensures that the SGW can still send Downlink Data Notification messages to the restarted MME or S4-SGSN until the corresponding UE learns that ISR is deactivated. If the timer expires, the SGW shall deactivate ISR by locally releasing the resources for the maintained restarted CN node (i.e. restarted CN node control plane F-TEID). + +Upon receipt of the downlink user plane or control plane packet on a maintained S5/S8 bearer for a UE in idle mode or in connected state with the failed CN node, the SGW shall initiate the network triggered service request procedure towards the non-failed CN node as specified in 3GPP TS 23.401 [15] clause 5.3.4.3. In addition, if the S5/S8 bearer is eligible for network initiated service restoration, the SGW shall also immediately send a Downlink Data Notification message including the IMSI towards the restarted CN node as specified in clause 25.2.2. The SGW shall continue to forward downlink user plane or control plane packet for a UE in connected state in the non-failed ISR associated node. + +The S5/S8 bearers eligible for network initiated service restoration are determined by the SGW based on operator's policy e.g. based on the QCI and/or ARP and/or APN. + +Emergency PDN connections for users without authenticated IMSI do not need to be maintained by the SGW and cannot be restored at the initiative of the network. + +NOTE 0: Users with an emergency call in progress can re-attach and re-establish the emergency PDN connection after detecting the loss of the signalling connection with the RAN. IMS Emergency PSAP callback is not supported for unauthenticated users with an emergency registration but without an emergency call in progress. + +The SGW may send the Downlink Data Notification message with the IMSI to another MME or S4-SGSN (the same type of mobility node as the failed one) in the same MME or S4-SGSN pool if the SGW can not send it to the failed MME or S4-SGSN (e.g. because it did not restart). It is an implementation/deployment matter how an SGW becomes aware that an MME/S4-SGSN has failed and has not restarted. + +Upon receipt of a Downlink Data Notification message including the IMSI, the restarted CN node shall respond to the SGW with a Downlink Data Notification Acknowledge message and should page the UE and force it to re-attach to the network as specified in clause 25.2. + +NOTE 1: If the UE camps under the service area of the restarted CN node, then the UE re-attaches to the network (see NOTE 1 in clause 25.2.3). + +If the paging is successful (i.e. Modify Bearer Request is received) for the non-failed ISR associated CN node, the SGW may send a Stop Paging Indication message including the IMSI to the restarted CN node (or the alternative node in the same pool to which the Downlink Data Notification message with the IMSI has been sent before) to stop the paging procedure. + +If the SGW receives a Create Session Request message as part of Initial Attach procedure for a UE for which the PDN connections, MM bearer context and ISR state have been maintained, the SGW shall stop the timer, deactivate ISR, and delete the maintained resources associated to the restarted CN node (i.e. CN node control plane F-TEID). The SGW may additionally send a Stop Paging Indication message to the non-failed ISR associated CN node to stop the paging procedure. + +NOTE 2: The SGW may have already deleted the restarted CN node resources since Delete Session Request from non-failed ISR associated CN node may arrive earlier than the Create Session Request message. + +If the non-failed ISR associated CN node received a Cancel Location message from HSS/HLR with "Initial Attach procedure" Cancellation Type, the non-failed CN node shall delete all the bearer contexts and send Delete Session Request message(s) to SGW. The SGW shall then release all the resources for this UE and sends one of the following messages to PGWs involved to release all the resources maintained in the PGWs as specified in 3GPP TS 23.401 [15] and 3GPP TS 23.402[18]. + +- For the GTP based S5/S8 case, Delete Session Request message(s) +- For the PMIP based S5/S8 case, PBU message(s) with Lifetime set to "0" + +The SGW shall stop the timer and delete the resources for the maintained restarted CN node (i.e. restarted CN node control plane F-TEID) if it receives one of the following messages while the timer is running: + +- a Modify Bearer Request message indicating that ISR is not active, e.g. from the non-failed CN node during a TAU/RAU procedure; or +- a Modify Bearer Request message indicating that ISR is active from another mobility management node with the same type as the restarted node. + +### 25.3.3 MME/S4-SGSN procedure + +If an MME/S4-SGSN detects a restart of an ISR associated counterpart (see clause 18), the MME/S4-SGSN shall wait for the next RAU/TAU procedure to deactivate ISR. + +NOTE: As an implementation option, an MME/S4-SGSN may internally mark the ISR as not active, but this should not be visible in messages sent to the SGW. + +The non-failed CN node may initiate the GUTI Relocation or P-TMSI Relocation Procedure with a non-broadcast TAI or RAI to force the UE to perform the TAU/RAU procedure for ISR deactivation, e.g. if a signalling connection is established with the UE following receipt of a Downlink Data Notification message. + +If afterwards the non-failed MME/S4-SGSN receives TAU/RAU Request, then the MME/S4-SGSN shall inform the UE in the TAU/RAU Accept message to disable ISR as specified in 3GPP TS 23.401[15] and 3GPP TS 23.060 [5]. The non-failed CN node shall send a Modify Bearer Request message to the SGW, even if the MME/S4-SGSN did not change during the TAU/RAU, to request the SGW to disable ISR and to update the SGW with the latest RAT Type and Serving Network values. Upon receipt of that message, the SGW shall disable ISR and shall stop sending Downlink Data Notification message with IMSI to the restarted CN node. + +--- + +## 26 Mobile terminated CS service delivery via an alternative MME in MME pool + +This procedure is an optional feature for VLR and MME. It enables the network to continue delivering mobile terminated CS services to UEs via an alternative MME in the MME pool where the UE is located when the MME to which the UE was registered fails without restart or fails for a long duration. + +NOTE 1: UEs in idle mode are not aware of an MME failure until they need to send some uplink data or signalling (e.g. a periodic Tracking Area Update) or until they are forced to re-attach e.g. via the network triggered service restoration procedure. Without support of the procedure defined in this clause, UEs that remain under LTE may not be able to receive mobile terminated CS services for a long duration after an MME failure without restart or a long MME failure. + +The following requirements shall apply if the VLR and MME support this feature. + +When the VLR has to page the UE for a mobile terminated CS service (e.g. upon receipt of an incoming CS call), if the VLR detects that the MME serving the UE is no longer in service, the VLR should send an SGs paging request with a CS restoration indicator to one alternative MME in the same MME pool. The VLR should load-balance the paging requests among the available MMEs in the pool during the restoration procedure. + +The VLR may know the set of MMEs pertaining to the same MME pool by local configuration or by checking the MME Group ID within the MME name that MMEs signal to the VLR in the SGsAP-LOCATION-UPDATE-REQUEST, + +SGsAP-RESET-INDICATION or SGsAP-RESET-ACK messages. The MME should send an SGsAP-RESET-INDICATION message to the VLR after restart. + +The VLR may detect that an MME is no longer in service if there are no more SCTP associations in service with that MME. + +NOTE 2: Semi-permanent SCTP associations are established between the MME and VLR, i.e. the SCTP associations remain up under normal circumstances. + +The VLR should adjust its paging retransmission delay to avoid requesting again the UE to re-attach before the restoration procedure completes. + +The MME shall behave as specified in clause 14.1.3 upon receipt of an SGs paging request not including the CS restoration indicator. + +The MME shall accept the SGs paging request and proceed as follows upon receipt of an SGs paging request including the CS restoration indicator: + +- if the IMSI is unknown by the MME, or if the IMSI is known and the UE is marked as EMM-DEREGISTERED, the MME shall send the paging request with the location information provided by the VLR, regardless of the value of the "MME-Reset" indicator. If no such location information is provided, the MME may either page the UE in all the tracking areas corresponding to that MME or in the tracking areas served by the MME and by the VLR, or reject the paging request per operator policy. The paging request shall include the IMSI and the CN domain indicator set to "PS" to request the UE to re-attach; +- if the IMSI is known by the MME and the UE is considered to be attached to both EPS and non-EPS services or for SMS only (for an SGs paging request with an 'SMS indicator'), the MME shall page the UE based on the location information stored in the MME. + +The MME may support and apply this procedure to a UE using extended idle mode DRX for MT-SMS service, and if so, the MME shall page the UE with the S-TMSI. + +NOTE 3: How the alternative MME knows the UE's DRX parameter or the extended DRX parameters to page the UE is implementation dependent. + +Upon receipt of a paging request including the IMSI and the CN domain indicator set to "PS", or upon receipt of a Service Reject with Cause #10 – Implicitly detached (when using S-TMSI paging), the UE re-attaches to one MME of the pool (that may not be necessarily the MME that initiated the paging procedure towards the UE) and a new SGs association is established with the VLR. This may be a different VLR than the VLR that initiated the SGs paging procedure, e.g. if Intra Domain Connection of RAN Nodes to Multiple CN Nodes is deployed for GERAN or UTRAN (see 3GPP TS 23.236 [24]). + +NOTE 4: The UE can receive a Service Reject with Cause #10 – "Implicitly detached" upon being paged by an alternative MME with the S-TMSI assigned by the MME that has failed. The UE then re-attaches to the network as specified in clause 5.6.2.2.1 of 3GPP TS 24.301 [19]. + +If the new SGs association is established towards the same VLR, the VLR should repeat the SGs paging request after the UE has re-attached to non-EPS services. The MT CS service or SMS is then delivered according to normal procedures. + +If the new SGs association is established towards a different VLR, the MT CS service may be delivered via the new VLR using Mobile Terminating Roaming Retry or Mobile Terminating Roaming Forwarding (see 3GPP TS 23.018 [23]); the on-going MT SMS is retransmitted by the SMS-SC using the existing SMS procedures (SMS alert). + +Subsequent MT CS services are delivered as per normal procedures. + +NOTE 5: A UE with ISR active before the MME failure and using GERAN or UTRAN radio access will not receive the paging request sent by the alternative MME. The VLR can deliver the MT CS service by paging the UE on the A/Iu interface as per existing principles of 3GPP TS 29.118 [14] when the UE does not respond to a first paging on the SGs interface. Paging the UE on the A interface fails if the network operates in NMO I and the UE is in PS connected mode in GERAN. + +See 3GPP TS 29.118 [14] for a comprehensive description. + +## 27 Restoration of PDN connections after an SGW failure + +### 27.1 General + +The procedures specified in this clause enable to restore in the EPC the PDN connections affected by an SGW failure with or without restart, and thus to resume delivery of downlink data towards the UE with minimum service interruption and with minimal signalling in the network. + +All the procedures specified in this clause are optional to support. + +The procedures specified in clause 27.2 apply to UEs for which ISR is not active when the SGW fails. The procedures specified in clause 27.3 apply to UEs for which ISR is active when SGW fails. The procedures specified in these clauses only apply to PDN connections established between MME/S4-SGSN and PGW pertaining to the same operator, i.e. for non-roaming and roaming scenarios with local breakout. The MME/S4-SGSN and the PGW shall behave as per the restoration requirements specified in clauses 14.1A.1 and 17.1A.1 for PDN connections established between nodes pertaining to different operators, i.e. as if the remote peer node does not support these SGW restoration procedures. + +The procedures specified for an SGW in clauses 27.2 and 27.3 apply as well to an SGW-C. An SGW-C shall always apply in addition the related PFCP procedures towards the SGW-U. + +NOTE 1: The applicability of these procedures is restricted to PDN connections established between MME/S4-SGSN and PGW pertaining to the same operator to ensure, simply by local configuration, that MME/S4-SGSN and PGWs apply the same logic i.e. same operator's policies when determining whether and which PDN connections should be restored. This enables to restore in particular IMS PDN connections (even in roaming scenarios, for which local break out is used). + +NOTE 2: The use of these SGW restoration procedures may be extended by Service Level Agreements to PDN connections established between MME/S4-SGSN and PGW pertaining to different operators, i.e. for roaming scenarios with home routed traffic, but this is not further considered in 3GPP specifications. + +### 27.2 Restoration of PDN connections after an SGW failure for UEs without ISR + +#### 27.2.1 General + +The PGW triggered SGW restoration procedure is an optional add-on feature for the MME/S4-SGSN, SGW and PGW on top of the MME/S4-SGSN triggered SGW restoration procedure as specified in clause 27.2.2. A node that supports the PGW triggered SGW restoration procedure shall support the requirements specified in clause 27.2.2 and in clause 27.2.3. + +#### 27.2.2 MME/S4-SGSN triggered SGW restoration + +##### 27.2.2.1 General + +The following requirements shall apply if the MME/S4-SGSN, the SGW, the PGW, and the PCRF support this feature. + +The MME/S4-SGSN, PGW, and PCRF for PMIP based S5, shall know by local configuration whether this MME/S4-SGSN triggered SGW restoration procedure is supported in the PLMN, i.e. by peer PGWs, PCRFs and MME/S4-SGSNs. The PGW shall assume that either all or none of the MMEs/S4-SGSNs in the PLMN support this procedure. Upon detecting an SGW failure with or without restart (relying on restart counter as specified in clause 18 "GTP-C based restart procedures" and clause 19 "PMIP based restart procedures", or implementation e.g. preconfigured path failure timer), the MME/S4-SGSN and PGW shall maintain the bearers and MM contexts of the PDN connections affected by the SGW failure and eligible for restoration, instead of removing associated resources as per procedures specified in clauses 14.1A.1 and 17.1A.1. + +For PMIP based S5, when the PCRF detects an SGW failure or restart, the PCRF shall maintain the IP-CAN sessions and delete locally the Gxc sessions affected by the SGW failure. + +NOTE 1: The PGW notifies the PCRF about the termination of IP-CAN sessions associated to PDN connections that are not restored by the MME/S4-SGSN within an operator configurable period. + +The PDN connections eligible for restoration are determined by the MME/S4-SGSN and PGW based on same operator's policies, e.g. based on QCI, ARP and/or APN. + +NOTE 2: The PCRF is not aware of which PDN connections are eligible for restoration. When the PGW detects an SGW failure, the PGW requests the PCRF to terminate IP-CAN sessions associated to PDN connections affected by the SGW failure and not eligible for restoration. + +Maintaining the PDN connections affected by the SGW failure enables the MME/S4-SGSN to restore the corresponding bearers of the UE by selecting a new SGW or the restarted SGW. These PDN connections are maintained for an operator configurable period (T-Release-PDN timer), which is locally provisioned on MME/S4-SGSN and PGW, that by default should cover the periodic tracking area update timer (timer T3412) as specified in 3GPP TS 24.301 [19] or the periodic routing area update timer (timer T3312) as specified in 3GPP TS 24.008 [20]. After the expiry of the T-Release-PDN timer the MME/S4-SGSN and the PGW should delete any EPS bearer contexts that have not been restored via a new or the restarted SGW. + +NOTE 3: The PGW's capability of supporting this SGW restoration procedure is stored per PDN and per UE by the serving MME/S4-SGSN. For a UE with multiple active PDN connections, some PGWs may support the SGW restoration procedure while others do not support the same. E.g. SGW restoration procedure may be supported for a PDN connection with local breakout while not supported for another PDN connection with home routed traffic. The restoration procedures upon SGW failure specified in clauses 14.1A.1 and 17.1A.1 apply to the PDN connections for which the SGW restoration procedure is not supported or not applicable. + +## 27.2.2.2 MME/S4-SGSN procedure + +After detecting an SGW failure, the MME/S4-SGSN should attempt to restore the PDN connections eligible for restoration for all the UEs affected by the SGW failure, i.e. including UEs in ECM\_IDLE / PMM-IDLE / GPRS STANDBY not engaged in any Service Request, or Connection Resume procedure or other mobility procedure. The MME/S4-SGSN shall control the pace of the SGW relocations to avoid core network node overload. The MME/S4-SGSN should prioritize the SGW relocation for UEs engaged in a Service Request, or a Connection Resume, or RAU/TAU procedures or having GBR bearers over UEs which are not engaged in any mobility procedure and that do not have a signaling connection to the MME/S4-SGSN nor GBR bearers. The MME/S4-SGSN should also prioritize the SGW relocation for UEs with an emergency PDN connection. + +The MME/S4-SGSN may further prioritize the PDN connections to restore, e.g. for UEs ECM\_IDLE / PMM-IDLE / GPRS STANDBY not engaged in any Service Request or Connection Resume procedure, based on operator's policy e.g. based on the QCI and/or APN. Besides, the MME/SGSN may use the subscribed Restoration Priority per APN, if received from the HSS, and if permitted per service level agreements for in-bound roamers, to determine the relative restoration priority among PDN connections to the same APN. The MME/SGSN may use a locally configured value as default restoration priority if the restoration priority for a user's PDN connection is not received from the HSS or not permitted by service level agreement for in-bound roamers. + +NOTE 1: This is to allow all the affected UEs to be reconnected to the network in a relatively short time (that is function of the speed of the SGW relocations that the MME/S4-SGSN performs, based on implementation and the network load) so that downlink packets may be delivered to the UEs with minimum service interruption. + +NOTE 2: Prioritizing the restoration of emergency PDN connections can enable to preserve emergency calls in progress for authenticated and unauthenticated users, and enable PSAP to call back authenticated users with an emergency registration but without an emergency call in progress. + +NOTE 3: The Restoration Priority can e.g. allow to restore with a higher priority users with an IMS voice subscription over IMS users without an IMS voice subscription. + +To restore the PDN connection(s) of a UE, the MME/S4-SGSN shall perform an SGW relocation procedure by sending a Create Session Request message (per PDN connection to restore) to the new or restarted SGW as per the steps 8-11 of a Tracking Area Update procedure with Serving GW change in clause 5.3.3.1 in 3GPP TS 23.401[15]. For PDN connections with GBR bearers existing before the SGW failure, the MME/S4-SGSN may either request to restore or remove the GBR bearers in the Create Session Request (e.g. depending on how quickly the PDN connection is + +restored). The MME/S4-SGSN shall restore the PDN connections of the affected UEs after the SGW failure as follows: + +1) for UEs in ECM\_IDLE/PMM-IDLE/GPRS STANDBY state: + +- the MME/S4-SGSN shall select a new SGW or the restarted SGW based on the last visited TAI/RAI. When Dedicated Core Networks are deployed, the UE Usage Type shall also be used for the SGW selection as specified in 3GPP TS 29.303 [37]; +- the MME/S4-SGSN shall then perform an SGW relocation procedure as specified above. + +2) for UEs in ECM\_CONNECTED/PMM-CONNECTED/GPRS READY state not engaged in any mobility procedure (TAU/RAU, Handover): + +- the MME/S4-SGSN shall release the S1/Iu/radio resources; if the eNodeB/RNC detects the SGW failure, the eNodeB/RNC may request the MME/S4-SGSN to release the S1/Iu resources; +- the MME/S4-SGSN shall then handle these UEs as specified for UEs in ECM\_IDLE/PMM-IDLE/GPRS STANDBY state, or for UEs performing a mobility procedure if the UE performs subsequently such a mobility procedure (e.g. a Service Request to re-establish the S1/Iu/radio bearers); +- as an exception to these rules, for UTRAN without direct tunnel and GERAN, the S4-SGSN may perform SGW relocation while keeping the UEs in PMM-CONNECTED/GPRS READY state (i.e. without tearing down the Iu/radio resources) because S4 user plane is used and the SGW failure remains not visible to the radio network. + +NOTE 4: An SGW failure with restart may be visible to the radio network and cause bearers to be released for bearers with on-going uplink traffic if an Error Indication is received from the SGW before the S4-SGSN detects the SGW restart. + +3) for UEs in ECM\_IDLE/PMM-IDLE/GPRS STANDBY state initiating a Service Request procedure or a Connection Resume procedure: + +- the MME/S4-SGSN shall first perform the SGW relocation procedure as specified above and then continue with the Service Request or the Connection Resume procedure since the MME/S4-SGSN has no valid SGW F-TEID to send in the S1-AP Initial Context Setup Request towards the eNodeB or in the Iu RAB Assignment Request message towards the RNC if Direct Tunnel is used. + +4) for UEs initiating an intra-MME or intra-S4-SGSN TAU/RAU procedure: + +- the MME/S4-SGSN shall perform the SGW relocation procedure as specified above before the TAU/RAU procedure; + +5) for UEs initiating an inter-MME/SGSN TAU/RAU procedure: + +- If both the source and target MME/S4-SGSNs support this SGW restoration procedure, the source MME/S4-SGSN should indicate to the target MME/S4-SGSN in the GTPv2 Context Response message that an SGW relocation procedure is needed due to an earlier SGW failure. Upon reception of such indication, the target MME/S4-SGSN shall perform the SGW relocation procedure as specified above and then proceed with the TAU/RAU procedure. The source MME/S4-SGSN may perform the SGW relocation procedure as specified above before responding to the GTPv2 Context Request message if the target MME/S4-SGSN does not support the SGW restoration procedure, e.g. during inter-PLMN RAU/TAU procedures when the target PLMN does not support the SGW restoration procedure. + +6) for UEs in ECM\_CONNECTED/PMM-CONNECTED/GPRS READY state for which a handover procedure is initiated: + +- The source MME/S4-SGSN should reject the Handover Required / Relocation Required message received from the RAN (for UEs with PDN connection(s) affected by an earlier SGW failure that have not been restored yet); the MME/S4-SGSN should then release the S1/Iu/radio resources of these UEs to force them to enter idle mode. The MME/S4-SGSN shall then proceed with the procedures specified above for UEs in ECM\_IDLE/PMM-IDLE/GPRS STANDBY state, or for UEs performing a mobility procedure if the UE performs subsequently such a mobility procedure (e.g. a Service Request to re-establish the S1/Iu/radio bearers). + +NOTE 5: S1/Iu/radio resources of UEs in ECM-CONNECTED/PMM-CONNECTED/GPRS READY state affected by an SGW failure are released very shortly after the SGW failure. Therefore only very few UEs affected an SGW failure and with PDN connections not restored yet may be subject to a handover, e.g. handovers taking place just after the SGW failure before the eNodeB/RNC or the MME/S4-SGSN release the S1/Iu/radio resources. This is why it is not necessary to support SGW relocation during Intra/Inter-CN handover procedures. + +### 27.2.2.3 PGW procedure + +The PGW shall maintain the PDN connections affected by the SGW failure and eligible for restoration for an operator configurable period (T-Release-PDN timer), as specified in clause 27.2.2.1. + +The PGW should maintain the GBR bearers of the PDN connections eligible for restoration for an operator configurable period (T-Release-GBR), which should be much shorter than the T-Release-PDN timer. Upon expiry of the T-Release-GBR timer, the PGW shall release GBR bearers that have not been restored yet and inform the PCRF about the corresponding PCC rule inactivation, with a cause as specified in 3GPP TS 29.212 [25]. + +NOTE: This is a safeguard mechanism to avoid e.g. overcharging the user in IMS for sessions not already terminated by IMS (e.g. by the far end user of a VoIP call). + +The PGW shall discard downlink packets received for a PDN connection maintained after an SGW failure that has not been restored yet. + +The PGW shall stop charging for PDN connections maintained after an SGW failure which have not been restored yet. + +If the IP-CAN Session Modification Request is received for a PDN connection maintained after an SGW failure but not restored yet, the PGW shall reject the request if the request contains the installation/modification of PCC rules and other policy decisions (e.g. change of APN-AMBR), however the P-GW shall accept to remove the PCC rule if the removal of PCC rules is included in the request. The PGW shall accept an IP-CAN Session Modification Request if it only includes the removal of PCC rules. Refer to 3GPP TS 29.212 [25] clause B.3.14 for the detail. For these IP-CAN sessions for which an IP-CAN session modification has been rejected, the PGW shall subsequently inform the PCRF when the PDN connection is restored as specified in clause B.3.14 of 3GPP TS 29.212 [25]. This would enable the PCRF to update the PCC rules in the PGW if necessary. After the PDN connection is restored, the PGW shall initiate the bearer modification/deactivation procedure if necessary to modify or remove the resources associated with the PCC rules that were removed during the SGW failure. + +The PGW shall accept an IP-CAN Session Termination Request received for a PDN connection maintained after an SGW failure but not restored yet, with an acceptance cause as specified in 3GPP TS 29.212 [25] and release the affected PDN connection locally. If subsequently the MME/S4-SGSN attempts to restore the PDN connection, the PGW shall reject the Modify Bearer Request (for GTP based S5) or the Proxy Binding Update (for PMIP based S5) with the cause "Context Not Found" as specified in 3GPP TS 29.274 [13] and 3GPP TS 29.275 [16] after the corresponding PDN connection has been released locally. + +### 27.2.2.4 PCRF procedure + +If the PGW rejects an IP-CAN session modification procedure with the rejection cause as specified in clause 27.2.2.3, the PCRF should maintain the corresponding IP-CAN session and refrain from sending any further IP-CAN session modification request to the PGW until being notified by the PGW that the PDN connection is restored. + +For PMIP based S5, the PCRF can not send any message to the SGW once the Gxc session in the PCRF is removed. The PCRF may however behave as for GTP based S5, e.g. send signaling to the PGW via the Gx interface. The Gxc session is restored when the PCRF receives Gateway Control Session Establishment from the SGW as specified in 3GPP TS 29.212 [25]. + +### 27.2.2.5 SGW procedure + +After the SGW restarts, the SGW shall not send Error indication message for a configurable period when the SGW receives a GTP-U PDU for which no Bearer context exists. + +NOTE: The period needs to be longer than the time required for the peer node to detect the restart of the SGW, e.g. the interval between two echo request messages. This ensures that the MME/SGSN or PGW does not deactivate the bearers before it detects the SGW failure and triggers the restoration procedure. + +## 27.2.3 PGW triggered SGW restoration + +### 27.2.3.1 General + +The following requirements shall apply if the MME/S4-SGSN, the SGW and the PGW support this feature. + +NOTE: The PGW triggered SGW restoration procedure does not require any further requirements from the PCRF than those already specified for the MME/S4-SGSN triggered SGW restoration procedure in clause 27.2.2.1. + +The PGW shall know by local configuration whether this PGW triggered SGW restoration procedure is supported in the PLMN. The MME/S4-SGSN/SGW may know the same by local configuration. When supported in the PLMN, the PGW supporting this procedure should be configured with the address of alternative(s) SGW(s) also supporting this procedure. The PGW shall assume that either all or none of the MMEs/S4-SGSNs in the PLMN support the procedure. All MMEs/S4-SGSNs in an MME/S4-SGSN pool should support this procedure when it is deployed. + +The PGW triggered SGW restoration procedure does not apply to emergency PDN connections for users without authenticated IMSI. + +NOTE: The MME/S4-SGSN can prioritize the restoration of emergency PDN connections (see clause 27.2.2.2). IMS Emergency PSAP callback is not supported for unauthenticated users with an emergency registration but without an emergency call in progress. + +### 27.2.3.2 MME/S4-SGSN procedure + +#### **During normal mode of operation (i.e. before SGW failure with/without restart):** + +The MME/S4-SGSN supporting the PGW triggered SGW restoration procedure shall include the MME/S4-SGSN identifier IE in existing signalling over the S11/S4 interface, i.e. in + +- Create Session Request messages during an E-UTRAN Initial Attach, a UE requested PDN connectivity, and a PDP Context Activation procedure; +- Create Session Request message during TAU/RAU procedures with a SGW change; +- Create Session Request message during X2 based handover/Enhanced SRNS Relocation procedure with a SGW change; +- Modify Bearer Request message during Inter-RAT Handover procedures with/without a SGW change; +- Modify Bearer Request message during Intra-RAT handover procedure with a SGW change; +- Modify Bearer Request message during Inter-RAT TAU/RAU procedures without a SGW change; +- Modify Bearer Request message over S11/S4 if the message is deemed to be sent to the PGW due to other reasons, e.g. reporting ULI, time zone. + +#### **During SGW restoration procedure:** + +Upon receipt of a PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message for which it can not find a UE context corresponding to the received IMSI, the MME/S4-SGSN shall send a PGW Downlink Triggering Acknowledge message with the rejection cause code "Context Not Found" to the SGW to inform the SGW that the PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message has been received by the MME/S4-SGSN. If the PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message contains an MME/S4-SGSN identifier, the MME/S4-SGSN shall also include the IMSI and the MME/S4-SGSN identifier in the PGW Downlink Triggering Acknowledge message. + +Upon receipt of a PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message for which it can find a UE context corresponding to the received IMSI, the MME/S4-SGSN shall send a PGW Downlink Triggering Acknowledge message back to the SGW with an acceptance cause code, and perform S-TMSI/P-TMSI paging as part of Network Initiated Service Request procedure as specified in clause 5.3.4.3 of 3GPP TS 23.401 [15] and in clause 6.12.1A of 3GPP TS 23.060 [5]. When receiving a Service Request message from the UE, the MME/S4-SGSN shall perform the SGW restoration procedure as specified in the clause 27.2.2 with the addition that the MME/S4-SGSN shall include the MME/S4-SGSN identifier IE in the create session request message. + +### 27.2.3.3 SGW procedure + +#### **During normal mode of operation (i.e. before SGW failure with/without restart):** + +The SGW shall forward the MME/S4-SGSN identifier IE to the PGW in existing signalling over the S5 interface if it is received over S11/S4 interface. + +#### **During SGW restoration procedure:** + +Upon receipt of a PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message (or a PMIP Update Notification message with the Notification Reason set to "PGW Downlink Trigger Notification") from a PGW, the SGW shall send the PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message to the MME/S4-SGSN identified by the MME/S4-SGSN identifier if present in the message. If no MME/S4-SGSN identifier is received from the PGW, the SGW shall send the PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message to all the MME/S4-SGSN within the MME/S4-SGSN pool as known by local configuration. The SGW shall then send a PGW Downlink Triggering Acknowledge message (or a PMIP Update Notification Acknowledgement message) back to the PGW with an acceptance cause code. + +If the SGW receives a PGW Downlink Triggering Acknowledge message from an MME/S4-SGSN with the rejection cause code "Context Not Found" and with an IMSI and an MME/S4-SGSN identifier, the SGW shall then send a PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message, including the IMSI (as received in the PGW Downlink Triggering Acknowledge message), to all the MME/S4-SGSN within the MME/S4-SGSN pool as known by local configuration, except to the MME/S4-SGSN identified by the MME/S4-SGSN identifier received in the Downlink Triggering Acknowledge message. + +The MME/S4-SGSN may have more than one IP address on the S11/S4 interface configured, but the PGW Downlink Triggering Notification should be sent only once per MME/S4-SGSN per local configuration in the SGW. + +### 27.2.3.4 PGW procedure + +#### **During normal mode of operation (i.e. before SGW failure with/without restart):** + +The PGW shall store the MME/S4-SGSN identifier received in the last Create Session Request or Modify Bearer Request message (for GTP based S5) or Proxy Binding Update (for PMIP based S5) per PDN connection. If the PGW receives a Modify Bearer Request without MME/SGSN identifier, it shall delete the stored MME/S4-SGSN identifier. + +NOTE 1: This allows the PGW to have the serving MME/S4-SGSN address whenever there is S5 signalling message. However this cannot ensure that the PGW is always aware of the current serving MME/S4-SGSN address. E.g. during an inter-MME HO without SGW change, the current serving MME/S4-SGSN address will not be propagated to the PGW if there is no S5 signalling. + +#### **During SGW restoration procedure:** + +When downlink data packets or signalling other than an IP-CAN Session Termination Request arrives at the PGW, for a PDN connection associated with a failed SGW and that has not been restored yet (as specified in clause 27.2.2), and the PDN connection is eligible for PGW initiated Downlink triggering based on operator's policies, e.g. for IMS PDN connection, the PGW shall proceed as follows: + +- the PGW shall select a SGW (i.e. the restarted or an alternative SGW) which supports the PGW triggered SGW restoration procedure, based on local configuration; +- for GTP-based S5, the PGW shall then send a PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message including the IMSI and the MME/S4-SGSN identifier if available; +- for PMIP-based S5, the PGW shall then send an PMIP Update Notification message as specified in IETF RFC 7077 [26] to indicate it is a PGW initiated downlink triggering notification, including the IMSI and the MME/S4-SGSN Identifier when it is available; +- the PGW should not send a new PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message (for GTP-based S5) or Update Notification message (for PMIP-based S5) in very short time if it continues to receive subsequent downlink data or signaling for the same PDN connection. It is an implementation option how many times/how frequently the PGW should send subsequent PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message (for GTP-based S5) or Update Notification message (for PMIP-based S5) before discarding the downlink packets or rejecting signalling. + +- the PGW shall handle an IP-CAN Session Modification Request received from the PCRF as specified in clause B.3.14 of 3GPP TS 29.212 [25] as if the PDN connection had not been affected by the SGW failure i.e. was in a normal state. After accepting an IP-CAN session modification request, if the MME/S4-SGSN does not restore the PDN connection shortly after the PGW initiated triggering, the PGW shall report the modification failure to the PCRF with a cause as specified in clause B.3.14 of 3GPP TS 29.212 [25]. + +The PGW shall behave as specified in clause 27.2.2.3 if the PGW receives an IP-CAN Session Termination Request for a PDN connection associated with a failed SGW and that has not been restored yet. + +NOTE 2: To ensure the delivery of downlink data, it is implementation specific whether the PGW buffers or not the downlink data until the PDN connection is restored. The application functions e.g. P-CSCF for IMS, may also retransmit the data packets. + +NOTE 3: The operator policies for PDN connections eligible for restoration (i.e. to be maintained upon SGW failure as per clause 27.2.2) and PDN connections eligible for PGW initiated downlink triggering may differ, i.e. the PDN connections eligible for PGW initiated downlink triggering may be a subset of the PDN connections eligible for restoration. + +## 27.3 Restoration of PDN connections after an SGW failure for UEs with ISR + +### 27.3.1 MME/S4-SGSN triggered SGW restoration for UEs with ISR + +#### 27.3.1.1 General + +The requirement specified in clause 27.3.1.2 shall apply on top of the MME/S4-SGSN triggered SGW restoration procedure specified in clause 27.2.2 and the involved MME and S4-SGSN additionally support the ISR feature. + +NOTE: The procedure in this clause does not consider the case where one of ISR associated nodes, i.e. the MME or the S4-SGSN, does not support the MME/S4-SGSN triggered SGW restoration procedure. + +#### 27.3.1.2 MME/S4-SGSN procedure + +The MME/S4-SGSN shall restore the PDN connections of the affected UEs after the SGW failure as follows: + +- 1) for UEs initiating an intra MME/S4-SGSN TAU/RAU procedure: + - the MME/S4 SGSN shall perform the SGW relocation procedure as specified in clause 27.2.2, and inform the UE in the related TAU/RAU Accept message to disable ISR as specified in 3GPP TS 23.401[15] and 3GPP TS 23.060 [5]. +- 2) for UEs in ECM-IDLE/PMM-IDLE/GPRS STANDBY state initiating a Service Request procedure: + - the MME/S4 SGSN shall perform the SGW relocation procedure as specified in clause 27.2.2 and initiate the GUTI Relocation or P-TMSI Relocation procedure with a non-broadcast TAI or RAI to force the UE to perform the TAU/RAU procedure for ISR deactivation. +- 3) for UEs in ECM-CONNECTED/PMM-CONNECTED/GPRS READY state engaged in any handover or inter MME/S4-SGSN TAU/RAU procedure: + - it shall be handled as specified in clause 27.2.2. +- 4) for UEs in ECM-IDLE/PMM-IDLE/GPRS STANDBY state which are not engaged in any Service Request or other mobility procedure: + - In networks supporting PGW triggered SGW restoration proactive paging of UEs in ECM-IDLE/PMM-IDLE/GPRS STANDBY state shall not be initiated. + +The MME/S4-SGSN shall page the UE to bring the UE to ECM-CONNECTED/PMM-CONNECTED. If the paging is successful and the UE initiates the Service Request procedure, the MME/S4-SGSN shall perform the SGW relocation procedure as specified in clause 27.2.2 and initiate the GUTI Relocation or P-TMSI + +Relocation Procedure with a non-broadcast TAI or RAI to force the UE to perform the TAU/RAU procedure for ISR deactivation as specified in clause 5.3.4.3 of 3GPP TS 23.401[15]. If paging the UE fails, the MME or S4-SGSN should adjust its paging retransmission strategy (e.g. limit the number of short spaced retransmissions) to take into account the fact that the UE might be in GERAN/UTRAN or E-UTRAN coverage. If the associated MME/S4-SGSN receives ISR Status Indication with "deactivation Indication" from S4-SGSN/MME, the MME/S4-SGSN shall release the UE session locally. Otherwise after retrying the paging procedure, the MME/S4-SGSN may release locally the PDN connection context and UE MM context assuming the UE is in GERAN/UTRAN or E-UTRAN coverage area. + +MME/S4-SGSN should handle UEs in ECM-CONNECTED/PMM-CONNECTED and involved in any handover or inter MME/S4-SGSN TAU/RAU procedure first before paging of UEs in ECM-IDLE/PMM-IDLE/GPRS STANDBY to minimise paging of UEs. Furthermore the sequence on how UEs in ECM-IDLE/PMM-IDLE/GPRS STANDBY can be paged to avoid overload are implementation dependent. + +The MME/S4-SGSN which initiates the SGW restoration procedure should send ISR Status Indication with "ISR deactivation Indication" to the ISR associated S4-SGSN/MME to release the PDN connection context and UE MM context. + +NOTE 1: The PDN connection context and UE MM context can be released after the timer (T-Release-PDN timer), which is used for maintaining the context, expires, as specified in clause 27.2.2.1. + +NOTE 2: The MME will only perform the SGW reselection for the UEs camping on the LTE, ISR activated UEs can camp in the GERAN/UTRAN, so paging is needed. + +The S4-SGSN will only perform the SGW reselection for the UEs camping on the GERAN/UTRAN, ISR activated UEs can camp in the LTE, so paging is needed. + +NOTE 3: It is the responsibility of the MME/S4-SGSN to avoid Paging Overload. + +## 27.3.2 PGW triggered SGW restoration for UEs with ISR + +### 27.3.2.1 General + +The requirement specified in clause 27.3.2.2 shall apply on top of the PGW triggered SGW restoration procedure specified in clause 27.2.3 and the involved MME and S4-SGSN additionally support the ISR feature. + +NOTE: The procedure in this clause does not consider the case where one of ISR associated nodes, i.e. the MME or the S4-SGSN, does not support the PGW triggered SGW restoration procedure. + +### 27.3.2.2 MME/S4-SGSN procedure + +If the MME/S4-SGSN receives a PGW Downlink Triggering Notification message containing MME/S4-SGSN Identifier from the SGW for those UEs affected by the failed SGW, the MME/S4-SGSN shall behave as specified in clause 27.2.3.2 and additionally send ISR Status Indication message with "Paging Indication" over the S3 interface to the ISR associated S4-SGSN/MME over the existing GTP-C tunnel between the S4-SGSN and the MME. + +The ISR associated S4-SGSN/MME, which receives ISR Status Indication message with "Paging Indication", shall perform P-TMSI/S-TMSI paging as part of the Network Initiated Service Request procedure as specified in clause 27.3.1.2. + +After the MME/S4-SGSN receiving NAS message Service Request, the MME/S4-SGSN shall behave as specified in the clause 27.3.1.2. + +--- + +## 28 Restoration of data in the CSS + +### 28.1 Restart of the CSS + +The periodic backup of CSS data to non-volatile storage is mandatory. + +When a CSS restarts after failure it shall perform the following actions for the subscriber data records that have been affected by the CSS fault: + +- reload all data from the non-volatile back-up; +- send a "Reset" message to each VLR where one or more of its MSs may be registered to the CSS. This causes each VLR concerned to mark each relevant roaming user record "Location Information Not Confirmed by CSS", and +- send a "Reset" message to each SGSN where one or more of its MSs may be registered to the CSS. This causes each SGSN to mark each relevant MM context "Location Information Not Confirmed by CSS". +- send a "Reset" message to each MME where one or more of its UEs may be registered to the CSS. + +--- + +## 29 MBMS Heartbeat procedure + +The BM-SC, MBMS GW and GCS AS may support the MBMS Heartbeat procedure over the SGmb or MB2-C reference point to probe the liveliness and detect the restart of a peer MBMS node. + +This procedure is optional to support and use for MBMS deployments without an intermediate Diameter Agent between the BM-SC and the MBMS GW or GCS AS. A BM-SC, MBMS GW or GCS AS which support the MBMS restoration procedures as specified in this specification shall support and use the MBMS Heartbeat procedure for MBMS deployments with an intermediate Diameter Agent between the BM-SC and MBMS GW or GCS AS. + +The restart of a peer MBMS node is detected using a Restart-Counter AVP. The Restart-Counter AVP contains a value that is incremented monotonically whenever the MBMS node restarts with loss of previous states. + +The MBMS Heartbeat Request and Answer messages shall contain the Restart-Counter AVP set to the local restart counter of the sending node. Other MBMS messages sent over the SGmb or MB2-C reference point may also contain the Restart-Counter AVP if contacting the peer node for the first time or if the local restart counter has been incremented. + +Upon receipt of a Restart-Counter AVP in a MBMS Heartbeat Request or Answer or in any other SGmb or MB2-C signalling message, the receiving node shall compare the value of the received Restart-Counter AVP with the previous Restart counter value stored for this peer entity and + +- if no previous value was stored, the Restart counter value received in the SGmb or MB2-C signalling message shall be stored for the peer; +- if the value of the received Restart-Counter AVP is greater than the Restart-Counter previously received from the same MBMS node, the receiver shall consider that the peer MBMS node has restarted. + +An intermediate Diameter Agent shall not modify the Restart-Counter AVP when proxying SGmb or MB2-C signalling between the BM-SC and MBMS GW or GCS AS. + +The BM-SC, MBMS GW and GCS AS shall support the detection of an SGmb or MB2-C path failure by sending an MBMS Heartbeat Request message periodically when no other signalling is exchanged over those interfaces between those nodes. The MBMS Heartbeat Request message shall be repeated one or more times if no MBMS Heartbeat Answer is received. The SGmb or MB2-C path shall be considered to be down if the peer MBMS node does not respond to a configured number of consecutive MBMS Heartbeat Requests. MBMS Heartbeat Requests shall only be sent on a per node basis (i.e. not on a per MBMS session basis). + +See 3GPP TS 29.061 [31] and 3GPP TS 29.468 [35] for further details. + +--- + +## 30 Restoration of the SCEF + +### 30.1 Restart of the SCEF + +When an SCEF restarts after failure and has lost all or parts of his data, it shall reply to a report from MME, SGSN or HSS containing a SCEF reference ID for which it has no data with an error cause + +"SCEF\_REFERENCE\_ID\_UNKNOWN" in the reply indicating that the SCEF reference ID provided in the message does not exist in the SCEF. + +If an HSS receives a reply message with error cause set to "SCEF\_REFERENCE\_ID\_UNKNOWN", it shall stop reporting and delete the event locally. + +If an MME/SGSN receives reply message with error cause set to "SCEF\_REFERENCE\_ID\_UNKNOWN", it shall stop reporting, initiate a notification to the HSS with cause "SCEF\_REFERENCE\_ID\_UNKNOWN" and delete the event. + +An HSS receiving a notification with cause "SCEF\_REFERENCE\_ID\_UNKNOWN", it shall delete the event locally. + +### 30.1.1 Mobile Originated NIDD procedure + +During the Mobile Originated NIDD procedure, if the MME receives a MO-Data-Answer from the SCEF with a failure cause that UE cannot be found, the MME shall deactivate the corresponding PDN connection towards the UE with the cause "re-activation required", or initiate an explicit detach procedure with reattached required procedure, as appropriate, see 3GPP TS 24.301 [19]. + +## Annex A (informative): Change history + +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | New | +|----------|-------|----------|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| +| Apr 1999 | | | | | Transferred to 3GPP CN1 | | +| CN#03 | | | | | Approved at CN#03 | 3.0.0 | +| CN#04 | | | 001 | | GPRS restoration procedures | 3.1.0 | +| CN#06 | | | 002r2 | | Authentication Enhancements | 3.2.0 | +| CN#06 | | | 003 | | Support of VLR and HLR Data Restoration procedures with LCS | 3.2.0 | +| CN#07 | | | 004 | | Support of VLR and HLR Data Restoration procedures with LCS | 3.3.0 | +| CN#08 | | | 005 | | Clarifications on GSM vs. UMTS specific parts | 3.4.0 | +| CN#11 | | | | | Release 4 after CN#11 | 4.0.0 | +| CN#16 | | | 007 | | Removal of an optional IMSI paging after SGSN restart | 4.1.0 | +| CN#16 | | | | | Release 5 after CN#16 | 5.0.0 | +| CN#22 | | | 011r1 | | Restoration of data in RA update | 5.1.0 | +| CN#23 | | | 008r3 | | Change of Restart Counter definition for enhanced GTP | 6.0.0 | +| CN#25 | | | 012 | | Error Indication during an ongoing MBMS data transfer | 6.1.0 | +| CN#25 | | | 013 | | Restoration of GSNs in MBMS | 6.1.0 | +| CT#30 | | | 0014 | | Incorrect References | 6.2.0 | +| CT#32 | | | 0019r1 | | Correction for Usage of Cancel Location for Supercharger | 7.0.0 | +| CT#40 | | | 0020r2 | | EPS Restoration | 8.0.0 | +| CT#41 | | | 0021r3 | | Moving restoration procedures from TS 23.060 into TS 23.007 | 8.1.0 | +| CT#41 | | | 0023r2 | | Node Restart Restoration Procedures for PGW, SGW and MME | 8.1.0 | +| CT#42 | | | 0027r2 | | RNC failure aligns with TS23.060 | 8.2.0 | +| CT#42 | | | 0028 | | Restoration procedures for SGs interface | 8.2.0 | +| CT#42 | | | 0033r5 | | Partial Failure Handling | 8.2.0 | +| CT#42 | | | 0037r1 | | PMIP Path management / Restoration Clean-up | 8.2.0 | +| CT#43 | | | 0030r5 | | Moving the description of the restoration procedures (from 29.274) to 23.007 | 8.3.0 | +| CT#43 | | | 0038r4 | | Partial fault handling finalization | 8.3.0 | +| CT#44 | | | 0043r1 | | FQ-CSID corrections | 8.4.0 | +| CT#44 | | | 0047r1 | | SGSN and SGW handling in case RNC/BSC Failure (Iu mode) using S4 | 8.4.0 | +| CT#44 | | | 0045r1 | | General on PMIP based restart procedure | 9.0.0 | +| CT#45 | | | 0065r1 | | Essential corrections to the partial failure support | 9.1.0 | +| | | | 0051 | | Removal of Editor's note | | +| | | | 0053r1 | | Restoration of data in MBMS GW | | +| | | | 0058r1 | | Echo usage for GTPv2 | | +| | | | 0063r3 | | Error Indication cleanup | | +| | | | 0064r4 | | Restoration of data in E-UTRAN | | +| CT#46 | | | 0066 | | Paging signalling optimization after SGSN failure | 9.2.0 | +| | | | 0067 | | Paging signalling optimization after MME failure | | +| | | | 0068 | | Error Indication for MBMS | | +| | | | 0072r1 | | Removal of Editor's Notes for Partial Failure | | +| | | | 0078r1 | | Error Indication Handling for MBMS | | + +| | | | | | | | +|-------|--|--|------------|--|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| | | | 0080 | | Alignment of eNodeB failure clause | | +| | | | 0082r
3 | | Alignment of RNC/BSC failure clause | | +| CT#47 | | | 0091 | | Bulk Binding Revocation Indication | 9.3.0 | +| | | | 0082r
2 | | Clarifications to eNodeB failure | | +| | | | 0092r
1 | | Reference corrections | | +| | | | 0095r
1 | | Restart counter correction | | +| CT#48 | | | 0100r
1 | | Essential correction to Error Indication message handling for the default bearer | 9.4.0 | +| | | | 0076r
4 | | Cleanup of hanging PDN connections/bearers | | +| | | | 0097r
1 | | Failure of remote nodes | | +| | | | 0107r
1 | | Optimization on hanging PDN connection cleanup | 10.0.0 | +| CT#49 | | | 0115 | | Data Restoration for SMS | 10.1.0 | +| | | | 0117 | | GTP-C based restart procedures | | +| | | | 0121 | | Partial Failure handling | | +| CT#50 | | | 0135r
1 | | Heartbeat Request | 10.2.0 | +| | | | 0129r
1 | | ePDG Partial Failure | | +| | | | 0133r
1 | | Restoration of data in the ePDG | | +| | | | 0131r
1 | | Error Indication handling in PGW and ePDG | | +| | | | 0132 | | ePDG/PGW restart and restoration | | +| | | | 0130r
1 | | PGW Restart Notification | | +| | | | 0124 | | Essential correction to the MME and PGW restoration procedure | | +| CT#51 | | | 0142r
2 | | Timing for sending Downlink Data Notification as a result of the SGW having received an Error Indication message from the eNodeB/RNC | 10.3.0 | +| | | | 0151r
1 | | Unclearness of Downlink Data Notification Handling at MME/S4 SGSN as a result of the SGW having received an Error Indication message from the eNodeB/RNC | | +| | | | 0155 | | eNodeB failure | | +| | | | 0154r
1 | | RNC failure | | +| | | | 0148r
2 | | Error Indication in SGW | | +| | | | 0145r
1 | | Error Indication for SGW | | +| | | | 0146r
5 | | PCRF Failure and Restoration | | +| | | | 0152r
2 | | Handling of UE specific Error Indication over the PMIP | | +| | | | 0156r
5 | | MME/SGSN restart and restoration procedure | | +| CT#52 | | | 0166r
2 | | SGW behavior when it receives GTP error indication from S4-SGSN | 10.4.0 | +| | | | 0160r
1 | | Fix wrong statement for the IMSI page in the Network triggered service restoration procedure | | +| | | | 0164r
2 | | Clarification on Network triggered service restoration procedure | | +| | | | 0167r
2 | | Gateway Control and QoS Policy Rules Provision Procedure handling at SGW | | +| | | | 0161r
1 | | Moving PCRF Restoration text under appropriate heading | | +| | | | 0162 | | eNB Error Indication Handling | | +| | | | 0163r
3 | | MME/SGSN restart with ISR | | +| CT#53 | | | 0169r | | Signalling path failure handling | 10.5.0 | + +| | | | | | | | +|-------|--|--|--------|--|------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| | | | 2 | | | | +| | | | 0175r1 | | Downlink Data Notification Handling at MME/S4 SGSN | | +| | | | 0170r1 | | User plane path failure handling | | +| | | | 0171r1 | | PMIP alignment for the network triggered service restoration procedure | | +| CT#54 | | | 0183 | | Inter MME and intra SGW HO/TAU procedures | 10.6.0 | +| | | | 0176 | | NTSR with ISR active | | +| | | | 0190 | | DDN message in the service restoration procedure | | +| | | | 0185r2 | | Essential correction to Partial failure | | +| CT#54 | | | 0178 | | FQ-CSID Reporting | 11.0.0 | +| | | | 0168r5 | | CS service restoration after MME failure | | +| | | | 0177r1 | | PGW restoration | | +| CT#55 | | | 0193r1 | | Error Indication Handling on S2a | 11.1.0 | +| | | | 0194r2 | | Restoration of data in the TWAN for S2a | | +| | | | 0195r2 | | TWAN partial failure | | +| | | | 0196r1 | | Restoration of data in the PGW for S2a | | +| | | | 0198r1 | | Correction on the S4-SGSN failure | | +| | | | 0199r1 | | S1 path failure handling | | +| | | | 0201r2 | | IP Address of the node sending the recovery IE | | +| CT#56 | | | 0191r1 | | SGW Restoration procedure | 11.2.0 | +| | | | 0204r1 | | Missing SGSN behavior in the PGW failure | | +| | | | 0206r1 | | PGW triggered SGW restoration procedure | | +| | | | 0208 | | Corrections to external resources cleanup upon SGW failure | | +| CT#57 | | | 0210r2 | | Restoration of Data for VCSG | 11.3.0 | +| | | | 0211r1 | | Downlink Data Notification message handling in S4 SGSN | | +| CT#58 | | | 0209r3 | | PCC and PMIP impacts for the SGW restoration procedure | 11.4.0 | +| | | | 0212 | | Corrections to reference titles | | +| | | | 0215r1 | | Handling of emergency PDN connections during EPC node restoration | | +| | | | 0216 | | Corrections to reference errors | | +| | | | 0217r3 | | SGW failure when ISR is active | | +| | | | 0214r4 | | Handling of VLR Failure without Restart | | +| CT#58 | | | 0224r1 | | SGSN handling of VLR restart | 11.5.0 | +| | | | 0225r1 | | Fixing editor's notes in SGW restoration procedure | | +| | | | 0226r1 | | The inclusion of the MME/S4-SGSN identifier IE | | +| CT#59 | | | 0218r1 | | Corrections to reference error for periodic location update timer | 12.0.0 | +| | | | 0220r1 | | MME/SGSN behaviour upon MBMS-GW restart | | +| | | | 0221r1 | | eMBMS service restoration upon MCE failure or M3AP path failure | | +| | | | 0222r1 | | eMBMS service restoration upon MME/SGSN restart | | + +| | | | | | | | +|----------|--|--|------------|--|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| | | | 0223r
2 | | Sm path failure handling | | +| CT#60 | | | 0228 | | Trigger for re-establishing MBMS sessions upon an M3AP path recovery | 12.1.0 | +| | | | 0239r
1 | | MME behaviour upon MBMS GW restart | | +| | | | 0240r | | SGSN behaviour upon MBMS GW restart | | +| | | | 0237r
1 | | BM-SC failure | | +| | | | 0238r
1 | | MBMS GW behaviour upon MME/SGSN restart | | +| | | | 0236r
2 | | MCE behavior on MME restart and MME behavior on MCE restart | | +| | | | 0232r
1 | | Contents of MBMS Session Start Request when re-establishing MBMS sessions | | +| | | | 0231r
2 | | SGmb path failure | | +| | | | 0230r
1 | | BM-SC behaviour upon MBMS GW restart | | +| | | | 0229r
1 | | Moving the control of an MBMS session to another MME | | +| | | | 0241r
2 | | Sn-path failure | | +| | | | 0245r
1 | | SGSN behaviour upon SGW restart | | +| | | | 0234 | | Restoration Priority during SGW and PGW restoration procedures | | +| | | | 0243r
2 | | Delete Bearer Request triggered by PMIP error indication message | | +| | | | 0242r
1 | | Stop Paging Indication in service restoration procedure with ISR | | +| CT#61 | | | 0246r
1 | | MBMS Session Start Request received for an on-going MBMS bearer service | 12.2.0 | +| | | | 0247r
1 | | MBMS Session duration | | +| | | | 0248r
1 | | BM-SC behaviour during SGmb path failure | | +| | | | 0249r
1 | | MCE behavior on MME restart | | +| | | | 0250r
1 | | Release of resources at old MME/SGSN during transient Sm path failure | | +| | | | 0251r
1 | | Separate Clause for MCE and RNC restoration functionality | | +| | | | 0252r
2 | | Correct S-GW behaviors when a peer P-GW failed | | +| | | | 0253r
1 | | Correct wrong NOTE reference | | +| | | | 0255r
2 | | Handling of VLR Failure without Restart for MO SMS | | +| Sep 2013 | | | | | Clause numbers corrected in clause 17A.2. Style correction also in clause 27.2.2.2. | 12.2.1 | +| Dec 2013 | | | 0265r
2 | | Correction of reference to Update Notifications for Proxy Mobile IPv6 | 12.3.0 | +| | | | 0271r
2 | | Error handling when the PCC rule is removed due to the S-GW restoration support | | +| | | | 0256r
1 | | Cause "GTP Resources Unavailable" handling at the SGSN | | +| | | | 0258r
6 | | Restoration of warning message delivery upon eNB failure/restart | | +| | | | 0259 | | M3AP path recovery | | +| | | | 0261r
2 | | S4-SGSN procedure upon RNC and Iu path failure | | +| | | | 0266r
2 | | Non transient SGmb path failure | | +| | | | 0267r
2 | | Detection of peer MBMS node restart and SGmb path failure/recovery | | + +| | | | | | | | +|----------|--|--|--------|--|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| | | | 0268r2 | | Non-transient SGi-mb path failure | | +| Mar 2014 | | | 0263r6 | | SGW behaviour upon GTP Error indication | 12.4.0 | +| | | | 0277r1 | | Correct the PCRF procedure during the SGW restoration | | +| | | | 0273r1 | | Update the reference of IETF draft Update Notifications for Proxy Mobile IPv6 to RFC 7077 | | +| | | | 0282r2 | | Handling of "GTP Resources Unavailable" cause in S4-SGSN | | +| | | | 0275r1 | | PWS Restart Indication parameters | | +| Jun 2014 | | | 0274r3 | | Sm path failure recovery | 12.5.0 | +| | | | 0283r1 | | SGmb path failure recovery | | +| | | | 0288r1 | | M1 and/or M3/Iu resources modification during MBMS session re-establishment | | +| | | | 0289 | | MCE Failure | | +| | | | 0291r1 | | SGmb path failure | | +| | | | 0284r1 | | Handling of E-RAB Release due to GTPU error indication for default bearer at MME | | +| | | | 0296r2 | | Update SGW behaviours after receiving PMIP error indication | | +| | | | 0285 | | PWS Restart Indication parameters | | +| | | | 0286r2 | | HeNB ID verification in the PWS Restart Indication message | | +| | | | 0287r2 | | Routing of PWS messages to HeNBs | | +| | | | 0298r2 | | SGW restoration when S5 path failure occurs | | +| | | | 0290 | | Restoring the (S)Gs associations during tracking/routing area update procedures | | +| Sep 2014 | | | 0300r2 | | Correct procedure name for PDN connection deactivation | 12.6.0 | +| | | | 0301r3 | | Handling of GTP Error Indication for Dual connectivity | | +| | | | 0302r2 | | Restoration for HSS Reset | | +| | | | 0304r1 | | Remove Editor's note for S5 path failure | | +| Dec 2014 | | | 0307 | | Warning Area List in Write-Replace Warning Request during PWS restoration | 12.7.0 | +| | | | 0308r1 | | Serial Number in Write-Replace Warning Request during PWS restoration | | +| | | | 0309 | | GCSE restoration procedures upon BM-SC restart | | +| | | | 0310r1 | | GCSE restoration procedures upon GCS AS restart | | +| | | | 0311r1 | | GCSE restoration procedures upon MB2-C path failure | | +| | | | 0312 | | GCSE restoration procedures upon SGi-mb path failure | | +| | | | 0314r1 | | GTP-C based restart procedures for HRPD | | +| Mar 2015 | | | 0316r2 | | SGW restoration procedure in PMIP case | 12.8.0 | +| Mar 2015 | | | 0317r1 | | Deferring GBR bearers deactivation upon S1 Reset or S1AP path failure | 13.0.0 | +| Jun 2015 | | | 0318r1 | | MCE configuration update after an MBMS restoration | 13.1.0 | +| Sep 2015 | | | 0320r1 | | HSS Reset | 13.2.0 | +| Dec 2015 | | | 0321r2 | | Services restoration for UEs using extended idle mode DRX | 13.3.0 | +| | | | 0326r2 | | DTCI for restoration procedure | | + +| | | | | | | | +|----------|--------|-----------|--------|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| | | | 0323r1 | | Implementation mistake of CR 0309 and CR 0310 | | +| | | | 0324r2 | | HSS restart MONTE impacts | | +| | | | 0325r2 | | SCEF restart and MONTE impacts | | +| | | | 0327r2 | | SGW Restoration in Dedicated Core Network | | +| Mar 2016 | | | 0329r2 | | HSS restart and resultant MONTE impacts | 13.4.0 | +| | | | 0330r2 | | Restart of SCEF | | +| | | | 0331r1 | | Correct the partial failure handling on SGW | | +| | | | 0332r1 | | S11-U Error Indication handling | | +| | | | 0334r3 | | Behaviours upon receipt of unknown NIDD | | +| | | | 0335r3 | | Enhance restoration procedure to be compatible with SCEF PDN connection and Attach without PDN connectivity | | +| | | | 0336r2 | | Connection Resume procedure used during restoration | | +| 2016-06 | CT#72 | CP-160228 | 0337 | 3 | MME handling of GTP Error Indication and MO-Data-Answer (failure) | 13.5.0 | +| 2016-06 | CT#72 | CP-160231 | 0338 | 2 | PGW restoration in NBIFOM case | 13.5.0 | +| 2016-06 | CT#72 | CP-160234 | 0340 | 3 | Restoration impact on the introduction of UE context retention at SCTP recovery | 13.5.0 | +| 2016-06 | CT#72 | CP-160217 | 0341 | 1 | Behaviours upon receipt of unknown NIDD (SGSN case) | 14.0.0 | +| 2016-09 | CT#73 | CP-160422 | 0343 | 1 | Failure case for NBIFOM | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-03 | CT#75 | CP-170043 | 0344 | 1 | Restoration Support for V2X Service | 14.2.0 | +| 2017-03 | CT#75 | CP-170040 | 0345 | 1 | Network triggered service restoration for PSM UE | 14.2.0 | +| 2017-06 | CT#76 | CP-171036 | 0348 | 1 | User Plane Path Failure with Control and User Plane Separation of SGW and PGW | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-06 | CT#76 | CP-171023 | 0350 | 1 | Service Restoration for UEs in extended DRX mode | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-06 | CT#76 | CP-171036 | 0351 | 3 | CUPS restoration procedures in SGW-C and SGW-U | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-06 | CT#76 | CP-171036 | 0352 | 2 | Partial failure handling for CUPS | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-06 | CT#76 | CP-171036 | 0353 | 2 | CUPS restoration procedures PGW-C and PGW-U | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-06 | CT#76 | CP-171036 | 0354 | 1 | CUPS restoration procedures | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-12 | CT#78 | CP-173019 | 0355 | - | Clarification on SGmb path failure | 14.4.0 | +| 2018-06 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-15 version (MCC) | 15.0.0 | +| 2018-09 | CT#81 | CP-182079 | 0357 | - | Corrections on CUPS restorations | 15.1.0 | +| 2018-09 | CT#81 | CP-182078 | 0358 | 2 | S1-U Path Failure Enhancement | 15.1.0 | +| 2019-03 | CT#83 | CP-190040 | 0359 | 5 | Recovery Time Stamp in PFCP | 15.2.0 | +| 2019-06 | CT#84 | CP-191024 | 0363 | 2 | Corrections to the restoration procedures for PFCP entities | 15.3.0 | +| 2019-09 | CT#85 | CP-192096 | 0364 | - | Heartbeat procedure | 15.4.0 | +| 2019-12 | CT#86 | CP-193041 | 0368 | - | GTP Recovery Counter and GSN node behaviour | 16.0.0 | +| 2019-12 | CT#86 | CP-193045 | 0365 | 1 | PFCP Association Setup Request with same Node ID | 16.0.0 | +| 2019-12 | CT#86 | CP-193045 | 0367 | 1 | Reestablishment of PFCP sessions after a UP function restart | 16.0.0 | +| 2020-03 | CT#87e | CP-200038 | 0369 | - | The Source IP Address in Heartbeat Request message | 16.1.0 | +| 2020-03 | CT#87e | CP-200038 | 0370 | 1 | The Recovery Time Stamp in PFCP Session Establishment Request message | 16.1.0 | +| 2020-03 | CT#87e | CP-200021 | 0371 | 1 | URCMP based restart procedures | 16.1.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23009/0073ee258067e591778333101c5d2edb_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23009/0073ee258067e591778333101c5d2edb_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8957f89efd69779315c13cc9e7461607e8939110 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23009/0073ee258067e591778333101c5d2edb_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid 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https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:cef40fe32bd753748c32e67e7d0ef2bf9ae822da91f54328b61b763318dc553b +size 74246 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23009/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23009/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..db4e79f4941d8d608b47bdb462b14c98bd395f5d --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23009/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,10237 @@ + + + + + + +# Contents + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword..... | 6 | +| 1 Scope..... | 7 | +| 2 References..... | 9 | +| 3 Abbreviations and definitions..... | 10 | +| 3.1 Abbreviations..... | 10 | +| 3.2 Definitions..... | 11 | +| 4 Role, functional composition of MSCs and interfaces for handover..... | 12 | +| 4.1 MSC-A..... | 12 | +| 4.1.1 Role of MSC-A..... | 12 | +| 4.1.2 Functional composition of MSC-A and its interfaces for handover..... | 14 | +| 4.2 MSC-B..... | 16 | +| 4.2.1 Role of MSC-B..... | 16 | +| 4.2.2 Functional composition of MSC-B and its interfaces for handover..... | 17 | +| 4.3 3G_MSC-A..... | 18 | +| 4.3.1 Role of 3G_MSC-A..... | 19 | +| 4.3.2 Functional composition of 3G_MSC-A and its interfaces for handover/relocation..... | 21 | +| 4.4 3G_MSC-B..... | 23 | +| 4.4.1 Role of 3G_MSC-B..... | 23 | +| 4.4.2 Functional composition of 3G_MSC-B and its interfaces for handover/relocation..... | 26 | +| 4.5 MSC server enhanced for SRVCC features..... | 27 | +| 4.5.1 Role of SRVCC MSC..... | 27 | +| 4.5.2 Functional composition of SRVCC MSC and its interfaces for handover/relocation..... | 28 | +| 4.5.3 Role of vSRVCC MSC..... | 28 | +| 4.5.4 Functional composition of vSRVCC MSC and its interfaces for handover/relocation..... | 28 | +| 5 Handover initiation conditions..... | 28 | +| 6 General description of the procedures for intra - MSC handovers..... | 29 | +| 6.1 Procedure for Intra-MSC Handovers..... | 29 | +| 6.2 Procedure for Intra-3G_MSC Handovers..... | 31 | +| 6.2.1 Intra-3G_MSC Handover from UMTS to GSM..... | 31 | +| 6.2.1.1 With no bearer or one bearer..... | 32 | +| 6.2.1.2 With multiple bearers (Optional functionality)..... | 33 | +| 6.2.2 Intra-3G_MSC GSM to UMTS Handover..... | 33 | +| 6.2.3 Procedure for Intra-3G_MSC SRNS Relocation..... | 35 | +| 6.2.3.1 With no bearer or one bearer..... | 37 | +| 6.2.3.1.1 SRNS Relocation..... | 37 | +| 6.2.3.1.2 Enhanced SRNS Relocation..... | 38 | +| 6.2.3.2 With multiple bearers (Optional functionality)..... | 39 | +| 6.3 Internal Handover with MSC Support for Intra-BSS handover with AoIP..... | 40 | +| 6.3.1 General Description of Internal Handover with MSC Support..... | 40 | +| 6.3.2 BSS-initiated Internal Handover with MSC Support..... | 40 | +| 6.3.3 MSC-initiated BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support..... | 42 | +| 7 General description of the procedures for inter - MSC handovers..... | 42 | +| 7.1 Basic handover procedure requiring a circuit connection between MSC-A and MSC-B..... | 43 | +| 7.2 Basic handover procedure not requiring the establishment of a circuit connection between MSC-A and MSC-B..... | 45 | +| 7.3 Procedure for subsequent handover requiring a circuit connection..... | 46 | +| 7.3.1 Description of subsequent handover procedure i): MSC-B to MSC-A..... | 47 | +| 7.3.2 Description of the subsequent handover procedure ii): MSC-B to MSC-B'..... | 48 | +| 7.4 Procedure for subsequent handover not requiring a circuit connection..... | 49 | +| 7.4.1 Description of the subsequent handover procedure without circuit connection i): MSC-B to MSC-A..... | 50 | +| 7.4.2 Description of the subsequent handover procedure without circuit connection ii): MSC-B to MSC-B'..... | 50 | +| 8 General Description of the procedures for inter - 3G_MSC handovers..... | 51 | +| 8.1 Handover UMTS to GSM..... | 51 | + +| | | | +|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| 8.1.1 | Basic Handover procedure requiring a circuit connection between 3G_MSC -A and MSC-B..... | 52 | +| 8.1.1.1 | With one circuit connection..... | 53 | +| 8.1.1.2 | With multiple circuit connections (Optional functionality)..... | 55 | +| 8.1.2 | Basic UMTS to GSM Handover procedure not requiring the establishment of a circuit connection between 3G_MSC-A and MSC-B..... | 55 | +| 8.1.3 | Procedure for subsequent UMTS to GSM handover requiring a circuit connection..... | 56 | +| 8.1.3.1 | Description of subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure i): 3G_MSC-B to MSC-A..... | 57 | +| 8.1.3.1.1 | With one circuit connection..... | 57 | +| 8.1.3.1.2 | With multiple circuit connections (Optional functionality)..... | 57 | +| 8.1.3.2 | Description of subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure ii): 3G_MSC-B to MSC-B'..... | 58 | +| 8.1.3.2.1 | With one circuit connection..... | 58 | +| 8.1.3.2.2 | With multiple circuit connections (Optional functionality)..... | 58 | +| 8.1.4 | Procedure for subsequent UMTS to GSM handover not requiring a circuit connection..... | 60 | +| 8.1.4.1 | Description of subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure i): 3G_MSC-B to MSC-A..... | 61 | +| 8.1.4.2 | Description of the subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure without circuit connection ii): 3G_MSC-B to MSC-B'..... | 61 | +| 8.2 | Handover GSM to UMTS..... | 62 | +| 8.2.1 | Basic Handover procedure requiring a circuit connection between MSC-A and 3G_MSC-B..... | 63 | +| 8.2.2 | Basic GSM to UMTS Handover procedure not requiring the establishment of a circuit connection between MSC-A and 3G_MSC-B..... | 66 | +| 8.2.3 | Procedure for subsequent GSM to UMTS handover requiring a circuit connection..... | 66 | +| 8.2.3.1 | Description of subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure i): MSC-B to 3G_MSC-A..... | 67 | +| 8.2.3.2 | Description of subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure ii): MSC-B to 3G_MSC-B'..... | 68 | +| 8.2.4 | Procedure for subsequent GSM to UMTS handover not requiring a circuit connection..... | 69 | +| 8.2.4.1 | Description of subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure without circuit connection i): MSC-B to 3G_MSC-A..... | 70 | +| 8.2.4.2 | Description of subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure without circuit connection ii): MSC-B to 3G_MSC-B'..... | 70 | +| 8.3 | SRNS Relocation..... | 71 | +| 8.3.1 | Basic relocation procedure requiring a circuit connection between 3G_MSC-A and 3G_MSC-B..... | 72 | +| 8.3.1.1 | With one circuit connection..... | 73 | +| 8.3.1.2 | With multiple circuit connections (Optional functionality)..... | 75 | +| 8.3.1.2.1 | 3G_MSC-B does not support multiple bearers..... | 75 | +| 8.3.1.2.2 | 3G_MSC-B supports multiple bearers..... | 75 | +| 8.3.2 | Basic relocation procedure not requiring the establishment of a circuit connection between 3G_MSC-A and 3G_MSC-B..... | 76 | +| 8.3.3 | Procedure for subsequent relocation requiring a circuit connection..... | 77 | +| 8.3.3.1 | Description of subsequent relocation procedure i): 3G_MSC-B to 3G_MSC-A..... | 78 | +| 8.3.3.1.1 | With one circuit connection..... | 78 | +| 8.3.3.1.2 | With multiple circuit connections (Optional functionality)..... | 79 | +| 8.3.3.2 | Description of subsequent relocation procedure ii): 3G_MSC-B to 3G_MSC-B'..... | 79 | +| 8.3.3.2.1 | With one circuit connection..... | 79 | +| 8.3.3.2.2 | With multiple circuit connections (Optional functionality)..... | 80 | +| 8.3.4 | Procedure for subsequent relocation not requiring a circuit connection..... | 82 | +| 8.3.4.1 | Description of subsequent relocation procedure i): 3G_MSC-B to 3G_MSC-A..... | 83 | +| 8.3.4.2 | Description of subsequent relocation procedure ii): 3G_MSC-B to 3G_MSC-B"..... | 83 | +| 9 | Detailed procedures in MSC-A..... | 84 | +| 9.1 | BSS/MSC and MS/MSC procedures in MSC-A (functional unit 1)..... | 84 | +| 9.2 | Call control procedures MSC-A (functional unit 2)..... | 85 | +| 9.3 | Handover control procedures MSC-A (functional unit 3)..... | 86 | +| 9.3A | BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support control procedures..... | 87 | +| 9.4 | MAP procedures in MSC-A (functional unit 4)..... | 88 | +| 9.5 | Interworking between Handover control procedures and MAP procedures in MSC-A..... | 88 | +| 9.6 | Compatibility with GSM Phase 1..... | 88 | +| 10 | Detailed procedures in MSC-B..... | 89 | +| 10.1 | BSS/MSC (MS/BSS) procedures MSC-B (functional unit 1)..... | 89 | +| 10.2 | Call control procedures MSC-B (functional unit 2)..... | 89 | +| 10.3 | Handover control procedures MSC-B (functional unit 3)..... | 90 | +| 10.4 | MAP procedures MSC-B (functional unit 4)..... | 90 | +| 10.5 | Interworking between Handover control procedures and MAP procedures in MSC-B..... | 91 | + +| | | | +|------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 10.6 | Compatibility with GSM Phase 1 ..... | 91 | +| 11 | Detailed procedures in 3G_MSC-A..... | 91 | +| 11.1 | RNC/BSC/3G_MSC and UE/MS/3G_MSC procedures in 3G_MSC-A (functional unit 1)..... | 91 | +| 11.2 | Call control procedures 3G_MSC-A (functional unit 2)..... | 91 | +| 11.3 | Handover/Relocation control procedures 3G_MSC-A (functional unit 3)..... | 93 | +| 11.4 | MAP procedures in 3G_MSC-A (functional unit 4)..... | 95 | +| 11.5 | Interworking between Handover/Relocation control procedures and MAP procedures in 3G_MSC-A..... | 95 | +| 11.6 | Compatibility with GSM Phase 1 ..... | 96 | +| 11.7 | Protocol interworking..... | 96 | +| 12 | Detailed procedures in 3G_MSC-B..... | 96 | +| 12.1 | RNC/BSC/3G_MSC (UE/MS/RNC/BSC) procedures in 3G_MSC-B (functional unit 1)..... | 96 | +| 12.2 | Call control procedures 3G_MSC-B (functional unit 2)..... | 96 | +| 12.3 | Handover/Relocation control procedures in 3G_MSC-B (functional unit 3)..... | 97 | +| 12.4 | MAP procedures in 3G_MSC-B (functional unit 4)..... | 99 | +| 12.5 | Interworking between Handover/Relocation control procedures and MAP procedures in 3G_MSC-B..... | 99 | +| 12.6 | Compatibility with GSM Phase 1 ..... | 99 | +| 12.7 | Protocol interworking..... | 99 | +| 12.8 | Interactions between handover/relocation control procedures and other RANAP procedures..... | 100 | +| 12.8.1 | Interactions between handover/relocation control procedures and the security mode procedure..... | 100 | +| 12.8.1.1 | Intra-3G_MSC-B handover/relocation..... | 100 | +| 12.8.1.2 | Subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation..... | 102 | +| 12.8.2 | Interactions between handover/relocation control procedures and the RAB assignment procedure..... | 104 | +| 12.8.2.1 | Intra-3G_MSC-B handover/relocation..... | 104 | +| 12.8.2.2 | Subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation..... | 106 | +| 12.8.3 | Interactions between directed retry handover procedures and the RAB assignment procedure..... | 108 | +| 12.8.3.1 | Intra-3G_MSC-B directed retry handover..... | 108 | +| 12.8.3.2 | Subsequent Inter-MSC directed retry handover..... | 109 | +| 13 | Subsequent channel assignment using a circuit connection between MSC-A and MSC-B..... | 111 | +| 13.1 | GSM handover..... | 111 | +| 13.2 | UMTS to GSM handover..... | 112 | +| 13.3 | GSM to UMTS handover..... | 114 | +| 13.4 | SRNS Relocation..... | 115 | +| 13.4.1 | Without circuit connection..... | 115 | +| 13.4.2 | With circuit connection (Optional functionality)..... | 116 | +| 14 | Directed retry handover..... | 117 | +| 14.1 | GSM handover..... | 117 | +| 14.2 | GSM to UMTS handover..... | 118 | +| 14.3 | UMTS to GSM handover..... | 120 | +| 15 | SDL diagrams..... | 121 | +| Annex A (informative): | Change history..... | 298 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The present document provides a mechanism giving reliable transfer of signalling messages within the 3GPP system. + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# 1 Scope + +The present document contains a detailed description of the handover procedures to be used in PLMNs. The purpose of the handover procedures, as described in the present document, are to ensure that the connection to the Mobile Station (MS) or User Equipment (UE) is maintained as it moves from one cell or radio network to another. The document defines the circuit switched handover functionality based on the service requirements in 3GPP TS 22.129 [9]. For the circuit switched handover functionality related to SRVCC and vSRVCC, it is based on the service requirements in 3GPP TS 23.216 [26]. + +The present document considers the following five handover cases: + +- i) handover between Base Station Subsystems (BSS) connected to the same MSC, this is termed an Intra-MSC handover; +- ii) handover between Radio Network Subsystems (RNS) connected to the same 3G\_MSC, this is termed an Intra-3G\_MSC handover/relocation. This case also includes inter-system handover between RNS and BSS if the 3G\_MSC supports the A-interface. In the context of this specification the term RNS refers also to a BSS when serving a mobile station in Iu mode. Furthermore, this case includes Intra-3G\_MSC enhanced SRNS relocation between two RNSs; +- iii) handover between Base Station Subsystems connected to different MSCs, this is termed an Inter-MSC handover. This category can be sub-divided into three further procedures: + - a) the Basic Inter-MSC Handover procedure, where the MS is handed over from a controlling MSC (MSC-A) to another MSC (MSC-B); + - b) the Subsequent Inter-MSC Handover procedure, where the MS is handed over from MSC-B to a third MSC (MSC-B'); + - c) the Subsequent Inter-MSC handback, where the MS is handed back from MSC-B to MSC-A. +- iv) handover between Radio Network Subsystems connected to different 3G\_MSCs, this is termed an Inter-3G\_MSC handover/relocation. In the context of this specification the term RNS also refers to a BSS when serving a mobile station in Iu mode. This category can be divided into three further sub-procedures: + - a) the Inter-3G\_MSC Handover procedure from UMTS to GSM, where the UE/MS is handed over from a controlling 3G\_MSC (3G\_MSC-A) to an MSC (MSC-B); + - b) the Inter-3G\_MSC Handover procedure from GSM to UMTS, where the UE/MS is handed over from a controlling MSC (MSC-A) to a 3G\_MSC (3G\_MSC-B); + - c) the Inter-3G\_MSC Relocation procedure, where the UE is relocated from 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B. This procedure can also be combined with a hard change of radio resources (Hard Handover with switch in the core network). + +The MSC in items a) and b) this category can optionally be a 3G\_MSC supporting the A-interface. The three sub-procedures also cover subsequent handover/relocation to a third MSC-B' or 3G\_MSC-B' and subsequent handover/relocation back to MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-A. + +- v) handover within one BSS connected via AoIP, supported by the same MSC, this is termed "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support". It is in fact a kind of external handover from MSC perspective and therefore a subset of i) but described in detail in separate subclause 6.3 for clarity. The MSC in this category can be any of MSC-A, MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-B. + +In both cases i) and iii) the same procedures as defined in the 3GPP TS 48.008 [5] and the 3GPP TS 24.008 [10] shall be used on the A-interface and on the Radio Interface, respectively. + +In case ii) the same procedures as defined in the 3GPP TS 25.413 [11] and the 3GPP TS 24.008 [10] shall be used on the Iu-interface. If the 3G\_MSC in case ii) also supports the A-interface, the 3GPP TS 48.008 [5] and the 3GPP TS 24.008 [10] shall be used on the A-interface. + +In case iii) the handover procedures shall transport the A-interface messages between MSC-A and MSC-B described in the Mobile Application Part (MAP), 3GPP TS 29.002 [12]. + +In case iv) the handover procedures shall transport the A-interface messages between 3G\_MSC and MSC described in the Mobile Application Part (MAP), 3GPP TS 29.002 [12]. + +In case iv) the relocation procedure shall transport the Iu-interface messages between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B described in the Mobile Application Part (MAP), 3GPP TS 29.002 [12]. + +The interworking between the 3GPP TS 29.002 [12] protocol and the 3GPP TS 48.008 [5] protocol is described in the 3GPP TS 29.010 [8]. + +Multicall supplementary service is not applicable in GERAN Iu mode and relocation of Multicalls is therefore only possible within UTRAN. + +Enhanced SRNS relocation is possible only within UTRAN between two RNSs connected to the same 3G\_MSC, i.e. in case ii). + +Handovers, which take place on the same MSC are termed Intra-MSC handovers; this includes both Inter-BSS and Intra-BSS handovers. + +Handovers, which take place on the same 3G\_MSC are termed Intra-3G\_MSC handovers; this includes Inter-RNS handovers and optionally RNS to BSS and BSS to RNS handovers. + +In the context of this specification the term InterSystem handover can also refer to a handover which takes place between a Base Station serving a mobile station in Iu mode and a Base Station serving a mobile in A/Gb mode. + +"Flexible Iu interface for handover/relocation" Option (see 3GPP TS 23.221 [19], subclause 4.2.1): Up to release 99 an RNS can be connected only to one 3G\_MSC. From release 4 onwards, as a network option, an RNS can have Iu interfaces to more than one MSC. Such an additional Iu interface may be selected by an MSC during an intra-PLMN relocation or intra-PLMN BSS to RNS handover procedure. This allows the MSC to use an Intra-3G\_MSC handover procedure according to case ii) instead of an Inter-3G\_MSC handover procedure according to case iv). The decision whether to use the Intra-3G\_MSC handover procedure is implementation and configuration dependent. In a network implementing this option, a global title based on the Global RNC-Id may optionally be used for the addressing of the Iu interface messages. + +"Intra Domain Connection of RAN Nodes to Multiple CN Nodes" Option (see 3GPP TS 23.236 [18]): when applied, a BSS or an RNS can be connected to more than one MSC. + +The present document also covers the requirements for handover in ongoing GSM voice group calls, directed retry and handover without a circuit connection between (U)MSCs. The present document does not consider the case of handovers between radio channels on the same BSS (Intra-BSS handover) or the handover of packet radio services except for case v), the "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" for Intra-BSS handover in AoIP, involving the MSC as described in subclause 6.3. The Inter-RNS handover case that results in a relocation is covered by the present document, but not other Inter-RNS or Intra-RNS handover cases. + +For voice broadcast calls in GSM, the speaker uses normal point-to-point handover procedures, whilst the listeners use idle mode cell reselection procedures, as for the voice group call listeners. + +Voice group calls is only applicable to GSM and handover of voice group calls is therefore only possible in GSM. + +Inter-MSC hand-over imposes a few limitations on the system. After inter-MSC hand-over: + +- call re-establishment is not supported. + +The list of 3GPP TS 48.008 [5] features supported during and after Inter-MSC handover is given in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7]. + +In the Inter-MSC handover case, the interworking between a Phase 1 BSSMAP protocol possibly used by one MSC and the Phase 2 BSSMAP protocol used in the Phase 2 MAP protocol on the E-interface is performed by this MSC. + +This specification assumes TDM based Core Network and therefore PCM, ITU-T G.711 [16] encoded, voice channel for speech calls between MSC-A and MSC-B and toward the other party. For bearer independent CS Core Network architecture implementations see 3GPP TS 23.205 [23] and 3GPP TS 23.231 [24]. For handover including Out-Of-Band transcoder control and transcoder free operation see 3GPP TS 23.153 [25]. For handover with Local Call Local Switch (LCLS) see 3GPP TS 23.284 [29]. + +NOTE 1: The message primitive names used in the SDL diagrams and message flows in the present document do not represent the actual messages specified in the GSM or 3GPP stage 3 technical specifications. The primitive names are only intended to be indicative of their use in the present document. + +The MSC server enhanced for SRVCC and the MSC server enhanced for vSRVCC as specified in 3GPP TS 23.216 [26] follows the procedures defined for 3G\_MSC-A in the present specification with the exceptions and additions as specified in subclause 4.5. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] ITU-T Recommendation Q.118: "Abnormal conditions - Special release arrangements". +- [2] Void. +- [2a] 3GPP TR 21.905: "3G Vocabulary". +- [3] 3GPP TS 43.068: "Voice Group Call Service (VGCS); Stage 2". +- [4] 3GPP TS 45.008: "Radio Subsystem Link Control". +- [5] 3GPP TS 48.008: "Mobile Switching Centre - Base Station System (MSC-BSS) Interface Layer 3 specification". +- [6] 3GPP TS 48.058: "Base Station Controller - Base Transceiver Station (BSC-BTS) Interface Layer 3 specification". +- [7] 3GPP TS 49.008: "Application of the Base Station System Application Part (BSSAP) on the E-interface". +- [8] 3GPP TS 29.010: "Information Element Mapping between Mobile Station - Base Station System (MS-BSS) and Base Station System - Mobile-services Switching Centre (BSS-MSC); Signalling procedures and the Mobile Application Part (MAP)". +- [9] 3GPP TS 22.129: "Handover Requirements between UMTS and GSM or other Radio Systems". +- [10] 3GPP TS 24.008: "Mobile Radio Interface Layer 3 specification; Core Network Protocols; Stage 3". +- [11] 3GPP TS 25.413: "UTRAN Iu interface RANAP signalling". +- [12] 3GPP TS 29.002: "Mobile Application Part (MAP) specification". +- [13] 3GPP TS 25.303: "UE functions and inter-layer procedures in connected mode". +- [14] 3GPP TS 25.331: "Radio Resource Control (RRC) Protocol Specification". +- [15] 3GPP TS 29.108: "Application of the Radio Access Network Application Part (RANAP) on the E-interface". +- [16] ITU-T Recommendation G.711: "Pulse code modulation (PCM) of voice frequencies". +- [17] 3GPP TS 23.135: "Multicall supplementary service; Stage 2". + +- [18] 3GPP TS 23.236: "Intra Domain Connection of RAN Nodes to Multiple CN Nodes". +- [19] 3GPP TS 23.221: "Architectural Requirements". +- [20] 3GPP TS 25.401: "UTRAN Overall Description". +- [21] 3GPP TS 23.195: "Provision of UE Specific Behaviour Information to Network Entities". +- [22] 3GPP TS 23.172: "Technical realization of Circuit Switched (CS) multimedia service; UDI/RDI fallback and service modification". +- [23] 3GPP TS 23.205: "Bearer-independent circuit-switched core network; Stage 2" +- [24] 3GPP TS 23.231: "SIP-I based circuit-switched core network; Stage 2" +- [25] 3GPP TS 23.153: "Out of band transcoder control; Stage 2". +- [26] 3GPP TS 23.216: "Single Radio Voice Call Continuity (SRVCC)". +- [27] 3GPP TS 29.280: "3GPP Sv interface (MME to MSC, and SGSN to MSC) for SRVCC". +- [28] 3GPP TS 44.018: "Mobile radio interface layer 3 specification; Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol". +- [29] 3GPP TS 23.284: "Local Call Local Switch; Stage 2". +- [30] 3GPP TS 24.237: "IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem (IMS) service continuity; Stage 3". +- [31] 3GPP TS 23.237: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Service Continuity; Stage 2". + +# --- 3 Abbreviations and definitions + +## 3.1 Abbreviations + +For the purpose of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: + +| | | +|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 3G_MSC | A third generation MSC that supports the Iu interface and optionally the A interface | +| 3G_MSC-A | The controlling 3G_MSC on which the call was originally established | +| 3G_MSC-B | The 3G_MSC to which the UE is handed over in a Basic Handover | +| 3G_MSC-B' | The 3G_MSC to which the UE is handed over in a Subsequent Handover | +| BSC | Base Station Controller | +| BSS | Base Station System | +| BSS-A | The BSS from which the MS is being handed over | +| BSS-B | The BSS to which the MS is being handed over | +| BTS | Base Transceiver Station | +| CSG | Closed Subscriber Group | +| CSS | CSG Subscriber Server | +| E-UTRAN | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network | +| GERAN | GSM EDGE Radio Access Network | +| ISC | International Switching Centre | +| LCLS | Local Call Local Switch | +| MS | Mobile Station | +| MSC | A second generation Mobile Services Switching Centre that only supports the A interface | +| MSC-A | The controlling MSC on which the call was originally established | +| MSC-B | The MSC to which the MS is handed over in a Basic Handover | +| MSC-B' | The MSC to which the MS is handed over in a Subsequent Handover | +| MME | Mobility Management Entity | +| RNC | Radio Network Controller | +| RNS | Radio Network Subsystem | +| SBSS | Serving BSS | +| SNA | Shared Network Area | +| SRNS | Serving RNS | + +| | | +|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| STN-SR | Session Transfer Number for SR-VCC | +| UE | A User Equipment is a terminal that supports USIM and the UMTS Uu interface | +| UE/MS | A terminal that supports USIM, SIM, the Uu interface and the Um interface | +| UESBI | UE Specific Behaviour Information | +| USIM | UMTS Subscriber Identity Module | + +Other abbreviations used in the GSM specifications are listed in 3GPP TR 21.905 [2a]. + +## 3.2 Definitions + +The following terms are used in this Technical Specification: + +**A/Gb mode:** mode of operation of the MS when connected to the Core Network via GERAN and the A and/or Gb interfaces. Throughout this specification the term GSM refers to GERAN A/Gb mode. + +**AoIP-Selected codec (Target):** the codec selected by the target BSS, to be used by the UE/MS in GERAN A/Gb mode after the handover to the BSS using A interface over IP. + +**AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor):** a list of codecs for GERAN A/Gb mode derived by the anchor MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A based on the codecs supported by the MS and the codecs available at the anchor MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A for A interface over IP, and provided by MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A to MSC-B/3G\_MSC-B during Inter-MSC handover/relocation with MAP signalling. Within the list, the codecs are ordered in decreasing order of priority, the first entry in the list being the highest priority codec (preferred codec) and the last entry the lowest priority codec. + +**AoIP-Available Codecs list (MAP):** a list of codecs for GERAN A/Gb mode available for the target AoIP interface signalled via MAP. + +**CSG ID list:** for a specific PLMN-ID the list of CSG IDs for which the MS has a valid subscription. The CSG ID list for the registered PLMN can be derived from the CSG subscription data provided by the HLR or the CSS to the anchor MSC. The CSG ID lists for the equivalent PLMNs can be derived from the CSG subscription data provided by the HLR. + +**Iu mode:** mode of operation of the MS when connected to the Core Network via GERAN or UTRAN and the Iu interface. Throughout this specification the term UMTS refers to UTRAN or GERAN Iu mode. + +**Iur interface:** the logical interface between two UTRAN RNSs. + +**Iur-g interface:** the logical interface between two BSSs or a BSC and an RNC and it is only considered in Iu mode. + +**Iu Currently used codec:** the codec used by the UE/MS in UTRAN or GERAN Iu mode before a handover or SRNS relocation. + +**Iu Selected codec:** the codec to be used by the UE/MS in UTRAN or GERAN Iu mode after the handover or SRNS relocation. + +**Iu Supported Codecs List:** a list of codecs supported by the MS and by the core network, provided by MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B during Inter-MSC handover/relocation. The Iu Supported Codecs List may contain separate list of codecs for UTRAN Iu mode and GERAN Iu mode. Within each list, the codecs are ordered in decreasing order of priority, the first entry in the list being the highest priority codec (preferred codec) and the last entry the lowest priority codec. + +**Default speech codec:** In UTRAN Iu mode the default speech codec is the UMTS AMR or UMTS AMR2 codec, dependent on the capabilities of the UE/MS. For a description of how the network determines the default UMTS speech codec, see 3GPP TS 24.008 [10], subclause 5.2.1.11. If necessary, 3G\_MSC-B shall use the Radio Resource Information instead of the GSM Bearer Capability, since the GSM Bearer Capability is not available in MSC-B. + +In GERAN Iu mode the default speech codec is the AMR FR codec. + +**SRVCC MSC:** MSC server enhanced for SRVCC as defined in 3GPP TS 23.216 [26] subclause 5.3.2. + +**vSRVCC MSC:** MSC server enhanced for vSRVCC as defined in 3GPP TS 23.216 [26] subclause 5.3.2a. + +**UE Specific Behaviour Information - Iu (UESBI-Iu):** information that is sent from the MSC to the RAN and that can be used to derive specific information about the UE's capabilities. + +For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 23.216 [26] apply: + +**SRVCC** +**vSRVCC** + +For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 23.237 [31] apply: + +**SCC AS** + +For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 24.008 [10] apply: + +**CSG cell** +**CSG ID** + +# --- 4 Role, functional composition of MSCs and interfaces for handover + +## 4.1 MSC-A + +### 4.1.1 Role of MSC-A + +In the Intra-MSC handover case (including "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" with AoIP), the MSC-A (simply termed MSC) controls the call, the mobility management and the radio resources before, during and after an Intra-MSC handover. When BSSAP procedures have to be performed, they are initiated and driven by MSC-A. + +If AoIP is supported by MSC-A and BSS, then the BSS or the MSC-A may initiate a "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" as described in detail in subclause 6.3. + +In the Inter-MSC handover case, MSC-A is the MSC which controls the call and the mobility management of the Mobile during the call, before, during and after a basic or subsequent handover. When BSSAP procedures related to dedicated resources have to be performed towards the MS, they are initiated and driven by MSC-A. The MSC-A - MSC-B interface works as a MSC - BSS interface for a subset of BSSMAP procedures. These BSSMAP procedures, described in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] are only those related to dedicated resources. The DTAP signalling is relayed transparently by MSC-B between MSC-A and the MS. + +During a basic handover, MSC-A initiates and controls all the handover procedure, from its initiation (reception of Handover Required from BSS-A on A-interface) until its completion (reception of Handover Complete from MSC-B on E-interface). + +For handover to an area where "Intra Domain Connection of RAN Nodes to Multiple CN Nodes" is applied, MSC-A can have multiple target CN nodes for each handover target in a pool-area as specified in 3GPP TS 23.236 [18]. + +During a subsequent handover back to MSC-A, MSC-A acts as a BSS towards MSC-B, which controls the handover procedure until the termination in MSC-A of the handover radio resources allocation (sending of the Handover Request Acknowledge to MSC-B from MSC-A). Then all handover related messages shall terminate at MSC-A (e.g. Handover Detect/Complete from BSS-B, Handover Failure from BSS-A). + +During a subsequent handover to a third MSC, MSC-A works towards MSC-B' as described above in the basic handover paragraph and towards MSC-B as described above in subsequent handover paragraph. + +In the Inter-System, inter-MSC handover case, MSC-A is the MSC which controls the call and the mobility management of the Mobile during the call, before, during and after a basic or subsequent handover. When BSSAP procedures related to dedicated resources have to be performed towards the MS, they are initiated and driven by MSC-A. The MSC-A - 3G\_MSC-B interface works as a MSC - BSS interface for a subset of BSSMAP procedures. These BSSMAP procedures, described in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] are only those related to dedicated resources. The DTAP signalling is relayed transparently by 3G\_MSC-B between MSC-A and the MS. + +During a basic inter-system handover, MSC-A initiates and controls all the handover procedure, from its initiation (reception of Handover Required from BSS-A on A-interface) until its completion (reception of Handover Complete from 3G\_MSC-B on E-interface). + +During a subsequent inter-system handover back to MSC-A, MSC-A acts as a BSS towards 3G\_MSC-B, which controls the handover procedure until the termination in MSC-A of the handover radio resources allocation (sending of the Handover Request Acknowledge to 3G\_MSC-B from MSC-A). Then all handover related messages shall terminate at MSC-A (e.g. Handover Detect/Complete from BSS-B, Handover Failure from BSS-A). + +During a subsequent inter-system handover to a third MSC, MSC-A works towards 3G\_MSC-B' as described above in the basic inter-system handover paragraph and towards 3G\_MSC-B as described above in subsequent inter-system handover paragraph. + +If MSC-A supports the "Provision of UE Specific Behaviour Information to Network Entities" (see 3GPP TS 23.195 [21]), it shall send UESBI-Iu to the target MSC during basic and subsequent handover, and basic and subsequent inter-system handover. + +MSC-A may support inter-MSC inter-system handover to a CSG cell. If MSC-A supports handover to a CSG cell, the serving BSS is served by MSC-A and provides a CSG ID for the target cell, and the call is not an emergency call, then MSC-A checks the CSG membership of the UE for the target cell using the CSG subscription data provided by the HLR or the CSS before proceeding with the handover procedure. If there is no subscription data for this CSG ID or the CSG subscription for the CSG ID has expired, the MSC-A considers the membership check as failed. If for a specific PLMN-ID an entry with the same CSG ID exists in both CSS subscription data and HLR subscription data, the CSG subscription data from the HLR shall take precedence over the data from CSS. + +NOTE 1: If MSC-A does not support CSG membership checking, and a CSG cell is configured as possible handover target, MSC-A will proceed with the handover to the CSG cell. If the CSG cell is not configured as possible handover target, MSC-A will not proceed with the handover. + +For handover of an emergency call to a CSG cell, MSC-A shall skip the CSG membership check and proceed with the handover procedure. + +For inter-PLMN handover to a CSG cell, if the HLR or the CSS provided a CSG ID list for the target PLMN, MSC-A shall validate the CSG membership of the UE in the target CSG cell using the CSG ID list for the target PLMN. + +NOTE 2: Due to certain restrictions in the access stratum, inter-PLMN handover to a CSG cell in a PLMN which is not an equivalent PLMN for the UE is not supported; therefore, the target PLMN will always be an equivalent PLMN. + +If the HLR did not provide any CSG ID lists for the equivalent PLMNs, then based on operator's configuration the MSC-A may allow the handover by validating the CSG membership of the UE in the target CSG cell using the CSG ID list of the registered PLMN-ID. Otherwise, MSC-A shall reject the handover due to no CSG subscription information of the target PLMN-ID available. + +NOTE 3: If MSC-A uses the CSG ID list of the registered PLMN-ID for membership validation, as the UE is using the CSG ID list of the equivalent PLMN, inter-PLMN handover to a CSG cell of an equivalent PLMN can only occur if the CSG ID of the cell is both in the CSG ID list of the registered PLMN used by MSC-A and in the CSG ID list of the equivalent PLMN used by the UE. If the HLR provided CSG ID lists for the equivalent PLMNs, this restriction does not apply. + +For subsequent inter-MSC handover to a third 3G\_MSC-B', if MSC-B/3G\_MSC-B belongs to a different PLMN than MSC-A, then as an operator option MSC-A may perform an additional CSG membership check for the target cell. + +### 4.1.2 Functional composition of MSC-A and its interfaces for handover + +In order to simplify the description of the handover procedures the controlling MSC (MSC-A) can be considered to be composed of five functional units, as shown in figure 1. + +Signalling functions: + +- 1) BSC/MSC (MS/BSC) Procedures MSC-A. This unit is used to control the signalling between the MSC, BSC and MS. Interface A' is the connection to the old BSC and interface A" is the connection to the new BSC, when an Intra-MSC handover takes place. Interface x represents the interworking connection to the Handover Control Procedures MSC-A. +- 2) Call Control Procedures MSC-A. This unit is used to control the call. Interface B' is used for normal call control procedures. When a Basic handover from MSC-A to MSC-B is to be performed then interface B" is employed to provide a signalling and call control connection to MSC-B. If a Subsequent handover to MSC-B' is to be + +performed then interface B''' is used. Similarly, when a Basic inter-system handover from MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B is to be performed, then interface B'' is employed to provide a signalling and call control connection to 3G\_MSC-B. If a subsequent inter-system handover to 3G\_MSC-B' is to be performed, then interface B''' is used. + +- 3) Handover Control Procedures MSC-A. This unit provides both the overall control of the handover procedure and interworking between the internal interfaces (x, y and z). +- 4) MAP Procedures MSC-A. This unit is responsible for controlling the exchange of MAP messages between MSCs during an Inter-MSC handover, or between MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B during an Inter-system Inter-MSC handover. This unit communicates with the Handover Control Procedures MSC-A via interface z. + +Switching functions: + +- 5) Switch and Handover Device MSC-A. For all calls, except for ongoing voice group calls (see 3GPP TS 43.068 [3] for a definition) this unit is responsible for connecting the new path into the network via interface B'. In the case of ongoing voice group calls this unit is responsible for maintaining the connection between the down link group call channels and the active uplink. In specific cases it may be unnecessary to take any explicit action in the MSC concerning the handover device. The handover device interconnections are illustrated in figure 2. + +![Figure 1: Functional composition of the controlling MSC (MSC-A) for supporting handover. The diagram shows two main functional blocks connected by a 'Switching control' interface. The top block, labeled 'Signalling functions', contains four sub-units: 1) BSC/MSC (MS/BSC) Procedures MSC-A, which connects to external interfaces A' and A''; 2) Call Control Procedures MSC-A, which connects to external interfaces B', B'', and B'''; 3) Handover Control Procedures MSC-A, which connects to interfaces x, y, and z; and 4) MAP Procedures MSC-A, which connects to interface C. The bottom block, labeled 'Switching functions', contains unit 5) Switch and Handover Device MSC-A, which connects to external interfaces A', A'', B', B'', and B'''. The internal interfaces are: x (between 1 and 3), y (between 2 and 3), z (between 3 and 4), and a 'Switching control' interface between the top and bottom blocks.](16c1175b5f05a4b55e6d396fc51b15b3_img.jpg) + +Figure 1: Functional composition of the controlling MSC (MSC-A) for supporting handover. The diagram shows two main functional blocks connected by a 'Switching control' interface. The top block, labeled 'Signalling functions', contains four sub-units: 1) BSC/MSC (MS/BSC) Procedures MSC-A, which connects to external interfaces A' and A''; 2) Call Control Procedures MSC-A, which connects to external interfaces B', B'', and B'''; 3) Handover Control Procedures MSC-A, which connects to interfaces x, y, and z; and 4) MAP Procedures MSC-A, which connects to interface C. The bottom block, labeled 'Switching functions', contains unit 5) Switch and Handover Device MSC-A, which connects to external interfaces A', A'', B', B'', and B'''. The internal interfaces are: x (between 1 and 3), y (between 2 and 3), z (between 3 and 4), and a 'Switching control' interface between the top and bottom blocks. + +**Figure 1: Functional composition of the controlling MSC (MSC-A) for supporting handover** + +For MS to MS calls in the same MSC the configuration in figure 2b applies. In this case interface B'' is internal to MSC-A and does not connect to another MSC. + +The handover device can either be a three-party bridge or a switching facility without three-party connection capabilities. For a three-party bridge configuration the states of the handover device are as shown in table 1. The three-party configuration exists in the intermediate state. This type of handover device may reduce the interruption time. However, this may require noise reduction if one of the radio channels is unterminated at some time in the intermediate state. + +For a handover device consisting of a simple switch there will be no intermediate state. + +**Table 1: States of the handover device** + +| Case | Initial Connection | Intermediate Connection | Resulting Connection | | +|------------|--------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------| +| | | | Successful Procedure | Unsuccessful Procedure | +| Figure 2a) | B' to A' | B' to A' and A'' | B' to A'' | B' to A' | +| Figure 2b) | B' to A' | B' to A' and B'' | B' to B'' | B' to A' | +| Figure 2c) | B' to B'' | B' to B'' and B''' | B' to B''' | B' to B'' | + +![Figure 2: Connections in the handover device (Unit 5). The figure contains three sub-diagrams: a) Intra- MSC Handover case, showing a connection from A' to B' being rerouted to A''; b) Basic Handover case and handover of MS to MS call in the same MSC, showing a connection from A' to B' being rerouted to B''; c) Subsequent Handover case, showing a connection from B' to B'' being rerouted to B'''.](9b6b5924b48bf2fd5f347f88f06f45b3_img.jpg) + +a) Intra- MSC Handover case. + +b) Basic Handover case and handover of MS to MS call in the same MSC. + +c) Subsequent Handover case + +Figure 2: Connections in the handover device (Unit 5). The figure contains three sub-diagrams: a) Intra- MSC Handover case, showing a connection from A' to B' being rerouted to A''; b) Basic Handover case and handover of MS to MS call in the same MSC, showing a connection from A' to B' being rerouted to B''; c) Subsequent Handover case, showing a connection from B' to B'' being rerouted to B'''. + +NOTE: In a) and b) A' is released after handover; +In c) B'' is released after handover. + +**Figure 2: Connections in the handover device (Unit 5)** + +## 4.2 MSC-B + +### 4.2.1 Role of MSC-B + +In the Intra- MSC-B handover cases (including "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" with AoIP), the MSC-B keeps the control of the whole Intra- MSC-B handover procedure. + +MSC-B notifies MSC-A or 3G\_ MSC-A of a successful Intra- MSC-B handover completion by using the A- HANDOVER-PERFORMED message. + +If AoIP is supported by MSC-B and BSS, then the BSS or the MSC-B may initiate a "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" as described in detail in subclause 6.3. + +The role of MSC-B is also to provide transcoder resources, if AoIP is supported and no transcoder is inserted in the BSS. + +In the Inter- MSC handover case, the role of MSC-B (MSC-B') is only to provide radio resources control within its area. This means that MSC-B keeps control of the radio resources connection and release towards BSS-B. MSC-B will do + +some processing on the BSSMAP information received on the E-interface or A-interface whereas it will relay the DTAP information transparently between A-interface and E-interface. MSC-A initiates and drives a subset of BSSMAP procedures towards MSC-B, while MSC-B controls them towards its BSSs to the extent that MSC-B is responsible for the connections of its BSSs. The release of the dedicated resources between MSC-B and BSS-B is under the responsibility of MSC-B and BSS-B, and is not directly controlled by MSC-A. When clearing is to be performed due to information received from BSS-B, MSC-B shall transfer this clearing indication to MSC-A, to clear its connection with BSS-B, to terminate the dialogue with MSC-A through the E-interface, and to release its circuit connection with MSC-A, if any. In the same way, the release of the connection to its BSS-B, is initiated by MSC-B, when the dialogue with MSC-A ends normally and a release is received from the circuit connection with MSC-A, if any, or when the dialogue with the MSC-A ends abnormally. + +When a release is received by MSC-B for the circuit connection with MSC-A then MSC-B shall release the circuit connection. + +In the Inter-system Inter- MSC handover case, the role of MSC-B (MSC-B') is only to provide radio resources control within its area. This means that MSC-B keeps control of the radio resources connection and release towards BSS-B. MSC-B will do some processing on the BSSMAP information received on the E-interface or A-interface whereas it will relay the DTAP information transparently between A-interface and E-interface. 3G\_MSC-A initiates and drives a subset of BSSMAP procedures towards MSC-B, while MSC-B controls them towards its BSSs to the extent that MSC-B is responsible for the connections of its BSSs. The release of the dedicated resources between MSC-B and BSS-B is under the responsibility of MSC-B and BSS-B, and is not directly controlled by 3G\_MSC-A. When clearing is to be performed due to information received from BSS-B, MSC-B shall transfer this clearing indication to 3G\_MSC-A, to clear its connection with BSS-B, to terminate the dialogue with 3G\_MSC-A through the E-interface, and to release its circuit connection with 3G\_MSC-A, if any. In the same way, the release of the connection to its BSS-B, is initiated by MSC-B, when the dialogue with 3G\_MSC-A ends normally and a release is received from the circuit connection with MSC-A, if any, or when the dialogue with the MSC-A ends abnormally. + +When a release is received by MSC-B for the circuit connection with 3G\_MSC-A then MSC-B shall release the circuit connection. + +For subsequent inter- MSC handover to an area where "Intra Domain Connection of RAN Nodes to Multiple CN Nodes" is applied, MSC-B can have multiple target CN nodes for each handover target in a pool-area as specified in 3GPP TS 23.236 [18]. + +MSC-B may support subsequent inter- MSC inter-system handover to a CSG cell. If MSC-B supports handover to a CSG cell, the serving BSS is served by MSC-B and provides a CSG ID for the target cell, and the call is not an emergency call, then MSC-B checks the CSG membership of the UE for the target cell using the CSG subscription data provided by the anchor MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-A during the basic inter- MSC handover before proceeding with the subsequent handover procedure. If there is no subscription data for this CSG ID or the CSG subscription for the CSG ID has expired, MSC-B considers the membership check as failed. + +NOTE 1: If MSC-B does not support CSG membership checking, and a CSG cell is configured as possible handover target, MSC-B will proceed with the subsequent handover to the CSG cell. If the CSG cell is not configured as possible handover target, MSC-B will not proceed with the handover. + +For subsequent handover of an emergency call to a CSG cell, MSC-B shall skip the CSG membership check and proceed with the handover procedure. + +For subsequent inter-PLMN handover to a CSG cell, if the anchor MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-A provided a CSG ID list for the target PLMN during the basic inter- MSC handover, MSC-B shall validate the CSG membership of the UE in the target CSG cell using the CSG ID list for the target PLMN. + +NOTE 2: Due to certain restrictions in the access stratum, inter-PLMN handover to a CSG cell in a PLMN which is not an equivalent PLMN for the UE is not supported; therefore, the target PLMN will always be an equivalent PLMN. + +If the anchor MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-A provided only a CSG ID list for the PLMN of MSC-B, then based on operator's configuration the MSC-B may allow the handover by validating the CSG membership of the UE in the target CSG cell using this CSG ID list. Otherwise, MSC-B shall reject the handover due to no CSG subscription information of the target PLMN-ID available. + +NOTE 3: If MSC-B uses the CSG ID list of the PLMN of MSC-B for membership validation, as the UE is using the CSG ID list of the equivalent PLMN, inter-PLMN handover to a CSG cell of an equivalent PLMN can only occur if the CSG ID of the cell is both in the CSG ID list of the PLMN of MSC-B which is used by MSC-B and in the CSG ID list of the equivalent PLMN which is used by the UE. If MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-A provided a CSG ID list for the target PLMN of the subsequent inter- MSC handover, this restriction does not apply. + +### 4.2.2 Functional composition of MSC-B and its interfaces for handover + +The functional composition of an MSC acting as MSC-B is essentially the same as that of MSC-A. However, there are some differences. The functional units are as follows (see figure 3). + +Signalling functions: + +- 1) BSC/MSC (MS/BSC) Procedures MSC-B. This unit is used to control the signalling between the MSC, BSC and MS. Interface A" is the connection to the new BSC, when an Intra- MSC handover takes place. Interface x represents the interworking connection to the Handover Control Procedures MSC-B. +- 2) Call Control Procedures MSC-B. This unit is used for normal call control and signalling to MSC-A, or 3G\_MSC-A in the case of inter-system inter- MSC handover. +- 3) Handover Control Procedures MSC-B. This unit provides both the overall control of the handover procedure and interworking between the internal interfaces (x, y and z) in MSC-B. +- 4) MAP Procedures MSC-B. This unit is responsible for controlling the exchange of MAP messages between MSC-A, or 3G\_MSC-A, and MSC-B and for signalling to the VLR in MSC-B. + +Switching functions: + +- 5) Switch MSC-B. For all calls, except ongoing voice group calls (see 3GPP TS 43.068 [3] for a definition) this unit is responsible, with BSS-B, for connecting the circuit from MSC-A, or 3G\_MSC-A, to BSS-B. This unit may also need to act as a handover device for Intra- MSC handovers controlled by MSC-B. In the case of ongoing voice group calls this unit is responsible for maintaining the connection between the group member currently assigned the uplink and the distribution device. In specific cases it may be unnecessary to take any explicit action in the MSC concerning the handover device. + +![Figure 3: Functional composition of MSC-B for supporting handover. The diagram shows two main functional blocks connected by a 'Switching control' interface. The top block, labeled 'Signalling functions', contains four sub-procedures: 1. BSC/MSC (MS/BSC) Procedures MSC-B, which connects to external interfaces A' and A''; 2. Call Control Procedures MSC-B, which connects to external interface B''; 3. Handover Control Procedures MSC-B, which connects to the 'Switching control' interface; and 4. MAP Procedures MSC-B, which connects to external interface C. The bottom block, labeled 'Switching functions', contains sub-procedure 5. Switch MSC-B, which connects to external interfaces A' and A'' on the left and B'' on the right. The 'Switching control' interface is a double-headed arrow between the top and bottom blocks. Internal connections are labeled x, y, and z: x connects sub-procedure 1 to 3; y connects sub-procedure 2 to 3; z connects sub-procedure 3 to 4.](4356776ca004ecba5d599667a155d7d4_img.jpg) + +Figure 3: Functional composition of MSC-B for supporting handover. The diagram shows two main functional blocks connected by a 'Switching control' interface. The top block, labeled 'Signalling functions', contains four sub-procedures: 1. BSC/MSC (MS/BSC) Procedures MSC-B, which connects to external interfaces A' and A''; 2. Call Control Procedures MSC-B, which connects to external interface B''; 3. Handover Control Procedures MSC-B, which connects to the 'Switching control' interface; and 4. MAP Procedures MSC-B, which connects to external interface C. The bottom block, labeled 'Switching functions', contains sub-procedure 5. Switch MSC-B, which connects to external interfaces A' and A'' on the left and B'' on the right. The 'Switching control' interface is a double-headed arrow between the top and bottom blocks. Internal connections are labeled x, y, and z: x connects sub-procedure 1 to 3; y connects sub-procedure 2 to 3; z connects sub-procedure 3 to 4. + +**Figure 3: Functional composition of MSC-B for supporting handover** + +## 4.3 3G\_MSC-A + +For roles and functional composition of the 3G\_MSC-A working as pure GSM MSC, please see previous clause ("MSC-A"). + +### 4.3.1 Role of 3G\_MSC-A + +In the Intra-3G\_MSC-A handover/relocation case, 3G\_MSC-A controls the call, the mobility management and the radio resources before, during and after an Intra-3G\_MSC-A handover/relocation. When RANAP or BSSMAP procedures have to be performed, they are initiated and driven by 3G\_MSC-A. + +In a network implementing the "Flexible Iu interface for handover/relocation" option, 3G\_MSC-A may optionally use a global title based on the Global RNC-Id for the addressing of the Iu interface messages towards the target RNC. + +For handover/relocation to an area where "Intra Domain Connection of RAN Nodes to Multiple CN Nodes" is applied, 3G\_MSC-A can have multiple target CN nodes for each handover/relocation target in a pool-area as specified in 3GPP TS 23.236 [18]. + +In the case of intra-3G\_MSC-A handover of a speech call, 3G\_MSC-A controls the transcoder in the core network. The 3G\_MSC-A determines, if a transcoder is required to be inserted or released in the CN. + +If AoIP is supported by 3G\_MSC-A and BSS, then the BSS or the 3G\_MSC-A may initiate a "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" as described in detail in subclause 6.3. + +In the case of Inter-3G\_MSC relocation, 3G\_MSC-A links out the transcoder. + +In the Inter-3G\_MSC relocation case, 3G\_MSC-A is the 3G\_MSC that controls the call and the mobility management of the UE during the call, before, during and after a basic or subsequent relocation. When RANAP procedures related to + +dedicated resources have to be performed towards the UE, they are initiated and driven by 3G\_MSC-A. The 3G\_MSC-A - 3G\_MSC-B interface works as a 3G\_MSC - RNS interface for the RANAP procedures. The Direct Transfer signalling is relayed transparently by 3G\_MSC-B between 3G\_MSC-A and the UE. + +During a successful relocation the order to perform location reporting at change of Service Area is not transferred to the target RNS. In the Intra-3G\_MSC-A relocation case, the 3G\_MSC-A re-issues the Location Reporting Control towards the target RNS. In the Inter-3G\_MSC relocation case, 3G\_MSC-A keeps the control of the Location Report Control procedure. However, re-issuing the Iu-LOCATION-REPORTING-CONTROL messages due to subsequent Intra-3G\_MSC-B relocations is the responsibility of 3G\_MSC-B. + +During a basic relocation, 3G\_MSC-A initiates and controls all the relocation procedure, from its initiation (reception of Relocation Required from RNS-A on Iu-interface) until its completion (reception of Relocation Complete from 3G\_MSC-B on E-interface). + +During a subsequent relocation back to 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-A acts as an RNS towards 3G\_MSC-B, which controls the relocation procedure until the termination in 3G\_MSC-A of the handover radio resources allocation (sending of the Relocation Request Acknowledge to 3G\_MSC-B from 3G\_MSC-A). Then all relocation related messages shall terminate at 3G\_MSC-A (e.g. Relocation Detect/Complete from RNS-B, Relocation Cancel from RNS-A). + +During a subsequent relocation to a third 3G\_MSC-B', 3G\_MSC-A works towards 3G\_MSC-B' as described above in the basic relocation paragraph and towards 3G\_MSC-B as described above in subsequent relocation paragraph. + +In the Inter-System, inter-3G\_MSC handover case, 3G\_MSC-A is the 3G\_MSC which controls the call and the mobility management of the UE/MS during the call, before, during and after a basic or subsequent inter-system handover. When BSSAP procedures related to dedicated resources have to be performed towards the UE/MS, they are initiated and driven by 3G\_MSC-A. The 3G\_MSC-A – MSC-B interface works as a 3G\_MSC – BSS interface for a subset of BSSMAP procedures. These BSSMAP procedures described in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] are those related to dedicated resources. The DTAP signalling is relayed transparently by MSC-B between 3G\_MSC-A and the UE/MS. + +During a basic inter-system UMTS to GSM handover, 3G\_MSC-A initiates and controls all the handover procedure, from its initiation (reception of Relocation Required from RNS-A on Iu-interface) until its completion (reception of Handover Complete from MSC-B on E-interface). + +During a subsequent inter-system UMTS to GSM handover back to 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-A acts as a BSS towards 3G\_MSC-B, which controls the handover procedure until the termination in 3G\_MSC-A of the handover radio resources allocation (sending of the Handover Request Acknowledge to 3G\_MSC-B from 3G\_MSC-A). Then all handover related messages shall terminate at 3G\_MSC-A (e.g. Handover Detect/Complete from BSS-B, Relocation Cancel from RNS-A). + +During a subsequent inter-system UMTS to GSM handover to a third 3G\_MSC, 3G\_MSC-A works towards MSC-B' as described above in the basic inter-system handover paragraph and towards 3G\_MSC-B as described above in subsequent inter-system handover paragraph. + +During a basic inter-system GSM to UMTS handover, 3G\_MSC-A initiates and controls all the handover procedure, from its initiation (reception of Handover Required from BSS-A on A-interface) until its completion (reception of Handover Complete from 3G\_MSC-B on E-interface). + +During a subsequent inter-system GSM to UMTS handover back to 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-A acts as an RNS towards MSC-B, which controls the handover procedure until the termination in 3G\_MSC-A of the handover radio resources allocation (sending of the Handover Request Acknowledge to MSC-B from 3G\_MSC-A). Then all handover related messages shall terminate at 3G\_MSC-A (e.g. Relocation Detect/Complete from RNS-B, Handover Failure from BSS-A). + +During a subsequent inter-system GSM to UMTS handover to a third 3G\_MSC, 3G\_MSC-A works towards 3G\_MSC-B' as described above in the basic inter-system handover paragraph and towards MSC-B as described above in subsequent inter-system handover paragraph. + +3G\_MSC-A may assign a priority level defined as RAB parameter in 3GPP TS 25.413 [11] for each bearer. In case of relocation of a multicall configuration the 3G\_MSC-B or the target RNC shall select the bearers to be handed over according to the priority level, if the target cell is not able to accommodate all bearers. If a selection has to be made between bearers of the same priority level, then the selection criteria are implementation dependent. + +For network sharing (see 3GPP TS 25.401 [20], subclause 7.2.3) 3G\_MSC-A shall send the SNA information to 3G\_MSC-B except for emergency calls. + +If 3G\_MSC-A supports the optional supplementary service Multicall (See 3GPP TS 23.135 [17]) and UE is engaged with multiple bearers the following description applies: + +- In the Intra-3G\_MSC relocation case, the 3G-MSC-A tries to relocate all bearers to a new RNS. +- In the basic relocation case, the 3G-MSC-A tries to relocate all bearers to 3G\_MSC-B. If 3G\_MSC-A receives an indication that the 3G\_MSC-B does not support multiple bearers, then 3G\_MSC-A shall be able to select one bearer to be handed over according to 3GPP TS 22.129 [9] and tries again to relocate the selected bearer. +- In the subsequent relocation to a third 3G\_MSC-B' case, the 3G-MSC-A tries to relocate all bearers to 3G\_MSC-B'. If 3G\_MSC-A receives an indication that the 3G\_MSC-B' does not support multiple bearers, then 3G\_MSC-A shall be able to select one bearer to be handed over according to 3GPP TS 22.129 [9] and tries again to relocate the selected bearer. +- In the Intra-3G\_MSC inter-system UMTS to GSM handover case and the basic inter-system UMTS to GSM handover case, the 3G\_MSC-A shall be able to select one bearer to be handed over according to 3GPP TS 22.129 [9] and tries to handover the selected bearer. +- In all cases described above, 3G\_MSC-A shall release some calls which has been carried by the bearers failed to set up in new RNS or the bearers not to be handed over. + +If 3G\_MSC-A supports the "Provision of UE Specific Behaviour Information to Network Entities" (see 3GPP TS 23.195 [21]), it shall send UESBI-Iu to the RNS-B during intra-3G\_MSC handover/relocation and during subsequent inter-3G\_MSC handover/relocation back to 3G\_MSC-A. Furthermore, 3G\_MSC-A shall send UESBI-Iu to the target MSC during basic and subsequent inter-MSC handover, and basic and subsequent inter-3G\_MSC handover/relocation. + +For a SCUDIF call (see 3GPP TS 23.172 [22]) 3G\_MSC-A may send information of the alternative radio access bearer to the target RNS during the intra-3G\_MSC handover/relocation and to the target MSC during basic and subsequent inter-3G\_MSC handover/relocation or assignment. + +3G\_MSC-A may support inter-system handover or SRNS relocation to a CSG cell. If 3G\_MSC-A supports handover/relocation to a CSG cell, the serving BSS or RNS is served by 3G\_MSC-A and provides a CSG ID for the target cell, and the call is not an emergency call, then 3G\_MSC-A checks the CSG membership of the UE for the target cell using the CSG subscription data provided by the HLR or the CSS before proceeding with the handover/relocation procedure. If there is no subscription data for this CSG ID or the CSG subscription for the CSG ID has expired, the 3G\_MSC-A considers the membership check as failed. If for a specific PLMN-ID the same CSG ID exists in both CSS subscription data and HLR subscription data, the CSG subscription data from the HLR shall take precedence over the data from CSS. + +NOTE 1: If 3G\_MSC-A does not support CSG membership checking, and a CSG cell is configured as possible handover target, 3G\_MSC-A will proceed with the handover/relocation to the CSG cell; if the CSG cell is not configured as possible handover target, 3G\_MSC-A will not proceed with the handover/relocation. + +For handover of an emergency call to a CSG cell, 3G\_MSC-A shall skip the CSG membership check and proceed with the handover/relocation procedure. + +For inter-PLMN handover/relocation to a CSG cell, if the HLR or the CSS provided a CSG ID list for the target PLMN, 3G\_MSC-A shall validate the CSG membership of the UE in the target CSG cell using the CSG ID list for the target PLMN. + +NOTE 2: Due to certain restrictions in the access stratum, inter-PLMN handover to a CSG cell in a PLMN which is not an equivalent PLMN for the UE is not supported; therefore, the target PLMN will always be an equivalent PLMN. + +If the HLR did not provide any CSG ID lists for the equivalent PLMNs, then based on operator's configuration the 3G\_MSC-A may allow the handover/relocation by validating the CSG membership of the UE in the target CSG cell using the CSG ID list of the registered PLMN-ID. Otherwise, 3G\_MSC-A shall reject the handover/relocation due to no CSG subscription information of the target PLMN-ID available. + +NOTE 3: If 3G\_MSC-A uses the CSG ID list of the registered PLMN-ID for membership validation, as the UE is using the CSG ID list of the equivalent PLMN, inter-PLMN handover to a CSG cell of an equivalent PLMN can only occur if the CSG ID of the cell is both in the CSG ID list of the registered PLMN used by 3G\_MSC-A and in the CSG ID list of the equivalent PLMN used by the UE. If the HLR provided CSG ID lists for the equivalent PLMNs, this restriction does not apply. + +For subsequent inter-MSC handover/relocation back to 3G\_MSC-A or to a third 3G\_MSC-B', if MSC-B/3G\_MSC-B belongs to a different PLMN than 3G\_MSC-A, then as an operator option MSC-A may perform an additional CSG membership check for the target cell. + +### 4.3.2 Functional composition of 3G\_MSC-A and its interfaces for handover/relocation + +In order to simplify the description of the handover/relocation procedures the controlling 3G\_MSC (3G\_MSC-A) can be considered to be composed of five functional units, as shown in figure 4. + +Signalling functions: + +- 1) RNC/BSC/3G\_MSC (UE/MS/RNC/BSC) Procedures 3G\_MSC-A. This unit is used to control the signalling between the 3G\_MSC, RNC or BSC and UE/MS. Interface Iu' is the connection to the old RNC and interface Iu'' is the connection to the new RNC, when an Intra-3G\_MSC relocation takes place. Interface Iu' is the connection to the old RNC and interface A'' is the connection to the new BSC, when an Intra-3G\_MSC UMTS to GSM handover takes place. Interface A' is the connection to the old BSC and interface Iu'' is the connection to the new RNC, when an Intra-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS handover takes place. Interface x represents the interworking connection to the Handover/Relocation Control Procedures 3G\_MSC-A. +- 2) Call Control Procedures 3G\_MSC-A. This unit is used to control the call. Interface B' is used for normal call control procedures. When a Basic relocation from 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B is to be performed then interface B'' is employed to provide a signalling and call control connection to 3G\_MSC-B. If a Subsequent handover/relocation to 3G\_MSC-B' is to be performed then interface B''' is used. Similarly, when a Basic inter-system handover from 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B is to be performed, then interface B'' is employed to provide a signalling and call control connection to 3G\_MSC-B. If a Subsequent inter-system handover to 3G\_MSC-B' is to be performed then interface B''' is used. +- 3) Handover/Relocation Control Procedures 3G\_MSC-A. This unit provides both the overall control of the handover/relocation procedure and interworking between the internal interfaces (x, y and z). +- 4) MAP Procedures 3G\_MSC-A. This unit is responsible for controlling the exchange of MAP messages between 3G\_MSCs during an Inter-3G\_MSC handover/relocation, or between 3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B during an Inter-system Inter-3G\_MSC handover. This unit communicates with the Handover/Relocation Control Procedures 3G\_MSC-A via interface z. + +Switching functions: + +- 5) Switch and Handover/Relocation Device 3G\_MSC-A. For all calls this unit is responsible for connecting the new path into the network via interface B'. In specific cases it may be unnecessary to take any explicit action in the 3G\_MSC concerning the handover/relocation device. The handover/relocation device interconnections are illustrated in figure 5. + +![Figure 4: Functional composition of the controlling 3G_MSC (3G_MSC-A) for supporting handover/relocation. The diagram shows two main functional blocks connected by a 'Switching control' interface. The top block, labeled 'Signalling functions', contains four sub-procedures: 1. RNC/BSC/3G_MSC (UE/MS/RNC/BSC) Procedures, 2. Call Control Procedures 3G_MSC-A, 3. HO/Rel Control Procedures 3G_MSC-A, and 4. MAP Procedures 3G_MSC-A. These are interconnected by interfaces x, y, and z. External interfaces include Iu'/A' and Iu''/A'' on the left, and B', B'', B''', and C on the right. The bottom block, labeled 'Switching functions', contains sub-procedure 5: Switch and HO/Rel Device 3G_MSC-A. It has external interfaces Iu'/A' and Iu''/A'' on the left, and B', B'', and B''' on the right.](e180f2b5fcbe8001554a7c0677cd3f82_img.jpg) + +Figure 4: Functional composition of the controlling 3G\_MSC (3G\_MSC-A) for supporting handover/relocation. The diagram shows two main functional blocks connected by a 'Switching control' interface. The top block, labeled 'Signalling functions', contains four sub-procedures: 1. RNC/BSC/3G\_MSC (UE/MS/RNC/BSC) Procedures, 2. Call Control Procedures 3G\_MSC-A, 3. HO/Rel Control Procedures 3G\_MSC-A, and 4. MAP Procedures 3G\_MSC-A. These are interconnected by interfaces x, y, and z. External interfaces include Iu'/A' and Iu''/A'' on the left, and B', B'', B''', and C on the right. The bottom block, labeled 'Switching functions', contains sub-procedure 5: Switch and HO/Rel Device 3G\_MSC-A. It has external interfaces Iu'/A' and Iu''/A'' on the left, and B', B'', and B''' on the right. + +**Figure 4: Functional composition of the controlling 3G\_MSC (3G\_MSC-A) for supporting handover/relocation** + +For UE/MS to UE/MS calls in the same 3G\_MSC the configuration in figure 5b applies. In this case interface B'' is internal to 3G\_MSC-A and does not connect to another 3G\_MSC. + +The handover/relocation device can be either a three-party bridge or a switching facility without three-party connection capabilities. For a three-party bridge configuration the states of the handover/relocation device are as shown in table 2. The three-party configuration exists in the intermediate state. This type of handover/relocation device may reduce the interruption time. However, this may require noise reduction if one of the radio channels is unterminated at some time in the intermediate state. + +For a handover/relocation device consisting of a simple switch there will be no intermediate state. + +**Table 2: States of the handover/relocation device** + +| Case | Initial Connection | Intermediate Connection | Resulting Connection | | +|------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------| +| | | | Successful Procedure | Unsuccessful Procedure | +| Figure 5a) | B' to Iu'
B' to Iu'
B' to A' | B' to Iu' and Iu''
B' to Iu' and A''
B' to A' and Iu'' | B' to Iu''
B' to A''
B' to Iu'' | B' to Iu'
B' to Iu'
B' to A' | +| Figure 5b) | B' to Iu' | B' to Iu' and B'' | B' to B'' | B' to Iu' | +| Figure 5c) | B' to B'' | B' to B'' and B''' | B' to B''' | B' to B'' | + +![Figure 5: Connections in the handover/relocation device (Unit 5). The figure contains three sequence diagrams labeled a), b), and c). Diagram a) shows an intra-3G_MSC handover where a UE moves from Iu'/A' to Iu''/A' while connected to B'. Diagram b) shows a basic handover where a UE moves from Iu' to B'' while connected to B'. Diagram c) shows a subsequent handover where a UE moves from B' to B''' while connected to B''.](eb03559a4d92ea9ebd63ea9be663c50a_img.jpg) + +a) Intra-3G\_MSC Handover/Relocation case. + +b) Basic Handover/Relocation case and handover/relocation of UE/MS to UE/MS call in the same 3G\_MSC. + +c) Subsequent Handover/Relocation case + +Figure 5: Connections in the handover/relocation device (Unit 5). The figure contains three sequence diagrams labeled a), b), and c). Diagram a) shows an intra-3G\_MSC handover where a UE moves from Iu'/A' to Iu''/A' while connected to B'. Diagram b) shows a basic handover where a UE moves from Iu' to B'' while connected to B'. Diagram c) shows a subsequent handover where a UE moves from B' to B''' while connected to B''. + +NOTE: In a) and b) Iu' is released after handover/relocation; +In c) B'' is released after handover/relocation. + +**Figure 5: Connections in the handover/relocation device (Unit 5)** + +## 4.4 3G\_MSC-B + +For roles and functional composition of the 3G\_MSC-B working as pure GSM MSC, please see previous clause ("MSC-B"). + +### 4.4.1 Role of 3G\_MSC-B + +In the Intra-3G\_MSC-B handover/relocation case, the 3G\_MSC-B keeps the control of the whole Intra-3G\_MSC-B handover/relocation procedure. 3G\_MSC-B notifies MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-A of intra-3G\_MSC-B InterSystem handover and intra GSM handovers (including "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support"), by using the A-HANDOVER-PERFORMED message. + +- If the security algorithms have been changed during an intra-3G\_MSC-B SRNS relocation; or +- if the codec type or codec modes of the Iu Selected codec have been changed during this relocation and the Iu Supported Codecs List was received by 3G\_MSC-B before, + +then 3G\_MSC-B shall indicate the changed parameters, i.e. the selected UMTS algorithm(s) and/or the codec type and codec modes of the Iu Selected codec, to MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-A in the MAP-PROCESS-ACCESS-SIGNALLING request. + +Encapsulated in the MAP-PROCESS-ACCESS-SIGNALLING request 3G\_MSC-B shall send: + +- an A-HANDOVER-PERFORMED message, when encapsulated BSSAP is used on the E interface; or +- an Iu-LOCATION-REPORT message, when encapsulated RANAP is used on the E interface. + +On reception of an order to perform location reporting at change of Service Area from 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B shall be responsible to re-issue the Iu-LOCATION-REPORTING-CONTROL message after subsequent Intra-3G\_MSC-B relocations/handovers. This shall be performed immediately after the successful completion of the Relocation Resource Allocation procedure. + +In a network implementing the "Flexible Iu interface for handover/relocation" option, in the Intra-3G\_MSC handover/relocation case, 3G\_MSC-B may optionally use a global title based on the Global RNC-Id for the addressing of the Iu interface messages towards the target RNC. + +If AoIP is supported by 3G\_MSC-B and BSS, then the BSS or the 3G\_MSC-B may initiate a "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" as described in detail in subclause 6.3. + +If AoIP is supported and no transcoder is inserted in the BSS, then 3G\_MSC-B shall provide transcoder resources. + +For subsequent inter- MSC handover/relocation to an area where "Intra Domain Connection of RAN Nodes to Multiple CN Nodes" is applied, 3G\_MSC-B can have multiple target CN nodes for each handover target in a pool-area as specified in 3GPP TS 23.236 [18]. + +The role of 3G\_MSC-B is also to provide transcoder resources. For speech calls in UMTS, 3G\_MSC-B shall select an Iu Selected codec from the Iu Supported Codecs List provided by MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. If the Iu Supported Codecs List was not received or 3G\_MSC-B does not support the selection of codec based on the Iu-Supported Codecs List, 3G\_MSC-B shall select the appropriate default speech codec. + +If an intra-3G\_MSC-B intersystem handover to UMTS is performed, the Iu Supported Codecs List was received by 3G\_MSC-B during the basic inter MSC handover/relocation procedure and 3G\_MSC-B supports the selection of codec based on the Iu-Supported Codecs List, then 3G\_MSC-B shall indicate the Iu Selected codec to MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-A in MAP-PROCESS-ACCESS-SIGNALLING request. + +In the Inter-3G\_MSC relocation case, the role of 3G\_MSC-B (3G\_MSC-B') is only to provide radio resources control within its area. This means that 3G\_MSC-B keeps control of the radio resources connection and release towards RNS-B. 3G\_MSC-B will do some processing on the RANAP information received on the E-interface or the RANAP information received on the Iu-interface whereas it will relay the Direct Transfer information transparently between Iu-interface and E-interface. 3G\_MSC-A initiates and drives RANAP procedures towards 3G\_MSC-B, while 3G\_MSC-B controls them towards its RNSs to the extent that 3G\_MSC-B is responsible for the connections of its RNSs. The release of the dedicated resources between 3G\_MSC-B and RNS-B is under the responsibility of 3G\_MSC-B and RNS-B, and is not directly controlled by 3G\_MSC-A. When clearing is to be performed due to information received from RNS-B, 3G\_MSC-B shall transfer this clearing indication to 3G\_MSC-A, to clear its connection with RNS-B, to terminate the dialogue with 3G\_MSC-A through the E-interface, and to release its circuit connection with 3G\_MSC-A, if any. In the same way, the release of the connection to its RNS-B, is initiated by 3G\_MSC-B, when the dialogue with 3G\_MSC-A ends normally and a release is received from the circuit connection with 3G\_MSC-A, if any, or when the dialogue with the 3G\_MSC-A ends abnormally. + +When a release is received by 3G\_MSC-B for the circuit connection with 3G\_MSC-A then 3G\_MSC-B shall release the circuit connection. + +In the Inter-system UMTS to GSM Inter-3G\_MSC handover case, the role of 3G\_MSC-B (3G\_MSC-B') is only to provide radio resources control within its area. This means that 3G\_MSC-B keeps control of the radio resources connection and release towards BSS-B. 3G\_MSC-B will do some processing on the BSSMAP information received on the E-interface or the BSSMAP information received on the A-interface whereas it will relay the DTAP information transparently between A-interface and E-interface. 3G\_MSC-A initiates and drives a subset of BSSMAP procedures towards 3G\_MSC-B, while 3G\_MSC-B controls them towards its BSSs to the extent that 3G\_MSC-B is responsible for the connections of its BSSs. The release of the dedicated resources between 3G\_MSC-B and BSS-B is under the responsibility of 3G\_MSC-B and BSS-B, and is not directly controlled by 3G\_MSC-A. When clearing is to be performed due to information received from BSS-B, 3G\_MSC-B shall transfer this clearing indication to 3G\_MSC-A, to clear its connection with BSS-B, to terminate the dialogue with 3G\_MSC-A through the E-interface, and to release its circuit connection with MSC-A, if any. In the same way, the release of the connection to its BSS-B, is initiated by 3G\_MSC-B, when the dialogue with 3G\_MSC-A ends normally and a release is received from the circuit connection with 3G\_MSC-A, if any, or when the dialogue with the MSC-A ends abnormally. + +When a release is received by 3G\_MSC-B for the circuit connection with 3G\_MSC-A then 3G\_MSC-B shall release the circuit connection. + +In the Inter-system GSM to UMTS Inter-3G\_MSC handover case, the role of 3G\_MSC-B (3G\_MSC-B') is only to provide radio resources control within its area. This means that 3G\_MSC-B keeps control of the radio resources connection and release towards RNS-B. 3G\_MSC-B will do some processing on the BSSMAP information received on the E-interface or the RANAP information received on the Iu-interface whereas it will relay the Direct Transfer information transparently between Iu-interface and E-interface. MSC-A initiates and drives a subset of BSSMAP procedures towards 3G\_MSC-B, while 3G\_MSC-B controls them towards its RNSs to the extent that 3G\_MSC-B is responsible for the connections of its RNSs. The release of the dedicated resources between 3G\_MSC-B and RNS-B is + +under the responsibility of 3G\_MSC-B and RNS-B, and is not directly controlled by MSC-A. When clearing is to be performed due to information received from RNS-B, 3G\_MSC-B shall transfer this clearing indication to MSC-A, to clear its connection with RNS-B, to terminate the dialogue with MSC-A through the E-interface, and to release its circuit connection with MSC-A, if any. In the same way, the release of the connection to its RNS-B, is initiated by 3G\_MSC-B, when the dialogue with MSC-A ends normally and a release is received from the circuit connection with MSC-A, if any, or when the dialogue with the MSC-A ends abnormally. + +When a release is received by 3G\_MSC-B for the circuit connection with MSC-A then 3G\_MSC-B shall release the circuit connection. + +At intra-PLMN handover/relocation, 3G\_MSC-B shall send Service Handover related information to the BSC/RNC if and only if this Service Handover information is received from 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-B shall not modify Service Handover related information received from a 3G\_MSC-A within the same PLMN. + +For network sharing (see 3GPP TS 25.401 [20], subclause 7.2.3) when SNA information is received by 3G\_MSC-B from 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B shall send the SNA information to the RNS. + +If 3G\_MSC-B does not support the optional supplementary service Multicall (see 3GPP TS 23.135 [17]) and 3G\_MSC-A requests to relocate multiple bearers, 3G\_MSC-B shall indicate that it does not support multiple bearers to 3G\_MSC-A. + +If 3G\_MSC-B supports the optional supplementary service Multicall (see 3GPP TS 23.135 [17]) and UE is engaged with multiple bearers the following description applies: + +- In the basic relocation case, the 3G\_MSC-B shall be able to allocate a Handover Number for each bearer. The 3G\_MSC-B shall also be able to select some bearers to be handed over according to the priority level defined as RAB parameters in 3GPP TS 25.413 [11] so that the number of bearers will fulfill the maximum number of bearers supported by the 3G\_MSC-B. If a selection has to be made between bearers of the same priority level, then the selection criteria are implementation dependent. +- In the Intra-3G\_MSC relocation case, the 3G\_MSC-B tries to relocate all bearers to a new RNS. +- In the subsequent relocation back to the 3G\_MSC-A or to a third 3G\_MSC-B' case, the 3G\_MSC-B tries to request to the 3G\_MSC-A to relocate all bearers to the 3G\_MSC-A or to the 3G\_MSC-B'. +- In the Intra-3G\_MSC inter-system UMTS to GSM handover case and the subsequent inter-system UMTS to GSM handover back to the 3G\_MSC-A or to a third MSC-B' case, the 3G\_MSC-B shall be able to select one bearer to be handed over according to 3GPP TS 22.129 [9] and tries to handover the selected bearer. + +If 3G\_MSC-B supports the "Provision of UE Specific Behaviour Information to Network Entities" (see 3GPP TS 23.195 [21]), and if it received UESBI-Iu from MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-A during the basic inter- MSC handover/relocation, then 3G\_MSC-B shall store the UESBI-Iu and forward it to RNS-B during basic inter- MSC handover/relocation and subsequent intra-3G\_MSC-B handover/relocation. + +If 3G\_MSC-B supports SCUDIF calls (see 3GPP TS 23.172 [22]), and if it received information of alternative radio access bearer from 3G\_MSC-A during the basic inter- MSC handover/relocation or assignment, then 3G\_MSC-B shall store that information and forward it to RNS-B during basic inter- MSC handover/relocation or assignment and subsequent intra-3G\_MSC-B handover/relocation. + +3G\_MSC-B may support subsequent inter-system handover or SRNS relocation to a CSG cell. If 3G\_MSC-B supports handover/relocation to a CSG cell, the serving BSS or RNS is served by 3G\_MSC-B and provides a CSG ID for the target cell, and the call is not an emergency call, then 3G\_MSC-B checks the CSG membership of the UE for the target cell using the CSG subscription data provided by the anchor MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-A during the basic inter- MSC handover/relocation before proceeding with the subsequent handover/relocation procedure. If there is no subscription data for this CSG ID or the CSG subscription for the CSG ID has expired, 3G\_MSC-B considers the membership check as failed. + +NOTE 1: If 3G\_MSC-B does not support CSG membership checking, and a CSG cell is configured as possible handover target, 3G\_MSC-B will proceed with the subsequent handover to the CSG cell. If the CSG cell is not configured as possible handover target, 3G\_MSC-B will not proceed with the handover. + +For subsequent handover/relocation of an emergency call to a CSG cell, 3G\_MSC-B shall skip the CSG membership check and proceed with the handover/relocation procedure. + +For subsequent inter-PLMN handover/relocation to a CSG cell, if the anchor MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-A provided a CSG ID list for the target PLMN during the basic inter- MSC handover/relocation, 3G\_MSC-B shall validate the CSG membership of the UE in the target CSG cell using the CSG ID list for the target PLMN. + +NOTE 2: Due to certain restrictions in the access stratum, inter-PLMN handover to a CSG cell in a PLMN which is not an equivalent PLMN for the UE is not supported; therefore, the target PLMN will always be an equivalent PLMN. + +Based on operator's configuration, if the anchor MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-A provided only a CSG ID list for the PLMN of 3G\_MSC-B, the 3G\_MSC-B may allow the handover/relocation by validating the CSG membership of the UE in the target CSG cell using this CSG ID list. Otherwise, 3G\_MSC-B shall reject the handover/relocation due to no CSG subscription information of the target PLMN-ID available. + +NOTE 3: If 3G\_MSC-B uses the CSG ID list of the PLMN of 3G\_MSC-B for membership validation, as the UE is using the CSG ID list of the equivalent PLMN, inter-PLMN handover to a CSG cell of an equivalent PLMN can only occur if the CSG ID of the cell is both in the CSG ID list of the PLMN of 3G\_MSC-B which is used by 3G\_MSC-B and in the CSG ID list of the equivalent PLMN which is used by the UE. If MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-A provided a CSG ID list for the target PLMN of the subsequent inter- MSC handover, this restriction does not apply. + +### 4.4.2 Functional composition of 3G\_MSC-B and its interfaces for handover/relocation + +The functional composition of a 3G\_MSC acting as 3G\_MSC-B is essentially the same as that of 3G\_MSC-A. However, there are some differences. The functional units are as follows (see figure 6). + +Signalling functions: + +- 1) RNC/BSC/3G\_MSC (UE/MS/RNC/BSC) Procedures 3G\_MSC-B. This unit is used to control the signalling between the 3G\_MSC, RNC, BSC and UE/MS. Interface Iu' is the connection to the old RNC and interface Iu" is the connection to the new RNC, when an Intra-3G\_MSC relocation takes place. Interface Iu' is the connection to the old RNC and interface A" is the connection to the new BSC, when an Intra-3G\_MSC UMTS to GSM handover takes place. Interface A' is the connection to the old BSC and interface Iu" is the connection to the new RNC, when an Intra-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS handover takes place. Interface x represents the interworking connection to the Handover/Relocation Control Procedures 3G\_MSC-B. +- 2) Call Control Procedures 3G\_MSC-B. This unit is used for normal call control and signalling to 3G\_MSC-A or MSC-A in the case of inter-system inter-3G\_MSC handover. +- 3) Handover/Relocation Control Procedures 3G\_MSC-B. This unit provides both the overall control of the handover/relocation procedure and interworking between the internal interfaces (x, y and z) in 3G\_MSC-B. +- 4) MAP Procedures 3G\_MSC-B. This unit is responsible for controlling the exchange of MAP messages between 3G\_MSC-A, or MSC-A, and 3G\_MSC-B and for signalling to the VLR in 3G\_MSC-B. + +Switching functions: + +- 5) Switch 3G\_MSC-B. For all calls this unit is responsible, with RNS-B, for connecting the circuit from 3G\_MSC-A, or MSC-A, to RNS-B. This unit may also need to act as a handover/relocation device for Intra-3G\_MSC handovers/relocation controlled by 3G\_MSC-B. In specific cases it may be unnecessary to take any explicit action in the 3G\_MSC concerning the handover/relocation device. + +![Figure 6: Functional composition of 3G_MSC-B for supporting handover/relocation. The diagram shows two main functional blocks. The top block, labeled 'Signalling functions', contains four sub-functions: 1) RNC/BSC/3G_MSC (UE/MS/RNC/BSC) Procedures, which connects to external interfaces Iu'/A' and Iu''/A''; 2) Call Control Procedures 3G_MSC-B, which connects to external interface B''; 3) HO/Rel Control Procedures 3G_MSC-B, which connects to external interface y; and 4) MAP Procedures 3G_MSC-B, which connects to external interface C. The bottom block, labeled 'Switching functions', contains sub-function 5) Switch 3G_MSC-B, which connects to external interfaces Iu'/A', Iu''/A'', and B''. A double-headed arrow labeled 'Switching control' connects the top and bottom blocks. Internal connections between sub-functions are marked with x, y, and z.](2ae3eae1bd80a90f192f568ae246a9a6_img.jpg) + +Figure 6: Functional composition of 3G\_MSC-B for supporting handover/relocation. The diagram shows two main functional blocks. The top block, labeled 'Signalling functions', contains four sub-functions: 1) RNC/BSC/3G\_MSC (UE/MS/RNC/BSC) Procedures, which connects to external interfaces Iu'/A' and Iu''/A''; 2) Call Control Procedures 3G\_MSC-B, which connects to external interface B''; 3) HO/Rel Control Procedures 3G\_MSC-B, which connects to external interface y; and 4) MAP Procedures 3G\_MSC-B, which connects to external interface C. The bottom block, labeled 'Switching functions', contains sub-function 5) Switch 3G\_MSC-B, which connects to external interfaces Iu'/A', Iu''/A'', and B''. A double-headed arrow labeled 'Switching control' connects the top and bottom blocks. Internal connections between sub-functions are marked with x, y, and z. + +Figure 6: Functional composition of 3G\_MSC-B for supporting handover/relocation + +## 4.5 MSC server enhanced for SRVCC features + +### 4.5.1 Role of SRVCC MSC + +SRVCC MSC takes the roles of 3G\_MSC-A as defined in subclause 4.3.1 with the following modification for an SRVCC handover: + +- During a SRVCC handover, SRVCC MSC initiates and controls all the Circuit Switch handover procedure, from its initiation (i.e., reception of SRVCC PS to CS Request via the Sv-interface as defined in 3GPP TS 29.280 [27] from MME) until its completion (i.e., reception of Relocation/Handover Complete from 3G\_MSC-B or MSC-B on E-interface or from RANAP or BSSMAP procedure if the target access network is connected via the same SRVCC MSC); +- Call flows on the interaction between Sv signalling and the handover signalling with the target network by SRVCC MSC is defined in 3GPP TS 23.216 [26]; +- SRVCC MSC initiates a normal call setup procedure to SCC AS with STN-SR for session continuity procedure as defined in 3GPP TS 23.216 [26]; and +- After SRVCC handover is completed, the UE is connected to SCC AS via target CS domain access. The subsequent handover to another BSS/RAN or inter-MSC HO follows the procedures defined for 3G\_MSC-A. There is no handover back to E-UTRAN via the Sv interface. + +### 4.5.2 Functional composition of SRVCC MSC and its interfaces for handover/relocation + +Functional composition of SRVCC MSC and its interfaces for handover/relocation follows the 3G\_MSC-A as defined in subclause 4.3.2 with the following modification for an SRVCC handover: + +- Interface Iu'/A' is not used. This is replaced by Sv interface; +- Interface B' is used for normal call control procedure to SCC AS for SRVCC session continuity procedures as defined in 3GPP TS 23.216 [26]; and +- During SRVCC procedure, B' is a one-way connection with SCC AS and is not connected to Sv interface. After SRVCC procedure is completed, B' is connected to A"/Iu". + +### 4.5.3 Role of vSRVCC MSC + +vSRVCC MSC takes the role of an SRVCC MSC as described in subclause 4.5.1 with the following modifications for a vSRVCC handover: + +- During a vSRVCC handover, vSRVCC MSC initiates and controls all the Circuit Switch handover procedure, from its initiation (i.e., reception of SRVCC PS to CS Request via the Sv-interface as defined in 3GPP TS 29.280 [27] from MME) until its completion (i.e., reception of Relocation/Handover Complete from 3G\_MSC-B on E-interface or from RANAP procedure if the target access network is connected via the same vSRVCC MSC); +- Call flows on the interaction between Sv signalling and the handover signalling with the target network by vSRVCC MSC are defined in 3GPP TS 23.216 [26]; +- vSRVCC MSC performs query to SCC AS to determine whether to perform the SRVCC or vSRVCC procedure, as defined in 3GPP TS 23.216 [26] and 3GPP TS 24.237 [30]; +- vSRVCC MSC initiates a normal call setup procedure to SCC AS with STN-SR for session continuity procedure as defined in 3GPP TS 23.216 [26]; and +- After vSRVCC handover is completed, the UE is connected to SCC AS via target CS domain access. The subsequent handover to another RAN or inter-MSC HO follows the procedures defined for 3G\_MSC-A. There is no handover back to E-UTRAN via the Sv interface. + +### 4.5.4 Functional composition of vSRVCC MSC and its interfaces for handover/relocation + +Functional composition of vSRVCC MSC and its interfaces for handover/relocation follows an SRVCC MSC for an SRVCC handover as specified in subclause 4.5.2. In addition, the following modifications to subclause 4.5.2 are required for a vSRVCC handover: + +- Interface B' is used for performing query to SCC AS to determine whether to perform the SRVCC or vSRVCC procedure, as defined in 3GPP TS 23.216 [26] and 3GPP TS 24.237 [30]; +- Interface B' is used for normal call control procedure to SCC AS for vSRVCC session continuity procedures as defined in 3GPP TS 23.216 [26]; and +- During vSRVCC procedure, B' is a one-way connection with SCC AS and is not connected to Sv interface. After vSRVCC procedure is completed, B' is connected to Iu". + +# --- 5 Handover initiation conditions + +Handover may be initiated by the network based on RF criteria as measured by the MS or the Network (signal level, Connection quality, power level propagation delay) as well as traffic criteria (e.g. current traffic loading per cell, interference levels, maintenance requests, etc.). + +In order to determine if a handover is required, due to RF criteria, it is typically the MS that shall take radio measurements from neighbouring cells. These measurements are reported to the serving cell on an event driven or regular basis. When a network determines a need for executing a handover the procedures given in 3GPP TS 48.008 [5], 3GPP TS 25.303 [13], 3GPP TS 25.331 [14] are followed. + +The decision process used to determine when to perform soft handover or hard handover will typically differ. Depending on the support for soft or hard handover the Intra-MSC and Inter-MSC handover may differ. + +In the case of an ongoing GSM voice group call (see 3GPP TS 43.068 [3]) the criteria described above shall only apply to the mobile station currently assigned the uplink and other users with a dedicated connection, no actions shall be taken for the listening users. + +# 6 General description of the procedures for intra - MSC handovers + +This clause gives a brief overview of the procedures that shall be followed when performing Intra-MSC handovers. Detailed explanation of these procedures can be found in 3GPP TS 48.008 [5] and 3GPP TS 24.008 [10]. + +There are three types of GSM handover that involve a single BSS and a single MSC. These are "Internal Handover", "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" and "External Handover". + +An "Internal Handover" takes place between channels on a cell or cells controlled by a single BSS, without reference to the MSC, although the MSC maybe informed of its occurrence after completion. This typical case can be used by the BSS e.g. if the A-Interface User Plane is not to be modified. This "Internal Handover" may take place with AoTDM or with AoIP and is not considered in the present document. + +A "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" shall only be used if AoIP is supported by both MSC and BSS and if the A-Interface User Plane has to be modified. In that case the BSS or the MSC may initiate a "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" procedure as described in detail in subclause 6.3 in this document. + +NOTE: From Core Network perspective this "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" is an "External Handover", because the MSC is actively involved, although it is called "Internal Handover" in 3GPP TS 48.008, because the call stays within one BSS. + +Handovers between channels on the same cell or between cells on the same BSS which are controlled by the MSC (as defined prior to the introduction of AoIP) are termed "External Handovers" and use identical procedures to those for Inter-BSS-Intra-MSC handovers. "External Handovers" are also specified with AoIP User Plane transport, for example the handover from speech to data services. Handovers from a BSS to an RNS controlled by the same 3G\_MSC are intra-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS handovers. Handovers from an RNS to a BSS controlled by the same 3G\_MSC are intra-3G\_MSC UMTS to GSM handovers. + +There are two types of handover in UMTS: soft handover and hard handover. The first one is fully performed within UTRAN, without involving the core network. The second one may be also performed within UTRAN or GERAN, or between GERAN and UTRAN, or the core network may be involved if the Iur or Iur-g interface between RNSs does not exist. This case of hard handover involving the core network is covered in the present document, together with SRNS relocation with Iur or Iur-g interface. + +## 6.1 Procedure for Intra-MSC Handovers + +The procedure for a successful External Intra-MSC handover is shown in figure 7. It is assumed that selection of a candidate MS has already taken place within the BSS based upon the criteria presented in clause 5. The exact algorithm, in the BSS, for determining a candidate MS is not addressed in the present document. The procedures discussed do not make use of the Mobile Application Part (MAP), represented by signalling function 4 in figure 2 and figure 3. The procedure described in this clause covers case i). + +![Sequence diagram of Basic External Intra-MSC Handover Procedure. Lifelines: MS (left), BSS-A, MSC-A, BSS-B, MS (right). The sequence starts with BSS-A sending A-Handover-Required to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-Handover-Request to BSS-B. BSS-B responds with A-Handover-Request-Ack. MSC-A sends A-Handover-Command to BSS-A, which then sends RI-HO-Command to the left MS. BSS-B sends RI-HO-Access to the right MS. The right MS sends RI-HO-Complete to BSS-B. BSS-B sends A-Handover-Detect to MSC-A. The right MS sends A-Handover-Complete to BSS-B. BSS-B sends A-Handover-Complete to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-Clear-Command to BSS-A. BSS-A sends A-Clear-Complete to MSC-A.](dd5771673aececa53d42ece89218299d_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant MS1 as MS + participant BSS-A + participant MSC-A + participant BSS-B + participant MS2 as MS + + BSS-A->>MSC-A: A-Handover-Required + MSC-A->>BSS-B: A-Handover-Request + BSS-B-->>MSC-A: A-Handover-Request-Ack + MSC-A->>BSS-A: A-Handover-Command + BSS-A->>MS1: RI-HO-Command + BSS-B->>MS2: RI-HO-Access + MS2->>BSS-B: RI-HO-Complete + BSS-B->>MSC-A: A-Handover-Detect + MS2->>BSS-B: A-Handover-Complete + BSS-B->>MSC-A: A-Handover-Complete + MSC-A->>BSS-A: A-Clear-Command + BSS-A->>MSC-A: A-Clear-Complete + +``` + +Sequence diagram of Basic External Intra-MSC Handover Procedure. Lifelines: MS (left), BSS-A, MSC-A, BSS-B, MS (right). The sequence starts with BSS-A sending A-Handover-Required to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-Handover-Request to BSS-B. BSS-B responds with A-Handover-Request-Ack. MSC-A sends A-Handover-Command to BSS-A, which then sends RI-HO-Command to the left MS. BSS-B sends RI-HO-Access to the right MS. The right MS sends RI-HO-Complete to BSS-B. BSS-B sends A-Handover-Detect to MSC-A. The right MS sends A-Handover-Complete to BSS-B. BSS-B sends A-Handover-Complete to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-Clear-Command to BSS-A. BSS-A sends A-Clear-Complete to MSC-A. + +**Figure 7: Basic External Intra-MSC Handover Procedure** + +The successful operation of the procedure is as follows. When the BSS (BSS-A), currently supporting the MS, determines that the MS requires to be handed over it will send an A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message to the MSC (MSC-A). The A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message shall contain a list of cells, or a single cell, to which the MS can be handed over. The list of cells shall be given in order of preference based upon operator determined criteria (These criteria are not addressed within the present document and are operator dependent). When the MSC-A receives the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message it shall begin the process of handing over the MS to a new BSS (BSS-B). (NOTE: BSS-A and BSS-B maybe the same BSS). The MSC-A shall generate an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST message to the selected BSS (BSS-B). When BSS-B receives the A-HANDOVER-REQUEST message it shall take the necessary action to allow the MS to access the radio resource of BSS-B, this is detailed in 3GPP TS 48.058 [6] and in 3GPP TS 45.008 [4]. The switching of the radio resource through the necessary terrestrial resources is detailed in 3GPP TS 24.008 [10] and 3GPP TS 48.008 [5]. + +Once resource allocation has been completed by BSS-B it shall return an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK. to MSC-A. When this message is received by MSC-A it shall begin the process of instructing the MS to tune to a new dedicated radio resource. An A-HANDOVER-COMMAND will be sent by the MSC-A to BSS-A. On receipt of the A-HANDOVER-COMMAND message BSS-A will send the radio interface message RI-HANDOVER-COMMAND, containing a Handover Reference number previously allocated by BSS-B, to the MS. The MS will then access the new radio resource using the Handover Reference number contained in the RI-HANDOVER-ACCESS message. The number will be checked by BSS-B to ensure it is as expected and the correct MS has been captured. If this is the correct MS then the BSS-B shall send an A-HANDOVER-DETECT to MSC-A. When the MS is successfully communicating with the BSS-B a RI-HANDOVER-COMPLETE message will be sent by the MS to BSS-B. The BSS-B will then send an A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE message to MSC-A. + +NOTE: The A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK from BSS-B contains the complete Radio Interface message that shall be sent by BSS-A to the MS in the RI-HANDOVER-COMMAND, MSC-A transparently passes this radio interface message onto BSS-A. + +After MSC-A has received the A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE message from BSS-B it shall begin to release the resources allocated on BSS-A. In figure 7 the resource is released by using the A-CLEAR-COMMAND sequence. + +In the case of ongoing GSM voice group calls the clearing of resources on BSS-A shall not be used if the resources are still be used on the down link. + +If a failure occurs during the handover attempt, for example A-HANDOVER-FAILURE returned from BSS-A or BSS-B, then MSC-A will terminate the handover to BSS-B. Under these conditions MSC-A may optionally take one of a number of actions: + +- i) retry the handover to the same cell; + +- ii) select the next cell from the list contained in the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message and attempt a handover to the new cell; +- iii) await the next A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message; +- iv) send an A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED-REJECT to BSS-A, if an A-HANDOVER-COMMAND has not already been sent. + +The exact action taken is dependent on whether the failure occurs before or after the A-HANDOVER-COMMAND has been sent. + +In all cases the existing connection to the MS shall not be cleared except in the case of expiry of the timer for receipt of A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE. + +During the period that the MS is not in communication with the network MSC-A shall queue all appropriate messages. All messages shall be delivered to the MS once communication is resumed. In the case of an Intra-MSC handover on MSC-B then the messages shall be queued by MSC-B. + +In the case of ongoing GSM voice group calls if a failure occurs when handing over a user on a dedicated channel then the procedures described above may optionally be applied. + +For the case of subsequent Inter-BSS Intra-MSC-B or Inter-BSS Intra-3G\_MSC-B handover the following applies: + +If handover to an A over IP capable BSS-B is performed, MSC-B/3G\_MSC-B includes a Codec List (MSC preferred) in the A-HANDOVER-REQUEST message to BSS-B. MSC-B/3G\_MSC-B may select the codecs for the Codec List (MSC preferred) from the channel type information and the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), if this list was provided by MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. For a detailed description of the handling of these codec lists by MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B/3G\_MSC-B see 3GPP TS 23.153 [25]. If the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) was not provided or MSC-B/3G\_MSC-B does not support the selection of codecs from the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), then MSC-B/3G\_MSC-B shall create the Codec List (MSC preferred) using the channel type information received from MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A in the A-HANDOVER-REQUEST message included in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. + +After successful completion of the Intra-MSC-B handover or Intra-3G\_MSC-B handover, if MSC-B/3G\_MSC-B received the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), MSC-B/3G\_MSC-B may send the new AoIP-Selected Codec (Target) and AoIP-Available Codecs List (MAP) to MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A in the MAP-PROCESS-ACCESS-SIGNALLING request transporting the A-HANDOVER-PERFORMED message, if the following conditions are fulfilled: MSC-B/3G\_MSC-B created a Codec List (MSC preferred) from the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) received from MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A, the target BSS-B uses A interface over IP and BSS-B does not insert a transcoder. + +## 6.2 Procedure for Intra-3G\_MSC Handovers + +### 6.2.1 Intra-3G\_MSC Handover from UMTS to GSM + +The procedure for a successful Intra-3G\_MSC handover from UMTS to GSM is shown in figure 8. It is assumed that selection of a candidate UE/MS has already taken place within the RNS based upon the criteria presented in clause 5. The exact algorithm, in the RNS, for determining a candidate UE/MS is not addressed in the present document. The procedures discussed do not make use of the Mobile Application Part (MAP), represented by signalling function 4 in figures 4 and 6. The procedure described in this clause covers case ii). + +![Sequence diagram of Basic Intra-3G_MSC Handover from UMTS to GSM Procedure. Lifelines: UE/MS, RNS-A, 3G_MSC-A, BSS-B, UE/MS. The sequence shows the flow of messages for handover preparation, execution, and completion.](e05b36c0d46549e681ce6581422c66b2_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS as UE/MS + participant RNS-A as RNS-A + participant 3G_MSC-A as 3G_MSC-A + participant BSS-B as BSS-B + Note left of UE/MS: + RNS-A->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Relocation-Required + 3G_MSC-A->>BSS-B: A-Handover-Request + BSS-B-->>3G_MSC-A: A-Handover-Request-Ack + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-A: Iu-Relocation-Command + RNS-A->>UE/MS: RRC-HO-Command + UE/MS->>BSS-B: RI-HO-Access + BSS-B-->>3G_MSC-A: A-Handover-Detect + UE/MS->>BSS-B: RI-HO-Complete + BSS-B-->>3G_MSC-A: A-Handover-Complete + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-A: Iu-Release-Command + RNS-A-->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Release-Complete + +``` + +Sequence diagram of Basic Intra-3G\_MSC Handover from UMTS to GSM Procedure. Lifelines: UE/MS, RNS-A, 3G\_MSC-A, BSS-B, UE/MS. The sequence shows the flow of messages for handover preparation, execution, and completion. + +**Figure 8: Basic Intra-3G\_MSC Handover from UMTS to GSM Procedure** + +#### 6.2.1.1 With no bearer or one bearer + +The successful operation of the procedure is as follows. When the RNS (RNS-A), currently supporting the UE/MS, determines that the UE/MS requires to be handed over to GSM it will send an IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED message to the 3G\_MSC (3G\_MSC-A). The IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED message shall contain a single cell, to which the UE/MS can be handed over. When the 3G\_MSC-A receives the IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED message it shall begin the process of handing over the UE/MS to a BSS (BSS-B). The 3G\_MSC-A shall generate an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST message to the selected BSS (BSS-B). When BSS-B receives the A-HANDOVER-REQUEST message it shall take the necessary action to allow the UE/MS to access the radio resource of BSS-B, this is detailed in 3GPP TS 48.058 [6] and in 3GPP TS 45.008 [4]. The switching of the radio resource through the necessary terrestrial resources is detailed in 3GPP TS 24.008 [10] and 3GPP TS 08.08 [5]. + +Once resource allocation has been completed by BSS-B it shall return an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK. to 3G\_MSC-A. When this message is received by 3G\_MSC-A it shall begin the process of instructing the UE/MS to tune to a new dedicated radio resource. An IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND will be sent by the 3G\_MSC-A to RNS-A. On receipt of the IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND message RNS-A will send the radio resource control message RRC-HANDOVER-COMMAND, containing a Handover Reference number previously allocated by BSS-B, to the UE/MS. The UE/MS will then access the new radio resource using the Handover Reference number contained in the RI-HANDOVER-ACCESS message. The number will be checked by BSS-B to ensure it is as expected and the correct UE/MS has been captured. If this is the correct UE/MS then the BSS-B shall send an A-HANDOVER-DETECT to 3G\_MSC-A. When the UE/MS is successfully communicating with the BSS-B a RI-HANDOVER-COMPLETE message will be sent by the UE/MS to BSS-B. The BSS-B will then send an A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE message to 3G\_MSC-A. + +**NOTE:** The A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK from BSS-B contains the complete radio resource control message that shall be sent by RNS-A to the UE/MS in the RRC-HANDOVER-COMMAND, 3G\_MSC-A transparently passes this radio interface message onto RNS-A. + +After 3G\_MSC-A has received the A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE message from BSS-B it shall begin to release the resources allocated on RNS-A. In figure 8 the resource is released by using the IU-RELEASE-COMMAND sequence. + +If a failure occurs during the handover attempt, for example A-HANDOVER-FAILURE returned from BSS-B, then 3G\_MSC-A will terminate the handover to BSS-B and send an IU-RELOCATION-PREPARATION-FAILURE message to RNS-A. + +If RNS-A has decided to cancel the handover, it sends IU-RELOCATION-CANCEL message to 3G\_MSC-A. The 3G\_MSC-A will then terminate the handover towards BSS-B (if initiated) and send IU-RELOCATION-CANCEL-ACKNOWLEDGE message to RNS-A. + +In all cases the existing connection to the UE/MS shall not be cleared except in the case of expiry of the timer for receipt of A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE. + +During the period that the UE/MS is not in communication with the network 3G\_MSC-A shall queue all appropriate messages. All messages shall be delivered to the UE/MS once communication is resumed. In the case of an Intra-3G\_MSC handover from UMTS to GSM on 3G\_MSC-B then the messages shall be queued by 3G\_MSC-B. + +For the case of subsequent Inter-system UMTS to GSM Intra-3G\_MSC-B handover the following applies: + +If handover to an A over IP capable BSS-B is performed, 3G\_MSC-B includes a Codec List (MSC preferred) in the A-HANDOVER-REQUEST message to BSS-B. 3G\_MSC-B may select the codecs for the Codec List (MSC preferred) from the channel type information and the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), if this list was provided by MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. For a detailed description of the handling of these codec lists by MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B see 3GPP TS 23.153 [25]. If the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) was not provided or 3G\_MSC-B does not support the selection of codecs from the AoIP-Supported Codecs List(Anchor), then 3G\_MSC-B shall create the Codec List (MSC preferred) using the channel type information received from MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A in the A-HANDOVER-REQUEST message included in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. + +After successful completion of the Inter-system UMTS to GSM Intra-3G\_MSC-B handover, if 3G\_MSC-B received the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), MSC-B/3G\_MSC-B may send the new AoIP-Selected Codec (Target) and AoIP-Available Codecs List (MAP) to MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A in the MAP-PROCESS-ACCESS-SIGNALLING request transporting the A-HANDOVER-PERFORMED message, if the following conditions are fulfilled: 3G\_MSC-B created a Codec List (MSC preferred) from the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), the target BSS-B uses A interface over IP and BSS-B does not insert a transcoder. + +#### 6.2.1.2 With multiple bearers (Optional functionality) + +If 3G\_MSC-A supports the optional supplementary service Multicall (See 3GPP TS 23.135 [17]), 3G\_MSC-A shall have the following functionality additionally to the description in subclause 6.2.1.1. + +Upon receipt of the IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-A 3G\_MSC-A shall select one bearer to be handed over if the UE is engaged with multiple bearers. After that, 3G\_MSC-A generates an A-HO-REQUEST message for the selected bearer to BSS-B. + +When an A-HO-REQUEST-ACK is received from BSS-B, 3G\_MSC-A sends IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND, which indicates the bearers not to be handed over as bearers to be released, to RNS-A. + +After 3G\_MSC-A receives A-HO-COMPLETE message from BSS-B, 3G\_MSC-A shall release calls via BSS-B, which has been carried by the bearers not to be handed over, and then sends IU-RELEASE-COMMAND to RNS-A. + +### 6.2.2 Intra-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS Handover + +The procedure for a successful Intra-3G\_MSC handover is shown in figure 9. It is assumed that selection of a candidate UE/MS has already taken place within the BSC based upon the criteria presented in clause 5. The exact algorithm, in the BSC, for determining a candidate UE/MS is not addressed in the present document. The procedures discussed do not make use of the Mobile Application Part (MAP), represented by signalling function 4 in figures 4 and 6. The procedure described in this clause covers case ii). + +In case of subsequent handover the following applies. If 3G\_MSC-B supports location reporting at change of Service Area and if encapsulated BSSAP signalling is used on the E-interface, 3G\_MSC-B shall always initiate the Location Reporting Control procedure at change of Service Area towards the target RNS since no request for Location Reporting can be received from MSC-A. In that case, the Location Reporting Control procedure shall be initiated by 3G\_MSC-B after the Relocation Resource Allocation procedure has been executed successfully. + +The change of Service Area shall be reported to MSC-A within an A-HANDOVER-PERFORMED message. + +In the case of ongoing voice group calls, the handover does not take place since voice group calls are not supported in UMTS. + +![Sequence diagram of Basic External Intra-3G_MSC GSM to UMTS Handover Procedure. Lifelines: UE/MS, BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, RNS-B, UE. The sequence shows the flow of messages for handover from GSM to UMTS via an external MSC.](05eb72d372e4bf78e3d6a64949d77bcc_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS + participant BSS-A + participant 3G_MSC-A as 3G MSC-A + participant RNS-B + participant UE + + Note left of UE/MS: UE/MS + Note right of UE: UE + + BSS-A->>3G_MSC-A: A-Handover-Required + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-B: Iu-Relocation-Request + RNS-B-->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Relocation-Request-Ack + 3G_MSC-A->>BSS-A: A-Handover-Command + BSS-A->>UE/MS: RI-HO-Command + RNS-B->>UE: RRC-HO-Complete + UE-->>RNS-B: + RNS-B->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Relocation-Detect + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-B: Iu-Relocation-Complete + 3G_MSC-A->>BSS-A: A-Clear-Command + BSS-A-->>3G_MSC-A: A-Clear-Complete + +``` + +Sequence diagram of Basic External Intra-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS Handover Procedure. Lifelines: UE/MS, BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, RNS-B, UE. The sequence shows the flow of messages for handover from GSM to UMTS via an external MSC. + +**Figure 9: Basic External Intra-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS Handover Procedure** + +The successful operation of the procedure is as follows. When the BSS (BSS-A), currently supporting the UE, determines that the UE requires to be handed over to UMTS it will send an A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message to the 3G\_MSC (3G\_MSC-A). The A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message shall contain a single cell, to which the UE can be handed over. When the 3G\_MSC-A receives the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message it shall begin the process of handing over the UE to a new RNS (RNS-B). The 3G\_MSC-A shall generate an Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST message to the selected RNS (RNS-B). For handover of a speech call to UTRAN Iu mode, 3G\_MSC-A shall include a NAS Synch Indicator in the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST message. + +If 3G\_MSC-A supports inter-system handover to a CSG cell and BSS-A includes a CSG ID for the target cell in the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message, then 3G\_MSC-A shall check the CSG membership of the UE for the target cell as described in subclause 4.3.1 before generating the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST message. If the UE fails the CSG membership check and the target cell is a CSG cell, 3G\_MSC-A shall send an A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED-REJECT to BSS-A. + +When RNS-B receives the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST message it shall take the necessary action to allow the UE to access the radio resource of RNS-B, this is detailed in the 3GPP TS 25.300 series and the 3GPP TS 25.200 series of 3GPP Technical Specifications. The switching of the radio resource through the necessary terrestrial resources is detailed in the 3GPP TS 25.430 series and 3GPP TS 25.413 [11]. + +Once resource allocation has been completed by RNS-B, it shall return an Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK. to 3G\_MSC-A. When this message is received by 3G\_MSC-A it shall begin the process of instructing the UE to tune to a new dedicated radio resource. An A-HANDOVER-COMMAND will be sent by the 3G\_MSC-A to BSS-A. On receipt of the A-HANDOVER-COMMAND message BSS-A will send the radio interface message RI-HANDOVER-COMMAND. The UE will then access the new radio resource. On detection of the UE, the RNS-B shall send an Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT to 3G\_MSC-A. When the UE is successfully communicating with the RNS-B an RRC-HANDOVER-COMPLETE message will be sent by the UE to RNS-B. The RNS-B will then send an Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE message to 3G\_MSC-A. + +**NOTE:** The Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B contains the complete RRC message that shall be sent by BSS-A to the MS in the RI-HANDOVER-COMMAND, 3G\_MSC-A transparently passes this radio interface message onto BSS-A. + +After 3G\_MSC-A has received the Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE message from RNS-B, it shall begin to release the resources allocated on BSS-A. In figure 9 the resource is released by using the A-CLEAR-COMMAND sequence. + +If a failure occurs during the handover attempt, for example, A-HANDOVER-FAILURE returned from BSS-A or Iu-RELOCATION FAILURE returned from RNS-B, then 3G\_MSC-A will terminate the handover to RNS-B. Under these conditions 3G\_MSC-A may optionally take one of a number of actions: + +- i) await the next A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message; + +- ii) send an A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED-REJECT to BSS-A, if an A-HANDOVER-COMMAND has not already been sent. + +The exact action taken is dependent on whether the failure occurs before or after the A-HANDOVER-COMMAND has been sent. + +In all cases the existing connection to the UE shall not be cleared except in the case of expiry of the timer for receipt of Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE. + +During the period that the UE is not in communication with the network 3G\_MSC-A shall queue all appropriate messages. All messages shall be delivered to the UE once communication is resumed. In the case of an Intra-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS handover on 3G\_MSC-B then the messages shall be queued by 3G\_MSC-B. + +### 6.2.3 Procedure for Intra-3G\_MSC SRNS Relocation + +The procedure for a successful Intra-3G\_MSC SRNS Relocation is shown in figures 10 and 11. For a successful Intra-3G\_MSC Enhanced SRNS Relocation the procedure is shown in figures 11a and 11b. SRNS Relocation and Enhanced SRNS Relocation are used to relocate the serving RNS functionality from one RNS to another. The procedures may or may not involve change of the radio resources assigned for the corresponding UE. Whether or not the Relocation includes change of radio resources assigned for the UE does not affect the SRNS Relocation procedure or Enhanced SRNS Relocation procedure in the Core Network. + +In case of subsequent Intra-3G\_MSC-B SRNS relocation or Intra-3G\_MSC-B Enhanced SRNS relocation the following applies: + +- If 3G\_MSC-B has previously received an order to perform location reporting at change of Service Area from 3G\_MSC-A and if 3G\_MSC-B also supports Location Reporting Control, it shall issue the Iu-LOCATION-REPORTING-CONTROL message towards the target RNS immediately after successful completion of relocation. Upon receipt of Iu-LOCATION-REPORT, 3G\_MSC-B shall forward it towards 3G\_MSC-A via E interface. + +If 3G\_MSC-B supports location reporting at change of Service Area and if encapsulated BSSAP signalling is used on the E-interface, 3G\_MSC-B shall always initiate the Location Reporting Control procedure at change of Service Area towards the target RNS, since no request for Location Reporting can be received from MSC-A. In that case, if an SRNS relocation is used, the Location Reporting Control procedure shall be initiated by 3G\_MSC-B after the Relocation Resource Allocation procedure has been executed successfully; otherwise 3G\_MSC-B shall initiate the Location Reporting Control procedure when the completion of the Enhanced SRNS Relocation has been confirmed by the target RNS. The change of Service Area shall be reported to MSC-A within an A-HANDOVER-PERFORMED message. + +It is assumed that selection of a candidate UE has already taken place within RNS based upon the criteria presenting in clause 5. The exact algorithm, in RNS, for determining a candidate UE is not addressed in the present document. The procedure discussed does not make use of the Mobile Application Part (MAP), represented by signalling function 4 in figures 4 and 6. The procedure described in this clause covers case ii). + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 10: Basic intra-3G_MSC SRNS Relocation Procedure. Lifelines: UE, RNS-A, 3G_MSC-A, RNS-B, UE. The process involves signaling between RNS-A and 3G_MSC-A, then between 3G_MSC-A and RNS-B, and finally between RNS-A and RNS-B to complete the relocation.](2837ffdadcdb1e5bababa56b564e56ed_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE_L as UE + participant RNS-A + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant RNS-B + participant UE_R as UE + + RNS-A->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Relocation-Required + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-B: Iu-Relocation-Request + RNS-B-->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Relocation-Request-Ack + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-A: Iu-Relocation-Command + RNS-A->>RNS-B: Iur-SRNC-Relocation-Commit + RNS-B-->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Relocation-Detect + 3G_MSC-A-->>RNS-B: Iu-Relocation-Complete + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-A: Iu-Release-Command + RNS-A-->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Release-Complete + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure 10: Basic intra-3G\_MSC SRNS Relocation Procedure. Lifelines: UE, RNS-A, 3G\_MSC-A, RNS-B, UE. The process involves signaling between RNS-A and 3G\_MSC-A, then between 3G\_MSC-A and RNS-B, and finally between RNS-A and RNS-B to complete the relocation. + +**Figure 10: Basic intra-3G\_MSC SRNS Relocation Procedure** + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 11: Basic intra-3G_MSC SRNS Relocation Procedure combined with hard change of radio resources. Lifelines: UE, RNS-A, 3G_MSC-A, RNS-B, UE. This diagram adds a 'Detection of UE in target RNS' step and changes the completion signaling between RNS-B and the UE.](fcbc3c31776721edc98ceb1944ec438f_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE_L as UE + participant RNS-A + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant RNS-B + participant UE_R as UE + + RNS-A->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Relocation-Required + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-B: Iu-Relocation-Request + RNS-B-->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Relocation-Request-Ack + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-A: Iu-Relocation-Command + RNS-A->>UE_L: RR-HO-Command + Note over RNS-B: Detection of UE in +target RNS + RNS-B-->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Relocation-Detect + UE_R->>RNS-B: RR-HO-Complete + 3G_MSC-A-->>RNS-B: Iu-Relocation-Complete + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-A: Iu-Release-Command + RNS-A-->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Release-Complete + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure 11: Basic intra-3G\_MSC SRNS Relocation Procedure combined with hard change of radio resources. Lifelines: UE, RNS-A, 3G\_MSC-A, RNS-B, UE. This diagram adds a 'Detection of UE in target RNS' step and changes the completion signaling between RNS-B and the UE. + +**Figure 11: Basic intra-3G\_MSC SRNS Relocation Procedure combined with hard change of radio resources (Hard Handover with switch in the Core Network)** + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 11a: Basic intra-3G_MSC Enhanced SRNS Relocation Procedure. The diagram shows the interaction between a UE, RNS-A, 3G_MSC-A, and RNS-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. RNS-A sends an Iur-Enhanced Relocation Request to RNS-B. 2. RNS-B sends an Iur-Enhanced Relocation Response to RNS-A. 3. RNS-A sends an Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Request to 3G_MSC-A. 4. 3G_MSC-A sends an Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Response to RNS-A. 5. RNS-A sends an Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Confirm to 3G_MSC-A. 6. 3G_MSC-A sends an Iu-Release-Command to RNS-A. 7. RNS-A sends an Iu-Release-Complete to 3G_MSC-A.](78ff716475b2f65bf01c3a4d02d89fc4_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant RNS-A + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant RNS-B + Note left of UE: UE + RNS-A->>RNS-B: Iur-Enhanced Relocation Request + RNS-B-->>RNS-A: Iur-Enhanced Relocation Response + RNS-A->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Request + 3G_MSC-A-->>RNS-A: Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Response + RNS-A->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Confirm + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-A: Iu-Release-Command + RNS-A-->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Release-Complete + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure 11a: Basic intra-3G\_MSC Enhanced SRNS Relocation Procedure. The diagram shows the interaction between a UE, RNS-A, 3G\_MSC-A, and RNS-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. RNS-A sends an Iur-Enhanced Relocation Request to RNS-B. 2. RNS-B sends an Iur-Enhanced Relocation Response to RNS-A. 3. RNS-A sends an Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Request to 3G\_MSC-A. 4. 3G\_MSC-A sends an Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Response to RNS-A. 5. RNS-A sends an Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Confirm to 3G\_MSC-A. 6. 3G\_MSC-A sends an Iu-Release-Command to RNS-A. 7. RNS-A sends an Iu-Release-Complete to 3G\_MSC-A. + +Figure 11a: Basic intra-3G\_MSC Enhanced SRNS Relocation Procedure + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 11b: Basic intra-3G_MSC Enhanced SRNS Relocation Procedure combined with hard change of radio resources (Hard Handover with switch in the Core Network). This diagram extends Figure 11a by adding radio resource management messages. 1. RNS-A sends an RR-HO-Command to the UE. 2. The UE sends an RR-HO-Complete to RNS-B. The core network signaling (Iur-Enhanced Relocation Request, Iur-Enhanced Relocation Response, Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Request, Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Response, Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Confirm, Iu-Release-Command, Iu-Release-Complete) follows the same sequence as in Figure 11a.](b2f5606b9c7184c1c6070a290080a3e3_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant RNS-A + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant RNS-B + Note left of UE: UE + RNS-A->>UE: RR-HO-Command + UE-->>RNS-B: RR-HO-Complete + RNS-A->>RNS-B: Iur-Enhanced Relocation Request + RNS-B-->>RNS-A: Iur-Enhanced Relocation Response + RNS-A->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Request + 3G_MSC-A-->>RNS-A: Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Response + RNS-A->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Confirm + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-A: Iu-Release-Command + RNS-A-->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Release-Complete + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure 11b: Basic intra-3G\_MSC Enhanced SRNS Relocation Procedure combined with hard change of radio resources (Hard Handover with switch in the Core Network). This diagram extends Figure 11a by adding radio resource management messages. 1. RNS-A sends an RR-HO-Command to the UE. 2. The UE sends an RR-HO-Complete to RNS-B. The core network signaling (Iur-Enhanced Relocation Request, Iur-Enhanced Relocation Response, Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Request, Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Response, Iu-Enhanced Relocation Complete Confirm, Iu-Release-Command, Iu-Release-Complete) follows the same sequence as in Figure 11a. + +Figure 11b: Basic intra-3G\_MSC Enhanced SRNS Relocation Procedure combined with hard change of radio resources (Hard Handover with switch in the Core Network) + +#### 6.2.3.1 With no bearer or one bearer + +##### 6.2.3.1.1 SRNS Relocation + +The successful operation of the SRNS Relocation procedure is as follows. When the Serving RNS (RNS-A) makes the decision to perform the SRNS Relocation procedure it will send an IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED message to the 3G\_MSC (3G\_MSC-A). The IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED message shall contain the identifier of the target RNS to which the Relocation is to be performed. When the 3G\_MSC-A receives the IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED message it shall begin the process of relocating the serving RNS functionality to the new RNS (RNS-B). The 3G\_MSC-A shall generate an IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST message to the selected RNS (RNS-B). For the relocation of a speech call to UTRAN Iu mode, 3G\_MSC-A shall include the NAS Synch Indicator in the IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST, if the Iu Selected codec to be used after the relocation is different from the Iu Currently used codec. + +If 3G\_MSC-A supports SRNS Relocation to a CSG cell and RNS-A includes a CSG ID for the target cell in the IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED message, then 3G\_MSC-A shall check the CSG membership of the UE for the target cell as described in subclause 4.3.1 before generating the IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST message. If the UE fails the CSG membership check and the target cell is a CSG cell, 3G\_MSC-A shall send an IU-RELOCATION-PREPARATION-FAILURE to RNS-A. + +When RNS-B receives the IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST message it shall take the necessary action to establish the new Iu transport bearers for each Radio Access Bearer related to 3G\_MSC-A for the UE in question, this is detailed in the 3GPP TS 25.430 series and 3GPP TS 25.413 [11]. + +Once resource allocation has been completed by RNS-B it shall return an IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE to 3G\_MSC-A. When this message is received by 3G\_MSC-A, and 3G\_MSC-A is ready for the move in Serving RNS functionality, it shall indicate the completion of the preparation phase on the core network side for the SRNS Relocation. An IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND message is sent by 3G\_MSC-A to RNS-A. RNS-A acts as follows: + +- i) if the procedure is a SRNS Relocation without change of radio resources, which means that the Iur interface between RNS-A and RNS-B can be used for the procedure, the RNS-A shall send IUR-SRNS-RELOCATION-COMMIT message to the RNS-B to trigger the Relocation execution. See figure 10. +- ii) if the procedure is a SRNS Relocation with change of radio resources, which means that the Iur interface between RNS-A and RNS-B is not used for the procedure, the RNS-A shall trigger the handover procedure on the air interface by sending the RRC-HANDOVER-COMMAND to the UE. The UE will then access the new radio resources. See figure 11. + +NOTE: The IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE from RNS-B may optionally contain a transparent container, which is transferred by 3G\_MSC-A to the RNS-A using the IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND message. + +When the relocation execution trigger is received, RNS-B shall then take the necessary action to assume the role of Serving RNS and shall send an IU-RELOCATION-DETECT message to 3G\_MSC-A. When the UE is successfully in communication with the RNS-B, then RNS-B shall send an IU-RELOCATION-COMPLETE message to 3G\_MSC-A. + +After 3G\_MSC-A has received the IU-RELOCATION-COMPLETE message from RNS-B, it shall begin to release the resources associated to the RNS-A. In figures 10 and 11, the resources are released by using the IU-RELEASE-COMMAND sequence. + +If a failure occurs during the SRNS Relocation attempt, then 3G\_MSC-A will terminate the relocation to RNS-B. For example, if IU-RELOCATION-FAILURE is returned from RNS-B then 3G\_MSC-A will terminate the relocation to RNS-B and send IU-RELOCATION-PREPARATION-FAILURE to RNS-A. If IU-RELOCATION-CANCEL is returned from RNS-A, then 3G\_MSC-A will terminate the relocation to RNS-B and send IU-RELOCATION-CANCEL-ACKNOWLEDGE to RNS-A. + +In all cases the existing connection to the UE shall not be cleared except in the case of expiry of the timer for receipt of IU-RELOCATION-COMPLETE. + +During the period that the UE is not in communication with the network, 3G\_MSC-A shall queue all appropriate messages. All messages shall be delivered to the UE once communication is resumed. In the case of an Intra-3G\_MSC SRNS Relocation (with or without change of radio resources) on 3G\_MSC-B, then the messages shall be queued by 3G\_MSC-B. + +##### 6.2.3.1.2 Enhanced SRNS Relocation + +The successful operation of the Enhanced SRNS Relocation procedure is as follows. When the Serving RNS (RNS-A) makes the decision to perform the Enhanced SRNS Relocation procedure it will send an IUR-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-REQUEST message to the new RNS (RNS-B). The IUR-ENHANCED RELOCATION-REQUEST message shall contain the necessary information to set up a CS Radio Access Bearer in RNS-B. + +When RNS-B receives the IUR-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-REQUEST message it shall take the necessary actions to establish the new Iu transport bearers for the Radio Access Bearer related to 3G\_MSC-A for the UE in question, as described in detail in the 3GPP TS 25.430 series and 3GPP TS 25.413 [11], and the new transport bearers for the Radio Access Bearer related to RNS-A, to enable data forwarding. RNS-B shall initialize the Iu UP towards RNS A, if necessary. + +Once resource allocation has been completed by RNS-B it shall return an IUR-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-RESPONSE message to RNC-A. If the resources cannot be allocated, RNS-B returns an IUR-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-FAILURE message to RNS-A, and RNS-A terminates the procedure. + +After transmission of the IUR-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-RESPONSE message RNS-B and RNS-A act as follows: + +- i) If the procedure is an Enhanced SRNS Relocation without change of radio resources, RNS-B shall send an IU-ENHANCED RELOCATION-COMPLETE-REQUEST message to 3G\_MSC-A and start data forwarding towards RNS-A for UL data. After receipt of the IUR-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-RESPONSE message RNS-A shall start data forwarding towards RNS-B for DL data. See figure 11a. +- ii) If the procedure is an Enhanced SRNS Relocation with change of radio resources, when RNS-A receives the IUR-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-RESPONSE message, it shall trigger the handover procedure on the air interface by sending the RRC-HANDOVER-COMMAND to the UE and start data forwarding towards RNS-B for DL data. The UE will then access the new radio resources. When the UE is successfully in communication with the RNS-B, then RNS-B shall start data forwarding towards RNS-A for UL data and send an IU-ENHANCED RELOCATION-COMPLETE-REQUEST message to 3G\_MSC-A. See figure 11b. + +After 3G\_MSC-A has received the IU-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-COMPLETE-REQUEST message from RNS-B, it shall start to configure the necessary Iu resources for the RNS-B and send the IU-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-COMPLETE-RESPONSE message to RNS-B. If the necessary resources cannot be allocated or a failure occurs in 3G\_MSC-A, it shall send an IU-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-COMPLETE-FAILURE message to RNS-B. + +After RNC-B has received the IU-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-COMPLETE-RESPONSE message, it shall start to configure the Iu transport bearer for each Radio Access Bearer between the MSC-A and RNC-B and perform Iu UP initialization, if necessary. After the completion of the Iu UP initialization, RNS-B shall send an IU-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-COMPLETE-CONFIRM message to 3G\_MSC-A. + +After 3G\_MSC-A has received the IU-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-COMPLETE-CONFIRM message from RNS-B, it shall begin to release the resources associated to the RNS-A. In figures 11a and 11b, the resources are released by using the IU-RELEASE-COMMAND sequence. + +#### 6.2.3.2 With multiple bearers (Optional functionality) + +If 3G\_MSC-A supports the optional supplementary service Multicall (See 3GPP TS 23.135 [17]), 3G\_MSC-A shall have the following functionality additionally to the description in subclause 6.2.3.1. + +For SRNS Relocation, upon receipt of the IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-A, 3G\_MSC-A generates an IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST message, which may include multiple bearers, to RNS-B. + +When an IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK is received from RNS-B, 3G\_MSC-A sends IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND, which indicates the bearers failed to set up in RNS-B as bearers to be released, to RNS-A. + +After 3G\_MSC-A receives a IU-RELOCATION-COMPLETE message from RNS-B, 3G\_MSC-A shall release the calls via RNS-B, which have been carried by the bearers failed to set up in RNS-B, and then sends IU-RELEASE-COMMAND to RNS-A. + +For Enhanced SRNS Relocation, RNC-A generates an IUR-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-REQUEST message, which may include multiple bearers, to RNS-B. If resources for at least one bearer are reserved in RNS-B, RNS-B shall return an IUR-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-RESPONSE message, which indicates the bearers failed to set up in RNS-B as bearers to be released, to RNC-A. + +When the UE is successfully in communication with the RNS-B, then RNS-B shall send an IU-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-COMPLETE-REQUEST message, which indicates the bearers failed to set up in RNS-B as bearers to be released, to 3G\_MSC-A. + +After 3G\_MSC-A receives the IU-ENHANCED-RELOCATION-COMPLETE-REQUEST message from RNS-B, 3G\_MSC-A shall release the calls via RNS-B, which have been carried by the bearers failed to set up in RNS-B, and then sends IU-RELEASE-COMMAND to RNS-A. + +## 6.3 Internal Handover with MSC Support for Intra-BSS handover with AoIP + +### 6.3.1 General Description of Internal Handover with MSC Support + +If the A-Interface User Plane is carried over IP (or shall be handed over to IP) and one or more of the A-Interface User Plane parameters need to be modified, for example the Codec Type, or the Codec Configuration (BSS determines that no compatible Codec Type or Codec Configuration exists for the target cell), or the IP Transport Layer Address, or the UDP Port, or the CSData Redundancy Level, or the A-Interface Type itself (e.g. from TDM to IP or vice versa), then a "BSS Internal Handover with MSC support" shall be performed (see 3GPP TS 48.008 [5] subclause 3.1.5c.1). + +The "BSS Internal Handover with MSC support" for AoIP is performed by the MSC that is currently serving the connected BSS (in the following just termed "serving MSC"); it may be either MSC-A, MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-B. + +NOTE: The "BSS Internal Handover with MSC support" involves the serving MSC actively in the handover. It is therefore in average slower and more resource demanding than the BSS Internal Handover without MSC support. In order to guarantee a high radio network performance the MSC needs to react quickly and handle this handover with high priority. + +The "BSS Internal Handover with MSC support" applies only if both BSS and Core Network support the AoIP procedures and messages, and an A-Interface User Plane connection has been established beforehand. The procedures and messages for this "BSS Internal Handover with MSC support" are described in 3GPP TS 48.008 [5]. + +The "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" can be initiated either: + +- by the BSS, by sending the A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message; or +- by the serving MSC, by sending the A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-ENQUIRY message. + +### 6.3.2 BSS-initiated Internal Handover with MSC Support + +The BSS-initiated "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" starts with an A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message from the BSS to the serving MSC, for further details see 3GPP TS 48.008 [5], subclause 3.1.5c. An example sequence is shown in figure 6.3.2.1 + +![Sequence diagram of BSS-initiated Internal Handover Execution. The diagram shows three participants: MS (Mobile Station), BSS-A (Base Station Subsystem), and Serving MSC (Mobile Switching Center). The sequence of messages is: 1. BSS-A sends A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED to Serving MSC. 2. Serving MSC sends A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-COMMAND to BSS-A. 3. BSS-A sends RI-HO-Command to MS. 4. MS sends RI-HO-Access to BSS-A. 5. BSS-A sends A-HANDOVER-DETECT to Serving MSC. 6. MS sends RI-HO-Complete to BSS-A. 7. BSS-A sends A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE to Serving MSC.](6757222e979ee95c44354a897c5cc1c1_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant MS + participant BSS-A + participant Serving MSC + BSS-A->>Serving MSC: A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED + Serving MSC-->>BSS-A: A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-COMMAND + BSS-A->>MS: RI-HO-Command + MS->>BSS-A: RI-HO-Access + BSS-A->>Serving MSC: A-HANDOVER-DETECT + MS->>BSS-A: RI-HO-Complete + BSS-A->>Serving MSC: A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE + +``` + +Sequence diagram of BSS-initiated Internal Handover Execution. The diagram shows three participants: MS (Mobile Station), BSS-A (Base Station Subsystem), and Serving MSC (Mobile Switching Center). The sequence of messages is: 1. BSS-A sends A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED to Serving MSC. 2. Serving MSC sends A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-COMMAND to BSS-A. 3. BSS-A sends RI-HO-Command to MS. 4. MS sends RI-HO-Access to BSS-A. 5. BSS-A sends A-HANDOVER-DETECT to Serving MSC. 6. MS sends RI-HO-Complete to BSS-A. 7. BSS-A sends A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE to Serving MSC. + +Figure 6.3.2.1: BSS-Initiated Internal Handover Execution + +The A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message contains a reason for the required handover and the currently valid Codec List (BSS Supported). It shall also contain an AoIP Transport Layer Address and UDP Port, if the BSS requires an IP-based target User Plane. The Codec List (BSS supported) contains the key requirements from the BSS, + +like target Codec Type(s), target Codec Configuration(s) and target A-interface Type(s) (TDM and/or IP), and may contain the required Redundancy Level for CSData, etc. + +When sending the A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message the BSS starts a timer "T25" (3GPP TS 48.008 [5]) and it expects an answer from the serving MSC within that timer period. If "T25" (3GPP TS 48.008 [5]) expires before the MSC has answered, then the BSS ignores any subsequent (late) answer from the serving MSC after expiry of timer "T25" (3GPP TS 48.008 [5]). The BSS will not send any new A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message before timer "T25" (3GPP TS 48.008 [5]) has expired or before the Internal Handover Preparation is terminated by other reasons. + +When the serving MSC receives the A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message it shall start timer T105 (see subclause 9.3A). The serving MSC shall not send any answer to the BSS after timer T105 has expired. Both timers ("T25" – 3GPP TS 48.008 [5] and T105) shall be configured (by O&M) to minimise the likelihood that the answer from serving MSC to BSS crosses with a new or repeated A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message from the BSS to the serving MSC, i.e. the timer T105 shall always expire before "T25" (3GPP TS 48.008 [5]) expires. + +If the serving MSC is able to fulfil the required "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support", then it shall generate and send an A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-COMMAND message to the BSS and stop timer T105. This answer shall contain the exact new A-Interface User Plane parameters, e.g. Codec Type, Codec Configuration, A-Interface Type, either TDM Circuit Identity Code or IP Transport Layer Address and UDP Port (see 3GPP TS 48.008 [5]). While T25 is still running the BSS can either accept or reject the A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-COMMAND. + +When the BSS receives the A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-COMMAND message it takes the necessary action to allow the MS to access the radio resource of the new cell in BSS, this is detailed in 3GPP TS 48.058 [6] and in 3GPP TS 45.008 [4]. The switching of the radio resource through the necessary terrestrial resources is detailed in 3GPP TS 44.018 [28] and 3GPP TS 48.008 [5]. On receipt of the A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-COMMAND message the BSS will send e.g. the radio interface message RI-HANDOVER-COMMAND, containing a Handover Reference number previously allocated to the MS. The MS will then access the new radio resource using the Handover Reference number contained in the RI-HANDOVER-ACCESS message. The number will be checked by BSS to ensure it is as expected and the correct MS has been captured. + +As BSS and MS proceed with the handover the BSS may send an A-HANDOVER-DETECT message to the serving MSC to enable fast User Plane switching on the Core Network side. As soon as the MS and BSS have completed the handover the BSS send an A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE message to serving MSC. Both BSS and serving MSC will then release the no longer needed BSS and Core Network resources. + +If the serving MSC is unable to support the required Internal Handover due to whatever reason then it shall send an A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED-REJECT message to the BSS (if T105 has not expired already). The serving MSC shall not send an A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED-REJECT message after an A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-COMMAND has been sent to the BSS. + +If a failure occurs during the handover attempt and the BSS sends an A-HANDOVER-FAILURE message, then the serving MSC shall terminate the handover and shall revert back to using the resources used before the handover attempt was made. + +The serving MSC shall supervise the "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" procedure after sending the A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-COMMAND using the same timer (T102) as used for Intra-MSC handover, see subclauses 9.3 and 11.3. + +In all cases the existing connection to the MS shall not be cleared, except in the case of expiry of the timer T102 before receipt of A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE. + +Whilst the MS is not in communication with the Core Network (i.e. in the time span between sending of A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-COMMAND and the reception of A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE or an A-HANDOVER-FAILURE) the serving MSC shall queue all appropriate messages towards the MS. All these messages shall be delivered to the MS once the communication is resumed. + +For the case of subsequent Intra-BSS handover with support from MSC-B or 3G\_MSC-B the following applies: + +After successful completion of the Intra-BSS handover, if MSC-B/3G\_MSC-B received the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), MSC-B/3G\_MSC-B may send the new AoIP-Selected Codec (Target) and AoIP-Available Codecs List (MAP) to MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A in the MAP-PROCESS-ACCESS-SIGNALLING request transporting the A-HANDOVER-PERFORMED message, if the following conditions are fulfilled: MSC-B/3G\_MSC-B created a Codec + +List (MSC preferred) from the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) received from MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A, the BSS uses A interface over IP and the BSS does not insert a transcoder. + +### 6.3.3 MSC-initiated BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support + +During a call the MSC may request to modify the A-Interface User Plane, for example to change the Codec Type or Codec Configuration on the A-Interface to optimise end-to-end speech quality by avoiding transcoding. + +The serving MSC may initiate a "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" by sending an A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-ENQUIRY message to the BSS containing, within the Speech Codec (MSC Chosen) IE, the serving MSC's preferred speech Codec Type and Codec Configuration and A-Interface Type. + +If accepted by the BSS, the BSS responds with an A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message, as described in subclause 6.3.2, with reason "Response to an INTERNAL HANDOVER ENQUIRY". Then the "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" may start. + +If the BSS does not accept the A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-ENQUIRY message, then it returns an A-HANDOVER-FAILURE message to the serving MSC. + +# --- 7 General description of the procedures for inter - MSC handovers + +The following clauses describe two options for the Basic and Subsequent Handover procedures. The first, as described in subclauses 7.1 and 7.3 respectively, provides for a circuit connection between MSC-A and MSC-B. The second, as described in subclauses 7.2 and 7.4 respectively, provides for a Basic and Subsequent Handover without the provision of a circuit connection between MSC-A and MSC-B. + +In all the above mentioned clauses, the following principles apply: + +- a) during the handover resource allocation, except for the messages explicitly indicated in b and c below, only the handover related messages that are part of the applicable BSSAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] - shall be transferred on the E-interface; +- b) the trace related messages that are part of the applicable BSSAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] - can be sent by the MSC-A on the E-interface after successful handover resource allocation. In subclauses 7.1 and 7.2, it is however allowed at basic handover initiation on the E-Interface to transfer one trace related message that is part of the applicable BSSAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] - together with the applicable handover related message. The applicable handover related message shall always appear as the first message; +- c) during the handover resource allocation for subsequent inter-MSC handover according to subclauses 7.3 and 7.4, it is allowed to transfer either DTAP or RANAP Direct Transfer messages on the E-Interface between MSC-A and MSC-B. RANAP Direct Transfer messages shall be used for this purpose if and only if the basic handover procedure was an inter MSC SRNS relocation; +- d) during the handover execution, ie while the MS is not in communication with the network, the MSC-A shall queue all outgoing BSSAP or RANAP messages until the communication with the MS is resumed; +- e) during the execution of a basic inter-MSC handover to MSC-B or a subsequent inter-MSC handover to a third MSC-B', only the handover related messages and the A-Clear-Request message that are part of the applicable BSSAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] - may be sent by the target MSC on the E-interface; +- f) during a subsequent inter-MSC handover back to MSC-A or to a third MSC-B', MSC-B may initiate either an Iu-Release-Request procedure or an A-Clear-Request procedure on the E-interface. An Iu-Release-Request procedure shall be initiated only if the basic handover procedure was an inter-MSC SRNS relocation; +- g) finally, during supervision, ie while the MS is not in the area of MSC-A after a successful Inter-MSC handover, the subset of BSSAP procedures and their related messages - as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] - shall apply on the E-Interface. As the only exception to this rule, in case of a subsequent inter-MSC SRNS relocation back to 3G\_MSC-A or to a third 3G\_MSC-B', during the relocation resource allocation, the relocation and trace related messages that are part of the applicable RANAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 29.108 [15] - shall be transferred on the E-interface (see subclause 8.3, a and b). + +If a subsequent inter-MSC handover/relocation back to 3G\_MSC-A or to a third 3G\_MSC-B' is cancelled, then the supervision continues, and BSSAP procedures and their related messages shall apply on the E-interface. + +NOTE: A subsequent inter-MSC SRNS relocation back to 3G\_MSC-A or to a third 3G\_MSC-B' can occur, e.g., if after the basic inter-MSC handover to 3G\_MSC-B the MS performed a subsequent intra-3G\_MSC-B GSM to UMTS inter-system handover; + +- h) during the intra-MSC-B handover execution, if any, the MSC-B shall queue all outgoing BSSAP messages until the communication with the MS is resumed. + +## 7.1 Basic handover procedure requiring a circuit connection between MSC-A and MSC-B + +The procedure used for successful Inter-MSC Handover is shown in figure 12. Initiation of the handover procedure is described in clause 5. The procedure described in this clause makes use of messages from the 3GPP TS 48.008 [5] and of the transport mechanism from the Mobile Application Part (MAP) (3GPP TS 29.002 [12]). After an Inter-MSC handover further Intra-MSC handovers may occur on MSC-B, these handovers will follow the procedures specified in the previous clause. + +![Sequence diagram of the Basic Handover Procedure requiring a circuit connection between MSC-A and MSC-B. The diagram shows the interaction between MS/BSS-A, MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-B/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence starts with A-HO-REQUIRED from MS/BSS-A to MSC-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Handover req. to MSC-B. MSC-B sends MAP-Allocate-Handover-Number req. to VLR-B. MSC-B sends A-HO-REQUEST to BSS-B/MS. BSS-B/MS sends A-HO-REQUEST-ACK to MSC-B. MSC-B sends MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. to VLR-B. VLR-B sends MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) to MSC-B. MSC-A sends IAM to MSC-B. MSC-B sends ACM to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-HO-COMMAND to MS/BSS-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. to MSC-B. MSC-B sends A-HO-DETECT to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-CLR-CMD/COM to MS/BSS-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal req. to MSC-B. MSC-B sends A-HO-COMPLETE to MSC-A. MSC-A sends ANSWER to MSC-B. MSC-A sends RELEASE to MSC-B. MSC-B sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to MSC-A. The diagram ends with 'End of call' at MSC-A.](bc9d0c0b02cbe628b1b6548cc1107734_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant MS/BSS-A + participant MSC-A + participant MSC-B + participant BSS-B/MS + participant VLR-B + + Note left of MS/BSS-A: End of call + MS/BSS-A->>MSC-A: A-HO-REQUIRED + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Handover req. + MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Allocate-Handover-Number req. + MSC-B->>BSS-B/MS: A-HO-REQUEST + BSS-B/MS-->>MSC-B: A-HO-REQUEST-ACK + MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. + VLR-B-->>MSC-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) + MSC-A->>MSC-B: IAM + MSC-B-->>MSC-A: ACM + MSC-A->>MS/BSS-A: A-HO-COMMAND + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. + MSC-B->>MSC-A: A-HO-DETECT + MSC-A->>MS/BSS-A: A-CLR-CMD/COM + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + MSC-B->>MSC-A: A-HO-COMPLETE + MSC-A-->>MSC-B: ANSWER + MSC-A->>MSC-B: RELEASE + MSC-B-->>MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram of the Basic Handover Procedure requiring a circuit connection between MSC-A and MSC-B. The diagram shows the interaction between MS/BSS-A, MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-B/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence starts with A-HO-REQUIRED from MS/BSS-A to MSC-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Handover req. to MSC-B. MSC-B sends MAP-Allocate-Handover-Number req. to VLR-B. MSC-B sends A-HO-REQUEST to BSS-B/MS. BSS-B/MS sends A-HO-REQUEST-ACK to MSC-B. MSC-B sends MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. to VLR-B. VLR-B sends MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) to MSC-B. MSC-A sends IAM to MSC-B. MSC-B sends ACM to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-HO-COMMAND to MS/BSS-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. to MSC-B. MSC-B sends A-HO-DETECT to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-CLR-CMD/COM to MS/BSS-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal req. to MSC-B. MSC-B sends A-HO-COMPLETE to MSC-A. MSC-A sends ANSWER to MSC-B. MSC-A sends RELEASE to MSC-B. MSC-B sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to MSC-A. The diagram ends with 'End of call' at MSC-A. + +NOTE 1: Can be sent at any time after the reception of IAM. + +**Figure 12: Basic Handover Procedure requiring a circuit connection** + +The handover is initiated as described in subclause 6.1. (This is represented by A-HO-REQUIRED in figure 12. Upon receipt of the A-HO-REQUIRED from BSS-A, MSC-A shall send a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request to MSC-B including a complete A-HO-REQUEST message. + +NOTE: MSC-A shall not send further MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER requests while a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response is pending or before any timeouts. + +The MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request shall carry in the A-HO-REQUEST all information needed by MSC-B for allocating a radio channel, see 3GPP TS 48.008 [5]. For compatibility reasons, the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request will also identify the cell to which the call is to be handed over. For speech calls, MSC-A shall also include the Iu Supported Codecs List to be used by MSC-B for subsequent intra-MSC-B intersystem handover to UMTS and intra-MSC-B SRNS relocation. + +If MSC-A supports A interface over IP, then for speech calls MSC-A may include the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. If handover to an A over IP capable BSS-B is performed, MSC-B shall include a Codec List (MSC preferred) in the A-HO-REQUEST message to BSS-B. MSC-B may select the codecs for the Codec List (MSC preferred) from the channel type information and the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), if this list was provided by MSC-A in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. For a detailed description of the handling of these codec lists by MSC-A and MSC-B see 3GPP TS 23.153 [25]. If the AoIP-Supported Codecs List was not provided or MSC-B does not support the selection of codecs from the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), then MSC-B shall create the Codec List (MSC preferred) using the channel type information received from MSC-A in the A-HO-REQUEST message included in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. + +If MSC-A supports handover to a CSG cell, the target cell belongs to the registered PLMN or an equivalent PLMN, and the HLR or the CSS provided CSG subscription data, MSC-A shall include the CSG subscription data for the registered PLMN and, if available, for the equivalent PLMNs in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. + +MSC-B will return the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response after having retrieved a Handover Number from its associated VLR (exchange of the messages MAP-allocate-handover-number request and MAP-send-handover-report request). The Handover Number shall be used for routing the connection of the call from MSC-A to MSC-B. If a traffic channel is available in MSC-B the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response, sent to MSC-A will contain the complete A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE message received from BSS-B, containing the radio resources definition to be sent by BSS-A to the MS and possible extra BSSMAP information, amended by MSC-B due to the possible interworking between the BSSMAP protocol carried on the E-interface and the BSSMAP protocol used on the A-interface. If the traffic channel allocation is queued by BSS-B, the A-QUEUING-INDICATION may optionally be sent back to MSC-A. The further traffic channel allocation result (A-HO-REQUEST-ACK or A-HO-FAILURE) will be transferred to MSC-A using the MAP-PROCESS-ACCESS-SIGNALLING request. If the traffic channel allocation is not possible, the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response containing an A-HO-FAILURE will be sent to MSC-A. MSC-B will do the same if a fault is detected on the identity of the cell where the call has to be handed over. MSC-B simply reports the events related to the dialogue. It is up to MSC-A to decide the action to perform if it receives negative responses or the operation fails due to the expiry of the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER timer. + +If A interface over IP is supported, then for speech calls via an A over IP capable BSS-B the selection of the speech codec shall be as described in 3GPP TS 48.008 [5], and if no transcoder is inserted in the BSS-B then MSC-B shall insert a transcoder. + +If MSC-A provided an AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request and MSC-B selected the codecs for the Codec List (MSC preferred) from the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), MSC-B may send the AoIP-Selected Codec (Target) and AoIP-Available Codecs List (MAP) to MSC-A in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response. + +If BSS-B does not support A interface over IP or MSC-A did not include the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE HANDOVER request, then MSC-B shall not include the AoIP-Selected Codec (Target) and AoIP-Available Codecs List (MAP) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response. Reception of AoIP-Selected Codec (Target) and AoIP Available Codecs List (MAP) from MSC-B with the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response indicates to MSC-A that the target access supports A interface over IP. + +If an error related to the TCAP dialogue or to the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request is returned from MSC-B, this will be indicated to MSC-A and MSC-A will terminate the handover attempt. MSC-A may retry the handover attempt using the cell identity list, if provided, or may reject the handover attempt towards BSS-A. The existing connection to the MS shall not be cleared. + +When the A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE has been received, MSC-A shall establish a circuit between MSC-A and MSC-B by signalling procedures supported by the network. In figure 12 this is illustrated by the messages IAM (Initial Address Message) and ACM (Address Complete Message) of Signalling System no 7. MSC-B awaits the capturing of the MS (subclause 6.1) on the radio path when the ACM is sent and MSC-A initiates the handover execution when ACM is received (illustrated by the A-HO-COMMAND and described in the subclause 6.1). + +If the BSS-A was connected via an A interface over IP and no transcoding performed in the BSS then MSC-A shall remove the transcoder between the MSC and the other party. + +MSC-B transfers to MSC-A the acknowledgement received from the correct MS (A-HO-DETECT/A-HO-COMPLETE). The A-HO-DETECT, if received, is transferred to MSC-A using the MAP-PROCESS-ACCESS-SIGNALLING request. The A-HO-COMPLETE, when received from the correct MS, is included in the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request and sent back to MSC-A. The circuit is through-connected in MSC-A when the A-HO-DETECT or the A-HO-COMPLETE is received from MSC-B. The old radio channel is released when the A-HO-COMPLETE message is received from MSC-B. The sending of the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request starts the MAP supervision timer for the MAP dialogue between MSC-A and MSC-B. When the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request including the A-HO-COMPLETE message is received in MSC-A the resources in BSS-A shall be cleared. + +In order not to conflict with the PSTN/ISDN signalling system(s) used between MSC-A and MSC-B, MSC-B must generate an answer signal when A-HO-DETECT/COMPLETE is received. + +MSC-B shall release the Handover Number when the circuit between MSC-A and MSC-B has been established. + +If the circuit between MSC-A and MSC-B cannot be established (e.g. an unsuccessful backward message is received instead of ACM). MSC-A terminates the inter-MSC handover attempt by sending an appropriate MAP message, for example an ABORT. MSC-A may retry the handover at this point, see subclause 6.1. + +MSC-A shall retain overall call control until the call is cleared by the fixed subscriber or the MS and there is no further call control functions to be performed (e.g. servicing waiting calls, echo cancellers). + +When MSC-A clears the call to the MS it also clears the call control functions in MSC-A and sends the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response to release the MAP resources in MSC-B. + +MSC-A may terminate the procedure at any time by sending an appropriate MAP message to MSC-B. If establishment of the circuit between MSC-A and MSC-B has been initiated, the circuit must also be cleared. + +The handover will be aborted by MSC-A if it detects clearing or interruption of the radio path before the call has been established on MSC-B. + +## 7.2 Basic handover procedure not requiring the establishment of a circuit connection between MSC-A and MSC-B + +The basic handover procedures to be used when no circuit connection is required by MSC-A are similar to those described in subclause 7.1 for circuit switched calls. The main differences to the procedures described in subclause 7.1 relate to the establishment of circuits between the network entities and the Handover Number allocation. + +In the case of ongoing GSM voice group calls the circuit connections are already established therefore the procedures described in this clause are also applicable. When applied to ongoing voice group calls the clearing of resources on BSS-A shall not be used if the resources are still be used on the down link. Consequently the A-CLEAR-COMMAND message shall not be sent, but an HANDOVER-SUCCEEDED message shall be sent. + +In the case of basic handover, MSC-A shall specify to MSC-B that no Handover Number is required in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request (see 3GPP TS 29.002 [12]). As for the basic handover using a circuit connection, the A-HO-REQUEST is transmitted at the same time. Any subsequent Handover Number allocation procedure will not be invoked until the completion of the basic handover procedure (see clause: Subsequent Channel Assignment using a circuit connection). MSC-B shall then perform the radio resources allocation as described in subclause 7.1. The MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response shall be returned to MSC-A including either the response of the radio resources allocation request received from BSS-B (A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE/A-HO-FAILURE with possible extra BSSMAP information. These extra information are amended by MSC-B due to the possible interworking between the BSSMAP protocol carried on the E-interface and the BSSMAP protocol used on the A-interface) or potentially the A-QUEUING-INDICATION. The basic handover procedure will continue as described in subclause 7.1 except that no circuit connection will be established towards MSC-B. + +The relevant case for the basic handover without circuit connection is shown in figure 13. As can be seen the major differences to the equivalent figure 12 is the omission of any circuit establishment messaging and the omission of handover number allocation signalling. + +![Sequence diagram of the Basic Handover Procedure without circuit connection. The diagram shows five lifelines: MS/BSS-A, MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-B/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. MS/BSS-A sends A-HO-REQUIRED to MSC-A. 2. MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Handover req. to MSC-B. 3. MSC-B sends A-HO-REQUEST to BSS-B/MS. 4. BSS-B/MS sends A-HO-REQUEST-ACK to MSC-B. 5. MSC-B sends MAP-Prep-Handover resp. to MSC-A. 6. MSC-A sends A-HO-COMMAND to MS/BSS-A. 7. MSC-B sends A-HO-DETECT to BSS-B/MS. 8. BSS-B/MS sends A-HO-COMPLETE to MSC-B. 9. MSC-B sends MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. to MSC-A. 10. MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal req. to MSC-B. 11. MSC-B sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to MSC-A. 12. MSC-A sends A-CLR-CMD/COM to MS/BSS-A. 13. MSC-A sends End of link to MSC-B. Vertical bars on the lifelines indicate active periods for the entities.](a161a2bbb4d830e847ccb4f44b7e41a9_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram of the Basic Handover Procedure without circuit connection. The diagram shows five lifelines: MS/BSS-A, MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-B/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. MS/BSS-A sends A-HO-REQUIRED to MSC-A. 2. MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Handover req. to MSC-B. 3. MSC-B sends A-HO-REQUEST to BSS-B/MS. 4. BSS-B/MS sends A-HO-REQUEST-ACK to MSC-B. 5. MSC-B sends MAP-Prep-Handover resp. to MSC-A. 6. MSC-A sends A-HO-COMMAND to MS/BSS-A. 7. MSC-B sends A-HO-DETECT to BSS-B/MS. 8. BSS-B/MS sends A-HO-COMPLETE to MSC-B. 9. MSC-B sends MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. to MSC-A. 10. MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal req. to MSC-B. 11. MSC-B sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to MSC-A. 12. MSC-A sends A-CLR-CMD/COM to MS/BSS-A. 13. MSC-A sends End of link to MSC-B. Vertical bars on the lifelines indicate active periods for the entities. + +Figure 13: Basic Handover Procedure without circuit connection + +## 7.3 Procedure for subsequent handover requiring a circuit connection + +After the call has been handed over to MSC-B, if the MS leaves the area of MSC-B during the same call, subsequent handover is necessary in order to continue the connection. + +The following cases apply: + +- i) the MS moves back to the area of MSC-A; +- ii) the MS moves into the area of a third MSC (MSC-B'). + +In both cases the call is switched in MSC-A; the circuit between MSC-A and MSC-B shall be released after a successful subsequent handover has been performed. + +### 7.3.1 Description of subsequent handover procedure i): MSC-B to MSC-A + +The procedure for successful handover from MSC-B back to MSC-A is shown in figure 14. + +![Sequence diagram of subsequent handover procedure i): successful handover from MSC-B to MSC-A using a circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between MS/BSS-B, MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-A/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. MSC-B sends A-HO-REQUIRED to BSS-A/MS. 2. BSS-A/MS sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. to MSC-A. 3. MSC-A sends A-HO-REQUEST to MS/BSS-B. 4. MS/BSS-B sends A-HO-REQUEST-ACK to MSC-A. 5. MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. to MSC-B. 6. MSC-B sends A-HO-COMMAND to BSS-A/MS. 7. BSS-A/MS sends A-HO-DETECT to MS/BSS-B. 8. MS/BSS-B sends A-HO-COMPLETE to MSC-A. 9. MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to MSC-B. 10. MSC-B sends A-CLR-CMD/COM to BSS-A/MS. 11. MSC-A sends Release to MSC-B.](69e5f1993021af230d08c08aac97d9df_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant MS/BSS-B + participant MSC-A + participant MSC-B + participant BSS-A/MS + participant VLR-B + + MSC-B->>BSS-A/MS: A-HO-REQUIRED + BSS-A/MS->>MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + MSC-A->>MS/BSS-B: A-HO-REQUEST + MS/BSS-B->>MSC-A: A-HO-REQUEST-ACK + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. + MSC-B->>BSS-A/MS: A-HO-COMMAND + BSS-A/MS->>MS/BSS-B: A-HO-DETECT + MS/BSS-B->>MSC-A: A-HO-COMPLETE + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + MSC-B->>BSS-A/MS: A-CLR-CMD/COM + MSC-A-->>MSC-B: Release + +``` + +Sequence diagram of subsequent handover procedure i): successful handover from MSC-B to MSC-A using a circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between MS/BSS-B, MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-A/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. MSC-B sends A-HO-REQUIRED to BSS-A/MS. 2. BSS-A/MS sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. to MSC-A. 3. MSC-A sends A-HO-REQUEST to MS/BSS-B. 4. MS/BSS-B sends A-HO-REQUEST-ACK to MSC-A. 5. MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. to MSC-B. 6. MSC-B sends A-HO-COMMAND to BSS-A/MS. 7. BSS-A/MS sends A-HO-DETECT to MS/BSS-B. 8. MS/BSS-B sends A-HO-COMPLETE to MSC-A. 9. MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to MSC-B. 10. MSC-B sends A-CLR-CMD/COM to BSS-A/MS. 11. MSC-A sends Release to MSC-B. + +**Figure 14: Subsequent handover procedure i):successful handover from MSC-B to MSC-A using a circuit connection** + +The procedure is as follows. + +MSC-B sends the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request to MSC-A indicating the new MSC number(MSC-A number), indicating also the identity of the cell where the call has to be handed over and including a complete A-HO-REQUEST message. (NOTE: MSC-B shall not send further MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER requests while a handover attempt is pending or before any timeouts). Since MSC-A is the call controlling MSC, this MSC needs no Handover Number for routing purposes; MSC-A can immediately initiate the search for a free radio channel. + +When a radio channel can be assigned, MSC-A shall return in the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response the complete A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE message received from the BSS-B and possible extra BSSMAP information, amended by MSC-A due to the possible interworking between the BSSMAP protocol carried on the E-interface and the BSSMAP protocol used on the A-interface. If the traffic channel allocation is queued by BSS-B, the A-QUEUING-INDICATION may optionally be sent back to MSC-B. The further traffic channel allocation result (A-HO-REQUEST-ACK or A-HO-FAILURE) will be transferred to MSC-B using the MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING request. If a radio channel cannot be assigned or if a fault is detected on the target cell identity, or the target cell identity in the A-HO-REQUEST is not consistent with the target MSC number, the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response containing an A-HO-FAILURE message shall be given to MSC-B, in addition MSC-B shall maintain the connection with the MS. + +If the procedure in MSC-A is successful then MSC-B can request the MS to return to the new BSS-B on MSC-A. This is illustrated in figure 14 by the A-HO-COMMAND message. The operation is successfully completed when MSC-A receives the A-HO-COMPLETE message. + +After handover MSC-A shall release the circuit to MSC-B. + +MSC-A must also terminate the MAP procedure for the basic handover between MSC-A and MSC-B by sending an appropriate MAP message. MSC-B will clear the resources in BSS-A when the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response is received. + +### 7.3.2 Description of the subsequent handover procedure ii): MSC-B to MSC-B' + +The procedure for successful handover from MSC-B to MSC-B' is shown in figure 15. + +The procedure consists of two parts: + +- a subsequent handover from MSC-B back to MSC-A as described in subclause 7.3.1 (the same procedures apply if MSC-A is replaced by 3G\_MSC-A); and +- a basic handover from MSC-A to MSC-B' as described in subclause 7.1. + +MSC-B sends the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request to MSC-A indicating a new MSC number (which is the identity of MSC-B'), indicating also the target cell identity and including a complete A-HO-REQUEST, MSC-A then starts a basic handover procedure towards MSC-B'. + +If MSC-A supports A interface over IP, then for speech calls MSC-A may include the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request towards MSC-B'. For a detailed description of the handling of this codec list by MSC-A and MSC-B' see 3GPP TS 23.153 [25]. + +When MSC-A receives the ACM from MSC-B', MSC-A informs MSC-B that MSC-B' has successfully allocated the radio resources on BSS-B' side by sending the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response containing the complete A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE received from BSS-B' and possible extra BSSMAP information, amended by MSC-A due to the possible interworking between the BSSMAP protocol carried on the E-interface between MSC-A and MSC-B' and the BSSMAP protocol carried on the E-interface between MSC-A and MSC-B. Now MSC-B can start the procedure on the radio path. + +For MSC-A the handover is completed when it has received the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL REQUEST from MSC-B' containing the A-HO-COMPLETE received from the BSS-B'. The circuit between MSC-A and MSC-B is released. MSC-A also sends the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response to MSC-B in order to terminate the original MAP dialogue between MSC-A and MSC-B. MSC-B releases the radio resources when it receives this message. + +If the traffic channel allocation is queued by the BSS-B', the A-QUEUING-INDICATION may optionally be sent back to MSC-B. If no radio channel can be allocated by MSC-B' or no circuit between MSC-A and MSC-B' can be established or a fault is detected on the target cell identity or the target cell identity in the A-HO-REQUEST is not consistent with the target MSC number, MSC-A informs MSC-B by using the A-HO-FAILURE message included in the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response. MSC-B shall maintain the existing connection with the MS. + +When the subsequent handover is completed, MSC-B' is considered as MSC-B. Any further inter-MSC handover is handled as described above for a subsequent handover. + +![Sequence diagram of a successful subsequent handover from MSC-B to MSC-B' requiring a circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between MS/BSS, MSC-A, MSC-B, MSC-B', VLR-B, and VLR-B'. The process involves A-HO-REQUIRED, MAP-Prepare-Handover, IAM, ACM, A-HO-DETECT, MAP-Process-Access-Signalling, A-HO-COMPLETE, and final release signaling.](8d66c9c295023a1380f9986d3663bb1e_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant MS/BSS + participant MSC-A + participant MSC-B + participant MSC-B' + participant VLR-B + participant VLR-B' + + Note right of MS/BSS: (end of call) + MS/BSS->>MSC-B: A-HO-REQUIRED + MSC-B->>MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Prepare-Handover req. + MSC-B->>MSC-B': MAP-Prepare-Handover resp. + MSC-B'->>VLR-B': MAP-Allocate-Handover-Number req. + VLR-B'->>MSC-B': MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. + MSC-B'-->>MSC-A: IAM + MSC-B'-->>VLR-B': MAP-Send-Handover-Rep. resp. (1) + MSC-A-->>MSC-B: ACM + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Ho resp. + MSC-B->>MS/BSS: A-HO-COMMAND + MS/BSS->>MSC-B': A-HO-DETECT + MSC-B'->>MSC-A: MAP-Process-Access-Signalling req. + MSC-B'->>MSC-B: A-HO-COMPLETE + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + MSC-A-->>MSC-B: Answer + MSC-A-->>MSC-B: Release + MSC-B->>MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + MSC-B->>MS/BSS: A-CLR-CMD/COM + MSC-A-->>MSC-B': Release + MSC-A->>MSC-B': MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram of a successful subsequent handover from MSC-B to MSC-B' requiring a circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between MS/BSS, MSC-A, MSC-B, MSC-B', VLR-B, and VLR-B'. The process involves A-HO-REQUIRED, MAP-Prepare-Handover, IAM, ACM, A-HO-DETECT, MAP-Process-Access-Signalling, A-HO-COMPLETE, and final release signaling. + +NOTE 1: Can be sent at any time after the reception of IAM. + +**Figure 15: Subsequent handover procedure ii): Successful handover from MSC-B to MSC-B' requiring a circuit connection** + +## 7.4 Procedure for subsequent handover not requiring a circuit connection + +As for the subsequent handover with a circuit connection, the same two cases of subsequent handover apply: + +- the MS moves back to the area of MSC-A; +- the MS moves into the area of a third MSC (MSC-B'). + +### 7.4.1 Description of the subsequent handover procedure without circuit connection i): MSC-B to MSC-A + +The procedure for successful handover from MSC-B back to MSC-A without circuit connection is shown in figure 16. The only difference with the figure 14, is that no circuit release is needed between MSC-A and MSC-B. + +![Sequence diagram for subsequent handover procedure i): Successful handover from MSC-B to MSC-A not requiring a circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between MS/BSS-B, MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-A/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. A-HO-REQUIRED from BSS-A/MS to MSC-B. 2. MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. from MSC-B to MSC-A. 3. A-HO-REQUEST from MSC-A to MS/BSS-B. 4. A-HO-REQUEST-ACK from MS/BSS-B to MSC-A. 5. MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. from MSC-A to MSC-B. 6. A-HO-COMMAND from MSC-B to BSS-A/MS. 7. A-HO-DETECT from MS/BSS-B to MSC-A. 8. A-HO-COMPLETE from MS/BSS-B to MSC-A. 9. MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. from MSC-A to MSC-B. 10. A-CLR-CMD/COM from MSC-B to BSS-A/MS.](9cbc1ebd80813fc36e499f7d70ed6881_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant MS/BSS-B + participant MSC-A + participant MSC-B + participant BSS-A/MS + participant VLR-B + + Note left of MS/BSS-B: MS/BSS-B and BSS-A/MS are connected by a dashed line + BSS-A/MS->>MSC-B: A-HO-REQUIRED + MSC-B->>MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + MSC-A->>MS/BSS-B: A-HO-REQUEST + MS/BSS-B->>MSC-A: A-HO-REQUEST-ACK + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. + MSC-B->>BSS-A/MS: A-HO-COMMAND + MS/BSS-B->>MSC-A: A-HO-DETECT + MS/BSS-B->>MSC-A: A-HO-COMPLETE + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + MSC-B->>BSS-A/MS: A-CLR-CMD/COM + +``` + +Sequence diagram for subsequent handover procedure i): Successful handover from MSC-B to MSC-A not requiring a circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between MS/BSS-B, MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-A/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. A-HO-REQUIRED from BSS-A/MS to MSC-B. 2. MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. from MSC-B to MSC-A. 3. A-HO-REQUEST from MSC-A to MS/BSS-B. 4. A-HO-REQUEST-ACK from MS/BSS-B to MSC-A. 5. MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. from MSC-A to MSC-B. 6. A-HO-COMMAND from MSC-B to BSS-A/MS. 7. A-HO-DETECT from MS/BSS-B to MSC-A. 8. A-HO-COMPLETE from MS/BSS-B to MSC-A. 9. MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. from MSC-A to MSC-B. 10. A-CLR-CMD/COM from MSC-B to BSS-A/MS. + +**Figure 16: Subsequent handover procedure i): Successful handover from MSC-B to MSC-A not requiring a circuit connection** + +### 7.4.2 Description of the subsequent handover procedure without circuit connection ii): MSC-B to MSC-B' + +The procedure for successful handover from MSC-B to MSC-B' is shown in figure 17. + +The procedure consists of two parts: + +- a subsequent handover from MSC-B back to MSC-A as described in subclause 7.4.1 (the same procedures apply if MSC-A is replaced by 3G\_MSC-A); and +- a basic handover from MSC-A to MSC-B' as described in subclause 7.2. + +The only difference to the equivalent figure 15 is the omission of the circuit and handover number allocation signallings. + +![Sequence diagram for Subsequent handover procedure ii: Successful handover from MSC-B to MSC-B' without circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between MS/BSS, MSC-A, MSC-B, MSC-B', VLR-B, and VLR-B'. The process involves A-HO-REQUIRED, MAP-Prepare-Handover, A-HO-DETECT, and A-HO-COMPLETE messages, with a break in the link between MSC-B and MSC-B'.](187d05bf7ead21e1394b61320d8b3632_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant MS/BSS + participant MSC-A + participant MSC-B + participant MSC-B' + participant VLR-B + participant VLR-B' + + Note left of MSC-A: (end of link) + MSC-B->>MSC-B': A-HO-DETECT + Note right of MSC-B': break + MSC-B'-->>MSC-A: MAP-Process-Access-Signalling req. + MSC-B'->>MSC-B: A-HO-COMPLETE + Note left of MSC-A: (end of link) + MSC-B'-->>MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + MSC-B->>MSC-B': MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + Note right of MSC-B': break + MSC-B->>MSC-A: A-CLR-CMD/COM + Note left of MSC-A: (end of link) + MSC-B'-->>MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Subsequent handover procedure ii: Successful handover from MSC-B to MSC-B' without circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between MS/BSS, MSC-A, MSC-B, MSC-B', VLR-B, and VLR-B'. The process involves A-HO-REQUIRED, MAP-Prepare-Handover, A-HO-DETECT, and A-HO-COMPLETE messages, with a break in the link between MSC-B and MSC-B'. + +**Figure 17: Subsequent handover procedure ii): Successful handover from MSC-B to MSC-B' without circuit connection** + +# 8 General Description of the procedures for inter - 3G\_MSC handovers + +## 8.1 Handover UMTS to GSM + +The following clauses describe two options for the Basic and Subsequent UMTS to GSM Handover procedures. The first, as described in subclauses 8.1.1 and 8.1.3 respectively, provides for a circuit connection between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. The second, as described in subclauses 8.1.2 and 8.1.4 respectively, provides for a Basic and Subsequent Handover without the provision of a circuit connection between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC can also be a pure GSM MSC. + +In all the above mentioned clauses, the following principles apply: + +- during the handover resource allocation, except for the messages explicitly indicated in b and c below, only the handover related messages that are part of the applicable BSSAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] - shall be transferred on the E-interface; +- the trace related messages that are part of the applicable BSSAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7]- can be sent by the 3G\_MSC-A on the E-interface after successful handover resource allocation. In the subclauses 8.1.1 and 8.1.2, it is however allowed at basic handover initiation on the E-Interface to transfer one trace related message that is part of the applicable BSSAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] - together with the applicable handover related message. The applicable handover related message shall always appear as the first message; + +- c) during the handover resource allocation for subsequent inter-MSC inter-system handover according to subclauses 8.1.3 and 8.1.4, it is allowed to transfer either DTAP or RANAP Direct Transfer messages on the E-Interface between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. RANAP Direct Transfer messages shall be used for this purpose if and only if the basic handover procedure was an inter MSC SRNS relocation; +- d) during the handover execution, i.e. while the UE/MS is not in communication with the network, the 3G\_MSC-A shall queue all outgoing BSSAP or RANAP messages until the communication with the UE/MS is resumed; +- e) during the execution of a basic inter-system inter-MSC handover to MSC-B or a subsequent inter-system inter-MSC handover to a third MSC-B', only the handover related messages and the A-Clear-Request message that are part of the applicable BSSAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] – may be sent by the target MSC on the E-interface; +- f) during a subsequent inter-system inter-MSC handover back to 3G\_MSC-A or to a third MSC-B', 3G\_MSC-B may initiate either an Iu-Release-Request procedure or an A-Clear-Request procedure on the E-interface. An Iu-Release-Request procedure shall be initiated only if the basic handover procedure was an inter-MSC SRNS relocation; +- g) finally, during supervision, i.e. while the UE/MS is not in the area of 3G\_MSC-A after a successful Inter-3G\_MSC handover, the subset of BSSAP procedures and their related messages - as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] - shall apply on the E-Interface. As the only exception to this rule, in case of a subsequent inter-MSC SRNS relocation back to 3G\_MSC-A or to a third 3G\_MSC-B', during the relocation resource allocation, the relocation and trace related messages that are part of the applicable RANAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 29.108 [15] - shall be transferred on the E-interface (see subclause 8.3, a and b). + +If a subsequent inter-MSC handover/relocation back to 3G\_MSC-A or to a third 3G\_MSC-B' is cancelled, then the supervision continues, and BSSAP procedures and their related messages shall apply on the E-interface. + +NOTE: A subsequent inter-MSC SRNS relocation back to 3G\_MSC-A or to a third 3G\_MSC-B' can occur, e.g., if after the basic inter-MSC handover to 3G\_MSC-B the MS performed a subsequent intra-3G\_MSC-B GSM to UMTS inter-system handover; + +- h) during the intra-3G\_MSC -B handover execution, if any, the 3G\_MSC -B shall queue all outgoing BSSAP or RANAP messages until the communication with the UE/MS is resumed. + +### 8.1.1 Basic Handover procedure requiring a circuit connection between 3G\_MSC -A and MSC-B + +The procedure used for successful Inter-3G\_MSC UMTS to GSM Handover is shown in figure 18. Initiation of the UMTS to GSM handover procedure is described in clause 5. The procedure described in this clause makes use of messages from the 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] and of the transport mechanism from the Mobile Application Part (MAP) (3GPP TS 29.002 [12]). After an Inter-3G\_MSC relocation/handover, Intra-3G\_MSC UMTS to GSM handover may occur on 3G\_MSC -B, this handover will follow the procedures specified in a previous clause. + +![Sequence diagram of Basic UMTS to GSM Handover Procedure requiring a circuit connection. Lifelines: UE/MS/RNS-A, 3G MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-B/MS/UE, VLR-B. The process involves Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED, MAP-Prep-Handover req., MAP-Allocate-Handover-Number req., A-HO-REQUEST, A-HO-REQUEST-ACK, MAP-Prep-Handover resp., MAP-Send-Handover-Report req., IAM, MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1), Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND, ACM, MAP-Process-Access-Sig req., A-HO-DETECT, Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM, MAP-Send-End-Signal req., A-HO-COMPLETE, ANSWER, RELEASE, and MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. The diagram ends with 'End of call'.](a0e8fe7862a6d7341faf5dac275277cc_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS/RNS-A + participant 3G MSC-A + participant MSC-B + participant BSS-B/MS/UE + participant VLR-B + + Note left of UE/MS/RNS-A: Error: Reference source not + UE/MS/RNS-A->>3G MSC-A: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + 3G MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Handover req. + MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Allocate-Handover-Number req. + MSC-B->>BSS-B/MS/UE: A-HO-REQUEST + BSS-B/MS/UE->>MSC-B: A-HO-REQUEST-ACK + MSC-B->>3G MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Handover resp. + MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. + 3G MSC-A->>MSC-B: IAM + MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) + 3G MSC-A->>UE/MS/RNS-A: Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND + 3G MSC-A->>MSC-B: ACM + 3G MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. + MSC-B->>BSS-B/MS/UE: A-HO-DETECT + 3G MSC-A->>UE/MS/RNS-A: Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM + 3G MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + MSC-B->>BSS-B/MS/UE: A-HO-COMPLETE + 3G MSC-A->>MSC-B: ANSWER + Note left of 3G MSC-A: End of call + 3G MSC-A->>MSC-B: RELEASE + 3G MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram of Basic UMTS to GSM Handover Procedure requiring a circuit connection. Lifelines: UE/MS/RNS-A, 3G MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-B/MS/UE, VLR-B. The process involves Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED, MAP-Prep-Handover req., MAP-Allocate-Handover-Number req., A-HO-REQUEST, A-HO-REQUEST-ACK, MAP-Prep-Handover resp., MAP-Send-Handover-Report req., IAM, MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1), Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND, ACM, MAP-Process-Access-Sig req., A-HO-DETECT, Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM, MAP-Send-End-Signal req., A-HO-COMPLETE, ANSWER, RELEASE, and MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. The diagram ends with 'End of call'. + +NOTE 1: Can be sent at any time after the reception of IAM. + +**Figure 18: Basic UMTS to GSM Handover Procedure requiring a circuit connection** + +#### 8.1.1.1 With one circuit connection + +The UMTS to GSM handover is initiated as described in subclause 6.2.1. (This is represented by Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED in figure 18). Upon receipt of the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-A, 3G MSC-A shall send a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request to MSC-B including a complete A-HO-REQUEST message. + +NOTE: 3G MSC-A shall not send further MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER requests while a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response is pending or before any timeouts. + +The MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request shall carry in the A-HO-REQUEST all information needed by MSC-B for allocating a radio channel, see 3GPP TS 08.08. For compatibility reasons, the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request will also identify the cell to which the call is to be handed over. For speech calls, 3G MSC-A shall also include the Iu Supported Codecs List to be used by MSC-B for subsequent intra-MSC-B intersystem handover to UMTS and intra-MSC-B SRNS relocation. + +If 3G MSC-A supports A interface over IP, then for speech calls 3G MSC-A may include the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. If handover to an A over IP capable BSS-B is performed, MSC-B shall include a Codec List (MSC preferred) in the A-HO-REQUEST message to BSS-B. MSC-B may select the codecs for the Codec List (MSC preferred) from the channel type information and the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), if this list was provided by 3G MSC-A in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. For a detailed description of the handling of these codec lists by 3G MSC-A and MSC-B see 3GPP TS 23.153 [25]. If the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) was not provided or MSC-B does not support the selection of codecs from the AoIP-Supported Codecs List, then MSC-B shall create the Codec List (MSC preferred) using the channel type information received from 3G MSC-A in the A-HO-REQUEST message included in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. + +If 3G MSC-A supports handover/relocation to a CSG cell, the target cell belongs to the registered PLMN or an equivalent PLMN, and the HLR or the CSS provided CSG subscription data, 3G MSC-A shall include the CSG subscription data for the registered PLMN and, if available, for the equivalent PLMNs in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. + +MSC-B will return the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response after having retrieved a Handover Number from its associated VLR (exchange of the messages MAP-allocate-handover-number request and MAP-send-handover-report request). The Handover Number shall be used for routing the connection of the call from 3G\_MSC-A to MSC-B. If a traffic channel is available in MSC-B the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response, sent to 3G\_MSC-A will contain the complete A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE message received from BSS-B, containing the radio resources definition to be sent by RNS-A to the UE/MS and possible extra BSSMAP information, amended by MSC-B due to the possible interworking between the BSSMAP protocol carried on the E-interface and the BSSMAP protocol used on the A-interface. If the traffic channel allocation is queued by BSS-B, the A-QUEUING-INDICATION may optionally be sent back to 3G\_MSC-A. The further traffic channel allocation result (A-HO-REQUEST-ACK or A-HO-FAILURE) will be transferred to 3G\_MSC-A using the MAP-PROCESS-ACCESS-SIGNALLING request. If the traffic channel allocation is not possible, the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response containing an A-HO-FAILURE will be sent to 3G\_MSC-A. MSC-B will do the same if a fault is detected on the identity of the cell where the call has to be handed over. MSC-B simply reports the events related to the dialogue. It is up to 3G\_MSC-A to decide the action to perform if it receives negative responses or the operation fails due to the expiry of the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER timer. + +If A interface over IP is supported, then for speech calls via an A over IP capable BSS-B the selection of the speech codec shall be as described in 3GPP TS 48.008 [5], and if no transcoder is inserted in the BSS-B then MSC-B shall insert a transcoder. + +If 3G\_MSC-A provided an AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request and MSC-B selected the codecs for the Codec List (MSC preferred) from the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), MSC-B may send the AoIP-Selected Codec (Target) and AoIP-Available Codecs List (MAP) to 3G\_MSC-A in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response. + +If BSS-B does not support A interface over IP or 3G\_MSC-A did not include the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE HANDOVER request, then MSC-B shall not include the AoIP-Selected Codec (Target) and AoIP-Available Codecs List (MAP) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response. Reception of the AoIP-Selected Codec (Target) and AoIP Available Codecs List (MAP) from MSC-B with the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response indicates to 3G\_MSC-A that the target access supports A interface over IP. + +If an error related to the TCAP dialogue or to the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request is returned from MSC-B, this will be indicated to 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-A will terminate the handover attempt. 3G\_MSC-A rejects the handover attempt towards RNS-A. The existing connection to the UE/MS shall not be cleared. + +When the A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE has been received, 3G\_MSC-A shall establish a circuit between 3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B by signalling procedures supported by the network. In figure 18 this is illustrated by the messages IAM (Initial Address Message) and ACM (Address Complete Message) of Signalling System no 7. MSC-B awaits the capturing of the UE/MS (subclause 6.2.1) on the radio path when the ACM is sent and 3G\_MSC-A initiates the UMTS to GSM handover execution when ACM is received (illustrated by the Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND and described in subclause 6.2.1). 3G\_MSC-A removes the transcoder from the path to the other party. + +MSC-B transfers to 3G\_MSC-A the acknowledgement received from the correct UE/MS (A-HO-DETECT/A-HO-COMPLETE). The A-HO-DETECT, if received, is transferred to 3G\_MSC-A using the MAP-PROCESS-ACCESS-SIGNALLING request. The A-HO-COMPLETE, when received from the correct UE/MS, is included in the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request and sent back to 3G\_MSC-A. The circuit is through connected in 3G\_MSC-A when the A-HO-DETECT or the A-HO-COMPLETE is received from MSC-B. The old radio channel is released when the A-HO-COMPLETE message is received from MSC-B. The sending of the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request starts the MAP supervision timer for the MAP dialogue between 3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B. When the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request including the A-HO-COMPLETE message is received in 3G\_MSC-A, the resources in RNS-A shall be cleared. + +In order not to conflict with the PSTN/ISDN signalling system(s) used between 3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B, MSC-B must generate an answer signal when A-HO-DETECT/COMPLETE is received. + +MSC-B shall release the Handover Number when the circuit between 3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B has been established. + +If the circuit between 3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B cannot be established, (e.g. an unsuccessful backward message is received instead of ACM), 3G\_MSC-A terminates the inter-3G\_MSC UMTS to GSM handover attempt by sending an appropriate MAP message, for example an ABORT. + +3G\_MSC-A shall retain overall call control until the call is cleared by the fixed subscriber or the UE/MS and there is no further call control functions to be performed (e.g. servicing waiting calls, echo cancellers). + +When 3G\_MSC-A clears the call to the UE/MS it also clears the call control functions in 3G\_MSC-A and sends the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response to release the MAP resources in MSC-B. + +3G\_MSC-A may terminate the procedure at any time by sending an appropriate MAP message to MSC-B. If establishment of the circuit between 3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B has been initiated, the circuit must also be cleared. + +The UMTS to GSM handover will be aborted by 3G\_MSC-A if it detects clearing or interruption of the radio path before the call has been established on MSC-B. + +#### 8.1.1.2 With multiple circuit connections (Optional functionality) + +If 3G\_MSC-A supports the optional supplementary service Multicall (See 3GPP TS 23.135 [17]), 3G\_MSC-A shall have the following functionality additionally to the description in subclause 8.1.1.1. + +Upon receipt of the IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-A 3G\_MSC-A shall select one bearer to be handed over if the UE is engaged with multiple bearers. After that, the 3G\_MSC-A generates an A-HO-REQUEST message for the selected bearer and sends it to MSC-B over MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. + +When MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response including an A-HO-REQUEST-ACK is received from MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-A sends IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND, which indicates the bearers not to be handed over as bearers to be released, to RNS-A. + +After 3G\_MSC-A receives MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request from MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-A shall release calls via MSC-B, which has been carried by the bearers not to be handed over, and then 3G\_MSC-A sends IU-RELEASE-COMMAND to RNS-A. + +### 8.1.2 Basic UMTS to GSM Handover procedure not requiring the establishment of a circuit connection between 3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B + +The basic UMTS to GSM handover procedures to be used when no circuit connection is required by 3G\_MSC-A are similar to those described in clause 8.1.1 for circuit switched calls. The main differences to the procedures described in clause 8.1.1 relate to the establishment of circuits between the network entities and the Handover Number allocation. + +In the case of basic UMTS to GSM handover, 3G\_MSC-A shall specify to MSC-B that no Handover Number is required in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request (see 3GPP TS 29.002 [12]). As for the basic UMTS to GSM handover using a circuit connection, the A-HO-REQUEST is transmitted at the same time. Any subsequent Handover Number allocation procedure will not be invoked until the completion of the basic UMTS to GSM handover procedure (see clause: Subsequent Channel Assignment using a circuit connection). MSC-B shall then perform the radio resources allocation as described in subclause 8.1.1. The MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response shall be returned to 3G\_MSC-A including either the response of the radio resources allocation request received from BSS-B (A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE/A-HO-FAILURE with possible extra BSSMAP information. These extra information are amended by MSC-B due to the possible interworking between the BSSMAP protocol carried on the E-interface and the BSSMAP protocol used on the A-interface) or potentially the A-QUEUING-INDICATION. The basic UMTS to GSM handover procedure will continue as described in subclause 8.1.1 except that no circuit connection will be established towards MSC-B. + +The relevant case for the basic UMTS to GSM handover without circuit connection is shown in figure 19. As can be seen the major differences to the equivalent figure 18 is the omission of any circuit establishment messaging and the omission of handover number allocation signalling. + +![Sequence diagram of Basic UMTS to GSM Handover Procedure without circuit connection. Lifelines: UE/MS/RNS-A, 3G MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-B/UE/MS, VLR-B. The sequence shows the flow of signaling messages for handover preparation, execution, and completion.](2cf3896394a2342a2b46c504ab9a8830_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS/RNS-A + participant 3G MSC-A + participant MSC-B + participant BSS-B/UE/MS + participant VLR-B + + Note left of UE/MS/RNS-A: End of link + UE/MS/RNS-A->>3G MSC-A: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + 3G MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Handover req. + MSC-B->>BSS-B/UE/MS: A-HO-REQUEST + BSS-B/UE/MS-->>MSC-B: A-HO-REQUEST-ACK + MSC-B-->>3G MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Handover resp. + 3G MSC-A->>UE/MS/RNS-A: Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND + 3G MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. + MSC-B->>BSS-B/UE/MS: A-HO-DETECT + 3G MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + MSC-B->>BSS-B/UE/MS: A-HO-COMPLETE + BSS-B/UE/MS-->>3G MSC-A: Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM + 3G MSC-A-->>MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram of Basic UMTS to GSM Handover Procedure without circuit connection. Lifelines: UE/MS/RNS-A, 3G MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-B/UE/MS, VLR-B. The sequence shows the flow of signaling messages for handover preparation, execution, and completion. + +**Figure 19: Basic UMTS to GSM Handover Procedure without circuit connection** + +### 8.1.3 Procedure for subsequent UMTS to GSM handover requiring a circuit connection + +After the call has been handed over to 3G MSC-B, if the UE/MS leaves the area of 3G MSC-B during the same call and enters a GSM area, subsequent UMTS to GSM handover is necessary in order to continue the connection. + +The following cases apply: + +- i) the UE/MS moves back to the area of MSC-A; +- ii) the UE/MS moves into the area of a third MSC (MSC-B'). + +In both cases the call is switched in 3G MSC-A; the circuit between 3G MSC-A and MSC-B shall be released after a successful subsequent handover has been performed the same procedures apply if 3G MSC-A is replaced by MSC-A. + +#### 8.1.3.1 Description of subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure i): 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-A + +The procedure for successful UMTS to GSM handover from MSC-B back to 3G\_MSC-A is shown in figure 20. + +![Sequence diagram for subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure i): successful UMTS to GSM handover from 3G_MSC-B to MSC-A using a circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between UE/MS/BSS-B, MSC-A, 3G_MSC-B, RNS-A/UE/MS, and VLR-B.](c419b566d720267c499087add1506018_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS/BSS-B + participant MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC-B + participant RNS-A/UE/MS + participant VLR-B + + Note left of UE/MS/BSS-B: UE/MS/BSS-B + Note right of RNS-A/UE/MS: RNS-A/UE/MS + Note right of VLR-B: VLR-B + + 3G_MSC-B->>MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + MSC-A->>UE/MS/BSS-B: A-HO-REQUEST + UE/MS/BSS-B-->>MSC-A: A-HO-REQUEST-ACK + MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. + 3G_MSC-B->>RNS-A/UE/MS: Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND + UE/MS/BSS-B->>MSC-A: A-HO-DETECT + MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + 3G_MSC-B->>RNS-A/UE/MS: Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM + UE/MS/BSS-B->>MSC-A: A-HO-COMPLETE + MSC-A-->>3G_MSC-B: Release + +``` + +Sequence diagram for subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure i): successful UMTS to GSM handover from 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-A using a circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between UE/MS/BSS-B, MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B, RNS-A/UE/MS, and VLR-B. + +**Figure 20: Subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure i): successful UMTS to GSM handover from 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-A using a circuit connection** + +##### 8.1.3.1.1 With one circuit connection + +The procedure is as follows. + +3G\_MSC-B sends the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request to MSC-A indicating the new MSC number (MSC-A number), indicating also the identity of the cell where the call has to be handed over and including a complete A-HO-REQUEST message. (NOTE: 3G\_MSC-B shall not send further MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER requests while a handover attempt is pending or before any timeouts). Since MSC-A is the call controlling MSC, this MSC needs no Handover Number for routing purposes; MSC-A can immediately initiate the search for a free radio channel. + +When a radio channel can be assigned, MSC-A shall return in the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response the complete A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE message received from the BSS-B and possible extra BSSMAP information, amended by MSC-A due to the possible interworking between the BSSMAP protocol carried on the E-interface and the BSSMAP protocol used on the A-interface. If the traffic channel allocation is queued by BSS-B, the A-QUEUING-INDICATION may optionally be sent back to 3G\_MSC-B. The further traffic channel allocation result (A-HO-REQUEST-ACK or A-HO-FAILURE) will be transferred to 3G\_MSC-B using the MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING request. If a radio channel cannot be assigned or if a fault is detected on the target cell identity, or the target cell identity in the A-HO-REQUEST is not consistent with the target MSC number, the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response containing an A-HO-FAILURE message shall be given to 3G\_MSC-B, in addition 3G\_MSC-B shall maintain the connection with the UE/MS. + +If the procedure in MSC-A is successful then 3G\_MSC-B can request the UE/MS to return to the new BSS-B on MSC-A. This is illustrated in figure 20 by the Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND message. The operation is successfully completed when MSC-A receives the A-HO-COMPLETE message. + +After UMTS to GSM handover MSC-A shall release the circuit to 3G\_MSC-B. + +MSC-A must also terminate the MAP procedure for the basic UMTS to GSM handover between MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B by sending an appropriate MAP message. 3G\_MSC-B will clear the resources in RNS-A when the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response is received. + +##### 8.1.3.1.2 With multiple circuit connections (Optional functionality) + +If 3G\_MSC-B supports the optional supplementary service Multicall (See 3GPP TS 23.135 [17]), 3G\_MSC-B shall have the following functionality additionally to the description in subclause 8.1.3.1.1. + +Upon receipt of the IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-A which indicates the target is BSS, 3G\_MSC-B shall select one bearer to be handed over if the UE is engaged with multiple bearers. After that, the 3G\_MSC-B generates an A-HO-REQUEST message for the selected bearer and sends it to 3G\_MSC-A over MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request with indication of RAB ID of the selected bearer. + +When MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response including an A-HO-REQUEST-ACK is received from the 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B sends IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND, which indicates the bearers not to be handed over as bearers to be released, to RNS-A. + +After 3G\_MSC-A receives A-HO-COMPLETE message from BSS-B, 3G\_MSC-A shall release calls via BSS-B, which has been carried by the bearers not to be handed over, and then 3G\_MSC-A sends MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response to 3G\_MSC-B. + +#### 8.1.3.2 Description of subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure ii): 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-B' + +The procedure for successful UMTS to GSM handover from 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-B' is shown in figure 21. + +The procedure consists of two parts: + +- a subsequent UMTS to GSM handover from 3G\_MSC-B back to 3G\_MSC-A as described in subclause 8.1.3.1 (the same procedures apply if 3G\_MSC-A is replaced by MSC-A); and +- a basic handover from 3G\_MSC-A to MSC-B' as described in subclause 7.1. + +##### 8.1.3.2.1 With one circuit connection + +3G\_MSC-B sends the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request to 3G\_MSC-A indicating a new MSC number (which is the identity of MSC-B'), indicating also the target cell identity and including a complete A-HO-REQUEST, 3G\_MSC-A then starts a basic handover procedure towards MSC-B'. + +If 3G\_MSC-A supports A interface over IP, then for speech calls 3G\_MSC-A may include the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request towards MSC-B'. For a detailed description of the handling of this codec list by 3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B' see 3GPP TS 23.153 [25]. + +When 3G\_MSC-A receives the ACM from MSC-B', 3G\_MSC-A informs 3G\_MSC-B that MSC-B' has successfully allocated the radio resources on BSS-B' side by sending the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response containing the complete A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE received from BSS-B' and possible extra BSSMAP information, amended by 3G\_MSC-A due to the possible interworking between the BSSMAP protocol carried on the E-interface between 3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B' and the BSSMAP protocol carried on the E-interface between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. Now 3G\_MSC-B can start the procedure on the radio path. + +For 3G\_MSC-A the UMTS to GSM handover is completed when it has received the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL REQUEST from MSC-B' containing the A-HO-COMPLETE received from the BSS-B'. The circuit between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B is released. 3G\_MSC-A also sends the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response to 3G\_MSC-B in order to terminate the original MAP dialogue between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B releases the radio resources when it receives this message. + +If the traffic channel allocation is queued by the BSS-B', the A-QUEUING-INDICATION may optionally be sent back to 3G\_MSC-B. If no radio channel can be allocated by MSC-B' or no circuit between 3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B' can be established or a fault is detected on the target cell identity or the target cell identity in the A-HO-REQUEST is not consistent with the target MSC number, 3G\_MSC-A informs 3G\_MSC-B by using the A-HO-FAILURE message included in the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response. 3G\_MSC-B shall maintain the existing connection with the UE/MS. + +When the subsequent UMTS to GSM handover is completed, MSC-B' is considered as MSC-B. Any further inter-MSC handover is handled as described earlier for a subsequent handover. + +##### 8.1.3.2.2 With multiple circuit connections (Optional functionality) + +If 3G\_MSC-B supports the optional supplementary service Multicall (See 3GPP TS 23.135 [17]), 3G\_MSC-B shall have the following functionality additionally to the description in subclause 8.1.3.2.1. + +Upon receipt of the IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-B 3G\_MSC-B shall select one bearer to be handed over if the UE is engaged with multiple bearers. After that, the 3G\_MSC-B generates an A-HO-REQUEST message for the selected bearer and sends it to 3G\_MSC-A over MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request with indication of RAB ID of the selected bearer. + +Upon receipt of the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request from 3G\_MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-A starts a basic handover procedure towards MSC-B'. + +When 3G\_MSC-A receives the ACM from MSC-B', 3G\_MSC-A informs 3G\_MSC-B that MSC-B' has successfully allocated the radio resources on BSS-B' side by sending the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response containing the complete A-HO-REQUEST-ACK received from BSS-B' and possible extra BSSAP information, amended by 3G\_MSC-A due to the possible interworking between the BSSMAP protocol carried on the E-interface between 3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B' and the BSSMAP protocol carried on the E-interface between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. + +When MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response including an A-HO-REQUEST-ACK is received from 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B sends IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND, which indicates the bearers not to be handed over as bearers to be released, to RNS-A. + +After 3G\_MSC-A receives MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request from MSC-B', 3G\_MSC-A shall release calls via MSC-B', which has been carried by the bearers not to be handed over, and then 3G\_MSC-A sends MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response to 3G\_MSC-B. + +![Sequence diagram for subsequent handover procedure ii): Successful UMTS to GSM handover from 3G_MSC-B to MSC-B' requiring a circuit connection.](b34c69e1ec326b01c3a485b27b1df5f6_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE as UE/MS/BSS/RNS + participant A as 3G_MSC-A + participant B as 3G_MSC-B + participant B_prime as MSC-B' + participant VLR_B as VLR-B + participant VLR_B_prime as VLR-B' + + UE->>B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + B->>A: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + A->>B_prime: MAP-Prepare-Handover req. + B_prime->>VLR_B_prime: MAP-Allocate-Handover-Number req. + VLR_B_prime-->>B_prime: MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. + B_prime-->>A: MAP-Prepare-Handover resp. + VLR_B_prime-->>B_prime: MAP-Send-Handover-Rep. resp. (1) + A-->>B_prime: IAM + B_prime-->>A: ACM + A-->>B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Ho resp. + B->>UE: Iu-RELOCATION-CMD + UE->>B_prime: A-HO-DETECT + B_prime->>A: MAP-Process-Access-Signalling req. + UE->>B_prime: A-HO-COMPLETE + B_prime->>A: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + A-->>B_prime: Answer + B-->>A: Release + A->>B: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + B->>UE: Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM + Note over UE, B: (end of call) + A-->>B_prime: Release + B_prime->>A: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram for subsequent handover procedure ii): Successful UMTS to GSM handover from 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-B' requiring a circuit connection. + +NOTE 1: Can be sent at any time after the reception of IAM. + +**Figure 21: Subsequent handover procedure ii): Successful UMTS to GSM handover from 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-B' requiring a circuit connection** + +### 8.1.4 Procedure for subsequent UMTS to GSM handover not requiring a circuit connection + +As for the subsequent UMTS to GSM handover with a circuit connection, the same two cases of subsequent handover apply: + +- i) the UE/MS moves back to the area of MSC-A; +- ii) the UE/MS moves into the area of a third MSC (MSC-B'). + +#### 8.1.4.1 Description of subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure i): 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-A + +The procedure for successful UMTS to GSM handover from 3G\_MSC-B back to MSC-A without circuit connection is shown in figure 22. The only difference with the figure 20, is that no circuit release is needed between MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 22: Subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure i). The diagram shows the interaction between UE/MS/BSS-B, MSC-A, 3G_MSC-B, RNS-A/UE/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. RNS-A/UE/MS sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED to 3G_MSC-B. 2. 3G_MSC-B sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. to MSC-A. 3. MSC-A sends A-HO-REQUEST to UE/MS/BSS-B. 4. UE/MS/BSS-B sends A-HO-REQUEST-ACK to MSC-A. 5. MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. to 3G_MSC-B. 6. 3G_MSC-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND to RNS-A/UE/MS. 7. RNS-A/UE/MS sends A-HO-DETECT to UE/MS/BSS-B. 8. UE/MS/BSS-B sends A-HO-COMPLETE to MSC-A. 9. MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to 3G_MSC-B. 10. 3G_MSC-B sends Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM to RNS-A/UE/MS.](68a5a1a1a761c652b4b4c56da7cf9914_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS/BSS-B + participant MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC-B + participant RNS-A/UE/MS + participant VLR-B + + Note left of UE/MS/BSS-B: UE/MS/BSS-B + Note right of RNS-A/UE/MS: RNS-A/UE/MS + Note right of VLR-B: VLR-B + + RNS-A/UE/MS->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + 3G_MSC-B->>MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + MSC-A->>UE/MS/BSS-B: A-HO-REQUEST + UE/MS/BSS-B->>MSC-A: A-HO-REQUEST-ACK + MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. + 3G_MSC-B->>RNS-A/UE/MS: Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND + RNS-A/UE/MS->>UE/MS/BSS-B: A-HO-DETECT + UE/MS/BSS-B->>MSC-A: A-HO-COMPLETE + MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + 3G_MSC-B->>RNS-A/UE/MS: Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure 22: Subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure i). The diagram shows the interaction between UE/MS/BSS-B, MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B, RNS-A/UE/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. RNS-A/UE/MS sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED to 3G\_MSC-B. 2. 3G\_MSC-B sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. to MSC-A. 3. MSC-A sends A-HO-REQUEST to UE/MS/BSS-B. 4. UE/MS/BSS-B sends A-HO-REQUEST-ACK to MSC-A. 5. MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. to 3G\_MSC-B. 6. 3G\_MSC-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND to RNS-A/UE/MS. 7. RNS-A/UE/MS sends A-HO-DETECT to UE/MS/BSS-B. 8. UE/MS/BSS-B sends A-HO-COMPLETE to MSC-A. 9. MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to 3G\_MSC-B. 10. 3G\_MSC-B sends Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM to RNS-A/UE/MS. + +**Figure 22: Subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure i): Successful UMTS to GSM handover from 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-A not requiring a circuit connection** + +#### 8.1.4.2 Description of the subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure without circuit connection ii): 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-B' + +The procedure for successful UMTS to GSM handover from 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-B' is shown in figure 23. + +The procedure consists of two parts: + +- a subsequent UMTS to GSM handover from 3G\_MSC-B back to 3G\_MSC-A as described in subclause 8.1.4.1 (the same procedures apply if 3G\_MSC-A is replaced by MSC-A); and +- a basic handover from 3G\_MSC-A to MSC-B' as described in subclause 7.2. + +The only difference to the equivalent figure 21 is the omission of the circuit and handover number allocation signallings. + +![Sequence diagram for Subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure ii). Lifelines: UE/MS/BSS/RNS, 3G_MSC-A, 3G_MSC-B, MSC-B', VLR-B, VLR-B'. The sequence shows signaling between 3G_MSC-A and 3G_MSC-B, and between 3G_MSC-B and MSC-B'. The process includes Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED, MAP-Prepare-Handover req./resp., MAP-Process-Access-Signalling req., A-HO-DETECT, A-HO-COMPLETE, MAP-Send-End-Signal req./resp., and Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM. The diagram ends with '(end of link)' and a final MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. from 3G_MSC-A to MSC-B'.](56a5265d174ce056c1dbe5e7a60839fc_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS/BSS/RNS + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC-B + participant MSC-B' + participant VLR-B + participant VLR-B' + + Note left of 3G_MSC-A: (end of link) + + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + 3G_MSC-B->>MSC-B': MAP-Prepare-Handover req. + MSC-B'-->3G_MSC-B: MAP-Prepare-Handover resp. + 3G_MSC-B-->3G_MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Sub-Ho resp. + 3G_MSC-B-->UE/MS/BSS/RNS: Iu-RELOCATION-CMD + 3G_MSC-B->>MSC-B': A-HO-DETECT + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Process-Access-Signalling req. + 3G_MSC-B->>MSC-B': A-HO-COMPLETE + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + 3G_MSC-B-->3G_MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + 3G_MSC-B-->UE/MS/BSS/RNS: Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM + Note right of 3G_MSC-A: (end of link) + 3G_MSC-A->>MSC-B': MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure ii). Lifelines: UE/MS/BSS/RNS, 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B, MSC-B', VLR-B, VLR-B'. The sequence shows signaling between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B, and between 3G\_MSC-B and MSC-B'. The process includes Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED, MAP-Prepare-Handover req./resp., MAP-Process-Access-Signalling req., A-HO-DETECT, A-HO-COMPLETE, MAP-Send-End-Signal req./resp., and Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM. The diagram ends with '(end of link)' and a final MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. from 3G\_MSC-A to MSC-B'. + +**Figure 23: Subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure ii): Successful UMTS to GSM handover from 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-B' without circuit connection** + +## 8.2 Handover GSM to UMTS + +The following clauses describe two options for the Basic and Subsequent GSM to UMTS Handover procedures. The first, as described in subclauses 8.2.1 and 8.2.3 respectively, provides for a circuit connection between (3G\_)MSC-A and (3G\_)MSC-B. The second, as described in subclauses 8.2.2 and 8.2.4 respectively, provides for a Basic and Subsequent Handover without the provision of a circuit connection between (3G\_)MSC-A and (3G\_)MSC-B. In all the above mentioned clauses, the following principles apply: + +- during the handover resource allocation, except for the messages explicitly indicated in b and c below, only the handover related messages that are part of the applicable BSSAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] - shall be transferred on the E-interface; +- the trace related messages that are part of the applicable BSSAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] - can be sent by the MSC-A on the E-interface after successful handover resource allocation. In subclauses 8.2.1 and 8.2.2, it is however allowed at basic handover initiation on the E-Interface to transfer one trace related message that is part of the applicable BSSAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] - together with the applicable handover related message. The applicable handover related message shall always appear as the first message; +- during the handover resource allocation for subsequent inter-MSC inter-system handover according to subclauses 8.2.3 and 8.2.4, it is allowed to transfer either DTAP or RANAP Direct Transfer messages on the E-Interface between MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. RANAP Direct Transfer messages shall be used for this purpose if and only if the basic handover procedure was an inter MSC SRNS relocation; +- If 3G\_MSC-B or 3G-MSC-B' supports location reporting at change of Service Area, 3G\_MSC-B or 3G\_MSC-B' shall always initiate the Location Reporting Control procedure at change of Service Area towards the target RNS since no request for Location Reporting can be received from MSC-A. In that case, the Location Reporting + +Control procedure shall be initiated by 3G\_MSC-B or 3G\_MSC-B' after the Relocation Resource Allocation procedure has been executed successfully. The change of Service Area shall be reported to MSC-A within an A-HANDOVER-PERFORMED message; + +- e) during the handover execution, i.e. while the UE/MS is not in communication with the network, the MSC-A shall queue all outgoing BSSAP or RANAP messages until the communication with the UE/MS is resumed; +- f) during the execution of a basic inter-system inter-MSC handover to 3G\_MSC-B or a subsequent inter-system inter-MSC handover to a third 3G\_MSC-B', only the handover related messages and the A-Clear-Request message that are part of the applicable BSSAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] – may be sent by the target MSC on the E-interface; +- g) during a subsequent inter-system inter-MSC handover back to 3G\_MSC-A or to a third 3G\_MSC-B', 3G\_MSC-B may initiate either an Iu-Release-Request procedure or an A-Clear-Request procedure on the E-interface. An Iu-Release-Request procedure shall be initiated only if the basic handover procedure was an inter-MSC SRNS relocation; +- h) finally, during supervision, i.e. while the UE/MS is not in the area of MSC-A after a successful Inter-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS handover, the subset of BSSAP procedures and their related messages - as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] - shall apply on the E-Interface. As the only exception to this rule, in case of a subsequent inter-MSC SRNS relocation back to 3G\_MSC-A or to a third 3G\_MSC-B', during the relocation resource allocation, the relocation and trace related messages that are part of the applicable RANAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 29.108 [15] - shall be transferred on the E-interface (see subclause 8.3, a and b). + +If a subsequent inter-MSC handover/relocation back to 3G\_MSC-A or to a third 3G\_MSC-B' is cancelled, then the supervision continues, and BSSAP procedures and their related messages shall apply on the E-interface; + +- i) during the intra-3G\_MSC-B GSM to UMTS handover execution, if any, the 3G\_MSC-B shall queue all outgoing BSSAP or RANAP messages until the communication with the UE/MS is resumed. + +### 8.2.1 Basic Handover procedure requiring a circuit connection between MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B + +The procedure used for successful Inter-3G\_MSC Handover from GSM to UMTS is shown in figure 24. Initiation of the GSM to UMTS handover procedure is described in clause 5. The procedure described in this clause makes use of messages from the 3GPP TS 48.008 [5], 3GPP TS 25.413 [11] and of the transport mechanism from the Mobile Application Part (MAP) (3GPP TS 29.002 [12]). After an Inter-3G\_MSC handover further Intra-3G\_MSC handovers may occur on 3G\_MSC-B, these handovers will follow the procedures specified in the previous clauses. + +![Sequence diagram of Basic GSM to UMTS Handover Procedure requiring a circuit connection. Lifelines: UE/MS/BSS-A, MSC-A, 3G_MSC-B, RNS-B/UE/MS, VLR-B. The sequence starts with A-HO-REQUIRED from UE/MS/BSS-A to MSC-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Handover req. to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends MAP-Allocate-Handover-Number req. to VLR-B. VLR-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B/UE/MS. RNS-B/UE/MS sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. to VLR-B. VLR-B sends MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends MAP-Prep-Handover resp. to MSC-A. MSC-A sends IAM to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends ACM to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-HO-COMMAND to UE/MS/BSS-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT to RNS-B/UE/MS. RNS-B/UE/MS sends Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends MAP-Send-End-Signal req. to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-CLR-CMD/COM to UE/MS/BSS-A. MSC-A sends ANSWER to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends RELEASE to MSC-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to 3G_MSC-B. The sequence ends with 'End of call'.](575d7d345b3ec04393bb2ec720ebabca_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS/BSS-A + participant MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC-B + participant RNS-B/UE/MS + participant VLR-B + + Note right of UE/MS/BSS-A: End of call + UE/MS/BSS-A->>MSC-A: A-HO-REQUIRED + MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Handover req. + 3G_MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Allocate-Handover-Number req. + VLR-B->>RNS-B/UE/MS: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST + RNS-B/UE/MS->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK + 3G_MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. + VLR-B->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) + 3G_MSC-B->>MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Handover resp. + MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: IAM + 3G_MSC-B->>MSC-A: ACM + MSC-A->>UE/MS/BSS-A: A-HO-COMMAND + MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. + 3G_MSC-B->>RNS-B/UE/MS: Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT + RNS-B/UE/MS->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE + 3G_MSC-B->>MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + MSC-A->>UE/MS/BSS-A: A-CLR-CMD/COM + MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: ANSWER + 3G_MSC-B->>MSC-A: RELEASE + MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram of Basic GSM to UMTS Handover Procedure requiring a circuit connection. Lifelines: UE/MS/BSS-A, MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B, RNS-B/UE/MS, VLR-B. The sequence starts with A-HO-REQUIRED from UE/MS/BSS-A to MSC-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Handover req. to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends MAP-Allocate-Handover-Number req. to VLR-B. VLR-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B/UE/MS. RNS-B/UE/MS sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. to VLR-B. VLR-B sends MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends MAP-Prep-Handover resp. to MSC-A. MSC-A sends IAM to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends ACM to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-HO-COMMAND to UE/MS/BSS-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT to RNS-B/UE/MS. RNS-B/UE/MS sends Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends MAP-Send-End-Signal req. to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-CLR-CMD/COM to UE/MS/BSS-A. MSC-A sends ANSWER to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends RELEASE to MSC-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to 3G\_MSC-B. The sequence ends with 'End of call'. + +NOTE: Can be sent at any time after the reception of IAM. + +**Figure 24: Basic GSM to UMTS Handover Procedure requiring a circuit connection** + +The GSM to UMTS handover is initiated as described in subclause 6.2.2. (This is represented by A-HO-REQUIRED in figure 24). Upon receipt of the A-HO-REQUIRED from BSS-A, MSC-A shall send a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request to 3G\_MSC-B including a complete A-HO-REQUEST message. + +NOTE: MSC-A shall not send further MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER requests while a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response is pending or before any timeouts. + +The MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request shall carry in the A-HO-REQUEST all information needed by 3G\_MSC-B for allocating radio resources in RNS-B, see 3GPP TS 48.008 [5]. + +The MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request shall also carry the identity of the target RNS to which the call is to be handed over, see 3GPP TS 29.002 [12]. + +If MSC-A supports inter-system handover to a CSG cell and BSS-A includes a CSG ID for the target cell in the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message, then MSC-A shall check the CSG membership of the UE for the target cell as described in subclause 4.1.1 before generating the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. If the UE fails the CSG membership check and the target cell is a CSG cell, MSC-A shall send an A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED-REJECT to BSS-A. + +If MSC-A supports inter-system handover to a CSG cell, the target cell belongs to the registered PLMN or an equivalent PLMN, and the HLR or the CSS provided CSG subscription data, MSC-A shall include the CSG subscription data for the registered PLMN and, if available, for the equivalent PLMNs in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. + +3G\_MSC-B will return the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response after having retrieved a Handover Number from its associated VLR (exchange of the messages MAP-allocate-handover-number request and MAP-send-handover-report request). The Handover Number shall be used for routing the connection of the call from MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B. + +For speech calls, if 3G\_MSC-B supports the selection of codec based on the Iu-Supported Codecs List, 3G\_MSC-B shall select an Iu Selected codec from the Iu Supported Codecs List, generate associated RAB parameters and connect a + +transcoder. If the Iu Supported Codecs List was not received or 3G\_MSC-B does not support the selection of codec based on the Iu-Supported Codecs List, 3G\_MSC-B shall select the appropriate default speech codec. + +For handover to UTRAN Iu mode, 3G\_MSC-B shall also generate a NAS Synch Indicator for the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST message. If the Iu Supported Codecs List was received by 3G\_MSC-B and 3G\_MSC-B supports the selection of codec based on the Iu-Supported Codecs List, then the Iu Selected codec shall be indicated in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response, sent from 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-A. + +If A over IP is supported by MSC-A, then for speech calls MSC-A may include the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request to be used by 3G\_MSC-B for subsequent intra-MSC-B intersystem handover to A over IP capable BSC. For a detailed description of the handling of this codec list by MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B see 3GPP TS 23.153 [25]. + +If radio resources are available in RNS-B the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response will contain the complete A-HO-REQUEST-ACK message generated from the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK received from RNS-B, containing the radio resources definition to be sent by BSS-A to the UE/MS. If the radio resource allocation is not possible, the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response containing an A-HO-FAILURE will be sent to MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-B will do the same if a fault is detected on the identity of the cell where the call has to be handed over. 3G\_MSC-B simply reports the events related to the dialogue. It is up to MSC-A to decide the action to perform if it receives negative responses or the operation fails due to the expiry of the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER timer. + +If an error related to the TCAP dialogue or to the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request is returned from 3G\_MSC-B, this will be indicated to MSC-A and MSC-A will terminate the handover attempt. MSC-A shall reject the handover attempt towards BSS-A. The existing connection to the UE/MS shall not be cleared. + +When the A-HO-REQUEST-ACK has been received, MSC-A shall establish a circuit between MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B by signalling procedures supported by the network. In figure 24 this is illustrated by the messages IAM (Initial Address Message) and ACM (Address Complete Message) of Signalling System no 7. 3G\_MSC-B awaits the capturing of the UE/MS (subclause 6.2.2) on the radio path when the ACM is sent and MSC-A initiates the handover execution when ACM is received (illustrated by the A-HO-COMMAND and described in subclause 6.2.2). + +If the BSS-A was connected via an A interface over IP and no transcoding performed in the BSS then MSC-A shall remove the transcoder between the MSC and the other party. + +3G\_MSC-B transfers to MSC-A the acknowledgement received from the correct UE/MS (A-HO-DETECT/A-HO-COMPLETE). The Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT, if received, is converted to A-HO-DETECT and transferred to MSC-A using the MAP-PROCESS-ACCESS-SIGNALLING request. The Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE, when received from the correct UE/MS, is converted to A-HO-COMPLETE and included in the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request and sent back to MSC-A. The circuit is through-connected in MSC-A when the A-HO-DETECT or the A-HO-COMPLETE is received from 3G\_MSC-B. The old radio channel is released when the A-HO-COMPLETE message is received from 3G\_MSC-B. The sending of the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request starts the MAP supervision timer for the MAP dialogue between MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. When the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request including the A-HO-COMPLETE message is received in MSC-A the resources in BSS-A shall be cleared. + +In order not to conflict with the PSTN/ISDN signalling system(s) used between MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-B must generate an answer signal when Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT/COMPLETE is received. + +3G\_MSC-B shall release the Handover Number when the circuit between MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B has been established. + +If the circuit between MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B cannot be established (e.g. an unsuccessful backward message is received instead of ACM). MSC-A terminates the inter3G\_MSC handover attempt by sending an appropriate MAP message, for example an ABORT. + +MSC-A shall retain overall call control until the call is cleared by the fixed subscriber or the UE/MS and there is no further call control functions to be performed (e.g. servicing waiting calls, echo cancellers). + +When MSC-A clears the call to the UE/MS it also clears the call control functions in MSC-A and sends the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response to release the MAP resources in 3G\_MSC-B. + +MSC-A may terminate the procedure at any time by sending an appropriate MAP message to 3G\_MSC-B. If establishment of the circuit between MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B has been initiated, the circuit must also be cleared. + +The GSM to UMTS handover will be aborted by MSC-A if it detects clearing or interruption of the radio path before the call has been established on 3G\_MSC-B. + +### 8.2.2 Basic GSM to UMTS Handover procedure not requiring the establishment of a circuit connection between MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B + +The basic GSM to UMTS handover procedures to be used when no circuit connection is required by MSC-A are similar to those described in subclause 8.2.1 for circuit switched calls. The main differences to the procedures described in subclause 8.2.1 relate to the establishment of circuits between the network entities and the Handover Number allocation. + +In the case of basic GSM to UMTS handover, MSC-A shall specify to 3G\_MSC-B that no Handover Number is required in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request (see 3GPP TS 29.002 [12]). As for the basic GSM to UMTS handover using a circuit connection, the A-HO-REQUEST is transmitted at the same time. Any subsequent Handover Number allocation procedure will not be invoked until the completion of the basic GSM to UMTS handover procedure (see clause: Subsequent Channel Assignment using a circuit connection). 3G\_MSC-B shall then perform the radio resources allocation as described in subclause 8.2.1. The MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response shall be returned to MSC-A including either the translated response of the radio resources allocation request received from RNS-B (A-HO-REQUEST-ACK/A-HO-FAILURE). The basic GSM to UMTS handover procedure will continue as described in clause 8.2.1 except that no circuit connection will be established towards 3G\_MSC-B. + +The relevant case for the basic GSM to UMTS handover without circuit connection is shown in figure 25. As can be seen the major differences to the equivalent figure 24 are the omission of any circuit establishment messaging and the omission of handover number allocation signalling. + +![Sequence diagram of Basic GSM to UMTS Handover Procedure without circuit connection. Lifelines: UE/MS/BSS-A, MSC-A, 3G_MSC-B, RNS-B/UE/MS, VLR-B. The process starts with A-HO-REQUIRED from UE/MS/BSS-A to MSC-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Handover req. to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B/UE/MS. RNS-B/UE/MS responds with Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends MAP-Prep-Handover resp. to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-HO-COMMAND to UE/MS/BSS-A. 3G_MSC-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT to MSC-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-CLR-CMD/COM to UE/MS/BSS-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal req. to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to MSC-A. The diagram ends with 'End of link' markers on the lifelines.](2438c4dd81a8b76ec881d47d87b11fc3_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram of Basic GSM to UMTS Handover Procedure without circuit connection. Lifelines: UE/MS/BSS-A, MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B, RNS-B/UE/MS, VLR-B. The process starts with A-HO-REQUIRED from UE/MS/BSS-A to MSC-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Handover req. to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B/UE/MS. RNS-B/UE/MS responds with Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends MAP-Prep-Handover resp. to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-HO-COMMAND to UE/MS/BSS-A. 3G\_MSC-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT to MSC-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-CLR-CMD/COM to UE/MS/BSS-A. MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal req. to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to MSC-A. The diagram ends with 'End of link' markers on the lifelines. + +Figure 25: Basic GSM to UMTS Handover Procedure without circuit connection + +### 8.2.3 Procedure for subsequent GSM to UMTS handover requiring a circuit connection + +After the call has been handed over to MSC-B, if the UE/MS leaves the GSM area of MSC-B during the same call and enters a UTRAN area, subsequent GSM to UMTS handover is necessary in order to continue the connection. + +The following cases apply: + +- i) the UE/MS moves back to the area of 3G\_MSC-A; +- ii) the UE/MS moves into the area of a third 3G\_MSC (3G\_MSC-B'). + +In both cases the call is switched in 3G\_MSC-A; the circuit between 3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B shall be released after a successful subsequent handover has been performed. + +#### 8.2.3.1 Description of subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure i): MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A + +The procedure for successful GSM to UMTS handover from MSC-B back to 3G\_MSC-A is shown in figure 26. + +![Sequence diagram of subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure i): successful handover from MSC-B to 3G_MSC-A using a circuit connection. The diagram shows the interaction between UE/MS/RNS-B, 3G_MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-A/UE/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. MSC-B sends A-HO-REQUIRED to BSS-A/UE/MS. 2. BSS-A/UE/MS sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. to 3G_MSC-A. 3. 3G_MSC-A sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to UE/MS/RNS-B. 4. UE/MS/RNS-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK to 3G_MSC-A. 5. 3G_MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. to MSC-B. 6. MSC-B sends A-HO-COMMAND to BSS-A/UE/MS. 7. BSS-A/UE/MS sends Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT to 3G_MSC-A. 8. 3G_MSC-A sends Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE to MSC-B. 9. MSC-B sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to 3G_MSC-A. 10. 3G_MSC-A sends A-CLR-CMD/COM to BSS-A/UE/MS. 11. 3G_MSC-A sends Release to MSC-B.](a47713c2491e6ce619259ed2f196fd24_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS/RNS-B + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant MSC-B + participant BSS-A/UE/MS + participant VLR-B + + MSC-B->>BSS-A/UE/MS: A-HO-REQUIRED + BSS-A/UE/MS-->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + 3G_MSC-A->>UE/MS/RNS-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST + UE/MS/RNS-B-->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK + 3G_MSC-A-->>MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. + MSC-B->>BSS-A/UE/MS: A-HO-COMMAND + BSS-A/UE/MS->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT + 3G_MSC-A->>MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE + MSC-B-->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + 3G_MSC-A->>BSS-A/UE/MS: A-CLR-CMD/COM + 3G_MSC-A-->>MSC-B: Release + +``` + +Sequence diagram of subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure i): successful handover from MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A using a circuit connection. The diagram shows the interaction between UE/MS/RNS-B, 3G\_MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-A/UE/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. MSC-B sends A-HO-REQUIRED to BSS-A/UE/MS. 2. BSS-A/UE/MS sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. to 3G\_MSC-A. 3. 3G\_MSC-A sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to UE/MS/RNS-B. 4. UE/MS/RNS-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK to 3G\_MSC-A. 5. 3G\_MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. to MSC-B. 6. MSC-B sends A-HO-COMMAND to BSS-A/UE/MS. 7. BSS-A/UE/MS sends Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT to 3G\_MSC-A. 8. 3G\_MSC-A sends Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE to MSC-B. 9. MSC-B sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to 3G\_MSC-A. 10. 3G\_MSC-A sends A-CLR-CMD/COM to BSS-A/UE/MS. 11. 3G\_MSC-A sends Release to MSC-B. + +**Figure 26: Subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure i): successful handover from MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A using a circuit connection** + +The procedure is as follows. + +If MSC-B supports inter-system handover to a CSG cell, 3G\_MSC-A provided CSG subscription data during the basic inter-MSC handover, and BSS-A includes a CSG ID for the target cell in the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message, then MSC-B shall check the CSG membership of the UE for the target cell as described in subclause 4.2.1 before generating the MAP-PREPARE- SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request. If the UE fails the CSG membership check and the target cell is a CSG cell, MSC-B shall send an A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED-REJECT to BSS-A. + +MSC-B sends the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request to 3G\_MSC-A indicating the new MSC number (3G\_MSC-A number), indicating also the identity of the target RNS where the call has to be handed over and including a complete A-HO-REQUEST message. (NOTE: MSC-B shall not send further MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER requests while a handover attempt is pending or before any timeouts). Since 3G\_MSC-A is the call controlling MSC, this MSC needs no Handover Number for routing purposes; 3G\_MSC-A can immediately initiate the search for free radio resources. 3G\_MSC-A then inserts a transcoder between its RNS and the connection to the other party. + +When radio resources can be assigned, 3G\_MSC-A shall return in the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response the complete A-HO-REQUEST-ACK message generated from the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK received from the RNS-B and possible extra BSSMAP information, amended by 3G\_MSC-A due to the possible interworking between the BSSMAP protocol carried on the E-interface and the RANAP protocol used on the Iu-interface. If radio resources cannot be assigned or if a fault is detected on the target cell identity, or the target cell identity in the A-HO-REQUEST is not consistent with the target MSC number, the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response containing an A-HO-FAILURE message shall be given to MSC-B, in addition MSC-B shall maintain the connection with the UE/MS. + +If the procedure in 3G\_MSC-A is successful then MSC-B can request the UE/MS to return to the new RNS-B on 3G\_MSC-A. This is illustrated in figure 26 by the A-HO-COMMAND message. The operation is successfully completed when 3G\_MSC-A receives the Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE message. + +After GSM to UMTS handover 3G\_MSC-A shall release the circuit to MSC-B. + +3G\_MSC-A must also terminate the MAP procedure for the basic handover between 3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B by sending an appropriate MAP message. MSC-B will clear the resources in BSS-A when the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response is received. + +#### 8.2.3.2 Description of subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure ii): MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' + +The procedure for successful GSM to UMTS handover from MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' is shown in figure 27. + +The procedure consists of two parts: + +- a subsequent handover from MSC-B back to MSC-A as described in subclause 7.3.1 (the same procedures apply if MSC-A is replaced by 3G\_MSC-A); and +- a basic GSM to UMTS handover from MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B' as described in subclause 8.2.1. + +If MSC-B supports inter-system handover to a CSG cell and BSS-A includes a CSG ID for the target cell in the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message, then MSC-B shall check the CSG membership of the UE for the target cell as described in subclause 8.2.3.1 before initiating the procedure, and reject the handover if necessary. + +MSC-B sends the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request to MSC-A indicating a new MSC number (which is the identity of 3G\_MSC-B'), indicating also the identity of the target RNS where the call has to be handed over and including a complete A-HO-REQUEST, MSC-A then starts a basic handover procedure towards 3G\_MSC-B'. + +If MSC-A supports A interface over IP, then for speech calls MSC-A may include the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request towards 3G\_MSC-B'. For a detailed description of the handling of this codec list by MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B' see 3GPP TS 23.153 [25]. + +When MSC-A receives the ACM from 3G\_MSC-B', MSC-A informs MSC-B that 3G\_MSC-B' has successfully allocated the radio resources on RNS-B' side by sending the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response containing the complete A-HO-REQUEST-ACK generated from the RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK received from RNS-B' and possible extra BSSMAP information, amended by MSC-A due to the possible interworking between the BSSMAP protocol carried on the E-interface between MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B' and the BSSMAP protocol carried on the E-interface between MSC-A and MSC-B. Now MSC-B can start the procedure on the radio path. + +For MSC-A the handover is completed when it has received the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL REQUEST from 3G\_MSC-B' containing the A-HO-COMPLETE generated from Iu-RELOCATION COMPLETE received from the RNS-B'. The circuit between MSC-A and MSC-B is released. MSC-A also sends the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response to MSC-B in order to terminate the original MAP dialogue between MSC-A and MSC-B. MSC-B releases the radio resources when it receives this message. + +If no radio resources can be allocated by 3G\_MSC-B' or no circuit between MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B' can be established or a fault is detected on the target cell identity or the target cell identity in the A-HO-REQUEST is not consistent with the target MSC number, MSC-A informs MSC-B by using the A-HO-FAILURE message included in the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response. MSC-B shall maintain the existing connection with the UE/MS. + +When the subsequent GSM to UMTS handover is completed, 3G\_MSC-B' is considered as 3G\_MSC-B. Any further inter-MSC handover is handled as described above for a subsequent handover. + +![Sequence diagram for subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure ii) from MSC-B to 3G_MSC-B' requiring a circuit connection. The diagram shows the interaction between UE/MS/BSS/RNS, MSC-A, MSC-B, 3G_MSC-B', VLR-B, and VLR-B'.](e2c120be98ede6deb60dd341f5a9803b_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS/BSS/RNS + participant MSC-A + participant MSC-B + participant 3G_MSC-B' + participant VLR-B + participant VLR-B' + + Note left of MSC-A: (end of call) + UE/MS/BSS/RNS->>MSC-B: A-HO-REQUIRED + MSC-B->>MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B': MAP-Prepare-Handover req. + 3G_MSC-B'->>VLR-B': MAP-Allocate-Handover-Number req. + 3G_MSC-B'->>MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST + MSC-B->>3G_MSC-B': Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK + 3G_MSC-B'->>MSC-A: MAP-Prepare-Handover resp. + 3G_MSC-B'->>VLR-B': MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. + MSC-A-->>3G_MSC-B': IAM + 3G_MSC-B'->>VLR-B': MAP-Send-Handover-Rep. resp. (1) + MSC-A-->>3G_MSC-B': ACM + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Ho resp. + MSC-B-->>MSC-A: A-HO-COMMAND + MSC-B->>3G_MSC-B': Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT + 3G_MSC-B'->>MSC-A: MAP-Process-Access-Signalling req. + MSC-A-->>3G_MSC-B': Answer + MSC-B->>3G_MSC-B': Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE + 3G_MSC-B'->>MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + MSC-A-->>3G_MSC-B': Release + MSC-B->>3G_MSC-B': MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + MSC-B->>UE/MS/BSS/RNS: A-CLR-CMD/COM + Note left of MSC-A: (end of call) + UE/MS/BSS/RNS-->>3G_MSC-B': Release + 3G_MSC-B'->>MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram for subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure ii) from MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' requiring a circuit connection. The diagram shows the interaction between UE/MS/BSS/RNS, MSC-A, MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-B', VLR-B, and VLR-B'. + +NOTE 1: Can be sent at any time after the reception of IAM. + +**Figure 27: Subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure ii): Successful handover from MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' requiring a circuit connection** + +### 8.2.4 Procedure for subsequent GSM to UMTS handover not requiring a circuit connection + +As for the subsequent GSM to UMTS handover with a circuit connection, the same two cases of subsequent handover apply: + +- the UE/MS moves back to the area of 3G\_MSC-A; +- the UE/MS moves into the area of a third 3G\_MSC (3G\_MSC-B'). + +#### 8.2.4.1 Description of subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure without circuit connection i): MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A + +The procedure for successful GSM to UMTS handover from MSC-B back to 3G\_MSC-A without circuit connection is shown in figure 28. The only difference with the figure 26, is that no circuit release is needed between 3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 28: Subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure i). The diagram shows the interaction between UE/MS/RNS-B, 3G_MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-A/UE/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. BSS-A/UE/MS sends A-HO-REQUIRED to MSC-B. 2. MSC-B sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. to 3G_MSC-A. 3. 3G_MSC-A sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to UE/MS/RNS-B. 4. UE/MS/RNS-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK to 3G_MSC-A. 5. 3G_MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. to MSC-B. 6. MSC-B sends A-HO-COMMAND to BSS-A/UE/MS. 7. BSS-A/UE/MS sends Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT to 3G_MSC-A. 8. 3G_MSC-A sends Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE to UE/MS/RNS-B. 9. UE/MS/RNS-B sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to 3G_MSC-A. 10. 3G_MSC-A sends A-CLR-CMD/COM to MSC-B. The VLR-B lifeline is present but not active in this sequence.](9b9262a549828579ab904148450734f6_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for Figure 28: Subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure i). The diagram shows the interaction between UE/MS/RNS-B, 3G\_MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-A/UE/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. BSS-A/UE/MS sends A-HO-REQUIRED to MSC-B. 2. MSC-B sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. to 3G\_MSC-A. 3. 3G\_MSC-A sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to UE/MS/RNS-B. 4. UE/MS/RNS-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK to 3G\_MSC-A. 5. 3G\_MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. to MSC-B. 6. MSC-B sends A-HO-COMMAND to BSS-A/UE/MS. 7. BSS-A/UE/MS sends Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT to 3G\_MSC-A. 8. 3G\_MSC-A sends Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE to UE/MS/RNS-B. 9. UE/MS/RNS-B sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to 3G\_MSC-A. 10. 3G\_MSC-A sends A-CLR-CMD/COM to MSC-B. The VLR-B lifeline is present but not active in this sequence. + +**Figure 28: Subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure i): Successful handover from MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A not requiring a circuit connection** + +#### 8.2.4.2 Description of subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure without circuit connection ii): MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' + +The procedure for successful GSM to UMTS handover from MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' is shown in figure 29. + +The procedure consists of two parts: + +- a subsequent handover from MSC-B back to MSC-A as described in subclause 7.4.1 (the same procedures apply if MSC-A is replaced by 3G\_MSC-A); and +- a basic GSM to UMTS handover from MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B' as described in subclause 8.2.2. + +The only difference to the equivalent figure 27 is the omission of the circuit and handover number allocation signallings. + +![Sequence diagram of Subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure ii: Successful handover from MSC-B to 3G_MSC-B' without circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between UE/MS/BSS/RNS, MSC-A, MSC-B, 3G_MSC-B', VLR-B, and VLR-B'. The process involves A-HO-REQUIRED, MAP-Prepare-Handover req., Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST, Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK, MAP-Prepare-Handover resp., MAP-Prep-Sub-Ho resp., A-HO-COMMAND, Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT, MAP-Process-Access-Signalling req., Iu-RELOCATION_COMPLETE, MAP-Send-End-Signal req., MAP-Send-End-Signal resp., and A-CLR-CMD/COM messages. A break in the link occurs between MSC-B and 3G_MSC-B'.](5e9af8986a5845504f251d3079da8078_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS/BSS/RNS + participant MSC-A + participant MSC-B + participant 3G_MSC-B' + participant VLR-B + participant VLR-B' + + Note right of UE/MS/BSS/RNS: (end of link) + + MSC-B->>MSC-A: A-HO-REQUIRED + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + MSC-B->>3G_MSC-B': MAP-Prepare-Handover req. + 3G_MSC-B'->>MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST + MSC-B->>3G_MSC-B': Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK + 3G_MSC-B'->>MSC-A: MAP-Prepare-Handover resp. + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Ho resp. + MSC-B->>MSC-A: A-HO-COMMAND + MSC-B->>3G_MSC-B': Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT + 3G_MSC-B'->>MSC-A: MAP-Process-Access-Signalling req. + MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B': Iu-RELOCATION_COMPLETE + 3G_MSC-B'->>MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + MSC-B->>MSC-A: A-CLR-CMD/COM + Note left of MSC-A: (end of link) + MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B': MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram of Subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure ii: Successful handover from MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' without circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between UE/MS/BSS/RNS, MSC-A, MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-B', VLR-B, and VLR-B'. The process involves A-HO-REQUIRED, MAP-Prepare-Handover req., Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST, Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK, MAP-Prepare-Handover resp., MAP-Prep-Sub-Ho resp., A-HO-COMMAND, Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT, MAP-Process-Access-Signalling req., Iu-RELOCATION\_COMPLETE, MAP-Send-End-Signal req., MAP-Send-End-Signal resp., and A-CLR-CMD/COM messages. A break in the link occurs between MSC-B and 3G\_MSC-B'. + +**Figure 29: Subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure ii): Successful handover from MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' without circuit connection** + +## 8.3 SRNS Relocation + +The following clauses describe two options for the Basic and Subsequent Relocation procedures. The first, as described in subclauses 8.3.1 and 8.3.3 respectively, provides for a circuit connection between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. The second, as described in subclauses 8.3.2 and 8.3.4 respectively, provides for a Basic and Subsequent Relocation without the provision of a circuit connection between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. + +In all the above mentioned clauses, the following principles apply: + +- during the relocation resource allocation, except for the messages explicitly indicated in b and c below, only the relocation related messages that are part of the applicable RANAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 29.108 [15] - shall be transferred on the E-interface; +- the trace related messages that are part of the applicable RANAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 29.108 [15] - can be sent by the 3G\_MSC-A on the E-interface after successful relocation resource allocation. In the clauses 8.3.1 and 8.3.2, it is however allowed at basic relocation initiation on the E-Interface to transfer one trace invocation related message that is part of the applicable RANAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 29.108 [15] - together with the applicable relocation related message. The applicable relocation related message shall always appear as the first message; +- during the relocation resource allocation for subsequent inter- MSC SRNS relocation according to subclauses 8.3.3 and 8.3.4, it is allowed to transfer either DTAP or RANAP Direct Transfer messages on the E-Interface between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. RANAP Direct Transfer messages shall be used for this purpose if and only if the basic handover procedure was an inter MSC SRNS relocation; + +- d) the Iu-Location Reporting Control message which belongs to the applicable RANAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 29.108 [15] - can be sent by the 3G\_MSC-A on the E-interface after successful relocation resource allocation; +- e) during the relocation execution, i.e. while the UE is not in communication with the network, the 3G\_MSC-A shall queue all outgoing RANAP or BSSAP messages until the communication with the UE is resumed; +- f) during the execution of a basic inter-MSC SRNS relocation to 3G\_MSC-B or a subsequent inter-MSC SRNS relocation to a third 3G\_MSC-B', only the relocation related messages and the Iu-Release-Request message that are part of the applicable RANAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 29.108 [15] – may be sent by the target MSC on the E-interface; +- g) during a subsequent inter-MSC SRNS relocation back to 3G\_MSC-A or to a third 3G\_MSC-B', 3G\_MSC-B may initiate either an Iu-Release-Request procedure or an A-Clear-Request procedure on the E-interface. An Iu-Release-Request procedure shall be initiated only if the basic handover procedure was an inter-MSC SRNS relocation; +- h) finally, during supervision, i.e. while the UE is not in the area of 3G\_MSC-A after a successful Inter-3G\_MSC relocation, the subset of RANAP procedures and their related messages - as defined in 3GPP TS 29.108 [15] - shall apply on the E-Interface. As an exception to this rule, 3G\_MSC-B shall notify 3G\_MSC-A of a successfully completed subsequent intra-MSC-B intra GSM or inter-system handover by using the Internal Handover Indication procedure as specified in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7]. Furthermore, in case of a subsequent inter-MSC intra GSM or inter-system handover back to 3G\_MSC-A or to a third 3G\_MSC-B', during the handover resource allocation, the handover and trace related messages that are part of the applicable BSSAP subset - as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7] - shall be transferred on the E-interface (see list items a and b in clause 7, subclauses 8.1 and 8.2, respectively). + +If a subsequent inter-MSC handover/relocation back to 3G\_MSC-A or to a third 3G\_MSC-B' is cancelled, then the supervision continues, and RANAP procedures and their related messages shall apply on the E-interface. + +NOTE: A subsequent inter-MSC intra GSM or GSM to UMTS inter-system handover back to 3G\_MSC-A or to a third 3G\_MSC-B' can occur, e.g., if after the basic inter-MSC SRNS relocation to 3G\_MSC-B the MS performed a subsequent intra-3G\_MSC-B UMTS to GSM inter-system handover; + +- i) during the intra-3G\_MSC-B relocation execution, if any, the 3G\_MSC-B shall queue all outgoing RANAP messages until the communication with the UE is resumed. +- j) after successful completion of the Intra-3G\_MSC-B relocation, if 3G\_MSC-B or 3G\_MSC-B' has previously received an order to perform location reporting at change of Service Area from 3G\_MSC-A, it shall act as specified in subclause 6.2.3. + +### 8.3.1 Basic relocation procedure requiring a circuit connection between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B + +The procedure used for successful Inter-3G\_MSC SRNS relocation is shown in figure 30. Initiation of the relocation procedure is described in clause 5. The procedure described in this clause makes use of messages from the 3GPP TS 25.413 [11] and of the transport mechanism from the Mobile Application Part (MAP) (3GPP TS 29.002 [12]). After an Inter-3G\_MSC SRNS relocation further Intra-3G\_MSC relocations may occur on 3G\_MSC-B, these relocations will follow the procedures specified in a previous clause. + +![Sequence diagram of the Basic SRNS Relocation Procedure requiring a circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between RNS-A, 3G_MSC-A, 3G_MSC-B, RNS-B, and VLR-B. The procedure starts with IU-RELOC-REQUIRED from RNS-A to 3G_MSC-A. 3G_MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Handover req. to 3G_MSC-B, which includes IU-RELOC-REQUEST. 3G_MSC-B sends MAP-Allocate-Handover-Number req. to VLR-B. VLR-B sends IU-RELOC-REQUEST to RNS-B. RNS-B sends IU-RELOC-REQUEST-ACK to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. to VLR-B. VLR-B sends MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends MAP-Prep-Handover resp. to 3G_MSC-A. 3G_MSC-A sends IAM to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends ACM to 3G_MSC-A. 3G_MSC-A sends IU-RELOC-COMMAND to RNS-A. RNS-A sends IU-RELOC-DETECT to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends IU-RELOC-COMPLETE to RNS-B. RNS-B sends MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends IU-REL-CMD/COM to 3G_MSC-A. 3G_MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal req. to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends ANSWER to 3G_MSC-A. 3G_MSC-A sends RELEASE to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to 3G_MSC-A. The procedure ends with End of call at 3G_MSC-A.](347010b7ac06d3ae97927fde0f784d7c_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant RNS-A + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC-B + participant RNS-B + participant VLR-B + + Note left of RNS-A: End of call + RNS-A->>3G_MSC-A: IU-RELOC-REQUIRED + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Handover req. (includes IU-RELOC-REQUEST) + 3G_MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Allocate-Handover-Number req. + VLR-B->>RNS-B: IU-RELOC-REQUEST + RNS-B->>3G_MSC-B: IU-RELOC-REQUEST-ACK + 3G_MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. + VLR-B->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Handover resp. + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: IAM + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: ACM + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-A: IU-RELOC-COMMAND + RNS-A->>3G_MSC-B: IU-RELOC-DETECT + 3G_MSC-B->>RNS-B: IU-RELOC-COMPLETE + RNS-B->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: IU-REL-CMD/COM + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: ANSWER + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: RELEASE + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram of the Basic SRNS Relocation Procedure requiring a circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between RNS-A, 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B, RNS-B, and VLR-B. The procedure starts with IU-RELOC-REQUIRED from RNS-A to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Handover req. to 3G\_MSC-B, which includes IU-RELOC-REQUEST. 3G\_MSC-B sends MAP-Allocate-Handover-Number req. to VLR-B. VLR-B sends IU-RELOC-REQUEST to RNS-B. RNS-B sends IU-RELOC-REQUEST-ACK to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. to VLR-B. VLR-B sends MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends MAP-Prep-Handover resp. to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A sends IAM to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends ACM to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A sends IU-RELOC-COMMAND to RNS-A. RNS-A sends IU-RELOC-DETECT to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends IU-RELOC-COMPLETE to RNS-B. RNS-B sends MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends IU-REL-CMD/COM to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal req. to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends ANSWER to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A sends RELEASE to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to 3G\_MSC-A. The procedure ends with End of call at 3G\_MSC-A. + +NOTE 1: Can be sent at any time after the reception of IAM. + +**Figure 30: Basic SRNS Relocation Procedure requiring a circuit connection** + +#### 8.3.1.1 With one circuit connection + +The relocation is initiated as described in subclause 6.2.3. (This is represented by IU-RELOC-REQUIRED in figure 30). Upon receipt of the IU-RELOC-REQUIRED from RNS-A, 3G\_MSC-A shall send a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request to 3G\_MSC-B including a complete IU-RELOC-REQUEST message. (NOTE: 3G\_MSC-A shall not send further MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER requests while a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response is pending or before any timeouts). The MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request shall carry in the IU-RELOC-REQUEST all information needed by 3G\_MSC-B for allocating radio resources in the case of SRNS relocation without Iur interface, see 3GPP TS 25.413 [11]. + +For speech calls, 3G\_MSC-A shall include the Iu Currently used codec and the Iu Supported Codecs List in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. 3G\_MSC-A shall configure the RANAP RAB parameters according to the appropriate default speech codec. For a relocation to UTRAN Iu mode, if this codec is different from the Iu Currently used codec, 3G\_MSC-A shall also include the NAS Synch Indicator for the default speech codec in the IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST. + +Alternatively, if 3G\_MSC-B is known to support the use of the Iu Supported Codecs List, 3G\_MSC-A may configure the RANAP RAB parameters according to the preferred codec and indicate this to 3G\_MSC-B by including the RAB configuration indicator in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. For a relocation to UTRAN Iu mode, if the preferred codec is different from the Iu Currently used codec, 3G\_MSC-A shall also include the NAS Synch Indicator for the preferred codec in the IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST. The decision to use this option is based on internal configuration information in 3G\_MSC-A. + +MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request shall also carry the identity of the target RNS to which the call is to be relocated, see 3GPP TS 29.002 [12]. + +If 3G\_MSC-A supports SRNS Relocation to a CSG cell and RNS-A includes a CSG ID for the target cell in the IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED message, then 3G\_MSC-A shall check the CSG membership of the UE for the target cell as described in subclause 4.3.1 before generating the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. If the UE fails the CSG + +membership check and the target cell is a CSG cell, 3G\_MSC-A shall send an IU-RELOCATION-PREPARATION-FAILURE to RNS-A. + +If 3G\_MSC-A supports SRNS Relocation to a CSG cell, the target cell belongs to the registered PLMN or an equivalent PLMN, and the HLR or the CSS provided CSG subscription data, 3G\_MSC-A shall include the CSG subscription data for the registered PLMN and, if available, for the equivalent PLMNs in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. + +3G\_MSC-B will return the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response after having retrieved one or several Handover Numbers from its associated VLR (exchange of the messages MAP-allocate-handover-number request and MAP-send-handover-report request). The Handover Numbers shall be used for routing the connections of the calls from 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B. + +If A over IP is supported by 3G\_MSC-A, then for speech calls 3G\_MSC-A may include the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request to be used by 3G\_MSC-B for subsequent intra-3G\_MSC-B intersystem handover to an A over IP capable BSS. For a detailed description of the handling of this codec list by 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B see 3GPP TS 23.153 [25]. + +For speech calls, if 3G\_MSC-B supports the selection of codec based on the Iu-Supported Codecs List, 3G\_MSC-B shall select an Iu Selected codec from the Iu Supported Codecs List and connect a transcoder. If the Iu Supported Codecs List was not received or 3G\_MSC-B does not support the selection of codec based on the Iu-Supported Codecs List, 3G\_MSC-B shall select the appropriate default speech codec. + +3G\_MSC-B shall reconfigure the RANAP RAB parameters according to the Iu Selected codec: + +- if the RAB configuration indicator is included in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request and the codec selected by 3G\_MSC-B is different from the preferred codec; or +- if the RAB configuration indicator is not included in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request and the codec selected by 3G\_MSC-B is different from the appropriate default speech codec. + +Additionally, for a relocation to UTRAN Iu mode, if the Iu Selected codec is different from the Iu Currently used codec, 3G\_MSC-B shall include the NAS Synch Indicator for the Iu Selected codec in the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST. If the Iu Supported Codecs List was received by 3G\_MSC-B and 3G\_MSC-B supports the selection of codec based on the Iu-Supported Codecs List, then the Iu Selected codec shall be indicated in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response, sent from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A. + +If radio resources are available in 3G\_MSC-B, the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response will contain the complete IU-RELOC-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE message received from RNS-B, containing the radio resources definition to be sent by RNS-A to the UE (in case of relocation without Iur interface) and possible extra RANAP information, amended by 3G\_MSC-B due to the possible interworking between the RANAP protocol carried on the E-interface and the RANAP protocol used on the Iu-interface. If the radio resource allocation is not possible, the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response containing an IU-RELOCATION-FAILURE will be sent to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-B will do the same if a fault is detected on the identity of the RNS where the call has to be relocated. 3G\_MSC-B simply reports the events related to the dialogue. It is up to 3G\_MSC-A to decide the action to perform if it receives negative responses or the operation fails due to the expiry of the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER timer. + +If an error related to the TCAP dialogue or to the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request is returned from 3G\_MSC-B, this will be indicated to 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-A will terminate the relocation attempt. The existing connection to the UE shall not be cleared. + +When the IU-RELOC-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE has been received, 3G\_MSC-A shall establish a circuit between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B by signalling procedures supported by the network. In figure 30 this is illustrated by the messages IAM (Initial Address Message) and ACM (Address Complete Message) of Signalling System no 7. 3G\_MSC-B awaits the capturing of the UE (subclause 6.2.3) on the radio path when the ACM is sent and 3G\_MSC-A initiates the relocation execution when ACM is received (illustrated by the IU-RELOC-COMMAND and described in subclause 6.2.3). 3G\_MSC-A shall remove the transcoder between the MSC and other party. + +3G\_MSC-B transfers to 3G\_MSC-A the acknowledgement received from the correct UE (IU-RELOC-DETECT/IU-RELOC-COMPLETE). The IU-RELOC-DETECT, if received, is transferred to 3G\_MSC-A using the MAP-PROCESS-ACCESS-SIGNALLING request. The IU-RELOC-COMPLETE, when received from the correct UE, is included in the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request and sent back to 3G\_MSC-A. The circuit is through connected in 3G\_MSC-A when the IU-RELOC-DETECT or the IU-RELOC-COMPLETE is received from 3G\_MSC-B. The old radio resources are released when the IU-RELOC-COMPLETE message is received from 3G\_MSC-B. The sending of the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request starts the MAP supervision timer for the MAP dialogue between 3G\_MSC-A + +and 3G\_MSC-B. When the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request including the IU-RELOC-COMPLETE message is received in 3G\_MSC-A, the resources in RNS-A shall be released. + +In order not to conflict with the PSTN/ISDN signalling system(s) used between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-B must generate an answer signal when IU-RELOC-DETECT/COMPLETE is received. + +3G\_MSC-B shall release the Handover Number when the circuit between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B has been established. + +If the circuit between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B cannot be established, (e.g. an unsuccessful backward message is received instead of ACM) 3G\_MSC-A terminates the inter-3G\_MSC relocation attempt by sending an appropriate MAP message, for example an ABORT. + +3G\_MSC-A shall retain overall call control until the call is cleared by the fixed subscriber or the UE and there is no further call control functions to be performed (e.g. servicing waiting calls, echo cancellers). + +When 3G\_MSC-A clears the call to the UE it also clears the call control functions in 3G\_MSC-A and sends the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response to release the MAP resources in 3G\_MSC-B. + +3G\_MSC-A may terminate the procedure at any time by sending an appropriate MAP message to 3G\_MSC-B. If establishment of the circuit between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B has been initiated, the circuit must also be cleared. + +The relocation will be aborted by 3G\_MSC-A if it detects release or interruption of the radio path before the call has been established on 3G\_MSC-B. + +#### 8.3.1.2 With multiple circuit connections (Optional functionality) + +##### 8.3.1.2.1 3G\_MSC-B does not support multiple bearers + +If 3G\_MSC-A supports the optional supplementary service Multicall (See 3GPP TS 23.135 [17]), 3G\_MSC-A shall have the following functionality additionally to the description in subclause 8.3.1.1. + +Upon receipt of the IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-A, 3G\_MSC-A generates IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST and sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request to 3G\_MSC-B including the IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST message, which may include multiple bearers. If 3G\_MSC-A receives an indication that 3G\_MSC-B does not support multiple bearers, 3G\_MSC-A shall select one bearer to be handed over if the UE is engaged with multiple bearers. 3G\_MSC-A reconstructs IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST and sends again a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request to 3G\_MSC-B including the IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST message, which includes only the selected bearer. + +When MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response including an IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK is received from 3G\_MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-A sends IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND, which indicates the bearers not to be handed over as bearers to be released, to RNS-A. + +After 3G\_MSC-A receives MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request from 3G\_MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-A shall release calls via 3G\_MSC-B, which has been carried by the bearers not to be handed over, and then 3G\_MSC-A sends IU-RELEASE-COMMAND to RNS-A. + +##### 8.3.1.2.2 3G\_MSC-B supports multiple bearers + +If 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B support the optional supplementary service Multicall (See 3GPP TS 23.135 [17]), 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B shall have the following functionality additionally to the description in subclause 8.3.1.1. + +Upon receipt of the IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-A, 3G\_MSC-A generates IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST and sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request to 3G\_MSC-B including the IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST message, which may include multiple bearers. + +When MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request including an IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST message is received by the 3G\_MSC-B and the number of bearers included in the IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST message has exceeded the maximum number of bearers supported by 3G\_MSC-B, the 3G\_MSC-B shall select several bearers so that the number of bearers will fulfil the range of 3G\_MSC-B capability. In this case 3G\_MSC-B shall reconstruct IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST message to cope with the capability of 3G\_MSC-B. The 3G\_MSC-B shall retrieve multiple Handover Numbers from its associated VLR (exchange of the messages MAP-allocate-handover-number request and MAP-send-handover-report request several times). The number of Handover Numbers depends on the number of RAB IDs in the reconstructed IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST. + +After the completion of Handover Number allocation 3G\_MSC-B may select several bearers and reconstruct IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST again if the number of successfully allocated Handover Numbers is less than the number of required bearers, and sends IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B. + +After the reception of IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B, the 3G\_MSC-B shall generate Relocation Number List, which includes couples of RAB ID (See 3GPP TS 25.413 [11]) and Handover Number successfully allocated. Then the 3G\_MSC-B sends MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response including Relocation Number List back to the 3G\_MSC-A. + +Upon receipt of the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response 3G\_MSC-A shall establish circuits between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B by signalling procedures supported by the network according to the Relocation Number List. When 3G\_MSC-A receives all the results from attempted circuits (the results may be successful ACM message or unsuccessful backward message for each attempt) and if at least one circuit has been successfully established, 3G\_MSC-A sends IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND, which indicates the bearers failed to set up in RNS-B and the bearers associated with circuits which has failed to set up as bearers to be released, to RNS-A. + +After 3G\_MSC-A receives MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request from 3G\_MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-A shall release calls via 3G\_MSC-B, which has been carried by the bearers failed to set up in RNS-B and the bearers associated with circuits which has failed to set up, and then 3G\_MSC-A sends IU-RELEASE-COMMAND to RNS-A. + +If no circuit connection has been successfully established 3G\_MSC-A terminates the inter-3G\_MSC relocation attempt by sending an appropriate MAP message, for example ABORT. + +### 8.3.2 Basic relocation procedure not requiring the establishment of a circuit connection between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B + +The basic SRNS relocation procedures to be used when no circuit connection is required by 3G\_MSC-A are similar to those described in subclause 8.3.1 for circuit switched calls. The main differences to the procedures described in subclause 8.3.1 relate to the establishment of circuits between the network entities and the Handover Number allocation. + +In the case of basic relocation, 3G\_MSC-A shall specify to 3G\_MSC-B that no Handover Number is required in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request (see 3GPP TS 29.002 [12]). As for the basic relocation using a circuit connection, the IU-RELOC-REQUEST is transmitted at the same time together with the identity of the target RNS to which the call is to be relocated. Any subsequent Handover Number allocation procedure will not be invoked until the completion of the basic relocation procedure (see clause: Subsequent Channel Assignment using a circuit connection). 3G\_MSC-B shall then perform the radio resources allocation as described in subclause 8.3.1 if applicable. The MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response shall be returned to 3G\_MSC-A including either the response of the radio resources allocation request received from RNS-B (IU-RELOC-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE/IU-RELOC-FAILURE with possible extra RANAP information. This extra information is amended by 3G\_MSC-B due to the possible interworking between the RANMAP protocol carried on the E-interface and the RANAP protocol used on the Iu-interface). The basic relocation procedure will continue as described in subclause 8.3.1 except that no circuit connection will be established towards 3G\_MSC-B. + +The relevant case for the basic relocation without circuit connection is shown in figure 31. As can be seen the major differences to the equivalent figure 30 are the omission of any circuit establishment messaging and the omission of handover number allocation signalling. + +![Sequence diagram of the Basic SRNS relocation procedure without a circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between RNS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, RNS-B, and VLR-B. The process involves several signaling messages: IU-RELOC-REQUIRED, MAP-Prep-Handover req., IU-RELOC-REQUEST, IU-RELOC-REQUEST-ACK, MAP-Prep-Handover resp., IU-RELOC-COMMAND, MAP-Process-Access-Sig req., IU-RELOC-DETECT, IU-REL-CMD/COM, MAP-Send-End-Signal req., IU-RELOC-COMPLETE, and MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. The diagram also indicates 'End of link' points for the RNS and MSC entities.](ffb6acd27b8e3a54392840948a75869f_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant RNS-A + participant 3G MSC-A + participant 3G MSC-B + participant RNS-B + participant VLR-B + + Note left of RNS-A: End of link + RNS-A->>3G MSC-A: IU-RELOC-REQUIRED + 3G MSC-A->>3G MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Handover req. + 3G MSC-B->>RNS-B: IU-RELOC-REQUEST + RNS-B-->>3G MSC-B: IU-RELOC-REQUEST-ACK + 3G MSC-B-->>3G MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Handover resp. + 3G MSC-A->>RNS-A: IU-RELOC-COMMAND + Note left of 3G MSC-A: End of link + 3G MSC-A->>3G MSC-B: MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. + RNS-B->>3G MSC-B: IU-RELOC-DETECT + 3G MSC-A->>RNS-A: IU-REL-CMD/COM + 3G MSC-A->>3G MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + RNS-B->>3G MSC-B: IU-RELOC-COMPLETE + Note left of 3G MSC-B: End of link + 3G MSC-B-->>3G MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram of the Basic SRNS relocation procedure without a circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between RNS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, RNS-B, and VLR-B. The process involves several signaling messages: IU-RELOC-REQUIRED, MAP-Prep-Handover req., IU-RELOC-REQUEST, IU-RELOC-REQUEST-ACK, MAP-Prep-Handover resp., IU-RELOC-COMMAND, MAP-Process-Access-Sig req., IU-RELOC-DETECT, IU-REL-CMD/COM, MAP-Send-End-Signal req., IU-RELOC-COMPLETE, and MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. The diagram also indicates 'End of link' points for the RNS and MSC entities. + +**Figure 31: Basic SRNS relocation procedure without a circuit connection** + +### 8.3.3 Procedure for subsequent relocation requiring a circuit connection + +After the call has been relocated to 3G\_MSC-B, if the UE leaves the area of 3G\_MSC-B during the same call, subsequent relocation is necessary in order to continue the connection when no Iur interface exists between the involved RNSs, or to optimise the transmission path when the Iur interface is used. + +The following cases apply: + +- i) the UE moves back to the area of 3G\_MSC-A; +- ii) the UE moves into the area of a third 3G\_MSC (3G\_MSC-B'). + +In both cases the call is switched in 3G\_MSC-A; the circuit between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B shall be released after a successful subsequent relocation has been performed. + +If 3G\_MSC-A is replaced by MSC-A in the procedures, then a subsequent relocation from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' shall not be possible since MSC-A does not support the RANAP protocol. + +#### 8.3.3.1 Description of subsequent relocation procedure i): 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A + +The procedure for successful relocation from 3G\_MSC-B back to 3G\_MSC-A is shown in figure 32. + +![Sequence diagram for subsequent relocation procedure i) from 3G_MSC-B to 3G_MSC-A using a circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between RNS-B, 3G_MSC-A, 3G_MSC-B, RNS-A, and VL.R-B. The sequence starts with 3G_MSC-B sending an IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED message to RNS-A. RNS-A then sends a MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. to 3G_MSC-A. 3G_MSC-A responds with an IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B. RNS-B replies with an IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK. 3G_MSC-A then sends a MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends an IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND to RNS-A. RNS-A performs detection and sends an IU-RELOCATION-DETECT to 3G_MSC-A. 3G_MSC-A sends an IU-RELOCATION-COMPLETE to RNS-B. RNS-B then sends a MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to 3G_MSC-A. Finally, 3G_MSC-A sends a Release message to 3G_MSC-B, and RNS-A sends an IU-RELEASE-CMD/COM to 3G_MSC-B.](b63f41ca262d8ce9ef8affb62607f32b_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant RNS-B + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC-B + participant RNS-A + participant VL.R-B + + Note left of RNS-B: + 3G_MSC-B->>RNS-A: IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + RNS-A->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-B: IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST + RNS-B-->>3G_MSC-A: IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. + 3G_MSC-B->>RNS-A: IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND + RNS-A->>3G_MSC-A: IU-RELOCATION-DETECT + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-B: IU-RELOCATION-COMPLETE + RNS-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + 3G_MSC-A-->>3G_MSC-B: Release + RNS-A->>3G_MSC-B: IU-RELEASE-CMD/COM + +``` + +Sequence diagram for subsequent relocation procedure i) from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A using a circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between RNS-B, 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B, RNS-A, and VL.R-B. The sequence starts with 3G\_MSC-B sending an IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED message to RNS-A. RNS-A then sends a MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A responds with an IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B. RNS-B replies with an IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK. 3G\_MSC-A then sends a MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends an IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND to RNS-A. RNS-A performs detection and sends an IU-RELOCATION-DETECT to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A sends an IU-RELOCATION-COMPLETE to RNS-B. RNS-B then sends a MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to 3G\_MSC-A. Finally, 3G\_MSC-A sends a Release message to 3G\_MSC-B, and RNS-A sends an IU-RELEASE-CMD/COM to 3G\_MSC-B. + +**Figure 32: Subsequent relocation procedure i) successful relocation from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A using a circuit connection** + +##### 8.3.3.1.1 With one circuit connection + +The procedure is as follows. + +If 3G\_MSC-B supports SRNS Relocation to a CSG cell, 3G\_MSC-A provided CSG subscription data during the basic inter-MSC handover/relocation, and RNS-A includes a CSG ID for the target cell in the IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED message, then 3G\_MSC-B shall check the CSG membership of the UE for the target cell as described in subclause 4.4.1 before generating the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request. If the UE fails the CSG membership check and the target cell is a CSG cell, 3G\_MSC-B shall send an IU-RELOCATION-PREPARATION-FAILURE message to RNS-A. + +3G\_MSC-B sends the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request to 3G\_MSC-A indicating the new 3G\_MSC number (3G\_MSC-A number), indicating also the identity of the target RNS where the call has to be relocated and including a complete IU-RELOC-REQUEST message. + +For speech calls, 3G\_MSC-B shall configure the RANAP RAB parameters according to the appropriate default speech codec. For a relocation to UTRAN Iu mode, if this codec is different from the Iu Currently used codec, 3G\_MSC-B shall also include the NAS Synch Indicator for the default speech codec in the IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST. + +Alternatively, if 3G\_MSC-A is known to support the use of the Iu Supported Codecs List, 3G\_MSC-B may configure the RANAP RAB parameters according to the preferred codec and indicate this to 3G\_MSC-A by including the RAB configuration indicator in the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request. For a relocation to UTRAN Iu mode, if the preferred codec is different from the Iu Currently used codec, 3G\_MSC-B shall also include the NAS Synch Indicator for the preferred codec in the IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST. + +NOTE: 3G\_MSC-B shall not send further MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER requests while a relocation attempt is pending or before any timeouts. + +Since 3G\_MSC-A is the call controlling 3G\_MSC, this 3G\_MSC needs no Handover Number for routing purposes; 3G\_MSC-A can immediately initiate the relocation towards the target RNS. + +For speech calls, 3G\_MSC-A shall select an Iu Selected codec and connect a transcoder. + +3G\_MSC-A shall reconfigure the RANAP RAB parameters according to the Iu Selected codec: + +- if the RAB configuration indicator is included in the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request, and the codec selected by 3G\_MSC-A is different from the preferred codec; or + +- if the RAB configuration indicator is not included in the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request and the codec selected by 3G\_MSC-A is different from the appropriate default speech codec. + +Additionally, for a relocation to UTRAN Iu mode, if the Iu Selected codec is different from the Iu Currently used codec, 3G\_MSC-A shall include the NAS Synch Indicator for the Iu Selected codec in the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST. + +When relocation can be initiated, 3G\_MSC-A shall return in the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response the complete IU-RELOC-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE message received from the RNS-B and possible extra RANAP information, amended by 3G\_MSC-A due to the possible interworking between the RANAP protocol carried on the E-interface and the RANAP protocol used on the Iu-interface. If a radio resource cannot be assigned or if a fault is detected on the target RNS identity, or the target RNS identity in the IU-RELOC-REQUEST is not consistent with the target 3G\_MSC number, the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response containing an IU-RELOC-FAILURE message shall be given to 3G\_MSC-B, in addition 3G\_MSC-B shall maintain the connection with the UE. + +If the procedure in 3G\_MSC-A is successful then 3G\_MSC-B can request the UE to return to the new RNS-B on 3G\_MSC-A in the case of relocation without Iur interface, or request RNS-B to become serving RNS in the case of relocation with Iur interface. This is illustrated in figure 32 by the IU-RELOC-COMMAND message. The operation is successfully completed when 3G\_MSC-A receives the IU-RELOC-COMPLETE message. + +After relocation 3G\_MSC-A shall release the circuit to 3G\_MSC-B. + +3G\_MSC-A must also terminate the MAP procedure for the basic relocation between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B by sending an appropriate MAP message. 3G\_MSC-B will release the resources in RNS-A when the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response is received. + +##### 8.3.3.1.2 With multiple circuit connections (Optional functionality) + +If 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B support the optional supplementary service Multicall (See 3GPP TS 23.135 [17]), 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B shall have the following functionality additionally to the description in subclause 8.3.3.1.1. + +Upon receipt of the IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-A, 3G\_MSC-B generates IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST which may include several bearers and sends it to 3G\_MSC-A over MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request. + +3G\_MSC-A sends IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B and receives IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK. + +When MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response is received from 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B sends IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND, which indicates the bearers failed to set up in RNS-B as bearers to be released, to RNS-A. + +After 3G\_MSC-A receives IU-RELOCATION-COMPLETE message from RNS-B, 3G\_MSC-A shall release calls via RNS-B, which has been carried by the bearers failed to set up in RNS-B, and then 3G\_MSC-A sends MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response to 3G\_MSC-B. + +#### 8.3.3.2 Description of subsequent relocation procedure ii): 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' + +The procedure for successful relocation from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' is shown in figure 33. + +The procedure consists of two parts: + +- a subsequent relocation from 3G\_MSC-B back to 3G\_MSC-A as described in subclause 8.3.3.1; and +- a basic relocation from 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B' as described in subclause 8.3.1. + +##### 8.3.3.2.1 With one circuit connection + +If 3G\_MSC-B supports SRNS Relocation to a CSG cell and RNS-A includes a CSG ID for the target cell in the IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED message, then 3G\_MSC-B shall check the CSG membership of the UE for the target cell as described in subclause 8.3.3.1.1 before initiating the procedure, and reject the handover if necessary. + +3G\_MSC-B sends the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request to 3G\_MSC-A indicating a new 3G\_MSC number (which is the identity of 3G\_MSC-B'), indicating also the target RNS identity and including a complete IU-RELOC-REQUEST, 3G\_MSC-A then starts a basic relocation procedure towards 3G\_MSC-B'. + +For speech calls, 3G\_MSC-B shall configure the RANAP RAB parameters according to the appropriate default speech codec. For a relocation to UTRAN Iu mode, if this codec is different from the Iu Currently used codec, 3G\_MSC-B shall also include the NAS Synch Indicator for the default speech codec in the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST. + +Alternatively, if 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B' are known to support the use of the Iu Supported Codecs List, 3G\_MSC-B may configure the RANAP RAB parameters according to the preferred codec and indicate this to 3G\_MSC-A by including the RAB configuration indicator in the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request. For a relocation to UTRAN Iu mode, if the preferred codec is different from the Iu Currently used codec, 3G\_MSC-B shall also include the NAS Synch Indicator for the preferred codec in the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST. The decision to use this option is based on internal configuration information in 3G\_MSC-B. + +If 3G\_MSC-A supports A interface over IP, then for speech calls 3G\_MSC-A may include the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request towards 3G\_MSC-B'. For a detailed description of the handling of this codec list by 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B' see 3GPP TS 23.153 [25]. + +When 3G\_MSC-A receives the ACM from 3G\_MSC-B', 3G\_MSC-A informs 3G\_MSC-B that 3G\_MSC-B' has successfully allocated the radio resources on RNS-B' side by sending the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response containing the complete IU-RELOC-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE received from RNS-B' and possible extra RANAP information, amended by 3G\_MSC-A due to the possible interworking between the RANAP protocol carried on the E-interface between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B' and the RANAP protocol carried on the E-interface between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. Now 3G\_MSC-B can start the procedure on the radio path if needed. + +For 3G\_MSC-A the relocation is completed when it has received the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL REQUEST from 3G\_MSC-B' containing the IU-RELOC-COMPLETE received from the RNS-B'. The circuit between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B is released. 3G\_MSC-A also sends the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response to 3G\_MSC-B in order to terminate the original MAP dialogue between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B releases the radio resources when it receives this message. + +If no radio resource can be allocated by 3G\_MSC-B' or no circuit between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B' can be established or a fault is detected on the target RNS identity or the target RNS identity in the IU-RELOC-REQUEST is not consistent with the target 3G\_MSC number, 3G\_MSC-A informs 3G\_MSC-B by using the IU-RELOC-FAILURE message included in the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response. 3G\_MSC-B shall maintain the existing connection with the UE. + +When the subsequent relocation is completed, 3G\_MSC-B' is considered as 3G\_MSC-B. Any further inter-3G\_MSC relocation is handled as described above for a subsequent relocation. + +##### 8.3.3.2.2 With multiple circuit connections (Optional functionality) + +If 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B support the optional supplementary service Multicall (See 3GPP TS 23.135 [17]), 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B shall have the following functionality additionally to the description in subclause 8.3.3.2.1. + +Upon receipt of the IU-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-B 3G\_MSC-B generates an IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST message which may include multiple bearer and sends it to 3G\_MSC-A over MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request. + +Upon receipt of the MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request from 3G\_MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-A starts a basic relocation procedure towards 3G\_MSC-B'. + +###### 8.3.3.2.2.1 3G\_MSC-B' does not support multiple bearers + +If 3G\_MSC-A receives an indication that 3G\_MSC-B' does not support multiple bearers, 3G\_MSC-A shall select one bearer to be handed over. 3G\_MSC-A reconstructs IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST and sends again a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request to 3G\_MSC-B' including the IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST message, which includes only the selected bearer. Upon receipt of MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response from 3G\_MSC-B', 3G\_MSC-A shall reconstructs IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK to indicate the bearers not to be handed over as the bearers failed to set up in IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK and send it over MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response to 3G\_MSC-B. + +When MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response is received from 3G\_MSC-A 3G\_MSC-B sends IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND, which indicates the bearers failed to set up as bearers to be released, to RNS-A. + +After 3G\_MSC-A receives MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request from 3G\_MSC-B', 3G\_MSC-A shall release calls via 3G\_MSC-B', which has been carried by the bearers failed to set up, and then 3G\_MSC-A sends MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response to 3G\_MSC-B. + +###### 8.3.3.2.2.2 3G\_MSC-B' supports multiple bearers + +If some of circuit connections failed to set up between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B', 3G\_MSC-A shall reconstruct IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK message so that the IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK includes only the bearers which have successfully established circuit connection and sends it to 3G\_MSC-B over MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response. + +When MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response is received from 3G\_MSC-A 3G\_MSC-B sends IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND, which indicates the bearers failed to set up as bearers to be released, to RNS-A. + +After 3G\_MSC-A receives MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request from 3G\_MSC-B', 3G\_MSC-A shall release calls via 3G\_MSC-B', which has been carried by the bearers failed to set up, and then 3G\_MSC-A sends MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response to 3G\_MSC-B. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 33: Subsequent relocation procedure ii) Successful SRNS relocation from 3G_MSC-B to 3G_MSC-B' requiring a circuit connection. The diagram shows the interaction between 3G_MSC-A, RNS-B, 3G_MSC-B, RNS-B', 3G_MSC-B', VLR-B, and VLR-B'.](e7010c66da16316c2935dfbbef5056b3_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant RNS-B + participant 3G_MSC-B + participant RNS-B' + participant 3G_MSC-B' + participant VLR-B + participant VLR-B' + + RNS-B->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B': MAP-Prepare-Handover req. + 3G_MSC-B'->>VLR-B': MAP-Allocate-Handover-Number req. + 3G_MSC-B'->>RNS-B': Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST + RNS-B'->>3G_MSC-B': Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK + 3G_MSC-B'->>VLR-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. + 3G_MSC-B'->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Prepare-Handover resp. + VLR-B->>3G_MSC-B': MAP-Send-Handover-Rep. resp. (1) + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B': IAM + 3G_MSC-B'->>3G_MSC-A: ACM + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Ho resp. + 3G_MSC-B->>RNS-B: Iu-RELOCATION-CMD + RNS-B'->>3G_MSC-B': Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT + 3G_MSC-B'->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Process-Access-Signalling req. + RNS-B'->>3G_MSC-B': Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE + 3G_MSC-B'->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + 3G_MSC-B'->>3G_MSC-A: Answer + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: Release + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + 3G_MSC-B->>RNS-B: Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM + Note over 3G_MSC-A, 3G_MSC-B: (end of call) + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B': Release + 3G_MSC-B'->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure 33: Subsequent relocation procedure ii) Successful SRNS relocation from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' requiring a circuit connection. The diagram shows the interaction between 3G\_MSC-A, RNS-B, 3G\_MSC-B, RNS-B', 3G\_MSC-B', VLR-B, and VLR-B'. + +NOTE 1: Can be sent at any time after the reception of IAM. + +**Figure 33: Subsequent relocation procedure ii) Successful SRNS relocation from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' requiring a circuit connection** + +### 8.3.4 Procedure for subsequent relocation not requiring a circuit connection + +As for the subsequent relocation with a circuit connection between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B, the same two cases of subsequent relocation apply: + +- i) the UE moves back to the area of 3G\_MSC-A; +- ii) the UE moves into the area of a third 3G\_MSC (3G\_MSC-B'). + +If 3G\_MSC-A is replaced by MSC-A in the procedures, then a subsequent relocation from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' shall not be possible since MSC-A does not support the RANAP protocol. + +#### 8.3.4.1 Description of subsequent relocation procedure i): 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A + +The procedure for successful relocation from 3G\_MSC-B back to 3G\_MSC-A without circuit connection is shown in figure 34. The only difference with the figure 32 is that no circuit release is needed between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. + +![Sequence diagram for subsequent relocation procedure i) from 3G_MSC-B to 3G_MSC-A. Lifelines: RNS-B, 3G_MSC-A, 3G_MSC-B, RNS-A, VLR-B. The sequence shows signaling between RNS-B and 3G_MSC-A, 3G_MSC-A and 3G_MSC-B, and 3G_MSC-B and RNS-A. RNS-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to 3G_MSC-A, which responds with Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK. 3G_MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. to 3G_MSC-B, which responds with MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. 3G_MSC-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED to RNS-A, which responds with Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND. RNS-A sends Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT to 3G_MSC-A, which responds with Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE. Finally, 3G_MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to 3G_MSC-B, which responds with Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM.](967e98a12645f89cb4a7620f42bf8c2e_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant RNS-B + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC-B + participant RNS-A + participant VLR-B + + Note left of RNS-B: + RNS-B->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST + 3G_MSC-A-->>RNS-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + 3G_MSC-B-->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. + 3G_MSC-B->>RNS-A: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + RNS-A-->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND + RNS-A->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT + 3G_MSC-A-->>RNS-A: Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + 3G_MSC-B-->>RNS-A: Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM + +``` + +Sequence diagram for subsequent relocation procedure i) from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A. Lifelines: RNS-B, 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B, RNS-A, VLR-B. The sequence shows signaling between RNS-B and 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B, and 3G\_MSC-B and RNS-A. RNS-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to 3G\_MSC-A, which responds with Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK. 3G\_MSC-A sends MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. to 3G\_MSC-B, which responds with MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover resp. 3G\_MSC-B sends Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED to RNS-A, which responds with Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND. RNS-A sends Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT to 3G\_MSC-A, which responds with Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE. Finally, 3G\_MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to 3G\_MSC-B, which responds with Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM. + +**Figure 34: Subsequent relocation procedure i) successful relocation from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B not requiring a circuit connection** + +#### 8.3.4.2 Description of subsequent relocation procedure ii): 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B" + +The procedure for successful relocation from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' is shown in figure 35. + +The procedure consists of two parts: + +- a subsequent relocation from 3G\_MSC-B back to 3G\_MSC-A as described in subclause 8.3.4.1; and +- a basic relocation from 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B' as described in subclause 8.3.2. + +The only difference to the equivalent figure 33 is the omission of the circuit and handover number allocation signallings. + +![Sequence diagram of subsequent relocation procedure ii) Successful SRNS relocation from 3G_MSC-B to 3G_MSC-B' not requiring a circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between 3G_MSC-A, RNS-B, 3G_MSC-B, RNS-B', 3G_MSC-B', VLR-B, and VLR-B'.](4806f9f95fff13a30d6523bd6ffeac63_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant RNS-B + participant 3G_MSC-B + participant RNS-B' + participant 3G_MSC-B' + participant VLR-B + participant VLR-B' + + RNS-B->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B': MAP-Prepare-Handover req. + 3G_MSC-B'->>RNS-B': Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST + RNS-B'->>3G_MSC-B': Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK + 3G_MSC-B'->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Prepare-Handover resp. + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Ho resp. + 3G_MSC-B->>RNS-B: Iu-RELOCATION-CMD + RNS-B'->>3G_MSC-B': Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT + 3G_MSC-B'->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Process-Access-Signalling req. + RNS-B'->>3G_MSC-B': Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE + 3G_MSC-B'->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + 3G_MSC-B->>RNS-B: Iu-RELEASE-CMD/COM + Note left of 3G_MSC-B: (end of link) + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B': MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram of subsequent relocation procedure ii) Successful SRNS relocation from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' not requiring a circuit connection. The diagram shows interactions between 3G\_MSC-A, RNS-B, 3G\_MSC-B, RNS-B', 3G\_MSC-B', VLR-B, and VLR-B'. + +**Figure 35: Subsequent relocation procedure ii) Successful SRNS relocation from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' not requiring a circuit connection** + +# 9 Detailed procedures in MSC-A + +## 9.1 BSS/MSC and MS/MSC procedures in MSC-A (functional unit 1) + +The handover procedures in this functional unit consist of: + +- signalling between the MS and the MSC; +- signalling between the BSS and the MSC for access management. + +## 9.2 Call control procedures MSC-A (functional unit 2) + +The call control procedures related to handover in MSC-A can be divided into two functional entities: + +- the first entity is the call control procedure as part of the normal interworking between the PSTN/ISDN and the PLMN; for an MS originating call MSC-A is the originating exchange, for an MS terminating call MSC-A is the destination exchange; +- the second entity is the call control procedure for the connection between MSC-A and MSC-B in case of a handover from MSC-A to MSC-B. For this call control procedure the following applies. + +Call set-up: + +- the connection to MSC-B is set up by procedures relevant to the signalling system used in the PSTN/ISDN to which MSC-A is connected. The call is set up by using the MS Handover Number received from MSC-B as part of the MAP procedure; +- the call set-up direction will always be from MSC-A to MSC-B, even when the call was originally established by the MS. Functional unit 2 (see figure 2) should therefore keep information on call set-up direction in order to be able to interpret correctly any clearing signals (see below); +- the unit should indicate the address complete condition to functional unit 3 and through-connect without awaiting the answer signal from MSC-B. This applies also to signalling systems where address complete signals are not supported. In such cases an artificial address complete is established by functional unit 2. + +Call clearing: + +- call clearing consists of two parts: after inter-MSC handover, clearing of the MS-BSS connection and clearing of the inter-MSC connection. If a request to release the call is generated by the network while the MS is re-tuning from one BSS to another BSS, then MSC-A shall begin clearing the call to the network and queue the call release to the MS until the MS has resumed communication. This includes the case when MSC-B and/or MSC-B' are involved; +- the MAP procedures are used to transfer information between MSC-B and MSC-A in order to maintain full call control within MSC-A. MSC-A determines, based on information received from MSC-B, the appropriate signals (according to 3GPP TS 24.008 [10]) to be sent to the MS, and sends this information to MSC-B; +- when MSC-A clears the call to the MS it also clears the call control functions in MSC-B and sends the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response to release the MAP resources in MSC-B. The clearing of the connection is by procedures relevant to the signalling system in the PSTN/ISDN to which MSC-A is connected; +- when the Signalling System no 7 ISDN User Part is used, the normal symmetric release procedures apply on both the connection to the fixed network and to MSC-B; +- when a signalling system is used without a symmetric release possibility, some notice should be given to the clear-forward and clear-back procedures; +- for MS terminating calls the following conditions apply on clear-forward and clear-back: + - when a clear-forward signal is received on interface B' (see figure 1), MSC-A clears the circuit to MSC-B by normal clear-forward procedures; + - when a clear-back signal is received from MSC-B, MSC-A starts normal clear-back procedures towards the fixed network (interface B') and sends the clear-forward signal on interface B'' in order to clear the connection with MSC-B. + +NOTE 1: This case corresponds to a fault situation. + +- for MS originated calls the following applies: + - when MSC-A receives a clear-back signal from MSC-B, this signal must be interpreted as indicating a clear-forward condition. MSC-A then clears both the connection on interface B' (see figure 1) and to MSC-B by normal clear-forward procedures. + +NOTE 2: This case corresponds to a fault situation. + +- when MSC-A receives a clear-back signal on interface B', MSC-A should distinguish between national and international connections: + - for international connections where the Q.118 [1] supervision is done in the ISC, MSC-A sends a clear-forward signal on both interface B' to the fixed network and interface B'' to MSC-B; + - for national connections or for international connections where the Q.118 [1] supervision is not done in the ISC, a timer is started according to national practice for clear-back supervision and MSC-A proceeds as follows: + - i) if a clear-back signal is received from MSC-B, MSC-A interprets this as indicating a clear-forward condition and proceeds by clearing the connections on interface B' and to MSC-B by normal clear-forward procedures; + - ii) if the timer expires, MSC-A proceeds by normal clear-forward of the connections on interface B' and to MSC-B. + +## 9.3 Handover control procedures MSC-A (functional unit 3) + +The procedures of functional unit 3 are given in terms of SDL diagrams in figure 41. To easily distinguish the interface concerned the messages received or sent from this unit are prefixed with either 'MAP' for a MAP message, 'A' for an A-Interface message or 'I' for an ISDN/PSTN message. + +The procedures of functional unit 3 include: + +- i) initiation. The initiation condition is shown by the signal A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED. + +The diagram also includes queuing when there is no channel available. Calls for which handover has been initiated should be queued with priority higher than normal calls. They should have lower priority than emergency calls. + +- ii) handover of calls within the area of MSC-A, i.e. handover case i). In this case MSC-A controls the procedures on both the previous and the new radio channel, using signals A-HANDOVER-REQUEST and A-HANDOVER-COMMAND. The handover procedure is completed when A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE is received. If this signal is not received (expiry of timer T102), the radio path and the connection on interface B' are released. + +In the case of ongoing GSM voice group calls for subsequent users of the VGCS channel uplink the original connection shall always be maintained. + +For handover devices with three-party capabilities the handover device is first set up so that all interfaces A', A'' and B' are connected (illustrated by the signal 'set up handover device'). This is done when the Handover Command is sent to the MS. The device is connected in its final position (i.e. A'' to B' for case ii)) (illustrated by the signal 'connect handover device') when A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE is received. + +- iii) handover to MSC-B. This procedure is the one described in subclauses 7.1 and 7.2. For handover devices with three-party capabilities the handover device is set-up when MSC-A sends the Handover Command to the MS, i.e. the interfaces A', B' and B'' are then connected. The device is connected in its final position (i.e. B' to B'') when the successful procedure indication is received from functional unit 4. +- iv) subsequent handover to MSC-A. The procedure is described in subclauses 7.3 and 7.4. When a handover to MSC-A indication is received from functional unit 4, the handover device is set up so that interfaces B', B'' and A' are connected (for handover devices with three-party capabilities). When A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE is received, the device is connected in its final position (i.e. B' to A'). + +If A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE is not received (expiry of timer T104), the handover device releases interface A', B' and B''. + +- v) subsequent handover to a third MSC (MSC-B') . The procedure is described in subclauses 7.3 and 7.4. The handover device is set up in its initial position, (i.e. interconnection of interfaces B', B" and B''') when the connection to MSC-B' has been established. MSC-B is informed via functional unit 4 that the connection has been established and that the procedure on the radio path can be initiated. The device is connected in its final position (i.e. B' to B''') when a successful procedure indication is received from functional unit 4. MSC-B is informed that all procedures in MSC-B can be terminated (illustrated by the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response). The device returns to the state where B' and B" are connected if the subsequent handover procedure fails. + +### Timers in MSC-A. + +The procedures are supervised by timers in order to avoid a deadlock when responses are not received or the procedures fail. The following timers are defined: + +- T101: this timer supervises the queuing time for a free channel. If T101 expires, a no channel indication is generated, a retry procedure could be applied as described in subclause 6.1. T101 is set by O&M, +- T102: this timer supervises the time for handover completion for handover between BSSs in MSC-A. T102 is set by O&M, +- T103: this timer supervises the time between issuing an A-HANDOVER-COMMAND from MSC-A and receiving a successful procedure indication from MSC-B. This timer also supervises the time between sending an A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE to MSC-B and receiving a successful procedure indication from MSC-B'. If T103 expires, the handover procedure is terminated. T103 is set by O&M, +- T104: this timer supervises the time between sending of an A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE to MSC-B and receiving the A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B on MSC-A. If the timer expires, the new radio channel is released. T104 is set by O&M. + +## 9.3A BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support control procedures + +The "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" for AoIP is performed by the MSC that is currently serving the connected BSS (in the following just termed "serving MSC"), it may be either MSC-A, MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-B. + +The "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" control procedures in serving MSC include: + +- i) **Handover enquiry.** This procedure is only part of the MSC-initiated "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" described in subclause 6.3.3. The MSC initiates the handover enquiry by sending an A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-ENQUIRY message and starting timer T106. + +The handover enquiry phase is completed when an A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message is received from the BSS with cause code "response to an INTERNAL HANDOVER ENQUIRY message". If this message is not received (expiry of timer T106), or the BSS responds with an A-HANDOVER-FAILURE message, or the BSS sends an A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message with another cause code, then the MSC terminates the MSC-initiated "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support". + +- ii) **Initiation.** The initiation condition is given by reception of the A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message. This starts the Internal Handover Preparation phase for the serving MSC; the serving MSC starts timer T105. Calls for which Internal Handover Preparation has been initiated should be handled with priority higher than normal calls. They should have lower priority than emergency calls. During that phase the serving MSC considers the A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED parameters, tries to allocate the necessary resources. + +The Internal Handover Preparation phase for the serving MSC ends when the serving MSC sends the A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-COMMAND message or an A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED-REJECT message or when timer T105 expires. + +If the serving MSC can not perform the "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support", then it shall send an A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED-REJECT Message to the BSS and shall release all potentially allocated resources as if no A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message was received. + +If timer T105 expires before the serving MSC could send the A-INTERNAL HANDOVER-COMMAND message, then the serving MSC shall consider the Internal Handover Preparation phase as terminated without success and shall release any allocated resources for the Internal Handover such that the status returns as it was + +prior to receiving the A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message. No response shall be sent to the BSS after the expiry of timer T105. + +- ii) **Execution.** Serving MSC controls the "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" by sending the A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-COMMAND message. The "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" is completed when the A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE message is received. If this signal is not received (expiry of timer T102), the radio path and all the connections and resources associated to that call shall be released. + +For handover devices with three-party capabilities, the handover device is first set up so that all interfaces A', A" and B' are connected. This is performed before the A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-COMMAND message is sent to the BSS. The handover device may be adjusted when the A-HANDOVER-DETECT message is received. The handover device is connected in its final position (i.e. A" to B') when the A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE message is received. + +### Timers in serving MSC for Internal Handover Preparation + +The procedures are supervised by timers in order to avoid a deadlock when responses are not received or the procedures fail. The following additional timers are defined: + +T105: this timer supervises the Internal Handover Preparation procedure between BSS and serving MSC. T105 is set by O&M in relation to timer "T25" (3GPP TS 48.008 [5]). T105 defines the maximum time a serving MSC may take to respond to an "INTERNAL HANDOVER REQUIRED" message. Timer "T25" (3GPP TS 48.008 [5]) defines the minimum time the BSS will to wait before it can send a new or repeated (INTERNAL) HANDOVER REQUIRED message or an A-HANDOVER FAILURE. T105 shall be configured to be at least one round trip delay shorter than the time configured for "T25" (3GPP TS 48.008 [5]) to minimise the risk of crossing messages. + +T106: this timer supervises the time between sending of an A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-ENQUIRY message to the BSS and receiving an A-INTERNAL-HANDOVER-REQUIRED or A-HANDOVER-FAILURE message from the BSS. If T106 expires, the handover procedure is terminated. T106 is set by O&M and should be sufficiently long so that no late responses from BSS can be expected after its expiry. + +## 9.4 MAP procedures in MSC-A (functional unit 4) + +The MAP procedures for handover are defined in 3GPP TS 29.002 [12]. They include: + +- procedures for basic handover; +- procedures for subsequent handover. + +These procedures are as outlined in clause 7. + +## 9.5 Interworking between Handover control procedures and MAP procedures in MSC-A + +The interworking between the Handover control procedures and the MAP procedures for handover is defined in 3GPP TS 29.010 [8]. It includes: + +- interworking at basic handover initiation; +- interworking at subsequent handover completion. + +This interworking is not described in the present document. + +## 9.6 Compatibility with GSM Phase 1 + +If the MSC-A initiates an Inter-MSC handover procedure according to Phase 2 MAP and BSSMAP protocols while using a Phase 1 BSSMAP protocol towards BSS-A, MSC-A has to perform the protocol interworking. + +The same holds if a Phase 2 BSSMAP protocol is used between MSC-A and BSS-A and the E-interface supports only Phase 1 protocol. + +# 10 Detailed procedures in MSC-B + +## 10.1 BSS/MSC (MS/BSS) procedures MSC-B (functional unit 1) + +The handover procedures in this functional unit consist of: + +- i) signalling between the MS and the MSC; +- ii) signalling between the BS and the MSC for access management. + +Signals exchanged with functional unit 3 are indicated in subclause 10.3. + +## 10.2 Call control procedures MSC-B (functional unit 2) + +These procedures relate to the call control in MSC-B of the "handover" connection with MSC-A. For these procedures the following apply: + +Call set-up: + +- the connection is set up by MSC-A. MSC-B should provide, if possible, the following backward signals: + - signals indicating unsuccessful call set-up and, if possible, the cause of call failure; + - address complete signal; + - answer signal (see note). + +NOTE: The answer signal is not related to answering by the MS and it has no meaning in the handover procedure between MSC-A and MSC-B. But after successful handover or successful subsequent channel assignment using a circuit connection between MSC-A and MSC-B this signal is needed for bringing the connection in the answered state in the intermediate PSTN/ISDN exchanges. + +- there will be no indication that the call applies to a handover. This information has to be derived from the MS Handover Number received during call set-up in relation to the earlier MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request/MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response procedure between MSC-A and MSC-B. + +Call clearing: + +- call clearing consists of two parts after inter-MSC handover: clearing of the BSS-MS connection and clearing of the inter-MSC connection, this case is only applicable to calls successfully handed over. If a request to release the call is generated by the network while the MS is re-tuning from one BSS to another BSS, then MSC-B shall begin clearing the call to the network and queue the call release to the MS until the MS has resumed communication; +- the MAP is used to transfer information between MSC-A and MSC-B in order to make it possible for MSC-B to send the appropriate signals to the MS, specified in 3GPP TS 24.008 [10], and still leave the call control to MSC-A. MSC-A normally initiates release of the connection between MSC-A and MSC-B. Exceptionally MSC-B is allowed to release the connection if no MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response is received, or if the Handover is to be aborted. +- when the Signalling System no 7 ISDN User Part is used, the normal symmetric release procedures apply. When a signalling system is used without a symmetric release possibility or a fault condition occurs, the following may apply: + - when MSC-B receives a clear-forward signal from MSC-A, it shall release the radio resources; + - in fault situation eg. machine malfunction or loss of the connection on interface A, MSC-B may send a clear-back signal to MSC-A. + +## 10.3 Handover control procedures MSC-B (functional unit 3) + +The procedures of functional unit 3 are given in form of SDL diagrams in figure 42. To easily distinguish the interface concerned the messages received or sent from this unit are prefixed with either 'MAP' for a MAP message, 'A' for an A-Interface message or 'T' for an ISDN/PSTN message. The procedure in functional unit 3 include: + +- i) handover from MSC-A. + +This case is initiated by MSC-A, and includes allocation and establishment of the new radio channel. The procedure is outlined in subclauses 7.1 and 7.2. + +- ii) intra-MSC handovers within the area controlled by MSC-B. + +This procedure is the same as that of i) in subclause 9.3, except that the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED is received by MSC-B. After successful completion of the intra-MSC handover, MSC-B shall notify MSC-A by sending an A-HANDOVER-PERFORMED message. + +- iii) subsequent handover to another MSC (MSC-A or MSC-B'). + +The initiation procedure is essentially the same as that of i) of subclause 9.3. The Handover Command to the MS is now generated by MSC-B after the A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE is received from MSC-A (via functional unit 4). The procedure is terminated in MSC-B when MSC-B receives a terminate procedure indication from functional unit 4. + +Timers in MSC-B. + +The following procedures are supervised by timers in order to avoid a deadlock when responses are not received or the procedures fail. + +The following timers are defined: + +- T201: this timer supervises the queuing time for a free channel. T201 is set by O&M; +- T202: this timer supervises the time for handover completion for handover between BSSs in MSC-B. If T202 expires, the radio path and the connection on interface B' are released. T202 is set by O&M; +- T204: this timer supervises the time between sending of address complete message to MSC-A and receiving the A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B on MSC-B. This timer also supervises the time between issuing the handover command to the MS and receiving the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response from MSC-A, for a subsequent handover. In the case of a handover without circuit connection between MSC-A and MSC-B this timer supervises the time between issuing the A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE to the MSC-A and receiving the A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B on MSC-B. If the timer expires, then any new radio channel is released. T204 is set by O&M; +- T210: this timer is used to supervise the time for establishing a circuit connection from MSC-A to MSC-B. When T210 expires, the allocated channel in MSC-B is released. T210 is set by O&M. This timer is not started when MSC-A explicitly indicates that no handover number is needed; +- T211: this timer is used to control the time between requesting a subsequent handover (A-HO-REQUEST to the MSC-A) and receiving the response from MSC-A (A-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE/A-HO-FAILURE). If T211 expires, the existing connection with the MS is maintained. T211 is set by O&M. + +## 10.4 MAP procedures MSC-B (functional unit 4) + +The MAP procedures for handover are defined in 3GPP TS 29.002 [12]. They include: + +- procedures for basic handover; +- procedures for subsequent handover; +- procedures for obtaining the handover number from the VLR. + +These procedures are outlined in clause 7. + +## 10.5 Interworking between Handover control procedures and MAP procedures in MSC-B + +The interworking between the Handover control procedures and the MAP procedures for handover is defined in 3GPP TS 29.010 [8]. It includes: + +- interworking at basic handover completion; +- interworking at subsequent handover initiation. + +This interworking is not described in the present document. + +## 10.6 Compatibility with GSM Phase 1 + +If the MSC-B accepts an Inter-MSC handover procedure according to Phase 2 MAP and BSSMAP protocols while using a Phase 1 BSSMAP protocol towards BSS-B, MSC-B has to perform the protocol interworking. + +The same holds if a Phase 1 MAP protocol is requested on the E-interface and MSC-B uses a Phase 2 BSSMAP protocol towards BSS-B. + +# --- 11 Detailed procedures in 3G\_MSC-A + +For detailed procedures in MSC-A at handover within the GSM network, please see clause 9 "Detailed procedures in MSC-A". + +## 11.1 RNC/BSC/3G\_MSC and UE/MS/3G\_MSC procedures in 3G\_MSC-A (functional unit 1) + +The handover/relocation procedures in this functional unit consist of: + +- i) signalling between the UE/MS and the 3G\_MSC; +- ii) signalling between the RNS/BSS and the 3G\_MSC for access management. + +## 11.2 Call control procedures 3G\_MSC-A (functional unit 2) + +The call control procedures related to handover/relocation in 3G\_MSC-A can be divided into two functional entities: + +- the first entity is the call control procedure as part of the normal interworking between the PSTN/ISDN and the PLMN/UTRAN; for an UE/MS originating call 3G\_MSC-A is the originating exchange, for an UE/MS terminating call 3G\_MSC-A is the destination exchange; +- the second entity is the call control procedure for the connection between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B in case of a handover/relocation from 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B. For this call control procedure the following applies. + +Call set-up: + +- the connection to 3G\_MSC-B is set up by procedures relevant to the signalling system used in the PSTN/ISDN to which 3G\_MSC-A is connected. The call is set up by using the Handover Number received from 3G\_MSC-B as part of the MAP procedure; +- the call set-up direction will always be from 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B, even when the call was originally established by the UE/MS. Functional unit 2 (see figure 5) should therefore keep information on call set-up direction in order to be able to interpret correctly any clearing signals (see below); +- the unit should indicate the address complete condition to functional unit 3 and through-connect without awaiting the answer signal from 3G\_MSC-B. This applies also to signalling systems where address complete signals are not supported. In such cases an artificial address complete is established by functional unit 2. + +Call clearing: + +- call clearing consists of two parts: after handover/relocation, clearing of the RNS-UE/MS or BSS-UE/MS connection and clearing of the inter-3G\_MSC connection. If a request to release the call is generated by the network while the UE/MS is re-tuning from one RNS/BSS to another RNS/BSS, then 3G\_MSC-A shall begin clearing the call to the network and queue the call release to the UE/MS until the UE/MS has resumed communication. This includes the case when 3G\_MSC-B and/or 3G\_MSC-B' are involved; +- the MAP procedures are used to transfer information between 3G\_MSC-B and 3G\_MSC-A in order to maintain full call control within 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A determines, based on information received from 3G\_MSC-B, the appropriate signals (according to 3GPP TS 24.008 [10]) to be sent to the UE/MS, and sends this information to 3G\_MSC-B; +- when 3G\_MSC-A clears the call to the UE/MS it also clears the call control functions in 3G\_MSC-B and sends the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response to release the MAP resources in 3G\_MSC-B. The clearing of the connection is by procedures relevant to the signalling system in the PSTN/ISDN to which 3G\_MSC-A is connected; +- when the Signalling System no 7 ISDN User Part is used, the normal symmetric release procedures apply on both the connection to the fixed network and to 3G\_MSC-B; +- when a signalling system is used without a symmetric release possibility, some notice should be given to the clear-forward and clear-back procedures; +- for UE/MS terminating calls the following conditions apply on clear-forward and clear-back: + - when a clear-forward signal is received on interface B' (see figure 4), 3G\_MSC-A clears the circuit to 3G\_MSC-B by normal clear-forward procedures; + - when a clear-back signal is received from 3G\_MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-A starts normal clear-back procedures towards the fixed network (interface B') and sends the clear-forward signal on interface B'' in order to clear the connection with 3G\_MSC-B. + +NOTE 1: This case corresponds to a fault situation. + +- for UE/MS originated calls the following applies: + - when 3G\_MSC-A receives a clear-back signal from 3G\_MSC-B, this signal must be interpreted as indicating a clear-forward condition. 3G\_MSC-A then clears both the connection on interface B' (see figure 4) and to 3G\_MSC-B by normal clear-forward procedures; + +NOTE 2: This case corresponds to a fault situation. + +- when 3G\_MSC-A receives a clear-back signal on interface B', 3G\_MSC-A should distinguish between national and international connections: + - for international connections where the Q.118 [1] supervision is done in the ISC, 3G\_MSC-A sends a clear-forward signal on both interface B' to the fixed network and interface B'' to 3G\_MSC-B; + - for national connections or for international connections where the Q.118 [1] supervision is not done in the ISC, a timer is started according to national practice for clear-back supervision and MSC-A proceeds as follows: + - i) if a clear-back signal is received from 3G\_MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-A interprets this as indicating a clear-forward condition and proceeds by clearing the connections on interface B' and to 3G\_MSC-B by normal clear-forward procedures; + - ii) if the timer expires, 3G\_MSC-A proceeds by normal clear-forward of the connections on interface B' and to 3G\_MSC-B. + +## 11.3 Handover/Relocation control procedures 3G\_MSC-A (functional unit 3) + +The procedures of functional unit 3 are given in terms of SDL diagrams in figure 43. To easily distinguish the interface concerned the messages received or sent from this unit are prefixed with either 'MAP' for a MAP message, 'A' for an A-Interface message, 'I' for an ISDN/PSTN message or 'Iu' for an Iu-message. + +The procedures of functional unit 3 include: + +- i) initiation. The initiation condition is shown by the signal Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED or A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED; + +The diagram also includes queuing when there is no channel available. Calls for which handover/relocation has been initiated should be queued with priority higher than normal calls. They should have lower priority than emergency calls. + +- ii) handover/relocation of calls within the area controlled by 3G\_MSC-A, i.e. handover/relocation case i); + +In the handover/relocation from RNS-A/BSS-A to RNS-B/BSS-B 3G\_MSC-A controls the procedures on both the previous and the new radio channel, using signals Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST/A-HANDOVER-REQUEST and Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND/A-HANDOVER-COMMAND. The handover/relocation procedure is completed when Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE/A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE is received. If this signal is not received (expiry of timer T102, T302, T502 or T702), the radio path and the connection on interface B' are released. + +For handover/relocation devices with three-party capabilities the device is first set up so that all interfaces Iu'/A', Iu"/A" and B' are connected (illustrated by the signal 'set up handover device'). This is done when the Relocation Command is sent to serving RNS or Handover Command is sent to the serving BSS. The device is connected in its final position (i.e. Iu"/A" to B' for case ii)) (illustrated by the signal 'connect handover device') when Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE/A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE is received. + +- iii) relocation to 3G\_MSC-B. This procedure is the one described in subclauses 8.3.1 and 8.3.2. For handover/relocation devices with three-party capabilities the device is set-up when 3G\_MSC-A sends the Relocation Command to the UE, i.e. the interfaces Iu', B' and B" are then connected. The device is connected in its final position (i.e. B' to B") when the successful procedure indication is received from functional unit 4; +- iv) UMTS to GSM handover to MSC-B. This procedure is the one described in subclauses 8.1.1 and 8.1.2. For handover/relocation devices with three-party capabilities the device is set-up when 3G\_MSC-A sends the Relocation Command to the serving RNS, i.e. the interfaces Iu', B' and B" are then connected. The device is connected in its final position (i.e. B' to B") when the successful procedure indication is received from functional unit 4; +- v) GSM to UMTS handover to 3G\_MSC-B. This procedure is the one described in subclauses 8.2.1 and 8.2.2. For handover/relocation devices with three-party capabilities the device is set-up when MSC-A sends the Handover Command to the serving BSS, i.e. the interfaces A', B' and B" are then connected. The device is connected in its final position (i.e. B' to B") when the successful procedure indication is received from functional unit 4; +- vi) subsequent relocation from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A. The procedure is described in subclauses 8.3.3.1 and 8.3.4.1. When a relocation to 3G\_MSC-A indication is received from functional unit 4, the handover/relocation device is set up so that interfaces B', B" and Iu' are connected (for devices with three-party capabilities). When Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE is received, the device is connected in its final position (i.e. B' to Iu'); + +If Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE is not received (expiry of timer T704), the handover/relocation device releases interface Iu', B' and B". + +- vii) subsequent GSM to UMTS handover from MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A. The procedure is described in subclauses 8.2.3.1 and 8.2.4.1. When a handover to 3G\_MSC-A indication is received from functional unit 4, the handover device is set up so that interfaces B', B" and A' are connected (for handover devices with three-party capabilities). When Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE is received, the device is connected in its final position (i.e. B' to Iu'); + +If Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE is not received (expiry of timer T504), the device releases interface Iu', B' and B". + +- viii) subsequent UMTS to GSM handover from 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-A. The procedure is described in clauses 8.1.3.1 and 8.1.4.1. When a handover to MSC-A indication is received from functional unit 4, the handover device is set up so that interfaces B', B" and Iu' are connected (for handover devices with three-party capabilities). When A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE is received, the device is connected in its final position (i.e. B' to A'); + +If A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE is not received (expiry of timer T304), the device releases interface A', B' and B''. + +- ix) subsequent relocation from 3G\_MSC-B to a third 3G\_MSC (3G\_MSC-B'). The procedure is described in subclauses 8.3.4.2 and 8.3.5.2. The handover/relocation device is set up in its initial position, (i.e. interconnection of interfaces B', B'' and B''') when the connection to 3G\_MSC-B' has been established. 3G\_MSC-B is informed via functional unit 4 that the connection has been established and that the procedure on the radio path can be initiated. The device is connected in its final position (i.e. B' to B''') when a successful procedure indication is received from functional unit 4. 3G\_MSC-B is informed that all procedures in 3G\_MSC-B can be terminated (illustrated by the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response). The device returns to the state where B' and B'' are connected if the subsequent relocation procedure fails; +- x) subsequent UMTS to GSM handover from 3G\_MSC-B to a third MSC (MSC-B'). The procedure is described in subclauses 8.1.3.2 and 8.1.4.2. The handover/relocation device is set up in its initial position, (i.e. interconnection of interfaces B', B'' and B''') when the connection to MSC-B' has been established. 3G\_MSC-B is informed via functional unit 4 that the connection has been established and that the procedure on the radio path can be initiated. The device is connected in its final position (i.e. B' to B''') when a successful procedure indication is received from functional unit 4. 3G\_MSC-B is informed that all procedures in 3G\_MSC-B can be terminated (illustrated by the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response). The device returns to the state where B' and B'' are connected if the subsequent UMTS to GSM handover procedure fails; +- xi) subsequent GSM to UMTS handover from MSC-B to a third MSC (3G\_MSC-B'). The procedure is described in subclauses 8.2.3.2 and 8.2.4.2. The handover/relocation device is set up in its initial position, (i.e. interconnection of interfaces B', B'' and B''') when the connection to 3G\_MSC-B' has been established. MSC-B is informed via functional unit 4 that the connection has been established and that the procedure on the radio path can be initiated. The device is connected in its final position (i.e. B' to B''') when a successful procedure indication is received from functional unit 4. MSC-B is informed that all procedures in MSC-B can be terminated (illustrated by the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response). The device returns to the state where B' and B'' are connected if the subsequent GSM to UMTS handover procedure fails. + +NOTE: The procedures ii), vi) and vii) may be applied also in case of a handover/relocation to an RNC which is controlled by 3G\_MSC-A by using the "Flexible Iu interface for handover/relocation" option. + +Timers in 3G\_MSC-A. + +The procedures are supervised by timers in order to avoid a deadlock when responses are not received or the procedures fail. + +The following timers are defined for SRNS Relocation: + +- T701: this timer supervises the queuing time for a free channel for the relocation inside UMTS. If T701 expires, a no channel indication is generated and 3G\_MSC-A will terminate the relocation as described in subclause 6.2.3. T701 is set by O&M; +- T702: this timer supervises the time for relocation completion for relocation between RNSs in 3G\_MSC-A. T702 is set by O&M; +- T703: this timer supervises the time between issuing an IU-RELOCATION-COMMAND from 3G\_MSC-A and receiving a successful procedure indication from 3G\_MSC-B. This timer also supervises the time between sending an IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE to 3G\_MSC-B and receiving a successful procedure indication from 3G\_MSC-B'. If T703 expires, the relocation procedure is terminated. T703 is set by O&M; +- T704: this timer supervises the time between sending of an IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE to 3G\_MSC-B and receiving the IU-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B on 3G\_MSC-A. If the timer expires, the new radio channel is released. T704 is set by O&M. + +The following timers are defined for UMTS to GSM handover: + +- T301: this timer supervises the queuing time for a free channel for the UMTS to GSM handover. If T301 expires, a no channel indication is generated and 3G\_MSC-A will terminate the handover as described in subclause 6.2.3. T301 is set by O&M; +- T302: this timer supervises the time for UMTS to GSM handover completion for handover from RNS to BSS in 3G\_MSC-A. T302 is set by O&M; +- T303: this timer supervises the time between issuing an Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND from 3G\_MSC-A and receiving a successful procedure indication from MSC-B. This timer also supervises the time between sending an A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE to MSC-B and receiving a successful procedure indication from MSC-B'. If T303 expires, the UMTS to GSM handover procedure is terminated. T303 is set by O&M; +- T304: this timer supervises the time between sending of an A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE to MSC-B and receiving the A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B on 3G\_MSC-A. If the timer expires, the new radio channel is released. T304 is set by O&M. + +The following timers are defined for GSM to UMTS handover: + +- T501: this timer supervises the queuing time for a free channel for the GSM to UMTS handover. If T501 expires, a no channel indication is generated and 3G\_MSC-A will terminate the handover as described in subclause 6.2.3. T501 is set by O&M; +- T502: this timer supervises the time for GSM to UMTS handover completion for handover from BSS to RNS in 3G\_MSC-A. T502 is set by O&M; +- T503: this timer supervises the time between issuing an A-HANDOVER-COMMAND from MSC-A and receiving a successful procedure indication from 3G\_MSC-B. This timer also supervises the time between sending an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE to 3G\_MSC-B and receiving a successful procedure indication from 3G\_MSC-B'. If T503 expires, the GSM to UMTS handover procedure is terminated. T503 is set by O&M; +- T504: this timer supervises the time between sending of an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE to 3G\_MSC-B and receiving the Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B on 3G\_MSC-A. If the timer expires, the new radio channel is released. T504 is set by O&M. + +## 11.4 MAP procedures in 3G\_MSC-A (functional unit 4) + +The MAP procedures for handover/relocation are defined in 3GPP TS 29.002 [12]. They include: + +- procedures for basic handover/relocation; +- procedures for subsequent handover/relocation. + +These procedures are as outlined in clause 8. + +## 11.5 Interworking between Handover/Relocation control procedures and MAP procedures in 3G\_MSC-A + +The interworking between the Handover/Relocation control procedures and the MAP procedures for handover/relocation is defined in 3GPP TS 29.010 [8]. It includes: + +- interworking at basic handover/relocation initiation; +- interworking at subsequent handover/relocation completion. + +This interworking is not described in the present document. + +## 11.6 Compatibility with GSM Phase 1 + +Interworking with the GSM Phase 1 is not supported. + +## 11.7 Protocol interworking + +If the 3G\_MSC-A initiates a basic inter-MSC UMTS to GSM handover procedure according to MAP and BSSMAP protocols while using a RANAP protocol towards RNS-A, 3G\_MSC-A has to perform the protocol interworking between RANAP on the Iu-Interface and encapsulated BSSMAP on the E-interface. + +The same holds if 3G\_MSC-A accepts a subsequent inter-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS handover back to 3G\_MSC-A while using a RANAP protocol towards RNS-B. + +# --- 12 Detailed procedures in 3G\_MSC-B + +For detailed procedures in 3G\_MSC-B at handover within the GSM network, please see clause 10 'Detailed procedures in MSC-B'. + +## 12.1 RNC/BSC/3G\_MSC (UE/MS/RNC/BSC) procedures in 3G\_MSC-B (functional unit 1) + +The Intra and Inter-3G\_MSC handover/relocation procedures in this functional unit consist of: + +- i) signalling between the UE/MS and the 3G\_MSC; +- ii) signalling between the RNS/BSS and the 3G\_MSC for access management. + +Signals exchanged with functional unit 3 are indicated in subclause 12.3. + +## 12.2 Call control procedures 3G\_MSC-B (functional unit 2) + +These procedures relate to the call control in 3G\_MSC-B of the "3G\_MSC handover/relocation" connection with 3G\_MSC-A. For these procedures the following apply: + +Call set-up: + +- the connection is set up by 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-B should provide, if possible, the following backward signals: + - signals indicating unsuccessful call set-up and, if possible, the cause of call failure; + - address complete signal; + - answer signal (see note). + +NOTE: The answer signal is not related to answering by the UE/MS and it has no meaning in the 3G\_MSC handover/relocation procedure between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. But after successful handover/relocation or successful subsequent channel assignment using a circuit connection between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B this signal is needed for bringing the connection in the answered state in the intermediate PSTN/ISDN exchanges. + +- there will be no indication that the call applies to a 3G\_MSC handover/relocation. This information has to be derived from the UE/MS Handover Number received during call set-up in relation to the earlier MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request/MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response procedure between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. + +Call clearing: + +- call clearing consists of two parts after inter-3G\_MSC handover/relocation: clearing of the RNS-UE/MS or the BSS-UE/MS connection and clearing of the inter-3G\_MSC connection, these cases are only applicable to calls successfully handed over or relocated. If a request to release the call is generated by the network while the UE/MS is re-tuning from one RNS/BSS to another RNS/BSS, then 3G\_MSC-B shall begin clearing the call to the network and queue the call release to the UE/MS until the UE/MS has resumed communication; +- the MAP is used to transfer information between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B in order to make it possible for 3G\_MSC-B to send the appropriate signals to the UE/MS, specified in 3GPP TS 24.008 [10], and still leave the call control to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A normally initiates release of the connection between 3G\_MSC-A and + +3G\_MSC-B. Exceptionally 3G\_MSC-B is allowed to release the connection if no MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response is received, or if the 3G\_MSC Handover/Relocation is to be aborted; + +- when the Signalling System no 7 ISDN User Part is used, the normal symmetric release procedures apply. When a signalling system is used without a symmetric release possibility or a fault condition occurs, the following may apply: + - when 3G\_MSC-B receives a clear-forward signal from 3G\_MSC-A, it shall release the radio resources; + - in fault situation e.g. machine malfunction or loss of the connection on interface Iu or interface A, 3G\_MSC-B may send a clear-back signal to 3G\_MSC-A. + +## 12.3 Handover/Relocation control procedures in 3G\_MSC-B (functional unit 3) + +The procedures of functional unit 3 are given in form of SDL diagrams in figure 44. To easily distinguish the interface concerned the messages received or sent from this unit are prefixed with either 'MAP' for a MAP message, 'A' for an A-Interface message, 'Iu' for an Iu-Interface message or 'I' for an ISDN/PSTN message. The procedure in functional unit 3 include: + +- i) inter 3G\_MSC handover/relocation from 3G\_MSC-A; + +This case is initiated by 3G\_MSC-A, and includes allocation and establishment of the new radio resources. The procedure is outlined in subclauses 8.1.1 and 8.1.2. for UMTS to GSM handover, clauses 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 for GSM to UMTS handover and subclauses 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 for relocation. + +- ii) intra-3G\_MSC UMTS to GSM handovers within the area controlled by 3G\_MSC-B; + +This procedure is the same as that of ii) in clause 11.3, except that the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED is received by 3G\_MSC-B. After successful completion of the intra-3G\_MSC handover, 3G\_MSC-B shall notify 3G\_MSC-A by sending an A-HANDOVER-PERFORMED message. + +- iii) intra-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS handovers within the area controlled by 3G\_MSC-B; + +This procedure is the same as that of ii) in subclause 11.3, except that the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED is received by 3G\_MSC-B. After successful completion of the intra-3G\_MSC handover, 3G\_MSC-B shall notify 3G\_MSC-A by sending an A-HANDOVER-PERFORMED message. + +- iv) intra-3G\_MSC SRNS Relocation within the area controlled by 3G\_MSC-B; + +This procedure is the same as that of ii) in subclause 11.3, except that the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED is received by 3G\_MSC-B. After successful completion of the intra-3G\_MSC SRNS relocation, if security algorithms have been changed, 3G\_MSC-B shall notify 3G\_MSC-A by sending an A-HANDOVER-PERFORMED or an Iu-LOCATION-REPORT message, depending on the access network protocol used encapsulated on the E-interface (see subclauses 4.4.1 and 6.2.3). + +- v) subsequent handover/relocation to another 3G\_MSC (3G\_MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-B'); + +The initiation procedure is essentially the same as that of i) of subclause 11.3. The Handover Command to the BSS or the Relocation Command to the RNS is now generated by 3G\_MSC-B after the A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE or Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE is received from 3G\_MSC-A (via functional unit 4). The procedure is terminated in 3G\_MSC-B when 3G\_MSC-B receives a terminate procedure indication from functional unit 4. + +NOTE: The procedures iii), iv) and, in case of a subsequent handover back to 3G\_MSC-A, the procedure v) may be applied also in case of a handover/relocation to an RNC which is controlled by 3G\_MSC-B or 3G\_MSC-A respectively by using the "Flexible Iu interface for handover/relocation" option. + +Timers in 3G\_MSC-B. + +The following procedures are supervised by timers in order to avoid a deadlock when responses are not received or the procedures fail. + +The following timers are defined for UMTS to GSM handover: + +- T401: this timer supervises the queuing time for a free channel. T401 is set by O&M; +- T402: this timer supervises the time for handover completion for UMTS to GSM handover from RNS to BSS in 3G\_MSC-B. If T402 expires, the radio path and the connection on interface B' are released. T402 is set by O&M; +- T404: this timer supervises the time between sending of address complete message to 3G\_MSC-A and receiving the A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B on 3G\_MSC-B. This timer also supervises the time between issuing the handover command to the UE/MS and receiving the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response from 3G\_MSC-A, for a subsequent handover from UMTS to GSM. In the case of a UMTS to GSM handover without circuit connection between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B this timer supervises the time between issuing the A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE to the 3G\_MSC-A and receiving the A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B on 3G\_MSC-B. If the timer expires, then any new radio channel is released. T404 is set by O&M; +- T410: this timer is used to supervise the time for establishing a circuit connection from 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B. When T410 expires, the allocated channel in 3G\_MSC-B is released. T410 is set by O&M. This timer is not started when 3G\_MSC-A explicitly indicates that no handover number is needed; +- T411: this timer is used to control the time between requesting a subsequent UMTS to GSM handover (A-HO-REQUEST to the 3G\_MSC-A) and receiving the response from 3G\_MSC-A (A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE/A-HO-FAILURE). If T411 expires, the existing connection with the UE/MS is maintained. T411 is set by O&M. + +The following timers are defined for GSM to UMTS handover: + +- T601: this timer supervises the queuing time for a free radio resource. T601 is set by O&M; +- T602: this timer supervises the time for handover completion for GSM to UMTS handover from BSS to RNS in 3G\_MSC-B. If T602 expires, the radio path and the connection on interface B' are released. T602 is set by O&M; +- T604: this timer supervises the time between sending of address complete message to 3G\_MSC-A and receiving the Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B on 3G\_MSC-B. This timer also supervises the time between issuing the handover command to the UE/MS and receiving the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response from 3G\_MSC-A, for a subsequent handover from GSM to UMTS. In the case of a GSM to UMTS handover without circuit connection between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B this timer supervises the time between issuing the A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE to the 3G\_MSC-A and receiving the Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B on 3G\_MSC-B. If the timer expires, then any new radio resource is released. T604 is set by O&M; +- T610: this timer is used to supervise the time for establishing a circuit connection from 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B. When T610 expires, the allocated radio resource in 3G\_MSC-B is released. T610 is set by O&M. This timer is not started when 3G\_MSC-A explicitly indicates that no handover number is needed; +- T611: this timer is used to control the time between requesting a subsequent GSM to UMTS handover (A-HO-REQUEST to the 3G\_MSC-A) and receiving the response from 3G\_MSC-A (A-HO-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE/A-HO-FAILURE). If T611 expires, the existing connection with the UE/MS is maintained. T611 is set by O&M. + +The following timers are defined for SRNS Relocation: + +- T801: this timer supervises the queuing time for a free radio resource. T801 is set by O&M; +- T802: this timer supervises the time for relocation completion for relocation between RNSs in 3G\_MSC-B. If T802 expires, the radio path and the connection on interface B' are released. T802 is set by O&M; + +- T804: this timer supervises the time between sending of address complete message to 3G\_MSC-A and receiving the Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B on 3G\_MSC-B. This timer also supervises the time between issuing the handover command to the UE and receiving the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response from 3G\_MSC-A, for a subsequent relocation. In the case of a relocation without circuit connection between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B this timer supervises the time between issuing the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE to the 3G\_MSC-A and receiving the Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B on 3G\_MSC-B. If the timer expires, then any new radio resource is released. T804 is set by O&M; +- T810: this timer is used to supervise the time for establishing a circuit connection from 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B. When T810 expires, the allocated channel in 3G\_MSC-B is released. T810 is set by O&M. This timer is not started when 3G\_MSC-A explicitly indicates that no handover number is needed; +- T811: this timer is used to control the time between requesting a subsequent relocation (Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to the 3G\_MSC-A) and receiving the response from 3G\_MSC-A (Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACKNOWLEDGE/ Iu-RELOCATION-FAILURE). If T811 expires, the existing connection with the UE is maintained. T811 is set by O&M. + +## 12.4 MAP procedures in 3G\_MSC-B (functional unit 4) + +The MAP procedures for handover/relocation are defined in 3GPP TS 29.002 [12]. They include: + +- procedures for basic handover/relocation; +- procedures for subsequent handover/relocation; +- procedures for obtaining the handover number from the VLR. + +These procedures are outlined in clause 8. + +## 12.5 Interworking between Handover/Relocation control procedures and MAP procedures in 3G\_MSC-B + +The interworking between the Handover/Relocation control procedures and the MAP procedures for handover/relocation is defined in 3GPP TS 29.010 [8]. It includes: + +- interworking at basic handover/relocation completion; +- interworking at subsequent handover/relocation initiation. + +This interworking is not described in the present document. + +## 12.6 Compatibility with GSM Phase 1 + +GSM phase 1 is not supported. + +## 12.7 Protocol interworking + +If the 3G\_MSC-B accepts an Inter-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS handover procedure according to MAP and BSSMAP protocols while using a RANAP protocol towards RNS-B, 3G\_MSC-B has to perform the protocol interworking between RANAP on the Iu-Interface and encapsulated BSSMAP on the E-interface. + +The same holds if 3G\_MSC-B initiates a subsequent inter-MSC UMTS to GSM handover while using a RANAP protocol towards RNS-A. + +If during the supervision, i.e. while the UE/MS is not in the area of MSC-A or 3G\_MSC-A, the protocol used encapsulated on the E-interface and the protocol used between 3G\_MSC-B and the serving BSS or RNS are different, then 3G\_MSC-B has to perform the protocol interworking between BSSAP and RANAP. + +NOTE: The two protocols are different, e.g., after an inter-MSC GSM to UMTS inter-system handover, or after an inter-MSC SRNS relocation to 3G\_MSC-B followed by a subsequent intra-3G\_MSC-B UMTS to GSM inter-system handover. + +## 12.8 Interactions between handover/relocation control procedures and other RANAP procedures + +This clause gives an overview of the procedures that shall be followed when handover/relocation control procedures interact with other RANAP procedures on 3G\_MSC-B. + +### 12.8.1 Interactions between handover/relocation control procedures and the security mode procedure + +#### 12.8.1.1 Intra-3G\_MSC-B handover/relocation + +A security mode control procedure may be requested by MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A after an Inter- MSC GSM to UMTS handover or Inter- MSC SRNS relocation. If RNS-A replies with an Iu-SECURITY-MODE-REJECT containing the cause value 'Relocation Triggered' due to an already initiated Intra-3G\_MSC-B UMTS to GSM handover or Intra-3G\_MSC-B SRNS relocation, the 3G\_MSC-B shall not forward the result of the security mode control procedure to MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A, but wait for the outcome of the handover/relocation procedure. If the relocation procedure is completed successfully, the 3G\_MSC-B shall reattempt the security mode control procedure towards the new serving radio network. If the handover procedure is completed successfully, the 3G\_MSC-B shall reattempt the cipher mode control procedure towards the new serving radio network, if ciphering is to be activated. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the collision between a subsequent Intra-3G_MSC-B handover/relocation and a security mode control procedure. The diagram shows message exchanges between BSS-A, 3G_MSC-A, 3G_MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, and BSS-B/UE. The sequence starts with an Inter- MSC HO Completed message from 3G_MSC-A to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-A then sends a MAP-Forward-Access-Sig req. to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends an Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMMAND to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A responds with Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED. 3G_MSC-B then sends an Iu-SECURITY-MODE-REJECT to 3G_MSC-A. UE/RNS-A sends an A-HO-REQUEST to BSS-B/UE. BSS-B/UE responds with A-HO-REQUEST-ACK. UE/RNS-A then sends Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends A-HO-DETECT to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A sends A-HO-COMPLETE to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B then sends a MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. to 3G_MSC-A. 3G_MSC-B sends an Iu-RELEASE-CMD/CMP to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A sends an A-CIPHER-MODE-COMMAND to BSS-B/UE. BSS-B/UE responds with A-CIPHER-MODE-COMPLETE. 3G_MSC-B sends another MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. to 3G_MSC-A.](ff3417b75213b8688e6504a21220b430_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSS-A + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC-B + participant UE/RNS-A + participant BSS-B/UE + + Note left of 3G_MSC-A: Inter- MSC HO Completed + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Forward-Access-Sig req. + 3G_MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMMAND + UE/RNS-A-->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + 3G_MSC-B-->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-SECURITY-MODE-REJECT + UE/RNS-A->>BSS-B/UE: A-HO-REQUEST + BSS-B/UE-->>UE/RNS-A: A-HO-REQUEST-ACK + UE/RNS-A->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND + 3G_MSC-B-->>UE/RNS-A: A-HO-DETECT + UE/RNS-A-->>3G_MSC-B: A-HO-COMPLETE + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. + 3G_MSC-B-->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-RELEASE-CMD/CMP + UE/RNS-A->>BSS-B/UE: A-CIPHER-MODE-COMMAND + BSS-B/UE-->>UE/RNS-A: A-CIPHER-MODE-COMPLETE + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the collision between a subsequent Intra-3G\_MSC-B handover/relocation and a security mode control procedure. The diagram shows message exchanges between BSS-A, 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, and BSS-B/UE. The sequence starts with an Inter- MSC HO Completed message from 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-A then sends a MAP-Forward-Access-Sig req. to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends an Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMMAND to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A responds with Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED. 3G\_MSC-B then sends an Iu-SECURITY-MODE-REJECT to 3G\_MSC-A. UE/RNS-A sends an A-HO-REQUEST to BSS-B/UE. BSS-B/UE responds with A-HO-REQUEST-ACK. UE/RNS-A then sends Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends A-HO-DETECT to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A sends A-HO-COMPLETE to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B then sends a MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-B sends an Iu-RELEASE-CMD/CMP to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A sends an A-CIPHER-MODE-COMMAND to BSS-B/UE. BSS-B/UE responds with A-CIPHER-MODE-COMPLETE. 3G\_MSC-B sends another MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. to 3G\_MSC-A. + +NOTE: The message flow is shown in the perspective of 3G\_MSC-B. It is assumed that RNS-A has sent the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED before it received the Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMMAND. + +**Figure 35a: Collision between a subsequent Intra-3G\_MSC-B handover/relocation and a security mode control procedure i): successful handover/relocation** + +If the handover/relocation procedure is unsuccessful and the UE is still served by RNS-A, the 3G\_MSC-B shall reattempt the security mode procedure towards RNS-A. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating a collision between a subsequent Intra-3G_MSC-B handover/relocation and a security mode control procedure. The diagram shows message exchanges between BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, and BSS-B/UE. The sequence starts with an 'Inter-MSC HO Completed' message from 3G MSC-A to UE/RNS-A. This is followed by a 'MAP-Forward-Access-Sig req.' from 3G MSC-A to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B then sends an 'Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMMAND' to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A responds with 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED'. 3G MSC-B then sends an 'Iu-SECURITY-MODE-REJECT' to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A sends an 'A-HO-REQUEST' to BSS-B/UE. BSS-B/UE responds with 'A-HO-FAILURE'. 3G MSC-B then sends an 'Iu-RELOCATION-PREPARATION-FAILURE' to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A sends an 'Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMMAND' to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B responds with 'Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMPLETE'. Finally, 3G MSC-B sends a 'MAP-Process-Access-Sig req.' to 3G MSC-A.](e16bfa31d748f4d99ec4ae3d16656926_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSS-A + participant 3G_MSC-A as 3G MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC-B as 3G MSC-B + participant UE_RNS-A as UE/RNS-A + participant BSS_B_UE as BSS-B/UE + + Note left of 3G_MSC-A: Inter-MSC HO Completed + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Forward-Access-Sig req. + 3G_MSC-B->>UE_RNS-A: Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMMAND + UE_RNS-A-->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + 3G_MSC-B-->>UE_RNS-A: Iu-SECURITY-MODE-REJECT + UE_RNS-A->>BSS_B_UE: A-HO-REQUEST + BSS_B_UE-->>UE_RNS-A: A-HO-FAILURE + 3G_MSC-B-->>UE_RNS-A: Iu-RELOCATION-PREPARATION-FAILURE + UE_RNS-A->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMMAND + 3G_MSC-B-->>UE_RNS-A: Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMPLETE + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating a collision between a subsequent Intra-3G\_MSC-B handover/relocation and a security mode control procedure. The diagram shows message exchanges between BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, and BSS-B/UE. The sequence starts with an 'Inter-MSC HO Completed' message from 3G MSC-A to UE/RNS-A. This is followed by a 'MAP-Forward-Access-Sig req.' from 3G MSC-A to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B then sends an 'Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMMAND' to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A responds with 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED'. 3G MSC-B then sends an 'Iu-SECURITY-MODE-REJECT' to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A sends an 'A-HO-REQUEST' to BSS-B/UE. BSS-B/UE responds with 'A-HO-FAILURE'. 3G MSC-B then sends an 'Iu-RELOCATION-PREPARATION-FAILURE' to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A sends an 'Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMMAND' to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B responds with 'Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMPLETE'. Finally, 3G MSC-B sends a 'MAP-Process-Access-Sig req.' to 3G MSC-A. + +NOTE: The message flow is shown in the perspective of 3G\_MSC-B. It is assumed that RNS-A has sent the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED before it received the Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMMAND. + +**Figure 35b: Collision between a subsequent Intra-3G\_MSC-B handover/relocation and a security mode control procedure ii): unsuccessful handover/relocation** + +#### 12.8.1.2 Subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation + +A security mode control procedure may be requested by MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A after an Inter-MSC GSM to UMTS handover or Inter-MSC SRNS relocation. If RNS-A replies with an Iu-SECURITY-MODE-REJECT containing the cause value 'Relocation Triggered' due to an already initiated subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation, the 3G\_MSC-B shall not forward the result of the security mode procedure to MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A, but wait for the outcome of the handover/relocation procedure. If the subsequent Inter-MSC relocation procedure is completed successfully, the 3G\_MSC-A shall reattempt the security mode control procedure towards the new serving radio network or MSC-B'/3G\_MSC-B'. If the subsequent Inter-MSC handover procedure is completed successfully, the MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A shall reattempt the cipher mode control procedure towards the new serving radio network or MSC-B'/3G\_MSC-B, if ciphering is to be activated. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating a collision between a subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation and a security mode control procedure. The diagram shows message exchanges between BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, MSC-B', and BSS-B/UE.](c0ca823603794512478906b302176bca_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSS-A + participant 3G_MSC-A as 3G MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC-B as 3G MSC-B + participant UE_RNS-A as UE/RNS-A + participant MSC_B_prime as MSC-B' + participant BSS_B_UE as BSS-B/UE + + 3G_MSC-B->>BSS-A: Inter-MSC HO Completed + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Forward-Access-Sig req. + 3G_MSC-B->>UE_RNS-A: Iu-SECURITY-MODECOMMAND + UE_RNS-A->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + UE_RNS-A->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-SECURITY-MODE-REJECT + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + 3G_MSC-B->>MSC_B_prime: MAP-Prep-Handover req. + MSC_B_prime->>BSS_B_UE: A-HO-REQUEST + BSS_B_UE->>MSC_B_prime: A-HO-REQUEST-ACK + MSC_B_prime->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Handover rsp. + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover rsp. + 3G_MSC-B->>UE_RNS-A: Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND + MSC_B_prime->>BSS_B_UE: A-HO-DETECT + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. + MSC_B_prime->>BSS_B_UE: A-HO-COMPLETE + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal rsp. + 3G_MSC-B->>UE_RNS-A: Iu-RELEASE-CMD/CMP + 3G_MSC-B->>MSC_B_prime: MAP-Forward-Access-Sig req. + MSC_B_prime->>BSS_B_UE: A-CIPHER-MODE-COMMAND + BSS_B_UE->>MSC_B_prime: A-CIPHER-MODE-COMPLETE + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating a collision between a subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation and a security mode control procedure. The diagram shows message exchanges between BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, MSC-B', and BSS-B/UE. + +NOTE: The message flow is shown in the perspective of 3G\_MSC-B. It is assumed that RNS-A has sent the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED before it received the Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMMAND. + +**Figure 35ba: Collision between a subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation and a security mode control procedure i): successful handover/relocation** + +If the subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation procedure is unsuccessful and the UE is still served by 3G\_MSC-B, the 3G\_MSC-B shall reattempt the security mode procedure towards RNS-A. + +![Sequence diagram showing a collision between an intra-3G MSC-B handover/relocation and a security mode control procedure. Lifelines: BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, MSC-B', BSS-B/UE. The diagram shows message exchanges between these entities, starting with 'Inter-MSC HO Completed' from 3G MSC-B to BSS-A. It details the preparation and execution of a handover while a security mode control procedure is ongoing, resulting in an 'A-HO-FAILURE' and 'Iu-SECURITY-MODE-REJECT' messages.](fc3e2b49a9f850951570e502393b697f_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSS-A + participant 3G_MSC-A as 3G MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC-B + participant UE/RNS-A + participant MSC-B_prime as MSC-B' + participant BSS-B/UE + + Note right of 3G_MSC-A: Inter-MSC HO Completed + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Forward-Access-Sig req + 3G_MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-SECURITY-MODECOMMAND + UE/RNS-A->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + 3G_MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-SECURITY-MODE-REJECT + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + 3G_MSC-A->>MSC-B_prime: MAP-Prep-Handover req. + MSC-B_prime->>BSS-B/UE: A-HO-REQUEST + BSS-B/UE->>MSC-B_prime: A-HO-FAILURE + MSC-B_prime->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Handover rsp. + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover rsp. + 3G_MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-RELOCATION-PREPARATION-FAILURE + 3G_MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-SECURITY-MODECOMMAND + UE/RNS-A->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMPLETE + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing a collision between an intra-3G MSC-B handover/relocation and a security mode control procedure. Lifelines: BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, MSC-B', BSS-B/UE. The diagram shows message exchanges between these entities, starting with 'Inter-MSC HO Completed' from 3G MSC-B to BSS-A. It details the preparation and execution of a handover while a security mode control procedure is ongoing, resulting in an 'A-HO-FAILURE' and 'Iu-SECURITY-MODE-REJECT' messages. + +NOTE: The message flow is shown in the perspective of 3G MSC-B. It is assumed that RNS-A has sent the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED before it received the Iu-SECURITY-MODE-COMMAND. + +**Figure 35bb: Collision between a subsequent Intra-3G MSC-B handover/relocation and a security mode control procedure ii): unsuccessful handover/relocation** + +### 12.8.2 Interactions between handover/relocation control procedures and the RAB assignment procedure + +#### 12.8.2.1 Intra-3G MSC-B handover/relocation + +A subsequent channel assignment procedure may be requested by MSC-A/3G MSC-A after an Inter-MSC GSM to UMTS handover or Inter-MSC SRNS relocation without circuit connection (see subclauses 13.2 and 13.4). If RNS-A replies with an Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE containing the cause value 'Relocation Triggered' due to an already initiated Intra-3G MSC-B UMTS to GSM handover or Intra-3G MSC-B SRNS relocation, the 3G MSC-B shall not forward the result of the RAB assignment procedure to MSC-A/3G MSC-A, but wait for the outcome of the handover/relocation procedure. If the handover/relocation procedure is completed successfully, the 3G MSC-B shall construct an A-ASSIGNMENT-COMPLETE or Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE message, dependent on the encapsulated protocol used on the E-interface, and forward this message to MSC-A/3G MSC-A in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response. + +![Sequence diagram showing a collision between an intra-3G MSC-B handover/relocation and a RAB assignment procedure. The diagram illustrates the message flow between BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, and BSS-B/UE. The process starts with an 'Inter-MSC HO Completed' message from 3G MSC-B to 3G MSC-A. This is followed by a 'MAP-Prep-Handover req.' from 3G MSC-A to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B then sends an 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST' to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A responds with 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED', 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE', 'A-HO-REQUEST', 'A-HO-REQUEST-ACK', 'Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND', 'A-HO-DETECT', and 'A-HO-COMPLETE'. Finally, 3G MSC-B sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover rsp.' to 3G MSC-A and an 'Iu-RELEASE-CMD/CMP' to UE/RNS-A.](6a993bfdf2e00cfad01c4d2188a75d86_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant BSS-A + participant 3G MSC-A + participant 3G MSC-B + participant UE/RNS-A + participant BSS-B/UE + + Note over 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B: Inter-MSC HO Completed + 3G MSC-B->>BSS-A: + 3G MSC-A->>3G MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Handover req. + 3G MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST + UE/RNS-A->>3G MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + UE/RNS-A->>3G MSC-B: Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE + UE/RNS-A->>BSS-B/UE: A-HO-REQUEST + BSS-B/UE->>UE/RNS-A: A-HO-REQUEST-ACK + 3G MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND + UE/RNS-A->>BSS-B/UE: A-HO-DETECT + BSS-B/UE->>UE/RNS-A: A-HO-COMPLETE + 3G MSC-B->>3G MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Handover rsp. + 3G MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-RELEASE-CMD/CMP +``` + +Sequence diagram showing a collision between an intra-3G MSC-B handover/relocation and a RAB assignment procedure. The diagram illustrates the message flow between BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, and BSS-B/UE. The process starts with an 'Inter-MSC HO Completed' message from 3G MSC-B to 3G MSC-A. This is followed by a 'MAP-Prep-Handover req.' from 3G MSC-A to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B then sends an 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST' to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A responds with 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED', 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE', 'A-HO-REQUEST', 'A-HO-REQUEST-ACK', 'Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND', 'A-HO-DETECT', and 'A-HO-COMPLETE'. Finally, 3G MSC-B sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover rsp.' to 3G MSC-A and an 'Iu-RELEASE-CMD/CMP' to UE/RNS-A. + +NOTE: The message flow is shown in the perspective of 3G\_MSC-B. It is assumed that RNS-A has sent the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED before it received the Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST. + +**Figure 35c: Collision between a subsequent Intra-3G\_MSC-B handover/relocation and a RAB assignment procedure i): successful handover/relocation** + +If the handover/relocation procedure is unsuccessful and the UE is still served by RNS-A, the 3G\_MSC-B shall reattempt the RAB assignment procedure towards RNS-A. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating a collision between a subsequent Intra-3G_MSC-B handover/relocation and a RAB assignment procedure ii). The diagram shows message exchanges between BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, and BSS-B/UE. The process starts with an 'Inter-MSC HO Completed' message from 3G MSC-A to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B then sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover req.' to 3G MSC-A. 3G MSC-A responds with 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST' to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A replies with 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED'. 3G MSC-B receives 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE' from UE/RNS-A and sends 'A-HO-REQUEST' to BSS-B/UE. BSS-B/UE responds with 'A-HO-FAILURE'. 3G MSC-B then sends 'Iu-RELOCATION-PREPARATION-FAILURE' to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A sends another 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST' to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B responds with 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE'. Finally, 3G MSC-A receives 'MAP-Prep-Handover rsp.' from 3G MSC-B.](d04c50badc78d5ba47bf4e352af4a754_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSS-A + participant 3G_MSC-A as 3G MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC-B as 3G MSC-B + participant UE_RNS-A as UE/RNS-A + participant BSS_B_UE as BSS-B/UE + + Note left of BSS-A: Error: Reference source not + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: Inter-MSC HO Completed + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Handover req. + 3G_MSC-A->>UE_RNS-A: Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST + UE_RNS-A->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + 3G_MSC-B->>UE_RNS-A: Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE + 3G_MSC-B->>BSS_B_UE: A-HO-REQUEST + BSS_B_UE->>3G_MSC-B: A-HO-FAILURE + 3G_MSC-B->>UE_RNS-A: Iu-RELOCATION-PREPARATION-FAILURE + UE_RNS-A->>3G_MSC-B: Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST + 3G_MSC-B->>UE_RNS-A: Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Handover rsp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating a collision between a subsequent Intra-3G\_MSC-B handover/relocation and a RAB assignment procedure ii). The diagram shows message exchanges between BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, and BSS-B/UE. The process starts with an 'Inter-MSC HO Completed' message from 3G MSC-A to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B then sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover req.' to 3G MSC-A. 3G MSC-A responds with 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST' to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A replies with 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED'. 3G MSC-B receives 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE' from UE/RNS-A and sends 'A-HO-REQUEST' to BSS-B/UE. BSS-B/UE responds with 'A-HO-FAILURE'. 3G MSC-B then sends 'Iu-RELOCATION-PREPARATION-FAILURE' to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A sends another 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST' to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B responds with 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE'. Finally, 3G MSC-A receives 'MAP-Prep-Handover rsp.' from 3G MSC-B. + +NOTE: The message flow is shown in the perspective of 3G\_MSC-B. It is assumed that RNS-A has sent the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED before it received the Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST. + +**Figure 35d: Collision between a subsequent Intra-3G\_MSC-B handover/relocation and a RAB assignment procedure ii): unsuccessful handover/relocation** + +#### 12.8.2.2 Subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation + +A subsequent channel assignment procedure may be requested by MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A after an Inter-MSC GSM to UMTS handover or Inter-MSC SRNS relocation without circuit connection (see subclauses 13.2 and 13.4). If RNS-A replies with an Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE containing the cause value 'Relocation Triggered' due to an already initiated subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation, the 3G\_MSC-B shall not forward the result of the RAB Assignment procedure to MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A, but wait for the outcome of the handover/relocation procedure. + +![Sequence diagram showing a collision between a subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation and a RAB assignment procedure i) for a successful handover/relocation. The diagram involves BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, MSC-B', and BSS-B/UE. The sequence starts with an 'Inter-MSC HO Completed' message from 3G MSC-A to UE/RNS-A. Then, 3G MSC-A sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover req.' to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B sends an 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST' to UE/RNS-A, which responds with 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED'. 3G MSC-B then sends an 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE' to 3G MSC-A, which in turn sends a 'MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req.' to 3G MSC-A. 3G MSC-A sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover req.' to MSC-B', which responds with 'A-HO-REQUEST' to BSS-B/UE. BSS-B/UE responds with 'A-HO-REQUEST-ACK' to MSC-B'. 3G MSC-A receives a 'MAP-Prep-Handover rsp.' from MSC-B' and sends an 'IAM.' to 3G MSC-B, which responds with 'ACM.'. 3G MSC-A then sends a 'MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover rsp.' to 3G MSC-B, which sends an 'Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND' to UE/RNS-A. MSC-B' sends an 'A-HO-DETECT' to BSS-B/UE, which responds with 'A-HO-COMPLETE' to MSC-B'. 3G MSC-A sends a 'MAP-Process-Access-Sig req.' to 3G MSC-B, which responds with 'MAP-Send-End-Signal req.' to 3G MSC-A. 3G MSC-A sends an 'ANM.' to 3G MSC-B, which responds with 'MAP-Send-End-Signal rsp.' to 3G MSC-A. Finally, 3G MSC-B sends an 'Iu-RELEASE-CMD/CMP' to UE/RNS-A.](e18841eb4a995df8354a793459e12fd0_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSS-A + participant 3G MSC-A + participant 3G MSC-B + participant UE/RNS-A + participant MSC-B' + participant BSS-B/UE + + Note right of 3G MSC-A: Inter-MSC HO Completed + 3G MSC-A->>UE/RNS-A: Inter-MSC HO Completed + 3G MSC-A->>3G MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Handover req. + 3G MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST + UE/RNS-A-->>3G MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + 3G MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE + 3G MSC-B->>3G MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + 3G MSC-A->>MSC-B': MAP-Prep-Handover req. + MSC-B'->>BSS-B/UE: A-HO-REQUEST + BSS-B/UE-->>MSC-B': A-HO-REQUEST-ACK + 3G MSC-A-->>MSC-B': MAP-Prep-Handover rsp. + 3G MSC-A-->>3G MSC-B: IAM. + 3G MSC-B-->>3G MSC-A: ACM. + 3G MSC-A->>3G MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover rsp. + 3G MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND + MSC-B'->>BSS-B/UE: A-HO-DETECT + BSS-B/UE-->>MSC-B': A-HO-COMPLETE + 3G MSC-A->>3G MSC-B: MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. + 3G MSC-B->>3G MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + 3G MSC-A-->>3G MSC-B: ANM. + 3G MSC-B->>3G MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal rsp. + 3G MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-RELEASE-CMD/CMP + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing a collision between a subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation and a RAB assignment procedure i) for a successful handover/relocation. The diagram involves BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, MSC-B', and BSS-B/UE. The sequence starts with an 'Inter-MSC HO Completed' message from 3G MSC-A to UE/RNS-A. Then, 3G MSC-A sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover req.' to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B sends an 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST' to UE/RNS-A, which responds with 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED'. 3G MSC-B then sends an 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE' to 3G MSC-A, which in turn sends a 'MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req.' to 3G MSC-A. 3G MSC-A sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover req.' to MSC-B', which responds with 'A-HO-REQUEST' to BSS-B/UE. BSS-B/UE responds with 'A-HO-REQUEST-ACK' to MSC-B'. 3G MSC-A receives a 'MAP-Prep-Handover rsp.' from MSC-B' and sends an 'IAM.' to 3G MSC-B, which responds with 'ACM.'. 3G MSC-A then sends a 'MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover rsp.' to 3G MSC-B, which sends an 'Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND' to UE/RNS-A. MSC-B' sends an 'A-HO-DETECT' to BSS-B/UE, which responds with 'A-HO-COMPLETE' to MSC-B'. 3G MSC-A sends a 'MAP-Process-Access-Sig req.' to 3G MSC-B, which responds with 'MAP-Send-End-Signal req.' to 3G MSC-A. 3G MSC-A sends an 'ANM.' to 3G MSC-B, which responds with 'MAP-Send-End-Signal rsp.' to 3G MSC-A. Finally, 3G MSC-B sends an 'Iu-RELEASE-CMD/CMP' to UE/RNS-A. + +NOTE: The message flow is shown in the perspective of 3G\_MSC-B. It is assumed that RNS-A has sent the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED before it received the Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST. + +**Figure 35da: Collision between a subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation and a RAB assignment procedure i): successful handover/relocation** + +If the subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation procedure is unsuccessful and the UE is still served by 3G\_MSC-B, the 3G\_MSC-B shall reattempt the subsequent channel assignment procedure towards RNS-A. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating a collision between a subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation and a RAB assignment procedure. The diagram shows message exchanges between BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, MSC-B', and BSS-B/UE. The process starts with an 'Inter-MSC HO Completed' message from 3G MSC-A to UE/RNS-A. This is followed by a 'MAP- Prep-Handover req.' from 3G MSC-A to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B then sends an 'Iu-RAB- ASSIGNMENT- REQUEST' to UE/RNS-A, which responds with 'Iu-RELOCATION- REQUIRED'. 3G MSC-B then sends a 'MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req.' to 3G MSC-A, which responds with 'MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover rsp.'. 3G MSC-B then sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover req.' to MSC-B', which responds with 'A-HO-REQUEST' to BSS-B/UE. BSS-B/UE responds with 'A-HO-FAILURE' to MSC-B', which then sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover rsp.' to 3G MSC-A. 3G MSC-A responds with 'MAP-Prep-Handover rsp.' to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A then sends an 'Iu-RELOCATION- PREPARATION- FAILURE' to 3G MSC-B, which responds with 'Iu- RAB- ASSIGNMENT- REQUEST'. UE/RNS-A responds with 'Iu- RAB- ASSIGNMENT- RESPONSE' to 3G MSC-B, which finally sends a 'MAP- Prep-Handover rsp.' to 3G MSC-A.](0b998e3ad8f9d104768642612605cb35_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram illustrating a collision between a subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation and a RAB assignment procedure. The diagram shows message exchanges between BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, MSC-B', and BSS-B/UE. The process starts with an 'Inter-MSC HO Completed' message from 3G MSC-A to UE/RNS-A. This is followed by a 'MAP- Prep-Handover req.' from 3G MSC-A to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B then sends an 'Iu-RAB- ASSIGNMENT- REQUEST' to UE/RNS-A, which responds with 'Iu-RELOCATION- REQUIRED'. 3G MSC-B then sends a 'MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req.' to 3G MSC-A, which responds with 'MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover rsp.'. 3G MSC-B then sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover req.' to MSC-B', which responds with 'A-HO-REQUEST' to BSS-B/UE. BSS-B/UE responds with 'A-HO-FAILURE' to MSC-B', which then sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover rsp.' to 3G MSC-A. 3G MSC-A responds with 'MAP-Prep-Handover rsp.' to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A then sends an 'Iu-RELOCATION- PREPARATION- FAILURE' to 3G MSC-B, which responds with 'Iu- RAB- ASSIGNMENT- REQUEST'. UE/RNS-A responds with 'Iu- RAB- ASSIGNMENT- RESPONSE' to 3G MSC-B, which finally sends a 'MAP- Prep-Handover rsp.' to 3G MSC-A. + +NOTE: The message flow is shown in the perspective of 3G MSC-B. It is assumed that RNS-A has sent the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED before it received the Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST. + +**Figure 35db: Collision between a subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation and a RAB assignment procedure ii): unsuccessful handover/relocation** + +### 12.8.3 Interactions between directed retry handover procedures and the RAB assignment procedure + +#### 12.8.3.1 Intra-3G\_MSC-B directed retry handover + +For a description of the directed retry handover procedure see subclause 14.3. + +A subsequent channel assignment procedure may be requested by MSC-A/3G MSC-A after an Inter-MSC GSM to UMTS handover or Inter-MSC SRNS relocation without circuit connection (see subclauses 13.2 and 13.4). If RNS-A replies with an Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE containing the cause value 'Directed Retry' and the subsequent Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED indicates that an Intra-3G\_MSC-B directed retry handover is required, the 3G\_MSC-B shall not forward the result of the RAB assignment procedure to MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A, but wait for the outcome of the directed retry handover procedure. If the directed retry handover procedure is completed successfully, the 3G\_MSC-B shall construct an A-ASSIGNMENT-COMPLETE or Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE message, dependent on the encapsulated protocol used on the E-interface, and forward this message to MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response. + +![Sequence diagram showing the interaction between a RAB assignment procedure and a subsequent Intra-3G_MSC-B directed retry handover. The diagram involves five lifelines: BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, and BSS-B/UE. The sequence starts with an 'Inter-MSC HO Completed' message from 3G MSC-A to UE/RNS-A. This is followed by a 'MAP-Prep-Handover req.' from 3G MSC-A to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B then sends an 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST' to UE/RNS-A, which receives an 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE'. Next, 3G MSC-B sends an 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED' to UE/RNS-A, which responds with 'A-HO-REQUEST' to BSS-B/UE. BSS-B/UE returns 'A-HO-REQUEST-ACK' to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A then sends an 'Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND' to 3G MSC-B, which in turn sends 'A-HO-DETECT' and 'A-HO-COMPLETE' to UE/RNS-A. Finally, 3G MSC-B sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover rsp.' to 3G MSC-A and an 'Iu-RELEASE-CMD/CMP' to UE/RNS-A.](69467ece0a576b4c2ec3e0c89ba61527_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSS-A + participant 3G MSC-A + participant 3G MSC-B + participant UE/RNS-A + participant BSS-B/UE + + Note over 3G MSC-A, UE/RNS-A: Inter-MSC HO Completed + 3G MSC-A->>3G MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Handover req. + 3G MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST + UE/RNS-A-->>3G MSC-B: Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE + 3G MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED + UE/RNS-A->>BSS-B/UE: A-HO-REQUEST + BSS-B/UE-->>UE/RNS-A: A-HO-REQUEST-ACK + UE/RNS-A->>3G MSC-B: Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND + 3G MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: A-HO-DETECT + UE/RNS-A-->>3G MSC-B: A-HO-COMPLETE + 3G MSC-B->>3G MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Handover rsp. + 3G MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-RELEASE-CMD/CMP + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the interaction between a RAB assignment procedure and a subsequent Intra-3G\_MSC-B directed retry handover. The diagram involves five lifelines: BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, and BSS-B/UE. The sequence starts with an 'Inter-MSC HO Completed' message from 3G MSC-A to UE/RNS-A. This is followed by a 'MAP-Prep-Handover req.' from 3G MSC-A to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B then sends an 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST' to UE/RNS-A, which receives an 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE'. Next, 3G MSC-B sends an 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED' to UE/RNS-A, which responds with 'A-HO-REQUEST' to BSS-B/UE. BSS-B/UE returns 'A-HO-REQUEST-ACK' to UE/RNS-A. UE/RNS-A then sends an 'Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND' to 3G MSC-B, which in turn sends 'A-HO-DETECT' and 'A-HO-COMPLETE' to UE/RNS-A. Finally, 3G MSC-B sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover rsp.' to 3G MSC-A and an 'Iu-RELEASE-CMD/CMP' to UE/RNS-A. + +**Figure 35e: Interaction between a RAB assignment procedure and a subsequent Intra-3G\_MSC-B directed retry handover i): successful directed retry handover** + +If the directed retry handover procedure is unsuccessful and the UE is still served by RNS-A, the 3G\_MSC-B may optionally take one of a number of actions: + +- i) send an Iu-RELOCATION-PREPARATION FAILURE to RNS-A, if an Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND has not already been sent. Additionally 3G\_MSC-B may retry the assignment procedure to RNS-A; +- ii) retry the assignment procedure to RNS-A, if the failure message was returned from RNS-A. This option is additional to those for normal handover; +- iii) construct an A-ASSIGNMENT-FAILURE message containing the cause value 'Radio interface failure, reversion to old channel' or Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE message containing the cause value 'Failure In The Radio Interface Procedure', dependent on the encapsulated protocol used on the E-interface, and forward this message to MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A. + +#### 12.8.3.2 Subsequent Inter-MSC directed retry handover + +A subsequent channel assignment procedure may be requested by MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A after an Inter-MSC GSM to UMTS handover or SRNS relocation without circuit connection (see subclauses 13.2 and 13.4). If RNS-A replies with an Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE containing the cause value 'Directed Retry' and the subsequent Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED indicates that a subsequent Inter-MSC directed retry handover is required, the 3G\_MSC-B shall not forward the result of the RAB Assignment procedure to MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A, but wait for the outcome of the directed retry handover procedure. 3G\_MSC-B shall continue with the directed retry handover procedure as described in subclause 14.3. + +![Sequence diagram showing the interaction between a RAB assignment procedure and a subsequent Inter-MSC directed retry handover. The diagram involves BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, MSC-B', and BSS-B/UE. The process starts with an 'Inter-MSC HO Completed' message from 3G MSC-B to UE/RNS-A. This is followed by a 'MAP- Prep-Handover req.' from 3G MSC-A to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B then sends an 'Iu-RAB- ASSIGNMENT- REQUEST' to UE/RNS-A, which responds with 'Iu-RAB- ASSIGNMENT- RESPONSE'. 3G MSC-B also sends an 'Iu-RELOCATION- REQUIRED' message to UE/RNS-A. 3G MSC-A then sends a 'MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req.' to 3G MSC-B, which in turn sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover req.' to MSC-B'. MSC-B' sends an 'A-HO-REQUEST' to BSS-B/UE, which responds with 'A-HO-REQUEST-ACK'. 3G MSC-B then sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover rsp.' to 3G MSC-A. 3G MSC-A sends 'IAM.' and 'ACM.' messages to MSC-B'. 3G MSC-A also sends a 'MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover rsp.' to 3G MSC-B, which sends an 'Iu-RELOCATION- COMMAND' to UE/RNS-A. MSC-B' sends 'A-HO-DETECT' and 'A-HO-COMPLETE' messages to BSS-B/UE. 3G MSC-A sends 'MAP-Process-Access-Sig req.' and 'MAP-Send-End-Signal req.' to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B sends 'ANM.' to MSC-B' and 'MAP-Send-End-Signal rsp.' to 3G MSC-A. Finally, 3G MSC-B sends an 'Iu-RELEASE- CMD/CMP' message to UE/RNS-A.](ba676d18b6a00f27c5bfaec9eeec20be_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSS-A + participant 3G MSC-A + participant 3G MSC-B + participant UE/RNS-A + participant MSC-B' + participant BSS-B/UE + + Note right of 3G MSC-B: Inter-MSC HO Completed + 3G MSC-A->>3G MSC-B: MAP- Prep-Handover req. + 3G MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-RAB- ASSIGNMENT- REQUEST + UE/RNS-A-->>3G MSC-B: Iu-RAB- ASSIGNMENT- RESPONSE + 3G MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-RELOCATION- REQUIRED + 3G MSC-A->>3G MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req. + 3G MSC-B->>MSC-B': MAP-Prep-Handover req. + MSC-B'->>BSS-B/UE: A-HO-REQUEST + BSS-B/UE-->>MSC-B': A-HO-REQUEST-ACK + 3G MSC-B->>3G MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Handover rsp. + 3G MSC-A-->>MSC-B': IAM. + 3G MSC-A-->>MSC-B': ACM. + 3G MSC-A->>3G MSC-B: MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover rsp. + 3G MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-RELOCATION- COMMAND + MSC-B'->>BSS-B/UE: A-HO-DETECT + MSC-B'->>BSS-B/UE: A-HO-COMPLETE + 3G MSC-A->>3G MSC-B: MAP-Process-Access-Sig req. + 3G MSC-A->>3G MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal req. + 3G MSC-B-->>MSC-B': ANM. + 3G MSC-B->>3G MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal rsp. + 3G MSC-B->>UE/RNS-A: Iu-RELEASE- CMD/CMP + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the interaction between a RAB assignment procedure and a subsequent Inter-MSC directed retry handover. The diagram involves BSS-A, 3G MSC-A, 3G MSC-B, UE/RNS-A, MSC-B', and BSS-B/UE. The process starts with an 'Inter-MSC HO Completed' message from 3G MSC-B to UE/RNS-A. This is followed by a 'MAP- Prep-Handover req.' from 3G MSC-A to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B then sends an 'Iu-RAB- ASSIGNMENT- REQUEST' to UE/RNS-A, which responds with 'Iu-RAB- ASSIGNMENT- RESPONSE'. 3G MSC-B also sends an 'Iu-RELOCATION- REQUIRED' message to UE/RNS-A. 3G MSC-A then sends a 'MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover req.' to 3G MSC-B, which in turn sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover req.' to MSC-B'. MSC-B' sends an 'A-HO-REQUEST' to BSS-B/UE, which responds with 'A-HO-REQUEST-ACK'. 3G MSC-B then sends a 'MAP-Prep-Handover rsp.' to 3G MSC-A. 3G MSC-A sends 'IAM.' and 'ACM.' messages to MSC-B'. 3G MSC-A also sends a 'MAP-Prep-Sub-Handover rsp.' to 3G MSC-B, which sends an 'Iu-RELOCATION- COMMAND' to UE/RNS-A. MSC-B' sends 'A-HO-DETECT' and 'A-HO-COMPLETE' messages to BSS-B/UE. 3G MSC-A sends 'MAP-Process-Access-Sig req.' and 'MAP-Send-End-Signal req.' to 3G MSC-B. 3G MSC-B sends 'ANM.' to MSC-B' and 'MAP-Send-End-Signal rsp.' to 3G MSC-A. Finally, 3G MSC-B sends an 'Iu-RELEASE- CMD/CMP' message to UE/RNS-A. + +**Figure 35f: Interaction between a RAB assignment procedure and a subsequent Inter-MSC directed retry handover i): successful directed retry handover** + +If the directed retry handover procedure is unsuccessful and the UE is still served by 3G\_MSC-B, the 3G\_MSC-B may optionally take one of a number of actions: + +- i) send an Iu-RELOCATION-PREPARATION FAILURE to RNS-A, if an Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND has not already been sen. Additionally 3G\_MSC-B may retry the assignment procedure to RNS-A t; +- ii) retry the assignment procedure to RNS-A, if the failure message was returned from RNS-A. This option is additional to those for normal handover; +- iii) construct an A-ASSIGNMENT-FAILURE message containing the cause value 'Radio interface failure, reversion to old channel' or Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE message containing the cause value 'Failure In The Radio Interface Procedure', dependent on the encapsulated protocol used on the E-interface, and forward this message to MSC-A/3G\_MSC-A. + +# 13 Subsequent channel assignment using a circuit connection between MSC-A and MSC-B + +## 13.1 GSM handover + +If a circuit connection has to be set up (for example for a Mobile Originated or Mobile Terminated Call Establishment) after an Inter-MSC handover without circuit connection, MSC-A shall request a Handover Number using a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request, containing the A-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST, on the established MAP connection. For speech calls, MSC-A shall also include the Iu Supported Codecs List to be used by MSC-B for subsequent intra-MSC-B intersystem handover to UMTS and intra-MSC-B SRNS relocation. If MSC-B indicates to MSC-A that at least one of two procedures assignment or Handover Number allocation can not be completed, then MSC-A shall terminate the circuit establishment attempt. The existing connection to the MS shall be maintained, if possible. + +Upon receipt of the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request MSC-B shall perform the requested assignment operation towards the BSS. In addition it shall retrieve a Handover Number from VLR-B. If a failure occurs in the assignment or Handover Number allocation then it shall be reflected in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response that at least one of these two procedures has not been completed (i.e. either by a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER result with the assignment procedure outcome and the Handover Number allocation outcome or by a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER error). + +If MSC-A supports A interface over IP, then for speech calls MSC-A may include the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. + +If the BSS-B supports A over IP then MSC-B shall include a Codec List (MSC preferred) in the A-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST message to BSS-B. MSC-B may select the codecs for the Codec List (MSC preferred) from the channel type information and the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), if this list was provided by 3G\_MSC-A in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. For a detailed description of the handling of these codec lists by MSC-A and MSC-B see 3GPP TS 23.153 [25]. If the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) was not provided or MSC-B does not support the selection of codecs from the AoIP-Supported Codecs List, then MSC-B shall create the Codec List (MSC preferred) using the channel type information received from 3G\_MSC-A in the A-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST message included in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. + +If MSC-A provided an AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request and MSC-B selected the codecs for the Codec List (MSC preferred) from the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), MSC-B may include the AoIP-Selected Codec (Target) and AoIP-Available Codecs List (MAP) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response. + +When MSC-A receives a successful MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response it shall establish a circuit connection to MSC-B by using the appropriate network supported procedures. In figure 36 this is indicated by the IAM (Initial Address Message) and ACM (Address Complete Message). MSC-B shall also send the Answer message if appropriate to the signalling system. Upon receipt of the Answer MSC-A shall consider the circuit connection establishment phase complete. If a failure occurs during the circuit establishment phase then the existing connection to the MS shall be maintained, if possible. + +![Sequence diagram showing successful circuit-switched call establishment after a Basic Handover without circuit connection. Lifelines: MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-B/MS, VLR-B. The sequence involves MAP-Prepare-Handover req., MAP-Alloc-Handover-Number req., A-ASG-REQUEST, A-ASG-COMPLETE, MAP-Prep-Handover resp., MAP-Send-Handover-Report req., IAM, MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1), ACM, Answer, End of call, RELEASE, and MAP-Send-End-Signal resp.](a7450c80e88ad3f6ca1427ad84020998_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant MSC-A + participant MSC-B + participant BSS-B/MS + participant VLR-B + + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Prepare-Handover req. + MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Alloc-Handover-Number req. + MSC-B->>BSS-B/MS: A-ASG-REQUEST + BSS-B/MS-->>MSC-B: A-ASG-COMPLETE + MSC-B-->>MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Handover resp. + MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. + MSC-A-->>MSC-B: IAM + MSC-B-->>VLR-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) + MSC-A-->>MSC-B: ACM + MSC-A-->>MSC-B: Answer + Note left of MSC-A: End of call + MSC-A-->>MSC-B: RELEASE + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing successful circuit-switched call establishment after a Basic Handover without circuit connection. Lifelines: MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-B/MS, VLR-B. The sequence involves MAP-Prepare-Handover req., MAP-Alloc-Handover-Number req., A-ASG-REQUEST, A-ASG-COMPLETE, MAP-Prep-Handover resp., MAP-Send-Handover-Report req., IAM, MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1), ACM, Answer, End of call, RELEASE, and MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +NOTE: Can be sent at any time after the reception of IAM. + +**Figure 36: Successful circuit-switched call establishment after a Basic Handover without circuit connection** + +## 13.2 UMTS to GSM handover + +If a circuit connection has to be set up (for example for a Mobile Originated or Mobile Terminated Call Establishment) after an Inter-3G\_MSC UMTS to GSM handover without circuit connection, 3G\_MSC-A shall request a Handover Number using a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request, containing the A-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST, on the established MAP connection. For speech calls, 3G\_MSC-A shall also include the Iu Supported Codecs List to be used by MSC-B for subsequent intra-MSC-B intersystem handover to UMTS and intra-MSC-B SRNS relocation. If MSC-B indicates to MSC-B and to 3G\_MSC-A that at least one of two procedures assignment or Handover Number allocation can not be completed, then 3G\_MSC-A shall terminate the circuit establishment attempt. The existing connection to the UE/MS shall be maintained, if possible. + +Upon receipt of the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request MSC-B shall perform the requested assignment operation towards the BSS. In addition it shall retrieve a Handover Number from VLR-B. If a failure occurs in the assignment or Handover Number allocation then it shall be reflected in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response that at least one of these two procedures has not been completed (i.e. either by a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER result with the assignment procedure outcome and the Handover Number allocation outcome or by a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER error). + +If 3G\_MSC-A supports A interface over IP, then for speech calls 3G\_MSC-A may include the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. + +If the BSS-B supports A over IP, then MSC-B shall include a Codec List (MSC preferred) in the A-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST message to BSS-B. MSC-B may select the codecs for the Codec List (MSC preferred) from the channel type information and the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), if this list was provided by 3G\_MSC-A in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. For a detailed description of the handling of these codec lists by 3G\_MSC-A and MSC-B see 3GPP TS 23.153 [25]. If the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) was not provided or MSC-B does not support the selection of codecs from the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), then MSC-B shall create the Codec List (MSC preferred) using the channel type information received from 3G\_MSC-A in the A-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST message included in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. + +If MSC-A provided an AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request and MSC-B selected the codecs for the Codec List (MSC preferred) from the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor), MSC-B may include the AoIP-Selected Codec (Target) and AoIP-Available Codecs List (MAP) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response. + +When 3G\_MSC-A receives a successful MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response, it shall establish a circuit connection to MSC-B by using the appropriate network supported procedures. In figure 37 this is indicated by the IAM (Initial Address Message) and ACM (Address Complete Message). MSC-B shall also send the Answer message if appropriate to the signalling system. Upon receipt of the Answer 3G\_MSC-A shall consider the circuit connection establishment phase complete. If a failure occurs during the circuit establishment phase then the existing connection to the UE/MS shall be maintained, if possible. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the successful circuit-switched call establishment after a Basic UMTS to GSM Handover without circuit connection. The diagram shows four lifelines: 3G_MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-B/UE/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. 3G_MSC-A sends MAP-Prepare-Handover req. to MSC-B. 2. MSC-B sends MAP-Alloc-Handover-Number req. to VLR-B. 3. MSC-B sends A-ASG-REQUEST to BSS-B/UE/MS. 4. BSS-B/UE/MS sends A-ASG-COMPLETE to MSC-B. 5. MSC-B sends MAP-Prep-Handover resp. to 3G_MSC-A. 6. MSC-B sends MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. to VLR-B. 7. 3G_MSC-A sends IAM to MSC-B. 8. MSC-B sends MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) to VLR-B. 9. 3G_MSC-A sends ACM to MSC-B. 10. 3G_MSC-A sends Answer to MSC-B. 11. End of call. 12. 3G_MSC-A sends RELEASE to MSC-B. 13. 3G_MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to MSC-B.](521e2e9d53a2d9c4b3e22d151d46ee23_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant MSC-B + participant BSS-B/UE/MS + participant VLR-B + Note left of 3G_MSC-A: End of call + 3G_MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Prepare-Handover req. + MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Alloc-Handover-Number req. + MSC-B->>BSS-B/UE/MS: A-ASG-REQUEST + BSS-B/UE/MS->>MSC-B: A-ASG-COMPLETE + MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Handover resp. + MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. + 3G_MSC-A-->>MSC-B: IAM + MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) + 3G_MSC-A-->>MSC-B: ACM + 3G_MSC-A-->>MSC-B: Answer + 3G_MSC-A-->>MSC-B: RELEASE + 3G_MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the successful circuit-switched call establishment after a Basic UMTS to GSM Handover without circuit connection. The diagram shows four lifelines: 3G\_MSC-A, MSC-B, BSS-B/UE/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. 3G\_MSC-A sends MAP-Prepare-Handover req. to MSC-B. 2. MSC-B sends MAP-Alloc-Handover-Number req. to VLR-B. 3. MSC-B sends A-ASG-REQUEST to BSS-B/UE/MS. 4. BSS-B/UE/MS sends A-ASG-COMPLETE to MSC-B. 5. MSC-B sends MAP-Prep-Handover resp. to 3G\_MSC-A. 6. MSC-B sends MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. to VLR-B. 7. 3G\_MSC-A sends IAM to MSC-B. 8. MSC-B sends MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) to VLR-B. 9. 3G\_MSC-A sends ACM to MSC-B. 10. 3G\_MSC-A sends Answer to MSC-B. 11. End of call. 12. 3G\_MSC-A sends RELEASE to MSC-B. 13. 3G\_MSC-A sends MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to MSC-B. + +NOTE 1: Can be sent at any time after the reception of IAM. + +**Figure 37: Successful circuit-switched call establishment after a Basic UMTS to GSM Handover without circuit connection** + +## 13.3 GSM to UMTS handover + +If a circuit connection has to be set up (for example for a Mobile Originated or Mobile Terminated Call Establishment) after an Inter-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS handover without circuit connection, MSC-A shall request a Handover Number using a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request, containing the A-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST, on the established MAP connection. If 3G\_MSC-B indicates to 3G\_MSC-B and to MSC-A that at least one of two procedures assignment or Handover Number allocation can not be completed, then MSC-A shall terminate the circuit establishment attempt. The existing connection to the UE/MS shall be maintained, if possible. + +If MSC-A supports A interface over IP, then for speech calls MSC-A may include the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request to be used by 3G\_MSC-B for subsequent intra-3G\_MSC-B intersystem handover to an A over IP capable BSS. For a detailed description of the handling of this codec list by MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B see 3GPP TS 23.153 [25]. + +Upon receipt of the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request 3G\_MSC-B shall perform the requested assignment operation towards the RNS. In addition it shall retrieve a Handover Number from VLR-B. If a failure occurs in the assignment or Handover Number allocation then it shall be reflected in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response that at least one of these two procedures has not been completed (i.e. either by a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER result with the assignment procedure outcome and the Handover Number allocation outcome or by a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER error). + +For speech calls, if 3G\_MSC-B supports the selection of codec based on the Iu-Supported Codecs List, 3G\_MSC-B shall select a codec from the Iu Supported Codecs List, generate associated RAB parameters and connect a transcoder. If the Iu Supported Codecs List was not received or 3G\_MSC-B does not support the selection of codec based on the Iu-Supported Codecs List, 3G\_MSC-B shall select the appropriate default speech codec. + +For an assignment in UTRAN Iu mode, 3G\_MSC-B shall also generate a NAS Synch Indicator for the Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST message. If the Iu Supported Codecs List was received by 3G\_MSC-B and 3G\_MSC-B supports the selection of codec based on the Iu-Supported Codecs List, then the Iu Selected codec shall be indicated in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response, sent from 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-A. + +When MSC-A receives a successful MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response, it shall establish a circuit connection to 3G\_MSC-B by using the appropriate network supported procedures. In figure 38 this is indicated by the IAM (Initial Address Message) and ACM (Address Complete Message). 3G\_MSC-B shall also send the Answer message if appropriate to the signalling system. Upon receipt of the Answer MSC-A shall consider the circuit connection establishment phase complete. If a failure occurs during the circuit establishment phase then the existing connection to the UE/MS shall be maintained, if possible. + +![Sequence diagram showing successful circuit-switched call establishment after a Basic GSM to UMTS Handover without circuit connection. The diagram involves four lifelines: MSC-A, 3G_MSC-B, RNS-B/UE/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence starts with MSC-A sending a MAP-Prepare-Handover req. to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends a MAP-Alloc-Handover-Number req. to VLR-B and an IU-RAB-ASG-REQUEST to RNS-B/UE/MS. RNS-B/UE/MS responds with IU-RAB-ASG-COMPLETE. 3G_MSC-B sends a MAP-Prep-Handover resp. to MSC-A and a MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. to VLR-B. MSC-A sends IAM, ACM, and Answer messages to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-B sends a MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) to VLR-B. The call ends with a RELEASE message from MSC-A to 3G_MSC-B, and 3G_MSC-B responds with a MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to MSC-A.](6e9d059430baba0c363e33749f68b107_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC-B + participant RNS-B/UE/MS + participant VLR-B + + MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Prepare-Handover req. + 3G_MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Alloc-Handover-Number req. + 3G_MSC-B->>RNS-B/UE/MS: IU-RAB-ASG-REQUEST + RNS-B/UE/MS-->>3G_MSC-B: IU-RAB-ASG-COMPLETE + 3G_MSC-B->>MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Handover resp. + 3G_MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. + MSC-A-->>3G_MSC-B: IAM + MSC-A-->>3G_MSC-B: ACM + MSC-A-->>3G_MSC-B: Answer + 3G_MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) + Note left of MSC-A: End of call + MSC-A-->>3G_MSC-B: RELEASE + 3G_MSC-B->>MSC-A: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing successful circuit-switched call establishment after a Basic GSM to UMTS Handover without circuit connection. The diagram involves four lifelines: MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B, RNS-B/UE/MS, and VLR-B. The sequence starts with MSC-A sending a MAP-Prepare-Handover req. to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends a MAP-Alloc-Handover-Number req. to VLR-B and an IU-RAB-ASG-REQUEST to RNS-B/UE/MS. RNS-B/UE/MS responds with IU-RAB-ASG-COMPLETE. 3G\_MSC-B sends a MAP-Prep-Handover resp. to MSC-A and a MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. to VLR-B. MSC-A sends IAM, ACM, and Answer messages to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-B sends a MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) to VLR-B. The call ends with a RELEASE message from MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B, and 3G\_MSC-B responds with a MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. to MSC-A. + +NOTE 1: Can be sent at any time after the reception of IAM. + +**Figure 38: Successful circuit-switched call establishment after a Basic GSM to UMTS Handover without circuit connection** + +## 13.4 SRNS Relocation + +### 13.4.1 Without circuit connection + +If a circuit connection has to be set up (for example for a Mobile Originated or Mobile Terminated Call Establishment) after an Inter-3G\_MSC relocation without circuit connection, 3G\_MSC-A shall request a Handover Number using a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request, containing the IU-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST, on the established MAP connection. + +For speech calls, 3G\_MSC-A shall include the Iu Supported Codecs List in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. 3G\_MSC-A shall configure the RANAP RAB parameters according to the appropriate default speech codec. + +If 3G\_MSC-A supports A interface over IP, then for speech calls 3G\_MSC-A may include the AoIP-Supported Codecs List (Anchor) in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request to be used by 3G\_MSC-B for subsequent intra-3G\_MSC-B intersystem handover to an A over IP capable BSS. For a detailed description of the handling of this codec list by 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B see 3GPP TS 23.153 [25]. + +Alternatively, if 3G\_MSC-B is known to support the use of the Iu Supported Codecs List, 3G\_MSC-A may configure the RANAP RAB parameters according to the preferred codec and indicate this to 3G\_MSC-B by including the RAB configuration indicator in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request. The decision to use this option is based on internal configuration information in 3G\_MSC-A. + +For an assignment in UTRAN Iu mode, 3G\_MSC-A shall also include the NAS Synch Indicator in the Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST. + +If 3G\_MSC-B indicates to 3G\_MSC-B and to 3G\_MSC-A that at least one of two procedures (RAB) assignment or Handover Number allocation can not be completed, then 3G\_MSC-A shall terminate the circuit establishment attempt. The existing connection to the UE shall be maintained, if possible. + +Upon receipt of the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request, 3G\_MSC-B shall perform the requested RAB assignment operation towards the RNS. In addition it shall retrieve a Handover Number from VLR-B. + +For speech calls, if 3G\_MSC-B supports the selection of codec based on the Iu-Supported Codecs List, 3G\_MSC-B shall select an Iu Selected codec from the Iu Supported Codecs List and connect a transcoder. If the Iu Supported Codecs List was not received or 3G\_MSC-B does not support the selection of codec based on the Iu-Supported Codecs List, 3G\_MSC-B shall select the appropriate default speech codec. + +3G\_MSC-B shall reconfigure the RANAP RAB parameters according to the Iu Selected codec: + +- if the RAB configuration indicator is included in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request and the codec selected by 3G\_MSC-B is different from the preferred codec; or +- if the RAB configuration indicator is not included in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request and the codec selected by 3G\_MSC-B is different from the appropriate default speech codec. + +Additionally, for an assignment in UTRAN Iu mode, 3G\_MSC-B shall include the NAS Synch Indicator for the Iu Selected codec in the Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST. If the Iu Supported Codecs List was received by 3G\_MSC-B and 3G\_MSC-B supports the selection of codec based on the Iu-Supported Codecs List, then the Iu Selected codec shall be indicated in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response, sent from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A. + +If a failure occurs in the RAB assignment or Handover Number allocation then it shall be reflected in the MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response that at least one of these two procedures has not been completed (i.e. either by a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER result with the RAB assignment procedure outcome and the Handover Number allocation outcome or by a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER error). + +When 3G\_MSC-A receives a successful MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response, it shall establish a circuit connection to 3G\_MSC-B by using the appropriate network supported procedures. In figure 39 this is indicated by the IAM (Initial Address Message) and ACM (Address Complete Message). 3G\_MSC-B shall also send the Answer message if appropriate to the signalling system. Upon receipt of the Answer 3G\_MSC-A shall consider the circuit connection establishment phase complete. If a failure occurs during the circuit establishment phase then the existing connection to the UE shall be maintained, if possible. + +### 13.4.2 With circuit connection (Optional functionality) + +If 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B support the optional supplementary service Multicall (See 3GPP TS 23.135 [17]), 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B shall have the following functionality additionally to the description in subclause 13.4.1. + +A new circuit connection shall be able to set up (for example for a new Mobile Originated or a new Mobile Terminated Call Establishment) after an Inter-3G\_MSC relocation with one or several circuit connections. The procedures for the establishment of the additional circuit connection in 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B are the same as that described in subclause 13.4.1. + +![Sequence diagram showing successful circuit-switched call establishment after a Basic Relocation without circuit connection. Lifelines: 3G_MSC-A, 3G_MSC-B, RNS-B/UE, VLR-B. The sequence involves MAP-Prepare-Handover req., MAP-Alloc-Handover-Number req., IU-RAB-ASG-REQUEST, IU-RAB-ASG-COMPLETE, MAP-Prep-Handover resp., MAP-Send-Handover-Report req., IAM, MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1), ACM, Answer, RELEASE, and MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. The call ends at the 'End of call' point.](2b00743506f6a3bbd17af764162dc76d_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC-B + participant RNS-B/UE + participant VLR-B + Note left of 3G_MSC-A: End of call + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Prepare-Handover req. + 3G_MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Alloc-Handover-Number req. + 3G_MSC-B->>RNS-B/UE: IU-RAB-ASG-REQUEST + RNS-B/UE-->>3G_MSC-B: IU-RAB-ASG-COMPLETE + 3G_MSC-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-Prep-Handover resp. + 3G_MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report req. + 3G_MSC-A-->>3G_MSC-B: IAM + 3G_MSC-B->>VLR-B: MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1) + 3G_MSC-A-->>3G_MSC-B: ACM + 3G_MSC-A-->>3G_MSC-B: Answer + 3G_MSC-A-->>3G_MSC-B: RELEASE + 3G_MSC-A->>3G_MSC-B: MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing successful circuit-switched call establishment after a Basic Relocation without circuit connection. Lifelines: 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B, RNS-B/UE, VLR-B. The sequence involves MAP-Prepare-Handover req., MAP-Alloc-Handover-Number req., IU-RAB-ASG-REQUEST, IU-RAB-ASG-COMPLETE, MAP-Prep-Handover resp., MAP-Send-Handover-Report req., IAM, MAP-Send-Handover-Report resp. (1), ACM, Answer, RELEASE, and MAP-Send-End-Signal resp. The call ends at the 'End of call' point. + +NOTE 1: Can be sent at any time after the reception of IAM. + +**Figure 39: Successful circuit-switched call establishment after a Basic Relocation without circuit connection** + +# 14 Directed retry handover + +Editor's Note: [Directed retry in the cases of SRNS relocation is FFS] + +## 14.1 GSM handover + +The directed retry procedure allows the network to select the optimum cell for the Mobile Station. The process of directed retry involves the assignment of a Mobile Station to a radio channel on a cell other than the serving cell. This process is triggered by the assignment procedures, as described in 3GPP TS 48.008 [5], and employs internal or external handover procedures as described in clauses 6 and 7. The successful procedure for a directed retry is as shown in figure 40 and as described below. + +If during the assignment phase, as represented by the A-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST message, a handover becomes necessary, due to either radio conditions or congestion, then the Mobile Station may be handed over to a different cell. When the decision has been made to handover the MS the BSS-A may send an A-ASSIGNMENT-FAILURE message, indicating 'directed retry', before sending the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message to MSC-A, indicating 'directed retry'. However BSS-A may alternatively send the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message, indicating 'directed retry', without sending the A-ASSIGNMENT-FAILURE message. Other cause values may be used instead of "Directed Retry" in the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message, this will allow the MSC to take different actions dependent on the received cause. Upon receipt of the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message from BSS-A, then MSC-A shall initiate the handover as described in clauses 6 and 7. No resources shall be cleared in the MSC-A or BSS-A for this connection. + +After receipt of the A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE message from BSS-B the assignment procedure shall be considered to be complete and the resources on BSS-A shall be cleared. + +![Sequence diagram of a Directed Retry Intra-MSC Handover Procedure. The diagram shows interactions between MS, BSS-A, MSC-A, BSS-B, and MS. The sequence starts with MSC-A sending an A-Assignment-Request to BSS-A. BSS-A responds with A-Assignment-Failure. MSC-A then sends A-Handover-Required to BSS-A. BSS-A sends A-Handover-Request to BSS-B. BSS-B responds with A-Handover-Request-Ack. MSC-A sends A-Handover-Command to BSS-A. BSS-A sends RI-HO-Command to MS. BSS-B sends RI-HO-Access to MS. MS sends RI-HO-Complete to BSS-B. BSS-B sends A-Handover-Detect to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-Handover-Complete to BSS-B. BSS-B sends A-Clear-Command to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-Clear-Complete to BSS-A.](cc7baa8e5118f4b42c01166637c738ea_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant MS1 as MS + participant BSS-A + participant MSC-A + participant BSS-B + participant MS2 as MS + + MSC-A->>BSS-A: A-Assignment-Request + BSS-A-->>MSC-A: A-Assignment-Failure + MSC-A->>BSS-A: A-Handover-Required + BSS-A->>BSS-B: A-Handover-Request + BSS-B-->>MSC-A: A-Handover-Request-Ack + MSC-A->>BSS-A: A-Handover-Command + BSS-A->>MS1: RI-HO-Command + BSS-B->>MS2: RI-HO-Access + MS2-->>BSS-B: RI-HO-Complete + BSS-B->>MSC-A: A-Handover-Detect + MSC-A->>BSS-B: A-Handover-Complete + BSS-B->>MSC-A: A-Clear-Command + MSC-A-->>BSS-A: A-Clear-Complete + +``` + +Sequence diagram of a Directed Retry Intra-MSC Handover Procedure. The diagram shows interactions between MS, BSS-A, MSC-A, BSS-B, and MS. The sequence starts with MSC-A sending an A-Assignment-Request to BSS-A. BSS-A responds with A-Assignment-Failure. MSC-A then sends A-Handover-Required to BSS-A. BSS-A sends A-Handover-Request to BSS-B. BSS-B responds with A-Handover-Request-Ack. MSC-A sends A-Handover-Command to BSS-A. BSS-A sends RI-HO-Command to MS. BSS-B sends RI-HO-Access to MS. MS sends RI-HO-Complete to BSS-B. BSS-B sends A-Handover-Detect to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-Handover-Complete to BSS-B. BSS-B sends A-Clear-Command to MSC-A. MSC-A sends A-Clear-Complete to BSS-A. + +**Figure 40: Example of a Directed Retry Intra-MSC Handover Procedure** + +If a failure occurs during the handover attempt, for example A-HANDOVER-FAILURE returned from BSS-A or BSS-B, then MSC-A will terminate the handover to BSS-B. Under these conditions MSC-A may optionally take one of a number of actions: + +- i) retry the handover to the same cell; +- ii) select the next cell from the list contained in the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message and attempt a handover to the new cell; +- iii) send an A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED-REJECT to BSS-A, if an A-HANDOVER-COMMAND has not already been sent. Additionally MSC-A may retry the assignment procedure to BSS-A; +- iv) retry the assignment procedure to BSS-A, if the failure message was returned from BSS-A. This option is additional to those for normal handover; +- v) Clear the complete call. + +The procedures for Inter-MSC handover are also applicable to the directed retry process. If an Inter-MSC handover is necessary then the assignment process should be considered to have completed successfully upon receipt of the A-HO-COMPLETE included in the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request. + +## 14.2 GSM to UMTS handover + +The directed retry procedure allows the network to select the optimum cell for the UE/MS. The process of directed retry involves the assignment of a UE/MS to a radio channel on a cell other than the serving cell. This process is triggered by the assignment procedures, as described in 3GPP TS 48.008 [5], and employs internal or external GSM to UMTS handover procedures as described in subclauses 6.2.2 and 8.2. The successful procedure for a directed retry in case of an intra-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS handover is as shown in figure 40a and as described below. + +If during the assignment phase, as represented by the A-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST message, a GSM to UMTS handover becomes necessary, due to radio conditions, congestion or inability to provide the requested bearer service in GSM, then the UE/MS may be handed over to a UMTS cell. If the requested bearer service cannot be provided in GSM, 3G\_MSC-A shall indicate in the A-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST message that handover to UMTS should be performed. When the decision has been made to handover the UE/MS the BSS-A may send an A-ASSIGNMENT-FAILURE message, indicating 'directed retry', before sending the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message to 3G\_MSC-A, indicating 'directed retry'. However BSS-A may alternatively send the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message, indicating 'directed retry', without sending the A-ASSIGNMENT-FAILURE message. Other cause values may be used instead of "Directed Retry" in the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message, this will allow the 3G\_MSC to take different actions dependent on the received cause. Upon receipt of the A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message from BSS-A, then 3G\_MSC-A shall initiate the GSM to UMTS handover as described in subclauses 6.2.2 and 8.2. No resources shall be cleared in the 3G\_MSC-A or BSS-A for this connection. + +After receipt of the Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE message from RNS-B the assignment procedure shall be considered to be complete and the resources on BSS-A shall be cleared. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the Directed Retry Intra-3G_MSC GSM to UMTS Handover Procedure. The diagram shows the interaction between UE/MS, BSS-A, 3G_MSC-A, and RNS-B. The sequence starts with BSS-A sending an A-Assignment-Request to 3G_MSC-A. 3G_MSC-A responds with A-Assignment-Failure. BSS-A then sends A-Handover-Required to 3G_MSC-A. 3G_MSC-A sends Iu-Relocation-Request to RNS-B. RNS-B responds with Iu-Relocation-Request-Ack. 3G_MSC-A sends A-Handover-Command to BSS-A. BSS-A sends RI-HO-Command to UE/MS. 3G_MSC-A sends Iu-Relocation-Detect to RNS-B. RNS-B sends RRC-HO-Complete to UE/MS. 3G_MSC-A sends Iu-Relocation-Complete to RNS-B. BSS-A sends A-Clear-Command to 3G_MSC-A. 3G_MSC-A sends A-Clear-Complete to BSS-A.](aa39f51ba214496042ee3e2ce4ecee80_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS + participant BSS-A + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant RNS-B + Note right of UE/MS: UE/MS + BSS-A->>3G_MSC-A: A-Assignment-Request + 3G_MSC-A-->>BSS-A: A-Assignment-Failure + BSS-A->>3G_MSC-A: A-Handover-Required + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-B: Iu-Relocation-Request + RNS-B-->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Relocation-Request-Ack + 3G_MSC-A->>BSS-A: A-Handover-Command + BSS-A->>UE/MS: RI-HO-Command + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-B: Iu-Relocation-Detect + RNS-B-->>UE/MS: RRC-HO-Complete + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-B: Iu-Relocation-Complete + BSS-A->>3G_MSC-A: A-Clear-Command + 3G_MSC-A-->>BSS-A: A-Clear-Complete + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the Directed Retry Intra-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS Handover Procedure. The diagram shows the interaction between UE/MS, BSS-A, 3G\_MSC-A, and RNS-B. The sequence starts with BSS-A sending an A-Assignment-Request to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A responds with A-Assignment-Failure. BSS-A then sends A-Handover-Required to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A sends Iu-Relocation-Request to RNS-B. RNS-B responds with Iu-Relocation-Request-Ack. 3G\_MSC-A sends A-Handover-Command to BSS-A. BSS-A sends RI-HO-Command to UE/MS. 3G\_MSC-A sends Iu-Relocation-Detect to RNS-B. RNS-B sends RRC-HO-Complete to UE/MS. 3G\_MSC-A sends Iu-Relocation-Complete to RNS-B. BSS-A sends A-Clear-Command to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A sends A-Clear-Complete to BSS-A. + +**Figure 40a: Example of a Directed Retry Intra-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS Handover Procedure** + +If a failure occurs during the handover attempt, for example A-HANDOVER-FAILURE returned from BSS-A or Iu-RELOCATION FAILURE from RNS-B then 3G\_MSC-A will terminate the GSM to UMTS handover to RNS-B. Under these conditions 3G\_MSC-A may optionally take one of a number of actions: + +- i) send an A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED-REJECT to BSS-A, if an A-HANDOVER-COMMAND has not already been sent. Additionally 3G\_MSC-A may retry the assignment procedure to BSS-A; +- ii) retry the assignment procedure to BSS-A, if the failure message was returned from BSS-A. This option is additional to those for normal handover; +- iii) Clear the complete call. + +The procedures for Inter-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS handover are also applicable to the directed retry process. If an Inter-3G\_MSC GSM to UMTS handover is necessary then the assignment process should be considered to have completed successfully upon receipt of the A-HO-COMPLETE included in the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request. + +## 14.3 UMTS to GSM handover + +The directed retry procedure allows the network to select the optimum cell for the UE/MS. The process of directed retry involves the assignment of a UE/MS to a radio channel on a cell other than the serving cell. This process is triggered by the assignment procedures, as described in 3GPP TS 25.413 [1], and employs UMTS to GSM handover procedures as described in subclauses 6.2.1 and 8.1. The successful procedure for a directed retry in case of an intra-3G\_MSC UMTS to GSM handover is as shown in figure 40b and as described below. + +If during the assignment phase, as represented by the Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST message, a UMTS to GSM handover becomes necessary, due to either radio conditions, congestion or network preference, then the UE/MS may be handed over to a GSM cell. If the handover to GSM is required due to network preference, 3G\_MSC-A shall indicate in the Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST message that handover to GSM should be performed. When the decision has been made to handover the UE/MS the RNS-A shall send an Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE message, indicating 'directed retry', before sending the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED message to 3G\_MSC-A, indicating 'directed retry'. Other cause values may be used instead of "Directed Retry" in the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED message, this will allow the 3G\_MSC to take different actions dependent on the received cause. Upon receipt of the Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED message from RNS-A, then 3G\_MSC-A shall initiate the UMTS to GSM handover as described in subclauses 6.2.1 and 8.1. No resources shall be cleared in the 3G\_MSC-A or RNS-A for this connection. + +After receipt of the A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE message from BSS-B the assignment procedure shall be considered to be complete and the resources on RNS-A shall be cleared. + +![Sequence diagram of Figure 40b: Example of a Directed Retry Intra-3G_MSC UMTS to GSM Handover Procedure. The diagram shows the interaction between UE/MS, RNS-A, 3G_MSC-A, and BSS-B. The sequence starts with RNS-A sending an Iu-RAB-Assignment-Request to 3G_MSC-A. 3G_MSC-A responds with Iu-RAB-Assignment-Response. RNS-A then sends Iu-Relocation-Required to 3G_MSC-A. 3G_MSC-A sends A-Handover-Request to BSS-B. BSS-B responds with A-Handover-Request-Ack. 3G_MSC-A sends Iu-Relocation-Command to RNS-A. RNS-A sends RRC-HO-Command to UE/MS. BSS-B sends RI-HO-Access to UE/MS. 3G_MSC-A sends A-Handover-Detect to BSS-B. BSS-B sends RI-HO-Complete to 3G_MSC-A. 3G_MSC-A sends A-Handover-Complete to BSS-B. BSS-B sends RI-HO-Complete to 3G_MSC-A. 3G_MSC-A sends Iu-Release-Command to RNS-A. RNS-A sends Iu-Release-Complete to 3G_MSC-A.](74e409e1548dd2606c4de9bdfe9806e4_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS + participant RNS-A + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant BSS-B + + Note left of UE/MS: UE/MS + Note right of BSS-B: UE/MS + + RNS-A->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-RAB-Assignment-Request + 3G_MSC-A-->>RNS-A: Iu-RAB-Assignment-Response + RNS-A->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Relocation-Required + 3G_MSC-A->>BSS-B: A-Handover-Request + BSS-B-->>3G_MSC-A: A-Handover-Request-Ack + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-A: Iu-Relocation-Command + RNS-A->>UE/MS: RRC-HO-Command + BSS-B->>UE/MS: RI-HO-Access + 3G_MSC-A->>BSS-B: A-Handover-Detect + BSS-B-->>3G_MSC-A: RI-HO-Complete + 3G_MSC-A->>BSS-B: A-Handover-Complete + BSS-B-->>3G_MSC-A: RI-HO-Complete + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-A: Iu-Release-Command + RNS-A-->>3G_MSC-A: Iu-Release-Complete + +``` + +Sequence diagram of Figure 40b: Example of a Directed Retry Intra-3G\_MSC UMTS to GSM Handover Procedure. The diagram shows the interaction between UE/MS, RNS-A, 3G\_MSC-A, and BSS-B. The sequence starts with RNS-A sending an Iu-RAB-Assignment-Request to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A responds with Iu-RAB-Assignment-Response. RNS-A then sends Iu-Relocation-Required to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A sends A-Handover-Request to BSS-B. BSS-B responds with A-Handover-Request-Ack. 3G\_MSC-A sends Iu-Relocation-Command to RNS-A. RNS-A sends RRC-HO-Command to UE/MS. BSS-B sends RI-HO-Access to UE/MS. 3G\_MSC-A sends A-Handover-Detect to BSS-B. BSS-B sends RI-HO-Complete to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A sends A-Handover-Complete to BSS-B. BSS-B sends RI-HO-Complete to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A sends Iu-Release-Command to RNS-A. RNS-A sends Iu-Release-Complete to 3G\_MSC-A. + +**Figure 40b: Example of a Directed Retry Intra-3G\_MSC UMTS to GSM Handover Procedure** + +If a failure occurs during the handover attempt, for example Iu-RELOCATION FAILURE returned from RNS-A or A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-B then 3G\_MSC-A will terminate the UMTS to GSM handover to BSS-B. Under these conditions 3G\_MSC-A may optionally take one of a number of actions: + +- i) send an Iu-RELOCATION-PREPARATION FAILURE to RNS-A, if an Iu-RELOCATION-COMMAND has not already been sent. Additionally 3G\_MSC-A may retry the assignment procedure to RNS-A; +- ii) retry the assignment procedure to RNS-A, if the failure message was returned from RNS-A. This option is additional to those for normal handover; +- iii) Clear the complete call. + +The procedures for Inter-3G\_MSC UMTS to GSM handover are also applicable to the directed retry process. If an Inter-3G\_MSC UMTS to GSM handover is necessary then the assignment process should be considered to have completed successfully upon receipt of the A-HO-COMPLETE included in the MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL request. + +# 15 SDL diagrams + +NOTE 1: The message primitive names used in the SDL diagrams and message flows in the present document do not represent the actual messages specified in the GSM or 3GPP stage 3 technical specifications. The primitive names are only intended to be indicative of their use in the present document. + +SDL Annotation. + +The following conventions and abbreviations have been used in the SDLs. Text included in '[]' is used to indicate either, the BSSMAP message (as defined in 3GPP TS 49.008 [7]) included in the message, or the transport of a Handover Number. + +When traversing the following SDLs it may be possible that resources appear to be released repeatedly, however these operations are only executed once on their first occurrence. Furthermore it maybe that certain messages cannot, in practice, be received in particular states, after specific events have taken place. In general both of the above cases are obvious. This approach has been adopted (in line with other GSM Technical Specifications) in order to reduce the complexity of the SDLs and improve clarity, without reducing the quality of the functional description. + +The following abbreviations have been used in the SDLs: + +| | | +|--------------------|------------------------------------| +| A-HO-REQUEST | A-HANDOVER-REQUEST | +| A-HO-REQUEST-ACK | A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK. | +| A-HO-COMPLETE | A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE | +| A-HO-DETECT | A-HANDOVER-DETECT | +| A-HO-PERFORMED | A-HANDOVER-PERFORMED | +| A-ASG-REQUEST | A-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST | +| A-ASG-COMPLETE | A-ASSIGNMENT-COMPLETE | +| A-ASG-FAILURE | A-ASSIGNMENT-FAILURE | +| MAP-PAS req | MAP-PROCESS-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req. | +| MAP-FAS req | MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req. | +| IU-RLC-REQUEST | IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST | +| IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK | IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK | +| IU-RLC-COMPLETE | IU-RELOCATION-COMPLETE | +| IU-RLC-DETECT | IU-RELOCATION-DETECT | +| IU-IREL-REQUEST | IU-IU-RELEASE-REQUEST | +| IU-RREL-REQUEST | IU-RAB-RELEASE-REQUEST | +| IU-RASG-REQUEST | IU-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST | +| IU-RASG-RESPONSE | IU-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE | + +NOTE 2: The SDL diagrams have been checked for consistency with the allocation of the A interface circuits by the BSC. The conclusion was that SDLs are expressed in general terms, and offer a sufficient latitude of interpretation to be consistent with the allocation of A interface circuits by the BSC. + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A](da85343976fdbb19f866d9ddbdad0eae_img.jpg) + +**Procedure MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet1(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; IDLE1([IDLE]) --> CallProgress([Call in Progress on MSC-A]); CallProgress --> Decision1{ }; Decision1 -- "A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED from BSS-A" --> CallRelease[Call Release]; CallProgress -.-> Note1[From MS or Network Implicit Release of BSS-A]; Decision1 --> Decision2{Known MSC?}; Decision2 -- Yes --> Decision3{ }; Decision2 -- No --> Decision4{Handover allowed to Cell?}; Decision4 -- No --> Decision2; Decision4 -- Yes --> Decision5{Which MSC?}; Decision5 -- MSC-B --> Decision3; Decision5 -- MSC-A --> Decision6{Known BSS?}; Decision6 -- No --> Decision3; Decision6 -- Yes --> Decision7{Resources on BSS-B?}; Decision7 -- No --> Decision3; Decision7 -- Yes --> Exit2((2)); Decision3 -- Yes --> Exit1((1)); Decision3 -- No --> Decision8{Select New Cell?}; Decision8 -- Yes --> Exit3((3)); Decision8 -- No --> Decision9{Send Reject?}; Decision9 -- No --> Decision3; Decision9 -- Yes --> CallReject[A-HANDOVER-REJECT to BSS-A]; CallReject --> CallProgress2([Call in Progress on MSC-A]); CallProgress2 --> Decision3; Exit4((4)) --> IDLE2([IDLE]); +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-A. It begins with an IDLE state, transitioning to a 'Call in Progress on MSC-A' state. Upon receiving an 'A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED' message from BSS-A, the MSC-A can either release the call or proceed with handover preparation. The preparation involves checking if the target MSC is known. If not, it checks if handover is allowed to the cell. If allowed, it identifies the target MSC (MSC-B or MSC-A). For MSC-A, it checks if the BSS is known and if resources are available on BSS-B. If all conditions are met, the call is handed over (exit 2). If the target MSC is unknown, the call remains in progress on MSC-A (exit 1). If no new cell is selected, a reject message is sent to BSS-A, and the call remains in progress on MSC-A (exit 3). The procedure concludes with an IDLE state (exit 4). + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +Figure 41 (Sheet 1 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A](c21bad844b5cb6026c067a1f43ce67c3_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +Handover on MSC-A from BSS-A to BSS-B. + +Sheet2(26) + +``` +graph TD; Start((2)) --> A_HANDOVER_REQUEST[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B]; A_HANDOVER_REQUEST --> Set_T101[Set T101]; Set_T101 --> Wait_Channel_Allocation[Wait for Channel Allocation Intra-MSC]; Wait_Channel_Allocation --> A_HANDOVER_REQUEST_ACK[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK from BSS-B]; A_HANDOVER_REQUEST_ACK --> Reset_T101_1[Reset T101]; Reset_T101_1 --> Queue_Messages[Queue Messages for MS in MSC-A]; Queue_Messages --> Handover_Command[Handover Command to MS via BSS-A]; Handover_Command --> Set_Up_Handover_Device[Set Up Handover Device]; Set_Up_Handover_Device --> Set_T102[Set T102]; Set_T102 --> Wait_Access[Wait for access by MS on BSS]; A_HANDOVER_FAILURE[A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-B] --> Expiry_T101[Expiry T101]; Expiry_T101 --> Cancel_Channel[Cancel Channel in BSS-B]; Cancel_Channel --> Retry_Handover_Attempt{Retry Handover Attempt?}; Retry_Handover_Attempt -- Yes --> Cell{Cell?}; Cell -- Same Cell --> End_2((2)); Cell -- New Cell --> End_1((1)); Retry_Handover_Attempt -- No --> End_3((3)); A_CLEAR_REQUEST[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A] --> Call_Release_Network[Call Release to Network]; Call_Release_Network --> Release_Resources[Release Resources in BSS-A]; Release_Resources --> Cancel_Channel_BSS_B[Cancel Channel in BSS-B]; Cancel_Channel_BSS_B --> IDLE[IDLE]; From_MS_or_Network[From MS or Network] --> Call_Release[Call Release]; Call_Release --> Cancel_Channel_BSS_B; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-A. It begins with a connector '2' leading to the 'A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B' message. This is followed by 'Set T101' and 'Wait for Channel Allocation Intra-MSC'. The process then branches based on responses: 'A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK from BSS-B' leads to 'Reset T101', 'Queue Messages for MS in MSC-A', 'Handover Command to MS via BSS-A', 'Set Up Handover Device', 'Set T102', and 'Wait for access by MS on BSS'. 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-B' leads to 'Expiry T101', 'Cancel Channel in BSS-B', and a decision 'Retry Handover Attempt?'. If 'Yes', it checks 'Cell?'; 'Same Cell' leads to connector '2', 'New Cell' leads to connector '1'. If 'No', it leads to connector '3'. 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A' leads to 'Call Release to Network', 'Release Resources in BSS-A', 'Cancel Channel in BSS-B', and 'IDLE'. 'From MS or Network' leads to 'Call Release', which also leads to 'Cancel Channel in BSS-B' and 'IDLE'. + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +Figure 41 (Sheet 2 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A](b50f38be091844d58b11e3d47bc71e73_img.jpg) + +Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet3(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for access by MS on BSS]) --> Join1(( )); Start --> Join2(( )); AHC[A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B] --> Join1; AHD[A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B] --> Join2; Join1 --> CHD1[Connect the Handover Device (Option)]; CHD1 -.-> Note1[Only if not already connected]; CHD1 --> Reset[Reset T102]; Reset --> Release[Release Resources in BSS-A]; Release --> Forward[Forward queued messages for MS via BSS-B]; Forward --> End1([Call in Progress on MSC-A]); Join2 --> CHD2[Connect the Handover Device (Option)]; CHD2 --> End2([Wait for access by MS on BSS]); +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-A. It begins with a common state: 'Wait for access by MS on BSS'. From this state, two distinct paths emerge based on the type of handover message received from BSS-B. The first path, triggered by 'A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B', involves connecting the handover device (optional, only if not already connected), resetting timer T102, releasing resources in BSS-A, and forwarding queued messages for the MS via BSS-B, leading to 'Call in Progress on MSC-A'. The second path, triggered by 'A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B', involves connecting the handover device (optional) and returning to the initial state of 'Wait for access by MS on BSS'. + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +Figure 41 (Sheet 3 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Handover control procedure in MSC-A flowchart](72d448a65347c51989171748789c7d4b_img.jpg) + +**Procedure** Sheet4(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for access by MS on BSS]) --> Decision1{ }; Decision1 --> A_FAILURE[A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A]; Decision1 --> A_CLEAR_A[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A]; Decision1 --> Allowed1{(Allowed once in this state)}; Decision1 --> T102_Exp[Expiry T102]; Decision1 --> Call_Release[Call Release]; Call_Release --> From_Net[From Network]; A_FAILURE --> Reset_T102_1[Reset T102]; Reset_T102_1 --> Forward[Forward queued messages for MS via BSS-A]; Forward --> Release_BSSB_1[Release Resources in BSS-B]; Release_BSSB_1 --> Release_HD_1[Release Handover Device]; Release_HD_1 --> Call_Prog[Call in Progress on MSC-A]; A_CLEAR_A --> Allowed2{(Allowed once in this state)}; Allowed2 --> A_CLEAR_B[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B]; A_CLEAR_B --> Release_BSSA_1[Release Resources in BSS-A]; Release_BSSA_1 --> Wait_BSSB{Wait for MS on BSS-B?}; Wait_BSSB -- Yes --> Release_BSSB_2[Release Resources in BSS-B]; Wait_BSSB -- No --> Reset_T102_2[Reset T102]; Reset_T102_2 --> Release_BSSB_2; Release_BSSB_2 --> Call_Release_2[Call Release]; Call_Release_2 --> To_Net[to Network]; Call_Release_2 --> Release_HD_2[Release Handover Device]; Release_HD_2 --> IDLE([IDLE]); T102_Exp --> Release_BSSA_2[Release Resources in BSS-A]; Release_BSSA_2 --> Release_HD_3[Release Handover Device]; Release_HD_3 --> Wait_BSS_2([Wait for access by MS on BSS]); +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-A. It begins with a state 'Wait for access by MS on BSS'. From this state, five possible events can occur: 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A', 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A', an internal condition '(Allowed once in this state)', 'Expiry T102', or 'Call Release' (triggered 'From Network'). + +1. 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A' leads to 'Reset T102', then 'Forward queued messages for MS via BSS-A', then 'Release Resources in BSS-B', then 'Release Handover Device', ending in 'Call in Progress on MSC-A'. + +2. 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A' leads to '(Allowed once in this state)'. If allowed, it leads to 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B', then 'Release Resources in BSS-A', then 'Wait for MS on BSS-B?'. If 'Yes', it leads to 'Release Resources in BSS-B', then 'Call Release' (to Network), then 'Release Handover Device', ending in 'IDLE'. If 'No', it leads to 'Reset T102', then 'Release Resources in BSS-B', then 'Call Release' (to Network), then 'Release Handover Device', ending in 'IDLE'. + +3. 'Expiry T102' leads to 'Release Resources in BSS-A', then 'Release Handover Device', ending in 'Wait for access by MS on BSS'. + +4. 'Call Release' (From Network) leads to 'Release Handover Device', ending in 'Wait for access by MS on BSS'. + +Handover control procedure in MSC-A flowchart + +Figure 41 (Sheet 4 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A. The process starts at node 4, sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. to MSC-B, and waits for an acknowledgment. It then branches based on the response: ACK leads to a 'Handover Number?' decision; FAILURE leads to a 'Retry Handover Attempt?' decision; MAP ERROR leads to an error handling path. The 'Handover Number?' decision leads to either 'I_CONNECT (IAM) to MSC-B using Handover Number' and then 'Wait for Connection from MSC-B' (ending at node 7), or to node 7 directly. The 'Retry Handover Attempt?' decision leads to a 'Cell?' decision if 'Yes', which then branches to node 1 ('New Cell') or node 4 ('Same Cell'). If 'No' to 'Retry', it leads to node 3.](3ec35c497a0765a1a885c85f214b1bef_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet5(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +Basic Handover to MSC-B +Circuit Connection required + +``` +graph TD; Start((4)) --> SendReq[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] to MSC-B]; SendReq --> WaitAck((Wait For Acknowledgement from MSC-B)); WaitAck --> Decision1{ }; Decision1 -- "MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] from MSC-B" --> Decision2{Handover Number?}; Decision2 -- "Not Requested" --> End7((7)); Decision2 -- "Requested" --> SendIAM[> I_CONNECT (IAM) to MSC-B using Handover Number]; SendIAM --> WaitConn((Wait for Connection from MSC-B)); WaitConn --> End7; Decision1 -- "MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] from MSC-B" --> Decision3{Retry Handover Attempt?}; Decision3 -- "Yes" --> Decision4{Cell?}; Decision4 -- "New Cell" --> End1((1)); Decision4 -- "Same Cell" --> End4((4)); Decision3 -- "No" --> End3((3)); Decision1 -- "MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] from MSC-B" --> ErrorPath[>]; +``` + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A. The process starts at node 4, sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. to MSC-B, and waits for an acknowledgment. It then branches based on the response: ACK leads to a 'Handover Number?' decision; FAILURE leads to a 'Retry Handover Attempt?' decision; MAP ERROR leads to an error handling path. The 'Handover Number?' decision leads to either 'I\_CONNECT (IAM) to MSC-B using Handover Number' and then 'Wait for Connection from MSC-B' (ending at node 7), or to node 7 directly. The 'Retry Handover Attempt?' decision leads to a 'Cell?' decision if 'Yes', which then branches to node 1 ('New Cell') or node 4 ('Same Cell'). If 'No' to 'Retry', it leads to node 3. + +Figure 41 (Sheet 5 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A](24ee23a8f3995ecfd3aae31a37a1d40c_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +Sheet6(26) + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait For Acknowledgement from MSC-B]) --> ERROR{ERROR}; ERROR -- "from MSC-B" --> CancelMAP[Cancel MAP Resources]; CancelMAP -- "In MSC-A" --> Retry{Retry Handover Attempt?}; Retry -- Yes --> Cell{Cell?}; Cell -- New Cell --> 1((1)); Cell -- Same Cell --> 4((4)); Retry -- No --> 3((3)); Start --> A_CLEAR[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A]; A_CLEAR --> CallRelease1[Call Release]; CallRelease1 -- "to Network" --> CallRelease2[Call Release]; Start --> CallRelease3[Call Release]; CallRelease3 -- "From MS or Network" --> ReleaseBSS[Release Resources in BSS-A]; ReleaseBSS --> CancelMAPB[Cancel MAP Resources]; CancelMAPB -- "to MSC-B" --> IDLE([IDLE]); +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-A. It begins with a 'Wait For Acknowledgement from MSC-B' state. From here, three main paths emerge: an 'ERROR' path from MSC-B leading to 'Cancel MAP Resources' in MSC-A and then to a 'Retry Handover Attempt?' decision; an 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A' path leading to a 'Call Release' to the Network; and a direct 'Call Release' path from the initial state. The 'Call Release' to the Network leads to another 'Call Release' step, which then leads to 'Release Resources in BSS-A', 'Cancel MAP Resources' to MSC-B, and finally the 'IDLE' state. The 'ERROR' path from MSC-B leads to 'Cancel MAP Resources' in MSC-A, which then leads to a 'Retry Handover Attempt?' decision. If 'Yes', it leads to a 'Cell?' decision. If 'New Cell', it leads to connector 1. If 'Same Cell', it leads to connector 4. If 'No' (from the 'Retry Handover Attempt?' decision), it leads to connector 3. + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +Figure 41 (Sheet 6 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure MSC_A_HO showing various states and transitions for a handover control procedure in MSC-A.](b13465efdac63129aef9b6f1787d0d00_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet7(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Connection from MSC-B]) --> Join(( )); Join --> I_COMPLETE[> I_COMPLETE (ACM) from MSC-B]; Join --> A_CLEAR_REQUEST[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A]; Join --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B]; A_CLEAR_REQUEST --> AllowedOnce1{Allowed once in this state}; AllowedOnce1 --> FromMS[From MS or Network]; FromMS --> CallRelease1[Call Release]; CallRelease1 --> CallRelease2[Call Release to MS and Network]; CallRelease2 --> ReleaseResources[Release Resources in BSS-A]; MAP_PAS --> AllowedOnce2{Allowed once in this state}; AllowedOnce2 --> WaitConnection2([Wait for Connection from MSC-B]); WaitConnection2 --> ERROR{ERROR}; ERROR --> FromMSCB[from MSC-B or Network]; ERROR --> I_DISCONNECT[> I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B]; I_DISCONNECT --> RetryAttempt{Retry Handover Attempt?}; RetryAttempt -- No --> CancelMAP[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelMAP --> ToMSCB[> to MSC-B in MSC-A]; ToMSCB --> I_DISCONNECT2[> I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B]; I_DISCONNECT2 --> IDLE([IDLE]); RetryAttempt -- Yes --> SameCell{Same Cell?}; SameCell -- Same Cell --> 4((4)); SameCell -- New Cell --> 1((1)); SameCell --> 3((3)); I_COMPLETE --> QueueMessages[Queue Messages for MS in MSC-A]; QueueMessages --> HandoverCommand[> Handover Command to MS via BSS-A]; HandoverCommand --> SetT103[Set T103]; SetT103 --> SetupDevice[> Set Up the Handover Device]; SetupDevice --> InternalMessage[Internal message in MSC-A]; InternalMessage --> WaitCompletion([Wait for Completion on MSC-B]); +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-A. It begins with a state 'Wait for Connection from MSC-B'. From this state, three main paths emerge: 1) Receiving 'I\_COMPLETE (ACM) from MSC-B' leads to a junction point. 2) Receiving 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A' leads to a decision 'Allowed once in this state'. If 'From MS or Network', it leads to 'Call Release', which then leads to another 'Call Release' (to MS and Network), which then leads to 'Release Resources in BSS-A'. 3) Receiving 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B' leads to another decision 'Allowed once in this state', which leads to 'Wait for Connection from MSC-B', which then leads to an 'ERROR' state. The 'ERROR' state can lead to 'from MSC-B or Network' or to 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B'. The 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B' leads to a decision 'Retry Handover Attempt?'. If 'No', it leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures', which leads to '> to MSC-B in MSC-A', which leads to 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', which then leads to 'IDLE'. If 'Yes', it leads to a decision 'Same Cell?'. If 'Same Cell', it leads to connector '4'. If 'New Cell', it leads to connector '1'. Otherwise, it leads to connector '3'. The 'I\_COMPLETE (ACM) from MSC-B' path leads to a junction point that also receives the 'MAP-PAS req.' path. From this junction, it leads to 'Queue Messages for MS in MSC-A', which leads to '> Handover Command to MS via BSS-A', which leads to 'Set T103', which leads to '> Set Up the Handover Device', which leads to 'Internal message in MSC-A', which leads to 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B'. + +Flowchart of Procedure MSC\_A\_HO showing various states and transitions for a handover control procedure in MSC-A. + +Figure 41 (Sheet 7 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B', leading to a merge point. From the merge point, it branches into three main paths: 1) MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] from MSC-B, followed by 'Reset T103', 'Connect Handover Device (option)', 'Forward queued messages via MSC-B', 'Release Resources on BSS-A', and ending at 'Call on MSC-B'. 2) I-ANSWER (ANM) from MSC-B, followed by a merge point, then 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from BSS-B', a decision '(Allowed once in this state)', 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A', 'Release Resources on BSS-A', a decision 'Yes Wait for MS on MSC-B?', 'Call Release' to Network and MS, 'Release MAP Resources' to MSC-B in MSC-A, a merge point, 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', and ending at 'IDLE'. 3) MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from MSC-B, leading to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' and ending at 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B'. There is also a 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B' block between the first and second paths, and a decision '(Allowed once in this state)' between the first and second paths.](684f7a2cd4ba3346bcaec1f7336f6aa3_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +Sheet8(26) + +``` +graph TD + Start([Wait for Completion on MSC-B]) --> Merge1(( )) + Merge1 --> T103[Reset T103] + Merge1 --> Wait1([Wait for Completion on MSC-B]) + Merge1 --> Merge2(( )) + T103 --> CHD1[Connect Handover Device option] + CHD1 --> FQM[Forward queued messages via MSC-B] + FQM --> RR1[Release Resources on BSS-A] + RR1 --> COM1([Call on MSC-B]) + Merge2 --> MAP_PAS_Req[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from BSS-B] + MAP_PAS_Req --> Allowed1{Allowed once in this state} + Allowed1 --> A_CLEAR_Req[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A] + A_CLEAR_Req --> RR2[Release Resources on BSS-A] + RR2 --> WaitMS{Yes Wait for MS on MSC-B?} + WaitMS -- No --> CallRelease[Call Release] + CallRelease --> NetMS[to Network and MS] + WaitMS -- Yes --> Merge3(( )) + Merge3 --> RR3[Release MAP Resources] + RR3 --> MSCB[to MSC-B in MSC-A] + RR3 --> Merge4(( )) + Merge4 --> I_DISCONNECT[I_DISCONNECT REL to MSC-B] + I_DISCONNECT --> IDLE([IDLE]) + Merge2 --> MAP_PAS_Detect[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from MSC-B] + MAP_PAS_Detect --> CHD2[Connect Handover Device option] + CHD2 --> COM2([Wait for Completion on MSC-B]) +``` + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B', leading to a merge point. From the merge point, it branches into three main paths: 1) MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] from MSC-B, followed by 'Reset T103', 'Connect Handover Device (option)', 'Forward queued messages via MSC-B', 'Release Resources on BSS-A', and ending at 'Call on MSC-B'. 2) I-ANSWER (ANM) from MSC-B, followed by a merge point, then 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from BSS-B', a decision '(Allowed once in this state)', 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A', 'Release Resources on BSS-A', a decision 'Yes Wait for MS on MSC-B?', 'Call Release' to Network and MS, 'Release MAP Resources' to MSC-B in MSC-A, a merge point, 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', and ending at 'IDLE'. 3) MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from MSC-B, leading to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' and ending at 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B'. There is also a 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B' block between the first and second paths, and a decision '(Allowed once in this state)' between the first and second paths. + +Figure 41 (Sheet 8 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A](921f8fa0f7ce2c9956f20d33162c13a2_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +Sheet9(26) + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-A. It begins with a 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B' state. From here, four main paths emerge based on specific triggers: + +- A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A:** This path leads to a sequence of actions: 'Reset T103', 'Forward queued messages for MS via BSS-A', and 'Release Handover Device'. It then branches based on context: 'in MSC-A to MSC-B' leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures', and 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B' leads to another 'Cancel MAP Procedures' block. Both branches converge to the 'Call in Progress on MSC-A' state. +- Internal/From MSC-B Triggers:** This path includes 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (leading to 'In MSC-A and to MSC-B'), 'Release Handover Device' (leading to 'Internal to MSC-A'), and 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B'. These lead to a junction point, followed by 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (from MSC-B), 'Release Handover Device', and another 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B' block. This sequence concludes with 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B'. +- Expiry T103:** This trigger leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (to 'In MSC-A and to MSC-B'), 'Release Handover Device' (to 'Internal to MSC-A'), and 'Release Resources BSS-A', all of which lead to the 'IDLE' state. +- Call Release from Network:** This path leads to 'Release Handover Device' (to 'Internal to MSC-A') and 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B'. + +There are also several intermediate junction points (represented by empty pentagonal shapes) that merge different signal paths throughout the procedure. + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +Figure 41 (Sheet 9 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart for Procedure MSC_A_HO (Procedure for Handover in MSC-A). The process starts with 'Call on MSC-B' and proceeds through various decision points: 'Known MSC?', 'Handover allowed to Cell?', 'Which MSC?' (MSC-B' or MSC-A), 'Known BSS?', and 'Resources on new BSS?'. It includes message exchanges like 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req.', 'MAP-PAS req.', 'A-HANDOVER-REQUEST', and 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp.'. The final states are 'Wait for Channel Allocation', 'MS on MSC-B', 'Call on MSC-B', and 'IDLE'.](536768a30136cd5c2d57f46c25d1d804_img.jpg) + +Procedure MSC\_A\_HO +Sheet10(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +``` + +graph TD + Start([Call on MSC-B]) --> Join1(( )) + Join1 --> Decision1{Known MSC?} + Decision1 -- No --> CallRelease1[Call Release] + CallRelease1 --> FromMS[From MS or Network] + Decision1 -- Yes --> Decision2{Handover allowed to Cell?} + Decision2 -- No --> CallRelease2[Call Release] + CallRelease2 --> FromMSCB[from MSC-B] + Decision2 -- Yes --> Decision3{Which MSC?} + Decision3 -- MSC-B' --> Join2(( )) + Decision3 -- MSC-A --> Decision4{Known BSS?} + Decision4 -- No --> CallRelease3[Call Release] + CallRelease3 --> ToNetworkMS[to Network and MS] + Decision4 -- Yes --> Decision5{Resources on new BSS?} + Decision5 -- No --> CallRelease4[Call Release] + CallRelease4 --> ToNetworkMS + Decision5 -- Yes --> AHOReq[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B] + AHOReq --> MAPPrepSubSeqReq[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] from MSC-B] + MAPPrepSubSeqReq --> Decision6{Circuit Connection?} + Decision6 -- No --> MSonMSCB([MS on MSC-B]) + Decision6 -- Yes --> CallonMSCB([Call on MSC-B]) + MAPPrepSubSeqReq --> MAPPrepSubSeqResp[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-B] + MAPPrepSubSeqResp --> SetT101[Set T101] + SetT101 --> WaitChannelAlloc([Wait for Channel Allocation]) + MAPPrepSubSeqReq --> MAPPASReq[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B] + MAPPASReq --> CallRelease5[Call Release] + CallRelease5 --> IDLE([IDLE]) + MAPPrepSubSeqReq --> MAPSendEndSignal[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B] + MAPSendEndSignal --> IDLE + MAPPrepSubSeqReq --> CancelMAP[Cancel MAP procedures] + CancelMAP --> FromMSCB + MAPPrepSubSeqReq --> CallRelease6[Call Release] + CallRelease6 --> ToNetworkMS + MAPPrepSubSeqReq --> IDISCONNECT[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B] + IDISCONNECT --> IDLE + MAPPrepSubSeqReq --> MAPPrepSubSeqResp2[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] to MSC-B] + MAPPrepSubSeqResp2 --> IDLE + +``` + +Flowchart for Procedure MSC\_A\_HO (Procedure for Handover in MSC-A). The process starts with 'Call on MSC-B' and proceeds through various decision points: 'Known MSC?', 'Handover allowed to Cell?', 'Which MSC?' (MSC-B' or MSC-A), 'Known BSS?', and 'Resources on new BSS?'. It includes message exchanges like 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req.', 'MAP-PAS req.', 'A-HANDOVER-REQUEST', and 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp.'. The final states are 'Wait for Channel Allocation', 'MS on MSC-B', 'Call on MSC-B', and 'IDLE'. + +**Figure 41 (Sheet 10 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A** + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A](245166735676c675f98f535bc4c6f0a1_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +Sheet11(26) + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Channel Allocation]) --> A_HO_REQ_ACK[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK. from BSS-B]; Start --> A_HO_FAILURE[A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-B]; Start --> T101_Exp{Expiry T101}; Start --> Call_Release[Call Release]; A_HO_REQ_ACK --> Reset_T101_1[Reset T101]; A_HO_FAILURE --> Reset_T101_2[Reset T101]; Call_Release --> Cancel_Channel[Cancel Channel BSS-B]; Reset_T101_1 --> Queue_Messages[Queue Messages for MS in MSC-A]; Queue_Messages --> MAP_PREPARE_SUB[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to MSC-B]; MAP_PREPARE_SUB --> Circuit_Conn{Circuit Connection?}; Circuit_Conn -- No --> Start; Circuit_Conn -- Yes --> Set_Up_HO[Set Up Handover Device]; Set_Up_HO --> Set_T104[Set T104]; Set_T104 --> Wait_MS[Wait for Access by MS]; Set_T104 --> MAP_PREPARE_SUB_RESP[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-B]; MAP_PREPARE_SUB_RESP --> Call_MSC_B_1([Call on MSC-B]); Reset_T101_2 --> Allowed{Allowed once in this state}; Allowed -- Yes --> MAP_PAS_REQ[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B]; MAP_PAS_REQ --> Release_Resources_1[Release Resources in BSS-B]; Release_Resources_1 --> Call_MSC_B_2([Call on MSC-B]); T101_Exp --> Release_Resources_2[Release Resources in BSS-B]; Release_Resources_2 --> Retry_Same_Cell{Retry Same Cell?}; Retry_Same_Cell -- No --> Call_MSC_B_3([Call on MSC-B]); Retry_Same_Cell -- Yes --> 6((6)); Cancel_Channel --> MAP_SEND_END[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp to MSC-B]; MAP_SEND_END --> I_DISCONNECT[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B]; I_DISCONNECT --> IDLE([IDLE]); +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-A. It begins with a 'Wait for Channel Allocation' state. From here, three main paths emerge: 1) Receipt of an 'A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK. from BSS-B', which leads to 'Reset T101', then 'Queue Messages for MS in MSC-A', and then 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to MSC-B'. 2) Receipt of an 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-B', which leads to 'Reset T101', then a decision '(Allowed once in this state)'. If 'Yes', it sends 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B' and 'Release Resources in BSS-B', resulting in 'Call on MSC-B'. 3) An 'Expiry T101' event, which leads to 'Release Resources in BSS-B', then a decision 'Retry Same Cell?'. If 'No', it results in 'Call on MSC-B'; if 'Yes', it leads to connector '6'. A 'Call Release' from the 'MS or Network' leads to 'Cancel Channel BSS-B', 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp to MSC-B', 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', and finally 'IDLE'. From 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to MSC-B', a 'Circuit Connection?' decision follows. If 'No', it loops back to 'Wait for Channel Allocation'. If 'Yes', it proceeds to 'Set Up Handover Device', 'Set T104', and 'Wait for Access by MS'. From 'Set T104', it also sends 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-B', which results in 'Call on MSC-B'. + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +Figure 41 (Sheet 11 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A](92724c769da9d46b730fde1a6dccb023_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +Sheet12(26) + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for access by MS]) --> A_COMPLETE[A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B]; Start --> A_DETECT[A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B]; Start --> T104_Exp[Expiry T104]; A_COMPLETE --> Reset[Reset T104]; Reset --> ConnectDev1[Connect Handover Device option]; ConnectDev1 --> ForwardMsg[Forward queued messages for MS via BSS-B]; ForwardMsg --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B]; MAP_SEND --> ConnCheck1{Circuit Connection?}; ConnCheck1 -- No --> Start; ConnCheck1 -- Yes --> ReleaseDev1[Release Handover Device]; ReleaseDev1 --> I_DISCONNECT1[I_DISCONNECT REL to MSC-B]; I_DISCONNECT1 --> CallProg[Call in Progress on MSC-A]; A_DETECT --> ConnCheck2{Circuit Connection?}; ConnCheck2 -- No --> Start; ConnCheck2 -- Yes --> ConnectDev2[Connect Handover Device option]; ConnectDev2 --> CallProg; T104_Exp --> CallRelease[Call Release to Network]; CallRelease --> ReleaseRes[Release Resources on BSS-B]; ReleaseRes --> CancelMAP[Cancel MAP Procedures in MSC-A to MSC-B]; CancelMAP --> I_DISCONNECT2[I_DISCONNECT REL to MSC-B]; I_DISCONNECT2 --> Idle([IDLE]); +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-A. It begins with a 'Wait for access by MS' state. From here, three main paths emerge: 1) Upon receiving 'A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B', the 'T104' timer is reset, the handover device is connected (optional), queued messages are forwarded via BSS-B, and an 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL' response is sent to MSC-B. A 'Circuit Connection?' check follows; if 'No', it returns to the initial wait state; if 'Yes', the handover device is released, an 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL)' message is sent to MSC-B, and the call proceeds in progress on MSC-A. 2) Upon receiving 'A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B', a 'Circuit Connection?' check is performed; if 'No', it returns to the initial wait state; if 'Yes', the handover device is connected (optional), and the call proceeds in progress on MSC-A. 3) Upon 'Expiry T104', a 'Call Release' is sent to the network, resources are released on BSS-B, MAP procedures are cancelled in MSC-A to MSC-B, an 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL)' message is sent to MSC-B, and the state becomes 'IDLE'. + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +Figure 41 (Sheet 12 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure MSC_A_HO for handover control in MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for access by MS'. It branches based on incoming requests: 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from MSC-B' (leading to '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'Cancel MAP Procedures' -> 'Call Release'), 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B' (leading to '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'Call Release'), and 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B' (leading to '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'Call Release'). A 'from Network' dashed box also points to 'Call Release'. Another path involves 'Forward queued messages via MSC-B' -> 'Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.' -> 'Release Resources on BSS-B'. From there, a decision 'Circuit Connection?' is made. If 'Yes', it proceeds to 'Release Handover Device' -> 'Call on MSC-B'. If 'No', it proceeds to 'MS on MSC-B'. All terminal states ('Call on MSC-B', 'MS on MSC-B', and 'Wait for access by MS') lead to a common bottom line.](db7a693cf26f527ac6c0d4d41da20858_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet13(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for access by MS]) --> J1(( )); J1 --> MAP_HO_FAILURE[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from MSC-B]; J1 --> MAP_CLEAR_REQUEST[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B]; J1 --> A_CLEAR_REQUEST[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B]; J1 --> Forward[Forward queued messages via MSC-B]; J1 --> Call_Release[Call Release]; MAP_HO_FAILURE --> Allowed1{(Allowed once in this state)}; Allowed1 --> Cancel[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel --> Call_Release; MAP_CLEAR_REQUEST --> Allowed2{(Allowed once in this state)}; Allowed2 --> Call_Release; A_CLEAR_REQUEST --> Allowed3{(Allowed once in this state)}; Allowed3 --> Call_Release; Network[from Network] -.-> Call_Release; Forward --> ForwardReq[Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.]; ForwardReq --> Release_Resources[Release Resources on BSS-B]; Release_Resources --> Circuit_Connection{Circuit Connection?}; Circuit_Connection -- Yes --> Release_Device[Release Handover Device]; Release_Device --> Call_MSC_B[Call on MSC-B]; Circuit_Connection -- No --> MS_MSC_B[MS on MSC-B]; Call_MSC_B --> BottomLine(( )); MS_MSC_B --> BottomLine; Call_Release --> BottomLine; BottomLine --> End([Wait for access by MS]) +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure MSC\_A\_HO for handover control in MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for access by MS'. It branches based on incoming requests: 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from MSC-B' (leading to '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'Cancel MAP Procedures' -> 'Call Release'), 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B' (leading to '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'Call Release'), and 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B' (leading to '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'Call Release'). A 'from Network' dashed box also points to 'Call Release'. Another path involves 'Forward queued messages via MSC-B' -> 'Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.' -> 'Release Resources on BSS-B'. From there, a decision 'Circuit Connection?' is made. If 'Yes', it proceeds to 'Release Handover Device' -> 'Call on MSC-B'. If 'No', it proceeds to 'MS on MSC-B'. All terminal states ('Call on MSC-B', 'MS on MSC-B', and 'Wait for access by MS') lead to a common bottom line. + +Figure 41 (Sheet 13 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A. It starts at connector 5, sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req to MSC-B', waits for an ack, then branches based on response: 'Not Requested' leads to connector 9, 'Requested' leads to I-CONNECT (IAM) and then waiting for connection, and 'Retry Same Cell?' (for failures) leads to either 'Call on MSC-B' (if No) or back to connector 5 (if Yes).](8faeb7db381e28ab1ba06e9f48c19c6e_img.jpg) + +**Procedure MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet14(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +Subsequent Handover from MSC-B to MSC-B' +Circuit Connection required + +``` +graph TD; Start((5)) --> SendReq[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req [A-HO-REQUEST] to MSC-B']; SendReq --> WaitAck{Wait for Ack from MSC-B'}; WaitAck --> Success{MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] from MSC-B'}; Success --> HandoverNumber{Handover Number?}; HandoverNumber -- Not Requested --> End9((9)); HandoverNumber -- Requested --> IAM[I-CONNECT (IAM) to MSC-B' using Handover Number]; IAM --> WaitConn{Wait for Connection from MSC-B'}; Success --> Failure{MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] from MSC-B'}; Failure --> RetrySameCell{Retry Same Cell?}; RetrySameCell -- No --> Subsequent[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-B]; Subsequent --> CallOnMSCB{Call on MSC-B}; RetrySameCell -- Yes --> End5((5)); +``` + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A. It starts at connector 5, sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req to MSC-B', waits for an ack, then branches based on response: 'Not Requested' leads to connector 9, 'Requested' leads to I-CONNECT (IAM) and then waiting for connection, and 'Retry Same Cell?' (for failures) leads to either 'Call on MSC-B' (if No) or back to connector 5 (if Yes). + +**Figure 41 (Sheet 14 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A** + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Ack from MSC-B\''. It branches based on inputs: 'ERROR from MSC-B\'', 'from MSC-B or Network', and 'Call Release From MS or Network'. The 'ERROR from MSC-B\'' path leads to 'Release MAP Resources to MSC-B\'' and then to a 'Retry Same Cell?' decision. The 'from MSC-B or Network' path leads to an 'ERROR' block and then to 'Cancel MAP Procedures to MSC-B\'' and 'Wait for Ack from MSC-B\'' (connector 5). The 'Call Release' path leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures to MSC-B\'' and then to 'Release Handover Device', 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B', and 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', ending in 'IDLE'. The 'Retry Same Cell?' decision leads to 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. to MSC-B' (No) or connector '5' (Yes).](9958beca8f65818eb0ff893647af94de_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet15(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Ack from MSC-B']) --> J1(( )); J1 --> ERROR1{{ERROR}}; J1 --> FROM_B[from MSC-B or Network]; J1 --> CALL_RELEASE[Call Release]; ERROR1 --> FROM_B1[from MSC-B']; FROM_B --> ERROR2{{ERROR}}; CALL_RELEASE --> FROM_MS[From MS or Network]; ERROR2 --> CALL_RELEASE; ERROR1 --> RELEASE_MAP[Release MAP Resources]; RELEASE_MAP --> TO_B1[to MSC-B']; RELEASE_MAP --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B]; MAP_PAS --> J2(( )); J2 --> RETRY[Retry Same Cell?]; RETRY -- No --> PREPARE[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. to MSC-B]; PREPARE --> ERROR3{{ERROR}}; ERROR3 --> CALL_B([Call on MSC-B]); RETRY -- Yes --> J3((5)); J3 --> WAIT_ACK[Wait for Ack from MSC-B']; ERROR2 --> CANCEL_MAP[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CANCEL_MAP --> TO_B2[to MSC-B']; CANCEL_MAP --> J3; CALL_RELEASE --> CANCEL_MAP2[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CANCEL_MAP2 --> TO_B3[to MSC-B']; CANCEL_MAP2 --> RELEASE_DEVICE[Release Handover Device]; RELEASE_DEVICE --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B]; MAP_SEND --> I_DISCONNECT[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B]; I_DISCONNECT --> IDLE([IDLE]) +``` + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Ack from MSC-B\''. It branches based on inputs: 'ERROR from MSC-B\'', 'from MSC-B or Network', and 'Call Release From MS or Network'. The 'ERROR from MSC-B\'' path leads to 'Release MAP Resources to MSC-B\'' and then to a 'Retry Same Cell?' decision. The 'from MSC-B or Network' path leads to an 'ERROR' block and then to 'Cancel MAP Procedures to MSC-B\'' and 'Wait for Ack from MSC-B\'' (connector 5). The 'Call Release' path leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures to MSC-B\'' and then to 'Release Handover Device', 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B', and 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', ending in 'IDLE'. The 'Retry Same Cell?' decision leads to 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. to MSC-B' (No) or connector '5' (Yes). + +Figure 41 (Sheet 15 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![SDL diagram for Procedure MSC_A_HO showing handover control in MSC-A. It includes states like 'Wait for Connection from MSC-B'', 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B'', and 'IDLE'. It details message flows including MAP-PAS, I_COMPLETE, and I_DISCONNECT between MSC-A, MSC-B, and the Network/MS.](fa1eb5ed4fcf8f8d184ead2a8a5a08e6_img.jpg) + +Procedure MSC\_A\_HOSheet16(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +``` + +stateDiagram-v2 + state "Wait for Connection\nfrom MSC-B'" as S1 + state "Wait for Connection\nfrom MSC-B'" as S2 + state "Wait for Completion\non MSC-B'" as S3 + state "IDLE" as S4 + state "Call on\nMSC-B" as S5 + + [*] --> S1 + + S1 --> I_COMPLETE : I_COMPLETE (ACM) from MSC-B' or Network + I_COMPLETE --> SetUp : Set up Handover Device + SetUp --> Queue : Queue messages for MS in MSC-A + Queue --> SetT103 : Set T103 + SetT103 --> S3 + + S1 --> MAP_PAS_B_prime : MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B' + MAP_PAS_B_prime --> AllowedOnce : (Allowed once in this state) + AllowedOnce --> S2 + S2 --> MAP_PREP_RESP : MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to MSC-B + MAP_PREP_RESP --> CancelMAP : Cancel MAP Procedures to MSC-B' + CancelMAP --> I_DISC_B_prime : I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B' + I_DISC_B_prime --> Retry : Retry to MSC-B'? + Retry --> 5 : Yes + Retry --> ERROR : No + ERROR --> MAP_PREP_RESP_B : MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. to MSC-B + MAP_PREP_RESP_B --> S5 + + S1 --> ERROR_STATE : ERROR + ERROR_STATE --> MAP_PREP_RESP + + S1 --> MS_Network : from MS or Network + MS_Network --> MAP_PAS_B : MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B + MAP_PAS_B --> CancelMAP_B : Cancel MAP Procedures to MSC-B' + CancelMAP_B --> I_DISC_B : I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B + I_DISC_B --> S4 + + S1 --> CallRelease : Call Release + CallRelease --> CancelMAP_BB : Cancel MAP Procedures to MSC-B and MSC-B' + CancelMAP_BB --> MAP_SEND : MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B + MAP_SEND --> CallRelease_Net : Call Release to Network and MS + CallRelease_Net --> I_DISC_BB : I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B and MSC-B' + I_DISC_BB --> S4 + +``` + +SDL diagram for Procedure MSC\_A\_HO showing handover control in MSC-A. It includes states like 'Wait for Connection from MSC-B'', 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B'', and 'IDLE'. It details message flows including MAP-PAS, I\_COMPLETE, and I\_DISCONNECT between MSC-A, MSC-B, and the Network/MS. + +**Figure 41 (Sheet 16 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A** + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A](3334fcca5dac808f4fd3840aba35bc2e_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +Sheet17(26) + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Completion on MSC-B']) --> Join(( )); Join --> MAP_SEND_END_SIGNAL[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] from MSC-B']; MAP_SEND_END_SIGNAL --> Reset_T103[Reset T103]; Reset_T103 --> I_ANSWER[ I_ANSWER (ANM) from MSC-B']; I_ANSWER --> Connect_HD1[Connect Handover Device (option)]; Connect_HD1 --> Forward[Forward queued messages for MS via MSC-B']; Forward --> Use_MAP_FORWARD[Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.]; Use_MAP_FORWARD --> MAP_SEND_END_RESP[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B]; MAP_SEND_END_RESP --> I_DISCONNECT[ I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B]; I_DISCONNECT --> Redefine[Redfine MSC-B' as MSC-B]; Redefine --> Call_MSC_B[Call on MSC-B]; Redefine --> Join; Join --> MAP_PAS_A_HO[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from MSC-B']; MAP_PAS_A_HO --> MAP_PAS_A_CLEAR[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B']; MAP_PAS_A_CLEAR --> Allowed1{Allowed once in this state}; Allowed1 --> Wait_Access{Wait for access by MS?}; Wait_Access -- No --> Release[Release Handover Device]; Release --> Cancel[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel --> Call_Release[Call Release]; Call_Release --> I_DISCONNECT_REL[ I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B and MSC-B']; I_DISCONNECT_REL --> IDLE([IDLE]); Allowed1 --> Allowed2{Allowed once in this state}; Allowed2 --> Connect_HD2[Connect Handover Device (option)]; Connect_HD2 --> Wait_Completion[Wait for Completion from MSC-B']; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-A. It begins with a 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B'' state, leading to a junction point. From this junction, one path involves sending a 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] from MSC-B'', followed by 'Reset T103', ' I\_ANSWER (ANM) from MSC-B'', and 'Connect Handover Device (option)'. This leads to 'Forward queued messages for MS via MSC-B'' and 'Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.'. The next steps are 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B', ' I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', and 'Redfine MSC-B' as MSC-B'. From 'Redfine MSC-B' as MSC-B', the flow goes to 'Call on MSC-B' and back to the junction. Another path from the junction involves 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from MSC-B'' and 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B''. This leads to a decision 'Allowed once in this state'. If 'No', it goes to 'Wait for access by MS?', then 'Release Handover Device', 'Cancel MAP Procedures', 'Call Release', ' I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B and MSC-B'', and finally 'IDLE'. If 'Allowed once in this state' is 'Yes', it goes to another decision 'Allowed once in this state', which leads to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' and then 'Wait for Completion from MSC-B''. + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +Figure 41 (Sheet 17 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B\''. It branches based on 'Expiry T103' and 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from MSC-B'. It includes steps for 'Cancel MAP Procedures', 'I_DISCONNECT (REL)', 'Release Handover Device', and 'Call Release'. It ends at 'IDLE' or 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B\''.](1bc1746388cb64bf23b356ce2365dfc2_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +Sheet18(26) + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Completion on MSC-B']) --> T103{Expiry T103}; T103 --> MAP_REQ[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from MSC-B]; MAP_REQ --> MSCB[from MSC-B']; MSCB --> CancelMAP[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelMAP --> Network[From Network or MSC-B]; Network --> CallRelease[Call Release]; CallRelease --> End1([Wait for Completion on MSC-B']); T103 --> ResetT103[Reset T103]; ResetT103 --> MSCB2[from MSC-B]; MSCB2 --> CancelMAP2[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelMAP2 --> I_DISCONNECT[ I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B' ]; I_DISCONNECT --> ReleaseDevice1[Release Handover Device]; ReleaseDevice1 --> End1; T103 --> CancelMAP3[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelMAP3 --> MSCB3[to MSC-B']; MSCB3 --> I_DISCONNECT2[ I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B ]; I_DISCONNECT2 --> ReleaseDevice2[Release Handover Device]; ReleaseDevice2 --> WaitAccess{Wait for access by MS?}; WaitAccess -- Yes --> End1; WaitAccess -- No --> CancelMAP4[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelMAP4 --> MSCB4[to MSC-B']; MSCB4 --> I_DISCONNECT3[ I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B' ]; I_DISCONNECT3 --> End2([IDLE]); I_DISCONNECT2 --> MSCBConn{MSC-B Connection?}; MSCBConn -- Yes --> ForwardMsg[Forward queued messages for MS via MSC-B]; ForwardMsg --> CallOnMSCB([Call on MSC-B]); MSCBConn -- No --> CallRelease2[Call Release]; CallRelease2 --> Network2[to Network]; CallRelease2 --> End3([IDLE]); +``` + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B\''. It branches based on 'Expiry T103' and 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from MSC-B'. It includes steps for 'Cancel MAP Procedures', 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL)', 'Release Handover Device', and 'Call Release'. It ends at 'IDLE' or 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B\''. + +Figure 41 (Sheet 18 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure MSC_A_HO. The process starts at connector 7, followed by 'Queue Messages for MS in MSC-A', 'Handover Command to MS via BSS-A', 'Set T103', and 'Wait for MS on MSC-B'. A decision diamond '(Allowed once in this state)' leads to three paths: 1) 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] from MSC-B' -> 'Reset T103' -> 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from BSS-B' -> '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'Release Resources on BSS-A' -> 'Forward queued messages for MS via MSC-B' -> 'Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.' -> 'MS on MSC-B'; 2) 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A' -> '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'Release Resources on BSS-A' -> 'Wait for MS on MSC-B?'. If 'Yes', it leads to 'Wait for MS on MSC-B'. If 'No', it leads to 'Call Release' -> 'to Network and MS' -> 'Release MAP Resources' -> 'to MSC-B in MSC-A' -> 'IDLE'; 3) 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from MSC-B' -> 'Wait for MS on MSC-B'.](93bd00a00fa28558486f0664550699b1_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet19(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +Basic Handover to MSC-B +no Circuit Connection required + +``` +graph TD + Start((7)) --> Queue[Queue Messages for MS in MSC-A] + Queue --> Command{Handover Command to MS via BSS-A} + Command --> SetT103[Set T103] + SetT103 --> WaitMSB[Wait for MS on MSC-B] + WaitMSB --> Decision1{Allowed once in this state} + Decision1 --> SendEndSignal[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] from MSC-B] + SendEndSignal --> ResetT103[Reset T103] + ResetT103 --> PASreq[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from BSS-B] + PASreq --> Decision2{Allowed once in this state} + Decision2 --> ReleaseBSSA1[Release Resources on BSS-A] + ReleaseBSSA1 --> ForwardMsg[Forward queued messages for MS via MSC-B] + ForwardMsg --> UseMAP[Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.] + UseMAP --> MSB1[MS on MSC-B] + Decision1 --> ClearRequest[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A] + ClearRequest --> Decision3{Allowed once in this state} + Decision3 --> ReleaseBSSA2[Release Resources on BSS-A] + ReleaseBSSA2 --> WaitMSB2{Wait for MS on MSC-B?} + WaitMSB2 -- Yes --> WaitMSB3[Wait for MS on MSC-B] + WaitMSB2 -- No --> CallRelease[Call Release] + CallRelease --> NetworkMS[to Network and MS] + NetworkMS --> ReleaseMAP[Release MAP Resources] + ReleaseMAP --> MSCB[to MSC-B in MSC-A] + MSCB --> Idle[IDLE] + Decision1 --> PASdetect[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from MSC-B] + PASdetect --> WaitMSB4[Wait for MS on MSC-B] +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure MSC\_A\_HO. The process starts at connector 7, followed by 'Queue Messages for MS in MSC-A', 'Handover Command to MS via BSS-A', 'Set T103', and 'Wait for MS on MSC-B'. A decision diamond '(Allowed once in this state)' leads to three paths: 1) 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] from MSC-B' -> 'Reset T103' -> 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from BSS-B' -> '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'Release Resources on BSS-A' -> 'Forward queued messages for MS via MSC-B' -> 'Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.' -> 'MS on MSC-B'; 2) 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A' -> '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'Release Resources on BSS-A' -> 'Wait for MS on MSC-B?'. If 'Yes', it leads to 'Wait for MS on MSC-B'. If 'No', it leads to 'Call Release' -> 'to Network and MS' -> 'Release MAP Resources' -> 'to MSC-B in MSC-A' -> 'IDLE'; 3) 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from MSC-B' -> 'Wait for MS on MSC-B'. + +Figure 41 (Sheet 19 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A](d22fb161d760fcf9fe3fb7b36f81c6fb_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet20(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for MS on MSC-B]) --> Join(( )); A_HANDOVER_FAILURE[A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A] --> Join; Join --> Cancel_MAP_1[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel_MAP_1 --> Cancel_MAP_1_note[from MSC-B]; Cancel_MAP_1 --> Reset_T103[Reset T103]; Reset_T103 --> Forward_messages[Forward queued messages for MS via BSS-A]; Forward_messages --> Cancel_MAP_2[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel_MAP_2 --> Cancel_MAP_2_note[in MSC-A to MSC-B]; Cancel_MAP_2 --> Call_in_Progress[Call in Progress on MSC-A]; Call_in_Progress --> End1([Call in Progress on MSC-A]); Cancel_MAP_1 --> Release_Resources_1[Release Resources BSS-A]; Release_Resources_1 --> End2([Wait for MS on MSC-B]); Join --> Expiry_T103{Expiry T103}; Expiry_T103 --> Cancel_MAP_3[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel_MAP_3 --> Cancel_MAP_3_note[In MSC-A and to MSC-B]; Cancel_MAP_3 --> Release_Resources_2[Release Resources BSS-A]; Release_Resources_2 --> End3([IDLE]); Join --> Call_Release[Call Release]; Call_Release --> Call_Release_note[from Network]; Call_Release --> End4([Wait for MS on MSC-B]); +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-A. It begins with a state 'Wait for MS on MSC-B'. An 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A' event leads to a junction point. From this junction, four paths emerge: 1) 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (triggered 'from MSC-B'), which leads to 'Reset T103', then 'Forward queued messages for MS via BSS-A', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (triggered 'in MSC-A to MSC-B'), ending in 'Call in Progress on MSC-A'. 2) 'Release Resources BSS-A', ending in 'Wait for MS on MSC-B'. 3) 'Expiry T103', which leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (triggered 'In MSC-A and to MSC-B'), then 'Release Resources BSS-A', ending in 'IDLE'. 4) 'Call Release' (triggered 'from Network'), ending in 'Wait for MS on MSC-B'. + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +Figure 41 (Sheet 20 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Sequence diagram for Handover control procedure in MSC-A. The diagram shows the interaction between an MS on MSC-B and MSC-A. It starts with a 'Request for Circuit Establishment' from the MS. MSC-A then sends a 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [A-ASG-REQUEST] to MSC-B'. The MS then sends a 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] from MSC-B'. MSC-A responds with 'Cancel MAP Procedures' to the MS and 'Call Release' to the Network. The MS then sends 'Call Release' to MSC-A, which responds with 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B'. The process ends in an 'IDLE' state. There are also intermediate states: 'Wait For Response from MSC-B' and a connector '8'.](f4e5a86da5c799372a7c1ea2397dedb7_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet21(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +MS Established on MSC-B without a Circuit Connection + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant MS as MS on MSC-B + participant MSC_A as MSC-A + Note right of MS: MS Established on MSC-B without a Circuit Connection + Note left of MSC_A: Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + MS->>MSC_A: Request for Circuit Establishment + MSC_A->>MSC_A: MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [A-ASG-REQUEST] to MSC-B + Note left of MSC_A: Wait For Response from MSC-B + Note right of MSC_A: 8 + MSC_A->>MS: MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] from MSC-B + MSC_A->>MS: Cancel MAP Procedures + MSC_A->>Network: Call Release + Note right of Network: to Network + MS->>MSC_A: Call Release + Note right of MS: From MS or Network + MSC_A->>MSC_A: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B + Note right of MSC_A: IDLE +``` + +Sequence diagram for Handover control procedure in MSC-A. The diagram shows the interaction between an MS on MSC-B and MSC-A. It starts with a 'Request for Circuit Establishment' from the MS. MSC-A then sends a 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [A-ASG-REQUEST] to MSC-B'. The MS then sends a 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] from MSC-B'. MSC-A responds with 'Cancel MAP Procedures' to the MS and 'Call Release' to the Network. The MS then sends 'Call Release' to MSC-A, which responds with 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B'. The process ends in an 'IDLE' state. There are also intermediate states: 'Wait For Response from MSC-B' and a connector '8'. + +Figure 41 (Sheet 21 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A](9ba75f891de20483c291538e38701d96_img.jpg) + +**Procedure MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet22(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +Circuit Connection Establishment to MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait For Response from MSC-B]) --> Decision{ }; Decision --> Action1[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [A-ASG-COMPLETE] from MSC-B]; Action1 --> Decision2{ }; Decision2 --> Action2[I_CONNECT (IAM) to MSC-B using Handover Number]; Action2 --> End1([Wait for Complete from MSC-B]); Decision --> Action3[Call Release]; Action3 --> Note1[From MS or Network]; Note1 --> Decision3{ }; Decision3 --> Action4[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B]; Action4 --> End2([IDLE]); +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-A. It begins with a start node 'Wait For Response from MSC-B'. A decision node follows, leading to two possible paths. The first path involves receiving a 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [A-ASG-COMPLETE] from MSC-B', followed by another decision node, then sending an 'I\_CONNECT (IAM) to MSC-B using Handover Number', and finally reaching a 'Wait for Complete from MSC-B' node. The second path from the first decision node leads to 'Call Release', which is associated with 'From MS or Network', followed by a third decision node, then sending a 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B', and ending at an 'IDLE' node. + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +Figure 41 (Sheet 22 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A](61b2e15aedbb8a8dffc5426c0a284eb1_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +Sheet23(26) + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait For Response from MSC-B]) --> Decision{ }; Decision --> MAP_PREPARE_RESP[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] from MSC-B]; Decision --> MAP_PREPARE_RESP_FAIL[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-ASG-FAILURE] from MSC-B]; Decision --> Cancel[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel --> CancelText[from MSC-B]; Decision --> Retry{Retry?}; Retry -- No --> MAP_PAS_REQ[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B]; MAP_PAS_REQ --> Allowed{Allowed once in this state}; Allowed --> Call_Release[Call Release]; Call_Release --> CallReleaseText[to Network]; Allowed --> MS_B([MS on MSC-B]); Call_Release -- Failure --> Response_Circuit[Response to Circuit Establishment Request]; Call_Release --> IDLE([IDLE]); Retry -- Yes --> MAP_PREPARE_REQ[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [A-ASG-REQUEST] to MSC-B]; MAP_PREPARE_REQ --> Wait_B([Wait For Response from MSC-B]); MAP_PREPARE_REQ -- Failure --> Response_Circuit; MAP_PREPARE_REQ --> MS_B; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-A. It begins with a 'Wait For Response from MSC-B' state. The process then enters a decision loop. If a 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] from MSC-B' or 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-ASG-FAILURE] from MSC-B' is received, the procedure can be cancelled (leading to 'from MSC-B'). If the response is not an error or failure, the process proceeds to a 'Retry?' decision. If 'No', it sends a 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B'. This is followed by a check '(Allowed once in this state)'. If allowed, it sends a 'Call Release' to the Network and ends in an 'IDLE' state. If a 'Failure' occurs during 'Call Release', it sends a 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request'. If 'Yes' to 'Retry?', it sends a 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [A-ASG-REQUEST] to MSC-B' and returns to 'Wait For Response from MSC-B'. If a 'Failure' occurs during this request, it sends a 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request'. Both successful and failed 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req.' lead to the 'MS on MSC-B' state. + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +Figure 41 (Sheet 23 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![State transition diagram for Procedure MSC_A_HO. It shows various states and transitions between them, including messages like I COMPLETE (ACM), I-ANSWER (ANM), MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST], and I_DISCONNECT (REL).](b02ba0b73e95416eb547976f6145b169_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet24(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +``` +stateDiagram-v2 + [*] --> Wait1: Wait for Complete from MSC-B + state "Wait for Complete from MSC-B" as Wait1 + state "Call on MSC-B" as CallOnMSCB + state "IDLE" as IDLE + state "Cancel MAP Procedures" as CancelMAP + state "Call Release" as CallRelease + state "Success" as Success + state "Failure" as Failure + state "Allowed once in this state" as AllowedOnce + state "Response to Circuit Establishment Request" as ResCircuitReq + + Wait1 --> Success: I COMPLETE (ACM) from MSC-B + Success --> CallOnMSCB: Response to Circuit Establishment Request + Wait1 --> ResCircuitReq: I-ANSWER (ANM) from MSC-B + ResCircuitReq --> Wait2: Wait for Complete from MSC-B + state "Wait for Complete from MSC-B" as Wait2 + Wait1 --> AllowedOnce: MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B + AllowedOnce --> CancelMAP: from MSC-B + CancelMAP --> Failure: Response to Circuit Establishment Request + Failure --> IDLE + CallRelease --> ResCircuitReq: From MS or Network + ResCircuitReq --> CallRelease: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B + CallRelease --> IDLE: I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B +``` + +State transition diagram for Procedure MSC\_A\_HO. It shows various states and transitions between them, including messages like I COMPLETE (ACM), I-ANSWER (ANM), MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST], and I\_DISCONNECT (REL). + +Figure 41 (Sheet 24 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure MSC_A_HO for handover control in MSC-A. The process starts at connector 9, involves message preparation, queueing, timer setting, and waiting for the mobile station (MS) on MSC-B'. It then branches based on incoming signals (END-SIGNAL, PAS req.) and decisions (Allowed once in this state, Wait for access by MS?). Outcomes include MS on MSC-B, Wait for MS on MSC-B', or IDLE state after call release.](710ff83dc4a77abbe489fbf1a462845a_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet25(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +Subsequent Handover from MSC-B to MSC-B' no Circuit Connection required. + +``` +graph TD; 9((9)) --> P1[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to MSC-B]; P1 --> Q[Queue Messages for MS in MSC-A]; Q --> T1[Set T103]; T1 --> W1[Wait for MS on MSC-B']; W1 --> J1(( )); J1 --> P2[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] from MSC-B']; P2 --> R1[Reset T103]; R1 --> P3[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B']; P3 --> D1{Allowed once in this state}; D1 --> F1[Forward queued messages for MS via MSC-B]; F1 --> R2[Redfine MSC-B' as MSC-B]; R2 --> M1[MS on MSC-B]; D1 --> J1; J1 --> P4[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from MSC-B']; P4 --> D2{Allowed once in this state}; D2 --> W2[Wait for access by MS?]; W2 -- Yes --> C1[Cancel MAP Procedures]; C1 --> T2[to MSC-B and MSC-B']; T2 --> C2[Call Release]; C2 --> T3[to Network and MS]; T3 --> I[IDLE]; W2 -- No --> J1; D2 --> W3[Wait for MS on MSC-B']; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure MSC\_A\_HO for handover control in MSC-A. The process starts at connector 9, involves message preparation, queueing, timer setting, and waiting for the mobile station (MS) on MSC-B'. It then branches based on incoming signals (END-SIGNAL, PAS req.) and decisions (Allowed once in this state, Wait for access by MS?). Outcomes include MS on MSC-B, Wait for MS on MSC-B', or IDLE state after call release. + +Figure 41 (Sheet 25 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of the handover control procedure in MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for MS on MSC-B\''. It branches based on 'Expiry T103' and 'Reset T103' events. It handles 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from MSC-B', 'from MSC-B\'', and 'from Network or MSC-B'. It includes decision points for 'Wait for access by MS?' and 'Cancel MAP Procedures'. The final states are 'MS on MSC-B', 'IDLE', and 'Wait for MS on MSC-B\''.](1cd38e4f2ffcae2871964fa6313a9a27_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet26(26) + +Procedure for Handover in MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for MS on MSC-B']) --> T103_Expiry{Expiry T103}; T103_Expiry --> T103_Reset[Reset T103]; T103_Reset --> Forward[Forward queued messages for MS via MSC-B]; Forward --> Cancel1[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel1 --> End1([MS on MSC-B]); T103_Expiry --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from MSC-B]; MAP_PAS --> Cancel2[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel2 --> End2([IDLE]); T103_Expiry --> From_B[from MSC-B]; From_B --> Cancel3[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel3 --> Wait_Access{Wait for access by MS?}; Wait_Access -- No --> Cancel4[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel4 --> End2; Wait_Access -- Yes --> Call_Release[Call Release]; Call_Release --> End3([Wait for MS on MSC-B']); Call_Release --> From_Net[from Network or MSC-B]; T103_Expiry --> From_B_prime[from MSC-B']; From_B_prime --> Cancel5[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel5 --> End3; T103_Reset --> Use_Forward[Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.]; Use_Forward --> To_B_prime1[to MSC-B']; Use_Forward --> To_B_prime2[to MSC-B']; To_B_prime1 --> Cancel6[Cancel MAP Procedures]; To_B_prime2 --> Cancel6; Cancel6 --> End2; +``` + +Flowchart of the handover control procedure in MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for MS on MSC-B\''. It branches based on 'Expiry T103' and 'Reset T103' events. It handles 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from MSC-B', 'from MSC-B\'', and 'from Network or MSC-B'. It includes decision points for 'Wait for access by MS?' and 'Cancel MAP Procedures'. The final states are 'MS on MSC-B', 'IDLE', and 'Wait for MS on MSC-B\''. + +Figure 41 (Sheet 26 of 26): Handover control procedure in MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-B](884c44b6cb9fbe15347e0562a6085df2_img.jpg) + +Procedure MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet1(18) + +Procedures for Handover in MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; IDLE1([IDLE]) --> IN1{{ }}; IN1 -- "MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] from MSC-A" --> KNOWN{Known BSS?}; KNOWN -- No --> OUT1{{ }}; KNOWN -- Yes --> REQUESTED{Handover Number?}; REQUESTED -- Not Requested --> OUT2{{ }}; REQUESTED -- Requested --> ALLOC[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER req. to VLR]; ALLOC --> SET[Set T201]; SET --> REQ[ A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B]; REQ --> IDLE2([IDLE]); OUT1 --> OUT2; OUT2 -- "MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp [A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-A" --> IDLE3([IDLE]); +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-B. It begins at an IDLE state, receiving a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request (A-HO-REQUEST) from MSC-A. A decision is made to check if the BSS is known. If not known, it proceeds to an intermediate state and then sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response (A-HO-FAILURE) to MSC-A, returning to IDLE. If known, it checks if a handover number is requested. If not requested, it proceeds to the same intermediate state. If requested, it sends a MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER request to the VLR, sets timer T201, sends an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B, and enters a 'Wait for Channel or Handover Number' state. + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +Figure 42 (Sheet 1 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-B](b0384c8e0ff826a8116ab2ff67dadc43_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet2(18) + +Procedures for Handover in MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Channel or Handover Number]) --> Join(( )); Start --> Join; Join --> A_HANDOVER_REQUEST_ACK[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK from BSS-B]; A_HANDOVER_REQUEST_ACK --> Reset_T201_1[Reset T201]; Reset_T201_1 --> Handover_Number{Handover Number?}; Handover_Number -- Requested --> Wait_HN[Wait for Handover Number Allocation]; Handover_Number -- Not Requested --> MAP_PREPARE_HO_resp[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to MSC-A]; MAP_PREPARE_HO_resp --> Set_T204[Set T204]; Set_T204 --> Wait_MS[Wait for MS on BSS-B]; Start --> Join; Join --> MAP_ALLOCATE_HO_NUMBER_resp[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR]; MAP_ALLOCATE_HO_NUMBER_resp --> A_HANDOVER_REQUEST_ACK_B[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK from BSS-B]; A_HANDOVER_REQUEST_ACK_B --> Reset_T201_2[Reset T201]; Reset_T201_2 --> Wait_CA[Wait for Channel Allocation]; Wait_CA --> Join; Wait_HN --> MAP_ALLOCATE_HO_NUMBER_resp_B[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR]; MAP_ALLOCATE_HO_NUMBER_resp_B --> MAP_PREPARE_HO_resp_B[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] [Handover Number] to MSC-A]; MAP_PREPARE_HO_resp_B --> Set_T210[Set T210]; Set_T210 --> Wait_Connection[Wait for Connection from MSC-A]; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-B. It begins with a 'Wait for Channel or Handover Number' state. From here, the process can receive an 'A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK from BSS-B' or a 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR'. Both lead to a 'Reset T201' action. Following the reset, a decision 'Handover Number?' is made. If 'Requested', the process moves to 'Wait for Handover Number Allocation', which then leads to receiving a 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR'. This response leads to sending a 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] [Handover Number] to MSC-A', followed by 'Set T210' and 'Wait for Connection from MSC-A'. If 'Not Requested', the process leads to sending a 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to MSC-A', followed by 'Set T204' and 'Wait for MS on BSS-B'. There is also a 'Wait for Channel Allocation' state that leads back to the initial join point for receiving responses. + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +Figure 42 (Sheet 2 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for Channel or Handover Number'. It branches into two main paths. The left path handles 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-B', leading to 'Release Resources in BSS-B', then a decision 'Retry Same Cell?'. If 'Yes', it goes to 'Set T201' and then 'A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B', returning to the start. If 'No', it goes to 'Release Resources in BSS-B' and then 'IDLE'. The right path handles 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B', leading to 'ERROR' (with 'Indication from VLR'), then 'Cancel Channel on BSS-B', and finally 'IDLE'. There are also intermediate states like 'Wait for Channel Allocation' and 'Expiry T201'.](223792b3652794024244c277cc46394b_img.jpg) + +Procedure MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet3(18) + +Procedures for Handover in MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start1([Wait for Channel or Handover Number]) --> Decision1{ }; Start2([Wait for Channel or Handover Number]) --> Decision2{ }; Decision1 --> Failure[A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-B]; Failure --> Release1[Release Resources in BSS-B]; Release1 --> Retry{Retry Same Cell?}; Retry -- Yes --> SetT201[Set T201]; SetT201 --> Request[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B]; Request --> Start1; Retry -- No --> Release2[Release Resources in BSS-B]; Release2 --> Idle1([IDLE]); Start2 --> Clear[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B]; Clear --> Error[ERROR]; Error --> Indication[Indication from VLR]; Error --> Cancel[Cancel Channel on BSS-B]; Cancel --> Idle2([IDLE]); Start2 --> Allocation[Wait for Channel Allocation]; Allocation --> Expiry[Expiry T201]; Expiry --> Release2; +``` + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for Channel or Handover Number'. It branches into two main paths. The left path handles 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-B', leading to 'Release Resources in BSS-B', then a decision 'Retry Same Cell?'. If 'Yes', it goes to 'Set T201' and then 'A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B', returning to the start. If 'No', it goes to 'Release Resources in BSS-B' and then 'IDLE'. The right path handles 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B', leading to 'ERROR' (with 'Indication from VLR'), then 'Cancel Channel on BSS-B', and finally 'IDLE'. There are also intermediate states like 'Wait for Channel Allocation' and 'Expiry T201'. + +Figure 42 (Sheet 3 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure MSC_B_HO showing the sequence of operations for a handover in MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for Connection from MSC-A', followed by receiving 'I_CONNECT (IAM) from MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)'. It then branches based on 'Expiry T210' and 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B'. The main path involves 'Reset T210', 'Cancel MAP Procedures', 'MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B', 'Set T204', 'I_COMPLETE (ACM) to MSC-A', 'Release Radio Resources on BSS-B', and finally reaching 'IDLE' or 'Wait for access by MS on BSS-B'. A secondary path from 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST' involves 'Cancel MAP Procedures', sending 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A', and then 'Cancel MAP Procedures' again leading 'To MSC-A in MSC-B'.](b55cd9b5721bd8aabc979c85316924e4_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet4(18) + +Procedures for Handover in MSC-B + +Basic handover from MSC-A to MSC-B +Circuit Connection required + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Connection from MSC-A]) --> Join(( )); Join --> IAM[I_CONNECT (IAM) from MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)]; IAM --> T210_Exp[Expiry T210]; T210_Exp --> Reset[Reset T210]; Reset --> ToMSCA1[To MSC-A in MSC-B]; ToMSCA1 --> CancelMAP1[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelMAP1 --> Join; T210_Exp --> A_CLEAR[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B]; A_CLEAR --> Join; A_CLEAR --> CancelMAP2[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelMAP2 --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A]; MAP_PAS --> CancelMAP3[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelMAP3 --> ToMSCA2[To MSC-A in MSC-B]; CancelMAP3 --> Join; Join --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B]; MAP_SEND --> SetT204[Set T204]; SetT204 --> ACM[I_COMPLETE (ACM) to MSC-A]; ACM --> Release[Release Radio Resources on BSS-B]; Release --> IDLE([IDLE]); Release --> WaitAccess([Wait for access by MS on BSS-B]); +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure MSC\_B\_HO showing the sequence of operations for a handover in MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for Connection from MSC-A', followed by receiving 'I\_CONNECT (IAM) from MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)'. It then branches based on 'Expiry T210' and 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B'. The main path involves 'Reset T210', 'Cancel MAP Procedures', 'MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B', 'Set T204', 'I\_COMPLETE (ACM) to MSC-A', 'Release Radio Resources on BSS-B', and finally reaching 'IDLE' or 'Wait for access by MS on BSS-B'. A secondary path from 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST' involves 'Cancel MAP Procedures', sending 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A', and then 'Cancel MAP Procedures' again leading 'To MSC-A in MSC-B'. + +Figure 42 (Sheet 4 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +![SDL diagram for Procedure MSC_B_HO showing the handover control logic in MSC-B. It includes states like 'Wait for access by MS on BSS-B', 'Call in Progress on MSC-B', 'IDLE', and 'Wait for Disconnect'. Transitions are triggered by messages such as A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE, A-CLEAR-REQUEST, and Expiry T204.](2ed8cadf211f7d2dba5eecc5f0ad1876_img.jpg) + +Procedure MSC\_B\_HOSheet5(18) + +Procedures for Handover in MSC-B + +``` + +stateDiagram-v2 + state "Wait for access by MS on BSS-B" as WaitAccess + state "Reset T204" as ResetT204_1 + state "ANM Sent?" as ANMSent + state "Call in Progress on MSC-B" as CallInProgress + state "Cancel MAP Procedures" as CancelMAP + state "Release Resources on BSS-B" as ReleaseBSS + state "IDLE" as IDLE + state "Reset T204" as ResetT204_2 + state "Release Resources on BSS-B" as ReleaseBSS_2 + state "Wait for access by MS on BSS-B" as WaitAccess_2 + state "Wait for Disconnect" as WaitDisconnect + + [*] --> WaitAccess + + WaitAccess --> A_HO_COMPLETE : A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B + A_HO_COMPLETE --> ResetT204_1 + ResetT204_1 --> ANMSent + ANMSent --> ANM_TO_MSCA : Yes + ANM_TO_MSCA : I_ANSWER (ANM) to MSC-A + ANM_TO_MSCA --> SEND_END_SIG + SEND_END_SIG : MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] to MSC-A + SEND_END_SIG --> CallInProgress + + ANMSent --> TO_MSCA_IN_MSCB : No + TO_MSCA_IN_MSCB : to MSC-A in MSC-B + TO_MSCA_IN_MSCB --> CancelMAP + CancelMAP --> ReleaseBSS + ReleaseBSS --> IDLE + + WaitAccess --> A_CLEAR_REQ : A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B + A_CLEAR_REQ --> MAP_PAS_CLEAR + MAP_PAS_CLEAR : MAP-PAS req [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A + MAP_PAS_CLEAR --> CancelMAP + + WaitAccess --> ExpiryT204 : Expiry T204 + ExpiryT204 --> I_DISC_TO_MSCA + I_DISC_TO_MSCA : I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-A + I_DISC_TO_MSCA --> CancelMAP + + WaitAccess --> FROM_MSCA : from MSC-A + FROM_MSCA --> I_DISC_FROM_MSCA + I_DISC_FROM_MSCA : I_DISCONNECT (REL) from MSC-A + I_DISC_FROM_MSCA --> A_HO_DETECT + A_HO_DETECT : A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B + A_HO_DETECT --> ANM_TO_MSCA_2 + ANM_TO_MSCA_2 : I_ANSWER (ANM) to MSC-A + ANM_TO_MSCA_2 --> MAP_PAS_DETECT + MAP_PAS_DETECT : MAP-PAS req [A-HO-DETECT] to MSC-A + MAP_PAS_DETECT --> WaitAccess_2 + + WaitAccess --> CancelMAPProc : Cancel MAP Procedure + CancelMAPProc --> ResetT204_2 + ResetT204_2 --> ReleaseBSS_2 + ReleaseBSS_2 --> WaitDisconnect + +``` + +SDL diagram for Procedure MSC\_B\_HO showing the handover control logic in MSC-B. It includes states like 'Wait for access by MS on BSS-B', 'Call in Progress on MSC-B', 'IDLE', and 'Wait for Disconnect'. Transitions are triggered by messages such as A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE, A-CLEAR-REQUEST, and Expiry T204. + +**Figure 42 (Sheet 5 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B** + +![Sequence diagram for Procedure MSC_B_HO showing interactions between MSC-A, BSS-A, BSS, and MSC-B. The diagram includes states like 'Call in Progress on MSC-B', 'IDLE', and 'A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED from BSS-A'. It details the flow of messages such as 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST', 'A-HO-PERFORMED', and 'I_DISCONNECT (REL)'.](6059b0a3a051cc20b414d51a4e412f3e_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet6(18) + +Procedures for Handover in MSC-B + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant MSC-A + participant BSS-A + participant BSS + participant MSC-B + + Note left of MSC-A: Forward Messages to MS + Note right of MSC-B: Call in Progress on MSC-B + + MSC-A->>BSS-A: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A + BSS-A->>BSS: A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A + BSS->>BSS-A: A-HO-PERFORMED from BSS + BSS-A->>MSC-A: MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A + BSS->>MSC-A: MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-PERFORMED] to MSC-A + BSS-A->>MSC-B: Cancel MAP Procedures + BSS->>MSC-B: Call in Progress on MSC-B + + MSC-A->>BSS-A: I_DISCONNECT (REL) from MSC-A + BSS-A->>MSC-B: Release Resources in BSS-A + BSS-A->>MSC-A: I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-A + BSS->>MSC-A: A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED from BSS-A + BSS->>MSC-B: Cancel MAP Procedures from MSC-A + BSS->>MSC-A: Release Resources in BSS-A + BSS->>MSC-B: IDLE + BSS->>2: 2 + + Note right of MSC-B: MSC-A disconnected? + alt Yes: IDLE + alt No: Wait for Disconnect -> I_DISCONNECT (REL) from MSC-A -> IDLE +``` + +Sequence diagram for Procedure MSC\_B\_HO showing interactions between MSC-A, BSS-A, BSS, and MSC-B. The diagram includes states like 'Call in Progress on MSC-B', 'IDLE', and 'A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED from BSS-A'. It details the flow of messages such as 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST', 'A-HO-PERFORMED', and 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL)'. + +Figure 42 (Sheet 6 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +![Flowchart of handover control procedure in MSC-B. The process starts at connector 2. It checks if the MSC is known. If no, it checks if handover is allowed to the cell. If yes, it asks which MSC (MSC-A/MS-B' or MSC-B). If MSC-A/MS-B', it sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] to MSC-A and waits for a response. If MSC-B, it checks if the BSS is known. If no, it checks if resources on BSS-B are available. If yes, it goes to connector 3. If no, it goes to connector 1. If the BSS is known, it checks if resources on BSS-B are available. If yes, it goes to connector 3. If no, it goes to connector 1. If the MSC is known (Yes), it checks if a new cell can be selected. If no, it checks if a reject should be sent. If yes, it sends an A-HANDOVER-REJECT to BSS-A. If no, it checks if a circuit connection is available. If yes, it goes to 'Call in Progress on MSC-B'. If no, it goes to 'MS on MSC-B'.](09797d4289ec96309d21a9a993153dab_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet7(18) + +Procedures for Handover in MSC-B + +``` +graph TD + 2((2)) --> K{Known MSC?} + K -- Yes --> S{Select New Cell?} + K -- No --> H{Handover allowed to Cell?} + H -- No --> K + H -- Yes --> W{Which MSC?} + W -- "MSC-A/MS-B'" --> M[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] to MSC-A] + M --> S1[Set T211] + S1 --> WR[Wait for Response] + W -- "MSC-B" --> KB{Known BSS?} + KB -- No --> R{Resources on BSS-B?} + R -- No --> 1((1)) + R -- Yes --> 3((3)) + KB -- Yes --> R + S -- Yes --> K + S -- No --> SR{Send Reject?} + SR -- Yes --> AR[A-HANDOVER-REJECT to BSS-A] + AR --> S + SR -- No --> CC{Circuit Connection?} + CC -- Yes --> CP[Call in Progress on MSC-B] + CC -- No --> MS[MS on MSC-B] + 4((4)) --> S1 +``` + +Flowchart of handover control procedure in MSC-B. The process starts at connector 2. It checks if the MSC is known. If no, it checks if handover is allowed to the cell. If yes, it asks which MSC (MSC-A/MS-B' or MSC-B). If MSC-A/MS-B', it sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] to MSC-A and waits for a response. If MSC-B, it checks if the BSS is known. If no, it checks if resources on BSS-B are available. If yes, it goes to connector 3. If no, it goes to connector 1. If the BSS is known, it checks if resources on BSS-B are available. If yes, it goes to connector 3. If no, it goes to connector 1. If the MSC is known (Yes), it checks if a new cell can be selected. If no, it checks if a reject should be sent. If yes, it sends an A-HANDOVER-REJECT to BSS-A. If no, it checks if a circuit connection is available. If yes, it goes to 'Call in Progress on MSC-B'. If no, it goes to 'MS on MSC-B'. + +Figure 42 (Sheet 7 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure MSC_B_HO showing the handover control process from BSS-A to BSS-B on MSC-B. The process starts at connector 3, sends an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B, sets timer T201, and waits for a channel. It then branches based on responses: A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK (success path), A-HANDOVER-FAILURE (failure path), or MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL (error path). The success path involves resetting T201, queuing messages, sending a handover command, setting up the device, setting timer T202, and waiting for MS access. The failure path involves resetting T201, releasing resources on BSS-B, and checking if a retry is needed. If a retry is needed and it's a new cell, it goes to connector 1. If it's the same cell, it goes to connector 2. If no retry, it goes to connector 1. The error path involves canceling the channel request on BSS-B, releasing resources on BSS-A, and waiting for disconnect.](893d65bf826925a7283359b1672010a0_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet8(18) + +Procedures for Handover in MSC-B + +Handover from BSS-A to BSS-B on MSC-B + +``` +graph TD + Start((3)) --> T1[ ] + T1 --> R1[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B] + R1 --> T201[Set T201] + T201 --> W1[Wait for Channel] + W1 --> J1(( )) + J1 --> R2[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK from BSS-B] + J1 --> T201_Exp[Expiry T201] + J1 --> R3[A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-B] + J1 --> R4[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A] + R2 --> T201_Reset[Reset T201] + T201_Reset --> Q[Queue Messages in MSC-B] + Q --> R5[Handover Command to MS via BSS-A] + R5 --> D[Set Up Handover Device] + D --> T202[Set T202] + T202 --> W2[Wait for access by MS] + T201_Exp --> R6[Release Resources on BSS-B] + R6 --> RA{Retry Handover Attempt?} + RA -- Yes --> C{Cell?} + C -- Same Cell --> End2((2)) + C -- New Cell --> End1((1)) + RA -- No --> End1 + R3 --> T201_Reset2[Reset T201] + T201_Reset2 --> R6 + R3 --> CR[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A] + CR --> MPAS[MAP-PAS req [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A] + MPAS --> CM[Cancel MAP Procedures] + CM --> ToMSCA[To MSC-A in MSC-B] + R4 --> CC[Cancel Channel request on BSS-B] + CC --> RB[Release Resources on BSS-A] + RB --> W3[Wait for Disconnect] + End3((3)) +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure MSC\_B\_HO showing the handover control process from BSS-A to BSS-B on MSC-B. The process starts at connector 3, sends an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B, sets timer T201, and waits for a channel. It then branches based on responses: A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK (success path), A-HANDOVER-FAILURE (failure path), or MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL (error path). The success path involves resetting T201, queuing messages, sending a handover command, setting up the device, setting timer T202, and waiting for MS access. The failure path involves resetting T201, releasing resources on BSS-B, and checking if a retry is needed. If a retry is needed and it's a new cell, it goes to connector 1. If it's the same cell, it goes to connector 2. If no retry, it goes to connector 1. The error path involves canceling the channel request on BSS-B, releasing resources on BSS-A, and waiting for disconnect. + +Figure 42 (Sheet 8 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for access by MS'. It branches into three main paths based on incoming messages: 'A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B', 'A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B', and 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A'. The 'COMPLETE' path involves resetting T202, sending a MAP-PAS request, and then checking for a circuit connection. If 'Yes', it connects the handover device (optional), forwards queued messages via BSS-B, releases resources in BSS-A, and checks for a circuit connection again. If 'Yes' again, it releases the handover device and ends with 'Call in Progress on MSC-B'. If 'No' at any point, it ends with 'MS on MSC-B'. The 'DETECT' path also checks for a circuit connection. If 'Yes', it connects the handover device (optional) and ends with 'Wait for access by MS'. If 'No', it ends with 'MS on MSC-B'. The 'FAILURE' path involves resetting T202, forwarding queued messages via BSS-A, releasing resources in BSS-B, and checking for a circuit connection. If 'Yes', it releases the handover device and ends with 'Call in Progress on MSC-B'. If 'No', it ends with 'MS on MSC-B'.](137bcfed81ada68ca5162ca5afed35c7_img.jpg) + +**Procedure MSC\_B\_HO** Sheet9(18) + +Procedures for Handover in MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for access by MS]) --> In1{ }; In1 --> In2{ }; In1 --> In3{ }; In2 --> A_Handover_Complete["A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B"]; In3 --> A_Handover_Detect["A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B"]; In3 --> A_Handover_Failure["A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A"]; A_Handover_Complete --> Reset_T202_1[Reset T202]; Reset_T202_1 --> MAP_PAS["MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-PERFORMED] to MSC-A"]; MAP_PAS --> CC_1{Circuit Connection?}; CC_1 -- No --> MS_B_1([MS on MSC-B]); CC_1 -- Yes --> CHD_1{{Connect Handover Device (Optional)}}; CHD_1 --> FQM_1[Forward queued messages via BSS-B]; FQM_1 --> RR_1[Release Resources in BSS-A]; RR_1 --> CC_2{Circuit Connection?}; CC_2 -- No --> MS_B_2([MS on MSC-B]); CC_2 -- Yes --> RH_1{{Release Handover Device}}; RH_1 --> CIP_1([Call in Progress on MSC-B]); A_Handover_Detect --> CC_3{Circuit Connection?}; CC_3 -- No --> MS_B_3([MS on MSC-B]); CC_3 -- Yes --> CHD_2{{Connect Handover Device (Optional)}}; CHD_2 --> WAM_1([Wait for access by MS]); A_Handover_Failure --> Reset_T202_2[Reset T202]; Reset_T202_2 --> FQM_2[Forward queued messages via BSS-A]; FQM_2 --> RR_2[Release Resources in BSS-B]; RR_2 --> CC_4{Circuit Connection?}; CC_4 -- No --> MS_B_4([MS on MSC-B]); CC_4 -- Yes --> RH_2{{Release Handover Device}}; RH_2 --> CIP_2([Call in Progress on MSC-B]); +``` + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for access by MS'. It branches into three main paths based on incoming messages: 'A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B', 'A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B', and 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A'. The 'COMPLETE' path involves resetting T202, sending a MAP-PAS request, and then checking for a circuit connection. If 'Yes', it connects the handover device (optional), forwards queued messages via BSS-B, releases resources in BSS-A, and checks for a circuit connection again. If 'Yes' again, it releases the handover device and ends with 'Call in Progress on MSC-B'. If 'No' at any point, it ends with 'MS on MSC-B'. The 'DETECT' path also checks for a circuit connection. If 'Yes', it connects the handover device (optional) and ends with 'Wait for access by MS'. If 'No', it ends with 'MS on MSC-B'. The 'FAILURE' path involves resetting T202, forwarding queued messages via BSS-A, releasing resources in BSS-B, and checking for a circuit connection. If 'Yes', it releases the handover device and ends with 'Call in Progress on MSC-B'. If 'No', it ends with 'MS on MSC-B'. + +Figure 42 (Sheet 9 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure MSC_B_HO showing four parallel paths for handover control. Path 1: Wait for access by MS -> Expiry T202 -> A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B -> Release Resources in BSS-B and BSS-A -> Release Handover Device -> MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A -> Cancel MAP Procedures -> To MSC-A in MSC-B -> I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-A -> IDLE. Path 2: Wait for access by MS -> A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A -> Release Resources in BSS-B -> MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A -> To MSC-A in MSC-B -> Wait for access by MS. Path 3: Wait for access by MS -> [Blank] -> Release Resources in BSS-A -> Wait for access by MS? (Yes/No) -> (Yes) Release Resources in BSS-B -> MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A -> To MSC-A in MSC-B -> Cancel MAP Procedures -> Release Resources in BSS-B -> Wait for Disconnect. (No) [Blank] -> Release Resources in BSS-B -> Wait for Disconnect. Path 4: Wait for access by MS -> [Blank] -> MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A -> Release Resources in BSS-B and BSS-A -> Release Handover Device -> Wait for Disconnect.](86986d4dfd54f298d7b9fa9f82ab3009_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet10(18) + +Procedures for Handover in MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for access by MS]) --> T202{Expiry T202}; T202 --> ACR_B[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B]; ACR_B --> ResRel1[Release Resources in BSS-B and BSS-A]; ResRel1 --> HandoverRel1[Release Handover Device]; HandoverRel1 --> MAPPAS1[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A]; MAPPAS1 --> CancelMAP1[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelMAP1 --> ToMSCA1[To MSC-A in MSC-B]; ToMSCA1 --> IDISCONNECT1[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-A]; IDISCONNECT1 --> IDLE([IDLE]); Start --> ACR_A[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A]; ACR_A --> ResRel2[Release Resources in BSS-B]; ResRel2 --> MAPPAS2[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A]; MAPPAS2 --> ToMSCA2[To MSC-A in MSC-B]; ToMSCA2 --> WaitAccess2([Wait for access by MS]); Start --> Blank3[ ]; Blank3 --> ResRel3[Release Resources in BSS-A]; ResRel3 --> WaitAccess3{Wait for access by MS?}; WaitAccess3 -- Yes --> ResRel4[Release Resources in BSS-B]; ResRel4 --> MAPPAS3[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A]; MAPPAS3 --> ToMSCA3[To MSC-A in MSC-B]; ToMSCA3 --> CancelMAP3[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelMAP3 --> ResRel5[Release Resources in BSS-B]; ResRel5 --> WaitDisconnect3([Wait for Disconnect]); WaitAccess3 -- No --> Blank4[ ]; Blank4 --> ResRel6[Release Resources in BSS-B]; ResRel6 --> WaitDisconnect4([Wait for Disconnect]); Start --> Blank5[ ]; Blank5 --> MAPSEND[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A]; MAPSEND --> ResRel7[Release Resources in BSS-B and BSS-A]; ResRel7 --> HandoverRel2[Release Handover Device]; HandoverRel2 --> WaitDisconnect5([Wait for Disconnect]); +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure MSC\_B\_HO showing four parallel paths for handover control. Path 1: Wait for access by MS -> Expiry T202 -> A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B -> Release Resources in BSS-B and BSS-A -> Release Handover Device -> MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A -> Cancel MAP Procedures -> To MSC-A in MSC-B -> I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-A -> IDLE. Path 2: Wait for access by MS -> A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A -> Release Resources in BSS-B -> MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A -> To MSC-A in MSC-B -> Wait for access by MS. Path 3: Wait for access by MS -> [Blank] -> Release Resources in BSS-A -> Wait for access by MS? (Yes/No) -> (Yes) Release Resources in BSS-B -> MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A -> To MSC-A in MSC-B -> Cancel MAP Procedures -> Release Resources in BSS-B -> Wait for Disconnect. (No) [Blank] -> Release Resources in BSS-B -> Wait for Disconnect. Path 4: Wait for access by MS -> [Blank] -> MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A -> Release Resources in BSS-B and BSS-A -> Release Handover Device -> Wait for Disconnect. + +Figure 42 (Sheet 10 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +![SDL Diagram for Handover control procedure in MSC-B showing subsequent handover from MSC-B to MSC-A.](c15cb6383bc35906e6b3c7c3aac621ed_img.jpg) + +**Procedure MSC\_B\_HO** Sheet 11(18) + +Procedures for Handover in MSC-B + +Subsequent Handover from MSC-B to MSC-A + +``` + +graph TD + Start([Wait for Response]) + Start --- Join[ ] + + %% Path 1: Success + Join --> In1[/MAP-PREPARE- +SUBSEQUENT- +HANDOVER resp. +[A-HO-REQUEST- +ACK] from MSC-A/] + In1 --> Task1[Reset +T211] + Task1 --> Out1[Handover Command +to MS via BSS-A] + Out1 --> Task2[Set +T204] + Task2 --> State2([Wait for +Ack. from +MSC-A]) + + %% Path 2: Failure/End Signal + Join --> In2[/MAP-SEND-END- +SIGNAL resp. +from MSC-A/] + In2 --> Task3[Reset +T211] + Task3 --> Task4[Release Resources +in BSS-B] + Task4 --> Dec1{Retry +Handover +Attempt?} + Dec1 -- Yes --> Dec2{Cell?} + Dec1 -- No --> Conn1((1)) + Dec2 -- New Cell --> Conn2((2)) + Dec2 -- Same Cell --> Conn4((4)) + + %% Path 3: Failure Response + Join --> In3[/MAP-PREPARE- +SUBSEQUENT- +HANDOVER resp. +[A-HO-FAILURE +or MAP ERROR] +from MSC-A/] + In3 --> Conn1 + + %% Path 4: Expiry + Join --> In4[/Expiry +T211/] + In4 --> Conn1 + + %% Path 5: Clear Request + Join --> In5[/A-CLEAR- +REQUEST +from BSS-A/] + In5 --> Out2[MAP-PAS req. +[A-CLEAR- +REQUEST] +to MSC-A] + Out2 --> Task5[in MSC-B +to MSC-A] + Task5 --> Task6[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + Task6 --> Task7[Release Resources +in BSS-A] + Task7 --> State3([Wait for +Disconnect]) + +``` + +SDL Diagram for Handover control procedure in MSC-B showing subsequent handover from MSC-B to MSC-A. + +**Figure 42 (Sheet 11 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B** + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for Ack. from MSC-A'. It branches into four main paths based on received signals or timer expiry: 1) MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A, 2) Expiry T204, 3) A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A, and 4) A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A. Each path leads to resource release, MAP procedure cancellation, or signal forwarding to MSC-A, eventually terminating in states like IDLE, Wait for Disconnect, Call in Progress, or MS on MSC-B based on a 'Circuit Connection?' decision.](511f9b05a4c458937dd12c30936fd7d6_img.jpg) + +**Procedure MSC\_B\_HO** Sheet12(18) + +*Procedures for Handover in MSC-B* + +``` + +graph TD + Start([Wait for Ack. from MSC-A]) + + %% Path 1: Success + Start --> In1{ } + In1 --> Sig1[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. +from MSC-A] + Sig1 --> Res1[Reset +T204] + Res1 --> Rel1[Release Resources +in BSS-A] + Rel1 --> Can1[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + Can1 --> ToMSCA1[to MSC-A +in MSC-B] + ToMSCA1 --> Dec1{Circuit +Connection?} + Dec1 -- Yes --> WaitDisc([Wait for +Disconnect]) + Dec1 -- No --> Idle([IDLE]) + + %% Path 2: Expiry + In1 --> Sig2[Expiry +T204] + Sig2 --> Rel2[Release Resources +in BSS-A] + Rel2 --> Join1{ } + + %% Path 3: Clear Request + In1 --> Sig3[A-CLEAR-REQUEST +from BSS-A] + Sig3 --> Req1[MAP-PAS req. +[A-CLEAR-REQUEST] +to MSC-A] + Req1 --> Join1 + Join1 --> Res2[Reset +T204] + Res2 --> Rel3[Release Resources +in BSS-A] + Rel3 --> Can2[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + Can2 --> ToMSCA2[to MSC-A] + ToMSCA2 --> Dec1 + + %% Path 4: Handover Failure + In1 --> Sig4[A-HANDOVER- +FAILURE +from BSS-A] + Sig4 --> Req2[MAP-PAS req. +[A-HO-FAILURE] +to MSC-A] + Req2 --> Dec2{Circuit +Connection?} + Dec2 -- Yes --> CallProg([Call in Progress +on MSC-B]) + Dec2 -- No --> MSonB([MS +on +MSC-B]) + +``` + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for Ack. from MSC-A'. It branches into four main paths based on received signals or timer expiry: 1) MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A, 2) Expiry T204, 3) A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A, and 4) A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A. Each path leads to resource release, MAP procedure cancellation, or signal forwarding to MSC-A, eventually terminating in states like IDLE, Wait for Disconnect, Call in Progress, or MS on MSC-B based on a 'Circuit Connection?' decision. + +Figure 42 (Sheet 12 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +![SDL Diagram for MSC_B_HO handover procedure. It shows the logic flow from 'Wait for MS on BSS-B' state through various inputs like handover completion, clear requests, and timers, leading to states like 'MS on MSC-B' or 'IDLE'.](e9540f7fc7a084859dd5cdb0f9b7fcf2_img.jpg) + +## Procedure MSC\_B\_HO + +## Sheet13(18) + +Procedures for +Handover in MSC-B + +Basic handover from MSC-A to MSC-B +no Circuit Connection required + +``` + +stateDiagram-v2 + state "Wait for MS\non BSS-B" as WaitMS + state "MS on\nMSC-B" as MSonMSC + state "Wait for\nMS on BSS-B" as WaitMS2 + state IDLE + + [*] --> WaitMS + + WaitMS --> A_HO_Comp: A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B + A_HO_Comp --> ResetT204: Reset T204 + ResetT204 --> MapSendEnd: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] to MSC-A + MapSendEnd --> MSonMSC + + WaitMS --> A_Clear_Req: A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B + A_Clear_Req --> MapPasClear: MAP-PAS req [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A + MapPasClear --> WaitMS2 + + WaitMS --> ExpiryT204: Expiry T204 + ExpiryT204 --> CancelMap: Cancel MAP Procedures (to MSC-A in MSC-B) + CancelMap --> ReleaseRes: Release Resources on BSS-B + ReleaseRes --> IDLE + + WaitMS --> CancelMapProc: Cancel MAP Procedure (from MSC-A) + CancelMapProc --> ReleaseRes + + WaitMS --> A_HO_Detect: A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B + A_HO_Detect --> MapPasDetect: MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] to MSC-A + MapPasDetect --> WaitMS2 + +``` + +SDL Diagram for MSC\_B\_HO handover procedure. It shows the logic flow from 'Wait for MS on BSS-B' state through various inputs like handover completion, clear requests, and timers, leading to states like 'MS on MSC-B' or 'IDLE'. + +**Figure 42 (Sheet 13 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B** + +![Sequence diagram for Handover control procedure in MSC-B. The diagram shows three parallel lifelines: MS on MSC-B, MSC-A, and BSS-A. The process starts with MSC-A sending a MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MS on MSC-B, which then leads to 'Release Resources in BSS-B' and an 'IDLE' state. Simultaneously, BSS-A sends an A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED to MSC-A, which then sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [A-ASG-REQUEST] to MSC-B. MSC-B then sends a MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER req. to VLR and an A-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST to BSS-A, leading to a 'Wait for Assignment or Handover Number' state. A connector '2' is also shown.](649426750a89fa0e5d7c1736d5cf72c6_img.jpg) + +Procedure MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet14(18) + +Procedures for Handover in MSC-B + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant MS as MS on MSC-B + participant MSC_A as MSC-A + participant BSS_A as BSS-A + Note left of MS: Forward Messages to MS + MSC_A->>MS: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A + Note right of MS: Release Resources in BSS-B + MS-->>IDLE: IDLE + BSS_A->>MSC_A: A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED from BSS-A + MSC_A->>MSC_B: MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [A-ASG-REQUEST] from MSC-A + Note right of MSC_A: MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER req. to VLR + Note right of MSC_A: A-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST to BSS-A + MSC_B-->>Wait: Wait for Assignment or Handover Number + Note right of MSC_A: 2 +``` + +Sequence diagram for Handover control procedure in MSC-B. The diagram shows three parallel lifelines: MS on MSC-B, MSC-A, and BSS-A. The process starts with MSC-A sending a MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MS on MSC-B, which then leads to 'Release Resources in BSS-B' and an 'IDLE' state. Simultaneously, BSS-A sends an A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED to MSC-A, which then sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [A-ASG-REQUEST] to MSC-B. MSC-B then sends a MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER req. to VLR and an A-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST to BSS-A, leading to a 'Wait for Assignment or Handover Number' state. A connector '2' is also shown. + +Figure 42 (Sheet 14 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-B](0073ee258067e591778333101c5d2edb_img.jpg) + +Procedure MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet15(18) + +Procedures for Handover in MSC-B + +Circuit Connection Establishment on MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Assignment or Handover Number]) --> Join1(( )); BSSA_ASG_Comp[A-ASSIGNMENT-COMPLETE from BSS-A] --> Join1; VLR_MAP_Alloc[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR] --> Join1; Join1 --> WaitHN[Wait for Handover Number Allocation]; Join1 --> WaitASG[Wait for Assignment]; HN_Wait[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR] --> Join2(( )); ASG_Comp[A-ASSIGNMENT-COMPLETE from BSS-A] --> Join2; Join2 --> MAP_Prep[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [A-ASG-COMPLETE] to MSC-A]; MAP_Prep --> SetT210[Set T210]; SetT210 --> WaitConn[Wait for Connect from MSC-A]; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-B. It begins with a state 'Wait for Assignment or Handover Number'. Two parallel inputs, 'A-ASSIGNMENT-COMPLETE from BSS-A' and 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR', lead to a junction. From this junction, the process splits into two parallel waiting states: 'Wait for Handover Number Allocation' and 'Wait for Assignment'. These lead to another junction where 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR' and 'A-ASSIGNMENT-COMPLETE from BSS-A' are received. This second junction leads to a state 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [A-ASG-COMPLETE] to MSC-A', which then leads to 'Set T210', and finally to 'Wait for Connect from MSC-A'. + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +Figure 42 (Sheet 15 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +![Sequence diagram for Handover control procedure in MSC-B. The diagram shows two main paths: one for a successful handover and one for a failure. The failure path starts with 'A-ASSIGNMENT-FAILURE from BSS-A' leading to an 'ERROR' state and 'Indication from VLR'. The success path involves 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-ASG-FAILURE] to MSC-A', 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] to MSC-A', 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A', 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A', 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (to MSC-A and VLR-B, and to VLR-B), 'Release Resources in BSS-A', and finally reaching an 'IDLE' state. Various 'Wait for' states are shown at the top, such as 'Wait for Assignment or Handover Number', 'Wait for Assignment', and 'Wait for Handover Number Allocation'. The diagram ends with 'MS on MSC-B' on the left and 'IDLE' on the right.](9ef15a4afab1416db28b91184862a3a5_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet16(18) + +Procedures for Handover in MSC-B + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant BSS-A + participant MSC-A + participant MSC-B + participant VLR-B + + Note right of MSC-B: Procedures for Handover in MSC-B + + Note left of BSS-A: Wait for Assignment or Handover Number + Note left of MSC-A: Wait for Assignment + Note left of MSC-B: Wait for Assignment or Handover Number + Note left of VLR-B: Wait for Handover Number Allocation + Note left of BSS-A: Wait for Assignment or Handover Number + Note left of MSC-A: Wait for Assignment + Note left of VLR-B: Wait for Handover Number Allocation + + BSS-A->>MSC-A: A-ASSIGNMENT-FAILURE from BSS-A + MSC-A->>MSC-B: ERROR + MSC-B-->>VLR-B: Indication from VLR + MSC-B->>MSC-A: MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-ASG-FAILURE] to MSC-A + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] to MSC-A + BSS-A->>MSC-A: A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A + MSC-B->>MSC-A: Cancel MAP Procedures to MSC-A and VLR-B + MSC-B->>VLR-B: Cancel MAP Procedures to VLR-B + MSC-B->>BSS-A: Release Resources in BSS-A + MSC-B-->>MS: MS on MSC-B + BSS-A-->>IDLE: IDLE +``` + +Sequence diagram for Handover control procedure in MSC-B. The diagram shows two main paths: one for a successful handover and one for a failure. The failure path starts with 'A-ASSIGNMENT-FAILURE from BSS-A' leading to an 'ERROR' state and 'Indication from VLR'. The success path involves 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-ASG-FAILURE] to MSC-A', 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] to MSC-A', 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A', 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A', 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (to MSC-A and VLR-B, and to VLR-B), 'Release Resources in BSS-A', and finally reaching an 'IDLE' state. Various 'Wait for' states are shown at the top, such as 'Wait for Assignment or Handover Number', 'Wait for Assignment', and 'Wait for Handover Number Allocation'. The diagram ends with 'MS on MSC-B' on the left and 'IDLE' on the right. + +Figure 42 (Sheet 16 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-B](27c9c38b326b85de631d54a9ff1e2bd4_img.jpg) + +### Procedure MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet17(18) + +Procedures for +Handover in MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Connect from MSC-A]) --> Join(( )); Join --> I_CONNECT["I_CONNECT (IAM) from MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)"]; I_CONNECT --> T210_Exp{Expiry T210}; T210_Exp --> Reset["Reset T210"]; Reset --> to_MSC_A_1["to MSC-A in MSC-B"]; to_MSC_A_1 --> Cancel_MAP_1[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel_MAP_1 --> MAP_SEND["MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B"]; MAP_SEND --> I_COMPLETE["I_COMPLETE (ACM) to MSC-A"]; I_COMPLETE --> Call([Call on MSC-B]); T210_Exp --> A_CLEAR["A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A"]; A_CLEAR --> MAP_PAS["MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR_REQUEST] to MSC-A"]; MAP_PAS --> Cancel_MAP_2[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel_MAP_2 --> to_MSC_A_2["to MSC-A in MSC-B"]; to_MSC_A_2 --> Release["Release Radio Resources on BSS-A"]; Release --> Idle([IDLE]); +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-B. It begins with a 'Wait for Connect from MSC-A' state. Upon receiving an 'I\_CONNECT (IAM) from MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)', the system checks the 'Expiry T210' timer. If the timer expires, it triggers a 'Reset T210' and sends a message 'to MSC-A in MSC-B', followed by 'Cancel MAP Procedures'. The next step is 'MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B', then 'I\_COMPLETE (ACM) to MSC-A', leading to the 'Call on MSC-B' state. If the 'Expiry T210' timer expires before the connection is established, it triggers 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A', followed by 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR\_REQUEST] to MSC-A', 'Cancel MAP Procedures', and a message 'to MSC-A in MSC-B'. This leads to 'Release Radio Resources on BSS-A', which results in the 'IDLE' state. + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +Figure 42 (Sheet 17 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-B](e01c6273c4177746475715ee9c17a882_img.jpg) + +Procedure MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet18(18) + +Procedures for Handover in MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Connect from MSC-A]) --> I_DISCONNECT[I_DISCONNECT (REL) from MSC-A]; Start --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A]; Start --> Cancel_MAP[Cancel MAP Procedure]; I_DISCONNECT --> MS_on_MSC_B([MS on MSC-B]); MAP_SEND --> Release_BSS_A_1[Release Resources on BSS-A]; Release_BSS_A_1 --> IDLE_1([IDLE]); Cancel_MAP --> Release_BSS_A_2[Release Resources on BSS-A]; Release_BSS_A_2 --> IDLE_2([IDLE]); +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in MSC-B. It begins with a 'Wait for Connect from MSC-A' state. From this state, three possible actions are available: 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) from MSC-A', 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A', and 'Cancel MAP Procedure'. The 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) from MSC-A' action leads to the 'MS on MSC-B' state. The 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A' action leads to 'Release Resources on BSS-A', which then leads to the 'IDLE' state. The 'Cancel MAP Procedure' action, which is also labeled 'from MSC-A', leads to 'Release Resources on BSS-A', which then leads to the 'IDLE' state. + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +Figure 42 (Sheet 18 of 18): Handover control procedure in MSC-B + +![Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts at IDLE, proceeds to Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A, then branches based on A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED or Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED messages. It includes decision points for Known MSC, Handover allowed to Cell, Which MSC, Known RNS, and Resources on RNS-B2, leading to various outcomes like Call Release, SRNS Relocation, or returning to IDLE.](4f7470055bfc22c4aa6b007a4056940e_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet1(78) + +``` +graph TD; IDLE1([IDLE]) --> CallProgress([Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A]); CallProgress --> AHandoverReq[A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED from BSS-A (GSM to UMTS Handover)]; CallProgress --> IuRelocationReq[Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-A]; AHandoverReq --> KnownMSC{Known MSC?}; KnownMSC -- Yes --> WhichMSC{Which MSC?}; KnownMSC -- No --> HandoverAllowed{Handover allowed to Cell?}; HandoverAllowed -- No --> KnownMSC; HandoverAllowed -- Yes --> WhichMSC; WhichMSC -- 3G_MSC-B --> Exit2((2)); WhichMSC -- 3G_MSC-A --> KnownRNS{Known RNS?}; KnownRNS -- No --> SendReject{Send Reject?}; KnownRNS -- Yes --> Resources{Resources on RNS-B2?}; SendReject -- No --> Exit3((3)); SendReject -- Yes --> AHandoverReject[A-HANDOVER-REJECT to BSS-A]; AHandoverReject --> CallProgressGSM([Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (GSM)]); Resources -- No --> SendReject; Resources -- Yes --> Exit4((4)); IuRelocationReq --> TypeHandover{Type of handover}; TypeHandover -- To GSM --> Exit10((10)); TypeHandover -- SRNS Relocation --> Exit11((11)); FromMS[From MS or Network Implicit Release of BSS-A] -.-> CallRelease[Call Release]; CallRelease --> IDLE2([IDLE]); +``` + +Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts at IDLE, proceeds to Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A, then branches based on A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED or Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED messages. It includes decision points for Known MSC, Handover allowed to Cell, Which MSC, Known RNS, and Resources on RNS-B2, leading to various outcomes like Call Release, SRNS Relocation, or returning to IDLE. + +Figure 43 (sheet 1 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing the handover control process from BSS-A to RNS-B.](c0438093a10a593c42106b1e5dbb4331_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Handover on 3G\_MSC-A from BSS-A to RNS-B. + +Sheet2(78) + +``` +graph TD; Start((2)) --> Request[lu RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B]; Request --> SetT501_1[Set T501]; SetT501_1 --> WaitChannel[Wait for Channel Allocation Intra-MSC]; WaitChannel --> Decision1{ }; Decision1 --> Ack[lu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B]; Ack --> ResetT501_1[Reset T501]; ResetT501_1 --> Queue[Queue Messages for UE/MS in 3G_MSC-A]; Queue --> Command[Handover Command to UE/MS via BSS-A]; Command --> Setup[Set Up Handover Device]; Setup --> SetT502[Set T502]; SetT502 --> WaitAccess[Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS Ho)]; Decision1 --> Failure[lu-RELOCATION FAILURE from RNS-B]; Failure --> Decision2{ }; Decision2 --> Expiry[Expiry T501]; Expiry --> CancelRNSB[Cancel Channel in RNS-B]; CancelRNSB --> End3((3)); Decision2 --> ResetT501_2[Reset T501]; ResetT501_2 --> CallRelease[Call Release]; CallRelease --> ToNetwork[to Network]; ToNetwork --> ReleaseBSSA[Release Resources in BSS-A]; ReleaseBSSA --> CancelRNSB_2[Cancel Channel in RNS-B]; CancelRNSB_2 --> Idle[IDLE]; Decision1 --> FromUE[From UE/MS or Network]; FromUE --> CallRelease_2[Call Release]; CallRelease_2 --> ReleaseBSSA; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. It begins at connector 2, where an 'lu RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B' is sent. The timer T501 is set, and the system waits for channel allocation. A decision point follows: if an 'lu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B' is received, T501 is reset, messages are queued, a handover command is sent to the UE/MS via BSS-A, the handover device is set up (with an internal message), T502 is set, and the system waits for access by the UE/MS on RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS Ho). If an 'lu-RELOCATION FAILURE from RNS-B' is received, a decision point follows: if T501 expires, the channel is cancelled in RNS-B and the procedure ends at connector 3; if T501 is reset, a call release is initiated to the network, resources are released in BSS-A, the channel is cancelled in RNS-B, and the system enters an IDLE state. Alternatively, a call release can be initiated directly from a decision point if the request comes from the UE/MS or the network. + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing the handover control process from BSS-A to RNS-B. + +Figure 43 (sheet 2 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing two parallel paths for handover control. The left path starts with 'Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS Ho)', followed by 'Iu-RELOCATION COMPLETE from RNS-B', 'Connect the Handover Device (Option) [Only if not already connected]', 'Reset T502', 'Release Resources in BSS-A', 'Forward queued messages for UE/MS via RNS-B', and ends with 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. The right path starts with 'Iu-RELOCATION DETECT from RNS-B', followed by 'Connect the Handover Device (Option)', and ends with 'Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS handover)'.](0eb348bf17d67bf96326e07011d1c1ad_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet3(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start(( )) --> Wait1[Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS Ho)]; Start --> Detect[Iu-RELOCATION DETECT from RNS-B]; Detect --> Connect2[Connect the Handover Device (Option)]; Connect2 --> Wait2[Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS handover)]; Wait1 --> Complete[Iu-RELOCATION COMPLETE from RNS-B]; Complete --> Connect1[Connect the Handover Device (Option)]; Note1[Only if not already connected] -.-> Connect1; Connect1 --> Reset[Reset T502]; Reset --> Release[Release Resources in BSS-A]; Release --> Forward[Forward queued messages for UE/MS via RNS-B]; Forward --> CallProgress[Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)]; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing two parallel paths for handover control. The left path starts with 'Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS Ho)', followed by 'Iu-RELOCATION COMPLETE from RNS-B', 'Connect the Handover Device (Option) [Only if not already connected]', 'Reset T502', 'Release Resources in BSS-A', 'Forward queued messages for UE/MS via RNS-B', and ends with 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. The right path starts with 'Iu-RELOCATION DETECT from RNS-B', followed by 'Connect the Handover Device (Option)', and ends with 'Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS handover)'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 3 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. It starts with 'Wait for Access by UE/MS On RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. From here, it branches into four main paths: 1) Success path: 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A' -> 'Reset T502' -> 'Forward queued messages for UE/MS via BSS-A' -> 'Release Resources in RNS-B' -> 'Release Handover Device' -> 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (GSM)'. 2) Failure path: 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A' -> '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'Iu-RELEASE REQUEST from RNS-B' -> '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'Release Resources in RNS-B' -> 'Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. 3) Expiry path: 'Expiry T502' -> 'Release Resources in BSS-A' -> 'Wait for UE/MS on BSS-B?' -> (Yes: 'Release Resources in RNS-B' -> 'Call Release to Network' -> 'Release Handover Device' -> 'IDLE'; No: 'Reset T502' -> 'Release Resources in RNS-B' -> 'Call Release to Network' -> 'Release Handover Device' -> 'IDLE'). 4) Call Release path: 'Call Release From Network' -> 'Release Handover Device' -> 'Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS Ho)'.](febb6833677d1ca3a5550901b7673b63_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet4(78) + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Access by UE/MS On RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS Ho)]) --> A_HF[A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A]; Start --> A_CR[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A]; Start --> E_T502[Expiry T502]; Start --> CR[Call Release From Network]; A_HF --> R_T502_1[Reset T502]; R_T502_1 --> FQM[Forward queued messages for UE/MS via BSS-A]; FQM --> RR_RNSB_1[Release Resources in RNS-B]; RR_RNSB_1 --> RD_1[Release Handover Device]; RD_1 --> CIP[Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (GSM)]; A_CR --> AO1[(Allowed once in this state)]; AO1 --> IRQ[Iu-RELEASE REQUEST from RNS-B]; IRQ --> AO2[(Allowed once in this state)]; AO2 --> RR_RNSB_2[Release Resources in RNS-B]; RR_RNSB_2 --> WAM_1([Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS Ho))]; E_T502 --> RR_BSSA_1[Release Resources in BSS-A]; RR_BSSA_1 --> WUM_B[Wait for UE/MS on BSS-B?]; WUM_B -- Yes --> RR_RNSB_3[Release Resources in RNS-B]; WUM_B -- No --> R_T502_2[Reset T502]; RR_RNSB_3 --> CR_Net[Call Release to Network]; CR_Net --> RD_2[Release Handover Device]; RD_2 --> IDLE([IDLE]); R_T502_2 --> RR_RNSB_4[Release Resources in RNS-B]; RR_RNSB_4 --> CR_Net; CR_Net --> RD_2; RD_2 --> IDLE; CR --> RD_3[Release Handover Device]; RD_3 --> WAM_2([Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS Ho))]); +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. It starts with 'Wait for Access by UE/MS On RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. From here, it branches into four main paths: 1) Success path: 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A' -> 'Reset T502' -> 'Forward queued messages for UE/MS via BSS-A' -> 'Release Resources in RNS-B' -> 'Release Handover Device' -> 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (GSM)'. 2) Failure path: 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A' -> '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'Iu-RELEASE REQUEST from RNS-B' -> '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'Release Resources in RNS-B' -> 'Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. 3) Expiry path: 'Expiry T502' -> 'Release Resources in BSS-A' -> 'Wait for UE/MS on BSS-B?' -> (Yes: 'Release Resources in RNS-B' -> 'Call Release to Network' -> 'Release Handover Device' -> 'IDLE'; No: 'Reset T502' -> 'Release Resources in RNS-B' -> 'Call Release to Network' -> 'Release Handover Device' -> 'IDLE'). 4) Call Release path: 'Call Release From Network' -> 'Release Handover Device' -> 'Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS/BSS (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 4 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart for Handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-A. It starts at connector 10, checks if the MSC is known. If not, it checks if handover is allowed to the cell. If allowed, it checks which MSC (MSC-B or 3G_MSC-A). If 3G_MSC-A, it checks if the BSS is known. If not, it checks if resources are available on BSS-B. If resources are available, it proceeds to connector 13. If the BSS is known, it also proceeds to connector 13. If handover is not allowed to the cell, or if the MSC is known, it proceeds to connector 12. From connector 12, it goes to an 'Iu-RELOCATION PREPARATION FAILURE to RNS-A' block, and then to 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. From connector 14, it also leads to 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)'.](6d54943c64ae4af089cb9e98a78d0af7_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet5(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; 10((10)) --> K{Known MSC?}; K -- Yes --> J(( )); K -- No --> H{Handover allowed to Cell?}; H -- No --> J; H -- Yes --> I{Which MSC?}; I -- MSC-B --> L((14)); I -- 3G_MSC-A --> G{Known BSS?}; G -- No --> F{Resources on BSS-B?}; F -- No --> J; F -- Yes --> 13((13)); G -- Yes --> 13; J --> 12((12)); 12 --> E{{Iu-RELOCATION PREPARATION FAILURE to RNS-A}}; E --> D[Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)]; L --> D; +``` + +Flowchart for Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. It starts at connector 10, checks if the MSC is known. If not, it checks if handover is allowed to the cell. If allowed, it checks which MSC (MSC-B or 3G\_MSC-A). If 3G\_MSC-A, it checks if the BSS is known. If not, it checks if resources are available on BSS-B. If resources are available, it proceeds to connector 13. If the BSS is known, it also proceeds to connector 13. If handover is not allowed to the cell, or if the MSC is known, it proceeds to connector 12. From connector 12, it goes to an 'Iu-RELOCATION PREPARATION FAILURE to RNS-A' block, and then to 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. From connector 14, it also leads to 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 5 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing the handover control process from RNS-A to BSS-B via 3G_MSC-A.](1fd763be1b7a05b52e554f0583617642_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Handover on 3G\_MSC-A from RNS-A to BSS-B. + +Sheet6(78) + +``` +graph TD; Start((13)) --> A_HANDOVER_REQUEST[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B]; A_HANDOVER_REQUEST --> Set_T301[Set T301]; Set_T301 --> Wait_Channel_Allocation[Wait for Channel Allocation Intra-MSC]; Wait_Channel_Allocation --> Decision1{ }; Decision1 --> A_HANDOVER_REQUEST_ACK[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK from BSS-B]; A_HANDOVER_REQUEST_ACK --> Reset_T301_1[Reset T301]; Reset_T301_1 --> Queue_Messages[Queue Messages for UE/MS in 3G_MSC-A]; Queue_Messages --> Handover_Command[Handover Command to UE/MS via Iu-RELOCATION Command to RNS-A]; Handover_Command --> Set_Up_Handover_Device[Set Up Handover Device]; Set_Up_Handover_Device --> Internal_Message[Internal message in 3G_MSC-A]; Internal_Message --> Set_T302[Set T302]; Set_T302 --> Wait_Access[Wait for access by UE/MS on BSS/RNS (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; Decision1 --> A_HANDOVER_FAILURE[A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-B]; A_HANDOVER_FAILURE --> Decision2{ }; Decision2 --> Expiry_T301[Expiry T301]; Expiry_T301 --> Cancel_Channel_BSS_B_1[Cancel Channel in BSS-B]; Cancel_Channel_BSS_B_1 --> End12((12)); Decision2 --> Reset_T301_2[Reset T301]; Reset_T301_2 --> Cancel_Channel_BSS_B_2[Cancel Channel in BSS-B]; Cancel_Channel_BSS_B_2 --> End12; Decision1 --> From_UE_MS[From UE/MS or Network]; From_UE_MS --> Call_Release_1[Call Release]; Call_Release_1 --> Iu_RELEASE_REQUEST[Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A]; Iu_RELEASE_REQUEST --> Call_Release_2[Call Release]; Call_Release_2 --> To_Network[to Network]; To_Network --> Release_Resources[Release Resources in RNS-A]; Release_Resources --> Cancel_Channel_BSS_B_3[Cancel Channel in BSS-B]; Cancel_Channel_BSS_B_3 --> IDLE([IDLE]); +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. It begins at connector 13, where an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST is sent to BSS-B. The timer T301 is set, and the system waits for channel allocation within the intra-MSC. A decision point follows. If an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK is received from BSS-B, T301 is reset, messages are queued for the UE/MS, a handover command is sent via Iu-RELOCATION to RNS-A, the handover device is set up, an internal message is sent, T302 is set, and the system waits for UE/MS access on BSS/RNS (UMTS to GSM Ho). If an A-HANDOVER-FAILURE is received from BSS-B, a decision is made. If the T301 timer expires, the channel is cancelled in BSS-B, and the process ends at connector 12. If the T301 timer is reset, the channel is cancelled in BSS-B, and the process ends at connector 12. Alternatively, if a request comes from the UE/MS or Network, a call release is initiated, an Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST is sent from RNS-A, the call is released to the network, resources are released in RNS-A, the channel is cancelled in BSS-B, and the system enters the IDLE state. + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing the handover control process from RNS-A to BSS-B via 3G\_MSC-A. + +Figure 43 (sheet 6 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. It starts with 'Wait for access by UE/MS on BSS/RNS (UMTS to GSM handover)'. From here, two paths emerge: 1) 'A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B' leads to 'Connect the Handover Device (Option)' (with a note 'Only if not already connected'), then 'Reset T302', 'Release Resources in RNS-A', 'Forward queued messages for UE/MS via BSS-B', and finally 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (GSM)'. 2) 'A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B' leads to another 'Connect the Handover Device (Option)', which then leads to 'Wait for access by UE/MS on BSS/RNS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'.](c36c9f3fd6dfe6c3116a5b86b6ab0877_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet7(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for access by UE/MS on BSS/RNS (UMTS to GSM handover)]) --> AHC[A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B]; Start --> AHD[A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B]; AHC --> CHD1[Connect the Handover Device (Option)]; CHD1 -.-> Note1[Only if not already connected]; CHD1 --> Reset[Reset T302]; Reset --> Release[Release Resources in RNS-A]; Release --> Forward[Forward queued messages for UE/MS via BSS-B]; Forward --> CallProg([Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (GSM)]); AHD --> CHD2[Connect the Handover Device (Option)]; CHD2 --> WaitHo([Wait for access by UE/MS on BSS/RNS (UMTS to GSM Ho))]; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. It starts with 'Wait for access by UE/MS on BSS/RNS (UMTS to GSM handover)'. From here, two paths emerge: 1) 'A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B' leads to 'Connect the Handover Device (Option)' (with a note 'Only if not already connected'), then 'Reset T302', 'Release Resources in RNS-A', 'Forward queued messages for UE/MS via BSS-B', and finally 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (GSM)'. 2) 'A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B' leads to another 'Connect the Handover Device (Option)', which then leads to 'Wait for access by UE/MS on BSS/RNS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 7 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![SDL Flowchart for Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO. The process begins at the state 'Wait for Access by UE/MS On RNS/BSS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. There are five input paths: 1. 'Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A' leads to 'Reset T302', 'Forward queued messages for UE/MS via RNS-A', 'Release Resources in BSS-B', 'Release Handover Device', and ends at state 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. 2. 'Iu-RELEASE REQUEST from RNS-A' leads to a condition '(Allowed once in this state)', then 'A-CLEAR REQUEST from BSS-B', another '(Allowed once in this state)', 'Release Resources in BSS-B', and returns to 'Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS/BSS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. 3. A condition '(Allowed once in this state)' leads to 'Release Resources in RNS-A', then a decision 'Wait for UE/MS on BSS-B?'. If 'Yes', it returns to the 'Wait for access' state. If 'No', it leads to 'Reset T302', 'Release Resources in BSS-B', 'Call Release' (to Network), 'Release Handover Device', and ends at 'IDLE'. 4. 'Expiry T302' leads to 'Release Resources in RNS-A' and returns to the 'Wait for access' state. 5. 'Call Release' (from Network) leads to 'Release Handover Device' and returns to the 'Wait for access' state.](126e772862105e7d64e4ef3f85a16840_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet8(78) + +``` + +graph TD + StartState([Wait for Access by UE/MS On RNS/BSS +UMTS to GSM Ho]) + + %% Path 1 + In1[/Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL +from RNS-A/] + Task1_1[Reset +T302] + Task1_2[Forward queued +messages for +UE/MS via RNS-A] + Task1_3[Release +Resources +in BSS-B] + Task1_4[Release +Handover +Device] + End1([Call in Progress +on 3G_MSC-A +UTRAN]) + + StartState --> In1 + In1 --> Task1_1 + Task1_1 --> Task1_2 + Task1_2 --> Task1_3 + Task1_3 --> Task1_4 + Task1_4 --> End1 + + %% Path 2 + In2[/Iu-RELEASE +REQUEST +from RNS-A/] + Cond2_1{Allowed +once in +this state} + Task2_1[/A-CLEAR +REQUEST +from BSS-B/] + Cond2_2{Allowed +once in +this state} + Task2_2[Release +Resources +in BSS-B] + End2([Wait for access +by UE/MS +on RNS/BSS +UMTS to GSM Ho]) + + StartState --> In2 + In2 --> Cond2_1 + Cond2_1 --> Task2_1 + Task2_1 --> Cond2_2 + Cond2_2 --> Task2_2 + Task2_2 --> End2 + + %% Path 3 + Cond3_1{Allowed +once in +this state} + Task3_1[Release +Resources +in RNS-A] + Dec3{Wait for +UE/MS on +BSS-B?} + Task3_2[Reset +T302] + Task3_3[Release +Resources +in BSS-B] + Task3_4[/Call +Release/] --> Out3_1((to Network)) + Task3_5[Release +Handover +Device] + End3([IDLE]) + + StartState --> Cond3_1 + Cond3_1 --> Task3_1 + Task3_1 --> Dec3 + Dec3 -- Yes --> End2 + Dec3 -- No --> Task3_2 + Task3_2 --> Task3_3 + Task3_3 --> Task3_4 + Task3_4 --> Task3_5 + Task3_5 --> End3 + + %% Path 4 + In4[/Expiry +T302/] + Task4_1[Release +Resources +in RNS-A] + + StartState --> In4 + In4 --> Task4_1 + Task4_1 --> End2 + + %% Path 5 + In5[/Call +Release/] --> Out5_1((From Network)) + Task5_1[Release +Handover +Device] + + StartState --> In5 + In5 --> Task5_1 + Task5_1 --> End2 + +``` + +SDL Flowchart for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO. The process begins at the state 'Wait for Access by UE/MS On RNS/BSS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. There are five input paths: 1. 'Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A' leads to 'Reset T302', 'Forward queued messages for UE/MS via RNS-A', 'Release Resources in BSS-B', 'Release Handover Device', and ends at state 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. 2. 'Iu-RELEASE REQUEST from RNS-A' leads to a condition '(Allowed once in this state)', then 'A-CLEAR REQUEST from BSS-B', another '(Allowed once in this state)', 'Release Resources in BSS-B', and returns to 'Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS/BSS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. 3. A condition '(Allowed once in this state)' leads to 'Release Resources in RNS-A', then a decision 'Wait for UE/MS on BSS-B?'. If 'Yes', it returns to the 'Wait for access' state. If 'No', it leads to 'Reset T302', 'Release Resources in BSS-B', 'Call Release' (to Network), 'Release Handover Device', and ends at 'IDLE'. 4. 'Expiry T302' leads to 'Release Resources in RNS-A' and returns to the 'Wait for access' state. 5. 'Call Release' (from Network) leads to 'Release Handover Device' and returns to the 'Wait for access' state. + +**Figure 43 (sheet 8 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A** + +![Flowchart for Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO. It starts at connector 11, checks if 3G_MSC is known. If no, it goes to connector 16. If yes, it asks which 3G_MSC (A or B). For 3G_MSC-A, it checks if RNS is known and if resources on RNS-B are available. If both yes, it goes to connector 15. If no to either, it goes to connector 16. For 3G_MSC-B, it goes directly to connector 17. A failure message 'Iu-RELOCATION PREPARATION FAILURE to RNS-A' is shown before the final state 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)'.](dfd09f348b50c9255f3cfe67985db9bc_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet9(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; 11((11)) --> K1{Known 3G_MSC?}; K1 -- No --> 16((16)); K1 -- Yes --> W{Which 3G_MSC?}; W -- 3G_MSC-B --> 17((17)); W -- 3G_MSC-A --> K2{Known RNS?}; K2 -- No --> 16; K2 -- Yes --> R{Resources on RNS-B?}; R -- No --> 16; R -- Yes --> 15((15)); 16 --> F{{Iu-RELOCATION PREPARATION FAILURE to RNS-A}}; F --> C[Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)]; +``` + +Flowchart for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO. It starts at connector 11, checks if 3G\_MSC is known. If no, it goes to connector 16. If yes, it asks which 3G\_MSC (A or B). For 3G\_MSC-A, it checks if RNS is known and if resources on RNS-B are available. If both yes, it goes to connector 15. If no to either, it goes to connector 16. For 3G\_MSC-B, it goes directly to connector 17. A failure message 'Iu-RELOCATION PREPARATION FAILURE to RNS-A' is shown before the final state 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 9 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO. The process starts at connector 15, sends an Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B, sets timer T701, and waits for channel allocation. It then branches based on responses: success leads to resetting T701, queuing messages, sending a command to RNS-A, setting up the device, setting timer T702, and waiting for access (ending at connector 16); failure leads to resetting T701 and canceling the channel in RNS-B (ending at connector 16); a timeout leads to releasing resources in RNS-A, canceling the channel in RNS-B, and returning to an IDLE state; a release request from RNS-A leads to a call release to the network (ending at connector 16).](e3e8a926bfe6337a654ecac063ba3682_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet10(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +SRNS Relocation on 3G\_MSC-A from RNS-A to RNS-B + +``` +graph TD; 15((15)) --> IuR[lu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B]; IuR --> T701Set[Set T701]; T701Set --> WaitAlloc[Wait for Channel Allocation Intra-3G_MSC]; WaitAlloc --> Success{ }; Success --> IuRA[lu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B]; IuRA --> T701Reset1[Reset T701]; T701Reset1 --> Queue[Queue Messages for UE in 3G_MSC-A]; Queue --> IuC[lu-RELOCATION Command to RNS-A]; IuC --> Setup[Set Up Handover Device]; Setup --> Internal[Internal message in 3G_MSC-A]; Internal --> T702Set[Set T702]; T702Set --> WaitAccess[Wait for access by UE on RNS (SRNS Relocation)]; WaitAccess --> 16((16)); Success --> Failure{ }; Failure --> IuRF[lu-RELOCATION FAILURE from RNS-B]; IuRF --> T701Reset2[Reset T701]; T701Reset2 --> CancelB[Cancel Channel in RNS-B]; CancelB --> 16; Success --> Timeout{ }; Timeout --> T701Exp[Expiry T701]; T701Exp --> ReleaseA[Release Resources in RNS-A]; ReleaseA --> CancelB2[Cancel Channel in RNS-B]; CancelB2 --> IDLE([IDLE]); Success --> ReleaseReq{ }; ReleaseReq --> IuRel[lu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A]; IuRel --> CallRel[Call Release]; CallRel --> ToNet[to Network]; ToNet --> 16; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO. The process starts at connector 15, sends an Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B, sets timer T701, and waits for channel allocation. It then branches based on responses: success leads to resetting T701, queuing messages, sending a command to RNS-A, setting up the device, setting timer T702, and waiting for access (ending at connector 16); failure leads to resetting T701 and canceling the channel in RNS-B (ending at connector 16); a timeout leads to releasing resources in RNS-A, canceling the channel in RNS-B, and returning to an IDLE state; a release request from RNS-A leads to a call release to the network (ending at connector 16). + +Figure 43 (sheet 10 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing two parallel paths for handover control. The left path starts with 'Wait for access by UE on RNS (SRNS RELOCATION)', followed by 'Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B', 'Connect the Handover Device (Option)' (with a note 'Only if not already connected'), 'Reset T702', 'Release Resources in RNS-A', 'Forward queued messages for UE via RNS-B', and ends with 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. The right path starts with 'Wait for access by UE on RNS (SRNS RELOCATION)', followed by 'Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT from RNS-B', 'Connect the Handover Device (Option)', and ends with 'Wait for access by UE on RNS (SRNS Relocation)'.](dbe8bef1723acb3e03e8616be4faf939_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet11(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start1[Wait for access by UE on RNS (SRNS RELOCATION)] --> Join1(( )); Start2[Wait for access by UE on RNS (SRNS RELOCATION)] --> Join2(( )); Join1 --> IuRC[Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B]; IuRC --> CHD1[Connect the Handover Device (Option)]; CHD1 -.-> Note1[Only if not already connected]; CHD1 --> Reset[Reset T702]; Reset --> Release[Release Resources in RNS-A]; Release --> Forward[Forward queued messages for UE via RNS-B]; Forward --> CallProgress[Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)]; Join2 --> IuRD[Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT from RNS-B]; IuRD --> CHD2[Connect the Handover Device (Option)]; CHD2 --> WaitAccess2[Wait for access by UE on RNS (SRNS Relocation)]; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing two parallel paths for handover control. The left path starts with 'Wait for access by UE on RNS (SRNS RELOCATION)', followed by 'Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B', 'Connect the Handover Device (Option)' (with a note 'Only if not already connected'), 'Reset T702', 'Release Resources in RNS-A', 'Forward queued messages for UE via RNS-B', and ends with 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. The right path starts with 'Wait for access by UE on RNS (SRNS RELOCATION)', followed by 'Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT from RNS-B', 'Connect the Handover Device (Option)', and ends with 'Wait for access by UE on RNS (SRNS Relocation)'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 11 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for Access (by UE On RNS) (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into four main paths: 1) 'Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A' leads to 'Reset T702', 'Forward queued messages for UE via RNS-A', 'Release Resources in RNS-B', 'Release Handover Device', and ends at 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. 2) 'Iu-RELEASE REQUEST from RNS-A' leads to a decision '(Allowed once in this state)'. If 'Yes', it leads to 'Release Resources in RNS-A', which then leads to a decision 'Wait for UE on RNS-B?'. If 'No', it leads to 'Reset T702', 'Release Resources in RNS-B', 'Call Release' (to Network), 'Release Handover Device', and ends at 'IDLE'. If 'Yes', it leads to 'Wait for access (by UE on RNS) (SRNS Relocation)'. If 'No' (from the first decision), it leads to 'Iu-RELEASE REQUEST from RNS-B', 'Release Resources in RNS-B', 'Wait for access (by UE on RNS) (SRNS Relocation)'. 3) 'Expiry T702' leads to 'Release Resources in RNS-A', which then leads to 'Release Handover Device' and ends at 'Wait for access (by UE on RNS) (SRNS Relocation)'. 4) 'Call Release' (From Network) leads to 'Release Handover Device' and ends at 'Wait for access (by UE on RNS) (SRNS Relocation)'.](b0f7b7a99fad9dffaf1b3dc5e4d01c86_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet12(78) + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Access by UE On RNS SRNS Relocation]) --> IuRCancel[Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A]; Start --> IuReleaseA[Iu-RELEASE REQUEST from RNS-A]; Start --> ExpiryT702[Expiry T702]; Start --> CallRelease[Call Release]; IuRCancel --> ResetT702A[Reset T702]; ResetT702A --> ForwardMessages[Forward queued messages for UE via RNS-A]; ForwardMessages --> ReleaseResourcesRNSB1[Release Resources in RNS-B]; ReleaseResourcesRNSB1 --> ReleaseHandoverDevice1[Release Handover Device]; ReleaseHandoverDevice1 --> CallInProgress[Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A UTRAN]; IuReleaseA --> AllowedOnceA{Allowed once in this state}; AllowedOnceA -- Yes --> ReleaseResourcesRNSA1[Release Resources in RNS-A]; AllowedOnceA -- No --> IuReleaseB[Iu-RELEASE REQUEST from RNS-B]; ReleaseResourcesRNSA1 --> WaitUEonRNSB{Wait for UE on RNS-B?}; WaitUEonRNSB -- Yes --> WaitAccessSRNS[Wait for access by UE on RNS SRNS Relocation]; WaitUEonRNSB -- No --> ResetT702B[Reset T702]; ResetT702B --> ReleaseResourcesRNSB2[Release Resources in RNS-B]; ReleaseResourcesRNSB2 --> CallReleaseB[Call Release]; CallReleaseB --> ToNetwork[to Network]; CallReleaseB --> ReleaseHandoverDevice2[Release Handover Device]; ReleaseHandoverDevice2 --> IDLE([IDLE]); IuReleaseB --> ReleaseResourcesRNSB3[Release Resources in RNS-B]; ReleaseResourcesRNSB3 --> WaitAccessSRNS; ExpiryT702 --> ReleaseResourcesRNSA2[Release Resources in RNS-A]; ReleaseResourcesRNSA2 --> ReleaseHandoverDevice3[Release Handover Device]; ReleaseHandoverDevice3 --> WaitAccessSRNS; CallRelease --> ReleaseHandoverDevice4[Release Handover Device]; ReleaseHandoverDevice4 --> WaitAccessSRNS; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for Access (by UE On RNS) (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into four main paths: 1) 'Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A' leads to 'Reset T702', 'Forward queued messages for UE via RNS-A', 'Release Resources in RNS-B', 'Release Handover Device', and ends at 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. 2) 'Iu-RELEASE REQUEST from RNS-A' leads to a decision '(Allowed once in this state)'. If 'Yes', it leads to 'Release Resources in RNS-A', which then leads to a decision 'Wait for UE on RNS-B?'. If 'No', it leads to 'Reset T702', 'Release Resources in RNS-B', 'Call Release' (to Network), 'Release Handover Device', and ends at 'IDLE'. If 'Yes', it leads to 'Wait for access (by UE on RNS) (SRNS Relocation)'. If 'No' (from the first decision), it leads to 'Iu-RELEASE REQUEST from RNS-B', 'Release Resources in RNS-B', 'Wait for access (by UE on RNS) (SRNS Relocation)'. 3) 'Expiry T702' leads to 'Release Resources in RNS-A', which then leads to 'Release Handover Device' and ends at 'Wait for access (by UE on RNS) (SRNS Relocation)'. 4) 'Call Release' (From Network) leads to 'Release Handover Device' and ends at 'Wait for access (by UE on RNS) (SRNS Relocation)'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 12 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![SDL Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO Sheet 13](0f666d2ebbad7fab84c7c4fb531ea932_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet13(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Basic GSM to UMTS handover +to 3G\_MSC-B Circuit +Connection required + +``` + +graph TD + Start((4)) --> Out1[/"MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. +[A-HO-REQUEST] +to 3G_MSC-B"/] + Out1 --> State1(["Wait For Acknowledgement +from 3G_MSC-B +(GSM to UMTS Ho)"]) + + State1 --> In1[\"MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. +[A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] +from 3G_MSC-B"/] + State1 --> In2[\"MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. +[A-HO-FAILURE] +from 3G_MSC-B"/] + State1 --> In3[\"MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. +[MAP ERROR] +from 3G_MSC-B"/] + + In1 --> Dec1{Handover +Number?} + Dec1 -- "Requested" --> Out2[/"I_CONNECT (IAM) +to 3G_MSC-B using +Handover Number"/] + Out2 --> State2(["Wait for Connection +from 3G_MSC-B +(GSM to UMTS Ho)"]) + + Dec1 -- "Not Requested" --> Conn7((7)) + + In2 --> Conn3((3)) + In3 --> Conn3 + +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. It begins at connector 4, leading to an output block that sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request (A-HO-REQUEST) to 3G\_MSC-B. The system then enters a state waiting for an acknowledgement. Three possible inputs are handled: a successful acknowledgement (A-HO-REQUEST-ACK), a failure (A-HO-FAILURE), or a MAP error. If a successful acknowledgement is received, a decision is made based on whether a Handover Number was requested. If requested, an I\_CONNECT (IAM) message is sent to 3G\_MSC-B and the system waits for a connection. If not requested, the flow ends at connector 7. Failure and error responses lead to connector 3. + +SDL Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO Sheet 13 + +Figure 43 (sheet 13 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for GSM to UMTS Handover. The process starts with 'Wait For Acknowledgement from 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. From here, it branches into two main paths. The left path is an error handling sequence: 'ERROR from 3G_MSC-B' -> 'Cancel MAP Resources in 3G_MSC-A' -> connector '3'. The right path is the successful handover sequence: 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A' -> 'Call Release to Network' -> 'Call Release From UE/MS or Network' -> 'Release Resources in BSS-A' -> 'Cancel MAP Resources to 3G_MSC-B' -> 'IDLE'.](b151ddbeea4f514f5f29ce489350c7f7_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet14(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait For Acknowledgement from 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)]) --> ERROR{ERROR}; Start --> A_CLEAR[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A]; ERROR --> ERROR_MSG[from 3G_MSC-B]; ERROR --> CANCEL_MAP[Cancel MAP Resources]; CANCEL_MAP --> CANCEL_MAP_MSG[In 3G_MSC-A]; CANCEL_MAP --> Connector((3)); A_CLEAR --> Call_Release_Net[Call Release]; Call_Release_Net --> Call_Release_Net_MSG[to Network]; Call_Release_Net --> Call_Release_UE[Call Release]; Call_Release_UE --> Call_Release_UE_MSG[From UE/MS or Network]; Call_Release_UE --> Release_Res[Release Resources in BSS-A]; Release_Res --> CANCEL_MAP_B[Cancel MAP Resources]; CANCEL_MAP_B --> CANCEL_MAP_B_MSG[to 3G_MSC-B]; CANCEL_MAP_B --> IDLE([IDLE]) +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for GSM to UMTS Handover. The process starts with 'Wait For Acknowledgement from 3G\_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. From here, it branches into two main paths. The left path is an error handling sequence: 'ERROR from 3G\_MSC-B' -> 'Cancel MAP Resources in 3G\_MSC-A' -> connector '3'. The right path is the successful handover sequence: 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A' -> 'Call Release to Network' -> 'Call Release From UE/MS or Network' -> 'Release Resources in BSS-A' -> 'Cancel MAP Resources to 3G\_MSC-B' -> 'IDLE'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 14 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![SDL diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing handover control logic from GSM to UMTS.](d884367c84ba50f250499f79c4b4b950_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet15(78) + +``` + +graph TD + State1[Wait for Connection +from 3G_MSC-B +(GSM to UMTS Ho)] + + %% Inputs + In1[/I_COMPLETE (ACM) +from 3G_MSC-B/] + In2[/A-CLEAR-REQUEST +from BSS-A/] + In3[/MAP-PAS req. +[A-CLEAR-REQUEST] +from 3G_MSC-B/] + In4[/From UE/MS +or Network/] + In5[/Call +Release/] + + State1 --> In1 + State1 --> In2 + State1 --> In3 + State1 --> In4 + State1 --> In5 + + %% Left Path + In1 --> Task1[Queue Messages +for UE/MS +in 3G_MSC-A] + Task1 --> Out1[Handover Command +to UE/MS via BSS-A] + Out1 --> Task2[Set +T503] + Task2 --> Task3[Set Up the +Handover +Device] + Task3 --> Out2[Internal message +in 3G_MSC-A] + Out2 --> State2[Wait for Completion +on 3G_MSC-B +(GSM to UMTS Ho)] + + %% Middle Path + In2 --> Dec1{Allowed +once in +this state} + In3 --> Dec2{Allowed +once in +this state} + + Dec1 --> Out3[Call +Release] + Dec2 --> Out3 + Out3 --> Out4[to UE/MS +and Network] + Out3 --> Task4[Release +Resources +in BSS-A] + + In4 --> Out3 + In5 --> Task4 + + Task4 --> Out5[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + Out5 --> Out6[I_DISCONNECT +(REL) to 3G_MSC-B] + Out6 --> State3([IDLE]) + + %% Error Path + InError[/from 3G_MSC-B +or Network/] + InError --> Dec3{ERROR} + Dec3 --> Out7[to 3G_MSC-B +in 3G_MSC-A] + Out7 --> Out8[I_DISCONNECT +(REL) to 3G_MSC-B] + Out8 --> State3 + Dec3 --> Conn3((3)) + +``` + +SDL diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing handover control logic from GSM to UMTS. + +Figure 43 (sheet 15 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion (on 3G_MSC-B) (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into three main paths based on incoming signals: 1) MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] from 3G_MSC-B leads to 'Reset T503' and then 'Connect Handover Device (option)'. 2) I-ANSWER (ANM) from 3G_MSC-B leads to a decision '(Allowed once in this state)'. If 'Yes', it sends 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from BSS-B' and then 'Wait for Completion (on 3G_MSC-B) (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. If 'No', it sends 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A', 'Release Resources on BSS-A', and then another decision 'Wait for UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B?'. If 'Yes' to the second decision, it goes to 'Wait for Completion (on 3G_MSC-B) (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. If 'No', it sends 'Call Release to Network and UE/MS', 'Release MAP Resources to 3G_MSC-B in 3G_MSC-A', 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B', and ends at 'IDLE'. 3) MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from 3G_MSC-B leads to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' and then 'Wait for Completion (on 3G_MSC-B) (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. All three paths eventually lead to 'Forward queued messages via 3G_MSC-B', 'Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req', 'Release Resources on BSS-A', and 'Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'.](313826501fcb4294a5d337702ea35f2d_img.jpg) + +Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO +Sheet16(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + + graph TD + Start([Wait for Completion +on 3G_MSC-B +(GSM to UMTS Ho)]) --> Branch{ } + + Branch --> In1[/MAP-SEND- +END-SIGNAL req. +[A-HO-COMPLETE] +from 3G_MSC-B/] + In1 --> Task1[Reset +T503] + Task1 --> Task2{Connect +Handover +Device (option)} + Task2 --> State2([Wait for Completion +on 3G_MSC-B +(GSM to UMTS Ho)]) + + Branch --> In2[/I-ANSWER +(ANM) from 3G_MSC-B/] + In2 --> Dec1{Allowed +once in +this state} + Dec1 -- Yes --> Task3[MAP-PAS req. +[A-CLEAR-REQUEST] +from BSS-B] + Task3 --> State2 + Dec1 -- No --> Task4[A-CLEAR-REQUEST +from BSS-A] + Task4 --> Task5{Release +Resources +on BSS-A} + Task5 --> Dec2{Wait for +UE/MS on +3G_MSC-B?} + Dec2 -- Yes --> State2 + Dec2 -- No --> Task6{Call +Release} --> Note1[to Network +and UE/MS] + Task6 --> Task7{Release MAP +Resources} --> Note2[to 3G_MSC-B +in 3G_MSC-A] + Task7 --> Task8[I_DISCONNECT +(REL) to 3G_MSC-B] + Task8 --> End([IDLE]) + + Branch --> In3[/MAP-PAS req. +[A-HO-DETECT] +from 3G_MSC-B/] + In3 --> Task9{Connect +Handover +Device (option)} + Task9 --> State3([Wait for Completion +on 3G_MSC-B +(GSM to UMTS Ho)]) + + State2 --> Task10[Forward queued +messages +via 3G_MSC-B] --> Note3[Use MAP- +FORWARD-ACCESS- +SIGNALLING req] + State3 --> Task10 + Task10 --> Task11{Release +Resources +on BSS-A} + Task11 --> Task12([Call +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)]) + +``` + +Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion (on 3G\_MSC-B) (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into three main paths based on incoming signals: 1) MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] from 3G\_MSC-B leads to 'Reset T503' and then 'Connect Handover Device (option)'. 2) I-ANSWER (ANM) from 3G\_MSC-B leads to a decision '(Allowed once in this state)'. If 'Yes', it sends 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from BSS-B' and then 'Wait for Completion (on 3G\_MSC-B) (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. If 'No', it sends 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A', 'Release Resources on BSS-A', and then another decision 'Wait for UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B?'. If 'Yes' to the second decision, it goes to 'Wait for Completion (on 3G\_MSC-B) (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. If 'No', it sends 'Call Release to Network and UE/MS', 'Release MAP Resources to 3G\_MSC-B in 3G\_MSC-A', 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B', and ends at 'IDLE'. 3) MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from 3G\_MSC-B leads to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' and then 'Wait for Completion (on 3G\_MSC-B) (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. All three paths eventually lead to 'Forward queued messages via 3G\_MSC-B', 'Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req', 'Release Resources on BSS-A', and 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. + +**Figure 43 (sheet 16 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A** + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion on 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into several paths: 1) 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A' leads to 'Reset T503', then 'Forward queued messages for UE/MS via BSS-A', then 'Release Handover Device', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures (in 3G_MSC-A to 3G_MSC-B)', then 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B', ending at 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (GSM)'. 2) A middle path leads to 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G_MSC-B', 'Cancel MAP Procedures (In 3G_MSC-A and to 3G_MSC-B)', 'Release Handover Device (Internal to 3G_MSC-A)', 'Cancel MAP Procedures (from 3G_MSC-B)', 'Release Handover Device', 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B', ending at 'Wait for Completion on 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. 3) 'Expiry T503' leads to 'Call Release (from Network)', 'Release Handover Device (Internal to 3G_MSC-A)', 'Wait for Completion on 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)', an unlabeled connector, 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B', 'Cancel MAP Procedures (In 3G_MSC-A and to 3G_MSC-B)', 'Release Handover Device (Internal to 3G_MSC-A)', 'Release Resources BSS-A', ending at 'IDLE'.](d77263a08ee7c05fd8a0edf5b071b865_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet17(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + +graph TD + Start[Wait for Completion on 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)] --> Junction1(( )) + Junction1 --> A_HO_FAILURE[A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A] + Junction1 --> Junction2(( )) + Junction1 --> ExpiryT503{Expiry T503} + Junction1 --> CallRelease[Call Release] + CallRelease --> fromNetwork[from Network] + A_HO_FAILURE --> ResetT503[Reset T503] + ResetT503 --> ForwardQueued[Forward queued messages for UE/MS via BSS-A] + ForwardQueued --> ReleaseHoDevice1[Release Handover Device] + ReleaseHoDevice1 --> CancelMAP1[Cancel MAP Procedures] + CancelMAP1 --> in3G_MSC_A_to_3G_MSC_B1[In 3G_MSC-A and to 3G_MSC-B] + in3G_MSC_A_to_3G_MSC_B1 --> I_DISCONNECT1[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B] + I_DISCONNECT1 --> CallInProgress[Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (GSM)] + Junction2 --> I_DISCONNECT2[I_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G_MSC-B] + I_DISCONNECT2 --> CancelMAP2[Cancel MAP Procedures] + CancelMAP2 --> In3G_MSC_A_and_to_3G_MSC_B2[In 3G_MSC-A and to 3G_MSC-B] + In3G_MSC_A_and_to_3G_MSC_B2 --> ReleaseHoDevice2[Release Handover Device] + ReleaseHoDevice2 --> InternalTo3G_MSC_A2[Internal to 3G_MSC-A] + ReleaseHoDevice2 --> CancelMAP3[Cancel MAP Procedures] + CancelMAP3 --> from3G_MSC_B[from 3G_MSC-B] + from3G_MSC_B --> ReleaseHoDevice3[Release Handover Device] + ReleaseHoDevice3 --> I_DISCONNECT3[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B] + I_DISCONNECT3 --> WaitCompletion2[Wait for Completion on 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)] + ExpiryT503 --> CallRelease + CallRelease --> ReleaseHoDevice4[Release Handover Device] + ReleaseHoDevice4 --> InternalTo3G_MSC_A4[Internal to 3G_MSC-A] + ReleaseHoDevice4 --> WaitCompletion3[Wait for Completion on 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)] + WaitCompletion3 --> UnlabeledConnector[ ] + UnlabeledConnector --> I_DISCONNECT4[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B] + I_DISCONNECT4 --> CancelMAP4[Cancel MAP Procedures] + CancelMAP4 --> In3G_MSC_A_and_to_3G_MSC_B4[In 3G_MSC-A and to 3G_MSC-B] + In3G_MSC_A_and_to_3G_MSC_B4 --> ReleaseHoDevice5[Release Handover Device] + ReleaseHoDevice5 --> InternalTo3G_MSC_A5[Internal to 3G_MSC-A] + ReleaseHoDevice5 --> ReleaseResourcesBSSA[Release Resources BSS-A] + ReleaseResourcesBSSA --> IDLE[IDLE] + +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion on 3G\_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into several paths: 1) 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A' leads to 'Reset T503', then 'Forward queued messages for UE/MS via BSS-A', then 'Release Handover Device', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures (in 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B)', then 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B', ending at 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (GSM)'. 2) A middle path leads to 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G\_MSC-B', 'Cancel MAP Procedures (In 3G\_MSC-A and to 3G\_MSC-B)', 'Release Handover Device (Internal to 3G\_MSC-A)', 'Cancel MAP Procedures (from 3G\_MSC-B)', 'Release Handover Device', 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B', ending at 'Wait for Completion on 3G\_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. 3) 'Expiry T503' leads to 'Call Release (from Network)', 'Release Handover Device (Internal to 3G\_MSC-A)', 'Wait for Completion on 3G\_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)', an unlabeled connector, 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B', 'Cancel MAP Procedures (In 3G\_MSC-A and to 3G\_MSC-B)', 'Release Handover Device (Internal to 3G\_MSC-A)', 'Release Resources BSS-A', ending at 'IDLE'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 17 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts with a call on MSC-B (GSM) and proceeds through various decision points and message exchanges to either complete the handover or release the call.](b1123ddbaa09fda65dcdf91d8caaa0f2_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet18(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + +graph TD + Start([Call on MSC-B (GSM)]) --> Join1(( )) + Join1 --> MAP_PREPARE[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] from MSC-B] + MAP_PREPARE --> Known_3G_MSC{Known 3G_MSC?} + Known_3G_MSC -- No --> Call_Release_1[Call Release] + Known_3G_MSC -- Yes --> Allowed{Handover allowed to Cell?} + Allowed -- No --> Cancel_MAP[Cancel MAP procedures] + Cancel_MAP --> Call_Release_2[Call Release] + Allowed -- Yes --> Which_3G_MSC{Which 3G_MSC?} + Which_3G_MSC -- 3G_MSC-B' --> Join2(( )) + Which_3G_MSC -- 3G_MSC-A --> Known_RNS{Known RNS?} + Known_RNS -- No --> Call_Release_3[Call Release] + Known_RNS -- Yes --> Resources{Resources on new RNS?} + Resources -- No --> Call_Release_4[Call Release] + Resources -- Yes --> IU_RELOCATION[IU-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B] + IU_RELOCATION --> Set_T501[Set T501] + Set_T501 --> Wait_Alloc[Wait for Channel Allocation (GSM to UMTS Ho)] + Wait_Alloc --> UE_MS[UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM)] + Wait_Alloc --> Call_MSC_B[Call on MSC-B (GSM)] + Wait_Alloc --> IDLE[IDLE] + MAP_PREPARE --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B] + MAP_PAS --> MAP_SEND_END[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B] + MAP_SEND_END --> I_DISCONNECT[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B] + I_DISCONNECT --> IDLE + From_UE[From UE/MS or Network] --> Call_Release_1 + Call_Release_1 --> IDLE + Call_Release_2 --> IDLE + Call_Release_3 --> IDLE + Call_Release_4 --> IDLE + MAP_PREPARE --> MAP_PREP_FAIL[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-B] + MAP_PREP_FAIL --> Circuit_Conn{Circuit Connection?} + Circuit_Conn -- No --> UE_MS + Circuit_Conn -- Yes --> Call_MSC_B + Circuit_Conn --> IDLE + MAP_PREP_FAIL --> MAP_ERROR[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] to MSC-B] + MAP_ERROR --> IDLE + +``` + +Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts with a call on MSC-B (GSM) and proceeds through various decision points and message exchanges to either complete the handover or release the call. + +Figure 43 (sheet 18 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Channel Allocation (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into four main paths: 1) Success path: 'Iu-RELOCATION REQUEST-ACK. from RNS-B' -> 'Reset T501' -> 'Queue Messages for UE/MS in 3G_MSC-A' -> 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to MSC-B' -> 'Circuit Connection?' (Yes) -> 'Set Up Handover Device' -> 'Set T504' -> 'Wait for Access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. 2) Failure path 1: 'Iu-RELOCATION FAILURE from RNS-B' -> 'Reset T501' -> '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B' -> 'Release Resources in RNS-B' -> 'Call on MSC-B'. 3) Failure path 2: 'Expiry T501' -> 'Release Resources in RNS-B' -> 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-B' -> 'Call on MSC-B (GSM)'. 4) Call Release path: 'Call Release' (From UE/MS or Network) -> 'Cancel Channel RNS-B' -> 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp to MSC-B' -> 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B' -> 'IDLE'. A 'No' branch from 'Circuit Connection?' loops back to the entry point of the success path.](d33f50868e9cfda1b1206833c4061e12_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet19(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + +graph TD + Start[Wait for Channel Allocation +(GSM to UMTS Ho)] --> SuccessEntry(( )) + Start --> Failure1Entry(( )) + Start --> Failure2Entry(( )) + Start --> CallReleaseEntry(( )) + + SuccessEntry --> SuccessAck[Iu-RELOCATION REQUEST-ACK. +from RNS-B] + SuccessAck --> ResetT501_1[Reset T501] + ResetT501_1 --> QueueMsgs[Queue Messages for UE/MS +in 3G_MSC-A] + QueueMsgs --> MapPrepare[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp +[A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to MSC-B] + MapPrepare --> CircuitConn{Circuit Connection?} + CircuitConn -- No --> SuccessEntry + CircuitConn -- Yes --> SetupHandover[Set Up Handover Device] + SetupHandover --> SetT504[Set T504] + SetT504 --> WaitAccess[Wait for Access by UE/MS +(GSM to UMTS Ho)] + + Failure1Entry --> Failure1[Iu-RELOCATION FAILURE +from RNS-B] + Failure1 --> ResetT501_2[Reset T501] + ResetT501_2 --> AllowedOnce{Allowed once in this state} + AllowedOnce --> MapPas[MAP-PAS req. +[A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B] + MapPas --> ReleaseRes_1[Release Resources in RNS-B] + ReleaseRes_1 --> CallOnMSCB_1[Call on MSC-B] + + Failure2Entry --> ExpiryT501[Expiry T501] + ExpiryT501 --> ReleaseRes_2[Release Resources in RNS-B] + ReleaseRes_2 --> MapPrepareFailure[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. +[A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-B] + MapPrepareFailure --> CallOnMSCB_2[Call on MSC-B (GSM)] + + CallReleaseEntry --> CallRelease[Call Release] + CallRelease -.-> FromUEMS[From UE/MS or Network] + CallRelease --> CancelChannel[Cancel Channel RNS-B] + CancelChannel --> MapSendEnd[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp to MSC-B] + MapSendEnd --> IDisconnect[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B] + IDisconnect --> Idle[IDLE] + +``` + +Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Channel Allocation (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into four main paths: 1) Success path: 'Iu-RELOCATION REQUEST-ACK. from RNS-B' -> 'Reset T501' -> 'Queue Messages for UE/MS in 3G\_MSC-A' -> 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to MSC-B' -> 'Circuit Connection?' (Yes) -> 'Set Up Handover Device' -> 'Set T504' -> 'Wait for Access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. 2) Failure path 1: 'Iu-RELOCATION FAILURE from RNS-B' -> 'Reset T501' -> '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B' -> 'Release Resources in RNS-B' -> 'Call on MSC-B'. 3) Failure path 2: 'Expiry T501' -> 'Release Resources in RNS-B' -> 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-B' -> 'Call on MSC-B (GSM)'. 4) Call Release path: 'Call Release' (From UE/MS or Network) -> 'Cancel Channel RNS-B' -> 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp to MSC-B' -> 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B' -> 'IDLE'. A 'No' branch from 'Circuit Connection?' loops back to the entry point of the success path. + +Figure 43 (sheet 19 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) 'Iu-RELOCATION COMPLETE from RNS-B' leads to 'Reset T504', 'Connect Handover Device (option)', 'Forward queued messages for MS via RNS-B', 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B', a 'Circuit Connection?' decision, and finally 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. 2) 'Iu-RELOCATION DETECT from RNS-B' leads to a 'Circuit Connection?' decision. If 'Yes', it goes to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' and then to 'Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. If 'No', it loops back to the start. 3) 'Expiry T504' leads to 'Call Release' (to Network), 'Release Resources on RNS-B', 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (in 3G_MSC-A to MSC-B), 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', and finally 'IDLE'.](8f78b5d84dca49cf2769440c7942a27d_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet20(78) + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho)]) --> Junction1(( )); Junction1 --> IuComplete[Iu-RELOCATION COMPLETE from RNS-B]; Junction1 --> IuDetect[Iu-RELOCATION DETECT from RNS-B]; Junction1 --> ExpiryT504[Expiry T504]; IuComplete --> ResetT504[Reset T504]; ResetT504 --> ConnectHO[Connect Handover Device (option)]; ConnectHO --> ForwardMsg[Forward queued messages for MS via RNS-B]; ForwardMsg --> MAPSend[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B]; MAPSend --> CircuitConn1{Circuit Connection?}; CircuitConn1 -- No --> Junction1; CircuitConn1 -- Yes --> ReleaseHO[Release Handover Device]; ReleaseHO --> IDisconnect[ I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B]; IDisconnect --> CallInProg([Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)]); IuDetect --> CircuitConn2{Circuit Connection?}; CircuitConn2 -- No --> Junction1; CircuitConn2 -- Yes --> ConnectHO2[Connect Handover Device (option)]; ConnectHO2 --> Junction2(( )); Junction2 --> WaitAccess([Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho)]); ExpiryT504 --> CallRelease[Call Release]; CallRelease --> Network[ to Network]; CallRelease --> ReleaseRes[Release Resources on RNS-B]; ReleaseRes --> CancelMAP[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelMAP --> MSCB[ in 3G_MSC-A to MSC-B]; CancelMAP --> IDisconnect2[ I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B]; IDisconnect2 --> IDLE([IDLE]); +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) 'Iu-RELOCATION COMPLETE from RNS-B' leads to 'Reset T504', 'Connect Handover Device (option)', 'Forward queued messages for MS via RNS-B', 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B', a 'Circuit Connection?' decision, and finally 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. 2) 'Iu-RELOCATION DETECT from RNS-B' leads to a 'Circuit Connection?' decision. If 'Yes', it goes to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' and then to 'Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. If 'No', it loops back to the start. 3) 'Expiry T504' leads to 'Call Release' (to Network), 'Release Resources on RNS-B', 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (in 3G\_MSC-A to MSC-B), 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', and finally 'IDLE'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 20 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches based on incoming messages: 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from MSC-B', 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B', and 'Iu-RELEASE REQUEST from RNS-B'. The first leads to 'Forward queued messages via MSC-B'. The second and third lead to state-based checks ('Allowed once in this state'). If the second is allowed, it leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures'. All three paths eventually lead to 'Call Release'. From 'Forward queued messages via MSC-B', the flow goes to 'Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.', then 'Release Resources on RNS-B', then a decision 'Circuit Connection?'. If 'Yes', it goes to 'Release Handover Device' and then 'Call on MSC-B (GSM)'. If 'No', it goes to 'UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM)'. Both 'Call on MSC-B (GSM)' and 'UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM)' lead to the final state 'Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho)'.](e67401bb970e10780dd4086d67c8195f_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet21(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho)]) --> Branch1(( )); Branch1 --> MAP_FAILURE[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from MSC-B]; Branch1 --> MAP_CLEAR[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B]; Branch1 --> Iu_RELEASE[Iu-RELEASE REQUEST from RNS-B]; MAP_FAILURE --> Forward[Forward queued messages via MSC-B]; MAP_CLEAR --> Allowed1[Allowed once in this state]; Iu_RELEASE --> Allowed2[Allowed once in this state]; Allowed1 --> Cancel[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel --> Network[from Network]; Network --> CallRelease[Call Release]; Forward --> MAP_FORWARD[Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.]; MAP_FORWARD --> ReleaseResources[Release Resources on RNS-B]; ReleaseResources --> CircuitConn{Circuit Connection?}; CircuitConn -- Yes --> ReleaseDevice[Release Handover Device]; ReleaseDevice --> CallGSM[Call on MSC-B (GSM)]; CircuitConn -- No --> UEMSGSM[UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM)]; CallGSM --> End([Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho)]); UEMSGSM --> End; +``` + +Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches based on incoming messages: 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from MSC-B', 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B', and 'Iu-RELEASE REQUEST from RNS-B'. The first leads to 'Forward queued messages via MSC-B'. The second and third lead to state-based checks ('Allowed once in this state'). If the second is allowed, it leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures'. All three paths eventually lead to 'Call Release'. From 'Forward queued messages via MSC-B', the flow goes to 'Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.', then 'Release Resources on RNS-B', then a decision 'Circuit Connection?'. If 'Yes', it goes to 'Release Handover Device' and then 'Call on MSC-B (GSM)'. If 'No', it goes to 'UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM)'. Both 'Call on MSC-B (GSM)' and 'UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM)' lead to the final state 'Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 21 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO. It starts at connector 5, sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req [A-HO-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-B', waits for an ack, then branches based on the response. A success response leads to a decision on the Handover Number. If requested, it sends an I_CONNECT (IAM) and waits for a connection. If not requested or if a failure response is received, it sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp [A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-B and returns to connector 9.](909e1cd5419742a8ea8a95a16a40d849_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet22(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Subsequent GSM to UMTS Handover from MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' +Circuit Connection required + +``` +graph TD; 5((5)) --> P1{{ }}; P1 -- "MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req [A-HO-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-B'" --> W1[Wait for Ack from 3G_MSC-B' (GSM to UMTS Ho)]; W1 --> D1{ }; D1 -- "MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp.. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] from 3G_MSC-B'" --> D2{Handover Number?}; D2 -- "Not Requested" --> P2{{ }}; D2 -- "Requested" --> P3{{ }}; P3 -- "I_CONNECT (IAM) to 3G_MSC-B' using Handover Number" --> W2[Wait for Connection from 3G_MSC-B' (GSM to UMTS Ho)]; W2 --> 9((9)); D1 -- "MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] from 3G_MSC-B'" --> P4{{ }}; P4 -- "MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-B" --> P5{{ }}; P5 --> C1[Call on MSC-B (GSM)]; C1 --> 9; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO. It starts at connector 5, sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req [A-HO-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-B', waits for an ack, then branches based on the response. A success response leads to a decision on the Handover Number. If requested, it sends an I\_CONNECT (IAM) and waits for a connection. If not requested or if a failure response is received, it sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp [A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-B and returns to connector 9. + +Figure 43 (sheet 22 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. It starts with 'Wait for Ack from 3G_MSC-B' (GSM to UMTS Ho) and branches based on inputs: 'ERROR from 3G_MSC-B', 'from MSC-B or Network', and 'Call Release From UE/MS or Network'. The 'ERROR from 3G_MSC-B' path leads to 'Release MAP Resources to 3G_MSC-B', then 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures to 3G_MSC-B', then 'Wait for Ack from 3G_MSC-B' (GSM to UMTS Ho), and finally 'Call on MSC-B (GSM)'. The 'from MSC-B or Network' path leads to 'ERROR', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures to 3G_MSC-B', then 'Release Handover Device', then 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B', then 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', and finally 'IDLE'. The 'Call Release' path leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures to 3G_MSC-B', then 'Release Handover Device', then 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B', then 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', and finally 'IDLE'. There is also an 'ERROR' block connected to 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. to MSC-B'.](16d5f9c016e78737423c11d4fba9ae25_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet23(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Ack from 3G_MSC-B' (GSM to UMTS Ho)]) --> J1(( )); J1 --> ERROR1{ERROR}; J1 --> FROM_MSC_B[from MSC-B or Network]; J1 --> CALL_RELEASE{Call Release}; ERROR1 --> FROM_3G_MSC_B1[from 3G_MSC-B']; FROM_MSC_B --> ERROR2{ERROR}; CALL_RELEASE --> FROM_UE_MS[From UE/MS or Network]; ERROR2 --> CALL_RELEASE; CALL_RELEASE --> CANCEL_MAP1{Cancel MAP Procedures}; CANCEL_MAP1 --> TO_3G_MSC_B1[to 3G_MSC-B']; CANCEL_MAP1 --> RELEASE_DEVICE{Release Handover Device}; RELEASE_DEVICE --> MAP_SEND_END[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B]; MAP_SEND_END --> I_DISCONNECT[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B]; I_DISCONNECT --> IDLE([IDLE]); FROM_3G_MSC_B1 --> RELEASE_MAP[Release MAP Resources]; RELEASE_MAP --> TO_3G_MSC_B2[to 3G_MSC-B']; TO_3G_MSC_B2 --> MAP_PAS_REQ[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B]; MAP_PAS_REQ --> CANCEL_MAP2{Cancel MAP Procedures}; CANCEL_MAP2 --> TO_3G_MSC_B2; CANCEL_MAP2 --> WAIT_ACK2([Wait for Ack from 3G_MSC-B' (GSM to UMTS Ho)]); WAIT_ACK2 --> CALL_GSM([Call on MSC-B (GSM)]); ERROR1 --> ERROR3{ERROR}; ERROR3 --> MAP_PREPARE[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. to MSC-B]; MAP_PREPARE --> TO_MSC_B[ to MSC-B]; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. It starts with 'Wait for Ack from 3G\_MSC-B' (GSM to UMTS Ho) and branches based on inputs: 'ERROR from 3G\_MSC-B', 'from MSC-B or Network', and 'Call Release From UE/MS or Network'. The 'ERROR from 3G\_MSC-B' path leads to 'Release MAP Resources to 3G\_MSC-B', then 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures to 3G\_MSC-B', then 'Wait for Ack from 3G\_MSC-B' (GSM to UMTS Ho), and finally 'Call on MSC-B (GSM)'. The 'from MSC-B or Network' path leads to 'ERROR', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures to 3G\_MSC-B', then 'Release Handover Device', then 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B', then 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', and finally 'IDLE'. The 'Call Release' path leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures to 3G\_MSC-B', then 'Release Handover Device', then 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B', then 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', and finally 'IDLE'. There is also an 'ERROR' block connected to 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. to MSC-B'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 23 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![SDL diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing state transitions and signal handling for handover from GSM to UMTS. It includes states like 'Wait for Connection from 3G_MSC-B\' (GSM to UMTS Ho)', 'Wait for Completion on 3G_MSC-B\' (GSM to UMTS Ho)', and 'IDLE'. Signals handled include I_COMPLETE, ERROR, Call Release, and MAP-PAS requests. Actions include setting up handover devices, queuing messages, and sending MAP responses.](69981c87c5b93c90e9012f6dabce4215_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet24(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + + State: Wait for Connection from 3G_MSC-B' (GSM to UMTS Ho) + | + +--- Input: I_COMPLETE (ACM) from 3G_MSC-B' + | | + | +--- Action: Set up Handover Device + | | + | +--- Output: MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to MSC-B + | | + | +--- Action: Queue messages for UE/MS in 3G_MSC-A + | | + | +--- Action: Set T503 + | | + | +--- Next State: Wait for Completion on 3G_MSC-B' (GSM to UMTS Ho) + | + +--- Input: MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B' + | | + | +--- Condition: (Allowed once in this state) + | | + | +--- Next State: Wait for Connection from 3G_MSC-B' (GSM to UMTS Ho) + | + +--- Input: ERROR from 3G_MSC-B' or Network + | | + | +--- Action: Cancel MAP Procedures to 3G_MSC-B' + | | + | +--- Output: I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B' + | | + | +--- Input: ERROR + | | + | +--- Output: MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. to MSC-B + | | + | +--- Next State: Call on MSC-B (GSM) + | + +--- Input: Call Release from UE/MS or Network + | | + | +--- Input: MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B + | | + | +--- Action: Cancel MAP Procedures to 3G_MSC-B' + | | + | +--- Action: Cancel MAP Procedures to MSC-B and 3G_MSC-B' + | | + | +--- Output: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp to MSC-B + | | + | +--- Action: Call Release to Network and UE/MS + | | + | +--- Output: I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B and 3G_MSC-B' + | | + | +--- Next State: IDLE + +``` + +SDL diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing state transitions and signal handling for handover from GSM to UMTS. It includes states like 'Wait for Connection from 3G\_MSC-B\' (GSM to UMTS Ho)', 'Wait for Completion on 3G\_MSC-B\' (GSM to UMTS Ho)', and 'IDLE'. Signals handled include I\_COMPLETE, ERROR, Call Release, and MAP-PAS requests. Actions include setting up handover devices, queuing messages, and sending MAP responses. + +Figure 43 (sheet 24 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![](7257d4b73261f355fa2c74278e6ed059_img.jpg) + +Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO +Sheet25(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + + graph TD + Start([Wait for Completion +on 3G_MSC-B' +GSM to UMTS Ho]) + + Start --- BranchPoint(( )) + + %% Path 1 + BranchPoint --> Sig1{{MAP-SEND- +END-SIGNAL req. +[A-HO-COMPLETE] +from 3G_MSC-B'}} + Sig1 --> Reset[Reset +T503] + Reset --> Sig2{{I_ANSWER (ANM) +from 3G_MSC-B'}} + Sig2 --> CHD1[Connect +Handover +Device (option)] + CHD1 --> FQM[Forward queued +messages for +UE/MS via +3G_MSC-B'] + FQM -.-> Note1[Use MAP-FORWARD- +ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.] + FQM --> Sig3{{MAP-SEND- +END-SIGNAL resp. +to MSC-B}} + Sig3 --> Sig4{{I_DISCONNECT +(REL) to MSC-B}} + Sig4 --> Redefine[Redefine +3G_MSC-B' as +3G_MSC-B] + Redefine --> CallUTRAN([Call on +3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)]) + + %% Path 2 + BranchPoint --> Sig5{{MAP-PAS req. +[A-HO-DETECT] +from 3G_MSC-B'}} + Sig5 --> CHD2[Connect +Handover +Device (option)] + CHD2 --> WaitComp([Wait for Completion +from 3G_MSC-B' +GSM to UMTS Ho]) + + %% Path 3 + BranchPoint --> Sig6{{MAP-PAS req. +[A-CLEAR- +REQUEST] +from MSC-B}} + Sig6 --> Allowed1[Allowed +once in +this state] + Allowed1 --> WaitAccess{Wait for +access by +UE/MS?} + WaitAccess -- Yes --> WaitComp + WaitAccess -- No --> RelHD[Release +Handover +Device] + RelHD --> CancelMAP[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + CancelMAP -.-> Note2[to MSC-B +and 3G_MSC-B'] + CancelMAP --> CallRel[Call +Release] + CallRel -.-> Note3[to Network +and UE/MS] + CallRel --> Sig7{{I_DISCONNECT (REL) +to MSC-B and 3G_MSC-B'}} + Sig7 --> Idle([IDLE]) + + %% Cross-connections + Sig1 --> Allowed2[Allowed +once in +this state] + Allowed2 --> CHD2 + +``` + +**Figure 43 (sheet 25 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A** + +![SDL diagram of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing handover control logic with branches for timer expiry, MAP failure, and network release.](7c19fc92dc74a74ec346d46bc39a3946_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet26(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + + graph TD + %% Initial State + Start((Wait for Completion +on 3G_MSC-B' +GSM to UMTS Ho)) --> Branch1[Expiry +T503] + Start --> Branch2[MAP-PAS req. +A-HO-FAILURE +from MSC-B] + Start --> Branch3[from 3G_MSC-B'] + Start --> Branch4[From +Network +or MSC-B] + + %% Branch 1 Logic + Branch1 --> CancelMAP1[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + CancelMAP1 --> ToMSC_B1[to 3G_MSC-B'] + CancelMAP1 --> RelHD1[Release +Handover +Device] + RelHD1 --> MSCBConn{MSC-B +Connection?} + MSCBConn -- Yes --> UseMAP[Use MAP- +FORWARD- +ACCESS- +SIGNALLING req.] + UseMAP --> FwdMsg[Forward queued +messages for +UE/MS via MSC-B] + FwdMsg --> CallGSM((Call +on MSC-B +GSM)) + MSCBConn -- No --> CallRel1[Call +Release] + CallRel1 --> ToNet[to Network] + CallRel1 --> Idle1((IDLE)) + + %% Branch 2 Logic + Branch2 --> ResetT503[Reset +T503] + ResetT503 --> FromMSCB[from MSC-B] + FromMSCB --> CancelMAP2[Cancel +MAP +Procedures] + CancelMAP2 --> I_Disc1[I_DISCONNECT +REL to MSC-B] + I_Disc1 --> RelHD2[Release +Handover +Device] + RelHD2 --> WaitUE{Wait for +access by +UE/MS?} + + %% Branch 3 Logic + Branch3 --> CancelMAP3[Cancel +MAP +Procedures] + CancelMAP3 --> I_Disc2[I_DISCONNECT +REL to 3G_MSC-B'] + I_Disc2 --> RelHD3[Release +Handover +Device] + RelHD3 --> WaitUE + + %% WaitUE Decision Logic + WaitUE -- Yes --> RelHD4[Release +Handover +Device] + RelHD4 --> Start + WaitUE -- No --> CancelMAP4[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + CancelMAP4 --> ToMSC_B2[to 3G_MSC-B'] + CancelMAP4 --> I_Disc3[I_DISCONNECT +REL to 3G_MSC-B'] + I_Disc3 --> Idle2((IDLE)) + + %% Branch 4 Logic + Branch4 --> CallRel2[Call +Release] + CallRel2 --> Start + +``` + +SDL diagram of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing handover control logic with branches for timer expiry, MAP failure, and network release. + +Figure 43 (sheet 26 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO. The process starts at connector 7, followed by queuing messages, sending a handover command, setting timer T503, and waiting for the UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B. It then branches based on signals from 3G_MSC-B (MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL, A-CLEAR-REQUEST, MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT]). The main path involves resetting T503, releasing resources on BSS-A, forwarding messages, and ending with the UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN). Other branches lead to IDLE or waiting for the UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho).](1750e325061d2206b5af0af175793d79_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet27(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Basic GSM to UMTS Handover to 3G\_MSC-B +no Circuit Connection required + +``` +graph TD + 7((7)) --> Q[Queue Messages for UE/MS in 3G_MSC-A] + Q --> HC{Handover Command to UE/MS via BSS-A} + HC --> T503_1[Set T503] + T503_1 --> W1[Wait for UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)] + W1 --> S1{ } + S1 --> MS[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] from 3G_MSC-B] + S1 --> A1{Allowed once in this state} + A1 --> AR[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A] + AR --> S2{ } + S2 --> MP[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from 3G_MSC-B] + W1 --> R[Reset T503] + R --> MP2[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B] + MP2 --> A2{Allowed once in this state} + A2 --> RR[Release Resources on BSS-A] + RR --> FRM[Forward queued messages for UE/MS via 3G_MSC-B] + FRM --> MF[Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.] + MF --> U[UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)] + W1 --> W2{Wait for UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B?} + W2 -- Yes --> W3[Wait for UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)] + W2 -- No --> CR[Call Release] + CR --> CN[to Network and UE/MS] + CR --> RM[Release MAP Resources] + RM --> CM[to 3G_MSC-B in 3G_MSC-A] + RM --> IDLE[IDLE] +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO. The process starts at connector 7, followed by queuing messages, sending a handover command, setting timer T503, and waiting for the UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B. It then branches based on signals from 3G\_MSC-B (MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL, A-CLEAR-REQUEST, MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT]). The main path involves resetting T503, releasing resources on BSS-A, forwarding messages, and ending with the UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN). Other branches lead to IDLE or waiting for the UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho). + +Figure 43 (sheet 27 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into four main paths: 1) 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A' leads to 'Reset T503', then 'Forward queued messages for UE/MS via BSS-A', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (labeled 'in 3G_MSC-A to 3G_MSC-B'), ending at 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (GSM)'. 2) 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (labeled 'from 3G_MSC-B') leads to 'Release Resources BSS-A', ending at 'Wait for UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. 3) 'Expiry T503' leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (labeled 'In 3G_MSC-A and to 3G_MSC-B'), then 'Release Resources BSS-A', ending at 'IDLE'. 4) 'Call Release' (labeled 'from Network') leads directly to 'Wait for UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'.](b96be3d7d73fc1d7af1879bb57de1cc4_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet28(78) + +``` +graph TD; Start[Wait for UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)]; Start --> A_HF[A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A]; Start --> CMAP1[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Start --> E_T503[Expiry T503]; Start --> CR[Call Release]; A_HF --> R_T503[Reset T503]; R_T503 --> FQM[Forward queued messages for UE/MS via BSS-A]; FQM --> CMAP2[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CMAP2 -.->|in 3G_MSC-A to 3G_MSC-B| CMAP2; CMAP2 --> CIP[Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (GSM)]; CMAP1 -.->|from 3G_MSC-B| CMAP1; CMAP1 --> RR1[Release Resources BSS-A]; RR1 --> W_UE_1[Wait for UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)]; E_T503 --> CMAP3[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CMAP3 -.->|In 3G_MSC-A and to 3G_MSC-B| CMAP3; CMAP3 --> RR2[Release Resources BSS-A]; RR2 --> IDLE[IDLE]; CR -.->|from Network| CR; CR --> W_UE_2[Wait for UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)]; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into four main paths: 1) 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A' leads to 'Reset T503', then 'Forward queued messages for UE/MS via BSS-A', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (labeled 'in 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B'), ending at 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (GSM)'. 2) 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (labeled 'from 3G\_MSC-B') leads to 'Release Resources BSS-A', ending at 'Wait for UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. 3) 'Expiry T503' leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (labeled 'In 3G\_MSC-A and to 3G\_MSC-B'), then 'Release Resources BSS-A', ending at 'IDLE'. 4) 'Call Release' (labeled 'from Network') leads directly to 'Wait for UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 28 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing handover control between UE/MS, MSC-A, and MSC-B.](55a415876cf7b7c2509c0318bb857efa_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet29(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +UE/MS Established on MSC-B without a Circuit Connection + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS as UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM) + participant MSC-A + participant MSC-B + Note right of UE/MS: UE/MS Established on MSC-B without a Circuit Connection + + Note left of MSC-A: Procedure for Handover in 3G_MSC-A + + UE/MS->>MSC-A: Request for Circuit Establishment + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [A-ASG-REQUEST] to MSC-B + MSC-A->>UE/MS: Wait For Response from MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho) + Note right of MSC-A: 8 + + Note left of MSC-B: From MSC-B + MSC-B->>MSC-A: MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] from MSC-B + MSC-A->>MSC-B: Cancel MAP Procedures + Note right of MSC-A: to Network + MSC-A->>MSC-B: Call Release + Note left of UE/MS: From UE/MS or Network + UE/MS->>MSC-A: Call Release + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B + MSC-A->>UE/MS: IDLE +``` + +The diagram illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. It begins with the UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM) sending a 'Request for Circuit Establishment' to MSC-A. MSC-A responds with 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [A-ASG-REQUEST] to MSC-B' and enters a 'Wait For Response from MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)' state, leading to connector '8'. From MSC-B, a 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] from MSC-B' is received by MSC-A. MSC-A then sends 'Cancel MAP Procedures' to MSC-B and a 'Call Release' to the Network. Simultaneously, a 'Call Release' is received from the UE/MS or Network by MSC-A. MSC-A sends 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B' and finally reaches the 'IDLE' state. + +Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing handover control between UE/MS, MSC-A, and MSC-B. + +Figure 43 (sheet 29 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Sequence diagram for handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-A. The diagram shows three lifelines: 3G_MSC-A (left), UE/MS or Network (middle), and 3G_MSC-B (right). The sequence starts with a 'Wait For Response from 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS_Ho)' at 3G_MSC-A. 3G_MSC-A sends 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [A-ASG-COMPLETE] from 3G_MSC-B' to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-A sends 'I_CONNECT (IAM) to 3G_MSC-B using Handover Number' to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-A then enters 'Wait for Complete from 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS_Ho)'. 3G_MSC-A sends 'Call Release' to UE/MS or Network. UE/MS or Network sends 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B' to 3G_MSC-B. UE/MS or Network enters 'IDLE'. 3G_MSC-A sends 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER -SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req [A-HO-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B' to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-A ends at connector 19.](b1a6ab9f3d33d6e8d64173bfa595b763_img.jpg) + +Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet30(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A: Circuit Connection Establishment to 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant 3G_MSC_A as 3G_MSC-A + participant UE as UE/MS or Network + participant 3G_MSC_B as 3G_MSC-B + + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: Wait For Response from 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS_Ho) + 3G_MSC_A->>3G_MSC_B: MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [A-ASG-COMPLETE] from 3G_MSC-B + 3G_MSC_A->>3G_MSC_B: I_CONNECT (IAM) to 3G_MSC-B using Handover Number + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: Wait for Complete from 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS_Ho) + 3G_MSC_A->>UE: Call Release + Note right of UE: From UE/MS or Network + UE->>3G_MSC_B: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B + Note right of UE: IDLE + 3G_MSC_A->>3G_MSC_B: MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER -SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req [A-HO-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B + Note right of 3G_MSC_A: 19 +``` + +Sequence diagram for handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. The diagram shows three lifelines: 3G\_MSC-A (left), UE/MS or Network (middle), and 3G\_MSC-B (right). The sequence starts with a 'Wait For Response from 3G\_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS\_Ho)' at 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A sends 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [A-ASG-COMPLETE] from 3G\_MSC-B' to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-A sends 'I\_CONNECT (IAM) to 3G\_MSC-B using Handover Number' to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-A then enters 'Wait for Complete from 3G\_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS\_Ho)'. 3G\_MSC-A sends 'Call Release' to UE/MS or Network. UE/MS or Network sends 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G\_MSC-B' to 3G\_MSC-B. UE/MS or Network enters 'IDLE'. 3G\_MSC-A sends 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER -SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req [A-HO-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B' to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-A ends at connector 19. + +Figure 43 (sheet 30 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Sequence diagram for handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait For Response from 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) Success: 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B' -> '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 2) Error/Failure: 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] from 3G_MSC-B' or 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-ASG-FAILURE] from 3G_MSC-B' -> 'Failure' -> 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request' -> 'UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 3) Cancel: 'Cancel MAP Procedures from 3G_MSC-B' -> 'Call Release to Network' -> 'Failure' -> 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request' -> 'IDLE'.](21df39ef27b27dec52a36c0bedc53e6b_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet31(78) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant 3G_MSC_A + participant 3G_MSC_B + participant Network + participant UE/MS + + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: Wait For Response from 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho) + 3G_MSC_A->>3G_MSC_B: Request + Note right of 3G_MSC_B: MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B + 3G_MSC_B->>3G_MSC_A: Response + Note right of 3G_MSC_A: (Allowed once in this state) + 3G_MSC_A->>UE/MS: Command + Note right of UE/MS: UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN) + + Note right of 3G_MSC_A: MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] from 3G_MSC-B + 3G_MSC_A->>Failure1: Failure + Note right of Failure1: Response to Circuit Establishment Request + Failure1->>UE/MS: Command + Note right of UE/MS: UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN) + + Note right of 3G_MSC_A: MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-ASG-FAILURE] from 3G_MSC-B + 3G_MSC_A->>Failure2: Failure + Note right of Failure2: Response to Circuit Establishment Request + Failure2->>UE/MS: Command + Note right of UE/MS: UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN) + + Note right of 3G_MSC_A: Cancel MAP Procedures from 3G_MSC-B + 3G_MSC_A->>CallRelease: Call Release + Note right of CallRelease: to Network + CallRelease->>Failure3: Failure + Note right of Failure3: Response to Circuit Establishment Request + Failure3->>IDLE: Command + Note right of IDLE: IDLE +``` + +Sequence diagram for handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait For Response from 3G\_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) Success: 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B' -> '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 2) Error/Failure: 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] from 3G\_MSC-B' or 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-ASG-FAILURE] from 3G\_MSC-B' -> 'Failure' -> 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request' -> 'UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 3) Cancel: 'Cancel MAP Procedures from 3G\_MSC-B' -> 'Call Release to Network' -> 'Failure' -> 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request' -> 'IDLE'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 31 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for GSM to UMTS handover. The process starts with 'Wait for Complete from 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into 'Success' (leading to 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request' and 'Wait for Complete from 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)') and 'Failure' (leading to 'Cancel MAP Procedures'). 'Cancel MAP Procedures' leads to 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B' and 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B', both leading to 'IDLE'. 'Failure' also leads to 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request'. 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B' leads to '(Allowed once in this state)' and 'Call Release' (from UE/MS or Network). 'I_COMPLETE (ACM) from 3G_MSC-B' and 'I-ANSWER (ANM) from 3G_MSC-B' lead to 'Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'.](476b627f69146cf2c394a1f1f697b24e_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet32(78) + +``` +graph TD + Start[Wait for Complete from 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)] --> Success{Success} + Start --> Failure{Failure} + Start --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B] + Start --> I_COMPLETE[I_COMPLETE (ACM) from 3G_MSC-B] + Start --> I_ANSWER[I-ANSWER (ANM) from 3G_MSC-B] + Start --> Call_Release[Call Release] + + Success --> Success_Req[Response to Circuit Establishment Request] + Success_Req --> Success_Wait[Wait for Complete from 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)] + + Failure --> Cancel[Cancel MAP Procedures] + Cancel --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B] + Cancel --> I_DISCONNECT[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B] + MAP_SEND --> IDLE[(IDLE)] + I_DISCONNECT --> IDLE + + Failure --> Failure_Req[Response to Circuit Establishment Request] + + MAP_PAS --> Allowed[(Allowed once in this state)] + Allowed --> Call_Release + Call_Release --> Call_Release_Text[From UE/MS or Network] + + I_COMPLETE --> Call_UTRAN[(Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN))] + I_ANSWER --> Call_UTRAN +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for GSM to UMTS handover. The process starts with 'Wait for Complete from 3G\_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into 'Success' (leading to 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request' and 'Wait for Complete from 3G\_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)') and 'Failure' (leading to 'Cancel MAP Procedures'). 'Cancel MAP Procedures' leads to 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G\_MSC-B' and 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B', both leading to 'IDLE'. 'Failure' also leads to 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request'. 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B' leads to '(Allowed once in this state)' and 'Call Release' (from UE/MS or Network). 'I\_COMPLETE (ACM) from 3G\_MSC-B' and 'I-ANSWER (ANM) from 3G\_MSC-B' lead to 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 32 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for GSM to UMTS Handover. The process starts at connector 9, sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response, queues messages, sets timer T503, and waits for UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B'. It then branches based on incoming signals (MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL, MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT], or MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST]) and a decision on whether access is allowed. Success leads to UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN), while failure leads to IDLE.](29178b001cb4c04e0c5ab60662ce5d80_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet33(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Subsequent GSM to UMTS Handover from MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' no Circuit Connection required. + +``` + +graph TD + Start((9)) --> P1[ ] + P1 --> M1[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. +[A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] +to 3G_MSC-B] + M1 --> Q[Queue Messages +for UE/MS +in 3G_MSC-A] + Q --> T1[Set +T503] + T1 --> W1[Wait for UE/MS +on 3G_MSC-B' +(GSM to UMTS Ho)] + W1 --> P2[ ] + P2 --> M2[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. +[A-HO-COMPLETE] +from 3G_MSC-B'] + M2 --> T2[Reset +T503] + T2 --> F[Forward queued +messages +for UE/MS +via 3G_MSC-B'] + F --> R[Redefine +3G_MSC-B' +as 3G_MSC-B] + R --> U1[UE/MS +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)] + W1 --> P3[ ] + P3 --> M3[MAP-PAS req. +[A-HO-DETECT] +from 3G_MSC-B'] + M3 --> D1{(Allowed +once in +this state)} + D1 --> W2[Wait for UE/MS +on 3G_MSC-B' +(GSM to UMTS Ho)] + W1 --> P4[ ] + P4 --> M4[MAP-PAS req. +[A-CLEAR-REQUEST] +from MSC-B] + M4 --> D2{(Allowed +once in +this state)} + D2 --> D3{Wait for +access by UE/MS?} + D3 -- Yes --> D1 + D3 -- No --> C[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + C --> T3[to 3G_MSC-B +and 3G_MSC-B'] + T3 --> CR[Call +Release] + CR --> T4[to Network +and UE/MS] + T4 --> IDLE([IDLE]) + +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for GSM to UMTS Handover. The process starts at connector 9, sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response, queues messages, sets timer T503, and waits for UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B'. It then branches based on incoming signals (MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL, MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT], or MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST]) and a decision on whether access is allowed. Success leads to UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN), while failure leads to IDLE. + +Figure 43 (sheet 33 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![SDL diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing handover control logic in 3G_MSC-A.](573293af67ee571aef04bf725fcefbe5_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet34(78) + +``` + +graph TD + State1([Wait for UE/MS +on 3G_MSC-B' +GSM to UMTS Ho]) + + State1 --- Line1[ ] + + Line1 --- Input1{{Expiry +T503}} + Line1 --- Input2[/MAP-PAS req. +A-HO-FAILURE +from MSC-B/] + Line1 --- Input3[/from 3G_MSC-B'/] + Line1 --- Input4[/Call +Release/] + + Input1 --> Task1[Forward queued +messages for +UE/MS via MSC-B] + Task1 --> Task2[Use MAP- +FORWARD- +ACCESS- +SIGNALLING req.] + Task2 --> Output1{{to 3G_MSC-B'}} + Output1 --> Task3[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + Task3 --> State2([UE/MS +on MSC-B +GSM]) + + Input2 --> Task4[Reset +T503] + Task4 --> Input5[/from MSC-B/] + Input5 --> Task5[Cancel +MAP +Procedures] + Task5 --> Decision1{Wait for +access by UE/MS?} + + Decision1 -- Yes --> Join1[ ] + Decision1 -- No --> Output2{{to 3G_MSC-B'}} + Output2 --> Task6[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + Task6 --> State3([IDLE]) + + Input3 --> Task7[Cancel +MAP +Procedures] + Task7 --> Join1 + + Input4 --- Input6[/from Network +or MSC-B/] + Input6 --> Join1 + + Join1 --> State4([Wait for UE/MS +on 3G_MSC-B' +GSM to UMTS Ho]) + +``` + +SDL diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing handover control logic in 3G\_MSC-A. + +Figure 43 (sheet 34 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for UMTS to GSM handover. It starts at connector 14, sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] to MSC-B, and waits for an acknowledgement. A decision diamond 'Handover Number?' follows. If 'Not Requested', it goes to connector 18. If 'Requested', it sends an L-CONNECT (IAM) to MSC-B and waits for a connection. Responses from MSC-B include MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER esp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK], MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE], or MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR]. The first two lead to connector 12, while the third leads to connector 18.](93c9262c68d25c26b8cf8cd547554d9f_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Basic UMTS to GSM Handover to MSC-B +Circuit Connection required + +Sheet35(78) + +``` +graph TD; 14((14)) --> P1[ ]; P1 -- "MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] to MSC-B" --> W1[Wait For Acknowledgement from MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; W1 --> D{Handover Number?}; D -- "Not Requested" --> 18((18)); D -- "Requested" --> P2[ ]; P2 -- "L-CONNECT (IAM) to MSC-B using Handover Number" --> W2[Wait for Connection from MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; W1 --> R1[ ]; R1 -- "MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER esp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] from MSC-B" --> 12((12)); W1 --> R2[ ]; R2 -- "MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] from MSC-B" --> 12; W1 --> R3[ ]; R3 -- "MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] from MSC-B" --> 18; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for UMTS to GSM handover. It starts at connector 14, sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] to MSC-B, and waits for an acknowledgement. A decision diamond 'Handover Number?' follows. If 'Not Requested', it goes to connector 18. If 'Requested', it sends an L-CONNECT (IAM) to MSC-B and waits for a connection. Responses from MSC-B include MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER esp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK], MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE], or MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR]. The first two lead to connector 12, while the third leads to connector 18. + +Figure 43 (sheet 35 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. It starts with 'Wait For Acknowledgement from MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. From here, an 'ERROR from MSC-B' leads to 'Cancel MAP Resources in 3G_MSC-A' and then to connector '12'. A successful path leads to 'lu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A', which triggers a 'Call Release to Network'. Simultaneously, a 'Call Release From UE/MS or Network' occurs. Both 'Call Release' events lead to 'Release Resources in RNS-A', followed by 'Cancel MAP Resources to MSC-B', and finally reaching the 'IDLE' state.](83fd0d406cba6f9c189e77e05859a600_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet36(78) + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait For Acknowledgement from MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)]) --> ERROR{ERROR}; Start --> lu[lu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A]; ERROR -- from MSC-B --> CancelMAP1{Cancel MAP Resources}; CancelMAP1 -- in 3G_MSC-A --> 12((12)); lu --> CallRelease1{Call Release}; CallRelease1 -- to Network --> CallRelease2{Call Release}; CallRelease2 --> ReleaseRNS[Release Resources in RNS-A]; CallRelease2 --> CallRelease3{Call Release}; CallRelease3 -- From UE/MS or Network --> ReleaseRNS; ReleaseRNS --> CancelMAP2{Cancel MAP Resources}; CancelMAP2 -- to MSC-B --> IDLE([IDLE]); +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. It starts with 'Wait For Acknowledgement from MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. From here, an 'ERROR from MSC-B' leads to 'Cancel MAP Resources in 3G\_MSC-A' and then to connector '12'. A successful path leads to 'lu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A', which triggers a 'Call Release to Network'. Simultaneously, a 'Call Release From UE/MS or Network' occurs. Both 'Call Release' events lead to 'Release Resources in RNS-A', followed by 'Cancel MAP Resources to MSC-B', and finally reaching the 'IDLE' state. + +Figure 43 (sheet 36 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for Connection (from MSC-B) (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches based on incoming messages: 'I_COMPLETE (ACM) from MSC-B', 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B', 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A', or 'From UE/MS or Network'. The main path involves 'Queue Messages for UE/MS in 3G_MSC-A', 'Iu-Relocation Command to RNS-A', 'Set T303', 'Set Up the Handover Device', and 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. Error handling includes 'ERROR from MSC-B or Network' leading to 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B' and connector '12'. Other paths lead to 'Call Release', 'Release Resources in RNS-A', 'Cancel MAP Procedures', and 'IDLE'.](df72bd7468eb8bd59e911d0b5cb7a810_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet37(78) + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Connection from MSC-B UMTS to GSM Ho]) --> I_COMPLETE[I_COMPLETE ACM from MSC-B]; Start --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. A-CLEAR-REQUEST from MSC-B]; Start --> Iu_RELEASE[Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A]; Start --> From_UE[From UE/MS or Network]; I_COMPLETE --> Queue[Queue Messages for UE/MS in 3G_MSC-A]; MAP_PAS --> Allowed1[Allowed once in this state]; Allowed1 --> Wait2[Wait for Connection from MSC-B UMTS to GSM Ho]; Iu_RELEASE --> Allowed2[Allowed once in this state]; Allowed2 --> Call_Release1[Call Release]; Call_Release1 --> To_UE[To UE/MS and Network]; Call_Release1 --> Release[Release Resources in RNS-A]; From_UE --> Call_Release2[Call Release]; Call_Release2 --> To_UE; Call_Release2 --> Release; Queue --> Relocation[Iu-Relocation Command to RNS-A]; Relocation --> T303[Set T303]; T303 --> Handover[Set Up the Handover Device]; Handover --> Internal[Internal message in 3G_MSC-A]; Internal --> Wait3[Wait for Completion on MSC-B UMTS to GSM Ho]; ERROR[ERROR from MSC-B or Network] --> Disconnect[I_DISCONNECT REL to MSC-B]; Disconnect --> Connector((12)); Release --> Cancel[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel --> Disconnect2[I_DISCONNECT REL to MSC-B]; Disconnect2 --> IDLE([IDLE]); +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for Connection (from MSC-B) (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches based on incoming messages: 'I\_COMPLETE (ACM) from MSC-B', 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B', 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A', or 'From UE/MS or Network'. The main path involves 'Queue Messages for UE/MS in 3G\_MSC-A', 'Iu-Relocation Command to RNS-A', 'Set T303', 'Set Up the Handover Device', and 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. Error handling includes 'ERROR from MSC-B or Network' leading to 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B' and connector '12'. Other paths lead to 'Call Release', 'Release Resources in RNS-A', 'Cancel MAP Procedures', and 'IDLE'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 37 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. It starts with 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. Three parallel paths emerge: 1) MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] from MSC-B leads to 'Reset T303' -> 'Connect Handover Device (option)' -> 'Forward queued messages via MSC-B' -> 'Release Resources on RNS-A' -> 'Call on MSC-B (GSM)'. 2) I-ANSWER (ANM) from MSC-B leads to a decision '(Allowed once in this state)'. If Yes, 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B' -> 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. If No, 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A' -> 'Release Resources on RNS-A' -> 'Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B?'. If Yes, it leads to the 'Forward queued messages' path. If No, 'Call Release' -> 'to Network and UE/MS' -> 'Release MAP Resources' -> 'to MSC-B in 3G_MSC-A' -> 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B' -> 'IDLE'. 3) MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from MSC-B leads to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' -> 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'.](3054e46608784063609e8c7a253fcd24_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet38(78) + +``` +graph TD + Start([Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)]) --> T1[ ] + T1 --> M1[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] from MSC-B] + T1 --> T2[ ] + T2 --> M2[I-ANSWER (ANM) from MSC-B] + T2 --> T3[ ] + T3 --> M3[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from MSC-B] + M1 --> R1[Reset T303] + R1 --> H1[Connect Handover Device (option)] + H1 --> F1[Forward queued messages via MSC-B] + F1 --> U1[Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req] + U1 --> RR1[Release Resources on RNS-A] + RR1 --> C1((Call on MSC-B (GSM))) + M2 --> D1{Allowed once in this state} + D1 -- Yes --> M4[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B] + M4 --> U2([Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)]) + D1 -- No --> M5[Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A] + M5 --> RR2[Release Resources on RNS-A] + RR2 --> D2{Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B?} + D2 -- Yes --> F1 + D2 -- No --> CR[Call Release] + CR --> N1[to Network and UE/MS] + CR --> RM[Release MAP Resources] + RM --> N2[to MSC-B in 3G_MSC-A] + RM --> ID[ ] + ID --> IDL[ ] + IDL --> IDLE((IDLE)) + M3 --> H2[Connect Handover Device (option)] + H2 --> U3([Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)]) +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. It starts with 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. Three parallel paths emerge: 1) MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] from MSC-B leads to 'Reset T303' -> 'Connect Handover Device (option)' -> 'Forward queued messages via MSC-B' -> 'Release Resources on RNS-A' -> 'Call on MSC-B (GSM)'. 2) I-ANSWER (ANM) from MSC-B leads to a decision '(Allowed once in this state)'. If Yes, 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B' -> 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. If No, 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A' -> 'Release Resources on RNS-A' -> 'Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B?'. If Yes, it leads to the 'Forward queued messages' path. If No, 'Call Release' -> 'to Network and UE/MS' -> 'Release MAP Resources' -> 'to MSC-B in 3G\_MSC-A' -> 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B' -> 'IDLE'. 3) MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from MSC-B leads to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' -> 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 38 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into several paths: 1) 'Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A' leads to 'Reset T303' then 'Forward queued messages for UE/MS via RNS-A', then 'Release Handover Device', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (in 3G_MSC-A to MSC-B), then 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', ending at 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. 2) A path leads to 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) from MSC-B', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (In 3G_MSC-A and to MSC-B), then 'Release Handover Device' (Internal to 3G_MSC-A), then 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', ending at 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. 3) 'Expiry T303' leads to 'Call Release' (from Network), then 'Release Handover Device' (Internal to 3G_MSC-A), then 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. 4) A path leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (from MSC-B), then 'Release Handover Device', then 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', ending at 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. 5) A path leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (In 3G_MSC-A and to MSC-B), then 'Release Handover Device' (Internal to 3G_MSC-A), then 'Release Resources RNS-A', ending at 'IDLE'.](e27f0c293be4088211306b9fc673178b_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet39(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)]) --> Join(( )); Join --> IuRC[Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A]; IuRC --> Reset[Reset T303]; Reset --> FQ[Forward queued messages for UE/MS via RNS-A]; FQ --> RD1[Release Handover Device]; RD1 --> CMP1[Cancel MAP Procedures in 3G_MSC-A to MSC-B]; CMP1 --> ID1[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B]; ID1 --> CIP[Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)]; Join --> ID2[I_DISCONNECT (REL) from MSC-B]; ID2 --> CMP2[Cancel MAP Procedures In 3G_MSC-A and to MSC-B]; CMP2 --> RD2[Release Handover Device Internal to 3G_MSC-A]; RD2 --> ID3[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B]; ID3 --> WCM2([Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho))]; Join --> ET303{Expiry T303}; ET303 --> CR[Call Release from Network]; CR --> RD3[Release Handover Device Internal to 3G_MSC-A]; RD3 --> WCM3([Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho))]; Join --> CMP3[Cancel MAP Procedures from MSC-B]; CMP3 --> RD4[Release Handover Device]; RD4 --> ID4[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B]; ID4 --> WCM4([Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho))]; Join --> CMP4[Cancel MAP Procedures In 3G_MSC-A and to MSC-B]; CMP4 --> RD5[Release Handover Device Internal to 3G_MSC-A]; RD5 --> RR[Release Resources RNS-A]; RR --> IDLE([IDLE]) +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into several paths: 1) 'Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A' leads to 'Reset T303' then 'Forward queued messages for UE/MS via RNS-A', then 'Release Handover Device', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (in 3G\_MSC-A to MSC-B), then 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', ending at 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. 2) A path leads to 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) from MSC-B', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (In 3G\_MSC-A and to MSC-B), then 'Release Handover Device' (Internal to 3G\_MSC-A), then 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', ending at 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. 3) 'Expiry T303' leads to 'Call Release' (from Network), then 'Release Handover Device' (Internal to 3G\_MSC-A), then 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. 4) A path leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (from MSC-B), then 'Release Handover Device', then 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', ending at 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. 5) A path leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (In 3G\_MSC-A and to MSC-B), then 'Release Handover Device' (Internal to 3G\_MSC-A), then 'Release Resources RNS-A', ending at 'IDLE'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 39 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts with a call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN) entering from point 19. It checks if the MSC is known. If not, it sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-B. If known, it checks if handover is allowed to the cell. If not, it sends a MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-B and releases the call. If allowed, it checks which MSC is involved (MSC-B' or 3G_MSC-A). For 3G_MSC-A, it checks if the BSS is known and if resources are available. If not, it sends an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B, sets T301, and waits for channel allocation. If known and resources are available, it sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to 3G_MSC-B and checks for a circuit connection. If no connection, the call is released. If connected, the call continues on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN). For MSC-B', it sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] to 3G_MSC-B. All failure paths lead to a call release and an IDLE state.](351243fd59cdae993f191da9ebb48016_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet40(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + +graph TD + Start([Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]) --> J19((19)) + J19 --> Decision1{Known MSC?} + Decision1 -- No --> Message1[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B] + Message1 --> Decision1 + Decision1 -- Yes --> Decision2{Handover allowed to Cell?} + Decision2 -- No --> Message2[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B] + Message2 --> CallRelease1[Call Release] + CallRelease1 --> IDLE([IDLE]) + Decision2 -- Yes --> Decision3{Which MSC?} + Decision3 -- MSC-B' --> J20((20)) + Decision3 -- 3G_MSC-A --> Decision4{Known BSS?} + Decision4 -- No --> Message3[Cancel MAP procedures from 3G_MSC-B] + Message3 --> CallRelease2[Call Release to Network and UE/MS] + CallRelease2 --> IDLE + Decision4 -- Yes --> Decision5{Resources on new BSS?} + Decision5 -- No --> Message3 + Decision5 -- Yes --> Message4[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B] + Message4 --> SetT301[Set T301] + SetT301 --> Wait[Wait for Channel Allocation (UMTS to GSM Ho)] + Wait --> CallRelease3[UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)] + CallRelease3 --> IDLE + Message4 --> Message5[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to 3G_MSC-B] + Message5 --> Decision6{Circuit Connection?} + Decision6 -- No --> CallRelease3 + Decision6 -- Yes --> CallRelease4[Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)] + CallRelease4 --> IDLE + Message5 --> Message6[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] to 3G_MSC-B] + Message6 --> IDLE + Message6 --> I_DISCONNECT[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B] + I_DISCONNECT --> IDLE + +``` + +Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts with a call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN) entering from point 19. It checks if the MSC is known. If not, it sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-B. If known, it checks if handover is allowed to the cell. If not, it sends a MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-B and releases the call. If allowed, it checks which MSC is involved (MSC-B' or 3G\_MSC-A). For 3G\_MSC-A, it checks if the BSS is known and if resources are available. If not, it sends an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B, sets T301, and waits for channel allocation. If known and resources are available, it sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to 3G\_MSC-B and checks for a circuit connection. If no connection, the call is released. If connected, the call continues on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN). For MSC-B', it sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] to 3G\_MSC-B. All failure paths lead to a call release and an IDLE state. + +Figure 43 (sheet 40 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for Channel Allocation (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches based on incoming signals: 'A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK. from BSS-B', 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-B', 'Expiry T301', or 'Call Release From UE/MS or Network'. The 'A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK.' path leads to 'Reset T301', 'Queue Messages for UE/MS in 3G_MSC-A', and then to a decision 'Circuit Connection?'. If 'Yes', it proceeds to 'Set Up Handover Device', 'Set T304', and 'Wait for Access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. If 'No', it loops back to the initial wait state. The 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE' path leads to 'Reset T301', a decision '(Allowed once in this state)', and then to 'Release Resources in BSS-B', resulting in 'Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. The 'Expiry T301' path leads to 'Release Resources in BSS-B', resulting in 'Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. The 'Call Release' path leads to 'Cancel Channel BSS-B', 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp to 3G_MSC-B', 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B', and finally 'IDLE'. A 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B' is sent from the '(Allowed once in this state)' decision. A 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to 3G_MSC-B' is sent from the 'Queue Messages...' block. A 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to 3G_MSC-B' is sent from the 'Release Resources in BSS-B' block.](cf734b5645d3e02a8df25f67904cd2d3_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet41(78) + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for Channel Allocation (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches based on incoming signals: 'A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK. from BSS-B', 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-B', 'Expiry T301', or 'Call Release From UE/MS or Network'. The 'A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK.' path leads to 'Reset T301', 'Queue Messages for UE/MS in 3G\_MSC-A', and then to a decision 'Circuit Connection?'. If 'Yes', it proceeds to 'Set Up Handover Device', 'Set T304', and 'Wait for Access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. If 'No', it loops back to the initial wait state. The 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE' path leads to 'Reset T301', a decision '(Allowed once in this state)', and then to 'Release Resources in BSS-B', resulting in 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. The 'Expiry T301' path leads to 'Release Resources in BSS-B', resulting in 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. The 'Call Release' path leads to 'Cancel Channel BSS-B', 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp to 3G\_MSC-B', 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B', and finally 'IDLE'. A 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B' is sent from the '(Allowed once in this state)' decision. A 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to 3G\_MSC-B' is sent from the 'Queue Messages...' block. A 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to 3G\_MSC-B' is sent from the 'Release Resources in BSS-B' block. + +Figure 43 (sheet 41 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) 'A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B' leads to 'Reset T304', then 'Connect Handover Device (option)', then 'Forward queued messages for UE/MS via BSS-B', then 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B', then a 'Circuit Connection?' decision. If 'No', it goes to 'Release Handover Device' then 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B' then 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (GSM)'. If 'Yes', it goes to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' then 'Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. 2) 'A-HANDOVER DETECT from BSS-B' leads directly to 'Circuit Connection?'. If 'No', it goes to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' then 'Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. If 'Yes', it goes to 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B' then 'IDLE'. 3) 'Expiry T304' leads to 'Call Release' (to Network), 'Release Resources on BSS-B', 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (in 3G_MSC-A to 3G_MSC-B), then 'IDLE'.](9ba478ec5af01fd2fb458d145565198e_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet42(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)]) --> AHC[A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B]; Start --> AHD[A-HANDOVER DETECT from BSS-B]; Start --> ET304[Expiry T304]; AHC --> R[T304]; R --> CHD1[Connect Handover Device (option)]; CHD1 --> FQM[Forward queued messages for UE/MS via BSS-B]; FQM --> MES[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B]; MES --> CC1{Circuit Connection?}; CC1 -- No --> RH[Release Handover Device]; RH --> ID1[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B]; ID1 --> CIP[Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (GSM)]; CIP --> Start; CC1 -- Yes --> CHD2[Connect Handover Device (option)]; CHD2 --> Start2([Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)]); AHD --> CC2{Circuit Connection?}; CC2 -- No --> CHD3[Connect Handover Device (option)]; CHD3 --> Start2; CC2 -- Yes --> ID2[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B]; ID2 --> IDLE([IDLE]); ET304 --> CR[Call Release]; CR --> Net[Network]; CR --> RR[Release Resources on BSS-B]; RR --> CMP[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CMP --> MSCA[3G_MSC-A to 3G_MSC-B]; CMP --> IDLE; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) 'A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B' leads to 'Reset T304', then 'Connect Handover Device (option)', then 'Forward queued messages for UE/MS via BSS-B', then 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G\_MSC-B', then a 'Circuit Connection?' decision. If 'No', it goes to 'Release Handover Device' then 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B' then 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (GSM)'. If 'Yes', it goes to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' then 'Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. 2) 'A-HANDOVER DETECT from BSS-B' leads directly to 'Circuit Connection?'. If 'No', it goes to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' then 'Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. If 'Yes', it goes to 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B' then 'IDLE'. 3) 'Expiry T304' leads to 'Call Release' (to Network), 'Release Resources on BSS-B', 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (in 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B), then 'IDLE'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 42 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. It starts with 'Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches based on incoming messages: 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from 3G_MSC-B', 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B', and 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B'. The first leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures'. The second and third lead to state checks '(Allowed once in this state)'. From these checks, it leads to 'Call Release' (via 'from Network') or to 'Forward queued messages via 3G_MSC-B'. The latter leads to 'Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALING req.', then 'Release Resources on BSS-B'. A decision 'Circuit Connection?' follows. If 'Yes', it leads to 'Release Handover Device' and then 'Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. If 'No', it leads to 'UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. A 'Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)' terminal is also shown on the right.](3d6d0738981fdd03d003cc653bdfdaae_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet43(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)]) --> Junction(( )); Junction --> MAP_PAS_FAILURE[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from 3G_MSC-B]; Junction --> MAP_PAS_REQUEST[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B]; Junction --> A_CLEAR_REQUEST[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B]; MAP_PAS_FAILURE --> Cancel[Cancel MAP Procedures]; MAP_PAS_REQUEST --> Allowed1{(Allowed once in this state)}; A_CLEAR_REQUEST --> Allowed2{(Allowed once in this state)}; Cancel --> Call_Release[Call Release]; Allowed1 --> Call_Release; Allowed2 --> Call_Release; Call_Release --> from_Network[from Network]; from_Network --> Call_Release; Call_Release --> Wait_End([Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)]); Junction --> Forward[Forward queued messages via 3G_MSC-B]; Forward --> Use_MAP[Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALING req.]; Use_MAP --> Release_Resources[Release Resources on BSS-B]; Release_Resources --> Circuit_Connection{Circuit Connection?}; Circuit_Connection -- Yes --> Release_Device[Release Handover Device]; Release_Device --> Call_UTRAN[Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]; Circuit_Connection -- No --> UE_UTRAN[UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. It starts with 'Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches based on incoming messages: 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from 3G\_MSC-B', 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B', and 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B'. The first leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures'. The second and third lead to state checks '(Allowed once in this state)'. From these checks, it leads to 'Call Release' (via 'from Network') or to 'Forward queued messages via 3G\_MSC-B'. The latter leads to 'Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALING req.', then 'Release Resources on BSS-B'. A decision 'Circuit Connection?' follows. If 'Yes', it leads to 'Release Handover Device' and then 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. If 'No', it leads to 'UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. A 'Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)' terminal is also shown on the right. + +Figure 43 (sheet 43 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO](c0ef0292328b1602e278f6a0b2ee07e0_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet44(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Subsequent UMTS to GSM +Handover from 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-B' +Circuit Connection required + +``` +graph TD; Start((20)) --> Step1[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req [A-HO-REQUEST] to MSC-B']; Step1 --> Wait1[Wait for Ack from MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; Wait1 --> Decision1{ }; Decision1 --> Step2[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp.. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] from MSC-B']; Decision1 --> Step3[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] from MSC-B']; Step2 --> Decision2{Handover Number?}; Decision2 -- Not Requested --> End((21)); Decision2 -- Requested --> Step4[CONNECT (IAM) to MSC-B' using Handover Number]; Step4 --> Wait2[Wait for Connection from MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; Step3 --> Step5[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to 3G_MSC-B]; Step5 --> Step6[ ]; Step6 --> End2[Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. It begins at connector 20, where a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request (A-HO-REQUEST) is sent to MSC-B'. The system then waits for an acknowledgment from MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho). A decision point follows: if a response (A-HO-REQUEST-ACK) is received from MSC-B', the next step is to check the Handover Number. If 'Not Requested', the procedure ends at connector 21. If 'Requested', a CONNECT (IAM) message is sent to MSC-B' using the Handover Number, and the system waits for a connection from MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho). If a response (A-HO-FAILURE) is received from MSC-B' at the first decision point, a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response (A-HO-FAILURE) is sent to 3G\_MSC-B. This is followed by another decision point leading to a call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN). + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Figure 43 (sheet 44 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for Ack from MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho). It branches based on inputs: 'ERROR from MSC-B'', 'from 3G_MSC-B or Network', and 'Call Release From UE/MS or Network'. The 'ERROR from MSC-B'' path leads to 'Release MAP Resources to MSC-B'', then 'ERROR' (leading to 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. to 3G_MSC-B'), and finally 'Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. The 'from 3G_MSC-B or Network' path leads to 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures to MSC-B'', and finally 'Wait for Ack from MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. The 'Call Release' path leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures to MSC-B'', then 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B', 'Release Handover Device', 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B', and finally 'IDLE'.](c24f22afc8106a8f9b76c759a1db6891_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet45(78) + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Ack from MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)]) --> ERROR1{ERROR}; Start --> FROM_3G[from 3G_MSC-B or Network]; Start --> CALL_RELEASE{Call Release}; ERROR1 --> FROM_MSCB[from MSC-B']; FROM_3G --> ERROR2{ERROR}; CALL_RELEASE --> FROM_UE[From UE/MS or Network]; ERROR1 --> RELEASE_MAP[Release MAP Resources]; RELEASE_MAP --> TO_MSCB1[to MSC-B']; RELEASE_MAP --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B]; MAP_PAS --> CANCEL_MAP1[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CANCEL_MAP1 --> TO_MSCB2[to MSC-B']; CANCEL_MAP1 --> WAIT_ACK1([Wait for Ack from MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)]); ERROR2 --> ERROR3{ERROR}; ERROR3 --> MAP_PREPARE[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. to 3G_MSC-B]; MAP_PREPARE --> CALL_3G([Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]); CALL_RELEASE --> CANCEL_MAP2[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CANCEL_MAP2 --> TO_MSCB3[to MSC-B']; CANCEL_MAP2 --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B]; MAP_SEND --> RELEASE_DEVICE[Release Handover Device]; RELEASE_DEVICE --> I_DISCONNECT[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B]; I_DISCONNECT --> IDLE([IDLE]) +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for Ack from MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho). It branches based on inputs: 'ERROR from MSC-B'', 'from 3G\_MSC-B or Network', and 'Call Release From UE/MS or Network'. The 'ERROR from MSC-B'' path leads to 'Release MAP Resources to MSC-B'', then 'ERROR' (leading to 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. to 3G\_MSC-B'), and finally 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. The 'from 3G\_MSC-B or Network' path leads to 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures to MSC-B'', and finally 'Wait for Ack from MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. The 'Call Release' path leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures to MSC-B'', then 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G\_MSC-B', 'Release Handover Device', 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B', and finally 'IDLE'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 45 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![State transition diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing various states and transitions between MSC-A, MSC-B, MSC-B', and UE/MS.](64c76a4fd6b7918cd8a2704de0265e8d_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet46(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + +stateDiagram-v2 + [*] --> Wait4Conn_B: Wait for Connection from MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho) + state "Wait for Connection from MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)" as Wait4Conn_B + state "Set up Handover Device" as SetupHo + state "Queue messages for UE/MS in 3G_MSC-A" as QueueMsgs + state "Set T303" as SetT303 + state "Wait for Completion on MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)" as Wait4Comp_B + state "Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)" as CallUTRAN + state "IDLE" as IDLE + + Wait4Conn_B --> SetupHo + SetupHo --> QueueMsgs + QueueMsgs --> SetT303 + SetT303 --> Wait4Comp_B + + Wait4Conn_B --> ERROR: from MSC-B' or Network + ERROR --> CallRelease: from UE/MS or Network + ERROR --> CallUTRAN: ERROR + + SetupHo --> Wait4Conn_B: I_COMPLETE (ACM) from MSC-B' + SetupHo --> QueueMsgs: MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B' + QueueMsgs --> ERROR: MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to 3G_MSC-B + QueueMsgs --> CallRelease: Cancel MAP Procedures to MSC-B' + QueueMsgs --> CallUTRAN: I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B' + + Wait4Comp_B --> ERROR: ERROR + CallUTRAN --> ERROR: MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. to 3G_MSC-B + CallUTRAN --> IDLE: I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B and MSC-B' + +``` + +The diagram illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. It begins with a state 'Wait for Connection from MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. From here, a transition 'Set up Handover Device' leads to 'Queue messages for UE/MS in 3G\_MSC-A', which then leads to 'Set T303' and finally 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. There are several error and release paths: an 'ERROR' state reached from 'from MSC-B' or Network' leads to 'Call Release' (from 'from UE/MS or Network') or 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. A transition 'I\_COMPLETE (ACM) from MSC-B'' returns from 'ERROR' to 'Set up Handover Device'. A transition 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B'' leads from 'Set up Handover Device' to a state '(Allowed once in this state)', which then leads to 'Wait for Connection from MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. A transition 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to 3G\_MSC-B' leads from 'Queue messages for UE/MS in 3G\_MSC-A' to 'ERROR'. Two 'Cancel MAP Procedures' transitions lead from 'Queue messages for UE/MS in 3G\_MSC-A' to 'to MSC-B'' and 'to 3G\_MSC-B and MSC-B'' respectively. A transition 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B'' leads from 'Queue messages for UE/MS in 3G\_MSC-A' to 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. A transition 'ERROR' leads from 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)' to 'ERROR'. A transition 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. to 3G\_MSC-B' leads from 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)' to 'ERROR'. A transition 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B and MSC-B'' leads from 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)' to 'IDLE'. A transition 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp to 3G\_MSC-B' leads from 'to 3G\_MSC-B and MSC-B'' to 'Call Release', which then leads to 'to Network and UE/MS'. + +State transition diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing various states and transitions between MSC-A, MSC-B, MSC-B', and UE/MS. + +Figure 43 (sheet 46 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Sequence diagram for Handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-A. The diagram shows the interaction between 3G_MSC-A, 3G_MSC-B, and MSC-B' for a UMTS to GSM handover. The process starts with 3G_MSC-A waiting for completion from MSC-B'. It then sends a MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] to MSC-B', which responds with I_ANSWER (ANM). 3G_MSC-A then connects the handover device (optional) and forwards queued messages for UE/MS via MSC-B' using MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req. MSC-B' responds with MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B and I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B. 3G_MSC-A redefines MSC-B' as MSC-B and calls on MSC-B (GSM). Simultaneously, 3G_MSC-B sends MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A, which checks if allowed. 3G_MSC-A sends MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] to MSC-B', which checks if allowed. 3G_MSC-A connects the handover device (optional) and waits for completion from MSC-B'. A decision 'Wait for access by UE/MS?' is made. If 'Yes', it calls on MSC-B (GSM). If 'No', it releases the handover device, cancels MAP procedures, calls release to network and UE/MS, sends I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B and MSC-B', and enters IDLE state.](74340c36eadb11d858e925d7b77260bf_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet47(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant 3G_MSC_A as 3G_MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC_B as 3G_MSC-B + participant MSC_B_prime as MSC-B' + + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: Wait for Completion on MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho) + 3G_MSC_A->>MSC_B_prime: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] + MSC_B_prime-->>3G_MSC_A: I_ANSWER (ANM) + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: Reset T303 + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: Connect Handover Device (option) + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: Forward queued messages for UE/MS via MSC-B' + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req. + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: Redefine MSC-B' as MSC-B + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: Call on MSC-B (GSM) + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: Wait for Completion from MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho) + + 3G_MSC_B->>3G_MSC_A: MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] + Note right of 3G_MSC_A: (Allowed once in this state) + 3G_MSC_A->>MSC_B_prime: MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] + Note right of MSC_B_prime: (Allowed once in this state) + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: Connect Handover Device (option) + + Note right of 3G_MSC_A: Wait for access by UE/MS? + alt Yes + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: Call on MSC-B (GSM) + else No + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: Release Handover Device + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: Cancel MAP Procedures + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: Call Release + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B and MSC-B' + Note left of 3G_MSC_A: IDLE + end + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. The diagram shows the interaction between 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B, and MSC-B' for a UMTS to GSM handover. The process starts with 3G\_MSC-A waiting for completion from MSC-B'. It then sends a MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] to MSC-B', which responds with I\_ANSWER (ANM). 3G\_MSC-A then connects the handover device (optional) and forwards queued messages for UE/MS via MSC-B' using MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req. MSC-B' responds with MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G\_MSC-B and I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B. 3G\_MSC-A redefines MSC-B' as MSC-B and calls on MSC-B (GSM). Simultaneously, 3G\_MSC-B sends MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-A, which checks if allowed. 3G\_MSC-A sends MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] to MSC-B', which checks if allowed. 3G\_MSC-A connects the handover device (optional) and waits for completion from MSC-B'. A decision 'Wait for access by UE/MS?' is made. If 'Yes', it calls on MSC-B (GSM). If 'No', it releases the handover device, cancels MAP procedures, calls release to network and UE/MS, sends I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B and MSC-B', and enters IDLE state. + +Figure 43 (sheet 47 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches based on 'Expiry T303', 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from 3G_MSC-B', and 'from MSC-B''. It includes steps like 'Cancel MAP Procedures', 'Release Handover Device', 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B'', and 'Wait for access by UE/MS?'. Final states include 'IDLE', 'Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)', and 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)'.](9f5f9afcedaa0d9b7991976f5000865c_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet48(78) + +``` +graph TD + Start([Wait for Completion on MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)]) --> ExpiryT303{Expiry T303} + ExpiryT303 --> ResetT303[Reset T303] + ResetT303 --> CancelMAP1[Cancel MAP Procedures] + CancelMAP1 --> ReleaseHD1[Release Handover Device] + ReleaseHD1 --> IDLE1([IDLE]) + + ExpiryT303 --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from 3G_MSC-B] + MAP_PAS --> CancelMAP2[Cancel MAP Procedures] + CancelMAP2 --> IDISCONNECT1[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B] + IDISCONNECT1 --> ReleaseHD2[Release Handover Device] + ReleaseHD2 --> WaitAccess{Wait for access by UE/MS?} + WaitAccess -- No --> CancelMAP3[Cancel MAP Procedures] + CancelMAP3 --> IDISCONNECT2[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B'] + IDISCONNECT2 --> IDLE2([IDLE]) + WaitAccess -- Yes --> CallRelease1[Call Release] + CallRelease1 --> WaitCompletion1([Wait for Completion on MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)]) + + ExpiryT303 --> fromMSCB[from MSC-B'] + fromMSCB --> CancelMAP4[Cancel MAP Procedures] + CancelMAP4 --> IDISCONNECT3[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B'] + IDISCONNECT3 --> ReleaseHD3[Release Handover Device] + ReleaseHD3 --> WaitAccess + WaitAccess -- Yes --> CallRelease2[Call Release] + CallRelease2 --> WaitCompletion2([Wait for Completion on MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)]) + + ExpiryT303 --> 3G_MSCB_Connected{3G_MSC-B Connection?} + 3G_MSCB_Connected -- No --> CallRelease3[Call Release] + CallRelease3 --> IDLE3([IDLE]) + 3G_MSCB_Connected -- Yes --> UseMAP[Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.] + UseMAP --> ForwardMsg[Forward queued messages for UE/MS via 3G_MSC-B] + ForwardMsg --> CallUTRAN([Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]) +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches based on 'Expiry T303', 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from 3G\_MSC-B', and 'from MSC-B''. It includes steps like 'Cancel MAP Procedures', 'Release Handover Device', 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B'', and 'Wait for access by UE/MS?'. Final states include 'IDLE', 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)', and 'Wait for Completion on MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 48 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for UMTS to GSM handover. The process starts at connector 18, queues messages, sends an Iu-Relocation Command to RNS-A, sets timer T303, and waits for UE/MS on MSC-B. It then branches based on signals from MSC-B (MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL, MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT]) and RNS-A (Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST). Depending on these signals, it either resets T303, releases resources, forwards messages, and ends with UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM); or it checks if the state is allowed, releases resources, calls release, and ends in an IDLE state; or it waits for UE/MS on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho).](993921f0d5f99fb48933465306644535_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Basic UMTS to GSM Handover to MSC-B no Circuit Connection required + +Sheet49(78) + +``` +graph TD + 18((18)) --> Queue[Queue Messages for UE/MS in 3G_MSC-A] + Queue --> Command[Iu-Relocation Command to RNS-A] + Command --> T303[Set T303] + T303 --> Wait1[Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)] + Wait1 --> Branch1(( )) + Branch1 --> Signal1[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] from MSC-B] + Signal1 --> Reset[Reset T303] + Reset --> Release1[Release Resources on RNS-A] + Release1 --> Forward[Forward queued messages for UE/MS via MSC-B] + Forward --> UseMap[Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.] + UseMap --> End1[UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM)] + Branch1 --> Allowed1{(Allowed once in this state)} + Allowed1 --> Signal2[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B] + Signal2 --> Allowed2{(Allowed once in this state)} + Allowed2 --> Release2[Release Resources on RNS-A] + Release2 --> Wait2[Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B?] + Wait2 -- Yes --> End2[Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)] + Wait2 -- No --> CallRelease[Call Release] + CallRelease --> ToNetwork[to Network and UE/MS] + CallRelease --> ReleaseMap[Release MAP Resources] + ReleaseMap --> ToMSCB[to MSC-B in 3G_MSC-A] + ReleaseMap --> Idle[IDLE] + Branch1 --> Signal3[Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A] + Signal3 --> Branch2(( )) + Branch2 --> Signal4[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from MSC-B] + Signal4 --> End3[Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)] +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for UMTS to GSM handover. The process starts at connector 18, queues messages, sends an Iu-Relocation Command to RNS-A, sets timer T303, and waits for UE/MS on MSC-B. It then branches based on signals from MSC-B (MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL, MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT]) and RNS-A (Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST). Depending on these signals, it either resets T303, releases resources, forwards messages, and ends with UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM); or it checks if the state is allowed, releases resources, calls release, and ends in an IDLE state; or it waits for UE/MS on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho). + +Figure 43 (sheet 49 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing four parallel paths starting from a common wait state for UE/MS on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho). Path 1: Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A -> Reset T303 -> Forward queued messages for UE/MS via RNS-A -> Cancel MAP Procedures (in 3G_MSC-A to MSC-B) -> Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN). Path 2: Cancel MAP Procedures (from MSC-B) -> Release Resources RNS-A -> Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho). Path 3: Expiry T303 -> Cancel MAP Procedures (In 3G_MSC-A and to MSC-B) -> Release Resources RNS-A -> IDLE. Path 4: Call Release (from Network) -> Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho).](fe82ce00eaac699b60a35ccb558e7851_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet50(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start["(Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho))"] --> P1[ ]; Start --> P2[ ]; Start --> P3[ ]; Start --> P4[ ]; P1 --> Iu["Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A"]; Iu --> R1["Reset T303"]; R1 --> F1["Forward queued messages for UE/MS via RNS-A"]; F1 --> C1["Cancel MAP Procedures"]; C1 -.-> C1_note["in 3G_MSC-A to MSC-B"]; C1 --> S1["Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)"]; P2 --> C2["Cancel MAP Procedures"]; C2 -.-> C2_note["from MSC-B"]; C2 --> R2["Release Resources RNS-A"]; R2 --> S2["(Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho))"]; P3 --> E3["Expiry T303"]; E3 --> C3["Cancel MAP Procedures"]; C3 -.-> C3_note["In 3G_MSC-A and to MSC-B"]; C3 --> R3["Release Resources RNS-A"]; R3 --> S3["IDLE"]; P4 --> CR["Call Release"]; CR -.-> CR_note["from Network"]; CR --> S4["(Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho))"]; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing four parallel paths starting from a common wait state for UE/MS on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho). Path 1: Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A -> Reset T303 -> Forward queued messages for UE/MS via RNS-A -> Cancel MAP Procedures (in 3G\_MSC-A to MSC-B) -> Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (UTRAN). Path 2: Cancel MAP Procedures (from MSC-B) -> Release Resources RNS-A -> Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho). Path 3: Expiry T303 -> Cancel MAP Procedures (In 3G\_MSC-A and to MSC-B) -> Release Resources RNS-A -> IDLE. Path 4: Call Release (from Network) -> Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B (UMTS to GSM Ho). + +Figure 43 (sheet 50 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing handover control between UE/MS and 3G_MSC-B.](e34d324a8cb26c08d19f79220bb7104c_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet51(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +UE/MS Established on 3G\_MSC-B without a Circuit Connection + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B + Note left of UE/MS: Request for Circuit Establishment + UE/MS->>UE/MS: MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [A-ASG-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-B + UE/MS->>UE/MS: Wait For Response from 3G_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho) + Note right of UE/MS: From 3G_MSC-B + UE/MS->>UE/MS: MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B + Note right of UE/MS: Cancel MAP Procedures + UE/MS->>UE/MS: Call Release + Note right of UE/MS: to Network + Note right of UE/MS: From UE/MS or Network + UE/MS->>UE/MS: Call Release + Note right of UE/MS: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B + UE/MS->>UE/MS: IDLE + Note right of UE/MS: 19 +``` + +The diagram illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. It begins with the UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B. A 'Request for Circuit Establishment' is received, leading to a state where 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [A-ASG-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-B' is sent. The system then enters a 'Wait For Response from 3G\_MSC-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)' state. Upon receiving 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B', the 'Cancel MAP Procedures' step is initiated, followed by a 'Call Release' to the Network. If a 'Call Release' is received 'From UE/MS or Network', the 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G\_MSC-B' is sent, and the system returns to an 'IDLE' state. A connector '19' is also shown as an alternative exit point. + +Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing handover control between UE/MS and 3G\_MSC-B. + +Figure 43 (sheet 51 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait For Response (from MSC-B) (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It then branches into two paths. The left path consists of 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [A-ASG-COMplete] from MSC-B', followed by 'I_CONNECT (IAM) to MSC-B using Handover Number', and ends with 'Wait for Complete (from MSC-B) (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. The right path consists of 'Call Release' (with a note 'From UE/MS or Network'), followed by 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B', and ends with 'IDLE'.](6bd84b6e2e96b0d1193956b5a04b0e69_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet52(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Circuit Connection Establishment to MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start[Wait For Response (from MSC-B) (UMTS to GSM Ho)] --> LeftPath[ ]; Start --> RightPath[ ]; subgraph LeftPath; L1[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [A-ASG-COMplete] from MSC-B]; L2[I_CONNECT (IAM) to MSC-B using Handover Number]; L3[Wait for Complete (from MSC-B) (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; L1 --> L2 --> L3; end; subgraph RightPath; R1[Call Release]; R2[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B]; R3[IDLE]; R1 --> R2 --> R3; end; style LeftPath fill:none,stroke:none; style RightPath fill:none,stroke:none; +``` + +Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait For Response (from MSC-B) (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It then branches into two paths. The left path consists of 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [A-ASG-COMplete] from MSC-B', followed by 'I\_CONNECT (IAM) to MSC-B using Handover Number', and ends with 'Wait for Complete (from MSC-B) (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. The right path consists of 'Call Release' (with a note 'From UE/MS or Network'), followed by 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B', and ends with 'IDLE'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 52 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait For Response (from MSC-B) (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) Success: 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B' -> '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM)'. 2) Error: 'MAP-PREPRE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] from MSC-B' -> 'Failure' -> 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request' -> 'UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM)'. 3) Failure: 'MAP-PREPRE-HANDOVER resp. [A-ASG-FAILURE] from MSC-B' -> 'Cancel MAP Procedures (from MSC-B)' -> 'Call Release (to Network)' -> 'Failure' -> 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request' -> 'IDLE'.](5f5a8699620b98137f36540ead9912f9_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet53(78) + +``` +graph TD; Start[Wait For Response from MSC-B UMTS to GSM Ho] --> Decision1{ }; Decision1 --> Success[MAP-PAS req. A-CLEAR-REQUEST from MSC-B]; Decision1 --> Error[MAP-PREPRE-HANDOVER resp. MAP ERROR from MSC-B]; Decision1 --> Failure[MAP-PREPRE-HANDOVER resp. A-ASG-FAILURE from MSC-B]; Success --> Allowed{(Allowed once in this state)}; Allowed --> UE1[UE/MS on MSC-B GSM]; Error --> Failure1{Failure}; Failure1 --> Response1[Response to Circuit Establishment Request]; Response1 --> UE2[UE/MS on MSC-B GSM]; Failure --> Cancel[Cancel MAP Procedures from MSC-B]; Cancel --> Release[Call Release to Network]; Release --> Failure2{Failure}; Failure2 --> Response2[Response to Circuit Establishment Request]; Response2 --> Idle[IDLE]; +``` + +Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait For Response (from MSC-B) (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) Success: 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B' -> '(Allowed once in this state)' -> 'UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM)'. 2) Error: 'MAP-PREPRE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] from MSC-B' -> 'Failure' -> 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request' -> 'UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM)'. 3) Failure: 'MAP-PREPRE-HANDOVER resp. [A-ASG-FAILURE] from MSC-B' -> 'Cancel MAP Procedures (from MSC-B)' -> 'Call Release (to Network)' -> 'Failure' -> 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request' -> 'IDLE'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 53 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![State transition diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO. The diagram shows various states and transitions for a handover process. States include 'Wait for Complete (from MSC-B) (UMTS to GSM Ho)', 'Success', 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request', 'Call on MSC-B (GSM)', 'Cancel MAP Procedures', 'Failure', 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request', 'Call Release', 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B', 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', and 'IDLE'. Transitions are triggered by messages like 'I_COMPLETE (ACM) from MSC-B', 'I-ANSWER (ANM) from MSC-B', 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B', 'from MSC-B', 'from UE/MS or Network', and 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B'.](841943891f19fcd045f406339e8d5655_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet54(78) + +``` +stateDiagram-v2 + [*] --> S1: Wait for Complete (from MSC-B) (UMTS to GSM Ho) + S1 --> S2: I_COMPLETE (ACM) from MSC-B + S1 --> S3: I-ANSWER (ANM) from MSC-B + S1 --> S4: MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B + S1 --> S5: Call Release + S2 --> S6: Success + S2 --> S7: Response to Circuit Establishment Request + S3 --> S8: Call on MSC-B (GSM) + S4 --> S9: (Allowed once in this state) + S4 --> S10: Cancel MAP Procedures + S4 --> S11: Failure + S5 --> S12: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B + S5 --> S13: I_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B + S5 --> S14: IDLE + S6 --> S15: Wait for Complete (from MSC-B) (UMTS to GSM Ho) + S7 --> S15 + S8 --> S15 + S9 --> S10 + S10 --> S11 + S11 --> S12 + S11 --> S13 + S11 --> S14 +``` + +State transition diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO. The diagram shows various states and transitions for a handover process. States include 'Wait for Complete (from MSC-B) (UMTS to GSM Ho)', 'Success', 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request', 'Call on MSC-B (GSM)', 'Cancel MAP Procedures', 'Failure', 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request', 'Call Release', 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to MSC-B', 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B', and 'IDLE'. Transitions are triggered by messages like 'I\_COMPLETE (ACM) from MSC-B', 'I-ANSWER (ANM) from MSC-B', 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B', 'from MSC-B', 'from UE/MS or Network', and 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-B'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 54 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. The process starts at connector 21, sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response, queues messages, sets timer T303, and waits for UE/MS on MSC-B'. It then branches based on signals from MSC-B' (MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL, MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT]) and decisions on whether actions are allowed or if access is granted. Successful paths lead to redefining MSC-B' as MSC-B and UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM). Failure paths lead to canceling MAP procedures or call release to an IDLE state.](c69cb6aeb2c0a91ab4ba98bddf14e55a_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet55(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Subsequent UMTS to GSM Handover from 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-B' no Circuit Connection required. + +``` + +graph TD + Start((21)) --> MAP_Prep[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to 3G_MSC-B] + MAP_Prep --> Queue[Queue Messages for UE/MS in 3G_MSC-A] + Queue --> Set_T303[Set T303] + Set_T303 --> Wait_UE_MS_B[Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)] + Wait_UE_MS_B --> MAP_Send_End[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] from MSC-B'] + Wait_UE_MS_B --> MAP_PAS_Detect[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] from MSC-B'] + Wait_UE_MS_B --> Allowed_Once_1{(Allowed once in this state)} + MAP_Send_End --> Reset_T303[Reset T303] + Reset_T303 --> Forward_Queue[Forward queued messages for UE/MS via MSC-B'] + Forward_Queue --> Redefine[Redefined MSC-B' as MSC-B] + Redefine --> UE_MS_GSM[UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM)] + MAP_PAS_Detect --> Allowed_Once_2{(Allowed once in this state)} + Allowed_Once_2 -- Yes --> Wait_Access{Wait for access by UE/MS?} + Allowed_Once_2 -- No --> Cancel[Cancel MAP Procedures] + Cancel --> Call_Release[Call Release] + Call_Release --> IDLE[IDLE] + Cancel -.-> to_3G_MSC[to 3G_MSC-B and MSC-B'] + Call_Release -.-> to_Net[to Network and UE/MS] + Wait_Access -- Yes --> Wait_UE_MS_B + Wait_Access -- No --> Cancel + Allowed_Once_1 --> MAP_PAS_Req[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from MSC-B'] + MAP_PAS_Req --> Allowed_Once_2 + Allowed_Once_1 --> Forward_Access[Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req] + Forward_Access --> Forward_Queue + MAP_PAS_Req --> MAP_PAS_Req_3G[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B] + +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. The process starts at connector 21, sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response, queues messages, sets timer T303, and waits for UE/MS on MSC-B'. It then branches based on signals from MSC-B' (MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL, MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT]) and decisions on whether actions are allowed or if access is granted. Successful paths lead to redefining MSC-B' as MSC-B and UE/MS on MSC-B (GSM). Failure paths lead to canceling MAP procedures or call release to an IDLE state. + +Figure 43 (sheet 55 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. It starts with 'Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho) and branches based on timer expiry, failure messages, or network requests.](38e71c92bab0b1f77d50284f69e399f4_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet56(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)]) --> T303_Exp{Expiry T303}; T303_Exp --> Reset[Reset T303]; Reset --> Forward[Forward queued messages for UE/MS via 3G_MSC-B]; Forward --> CancelA[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelA --> EndA([UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]); T303_Exp --> Failure[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] from 3G_MSC-B]; Failure --> CancelB[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelB --> WaitAccess{Wait for access by UE/MS?}; WaitAccess -- No --> CancelC[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelC --> EndB([IDLE]); WaitAccess -- Yes --> Release[Call Release]; Release --> EndC([Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho)]); CancelA --> ToMSCB1[to MSC-B']; CancelB --> ToMSCB2[to MSC-B']; CancelC --> ToMSCB3[to MSC-B']; Forward -.-> UseMap[Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.]; Failure -.-> FromMSCB1[from 3G_MSC-B]; CancelB -.-> FromMSCB2[from MSC-B']; Release -.-> FromNetwork[from Network or 3G_MSC-B]; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. It starts with 'Wait for UE/MS on MSC-B' (UMTS to GSM Ho) and branches based on timer expiry, failure messages, or network requests. + +Figure 43 (sheet 56 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO. It starts at connector 17, sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [IU-RLC-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-B, and waits for an acknowledgement. A decision 'Handover Number?' follows. If 'Not Requested', it goes to connector 22. If 'Requested', it sends an L_CONNECT (IAM) to 3G_MSC-B and waits for a connection. Three possible responses from 3G_MSC-B are shown: 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK]', 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-FAILURE]', and 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR]'. The first two lead to connector 16, while the third leads to connector 22.](3d885b841119080a2bcfd603a7afca63_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Basic SRNS Relocation to 3G\_MSC-B +Circuit Connection required + +Sheet57(78) + +``` +graph TD; 17((17)) --> P1[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [IU-RLC-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-B]; P1 --> W1[Wait For Acknowledgement from 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)]; W1 --> D{Handover Number?}; D -- Not Requested --> 22((22)); D -- Requested --> P2[L_CONNECT (IAM) to 3G_MSC-B using Handover Number]; P2 --> W2[Wait for Connection from 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)]; W1 --> P3[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK] from 3G_MSC-B]; W1 --> P4[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-FAILURE] from 3G_MSC-B]; W1 --> P5[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] from 3G_MSC-B]; P3 --> 16((16)); P4 --> 16; P5 --> 22; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO. It starts at connector 17, sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [IU-RLC-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-B, and waits for an acknowledgement. A decision 'Handover Number?' follows. If 'Not Requested', it goes to connector 22. If 'Requested', it sends an L\_CONNECT (IAM) to 3G\_MSC-B and waits for a connection. Three possible responses from 3G\_MSC-B are shown: 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK]', 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-FAILURE]', and 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR]'. The first two lead to connector 16, while the third leads to connector 22. + +Figure 43 (sheet 57 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing two main paths: one for a successful handover and one for an error condition.](5cdc04ba574b7b819a3cb6dbbd91306c_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet58(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait For Acknowledgement from 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)]) --> Decision{ }; Decision --> ERROR[/ERROR/]; Decision --> REQUEST[lu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A]; ERROR --> ERROR_FROM[from 3G_MSC-B]; ERROR --> CANCEL_MAP_A[/Cancel MAP Resources/]; CANCEL_MAP_A --> CANCEL_MAP_A_IN[In 3G_MSC-A]; CANCEL_MAP_A --> Connector((16)); REQUEST --> CallRelease_A[/Call Release/]; CallRelease_A --> TO_NETWORK[to Network]; CallRelease_A --> CallRelease_B[/Call Release/]; CallRelease_B --> FROM_UE[From UE or Network]; CallRelease_B --> RELEASE_RNS[/Release Resources in RNS-A/]; RELEASE_RNS --> CANCEL_MAP_B[/Cancel MAP Resources/]; CANCEL_MAP_B --> TO_MSC_B[to 3G_MSC-B]; CANCEL_MAP_B --> IDLE([IDLE]) +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. It begins with a 'Wait For Acknowledgement from 3G\_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)' state. A decision point follows, leading to two main paths. The 'ERROR' path, labeled 'from 3G\_MSC-B', leads to an 'ERROR' state, which then leads to 'Cancel MAP Resources in 3G\_MSC-A', which finally leads to connector '16'. The 'lu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A' path leads to a 'Call Release' state, which then leads to 'to Network'. This 'to Network' path leads to another 'Call Release' state, labeled 'From UE or Network'. This second 'Call Release' state leads to 'Release Resources in RNS-A', which then leads to 'Cancel MAP Resources to 3G\_MSC-B', which finally leads to the 'IDLE' state. + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing two main paths: one for a successful handover and one for an error condition. + +Figure 43 (sheet 58 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![SDL Flowchart for Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing handover control logic in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts at 'Wait for Connection from 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)'. It handles inputs like I_COMPLETE (ACM), MAP-PAS req., and Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST. It includes states for queuing messages, setting timers (T703), and setting up handover devices. Error paths lead to call release and resource release in RNS-A, eventually reaching an IDLE state or a connector '16'.](59b0fc7f07c6794ca85c36c2d06a5fd9_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +### Sheet59(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + + graph TD + Start([Wait for Connection +from 3G_MSC-B +SRNS Relocation]) + + %% Path 1: Success Path + Input1[/I_COMPLETE (ACM) +from 3G_MSC-B/] + Task1[Queue Messages +for UE in +3G_MSC-A] + Output1[/Iu-RELOCATION COMMAND +to RNS-A/] + Task2[Set +T703] + Task3[Set Up the +Handover +Device] + Note1[Internal message +in 3G_MSC-A] + End1([Wait for Completion +on 3G_MSC-B +SRNS Relocation]) + + Start --> Input1 + Input1 --> Task1 + Task1 --> Output1 + Output1 --> Task2 + Task2 --> Task3 + Task3 --> Note1 + Note1 --> End1 + + %% Path 2: MAP Request Path + Input2[/MAP-PAS req. +IU-IREL-REQUEST +from 3G_MSC-B/] + Decision1{Allowed +once in +this state} + State2([Wait for Connection +from 3G_MSC-B +SRNS Relocation]) + ErrorNode{ERROR} + Connector16((16)) + + Start --> Input2 + Input2 --> Decision1 + Decision1 --> State2 + State2 --> ErrorNode + ErrorNode --> Connector16 + + %% Path 3: Release Request Path + Input3[/Iu-RELEASE- +REQUEST +from RNS-A/] + Decision2{Allowed +once in +this state} + Input4[/From UE +or Network/] + Output2[/Call +Release/] + Output3[/Call +Release/] + Note2[to UE +and Network] + Output4[/Release +Resources +in RNS-A/] + Output5[/Cancel MAP +Procedures/] + Task4[to 3G_MSC-B +in 3G_MSC-A] + Output6[/I_DISCONNECT +(REL) to 3G_MSC-B/] + End2([IDLE]) + + Start --> Input3 + Input3 --> Decision2 + Decision2 --> Input4 + Input4 --> Output2 + Output2 --> Output3 + Output3 --> Note2 + Output3 --> Output4 + Output4 --> Output5 + Output5 --> Task4 + Task4 --> Output6 + Output6 --> End2 + + %% Error handling from middle + Input5[/from 3G_MSC-B +or Network/] + Output7[/I_DISCONNECT +(REL) to 3G_MSC-B/] + + ErrorNode --> Input5 + Input5 --> Output7 + Output7 --> End2 + +``` + +SDL Flowchart for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing handover control logic in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts at 'Wait for Connection from 3G\_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)'. It handles inputs like I\_COMPLETE (ACM), MAP-PAS req., and Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST. It includes states for queuing messages, setting timers (T703), and setting up handover devices. Error paths lead to call release and resource release in RNS-A, eventually reaching an IDLE state or a connector '16'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 59 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for Handover in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion (on 3G_MSC-B) (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into three main paths based on signals received from 3G_MSC-B: 1) MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [IU-RLC-COMPLETE], 2) I-ANSWER (ANM), and 3) MAP-PAS req. [IU-RLC-DETECT]. The first path leads to 'Reset T703' and then to 'Connect Handover Device (option)'. The second path leads to a decision '(Allowed once in this state)'. If 'Yes', it sends 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B' and then to 'Wait for Completion (on 3G_MSC-B) (SRNS Relocation)'. If 'No', it sends 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A', 'Release Resources on RNS-A', and then to 'Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B?'. If 'Yes' to the UE wait, it goes to 'Connect Handover Device (option)'. If 'No', it sends 'Call Release to Network and UE', 'Release MAP Resources to 3G_MSC-B in 3G_MSC-A', 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B', and ends at 'IDLE'. The third path leads to 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-RLC-DETECT] from 3G_MSC-B' and then to 'Connect Handover Device (option)'. All 'Connect Handover Device (option)' paths lead to 'Forward queued messages via 3G_MSC-B', 'Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req', 'Release Resources on RNS-A', and finally 'Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'.](87f625baee73880fd5464a9f60b1b3b8_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet60(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + +graph TD + Start[Wait for Completion +(on 3G_MSC-B) +(SRNS Relocation)] --> J1(( )) + J1 --> M1[MAP-SEND- +END-SIGNAL req. +[IU-RLC-COMPLETE] +from 3G_MSC-B] + J1 --> M2[I-ANSWER +(ANM) from 3G_MSC-B] + J1 --> M3[MAP-PAS req. +[IU-RLC-DETECT] +from 3G_MSC-B] + M1 --> R[Reset +T703] + R --> CHD1[Connect +Handover +Device (option)] + M2 --> A1{Allowed +once in +this state} + A1 -- Yes --> M4[MAP-PAS req. +[IU-IREL-REQUEST] +from 3G_MSC-B] + M4 --> W1[Wait for Completion +(on 3G_MSC-B) +(SRNS Relocation)] + A1 -- No --> Iu[lu-RELEASE-REQUEST +from RNS-A] + Iu --> RR1[Release +Resources +on RNS-A] + RR1 --> W2{Wait for UE on +3G_MSC-B?} + W2 -- Yes --> CHD2[Connect +Handover +Device (option)] + W2 -- No --> CR[Call +Release] + CR --> NW[to Network +and UE] + CR --> RM[Release MAP +Resources] + RM --> MW[to 3G_MSC-B +in 3G_MSC-A] + RM --> ID[ ] + ID --> IDL[ ] + IDL --> IDLE[IDLE] + M3 --> CHD3[Connect +Handover +Device (option)] + CHD1 --> FQ[Forward queued +messages +via 3G_MSC-B] + CHD2 --> FQ + CHD3 --> FQ + FQ --> MF[Use MAP- +FORWARD-ACCESS- +SIGNALLING req] + MF --> RR2[Release +Resources +on RNS-A] + RR2 --> C[Call +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)] + C --> W3[Wait for Completion +(on 3G_MSC-B) +(SRNS Relocation)] + +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion (on 3G\_MSC-B) (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into three main paths based on signals received from 3G\_MSC-B: 1) MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [IU-RLC-COMPLETE], 2) I-ANSWER (ANM), and 3) MAP-PAS req. [IU-RLC-DETECT]. The first path leads to 'Reset T703' and then to 'Connect Handover Device (option)'. The second path leads to a decision '(Allowed once in this state)'. If 'Yes', it sends 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B' and then to 'Wait for Completion (on 3G\_MSC-B) (SRNS Relocation)'. If 'No', it sends 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A', 'Release Resources on RNS-A', and then to 'Wait for UE on 3G\_MSC-B?'. If 'Yes' to the UE wait, it goes to 'Connect Handover Device (option)'. If 'No', it sends 'Call Release to Network and UE', 'Release MAP Resources to 3G\_MSC-B in 3G\_MSC-A', 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B', and ends at 'IDLE'. The third path leads to 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-RLC-DETECT] from 3G\_MSC-B' and then to 'Connect Handover Device (option)'. All 'Connect Handover Device (option)' paths lead to 'Forward queued messages via 3G\_MSC-B', 'Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req', 'Release Resources on RNS-A', and finally 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 60 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for Handover in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts from the state 'Wait for Completion on 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)'. It handles multiple events: Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL, I_DISCONNECT from 3G_MSC-B, Expiry T703, and Call Release from Network. Paths lead to either 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)' or 'IDLE' after releasing resources.](38c0f202ad5767f3df428353919fa90a_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet61(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + + graph TD + State1[Wait for Completion on 3G_MSC-B +SRNS Relocation] --> BranchPoint{ } + + %% Path 1: Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL + BranchPoint --> Event1[Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL +from RNS-A] + Event1 --> Task1[Reset T703] + Task1 --> Task2[Forward queued +messages for UE +via RNS-A] + Task2 --> Task3[Release +Handover +Device] + Task3 --> Task4[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + Task4 --> Task5[I_DISCONNECT +(REL) to +3G_MSC-B] + Task5 --> End1[Call in Progress +on 3G_MSC-A +(UTRAN)] + + %% Path 2: I_DISCONNECT from 3G_MSC-B + BranchPoint --> Event2[I_DISCONNECT +(REL) from +3G_MSC-B] + Event2 --> Task6[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + Task6 --> Task7[Release +Handover +Device] + Task7 --> Task8[I_DISCONNECT +(REL) to +3G_MSC-B] + Task8 --> State1 + + %% Path 3: Expiry T703 + BranchPoint --> Event3[Expiry T703] + Event3 --> Task9[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + Task9 --> Task10[Release +Handover +Device] + Task10 --> Task11[I_DISCONNECT +(REL) to +3G_MSC-B] + Task11 --> State1 + + %% Path 4: Call Release from Network + BranchPoint --> Event4[Call Release +from Network] + Event4 --> Task12[Release +Handover +Device] + Task12 --> State2[Wait for Completion +on 3G_MSC-B +SRNS Relocation] + State2 --> Task13[I_DISCONNECT +(REL) to 3G_MSC-B] + Task13 --> Task14[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + Task14 --> Task15[Release +Handover +Device] + Task15 --> Task16[Release +Resources +RNS-A] + Task16 --> End2([IDLE]) + + %% Additional side paths + BranchPoint --> Event5[from 3G_MSC-B] + Event5 --> Task17[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + Task17 --> Task18[Release +Handover +Device] + Task18 --> Task19[I_DISCONNECT +(REL) to +3G_MSC-B] + Task19 --> State1 + +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts from the state 'Wait for Completion on 3G\_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)'. It handles multiple events: Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL, I\_DISCONNECT from 3G\_MSC-B, Expiry T703, and Call Release from Network. Paths lead to either 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (UTRAN)' or 'IDLE' after releasing resources. + +Figure 43 (sheet 61 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-A. The process involves multiple decision points regarding known MSCs, RNS availability, and resource allocation, with corresponding MAP message exchanges and call handling actions.](c9bfcc4c4ef694696c292b03de45d2bb_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet62(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + + graph TD + Start([Call on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)]) --> In1[/MAP-PREPARE- +SUBSEQUENT- +HANDOVER req. +[IU-RLC- +REQUEST] +from 3G_MSC-B/] + + C24((24)) --> D1{Known +3G_MSC?} + In1 --> D1 + + D1 -- Yes --> D2{Which +3G_MSC?} + D1 -- No --> Out1[/MAP-PREPARE- +SUBSEQUENT- +HANDOVER resp. +[MAP ERROR] +to 3G_MSC-B/] + + D2 -- 3G_MSC-B' --> C25((25)) + D2 -- 3G_MSC-A --> D3{Known +RNS?} + + D3 -- Yes --> D4{Resources on +new RNS?} + D3 -- No --> Out1 + + D4 -- Yes --> Task1[Iu- +RELOCATION- +REQUEST +to RNS-B] + D4 -- No --> Out1 + + Task1 --> Out2[/MAP-PREPARE- +SUBSEQUENT- +HANDOVER resp. +[IU-RLC-FAILURE] +to 3G_MSC-B/] + + Out2 --> Task2[Set +T701] + Task2 --> End1([Wait for Channel +Allocation +(SRNS Relocation)]) + + %% Right side branches + In2[/MAP-PAS req. +[IU-IREL- +REQUEST] +from 3G_MSC-B/] --> Out3[/MAP-SEND-END- +SIGNAL resp. +to 3G_MSC-B/] + + In3[/from UE +or Network/] --> Task3[Call +Release] + Task3 --> Idle([IDLE]) + + In4[/from 3G_MSC-B/] --> Task4[Cancel MAP +procedures] + Task4 --> Task5[Call +Release] + Task5 --> Out4[/to Network +and UE/] + + Out4 --> Idle + + Out1 --> Idle + + Task6[I_DISCONNECT +(REL) to 3G_MSC-B] --> Idle + + D5{Circuit +Connection?} -- Yes --> End2([Call +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)]) + D5 -- Yes --> End3([UE +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)]) + D5 -- No --> Out1 + +``` + +Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. The process involves multiple decision points regarding known MSCs, RNS availability, and resource allocation, with corresponding MAP message exchanges and call handling actions. + +Figure 43 (sheet 62 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for Handover in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Channel Allocation (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches based on incoming messages: 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK. from RNS-B', 'Iu-RELOCATION-FAILURE from RNS-B', 'Expiry T701', or 'Call Release' (from UE or Network). The 'ACK' path leads to 'Reset T701', 'Queue Messages for UE in 3G_MSC-A', and then to a decision 'Circuit Connection?'. If 'Yes', it proceeds to 'Set Up Handover Device', 'Set T704', and 'Wait for Access by UE (SRNS Relocation)'. If 'No', it leads to 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp [IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK] to 3G_MSC-B'. The 'FAILURE' path leads to 'Reset T701', a decision '(Allowed once in this state)', and then to 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B'. The 'Expiry T701' path leads to 'Release Resources in RNS-B' and 'Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. The 'Call Release' path leads to 'Cancel Channel RNS-B', 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp to 3G_MSC-B', 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B', and 'IDLE'. A 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-FAILURE] to 3G_MSC-B' message is also shown leading to 'Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'.](cdb980c2fe504f3132b907d4de707c7f_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet63(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + +graph TD + Start([Wait for Channel Allocation +(SRNS Relocation)]) --> Join(( )) + IuRelReqAck[Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK. +from RNS-B] --> Join + IuRelFail[Iu-RELOCATION-FAILURE +from RNS-B] --> Join + ExpiryT701{Expiry T701} --> Join + CallRelease[Call Release] --> Join + FromUE[From UE or Network] -.-> CallRelease + + Join --> ResetT701_1[Reset T701] + ResetT701_1 --> QueueMsgs[Queue Messages +for UE in +3G_MSC-A] + QueueMsgs --> CircuitConn{Circuit +Connection?} + + CircuitConn -- No --> MapPrepareSubseq[MAP-PREPARE- +SUBSEQUENT- +HANDOVER resp +[IU-RLC-REQUEST- +ACK] +to 3G_MSC-B] + CircuitConn -- Yes --> SetUpHandover[Set Up +Handover +Device] + SetUpHandover --> SetT704[Set T704] + SetT704 --> WaitAccess([Wait for +Access by UE +(SRNS Relocation))] + + IuRelFail --> ResetT701_2[Reset T701] + ResetT701_2 --> AllowedOnce{Allowed +once in +this state)} + AllowedOnce --> MapPasReq[MAP-PAS req. +[IU-IREL-REQUEST] +from 3G_MSC-B] + MapPasReq --> ReleaseRes_1[Release Resources +in RNS-B] + ReleaseRes_1 --> CallOn3G_1([Call +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN))] + + ExpiryT701 --> ReleaseRes_2[Release Resources +in RNS-B] + ReleaseRes_2 --> CallOn3G_2([Call +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN))] + + MapPrepareSubseqResp[MAP-PREPARE- +SUBSEQUENT- +HANDOVER resp. +[IU-RLC-FAILURE] +to 3G_MSC-B] --> CallOn3G_2 + + CallRelease --> CancelChannel[Cancel +Channel +RNS-B] + CancelChannel --> MapSendEnd[MAP-SEND- +END- +SIGNAL resp +to 3G_MSC-B] + MapSendEnd --> IDisconnect[I_DISCONNECT +(REL) to +3G_MSC-B] + IDisconnect --> Idle([IDLE]) + +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Channel Allocation (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches based on incoming messages: 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK. from RNS-B', 'Iu-RELOCATION-FAILURE from RNS-B', 'Expiry T701', or 'Call Release' (from UE or Network). The 'ACK' path leads to 'Reset T701', 'Queue Messages for UE in 3G\_MSC-A', and then to a decision 'Circuit Connection?'. If 'Yes', it proceeds to 'Set Up Handover Device', 'Set T704', and 'Wait for Access by UE (SRNS Relocation)'. If 'No', it leads to 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp [IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK] to 3G\_MSC-B'. The 'FAILURE' path leads to 'Reset T701', a decision '(Allowed once in this state)', and then to 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B'. The 'Expiry T701' path leads to 'Release Resources in RNS-B' and 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. The 'Call Release' path leads to 'Cancel Channel RNS-B', 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp to 3G\_MSC-B', 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B', and 'IDLE'. A 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-FAILURE] to 3G\_MSC-B' message is also shown leading to 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 63 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing three main paths: successful handover, circuit connection failure, and timer expiry.](b437cd7078b36507e5d918fe6224e6dd_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet64(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for access by UE (SRNS Relocation)]) --> IuRC[ ]; IuRC --> IuRC_Comp[lu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B]; IuRC --> IuRC_Det[lu-RELOCATION DETECT from RNS-B]; IuRC --> T704_Exp[ ]; IuRC_Comp --> Reset[Reset T704]; Reset --> HandoverDev[Connect Handover Device (option)]; HandoverDev --> ForwardMsg[Forward queued messages for UE via RNS-B]; ForwardMsg --> MAPSend[ ]; MAPSend --> MAPSendEnd[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B]; MAPSendEnd --> CircuitConn1{Circuit Connection?}; CircuitConn1 -- No --> CallProg[Call in Progress on MSC-A (UTRAN)]; CircuitConn1 -- Yes --> ReleaseDev[Release Handover Device]; ReleaseDev --> IDisconnect1[ ]; IDisconnect1 --> IDisconnect1Msg[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B]; IDisconnect1Msg --> CallProg; IuRC_Det --> CircuitConn2{Circuit Connection?}; CircuitConn2 -- No --> CallProg; CircuitConn2 -- Yes --> HandoverDev2[Connect Handover Device (option)]; HandoverDev2 --> CallProg; T704_Exp --> CallRelease[Call Release]; CallRelease --> ToNet[ ]; CallRelease --> ReleaseRes[Release Resources on RNS-B]; ReleaseRes --> CancelMAP[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelMAP --> In3G[ ]; CancelMAP --> IDisconnect2[ ]; IDisconnect2 --> IDisconnect2Msg[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B]; IDisconnect2Msg --> IDLE[ ]; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. It begins with a 'Wait for access by UE (SRNS Relocation)' state. From here, three main paths emerge: 1) Upon receiving 'lu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B', the MSC-A resets timer T704, optionally connects the handover device, forwards queued messages via RNS-B, and sends a 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL' to 3G\_MSC-B. It then checks for a circuit connection; if 'No', the call remains in progress on MSC-A (UTRAN); if 'Yes', it releases the handover device and sends an 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL)' message to 3G\_MSC-B before returning to the 'Call in Progress' state. 2) Upon receiving 'lu-RELOCATION DETECT from RNS-B', it checks for a circuit connection; if 'No', the call remains in progress; if 'Yes', it optionally connects the handover device and returns to the 'Call in Progress' state. 3) If timer T704 expires, it performs a 'Call Release' to the network, releases resources on RNS-B, cancels MAP procedures (in 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B), sends an 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL)' message to 3G\_MSC-B, and enters the 'IDLE' state. + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing three main paths: successful handover, circuit connection failure, and timer expiry. + +Figure 43 (sheet 64 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for Handover in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for access by UE (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches based on incoming messages: 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-RLC-FAILURE] from 3G_MSC-B', 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B', and 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B'. The first two lead to '(Allowed once in this state)' and then to 'Cancel MAP Procedures'. The third leads to '(Allowed once in this state)' and then to 'Call Release'. From 'Cancel MAP Procedures', it goes to 'from Network' and then to 'Call Release'. All three paths ('Cancel MAP Procedures', 'Call Release', and 'from Network') lead to a common vertical line that goes down to 'Wait for access by UE (SRNS Relocation)'. From the initial 'Wait for access by UE (SRNS Relocation)', it also goes down to 'Forward queued messages via 3G_MSC-B', which leads to 'Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.'. This leads to 'Release Resources on RNS-B', which leads to a decision 'Circuit Connection?'. If 'Yes', it goes to 'Release Handover Device', which leads to 'Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. If 'No', it leads to 'UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'.](5d819f259411162c4e3371915818ae22_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet65(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for access by UE (SRNS Relocation)]) --> MAP_PAS_FAILURE[MAP-PAS req. [IU-RLC-FAILURE] from 3G_MSC-B]; Start --> MAP_PAS_REQUEST[MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B]; Start --> Iu_RELEASE[Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B]; MAP_PAS_FAILURE --> Allowed1{(Allowed once in this state)}; MAP_PAS_REQUEST --> Allowed2{(Allowed once in this state)}; Iu_RELEASE --> Allowed3{(Allowed once in this state)}; Allowed1 --> Cancel[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Allowed2 --> Release[Call Release]; Allowed3 --> Release; Cancel --> Network[from Network]; Network --> Release; Release --> End([Wait for access by UE (SRNS Relocation)]); Start --> Forward[Forward queued messages via 3G_MSC-B]; Forward --> MAP_FORWARD[Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.]; MAP_FORWARD --> Release_Resources[Release Resources on RNS-B]; Release_Resources --> Circuit{Circuit Connection?}; Circuit -- Yes --> Release_Device[Release Handover Device]; Release_Device --> Call_3G[Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]; Circuit -- No --> UE_3G[UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for access by UE (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches based on incoming messages: 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-RLC-FAILURE] from 3G\_MSC-B', 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B', and 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B'. The first two lead to '(Allowed once in this state)' and then to 'Cancel MAP Procedures'. The third leads to '(Allowed once in this state)' and then to 'Call Release'. From 'Cancel MAP Procedures', it goes to 'from Network' and then to 'Call Release'. All three paths ('Cancel MAP Procedures', 'Call Release', and 'from Network') lead to a common vertical line that goes down to 'Wait for access by UE (SRNS Relocation)'. From the initial 'Wait for access by UE (SRNS Relocation)', it also goes down to 'Forward queued messages via 3G\_MSC-B', which leads to 'Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.'. This leads to 'Release Resources on RNS-B', which leads to a decision 'Circuit Connection?'. If 'Yes', it goes to 'Release Handover Device', which leads to 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. If 'No', it leads to 'UE on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 65 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO](728a02fe4a04e7f91835147194997cd4_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet66(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Subsequent SRNS Relocation from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' +Circuit Connection required + +``` +graph TD; Start((25)) --> Step1[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req +[IU-RLC-REQUEST] +to 3G_MSC-B']; Step1 --> Wait1[Wait for Ack +from 3G_MSC-B' +(SRNS Relocation)]; Wait1 --> Decision1{ }; Decision1 --> Success[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp.. +[IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK] +from 3G_MSC-B']; Decision1 --> Failure[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. +[IU-RLC-FAILURE] +from 3G_MSC-B']; Success --> Decision2{Handover Number?}; Decision2 -- Not Requested --> End((26)); Decision2 -- Requested --> Step2[CONNECT (IAM) +to 3G_MSC-B' using +Handover Number]; Step2 --> Wait2[Wait for Connection +from 3G_MSC-B' +(SRNS Relocation)]; Failure --> Step3[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. +[IU-RLC-FAILURE] +to 3G_MSC-B]; Step3 --> Step4[ ]; Step4 --> Call[Call +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)]; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. It begins at connector 25, where a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request (IU-RLC-REQUEST) is sent to 3G\_MSC-B'. The system then waits for an acknowledgment from 3G\_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation). A decision point follows, leading to either a successful response (IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK) or a failure response (IU-RLC-FAILURE). In the success case, another decision is made regarding the Handover Number. If not requested, the procedure ends at connector 26. If requested, an I\_CONNECT (IAM) message is sent to 3G\_MSC-B' using the Handover Number, followed by a wait for connection from 3G\_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation). In the failure case, a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response (IU-RLC-FAILURE) is sent to 3G\_MSC-B, followed by a transition to a call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN). + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Figure 43 (sheet 66 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing three main paths: successful handover, error handling, and call release.](931bd52904f67b17796a38b47af51e30_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet67(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Ack from 3G_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation)]) --> Decision1{ }; Decision1 -- "from 3G_MSC-B'" --> ERROR1[ERROR]; Decision1 -- "from 3G_MSC-B or Network" --> Decision2{ }; Decision1 --> CallRelease[Call Release]; CallRelease --> FromUE[From UE or Network]; CallRelease --> CancelMAP1[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelMAP1 --> To3GMSCB1[to 3G_MSC-B']; CancelMAP1 --> MAPSEND[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B]; MAPSEND --> ReleaseDevice[Release Handover Device]; ReleaseDevice --> IDISCONNECT[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B]; IDISCONNECT --> IDLE([IDLE]); Decision2 --> ERROR2[ERROR]; Decision2 --> ReleaseMAP[Release MAP Resources]; ReleaseMAP --> To3GMSCB2[to 3G_MSC-B']; ReleaseMAP --> MAPPAS[MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B]; MAPPAS --> Decision3{ }; Decision3 --> CancelMAP2[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CancelMAP2 --> To3GMSCB3[to 3G_MSC-B']; CancelMAP2 --> WaitAck2([Wait for Ack from 3G_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation)]); Decision3 --> ERROR3[ERROR]; ERROR3 --> MAPPREP[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. to 3G_MSC-B]; MAPPREP --> CallOn3GMSCB([Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]); +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. It begins with a 'Wait for Ack from 3G\_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation)' state. From here, three main paths emerge: 1) An 'ERROR' path from 3G\_MSC-B' leading to 'Release MAP Resources' (which then leads to 'to 3G\_MSC-B' and 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B'), then to another 'ERROR' state which leads to 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. to 3G\_MSC-B' and finally 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 2) A 'from 3G\_MSC-B or Network' path leading to a decision point. If 'ERROR', it leads to 'Release MAP Resources'. If successful, it leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (to 3G\_MSC-B') and 'Wait for Ack from 3G\_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation)'. 3) A 'Call Release' path 'From UE or Network' leading to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (to 3G\_MSC-B'), 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G\_MSC-B', 'Release Handover Device', 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B', and finally 'IDLE'. + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing three main paths: successful handover, error handling, and call release. + +Figure 43 (sheet 67 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![SDL Flowchart for Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO sheet 68 of 78. The diagram shows the logic for handling connections and handovers between 3G_MSC-A, 3G_MSC-B, and 3G_MSC-B'.](7109096552c3464c931b0b39109b9b41_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** + +Sheet68(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + + graph TD + Start([Wait for Connection from 3G_MSC-B' SRNS Relocation]) --> In1[/I_COMPLETE ACM from 3G_MSC-B'/] + Start --> In2[/from 3G_MSC-B' or Network/] + Start --> In3[/from UE or Network/] + Start --> In4[/MAP-PAS req. IU-IREL-REQUEST from 3G_MSC-B'/] + + In1 --> SetUp[Set up Handover Device] + SetUp --> Out1[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK to 3G_MSC-B] + Out1 --> Queue[Queue messages for UE in 3G_MSC-A] + Queue --> SetT[Set T703] + SetT --> WaitComp([Wait for Completion on 3G_MSC-B' SRNS Relocation]) + + In2 --> Err[ERROR] + Err --> Cancel1[Cancel MAP Procedures to 3G_MSC-B'] + Cancel1 --> Disc1[I_DISCONNECT REL to 3G_MSC-B'] + Disc1 --> ErrState([ERROR]) + ErrState --> CallB([Call on 3G_MSC-B UTRAN]) + + In3 --> CallRel[Call Release] + CallRel --> Cancel2[Cancel MAP Procedures to 3G_MSC-B'] + Cancel2 --> Out2[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp to 3G_MSC-B] + Out2 --> CallRel2[Call Release to Network and UE] + CallRel2 --> Disc2[I_DISCONNECT REL to 3G_MSC-B and 3G_MSC-B'] + Disc2 --> Idle([IDLE]) + + In4 --> Allowed{Allowed once in this state} + Allowed --> WaitConn([Wait for Connection from 3G_MSC-B' SRNS Relocation]) + WaitConn --> Out3[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. to 3G_MSC-B] + Out3 --> Cancel3[Cancel MAP Procedures to 3G_MSC-B and 3G_MSC-B'] + +``` + +SDL Flowchart for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO sheet 68 of 78. The diagram shows the logic for handling connections and handovers between 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B, and 3G\_MSC-B'. + +**Figure 43 (sheet 68 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A** + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for Handover in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion on 3G_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into three main paths based on received signals: 1) MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [IU-RLC-COMPLETE] from 3G_MSC-B' leads to 'Reset T703' and 'I_ANSWER (ANM) from 3G_MSC-B'', then to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' and 'Forward queued messages for UE via 3G_MSC-B'' (using MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.), followed by 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B', 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B', 'Redefine 3G_MSC-B' as 3G_MSC-B', and finally 'Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 2) MAP-PAS req. [IU-RLC-DETECT] from 3G_MSC-B' leads to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' and then 'Wait for Completion from 3G_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation)'. 3) MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B leads to '(Allowed once in this state)', then to a decision 'Wait for access by UE?'. If 'Yes', it leads to 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B'' and '(Allowed once in this state)'. If 'No', it leads to 'Release Handover Device', 'Cancel MAP Procedures', 'Call Release' (to Network and UE), 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B and 3G_MSC-B'', and finally 'IDLE'.](8c05782074bb11421b43f2d5d6799b62_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet69(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + + graph TD + Start([Wait for Completion +on 3G_MSC-B' +(SRNS Relocation)]) --> Branch1(( )) + + Branch1 --> Path1[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. +[IU-RLC-COMPLETE] +from 3G_MSC-B'] + Path1 --> Reset[Reset T703] + Reset --> Answer[I_ANSWER (ANM) +from 3G_MSC-B'] + Answer --> Connect1[Connect Handover Device (option)] + Connect1 --> Forward[Forward queued messages for UE +via 3G_MSC-B'] + Forward -.- ForwardReq[Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.] + Forward --> EndSignal[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. +to 3G_MSC-B] + EndSignal --> Disconnect1[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B] + Disconnect1 --> Redefine[Redefine 3G_MSC-B' +as 3G_MSC-B] + Redefine --> Call[Call on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)] + + Branch1 --> Path2[MAP-PAS req. +[IU-RLC-DETECT] +from 3G_MSC-B'] + Path2 --> Connect2[Connect Handover Device (option)] + Connect2 --> Wait2([Wait for Completion +from 3G_MSC-B' +(SRNS Relocation)]) + + Branch1 --> Path3[MAP-PAS req. +[IU-IREL-REQUEST] +from 3G_MSC-B] + Path3 --> Allowed1["(Allowed once in this state)"] + Allowed1 --> Decision1{Wait for access +by UE?} + + Decision1 -- Yes --> Path3_1[MAP-PAS req. +[IU-IREL-REQUEST] +from 3G_MSC-B'] + Path3_1 --> Allowed2["(Allowed once in this state)"] + Allowed2 --> Decision1 + + Decision1 -- No --> Release[Release Handover Device] + Release --> Cancel[Cancel MAP Procedures] + Cancel -.- CancelText[to 3G_MSC-B +and 3G_MSC-B'] + Cancel --> CallRelease[Call Release] + CallRelease -.- CallReleaseText[to Network +and UE] + CallRelease --> Disconnect2[I_DISCONNECT (REL) +to 3G_MSC-B and 3G_MSC-B'] + Disconnect2 --> Idle([IDLE]) + +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion on 3G\_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into three main paths based on received signals: 1) MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [IU-RLC-COMPLETE] from 3G\_MSC-B' leads to 'Reset T703' and 'I\_ANSWER (ANM) from 3G\_MSC-B'', then to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' and 'Forward queued messages for UE via 3G\_MSC-B'' (using MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.), followed by 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G\_MSC-B', 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B', 'Redefine 3G\_MSC-B' as 3G\_MSC-B', and finally 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 2) MAP-PAS req. [IU-RLC-DETECT] from 3G\_MSC-B' leads to 'Connect Handover Device (option)' and then 'Wait for Completion from 3G\_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation)'. 3) MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B leads to '(Allowed once in this state)', then to a decision 'Wait for access by UE?'. If 'Yes', it leads to 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B'' and '(Allowed once in this state)'. If 'No', it leads to 'Release Handover Device', 'Cancel MAP Procedures', 'Call Release' (to Network and UE), 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B and 3G\_MSC-B'', and finally 'IDLE'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 69 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for Handover in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion (on 3G_MSC-B') (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches based on timer T703 expiry, MAP-PAS request failure, or messages from 3G_MSC-B'. It includes steps for MAP procedure cancellation, I_DISCONNECT (REL) signaling, handover device release, and final state transitions to IDLE or Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN).](74b47701fe8a059c632b40e009c57a96_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet70(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +``` + +graph TD + Start[Wait for Completion on 3G_MSC-B' SRNS Relocation] --> T703_Exp{Expiry T703} + T703_Exp --> Reset[Reset T703] + Reset --> CancelMap1[Cancel MAP Procedures] + CancelMap1 --> ReleaseDevice1[Release Handover Device] + ReleaseDevice1 --> IDisconnect1[I_DISCONNECT REL to 3G_MSC-B'] + IDisconnect1 --> ConnectionCheck{3G_MSC-B Connection?} + ConnectionCheck -- Yes --> ForwardMsg[Forward queued messages for UE via 3G_MSC-B] + ForwardMsg --> CallUTRAN[Call on 3G_MSC-B UTRAN] + ConnectionCheck -- No --> UseMapForward[Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.] + UseMapForward --> CallRelease1[Call Release] + CallRelease1 --> IDLE1[IDLE] + T703_Exp --> MAPFailure[MAP-PAS req. IU-RLC-FAILURE from 3G_MSC-B] + MAPFailure --> CancelMap2[Cancel MAP Procedures] + CancelMap2 --> ReleaseDevice2[Release Handover Device] + ReleaseDevice2 --> WaitAccess{Wait for access by UE?} + WaitAccess -- Yes --> CallRelease2[Call Release] + WaitAccess -- No --> CancelMap3[Cancel MAP Procedures] + CancelMap3 --> IDisconnect2[I_DISCONNECT REL to 3G_MSC-B'] + IDisconnect2 --> IDLE2[IDLE] + Start --> From3GMSCB[from 3G_MSC-B'] + From3GMSCB --> CancelMap4[Cancel MAP Procedures] + CancelMap4 --> IDisconnect3[I_DISCONNECT REL to 3G_MSC-B'] + IDisconnect3 --> ReleaseDevice3[Release Handover Device] + ReleaseDevice3 --> CallRelease3[Call Release] + CallRelease3 --> WaitCompletion2[Wait for Completion on 3G_MSC-B' SRNS Relocation] + Start --> FromNetwork[From Network or 3G_MSC-B] + FromNetwork --> CallRelease4[Call Release] + CallRelease4 --> WaitCompletion2 + +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for Completion (on 3G\_MSC-B') (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches based on timer T703 expiry, MAP-PAS request failure, or messages from 3G\_MSC-B'. It includes steps for MAP procedure cancellation, I\_DISCONNECT (REL) signaling, handover device release, and final state transitions to IDLE or Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN). + +Figure 43 (sheet 70 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. The process starts at connector 22, queues messages, sends an Iu-Relocation Command to RNS-A, sets timer T703, and waits for UE on 3G_MSC-B. It then branches based on incoming signals from 3G_MSC-B (MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL, MAP-PAS, Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST) and RNS-A (IU-RLC-DETECT). Actions include resetting T703, releasing resources on RNS-A, forwarding messages, calling release, and finally reaching an IDLE state or waiting for UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN or SRNS Relocation).](e002d1b87dc447584fd9829eac949a12_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Basic SRNS Relocation to 3G\_MSC-B no Circuit Connection required + +Sheet71(78) + +``` +graph TD + Start((22)) --> Queue[Queue Messages for UE in 3G_MSC-A] + Queue --> Command[Iu-Relocation Command to RNS-A] + Command --> SetT703[Set T703] + SetT703 --> WaitUE[Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)] + WaitUE --> Junction1(( )) + Junction1 --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [IU-RLC-COMPLETE] from 3G_MSC-B] + Junction1 --> Allowed1{(Allowed once in this state)} + Junction1 --> Iu_RELEASE[Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A] + Junction1 --> Junction2(( )) + Junction2 --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. [IU-RLC-DETECT] from 3G_MSC-B] + MAP_SEND --> ResetT703[Reset T703] + ResetT703 --> ReleaseRNSA1[Release Resources on RNS-A] + ReleaseRNSA1 --> Forward[Forward queued messages for UE via 3G_MSC-B] + Forward --> UE_UTRAN[UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)] + MAP_PAS --> MAP_PAS_REQ[MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B] + MAP_PAS_REQ --> Allowed2{(Allowed once in this state)} + Allowed2 --> ReleaseRNSA2[Release Resources on RNS-A] + ReleaseRNSA2 --> WaitUE2{Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B?} + WaitUE2 -- Yes --> WaitUE3[Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)] + WaitUE2 -- No --> CallRelease[Call Release] + CallRelease --> Network[to Network and UE] + CallRelease --> ReleaseMAP[Release MAP Resources] + ReleaseMAP --> MSCB[to 3G_MSC-B in 3G_MSC-A] + ReleaseMAP --> IDLE[IDLE] + Iu_RELEASE --> Allowed3{(Allowed once in this state)} + Allowed3 --> WaitUE4[Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)] +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. The process starts at connector 22, queues messages, sends an Iu-Relocation Command to RNS-A, sets timer T703, and waits for UE on 3G\_MSC-B. It then branches based on incoming signals from 3G\_MSC-B (MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL, MAP-PAS, Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST) and RNS-A (IU-RLC-DETECT). Actions include resetting T703, releasing resources on RNS-A, forwarding messages, calling release, and finally reaching an IDLE state or waiting for UE on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN or SRNS Relocation). + +Figure 43 (sheet 71 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into four main paths: 1) 'Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A' leads to 'Reset T703' -> 'Forward queued messages for UE via RNS-A' -> 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (in 3G_MSC-A to 3G_MSC-B) -> 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. 2) 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (from 3G_MSC-B) leads to 'Release Resources RNS-A' -> 'Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)'. 3) 'Expiry T703' leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (In 3G_MSC-A and to 3G_MSC-B) -> 'Release Resources RNS-A' -> 'IDLE'. 4) 'Call Release' (from Network) leads to 'Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)'.](31f5b6310f831ca3ea4f18453980c070_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet72(78) + +``` +graph TD; Start[Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)] --> Branch(( )); Branch --> Path1[Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A]; Branch --> Path2[Cancel MAP Procedures from 3G_MSC-B]; Branch --> Path3[Expiry T703]; Branch --> Path4[Call Release from Network]; Path1 --> T703[Reset T703]; T703 --> Forward[Forward queued messages for UE via RNS-A]; Forward --> CancelMAP1[Cancel MAP Procedures in 3G_MSC-A to 3G_MSC-B]; CancelMAP1 --> CallProgress[Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-A (UTRAN)]; Path2 --> ReleaseRNSA1[Release Resources RNS-A]; ReleaseRNSA1 --> WaitUE1[Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)]; Path3 --> CancelMAP2[Cancel MAP Procedures In 3G_MSC-A and to 3G_MSC-B]; CancelMAP2 --> ReleaseRNSA2[Release Resources RNS-A]; ReleaseRNSA2 --> IDLE[IDLE]; Path4 --> WaitUE2[Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)]; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for UE on 3G\_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into four main paths: 1) 'Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A' leads to 'Reset T703' -> 'Forward queued messages for UE via RNS-A' -> 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (in 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B) -> 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-A (UTRAN)'. 2) 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (from 3G\_MSC-B) leads to 'Release Resources RNS-A' -> 'Wait for UE on 3G\_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)'. 3) 'Expiry T703' leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (In 3G\_MSC-A and to 3G\_MSC-B) -> 'Release Resources RNS-A' -> 'IDLE'. 4) 'Call Release' (from Network) leads to 'Wait for UE on 3G\_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 72 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![State transition diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO. The diagram shows various states and transitions for a handover control procedure. States include 'UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)', 'Wait For Response from 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)', '24', and 'IDLE'. Transitions are triggered by events like 'Request for Circuit Establishment', 'From 3G_MSC-B', 'From UE or Network', and internal actions like 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [IU-RASG-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-B'.](14af2781d0bd19b98b10672b74daaca2_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet73(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +UE Established on 3G\_MSC-B without a Circuit Connection + +``` +stateDiagram-v2 + [*] --> S1 : UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN) + S1 --> S2 : Request for Circuit Establishment + S1 --> S3 : From 3G_MSC-B + S1 --> S4 : From UE or Network + S1 --> S5 : Call Release + S2 --> S6 : MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [IU-RASG-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-B + S2 --> S7 : Wait For Response from 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation) + S3 --> S8 : MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [IU-RLC-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B + S3 --> S9 : 24 + S4 --> S10 : Cancel MAP Procedures + S4 --> S11 : Call Release + S4 --> S12 : to Network + S5 --> S13 : MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B + S5 --> S14 : IDLE +``` + +State transition diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO. The diagram shows various states and transitions for a handover control procedure. States include 'UE on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)', 'Wait For Response from 3G\_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)', '24', and 'IDLE'. Transitions are triggered by events like 'Request for Circuit Establishment', 'From 3G\_MSC-B', 'From UE or Network', and internal actions like 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [IU-RASG-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-B'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 73 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing handover control steps between 3G_MSC-A and 3G_MSC-B.](dd1dd483573cc9c3bc666a371f59d5d7_img.jpg) + +Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Sheet74(78) + +``` +graph TD; Start[Procedure for Handover in 3G_MSC-A: Circuit Connection Establishment to 3G_MSC-B] --> WaitR[Wait For Response from 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)]; WaitR --> Split1(( )); Split1 --> PrepResp[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [IU-RASG-COMPLETE] from 3G_MSC-B]; PrepResp --> IConnect[I_CONNECT (IAM) to 3G_MSC-B using Handover Number]; IConnect --> WaitC[Wait for Complete from 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)]; Split1 --> CallRel[Call Release]; CallRel --> FromUE[From UE or Network]; CallRel --> Split2(( )); Split2 --> SendEnd[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B]; SendEnd --> Idle([IDLE]); Split2 --> PrepSubseq[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req [IU-RLC-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B]; PrepSubseq --> Split3(( )); Split3 --> End((24)); +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. It begins with a dashed box labeled 'Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A: Circuit Connection Establishment to 3G\_MSC-B'. The process then enters a 'Wait For Response from 3G\_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)' state. A decision point (diamond) follows, leading to two parallel paths. The left path consists of 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [IU-RASG-COMPLETE] from 3G\_MSC-B', followed by 'I\_CONNECT (IAM) to 3G\_MSC-B using Handover Number', and then 'Wait for Complete from 3G\_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)'. The right path consists of 'Call Release', which is associated with 'From UE or Network', followed by another decision point (diamond). This second decision point leads to 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G\_MSC-B' and 'IDLE' state, and also to 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req [IU-RLC-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B'. The 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req' path leads to a third decision point (diamond), which finally leads to a connector circle labeled '24'. + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing handover control steps between 3G\_MSC-A and 3G\_MSC-B. + +Figure 43 (sheet 74 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for handover in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait For Response from 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) Success: 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] from 3G_MSC-B' leads to 'Failure' which results in 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request' and 'UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 2) Success: 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RASG-FAILURE] from 3G_MSC-B' leads to 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B' which leads to '(Allowed once in this state)' and 'UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 3) Failure: 'Cancel MAP Procedures from 3G_MSC-B' leads to 'Call Release to Network' which leads to 'Failure' which results in 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request' and 'IDLE'.](bf1635af3b59ca260bc86e762d0f2466_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet75(78) + +``` +graph TD; Start[Wait For Response from 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)] --> J1(( )); J1 --> S1[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] from 3G_MSC-B]; J1 --> S2[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RASG-FAILURE] from 3G_MSC-B]; J1 --> F1[Cancel MAP Procedures from 3G_MSC-B]; S1 --> F2[Failure]; F2 --> R1[Response to Circuit Establishment Request]; R1 --> U1(UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)); S2 --> M[MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B]; M --> A[(Allowed once in this state)]; A --> U2(UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)); F1 --> C[Call Release to Network]; C --> F3[Failure]; F3 --> R2[Response to Circuit Establishment Request]; R2 --> I(IDLE); +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for handover in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait For Response from 3G\_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) Success: 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] from 3G\_MSC-B' leads to 'Failure' which results in 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request' and 'UE on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 2) Success: 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RASG-FAILURE] from 3G\_MSC-B' leads to 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B' which leads to '(Allowed once in this state)' and 'UE on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 3) Failure: 'Cancel MAP Procedures from 3G\_MSC-B' leads to 'Call Release to Network' which leads to 'Failure' which results in 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request' and 'IDLE'. + +Figure 43 (sheet 75 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing various signaling paths between 3G_MSC-B, 3G_MSC-A, and UTRAN.](9144d599bb5bf98cd607202d768a4956_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet76(78) + +``` +graph TD; Start[Wait for Complete from 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)] --> I_COMPLETE[I_COMPLETE (ACM) from 3G_MSC-B]; Start --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B]; Start --> Call_Release[Call Release]; Start --> I_ANSWER[I-ANSWER (ANM) from 3G_MSC-B]; Start --> Cancel_MAP[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Start --> Success[Success]; Start --> Failure[Failure]; I_COMPLETE --> Success; I_ANSWER --> Call_UTRAN[Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]; MAP_PAS --> Allowed[(Allowed once in this state)]; Allowed --> Call_UTRAN; Call_Release --> From_UE[From UE or Network]; Call_Release --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G_MSC-B]; Call_Release --> I_DISCONNECT[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-B]; Call_Release --> IDLE[IDLE]; Success --> Response_Circuit[Response to Circuit Establishment Request]; Response_Circuit --> Wait_Complete[Wait for Complete from 3G_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)]; Failure --> Response_Circuit; Failure --> Cancel_MAP; Cancel_MAP --> from_3G_MSC_B[from 3G_MSC-B]; from_3G_MSC_B --> Call_UTRAN; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. It begins with a 'Wait for Complete from 3G\_MSC-B (SRNS Relocation)' state. From here, several signaling paths are possible: 1) Receipt of 'I\_COMPLETE (ACM) from 3G\_MSC-B' leads to 'Success', which then sends a 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request' and returns to the initial wait state. 2) Receipt of 'I-ANSWER (ANM) from 3G\_MSC-B' leads to 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 3) Receipt of 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B' leads to a state '(Allowed once in this state)', which then leads to 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 4) Receipt of 'Call Release' from 'UE or Network' leads to sending 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. to 3G\_MSC-B', 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-B', and entering an 'IDLE' state. 5) Receipt of 'Cancel MAP Procedures' from '3G\_MSC-B' leads to 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 6) Receipt of 'Failure' leads to sending a 'Response to Circuit Establishment Request' and also triggers 'Cancel MAP Procedures'. + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing various signaling paths between 3G\_MSC-B, 3G\_MSC-A, and UTRAN. + +Figure 43 (sheet 76 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO showing the sequence of messages and state transitions for a handover in 3G_MSC-A.](050e99bf626cb208bd2646b0e0b80708_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO** Sheet77(78) + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Subsequent SRNS Relocation from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-B' no Circuit Connection required. + +``` + +graph TD + Start((26)) --> MAP_PREPARE[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK] to 3G_MSC-B] + MAP_PREPARE --> Queue[Queue Messages for UE in 3G_MSC-A] + Queue --> Set_T703[Set T703] + Set_T703 --> Wait_UE[Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation)] + Wait_UE --> MAP_SEND_END[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req [IU-RLC-COMPLETE] from 3G_MSC-B'] + MAP_SEND_END --> Reset_T703[Reset T703] + Reset_T703 --> Forward[Forward queued messages for UE via 3G_MSC-B'] + Forward --> Redefine[Redefine 3G_MSC-B' as 3G_MSC-B] + Redefine --> UE_UTRAN[UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)] + + Wait_UE --> MAP_PAS_REQ[MAP-PAS req. [IU-RLC-DETECT] from 3G_MSC-B'] + MAP_PAS_REQ --> Allowed_Once1{(Allowed once in this state)} + Allowed_Once1 --> Wait_UE + + Wait_UE --> MAP_IREL_REQ[MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-B'] + MAP_IREL_REQ --> Allowed_Once2{(Allowed once in this state)} + Allowed_Once2 --> Wait_UE + + Wait_UE --> Wait_UE_End[Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation)] + + Allowed_Once2 --> Wait_UE_Access{Wait for access by UE?} + Wait_UE_Access -- Yes --> Cancel[Cancel MAP Procedures] + Cancel --> Release[Call Release] + Release --> IDLE[IDLE] + + Cancel -.-> To_MSC[to 3G_MSC-B and 3G_MSC-B'] + Release -.-> To_Net[to Network and UE] + +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A. It begins with a connector '26' leading to a message block 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK] to 3G\_MSC-B'. This is followed by 'Queue Messages for UE in 3G\_MSC-A', 'Set T703', and 'Wait for UE on 3G\_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation)'. From this wait state, three paths emerge: 1) 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req [IU-RLC-COMPLETE] from 3G\_MSC-B'' leading to 'Reset T703', 'Forward queued messages for UE via 3G\_MSC-B'', 'Redefine 3G\_MSC-B' as 3G\_MSC-B', and finally 'UE on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 2) 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-RLC-DETECT] from 3G\_MSC-B'' leading to a decision '(Allowed once in this state)' which loops back to the wait state. 3) A direct path to 'Wait for UE on 3G\_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation)'. From the 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] from 3G\_MSC-B'' message, another '(Allowed once in this state)' decision loops back to the wait state. Finally, a decision 'Wait for access by UE?' follows. A 'Yes' leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures', 'Call Release', and 'IDLE'. A 'No' loops back to the wait state. Dashed boxes indicate messages sent 'to 3G\_MSC-B and 3G\_MSC-B'' and 'to Network and UE'. + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO showing the sequence of messages and state transitions for a handover in 3G\_MSC-A. + +Figure 43 (sheet 77 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_A_HO for Handover in 3G_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation). It branches based on 'Expiry T703' and 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-RLC-FAILURE] from 3G_MSC-B'. One path leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' and 'UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. Another path leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' and 'IDLE'. A third path leads to 'Call Release' and 'Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation).](b6f6f51bf96aef85ffe1dcd9d57f398b_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO + +Procedure for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A + +Sheet78(78) + +``` +graph TD + Start([Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation)]) --> T703{Expiry T703} + T703 --> Reset[Reset T703] + Reset --> Forward[Forward queued messages for UE via 3G_MSC-B] + Forward --> Cancel1[Cancel MAP Procedures] + Cancel1 --> UTRAN([UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]) + T703 --> MAPReq[MAP-PAS req. [IU-RLC-FAILURE] from 3G_MSC-B] + MAPReq --> Cancel2[Cancel MAP Procedures] + Cancel2 --> IDLE([IDLE]) + T703 --> From3G[from 3G_MSC-B'] + From3G --> Cancel3[Cancel MAP Procedures] + Cancel3 --> Wait3G[Wait for access by UE?] + Wait3G -- No --> Cancel4[Cancel MAP Procedures] + Cancel4 --> IDLE + Wait3G -- Yes --> CallRelease[Call Release] + CallRelease --> FromNet[from Network or 3G_MSC-B] + CallRelease --> WaitUE[Wait for UE on 3G_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation)] + Forward --> UseMap[Use MAP-FORWARD-ACCESS-SIGNALLING req.] + UseMap --> To3G[to 3G_MSC-B'] + Cancel1 --> To3G + Cancel2 --> To3G + Cancel3 --> To3G + Cancel4 --> To3G +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_A\_HO for Handover in 3G\_MSC-A. The process starts with 'Wait for UE on 3G\_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation). It branches based on 'Expiry T703' and 'MAP-PAS req. [IU-RLC-FAILURE] from 3G\_MSC-B'. One path leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' and 'UE on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. Another path leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' and 'IDLE'. A third path leads to 'Call Release' and 'Wait for UE on 3G\_MSC-B' (SRNS Relocation). + +Figure 43 (sheet 78 of 78): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-A + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO for handover control. It starts with IDLE, receives MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. from 3G_MSC-A, checks the type of handover (GSM or UMTS), checks if the RNS is known, and then either allocates a handover number or prepares a response. The process ends in IDLE or waits for a channel/handover number for GSM to UMTS handover.](f63b447b65c94acf4135bcd496ebfe05_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Sheet1(54) + +``` +graph TD; IDLE1([IDLE]) --> J1(( )); J1 --> M1[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-A]; M1 --> T{Type of handover?}; T -- To GSM --> C5((5)); T -- To UMTS --> K{Known RNS?}; K -- No --> J2(( )); K -- Yes --> H{Handover Number?}; H -- Not Requested --> J2; H -- Requested --> M2[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER req. to VLR]; M2 --> S[Set T601]; S --> M3[lu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B]; M3 --> W[Wait for Channel or Handover Number (GSM to UMTS Ho)]; J2 --> M4[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp [A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-A]; M4 --> IDLE2([IDLE]); +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO for handover control. It starts with IDLE, receives MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. from 3G\_MSC-A, checks the type of handover (GSM or UMTS), checks if the RNS is known, and then either allocates a handover number or prepares a response. The process ends in IDLE or waits for a channel/handover number for GSM to UMTS handover. + +Figure 44 (sheet 1 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-B. The process starts with a wait for channel or handover number. It then branches into two main paths. The left path involves receiving an lu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B, resetting timer T601, sending an lu-LOCATION-REPORTING-CONTROL to RNS-B, and then checking if a handover number was requested. If not requested, it sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response to MSC-A, sets timer T604, and waits for the UE/MS on RNS-B. If requested, it waits for handover number allocation, receives a MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER response from VLR, sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response to MSC-A, sets timer T610, and waits for a connection from MSC-A. The right path involves receiving a MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER response from VLR, waiting for channel allocation, receiving an lu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B, resetting timer T601, and then checking if location reporting is supported. If supported, it sends an lu-LOCATION-REPORTING-CONTROL to RNS-B. Both paths converge to sending a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response to MSC-A.](8579e6ff712a88fe7ae237a5ec602f12_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Sheet2(54) + +``` +graph TD + Start([Wait for Channel or Handover Number (GSM to UMTS Ho)]) --> Join1(( )) + Join1 --> LeftPath[ ] + Join1 --> RightPath[ ] + LeftPath --> L1[lu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B] + L1 --> L2[Reset T601] + L2 --> L3[lu-LOCATION-REPORTING-CONTROL to RNS-B] + L3 --> L4{Handover Number?} + L4 -- Not Requested --> L5[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to MSC-A] + L4 -- Requested --> L6[Wait for Handover Number Allocation] + L6 --> L7[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR] + L7 --> L8[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] [Handover Number] to MSC-A] + L5 --> L9[Set T604] + L8 --> L10[Set T610] + L9 --> L11([Wait for UE/MS on RNS-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)]) + L10 --> L12([Wait for Connection from MSC-A (GSM to UMTS Ho)]) + RightPath --> R1[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR] + R1 --> R2[Wait for Channel Allocation] + R2 --> R3[lu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B] + R3 --> R4[Reset T601] + R4 --> R5{LOCATION REPORTING} + R5 -- Supported --> R6[lu-LOCATION-REPORTING-CONTROL to RNS-B] + R5 -- Not Supported --> R7(( )) + R6 --> R7 + R7 --> L8 +``` + +Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. The process starts with a wait for channel or handover number. It then branches into two main paths. The left path involves receiving an lu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B, resetting timer T601, sending an lu-LOCATION-REPORTING-CONTROL to RNS-B, and then checking if a handover number was requested. If not requested, it sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response to MSC-A, sets timer T604, and waits for the UE/MS on RNS-B. If requested, it waits for handover number allocation, receives a MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER response from VLR, sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response to MSC-A, sets timer T610, and waits for a connection from MSC-A. The right path involves receiving a MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER response from VLR, waiting for channel allocation, receiving an lu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B, resetting timer T601, and then checking if location reporting is supported. If supported, it sends an lu-LOCATION-REPORTING-CONTROL to RNS-B. Both paths converge to sending a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response to MSC-A. + +Figure 44 (sheet 2 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing two parallel paths for GSM to UMTS handover. The left path handles a successful handover, while the right path handles an error scenario. Both paths lead to an IDLE state.](1b50f9f141d3d1a1de52e959f85f8fc2_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO** Sheet3(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; subgraph LeftPath [ ]; W1[Wait for Channel or Handover Number (GSM to UMTS Ho)]; W2[Wait for Channel Allocation (GSM to UMTS Ho)]; J1(( )); F1[lu-RELOCATION-FAILURE from RNS-B]; E1[Expiry T601]; R1[Release Resources in RNS-B]; R2[Release Resources in RNS-B]; M1[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-A]; I1([IDLE]); W1 --> J1; W2 --> J1; J1 --> F1; F1 --> R1; R1 --> J1; J1 --> E1; E1 --> R2; R2 --> M1; M1 --> J1; J1 --> I1; end; subgraph RightPath [ ]; W3[Wait for Channel or Handover Number (GSM to UMTS Ho)]; W4[Wait for Handover Number Allocation (GSM to UMTS Ho)]; J2(( )); F2[lu-Release-REQUEST from RNS-B]; E2[ERROR]; I2[Indication from VLR]; M2[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] to MSC-A]; C[Cancel Channel on RNS-B]; I3([IDLE]); W3 --> J2; W4 --> J2; J2 --> F2; F2 --> J2; J2 --> E2; E2 --> I2; E2 --> M2; M2 --> J2; J2 --> C; C --> I3; end; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. It consists of two main parallel paths starting from a common entry point. + +**Left Path (Successful Handover):** + +- Starts with two parallel wait states: "Wait for Channel or Handover Number (GSM to UMTS Ho)" and "Wait for Channel Allocation (GSM to UMTS Ho)". +- These lead to a junction point. +- From the junction, a message "lu-RELOCATION-FAILURE from RNS-B" is received, leading to a "Release Resources in RNS-B" block. +- Simultaneously, an "Expiry T601" timer expires, also leading to a "Release Resources in RNS-B" block. +- Both resource release blocks lead to a junction point. +- From this junction, a message "MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-A" is sent. +- The flow then returns to the junction point and finally reaches the "IDLE" state. + +**Right Path (Error Handling):** + +- Starts with two parallel wait states: "Wait for Channel or Handover Number (GSM to UMTS Ho)" and "Wait for Handover Number Allocation (GSM to UMTS Ho)". +- These lead to a junction point. +- From the junction, a message "lu-Release-REQUEST from RNS-B" is received, leading to an "ERROR" state. +- The "ERROR" state also receives an "Indication from VLR". +- From the "ERROR" state, a message "MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] to MSC-A" is sent. +- The flow then returns to the junction point. +- From the junction, a "Cancel Channel on RNS-B" action is performed. +- Finally, the flow reaches the "IDLE" state. + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing two parallel paths for GSM to UMTS handover. The left path handles a successful handover, while the right path handles an error scenario. Both paths lead to an IDLE state. + +Figure 44 (sheet 3 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![State transition diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO. The diagram shows various states and transitions for a handover process. States include 'Wait for Connection (from MSC-A) (GSM to UMTS Ho)', 'Reset T610', 'Set T604', 'Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)', and 'IDLE'. Transitions include 'I_CONNECT (IAM) from MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)', 'MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B', 'I_COMPLETE (ACM) to MSC-A', 'Cancel MAP Procedures', 'Release Radio Resources on RNS-B', 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A', and 'To MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B'. There are also timers 'Expiry T610' and 'e.g. MAP-ABORT from MSC-A'.](675d8979e8be8b43c33598a654386dcd_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet4(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Basic GSM to UMTS handover from MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B +Circuit Connection required + +``` +stateDiagram-v2 + [*] --> S0: Wait for Connection (from MSC-A) (GSM to UMTS Ho) + S0 --> S1: I_CONNECT (IAM) from MSC-A (Uses Handover No.) + S1 --> S2: Reset T610 + S2 --> S3: MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B + S3 --> S4: Set T604 + S4 --> S5: I_COMPLETE (ACM) to MSC-A + S5 --> S6: Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS-B (GSM to UMTS Ho) + S0 --> S7: Expiry T610 + S7 --> S8: Cancel MAP Procedures + S8 --> S9: Release Radio Resources on RNS-B + S9 --> [*]: IDLE + S0 --> S10: Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B + S10 --> S11: MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A + S11 --> S12: Cancel MAP Procedures + S12 --> S13: To MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B + S13 --> S8 + S13 --> S14: e.g. MAP-ABORT from MSC-A + S14 --> S8 +``` + +State transition diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO. The diagram shows various states and transitions for a handover process. States include 'Wait for Connection (from MSC-A) (GSM to UMTS Ho)', 'Reset T610', 'Set T604', 'Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)', and 'IDLE'. Transitions include 'I\_CONNECT (IAM) from MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)', 'MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B', 'I\_COMPLETE (ACM) to MSC-A', 'Cancel MAP Procedures', 'Release Radio Resources on RNS-B', 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A', and 'To MSC-A in 3G\_MSC-B'. There are also timers 'Expiry T610' and 'e.g. MAP-ABORT from MSC-A'. + +Figure 44 (sheet 4 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![SDL Diagram of Handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-B](6dfec99f21c7ceff8c742d87111a056a_img.jpg) + +Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO +Sheet 5(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Detailed description of the SDL diagram: + +- Initial State:** Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS-B (GSM to UMTS Ho) +- Path 1 (Left):** Input 'Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B' leads to task 'Reset T604'. Then a decision 'ANM Sent?'. + - If 'No': Output 'I\_ANSWER (ANM) to MSC-A'. + - If 'Yes' or after 'No' branch: Output 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] to MSC-A' leading to state 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. +- Path 2 (Middle-Left):** Input 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B' leads to output 'MAP-PAS req [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A', then output 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to MSC-A', then task 'Cancel MAP Procedures', then task 'Release Resources on RNS-B', ending in state 'IDLE'. +- Path 3 (Middle-Right):** Input 'Expiry T604' or 'from MSC-A' or 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) from MSC-A' leads to the same 'Cancel MAP Procedures' flow ending in 'IDLE'. +- Path 4 (Right):** Input 'Cancel MAP Procedure' leads to task 'Reset T604'. Then input 'Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT from RNS-B' leads to output 'I\_ANSWER (ANM) to MSC-A', then output 'MAP-PAS req [A-HO-DETECT] to MSC-A', leading to state 'Wait for access by UE/MS on RNS-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. +- Path 5 (Far Right):** Task 'Release Resources on RNS-B' leads to state 'Wait for Disconnect (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. + +SDL Diagram of Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +Figure 44 (sheet 5 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-B](4325ad0fb1a0bcc317492c16a5467f71_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Sheet6(54) + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. It begins with a 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-B (GSM)' state, which leads to 'Forward Messages to UE/MS'. The process then enters a loop involving several message exchanges: 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G\_MSC-A', 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A', and 'A-HO-PERFORMED from BSS'. These are followed by 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-A' and 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-PERFORMED] to 3G\_MSC-A'. A 'Cancel MAP Procedures' block is shown. The next major step is 'Release Resources in BSS-A', which leads to a decision '3G\_MSC-A disconnected?'. If 'Yes', the call ends in 'IDLE'. If 'No', it leads to 'Wait for Disconnect (UMTS to GSM Hb)', then 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G\_MSC-A', and finally 'IDLE'. Another path from 'Release Resources in BSS-A' leads to 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G\_MSC-A', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures from 3G\_MSC-A', 'Release Resources in BSS-A', 'A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED from BSS-A', 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-A', and ends at connector '2'. A third path from 'Cancel MAP Procedures' leads to 'IDLE'. A fourth path from 'A-HO-PERFORMED from BSS' leads to 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-B (GSM)', which then leads to 'IDLE'. + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +Figure 44 (sheet 6 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart for Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing decision points for handover control.](7c5564b9e8a382de9dfa5f44116cbf2b_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO** Sheet7(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start((2)) --> D1{Known 3G_MSC?}; D1 -- Yes --> D2{Handover allowed to Cell?}; D1 -- No --> D2; D2 -- No --> D3{Which 3G_MSC?}; D2 -- Yes --> D3; D3 -- "3G_MSC-A/3G_MSC-B'" --> P1[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A]; D3 -- "3G_MSC-B" --> D4{Known RNS?}; P1 --> D4; D4 -- No --> D5{Resources on RNS-B?}; D4 -- Yes --> End3((3)); D5 -- No --> D6{Send Reject?}; D5 -- Yes --> End3; D6 -- No --> D7{Circuit Connection?}; D6 -- Yes --> P2[A-HANDOVER-REJECT to BSS-A]; P2 --> D7; D7 -- No --> P3[UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM)]; D7 -- Yes --> P4[Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-B (GSM)]; P3 --> End3; P4 --> End3; P4 --> Start1((1)); Start1 --> D1; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. It begins at connector 2, leading to a decision 'Known 3G\_MSC?'. If 'Yes', it proceeds to 'Handover allowed to Cell?'. If 'No', it also proceeds to 'Handover allowed to Cell?'. From 'Handover allowed to Cell?', a 'No' leads to 'Which 3G\_MSC?' and a 'Yes' leads to 'Which 3G\_MSC?'. From 'Which 3G\_MSC?', the path '3G\_MSC-A/3G\_MSC-B'' leads to a process box 'MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-A', which then leads to 'Known RNS?'. The path '3G\_MSC-B' leads directly to 'Known RNS?'. From 'Known RNS?', a 'Yes' leads to connector 3, and a 'No' leads to 'Resources on RNS-B?'. From 'Resources on RNS-B?', a 'Yes' leads to connector 3, and a 'No' leads to 'Send Reject?'. From 'Send Reject?', a 'Yes' leads to a process box 'A-HANDOVER-REJECT to BSS-A', which then leads to 'Circuit Connection?'. A 'No' from 'Send Reject?' also leads to 'Circuit Connection?'. From 'Circuit Connection?', a 'Yes' leads to a process box 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-B (GSM)', which leads to connector 3. A 'No' from 'Circuit Connection?' leads to a process box 'UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (GSM)', which also leads to connector 3. Connector 1 is located below 'Resources on RNS-B?' and loops back to 'Known 3G\_MSC?'. + +Flowchart for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing decision points for handover control. + +Figure 44 (sheet 7 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing the sequence of messages and actions for a handover from BSS-A to RNS-B on 3G_MSC-B. The process starts at connector 3, sends an Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B, sets timer T601, and waits for a response. It then branches based on whether location reporting is supported and the response from RNS-B (ACK, FAILURE, or no response due to timer expiry).](a74659686b764b14e7d9992d73e3a274_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet8(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Handover from BSS-A to RNS-B on 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD + Start((3)) --> IuReq[Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B] + IuReq --> T601Set[Set T601] + T601Set --> WaitGSM[Wait for Channel GSM to UMTS Ho] + WaitGSM --> Decision1{ } + Decision1 --> IuAck[Iu-RELOCATION-ACK from RNS-B] + Decision1 --> T601Exp[Expiry T601] + Decision1 --> IuFail[Iu-RELOCATION-FAILURE from RNS-B] + Decision1 --> MAPSend[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp from 3G_MSC-A] + IuAck --> T601Reset1[Reset T601] + T601Reset1 --> LocRep{LOCATION REPORTING} + LocRep -- Supported --> Queue[Queue Messages in 3G_MSC-B] + LocRep -- Not Supported --> LocCtrl[lu-LOCATION-REPORTING-CONTROL to RNS-B] + Queue --> HandoverCmd[Handover Command to UE/MS via BSS-A] + HandoverCmd --> Setup[Set Up Handover Device] + Setup --> T602Set[Set T602] + T602Set --> WaitUMTS[Wait for access by UE/MS GSM to UMTS Ho] + T601Exp --> T601Reset2[Reset T601] + T601Reset2 --> ReleaseRNSB[Release Resources on RNS-B] + ReleaseRNSB --> End1((1)) + IuFail --> ClearReq[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A] + ClearReq --> MAPReq[MAP-PAS req A-CLEAR-REQUEST to 3G_MSC-A] + MAPReq --> CancelMAP[Cancel MAP Procedures] + CancelMAP --> To3GMSCA[To 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B] + To3GMSCA --> ReleaseBSSA[Release Resources on BSS-A] + ReleaseBSSA --> WaitDisconnect[Wait for Disconnect GSM to UMTS Ho] + MAPSend --> CancelChan[Cancel Channel request on RNS-B] + CancelChan --> ReleaseBSSA +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing the sequence of messages and actions for a handover from BSS-A to RNS-B on 3G\_MSC-B. The process starts at connector 3, sends an Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B, sets timer T601, and waits for a response. It then branches based on whether location reporting is supported and the response from RNS-B (ACK, FAILURE, or no response due to timer expiry). + +Figure 44 (sheet 8 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart for Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing three main paths: 1) Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho) leads to Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B, then Reset T602, then MAP-PAS req. to 3G_MSC-A, then a Circuit Connection? decision. 2) Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT from RNS-B leads to a Circuit Connection? decision. 3) A-HANDOVER FAILURE from BSS-A leads to a junction, then Reset T602, then Forward queued messages via BSS-A, then Release Resources in RNS-B, then a Circuit Connection? decision. All paths eventually lead to either Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN/GSM), UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN/GSM), or Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho).](4c815618b2aaed14f81e59f6272d6511_img.jpg) + +Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO Sheet9(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` + + graph TD + Start1([Wait for access +by UE/MS +(GSM to UMTS Ho)]) --> Junction1(( )) + + Junction1 --> luRC[Iu-RELOCATION- +COMPLETE +from RNS-B] + luRC --> ResetT602_1[Reset +T602] + ResetT602_1 --> MAPPAS[MAP-PAS req. +[A-HO-PERFORMED] +to 3G_MSC-A] + MAPPAS --> CC1{Circuit +Connection?} + CC1 -- No --> FQM1[Forward queued +messages +via RNS-B] + CC1 -- Yes --> CHD1{{Connect +Handover +Device (Optional)}} + CHD1 --> FQM1 + FQM1 --> RR1{{Release Resources +in BSS-A}} + RR1 --> CC2{Circuit +Connection?} + CC2 -- No --> CP1([Call in Progress +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)]) + CC2 -- Yes --> RHD1{{Release +Handover +Device}} + RHD1 --> CP1 + RHD1 --> UE1([UE/MS +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)]) + + Junction1 --> luRD[Iu-RELOCATION- +DETECT +from RNS-B] + luRD --> CC3{Circuit +Connection?} + CC3 -- No --> CHD3_Join(( )) + CC3 -- Yes --> CHD3{{Connect +Handover +Device (Optional)}} + CHD3 --> CHD3_Join + CHD3_Join --> WAM([Wait for access +by UE/MS +(GSM to UMTS Ho)]) + + Junction1 --> AHF[A-HANDOVER +FAILURE +from BSS-A] + AHF --> ResetT602_2[Reset +T602] + ResetT602_2 --> FQM2[Forward queued +messages +via BSS-A] + FQM2 --> RR2{{Release +Resources +in RNS-B}} + RR2 --> CC4{Circuit +Connection?} + CC4 -- No --> UE2([UE/MS +on 3G_MSC-B +(GSM)]) + CC4 -- Yes --> RHD2{{Release +Handover +Device}} + RHD2 --> CP2([Call in Progress +on 3G_MSC-B +(GSM)]) + RHD2 --> UE2 + +``` + +Flowchart for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing three main paths: 1) Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho) leads to Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B, then Reset T602, then MAP-PAS req. to 3G\_MSC-A, then a Circuit Connection? decision. 2) Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT from RNS-B leads to a Circuit Connection? decision. 3) A-HANDOVER FAILURE from BSS-A leads to a junction, then Reset T602, then Forward queued messages via BSS-A, then Release Resources in RNS-B, then a Circuit Connection? decision. All paths eventually lead to either Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN/GSM), UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN/GSM), or Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho). + +**Figure 44 (sheet 9 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B** + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO for handover control in 3G_MSC-B. The process starts from 'Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho)' and handles various events like timer expiry, release requests from RNS-B or BSS-A, and MAP signaling responses. It includes resource release steps, MAP procedure cancellations, and transitions to IDLE or further wait states.](d49c6ed7cc2cd764f77a0a43ecc9e636_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO** Sheet10(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` + + graph TD + Start([Wait for access by UE/MS +GSM to UMTS Ho]) + + %% Path 1: Expiry T602 + Start --- Path1 + Path1{{Expiry T602}} --> Rel_RNSB_BSSA[Release Resources +in RNS-B +and BSS-A] + Rel_RNSB_BSSA --> Rel_HO_Dev[Release +Handover +Device] + Rel_HO_Dev --> MAP_PAS_A[MAP-PAS req. +A-CLEAR-REQUEST +to 3G_MSC-A] + MAP_PAS_A --> Cancel_MAP_A[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + Cancel_MAP_A --> I_DISC[I_DISCONNECT +(REL) to 3G_MSC-A] + I_DISC --> IDLE([IDLE]) + + %% Path 2: Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST + Start --- Path2 + Path2{{Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST +from RNS-B}} --> Rel_RNSB[Release +Resources +in RNS-B] + Rel_RNSB --> Wait_Access{Wait for access +by UE/MS?} + + Wait_Access -- Yes --> Wait_Access_Loop([Wait for access +by UE/MS +GSM to UMTS Ho]) + + Wait_Access -- No --> MAP_PAS_B[MAP-PAS req. +A-CLEAR-REQUEST +to 3G_MSC-A] + MAP_PAS_B --> Cancel_MAP_B[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + Cancel_MAP_B --> Rel_RNSB_2[Release +Resources +in RNS-B] + Rel_RNSB_2 --> Wait_Disc([Wait for Disconnect +GSM to UMTS Ho]) + + %% Path 3: A-CLEAR-REQUEST + Start --- Path3 + Path3{{A-CLEAR-REQUEST +from BSS-A}} --> Rel_BSSA[Release +Resources +in BSS-A] + Rel_BSSA --> Rel_RNSB_BSSA_2[Release Resources +in RNS-B +and BSS-A] + Rel_RNSB_BSSA_2 --> Rel_HO_Dev_2[Release +Handover +Device] + Rel_HO_Dev_2 --> Wait_Disc + + %% Path 4: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL + Start --- Path4 + Path4{{MAP-SEND-END- +SIGNAL resp. +from 3G_MSC-A}} --> Wait_Disc + + %% Connections to MSC-A/B labels + MAP_PAS_A --- Label_A[To 3G_MSC-A +in 3G_MSC-B] + MAP_PAS_B --- Label_B[To 3G_MSC-A +in 3G_MSC-B] + +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO for handover control in 3G\_MSC-B. The process starts from 'Wait for access by UE/MS (GSM to UMTS Ho)' and handles various events like timer expiry, release requests from RNS-B or BSS-A, and MAP signaling responses. It includes resource release steps, MAP procedure cancellations, and transitions to IDLE or further wait states. + +**Figure 44 (sheet 10 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B** + +![SDL diagram showing the handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-B for a subsequent GSM to UMTS handover. The process begins at the state 'Wait for Response (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. Four main branches handle different inputs: 1) Successful MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response leads to sending a Handover Command and waiting for an acknowledgement. 2) A failure response leads to resetting timer T611 and releasing RNS-B resources. 3) Expiry of timer T611 leads to sending a MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL and cancelling MAP procedures. 4) An A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A leads to a MAP-PAS request, cancelling MAP procedures, releasing BSS-A resources, and waiting for disconnect.](daa086b264328b888e9d54b9bbad081e_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO** +Sheet11(54) + + + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Subsequent GSM to UMTS Handover from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A + +Detailed logic flow within the diagram: + +- State: Wait for Response (GSM to UMTS Ho)** + - Input: *MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] from 3G\_MSC-A* + - Task: Reset T611 + - Output: *Handover Command to UE/MS via BSS-A* + - Task: Set T604 + - Next State: Wait for Ack. from 3G\_MSC-A (GSM to UMTS Ho)** + - Input: *MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE or MAP ERROR] from 3G\_MSC-A* + - Task: Reset T611 + - Task: Release Resources in RNS-B + - Exit to connector 1** + - Input: *Expiry T611* + - Output: *MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G\_MSC-A* + - Task: Cancel MAP Procedures + - Task: Release Resources in BSS-A + - Next State: Wait for Disconnect (GSM to UMTS Ho)** + - Input: *A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A* + - Output: *MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-A* + - Sub-process: in 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A + - Task: Cancel MAP Procedures + - Task: Release Resources in BSS-A + - Next State: Wait for Disconnect (GSM to UMTS Ho)** + +SDL diagram showing the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B for a subsequent GSM to UMTS handover. The process begins at the state 'Wait for Response (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. Four main branches handle different inputs: 1) Successful MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER response leads to sending a Handover Command and waiting for an acknowledgement. 2) A failure response leads to resetting timer T611 and releasing RNS-B resources. 3) Expiry of timer T611 leads to sending a MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL and cancelling MAP procedures. 4) An A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A leads to a MAP-PAS request, cancelling MAP procedures, releasing BSS-A resources, and waiting for disconnect. + +Figure 44 (sheet 11 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart for Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing handover control logic in 3G_MSC-B.](b3e20b3a7c662b6f564c2b92175a2909_img.jpg) + +Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet12(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + + + +``` + + graph TD + Start([Wait for Ack. +from 3G_MSC-A +(GSM to UMTS Ho)]) --> Join1 + + Join1 --- In1{ } + In1 -->|MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A| Task1[Reset T604] + In1 -->|Expiry T604| Task2[Release Resources in BSS-A] + In1 -->|A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A| Task3[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A] + In1 -->|A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-A| Task4[Reset T604] + + Task1 --> Task5[Release Resources in BSS-A] + Task5 --> Dec1{Circuit Connection?} + Dec1 -- Yes --> End1([Wait for Disconnect +(GSM to UMTS Ho)]) + Dec1 -- No --> End2([IDLE]) + + Task2 --> Task6[Cancel MAP Procedures] + Task6 --> Task7[to 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B] + Task7 --> Join2 + + Task3 --> Task8[to 3G_MSC-A] + Task8 --> Task9[Release Resources in BSS-A] + Task9 --> Task10[Cancel MAP Procedures] + Task10 --> Join2 + + Task4 --> Task11[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] to 3G_MSC-A] + Task11 --> Dec2{Circuit Connection?} + Dec2 -- Yes --> End3([Call in Progress +on 3G_MSC-B +(GSM)]) + Dec2 -- No --> End4([UE/MS +on 3G_MSC-B +(GSM)]) + + Join2 --> Dec1 + +``` + +Flowchart for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing handover control logic in 3G\_MSC-B. + +**Figure 44 (sheet 12 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B** + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing various states and transitions for a handover process.](de1324b584dbd2fb53fcdde6e28b2182_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet13(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Basic GSM to UMTS handover from MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B +no Circuit Connection required + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for UE/MS on RNS-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)]) --> J1(( )); J1 --> Iu_RELEASE_REQUEST[Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B]; Iu_RELEASE_REQUEST --> J2(( )); J2 --> MAP_PAS_req_A[MAP-PAS req [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A]; MAP_PAS_req_A --> J3(( )); J3 --> Iu_RELOCATION_DETECT[Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT from RNS-B]; Iu_RELOCATION_DETECT --> J4(( )); J4 --> MAP_PAS_req_A_HO[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] to MSC-A]; MAP_PAS_req_A_HO --> J5(( )); J5 --> Wait_RNS_B([Wait for UE/MS on RNS-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)]); J1 --> Iu_RELOCATION_COMPLETE[Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B]; Iu_RELOCATION_COMPLETE --> Reset_T604[Reset T604]; Reset_T604 --> J6(( )); J6 --> MAP_SEND_END[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] to MSC-A]; MAP_SEND_END --> J7(( )); J7 --> UE_MS_3G[UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]; J1 --> Expiry_T604{Expiry T604}; Expiry_T604 --> Cancel_MAP_Proc[Cancel MAP Procedure]; Cancel_MAP_Proc --> Release_Resources[Release Resources on RNS-B]; Release_Resources --> IDLE([IDLE]); Expiry_T604 --> Cancel_MAP_Proc_3G[Cancel MAP Procedures to MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B]; Cancel_MAP_Proc_3G --> Release_Resources; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. It begins with a state 'Wait for UE/MS on RNS-B (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. From here, several paths emerge: 1) Receipt of 'Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B' leads to 'Reset T604', then 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] to MSC-A', and finally 'UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 2) Receipt of 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B' leads to a sequence of messages: 'MAP-PAS req [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A', 'Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT from RNS-B', and 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] to MSC-A', returning to the initial wait state. 3) An 'Expiry T604' event triggers 'Cancel MAP Procedure', which leads to 'Release Resources on RNS-B' and then 'IDLE'. It also triggers 'Cancel MAP Procedures to MSC-A in 3G\_MSC-B', which also leads to 'Release Resources on RNS-B'. + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing various states and transitions for a handover process. + +Figure 44 (sheet 13 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing handover control between UE/MS, MSC-A, BSS-A, and MSC-B.](e645ed71024459749170f5d01e301b37_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet14(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS as UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM) + participant MSC-A as MSC-A + participant BSS-A as BSS-A + participant MSC-B as MSC-B + Note left of UE/MS: Forward Messages to UE/MS + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A + MSC-B->>BSS-A: A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED from BSS-A + Note right of MSC-B: Release Resources in BSS-B + MSC-B->>UE/MS: + BSS-A->>MSC-A: MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [A-ASG-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-A + MSC-A->>MSC-B: MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER req. to VLR + MSC-B->>BSS-A: A-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST to BSS-A + Note right of MSC-B: Wait for Assignment or Handover Number (UMTS to GSM Ho) + Note right of UE/MS: IDLE + Note right of BSS-A: 2 +``` + +The diagram illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. It begins with the UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (GSM). The process involves several message exchanges: 1. MSC-A sends a MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response to MSC-B. 2. MSC-B sends an A-HANDOVER-REQUIRED message to BSS-A. 3. MSC-B also triggers a 'Release Resources in BSS-B' action, leading to an IDLE state for the UE/MS. 4. BSS-A sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request (containing NULL and A-ASG-REQUEST) to MSC-A. 5. MSC-A responds with a MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER request to MSC-B. 6. MSC-B then sends an A-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST to BSS-A. 7. Finally, MSC-B enters a 'Wait for Assignment or Handover Number (UMTS to GSM Ho)' state, and the process continues to step 2. + +Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing handover control between UE/MS, MSC-A, BSS-A, and MSC-B. + +Figure 44 (sheet 14 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for Assignment or Handover Number (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into two parallel paths. The left path receives 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE from RNS-B', followed by 'Wait for Handover Number Allocation', then 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR'. The right path receives 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR', followed by 'Wait for Assignment', then 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE from RNS-B'. Both paths converge to a merge point, followed by 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [A-ASG-COMPLETE] to MSC-A', 'Set T610', and finally 'Wait for Connect from MSC-A (GSM to UMTS Ho)'.](738aa211ec8ef1c9162c577d0bea7eca_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO** Sheet15(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B      Circuit Connection Establishment on 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start[Wait for Assignment or Handover Number (GSM to UMTS Ho)]; Start --> Merge1(( )); Merge1 --> LeftPath[ ]; Merge1 --> RightPath[ ]; LeftPath --> L1[Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE from RNS-B]; L1 --> L2((Wait for Handover Number Allocation)); L2 --> L3[ ]; RightPath --> R1[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR]; R1 --> R2((Wait for Assignment)); R2 --> R3[ ]; L3 --> Merge2(( )); R3 --> Merge2; Merge2 --> MAP[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [A-ASG-COMPLETE] to MSC-A]; MAP --> SetT610[Set T610]; SetT610 --> End[Wait for Connect from MSC-A (GSM to UMTS Ho)]; +``` + +Flowchart of handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for Assignment or Handover Number (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into two parallel paths. The left path receives 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE from RNS-B', followed by 'Wait for Handover Number Allocation', then 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR'. The right path receives 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR', followed by 'Wait for Assignment', then 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE from RNS-B'. Both paths converge to a merge point, followed by 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [A-ASG-COMPLETE] to MSC-A', 'Set T610', and finally 'Wait for Connect from MSC-A (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. + +Figure 44 (sheet 15 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![SDL diagram for Handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-B showing various states like Wait for Assignment, Error handling, and Release sequences leading to IDLE.](38e67fda26b37cfba4e5ffa0f0fa61ab_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO** Sheet16(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` + + graph TD + %% Entry States + S1[Wait for Assignment or +Handover Number +(GSM to UMTS Ho)] + S2[Wait for Assignment +(GSM to UMTS Ho)] + S3[Wait for Assignment or +Handover Number +(GSM to UMTS Ho)] + S4[Wait for Handover +Number Allocation +(GSM to UMTS Ho)] + S5[Wait for Assignment +(GSM to UMTS Ho)] + S6[Wait for Assignment or +Handover Number +(GSM to UMTS Ho)] + S7[Wait for Handover +Number Allocation +(GSM to UMTS Ho)] + + %% Left Path + S1 --> In1{/} + S2 --> In1 + In1 --> RAB_FAIL[Iu-RAB- +ASSIGNMENT- +RESPONSE with +unsuccessful +result from RNS-B] + RAB_FAIL --> MAP_FAIL[MAP-PREPARE- +HANDOVER resp. +[A-ASG-FAILURE] +to MSC-A] + MAP_FAIL --> UE_MS([UE/MS +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)]) + + %% Middle Path + S3 --> In2{/} + S4 --> In2 + In2 --> ERROR_STATE((ERROR)) + VLR_IND[Indication from +VLR] -.-> ERROR_STATE + ERROR_STATE --> MAP_ERR[MAP-PREPARE- +HANDOVER resp. +[MAP ERROR] +to MSC-A] + MAP_ERR --> UE_MS + + %% Right Path + S5 --> In3{/} + S6 --> In3 + S7 --> In4{/} + In3 --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND- +END-SIGNAL resp. +from MSC-A] + In4 --> MAP_SEND + MAP_SEND --> IU_REL[Iu-RELEASE- +REQUEST +from RNS-B] + IU_REL --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. +[A-CLEAR-REQUEST] +to MSC-A] + MAP_PAS --> CANCEL_MAP1[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + CANCEL_MAP1 --> TO_MSC_VLR[to MSC-A +and VLR-B] + + MAP_PAS --> CANCEL_MAP2[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + CANCEL_MAP2 --> TO_VLR[to VLR-B] + + TO_MSC_VLR --> REL_RES[Release +Resources +in RNS-B] + TO_VLR --> REL_RES + REL_RES --> IDLE([IDLE]) + +``` + +SDL diagram for Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B showing various states like Wait for Assignment, Error handling, and Release sequences leading to IDLE. + +Figure 44 (sheet 16 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO for GSM to UMTS Handover. The process starts with 'Wait for Connect from MSC-A (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) Receiving 'I_CONNECT (IAM) from MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)' leads to 'Reset T610', then 'MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B', then 'I_COMPLETE (ACM) to MSC-A', ending at 'Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 2) 'Expiry T610' leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures', which then leads to 'Release Radio Resources on RNS-B', ending at 'IDLE'. 3) Receiving 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A' leads to 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR_REQUEST] to MSC-A', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (to MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B), which then leads to 'Release Radio Resources on RNS-B', ending at 'IDLE'. There is also a 'to MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B' label near the first 'Cancel MAP Procedures' block.](ee9ec9df0528b0bc5018e4d2d640207f_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet17(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Connect from MSC-A (GSM to UMTS Ho)]) --> I_CONNECT[I_CONNECT (IAM) from MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)]; Start --> T610_Expiry{Expiry T610}; Start --> Iu_RELEASE[Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A]; I_CONNECT --> Reset[Reset T610]; Reset --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B]; MAP_SEND --> I_COMPLETE[I_COMPLETE (ACM) to MSC-A]; I_COMPLETE --> Call[Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]; T610_Expiry --> Cancel1[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel1 --> Release[Release Radio Resources on RNS-B]; Release --> Idle1([IDLE]); Iu_RELEASE --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR_REQUEST] to MSC-A]; MAP_PAS --> Cancel2[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel2 --> Release; Release --> Idle2([IDLE]); +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO for GSM to UMTS Handover. The process starts with 'Wait for Connect from MSC-A (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) Receiving 'I\_CONNECT (IAM) from MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)' leads to 'Reset T610', then 'MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B', then 'I\_COMPLETE (ACM) to MSC-A', ending at 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 2) 'Expiry T610' leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures', which then leads to 'Release Radio Resources on RNS-B', ending at 'IDLE'. 3) Receiving 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A' leads to 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR\_REQUEST] to MSC-A', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (to MSC-A in 3G\_MSC-B), which then leads to 'Release Radio Resources on RNS-B', ending at 'IDLE'. There is also a 'to MSC-A in 3G\_MSC-B' label near the first 'Cancel MAP Procedures' block. + +Figure 44 (sheet 17 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing three possible outcomes from a 'Wait for Connect' state.](bdedc4445bc14629d68d2fed555b83e9_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet18(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start[Wait for Connect from MSC-A (GSM to UMTS Ho)] --> Path1[ ]; Start --> Path2[ ]; Start --> Path3[ ]; Path1 --> I_DISCONNECT[I_DISCONNECT (REL) from MSC-A]; I_DISCONNECT --> UE_MS[UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]; Path2 --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A]; MAP_SEND --> Release_RNSB_1[Release Resources on RNS-B]; Release_RNSB_1 --> IDLE_1[IDLE]; Path3 --> from_MSC_A[from MSC-A]; from_MSC_A --> Cancel_MAP[Cancel MAP Procedure]; Cancel_MAP --> Release_RNSB_2[Release Resources on RNS-B]; Release_RNSB_2 --> IDLE_2[IDLE]; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. It begins with a state 'Wait for Connect from MSC-A (GSM to UMTS Ho)'. From this state, three distinct paths emerge. The first path leads to an 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) from MSC-A' message, which results in the 'UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. The second path leads to a 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A' message, followed by 'Release Resources on RNS-B', and finally reaching an 'IDLE' state. The third path leads to a 'from MSC-A' message, which triggers a 'Cancel MAP Procedure', followed by 'Release Resources on RNS-B', and finally reaching an 'IDLE' state. + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing three possible outcomes from a 'Wait for Connect' state. + +Figure 44 (sheet 18 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO. It starts at connector 5, checks if the BSS is known. If not, it sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response to 3G_MSC-A and goes to IDLE. If known, it checks if a handover number is requested. If not requested, it goes to IDLE. If requested, it sends a MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER request to the VLR, sets timer T401, sends an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B, and waits for a channel or handover number (UMTS to GSM Ho).](061137657bf1fb2669843fe20861b2ec_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Sheet19(54) + +``` +graph TD; Start((5)) --> KnownBSS{Known BSS?}; KnownBSS -- No --> PrepResp[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp [A-HO-FAILURE] to 3G_MSC-A]; PrepResp --> IDLE([IDLE]); KnownBSS -- Yes --> HandoverNumber{Handover Number?}; HandoverNumber -- Not Requested --> IDLE; HandoverNumber -- Requested --> MapAlloc[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER req. to VLR]; MapAlloc --> SetT401[Set T401]; SetT401 --> AHandover[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B]; AHandover --> Wait[Wait for Channel or Handover Number (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO. It starts at connector 5, checks if the BSS is known. If not, it sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER response to 3G\_MSC-A and goes to IDLE. If known, it checks if a handover number is requested. If not requested, it goes to IDLE. If requested, it sends a MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER request to the VLR, sets timer T401, sends an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B, and waits for a channel or handover number (UMTS to GSM Ho). + +Figure 44 (sheet 19 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-B](b2f6158e74f297659bf41c5939b2c1e0_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO** Sheet20(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Channel or Handover Number (UMTS to GSM Ho)]) --> A_HO_REQ_ACK[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK from BSS-B]; Start --> MAP_ALLOC_NUM[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR]; A_HO_REQ_ACK --> Reset_T401[Reset T401]; Reset_T401 --> Handover_Number{Handover Number?}; Handover_Number -- Requested --> Wait_HN[Wait for Handover Number Allocation]; Handover_Number -- Not Requested --> MAP_PREPARE_HO[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to 3G_MSC-A]; MAP_ALLOC_NUM --> Wait_CA[Wait for Channel Allocation]; Wait_CA --> A_HO_REQ_ACK_2[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK from BSS-B]; A_HO_REQ_ACK_2 --> Reset_T401_2[Reset T401]; Reset_T401_2 --> MAP_ALLOC_NUM_2[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR]; MAP_ALLOC_NUM_2 --> MAP_PREPARE_HO_2[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] [Handover Number] to 3G_MSC-A]; MAP_PREPARE_HO_2 --> Set_T410[Set T410]; Set_T410 --> Wait_Conn[Wait for Connection from 3G_MSC-A (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; MAP_PREPARE_HO --> Set_T404[Set T404]; Set_T404 --> Wait_UE[Wait for UE/MS on BSS-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. It begins with a wait state for a channel or handover number (UMTS to GSM Ho). From here, two parallel paths emerge. The first path involves receiving an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK from BSS-B, resetting timer T401, and then checking if a handover number was requested. If requested, it waits for handover number allocation, receives a MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR, sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] [Handover Number] to 3G\_MSC-A, sets timer T410, and waits for a connection from 3G\_MSC-A (UMTS to GSM Ho). If not requested, it sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] to 3G\_MSC-A, sets timer T404, and waits for UE/MS on BSS-B (UMTS to GSM Ho). The second path involves receiving a MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR, waiting for channel allocation, receiving an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK from BSS-B, resetting timer T401, receiving a MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR, sending a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] [Handover Number] to 3G\_MSC-A, setting timer T410, and waiting for a connection from 3G\_MSC-A (UMTS to GSM Ho). + +Flowchart of Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +Figure 44 (sheet 20 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-B. The diagram shows two main paths starting from 'Wait for Channel or Handover Number (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. The left path handles a failure case where 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-B' is received, leading to 'Release Resources in BSS-B', 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to 3G_MSC-A', and finally 'IDLE'. The right path handles a success case where 'A_CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B' is received, leading to 'ERROR' (with 'Indication from VLR'), 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] to 3G_MSC-A', 'Cancel Channel on BSS-B', and finally 'IDLE'. Both paths also include a 'Wait for Channel Allocation (UMTS to GSM Ho)' and an 'Expiry T401' timer. The 'Expiry T401' timer leads to 'Release Resources in BSS-B' and then to the 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to 3G_MSC-A' message.](3c65409bf428d5233f0443c2437c5b40_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Sheet21(54) + +``` +graph TD; subgraph LeftPath [ ]; W1[Wait for Channel or Handover Number (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; W2[Wait for Channel Allocation (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; E1[Expiry T401]; R1[Release Resources in BSS-B]; M1[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to 3G_MSC-A]; I1([IDLE]); W1 --> E1; W2 --> E1; E1 --> R1; R1 --> M1; M1 --> I1; end; subgraph RightPath [ ]; W3[Wait for Channel or Handover Number (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; W4[Wait for Handover Number Allocation (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; E2[ERROR]; M2[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] to 3G_MSC-A]; C1[Cancel Channel on BSS-B]; I2([IDLE]); W3 --> E2; W4 --> E2; E2 --> M2; M2 --> C1; C1 --> I2; end; W1 --> W2; W3 --> W4; E1 --> M1; E2 --> I2; R1 --> M1; M2 --> I2; +``` + +Flowchart of handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. The diagram shows two main paths starting from 'Wait for Channel or Handover Number (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. The left path handles a failure case where 'A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-B' is received, leading to 'Release Resources in BSS-B', 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to 3G\_MSC-A', and finally 'IDLE'. The right path handles a success case where 'A\_CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B' is received, leading to 'ERROR' (with 'Indication from VLR'), 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] to 3G\_MSC-A', 'Cancel Channel on BSS-B', and finally 'IDLE'. Both paths also include a 'Wait for Channel Allocation (UMTS to GSM Ho)' and an 'Expiry T401' timer. The 'Expiry T401' timer leads to 'Release Resources in BSS-B' and then to the 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE] to 3G\_MSC-A' message. + +Figure 44 (sheet 21 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO. The process starts with 'Wait for Connection from 3G_MSC-A (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) Receiving 'I_CONNECT (IAM) from 3G_MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)' leads to 'Reset T410', then 'MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B', then 'Set T404', then 'I_COMPLETE (ACM) to 3G_MSC-A', and finally 'Wait for access by UE/MS on BSS-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. 2) 'Expiry T410' leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (with a note 'To 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B'), which then leads to 'Release Radio Resources on BSS-B' and 'IDLE'. 3) Receiving 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B' leads to a 'Cancel MAP Procedures' block (with a note 'e.g. MAP-ABORT from 3G_MSC-A'), which then leads to 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A' and another 'Cancel MAP Procedures' block (with a note 'To 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B'). All three paths eventually converge to 'Release Radio Resources on BSS-B' and 'IDLE'.](58fec65be756fd3ae9ef18840002fe73_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet22(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Basic UMTS to GSM handover from 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B +Circuit Connection required + +``` +graph TD; Start[Wait for Connection from 3G_MSC-A (UMTS to GSM Ho)] --> I_CONNECT[I_CONNECT (IAM) from 3G_MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)]; Start --> T410_Exp[Expiry T410]; Start --> A_CLEAR[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B]; I_CONNECT --> Reset[Reset T410]; Reset --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B]; MAP_SEND --> T404[Set T404]; T404 --> I_COMPLETE[I_COMPLETE (ACM) to 3G_MSC-A]; I_COMPLETE --> WaitAccess[Wait for access by UE/MS on BSS-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; T410_Exp --> Cancel1[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel1 -.-> Note1[To 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B]; Cancel1 --> Release[Release Radio Resources on BSS-B]; Release --> IDLE[IDLE]; A_CLEAR --> Cancel2[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel2 -.-> Note2[e.g. MAP-ABORT from 3G_MSC-A]; Cancel2 --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A]; MAP_PAS --> Cancel3[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel3 -.-> Note3[To 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B]; Cancel3 --> Release; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO. The process starts with 'Wait for Connection from 3G\_MSC-A (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) Receiving 'I\_CONNECT (IAM) from 3G\_MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)' leads to 'Reset T410', then 'MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B', then 'Set T404', then 'I\_COMPLETE (ACM) to 3G\_MSC-A', and finally 'Wait for access by UE/MS on BSS-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. 2) 'Expiry T410' leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (with a note 'To 3G\_MSC-A in 3G\_MSC-B'), which then leads to 'Release Radio Resources on BSS-B' and 'IDLE'. 3) Receiving 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B' leads to a 'Cancel MAP Procedures' block (with a note 'e.g. MAP-ABORT from 3G\_MSC-A'), which then leads to 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-A' and another 'Cancel MAP Procedures' block (with a note 'To 3G\_MSC-A in 3G\_MSC-B'). All three paths eventually converge to 'Release Radio Resources on BSS-B' and 'IDLE'. + +Figure 44 (sheet 22 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![SDL diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing handover control logic in 3G_MSC-B. It includes states like 'Wait for access', 'Call in Progress', and 'IDLE'. It processes messages from BSS-B and 3G_MSC-A, manages T404 timers, and handles MAP procedures and resource release.](cd2b491634dadbccc5b38620840d01f9_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO** +Sheet23(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` + + State: Wait for access by UE/MS on BSS-B (UMTS to GSM Ho) + + Input: A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B + Task: Reset T404 + Decision: ANM Sent? + Yes -> (Continue) + No -> Output: I_ANSWER (ANM) to 3G_MSC-A + Output: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] to 3G_MSC-A + State: Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-B (GSM) + + Input: A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B + Output: MAP-PAS req [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A + Output: I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-A + Task: Cancel MAP Procedures + Task: Release Resources on BSS-B + State: IDLE + + Input: Expiry T404 + Output: I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-A + Task: Cancel MAP Procedures + Task: Release Resources on BSS-B + State: IDLE + + Input: from 3G_MSC-A + Task: Cancel MAP Procedure + Task: Reset T404 + Task: Release Resources on BSS-B + State: Wait for Disconnect (UMTS to GSM Ho) + + Input: I_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G_MSC-A + Input: A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B + Output: I_ANSWER (ANM) to 3G_MSC-A + Output: MAP-PAS req [A-HO-DETECT] to 3G_MSC-A + State: Wait for access by UE/MS on BSS-B (UMTS to GSM Ho) + +``` + +SDL diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing handover control logic in 3G\_MSC-B. It includes states like 'Wait for access', 'Call in Progress', and 'IDLE'. It processes messages from BSS-B and 3G\_MSC-A, manages T404 timers, and handles MAP procedures and resource release. + +Figure 44 (sheet 23 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-B. The process starts with a 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)' which triggers 'Forward Messages to UE/MS'. It then branches into three parallel paths. The first path involves receiving a 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A', followed by 'Release Resources in RNS-A', a decision '3G_MSC-A disconnected?', and if 'No', 'Wait for Disconnect (GSM to UMTS Hb)' leading to 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G_MSC-A' and finally 'IDLE'. The second path involves receiving an 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A', sending a 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A', 'Cancel MAP Procedures', receiving an 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G_MSC-A', and ending at 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. The third path involves receiving an 'Iu-LOCATION-REPORT from RNS', sending a 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-PERFORMED] to 3G_MSC-A', 'Cancel MAP Procedures from 3G_MSC-A', 'Release Resources in RNS-A', sending an 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-A', 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-A', and ending at connector '8'.](1c877fb0cc57a813ade0008fa01971f0_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO** Sheet24(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` + +graph TD + Start([Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]) --> Forward[Forward Messages to UE/MS] + Forward --> Branch1(( )) + Branch1 --> Path1[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A] + Path1 --> Release1[Release Resources in RNS-A] + Release1 --> Dec1{3G_MSC-A disconnected?} + Dec1 -- Yes --> End1([IDLE]) + Dec1 -- No --> Wait[Wait for Disconnect (GSM to UMTS Hb)] + Wait --> Disconnect1[I_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G_MSC-A] + Disconnect1 --> End1 + Branch1 --> Path2[Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A] + Path2 --> PAS2[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A] + PAS2 --> Cancel2[Cancel MAP Procedures] + Cancel2 --> Disconnect2[I_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G_MSC-A] + Disconnect2 --> End2([Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]) + Branch1 --> Path3[Iu-LOCATION-REPORT from RNS] + Path3 --> PAS3[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-PERFORMED] to 3G_MSC-A] + PAS3 --> Cancel3[Cancel MAP Procedures from 3G_MSC-A] + Cancel3 --> Release3[Release Resources in RNS-A] + Release3 --> RelReq[Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-A] + RelReq --> Disconnect3[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-A] + Disconnect3 --> End3((8)) + +``` + +Flowchart of the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. The process starts with a 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)' which triggers 'Forward Messages to UE/MS'. It then branches into three parallel paths. The first path involves receiving a 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G\_MSC-A', followed by 'Release Resources in RNS-A', a decision '3G\_MSC-A disconnected?', and if 'No', 'Wait for Disconnect (GSM to UMTS Hb)' leading to 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G\_MSC-A' and finally 'IDLE'. The second path involves receiving an 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A', sending a 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-A', 'Cancel MAP Procedures', receiving an 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G\_MSC-A', and ending at 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. The third path involves receiving an 'Iu-LOCATION-REPORT from RNS', sending a 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-PERFORMED] to 3G\_MSC-A', 'Cancel MAP Procedures from 3G\_MSC-A', 'Release Resources in RNS-A', sending an 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-A', 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-A', and ending at connector '8'. + +Figure 44 (sheet 24 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-B. The process starts at connector 8, checks if the MSC is known. If not, it checks if handover is allowed to the cell. If allowed, it checks which 3G_MSC (MSC-A/MSC-B' or MSC-B). For MSC-A/MSC-B', it sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. to MSC-A, sets timer T411, and waits for a response. For MSC-B, it checks if the BSS is known. If not, it checks if resources on BSS-B are available. If resources are not available, it sends a reject to RNS-A and checks the circuit connection. If the circuit connection is not available, the call is in progress on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN) or UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN). If resources are available, it proceeds to connector 9. If the BSS is known, it also proceeds to connector 9. If the MSC is known at the start, it proceeds directly to connector 9.](00c09a613659598c2bc71a13e882192a_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Sheet25(54) + +``` +graph TD; 8((8)) --> K{Known MSC?}; K -- Yes --> 9((9)); K -- No --> H{Handover allowed to Cell?}; H -- No --> K; H -- Yes --> W{Which 3G_MSC?}; W -- MSC-A/MSC-B' --> M[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [A-HO-REQUEST] to MSC-A]; M --> T[Set T411]; T --> WR[Wait for Response (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; WR --> 9; W -- MSC-B --> KB{Known BSS?}; KB -- No --> R{Resources on BSS-B?}; R -- No --> S{Send Reject?}; S -- Yes --> IF[lu-RELOCATION-PREPARATION-FAILURE to RNS-A]; IF --> C{Circuit Connection?}; C -- No --> CP[Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]; C -- Yes --> UM[UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]; R -- Yes --> 9; KB -- Yes --> 9; 7((7)) --> S; +``` + +Flowchart of handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. The process starts at connector 8, checks if the MSC is known. If not, it checks if handover is allowed to the cell. If allowed, it checks which 3G\_MSC (MSC-A/MSC-B' or MSC-B). For MSC-A/MSC-B', it sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. to MSC-A, sets timer T411, and waits for a response. For MSC-B, it checks if the BSS is known. If not, it checks if resources on BSS-B are available. If resources are not available, it sends a reject to RNS-A and checks the circuit connection. If the circuit connection is not available, the call is in progress on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN) or UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN). If resources are available, it proceeds to connector 9. If the BSS is known, it also proceeds to connector 9. If the MSC is known at the start, it proceeds directly to connector 9. + +Figure 44 (sheet 25 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO for UMTS to GSM Handover. The process starts at connector 9, sends an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B, sets timer T401, and waits for a channel. It then branches based on responses from BSS-B (ACK, Failure, or MAP-END-SIGNAL) and RNS-A (lu-RELEASE-REQUEST). Success leads to connector 7, while failure or cancellation leads to connector 8.](3cd8510d8b9bfa7b6974a537fdfb3f19_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet26(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-BUMTS to GSM Handover from RNS-A to BSS-B on MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start((9)) --> AHR[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B]; AHR --> T401_1[Set T401]; T401_1 --> WCH[Wait for Channel UMTS to GSM Ho]; WCH --> BSSB_Logic{ }; BSSB_Logic --> HRQA[A-HANDOVER-REQUEST-ACK from BSS-B]; BSSB_Logic --> T401_Exp[Expiry T401]; BSSB_Logic --> HF[A-HANDOVER-FAILURE from BSS-B]; BSSB_Logic --> MSER[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A]; HRQA --> T401_2[Reset T401]; T401_2 --> QM[Queue Messages in MSC-B]; QM --> HCU[Handover Command to UE/MS via lu-RELOCATION-COMMAND to RNS-A]; HCU --> SHD[Set Up Handover Device]; SHD --> T402[Set T402]; T402 --> WUA[Wait for access by UE/MS UMTS to GSM Ho]; WUA --> End7((7)); HF --> T401_3[Reset T401]; T401_3 --> RR[Release Resources on BSS-B]; RR --> End7; MSER --> CC[Cancel Channel request on BSS-B]; CC --> RR_A[Release Resources on RNS-A]; RR_A --> WD[Wait for Disconnect UMTS to GSM Ho]; WD --> End8((8)); luRR[lu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A] --> MPAS[MAP-PAS req A-CLEAR-REQUEST to 3G_MSC-A]; MPAS --> CMP[Cancel MAP Procedures]; CMP --> T3G[To 3G_MSC-A in MSC-B]; CMP --> End8; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO for UMTS to GSM Handover. The process starts at connector 9, sends an A-HANDOVER-REQUEST to BSS-B, sets timer T401, and waits for a channel. It then branches based on responses from BSS-B (ACK, Failure, or MAP-END-SIGNAL) and RNS-A (lu-RELEASE-REQUEST). Success leads to connector 7, while failure or cancellation leads to connector 8. + +Figure 44 (sheet 26 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing three main paths: A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE, A-HANDOVER-DETECT, and Iu-RELOCATION CANCEL. Each path involves various steps like Reset T402, MAP-PAS req., Circuit Connection checks, and final UE/MS states.](6c5c4041e081d25a3f7e13f5fd2a3390_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet27(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)]) --> AHC[A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B]; Start --> AHD[A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B]; Start --> IRC[Iu-RELOCATION CANCEL from RNS-A]; AHC --> R1[Reset T402]; R1 --> MP[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-PERFORMED] to 3G_MSC-A]; MP --> CC1{Circuit Connection?}; CC1 -- No --> FQ[Forward queued messages via BSS-B]; CC1 -- Yes --> CHD1[Connect Handover Device (Optional)]; CHD1 --> FQ; FQ --> RR1[Release Resources in RNS-A]; RR1 --> CC2{Circuit Connection?}; CC2 -- No --> CIP1[Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-B (GSM)]; CC2 -- Yes --> RD1[Release Handover Device]; RD1 --> UM1[UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM)]; AHD --> CC3{Circuit Connection?}; CC3 -- No --> W[Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; CC3 -- Yes --> CHD2[Connect Handover Device (Optional)]; CHD2 --> W; IRC --> R2[Reset T402]; R2 --> FQ2[Forward queued messages via RNS-A]; FQ2 --> RR2[Release Resources in BSS-B]; RR2 --> CC4{Circuit Connection?}; CC4 -- No --> UM2[UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]; CC4 -- Yes --> RD2[Release Handover Device]; RD2 --> CIP2[Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing three main paths: A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE, A-HANDOVER-DETECT, and Iu-RELOCATION CANCEL. Each path involves various steps like Reset T402, MAP-PAS req., Circuit Connection checks, and final UE/MS states. + +Figure 44 (sheet 27 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) Expiry T402 -> Release Resources in BSS-B and RNS-A -> Release Handover Device -> MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A -> Cancel MAP Procedures -> To 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B -> I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-A -> IDLE. 2) A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B -> Release Resources in BSS-B -> Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho). 3) Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A -> Release Resources in RNS-A -> Wait for access by UE/MS? (Decision). If No, it goes to Release Resources in BSS-B. If Yes, it goes to MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A -> To 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B -> Cancel MAP Procedures -> Release Resources in BSS-B -> Wait for Disconnect (UMTS to GSM Ho). A fourth path from the initial wait leads to an unlabeled box -> MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A -> Release Resources in BSS-B and RNS-A -> Release Handover Device -> Wait for Disconnect (UMTS to GSM Ho).](f814714d4415807ccec0645e664397e6_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Sheet28(54) + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)]) --> T402{Expiry T402}; Start --> A_CLEAR[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B]; Start --> IU_RELEASE[Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A]; Start --> Unlabeled[ ]; Start --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A]; T402 --> Res1[Release Resources in BSS-B and RNS-A]; Res1 --> Handover1[Release Handover Device]; Handover1 --> PAS1[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A]; PAS1 --> Cancel1[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel1 --> ToMSCA1[To 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B]; ToMSCA1 --> DISCONNECT1[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-A]; DISCONNECT1 --> IDLE([IDLE]); A_CLEAR --> Res2[Release Resources in BSS-B]; Res2 --> WaitAccess2([Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)]); IU_RELEASE --> Res3[Release Resources in RNS-A]; Res3 --> WaitAccess3{Wait for access by UE/MS?}; WaitAccess3 -- No --> Res2; WaitAccess3 -- Yes --> PAS2[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A]; PAS2 --> ToMSCA2[To 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B]; ToMSCA2 --> Cancel2[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel2 --> Res4[Release Resources in BSS-B]; Res4 --> WaitDisconnect3([Wait for Disconnect (UMTS to GSM Ho)]); Unlabeled --> Res5[Release Resources in BSS-B and RNS-A]; Res5 --> Handover2[Release Handover Device]; Handover2 --> WaitDisconnect4([Wait for Disconnect (UMTS to GSM Ho)]); +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) Expiry T402 -> Release Resources in BSS-B and RNS-A -> Release Handover Device -> MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-A -> Cancel MAP Procedures -> To 3G\_MSC-A in 3G\_MSC-B -> I\_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G\_MSC-A -> IDLE. 2) A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B -> Release Resources in BSS-B -> Wait for access by UE/MS (UMTS to GSM Ho). 3) Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A -> Release Resources in RNS-A -> Wait for access by UE/MS? (Decision). If No, it goes to Release Resources in BSS-B. If Yes, it goes to MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-A -> To 3G\_MSC-A in 3G\_MSC-B -> Cancel MAP Procedures -> Release Resources in BSS-B -> Wait for Disconnect (UMTS to GSM Ho). A fourth path from the initial wait leads to an unlabeled box -> MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G\_MSC-A -> Release Resources in BSS-B and RNS-A -> Release Handover Device -> Wait for Disconnect (UMTS to GSM Ho). + +Figure 44 (sheet 28 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing the handover process from 3G_MSC-B to MSC-A. The diagram includes lifelines for RNS-A, BSS-B, and MSC-A. It details the preparation, execution, and cleanup phases of the handover, including message exchanges like MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER, Relocation Command, and MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL. Timer T411 and T404 are used for synchronization and error handling.](1dd32fc202575cb394770f965b887f6e_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO** Sheet29(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B      Subsequent UMTS to GSM Handover from 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-A + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant RNS-A + participant BSS-B + participant MSC-A + + Note left of RNS-A: Procedures for Handover in 3G_MSC-B + Note right of MSC-A: Subsequent UMTS to GSM Handover from 3G_MSC-B to MSC-A + + RNS-A->>BSS-B: Relocation Command to RNS-A + BSS-B->>RNS-A: MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-REQUEST-ACK] from MSC-A + Note right of BSS-B: Wait for Response (UMTS to GSM Ho) + Note right of BSS-B: Reset T411 + Note right of BSS-B: Set T404 + Note right of BSS-B: Wait for Ack. from MSC-A (UMTS to GSM Ho) + Note right of BSS-B: 7 + + RNS-A->>MSC-A: lu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A + MSC-A->>RNS-A: MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A + Note right of MSC-A: in 3G_MSC-B to MSC-A + Note right of MSC-A: Cancel MAP Procedures + Note right of MSC-A: Release Resources in RNS-A + Note right of MSC-A: Wait for Disconnect (UMTS to GSM Ho) + + BSS-B->>MSC-A: MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [A-HO-FAILURE or MAP ERROR] from MSC-A + Note right of BSS-B: Reset T411 + Note right of BSS-B: Release Resources in BSS-B + Note right of BSS-B: 7 + + MSC-A->>BSS-B: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A + Note right of MSC-A: Expiry T411 + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing the handover process from 3G\_MSC-B to MSC-A. The diagram includes lifelines for RNS-A, BSS-B, and MSC-A. It details the preparation, execution, and cleanup phases of the handover, including message exchanges like MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER, Relocation Command, and MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL. Timer T411 and T404 are used for synchronization and error handling. + +Figure 44 (sheet 29 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for Ack. (from MSC-A) (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into four main paths: 1) 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A' -> 'Reset T404' -> 'Release Resources in RNS-A' -> 'Circuit Connection?' (Yes: 'Wait for Disconnect (UMTS to GSM Ho)', No: 'IDLE'). 2) 'Expiry T404' -> 'Release Resources in RNS-A' -> 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (to MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B) -> 'Circuit Connection?' (Yes: 'Wait for Disconnect (UMTS to GSM Ho)', No: 'IDLE'). 3) 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A' -> 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A' -> 'Release Resources in RNS-A' -> 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (to MSC-A) -> 'Circuit Connection?' (Yes: 'Wait for Disconnect (UMTS to GSM Ho)', No: 'IDLE'). 4) 'Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A' -> 'Reset T404' -> 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-A' -> 'Circuit Connection?' (Yes: 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)', No: 'UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)').](e208ceb0e30e3b7a3a55f613d87ed1e3_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Sheet30(54) + +``` +graph TD; Start["Wait for Ack. +(from MSC-A) +(UMTS to GSM Ho)"] --> J1(( )); J1 --> P1["MAP-SEND- +END- +SIGNAL resp. +from MSC-A"]; J1 --> P2["Expiry +T404"]; J1 --> P3["Iu-RELEASE- +REQUEST +from RNS-A"]; J1 --> P4["Iu-RELOCATION- +CANCEL +from RNS-A"]; P1 --> R1["Reset +T404"]; R1 --> R2["Release +Resources +in RNS-A"]; R2 --> C1{"Circuit +Connection?"}; C1 -- Yes --> E1["Wait for Disconnect +(UMTS to GSM Ho)"]; C1 -- No --> E2["IDLE"]; P2 --> R3["Release +Resources +in RNS-A"]; R3 --> R4["Cancel MAP +Procedures"]; R4 --> D1["to MSC-A +in 3G_MSC-B"]; R4 --> D2["to MSC-A"]; R4 --> C2{"Circuit +Connection?"}; C2 -- Yes --> E3["Wait for Disconnect +(UMTS to GSM Ho)"]; C2 -- No --> E4["IDLE"]; P3 --> R5["MAP-PAS req. +[A-CLEAR- +REQUEST] +to MSC-A"]; R5 --> R6["Release +Resources +in RNS-A"]; R6 --> R7["Cancel MAP +Procedures"]; R7 --> D3["to MSC-A"]; R7 --> C3{"Circuit +Connection?"}; C3 -- Yes --> E5["Wait for Disconnect +(UMTS to GSM Ho)"]; C3 -- No --> E6["IDLE"]; P4 --> R8["Reset +T404"]; R8 --> R9["MAP-PAS req. +[A-HO-FAILURE] +to MSC-A"]; R9 --> C4{"Circuit +Connection?"}; C4 -- Yes --> E7["Call in Progress +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)"]; C4 -- No --> E8["UE/MS +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)"]; +``` + +Flowchart of handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for Ack. (from MSC-A) (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into four main paths: 1) 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from MSC-A' -> 'Reset T404' -> 'Release Resources in RNS-A' -> 'Circuit Connection?' (Yes: 'Wait for Disconnect (UMTS to GSM Ho)', No: 'IDLE'). 2) 'Expiry T404' -> 'Release Resources in RNS-A' -> 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (to MSC-A in 3G\_MSC-B) -> 'Circuit Connection?' (Yes: 'Wait for Disconnect (UMTS to GSM Ho)', No: 'IDLE'). 3) 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A' -> 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to MSC-A' -> 'Release Resources in RNS-A' -> 'Cancel MAP Procedures' (to MSC-A) -> 'Circuit Connection?' (Yes: 'Wait for Disconnect (UMTS to GSM Ho)', No: 'IDLE'). 4) 'Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A' -> 'Reset T404' -> 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-FAILURE] to MSC-A' -> 'Circuit Connection?' (Yes: 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)', No: 'UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'). + +Figure 44 (sheet 30 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing the sequence of messages and states for a UMTS to GSM handover. The process starts with 'Wait for UE/MS on BSS-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into two main paths: one for successful handover ('A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B' -> 'Reset T404' -> 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] to 3G_MSC-A' -> 'UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM)') and one for error handling ('A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B' -> 'MAP-PAS req [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A' -> 'A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B' -> 'Cancel MAP Procedures' -> 'to 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B' -> 'Cancel MAP Procedure' -> 'Release Resources on BSS-B' -> 'IDLE'). There is also an 'Expiry T404' state leading to 'Cancel MAP Procedure' and a 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] to 3G_MSC-A' state leading back to 'Wait for UE/MS on BSS-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'.](ae69c35cda128ac38cd578a5172555d4_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet31(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Basic UMTS to GSM handover from 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B +no Circuit Connection required + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for UE/MS on BSS-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)]) --> A_Handover_Complete[A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B]; Start --> A_Clear_Request[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B]; A_Handover_Complete --> Reset_T404[Reset T404]; Reset_T404 --> MAP_Send_End_Signal[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] to 3G_MSC-A]; MAP_Send_End_Signal --> UE_MS_3G_MSC_B([UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM)]); A_Clear_Request --> MAP_PAS_req_A_Clear[MAP-PAS req [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A]; MAP_PAS_req_A_Clear --> A_Handover_Detect[A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B]; A_Handover_Detect --> Cancel_MAP_Procedures[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel_MAP_Procedures --> To_3G_MSC_A[to 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B]; To_3G_MSC_A --> Cancel_MAP_Procedure[Cancel MAP Procedure]; Cancel_MAP_Procedure --> Release_Resources[Release Resources on BSS-B]; Release_Resources --> IDLE([IDLE]); A_Handover_Detect --> MAP_PAS_req_A_Ho_Detect[MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] to 3G_MSC-A]; MAP_PAS_req_A_Ho_Detect --> Wait_UE_MS_BSS_B([Wait for UE/MS on BSS-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)]); Expiry_T404{Expiry T404} --> Cancel_MAP_Procedure; MAP_PAS_req_A_Ho_Detect --> Expiry_T404; Expiry_T404 --> From_3G_MSC_A[from 3G_MSC-A]; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing the sequence of messages and states for a UMTS to GSM handover. The process starts with 'Wait for UE/MS on BSS-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into two main paths: one for successful handover ('A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE from BSS-B' -> 'Reset T404' -> 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [A-HO-COMPLETE] to 3G\_MSC-A' -> 'UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (GSM)') and one for error handling ('A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B' -> 'MAP-PAS req [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-A' -> 'A-HANDOVER-DETECT from BSS-B' -> 'Cancel MAP Procedures' -> 'to 3G\_MSC-A in 3G\_MSC-B' -> 'Cancel MAP Procedure' -> 'Release Resources on BSS-B' -> 'IDLE'). There is also an 'Expiry T404' state leading to 'Cancel MAP Procedure' and a 'MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-DETECT] to 3G\_MSC-A' state leading back to 'Wait for UE/MS on BSS-B (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. + +Figure 44 (sheet 31 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing handover control between UE/MS, RNS-A, RNS-B, VLR, and MSC-A.](9e47aa7528e713ae12a7739999286108_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet32(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN) + participant RNS-A + participant RNS-B + participant VLR + participant MSC-A + + Note left of UE/MS: Forward Messages to UE/MS + UE/MS->>RNS-B: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A + RNS-B->>UE/MS: Release Resources in RNS-B + UE/MS-->>RNS-B: IDLE + RNS-A->>RNS-B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-A + Note right of RNS-B: 8 + MSC-A->>RNS-B: MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [A-ASG-REQUEST] from MSC-A + MSC-A->>VLR: MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER req. to VLR + MSC-A->>RNS-A: Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST to RNS-A + Note right of RNS-A: Wait for Assignment or Handover Number (GSM to UMTS Ho) + RNS-B->>MSC-A: Iu-LOCATION-REPORT from RNS + MSC-A->>RNS-B: MAP-PAS req. [A-HO-PERFORMED] to 3G_MSC-A + UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN) +``` + +The diagram illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. It begins with the UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN) receiving forward messages. The process involves several steps: 1) MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response from 3G\_MSC-A to RNS-B, followed by resource release in RNS-B and an IDLE state. 2) Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-A, leading to a transition point (8). 3) MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request [NULL] [A-ASG-REQUEST] from MSC-A to RNS-B. 4) MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER request to VLR. 5) Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST to RNS-A, followed by a wait for assignment or handover number (GSM to UMTS Ho). 6) Iu-LOCATION-REPORT from RNS to MSC-A. 7) MAP-PAS request [A-HO-PERFORMED] to 3G\_MSC-A. The procedure concludes with the UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN). + +Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing handover control between UE/MS, RNS-A, RNS-B, VLR, and MSC-A. + +Figure 44 (sheet 32 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for Assignment or Handover Number (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into two parallel paths. The left path receives 'A-ASSIGNMENT-COMPLETE from BSS-B', then enters 'Wait for Handover Number Allocation', then receives 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR'. The right path receives 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR', then enters 'Wait for Assignment', then receives 'A-ASSIGNMENT-COMPLETE from BSS-A'. Both paths converge to a merge point, followed by 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [A-ASG-COMPLETE] to 3G_MSC-A', then 'Set T410', and finally 'Wait for Connect from 3G_MSC-A (UMTS to GSM Ho)'.](e6be648d8221efac693395d853c3bc77_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet33(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Circuit Connection Establishment on 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start[Wait for Assignment or Handover Number (UMTS to GSM Ho)] --> Merge1(( )); Merge1 --> Left[ ]; Merge1 --> Right[ ]; Left --> A1[A-ASSIGNMENT-COMPLETE from BSS-B]; Right --> M1[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR]; A1 --> W1((Wait for Handover Number Allocation)); M1 --> W2((Wait for Assignment)); W1 --> Merge2(( )); W2 --> A2[A-ASSIGNMENT-COMPLETE from BSS-A]; Merge2 --> Left2[ ]; Merge2 --> Right2[ ]; Left2 --> M2[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR]; Right2 --> A2; A2 --> Merge3(( )); Merge3 --> P1{{ }}; P1 --> P2[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [A-ASG-COMPLETE] to 3G_MSC-A]; P2 --> T1[Set T410]; T1 --> End[Wait for Connect from 3G_MSC-A (UMTS to GSM Ho)]; +``` + +Flowchart of handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for Assignment or Handover Number (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into two parallel paths. The left path receives 'A-ASSIGNMENT-COMPLETE from BSS-B', then enters 'Wait for Handover Number Allocation', then receives 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR'. The right path receives 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR', then enters 'Wait for Assignment', then receives 'A-ASSIGNMENT-COMPLETE from BSS-A'. Both paths converge to a merge point, followed by 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [A-ASG-COMPLETE] to 3G\_MSC-A', then 'Set T410', and finally 'Wait for Connect from 3G\_MSC-A (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. + +Figure 44 (sheet 33 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing various handover scenarios between UMTS and GSM. The diagram includes lifelines for the UE/MS, BSS-A, BSS-B, VLR-B, and 3G_MSC-A. It details steps for successful handovers, assignment failures, and error handling paths.](704c5137e8e6d3474b72294e6b9c88e4_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet34(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE/MS as UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM) + participant BSS-A + participant BSS-B + participant VLR-B + participant 3G_MSC-A + + Note left of BSS-A: Wait for Assignment (UMTS to GSM Ho) + Note left of BSS-B: Wait for Handover Number Allocation (UMTS to GSM Ho) + + BSS-A->>BSS-A: A-ASSIGNMENT-FAILURE from BSS-A + BSS-A->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [A-ASG-FAILURE] to 3G_MSC-A + Note right of BSS-A: ERROR Indication from VLR + BSS-A->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] to 3G_MSC-A + Note right of BSS-B: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A + BSS-B->>3G_MSC-A: A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-B + BSS-B->>3G_MSC-A: MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A + Note right of BSS-B: Cancel MAP Procedures to 3G_MSC-A and VLR-B + Note right of BSS-B: Cancel MAP Procedures to VLR-B + BSS-B->>BSS-B: Release Resources in BSS-B + BSS-B->>UE/MS: IDLE +``` + +Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing various handover scenarios between UMTS and GSM. The diagram includes lifelines for the UE/MS, BSS-A, BSS-B, VLR-B, and 3G\_MSC-A. It details steps for successful handovers, assignment failures, and error handling paths. + +Figure 44 (sheet 34 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for Connect from 3G_MSC-A (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) Receiving 'I_CONNECT (IAM) from 3G_MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)' leads to 'Reset T410', then 'MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B', then 'I_COMPLETE (ACM) to 3G_MSC-A', ending at 'Call on 3G_MSC-B (GSM)'. 2) 'Expiry T410' leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures', which then leads to 'Release Radio Resources on BSS-B', ending at 'IDLE'. 3) Receiving 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A' leads to 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR_REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures', which then leads to 'Release Radio Resources on BSS-B', ending at 'IDLE'. There is also a dashed box 'to 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B' associated with the first 'Cancel MAP Procedures' block.](c94fdc8aee435b1f4ed6917e28b1db5c_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet35(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start[Wait for Connect from 3G_MSC-A (UMTS to GSM Ho)] --> I_CONNECT[I_CONNECT (IAM) from 3G_MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)]; Start --> Expiry[Expiry T410]; Start --> A_CLEAR[A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A]; I_CONNECT --> Reset[Reset T410]; Reset --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B]; MAP_SEND --> I_COMPLETE[I_COMPLETE (ACM) to 3G_MSC-A]; I_COMPLETE --> Call[Call on 3G_MSC-B (GSM)]; Expiry --> Cancel1[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel1 --> Release[Release Radio Resources on BSS-B]; Release --> Idle1[IDLE]; A_CLEAR --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR_REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A]; MAP_PAS --> Cancel2[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel2 --> Release; Release --> Idle2[IDLE]; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO for handover control. The process starts with 'Wait for Connect from 3G\_MSC-A (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) Receiving 'I\_CONNECT (IAM) from 3G\_MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)' leads to 'Reset T410', then 'MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B', then 'I\_COMPLETE (ACM) to 3G\_MSC-A', ending at 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (GSM)'. 2) 'Expiry T410' leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures', which then leads to 'Release Radio Resources on BSS-B', ending at 'IDLE'. 3) Receiving 'A-CLEAR-REQUEST from BSS-A' leads to 'MAP-PAS req. [A-CLEAR\_REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-A', then 'Cancel MAP Procedures', which then leads to 'Release Radio Resources on BSS-B', ending at 'IDLE'. There is also a dashed box 'to 3G\_MSC-A in 3G\_MSC-B' associated with the first 'Cancel MAP Procedures' block. + +Figure 44 (sheet 35 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO. It starts with 'Wait for Connect from 3G_MSC-A (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. From here, it branches into three paths: 1) 'I_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G_MSC-A' leads to a box, which then leads to 'UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM)'. 2) 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A' leads to a box, which leads to 'Release Resources on BSS-B', which then leads to 'IDLE'. 3) 'from 3G_MSC-A' leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedure', which leads to 'Release Resources on BSS-B', which then leads to 'IDLE'.](b543946164dcd60756be812898e547e0_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet36(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start[Wait for Connect from 3G_MSC-A (UMTS to GSM Ho)] --> I_DISCONNECT[I_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G_MSC-A]; Start --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A]; Start --> FROM_3G_MSC_A[from 3G_MSC-A]; I_DISCONNECT --> Box1[ ]; Box1 --> UE_MS[UE/MS on 3G_MSC-B (GSM)]; MAP_SEND --> Box2[ ]; Box2 --> Release1[Release Resources on BSS-B]; Release1 --> IDLE1[IDLE]; FROM_3G_MSC_A --> Cancel[Cancel MAP Procedure]; Cancel --> Release2[Release Resources on BSS-B]; Release2 --> IDLE2[IDLE]; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO. It starts with 'Wait for Connect from 3G\_MSC-A (UMTS to GSM Ho)'. From here, it branches into three paths: 1) 'I\_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G\_MSC-A' leads to a box, which then leads to 'UE/MS on 3G\_MSC-B (GSM)'. 2) 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G\_MSC-A' leads to a box, which leads to 'Release Resources on BSS-B', which then leads to 'IDLE'. 3) 'from 3G\_MSC-A' leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedure', which leads to 'Release Resources on BSS-B', which then leads to 'IDLE'. + +Figure 44 (sheet 36 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO](e04a952ad587547899d15c77183a5b24_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet37(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` + +graph TD + Start((6)) --> KnownRNS{Known +RNS?} + KnownRNS -- No --> MAP_PREPARE[MAP-PREPARE- +HANDOVER resp +[IU-RLC-FAILURE] +To 3G_MSC-A] + KnownRNS -- Yes --> HandoverNumber{Handover +Number?} + HandoverNumber -- Requested --> MAP_ALLOCATE[MAP-ALLOCATE- +HANDOVER-NUMBER req. +to VLR] + HandoverNumber -- Not Requested --> SetT801 + MAP_ALLOCATE --> SetT801[Set +T801] + SetT801 --> IU_RELOCATION[Iu-RELOCATION- +REQUEST +to RNS-B] + IU_RELOCATION --> Wait([Wait for Channel +or Handover Number +SRNS Relocation]) + MAP_PREPARE --> IDLE([IDLE]) + +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. It begins at connector 6 and proceeds to a decision 'Known RNS?'. If 'No', it sends a 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp [IU-RLC-FAILURE] To 3G\_MSC-A' and ends at 'IDLE'. If 'Yes', it proceeds to 'Handover Number?'. If 'Not Requested', it proceeds directly to 'Set T801'. If 'Requested', it first sends a 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER req. to VLR' before reaching 'Set T801'. After setting 'T801', it sends an 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B' and enters a 'Wait for Channel or Handover Number (SRNS Relocation)' state. + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +**Figure 44 (sheet 37 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B** + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing two main paths for handover control. Path 1 (left) starts with 'Wait for Channel or Handover Number (SRNS Relocation)', followed by 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B', 'Reset T801', and a decision 'Handover Number?'. If 'Not Requested', it sends 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK] to 3G_MSC-A', 'Set T804', and 'Wait for UE on RNS-B (SRNS Relocation)'. If 'Requested', it sends 'Wait for Handover Number Allocation', 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER NUMBER resp. from VLR', 'Set T810', and 'Wait for Connection from 3G_MSC-A (SRNS Relocation)'. Path 2 (right) starts with 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER NUMBER resp. from VLR', 'Wait for Channel Allocation (SRNS Relocation)', 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B', 'Reset T801', and then sends 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK] [Handover Number] to 3G_MSC-A'.](bf9abec3605f1a8d00ae6524a9af02ed_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet38(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start1[Wait for Channel or Handover Number (SRNS Relocation)] --> Ack1[Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B]; Ack1 --> Reset1[Reset T801]; Reset1 --> Decision{Handover Number?}; Decision -- Not Requested --> Prep1[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK] to 3G_MSC-A]; Prep1 --> Set1[Set T804]; Set1 --> Wait1[Wait for UE on RNS-B (SRNS Relocation)]; Decision -- Requested --> Wait2[Wait for Handover Number Allocation]; Wait2 --> Alloc1[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER NUMBER resp. from VLR]; Alloc1 --> Set2[Set T810]; Set2 --> Wait3[Wait for Connection from 3G_MSC-A (SRNS Relocation)]; Start2[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER NUMBER resp. from VLR] --> Wait4[Wait for Channel Allocation (SRNS Relocation)]; Wait4 --> Ack2[Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B]; Ack2 --> Reset2[Reset T801]; Reset2 --> Prep2[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK] [Handover Number] to 3G_MSC-A]; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing two main paths for handover control. Path 1 (left) starts with 'Wait for Channel or Handover Number (SRNS Relocation)', followed by 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B', 'Reset T801', and a decision 'Handover Number?'. If 'Not Requested', it sends 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK] to 3G\_MSC-A', 'Set T804', and 'Wait for UE on RNS-B (SRNS Relocation)'. If 'Requested', it sends 'Wait for Handover Number Allocation', 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER NUMBER resp. from VLR', 'Set T810', and 'Wait for Connection from 3G\_MSC-A (SRNS Relocation)'. Path 2 (right) starts with 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER NUMBER resp. from VLR', 'Wait for Channel Allocation (SRNS Relocation)', 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B', 'Reset T801', and then sends 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK] [Handover Number] to 3G\_MSC-A'. + +Figure 44 (sheet 38 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing two parallel paths for handover control. The left path handles a successful handover preparation, while the right path handles an error scenario. Both paths lead to an IDLE state.](933a097f8f087e901730352801e25555_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet39(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; subgraph LeftPath [ ]; W1[Wait for Channel or Handover Number (SRNS Relocation)]; W2[Wait for Channel Allocation (SRNS Relocation)]; E1[ ] --> IuRF[IU-RELOCATION-FAILURE from RNS-B]; E1 --> R1[Release Resources in RNS-B]; W2 --> T801[Expiry T801]; T801 --> R2[Release Resources in RNS-B]; R1 --> M1[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-FAILURE] to 3G_MSC-A]; R2 --> M1; M1 --> IDLE1([IDLE]); end; subgraph RightPath [ ]; W3[Wait for Channel or Handover Number (SRNS Relocation)]; W4[Wait for Handover Number Allocation (SRNS Relocation)]; E2[ ] --> IuRR[IU-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B]; E2 --> E3[ERROR]; E3 --> I[Indication from VLR]; E3 --> M2[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] to 3G_MSC-A]; E3 --> C[Cancel Channel on RNS-B]; M2 --> IDLE2([IDLE]); C --> IDLE2; end; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. It consists of two main parallel paths. The left path starts with 'Wait for Channel or Handover Number (SRNS Relocation)' and 'Wait for Channel Allocation (SRNS Relocation)'. If an 'IU-RELOCATION-FAILURE from RNS-B' occurs, resources are released in RNS-B. If the 'Expiry T801' timer expires, resources are also released in RNS-B. Both resource release actions lead to sending a 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-FAILURE] to 3G\_MSC-A', which then leads to the 'IDLE' state. The right path starts with 'Wait for Channel or Handover Number (SRNS Relocation)' and 'Wait for Handover Number Allocation (SRNS Relocation)'. If an 'IU-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B' occurs, an 'ERROR' state is reached. From the 'ERROR' state, an 'Indication from VLR' is sent, a 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [MAP ERROR] to 3G\_MSC-A' is sent, and the channel is cancelled on RNS-B. Both the response and the cancellation lead to the 'IDLE' state. + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing two parallel paths for handover control. The left path handles a successful handover preparation, while the right path handles an error scenario. Both paths lead to an IDLE state. + +Figure 44 (sheet 39 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO. The process starts with 'Wait for Connection from 3G_MSC-A (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) Success path: I_CONNECT (IAM) from 3G_MSC-A -> Reset T810 -> MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B -> Set T804 -> I_COMPLETE (ACM) to 3G_MSC-A -> Wait for access by UE on RNS-B (SRNS Relocation). 2) Error/Timeout path: Expiry T810 -> Cancel MAP Procedures -> Release Radio Resources on RNS-B -> IDLE. 3) Abort path: Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B -> MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A -> Cancel MAP Procedures -> To 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B. A 'Cancel MAP Procedures' block from the middle also leads to the abort path. A note 'e.g. MAP-ABORT from 3G_MSC-A' is associated with the abort path.](a9858b877d4da8ec2e81be7a7a50dd00_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet40(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Basic SRNS Relocation from 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B +Circuit Connection required + +``` +graph TD; Start[Wait for Connection from 3G_MSC-A (SRNS Relocation)] --> I_CONNECT[I_CONNECT (IAM) from 3G_MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)]; Start --> Expiry[Expiry T810]; Start --> Iu_RELEASE[Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B]; I_CONNECT --> Reset[Reset T810]; Reset --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B]; MAP_SEND --> Set_T804[Set T804]; Set_T804 --> I_COMPLETE[I_COMPLETE (ACM) to 3G_MSC-A]; I_COMPLETE --> Wait_UE[Wait for access by UE on RNS-B (SRNS Relocation)]; Expiry --> Cancel_1[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel_1 --> Release[Release Radio Resources on RNS-B]; Release --> IDLE[IDLE]; Iu_RELEASE --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A]; MAP_PAS --> Cancel_2[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel_2 --> To_MSC_A[To 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B]; Cancel_1 --> Cancel_3[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel_3 --> To_MSC_A; Note[e.g. MAP-ABORT from 3G_MSC-A] -.-> To_MSC_A; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO. The process starts with 'Wait for Connection from 3G\_MSC-A (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) Success path: I\_CONNECT (IAM) from 3G\_MSC-A -> Reset T810 -> MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B -> Set T804 -> I\_COMPLETE (ACM) to 3G\_MSC-A -> Wait for access by UE on RNS-B (SRNS Relocation). 2) Error/Timeout path: Expiry T810 -> Cancel MAP Procedures -> Release Radio Resources on RNS-B -> IDLE. 3) Abort path: Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B -> MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-A -> Cancel MAP Procedures -> To 3G\_MSC-A in 3G\_MSC-B. A 'Cancel MAP Procedures' block from the middle also leads to the abort path. A note 'e.g. MAP-ABORT from 3G\_MSC-A' is associated with the abort path. + +Figure 44 (sheet 40 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing handover control between RNS-B, 3G_MSC-A, and 3G_MSC-B. The diagram includes lifelines for RNS-B, 3G_MSC-A, and 3G_MSC-B. It details the flow of messages such as IU-RELOCATION-COMPLETE, IU-RELEASE-REQUEST, MAP-PAS req, I_DISCONNECT (REL), ANM, I_ANSWER (ANM), MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req, and various timers and resource management steps.](a2763753bfc5fc69f0694c695973cd40_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO** Sheet41(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant RNS-B + participant 3G_MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC-B + + Note left of RNS-B: Wait for access by UE on RNS-B (SRNS Relocation) + RNS-B->>3G_MSC-A: IU-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B + RNS-B->>3G_MSC-A: IU-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B + Note right of 3G_MSC-A: Expiry T804 + Note right of 3G_MSC-A: from 3G_MSC-A + Note right of 3G_MSC-A: Cancel MAP Procedure + Note right of 3G_MSC-A: Reset T804 + Note right of 3G_MSC-A: Release Resources on RNS-B + Note right of 3G_MSC-A: Wait for Disconnect (SRNS Relocation) + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-B: MAP-PAS req [IU_IREL-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-B: I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-A + Note left of 3G_MSC-B: Reset T804 + Note left of 3G_MSC-B: ANM Sent? + Note left of 3G_MSC-B: I_ANSWER (ANM) to 3G_MSC-A + Note left of 3G_MSC-B: to 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B + Note left of 3G_MSC-B: Cancel MAP Procedures + Note left of 3G_MSC-B: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [IU_RLC-COMPLETE] to 3G_MSC-A + Note left of 3G_MSC-B: Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN) + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-B: I_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G_MSC-A + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-B: IU-RELOCATION-DETECT from RNS-B + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-B: I_ANSWER (ANM) to 3G_MSC-A + 3G_MSC-A->>RNS-B: MAP-PAS req [IU-RLC-DETECT] to 3G_MSC-A + Note right of RNS-B: Wait for access by UE on RNS-B (SRNS Relocation) + RNS-B->>3G_MSC-A: Release Resources on RNS-B + Note right of 3G_MSC-A: IDLE + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing handover control between RNS-B, 3G\_MSC-A, and 3G\_MSC-B. The diagram includes lifelines for RNS-B, 3G\_MSC-A, and 3G\_MSC-B. It details the flow of messages such as IU-RELOCATION-COMPLETE, IU-RELEASE-REQUEST, MAP-PAS req, I\_DISCONNECT (REL), ANM, I\_ANSWER (ANM), MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req, and various timers and resource management steps. + +Figure 44 (sheet 41 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![SDL diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing the handover control logic in 3G_MSC-B. The diagram includes states like 'Call in Progress', 'Wait for Disconnect', and 'IDLE', and messages like 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL', 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST', and 'I_DISCONNECT'.](d1203e87a330a98abf08c99d65e5a24b_img.jpg) + +Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO +Sheet42(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` + + graph TD + Start([Call in Progress +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)]) --> Forward[/Forward Messages +to UE/] + Forward --> Split{ } + + Split --> MAP_Send[< MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. +from 3G_MSC-A] + Split --> Iu_Rel_Req[< Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST +from RNS-A] + + Iu_Rel_Req --> MAP_PAS[/MAP-PAS req. +[IU-IREL-REQUEST] +to 3G_MSC-A/] + MAP_PAS --> Cancel_MAP[/Cancel MAP +Procedures/] + + MAP_Send --> Join1{ } + Cancel_MAP --> Join1 + + Join1 --> Release_Res[/Releas Resources +in RNS-A/] + Join1 --> I_Disc_From[< I_DISCONNECT +(REL) from 3G_MSC-A] + + Release_Res --> Disconnected_Dec{3G_MSC-A +disconnected?} + Disconnected_Dec -- Yes --> Conn12((12)) + Disconnected_Dec -- No --> Wait_Disc([Wait for +Disconnect]) + + Wait_Disc --> I_Disc_Wait[< I_DISCONNECT +(REL) from 3G_MSC-A] + I_Disc_Wait --> Idle1([IDLE]) + + I_Disc_From --> Cancel_MAP2[/Cancel MAP +Procedures/] + Cancel_MAP2 -- from 3G_MSC-A --> Release_Res2[/Release Resources +in RNS-A/] + Release_Res2 --> Iu_Reloc[< Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED +from RNS-A] + Iu_Reloc --> I_Disc_To[/I_DISCONNECT +(REL) to 3G_MSC-A/] + + I_Disc_To --> Conn12 + + %% Other paths + Split --> Call_Prog2([Call in Progress +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)]) + Split --> Idle2([IDLE]) + +``` + +The SDL diagram illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. It starts from a state of 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. Messages are forwarded to the UE. The process then handles concurrent signals: a 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL' response from 3G\_MSC-A and an 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST' from RNS-A. The latter leads to a 'MAP-PAS' request to 3G\_MSC-A and cancellation of MAP procedures. Resources in RNS-A are released, and an 'I\_DISCONNECT' is received from 3G\_MSC-A. If 3G\_MSC-A is disconnected, the process moves to connector 12. If not, it waits for disconnect, receives the 'I\_DISCONNECT', and enters the IDLE state. Another branch shows 'Cancel MAP Procedures' triggered from 3G\_MSC-A, leading to resource release, 'Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED' from RNS-A, and 'I\_DISCONNECT' to 3G\_MSC-A, eventually reaching connector 12. + +SDL diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing the handover control logic in 3G\_MSC-B. The diagram includes states like 'Call in Progress', 'Wait for Disconnect', and 'IDLE', and messages like 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL', 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST', and 'I\_DISCONNECT'. + +**Figure 44 (sheet 42 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B** + +![Flowchart for Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing handover control logic.](00bb8c9fd2ec7fa7da34a98f824468b6_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Sheet43(54) + +``` +graph TD; Start((12)) --> D1{Known 3G_MSC?}; D1 -- No --> D2{Send Reject?}; D1 -- Yes --> D3{Which 3G_MSC?}; D3 -- "3G_MSC-A/3G_MSC-B'" --> P1[MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER req. [IU-RLC-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A]; D3 -- MSC-B --> D4{Known RNS?}; D4 -- No --> D5{Resources on RNS-B?}; D4 -- Yes --> D5; D5 -- No --> D2; D5 -- Yes --> End1((13)); P1 --> S1[Set T811]; S1 --> End2{{Wait for Response (SRNS Relocation)}}; D2 -- No --> D6{Circuit Connection?}; D2 -- Yes --> P2[lu-RELOCATION-PREPARATION-FAILURE to RNS-A]; P2 --> D6; D6 -- No --> End3{{UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)}}; D6 -- Yes --> End4{{Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)}}; D2 --> End5((11)); D5 --> End5; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. It begins at connector 12 and checks if the 3G\_MSC is known. If not, it proceeds to 'Send Reject?'. If known, it checks which 3G\_MSC (3G\_MSC-A/3G\_MSC-B' or MSC-B) is involved. For 3G\_MSC-A/3G\_MSC-B', it sends a MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER request to 3G\_MSC-A, sets timer T811, and waits for a response. For MSC-B, it checks if the RNS is known. If not, it checks for resources on RNS-B. If resources are not available, it proceeds to 'Send Reject?'. If resources are available, it proceeds to connector 13. If the RNS is known, it proceeds directly to 'Resources on RNS-B?'. From 'Send Reject?', if the answer is No, it checks the circuit connection. If the circuit connection is No, the UE is on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN). If the circuit connection is Yes, the call is in progress on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN). If the answer to 'Send Reject?' is Yes, it sends an lu-RELOCATION-PREPARATION-FAILURE message to RNS-A and then checks the circuit connection. Both connectors 11 and 13 lead back to the 'Resources on RNS-B?' decision point. + +Flowchart for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing handover control logic. + +Figure 44 (sheet 43 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![SDL diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing handover control logic. The process starts at connector 13, sends a relocation request to RNS-B, and waits for a channel. It handles success (ACK), failure, or timeout (T801 expiry). Success leads to location reporting checks, relocation commands to RNS-A, and setting T802. Failures lead to resource release or MAP procedure cancellation, ending at connector 11 or a disconnect wait state.](524bf86b6b42612b7ec0d0a04b04a708_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO** + +Sheet44(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +SRNS Relocation from RNS-A to RNS-B on 3G\_MSC-B + +``` + + graph TD + Start((13)) --> Req[Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST to RNS-B] + Req --> SetT801[Set T801] + SetT801 --> WaitChannel{Wait for Channel +SRNS Relocation} + + WaitChannel -- Iu-RELOCATION-REQUEST-ACK from RNS-B --> ResetT801[Reset T801] + ResetT801 --> Queue[Queue Messages in 3G_MSC-B] + Queue --> LocRep{Location Reporting} + + LocRep -- Supported --> LocCtrl[Iu-LOCATION REPORTING CONTROL to RNS-B] + LocCtrl --> RelocCmd[Relocation Command to RNS-A] + LocRep -- Not supported --> RelocCmd + + RelocCmd --> SetHO[Set Up Handover Device] + SetHO --> SetT802[Set T802] + SetT802 --> WaitUE{Wait for access by UE +SRNS Relocation} + + WaitChannel -- Expiry T801 --> ResetT801_2[Reset T801] + WaitChannel -- Iu-RELOCATION-FAILURE from RNS-B --> ResetT801_2 + ResetT801_2 --> ReleaseRNSB[Release Resources on RNS-B] + ReleaseRNSB --> End11((11)) + + WaitChannel -- Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A --> MAPReq[MAP-PAS req [IU-IREL-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A] + MAPReq --> CancelMAP[Cancel MAP Procedures] + CancelMAP --> ToMSCA[To 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B] + ToMSCA --> End11 + + WaitChannel -- MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A --> CancelChan[Cancel Channel request on RNS-B] + CancelChan --> ReleaseRNSA[Release Resources on RNS-A] + ReleaseRNSA --> WaitDisc{Wait for Disconnect +SRNS Relocation} + +``` + +SDL diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing handover control logic. The process starts at connector 13, sends a relocation request to RNS-B, and waits for a channel. It handles success (ACK), failure, or timeout (T801 expiry). Success leads to location reporting checks, relocation commands to RNS-A, and setting T802. Failures lead to resource release or MAP procedure cancellation, ending at connector 11 or a disconnect wait state. + +**Figure 44 (sheet 44 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B** + +![Flowchart of handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for access by UE (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) 'Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B' leads to 'Reset T802', then a decision 'Have security algorithms been changed?'. If 'Yes', it checks the 'Protocol on E-interface' (BSSMAP or RANAP) and sends a 'MAP-PAS req.' to 3G_MSC-A. If 'No', it checks 'Circuit Connection?'. If 'Yes', it performs 'Connect Handover Device (Optional)', 'Forward queued messages via RNS-B', and 'Release Resources in RNS-A'. A subsequent 'Circuit Connection?' decision leads to either 'Release Handover Device' or 'UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 2) 'Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT from RNS-B' leads directly to a 'Circuit Connection?' decision. If 'Yes', it performs 'Connect Handover Device (Optional)' and returns to the initial wait state. 3) 'Iu-RELOCATION CANCEL from RNS-A' leads to 'Reset T802', 'Forward queued messages via RNS-A', and 'Release Resources in RNS-B'. A 'Circuit Connection?' decision follows, leading to either 'Release Handover Device' or 'Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'.](ca2740c55eeb32272b09a48cdfb7ee4d_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet45(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD + Start([Wait for access by UE +(SRNS Relocation)]) --> Join(( )) + Join --> IuComplete[Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE +from RNS-B] + Join --> IuDetect[Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT +from RNS-B] + Join --> IuCancel[Iu-RELOCATION CANCEL +from RNS-A] + + IuComplete --> Reset1[Reset T802] + Reset1 --> SecChanged{Have security algorithms +been changed?} + SecChanged -- No --> CircuitConn1{Circuit Connection?} + SecChanged -- Yes --> Protocol{Protocol +on E-interface} + Protocol -- BSSMAP --> MAP1[MAP-PAS req. +[A-HO-PERFORMED] +to 3G_MSC-A] + Protocol -- RANAP --> MAP2[MAP-PAS req. +[Iu-LOC-REPORT] +to 3G_MSC-A] + MAP1 --> CircuitConn1 + MAP2 --> CircuitConn1 + + CircuitConn1 -- No --> Forward1[Forward queued +messages +via RNS-B] + Forward1 --> Release1[Release Resources +in RNS-A] + Release1 --> CircuitConn2{Circuit Connection?} + CircuitConn2 -- Yes --> ReleaseHandover1[Release Handover Device] + CircuitConn2 -- No --> UE1([UE +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)]) + ReleaseHandover1 --> CallInProg1([Call in Progress +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)]) + + IuDetect --> CircuitConn3{Circuit Connection?} + CircuitConn3 -- Yes --> Connect1[Connect Handover Device +(Optional)] + Connect1 --> Join + CircuitConn3 -- No --> Forward1 + + IuCancel --> Reset2[Reset T802] + Reset2 --> Forward2[Forward queued +messages +via RNS-A] + Forward2 --> Release2[Release Resources +in RNS-B] + Release2 --> CircuitConn4{Circuit Connection?} + CircuitConn4 -- Yes --> ReleaseHandover2[Release Handover Device] + CircuitConn4 -- No --> UE2([UE +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)]) + ReleaseHandover2 --> CallInProg2([Call in Progress +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)]) +``` + +Flowchart of handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for access by UE (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into three main paths: 1) 'Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B' leads to 'Reset T802', then a decision 'Have security algorithms been changed?'. If 'Yes', it checks the 'Protocol on E-interface' (BSSMAP or RANAP) and sends a 'MAP-PAS req.' to 3G\_MSC-A. If 'No', it checks 'Circuit Connection?'. If 'Yes', it performs 'Connect Handover Device (Optional)', 'Forward queued messages via RNS-B', and 'Release Resources in RNS-A'. A subsequent 'Circuit Connection?' decision leads to either 'Release Handover Device' or 'UE on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. 2) 'Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT from RNS-B' leads directly to a 'Circuit Connection?' decision. If 'Yes', it performs 'Connect Handover Device (Optional)' and returns to the initial wait state. 3) 'Iu-RELOCATION CANCEL from RNS-A' leads to 'Reset T802', 'Forward queued messages via RNS-A', and 'Release Resources in RNS-B'. A 'Circuit Connection?' decision follows, leading to either 'Release Handover Device' or 'Call in Progress on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. + +Figure 44 (sheet 45 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing handover control logic for 3G_MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for access by UE (SRNS Relocation)' and branches based on 'iu-RELEASE-REQUEST' messages from RNS-B and RNS-A, leading to resource releases, MAP signaling, and final IDLE or wait states.](07ccb21f70641797dd02a891ced72b7e_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO** Sheet46(54) + +*Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B* + +``` + +graph TD + Start([Wait for access by UE +(SRNS Relocation)]) --> ExpiryT802{Expiry T802} + ExpiryT802 --> R1[ ] + R1 --> R1a[iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B] + R1a --> R1b[ ] + R1b --> R1c{Release Resources in RNS-B} + R1c --> R1d{Release Handover Device} + R1d --> R1e[ ] + R1e --> R1f[MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A] + R1f --> R1g{Cancel MAP Procedures} + R1g --> R1h[To 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B] + R1h --> R1i[ ] + R1i --> R1j[I_DISCONNECT (REL) to 3G_MSC-A] + R1j --> R1k[ ] + R1k --> R1l([IDLE]) + + ExpiryT802 --> R2[ ] + R2 --> R2a[iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A] + R2a --> R2b[ ] + R2b --> R2c{Release Resources in RNS-A} + R2c --> R2d{Wait for access by UE?} + R2d -- Yes --> R2e[ ] + R2d -- No --> R2f[ ] + R2f --> R2g[MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A] + R2g --> R2h{Cancel MAP Procedures} + R2h --> R2i[To 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B] + R2i --> R2j[ ] + R2j --> R2k{Release Resources in RNS-B} + R2k --> R2l([Wait for Disconnect +(SRNS Relocation)]) + + R1c --> R3[ ] + R3 --> R3a[iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B] + R3a --> R3b[ ] + R3b --> R3c{Release Resources in RNS-B} + R3c --> R3d([Wait for access by UE +(SRNS Relocation)]) + + R2c --> R4[ ] + R4 --> R4a[ ] + R4a --> R4b[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A] + R4b --> R4c[ ] + R4c --> R4d{Release Resources in RNS-B and RNS-A} + R4d --> R4e{Release Handover Device} + R4e --> R4f[ ] + R4f --> R4g([Wait for access by UE +(SRNS Relocation)]) + +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing handover control logic for 3G\_MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for access by UE (SRNS Relocation)' and branches based on 'iu-RELEASE-REQUEST' messages from RNS-B and RNS-A, leading to resource releases, MAP signaling, and final IDLE or wait states. + +Figure 44 (sheet 46 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing interactions between 3G_MSC-A, 3G_MSC-B, RNS-A, and RNS-B. The diagram includes steps for MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER, Relocation Command, Reset T811, Set T804, Release Resources, MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL, MAP-PAS, Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST, Cancel MAP Procedures, and final wait states for Ack and Disconnect.](e4b6ed98fad76b79cb9f85783e13086a_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet47(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-BSubsequent SRNS Relocation from 3G\_MSC-B to 3G\_MSC-A + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant 3G_MSC_A as 3G_MSC-A + participant 3G_MSC_B as 3G_MSC-B + participant RNS_A as RNS-A + participant RNS_B as RNS-B + + Note right of 3G_MSC_A: Wait for Response (SRNS Relocation) + 3G_MSC_A->>RNS_A: MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-REQUEST-ACK] from 3G_MSC-A + RNS_A->>3G_MSC_A: Relocation Command to RNS-A + 3G_MSC_A->>RNS_A: Set T804 + RNS_A->>3G_MSC_A: Wait for Ack. from 3G_MSC-A (SRNS Relocation) + 3G_MSC_B->>RNS_B: Reset T811 + RNS_B->>3G_MSC_B: Release Resources in RNS-B + 3G_MSC_B->>RNS_B: Reset T811 + 3G_MSC_A->>3G_MSC_B: MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER resp. [IU-RLC-FAILURE or MAP ERROR] from 3G_MSC-A + Note right of 3G_MSC_A: Expiry T811 + 3G_MSC_A->>RNS_A: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A + 3G_MSC_B->>RNS_A: in 3G_MSC-B to 3G_MSC-A + RNS_A->>3G_MSC_B: MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A + 3G_MSC_B->>RNS_A: Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A + RNS_A->>3G_MSC_B: Cancel MAP Procedures + RNS_A->>3G_MSC_A: Release Resources in RNS-A + 3G_MSC_A->>RNS_A: Wait for Disconnect (SRNS Relocation) + Note right of RNS_B: 11 +``` + +Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing interactions between 3G\_MSC-A, 3G\_MSC-B, RNS-A, and RNS-B. The diagram includes steps for MAP-PREPARE-SUBSEQUENT-HANDOVER, Relocation Command, Reset T811, Set T804, Release Resources, MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL, MAP-PAS, Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST, Cancel MAP Procedures, and final wait states for Ack and Disconnect. + +Figure 44 (sheet 47 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing various signaling paths and decision points for handover control.](9997ce2599510a8912ccac15865ae602_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet48(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start([Wait for Ack. from 3G_MSC-A (SRNS Relocation)]) --> J1(( )); J1 --> T1[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A]; J1 --> T2[Expire T804]; J1 --> T3[Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A]; J1 --> T4[ ]; J1 --> T5[Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A]; T1 --> R1[Reset T804]; T2 --> R2[Release Resources in RNS-A]; T3 --> R3[MAP-PAS req. [IU-IREL-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A]; T4 --> R4[ ]; T5 --> R5[Reset T804]; R1 --> R6[Release Resources in RNS-A]; R2 --> R7[Cancel MAP Procedures]; R3 --> R8[ ]; R4 --> R9[Release Resources in RNS-A]; R5 --> R10[ ]; R6 --> D1{Circuit Connection?}; R7 --> D1; R8 --> D2[ ]; R9 --> D2; R10 --> R11[MAP-PAS req. [IU-RLC-FAILURE] to 3G_MSC-A]; R11 --> D3{Circuit Connection?}; D1 -- No --> E1([IDLE]); D1 -- Yes --> E2([Wait for Disconnect (SRNS Relocation)]); D2 -- No --> E3([IDLE]); D2 -- Yes --> E4([Wait for Disconnect (SRNS Relocation)]); D3 -- No --> E5([UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]); D3 -- Yes --> E6([Call in Progress on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]); +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. It begins with a wait state for an acknowledgment from 3G\_MSC-A (SRNS Relocation). From this state, five main paths emerge: 1) Receiving a MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL response from 3G\_MSC-A, which leads to resetting timer T804 and releasing resources in RNS-A. 2) Timer T804 expiration, leading to resource release in RNS-A and cancellation of MAP procedures. 3) Receiving an Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A, leading to sending a MAP-PAS request (IU-IREL-REQUEST) to 3G\_MSC-A. 4) A null transition leading to resource release in RNS-A and cancellation of MAP procedures. 5) Receiving an Iu-RELOCATION-CANCEL from RNS-A, leading to resetting timer T804. Subsequent decision points for 'Circuit Connection?' determine the final state: IDLE, Wait for Disconnect (SRNS Relocation), or UE on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN). + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing various signaling paths and decision points for handover control. + +Figure 44 (sheet 48 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing the handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for UE on RNS-B (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into two main paths. The left path is for successful handover: 'Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B' -> 'Reset T804' -> 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [IU-RLC-COMPLETE] to 3G_MSC-A' -> 'UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. The right path is for error handling: 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B' -> 'MAP-PAS req [IU-IREL-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A' -> 'Cancel MAP Procedures' -> 'to 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B' -> 'Release Resources on RNS-B' -> 'IDLE'. There is also an 'Expiry T804' timer and a 'Cancel MAP Procedure' box receiving input 'from 3G_MSC-A'.](d1aa8db844a6bb8519d74e48d1cf5343_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO** Sheet49(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +Basic SRNS Relocation from 3G\_MSC-A to 3G\_MSC-B +no Circuit Connection required + +``` + +graph TD + Start([Wait for UE on RNS-B +(SRNS Relocation)]) --> Join(( )) + Join --> IuRelocComplete[Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE +from RNS-B] + Join --> IuReleaseReq[Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST +from RNS-B] + IuRelocComplete --> ResetT804[Reset T804] + ResetT804 --> MapSendEndSignal[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. +[IU-RLC-COMPLETE] +to 3G_MSC-A] + MapSendEndSignal --> UEOn3G[UE on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)] + IuReleaseReq --> MapPasReq1[MAP-PAS req +[IU-IREL-REQUEST] +to 3G_MSC-A] + MapPasReq1 --> CancelMapProc[Cancel MAP Procedures] + CancelMapProc --> To3G_MSC_A[to 3G_MSC-A +in 3G_MSC-B] + To3G_MSC_A --> ReleaseResources[Release Resources +on RNS-B] + ReleaseResources --> Idle([IDLE]) + IuReleaseReq --> ExpiryT804{Expiry T804} + From3G_MSC_A[from 3G_MSC-A] --> CancelMapProc2[Cancel MAP Procedure] + ExpiryT804 --> CancelMapProc2 + CancelMapProc2 --> ReleaseResources + MapPasReq1 --> IuRelocDetect[Iu-RELOCATION-DETECT +from RNS-B] + IuRelocDetect --> MapPasReq2[MAP-PAS req. +[IU-RLC-DETECT] +to 3G_MSC-A] + MapPasReq2 --> WaitUE[Wait for UE on RNS-B +(SRNS Relocation)] + +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for UE on RNS-B (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into two main paths. The left path is for successful handover: 'Iu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE from RNS-B' -> 'Reset T804' -> 'MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL req. [IU-RLC-COMPLETE] to 3G\_MSC-A' -> 'UE on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. The right path is for error handling: 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-B' -> 'MAP-PAS req [IU-IREL-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-A' -> 'Cancel MAP Procedures' -> 'to 3G\_MSC-A in 3G\_MSC-B' -> 'Release Resources on RNS-B' -> 'IDLE'. There is also an 'Expiry T804' timer and a 'Cancel MAP Procedure' box receiving input 'from 3G\_MSC-A'. + +Figure 44 (sheet 49 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing handover control between UE, RNS-A, RNS-B, and 3G_MSC-A.](d33209b2cda1d21b3db2a2b0382a4c05_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet50(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE as UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN) + participant RNS_A as RNS-A + participant RNS_B as RNS-B + participant MSC_A as 3G_MSC-A + + Note left of UE: Forward Messages to UE + UE->>RNS_B: + RNS_A->>RNS_B: Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED from RNS-A + RNS_B->>MSC_A: MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER req. [NULL] [IU-RASG-REQUEST] from 3G_MSC-A + MSC_A->>RNS_B: MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A + RNS_B->>UE: Release Resources in RNS-B + RNS_B->>MSC_A: MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER req. to VLR + RNS_B->>RNS_A: Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST to RNS-A + RNS_B->>UE: Wait for Assignment or Handover Number (SRNS Relocation) + RNS_B->>12: + UE->>RNS_B: + RNS_B->>UE: IDLE +``` + +The diagram illustrates the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. It begins with the UE on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN) sending a message to RNS-B. Simultaneously, RNS-A sends an Iu-RELOCATION-REQUIRED message to RNS-B. RNS-B then sends a MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER request (containing NULL and IU-RASG-REQUEST) to 3G\_MSC-A. 3G\_MSC-A responds with a MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL message to RNS-B. RNS-B releases resources in RNS-B and sends a MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER request to the VLR. It also sends an Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-REQUEST to RNS-A. RNS-B then enters a 'Wait for Assignment or Handover Number (SRNS Relocation)' state. A connector labeled '12' leads from RNS-B. The UE sends another message to RNS-B, which responds with an IDLE message. A note indicates 'Forward Messages to UE'. + +Sequence diagram for Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing handover control between UE, RNS-A, RNS-B, and 3G\_MSC-A. + +Figure 44 (sheet 50 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for Assignment or Handover Number (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into two parallel paths. The left path receives 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE from RNS-A', followed by 'Wait for Handover Number Allocation', then 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR'. The right path receives 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR', followed by 'Wait for Assignment (SRNS Relocation)', then 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE from RNS-A'. Both paths converge to a merge point, which leads to 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [IU-RASG-COMPLETE] to 3G_MSC-A', then 'Set T810', and finally 'Wait for Connect from 3G_MSC-A (SRNS Relocation)'.](69e2cabe4d7ea5d5fb8f98661cacdda3_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO** Sheet51(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B      Circuit Connection Establishment on 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start[Wait for Assignment or Handover Number (SRNS Relocation)] --> Merge1(( )); Merge1 --> LeftPath[ ]; Merge1 --> RightPath[ ]; LeftPath --> L1[Wait for Handover Number Allocation]; L1 --> L2[ ]; L2 --> L3[MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR]; RightPath --> R1[Wait for Assignment (SRNS Relocation)]; R1 --> R2[ ]; R2 --> R3[Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE from RNS-A]; L3 --> Merge2(( )); R3 --> Merge2; Merge2 --> MAP[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [IU-RASG-COMPLETE] to 3G_MSC-A]; MAP --> Set[Set T810]; Set --> End[Wait for Connect from 3G_MSC-A (SRNS Relocation)]; +``` + +Flowchart of handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. The process starts with 'Wait for Assignment or Handover Number (SRNS Relocation)'. It branches into two parallel paths. The left path receives 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE from RNS-A', followed by 'Wait for Handover Number Allocation', then 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR'. The right path receives 'MAP-ALLOCATE-HANDOVER-NUMBER resp. from VLR', followed by 'Wait for Assignment (SRNS Relocation)', then 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE from RNS-A'. Both paths converge to a merge point, which leads to 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. [Handover Number] [IU-RASG-COMPLETE] to 3G\_MSC-A', then 'Set T810', and finally 'Wait for Connect from 3G\_MSC-A (SRNS Relocation)'. + +Figure 44 (sheet 51 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![SDL diagram showing the handover control procedure in 3G_MSC-B. It details various states like 'Wait for Assignment' and 'Wait for Handover Number Allocation', and the signals exchanged such as 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE', 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER', and 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST'. The flow leads to either a UE state on 3G_MSC-B or an IDLE state after releasing resources.](b10773c5223053f543c2f978197d4882_img.jpg) + +**Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO** Sheet52(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` + + graph TD + %% States + S1(Wait for Assignment +($SRNS Relocation)) + S2(Wait for Handover +Number Allocation +($SRNS Relocation)) + S3(Wait for Assignment +($SRNS Relocation)) + S4(Wait for Assignment +or Handover Number +($SRNS Relocation)) + S5(Wait for Assignment +or Handover Number +($SRNS Relocation)) + S6(Wait for Assignment +or Handover Number +($SRNS Relocation)) + S7(Wait for Handover +Number Allocation +($SRNS Relocation)) + + %% Inputs/Outputs Path 1 + S4 -- Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE with +Unsuccessful result from RNS-B --> O1[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. +[IU-RASG-RESPONSE] +to 3G_MSC-A] + O1 --> UE_STATE([UE +on 3G_MSC-B +(UTRAN)]) + + %% Path 2 + S5 -- ERROR --> O2[MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER resp. +[MAP ERROR] +to 3G_MSC-A] + S2 -- Indication from +VLR --> O2 + + %% Path 3 + S6 -- MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. +from 3G_MSC-A --> P1{ } + S7 -- MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. +from 3G_MSC-A --> P1 + P1 -- Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST +from RNS-A --> O3[MAP-PAS req. +[IU-IREL-REQUEST] +to 3G_MSC-A] + O3 -- to 3G_MSC-A +and VLR-B --> T1[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + T1 -- to VLR-B --> T2[Cancel MAP +Procedures] + T2 --> T3[Release +Resources +in RNS-A] + T3 --> IDLE([IDLE]) + +``` + +SDL diagram showing the handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B. It details various states like 'Wait for Assignment' and 'Wait for Handover Number Allocation', and the signals exchanged such as 'Iu-RAB-ASSIGNMENT-RESPONSE', 'MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER', and 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST'. The flow leads to either a UE state on 3G\_MSC-B or an IDLE state after releasing resources. + +**Figure 44 (sheet 52 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B** + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing the handover control process. It starts with 'Wait for Connect from 3G_MSC-A (SRNS Relocation)'. From here, it branches into three main paths. Path 1 (Left): A box with an input arrow leads to 'I_CONNECT (IAM) from 3G_MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)'. Below this is 'Reset T810', which leads to a box with an output arrow leading to 'MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B'. This leads to another box with an output arrow leading to 'I_COMPLETE (ACM) to 3G_MSC-A', which finally leads to 'Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. Path 2 (Center): From the initial wait, it goes to 'Expiry T810', which leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures'. Below this is 'Release Radio Resources on RNS-A', which leads to 'IDLE'. Path 3 (Right): From the initial wait, it goes to a box with an input arrow leading to 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A'. Below this is a box with an output arrow leading to 'MAP-PAS req. [[IU-IREL-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A]'. This leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures', which leads to a dashed box 'to 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B'. A line from this dashed box connects to the 'Release Radio Resources on RNS-A' box in Path 2.](4faa0ca1a17f1e12f0a9ca7f8ffda2c9_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet53(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start[Wait for Connect from 3G_MSC-A (SRNS Relocation)]; Start --> I_CONNECT[I_CONNECT (IAM) from 3G_MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)]; Start --> Expiry[Expiry T810]; Start --> Iu_RELEASE[Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A]; I_CONNECT --> Reset[Reset T810]; Reset --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B]; MAP_SEND --> I_COMPLETE[I_COMPLETE (ACM) to 3G_MSC-A]; I_COMPLETE --> Call[Call on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]; Expiry --> Cancel1[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel1 --> Release[Release Radio Resources on RNS-A]; Release --> IDLE[IDLE]; Iu_RELEASE --> MAP_PAS[MAP-PAS req. [[IU-IREL-REQUEST] to 3G_MSC-A]]; MAP_PAS --> Cancel2[Cancel MAP Procedures]; Cancel2 --> To3G_MSCA[to 3G_MSC-A in 3G_MSC-B]; To3G_MSCA --> Release; +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing the handover control process. It starts with 'Wait for Connect from 3G\_MSC-A (SRNS Relocation)'. From here, it branches into three main paths. Path 1 (Left): A box with an input arrow leads to 'I\_CONNECT (IAM) from 3G\_MSC-A (Uses Handover No.)'. Below this is 'Reset T810', which leads to a box with an output arrow leading to 'MAP-SEND-HANDOVER-REPORT resp. to VLR-B'. This leads to another box with an output arrow leading to 'I\_COMPLETE (ACM) to 3G\_MSC-A', which finally leads to 'Call on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN)'. Path 2 (Center): From the initial wait, it goes to 'Expiry T810', which leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures'. Below this is 'Release Radio Resources on RNS-A', which leads to 'IDLE'. Path 3 (Right): From the initial wait, it goes to a box with an input arrow leading to 'Iu-RELEASE-REQUEST from RNS-A'. Below this is a box with an output arrow leading to 'MAP-PAS req. [[IU-IREL-REQUEST] to 3G\_MSC-A]'. This leads to 'Cancel MAP Procedures', which leads to a dashed box 'to 3G\_MSC-A in 3G\_MSC-B'. A line from this dashed box connects to the 'Release Radio Resources on RNS-A' box in Path 2. + +Figure 44 (sheet 53 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +![Flowchart of Procedure 3G_MSC_B_HO showing three possible outcomes from a 'Wait for Connect' state: 1) I_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G_MSC-A leads to UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN); 2) MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A leads to Release Resources on RNS-A and then IDLE; 3) from 3G_MSC-A leads to Cancel MAP Procedure, Release Resources on RNS-A, and then IDLE.](b7ad33d883b9848a765e0abcc9ddc938_img.jpg) + +### Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO + +Sheet54(54) + +Procedures for Handover in 3G\_MSC-B + +``` +graph TD; Start[Wait for Connect from 3G_MSC-A (SRNS Relocation)]; Start --> I_DISCONNECT[I_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G_MSC-A]; Start --> MAP_SEND[MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G_MSC-A]; Start --> FROM_3G_MSC_A[from 3G_MSC-A]; I_DISCONNECT --> UE[UE on 3G_MSC-B (UTRAN)]; MAP_SEND --> Release1{Release Resources on RNS-A}; Release1 --> IDLE1([IDLE]); FROM_3G_MSC_A --> Cancel[Cancel MAP Procedure]; Cancel --> Release2{Release Resources on RNS-A}; Release2 --> IDLE2([IDLE]); +``` + +Flowchart of Procedure 3G\_MSC\_B\_HO showing three possible outcomes from a 'Wait for Connect' state: 1) I\_DISCONNECT (REL) from 3G\_MSC-A leads to UE on 3G\_MSC-B (UTRAN); 2) MAP-SEND-END-SIGNAL resp. from 3G\_MSC-A leads to Release Resources on RNS-A and then IDLE; 3) from 3G\_MSC-A leads to Cancel MAP Procedure, Release Resources on RNS-A, and then IDLE. + +Figure 44 (sheet 54 of 54): Handover control procedure in 3G\_MSC-B + +# --- Annex A (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|-------------|-----|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| Apr 1999 | | | CR0
01r2 | | | | | +| CN#03 | | | CR0
03 | | | | 3.0.0 | +| CN#06 | | | CR0
04 | | | Introduction of UMTS functionalities in 23.009 | 3.1.0 | +| CN#7 | | | CR0
05 | | | Functional requirements for the use of RANAP over the E i/f | 3.2.0 | +| CN#7 | | | CR0
06 | | | | 3.2.0 | +| CN#7 | | | CR0
07 | | | | 3.2.0 | +| CN#7 | | | CR0
08r2 | | | Introduction of RANAP for intra-UMTS inter-MSC relocation | 3.2.0 | +| CN#7 | | | - | | | Clarifications of 3G_MSC-A and 3G_MSC-B roles | 3.2.0 | +| CN#7 | | | | | | Transcoder handling in the CN at inter-system handover and relocation | 3.2.0 | +| 15/05/00 | | | | | | Missing SDLs re-inserted by MCC for Figures 41 - 42 (GSM Handover control procedure in MSC-A and MSC-B) | 3.2.1 | +| | NP-08 | NP-000278 | 002 | 4 | | CR to 23.009 on Handover scenario for Multicall | 3.3.0 | +| | NP-08 | NP-000270 | 009 | | | Clean-up of 3G_MSC-A_HO SDLs | 3.3.0 | +| | NP-08 | NP-000270 | 010 | | | Clean-up of 3G_MSC-B_HO SDLs | 3.3.0 | +| | NP-09 | NP-000444 | 012 | 1 | | Correction to transcoder handling for R99 | 3.4.0 | +| | NP-10 | NP-000671 | 013 | | | GSM to UMTS Handover: Directed Retry | 3.5.0 | +| | NP-10 | NP-000671 | 014 | | | GSM to UMTS Handover: MAP parameter Target Cell ID | 3.5.0 | +| | NP-10 | NP-000724 | 015 | 2 | | GSM to UMTS Handover: Location Reporting in 3G MSC B | 3.5.0 | +| | NP-10 | NP-000671 | 016 | 1 | | Subsequent Handover procedure corrections | 3.5.0 | +| | NP-10 | NP-000671 | 017 | 3 | | Missing Subsequent Handover scenarios | 3.5.0 | +| | NP-10 | NP-000673 | 019 | | | Reference clean-up | 3.5.0 | +| | NP-10 | NP-000671 | 020 | 1 | | Indication of Intra-MSC Intersystem handover from 3G_MSC-B to MSC-A/3G_MSC-A | 3.5.0 | +| | NP-10 | NP-000671 | 021 | 1 | | UMTS to GSM handover: Directed Retry | 3.5.0 | +| | NP-11 | NP-010123 | 018 | 2 | | GSM to UMTS Handover: Location Reporting in 3G_MSC-B | 3.6.0 | +| | NP-11 | NP-010207 | 024 | | | GSM to UMTS handover: addition of MAP parameter Target RNC ID | 3.6.0 | +| | NP-11 | NP-010207 | 026 | | | Directed Retry procedure alignment | 3.6.0 | +| | NP-11 | NP-010161 | 022 | 2 | | Applicability of intra-3G_MSC SRNS Relocation | 4.0.0 | +| | NP-12 | NP-010270 | 035 | 3 | | Indication of Intra MSC handover from 3G_MSC-B to MSC-A/3G_MSC-A | 4.1.0 | +| | NP-13 | | 23.0
09 | 041 | | 4.2.0 | 4.1.0 | +| | NP-13 | NP-010495 | 047 | | | Correction of SDL figures in CRs 034 and 035 (N1-010913, N1-010914) | 4.2.0 | +| | NP-13 | NP-010494 | 049 | 1 | | Usage of Location Reporting for Relocation and Inter-system Handover | 4.2.0 | +| | NP-14 | NP-010651 | 055 | | | Multicall bearer selection | 4.3.0 | +| | NP-14 | NP-010682 | 057 | 2 | | Usage of Location Reporting for Relocation and Inter-system Handover | 4.3.0 | +| | NP-14 | NP-010682 | 060 | | | E-interface protocol during the supervision phase | 4.3.0 | +| | NP-14 | NP-010691 | 063 | 3 | | GSM to UMTS Handover: lu-LOCATION-REPORTING message reception | 4.3.0 | +| | NP-14 | NP-010659 | 052 | 3 | | Introduction of Intra Domain Connection of RAN | 5.0.0 | +| | NP-14 | NP-010661 | 061 | 4 | | Reflection of RRC changes in 44.018 to 23.009 | 5.0.0 | +| | NP-16 | NP-020243 | 066 | 2 | | Sending of RANAP Location Reporting Control on the E Interface | 5.1.0 | +| | NP-16 | NP-020218 | 071 | | | Clarification of the end of supervision after inter-MSC handover | 5.1.0 | +| | NP-16 | NP-020243 | 074 | 1 | | Clarification that Multicall is not supported in GERAN lu-mode | 5.1.0 | +| | NP-16 | NP-020218 | 077 | 1 | | Handling of Service Handover parameter in non-anchor | 5.1.0 | +| | NP-17 | NP-020383 | 080 | 1 | | Support for Shared Network Area | 5.2.0 | +| | | | | | | ETSI/MCC updated with correct release to references [2], [3], [4], [6], and [7]. | 5.3.0 | +| | NP-18 | NP-020549 | 083 | 2 | | MSC_A_HO SDL correction | 5.3.0 | +| | NP-18 | NP-020548 | 084 | 3 | | Inter-MSC relocation and intersystem handover for multiple codecs | 5.3.0 | +| | NP-18 | NP-020630 | 090 | | | Clarification of the protocol to be used on the E-interface | 5.3.0 | +| | NP-19 | NP-030041 | 093 | 1 | | Further clarification of the protocol to be used on the E-interface | 5.4.0 | +| | NP-20 | NP-030268 | 096 | 2 | | Correct text related to timer expiry for receipt of A-HANDOVER-COMPLETE / lu-RELOCATION-COMPLETE | 5.5.0 | +| | NP-20 | NP-030283 | 097 | 2 | | Addition of UESBI-lu to handover and relocation procedures | 5.5.0 | +| | NP-21 | NP-030417 | 099 | | | Correction to UESBI-lu definition | 5.6.0 | +| | NP-22 | NP-030473 | 101 | | | Correcting a mistake in previously approved category A of its Rel99 category F CR 091 Rev 1 in NP-030041 | 5.7.0 | +| | NP-23 | NP-040031 | 102 | 2 | | Renaming of the Available Codecs List to lu Supported Codecs List | 5.8.0 | + +| | | | | | | | | +|---------|---------|-----------|-----|---|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| | NP-26 | | | | | Rel-6 published after CN#26 | 6.0.0 | +| | CP-28 | CP-050071 | 104 | 2 | | Full RANAP support of network initiated SCUDIF | 6.1.0 | +| | CP-28 | CP-050072 | 105 | 1 | | Directed Retry Handover for Bearer Service | 6.1.0 | +| | CP-29 | CP-050443 | | | | Intra-3G_MSC-B handover/relocation interactions with other RANAP procedures | 6.2.0 | +| | CP-30 | CP-050536 | 109 | 5 | | Subsequent Inter-MSC handover/relocation interactions with other RANAP procedures | 6.3.0 | +| | CP-30 | CP-050536 | 113 | | | Correction to Intra-3G_MSC-B handover/relocation interactions with other RANAP procedures for the security mode control procedure | 6.3.0 | +| | CP-31 | | 115 | | | Clarification of directed retry handover failure cases | 6.4.0 | +| | CP-31 | CP-060108 | 011 | 9 | 1 | Aligning release 6 with release 5 | 6.4.0 | +| | CP-31 | CP-060113 | 012 | 0 | - | | | +| | CP-35 | | 012 | | | Misalignment With The Usage Of Iu-Selected Codec During Handover | 7.0.0 | +| | CP-42 | CP-070155 | 1 | 4 | | Correction of white-on-white text in 23.009 | 7.1.0 | +| | CP-42 | CP-080871 | 012 | 2 | | Enhanced SRNS relocation | 8.0.0 | +| | CP-42 | CP-080863 | 012 | 5 | 1 | Updates to TS 23.009 for AoIP | 8.0.0 | +| | CP-42 | CP-080833 | 012 | 6 | 1 | Adding SRVCC description | 8.0.0 | +| | CP-42 | CP-080868 | 012 | 7 | 3 | Editorial cleanup by MCC | 8.0.0 | +| | CP-42 | | | | | Added missing SDL source files | 8.0.1 | +| | CP-43 | CP-090161 | 012 | 8 | | Data Forwarding for Enhanced SRNS Relocation | 8.1.0 | +| | CP-45 | CP-090666 | 012 | 9 | 5 | AoIP - Clarification for the "BSS Internal Handover with MSC Support" procedure | 8.2.0 | +| | CP-46 | | | | | Automatic upgrade from Rel-8 | 9.0.0 | +| | CP-47 | CP-100135 | 013 | 1 | 5 | AoIP-MAP level codec negotiation changes | 9.1.0 | +| | CP-51 | CP-110174 | 013 | 2 | 1 | Correction of handling of AoIP Supported codec list | 9.2.0 | +| | CP-51 | CP-110203 | 013 | 4 | 1 | Introduction of LCLS functionality in TS 23.009 | 10.0.0 | +| | CP-53 | CP-110697 | 013 | 5 | 2 | Add description for MSC server enhanced for vSRVCC | 11.0.0 | +| | CP-57 | CP-120584 | 013 | 9 | 4 | Support of handover to a CSG cell | 11.1.0 | +| | CP-58 | CP-120900 | 014 | 8 | 2 | BSS-internal handover in AoIP mode with MSC support | 11.2.0 | +| | 2014-09 | - 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Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- 1 Scope + +This Technical Specification specifies the stage 2 description of the Fraud Information Gathering System (FIGS) feature which provides the means for the HPLMN to monitor the activities of its subscribers in a VPLMN. + +Three levels of FIGS service are defined, levels 1 to 3. + +Level 1 will use the facilities provided by Transferred Account Procedure (TAP). + +Levels 2 and 3 will use facilities provided by Customised Applications for Mobile network Enhanced Logic (CAMEL), in particular, the information flows between the GSM Service Switching Function (gsmSSF) and GSM Service Control Function (gsmSCF). Phase 1 and Phase 2 CAMEL facilities will be used. + +Connection-orientated services only are covered. + +# --- 2 Normative references + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. + - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. + - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. +- [1] GSM 01.04: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Abbreviations and acronyms". +- [2] 3GPP TS 42.031: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Fraud Information Gathering System (FIGS) - Stage 1". +- [3] GSM 03.78: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Customised Application for Mobile network Enhanced Logic (CAMEL Phase 1)" - stage 2; version 5.x.y". (GSM Release 96) +- [4] GSM 03.78: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Customised Application for Mobile network Enhanced Logic (CAMEL Phase 2) - stage 2; version 6.x.y". (GSM Release 97) + +NOTE: [3] specifies CAMEL Phase 1 functionality, [4] specifies CAMEL Phase 2 functionality. + +# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of this specification the following definitions apply: + +**A subscriber:** The calling mobile subscriber. + +**B subscriber:** The mobile subscriber originally called by the A subscriber. + +**C subscriber:** The subscriber to whom the B subscriber has requested that calls be forwarded. The C subscriber may be fixed or mobile. + +**call:** connection-oriented service/event. + +**GSM Service Control Function (gsmSCF):** A functional entity that contains the CAMEL service logic to implement OSS. It interfaces with the gsmSSF and the HLR. + +**GSM Service Switching Function (gsmSSF):** A functional entity that interfaces the MSC/GMSC to the gsmSCF. The concept of the gsmSSF is derived from the IN gsmSSF, but uses different triggering mechanisms because of the nature of the mobile network. + +**Originating CAMEL Subscription Information (O-CSI):** The O-CSI identifies the subscriber as having originating CAMEL services. + +**Supplementary Service Notification CAMEL Subscription Information (SS-CSI):** The SS-CSI identifies the subscriber as having supplementary service invocation notification CAMEL services. + +**Terminating CAMEL Subscription Information (T-CSI):** The T-CSI identifies the subscriber as having terminating CAMEL services. + +**VMSC:** The serving MSC in the VPLMN. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +Abbreviations used in this specification are listed in GSM 01.04. + +For the purposes of this specification the following abbreviations apply: + +| | | +|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------| +| CAMEL | Customised Applications for Mobile network Enhanced Logic | +| CGI | Cell Global Identifier | +| FIGS | Fraud Information Gathering System | +| FDS | Fraud Detection System | +| MO | Mobile Originated | +| MT | Mobile Terminated | +| O-CSI | Originating CAMEL Subscription Information | +| OSS | Operator Specific Services | +| SS-CSI | Supplementary Service Notification CAMEL Subscription Information | +| T-CSI | Terminating CAMEL Subscription Information | +| TAP | Transferred Account Procedure | + +# --- 4 FIGS Monitoring Levels + +There are three levels of monitoring of subscriber activities using FIGS. + +- | | | +|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Level 1 | an accelerated TAP procedure associated with a mechanism such as Hot Billing is implemented in the MSC of the VPLMN. | +| Level 2 | CAMEL is used to gather information, but only at the beginning and the end of the call. | +| Level 3 | CAMEL provides full information on subscriber activities, as defined in 3GPP TS 42.031, i.e. call start and end times, and partial call records. Notification of the invocation of Explicit Call Transfer, Call Deflection, Call Forwarding, Call Hold and Multi Party Service is also given. | + +# --- 5 FIGS Level 1: Accelerated TAP Records + +## 5.1 Method of FIGS Setting + +A PLMN shall request that a VPLMN monitor a designated subscriber using FIGS level 1 by setting a Hot Billing flag in the subscriber data stored in the HLR of the HPLMN. This data is drawn down by the VPLMN when the subscriber first registers in the VPLMN. + +If the HPLMN wishes to begin monitoring of a subscriber using FIGS Level 1 when the subscriber is already registered in the VPLMN, it resets the subscriber data in the VPLMN using command *Insert Subscriber Data*. + +## 5.2 Information Flows + +If a subscriber in a VPLMN is set in the subscriber categories to be monitored using FIGS Level 1 the VMSC shall process and return the TAP records for that subscriber in accordance with the guidelines given in current and future version of TAP. + +# 6 FIGS and CAMEL Architecture for FIGS Levels 2 and 3 + +FIGS provides the following information flows to the HPLMN, with respect to roaming subscribers monitored by FIGS Levels 2 and 3. + +## FIGS Level 2: + +**call start and end times** (both MO, MT and forwarded calls). (At CAMEL Phase 1 the gsmSSF will not put a timestamp on messages. The arrival times of messages at the gsmSCF will be used for call start and end times.) + +## FIGS Level 3: + +As for level 2 with the addition of: + +**partial call information** (accumulated duration of call still in progress) (CAMEL Phase only); + +**notification of the invocation of ECT, CD and MPTY, CF and call hold** (CAMEL Phase 2 only). + +Further phases of CAMEL will provide the functionality to check the IMEI of the ME used by a CAMEL subscriber. Other information required by 3GPP TS 42.031, annex A, that is not provided by CAMEL Phase 1 and CAMEL Phase 2, may also be provided by further phases of CAMEL. + +The architecture of the services provided by FIGS Levels 2 and 3 is given in the diagrams below. Thick lines indicate possible CAMEL monitoring/control relationships. + +![Diagram of FIGS architecture for MO call showing HPLMN and VPLMN components and their interactions.](06da11ab76cacc38bbcd714e437797ea_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the FIGS architecture for a Mobile Originated (MO) call, divided into HPLMN (Home PLMN) and VPLMN (Visited PLMN) sides. + +- HPLMN side:** Contains two main components: FDS (Home Subscriber Database) and gsmSCF (Service Control Function). FDS sends "FIGS commands" to gsmSCF, and gsmSCF returns "FIGS data" to FDS. +- VPLMN side:** Contains three components: VgsmSSF (Service Switching Function), VLR (Visitor Location Register), and VMSCA (Mobile Switching Center/Access). VgsmSSF and VLR are connected to each other. VMSCA is connected to VgsmSSF. An "Outgoing MO leg" is shown originating from the VLR. +- Interactions:** + - A thick diagonal line connects gsmSCF in the HPLMN to VgsmSSF in the VPLMN, indicating a CAMEL monitoring/control relationship. + - A thin diagonal line connects gsmSCF in the HPLMN to the "Outgoing MO leg" in the VPLMN. + +Diagram of FIGS architecture for MO call showing HPLMN and VPLMN components and their interactions. + +Figure 1: FIGS architecture for MO call + +![Diagram of FIGS Architecture for MT/forwarded call. The diagram shows the flow of information between various network elements across three domains: HPLMN, IPLMN B, and VPLMN B. In the HPLMN, FDS sends FIGS commands to gsmSCF and receives FIGS data. gsmSCF is connected to HLR. In IPLMN B, an incoming leg goes to GMSC, which then splits into an MT leg and an Early Forwarding leg. GMSC is connected to IgsmsSSF. In VPLMN B, IgsmsSSF sends a Roaming leg to VLR. VLR is connected to VMSC and VgsmsSSF. VMSC sends a Late Forwarding leg. VgsmsSSF sends a 'For forwarding at VMSC' message to HLR. Thick lines indicate FIGS-related connections between gsmSCF, IgsmsSSF, and VgsmsSSF.](d0abac95583b52a3b35f74a215567334_img.jpg) + +**MT side** + +``` + +graph TD + subgraph HPLMN + FDS((FDS)) -- "FIGS commands" --> gsmSCF((gsmSCF)) + gsmSCF -- "FIGS data" --> FDS + gsmSCF --- HLR((HLR)) + end + subgraph IPLMN_B [IPLMN B] + IL[Incoming leg] --> GMSC((GMSC)) + GMSC -- "MT leg" --> EL[Early Forwarding leg] + GMSC --- IgsmsSSF((IgsmsSSF)) + end + subgraph VPLMN_B [VPLMN B] + IgsmsSSF -- "Roaming leg" --> VLR((VLR)) + VLR --- VMSC((VMSC)) + VLR --- VgsmsSSF((VgsmsSSF)) + VMSC -- "Late Forwarding leg" --> LF[Late Forwarding leg] + VgsmsSSF -- "For forwarding at VMSC" --> HLR + end + gsmSCF === IgsmsSSF + IgsmsSSF === VgsmsSSF + +``` + +Diagram of FIGS Architecture for MT/forwarded call. The diagram shows the flow of information between various network elements across three domains: HPLMN, IPLMN B, and VPLMN B. In the HPLMN, FDS sends FIGS commands to gsmSCF and receives FIGS data. gsmSCF is connected to HLR. In IPLMN B, an incoming leg goes to GMSC, which then splits into an MT leg and an Early Forwarding leg. GMSC is connected to IgsmsSSF. In VPLMN B, IgsmsSSF sends a Roaming leg to VLR. VLR is connected to VMSC and VgsmsSSF. VMSC sends a Late Forwarding leg. VgsmsSSF sends a 'For forwarding at VMSC' message to HLR. Thick lines indicate FIGS-related connections between gsmSCF, IgsmsSSF, and VgsmsSSF. + +**Figure 2: FIGS Architecture for MT/forwarded call** + +Early call forwarding can be performed if the subscriber has set Unconditional Call Forward or the HLR has determined, before the call is extended to VPLMN B, that the B subscriber is not reachable. In all other cases the call must be extended to the VMSC. + +The information flows required by FIGS levels 2 and 3 can be provided by the information flows on the CAP interfaces between the gsmSCF and the gsmSSF in the interrogating and visiting networks. + +The interface between the gsmSCF and the Fraud Detection System (FDS) is non-standard. + +# 7 FIGS Levels 2 and 3 + +## 7.1 Method of FIGS Setting + +A PLMN shall request that a VPLMN monitor a designated subscriber using FIGS levels 2 or 3 by setting the O-CSI, T-CSI and SS-CSI (level 3 only) flags in the subscriber data stored in the HLR of the HPLMN. This data is drawn down by the VPLMN when the subscriber first registers in the VPLMN. + +If the HPLMN wishes to begin monitoring of a subscriber using FIGS Level 2 or 3 when the subscriber is already registered in the VPLMN, it resets the subscriber data in the VPLMN using command *Insert Subscriber Data*. + +## 7.2 Information Flows + +FIGS Levels 2 and 3 will be treated together in this section but it should be remembered that partial call records and SS notification invocation is not available with FIGS Level 2. + +Each item of call data required by FIGS will be considered in turn and the information flows within CAMEL which provide this data given. + +Text applies to the implementation of FIGS functionality using both Phases 1 and 2, unless otherwise stated. + +MO and MT calls will be treated together. If a message or DP is named as *O/T\_Answer*, for instance, this means that if the call is MO, the relevant DP is *O\_answer*, and that if the call is MT, the relevant DP is *T\_answer*. + +Diagrams showing the information flows for FIGS levels 2 and 3 are given in Annex A. + +### 7.2.1 Mobile Originated and Mobile Terminated Calls + +#### 7.2.1.1 Call Start Time + +Information regarding a call attempt can be obtained from the *InitialDP* message sent from the gsmSSF to the gsmSCF. This message is sent after a control relationship for the call has been set up between the gsmSSF and gsmSCF. This message will provide notification to the FDS that a FIGS monitored subscriber has made a call **attempt**, or that an attempt is being made to call a FIGS monitored subscriber. + +##### CAMEL Phase 1 + +The call, however, has not been connected at the time of the *InitialDP* message. The gsmSCF must therefore arm DP *O/T\_answer*, so that the gsmSSF will inform the gsmSCF when the called party answers/connects. The gsmSCF arms the DP with message *Request\_Report\_BCSM\_Event* sent to the gsmSSF. + +**If the called party answers**, the gsmSSF sends *Event\_Report\_BCSM (Notify and Continue)* to gsmSCF. This message provides notification to the FDS that the attempted call has begun. The gsmSCF must then arm DP *O/T\_Disconnect*, so that the gsmSSF will notify the gsmSCF when the call ends. + +**If the called party does not answer**, the gsmSSF terminates the relationship for the call with the gsmSCF. It does this using message “*ABORT*”. This message provides notification to the FDS that the call attempted did not connect. + +##### CAMEL Phase 2 + +The call, however, has not been connected at the time of the *InitialDP* message. The gsmSCF must therefore arm DP *O/T\_Answer*, so that the gsmSSF will inform the gsmSCF when the called party answers/connects. The following DP's (with trigger events given) must also be armed so that the gsmSCF will be informed if the trigger event occurs: + +| | | +|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| O_Route_Select_Failure | (call establishment fails, MO calls only) | +| O/T_Busy | (called party is busy) | +| O/T_No_Answer | (no answer from called party) | +| O/T_Abandon | (calling party abandons the call before the called party has answered) | +| O/T_Not_Reachable | (called party is not reachable) | + +For the purposes of FIGS, these DP's need only be armed for notification (N). + +The gsmSCF arms all these DPs with a single message *Request\_Report\_BCSM\_Event*, sent to the gsmSSF. + +**If the trigger event** for any of *O\_Route\_Select\_Failure*, *O/T\_Busy*, *O/T\_No\_Answer*, *O/T\_Not\_Reachable* occurs then the gsmSCF is informed by the gsmSSF of the failure of the call attempt with *Event\_Report\_BCSM*, enclosing the relevant cause. + +**If the called party answers**, the gsmSSF sends message *Event\_Report\_BCSM* to the gsmSCF. This message provides notification to the FDS of the start of a call by a FIGS monitored subscriber. The gsmSCF must then arm DP *O/T\_Disconnect*, so that the gsmSSF will notify the gsmSCF when the call ends. + +#### 7.2.1.2 Partial Call Records + +This functionality is available with CAMEL Phase 2 only. + +Using the “Apply Charging” process within CAMEL Phase 2, the gsmSCF can control the duration of a call. The gsmSCF authorises the gsmSSF to allow the call to proceed continue for a certain time. At the conclusion of this time period, the gsmSSF seeks further instructions from the gsmSCF. The gsmSCF can, at this point, authorise the call to continue for another time period (which may be different to the first) or may instruct the gsmSSF to terminate the call. + +With regard to FIGS, this functionality can be used to generate **partial call records** for the gsmSCF, as follows: + +After the gsmSCF has received the *InitialDP* message from the gsmSSF, the gsmSCF sends message *Apply\_Charging* to the gsmSSF, containing parameter "Tcs", the "call segment" duration. The gsmSSF will then send message *Apply\_Charging\_Report* to the gsmSCF after *Tcs* seconds. This message c + +ontains the duration of the call since the start of charging. The gsmSCF may then instruct the gsmSSF to allow the call to continue for another *Tcs* seconds and this sequence of events continues until the call is released. When the call is released, *Apply\_Charging\_Report* is sent to the gsmSCF. + +The gsmSCF can therefore define how often it is to receive partial call records on a per subscriber, per call basis, and can change how often the partial call records are received during a call + +#### 7.2.1.3 Call End Time + +When either of the calling or called parties releases the call, the *O/T-Disconnect* DP is triggered and message *Event\_Report\_BCSM* is sent to the gsmSCF. This message provides notification to the FDS of the call end. + +### 7.2.2 Forwarded Call + +#### 7.2.2.1 Call Start Time + +The forwarded leg "from" the called party to the forwarded-to number is considered as an MO call, originated by the called subscriber, as well as an MT call for the called subscriber. Two separate CAMEL dialogues will therefore be set up. + +The CAMEL process for the terminating leg will follow subclause 7.1 as an MT call and the CAMEL process for the "originating" (forwarded) leg will follow subclause 7.1 as an MO call. + +#### 7.2.2.2 Partial Call Records + +As for subclause 7.1.2. + +#### 7.2.2.3 Call End Time + +As for subclause 7.1.3. + +### 7.2.3 Supplementary Service Invocation + +This functionality is available with CAMEL Phase 2 only. + +From CAMEL Phase 2 (GSM 03.78 Release 97), subclause 8.11: + +"At the invocation of any of the services ECT, CD and MPTY the MSC/VLR checks whether the criteria for sending a notification is fulfilled, i.e. whether the subscriber is provisioned with the SS-CSI and the particular invoked supplementary service is marked in the SS-CSI. If this is the case a notification is sent to the gsmSCF given by the gsmSCF address contained in the SS-CSI. The processing of the particular SS invocation is not suspended. If the notification criteria is not fulfilled the processing of the particular supplementary service continues unchanged and no notification is sent. + +The sending of the notification is independent of call related CAMEL processing, i.e. processing indicated by O/T-CSI." + +# Annex A (informative): FIGS Data provided by CAMEL Messages + +GSM 02.33 lists the information that should be present in FIGS Data messages. Tables A.1 to A.3 show the information required by GSM 02.33 for call start and end and partial call records, and the CAMEL messages, if any, that provide this information. Note that partial call records are only available with FIGS Level 3. + +The CAMEL message given for a particular call event, e.g. call end, will not necessarily arrive at that event. The FDS must have the ability to build up a full picture of a call as various CAMEL messages are received. + +**Table A.1: Required Call Start information** + +| Information | MO | MT | CF | +|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Dialled digits | InitialIDP (IDP), Called Party BCD Number | IDP, Called Party Number | IDP, Called Party Number | +| A party number | IDP, Calling Party Number | IDP, Calling Party Number, if available | IDP, Calling Party Number, if available | +| B party number | IDP, Called Party BCD Number | IDP, Called Party Number | IDP, Called Party Number | +| Modified B party number | gsmSCF | gsmSCF | gsmSCF | +| C party number | n/a | n/a | Called Party Number | +| Modified C party number | gsmSCF | gsmSCF | gsmSCF | +| CGI (of A party) | IDP, Location Number | location number in ISUP signalling, if available | location number in ISUP signalling, if available | +| IMSI | IDP, IMSI (of A party) | IDP, IMSI (of B party) | IDP, IMSI (of B party) | +| IMEI (of A party) | Not available | Not available | Not available | +| Call Start Time/Date | Phase 1: arrival time of Event_Report_BCSM
Phase 2: Timestamp on Event_Report_BCSM | Phase 1: arrival time of Event_Report_BCSM
Phase 2: Timestamp on Event_Report_BCSM | Phase 1: arrival time of Event_Report_BCSM
Phase 2: Timestamp on Event_Report_BCSM | +| Call Reference | IDP, Call Reference Number | IDP, Call Reference Number | IDP, Call Reference Number | +| MO/MT indicator | IDP, Event Type BCSM | IDP, Event Type BCSM | IDP, Event Type BCSM | +| Visited MSC address | IDP, MSC Address | IDP, MSC Address | IDP, MSC Address | +| Type of service | IDP, Basic Service Code, if available | IDP, Basic Service Code, if available | IDP, Basic Service Code, if available | + +**Dialed digits:** This always gives (for MO calls) the number originally entered by the party making the call, including any non-numeric characters. + +**Modified B/C party number:** As the number is modified by the gsmSCF itself, it is assumed that the FDS will have direct access to this field and need not scan outgoing messages from the gsmSCF to obtain the field. If, however, the FDS must scan outgoing messages, the field is given in field Destination Routing Address in message Connect. + +Cell Global Identifier (CGI): refers to the cell used by the MS at the start of the call. + +**Table A.2: Required Call End information** + +| Information | MO | MT | CF | +|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| A party number | IDP, Calling Party Number | IDP, Calling Party Number, if available | IDP, Calling Party Number, if available | +| B party number | IDP, Called Party BCD Number | IDP, Called Party Number | IDP, Called Party Number | +| Modified B party number | gsmSCF | gsmSCF | gsmSCF | +| CGI | IDP, Location Number | location number in ISUP signalling, if available | location number in ISUP signalling, if available | +| IMSI | IDP, IMSI (of A party) | IDP, IMSI (of B party) | IDP, IMSI (of B party) | +| IMEI | Not available | Not available | Not available | +| Call Duration/end | Phase 1: Arrival time, Phase 2: Timestamp, of Event_Report_BCSM (with Event_Type_BCSM = O/T_Disconnect ) | Phase 1: Arrival time, Phase 2: Timestamp, of Event_Report_BCSM (with Event_Type_BCSM = O/T_Disconnect ) | Phase 1: Arrival time, Phase 2: Timestamp, of Event_Report_BCSM (with Event_Type_BCSM = O/T_Disconnect ) | +| Call Reference | IDP, Call Reference Number | IDP, Call Reference Number | IDP, Call Reference Number | +| MO/MT indicator | IDP, Event Type BCSM | IDP, Event Type BCSM | IDP, Event Type BCSM | + +*CGI*. If available, the CGI of the cell used by the MS at the end of the call is used. If this is not available, the CGI of the cell used at the start of the call is given. + +**Table A.3: Required Partial Call Information (CAMEL Phase 2 only)** + +| Information | MO | MT | CF | +|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Dialled digits | InitialDP (IDP), Called Party BCD Number | IDP, Called Party Number | IDP, Called Party Number | +| A party number | IDP, Calling Party Number | IDP, Calling Party Number, if available | IDP, Calling Party Number, if available | +| B party number | IDP, Called Party BCD Number | IDP, Called Party Number | IDP, Called Party Number | +| Modified B party number | gsmSCF | gsmSCF | gsmSCF | +| C party number | n/a | n/a | Called Party Number | +| Modified C party number | gsmSCF | gsmSCF | gsmSCF | +| CGI | IDP, Location Number | location number in ISUP signalling, if available | location number in ISUP signalling, if available | +| IMSI | IDP, IMSI (of A party) | IDP, IMSI (of B party) | IDP, IMSI (of B party) | +| IMEI | Not available | Not available | Not available | +| Call Start Time/Date | Phase 1: arrival time of Event_Report_BCSM
Phase 2: Timestamp on Event_Report_BCSM | Phase 1: arrival time of Event_Report_BCSM
Phase 2: Timestamp on Event_Report_BCSM | Phase 1: arrival time of Event_Report_BCSM
Phase 2: Timestamp on Event_Report_BCSM | +| Call Duration | Apply_Charging_Report, Time Since Start of Charging | Apply_Charging_Report, Time Since Start of Charging | Apply_Charging_Report, Time Since Start of Charging | +| Call Reference | IDP, Call Reference_Number | IDP, Call Reference_Number | IDP, Call Reference_Number | +| MO/MT indicator | IDP, Event Type BCSM | IDP, Event Type BCSM | IDP, Event Type BCSM | +| Visited MSC address | IDP, MSC Address | IDP, MSC Address | IDP, MSC Address | +| Type of service | IDP, Basic Service Code, if available | IDP, Basic Service Code, if available | IDP, Basic Service Code, if available | + +The CAMEL message for SS invocation notification have not yet been defined so the call information for SS invocation notification can only be specified in general terms. + +The notification of supplementary service (SS) invocation will be the same as table A.3, except that information field “Type of Service” will be “Type of SS”, and “Call Duration” will be “Time of SS invocation”. “Type of SS” will be given in the invocation notification sent from the gsmSSF to the gsmSCF. “Time of SS invocation” will be the timestamp in the invocation notification or its time of arrival at the gsmSCF. + +# Annex B (informative): Information Flow for FIGS Levels 2 and 3 + +![Sequence diagram showing message flow between VPLMN MSC and HPLMN gsmSCF for FIGS Level 2. The diagram includes lifelines for VPLMN MSC (with EDP-N) and HPLMN gsmSCF. Messages include Initial DP, Request Report BCSM Event, Continue, and Event Report BCSM. Comments explain the purpose of each message, such as requesting instructions from the SCP or notifying it of call end.](bd671b21db63e6fdb2196e9b18502aac_img.jpg) + +| VPLMN
MSC | Messages | HPLMN
gsmSCF | Comments | +|--------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------| +| [Lifeline] | For each call attempt : | [Lifeline] | | +| | Initial DP
-----> | | Request for instructions from the SCP | +| | Request Report BCSM Event
<----- | | To be aware of the call end | +| | Continue
<----- | | To continue the call | +| | + For each successful call : | | | +| | Event Report BCSM
-----> | | To notify the SCP that the call has ended | +| | + For each unsuccessful call : | | | +| | Event Report BCSM
-----> | | Event report on « Busy », « no answer », etc. | +| | EDP-N | | | +| | EDP-N | | | + +Sequence diagram showing message flow between VPLMN MSC and HPLMN gsmSCF for FIGS Level 2. The diagram includes lifelines for VPLMN MSC (with EDP-N) and HPLMN gsmSCF. Messages include Initial DP, Request Report BCSM Event, Continue, and Event Report BCSM. Comments explain the purpose of each message, such as requesting instructions from the SCP or notifying it of call end. + +Figure B.1: Message flow for a subscriber monitored using FIGS Level 2 + +![](7efae06af3af43ffe5d4b956a679cf54_img.jpg) + +| VPLMN
MSC | Messages | HPLMN
SCP | Comments | +|----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | For each call attempt : | | | +| | Initial DP
-----> | | Request for instructions from the SCP | +| | Apply Charging
<----- | | To control the call duration | +| | Request Report BCSM Event
<----- | | To be aware of the call answer & the call end | +| | Continue
<----- | | To continue the call without change of the data by the SCP | +| | + For each successful call : | | | +| | Event Report BCSM
-----> | | To notify the SCP that the call has been answered by the remote party | +| | ( <----- Release ----- ) | | This message is sent during the call only if the call must be released by the SCP because of a fraudulent situation | +| | :
:
: | | | +| | Apply Charging Report
-----> | | End of the call :
To provide the SCP with the elapsed time since the start of charging | +| Event Report BCSM
-----> | To notify the SCP that the call has ended | | | +| Continue / Release
<----- | Release is sent to stop the call at the end | | | +| + For each unsuccessful call : | | | | +| Event Report BCSM
-----> | Event report on « Busy », « no answer », etc.. | | | + +**Figure B.2: Message flow for a subscriber monitored using FIGS Level 3** + +# Annex C (informative): Change history + +| Change history GSM 03.31 | | | | | | | | +|--------------------------------------|--------------|-----------------|-----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|------------------| +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | Old | New | +| | | | | | No Phase 1 version | | | +| 03-1998 | SMG#25 | | | | (cleaned up by SMG-PN) To SMG#25 for information | | 1.0.0 | +| 06-1998 | SMG#26 | | | | To SMG#26 for approval | | 2.0.0 | +| 06-1998 | SMG#26 | | | | TS approved by SMG#26 | 2.0.0 | 7.0.0 | +| 04-2000 | | | | | Release 1999 version | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | +| Change history 3GPP TS 43.031 | | | | | | | | +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | Old | New | +| 03-2001 | SA#11 | | | | Upgrade to Release 4 (3GPP numbering) | 03.31
V8.0.0 | 43.031
V4.0.0 | +| 06-2002 | SA#16 | | | | Upgrade to Release 5 | 4.0.0 | 5.0.0 | +| Change history 3GPP TS 23.031 | | | | | | | | +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | Old | New | +| 12-2002 | SA#18 | | | | Agreed to convert to 3GPP/GSM joint numbering scheme.
43.031 WITHDRAWN.
Technically equivalent to 43.031 version 5.0.0 | 43.031
v5.0.0 | 23.031
v5.0.0 | +| 12-2004 | SA#26 | | | | Upgrade to Release 6 | 5.0.0 | 6.0.0 | +| 06-2007 | SA#36 | | | | Upgrade to Release 7 | 6.0.0 | 7.0.0 | +| 12-2008 | SA#42 | | | | Upgrade to Release 8 | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | +| 12-2009 | SA#46 | | | | Upgrade to Release 9 | 8.0.0 | 9.0.0 | +| 2011-03 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-10 version (MCC) | 9.0.0 | 10.0.0 | +| 2012-09 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-11 version (MCC) | 10.0.0 | 11.0.0 | +| 2014-09 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-12 version (MCC) | 11.0.0 | 12.0.0 | +| 2016-01 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-13 version (MCC) | 12.0.0 | 13.0.0 | +| 2017-03 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-14 version (MCC) | 13.0.0 | 14.0.0 | +| 2018-06 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-15 version (MCC) | 14.0.0 | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 15.0.0 | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23038/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23038/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b823046dd7472b4f34c144fbbb659e06a899ca6f --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23038/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,1709 @@ + + + + + + +# Contents + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| Foreword ..... | 5 | +| 1 Scope..... | 6 | +| 2 References..... | 6 | +| 3 Abbreviations and definitions ..... | 7 | +| 4 SMS Data Coding Scheme..... | 8 | +| 5 CBS Data Coding Scheme ..... | 11 | +| 6 Individual parameters..... | 14 | +| 6.1 General principles ..... | 14 | +| 6.1.1 General notes ..... | 14 | +| 6.1.2 Character packing..... | 14 | +| 6.1.2.1 SMS Packing..... | 14 | +| 6.1.2.1.1 Packing of 7-bit characters ..... | 14 | +| 6.1.2.2 CBS Packing..... | 15 | +| 6.1.2.2.1 Packing of 7-bit characters ..... | 15 | +| 6.1.2.3 USSD packing..... | 16 | +| 6.1.2.3.1 Packing of 7 bit characters..... | 16 | +| 6.2 Character sets and coding..... | 19 | +| 6.2.1 GSM 7 bit Default Alphabet..... | 19 | +| 6.2.1.1 GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table ..... | 20 | +| 6.2.1.2 National Language Identifier ..... | 22 | +| 6.2.1.2.1 Introduction ..... | 22 | +| 6.2.1.2.2 Single shift mechanism ..... | 22 | +| 6.2.1.2.3 Locking shift mechanism ..... | 22 | +| 6.2.1.2.4 National Language Identifier ..... | 22 | +| 6.2.1.2.5 Processing of national language characters..... | 23 | +| 6.2.2 8 bit data ..... | 24 | +| 6.2.3 UCS2 ..... | 24 | +| Annex A (normative): National Language Tables..... | 25 | +| A.1 Introduction..... | 25 | +| A.2 National Language Single Shift Tables ..... | 26 | +| A.2.1 Turkish National Language Single Shift Table..... | 26 | +| A.2.2 Spanish National Language Single Shift Table..... | 27 | +| A.2.3 Portuguese National Language Single Shift Table ..... | 28 | +| A.2.4 Bengali National Language Single Shift Table..... | 28 | +| A.2.5 Gujarati National Language Single Shift Table ..... | 30 | +| A.2.6 Hindi National Language Single Shift Table ..... | 31 | +| A.2.7 Kannada National Language Single Shift Table ..... | 32 | +| A.2.8 Malayalam National Language Single Shift Table ..... | 33 | +| A.2.9 Oriya National Language Single Shift Table ..... | 34 | +| A.2.10 Punjabi National Language Single Shift Table ..... | 35 | +| A.2.11 Tamil National Language Single Shift Table..... | 36 | +| A.2.12 Telugu National Language Single Shift Table..... | 37 | +| A.2.13 Urdu National Language Single Shift Table ..... | 38 | +| A.3 National Language Locking Shift Tables ..... | 39 | +| A.3.1 Turkish National Language Locking Shift Table..... | 39 | +| A.3.2 Void..... | 40 | +| A.3.3 Portuguese National Language Locking Shift Table ..... | 40 | +| A.3.4 Bengali National Language Locking Shift Table..... | 40 | +| A.3.5 Gujarati National Language Locking Shift Table ..... | 42 | +| A.3.6 Hindi National Language Locking Shift Table ..... | 43 | +| A.3.7 Kannada National Language Locking Shift Table ..... | 44 | +| A.3.8 Malayalam National Language Locking Shift Table ..... | 45 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| A.3.9 | Oriya National Language Locking Shift Table ..... | 46 | +| A.3.10 | Punjabi National Language Locking Shift Table ..... | 47 | +| A.3.11 | Tamil National Language Locking Shift Table..... | 48 | +| A.3.12 | Telugu National Language Locking Shift Table..... | 49 | +| A.3.13 | Urdu National Language Locking Shift Table..... | 50 | +| Annex B (informative): | Guidelines for creating language tables ..... | 51 | +| B.1 | Introduction..... | 51 | +| B.2 | Template for Single Shift Language Tables ..... | 51 | +| B.3 | Template for Locking Shift Language Tables ..... | 53 | +| Annex C (Informative): | Example for locking shift and single shift mechanisms ..... | 54 | +| C.1 | Introduction..... | 54 | +| C.2 | Example of single shift ..... | 54 | +| C.3 | Example of locking shift..... | 54 | +| Annex D (informative): | Document change history..... | 56 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 Indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the specification; + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document defines the character sets, languages and message handling requirements for SMS, CBS and USSD and may additionally be used for Man Machine Interface (MMI) (3GPP TS 22.030 [2]). + +The specification for the Data Circuit terminating Equipment/Data Terminal Equipment (DCE/DTE) interface (3GPP TS 27.005 [8]) will also use the codes specified herein for the transfer of SMS data to an external terminal. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] void +- [2] 3GPP TS 22.030: "Man-Machine Interface (MMI) of the User Equipment (UE)". +- [3] 3GPP TS 23.090: "Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) - Stage 2". +- [4] 3GPP TS 23.040: "Technical realization of the Short Message Service (SMS) ". +- [5] 3GPP TS 23.041: "Technical realization of Cell Broadcast Service (CBS)". +- [6] 3GPP TS 24.011: "Point-to-Point (PP) Short Message Service (SMS) support on mobile radio interface". +- [7] Void. +- [8] 3GPP TS 27.005: "Use of Data Terminal Equipment - Data Circuit terminating Equipment (DTE - DCE) interface for Short Message Service (SMS) and Cell Broadcast Service (CBS)". +- [10] ISO/IEC 10646: "Information technology; Universal Multiple-Octet Coded Character Set (UCS)". +- [11] 3GPP TS 24.090: "Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD); Stage 3". +- [12] ISO 639: "Code for the representation of names of languages". +- [13] 3GPP TS 23.042: "Compression algorithm for text messaging services". +- [14] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [15] "Wireless Datagram Protocol Specification", Wireless Application Protocol Forum Ltd. +- [16] ISO 1073-1 and ISO 1073-2 Alphanumeric character sets for optical recognition – Parts 1 and 2: Character sets OCR-A and OCR-B, respectively - Shapes and dimensions of the printed image. +- [17] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the USIM application" +- [18] 3GPP TS 51.011 Release 4 (version 4.x.x): “Specification of the Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment (SIM - ME) interface” +- [19] 3GPP TS 24.294: "IMS Centralized Services (ICS) Protocol via I1 Interface". + +# --- 3 Abbreviations and definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: + +**National Language Identifier:** A code representing a specific language and thereby selecting a specific National Language Table. + +**National Language Locking Shift Table:** A national language table which replaces the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table in the case where the locking shift mechanism as defined in subclause 6.2.1.2.3 is used. + +**National Language Single Shift Table:** A national language table which replaces the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table in the case where the single shift mechanism as defined in subclause 6.2.1.2.2 is used. + +**National Language Table:** A table containing the characters of a specific national language. + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations used in the present document are listed in 3GPP TR 21.905 [14]. + +# --- 4 SMS Data Coding Scheme + +The TP-Data-Coding-Scheme field, defined in 3GPP TS 23.040 [4], indicates the data coding scheme of the TP-UD field, and may indicate a message class. Any reserved codings shall be assumed to be the GSM 7 bit default alphabet (the same as codepoint 00000000) by a receiving entity. The octet is used according to a coding group which is indicated in bits 7..4. The octet is then coded as follows: + +| Coding Group Bits
7..4 | Use of bits 3..0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------|---------------|---|---|---------|---|---|---------------------------------------|---|---|---------------------------------|---|---|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|----------------|---|---|----------------------------|---|---|------------|---|---|-------------------|---|---|----------| +| 00xx |

General Data Coding indication
Bits 5..0 indicate the following:

Bit 5, if set to 0, indicates the text is uncompressed
Bit 5, if set to 1, indicates the text is compressed using the compression algorithm defined in 3GPP TS 23.042 [13]

Bit 4, if set to 0, indicates that bits 1 to 0 are reserved and have no message class meaning
Bit 4, if set to 1, indicates that bits 1 to 0 have a message class meaning::

Bit 1 Bit 0 Message Class
0 0 Class 0
0 1 Class 1 Default meaning: ME-specific.
1 0 Class 2 (U)SIM specific message
1 1 Class 3 Default meaning: TE specific (see 3GPP TS 27.005 [8])

Bits 3 and 2 indicate the character set being used, as follows :

Bit 3 Bit 2 Character set:
0 0 GSM 7 bit default alphabet
0 1 8 bit data
1 0 UCS2 (16bit) [10]
1 1 Reserved

NOTE: The special case of bits 7..0 being 0000 0000 indicates the GSM 7 bit default alphabet with no message class

| Bit 1 | Bit 0 | Message Class | 0 | 0 | Class 0 | 0 | 1 | Class 1 Default meaning: ME-specific. | 1 | 0 | Class 2 (U)SIM specific message | 1 | 1 | Class 3 Default meaning: TE specific (see 3GPP TS 27.005 [8]) | Bit 3 | Bit 2 | Character set: | 0 | 0 | GSM 7 bit default alphabet | 0 | 1 | 8 bit data | 1 | 0 | UCS2 (16bit) [10] | 1 | 1 | Reserved | +| Bit 1 | Bit 0 | Message Class | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | Class 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | Class 1 Default meaning: ME-specific. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | Class 2 (U)SIM specific message | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | Class 3 Default meaning: TE specific (see 3GPP TS 27.005 [8]) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| Bit 3 | Bit 2 | Character set: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | GSM 7 bit default alphabet | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 8 bit data | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | UCS2 (16bit) [10] | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | Reserved | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 01xx |

Message Marked for Automatic Deletion Group

This group can be used by the SM originator to mark the message ( stored in the ME or (U)SIM ) for deletion after reading irrespective of the message class.
The way the ME will process this deletion should be manufacturer specific but shall be done without the intervention of the End User or the targeted application. The mobile manufacturer may optionally provide a means for the user to prevent this automatic deletion.

Bit 5..0 are coded exactly the same as Group 00xx

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1000..1011 | Reserved coding groups | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1100 |

Message Waiting Indication Group: Discard Message

The specification for this group is exactly the same as for Group 1101, except that:

The ME shall be able to receive, process and acknowledge messages in this group, irrespective of memory availability for other types of short message.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + +| Coding Group Bits
7..4 | Use of bits 3..0 | +|---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1101 |

Message Waiting Indication Group: Store Message

This Group defines an indication to be provided to the user about the status of types of message waiting on systems connected to the GSM/UMTS PLMN. The ME should present this indication as an icon on the screen, or other MMI indication. The ME shall update the contents of the Message Waiting Indication Status on the SIM (see 3GPP TS 51.011 [18]) or USIM (see 3GPP TS 31.102 [17]) when present or otherwise should store the status in the ME. In case there are multiple records of EFMWIS this information shall be stored within the first record. The contents of the Message Waiting Indication Status should control the ME indicator. For each indication supported, the mobile may provide storage for the Origination Address. The ME may take note of the Origination Address for messages in this group and group 1100.

Text included in the user data is coded in the GSM 7 bit default alphabet. Where a message is received with bits 7..4 set to 1101, the mobile shall store the text of the SMS message in addition to setting the indication. The indication setting should take place irrespective of memory availability to store the short message.

Bits 3 indicates Indication Sense:

Bit 3
0 Set Indication Inactive
1 Set Indication Active

Bit 2 is reserved, and set to 0

Bit 1 Bit 0 Indication Type:
0 0 Voicemail Message Waiting
0 1 Fax Message Waiting
1 0 Electronic Mail Message Waiting
1 1 Other Message Waiting*

* Mobile manufacturers may implement the "Other Message Waiting" indication as an additional indication without specifying the meaning.

| +| 1110 |

Message Waiting Indication Group: Store Message

The coding of bits 3..0 and functionality of this feature are the same as for the Message Waiting Indication Group above, (bits 7..4 set to 1101) with the exception that the text included in the user data is coded in the uncompressed UCS2 character set.

| +| 1111 |

Data coding/message class

Bit 3 is reserved, set to 0.

Bit 2 Message coding:
0 GSM 7 bit default alphabet
1 8-bit data

Bit 1 Bit 0 Message Class:
0 0 Class 0
0 1 Class 1 default meaning: ME-specific.
1 0 Class 2 (U)SIM-specific message.
1 1 Class 3 default meaning: TE specific (see 3GPP TS 27.005 [8])

| + +GSM 7 bit default alphabet indicates that the TP-UD is coded from the GSM 7 bit default alphabet given in clause 6.2.1. When this character set is used, the characters of the message are packed in octets as shown in clause 6.1.2.1.1, and the message can consist of up to 160 characters. The GSM 7 bit default alphabet shall be supported by all MSs and SCs offering the service. If the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension mechanism is used then the number of displayable characters will reduce by one for every instance where the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table is used. 8-bit data indicates that the TP-UD has user-defined coding, and the message can consist of up to 140 octets. + +UCS2 character set indicates that the TP-UD has a UCS2 [10] coded message, and the message can consist of up to 140 octets, i.e. up to 70 UCS2 characters. The General notes specified in clause 6.1.1 override any contrary + +specification in UCS2, so for example even in UCS2 a character will cause the MS to return to the beginning of the current line and overwrite any existing text with the characters which follow the . + +When a message is compressed, the TP-UD consists of the GSM 7 bit default alphabet or UCS2 character set compressed message, and the compressed message itself can consist of up to 140 octets in total. + +When a mobile terminated message is class 0 and the MS has the capability of displaying short messages, the MS shall display the message immediately and send an acknowledgement to the SC when the message has successfully reached the MS irrespective of whether there is memory available in the (U)SIM or ME. The message shall not be automatically stored in the (U)SIM or ME. + +The ME may make provision through MMI for the user to selectively prevent the message from being displayed immediately. + +If the ME is incapable of displaying short messages or if the immediate display of the message has been disabled through MMI then the ME shall treat the short message as though there was no message class, i.e. it will ignore bits 0 and 1 in the TP-DCS and normal rules for memory capacity exceeded shall apply. + +When a mobile terminated message is Class 1, the MS shall send an acknowledgement to the SC when the message has successfully reached the MS and can be stored. The MS shall normally store the message in the ME by default, if that is possible, but otherwise the message may be stored elsewhere, e.g. in the (U)SIM. The user may be able to override the default meaning and select their own routing. + +When a mobile terminated message is Class 2 ((U)SIM-specific), an MS shall ensure that the message has been transferred to the SMS data field in the (U)SIM before sending an acknowledgement to the SC. The MS shall return a "protocol error, unspecified" error message (see 3GPP TS 24.011 [6]) if the short message cannot be stored in the (U)SIM and there is other short message storage available at the MS. If all the short message storage at the MS is already in use, the MS shall return "memory capacity exceeded". This behaviour applies in all cases except for an MS supporting (U)SIM Application Toolkit when the Protocol Identifier (TP-PID) of the mobile terminated message is set to "(U)SIM Data download" (see 3GPP TS 23.040 [4]). + +When a mobile terminated message is Class 3, the MS shall send an acknowledgement to the SC when the message has successfully reached the MS and can be stored, irrespectively of whether the MS supports an SMS interface to a TE, and without waiting for the message to be transferred to the TE. Thus the acknowledgement to the SC of a TE-specific message does not imply that the message has reached the TE. Class 3 messages shall normally be transferred to the TE when the TE requests "TE-specific" messages (see 3GPP TS 27.005 [8]). The user may be able to override the default meaning and select their own routing. + +The message class codes may also be used for mobile originated messages, to provide an indication to the destination SME of how the message was handled at the MS. + +The MS will not interpret reserved or unsupported values but shall store them as received. The SC may reject messages with a Data Coding Scheme containing a reserved value or one which is not supported. + +# 5 CBS Data Coding Scheme + +The CBS Data Coding Scheme indicates the intended handling of the message at the MS, the character set/coding, and the language (when applicable). Any reserved codings shall be assumed to be the GSM 7 bit default alphabet (the same as codepoint 00001111) by a receiving entity. The octet is used according to a coding group which is indicated in bits 7..4. The octet is then coded as follows: + +| Coding Group
Bits
7..4 | Use of bits 3..0 | +|------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 0000 |

Language using the GSM 7 bit default alphabet

Bits 3..0 indicate the language:

  • 0000 German
  • 0001 English
  • 0010 Italian
  • 0011 French
  • 0100 Spanish
  • 0101 Dutch
  • 0110 Swedish
  • 0111 Danish
  • 1000 Portuguese
  • 1001 Finnish
  • 1010 Norwegian
  • 1011 Greek
  • 1100 Turkish
  • 1101 Hungarian
  • 1110 Polish
  • 1111 Language unspecified
| +| 0001 |

0000 GSM 7 bit default alphabet; message preceded by language indication.

The first 3 characters of the message are a two-character representation of the language encoded according to ISO 639 [12], followed by a CR character. The CR character is then followed by 90 characters of text.

0001 UCS2; message preceded by language indication

The message starts with a two GSM 7-bit default alphabet character representation of the language encoded according to ISO 639 [12]. This is padded to the octet boundary with two bits set to 0 and then followed by 40 characters of UCS2-encoded message.
An MS not supporting UCS2 coding will present the two character language identifier followed by improperly interpreted user data.

0010..1111 Reserved

| +| 0010.. |

0000 Czech

0001 Hebrew

0010 Arabic

0011 Russian

0100 Icelandic

0101..1111 Reserved for other languages using the GSM 7 bit default alphabet, with unspecified handling at the MS

| +| 0011 |

0000..1111 Reserved for other languages using the GSM 7 bit default alphabet, with unspecified handling at the MS

| + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------------------|---|------------|-------|-------|---------------------------------------|---|---|----------------------------------|---|---|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-----------------------|---|---|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|------------|---|---|--------------------|---|---|----------| +| Coding Group
Bits
7..4 | Use of bits 3..0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 01xx |

General Data Coding indication
Bits 5..0 indicate the following:

Bit 5, if set to 0, indicates the text is uncompressed
Bit 5, if set to 1, indicates the text is compressed using the compression algorithm defined in 3GPP TS 23.042 [13]

Bit 4, if set to 0, indicates that bits 1 to 0 are reserved and have no message class meaning
Bit 4, if set to 1, indicates that bits 1 to 0 have a message class meaning:

Bit 1 Bit 0 Message Class:
0 0 Class 0
0 1 Class 1 Default meaning: ME-specific.
1 0 Class 2 (U)SIM specific message.
1 1 Class 3 Default meaning: TE-specific (see 3GPP TS 27.005 [8])

Bits 3 and 2 indicate the character set being used, as follows:

Bit 3 Bit 2 Character set:
0 0 GSM 7 bit default alphabet
0 1 8 bit data
1 0 UCS2 (16 bit) [10]
1 1 Reserved
| Bit 1 | Bit 0 | Message Class: | 0 | 0 | Class 0 | 0 | 1 | Class 1 Default meaning: ME-specific. | 1 | 0 | Class 2 (U)SIM specific message. | 1 | 1 | Class 3 Default meaning: TE-specific (see 3GPP TS 27.005 [8]) | Bit 3 | Bit 2 | Character set: | 0 | 0 | GSM 7 bit default alphabet | 0 | 1 | 8 bit data | 1 | 0 | UCS2 (16 bit) [10] | 1 | 1 | Reserved | +| Bit 1 | Bit 0 | Message Class: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | Class 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | Class 1 Default meaning: ME-specific. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | Class 2 (U)SIM specific message. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | Class 3 Default meaning: TE-specific (see 3GPP TS 27.005 [8]) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| Bit 3 | Bit 2 | Character set: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | GSM 7 bit default alphabet | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 8 bit data | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | UCS2 (16 bit) [10] | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | Reserved | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1000 | Reserved coding groups | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1001 |

Message with User Data Header (UDH) structure:

Bit 1 Bit 0 Message Class:
0 0 Class 0
0 1 Class 1 Default meaning: ME-specific.
1 0 Class 2 (U)SIM specific message.
1 1 Class 3 Default meaning: TE-specific (see 3GPP TS 27.005 [8])

Bits 3 and 2 indicate the alphabet being used, as follows:

Bit 3 Bit 2 Alphabet:
0 0 GSM 7 bit default alphabet
0 1 8 bit data
1 0 USC2 (16 bit) [10]
1 1 Reserved
| Bit 1 | Bit 0 | Message Class: | 0 | 0 | Class 0 | 0 | 1 | Class 1 Default meaning: ME-specific. | 1 | 0 | Class 2 (U)SIM specific message. | 1 | 1 | Class 3 Default meaning: TE-specific (see 3GPP TS 27.005 [8]) | Bit 3 | Bit 2 | Alphabet: | 0 | 0 | GSM 7 bit default alphabet | 0 | 1 | 8 bit data | 1 | 0 | USC2 (16 bit) [10] | 1 | 1 | Reserved | +| Bit 1 | Bit 0 | Message Class: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | Class 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | Class 1 Default meaning: ME-specific. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | Class 2 (U)SIM specific message. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | Class 3 Default meaning: TE-specific (see 3GPP TS 27.005 [8]) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| Bit 3 | Bit 2 | Alphabet: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | GSM 7 bit default alphabet | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 8 bit data | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | USC2 (16 bit) [10] | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | Reserved | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1010..1100 | Reserved coding groups | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1101 | I1 protocol message defined in 3GPP TS 24.294 [19] | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1110 | Defined by the WAP Forum [15] | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1111 |

Data coding / message handling

Bit 3 is reserved, set to 0.

Bit 2 Message coding:
0 GSM 7 bit default alphabet
1 8 bit data

Bit 1 Bit 0 Message Class:
0 0 No message class.
0 1 Class 1 user defined.
1 0 Class 2 user defined.
1 1 Class 3
default meaning: TE specific
(see 3GPP TS 27.005 [8])
| Bit 2 | Message coding: | 0 | GSM 7 bit default alphabet | 1 | 8 bit data | Bit 1 | Bit 0 | Message Class: | 0 | 0 | No message class. | 0 | 1 | Class 1 user defined. | 1 | 0 | Class 2 user defined. | 1 | 1 | Class 3
default meaning: TE specific
(see 3GPP TS 27.005 [8]) | | | | | | | | | | +| Bit 2 | Message coding: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | GSM 7 bit default alphabet | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 8 bit data | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| Bit 1 | Bit 0 | Message Class: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | No message class. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | Class 1 user defined. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | Class 2 user defined. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | Class 3
default meaning: TE specific
(see 3GPP TS 27.005 [8]) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + +These codings may also be used for USSD and MMI/display purposes. + +The message length specified in this subclause is not applicable for UTRAN and E-UTRAN but only applicable for GSM. + +See 3GPP TS 24.090 [11] for specific coding values applicable to USSD for MS originated USSD messages and MS terminated USSD messages. USSD messages using the default alphabet are coded with the GSM 7-bit default alphabet given in clause 6.2.1. The message can then consist of up to 182 user characters. + +Cell Broadcast messages using the default alphabet are coded with the GSM 7-bit default alphabet given in clause 6.2.1. The message then consists of 93 user characters. + +If the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension mechanism is used then the number of displayable characters will reduce by one for every instance where the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table is used. Cell Broadcast messages using 8-bit data have user-defined coding, and will be 82 octets in length. + +UCS2 character set indicates that the message is coded in UCS2 [10]. The General notes specified in clause 6.1.1 override any contrary specification in UCS2, so for example even in UCS2 a character will cause the MS to return to the beginning of the current line and overwrite any existing text with the characters which follow the . Cell Broadcast messages encoded in UCS2 consist of 41 characters. + +When a CBS message received by the MS is message class 0 and the MS has the capability of displaying CBS messages, the MS shall display the message immediately. The message shall not be automatically stored in the (U)SIM or ME. + +The ME may make provision through MMI for the user to selectively prevent the message from being displayed immediately. + +If the ME is incapable of displaying CBS messages or if the immediate display of the message has been disabled through MMI then the ME shall treat the CBS message as though there was no message class, i.e. it will ignore bits 0 and 1 in the TP-DCS but may store the message either on the ME or on the (U)SIM. + +Class 1 and Class 2 messages may be routed by the ME to user-defined destinations, but the user may override any default meaning and select their own routing. + +Class 3 messages will normally be selected for transfer to a TE, in cases where a ME supports an SMS/CBS interface to a TE, and the TE requests "TE-specific" cell broadcast messages (see 3GPP TS 27.005 [8]). The user may be able to override the default meaning and select their own routing. + +Messages with a User Data Header Structure are encoded as described in 3GPP TS 23.040 [4] for SMS, in subclauses 3.10 and 9.2.3.24. + +The use of Cell Broadcast DCS values for messages with a User Data Header structure implies that the 82-bytes CB payload has a User Data Header structure. + +The CBS message information field will contain the IEs as described in 3GPP TS 23.040. The concatenation IEs will not be used, as CB concatenation will rely in that case on the existing CB mechanism. Note that IEs that cannot be split and that IEs that are too large to fit in one CB segment cannot be transmitted using this mechanism. Also, some IEs as defined for SMS are not applicable for CB: + +| VALUE
(hex) | MEANING | +|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------| +| 00 | Concatenated short messages, 8-bit reference number | +| 01 | Special SMS Message Indication | +| 06 | SMSC Control Parameters | +| 08 | Concatenated short message, 16-bit reference number | +| 20 | RFC 822 E-Mail Header | +| 23 | Enhanced Voice Mail Information | +| 70-7F | (U)SIM Toolkit Security Headers | +| 80-89 | SME to SME specific use | + +# 6 Individual parameters + +## 6.1 General principles + +### 6.1.1 General notes + +Except where otherwise indicated, the following shall apply to all character sets: + +- 1: The characters marked "1)" are not used but are displayed as a space. +- 2: The characters of this set, when displayed, should approximate to the appearance of the relevant characters specified in ISO 1073 [16] and the relevant national standards. +- 3: Control characters: + +| Code | Meaning | +|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| LF | Line feed: Any characters following LF which are to be displayed shall be presented as the next line of the message, commencing with the first character position. | +| CR | Carriage return: Any characters following CR which are to be displayed shall be presented as the current line of the message, commencing with the first character position. | +| SP | Space character. | + +- 4: The display of characters within a message is achieved by taking each character in turn and placing it in the next available space from left to right and top to bottom. + +### 6.1.2 Character packing + +#### 6.1.2.1 SMS Packing + +##### 6.1.2.1.1 Packing of 7-bit characters + +If a character number $\alpha$ is noted in the following way: + +| | | | | | | | +|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------| +| b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| $\alpha$ a | $\alpha$ b | $\alpha$ c | $\alpha$ d | $\alpha$ e | $\alpha$ f | $\alpha$ g | + +The packing of the 7-bit characters in octets is done by completing the octets with zeros on the left. + +For examples, packing: $\alpha$ + +- one character in one octet: + +- bits number: + +| | | | | | | | | +|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +| 0 | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d | 1e | 1f | 1g | + +- two characters in two octets: + +- bits number: + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +| 2g | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d | 1e | 1f | 1g | +| 0 | 0 | 2a | 2b | 2c | 2d | 2e | 2f | + +- three characters in three octets: + +- bits number: + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +| 2g | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d | 1e | 1f | 1g | +| 3f | 3g | 2a | 2b | 2c | 2d | 2e | 2f | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 3a | 3b | 3c | 3d | 3e | + +- seven characters in seven octets: + +- bits number: + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +| 2g | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d | 1e | 1f | 1g | +| 3f | 3g | 2a | 2b | 2c | 2d | 2e | 2f | +| 4e | 4f | 4g | 3a | 3b | 3c | 3d | 3e | +| 5d | 5e | 5f | 5g | 4a | 4b | 4c | 4d | +| 6c | 6d | 6e | 6f | 6g | 5a | 5b | 5c | +| 7b | 7c | 7d | 7e | 7f | 7g | 6a | 6b | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7a | + +- eight characters in seven octets: + +- bits number: + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +| 2g | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d | 1e | 1f | 1g | +| 3f | 3g | 2a | 2b | 2c | 2d | 2e | 2f | +| 4e | 4f | 4g | 3a | 3b | 3c | 3d | 3e | +| 5d | 5e | 5f | 5g | 4a | 4b | 4c | 4d | +| 6c | 6d | 6e | 6f | 6g | 5a | 5b | 5c | +| 7b | 7c | 7d | 7e | 7f | 7g | 6a | 6b | +| 8a | 8b | 8c | 8d | 8e | 8f | 8g | 7a | + +The bit number zero is always transmitted first. + +Therefore, in 140 octets, it is possible to pack (140x8)/7=160 characters. + +#### 6.1.2.2 CBS Packing + +##### 6.1.2.2.1 Packing of 7-bit characters + +If a character number $\alpha$ is noted in the following way: + +| | | | | | | | +|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------| +| b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| $\alpha$ a | $\alpha$ b | $\alpha$ c | $\alpha$ d | $\alpha$ e | $\alpha$ f | $\alpha$ g | + +the packing of the 7-bits characters in octets is done as follows: + +| bit number | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +|--------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| +| octet number | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 2g | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d | 1e | 1f | 1g | +| 2 | 3f | 3g | 2a | 2b | 2c | 2d | 2e | 2f | +| 3 | 4e | 4f | 4g | 3a | 3b | 3c | 3d | 3e | +| 4 | 5d | 5e | 5f | 5g | 4a | 4b | 4c | 4d | +| 5 | 6c | 6d | 6e | 6f | 6g | 5a | 5b | 5c | +| 6 | 7b | 7c | 7d | 7e | 7f | 7g | 6a | 6b | +| 7 | 8a | 8b | 8c | 8d | 8e | 8f | 8g | 7a | +| 8 | 10g | 9a | 9b | 9c | 9d | 9e | 9f | 9g | +| | | | | | | | | | +| | | | | | | | | | +| 81 | 93d | 93e | 93f | 93g | 92a | 92b | 92c | 92d | +| 82 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 93a | 93b | 93c | | + +The bit number zero is always transmitted first. + +Therefore, in 82 octets, it is possible to pack $(82 \times 8) / 7 = 93.7$ , that is 93 characters. The 5 remaining bits are set to zero as stated above. + +#### 6.1.2.3 USSD packing + +##### 6.1.2.3.1 Packing of 7 bit characters + +If a character number $\alpha$ is noted in the following way: + +| | | | | | | | +|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------| +| b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| $\alpha a$ | $\alpha b$ | $\alpha c$ | $\alpha d$ | $\alpha e$ | $\alpha f$ | $\alpha g$ | + +The packing of the 7-bit characters in octets is done by completing the octets with zeros on the left. + +For example, packing: $\alpha$ + +- one character in one octet: + +- bits number: + +| | | | | | | | | | +|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---| +| | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +| 0 | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d | 1e | 1f | 1g | | + +- two characters in two octets: + +- bits number: + +| | | | | | | | | | +|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +| | 2g | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d | 1e | 1f | 1g | +| 0 | 0 | 2a | 2b | 2c | 2d | 2e | 2f | | + +- three characters in three octets: + +- bits number: + +| | | | | | | | | | +|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +| | 2g | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d | 1e | 1f | 1g | +| | 3f | 3g | 2a | 2b | 2c | 2d | 2e | 2f | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 3a | 3b | 3c | 3d | 3e | | + +- six characters in six octets: + +- bits number: + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +| 2g | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d | 1e | 1f | 1g | +| 3f | 3g | 2a | 2b | 2c | 2d | 2e | 2f | +| 4e | 4f | 4g | 3a | 3b | 3c | 3d | 3e | +| 5d | 5e | 5f | 5g | 4a | 4b | 4c | 4d | +| 6c | 6d | 6e | 6f | 6g | 5a | 5b | 5c | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6a | 6b | + +- seven characters in seven octets: + +- bits number: + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +| 2g | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d | 1e | 1f | 1g | +| 3f | 3g | 2a | 2b | 2c | 2d | 2e | 2f | +| 4e | 4f | 4g | 3a | 3b | 3c | 3d | 3e | +| 5d | 5e | 5f | 5g | 4a | 4b | 4c | 4d | +| 6c | 6d | 6e | 6f | 6g | 5a | 5b | 5c | +| 7b | 7c | 7d | 7e | 7f | 7g | 6a | 6b | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 7a | + +The bit number zero is always transmitted first. + +- eight characters in seven octets: + +- bits number: + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +| 2g | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d | 1e | 1f | 1g | +| 3f | 3g | 2a | 2b | 2c | 2d | 2e | 2f | +| 4e | 4f | 4g | 3a | 3b | 3c | 3d | 3e | +| 5d | 5e | 5f | 5g | 4a | 4b | 4c | 4d | +| 6c | 6d | 6e | 6f | 6g | 5a | 5b | 5c | +| 7b | 7c | 7d | 7e | 7f | 7g | 6a | 6b | +| 8a | 8b | 8c | 8d | 8e | 8f | 8g | 7a | + +- nine characters in eight octets: + +- bits number: + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +| 2g | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d | 1e | 1f | 1g | +| 3f | 3g | 2a | 2b | 2c | 2d | 2e | 2f | +| 4e | 4f | 4g | 3a | 3b | 3c | 3d | 3e | +| 5d | 5e | 5f | 5g | 4a | 4b | 4c | 4d | +| 6c | 6d | 6e | 6f | 6g | 5a | 5b | 5c | +| 7b | 7c | 7d | 7e | 7f | 7g | 6a | 6b | +| 8a | 8b | 8c | 8d | 8e | 8f | 8g | 7a | +| 0 | 9a | 9b | 9c | 9d | 9e | 9f | 9g | + +- fifteen characters in fourteen octets: + +- bits number: + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--| +| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | | | | | | | | +| 2g | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d | 1e | 1f | 1g | | | | | | | | +| 3f | 3g | 2a | 2b | 2c | 2d | 2e | 2f | | | | | | | | +| 4e | 4f | 4g | 3a | 3b | 3c | 3d | 3e | | | | | | | | +| 5d | 5e | 5f | 5g | 4a | 4b | 4c | 4d | | | | | | | | +| 6c | 6d | 6e | 6f | 6g | 5a | 5b | 5c | | | | | | | | +| 7b | 7c | 7d | 7e | 7f | 7g | 6a | 6b | | | | | | | | +| 8a | 8b | 8c | 8d | 8e | 8f | 8g | 7a | | | | | | | | +| 10g | 9a | 9b | 9c | 9d | 9e | 9f | 9g | | | | | | | | +| 11f | 11g | 10a | 10b | 10c | 10d | 10e | 10f | | | | | | | | +| 12e | 12f | 12g | 11a | 11b | 11c | 11d | 11e | | | | | | | | +| 13d | 13e | 13f | 13g | 12a | 12b | 12c | 12d | | | | | | | | +| 14c | 14d | 14e | 14f | 14g | 13a | 13b | 13c | | | | | | | | +| 15b | 15c | 15d | 15e | 15f | 15g | 14a | 14b | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 15a | | | | | | | | + +- sixteen characters in fourteen octets: + +- bits number: + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--| +| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | | | | | | | | +| 2g | 1a | 1b | 1c | 1d | 1e | 1f | 1g | | | | | | | | +| 3f | 3g | 2a | 2b | 2c | 2d | 2e | 2f | | | | | | | | +| 4e | 4f | 4g | 3a | 3b | 3c | 3d | 3e | | | | | | | | +| 5d | 5e | 5f | 5g | 4a | 4b | 4c | 4d | | | | | | | | +| 6c | 6d | 6e | 6f | 6g | 5a | 5b | 5c | | | | | | | | +| 7b | 7c | 7d | 7e | 7f | 7g | 6a | 6b | | | | | | | | +| 8a | 8b | 8c | 8d | 8e | 8f | 8g | 7a | | | | | | | | +| 10g | 9a | 9b | 9c | 9d | 9e | 9f | 9g | | | | | | | | +| 11f | 11g | 10a | 10b | 10c | 10d | 10e | 10f | | | | | | | | +| 12e | 12f | 12g | 11a | 11b | 11c | 11d | 11e | | | | | | | | +| 13d | 13e | 13f | 13g | 12a | 12b | 12c | 12d | | | | | | | | +| 14c | 14d | 14e | 14f | 14g | 13a | 13b | 13c | | | | | | | | +| 15b | 15c | 15d | 15e | 15f | 15g | 14a | 14b | | | | | | | | +| 16a | 16b | 16c | 16d | 16e | 16f | 16g | 15a | | | | | | | | + +The bit number zero is always transmitted first. + +Therefore, in 160 octets, is it possible to pack $(160*8)/7 = 182.8$ , that is 182 characters. The remaining 6 bits are set to zero as stated above. + +Packing of 7 bit characters in USSD strings is done in the same way as for SMS (clause 6.1.2.1). The character stream is bit padded to octet boundary with binary zeroes as shown above. + +If the total number of characters to be sent equals $(8n-1)$ where $n=1,2,3$ etc. then there are 7 spare bits at the end of the message. To avoid the situation where the receiving entity confuses 7 binary zero pad bits as the @ character, the carriage return or character (defined in clause 6.1.1) shall be used for padding in this situation, just as for Cell Broadcast. + +If is intended to be the last character and the message (including the wanted ) ends on an octet boundary, then another must be added together with a padding bit 0. The receiving entity will perform the carriage return function twice, but this will not result in misoperation as the definition of in clause 6.1.1 is identical to the definition of . + +The receiving entity shall remove the final character where the message ends on an octet boundary with as the last character. + +## 6.2 Character sets and coding + +This section provides list of character sets and codings to be supported by SMS, CBS and USSD. Implementation of the GSM 7 bit default alphabet is mandatory. Support of other character sets is optional. + +It should be noted that support of Latin and non-Latin languages by GSM 7 bit default alphabet is limited. It is therefore essential to introduce UCS 2 character set in mobile stations, SCs and systems handling SMSs, CBSs and USSDs. + +### 6.2.1 GSM 7 bit Default Alphabet + +Bits per character: 7 + +CBS/USSD pad character: CR + +Character table: + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | @ | Δ | SP | 0 | ; | P | ¿ | p | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | £ | _ | ! | 1 | A | Q | a | q | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | \$ | Φ | " | 2 | B | R | b | r | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ¥ | Γ | # | 3 | C | S | c | s | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | è | Λ | α | 4 | D | T | d | t | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | é | Ω | % | 5 | E | U | e | u | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | ù | Π | & | 6 | F | V | f | v | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | ì | Ψ | ' | 7 | G | W | g | w | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | ò | Σ | ( | 8 | H | X | h | x | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | Ç | Θ | ) | 9 | I | Y | i | y | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | LF | Ξ | * | : | J | Z | j | z | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | Ø | 1) | + | ; | K | Ä | k | ä | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | ø | Æ | , | < | L | Ö | l | ö | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | CR | æ | - | = | M | Ñ | m | ñ | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | Å | ß | . | > | N | Ü | n | ü | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | å | É | / | ? | O | Š | o | à | + +NOTE 1): This code is an escape to an extension of this table (either to the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table, see subclause 6.2.1.1, or a National Language Single Shift Table, see subclause 6.2.1.2.2). A receiving entity which does not understand the meaning of this escape mechanism shall display it as a space character. + +#### 6.2.1.1 GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table + +The table below is reserved for symbols of international significance (e.g currency symbols). It also contains a mechanism to permit escape (Note 1) to additional tables for symbols of international significance in the event that the table below becomes fully populated. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | | ^ | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | | | | | | | € | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | | | { | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | | | } | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3) | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | | 1) | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | | | | [ | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | | | | ~ | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | | | | ] | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | | | \ | | | | | | + +In the event that an MS receives a code where a symbol is not represented in the above table then the MS shall display either the character shown in the main GSM 7 bit default alphabet table in subclause 6.2.1., or the character from the National Language Locking Shift Table in the case where the locking shift mechanism as defined in subclause 6.2.1.2.3 is used. + +NOTE 1): This code is reserved for the extension to another extension table. On receipt of this code, a receiving entity shall display a space until another extension table is defined. It is not intended that this extension mechanism should be used as an alternative to UCS2 to enhance the 7bit default alphabet character repertoire for national specific character sets. + +NOTE 2): Void + +NOTE 3): This code is defined as a Page Break character and may be used for example in compressed CBS messages. Any mobile station which does not understand the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table extension mechanism will treat this character as Line Feed. + +#### 6.2.1.2 National Language Identifier + +##### 6.2.1.2.1 Introduction + +The national language tables are used for adding the special characters of certain languages that cannot be expressed using the GSM default 7 bit alphabet. + +The principle is to use the National Language Identifier to indicate to a receiving entity that the message has been encoded using a national language table. Both single shift and locking shift mechanisms are defined. + +The single shift mechanism, as defined in subclause 6.2.1.2.2, applies to a single character and it replaces the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table defined in subclause 6.2.1.1 with a National Language Single Shift Table (see subclause A.2). + +The locking shift mechanism, as defined in subclause 6.2.1.2.3, applies throughout the message, or the current segment in case of a concatenated message, and it replaces the GSM 7 bit default alphabet defined in subclause 6.2.1 with a National Language Locking Shift Table (see subclause A.3) that defines the whole character set needed for the language. + +In case that several languages are used, which require different national language tables, it is recommended to encode the message in UCS-2, however it is possible to use both single shift and locking shift with the corresponding tables in a single message. + +Implementations based on older reference versions (so-called "legacy implementations") will use the fallback mechanisms that are defined in the earlier versions of the specification for handling of unknown characters. + +##### 6.2.1.2.2 Single shift mechanism + +In the case where single shift is not combined with locking shift, single shift means that the receiving entity shall decode all characters in the message (or the current segment in case of a concatenated message) using the GSM 7 bit default alphabet unless the escape mechanism is used, i.e. , as defined in subclause 6.2.1. + +The case where single shift and locking shift (which may be for the same or different languages) are combined is described in subclause 6.2.1.2.3. + +If the escape mechanism is used then instead of the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table in subclause 6.2.1.1 the receiving entity shall decode the subsequent character using the National Language Single Shift Table for the indicated language in table 6.2.1.2.4.1. Each time a sending entity requires to send a character from the National Language Single Shift Table the sending entity shall encode this as , where the is encoded using the indicated National Language Single Shift Table. + +##### 6.2.1.2.3 Locking shift mechanism + +Locking Shift means that the receiving entity shall decode all characters in the message (or the current segment in case of a concatenated message) using the National Language Locking Shift Table unless the escape mechanism is used. i.e. , as defined in subclause 6.2.1. + +If the escape mechanism is used and no National Language Single Shift Table is indicated (see subclause 6.2.1.2.4), the receiving entity shall decode the message (or the current segment in case of a concatenated message) using the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table as defined in subclause 6.2.1.1. + +If the escape mechanism is used and a National Language Single Shift Table is indicated (see subclause 6.2.1.2.4), the receiving entity shall decode the message (or the current segment in case of a concatenated message) using the National Language Single Shift Table as defined in subclause 6.2.1.2.2. + +##### 6.2.1.2.4 National Language Identifier + +A National Language Single Shift IE and a National Language Locking Shift IE can be included in the TP User Data Header, as defined in 3GPP TS 23.040 [4]. The receiving entity shall decode using single shift or locking shift as applicable for the language indicated in the National Language Identifier within these IEs. + +The National Language Identifier octet is encoded as shown in table 6.2.1.2.4.1. + +**Table 6.2.1.2.4.1** + +| Language code b7.....b0 | Language | National Language Single Shift Table | National Language Locking Shift Table | +|-------------------------|------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 00000000 | Reserved | n/a | n/a | +| 00000001 | Turkish | Subclause A.2.1 | Subclause A.3.1 | +| 00000010 | Spanish | Subclause A.2.2 | Not defined – fallback to GSM 7 bit default alphabet (see subclause 6.2.1) | +| 00000011 | Portuguese | Subclause A.2.3 | Subclause A.3.3 | +| 00000100 | Bengali | Subclause A.2.4 | Subclause A.3.4 | +| 00000101 | Gujarati | Subclause A.2.5 | Subclause A.3.5 | +| 00000110 | Hindi | Subclause A.2.6 | Subclause A.3.6 | +| 00000111 | Kannada | Subclause A.2.7 | Subclause A.3.7 | +| 00001000 | Malayalam | Subclause A.2.8 | Subclause A.3.8 | +| 00001001 | Oriya | Subclause A.2.9 | Subclause A.3.9 | +| 00001010 | Punjabi | Subclause A.2.10 | Subclause A.3.10 | +| 00001011 | Tamil | Subclause A.2.11 | Subclause A.3.11 | +| 00001100 | Telugu | Subclause A.2.12 | Subclause A.3.12 | +| 00001101 | Urdu | Subclause A.2.13 | Subclause A.3.13 | +| 00001110 to 11111111 | Reserved | n/a | n/a | + +##### 6.2.1.2.5 Processing of national language characters + +When supporting a specific national language, the sending entity shall support the encoding of messages using the corresponding National Language Identifier defined in subclause 6.2.1.2.4. + +The receiving entity should be able to decode messages using the National Language Identifiers defined in subclause 6.2.1.2.4 for the languages that are supported by that entity. + +If a message is received, containing a National Language Identifier indicating a reserved value or a value that is not supported by the receiving entity, the receiving entity shall ignore the IE (see 3GPP TS 23.040 [4]) in which the National Language Identifier was indicated. + +The receiving entity shall be capable of processing both single shift and locking shift within the same message. + +It is an implementation option for the sending entity whether to use the single shift mechanism, the locking shift mechanism or both. + +NOTE 1: A message using the locking shift mechanism cannot make use of characters from the GSM 7 bit Default Alphabet table unless such characters are replicated in the National Language Locking Shift Table or (in the case of locking shift and single shift), the National Language Single Shift table. + +NOTE 2: Encoding of a message using the national locking shift mechanism is not intended to be implemented until a formal request is issued by the relevant national regulatory body. This is because a receiving entity not supporting the relevant locking-shift decoding will present different characters from the ones intended by the sending entity. + +NOTE 3: An SMS message using a locking shift table for a language may not be properly displayed when the terminal does not support the locking shift table for that language. When the network is aware of the list of the locking shift tables supported by the UE, the network can deliver the SMS messages using an appropriate encoding. + +### 6.2.2 8 bit data + +8 bit data is user defined + +Padding: CR in the case of an 8 bit character set +Otherwise - user defined + +Character table: User Specific + +### 6.2.3 UCS2 + +Bits per character: 16 + +CBS/USSD pad character: CR + +Character table: ISO/IEC 10646 [10] + +# --- Annex A (normative): National Language Tables + +## A.1 Introduction + +This annex contains character tables for specific languages whose characters are not wholly or partially present within the GSM 7 bit default alphabet. + +## A.2 National Language Single Shift Tables + +### A.2.1 Turkish National Language Single Shift Table + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | B1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | ı | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | | | | | | Ş | ç | ş | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | | ^ | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | | | | | | | € | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | | | | | Ğ | | ğ | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | | | { | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | | | } | | İ | | ı | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3) | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | | 1) | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | | | | [ | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 4) | | | ~ | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | | | | ] | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | | | \ | | | | | | + +NOTE 1): This code is reserved for the extension to another extension table. On receipt of this code, a receiving entity shall display a space until another extension table is defined. NOTE 2): Void + +NOTE 3): This code is defined as a Page Break character and may be used for example in compressed CBS messages. Any mobile station which does not understand the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table extension mechanism will treat this character as Line Feed. + +NOTE 4): This code represents a control character and therefore must not be used for language specific characters. + +### A.2.2 Spanish National Language Single Shift Table + +NOTE: This table also includes the character "ç" used in Catalan. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | ¡ | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | | Á | | á | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | | ^ | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | | | | | | Ú | € | ú | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | | | { | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | ç | | } | | Í | | í | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3) | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | | 1) | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | | | | [ | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 4) | | | ~ | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | | | | ] | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | | | \ | | Ó | | ó | | + +NOTE 1): This code is reserved for the extension to another extension table. On receipt of this code, a receiving entity shall display a space until another extension table is defined. + +NOTE 2): Void + +NOTE 3): This code is defined as a Page Break character and may be used for example in compressed CBS messages. Any mobile station which does not understand the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table extension mechanism will treat this character as Line Feed. + +NOTE 4): This code represents a control character and therefore must not be used for language specific characters. + +### A.2.3 Portuguese National Language Single Shift Table + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | | À | | Â | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | | Φ | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | | Γ | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | | ^ | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | ê | Ω | | | | Ú | € | ú | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | | Π | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | | Ψ | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | | Σ | { | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | ç | Θ | } | | Í | | í | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3) | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | Ô | 1) | | | | Ã | | ã | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | ô | | | [ | | Õ | | õ | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 4) | | | ~ | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | Á | | | ] | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | á | Ê | \ | | Ó | | ó | â | + +NOTE 1): This code is reserved for the extension to another extension table. On receipt of this code, a receiving entity shall display a space until another extension table is defined. + +NOTE 2): Void. + +NOTE 3): This code is defined as a Page Break character and may be used for example in compressed CBS messages. Any mobile station which does not understand the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table extension mechanism will treat this character as Line Feed. + +NOTE 4): This code represents a control character and therefore must not be used for language specific characters. + +### A.2.4 Bengali National Language Single Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Bengali characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|------|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | @ | < | 09EC | 09F6 | I | P | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | £ | = | 09ED | 09F7 | A | Q | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | \$ | > | 09EE | 09F8 | B | R | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ¥ | i | 09EF | 09F9 | C | S | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | ¿ | ^ | 09DF | 09FA | D | T | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | " | i | 09E0 | | E | U | € | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | ¤ | — | 09E1 | | F | V | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | % | # | 09E2 | | G | W | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | & | * | { | | H | X | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | ' | 09E6 | } | | I | Y | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3) | 09E7 | 09E3 | | J | Z | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | * | 1) | 09F2 | | K | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | + | 09E8 | 09F3 | [ | L | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 4) | 09E9 | 09F4 | ~ | M | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | — | 09EA | 09F5 | ] | N | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | / | 09EB | \ | | O | | | | + +NOTE 1): This code is reserved for the extension to another extension table. On receipt of this code, a receiving entity shall display a space until another extension table is defined. + +NOTE 2): Void + +NOTE 3): This code is defined as a Page Break character and may be used for example in compressed CBS messages. Any mobile station which does not understand the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table extension mechanism will treat this character as Line Feed. + +NOTE 4): This code represents a control character and therefore must not be used for language specific characters. + +### A.2.5 Gujarati National Language Single Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Gujarati characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|---|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | @ | < | 0AEA | | I | P | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | £ | = | 0AEB | | A | Q | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | \$ | > | 0AEC | | B | R | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ¥ | i | 0AED | | C | S | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | ¿ | ^ | 0AEE | | D | T | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | " | i | 0AEF | | E | U | € | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | ¤ | — | | | F | V | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | % | # | | | G | W | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | & | * | { | | H | X | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | ' | 0964 | } | | I | Y | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3) | 0965 | | | J | Z | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | * | 1) | | | K | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | + | 0AE6 | | [ | L | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 4) | 0AE7 | | ~ | M | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | - | 0AE8 | | ] | N | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | / | 0AE9 | \ | | O | | | | + +NOTE 1): This code is reserved for the extension to another extension table. On receipt of this code, a receiving entity shall display a space until another extension table is defined. + +NOTE 2): Void + +NOTE 3): This code is defined as a Page Break character and may be used for example in compressed CBS messages. Any mobile station which does not understand the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table extension mechanism will treat this character as Line Feed. + +NOTE 4): This code represents a control character and therefore must not be used for language specific characters. + +### A.2.6 Hindi National Language Single Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Hindi characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|------|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | @ | < | 096A | 095B | I | P | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | £ | = | 096B | 095C | A | Q | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | \$ | > | 096C | 095D | B | R | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ¥ | i | 096D | 095E | C | S | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | ¿ | ^ | 096E | 095F | D | T | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | " | i | 096F | 0960 | E | U | € | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | ¤ | _ | 0951 | 0961 | F | V | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | % | # | 0952 | 0962 | G | W | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | & | * | { | 0963 | H | X | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | ' | 0964 | } | 0970 | I | Y | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3) | 0965 | 0953 | 0971 | J | Z | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | * | 1) | 0954 | | K | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | + | 0966 | 0958 | [ | L | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 4) | 0967 | 0959 | ~ | M | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | - | 0968 | 095A | ] | N | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | / | 0969 | \ | | O | | | | + +NOTE 1): This code is reserved for the extension to another extension table. On receipt of this code, a receiving entity shall display a space until another extension table is defined. + +NOTE 2): Void + +NOTE 3): This code is defined as a Page Break character and may be used for example in compressed CBS messages. Any mobile station which does not understand the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table extension mechanism will treat this character as Line Feed. + +NOTE 4): This code represents a control character and therefore must not be used for language specific characters. + +### A.2.7 Kannada National Language Single Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Kannada characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|---|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | @ | < | 0CEA | | I | P | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | £ | = | 0CEB | | A | Q | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | \$ | > | 0CEC | | B | R | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ¥ | i | 0CED | | C | S | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | ¿ | ^ | 0CEE | | D | T | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | " | i | 0CEF | | E | U | € | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | ¤ | — | 0CDE | | F | V | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | % | # | 0CF1 | | G | W | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | & | * | { | | H | X | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | ' | 0964 | } | | I | Y | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3) | 0965 | 0CF2 | | J | Z | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | * | 1) | | | K | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | + | 0CE6 | | [ | L | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 4) | 0CE7 | | ~ | M | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | — | 0CE8 | | ] | N | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | / | 0CE9 | \ | | O | | | | + +NOTE 1): This code is reserved for the extension to another extension table. On receipt of this code, a receiving entity shall display a space until another extension table is defined. + +NOTE 2): Void + +NOTE 3): This code is defined as a Page Break character and may be used for example in compressed CBS messages. Any mobile station which does not understand the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table extension mechanism will treat this character as Line Feed. + +NOTE 4): This code represents a control character and therefore must not be used for language specific characters. + +### A.2.8 Malayalam National Language Single Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Malayalam characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|------|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | @ | < | 0D6A | 0D7B | I | P | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | £ | = | 0D6B | 0D7C | A | Q | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | \$ | > | 0D6C | 0D7D | B | R | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ¥ | i | 0D6D | 0D7E | C | S | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | ¿ | ^ | 0D6E | 0D7F | D | T | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | " | i | 0D6F | | E | U | € | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | ¤ | — | 0D70 | | F | V | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | % | # | 0D71 | | G | W | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | & | * | { | | H | X | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | ' | 0964 | } | | I | Y | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3) | 0965 | 0D72 | | J | Z | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | * | 1) | 0D73 | | K | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | + | 0D66 | 0D74 | [ | L | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 4) | 0D67 | 0D75 | ~ | M | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | - | 0D68 | 0D7A | ] | N | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | / | 0D69 | \ | | O | | | | + +NOTE 1): This code is reserved for the extension to another extension table. On receipt of this code, a receiving entity shall display a space until another extension table is defined. + +NOTE 2): Void + +NOTE 3): This code is defined as a Page Break character and may be used for example in compressed CBS messages. Any mobile station which does not understand the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table extension mechanism will treat this character as Line Feed. + +NOTE 4): This code represents a control character and therefore must not be used for language specific characters. + +### A.2.9 Oriya National Language Single Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Oriya characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|---|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | @ | < | 0B6A | | | P | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | £ | = | 0B6B | | A | Q | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | \$ | > | 0B6C | | B | R | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ¥ | ¡ | 0B6D | | C | S | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | ¿ | ^ | 0B6E | | D | T | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | " | i | 0B6F | | E | U | € | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | ¤ | _ | 0B5C | | F | V | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | % | # | 0B5D | | G | W | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | & | * | { | | H | X | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | ' | 0964 | } | | I | Y | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | ( | 0965 | 0B5F | | J | Z | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | ) | 1) | 0B70 | | K | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | + | 0B66 | 0B71 | [ | L | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | : | 0B67 | | ~ | M | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | - | 0B68 | | ] | N | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | / | 0B69 | \ | | O | | | | + +NOTE 1): This code is reserved for the extension to another extension table. On receipt of this code, a receiving entity shall display a space until another extension table is defined. + +NOTE 2): Void + +NOTE 3): This code is defined as a Page Break character and may be used for example in compressed CBS messages. Any mobile station which does not understand the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table extension mechanism will treat this character as Line Feed. + +NOTE 4): This code represents a control character and therefore must not be used for language specific characters. + +### A.2.10 Punjabi National Language Single Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Punjabi characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|---|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | @ | < | 0A6A | | I | P | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | £ | = | 0A6B | | A | Q | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | \$ | > | 0A6C | | B | R | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ¥ | ; | 0A6D | | C | S | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | ¿ | ^ | 0A6E | | D | T | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | " | i | 0A6F | | E | U | € | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | ¤ | _ | 0A59 | | F | V | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | % | # | 0A5A | | G | W | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | & | * | { | | H | X | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | ' | 0964 | } | | I | Y | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3) | 0965 | 0A5B | | J | Z | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | * | 1) | 0A5C | | K | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | + | 0A66 | 0A5E | [ | L | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 4) | 0A67 | 0A75 | ~ | M | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | - | 0A68 | | ] | N | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | / | 0A69 | \ | | O | | | | + +NOTE 1): This code is reserved for the extension to another extension table. On receipt of this code, a receiving entity shall display a space until another extension table is defined. + +NOTE 2): Void + +NOTE 3): This code is defined as a Page Break character and may be used for example in compressed CBS messages. Any mobile station which does not understand the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table extension mechanism will treat this character as Line Feed. + +NOTE 4): This code represents a control character and therefore must not be used for language specific characters. + +### A.2.11 Tamil National Language Single Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Tamil characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|---|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | @ | < | 0BEA | | | P | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | £ | = | 0BEB | | A | Q | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | \$ | > | 0BEC | | B | R | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ¥ | ¡ | 0BED | | C | S | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | ¿ | ^ | 0BEE | | D | T | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | " | i | 0BEF | | E | U | € | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | ¤ | _ | 0BF3 | | F | V | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | % | # | 0BF4 | | G | W | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | & | * | { | | H | X | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | ' | 0964 | } | | I | Y | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3) | 0965 | 0BF5 | | J | Z | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | * | 1) | 0BF6 | | K | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | + | 0BE6 | 0BF7 | [ | L | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 4) | 0BE7 | 0BF8 | ~ | M | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | - | 0BE8 | 0BFA | ] | N | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | / | 0BE9 | \ | | O | | | | + +NOTE 1): This code is reserved for the extension to another extension table. On receipt of this code, a receiving entity shall display a space until another extension table is defined. + +NOTE 2): Void + +NOTE 3): This code is defined as a Page Break character and may be used for example in compressed CBS messages. Any mobile station which does not understand the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table extension mechanism will treat this character as Line Feed. + +NOTE 4): This code represents a control character and therefore must not be used for language specific characters. + +### A.2.12 Telugu National Language Single Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Telugu characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|------|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | @ | < | 0C6A | 0C7D | | P | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | £ | = | 0C6B | 0C7E | A | Q | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | \$ | > | 06CC | 0C7F | B | R | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ¥ | ¡ | 06CD | | C | S | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | ¿ | ^ | 0C6E | | D | T | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | " | i | 0C6F | | E | U | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | ¤ | _ | 0C58 | | F | V | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | % | # | 0C59 | | G | W | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | & | * | { | | H | X | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9 | ' | | } | | I | Y | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3) | | 0C78 | | J | Z | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | * | 1) | 0C79 | | K | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | + | 0C66 | 0C7A | [ | L | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 4) | 0C67 | 0C7B | ~ | M | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | - | 0C68 | 0C7C | ] | N | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | / | 0C69 | \ | | O | | | | + +NOTE 1): This code is reserved for the extension to another extension table. On receipt of this code, a receiving entity shall display a space until another extension table is defined. + +NOTE 2): Void + +NOTE 3): This code is defined as a Page Break character and may be used for example in compressed CBS messages. Any mobile station which does not understand the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table extension mechanism will treat this character as Line Feed. + +NOTE 4): This code represents a control character and therefore must not be used for language specific characters. + +### A.2.13 Urdu National Language Single Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Urdu characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|------|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | @ | < | 06F4 | 0613 | I | P | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | £ | = | 06F5 | 0614 | A | Q | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | \$ | > | 06F6 | 061B | B | R | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ¥ | ; | 06F7 | 061F | C | S | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | ¿ | ^ | 06F8 | 0640 | D | T | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | " | ; | 06F9 | 0652 | E | U | € | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | ¤ | _ | 060C | 0658 | F | V | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | % | # | 060D | 066B | G | W | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | & | * | { | 066C | H | X | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | ' | 0600 | } | 0672 | I | Y | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3) | 0601 | 060E | 0673 | J | Z | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | * | 1) | 060F | 06CD | K | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | + | 06F0 | 0610 | [ | L | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 4) | 06F1 | 0611 | ~ | M | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | - | 06F2 | 0612 | ] | N | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | / | 06F3 | \ | 06D4 | O | | | | + +NOTE 1): This code is reserved for the extension to another extension table. On receipt of this code, a receiving entity shall display a space until another extension table is defined. + +NOTE 2): Void + +NOTE 3): This code is defined as a Page Break character and may be used for example in compressed CBS messages. Any mobile station which does not understand the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table extension mechanism will treat this character as Line Feed. + +NOTE 4): This code represents a control character and therefore must not be used for language specific characters. + +## A.3 National Language Locking Shift Tables + +### A.3.1 Turkish National Language Locking Shift Table + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | @ | Δ | SP | 0 | İ | P | ç | p | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | £ | _ | ! | 1 | A | Q | a | q | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | \$ | Φ | " | 2 | B | R | b | r | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ¥ | Γ | # | 3 | C | S | c | s | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | € | Λ | ¤ | 4 | D | T | d | t | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | é | Ω | % | 5 | E | U | e | u | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | ù | Π | & | 6 | F | V | f | v | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | ı | Ψ | ' | 7 | G | W | g | w | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | ò | Σ | ( | 8 | H | X | h | x | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | Ç | Θ | ) | 9 | I | Y | i | y | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | LF | Ξ | * | : | J | Z | j | z | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | Ğ | 1) | + | ; | K | Ä | k | ä | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | ğ | Ş | , | < | L | Ö | l | ö | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | CR | ş | - | = | M | Ñ | m | ñ | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | Å | ß | . | > | N | Ü | n | ü | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | å | É | / | ? | O | Ş | o | à | + +NOTE 1): This code is an escape to an extension of this table (either to the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table, see subclause 6.2.1.1, or a National Language Single Shift Table, see subclause 6.2.1.2.2). A receiving entity which does not understand the meaning of this escape mechanism shall display it as a space character. + +### A.3.2 Void + +### A.3.3 Portuguese National Language Locking Shift Table + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | @ | Δ | SP | 0 | Í | P | ~ | p | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | £ | _ | ! | 1 | A | Q | a | q | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | \$ | ª | " | 2 | B | R | b | r | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ¥ | Ç | # | 3 | C | S | c | s | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | ê | À | ° | 4 | D | T | d | t | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | é | º | % | 5 | E | U | e | u | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | ú | ^ | & | 6 | F | V | f | v | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | í | \ | ' | 7 | G | W | g | w | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | ó | € | ( | 8 | H | X | h | x | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | ç | Ó | ) | 9 | I | Y | i | y | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | LF | | * | : | J | Z | j | z | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | Ô | 1) | + | ; | K | Ã | k | ã | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | ô | Â | , | < | L | Õ | l | õ | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | CR | â | - | = | M | Ú | m | ò | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | Á | Ê | . | > | N | Ü | n | ü | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | á | É | / | ? | O | § | o | à | +| NOTE 1): This code is an escape to an extension of this table (either to the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table, see subclause 6.2.1.1, or a National Language Single Shift Table, see subclause 6.2.1.2.2). A receiving entity which does not understand the meaning of this escape mechanism shall display it as a space character. | | | | | | | | | | | | | + +### A.3.4 Bengali National Language Locking Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Bengali characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0981 | 0990 | SP | 0 | 09AC | 09BE | 09CE | p | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0982 | | ! | 1 | 09AD | 09BF | a | q | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0983 | | 099F | 2 | 09AE | 09C0 | b | r | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0985 | 0993 | 09A0 | 3 | 09AF | 09C1 | c | s | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0986 | 0994 | 09A1 | 4 | 09B0 | 09C2 | d | t | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0987 | 0995 | 09A2 | 5 | | 09C3 | e | u | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 0988 | 0996 | 09A3 | 6 | 09B2 | 09C4 | f | v | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 0989 | 0997 | 09A4 | 7 | | | g | w | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 098A | 0998 | ) | 8 | | | h | x | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 098B | 0999 | ( | 9 | | 09C7 | i | y | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | LF | 099A | 09A5 | : | 09B6 | 09C8 | j | z | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 098C | 1) | 09A6 | ; | 09B7 | | k | 09D7 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | | 099B | , | | 09B8 | | l | 09DC | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | CR | 099C | 09A7 | 09AA | 09B9 | 09CB | m | 09DD | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | | 099D | . | 09AB | 09BC | 09CC | n | 09F0 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 098F | 099E | 09A8 | ? | 09BD | 09CD | o | 09F1 | + +NOTE 1): This code is an escape to an extension of this table (either to the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table, see subclause 6.2.1.1, or a National Language Single Shift Table, see subclause 6.2.1.2.2). A receiving entity which does not understand the meaning of this escape mechanism shall display it as a space character. + +### A.3.5 Gujarati National Language Locking Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Gujarati characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0A81 | 0A90 | SP | 0 | 0AAC | 0ABE | 0AD0 | p | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0A82 | 0A91 | ! | 1 | 0AAD | 0ABF | a | q | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0A83 | | 0A9F | 2 | 0AAE | 0AC0 | b | r | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0A85 | 0A93 | 0AA0 | 3 | 0AAF | 0AC1 | c | s | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0A86 | 0A94 | 0AA1 | 4 | 0AB0 | 0AC2 | d | t | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0A87 | 0A95 | 0AA2 | 5 | | 0AC3 | e | u | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 0A88 | 0A96 | 0AA3 | 6 | 0AB2 | 0AC4 | f | v | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 0A89 | 0A97 | 0AA4 | 7 | 0AB3 | 0AC5 | g | w | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0A8A | 0A98 | ) | 8 | | | h | x | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 0A8B | 0A99 | ( | 9 | 0AB5 | 0AC7 | i | y | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | LF | 0A9A | 0AA5 | : | 0AB6 | 0AC8 | j | z | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 0A8C | 1) | 0AA6 | ; | 0AB7 | 0AC9 | k | 0AE0 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0A8D | 0A9B | , | | 0AB8 | | l | 0AE1 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | CR | 0A9C | 0AA7 | 0AAA | 0AB9 | 0ACB | m | 0AE2 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | | 0A9D | . | 0AAB | 0ABC | 0ACC | n | 0AE3 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 0A8F | 0A9E | 0AA8 | ? | 0ABD | 0ACD | o | 0AF1 | + +NOTE 1): This code is an escape to an extension of this table (either to the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table, see subclause 6.2.1.1, or a National Language Single Shift Table, see subclause 6.2.1.2.2). A receiving entity which does not understand the meaning of this escape mechanism shall display it as a space character. + +### A.3.6 Hindi National Language Locking Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Hindi characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0901 | 0910 | SP | 0 | 092C | 093E | 0950 | p | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0902 | 0911 | ! | 1 | 092D | 093F | a | q | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0903 | 0912 | 091F | 2 | 092E | 0940 | b | r | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0905 | 0913 | 0920 | 3 | 092F | 0941 | c | s | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0906 | 0914 | 0921 | 4 | 0930 | 0942 | d | t | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0907 | 0915 | 0922 | 5 | 0931 | 0943 | e | u | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 0908 | 0916 | 0923 | 6 | 0932 | 0944 | f | v | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 0909 | 0917 | 0924 | 7 | 0933 | 0945 | g | w | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 090A | 0918 | ) | 8 | 0934 | 0946 | h | x | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 090B | 0919 | ( | 9 | 0935 | 0947 | i | y | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | LF | 091A | 0925 | : | 0936 | 0948 | j | z | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 090C | 091B | 0926 | ; | 0937 | 0949 | k | 0972 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 090D | 091B | , | 0929 | 0938 | 094A | l | 097B | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | CR | 091C | 0927 | 092A | 0939 | 094B | m | 097C | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 090E | 091D | . | 092B | 093C | 094C | n | 097E | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 090F | 091E | 0928 | ? | 093D | 094D | o | 097F | + +NOTE 1): This code is an escape to an extension of this table (either to the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table, see subclause 6.2.1.1, or a National Language Single Shift Table, see subclause 6.2.1.2.2). A receiving entity which does not understand the meaning of this escape mechanism shall display it as a space character. + +### A.3.7 Kannada National Language Locking Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Kannada characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0C90 | SP | 0 | 0CAC | 0CBE | 0CD5 | p | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0C82 | | ! | 1 | 0CAD | 0CBF | a | q | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0C83 | 0C92 | 0C9F | 2 | 0CAE | 0CC0 | b | r | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0C85 | 0C93 | 0CA0 | 3 | 0CAF | 0CC1 | c | s | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0C86 | 0C94 | 0CAA | 4 | 0CB0 | 0CC2 | d | t | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0C87 | 0C95 | 0CA2 | 5 | 0CB1 | 0CC3 | e | u | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 0C88 | 0C96 | 0CA3 | 6 | 0CB2 | 0CC4 | f | v | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 0C89 | 0C97 | 0CA4 | 7 | 0CB3 | | g | w | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0C8A | 0C98 | ) | 8 | | 0CC6 | h | x | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 0C8B | 0C99 | ( | 9 | 0CB5 | 0CC7 | i | y | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | LF | 0C9A | 0CA5 | : | 0CB6 | 0CC8 | j | z | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 0C8C | 1) | 0CA6 | ; | 0CB7 | | k | 0CD6 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | | 0C9B | , | | 0CB8 | 0CCA | l | 0CE0 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | CR | 0C9C | 0CA7 | 0CAA | 0CB9 | 0CCB | m | 0CE1 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 0C8E | 0C9D | . | 0CAB | 0CBC | 0CCC | n | 0CE2 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 0C8F | 0C9E | 0CA8 | ? | 0CBD | 0CCD | o | 0CE3 | + +NOTE 1): This code is an escape to an extension of this table (either to the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table, see subclause 6.2.1.1, or a National Language Single Shift Table, see subclause 6.2.1.2.2). A receiving entity which does not understand the meaning of this escape mechanism shall display it as a space character. + +### A.3.8 Malayalam National Language Locking Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Malayalam characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0D10 | SP | 0 | 0D2C | 0D3E | 0D57 | p | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0D02 | | ! | 1 | 0D2D | 0D3F | a | q | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0D03 | 0D12 | 0D1F | 2 | 0D2E | 0D40 | b | r | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0D05 | 0D13 | 0D20 | 3 | 0D2F | 0D41 | c | s | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0D06 | 0D14 | 0D21 | 4 | 0D30 | 0D42 | d | t | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0D07 | 0D15 | 0D22 | 5 | 0D31 | 0D43 | e | u | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 0D08 | 0D16 | 0D23 | 6 | 0D32 | 0D44 | f | v | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 0D09 | 0D17 | 0D24 | 7 | 0D33 | | g | w | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0D0A | 0D18 | ) | 8 | 0D34 | 0D46 | h | x | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 0D0B | 0D19 | ( | 9 | 0D35 | 0D47 | i | y | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | LF | 0D1A | 0D25 | : | 0D36 | 0D48 | j | z | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 0D0C | 1) | 0D26 | ; | 0D37 | | k | 0D60 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | | 0D1B | , | | 0D38 | 0D4A | l | 0D61 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | CR | 0D1C | 0D27 | 0D2A | 0D39 | 0D4B | m | 0D62 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 0D0E | 0D1D | . | 0D2B | | 0D4C | n | 0D63 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 0D0F | 0D1E | 0D28 | ? | 0D3D | 0D4D | o | 0D79 | + +NOTE 1): This code is an escape to an extension of this table (either to the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table, see subclause 6.2.1.1, or a National Language Single Shift Table, see subclause 6.2.1.2.2). A receiving entity which does not understand the meaning of this escape mechanism shall display it as a space character. + +### A.3.9 Oriya National Language Locking Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Oriya characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0B01 | 0B10 | SP | 0 | 0B2C | 0B3E | 0B56 | p | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0B02 | | ! | 1 | 0B2D | 0B3F | a | q | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0B03 | | 0B1F | 2 | 0B2E | 0B40 | b | r | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0B05 | 0B13 | 0B20 | 3 | 0B2F | 0B41 | c | s | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0B06 | 0B14 | 0B21 | 4 | 0B30 | 0B42 | d | t | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0B07 | 0B15 | 0B22 | 5 | | 0B43 | e | u | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 0B08 | 0B16 | 0B23 | 6 | 0B32 | 0B44 | f | v | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 0B09 | 0B17 | 0B24 | 7 | 0B33 | | g | w | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0B0A | 0B18 | ) | 8 | | | h | x | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 0B0B | 0B19 | ( | 9 | 0B35 | 0B47 | i | y | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | LF | 0B1A | 0B25 | : | 0B36 | 0B48 | j | z | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 0B0C | 1) | 0B26 | ; | 0B37 | | k | 0B57 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | | 0B1B | , | | 0B38 | | l | 0B60 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | CR | 0B1C | 0B27 | 0B2A | 0B39 | 0B4B | m | 0B61 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | | 0B1D | . | 0B2B | 0B3C | 0B4C | n | 0B62 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 0B0F | 0B1E | 0B28 | ? | 0B3D | 0B4D | o | 0B63 | + +NOTE 1): This code is an escape to an extension of this table (either to the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table, see subclause 6.2.1.1, or a National Language Single Shift Table, see subclause 6.2.1.2.2). A receiving entity which does not understand the meaning of this escape mechanism shall display it as a space character. + +### A.3.10 Punjabi National Language Locking Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Punjabi characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0A01 | 0A10 | SP | 0 | 0A2C | 0A3E | 0A51 | p | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0A02 | | ! | 1 | 0A2D | 0A3F | a | q | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0A03 | | 0A1F | 2 | 0A2E | 0A40 | b | r | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0A05 | 0A13 | 0A20 | 3 | 0A2F | 0A41 | c | s | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0A06 | 0A14 | 0A21 | 4 | 0A30 | 0A42 | d | t | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0A07 | 0A15 | 0A22 | 5 | | | e | u | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 0A08 | 0A16 | 0A23 | 6 | 0A32 | | f | v | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 0A09 | 0A17 | 0A24 | 7 | 0A33 | | g | w | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0A0A | 0A18 | ) | 8 | | | h | x | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | | 0A19 | ( | 9 | 0A35 | 0A47 | i | y | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | LF | 0A1A | 0A25 | : | 0A36 | 0A48 | j | z | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | | 1) | 0A26 | ; | | | k | 0A70 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | | 0A1B | , | | 0A38 | | l | 0A71 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | CR | 0A1C | 0A27 | 0A2A | 0A39 | 0A4B | m | 0A72 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | | 0A1D | . | 0A2B | 0A3C | 0A4C | n | 0A73 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 0A0F | 0A1E | 0A28 | ? | | 0A4D | o | 0A74 | + +NOTE 1): This code is an escape to an extension of this table (either to the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table, see subclause 6.2.1.1, or a National Language Single Shift Table, see subclause 6.2.1.2.2). A receiving entity which does not understand the meaning of this escape mechanism shall display it as a space character. + +### A.3.11 Tamil National Language Locking Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Tamil characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0B90 | SP | 0 | | 0BBE | 0BD0 | p | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0B82 | | ! | 1 | | 0BBF | a | q | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0B83 | 0B92 | 0B9F | 2 | 0BAE | 0BC0 | b | r | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0B85 | 0B93 | | 3 | 0BAF | 0BC1 | c | s | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0B86 | 0B94 | | 4 | 0BB0 | 0BC2 | d | t | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0B87 | 0B95 | | 5 | 0BB1 | | e | u | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 0B88 | | 0BA3 | 6 | 0BB2 | | f | v | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 0B89 | | 0BA4 | 7 | 0BB3 | | g | w | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0B8A | | ) | 8 | 0BB4 | 0BC6 | h | x | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | | 0B99 | ( | 9 | 0BB5 | 0BC7 | i | y | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | LF | 0B9A | | : | 0BB6 | 0BC8 | j | z | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | | 1) | | ; | 0BB7 | | k | 0BD7 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | | | , | 0BA9 | 0BB8 | 0BCA | l | 0BF0 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | CR | 0B9C | | 0BAA | 0BB9 | 0BCB | m | 0BF1 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 0B8E | | . | | | 0BCC | n | 0BF2 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 0B8F | 0B9E | 0BA8 | ? | | 0BCD | o | 0BF9 | + +NOTE 1): This code is an escape to an extension of this table (either to the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table, see subclause 6.2.1.1, or a National Language Single Shift Table, see subclause 6.2.1.2.2). A receiving entity which does not understand the meaning of this escape mechanism shall display it as a space character. + +### A.3.12 Telugu National Language Locking Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Telugu characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0C01 | 0C10 | SP | 0 | 0C2C | 0C3E | 0C55 | p | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0C02 | | ! | 1 | 0C2D | 0C3F | a | q | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0C03 | 0C12 | 0C1F | 2 | 0C2E | 0C40 | b | r | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0C05 | 0C13 | 0C20 | 3 | 0C2F | 0C41 | c | s | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0C06 | 0C14 | 0C21 | 4 | 0C30 | 0C42 | d | t | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0C07 | 0C15 | 0C22 | 5 | 0C31 | 0C43 | e | u | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 0C08 | 0C16 | 0C23 | 6 | 0C32 | 0C44 | f | v | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 0C09 | 0C17 | 0C24 | 7 | 0C33 | | g | w | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0C0A | 0C18 | ) | 8 | | 0C46 | h | x | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 0C0B | 0C19 | ( | 9 | 0C35 | 0C47 | i | y | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | LF | 0C1A | 0C25 | : | 0C36 | 0C48 | j | z | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 0C0C | 1) | 0C26 | ; | 0C37 | | k | 0C56 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | | 0C1B | , | | 0C38 | 0C4A | l | 0C60 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | CR | 0C1C | 0C27 | 0C2A | 0C39 | 0C4B | m | 0C61 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 0C0E | 0C1D | . | 0C2B | | 0C4C | n | 0C62 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 0C0F | 0C1E | 0C28 | ? | 0C3D | 0C4D | o | 0C63 | + +NOTE 1): This code is an escape to an extension of this table (either to the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table, see subclause 6.2.1.1, or a National Language Single Shift Table, see subclause 6.2.1.2.2). A receiving entity which does not understand the meaning of this escape mechanism shall display it as a space character. + +### A.3.13 Urdu National Language Locking Shift Table + +NOTE: In the table below, the Urdu characters are represented using Unicode. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0627 | 062B | SP | 0 | 0635 | 06BA | 0654 | p | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0622 | 062C | ! | 1 | 0636 | 06BB | a | q | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0628 | 0681 | 068F | 2 | 0637 | 06BC | b | r | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 067B | 0684 | 068D | 3 | 0638 | 0648 | c | s | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0680 | 0683 | 0630 | 4 | 0639 | 06C4 | d | t | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 067E | 0685 | 0631 | 5 | 0641 | 06D5 | e | u | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 06A6 | 0686 | 0691 | 6 | 0642 | 06C1 | f | v | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 062A | 0687 | 0693 | 7 | 06A9 | 06BE | g | w | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 06C2 | 062D | ) | 8 | 06AA | 0621 | h | x | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 067F | 062E | ( | 9 | 06AB | 06CC | i | y | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | LF | 062F | 0699 | : | 06AF | 06D0 | j | z | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 0679 | 1) | 0632 | ; | 06B3 | 06D2 | k | 0655 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 067D | 068C | , | 069A | 06B1 | 064D | l | 0651 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | CR | 0688 | 0696 | 0633 | 0644 | 0650 | m | 0653 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 067A | 0689 | . | 0634 | 0645 | 064F | n | 0656 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 067C | 068A | 0698 | ? | 0646 | 0657 | o | 0670 | + +NOTE 1): This code is an escape to an extension of this table (either to the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table, see subclause 6.2.1.1, or a National Language Single Shift Table, see subclause 6.2.1.2.2). A receiving entity which does not understand the meaning of this escape mechanism shall display it as a space character. + +# --- Annex B (informative): Guidelines for creating language tables + +## B.1 Introduction + +This annex provides guidelines for creating language tables. + +It is recommended that the characters and their positions in the table are checked by people fluent in the appropriate language, and preferably endorsed by an appropriate responsible body. + +It is recommended that character positions are carefully selected so that receiving entities, which do not support the specific table, display symbols (glyphs) similar to the wanted symbols (glyphs) as far as possible. + +## --- B.2 Template for Single Shift Language Tables + +The format and structure of the table below shall be used to document the Language specific character codes used in the National Language selection mechanism. + +It is recommended that a National Language Single Shift Table includes the characters represented in the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table (as defined in subclause 6.2.1.1) in the same character position. This ensures the availability of these characters in case when the single shift mechanism is used. + +**Language – (Note. The actual Country and table content will be annotated when the country is known).** + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3) | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | | 1) | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 4) | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | | | | | | | | | + +NOTE 1): This code is reserved for the extension to another extension table. On receipt of this code, a receiving entity shall display a space until another extension table is defined. + +NOTE 2): Void + +NOTE 3): This code is defined as a Page Break character and may be used for example in compressed CBS messages. Any mobile station which does not understand the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table extension mechanism will treat this character as Line Feed. + +NOTE 4): This code represents a control character and therefore must not be used for language specific characters. + +## B.3 Template for Locking Shift Language Tables + +The format and structure of the table below shall be used to document the Language specific character codes used in the National Language selection mechanism. + +Language – (Note. The actual Country and table content will be annotated when the country is known). + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---|---|---|---|---| +| | | | | b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| | | | | b5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | SP | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | | | | | | | | | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | LF | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | | 1) | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | CR | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | | | | | | | | | + +NOTE 1): This code is an escape to an extension of this table (either to the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table, see subclause 6.2.1.1, or a National Language Single Shift Table, see subclause 6.2.1.2.2). A receiving entity which does not understand the meaning of this escape mechanism shall display it as a space character. + +# --- Annex C (Informative): Example for locking shift and single shift mechanisms + +## C.1 Introduction + +This annex gives an overview on how the national language extension mechanism of the GSM 7 bit default alphabet works. This annex shows how a message with an indication of the Turkish National Language Identifier is decoded, but the same principles apply to other languages. + +## --- C.2 Example of single shift + +This example outlines the behaviour of both supporting and non-supporting receiving entities where the Turkish National Language Single Shift Table is indicated in the received message. In this example there is no locking shift mechanism used in parallel. + +A non-supporting receiving entity will ignore the National Language Single Shift IE, and decode the message contents using the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table defined in subclause 6.2.1, including possible escape characters to the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table specified in subclause 6.2.1.1. For example the Turkish word "Türkçe" will be displayed as "Türkce". + +A receiving entity that supports the Turkish National Language Single Shift Table will detect a National Language Single Shift IE in a TP User Data Header. This IE tells the receiving entity that the single shift mechanism is used. + +A supporting receiving entity will notice the language code, in this example coded as '0000 0001', and therefore use the Turkish National Language Single Shift Table defined in subclause A.2.1 instead of the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table defined in subclause 6.2.1. + +If the next character is any character except , then the GSM 7 bit default alphabet table is used for the decode. If the next character is then the Turkish language specific table is used for the decode of the one character that follows the . This process will be repeated until the end of the received message, or until the end of the current segment of a concatenated message. + +The Language selection at the start of a message takes 4 octets which correspond to five 7 bit characters which reduces the maximum number of characters per single message to 155. + +Thereafter, the number of characters within that single message will be dependent upon the number of times a character is used that is within the National Language Single Shift Table. + +Every character used from the National Language Single Shift Table will need an additional character to identify the escape to the National Language Single Shift Table. The available 155 character capacity of a single message will therefore be reduced accordingly. This reduction of overall message length also applies when using characters from the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table (see subclause 6.2.1.1) when the National Language Single Shift IE is not used. + +## --- C.3 Example of locking shift + +This example outlines the behaviour of both supporting and non-supporting receiving entities where the Turkish National Language Locking Shift Table is indicated in the received message. + +A non-supporting receiving entity will ignore the National Language Locking Shift IE, and decode the message contents using the GSM 7 bit default alphabet defined in subclause 6.2.1, including possible escape characters to the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extensions specified in subclause 6.2.1.1. + +A receiving entity that supports the scheme will detect a National Language Locking Shift IE in a TP User Data Header. This IE tells the receiving entity that the locking shift mechanism is used. If no National Language Single Shift IE is indicated additionally to the National Language Locking Shift IE, then the whole message is decoded using the National Language Locking Shift Table defined for Turkish language in subclause 6.2.1.2.4.1. + +If, in addition to the National Language Locking Shift IE (which may be for Turkish or another language), a National Language Single Shift IE for the Turkish language is indicated, then makes an exception to the use of the National Language Locking Shift Table for the Turkish or another language. In that case a character following is decoded using the National Language Single Shift Table for the Turkish language, after which the use of the National Language Locking Shift Table for the Turkish or another language is resumed until the next or the end of the message is met. + +The Language selection at the start of a message takes 4 octets which corresponds to five 7 bit characters which reduces the maximum number of characters per single message to 155, unless the National Language Single Shift IE has also been included, in which case there is a further reduction of 3 octets making 7 octets in total, which corresponds to eight 7 bit characters, which reduces the maximum number of characters per single message to 152. + +Thereafter, if the single shift mechanism is used additionally to the locking shift mechanism, the number of characters within that single message will be dependent upon the number of times a character is used that is within the National Language Single Shift Table. + +Every character in the National Language Single Shift Table will use an additional character. The available 152 character single message length will therefore be reduced accordingly. This reduction of overall message length also applies when using characters from the GSM 7 bit default alphabet extension table (see subclause 6.2.1.1) when the National Language Single Shift IE is not used. + +# Annex D (informative): Document change history + +| TSG# | TDoc | VERS | NEW_VERS | CR | REV | Rel | CAT | WORK ITEM | SUBJECT | +|----------------|-----------|--------|----------|-------|-----|--------------------------------|-----|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| T#4 | | | 3.0.0 | New | | | | | Creation of 3GPP TS 23.038 v1.0.0 out of GSM 03.38 v7.1.0 | +| T#4 | TP-99124 | 3.0.0 | 3.1.0 | 001 | | R99 | A | MExE | Data Coding Scheme for WAP over USSD and CB | +| T#5 | TP-99177 | 3.1.0 | 3.2.0 | 002 | | R99 | B | TEI | Language codes for Hebrew, Arabic and Russian | +| T#6 | TP-99237 | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 | 003 | | R99 | F | TEI | Adaptations for UMTS | +| T#8 | TP-000074 | 3.3.0 | 4.0.0 | 004 | | Rel4 | B | TEI | Automatic removal of 'read' SMS | +| T#10 | TP-000195 | 4.0.0 | 4.1.0 | 005 | | Rel4 | B | TEI | Data coding scheme value for the Icelandic language | +| T#11 | TP-010029 | 4.1.0 | 4.2.0 | 006 | | Rel4 | C | UICC1-CPHS | Message Waiting Indication Status storage on the USIM | +| T#13 | TP-010194 | 4.2.0 | 4.3.0 | 007 | | Rel4 | F | TEI4 | Support to UCS2 and editorial corrections | +| T#14 | TP-010280 | 4.3.0 | 4.4.0 | 008 | | Rel4 | F | TEI4 | Deletion of GSM 01.04 reference | +| T#15 | TP-020015 | 4.4.0 | 5.0.0 | 009 | | Rel5 | F | TEI5 | User Data Header support over CBS | +| T#21 | TP-030173 | 5.0.0 | 6.0.0 | 010 | | Rel6 | C | TEI6 | Additional Indications in SMS DCS | +| T#25 | TP-040205 | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | 013 | 2 | Rel6 | F | TEI6 | Message Waiting Indication – how to handle Multiple Subscriber Profiles | +| T#25 | TP-040171 | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | 014 | | Rel6 | F | TEI6 | Enhanced Voice Mail Information – not applicable for CBS | +| CT#31 | CP-060126 | 6.1.0 | 7.0.0 | 015r1 | | Rel-7 | F | TEI7 | CBS – Reference removal | +| CT-39 | CP-080223 | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | 0017 | 5 | Rel-8 | B | TEI8 | SMS default alphabet. Generic solution for all languages | +| CT-39 | CP-080138 | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | 0019 | | Rel-8 | B | TEI8 | SMS-addition of turkish national language locking shift table | +| CT-40 | CP-080361 | 8.0.0 | 8.1.0 | 0020 | | Rel-8 | F | TEI8 | Corrections to single shift language tables for Turkish and Spanish | +| CT-40 | CP-080361 | 8.0.0 | 8.1.0 | 0021 | 3 | Rel-8 | F | TEI8 | Addition of national language tables for Portuguese | +| CT-41 | CP-080536 | 8.1.0 | 8.2.0 | 0229 | 1 | Rel-8 | F | TEI8 | Clarification of Locking / Single shift IE's for different languages in a single SM | +| CT-45 | CP-090682 | 8.2.0 | 9.0.0 | 0231 | 3 | Rel-9 | B | TEI9 | Addition of language tables for India | +| CT-45 | CP-090682 | 8.2.0 | 9.0.0 | 0232 | | Rel-9 | F | TEI9 | CBS Message Class 0 | +| CT-46 | CP-090912 | 9.0.0 | 9.1.0 | 0235 | 3 | Rel-9 | F | ETWS | Define the use of data coding scheme for the ETWS warning message | +| CT-46 | CP-090925 | 9.0.0 | 9.1.0 | 0236 | | Rel-9 | B | IMS_SCC-ICS I1 | Uniquely identify the I1 protocol in USSD | +| | | 9.1.0 | 9.1.1 | | | Rel-9 | | | Correction of a typo error in the change history table (wrong version number) | +| CT-51 | | 9.1.1 | 10.0.0 | | | Rel-10 | | | Upgrade to Rel-10 | +| CT-57 | | 10.0.0 | 11.0.0 | | | Rel-11 | | | Upgrade to Rel-11 | +| CT-65 | | 11.0.0 | 12.0.0 | | | Rel-12 | | | Upgrade to Rel-12 | +| CT-70 | | 12.0.0 | 13.0.0 | | | Rel-13 | | | Upgrade to Rel-13 | +| CT-75 | | 13.0.0 | 14.0.0 | | | Rel-14 | | | Upgrade to Rel-14 | +| Change history | | | | | | | | | | +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | | | New version | +| 2018-06 | SA-80 | | | | | Upgrade to Rel-15 | | | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | SA-88e | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | | | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23053/997233d405f0d4b89ddeb7683e047f66_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23053/997233d405f0d4b89ddeb7683e047f66_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..acafe69bd55775802cd9d06001e363b131aebc60 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23053/997233d405f0d4b89ddeb7683e047f66_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:e73cc0f7e2807ecd01fd27b63b9b2a41693cb9a488bd4ef6e8f452e4e9d207c8 +size 56435 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23053/d793cf7c174b89eb024d132f00679787_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23053/d793cf7c174b89eb024d132f00679787_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..218d33ac9670e04f053bc9a316dcf01ad5de2c88 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23053/d793cf7c174b89eb024d132f00679787_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:4e8bfd98aaa04f6b696a46c2b9bd348e1bf2b75a97c920c336c2079a5146f18a +size 57108 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23053/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23053/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2a85a43f4dddb08fd6b49f23542b2d30fe852f95 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23053/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,426 @@ + + + + + + +# --- Contents + +| | | +|------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 4 | +| 1 Scope..... | 5 | +| 2 References..... | 5 | +| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 6 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 6 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 6 | +| 4 Main Concepts ..... | 6 | +| 5 TFO Architecture and Transmission Mechanism ..... | 6 | +| 5.1 TFO Access Interfaces and Reference Points ..... | 6 | +| 5.2 General In-band Transmission Mechanism for TFO ..... | 7 | +| 5.3 High-Level Functions Required for TFO..... | 7 | +| 6 Model of operation..... | 8 | +| 6.1 Overview ..... | 8 | +| 6.2 TFO establishment phase ..... | 8 | +| 6.2.1 Sending of TFO_REQ message by a BSS..... | 8 | +| 6.2.2 Monitoring of TFO_REQ by a BSS ..... | 9 | +| 6.3 Transparency of transmission equipments ..... | 9 | +| 6.3.1 Local disabling ..... | 9 | +| 6.3.2 Transparency to TFO negotiation messages..... | 9 | +| 6.3.3 Transparency to TFO speech frames..... | 9 | +| 6.4 Modification of speech codec ..... | 10 | +| 6.4.1 Introduction ..... | 10 | +| 6.4.2 Exchanged parameters..... | 10 | +| 6.4.3 Change of speech codec configuration in the BSS..... | 10 | +| 6.5 TFO operation ..... | 10 | +| 6.5.1 End to end delay ..... | 10 | +| 6.5.2 Synchronisation between TRAUs ..... | 10 | +| 6.5.3 Monitoring in TFO operation ..... | 11 | +| 6.5.4 DTX aspects ..... | 11 | +| 6.5.5 Error concealment ..... | 11 | +| 6.5.6 Management of UFE bit ..... | 11 | +| 6.5.7 Handover management..... | 11 | +| 6.5.8 Other issues ..... | 12 | +| 7 Compatibility Issues..... | 12 | +| 8 Interactions with Other Services..... | 12 | +| 8.1 General ..... | 12 | +| 8.2 Support of DTMF..... | 13 | +| 9 Operational Aspects ..... | 13 | +| Annex A (informative): Change history..... | 14 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document defines the stage 2 service description for Tandem Free Operation (TFO) in and between GSM and UMTS. Tandem Free Operation applies only to speech calls. + +NOTE: The TFO principles are built so that they could be used as well by other systems other than GSM and UMTS. + +In analogy with ITU-T Recommendations I.130 [2] and with reference to ITU-T Recommendations Q.65 VI.1 (Stage 2 of the method for the characterisation of services supported by an ISDN), the second stage of the following three-level structure is derived from a stage 1 service description. + +- Stage 1 is an overall service description, from the service subscriber's and user's standpoints, that views the network as a single entity which provides services to the user. +- Stage 2 identifies the functional capabilities and information flows needed to support the service described in stage 1. Furthermore, it identifies various possible physical locations for the functional capabilities. The output of Stage 2, which is signalling system independent, is used as an input to Stage 3, the design of signalling system and switching Recommendations. +- Stage 3 defines the signalling system protocols and switching functions needed to implement the service described in stage 2. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TR 01.04: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Abbreviations and acronyms". +- [2] ITU-T Recommendations I.130 (1988): "Method for the characterization of telecommunication services supported by an ISDN and network capabilities of an ISDN". +- [3] 3GPP TS 22.053: "Tandem Free Operation (TFO); Service Description - Stage 1". +- [4] 3GPP TS 48.060: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); In-band control of remote transcoders and rate adaptors for full rate traffic channels". +- [5] 3GPP TS 48.061: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); In-band control of remote transcoders and rate adaptors for half rate traffic channels". + +# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: + +**Tandem Free Operation:** corresponds to the Mobile-to-Mobile calls for which the speech is not transcoded two times but only one by the Mobile Stations + +For simplicity the term MS is also used when UE is meant for 3G systems. The same is valid for TRAU and TC analogously. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: + +| | | +|------|-----------------------| +| IPE: | In Path Equipment | +| TFO: | Tandem Free Operation | + +Further abbreviations used may be found in 3GPP TR 01.04 [1]. + +# --- 4 Main Concepts + +In-band TFO aims to remove the speech coding and decoding done in the BSS in MS-to-MS calls in order to improve the perceived speech quality. In-band TFO is established after call set-up using in-band signalling. This signalling is therefore controlled by the TRAU. + +Using in-band signalling implies that the link between the TRAUs is transparent in the sense that the digital content of what is emitted by a TRAU is not modified. The so-called In Path Equipments must therefore be disabled or configured in such a way that the information (signalling and coded speech) required for Tandem Free is not altered. + +# --- 5 TFO Architecture and Transmission Mechanism + +## 5.1 TFO Access Interfaces and Reference Points + +The GSM BSS reference points for TFO are described in figure 1. GSM A interface reference point applies here with the exception that speech is not in the standard 64 kbit/s PCM format and between TFO TRAUs in-band signalling is used. For speech and in-band signalling the MSC is transparent. + +The UMTS core network reference points for TFO are described in figure 2. The UMTS Nb interface reference point applies here with the exception that speech is not in the standard 64 kbit/s PCM format and between TFO TRAUs in-band signalling is used. For speech and in-band signalling the Core Network is transparent. + +Additional transmission equipments are taken into account. These equipments are all those which can process the PCM signal between the two peer BSS, e.g. echo cancellers, DCME. The BSS to BSS transmission is then considered transparent provided no transmission equipment along the circuit do not modify the 1 or more LSB or these transmission equipments implement a TFO "transparency mode". A specific signalling allows to remotely control in-band these equipments. + +BSS-MSC out-of-band signalling consists in this version of TFO of the normal BSSMAP signalling which carries the list of acceptable speech codec that may be used for the TFO negotiation mechanism. + +Use of TFO specific out-of-band mechanism is not foreseen in that version of the specification. + +![Figure 1: General In-band Transmission Mechanism for TFO over Abis and A interfaces.](997233d405f0d4b89ddeb7683e047f66_img.jpg) + +Diagram illustrating the General In-band Transmission Mechanism for TFO. The network path is: MS ↔ BTS ↔ BSC ↔ TRAU ↔ MSC ↔ IPE ↔ IPE ↔ MSC ↔ TRAU ↔ BSC ↔ BTS ↔ MS. The interfaces labeled are Abis, A, A, and Abis. A red double-headed arrow connects the two TRAU units through the MSCs and IPEs. + +64 kbit/s Speech Samples carrying + +- TFO Frames on the LSB containing + - Compressed speech samples + - Control bits + - TFO Messages +- Original PCM speech samples on the MSB + +Figure 1: General In-band Transmission Mechanism for TFO over Abis and A interfaces. + +**Figure 1** +![Figure 2: General In-band Transmission Mechanism for TFO over Iu and Nb interfaces.](d793cf7c174b89eb024d132f00679787_img.jpg) + +Diagram illustrating the General In-band Transmission Mechanism for TFO in a 3G context. The network path is: UE ↔ Node B ↔ RNC ↔ [MSC Server / TC / MGW] ↔ IPE ↔ IPE ↔ [TC / MGW / MSC Server] ↔ RNC ↔ Node B ↔ UE. The interfaces labeled are Iu, Nb, Nb, and Iu. A red double-headed arrow connects the two TC (Transcoder) units through the IPEs. + +64 kbit/s Speech Samples carrying + +- TFO Frames on the LSB containing + - Compressed speech samples + - Control bits + - TFO Messages +- Original PCM speech samples on the MSB + +Figure 2: General In-band Transmission Mechanism for TFO over Iu and Nb interfaces. + +**Figure 2** + +## 5.2 General In-band Transmission Mechanism for TFO + +In TFO establishment mode, one bit out of 16 LSB bits is regularly stolen of the 64 kbits/s circuit. This provides for a 0,5 kbits/s channel and has been selected so that the degradation on the speech quality is inaudible. + +In TFO established mode bit stealing takes place on the LSB bit/s (bit 8, 7.. 9-N; $N \geq 1$ : number of stolen LSB bits) on each PCM sample. The number N of stolen LSB bit/s depends on the codec type. This provides for a $N \cdot 8$ kbits/s channel that allows to carry vocoded speech in TFO frames. The contents of the "unstolen" bits 1- (8-N) is normal A/ $\mu$ -law information. + +## 5.3 High-Level Functions Required for TFO + +The high level functions which apply to TFO are described hereafter. Not all these functions need necessarily to be covered by the first description of TFO since some issues may be too complex to solve in an initial stage or at all. + +The list of functions which are applicable to the BSS follows: + +- signalling a request message (TFO\_REQ) on the A interface that the TRAU supports TFO; +- signalling an acknowledgement message (TFO\_ACK) that the request message has been received from the peer entity; +- monitoring request and acknowledgement messages on the A interface that the peer entity supports TFO; +- remote control of echo cancellers, DCME, ...; +- signalling of current speech codec with acknowledgement message; +- signalling of speech codec capability with acknowledgement message; +- change of current speech codec within the BSS (optional); +- sending of TFO speech frames to the A interface; +- reception of TFO speech frames from the A interface; +- conversion of a flow of TRAU frames into TFO speech frames; +- conversion of a flow of TFO speech frames into TRAU frames. + +The following function applies to IPEs that may be along the 64 kbits/s circuit, such as DCME or echo cancellers equipments: + +- monitoring of TFO negotiation messages; +- repetition of LSB bit 8 one time out of 16 (TFO establishment mode, i.e. reproduce at the output of the IPE the detected message); +- capability to go full or sub-64 kbit/s transparent mode and to resume normal operation based on TFO negotiation messages; +- capability to monitor and alter TFO speech frame control information (optional); +- capability to insert TFO negotiation messages (optional). + +No assumption is made currently on the interactions between call set-up as seen by the MSC and TFO. This means that the initial working assumption is that TFO works independently of the Call Control in the MSC, using only a mechanisms internal to the BSS to activate and de-activate TFO operation. + +# --- 6 Model of operation + +## 6.1 Overview + +The TRAU must first identify each other as TRAU that are TFO capable. Next the TRAUs must check that they are using compatible speech codec types. If they don't use compatible speech codec types they can inform the BSC in order to modify the speech codec used in the MS. If they are using a compatible speech codec type the TRAU starts to insert TFO speech frames in the LSB(s) of the PCM octet present on the A / Nb interface. These frames contain the speech parameters as obtained from the uplink TRAU frames. + +## 6.2 TFO establishment phase + +### 6.2.1 Sending of TFO\_REQ message by a BSS + +The TFO\_REQ message is sent using bit stealing on bit 8, by stealing one bit out of 16. This allows to have the least possible degradation of the PCM, since the TFO\_REQ message is sent even in cases where TFO will not be possible e.g. MS to PSTN call. + +### 6.2.2 Monitoring of TFO\_REQ by a BSS + +The monitoring of the TFO\_REQ message can be performed by a BSS which is capable of TFO. + +Upon reception of a TFO\_REQ message, the BSS replies with an TFO\_ACK message which can contain the following information: + +- system identification (GSM, UMTS...); +- the current speech codec; +- the list of supported speech codecs; +- a random value that allows the detection of loop backs of a given BSS. + +## 6.3 Transparency of transmission equipments + +### 6.3.1 Local disabling + +Not used. + +### 6.3.2 Transparency to TFO negotiation messages + +IPE which support TFO protocol need to first synchronise on "transparency patterns" contained in the in-band transmitted TFO messages (negotiation messages TFO\_REQ, TFO\_ACK) as discussed in clause 6.2 and in addition track some specific TFO message (Go transparent command, Go to normal) needed to set the transparency mode required in TFO established mode or return to normal operation. Having synchronised to a transparency pattern, the IPE should reproduce at its output the TFO message in order to ensure transparency of the in-band signalling path. Some additional delay with respect to normal operation of the IPE may be introduced by the IPE as far as the in-band signalling information is concerned but such delay should be a multiple of 20 ms. No delay should be introduced on other bits. + +### 6.3.3 Transparency to TFO speech frames + +As part of the TFO establishment, if TFO can be successfully established (same codec type) then each TRAU sends TFO negotiation messages (Go transparent commands) which indicate to the In Path Equipment (IPE) along the BSS to BSS circuit the type of IPE transparency mode. The TFO speech frame then contains a "keep open" pattern that maintains the operation of the IPE as commanded. That "keep open" pattern is part of the synchronisation pattern of each TRAU frame and does not require hence complete tracking of the TFO speech frames by the IPE (nevertheless the commands within the TFO negotiation messages should be checked continuously). IPE revert to normal operation in case the keep open pattern is absent for [1s] or a new command "Go to normal" is received. + +IPE which support TFO protocol set the transparency mode as indicated in the received Go transparent command after having reproduced the received Go transparent command at its output. The IPE should simultaneously start to track the keep open pattern. Then the bits corresponding to the "transparent" path are copied in the 64 kbit/s output stream of the equipment. The delay introduced by the IPE on the TFO contained in the transparent part of the 64 kbit/s should be less than or equal to the delay in normal operation. + +These principles should be GSM/UMTS independent, allowing other systems to use the same transparency principle. + +The behaviour of the IPE regarding the remaining part of the circuit can be either of the following: + +- the IPE is speech transparent, meaning that the upper bits in the 64 kbits/s output stream should contain PCM speech, that speech being obtained by running the IPE in its normal way, possibly reproducing the PCM at the input. IPE should keep the same alignment as present at the input between transparent LSBs and upper bits containing the PCM speech; +- the IPE is non speech transparent, meaning that the IPE may strip the upper bits, if the IPE is the compressor part of an DCME. In such a case the peer IPE (the decompression part of the DCME) should reproduce the speech from the received TFO frame). This implies that the DCME implements the decoding part of some vocoders. + +## 6.4 Modification of speech codec + +### 6.4.1 Introduction + +In the speech codec modification procedure BSS informs the peer BSS the speech codec types supported by the sending BSS (within the ongoing call) and tries to align the codecs using implicit rule and BSS internal means to make appropriate handover. + +The support of the informing and BSS internal modification procedures are optional for a BSS since it depends on the BSS internal capabilities. This means that TFO should be applicable even if the informing and modification are not supported by one of the two peer entities. In this case, TFO will be available if both BSS happen to use a compatible speech codec type. + +### 6.4.2 Exchanged parameters + +The exchanged parameters are the speech codec currently in use and the other possible codecs that can be used within the call Modification procedure. + +In the TFO request message (TFO\_REQ), the BSS informs the fact that it supports TFO. + +The possible modification procedure is started when the TFO request message from the peer BSS has been detected. It is not synchronised explicitly on Call Set-up states. + +If both BSS receive a TFO\_REQ indicating that a compatible speech codec type is used, the modification is not necessary and the BSS can move to the TFO established mode. + +If the speech codec configurations used on both sides are not compatible, each BSS looks at the list of the acceptable speech codec configurations from the other BSS. + +There is an implicit rule as to the speech codec configuration that every BSS will try to use based on the current speech codec configuration, the list of locally acceptable speech codec configurations, and the list of remotely acceptable speech codec configuration. Each BSS then tries if it supports it to perform a change of codec configuration via a intra-BSS (normally intra-cell) handover. + +When a handover has been performed, each BSS will reply to TFO\_REQ by a new TFO\_ACK message indicating the newly used speech codec configuration. The process goes on until either a compatible codec configuration is used, or no more change of the codec configuration is possible according to the fixed rule. + +There is a timer that protects the TFO establishment phase. The BSS, after the timer has elapsed, stops sending TFO request messages, but continues the monitoring of the peer entity. This is in order not to degrade the communication if TFO cannot be established. To resume the TFO establishment phase, it will be up to the peer entity to send a new TFO\_REQ message to initiate a new attempt of establishment/modification of TFO e.g. when a handover has occurred. + +### 6.4.3 Change of speech codec configuration in the BSS + +This procedure is internal to the BSS. It can be based on the use of O&M frames on the Abis interface or on the use of a specific TRAU to BSC interface or on some other method. + +## 6.5 TFO operation + +### 6.5.1 End to end delay + +The end to end delay is similar to normal MS-MS call in TFO operation within a 20 ms range. + +### 6.5.2 Synchronisation between TRAUs + +The synchronisation depends on the kind of bit stealing used: + +- 0,5 kbits/s. There is a specific pattern one bit out of 16 on the LSB; +- 8 kbits/s. The synchronisation contained in the TFO frames is used; +- 16 kbits/s. The synchronisation contained in the TFO frames is used. + +Some sub-part of the synchronisation patterns can be understood by transmission equipments as well. + +There is no time alignment between TRAUs. + +### 6.5.3 Monitoring in TFO operation + +A TRAU in TFO established mode monitors permanently the synchronisation with the peer TRAU entity. + +In case of loss of synchronisation, a timer is started. When the timer elapses, the TRAU sends normal PCM speech, reverts to non-TFO mode and starts re-establishment procedures. + +### 6.5.4 DTX aspects + +Each direction is independent from the DTX point of view. This leads to the following scenarios for the transfer of speech in one direction. + +**Table 1** + +| Uplink User A | Downlink User B | +|----------------------|------------------------| +| DTX | DTX | +| DTX | no DTX | +| no DTX | DTX | +| no DTX | no DTX | + +The sending BSS, when DTX is applied on the uplink direction, generates normal speech frames when no SID frame is received. + +When a SID frame is received in the uplink, the BSS sends this SID frame to the peer BSS. + +When uplink DTX is applied and nothing is received from the MS by the BTS, i.e. during comfort noise generation, NO\_DATA frames are sent to the peer BSS. + +Based on this information, the receiving BSS can perform the best action depending on its mode. + +### 6.5.5 Error concealment + +The BSS which has received a bad frame in the uplink sends it unmodified to the peer BSS. The peer BSS either performs error concealment or forwards the frame to the MS. + +### 6.5.6 Management of UFE bit + +The UFE bit is managed as described in the 3GPP TS 48.060 and 3GPP TS 48.061. + +### 6.5.7 Handover management + +Different cases of handovers from the TRAU point of view will be encountered: + +- 1) handover with modification of the TRAU on one side or, which is equivalent, no modification of TRAU but change of transcoder DSP; +- 2) intra-cell handover without modification of transcoder DSP; +- 3) inter-cell handover without modification of transcoder DSP. + +In case 1, TFO will be interrupted and re-established if the newly allocated TRAU (TRAU B) is TFO capable. Indeed the newly allocated TRAU will start in normal mode and, if it is TFO capable, will immediately attempt to establish TFO. This will interrupt the reception of TFO frames at the TRAU in TFO mode (TRAU A). As defined in clause 6.5.3, the synchronisation loss timer may elapse and TRAU A will revert to normal mode. TFO will then be re-established given TFO establishment attempts are performed by the new TRAU. + +The management of handover for cases 2 and 3 will depend on the time put to actually switch the communication from one traffic channel to another one in the intra-cell handover case or between base stations in the inter-cell handover case. If the handover is fast enough, i.e. the timers to detect the loss of synchronisation do not elapse, then the TFO will + +be maintained. In the opposite case there will be a fallback to regular tandem. Attempts to re-establish TFO shall be performed if both TRAUs are still TFO-capable. + +### 6.5.8 Other issues + +The bridging of the communication in the MSC can potentially interfere TFO. The conference bridge will prevent TFO operation as long as it is present. The TFO synchronisation pattern should be lost and both TRAUs should revert to non-TFO operation if the bridge is present. TFO operation will start again from the start when the bridge is removed (handover is performed). + +# --- 7 Compatibility Issues + +Since the radio interface is not modified, there is no compatibility issue with the MS. It is up to the second TRAU to make sure that what it sends to the BTS is compatible with the existing. + +The compatibility issue is with end systems not supporting TFO. + +The TFO negotiation message synchronisation patterns should be chosen such that no other system uses such a pattern for another purpose, and that this pattern cannot be generated by a peer entity which is not supporting TFO. This does not preclude other systems than GSM or UMTS to use TFO since the type of system is part of the negotiation mechanism. + +# --- 8 Interactions with Other Services + +## 8.1 General + +The identified interactions are with the supplementary and basic services that modify the configuration of a communication. + +One example of Supplementary Service is Explicit Call Transfer, where a MS to MS communication can result in a MS to non-MS communication. Similarly, in a communication where user A is a Mobile user and User B is not a Mobile user become a communication between user A and user C where both are Mobile users. + +One example of Basic Service is Alternate speech and data, where TFO should not degrade the transitions between speech and data. + +More generally, the identified interactions are all related to the transitions between a configuration where TFO is possible (and potentially used) and a configuration where TFO is not possible. + +The consequence of a Multiparty Call is that TFO operation is not possible. + +The interactions between TFO and Lawful Intercept will depend on the capability of the devices used in such a case to not alter the in-band information (signalling and coded speech) required by the in-band TFO system. These devices can either use the 6- or 7- bit PCM available on the A-interface. + +The SS that modifies the digital content of what is emitted by a TRAU will interrupt TFO. Nevertheless as soon as the transparency is re-established the TRAUs will attempt re-establishing TFO. + +## 8.2 Support of DTMF + +The existing DTMF could be applied independently of TFO. It should be noted that DTMF in TFO operation means Mobile Terminated DTMF which is currently excluded from the standard. + +The DTMF when inserted by the MSC will interrupt the TFO since the TFO speech frames are modified when crossing the MSC. + +The TFO must be re-established as soon as possible when the DTMF insertion stops. + +# --- 9 Operational Aspects + +TFO feature shall be defined so that a TFO capable TRAU should be able interact with a TFO non capable TRAU without noticeable degradation of quality. It shall be possible to roll-out TFO on part of the network. + +The TFO establishment protocol shall define timers to set e.g. the negotiation message transmission time or the time needed to declare the loss of synchronisation (see clause 6.5.3). When setting the values of these timers it should be made sure that two sets of timers at both TRAUs are consistent in order to allow TFO establishment. Given that both TRAUs may be located in different PLMN and be manufactured by different companies, most of the timers will have to be initialised at pre-defined values. + +# Annex A (informative): Change history + +| SMG# | SPEC | CR | PHA
SE | VERS | NEW_VERS | SUBJECT | +|------|-------|--------------|-----------|------|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | 03.53 | 30 Sept 1996 | | | 0.0.0 | Draft proposal | +| | 03.53 | 25 Nov 1996 | | | 0.0.0 | Draft proposal after comments | +| | 03.53 | 27 Jan 1997 | | | 0.0.1 | Version 0.0.0 has been presented to SMG3/WPA and joint SMG3/SMG11 in Dec. 96. No comments were made.
Only change is editorial on official TS GSM reference | +| | 03.53 | 29 June 1997 | | | 0.0.2 | Changes reflecting the last decisions in SMG11. | +| | 03.53 | 18 Aug 1997 | | | 0.1.0 | Changes reflecting the decisions in SMG11 TFO #6
- format of the messages
- applicable to different systems
- transparency principle for transmission equipments. | +| | 03.53 | 01 Aug 1997 | | | 0.1.1 | Changes reflecting the review in SMG11 TFO #8 in Bois D'Arcy
- transparency of IPEs can be for 1 up to 8 bits
- no fixed pattern is used for the 6 MSB
- informative annex on IPE is added | +| | 03.53 | 08 Oct 1997 | | | 0.2.0 | Clarifications reflecting SMG11/TFO in Bois D'Arcy and SMG11 in Le Mans
Incorporation of comments received by e-mail.
Version for presentation to SMG3/SA | +| | 03.53 | 08 Nov 1997 | | | 0.3.0 | Addition of some text regarding the main concept, handover management, UFE bit management, interaction with Supplementary services. | +| | 03.53 | 08 Dec 1997 | | | 1.0.0 | Presented to SMG. The presented version was approved in SMG3/SA, but since it was not seen by SMG3, it was requested that it is presented again to SMG3, and was then only presented to SMG for information. | + +| SMG# | SPEC | CR | PHA
SE | VERS | NEW_VERS | SUBJECT | +|------|-------|----|-----------|------|----------|----------------------| +| S29 | 03.53 | | R98 | | 7.0.0 | Release 1998 version | +| S31 | 03.53 | | R99 | | 8.0.0 | Release 1999 version | + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|-------|-----------|-----|-----|-------------------------|--------|--------| +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | Old | New | +| 2001-03 | 11 | SP-010098 | 001 | 1 | Extension of TFO to AMR | 8.0.0 | 4.0.0 | +| 2001-08 | | | | | Clean-up | 4.0.0 | 4.0.1 | +| 2002-06 | 16 | | | | Version for Release 5 | 4.0.1 | 5.0.0 | +| 2004-12 | 26 | | | | Version for Release 6 | 5.0.0 | 6.0.0 | +| 2007-06 | 36 | | | | Version for Release 7 | 6.0.0 | 7.0.0 | +| 2008-12 | 42 | | | | Version for Release 8 | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | +| 2009-12 | 46 | | | | Version for Release 9 | 8.0.0 | 9.0.0 | +| 2011-03 | 51 | | | | Version for Release 10 | 9.0.0 | 10.0.0 | +| 2012-09 | 57 | | | | Version for Release 11 | 10.0.0 | 11.0.0 | +| 2014-09 | 65 | | | | Version for Release 12 | 11.0.0 | 12.0.0 | +| 2015-12 | 70 | | | | Version for Release 13 | 12.0.0 | 13.0.0 | + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|------|----|-----|-----|--------------------------------|---------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2017-03 | 75 | | | | | Version for Release 14 | 14.0.0 | +| 2018-06 | 80 | | | | | Version for Release 15 | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23091/1439cb942d9e363bbb3161b5540dd8c6_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23091/1439cb942d9e363bbb3161b5540dd8c6_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d97940f93c897808254b73b70478190124752705 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23091/1439cb942d9e363bbb3161b5540dd8c6_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 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+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 4 | +| 1 Scope..... | 5 | +| 2 References..... | 5 | +| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 5 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 5 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 6 | +| 4 Explicit Call Transfer (ECT)..... | 6 | +| 4.1 Functions ..... | 6 | +| 4.2 SDL diagrams and information flows ..... | 8 | +| 4.2.1 General description..... | 8 | +| 4.2.2 ECT (both calls answered) ..... | 8 | +| 4.2.3 ECT (one call answered, the other alerting) ..... | 11 | +| 4.3 Interaction with other supplementary services..... | 14 | +| 4.3.1 Line Identification services ..... | 14 | +| 4.3.2 Call Forwarding Unconditional (CFU) ..... | 16 | +| 4.3.3 Call Forwarding on mobile subscriber Busy (CFB)..... | 17 | +| 4.3.3.1 Call Forwarding on mobile subscriber Busy due to Network Determined User Busy (NDUB)..... | 17 | +| 4.3.3.2 Call Forwarding on mobile subscriber Busy due to User Determined User Busy (UDUB) ..... | 17 | +| 4.3.4 Call Forwarding on No Reply (CFNRy) ..... | 18 | +| 4.3.5 Call Forwarding on mobile subscriber Not Reachable (CFNRc)..... | 18 | +| 4.3.6 Call Waiting (CW) ..... | 18 | +| 4.3.7 Call Hold (HOLD)..... | 18 | +| 4.3.8 Multi Party (MPTY) ..... | 18 | +| 4.3.9 Closed User Group (CUG) ..... | 18 | +| 4.3.10 Advice of Charge (AoC) services..... | 19 | +| 4.3.11 Call Barring services ..... | 19 | +| 4.3.12 Explicit Call Transfer (ECT)..... | 19 | +| 4.4 Information stored in the HLR ..... | 19 | +| 4.5 State transition model..... | 19 | +| 4.6 Transfer of information from the HLR to the VLR ..... | 20 | +| 4.7 Information stored in the VLR ..... | 20 | +| 4.8 Handover ..... | 20 | +| Annex A: Change history ..... | 21 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document gives the stage 2 description of the call transfer supplementary services. + +Only one call transfer supplementary service has been defined, this is the Explicit Call Transfer (ECT) supplementary service, and is described in the present document. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. + - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. + - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "3G Vocabulary". +- [2] 3GPP TS 23.083: "Call Waiting (CW) and Call Hold (HOLD) supplementary services - Stage 2". +- [3] 3GPP TS 24.008: "Mobile Radio Interface Layer 3 specification; Core Network Protocols - Stage 3". +- [4] EN 300 368: "Integrated Services Digital network (ISDN); Explicit Call Transfer (ECT) supplementary service; Functional capabilities and information flows". +- [5] EN 300 356-14: "Integrated Services Digital network (ISDN); Signalling System No. 7; ISDN User Part (ISUP) version 3 for the international interface; Part 14: Explicit Call Transfer (ECT) supplementary service ". +- [6] 3GPP TS 23.011: "Technical realization of Supplementary Services". +- [7] 3GPP TS 23.018: "Basic Call Handling". + +# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +**First call:** One of the subscriber A calls (answered). + +**Notification Indicator (NI):** Indicates to each remote party in which state of the other remote party ECT was performed (active, alerting). + +**Redirection Number (Rdn):** Includes the presentation indicator and the directory number of the other remote party. + +**Second call:** The other subscriber A call (answered or alerting). + +**Subscriber A (PARTY A):** The served mobile subscriber - the one who has subscribed to, and invokes the ECT Supplementary Service. + +**Subscriber B (PARTY B):** The other party in the subscriber A first call. + +**Subscriber C (PARTY C):** The other party in the subscriber A second call. + +**Subscriber D (PARTY D):** The forwarded-to party when the call is forwarded by the subscriber C. + +**Transferred call:** The resulting call after successful explicit call transfer between B and C. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +In addition to those below, abbreviations used in the present document are listed in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1]. + +| | | +|-------|----------------------------------------------| +| ECT: | Explicit Call Transfer supplementary service | +| LI: | Line Identity | +| NI: | Notification Indicator | +| Rdn: | Redirection number | +| RdnB: | Redirection number of party B | +| RdnD: | Redirection number of party D | + +# --- 4 Explicit Call Transfer (ECT) + +## 4.1 Functions + +The following function has been identified for the explicit call transfer service: + +###### MAF027 + +Explicit Call Transfer related authorizations examination + +The ability of a PLMN component to determine the authorizations relating to explicit call transfer. See figure 1. + +Location: VLR + +![Flowchart for Process MAF027: Explicit Call Transfer related authorizations examination (VLR).](997233d405f0d4b89ddeb7683e047f66_img.jpg) + +**Process MAF027** + +391\_1(1) + +Process in the VLR to check +if ECT is provisioned. + +Signals to/from the left are +to/from the MSC. + +``` + +graph TD + Start([ ]) --> Idle1([Idle]) + Idle1 --> Check[Check ECT subscription] + Check --> ECT_Prov{ECT +provisioned} + + ECT_Prov -- No --> NotAvail[Indicator:= +ECT_not_ +available] + ECT_Prov -- Yes --> SS_CSI{SS-CSI +provisioned?} + + SS_CSI -- No --> Available[Indicator:= +ECT_available] + SS_CSI -- Yes --> Marked{ECT marked +in CSI?} + + Marked -- No --> Available + Marked -- Yes --> AvailablePlus[Indicator:= +ECT_available ++ SS-CSI] + + Available --> Process[Process +ECT] + AvailablePlus --> Process + NotAvail --> Process + + Process --> Idle2([Idle]) + +``` + +Flowchart for Process MAF027: Explicit Call Transfer related authorizations examination (VLR). + +**Figure 1: Explicit Call Transfer related authorizations examination (VLR)** + +## 4.2 SDL diagrams and information flows + +### 4.2.1 General description + +The procedures Handle\_ECT\_Active and Handle\_ECT\_Alerting show the behaviour of the service as perceived by the served mobile subscriber and by any of the other parties involved in the transfer. These procedures and the macro Check\_ECT show the actions to be taken by the network and the information provided by the network to the users. + +The following states for the invocation of the ECT supplementary service are defined: + +- a) First Call (Active, Held), Second Call (Active, Idle); +- b) First Call (Active, Held), Second Call (Call Delivered, Idle). + +NOTE: The call state "call delivered" means that an ALERTING message has been sent to the MS, but no ANSWER Message (ANM) has been received. + +In the information flows it is assumed that the served subscriber is a mobile subscriber and that the other parties are mobile or fixed subscribers. + +Party A is the subscriber controlling the Explicit Call Transfer Call (served mobile subscriber). Party B is the first remote party called. Party C is the second remote party called. + +The served party is disconnected by the generic disconnect/release procedure after a successful transfer request. The connection of the remote parties in a new call (transferred call) is located in the served subscriber's MSC. + +The information flows in figures 4 and 7 show the unsuccessful case (i.e. the check in the VLR or in the MSC fails). + +The information flows in figures 5 and 8 show the successful case. + +### 4.2.2 ECT (both calls answered) + +The SDL for the procedure Handle\_ECT\_Active (Explicit Call Transfer - both calls have been answered) is shown in figure 2. + +The checks of whether Explicit Call Transfer is barred or not are shown in figure 3. + +The corresponding information flows are given in figure 4 and figure 5. + +![Flowchart for Procedure Handle_ECT_Active. It starts with a connector, followed by 'Check_ECT'. If 'Pass', it goes to 'Connect both calls', then 'Retrieve notification' (to held party), 'Transfer notification', 'ECT ack', then a decision 'SS-CSI present?'. If 'Yes', it goes to 'SS Invocation notify' (to gsmSCF) then to 'Disconnect request' (for call legs A-B & A-C). If 'No', it goes directly to 'Disconnect request'. Both paths lead to 'Result:=Pass' and then an exit connector. If 'Fail' from 'Check_ECT', it goes to 'ECT reject', then 'Result:=Fail' and an exit connector.](b3baf3a29b67c7425d2562ddbc52f0cc_img.jpg) + +### Procedure Handle\_ECT\_Active + +ECT\_Ac(1) + +Procedure in the originating MSC to handle an Explicit Call Transfer when the first call leg (A-B) is connected and on hold and the other call leg (A-C) is connected and active. + +Signals to/from the left are to/from the MS; signals to/from the right are to/from all/any remote parties unless stated otherwise. + +``` +graph TD; Start([ ]) --> Check_ECT[Check_ECT]; Check_ECT -- Pass --> Connect[Connect both calls]; Check_ECT -- Fail --> Reject{ECT reject}; Connect --> Retrieve[Retrieve notification]; Retrieve --> Held[To the held party]; Retrieve --> Transfer[Transfer notification]; Transfer --> Ack{ECT ack}; Ack --> SS_CSI{SS-CSI present?}; SS_CSI -- Yes --> Notify[SS Invocation notify]; Notify --> GsmSCF[To gsmSCF]; SS_CSI -- No --> Disconnect[Disconnect request]; GsmSCF --> Disconnect; Disconnect --> PassResult[Result:=Pass]; PassResult --> Exit1([ ]); Reject --> FailResult[Result:=Fail]; FailResult --> Exit2([ ]); +``` + +Flowchart for Procedure Handle\_ECT\_Active. It starts with a connector, followed by 'Check\_ECT'. If 'Pass', it goes to 'Connect both calls', then 'Retrieve notification' (to held party), 'Transfer notification', 'ECT ack', then a decision 'SS-CSI present?'. If 'Yes', it goes to 'SS Invocation notify' (to gsmSCF) then to 'Disconnect request' (for call legs A-B & A-C). If 'No', it goes directly to 'Disconnect request'. Both paths lead to 'Result:=Pass' and then an exit connector. If 'Fail' from 'Check\_ECT', it goes to 'ECT reject', then 'Result:=Fail' and an exit connector. + +Figure 2: Procedure Handle\_ECT\_Active + +![Flowchart for Macro Check_ECT. It starts with a connector, then checks if ECT Treatment Indicator is present in SI2. If No, it goes to 'Release transaction' (From BSS). If Yes, it checks if the indicator is set to Reject ECT request. If Yes, it goes to 'Release' (From distant exchange). If No, it checks ECT subscription. After subscription check, it waits for a reply. Then it processes ECT, which branches into 'Int_Release Call' (From gsmSSF), 'Release' (From distant exchange), and 'Release transaction' (From BSS). Next, it checks if ECT is active. If No, it goes to 'Fail'. If Yes, it checks if transfer is barred by SS interaction. If Yes, it goes to 'Fail'. If No, it performs a loop prevention procedure. If the loop check fails, it goes to 'Fail'. If the loop check succeeds, it goes to 'Pass'.](e6df2733626a85205c1db682e6259c46_img.jpg) + +### Macrodefinition Check\_ECT + +1(1) + +Macro in the originating MSC to check if an Explicit Call Transfer can be performed. + +``` +graph TD; Start([ ]) --> Q1{ECT Treatment Indicator present in SI2 (for either ongoing call)?}; Q1 -- No --> RT[Release transaction]; RT --- RT_F[From BSS]; Q1 -- Yes --> Q2{ECT Treatment Indicator set to Reject ECT request (for either ongoing call)?}; Q2 -- Yes --> R[Release]; R --- R_F[From distant exchange]; Q2 -- No --> CS{{Check ECT subscription}}; CS --> WFSR([Wait_For_ECT_Status_Reply]); WFSR --> PE{{Process ECT}}; PE --- IRC[Int_Release Call]; IRC --- IRC_F[From gsmSSF]; PE --- R2[Release]; R2 --- R2_F[From distant exchange]; PE --- RT2[Release transaction]; RT2 --- RT2_F[From BSS]; PE --> Q3{ECT active?}; Q3 -- No --> Fail((Fail)); Q3 -- Yes --> Q4{Transfer barred by SS interaction?}; Q4 -- Yes --> Fail; Q4 -- No --> LP[Loop Prevention procedure]; LP --> LC{Loop check?}; LC -- Failure --> Fail; LC -- Success --> Pass((Pass)); +``` + +Flowchart for Macro Check\_ECT. It starts with a connector, then checks if ECT Treatment Indicator is present in SI2. If No, it goes to 'Release transaction' (From BSS). If Yes, it checks if the indicator is set to Reject ECT request. If Yes, it goes to 'Release' (From distant exchange). If No, it checks ECT subscription. After subscription check, it waits for a reply. Then it processes ECT, which branches into 'Int\_Release Call' (From gsmSSF), 'Release' (From distant exchange), and 'Release transaction' (From BSS). Next, it checks if ECT is active. If No, it goes to 'Fail'. If Yes, it checks if transfer is barred by SS interaction. If Yes, it goes to 'Fail'. If No, it performs a loop prevention procedure. If the loop check fails, it goes to 'Fail'. If the loop check succeeds, it goes to 'Pass'. + +Figure 3: Macro Check\_ECT + +![Sequence diagram for a failed explicit call transfer request. Lifelines: MSa, MSCa, VLRA, MSCb, MSb, LEc, TEca. MSa sends an ECT request to MSCa. MSCa sends an info request to VLRA. VLRA responds with MAF027 and info ack. MSCa sends OR1:N to VLRA. MSa receives an ECT rej from MSCa. The diagram shows two active calls: A-B (held) and A-C (idle) throughout the process.](5a4e62bead259c258d069fd3663ea670_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for a failed explicit call transfer request. Lifelines: MSa, MSCa, VLRA, MSCb, MSb, LEc, TEca. MSa sends an ECT request to MSCa. MSCa sends an info request to VLRA. VLRA responds with MAF027 and info ack. MSCa sends OR1:N to VLRA. MSa receives an ECT rej from MSCa. The diagram shows two active calls: A-B (held) and A-C (idle) throughout the process. + +NOTE: OR1: Checks in VLR and MSC ok? (Y: yes N: no). + +**Figure 4: Information flow for failed explicit call transfer request (both calls answered)** + +![Sequence diagram for a successful explicit call transfer. Lifelines: MSa, MSCa, VLRA, MSCb, MSb, LEc, TEca. MSa sends an ECT request to MSCa. MSCa sends an info request to VLRA. VLRA responds with MAF027 and info ack. MSCa sends OR1:Y to VLRA. MSCa sends a 'connect calls' message to VLRA. VLRA sends notifications (retrieve, ECT) to MSCa. MSCa sends notifications (retr, ECT) to MSCb. MSCb sends notifications (ECT) to MSb. MSb sends a notification (ECT) to LEc. LEc sends a notification (ECT) to TEca. MSa receives an ECT ack from MSCa. MSCa sends disc req A-B and NORMAL DISCONNECTION A-B. MSCa sends disc req A-C and NORMAL DISCONNECTION A-C. The final state shows B-C (active, idle).](5e92d9e8e9ce204e405bff2367f88176_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for a successful explicit call transfer. Lifelines: MSa, MSCa, VLRA, MSCb, MSb, LEc, TEca. MSa sends an ECT request to MSCa. MSCa sends an info request to VLRA. VLRA responds with MAF027 and info ack. MSCa sends OR1:Y to VLRA. MSCa sends a 'connect calls' message to VLRA. VLRA sends notifications (retrieve, ECT) to MSCa. MSCa sends notifications (retr, ECT) to MSCb. MSCb sends notifications (ECT) to MSb. MSb sends a notification (ECT) to LEc. LEc sends a notification (ECT) to TEca. MSa receives an ECT ack from MSCa. MSCa sends disc req A-B and NORMAL DISCONNECTION A-B. MSCa sends disc req A-C and NORMAL DISCONNECTION A-C. The final state shows B-C (active, idle). + +NOTE: OR1: Checks in VLR and MSC ok? (Y: yes N: no). + +**Figure 5: Information flow for successful explicit call transfer (both calls answered)** + +### 4.2.3 ECT (one call answered, the other alerting) + +The SDL for the procedure Handle\_ECT\_Alerting (Explicit Call Transfer - one call answered, the other alerting) is shown in figure 6. + +The checks of whether Explicit Call Transfer is barred or not are shown in figure 3. + +The corresponding information flows are given in figure 7 and figure 8. + +![Flowchart for Procedure Handle_ECT_Alerting](1439cb942d9e363bbb3161b5540dd8c6_img.jpg) + +**Procedure Handle\_ECT\_Alerting** + +ECT\_AI(1) + +Procedure in the originating MSC to handle an Explicit Call Transfer when the first call leg (A-B) is connected and on hold and the other call leg (A-C) is connected and alerting. + +Signals to/from the left are to/from the MS; signals to/from the right are to/from all/any remote parties unless stated otherwise. + +``` + +graph TD + Start([ ]) --> Alerting{Alerting} + Alerting -- False --> ECT_reject[ECT reject] + Alerting -- True --> Check_ECT[Check_ECT] + Check_ECT -- Fail --> ECT_reject + Check_ECT -- Pass --> Connect_both_calls[Connect both calls] + ECT_reject --> Result_Fail[Result:=Fail] + Result_Fail --> End_Fail((X)) + + Connect_both_calls --> Retrieve_notification[/Retrieve notification/] + Retrieve_notification -.- To_held_party[To the held party] + Retrieve_notification --> ECT_notification[/ECT notification/] + ECT_notification --> ECT_ack[/ECT ack/] + ECT_ack --> SS_CSI_present{SS-CSI +present?} + + SS_CSI_present -- Yes --> SS_Invocation_notify[/SS Invocation +notify/] + SS_Invocation_notify -.- To_gsmSCF[To gsmSCF] + SS_Invocation_notify --> Disconnect_request[/Disconnect +request/] + + SS_CSI_present -- No --> Disconnect_request + + Disconnect_request -.- For_call_legs[For call legs +A-B & A-C] + Disconnect_request --> Result_Pass[Result:=Pass] + Result_Pass --> End_Pass((X)) + +``` + +The flowchart describes the **Handle\_ECT\_Alerting** procedure. It starts with an **Alerting** decision. If False, it goes to **ECT reject**, sets **Result:=Fail**, and ends. If True, it proceeds to **Check\_ECT**. A 'Fail' at this stage also leads to **ECT reject**. A 'Pass' leads to the **Connect both calls** task. Following this, a series of signals are exchanged: **Retrieve notification** (sent to the held party), **ECT notification**, and **ECT ack**. Then, a decision **SS-CSI present?** is made. If 'Yes', an **SS Invocation notify** signal is sent to gsmSCF before proceeding to **Disconnect request**. If 'No', it goes directly to **Disconnect request**. The **Disconnect request** signal is for call legs A-B & A-C. Finally, the procedure sets **Result:=Pass** and ends. + +Flowchart for Procedure Handle\_ECT\_Alerting + +**Figure 6: Procedure Handle\_ECT\_Alerting** + +![Sequence diagram showing information flow for a failed explicit call transfer request. Lifelines: MSa, MSCa, VLRa, MSCb, MSb, LEc, TEc. The diagram shows an ECT request from MSa to MSCa, an info request from MSCa to VLRa, an info ack from VLRa to MSCa, and an ECT reject from MSCa to MSa. Call states are indicated at the top and bottom of the diagram.](ff0952ef692c9d960ce5f6708bcc9711_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant MSa + participant MSCa + participant VLRa + participant MSCb + participant MSb + participant LEc + participant TEc + + Note over MSa, MSCb: A-B (active, held) / A-C (call delivered, idle) + MSa->>MSCa: ECT request + MSCa->>VLRa: info request + Note right of VLRa: MAF027 + VLRa->>MSCa: info ack + Note right of MSCa: OR1:N + MSCa->>MSa: ECT rej + Note over MSa, MSCb: A-B (active, held) / A-C (call delivered, idle) +``` + +Sequence diagram showing information flow for a failed explicit call transfer request. Lifelines: MSa, MSCa, VLRa, MSCb, MSb, LEc, TEc. The diagram shows an ECT request from MSa to MSCa, an info request from MSCa to VLRa, an info ack from VLRa to MSCa, and an ECT reject from MSCa to MSa. Call states are indicated at the top and bottom of the diagram. + +NOTE: OR1: Checks in VLR and MSC ok? (Y: yes N: no). + +**Figure 7: Information flow for failed explicit call transfer request +(one call answered, the other alerting)** + +![Sequence diagram showing the information flow for successful explicit call transfer (ECT) between two mobile subscribers (A and B) and a third subscriber (C). The diagram involves MSa, MSCa, VLRa, MSCb, MSb, LEc, and TEc. The process starts with A-B (active, held) and A-C (call delivered, idle) states. The sequence includes ECT request, info request, info ack, OR1:Y, connect calls, notification (retrieve), notification (ECT), notification (retr), notification (ECT), notification (alerting), notification (ECT), notification (active, Rdn), ECT ack, disc req A-B, disc req A-C, A idle, B hears C ringing, ANSWER, notification (ECT), notification (active, Rdn), notification (active, Rdn), CONNECT, CONNECT ACK, and B-C active, idle.](a33da0f14e456f92539ce3e9b7d81f9a_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant MSa + participant MSCa + participant VLRa + participant MSCb + participant MSb + participant LEc + participant TEc + + Note right of MSa: A-B (active, held) / A-C (call delivered, idle) + MSa->>MSCa: ECT request + MSCa->>VLRa: info request + VLRa-->>MSCa: info ack + Note right of VLRa: MAF027 + MSCa->>MSa: OR1:Y + Note right of MSCa: connect calls + MSCa->>MSCb: notification (retrieve) + MSCb->>MSb: notification (retr) + MSCa->>MSCb: notification (ECT) + MSCb->>MSb: notification (ECT) + Note right of MSCa: (alerting) + Note right of MSCb: (alerting) + MSCa->>MSCb: notification (ECT) + MSCb->>LEc: notification (ECT) + Note right of MSCb: (active, Rdn) + Note right of LEc: (active, Rdn) + MSa->>MSCa: ECT ack + MSa->>MSCa: disc req A-B + MSa->>MSCa: disc req A-C + Note right of MSa: A idle, B hears C ringing + Note right of LEc: CONNECT + LEc->>TEc: CONNECT ACK + Note right of MSCa: ANSWER + MSCa->>MSCb: notification (ECT) + MSCb->>MSb: notification (ECT) + Note right of MSCb: (active, Rdn) + Note right of MSCb: (active, Rdn) + Note right of MSa: B-C active, idle + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the information flow for successful explicit call transfer (ECT) between two mobile subscribers (A and B) and a third subscriber (C). The diagram involves MSa, MSCa, VLRa, MSCb, MSb, LEc, and TEc. The process starts with A-B (active, held) and A-C (call delivered, idle) states. The sequence includes ECT request, info request, info ack, OR1:Y, connect calls, notification (retrieve), notification (ECT), notification (retr), notification (ECT), notification (alerting), notification (ECT), notification (active, Rdn), ECT ack, disc req A-B, disc req A-C, A idle, B hears C ringing, ANSWER, notification (ECT), notification (active, Rdn), notification (active, Rdn), CONNECT, CONNECT ACK, and B-C active, idle. + +NOTE: OR1: Checks in VLR and MSC ok? (Y: yes N: no). + +**Figure 8: Information flow for successful explicit call transfer +(one call answered, the other alerting)** + +## 4.3 Interaction with other supplementary services + +### 4.3.1 Line Identification services + +Tables 1 to 4 indicate the information to be provided in the Notification Indicator (NI) and the Redirection Number (Rdn) when the subscribers B and C are notified. Call states refer to the situation before ECT invocation. At that time one of the calls is on hold. + +If user B was the called subscriber in the call A-B, table 1 applies to the information supplied to subscriber C. If user B was the calling subscriber in the call A-B, table 2 applies to the information supplied to subscriber C. + +Mobile subscriber A has an active call to subscriber B and: + +- puts the active call on hold and calls subscriber C, table 3 applies to the information supplied to subscriber B; +- receives and accepts a call from subscriber C (by putting B on Hold), table 4 applies to the information supplied to subscriber B. + +**Table 1: Mobile subscriber A was calling subscriber B, puts B on hold and calls subscriber C** + +| Call states | COLR indication received from subscribers B's network | Information provided to C | +|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| A-B Active
A-C Active / Alerting | Indicated "allowed" | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = allowed, LI of B | +| A-B Active
A-C Active / Alerting | Indicated "restricted" | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = restricted (note 1) | +| A-B Active
A-C Active / Alerting | No indication received
(e.g. interworking) | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = not available | + +**Table 2: Mobile subscriber A was called by subscriber B, puts B on hold and calls subscriber C** + +| Call states | CLIR indication received from subscribers B's network | Information provided to C | +|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| A-B Active
A-C Active / Alerting | Indicated "allowed" | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = allowed, LI of B | +| A-B Active
A-C Active / Alerting | Indicated "restricted" | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = restricted (note 1) | +| A-B Active
A-C Active / Alerting | No indication received
(e.g. interworking) | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = not available | + +NOTE 1: If the subscriber C has CLIP Override Category then the following information is carried in the Redirection number: PI = restricted, LI of B. + +**Table 3: Mobile subscriber A puts the call to B on hold and calls subscriber C** + +| Call states | COLR indication received from subscribers C's network | Information provided to B | +|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| A-B Active
A-C Active | Indicated "allowed" | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = allowed, LI of C | +| A-B Active
A-C Active' | Indicated "restricted" | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = restricted (note 2) | +| A-B Active
A-C Active | No indication received
(e.g. interworking) | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = not available | +| A-B Active
A-C Alerting | Indicated "allowed" at receipt of CONNECT by subscriber C | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, alerting"
At subscribers C CONNECT:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = allowed, LI of C | +| A-B Active
A-C Alerting | Indicated "restricted" at receipt of CONNECT by subscriber C | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, alerting"
At subscribers C CONNECT:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = restricted (note 2) | +| A-B Active
A-C Alerting | No indication received at receipt of CONNECT by subscriber C
(e.g. interworking) | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, alerting"
At subscribers C CONNECT:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = not available | + +**Table 4: Mobile subscriber A was called by subscriber C and accepts the call by putting subscriber B on hold** + +| Call states | CLIR indication received from subscriber C's network | Information provided to B | +|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| A-B Active
A-C Active | Indicated "allowed" | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = allowed, LI of C | +| A-B Active
A-C Active | Indicated "restricted" | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = restricted (note 2) | +| A-B Active
A-C Active | No indication received
(e.g. interworking) | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = not available | + +NOTE 2: If the subscriber B was called by subscriber A and has CLIP Override Category, or if subscriber B called subscriber A and has COLP Override Category then the following information is carried in the Redirection number: PI = restricted, LI of C + +### 4.3.2 Call Forwarding Unconditional (CFU) + +No impact. + +### 4.3.3 Call Forwarding on mobile subscriber Busy (CFB) + +#### 4.3.3.1 Call Forwarding on mobile subscriber Busy due to Network Determined User Busy (NDUB) + +No impact. + +#### 4.3.3.2 Call Forwarding on mobile subscriber Busy due to User Determined User Busy (UDUB) + +When subscriber A transfers the forwarded call there is no impact. + +When subscriber C forwards the transferred call to the forwarded-to subscriber D due to UDUB the line identity information of the subscriber B that was received by the subscriber C in the ECT invocation notification shall be sent as calling line identity to the forwarded-to subscriber D instead of the line identity of the subscriber A. The corresponding information flow is given in figure 9. For the line identity information sent to the subscriber B after the call is answered by the forwarded-to subscriber D the table 5 applies. + +![Sequence diagram showing information flow for explicit call transfer with call forwarding. Lifelines: MSa, MSCa, VLRa, MSCb, MSb, MSCc, MSC, MSCd, MSd. The diagram shows the interaction between a caller (A), a callee (B), a forwarding subscriber (C), and a forwarded-to subscriber (D) through various network elements (MS, VLR, MSC).](29f586959675cafdf81cf934954908eb_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the information flow for an explicit call transfer (ECT) with call forwarding. The lifelines represent the following entities: MSa (Mobile Station A), MSCa (Mobile Switching Center a), VLRa (Visitor Location Register a), MSCb (Mobile Switching Center b), MSb (Mobile Station b), MSCc (Mobile Switching Center c), MSC (Mobile Switching Center), MSCd (Mobile Switching Center d), and MSd (Mobile Station d). + +The initial state shows two calls: A-B (active, held) and A-C (call delivered, idle). The sequence of messages is as follows: + +- MSa sends an ECT request to MSCa. +- MSCa sends an info request to VLRa. +- VLRa responds with MAF027. +- MSCa sends an info ack to VLRa. +- MSCa sends an ORI:Y (Checks in VLR and MSC ok? Y: yes N: no) to MSa. +- MSCa sends a connect calls message to MSCb. +- MSCb sends a notification (retrieve) to MSb. +- MSCb sends a notification (ECT) to MSb. +- MSb responds with (active, RdnB). +- MSCc sends a notification (ECT) to MSC. +- MSC sends a notification (ECT) to MSCd. +- MSCd sends a reject (UDUB) to MSC. +- MSC sends a set up (LI=RdnB) to MSCd. +- MSCd sends a setup to MSd. +- MSCd sends a connect to MSd. +- MSd responds with con ack. +- MSCd sends an ANSWER (LI=D) to MSC. +- MSC sends a notification (ECT) to MSCb. +- MSCb sends a notification (ECT) to MSb. +- MSb responds with (active, RdnD). +- MSCa sends a notification (ECT) to MSa. +- MSa responds with ECT ack. +- MSa sends disc req A-B to MSCa. +- MSa sends disc req A-C to MSCa. + +Sequence diagram showing information flow for explicit call transfer with call forwarding. Lifelines: MSa, MSCa, VLRa, MSCb, MSb, MSCc, MSC, MSCd, MSd. The diagram shows the interaction between a caller (A), a callee (B), a forwarding subscriber (C), and a forwarded-to subscriber (D) through various network elements (MS, VLR, MSC). + +NOTE: ORI: Checks in VLR and MSC ok? (Y: yes N: no) + +**Figure 9: Information flow for interaction of explicit call transfer (one call answered, the other alerting) with call forwarding** + +**Table 5: Subscriber C forwards the transferred call to the subscriber D** + +| Call states | COLR indication received from subscribers D's network | Information provided to B | +|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| A-B Active
A-C Alerting,
forwarded to D | Indicated "allowed" at receipt of
CONNECT by subscriber D | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, alerting"
At subscribers D CONNECT:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = allowed, LI of D | +| A-B Active
A-C Alerting,
forwarded to D | Indicated "restricted" at receipt of
CONNECT by subscriber D | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, alerting"
At subscribers D CONNECT:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = restricted (note 1) | +| A-B Active
A-C Alerting,
forwarded to D | No indication received at receipt of
CONNECT by subscriber D
(e.g. interworking) | At time of transfer:
NI: "call transferred, alerting"
At subscribers D CONNECT:
NI: "call transferred, active"
Rdn: PI = not available | + +NOTE 1: If the subscriber B was called by subscriber A and has CLIP Override Category, or if subscriber B called subscriber A and has COLP Override Category then the following information is carried in the Redirection number: PI = restricted, LI of D. + +### 4.3.4 Call Forwarding on No Reply (CFNRy) + +Same as the interaction between call forwarding on mobile subscriber busy due to UDUB and explicit call transfer as described in subclause 4.3.3.2. + +Figure 9 applies except that call forwarding is invoked by the CFNRy timer expiry instead of reception of reject (UDUB) message. + +For the line identity information sent to the subscriber B after the call is answered by the forwarded-to subscriber D the table 5 applies. + +### 4.3.5 Call Forwarding on mobile subscriber Not Reachable (CFNRc) + +No impact. + +### 4.3.6 Call Waiting (CW) + +No impact. + +### 4.3.7 Call Hold (HOLD) + +No impact. + +### 4.3.8 Multi Party (MPTY) + +The MSC/VLR shall reject any ECT request from the served subscriber of a MPTY call. + +### 4.3.9 Closed User Group (CUG) + +Closed user group restrictions shall be met between users when the first call is set up. + +Similarly, closed user group restrictions shall also be met between users when setting up the second call. + +Finally, for successful explicit call transfer the served mobile subscriber must use the same CUG-Interlock code for both calls. The same rule shall applied regardless of being two MO calls, two MT calls or one MO and one MT call. + +### 4.3.10 Advice of Charge (AoC) services + +No impact. + +### 4.3.11 Call Barring services + +No impact + +### 4.3.12 Explicit Call Transfer (ECT) + +It is required as a network option that the establishment of endless loops between subscriber A and subscriber B, both of them transferring the call to the other one, is prevented. The same loop prevention mechanism as in ISDN shall be used. + +## 4.4 Information stored in the HLR + +The following logical states are applicable for the Explicit Call Transfer service (refer to 3GPP TS 23.011 [6] for an explanation of the notation): + +| Provisioning State | Registration State | Activation State | HLR Induction State | +|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------| +| (Not Provisioned, | Not Applicable, | Not Active, | Not Induced) | +| (Provisioned, | Not Applicable, | Active and Operative, | Not Induced) | + +The HLR shall store the logical state of the Explicit Call Transfer service (which shall be one of the valid states listed above) on a per subscriber basis. + +## 4.5 State transition model + +Figure 10 shows the successful cases of transition between the applicable logical states of the Explicit Call Transfer service. The state changes are caused by actions of the service provider. + +Note that error cases are not shown in the diagram as they normally do not cause a state change. Additionally, some successful requests may not cause a state change and are therefore not shown in the diagram. + +![State transition model diagram for Explicit Call Transfer service. It shows two states: (Not Provisioned, Not Applicable, Not Active, Not Induced) and (Provisioned, Not Applicable, Active and Operative, Not Induced). Transitions are labeled 'Provision' and 'Withdrawal'.](2f58bcce74146d4d983070d93be12291_img.jpg) + +``` + +stateDiagram-v2 + state "(Not Provisioned, Not Applicable, Not Active, Not Induced)" as state1 + state "(Provisioned, Not Applicable, Active and Operative, Not Induced)" as state2 + state1 --> state2 : Provision + state2 --> state1 : Withdrawal + +``` + +State transition model diagram for Explicit Call Transfer service. It shows two states: (Not Provisioned, Not Applicable, Not Active, Not Induced) and (Provisioned, Not Applicable, Active and Operative, Not Induced). Transitions are labeled 'Provision' and 'Withdrawal'. + +Figure 10: State transition model + +## 4.6 Transfer of information from the HLR to the VLR + +If the provisioning state for the Explicit Call Transfer service is "Provisioned" then when the subscriber registers on a VLR the HLR shall send that VLR information about the logical state of the Explicit Call Transfer service. + +If the logical state of the Explicit Call Transfer service is changed while a subscriber is registered on a VLR then the HLR shall inform the VLR of the new logical state of the Explicit Call Transfer service. + +## 4.7 Information stored in the VLR + +For the supplementary service Explicit Call Transfer the VLR shall store the service state information received from the HLR. + +## 4.8 Handover + +Handover will have no impact on the control procedures and the operation of the service. + +# Annex A: Change history + +| TSG CN# | Spec | CR | Rev | Phase | Cat | New Ver | Subject/Comment | +|----------|-----------|-----|-----|--------|-----|---------|------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Apr 1999 | GSM 03.91 | | | | | | Transferred to 3GPP CN1 | +| CN#03 | 23.091 | | | R99 | | 3.0.0 | Approved at CN#03 | +| CN#06 | 23.091 | 001 | | R99 | | 3.1.0 | Approved at CN#06 | +| CN#09 | 23.091 | 002 | 1 | R99 | F | 3.2.0 | SDL refresh | +| CN#11 | 23.091 | | | Rel-4 | | 4.0.0 | Version increased from R99 to Rel-4 after CN#11 | +| CN#11 | 23.091 | 003 | 1 | Rel-4 | C | 4.0.0 | Enhancement of ECT SDLs and CAMEL functionality | +| CN#16 | 23.091 | | | Rel-5 | | 5.0.0 | Version increased from Rel-4 to Rel-5 after CN#16 | +| CN#17 | 23.091 | 005 | | Rel-5 | | 5.1.0 | Correction to check of ECT treatment indicator in SII2 parameter | +| CN#26 | 23.091 | | | Rel-6 | | 6.0.0 | Version increased from Rel-5 to Rel-6 after CN#26 | +| CT#36 | 23.091 | | | Rel-7 | | 7.0.0 | Upgraded unchanged from Rel-6 | +| CT#42 | 23.091 | | | Rel-8 | | 8.0.0 | Upgraded unchanged from Rel-7 | +| CT#46 | 23.091 | - | - | Rel-9 | | 9.0.0 | Update to Rel-9 version (MCC) | +| 2011-03 | 23.091 | - | - | Rel-10 | | 10.0.0 | Update to Rel-10 version (MCC) | +| 2012-09 | 23.091 | - | - | Rel-11 | | 11.0.0 | Update to Rel-11 version (MCC) | +| 2014-09 | 23.091 | - | - | Rel-12 | | 12.0.0 | Update to Rel-12 version (MCC) | +| 2015-12 | 23.091 | - | - | Rel-13 | | 13.0.0 | Update to Rel-13 version (MCC) | +| 2017-03 | 23.091 | - | - | Rel-14 | | 14.0.0 | Update to Rel-14 version (MCC) | +| 2018-06 | 23.091 | - | - | Rel-15 | - | 15.0.0 | Update to Rel-15 version (MCC) | +| 2020-07 | 23.091 | - | - | Rel-16 | - | 16.0.0 | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/0236eff05bcb8f3a343ea7933aaa306b_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/0236eff05bcb8f3a343ea7933aaa306b_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..84c1336fb8ba02f51ab1160446d0698f01e76c1e --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/0236eff05bcb8f3a343ea7933aaa306b_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:a13630c7a95cce61d6514dfe8275611880fe40d642cd89849402202c174ade5d +size 29835 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/5a4e62bead259c258d069fd3663ea670_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/5a4e62bead259c258d069fd3663ea670_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..be99ae1c4d4df58b550b36d5106a9027502ab80b --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/5a4e62bead259c258d069fd3663ea670_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:b4038f7da29c68bdc38279d117ee1a91fd6599113223a6efbafd0fb82b365ea3 +size 127920 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/63e0c22852c26699d0bd095a2d796bab_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/63e0c22852c26699d0bd095a2d796bab_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7bec0b3a7764a7eac3d59dc60d916f8ab9aae2ea --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/63e0c22852c26699d0bd095a2d796bab_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:03c0050832f4bfc8e2de63318f4c0ebde04643d25fef4a454b422a10ed7c282c +size 32205 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/b3baf3a29b67c7425d2562ddbc52f0cc_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/b3baf3a29b67c7425d2562ddbc52f0cc_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b5e421c2dbfa3b24e65adb17a79e9e140e71289d --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/b3baf3a29b67c7425d2562ddbc52f0cc_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:85be7f8af950f9139ef8913a3b5d29a7219912ce15bd0a65e6b7df523a4648dc +size 136664 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/d0abac95583b52a3b35f74a215567334_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/d0abac95583b52a3b35f74a215567334_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2148766f8505583e8ea4002924f5a5249a037f03 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/d0abac95583b52a3b35f74a215567334_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:4ce283b2ad3b46a2f924223c8d1d79a07d5e6306a5267f3d18b2c056d12c3e90 +size 70822 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/e6df2733626a85205c1db682e6259c46_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/e6df2733626a85205c1db682e6259c46_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..17424977d814dd183a7afec8e94fae74e63e16cf --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/e6df2733626a85205c1db682e6259c46_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:bbe7c67a279341c84f4442efd11a79c6002e13b494883c9d5360edea09c35396 +size 45662 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..23baec420b901db1ac6ce69f518a2f21105323f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23096/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ + + + + + + +# Contents + +Foreword ..... 4 + +1 Scope..... 5 + +2 References..... 5 + +3 Definitions and Abbreviations ..... 5 + +3.1 Definitions..... 5 + +3.2 Abbreviations ..... 6 + +4 Calling Name Presentation (CNAP) ..... 6 + +4.1 Handling of calling name presentation..... 6 + +4.1.1 Originating MSC Activities..... 6 + +4.1.2 Terminating VMSC Activities ..... 6 + +4.1.3 Interrogation ..... 7 + +4.2 Functions and information flows..... 7 + +4.3 Information stored in the HLR ..... 12 + +4.4 State Transition Model..... 12 + +4.5 Transfer of information from HLR to VLR ..... 12 + +4.6 Information stored in the VLR ..... 12 + +4.7 Handover ..... 13 + +**Annex A (normative for PCS1900):..... Calling Name Information Setting to +the MS..... 14** + +Annex B (informative): Change history..... 15 + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The present document describes name identification supplementary services (stage 2) within the 3GPP system. + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document gives the stage 2 description of the Name Identification Supplementary Services. + +The group of Name Identification Supplementary Services contains the following Supplementary Service: + +**CNAP** - Calling name presentation (clause 4). + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. + - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. + - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications ". +- [2] 3GPP TS 22.004: "General on Supplementary Services". +- [3] 3GPP TS 23.011: "Technical Realization of Supplementary Services - General Aspects". +- [4] 3GPP TS 23.016: "Subscriber Data Management - Stage 2". +- [5] 3GPP TS 23.081: "Line Identification Supplementary Services - Stage 2". + +# --- 3 Definitions and Abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +### **Definition of name identity:** + +The name identity is made up of the following information unit: + +- The name of the mobile subscriber for the purpose of calling name presentation - up to 80 characters of information associated with a specific calling party. + +The calling name identity is the name identity of the calling party. + +### **Definition of Presentation Indicator:** + +In addition to or instead of the name identity, the network may give a Presentation Indicator to the called mobile subscriber of the CNAP service. The following information may be given: + +- Presentation Indicator (PI) showing: + - a) presentation restricted, or + - b) name unavailable. + +### **Calling Name Information:** + +The calling name information of the calling party includes either the calling name identity or an indication of privacy or unavailability. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +In addition to the following abbreviations used in the present document, abbreviations are listed in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1]. + +| | | +|------|----------------------------| +| CNAP | Calling Name Presentation. | +|------|----------------------------| + +--- + +# 4 Calling Name Presentation (CNAP) + +## 4.1 Handling of calling name presentation + +### 4.1.1 Originating MSC Activities + +The originating MSC may include calling name information in the Setup. + +### 4.1.2 Terminating VMSC Activities + +The calling name identity shall be provided by the terminating VMSC to the MS. See Figure 3a/3b for details. + +The procedures of the name database query are outside the scope of the present document. + +The MSC shall determine the presentation indicator to be sent to the CNAP subscriber's MS by combining the presentation indicator in the calling line information (if available), the presentation indicator in the calling name information (if available) and the presentation indicator in the response from the name database (if applicable). The calling name shall be restricted if either the line or name indicator shows the information is to be restricted (and override category is not applicable). The precise handling depends on the structure of the name database and is therefore outside the scope of the present document. An example is shown in annex A. + +If a name database query is not possible, e.g. calling line identity is unavailable, name database is not responding, or the name database response timer expires, then the MSC shall send a presentation indicator of name unavailable to the CNAP subscriber's MS. + +A character translation may be required by the terminating MSC since the name characters stored in the name database are not using the GSM default alphabet (name characters passed to the CNAP subscriber's MS use the GSM default alphabet). Display of calling name identity to the subscriber is outside the scope of the present document. + +### 4.1.3 Interrogation + +#### Status check + +The mobile subscriber can request the status of the supplementary service and be informed if the service is provided to him/her. This procedure is illustrated in figure 1. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the interrogation of Calling Name Presentation (CNAP) between MS, MSC, and VLR.](0236eff05bcb8f3a343ea7933aaa306b_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant MS + participant MSC + participant VLR + Note left of MS: Status check + MS->>MSC: Interrogate CNAP + MSC->>VLR: Interrogate CNAP + VLR-->>MSC: Acknowledge + MSC-->>MS: Release Complete +``` + +The diagram shows a sequence of messages between three entities: MS (Mobile Station), MSC (Mobile Switching Center), and VLR (Visitor Location Register). The sequence is as follows: 1. MS sends an 'Interrogate' message with 'CNAP' to MSC. 2. MSC sends an 'Interrogate' message with 'CNAP' to VLR. 3. VLR sends an 'Acknowledge' message back to MSC. 4. MSC sends a 'Release' message with 'Complete' back to MS. + +Sequence diagram illustrating the interrogation of Calling Name Presentation (CNAP) between MS, MSC, and VLR. + +Figure 1: Interrogation of Calling Name Presentation + +## 4.2 Functions and information flows + +The following Mobile Additional Functions (MAF) have been identified for the PLMN: + +### MAF049 + +Determination of the calling name presentation subscription. + +The ability of a PLMN component to determine whether the supplementary service is provisioned for the mobile subscriber. See figure 3a. + +Location: VLR. + +### MAF050 + +Determination of the calling party name for offering to the called party. + +The ability of a PLMN component to determine and to forward the calling name identity and related indications to the called party. See figure 3b. + +Location: destination MSC. + +The information flow is shown in figure 4. + +![Flowchart for MAF049 Determination of the calling name presentation subscription (VLR). The process starts at 'Idle', goes to 'Initiate CNAP Handling', then checks 'CNAP Provisioned?'. If 'no', it sets 'provision indication = not provisioned'. If 'yes', it sets 'provision indication = provisioned' and then checks 'called subscriber in HPLMN?'. If 'no', it sets 'override category = no'. If 'yes', it checks 'override category?'. If 'yes', it sets 'override category = yes'. If 'no', it sets 'override category = no'. All three 'set' blocks lead to 'Continue Call Handling', which then returns to 'Idle'.](d0abac95583b52a3b35f74a215567334_img.jpg) + +``` +graph TD; Idle1([Idle]) --> Initiate[Initiate CNAP Handling]; Initiate --> CNAP_Provisioned{CNAP Provisioned?}; CNAP_Provisioned -- no --> SetNotProvisioned[set provision indication = not provisioned]; CNAP_Provisioned -- yes --> SetProvisioned[set provision indication = provisioned]; SetNotProvisioned --> ContinueCallHandling{Continue Call Handling}; SetProvisioned --> CalledSubscriber{called subscriber in HPLMN?}; CalledSubscriber -- no --> SetOverrideNo1[set override category = no]; CalledSubscriber -- yes --> OverrideCategory{override category?}; OverrideCategory -- yes --> SetOverrideYes[set override category = yes]; OverrideCategory -- no --> SetOverrideNo2[set override category = no]; SetOverrideYes --> ContinueCallHandling; SetOverrideNo1 --> ContinueCallHandling; SetOverrideNo2 --> ContinueCallHandling; ContinueCallHandling --> Idle2([Idle]); +``` + +Flowchart for MAF049 Determination of the calling name presentation subscription (VLR). The process starts at 'Idle', goes to 'Initiate CNAP Handling', then checks 'CNAP Provisioned?'. If 'no', it sets 'provision indication = not provisioned'. If 'yes', it sets 'provision indication = provisioned' and then checks 'called subscriber in HPLMN?'. If 'no', it sets 'override category = no'. If 'yes', it checks 'override category?'. If 'yes', it sets 'override category = yes'. If 'no', it sets 'override category = no'. All three 'set' blocks lead to 'Continue Call Handling', which then returns to 'Idle'. + +Figure 2: MAF049 Determination of the calling name presentation subscription (VLR) + +![Flowchart for MAF050(CNAP) Determination of the information for offering to the called party (Sheet 1).](b3baf3a29b67c7425d2562ddbc52f0cc_img.jpg) + +``` +graph TD; Idle1([Idle]) --> Initiate[Initiate CNAP Handling]; Initiate --> CNAP_Provisioned{CNAP Provisioned?}; CNAP_Provisioned -- no --> Idle2([Idle]); CNAP_Provisioned -- yes --> CLIA_Available{calling line identity available?*}; CLIA_Available -- no --> Pass_PI_Unavail[pass PI = name unavailable]; CLIA_Available -- yes --> CLIA_Restricted{calling line identity restricted?}; CLIA_Restricted -- yes --> CNAP_Override{CNAP override category?}; CLIA_Restricted -- no --> Name_Info_Avail{calling name information available?}; Name_Info_Avail -- no --> DB_Query[Perform Name Database Query start timer]; Name_Info_Avail -- yes --> Name_Pres_Restricted{name presentation restricted?}; Name_Pres_Restricted -- yes --> CNAP_Override; Name_Pres_Restricted -- no --> Name_Char_Exist{name characters exist?}; CNAP_Override -- no --> Pass_PI_Restr[pass PI = presentation restricted]; CNAP_Override -- yes --> Set_PI_Restr[set PI = presentation restricted for Override]; Set_PI_Restr --> Name_Char_Exist; Name_Char_Exist -- no --> DB_Query; Name_Char_Exist -- yes --> Obtain_CNI[Obtain Calling Name Information]; Obtain_CNI --> DB_Query; DB_Query --> Wait_Response[Wait For Name Database Response]; Wait_Response --> Recv_Response[Receive Name Database Response]; Recv_Response --> Exit1((1)); Wait_Response --> Timer_Expiry[Timer Expiry]; Timer_Expiry --> Exit2((2)); DB_Query --> Use_Char[Use Name Characters from the Calling Name Information]; Use_Char --> Pass_CNI[pass calling name identity]; Pass_CNI --> Idle2; Note1[* Calling line identity needed to perform the Name Database query.]; Note2[PI = Presentation Indicator]; +``` + +The flowchart describes the logic for determining information to offer to a called party during a CNAP call. It starts at an 'Idle' state, initiates CNAP handling, and checks if CNAP is provisioned. If not, it returns to 'Idle'. If provisioned, it checks if the calling line identity is available. If not, it passes a 'name unavailable' presentation indicator (PI) and returns to 'Idle'. If available, it checks if the identity is restricted. If restricted, it checks the CNAP override category. If no override, it passes a 'presentation restricted' PI and returns to 'Idle'. If an override exists, it sets the PI to 'presentation restricted for Override' and proceeds to check if name characters exist. If the calling name information is not available, it performs a name database query. If name characters exist, it obtains calling name information and then performs the database query. The database query starts a timer. If the database response is received, the process continues to the next sheet (exit 1). If the timer expires, the process continues to the next sheet (exit 2). If name characters exist and are used from signalling, it passes the calling name identity and returns to 'Idle'. A note indicates that the calling line identity is needed for the database query. Another note defines PI as Presentation Indicator. + +Flowchart for MAF050(CNAP) Determination of the information for offering to the called party (Sheet 1). + +Figure 3a: MAF050(CNAP) Determination of the information for offering to the called party (Sheet 1) + +![Flowchart for MAF050(CNAP) Determination of the information for offering to the called party (Sheet 2).](e6df2733626a85205c1db682e6259c46_img.jpg) + +``` +graph TD; Start((1)) --> D1{Name unavailable?}; D1 -- yes --> P1[pass PI = name unavailable]; D1 -- no --> D2{Has Setup been sent to MS?}; D2 -- no --> P2[pass calling name info to MS in Setup e.g. as in Annex A]; D2 -- yes --> D3{Has call been answered?}; D3 -- yes --> D4{Send calling name info after answer?}; D3 -- no --> P3[pass calling name info to MS in Facility e.g. as in Annex A]; D4 -- no --> P1; D4 -- yes --> P3; P1 --> End((2)); P2 --> End; P3 --> End; End --> Idle[Idle]; PI[PI = Presentation Indicator]; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the logic for determining information to offer to the called party. It begins at connector 1 with a decision 'Name unavailable?'. If 'yes', it proceeds to 'pass PI = name unavailable'. If 'no', it asks 'Has Setup been sent to MS?'. If 'no', it proceeds to 'pass calling name info to MS in Setup e.g. as in Annex A'. If 'yes', it asks 'Has call been answered?'. If 'no', it proceeds to 'pass calling name info to MS in Facility e.g. as in Annex A'. If 'yes', it asks 'Send calling name info after answer?'. If 'no', it proceeds to 'pass PI = name unavailable'. If 'yes', it proceeds to 'pass calling name info to MS in Facility e.g. as in Annex A'. All three 'pass' actions lead to connector 2. From connector 2, the flow proceeds to the 'Idle' state. A legend indicates 'PI = Presentation Indicator'. + +Flowchart for MAF050(CNAP) Determination of the information for offering to the called party (Sheet 2). + +Figure 3b: MAF050(CNAP) Determination of the information for offering to the called party (Sheet 2) + +![Sequence diagram showing information flow for calling name presentation from MSa/IE to MSb via MSCa/IE, VIRb, and MSCb. The diagram includes lifelines for MSa/IE, MSCa/IE, VIRb, MSCb, Name Database, and MSb. It details the exchange of Setup, info req, info ack, Query, and Response messages, with various CNAP provisioned (OR1), Calling Name Info Presentation Indicator Value (OR2), and Override category (OR3) options being communicated to the destination MSb.](5a4e62bead259c258d069fd3663ea670_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the interaction for calling name presentation. The lifelines are MSa/IE, MSCa/IE, VIRb, MSCb, Name Database, and MSb. The process starts with a Setup message from MSa/IE to MSCa/IE. MSCa/IE then sends a message containing (Calling Line Info\*, Calling Name Info\*\*) to VIRb. VIRb sends an info req to MSCb, which responds with an info ack. MSCb sends a Query (Calling line identity) to the Name Database, which returns a Response (Name). MSCb then sends multiple Setup messages to MSb, each containing different combinations of OR1, OR2, and OR3 parameters as shown in the diagram. A timer is indicated between the info ack and the first Setup message to MSb. + +\* The Calling Line Info contains a presentation indicator and the calling line identity. + \*\* If included in the Setup, Calling Name Info contains a presentation indicator and may contain the calling name identity. + +Sequence diagram showing information flow for calling name presentation from MSa/IE to MSb via MSCa/IE, VIRb, and MSCb. The diagram includes lifelines for MSa/IE, MSCa/IE, VIRb, MSCb, Name Database, and MSb. It details the exchange of Setup, info req, info ack, Query, and Response messages, with various CNAP provisioned (OR1), Calling Name Info Presentation Indicator Value (OR2), and Override category (OR3) options being communicated to the destination MSb. + +**Figure 4: Information Flow For Calling Name Presentation: Mobile Station Or Fixed Terminal To Mobile Station** + +| | | | | | +|-------|-------|------------------------------|---------------|----------------| +| NOTE: | OR1: | CNAP provisioned | Y: yes | | +| | | | | N: no | +| | OR2: | Calling Name Info | a: allowed | | +| | | Presentation Indicator Value | b: restricted | | +| | | | | c: unavailable | +| | OR3: | Override category | Y: yes | | +| | | | | N: no | +| | info: | information | | | +| | req: | request | | | +| | ack: | acknowledge | | | +| | PI: | presentation indicator | | | + +## 4.3 Information stored in the HLR + +**CNAP may have the following logical states (refer to 3GPP TS 23.011 for an explanation of the notation):** + +| Provision State | Registration State | Activation State | HLR Induced State | +|------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------| +| (Not Provisioned, | Not Applicable, | Not Active, | Not Induced) | +| (Provisioned, | Not Applicable, | Active and Operative, | Not Induced) | + +The HLR shall store the logical state of CNAP (which shall be one of the valid state listed above) on a per subscriber basis. + +The HLR shall also store the subscription option "override category" on a per subscriber basis. The subscription options are: "Yes" or "No". + +## 4.4 State Transition Model + +The following figure shows the successful cases of transition between the applicable logical states of CNAP. The state changes are caused by actions of the service provider. + +Note that error cases are not shown in the diagram as they normally do not cause change. Additionally, some successful requests may not cause a state change. Hence they are not shown in the diagram. + +![State Transition model for CNAP diagram showing two states and transitions between them.](63e0c22852c26699d0bd095a2d796bab_img.jpg) + +``` + +stateDiagram-v2 + state "((Not provisioned, Not Applicable, Not Active, Not Induced))" as S1 + state "((Provisioned, Not Applicable, Active and Operative, Not Induced))" as S2 + S1 --> S2 : Provision + S2 --> S1 : Withdrawal + +``` + +The diagram illustrates the state transition model for CNAP. It consists of two circular states. The left state contains the text: "(Not provisioned, Not Applicable, Not Active, Not Induced)". The right state contains the text: "(Provisioned, Not Applicable, Active and Operative, Not Induced)". A horizontal arrow labeled "Provision" points from the left state to the right state. A horizontal arrow labeled "Withdrawal" points from the right state back to the left state. + +State Transition model for CNAP diagram showing two states and transitions between them. + +**Figure 5: State Transition model for CNAP** + +## 4.5 Transfer of information from HLR to VLR + +If the provisioning state for CNAP is "provisioned" then, when the subscriber registers on a VLR, the HLR shall send the VLR subscriber information about the logical state of CNAP. Please refer to GSM 03.16 for details related to the handling of supplementary service information between the HLR and VLR. + +If the logical state of CNAP or the override category is changed while a subscriber is registered on a VLR, then the HLR shall inform the VLR of the logical state of CNAP. If the override category is changed and the provisioning state of CNAP is "Provisioned", then the HLR shall inform the VLR about the new override category when the VLR is in the HPLMN country. The HLR may inform the VLR about the new override category when the VLR is outside the HPLMN country. + +## 4.6 Information stored in the VLR + +For CNAP, the VLR shall store the service state information and override category received from the HLR. If not received from the HLR (in case of roaming outside the HPLMN country), the override category shall be set to the default value "no". + +## 4.7 Handover + +Handover will have no impact on the control procedures and the operation of the service. + +# Annex A (normative for PCS1900): Calling Name Information Setting to the MS + +A name database query is performed using the calling party's line identity as specified in ANSI T1.641 "Calling Name Identification Presentation". + +The calling name information, which contains the resulting presentation indicator, as shown in Table 1 is sent to the CNAP subscriber's MS. + +**Table 1: Determination of Calling Name Information sent to CNAP subscriber's MS** + +| Presentation Indicator in Calling Name Information | Presentation Indicator in Name Database | Calling Name Information sent to the CNAP subscriber's MS | +|-----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------| +| Presentation Allowed | Presentation Allowed | Calling Name Identity | +| | Presentation Restricted | | +| | Blocking Toggle | | +| | No Indication | | +| Presentation Restricted | No Database Query performed | Presentation Restricted 1 | +| Blocking Toggle | Presentation Allowed | Presentation Restricted 1 | +| | Presentation Restricted | Calling Name Identity | +| | Blocking Toggle | Unavailable 2 | +| | No Indication | Unavailable 2 | +| No Indication
(or No Calling Name Information present) | Presentation Allowed | Calling Name Identity | +| | Presentation Restricted | Presentation Restricted 1 | +| | Blocking Toggle | Unavailable 2 | +| | No Indication | Unavailable 2 | + +NOTE1: If the override category is set to yes, the MSC shall send the calling name identity and a presentation indicator of presentation restricted to the CNAP subscriber's MS. + +NOTE 2: These combinations are unexpected: an indication of name unavailable is given. + +# --- Annex B (informative): Change history + +| TSG CN# | Spec | CR | | New Version | Subject/Comment | +|----------|-----------|------|---------|-------------|----------------------------------| +| Apr 1999 | GSM 03.96 | | | | Transferred to 3GPP CN1 | +| CN#03 | 23.096 | | | 3.0.0 | Approved at CN#03 | +| | 23.096 | | R99 | 3.0.1 | References updated from 2G to 3G | +| CN#11 | 23.096 | | Rel-4 | 4.0.0 | Release 4 after CN#11 | +| CN#16 | 23.096 | | Rel-5 | 5.0.0 | Release 5 after CN#16 | +| CN#26 | 23.096 | | Rel-6 | 6.0.0 | Release 6 after CN#26 | +| CT#30 | 23.096 | 0001 | Rel-6 | 6.1.0 | Incorrect reference | +| CT#35 | 23.096 | | Rel-7 | 7.0.0 | Upgraded unchanged from Rel-6 | +| CT#42 | 23.096 | | Rel-8 | 8.0.0 | Upgraded unchanged from Rel-7 | +| CT#46 | 23.096 | - | Rel-9 | 9.0.0 | Update to Rel-9 version (MCC) | +| 2011-03 | 23.096 | - | Rel-10 | 10.0.0 | Update to Rel-10 version (MCC) | +| 2012-09 | 23.096 | - | Rel-11 | 11.0.0 | Update to Rel-11 version (MCC) | +| 2014-09 | 23.096 | - | Rel-12 | 12.0.0 | Update to Rel-12 version (MCC) | +| 2015-12 | 23.096 | - | Rel-13 | 13.0.0 | Update to Rel-13 version (MCC) | +| 2017-03 | 23.096 | - | Rel-14 | 14.0.0 | Update to Rel-14 version (MCC) | +| 2018-06 | 23.096 | - | Rel-15 | 15.0.0 | Update to Rel-15 version (MCC) | +| 2020-07 | 23.096 | - | Rel-16 | 16.0.0 | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23203/023599a4fac1a9e3fd8cced09d3e75a6_img.jpg 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sha256:b78ec830701fae7204d76be79e661e34c748a38f90d8a618918ed43fe31b5ad5 +size 69161 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23203/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23203/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dbd35afa138d1a149ddaf84cf7b9943db995d7c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23203/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,8978 @@ + + +# 3GPP TS 23.203 V16.3.0 (2021-12) + +Technical Specification + +## **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Policy and charging control architecture (Release 16)** + +![5G logo](64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg) + +The 5G logo, featuring the text "5G" in a bold, black, sans-serif font. Above the "5G" text is a green graphic consisting of three curved lines of increasing height, representing a signal or wave. + +5G logo + +![3GPP logo](5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg) + +The 3GPP logo, featuring the text "3GPP" in a stylized, bold, black font. Below the "3GPP" text is a red graphic consisting of three curved lines of increasing height, representing a signal or wave. Below the logo, the text "A GLOBAL INITIATIVE" is written in a smaller, black, sans-serif font. + +3GPP logo + +The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP. The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organizational Partners and shall not be implemented. This Specification is provided for future development work within 3GPP only. The Organizational Partners accept no liability for any use of this Specification. Specifications and Reports for implementation of the 3GPP™ system should be obtained via the 3GPP Organizational Partners' Publications Offices. + +# **3GPP** + +--- + +Postal address + +--- + +3GPP support office address + +--- + +650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis +Valbonne - FRANCE +Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 + +--- + +Internet + +--- + + + +## --- **Copyright Notification** --- + +No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. +The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. + +© 2021, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC). +All rights reserved. + +UMTS™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members +3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association + +# Contents + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword..... | 13 | +| Introduction..... | 13 | +| 1 Scope..... | 14 | +| 2 References..... | 14 | +| 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations..... | 16 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 16 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations..... | 19 | +| 4 High level requirements..... | 20 | +| 4.1 General requirements..... | 20 | +| 4.2 Charging related requirements..... | 21 | +| 4.2.1 General..... | 21 | +| 4.2.2 Charging models..... | 21 | +| 4.2.2a Charging requirements..... | 22 | +| 4.2.3 Examples of Service Data Flow Charging..... | 23 | +| 4.3 Policy control requirements..... | 23 | +| 4.3.1 General..... | 23 | +| 4.3.2 Gating control..... | 23 | +| 4.3.3 QoS control..... | 24 | +| 4.3.3.1 QoS control at service data flow level..... | 24 | +| 4.3.3.2 QoS control at IP-CAN bearer level..... | 24 | +| 4.3.3.3 QoS Conflict Handling..... | 24 | +| 4.3.3.4 QoS control at APN level..... | 24 | +| 4.3.4 Subscriber Spending Limits..... | 25 | +| 4.4 Usage Monitoring Control..... | 25 | +| 4.5 Application Detection and Control..... | 25 | +| 4.6 RAN user plane congestion detection, reporting and mitigation..... | 27 | +| 4.7 Support for service capability exposure..... | 27 | +| 4.8 Traffic Steering Control..... | 27 | +| 4.9 Management of Packet Flow Descriptions in the PCEF/TDF using the PFDF..... | 27 | +| 5 Architecture model and reference points..... | 28 | +| 5.1 Reference architecture..... | 28 | +| 5.2 Reference points..... | 31 | +| 5.2.1 Rx reference point..... | 31 | +| 5.2.2 Gx reference point..... | 31 | +| 5.2.3 Reference points to subscriber databases..... | 32 | +| 5.2.3.1 Sp reference point..... | 32 | +| 5.2.3.2 Ud reference point..... | 32 | +| 5.2.4 Gy reference point..... | 32 | +| 5.2.5 Gz reference point..... | 32 | +| 5.2.6 S9 reference point..... | 32 | +| 5.2.7 Gxx reference point..... | 33 | +| 5.2.8 Sd reference point..... | 33 | +| 5.2.9 Sy reference point..... | 34 | +| 5.2.10 Gyn reference point..... | 34 | +| 5.2.11 Gzn reference point..... | 34 | +| 5.2.12 Np reference point..... | 34 | +| 5.2.13 Nt reference point..... | 34 | +| 5.2.14 St reference point..... | 35 | +| 5.2.15 Nu reference point..... | 35 | +| 5.2.16 Gw reference point..... | 35 | +| 5.2.17 Gwn reference point..... | 35 | +| 6 Functional description..... | 35 | +| 6.1 Overall description..... | 35 | + +| | | | +|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| 6.1.0 | General..... | 35 | +| 6.1.1 | Binding mechanism..... | 36 | +| 6.1.1.1 | General..... | 36 | +| 6.1.1.2 | Session binding..... | 36 | +| 6.1.1.3 | PCC rule authorization and QoS rule generation..... | 37 | +| 6.1.1.4 | Bearer Binding..... | 38 | +| 6.1.2 | Reporting..... | 39 | +| 6.1.3 | Credit management..... | 40 | +| 6.1.4 | Event Triggers..... | 42 | +| 6.1.5 | Policy Control..... | 47 | +| 6.1.6 | Service (data flow) Prioritization and Conflict Handling..... | 48 | +| 6.1.7 | Standardized QoS characteristics..... | 49 | +| 6.1.7.1 | General..... | 49 | +| 6.1.7.2 | Standardized QCI characteristics..... | 49 | +| 6.1.7.3 | Allocation and Retention Priority characteristics..... | 56 | +| 6.1.8 | Termination Action..... | 56 | +| 6.1.9 | Handling of packet filters provided to the UE by PCEF/BBERF..... | 57 | +| 6.1.10 | IMS Emergency Session Support..... | 58 | +| 6.1.10.1 | Architecture model and Reference points..... | 58 | +| 6.1.10.2 | PCC Rule Authorization and QoS rule generation..... | 58 | +| 6.1.10.3 | Functional Entities..... | 58 | +| 6.1.10.3.1 | PCRF..... | 58 | +| 6.1.10.3.2 | PCEF..... | 58 | +| 6.1.10.3.3 | P-CSCF..... | 59 | +| 6.1.10.4 | PCC Procedures and Flows..... | 59 | +| 6.1.10a | Restricted Local Operator Services Support..... | 59 | +| 6.1.11 | Multimedia Priority Service Support..... | 60 | +| 6.1.11.1 | Architecture model and Reference points..... | 60 | +| 6.1.11.2 | PCC rule authorization and QoS rule generation..... | 60 | +| 6.1.11.3 | Priority EPS Bearer Service..... | 60 | +| 6.1.11.4 | Bearer priority for IMS Multimedia Priority Services..... | 61 | +| 6.1.12 | ADC rule authorization..... | 61 | +| 6.1.13 | Redirection..... | 61 | +| 6.1.14 | Resource sharing for different AF sessions..... | 62 | +| 6.1.15 | Reporting of RAN user plane congestion information..... | 62 | +| 6.1.15.1 | General..... | 62 | +| 6.1.15.2 | Reporting restrictions..... | 62 | +| 6.1.15.3 | UE mobility between RCAFs..... | 63 | +| 6.1.16 | Negotiation for future background data transfer..... | 63 | +| 6.1.17 | Traffic Steering Control..... | 64 | +| 6.1.18 | PCC support of NBIFOM..... | 64 | +| 6.1.18.1 | General..... | 64 | +| 6.1.18.2 | NBIFOM impacts on IP-CAN procedures..... | 65 | +| 6.1.19 | Resource reservation for services sharing priority..... | 68 | +| 6.1.20 | Management of Packet Flow Descriptions using the PFDF..... | 68 | +| 6.1.21 | 3GPP PS Data Off..... | 70 | +| 6.2 | Functional entities..... | 71 | +| 6.2.1 | Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF)..... | 71 | +| 6.2.1.0 | General..... | 71 | +| 6.2.1.1 | Input for PCC decisions..... | 76 | +| 6.2.1.2 | Subscription information management in the PCRF..... | 79 | +| 6.2.1.3 | V-PCRF..... | 79 | +| 6.2.1.3.1 | General..... | 79 | +| 6.2.1.3.2 | V-PCRF and Home Routed Access..... | 80 | +| 6.2.1.3.3 | V-PCRF and Visited Access (local breakout)..... | 80 | +| 6.2.1.4 | H-PCRF..... | 81 | +| 6.2.1.4.1 | General..... | 81 | +| 6.2.1.4.2 | H-PCRF and Home Routed Access..... | 82 | +| 6.2.1.4.3 | H-PCRF and Visited Access (Local Breakout)..... | 82 | +| 6.2.1.5 | Handling of Multiple BBFs associated with the same IP-CAN session..... | 82 | +| 6.2.1.5.1 | Handling of two BBFs associated with the same IP-CAN session during handover..... | 82 | + +| | | | +|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 6.2.1.5.2 | Handling of multiple BBFs with IP-CAN session flow mobility..... | 83 | +| 6.2.2 | Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF)..... | 84 | +| 6.2.2.1 | General..... | 84 | +| 6.2.2.2 | Service data flow detection..... | 87 | +| 6.2.2.3 | Measurement..... | 90 | +| 6.2.2.4 | QoS control..... | 91 | +| 6.2.2.5 | Application Detection..... | 92 | +| 6.2.2.6 | Traffic steering..... | 92 | +| 6.2.3 | Application Function (AF)..... | 93 | +| 6.2.4 | Subscription Profile Repository (SPR)..... | 94 | +| 6.2.5 | Online Charging System..... | 95 | +| 6.2.6 | Offline Charging System (OFCS)..... | 95 | +| 6.2.7 | Bearer Binding and Event Reporting Function (BBERF)..... | 95 | +| 6.2.7.1 | General..... | 95 | +| 6.2.7.2 | Service data flow detection..... | 95 | +| 6.2.7.3 | QoS Control..... | 96 | +| 6.2.8 | User Data Repository (UDR)..... | 96 | +| 6.2.9 | Traffic Detection Function (TDF)..... | 96 | +| 6.2.9.1 | General..... | 96 | +| 6.2.9.2 | Traffic steering..... | 97 | +| 6.2.10 | RAN Congestion Awareness Function (RCAF)..... | 97 | +| 6.2.11 | Service Capability Exposure Function (SCEF)..... | 98 | +| 6.2.12 | Traffic Steering Support Function (TSSF)..... | 98 | +| 6.2.13 | Packet Flow Description Function (PFDF)..... | 98 | +| 6.3 | Policy and charging control rule..... | 99 | +| 6.3.1 | General..... | 99 | +| 6.3.2 | Policy and charging control rule operations..... | 107 | +| 6.4 | IP-CAN bearer and IP-CAN session related policy information..... | 108 | +| 6.4a | TDF session related policy information..... | 110 | +| 6.4b | APN related policy information..... | 111 | +| 6.5 | Quality of Service Control rule..... | 113 | +| 6.5.1 | General..... | 113 | +| 6.5.2 | Quality of Service control rule operations..... | 114 | +| 6.6 | Usage Monitoring Control specific information..... | 115 | +| 6.6.1 | General..... | 115 | +| 6.6.2 | Usage Monitoring Control operations..... | 116 | +| 6.7 | S2c based IP flow mobility Routing rule..... | 116 | +| 6.7.1 | General..... | 116 | +| 6.7.2 | Routing rule operations..... | 117 | +| 6.8 | Application Detection and Control Rule..... | 117 | +| 6.8.1 | General..... | 117 | +| 6.8.2 | Application Detection and Control rule operations over Sd..... | 123 | +| 6.9 | Policy decisions based on spending limits..... | 124 | +| 6.11 | Traffic Steering Control Information..... | 125 | +| 6.11.1 | General..... | 125 | +| 6.11.2 | Traffic Steering Control Operations over St..... | 125 | +| 6.12 | NBIFOM Routing rule..... | 126 | +| 6.12.1 | General..... | 126 | +| 6.12.2 | NBIFOM Routing rule operations..... | 127 | +| 7 | PCC Procedures and flows..... | 127 | +| 7.1 | Introduction..... | 127 | +| 7.2 | IP-CAN Session Establishment..... | 129 | +| 7.3 | IP-CAN Session Termination..... | 132 | +| 7.3.1 | UE initiated IP-CAN Session termination..... | 132 | +| 7.3.2 | GW (PCEF) initiated IP-CAN Session termination..... | 135 | +| 7.4 | IP-CAN Session Modification..... | 137 | +| 7.4.1 | IP-CAN Session Modification; GW (PCEF) initiated..... | 137 | +| 7.4.2 | IP-CAN Session Modification; PCRF initiated..... | 140 | +| 7.4.3 | Void..... | 144 | +| 7.5 | Update of the subscription information in the PCRF..... | 144 | +| 7.6 | PCRF Discovery and Selection..... | 145 | + +| | | | +|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 7.6.1 | General principles..... | 145 | +| 7.6.2 | Solution Principles..... | 146 | +| 7.7 | Gateway Control Session Procedures..... | 147 | +| 7.7.1 | Gateway Control Session Establishment..... | 147 | +| 7.7.1.0 | General..... | 147 | +| 7.7.1.1 | Gateway Control Session Establishment during Attach..... | 148 | +| 7.7.1.2 | Gateway Control Session Establishment during BBERF Relocation..... | 149 | +| 7.7.2 | Gateway Control Session Termination..... | 151 | +| 7.7.2.1 | GW (BBERF)-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination..... | 151 | +| 7.7.2.2 | PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination..... | 152 | +| 7.7.3 | Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request..... | 152 | +| 7.7.3.1 | General..... | 152 | +| 7.7.3.2 | Event reporting for PCEF in visited network and locally terminated Gxx interaction..... | 154 | +| 7.7.4 | Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision..... | 155 | +| 7.7.5 | Void..... | 156 | +| 7.8 | Change in subscription for MPS priority services..... | 156 | +| 7.9 | Procedures over Sy reference point..... | 156 | +| 7.9.1 | Initial Spending Limit Report Request..... | 156 | +| 7.9.2 | Intermediate Spending Limit Report Request..... | 157 | +| 7.9.3 | Final Spending Limit Report Request..... | 157 | +| 7.9.4 | Spending Limit Report..... | 158 | +| 7.9.5 | Sy Session Termination..... | 159 | +| 7.10 | Procedures over Np reference point..... | 159 | +| 7.10.1 | Report RAN user plane congestion information to PCRF..... | 159 | +| 7.10.2 | PCRF provided reporting restrictions..... | 160 | +| 7.10.3 | UE mobility between RCAFs..... | 161 | +| 7.11 | Procedures over Nt reference point..... | 162 | +| 7.11.1 | Negotiation for future background data transfer..... | 162 | +| 7.12 | Procedures for management of PFDs..... | 163 | +| 7.12.1 | PFD Retrieval by the PCEF/TDF ("Pull mode")..... | 163 | +| 7.12.2 | Management of PFDs in the PCEF/TDF ("push mode")..... | 164 | + +# **Annex A (normative): Access specific aspects (3GPP).....165** + +| | | | +|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| A.1 | GPRS..... | 165 | +| A.1.0 | General..... | 165 | +| A.1.1 | High level requirements..... | 165 | +| A.1.1.1 | General..... | 165 | +| A.1.1.2 | Charging related requirements..... | 165 | +| A.1.1.3 | Policy control requirements..... | 165 | +| A.1.1.4 | QoS control..... | 166 | +| A.1.2 | Architecture model and reference points..... | 166 | +| A.1.2.1 | Reference points..... | 166 | +| A.1.2.1.1 | Gx reference point..... | 166 | +| A.1.2.2 | Reference architecture..... | 166 | +| A.1.3 | Functional description..... | 166 | +| A.1.3.1 | Overall description..... | 166 | +| A.1.3.1.1 | Binding mechanism..... | 166 | +| A.1.3.1.1.0 | General..... | 166 | +| A.1.3.1.1.1 | Bearer binding mechanism allocated to the PCEF..... | 167 | +| A.1.3.1.1.2 | Bearer binding mechanism allocated to the PCRF..... | 167 | +| A.1.3.1.2 | Reporting..... | 168 | +| A.1.3.1.3 | Credit management..... | 168 | +| A.1.3.1.4 | Event Triggers..... | 169 | +| A.1.3.1.5 | Policy Control..... | 170 | +| A.1.3.2 | Functional entities..... | 170 | +| A.1.3.2.1 | Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF)..... | 170 | +| A.1.3.2.1.0 | General..... | 170 | +| A.1.3.2.1.1 | Input for PCC decisions..... | 170 | +| A.1.3.2.2 | Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF)..... | 170 | +| A.1.3.2.2.1 | General..... | 170 | + +| | | | +|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| A.1.3.2.2.2 | Service data flow detection..... | 172 | +| A.1.3.2.2.3 | Packet Routeing and Transfer Function..... | 172 | +| A.1.3.2.2.4 | Measurement..... | 172 | +| A.1.3.2.3 | Application Function (AF)..... | 172 | +| A.1.3.3 | Policy and charging control rule..... | 172 | +| A.1.3.3.1 | General..... | 172 | +| A.1.3.3.2 | Policy and charging control rule operations..... | 172 | +| A.1.3.4 | IP-CAN bearer and IP-CAN session related policy information..... | 172 | +| A.1.3.4a | TDF session related policy information..... | 173 | +| A.1.3.5 | Void..... | 174 | +| A.1.4 | PCC Procedures and flows..... | 174 | +| A.1.4.1 | Introduction..... | 174 | +| A.1.4.2 | IP-CAN Session Establishment..... | 174 | +| A.1.4.3 | IP-CAN Session Termination..... | 175 | +| A.1.4.3.1 | UE initiated IP-CAN Session termination..... | 175 | +| A.1.4.3.2 | GW initiated IP-CAN Session termination..... | 175 | +| A.1.4.4 | IP-CAN Session Modification..... | 175 | +| A.1.4.4.1 | IP-CAN Session Modification; GW (PCEF) initiated..... | 175 | +| A.1.4.4.2 | IP-CAN Session Modification; PCRF initiated..... | 176 | +| A.2 | Void..... | 176 | +| A.3 | Void..... | 176 | +| A.4 | 3GPP Accesses (GERAN/UTRAN/E-UTRAN) - GTP-based EPC..... | 176 | +| A.4.0 | General..... | 176 | +| A.4.1 | High Level Requirements..... | 177 | +| A.4.1.1 | Charging related requirements..... | 177 | +| A.4.1.2 | QoS control..... | 177 | +| A.4.2 | Architectural Model and Reference Points..... | 177 | +| A.4.2.1 | Reference architecture..... | 177 | +| A.4.3 | Functional Description..... | 178 | +| A.4.3.1 | Overall description..... | 178 | +| A.4.3.1.1 | Credit management..... | 178 | +| A.4.3.1.2 | Event Triggers..... | 179 | +| A.4.3.1.3 | Binding mechanism..... | 180 | +| A.4.3.1.4 | Policy Control..... | 181 | +| A.4.3.2 | Functional Entities..... | 181 | +| A.4.3.2.1 | Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF)..... | 181 | +| A.4.3.2.2 | Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF)..... | 181 | +| A.4.3.2.3 | Application Function (AF)..... | 182 | +| A.4.3.3 | Void..... | 182 | +| A.4.3.4 | IP-CAN bearer and IP-CAN session related policy information..... | 182 | +| A.4.3.5 | TDF session related policy information..... | 183 | +| A.4.4 | PCC Procedures and Flows..... | 183 | +| A.4.4.1 | Introduction..... | 183 | +| A.4.4.2 | IP-CAN Session Establishment..... | 183 | +| A.4.4.3 | GW (PCEF) initiated IP-CAN Session termination..... | 183 | +| A.4.4.4 | IP-CAN Session Modification..... | 184 | +| A.4.4.4.1 | IP-CAN Session Modification; GW (PCEF) initiated..... | 184 | +| A.4.4.4.2 | IP-CAN Session Modification; PCRF initiated..... | 184 | +| A.5 | 3GPP Accesses (GERAN/UTRAN/E-UTRAN) - PMIP-based EPC..... | 184 | +| A.5.0 | General..... | 184 | +| A.5.1 | High Level Requirements..... | 184 | +| A.5.1.0 | General..... | 184 | +| A.5.1.1 | QoS control..... | 184 | +| A.5.2 | Architectural Model and Reference Points..... | 185 | +| A.5.2.1 | Reference architecture..... | 185 | +| A.5.3 | Functional Description..... | 185 | +| A.5.3.1 | Overall Description..... | 185 | +| A.5.3.1.1 | Binding mechanism..... | 185 | +| A.5.3.1.2 | Credit management..... | 185 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| A.5.3.1.3 | Event triggers..... | 185 | +| A.5.3.2 | Functional Entities..... | 185 | +| A.5.3.2.1 | Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF)..... | 185 | +| A.5.3.2.2 | Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF)..... | 185 | +| A.5.3.2.3 | Bearer Binding and Event Reporting Function (BBRF)..... | 186 | +| A.5.3.3 | Void..... | 186 | +| A.5.3.4 | Void..... | 186 | +| A.5.3.5 | IP-CAN bearer and IP-CAN session related policy information..... | 186 | +| A.5.3.6 | TDF session related policy information..... | 186 | +| A.5.4 | PCC Procedures and Flows..... | 186 | +| A.5.4.1 | Introduction..... | 186 | +| A.5.4.2 | Gateway Control Session Establishment..... | 186 | +| A.5.4.3 | Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request..... | 187 | +| A.5.4.4 | Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provisioning..... | 187 | +| A.5.4.5 | IP-CAN Session Establishment..... | 187 | +| A.5.4.6 | IP-CAN Session Modification..... | 187 | +| A.5.4.6.1 | IP-CAN Session Modification; GW (PCEF) initiated..... | 187 | +| A.5.4.6.2 | IP-CAN Session Modification; PCRF initiated..... | 187 | +| A.5.4.6.3 | Void..... | 187 | +| Annex B (informative): | Void..... | 188 | +| Annex C (informative): | Void..... | 189 | +| Annex D (informative): | Access specific aspects (Non-3GPP)..... | 190 | +| D.1 | DOCSIS IP-CAN..... | 190 | +| D.1.1 | General..... | 190 | +| D.1.1 | High level requirements..... | 190 | +| D.1.1.1 | General..... | 190 | +| D.1.1.2 | Charging related requirements..... | 191 | +| D.1.1.3 | Policy control requirements..... | 191 | +| D.1.2 | Architecture model and reference points..... | 192 | +| D.1.2.1 | Reference points..... | 192 | +| D.1.2.1.1 | Rx reference point..... | 192 | +| D.1.2.1.2 | Gx reference point..... | 192 | +| D.1.2.1.3 | Void..... | 192 | +| D.1.3 | Functional description..... | 192 | +| D.1.3.1 | Overall description..... | 192 | +| D.1.3.1.1 | Binding mechanism..... | 192 | +| D.1.3.2 | Functional entities..... | 193 | +| D.1.3.2.1 | Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF)..... | 193 | +| D.1.3.2.1.1 | Input for PCC decisions..... | 193 | +| D.1.3.2.2 | Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF)..... | 193 | +| D.1.3.2.3 | Application Function (AF)..... | 193 | +| D.1.3.3 | Policy and charging control rule..... | 193 | +| D.1.3.3.1 | General..... | 193 | +| D.1.3.3.2 | Policy and charging control rule operations..... | 193 | +| D.2 | WiMAX IP-CAN..... | 194 | +| D.2.1 | High level requirements..... | 194 | +| D.2.1.1 | General..... | 194 | +| D.2.1.2 | Charging related requirements..... | 194 | +| D.2.1.3 | Policy control requirements..... | 194 | +| D.2.2 | Architecture model and reference points..... | 195 | +| D.2.2.1 | Reference points..... | 195 | +| D.2.2.1.1 | Rx reference point..... | 195 | +| D.2.2.1.2 | Gx reference point..... | 195 | +| D.2.2.1.3 | Sp reference point..... | 195 | +| D.2.3 | Functional description..... | 195 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| D.2.3.1 | Overall description..... | 195 | +| D.2.3.1.1 | Binding mechanism..... | 195 | +| D.2.3.1.2 | Credit management..... | 195 | +| D.2.3.1.3 | Event triggers..... | 195 | +| D.2.3.2 | Functional entities..... | 195 | +| D.2.3.2.1 | Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF)..... | 195 | +| D.2.3.2.2 | Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF)..... | 196 | +| D.2.3.2.3 | Application Function (AF)..... | 196 | +| D.2.3.3 | Policy and charging control rule..... | 196 | +| D.2.3.3.1 | General..... | 196 | +| D.2.3.3.1 | Policy and charging control rule operations..... | 196 | +| Annex E (informative): | Void..... | 197 | +| Annex F (informative): | Void..... | 198 | +| Annex G (informative): | PCC rule precedence configuration..... | 199 | +| Annex H (normative): | Access specific aspects (EPC-based Non-3GPP)..... | 200 | +| H.1 | General..... | 200 | +| H.2 | EPC-based cdma2000 HRPD Access..... | 200 | +| H.3 | EPC-based Trusted WLAN Access with S2a..... | 201 | +| H.4 | EPC-based untrusted non-3GPP Access..... | 201 | +| Annex I (informative): | Void..... | 203 | +| Annex J (informative): | Standardized QCI characteristics - rationale and principles..... | 204 | +| Annex K (informative): | Limited PCC Deployment..... | 205 | +| Annex L (normative): | Limited PCC Deployment..... | 205 | +| Annex M (informative): | Handling of UE or network responsibility for the resource management of services..... | 206 | +| Annex N (informative): | PCC usage for sponsored data connectivity..... | 207 | +| N.1 | General..... | 207 | +| N.2 | Reporting for sponsored data connectivity..... | 208 | +| Annex P (normative): | Fixed Broadband Access Interworking with EPC..... | 209 | +| P.1 | Definitions..... | 209 | +| P.2 | Abbreviations..... | 209 | +| P.3 | High Level Requirements..... | 209 | +| P.4 | Architecture model and reference points..... | 210 | +| P.4.1 | Reference points..... | 210 | +| P.4.1.1 | S9a Reference point..... | 210 | +| P.4.1.2 | S15 Reference Point..... | 210 | +| P.4.1.3 | Gxx reference point..... | 210 | + +| | | | +|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| P.4.1.4 | S9 reference point..... | 210 | +| P.4.1.5 | Gx reference point..... | 211 | +| P.4.2 | Reference architecture..... | 211 | +| P.4.2.0 | General..... | 211 | +| P.4.2.1 | Reference architecture – Non-Roaming..... | 212 | +| P.4.2.2 | Reference architecture – Home Routed..... | 213 | +| P.4.2.3 | Reference architecture – Visited Access..... | 214 | +| P.4.2.4 | Reference architecture - Non-Roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network; scenario with AF..... | 215 | +| P.4.2.5 | Reference architecture - Roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network: scenario with AF..... | 215 | +| P.4.2.6 | Reference architecture - Non-Roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network: scenario with TDF..... | 216 | +| P.4.2.7 | Reference architecture - Roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network: scenario with TDF..... | 217 | +| P.5 | Functional description..... | 217 | +| P.5.1 | Overall description..... | 217 | +| P.5.1.1 | Binding Mechanism..... | 218 | +| P.5.1.1.1 | EPC-routed traffic..... | 218 | +| P.5.1.1.2 | Non-seamless WLAN offloaded traffic..... | 218 | +| P.5.1.2 | S9a, Gx and S15 Session Linking..... | 218 | +| P.6 | Functional Entities..... | 219 | +| P.6.1 | Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF)..... | 219 | +| P.6.1.1 | General..... | 219 | +| P.6.1.2 | V-PCRF..... | 219 | +| P.6.1.3 | H-PCRF..... | 220 | +| P.6.2 | Broadband Policy Control Function (BPCF)..... | 221 | +| P.6.3 | Bearer Binding and Event Reporting Function (BBERF)..... | 221 | +| P.6.4 | Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF)..... | 221 | +| P.7 | PCC Procedures and Flows..... | 221 | +| P.7.1 | Introduction..... | 221 | +| P.7.2 | IP-CAN Session Establishment..... | 222 | +| P.7.2.0 | General..... | 222 | +| P.7.2.1 | IP-CAN Session Establishment..... | 222 | +| P.7.2.2 | Void..... | 224 | +| P.7.3 | IP-CAN Session Termination..... | 224 | +| P.7.3.1 | Void..... | 224 | +| P.7.3.2 | IP-CAN Session Termination..... | 224 | +| P.7.4 | IP-CAN Session Modification..... | 225 | +| P.7.4.1 | PCEF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification..... | 226 | +| P.7.4.2 | PCRF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification..... | 226 | +| P.7.4.3 | BPCF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification..... | 228 | +| P.7.5 | Gateway Control Session Procedures..... | 229 | +| P.7.5.1 | BBERF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Establishment..... | 229 | +| P.7.5.2 | GW (BBERF)-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination..... | 230 | +| P.7.5.3 | Gateway Control and QoS Rule Request from ePDG/Serving GW..... | 231 | +| P.7.5.4 | PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination..... | 232 | +| P.7.6 | PCRF Discovery and Selection..... | 233 | +| P.7.6.1 | PCRF Discovery and Selection by BPCF..... | 233 | +| P.7.6.2 | PCRF Discovery and Selection by AF/TDF unsolicited application reporting for NS-WLAN offloaded traffic..... | 233 | +| P.7.6.3 | PCRF Discovery and Selection by HNB GW..... | 233 | +| P.7.7 | BPCF Discovery and Selection..... | 233 | +| P.7.8 | TDF Discovery and Selection for NS-WLAN offloaded traffic..... | 233 | +| P.8 | 3GPP HNB Procedures – CS Support..... | 234 | +| P.8.1 | S9a CS Session Establishment..... | 234 | +| P.8.2 | PCRF initiated S9a CS Session Modification..... | 235 | +| P.8.2A | BPCF initiated S9a CS Session Modification..... | 236 | +| P.8.3 | S9a CS Session Termination..... | 236 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| Annex Q (informative): | How to achieve Usage Monitoring via the OCS..... | 237 | +| Annex R (informative): | Disabling/re-enabling Usage Monitoring for a PCC/ADC rule..... | 238 | +| Annex S (normative): | Fixed Broadband Access..... | 239 | +| S.1 | General..... | 239 | +| S.2 | Definitions..... | 239 | +| S.3 | High Level Requirements..... | 239 | +| S.3.0 | General..... | 239 | +| S.3.1 | General Requirements..... | 239 | +| S.3.2 | Charging Related Requirements..... | 240 | +| S.3.3 | Policy Control Requirements..... | 241 | +| S.4 | Architecture model and reference points..... | 241 | +| S.4.1 | Reference architecture..... | 241 | +| S.4.1.1 | General..... | 241 | +| S.4.1.2 | Reference architecture - Non-Roaming..... | 242 | +| S.4.1.3 | Reference architecture - Roaming..... | 243 | +| S.4.2 | Reference points..... | 243 | +| S.4.2.1 | Gx Reference Point..... | 243 | +| S.4.2.2 | Sp Reference Point..... | 244 | +| S.4.2.3 | Ud Reference Point..... | 244 | +| S.4.2.4 | Gy/Gz Reference Point..... | 244 | +| S.4.2.5 | Gyn/Gzn Reference Point..... | 244 | +| S.4.2.6 | Sd Reference Point..... | 244 | +| S.5 | Functional description..... | 244 | +| S.5.1 | Overall description..... | 244 | +| S.5.1.1 | IP-CAN Session..... | 245 | +| S.5.1.2 | Subscriber Identifier..... | 245 | +| S.5.1.3 | Event triggers..... | 245 | +| S.5.1.4 | Void..... | 246 | +| S.5.1.5 | Void..... | 246 | +| S.5.1.6 | Credit management..... | 246 | +| S.5.2 | Policy and charging Control..... | 246 | +| S.5.2.1 | Policy and charging control rule..... | 246 | +| S.5.2.1a | IP-CAN session related policy information..... | 247 | +| S.5.2.2 | Void..... | 247 | +| S.5.3 | Void..... | 247 | +| S.5.4 | Reflective QoS..... | 247 | +| S.5.5 | Policy Control..... | 247 | +| S.5.5.1 | Default QoS Control..... | 248 | +| S.6 | Functional Entities..... | 248 | +| S.6.1 | Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF)..... | 248 | +| S.6.1.1 | General..... | 248 | +| S.6.1.1.1 | Input for PCC decisions..... | 248 | +| S.6.1.2 | Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF)..... | 249 | +| S.6.1.3 | Application Function (AF)..... | 249 | +| S.6.1.4 | Subscriber Profile Repository (SPR)..... | 249 | +| S.6.1.5 | Online Charging System (OCS)..... | 249 | +| S.6.1.6 | Offline Charging System (OFCS)..... | 250 | +| S.6.1.7 | User Data Repository (UDR)..... | 250 | +| S.6.1.8 | Traffic Detection Function (TDF)..... | 250 | +| S.7 | PCC Procedures and Flows..... | 250 | +| S.7.1 | Introduction..... | 250 | +| S.7.2 | IP-CAN Session Establishment..... | 250 | +| S.7.3 | IP-CAN Session Termination..... | 251 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| S.7.4 | IP-CAN Session Modification..... | 251 | +| S.7.4.1 | PCEF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification..... | 251 | +| S.7.4.2 | PCRF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification..... | 251 | +| S.7.5 | Update of the subscription information in the PCRF..... | 251 | +| S.7.6 | PCRF Discovery and selection..... | 252 | +| S.8 | Charging using AAA signalling..... | 252 | +| S.8.1 | Reference architecture - Non-Roaming..... | 253 | +| S.8.2 | Reference architecture - Roaming..... | 254 | +| S.8.3 | Gza Reference Point..... | 254 | +| S.8.4 | Gya Reference Point..... | 255 | +| S.8.5 | B Reference Point..... | 255 | +| S.8.6 | AAA based charging..... | 255 | +| S.8.7 | Accounting Interworking Function..... | 255 | +| S.8.8 | Procedures AAA based charging using accounting signalling..... | 255 | +| S.8.8.0 | General..... | 255 | +| S.8.8.1 | Charging Session Initiation..... | 256 | +| S.8.8.2 | Charging Session Modification..... | 257 | +| S.8.8.3 | Charging Session Termination..... | 258 | +| S.8.8.3.1 | Charging Session Termination BNG-initiated..... | 258 | +| Annex T (informative): | How to accumulate PCC/ADC Rule usage in multiple monitoring groups..... | 259 | +| Annex U (normative): | Policy and charging control in the downlink direction for traffic marked with DSCP by the TDF..... | 260 | +| Annex V (informative): | Policy Control for Remote UEs behind a ProSe UE-to-Network Relay UE..... | 261 | +| Annex W (informative): | Void..... | 262 | +| Annex X (informative): | Encrypted traffic detection by using domain name matching..... | 263 | +| Annex Y (informative): | Change history..... | 264 | + +--- + +## Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +--- + +## Introduction + +Policy and Charging Control functionality encompasses two main functions: + +- Flow Based Charging, including charging control and online credit control, for service data flows and application traffic; +- Policy control (e.g. gating control, QoS control, QoS signalling, etc.). + +The present document specifies the generic PCC aspects within the body, while the specifics for each type of IP-CAN are specified in Annexes. For one type of IP-CAN the corresponding clause in an Annex shall be understood to be a realization of the TS main body. The Annexes are therefore not stand-alone specifications for an IP-CAN. Annexes may specify additional restrictions to the specification body. + +# 1 Scope + +The present document specifies the overall stage 2 level functionality for Policy and Charging Control that encompasses the following high level functions for IP-CANs (e.g. GPRS, Fixed Broadband, EPC, etc.): + +- Flow Based Charging for network usage, including charging control and online credit control, for service data flows and application traffic; +- Policy control (e.g. gating control, QoS control, QoS signalling, etc.). + +The present document specifies the Policy and Charging Control functionality for Evolved 3GPP Packet Switched domain, including both 3GPP accesses GERAN/UTRAN/E-UTRAN and Non-3GPP accesses, according to TS 23.401 [17] and TS 23.402 [18]. + +The present document specifies functionality for unicast bearers. Broadcast and multicast bearers, such as MBMS contexts for GPRS, are out of scope of the present document. + +NOTE: For E-UTRAN access, the usage of functionalities covered in this specification for features such as MBMS, CIoT and V2X is described in TS 23.246 [6], TS 23.682 [42] and TS 23.285 [48], respectively. + +# 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TS 41.101: "Technical Specifications and Technical Reports for a GERAN-based 3GPP system". +- [2] Void. +- [3] 3GPP TS 32.240: "Telecommunication management; Charging management; Charging architecture and principles". +- [4] IETF RFC 4006: "Diameter Credit-Control Application". +- [5] 3GPP TS 23.207: "End-to-end Quality of Service (QoS) concept and architecture". +- [6] 3GPP TS 23.246: "Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS); Architecture and functional description". +- [7] 3GPP TS 23.125: "Overall high level functionality and architecture impacts of flow based charging; Stage 2". +- [8] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [9] 3GPP TS 32.251: "Telecommunication management; Charging management; Packet Switched (PS) domain charging". +- [10] 3GPP TS 29.061: "Interworking between the Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) supporting packet based services and Packet Data Networks (PDN)". +- [11] 3GPP TR 33.919: "3G Security; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); System description". +- [12] 3GPP TS 23.060: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service description; Stage 2". + +- [13] Void. +- [14] 3GPP TS 23.107: "Quality of Service (QoS) concept and architecture". +- [15] "WiMAX End-to-End Network Systems Architecture" (). +- [16] 3GPP TS 23.003: "Numbering, addressing and identification". +- [17] 3GPP TS 23.401: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access". +- [18] 3GPP TS 23.402: "Architecture Enhancements for non-3GPP accesses". +- [19] 3GPP TS 36.300: "Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN); Overall description; Stage 2". +- [20] 3GPP2 X.S0057-B v2.0: "E UTRAN - HRPD Connectivity and Interworking: Core Network Aspects", July 2014. +- [21] 3GPP TS 23.167: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) emergency sessions". +- [22] 3GPP TS 29.213: "Policy and Charging Control signalling flows and QoS parameter mapping". +- [23] 3GPP TS 23.261: "IP Flow Mobility and seamless WLAN offload; Stage 2". +- [24] 3GPP TS 23.198: "Open Service Access (OSA); Stage 2". +- [25] 3GPP TS 23.335: "User Data Convergence (UDC); Technical realization and information flows; Stage 2". +- [26] 3GPP TS 29.335: "User Data Convergence (UDC); User Data Repository Access Protocol over the Ud interface; Stage 3". +- [27] 3GPP TS 22.115: "Service aspects; Charging and billing". +- [28] 3GPP TS 23.216: "Single Radio Voice Call Continuity (SRVCC); Stage 2". +- [29] 3GPP TS 23.139: "3GPP-Fixed Broadband Access Interworking". +- [30] Broadband Forum TR-203: "Interworking between Next Generation Fixed and 3GPP Wireless Access" (work in progress). +- [31] Broadband Forum TR-134: "Policy Control Framework " (work in progress). +- [32] 3GPP TS 25.467: "UTRAN architecture for 3G Home Node B (HNB); Stage 2". +- [33] Broadband Forum TR-291: "Nodal Requirements for Interworking between Next Generation Fixed and 3GPP Wireless Access" (work in progress). +- [34a] Broadband Forum TR-124 issue 2: "Functional Requirements for Broadband Residential Gateway Devices". +- [34b] Broadband Forum TR-124 issue 3: "Functional Requirements for Broadband Residential Gateway Devices". +- [35] Broadband Forum TR-101: "Migration to Ethernet-Based Broadband Aggregation". +- [36] Broadband Forum TR-146: "Internet Protocol (IP) Sessions". +- [37] Broadband Forum TR-300: "Nodal Requirements for Converged Policy Management". +- [38] 3GPP TS 22.278: "Service requirements for the Evolved Packet System (EPS)". +- [39] 3GPP TS 23.228: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2". +- [40] Broadband Forum TR-092: "Broadband Remote Access Server (BRAS) Requirements Document". + +- [41] Broadband Forum TR-134: "Broadband Policy Control Framework (BPCF)". +- [42] 3GPP TS 23.682: "Architecture enhancements to facilitate communications with packet data networks and applications". +- [43] 3GPP TS 23.161: "Network-based IP flow mobility and Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) offload; Stage 2". +- [44] 3GPP TS 23.303: "Proximity-based services (ProSe); Stage 2". +- [45] 3GPP TS 26.114: "Multimedia telephony over IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Multimedia telephony; media handling and interaction". +- [46] 3GPP TS 23.179: "Functional architecture and information flows to support mission-critical communication service; Stage 2". +- [47] IETF RFC 6066: "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions". +- [48] 3GPP TS 23.285: "Architecture enhancements for V2X services". +- [49] 3GPP TS 22.011: "Service accessibility". +- [50] 3GPP TS 24.008: "Mobile radio interface Layer 3 specification; Core network protocols; Stage 3". +- [51] 3GPP TS 22.261: "Service requirements for the 5G system; Stage 1". +- [52] 3GPP TS 23.272: "Circuit Switched (CS) fallback in Evolved Packet System (EPS); Stage 2". +- [53] 3GPP TS 26.238: "Uplink streaming". +- [54] 3GPP TR 26.939: "Guidelines on the Framework for Live Uplink Streaming (FLUS)". +- [55] 3GPP TS 23.221: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and Systems Aspects; Architectural Requirements". + +--- + +## 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations + +### 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [8] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [8]. + +**application detection filter:** A logic used to detect packets generated by an application based on extended inspection of these packets, e.g. header and/or payload information, as well as dynamics of packet flows. The logic is entirely internal to a TDF or a PCEF enhanced with ADC, and is out of scope of this specification. + +**application identifier:** An identifier referring to a specific application detection filter. + +**application service provider:** A business entity responsible for the application that is being / will be used by a UE, which may be either an AF operator or has an association with the AF operator. + +**ADC decision:** A decision consists of references to ADC rules, associated enforcement actions (for dynamic ADC rules) and TDF session attributes and is provided by the PCRF to the TDF for application detection and control. + +**ADC rule:** A set of information enabling the detection of application traffic and associated enforcement actions. ADC rules are directly provisioned into the TDF and referenced by the PCRF. + +**authorised QoS:** The maximum QoS that is authorised for a service data flow. In case of an aggregation of multiple service data flows within one IP-CAN bearer (e.g. for GPRS a PDP context), the combination of the "Authorised QoS" information of the individual service data flows is the "Authorised QoS" for the IP-CAN bearer. It contains the QoS class identifier and the data rate. + +**binding:** The association between a service data flow and the IP-CAN bearer (for GPRS the PDP context) transporting that service data flow. + +**binding mechanism:** The method for creating, modifying and deleting bindings. + +**charging control:** The process of associating packets, belonging to a service data flow, to a charging key and applying online charging and/or offline charging, as appropriate. + +**charging key:** information used by the online and offline charging system for rating purposes. + +**detected application traffic:** An aggregate set of packet flows that are generated by a given application and detected by an application detection filter. + +**dynamic ADC Rule:** an ADC rule, for which the PCRF can provide and modify some parameters via the Sd reference point. + +**dynamic PCC Rule:** a PCC rule, for which the definition is provided to the PCEF via the Gx reference point. + +**event report:** a notification, possibly containing additional information, of an event which occurs that corresponds with an event trigger. Also, an event report is a report from the PCRF to the AF concerning transmission resources or requesting additional information. + +**event trigger:** a rule specifying the event reporting behaviour of a PCEF or BBERF or TDF. Also, it is a trigger for credit management events. + +**gating control:** The process of blocking or allowing packets, belonging to a service data flow / detected application's traffic, to pass through to the desired endpoint. + +**Gateway Control Session:** An association between a BBERF and a PCRF (when GTP is not used in the EPC), used for transferring access specific parameters, BBERF events and QoS rules between PCRF and BBERF. + +**GBR bearer:** An IP-CAN bearer with reserved (guaranteed) bitrate resources. + +**GPRS IP-CAN:** This IP-CAN incorporates GPRS over GERAN and UTRAN, see TS 23.060 [12]. + +**IP-CAN bearer:** An IP transmission path of defined capacity, delay and bit error rate, etc. See TR 21.905 [8] for the definition of bearer. + +**IP-CAN session:** The association between a UE and an IP network. The association is identified by one IPv4 and/or an IPv6 prefix together with UE identity information, if available, and a PDN represented by a PDN ID (e.g. an APN). An IP-CAN session incorporates one or more IP-CAN bearers. Support for multiple IP-CAN bearers per IP-CAN session is IP-CAN specific. An IP-CAN session exists as long as UE IP addresses/prefix are established and announced to the IP network. + +**non-GBR bearer:** An IP-CAN bearer with no reserved (guaranteed) bitrate resources. + +**operator-controlled service:** A service for which complete PCC rule information, including service data flow filter information, is available in the PCRF through configuration and/or dynamic interaction with an AF. + +**packet flow:** A specific user data flow from and/or to the UE. + +**Presence Reporting Area:** An area defined within 3GPP Packet Domain for the purposes of reporting of UE presence within that area due to policy control and/or charging reasons. There are two types of Presence Reporting Areas: "UE-dedicated Presence Reporting Areas", and "Core Network pre-configured Presence Reporting Areas". They are further defined in TS 23.401 [17]. + +**PCC decision:** A decision consists of PCC rules and IP-CAN bearer attributes and is provided by the PCRF to the PCEF for policy and charging control and, for PCEF enhanced with ADC, application detection and control. + +**PCC rule:** A set of information enabling the detection of a service data flow and providing parameters for policy control and/or charging control and, for PCEF enhanced with ADC, for application detection and control. + +**PCEF enhanced with ADC:** PCEF, enhanced with application detection and control feature. + +**policy control:** The process whereby the PCRF indicates to the PCEF how to control the IP-CAN bearer. Policy control includes QoS control and/or gating control. + +**predefined PCC Rule:** a PCC rule that has been provisioned directly into the PCEF by the operator. + +**policy counter:** A mechanism within the OCS to track spending applicable to a subscriber. + +**policy counter identifier:** A reference to a policy counter in the OCS for a subscriber. + +**policy counter status:** A label whose values are not standardized and that is associated with a policy counter's value relative to the spending limit(s) (the number of possible policy counter status values for a policy counter is one greater than the number of thresholds associated with that policy counter, i.e policy counter status values describe the status around the thresholds). This is used to convey information relating to subscriber spending from OCS to PCRF. Specific labels are configured jointly in OCS and PCRF. + +**Packet Flow Description (PFD):** A set of information enabling the detection of application traffic provided by a 3rd party service provider. A PFD is further defined in TS 23.682 [42]. + +**QoS class identifier (QCI):** A scalar that is used as a reference to a specific packet forwarding behaviour (e.g. packet loss rate, packet delay budget) to be provided to a SDF. This may be implemented in the access network by the QCI referencing node specific parameters that control packet forwarding treatment (e.g. scheduling weights, admission thresholds, queue management thresholds, link layer protocol configuration, etc.), that have been pre-configured by the operator at a specific node(s) (e.g. eNodeB). + +**QoS rule:** A set of information enabling the detection of a service data flow and defining its associated QoS parameters. + +**Monitoring key:** information used by the PCEF, TDF and PCRF for usage monitoring control purposes as a reference to a given set of service data flows or application (s), that all share a common allowed usage on a per UE and APN basis. + +**RAN user plane congestion:** RAN user plane congestion occurs when the demand for RAN resources exceeds the available RAN capacity to deliver the user data for a prolonged period of time. + +NOTE 1: Short-duration traffic bursts is a normal condition at any traffic load level, and is not considered to be RAN user plane congestion. Likewise, a high-level of utilization of RAN resources (based on operator configuration) is considered a normal mode of operation and might not be RAN user plane congestion. + +**Redirection:** Redirect the detected service traffic to an application server (e.g. redirect to a top-up / service provisioning page). + +**service data flow:** An aggregate set of packet flows carried through the PCEF that matches a service data flow template. + +**service data flow filter:** A set of packet flow header parameter values/ranges used to identify one or more of the packet flows. The possible service data flow filters are defined in clause 6.2.2.2. + +**service data flow filter identifier:** A scalar that is unique for a specific service data flow (SDF) filter (used on Gx and Gxx) within an IP-CAN session. + +**service data flow template:** The set of service data flow filters in a PCC Rule or an application identifier in a PCC rule referring to an application detection filter, required for defining a service data flow. + +**service identifier:** An identifier for a service. The service identifier provides the most detailed identification, specified for flow based charging, of a service data flow. A concrete instance of a service may be identified if additional AF information is available (further details to be found in clause 6.3.1). + +**session based service:** An end user service requiring application level signalling, which is separated from service rendering. + +**spending limit:** A spending limit is the usage limit of a policy counter (e.g. monetary, volume, duration) that a subscriber is allowed to consume. + +**spending limit report:** a notification, containing the current policy counter status generated from the OCS to the PCRF via the Sy reference point. + +**subscribed guaranteed bandwidth QoS:** The per subscriber, authorized cumulative guaranteed bandwidth QoS which is provided by the SPR/UDR to the PCRF. + +**subscriber category:** is a means to group the subscribers into different classes, e.g. gold user, the silver user and the bronze user. + +**(S)Gi-LAN:** The network infrastructure connected to the 3GPP network over the SGi or Gi reference point that provides various IP-based services. + +**(S)Gi-LAN service function:** A function located in the (S)Gi-LAN that provides value-added IP-based services e.g. NAT, anti-malware, parental control, DDoS protection. + +**TDF session:** An association between an IP-CAN session and the assigned TDF for the purpose of application detection and control. + +**uplink bearer binding verification:** The network enforcement of terminal compliance with the negotiated uplink traffic mapping to bearers. + +For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in TS 23.401 [17] apply: + +**Narrowband-IoT:** See TS 23.401 [17]. + +**WB-E-UTRAN:** See TS 23.401 [17]. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [8] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [8]. + +| | | +|---------|----------------------------------------------------| +| ADC | Application Detection and Control | +| AF | Application Function | +| AMBR | Aggregated Maximum Bitrate | +| ARP | Allocation and Retention Priority | +| ASP | Application Service Provider | +| BBERF | Bearer Binding and Event Reporting Function | +| BBF | Bearer Binding Function | +| BBF AAA | Broadband Forum AAA | +| BNG | Broadband Network Gateway | +| BPCF | Broadband Policy Control Function | +| BRAS | Broadband Remote Access Server | +| CSG | Closed Subscriber Group | +| CSG ID | Closed Subscriber Group Identity | +| DRA | Diameter Routing Agent | +| E-UTRAN | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network | +| H-PCEF | A PCEF in the HPLMN | +| H-PCRF | A PCRF in the HPLMN | +| HRPD | High Rate Packet Data | +| HSGW | HRPD Serving Gateway | +| IP-CAN | IP Connectivity Access Network | +| MPS | Multimedia Priority Service | +| NB-IoT | Narrowband IoT | +| NBIFOM | Network-based IP flow mobility | +| NSWO | Non-Seamless WLAN Offload | +| OAM | Operation Administration and Maintenance | +| OFCS | Offline Charging System | +| OCS | Online Charging System | +| PCC | Policy and Charging Control | +| PCEF | Policy and Charging Enforcement Function | +| PCRF | Policy and Charging Rules Function | +| PFDF | Packet Flow Description Function | +| PRA | Presence Reporting Area | + +| | | +|------------|------------------------------------------| +| QCI | QoS Class Identifier | +| RAN | Radio Access Network | +| RCAF | RAN Congestion Awareness Function | +| RLOS | Restricted Local Operator Services | +| RUCI | RAN User Plane Congestion Information | +| RG | Residential Gateway | +| SCEF | Service Capability Exposure Function | +| vSRVCC | video Single Radio Voice Call Continuity | +| SPR | Subscription Profile Repository | +| TDF | Traffic Detection Function | +| TSSF | Traffic Steering Support Function | +| UDC | User Data Convergence | +| UDR | User Data Repository | +| V-PCEF | A PCEF in the VPLMN | +| V-PCRF | A PCRF in the VPLMN | +| WB-E-UTRAN | Wide Band E-UTRAN | + +--- + +## 4 High level requirements + +### 4.1 General requirements + +It shall be possible for the PCC architecture to base decisions upon subscription information. + +It shall be possible to apply policy and charging control to any kind of 3GPP IP-CAN and any non-3GPP accesses connected via EPC complying with TS 23.402 [18]. Applicability of PCC to other IP-CANs is not restricted. However, it shall be possible for the PCC architecture to base decisions upon the type of IP-CAN used (e.g. GPRS, etc.). + +The policy and charging control shall be possible in the roaming and local breakout scenarios defined in TS 23.401 [17] and TS 23.402 [18]. + +The PCC architecture shall discard packets that don't match any service data flow of the active PCC rules. It shall also be possible for the operator to define PCC rules, with wild-carded service data flow filters, to allow for the passage and charging for packets that do not match any service data flow template of any other active PCC rules. + +The PCC architecture shall allow the charging control to be applied on a per service data flow and on a per application basis, independent of the policy control. + +The PCC architecture shall have a binding method that allows the unique association between service data flows and their IP-CAN bearer. + +A single service data flow detection shall suffice for the purpose of both policy control and flow based charging. + +A PCC rule may be predefined or dynamically provisioned at establishment and during the lifetime of an IP-CAN session. The latter is referred to as a dynamic PCC rule. + +The number of real-time PCC interactions shall be minimized although not significantly increasing the overall system reaction time. This requires optimized interfaces between the PCC nodes. + +It shall be possible to take a PCC rule into service, and out of service, at a specific time of day, without any PCC interaction at that point in time. + +It shall be possible to take APN-related policy information into service, and out of service, once validity conditions specified as part of the APN-related policy information are fulfilled or not fulfilled anymore, respectively, without any PCC interaction at that point in time. + +PCC shall be enabled on a per PDN basis (represented by an access point and the configured range of IP addresses) at the PCEF. It shall be possible for the operator to configure the PCC architecture to perform charging control, policy control or both for a PDN access. + +PCC shall support roaming users. + +The PCC architecture shall allow the resolution of conflicts which would otherwise cause a subscriber's Subscribed Guaranteed Bandwidth QoS to be exceeded. + +The PCC architecture shall support topology hiding. + +It should be possible to use PCC architecture for handling IMS-based emergency service and Restricted Local Operator Services. + +It shall be possible with the PCC architecture, in real-time, to monitor the overall amount of resources that are consumed by a user and to control usage independently from charging mechanisms, the so-called usage monitoring control. + +It shall be possible for the PCC architecture to provide application awareness even when there is no explicit service level signalling. + +The PCC architecture shall support making policy decisions based on subscriber spending limits. + +The PCC architecture shall support making policy decisions based on RAN user plane congestion status. + +The PCC architecture shall support making policy decisions for multi-access IP flow mobility solution described in TS 23.161 [43]. + +The PCC architecture shall support making policy decisions for (S)Gi-LAN traffic steering. + +## 4.2 Charging related requirements + +### 4.2.1 General + +In order to allow for charging control on service data flow, the information in the PCC rule identifies the service data flow and specifies the parameters for charging control. The PCC rule information may depend on subscription data. + +In order to allow for charging control on detected application traffic identified by ADC Rule for the TDF, the information in the ADC rule contains the application identifier and specifies the parameters for charging control. The ADC rule information may depend on subscription data. + +For the purpose of charging correlation between application level (e.g. IMS) and service data flow level, applicable charging identifiers shall be passed along within the PCC architecture, if such identifiers are available. + +For the purpose of charging correlation between service data flow level and application level (e.g. IMS) as well as on-line charging support at the application level, applicable charging identifiers and IP-CAN type identifiers shall be passed from the PCRF to the AF, if such identifiers are available. + +### 4.2.2 Charging models + +The PCC charging shall support the following charging models both for charging performed by PCEF and charging performed by TDF: + +- Volume based charging; +- Time based charging; +- Volume and time based charging; +- Event based charging; +- No charging. + +NOTE 1: The charging model - "No charging" implies that charging control is not applicable. + +Shared revenue services shall be supported. In this case settlement for all parties shall be supported, including the third parties that may have been involved providing the services. + +NOTE 2: When developing a charging solution, the PCC charging models may be combined to form the solution. How to achieve a specific solution is however not within the scope of this TS. + +NOTE 3: The Event based charging defined in this specification applies only to session based charging as defined by the charging specifications. + +## 4.2.2a Charging requirements + +The requirements in this clause apply to both PCC rules based charging and ADC rules based charging unless exceptions are explicitly mentioned. + +It shall be possible to apply different rates and charging models when a user is identified to be roaming from when the user is in the home network. Furthermore, it shall be possible to apply different rates and charging models based on the location of a user, beyond the granularity of roaming. + +It shall be possible to apply different rates and charging models when a user consuming network services via a CSG cell or a hybrid cell according to the user CSG information. User CSG information includes CSG ID, access mode and CSG membership indication. + +It shall be possible to apply a separate rate to a specific service, e.g. allow the user to download a certain volume of data, reserved for the purpose of one service for free, and then continue with a rate causing a charge. + +It shall be possible to change the rate based on the time of day. + +It shall be possible to enforce per-service identified by PCC Rule/per-application identified by ADC Rule usage limits for a service data flow using online charging on a per user basis (may apply to prepaid and post-paid users). + +It shall be possible to apply different rates depending on the access used to carry a Service Data Flow. This applies also to a PDN connection supporting NBIFOM. + +It shall be possible for the online charging system to set and send the thresholds (time and/or volume based) for the amount of remaining credit to the PCEF or TDF for monitoring. In case the PCEF or TDF detects that any of the time based or volume based credit falls below the threshold, the PCEF or TDF shall send a request for credit re-authorization to the OCS with the remaining credit (time and/or volume based). + +It shall be possible for the charging system to select the applicable rate based on: + +- home/visited IP-CAN; +- User CSG information; +- IP-CAN bearer characteristics (e.g. QoS); +- QoS provided for the service; +- time of day; +- IP-CAN specific parameters according to Annex A. + +IP-CAN bearer characteristics are not applicable to charging performed in TDF. + +NOTE 1: The same IP-CAN parameters related to access network/subscription/location information as reported for service data flow based charging may need to be reported for the application based charging at the beginning of the session and following any of the relevant re-authorization triggers. + +The charging system maintains the tariff information, determining the rate based on the above input. Thus the rate may change e.g. as a result of IP-CAN session modification to change the bearer characteristics provided for a service data flow. + +The charging rate or charging model applicable to a service data flow/detected application traffic may change as a result of events in the service (e.g. insertion of a paid advertisement within a user requested media stream). + +The charging model applicable to a service data flow/detected application traffic may change as a result of events identified by the OCS (e.g. after having spent a certain amount of time and/or volume, the user gets to use some services for free). + +The charging rate or charging model applicable to a service data flow/detected application traffic may change as a result of having used the service data flow/detected application traffic for a certain amount of time and/or volume. + +For online charging, it shall be possible to apply an online charging action upon PCEF or TDF events (e.g. re-authorization upon QoS change). + +It shall be possible to apply an online charging action for detected application upon Application Start/Stop events. + +It shall be possible to indicate to the PCEF or TDF that interactions with the charging systems are not required for a PCC or ADC rule, i.e. to perform neither accounting nor credit control for the service data flow/detected application traffic, and then no offline charging information is generated. + +This specification supports charging and enforcement being done in either the PCEF or the TDF for a certain IP-CAN session, but not both for the same IP-CAN session (applies to all IP-CAN sessions belonging to the same APN). + +NOTE 2: The above requirement is to ensure that there is no double charging in both TDF and PCEF or over charging in case of packet discarded at PCEF or TDF. + +## 4.2.3 Examples of Service Data Flow Charging + +There are many different services that may be used within a network, including both user-user and user-network services. Service data flows from these services may be identified and charged in many different ways. A number of examples of configuring PCC rules for different service data flows are described below. + +- EXAMPLE 1: A network server provides an FTP service. The FTP server supports both the active (separate ports for control and data) and passive modes of operation. A PCC rule is configured for the service data flows associated with the FTP server for the user. The PCC rule uses a filter specification for the uplink that identifies packets sent to port 20 or 21 of the IP address of the server, and the origination information is wildcarded. In the downlink direction, the filter specification identifies packets sent from port 20 or 21 of the IP address of the server. +- EXAMPLE 2: A network server provides a "web" service. A PCC rule is configured for the service data flows associated with the HTTP server for the user. The PCC rule uses a filter specification for the uplink that identifies packets sent to port 80 of the IP address of the server, and the origination information is wildcarded. In the downlink direction, the filter specification identifies packets sent from port 80 of the IP address of the server. +- EXAMPLE 3: The same server provides a WAP service. The server has multiple IP addresses, and the IP address of the WAP server is different from the IP address of the web server. The PCC rule uses the same filter specification as for the web server, but with the IP addresses for the WAP server only. +- EXAMPLE 4: An operator offers a zero rating for network provided DNS service. A PCC rule is established setting all DNS traffic to/from the operators DNS servers as offline charged. The data flow filter identifies the DNS port number, and the source/destination address within the subnet range allocated to the operators network nodes. +- EXAMPLE 5: An operator has a specific charging rate for user-user VoIP traffic over the IMS. A PCC rule is established for this service data flow. The filter information to identify the specific service data flow for the user-user traffic is provided by the P-CSCF (AF). +- EXAMPLE 6: An operator is implementing UICC based authentication mechanisms for HTTP based services utilizing the GAA Framework as defined in TR 33.919 [11] by e.g. using the Authentication Proxy. The Authentication Proxy may appear as an AF and provide information to the PCRF for the purpose of selecting an appropriate PCC Rule. + +## 4.3 Policy control requirements + +### 4.3.1 General + +The policy control features comprise gating control and QoS control. + +The concept of QoS class identifier and the associated bitrates specify the QoS information for service data flows and bearers on the Gx and Gxx reference points. + +### 4.3.2 Gating control + +Gating control shall be applied by the PCEF on a per service data flow basis. + +To enable the PCRF gating control decisions, the AF shall report session events (e.g. session termination, modification) to the PCRF. For example, session termination, in gating control, may trigger the blocking of packets or "closing the gate". + +### 4.3.3 QoS control + +#### 4.3.3.1 QoS control at service data flow level + +It shall be possible to apply QoS control on a per service data flow basis in the PCEF. + +QoS control per service data flow allows the PCC architecture to provide the PCEF with the authorized QoS to be enforced for each specific service data flow. Criteria such as the QoS subscription information may be used together with policy rules such as, service-based, subscription-based, or predefined PCRF internal policies to derive the authorized QoS to be enforced for a service data flow. + +It shall be possible to apply multiple PCC rules, without application provided information, using different authorised QoS within a single IP-CAN session and within the limits of the Subscribed QoS profile. + +#### 4.3.3.2 QoS control at IP-CAN bearer level + +It shall be possible for the PCC architecture to support control of QoS reservation procedures (UE-initiated or network-initiated) for IP-CANs that support such procedures for its IP-CAN bearers in the PCEF or the BBERF, if applicable. It shall be possible to determine the QoS to be applied in QoS reservation procedures (QoS control) based on the authorised QoS of the service data flows that are applicable to the IP-CAN bearer and on criteria such as the QoS subscription information, service based policies, and/or predefined PCRF internal policies. Details of QoS reservation procedures are IP-CAN specific and therefore, the control of these procedures is described in Annex A and Annex D. + +It shall be possible for the PCC architecture to support control of QoS for the packet traffic of IP-CANs. + +The PCC architecture shall be able to provide policy control in the presence of NAT devices. This may be accomplished by providing appropriate address and port information to the PCRF. + +The enforcement of the control for QoS reservation procedures for an IP-CAN bearer shall allow for a downgrading or an upgrading of the requested QoS as part of a UE-initiated IP-CAN bearer establishment and modification. The PCC architecture shall be able to provide a mechanism to initiate IP-CAN bearer establishment and modification (for IP-CANs that support such procedures for its bearers) as part of the QoS control. + +The IP-CAN shall prevent cyclic QoS upgrade attempts due to failed QoS upgrades. + +NOTE: These measures are IP-CAN specific. + +The PCC architecture shall be able to handle IP-CAN bearers that require a guaranteed bitrate (GBR bearers) and IP-CAN bearers for which there is no guaranteed bitrate (non-GBR bearers). + +#### 4.3.3.3 QoS Conflict Handling + +It shall be possible for the PCC architecture to support conflict resolution in the PCRF when the authorized bandwidth associated with multiple PCC rules exceeds the Subscribed Guaranteed bandwidth QoS. + +#### 4.3.3.4 QoS control at APN level + +It shall be possible for the PCRF to authorize the APN-AMBR to be enforced by the PCEF as defined in TS 23.401 [17]. The APN-AMBR applies to all IP-CAN sessions of a UE to the same APN and has separate values for the uplink and downlink direction. + +It shall be possible for the PCRF to provide the authorized APN-AMBR values unconditionally or conditionally, i.e. per IP-CAN type and/or RAT type. + +It shall be possible for the PCRF to request a change of the unconditional or conditional authorized APN-AMBR value(s) at a specific point in time. + +The details are specified in clause 6.4b. + +#### 4.3.4 Subscriber Spending Limits + +It shall be possible to enforce policies based on subscriber spending limits as per TS 22.115 [27]. The OCS shall maintain policy counter(s) to track spending for a subscription. These policy counters must be available in the OCS prior to their use over the Sy interface. + +NOTE 1: The mechanism for provisioning the policy counters in the OCS is out of scope of this document. + +NOTE 2: A policy counter in the OCS can represent the spending for one or more services, one or more devices, one or more subscribers, etc. The representation is operator dependent. There is no explicit relationship between Charging-Key and policy counter. + +The PCRF shall request information regarding the subscriber's spending from the OCS, to be used as input for dynamic policy decisions for the subscriber, using subscriptions to spending limit reports. The OCS shall make information regarding the subscriber's spending available to the PCRF using spending limit reports. + +### 4.4 Usage Monitoring Control + +It shall be possible to apply usage monitoring for the accumulated usage of network resources on a per IP-CAN session and user basis. This capability is required for enforcing dynamic policy decisions based on the total network usage in real-time. + +The PCRF that uses usage monitoring for making dynamic policy decisions shall set and send the applicable thresholds to the PCEF or TDF for monitoring. The usage monitoring thresholds shall be based either on time, or on volume. The PCRF may send both thresholds to the PCEF or TDF. The PCEF or TDF shall notify the PCRF when a threshold is reached and report the accumulated usage since the last report for usage monitoring. If both time and volume thresholds were provided to the PCEF or TDF, the accumulated usage since last report shall be reported when either the time or the volume thresholds are reached. + +NOTE: There are reasons other than reaching a threshold that may cause the PCEF/TDF to report accumulated usage to the PCRF as defined in clauses 6.2.2.3 and 6.6.2. + +The usage monitoring capability shall be possible for an individual or a group of service data flow(s), or for all traffic of an IP-CAN session in the PCEF. When usage monitoring for all traffic of an IP-CAN session is enabled, it shall be possible to exclude an individual SDF or a group of service data flow(s) from the usage monitoring for all traffic of this IP-CAN session. It shall be possible to activate usage monitoring both to service data flows associated with predefined PCC rules and dynamic PCC rules, including rules with deferred activation and/or deactivation times while those rules are active. + +The usage monitoring capability shall be possible for an individual or a group of detected application(s) traffic, or all detected traffic belonging to a specific TDF session. When usage monitoring for all traffic of a TDF session is enabled, it shall be possible to exclude an individual application or a group of detected application(s) from the usage monitoring for all traffic belonging to this TDF session if usage monitoring. It shall be possible to activate usage monitoring both to predefined ADC rules and to dynamic ADC rules, including rules with deferred activation and/or deactivation times while those rules are active. + +If service data flow(s)/application(s) need to be excluded from IP-CAN/TDF session level usage monitoring and IP-CAN /TDF session level usage monitoring is enabled, the PCRF shall be able to provide the an indication of exclusion from session level monitoring associated with the respective PCC/ADC rule(s). + +It shall be possible to apply different usage monitoring depending on the access used to carry a Service Data Flow. This applies also to a PDN connection supporting NBIFOM. IP-CAN session level usage monitoring is not dependent on the access used to carry a Service Data Flow. + +## 4.5 Application Detection and Control + +The application detection and control feature comprise the request to detect the specified application traffic, report to the PCRF on the start or stop of application traffic and to apply the specified enforcement and charging actions. + +The application detection and control shall be implemented either by the TDF or by the PCEF enhanced with ADC. + +Two models may be applied, depending on operator requirements: solicited and unsolicited application reporting. The unsolicited application reporting is only supported by the TDF. + +**Solicited application reporting:** The PCRF shall instruct the TDF, or the PCEF enhanced with ADC, on which applications to detect and whether to report start or stop event to the PCRF by activating the appropriate ADC/PCC rules in the TDF/PCEF enhanced with ADC. Reporting notifications of start and stop of application detection to the PCRF may be muted, in addition, per specific ADC/PCC rule. The PCRF may, in a dynamic ADC/PCC rule, instruct the TDF or PCEF enhanced with ADC, what enforcement actions to apply to the detected application traffic. The PCRF may activate application detection only if user profile configuration allows this. + +**Unsolicited application reporting:** The TDF is pre-configured on which applications to detect and report. The PCRF may enable enforcement in the PCEF based on the service data flow description provided to PCRF by the TDF. It is assumed that user profile configuration indicating whether application detection and control can be enabled is not required. + +The report to the PCRF shall include the same information for solicited and unsolicited application reporting that is whether the report is for start or stop, the detected application identifier and, if deducible, the service data flow descriptions for the detected application traffic. + +For the application types, where service data flow descriptions are deducible, the Start and Stop of the application may be indicated multiple times, including the application instance identifier to inform the PCRF about the service data flow descriptions belonging to that application instance. The application instance identifier is dynamically assigned by the TDF or by the PCEF enhanced with ADC in order to allow correlation of application Start and Stop events to the specific service data flow description. + +**NOTE 1:** The reporting to the PCRF on the start or stop of application traffic is not depending on any enforcement action of the ADC/PCC rule. Unless the PCRF muted the reporting for the ADC/PCC rule, every detected start or stop event is reported even if the application traffic is discarded due to enforcement actions of the ADC/PCC rule. + +For the TDF operating in the solicited application reporting model: + +- When the TDF cannot provide to the PCRF the service data flow description for the detected applications, the TDF shall perform charging, gating, redirection and bandwidth limitation for the detected applications, as defined in the ADC rule. The existing PCEF functionality remains unchanged. + +**NOTE 2:** Redirection may not be possible for all types of detected application traffic (e.g. this may only be performed on specific HTTP based flows). + +- When the TDF provides to the PCRF the service data flow description, the PCRF may take control over the actions resulting of application detection, by applying the charging and policy enforcement per service data flow as defined in this document, or the TDF may perform charging, gating, redirection and bandwidth limitation as described above. It is the PCRF's responsibility to coordinate the PCC rules with ADC rules in order to ensure consistent service delivery. + +Usage monitoring as described in clause 4.4 may be activated in conjunction with application detection and control. The usage monitoring functionality is only applicable to the solicited application reporting model. + +For TDF, ADC rule based charging is applicable. ADC rule based charging, as described in clause 4.2.2a, may be activated in conjunction with application detection and control. The charging functionality is only applicable to the solicited application reporting model. + +In order to avoid charging for the same traffic in both the TDF and the PCEF, this specification supports charging and enforcement implemented in either the PCEF or the TDF for a certain IP-CAN session, but not both for the same IP-CAN session. + +The ADC rules are used to determine the online and offline characteristics for charging. For offline charging, usage reporting over the Gzn interface shall be used. For online charging, credit management and reporting over the Gyn interface shall be used. The PCEF is in this case not used for charging and enforcement (based on active PCC rules and APN-AMBR configuration), but shall still be performing bearer binding based on the active PCC rules. In order to avoid having traffic that is charged in the TDF later discarded by the policing function in the PCEF, the assumption is that no GBR bearers are required when TDF is the charging and policy enforcement point. In addition, the DL APN-AMBR in PCEF shall be configured with such high values that it does not result in discarded packets. + +NOTE 3: An example of applicability is IMS APN, which would require dynamic PCC rules, would be configured such that PCEF based charging and enforcement is employed, but for regular internet access APN, the network would be configured such that the TDF performs both charging and enforcement. + +NOTE 4: An operator may also apply this solution with both PCEF and TDF performing enforcement and charging for a single IP-CAN session as long as the network is configured in such a way that the traffic charged and enforced in the PCEF does not overlap with the traffic charged and enforced by the TDF. + +NOTE 5: The PCEF may still do enforcement actions on uplink traffic without impacting the accuracy of the charging information produced by the TDF. + +If only charging for a service data flow identified by a PCC Rule is required for the corresponding IP-CAN session, the PCEF performs charging and policy enforcement for the IP-CAN session. The TDF may be used for application detection and reporting of application start/stop and for enforcement actions on downlink traffic. + +## 4.6 RAN user plane congestion detection, reporting and mitigation + +It shall be possible to transfer RAN user plane congestion information from the RAN to the Core Network in order to mitigate the congestion by measures selected by the PCRF and applied by the PCEF/TDF/AF. The detailed description of this functionality can be found in TS 23.401 [17] and TS 23.060 [12]. + +## 4.7 Support for service capability exposure + +It shall be possible to transfer information related to service capability exposure between the PCRF and the AF via an SCEF (see TS 23.682 [42]). + +## 4.8 Traffic Steering Control + +Traffic Steering Control refers to the capability to activate/deactivate traffic steering policies from the PCRF in the PCEF, the TDF or the TSSF for the purpose of steering the subscriber's traffic to appropriate operator or 3rd party service functions (e.g. NAT, antimalware, parental control, DDoS protection) in the (S)Gi-LAN. + +The traffic steering control is supported in non-roaming and home-routed scenarios only. + +## 4.9 Management of Packet Flow Descriptions in the PCEF/TDF using the PFDF + +Management of Packet Flow Descriptions in the PCEF/TDF using the PFDF refers to the capability to create, update or remove PFDs in the PFDF via the SCEF (as described in TS 23.682 [42]) and the distribution from the PFDF to the PCEF or the TDF or both. This feature may be used when the PCEF or the TDF is configured to detect a particular application provided by an ASP. + +NOTE 1: A possible scenario for the management of PFDs in the PCEF/TDF is when an application, identified by an application detection filter in the PCEF/TDF, deploys a new server or reconfiguration at the ASP network occurs which impacts the application detection filters of that particular application. + +NOTE 2: The management of application detection filters in the PCEF/TDF can still be performed by using operation and maintenance procedures. + +NOTE 3: This feature aims for both: to enable accurate application detection at the PCEF and at the TDF and to minimize storage requirements for the PCEF and the TDF. + +The management of Packet Flow Descriptions is supported in non-roaming and home-routed scenarios for those ASPs that have a business relation with the home operator. + +## 5 Architecture model and reference points + +### 5.1 Reference architecture + +The PCC functionality is comprised by the functions of the Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF), the Bearer Binding and Event Reporting Function (BBERF), the Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF), the Application Function (AF), the Traffic Detection Function (TDF), the Traffic Steering Support Function (TSSF), the Online Charging System (OCS), the Offline Charging System (OFCS) and the Subscription Profile Repository (SPR) or the User Data Repository (UDR). UDR replaces SPR when the UDC architecture as defined in TS 23.335 [25] is applied to store PCC related subscription data. In this deployment scenario Ud interface between PCRF and UDR is used to access subscription data in the UDR. + +NOTE 1: When UDC architecture is used, SPR and Sp, whenever mentioned in this document, can be replaced by UDR and Ud. + +The PCRF can receive RAN User Plane Congestion Information from the RAN Congestion Awareness Function (RCAF). + +The PCC architecture extends the architecture of an IP-CAN, where the Policy and Charging Enforcement Function is a functional entity in the Gateway node implementing the IP access to the PDN. The allocation of the Bearer Binding and Event Reporting Function is specific to each IP-CAN type and specified in the corresponding Annex. + +The non-3GPP network relation to the PLMN is the same as defined in TS 23.402 [18]. + +![Figure 5.1-1: Overall PCC logical architecture (non-roaming) when SPR is used. The diagram shows the logical architecture of the PCC (Policy and Charging Control) in a non-roaming scenario. At the top, the Subscription Profile Repository (SPR) is connected to the Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) via the Sp reference point. The RCAF (RAN Congestion Awareness Function) is connected to the PCRF via the Np reference point. The AF (Application Function) is connected to the PCRF via the Rx reference point. The SCEF (Service Capability Exposure Function) is connected to the PCRF via the Nt reference point. The Online Charging System (OCS) is connected to the PCRF via the Sy reference point. The PCRF is connected to the BBERF (Bearer Binding and Event Reporting Function) via the Gxx reference point. The PCRF is connected to the PCEF (Policy and Charging Enforcement Function) via the Gx reference point. The PCRF is connected to the TDF (Traffic Detection Function) via the Sd reference point. The PCRF is connected to the TSSF (Traffic Steering Support Function) via the St reference point. The TSSF is connected to the PFD (PDN Gateway) via the Gw reference point. The PFD is connected to the PCEF via the Gwn reference point. The PFD is connected to the OCS via the Gy reference point. The PFD is connected to the OFCS (Offline Charging System) via the Gzn reference point. The PCEF is connected to the Gateway via the Gz reference point. The Gateway is connected to the TDF via the Gz reference point. The Gateway is connected to the OFCS via the Gzn reference point.](49a49278cad196bdfe0db6b4dd1be7fd_img.jpg) + +Figure 5.1-1: Overall PCC logical architecture (non-roaming) when SPR is used. The diagram shows the logical architecture of the PCC (Policy and Charging Control) in a non-roaming scenario. At the top, the Subscription Profile Repository (SPR) is connected to the Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) via the Sp reference point. The RCAF (RAN Congestion Awareness Function) is connected to the PCRF via the Np reference point. The AF (Application Function) is connected to the PCRF via the Rx reference point. The SCEF (Service Capability Exposure Function) is connected to the PCRF via the Nt reference point. The Online Charging System (OCS) is connected to the PCRF via the Sy reference point. The PCRF is connected to the BBERF (Bearer Binding and Event Reporting Function) via the Gxx reference point. The PCRF is connected to the PCEF (Policy and Charging Enforcement Function) via the Gx reference point. The PCRF is connected to the TDF (Traffic Detection Function) via the Sd reference point. The PCRF is connected to the TSSF (Traffic Steering Support Function) via the St reference point. The TSSF is connected to the PFD (PDN Gateway) via the Gw reference point. The PFD is connected to the PCEF via the Gwn reference point. The PFD is connected to the OCS via the Gy reference point. The PFD is connected to the OFCS (Offline Charging System) via the Gzn reference point. The PCEF is connected to the Gateway via the Gz reference point. The Gateway is connected to the TDF via the Gz reference point. The Gateway is connected to the OFCS via the Gzn reference point. + +Figure 5.1-1: Overall PCC logical architecture (non-roaming) when SPR is used + +![Overall PCC logical architecture (non-roaming) when UDR is used. This diagram shows the internal network architecture. At the top, the User Data Repository (UDR) is connected to the Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) via the Ud interface. The PCRF is connected to the RCAF, AF, and SCEF via the Np interface. The AF is connected to the SCEF via the Rx interface. The SCEF is connected to the Online Charging System (OCS) via the Nu interface. The OCS is connected to the PFDF via the Sy interface. The PFDF is connected to the TSSF via the St interface. The TSSF is connected to the BBERF via the Gxx interface. The BBERF is connected to the Gateway via the Gx interface. The Gateway is connected to the PCEF via the Sd interface. The PCEF is connected to the TDF via the Gwn interface. The TDF is connected to the Offline Charging System (OFCS) via the Gzn and Gz interfaces. The OFCS is connected to the OCS via the Gy and Gyn interfaces.](28d75f39a24203712ee907b32cf0bbe5_img.jpg) + +Overall PCC logical architecture (non-roaming) when UDR is used. This diagram shows the internal network architecture. At the top, the User Data Repository (UDR) is connected to the Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) via the Ud interface. The PCRF is connected to the RCAF, AF, and SCEF via the Np interface. The AF is connected to the SCEF via the Rx interface. The SCEF is connected to the Online Charging System (OCS) via the Nu interface. The OCS is connected to the PFDF via the Sy interface. The PFDF is connected to the TSSF via the St interface. The TSSF is connected to the BBERF via the Gxx interface. The BBERF is connected to the Gateway via the Gx interface. The Gateway is connected to the PCEF via the Sd interface. The PCEF is connected to the TDF via the Gwn interface. The TDF is connected to the Offline Charging System (OFCS) via the Gzn and Gz interfaces. The OFCS is connected to the OCS via the Gy and Gyn interfaces. + +Figure 5.1-2: Overall PCC logical architecture (non-roaming) when UDR is used + +![Overall PCC architecture (roaming with home routed access) when SPR is used. This diagram illustrates a roaming scenario between the Home PLMN (HPLMN) and the Visited PLMN (VPLMN). In the HPLMN, the Subscription Profile Repository (SPR) is connected to the Policy and Charging Rules Function (H-PCRF) via the Sp interface. The H-PCRF is connected to the AF and SCEF via the Rx and Nt interfaces. The AF is connected to the SCEF via the Rx interface. The SCEF is connected to the Online Charging System (OCS) via the Nu interface. The OCS is connected to the PFDF via the Sy interface. The PFDF is connected to the TSSF via the St interface. The TSSF is connected to the BBERF via the Gxx interface. The BBERF is connected to the Gateway via the Gx interface. The Gateway is connected to the PCEF via the Sd interface. The PCEF is connected to the TDF via the Gwn interface. The TDF is connected to the Offline Charging System (OFCS) via the Gzn and Gz interfaces. The OFCS is connected to the OCS via the Gy and Gyn interfaces. In the VPLMN, the RCAF is connected to the Policy and Charging Rules Function (V-PCRF) via the Np interface. The V-PCRF is connected to the BBERF via the Gxx interface. The V-PCRF is connected to the H-PCRF via the S9 interface. The H-PCRF is connected to the V-PCRF via the S9 interface.](6ca05954842b17f14dfd52f26b9d43d2_img.jpg) + +Overall PCC architecture (roaming with home routed access) when SPR is used. This diagram illustrates a roaming scenario between the Home PLMN (HPLMN) and the Visited PLMN (VPLMN). In the HPLMN, the Subscription Profile Repository (SPR) is connected to the Policy and Charging Rules Function (H-PCRF) via the Sp interface. The H-PCRF is connected to the AF and SCEF via the Rx and Nt interfaces. The AF is connected to the SCEF via the Rx interface. The SCEF is connected to the Online Charging System (OCS) via the Nu interface. The OCS is connected to the PFDF via the Sy interface. The PFDF is connected to the TSSF via the St interface. The TSSF is connected to the BBERF via the Gxx interface. The BBERF is connected to the Gateway via the Gx interface. The Gateway is connected to the PCEF via the Sd interface. The PCEF is connected to the TDF via the Gwn interface. The TDF is connected to the Offline Charging System (OFCS) via the Gzn and Gz interfaces. The OFCS is connected to the OCS via the Gy and Gyn interfaces. In the VPLMN, the RCAF is connected to the Policy and Charging Rules Function (V-PCRF) via the Np interface. The V-PCRF is connected to the BBERF via the Gxx interface. The V-PCRF is connected to the H-PCRF via the S9 interface. The H-PCRF is connected to the V-PCRF via the S9 interface. + +Figure 5.1-3: Overall PCC architecture (roaming with home routed access) when SPR is used + +![Figure 5.1-4: Overall PCC architecture for roaming with PCEF in visited network (local breakout) when SPR is used. The diagram shows the interaction between various network functions across the Home PLMN (HPLMN) and Visited PLMN (VPLMN).](dd5771673aececa53d42ece89218299d_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the overall PCC architecture for roaming with PCEF in the visited network (local breakout) when SPR is used. It is divided into two main sections by a dashed line: HPLMN (Home PLMN) and VPLMN (Visited PLMN). + +- HPLMN (Home PLMN):** + - Subscription Profile Repository (SPR)** is connected to the **Policy and Charging Rules Function (H-PCRF)** via the **Sp** interface. + - AF** (Application Function) is connected to the **H-PCRF** via the **Rx** interface. + - SCEF** (Service Capability Exposure Function) is connected to the **H-PCRF** via the **Nt** interface. + - Online Charging System (OCS)** is connected to the **H-PCRF** via the **Sy** interface. +- VPLMN (Visited PLMN):** + - RCAF** (RAN Control and Management Function) is connected to the **Policy and Charging Rules Function (V-PCRF)** via the **Np** interface. + - AF** is connected to the **V-PCRF** via the **Rx** interface. + - The **V-PCRF** is connected to the **H-PCRF** via the **S9** interface. + - The **V-PCRF** is connected to the **PCEF** (PDN Gateway) via the **Gx** interface. + - The **V-PCRF** is connected to the **TDF** (Traffic Detection Function) via the **Sd** interface. + - The **V-PCRF** is connected to the **BBERF** (Bearer Binding and Event Reporting Function) via the **Gx** interface. + - The **PCEF** is connected to the **Gateway** (PDN Gateway). + - The **TDF** is connected to the **Gateway** via the **Gzn** interface. + - The **TDF** is connected to the **Offline Charging System (OFCS)** via the **Gz** interface. + - The **PCEF** is connected to the **OFCS** via the **Gy** interface. + - The **PCEF** is also connected to the **OFCS** via the **Gyn** interface. + +Figure 5.1-4: Overall PCC architecture for roaming with PCEF in visited network (local breakout) when SPR is used. The diagram shows the interaction between various network functions across the Home PLMN (HPLMN) and Visited PLMN (VPLMN). + +**Figure 5.1-4: Overall PCC architecture for roaming with PCEF in visited network (local breakout) when SPR is used** + +NOTE 2: Similar figures for the roaming cases apply when UDR is used instead of SPR and Ud instead of Sp. + +NOTE 3: PCEF may be enhanced with application detection and control feature. + +NOTE 4: In general, Gy and Gyn don't apply for the same IP-CAN session, and Gz and Gzn also doesn't apply for the same IP-CAN session. For the description of the case where simultaneous reports apply, please refer to the clause 4.5). + +NOTE 5: RCAF also supports Nq/Nq' interfaces for E-UTRAN and UTRAN as specified in TS 23.401 [17] and TS 23.060 [12], respectively. + +NOTE 6: Use of TSSF in roaming scenarios is in this release only specified for the home routed access case. + +NOTE 7: The SCEF acts as an AF (using Rx) in some service capability exposure use cases as described in TS 23.682 [42]. + +NOTE 8: Gw and Gwn interface are not supported in roaming scenario with PCEF/TDF in visited network. + +## 5.2 Reference points + +### 5.2.1 Rx reference point + +The Rx reference point resides between the AF and the PCRF. + +NOTE 1: The AF may be a third party application server. + +This reference point enables transport of application level session information from AF to PCRF. Such information includes, but is not limited to: + +- IP filter information to identify the service data flow for policy control and/or differentiated charging; +- Media/application bandwidth requirements for QoS control. +- In addition, for sponsored data connectivity: + - the sponsor's identification, + - optionally, a usage threshold and whether the PCRF reports these events to the AF, + - information identifying the application service provider and application (e.g. SDFs, application identifier, etc.). + +The Rx reference point enables the AF subscription to notifications on IP-CAN bearer level events (e.g. signalling path status of AF session) in the IP-CAN. + +In order to mitigate RAN user plane congestion, the Rx reference point enables transport of the following information from the PCRF to the AF: + +- Re-try interval, which indicates when service delivery may be retried on Rx. + +NOTE 2: Additionally, existing bandwidth limitation parameters on Rx interface during the Rx session establishment are available in order to mitigate RAN user plane congestion. + +### 5.2.2 Gx reference point + +The Gx reference point resides between the PCEF and the PCRF. + +The Gx reference point enables the PCRF to have dynamic control over the PCC behaviour at a PCEF. + +The Gx reference point enables the signalling of PCC decision, which governs the PCC behaviour, and it supports the following functions: + +- Establishment of Gx session (corresponding to an IP-CAN session) by the PCEF; +- Request for PCC decision from the PCEF to the PCRF; +- Provision of IP flow mobility routing information from PCEF to PCRF; this applies only when IP flow mobility as defined in TS 23.261 [23] is supported; +- Provision of PCC decision from the PCRF to the PCEF; +- Reporting of the start and the stop of detected applications and transfer of service data flow descriptions and application instance identifiers for detected applications from the PCEF to the PCRF; +- Reporting of the accumulated usage of network resources on a per IP-CAN session basis from the PCEF to the PCRF; +- Delivery of IP-CAN session specific parameters from the PCEF to the PCRF or, if Gxx is deployed, from the PCRF to the PCEF per corresponding request; +- Negotiation of IP-CAN bearer establishment mode (UE-only or UE/NW); +- Termination of Gx session (corresponding to an IP-CAN session) by the PCEF or the PCRF. + +NOTE: The PCRF decision to terminate a Gx session is based on operator policies. It should only occur in rare situations (e.g. the removal of a UE subscription) to avoid service interruption due to the termination of the IP-CAN session. + +The information contained in a PCC rule is defined in clause 6.3. + +## 5.2.3 Reference points to subscriber databases + +### 5.2.3.1 Sp reference point + +The Sp reference point lies between the SPR and the PCRF. + +The Sp reference point allows the PCRF to request subscription information related to the IP-CAN transport level policies from the SPR based on a subscriber ID, a PDN identifier and possible further IP-CAN session attributes, see Annex A and Annex D. For example, the subscriber ID can be IMSI. The reference point allows the SPR to notify the PCRF when the subscription information has been changed if the PCRF has requested such notifications. The SPR shall stop sending the updated subscription information when a cancellation notification request has been received from the PCRF. + +NOTE: The details associated with the Sp reference point are not specified in this Release. + +### 5.2.3.2 Ud reference point + +The Ud reference point resides between the UDR and the PCRF, acting as an Application Frontend as defined in TS 23.335 [25]. It is used by the PCRF to access PCC related subscription data when stored in the UDR. + +The details for this reference point are described in TS 23.335 [25] and TS 29.335 [26]. + +## 5.2.4 Gy reference point + +The Gy reference point resides between the OCS and the PCEF. + +The Gy reference point allows online credit control for service data flow based charging. The functionalities required across the Gy reference point are defined in TS 32.251 [9] and is based on RFC 4006 [4]. + +## 5.2.5 Gz reference point + +The Gz reference point resides between the PCEF and the OFCS. + +The Gz reference point enables transport of service data flow based offline charging information. + +The Gz interface is specified in TS 32.240 [3]. + +## 5.2.6 S9 reference point + +The S9 reference point resides between a PCRF in the HPLMN (H-PCRF) and a PCRF in the VPLMN (V-PCRF). + +For roaming with a visited access (PCEF and, if applicable, BBERF in the visited network), the S9 reference point enables the H-PCRF to (via the V-PCRF): + +- have dynamic PCC control, including the PCEF and, if applicable, BBERF, and, if applicable, TDF, in the VPLMN; +- deliver or receive IP-CAN-specific parameters from both the PCEF and, if applicable, BBERF, in the VPLMN; +- serve Rx authorizations and event subscriptions from an AF in the VPLMN; +- receive application identifier, service data flow descriptions, if available, application instance identifiers, if available, and application detection start/stop event triggers report. + +For roaming with a home routed access, the S9 enables the H-PCRF to provide dynamic QoS control policies from the HPLMN, via a V-PCRF, to a BBERF in the VPLMN. + +## 5.2.7 Gxx reference point + +The Gxx reference point resides between the PCRF and the BBERF. This reference point corresponds to the Gxa and Gxc, as defined in TS 23.402 [18] and further detailed in the annexes. + +The Gxx reference point enables a PCRF to have dynamic control over the BBERF behaviour. + +The Gxx reference point enables the signalling of QoS control decisions and it supports the following functions: + +- Establishment of Gxx session by BBERF; +Termination of Gxx session by BBERF or PCRF; +- Establishment of Gateway Control Session by the BBERF; +- Termination of Gateway Control Session by the BBERF or PCRF; +- Request for QoS decision from BBERF to PCRF; +- Provision of QoS decision from PCRF to BBERF; +- Delivery of IP-CAN-specific parameters from PCRF to BBERF or from BBERF to PCRF; +- Negotiation of IP-CAN bearer establishment mode (UE-only and UE/NW). + +A QoS control decision consists of zero or more QoS rule(s) and IP-CAN attributes. The information contained in a QoS rule is defined in clause 6.5. + +NOTE: The Gxx session serves as a channel for communication between the BBERF and the PCRF. A Gateway Control Session utilizes the Gxx session and operates as defined in TS 23.402 [18], which includes both the alternatives as defined by cases 2a and 2b in clause 7.1. + +## 5.2.8 Sd reference point + +The Sd reference point resides between the PCRF and the TDF. + +The Sd reference point enables a PCRF to have dynamic control over the application detection and control behaviour at a TDF. + +The Sd reference point enables the signalling of ADC decision, which governs the ADC behaviour, and it supports the following functions: + +1. Establishment of Sd session between the PCRF and the TDF; +2. Termination of Sd session between the PCRF and the TDF; +3. Provision of ADC decision from the PCRF for the purpose of application's traffic detection, enforcement and charging at the TDF; +4. Request for ADC decision from the TDF to the PCRF; +5. Reporting of the start and the stop of a detected applications and transfer of service data flow descriptions and application instance identifiers for detected applications from the TDF to the PCRF; +6. Reporting of the accumulated usage of network resources on a per TDF session basis from the TDF to the PCRF; +7. Request and delivery of IP-CAN session specific parameters between the PCRF and the TDF. + +While 1-7 are relevant for solicited application reporting; only 1, 2 and 5 are relevant for unsolicited application reporting. + +When Sd is used for traffic steering control only, then the following function is supported: + +- Provision of ADC Rules from the PCRF for the purpose of application's traffic detection and traffic steering control. + +The information contained in an ADC rule is defined in clause 6.8. + +## 5.2.9 Sy reference point + +The Sy reference point resides between the PCRF and the OCS. + +The Sy reference point enables transfer of policy counter status information relating to subscriber spending from OCS to PCRF and supports the following functions: + +- Request for reporting of policy counter status information from PCRF to OCS and subscribe to or unsubscribe from spending limit reports (i.e. notifications of policy counter status changes). +- Report of policy counter status information upon a PCRF request from OCS to PCRF. +- Notification of spending limit reports from OCS to PCRF. +- Cancellation of spending limit reporting from PCRF to OCS. + +Since the Sy reference point resides between the PCRF and OCS in the HPLMN, roaming with home routed or visited access as well as non-roaming scenarios are supported in the same manner. + +## 5.2.10 Gyn reference point + +The Gyn reference point resides between the OCS and the TDF. + +The Gyn reference point allows online credit control for charging in case of ADC rules based charging in TDF. The functionalities required across the Gyn reference point are defined in TS 32.251 [9] and is based on RFC 4006 [4]. + +## 5.2.11 Gzn reference point + +The Gzn reference point resides between the TDF and the OFCS. + +The Gzn reference point enables transport of offline charging information in case of ADC rule based charging in TDF. + +The Gzn interface is specified in TS 32.240 [3]. + +## 5.2.12 Np reference point + +The Np reference point resides between the RCAF and the PCRF. + +The Np reference point enables transport of RAN User Plane Congestion Information (RUCI) sent from the RCAF to the PCRF for all or selected subscribers, depending on the operator's congestion mitigation policy. + +The Np reference point supports the following functions: + +- Reporting of RUCI from the RCAF to the PCRF. +- Sending, updating and removal of the reporting restrictions from the PCRF to the RCAF as defined in clause 6.1.15.2. + +## 5.2.13 Nt reference point + +The Nt reference point enables the negotiation between the SCEF and the PCRF about the recommended time window(s) and the related conditions for future background data transfer. The SCEF is triggered by an SCS/AS (as described in TS 23.682 [42]) which requests for this negotiation and provides necessary information to the SCEF. The SCEF will forward the information received from the SCS/AS to the PCRF as well as the information received from the PCRF to the SCS/AS. + +Whenever the SCEF contacts the PCRF, the PCRF shall use the information provided by the SCS/AS via the SCEF to determine the policies belonging to the application service provider (ASP). + +NOTE: This interaction between the SCEF and the PCRF over the Nt reference point is not related to any IP-CAN session. + +## 5.2.14 St reference point + +The St reference point resides between the TSSF and the PCRF. + +The St reference point enables the PCRF to provide traffic steering control information to the TSSF. + +The St reference point supports the following functions: + +- Provision, modification and removal of traffic steering control information from PCRF to the TSSF. + +## 5.2.15 Nu reference point + +The Nu reference point resides between the SCEF and the PFDF, and enables the 3rd party service provider to manage PFDs in the PFDF as specified in TS 23.682 [42]. + +## 5.2.16 Gw reference point + +The Gw reference point resides between the PFDF and the PCEF. + +The Gw reference point enables transport of PFDs from the PFDF to the PCEF for a particular Application Identifier or for a set of Application Identifiers. + +The Gw reference point supports the following functions: + +- Creation, updating and removal of individual or the whole set of PFDs from the PFDF to the PCEF. +- Confirmation of creation, updating and removal of PFDs from the PCEF to the PFDF. + +NOTE: The interaction between the PCEF and the PFDF is not related to any IP-CAN session. + +## 5.2.17 Gwn reference point + +The Gwn reference point resides between the PFDF and the TDF. + +The Gwn reference point enables transport of PFDs from the PFDF to the TDF for a particular Application Identifier or for a set of Application Identifiers. + +The Gwn reference point supports the following functions: + +- Creation, updating and removal of individual or the whole set of PFDs from the PFDF to the TDF. +- Confirmation of creation, updating and removal of PFDs from the PCEF to the TDF. + +NOTE: The interaction between the PCEF and the TDF is not related to any IP-CAN session. + +--- + +# 6 Functional description + +## 6.1 Overall description + +### 6.1.0 General + +The PCC architecture works on a service data flow level. The PCC architecture provides the functions for policy and charging control as well as event reporting for service data flows. + +## 6.1.1 Binding mechanism + +### 6.1.1.1 General + +The binding mechanism is the procedure that associates a service data flow (defined in a PCC and QoS rule, if applicable, by means of the SDF template), to the IP-CAN bearer deemed to transport the service data flow. For service data flows belonging to AF sessions, the binding mechanism shall also associate the AF session information with the IP-CAN bearer that is selected to carry the service data flow. + +NOTE 1: The relation between AF sessions and rules depends only on the operator configuration. An AF session can be covered by one or more PCC and QoS rules, if applicable (e.g. one rule per media component of an IMS session). Alternatively, a rule could comprise multiple AF sessions. + +NOTE 2: The PCRF may authorize dynamic PCC rules for service data flows without a corresponding AF session. Such PCC rules may be statically configured at the PCRF or dynamically filled with the UE provided traffic mapping information. + +NOTE 3: For PCC rules with application identifier, and for certain IP-CAN types, up-link traffic may be received on other/additional IP-CAN bearers than the one determined by the binding mechanism (further details provided in clause 6.2.2.2 and the IP-CAN specific annexes). + +The binding mechanism creates bindings. The algorithm, employed by the binding mechanism, may contain elements specific for the kind of IP-CAN. + +The binding mechanism includes three steps: + +1. Session binding. +2. PCC rule authorization and QoS rule generation, if applicable. +3. Bearer binding. + +### 6.1.1.2 Session binding + +Session binding is the association of the AF session information to one and only one IP-CAN session. + +The PCRF shall perform the session binding, which shall take the following IP-CAN parameters into account: + +- a) The UE IPv4 address and/or IPv6 network prefix; +- b) The UE identity (of the same kind), if present. + +NOTE 1: In case the UE identity in the IP-CAN and the application level identity for the user are of different kinds, the PCRF needs to maintain, or have access to, the mapping between the identities. Such mapping is not subject to specification within this TS. + +- c) The information about the packet data network (PDN) the user is accessing, if present. + +For an IP-CAN session to the dedicated APN for UE-to-Network Relay connectivity (as defined in TS 23.303 [44]) and using IPv6 prefix delegation (i.e. the assigned IPv6 network prefix is shorter than 64) the PCRF shall perform session binding based on the IPv6 network prefix only. A successful session binding occurs whenever a longer prefix received from an AF matches the prefix value of the IP-CAN session. PCRF shall not use the UE identity for session binding for this IP-CAN session. + +NOTE 2: For UE-to-Network Relay connectivity, the UE identity that the PCEF has provided (i.e. UE-to-Network Relay UE Identity) and a UE identity provided by the AF (i.e. Remote UE Identity) can be different, while the binding with the IP-CAN session is valid. + +NOTE 3: In this Release of the specification the support for policy control of Remote UEs behind a ProSe UE-Network Relay using IPv4 is not available. + +The PCRF shall identify the PCC rules affected by the AF session information, including new rules to be installed and existing rules to be modified or removed. + +### 6.1.1.3 PCC rule authorization and QoS rule generation + +PCC Rule authorization is the selection of the QoS parameters (QCI, ARP, GBR, MBR, etc.) for the PCC rules. + +The PCRF shall perform the PCC rule authorization for complete dynamic PCC rules belonging to AF sessions that have been selected in step 1, as described in clause 6.1.1.2, as well as for PCC rules without corresponding AF sessions. Based on AF instructions (as described in clause 6.1.5) dynamic PCC rules can be authorized even if they are not complete (e.g. due to missing service information regarding QoS or traffic filter parameters). + +The PCC rule authorization depends on the IP-CAN bearer establishment mode of the IP-CAN session and the mode (UE or NW) of the PCC rule: + +- In UE/NW bearer establishment mode, the PCRF shall perform the authorization for all PCC rules that are to be handled in NW mode. +- In UE/NW bearer establishment mode, for PCC rules that are to be handled in UE mode or when in UE-only bearer establishment mode, the PCRF shall first identify the PCC rules that correspond to a UE resource request and authorize only these. + +The PCRF shall compare the traffic mapping information of the UE resource request with the service data flow filter information of the services that are allowed for the user. Each part of the traffic mapping information shall be evaluated separately in the order of their related precedence. Any matching service data flow filter leads to an authorization of the corresponding PCC rule for the UE resource request unless the PCC rule is already authorized for a more specific traffic mapping information or the PCC rule cannot be authorized for the QCI that is related to the UE resource request (the details are described in the next paragraph). Since a PCC rule can contain multiple service data flow filters it shall be ensured by the PCRF that a service data flow is only authorized for a single UE resource request. + +NOTE 1: For example, a PCC rule containing multiple service data flow filters that match traffic mapping information of different UE resource requests could be segmented by the PCRF according to the different matching traffic mapping information. Afterwards, the PCRF can authorize the different PCC rules individually. + +The PCRF knows whether a PCC rule can be authorized for a single QCI only or a set of QCIs (based on SPR information or local configuration). If the processing of the traffic mapping information would lead to an authorization of a PCC rule, the PCRF shall also check whether the PCC rule can be authorized for the QCI that is related to the UE resource request containing the traffic mapping information. If the PCC rule cannot be authorized for this QCI, the PCRF shall reject the traffic mapping information unless otherwise stated in an access-specific Annex. + +If there is any traffic mapping information not matching to any service data flow filter known to the PCRF and the UE is allowed to request for enhanced QoS for traffic not belonging to operator-controlled services, the PCRF shall authorize this traffic mapping information by adding the respective service data flow filter to a new or existing PCC. If the PCRF received an SDF filter identifier together with this traffic mapping information, the PCRF shall modify the existing PCC rule if the PCC rule is authorized for a GBR QCI. + +NOTE 2: If the PCC rule is authorized for a non-GBR QCI, the PCRF may either create a new PCC rule or modify the existing PCC rule. + +The PCC rule that needs to be modified can be identified by the service data flow filter the SDF filter identifier refers to. The requested QoS shall be checked against the subscription limitations for traffic not belonging to operator-controlled services. + +If the PCRF needs to perform the authorization based on incomplete service information and thus cannot associate a PCC rule with a single IP-CAN bearer, then the PCRF shall generate for the affected service data flow an individual PCC rule per IP-CAN bearer that could carry that service data flow. Once the PCRF receives the complete service information, the PCC rule on the IP-CAN bearer with the matching traffic mapping information shall be updated according to the service information. Any other PCC rule(s) previously generated for the same service data flow shall be removed by the PCRF. + +NOTE 3: This is required to enable the successful activation or modification of IP-CAN bearers before knowing the intended use of the IP-CAN bearers to carry the service data flow(s). + +For an IP-CAN, where the PCRF gains no information about the uplink IP flows (i.e. the UE provided traffic mapping information contains no information about the uplink IP flows), the binding mechanism shall assume that, for bi-directional service data flows, both downlink and uplink packets travel on the same IP-CAN bearer. + +Whenever the service data flow template or the UE provided traffic mapping information change, the existing authorizations shall be re-evaluated, i.e. the authorization procedure specified in this clause, is performed. The re-evaluation may, for a service data flow, require a new authorization for a different UE provided mapping information. + +Based on PCRF configuration or AF instructions (as described in clause 6.1.5) dynamic PCC rules may have to be first authorized for the default QCI/default bearer (i.e. bearer without UE provided traffic mapping information) until a corresponding UE resource request occurs. + +NOTE 4: This is required to enable services that start before dedicated resources are allocated. + +A PCC rule for a service data flow that is a candidate for vSRVCC according to TS 23.216 [28] shall have the PS to CS session continuity indicator set. + +For the authorization of a PCC rule the PCRF shall take into account the IP-CAN specific restrictions and other information available to the PCRF. Each PCC rule receives a set of QoS parameters that can be supported by the IP-CAN. The authorization of a PCC rule associated with an emergency service and Restricted Local Operator Services shall be supported without subscription information (e.g. information stored in the SPR). The PCRF shall apply policies configured for the emergency service and Restricted Local Operator Services. + +When both a Gx and associated Gxx interface(s) exist for an IP-CAN session, the PCRF shall generate QoS rules for all the authorized PCC rules in this step. The PCRF shall ensure consistency between the QoS rules and PCC rules authorized for the same service data flow when QoS rules are derived from corresponding PCC rules. + +When flow mobility applies for the IP-CAN Session, one IP-CAN session may be associated to multiple Gateway Control Sessions with separate BBRFs. In this case, the PCRF shall provision QoS rules only to the appropriate BBERF based on IP flow mobility routing rules received from the PCEF. + +#### 6.1.1.4 Bearer Binding + +Bearer binding is the association of the PCC rule and the QoS rule (if applicable) to an IP-CAN bearer within that IP-CAN session. This function resides in the Bearer Binding Function (BBF). + +The Bearer Binding Function is located either at the BBERF or at the PCEF, depending on the architecture (see clause 5.1). The BBF is located at the PCEF if GTP is used as the mobility protocol towards the PCEF; otherwise, the BBF is located at the BBERF. + +The Bearer Binding Function may also be located in the PCRF as specified in Annex A and Annex D (e.g. for GPRS running UE only IP-CAN bearer establishment mode). + +NOTE 1: For an IP-CAN, limited to a single IP-CAN bearer per IP-CAN session, the bearer is implicit, so finding the IP-CAN session is sufficient for successful binding. + +For an IP-CAN which allows for multiple IP-CAN bearers for each IP-CAN session, the binding mechanism shall use the QoS parameters of the existing IP-CAN bearers to create the bearer binding for a rule, in addition to the PCC rule and the QoS rule (if applicable) authorized in the previous step. + +The set of QoS parameters assigned in step 2, as described in clause 6.1.1.3, to the service data flow is the main input for bearer binding. The BBF should not use the same bearer for rules with different settings for the PS to CS session continuity indicator. + +NOTE 2: When NBIFOM applies for the IP-CAN session, additional information has to be taken into account as described in clause 6.1.18.1. + +The BBF shall evaluate whether it is possible to use one of the existing IP-CAN bearers or not and whether initiate IP-CAN bearer modification if applicable. If none of the existing bearers are possible to use, the BBF should initiate the establishment of a suitable IP-CAN bearer. The binding is created between service data flow(s) and the IP-CAN bearer which have the same QoS class identifier and ARP. + +NOTE 3: The handling of a rule with MBR>GBR is up to operator policy (e.g. an independent IP-CAN bearer may be maintained for that SDF to prevent unfairness between competing SDFs). + +Requirements, specific for each type of IP-CAN, are defined in the IP-CAN specific Annex. + +Whenever the QoS authorization of a PCC/QoS rule changes, the existing bindings shall be re-evaluated, i.e. the bearer binding procedures specified in this clause, is performed. The re-evaluation may, for a service data flow, require a new binding with another IP-CAN bearer. The BBF should, if the PCRF requests the same change to the ARP/QCI value for all PCC/QoS Rules with the bearer binding to the same bearer, modify the bearer ARP/QCI value as requested. + +NOTE 4: A QoS change of the default EPS bearer causes the bearer binding for PCC/QoS rules previously bound to the default EPS bearer to be re-evaluated. At the end of the re-evaluation of the PCC/QoS rules of the IP-CAN session, there needs to be at least one PCC rule that successfully binds with the default bearer. + +## 6.1.2 Reporting + +Reporting refers to the differentiated IP-CAN resource usage information (measured at the PCEF/TDF) being reported to the online or offline charging functions. + +NOTE 1: Reporting usage information to the online charging function is distinct from credit management. Hence multiple PCC/ADC rules may share the same charging key for which one credit is assigned whereas reporting may be at higher granularity if serviced identifier level reporting is used. + +The PCEF/TDF shall report usage information for online and offline charging. + +The PCEF/TDF shall report usage information for each charging key value. + +For service data flow charging, for the case of sponsored data connectivity, the reports for offline charging shall report usage for each charging key, Sponsor Identity and Application Service Provider Identity combination if Sponsor Identity and Application Service Provider Identifier have been provided in the PCC rules. + +NOTE 2: Usage reports for online charging that include Sponsor Identity and Application Service Provider Identity is not within scope of the specification in this release. Online charging for sponsored data connectivity can be based on charging key as described in Annex N. + +The PCEF shall report usage information for each charging key/service identifier combination if service identifier level reporting is requested in the PCC/ADC rule. + +NOTE 3: For reporting purposes when charging is performed by the PCEF: + +- a) the charging key value identifies a service data flow if the charging key value is unique for that particular service data flow, and +- b) if the service identifier level reporting is present then the service identifier value of the PCC rule together with the charging key identify the service data flow. + +The TDF shall report usage information for each charging key/service identifier combination if service identifier level reporting is requested in the ADC rule. + +NOTE 4: For reporting purposes in case charging is performed by the TDF a) the charging key value identifies an application if the charging key value is unique for that application identified by ADC Rule and b) if the service identifier level reporting is present then the service identifier value of the ADC rule together with the charging key identify the application + +NOTE 5: If operator applies this solution with both PCEF and TDF performing enforcement and charging for a single IP-CAN session, the PCRF is recommended to use a different charging keys provided to the PCEF and to the TDF. + +For the case where the BBF locates in the PCEF, charging information shall be reported based on the result from the service data flow detection and measurement on a per IP-CAN bearer basis. + +For the case where the BBF is not located in the PCEF, charging information shall be reported based on the result from the service data flow detection and measurement, separately per QCI and ARP combination (used by any of the active PCC rules). In case 2a defined in clause 7.1, charging ID is provided to the BBERF via the PCRF if charging correlation is needed. + +A report may contain multiple containers, each container associated with a charging key, charging key and Sponsor Identity (in case of sponsored connectivity) or charging key/service identifier. + +### 6.1.3 Credit management + +The credit management applies for online charging only and shall operate on a per charging key basis. The PCEF should initiate one credit management session with the OCS for each IP-CAN Session subject to online charging, unless specified otherwise in an IP-CAN specific annex. Alternatively, the PCEF may initiate one credit management session for each IP-CAN bearer as defined in the applicable annex. The TDF should initiate one credit management session with the OCS for each TDF Session subject to online charging. + +NOTE 1: Independent credit control for an individual service/application may be achieved by assigning a unique charging key value in the corresponding PCC/ADC rule. + +The PCEF/TDF shall request a credit for each charging key occurring in a PCC/ADC rule. It shall be up to operator configuration whether the PCEF/TDF shall request credit in conjunction with the PCC/ADC rule being activated or when the first packet corresponding to the service/the application is detected. The OCS may either grant or deny the request for credit. The OCS shall strictly control the rating decisions. + +NOTE 2: The term 'credit' as used here does not imply actual monetary credit, but an abstract measure of resources available to the user. The relationship between this abstract measure, actual money, and actual network resources or data transfer, is controlled by the OCS. + +During IP-CAN session establishment and modification, the PCEF shall request credit using the information after applying policy enforcement action (e.g. upgraded or downgraded QoS information), if applicable, even though the PCEF has not signalled it yet in the IP-CAN. + +It shall be possible for the OCS to form a credit pool for multiple (one or more) charging keys, applied at the PCEF/TDF, e.g. with the objective of avoiding credit fragmentation. Multiple pools of credit shall be allowed per IP-CAN bearer/TDF session. The OCS shall control the credit pooling decisions. The OCS shall, when credit authorization is sought, either grant a new pool of credit, together with a new credit limit, or give a reference to a pool of credit that is already granted for that IP-CAN bearer/TDF session. The grouping of charging keys into pools shall not restrict the ability of the OCS to do credit authorisation and provide termination action individually for each charging key of the pool. It shall be possible for the OCS to group service data flows/applications charged at different rates or in different units (e.g. time/volume/event) into the same pool. + +For each charging key, the PCEF/TDF may receive credit re-authorisation trigger information from the OCS, which shall cause the PCEF/TDF to perform a credit re-authorisation when the event occurs. If there are events which can not be monitored in the PCEF/TDF, the PCEF/TDF shall provide the information about the required event triggers to the PCRF. If information about required event triggers is provided to the PCRF, it is an implementation option whether a successful confirmation is required from the PCRF in order for the PCEF/TDF to consider the credit (re-)authorization procedure to be successful. The credit re-authorisation trigger detection shall cause the PCEF/TDF to request re-authorisation of the credit in the OCS. It shall be possible for the OCS to instruct the PCEF/TDF to seek re-authorisation of credit in case of the events listed in table 6.1. + +**Table 6.1: Credit re-authorization triggers** + +| Credit re-authorization trigger | Description | Applicable for | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------| +| Credit authorisation lifetime expiry | The OCS has limited the validity of the credit to expire at a certain time. | PCEF, TDF | +| Idle timeout | The service data flow identified by a PCC Rules or the application identified by an ADC Rule has been empty for a certain time. | PCEF, TDF | +| PLMN change | The UE has moved to another operators' domain. | PCEF, TDF | +| QoS changes | The QoS of the IP-CAN bearer has changed. | PCEF | +| Change in type of IP-CAN | The type of the IP-CAN has changed. | PCEF, TDF | +| Location change (serving cell) | The serving cell of the UE has changed. | PCEF, TDF | +| Location change (serving area) (see note 2) | The serving area of the UE has changed. | PCEF, TDF | +| Location change (serving CN node) (see note 3) | The serving core network node of the UE has changed. | PCEF, TDF | +| Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area (see note 4) | The UE has entered or left a Presence Reporting Area | PCEF, TDF | +| NOTE 1: This list is not exhaustive. Events specific for each IP-CAN are specified in Annex A, and the protocol description may support additional events. | | | +| NOTE 2: A change in the serving area may also result in a change in the serving cell, and possibly a change in the serving CN node. | | | +| NOTE 3: A change in the serving CN node may also result in a change in the serving cell, and possibly a change in the serving area. | | | +| NOTE 4: The Presence Reporting Area(s) is provided by the OCS to the PCEF/TDF. The maximum number of PRA(s) per UE per PDN connection is configured in the OCS. The OCS may have independent configuration of the maximum number for Core Network pre-configured PRAs and UE-dedicated PRAs. The exact number(s) should be determined by operator in deployment. | | | + +If the Location change trigger is armed, the PCEF shall activate the relevant IP-CAN specific procedure which reports any changes in location to the level indicated by the trigger. If credit-authorization triggers and event triggers require different levels of reporting of location change for a single UE, the location to be reported should be changed to the highest level of detail required. However, there should be no request being triggered for credit re-authorization to the OCS if the report received is more detailed than requested by the OCS. + +NOTE 1: The access network may be configured to report location changes only when transmission resources are established in the radio access network. + +The OCS determines at credit management session establishment/modification, based on local configuration, if the UE is located in an access type that supports reporting changes of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area. If the access type supports it, the OCS may subscribe to Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area at any time during the life time of the credit management session. + +NOTE 2: If Presence Reporting Area reporting is not supported, the OCS may instead activate Location change reporting at cell and/or serving area level but due to the potential increase in signalling load, it is recommended that such reporting is only applied for a limited number of subscribers. + +When activating reporting for change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area, the OCS provides all of the PRA Identifier(s) to be activated for Core Network pre-configured Presence Reporting Area(s) and additionally all of PRA Identifier(s) and the list(s) of its elements for UE- dedicated Presence Reporting Area(s). (See Table 6.4 in clause 6.4 for details of the PRA Identifier(s) and the list(s) of elements comprising each Presence Reporting Area). If OCS is configured with a PRA identifier referring to the list of PRA Identifier(s) within a Set of Core Network predefined Presence Reporting Areas as defined in TS 23.401 [17], it activates the reporting of UE entering/leaving the individual PRA in the Set of Core Network predefined Presence Reporting Areas without providing the complete set of individual PRAs. + +The OCS may change (activate/modify/remove) the Presence Reporting Area(s) to be reported by providing the updated PRA Identifier(s) to PCEF. For UE dedicated PRAs, the OCS may also change the list(s) of Presence Reporting Area elements related to the PRA Identifier(s). + +The OCS may unsubscribe to Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area at any time during the life time of the credit management session. + +The OCS may be notified during the life time of a credit management session that the UE is located in an access type where local OCS configuration indicates that reporting changes of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area is not supported. If so, the OCS unsubscribes to Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area, if previously activated. + +Some of the re-authorization triggers are related to IP-CAN bearer modifications. IP-CAN bearer modifications, which do not match any credit re-authorization trigger (received from the OCS for the bearer) shall not cause any credit re-authorization interaction with the OCS. + +If the PCRF set the Out of credit event trigger (see clause 6.1.4), the PCEF/TDF shall inform the PCRF about the PCC/ADC rules for which credit is no longer available together with the applied termination action. + +#### 6.1.4 Event Triggers + +The Event Reporting Function (ERF) performs event trigger detection. When an event matching the event trigger occurs, the ERF shall report the occurred event to the PCRF. The Event Reporting Function is located either at the PCEF or, at the BBERF (if applicable) or, at the TDF for solicited application reporting (if applicable). + +The event triggers define the conditions when the ERF shall interact again with PCRF after an IP-CAN session establishment. The event triggers that are required in procedures shall be unconditionally reported from the ERF, while the PCRF may subscribe to the remaining events. Whether an event trigger requires a subscription by the PCRF is indicated in column 4 in table 6.2 below. + +The PCRF subscribes to new event triggers or remove armed event triggers unsolicited at any time or upon receiving a request from the AF, an event report or rule request from the ERF (PCEF or BBERF or TDF) using the Provision of PCC Rules procedure or the Provision of QoS Rules procedure (if applicable) or the Provision of ADC Rules procedure (if applicable). If the provided event triggers are associated with certain parameter values then the ERF shall include those values in the response back to the PCRF. Event triggers are associated with all rules at the ERF of an IP-CAN session (ERF is located at PCEF) or Gateway Control session (ERF is located at BBERF) or with Traffic Detection session (ERF is located in TDF). Event triggers determine when the ERF shall signal to the PCRF that an IP-CAN bearer has been modified. It shall be possible for the ERF to react on the event triggers listed in table 6.2. + +**Table 6.2: Event triggers** + +| Event trigger | Description | Reported from | Condition for reporting | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------------| +| PLMN change | The UE has moved to another operators' domain. | PCEF | PCRF | +| QoS change | The QoS of the IP-CAN bearer has changed (note 3). | PCEF, BBERF | PCRF | +| QoS change exceeding authorization | The QoS of the IP-CAN bearer has changed and exceeds the authorized QoS (note 3). | PCEF | PCRF | +| Traffic mapping information change | The traffic mapping information of the IP-CAN bearer has changed (note 3). | PCEF | Always set | +| Resource modification request | A request for resource modification has been received by the BBERF/PCEF (note 6). | PCEF, BBERF | Always set | +| Routing information change | The IP flow mobility routing information has changed (when IP flow mobility as specified in TS 23.261 [23] applies) or the PCEF has received Routing Rules from the UE (when NBIFOM as specified in TS 23.161 [43] applies) (note 11) (note 16). | PCEF | Always set (note 15) | +| Change in type of IP-CAN (see note 1) | The access type of the IP-CAN bearer has changed. | PCEF | PCRF | +| Loss/recovery of transmission resources | The IP-CAN transmission resources are no longer usable/again usable. | PCEF, BBERF | PCRF | +| Location change (serving cell) (see note 10) | The serving cell of the UE has changed. | PCEF, BBERF | PCRF | +| Location change (serving area) (see notes 4 and 10) | The serving area of the UE has changed. | PCEF, BBERF | PCRF | +| Location change (serving CN node) (see notes 5 and 10) | The serving core network node of the UE has changed. | PCEF, BBERF | PCRF | +| Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area (see note 17) | The UE is entering/leaving a Presence Reporting Area | PCEF, BBERF | PCRF | +| Out of credit | Credit is no longer available. | PCEF, TDF | PCRF | +| Enforced PCC rule request | PCEF is performing a PCC rules request as instructed by the PCRF. | PCEF | PCRF | +| Enforced ADC rule request | TDF is performing an ADC rules request as instructed by the PCRF. | TDF | PCRF | +| UE IP address change (see note 9) | A UE IP address has been allocated/released | PCEF | Always set | +| Access Network Charging Correlation Information | Access Network Charging Correlation Information has been assigned. | PCEF | PCRF | +| Usage report (see note 7) | The IP-CAN session or the Monitoring key specific resources consumed by a UE either reached the threshold or needs to be reported for other reasons. | PCEF, TDF | PCRF | +| Start of application traffic detection and Stop of application traffic detection (see note 8) | The start or the stop of application traffic has been detected. | PCEF, TDF | PCRF | +| SRVCC CS to PS handover | A CS to PS handover has been detected | PCEF | PCRF | +| Access Network Information report | Access information as specified in the Access Network Information Reporting part of a PCC rule. | PCEF, BBERF | PCRF | +| Credit management session failure | Transient/Permanent Failure as specified by the OCS | PCEF, TDF | PCRF for PCEF, Always set for TDF | +| Addition / removal of an access to an IP-CAN session (note 11) | The PCEF reports when an access is added or removed | PCEF | Always set | +| Change of usability of an access (note 11) | The PCEF reports that an access becomes unusable or usable again (note 14) | PCEF | Always set | +| UE resumed from suspend state | The PCEF reports to the PCRF when it detects that the UE is resumed from suspend state. | PCEF | PCRF | + +| | | +|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| NOTE 1: | This list is not exhaustive. Events specific for each IP-CAN are specified in clause A. | +| NOTE 2: | A change in the type of IP-CAN may also result in a change in the PLMN. | +| NOTE 3: | Available only when the bearer binding mechanism is allocated to the PCRF. | +| NOTE 4: | A change in the serving area may also result in a change in the serving cell, and a change in the serving CN node. | +| NOTE 5: | A change in the serving CN node may also result in a change in the serving cell, and possibly a change in the serving area. | +| NOTE 6: | Available only when the IP-CAN supports corresponding procedures for bearer independent resource requests. | +| NOTE 7: | Usage is defined as either volume or time of user plane traffic. | +| NOTE 8: | The start and stop of application traffic detection are separate event triggers, but received under the same subscription from the PCRF. For unsolicited application reporting, these event triggers are always set for the TDF. | +| NOTE 9: | If TDF for solicited application reporting is applicable, upon receiving this event report from PCEF, PCRF always updates the TDF. | +| NOTE 10: | Due to the potential increase in signalling load, it is recommended that such event trigger subscription is only applied for a limited number of subscribers. | +| NOTE 11: | Used when NBIFOM is supported by the IP-CAN session. Refer to clause 6.1.18 for the description of NBIFOM impacts to PCC. NBIFOM Routing Rules are defined in clause 6.12. | +| NOTE 12: | Void. | +| NOTE 13: | Void.. | +| NOTE 14: | Used in Network-initiated NBIFOM mode. The PCEF reports that an access becomes unusable or usable again are based on notifications received from the UE. This may correspond to the procedure "Access becomes Unusable and Usable" and to the procedure "IP flow mobility triggered by RAN Rule indication" defined in TS 23.161 [43]. | +| NOTE 15: | This event is always set when IFOM per TS 23.261 [23] applies or when NBIFOM per TS 23.161 [43] applies. In the latter case it applies in both Network-initiated NBIFOM mode and in UE-initiated NBIFOM mode. | +| NOTE 16: | In UE-initiated NBIFOM mode this event indicates that the UE has created, modified or deleted Routing Rules. In Network-initiated NBIFOM mode this event indicates that the UE requests the network to create, modify or delete Routing Rules. | +| NOTE 17: | The maximum number of PRA(s) per UE per PDN connection is configured in the PCRF. The PCRF may have independent configuration of the maximum number for Core Network pre-configured PRAs and UE-dedicated PRAs. The exact number(s) should be determined by operator in deployment. | + +If the Location change trigger is armed, the PCEF shall activate the relevant IP-CAN specific procedure which reports any changes in location to the level indicated by the trigger. If credit-authorization triggers and event triggers require different levels of reporting of location change for a single UE, the location to be reported should be changed to the highest level of detail required. However, there should be no request being triggered for PCC rules or QoS rules (if applicable) update to the PCRF if the report received is more detailed than requested by the PCRF. + +NOTE 1: The access network may be configured to report location changes only when transmission resources are established in the radio access network. + +The PCRF determines at IP-CAN session establishment/modification, based on local configuration, if the UE is located in an access type that supports reporting changes of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area. If the access type supports it, the PCRF may subscribe to Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area at any time during the life time of the IP-CAN session + +NOTE 2: If Presence Reporting Area reporting is not supported, the PCRF may instead activate Location change reporting at cell and/or serving area level but due to the potential increase in signalling load, it is recommended that such reporting is only applied for a limited number of subscribers. + +When activating reporting for change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area, the PCRF provides all of the PRA Identifier(s) to be activated for Core Network pre-configured Presence Reporting Area(s) and additionally all of PRA Identifier(s) and list(s) of its elements for UE-dedicated Presence Reporting Area(s) (See Table 6.4 in clause 6.4 for details of the PRA Identifier(s) and the list(s) of elements comprising each Presence Reporting Area). Setting the Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area event trigger shall not preclude the PCRF from simultaneously setting another Location change event trigger. If PCRF is configured with a PRA identifier referring to the list of PRA Identifier(s) within a Set of Core Network predefined Presence Reporting Areas as defined in TS 23.401 [17], it activates the reporting of UE entering/leaving the individual PRA in the Set of Core Network predefined Presence Reporting Areas without providing the complete set of individual PRAs. + +The PCRF may change (activate/modify/remove) the Presence Reporting Area(s) to be reported by providing the updated PRA Identifier(s) to PCEF. For UE dedicated PRAs, the PCRF may also change the list(s) of Presence Reporting Area elements related to the PRA Identifier(s). + +The PCRF may unsubscribe to Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area at any time during the life time of the IP-CAN session. + +The PCRF may be notified during the life time of an IP-CAN session that the UE is located in an access type where local PCRF configuration indicates that reporting changes of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area is not supported. The PCRF unsubscribes to Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area, if previously activated. + +IP-CAN bearer modifications, which do not match any event trigger, shall cause no interaction with the PCRF. + +The QoS change event trigger shall trigger the PCRF interaction for all changes of the IP-CAN bearer QoS. The QoS change exceeding authorization event trigger shall only trigger the PCRF interaction for those changes that exceed the QoS of the IP-CAN bearer that has been authorized by the PCRF previously. The ERF shall check the QoS class identifier and the bandwidth. + +The Resource modification request event trigger shall trigger the PCRF interaction for all resource modification requests not tied to a specific IP-CAN bearer received by PCEF/BBERF. The resource modification request received by PCEF/BBERF may include request for guaranteed bit rate changes for a traffic aggregate and/or the association/disassociation of the traffic aggregate with a QCI and/or a modification of the traffic aggregate. + +The routing information change event trigger shall trigger the PCRF interaction for any change in how the IP flow is routed. The routing information change received by the PCEF is specified in TS 23.261 [23] (i.e. IP flow mobility routing rules) or TS 23.161 [43] (i.e. Routing Rules). + +The enforced PCC rule request event trigger shall trigger a PCEF interaction to request PCC rules from the PCRF for an established IP-CAN session. This PCEF interaction shall take place within the Revalidation time limit set by the PCRF in the IP-CAN session related policy information (clause 6.4). + +The enforced ADC rule request event trigger shall trigger a TDF interaction to request ADC rules from the PCRF for an established TDF session for solicited application reporting. This TDF interaction shall take place within the ADC Revalidation time limit set by the PCRF in the TDF session related policy information (clause 6.4). + +NOTE 3: The enforced PCC rule request and the enforced ADC rule request mechanisms can be used to avoid signalling overload situations e.g. due to time of day based PCC/ADC rule changes. + +The UE IP address change event trigger applies to the PCEF only and shall trigger a PCEF interaction with the PCRF in case a UE IPv4 address is allocated or released during the lifetime of the IP-CAN session. + +The Access Network Charging Correlation Information event shall trigger the PCEF to report the assigned access network charging identifier for the PCC rules that are accompanied with a request for this event at activation. + +To activate usage monitoring, the PCRF shall set the Usage report event trigger and provide applicable usage thresholds for the Monitoring key(s) that are subject to usage monitoring in the requested node (PCEF or TDF, solicited application reporting). The PCRF shall not remove the Usage report event trigger while usage monitoring is still active in the PCEF/TDF. + +If the Usage report event trigger is set and the volume or the time thresholds, earlier provided by the PCRF, are reached, the PCEF or TDF (whichever received the event trigger) shall report this event to the PCRF. If both volume and time thresholds were provided and the thresholds, for one of the measurements, are reached, the PCEF or TDF shall report this event to the PCRF and the accumulated usage since last report shall be reported for both measurements. + +The Start of application traffic detection and Stop of application traffic detection events shall trigger an interaction with PCRF once the requested application traffic is detected (i.e. Start of application traffic detection) or the end of the requested application traffic is detected (i.e. Stop of application traffic detection) unless it is requested within a specific PCC Rule or ADC Rule to mute such a notification for solicited application reporting or unconditionally in case of unsolicited application reporting. The application identifier and service data flow descriptions, if deducible, shall also be included in the report. An application instance identifier shall be included in the report both for Start and for Stop of application traffic detection when service data flow descriptions are deducible. This is done to unambiguously match the Start and the Stop events. + +The SRVCC CS to PS handover event trigger shall trigger a PCEF interaction with the PCRF to inform that a CS to PS handover procedure has been detected. The PCRF shall ensure, as specified in TS 23.216 [28], to allow voice media over the default bearer during the course of the CS to PS SRVCC procedure. + +At PCC rule activation, modification and deactivation the ERF shall send, as specified in the PCC/QoS rule, the User Location Report and/or UE Timezone Report to the PCRF. + +NOTE 4: At PCC rule deactivation the User Location Report includes information on when the UE was last known to be in that location. + +The PCRF shall send the User Location Report and/or UE Timezone Report to the AF upon receiving an Access Network Information report corresponding to the AF session from the ERF. + +If the event trigger for Access Network Information reporting is set, the ERF shall check the need for access network information reporting after successful installation/modification or removal of a PCC/QoS rule or upon termination of the IP-CAN session/bearer. The ERF shall check the Access Network Information report parameters (User Location Report, UE Timezone Report) of the PCC/QoS rules and report the access network information received in the corresponding IP-CAN bearer establishment, modification or termination procedure to the PCRF. The ERF shall not report any subsequent access network information updates received from the IP-CAN without any previous updates of related PCC/QoS rules unless the associated IP-CAN bearer or connection has been released. + +If the ERF receives a request to install/modify or remove a PCC/QoS rule with Access Network Information report parameters (User Location Report, UE Timezone Report) set and there is no bearer signalling related to this PCC/QoS rule (i.e. pending IP-CAN bearer signalling initiated by the UE or bearer signalling initiated by the ERF), the ERF shall initiate a bearer signalling to retrieve the current access network information of the UE and forward it to the PCRF afterwards. + +If the Access Network Information report parameter for the User Location Report is set and the user location (e.g. cell) is not available to the ERF, the ERF shall provide the serving PLMN identifier to the PCRF which shall forward it to the AF. + +The Credit management session failure event trigger shall trigger a PCEF or TDF interaction with the PCRF to inform about a credit management session failure and to indicate the failure reason, and the affected PCC/ADC rules. + +NOTE 5: As a result, the PCRF may decide about e.g. TDF session termination, IP-CAN session termination (via PCC rule removal), perform gating of services in the PCEF/TDF, switch to offline charging, rating group change, etc. + +NOTE 6: For the PCEF the Credit management session failure event trigger applies to situations wherein the IP-CAN session is not terminated by the PCEF due to the credit management session failure. + +If the UE resumed from suspend state event trigger is set and the UE is resumed from suspend state in EPC, the PCEF shall report this event to the PCRF. The PCEF shall not report any subsequent UE resumed from suspend state updates received from the IP-CAN to the PCRF. When receiving the event report that the UE is resumed, the PCRF may provision PCC Rules to the PCEF to trigger an IP-CAN Session modification procedure. + +## 6.1.5 Policy Control + +Policy control comprises functionalities for: + +- Binding, i.e. the generation of an association between a service data flow and the IP-CAN bearer transporting that service data flow; +- Gating control, i.e. the blocking or allowing of packets, belonging to a service data flow or specified by an application identifier, to pass through to the desired endpoint; +- Event reporting, i.e. the notification of and reaction to application events to trigger new behaviour in the user plane as well as the reporting of events related to the resources in the GW (PCEF); +- QoS control, i.e. the authorisation and enforcement of the maximum QoS that is authorised for a service data flow, an Application identified by application identifier or an IP-CAN bearer; +- Redirection, i.e. the steering of packets, belonging to an application defined by the application identifier to the specified redirection address; +- IP-CAN bearer establishment for IP-CANs that support network initiated procedures for IP-CAN bearer establishment. + +In case of an aggregation of multiple service data flows (e.g. for GPRS a PDP context), the combination of the authorised QoS information of the individual service data flows is provided as the authorised QoS for this aggregate. + +The enforcement of the authorized QoS of the IP-CAN bearer may lead to a downgrading or upgrading of the requested bearer QoS by the GW (PCEF) as part of a UE-initiated IP-CAN bearer establishment or modification. Alternatively, the enforcement of the authorised QoS may, depending on operator policy and network capabilities, lead to network initiated IP-CAN bearer establishment or modification. If the PCRF provides authorized QoS for both, the IP-CAN bearer and PCC rule(s), the enforcement of authorized QoS of the individual PCC rules shall take place first. + +QoS authorization information may be dynamically provisioned by the PCRF or, if the conditions mentioned in clause 6.3.1 apply, it can be a predefined PCC rule in the PCEF. In case the PCRF provides PCC rules dynamically, authorised QoS information for the IP-CAN bearer (combined QoS) may be provided. For a predefined PCC rules within the PCEF the authorized QoS information shall take effect when the PCC rule is activated. The PCEF shall combine the different sets of authorized QoS information, i.e. the information received from the PCRF and the information corresponding to the predefined PCC rules. The PCRF shall know the authorized QoS information of the predefined PCC rules and shall take this information into account when activating them. This ensures that the combined authorized QoS of a set of PCC rules that are activated by the PCRF is within the limitations given by the subscription and operator policies regardless of whether these PCC rules are dynamically provided, predefined or both. + +For policy control, the AF interacts with the PCRF and the PCRF interacts with the PCEF as instructed by the AF. For certain events related to policy control, the AF shall be able to give instructions to the PCRF to act on its own, i.e. based on the service information currently available. The following events are subject to instructions from the AF: + +- The authorization of the service based on incomplete service information; + +NOTE 1: The QoS authorization based on incomplete service information is required for e.g. IMS session setup scenarios with available resources on originating side and a need for resource reservation on terminating side. + +- The immediate authorization of the service; +- The gate control (i.e. whether there is a common gate handling per AF session or an individual gate handling per AF session component required); +- The forwarding of IP-CAN bearer level information or events: + - Type of IP-CAN (e.g. GPRS, etc.); + - Transmission resource status (established/released/lost); + - Access Network Charging Correlation Information; + - Credit denied. + +NOTE 2: The credit denied information is only relevant for AFs not performing service charging. + +To enable the binding functionality, the UE and the AF shall provide all available flow description information (e.g. source and destination IP address and port numbers and the protocol information). The UE shall use the traffic mapping information to indicate downlink and uplink IP flows. + +## 6.1.6 Service (data flow) Prioritization and Conflict Handling + +Service pre-emption priority enables the PCRF to resolve conflicts where the activation of all requested active PCC rules for services would result in a cumulative authorized QoS which exceeds the Subscribed Guaranteed bandwidth QoS. + +For example, when supporting network controlled QoS, the PCRF may use the pre-emption priority of a service, the activation of which would cause the subscriber's authorized QoS to be exceeded. If this pre-emption priority is greater than that of any one or more active PCC rules, the PCRF can determine whether the deactivation of any one or more such rules would allow the higher pre-emption priority PCC rule to be activated whilst ensuring the resulting cumulative QoS does not exceed a subscriber's Subscribed Guaranteed Bandwidth QoS. + +If such a determination can be made, the PCRF may resolve the conflict by deactivating those selected PCC rules with lower pre-emption priorities and accepting the higher priority service information from the AF. If such a determination cannot be made, the PCRF may reject the service information from the AF. + +NOTE: Normative PCRF requirements for conflict handling are not defined. Alternative procedures may use a combination of pre-emption priority and AF provided priority indicator. + +## 6.1.7 Standardized QoS characteristics + +### 6.1.7.1 General + +The service level (i.e., per SDF or per SDF aggregate) QoS parameters are QCI, ARP, GBR, and MBR. + +Each Service Data Flow (SDF) is associated with one and only one QoS Class Identifier (QCI). For the same IP-CAN session multiple SDFs with the same QCI and ARP can be treated as a single traffic aggregate which is referred to as an SDF aggregate. An SDF is a special case of an SDF aggregate. The QCI is scalar that is used as a reference to node specific parameters that control packet forwarding treatment (e.g. scheduling weights, admission thresholds, queue management thresholds, link layer protocol configuration, etc.) and that have been pre-configured by the operator owning the node (e.g. eNodeB). When required by operator policy, the eNodeB can be configured to also use the ARP priority level in addition to the QCI to control the packet forwarding treatment in the eNodeB for SDFs having high priority ARPs. + +### 6.1.7.2 Standardized QCI characteristics + +This clause specifies standardized characteristics associated with standardized QCI values. The characteristics describe the packet forwarding treatment that an SDF aggregate receives edge-to-edge between the UE and the PCEF (see figure 6.1.7-1) in terms of the following performance characteristics: + +- 1 Resource Type (GBR or Non-GBR); +- 2 Priority; +- 3 Packet Delay Budget; +- 4 Packet Error Loss Rate; +- 5 Maximum Data Burst Volume (for some GBR QCIs); +- 6 Data Rate Averaging Window (for some GBR QCIs). + +![Figure 6.1.7-1: Scope of the Standardized QCI characteristics for client/server (upper figure) and peer/peer (lower figure) communication. The diagram shows two network architectures. The upper figure (client/server) shows a UE on the left connected to a PCEF, which is connected to a Backbone, which is connected to a Server on the right. The lower figure (peer/peer) shows a UE on the left connected to a PCEF, which is connected to a Backbone, which is connected to another PCEF, which is connected to a UE on the right. Both diagrams show layers for Application / Service Level, IP, and Access Network (A side). Red ovals labeled 'Scope of the standardized QCI characteristics' are placed around the UE and PCEF components in both diagrams.](3442f31a562d1ef45bfa18b18a6a1ddc_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates two network communication scenarios. The upper figure represents client/server communication, where a User Equipment (UE) on the left is connected to a PDN Gateway (PCEF), which is connected to a central Backbone, which is then connected to a Server on the right. The lower figure represents peer/peer communication, where a UE on the left is connected to a PCEF, which is connected to a central Backbone, which is connected to another PCEF, which is then connected to a UE on the right. Both diagrams show three horizontal layers: 'Application / Service Level' at the top, 'IP' in the middle, and 'Access Network (A side)' at the bottom. In both cases, red ovals labeled 'Scope of the standardized QCI characteristics' encompass the UE and the PCEF components, indicating the range of standardized Quality of Service (QoS) parameters that apply to these elements. + +Figure 6.1.7-1: Scope of the Standardized QCI characteristics for client/server (upper figure) and peer/peer (lower figure) communication. The diagram shows two network architectures. The upper figure (client/server) shows a UE on the left connected to a PCEF, which is connected to a Backbone, which is connected to a Server on the right. The lower figure (peer/peer) shows a UE on the left connected to a PCEF, which is connected to a Backbone, which is connected to another PCEF, which is connected to a UE on the right. Both diagrams show layers for Application / Service Level, IP, and Access Network (A side). Red ovals labeled 'Scope of the standardized QCI characteristics' are placed around the UE and PCEF components in both diagrams. + +**Figure 6.1.7-1: Scope of the Standardized QCI characteristics for client/server (upper figure) and peer/peer (lower figure) communication** + +The standardized characteristics are not signalled on any interface. They should be understood as guidelines for the pre-configuration of node specific parameters for each QCI. The goal of standardizing a QCI with corresponding characteristics is to ensure that applications / services mapped to that QCI receive the same minimum level of QoS in multi-vendor network deployments and in case of roaming. A standardized QCI and corresponding characteristics is independent of the UE's current access (3GPP or Non-3GPP). + +The one-to-one mapping of standardized QCI values to standardized characteristics is captured in table 6.1.7-A and table 6.1.7-B. The main differences between the two parts are that, in contrast to Part A, Part B of Table 6.1.7 describes QCIs for which the Packet Error Loss Rate calculation includes those packets that are not delivered within the Packet Delay Budget; and, it provides additional information on the Data Rate Averaging Window as well as the Maximum Data Burst Volume that needs to be delivered within the Packet Delay Budget. + +**Table 6.1.7-A: Standardized QCI characteristics** + +| QCI | Resource Type | Priority Level | Packet Delay Budget (NOTE 13) | Packet Error Loss Rate (NOTE 2) | Example Services | +|---------------------------------|---------------|----------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1
(NOTE 3) | GBR | 2 | 100 ms
(NOTE 1, NOTE 11) | $10^{-2}$ | Conversational Voice | +| 2
(NOTE 3) | | 4 | 150 ms
(NOTE 1, NOTE 11) | $10^{-3}$ | Conversational Video (Live Streaming) | +| 3
(NOTE 3, NOTE 14) | | 3 | 50 ms
(NOTE 1, NOTE 11) | $10^{-3}$ | Real Time Gaming, V2X messages
Electricity distribution - medium voltage (e.g. TS 22.261 [51] clause 7.2.2)
Process automation - monitoring (e.g. TS 22.261 [51] clause 7.2.2) | +| 4
(NOTE 3) | | 5 | 300 ms
(NOTE 1, NOTE 11) | $10^{-6}$ | Non-Conversational Video (Buffered Streaming) | +| 65
(NOTE 3, NOTE 9, NOTE 12) | | 0.7 | 75 ms
(NOTE 7, NOTE 8) | $10^{-2}$ | Mission Critical user plane Push To Talk voice (e.g., MCPTT) | +| 66
(NOTE 3, NOTE 12) | | 2 | 100 ms
(NOTE 1, NOTE 10) | $10^{-2}$ | Non-Mission-Critical user plane Push To Talk voice | +| 67
(NOTE 3, NOTE 12) | | 1.5 | 100 ms
(NOTE 1, NOTE 10) | $10^{-3}$ | Mission Critical Video user plane | +| 75
(NOTE 14) | | 2.5 | 50 ms
(NOTE 1) | $10^{-2}$ | V2X messages | +| 71 | | 5.6 | 150ms
(NOTE 1, NOTE 16) | $10^{-6}$ | "Live" Uplink Streaming (e.g. TS 26.238 [53]) | +| 72 | | 5.6 | 300ms
(NOTE 1, NOTE 16) | $10^{-4}$ | "Live" Uplink Streaming (e.g. TS 26.238 [53]) | +| 73 | | 5.6 | 300ms
(NOTE 1, NOTE 16) | $10^{-8}$ | "Live" Uplink Streaming (e.g. TS 26.238 [53]) | +| 74 | | 5.6 | 500ms
(NOTE 1, NOTE 16) | $10^{-8}$ | "Live" Uplink Streaming (e.g. TS 26.238 [53]) | +| 76 | | 5.6 | 500ms
(NOTE 1, NOTE 16) | $10^{-4}$ | "Live" Uplink Streaming (e.g. TS 26.238 [53]) | +| 5
(NOTE 3) | Non-GBR | 1 | 100 ms
(NOTE 1, NOTE 10) | $10^{-6}$ | IMS Signalling | +| 6
(NOTE 4) | | 6 | 300 ms
(NOTE 1, NOTE 10) | $10^{-6}$ | Video (Buffered Streaming)
TCP-based (e.g., www, e-mail, chat, ftp, p2p file sharing, progressive video, etc.) | +| 7
(NOTE 3) | | 7 | 100 ms
(NOTE 1, NOTE 10) | $10^{-3}$ | Voice, Video (Live Streaming)
Interactive Gaming | +| 8
(NOTE 5) | | 8 | 300 ms
(NOTE 1) | $10^{-6}$ | Video (Buffered Streaming)
TCP-based (e.g., www, e-mail, chat, ftp, p2p file sharing, progressive video, etc.) | +| 9
(NOTE 6) | | 9 | | | | + +| | | | | | +|---------------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 69
(NOTE 3,
NOTE 9,
NOTE 12) | 0.5 | 60 ms
(NOTE 7,
NOTE 8) | $10^{-6}$ | Mission Critical delay sensitive signalling (e.g., MC-PTT signalling, MC Video signalling) | +| 70
(NOTE 4,
NOTE 12) | 5.5 | 200 ms
(NOTE 7,
NOTE 10) | $10^{-6}$ | Mission Critical Data (e.g. example services are the same as QCI 6/8/9) | +| 79
(NOTE 14) | 6.5 | 50 ms
(NOTE 1,
NOTE 10) | $10^{-2}$ | V2X messages | +| 80
(NOTE 3) | 6.8 | 10 ms
(NOTE 10,
NOTE 15) | $10^{-6}$ | Low latency eMBB applications (TCP/UDP-based);
Augmented Reality | + +NOTE 1: A delay of 20 ms for the delay between a PCEF and a radio base station should be subtracted from a given PDB to derive the packet delay budget that applies to the radio interface. This delay is the average between the case where the PCEF is located "close" to the radio base station (roughly 10 ms) and the case where the PCEF is located "far" from the radio base station, e.g. in case of roaming with home routed traffic (the one-way packet delay between Europe and the US west coast is roughly 50 ms). The average takes into account that roaming is a less typical scenario. It is expected that subtracting this average delay of 20 ms from a given PDB will lead to desired end-to-end performance in most typical cases. Also, note that the PDB defines an upper bound. Actual packet delays - in particular for GBR traffic - should typically be lower than the PDB specified for a QCI as long as the UE has sufficient radio channel quality. + +NOTE 2: The rate of non congestion related packet losses that may occur between a radio base station and a PCEF should be regarded to be negligible. A PELR value specified for a standardized QCI therefore applies completely to the radio interface between a UE and radio base station. + +NOTE 3: This QCI is typically associated with an operator controlled service, i.e., a service where the SDF aggregate's uplink / downlink packet filters are known at the point in time when the SDF aggregate is authorized. In case of E-UTRAN this is the point in time when a corresponding dedicated EPS bearer is established / modified. + +NOTE 4: If the network supports Multimedia Priority Services (MPS) then this QCI could be used for the prioritization of non real-time data (i.e. most typically TCP-based services/applications) of MPS subscribers. + +NOTE 5: This QCI could be used for a dedicated "premium bearer" (e.g. associated with premium content) for any subscriber / subscriber group. Also in this case, the SDF aggregate's uplink / downlink packet filters are known at the point in time when the SDF aggregate is authorized. Alternatively, this QCI could be used for the default bearer of a UE/PDN for "premium subscribers". + +NOTE 6: This QCI is typically used for the default bearer of a UE/PDN for non privileged subscribers. Note that AMBR can be used as a "tool" to provide subscriber differentiation between subscriber groups connected to the same PDN with the same QCI on the default bearer. + +NOTE 7: For Mission Critical services, it may be assumed that the PCEF is located "close" to the radio base station (roughly 10 ms) and is not normally used in a long distance, home routed roaming situation. Hence delay of 10 ms for the delay between a PCEF and a radio base station should be subtracted from this PDB to derive the packet delay budget that applies to the radio interface. + +NOTE 8: In both RRC Idle and RRC Connected mode, the PDB requirement for these QCIs can be relaxed (but not to a value greater than 320 ms) for the first packet(s) in a downlink data or signalling burst in order to permit reasonable battery saving (DRX) techniques. + +NOTE 9: It is expected that QCI-65 and QCI-69 are used together to provide Mission Critical Push to Talk service (e.g., QCI-5 is not used for signalling for the bearer that utilizes QCI-65 as user plane bearer). It is expected that the amount of traffic per UE will be similar or less compared to the IMS signalling. + +NOTE 10: In both RRC Idle and RRC Connected mode, the PDB requirement for these QCIs can be relaxed for the first packet(s) in a downlink data or signalling burst in order to permit battery saving (DRX) techniques. + +NOTE 11: In RRC Idle mode, the PDB requirement for these QCIs can be relaxed for the first packet(s) in a downlink data or signalling burst in order to permit battery saving (DRX) techniques. + +NOTE 12: This QCI value can only be assigned upon request from the network side. The UE and any application running on the UE is not allowed to request this QCI value. + +NOTE 13: Packet delay budget is not applicable on NB-IoT or when Enhanced Coverage is used for WB-E-UTRAN (see TS 36.300 [19]). + +NOTE 14: This QCI could be used for transmission of V2X messages as defined in TS 23.285 [48]. + +NOTE 15: A delay of 2 ms for the delay between a PCEF and a radio base station should be subtracted from the given PDB to derive the packet delay budget that applies to the radio interface. + +NOTE 16: For "live" uplink streaming (see TS 26.238 [53]), guidelines for PDB values of the different QCIs correspond to the latency configurations defined in TR 26.939 [54]. In order to support higher latency reliable streaming services (above 500ms PDB), if different PDB and PELR combinations are needed these configurations will have to use non-standardised QCIs. + +Table 6.1.7-B: Standardized QCI characteristics + +| QCI | Resource Type | Priority Level | Packet Delay Budget (NOTE B1) | Packet Error Loss Rate (NOTE B2) | Maximum Data Burst Volume (NOTE B1) | Data Rate Averaging Window | Example Services | +|-----------------|---------------|----------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 82
(NOTE B6) | GBR | 1.9 | 10 ms
(NOTE B4) | $10^{-4}$
(NOTE B3) | 255 bytes | 2000 ms | Discrete Automation (TS 22.278 [38], clause 8 bullet g, and TS 22.261 [51], table 7.2.2-1, "small packets") | +| 83
(NOTE B6) | | 2.2 | 10 ms
(NOTE B4) | $10^{-4}$
(NOTE B3) | 1354 bytes
(NOTE B5) | 2000 ms | Discrete Automation (TS 22.278 [38], clause 8 bullet g, and TS 22.261 [51], table 7.2.2-1, "big packets") | +| 84
(NOTE B6) | | 2.4 | 30 ms
(NOTE B7) | $10^{-5}$
(NOTE B3) | 1354 bytes
(NOTE B5) | 2000 ms | Intelligent Transport Systems (TS 22.278 [38], clause 8, bullet h, and TS 22.261 [51], table 7.2.2). | +| 85
(NOTE B6) | | 2.1 | 5 ms
(NOTE B8) | $10^{-5}$
(NOTE B3) | 255 bytes | 2000 ms | Electricity Distribution- high voltage (TS 22.278 [38], clause 8, bullet i, and TS 22.261 [51], table 7.2.2 and Annex D, clause D.4.2). | + +NOTE B1: The PDB applies to bursts that are not greater than Maximum Data Burst Volume. +NOTE B2: This Packet Error Loss Rate includes packets that are not successfully delivered over the access network plus those packets that comply with the Maximum Data Burst Volume and GBR requirements but which are not delivered within the Packet Delay Budget. +NOTE B3: Data rates above the GBR, or, bursts larger than the Maximum Data Burst Volume, are treated as best effort, and, in order to serve other packets and meet the PELR, this can lead to them being discarded. +NOTE B4: A delay of 1 ms for the delay between a PCEF and a radio base station should be subtracted from a given PDB to derive the packet delay budget that applies to the radio interface. +NOTE B5: This Maximum Data Burst Volume value is set to 1354 bytes to avoid IP fragmentation on an IPv6 based, IPSec protected GTP tunnel to the eNB (the value is calculated as in Annex C of TS 23.060 [12] and further reduced by 4 bytes to allow for the usage of a GTP-U extension header). +NOTE B6: This QCI is typically associated with a dedicated EPS bearer. +NOTE B7: A delay of 5 ms for the delay between a PCEF and a radio base station should be subtracted from a given PDB to derive the packet delay budget that applies to the radio interface. +NOTE B8: A delay of 2 ms for the delay between a PCEF and a radio base station should be subtracted from a given PDB to derive the packet delay budget that applies to the radio interface. + +The Resource Type determines if dedicated network resources related to a service or bearer level Guaranteed Bit Rate (GBR) value are permanently allocated (e.g. by an admission control function in a radio base station). GBR SDF aggregates are therefore typically authorized "on demand" which requires dynamic policy and charging control. A Non GBR SDF aggregate may be pre-authorized through static policy and charging control. + +The Maximum Data Burst Volume, if defined for the QCI (see Table 6.1.7-B), is the amount of data which the RAN is expected to deliver within the part of the Packet Delay Budget allocated to the link between the UE and the radio base station as long as the data is within the GBR requirements. If more data is transmitted from the application, delivery within the Packet Delay Budget cannot be guaranteed for packets exceeding the Maximum Data Burst Volume or GBR requirements. + +The Data Rate Averaging Window, if defined for the QCI (see Table 6.1.7-B), is the 'sliding window' duration over which the GBR and MBR for a GBR SDF aggregate shall be calculated (e.g. in the RAN, PDN-GW, and UE). + +The Packet Delay Budget (PDB) defines an upper bound for the time that a packet may be delayed between the UE and the PCEF. For a certain QCI the value of the PDB is the same in uplink and downlink. The purpose of the PDB is to support the configuration of scheduling and link layer functions (e.g. the setting of scheduling priority weights and HARQ target operating points). Except for QCIs 82 and 83, the PDB shall be interpreted as a maximum delay with a confidence level of 98 percent. For services using QCI 82 or 83, a packet delayed by more than the PDB is included in the calculation of the PELR if the packet is within the Maximum Data Burst Volume and GBR requirements. + +NOTE 1: The PDB denotes a "soft upper bound" in the sense that an "expired" packet, e.g. a link layer SDU that has exceeded the PDB, does not need to be discarded (e.g. by RLC in E-UTRAN). The discarding (dropping) of packets is expected to be controlled by a queue management function, e.g. based on pre-configured dropping thresholds. + +The support for SRVCC requires QCI=1 only be used for IMS speech sessions in accordance to TS 23.216 [28]. + +NOTE 2: Triggering SRVCC will cause service interruption and/or inconsistent service experience when using QCI=1 for non-IMS services. + +NOTE 3: Triggering SRVCC for WebRTC IMS session will cause service interruption and/or inconsistent service experience when using QCI=1. Operator policy (e.g. use of specific AF application identifier) can be used to avoid using QCI 1 for a voice service, e.g. WebRTC IMS session. + +Services using a Non-GBR QCI should be prepared to experience congestion related packet drops, and, except for QCI 80, 98 percent of the packets that have not been dropped due to congestion should not experience a delay exceeding the QCI's PDB. This may for example occur during traffic load peaks or when the UE becomes coverage limited. See Annex J for details. Packets that have not been dropped due to congestion may still be subject to non congestion related packet losses (see PELR below). Owing to its low latency objective, services using using QCI 80 should anticipate that more than 2 percent of packets might exceed the PDB of QCI 80. + +Except for services using QCI 82 or 83 services using a GBR QCI and sending at a rate smaller than or equal to GBR can in general assume that congestion related packet drops will not occur, and 98 percent of the packets shall not experience a delay exceeding the QCI's PDB. Exceptions (e.g. transient link outages) can always occur in a radio access system which may then lead to congestion related packet drops even for services using a GBR QCI and sending at a rate smaller than or equal to GBR. Packets that have not been dropped due to congestion may still be subject to non congestion related packet losses (see PELR below). For services using QCI 82 or 83 a packet which is delayed by more than the PDB but is within the Maximum Data Burst Volume and GBR requirements, is counted as lost when calculating the PELR. + +Every QCI (GBR and Non-GBR) is associated with a Priority level (see Table 6.1.7). The lowest Priority level value corresponds to the highest Priority. The Priority levels shall be used to differentiate between SDF aggregates of the same UE, and it shall also be used to differentiate between SDF aggregates from different UEs. Via its QCI an SDF aggregate is associated with a Priority level and a PDB. Scheduling between different SDF aggregates shall primarily be based on the PDB. If the target set by the PDB can no longer be met for one or more SDF aggregate(s) across all UEs that have sufficient radio channel quality then the QCI Priority level shall be used as follows: in this case a scheduler shall meet the PDB of an SDF aggregate on QCI Priority level N in preference to meeting the PDB of SDF aggregates on next QCI Priority level greater than N, until the priority N SDF aggregate's GBR (in case of a GBR SDF aggregate) has been satisfied. + +Other aspects related to the treatment of traffic exceeding an SDF aggregate's GBR are out of scope of this specification. + +When required by operator policy, the eNodeB can be configured to use the ARP priority level in addition to the QCI priority level to determine the relative priority of the SDFs in meeting the PDB of an SDF aggregate. This configuration applies only for high priority ARPs as defined in clause 6.1.7.3. + +NOTE 4: The definition (or quantification) of "sufficient radio channel quality" is out of the scope of 3GPP specifications. + +NOTE 5: In case of E-UTRAN a QCI's Priority level, and when required by operator policy, the ARP priority level may be used as the basis for assigning the uplink priority per Radio Bearer (see TS 36.300 [19] for details). + +The Packet Error Loss Rate (PELR) defines an upper bound for the rate of SDUs (e.g. IP packets) that have been processed by the sender of a link layer protocol (e.g. RLC in E-UTRAN) but that are not successfully delivered by the corresponding receiver to the upper layer (e.g. PDCP in E-UTRAN). Thus, the PELR defines an upper bound for a rate + +of non congestion related packet losses. The purpose of the PELR is to allow for appropriate link layer protocol configurations (e.g. RLC and HARQ in E-UTRAN). For a certain QCI the value of the PELR is the same in uplink and downlink. + +NOTE 6: The characteristics PDB and PELR are specified only based on application / service level requirements, i.e., those characteristics should be regarded as being access agnostic, independent from the roaming scenario (roaming or non-roaming), and independent from operator policies. + +### 6.1.7.3 Allocation and Retention Priority characteristics + +The QoS parameter ARP contains information about the priority level, the pre-emption capability and the pre-emption vulnerability. The priority level defines the relative importance of a resource request. This allows deciding whether a bearer establishment or modification request can be accepted or needs to be rejected in case of resource limitations (typically used for admission control of GBR traffic). It can also be used to decide which existing bearers to pre-empt during resource limitations. + +NOTE 1: The ARP priority level can be used in addition to the QCI to determine the transport level packet marking, e.g. to set the DiffServ Code Point of the associated EPS bearer, as described in TS 23.401 [17]. + +NOTE 2: When required by operator policy, the eNodeB can be configured to use the ARP priority level in addition to QCI priority level to control the packet forwarding treatment for SDFs having high priority ARPs. + +The range of the ARP priority level is 1 to 15 with 1 as the highest level of priority. The pre-emption capability information defines whether a service data flow can get resources that were already assigned to another service data flow with a lower priority level. The pre-emption vulnerability information defines whether a service data flow can lose the resources assigned to it in order to admit a service data flow with higher priority level. The pre-emption capability and the pre-emption vulnerability can be either set to 'yes' or 'no'. + +The ARP priority levels 1-8 should only be assigned to resources for services that are authorized to receive prioritized treatment within an operator domain (i.e. that are authorized by the serving network). The ARP priority levels 9-15 may be assigned to resources that are authorized by the home network and thus applicable when a UE is roaming. + +NOTE 3: This ensures that future releases may use ARP priority level 1-8 to indicate e.g. emergency and other priority services within an operator domain in a backward compatible manner. This does not prevent the use of ARP priority level 1-8 in roaming situation in case appropriate roaming agreements exist that ensure a compatible use of these priority levels. + +### 6.1.8 Termination Action + +The termination action applies only in case of online charging. The termination action indicates the action, which the PCEF/TDF should perform when no more credit is granted. A packet that matches a PCC rule/ADC rule, indicating a charging key for which no credit has been granted, is subject to a termination action. + +The defined termination actions include: + +- Allowing the packets to pass through; +- Dropping the packets; +- The PCEF/TDF Default Termination Action; +- The re-direction of packets to an application server (e.g. defined in the termination action). + +NOTE: Such a re-direction may cause an application protocol specific asynchronous close event and application protocol specific procedures may be required in the UE and/or AF in order to recover, e.g. as specified in RFC 2616 for HTTP. + +The Default Termination Action for all charging keys, for which no more credit is granted and there is no specific termination action shall be pre-configured in the PCEF/TDF according to operator's policy. For instance, the default behaviour may consist of allowing packets of any terminated service to pass through the PCEF/TDF. + +The OCS may provide a termination action for each charging key over the Gy interface. Any previously provided termination action may be overwritten by the OCS. A termination action remains valid and shall be applied by the + +PCEF/TDF until all the corresponding PCC/ADC rules of that charging key are removed or the corresponding IP-CAN bearer is removed (for GPRS the PDP context). + +The OCS shall provide the termination action to the PCEF/TDF before denying credit; otherwise the PCEF/TDF default termination action will be performed. + +### 6.1.9 Handling of packet filters provided to the UE by PCEF/BBERF + +The network shall ensure that the traffic mapping information negotiated with the UE reflects the bearer binding of PCC/QoS rules, except for those extending the inspection beyond what can be signalled to the UE. The PCC/QoS rules may restrict what traffic is allowed compared to what is explicitly negotiated with the UE. The PCRF may, per service data flow filter, indicate that the PCEF/BBERF is required to explicitly signal the corresponding traffic mapping information to the UE, e.g. for the purpose of IMS precondition handling at the UE. In absence of that indication, it is a PCEF/BBERF decision whether to signal the traffic mapping information that is redundant from a traffic mapping point of view. + +- NOTE 1: A new/modified PCC/QoS rule can cause that previously redundant, and therefore omitted, traffic mapping information to cease being redundant and causing the PCEF/BBERF to signal the corresponding traffic mapping information to the UE. +- NOTE 2: In order to signal a specific traffic mapping to a PDP context/EPS bearer without any previous TFT, if the operator policy is to continue allowing previously allowed traffic on that bearer, TFT filters that correspond to the previous traffic mapping need to be introduced as well. +- NOTE 3: The PCEF/BBERF can use all SDF filters for the generation of traffic mapping information. However if the number of SDF filters for an IP-CAN bearer exceeds the maximum number of filters that may be signalled to the UE (e.g. as specified in TS 24.008 [50]) another bearer needs to be established and a rebinding of PCC rules to bearers (by PCEF/BBERF) or even the splitting of the SDF template into two or more PCC rules (by PCRF) may be required. + +The traffic mapping information (e.g. TFT filters for GPRS and EPS) that the network provides to the UE shall include the same content as the corresponding SDF filters in the SDF template received over the Gx/Gxx interface. The representation/format of the packet filters provided by the network to the UE is access-system dependent and may vary between accesses and may also be different from the representation/format of the SDF filters in the SDF template on the Gx/Gxx interface. + +- NOTE 4: After handover from one access-system to another, if the UE needs to determine the QoS provided in the target access to the pre-existing IP flows in the source access, the UE can perform packet filter comparison between the packet filters negotiated in the old access and those provided by the target access during QoS resource activation. +- NOTE 5: If UE initiated procedures are supported and handover between access systems is to be supported, the content of the packet filters provided on the Gx/Gxx interface by the PCRF is restricted to the packet filter fields that all the accesses can provide to the UE. + +In case traffic mapping information is required for a dedicated bearer and in the PCC/QoS rules corresponding to the bearer there is no SDF filter for the uplink direction having an indication to signal corresponding traffic mapping information to the UE, the PCEF/BBERF derives traffic mapping information based on implementation specific logic (e.g. traffic mapping information that effectively disallows any useful packet flows in uplink direction as described in clause 15.3.3.4 of TS 23.060 [12]) and provides it to the UE. + +- NOTE 6: For GPRS and EPS, the state of TFT packet filters, as defined in TS 23.060 [12], for an IP-CAN session requires that there is at most one bearer with no TFT packet filter for the uplink direction. +- NOTE 7: This PCEF behaviour covers also the case that a PCC rule with an application identifier is the only PCC rule that is bound to a dedicated bearer. +- NOTE 8: For a default bearer, the PCEF/BBERF will not add traffic mapping information that effectively disallows any useful packet flows in uplink direction on its own. Traffic mapping information is only generated from SDF filters which have an indication to signal corresponding traffic mapping information to the UE. + +## 6.1.10 IMS Emergency Session Support + +### 6.1.10.1 Architecture model and Reference points + +Emergency bearer services (i.e. IP-CAN session for the IMS emergency services) are provided by the serving network to support IMS emergency when the network is configured to support emergency services. Emergency services are network services provided through an Emergency APN and may not require a subscription depending on operator policies and local regulatory requirements. For emergency services the architecture for the non-roaming case as described in clause 5.1 is the only applicable architecture model. + +For emergency services, the Sp reference point does not apply. + +Emergency services are handled locally in the serving network. Therefore the S9 reference point does not apply. + +### 6.1.10.2 PCC Rule Authorization and QoS rule generation + +The PCC Rule Authorization and QoS Rule generation function selects QoS parameters that allow prioritization of IMS Emergency sessions. If an IMS Emergency session is prioritized the QoS parameters shall contain an ARP value that is reserved for intra-operator use of IMS Emergency services. + +### 6.1.10.3 Functional Entities + +#### 6.1.10.3.1 PCRF + +The PCRF shall determine based on the PDN-id if an IP-CAN Session concerns an IMS emergency session. + +For an IP-CAN session serving an IMS emergency session, the PCRF makes authorization and policy decisions that restrict the traffic to emergency destinations, IMS signalling and the traffic to retrieve user location information (in the user plane) for emergency services. An IP-CAN session serving an IMS emergency session shall not serve any other service and shall not be converted to/from any IP-CAN session serving other services. + +If the UE IP address belongs to an emergency APN, the PCRF does not perform subscription check; instead it utilizes the locally configured operator policies to make authorization and policy decisions. + +For IMS, it shall be possible for the PCRF to verify that the IMS service information is associated with a UE IP address belonging to an emergency APN. If the IMS service information does not contain an emergency related indication and the UE IP address is associated with an emergency APN, the PCRF shall reject the IMS service information provided by the P-CSCF (and thus to trigger the release of the associated IMS session), see TS 23.167 [21]. + +The PCRF performs according to existing procedure: + +- If IMS service information containing an emergency related indication is received from the P-CSCF with an UE IP address associated to an Emergency APN, the PCRF initiates an IP-CAN session Modification Request for the IP-CAN session serving the IMS session to the PCEF to provide PCC Rule(s) that authorize media flow(s). +- At reception of an indication that the IMS emergency session is released from the P-CSCF, the PCRF removes the PCC rule(s) for that IMS session with an IP-CAN session Modification Request. + +In addition, upon Rx session establishment the PCRF shall provide the IMEI(SV) (if available) and the EPC-level subscriber identifiers (IMSI, MSISDN) (if available), received from the PCEF at IP-CAN session establishment, if so requested by the P-CSCF. + +#### 6.1.10.3.2 PCEF + +The PCEF initiates the IP-CAN Session termination if the last PCC rule for this IP-CAN session is removed according to existing procedure. + +In addition, at reception of an IP-CAN Session Modification Request triggered by the PCRF for an IP-CAN session serving an IMS emergency session that removes all PCC rules with a QCI other than the default bearer QCI and the QCI used for IMS signalling, the PCEF shall start a configurable inactivity timer (e.g., to enable PSAP Callback session). When the configured period of time expires the PCEF shall initiate an IP-CAN Session Termination Request for the IP-CAN session serving the IMS Emergency session. + +If a PCRF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification Request, providing new PCC rule(s) with a QCI other than the default bearer QCI and the QCI used for IMS signalling, the PCEF shall cancel the inactivity timer. + +### 6.1.10.3.3 P-CSCF + +The P-CSCF performs according to existing procedure: + +- At reception of an indication that an IMS emergency session is established, the P-CSCF sends IMS service information to the PCRF. +- At reception of an indication that an IMS emergency session is released, the P-CSCF interacts with the PCRF to revoke the IMS service information. + +In addition, the P-CSCF shall include an emergency related indication when providing IMS service information to the PCRF; see TS 23.167 [21]. + +Moreover, the P-CSCF upon Rx session establishment may request the PCRF to provide the IMEI(SV) and the EPC-level subscriber identifiers (IMSI, MSISDN) corresponding to the Rx session. + +NOTE: The IMEI(SV) and the EPC-level subscriber identifiers (IMSI, MSISDN) can be used to support authentication of roaming users in deployments with no IMS-level roaming interfaces or to support PSAP callback functionality for anonymous IMS emergency sessions, as described in TS 23.167 [21]. + +### 6.1.10.4 PCC Procedures and Flows + +At Indication of IP-CAN Session Establishment that includes a PDN-id that identifies an Emergency APN the PCRF ignores subscription information from the SPR. The PCRF uses locally configured operator policies to make authorization and policy decisions. + +At Indication of IP-CAN Session Establishment and Gateway Control Session Establishment, the user identity (e.g. IMSI) may not be available, or can not be authenticated. In this case, the IMEI shall be used to identify the UE. + +An IP-CAN session for an emergency service shall be restricted to the destination address(es) associated with the emergency service only. + +## 6.1.10a Restricted Local Operator Services Support + +Restricted Local Operator Services (i.e. IP-CAN session for the Restricted Local Operator Services) (as specified in TS 23.221 [55]) are provided by the serving network when the network is configured to support Restricted Local Operator Services. + +The PCC handling of Restricted Local Operator Services is very similar to that of emergency service as specified in clause 6.1.10 with the following differences: + +- RLOS APN and IMS RLOS session are used for Restricted Local Operator Services. +- Architecture model and Reference points (clause 6.1.10.1). + +Restricted Local Operator Services do not require a subscription. + +- PCC Rule Authorization and QoS rule generation (clause 6.1.10.2). + +The Restricted Local Operator Services is not a prioritized services, and the ARP can be determined based on operator policy. + +- Functional Entity: PCRF (clause 6.1.10.3.1). + +The PCRF shall determine based on the RLOS APN if an IP-CAN Session relates to an IMS RLOS session. + +- Functional Entity: PCEF (clause 6.1.10.3.2). + +Duration of PDN connection for RLOS is controlled through local policies in PCEF. Handling of inactivity timer for the emergency PDN connection is not applicable for RLOS. + +- Functional Entity: P-CSCF (clause 6.1.10.3.3). +Indication of IMS RLOS session is used. +- PCC Procedures and Flows (clause 6.1.10.4). + +The PDN-id identifies an RLOS APN. + +## 6.1.11 Multimedia Priority Service Support + +### 6.1.11.1 Architecture model and Reference points + +Subscription data for MPS is provided to PCC through the Sp reference point. To support MPS service, the PCRF shall subscribe to changes in the MPS subscription data for Priority EPS Bearer Service. Dynamic invocation for MPS is provided from an AF, using the Priority indicator, over Rx. + +### 6.1.11.2 PCC rule authorization and QoS rule generation + +For MPS service, the PCRF shall generate the corresponding PCC/QoS rule(s) with the ARP/QCI parameters as appropriate for the prioritized service. + +For non-MPS service, the PCRF shall generate the corresponding PCC/QoS rule(s) as per normal procedures, without consideration whether the MPS Priority EPS Bearer Service is active or not, but upgrade the ARP/QCI values suitable for MPS when the Priority EPS Bearer Service is invoked. When the priority EPS Bearer Service is revoked, the PCRF shall change ARP/QCI values modified for Priority EPS bearer service to an appropriate value according to PCRF decision. + +Whenever one or more AF sessions of an MPS service are active within the same PDN connection, the PCRF shall ensure that the ARP priority level of the default bearer is at least as high as the highest ARP priority level used by any authorized PCC rules belonging to an MPS service. If the ARP pre-emption capability is enabled for any of the authorized PCC rules belonging to an MPS service, the PCRF shall also enable the ARP pre-emption capability for the default bearer. + +NOTE 1: This ensures that services using dedicated bearers are not terminated because of a default bearer with a lower ARP priority level or disabled ARP pre-emption capability being dropped during mobility events. + +NOTE 2: This PCRF capability does not cover interactions with services other than MPS services. + +### 6.1.11.3 Priority EPS Bearer Service + +The MPS Priority EPS Bearer Service targets the ARP and/or QCI of bearer(s), enabling the prioritization of all traffic on the same bearer. + +The PCRF shall, at the activation of the Priority EPS Bearer Service: + +- modify the ARP of the default bearer as appropriate for the Priority EPS Bearer Service under consideration of the requirement described in clause 6.1.11.2; and +- if modification of the QCI of the default bearer is required, modify the QCI of the default bearer as appropriate for the Priority EPS Bearer Service; and +- modify the ARP of PCC/QoS Rules installed before the activation of the Priority EPS Bearer Service to the ARP as appropriate for the Priority EPS Bearer Service under consideration of the requirement described in clause 6.1.11.2; and +- if modification of the QCI of the PCC/QoS Rules is required, modify the QCI of the PCC/QoS Rules installed before the activation of the Priority EPS Bearer Service to the QCI as appropriate for the Priority EPS Bearer Service. + +The PCRF shall, at the deactivation of the Priority EPS Bearer Service: + +- modify the ARP of the default bearer to an appropriate value according to PCRF decision under consideration of the requirement described in clause 6.1.11.2; and + +- if modification of the QCI of the default bearer is required, modify the QCI of the default bearer to an appropriate value according to PCRF decision; and +- for PCC/QoS rules modified due to the activation of Priority EPS bearer service: + - modify the ARP to an appropriate value according to PCRF decision under consideration of the requirement described in clause 6.1.11.2; and + - if modification of the QCI of PCC/QoS Rules is required, modify the QCI to an appropriate value according to PCRF decision. + +#### 6.1.11.4 Bearer priority for IMS Multimedia Priority Services + +In addition to the mechanism specified in clause 6.1.11.2, IMS Multimedia Priority Services may require upgrade of the dedicated IM CN signalling bearer and the default bearer, e.g. in order to mitigate the IP-CAN session termination due to resource limitation at a location change the default bearer and dedicated IM CN signalling bearer may need an upgraded ARP. + +At reception of the indication that the IMS Signalling Priority is set for the IP-CAN Session or at reception of service authorization from the P-CSCF (AF) including an MPS session indication and the service priority level the PCRF shall under consideration of the requirement described in clause 6.1.11.2: + +- modify the ARP of the default bearer as appropriate for the IMS Multimedia Priority Service; and +- if upgrade of the dedicated IM CN signalling bearer is required, modify the ARP in all the PCC/QoS rules that describe the IM CN signalling traffic to the value appropriate for IMS Multimedia Priority Services. + +When the PCRF detects that the P-CSCF (AF) released all the MPS session and the IMS Signalling Priority is not set for the IP-CAN session the PCRF shall under consideration of the requirement described in clause 6.1.11.2: + +- modify the ARP of the default bearer to an appropriate value according to PCRF decision; and +- modify the ARP in all PCC/QoS Rules that describe the IM CN signalling traffic to an appropriate value according to PCRF decision. + +#### 6.1.12 ADC rule authorization + +ADC Rule authorization refers to the PCRF decision about which predefined and/or dynamic ADC rules to activate for a TDF session and is only applicable in case of solicited application reporting. + +It may also comprise the selection of parameters (monitoring key, enforcement actions etc.) for dynamic ADC rules to be applied once the traffic is detected. + +User profile configuration, received within subscription information, indicating whether application detection and control can be enabled, shall be taken into account by PCRF, when deciding on ADC rule authorization. + +NOTE 1: The enforcement actions are only applicable in case of solicited application reporting. + +NOTE 2: For unsolicited application reporting, all ADC rules pre-provisioned at TDF are authorized. + +#### 6.1.13 Redirection + +Redirection of application traffic is an option applicable in the TDF or the PCEF enhanced with ADC. + +PCRF may control redirection by provisioning and modifying dynamic ADC rules over the Sd interface for a TDF, or dynamic PCC rules over the Gx interface for a PCEF enhanced with ADC. The PCRF may enable/disable redirection and set a redirect destination for every dynamic ADC rule or PCC rule. + +Redirect information (redirection enabled/disabled and redirect destination) within a PCC Rule or within an ADC rule respectively, instructs the PCEF enhanced with ADC, or the TDF whether or not to perform redirection towards a specific redirect destination. The redirect destination may be provided as part of the dynamic PCC/ADC Rule, or may be preconfigured in the PCEF enhanced with ADC or the TDF. A redirect destination provided in a dynamic PCC/ADC + +Rule overrides the redirect destination preconfigured in the PCEF enhanced with ADC or in the TDF for this PCC/ADC Rule. + +The redirection is enforced by the PCEF enhanced with ADC or the TDF on uplink application's traffic matching the ADC or PCC rule for which redirection is enabled. + +## 6.1.14 Resource sharing for different AF sessions + +The P-CSCF (i.e. AF) may indicate to the PCRF that media of an AF session may share resources with media belonging to other AF sessions according to TS 23.228 [39]. For every media flow, the P-CSCF may indicate that the media flow may share resources in both directions or in one direction only (UL or DL). + +The PCRF makes authorization and policy decisions for the affected AF sessions individually and generates a PCC/QoS rule for every media flow in any AF session. + +If the PCRF received identical indication(s) for resource sharing for multiple AF sessions, the PCRF may request the PCEF/BBERF to realize resource sharing for the corresponding set of PCC/QoS rules. The PCRF provides a DL and/or UL sharing indication with the same value for those PCC/QoS Rules that are candidate to share resources according to the direction of resource sharing indicated by the AF. + +For each direction, the PCEF/BBERF shall take the highest GBR value from each set of PCC/QoS Rules related with the same sharing indication for this direction and bound to the same bearer and uses that value as input for calculating the GBR of the bearer. For each direction, the PCEF/BBERF may take the MBR value of the most demanding PCC/QoS Rule included in each set of PCC Rules related with the same sharing indication for this direction and bound to the same bearer and uses that as input for calculating the MBR of the bearer. + +The AF session termination or modification procedure that removes media flows triggers the removal of the corresponding PCC/QoS Rules from the PCEF/BBERF. The PCEF/BBERF shall recalculate the GBR (and MBR) value of the bearer whenever a set of PCC/QoS Rules with the same sharing indication changes. + +Resource sharing is applied as long as there are at least two active PCC/QoS rules with the same sharing indication bound to the same bearer. + +Resource sharing for different AF sessions is possible only if the P-CSCF, the PCRF and the PCEF/BBERF support it. + +NOTE: This procedure assumes that applications/service logic must do the necessary coordination, e.g. pause sending or employ gating, to avoid service data flows interfering and to ensure that multiple flows comply with the combined QoS parameters. + +## 6.1.15 Reporting of RAN user plane congestion information + +### 6.1.15.1 General + +RAN User Plane Congestion Information (RUCI) is reported to the PCRF to enable the PCRF to take the RAN user plane congestion status into account for policy decisions. + +The RUCI includes the following information: + +- The IMSI identifying the UE impacted by congestion; +- eNB identifier, ECGI or SAI identifying the eNB, E-UTRAN cell or Service Area, respectively, serving the UE. + +NOTE: Whether in case of E-UTRAN the eNB identifier or the ECGI is included in the RUCI is up to operator configuration in the RCAF. + +- APN for which congestion information is reported; +- Congestion level or an indication of the "no congestion" state. + +### 6.1.15.2 Reporting restrictions + +Depending on the operator's congestion mitigation policy, it may not be necessary to have RUCI reporting for all users. An operator shall be able to specify restrictions for RUCI reporting on a per UE per APN basis. Reporting restrictions + +can be used to activate or deactivate the RUCI reporting. Reporting restrictions can also be used to limit RUCI reporting. This is achieved by defining one or more sets of congestion levels, such that the RCAF indicates only that the UE experiences a congestion level within the given set but does not indicate the congestion level itself within that set. The sets must be non-overlapping such that a congestion level belongs to a single set only. Reporting restrictions can also be used to deactivate reporting of the congested cell's identifier as part of the RUCI. + +NOTE: The support for the reporting restrictions is optional, and used only if both the PCRF and the RCAF support this feature. + +### 6.1.15.3 UE mobility between RCAFs + +A RCAF is assumed to serve a geographical area. A UE may move from the area handled by one RCAF to an area handled by a different RCAF. RCAF nodes cannot detect mobility by themselves: an RCAF node cannot differentiate whether a UE that is no longer affected by congestion has moved to another RCAF or not. When a given RCAF indicates no congestion to the PCRF for a given UE on the Np interface, this should be interpreted as no congestion experienced at the given RCAF which does not exclude that another RCAF may report that the same UE experiences congestion. + +Consistent operation for UE mobility is ensured by applying the following rules at the PCRF. + +- The PCRF maintains the RCAF which has last indicated that the UE is affected by congestion. +- When a new RCAF indicates that the UE is affected by congestion, the PCRF sends a message to the old RCAF to explicitly release context at the old RCAF. + +### 6.1.16 Negotiation for future background data transfer + +The AF may contact the PCRF via the SCEF (and the Nt interface) to request a time window and related conditions for future background data transfer. + +NOTE 1: The SCEF may contact any PCRF in the operator network. + +The AF request shall contain an ASP identifier, the volume of data to be transferred per UE, the expected amount of UEs, the desired time window and optionally, network area information (e.g. list of cell ids, TAs/RAs). + +NOTE 2: A 3rd party application server is typically not able to provide any specific network area information and if so, the AF request is for the whole operator network. + +The PCRF shall first retrieve all existing transfer policies stored for any ASP from the SPR. Afterwards, the PCRF shall determine, based on the information provided by the AF and other available information (e.g. network policy, congestion level (if available), load status estimation for the required time window and network area, existing transfer policies) one or more transfer policies. + +A transfer policy consists of a recommended time window for the background data transfer, a reference to a charging rate for this time window and optionally a maximum aggregated bitrate (indicating that the charging according to the referenced charging rate is only applicable for the aggregated traffic of all involved UEs that stays below this value). Finally, the PCRF shall provide the transfer policies to the AF together with a reference ID. If the AF received more than one transfer policy, the AF shall select one of them and inform the PCRF about the selected transfer policy. + +NOTE 3: The maximum aggregated bitrate (optionally provided in a transfer policy) is not enforced in the network. The operator may apply offline CDRs processing (e.g. combining the accounted volume of the involved UEs for the time window) to determine whether the maximum aggregated bitrate for the set of UEs was exceeded by the ASP and charge the excess traffic differently. + +NOTE 4: It is assumed that the 3rd party application server is configured to understand the reference to a charging rate based on the agreement with the operator. + +The selected transfer policy is finally stored by the PCRF in the SPR together with the reference ID and the network area information. The same or a different PCRF can retrieve this transfer policy and the corresponding network area information from the SPR and take them into account for future decisions about transfer policies for background data related to the same or other ASPs. + +At the time the background data transfer is about to start, the AF provides for each UE the reference ID together with the AF session information to the PCRF (via the Rx interface). The PCRF retrieves the corresponding transfer policy from the SPR and derives the PCC rules for the background data transfer according to this transfer policy. + +NOTE 5: The AF will typically contact the PCRF for the individual UEs to request sponsored connectivity for the background data transfer. + +NOTE 6: A transfer policy is only valid until the end of its time window. The removal of outdated transfer policies from the SPR is up to implementation. + +## 6.1.17 Traffic Steering Control + +Traffic steering control is triggered by the PCRF initiated request and consists in applying a specific (S)Gi-LAN traffic steering policy for traffic detected based on application level information or service data flow level information for the purpose of steering the subscriber's selected traffic to appropriate (S)Gi-LAN service functions deployed by the operator or 3rd party service provider. + +The PCRF uses one or more pieces of information such as network operator's policies, user subscription, user's current RAT, network load status, application identifier, time of day, UE location, APN, related to the subscriber session and the application traffic as input for selecting a traffic steering policy. + +The PCRF controls traffic steering in the PCEF, TDF or TSSF by provisioning and modifying traffic steering control information. Traffic steering control information consists of a traffic description and a reference to a traffic steering policy that is configured in the PCEF, TDF or TSSF. + +The PCEF, TDF or TSSF performs necessary actions to enforce the traffic steering policy referenced by the PCRF. For enforcing the traffic steering policy, the PCEF, TDF or TSSF may support traffic steering related functions as defined by other standard organizations. The mechanism used for routing the traffic between the service functions within the (S)Gi-LAN, is out of 3GPP scope. + +The traffic steering control may be deployed using PCEF only, using TDF only, or using TSSF only, or using a combination of PCEF/TDF and TSSF. + +When a combination of PCEF/TDF with traffic steering control feature and TSSF is deployed, the PCEF/TDF is utilized for application detection and packet marking while traffic steering is done using TSSF. In this case the PCC/ADC Rules provided to the PCEF/TDF for application detection shall be at application level while the traffic steering control information provided to the TSSF for traffic detection and steering control shall be at service data flow level only, i.e. the Application identifier and Traffic steering policy identifier shall be included over Gx/Sd reference point for detection of the traffic and packet marking, and the Service data flow filter(s) and Traffic steering policy identifier shall be included over St reference point for traffic steering control. The value used for packet marking at the PCEF/TDF (according to the Traffic steering policy identifier received from the PCRF) shall be the same as the one within the Service data flow filter (using filter information described in clause 6.2.2.2) that is sent to the TSSF and used for traffic steering. Alternatively, the Application Identifier may be used for traffic detection at the TSSF. In this case the value used for packet marking at the PCEF/TDF (according to the Traffic steering policy identifier received from the PCRF) shall be the same as the one configured in the TSSF for that Application Identifier. + +NOTE 1: The above principle also enables a deployment scenario in which the PCEF/TDF acts as an uplink traffic classifier while the downlink traffic classifier, located in (S)Gi-LAN, acts only at service data flow filter level. This deployment scenario is applicable for applications with deducible service data flow filters only. In this case, the PCEF/TDF deduces the downlink service data flow description and communicates the related information to the downlink classifier. + +NOTE 2: The SDF filter(s) can be used for traffic detection at the TSSF when the PCEF/TDF is configured to do packet marking and forwarding using ToS or TC values in the IP header. The Application Identifier can be used when the PCEF/TDF is configured to do packet marking and forwarding using e.g. GRE or NSH. + +## 6.1.18 PCC support of NBIFOM + +### 6.1.18.1 General + +Clause 6.1.18 refers to Network Based IP Flow Mobility as described in TS 23.161 [43]. + +When PCC control for NBIFOM applies for an IP-CAN session: + +- Multiple IP-CAN types (3GPP EPS and Non 3GPP EPS) may be simultaneously associated with the same IP-CAN session. +- The PCRF sends PCC rules including NBIFOM related information as defined in clause 6.3.1. + - In UE-initiated NBIFOM mode this is based on Routing Rules received from the UE. + - For network-initiated NBIFOM mode, the PCRF determines the NBIFOM related information for a PCC rule as defined in clause 6.2.1.1 (including information about UE requested mapping of IP flows to an access, Change of usability of an Access). +- A change of access may trigger the modification of the charging key or the monitoring key in a PCC rule if access dependent charging or usage monitoring is required by the operator. +- The PCRF decides whether NBIFOM applies for the IP-CAN session, based on information about the support for NBIFOM received from the PCEF and operator policies that may take into account subscription information. +- The PCEF notifies the PCRF when an access is added or removed using the event trigger defined in clause 6.1.4. +- The PCEF notifies the PCRF when an access becomes Unusable or Usable again or when the move-to-WLAN or move-from-WLAN event occurs, both events are notified to the PCRF using the event trigger "Change of the usability of an access" as defined in clause 6.1.4. +- The PCRF may reject the NBIFOM Routing Rules received from the UE based on user subscription. + +In following conditions the PCRF mentioned above is the H-PCRF: + +- The UE is served by its HPLMN, or +- The PDN connection is served by a PGW in the Home PLMN (Home Routed roaming configuration), or +- The PDN connection is served by a PGW in the V-PLMN (LBO configuration), and S9 is deployed and the V-PCRF supports NBIFOM. In that case, the V-PCRF acts as a relay of information. + +The PCRF mentioned above is the V-PCRF in the case when, through roaming agreement, the HPLMN operator allows the VPLMN operator to operate the V-PCRF without S9; this includes authorization of roamers to use NBIFOM. In that case, network control related with subscription such as checking the total usage allowance does not apply. + +NOTE 1: If the Home operator wants to enforce control of the NBIFOM functionality on a PDN connection by the H-PCRF, the Home operator should ensure that the Home Routed roaming configuration applies to this PDN connection. + +NOTE 2: NBIFOM may be deployed without PCC support. This is defined in TS 23.161 [43]. + +In a multi access IP-CAN session, every PCC Rule is associated to one allowed access within the IP-CAN session. The information about the allowed access may be explicitly included in the PCC Rule, within the Allowed Access Type. Otherwise, the default NBIFOM access for the traffic on the IP-CAN session shall be applied as allowed access for a PCC rule. The bearer binding mechanism in the PCEF shall, in addition to the requirements defined in 6.1.1.4, ensure that a PCC Rule is associated to an IP-CAN bearer belonging to the allowed access. + +The PCEF may provide the following information for each access in a multi access IP-CAN session: + +- Location of the subscriber as defined in clauses A.4, H.3 and H.4. +- A serving PLMN identifier as defined in clauses A.4, H.3 and H.4. +- RAT type as defined in clauses A.4, H.3 and H.4. + +For the purpose of usage monitoring in the PCEF when NBIFOM applies for an IP-CAN session, the PCRF may receive an individual Monitoring key per access from SPR. + +## 6.1.18.2 NBIFOM impacts on IP-CAN procedures + +PCC support of NBIFOM requires following modifications to IP-CAN session procedures: + +- IP-CAN session establishment. + +During the IP-CAN session establishment, the PCEF informs the PCRF about the UE and network support of NBIFOM and the requested NBIFOM mode (defined in TS 23.161 [43]). The PCRF takes a policy decision on whether NBIFOM may apply to the IP-CAN session (the hPCRF decides the NBIFOM mode according to TS 23.161 [43]) and informs the PCEF about its decision. + +- Addition of an access. + +When the PCEF receives both a handover request and a NBIFOM indication from the UE, the PCEF initiates an IP-CAN Session Modification procedure, to: + +- Notify the PCRF about the addition of an access to the IP-CAN session together with the IP-CAN type and the RAT type of this access. If UE-initiated NBIFOM mode was selected at IP-CAN session establishment the notification contains also the default NBIFOM access selected by the UE. +- Notify the PCRF with the NBIFOM Routing Rules, if the UE included Routing Rules with the access addition request in UE-initiated NBIFOM mode. + +The PCRF takes policy decisions and communicates them to the PCEF: + +- The PCRF may reject the addition of the access if the multi-access IP-CAN session would correspond to an invalid combination of IP-CAN and RAT Types or is not allowed by the subscription. In this release of the specification the only allowed combination corresponds to the UE using a 3GPP access and a WLAN access. +- If network-initiated NBIFOM mode was selected at IP-CAN session establishment, the PCRF indicates the default NBIFOM access to the PCEF. +- In UE-initiated NBIFOM mode the PCRF verifies the default NBIFOM access provided by the UE. If it complies with the subscription the PCRF provides this default NBIFOM access to the PCEF. If not, the PCRF selects a different default NBIFOM access and provides it to the PCEF. +- In UE-initiated NBIFOM mode, the PCRF may receive NBIFOM Routing Rules created by the UE. The PCRF may reject a NBIFOM Routing Rule due to subscription limitations. Otherwise, the PCRF determines for each NBIFOM Routing Rule the impacted PCC rule and provides or modifies this PCC rule. +- The PCRF shall ensure that there is at least one PCC Rule that can be bound to the default bearer of each access. +- Removal of an access. + +When the PCEF is informed about the removal of an access of a multi-access IP-CAN session, the PCEF initiates an IP-CAN Session Modification procedure, to notify the PCRF about the removal of an access together with the IP-CAN type and the RAT type of this access. The PCRF determines the affected PCC rules and replies with updated PCC Rules or informs about the PCC Rules that are to be removed. + +The PCC rules corresponding to the removed access are then modified or deleted by the PCEF accordingly. This shall not trigger the sending of Routing Rules deletion to the UE in Network-initiated NBIFOM mode. + +NOTE 2: The UE deletes the Routing Rules locally in case of removal of access as described in TS 23.161 [43]. + +NOTE 3: The PCRF can also decide to trigger the removal of an access by updating or removing all PCC rules that are bound to this access. The removal of all PCC Rules bound to an access removes the access unless there are PCC Rules not known to the PCRF defined in the PCEF for this particular access. + +- Network-initiated IP flow mobility within a PDN connection (Network-initiated NBIFOM mode). + +When a multi-access IP-CAN session has been set-up in Network-initiated NBIFOM mode, the PCRF may at any time determine that flows should be moved from a source access to a target access. In that case, the PCRF provides updated PCC Rules with a modified Allowed Access Type and the Routing Rule Identifier using an IP-CAN Session Modification procedure (i.e. the Allowed Access Type can be added, changed or removed). + +The PCRF request triggers the sending of Routing Rules creation (when the Allowed Access Type is added) or Routing Rules modification (when the Allowed Access Type is changed) to the UE which may be rejected by the UE due to local radio conditions. In that case the PCRF gets notified which PCC rules cannot be modified. This notification from the PCEF contains an indication of the cause of the rejection received from the UE. + +The PCRF request triggers the sending of Routing Rules deletion to the UE when the Allowed Access Type is removed. + +- UE-initiated IP flow mobility within a PDN connection (UE-initiated NBIFOM mode). + +When the PCEF has received a request from the UE to create / modify / delete a Routing Rule, the PCEF initiates an IP-CAN Session Modification procedure and provides the Routing Rule received from the UE to the PCRF as an NBIFOM Routing Rule. The PCRF may reject an NBIFOM Routing Rule received from the UE due to subscription limitations. Otherwise the PCRF determines and updates the impacted PCC rule (as described in 6.12.2) and provides the updated PCC rule to the PCEF. + +- UE requested mapping of IP flows to an access (Network-initiated NBIFOM mode). + +This procedure is only used in Network-initiated NBIFOM mode when the UE wants to request the network to apply specific mappings of IP flows to an access. + +When the PCEF has received a request from the UE to have the network create / modify / delete a Routing Rule, the PCEF initiates an IP-CAN Session Modification procedure and provides the information received from the UE to the PCRF as an NBIFOM Routing Rule. The PCRF may reject an NBIFOM Routing Rule received from the UE due to subscription limitations. Otherwise the PCRF determines and updates the impacted PCC rule (as described in clause 6.12.2) and provides the updated PCC rule to the PCEF. The updated PCC rule triggers the sending of a Routing Rules creation / modification / deletion to the UE (as described above for Network-initiated IP flow mobility). + +- Indication that an access becomes unusable / usable again or indication of move-to-WLAN / move-from-WLAN (Network-initiated NBIFOM mode). + +The PCEF initiates an IP-CAN Session Modification procedure to notify the PCRF about the change of usability of an access to the PCRF. For every PCC rule that is currently bound to this access, the PCRF shall either change the Allowed Access Type and provide the updated PCC rule to the PCEF or remove this PCC rule. This triggers the sending of Routing Rules modification to the UE. If the PCRF receives an indication that an access become usable again, The PCRF may update the PCC rules, e.g. by changing the Allowed Access Type and provide the updated PCC rules to the PCEF. This triggers the sending of Routing Rules modification to the UE. + +- Reporting Access Network Information to the AF. + +The PCRF reports to the AF only Access Network Information associated with one access even though different media of the AF session are carried by different accesses. + +If the PCRF has received a request for Access Network Information from the AF and PCC rules related with the AF request are bound to multiple accesses, the PCRF selects one PCC rule to be associated with Access Network Information reporting from the PCEF. The selected PCC rule should correspond to the 3GPP access: Using the 3GPP access reduces the risk of getting non-trustable location information from the S2b access of the IP-CAN session. + +- UE resource request for a multi-access IP-CAN session. + +When the UE wants to request the network to allocate resources for one or more IP flows in the non-default NBIFOM access, the UE shall provide a corresponding Routing Rule in the same request in the UE-initiated mode. Without such Routing Rule, the network shall reject the UE resource request. + +NOTE 4: UE resource requests in the default NBIFOM access do not require a Routing Rule as the generated PCC rule will be bound to dedicated bearer in this access. + +- PCRF initiated IP-CAN session modification. + +When network-initiated NBIFOM mode applies and the PCRF modifies the service data flow filter or precedence in a PCC rule for which a corresponding Routing Rule exists, the PCEF shall also modify this Routing Rule at the UE accordingly. + +When network-initiated NBIFOM mode applies and the PCRF removes a PCC rule for which a corresponding Routing Rule exists, the PCEF shall also remove the corresponding Routing Rule at the UE. + +When UE-initiated NBIFOM mode applies and if a new PCC rule is created due to the request from the network (e.g. request from the AF or application detection information from the PCEF/TDF), the PCRF shall determine + +that the new PCC rule is bound to the default access. UE may initiate IP flow mobility request to bind the IP flow to another access later. + +## 6.1.19 Resource reservation for services sharing priority + +To enable the usage of the same bearer, an AF may indicate to the PCRF that a media flow of an AF session is allowed to use the same priority as media flows belonging to other AF sessions (instead of the service priority provided for this media flow). In this case, the AF will provide a priority sharing indicator in addition to the application identifier and the service priority. For MCPTT, the service priority and the priority sharing indicator are defined in TS 23.179 [46]. The priority sharing indicator is used to indicate what media flows are allowed to share priority. + +The PCRF makes authorization and policy decisions for the affected AF sessions individually and generates a PCC/QoS rule for every media flow as specified in clause 6.1.1.3. The application identifier and the service priority are used to calculate the ARP priority. The AF may also provide suggested pre-emption capability and vulnerability values per media flow to the PCRF. The ARP pre-emption capability and the ARP pre-emption vulnerability are set according to operator policies and regulatory requirements, also taking into consideration the application identifier and suggested values, when provided by the AF. The priority sharing indicator is stored for later use. + +For PCC/QoS rules with the same QCI assigned and having an associated priority sharing indicator, the PCRF shall try to make authorization and policy decisions taking the priority sharing indicator into account and modify the ARP of these PCC/QoS rules as follows, (the original ARP values are stored for later use): + +- The modified ARP priority is set to the highest of the original priority among all the PCC/QoS rules that include the priority sharing indicator; +- The modified ARP pre-emption capability is set if any of the original PCC/QoS rules have the ARP pre-emption capability set; +- The modified ARP pre-emption vulnerability is set if all the original PCC/QoS rules have the ARP pre-emption vulnerability set. + +NOTE 1: Having the same setting for the ARP parameter in the PCC/QoS rules with the priority sharing indicator set enables the usage of the same bearer. Furthermore, a combined modification of the ARP parameter in the PCC/QoS rules ensures that a bearer modification is triggered when a media flow with higher service priority starts. + +If the PCRF receives an indication that a PCC/QoS rule provisioning or modification failed (due to resource reservation failure) then, the PCRF may apply pre-emption and remove active PCC/QoS rules from the PCEF and then retry the PCC/QoS rule provisioning or modification procedure. If the PCRF does not apply pre-emption, the AF is notified using existing procedures (as defined in clause 6.1.5) that the resource reservation for the new media flow failed. + +The AF may optionally provide pre-emption control information, including pre-emption capability and vulnerability values, in addition to the priority sharing indicator to the PCRF. If so, the PCRF shall apply pre-emption and remove active PCC/QoS rules according to this information when receiving an indication that a PCC/QoS rule provisioning or modification failed. The pre-emption control information indicates: + +- whether media flows sharing priority are candidates to being pre-empted taking into account pre-emption capability and vulnerability values; +- how to perform pre-emption among multiple potential media flow candidates of same priority: most recently added media flow, least recently added media flow, media flow with highest requested bandwidth in the AF request. + +## 6.1.20 Management of Packet Flow Descriptions using the PFDF + +The Management of Packet Flow Descriptions (PFDs) enables the PCEF and TDF to perform accurate application detection when PFDs are provided by an ASP (via the SCEF and the PFDF) and then to apply enforcement actions as instructed in the PCC/ADC Rule. + +The operator is able to configure pre-defined PCC/ADC Rules in the PCEF/TDF or dynamic PCC/ADC Rules in the PCRF that include at least an application identifier for service data flow or application detection, charging control information, i.e. charging key and optionally the Sponsor identifier or the ASP identifier or both. Depending on the service level agreements between the operator and the Application Server Provider, it may be possible for the ASP to + +provide individual PFDs or the full set of PFDs for each application identifier maintained by the ASP to the PCEF/TDF via the SCEF and the PFDF. The PFDs become part of the application detection filters in the PCEF/TDF and therefore are used as part of the logic to detect traffic generated by an application. The ASP may remove or modify some or all of the PFDs which have been provisioned previously for one or more application identifiers. When a removed/modified PFD was used to detect application traffic related to an application identifier in a PCC/ADC Rule of an IP-CAN/TDF session and the PCEF/TDF has reported the application start as described in clause 4.5 to the PCRF for the application instance corresponding to this PFD, the PCEF/TDF shall report the application stop to the PCRF for the corresponding application instance identifier if the removed/modified PFD in PCEF/TDF results in that the stop of the application instance is not being able to be detected. + +NOTE 1: The management of Packet Flow Descriptions is optional, and is only used if the PFDF is deployed and the PCEF or the TDF supports this feature. + +Each PFD may be identified by a PFD id. A PFD id is unique in the scope of a particular application identifier. There may be different PFD types associated to an application identifier, see TS 23.682 [42] for the definition of PFD. + +The PFDs may be retrieved by PCEF/TDF from PFDF in "pull" mode or may be provisioned from PFDF to the PCEF/TDF in "push" mode. + +When the "push" mode is used, the PFDF distributes PFDs for each application identifier to those PCEFs/TDFs that enable access to those applications. The PFDF may be configured with the list of PCEFs/TDFs where PFDs should be distributed. There are three methods to provision PFDs from the PFDF to the PCEF/TDF, as described in clause 7.12.2: + +- a) Push of whole PFDF state according to operator configuration in PFDF (e.g., provision per day according to operator configuration); +- b) Selective push of an ASP change in the PFD set (i.e. ASP changes the PFD set while operator configuration defines when to push); +- c) Selective push of an ASP change in the PFD set according to ASP request (i.e. ASP indicates to push changes in a PFD set within the time interval indicated by the Allowed Delay as described in TS 23.682 [42]). + +NOTE 2: In all cases listed above, how to protect the PCEF/TDF from overload during the procedure to provision PFDs is up to Stage 3. + +The SCEF may be configured with a minimum allowed delay based on SLA to authorize the allowed delay provided by the ASP, as defined in TS 23.682 [42]. + +When the "pull" mode is used, at the time a PCC/ADC Rule with an application identifier for which PFDs provisioned by the PFDF are not available is activated or provisioned, the PCEF/TDF requests all PFDs for that application identifier from the PFDF. The PFDs retrieved for an application identifier from the PFDF are cached in the PCEF/TDF with an associated caching timer to control how long the PFDs are valid. When the caching timer elapses, if there are still active PCC/ADC rules that refer to the corresponding application identifier, the PCEF/TDF reloads the PFD(s) from the PFDF. When the PCEF/TDF removes the last PCC/ADC rule that refers to the corresponding application identifier, or when the caching timer expires and no PCC/ADC rule refers to the application identifier, the PCEF/TDF may remove the PFD(s) related with the application identifier. + +NOTE 3: It is assumed that all PCEF(s)/TDF(s) and PFDF(s) in an operator network are configured with the same default caching time value to be applied for all application identifiers. + +Within one PLMN, "push" mode only, "pull" mode only, or a combination of "pull" and "push" mode may be supported if the feature is supported. + +When the "pull" mode is used, the PFDF may provide to the PCEF/TDF a caching time value per application identifier. The PCEF/TDF receives the caching time value together with the PFD(s) from the PFDF over Gw/Gwn and applies this value for the application identifier instead of the configured default caching time value. In case no caching time value is received from PFDF, the PCEF/TDF uses the configured default caching time value. + +NOTE 4: The configuration of a caching time value per application identifier PFDF is based on the SLA between the operator and the ASP. + +When only "pull" mode is supported in one PLMN, if the Allowed Delay is shorter than the caching time value stored for this application identifier, or shorter than the default caching time if no application-specific caching time is stored, the PFDF sends a response to SCEF with an indication that the Allowed Delay cannot be met. The PFDF may still store the PFD(s) and if so, indicate this to the SCEF. The PFDF shall also include the caching time value in the response to + +the SCEF. The SCEF shall forward the indication that the PFDF stored the PFD(s) (if available) and the caching time value to the ASP when informing that the Allowed Delay could not be met. + +If the PFDs are managed by local O&M procedures, PFD retrieval is not used; otherwise, the PFDs retrieved from PFDF overrides any PFDs pre-configured in the PCEF/TDF. If all PFDs retrieved from the PFDF are removed for an application identifier, the pre-configured PFDs shall be applied again for the application identifier. The PCEF/TDF may differentiate the need for PFD retrieval based on operator configuration in the PCEF/TDF. + +The AF requests including an application identifier may trigger the activation or provisioning of a PCC/ADC Rule in the PCEF/TDF by the PCRF based on operator policies. + +## 6.1.21 3GPP PS Data Off + +This feature, when activated by the user, prevents downlink traffic and may prevent uplink traffic via 3GPP access except for 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services. + +NOTE 1: Preventing uplink packets that don't belong to 3GPP Data Off Exempt Services in PDN GW implies that the exempt uplink packets in the UE have traversed the Serving GW but get dropped in the PDN GW. If this happens, it's not possible to verify accounting information collected at the Serving GW for inter-operator charging. However, the subscriber may not be charged for those packets. + +The 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services are a set of operator services, defined in TS 22.011 [49], that are the only allowed services in downlink direction when the 3GPP PS Data Off feature has been activated by the user. + +When PCRF is deployed, it shall be configured with the list of 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services and the event trigger of 3GPP PS Data Off status change is used to inform the PCRF about every change of the 3GPP PS Data Off status. + +NOTE 2: The PCRF can be configured with a list of 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services per APN. The list of 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services for an APN can also be empty, or can allow for any service within that APN, according to operator policy. + +NOTE 3: The PCRF can be configured with up to two lists of 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services for UEs in HPLMN and for UEs camping in any VPLMNs using mechanism as specified in clause 6.2.1.1. + +NOTE 4: For the PDN connection used for IMS services, the 3GPP Data Off Exempt Services are enforced in the IMS domain as specified TS 23.228 [39]. Policies configured in the PCRF need to ensure that IMS services are allowed when the 3GPP Data Off status of the UE is set to "activated", e.g. by treating any service within a well-known IMS APN as 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services. + +When the PCRF is informed about the activation of 3GPP PS Data Off, it shall update the PCC rules in such a way that only packets for services belonging to the list of 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services are forwarded while all other packets are discarded. + +NOTE 5: In order for the PCEF to prevent the services that do not belong to the list of 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services, if the services are controlled by dynamic PCC rules, the PCRF could modify the PCC rules by setting the gate status to "closed" for the downlink and optionally uplink directions in all active dynamic PCC rules or remove those dynamic PCC rules. If the services are controlled by predefined PCC rules, the PCRF can deactivate those predefined PCC rules. PCC rule with wild-carded service data flow filters can be among the PCC rules that are modified, removed or deactivated in that manner. In this case, it can be necessary that the PCRF at the same time installs or activates PCC rules for data-off exempt services. + +NOTE 6: For example, four PCC rules (A, B, C, D) are active for a PDN connection with PCC rule A representing a 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Service. When 3GPP PS Data Off is activated, the PCRF could either modify PCC rules B, C and D if they are dynamic PCC rules by closing the gate in downlink and optionally in uplink direction or remove/deactivate PCC rules B, C and D if they are predefined PCC rules. PCC rule A does not need to be changed as it represents 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Service. Assuming that PCC rule B contained wild-carded service data flow filters which has enabled some 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Service is removed or deactivated, an additional PCC rule E can be installed or activated as well to enable the downlink traffic for that 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Service. + +NOTE 7: The network configuration can ensure that at least one PCC Rule is bound to the default bearer when Data Off is activated in order to avoid deletion of an existing PDN connection or in order not to fail a PDN connection establishment. + +When the PCRF receives service information from the AF, in addition to what is specified in clause 6.2.1.0, PCRF shall check if the requested service information belongs to the 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services. If the requested service belongs to 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services, PCRF shall continue as specified in clause 6.2.1.0. If the requested service doesn't belong to the 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services, PCRF shall reject the service request. + +When the PCRF is informed about the deactivation of 3GPP PS Data Off, it shall perform policy control decision as specified in clause 6.2.1.0 and perform PCC rule operations as specified in clause 6.3.2.2 to make sure that the services are allowed according to user's subscription and operator policy (irrespective of whether they belong to the list of 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services). + +When PCRF is not deployed, predefined PCC rules, as example, can be configured in the PCEF to ensure the following: + +- when the PCEF is informed about activation of 3GPP PS Data Off, only packets for services belonging to the list of 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services are forwarded while all other packets are discarded. The list of 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services for UEs camping in HPLMN and the list of 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services for UEs camping in VPLMN can be different, and +- When PCEF is informed about deactivation of 3GPP PS Data Off, downlink packets are forwarded according to the operator policy for the subscriber. + +NOTE 8: For example, the PCEF can be configured with three sets of predefined PCC rules: one set for UEs with 3GPP PS Data Off status "inactive", the second set for UE camping in the HPLMN with 3GPP PS Data Off status "active", and the third set for UEs camping in the VPLMN with 3GPP PS Data Off status "active". The set of predefined PCC rules for UE 3GPP PS Data Off status "active" can be equivalent to the set of predefined PCC rules for UE 3GPP PS Data Off status "inactive" with the following two differences: All services belonging to the list of 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services can be represented by PCC rule(s) which allows the traffic to pass while in all other PCC rules (not belonging to the list of 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services) the gate status can be "closed" for the downlink direction. When the PCEF is informed about the change of UE 3GPP PS Data Off status, it can replace the currently active set of predefined PCC rules with the other set of predefined PCC rules. + +When the UE 3GPP PS Data Off status is "active" and a handover from one access-system to another occurs, the PCRF performs the above operations so that the downlink traffic for services not belonging to the list of 3GPP PS Data Off Exempt Services is only prevented via the 3GPP access. + +When NBIFOM applies for the IP-CAN session, the PCRF shall not modify PCC rules associated to the IP-CAN type "Non 3GPP EPS". + +## 6.2 Functional entities + +### 6.2.1 Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) + +#### 6.2.1.0 General + +The PCRF encompasses policy control decision and flow based charging control functionalities. + +The PCRF provides network control regarding the service data flow detection, gating, QoS and flow based charging (except credit management) towards the PCEF and/or TDF. + +The PCRF provides network control regarding the application detection, gating, QoS and application based charging (except credit management) towards the TDF and the PCEF enhanced with ADC. + +The PCRF shall apply the security procedures, as required by the operator, before accepting service information from the AF. + +The PCRF shall decide whether application traffic detection is applicable, as per operator policies, based on user profile configuration, received within subscription information. + +The PCRF shall decide how certain service/application traffic shall be treated in the PCEF and in the TDF, if applicable, and ensure that the PCEF user plane traffic mapping and treatment is in accordance with the user's subscription profile. + +If Gxx applies, the PCRF shall provide QoS rules with identical service data flow templates as provided to the PCEF in the PCC rules. If the service data flow is tunnelled at the BBERF, the PCRF shall provide the BBERF with information received from the PCEF to enable the service data flow detection in the mobility tunnel at the BBERF. In case 2a, defined in clause 7.1, the PCRF may also provide to the BBERF the charging ID information received from the PCEF. If IP flow mobility as specified in TS 23.261 [23] applies, the PCRF shall, based on IP flow mobility routing rules received from the PCEF, provide the authorized QoS rules to the applicable BBERF as specified in clause 6.1.1.3. + +The PCRF should for an IP-CAN session derive, from IP-CAN specific restrictions, operator policy and SPR data, the list of permitted QoS class identifiers and associated GBR and MBR limits for the IP-CAN session. + +The PCRF may check that the service information provided by the AF is consistent with both the operator defined policy rules and the related subscription information as received from the SPR during IP-CAN session establishment before storing the service information. The service information shall be used to derive the QoS for the service. The PCRF may reject the request received from the AF when the service information is not consistent with either the related subscription information or the operator defined policy rules and as a result the PCRF shall indicate that this service information is not covered by the subscription information or by operator defined policy rules and may indicate, in the response to the AF, the service information that can be accepted by the PCRF (e.g. the acceptable bandwidth). In the absence of other policy control mechanisms outside the scope of PCC, it is recommended that the PCRF include this information in the response. + +When receiving service information from the AF, the PCRF may temporarily reject the AF request (e.g. if the service information is not consistent with the operator defined policy rules for the congestion status of the user). To temporarily reject the AF request the PCRF shall indicate a re-try interval to the AF. When receiving a re-try interval from the PCRF the AF shall not send the same service information to the PCRF again (for the same IP-CAN session) until the re-try interval has elapsed. + +NOTE 1: How the PCRF derives the re-try interval is up to implementation. + +In this Release, the PCRF supports only a single Rx reference point, i.e. there is one AF for each AF session. + +The PCRF authorizes QoS resources. The PCRF uses the service information received from the AF (e.g. SDP information or other available application information) and/or the subscription information received from the SPR to calculate the proper QoS authorization (QoS class identifier, bitrates). The PCRF may also take into account the requested QoS received from the PCEF via Gx interface. + +NOTE 2: The PCRF provides always the maximum values for the authorized QoS even if the requested QoS is lower than what can be authorized. + +The Authorization of QoS resources shall be based on complete service information unless the PCRF is required to perform the authorization of QoS resources based on incomplete service information. The PCRF shall after receiving the complete service information, update the affected PCC rules accordingly. + +The PCRF may use the subscription information as basis for the policy and charging control decisions. The subscription information may apply for both session based and non-session based services. + +The PCRF determines whether a Gx session from the PCEF is to be linked with a Gateway Control Session from the BBERF by matching the IPv4 address and/or IPv6 network prefix and conditionally the UE Identity, PDN Connection ID and PDN ID towards open Gateway Control Sessions. When IP flow mobility as specified in TS 23.261 [23] applies, one Gx session may be linked with multiple Gateway Control Sessions. + +If the BBERF does not provide any PDN ID at the Gateway Control Session Establishment, then the PCRF maintains Gateway Control Session to Gx session linking to the Gx sessions where the assigned CoA and UE Identity (if available over Gxx) are equal. The PCRF and BBERF shall be capable of separating information for each IP-CAN session within the common Gateway Control Session. + +If the BBERF provides a PDN ID at the Gateway Control Session Establishment, then the PCRF maintains Gateway Control Session to Gx session linking where the UE identity and PDN ID are equal. If the BBERF provides a PDN ID at Gateway Control Session establishment, it may also indicate in the Gateway Control Session establishment that the PCRF shall not attempt linking the new Gateway Control Session with an existing Gx session immediately. If the PCRF receives such an indication, it keeps the new Gateway Control Session pending and defers linking until an IP-CAN session establishment or an IP-CAN session modification with matching UE Identity, PDN ID and IP-CAN type arrives via Gx. + +If the BBERF provides a PDN ID and a PDN Connection ID at the Gateway Control Session establishment, then the PCRF maintains Gateway Control Session to Gx session linking where the UE identity, PDN Connection ID and PDN ID are equal. + +When a BBERF establishes multiple Gateway Control Sessions for the same PDN ID and the IP-CAN type changes, the PCRF assumes that this constitutes inter-system BBERF relocations of existing Gateway Control Sessions. The BBERF may supply UE IPv4 address and/or IPv6 network prefix (if known) that can be used for linking the new Gateway Control Session to the existing Gx session. If the UE IPv4 address and/or IPv6 network prefix is/are not provided in the new Gateway Control Session establishment, the PCRF shall defer the linking with existing Gx session until receiving an IP-CAN Session modification with matching UE Identity, IP-CAN type, PDN Connection ID, and PDN ID. + +The PCRF determines which case applies as described on clause 7.1. + +If an AF requests the PCRF to report on the signalling path status, for the AF session, the PCRF shall, upon indication of loss of resources from the PCEF, for PCC rules corresponding to the signalling traffic notify the AF on changes to the signalling path status. The PCRF needs to have the knowledge of which PCC rules identify signalling traffic. + +Negotiation of IP-CAN bearer establishment mode takes place via Gx for 3GPP IP-CANs. For non-3GPP IP-CANs specified in TS 23.402 [18] negotiation of bearer establishment mode takes place via Gx when GTP is used and via Gxx for the rest of the cases. For other accesses supporting multiple IP-CAN bearer establishment modes, if Gxx applies, the negotiation takes place via Gxx, otherwise via Gx. To support the different IP-CAN bearer establishment modes (UE-only or UE/NW) the PCRF shall: + +- shall set the IP-CAN bearer establishment mode for the IP-CAN session based on operator configuration, network and UE capabilities; +- shall, if the bearer establishment mode is UE/NW, decide what mode (UE or NW) shall apply for a PCC rule and resolve race conditions between for requests between UE-initiated and NW-initiated requests; + +NOTE 3: For an operator-controlled service, the UE and the PCRF may be provisioned with information indicating which mode is to be used. + +- may reject a UE request that is already served by a NW-initiated procedure in progress. When rejecting a UE-initiated request by sending a reject indication, the PCRF shall use an appropriate cause value which shall be delivered to the UE. + +NOTE 4: This situation may e.g. occur if the PCRF has already triggered a NW-initiated procedure that corresponds to the UE request. + +- guarantee the precedence of dynamic PCC rules with SDF template containing SDF filter(s) (and optionally also for SDF templates consisting of an application identifier) for network controlled services in the service data flow detection process at the PCEF by setting the PCC rule precedence information to appropriate values. + +If an AF requests the PCRF to report on the change of type of IP-CAN, the PCRF shall provide to the AF the information about the IP-CAN type the user is currently using and upon indication of change of IP-CAN type, notify the AF on changes of the type of IP-CAN. In the case of 3GPP IP-CAN, the information of the Radio Access Technology Type (e.g. UTRAN) shall be also reported to the AF. If IP flow mobility as specified in TS 23.161 [43] or in TS 23.261 [23] applies, the PCRF shall provide to the AF the new IP-CAN type information together with the affected service information. When IP flow mobility is allowed within an IP-CAN session, the PCRF shall only report to an AF the IP-CAN type change when the IP flow mobility applies to the service information provided by this AF. + +If an AF requests the PCRF to report Access Network Information, the PCRF shall set the Access Network Information report parameters in the corresponding PCC rule(s) or QoS rule(s) and provision them together with the corresponding event trigger to the PCEF or BBERF as per procedure in clause 7.4.2. For those PCC rule(s) or QoS rule(s) based on preliminary service information the PCRF may assign the QCI and ARP of the default bearer to avoid signalling to the UE. In addition the SDF filter(s) shall not be marked as to be used for signalling to the UE as traffic mapping information. + +NOTE 5: The PCRF can also use the dynamic or pre-defined PCC Rules related to the IMS signalling to request Access Network Information reporting. This can be used to support e.g., regulatory requirements for SMS over IP, where the IMS network (i.e. P-CSCF) needs to retrieve the user location and/or UE Time Zone information. Note that due to regulatory requirements, the Access Network Information can be requested for SMS over IP, impacting a large number of PDN Connections, that can lead to significant increase in signalling load when the Access Network Information is requested from the Access Node (e.g. MME). + +If an AF requests the PCRF to report Access Network Information, The PCRF shall also set the corresponding event trigger to the PCEF or BBERF as per procedure in clause 7.4.2. The PCRF shall, upon receiving the subsequent Access Network Information report corresponding to the AF session from the PCEF or BBERF, forward the Access Network Information as requested by the AF. + +If an AF requests the PCRF to report the PLMN identifier where the UE is currently located, then the PCRF shall provide the PLMN identifier to the AF if available. Otherwise, the PCRF shall provision both the corresponding PCC rules and QoS Rules if applicable, and the event trigger to report PLMN change to the PCEF. The PCRF shall, upon receiving of the PLMN identifier from the PCEF forward this information to the AF as defined in the procedures in clause 6.1.4. + +If an AF requests the PCRF to report Access Network Charging Correlation Information, the PCRF shall provide to the AF the Access Network Charging Correlation Information, which will identify the usage reports that include measurement for the flows, once the Access Network Charging Correlation Information is known at the PCRF. If not known in advance, the PCRF subscribes for the Access Network Charging Correlation Information event for the applicable PCC rule(s), unless a single charging identifier per IP-CAN session is used as described below. + +The PCEF provides at IP-CAN session establishment both a charging identifier and an optional indication that the charging identifier is the only one for that IP-CAN session, as defined in TS 32.251 [9] clause 5.1.3. In absence of the indication there is a separate charging identifier for each IP-CAN bearer to identify usage reports that include measurements for flows served by each individual bearer. When the PCEF indicates that a single charging identifier is used for the IP-CAN session, the PCRF uses the charging identifier received at IP-CAN session establishment to provide Access Charging Correlation information to the AF for all flows, instead of subscribing to the Access Network Charging Correlation Information event trigger for the applicable PCC Rule(s) as described above. + +If Gxx applies and the PCEF provided information about required event triggers, the PCRF shall provide these event triggers to the BBERF and notify the PCEF of the outcome of the provisioning procedure by using the PCRF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification procedure, as defined in clause 7.4.2. The PCRF shall include the parameter values received in the response from the BBERF in the notification to the PCEF. When multiple BBERFs exist (e.g. in IP flow mobility case), the PCEF may subscribe to different or common set of event triggers at different BBERFs; when the PCRF receives event notification from any BBERF, the PCRF shall include both the parameters values received from the BBERF and also the information for identifying the BBERF in the notification to the PCEF. + +If Sd applies and the TDF provided information about required event triggers, the PCRF shall provide these event triggers to the PCEF or BBERF, if Gxx applies, and notify the TDF of the outcome of the provisioning procedure within the PCEF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification procedure, as defined in clause 7.4.1. The PCRF shall include the parameter values, received in the response from the PCEF/BBERF, in the notification to the TDF. The relevant Event Triggers are: PLMN change, Location change, Change in type of IP-CAN, RAT type change, SGSN change, Serving GW change, User CSG Information change in CSG cell, User CSG Information change in subscribed hybrid cell, User CSG Information change in un-subscribed hybrid cell, Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area. + +NOTE 6: For IP flow mobility feature enabled, the TDF doesn't have accurate information about the location and the type of RAT the user is attached to. + +When the PCRF gets an event report from the BBERF that is required by the PCEF, the PCRF shall forward this event report to the PCEF. + +When the PCRF gets an Event Report from the PCEF/BBERF that is required by the TDF, the PCRF shall forward this Event Report to the TDF. + +The PCRF may support usage monitoring control. Usage is defined as either volume or time of user plane traffic. + +The PCRF may receive information about total allowed usage per PDN and UE from the SPR, i.e. the overall amount of allowed resources (based either on traffic volume and/or traffic time) that are to be monitored for the PDN connections of a user. In addition information about total allowed usage for Monitoring key(s) per PDN and UE may also be received from the SPR. For the purpose of usage monitoring per access type, the PCRF receives an individual Monitoring key per access type from SPR. + +For the purpose of usage monitoring control the PCRF shall request the Usage report trigger and provide the necessary usage threshold(s), either volume threshold, time threshold, or both volume threshold and time threshold, upon which the requested node (PCEF or TDF) shall report to the PCRF. The PCRF shall decide if and when to activate usage monitoring to the PCEF and TDF. + +The PCRF may provide a Monitoring time to the PCEF/TDF for the Monitoring key(s) and optionally specify a subsequent threshold value for the usage after the Monitoring time. + +If the PCEF reports usage before the Monitoring time is reached, the Monitoring time is not retained by the PCEF. Therefore the PCRF may again provide a Monitoring time and optionally the subsequent threshold value for the usage after the Monitoring time in the response. + +It shall be possible for the PCRF to request a usage report from the requested node (PCEF or TDF). + +NOTE 7: The PCRF ensures that the number of requests/following policy decisions provided over Gx/Sd reference point do not cause excessive signalling load by e.g. assigning the same time for the report only for a preconfigured number of IP-CAN/TDF sessions. + +Once the PCRF receives a usage report from the requested node (PCEF or TDF) the PCRF shall deduct the value of the usage report from the totally allowed usage for that PDN and UE (in case usage per IP-CAN session is reported). If usage is reported from the TDF or the PCEF, the PCRF shall deduct the value of the usage report from the totally allowed usage for individual Monitoring key(s) for that PDN and UE (in case of usage for one or several Monitoring keys is reported). + +NOTE 8: The PCRF maintains usage thresholds for each Monitoring key and IP-CAN session that is active for a certain PDN and UE. Updating the total allowed usage after the PCEF reporting, minimizes the risk of exceeding the usage allowance. + +If the PCEF or TDF reports usage for a certain Monitoring key and if monitoring shall continue for that Monitoring key then the PCRF shall provide new threshold value(s) in the response to the PCEF or TDF respectively. If Monitoring time and subsequent threshold value are used then the PCRF provides them to the PCEF or TDF as well. + +The PCRF may provide a new volume threshold and/or a new time threshold to the PCEF or TDF, the new threshold values overrides the existing threshold values in the PCEF or TDF. + +If monitoring shall no longer continue for that Monitoring key, then the PCRF shall not provide a new threshold in the response to the PCEF / TDF. + +NOTE 9: If the PCRF decides to deactivate all PCC rules or ADC rules associated with a certain Monitoring key, then the conditions defined in clause 6.6.2 for continued Monitoring will no longer be fulfilled for that Monitoring key. + +If all IP-CAN session of a user to the same APN is terminated, the PCRF shall store the remaining allowed usage, i.e. the information about the remaining overall amount of resources, in the SPR. + +The PCRF may authorise an application service provider to request specific PCC decisions (e.g. authorisation to request sponsored IP flows, authorisation to request QoS resources). For sponsored data connectivity (see Annex N), the PCRF may receive a usage threshold from the AF. + +If the AF specifies a usage threshold, the PCRF shall use the Sponsor Identity to construct a Monitoring key for monitoring the volume, time, or both volume and time of user plane traffic, and invoke usage monitoring on the PCEF/TDF. The PCRF shall notify the AF when the PCEF/TDF reports that a usage threshold for the Monitoring key is reached provided that the AF requests to be notified for this event. If the usage threshold is reached, the AF may terminate the AF session or provide a new usage threshold to the PCRF. Alternatively, the AF may allow the session to continue without specifying a usage threshold. If the AF decides to allow the session to continue without specifying a usage threshold, then monitoring in the PCEF/TDF shall be discontinued for that monitoring key by the PCRF, unless there are other reasons for continuing the monitoring. + +If the AF revokes the service information and the AF has notified previously a usage threshold to the PCRF, the PCRF shall report the usage up to the time of the revocation of service authorization. + +If the IP-CAN session terminates and the AF has specified a usage threshold then the PCRF shall notify the AF of the accumulated usage (i.e. either volume, or time, or both volume and time) of user plane traffic since the last usage report. + +The PCRF performs authorizations based on sponsored data connectivity profiles stored in the SPR. If the AF is in the operator's network and is based on the OSA/Parlay-X GW (TS 23.198 [24]), the PCRF is not required to verify that a trust relationship exists between the operator and the sponsors. + +If the H-PCRF detects that the UE is accessing the sponsored data connectivity in the roaming scenario with home routed access, it may allow the sponsored data connectivity in the service authorization request, reject the service authorization request, or initiate the AF session termination based on home operator policy. + +NOTE 10: Sponsored data connectivity is not supported in the roaming with visited access scenario in this Release. + +If the AF request includes an AF application identifier then, based on the operator policies the PCRF may trigger the activation of a predefined PCC/ADC Rule or provide a dynamic PCC/ADC rule with an appropriate application identifier in the PCEF/TDF. + +For the solicited application reporting, it is PCRF's responsibility to coordinate the PCC rules and QoS rules, if applicable, with ADC rules in order to ensure consistent service delivery. + +The PCRF uses the information relating to subscriber spending available in the OCS as input for policy decisions related to e.g. QoS control, gating or charging conditions. + +The PCRF uses the RUCI received from the RCAF as input for policy decisions. + +If the AF contacts the PCRF via the SCEF (and the Nt interface) to request a time window and related conditions for future background data transfer, the PCRF shall determine possible transfer policies (as described in clause 6.1.16) and send them to the AF together with a reference ID. If the AF received more than one transfer policy, the AF selects one of them and informs the PCRF about the selected transfer policy. The PCRF shall store the selected transfer policy in the SPR together with the reference ID and the network area information. Whenever the PCRF receives a reference ID from the AF during a subsequent transfer of AF session information (via the Rx interface), the PCRF shall retrieve the corresponding transfer policy from the SPR and apply it as one of the inputs for policy decisions for this IP-CAN session. + +The PCRF uses one or more pieces of information defined in the clause 6.2.1.1 as input for the selection of traffic steering policies used to control the steering of the subscriber's traffic to appropriate (S)Gi-LAN service functions. + +NOTE 11: In order to allow the PCRF to select and provision an application based traffic steering policy, the reporting of detected applications to the PCRF or any other information such as the RAT type, the RUCI etc. defined in clause 6.2.1.1 can be used. + +At reception of the IMS service information from the P-CSCF, if configured through policy, the PCRF determines the Maximum Packet Loss Rate for UL and DL based on the IMS service information and taking into account information defined in TS 26.114 [45] and sends it to PCEF along with the PCC rule for the voice media. + +NOTE 12: Based on local configuration, the PCRF sets the Maximum Packet Loss Rate (UL, DL) corresponding to either the most robust codec configuration (e.g., codec, mode, redundancy) or the least robust codec configuration of the negotiated set in each direction. + +### 6.2.1.1 Input for PCC decisions + +The PCRF shall accept input for PCC decision-making from the PCEF, the BBERF if present, the TDF if present, the SPR and if the AF is involved, from the AF, as well as the PCRF may use its own predefined information. These different nodes should provide as much information as possible to the PCRF. At the same time, the information below describes examples of the information provided. Depending on the particular scenario all the information may not be available or is already provided to the PCRF. + +The PCEF and/or BBERF may provide the following information: + +- Subscriber Identifier; +- The IMEI(SV) of the UE; +- IPv4 address of the UE; +- IPv6 network prefix assigned to the UE; +- NBIFOM Routing Rules (when NBIFOM as specified in TS 23.161 [43] applies); +- IP flow routing information (when IP flow mobility as specified in TS 23.261 [23] applies); + +NOTE 1: IP flow routing information and NBIFOM Routing Rules are provided only by the PCEF. + +- Change of usability of an Access (when NBIFOM as specified in TS 23.161 [43] applies); +- IP-CAN bearer attributes; + +NOTE 2: If IP flow mobility as specified in TS 23.161 [43] or in TS 23.261 [23] applies, an IP-CAN session may be active over multiple accesses and thus some IP-CAN bearer attributes may have a different value depending on the access type; + +- Request type (initial, modification, etc.); +- Type of IP-CAN (e.g. GPRS, etc.); + +NOTE 3: The Type of IP-CAN parameter should allow extension to include new types of accesses. + +- Location of the subscriber; + +NOTE 4: See clause 6.1.4 for the description of this location information. + +NOTE 5: Depending on the type of IP-CAN, the limited update rate for the location information at the PCEF may lead to a UE moving outside the area indicated in the detailed location information without notifying the PCEF. + +- A PDN ID; +- A PLMN identifier; +- IP-CAN bearer establishment mode; +- 3GPP PS Data Off status. + +The PCEF enhanced with ADC or the TDF may provide the following information: + +- Detected application identifier; +- Allocated application instance identifier; +- Detected service data flow descriptions. + +The SPR may provide the following information for a subscriber, connecting to a specific PDN: + +- Subscriber's allowed services, i.e. list of Service IDs; +- For each allowed service, a pre-emption priority; +- Information on subscriber's allowed QoS, including: + - the Subscribed Guaranteed Bandwidth QoS; + - a list of QoS class identifiers together with the MBR limit and, for real-time QoS class identifiers, GBR limit. +- Subscriber's charging related information; +- Spending limits profile containing an indication that policy decisions depend on policy counters available at the OCS that has a spending limit associated with it and optionally the list of relevant policy counters. +- Subscriber category; +- Subscriber's usage monitoring related information; +- Subscriber's profile configuration; +- Sponsored data connectivity profiles; +- MPS EPS Priority, MPS Priority Level (See TS 23.401 [17] for more detail on MPS Subscription); +- IMS Signalling Priority. + +NOTE 6: The MPS Priority Level represents user priority. + +NOTE 7: The MPS Priority Level is one among other input data such as operator policy for the PCRF to set the ARP value. The MPS EPS Priority, and MPS Priority Level are consistent with the corresponding parameters defined in the HSS. + +The SPR may provide the following policy information related to an ASP (see clause 6.1.16): + +- The ASP identifier; +- A transfer policy together with a reference ID, the volume of data to be transferred per UE, the expected amount of UEs and the network area information. + +The AF, if involved, may provide the following application session related information, e.g. based on SIP and SDP: + +- Subscriber Identifier; +- IP address of the UE; +- Media Type; +- Media Format, e.g. media format sub-field of the media announcement and all other parameter information (a= lines) associated with the media format; +- Bandwidth; +- Sponsored data connectivity information (see clause 5.2.1); +- Flow description, e.g. source and destination IP address and port numbers and the protocol; +- AF application identifier; +- AF Communication Service Identifier (e.g. IMS Communication Service Identifier), UE provided via AF; +- AF Application Event Identifier; +- AF Record Information; +- Flow status (for gating decision); +- Priority indicator, which may be used by the PCRF to guarantee service for an application session of a higher relative priority; + +NOTE 8: The AF Priority information represents session/application priority and is separate from the MPS EPS Priority indicator. + +- Emergency indicator; +- Indicator for Restricted Local Operator Services; +- Application service provider. + +NOTE 9: The application service provider may be identified in numerous forms e.g. the AF application identifier or the host realm at Diameter level. + +The OCS, if involved, may provide the following information for a subscriber: + +- Policy counter status for each relevant policy counter. + +The RCAF, if involved, may provide the following information for a subscriber: + +- Subscriber Identifier. +- Identifier of the eNB, E-UTRAN cell or Service Area serving the subscriber. + +NOTE 10: Whether in case of E-UTRAN the eNB identifier or the ECGI are included in the RUCI is up to operator configuration in the RCAF. + +NOTE 11: Depending on the RUCI reporting interval configured in the RCAF, a UE may move outside the area indicated without the RCAF immediately notifying the PCRF. The PCRF can avoid receiving information about the cell currently serving a UE from multiple sources (i.e. via the Np and the Gx interface) by deactivating reporting of the congested cell's identifier over Np. In case PCRF receives information about the cell currently serving a UE via Np and Gx, then the information received via Gx is expected to take precedence. + +- APNs. +- Congestion level or an indication of the "no congestion" state. + +In addition, the predefined information in the PCRF may contain additional rules based on charging policies in the network, whether the subscriber is in its home network or roaming, depending on the IP-CAN bearer attributes. + +The QoS Class Identifier (see clause 6.3.1) in the PCC rule is derived by the PCRF from AF or SPR interaction if available. The input can be SDP information or other available application information, in line with operator policy. + +The Allocation/Retention Priority in the PCC Rule is derived by the PCRF from AF or SPR interaction if available, in line with operator policy. + +## 6.2.1.2 Subscription information management in the PCRF + +The PCRF may request subscription information from the SPR for an IP-CAN session at establishment or a gateway control session at establishment. The subscription information may include user profile configuration indicating whether application detection and control should be enabled. The PCRF should specify the subscriber ID and, if available, the PDN identifier in the request. The PCRF should retain the subscription information that is relevant for PCC decisions until the IP-CAN session termination and the gateway control session termination. + +The PCRF may request notifications from the SPR on changes in the subscription information. Upon reception of a notification, the PCRF shall make the PCC decisions necessary to accommodate the change in the subscription and updates the PCEF and/or the BBERF and/or the TDF by providing the new PCC and/or QoS and/or ADC decisions if needed. The PCRF shall send a cancellation notification request to the SPR when the related subscription information has been deleted. + +## 6.2.1.3 V-PCRF + +### 6.2.1.3.1 General + +The V-PCRF (Visited-Policy and Charging Rules Function) is a functional element that encompasses policy and charging control decision functionalities in the V-PLMN. The V-PCRF includes functionality for both home routed access and visited access (local breakout). + +The V-PCRF determines based on the subscriber identity if a request is for a roaming user. + +A Gateway Control Session request received over the Gxx reference point may trigger a request over the S9 reference point from the V-PCRF to the H-PCRF. + +If a Gateway Control Session establishment request is received that can not be bound to an existing Gx session then the associated IP-CAN session is either home routed or it is visited access but the IP-CAN session establishment request has not yet been received over Gx. + +For this case the V-PCRF may determine based on PDN-Id carried in the GW control session and roaming agreements if the request shall be proxied to the H-PCRF over S9 or not. The V-PCRF may choose not to proxy the Gateway Control Session Establishment only if the PDN-Id indicates the request is for visited access. + +The Gateway Control Session Establishment request should only be proxied to the H-PCRF over S9 in case the V-PCRF is configured to do so e.g. based on roaming agreement. + +NOTE: Proxying the Gateway Control Session Establishment makes the H-PCRF aware of the Gateway Control Session and enables binding in case a subsequent IP-CAN Session is established with home routed access or visited access. + +If the V-PCRF determines that a Gateway Control Session Establishment shall be proxied to the H-PCRF over S9 then the reply from the H-PCRF shall also be communicated back to the GW (BBERF) over Gxx. + +In case the V-PCRF determines that a Gateway Control Session Establishment request shall not be proxied, then the V-PCRF shall respond to the request made by the GW (BBERF) without notifying the H-PCRF. + +If an IP-CAN session establishment request is received for a roaming user over the Gx reference point, then the V-PCRF shall conclude that the IP-CAN session use visited access and act as described in clause 6.2.1.3.3. + +NOTE 2: Through roaming agreement, the HPLMN operator may allow the VPLMN operator to operate the V-PCRF without using the capabilities described in clause 6.2.1.3.3 (i.e. no S9 is used). In such case, the PCRF in the VPLMN has no access to subscriber policy information from the HPLMN, only static policies will apply based on roaming agreements. The VPCRF may also interact with the AF in the VPLMN in order to generate PCC Rules for services delivered via the VPLMN. V-PCRF uses locally configured policies according to the roaming agreement with the HPLMN operator as input for PCC Rule generation. + +If a Gateway Control and QoS rules provision is received by the V-PCRF over the S9 reference point for a Gateway Control session which is not associated, at the V-PCRF, with an existing Gx session, the V-PCRF shall conclude that the IP-CAN session associated with the Gateway Control session is home routed, and act as described in clause 6.2.1.3.2. + +### 6.2.1.3.2 V-PCRF and Home Routed Access + +The V-PCRF provides functions to proxy Gxx interactions between the BBERF and the H-PCRF as follows: + +- Gateway Control Session establishment and termination; +- Gateway Control and QoS Policy Rules Provision; +- Gateway Control and QoS Rule Request. + +The V-PCRF provides functions to enforce visited operator policies regarding QoS authorization requested by the home operator as indicated by the roaming agreements. The V-PCRF informs the H-PCRF when a request has been denied and may provide the acceptable QoS Information. + +Within an IP-CAN session, a different V-PCRF may be selected when a new Gateway Control Session is established. + +### 6.2.1.3.3 V-PCRF and Visited Access (local breakout) + +The V-PCRF provides functions to: + +- Enforce visited operator policies regarding QoS authorization requested by the home operator e.g. on a per QCI or service basis as indicated by the roaming agreements. The V-PCRF informs the H-PCRF when a request has been denied and may provide the acceptable QoS Information for the service. +- When Gxx interaction is terminated locally at the V-PCRF, perform Gx to Gateway Control Session linking. +- When Gxx interaction is terminated locally at the V-PCRF, extract QoS rules (defined in clause 6.5) from PCC rules (defined in clause 6.3) provided by the H-PCRF over the S9 reference point. The V-PCRF provides updated PCC rules to the PCEF and QoS rules to the BBERF, if appropriate. +- For the case of AF in the VPLMN: + - Proxy Rx authorizations over the S9 reference point to the H-PCRF; + - Relay event subscriptions and notifications between the H-PCRF and V-AF + +When Gx interactions are proxied between the PCEF and the H-PCRF, the V-PCRF proxies: + +- Indication of IP-CAN Session Establishment and Termination; +- Policy and Charging Rule Provisioning; +- Request Policy and Charging Rules. + +If a Gateway Control Session is used and if during the IP-CAN Session Establishment the Gateway Control Session Establishment procedure was proxied to the H-PCRF (according to the logic in clause 6.2.1.3.1), then the V-PCRF shall also proxy all other Gateway Control Session procedures to the H-PCRF. + +If the Gateway Control Session was not proxied to the H-PCRF then the V-PCRF shall handle all Gateway Control Session procedures locally and not proxy them to the H-PCRF. This has the following implications: + +- An IP-CAN Session modification may trigger the V-PCRF to update the Gateway Control Session if required in order to maintain the alignment of PCC and QoS Rules. +- An IP-CAN Session termination procedure may trigger the V-PCRF to terminate the Gateway Control Session if the Gateway Control Session was established for the purpose of a single IP-CAN session. Otherwise a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision procedure may be initiated to remove the QoS Rules associated with the IP-CAN session. +- On receiving a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request message from the BBERF, the V-PCRF performs the procedure described in clause 7.7.3.2 for the event reporting for PCEF in visited network and locally terminated Gxx interaction. + +NOTE 1: The V-PCRF has to set the event triggers at the PCEF in a way that the PCEF would trigger a PCEF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification Procedure if an interaction with the H-PCRF is required. + +When Rx components are proxied between an AF in the VPLMN and the H-PCRF, the V-PCRF shall proxy service session information between the AF and the H-PCRF. + +The V-PCRF shall support functionality to generate ADC rules from the PCC rules providing application detection and control as instructed by the H-PCRF over S9. The V-PCRF shall provide updated PCC Rules to the PCEF, and generated ADC rules to the TDF, as appropriate in the VPLMN configuration. + +NOTE 2: There may be situations where the TDF or PCEF enhanced with ADC is not able to detect the traffic requested by the H-PCRF. Prior agreements could be arranged to ensure that there is a common understanding of the meaning of application identifiers transferred between PLMNs. + +The V-PCRF shall install the event triggers in the PCEF, in the TDF and in the BBERF that were provided for the IP-CAN session and install additional event triggers in the BBERF that are relevant only to the PCEF (i.e. such event triggers are typically set by the OCS) or the TDF. On receiving an Event report from the PCEF/BBERF, the V-PCRF forwards it to the TDF, if TDF has previously subscribed for it. + +NOTE 3: Event reports over Gxx that are relevant only to the PCEF will not trigger a PCEF initiated IP-CAN session modification procedure. + +For UEs in a local breakout scenario, the RCAF may contact the V-PCRF with the RUCI information. Congestion information shall not be exposed via the S9 interface. + +Within an IP-CAN session the same V-PCRF remains for the whole lifetime of the IP-CAN session. + +## 6.2.1.4 H-PCRF + +### 6.2.1.4.1 General + +The H-PCRF (Home-Policy and Charging Rules Function) is a functional element that encompasses policy and charging control decision functionalities in the H-PLMN and in the VPLMN. The H-PCRF includes functionality for both home routed access and visited access (local breakout). + +If a Gateway Control Session is used and a Gateway Control Session Establishment is indicated over S9, then one or more of the following cases applies: + +1. One (or several) home routed IP-CAN sessions are known to the H-PCRF that can be bound to the Gateway Control session. For such IP-CAN sessions, the H-PCRF shall act as described in clause 6.2.1.4.2. +2. No IP-CAN session is known to the H-PCRF that can be bound to the Gateway Control session. This is the case when an IP-CAN session establishment process has not yet been initiated over Gx or S9. + +If an IP-CAN Session Establishment is received over Gx then the H-PCRF shall conclude that the IP-CAN session is home routed and act as described in clause 6.2.1.4.2. + +If an IP-CAN Session Establishment is received over S9 then the H-PCRF shall conclude that the IP-CAN session use visited access and act as described in clause 6.2.1.4.3. + +#### 6.2.1.4.2 H-PCRF and Home Routed Access + +The H-PCRF shall use the S9 reference point to proxy information to the BBERF via the V-PCRF for the following related Gxx procedures: + +- Gateway Control Session establishment and termination; +- Gateway Control and QoS Policy Rules Provision; +- Gateway Control and QoS Rule Request. + +If an IP-CAN session termination is received over the Gx reference point, then the H-PCRF shall initiate a Gateway Control Session Termination procedure over S9 if the Gateway Control Session was established for the purpose of a single IP-CAN session. Otherwise a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision procedure may be initiated over S9 to remove the QoS Rules in the BBERF associated with the IP-CAN session. + +#### 6.2.1.4.3 H-PCRF and Visited Access (Local Breakout) + +The H-PCRF shall use the S9 reference point to proxy information to the PCEF (and indirectly also to the BBERF when the Gateway Control Session is not proxied to the H-PCRF, and indirectly also to the TDF) via the V-PCRF for the following related Gx procedures: + +- Indication of IP-CAN Session Establishment and Termination messages; +- Policy and Charging Rule Provisioning messages; +- Request Policy and Charging Rules messages. + +When the Gateway Control Session is proxied to the H-PCRF, the H PCRF shall use the S9 reference point to proxy information to the BBERF via the V PCRF for the following related Gxx procedures: + +- Indication of Gateway Control Session Establishment and Termination messages; +- QoS Rules Provisioning messages; +- Request QoS Rules messages. + +The H-PCRF shall generate PCC rules for application traffic detection, notification and policy control when the TDF is located in the VPLMN. + +The H-PCRF should generate PCC rules for both of the cases when the AF is located in the VPLMN and when the AF is located in the HPLMN. The H-PCRF provides the PCC rules to the V-PCRF over the S9 reference point. + +### 6.2.1.5 Handling of Multiple BBFs associated with the same IP-CAN session + +#### 6.2.1.5.1 Handling of two BBFs associated with the same IP-CAN session during handover + +The procedures specified in this clause apply when the case of multiple BBFs occurs during handovers. The two BBFs can be located in two separate BBERFs, or one BBF is located in the PCEF and the other one in a BBERF. If the PCRF determines that there is more than one BBF associated with the same IP-CAN session, the PCRF handles the multiple BBFs as follows: + +- The PCRF classifies the BBERF which reports the same IP-CAN type as that reported by the PCEF as the primary BBERF and a BBERF that reports an IP-CAN type different from that reported by the PCEF as non-primary BBERF. If there are more than one BBERFs that report the same IP-CAN type as that reported by the PCEF, the BBERF that last created the GW Control Session with the PCRF is classified as the primary BBERF and other BBERF(s) are classified as non-primary BBERF(s). + +- NOTE 1: During handover where the BBF moves from a BBERF to the PCEF (e.g. handover from PMIP to GTP), when the PCEF reports a new IP-CAN type, the BBERF is classified as a non-primary BBERF. There is no primary BBERF but the active BBF is in the PCEF. +- NOTE 2: During handover where the BBF moves from the PCEF to a BBERF (e.g. handover from GTP to PMIP), when the BBERF creates a Gateway Control Session, it is classified as a non-primary BBERF. This BBERF subsequently gets classified as the primary BBERF when the PCEF reports an IP-CAN type which is the same as that reported by the BBERF. +- When a new (primary/non-primary) BBERF supporting NW/UE bearer establishment mode creates a GW Control session, the PCRF provides to the new BBERF QoS rules corresponding to SDFs. For a change of IP-CAN type, the QoS parameters of some of the QoS rules may be changed or some QoS rules may not be provided to the new BBERF, e.g. depending of the capability of the target RAT. When a new (primary/non-primary) BBERF supporting only UE bearer establishment mode creates a GW Control session, the PCRF authorizes the setup of the default bearer and only pushes down QoS rules in response to specific requests from the BBERF. +- NOTE 3: After completion of the handover procedure to the new BBERF, the UE can still initiate the access specific procedures to modify or release the resources that were originally allocated based on UE-initiated resource allocation. Such operations and the associated changes to QoS rules are handled following the normal UE-initiated resource management procedures. +- NOTE 4: To facilitate the UE's determination of QoS resources in the target access allocated to pre-existing IP flows the access system is required to provide packet filters with the same content as that in the SDF template filters received over the Gx/Gxx interface (see clause 6.1.9). +- If the BBF is located in any of the BBERF, the PCRF keeps track of QoS rules activation by all the BBERFs. The PCRF updates PCC rules to the PCEF based on activation status of QoS rules in the primary BBERF. + - If the primary-BBERF reports failure to activate a QoS rule, the PCRF also removes the same QoS rule from the non-primary BBERFs, if any are already installed, and the corresponding PCC rule from the PCEF. If a non-primary BBERF reports failure to install a QoS rule, the PCRF updates the status for that particular BBERF in its record but does not perform any further action. + - When path-switch occurs and the PCEF informs the PCRF of a new IP-CAN type, if a BBERF is re-classified as a primary BBERF, the PCRF may update QoS rules in the BBERF corresponding to the PCC rules in the PCEF. + - For the case of UE initiated resource reservation through the non-primary BBERF: If a non-primary BBERF request results in a change of the QoS rules active in the primary-BBERF, e.g. creation of a new QoS rule or results in modification of an existing QoS rule, then the PCRF shall reject the request. + +#### 6.2.1.5.2 Handling of multiple BBFs with IP-CAN session flow mobility + +The procedures specified in this clause apply when the case of multiple BBFs occurs during flow mobility scenarios as specified in TS 23.261 [23]. The multiple BBFs can be located in either separate BBERFs, or one BBF is located in the PCEF and the other ones in separate BBERFs. If the PCRF determines that there is more than one BBF associated with the same IP-CAN session due to flow mobility, the PCRF handles the multiple BBFs as follows: + +- The default route may be associated with one of the BBFs. The PCRF does not differentiate between primary and secondary BBF. +- If, based on routing information received from the PCEF, the PCRF determines that the bearer binding for a service data flow is located in a BBERF, the PCRF provides QoS rules for bearer binding to the appropriate BBERF/BBF. Each service data flow is associated with one BBF based on the routing information. If no explicit routing information for a service data flow is available from the PCEF, the PCRF provides PCC/QoS rules for the service data flow based on the default route. +- When the route of a service data flow changes from one source BBF to another target BBF, the PCRF removes the QoS rules related to the service data flow from the source BBF (if the source BBF is located in a BBERF) and provisions the QoS rules related to the service data flow to the target BBF (if the target BBF is located in a BBERF). + +- The PCRF may select different bearer establishment mode for different BBFs. Provision of PCC/QoS rules to a specific BBF follows the rule provision procedures based on the bearer establishment mode selected for that BBF. + +## 6.2.2 Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF) + +### 6.2.2.1 General + +The PCEF encompasses service data flow detection, policy enforcement and flow based charging functionalities. + +This functional entity is located at the Gateway (e.g. GGSN in the GPRS case, and PDG in the WLAN case). It provides service data flow detection, user plane traffic handling, triggering control plane session management (where the IP-CAN permits), QoS handling, and service data flow measurement as well as online and offline charging interactions. + +A PCEF shall ensure that an IP packet, which is discarded at the PCEF as a result from PCC rule enforcement or flow based charging, is neither reported for offline charging nor cause credit consumption for online charging. + +NOTE 1: For certain cases e.g. suspected fraud an operator shall be able to block the service data flow but still be able to account for any packets associated with any blocked service data flow. + +The PCEF is enforcing the Policy Control as indicated by the PCRF in two different ways: + +- Gate enforcement. The PCEF shall allow a service data flow, which is subject to policy control, to pass through the PCEF if and only if the corresponding gate is open; +- QoS enforcement: + - QoS class identifier correspondence with IP-CAN specific QoS attributes. The PCEF shall be able to convert a QoS class identifier value to IP-CAN specific QoS attribute values and determine the QoS class identifier value from a set of IP-CAN specific QoS attribute values. + - PCC rule QoS enforcement. The PCEF shall enforce the authorized QoS of a service data flow according to the active PCC rule (e.g. to enforce uplink DSCP marking). + - IP-CAN bearer QoS enforcement. The PCEF controls the QoS that is provided to a combined set of service data flows. The policy enforcement function ensures that the resources which can be used by an authorized set of service data flows are within the "authorized resources" specified via the Gx interface by "authorized QoS". The authorized QoS provides an upper bound on the resources that can be reserved (GBR) or allocated (MBR) for the IP-CAN bearer. The authorized QoS information is mapped by the PCEF to IP-CAN specific QoS attributes. During IP-CAN bearer QoS enforcement, if packet filters are provided to the UE, the PCEF shall provide packet filters with the same content as that in the SDF template filters received over the Gx interface. + +The PCEF is enforcing the charging control in the following way: + +- For a service data flow (defined by an active PCC rule) that is subject to charging control, the PCEF shall allow the service data flow to pass through the PCEF if and only if there is a corresponding active PCC rule with and, for online charging, the OCS has authorized credit for the charging key. The PCEF may let a service data flow pass through the PCEF during the course of the credit re-authorization procedure. + +For a service data flow (defined by an active PCC rule) that is subject to both Policy Control and Charging Control, the PCEF shall allow the service data flow to pass through the PCEF if and only if the right conditions from both policy control and charging control happen. I.e. the corresponding gate is open and in case of online charging the OCS has authorized credit for its charging key. + +For a service data flow (defined by an active PCC rule) that is subject to policy control only and not charging control, the PCEF shall allow the service data flow to pass through the PCEF if and only if the conditions for policy control are met. + +A PCEF may be served by one or more PCRF nodes. The PCEF shall contact the appropriate PCRF based on the packet data network (PDN) connected to, together with, a UE identity information (if available, and which may be IP-CAN specific). It shall be possible to ensure that the same PCRF is contacted for a specific UE irrespective of the IP-CAN used. + +The operator may configure an indicator in HSS which is delivered to the PCEF within the Charging Characteristics and used by the PCEF to not establish the Gx session during the IP-CAN session establishment procedure. + +NOTE 2: The decision to not establish the Gx session applies for the life time of the IP-CAN session. + +NOTE 3: The indicator in the HSS is operator specific, therefore its value is understood within the HPLMN and can be used in both non-roaming or home routed roaming cases. + +The PCEF shall, on request from the PCRF, modify a PCC rule, using the equivalent PCEF behaviour as the removal of the old and the activation of the new (modified) PCC rule. The PCEF shall modify a PCC rule as an atomic operation. The PCEF shall not modify a predefined PCC rule on request from the PCRF. + +The PCEF should support predefined PCC rules. + +For online charging, the PCEF shall manage credit as defined in clause 6.1.3. + +The operator may apply different PCC rules depending on different PLMN. The PCEF shall be able to provide identifier of serving network to the PCRF, which may be used by the PCRF in order to select the PCC rule to be applied. + +The operator may configure whether Policy and Charging Control is to be applied based on different access point. + +The PCEF shall gather and report IP-CAN bearer usage information according to clause 6.1.2. The PCEF may have a pre-configured Default charging method. Upon the initial interaction with the PCRF, the PCEF shall provide pre-configured Default charging method if available. + +At IP-CAN session establishment the PCEF shall initiate the IP-CAN Session Establishment procedure, as defined in clause 7.2. In case the SDF is tunnelled at the BBERF, the PCEF shall inform the PCRF about the mobility protocol tunnelling header of the service data flows. In case 2a, defined in clause 7.1, the PCEF may provide charging ID information to the PCRF. The PCEF shall inform the PCRF on whether it is enhanced with ADC, or provide the TDF address, if one is configured at the PCEF. If no PCC rule was activated for the IP-CAN session, the PCEF shall reject the IP-CAN session establishment. + +If there is no PCC rule active for a successfully established IP-CAN session at any later point in time, e.g., through a PCRF initiated IP-CAN session modification, the PCEF shall initiate an IP-CAN session termination procedure, as defined in clause 7.3.2. If the PCRF terminates the Gx session, the PCEF shall initiate an IP-CAN session termination procedure, as defined in clause 7.3.2. + +If there is no PCC rule active for a successfully established IP-CAN bearer at any later point in time, e.g., through a PCRF initiated IP-CAN session modification, the PCEF shall initiate an IP-CAN bearer termination procedure, as defined in clause 7.4.1. + +If the IP-CAN session is modified, e.g. by changing the characteristics for an IP-CAN bearer, the PCEF shall first use the event trigger to determine whether to request the PCC rules for the modified IP-CAN session from the PCRF; afterwards, the PCEF shall use the re-authorisation triggers, if available, in order to determine whether to require re-authorisation for the PCC rules that were either unaffected or modified. If the PCEF receives an unsolicited update of the PCC rules from the PCRF (IP-CAN session modification, clause 7.4.2), the PCC rules shall be activated, modified or removed as indicated by the PCRF. + +The PCEF shall inform the PCRF about the outcome of a PCC rule operation. If network initiated procedures apply to the PCC rule and the corresponding IP-CAN bearer can not be established or modified to satisfy the bearer binding, then the PCEF shall reject the activation of a PCC rule. + +The PCEF shall inform the PCRF about any removal of a PCC rule, that the PCRF has activated, that occurs without explicit instruction from the PCRF. + +When IP-CAN bearer resources are released, i.e. at IP-CAN session termination or PCEF-initiated IP-CAN session modification notifying that PCC Rules are removed, the PCEF shall also provide, if available, the reason why resources are released, i.e. RAN/NAS Release Cause, TWAN Release Cause or UWAN Release Cause. + +NOTE 4: In case of a rejection of a PCC rule activation the PCRF may e.g. modify the attempted PCC rule, deactivate or modify other PCC rules and retry activation or abort the activation attempt and, if applicable, inform the AF that transmission resources are not available. + +If network initiated procedures for IP-CAN bearer establishment apply this also includes provisioning the UE with traffic mapping information. See clause 6.1.9, Annex A and Annex D for details. + +If another IP-CAN session is established by the same user, this is treated independently from the existing IP-CAN session. + +To support the different IP-CAN bearer establishment modes (UE-only or UE/NW) the PCEF shall: + +- forward the network and UE capabilities to the PCRF; +- apply the IP-CAN bearer establishment mode for the IP-CAN session set by the PCRF. + +During an IP-CAN session modification, the PCEF shall provide information (belonging to the IP-CAN bearer established or modified) to the PCRF as follows: + +- in UE-only bearer establishment mode, the PCEF shall send the full QoS and traffic mapping information; +- in UE/NW bearer establishment mode, the PCEF shall: + - at UE-initiated bearer establishment, send the full QoS and traffic mapping information; + - at UE-initiated bearer modification, send information on the requested change to QoS bitrates and changes to the traffic mapping information; +- at NW-initiated bearer establishment or modification, the PCEF shall not send any QoS or traffic mapping information. + +When flow mobility as specified in TS 23.261 [23] applies, the PCEF shall provide IP flow mobility routing information to the PCRF as follows: + +- the default route to be used if no explicit routing information for a service data flow is provided; +- the route for an IP flow. + +The PCEF shall derive the routing information from the IP flow mobility flow bindings installed in the PCEF, as defined in TS 23.261 [23]. + +If there are events which can not be monitored in the PCEF, the PCEF shall provide the information about the required event triggers to the PCRF using the PCEF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification procedure, as defined in clause 7.4.1, or in the response to a PCRF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification, as defined in clause 7.4.3. If the triggers were provided by the OCS at credit authorization, it is an implementation option whether a successful confirmation is required from the PCRF in order for the PCEF to consider the credit (re-)authorization procedure to be successful. + +IP-CAN-specific parameters may be sent by the PCRF to the PCEF or the PCEF to the PCRF. The IP-CAN Session Modification procedure may be used to deliver these parameters to allow interaction between the BBERF and the PCEF by way of the PCRF. This is required in accesses that require these parameters to be sent indirectly. + +The PCEF shall support usage monitoring as specified in clause 4.4. + +The PCEF enhanced with ADC shall handle application traffic detection as per request from PCRF as well as report about the detected application traffic along with service data flow descriptions, if deducible, to the PCRF, if requested by the PCRF. + +The PCEF shall support traffic steering as specified in clause 6.1.17. + +The PCEF shall support 3GPP PS Data Off as specified in clause 6.1.21. + +The PCEF forwards the Maximum Packet Loss Rate for UL and DL, if received from PCRF for the PCC rule bound to a QCI=1 bearer. In the case multiple PCC Rules share one QCI=1 bearer and the PCEF received multiple Maximum Packet Loss Rates, the PCEF chooses the lowest value per direction related to these PCC rules. + +When the PCRF provides updated PCC rules for the IP-CAN session to the PCEF, and the PCC rules were not enforced due to that the UE is in suspend state, e.g. due to SRVCC to GERAN without DTM support as specified in clause 6.2.2.1 in the TS 23.216 [28] or CSFB to UTRAN without PS Handover as specified in clause 6.5 in the TS 23.272 [52], the PCEF shall indicate to the PCRF that the PCC Rules were not enforced with the reason that the UE is in suspend state. Upon reception of the failure indication, the PCRF may subscribe to UE resumed from suspend state event trigger. + +### 6.2.2.2 Service data flow detection + +This clause refers to the detection process that identifies the packets belonging to a service data flow. Each PCC rule contains a service data flow template, which defines the data for the service data flow detection as a set of service data flow filters or an application identifier referring to an application detection filter. + +For PCC rules that contain an application identifier (i.e. that refer to an application detection filter), the order and the details of the detection are implementation specific. The application detection filter may be extended with the PFDs provided by the PFDF as described in clause 6.1.20. The new PFDs provided by the PFDF replace the existing ones in the PCEF. When multiple PFDs are associated with application identifier, the application is detected when any of the PFDs associated with the application identifier is matched. In addition, if a PFD contains multiple attributes, the PFD is only matched when every attribute contained in the PFD has a matching value. + +Once an application has been detected, enforcement and charging shall however be applied under consideration of the PCC rule precedence, i.e. when multiple PCC rules overlap, only the enforcement and charging actions of the PCC rule with the highest precedence shall be applied. + +For PCC Rules that contain an application identifier (i.e. that refer to an application detection filter) the detection of the uplink part of the service data flow may be active in parallel on other bearers with non-GBR QCI (e.g. the default bearer) in addition to the bearer where the PCC rule is bound to. + +NOTE 1: When PCC rules with application detection filters cannot be used to generate traffic mapping information for the UE, the application detection may need to inspect traffic on multiple bearers. The PCEF uses implementation specific logic to determine for what bearers the up-link service data flow detection applies. The uplink traffic will get the QoS of the bearer carrying the traffic. The QCI of the bearer may therefore be different than the QCI of the PCC rule detecting the service data flow. The charging and other enforcement functions performed by the PCEF will still be carried out based on parameters of the PCC rule detecting the service data flow. If the PCC rule contains a GBR QCI, the GBR resource reservation will only apply on the bearer where the PCC rule is bound to. The PCRF can prevent that uplink GBR resources are reserved by providing an uplink GBR value of zero in the PCC rule. + +The PCEF shall discard a packet in the case that there is no service data flow template of the same direction (i.e. of the IP-CAN session for the downlink or of the IP-CAN bearer for the uplink) detecting the packet. + +NOTE 2: For the uplink direction, discarding packets due to no matching service data flow template is also referred to as uplink bearer binding verification. For the case a BBERF is present, uplink bearer binding verification is done by the BBERF. + +NOTE 3: If PCC Rule containing an Application Identifier inspects traffic on multiple bearers in the uplink, such detected traffic counts as detection by that PCC rule. + +The remainder of this clause describes the detection of service data flows identified by a service data flow filter (i.e. does not apply to PCC rules containing an application identifier): + +- Each service data flow template may contain any number of service data flow filters; +- Each service data flow filter is applicable uplink, downlink or both uplink and downlink; +- Service data flow filters are applied for each direction, so that the detection is applied independently for the downlink and uplink directions; + +NOTE 4: Service data flow filters that apply in both uplink and downlink should be used whenever the underlying IP-CAN and access type supports this. + +NOTE 5: A service data flow template may include service data flow filters for one direction, or for both directions. + +- Each service data flow filter may contain information about whether the explicit signalling of the corresponding traffic mapping information to the UE is required. + +NOTE 6: This information enables e.g. the generation/removal of traffic mapping information for a default IP-CAN bearer as well as the usage of PCC rules with specific service data flow filters on a default IP-CAN bearer without the need to generate traffic mapping information. + +![Diagram illustrating the relationship between service data flow, packet flow, service data flow template, and service data flow filter. The diagram shows two main paths: downlink and uplink. In the downlink path, a 'down-link gate and counter' block receives 'packet flowA' and 'packet flowB' from 'service data flow filter 1'. In the uplink path, 'packet flowC' and 'packet flowD' are processed by 'service data flow filter 2' and 'service data flow filter 3' respectively, which then feed into an 'uplink gate and counter' block. A bracket labeled 'service dataflow' groups the downlink and uplink paths. Another bracket labeled 'service dataflowtemplate' groups the downlink and uplink parts of the service data flow filters.](5cf80bac69830ea773ac17c87e0ae24d_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the relationship between service data flow, packet flow, service data flow template, and service data flow filter. It is divided into two main parts: downlink and uplink. + +- Downlink Path:** On the left, a bracket labeled "service dataflow" encompasses the downlink part. It shows "packet flowA" and "packet flowB" entering a "service data flow filter 1" block. The output of this filter goes to a "down-link gate and counter" block, which then outputs the traffic. +- Uplink Path:** On the right, the uplink part shows "packet flowC" and "packet flowD" entering "service data flow filter 2" and "service data flow filter 3" blocks respectively. The outputs of these filters go to an "uplink gate and counter" block, which then outputs the traffic. +- Service Data Flow Template:** A bracket labeled "service dataflowtemplate" groups the "downlink part" (consisting of the down-link gate and counter and service data flow filter 1) and the "uplink part" (consisting of service data flow filter 2, service data flow filter 3, and the uplink gate and counter). + +Diagram illustrating the relationship between service data flow, packet flow, service data flow template, and service data flow filter. The diagram shows two main paths: downlink and uplink. In the downlink path, a 'down-link gate and counter' block receives 'packet flowA' and 'packet flowB' from 'service data flow filter 1'. In the uplink path, 'packet flowC' and 'packet flowD' are processed by 'service data flow filter 2' and 'service data flow filter 3' respectively, which then feed into an 'uplink gate and counter' block. A bracket labeled 'service dataflow' groups the downlink and uplink paths. Another bracket labeled 'service dataflowtemplate' groups the downlink and uplink parts of the service data flow filters. + +**Figure 6.3: Relationship of service data flow, packet flow, service data flow template and service data flow filter** + +Service data flow filters identifying the service data flow may: + +- be a pattern for matching the IP 5 tuple (source IP address or IPv6 network prefix, destination IP address or IPv6 network prefix, source port number, destination port number, protocol ID of the protocol above IP). In the pattern: + - a value left unspecified in a filter matches any value of the corresponding information in a packet; + - an IP address may be combined with a prefix mask; + - port numbers may be specified as port ranges. + - the pattern can be extended by the Type of Service (TOS) (IPv4) / Traffic class (IPv6) and Mask; +- consist of the destination IP address and optional mask, protocol ID of the protocol above IP, the Type of Service (TOS) (IPv4) / Traffic class (IPv6) and Mask and the IPSec Security Parameter Index (SPI); +- consist of the destination IP address and optional mask, the Type of Service (TOS) (IPv4) / Traffic class (IPv6) and Mask and the Flow Label (IPv6). + +NOTE 7: The details about the IPSec Security Parameter Index (SPI), the Type of Service (TOS) (IPv4) / Traffic class (IPv6) and Mask and the Flow Label (IPv6) are defined in TS 23.060 [12] clause 15.3. + +- extend the packet inspection beyond the possibilities described above and look further into the packet and/or define other operations (e.g. maintaining state). Such service data flow filters must be predefined in the PCEF. + +NOTE 8: Such filters may be used to support filtering with respect to a service data flow based on the transport and application protocols used above IP. This shall be possible for HTTP and WAP. This includes the ability to differentiate between TCP, Wireless-TCP according to WAP 2.0, WDP, etc, in addition to differentiation at the application level. Filtering for further application protocols and services may also be supported. + +For downlink traffic, the downlink parts of all the service data flow templates associated with the IP-CAN session for the destination address are candidates for matching in the detection process. + +![Diagram illustrating the mapping of service data flows to IP-CAN bearers based on precedence.](750b1652a4f4791b84c02aa755a1dedd_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the mapping of service data flows to IP-CAN bearers based on precedence. On the right, a stack of boxes represents 'IP packets from PDN for the UE IP address'. These packets are processed through a series of six triangular nodes labeled 'a' through 'f', which represent 'Service data flow templates (downlink parts)'. The nodes are arranged vertically, with 'a' at the top and 'f' at the bottom. A vertical double-headed arrow labeled 'Precedence' indicates the order, with 'High' at the top and 'Low' at the bottom. Below node 'f' is a box labeled 'discard'. On the left, three 'IP-CAN bearers' are shown, each containing a circle and two rectangular slots. Arrows show the mapping from the service data flow templates to the bearers: node 'a' maps to the top bearer's first slot, node 'b' to the bottom bearer's first slot, node 'c' to the top bearer's second slot, node 'd' to the middle bearer's first slot, node 'e' to the middle bearer's second slot, and node 'f' to the bottom bearer's second slot. The top bearer contains slots 'c' and 'e'; the middle bearer contains slots 'a' and 'd'; and the bottom bearer contains slots 'b' and 'f'. A label 'Service data flows a (downlink part)' is positioned above the templates. + +Diagram illustrating the mapping of service data flows to IP-CAN bearers based on precedence. + +**Figure 6.4: The service data flow template role in detecting the downlink part of a service data flow and mapping to IP-CAN bearers** + +For uplink traffic, the uplink parts of all the service data flow templates associated with the IP-CAN bearer (details according to clause A), are candidates for matching in the detection process. + +![Diagram illustrating the service data flow template role in detecting the uplink part of a service data flow. Uplink IP packets from the UE IP address are processed through IP-CAN bearers. Service data flow templates (uplink parts) are applied in order of precedence. The diagram shows two paths: one for service data flow 'a' (High precedence) which is forwarded to the PDN, and another for service data flow 'd' (Low precedence) which is discarded. The precedence is indicated by a vertical axis with 'High' at the top and 'Low' at the bottom.](f61d0925551545b5938b3a4d1bbf63c3_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows the processing of uplink IP packets from a User Equipment (UE) IP address through IP-CAN bearers. The packets are processed based on service data flow templates (uplink parts) associated with the IP-CAN bearer, applied in order of precedence. The precedence is indicated by a vertical axis with 'High' at the top and 'Low' at the bottom. + +Uplink IP packets from the UE IP address are shown entering the IP-CAN bearers. The packets are processed through two service data flow templates: + +- Service data flow "a" (High Precedence):** The packet is processed through the "a" template, which is associated with the IP-CAN bearer. The packet is then forwarded to the PDN as an IP packet of service data flow "a" from the UE IP address to PDN. +- Service data flow "d" (Low Precedence):** The packet is processed through the "d" template, which is associated with the IP-CAN bearer. The packet is then discarded. + +The diagram also shows the resulting service data flows (uplink part) for "a" and "d". + +Diagram illustrating the service data flow template role in detecting the uplink part of a service data flow. Uplink IP packets from the UE IP address are processed through IP-CAN bearers. Service data flow templates (uplink parts) are applied in order of precedence. The diagram shows two paths: one for service data flow 'a' (High precedence) which is forwarded to the PDN, and another for service data flow 'd' (Low precedence) which is discarded. The precedence is indicated by a vertical axis with 'High' at the top and 'Low' at the bottom. + +**Figure 6.5: The service data flow template role in detecting the uplink part of a service data flow** + +NOTE 9: To avoid the PCEF discarding packets due to no matching service data flow template, the operator may apply open PCC rules (with wild-carded service data flow filters) to allow for the passage of packets that do not match any other candidate service data flow template. + +Service data flow templates shall be applied in the order of their precedence. + +### 6.2.2.3 Measurement + +The PCEF shall support data volume, duration, combined volume/duration and event based measurement for charging. The Measurement method indicates what measurement type is applicable to the PCC rule. + +NOTE 1: Event based charging is only applicable to predefined PCC rules and PCC rules using an application detection filter (i.e. with an application identifier). + +The PCEF measurement measures all the user plane traffic, except traffic that PCC causes to be discarded. + +The PCEF shall maintain a measurement per IP-CAN bearer (IP-CAN specific details according to Annex A and Annex D), and Charging Key combination. + +If Service identifier level reporting is mandated in a PCC rule, the PCEF shall maintain a measurement for that Charging Key and Service Identifier combination, for the IP-CAN bearer (IP-CAN specific details according to Annex A and Annex D). + +NOTE 2: In addition, the GW may maintain IP-CAN bearer level measurement if required by the operator. + +For usage monitoring, the PCEF shall support volume and time measurement for an IP-CAN session and maintain a measurement for each IP-CAN session for which the PCRF has requested the Usage report trigger and provided threshold values on an IP-CAN session level. The PCEF shall be able to support volume and time measurements simultaneously for a given IP-CAN session. + +The PCEF shall support volume and time measurement per Monitoring key and maintain a measurement for each Monitoring key if the PCRF has requested the Usage report trigger and provided threshold values on Monitoring key level. The PCEF shall be able to support volume and time measurements simultaneously for a given Monitoring Key. + +The PCEF shall support simultaneous volume and time measurement for usage monitoring on IP-CAN session level and Monitoring key level for the same IP-CAN session. + +Volume and time measurements for usage monitoring purposes on IP-CAN session level and on Monitoring key level shall be performed independently of each other. If the PCC rule is associated with an indication of exclusion from session level monitoring, the PCEF shall not consider the corresponding service data flow for the volume and time measurement on IP-CAN session level. + +If the Usage report reached event trigger is set and a volume or a time threshold is reached, the PCEF shall report this event to the PCRF. The PCEF shall continue to perform volume or time measurement after the threshold is reached and before a new threshold is provided by the PCRF. At IP-CAN session termination or if the conditions defined in clause 6.6.2 for continued monitoring are no longer met, or if the PCRF explicitly requests a usage report, the PCEF shall inform the PCRF about the resources that have been consumed by the user since the last usage report for the affected Monitoring keys, including the resources consumed before and after the Monitoring time was reached, if provided according to clause 6.2.1.0. + +If combined volume and time measurements are requested by the PCRF, then the reporting shall be done for both together. For example, if the volume threshold is reached, the consumed time shall be reported as well and, in order to continue combined volume and time measurements, the PCRF shall provide a new time threshold along with a new volume threshold. The PCEF shall continue to perform volume and time measurement after the threshold is reached and before a new threshold is provided by the PCRF. If new threshold is provided only for time or volume, then the measurements shall continue only for that provided type and the accumulated usage for the non provided type shall be discarded by the PCEF. + +When the PCRF requests to report usage, the PCEF shall report the accumulated usage to the PCRF according to the provided usage threshold, i.e. the PCEF reports accumulated volume when the volume threshold was provided by the PCRF, accumulated time when the time threshold was provided by the PCRF and both accumulated volume and accumulated time when volume threshold and time threshold were provided by the PCRF. + +If the Usage thresholds for a Monitoring key are not provided to the PCEF in the acknowledgement of an IP-CAN Session modification where its usage was reported, then the usage monitoring shall not continue in the PCEF for that Monitoring key. + +When the Monitoring time occurs, the accumulated volume and/or time usage shall be recorded by the PCEF and: + +- If the subsequent usage threshold value is provided, the usage threshold shall be reset to this value by the PCEF. +- Otherwise, the usage threshold shall be set by the PCEF to the remaining value of the threshold previously sent by the PCRF (i.e. excluding the accumulated usage). + +The first usage report after the Monitoring Time was reached shall indicate the usage up to the Monitoring time and usage after the Monitoring time. + +In order to support time based usage monitoring, the PCRF may optionally indicate to the PCEF, along with other usage monitoring information provided, the Inactivity Detection Time. This value represents the time interval after which the time measurement shall stop for the Monitoring key, if no packets are received belonging to the corresponding Monitoring Key during that time period. Time measurement shall resume on receipt of a further packet belonging to the Monitoring key. + +Time measurement for a Monitoring key shall also be stopped when time based usage monitoring is disabled, if this happens before the Inactivity Detection Time is reached. + +If an Inactivity Detection Time value of zero is provided, or if no Inactivity Detection Time is present within the usage monitoring information provided by the PCRF, the time measurement shall be performed continuously from the point at which it was started until time based usage monitoring is disabled. + +#### 6.2.2.4 QoS control + +The PCEF enforces the authorized QoS for an IP-CAN bearer according to the information received via the Gx interface and depending on the bearer establishment mode. + +Only the GBR per bearer is used for resource reservation (e.g. admission control in the RAN). The MBR (per PCC rule / per bearer) is used for rate policing. + +For a UE-initiated IP-CAN bearer establishment or modification the PCEF receives the authorized QoS (QCI, ARP, GBR, MBR) for a bearer that the PCEF has identified for the PCRF. The PCEF shall enforce it which may lead to a downgrading or upgrading of the requested bearer QoS. + +NOTE 1: The MBR is an average value, which is measured over some time period. Services may generate media with variable bitrate. For example, TS 26.114 [45] describes the bitrate variations that may be generated for real-time conversational media in the MTSI service. The policing function in the PCEF should take such bitrate variations into account. + +For a network initiated IP-CAN bearer establishment or modification the PCEF receives the authorized QoS per PCC rule (QCI, ARP, GBR, MBR). For GBR bearers the PCEF should set the bearer's GBR to the sum of the GBRs of all PCC rules that are active and bound to that GBR bearer. If a set of PCC Rules is subject to resource sharing as specified in clause 6.1.14 the PCEF should use, for each applicable direction, the highest GBR from the set of PCC Rules sharing resources as input for calculating the bearer's GBR. For GBR bearers the PCEF should set the bearer's MBR to the sum of the MBRs of all PCC rules that are active and bound to that GBR bearer. If a set of PCC Rules is subject to resource sharing as specified in clause 6.1.14 the PCEF may, for each applicable direction, use the highest MBR from the set of PCC Rules as input for calculating the bearer's MBR. + +NOTE 2: Since the PCRF controls the GBR value in the PCC rule, the PCRF can prevent that uplink GBR resources are reserved by providing an uplink GBR value of zero for that PCC rule. This may be useful e.g. for a PCC rule with application identifier as the uplink traffic can be received in other bearers than the one the PCC rule is bound to. + +For an IP-CAN that supports non-GBR bearers that have a separate MBR (e.g. GPRS) the PCEF may, before or in connection with activation of the first PCC rule with a certain QCI, receive the authorized QoS (QCI, MBR) for that QCI. The authorized MBR per QCI only applies to non-GBR bearers, and it sets an upper limit for the MBR that the PCEF assigns to a non-GBR bearer with that QCI. In case multiple IP-CAN bearers within the same IP-CAN session are assigned the same QCI, the authorized MBR per QCI applies independently to each of those IP-CAN bearers. The PCRF may change the authorized MBR per QCI at any time. An authorized GBR per QCI shall not be signalled on Gx. + +NOTE 3: The intention of the authorized MBR per QCI is to avoid frequent IP-CAN bearer modifications as PCC rules are dynamically activated and deactivated. That is, the PCEF may choose to assign the authorized MBR per QCI to a non-GBR bearer with that QCI. + +## 6.2.2.5 Application Detection + +The PCEF shall detect Start and Stop of the application traffic for the PCC rules used for application detection (i.e. with application identifier) that the PCRF has activated at the PCEF. The PCEF shall report, if the PCRF has subscribed to the event, unless the notification is muted for the specific PCC Rule, to the PCRF: + +- For the Start of application event trigger: the application identifier and, when service data flow descriptions are deducible, the application instance identifier and the service data flow descriptions to use for detecting that application traffic with a dynamic PCC rule as defined in clause 6.1.4. +- For the Stop of application event trigger: the application identifier and if the application instance identifier was reported for the Start, also the application instance identifier as defined in the clause 6.1.4. + +## 6.2.2.6 Traffic steering + +When the PCRF provides a Traffic Steering Policy Identifier(s) in a PCC rule, the PCEF shall enforce the referenced traffic steering policy for the service data flow. A traffic steering policy is locally configured and can be used for the uplink, the downlink or for both directions. + +To enforce the traffic steering policy, the PCEF performs deployment specific actions as configured for that traffic steering policy. The PCEF may for example perform packet marking where, for the traffic identified by the service data flow template (defined by an active PCC rule), the PCEF provides information for traffic steering, as part of the packets, to the (S)Gi-LAN. This information for traffic steering identifies, explicitly or implicitly, a specific set of service functions and their order via which the traffic needs to be steered in the (S)Gi-LAN. + +### 6.2.3 Application Function (AF) + +The Application Function (AF) is an element offering applications that require dynamic policy and/or charging control over the IP-CAN user plane behaviour. The AF shall communicate with the PCRF to transfer dynamic session information, required for PCRF decisions as well as to receive IP-CAN specific information and notifications about IP-CAN bearer level events. One example of an AF is the P-CSCF of the IM CN subsystem. + +The AF may receive an indication that the service information is not accepted by the PCRF together with service information that the PCRF would accept. In that case, the AF rejects the service establishment towards the UE. If possible the AF forwards the service information to the UE that the PCRF would accept. + +An AF may communicate with multiple PCRFs. The AF shall contact the appropriate PCRF based on either: + +- the end user IP Address; and/or +- a UE identity that the AF is aware of. + +NOTE 1: By using the end user IP address, an AF is not required to acquire any UE identity in order to provide information, for a specific user, to the PCRF. + +In case of private IP address being used for the end user, the AF may send additional PDN information (e.g. PDN ID) over the Rx interface. This PDN information is used by the PCRF for session binding, and it is also used to help selecting the correct PCRF. + +For certain events related to policy control, the AF shall be able to give instructions to the PCRF to act on its own, i.e. based on the service information currently available as described in clause 6.1.5. + +The AF may use the IP-CAN bearer level information in the AF session signalling or to adjust the IP-CAN bearer level event reporting. + +The AF may request the PCRF to report on IP-CAN bearer level events (e.g. the signalling path status for the AF session). The AF shall cancel the request when the AF ceases handling the user. + +NOTE 2: The QoS authorization based on incomplete service information is required for e.g. IMS session setup scenarios with available resources on originating side and a need for resource reservation on terminating side. + +The AF may request the PCRF to report on the change of type of IP-CAN. The PCRF shall report the IP-CAN type and subsequent changes to the AF together with the information of the Radio Access Technology Type (e.g. UTRAN) as defined in access specific annexes. The change of the Radio Access Technology Type (e.g. UTRAN) shall be also reported to the AF, even if the IP-CAN type is unchanged. + +The AF may request the PCRF to report any combination of the user location and/or UE Timezone at AF session establishment, modification or termination. For AF session termination the communication between the AF and the PCRF shall be kept alive until the PCRF report is received. + +The AF may request the PCRF to report changes of the PLMN identifier where the UE is currently located at AF session establishment. The PLMN identifier reporting remains until the AF session is terminated. + +If IP-CAN bearer resources corresponding to the AF session are released, the PCRF reports to the AF, if available, the reason why IP-CAN bearer resources are released i.e. RAN/NAS Release Cause, TWAN Release Cause or UWAN Release Cause. + +If IP-CAN bearer resources corresponding to the AF session are released, the PCRF reports to the AF, if available, the User Location Information and/or the UE Timezone. + +NOTE 3: The H-PCRF informs the AF of event triggers that cannot be reported. For detail see Annex L. + +To support sponsored data connectivity (see Annex N), the AF may provide the PCRF with the sponsored data connectivity information, including optionally a usage threshold, as specified in clause 5.2.1. The AF may request the PCRF to report events related to sponsored data connectivity. + +If the user plane traffic traverses the AF, the AF may handle the usage monitoring and therefore it is not required to provide a usage threshold to the PCRF as part of the sponsored data connectivity information. + +In order to mitigate RAN user plane congestion, the Rx reference point enables transport of the following information from the PCRF to the AF: + +- Re-try interval, which indicates when service delivery may be retried on Rx. + +NOTE 4: Additionally, existing bandwidth limitation parameters on Rx interface during the Rx session establishment are available in order to mitigate RAN user plane congestion. + +When receiving service information from the AF, the PCRF may temporarily reject the AF request (e.g. if the service information is not consistent with the operator defined policy rules for the congestion status of the user). To temporarily reject the AF request the PCRF shall indicate a re-try interval to the AF. When receiving a re-try interval from the PCRF the AF shall not send the same service information to the PCRF again (for the same IP-CAN session) until the re-try interval has elapsed. + +The AF may contact the PCRF via the SCEF (and the Nt interface) to request a time window and related conditions for future background data transfer (as described in clause 6.1.16). If the PCRF replies with more than one transfer policy, the AF shall select one of them and inform the PCRF about the selected transfer policy. The reference ID provided by the PCRF shall be used by the AF during every subsequent transfer of AF session information related to this background data transfer (via the Rx interface). + +## 6.2.4 Subscription Profile Repository (SPR) + +The SPR logical entity contains all subscriber/subscription related information needed for subscription-based policies and IP-CAN bearer level PCC rules by the PCRF. The SPR may be combined with or distributed across other databases in the operator's network, but those functional elements and their requirements for the SPR are out of scope of this document. + +NOTE 1: The SPR's relation to existing subscriber databases is not specified in this Release. + +The SPR may provide the following subscription profile information (per PDN, which is identified by the PDN identifier): + +- Subscriber's allowed services; +- For each allowed service, a pre-emption priority; +- Information on subscriber's allowed QoS, including the Subscribed Guaranteed Bandwidth QoS; +- Subscriber's charging related information (e.g. location information relevant for charging); +- Subscriber's User CSG Information reporting rules; +- List of Presence Reporting Area identifiers and optionally the elements for one or more of the Presence Reporting Areas; +- Subscriber category; +- Subscriber's usage monitoring related information; +- MPS EPS Priority and MPS Priority Level; +- IMS Signalling Priority; +- Subscriber's profile configuration indicating whether application detection and control can be enabled. +- Spending limits profile containing an indication that policy decisions are based on policy counters available at OCS that has a spending limit associated with it and optionally the list of policy counters. + +The SPR may provide the following sponsored data connectivity profile information: + +- A list of Application Service Providers and their applications per sponsor identity. + +NOTE 2: The sponsored data connectivity profile may be locally configured at the PCRF. + +If the IMS Signalling Priority is set, it indicates that the IMS Signalling Bearer and the Default Bearer are assigned ARP appropriate for MPS at the time of the establishment of the PDN connection for IMS, i.e. EPS Attach or PDN Connectivity Request. + +The SPR may provide the following policy information related to an ASP (see clause 6.1.16): + +- The ASP identifier; +- A transfer policy together with a reference ID, the volume of data to be transferred per UE, the expected amount of UEs and the network area information. + +NOTE 3: The information related to an ASP is only available in the SPR after being stored by the PCRF as described in clauses 6.1.16 and 7.11.1. + +NOTE 4: A transfer policy is only valid until the end of its time window. The removal of outdated transfer policies from the SPR is up to implementation. + +## 6.2.5 Online Charging System + +The Online Charging System (OCS) performs online credit control functions as specified in TS 32.240 [3]. + +The OCS may trigger the PCEF to initiate an IP-CAN bearer service termination at any point in time. + +NOTE: As the OCS performs the credit control per charging key basis (and thus has not necessarily the knowledge about the existence of any specific service/application), it is recommended to use different charging keys for any service/application that shall not be unintentionally interrupted. + +There may be several OCSs in a PLMN. The default OCS addresses (i.e. the primary address and secondary address) shall be locally pre-configured within the PCEF and TDF. OCS addresses may also be passed once per IP-CAN session or TDF session from the PCRF to the PCEF or TDF. The OCS addresses provided by the PCRF shall have a higher priority than the pre-configured ones. + +## 6.2.6 Offline Charging System (OFCs) + +The Offline Charging System is specified in TS 32.240 [3]. + +There may be several OFCSs in a PLMN. The default OFCS addresses (i.e. the primary address and secondary address) shall be locally pre-configured within the PCEF and TDF. OFCS addresses may also be passed once per IP-CAN session or TDF session from the PCRF to the PCEF or TDF. The addresses provided by the PCRF shall have a higher priority than the pre-configured ones. + +## 6.2.7 Bearer Binding and Event Reporting Function (BBERF) + +### 6.2.7.1 General + +The BBERF includes the following functionalities: + +- Bearer binding. +- Uplink bearer binding verification. +- Event reporting to the PCRF. +- Sending or receiving IP-CAN-specific parameters, to or from the PCRF. + +### 6.2.7.2 Service data flow detection + +The service data flow detection at the BBERF is identical to the detection at PCEF with the following modifications: + +- If the service data flow is tunnelled at the BBERF, the BBERF uses information on the mobility protocol tunnelling header provided by the PCRF and the QoS rules to detect the service data flows. + +For the uplink direction, the BBERF applies QoS rules with a bearer binding to the bearer that the packet arrived on. The uplink bearer binding verification is successful if there is a QoS rule with a matching uplink SDF filter. The BBERF shall discard packets for which the uplink bearer binding verification fails. + +### 6.2.7.3 QoS Control + +The ARP, GBR, MBR and QCI are used by the BBERF in the same way as in the PCEF for resource reservation. + +When access network is not utilizing QCI based QoS parameters, the BBERF shall be able to convert a QoS class identifier value to QoS attribute values used in the access network and determine the QoS class identifier value from a set of QoS attribute values used in the access network. + +NOTE: The definition of the mapping between QCI and Non 3GPP access specific QoS is outside of scope for 3GPP. + +The BBERF controls the QoS that is provided to a combined set of service data flows. BBERF ensures that the resources which can be used by an authorized set of service data flows are within the "authorized resources" specified via the Gxx interface by "authorized QoS". The authorized QoS provides an upper bound on the resources that can be reserved (GBR) or allocated (MBR) for the service data flows. + +In order to support the different IP-CAN bearer establishment modes (UE-only or UE/NW), the BBERF shall support the same procedures for handling different IP-CAN bearer establishment modes as specified for the PCEF in clauses 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.4. + +## 6.2.8 User Data Repository (UDR) + +The UDR is a functional entity that acts as a single logical repository storing user data. As such it may contain all subscriber/subscription related information needed by the PCRF. In deployment scenarios where the UDR is used it replaces the SPR. The UDR provides a unique reference point to fetch these subscriber/subscription data. This reference point is named Ud. More information on the UDR can be found in TS 23.335 [25]. + +The SPR data listed in clause 6.2.4 are stored in the UDR, the information model remains unspecified. + +## 6.2.9 Traffic Detection Function (TDF) + +### 6.2.9.1 General + +The TDF is a functional entity that performs application detection and reporting of detected application and its service data flow description to the PCRF. The TDF supports solicited application reporting and/or unsolicited application reporting. The application detection filter may be extended with the PFDs provided by the PFDF as described in clause 6.1.20. The new PFDs provided by the PFDF replace the existing ones in the PCEF. + +The TDF shall detect Start and Stop of the application traffic for the ADC rules that the PCRF has activated at the TDF (solicited application reporting) or which are pre-provisioned at the TDF (unsolicited application reporting). The TDF shall report, unless the notification is muted for the specific ADC Rule in case of solicited application reporting, to the PCRF: + +- For the Start of application event trigger: the application identifier and, when service data flow descriptions are deducible, the application instance identifier and the service data flow descriptions to use for detecting that application traffic with a dynamic PCC rule as defined in clause 6.1.4. +- For the Stop of application event trigger: the application identifier and if the application instance identifier was reported for the Start, also the application instance identifier as defined in the clause 6.1.4. + +For solicited application reporting, the PCRF can request the TDF to also perform enforcement actions, charging and usage monitoring. + +For those cases where service data flow description is not possible to be provided by the TDF to the PCRF, the TDF performs: + +- Gating; + +- Redirection; +- Bandwidth limitation; +- Charging. + +for the detected applications. + +For those cases where service data flow description is provided by the TDF to the PCRF the actions resulting of application detection may be performed by the PCEF as part of the charging and policy enforcement per service data flow as defined in this document or may be performed by the TDF. + +NOTE: The PCEF can be enhanced with application detection and control feature as specified in clause 6.2.2.5. + +The TDF shall support usage monitoring as specified in clause 4.4 and the usage reporting functions as specified in clause 6.2.2.3 for the PCEF. + +The TDF shall support data volume, duration, combined volume/duration and event based measurement for charging. The Measurement method indicates what measurement type is applicable for the ADC rule. + +NOTE 1: Events to be charged are predefined in the TDF. + +The TDF measurement measures all the user plane traffic, except packets discarded by ADC-rule enforcement or due to MBR-enforcement. + +The TDF shall maintain a measurement per TDF session and Charging Key combination. + +If Service identifier level reporting is mandated in an ADC rule, the TDF shall maintain a measurement for that Charging Key and Service identifier combination, for the TDF session. + +If there are required events which cannot be monitored in the TDF (e.g. related to the location changes), the TDF shall request the information about these Event Triggers from the PCRF using either: + +- The IP-CAN Session Establishment procedure, as defined in clause 7.2, or +- The PCEF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification procedure, as defined in clause 7.4.1, or +- In the response to a PCRF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification, as defined in clause 7.4.2, or +- Within the Update of the subscription information in the PCRF procedure, as defined in clause 7.5. + +For unsolicited application reporting, the TDF performs only application detection and reporting functionality but neither enforcement actions nor usage monitoring. The TDF should handle each IPv4 address and IPv6 prefix, assuming the max prefix length used in the access network, within a separate TDF session. The PCRF shall, if needed, correlate TDF sessions that correspond to the same IP-CAN session. + +The TDF shall support traffic steering as specified in clause 6.1.17. + +## 6.2.9.2 Traffic steering + +When the PCRF provides a Traffic Steering Policy Identifier(s) in an ADC rule, the TDF shall enforce the referenced traffic steering policy for the application. A traffic steering policy is locally configured and can be used for the uplink, the downlink or for both directions. + +To enforce the traffic steering policy, the TDF performs deployment specific actions as configured for that traffic steering policy. The TDF may for example perform packet marking where, for the traffic identified by the Application Identifier or by the service data flow filter list (defined by an active ADC rule), the TDF provides information for traffic steering, as part of the packets, to the (S)Gi-LAN. This information for traffic steering identifies, explicitly or implicitly, a specific set of service functions and their order via which the traffic needs to be steered in the (S)Gi-LAN. + +## 6.2.10 RAN Congestion Awareness Function (RCAF) + +A RAN Congestion Awareness Function (RCAF) is an element which reports RAN User Plane Congestion Information (RUCI) via the Np interface to the PCRF to enable the PCRF to take the RAN user plane congestion status into account for policy decisions. The RCAF sends the RUCI to the PCRFs serving the UEs' PDN connections as follows: + +- For a PDN connection in a non-roaming scenario the RCAF reports the RUCI to the PCRF. +- For a PDN connection in a local breakout scenario, based on operator configuration, the RCAF reports the RUCI to the V-PCRF. +- For a PDN connection in a home routed scenario, based on the roaming agreement with the HPLMN and operator configuration, the RCAF reports the RUCI to the H-PCRF. + +NOTE 1: Reporting of congestion information to the HPLMN may be used e.g. in case of a group of PLMNs which belong to a single business entity. + +The RCAF determines whether a given PDN connection is served in a local breakout or a home routed roaming scenario based on the APN operator identifier received as part of the APN information from the MME or the S4-SGSN as documented in TS 23.401 [17] and TS 23.060 [12], respectively. + +NOTE 2: Operator configuration can be used to limit RUCI reporting on the Np interface to certain APNs only. + +In addition if the RCAF detects that a UE is no longer subject to congestion (i.e. the UE is no longer detected in any of the congested cells that the RCAF is monitoring) then the RCAF shall indicate the no congestion state to the PCRFs serving the UE. + +Any RUCI changes shall be reported by RCAF unless reporting restrictions apply. + +The RCAF maintains a context on per UE and per APN basis. The context is identified by the IMSI and the APN. It contains the following information: + +- The previously reported congestion level over the Np reference point. +- The reporting restrictions received from the PCRF. The reporting restrictions are stored by the RCAF until the PCRF explicitly signals to remove the reporting restrictions. +- The logical PCRF id received from the PCRF to identify the PCRF that is the Np destination for the RCAF when sending aggregate messages. + +## 6.2.11 Service Capability Exposure Function (SCEF) + +A Service Capability Exposure Function (SCEF) is an element which provides a means to securely expose the services and capabilities provided by 3GPP network interfaces (for further details see TS 23.682 [42]). + +## 6.2.12 Traffic Steering Support Function (TSSF) + +The TSSF is a function that receives traffic steering control information from the PCRF and ensures that the related traffic steering policy is enforced in the (S)Gi-LAN. + +A traffic steering policy is locally configured in TSSF and can be used for uplink, downlink or for both directions. To ensure that the traffic steering policy is enforced, the TSSF performs deployment specific actions as configured for that traffic steering policy. For example, the TSSF may configure traffic detection and forwarding entities in the (S)Gi-LAN to fulfil the traffic steering policy. + +## 6.2.13 Packet Flow Description Function (PFDF) + +A Packet Flow Description Function (PFDF) is an element which stores PFDs associated with an application identifier and transfers them to the PCEF/TDF via Gw/Gwn interface to enable the PCEF/TDF to perform application detection when the PFDs are managed by a 3rd party SP. + +The PFDF receives PFDs for an application identifier from the SCEF as defined in TS 23.682 [42]. + +## 6.3 Policy and charging control rule + +### 6.3.1 General + +The Policy and charging control rule (PCC rule) comprises the information that is required to enable the user plane detection of, the policy control and proper charging for a service data flow. The packets detected by applying the service data flow template of a PCC rule form a service data flow. + +Two different types of PCC rules exist: Dynamic rules and predefined rules. The dynamic PCC rules are provisioned by the PCRF via the Gx reference point, while the predefined PCC rules are directly provisioned into the PCEF and only referenced by the PCRF. The usage of predefined PCC rules for QoS control is possible if the BBF remains in the PCEF during the lifetime of an IP-CAN session. In addition, predefined PCC rules may be used in a non-roaming situation and if it can be guaranteed that corresponding predefined QoS rules are configured in the BBF and activated along with the predefined PCC rules. + +NOTE 1: The procedure for provisioning predefined PCC rules is out of scope for this specification. + +NOTE 2: There may be another type of predefined rules that are not explicitly known in the PCRF and not under the control of the PCRF. The operator may define such predefined PCC rules, to be activated by the PCEF on one IP-CAN bearer within the IP-CAN session. The PCEF may only activate such predefined PCC rules if there is no UE provided traffic mapping information related to that IP-CAN bearer. The IP-CAN session termination procedure deactivates such predefined PCC rules. + +There are defined procedures for activation, modification and deactivation of PCC rules (as described in clause 6.3.2). The PCRF may activate, modify and deactivate a PCC rule at any time, over the Gx reference point. However, the modification procedure is applicable to dynamic PCC rules only. + +Each PCC rule shall be installed for a single IP-CAN bearer only (for further details about predefined PCC rules see clause 6.3.2). + +The operator defines the PCC rules. + +Table 6.3 lists the information contained in a PCC rule, including the information name, the description and whether the PCRF may modify this information in a dynamic PCC rule which is active in the PCEF. The Category field indicates if a certain piece of information is mandatory or not for the construction of a PCC rule, i.e. if it is possible to construct a PCC rule without it. + +**Table 6.3: The PCC rule information** + +| Information name | Description | Category | PCRF permitted to modify for a dynamic PCC rule in the PCEF | +|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| Rule identifier | Uniquely identifies the PCC rule, within an IP-CAN session.
It is used between PCRF and PCEF for referencing PCC rules. | Mandatory | no | +| Service data flow detection | This part defines the method for detecting packets belonging to a service data flow. | | | +| Precedence | Determines the order, in which the service data flow templates are applied at service data flow detection, enforcement and charging. (NOTE 9). | Conditional (NOTE 13) | yes | +| Service data flow template | Either a list of service data flow filters or an application identifier that references the corresponding application detection filter for the detection of the service data flow. | Mandatory (NOTE 7) | Conditional (NOTE 12) | +| Mute for notification | Defines whether application's start or stop notification is to be muted. | Conditional (NOTE 8) | No | +| Charging | This part defines identities and instructions for charging and accounting that is required for an access point where flow based charging is configured | | | +| Charging key | The charging system (OCS or OFCS) uses the charging key to determine the tariff to apply to the service data flow. | | yes | +| Service identifier | The identity of the service or service component the service data flow in a rule relates to. | | yes | +| Sponsor Identifier | An identifier, provided from the AF which identifies the Sponsor, used for sponsored flows to correlate measurements from different users for accounting purposes. | Conditional (NOTE 6) | yes | +| Application Service Provider Identifier | An identifier, provided from the AF which identifies the Application Service Provider, used for sponsored flows to correlate measurements from different users for accounting purposes. | Conditional (NOTE 6) | yes | +| Charging method | Indicates the required charging method for the PCC rule.
Values: online, offline or neither. | Conditional (NOTE 4) | no | + +| Information name | Description | Category | PCRF permitted to modify for a dynamic PCC rule in the PCEF | +|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| Measurement method | Indicates whether the service data flow data volume, duration, combined volume/duration or event shall be measured.
This is applicable to reporting, if the charging method is online or offline.
Note: Event based charging is only applicable to predefined PCC rules and PCC rules used for application detection filter (i.e. with an application identifier). | | yes | +| Application Function Record Information | An identifier, provided from the AF, correlating the measurement for the Charging key/Service identifier values in this PCC rule with application level reports. | | no | +| Service identifier level reporting | Indicates that separate usage reports shall be generated for this Service identifier.
Values: mandated or not required | | Yes | +| Policy control | This part defines how the PCEF shall apply policy control for the service data flow. | | | +| Gate status | The gate status indicates whether the service data flow, detected by the service data flow template, may pass (Gate is open) or shall be discarded (Gate is closed) at the PCEF. | | Yes | +| QoS class identifier | Identifier for the authorized QoS parameters for the service data flow.
Values: see NOTE 1. | Conditional (NOTE 2) | Yes | +| UL-maximum bitrate | The uplink maximum bitrate authorized for the service data flow | Conditional (NOTE 3) | Yes | +| DL-maximum bitrate | The downlink maximum bitrate authorized for the service data flow | Conditional (NOTE 3) | Yes | +| UL-guaranteed bitrate | The uplink guaranteed bitrate authorized for the service data flow | | Yes | +| DL-guaranteed bitrate | The downlink guaranteed bitrate authorized for the service data flow | | Yes | +| UL sharing indication | Indicates resource sharing in uplink direction with service data flows having the same value in their PCC rule | | No | +| DL sharing indication | Indicates resource sharing in downlink direction with service data flows having the same value in their PCC rule | | No | + +| Information name | Description | Category | PCRF permitted to modify for a dynamic PCC rule in the PCEF | +|-------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| Redirect | Redirect state of the service data flow (enabled/disabled) | Conditional (NOTE 10) | Yes | +| Redirect Destination | Controlled Address to which the service data flow is redirected when redirect is enabled | Conditional (NOTE 11) | Yes | +| ARP | The Allocation and Retention Priority for the service data flow consisting of the priority level, the pre-emption capability and the pre-emption vulnerability | Conditional (NOTE 5) | Yes | +| Bind to Default Bearer | Indicates that the dynamic PCC rule shall always have its bearer binding with the default bearer. | Conditional (NOTE 15) | Yes | +| PS to CS session continuity | Indicates whether the service data flow is a candidate for vSRVCC. | Conditional | No | +| Access Network Information Reporting | This part describes access network information to be reported for the PCC rule when the corresponding bearer is established, modified or terminated. | | | +| User Location Report | The serving cell of the UE is to be reported. When the corresponding bearer is deactivated, and if available, information on when the UE was last known to be in that location is also to be reported. | | Yes | +| UE Timezone Report | The time zone of the UE is to be reported. | | Yes | +| Usage Monitoring Control | This part describes identities required for Usage Monitoring Control. | | | +| Monitoring key | The PCRF uses the monitoring key to group services that share a common allowed usage. | | Yes | +| Indication of exclusion from session level monitoring | Indicates that the service data flow shall be excluded from the IP-CAN session usage monitoring | | Yes | +| Traffic Steering Enforcement Control | This part describes identities required for Traffic Steering Enforcement Control. | | | +| Traffic steering policy identifier(s) | Reference to a pre-configured traffic steering policy at the PCEF (NOTE 14). | | Yes | +| NBIFOM related control Information | This part describes PCC rule information related with NBIFOM (defined in TS 23.161 [43]. Refer also to clause 6.1.18. | | | +| Allowed Access Type | The access to be used for traffic identified by the PCC rule | | Yes | +| Routing Rule Identifier | The Routing Rule identifier to be used in NBIFOM routing rule | | No | + +| Information name | Description | Category | PCRF permitted to modify for a dynamic PCC rule in the PCEF | +|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| RAN support information | This part defines information supporting the RAN for e.g. handover threshold decision. | | | +| UL Maximum Packet Loss Rate | The maximum rate for lost packets that can be tolerated in the uplink direction for service data flow. It is defined in TS 23.401 [17], clause 5.4.1. | Conditional (NOTE 16) | Yes | +| DL Maximum Packet Loss Rate | The maximum rate for lost packets that can be tolerated in the downlink direction for service data flow. It is defined in TS 23.401 [17], clause 5.4.1. | Conditional (NOTE 16) | Yes | + +NOTE 1: The QoS class identifier is scalar and accommodates the need for differentiating QoS in all types of 3GPP IP-CAN. The value range is expandable to accommodate additional types of IP-CAN. + +NOTE 2: The QoS class identifier is mandatory when the bearer binding is allocated to the PCEF. + +NOTE 3: Mandatory when the QoS class identifier is of Resource Type GBR. Used to activate policy control on SDF level at the PCEF. + +NOTE 4: Mandatory if there is no default charging method for the IP-CAN session. + +NOTE 5: Mandatory when policy control on SDF level applies unless otherwise stated in an access-specific Annex. + +NOTE 6: Applicable to sponsored data connectivity. + +NOTE 7: Either service data flow filter(s) or application identifier shall be defined per each rule. application identifier can only be used for PCEF enhanced with ADC. + +NOTE 8: Optional and applicable only if application identifier exists within the rule. + +NOTE 9: For PCC rules based on an application detection filter, the precedence is only relevant for the enforcement, i.e. when multiple PCC rules overlap, only the enforcement, reporting of application starts and stops, monitoring, and charging actions of the PCC rule with the highest precedence shall be applied. + +NOTE 10: Optional and applicable only if application identifier exists within the rule. + +NOTE 11: If Redirect is enabled. + +NOTE 12: YES, in case the service data flow template consists of a set of service data flow filters. NO in case the service data flow template consists of an application identifier. + +NOTE 13: The Precedence is mandatory for PCC rules with SDF template containing SDF filter(s). For dynamic PCC rules with SDF template containing an application identifier, the precedence is either preconfigured in PCEF or provided in the PCC rule from PCRF. + +NOTE 14: The Traffic steering policy identifier can be different for uplink and downlink direction. If two Traffic steering policy identifiers are provided, then one is for uplink direction, while the other one is for downlink direction. + +NOTE 15: The presence of this attribute causes the QCI/ARP of the rule to be ignored. This attribute is defined for selected accesses as specified in the access specific Annexes. + +NOTE 16: Optional and applicable only for voice service data flow in this Release. + +The *Rule identifier* shall be unique for a PCC rule within an IP-CAN session. A dynamically provided PCC rule that has the same Rule identifier value as a predefined PCC rule shall replace the predefined rule within the same IP-CAN session. + +The *Service data flow template* may comprise any number of Service data flow filters. A Service data flow filter contains information for matching user plane packets. A Service data flow filter, provided from the PCRF, contains information elements as described in clause 6.2.2.2. The Service data flow template filtering information within an activated PCC rule is applied at the PCEF to identify the packets belonging to a particular service data flow. + +NOTE 3: Predefined PCC rules may include service data flow filters, which support extended capabilities, including enhanced capabilities to identify events associated with application protocols. + +Alternatively, the Service data flow template consists of an *application identifier* that references an application detection filter that is used for matching user plane packets. The application identifier is also identifying the application, for which the rule applies. The same application identifier value can occur in more than one PCC rule with the following restrictions: + +- The same application identifier value can be used for a dynamic PCC rule and one or multiple predefined PCC rules. If so, the PCRF shall ensure that there is at most one PCC rule active per application identifier value at any time. + +NOTE 4: The configuration of the Application Identifier in the PCEF can include the set of information required for encrypted traffic detection as defined in Annex X. + +The *Mute for notification* defines whether notification to the PCRF of application's starts or stops shall be muted. Absence of this parameter means that start/stop notifications shall be sent. + +The *Precedence* defines in what order the activated PCC rules within the same IP-CAN session shall be applied at the PCEF for service data flow detection. When a dynamic PCC rule and a predefined PCC rule have the same precedence, the dynamic PCC rule takes precedence. For dynamic PCC rules that contain an application identifier, the Precedence shall be either preconfigured at the PCEF or provided dynamically by the PCRF within the PCC Rules. + +NOTE 5: The operator shall ensure that overlap between the predefined PCC rules can be resolved based on precedence of each predefined PCC rule in the PCEF. The PCRF shall ensure that overlap between the dynamically allocated PCC rules can be resolved based on precedence of each dynamically allocated PCC rule. Further information about the configuration of the PCC rule precedence is described in Annex G. + +NOTE 6: Whether precedence for dynamic PCC rules that contain an application identifier is preconfigured in PCEF or provided in the PCC rule from the PCRF depends on network configuration. + +For downlink packets all the service data flow templates, activated for the IP-CAN session shall be applied for service data flow detection and for the mapping to the correct IP-CAN bearer. For uplink packets the service data flow templates activated on their IP-CAN bearer shall be applied for service data flow detection (further details provided in clause 6.2.2.2 and the IP-CAN specific annexes). + +The *Charging key* is the reference to the tariff for the service data flow. Any number of PCC Rules may share the same charging key value. The charging key values for each service shall be operator configurable. + +NOTE 7: Assigning the same Charging key for several service data flows implies that the charging does not require the credit management to be handled separately. + +NOTE 8: If the IP flow mobility is supported and the tariff depends on what access network is in use for the service data flow, then a separate Charging key can be allocated for each access network, and the PCRF can set the Charging key in accordance with the access network in use. + +The *Service identifier* identifies the service. PCC Rules may share the same service identifier value. The service identifier provides the most detailed identification, specified for flow based charging, of a service data flow. + +NOTE 9: The PCC rule service identifier need not have any relationship to service identifiers used on the AF level, i.e. is an operator policy option. + +The *Sponsor Identifier* indicates the (3rd) party organization willing to pay for the operator's charge for connectivity required to deliver a service to the end user. + +The *Application Service Provider Identifier* indicates the (3rd) party organization delivering a service to the end user. + +The *Charging method* indicates whether online charging, offline charging, or both are required or the service data flow is not subject to any end user charging. If the charging method identifies that the service data flow is not subject to any end user charging, a Charging key shall not be included in the PCC rule for that service data flow, along with other charging related parameters. If the charging method is omitted the PCEF shall apply the default charging method as determined at IP-CAN session establishment (see clause 6.4). The Charging method is mandatory if there is no default charging method for the IP-CAN session. + +The *Measurement method* indicates what measurements apply to charging for PCC rule. + +The *Service Identifier Level Reporting* indicates whether the PCEF shall generate reports per Service Identifier. The PCEF shall accumulate the measurements from all PCC rules with the same combination of Charging key/Service identifier values in a single report. + +The *Application function record information* identifies an instance of service usage. A subsequently generated usage report, generated as a result of the PCC rule, may include the Application function record information, if available. The Application Function Record Information may contain the AF Charging Identifier and/or the Flow identifiers. The + +report is however not restricted to include only usage related to the Application function record information reported, as the report accumulates the usage for all PCC rules with the same combination of Charging key/Service identifier values. If exclusive charging information related to the Application function record information is required, the PCRF shall provide a service identifier, not used by any other PCC rule of the IP-CAN session at this point in time, for the AF session. + +NOTE 10: For example, the PCRF may be configured to maintain a range of service identifier values for each service which require exclusive per instance charging information. Whenever a separate counting or credit management for an AF session is required, the PCRF shall select a value, which is not used at this point in time, within that range. The uniqueness of the service identifier in the PCEF ensures a separate accounting/credit management while the AF record information identifies the instance of the service. + +The *Gate* indicates whether the PCEF shall let a packet identified by the PCC rule pass through (gate is open) the PCEF, or the PCEF shall discard (gate is closed) the packet. + +NOTE 11: A packet, matching a PCC Rule with an open gate, may be discarded due to credit management reasons. + +The *QoS Class Identifier* for the service data flow. The QoS class identifier represents the QoS parameters for the service data flow. The PCEF maintains the mapping between QoS class identifier and the QoS concept applied within the specific IP-CAN. The bitrate information is separate from the QoS class identifier value. + +The bitrates indicate the authorized bitrates at the IP packet level of the SDF, i.e. the bitrates of the IP packets before any IP-CAN specific compression or encapsulation. + +The *UL maximum-bitrate* indicates the authorized maximum bitrate for the uplink component of the service data flow. + +The *DL maximum-bitrate* indicates the authorized maximum bitrate for the downlink component of the service data flow. + +The *UL guaranteed-bitrate* indicates the authorized guaranteed bitrate for the uplink component of the service data flow. + +The *DL guaranteed-bitrate* indicates the authorized guaranteed bitrate for the downlink component of the service data flow. + +The 'Maximum bitrate' is used for enforcement of the maximum bit rate that the SDF may consume, while the 'Guaranteed bitrate' is used by the PCEF to determine resource allocation. + +The *UL sharing indication* indicates that resource sharing in uplink direction for service data flows with the same value in their PCC rule shall be applied by the PCEF as described in clauses 6.1.14 and 6.2.2.4. + +The *DL sharing indication* indicates that resource sharing in downlink direction for service data flows with the same value in their PCC rule shall be applied by the PCEF as described in clauses 6.1.14 and 6.2.2.4. + +The *Redirect* indicates whether the uplink part of the service data flow should be redirected to a controlled address. + +The *Redirect Destination* indicates the target redirect address when Redirect is enabled. + +The *Allocation and Retention Priority* indicates the allocation, retention and priority of the service data flow. The ARP contains information about the priority level, the pre-emption capability and the pre-emption vulnerability. The Allocation and Retention Priority resolves conflicts of demands for network resources. + +The *Bind to Default Bearer* indicates that the dynamic PCC rule shall be bound to the default bearer. + +The *PS to CS session continuity* is present if the service data flow is a candidate for vSRVCC according to TS 23.216 [28]. + +The access network information reporting parameters (*User Location Report*, *UE Timezone Report*) instruct the PCEF about what information to forward to the PCRF when the PCC rule is activated, modified or removed. + +The *Monitoring Key* is the reference to a resource threshold. Any number of PCC Rules may share the same monitoring key value. The monitoring key values for each service shall be operator configurable. + +The *Indication of exclusion from session level monitoring* indicates that the service data flow shall be excluded from the IP-CAN session usage monitoring. + +The *Traffic Steering Policy Identifier(s)* is a reference to a pre-configured traffic steering policy at the PCEF as defined in clause 6.11.1. + +The *Allowed Access Type* applies only in case of NBIFOM. The *Allowed Access Type* indicates the IP-CAN type that is to be used for the transfer of traffic identified by the PCC rule. The PCEF uses the *Allowed Access Type* as input for the bearer binding. When network-initiated NBIFOM mode applies, the PCEF shall also create / modify / delete a corresponding Routing Rule for such a PCC rule at the UE as described in clause 6.1.18.2. When the *Allowed Access Type* is not provided within a PCC rule, the traffic identified by the PCC rule is to be transferred on the default NBIFOM access. + +The *Routing Rule Identifier* applies only in case of NBIFOM. The PCRF provides it to the PCEF only when network-initiated NBIFOM mode applies. + +The *UL Maximum Packet Loss Rate* indicates the maximum rate for lost packets that can be tolerated in the uplink direction. + +The *DL Maximum Packet Loss Rate* indicates the maximum rate for lost packets that can be tolerated in the downlink direction. + +## 6.3.2 Policy and charging control rule operations + +Policy and charging control rule operations consist of activation, modification and de-activation of PCC rules. + +Activation of a dynamic PCC rule provides the PCC rule information to the PCEF via the Gx reference point. + +Activation of a predefined PCC rule provides an identifier of the relevant PCC rule to the PCEF via the Gx reference point. + +Activation of a predefined PCC rule, not known in the PCRF, may be done by the PCEF based on operator policy. The PCEF may only activate such predefined PCC rule if there are no UE provided traffic mapping information related to the IP-CAN bearer. Further restrictions regarding the usage of predefined PCC rules are described in clause 6.3.1. + +An active PCC rule means that: + +- the service data flow template shall be used for service data flow detection; +- the service data flow template shall be used for mapping of downlink packets to the IP-CAN bearer determined by the bearer binding; +- the service data flow template shall be used for service data flow detection of uplink packets on the IP-CAN bearer determined by the bearer binding; +- usage data for the service data flow shall be recorded (further details can be found in clause 6.1.2 Reporting and clause 6.1.3 Credit Management); +- policies associated with the PCC rule, if any, shall be invoked. +- for service data flow detection with an application detection filter, the start or the stop of the application traffic is reported to the PCRF, if applicable and requested by the PCRF. In that case, the notification for Start may include service data flow filters, (if possible to provide) and the application instance identifier associated with the service data flow filters. + +A predefined PCC rule is known at least, within the scope of one access point. + +NOTE 1: The same predefined PCC rule can be activated for multiple IP-CAN bearers in multiple IP-CAN sessions. + +A predefined PCC rule is bound to one and only one IP-CAN bearer per IP-CAN session. For a predefined PCC rule whose service data flow cannot be fully reflected for the uplink direction in terms of traffic mapping information sent to the UE, the PCEF may apply the uplink service data flow detection at additional IP-CAN bearers with non-GBR QCI of the same IP-CAN session. The deactivation of such a predefined PCC rule ceases its service data flow detection for the whole IP-CAN session. + +The PCRF may, at any time, modify an active, dynamic PCC rule. + +The PCRF may, at any time, deactivate an active PCC rule in the PCEF via the Gx reference point. At IP-CAN bearer termination all active PCC rules on that bearer are deactivated without explicit instructions from the PCRF to do so. + +Policy and charging control rule operations can be also performed in a deferred mode. A PCC rule may have either a single deferred activation time, or a single deferred deactivation time or both. + +A PCC rule with only a deferred activation time shall be inactive until that time. A PCC rule with only a deferred deactivation time shall be active until that time. When the rule activation time occurs prior to the rule deactivation time, the rule is inactive until the activation and remains active until the deactivation time occurs. When the rule deactivation time occurs prior to the rule activation time, the rule is initially active until the deactivation time, then remains inactive until the activation time, and then becomes active again. An inactive PCC rule, that has not been activated yet, is still considered to be installed, and may be removed by the PCRF. + +The PCRF may modify a currently installed PCC rule, including setting, modifying or clearing its deferred activation and/or deactivation time. When modifying a dynamic PCC rule with a prior and/or new deferred activation and/or deactivation time, the PCRF shall provide all attributes of that rule, including attributes that have not changed. + +NOTE 2: In this case, the PCRF omission of an attribute that has a prior value will erase that attribute from the rule. + +Deferred activation and deactivation of PCC rules can only be used for PCC rules that belong to the IP-CAN bearer without traffic mapping information. + +NOTE 3: This limitation prevents dependencies on the signalling of changed traffic mapping information towards the UE. + +Deferred modification of PCC rules shall not be applied for changes of the QoS or service data flow filter information of PCC rules. + +## 6.4 IP-CAN bearer and IP-CAN session related policy information + +The purpose of the IP-CAN bearer and IP-CAN session related policy information is to provide policy and charging control related information that is applicable to a single IP-CAN bearer or the whole IP-CAN session respectively. The PCRF provides the IP-CAN bearer and IP-CAN session related policy information to the PCEF and BBERF (if applicable) using the PCC rule and QoS rule (if applicable) provision procedure. The IP-CAN bearer related policy information may be provided together with rules or separately. + +Table 6.4 lists the PCC related IP-CAN bearer and IP-CAN session related policy information. + +**Table 6.4: PCC related IP-CAN bearer and IP-CAN session related policy information** + +| Attribute | Description | PCRF permitted to modify the attribute | Scope | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------| +| Charging information (NOTE 2) | Defines the containing OFCS and/or OCS addresses. | No | IP-CAN session | +| Default charging method (NOTE 2) | Defines the default charging method for the IP-CAN session. | No | IP-CAN session | +| Event trigger | Defines the event(s) that shall cause a re-request of PCC rules for the IP-CAN bearer. | Yes | IP-CAN session | +| Authorized QoS per bearer (UE-initiated IP-CAN bearer activation/modification) (NOTE 1) | Defines the authorised QoS for the IP-CAN bearer (QCI, GBR, MBR). | Yes | IP-CAN bearer | +| Authorized MBR per QCI (network initiated IP-CAN bearer activation/modification) (NOTE 1) (NOTE 3) | Defines the authorised MBR per QCI. | Yes | IP-CAN session | +| Revalidation time limit | Defines the time period within which the PCEF shall perform a PCC rules request. | Yes | IP-CAN session | +| PRA Identifier(s) | Defines the Presence Reporting Area(s) to monitor for the UE with respect to entering/leaving | Yes | IP-CAN session | +| List(s) of Presence Reporting Area elements (NOTE 4) | Defines the elements of the Presence Reporting Area(s) | Yes | IP-CAN session | +| Default NBIFOM access | The access to be used for all traffic that does not match any existing Routing Rule | Yes (only at the addition of an access to the IP-CAN session) | IP-CAN session | + +NOTE 1: Depending on the bearer establishment mode; only one Authorized QoS information has to be used. +NOTE 2: These attributes should not be provided to BBERF. +NOTE 3: This attribute is only applicable when the IP-CAN supports non-GBR bearers that have a separate MBR (e.g. for GPRS). +NOTE 4: The list of PRA elements shall be a short list of elements. + +Upon the initial interaction with the PCEF, the PCRF may provide Charging information containing OFCS and/or OCS addresses to the PCEF defining the offline and online charging system addresses respectively. These shall override any possible predefined addresses at the PCEF. If received by the PCEF, it supersedes the Primary OFCS/OCS address and Secondary OFCS/OCS address in the charging characteristics profile. + +Upon the initial interaction with the PCEF, the PCRF may provide Default charging method indicating what charging method shall be used in the IP-CAN session for every PCC rule where the charging method identifier is omitted, including predefined PCC rules that are activated by the PCEF. If received by the PCEF, it supersedes the Default charging method in the charging characteristics profile. + +Upon every interaction with the ERF, the PCRF may provide event triggers for the IP-CAN session. Event triggers are used to determine which IP-CAN bearer modification causes the ERF to re-request PCC rules. The triggers are listed in clause 6.1.4. + +The semantics of the authorized QoS per bearer (UE-initiated IP-CAN bearer activation/modification) and the authorized MBR per QCI (network initiated IP-CAN bearer activation/modification) are captured in clause 6.2.2.4. + +The Revalidation time limit defines the time period within which the PCEF shall trigger a request for PCC rules for an established IP-CAN session. + +Upon every interaction with the PCEF, the PCRF and the OCS may activate / deactivate reporting changes of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area by setting / unsetting the corresponding event trigger or credit reauthorization + +trigger by providing the PRA Identifier(s) and additionally the list(s) of elements comprising the Presence Reporting Area for UE-dedicated Presence Reporting Area(s), as described in clauses 6.1.4 and 6.1.3, respectively. + +The PCEF shall combine the requests from PCRF and the OCS. + +When the Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area is armed, i.e. when the PCRF or the OCS subscribes to reporting change of UE presence in a particular Presence Reporting Area and the reporting change of UE presence in this Presence Reporting Area was not activated before, the PCEF shall activate the relevant IP-CAN specific procedure which reports when the UE enters or leaves a Presence Reporting Area (an initial report is received when the IP-CAN specific procedure is activated). The PCEF reports the PRA Identifier(s) and indication(s) whether the UE is inside or outside the Presence Reporting Area(s), and indication(s) if the corresponding Presence Reporting Area(s) is set to inactive by the serving node to the PCRF and/or the OCS. + +NOTE: The serving node can activate the reporting for the PRAs which are inactive as described in the TS 23.401 [17]. + +When neither the PCRF nor the OCS are subscribed to change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area for a particular Presence Reporting Area, the PCEF shall deactivate the relevant IP-CAN specific procedure which reports when the UE enters or leaves a Presence Reporting Area. + +The PCEF stores PCRF or OCS subscription to reporting for changes of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area and forwards the PRA Identifier(s) and indication(s) whether the UE is inside or outside the Presence Reporting Area(s) received from the serving node according to the corresponding subscription. + +When a PRA set identified by a PRA Identifier was subscribed to report changes of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area by the PCRF and/or OCS, the PCEF additionally receives the PRA Identifier of the PRA set from the serving node, along with the individual PRA Identifier(s) belonging to the PRA set and indication(s) of whether the UE is inside or outside the individual Presence Reporting Area(s), as described in TS 23.401 [17]. + +## 6.4a TDF session related policy information + +The purpose of the TDF session related information is to provide information that is applicable to the whole TDF session. The PCRF provides the TDF session related information to the TDF (if applicable) using ADC rule provision procedure. + +Table 6.4a lists the TDF session related policy information. + +**Table 6.4a: TDF session related policy information** + +| Attribute | Description | PCRF permitted to modify the attribute | +|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------| +| Charging Characteristics | Defines how to control TDF behaviour regarding online and offline charging. | No | +| Charging information | Defines the containing OFCS and/or OCS addresses. | No | +| Default charging method | Defines the default charging method for the TDF session. | No | +| Event trigger | Defines the event(s) that shall cause a re-request of ADC rules for the TDF session. | Yes | +| Maximum downlink bit rate | Defines the maximum downlink bit rate per TDF session. | Yes | +| Maximum uplink bit rate | Defines the maximum uplink bit rate per TDF session. | Yes | +| ADC Revalidation time limit | Defines the time period within which the TDF shall perform an ADC rules request. | Yes | + +Upon the initial interaction with the TDF, the PCRF may provide Charging Characteristics to the TDF, if received from the PCEF, defining how to control TDF behaviour regarding online and offline charging. + +Upon the initial interaction with the TDF, the PCRF may provide Charging information containing OFCS and/or OCS addresses to the TDF defining the offline and online charging system addresses respectively. These shall override any possible predefined addresses at the TDF. If received by the TDF, it supersedes the Primary OFCS/OCS address and Secondary OFCS/OCS address predefined at the TDF. + +Upon the initial interaction with the TDF, the PCRF may provide Default charging method indicating what charging method shall be used in the TDF session for every ADC rule where the charging method identifier is omitted. If received by the TDF, it supersedes the defined Default charging method. + +If Charging Characteristics are received by the PCRF from the PCEF, the PCRF may take them into account when providing Charging information and Default charging method to the TDF. In case the TDF receives both Charging Characteristics and Charging information and Default charging method parameters, the Charging Information and Default charging method shall supersede the values received in Charging Characteristics. + +Upon every interaction with the TDF, the PCRF may provide Maximum downlink bit rate and/or Maximum uplink bit rate for the TDF session. + +NOTE: To avoid down-link packets being discarded in PCEF when TDF performs charging, the PCRF should set the Maximum downlink bit rate to the DL APN-AMBR. + +Upon every interaction with the TDF, the PCRF may provide event triggers for the TDF session. Event triggers are used to determine which event causes the TDF to re-request ADC rules. The triggers applicable for the TDF are listed in clause 6.1.4. + +The ADC Revalidation time limit defines the time period within which the TDF shall trigger a request for ADC rules for an established TDF session. + +## 6.4b APN related policy information + +The purpose of the APN related policy information is to provide policy and charging control related information that is applicable to all IP-CAN sessions of a UE to the same APN. The PCRF provides APN related policy information to the PCEF using the PCC provision procedure together with PCC rules or separately. + +Table 6.4b-1 lists the applicable PCC specific APN related policy information. + +**Table 6.4b-1: PCC specific APN related policy information** + +| Attribute | Description | PCRF permitted to modify the attribute | Scope | +|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------| +| Authorized APN-AMBR | Defines the APN-AMBR for the total bandwidth usage of non-GBR QCI traffic at the APN. | Yes | All IP-CAN sessions for the same UE within the same APN | +| Subsequent APN-AMBR (NOTE 1) | Defines the APN-AMBR for the total bandwidth usage of non-GBR QCI traffic at the APN to be applied by the PCEF when the APN-AMBR change time is reached. | No (NOTE 2) | All IP-CAN sessions for the same UE within the same APN | +| APN-AMBR change time (NOTE 1) | Defines the time at which the PCEF shall apply the Subsequent APN-AMBR for the total bandwidth usage of non-GBR QCI traffic at the APN. | No (NOTE 2) | All IP-CAN sessions for the same UE within the same APN | + +NOTE 1: Both parameters shall be provided together. The PCRF may provide up to four instances of them. If multiple instances are provided, the values of the APN-AMBR change time have to be different and should not be too close to each other in order to reduce the risk for signalling overload. + +NOTE 2: The PCRF may replace all instances that have been provided previously with a new instruction. A previously provided Subsequent APN-AMBR or APN-AMBR change time cannot be individually modified. + +The PCRF may provide the (unconditional) Authorized APN-AMBR in every interaction with the PCEF. The PCEF shall apply the Authorized APN-AMBR as APN-AMBR for all IP-CAN sessions of the UE to the same APN and shall communicate the changed APN-AMBR to the UE. + +NOTE 1: There is always an unconditional value for the APN-AMBR available at the PCEF. The initial value is received as Subscribed APN-AMBR in an access specific manner and the PCRF can overwrite it by providing an Authorized APN-AMBR. + +NOTE 2: In order to reduce the risk for signalling overload, the PCRF should avoid simultaneous provisioning of Authorized APN-AMBR for many UEs (e.g. by spreading over time). + +The Authorized APN-AMBR may be provided together with conditions, i.e. a list of RAT types and/or a list of IP-CAN types. One or multiple instances of conditional APN-AMBR, with different conditions, may be provided by the PCRF. The PCEF shall apply a conditional Authorized APN-AMBR as APN-AMBR only if the current RAT type and IP-CAN type match one of the RAT types and IP-CAN types specified in the conditions, respectively. Otherwise the PCEF shall apply the unconditional Authorized APN-AMBR as APN-AMBR. A changed APN-AMBR shall be communicated to the UE. + +NOTE 3: Guidance what conditional Authorized APN-AMBR value to use in case the current RAT type and IP-CAN type match multiple conditional Authorized APN-AMBRs is specified in stage 3. + +Conditional Authorized APN-AMBR(s) are not applied for a PDN connection supporting NBIFOM. + +Upon PCRF changing the unconditional Authorized APN-AMBR or providing a conditional Authorized APN-AMBR, the PCEF shall discard any previously received conditional Authorized APN-AMBR. + +The PCRF may provide the unconditional and/or one or multiple instances of conditional Authorized APN-AMBR together with an APN-AMBR change time, referred to as Subsequent APN-AMBR. When the APN-AMBR change time is reached, the PCEF shall apply the unconditional and/or conditional Subsequent APN-AMBR as unconditional and/or conditional Authorized APN-AMBR and discard any previously applied conditional Authorized APN-AMBRs. + +NOTE 4: The modification is made in the same way as if the PCRF had modified the Authorized APN-AMBR at that point in time. + +Up to four instances of Subsequent APN-AMBR may be provided by the PCRF. The PCEF shall discard any previously received Subsequent APN-AMBR instances on explicit instruction as well as whenever the PCRF provides a new instruction for one or more subsequent changes to the APN-AMBR or any other subsequent parameter. + +NOTE 5: In order to provide further Subsequent APN-AMBRs in a timely fashion the PCRF can use its own clock to issue the desired changes or use the Revalidation time limit parameter (clause 6.4) to trigger a PCEF request for a policy decision. + +## 6.5 Quality of Service Control rule + +### 6.5.1 General + +The Quality of Service control rule (QoS rule) comprises the information that is required to enable the user plane detection and the QoS control for a service data flow in the BBERF. The packets detected by applying the service data flow template of a QoS rule are designated a service data flow. + +NOTE 1: The BBERF only supports service data flow templates consisting of a set of service data flow filters. + +The PCRF shall ensure that each PCC rule in the PCEF has a corresponding active QoS rule in the BBERF. The QoS rule shall contain the same service data flow template, precedence and the QoS information as the corresponding PCC rule. + +NOTE 2: During the course of a BBERF change procedure the BBERF might not be able to maintain the correspondence throughout the procedure. The post-condition for the procedure shall however be that corresponding PCC and QoS rules are active at the PCEF and BBERF. + +There are defined procedures for activation, modification and deactivation of QoS rules (as described in clause 6.5.2). The PCRF may activate, modify and deactivate a QoS rule over the Gxx reference point. + +The QoS rules are derived from the PCC rules. + +Table 6.5 lists the information contained in a QoS rule, including the information name and whether the PCRF may modify this information in a QoS rule which is active in the BBERF. For the IE description, refer to clause 6.3.1. The Category field indicates if a certain piece of information is mandatory or not for the construction of a QoS rule, i.e. if it is possible to construct a QoS rule without it. + +**Table 6.5: The QoS rule information** + +| Information name | Category | PCRF permitted to modify for an active QoS rule in the BBERF | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------| +| Rule identifier (NOTE 1) | Mandatory | No | +| Service data flow detection | | | +| Precedence | Mandatory | Yes | +| Service data flow template | Mandatory | Yes | +| QoS control | | | +| QoS class identifier (NOTE 2) | Mandatory | Yes | +| UL-maximum bitrate | Conditional (NOTE 3) | Yes | +| DL-maximum bitrate | Conditional (NOTE 3) | Yes | +| UL-guaranteed bitrate | Conditional (NOTE 3) | Yes | +| DL-guaranteed bitrate | Conditional (NOTE 3) | Yes | +| UL sharing indication | | No | +| DL sharing indication | | No | +| ARP | Conditional (NOTE 3) | Yes | +| PS to CS session continuity | Conditional | No | +| Access Network Information Reporting | | | +| User Location Report | Conditional | Yes | +| UE Timezone Report | Conditional | Yes | +| NOTE 1: The Rule-Identifier uniquely defines an active QoS rule for a certain BBERF within the scope of a UE. | | | +| NOTE 2: The QoS class identifier is scalar and accommodates the need for differentiating QoS in all types of IP-CAN. The value range is expandable to accommodate operator specific policies. | | | +| NOTE 3: If present in the corresponding PCC rule. | | | + +## 6.5.2 Quality of Service control rule operations + +QoS control rule operations consist of activation, modification and de-activation of QoS rules. + +Activation of a dynamic QoS rule provides the QoS rule information to the BBERF via the Gxx reference point. + +An active QoS rule means that: + +- the service data flow template shall be used for service data flow detection; +- the service data flow template shall be used for mapping of downlink packets to the IP-CAN bearer determined by the bearer binding; +- the service data flow template shall be used for service data flow detection of uplink packets on the IP-CAN bearer determined by the bearer binding; +- QoS procedures associated with the QoS rule, if any, shall be invoked. + +The PCRF may, at any time, modify an active QoS rule. + +The PCRF may, at any time, deactivate an active QoS rule in the BBERF via the Gxx reference point. At IP-CAN bearer termination all active QoS rules on that bearer are deactivated without explicit instructions from the PCRF to do so. + +## 6.6 Usage Monitoring Control specific information + +### 6.6.1 General + +The Usage Monitoring Control information comprises the information that is required to enable user plane monitoring of resources for individual applications/services, groups of applications/services, for an IP-CAN session or for a TDF session. + +**Table 6.6: Usage Monitoring Control related information** + +| Information name | Description | Category | Scope | +|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------| +| Monitoring key | The PCRF uses the monitoring key to group services that share a common allowed usage. | Mandatory | IP-CAN session, TDF session | +| Volume threshold (NOTE 1) | Defines the traffic volume value after which the PCEF or the TDF shall report usage to the PCRF for this monitoring key. | Optional | Monitoring key | +| Time threshold (NOTE 1) | Defines the resource time usage after which the PCEF or the TDF shall report usage to the PCRF. | Optional | Monitoring key | +| Monitoring time | Defines the time at which the PCEF or the TDF shall reapply the Volume and/or Time Threshold. | Optional | Monitoring Key | +| Subsequent Volume threshold | Defines the traffic volume value after which the PCEF or the TDF shall report usage to the PCRF for this Monitoring key for the period after the Monitoring time. | Optional, Conditional (NOTE 2) | Monitoring Key | +| Subsequent Time threshold | Defines resource time usage after which the PCEF or the TDF shall report usage to the PCRF for this Monitoring key for the period after the Monitoring time. | Optional, Conditional (NOTE 2) | Monitoring Key | +| Inactivity Detection Time | Defines the period of time after which the time measurement shall stop, if no packets are received. | Optional, Conditional (NOTE 3) | Monitoring Key | + +NOTE 1: This attribute is also used by the PCEF/TDF, e.g. during IP-CAN/TDF session termination, to inform the PCRF about the resources that have been consumed by the UE. +NOTE 2: This attribute is applicable in presence of Monitoring Time only. +NOTE 3: This attribute is applicable in presence of Time threshold only. + +The *Monitoring Key* is the reference to a resource threshold. Any number of PCC/ADC Rules may share the same monitoring key value. The monitoring key values for each service shall be operator configurable. + +It shall also be possible for an operator to use the *Monitoring Key* parameter to indicate usage monitoring on an IP-CAN session level at the PCEF or on a TDF session level at the TDF. + +The *Volume threshold* indicates the overall user traffic volume value after which the PCEF or the TDF shall report the Usage threshold reached trigger to the PCRF. + +The *Time threshold* indicates the overall resource time usage after which the PCEF or the TDF shall report the Usage threshold reached trigger to the PCRF. + +The *Monitoring time* indicates the time at which the PCEF or the TDF shall store the accumulated usage information. + +The *Subsequent Volume threshold* indicates the overall user traffic volume value measured after Monitoring time, after which the PCEF or the TDF shall report the Usage threshold reached trigger to the PCRF. + +The *Subsequent Time threshold* indicates the overall resource time usage measured after Monitoring time, after which the PCEF or the TDF shall report the Usage threshold reached trigger to the PCRF. + +The *Inactivity Detection Time* indicates the period of time after which the time measurement shall stop, if no packets are received during that time period. + +## 6.6.2 Usage Monitoring Control operations + +Usage monitoring on IP-CAN session, TDF session or monitoring key level is active in the PCEF or TDF provided that certain conditions are met. The conditions for continued monitoring on session level are: + +- For IP-CAN session level monitoring at the PCEF, an IP-CAN session is active and a volume and/or time threshold value for the IP-CAN session has been provided. +- For TDF session level monitoring at the TDF, a TDF session is active and a volume and/or time threshold value has been provided. + +For usage monitoring on Monitoring key level at the PCEF or the TDF the following conditions are applicable: + +- A volume and/or time threshold has been provided for a Monitoring key to the PCEF and there is at least one PCC rule activated for the IP-CAN session that is associated with that Monitoring key. +- A volume and/or time threshold has been provided for a Monitoring key to the TDF and there is at least one ADC rule at the TDF activated for the TDF session that is associated with that Monitoring key. + +NOTE: The PCRF is recommended to use monitoring so that the same traffic is not monitored by both PCC rules and ADC rules. This avoids double counting. + +## 6.7 S2c based IP flow mobility Routing rule + +### 6.7.1 General + +The clause 6.7 refers to UE based IP flow mobility as described in TS 23.261 [23]. + +The routing rule comprises the information that is required for the PCRF to install the QoS rules for a service data flow at the right BBERF in flow mobility scenarios. The PCRF relies on the IP flow mobility routing information contained in the IP flow mobility routing rule to the applicable BBERF for each PCC/QoS rule. The IP flow mobility routing rules are provided by the PCEF to the PCRF during IP-CAN session establishment or modification. + +The PCEF derives IP flow mobility routing rules based on flow binding information received from the UE as described in TS 23.261 [23]. + +Table 6.7 lists the information contained in a routing rule, including the information name, the description and whether the PCEF may modify this information in an updated version of the rule. The Category field indicates if a certain piece of information is mandatory or not. + +**Table 6.7: The routing rule information** + +| Information name | Description | Category | PCEF permitted to modify in an update | +|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------| +| Rule identifier | Uniquely identifies the routing rule within an IP-CAN session. It is assigned by the PCEF. | Mandatory | No | +| Routing information | This clause defines the method for detecting packets belonging to a flow and the route for the flow. | | | +| Precedence | Determines the order, in which the routing filters are applied. | Mandatory | Yes | +| Packet filter | A list of packet filters for the detection of IP flows. | Mandatory | Yes | +| IP flow mobility Routing Address | The IP flow mobility Routing Address that the matching IP flows use. | Mandatory | Yes | + +The *Rule identifier* shall be unique for a routing rule within an IP-CAN session. It is assigned by the PCEF. + +The *Precedence* defines in what order the routing rules is used by the PCRF to determine where to route a service data flow. The Precedence is derived from the priority included in the Binding Update as specified in TS 23.261 [23]. + +The *Packet filter* may comprise any number of packet filters, containing information for matching service data flows. The format of the packet filters is the same as the service data flow filter described in clause 6.2.2.2. A default packet filter can be specified by using wild card filter. + +The *IP flow mobility Routing Address* identifies the IP address to be used for all service data flows matching the packet filters specified for this routing rule. The IP flow mobility Routing Address can be equal to the care-of address, or to the UE IP address (home address) in case of home link operations. + +## 6.7.2 Routing rule operations + +IP flow mobility routing rule operations consist of installation, modification and removal of routing rules. + +During installation of a routing rule, the PCEF provides the routing rule information to the PCRF via the Gx reference point. The PCRF uses all the installed routing rules related to an IP-CAN Session to select BBERF for any service data flow related for that IP-CAN Session. + +The PCEF may, at any time, modify or remove an installed routing rule based on updated flow binding information received from the UE as described in TS 23.261 [23]. + +## 6.8 Application Detection and Control Rule + +### 6.8.1 General + +The Application Detection and Control rule (ADC rule) comprises the information that is required in order to: + +- identify the rule; +- detect the Start and Stop of traffic for a certain application; +- apply enforcement actions and charging for the application traffic detected by the rule; +- apply charging for the application traffic detected by the rule. + +ADC rules are applicable over the Sd reference point. Over the Sd reference point, the ADC rules are used to support application detection and control as defined in clause 4.5 including traffic steering control as defined in clause 4.8. + +ADC Rules are also applicable over the St reference point. Over the St reference point, the ADC rules are used to transfer traffic steering control information as defined in clause 6.11.1. + +ADC rules definitions are assumed to be directly provisioned into the TDF or TSSF and referenced by the PCRF with the ADC Rule identifier. + +NOTE 1: The method to perform the detection, in particular for the Start and Stop, may extend beyond the IP header and is out of scope for this document. + +Two types of ADC rules exist: Predefined and dynamic ADC rules. A predefined ADC rule is constant and shall not be changed. For a dynamic ADC rule, some parameters can be provided and modified by the PCRF as defined in Table 6.8. + +There are defined procedures for activation, modification and deactivation of ADC rules (as described in clause 6.8.2). The PCRF may activate, modify and deactivate an ADC rule at any time. The modification procedure is applicable to dynamic ADC rules only. + +The operator defines the ADC rules. + +Table 6.8 lists the information contained in an ADC rule that can be exchanged over the Sd and St reference point, including the information element name, the description, whether the PCRF may modify this information in a dynamic ADC rule which is active in the TDF and the applicable reference point (i.e. Sd and/or St) for the corresponding information element. The Category field indicates if a certain piece of information is mandatory or not for the construction of an ADC rule, i.e. if it is possible to construct an ADC rule without it. + +**Table 6.8: The Application Detection and Control rule information** + +| Information name | Description | Category | PCRF permitted to modify for a dynamic ADC rule | Applicable reference point | +|-------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------| +| ADC Rule identifier | Uniquely identifies the ADC rule within a TDF/TSSF session. It is used between PCRF and TDF/TSSF for referencing ADC rules. | Mandatory | No | Sd, St | +| Application detection | This clause defines the detection and the application name. | | | Sd, St | +| Precedence | For ADC, the precedence is only relevant for the enforcement, i.e. when multiple ADC rules overlap, only the enforcement, reporting of application starts and stops, monitoring, and charging actions of the ADC rule with the highest precedence shall be applied. | Optional | Yes | Sd, St | +| Application identifier (NOTE 2) | References the corresponding application detection filter for the detection of the service data flow. References the corresponding application, for which the rule applies. | Conditional (NOTE 5) | No | Sd, St | +| Service data flow filter list | A list of service data flow filters for the detection of the traffic. | Conditional (NOTE 5) | No | Sd, St | +| Mute for notification | Defines whether application's start or stop notification is to be muted. | Optional | No | Sd | +| Usage Monitoring Control | This clause describes identities required for Usage Monitoring Control. | | | Sd | +| Monitoring key | The PCRF uses the monitoring key to group applications that share a common allowed usage. | Optional | Yes | Sd | +| Indication of exclusion from session level monitoring | Indicates that the application shall be excluded from the TDF session usage monitoring. | Optional | Yes | Sd | +| Enforcement control | This clause defines how the TDF shall apply enforcement actions for the detected application traffic. | | | Sd | +| Gate status | The gate status indicates whether the detected application may pass (Gate is open) or shall be discarded (Gate is closed) at the TDF. | Optional | Yes | Sd | +| UL-maximum bit rate | The uplink maximum bit rate authorized for the application traffic | Optional | Yes | Sd | +| DL-maximum bit rate | The downlink maximum bit rate authorized for the application traffic | Optional | Yes | Sd | +| Redirect | Redirect state of detected application traffic (enabled/disabled) | Optional | Yes | Sd | + +| Information name | Description | Category | PCRF permitted to modify for a dynamic ADC rule | Applicable reference point | +|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------| +| Redirect Destination | Controlled Address to which detected application traffic should be redirected when redirect is enabled | Conditional (NOTE 1) | Yes | Sd | +| DSCP value | Downlink packets of detected application traffic shall be marked with this DSCP value. | Optional (NOTE 4) | Yes | Sd | +| Charging | This clause defines identities and instructions for charging and accounting that is required for an access point where application usage charging is configured | | | Sd | +| Charging key | The charging system (OCS or OFCS) uses the charging key to determine the tariff to apply for the application. | Optional | Yes | Sd | +| Service identifier | Identifies one or more applications to the charging system. | Optional | Yes | Sd | +| Sponsor Identifier | An identifier, provided from the AF which identifies the Sponsor, used for sponsored flows to correlate measurements from different users for accounting purposes. | Conditional (NOTE 7) | Yes | | +| Application Service Provider Identifier | An identifier, provided from the AF which identifies the Application Service Provider, used for sponsored flows to correlate measurements from different users for accounting purposes. | Conditional (NOTE 7) | Yes | Sd | +| Charging method | Indicates the required charging method for the ADC rule.
Values: online, offline or neither. | Conditional (NOTE 3) | No | Sd | +| Measurement method | Indicates whether the application data volume, duration, combined volume/duration or event shall be measured.
This is applicable for reporting, if the charging method is online or offline. | Optional | Yes | Sd | +| Service identifier level reporting | Indicates that separate usage reports shall be generated for this Service identifier.
Values: mandated or not required. | Optional | Yes | Sd | +| Traffic Steering Enforcement Control | This part describes identities required for Traffic Steering Enforcement Control. | | | Sd, St | + +| Information name | Description | Category | PCRF permitted to modify for a dynamic ADC rule | Applicable reference point | +|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------| +| Traffic steering policy identifier(s) | Reference to a pre-configured traffic steering policy at the TDF/TSSF (NOTE 6). | Optional | Yes | Sd, St | + +NOTE 1: If Redirect is enabled. +NOTE 2: For every ADC rule this information is pre-configured in the TDF. +NOTE 3: Mandatory if there is no default charging method for the TDF session. It is possible to activate both online and offline charging for the same ADC Rule. +NOTE 4: See Annex U for details regarding how to apply policy and charging control for an application detected and marked by the TDF in the downlink direction (typically application with non-deducible service data flows). +NOTE 5: Either Application identifier or Service data flow filter list shall be included. +NOTE 6: The Traffic steering policy identifier can be different for uplink and downlink direction. If two Traffic steering policy identifiers are provided, then one is for uplink direction, while the other one is for downlink direction. +NOTE 7: Applicable to sponsored data connectivity. + +The *ADC Rule identifier* shall be unique for an ADC rule within a TDF/TSSF session. + +NOTE 2: The PCRF has to ensure that there is no dynamically provided ADC rule that has the same Rule identifier value as any of the predefined ADC rules. + +The *Precedence* defines, if multiple ADC rules overlap, which ADC Rule shall be applied for the purpose of enforcement, reporting of application start and stop, monitoring, and charging. When a dynamic ADC rule and a predefined ADC rule have the same precedence, the dynamic ADC rule takes precedence. For dynamic ADC rules, the Precedence shall be either preconfigured at the TDF/TSSF or provided dynamically by the PCRF within the ADC Rules. + +NOTE 3: The operator shall ensure that overlap between the predefined ADC rules can be resolved based on precedence of each predefined ADC rule in the TDF. For dynamic ADC rules, if precedence is not preconfigured in the TDF, the PCRF shall ensure that overlap between the dynamic ADC rules can be resolved based on precedence of each dynamic ADC rule. + +The *Application identifier* references the corresponding application detection filter that is used for matching user plane packets. It is also used for identifying the application, for which the rule applies, during reporting to the PCRF. The same application identifier value can occur in more than one ADC rule. If so, the PCRF shall ensure that there is at most one ADC rule active per application identifier value at any time. + +NOTE 4: The same application identifier value could be used for a dynamic ADC rule and a predefined ADC rule or for multiple predefined ADC rules. + +NOTE 5: The configuration of the Application Identifier in the TDF can include the set of information required for encrypted traffic detection as defined in Annex X. + +Instead of *Application identifier*, the *Service data flow filter list* may be provided which comprises one or more Service data flow filters and is used by the TDF or TSSF to identify the packets belonging to a detected traffic. The format of the Service data flow filter is described in clause 6.2.2.2, except the filters extending the inspection to look further into the packet and/or define other operations as those are identified by Application Identifier. + +The *Mute for notification* defines whether notification of application's start or stop shall be muted to the PCRF. Absence of this parameter means that start/stop notifications shall be sent. + +The *Monitoring Key* is the reference to a resource threshold. Any number of ADC Rules may share the same monitoring key value. The monitoring key values for each application shall be operator configurable. + +The *Indication of exclusion from session level monitoring* indicates that the application shall be excluded from the TDF session usage monitoring. + +The *Gate status* indicates whether the TDF shall let detected application traffic pass through (gate is open) the TDF or the TDF shall discard (gate is closed) the application traffic. + +The *UL maximum-bitrate* indicates the authorized maximum bitrate for the uplink component of the detected application traffic. + +The *DL maximum-bitrate* indicates the authorized maximum bitrate for the downlink component of the detected application traffic. + +NOTE 6: The maximum bit rate is an average value, which is measured over some time period. Services may generate media with variable bitrate. The policing function should take such bitrate variations into account. + +The *Redirect* indicates whether the uplink part of the detected application traffic should be redirected to a controlled address. + +The *Redirect Destination* indicates the target redirect address when *Redirect* is enabled. + +The *DSCP value* indicates the value with which a TDF marks downlink application traffic identified by an ADC rule. + +The *Charging key* is the reference to the tariff for the application. Any number of ADC Rules may share the same charging key value. The charging key values for each application shall be operator configurable. + +NOTE 7: Assigning the same Charging key for several applications implies that the charging does not require the credit management to be handled separately. + +The *Service identifier* identifies one or more applications to the charging system. ADC Rules may share the same Service identifier value. The service identifier provides the most detailed identification specified for application based charging. + +NOTE 8: The Service Identifier need not have any relationship to service identifiers used on the AF level, i.e. is an operator policy option. + +The *Sponsor Identifier* indicates the (3rd) party organization willing to pay for the operator's charge for connectivity required to deliver a service to the end user. + +The *Application Service Provider Identifier* indicates the (3rd) party organization delivering a service to the end user. + +The *Charging method* indicates whether online charging, offline charging, or both are required or the application is not subject to any end user charging. If the charging method identifies that the application is not subject to any end user charging, a Charging key shall not be included in the ADC rule for that application, along with other charging related parameters. If the charging method is omitted, the TDF shall apply the default charging method as determined at TDF session establishment (see clause 6.4a). The Charging method is mandatory if there is no default charging method for the TDF session. + +The *Measurement method* indicates what measurements apply for charging for ADC rule. + +The *Service Identifier Level Reporting* indicates whether the TDF shall generate reports per Service Identifier. The TDF shall accumulate the measurements from all ADC rules with the same combination of Charging key/Service Identifier values in a single report. + +The *Traffic Steering Policy Identifier(s)* is a reference to a pre-configured traffic steering policy at the TDF/TSSF as defined in clause 6.11.1. + +## 6.8.2 Application Detection and Control rule operations over Sd + +Application Detection and Control rule operations apply to solicited reporting and consist of activation, modification and deactivation of ADC rules. + +Activation: The PCRF provides the ADC Rule identifier to the TDF. The PCRF may provide data for usage monitoring and enforcement control for a dynamic ADC rule. + +An active ADC rule means that: + +- The application traffic, matching the corresponding application, can be detected; and +- Start or stop of application traffic is reported to the PCRF, if applicable and requested by the PCRF; the notification for Start may include service data flow filters, if possible to provide; and the application instance identifier associated with the service data flow filter; and +- Monitoring and enforcement, as specified within the rule, is applied. + +The PCRF may, at any time, modify an active, dynamic ADC rule. + +The PCRF may, at any time, deactivate an active ADC rule. The TDF session termination shall deactivate all ADC rules for that IP-CAN session. + +Application Detection and Control rule activation/deactivation operations can also be performed in a deferred mode. An ADC rule may have either a single deferred activation time, or a single deferred deactivation time or both. + +An ADC rule with only a deferred activation time shall be inactive until that time. An ADC rule with only a deferred deactivation time shall be active until that time. When the rule activation time occurs prior to the rule deactivation time, the rule is inactive until the activation and remains active until the deactivation time occurs. When the rule deactivation time occurs prior to the rule activation time, the rule is initially active until the deactivation time, then remains inactive until the activation time, and then becomes active again. An inactive ADC rule, that has not been activated yet, is still considered to be installed, and may be removed by the PCRF. + +The PCRF may modify a currently installed dynamic ADC rule, including setting, modifying or clearing its deferred activation and/or deactivation time. + +When modifying a dynamic ADC rule with a prior and/or new deferred activation and/or deactivation time, the PCRF shall provide all attributes of that rule, including attributes that have not changed. + +NOTE: In this case, the PCRF omission of an attribute that has a prior value will erase that attribute from the rule. + +## 6.9 Policy decisions based on spending limits + +Policy decisions based on spending limits is a function that allows PCRF taking actions related to the status of policy counters that are maintained in the OCS. + +The identifiers of the policy counters that are relevant for a policy decision in the PCRF may be stored in the PCRF or possibly in SPR. The PCRF is configured with the actions associated with the policy counter status that is received from OCS. + +The PCRF may request the status of policy counters in the OCS using the Initial or Intermediate Spending Limit Report Request Procedure. The OCS provides the current status of the requested policy counters to the PCRF. The OCS may in addition provide one or more pending statuses for a requested policy counter together with the time they have to be applied. The PCRF shall immediately apply the current status of a policy counter. A pending status of a policy counter shall autonomously become the current status of a policy counter at the PCRF when the indicated corresponding time is reached. Subsequently provided information for pending statuses of a policy counter shall overwrite the previously received information. + +The PCRF may subscribe to spending limit reporting for policy counters from the OCS using the Initial or Intermediate Spending Limit Report Request procedure. If spending limit reporting for a policy counter is enabled, the OCS shall notify the PCRF of changes in the status of this policy counter (e.g. daily spending limit of \$2 reached) and optionally pending statuses of this policy counter together with their activation time (e.g. due to a billing period that will expire at midnight). The PCRF may cancel spending limit reporting for specific policy counter(s) using the Intermediate Spending Limit Report Request procedure, or for all policy counter(s) using the Final Spending Limit Report Request procedure. + +The PCRF uses the status of each relevant policy counter, and optional pending policy counter statuses if known, as input to its policy decision to apply operator defined actions, e.g. change the QoS (e.g. downgrade APN-AMBR), modify the PCC/QoS/ADC Rules to apply gating or change charging conditions. + +NOTE: The relationship between a policy counter identifier and the Charging Key could be 1-1. However it could also be assumed that services that share the same Charging Key can be associated with different policy counters i.e. although they are rated in the same way they are subject to different actions regarding (e.g. QoS and gating) and are therefore counted separately. Likewise services that share the same policy counters can be associated with different Charging Key. + +## 6.11 Traffic Steering Control Information + +### 6.11.1 General + +The traffic steering control information comprises the information that is required to enable traffic steering for a detected application or service data flow. The traffic steering control information is transferred: + +- From the PCRF to the PCEF within PCC rules over Gx reference point; +- From the PCRF to the TDF within ADC rules over Sd reference point; +- From the PCRF to the TSSF within ADC rules over St reference point. + +NOTE 1: In this release of the specification, traffic steering control information does not contain the IP-CAN specific parameters such as e.g. RAT type, which may be needed by the (S)Gi-LAN service functions. + +Table 6.11 lists the components of traffic steering control information, and their corresponding information names in PCC/ADC rule. + +**Table 6.11: Traffic steering control information** + +| Component of traffic steering control information | Corresponding information name in ADC rule (NOTE 1) | Corresponding information name in PCC rule (NOTE 2) | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------| +| Rule Name | ADC Rule Identifier | Rule identifier | +| Description of Traffic | Application Identifier or Service data flow filter list | Service Data Flow Template | +| Traffic steering policy identifier(s) (NOTE 3) | Traffic steering policy identifier(s) (NOTE 3) | Traffic steering policy identifier(s) (NOTE 3) | +| Precedence | Precedence | Precedence | +| NOTE 1: The information definition refers to Table 6.8.
NOTE 2: The information definition refers to Table 6.3.
NOTE 3: The Traffic steering policy identifier can be different for uplink and downlink direction. If two Traffic steering policy identifiers are provided, then one is for uplink direction, while the other one is for downlink direction. | | | + +The Traffic Steering Policy Identifier is a reference to traffic steering policy locally configured at the PCEF/TDF/TSSF. The traffic steering policy identifies, explicitly or implicitly, a specific set of service functions and their order via which the traffic, identified by the description of traffic included in the traffic steering control information, needs to be steered in the (S)Gi-LAN. + +For traffic steering control at the PCEF, the PCC Rule operations described in the clause 6.3.2 apply. + +For traffic steering control at the TDF, the ADC Rule operations over Sd described in the clause 6.8.2 apply. + +For traffic steering control at the TSSF, the Traffic Steering Control operations over St described in the clause 6.11.2 apply. + +NOTE 2: In order for PCEF/TDF to measure the user plane traffic that is sent to a specific set of service functions, identified by a Traffic Steering Policy Identifier, a specific Charging Key or generic Charging Key and a specific Service Identifier is assigned to the PCC/ADC rule per each Traffic Steering Policy Identifier for which separate measurements are needed and the applicable measurement type as required. In case of Service Identifier usage, the PCC/ADC Rule also includes service identifier level reporting. + +### 6.11.2 Traffic Steering Control Operations over St + +Traffic steering control operations over St consists of provisioning, modification, and removal of traffic steering control information. + +Provisioning: Provisioning of traffic steering control information to the TSSF includes the activation of traffic steering policy, so that the traffic detected by the service data flow filter list or the application identifier can be steered in the SGi-LAN according to the information associated with the traffic steering policy identifier. The PCRF provides the UE IP address and the associated APN when provisioning of traffic steering control information to the TSSF. The TSSF uses the APN to determine the PDN. + +NOTE: The APN is provided from PCRF to the TSSF for the cases when the PCEF supports multiple APNs with overlapping IP addresses. In that case, the same UE IP address can be allocated to different UEs when they access different PDNs, each APN provides access to a different PDN. + +When using ADC Rules, the following applies: + +- For pre-defined ADC rules in TSSF, the PCRF provides the ADC Rule identifier(s) to the TSSF; +- For dynamic ADC Rules, the PCRF provides traffic steering control information within the ADC rules to the TSSF. + +Modification: The PCRF may modify traffic steering control information to change the traffic steering policy identifier(s), the precedence, the service data flow filters or application identifier. + +When using ADC Rules, the PCRF may modify a dynamic ADC rule. + +Removal: The PCRF may, at any time, remove traffic steering control information. + +When using ADC Rules, the PCRF may remove ADC Rule(s). + +## 6.12 NBIFOM Routing rule + +### 6.12.1 General + +The NBIFOM routing rule comprises the information about the UE request to associate an access type to a service data flow filter. The NBIFOM routing rules are provided by the PCEF to the PCRF during IP-CAN session establishment or modification. + +The PCEF derives NBIFOM routing rules based on the Routing Rules received from the UE (when UE-initiated NBIFOM mode applies) or based on requests from the UE to have the network create / modify / delete Routing Rules (when Network-initiated NBIFOM mode applies), as described in TS 23.161 [43]. + +Table 6.12 lists the information contained in an NBIFOM routing rule, including the information name, the description and whether the PCEF may modify this information in an updated version of the rule. The Category field indicates if a certain piece of information is mandatory or not. + +**Table 6.12: The NBIFOM routing rule information** + +| Information name | Description | Category | PCEF permitted to modify in an update | +|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------| +| Routing Rule identifier | Uniquely identifies the routing rule within an IP-CAN session. | Mandatory | No | +| Routing information | This clause defines the method for detecting packets belonging to a flow and the route for the flow. | | | +| Routing Rule Priority | Determines the order, in which the routing filters are applied. | Mandatory | Yes | +| Routing Filter | A packet filter for the detection of IP flows. | Mandatory | Yes | +| Routing Access Information | The access type that the matching IP flows intend to use. | Mandatory | Yes | + +The *Routing Rule identifier* shall be unique for a NBIFOM routing rule within an IP-CAN session. It is set to the Routing Rule identifier assigned by the UE when UE-initiated NBIFOM mode applies as specified in TS 23.161 [43] or by the PCRF when Network-initiated NBIFOM mode applies. + +The *Routing Rule Priority* defines in what order the NBIFOM routing rules are used by the PCRF to determine where to route a service data flow. The Routing Rule Priority is set according to the information provided by the UE as specified in TS 23.161 [43]. + +The *Routing Filter* comprises a single packet filter, containing information for matching IP flows. The format of the routing filter is the same as the service data flow filter described in clause 6.2.2.2. The Routing Filter is set according to the information provided by the UE as specified in TS 23.161 [43]. + +The *Routing Access Information* indicates the IP-CAN type that the IP flows matching the Routing Filter of this NBIFOM routing rule intend to use. + +## 6.12.2 NBIFOM Routing rule operations + +NBIFOM routing rule operations consist of creation, modification and removal of a NBIFOM routing rule. + +At creation of a NBIFOM routing rule, the PCEF provides the NBIFOM routing rule information to the PCRF. The PCRF checks if there is a PCC Rule with a corresponding service data flow template installed in the PCEF. If it is so, the PCRF updates the Allowed Access Type in this PCC Rule according to the Routing Access Information. Otherwise a new PCC Rule is created with a service data flow filter equal to the Routing Filter, a precedence according to the Routing Rule Priority and the Allowed Access Type set to the Routing Access Information and then installed in the PCEF. + +**NOTE:** If the Routing Filter is partially overlapping with a service data flow template of an installed PCC rule, it is up to the operator policy whether to reject the NBIFOM routing rule or whether to create a new PCC rule for this NBIFOM routing rule. In the latter case, this new PCC rule shall have the same parameters (except the rule name and the SDF template) and a higher precedence. The PCRF shall also ensure that relevant PCC rule modifications are applied for both PCC rules. + +The PCRF shall store the relation between the Routing Rule identifier and the corresponding PCC rule. The PCRF may also reject a NBIFOM routing rule according to operator policy. + +The modification of a NBIFOM routing rule to change the Routing Filter or the Routing Rule Priority triggers the PCRF to modify the service data flow filter or precedence in the corresponding installed PCC Rule accordingly. + +The modification of a NBIFOM routing rule to change the Routing Access Information triggers the PCRF to change the Allowed Access Type in the corresponding installed PCC Rule accordingly. + +The removal of a NBIFOM routing rule triggers the PCRF to remove the corresponding PCC Rule if the PCC rule creation was triggered by this NBIFOM routing rule. Otherwise, the PCRF removes only the Allowed Access Type in this PCC Rule. + +--- + +# 7 PCC Procedures and flows + +## 7.1 Introduction + +The specification of the PCC procedures and flows is valid for the general scenario. Access specific information is included in Annex A, Annex D, Annex H and Annex P. + +The description includes procedures for IP-CAN Session Establishment, Modification and Termination. The IP-CAN Session modification comprises IP-CAN bearer establishment, modification, termination, as well as unsolicited PCC decisions. + +There are three distinct network scenarios for an IP-CAN Session: + +- Case 1: No Gateway Control Session is required, no Gateway Control Establishment occurs at all (e.g. 3GPP Access where GTP-based S5/S8 are employed, as described in TS 23.401 [17] and the IP-CAN specific Annexes, and non-3GPP accesses where GTP-based S2a or GTP-based S2b is employed, as described in TS 23.402 [18]). +- Case 2: A Gateway Control Session is required. The BBERF establishes a Gateway Control Session prior to any IP-CAN session establishment. There are two sub-cases: + - 2a) The UE acquires a care of address (CoA) that is used for the S2c reference point. The same Gateway Control session applies for all IP-CAN sessions using that CoA. + +2b) A Gateway Control Session is required, as described in TS 23.402 [18] and the IP-CAN specific Annexes, Gateway Control Session Establishment, as defined in clause 7.7.1. +Each IP-CAN session is handled in a separate Gateway Control Session. + +The PCRF determines at Gx and Gxx session establishment what case applies initially as follows: + +1. If the BBERF, at establishment of the Gateway Controls Session, provides an APN, then case 2b applies for the IP-CAN session. +2. If the BBERF, at establishment of the Gateway Controls Session, does not provide any APN, then case 2a applies for the UE. For this case, the PCRF expects tunnelling header information for each IP-CAN session to be provided by the applicable PCEF. +3. If there is no Gateway Control Session for the UE with the same IP-CAN type as indicated over Gx, case 1 applies. + +In a handover procedure the applicable case may change for an IP-CAN session. The PCRF determines the new case in the same manner as described above. Details are defined in each such procedure. + +The procedures cover non-roaming, roaming with home routed access and roaming with access to a visited PDN. + +For the non-roaming case, the H-PCRF plays the full role of PCRF. The V-PCRF is not applicable in this case. + +For the roaming case with home routed access, the H-PCRF interacts with the PCEF and, if the Gxx applies, the V-PCRF interacts with the BBERF. + +For the roaming case with visited access (a.k.a. local breakout in TS 23.401 [17] and TS 23.402 [18]), the V-PCRF interacts with the PCEF and, if Gxx applies, the BBERF and, if Sd applies, the TDF. + +NOTE: The roaming scenario (figure 5.1-4) with visited access is not applicable for traffic steering control. + +Procedures defined in this clause cover the traffic cases where the TDF is located on Gi/SGi interface. + +Procedures defined in clause 7 cover all the traffic cases where roaming partners both operate PCC. For limited PCC deployment scenarios, Annex K and Annex L specify the impacts to these procedures. + +In the text describing the steps in each sequence diagram, the designation PCRF, without specifying V- or H-, refers to the PCRF in non-roaming case and refers to either the V-PCRF or the H-PCRF in the roaming cases. The interpretation of the text "PCRF" is thus dependent on the network scenario. + +When NBIFOM (defined in TS 23.161 [43]) applies, the description of the flows in this clause 7 is complemented by the description of NBIFOM dedicated behaviours documented in clause 6.1.18. + +## 7.2 IP-CAN Session Establishment + +This clause describes the signalling flow for IP-CAN Session establishment as well as network prefix and/or IP address assignment to the UE. The AF is not involved. + +![Sequence diagram for IP-CAN Session Establishment showing interactions between GW (BBERF), GW (PCEF), TDF, TSSF, V-PCRF, H-PCRF, SPR, and OCS.](4f3c8d71b3b182deb469aed61870e3fe_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant GW_BBERF as GW (BBERF) + participant GW_PCEF as GW (PCEF) + participant TDF + participant TSSF + participant V-PCRF + participant H-PCRF + participant SPR + participant OCS + + Note over GW_BBERF, GW_PCEF: 1. Gateway Control Session Establishment (case 2a and 2b) + GW_BBERF->>GW_PCEF: 2. Establish IPCAN Bearer Request + GW_PCEF->>H-PCRF: 3. Indication of IP CAN Session Establishment + H-PCRF->>SPR: 4. Profile Request + SPR-->>H-PCRF: 5. Profile Response + Note over H-PCRF, OCS: 6. Initial Spending Limit Report Request + Note over V-PCRF: 7. Policy Decision + V-PCRF->>TDF: 8. TDF Session Establishment Request + TDF-->>OCS: 9. TDF Initiated Credit Request + OCS-->>TDF: 10. Credit Response + TDF-->>H-PCRF: 11. TDF Session Establishment Acknowledge + H-PCRF->>TSSF: 12. Traffic Steering Control Information Provisioning + TSSF-->>H-PCRF: 13. Traffic Steering Control Information Provisioning Acknowledge + H-PCRF->>GW_PCEF: 14. Acknowledge IP CAN Session Establishment + GW_PCEF-->>OCS: 15. PCEF Initiated Credit Request + OCS-->>GW_PCEF: 16. Credit Response + GW_PCEF->>GW_BBERF: 17. Establish IPCAN BearerResponse + GW_BBERF-->>GW_PCEF: 18. IP CAN Bearer Signaling + GW_PCEF-->>H-PCRF: 19. IP CAN Session Establishment Acknowledge + +``` + +Sequence diagram for IP-CAN Session Establishment showing interactions between GW (BBERF), GW (PCEF), TDF, TSSF, V-PCRF, H-PCRF, SPR, and OCS. + +Figure 7.2-1: IP-CAN Session Establishment + +This procedure concerns both roaming and non-roaming scenarios. In the roaming case when a Gateway Control Session is used, the V-PCRF should proxy the Gateway Control Session Establishment information between the BBERF in the VPLMN and the H-PCRF over S9 based on PDN-Id and roaming agreements. + +For the Local Breakout scenario (Figure 5.1-4) the V-PCRF shall proxy the Indication and Acknowledge of IP-CAN Session Establishment over S9 between the PCEF in the VPLMN and the H-PCRF. For TDF and solicited application reporting, the V-PCRF shall generate ADC rules from PCC Rules containing application detection and control information as instructed by the H-PCRF over S9. Then, the V-PCRF shall install PCC Rules to the PCEF and ADC Rules to the TDF, if applicable. + +In the non-roaming case (Figure 5.1-1) the V-PCRF is not involved. + +1. The BBERF initiates a Gateway Control Session Establishment procedure as defined in clause 7.7.1 (applicable to case 2a during initial attach and case 2b, as defined in clause 7.1). +2. The GW (PCEF) receives a request for IP-CAN Bearer establishment. A PDN Connection Identifier may be included in the request. The GW (PCEF) accepts the request and assigns an IP address and (if requested) network prefix for the user. +3. The PCEF determines that the PCC authorization is required, requests the authorization of allowed service(s) and PCC Rules information. The PCEF includes the following information: UE Identity (e.g. MN NAI), a PDN identifier (e.g. APN), the IP-CAN type and the IPv4 address and IPv6 network prefix, if available, the PDN Connection Identifier received for IP-CAN Bearer establishment if multiple PDN connections to the same APN are supported and, if available, the default charging method and the IP-CAN bearer establishment modes supported and information on whether PCEF is enhanced with ADC. It may also include the TDF IP address, in case of solicited application reporting, if applicable. If the UE has declared support for the extended TFT filter format and the PCEF does not prevent the use thereof, then the PCEF shall indicate that support to the PCRF. The PDN identifier, IP address(es) and UE identity enables identification of the IP-CAN session. The IP-CAN Type identifies the type of access from which the IP-CAN session is established. If the service data flow is tunnelled at the BBERF, the PCEF shall provide information about the mobility protocol tunnelling encapsulation header. The PCEF may also include the Default Bearer QoS and APN-AMBR (applicable to case 1 and case 2a, as defined in clause 7.1). In case 2a the PCEF may also include charging ID information. If the GW/PCEF allocates a shorter IPv6 prefix for use with IPv6 Prefix Delegation, the GW/PCEF provides this shorter prefix as the IPv6 network prefix. If Charging Characteristics were received by GW/PCEF according to TS 23.401 [17] and TS 23.402 [18], the GW/PCEF also forwards Charging Characteristics to the PCRF. Based on local configuration the GW/PCEF may also include the following information: its control plane IPv4 and/or IPv6 address(es), an indication on how the APN was selected, indications on whether IP address(es) were statically or dynamically allocated, and the charging identifier of the default bearer to identify different records belonging to the same PDN connection, indication on whether the charging identifier is the only one for the IP-CAN session. When the PCEF has received the IMEI(SV) in the request for IP-CAN Bearer establishment received at step 2, the PCEF shall transfer this information to the PCRF. + +NOTE 1: In case of TDF and solicited application reporting, either PCEF informs PCRF with TDF IP address, or PCRF has it preconfigured per each one of PCEFs. + +4. If the PCRF does not have the subscriber's subscription related information, it sends a request to the SPR in order to receive the information related to the IP-CAN session. The PCRF provides the subscriber ID and, if applicable, the PDN identifier to the SPR. The PCRF may request notifications from the SPR on changes in the subscription information. +5. The PCRF stores the subscription related information containing the information about the allowed service(s) and PCC Rules information, and may include MPS EPS Priority, MPS Priority Level and IMS Signalling Priority for establishing a PS session with priority and may also include user profile configuration indicating whether application detection and control should be enabled for the IP-CAN session. +6. If the PCRF determines that the policy decision depends on the status of the policy counters available at the OCS and such reporting is not established for the subscriber, the PCRF sends an Initial Spending Limit Report Request as defined in clause 7.9.1. If policy counter status reporting is already established for the subscriber, and the PCRF determines that the status of additional policy counters are required, the PCRF sends an Intermediate Spending Limit Report Request as defined in clause 7.9.2. +7. The PCRF makes the authorization and policy decision. If MPS EPS Priority, MPS Priority Level, and IMS Signalling Priority are present for the user, the PCRF takes the information into account. +8. For the solicited application reporting, the PCRF requests the TDF to establish the relevant session towards PCRF and provides ADC Rules to the TDF, as per user profile configuration, if traffic steering control over Sd applies, ADC Rules may contain traffic steering control information. The PCRF shall include the following information: a PDN identifier (e.g. APN), the IPv4 address and/or IPv6 network prefix, if available, and may + +also include the UE Identity Information and the location/access network information, if available. If Charging Characteristics were received by the PCRF according to step 3 and charging is applicable for the TDF, the PCRF shall also forward received Charging Characteristics to the TDF. Additionally, if received from the PCEF and if charging is applicable for the TDF, the PCRF shall also forward the following parameters to the TDF: the GW/PCEF control plane IPv4 and/or IPv6 address (es), an indication on how the APN was selected, indications on whether IP address (es) were statically or dynamically allocated, and the PDN charging identifier of the default bearer. The PCRF may also subscribe to the Event Triggers applicable for the TDF, according to table 6.2. + +NOTE 2: If Charging Characteristics are received by the PCRF from the PCEF, PCRF may take them into account when providing Charging information and Default charging method to the TDF. + +9. If online charging is applicable for the TDF, and at least one ADC rule with charging parameters was activated, the TDF activates the online charging session, and provides relevant input information for the OCS decision. Depending on operator configuration, the TDF may request credit from the OCS for each charging key of the activated ADC rules. +10. If online charging is applicable for the TDF, the OCS provides the possible credit information to the TDF and may provide re-authorisation triggers for each of the credits. +11. The TDF sends an Ack (accept or reject of the ADC rule operation(s)) to inform the PCRF about the outcome of the actions related to the decision(s) received in step 8. The Ack also includes the list of Event Triggers to report, including the case when the OCS provides any credit re-authorisation trigger, e.g. PLMN change, Location change (serving CN node), which cannot be monitored at the TDF. The Event Triggers indicate to the PCRF what events to be forwarded from the PCRF to the TDF, once PCRF gets the corresponding Event Report from the PCEF/BBERF. +12. If traffic steering control over St applies, the PCRF determines the traffic steering control information needed for the IP-CAN session; the PCRF provides the UE IPv4 address and/or UE IPv6 prefix and one or more sets of traffic steering control information to the TSSF. The TSSF identifier is pre-configured on the PCRF per e.g. PCEF. +13. The TSSF sends an acknowledgement to the PCRF to inform the PCRF about the outcome of the actions related to the traffic steering control information received in step 12. +14. The PCRF sends the decision(s) including the chosen IP-CAN bearer establishment mode and indicates whether the use of the extended TFT filter format is allowed in the IP-CAN session, to the PCEF. The GW (PCEF) enforces the decision. The PCRF may provide the default charging method and may include the following information: the PCC Rules to activate and the Event Triggers to report. If PCEF is enhanced with ADC, the applicable PCC rules are provided, according to the user profile configuration, if traffic steering control over Gx applies, PCC Rules may contain traffic steering control information. The Policy and Charging Rules allow the enforcement of policy associated with the IP-CAN session. The Event Triggers indicate to the PCEF what events must be reported to the PCRF. If the TDF provided a list of Event Triggers to the PCRF in the previous step, the PCRF shall also provide those Event Triggers to the PCEF. +15. If online charging is applicable, and at least one PCC rule with charging parameters was activated, the PCEF activates the online charging session, and provides relevant input information for the OCS decision. Depending on operator configuration, the PCEF may request credit from the OCS for each charging key of the activated PCC rules. +16. If online charging is applicable, the OCS provides the possible credit information to the PCEF and may provide re-authorisation triggers for each of the credits. + +In cases 2a and 2b, if the OCS provides any re-authorisation trigger, which cannot be monitored at the PCEF, the PCEF shall request PCRF to arrange those to be reported by the BBERF via the PCRF. + +17. If at least one PCC rule was successfully activated and if online charging is applicable, and credit was not denied by the OCS, the GW (PCEF) acknowledges the IP-CAN Bearer Establishment Request. +18. If network control applies the GW may initiate the establishment of additional IP--CAN bearers. See Annex A and Annex D for details. + +19. If the PCRF in step 12 has requested an acknowledgement based on PCC rule operations, the GW (PCEF) sends the IP-CAN Session Establishment Acknowledgement to the PCRF in order to inform the PCRF of the activated PCC rules result. + +### 7.3 IP-CAN Session Termination + +#### 7.3.1 UE initiated IP-CAN Session termination + +![Sequence diagram for UE initiated IP-CAN Session termination showing interactions between GW(BBERF), GW(PCEF), TDF, TSSF, V-PCRF, (H-)PCRF, OCS, SPR, RCAF, and AF.](b73fce8bb6592c6a3c0cd51e9c08d517_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant GW(BBERF) + participant GW(PCEF) + participant TDF + participant TSSF + participant V-PCRF + participant (H-)PCRF + participant OCS + participant SPR + participant RCAF + participant AF + + Note left of GW(BBERF): 1. Remove IP-CAN Session Request + GW(BBERF)->>GW(PCEF): 1. Remove IP-CAN Session Request + Note right of GW(PCEF): 2. GW(BBERF)-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination (case 2b) + GW(PCEF)->>AF: 3. Indication of IP-CAN Session Termination + Note right of AF: 4. Identify what Policy and Charging Rules are affected. + Note left of GW(PCEF): 5. Remove all Policy and Charging Rules + AF->>OCS: 6. Notify loss of transmission + OCS-->>AF: 7. Notification response + Note right of AF: 8. Final Spending Limit Report Request + AF->>TDF: 9. TDF Session Termination + TDF-->>AF: 10. Acknowledge TDF Session Termination + AF->>OCS: 11. TDF Initiated Credit Final Report + OCS-->>TDF: 12. Credit Acknowledge + (H-)PCRF->>GW(PCEF): 13. Acknowledge IP-CAN Session Termination + GW(PCEF)->>GW(BBERF): 14. Remove IP-CAN Session Response + Note right of GW(PCEF): 15. Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision (case 2a) or PCRF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination (case 2a) + Note right of V-PCRF: 16. PCEF Initiated Credit Final Report + V-PCRF-->>OCS: 16. PCEF Initiated Credit Final Report + OCS-->>V-PCRF: 17. Credit Acknowledge + (H-)PCRF->>SPR: 18. Cancel Subscribed Notification Request + SPR-->>(H-)PCRF: 19. Cancel Subscribed Notification Response + (H-)PCRF->>RCAF: 20. Release context request + RCAF-->>(H-)PCRF: 21.. Release context response + (H-)PCRF->>TSSF: 22. Traffic Steering Control Information Removal + TSSF-->>(H-)PCRF: 23. Acknowledge Traffic Steering Control Information Removal + +``` + +Sequence diagram for UE initiated IP-CAN Session termination showing interactions between GW(BBERF), GW(PCEF), TDF, TSSF, V-PCRF, (H-)PCRF, OCS, SPR, RCAF, and AF. + +Figure 7.3.1: IP-CAN Session Termination + +This procedure concerns both roaming and non-roaming scenarios. In the roaming case when home routed access is used (figure 5.1-3) or if case 2a applies (as defined in clause 7.1) for Local Breakout (figure 5.1-4), the V-PCRF should proxy the GW (BBERF) initiated Gateway Control Session Termination or the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision between the BBERF in the VPLMN and the H-PCRF. For those cases it is also the H-PCRF that initiates the PCRF initiated Gateway Control Session Termination procedure or the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision procedure and proxy the information over S9 to the BBERF through the V-PCRF. + +For the Local breakout scenario (figure 5.1-4) the V-PCRF shall proxy Indication and Acknowledge of IP-CAN Session Termination over S9 between the PCEF in the VPLMN and the H-PCRF. If the AF resides in the VPLMN, the V-PCRF shall proxy AF session signalling over S9 between the AF and the H-PCRF. + +NOTE 1: The case when the AF resides in the VPLMN is not showed in the figure. + +For the same scenario if either case 1 or case 2b applies (as defined in clause 7.1), the V-PCRF may respond to/initiate the Gateway Control Session procedures locally without notifying the H-PCRF. + +In the non-roaming case (figure 5.1-1) the V-PCRF is not involved at all. + +1. If case 2b applies, the GW (BBERF) receives a request to remove the IP-CAN session. In case 2a, the request goes transparently through the GW (BBERF). In all cases, the GW (PCEF) receives a request to remove the IP-CAN session. +2. If case 2b applies, the GW (BBERF)-initiated GW Control Session Termination procedure as defined in clause 7.7.2.1 is initiated. +3. The GW (PCEF) indicates that the IP-CAN Session is being removed and provides relevant information to the PCRF. + +NOTE 2: The GW (PCEF) may proceed to step 11 in parallel with the indication of IP-CAN Session termination. + +4. The PCRF finds the PCC Rules that require an AF to be notified and removes PCC Rules for the IP-CAN session. +5. The GW (PCEF) removes all PCC Rules associated with the IP-CAN session. +6. The PCRF notifies the AF that there are no transmission resources for the service if this is requested by the AF. +7. The AF acknowledges the notification of the loss of transmission resources. +8. If this is the last IP-CAN session for this subscriber requiring policy counter status reporting, the Final Spending Limit Report Request as defined in clause 7.9.3 is sent. If any existing IP-CAN sessions for this subscriber require policy counter status reporting, the Intermediate Spending Limit Report Request as defined in clause 7.9.2 may be sent to alter the list of subscribed policy counters. +9. If there is an active Sd session between TDF and PCRF, the PCRF terminates it. +10. For the solicited application reporting, the TDF deactivates all the ADC Rules associated with the TDF session. The TDF acknowledges the termination request from the PCRF. +11. If online charging is applicable for the TDF, the TDF issues the final reports and returns the remaining credit to the OCS. +12. The OCS acknowledges the credit report and terminates the online charging session with the TDF. +13. The PCRF removes the information related to the terminated IP-CAN Session (subscription information etc.), and acknowledges to the GW (PCEF) that the PCRF handling of the IP-CAN session has terminated. This interaction is the response to the GW (PCEF) request in step 3. + +NOTE 3: Step 13 may be initiated any time after step 7. + +14. The GW (PCEF) continues the IP-CAN Session removal procedure. +15. If case 2a applies, the GW Control and QoS Rules Provision procedure as defined in clause 7.7.4 may be initiated to remove the QoS rules associated with the IP-CAN session being terminated. This applies e.g. in case the Gateway Control Session shall remain to serve other IP-CAN sessions. + +Alternatively, if case 2a applies and the PCRF determines that all QoS rules are to be removed and the Gateway Control Session shall be terminated, the PCRF-initiated GW Control Session Termination procedure as defined in clause 7.7.2.2 is initiated. This applies e.g. in case the UE is detached and the CoA acquired by the UE is not used for any other IP-CAN session. + +16. If online charging is applicable for the PCEF, the PCEF issues the final reports and returns the remaining credit to the OCS. + +NOTE 4: Step 16 may be initiated any time after step 13. + +17. The OCS acknowledges that credit report and terminates the online charging session with the PCEF. + +18. The PCRF sends a cancellation notification request to the SPR if it has subscribed such notification. If all IP-CAN sessions of the user to the same APN are terminated, the PCRF stores the remaining usage allowance in the SPR. + +NOTE 5: Step 18 may be initiated any time after step 13. + +19. The SPR sends a response to the PCRF. + +20. If RUCI reporting from RCAF to PCRF is used, the PCRF sends a Release context request message to the RCAF using the previously stored identity of the RCAF. + +21. RCAF acknowledges this by sending the Release context response message to the PCRF. The RCAF releases the context corresponding to the given UE for the given APN, including any reporting restrictions. This also implies that the RCAF does not indicate to the PCRF that the congestion state is over. In case of multiple PCRFs being in simultaneous use for a given UE, a Release context request message from a PCRF applies to the UE context specific to the given Np connection only, identified by the APN. The RCAF can completely release all context information for a given UE when it has released the context for each Np connection of the given UE. + +NOTE 6: The IP-CAN Session removal procedure may proceed in parallel with the indication of IP-CAN Session termination. + +22. If the PCRF has provided traffic steering control information to the TSSF for the IP-CAN session, the PCRF sends a request to the TSSF to remove the traffic steering control information associated to the UE IPv4 address and/or to the UE IPv6 prefix for the terminated IP-CAN session. + +NOTE 7: Step 22 may be initiated any time after step 13. + +23. The TSSF acknowledges the removal of the traffic steering control information. + +### 7.3.2 GW (PCEF) initiated IP-CAN Session termination + +![Sequence diagram for GW (PCEF) initiated IP-CAN Session Termination. Lifelines: GW(BBERF), GW(PCEF), TDF, TSSF, V-PCRF, (H-)PCRF, OCS, SPR, RCAF, AF. The diagram shows 24 steps of interaction between these entities to terminate an IP-CAN session.](37104233d1b6d7728427e833816594dc_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant GW(BBERF) + participant GW(PCEF) + participant TDF + participant TSSF + participant V-PCRF + participant (H-)PCRF + participant OCS + participant SPR + participant RCAF + participant AF + + Note right of GW(PCEF): 1. Detection what IP-CAN Sessions shall terminate. + GW(PCEF)->>GW(BBERF): 2. Remove IP-CAN Session Request + Note left of GW(BBERF): 3. GW(BBERF)-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination (case 2b) + GW(BBERF)->>GW(PCEF): 4. Remove IP-CAN Session Response + GW(PCEF)->>(H-)PCRF: 5. Indication of IP-CAN Session Termination + Note right of (H-)PCRF: 6. Identify what Policy and Charging Rules are affected. + Note left of GW(PCEF): 10. Remove all Policy and Charging Rules + (H-)PCRF-->>AF: 7. Notify loss of transmission. + AF-->>(H-)PCRF: 8. Notification response. + Note right of (H-)PCRF: 9. Final Spending Limit Report Request + (H-)PCRF-->>TDF: 11. TDF Session Termination + TDF-->>(H-)PCRF: 12. TDF Session Termination Acknowledge + (H-)PCRF-->>OCS: 13. TDF Initiated Credit Final report + OCS-->>TDF: 14. Credit Acknowledge + (H-)PCRF-->>GW(PCEF): 15. Acknowledge IP-CAN Session Termination + Note left of GW(PCEF): 16. Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision (case 2a) or PCRF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination (case 2a) + (H-)PCRF-->>OCS: 17. PCEF Initiated Credit Final Report + OCS-->>GW(PCEF): 18. Credit Acknowledge + (H-)PCRF-->>SPR: 19. Cancel Subscribed Notification Request + SPR-->>(H-)PCRF: 20. Cancel Subscribed Notification Response + (H-)PCRF-->>RCAF: 21. Release context request + RCAF-->>(H-)PCRF: 22. Release context response + (H-)PCRF-->>TSSF: 23. Traffic Steering Control Information Removal + TSSF-->>(H-)PCRF: 24. Acknowledge Traffic Steering Control Information Removal + +``` + +Sequence diagram for GW (PCEF) initiated IP-CAN Session Termination. Lifelines: GW(BBERF), GW(PCEF), TDF, TSSF, V-PCRF, (H-)PCRF, OCS, SPR, RCAF, AF. The diagram shows 24 steps of interaction between these entities to terminate an IP-CAN session. + +**Figure 7.3.2: GW (PCEF) Initiated IP-CAN Session Termination** + +This procedure concerns both roaming and non-roaming scenarios. In the roaming case when home routed access is used (figure 5.1-3) or if case 2a applies (as defined in clause 7.1) for Local Breakout (figure 5.1-4), the V-PCRF should proxy the GW (BBERF) initiated Gateway Control Session Termination or the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision between the BBERF in the VPLMN and the H-PCRF. For those cases it is also the H-PCRF that initiates the PCRF initiated Gateway Control Session Termination procedure or the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision procedure and proxy the information over S9 to the BBERF through the V-PCRF. + +For the Local breakout scenario (figure 5.1-4) the V-PCRF shall proxy Indication and Acknowledge of IP-CAN Session Termination over S9 between the PCEF in the VPLMN and the H-PCRF. If the AF relies in the VPLMN, the V-PCRF shall proxy AF session signalling over S9 between the AF and the H-PCRF. + +NOTE 1: The case when the AF resides in the VPLMN is not showed in the figure. + +For the same scenario if either case 1 or case 2b applies (as defined in clause 7.1), the V-PCRF may respond to/initiate the Gateway Control Session procedures locally without notifying the H-PCRF. + +In the non-roaming case (figure 5.1-1) the V-PCRF is not involved at all. + +1. The GW (PCEF) detects that IP-CAN Session termination is required. +2. The GW (PCEF) sends a request to remove the IP-CAN session. +3. If case 2b applies, the GW (BBERF)-initiated GW Control Session Termination procedure as defined in clause 7.7.2.1 is initiated. +4. The GW (PCEF) receives the response for the IP-CAN session removal. +5. The GW (PCEF) indicates the IP-CAN Session termination and provides the relevant information to the PCRF. +6. The PCRF finds the PCC Rules that require an AF to be notified. +7. The PCRF notifies the AF that there are no transmission resources for the service if this is requested by the AF. +8. The AF acknowledges the notification on the loss of transmission resources. +9. If this is the last IP-CAN session for this subscriber requiring policy counter status reporting, the Final Spending Limit Report Request as defined in clause 7.9.3 is sent. If any existing IP-CAN sessions for this subscriber require policy counter status reporting, the Intermediate Spending Limit Report Request as defined in clause 7.9.2 may be sent to alter the list of subscribed policy counters. +10. The GW (PCEF) removes all the PCC Rules associated with the IP-CAN session. +11. If there is an active Sd session between TDF and PCRF, the PCRF informs TDF about IP-CAN session termination. +12. For the solicited application reporting, the TDF deactivates all the ADC Rules associated with the TDF session. The TDF acknowledges the termination request from the PCRF. +13. If online charging is applicable for the TDF, the TDF issues the final reports and returns the remaining credit to the OCS. +14. The OCS acknowledges the credit report and terminates the online charging session with the TDF. +15. The PCRF removes the information related to the terminated IP-CAN Session (subscription information etc.), and acknowledges the IP-CAN Session termination. + +NOTE 2: Step 15 may be initiated any time after step 6. + +16. If case 2a applies, the GW Control and QoS Rules Provision procedure as defined in clause 7.7.4 may be initiated to remove the QoS rules associated with the IP-CAN session being terminated. This applies e.g. in case the Gateway Control Session shall remain to serve other IP-CAN sessions. + +Alternatively, if case 2a applies and the PCRF determines that the Gateway Control session shall be terminated, the PCRF-initiated GW Control Session Termination procedure as defined in clause 7.7.2.2 is initiated. This applies e.g. in case the UE is detached and the CoA acquired by the UE is not used for any other IP-CAN session. + +17. If online charging is applicable for the PCEF, the PCEF issues final reports and returns the remaining credit to the OCS. + +NOTE 3: Step 17 may be initiated any time after step 15. + +18. The OCS acknowledges the credit report and terminates the online charging session. + +19. The PCRF sends a cancellation notification request to the SPR if it has subscribed such notification. If all IP-CAN sessions of the user to the same APN are terminated, the PCRF stores the remaining usage allowance in the SPR. + +NOTE 4: Step 19 may be initiated any time after step 8. + +20. The SPR sends a response to the PCRF. + +21. If RUCI reporting from RCAF to PCRF is used, the PCRF sends a Release context request message to the RCAF using the previously stored identity of the RCAF. + +22. RCAF acknowledges this by sending the Release context response message to the PCRF. The RCAF releases the context corresponding to the given UE for the given APN, including any reporting restrictions. This also implies that the RCAF does not indicate to the PCRF that the congestion state is over. In case of multiple PCRFs being in simultaneous use for a given UE, a Release context request message from a PCRF applies to the UE context specific to the given Np connection only, identified by the APN. The RCAF can completely release all context information for a given UE when it has released the context for each Np connection of the given UE. + +23. If the PCRF has provided traffic steering control information to the TSSF for the IP-CAN session, the PCRF sends a request to the TSSF to remove the traffic steering control information associated to the UE IPv4 address and/or the UE IPv6 prefix for the terminated IP-CAN session. + +NOTE 5: Step 23 may be initiated any time after step 6. + +24. The TSSF acknowledges the removal of the traffic steering control information. + +## 7.4 IP-CAN Session Modification + +### 7.4.1 IP-CAN Session Modification; GW (PCEF) initiated + +This clause describes the signalling flow for the IP-CAN Session modification initiated by the GW (PCEF). These modifications include IP-CAN bearer establishment and termination as well as modification if the triggering conditions given to the PCEF are fulfilled. + +For the PCEF enhanced with ADC, the reason for such a modification may be that a start or stop of application traffic that matches with one of the activated PCC Rules is detected. + +The AF may be involved. An example of the scenario is authorization of a session-based service for which an IP-CAN Session is also modified. + +![Sequence diagram for IP-CAN Session Modification initiated by GW (PCEF).](3334fcca5dac808f4fd3840aba35bc2e_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant GW_BBERF as GW (BBERF) + participant GW_PCEF as GW (PCEF) + participant TDF + participant TSSF + participant V_PCRF as V-PCRF + participant H_PCRF as H-PCRF + participant AF + participant OCS + + Note right of GW_PCEF: 4. Decision for IP-CAN Session Modification + GW_PCEF->>H_PCRF: 5. Indication of IP-CAN Session modification + Note right of V_PCRF: 6. Correlate Application / Service info with IP-CAN session + H_PCRF->>AF: 7. Event report + AF-->>H_PCRF: 8. Ack and new Application/Service info + Note right of H_PCRF: 9. Spending Limit Report Request + Note right of H_PCRF: 10. Policy Decision + H_PCRF->>TDF: 11. Modified ADC Rules + TDF->>OCS: 12. TDF Initiated Credit Request + OCS-->>TDF: 13. Credit Response + TDF->>H_PCRF: 14. Acknowledge for modified ADC Rules + H_PCRF->>TSSF: 15. Traffic Steering Control Info Provision/Modification/removal + TSSF-->>H_PCRF: 16. Ack of Traffic Steering Control Info Provision/Modification/removal + H_PCRF->>GW_PCEF: 17. Acknowledge IP-CAN Session modification + GW_PCEF->>OCS: 18. PCEF Initiated Credit Request + OCS-->>GW_PCEF: 19. Credit Response + GW_PCEF->>GW_BBERF: 20. IP-CAN Session signalling + GW_BBERF->>GW_PCEF: 21. IP-CAN Session signalling + GW_PCEF->>H_PCRF: 22. Provision Ack + Note right of H_PCRF: 23. Gateway Control and QoS Rules provision (case 2a and 2b) + H_PCRF->>AF: 24. Notification of Bearer Level Events + AF-->>H_PCRF: 25. Ack + +``` + +Sequence diagram for IP-CAN Session Modification initiated by GW (PCEF). + +**Figure 7.4: IP-CAN Session Modification; GW (PCEF) initiated** + +This procedure concerns both roaming and non-roaming scenarios. In the roaming case when home routed access applies (figure 5.1-3) or if case 2a applies (as defined in clause 7.1) for Local Breakout (figure 5.1-4), when a Gateway Control Session is used, the H-PCRF may initiate a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provisioning procedure towards the BBERF and proxy the information through the V-PCRF over S9. + +For case 2b in the Local Breakout scenario (figure 5.1-4) and if the Gateway Control Session is terminated locally at the V-PCRF, the V-PCRF shall initiate the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provisioning procedure locally without notifying the H-PCRF. For this case the V-PCRF shall proxy the Indication and Acknowledge of IP-CAN Session Modification over S9 between the PCEF in the VPLMN and the H-PCRF. If the AF is located in the VPLMN for this scenario, the V-PCRF shall proxy AF session signalling over S9 between the AF and the H-PCRF. + +NOTE 1: The case when the AF resides in the VPLMN is not shown in the figure. + +In the non-roaming case (figure 5.1-1) the V-PCRF is not involved at all. + +- Optionally, the AF provides/revokes service information to the PCRF due to AF session signalling. The AF may subscribe at this point to notification of bearer level events related to the service information. + +NOTE 2: For the PCRF to generate the applicable events, the PCRF instructs the PCEF to report events related to the corresponding PCC rules. Such events are not shown in this sequence diagram. + +2. The PCRF stores the service information and responds with the Acknowledgement to the AF. +3. The GW (PCEF) may receive IP-CAN session signalling for IP-CAN Session modification. PDN Connection Identifier may be included in the IP-CAN session signalling. +4. The GW (PCEF) makes a decision to trigger IP-CAN Session modification either caused by the previous step or based on an internal decision or, e.g. if the GW (PCEF) enhanced with ADC, has detected the start/ stop of application traffic, requested by one of the activated PCC Rules. +5. The GW (PCEF) determines that the PCC interaction is required and sends an Indication of IP-CAN Session modification (Event Report, affected PCC Rules, if available, the PDN Connection Identifier) to the PCRF together with, if available, User Location Information and/or UE Time Zone and RAN/NAS Release Cause and, if changed, the new IP-CAN bearer establishment modes supported. If there is a limitation or termination of the transmission resources for a PCC Rule, the GW (PCEF) reports this to the PCRF. If flow mobility applies, the GW (PCEF) may include updated IP flow mobility routing information for any IP flows; the GW (PCEF) also provides an indication if default route for the IP-CAN session is changed. +6. The PCRF correlates the request for PCC Rules with the IP-CAN session and service information available at the GW (PCEF). +7. The PCRF may need to report to the AF an event related to the transmission resources if the AF requested it at initial authorisation. +8. The AF acknowledges the event report and/or responds with the requested information. +9. If the PCRF determines a change to policy counter status reporting is required, it may alter the subscribed list of policy counters using the Initial, Intermediate or Final Spending Limit Report Request procedures as defined in clauses 7.9.1, 7.9.2 and 7.9.3. +10. The PCRF makes the authorization and policy decision. +11. For the TDF solicited application reporting, the steps 11-14 take place. The PCRF provides all new ADC decisions to the TDF. This may include ADC Rules activation, deactivation and modification, if traffic steering control over Sd applies, ADC Rules may contain traffic steering control information. This may also include the list of Event triggers and also Event Report for the Event triggers, if reported by the PCEF/BBERF to the PCRF, if the TDF has previously subscribed for such an Event Report. In case of local breakout, the V-PCRF shall provide ADC rules generated from PCC Rules providing application detection and control as instructed by the H-PCRF over S9. + +For unsolicited application reporting and if the PCRF has recorded the release of an IPv4 address in step 5, the PCRF terminates the related Sd session. + +12. If online charging is applicable for the TDF, the TDF may request credit for new charging keys from the OCS and/or may inform the OCS about re-authorization trigger if the event occurs and/or may issue final reports and return remaining credit for charging keys no longer active to the OCS. +13. If OCS was contacted by the TDF, the OCS provides the credit information to the TDF, and/or acknowledges the credit report. +14. The TDF sends an Ack (accept or reject of the ADC rule operation(s)) to inform the PCRF about the outcome of the actions related to the decision(s) received in step 11. The Ack also includes the list of Event Triggers to report, including the case when the OCS provides any credit re-authorisation trigger, e.g. PLMN change, Location change (serving CN node), which cannot be monitored at the TDF. The Event Triggers indicate to the PCRF what events to be forwarded from the PCRF to the TDF, once PCRF gets the corresponding Event Report from the PCEF/BBERF. +15. If traffic steering control over St applies, the PCRF determines if traffic steering control information needs to be modified/provisioned for the IP-CAN session; the PCRF provides to the TSSF the traffic steering control information associated to the UE IPv4 address and/or to the UE IPv6 prefix. +16. The TSSF sends an acknowledgement to the PCRF to inform the PCRF about the outcome of the actions related to the traffic steering control information received in step 15. + +17. The PCRF sends an Acknowledge of IP-CAN Session modification (PCC Rules, Event Triggers and, if changed, the chosen IP-CAN bearer establishment mode) to the GW (PCEF). If traffic steering control over Gx applies, PCC Rules may contain traffic steering control information. The GW (PCEF) enforces the decision. If the TDF provided a list of Event Triggers to the PCRF in the previous step, the PCRF shall also provide those Event Triggers to the PCEF. +18. If online charging is applicable for the PCEF, the GW (PCEF) may request credit for new charging keys from the OCS and/or may inform the OCS about re-authorization trigger if the event occurs and/or may issue final reports and return remaining credit for charging keys no longer active to the OCS. +19. If OCS was contacted by the PCEF, the OCS provides the credit information to the GW (PCEF), and/or acknowledges the credit report. +- 20 The GW (PCEF) acknowledges or rejects any IP-CAN Session signalling received in step 3. + +An IP-CAN bearer establishment is accepted if at least one PCC rule is active for the IP-CAN bearer and in case of online charging credit was not denied by the OCS. Otherwise, the IP-CAN bearer establishment is rejected. + +An IP-CAN bearer termination is always acknowledged by the GW (PCEF). + +An IP-CAN bearer modification not upgrading the QoS and not providing traffic mapping information is always acknowledged by the GW (PCEF). An IP-CAN bearer modification is accepted if the provided traffic mapping information is accepted by the PCRF. Otherwise, the IP-CAN bearer modification is rejected. + +In case of a GW (PCEF) internal decision the GW (PCEF) initiates any additional IP-CAN Session signalling required for completion of the IP-CAN Session modification (applicable to case 1). + +In case the IP-CAN session modification is due to the BBF transitioning from a BBERF in the source access-network to the PCEF, the PCEF initiates IP-CAN bearer signalling to activate bearers in the target access network (applicable to case 1). + +21. The GW (PCEF) receives the response for the IP-CAN Session signalling request (applicable to case 1). +22. The GW (PCEF) sends a Provision Ack (accept or reject of the PCC rule operation(s)) to inform the PCRF about the outcome of the GW (PCEF) actions related to the decision(s) received in step 15. + +NOTE 3: For Cases 2a and 2b, the rejection of PCC rule operation can only occur as a result of online charging interaction. + +23. Based on the result of PCC rule operations, the PCRF decides whether to initiate a Gateway Control and QoS Rules provision procedure as defined in clause 7.7.4, if required to keep the PCC and QoS rules aligned (applicable to cases 2a and 2b, as defined in clause 7.1). + +If there are multiple BBERFs associated with the IP-CAN session, this step is performed with all the affected BBERFs. + +24. If the AF requested it, the PCRF notifies the AF of related bearer level events (e.g. transmission resources are established/released/lost). + +NOTE 4: Based on the outcome reported in this step the AF performs the appropriate action, e.g. starting charging or terminating the AF session. + +25. The AF acknowledges the notification from the PCRF. + +## 7.4.2 IP-CAN Session Modification; PCRF initiated + +This clause describes the signalling flow for the IP-CAN Session modification initiated by the PCRF. The AF or TDF or the OCS or the TSSF may be involved. An example of PCRF inputs that may trigger the procedure include: + +- Initiation and authorization of a session-based service for which an IP-CAN Session is modified. +- A change in the status of a policy counter. + +IP-CAN Session handling and handling of PCC rules for non-session based services, and also general handling of PCC rules that are not subject to AF-interaction or TDF-interaction is also applicable here. + +![Sequence diagram for IP-CAN Session Modification; PCRF initiated. Lifelines: GW (BBERF), GW (PCEF), TDF, TSSF, V-PCRF, H-PCRF, AF, OCS. The diagram shows 20 numbered steps of interaction between these entities, with a shaded 'Roaming Scenarios' area covering the V-PCRF lifeline.](d22fb161d760fcf9fe3fb7b36f81c6fb_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the interaction for an IP-CAN Session Modification initiated by the PCRF. The lifelines are GW (BBERF), GW (PCEF), TDF, TSSF, V-PCRF, H-PCRF, AF, and OCS. A shaded region labeled 'Roaming Scenarios' covers the V-PCRF lifeline. The sequence of messages is as follows: + +- 1a. Application/Service Info: AF to H-PCRF +- 1b. Service Traffic Detection: TDF to V-PCRF +- 1c. Spending Limit Report: H-PCRF to OCS +- 2a. Ack: H-PCRF to AF +3. Spending Limit Report Request: V-PCRF to OCS +4. Policy Decision: V-PCRF to H-PCRF +5. Acknowledgment or TDF session Establishment/Termination/Modification: H-PCRF to TDF +6. TDF Initiated Credit Request: TDF to OCS +7. Credit Response: OCS to TDF +8. Acknowledgment TDF session Establishment/Termination/Modification: TDF to H-PCRF +9. Traffic Steering Control information provisioning/update/removal: H-PCRF to TSSF +10. Ack Traffic Steering Control Info provisioning/update/removal: TSSF to H-PCRF +11. Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision (case 2a and 2b): V-PCRF to GW (PCEF) +12. Policy and Charging Rules Provision: V-PCRF to GW (PCEF) +13. Policy Enforcement: GW (PCEF) to GW (BBERF) +14. PCEF Initiated Credit Request: GW (PCEF) to OCS +15. Credit Response: OCS to GW (PCEF) +16. IP CAN Bearer Signaling (case 1): GW (PCEF) to GW (BBERF) +17. IP CAN Bearer Signaling (case 1): GW (BBERF) to GW (PCEF) +18. Ack: GW (PCEF) to GW (BBERF) +19. Notification of Bearer Level Event: GW (PCEF) to H-PCRF +20. Ack: H-PCRF to GW (PCEF) + +Sequence diagram for IP-CAN Session Modification; PCRF initiated. Lifelines: GW (BBERF), GW (PCEF), TDF, TSSF, V-PCRF, H-PCRF, AF, OCS. The diagram shows 20 numbered steps of interaction between these entities, with a shaded 'Roaming Scenarios' area covering the V-PCRF lifeline. + +Figure 7.5: IP-CAN Session Modification; PCRF initiated + +This procedure concerns both roaming and non-roaming scenarios. In the roaming case when home routed access applies (figure 5.1-3) or if case 2a applies (as defined in clause 7.1) for Local Breakout (figure 5.1-4), when a Gateway Control Session is used, the V-PCRF shall proxy Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request between the BBERF in the VPLMN and the H-PCRF over S9. For this case the H-PCRF may also initiate a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provisioning procedure towards the BBERF in the VPLMN and proxy the information via the V-PCRF over S9. + +For case 2b in the Local Breakout scenario (figure 5.1-4) and if the Gateway Control Session is terminated locally at the V-PCRF, the V-PCRF shall reply to/initiate Gateway Control Session and QoS Rules Request/Provisioning procedures locally without notifying the H-PCRF. For this case the V-PCRF shall proxy the Policy and Charging Rules + +Provisioning and Acknowledge over S9 between the PCEF in the VPLMN and the H-PCRF. If the AF is located in the VPLMN for this scenario, the V-PCRF shall proxy AF session signalling over S9 between the AF and the H-PCRF. + +NOTE 1: The case when the AF resides in the VPLMN is not showed in the figure. + +In the non-roaming case (figure 5.1-1) the V-PCRF is not involved at all. + +- 1a. Optionally, the AF provides/revokes service information to the PCRF due to AF session signalling. The AF may subscribe at this point to notification of bearer level events related to the service information. The AF may also provide a reference ID to a transfer policy that the AF previously negotiated with the PCRF (as described in clauses 6.1.16 and 7.11.1). + +NOTE 2: For the PCRF to generate the applicable events, the PCRF instructs the PCEF to report events related to the corresponding PCC rules. Such events are not shown in this sequence diagram. + +- 1b. Alternatively, optionally, for TDF, e.g. the TDF detects the start/stop of an application traffic that matches with one of the active ADC Rules. + +For solicited application reporting, if the start/stop of application traffic detection Event Trigger was received from the PCRF and the reporting is not muted for the ADC rule, the TDF shall provide application information to the PCRF, including the application identifier, start or stop of application traffic detection event trigger and, for the start of application's traffic detection, the service data flow descriptions, if deducible. Additionally, the application instance identifier should be included in the report both for Start and for Stop of application traffic detection, when the service data flow descriptions are provided. + +For unsolicited application reporting, the Sd reports the same application information to the PCRF unconditionally. The TDF establishes a new Sd session if it detects an application for an IPv4 address or IPv6 address for which no corresponding Sd session exists. + +- 1c. Alternatively, optionally, the OCS provides a Spending Limit Report to the PCRF as described in clause 7.9.4. + +- 1d. Alternatively, optionally, the RCAF provides a Congestion Report to the PCRF as described in clause 7.10.1. + +NOTE 3: This step is not shown on the diagram. + +- 2a. The PCRF stores the service information if available and responds with the Acknowledgement to the AF. This is applicable to 1a case. + +NOTE 4: Without AF interaction, a trigger event in the PCRF may cause the PCRF to determine that the PCC rules require updating at the PCEF, e.g. change to configured policy. + +NOTE 5: This procedure could also be triggered by the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request procedure as described in clause 7.7.3. + +3. If the PCRF determines a change to policy counter status reporting is required, it may alter the subscribed list of policy counters using the Initial, Intermediate or Final Spending Limit Report Request procedures as defined in clauses 7.9.1, 7.9.2 and 7.9.3. +4. The PCRF makes the authorization and policy decision. If the AF provided a reference ID to a transfer policy in step 1a, the PCRF shall retrieve the corresponding transfer policy from the SPR before making any decisions. +5. The PCRF may store the application information if provided and responds with an Acknowledgement to the TDF (for unsolicited application reporting) or a Sd session modification (for solicited application reporting). For the TDF solicited application reporting, the PCRF may provide a new ADC decision to the TDF. If the last ADC rule is deactivated, the PCRF requests the TDF to terminate the Sd session towards the PCRF. If there is no active Sd session yet between the TDF and the PCRF, the PCRF requests the TDF to establish the Sd session towards PCRF and provides an ADC decision to the TDF, if traffic steering control over Sd applies, ADC Rules may contain traffic steering control information. In case of local breakout, the V-PCRF shall provide ADC rules generated from PCC Rules providing application detection and control as instructed by the H-PCRF over S9. +6. If online charging is applicable for the TDF, the TDF may request credit for new charging keys from the OCS and/or may inform the OCS about re-authorization trigger if the event occurs and/or may issue final reports and return remaining credit for charging keys no longer active to the OCS. + +7. If OCS was contacted by the TDF, the OCS provides the credit information to the TDF, and/or acknowledges the credit report. +8. For the TDF solicited application reporting, in the case of an existing on-going session, if requested by the PCRF the TDF sends a Provision Ack (accept or reject of the ADC Rule operation(s)). For a new session, the TDF sends an Ack. This is to inform the PCRF about the outcome of the actions related to the received ADC decision(s). The Provision Ack / Ack also includes the list of Event Triggers to report, including the case when the OCS provides any credit re-authorisation trigger, e.g. PLMN change, Location change (serving CN node), which cannot be monitored at the TDF. The Event Triggers indicate to the PCRF what events to be forwarded from the PCRF to the TDF, once PCRF gets the corresponding Event Report from the PCEF/BBERF. +9. If traffic steering control over St applies, the PCRF determines if traffic steering control information needs to be modified/provisioned for the IP-CAN session; the PCRF provides to the TSSF the traffic steering control information associated to the UE IPv4 address and/or to the UE IPv6 prefix. +10. The TSSF sends an acknowledgement to the PCRF to inform the PCRF about the outcome of the actions related to the traffic steering control information received in step 9. +11. If there is no Gateway Control and QoS Rules Reply pending and there is a need to provision QoS rules, the PCRF initiates a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision Procedure as defined in 7.7.4 (applicable to cases 2a and 2b, as defined in clause 7.1). + +If there are multiple BBERFs associated with the IP-CAN session, Step 9 is performed with the BBERFs that support UE/NW bearer establishment mode. + +NOTE 6: If there is a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Reply pending, e.g. this procedure was invoked from the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request procedure as defined in clause 7.7.3, the PCRF shall use that opportunity for provisioning the applicable QoS rules. If there are multiple BBERFs associated with the IP-CAN session, and the procedure was invoked by a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request procedure from the primary BBERF, the PCRF may receive a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request from the non-primary BBERFs. + +12. The PCRF sends the Policy and Charging Rules Provision (PCC Rules, Event Trigger, Event Report) to the PCEF. If traffic steering control over Gx applies, the PCC Rules may contain traffic steering control information. If the TDF provided a list of Event Triggers to the PCRF in the previous step, the PCRF shall also provide those Event Triggers to the PCEF. +13. The PCEF enforces the decision. +14. If online charging is applicable for the PCEF, the PCEF may request credit for new charging keys from the OCS and/or may inform the OCS about re-authorization trigger if the event occurs and/or may return the remaining credit for charging keys no longer active to the OCS. +15. If OCS was contacted by the PCEF, the OCS provides the credit information to the PCEF, and/or acknowledges the credit report. +16. The GW (PCEF) may send an IP-CAN Bearer establishment, modification or termination request (applicable to case 1, as defined in clause 7.1). + +An IP-CAN bearer modification is sent by the GW (PCEF) if the QoS of the IP-CAN bearer exceeds the authorized QoS provided by the PCRF in step 4. + +An IP-CAN bearer termination request is sent by the GW (PCEF) if all PCC rules for an IP-CAN bearer have been removed. + +17. The GW (PCEF) receives the response for the IP-CAN Bearer modification or termination request (applicable to case 1). +18. The PCEF sends Acknowledge Policy and Charging Rules Provisioning (accept or reject of the PCC rule operation(s)) to the PCRF. +19. If the AF requested it, the PCRF notifies the AF related bearer level events (e.g. transmission resources are established/released/lost). +20. The AF acknowledges the notification from the PCRF. + +### 7.4.3 Void + +## 7.5 Update of the subscription information in the PCRF + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 7.6: Procedure for update of the subscription information in the PCRF. The diagram shows vertical lifelines for GW (BBERF), GW (PCEF), TDF, V-PCRF, (H-)PCRF, SPR, and OCS. V-PCRF is enclosed in a shaded box labeled 'Roaming Scenarios'. Step 1: SPR detects profile change. Step 2: SPR sends Profile Update to (H-)PCRF. Step 3: (H-)PCRF sends Response to SPR. Step 4: (H-)PCRF stores updated profile. Step 5: (H-)PCRF interacts with OCS for Spending Limit Report Request. Step 6: (H-)PCRF makes Policy Decision. Step 7: PCC decision provisioning and TDF session Establishment/Termination/Modification involves (H-)PCRF, V-PCRF, TDF, GW (PCEF), and GW (BBERF).](0850300da6b28250eb47881da35cabad_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BBERF as GW (BBERF) + participant PCEF as GW (PCEF) + participant TDF + box "Roaming Scenarios" + participant VPCRF as V-PCRF + end + participant HPCRF as (H-)PCRF + participant SPR + participant OCS + + Note over SPR: 1. Detect that the related +profile changed + SPR->>HPCRF: 2. Profile Update + HPCRF->>SPR: 3. Response + Note over HPCRF: 4. Stores the +updated profile + rect rgb(255, 255, 255) + Note over HPCRF, OCS: 5. Initial/Intermediate/Final Spending Limit Report +Request + end + Note over HPCRF: 6. Policy Decision + rect rgb(255, 255, 255) + Note over BBERF, HPCRF: 7. PCC decision provisioning and +TDF session Establishment/Termination/Modification + end + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure 7.6: Procedure for update of the subscription information in the PCRF. The diagram shows vertical lifelines for GW (BBERF), GW (PCEF), TDF, V-PCRF, (H-)PCRF, SPR, and OCS. V-PCRF is enclosed in a shaded box labeled 'Roaming Scenarios'. Step 1: SPR detects profile change. Step 2: SPR sends Profile Update to (H-)PCRF. Step 3: (H-)PCRF sends Response to SPR. Step 4: (H-)PCRF stores updated profile. Step 5: (H-)PCRF interacts with OCS for Spending Limit Report Request. Step 6: (H-)PCRF makes Policy Decision. Step 7: PCC decision provisioning and TDF session Establishment/Termination/Modification involves (H-)PCRF, V-PCRF, TDF, GW (PCEF), and GW (BBERF). + +**Figure-7.6: Procedure for update of the subscription information in the PCRF** + +1. The SPR detects that the related subscription profile of an IP-CAN session has been changed. +2. If requested by the PCRF, the SPR notifies the PCRF on the changed profile. +3. The PCRF responds to the SPR. +4. The PCRF stores the updated profile. +5. If the updated subscriber profile requires the status of new policy counters available at the OCS then an Initial/Intermediate Spending Limit Report Request is sent from PCRF as defined in clauses 7.9.1, and 7.9.2. If the updated subscriber profile implies that no policy counter status is needed an Intermediate Spending Limit Report Request is sent from PCRF, if this is the last policy counter status Final Spending Limit Report Request is sent from PCRF as specified in clause 7.9.3. +6. PCRF makes an authorization and policy decision. +7. The PCRF provides all new PCC decisions to the PCEF and BBERF (if applicable), using the PCRF initiated IP-CAN session modification procedure in clause 7.4.2. The PCRF also provides all new ADC decisions to the TDF, if applicable. + +## 7.6 PCRF Discovery and Selection + +### 7.6.1 General principles + +This clause describes the underlying principles for PCRF selection and discovery: + +- A single logical PCRF entity may be deployed by means of multiple and separately addressable PCRFs. +- The H-PCRF must be able to correlate the AF service session information received over Rx with the right IP-CAN session (PCC Session binding). +- The PCRF must be able to associate sessions established over the different reference points (Gx, Rx, S9, Gxa/Gxc, Sd, Np), for the same UE's IP-CAN session. The actual reference points that need to be correlated depend on the scenario (e.g. roaming, LBO etc.). +- It shall be possible to deploy a network so that a PCRF may serve only specific PDN(s). For example, PCC may be enabled on a per APN basis. + +For the case 2a (as defined in clause 7.1), the same PCRF shall support all the PDNs for which PCC is enabled and for which there are potential users accessing by means of case 2a (as defined in clause 7.1). + +It shall also be possible to deploy a network so that the same PCRF can be allocated for all PDN connections for a UE. + +- A standardized procedure for contacting the PCRF is preferred to ensure interoperability between PCRFs from different vendors. The procedure may be specific for each reference point. The procedure shall enable the PCRF(s) to coordinate Gx, Rx and, when applicable, Gxa/Gxc, S9, Sd and Np interactions. +- It shall allow that entities contacting the PCRF may be able to provide different sets of information about the UE and PDN connections. For example: + - The AF has information about UE IP address and PDN but may not have user identity information. + - The PDN GW has information about user identity (UE NAI), the APN and the UE IP address(es) for a certain PDN connection. + - For case 2b as defined in clause 7.1, the S-GW and trusted non-3GPP access has information about the user identity (UE NAI) and, the APN(s) but may not know the UE IP address(es). + - For case 2a as defined in clause 7.1, the trusted non-3GPP access has information about the user identity (UE NAI) and the local IP address (CoA) but may not know the APN or UE IP address(es) (HoA). + - The TDF (when the unsolicited application reporting applies) has the information about UE IP address, but may not have the UE identity. + - The RCAf has the information about the user identity (IMSI) and the APN. +- The DRA has information about the user identity (UE NAI), the APN, the UE IP address(es) and the selected PCRF address for a certain IP-CAN Session. + +When the DRA first receives a request for a certain IP-CAN Session (e.g. from the PDN GW), the DRA selects a suitable PCRF for the IP-CAN Session and stores the PCRF address. Subsequently, the DRA can retrieve the selected PCRF address according to the information carried by the incoming requests from other entities (e.g. the AF or the BBERF). + +When the IP-CAN Session terminates, the DRA shall remove the information about the IP-CAN Session. In case of the PCRF realm change, the information about the IP-CAN session stored in the old DRA shall be removed. + +- All PCRFs in a PLMN belong to one or more Diameter realms. Routing of PCC messages for a UE towards the right Diameter realm in a PLMN is based on standard Diameter routing, as specified in RFC 3588, i.e. based on UE-NAI domain part. A Diameter realm shall provide the ability of routing PCC messages for the same UE and PDN connection to the same PCRF based on the available information supplied by the entities contacting the PCRF. + +- A PLMN may be separated into multiple Diameter realms based on the PDN ID information or IP address range. In this case, the relevant information (PDN ID, IP address, etc) shall be used to assist routing PCC message to the appropriate Diameter realm. +- Unique identification of an IP-CAN session in the PCRF shall be possible based on the (UE ID, PDN ID)-tuple , the (UE IP Address(es), PDN ID)-tuple and the (UE ID, UE IP Address(es), PDN ID). +- Standard IETF RFC 3588 mechanisms and components, e.g. Diameter agents, should be applied to deploy a network where the PCRF implementation specifics are invisible for Diameter clients. The use of Diameter agents, including Diameter redirect agents, shall be permitted, but the use of agents in a certain deployment shall be optional. + +NOTE: For the use of private UE IPv4 address TS 29.213 [22] provides guidance. + +## 7.6.2 Solution Principles + +In order to ensure that all Diameter sessions for Gx, S9, Gxa/Gxc, Rx, Sd (when the unsolicited application reporting applies) and Np for a certain IP-CAN session reach the same PCRF when multiple and separately addressable PCRFs have been deployed in a Diameter realm, an optional logical "Diameter Routing Agent (DRA)" function is enabled. This resolution mechanism is not required in networks that utilise a single PCRF per Diameter realm. The DRA has the following roles: + +- When deployed, DRA needs to be contacted at first interaction point for a given GW and IP-CAN session. + +NOTE: How subsequent interactions work is described in TS 29.213 [22]. + +- When deployed, the DRA is on the Diameter routing path when initiating a session with a PCRF over Gx, Rx, Gxa/Gxc, S9 and Sd. +- The DRA is involved at IP-CAN session establishment by the PDN GW. +- The DRA selects the PCRF at initial attach (IP-CAN session or Gateway Control session establishment). +- The DRA is involved at Gateway Control session establishment by the S-GW and trusted non-3GPP access. +- The DRA selects the PCRF at unsolicited service reporting over Sd. +- After IP-CAN session or Gateway Control Session establishment, the DRA ensures that the same PCRF is contacted for Rx, Gxa/Gxc, Gx, S9, Sd and Np. +- The DRA keeps status of assigned PCRF for a certain UE and IP-CAN session. +- It is assumed that there is a single logical DRA serving a Diameter realm. +- In roaming scenarios, there is only a single VPCRF for all the PCC sessions (IP-CAN session, GW control sessions, AF session, etc.) belonging to a single PDN connection of the UE. The VPCRF shall be selected by a DRA in the visited PLMN. + +![Diagram illustrating PCRF selection and discovery using DRA. On the left, a vertical oval contains network elements: RCAF, S-GW, P-GW, Non-3GPP GW, ePDG, AF, and TDF. A large double-headed arrow labeled 'Gx, Gxa, Gxb, Gxc, Rx, Sd, Np' connects this oval to a dashed circle labeled 'PLMN'. Inside the PLMN, there are two ovals labeled 'Diameter (PCRF) realm'. Each realm contains a 'DRA' box and a stack of three 'PCRF' boxes. The central arrow points from the network elements on the left into the top Diameter realm of the PLMN.](1cd38e4f2ffcae2871964fa6313a9a27_img.jpg) + +Diagram illustrating PCRF selection and discovery using DRA. On the left, a vertical oval contains network elements: RCAF, S-GW, P-GW, Non-3GPP GW, ePDG, AF, and TDF. A large double-headed arrow labeled 'Gx, Gxa, Gxb, Gxc, Rx, Sd, Np' connects this oval to a dashed circle labeled 'PLMN'. Inside the PLMN, there are two ovals labeled 'Diameter (PCRF) realm'. Each realm contains a 'DRA' box and a stack of three 'PCRF' boxes. The central arrow points from the network elements on the left into the top Diameter realm of the PLMN. + +**Figure 7.6-1: PCRF selection and discovery using DRA** + +The DRA functionality should be transparent to the Diameter applications used on the Gx, Gxa/Gxc, S9, Rx, Sd or Np reference points. + +In roaming scenario, home routed or local breakout, if the DRA is deployed, the vPCRF is selected by the DRA located in the visited PLMN, and the hPCRF is selected by the DRA located in the home PLMN. + +The parameters available for the DRA to be able to determine the already allocated PCRF depend on the reference point over which the DRA is contacted, as described in clause 7.6.1. + +## 7.7 Gateway Control Session Procedures + +### 7.7.1 Gateway Control Session Establishment + +#### 7.7.1.0 General + +There are two cases considered for Gateway Control Session Establishment: + +1. The PCEF establishes the IP-CAN Session during the Gateway Control session establishment. This happens when the UE attaches to the EPC for the first time and when the UE establishes a new PDN Connection. +2. There exists an established IP-CAN Session corresponding to the Gateway Control Session being established. This happens when the BBERF changes, i.e. during BBERF relocation and handovers from and to GTP based EPC. + +### 7.7.1.1 Gateway Control Session Establishment during Attach + +![Sequence diagram illustrating Gateway Control Session Establishment during Attach. The diagram shows interactions between GW(BBERF), V-PCRF, H-PCRF, and GW(PCEF).](48090d8f1db2e826aaa740035aa12ecb_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant GW(BBERF) + participant V-PCRF + participant H-PCRF + participant GW(PCEF) + + Note left of GW(BBERF): + GW(BBERF)->>H-PCRF: 1. Establish Gateway Control Session Request + H-PCRF->>V-PCRF: 2. Gateway Control Session Establishment + Note right of H-PCRF: 3. PCRF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification Procedure + H-PCRF->>GW(BBERF): 4. Acknowledge Gateway Control Establishment + Note left of GW(BBERF): 5. Deploy QoS Rules and Event Triggers + GW(BBERF)->>V-PCRF: 6. Establish Gateway Control Session Reply + +``` + +The sequence diagram illustrates the Gateway Control Session Establishment during Attach. It involves four main entities: GW(BBERF), V-PCRF, H-PCRF, and GW(PCEF). The process starts with the GW(BBERF) sending a '1. Establish Gateway Control Session Request' to the H-PCRF. The H-PCRF then sends a '2. Gateway Control Session Establishment' to the V-PCRF. The V-PCRF initiates a '3. PCRF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification Procedure' with the GW(PCEF). The H-PCRF sends an '4. Acknowledge Gateway Control Establishment' back to the GW(BBERF). The GW(BBERF) then '5. Deploy QoS Rules and Event Triggers' and finally sends a '6. Establish Gateway Control Session Reply' to the V-PCRF. The V-PCRF is shown in a shaded box, indicating it is involved in the roaming scenario. + +Sequence diagram illustrating Gateway Control Session Establishment during Attach. The diagram shows interactions between GW(BBERF), V-PCRF, H-PCRF, and GW(PCEF). + +**Figure 7.7.1.1-1: Gateway Control Session Establishment during Attach** + +This procedure concerns both roaming and non-roaming scenarios. In the roaming case when a Gateway Control Session is used, the V-PCRF should proxy the Gateway Control Session Establishment between the BBERF in the VPLMN and the H-PCRF over S9 based on PDN-Id and roaming agreements. + +In the non-roaming case (Figure 5.1-1) the V-PCRF is not involved. + +1. The GW (BBERF) receives an indication that it must establish a Gateway Control Session. + 2. The GW (BBERF) sends the PCRF a Gateway Control Session Establishment. The BBERF includes the following information: IP-CAN Type, UE Identity, PDN Identifier (if known), IP address(es) (if known), an indication that leg linking shall be deferred (applicable for case 2b, as defined in clause 7.1), if available, the PDN Connection Identifier and if available, the IP-CAN bearer establishment modes supported and the indication of BBERF support for the extended TFT filter format. The IP-CAN Type identifies the type of access used by the UE. The UE's identity and PDN Identifier requested are used to identify the subscriber and in PCRF selection to locate the PCRF function with the corresponding IP-CAN session established by the PDN GW. The BBERF may also include the Default Bearer QoS and APN-AMBR (applicable for case 2b, as defined in clause 7.1). An indication that leg linking shall be deferred is included to inform the PCRF that linking the Gateway Control Session to a Gx session shall occur when a matching Gx message is received as described clause 6.2.1.0. Further information is supplied on an access specific basis, as described in the IP-CAN specific Annexes. +- NOTE: The BBERF support is a prerequisite for the PCRF enabling the possibility for usage of the extended TFT filter format in the IP-CAN session(s). +3. For GERAN/UTRAN accesses, if the PCRF is required to interact with the GW (PCEF), the PCRF waits until it gets informed about the establishment of the corresponding IP-CAN session (step 7 of the IP-CAN session establishment procedure) and performs a PCRF initiated IP-CAN session modification procedure with the GW (PCEF). + 4. The PCRF sends an Acknowledge Gateway Control Session Establishment to the GW (BBERF). The PCRF may include the following information: the chosen IP-CAN bearer establishment mode, QoS Rules and Event Triggers. In case 2a a charging ID may be provided together with QoS rules. The QoS policy rules are employed by the GW (BBERF) to perform Bearer Binding. The Event Triggers indicate events that require the GW (BBERF) to report to the PCRF. + +5. The QoS Rules and Event Triggers received by the GW (BBERF) are deployed. This will result in bearer binding being performed, according to the rules. This step may trigger IP-CAN bearer establishment procedures. The details of bearer establishment are IP-CAN specific. +6. An indication of Gateway Control Session Established is sent to the entity that triggered the initiation of the session. + +### 7.7.1.2 Gateway Control Session Establishment during BBERF Relocation + +![Sequence diagram illustrating Gateway Control Session Establishment during BBERF Relocation. The diagram shows interactions between Source GW(BBERF), Target GW(BBERF), V-PCRF, H-PCRF, and GW(PCEF).](16e2337d7302fa71012e69303a459c35_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant Source GW(BBERF) + participant Target GW(BBERF) + participant V-PCRF + participant H-PCRF + participant GW(PCEF) + + Note right of Target GW(BBERF): V-PCRF Proxy Area + Note left of V-PCRF: V-PCRF Proxy Area + + Target GW(BBERF)->>V-PCRF: 1. Establish Gateway Control Session Request + V-PCRF->>H-PCRF: 2. Gateway Control Session Establishment + H-PCRF-->>V-PCRF: 3. Acknowledge Gateway Control Establishment + V-PCRF->>Target GW(BBERF): 4. Deploy QoS Rules and Event Triggers + Target GW(BBERF)->>Source GW(BBERF): 5. Establish Gateway Control Session Reply + Source GW(BBERF)-->>Target GW(BBERF): 6. IP-CAN Bearer Signaling + Target GW(BBERF)-->>Source GW(BBERF): 7. IP-CAN Bearer Signaling + Target GW(BBERF)-.->>H-PCRF: 8. Gateway Control and QoS Rules Ack + Note right of Source GW(BBERF): 9. BBERF initiated Gateway Control Session Termination (case 2b) + Note right of H-PCRF: 10. IP-CAN Session Modification Procedure + Note right of V-PCRF: 11. Gateway Control and QoS Rules provision (case 2a) + Note right of V-PCRF: 12. Gateway Control and QoS Rules provision (case 2a) +or PCRF initiated Gateway Control Session Termination (case 2a) + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating Gateway Control Session Establishment during BBERF Relocation. The diagram shows interactions between Source GW(BBERF), Target GW(BBERF), V-PCRF, H-PCRF, and GW(PCEF). + +**Figure 7.7.1.2-1: Gateway Control Session Establishment during BBERF Relocation** + +This procedure concerns both roaming and non-roaming scenarios. In the roaming case when a Gateway Control Session is used, the V-PCRF should proxy the Gateway Control Session Establishment between the BBERF in the VPLMN and the H-PCRF over S9 based on PDN-Id and roaming agreements. + +In the non-roaming case (Figure 5.1-1) the V-PCRF is not involved. + +1. The target GW (BBERF) receives an indication that it must establish a Gateway Control Session. +2. The target GW (BBERF) sends the PCRF a Gateway Control Session Establishment. The BBERF includes the following information: IP-CAN Type, UE Identity, PDN Identifier (if known), IP address(es) (if known), PDN Connection Identifier if available and, if available, the IP-CAN bearer establishment modes supported. The + +IP-CAN Type identifies the type of access used by the UE. The UE's identity and PDN Identifier requested are used to identify the subscriber and in PCRF selection to locate the PCRF function with the corresponding IP-CAN session established by the PDN GW. The BBERF may also include the Default Bearer QoS and APN-AMBR (applicable for case 2b, as defined in clause 7.1). If the handover state is unknown to the GW (BBERF), as described in TS 23.402 [18], the GW (BBERF) includes an indication to inform the PCRF that linking the Gateway Control Session to a Gx session shall be deferred as described clause 6.2.1.0 (applicable for case 2b, as defined in clause 7.1). Further information is supplied on an access specific basis, as described in the IP-CAN specific Annexes. + +3. If case 2b of clause 7.1 applies and the PCRF correlates the Gateway Control Session with an existing IP-CAN session, it sends an Acknowledge Gateway Control Session Establishment to the target GW (BBERF). The PCRF may include the following information: QoS Rules and Event Triggers. The QoS policy rules are employed by the GW (BBERF) to perform Bearer Binding. The Event Triggers indicate events that require the GW (BBERF) to report to the PCRF. If the BBERF supports NW/UE bearer establishment mode, the PCRF provides to the new BBERF QoS rules corresponding to existing SDFs. For a change of IP-CAN type, the QoS parameters of some of the QoS rules may be changed or some QoS rules may not be provided to the new BBERF, e.g. depending of the capability of the target RAT. + +If case 2a of clause 7.1 applies, the PCRF sends an Acknowledge Gateway Control Session Establishment to the target GW (BBERF). The PCRF includes packet filters and QoS information for the CoA in order to establish the initial bearer, e.g. for the DSMIPv6 signalling. The PCRF may also include Event Triggers. + +NOTE: The packet filters and QoS information provided at this step conceptually are not QoS rules as they are not associated with any IP-CAN session. However, it is a stage 3 issue if the packet filters and QoS information are communicated to the BBERF with the same information elements by which QoS rules are communicated. + +4. The QoS Rules and Event Triggers received by the target GW (BBERF) are deployed. This will result in bearer binding being performed, according to the rules. This step may trigger IP-CAN bearer establishment procedures. The details of bearer establishment are IP-CAN specific. +5. An indication of Gateway Control Session Established is sent to the entity that triggered the initiation of the session. +6. The target GW (BBERF) initiates the IP-CAN Bearer signalling if required for the QoS Rules and Event Triggers deployed in step 4. +7. The target GW (BBERF) receives the response for the IP-CAN Bearer signalling. +8. The target GW (BBERF) sends the result of the QoS rule activation to the PCRF, indicating whether the resources requested have been successfully allocated. +9. If case 2b applies the source GW (BBERF) initiates the Gateway Control Session Termination procedure as defined in clause 7.7.2.1, if appropriate. +10. If the PCC rules previously provided to the GW (PCEF) need to be removed due to the result of the QoS rule activation as received in step 8, the PCRF updates the GW (PCEF). The PCRF first waits for the PCEF initiated IP-CAN session modification procedure to provide the updates. If the IP-CAN session modification procedure already occurred, the PCRF performs an IP-CAN session modification procedure with the GW (PCEF). +11. If case 2a applies the PCRF initiates a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision procedure towards the target GW (BBERF) as defined in clause 7.7.4, if appropriate, in order to provide any QoS Rules based on the IP-CAN session modification of step 10. In case 2a a charging ID may be provided together with QoS rules. +12. If case 2a applies the PCRF initiates a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision procedure towards the source GW (BBERF) as defined in clause 7.7.4, if appropriate, in order to remove any QoS Rules affected by the GW (BBERF) re-location. If there is no other IP-CAN session established at the source GW (BBERF), the PCRF instead initiates the Gateway Control Session Termination procedure as defined in clause 7.7.2.2. + +## 7.7.2 Gateway Control Session Termination + +### 7.7.2.1 GW (BBERF)-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination + +![Sequence diagram for BBERF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination](9d47fe89bc71acebde670ea760ee6ffb_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the sequence of messages for a BBERF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination. It features three main entities: GW(BBERF), V-PCRF, and H-PCRF. The V-PCRF and H-PCRF are grouped within a shaded rectangular area. The sequence of messages is as follows: + +- An external request (indicated by an arrow from the left) is received by the GW(BBERF). +- The GW(BBERF) sends a "Remove Gateway Control Session Request" to the V-PCRF. +- The V-PCRF sends a "Gateway Control Session Termination" message to the H-PCRF. +- The H-PCRF sends an "Ack Gateway Control Session Termination" message back to the V-PCRF. +- The V-PCRF then sends a "Remove QoS Rules and Event Triggers" message to the GW(BBERF). +- Finally, the GW(BBERF) sends a "Remove Gateway Control Session Reply" back to the external requester (indicated by an arrow pointing left). + +Sequence diagram for BBERF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination + +**Figure 7.7.2-1: BBERF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination** + +1. The GW (BBERF) is requested to terminate its Gateway Control Session. +2. The GW (BBERF) initiates a Gateway Control Session Termination towards the H-PCRF. If the GW (BBERF) is deployed in a visited network, this procedure is initiated by the GW (BBERF) to the V-PCRF. The V-PCRF forwards the information to the H-PCRF. +3. The H-PCRF replies to the GW (BBERF) with an Ack Gateway Control Session Termination. If the GW (BBERF) is deployed in a visited network, this information is sent by the H-PCRF to the V-PCRF. The V-PCRF forwards the information to the GW (BBERF). +4. The GW (BBERF) removes the QoS rules and Event triggers associated with the Gateway Control Session. This means the GW (BBERF) ceases its bearer binding and other Gateway Control functions associated with the QoS rules and Event Triggers. +5. The GW (BBERF) has completed terminating the session and can continue with the activity that prompted this procedure. + +## 7.7.2.2 PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination + +![Sequence diagram for PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination. The diagram shows three main entities: GW(BBERF), V-PCRF, and H-PCRF. The sequence of messages is: 1. H-PCRF sends a 'Decision to Remove Gateway Control Session' to V-PCRF. 2. V-PCRF sends a 'PCRF Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination' to GW(BBERF). 3. GW(BBERF) performs 'Remove QoS Rules and Event Triggers'. 4. GW(BBERF) sends an 'IP-CAN Bearer Removal Request' (dashed line) to an external entity. 5. The external entity sends an 'IP-CAN Bearer Removal Reply' (dashed line) back to GW(BBERF). 6. GW(BBERF) sends a 'PCRF Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination Ack' to V-PCRF.](c1bf17571f9cedf76c4072121295d10e_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant H-PCRF + participant V-PCRF + participant GW(BBERF) + Note right of H-PCRF: 1. Decision to Remove Gateway Control Session + H-PCRF->>V-PCRF: + V-PCRF->>GW(BBERF): 2. PCRF Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination + Note left of GW(BBERF): 3. Remove QoS Rules and Event Triggers + GW(BBERF)-->>External: 4. IP-CAN Bearer Removal Request + External-->>GW(BBERF): 5. IP-CAN Bearer Removal Reply + GW(BBERF)->>V-PCRF: 6. PCRF Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination Ack + +``` + +Sequence diagram for PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination. The diagram shows three main entities: GW(BBERF), V-PCRF, and H-PCRF. The sequence of messages is: 1. H-PCRF sends a 'Decision to Remove Gateway Control Session' to V-PCRF. 2. V-PCRF sends a 'PCRF Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination' to GW(BBERF). 3. GW(BBERF) performs 'Remove QoS Rules and Event Triggers'. 4. GW(BBERF) sends an 'IP-CAN Bearer Removal Request' (dashed line) to an external entity. 5. The external entity sends an 'IP-CAN Bearer Removal Reply' (dashed line) back to GW(BBERF). 6. GW(BBERF) sends a 'PCRF Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination Ack' to V-PCRF. + +**Figure 7.7.2-2: PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination** + +This procedure concerns both roaming and non-roaming scenarios. In the roaming case when a Gateway Control Session is used, the V-PCRF should proxy the Gateway Control Session Termination between the BBERF in the VPLMN and the H-PCRF over S9 based on PDN-Id and roaming agreements. + +In the non-roaming case (Figure 5.1-1) the V-PCRF is not involved. + +1. The PCRF is requested to terminate its Gateway Control Session. +2. The PCRF sends a PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination to the GW (BBERF). +3. The GW (BBERF) removes the QoS rules and Event triggers associated with the Gateway Control Session. This means the GW (BBERF) ceases its bearer binding and other Gateway Control functions associated with the QoS rules and Event Triggers. +4. If the bearer(s) corresponding to the removed QoS rules are still established, the GW (BBERF) initiates an IP-CAN specific bearer removal procedure. +5. The GW (BBERF) receives the response for the IP-CAN specific bearer removal procedure. +6. The GW (BBERF) replies to the PCRF with an PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination acknowledgement. + +## 7.7.3 Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request + +### 7.7.3.1 General + +There are two cases considered for a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request depending on the parameters the GW (BBERF) receives: + +- Case A: In case the GW (BBERF) action does not depend on the subsequent IP-CAN session modification, the GW (BBERF) can acknowledge the request after interacting with the PCRF. + +NOTE 1: If QoS rules have to be updated due to the event reporting, the PCRF shall use the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision procedure. + +- Case B: The GW (BBERF) is requested to obtain QoS rules for a Gateway Control Session or to deliver IP-CAN-specific parameters or both. + +![Sequence diagram for Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request. Lifelines: GW(BBERF), V-PCRF, H-PCRF, GW(PCEF). The diagram shows a request from GW(BBERF) to V-PCRF, which then proxies it to H-PCRF. H-PCRF may initiate an IP-CAN session modification. V-PCRF sends a reply to GW(BBERF), which then deploys rules and triggers. Finally, GW(BBERF) sends bearer signaling to V-PCRF, which sends an acknowledgment to H-PCRF.](6059b0a3a051cc20b414d51a4e412f3e_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant GW(BBERF) + participant V-PCRF + participant H-PCRF + participant GW(PCEF) + + Note right of V-PCRF: V-PCRF Proxy Area + Note right of H-PCRF: PCRF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification Procedure + Note left of GW(BBERF): Deploy QoS Rules and Event Triggers + + GW(BBERF)->>V-PCRF: 1. Gateway Request or Report + V-PCRF->>H-PCRF: 2. Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request + V-PCRF-->>GW(BBERF): 3. Result (case A) + H-PCRF->>GW(PCEF): 4. PCRF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification Procedure + H-PCRF-->>V-PCRF: 5. Gateway Control and QoS Rules Reply (case B) + V-PCRF-->>GW(BBERF): 6. Deploy QoS Rules and Event Triggers + GW(BBERF)-->>V-PCRF: 7. IP-CAN Bearer Signaling (case B) + V-PCRF-->>GW(BBERF): 8. IP-CAN Bearer Signaling (case B) + GW(BBERF)->>H-PCRF: 9. Gateway Control and QoS Rules Ack (case B) + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request. Lifelines: GW(BBERF), V-PCRF, H-PCRF, GW(PCEF). The diagram shows a request from GW(BBERF) to V-PCRF, which then proxies it to H-PCRF. H-PCRF may initiate an IP-CAN session modification. V-PCRF sends a reply to GW(BBERF), which then deploys rules and triggers. Finally, GW(BBERF) sends bearer signaling to V-PCRF, which sends an acknowledgment to H-PCRF. + +**Figure 7.7.3-1: Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request** + +NOTE 2: If QoS rules have to be updated for case A, the PCRF shall use the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision procedure (clause 7.7.4). + +This procedure concerns both roaming and non-roaming scenarios. In the roaming case when a Gateway Control Session is used, the V-PCRF should proxy the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request between the BBERF in the VPLMN and the H-PCRF over S9 based on PDN-Id and roaming agreements. + +In the non-roaming case (Figure 5.1-1) the V-PCRF is not involved. + +1. The GW (BBERF) is requested to either report an event or obtain QoS rules or both for a Gateway Control Session. +2. The GW (BBERF) sends a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request to the PCRF and includes the new IP-CAN bearer establishment modes if changed. The information sent by the GW (BBERF) to the PCRF includes: a request for resource authorization and/or a report corresponding to a deployed Event Trigger. +3. If the GW (BBERF) is only requested to report an event, the GW (BBERF) acknowledges the step 1 by sending a result to the entity that triggered this procedure. +4. The PCRF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification Procedure may occur as the result of the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request procedure, either to forward an Event Report to the GW (PCEF) or to issue new or revised PCC Rules and Event Triggers, or both an Event Report and a PCC Rules and Event Triggers provision. +5. If the GW (BBERF) asked for new QoS rules or IP-CAN-specific parameters need to be delivered back to the GW (BBERF) or both, the PCRF sends a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Reply to the GW (BBERF). This interaction may include QoS Rules and Event Triggers. In case 2a a charging ID may be provided together with QoS rules. + +If there are multiple BBFs associated with the IP-CAN session and the request in Step 2 is from a non-primary BBERF (see clause 6.2.1.5), only QoS rules corresponding to already activated PCC rules are included in the reply. If a request from a non-primary BBERF results in an authorization of a new QoS rule or to a modification of an existing QoS rules, the PCRF shall reject the request. + +6. The QoS Rules and Event Triggers, if any, received by the GW (BBERF) are deployed. This will result in bearer binding being performed, according to the rules. This may result in the binding of additional SDFs or a change in the binding of previously bound SDFs. Subsequent events corresponding to the Event Triggers will cause an Event Report to be delivered to the PCRF by means of a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request procedure. +7. The GW (BBERF) initiates the IP-CAN Bearer signalling if required for the QoS Rules and Event Triggers deployed in step 6. +8. The GW (BBERF) receives the response for the IP-CAN Bearer signalling. +9. If the step 5 contained new and/or modified QoS Rules, the result of the QoS rule activation is returned to the PCRF, indicating whether the resources requested have been successfully allocated. + +### 7.7.3.2 Event reporting for PCEF in visited network and locally terminated Gxx interaction + +This procedure is only used for the event reporting for a PCEF in the visited network and when the Gxx interaction is locally terminated at the V-PCRF. + +![Sequence diagram for Event reporting for PCEF in visited network and locally terminated Gxx interaction. The diagram shows four lifelines: GW(BBERF), V-PCRF, GW(PCEF), and H-PCRF. The sequence of messages is: 1. Gateway Report from an external source to GW(BBERF); 2. Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request from GW(BBERF) to V-PCRF; 3. Result (case A) from GW(BBERF) back to the external source; 4. Event Report from V-PCRF to GW(PCEF); 5. PCEF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification Procedure, shown as a dashed box spanning V-PCRF, GW(PCEF), and H-PCRF lifelines.](eaad3504edeecffe148decdc5c04a171_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant External + participant GW(BBERF) + participant V-PCRF + participant GW(PCEF) + participant H-PCRF + + External->>GW(BBERF): 1. Gateway Report + GW(BBERF)->>V-PCRF: 2. Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request + GW(BBERF)->>External: 3. Result (case A) + V-PCRF->>GW(PCEF): 4. Event Report + Note right of V-PCRF: 5. PCEF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification Procedure + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Event reporting for PCEF in visited network and locally terminated Gxx interaction. The diagram shows four lifelines: GW(BBERF), V-PCRF, GW(PCEF), and H-PCRF. The sequence of messages is: 1. Gateway Report from an external source to GW(BBERF); 2. Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request from GW(BBERF) to V-PCRF; 3. Result (case A) from GW(BBERF) back to the external source; 4. Event Report from V-PCRF to GW(PCEF); 5. PCEF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification Procedure, shown as a dashed box spanning V-PCRF, GW(PCEF), and H-PCRF lifelines. + +**Figure 7.7.3-2: Event reporting for PCEF in visited network and locally terminated Gxx interaction** + +1. The GW (BBERF) is requested to report an event for a Gateway Control Session. +2. The GW (BBERF) sends a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request to the V-PCRF and includes the new IP-CAN bearer establishment modes if changed. The information sent by the GW (BBERF) to the V-PCRF includes a report corresponding to a deployed Event Trigger. +3. Since the GW (BBERF) is only requested to report an event, the GW (BBERF) acknowledges the message received in step 1 by sending a result message to the entity that triggered this procedure. +4. The V-PCRF forwards the report corresponding to a deployed Event Trigger to the PCEF. +5. A PCEF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification Procedure may occur as the result of the received report, either to forward the report about the relevant deployed Event Trigger(s) to the H-PCRF or to request new or revised PCC Rules and Event Triggers, or both. + +## 7.7.4 Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision + +![Sequence diagram for Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision. Lifelines: GW(BBERF), V-PCRF, and H-PCRF. The sequence starts with H-PCRF sending a decision to send an event trigger or QoS rules update to V-PCRF. V-PCRF then sends a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision to GW(BBERF). GW(BBERF) deploys the rules and triggers, then initiates IP-CAN bearer signaling (steps 4 and 5). GW(BBERF) sends an acknowledgment (step 6) to V-PCRF, which returns the result (step 7) to H-PCRF.](b15cf8c50195a52cca59b4645c6f59fa_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant H-PCRF + participant V-PCRF + participant GW(BBERF) + + Note right of H-PCRF: 1. Decision to send an Event Trigger or QoS Rules update + H-PCRF->>V-PCRF: + V-PCRF->>GW(BBERF): 2. Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision + Note left of GW(BBERF): 3. Deploy QoS Rules and Event Triggers + GW(BBERF)-->>GW(BBERF): 4. IP-CAN Bearer Signaling + GW(BBERF)-->>GW(BBERF): 5. IP-CAN Bearer Signaling + GW(BBERF)->>V-PCRF: 6. Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision Ack + V-PCRF->>H-PCRF: 7. Result + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision. Lifelines: GW(BBERF), V-PCRF, and H-PCRF. The sequence starts with H-PCRF sending a decision to send an event trigger or QoS rules update to V-PCRF. V-PCRF then sends a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision to GW(BBERF). GW(BBERF) deploys the rules and triggers, then initiates IP-CAN bearer signaling (steps 4 and 5). GW(BBERF) sends an acknowledgment (step 6) to V-PCRF, which returns the result (step 7) to H-PCRF. + +**Figure 7.7.4-1: Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision** + +This procedure concerns both roaming and non-roaming scenarios. In the roaming case when a Gateway Control Session is used, the V-PCRF should proxy the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision between the BBERF in the VPLMN and the H-PCRF over S9 based on PDN-Id and roaming agreements. + +In the non-roaming case (Figure 5.1-1) the V-PCRF is not involved. + +1. The PCRF is requested to update the QoS Rules and Event triggers for a Gateway Control Session. +2. The PCRF sends a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision to the GW (BBERF). It will include QoS Rules and Event Triggers. In case 2a a charging ID may be provided together with QoS rules. If the service data flow is tunnelled at the BBERF, the information about the mobility protocol tunnelling encapsulation header may be included. It is also possible that this interaction includes an Event Report originating from the GW (PCEF) and relayed by the PCRF to the BBERF. This Event Report enables a GW (PCEF)-originating interaction to be sent by way of the PCC infrastructure to the BBERF in situations that communication is needed between the GW (PCEF) and the GW (BBERF) and no interface exists between the GWs. +3. The QoS Rules and Event Triggers received by the GW (BBERF) are deployed. This may result in bearer binding being performed, according to the rules. Subsequent events corresponding to the Event Triggers will cause an Event Report to be delivered to the PCRF by means of a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request procedure. +4. The GW (BBERF) initiates the IP-CAN Bearer signalling if required for the QoS Rules and Event Triggers deployed in step 3. +5. The GW (BBERF) receives the response for the IP-CAN Bearer signalling. +6. The GW (BBERF) sends a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision Ack (Result) to the PCRF. The Result information element indicates whether the indicated QoS Rules could be implemented. +7. The PCRF has completed updating the session and can continue with the activity that prompted this procedure. + +If there are multiple BBFs associated with the IP-CAN session (see clause 6.2.1.5), then the processing of the response is as follows depending on whether the BBERF is a primary BBERF or a non-primary BBERF: + +- If a primary-BBERF reports failure to install a QoS rule in Step 4, the PCRF also removes the same QoS rule from the non-primary BBERF(s) if any. The PCRF also removes the corresponding PCC rule from the PCEF. +- If a non-primary BBERF reports failure to install a QoS rule, the PCRF updates the enforcement status of the QoS rule for that particular BBERF in its record but does not perform any further action. + +## 7.7.5 Void + +## 7.8 Change in subscription for MPS priority services + +Once the PCRF receives a notification of a change in MPS EPS Priority, MPS Priority Level and/or IMS Signalling Priority from the SPR, the PCRF shall make the corresponding policy decisions (i.e. ARP and/or QCI change) and initiates the necessary IP-CAN session modification procedure(s) to apply the change. + +## 7.9 Procedures over Sy reference point + +### 7.9.1 Initial Spending Limit Report Request + +This clause describes the signalling flow for the H-PCRF to request the status of the policy counters available at the OCS, and to subscribe to spending limit reporting (i.e. to notifications of policy counter status changes) by the OCS. If the H-PCRF provides the list of policy counter identifier(s), the OCS returns the policy counter status per policy counter identifier provided by the PCRF. If the H-PCRF does not provide the list of policy counter identifier(s), the OCS returns the policy counter status of all policy counter(s), which are available for this subscriber. + +The Initial Spending Limit Report Request includes all subscriber Identifiers associated with the UE available at the PCRF. + +NOTE: In case the OCS returns the status of all available policy counters some of these may not be relevant for a policy decision (e.g. those used in a policy decision only when roaming). + +![Sequence diagram showing the Initial Spending Limit Report Request procedure between H-PCRF and OCS.](03a73cf37615028406f13c2aea732d60_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant H-PCRF + participant OCS + Note left of H-PCRF: 1. Policy decision depends on policy counter status + H-PCRF->>OCS: 2. Initial Spending Limit Report Request + OCS-->>H-PCRF: 3. Initial Spending Limit Report Response +``` + +The diagram illustrates the interaction between the H-PCRF and the OCS. It starts with a note on the H-PCRF side stating '1. Policy decision depends on policy counter status'. This is followed by a message '2. Initial Spending Limit Report Request' sent from the H-PCRF to the OCS. Finally, a message '3. Initial Spending Limit Report Response' is sent from the OCS back to the H-PCRF. + +Sequence diagram showing the Initial Spending Limit Report Request procedure between H-PCRF and OCS. + +**Figure 7.9.1: Initial Spending Limit Report Request** + +1. The H-PCRF retrieves subscription information that indicates that policy decisions depend on the status of policy counter(s) held at the OCS and optionally the list of policy counter identifier(s). +2. The H-PCRF sends an Initial Spending Limit Report Request if this is the first time policy counter status information is requested for the user and the PDN connection. It includes in the request: the subscriber ID (e.g. IMSI) and , optionally, the list of policy counter identifier(s). +3. The OCS sends an Initial Spending Limit Report Response that contains a policy counter status, and optionally pending policy counter statuses and their activation times, per required policy counter identifier and stores the H-PCRF's subscription to spending limit reports for these policy counters. If no policy counter identifier(s) was provided the OCS returns the policy counter status, optionally including pending policy counter statuses and their activation times, for all policy counter(s), which are available for this subscriber and stores the H-PCRF's subscription to spending limit reports of all policy counters provided to the H-PCRF. Otherwise, the OCS returns the policy counter status of all policy counter(s), which are available for this subscriber. + +## 7.9.2 Intermediate Spending Limit Report Request + +This clause describes the signalling flow for the H-PCRF to request the status of additional policy counters available at the OCS or to unsubscribe from spending limit reporting. If the H-PCRF provides the list of policy counter identifier(s), the OCS returns the policy counter status per policy counter identifier provided by the PCRF. + +NOTE: In case the OCS returns the status of all available policy counters some of these may not be relevant for a policy decision, (e.g. those used in a policy decision only when roaming). + +![Sequence diagram for Intermediate Spending Limit Report Request](819f1d00e68b342a246b64fa888a97f9_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant H-PCRF + participant OCS + Note left of H-PCRF: 1. Status of additional or fewer policy counters is relevant for policy decisions + H-PCRF->>OCS: 2. Intermediate Spending Limit Report Request + OCS-->>H-PCRF: 3. Intermediate Spending Limit Report Response +``` + +The diagram illustrates a sequence of three steps between the H-PCRF and the OCS. Step 1 is a note on the H-PCRF side stating that the status of additional or fewer policy counters is relevant for policy decisions. Step 2 is a message from the H-PCRF to the OCS labeled 'Intermediate Spending Limit Report Request'. Step 3 is a message from the OCS to the H-PCRF labeled 'Intermediate Spending Limit Report Response'. + +Sequence diagram for Intermediate Spending Limit Report Request + +**Figure 7.9.2: Intermediate Spending Limit Report Request** + +1. The H-PCRF determines that policy decisions depend on the status of additional policy counter(s) held at the OCS or that notifications of policy counter status changes for some policy counters are no longer required. +2. The H-PCRF sends an Intermediate Spending Limit Report Request, optionally including in the request an updated list of policy counter identifier(s). +3. The OCS sends the Intermediate Spending Limit Report Response that contains the policy counter status, and optionally pending policy counter statuses and their activation times, per required policy counter identifier, and stores or removes the H-PCRF's subscription to spending limit reporting by comparing the updated list with the existing H-PCRF subscriptions. If no policy counter identifier(s) was provided, the OCS returns the policy counter status, optionally including pending policy counter statuses and their activation times, for all policy counter(s), which are available for this subscriber and stores the H-PCRF's subscription to spending limit reports of all policy counters provided to the H-PCRF. + +## 7.9.3 Final Spending Limit Report Request + +This clause describes the signalling flow for the H-PCRF to cancel the subscriptions to status changes for the policy counters available at the OCS. + +![Sequence diagram for Final Spending Limit Report Request](c15cb6383bc35906e6b3c7c3aac621ed_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant H-PCRF + participant OCS + Note left of H-PCRF: 1. Decision to unsubscribe from notifications of changes in the policy counter status + H-PCRF->>OCS: 2. Final Spending Limit Report Request + OCS-->>H-PCRF: 3. Final Spending Limit Report Response +``` + +The diagram shows a sequence of three messages between H-PCRF and OCS. Step 1 is a decision box on the H-PCRF side. Step 2 is a request message from H-PCRF to OCS. Step 3 is a response message from OCS to H-PCRF. + +Sequence diagram for Final Spending Limit Report Request + +**Figure 7.9.3: Final Spending Limit Report Request** + +1. The H-PCRF decides that notifications of policy counter status changes are no longer needed. +2. The H-PCRF sends a Final Spending Limit Report Request to the OCS to cancel the subscription to notifications of policy counter status changes from the OCS. +3. The OCS removes the H-PCRF's subscription to spending limit reporting and acknowledges the request by sending the Final Spending Limit Report Response to the H-PCRF. + +## 7.9.4 Spending Limit Report + +This clause describes the signalling flow for the OCS to notify the change of the status of the subscribed policy counters available at the OCS for that subscriber. Alternatively, the signalling flow can be used by the OCS to provide one or more pending statuses for a subscribed policy counter together with the time they have to be applied. + +![Sequence diagram for Spending Limit Report](813ef40a14c7e2a52988a63e33c2b59f_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant H-PCRF + participant OCS + Note right of OCS: 1. Change of policy counter status (e.g. Threshold reached) + OCS->>H-PCRF: 2. Spending Limit Report + H-PCRF-->>OCS: 3. Spending Limit Report Response +``` + +The diagram shows a sequence of three messages between OCS and H-PCRF. Step 1 is a decision box on the OCS side. Step 2 is a report message from OCS to H-PCRF. Step 3 is a response message from H-PCRF to OCS. + +Sequence diagram for Spending Limit Report + +**Figure 7.9.4: Spending Limit Report** + +1. The OCS detects that the status of a policy counter(s) has changed and the PCRF subscribed to notifications of changes in the status of this policy counter. Alternatively, the OCS may detect that a policy counter status will change at a future point in time, and decides to instruct the PCRF to apply one or more pending statuses for a requested policy counter. +2. The OCS sends the policy counter status, and optionally pending policy counter statuses and their activation times, for each policy counter that has changed and for which the H-PCRF subscribed to spending limit + +reporting. Alternatively, the OCS sends one or more pending statuses for any of the subscribed policy counters together with the time they have to be applied. + +NOTE: The values related to the status of the subscribed counter (e.g. valid, invalid or any other status) are not specified. The interpretation and actions related to the defined values are out of scope of 3GPP. + +3. The H-PCRF acknowledges the Spending Limit Report and takes that information into account as input for a policy decision. + +## 7.9.5 Sy Session Termination + +This clause describes the signalling flow for the OCS to terminate the Sy session of a subscriber. This feature is optional. + +NOTE 1: When the PCRF supports this procedure and a subscriber is removed from an OCS system, the existing Sy session of the subscriber can be terminated by this procedure. + +![Sequence diagram for Sy Session Termination between H-PCRF and OCS.](d74d2943c702ef88a5f9dec974fc92a5_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant OCS + participant H-PCRF + Note right of OCS: 1. Decision on the removal of Sy session of a subscriber + OCS->>H-PCRF: 2. Sy Session Termination Request + H-PCRF-->>OCS: 3. Sy Session Termination Response +``` + +The diagram illustrates the signalling flow for Sy Session Termination. It involves two main entities: H-PCRF and OCS. The process starts with the OCS making a decision on the removal of a Sy session for a subscriber. The OCS then sends a 'Sy Session Termination Request' to the H-PCRF. The H-PCRF responds with a 'Sy Session Termination Response'. + +Sequence diagram for Sy Session Termination between H-PCRF and OCS. + +Figure 7.9.5: Sy Session Termination + +1. The OCS decides that the Sy session for a subscriber needs to be terminated. +2. The OCS sends the Sy Session Termination Request to H-PCRF to terminate the Sy session. The H-PCRF removes the Sy session context of the subscriber. + +NOTE 2: The termination of the Sy session causes the H-PCRF to make the applicable policy decision and act accordingly, i.e. sessions on other interfaces such as the Rx or Gx interface will remain established, unless the policy decision causes their termination. + +3. The H-PCRF acknowledges the termination of the Sy session of the subscriber by sending the Sy Session Termination Response. + +## 7.10 Procedures over Np reference point + +### 7.10.1 Report RAN user plane congestion information to PCRF + +This clause describes the signalling flow for reporting RUCI (RAN User Plane Congestion Information) from the RCAF to the PCRF. Any RUCI changes shall be reported by RCAF unless reporting restrictions apply. + +Two types of messages are used on Np for transfer of congestion information from RCAF to PCRF: + +- Non-aggregated RUCI report messages, which are sent on a per UE per APN basis using DRA routing. The IMSI and the APN can be used to route messages. +- Aggregated RUCI report messages, which are sent between an RCAF and PCRF and contain congestion information for multiple UEs. A logical PCRF id is allocated for these aggregate messages which determine the destination of the message. + +The congestion reporting takes place as shown in Figure 7.10.1 below. + +![Sequence diagram showing RUCI reporting from RCAF to PCRF. The diagram consists of two vertical lifelines labeled RCAF and PCRF. The sequence of messages is: 1. RUCI report (RCAF to PCRF), 2. RUCI acknowledgement (PCRF to RCAF), followed by a vertical ellipsis indicating a gap. After the ellipsis, the sequence continues with: 3. Aggregated RUCI report (RCAF to PCRF), and 4. Aggregated RUCI acknowledgement (PCRF to RCAF).](e9540f7fc7a084859dd5cdb0f9b7fcf2_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant RCAF + participant PCRF + Note left of RCAF: ... + RCAF->>PCRF: 1. RUCI report + PCRF-->>RCAF: 2. RUCI acknowledgement + Note right of PCRF: ... + RCAF->>PCRF: 3. Aggregated RUCI report + PCRF-->>RCAF: 4. Aggregated RUCI acknowledgement + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing RUCI reporting from RCAF to PCRF. The diagram consists of two vertical lifelines labeled RCAF and PCRF. The sequence of messages is: 1. RUCI report (RCAF to PCRF), 2. RUCI acknowledgement (PCRF to RCAF), followed by a vertical ellipsis indicating a gap. After the ellipsis, the sequence continues with: 3. Aggregated RUCI report (RCAF to PCRF), and 4. Aggregated RUCI acknowledgement (PCRF to RCAF). + +**Figure 7.10.1: RUCI reporting from RCAF to PCRF** + +1. RCAF indicates congestion information for a given UE and APN in a RUCI report message. This message is routed by DRA to the appropriate PCRF based on IMSI and APN. + +The RUCI report message includes the RUCI which is defined in clause 6.1.15.1. + +Upon receiving the RUCI the PCRF stores the identity of the RCAF for the given UE if the RUCI indicates congestion. The PCRF makes a policy decision. + +2. The PCRF allocates a logical PCRF id to identify the PCRF that is the Np destination for the given UE and APN for the RCAF when sending aggregate messages, and reports the logical PCRF id in the RUCI acknowledgement. + +The RCAF stores the logical PCRF id in the UE context for the given IMSI, APN combination. + +3. Subsequent congestion information for the given UE can be sent as part of an Aggregated RUCI report message. Such a message can contain the congestion information for multiple UEs. These UEs can have different congestion levels associated with different eNB identifier or ECGI or SAI, which are indicated in the message. An aggregated RUCI report message is always destined to a single PCRF only, and can be routed directly to that PCRF or via the DRA. + +**NOTE:** How the RCAF decides about which information should be contained in a single aggregated RUCI report message out of the UEs with a given logical PCRF id is out of the scope of 3GPP specifications. e.g. the RCAF may aggregate information only for a given cell or eNB into a single message. Alternatively, the RCAF may wait for a configurable period of time to aggregate information from multiple cells or eNBs into a single message. The amount of RUCI updates may be limited by configuring a minimum time between RUCI updates in the RCAF (e.g. when only the identifier of the congested cell serving the UE has changed). This configuration is expected to take both the required accuracy as well as the acceptable signalling amount into account. + +4. The Aggregated RUCI is acknowledged. + +## 7.10.2 PCRF provided reporting restrictions + +This clause describes the signalling flow for adding, updating or removing reporting restrictions for a given UE and APN. A pre-condition for this procedure is that the RCAF has already performed RUCI reporting for the given UE and APN. The PCRF stores the RCAF identity for the given UE when the RCAF performs RUCI reporting indicating congestion + +This procedure may be triggered by the initial RUCI report message for the given UE at an RCAF, or by other events, e.g., change in the subscription. The procedure is shown in Figure 7.10.2 below. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 7.10.2: PCRF provided reporting restrictions. The diagram shows four messages between RCAF and PCRF: 1. Modify UE context request (PCRF to RCAF), 2. Modify UE context response (RCAF to PCRF), 3. RUCI report (RCAF to PCRF, dashed line), and 4. RUCI acknowledgement (PCRF to RCAF, dashed line).](649426750a89fa0e5d7c1736d5cf72c6_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant PCRF + participant RCAF + Note right of PCRF: 1. Modify UE context request + PCRF->>RCAF: 1. Modify UE context request + Note left of RCAF: 2. Modify UE context response + RCAF->>PCRF: 2. Modify UE context response + Note left of RCAF: 3. RUCI report + RCAF-->>PCRF: 3. RUCI report + Note right of PCRF: 4. RUCI acknowledgement + PCRF-->>RCAF: 4. RUCI acknowledgement + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure 7.10.2: PCRF provided reporting restrictions. The diagram shows four messages between RCAF and PCRF: 1. Modify UE context request (PCRF to RCAF), 2. Modify UE context response (RCAF to PCRF), 3. RUCI report (RCAF to PCRF, dashed line), and 4. RUCI acknowledgement (PCRF to RCAF, dashed line). + +**Figure 7.10.2: PCRF provided reporting restrictions** + +1. PCRF sends a Modify UE context request to the RCAF of the given UE and APN using the stored identity of the RCAF, specifying the new reporting restrictions or the removal of the reporting restrictions. The RCAF stores the new reporting restrictions or removes the reporting restrictions accordingly. +2. The RCAF sends a Modify UE context response back to the PCRF to notify the PCRF about the success of the change in the reporting restrictions. +3. In case the RCAF already had reporting restrictions for the UE and the APN which are changed in step 2, this may trigger RUCI reporting as specified in clause 7.10.1. This occurs in case of a change from disabled reporting to enabled reporting, or if some reporting restrictions are lifted. The RCAF uses the RUCI report message to report congestion information to the PCRF if it is allowed by the change in the reporting restrictions. +4. The RUCI is acknowledged. + +### 7.10.3 UE mobility between RCAFs + +This clause describes the handling mobility of a UE from one RCAF to a different RCAF. The PCRF applies the rules described in clause 6.1.15.3. + +The process is shown in Figure 7.10.3 below for the case when the UE is affected by congestion at RCAF2 after the UE was earlier affected by congestion at RCAF1. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 7.10.3: UE mobility from RCAF1 to RCAF2 in case UE is affected by congestion at RCAF2 after the UE was earlier affected by congestion at RCAF1. The diagram shows six messages: 1. RUCI report (RCAF1 to PCRF), 2. RUCI acknowledgement (PCRF to RCAF1), 3. RUCI report (RCAF2 to PCRF), 4. RUCI acknowledgement (PCRF to RCAF2), 5. Release context request (RCAF2 to RCAF1), and 6. Release context response (RCAF1 to RCAF2). A note indicates 'UE moves to RCAF2' between steps 2 and 3.](e296a8a434d477069635ceb7f377507d_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant RCAF1 + participant RCAF2 + participant PCRF + Note left of RCAF1: 1. RUCI report + RCAF1->>PCRF: 1. RUCI report + Note right of PCRF: 2. RUCI acknowledgement + PCRF->>RCAF1: 2. RUCI acknowledgement + Note left of RCAF1: UE moves to RCAF2 + Note left of RCAF2: 3. RUCI report + RCAF2->>PCRF: 3. RUCI report + Note right of PCRF: 4. RUCI acknowledgement + PCRF->>RCAF2: 4. RUCI acknowledgement + Note left of RCAF2: 5. Release context request + RCAF2->>RCAF1: 5. Release context request + Note left of RCAF1: 6. Release context response + RCAF1->>RCAF2: 6. Release context response + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure 7.10.3: UE mobility from RCAF1 to RCAF2 in case UE is affected by congestion at RCAF2 after the UE was earlier affected by congestion at RCAF1. The diagram shows six messages: 1. RUCI report (RCAF1 to PCRF), 2. RUCI acknowledgement (PCRF to RCAF1), 3. RUCI report (RCAF2 to PCRF), 4. RUCI acknowledgement (PCRF to RCAF2), 5. Release context request (RCAF2 to RCAF1), and 6. Release context response (RCAF1 to RCAF2). A note indicates 'UE moves to RCAF2' between steps 2 and 3. + +**Figure 7.10.3: UE mobility from RCAF1 to RCAF2 in case UE is affected by congestion at RCAF2 after the UE was earlier affected by congestion at RCAF1** + +1. RCAF1 reports RAN user plane congestion information (RUCI). The PCRF stores the identity of the current RCAF1 for a given UE when it receives the congestion information over Np that is different from no congestion. + +2. The RUCI is acknowledged. +3. The UE moves to RCAF2 where it is affected by congestion. RCAF2 reports RAN user plane congestion information (RUCI). The PCRF stores the identity of the current RCAF2 for the given UE when it receives the congestion information over Np that is different from no congestion. +4. The RUCI is acknowledged. +5. Using on the previously stored identity of the old RCAF, the PCRF sends a Release context request message to RCAF1. +6. RCAF1 acknowledges this by sending the Release context response message to the PCRF. The RCAF releases the context corresponding to the given UE and given APN, including any reporting restrictions. This also implies that the RCAF does not indicate to the PCRF that the congestion state is over. In case of multiple PCRFs being in simultaneous use for a given UE, a Release context request message from a PCRF applies to the given Np connection only identified by the APN. The RCAF can completely release all context information for a given UE when it has released the context for each Np connection of the given UE. + +## 7.11 Procedures over Nt reference point + +### 7.11.1 Negotiation for future background data transfer + +This procedure enables the negotiation between the SCEF and the H-PCRF about the time window and the related conditions for future background data transfer (as described in clause 6.1.16). The interaction between the SCEF and the H-PCRF is not related to an IP-CAN session and the H-PCRF associates the information provided by the SCEF to the policies belonging to the ASP and stored in the SPR. + +![Sequence diagram for Negotiation for future background data transfer. The diagram shows interactions between SPR, H-PCRF, and SCEF. The sequence is: 1. SCEF sends a Background data transfer request to H-PCRF. 2. H-PCRF sends a Request existing transfer policies to SPR. 3. SPR sends a Report existing transfer policies to H-PCRF. 4. H-PCRF performs a Policy decision. 5. H-PCRF sends a Background data transfer response to SCEF. 6. SCEF sends a Background data transfer request to H-PCRF. 7. H-PCRF sends a Background data transfer response to SCEF. 8. H-PCRF sends a Store new transfer policy to SPR. 9. SPR sends an ACK to H-PCRF.](da5916a6e0721dae9522ac5b8abd218f_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant SPR + participant H-PCRF + participant SCEF + Note right of H-PCRF: 4. Policy decision + SCEF->>H-PCRF: 1. Background data transfer request + H-PCRF->>SPR: 2. Request existing transfer policies + SPR-->>H-PCRF: 3. Report existing transfer policies + H-PCRF->>SCEF: 5. Background data transfer response + SCEF->>H-PCRF: 6. Background data transfer request + H-PCRF-->>SCEF: 7. Background data transfer response + H-PCRF->>SPR: 8. Store new transfer policy + SPR-->>H-PCRF: 9. ACK + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Negotiation for future background data transfer. The diagram shows interactions between SPR, H-PCRF, and SCEF. The sequence is: 1. SCEF sends a Background data transfer request to H-PCRF. 2. H-PCRF sends a Request existing transfer policies to SPR. 3. SPR sends a Report existing transfer policies to H-PCRF. 4. H-PCRF performs a Policy decision. 5. H-PCRF sends a Background data transfer response to SCEF. 6. SCEF sends a Background data transfer request to H-PCRF. 7. H-PCRF sends a Background data transfer response to SCEF. 8. H-PCRF sends a Store new transfer policy to SPR. 9. SPR sends an ACK to H-PCRF. + +**Figure 7.11.1-1: Negotiation for future background data transfer** + +1. Based on an AF request, the SCEF sends a Background data transfer request to the H-PCRF. The background data transfer request contains ASP identifier, the volume of data to be transferred per UE, the expected amount of UEs, the desired time window and optionally, network area information (e.g. list of cell ids, TAs/RAs). + +NOTE 1: The SCEF does not provide any information about the identity of the UEs potentially involved in the future background data transfer. + +NOTE 2: A 3rd party application server is typically not able to provide any specific network area information and if so, the AF request is for the whole operator network. + +2. The H-PCRF requests from the SPR all existing transfer policies. + +3. The SPR provides all existing transfer policies and corresponding network area information to the H-PCRF. +4. The H-PCRF determines, based on information provided by the AF and other available information (see clause 6.1.16) one or more transfer policies. A transfer policy consists of a recommended time window for the background data transfer, a reference to a charging rate for this time window and optionally a maximum aggregated bitrate. + +NOTE 3: The maximum aggregated bitrate is not enforced in the network. + +5. The H-PCRF sends a Background data transfer response to the SCEF with the possible transfer policies and a reference ID. + +NOTE 4: The SCEF forwards the information to the AF. The AF stores the reference ID for the future transfer of AF session information related to this background data transfer via the Rx interface. + +- 6.-7. If the SCEF receives more than one transfer policy, the AF selects one of them and send another Background data transfer request to inform the H-PCRF about the selected transfer policy. The H-PCRF sends a Background data transfer response to the SCEF to acknowledge the selection. + +NOTE 5: If the SCEF receives only one transfer policy, the AF is not required to confirm. + +8. The H-PCRF stores the reference ID together with the new transfer policy and the corresponding network area information in the SPR. +9. The SPR sends an acknowledgement to the H-PCRF. + +## 7.12 Procedures for management of PFDs + +### 7.12.1 PFD Retrieval by the PCEF/TDF ("Pull mode") + +This procedure enables the PCEF/TDF to retrieve PFDs for an Application Identifier from the PFDF when a PCC/ADC Rule with an Application Identifier is provisioned/activated and PFDs provisioned by the PFDF are not available at the PCEF/TDF. + +In addition, this procedure enables the PCEF/TDF to retrieve PFDs from the PFDF when the caching timer for an Application Identifier elapses and a PCC/ADC Rule for this Application Identifier is still active. + +The PCEF/TDF may retrieve PFDs for one or more Application Identifiers in the same Request. All PFDs related to an Application Identifier is provided in the response from the PFDF. The signalling flow of PFD Retrieval is depicted in Figure 7.12.1-1 as below. + +![Sequence diagram showing PFD Retrieval by the PCEF/TDF. The diagram consists of two vertical lifelines: GW (PCEF) / TDF on the left and PFDF on the right. Step 1: A horizontal arrow points from the GW (PCEF) / TDF lifeline to the PFDF lifeline, labeled '1. Fetch PFD Request'. Step 2: A horizontal arrow points from the PFDF lifeline back to the GW (PCEF) / TDF lifeline, labeled '2. Fetch PFD Response'.](7374350e6d067648bb7e147c32bc04d9_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant GW as GW (PCEF) / TDF + participant PFDF as PFDF + Note left of GW: PCEF/TDF sends Fetch PFD Request + GW->>PFDF: 1. Fetch PFD Request + Note right of PFDF: PFDF returns Fetch PFD Response + PFDF-->>GW: 2. Fetch PFD Response +``` + +Sequence diagram showing PFD Retrieval by the PCEF/TDF. The diagram consists of two vertical lifelines: GW (PCEF) / TDF on the left and PFDF on the right. Step 1: A horizontal arrow points from the GW (PCEF) / TDF lifeline to the PFDF lifeline, labeled '1. Fetch PFD Request'. Step 2: A horizontal arrow points from the PFDF lifeline back to the GW (PCEF) / TDF lifeline, labeled '2. Fetch PFD Response'. + +Figure 7.12.1-1 PFD Retrieval by the PCEF/TDF + +1. When one of the above mentioned conditions is met, PCEF/TDF shall fetch from the PFDF the PFDs for the Application Identifier(s) by sending Fetch PFD Request, in which the Application Identifier(s) is included. + +2. The PFDF shall response with the list of Application Identifier and all associated PFDs in the Fetch PFD Response message. The PCEF/TDF shall bind the PFDs received from the PFDF to the respective Application Identifier. + +## 7.12.2 Management of PFDs in the PCEF/TDF ("push mode") + +This procedure enables the provisioning, modification or removal of PFDs associated with an application identifier in the PCEF/TDF via PFDF. Either the complete list of all PFDs of all application identifiers, the complete list of all PFDs of one or more application identifiers or a subset of PFDs for individual application identifiers may be managed. + +Each PFD of an application identifier is associated with a PFD id in case a subset of the PFD(s) associated with an application identifier can be provisioned, updated or removed. In case always the full set of PFD(s) for an application identifier is managed in each transaction, PFD ids do not need to be provided. + +NOTE 1: The prerequisite to provision or update PFDs is that the application identifier which the external entity provided is mapped into the application identifier that is included in the PCC/ADC Rule as described in TS 23.682 [42]. + +The interaction between the PFDF and the PCEF/TDF is not related to an IP-CAN session. + +The PFDF may decide to delay the distribution of PFDs to PCEFs/TDFs for some time to optimize the signalling load over the Gw/Gwn interface. If the PFDF received an Allowed Delay for a PFD, the PFDF shall distribute this PFD within the indicated time interval. + +![Sequence diagram showing the interaction between PCEF/TDF and PFDF for provisioning, updating, or removing PFDs. The PCEF/TDF sends a '1. PFD provisioning /update/remove' message to the PFDF, and the PFDF responds with a '2. PFD provisioning /update/remove ACK' message.](ef8cc1aaa5bf706cad5af7fe7c7d640d_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant PCEF/TDF + participant PFDF + Note left of PCEF/TDF: PFD provisioning /update/remove + PCEF/TDF->>PFDF: 1. PFD provisioning /update/remove + Note right of PFDF: PFD provisioning /update/remove ACK + PFDF-->>PCEF/TDF: 2. PFD provisioning /update/remove ACK +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the interaction between PCEF/TDF and PFDF for provisioning, updating, or removing PFDs. The PCEF/TDF sends a '1. PFD provisioning /update/remove' message to the PFDF, and the PFDF responds with a '2. PFD provisioning /update/remove ACK' message. + +**Figure 7.12.2-1: Provisioning/update/removal of PFDs in the PCEF/TDF** + +1. The PFDF may provision, update or remove one, multiple, or all PFDs associated with an application identifier. The PFDF may manage PFDs for more than one application identifier at the same time. Alternatively, the PFDF may provision or remove the list of all PFDs associated with all application identifiers. +2. The PCEF/TDF binds (for provision or update) or unbinds (for removal) the PFDs to the application identifier received from the PFDF. The provisioning of PFDs associates new PFDs to an application identifier. The PFDF may also provide a PFD id for each PFD provided. The update of PFDs modifies existing PFDs associated to an application identifier. Either all PFDs of an application identifier are replaced, or a subset of the PFDs are replaced, where each PFD is identified by a PFD id. Partial modification of a PFD is not supported. The removal of PFDs removes some or all existing PFDs associated to an application identifier. In the case of removal of a subset of the PFD(s), each PFD is identified by a PFD id. The PCEF/TDF acknowledges the reception of the PFDs to the PFDF. + +## Annex A (normative): Access specific aspects (3GPP) + +### A.1 GPRS + +#### A.1.0 General + +The GPRS IP-CAN employs, for an IP-CAN session, the concept of PDP contexts in order to provide an information transmission path of defined capacity (QoS). For GPRS, the IP-CAN bearer is the PDP context. + +![Diagram of the GPRS IP-CAN architecture showing the UE connected to a GPRS IP-CAN cloud, which is connected to a GGSN. The GGSN is connected to a PCEF, which is connected to a PCRF via a Gx interface.](7b24e2d4d1416a6411999a7f02fa5414_img.jpg) + +``` +graph LR; UE[UE] --- GPRS_IP_CAN((GPRS IP-CAN)); GPRS_IP_CAN --- GGSN[GGSN]; GGSN --- PCEF[PCEF]; PCEF ---|Gx| PCRF[PCRF]; +``` + +Diagram of the GPRS IP-CAN architecture showing the UE connected to a GPRS IP-CAN cloud, which is connected to a GGSN. The GGSN is connected to a PCEF, which is connected to a PCRF via a Gx interface. + +Figure A.1: The GPRS IP-CAN + +#### A.1.1 High level requirements + +##### A.1.1.1 General + +##### A.1.1.2 Charging related requirements + +It shall be possible for the charging system to select the applicable rate based on: + +- SGSN IP address that is used by the GTP control plane for the handling of control messages. +- location with the granularity as specified for the credit re-authorization trigger Location change in clause A.1.3.1.3; +- User CSG Information, including CSG ID, access mode and CSG membership indication; +- RAT type. + +##### A.1.1.3 Policy control requirements + +IP-CAN Bearer QoS control allows the PCC architecture to control the "Authorized QoS" of a PDP context. Criteria such as the QoS subscription information may be used together with service-based, subscription-based, or a predefined PCRF internal policies to derive the "Authorized QoS" of a PDP context. + +NOTE: If the PCRF provides authorized QoS for both the IP-CAN bearer and PCC rule(s), the enforcement of authorized QoS of the individual PCC rules takes place first. + +### A.1.1.4 QoS control + +For GPRS IP-CANs it shall be possible to apply QoS control at APN-level. + +QoS control per APN allows the PCC architecture to control the authorized APN-AMBR to be enforced for the total bandwidth usage of non-GBR QCIs at the PCEF within the same APN. + +NOTE: For the enforcement of the APN-AMBR for all IP-CAN sessions to the same APN, the IP-CAN is required to select the same PCEF for all of them. + +## A.1.2 Architecture model and reference points + +### A.1.2.1 Reference points + +#### A.1.2.1.1 Gx reference point + +The Gx reference point enables the signalling of PCC rules, which govern the PCC behaviour, and it supports the following GPRS-specific functions: + +- Indication of PDP context activation, modification and deactivation. + +### A.1.2.2 Reference architecture + +In the GPRS IP-CAN, the Bearer Binding and Event Reporting Function (BBERF) does not apply. + +## A.1.3 Functional description + +### A.1.3.1 Overall description + +#### A.1.3.1.1 Binding mechanism + +##### A.1.3.1.1.0 General + +As explained in clause 6.1.1, the binding mechanism is performed in three different steps: session binding, PCC rule authorization and bearer binding. Session binding has no GPRS specifics. + +For the authorization of a PCC rule with a GBR QCI the PCRF shall assign a GBR value within the limit supported by the serving network. + +NOTE: For the authorization of PCC Rules with the same QCI the PCRF may also check that aggregated GBR is within the limits supported by the serving network to minimize the risk of rejection of the bearer by the serving network. + +For the GPRS case bearer binding is performed by: + +- PCRF, when the selected operation mode is UE-only, see TS 23.060 [12], either due to PCRF decision or network/UE capability; +- PCRF and PCEF (i.e. the PCRF performs the binding of the PCC rules for user controlled services while the PCEF performs the binding of the PCC rules for the network controlled services), when the selected operation mode is UE/NW. + +The bearer binding performed by the PCRF shall bind a PCC rule that is authorized for a TFT packet filter to the PDP context the TFT packet filter has been assigned by the UE if the PCC rule can be authorized for the QCI of the PDP context. If a new PDP context is established, the PCRF can also bind PCC rule(s) to the PDP context if the QCI of the PDP context is different from the QCI, the PCC rule(s) can be authorized for since the PCRF can modify the QCI of the new PDP context. The binding mechanism shall comply with the established traffic flow template (TFT) packet filters (for the whole IP-CAN session). + +The bearer binding performed by the PCEF shall compare the PCC rule QoS parameters with the PDP context QoS parameters and bind a PCC rule: + +- to a candidate PDP context with a matching QoS class and Evolved ARP (if this is supported by the SGSN); +- to a candidate PDP context with a matching QoS class and Evolved ARP (if this is supported by the SGSN) that, after modification of the bitrates, fulfils the PCC rule QoS demands; +- to a new PDP context with a matching QoS class and Evolved ARP (if this is supported by the SGSN), if there is no suitable candidate PDP context present. + +The bearer binding mechanism associates the PCC rule with the PDP context to carry the service data flow. The association shall: + +- cause the downlink part of the service data flow to be directed to the PDP context in the association, and +- assume that the UE directs the uplink part of the service data flow to the PDP context in the association. + +Thus, the detection of the uplink part of a service data flow shall be active on the PDP context, which the downlink packets of the same service data flow is directed to. The detection of the uplink part of the service data flow may be active, in parallel, on any number of additional PDP contexts. + +#### A.1.3.1.1.1 Bearer binding mechanism allocated to the PCEF + +When the bearer binding mechanism is allocated to the PCEF, no per bearer information is required to be communicated over the Gx reference point. + +Once the PCRF has provided the PCC rule decisions at the IP-CAN session establishment procedure, the PCRF shall provide further PCC rule decisions + +- using the PCRF initiated IP-CAN Session Modification procedure; or +- in response to an event report from the PCEF (the GW (PCEF) initiated IP-CAN Session Modification). + +The bearer binding function shall not combine PCC rules with different ARP values onto the same PDP context. + +NOTE: If Evolved ARP is not supported by the SGSN then this enables a modification of the PDP context ARP without impacting the bearer binding after relocation to a SGSN that supports Evolved ARP. + +#### A.1.3.1.1.2 Bearer binding mechanism allocated to the PCRF + +If a PDP context is established/modified in order to successfully perform the bearer binding the PCRF will set the PCC rule as binding-pending status until the PCEF reports the establishment or modification of a PDP context that fulfils the PCC rule demands or the PCC rule is removed. + +The following particularities apply when the bearer binding mechanism is allocated to the PCRF: + +- The PCEF + - shall include a bearer reference in all requests for PCC decisions; + - shall report bearer QoS class identifier and the associated bitrates for new/modified PDP contexts; + - shall report the TFT filter status for new PDP contexts and for modified TFTs; + - shall report the deactivation of a PDP context +- The PCRF + - shall provide the bearer reference for the binding result when activating a PCC rule; + - shall arm the GPRS-specific IP-CAN event trigger "PDP context activity". + - shall arm the event trigger "traffic mapping information change". + +NOTE: For the above case, the allocation of the bearer binding mechanism to the PCRF facilitates the migration from Rel-6 products to Rel-7 products. The allocation of the binding mechanism may be re-evaluated in future releases. + +When the PCRF performs the bearer binding the ARP information in the PCC rule shall be ignored unless the SGSN has indicated support for Evolved ARP. + +#### A.1.3.1.2 Reporting + +A container may be closed and a new container opened by the triggering of event triggers. + +#### A.1.3.1.3 Credit management + +For GPRS the PCEF shall initiate one credit management session for each PDP context. + +For GPRS the credit re-authorisation triggers in table A.1-1 shall apply in addition to the ones in table 6.1. They are applicable both in case of PCEF and in case of TDF. + +**Table A.1-1: GPRS specific credit re-authorization triggers** + +| Credit re-authorization trigger | Description | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| SGSN change | The UE has moved to a new SGSN. | +| RAT type change. | The characteristics of the air interface, communicated as the radio access type, have changed. | +| Location change (routeing area) | The routeing area of the UE has changed. | +| Location change (CGI/SAI) | The CGI/SAI of the UE has changed. | +| User CSG Information change in CSG cell | User CSG Information has changed when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a CSG cell | +| User CSG Information change in subscribed hybrid cell | User CSG Information has changed when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is a CSG member | +| User CSG Information change in un-subscribed hybrid cell (see note) | User CSG Information has changed when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is not a CSG member | +| NOTE: | Due to the increased signalling load, such reporting should be applied for a limited number of subscribers only. | + +If the Location change trigger for CGI / SAI or RAI is armed, the GGSN should request the SGSN to report any changes in location to the level indicated by the trigger according to the procedures described in TS 23.060 [12]. If credit re-authorization triggers and event triggers require different levels of reporting of location change for different PDP contexts for a single IP-CAN session, the SGSN reports location changes to the highest level of detail required. However, the GGSN should not trigger a credit re-authorization if the report received is more detailed than requested by the OCS. + +If the User CSG Information change in CSG cell trigger is armed, the GGSN should request the SGSN to report any changes in user CSG information when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a CSG cell. + +If the User CSG Information change in subscribed hybrid cell trigger is armed, the GGSN should request the SGSN to report any changes in user CSG information when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is a CSG member. + +If the User CSG Information change in un-subscribed hybrid cell trigger is armed, the GGSN should request the SGSN to report any changes in user CSG information when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is not a CSG member. + +If credit re-authorization triggers, event triggers and IP-CAN session related policy information require different levels of reporting of User CSG information for a single IP-CAN session, then the User CSG information to be requested from the SGSN should be changed to the highest level of detail required. + +Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area is not applicable for GPRS IP-CAN. + +#### A.1.3.1.4 Event Triggers + +For GPRS the event triggers in table A.2 shall apply in addition to the ones in table 6.2 at the PCEF upon the request of the PCRF. + +NOTE: The request from the PCRF can be triggered by configured policy, or a request received from the TDF. In case of TDF, this may be a result of credit re-authorization trigger received by the TDF from the OCS. + +**Table A.2: GPRS specific event triggers** + +| Event trigger | Description | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| SGSN change | The UE has moved to a new SGSN. | +| RAT type change. | The characteristics of the air interface, communicated as the radio access type, have changed. | +| PDP Context Activity | The GGSN has received a request for a PDP context activation, modification or deactivation. Note 1. | +| Location change (routeing area) | The routeing area of the UE has changed. | +| Location change (CGI/SAI) | The CGI/SAI of the UE has changed. | +| Subscribed APN-AMBR change | The subscribed APN-AMBR has changed. | +| User CSG Information change in CSG cell | User CSG Information has changed when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a CSG cell. (Note 2) | +| User CSG Information change in subscribed hybrid cell | User CSG Information has changed when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is a CSG member. (Note 2) | +| User CSG Information change in un-subscribed hybrid cell (see note) | User CSG Information has changed when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is not a CSG member. (Note 2) | +| 3GPP PS Data Off status change | The PCEF reports when the 3GPP PS Data Off status changes. | +| NOTE 1: Available only when the bearer binding mechanism is allocated to the PCRF. | | +| NOTE 2: Due to the increased signalling load, such reporting should be applied to a limited number of subscribers only. | | + +If the Location change trigger is armed, the GGSN should request the SGSN to report any changes in location to the level indicated by the trigger according to the procedures described in TS 23.060 [12]. If credit-authorization triggers and event triggers require different levels of reporting of location change for different PDP contexts for a single UE, the SGSN reports location changes to the highest level of detail required. However, the GGSN should not trigger a request for PCC rules if the report received is more detailed than requested by the PCRF. + +For GPRS, the traffic mapping information is represented by the TFT information. + +For GPRS, the loss/recovery of transmission resources is indicated by a PDP context modification changing the 'Maximum bitrate' UMTS QoS parameter to/from 0 kbit/s (as described in the PDP context preservation procedure in TS 23.060 [12]). + +The User Location Report in the Access Network Information Reporting contains the CGI/SAI and when the PDP context is deactivated, information on when the UE was last known to be in that location. + +If the User CSG Information change in CSG cell was provided as event trigger, the GGSN should request the SGSN to report any changes in user CSG information when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a CSG cell. + +If the User CSG Information change in subscribed hybrid cell was provided as event trigger, the GGSN should request the SGSN to report any changes in user CSG information when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is a CSG member. + +If the User CSG Information change in un-subscribed hybrid cell was provided as event trigger, the GGSN should request the SGSN to report any changes in user CSG information when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is not a CSG member. + +If credit re-authorization triggers, event triggers and IP-CAN session related policy information require different levels of reporting of User CSG information for a single IP-CAN session, then the User CSG information to be requested from the SGSN should be changed to the highest level of detail required. + +Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area is not applicable for GPRS IP-CAN. + +#### A.1.3.1.5 Policy Control + +For GPRS the AF instruction to report changes of the IP-CAN bearer level information Type of IP-CAN shall also result in a reporting of RAT type changes, even if the IP-CAN type is unchanged. + +### A.1.3.2 Functional entities + +#### A.1.3.2.1 Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) + +##### A.1.3.2.1.0 General + +The PCRF shall upon indication of PCC rule removal due to PS to CS handover notify the AF that the associated flows are no longer served by the PS-domain due to PS to CS handover. + +##### A.1.3.2.1.1 Input for PCC decisions + +The PCRF shall accept any of the following input which the PCEF may provide, specific for GPRS, as a basis for decisions on PCC rule operations. + +The following information represents GPRS specific values of the ones listed in clause 6.2.1.1: + +- Subscriber Identifier in the form of IMSI, MSISDN; +- A PDN identifier in the form of APN; +- A PLMN identifier in the form of SGSN Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Code; +- Type of IP-CAN set to GPRS; +- IP-CAN bearer attributes in the form of: + - Requested QoS, for a PDP context; + - TFT, to enable the identification of the corresponding PDP Context; +- Location of the subscriber in the form of CGI/SAI or RAI. + +The following information is in addition to the ones listed in clause 6.2.1.1: + +- RAT type. +- Subscribed APN-AMBR. + +The SPR may provide the following information for a subscriber (in addition to the information in clause 6.2.1.1) connecting to a specific PDN: + +- Authorized APN-AMBR. + +The Authorized APN-AMBR is derived by the PCRF from SPR interaction, according to operator policy. + +#### A.1.3.2.2 Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF) + +##### A.1.3.2.2.1 General + +This functional entity is located in the GGSN. The GGSN provides the GPRS-specific bearer QoS handling. + +The PCEF shall contact the PCRF based on PCRF address information that shall be configured for the access point name (APN) together with the IMSI or MSISDN (if needed). + +The PCEF shall maintain a 1:1 mapping from the GPRS QoS Class Identifier to a UMTS QoS profile and vice versa. Each GPRS QoS Class Identifier (QCI) parameter value has a 1:1 mapping to a set of QoS parameters defined for GPRS, TS 23.107 [14]. A recommended mapping is listed in table A.3. + +**Table A.3: Recommended mapping for GPRS QoS Class Identifier to/from Release 99 UMTS QoS parameters** + +| GPRS
QoS
Class
Identifier
value | UMTS QoS parameters | | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-----|--------------------------|------------------------------------| +| | Traffic Class | THP | Signalling
Indication | Source
Statistics
Descriptor | +| 1 | Conversational | n/a | n/a | speech
(NOTE 1) | +| 2 | Conversational | n/a | n/a | unknown | +| 3 | Streaming | n/a | n/a | speech
(NOTE 1) | +| 4 | Streaming | n/a | n/a | unknown | +| 5 | Interactive | 1 | Yes | n/a | +| 6 | Interactive | 1 | No | n/a | +| 7 | Interactive | 2 | No | n/a | +| 8 | Interactive | 3 | No | n/a | +| 9 | Background | n/a | n/a | n/a | +| NOTE 1: The operator's configuration should reserve QCI values that map to "speech" for service data flows consisting of speech (and the associated RTCP) only. | | | | | + +NOTE 2: This table defines the mapping for GPRS QCI to/from UMTS QoS parameters for pre-Release 8 GPRS. The characteristics of GPRS QCIs are independent from the standardized QCI characteristics for EPS. + +The PCEF determines Release 97/Release 98 attributes from Release 99 attributes according to TS 23.107 [14]. + +The remaining UMTS QoS parameters are subject to operator's policies and either provisioned in the Create PDP Context Request or locally defined in GGSN. + +NOTE 3: Any change of the ARP parameter by the PCEF may get overwritten by the SGSN due to subscription enforcement unless the SGSN has indicated support for Evolved ARP. + +For each PDP context, the PCEF shall accept information during bearer establishment and modification relating to: + +- The user and terminal (e.g. MSISDN, IMEISV); +- Bearer characteristics (e.g. QoS negotiated, APN, IM CN Subsystem signalling flag); +- Network related information (e.g. MCC and MNC). + +The PCEF shall use this information in the OCS request/reporting or request for PCC rules. + +A GGSN may provide more than one APN for access to the same PDN. It should be possible to enable or disable PCC functionality for each APN, independent from the other APNs for access to the same PDN. Once the PCC functionality is disabled, regular GPRS charging and policy methods would be applied, i.e. no PCRF interaction would occur. + +For each PDP context, there shall be a separate OCS request/OFCS reporting, so this allows the OCS and offline charging system to apply different rating depending on the PDP context. + +The GGSN shall report the service data flow based charging data on a per PDP context basis. + +The GGSN shall be able to request the SGSN to provide reports of changes in CGI/SAI/RAI of a UE as directed by the credit re-authorization triggers and/or event triggers. + +The PCEF enforces QoS Policies as indicated by the PCRF in accordance to what is stated in clause 6.2.2.1 with the following additions: + +- Authorized APN-AMBR enforcement. The PCEF shall enforce the authorized APN-AMBR received via the Gx interface for the total bandwidth usage of non-GBR QCI for the APN. + +Only the GBR per bearer is used for resource reservation (e.g. admission control in the RAN). + +The MBR (per PCC rule / per bearer) and the authorized APN-AMBR are used for rate policing. + +When the GGSN is connected to a SGSN that does not support the Evolved ARP, the GGSN shall map the Evolved ARP to Rel-99 ARP parameter value as specified in Annex E of TS 23.401 [17]. + +#### A.1.3.2.2.2 Service data flow detection + +For uplink traffic, in the case of GPRS, all the uplink parts of service data flows templates, which are associated with the PDP context are candidates for matching in the detection process. + +NOTE: Service data flow templates, which are not associated with the PDP context the packet was received, are not candidates for matching (dashed in the figure). + +#### A.1.3.2.2.3 Packet Routeing and Transfer Function + +The PCEF performs the packet routeing and transfer functions as specified in TS 23.060 [12], with the differences specified in this clause. + +For the PDP address of an UE, the PCEF routes downlink packets to the different PDP contexts based on the downlink parts of the service data flow templates, in the active PCC rules and their routeing associations to the PDP contexts. The association between an active PCC rule and a PDP context shall correspond to the downlink TFT received from the UE. Each active PCC rule shall have a single routeing association to a PDP context. Upon reception of a packet, the PCEF evaluates the downlink part of the service data flow templates of the PCC rules activated for the PDP address in order of precedence to find a match. When the first match is found, the packet is tunnelled to the SGSN via the PDP context, for which the PCC rule has the routeing association. If no match is found, the PCEF shall silently discard the packet. + +The UE shall define TFTs that enable successful binding at the PCRF for service data flows requiring a binding to occur. + +For each uplink packet, the UE should choose the PDP context that is used for the downlink direction of the same service data flow, as declared in the TFT information. The PCEF shall only apply the uplink parts of the service data flow templates of the PCC rules, which are associated with the same PDP context as the uplink packet arrived on. + +The packet filters, to be applied on dedicated signalling PDP contexts, shall form PCC rules, which shall be granted higher precedence than any other PCC rule and be active on the dedicated signalling context. + +#### A.1.3.2.2.4 Measurement + +The details of measurement are specified in TS 32.251 [9]. + +#### A.1.3.2.3 Application Function (AF) + +For GPRS the AF instruction to report changes of the IP-CAN bearer level information Type of IP-CAN will also result in a reporting of RAT type changes, even if the IP-CAN type is unchanged. + +The AF instructions to report loss of transmission resources will result in a notification from the PCRF that may include an indication that the transmission resources are lost due to PS to CS handover. + +NOTE: The AF action up to notification of termination of transmission resources due to PS to CS handover is application specific. IMS interprets that the PS to CS handover notification as SRVCC. + +### A.1.3.3 Policy and charging control rule + +#### A.1.3.3.1 General + +Void. + +#### A.1.3.3.2 Policy and charging control rule operations + +The PCRF associates, at activation, a PCC rule with a PDP context at the PCEF. + +#### A.1.3.4 IP-CAN bearer and IP-CAN session related policy information + +For GPRS the IP-CAN bearer and IP-CAN session related policy information in table A.4 shall apply in addition to the ones in table 6.4. + +**Table A.4: PCC related IP-CAN bearer and IP-CAN session related policy information** + +| Attribute | Description | PCRF permitted to modify the attribute | Scope | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|----------------| +| User CSG Information change in CSG cell | Defines whether to report User CSG Information change when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a CSG cell. | Yes | IP-CAN session | +| User CSG Information change in subscribed hybrid cell | Defines whether to report User CSG Information change when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is a CSG member. | Yes | IP-CAN session | +| User CSG Information change in un-subscribed hybrid cell (see note) | Defines whether to report User CSG Information change when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is not a CSG member. | Yes | IP-CAN session | + +NOTE: Due to the increased signalling load, such reporting should be applied for a limited number of subscribers only. + +If the User CSG Information change in CSG cell was provided under IP-CAN session related policy information, the GGSN should request the Serving Node to report any changes in user CSG information when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a CSG cell. + +If the User CSG Information change in subscribed hybrid cell was provided under IP-CAN session related policy information, the GGSN should request the Serving Node to report any changes in user CSG information when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is a CSG member. + +If the User CSG Information change in un-subscribed hybrid cell was provided under IP-CAN session related policy information, the GGSN should request the Serving Node to report any changes in user CSG information when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is not a CSG member. + +If credit re-authorization triggers, event triggers and IP-CAN session related policy information require different levels of reporting of User CSG information for a single IP-CAN session, then the User CSG information to be requested from the Serving Node should be changed to the highest level of detail required. + +The reporting of User CSG information to the OFCS shall be done on the level of detail as requested by the PCRF within IP-CAN session related policy information and the reporting of User CSG information to the OCS shall be done on the level of detail as requested by the OCS re-authorization triggers. + +The authorized QoS per bearer (UE-initiated IP-CAN bearer activation/modification) and the authorized MBR per QCI (network initiated IP-CAN bearer activation/modification) shall be mapped by the PCEF to the GBR and MBR of the PDP context as described in clause 6.2.2.4. The mapping of the QCI to the UMTS QoS profile parameters is defined in clause A.1.3.2.2.1. + +### A.1.3.4a TDF session related policy information + +For TDF session related policy information in table A.4a shall apply in addition to the ones in table 6.4a. + +**Table A.4a: TDF session related policy information** + +| Attribute | Description | PCRF permitted to modify the attribute | Scope | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------| +| User CSG Information change in CSG cell | Defines whether to report User CSG Information change when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a CSG cell. | Yes | TDF session | +| User CSG Information change in subscribed hybrid cell | Defines whether to report User CSG Information change when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is a CSG member. | Yes | TDF session | +| User CSG Information change in un-subscribed hybrid cell (see note) | Defines whether to report User CSG Information change when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is not a CSG member. | Yes | TDF session | + +NOTE: Due to the increased signalling load, such reporting should be applied for a limited number of subscribers only. + +The reporting of User CSG information to the OFCS shall be done on the level of detail as requested by the PCRF within TDF session related policy information and the reporting of User CSG information to the OCS shall be done on the level of detail as requested by the OCS re-authorization triggers. + +NOTE: PCRF is responsible for setting the event triggers to the highest level of detail required in case different levels of User CSG information reporting to the charging domain are required for a single TDF session. + +### A.1.3.5 Void + +## A.1.4 PCC Procedures and flows + +### A.1.4.1 Introduction + +For GPRS, the GW (PCEF) is the GGSN. The IP-CAN bearer is the PDP context and the IP-CAN Session is established by the Create PDP Context message. The IP-CAN Session is terminated when the last PDP Context of the specific IP address is deleted and the IP Address is released. + +### A.1.4.2 IP-CAN Session Establishment + +The IP-CAN session establishment procedure (described in clause 7.2) is triggered at the GGSN by receiving a Create PDP Context Request message for the first PDP Context that is created for a new IP Address. The successful procedure results in an establishment of a UE IP Address and a PDP Context for the UE. The Create PDP Context Response message, indicating that a new PDP context is created, is sent to the SGSN. The response may include any changes in QoS according to bearer binding and policy enforcement. + +During the PDP context activation procedure, it shall be possible to forward the network capability of reporting of changes in CGI/SAI/RAI to the PCRF. + +The PCRF also includes the Authorized APN-AMBR in the IP-CAN Session Establishment Ack. + +### A.1.4.3 IP-CAN Session Termination + +#### A.1.4.3.1 UE initiated IP-CAN Session termination + +The UE initiated IP-CAN Session termination procedure (described in clause 7.3.1) is triggered at the GGSN by receiving a Delete PDP Context request message if this is the deletion of the last PDP Context for the IP Address or the Teardown Indicator in the Delete PDP Context Request indicates that all PDP contexts that share the same IP address should be deactivated. All PDP Contexts in the IP-CAN Session are deleted in the GGSN. The IP Address of the UE is released. The Delete PDP Context Response message, indicating that the PDP context(s) is deleted, is sent to the SGSN. + +#### A.1.4.3.2 GW initiated IP-CAN Session termination + +The GW initiated IP-CAN Session termination procedure (described in clause 7.3.2) is triggered if the GGSN detects that the IP-CAN Session shall be terminated. The Delete PDP Context request message is sent by the GGSN to the SGSN. + +This may be the deletion of the last PDP Context for the IP Address. If not, the GGSN shall set the Teardown Indicator in the Delete PDP Context Request message to indicate that all PDP contexts that share that same IP address shall also be deactivated. All PDP Contexts in the IP-CAN Session are deleted. The IP Address of the UE is released. The Delete PDP Context Response, indicating that the PDP context(s) is deleted, is received from the SGSN. + +### A.1.4.4 IP-CAN Session Modification + +#### A.1.4.4.1 IP-CAN Session Modification; GW (PCEF) initiated + +The GW (PCEF) initiated IP-CAN Session modification procedure (described in clause 7.4.1) is triggered at the GGSN by receiving one of the following messages: + +- Create PDP Context Request message; +- Update PDP Context Request message; +- Delete PDP Context Request message; +- a Change Notification message (indicating the new CGI, SAI or RAI) – see TS 23.060 [12]. + +In case of a Create PDP Context Request message, the modification of the IP-CAN Session is the addition of a new PDP Context to the IP-CAN Session. The new PDP Context is added with specific QoS requirements and traffic mapping information (TFT). A Create PDP Context Response message, indicating that a new PDP context is created, is sent to the SGSN. The response may include any changes in QoS according to bearer binding and policy enforcement. + +In case of an Update PDP Context Request, a PDP Context in the IP-CAN Session is modified. The modification may include modifying the QoS and/or the traffic mapping information. The Update PDP Context Response message, indicating that a PDP context is modified, is sent to the SGSN. The response may include any changes in QoS according to bearer binding and policy enforcement. + +In case of a Delete PDP Context Request message, a PDP Context in the IP-CAN Session is deleted. The Delete PDP Context Response message, indicating that a PDP context is deleted, is sent to the SGSN. If the PS to CS handover indicator is set in a Delete PDP context request message, the PCEF reports termination of transmission resources for associated PCC Rules due to PS to CS handover. + +A Change Notification message indicating a change in CGI / SAI or RAI information is received when there are only changes regarding the current location of the UE. A change in CGI / SAI or RAI may also be notified within other session management messages. + +The PCRF may provide the Authorized APN-AMBR in the Acknowledgement of the IP-CAN Session Modification to the GW (in addition to the parameters in clause 7.4.1). + +Based on operator policy the PCRF may re-authorize MBR/APN-AMBR. + +#### A.1.4.4.2 IP-CAN Session Modification; PCRF initiated + +The PCRF initiated IP-CAN Session modification procedure (described in clause 7.4.2) may result in a GGSN initiated PDP Context Modification or Deactivation or a Network Requested secondary PDP Context Activation. + +If a PDP Context in the IP-CAN Session needs to be modified, the GGSN sends an Update PDP Context Request message. The modification may include modifying the QoS negotiated, negotiated Evolved ARP or the required CGI/SAI/RAI change reporting. The Update PDP Context Response message, indicating that a PDP context is modified, will be received from the SGSN. + +If a PDP Context in the IP-CAN Session needs to be deleted, the GGSN sends a Delete PDP Context Request message. The Delete PDP Context Response message will be received from the SGSN. + +If the PCEF bearer binding yields that a new PDP context is required, the PCEF shall initiate the Network Requested secondary PDP Context Activation procedure. + +NOTE: If online charging is applicable, with PCEF bearer binding and a new PDP Context is required, the PCEF may not have all the information (e.g. NSAPI and negotiated QoS) associated with that PDP context for the credit authorisation until the activation procedure is complete and therefore a second credit authorisation may be necessary to provide the remaining information. + +The PCRF may provide the Authorized APN-AMBR in the Policy and Charging Rule Provision to the GW (in addition to the parameters in clause 7.4.2). + +--- + +## A.2 Void + +--- + +## A.3 Void + +--- + +## A.4 3GPP Accesses (GERAN/UTRAN/E-UTRAN) - GTP-based EPC + +### A.4.0 General + +For 3GPP Access (GTP-based), architecture details are described in TS 23.401 [17] and in TS 23.060 [12]. + +![Diagram of the 3GPP EPS IP-CAN (GTP-based) architecture. A UE (User Equipment) box is connected to an orange cloud labeled '3GPP IP CAN GTP-based'. The cloud is connected to a PDN GW (PDN Gateway) box. The PDN GW box contains a PCEF (PDN Connection Function) box. The PCEF box is connected to a PCRF (PDN Connection Function) box via a Gx interface.](52feb2681d5799bd8a13f424ea897fb7_img.jpg) + +``` +graph LR; UE[UE] --- IP_CAN((3GPP IP CAN GTP-based)); IP_CAN --- PDN_GW[PDN GW]; PDN_GW --- PCEF[PCEF]; PCEF ---|Gx| PCRF[PCRF]; +``` + +Diagram of the 3GPP EPS IP-CAN (GTP-based) architecture. A UE (User Equipment) box is connected to an orange cloud labeled '3GPP IP CAN GTP-based'. The cloud is connected to a PDN GW (PDN Gateway) box. The PDN GW box contains a PCEF (PDN Connection Function) box. The PCEF box is connected to a PCRF (PDN Connection Function) box via a Gx interface. + +Figure A.1: The 3GPP EPS IP-CAN (GTP-based) + +## A.4.1 High Level Requirements + +### A.4.1.1 Charging related requirements + +It shall be possible for the charging system to select the applicable rate based on: + +- Location with the granularity as specified for the credit re-authorization trigger Location change in clause A.4.3.1.1; +- User CSG Information, including CSG ID, access mode and CSG membership indication; +- RAT type. + +### A.4.1.2 QoS control + +For 3GPP Access (GTP based) it shall be possible to apply QoS control at APN-level. + +QoS control per APN allows the PCC architecture to control the authorized APN-AMBR to be enforced for the total bandwidth usage of non-GBR QCIs at the PCEF within the same APN. + +NOTE 1: For the enforcement of the APN-AMBR for all IP-CAN sessions to the same APN, the IP-CAN is required to select the same PCEF for all of them. + +If there is a QCI assigned to a PCC/QoS rule which is not supported by all RATs of the IP-CAN, the PCRF shall subscribe to the event trigger 'RAT change'. At inter-RAT mobility, the PCRF will be informed and shall then modify those PCC/QoS rules in the PCEF/BBERF to align their QCI values with those supported by the current RAT. + +NOTE 2: It is assumed that the PCRF is configured with the same mapping rules as the MME. + +NOTE 3: Subscription to RAT changes ensure that the PCRF is invoked in case the UE moves to a RAT not supporting the assigned QCI in the PCC Rules as well as in case the UE moves back to a RAT supporting the originally assigned QCI. In the latter case, the PCRF can then modify the QCI in the PCC Rules back to the originally assigned value. + +It shall be possible for the PCRF to authorize the QCI and ARP of the default EPS bearer to be enforced by the PCEF immediately and/or at a specific point in time by providing the default EPS bearer related policy information as defined in clause A.4.3.4. + +## A.4.2 Architectural Model and Reference Points + +### A.4.2.1 Reference architecture + +In the 3GPP Access (GTP-based) architecture, see TS 23.401 [17] and in TS 23.060 [12], + +- the Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF) is allocated to the PDN GW; +- the Bearer Binding and Event Reporting Function (BBERF) does not apply. + +## A.4.3 Functional Description + +### A.4.3.1 Overall description + +#### A.4.3.1.1 Credit management + +For EPS the credit re-authorisation triggers in table A.4.3-1 shall apply in addition to the ones in table 6.1. They are applicable both in case of PCEF and in case of TDF. + +**Table A.4.3-1: EPS specific credit re-authorization triggers** + +| Credit re-authorization trigger | Description | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| SGSN change | The UE has moved to a new SGSN. (Note 2) | +| Serving GW change | The UE has moved to a new Serving GW. (Note 1) (Note 2) | +| RAT type change. | The characteristics of the air interface, communicated as the radio access type, have changed. | +| Location change (routeing area) | The routeing area of the UE has changed. (Note 2) | +| Location change (tracking area) | The tracking area of the UE has changed. (Note 1) | +| Location change (ECGI) | The ECGI of the UE has changed.(Note 1) | +| Location change (CGI/SAI) | The CGI/SAI of the UE has changed.(Note 2) | +| Location change (eNodeB ID) | The eNodeB ID of the UE has changed. (Note 1) | +| Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area | The UE is entering/leaving a Presence Reporting Area | +| User CSG Information change in CSG cell | User CSG Information has changed when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a CSG cell | +| User CSG Information change in subscribed hybrid cell | User CSG Information has changed when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is a CSG member | +| User CSG Information change in un-subscribed hybrid cell (see NOTE 3 ) | User CSG Information has changed when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is not a CSG member | +| NOTE 1: These triggers are used for E-UTRAN access. | | +| NOTE 2: These triggers are used for GERAN/UTRAN accesses. | | +| NOTE 3: Due to the increased signalling load, such reporting should be applied to a limited number of subscribers only. | | + +If the Location change trigger for GERAN/UTRAN or E-UTRAN is armed, the PDN GW should request the Serving Nodes (then SGSN or MME specifically) to report any changes in location to the level indicated by the trigger according to the procedures described in TS 23.060 [12] or TS 23.401 [17]. + +The OCS determines at credit management session establishment/modification whether the UE is located in an access type that supports reporting changes of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area. This determination relies on local configuration and may rely on whether the UE is served by a Gn-SGSN (where this reporting is not defined) or by a S4-SGSN. The "SGSN change" trigger and the "Serving GW change" trigger may be used to determine whether the UE is served by a S4-SGSN. If the access type supports it, the OCS may subscribe to Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area at any time during the life time of the credit management session. + +If the Change of UE Presence in Presence Reporting Area trigger is armed, the PDN GW should request the Serving Nodes (the SGSN or MME) to report any changes in the UE presence in Presence Reporting Area according to the procedures described in TS 23.060 [12] or TS 23.401 [17]. + +If the User CSG Information change in CSG cell trigger is armed, the PDN GW should request the Serving Nodes (then SGSN or MME specifically) to report any changes in user CSG information when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a CSG cell. + +If the User CSG Information change in subscribed hybrid cell trigger is armed, the PDN GW should request the Serving Nodes (then SGSN or MME specifically) to report any changes in user CSG information when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is a CSG member. + +If the User CSG Information change in un-subscribed hybrid cell trigger is armed, the PDN GW should request the Serving Nodes (then SGSN or MME specifically) to report any changes in user CSG information when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is not a CSG member. + +If credit re-authorization triggers, event triggers and IP-CAN session related policy information require different levels of reporting of User CSG information for a single IP-CAN session, then the User CSG information to be requested from the Serving Nodes should be changed to the highest level of detail required. + +#### A.4.3.1.2 Event Triggers + +For EPS the event triggers in table A.4.3-2 shall apply in addition to the ones in table 6.2 at the PCEF upon the request of the PCRF. + +NOTE: The request from the PCRF can be triggered by configured policy, or a request received from the TDF. In case of TDF, this may be a result of credit re-authorization trigger received by the TDF from the OCS. + +**Table A.4.3-2: EPS specific event triggers** + +| Event trigger | Description | Reported from | Condition for reporting | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------| +| SGSN change | The UE has moved to a new SGSN. (Note 2) | PCEF | PCRF | +| Serving GW change | The UE has moved to a new Serving GW. (Note 1)
(Note 2) | PCEF | PCRF | +| RAT type change. | The characteristics of the air interface, communicated as the radio access type, have changed. | PCEF | PCRF | +| Location change (routeing area) | The routeing area of the UE has changed. | PCEF | PCRF | +| Location change (tracking area) | The tracking area of the UE has changed. (Note 1) | PCEF | PCRF | +| Location change (ECGI) | The ECGI of the UE has changed.(Note 1) | PCEF | PCRF | +| Location change (CGI/SAI) | The CGI/SAI of the UE has changed.(Note 2) | PCEF | PCRF | +| Location change (eNodeB ID) | The eNodeB ID of the UE has changed. (Note 1) | PCEF | PCRF | +| Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area | The UE is entering/leaving a Presence Reporting Area | PCEF | PCRF | +| Subscribed APN-AMBR change | The subscribed APN-AMBR has changed | PCEF | Always set | +| EPS Subscribed QoS change | The QoS of the default EPS bearer has changed. | PCEF | Always set | +| User CSG Information change in CSG cell | User CSG Information has changed when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a CSG cell. (Note 3) | PCEF | PCRF | +| User CSG Information change in subscribed hybrid cell | User CSG Information has changed when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is a CSG member. (Note 3) | PCEF | PCRF | +| User CSG Information change in un-subscribed hybrid cell (see note) | User CSG Information has changed when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is not a CSG member. (Note 3) | PCEF | PCRF | +| 3GPP PS Data Off status change | The PCEF reports when the 3GPP PS Data Off status changes | PCEF | Always set | +| NOTE 1: These triggers are used for E-UTRAN access. | | | | +| NOTE 2: These triggers are used for GERAN/UTRAN accesses. | | | | +| NOTE 3: Due to the increased signalling load, such reporting should be applied to a limited number of subscribers only. | | | | + +If the Location change trigger is armed, the PDN GW should request the Serving Nodes (then SGSN or MME specifically) to report any changes in location to the level indicated by the trigger according to the procedures described in TS 23.060 [12] or TS 23.401 [17]. + +The PCRF determines at IP-CAN session establishment/modification whether the UE is located in an access type that supports reporting changes of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area. This determination relies on local configuration and may rely on whether the UE is served by a Gn-SGSN (where this reporting is not defined) or by a S4-SGSN. The "SGSN change" trigger and the "Serving GW change" trigger may be used to determine whether the UE is served by a S4-SGSN. If the access type supports it, the PCRF may subscribe to Change of UE presence in Presence Reporting Area at any time during the life time of the IP-CAN session. + +If the Change of UE Presence in Presence Reporting Area trigger is armed, the PDN GW should request the Serving Nodes (SGSN or MME) to report any changes in the UE presence in Presence Reporting Area according to the procedures described in TS 23.060 [12] or TS 23.401 [17]. + +The User Location Report in the Access Network Information Reporting contains the ECGI and when the bearer is deactivated, information on when the UE was last known to be in that location. + +If the User CSG Information change in CSG cell was provided as event trigger, the PDN GW should request the Serving Nodes to report any changes in user CSG information when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a CSG cell. + +If the User CSG Information change in subscribed hybrid cell was provided as event trigger, the PDN GW should request the Serving Nodes to report any changes in user CSG information when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is a CSG member. + +If the User CSG Information change in un-subscribed hybrid cell was provided as event trigger, the PDN GW should request the Serving Nodes to report any changes in user CSG information when the UE enters/leaves/accesses via a hybrid cell in which the subscriber is not a CSG member. + +If credit re-authorization triggers, event triggers and IP-CAN session related policy information require different levels of reporting of User CSG information for a single IP-CAN session, then the User CSG information to be requested from the Serving Nodes should be changed to the highest level of detail required. + +#### A.4.3.1.3 Binding mechanism + +As explained in clause 6.1.1, the binding mechanism is performed in three steps: Session Binding, PCC Rule authorization and Bearer Binding. + +Session Binding has no 3GPP Access (GTP-based) specifics. + +For the authorization of a PCC rule with a GBR QCI the PCRF shall assign a GBR value within the limit supported by the serving network. + +NOTE 1: For the authorization of PCC Rules with the same QCI the PCRF may also check that aggregated GBR is within the limits supported by the serving network to minimize the risk of rejection of the bearer by the serving network. + +For the 3GPP Access (GTP-based) the Bearer Binding is performed by the PCEF. For GERAN/UTRAN in UE-only mode the Bearer Binding mechanism is restricted by the UE provided binding between a SDF and a bearer for UE initiated resource requests. + +A PCEF supporting the Bind to Default Bearer PCC rule attribute shall bind a dynamic PCC rule with this attribute to the default bearer instead of using the bearer binding mechanism defined in clause 6.1.1.4 and keep the binding as long as this attribute remains set. When the PCRF removes the Bind to Default Bearer PCC rule attribute, the bearer binding mechanism as defined in clause 6.1.1.4 shall be applied by using the QoS Class Identifier and ARP values of the dynamic PCC rule. The PCEF support for the Bind to Default Bearer PCC rule attribute is optional, and shall be indicated to the PCRF. + +The bearer binding mechanism associates the PCC Rule with the EPS bearer to carry the service data flow. The association shall: + +- cause the downlink part of the service data flow to be directed to the EPS bearer in the association; and +- assume that the UE directs the uplink part of the service data flow to the EPS bearer in the association. + +Thus, the detection of the uplink part of a service data flow shall be performed on the EPS bearer over which the downlink packets of the same service data flow is directed to. + +NOTE 2: For GERAN/UTRAN in UE-only mode the detection of the uplink part of the service data flow may be active, in parallel, on any number of EPS bearers. + +When the PDN GW is connected to an SGSN via Gn/Gp (and thus a handover from UTRAN/GERAN to E-UTRAN is possible), the bearer binding in the PCEF shall not combine PCC rules with different ARP values onto the same PDP context. For the UE-only mode (which is based on a UE provided binding) PCC rules with different ARP values shall not be authorized for the same PDP context. + +NOTE 3: If Evolved ARP is not supported by the SGSN then this enables a modification of the EPS bearer ARP without impacting the service assignment after a handover to E-UTRAN or after relocation to a S4-SGSN or a Gn/Gp SGSN that supports Evolved ARP. + +#### A.4.3.1.4 Policy Control + +For 3GPP Access (GTP based) the policy control functionalities should include the following functionality for QoS control (in addition to the functionalities listed in clause 6.1.5): + +- Authorization and enforcement of the maximum QoS that is authorized for the total bandwidth usage of non-GBR QCIs at an APN. +- Authorization and enforcement of the maximum QoS allocated to the Default EPS bearer. The Default EPS bearer shall have a non-GBR QCI as defined in TS 23.401 [17], clause 4.7.2.1. + +### A.4.3.2 Functional Entities + +#### A.4.3.2.1 Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) + +The following information represents 3GPP EPS specific values of the ones listed in clause 6.2.1.1: + +- Subscriber Identifier in the form of IMSI, MSISDN; +- Type of IP-CAN is set to 3GPP-EPS. + +The PCEF may provide the following information (in addition to the information in clause 6.2.1.1): + +- Subscribed APN-AMBR; +- Default EPS Bearer QoS. + +The SPR may provide the following information for a subscriber (in addition to the information in clause 6.2.1.1) connecting to a specific PDN: + +- Authorized APN-AMBR for 3GPP Access; +- Authorized Default EPS Bearer QoS. + +The Authorized APN-AMBR and the Authorized Default EPS Bearer QoS are derived by the PCRF from SPR interaction, according to operator policy. + +The PCRF shall upon indication of PCC rule removal due to PS to CS handover notify the AF that the associated flows are no longer served by the PS-domain due to PS to CS handover. + +If vSRVCC is supported in the serving network, the PCRF (V-PCRF if roaming) provides an indicator via Gx to the PCEF to indicate that vSRVCC is allowed for the flow corresponding to the video component of the voice/video call. + +The PCRF shall provide SDF filters in the PCC rule as received in the packet filter information from the PCEF. + +If the PCRF receives a request for addition of service data flow(s) with a reference to existing SDF filter identities (and by that to existing PCC rule(s)), the PCRF shall use the QCI or ARP of the existing PCC rule for the new service data flow(s). + +NOTE: The reference to existing SDF filter identities informs the PCRF that the request is confined to an existing bearer, having bearer bindings with PCC rules that have the same QCI/ARP combination. Assigning a different QCI or ARP to the new SDFs would cause the procedure to fail, since the PCEF cannot map the new SDFs to another bearer. + +#### A.4.3.2.2 Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF) + +In the 3GPP Access (GTP-based) architecture the PCEF enforce QoS Policies as indicated by the PCRF in accordance to what is stated in clause 6.2.2.1 with the following additions: + +- Authorized APN-AMBR enforcement. The PCEF shall enforce the authorized APN-AMBR received via the Gx interface for the total bandwidth usage of non-GBR QCI for the APN. +- Authorized Default EPS Bearer QoS Enforcement. The PCEF receives the authorized QoS for the default bearer over Gx interface. The PCEF enforces it which may lead to the upgrade or downgrade of the default EPS Bearer QoS. The PCEF shall re-evaluate the bearer binding (as defined in clause 6.1.1.4) taking into account the default bearer QoS change and any PCC Rule operation requested by the PCRF. + +When the PDN GW is connected via Gn/Gp (and thus handover from UTRAN/GERAN to E-UTRAN is possible), the PDN-GW shall map QoS parameters of EPS bearers and APN-AMBR (if not received via Gn/Gp) to/from Release 99 and Release 97/Release 98 QoS parameter values of PDP-contexts as specified in Annex E of TS 23.401 [17]. The PDN GW shall mediate Gn/Gp procedures so that PCRF experiences no difference compared to S5/S8 procedures. + +Only the GBR per bearer is used for resource reservation (e.g. admission control in the RAN). + +The MBR (per PCC rule / per bearer) and the authorized APN-AMBR are used for rate policing. + +#### A.4.3.2.3 Application Function (AF) + +The AF instructions to report loss of transmission resources will result in a notification from the PCRF that may include an indication that the transmission resources are lost due to PS to CS handover. + +NOTE: The AF action up to notification of termination of transmission resources due to PS to CS handover is application specific. IMS interprets that the PS to CS handover notification as SRVCC. + +#### A.4.3.3 Void + +#### A.4.3.4 IP-CAN bearer and IP-CAN session related policy information + +For EPS the IP-CAN bearer and IP-CAN session related policy information in table A.4.3.4-1 shall apply in addition to the ones in table 6.4 and table A.4. + +A Presence Reporting Area may be defined as a short list of TAs or eNBs and/or ECGI for E-UTRAN, a short list of RAs or SAIs or CGIs for UTRAN, and a short list of RAs or CGIs for GERAN. + +**Table A.4.3.4-1: PCC related IP-CAN bearer and IP-CAN session related policy information** + +| Attribute | Description | PCRF permitted to modify the attribute | Scope | +|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|----------------| +| Authorized default EPS bearer QoS | Defines the QCI and ARP of the default EPS bearer. | Yes | IP-CAN session | +| Subsequent default EPS bearer QoS (NOTE 1) | Defines the QCI and ARP of the default EPS bearer to be applied by the PCEF when the default EPS bearer QoS change time is reached. | No (NOTE 2) | IP-CAN session | +| Default EPS Bearer QoS change time (NOTE 1) | Defines the time at which the PCEF shall apply the subsequent default EPS bearer QoS. | No (NOTE 2) | IP-CAN session | + +NOTE 1: Both parameters shall be provided together. The PCRF may provide up to four instances of them. +NOTE 2: The PCRF may replace all instances of Subsequent default EPS bearer QoS that have been provided previously with a new instruction. There is no operation to modify a previously provided instance of Subsequent default EPS bearer QoS and/or Default EPS Bearer QoS change time. + +The purpose of the default EPS bearer related policy information in table A.4.3.4-1 is to provide QCI and ARP that is applicable to the default bearer of an IP-CAN session. The PCRF may provide the authorized default EPS bearer QoS in every interaction with the PCEF. The PCEF shall apply the authorized default EPS bearer QoS for the IP-CAN session, including the necessary bearer binding actions. + +If dynamic PCC rules are used and the PCEF has indicated that it supports the PCC rule attribute Bind to Default Bearer, the PCRF may provide a subsequent default EPS bearer QoS together with a default EPS bearer QoS change time. When the default EPS bearer QoS change time is reached, the PCEF shall apply the corresponding subsequent default EPS bearer QoS as the new authorized default EPS bearer QoS for the IP-CAN session and perform the necessary bearer binding actions for all of the respective dynamic PCC rules. To keep dynamic PCC rules bound to the default bearer, the PCRF shall include the attribute Bind to Default Bearer in every dynamic PCC rule intended to remain bound to the default bearer. + +The PCRF may provide up to four instances of subsequent default EPS bearer QoS. + +NOTE 1: In order to reduce the risk for signalling overload, the PCRF can spread the provisioning of subsequent default EPS bearer QoS for many UEs over time. + +NOTE 2: The bearer modification is made in the same way as if the PCRF had modified the authorized default EPS bearer QoS at that point in time. + +The PCEF shall discard any previously received subsequent default EPS bearer QoS instances on explicit instruction as well as whenever the PCRF provides a new instruction for one or more subsequent changes to the default EPS bearer QoS or any other subsequent parameter. + +NOTE 3: In order to provide further subsequent default EPS bearer QoS in a timely fashion the PCRF can use its own clock to issue the desired changes or use the Revalidation time limit parameter (clause 6.4) to trigger a PCEF request for a policy decision. + +NOTE 4: For services that depend on specific APN-AMBR and/or QoS for the default EPS bearer (e.g. MPS session) the PCRF is responsible to ensure that no subsequent APN-AMBR or default EPS bearer QoS interfere with the service, e.g. by removing the subsequent APN-AMBR or default EPS bearer QoS before the respective change time is reached. + +#### A.4.3.5 TDF session related policy information + +For EPS the TDF session related policy information in table A.4a shall apply in addition to the ones in table 6.4a. + +### A.4.4 PCC Procedures and Flows + +#### A.4.4.1 Introduction + +For the 3GPP Access (GTP-based), an IP-CAN session is established by the Create Default Bearer message. The IP-CAN session is terminated when the last EPS bearer of the IP-CAN session is disconnected. + +From the network scenarios listed in clause 7.1, the Case 1 (no Gateway Control Session) applies. + +#### A.4.4.2 IP-CAN Session Establishment + +In the case of IP-CAN Session Establishment (described in clause 7.2), the PCEF provides to PCRF (in addition to the parameters described in clause 7.2): the User Location Information, Serving Network, Serving-GW address and RAT type. + +The PCEF shall also forward the network capability of reporting of changes in CGI/SAI/RAI to the PCRF. + +The PCRF includes, in the IP-CAN Session Establishment Ack, PCC Rules with QCI and ARP matching the Authorized Default EPS Bearer QoS, Authorized APN-AMBR and Authorized Default EPS Bearer QoS. If bearer establishment mode is UE/NW, the PCRF may also include PCC Rules requiring a QCI and ARP different from the Default Bearer QoS and for which NW mode applies. + +#### A.4.4.3 GW (PCEF) initiated IP-CAN Session termination + +The GW (PCEF) initiated IP-CAN Session termination procedure (described in clause 7.3.2) has no 3GPP specific information. + +#### A.4.4.4 IP-CAN Session Modification + +##### A.4.4.4.1 IP-CAN Session Modification; GW (PCEF) initiated + +For IP-CAN session modification (described in clause 7.4.1) the PCEF includes the modification of any of the 3GPP specific information listed in clause A.4.4.2. + +If the PS to CS handover indicator is set for an IP-CAN bearer that is deleted, the PCEF reports termination of transmission resources for associated PCC Rules due to PS to CS handover. + +The PCRF may provide the following parameters in the Acknowledgement of the IP-CAN Session Modification to the PDN GW (in addition to the parameters in clause 7.4.1): Authorized APN-AMBR, Authorized Default EPS Bearer QoS. + +##### A.4.4.4.2 IP-CAN Session Modification; PCRF initiated + +The PCRF may provide the following parameters in the Policy and Charging Rule Provision to the PDN GW (in addition to the parameters in clause 7.4.2): Authorized APN-AMBR, Authorized Default EPS Bearer QoS. + +Whenever the PCRF modifies the Authorized Default EPS Bearer QoS, the PCRF shall simultaneously modify the QCI and ARP of all PCC Rules that, according to the operator policy, shall have the same QoS as the default bearer. + +A modification of the Authorized Default EPS Bearer QoS requires that at least one PCC Rule with a matching QoS can be bound to the default bearer as defined in clause 6.1.1.4. + +NOTE: The network configuration can ensure that at least one PCC Rule is bound to the default bearer by applying, either operator policies in the PCRF ensuring that a PCC Rule with matching QoS will be active or in the PCEF ensuring that a predefined PCC Rule not known to the PCRF is bound to the default bearer. + +--- + +## A.5 3GPP Accesses (GERAN/UTRAN/E-UTRAN) - PMIP-based EPC + +### A.5.0 General + +For 3GPP Access (PMIP-based), architecture details are described in TS 23.402 [18]. + +When PMIP-based S5/S8 has been deployed, the IP-CAN-specific parameter exchange occurs by means of IP-CAN Session Modification messages including the necessary information. + +### A.5.1 High Level Requirements + +#### A.5.1.0 General + +The same requirements as in clause A.4.1 apply for 3GPP Access (PMIP-based). + +#### A.5.1.1 QoS control + +For 3GPP Access (PMIP based) the same requirements as defined in clause A.4.1.2 apply. + +## A.5.2 Architectural Model and Reference Points + +### A.5.2.1 Reference architecture + +In the 3GPP Access (PMIP-based) architecture, see TS 23.402 [18], + +- the Policy and Charging Enforcement Function is allocated to the PDN GW; +- the Bearer Binding and Event Reporting Function (BBERF) is allocated to the Serving GW. + +The Gxx applies and corresponds to the Gxc, as defined in TS 23.402 [18]. One Gateway Control Session corresponds to one IP-CAN session. + +## A.5.3 Functional Description + +### A.5.3.1 Overall Description + +#### A.5.3.1.1 Binding mechanism + +The same considerations as in clause A.4.3.1.3 apply with the following modifications: + +- For the 3GPP Access (PMIP-based) the Bearer binding is performed by the BBERF. + +#### A.5.3.1.2 Credit management + +For 3GPP Access (PMIP-based EPC) the same credit re-authorisation triggers as defined in table A.4.3-1 apply. + +#### A.5.3.1.3 Event triggers + +For 3GPP Access (PMIP-based EPC) the same event triggers as defined in table A.4.3-2 apply. However, they apply at the BBERF (and not at the PCEF) upon the request from the PCRF. + +- NOTE: The request from the PCRF can be triggered by configured policy, a request received from the PCEF or request received from the TDF. For a PCEF or TDF based request, this may be a result of credit re-authorization trigger received by the PCEF or by the TDF from the OCS. + +### A.5.3.2 Functional Entities + +#### A.5.3.2.1 Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) + +For 3GPP Access (PMIP based) the same requirements as defined in clause A.4.3.2.1 apply with the following modification: + +- Default EPS Bearer QoS and Subscribed APN-AMBR are provided by the BBERF. + +For 3GPP Access (PMIP based), the PCRF receives information about supported bearer establishment modes from the PCEF and provides the bearer establishment mode to be used to the PCEF, i.e. in the same way as for 3GPP Access (GTP based). + +#### A.5.3.2.2 Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF) + +For 3GPP Access (PMIP based) the same requirements as defined in clause A.4.3.2.2 apply with the following modification: + +- For the 3GPP Access (PMIP-based) the enforcement of the Authorized Default EPS Bearer QoS is not performed by the PCEF. + +### A.5.3.2.3 Bearer Binding and Event Reporting Function (BBERF) + +In the 3GPP Access (PMIP-based) the BBERF enforces QoS Policies as indicated by the PCRF in accordance to what is stated in clause 6.2.7.3 with the following additions: + +- Authorized Default EPS Bearer QoS Enforcement. The BBERF receives the authorized QoS for the default bearer over Gxx interface. The BBERF enforces it which may lead to the upgrade or downgrade of the default EPS Bearer QoS. The BBERF shall re-evaluate the bearer binding (as defined in clause 6.1.1.4) taking into account the default bearer QoS change and any QoS Rule operation requested by the PCRF. + +### A.5.3.3 Void + +### A.5.3.4 Void + +### A.5.3.5 IP-CAN bearer and IP-CAN session related policy information + +For 3GPP Access (PMIP based) the same requirements as defined in clause A.4.3.4 apply. + +### A.5.3.6 TDF session related policy information + +For 3GPP Access (PMIP based) the same requirements as defined in clause A.4.3.5 apply. + +## A.5.4 PCC Procedures and Flows + +### A.5.4.1 Introduction + +For the 3GPP Access (PMIP-based), the IP-CAN session is established by the Proxy Binding Update message to the PDN-GW. The IP-CAN session is terminated when the PMIP session is terminated. + +From the network scenarios listed in clause 7.1, the Case 2b applies. + +### A.5.4.2 Gateway Control Session Establishment + +For the Gateway Control Session Establishment Procedure (see clause 7.7.1), the Serving GW includes the following additional information in the Gateway Control Session Establishment message (in addition to the parameters described in clause 7.7.1): User Location Information, user GSG information, (if received from the MME), Serving-GW address, Serving Network, RAT Type, Default EPS Bearer QoS and if available the APN-AMBR are provided to the PCRF. + +The PCRF includes, in the Acknowledge Gateway Control Session Establishment (in addition to the parameters described in clause 7.7.1): QoS Rules with QCI and ARP matching the Default EPS Bearer QoS. If the bearer establishment mode is UE/NW, the PCRF may also include QoS Rules requiring a QCI and ARP different from the Default EPS Bearer QoS and for which NW mode applies. + +In support of PDP Context Activation procedures over S4, the BBERF must indicate various session parameters, e.g. the RAT type, to the PCRF. + +The PCRF may provide the following parameters in the Acknowledgement of the Gateway Control Session Establishment to the Serving GW (in addition to the parameters described in clause 7.7.1): Authorized APN-AMBR, Authorized Default EPS Bearer QoS. + +If the PS to CS handover indicator is set for an IP-CAN bearer that is deleted, the BBERF reports termination of transmission resources for associated QoS Rules due to PS to CS handover. + +### A.5.4.3 Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request + +In the case of Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request (described in clause 7.7.3) the BBERF includes the addition/modification/removal of any the 3GPP specific information listed in clause A.5.4.2. + +When a change of RAT without S-GW relocation occurs, the BBERF signals the RAT type change as a parameter in an event report sent from the BBERF to the PCRF. An event report is then sent, indicating the RAT type change, from the PCRF to the PCEF. + +When Secondary PDP Context Activation occurs, the S4 SGSN performs a Request Bearer Resource Allocation procedure with the Serving GW. The Serving GW supplies the parameters required by the PCEF to properly handle the allocation of resources. These parameters are sent from the BBERF (Serving GW) to the PCRF for further processing when a PMIP-based S5/S8 is deployed. + +The PCRF may provide the following parameters in the Acknowledgement of the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request to the Serving GW (in addition to the parameters described in clause 7.7.3): Authorized APN-AMBR, Authorized Default EPS Bearer QoS. + +For the purpose of event reporting to the PCEF the BBERF may generate Event Reports to the PCRF if this has been requested by the PCRF. + +### A.5.4.4 Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provisioning + +In the case of Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provisioning (described in clause 7.7.4) the PCRF may provide the following parameters (in addition to the parameters described in clause 7.7.4) to the Serving GW: Authorized APN-AMBR, Authorized Default EPS Bearer QoS. + +Whenever the PCRF modifies the Authorized Default EPS Bearer QoS, the PCRF shall simultaneously modify the QCI and ARP of all QoS Rules that, according to the operator policy, shall have the same QoS as the default bearer. + +A modification of the Authorized Default EPS Bearer QoS requires that at least one QoS Rule with a matching QoS can be bound to the default bearer as defined in clause 6.1.1.4. + +NOTE: The network configuration can ensure that at least one QoS Rule is bound to the default bearer by applying operator policies in the PCRF ensuring that a QoS Rule with matching QoS will be active. + +For the purpose of event reporting to the PCEF the PCRF may request Event Reports from the BBERF. In response to such request the BBERF shall provide the present value(s) of the event parameters. + +### A.5.4.5 IP-CAN Session Establishment + +The PCRF may provide the following parameters in the Acknowledgement of the IP-CAN Session Establishment to the PDN GW (in addition to the parameters in clause 7.2): Authorized APN-AMBR, User Location Information, user GSG information (if received from the BBERF). + +### A.5.4.6 IP-CAN Session Modification + +#### A.5.4.6.1 IP-CAN Session Modification; GW (PCEF) initiated + +The PCRF may provide the following parameters in the Acknowledgement of the IP-CAN Session Modification to the PDN GW (in addition to the parameters in clause 7.4.1): Authorized APN-AMBR. + +#### A.5.4.6.2 IP-CAN Session Modification; PCRF initiated + +The PCRF may provide the following parameters in the Policy and Charging Rule Provision to the PDN GW (in addition to the parameters in clause 7.4.2): Authorized APN-AMBR, User Location Information (if received from the BBERF), user GSG information (if received from the BBERF). + +A.5.4.6.3 Void + +--- + +Annex B (informative): +Void + +--- + +Annex C (informative): +Void + +## Annex D (informative): Access specific aspects (Non-3GPP) + +### D.1 DOCSIS IP-CAN + +#### D.1.1 General + +In the DOCSIS IP-CAN, each UE is connected to the network via a Cable Modem (CM) which is connected through a Hybrid Fibre Coax (HFC) access network to a Cable Modem Termination System (CMTS). Though the UE and CM may or may not be embedded within the same physical package, they remain separate logical devices. One or more UEs may subtend a single CM. Because the CMTS provides the IP connectivity and traffic scheduling and manages quality of service for the CM and the UEs which subtend it, the CMTS fulfils the role of PCEF for the DOCSIS IP-CAN. In the DOCSIS IP-CAN, the Application Manager (AM) and the Policy Server (PS) fulfil the role of the PCRF. + +When accessing resources via a DOCSIS IP-CAN, the Rx interface can be used to request resources. The communication between the AM and PS and the PS and CMTS uses the PKT-MM-2 interface which is based on COPS and defined in J.179. The remainder of this clause documents the mapping of PCC terminology to the DOCSIS IP-CAN and how the DOCSIS IP-CAN realizes the defined PCC functionality. This clause also establishes the requirements of the Rx interface as it is used for the DOCSIS IP-CAN. + +The PKT-MM-2 interface is shown here for information to illustrate the organization of the DOCSIS IP-CAN. References that specify the PKT-MM-2 interface do not constitute normative requirements for the 3GPP architecture. The DOCSIS IP-CAN does not intend to pose any new normative requirements for the Gx interface. + +![Diagram of DOCSIS IP-CAN architecture showing the flow from UE to CM, then through the DOCSIS IP-CAN cloud to the CMTS (which contains the PCEF). Above the cloud, the AF connects via Rx to the PCRF (containing AM and PS), which in turn connects via Pkt-mm-2 (COPS) to the CMTS.](6f97d19f0a9f27cb869c6e1af68e6e79_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph LR + UE[UE] --- CM[CM] + CM --- DOCSIS_IP_CAN((DOCSIS IP-CAN)) + DOCSIS_IP_CAN --- CMTS[CMTS] + subgraph PCRF + AM[AM] + PS[PS] + end + AF[AF] -- Rx --> AM + PS -- "Pkt-mm-2 (COPS)" --> CMTS + subgraph CMTS + PCEF[PCEF] + end + +``` + +Diagram of DOCSIS IP-CAN architecture showing the flow from UE to CM, then through the DOCSIS IP-CAN cloud to the CMTS (which contains the PCEF). Above the cloud, the AF connects via Rx to the PCRF (containing AM and PS), which in turn connects via Pkt-mm-2 (COPS) to the CMTS. + +Figure D.1.1: DOCSIS IP-CAN + +#### D.1.1 High level requirements + +##### D.1.1.1 General + +The DOCSIS IP-CAN employs for an IP-CAN session, the concept of a DOCSIS registration. + +The DOCSIS IP-CAN employs for an IP-CAN bearer, the concept of a DOCSIS service flow in order to provide an information path between the UE and the CMTS. Note that DOCSIS service flows are unidirectional, either upstream (toward the CMTS) or downstream (toward the CM). When a CM is registered in the DOCSIS IP-CAN, it is assigned a unique IP Address and separate primary service flows are created for both the upstream and downstream direction. These primary service flows are typically given best effort scheduling and are used to carry all IP traffic through the + +CM for which a more specific service flow has not been created. When a UE is registered in the DOCSIS IP-CAN, it is assigned its own IP Address and is identified by its MAC address. A UE does not have a service flow assigned to it as a result of registration; rather it is associated with the primary service flows of the CM through which it is attached to the network. Additional bearers for the UE are created dynamically as required to provide appropriate QoS for service flows. + +Bearer creation is triggered when media descriptors (Media Type and Format) for the SIP session are sent from the AF to the AM over the Rx interface. The AM translates the media descriptors into a QoS request for a DOCSIS service flow. The AM then forwards the QoS request towards the bearer enforcement point using the PKT-MM-2 interface. The PKT-MM-2 interface is not a 3GPP reference point, Specifications that detail the PKT-MM-2 interface do not impose normative requirements on the 3GPP architecture. + +The following figure provides a graphical representation of the DOCSIS IP-CAN and how it maps into the generic PCC terminology. + +![Diagram showing the mapping between PCC Terminology and DOCSIS Terminology. PCC Terminology includes IP-CAN Session, IP-CAN Bearer, and Service Data Flow (containing Packet Flow). DOCSIS Terminology includes DOCSIS Registration, DOCSIS Service Flow 1 to n, and IP-Flows (11, 12, 1m for flow 1; n1, n2, nm for flow n).](3f47bcff76a8105d2539569fc8909db7_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + subgraph PCC_Terminology + direction TB + PCC_S1[IP-CAN Session] --> PCC_B1[IP-CAN Bearer] + PCC_B1 --> PCC_SDF[Service Data Flow] + subgraph PCC_SDF + PCC_P1[Packet Flow] + end + end + + subgraph DOCSIS_Terminology + direction TB + DOCSIS_R[DOCSIS Registration] --> DOCSIS_SF1[DOCSIS Service Flow 1] + DOCSIS_R --> DOCSIS_SFn[DOCSIS Service Flow n] + DOCSIS_SF1 --> IPF11[IP-Flow 11] + DOCSIS_SF1 --> IPF12[IP-Flow 12] + DOCSIS_SF1 --> IPF1m[IP-Flow 1m] + DOCSIS_SFn --> IPFn1[IP-Flow n1] + DOCSIS_SFn --> IPFn2[IP-Flow n2] + DOCSIS_SFn --> IPFnm[IP-Flow nm] + end + + PCC_S1 -.-> DOCSIS_R + PCC_B1 -.-> DOCSIS_SF1 + PCC_B1 -.-> DOCSIS_SFn + PCC_SDF -.-> IPF11 + PCC_SDF -.-> IPF12 + PCC_SDF -.-> IPF1m + PCC_SDF -.-> IPFn1 + PCC_SDF -.-> IPFn2 + PCC_SDF -.-> IPFnm + +``` + +Diagram showing the mapping between PCC Terminology and DOCSIS Terminology. PCC Terminology includes IP-CAN Session, IP-CAN Bearer, and Service Data Flow (containing Packet Flow). DOCSIS Terminology includes DOCSIS Registration, DOCSIS Service Flow 1 to n, and IP-Flows (11, 12, 1m for flow 1; n1, n2, nm for flow n). + +Figure D.1.2: PCC to DOCSIS terminology mapping + +The DOCSIS IP-CAN defines an IP-Flow to be a unidirectional sequence of packets identified by OSI Layer 3 and Layer 4 header information. This information includes source/destination IP addresses, source/destination port numbers, protocol ID. Multiple Multimedia streams may be carried in a single IP Flow. + +In a DOCSIS IP-CAN, there is no equivalent concept as a service data flow. Further a DOCSIS service flow is unidirectional and each service flow is an aggregation of the QoS needs for all the IP-Flows which make up the service flow. As such, the QoS enforcement is done at the service flow level not at the IP-Flow level. + +### D.1.1.2 Charging related requirements + +### D.1.1.3 Policy control requirements + +## D.1.2 Architecture model and reference points + +### D.1.2.1 Reference points + +#### D.1.2.1.1 Rx reference point + +#### D.1.2.1.2 Gx reference point + +#### D.1.2.1.3 Void + +## D.1.3 Functional description + +### D.1.3.1 Overall description + +The DOCSIS IP-CAN employs for an IP-CAN bearer, the concept of a DOCSIS service flow in order to provide an information path between the UE and the CMTS. When a Cable Modem is registered in the DOCSIS IP-CAN, primary upstream and downstream service flows are created. + +When a UE is registered in the DOCSIS IP-CAN it is associated with the primary service flows of the cable modem through which it is attached to the network. Based on session information provided by the AF using the Rx reference point, the Application Manager will determine QoS requirements for each IP flow. IP flows which do not require special quality of service treatment may be carried over the primary service flows. For other IP flows which require specific QoS treatment, the Policy Server requests the CMTS to admit the flows using the pkt-mm-2 interface providing detailed information of the QoS requirements. Provided that resources are available, the CMTS will create additional bearers dynamically and push the appropriate traffic filters to the cable modem. + +#### D.1.3.1.1 Binding mechanism + +In the DOCSIS IP-CAN, the binding mechanism is achieved through the use of traffic Classifiers. These Classifiers filter traffic destined to a UE behind a Cable Modem or sourced from a UE behind a Cable Modem, to a particular DOCSIS service flow. DOCSIS Classifiers contain the following attributes which can be used to filter IP traffic: + +- IP Type of Service – Range and Mask; +- IP Protocol; +- IP Source Address; +- IP Source Mask; +- IP Destination Address; +- IP Destination Mask; +- TCP/UDP Source Port Start; +- TCP/UDP Source Port End; +- TCP/UDP Destination Port Start; +- TCP/UDP Destination Port End. + +The Classifier(s) which are used for a particular DOCSIS service flow are communicated to the CMTS by the Policy Server (on behalf of the Application Manager) via the pkt-mm-2 interface. The Application Manager will specify the + +QoS requirements for the IP flow, the direction of the IP flow, and the Classifier(s) which are to be used for the DOCSIS service flow serving the IP flow. + +When a session is no longer in use, the Application Manager communicates to the CMTS to tear down the resources associated with the session. Based on this communication, the CMTS will remove the DOCSIS service flow(s) and any Classifier(s) associated with the service flow(s), and inform the Cable Modem of the removal. Traffic which previously matched the removed Classifier(s) will now be placed on either the upstream or downstream primary DOCSIS service flow, depending on the direction of the traffic. + +## D.1.3.2 Functional entities + +### D.1.3.2.1 Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) + +In the DOCSIS IP-CAN, the Application Manager (AM) and the Policy Server (PS) fulfil the role of the PCRF. + +The AM receives media descriptors (Media Type and Format) from the AF for SIP sessions and maps the QoS needs of the session to a FlowSpec. The FlowSpec is a layer 2 independent representation of the bandwidth and QoS requirements for the flow derived from the media descriptors using a well defined algorithm. The AM and PS provide network resource control in the DOCSIS IP-CAN by managing the CMTS using the PacketCable Multimedia interface pkt-mm-2. + +The AM and PS map IP flows to DOCSIS service flows in accordance with the operator's policies and based on the media format information provided by the AF. + +#### D.1.3.2.1.1 Input for PCC decisions + +The AM accepts any of the following input as a basis for decisions on PCC rule operations: + +- Per IP-CAN session (e.g.: UE IP address); +- Requested QoS, media format, priority indicator. + +The SPR may provide the following information: + +- Subscribers maximum allowed QoS resources. + +Subscriber's maximum allowed bit rate for upstream and downstream. + +### D.1.3.2.2 Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF) + +The CMTS provides PCEF equivalent functionality within the DOCSIS IP-CAN. The CMTS creates, modifies, and deletes DOCSIS service flows upon request of the Policy Server. The CMTS receives requests from the Policy Server over the pkt-mm-2 interface. + +### D.1.3.2.3 Application Function (AF) + +## D.1.3.3 Policy and charging control rule + +### D.1.3.3.1 General + +### D.1.3.3.2 Policy and charging control rule operations + +## D.2 WiMAX IP-CAN + +In the WiMAX IP-CAN, the UE (also referenced as Mobile Station or MS in IEEE 802.16 standards) connects to the WiMAX Access Service Network (ASN). The ASN logically communicates with a Connectivity Service Network (CSN) which is a collection of core networking functions (e.g. Mobile IP HA, AAA Server, DHCP, DNS etc.). The ASN manages traffic admission and scheduling, enforces QoS for an authorized UE and performs accounting functions for the UE (per session, flow, or UE). WiMAX PCEF is part of WiMAX IP-CAN and is to be defined by WiMAX Forum [15]. WiMAX PCEF terminates the Gx reference point from the PCRF and may be a distributed enforcement architecture. + +The PCC functional mapping to WiMAX IP-CAN is shown in the following figure where PCC Gx and Rx are applied. + +![Diagram of WiMAX IP-CAN and 3GPP PCC functional mapping.](8650b869a9e7291ac2caad3d008e1770_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the functional mapping of 3GPP PCC to WiMAX IP-CAN. At the top, an **AF** (Application Function) block is connected to a **PCRF** (PDN Gateway Control Function) block via an **Rx** reference point. The **PCRF** block is connected to a **WiMAX PCEF** (PDN Gateway Control Function) block via a **Gx** reference point. The **WiMAX PCEF** block is located within a cloud representing the **WiMAX IP-CAN**. To the left of the cloud, a **WiMAX UE** (User Equipment) block is shown, connected to the **WiMAX IP-CAN** cloud. + +Diagram of WiMAX IP-CAN and 3GPP PCC functional mapping. + +Figure D.2.1: WiMAX IP-CAN and 3GPP PCC + +### D.2.1 High level requirements + +#### D.2.1.1 General + +No new requirements have been identified. + +#### D.2.1.2 Charging related requirements + +No new requirements have been identified. + +#### D.2.1.3 Policy control requirements + +No new requirements have been identified. + +## D.2.2 Architecture model and reference points + +### D.2.2.1 Reference points + +#### D.2.2.1.1 Rx reference point + +WiMAX IP-CAN imposes no new requirements to the Rx reference point. + +#### D.2.2.1.2 Gx reference point + +WiMAX IP-CAN imposes no new requirements to the Gx reference point other than WiMAX specific values for existing Gx parameters (e.g. RAT type) as described in [15]. + +#### D.2.2.1.3 Sp reference point + +WiMAX IP-CAN imposes no new requirements to the Sp reference point. + +## D.2.3 Functional description + +### D.2.3.1 Overall description + +The WiMAX IP-CAN employs for an IP-CAN bearer, the concept of a WiMAX service flow, in order to provide a data path between the UE and the WiMAX CSN via the ASN. When a UE is registered in the WiMAX IP-CAN, it is associated with one or more WiMAX service flows. Based on session information provided by the AF via the Rx reference point, the PCRF determines the QoS requirements for each service by constructing PCC rules. The PCRF requests the WiMAX IP-CAN via Gx interface to enforce the authorized PCC rules on the WiMAX service flows. The PCEF function in the WiMAX IP-CAN enforces the PCC rules received from the PCRF. Provided that resources are available, the ASN creates and configures logical bearers and enforces creation of appropriate traffic classes associated with service flows compliant with IEEE 802.16 standards for the air interface and IP-CAN bearer capabilities in the ASN (e.g. DiffServ). + +#### D.2.3.1.1 Binding mechanism + +#### D.2.3.1.2 Credit management + +#### D.2.3.1.3 Event triggers + +### D.2.3.2 Functional entities + +#### D.2.3.2.1 Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) + +The 3GPP PCRF is used for the WiMAX IP-CAN. The PCRF interacts with WiMAX IP-CAN using 3GPP Gx reference point. + +#### D.2.3.2.2 Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF) + +For WiMAX IP-CAN, PCEF functions may be distributed. It additionally: + +- Terminates the Gx reference point from PCRF and may act as a proxy for the PCRF. +- Handles the enforcement function relocation in WiMAX IP-CAN in a way that is transparent to the PCRF. + +#### D.2.3.2.3 Application Function (AF) + +WiMAX IP-CAN imposes no requirements to the AF functionalities. + +### D.2.3.3 Policy and charging control rule + +#### D.2.3.3.1 General + +##### D.2.3.3.1 Policy and charging control rule operations + +--- + +Annex E (informative): +Void + +--- + +Annex F (informative): +Void + +## Annex G (informative): PCC rule precedence configuration + +The precedence information is part of the PCC rule (see clause 6.3.1) and instructs the PCEF in which order the service data flow templates of the active PCC rules needs to be analyzed when an IP packet arrives. This mechanism ensures that the service data flows can be correctly identified even if the service data flow templates contain overlapping service data flow filters. + +For PCC rules that contain an application identifier (i.e. that refer to an application detection filter), the order and the details of the detection are implementation specific. Once an application has been detected, enforcement and charging shall however be applied under consideration of the PCC rule precedence, i.e. when multiple PCC rules overlap, only the enforcement and charging actions of the PCC rule with the highest precedence shall be applied. + +NOTE: This ensures that traffic described by service data flow filters can be precluded from the enforcement of application detection filter based PCC rules if this is necessary (e.g. for sponsored data connectivity). + +Within the PCC framework it is possible to use different types of PCC rules for which the service data flow templates may not always be known by the PCRF. Therefore, the PCC rule precedence information needs to be carefully configured to avoid certain situations e.g. a dynamic PCC rule cannot be applied for service data flow detection due to a predefined PCC rule not known to the PCRF with overlapping filter information and a higher precedence. + +For example, an operator could structure the value range of the precedence information into separate value ranges (in decreasing order) for the different types of PCC rules as follows: + +- dynamic PCC rules; +- predefined PCC rules known to the PCRF; +- predefined PCC rules not known to the PCRF; +- dynamic PCC rules for non-operator controlled services, i.e. those which are generated by the PCRF based on the UE provided traffic mapping information (and which take over the UE provided precedence information). + +--- + +## Annex H (normative): Access specific aspects (EPC-based Non-3GPP) + +### H.1 General + +An EPC-based non-3GPP IP-CAN (TS 23.402 [18]), which requires the Gxa for dynamic QoS control, shall include the BBERF. The allocation of a BBERF to a node within the non-3GPP IP-CAN is out of 3GPP scope, unless otherwise specified in this Annex. + +--- + +### H.2 EPC-based cdma2000 HRPD Access + +In case of EPC-based cdma2000 HRPD access the BBERF is located in the HRPD Serving Gateway (HSGW) defined in 3GPP2 X.S0057 [20]. + +The HSGW of an EPC-based cdma2000 HRPD access that supports a Gxa interface shall support all the Gxa procedures defined in this specification. + +NOTE 1: If the HSGW does not support the Gxa interface, the HSGW performs QoS enforcement in the HRPD access based on subscription-based QoS policies provided by the 3GPP AAA Server/Proxy during access authentication and/or static QoS policies configured in the HSGW. However, this is out of the scope of this specification. + +The operator may configure an indicator in HSS which is delivered to the BBERF in HSGW within the Charging Characteristics and used by the BBERF to not establish the Gateway Control Session during the IP-CAN session establishment procedure. + +NOTE 2: The decision to not establish the Gateway Control Session applies for the life time of the IP-CAN session. + +NOTE 3: The indicator in the HSS is operator specific, therefore it can only be used in non-roaming cases. + +During the pre-registration phase in case of optimised EUTRAN-to-HRPD handovers, the Serving GW and the HSGW are associated with the IP-CAN session(s) of the UE in the PCRF. The HSGW is the non-primary BBERF. For each PDN connection, if the UE has acquired an IPv6 prefix via the 3GPP access, the PCRF (H-PCRF in the home-routed case, V-PCRF in the local-breakout case) shall provide the IPv6 prefix of UE to the HSGW during the Gateway Control Session establishment procedure. In order to allow PCRF to link the new Gateway Control session to a Gx session based on the information received in the Gateway Control session establishment message, it is assumed that there is only a single IP-CAN session per PDN ID and IMSI. + +NOTE 4: The HSGW performs QoS mapping between the QoS parameters exchanged across Gxa interface and the cdma2000 HRPD QoS parameters used within the HRPD access. However, this is out of the scope of this specification. + +For EPC based cdma2000 HRPD access, the IP-CAN bearer establishment mode for all of the simultaneous IP-CAN sessions between a UE and a PDN shall have the same value. + +NOTE 5: The UE is supposed to assign the same BCM value and the PCRF is supposed to keep the value assigned by the UE. + +## H.3 EPC-based Trusted WLAN Access with S2a + +In an EPC-based trusted WLAN Access with S2a, the PCEF is located in the PDN-GW and the BBERF does not apply. + +NOTE: Gxa interface is not used for S2a-PMIP in Trusted WLAN within this Release of the specification. + +From the network scenarios listed in clause 7.1, the Case 1 (no Gateway Control Session) applies. + +Specific event triggers applicable are listed in table H.3. + +**Table H.3: TWAN access specific event/credit reauthorization triggers** + +| Event/Credit reauthorization trigger | Description | Reported from | Condition for reporting | +|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------| +| RAT type change. | The characteristics of the air interface, communicated as the radio access type, have changed. | PCEF | PCRF/OCS | + +For an IP-CAN session set-up over a Trusted WLAN Access with S2a: + +- at IP-CAN Session Establishment the PCEF provides TWAN location information (TWAN ID and/or UE Time Zone as described in clause 16 of TS 23.402 [18]), IP-CAN type, RAT Type, PLMN identifier and an indication that access is trusted to the PCRF (over Gx). The TWAN ID may include the identifier of the operator of the TWAN as defined in clause 16 of TS 23.402 [18]. This occurs at step 3 of Figure 7.2-1 (IP-CAN Session Establishment). This information is also provided by the PCEF to the charging entities as described in TS 32.251 [9]. +- The Access Network Information Report event trigger defined in clause 6.1.4 applies. The user location information within the Access Network Information reporting contains the TWAN ID and/or UE Time Zone as described in clause 16 of TS 23.402 [18]. This information is sent when a bearer over Trusted WLAN access is activated or modified or deactivated and when the IP-CAN session is terminated. When the bearer over Trusted WLAN access is deactivated or the IP-CAN session is terminated the user location information corresponds to the last known UE location. When the IP-CAN session is terminated a TWAN Release Cause (if available) is also provided to the PCRF. + +The IP-CAN type change, the PLMN change event triggers defined in clause 6.1.4 and RAT type event trigger applies. The PCEF reports to the PCRF when a Create Session Request is received including information that the UE moved to a trusted WLAN access. This information is also provided by the PCEF to the charging entities as described in TS 32.251 [9]. + +When the PCRF subscribes to any of the listed above event triggers using the Provision of PCC Rules procedure, the PCEF provides the parameter values in the response back to the PCRF, as defined in clause 6.1.4. + +It shall be possible for the PCRF to authorize the QCI and ARP of the default EPS bearer to be enforced by the PCEF immediately or at a specific point in time by providing the default EPS bearer related policy information as defined in clause A.4.3.4. + +## H.4 EPC-based untrusted non-3GPP Access + +In an EPC-based untrusted non 3GPP Access, the BBERF does not apply. + +Specific event triggers and credit reauthorization triggers are listed in table H.4. + +**Table H.4: Untrusted non-3GPP access specific event/credit reauthorization triggers** + +| Event/Credit reauthorization trigger | Description | Reported from | Condition for reporting | +|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------| +| RAT type change. | The characteristics of the air interface, communicated as the radio access type, have changed. | PCEF | PCRF/OCS | + +For an IP-CAN session set-up over an untrusted non-3GPP access over S2b: + +- At IP-CAN Session Establishment the PCEF provides IP-CAN type, indication that it is untrusted RAT type, ePDG IP address and the Serving Network Identifier to the PCRF. This occurs at step 3 of Figure 7.2-1 (IP-CAN Session Establishment). This information is also provided by the PCEF to the charging entities as described in TS 32.251 [9]. The PCEF provides also the PCRF with User location information it may have received from the ePDG. As defined in TS 23.402 [18], this User location information may contain: ePDG IP address used in IKEv2 tunnel procedures. The local IP address and the UDP or TCP port number (if NAT was detected) detected by the ePDG as the source of the UE traffic over Swu. +- WLAN Location Information and the WLAN Location Information Age. The TWAN ID within the WLAN location Information includes the identifier of the operator of the TWAN as defined in clause 16 of TS 23.402 [18]. +- The IP-CAN type changes, the PLMN change event trigger defined in clause 6.1.4 and RAT type changes event trigger applies. The PCEF reports to PCRF when a Create Session Request is received including information that the UE moved to an untrusted WLAN access. This information is also provided by the PCEF to the charging entities as described in TS 32.251 [9]. As described for the case of an IP-CAN Session Establishment, the PCEF provides also the PCRF with location information it may have received from the ePDG and the ePDG IP address used in IKEv2 tunnel procedures. +- When the PCRF subscribes to any of the listed above event triggers using the Provision of PCC Rules procedure, the PCEF provides the parameter values in the response back to the PCRF, as defined in clause 6.1.4. +- The Access Network Information Report event trigger defined in clause 6.1.4 applies. As defined in TS 23.402 [18], the user location information within the Access Network Information reporting may contain: + - The local IP address and the UDP or TCP port number (if NAT was detected) detected by the ePDG as the source of the UE traffic over Swu. + - WLAN Location Information and the WLAN Location Information Age. + +When the Access Network Information reported by the PCRF to the AF corresponds to the local IP address used by the UE to reach the ePDG, this information cannot be considered as reliable. + +NOTE 1: This is because the UE can spoof its IP address. + +- When the IP-CAN session is terminated a UWAN Release Cause (if available) is provided to the PCRF. As defined in TS 23.402 [18], the User Location Information within the Access Network Information reporting may contain: + - The local IP address and the UDP or TCP port number (if NAT was detected) detected by the ePDG as the source of the UE traffic over Swu. + - WLAN Location Information and the WLAN Location Information Age defined in TS 23.402 [18] + +When the PCEF receives no user location information from the ePDG, it provides at least information on the Serving Network of the ePDG. + +The PCRF reports the ePDG IP address used in IKEv2 tunnel procedures to the AF (i.e. P-CSCF) at the time the AF instructions as described in clause 6.2.3 are received and the ePDG IP address is available, i.e. at the time the AF session is established and at the time the PCRF reports IP-CAN type change, if the AF (i.e. P-CSCF) subscribes to it. + +The AF instruction to report changes of the IP-CAN type is described in clause 6.2.3 including an indication that the access type is untrusted. + +NOTE 2: In order to provide more detailed information to the AF about the characteristics of the access when the RAT type is unknown, the information on whether the access is untrusted is provided. + +It shall be possible for the PCRF to authorize the QCI and ARP of the default EPS bearer to be enforced by the PCEF immediately or at a specific point in time by providing the default EPS bearer related policy information as defined in clause A.4.3.4. + +--- + +Annex I (informative): +Void + +## Annex J (informative): Standardized QCI characteristics - rationale and principles + +The following bullets capture design rationale and principles with respect to standardized QCI characteristics: + +- A key advantage of only signalling a single scalar parameter, the QCI, as a "pointer" to standardized characteristics - as opposed to signalling separate parameters for resource type, priority, delay, and loss – is that this simplifies a node implementation. + +NOTE 1: TS 23.107 [14] permits the definition of more than 1600 valid GPRS QoS profiles (without considering GBR, MBR, ARP, and Transfer Delay) and this adds unnecessary complexity. + +- In general, the rate of congestion related packet drops can not be controlled precisely for Non-GBR traffic. This rate is mainly determined by the current Non-GBR traffic load, the UE's current radio channel quality, and the configuration of user plane packet processing functions (e.g. scheduling, queue management, and rate shaping). That is the reason why services using a Non-GBR QCI should be prepared to experience congestion related packet drops and/or per packet delays that may exceed a given PDB. The discarding (dropping) of packets is expected to be controlled by a queue management function, e.g. based on pre-configured dropping thresholds, and is relevant mainly for Non-GBR QCIs. The discarding (dropping) of packets of an SDF aggregate mapped to a GBR QCI should be considered to be an exception as long as the source sends at a rate smaller than or equal to the SDF aggregate's GBR. Under these exceptional conditions, when required by operator policy, the eNodeB can be configured to also use the bearer's ARP priority level to assess the relative priority of packets belonging to different SDFs in determining whether to discard a packet or not. +- An operator would choose GBR QCIs for services where the preferred user experience is "service blocking over service dropping", i.e. rather block a service request than risk degraded performance of an already admitted service request. This may be relevant in scenarios where it may not be possible to meet the demand for those services with the dimensioned capacity (e.g. on "new year's eve"). Whether a service is realized based on GBR QCIs or Non-GBR QCIs is therefore an operator policy decision that to a large extent depends on expected traffic load vs. dimensioned capacity. Assuming sufficiently dimensioned capacity any service, both Real Time (RT) and Non Real Time (NRT), can be realized based only on Non-GBR QCIs. + +NOTE 2: The TCP's congestion control algorithm becomes increasingly sensitive to non congestion related packet losses (that occur in addition to congestion related packet drops) as the end-to-end bit rate increases. To fully utilise "EUTRA bit rates" TCP bulk data transfers will require a PLR of less than $10^{-6}$ . + +--- + +## Annex K (informative): Limited PCC Deployment + +Limited support for policy provisioning occurs in certain deployment scenarios. + +If PCC is deployed in the HPLMN but not the VPLMN, dynamic policy provisioning only occurs in the home routed roaming cases if no BBERF is employed, or in the non-roaming scenarios. + +In roaming scenarios in which the PCC is deployed in the HPLMN but not the VPLMN, and a GW (BBERF) is used: + +- limited policy control is possible when the UE moves from the HPLMN to the VPLMN. In the VPLMN, the UE receives only service according to static policies or according to static subscriber policies, defined outside the PCC framework delivered as described in TS 23.402 [18]; the dynamically allocated resources associated with specific EPS Bearers no longer apply after this transition. +- If a UE moves from the VPLMN to the HPLMN, dedicated resource establishment procedures are used to dynamically allocate the appropriate resources in the HPLMN for EPS bearers. +- PCC may still be employed to provision rules to the PCEF/TDF for the purpose of charging on the basis of the IP-CAN session. + +When PCC is supported in the VPLMN and not in the HPLMN, dynamic policy may only be provided for the LBO case. As the VPCRF has no access to subscriber policy information from the HPLMN, only static policy will apply. The VPCRF may however interact with the AF in the VPLMN in order to determine dynamic policy operating entirely in the VPLMN. This policy will be enforced either in the PCEF or the BBERF or the TDF to be enforced entirely in the VPLMN. Bearer binding will occur under control of the VPLMN, either in the GW (BBERF) or in the GW (PCEF) (in the case of GTP-based S5/S8 for 3GPP access). + +--- + +## Annex L (normative): Limited PCC Deployment + +In roaming scenarios in which the PCC is deployed in the HPLMN but not the VPLMN, and a GW (BBERF) is used: + +- HPCRF and OCS shall detect based on local configuration according to roaming agreements that the event reporting is restricted. The OCS shall not set re/authorization triggers which would require event reporting that can not be generated. +- The H-PCRF shall inform the AF of event triggers that cannot be reported. The H-PCRF shall inform the AF of events that cannot be reported when AF registers event trigger to the H-PCRF. When the H-PCRF detects limited PCC deployment, some event triggers which are dependent upon reporting from the BBERF cannot be reported. The H-PCRF shall inform the AF of events that cannot be reported when the UE is in or after the UE has handed over to an Access Gateway where the BBERF functionality is not deployed. + +--- + +## Annex M (informative): Handling of UE or network responsibility for the resource management of services + +For access networks supporting network initiated resource signalling, the network can take over the responsibility for the resource management for a service. This means the network triggers the request for resources when the service is started or modified and triggers the release of the resources when the service is terminated. The UE remains responsible for starting the service or reacting to an incoming service signalling and needs to decide about how to proceed with the service if the desired resources are not available. + +As the network initiated resource signalling cannot always be used due to UE, access network, roaming or other restrictions, the default responsibility for the resource management for a service is given to the UE. However, the UE and the PCRF may be configured on a per service basis to make use of the network responsibility for resource management if the current access network allows this, i.e. if network initiated resource signalling is possible. The UE configuration regarding the responsibility for the resource management of a service might be updated by device management. + +Regarding the PCC functionality, the main difference between the UE and the network responsibility for resource management is in the PCRF behaviour. When the UE is responsible, the PCRF waits with the authorization and installation of PCC rules until an appropriate resource request arrives. The main criteria for authorizing a PCC rule is a match of the service data flow filter information with the UE provided traffic mapping information, i.e. the UE desire to run this service on the requested resource. The QoS requested by the UE is then aligned with the authorized QoS for the PCC rules that are associated with the resource request by the PCRF. + +When the network is responsible for the resource management, the PCRF authorizes PCC rules immediately, i.e. when the IP-CAN session is established and when new service information is received from the AF. The authorized PCC rules are installed afterwards. + +## Annex N (informative): PCC usage for sponsored data connectivity + +### N.1 General + +With sponsored data connectivity, the Sponsor has a business relationship with the operator and the Sponsor reimburses the operator for the user's data connectivity in order to allow the user access to an associated Application Service Provider's (ASP) services. Alternatively, the user pays for the connectivity with a transaction which is separate from the subscriber's charging. It is assumed the user already has a subscription with the operator. + +A possible deployment configuration for sponsored data connectivity in the non roaming case is illustrated in Figure N.1-1. In the roaming case a S9 reference point is present between the H-PCRF and the V-PCRF. + +NOTE 1: Sponsored data connectivity is not supported in the roaming with visited access scenario in this Release. + +![Diagram of deployment for sponsored data connectivity](f53d26a0d0ab96356a6ed4f869f8d64d_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the network architecture for sponsored data connectivity. At the top, a dashed box contains three components: 'ASP', 'Sponsor', and 'AF'. Below this box, an 'AF' (Application Function) block is connected to a 'PCRF' (PDN Gateway Control Function) block via an 'Rx' reference point. The 'PCRF' is connected to a 'PCEF/TDF' (PDN Gateway Control Function/Traffic Detection Function) block via a 'Gx/Sd' reference point. The 'PCEF/TDF' is connected to a 'BBERF' (Bearer Resource Function) block. The 'BBERF' is connected to a 'UE' (User Equipment) block. A dashed line labeled 'Application level signaling' connects the 'UE' to the 'ASP' inside the top dashed box. A solid line labeled 'Gxx' connects the 'BBERF' to the 'PCRF'. + +Diagram of deployment for sponsored data connectivity + +Figure N.1-1: Deployment for sponsored data connectivity + +The relationship between the AF and Sponsor and between the Sponsor and ASP is out of scope of this specification. A single AF can serve multiple ASPs and multiple sponsors. + +NOTE 2: An ASP can also be a sponsor. + +The sponsor may choose to supply the PCRF (via the AF) with the usage thresholds that it expects the PCEF/TDF to enforce. Alternatively, the Sponsor can allow the ASP to enforce such control over the sponsored data connectivity. + +The information required for the detection of sponsored HTTP traffic (i.e. server host name) can be verified with the corresponding server IP address/prefix of the IP packets by the PCEF/TDF. The PCEF/TDF uses implementation specific logic to perform this verification. + +--- + +## N.2 Reporting for sponsored data connectivity + +There are two deployment scenarios for usage reporting for sponsored data connectivity. The Sponsor Identifier and Application Service Provider Identifier are provided for sponsored services to the PCRF from the AF over the Rx interface. + +In the first scenario the PCRF assigns a service specific Charging Key for a sponsored IP flow. The Charging key is used by the PCEF/TDF to generate separate accounting records for offline charging and and/or usage data records for online charging for the sponsored flows. Correlation of accounting records and usage data records from multiple users per sponsor and/or application service provider is then performed using the charging key. + +In a second scenario the Sponsor Identifier and Application Service Provider Identity is included in PCC/ADC rules from the PCRF to the PCEF/TDF as defined in clause 6.3.1. For this scenario the same Charging Key may be used both for IP flows that are sponsored and for flows that are not sponsored. Accounting records generated by the PCEF/TDF for offline charging include the Sponsor Identity and the Application Service Provider Identity. Correlation of accounting records from multiple users per sponsor and/or application service provider can then be based on Sponsor Identity and Application Service Provider Identity instead of the Charging Key. Usage reporting for online charging including Sponsor Identity and Application Service Provider Identity has not been specified in this release of the specification. PCC/ADC rules that include a Sponsor Identity and an Application Service Provider Identity should include a Charging Method that indicates offline charging. + +--- + +## Annex P (normative): Fixed Broadband Access Interworking with EPC + +This annex specifies the enhancement to PCC framework for supporting dynamic QoS interworking with Policy Framework defined by Broadband Forum. + +--- + +### P.1 Definitions + +**UE local IP address** is defined as: either the public IPv4 address and/or IPv6 address/IPv6 network prefix assigned to the UE by the BBF domain in the no-NAT case, or the public IPv4 address assigned by the BBF domain to the NATed RG that is used for this UE. + +**H(e)NB local IP address** is defined as: either the public IPv4 address and/or IPv6 address/IPv6 network prefix assigned to the H(e)NB by the BBF domain in the no-NAT case, or the public IPv4 address assigned by the BBF domain to the NATed RG that is used for this H(e)NB. + +**Non-seamless WLAN offload (NSWO)** is a capability of routing specific IP flows over the WLAN access without traversing the EPC as defined in clause 4.1.5 of TS 23.402 [18]. + +**EPC-routed:** User plane traffic that is routed via a PDN GW in EPC as part of a PDN Connection. EPC-routed applies to non-roaming, roaming with traffic home-routed and roaming with traffic local break-out cases. + +--- + +### P.2 Abbreviations + +The following abbreviations are relevant for this annex only: + +| | | +|----------|-----------------------------------| +| BBF | Broadband Forum | +| BPCF | Broadband Policy Control Function | +| NSWO | Non-Seamless WLAN offload | +| NSWO-APN | Non-Seamless WLAN offload APN | + +--- + +### P.3 High Level Requirements + +The same requirements as defined in clause 4 applies with the following exceptions: + +- no UE initiated resource reservation procedures are supported for EPC-based Fixed Broadband Access. +- The support of traffic steering control for the traffic in the (S)Gi-LAN is only applicable to the EPC-routed traffic of Home-routed scenario. + +In addition, it shall be possible to: + +- perform resource reservation (e.g. admission control request to the Fixed Broadband Network) based on the bandwidth requirements and the QoS attributes of a service request for EPC-routed traffic in the Fixed Broadband network; +- provide information to identify a 3GPP UE in the Fixed Broadband Network. +- perform resource reservation (e.g. admission control request to the Fixed Broadband Network) based on the bandwidth requirements and the QoS attributes of a service request for non-seamless WLAN offloaded traffic in the Fixed Broadband network. In this case the non-seamless WLAN offloaded traffic shall be managed by PCRF as an IP-CAN session identified by one IPv4 and/or an IPv6 prefix together with UE identity information and Non-seamless WLAN offload APN. The IP-CAN session for NSWO exists as long as UE Local IP addresses/prefix is announced to the IP network and authorized by EPC. The NSWO-APN is an APN allowing the BPCF to indicate to PCRF that for subscribers of a certain HPLMN the IP-CAN session is related to NSWO traffic. + +NOTE 1: The NSWO-APN is not used for the selection of a PDN GW. + +NOTE 2: Dynamic provisioning from the HPLMN of NSWO-APN to BPCF is out of the scope of this Release. + +NOTE 3: The naming convention of NSWO-APN is left to operator's implementation decision. + +--- + +## P.4 Architecture model and reference points + +### P.4.1 Reference points + +#### P.4.1.1 S9a Reference point + +The S9a reference point resides between: + +- the PCRF in the PLMN and the BPCF in the Fixed Broadband Access Network (BPCF); +- the PCRF in the VPLMN (V PCRF) and the BPCF in the Fixed Broadband Access Network (BPCF). + +The S9a reference point enables transfer of dynamic QoS control policies from the (V-)PCRF to the BPCF for the purpose of allocation of QoS resources in the Fixed Broadband Access Network for non-seamless WLAN offloaded traffic and for EPC-routed traffic. + +For scenarios where the traffic is non-seamless WLAN offloaded in the Fixed Broadband Access Network, based on Rx authorizations and event subscriptions, or equivalent information, received by the BPCF from an AF in the Fixed Broadband Access Network, the S9a reference point enables the BPCF to send Rx authorizations and event subscriptions to the PCRF. + +NOTE: The AF in the Fixed Broadband Access Network and the reference point between the AF in the Fixed Broadband Access Network and the BPCF are out of scope for this specification. + +#### P.4.1.2 S15 Reference Point + +The S15 reference point between the HNB GW and the PCRF and between the HNB GW and the V-PCRF. It enables the transfer of dynamic QoS control policies from the (V-)PCRF to the BPCF for the purpose of allocation of QoS resources in the Fixed Broadband Access Network for HNB CS calls. + +#### P.4.1.3 Gxx reference point + +When this reference point corresponds to the Gxb\*, it transports access information for WLAN UEs such as the UE local IP address and the UDP port number. It is used scenarios in which the ePDG provides the access information via Gxb\* to trigger the PCRF to initiate the S9a session i.e. S2b-PMIP and untrusted S2c. + +For the case of H(e)NB with S5/S8 PMIP, this reference point corresponds to Gxc and the requirements in clause 5.2.7 applies. In addition for the purpose of fixed broadband access interworking, Gxc transports the H(e)NB Local IP address and the UDP source port, if available, in the fixed broadband access network where the H(e)NB connects to. + +#### P.4.1.4 S9 reference point + +In addition to the specification of the S9 reference point defined in clause 5.2.6, this reference point is used to trigger the V-PCRF to initiate the Gateway Control Session establishment over S9a. The S9 interface is enhanced to carry from the H-PCRF to the V-PCRF the UE local IP address, the UDP port number, if available, the H(e)NB local IP address and UDP port, if available, and the ePDG IP address (for S2b and untrusted S2c access) or the PDN GW IP address (for trusted S2c access), if available. + +### P.4.1.5 Gx reference point + +In addition to the specification of the Gx reference point defined in clause 5.2.2, this reference point is enhanced as described in the following. The IP-CAN establishment/modification request message, send from PCEF to PCRF, should include: + +- the UE local IP address and the UDP port number, if available, when WLAN access and GTP is used. +- the UE local IP address and the UDP port number, if available, when trusted S2c is used. +- the H(e)NB local IP address and the UDP port number, if available, when UE accesses from H(e)NB and GTP S5/S8 is used. + +## P.4.2 Reference architecture + +### P.4.2.0 General + +The reference architecture described in clause 5.1 is: + +- extended to include S9a reference point to support fixed broadband access interworking to EPC for the following scenarios: + - S9a reference point between PCRF and BPCF in the non-roaming case for traffic that is routed via EPC and for traffic that is non-seamless WLAN offloaded in the fixed broadband access network; and + - S9a reference point between the V-PCRF and BPCF for roaming cases with visited access and home routed for traffic that is routed via EPC; and for traffic that is non-seamless WLAN offloaded in the fixed broadband access network; +- extended to include the S15 reference point as defined in clause P.4.1.2; +- PCEF resides in the PDN GW; +- for WLAN access: BBERF resides in the ePDG. The BBERF only applies for cases 2b (i.e. S2b-PMIP, S2c-untrusted); +- for H(e)NB access with S5/S8 PMIP: BBERF resides in the Serving GW. + +The UE may or may not be behind a NAT. The NAT may reside in the BBF access network or in the customer premises network. Policy interworking via S9a for non-seamless WLAN offloaded traffic in this release is supported for scenarios without NAT in the BBF domain. + +### P.4.2.1 Reference architecture – Non-Roaming + +![Figure P.4.2.1-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking](03b1d46bdcb71b03d29c6ab572fb9b33_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows the PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking in a non-roaming scenario. The architecture is divided by a vertical dashed line; to the left is the "Fixed Broadband Access NW" containing the BPCF and HNB-GW. The BPCF connects to the PCRF via the S9a interface. The HNB-GW connects to the PCRF via the S15 interface. + +In the core network, the Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) is the central node. It connects to: + + +- Subscription Profile Repository (SPR) via the Sp interface. +- RCAF via the Np interface. +- AF via the Rx interface. +- BBERF via the Gxx interface. +- PDN GW (specifically the PCEF within it) via the Gx interface. +- TDF via the Sd interface. +- TSSF via the St interface. +- Online Charging System (OCS) via the Sy interface. + +The PDN GW contains the PCEF. The PDN GW/PCEF connects to the TDF. The TDF connects to the TSSF. Charging interfaces include: + + +- OCS connects to TSSF via Gy and to TDF via Gyn. +- Offline Charging System (OFCS) connects to TDF via Gzn and to PDN GW via Gz. + +Figure P.4.2.1-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking + +**Figure P.4.2.1-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking** + +### P.4.2.2 Reference architecture – Home Routed + +![PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (home routed) diagram showing various network functions and their interfaces.](cfd911568094b540490a86efe5c0ead6_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (home routed). It shows the following components and interfaces: + +- Subscription Profile Repository (SPR)**: Connected to the H-PCRF via the **Sp** interface. +- AF (Application Function)**: Connected to the H-PCRF via the **Rx** interface. +- Online Charging System (OCS)**: Connected to the H-PCRF via the **Sy** interface. It also connects to the TSSF via **Gy** and to the OFCS via **Gyn**. +- Policy and Charging Rules Function (H-PCRF)**: The central function that connects to the SPR, AF, OCS, V-PCRF, TSSF, and PCEF. +- Policy and Charging Rules Function (V-PCRF)**: Located within the VPLMN, it connects to the BPCF via **S9a**, to the H-PCRF via **S9**, to the HNB-GW via **S15**, and to the BBERF via **Gxx**. +- TSSF (Traffic Steering Function)**: Connected to the H-PCRF via **St** and **Sd** interfaces. It connects to the OCS via **Gy** and to the OFCS via **Gzn**. +- Offline Charging System (OFCS)**: Connected to the TSSF via **Gzn** and to the PCEF via **Gz**. +- PCEF (PDN Connection Function)**: Located within the PDN GW, it connects to the H-PCRF via the **Gx** interface and to the OFCS via **Gz**. +- PDN GW**: Contains the PCEF. +- TDF (Traffic Detection Function)**: Connected to the H-PCRF via **Sd** and to the OFCS via **Gzn**. +- Fixed Broadband Access Network**: Contains the BPCF, VPLMN, and HPLMN. +- BPCF (BPF)**: Connected to the V-PCRF via **S9a**. +- VPLMN (Visited PLMN)**: Contains the RCAF, V-PCRF, HNB-GW, and BBERF. It connects to the HPLMN via the **Np** interface. +- HPLMN (Home PLMN)**: Contains the SPR, AF, H-PCRF, and PDN GW. +- RCAF (RAN Connection Function)**: Located within the VPLMN, it connects to the H-PCRF via the **Np** interface. +- HNB-GW (Home NodeB Gateway)**: Located within the VPLMN, it connects to the V-PCRF via **S15**. +- BBERF (Bearers Binding and Event Reporting Function)**: Located within the VPLMN, it connects to the V-PCRF via **Gxx**. + +PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (home routed) diagram showing various network functions and their interfaces. + +Figure P.4.2.2-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (home routed) + +P.4.2.3 Reference architecture – Visited Access + +![PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (visited access) diagram showing various network functions and their interfaces across VPLMN and HPLMN domains.](023599a4fac1a9e3fd8cced09d3e75a6_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (visited access). It is divided into two main domains by a vertical dashed line: VPLMN (Visited PLMN) on the left and HPLMN (Home PLMN) on the right. A horizontal dashed line separates the core network functions from the access and external systems. + +- External Systems:** + - Subscription Profile Repository (SPR):** Located in the HPLMN, it connects to the H-PCRF via the Sp interface. + - AF (Application Function):** Located in the HPLMN, it connects to the H-PCRF via the Rx interface. + - Online Charging System (OCS):** Located outside the core, it connects to the H-PCRF via the Sy interface and to the PCEF via the Gy interface. + - Offline Charging System (OFCS):** Located outside the core, it connects to the TDF via Gyn and Gzn interfaces, and to the PCEF via the Gz interface. +- Core Network Functions:** + - H-PCRF (Policy and Charging Rules Function):** Located in the HPLMN, it receives inputs from SPR (Sp) and AF (Rx), and connects to the V-PCRF via the S9 interface. It also has a Sy interface to the OCS. + - V-PCRF (Policy and Charging Rules Function):** Located in the VPLMN, it connects to the H-PCRF via S9, to the BPCF via S9a, to the RCAF via Np, and to the AF via Rx. It also connects to the PDN GW via Sd and Gx interfaces. + - BPCF (Bearing Control Function):** Located in the Fixed Broadband Access Network, it connects to the V-PCRF via S9a. + - HNB-GW (Home NodeB Gateway):** Located in the Fixed Broadband Access Network, it connects to the V-PCRF via S15. + - BBERF (Bearer Resource Function):** Located in the Fixed Broadband Access Network, it connects to the PDN GW via Gxx. + - PCEF (PDN Connection Entity Function):** Located within the PDN GW, it connects to the V-PCRF via Sd and Gx, to the OCS via Gy, and to the OFCS via Gz. + - TDF (Traffic Detection Function):** Located within the PDN GW, it connects to the PCEF via Sd and to the OFCS via Gyn and Gzn. + - PDN GW (PDN Gateway):** The central gateway element containing the PCEF and TDF. It connects to the V-PCRF via Sd and Gx, to the BBERF via Gxx, and to the OFCS via Gz. +- Interfaces:** + - Sp:** Between SPR and H-PCRF. + - Rx:** Between AF and H-PCRF. + - Sy:** Between H-PCRF and OCS. + - S9:** Between H-PCRF and V-PCRF. + - S9a:** Between BPCF and V-PCRF. + - Np:** Between RCAF and V-PCRF. + - S15:** Between HNB-GW and V-PCRF. + - Gxx:** Between BBERF and PDN GW. + - Gx:** Between V-PCRF and PDN GW. + - Sd:** Between V-PCRF and PDN GW. + - Gy:** Between OCS and PDN GW. + - Gzn:** Between TDF and OFCS. + - Gyn:** Between TDF and OFCS. + - Gz:** Between PCEF and OFCS. + +PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (visited access) diagram showing various network functions and their interfaces across VPLMN and HPLMN domains. + +Figure P.4.2.3-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (visited access) + +#### P.4.2.4 Reference architecture - Non-Roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network; scenario with AF + +![Figure P.4.2.4-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (non-roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network).](24fb4322a331cba19f7f0b0084bc264c_img.jpg) + +This diagram illustrates the PCC reference architecture for non-roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in a Fixed Broadband Access Network (FBN) with an Application Function (AF). A dashed vertical line on the left separates the 'Fixed Broadband Access NW' (containing the BPCF) from the core network elements. The BPCF connects to the Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) via the S9a reference point. The PCRF connects to the Subscription Profile Repository (SPR) via the Sp reference point, to the AF via the Rx reference point, and to the Online Charging System (OCS) via the Sy reference point. + +Figure P.4.2.4-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (non-roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network). + +**Figure P.4.2.4-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (non-roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network)** + +NOTE 1: The architecture also supports scenarios where there is an Application Function in the Fixed Broadband Access Network. The AF in the Fixed Broadband Access Network and the reference point between the AF in the Fixed Broadband Access Network and the BPCF are out of scope for this specification. + +NOTE 2: The AF in this architecture is used with traffic that is non-seamless WLAN offloaded in the Fixed Broadband Access Network. + +#### P.4.2.5 Reference architecture - Roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network: scenario with AF + +![Figure P.4.2.5-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network).](4cffd2caac57799e062fd4d4674b4f4c_img.jpg) + +This diagram illustrates the PCC reference architecture for roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in a Fixed Broadband Access Network (FBN) with an Application Function (AF). The diagram is divided into three main areas by dashed vertical lines: 'HPLMN' (Home PLMN), 'VPLMN' (Visited PLMN), and 'Fixed Broadband Access Network'. The BPCF is located in the Fixed Broadband Access Network and connects to the V-PCRF (Visited Policy and Charging Rules Function) in the VPLMN via the S9a reference point. The V-PCRF connects to the H-PCRF (Home Policy and Charging Rules Function) in the HPLMN via the S9 reference point. The H-PCRF connects to the SPR via the Sp reference point, to the AF via the Rx reference point, and to the OCS via the Sy reference point. + +Figure P.4.2.5-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network). + +**Figure P.4.2.5-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network)** + +NOTE 1: The architecture also supports scenarios where there is an Application Function in the Fixed Broadband Access Network. The AF in the Fixed Broadband Access Network and the reference point between the AF in the Fixed Broadband Access Network and the BPCF are out of scope for this specification. + +NOTE 2: The AF in this architecture is used with traffic that is non-seamless WLAN offloaded in the Fixed Broadband Access Network. + +#### P.4.2.6 Reference architecture - Non-Roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network: scenario with TDF + +![Figure P.4.2.6-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (non-roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network).](5220c0467c5bc5d0dd768fb7a832b250_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking. It features a central 'Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF)' connected to several entities: 'Subscription Profile Repository (SPR)' via the 'Sp' interface, 'Online Charging System (OCS)' via the 'Sy' interface, and 'TDF' via the 'Sd' interface. The PCRF is also connected to the 'Fixed Broadband Access NW' (represented by a dashed line) via the 'S9a' interface. The 'BPCF' (Broadband Packet Core Function) is located within the Fixed Broadband Access NW and is connected to the PCRF. + +Figure P.4.2.6-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (non-roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network). + +**Figure P.4.2.6-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (non-roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network)** + +NOTE 1: The TDF in this architecture is used with traffic that is non-seamless WLAN offloaded in the Fixed Broadband Access Network. + +NOTE 2: Sd is an intra-operator interface. Scenarios where non-seamless WLAN offloaded traffic is routed via the TDF are therefore limited to the case where the Fixed Broadband Access Network and the PLMN are owned by the same operator. + +## P.4.2.7 Reference architecture - Roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network: scenario with TDF + +![Figure P.4.2.7-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network).](f5a43bbc3d3642eb257baf1b10602488_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking. It shows the following components and interfaces: + +- Subscription Profile Repository (SPR)**: Located in the HPLMN, it connects to the H-PCRF via the Sp interface. +- Policy and Charging Rules Function (H-PCRF)**: Located in the HPLMN, it connects to the SPR (Sp), the OCS (Sy), and the V-PCRF (S9). +- Online Charging System (OCS)**: Located in the HPLMN, it connects to the H-PCRF via the Sy interface. +- Policy and Charging Rules Function (V-PCRF)**: Located in the VPLMN, it connects to the H-PCRF (S9) and the TDF (Sd). +- TDF**: Located in the VPLMN, it connects to the V-PCRF via the Sd interface. +- BPCF**: Located in the Fixed Broadband Access Network, it connects to the V-PCRF via the S9a interface. + +The Fixed Broadband Access Network is shown as a dashed box containing the BPCF. The VPLMN is also shown as a dashed box containing the V-PCRF and the TDF. The HPLMN contains the SPR, H-PCRF, and OCS. + +Figure P.4.2.7-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network). + +**Figure P.4.2.7-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (roaming with non-seamless WLAN offload in Fixed Broadband Access Network)** + +NOTE 1: The TDF in this architecture is used with traffic that is non-seamless WLAN offloaded in the Fixed Broadband Access Network. + +NOTE 2: Sd is an intra-operator interface. Scenarios where non-seamless WLAN offloaded traffic is routed via the TDF are therefore limited to the case where the Fixed Broadband Access Network and the VPLMN are owned by the same operator. + +## P.5 Functional description + +### P.5.1 Overall description + +For EPC based Fixed Broadband Access Interworking with EPC-routed traffic the credit management, reporting, usage monitoring, termination actions, service data flow prioritization and standardized QoS characteristics as defined in clause 6.1 shall apply. + +For non-seamless WLAN offloaded traffic service data flow prioritization as defined in clause 6.1 applies. For scenario with TDF, usage monitoring as defined in clause 6.1 applies. For NSWO traffic in other scenarios, without TDF, usage monitoring is out of scope of this specification. For all scenarios, credit management, termination actions and reporting for NSWO traffic are out of scope of this specification. + +The purpose of policy interworking via S9a for non-seamless WLAN offloaded traffic (PCC Rules provisioned for the UE local IP address) is to enable policy control in the BBF domain in two different ways: + +- Gate enforcement. The BPCF is expected to provide information over R interface to control whether a service data flow, which is subject to policy control, pass through the BNG if and only if the corresponding gate is open. +- QoS enforcement: The BPCF is expected to provide information over R interface to control the authorized QoS of a service data flow according to the QoS information received over S9a interface. + +The complete specification of the BPCF is defined in BBF TR-134 [31] and BBF TR-203 [30] and BBF TR-291 [33] and it is out of the scope of 3GPP. + +The information contained in a PCC Rule generated by the PCRF for NSWO traffic includes Service Data Flow Detection and Policy Control information elements specified in table 6.3. The PCC rules for NSWO traffic do not include the Charging and Usage Monitoring Control elements specified in table 6.3. + +For Fixed Broadband Access the event triggers in table P.5.1-1 shall apply in addition to the ones in table 6.2. + +**Table P.5.1-1: Fixed Broadband specific event triggers** + +| Event trigger | Description | Reported from | Conditions for reporting | +|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|--------------------------| +| UE local IP address change | Either the UE local IP address or the UDP port number or both assigned by Fixed Broadband Access have changed | PCEF, BBERF | Always set | +| H(e)NB local IP address change | Either the H(e)NB IP address or the UDP port number or both assigned by Fixed Broadband Access have changed | PCEF, BBERF | PCRF | + +## P.5.1.1 Binding Mechanism + +### P.5.1.1.1 EPC-routed traffic + +For EPC routed traffic, binding mechanisms apply as defined in clause 6.1.1 by PCRF, PCEF and BBERF. In addition, the PCC and QoS Rule generation is performed by PCRF as specified in clause 6.1.1, in addition when: + +- Both a Gx and associated Gateway Control Session exist for the same IP-CAN session; the PCRF shall generate QoS Rules for all the authorized PCC rules in this step. + +### P.5.1.1.2 Non-seamless WLAN offloaded traffic + +The binding mechanism includes two steps for the non-seamless WLAN offloaded traffic: + +1. Session binding. +2. PCC rule authorization. + +For NSWO traffic, session binding of AF session and TDF session (in unsolicited mode) to an IP-CAN session is performed by the PCRF, as defined in clause 6.1.1, for the purpose of policy control in the BBF domain. + +The PCRF derives and authorises PCC rules as described in clause 6.1.1. + +## P.5.1.2 S9a, Gx and S15 Session Linking + +For WLAN, PCRF and BPCF both need to support session linking function. Depending on the deployment there may be one or multiple PCRF that have a Gateway Control Session on S9a for a given UE. The PCRF shall be able to perform the linking between IP-CAN sessions on Gx and the Gateway Control Session on S9a for the same UE based on IMSI and UE local IP address. + +For H(e)NB scenarios a Gateway Control Session on S9a may be linked to: + +- IP-CAN Sessions on Gx for all UEs connected to the H(e)NB; +- Gateway Control Sessions on S9 and/or IP-CAN Sessions on S9 (in roaming cases); +- S15 Session; + +NOTE 1: There is a single S15 session per HNB for CS calls for all UEs connected to the HNB in order to improve performance. In addition, for CS calls there are no UE specific policies and therefore a single PCRF can handle CS calls for all UEs. + +When the Gateway Control Session on S9a is initiated by PCRF, BPCF is expected to associate the session on R with the Gateway Control Session on S9a. + +NOTE 2: How the BPCF performs the association of a Gateway Control Session on S9a and R session is out of the scope of 3GPP. + +--- + +## P.6 Functional Entities + +### P.6.1 Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) + +#### P.6.1.1 General + +The PCRF functionality defined in clause 6.2.1.0 shall apply. In addition, to support interworking with Fixed Broadband networks, the PCRF shall: + +- Send the QoS rules to the BPCF over S9a to request admission control in the fixed access. +- Send to the BPCF the UE local IP address and UDP port number for the WLAN scenario to allow the Fixed Broadband Access to identify UE traffic. +- Send to the BPCF the HeNB Local IP address and UDP port number for the Femto scenario. This allows the Fixed Broadband Access to identify IP flows corresponding to the IPSec tunnel from the HeNB GW to the SeGW which transports H(e)NB UE traffic. +- Be able to be configured with the relation of IP address ranges to Fixed Broadband Access, to allow BPCF discovery. +- Be able to receive from PDN GW the H(e)NB Local IP address and the UDP source port, if available, in the Fixed Broadband access network at which the H(e)NB is connected. +- Be able to receive the UE local IP address and UDP source port from the ePDG (case 2a and case 2b) and PDN GW (case 1). +- Be able to receive the HNB local IP address and UDP source port from HNB GW (case 1) for the HNB CS scenario. + +When PCRF receives the IP-CAN session establishment indication for a PDN connection initiated for a UE connected via Fixed network access, the PCRF determines if a Gateway control session is already present for this IP-CAN session. If Gateway control session is not already established, the PCRF shall trigger Gateway control session establishment procedure from the BPCF. + +When the UE is connecting via Fixed Broadband access network, no QoS Rules should be sent to the ePDG. The PCRF identifies when the UE is connecting via Fixed Broadband access network from the IP-CAN type. + +For the purpose of the policy control in the Fixed Broadband Access network for the non-seamless WLAN offloaded traffic, the PCRF shall: + +- Handle incoming request of IP-CAN session establishment received over S9a. +- Perform session binding of the AF session information received via Rx or via S9a with an existing IP-CAN session using the UE local IP address and the IMSI (if available). +- Initiate IP-CAN Session Modification and also QoS information provision for Non-seamless WLAN offloaded traffic. +- Establish an Sd session with the TDF when an indication of IP-CAN session establishment is received over S9a for the UE local IP address in case of architecture variant C the solicited mode. + +#### P.6.1.2 V-PCRF + +The V-PCRF functionality defined in clause 6.2.1.3 shall apply. For the purpose of Fixed Access interworking the V-PCRF functionalities for EPC routed traffic, the following are applicable: + +- If a BPCF-Initiated Gateway Control Session termination is received over S9a, then the V-PCRF shall terminate a Gateway Control session over S9 with the H-PCRF. +- For home routed roaming case, in case 1: + - If a Gateway Control Session termination indication is received over S9 from the H-PCRF, then the V-PCRF shall trigger a Gateway Control Session termination to the BPCF. + - If a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request is received over S9 from the H-PCRF, then the V-PCRF shall trigger a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request to the BPCF. +- For both home routed and visited access roaming cases, in case 2b: + - If a Gateway Control Session establishment from the BBERF (ePDG) occurs, then the V-PCRF shall establish a Gateway Control Session with the BPCF over S9a and with the H-PCRF over S9. + - If the last Gateway Control Session from the BBERF (ePDG) is terminated, then the V-PCRF shall terminate the Gateway Control Session with the BPCF over S9a and with the H-PCRF over S9. +- When the last PDN connection over the HNB has been terminated the V-PCRF initiates the GW Control Session Termination to the BPCF if there is no S15 session bound to the Gateway control session over S9a interface session. Otherwise, if there is a S15 session bound to the Gateway control session over S9a interface session the V-PCRF initiates the GW Control QoS rule Provision procedure to the BPCF to release the resources in the fixed broadband network. + +When the V-PCRF receives the Gateway Control Session establishment indication for a PDN connection initiated for a UE connected via Fixed network access, the V-PCRF determines if a Gateway Control Session is already present for this IP-CAN session. If a Gateway Control Session is not already established, the V-PCRF shall trigger a Gateway Control Session establishment procedure from the BPCF. + +For the purpose of BBF interworking for NSWO traffic, the V-PCRF functionalities described in the following are applicable: + +- For roaming scenario, V-PCRF shall handle incoming request of IP-CAN session establishment received over S9a. +- If an IP-CAN session establishment request is received for a roaming user over the S9a reference point, then the V PCRF shall conclude that the IP-CAN session is used for NSWO and acts as visited access network as described in clause 6.2.1.3.3. + +### P.6.1.3 H-PCRF + +The H-PCRF functionality defined in clause 6.2.1.4 shall apply. For the purpose of Fixed Access interworking, the H-PCRF functionalities defined in the following are applicable to the home routed scenario: + +- For case 1, if an IP-CAN Session Establishment indication is received over Gx, then if this is the first IP-CAN session for this UE the H-PCRF shall establish a Gateway Control Session to the V-PCRF over S9. +- For case 1, if an IP-CAN Session Termination indication is received over Gx then if this is the last IP-CAN session for this UE, the H-PCRF shall terminate the Gateway Control session to the V-PCRF over S9. +- If a PCC Rule is generated, the H-PCRF shall send QoS rules to the V-PCRF to request admission control over S9. +- If a PCEF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification Procedure occurs over Gx to update, for WLAN scenario, the UE local IP Address and UDP port number, or, for the HeNB scenario, the HeNB local IP Address and UDP port number, then the H-PCRF shall send them to the V-PCRF. +- For the purpose of BBF interworking for NSWO traffic, in case of roaming, the H-PCRF shall determine PCC rules based on home operator policy for the specific UE when it receives the IP-CAN session establishment request from V-PCRF. + +## P.6.2 Broadband Policy Control Function (BPCF) + +The BPCF is the policy Control entity in the Fixed Broadband Access network. The complete specification of the BPCF is defined in BBF TR-134 [31] and BBF TR-203 [30] and it is out of the scope of the 3GPP. + +For the purpose of interworking with 3GPP network the BPCF is expected to: + +- Perform admission control in fixed access or delegates admission control decision to other BBF nodes. Based on the admission control, the BPCF accepts or rejects the request received from PCRF over S9a. As with current S9, the BPCF may include the acceptable QoS in the reply if the request is rejected. +- Translate the 3GPP QoS rule as received from PCRF over S9a interface into access specific QoS parameters applicable in the Fixed Broadband access network. +- Support PCRF-triggered Gateway Control session establishment procedure over S9a. +- Support Gateway Control session modification and termination procedures over S9a. + +The functionality of the BPCF in a roaming scenario is the same as in a non-roaming scenario. + +For the purpose of the policy control in the BBF domain for the Non-Seamless WLAN offloaded, the BPCF shall: + +- Support BPCF-initiated IP-CAN Session Establishment procedure over S9a only after successfully checking the local policies indicating that policy control for NSWO is provided. +- Support IP-CAN Session Modification procedure over S9a. +- Support IP-CAN Session Termination procedure over S9a. +- Bind the request received on E/G from AF in the Fixed Broadband access network with an existing IP-CAN session on S9a using the UE local IP address and the IMSI ( if available). + +## P.6.3 Bearer Binding and Event Reporting Function (BBERF) + +For case 2a and case 2b, the BBERF in the ePDG supports only reporting of the UE's Local IP address and UDP port number to the PCRF. Bearer binding, uplink bearer binding verification functions are not supported. + +For case 2b, the BBERF in the Serving GW supports those functions specified in clause 6.2.7.1 + +NOTE: The IP-CAN-specific parameters provided by BBERF in Serving GW to PCRF includes the H(e)NB's Local IP address and UDP port number. + +## P.6.4 Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF) + +PCEF supports those functions specified in clause 6.2.2.1. Case 1 additionally supports the reporting of the UE / H(e)NB Local IP address and the UDP port number, if available, in the Fixed Broadband Access at which the H(e)NB is connected to the PCRF. + +--- + +## P.7 PCC Procedures and Flows + +### P.7.1 Introduction + +From the network scenarios listed in clause 7.1, the Case 1 (no Gateway Control Session over Gxx interface) applies for Fixed Broadband Access for S2a-GTP, S2b-GTP, trusted S2c and H(e)NB scenarios, the Case 2b (a Gateway Control Session over Gxx interface per IP-CAN Session) applies for S2b-PMIP and case 2a (the same Gateway Control Session over Gxx interface for all IP-CAN Sessions) applies for untrusted S2c. + +In all information flows, the ePDG is present only in untrusted scenario case 2a and case 2b. + +NOTE: No policy interworking solution based on S9a is defined for Fixed Broadband access interworking via S2a within this release of the specification. + +## P.7.2 IP-CAN Session Establishment + +### P.7.2.0 General + +This procedure is applicable for WLAN and H(e)NB scenarios for EPC routed traffic and for NSWO traffic. This procedure is the same as described in clause 7.2 with the exceptions described in this clause. + +NOTE 1: When PCRF receives the IP-CAN session establishment indication over Gx interface, PCRF determines if a Gateway Control session is already present for this IP-CAN session. If a Gateway Control session is not already established, the PCRF shall trigger a Gateway Control session establishment procedure from the BPCF. + +### P.7.2.1 IP-CAN Session Establishment + +![Sequence diagram for IP-CAN Session Establishment for both EPC routed and NSWO traffic. The diagram shows interactions between BPCF, V-PCRF, H-PCRF, SPR, and TDF. It is divided into 'Roaming Scenarios' and 'Non-Roaming Scenarios'. The 'Roaming Scenarios' part includes steps 1-7, where BPCF triggers the process, V-PCRF indicates to H-PCRF, H-PCRF requests profile from SPR, SPR responds, V-PCRF ACKs BPCF, V-PCRF requests TDF session from TDF, and TDF ACKs V-PCRF. The 'Non-Roaming Scenarios' part includes steps 8 and 9. Step 8 is a sub-clause 7.2 procedure (steps 1-5) which includes sub-steps A (Gateway Control Session Establishment) and B (Gateway Control and QoS Rule Provisioning). Step 9 is a sub-clause 7.2 procedure (from step 6).](b31470b6896e3010418b8418c3708c53_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BPCF + participant V-PCRF + participant H-PCRF + participant SPR + participant TDF + + Note left of BPCF: 1. Trigger + BPCF-->>V-PCRF: 2. Indication of IP-CAN Session Establishment + Note right of V-PCRF: Roaming Scenarios + V-PCRF-->>H-PCRF: 3. Profile Request + H-PCRF-->>SPR: 4. Profile Response + H-PCRF-->>V-PCRF: 5. Indication of IP-CAN Session Establishment ACK + V-PCRF-->>TDF: 6. TDF Session Establishment Request + TDF-->>V-PCRF: 7. TDF Session Establishment ACK + + Note right of V-PCRF: Non-Roaming Scenarios + Note right of V-PCRF: 8. IP-CAN Session Establishment Procedure sub-clause 7.2 (steps 1-5) + Note right of V-PCRF: (A) + Note right of V-PCRF: A.1 PCRF-triggered Gateway Control Session Establishment + Note right of V-PCRF: A.2 BPCF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Establishment + Note right of V-PCRF: A.3 BPCF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Establishment ACK + Note right of V-PCRF: (B) + Note right of V-PCRF: B.1 Gateway Control and QoS Rule Provisioning + Note right of V-PCRF: B.2 Gateway Control and QoS Rule Provisioning ACK + + Note right of V-PCRF: 9. IP-CAN Session Establishment Procedure sub-clause 7.2 (from step 6) + +``` + +Sequence diagram for IP-CAN Session Establishment for both EPC routed and NSWO traffic. The diagram shows interactions between BPCF, V-PCRF, H-PCRF, SPR, and TDF. It is divided into 'Roaming Scenarios' and 'Non-Roaming Scenarios'. The 'Roaming Scenarios' part includes steps 1-7, where BPCF triggers the process, V-PCRF indicates to H-PCRF, H-PCRF requests profile from SPR, SPR responds, V-PCRF ACKs BPCF, V-PCRF requests TDF session from TDF, and TDF ACKs V-PCRF. The 'Non-Roaming Scenarios' part includes steps 8 and 9. Step 8 is a sub-clause 7.2 procedure (steps 1-5) which includes sub-steps A (Gateway Control Session Establishment) and B (Gateway Control and QoS Rule Provisioning). Step 9 is a sub-clause 7.2 procedure (from step 6). + +Figure P.7.2.1: IP-CAN Session Establishment for both EPC routed and NSWO traffic + +This procedure is the same as described in clause 7.2 with the additions described below: + +1. The BBF access network may become aware of the IMSI of the 3GPP UE if 3GPP-based access authentication (EAP-AKA/AKA') is performed. The BPCF also becomes aware of the UE local IP address. + +The steps from 2 to 7 show PCC signalling to provision PCC rules and ADC rules for NSWO traffic. + +2. The BPCF Initiates a IP-CAN session establishment over S9a to the PCRF for non-roaming and to the V-PCRF for roaming cases, the information contained in the request message includes IMSI, IP-CAN type, local UE IP address and the NSWO-APN. Triggered by the IP-CAN session establishment over S9 the V-PCRF triggers the S9 session establishment to the H-PCRF. +- 3-4. The PCRF retrieves user profile from SPR as described in clause 7.2. As part of the user profile, the PCRF may receive an indication on whether policy control for NSWO traffic should be performed for that UE. +5. The PCRF enables policy control for NSWO traffic for that UE based on operator policies and user profile information that may depend on e.g. network where the UE is offloading. The PCRF sends a reply message containing PCC Rules if policy control is enabled . +6. Triggered by the successful establishment of the IP-CAN session for the UE local IP address in step 3, the V-PCRF (roaming) and the PCRF (non-roaming) may establish a session with the TDF to provision ADC Rules for that UE local IP address (if applicable, when solicited application reporting applies and when policy control for offloaded traffic is to be performed). The PCRF provides the TDF with the UE local IP address, the IMSI, the IP-CAN type and the NSWO-APN. +7. The TDF replies as described in the clause 7.2. + +The steps from 6 to 10 show PCC signalling to provision policies for EPC routed traffic. + +8. IP-CAN session establishment as specified in clause 7.2 is performed, including the establishment of a Gateway Control session (if applicable), as specified below with the following additional information: + +In case 2a and case 2b, the ePDG (BBERF) initiates a Gateway Control Session Establishment procedure to provide the UE local IP address and UDP port (if available) as defined in clause P.7.5.1. + +For case 1, step 3 of clause 7.2 for WLAN scenario the PCEF includes the UE local IP address and the UDP port number (if available), while for the H(e)NB scenario the PCEF includes the H(e)NB Local IP address and the UDP port number (if available) in the Fixed Broadband Access at which the H(e)NB is connected to. + +In case 2b, S-GW (BBERF) initiates a Gateway Control Session Establishment procedure to request QoS Rules for the H(e)NB local IP address as defined in clause P.7.5.1. + +The PCRF determines, based on information (UE local IP address information or H(e)NB local IP address information) provided in the IP-CAN session establishment indication or Gateway Control Session establishment indication (if applicable), whether or not the user is connecting via a Fixed Broadband Access Network. + +The steps in (A) show PCC signalling to establish a Gateway Control Session over S9a for EPC routed traffic. + +- A.1. Triggered by the IP-CAN session establishment indication, or triggered by Gateway control session establishment over Gxb\*, the PCRF (non-roaming case) or the V-PCRF (visited access roaming case) initiates Gateway Control Session establishment with the BPCF over S9a, if no Gateway Control Session exists for the same IMSI for WLAN scenario. The PCRF includes in the request message to BPCF the IMSI, the UE local IP address and the UDP port number (if available), QoS Rules, and the ePDG IP address (for S2b-GTP access) or PDN GW IP address (for trusted S2c access), while for the H(e)NB scenario, the PCRF (Non-roaming case) or the V-PCRF (visited access roaming case) initiates Gateway Control Session establishment with the BPCF over S9a, if no Gateway Control Session exists for the same H(e)NB including the IMSI, H(e)NB Local IP address, the UDP port number (if available) and QoS Rules. For home routed, the H-PCRF initiates a Gateway Control Session over S9 to trigger the V-PCRF to establish a Gateway Control Session over S9a, for visited access, the V-PCRF initiates a Gateway Control Session over S9 to H-PCRF and the Gateway Control Session over S9a to BPCF. +- A.2. For WLAN scenario the BPCF Initiates the Gateway Control session establishment on S9a including in the request message the IMSI, UE Local IP address and the UDP port (if available), while for the H(e)NB scenario it includes the IMSI, H(e)NB Local IP address and the UDP port number (if available) to the PCRF. +- A.3. The PCRF reply message contains the result code. + +The steps in (B) show PCC signalling to provision QoS Rules over S9a for EPC routed traffic. + +- B.1. Triggered by the IP-CAN session establishment indication, or triggered by Gateway control session establishment over Gxb\*, the PCRF (non-roaming case) or the V-PCRF (visited access roaming case) initiates Gateway Control and QoS Rule provisioning including QoS Rules and the PDN GW IP address (for trusted S2c access and if this PDN GW IP address has not been provided before), if a Gateway Control Session exists for the same IMSI for WLAN scenario while for the H(e)NB scenario the PCRF (Non-roaming case) or the V-PCRF (visited access roaming case) initiates Gateway Control and QoS Rule provisioning, if Gateway Control Session exists for the same H(e)NB including QoS Rules. +- B.2. The PCRF reply message contains the result code. +- 9. Remaining steps of IP-CAN session establishment procedure as defined in clause 7.2 from step 6 onwards. + +### P.7.2.2 Void + +## P.7.3 IP-CAN Session Termination + +### P.7.3.1 Void + +### P.7.3.2 IP-CAN Session Termination + +![Sequence diagram for IP-CAN Session Termination for either EPC routed or NSWO traffic. The diagram shows interactions between BPCF, V-PCRF (under Roaming Scenarios), H-PCRF, SPR, and TDF. The process is divided into two main phases: 1-IP-CAN Session Termination (steps 1 to 3 in clause 7.3.1 or step 1 to 5 in clause 7.3.2) and 4-IP-CAN Session Termination (from step 4 in clause 7.3.1 or from step 6 in clause 7.3.2).](5fe00c307df5f699351f7215555bc6a6_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BPCF + participant V-PCRF as V-PCRF (Roaming Scenarios) + participant H-PCRF + participant SPR + participant TDF + + Note over BPCF, TDF: 1-IP-CAN Session Termination steps 1 to 3 in clause 7.3.1 or step 1 to 5 in clause 7.3.2 + V-PCRF->>BPCF: 2. PCRF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination Or Gateway Control and QoS Rules provisioning + BPCF-->>V-PCRF: 3. PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination ACK Or Gateway Control and QoS Rule Provisioning ACK + + Note over BPCF, TDF: 4-IP-CAN Session Termination (from step 4) in clause 7.3.1 or from step 6 in clause 7.3.2 + V-PCRF->>H-PCRF: 5. Indication of IP-CAN Session Termination + H-PCRF-->>V-PCRF: 6. Indication of IP-CAN Session Termination ACK + V-PCRF->>TDF: 7. TDF Session Termination + TDF-->>V-PCRF: 8. TDF Session Termination ACK + +``` + +Sequence diagram for IP-CAN Session Termination for either EPC routed or NSWO traffic. The diagram shows interactions between BPCF, V-PCRF (under Roaming Scenarios), H-PCRF, SPR, and TDF. The process is divided into two main phases: 1-IP-CAN Session Termination (steps 1 to 3 in clause 7.3.1 or step 1 to 5 in clause 7.3.2) and 4-IP-CAN Session Termination (from step 4 in clause 7.3.1 or from step 6 in clause 7.3.2). + +Figure P.7.3.2: IP-CAN Session Termination for either EPC routed or NSWO traffic + +This procedure is applicable for both WLAN and H(e)NB scenario. + +For WLAN scenarios, this procedure is performed when the PCRF knows that the 3GPP UE released a PDN connection and request the BPCF to remove the PCC/QoS Rules associated to the terminated IP-CAN session or when the last PDN connection for that 3GPP UE is released to terminate the Gateway Control Session over S9a. + +For H(e)NB scenarios, this procedure is performed when the PCRF knows that the last 3GPP UE connecting to the H(e)NB released its last PDN connection and request the BPCF to release the Gateway Control session over S9a or + +when a PDN connection is released to request the BPCF to remove the QoS Rules associated with the terminated IP-CAN session. + +This procedure is the same as described in clauses 7.3.1 and 7.3.2, with the new steps described below: + +1. The PCEF initiates the IP-CAN session termination over Gx, as defined in the clauses 7.3.1 and 7.3.2. +2. This step is triggered by the IP-CAN session termination indication in step 3 in clauses 7.3.1 and 7.3.2, the PCRF (non-roaming case) or the H-PCRF (roaming case) initiates Gateway Control Session Termination over S9a with the BPCF if this is the last IP-CAN session corresponding to this Gateway Control Session over S9a, or initiates Gateway Control and QoS Rule Provisioning over S9a to remove QoS Rules for the purpose to release resources in the Fixed Broadband Access. + +NOTE: For case 2b, the description of the Gateway Control Session Termination procedure over Gxb\* when triggered by the ePDG (BBERF) is described in clause P.7.5.2 and the description of the Gateway Control and QoS Rule request procedure when triggered by the ePDG (BBERF) is described in clause P.7.5.3. + +For case 2a, the description of the Gateway Control Session Termination procedure over Gxb\* when triggered by the PCRF is described in clause P.7.5.4. + +3. The BPCF reply message contains the result code. +4. Remaining steps of IP-CAN session termination as described in clause 7.3 from step 4 onwards, with the additions that in case 2a and roaming scenario, triggered by step 2, the vPCRF initiates the Gateway control session termination with the ePDG over Gxb\* if the Gateway control session over S9a bound to that IMSI has been terminated. + +Steps 5, 6, 7 and 8 are triggered when the BBF access is aware that the UE is detached from BBF access. These steps are not necessarily performed at termination of the IP-CAN session but may occur at a later time. + +5. If the BBF access network is aware of the UE is detached from the BBF access network, the BPCF Initiates IP-CAN session termination to the PCRF (non-roaming) and the V-PCRF (for roaming cases). Triggered by the IP-CAN session termination over S9a, the V-PCRF triggers the IP-CAN session termination over S9. +6. The PCRF reply message contains the result code for the IP-CAN session terminated. +7. Triggered by step 6, the PCRF (for non-roaming case) and the V-PCRF (for roaming cases) terminates the TDF session, if exists for the UE local IP address as described in the clause 7.3. +8. The TDF replies as described in the clause 7.3. + +## P.7.4 IP-CAN Session Modification + +Both the PCRF-initiated IP-CAN Session Modification Procedure and the PCEF-initiated IP-CAN Session Modification Procedures as described in clause 7.4 are applicable for a 3GPP UE that attaches via a Fixed Broadband Access. + +### P.7.4.1 PCEF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification + +![Sequence diagram for PCEF-initiated IP-CAN Session Modification showing interactions between BPCF, V-PCRF, H-PCRF, SPR, and OCS.](3c64d84c629f2c29e5f853c708314c47_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BPCF + participant V_PCRF as V-PCRF + participant H_PCRF as H-PCRF + participant SPR + participant OCS + + Note over BPCF, OCS: IP-CAN Session Modification steps 3 to 5 in clause 7.4.1 + V_PCRF->>BPCF: 1. Gateway Control and QoS Rule Provisioning + BPCF->>V_PCRF: 2. Gateway Control and QoS Rule Provisioning ACK + Note over BPCF, OCS: IP-CAN Session Modification steps 6 to 20 in clause 7.4.1 + +``` + +The diagram illustrates the PCEF-initiated IP-CAN Session Modification procedure. It involves five entities: BPCF, V-PCRF (within Roaming Scenarios), H-PCRF, SPR, and OCS. The process starts with IP-CAN Session Modification steps 3 to 5 as defined in clause 7.4.1. Then, a 'Gateway Control and QoS Rule Provisioning' message (step 1) is sent from the V-PCRF to the BPCF. The BPCF responds with a 'Gateway Control and QoS Rule Provisioning ACK' (step 2) back to the V-PCRF. Finally, the procedure continues with IP-CAN Session Modification steps 6 to 20 as defined in clause 7.4.1. + +Sequence diagram for PCEF-initiated IP-CAN Session Modification showing interactions between BPCF, V-PCRF, H-PCRF, SPR, and OCS. + +**Figure P.7.4.1: PCEF-initiated IP-CAN Session Modification** + +This procedure is applicable for WLAN and H(e)NB scenario. This procedure is performed when the UE Local IP address, H(e)NB Local IP address or the UDP port number is changed and/or when a request for PCC Rules is received from the PCEF. This procedure is the same as described in clause 7.4.1 with the additions described below: + +Step 3 in case 1, the PCEF provides the updated UE local IP address, the updated H(e)NB IP address and/or UDP port number to the PCRF. + +1. The PCRF (non-roaming case) initiates Gateway Control and QoS Rule Provisioning with the BPCF to provide either: + - a. QoS-Rule with the QoS control information (i.e. QCI, GBR, MBR, ARP) and SDF information; and/or + - b. UE local IP address and/or the UDP port number, the H(e)NB Local IP address may be provided in the request; + - c. Information (e.g. Session ID) that allows the BPCF to associate the request with the existing Gateway Control Session on S9a so that the fixed access can identify the traffic plane resources that are affected. + +The H-PCRF (home routed roaming case) provisions for WLAN case the UE local IP address and UDP port number (if available) and for H(e)NB case the H(e)NB local IP address and UDP port number (if available) to the V-PCRF to trigger the provisioning over S9a. + +2. The BPCF translates the QoS rule as received of the S9a interface (i.e. SDF information, QCI, GBR, MBR and ARP) into access specific QoS parameters applicable in the BBF domain (the details of the mapping from 3GPP QoS parameters on S9a to QoS parameters applicable in the BBF domain is out of 3GPP scope). The BPCF may respond with a "counter-offer" in form of acceptable bandwidth and/or QoS for one or more SDFs if it cannot provide the requested QoS from the PCRF. The BPCF provides the acceptable QoS in the BBF access using 3GPP QoS parameters (i.e. QCI, GBR, MBR and ARP) and SDF information on S9a interface in the reply if the QoS validation for admission control fails. The PCRF may make a new policy decision, e.g. decide to modify or remove the affected QoS rules. + +NOTE: For H(e)NB PMIP scenario, Gateway Control and QoS Rule Provisioning to the BBERF may be performed as described in clause 7.4.1. + +### P.7.4.2 PCRF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification + +This procedure is initiated by the PCRF (non-roaming) or by the V-PCRF (roaming). The (V-)PCRF requests the BPCF to perform admission control. Steps (A) show how to provision QoS Rules for the UE IP address(es) allocated by EPC + +and received over Gx and Steps (B) show how to provision PCC Rules to request admission control for the IP-CAN session for the UE local IP address received over S9a. Note that the TDF that is selected for EPC routed and NSWO traffic may or may not be the same TDF. + +![Sequence diagram Figure P.7.4.2: PCRF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification](4d9c52be1198628362ec7871f6e0f530_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BPCF + participant V_PCRF as V-PCRF + participant H_PCRF as H-PCRF + participant TDF + participant AF + + Note over V_PCRF, H_PCRF: Roaming Scenarios + + TDF-->>V_PCRF: 1b. Service Traffic Detection + AF-->>H_PCRF: 1a. Application/Service Info + H_PCRF-->>AF: 2a. Ack + Note over H_PCRF: 3 Policy Decision + H_PCRF-->>TDF: 4. Acknowledge and Modified ADC Rules + + rect rgb(255, 255, 255) + Note right of BPCF: (A) + V_PCRF->>BPCF: A.1. Gateway Control and QoS Rule Provisioning + BPCF->>V_PCRF: A.2. Gateway Control and QoS Rule Provisioning ACK + Note over BPCF, AF: A.3. PCRF-Init IP-CAN Session Modification steps 5 to 12 clause 7.4.2 + end + + rect rgb(255, 255, 255) + Note right of BPCF: (B) + H_PCRF->>V_PCRF: B.1. Policy Rule Provisioning + V_PCRF->>H_PCRF: B.2. Policy Rule Provisioning ACK + TDF->>AF: B.3. Notification + AF->>TDF: B.4. Notification ACK + end + +``` + +Sequence diagram Figure P.7.4.2: PCRF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification + +**Figure P.7.4.2: PCRF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification** + +This procedure is applicable for WLAN and H(e)NB scenario. This procedure is the same as described in clause 7.4.2 with the additions described below: + +- 1a, 2a, 1b. The AF or the TDF provides/revokes service information to the PCRF and detected event triggers if applicable as described in steps 1a, 2a and 1b in clause 7.4.2. For roaming case and for NS-WLAN offloaded traffic, the TDF provides service information and event triggers detected to the V-PCRF. +- 3. The PCRF for non-roaming cases or the H-PCRF for roaming cases, makes the authorization and policy decision. +- 4. The PCRF acknowledges to the TDF as described in clause 7.4.2. + +A: The steps in (A) show PCC signalling to provision QoS Rules for EPC routed traffic. + +- A.1. Triggered by the step 1, the PCRF (non-roaming case) or the v-PCRF (roaming case) initiates Gateway Control and QoS Rule Provisioning to provide: + +- a. QoS-Rule with the QoS control information (QCI, GBR, MBR, ARP) and SDF information. + - b. Information (e.g. Session ID) that allows the BPCF to associate the request with the existing Gateway Control Session on S9a so that the fixed access can identify the traffic plane resources that are affected. +- A.2. The BPCF translates the QoS rule as received of the S9a interface (i.e. QCI, MBR, GBR and ARP) into access specific QoS parameters applicable in the BBF domain (the details of the mapping from 3GPP QoS parameters on S9a to QoS parameters applicable in the BBF domain is out of 3GPP scope). The BPCF may respond with a "counter-offer" in form of acceptable bandwidth and/or QoS for one or more SDFs if it cannot provide the requested QoS from the PCRF. The BPCF provides the acceptable QoS in the BBF access using 3GPP QoS parameters on S9a interface (i.e. QCI, GBR) in the reply if the QoS validation for admission control fails. The PCRF may make a new policy decision, e.g. decide to modify or remove the affected QoS rules. +- A.3. PCC Rules are installed in the PCEF as described in clause 7.4.2 and AF is notified if subscribed to the notification of the resource allocation request/modification. +- B: The steps in (B) show PCC signalling to provision PCC Rules for NS-WLAN offloaded traffic. +- B.1. Triggered by the step 3, the PCRF (non-roaming case) or the H-PCRF (roaming case) initiates Policy Rule Provisioning towards the BPCF to provide QoS-Rules for the UE local IP address. + - B.2. The BPCF translates the PCC rules as received of the S9a interface (i.e. SDF information, QCI, MBR, GBR and ARP) into access specific QoS parameters applicable in the BBF domain as described in A.2. + - B.3. If the AF requested it, the PCRF notifies the AF (e.g. transmission resources are established/released/lost). + - B.4. The AF acknowledges the notification from the PCRF. + +### P.7.4.3 BPCF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification + +![Sequence diagram for BPCF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification showing two scenarios: (A) PCRF-Initiated and (B) BPCF-triggered.](4dacbe3dedea8f941e6500272dce3539_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the sequence of messages for BPCF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification, divided into two scenarios: (A) PCRF-Initiated and (B) BPCF-triggered. The participants involved are BPCF, V-PCRF (within Roaming Scenarios), H-PCRF, and AF. + +**Scenario (A): PCRF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification** + +- A.1. Gateway Control and QoS Rule Request: BPCF sends a request to H-PCRF. +- A.2. Gateway Control and QoS Rule Request ACK: H-PCRF responds to BPCF. +- A.3. Notification: H-PCRF sends a notification to AF. +- A.4. Notification ACK: AF responds to H-PCRF. +- A.5. PCRF-Init IP-CAN Session Modification step 5 to 14 clause 7.4.2: A dashed box indicates a sequence of steps defined in clause 7.4.2. + +**Scenario (B): BPCF-triggered IP-CAN Session Modification** + +- B.1. BPCF-triggered IP-CAN Session Modification: BPCF sends a request to H-PCRF. +- B.2. BPCF-triggered IP-CAN session modification ACK: H-PCRF responds to BPCF. +- B.3. Notification: H-PCRF sends a notification to AF. +- B.4. Notification ACK: AF responds to H-PCRF. + +Sequence diagram for BPCF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification showing two scenarios: (A) PCRF-Initiated and (B) BPCF-triggered. + +Figure P.7.4.3: BPCF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification + +The trigger for this procedure is that the BPCF has pre-empted some resources and wants to report a QoS rule failure to the PCRF, or when the BBF network cannot sustain the Bandwidth allocated to a particular traffic class/DSCP aggregate. + +This procedure is applicable for both WLAN and H(e)NB scenarios. + +NOTE: Whether additional condition and criteria specific for BBF network and defined by BBF forum are applicable for trigger BPCF-Initiated IP-CAN session modification is out of the scope of 3GPP definition. + +A: The steps in (A) show PCC signalling to report QoS Rule failure to PCRF for the EPC routed traffic. + +- A.1. The BPCF initiates Gateway Control and QoS Rule Request to report QoS Rule failure to PCRF. The request includes a report identifying the QoS Rules that failed and a reason. +- A.2. The PCRF acknowledge the request and may initiate PCRF-initiated IP-CAN session modification. + +Step 5 to 14 is the same as described in clause 7.4.2. + +- A.3. If the AF requested it, the PCRF notifies the AF (e.g. transmission resources are released). +- A.4. The AF acknowledges the notification from the PCRF. +- A.5. The PCRF-initiated IP-CAN session modification as described in clause P.7.4.2 may take place. + +B: The steps in (B) show PCC signalling to report PCC Rule failure to PCRF for NSWO traffic. + +- B.1. The BPCF initiates IP-CAN session modification to report PCC Rule failure to PCRF. +- A.2. The PCRF acknowledges the request. +- A.3. If the AF requested it, the PCRF notifies the AF (e.g. transmission resources are released). +- A.4. The AF acknowledges the notification from the PCRF. + +## P.7.5 Gateway Control Session Procedures + +### P.7.5.1 BBERF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Establishment + +![Sequence diagram for PCRF-triggered Gateway Control Session Establishment for EPC routed traffic. The diagram involves BBERF, BPCF, V-PCRF, and H-PCRF. Step 1: BBERF sends Gateway Control Session Establishment to H-PCRF. Step 2: H-PCRF sends PCRF-triggered Gateway Control Session Establishment to BPCF. Step 3: BPCF sends BPCF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Establishment to H-PCRF. Step 4: H-PCRF sends BPCF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Establishment ACK to BPCF. Step 5: BPCF sends Gateway Control Session Establishment ACK to BBERF.](ae6a6693b862ab33ece3b16176efc61c_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BBERF + participant BPCF + box gray PCRF + participant V-PCRF + participant H-PCRF + end + Note over BBERF, H-PCRF: Gateway Control Session Establishment Procedure step 1 clause 7.7.1.1-1 + BBERF->>H-PCRF: 1. Gateway Control Session Establishment + H-PCRF-->>BPCF: 2. PCRF-triggered Gateway Control Session Establishment + BPCF->>H-PCRF: 3. BPCF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Establishment + H-PCRF->>BPCF: 4. BPCF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Establishment ACK + BPCF-->>BBERF: 5. Gateway Control Session Establishment ACK + +``` + +Sequence diagram for PCRF-triggered Gateway Control Session Establishment for EPC routed traffic. The diagram involves BBERF, BPCF, V-PCRF, and H-PCRF. Step 1: BBERF sends Gateway Control Session Establishment to H-PCRF. Step 2: H-PCRF sends PCRF-triggered Gateway Control Session Establishment to BPCF. Step 3: BPCF sends BPCF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Establishment to H-PCRF. Step 4: H-PCRF sends BPCF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Establishment ACK to BPCF. Step 5: BPCF sends Gateway Control Session Establishment ACK to BBERF. + +**Figure P.7.5.1: PCRF-triggered Gateway Control Session Establishment for EPC routed traffic** + +This procedure is applicable for both WLAN and H(e)NB PMIP. This procedure is the same as described in clause 7.7.1.1 with the additions described below: + +1. For the WLAN case, the ePDG (BBERF) initiates a Gateway Control Session Establishment as defined in clause 7.7.1 with the PCRF (for non-roaming) and with the V-PCRF (for home routed and visited access roaming cases) including the IMSI, APN (if available), the UE Local IP address, the UDP port number if available, while for H(e)NB case the SGW (BBERF) initiates a Gateway Control Session Establishment as defined in clause 7.7.1 with the PCRF (for non-roaming) and with V-PCRF (for home routed and visited access roaming case) including the H(e)NB local IP address and the UDP port number (if available) in the Fixed Broadband Access at which the H(e)NB is connected to. +2. For WLAN case, the PCRF (non-roaming case) or the V-PCRF (home routed and visited access roaming cases) triggers Gateway Control Session establishment with the BPCF over S9a, if this is the first Gateway Control Session for the same IMSI, the PCRF includes in the request message to BPCF the IMSI, the UE local IP address and the UDP port number (if available) and the ePDG IP address (for S2b-PMIP and untrusted S2c access). + +For the H(e)NB case, the PCRF (non-roaming case) or the V-PCRF (home routed and visited access roaming cases) triggers Gateway Control Session establishment with the BPCF over S9a, if this is the first Gateway Control Session for the same H(e)NB, the PCRF includes in the request message to BPCF the IMSI, the H(e)NB IP address and the UDP port number (if available). + +3. The BPCF Initiates the Gateway Control session establishment to the PCRF (for non-roaming case), to the V-PCRF (for visited access and home routed roaming case) including in the request message the IMSI. Triggered by the BPCF-initiated Gateway Control Session establishment over S9a the V-PCRF sends the Gateway Control Session Establishment over S9. +4. The PCRF in non-roaming and the V-PCRF for roaming cases reply message contains the result code. +5. For H(e)NB case, the PCRF provisions QoS Rules to the BBERF, while for the WLAN case, the PCRF sends a result code in the reply message. + +No QoS Rules and no event triggers are provided to the BBERF for WLAN scenarios. + +## P.7.5.2 GW (BBERF)-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination + +![Sequence diagram for Gateway Control Session Termination over S9a. The diagram shows five steps: 1. BBERF-triggered Gateway Control Session Termination (BBERF to V-PCRF), 2. BBERF-triggered Gateway Control Session Termination ACK (V-PCRF to BBERF), 3. PCRF-triggered Gateway Control Session Termination (H-PCRF to V-PCRF), 4. BPCF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination (BPCF to V-PCRF), 5. BPCF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination ACK (V-PCRF to BPCF). The V-PCRF is highlighted in a grey box.](eb5c5bacf91c6062b2d5ba64a50b1a43_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BBERF + participant BPCF + participant V-PCRF + participant H-PCRF + participant GW(PCEF) + + rect rgb(230, 230, 230) + Note over V-PCRF: V-PCRF + end + + Note over BBERF, GW(PCEF): GW-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination Procedure step 1 clause 7.7.2.1 + + BBERF->>V-PCRF: 1. BBERF-triggered Gateway Control Session Termination + V-PCRF-->>BBERF: 2. BBERF-triggered Gateway Control Session Termination ACK + H-PCRF->>V-PCRF: 3. PCRF-triggered Gateway Control Session Termination + BPCF->>V-PCRF: 4. BPCF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination + V-PCRF-->>BPCF: 5. BPCF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination ACK + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Gateway Control Session Termination over S9a. The diagram shows five steps: 1. BBERF-triggered Gateway Control Session Termination (BBERF to V-PCRF), 2. BBERF-triggered Gateway Control Session Termination ACK (V-PCRF to BBERF), 3. PCRF-triggered Gateway Control Session Termination (H-PCRF to V-PCRF), 4. BPCF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination (BPCF to V-PCRF), 5. BPCF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination ACK (V-PCRF to BPCF). The V-PCRF is highlighted in a grey box. + +**Figure P.7.5.2: Gateway Control Session Termination over S9a** + +This procedure is applicable for both WLAN and H(e)NB scenarios. This procedure is the same as described in clause 7.7.2.1 with the additions described below: + +1. For WLAN scenarios, the ePDG (BBERF) initiates a Gateway Control Session Termination with the PCRF (for non-roaming) and with the V-PCRF (for home routed and visited access roaming cases). + +For H(e)NB scenarios, the SGW (BBERF) initiates a Gateway Control Session Termination as defined with the PCRF (for non-roaming) and with the V-PCRF (for home routed and visited access roaming cases). + +2. The PCRF sends a response code. +3. The PCRF (non-roaming case) or the V-PCRF (roaming case) initiates a Gateway Control Session Termination over S9a with the BPCF to terminate the Gateway Control Session with the BPCF if this is the last Gateway Control Session bound to the Gateway Control session over S9a. +4. The BPCF terminates the Gateway Control Session over S9a to the PCRF. In the roaming scenario, V-PCRF (for both home routed and visited access) sends a Gateway Control Session Termination over S9 to the PCRF. +5. The PCRF sends a response code. + +### P.7.5.3 Gateway Control and QoS Rule Request from ePDG/Serving GW + +![Sequence diagram for Gateway Control and QoS Rule Request from ePDG/Serving GW. The diagram shows interactions between BBERF, BPCF, V-PCRF, H-PCRF, and GW(PCEF). A request is sent from BBERF to V-PCRF. V-PCRF then sends a provision to BPCF, which responds with an ACK. The diagram is divided into two main sections: 'Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request step 1 to 3 clause 7.7.3.1' and 'Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request steps 4 to 9 clause 7.7.3.1'.](fa849f3297b46a8d257e718ba0720135_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BBERF + participant BPCF + participant V-PCRF + participant H-PCRF + participant GW(PCEF) + + Note over BBERF, V-PCRF: Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request step 1 to 3 clause 7.7.3.1 + BBERF->>V-PCRF: Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request + Note over BPCF, V-PCRF: 1. Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision + V-PCRF->>BPCF: Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision + Note over BPCF, V-PCRF: 2. Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision ACK + BPCF->>V-PCRF: Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision ACK + + Note over BBERF, V-PCRF: Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request steps 4 to 9 clause 7.7.3.1 + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Gateway Control and QoS Rule Request from ePDG/Serving GW. The diagram shows interactions between BBERF, BPCF, V-PCRF, H-PCRF, and GW(PCEF). A request is sent from BBERF to V-PCRF. V-PCRF then sends a provision to BPCF, which responds with an ACK. The diagram is divided into two main sections: 'Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request step 1 to 3 clause 7.7.3.1' and 'Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request steps 4 to 9 clause 7.7.3.1'. + +**Figure P.7.5.3: Gateway Control and QoS Rule Request for EPC Routed Traffic** + +This procedure is applicable for both WLAN and H(e)NB PMIP. This procedure is the same as described in clause 7.7.3.1 with the exceptions described below: + +In case 2b and case 2a for WLAN scenario, the ePDG (BBERF) may initiate a Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request Procedure to provide the updated UE local IP address and the UDP port number, if available, while for H(e)NB scenario the SGW (BBERF) may initiate a Gateway Control and QoS Rule Procedure to provide the updated H(e)NB local IP address and the UDP port number (if available) in the Fixed Broadband Access at which the H(e)NB is connected to. + +1. For the WLAN scenario, triggered by the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Request Procedure in step 2 of clause 7.7.3.1, the PCRF (non-roaming case) or the v-PCRF (roaming case) initiates Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provision Procedure. The updated UE local IP address and/or the UDP port number are provided in the procedure if available, while for H(e)NB scenario the PCRF (non-roaming) or the H-PCRF (for visited access and home routed) may initiate a Gateway Control and QoS Rule Procedure to provide the updated H(e)NB local IP address and the UDP port number (if available) in the Fixed Broadband Access at which the H(e)NB is connected to. + +For H(e)NB PMIP scenario, the PCRF may provide: + +- a. QoS-Rule with the QoS control information (i.e. QCI, GBR, MBR, ARP) and SDF information. + +- b. Information (e.g. Session ID) that allows the BPCF to associate the request with the existing Gateway Control Session on S9a so that the fixed access can identify the traffic plane resources that are affected. +2. The BPCF replies with a response code, when QoS Rules were provided by the PCRF, the BPCF translates the QoS rule as received of the S9a interface into access specific QoS parameters applicable in the BBF domain . The BPCF may respond with a "counter-offer" in form of acceptable bandwidth and/or QoS for one or more SDFs if it cannot provide the requested QoS from the PCRF. The BPCF provides the acceptable QoS in the BBF access using 3GPP QoS parameters on S9a interface (i.e. QCI, GBR) in the reply if the QoS validation for admission control fails. The PCRF may make a new policy decision, e.g. decide to modify or remove the affected QoS rules. + +NOTE: For H(e)NB PMIP scenario, Gateway Control and QoS Rule Provisioning to the BBERF may be performed as described in clause 7.4.1. + +### P.7.5.4 PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination + +![Sequence diagram for PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination. The diagram shows five entities: BBERF, BPCF, V-PCRF (highlighted in a grey box), H-PCRF, and GW(PCEF). A box at the top indicates the procedure is 'PCRF-init.Gateway control session termination procedure in subclause 7.7.2.2 step 1'. The sequence of messages is: 1. PCRF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination (from V-PCRF to BPCF); 2. PCRF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination ACK (from BPCF to V-PCRF); 3. PCRF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination (from H-PCRF to BBERF); 4. PCRF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination ACK (from BBERF to H-PCRF).](2f903f194dbf70f3aa6c281a6f96db03_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination. The diagram shows five entities: BBERF, BPCF, V-PCRF (highlighted in a grey box), H-PCRF, and GW(PCEF). A box at the top indicates the procedure is 'PCRF-init.Gateway control session termination procedure in subclause 7.7.2.2 step 1'. The sequence of messages is: 1. PCRF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination (from V-PCRF to BPCF); 2. PCRF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination ACK (from BPCF to V-PCRF); 3. PCRF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination (from H-PCRF to BBERF); 4. PCRF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination ACK (from BBERF to H-PCRF). + +**Figure P.7.5.4: PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination** + +This procedure is applicable for WLAN scenario. This procedure is the same as described in clause 7.7.2.2 steps 1 with the additions described below: + +1. For the non-roaming and roaming home routed cases, triggered by step 1 in clause 7.7.2.2, the (h)PCRF sends a PCRF-initiated Gateway Control Session termination procedure with BPCF over S9a. For the roaming LBO case, triggered by step 1 in clause 7.7.2.2, the (v)PCRF sends a PCRF-Initiated Gateway control session termination procedure with BPCF over S9a. +2. The BPCF sends PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination acknowledgement. +3. Triggered by step 1 in clause 7.7.2.2, the (h)PCRF (for non-roaming case and home routed roaming case) sends a PCRF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination over Gxb\* with the ePDG (BBERF). Triggered by the Gateway Control Session Termination over S9a and S9 with the BPCF, the V-PCRF (roaming LBO case) sends a PCRF-initiated Gateway Control Session Termination over Gxb\* with the ePDG (BBERF). +4. The ePDG (BBERF) sends a PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination acknowledgement. + +## P.7.6 PCRF Discovery and Selection + +### P.7.6.1 PCRF Discovery and Selection by BPCF + +When the BPCF knows that a 3GPP UE attached via a Fixed Broadband access network and learns the IMSI and the NSWO-APN, the BPCF initiates the IP-CAN session establishment for NSWO offloaded traffic, the BPCF finds the PCRF using the DRA as described in clause 7.6.1. + +When the BPCF is requested to establish a Gateway Control Session over S9a by PCRF, the BPCF uses the PCRF address provided in the request to establish the Gateway Control Session over S9a. + +In roaming scenarios, the selected V-PCRF shall belong to the same V-PLMN selected during the 3GPP access authentication procedure. The BPCF uses the VPLMN id to find the V-DRA in the VPLMN. The V-PCRF finds the DRA in the HPLMN based on the IMSI and the APN if available as described in clause 7.6.1. + +### P.7.6.2 PCRF Discovery and Selection by AF/TDF unsolicited application reporting for NS-WLAN offloaded traffic + +For PCRF discovery and selection by AF/TDF unsolicited application reporting for NS-WLAN offloaded traffic the procedure described in clause 7.6.1 applies. + +### P.7.6.3 PCRF Discovery and Selection by HNB GW + +When the DRA receives a request for a certain S15 Session establishment from the HNB GW, the DRA selects a suitable PCRF for the S15 Session based on HNB local IP address. When the S15 Session terminates, the DRA shall remove the information about the S15 Session. + +## P.7.7 BPCF Discovery and Selection + +For PCRF-triggered Gateway Control Session establishment, the PCRF (for non-roaming case) and the V-PCRF (for home routed and visited access roaming cases) is configured with IP address range mappings { (IPx..IPy) -> BBF network entry point}. The PCRF (for non-roaming) and the V-PCRF (for roaming cases) selects the correct BBF network entry point based on UE Local IP address for WLAN access and based on H(e)NB Local IP address received from the PCEF/BBERF for H(e)NB case. The implementation of a BBF network entry point is out-of-scope for 3GPP e.g. be a BPCF or a DRA. The H-PCRF sends the H(e)NB/UE local IP address to the V-PCRF over the S9 interface. + +For WLAN and H(e)NB in Home Routed roaming case, for PCRF-triggered Gateway Control Session establishment, H-PCRF finds V-DRA according to the VPLMN ID if received via Gx session, and then discovers V-PCRF by V-DRA. V-PCRF selects the correct BBF network entry point with the given UE local IP address and the H(e)NB Local IP address in the BBF access network at which the H(e)NB is connected to respectively. + +NOTE: Mobility procedures that implies selection of a new BPCF are not supported in this Release. + +## P.7.8 TDF Discovery and Selection for NS-WLAN offloaded traffic + +For the solicited application reporting, the TDF address may be preconfigured in the PCRF. Alternatively, the PCRF may receive the TDF address as a part of IP-CAN session signalling for NS-WLAN offloaded traffic over S9a. + +NOTE: It is assumed that UL and DL traffic are routed via the same TDF. + +## P.8 3GPP HNB Procedures – CS Support + +### P.8.1 S9a CS Session Establishment + +![Sequence diagram for S9a CS Session Establishment showing interactions between BPCF, HNB GW, and (V-)PCRF.](8db92c2d49f464fdd3e01aad57bfda53_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BPCF + participant HNB GW + participant VPCRF as (V-)PCRF + HNB GW->>VPCRF: 1. S15 session establishment, as defined in step 4-5, clause 9.4.1, TS 23.139. + VPCRF<->BPCF: 2. Gateway Control Session Establishment step (A) in clause P.7.2.1 + +``` + +The diagram illustrates the S9a CS Session Establishment procedure involving three entities: BPCF, HNB GW, and (V-)PCRF. Step 1 shows a session establishment request from HNB GW to (V-)PCRF. Step 2 shows a bidirectional Gateway Control Session Establishment interaction between (V-)PCRF and BPCF. + +Sequence diagram for S9a CS Session Establishment showing interactions between BPCF, HNB GW, and (V-)PCRF. + +**Figure P.8.1-1: S9a CS Session Establishment** + +This procedure is applicable to HNB for QoS enforcement for CS services. + +- 1) S15 session establishment procedure is performed, which can be referred to step 4-5, clause 9.4.1, TS 23.139 [29]. +- 2) The (v-)PCRF initiates Gateway Control Session Establishment procedure with BPCF. The description of this step is the same as steps (A) in clause P.7.2.1. + +## P.8.2 PCRF initiated S9a CS Session Modification + +![Sequence diagram for PCRF initiated S9a CS Session Modification](c614b03eba4d8f7e0f6ffec64ecb68b0_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant BPCF + participant HNB GW + participant V_PCRF as (V-)PCRF + Note right of HNB GW: 1. S15 session modification is initiated, as defined in TS 23.139, clause 9.4.2, step 3. + Note over BPCF, V_PCRF: 2. PCRF initiates the Gateway Control Session and QoS Rule provisioning procedure, as defined in step A.1 to A.2 in clause P.7.4.2 + Note right of BPCF: 3. Steps 5 to 7 according to TS 23.139, Figure 9.4.2-1 +``` + +The diagram is a sequence diagram illustrating the PCRF initiated S9a CS Session Modification procedure. It features three lifelines: BPCF, HNB GW, and (V-)PCRF. The sequence of events is as follows: 1. The HNB GW sends an S15 session modification message to the (V-)PCRF. 2. The (V-)PCRF initiates the Gateway Control Session and QoS Rule provisioning procedure to the BPCF. 3. The procedure continues with steps 5 to 7 as defined in TS 23.139, Figure 9.4.2-1. + +Sequence diagram for PCRF initiated S9a CS Session Modification + +**Figure P.8.2-1: PCRF initiated S9a CS Session Modification** + +This procedure is performed when the first UE or a subsequent UE connected to a HNB requesting a CS call. + +- 1) The HNB GW sends the S15 session modification message to the PCRF, which can be referred to TS 23.139 [29], clause 9.4.2, step3. +- 2) The PCRF (V-PCRF) initiates the Gateway Control and QoS Rules Provisioning procedure to the BPCF as described in step from A.1 to A.2 in clause P.7.4.2. +- 3) The remaining steps are the same as for TS 23.139 [29], clause 9.4.2, steps 5-7. + +## P.8.2A BPCF initiated S9a CS Session Modification + +![Sequence diagram for BPCF initiated S9a CS Session Modification](28f9598c1cd4a12dcf83455c95ea4fcd_img.jpg) + +A sequence diagram showing the interaction between BPCF, HNB GW, and (V-)PCRF. The BPCF sends a 'Gateway Control Session and QoS Rule Request Procedure' to the (V-)PCRF. The (V-)PCRF then sends a 'PCRF initiated S15 session modification, as defined in TS 23.139' to the HNB GW. + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant BPCF + participant HNB GW + participant V_PCRF as (V-)PCRF + Note right of V_PCRF: 1. Gateway Control Session and QoS Rule Request Procedure + Note right of HNB GW: 2. PCRF initiated S15 session modification, as defined in TS 23.139 +``` + +Sequence diagram for BPCF initiated S9a CS Session Modification + +**Figure P.8.2A-1: BPCF initiated S9a CS Session Modification** + +- 1) This step shows PCC signalling to report QoS Rule failure to (v)PCRF for the CS traffic. + +NOTE: Whether additional condition and criteria specific for BBF network and defined by BBF forum are applicable for trigger BPCF-Initiated S9a CS Session Modification is out of the scope of 3GPP definition. + +The BPCF initiates Gateway Control and QoS Rule Request to report QoS Rule failure to (v)PCRF. The request includes a report identifying the QoS Rules that failed and a reason. The (v)PCRF acknowledges the request. + +- 2) The (v)PCRF sends the S15 session modification request message to the HNB GW. The (v)PCRF includes the report identifying the QoS Rules that failed and a reason derived from the BPCF. The BPCF response the S15 session modification to the (v)PCRF, which is according to TS 23.139 [29]. + +## P.8.3 S9a CS Session Termination + +![Sequence diagram for S9a CS Session Termination](b0b96fc2fa2f3dab5ec2f28e4276255b_img.jpg) + +A sequence diagram showing the interaction between BPCF, HNB GW, and (V-)PCRF. The HNB GW sends an 'S15 Session Termination procedure, as defined in TS 23.139, clause 9.4.3, step 2' to the (V-)PCRF. The (V-)PCRF then initiates a 'PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination steps 2 to 3 in clause P.7.3.2' with the BPCF. + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant BPCF + participant HNB GW + participant V_PCRF as (V-)PCRF + Note right of HNB GW: 1. S15 Session Termination procedure, as defined in TS 23.139, clause 9.4.3, step 2 + Note right of V_PCRF: 2. PCRF-Initiated Gateway Control Session Termination steps 2 to 3 in clause P.7.3.2 +``` + +Sequence diagram for S9a CS Session Termination + +**Figure P.8.3-1: S9a CS Session Termination** + +- 1) The HNB GW sends a S15 session termination request to the to (v-)PCRF and then the (v-)PCRF acknowledges the request. This can be referred to TS 23.139 [29], clause 9.4.3, step 2. +- 2) The PCRF (V-PCRF) initiated the GW control session termination as defined in steps 2 and 3 in clause P.7.3.2. + +## Annex Q (informative): How to achieve Usage Monitoring via the OCS + +An alternative to providing the usage monitoring feature described in this technical specification is to re-use the capabilities defined in 3GPP Release 11 for implementation of Policy Control based on Subscriber Spending Limits when online charging is also performed. + +There are two ways defined in this Annex to achieve usage monitoring via OCS: + +If PCC/ADC rules that are subject to usage monitoring share the same charging key, the same measurement methods then the Usage Reports over Gy are used for both charging and usage monitoring, and in addition: + +- Policy Counter Status values are associated with the quota allocated with Charging Keys are configured in the OCS. Policy Counter Status (INQUOTA, OUTQUOTA) changes trigger notifications over Sy. +- The PCRF is configured with operator policies that associate the policy counter status to a policy decision e.g. block or allow a service to a QoS. + +If PCC/ADC rules that are subject to usage monitoring have different charging keys and/or different measurement methods then to achieve a common usage report over Gy then: + +- A common Charging Key is used for all services that are subject to usage monitoring. The charging control information of the PCC/ADC rules includes that online charging applies, the common charging key for the service and service level reporting is activated. In addition, the measurement method is to be set to time/volume. +- Policy Counter Status values associated with the quota allocated with Service identifier is configured in the OCS. Policy Counter Status (INQUOTA, OUTQUOTA) changes trigger notifications over Sy. +- The PCRF is configured with operator policies that associate the policy counter status to a policy decision e.g. block or allow a service to a QoS. + +![Diagram showing the deployment for usage monitoring via the Online Charging System (OCS). The PCRF is connected to the PCEF/TDF via the Gx, Sd interface. The PCRF is also connected to the OCS via the Sy interface. The PCEF/TDF is connected to the OCS via the Gy, Gyn interface.](07a8dab6afb9f88d7e6ee8a283b53094_img.jpg) + +``` +graph TD; PCRF[PCRF] ---|Gx, Sd| PCEF_TDF[PCEF/TDF]; PCRF ---|Sy| OCS[OCS]; PCEF_TDF ---|Gy, Gyn| OCS; +``` + +Diagram showing the deployment for usage monitoring via the Online Charging System (OCS). The PCRF is connected to the PCEF/TDF via the Gx, Sd interface. The PCRF is also connected to the OCS via the Sy interface. The PCEF/TDF is connected to the OCS via the Gy, Gyn interface. + +Figure Q.1-1: Deployment for Usage Monitoring via Online Charging System + +--- + +## Annex R (informative): Disabling/re-enabling Usage Monitoring for a PCC/ADC rule + +If usage monitoring for a PCC/ADC rule (belonging to a usage monitoring group) needs to be disabled, one of the two ways below can be chosen to realize this feature: + +- The PCRF generates a new PCC/ADC rule with the same information (apart from the PCC/ADC Rule identifier) as the existing PCC/ADC rule used to control the same traffic but without the monitoring key. The PCRF provides the new PCC/ADC rule to the PCEF/TDF and removes the existing PCC/ADC rule. + +NOTE 1: It is assumed that the activation of the new PCC/ADC rule takes place at the same time as the removal of the existing PCC/ADC rule and that no other actions are triggered (e.g. with respect to charging and bearer management) beside the ones related to the disabling of usage monitoring. + +- The operator selects a specific monitoring key value to be used for all PCC/ADC rules for which usage monitoring is disabled. The PCRF modifies the monitoring key of the corresponding PCC/ADC rule to this specific value. Following the PCRF instruction, the PCEF or TDF updates the monitoring key in the modified PCC/ADC rule and collects the usage information for the specific monitoring key value. The PCEF/TDF usage reports would still be received by the PCRF but could be ignored. + +NOTE 2: The operator should configure the usage threshold to a sufficiently high value so that frequent usage reports are avoided. + +If usage monitoring needs to be re-enabled for a PCC/ADC rule (i.e. usage monitoring has been disabled for this PCC/ADC rule before), one of the two ways below can be chosen to realize this feature: + +- The PCRF generates a new PCC/ADC rule with the same information (apart from the PCC/ADC Rule identifier) as the existing PCC/ADC rule used to control the same traffic and adds the required monitoring key. The PCRF provides the new PCC/ADC rule to the PCEF/TDF and removes the existing PCC/ADC rule without monitoring key. The PCEF/TDF executes the operations in the same way it is described above in Note 1. +- The PCRF modifies the monitoring key of the corresponding PCC/ADC rule to the value of the required usage monitoring group (e.g. back to its original value). + +--- + +## Annex S (normative): Fixed Broadband Access + +### S.1 General + +This annex specifies the enhancement to PCC framework for supporting policy and charging control in the fixed broadband access network in the convergent scenario where a single operator is deploying both the fixed broadband access network and the Evolved Packet Core (EPC). + +The scope of this Annex is to define requirements for the convergent scenario where the PCRF controls directly the network element(s) in the fixed broadband access without the mediation of a different policy server, such as the BPCF defined in Annex P. + +Policy and charging control is provided for both Non-seamless WLAN offload traffic from a 3GPP UE and fixed devices. + +The work in this annex takes the fixed broadband accesses as specified by BroadBand Forum in TR-300 [37] as a reference. + +NOTE 1: This does not preclude the applicability of the solutions described in this Annex to fixed broadband accesses not defined by Broadband Forum. + +This annex is a realization of the main specification body for the Fixed Broadband Access IP-CAN. It describes only the exceptions and additions in respect to the main specification body, therefore, if not explicitly mentioned, the main specification body is applicable. + +NOTE 2: Support for MPS Services and IMS Emergency is not specified in this Release. + +--- + +### S.2 Definitions + +The definitions in the following are relevant for this annex only. + +**UE local IP address:** Defined as either the public IP address assigned to the UE by the Broadband Forum domain in the no-NAT case, or the public IP address assigned by the Broadband Forum domain to the NATed RG. + +**IP-CAN session:** For fixed broadband access, the IP-CAN session can also be identified primarily by an IP address(es). The term UE corresponds to the device that access the services provided by the network (i.e. either RG, or 3GPP UE or fixed end-device), the PDN identifies the IP network where the device gets IP connectivity and the UE identity information may be the IMSI, the user-name or the access line identifier (if available). In a Fixed Broadband Access an IP-CAN session corresponds to a Subscriber IP Session defined in TR-146 [36]. + +NOTE: The PDN connection concept and APN are not applicable to Subscriber IP session for fixed device. + +--- + +### S.3 High Level Requirements + +#### S.3.0 General + +The same requirements as defined in clause 4.4 to support usage monitoring and clause 4.5 to support application detection and control applies. + +#### S.3.1 General Requirements + +The same requirements as defined in clause 4 applies with the following exception and addition: + +- For Fixed devices the policy and charging control shall be possible only in non-roaming scenario. + +- For Fixed Broadband Access, PCC decisions shall be based on subscription information for both fixed device and/or fixed access line. +- PCRF shall control directly the PCEF in the IP-Edge in the fixed broadband access without the mediation of the BPCF defined in TS 23.139 [29]. + +NOTE 1: In this Release of the specification, Policy and charging control for layer 2 sessions are out of the scope. + +- An IP-CAN session shall be established on the IP-Edge per IPv4 address and/or IPv6 address or IPv6 prefix known in the IP-Edge. + +PCC shall be supported for both the IP-CAN session established for the RG and for each IP-CAN session created for every device (i.e. fixed device or 3GPP UE) behind the RG that is visible in the IP-Edge/PCEF. + +NOTE 2: In this Release the identification of end-user devices behind a RG configured in routed mode is not supported. + +NOTE 3: In this Release of the specification, there is no support for IMS-based emergency services. + +NOTE 4: In this Release of the specification, there is no support for traffic steering control. + +## S.3.2 Charging Related Requirements + +The same requirements as defined in clauses 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.2.a apply, with the exception and addition listed in the following: + +- The architecture shall provide charging for traffic exchanged by fixed devices and NSWO traffic to/from 3GPP UEs in the following scenarios: + - 3GPP IP-Edge based charging with PCEF located in the fixed broadband access network; + - Traffic Detection Function (TDF)-based charging; + - AAA-based charging, +- The requirements for the AAA-based charging solution are described in clause S.8. + +NOTE 1: The selection of which accounting methods enabled is based on deployment option and there is no dynamic capability negotiation. + +NOTE 2: The same accounting method is applicable to all devices connected to the same fixed broadband access network. + +Charging interaction per device (i.e. fixed device or 3GPP UE) is possible only when an IP-CAN session exists for the 3GPP UE or fixed device connected behind a RG. + +NOTE 3: For a 3GPP UE or a fixed device behind a NATed RG it is not possible to perform charging for that specific device. + +Inter operator settlements are assumed to ensure support of the case of an UE receiving NSWO over a Fixed Broadband Access (FBA), when the HPLMN and the FBA Service Provider support different charging options. + +It shall be possible for the charging system to select the applicable rate based on: + +- home/visited IP-CAN; +- QoS provided for the service; +- Time of day; +- Location of the subscriber. +- Subscriber identifier. + +Home/visited IP-CAN is not applicable for charging of fixed devices. + +## S.3.3 Policy Control Requirements + +The same requirements as defined in clause 4.3 applies with the exception and addition listed below: + +- The PCEF in the IP-Edge shall be able to enforce policies and to perform the appropriate mapping from QoS parameters it receives from the PCRF to Broadband Forum specific parameters. + +NOTE: How the IP-Edge performs such mapping is out of 3GPP scope. + +- PCC shall provide QoS control on a service data flow/detected application traffic basis, for IP traffic exchanged by fixed devices and for NSWO traffic exchange by 3GPP UEs in the fixed broadband access. +- Requirements for QoS control at IP-CAN bearer level defined in clause 4.3.3.2 are not applicable for Fixed Broadband Access. + +--- + +## S.4 Architecture model and reference points + +### S.4.1 Reference architecture + +#### S.4.1.1 General + +The reference architecture described in clause 5.1 and shown in figures S.4.1.2-1 and S.4.1.3-1 applies with the exception and addition listed in the following: + +- PCEF resides in the IP-Edge in the Broadband Forum access network; +- Gxx reference point is not used. + +NOTE 1: Either SPR or UDR is used in this architecture. + +NOTE 2: The roaming scenario is not applicable to fixed device and RG. + +### S.4.1.2 Reference architecture - Non-Roaming + +![PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access convergence when SPR is used. The diagram shows the interconnections between SPR, RCAF, AF, PCRF, OCS, PCEF, TDF, and OFCS. A dashed box labeled 'BBF defined Fixed Broadband Access' contains the PCEF and IPEdge components.](f7ff94a3fa53c264a0d99eb4e9185acf_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access convergence when SPR is used. It features the following components and interfaces: + +- Subscription Profile Repository (SPR)**: Connected to the PCRF via the **Sp** interface. +- RCAF**: Connected to the PCRF via the **Np** interface. +- AF**: Connected to the PCRF via the **Rx** interface. +- Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF)**: The central element, connected to SPR, RCAF, AF, OCS, PCEF, and TDF. +- Online Charging System (OCS)**: Connected to the PCRF via the **Sy** interface. It also connects to the TDF via **Gyn** and to the OFCS via **Gzn**. +- BBF defined Fixed Broadband Access**: A dashed box containing: + - PCEF**: Connected to the PCRF via the **Gx** interface and to the IPEdge. + - IPEdge**: Connected to the PCEF. +- TDF**: Connected to the PCRF via the **Sd** interface. It also connects to the PCEF via **Gy** and to the OFCS via **Gz**. +- Offline Charging System (OFCS)**: Connected to the TDF via the **Gz** interface and to the OCS via **Gzn**. + +PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access convergence when SPR is used. The diagram shows the interconnections between SPR, RCAF, AF, PCRF, OCS, PCEF, TDF, and OFCS. A dashed box labeled 'BBF defined Fixed Broadband Access' contains the PCEF and IPEdge components. + +Figure S.4.1.2-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access convergence when SPR is used + +### S.4.1.3 Reference architecture - Roaming + +![Figure S.4.1.3-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access convergence (roaming) when SPR is used. The diagram shows the network architecture for roaming, divided into HPLMN (Home PLMN) and VPLMN (Visited PLMN) by a dashed line. In the HPLMN, the Subscription Profile Repository (SPR) connects to the Policy and Charging Rules Function (H-PCRF) via the Sp reference point. The AF (Application Function) connects to the H-PCRF via the Rx reference point. The H-PCRF connects to the V-PCRF (Visited PLMN) via the S9 reference point. The V-PCRF connects to the IP-Edge via the Gx reference point. The IP-Edge contains the PCEF (PDN Connection Function). The PCEF connects to the TDF (Traffic Detection Function) via the Sd reference point. The TDF connects to the Offline Charging System (OFCS) via the Gzn and Gz reference points. The TDF also connects to the Online Charging System (OCS) via the Gyn reference point. The OCS connects to the H-PCRF via the Sy reference point. The OCS also connects to the PCEF via the Gy reference point. The RCAF (Resource Control and Admission Function) connects to the V-PCRF via the Np reference point. The VPLMN contains the AF, RCAF, and V-PCRF. The HPLMN contains the SPR, H-PCRF, and AF. The BBF defined Fixed Broadband Access is shown as a dashed box containing the IP-Edge and PCEF.](980ef81c36b6f6a8e6f8fca61b354f6c_img.jpg) + +Figure S.4.1.3-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access convergence (roaming) when SPR is used. The diagram shows the network architecture for roaming, divided into HPLMN (Home PLMN) and VPLMN (Visited PLMN) by a dashed line. In the HPLMN, the Subscription Profile Repository (SPR) connects to the Policy and Charging Rules Function (H-PCRF) via the Sp reference point. The AF (Application Function) connects to the H-PCRF via the Rx reference point. The H-PCRF connects to the V-PCRF (Visited PLMN) via the S9 reference point. The V-PCRF connects to the IP-Edge via the Gx reference point. The IP-Edge contains the PCEF (PDN Connection Function). The PCEF connects to the TDF (Traffic Detection Function) via the Sd reference point. The TDF connects to the Offline Charging System (OFCS) via the Gzn and Gz reference points. The TDF also connects to the Online Charging System (OCS) via the Gyn reference point. The OCS connects to the H-PCRF via the Sy reference point. The OCS also connects to the PCEF via the Gy reference point. The RCAF (Resource Control and Admission Function) connects to the V-PCRF via the Np reference point. The VPLMN contains the AF, RCAF, and V-PCRF. The HPLMN contains the SPR, H-PCRF, and AF. The BBF defined Fixed Broadband Access is shown as a dashed box containing the IP-Edge and PCEF. + +Figure S.4.1.3-1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access convergence (roaming) when SPR is used + +## S.4.2 Reference points + +### S.4.2.1 Gx Reference Point + +This reference point corresponds to the Gx which resides between the PCEF in the IP-Edge and the PCRF. + +The same functionality as defined in clause 5.2.2 with the following exceptions: + +- No provisioning of IP flow mobility routing information from PCEF to PCRF is performed. +- Negotiation of IP-CAN bearer establishment mode (UE-only or UE/NW) does not apply. + +In addition, for the purpose of convergence between 3GPP access and Broadband Forum access network, the Gx reference point enables the transfer of PCC rules for an IP-CAN session that exists in the PCEF for a fixed device or for a 3GPP UE. + +### S.4.2.2 Sp Reference Point + +For the purpose of policy and charging control convergence between 3GPP and Broadband Forum access network, the Sp reference point allows the PCRF to request subscription information from the SPR based on a subscriber ID that is defined in clause S.5.2.1. When the subscriber Id is an IMSI, the PDN identifier is the NSWO-APN. When the subscriber Id is used to identify a fixed device no PDN identifier is applicable. + +NOTE 1: The naming convention of NSWO-APN is left to operator's implementation decision. + +### S.4.2.3 Ud Reference Point + +For the purpose of convergence between 3GPP access and Broadband Forum access network, the Ud reference point provides the same functionality as the Sp reference point described in clause S.4.2.2. + +### S.4.2.4 Gy/Gz Reference Point + +These reference points provide the same functionality as defined in the clauses 5.2.4 and 5.2.5 respectively. + +For the purpose of convergence between 3GPP access and BBF access network, the functions of credit management and reporting is defined in clause S.5.1.6. + +The Gz and Gy interfaces are specified in TS 32.240 [3] and the functionalities required across the Gz and Gy reference point are defined in TS 32.251 [9]. + +### S.4.2.5 Gyn/Gzn Reference Point + +These reference points provide the same functionality as defined in the clause 5.2.10 and 5.2.11 respectively. + +In addition for the purpose of convergence between 3GPP and BBF access network, the functions of credit management and reporting are defined in clause S.5.1.6. + +The Gzn and Gyn interfaces are specified in TS 32.240 [3] and the functionalities required across the Gzn and Gyn reference point are defined in TS 32.251 [9]. + +### S.4.2.6 Sd Reference Point + +For the purpose of convergence between 3GPP and Broadband Forum access network, the Sd reference point allows PCRF to have dynamic control over the application detection and control behaviour at a TDF for a fixed device or for a 3GPP UE. The Sd reference point enables the signalling of ADC decision, which governs the ADC behaviour. The Sd reference point provides the same functionality as the Sd described in clause 5.2.8. + +--- + +## S.5 Functional description + +### S.5.1 Overall description + +The purpose of PCC convergence is to enable the policy and charging control for NSWO traffic from 3GPP UE connected to the fixed broadband access network and for the traffic from fixed devices with where the PCRF controls directly the network element(s) in the fixed broadband access without the mediation of a different policy server, such as the BPCF defined in TS 23.139 [29]. In this release, EPC-routed traffic from 3GPP UE connected to connected fixed broadband access network is considered outside the scope. + +The binding mechanism, credit management, reporting, usage monitoring, termination actions, service data flow prioritization, ADC Rule definition and operations, PCC Rule definition and operations and standardized QoS characteristics as defined in clause 6.1 shall apply. + +Handling of packet filters provided to the UE by the PCEF as defined in clause 6.1.9 is not applicable for Fixed Broadband Access. + +### S.5.1.1 IP-CAN Session + +For routed mode RG with NAT, one IP-CAN session shall be established for each corresponding Subscriber IP session on the IP-Edge for the IPv4 address and/or IPv6 address or IPv6 prefix assigned to the RG. + +In case of routed mode RG when the PPP pass-through feature is enabled (see requirement R-10 in TR-124 Issue 3 [34b]) an IP-CAN session shall be established for the each single fixed device starting the PPP session. In this case the 3GPP UE does not have Subscriber IP session in IP-Edge. + +For bridged mode RG, one IP-CAN session shall be established for each corresponding Subscriber IP session on the IP-Edge for each IPv4 address and/or IPv6 address or IPv6 prefix assigned to the fixed device or 3GPP UE which established a Subscriber IP session in fixed broadband network. + +For routed mode RG with IPv6 when stateless IPv6 address autoconfiguration is used by the end-device behind the RG, one IP-CAN session shall be established for each corresponding Subscriber IP session on the IP-Edge for the IPv6 prefix assigned to the RG. When stateful IPv6 address configuration is used by the end-devices, one IP-CAN session may be established for each end-device. + +For routed mode RG, the successful completion of 3GPP-based access authentication and assignment of IP address to the 3GPP UE shall not result in any IP-CAN session establishment if the IP address assignment does not result in a new Subscriber IP Session in the IP-Edge. In this case the pre-existent IP-CAN session for the RG is used. + +A device connected to the RG (e.g. VoIP phones) may also initiate a Subscriber IP session when the RG is configured in bridge mode or when the PPP pass-through feature is enabled on the Routing RG (see requirement R-10 in TR-124 Issue 3 [34b]). + +### S.5.1.2 Subscriber Identifier + +The Subscriber ID represents the identity of the User. + +For the 3GPP UE the Subscriber ID is the IMSI. + +The Subscriber ID used by fixed device at establishment of Subscriber IP session in fixed broadband access network can be the Access Line Identifier (physical and logical circuit ID) or the username, for example when the Subscriber IP session is a PPP Session. For the RG and fixed device based on Broadband Forum specification, the Subscriber ID is defined in Broadband Forum WT 134 [31] specification. + +### S.5.1.3 Event triggers + +The fixed broadband access network in the convergent scenario supports the Event triggering mechanisms described in clause 6.1.4. The event triggers applicable are listed in the following: + +**Table S.5.1.3-1: Event triggers** + +| Event trigger | Description | Reported from | Condition for reporting | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------| +| QoS change | The QoS of the Default Access Profile in AAA has changed | PCEF | PCRF | +| Out of credit (see note 1) | Credit is no longer available. | PCEF, TDF | PCRF | +| Enforced ADC rule request | TDF is performing an ADC rules request as instructed by the PCRF. | TDF | PCRF | +| Usage report | The IP-CAN/TDF session or the Monitoring key specific resources consumed by a UE either reached the threshold or needs to be reported for other reasons. | PCEF, TDF | PCRF | +| Start of application traffic detection and Stop of application traffic detection (see note 2) | The start or the stop of application traffic has been detected. | PCEF, TDF | PCRF | +| Credit management session failure (see note 1) | Transient/Permanent Failure as specified by the OCS | PCEF, TDF | Always set | + +NOTE 1: This event may apply only when Gy and/or Gyn are deployed. +NOTE 2: This event may only be triggered by a PCEF enhanced with ADC. + +### S.5.1.4 Void + +### S.5.1.5 Void + +### S.5.1.6 Credit management + +For the purpose of credit management of an IP-CAN session for a fixed devices or a 3GPP UE using NSWO, the description in clause 6.1.3 applies with the following exceptions: the subscription identity is provided by PCEF or TDF to the OCS as defined in S.5.1.2 and the applicable credit-reauthorization triggers are defined in the table S.5.1.6-1: + +**Table S.5.1.6-1: Credit re-authorization triggers** + +| Credit re-authorization trigger | Description | Applicable for | +|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------| +| Credit authorisation lifetime expiry (see note 1) | The OCS has limited the validity of the credit to expire at a certain time. | PCEF, TDF | +| Idle timeout (see note 1) | The service data flow identified by a PCC Rules or the application identified by an ADC Rule has been empty for a certain time. | PCEF, TDF | +| QoS changes | The QoS of the access network profile has changed. | PCEF | + +NOTE 1: This credit reauthorization triggers apply only when Gy and/or Gyn are deployed. + +## S.5.2 Policy and charging Control + +### S.5.2.1 Policy and charging control rule + +The definition of PCC rule and PCC Rule operations in clauses 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 are applicable, except: + +- PS to CS session continuity; + +- User Location Report. + +NOTE: The procedure for provisioning predefined PCC rules at the IP-Edge is out of 3GPP scope. + +### S.5.2.1a IP-CAN session related policy information + +Table 6.4 applies with the following exceptions: + +- Authorized QoS per bearer and authorized MBR per QCI are not applicable for Fixed Broadband Access. +- Charging characteristics profile for 3GPP UE is not available at the PCEF/IP-Edge. +- No Charging Characteristics profile is defined for fixed devices. + +### S.5.2.2 Void + +### S.5.3 Void + +### S.5.4 Reflective QoS + +The Fixed Broadband Network received the PCC rules from Gx reference point and as described in clauses S.3.3 and S.6.1.2 performs the appropriated mapping to Fixed Broadband access parameters. The mapping is outside the scope of 3GPP network and defined in TR-300 [37]. Fixed Broadband Access network currently supports the DSCP marking as specified in BBF TR-092 [40] for BRAS, in BBF TR-101 [35] for Access Nodes and Aggregation Nodes and in BBF TR-124 Issue 3 [34b] for the RG. + +The solution is based on DSCP marking of packets traversing the Fixed Broadband Access network. The solution assumes functionality in the BBF domain, all these functions are out-of-scope for 3GPP; also, these functions may or may not be implemented depending on the agreement between 3GPP and Fixed Broadband Access operator, these functions are described for information only. + +The downlink QoS treatment of the traffic in the PCEF is defined in clause S.6.1.2 and in TR-300 [37]. + +For the QoS treatment of the IP flow traffic from the UE to the IP-Edge, DSCP marking may be performed by the 3GPP UE by means of reflective QoS as defined in TS 23.139 [29], in particular: + +- How to inform the UE, as part of 3GPP access authentication signalling, that reflective QoS shall be applied on all the traffic in the attached network as defined in clause 6.3.1 of TS 23.139 [29]. +- How the UE creates a 5-tuple rule for uplink traffic as defined in clause 6.3.3 of TS 23.139 [29]. How the RG or the IP-Edge may implement protective measurements (e.g. per UE-bandwidth limitations in the RG or in the IP-Edge) as defined in clause 6.3.1 of TS 23.139 [29]. + +NOTE: The UE supporting reflective QoS always send this indication during the Access authentication procedure. + +### S.5.5 Policy Control + +Policy control functionalities listed in clause 6.1.5: binding, gating control, event reporting, QoS control and Redirection are applicable for Fixed Broadband Access. There is no support for NW initiated or UE initiated bearer establishment procedures; policy control is performed locally at the PCEF or at the TDF. + +If the PCRF provides authorized QoS for both, the IP-CAN session and PCC rule(s), the enforcement of authorized QoS of the individual PCC rules shall take place first. + +### S.5.5.1 Default QoS Control + +The BBF AAA may provide a default Access Profile QoS for the IP-CAN session that may contain QoS information. + +The PCRF may provide dynamically the default QoS for the IP-CAN session to the PCEF over Gx or alternatively may provide a default QoS profile name for those cases when the default QoS profile is provisioned in the IP-Edge/PCEF. The PCEF enforces the default QoS or the default QoS profile for the IP-CAN session provisions over Gx. The PCEF does not enforce the default Access Profile QoS provided by BBF AAA for the IP-CAN session if PCRF is deployed. + +The default QoS consists of a QCI and MBR. + +The IP-Edge/PCEF shall be able to convert default QoS into Fixed Broadband Access QoS attribute values. In the IP-Edge, the QCI and optionally the ARP priority level is used to determine the DSCP code value or other transport specific information element and the MBR is used for bandwidth limitation for the DSCP code value. The PCEF/IP-Edge shall enforce first the QoS for the packets that matches a service data flow template in an installed PCC Rule for which specific QoS enforcement actions are provided then the IP-Edge/PCEF shall enforce the default QoS for all downlink and uplink traffic for the IP-CAN session. + +--- + +## S.6 Functional Entities + +The functional entities listed in clause 6.2 apply, except BBERF. Those functional entities that have specific values or specific functionality for Fixed Broadband Access are described in this clause. + +NOTE: Support for MPS Services and IMS Emergency is not specified in this Release. + +### S.6.1 Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) + +#### S.6.1.1 General + +The PCRF functionality defined in clause 6.2.1.0 shall apply, with the following exceptions: + +- No negotiation of IP-CAN bearer establishment mode applies. +- No subscription to changes of IP-CAN type, RAT type or Access Network Information applies to the PCEF. +- No event triggers that the TDF can subscribe to need to be monitored by the PCRF. +- Usage Monitoring Control as defined in clause 6.6 applies with the following exceptions: + - In the routed RG with NAT mode, the IP-CAN session is per RG in the PCEF/IP-Edge, the PCRF retrieves the usage monitoring related information from the SPR using the subscriber-id provided over Gx. The PCRF decides how to allocate a usage threshold to each existing IP-CAN session and/or MK. + - In the bridge RG mode and in routed RG mode without NAT there may be a separate fixed subscriber session (i.e. IP-CAN session) for the each device behind the RG. The PCRF retrieves usage monitoring related information from the SPR using the subscriber-id and, if the request is for a 3GPP UE, the NSWO APN provided over Gx. The PCRF decides how to allocate a usage threshold to each existing IP-CAN session and/or Monitoring Key. + +##### S.6.1.1.1 Input for PCC decisions + +The PCEF may provide a subset of the information listed in clause 6.2.1.1 with the following fixed broadband specific values: + +- Subscriber Identifier in the form of an IMSI, MSISDN for a 3GPP UE or in the form of a user-name or Access Line Identifier (physical and logical circuit ID) for fixed device or RG; +- Location of the subscriber; that may include Access line id (physical and logical circuit ID), SSID of the AP, BSSID of the AP; + +NOTE: How the location information becomes available to the PCEF/IPEdge is out of the scope of 3GPP. + +- PLMN id of the PCEF located in the IPEdge, if available; +- IPv4/IPv6 address or IPv6 prefix of the UE; +- Type of IP-CAN (i.e. Fixed Broadband Access); +- A PDN ID in the form of the NSWO-APN for a 3GPP UE. + +The SPR may provide the information listed in clause 6.2.1.1 for a UE and optionally for NSWO-APN. + +The OCS may provide the information listed in clause 6.2.1.1 for a UE. + +The TDF may provide the information listed in clause 6.2.1.1 for a UE and optionally for NSWO-APN. + +The AF, if involved, may provide the information listed in clause 6.2.1.1 with the following Fixed Broadband Access Specific values: + +- Subscriber Identifier; +- IPv4/IPv6 address or IPv6 prefix of the UE. + +### S.6.1.2 Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF) + +The PCC requirements for the PCEF is located in the Fixed Broadband Access are defined in TR-300 [37]. The PCEF performs the following Fixed Broadband specific functions: + +QoS enforcement: + +- The PCEF shall be able to convert a QoS parameters sent from PCRF to Fixed Broadband Access to specific QoS attribute and determine the QoS parameters sent to PCRF from the PCEF from a set of Fixed Broadband Access specific QoS attribute. + +Application Detection: + +- The support of Application Detection functionality is considered a network operator choice in Fixed Broadband Access. If supported, the functionality defined in clause 6.2.2.5 applies. + +In addition, the following functions are not supported: + +- No UE and/or NW initiated bearer procedures and no enforcement of the authorized QoS for an IP-CAN bearer is supported for Fixed Broadband Access. + +### S.6.1.3 Application Function (AF) + +The AF functionality defined in clause 6.2.3 shall apply, except for the following functionality: + +- No subscription to changes of IP-CAN type, RAT type or Access Network Information applies. + +### S.6.1.4 Subscriber Profile Repository (SPR) + +The SPR functionality defined in clause 6.2.4 shall apply. For Fixed Broadband Access the SPR may provide the subscription profile information per subscriber and PDN in case of a 3GPP UE or per subscriber in case of a fixed device or RG: + +- Subscriber Identifier in the form of an IMSI, MSISDN for a 3GPP UE or in the form of a user-name or Access Line Identifier (physical and logical circuit ID) for fixed device or RG; +- A PDN ID in the form of the NSWO-APN. + +### S.6.1.5 Online Charging System (OCS) + +The OCS functionality defined in clause 6.2.5 shall apply. + +For Fixed Broadband Access the PCEF provides the Subscriber Identifier that may be e.g. IMSI for a 3GPP UE or a user name or Access line identifier for a fixed devices or RG to the OCS. The PCEF or TDF also sends Access line id (physical and logical circuit ID) to the OCS when the subscriber ID identifies a 3GPP UE or a fixed device behind the RG. + +NOTE: An operator may also apply this solution with both PCEF and TDF performing enforcement and charging for a single IP-CAN session as long as the network is configured in such a way that the traffic charged and enforced in the PCEF does not overlap with the traffic charged and enforced by the TDF. + +### S.6.1.6 Offline Charging System (OFCS) + +The OCS functionality defined in clause 6.2.6 shall apply. + +For Fixed Broadband Access the PCEF provides the Subscriber Identifier that may be e.g. IMSI for a 3GPP UE or a user name or Access line identifier for a fixed devices or RG to the OFCS. The PCEF or TDF also sends Access line id (physical and logical circuit ID) to the OFCS when the subscriber ID identifies a 3GPP UE or a fixed device behind the RG. + +NOTE: An operator may also apply this solution with both PCEF and TDF performing enforcement and charging for a single IP-CAN session as long as the network is configured in such a way that the traffic charged and enforced in the PCEF does not overlap with the traffic charged and enforced by the TDF. + +### S.6.1.7 User Data Repository (UDR) + +The SPR data listed in clause 6.2.3 are stored in the UDR, the subscriber identifier and the PDN ID defined in S.6.1.4 applies. + +### S.6.1.8 Traffic Detection Function (TDF) + +The TDF functionality defined in clause 6.2.9 shall apply. For Fixed Broadband Access, the TDF does not subscribe to event triggers indication from the PCRF at any IP-CAN session procedure. + +--- + +## S.7 PCC Procedures and Flows + +### S.7.1 Introduction + +A "Fixed Broadband Access IP-CAN" is a fixed access broadband network that provides IP connectivity to a UE. The Fixed Broadband Access IP-CAN reuses the definition of an IP-CAN session in this specification. + +The AF can provide the NATed IP address and ports used by the UE (for IMS, according to TS 23.228 [39]). + +NOTE: When the above condition is not met, there are no standardized means as for now to identify a UE behind a NATed-RG. + +The Fixed Broadband Access network does not support the concept of a bearer and multiple bearers as defined in TS 23.401 [17]. However, DSCP marking provides QoS support on transport network layer so that QoS and charging policies can be applied per SDF. + +Case 1, no Gateway Control Session applies for Fixed Broadband Access. + +The procedures cover both non-roaming and roaming with access to NSWO APN for a 3GPP UE. For the roaming case with access to NSWO APN, the V PCRF interacts with the IP-Edge PCEF and, if Sd applies, with the TDF. + +### S.7.2 IP-CAN Session Establishment + +The PCEF located in the IP-Edge initiates the Gx IP-CAN Session establishment as defined in clause 7.2. The session is initiated after that the IP-Edge becomes aware of an IPv4 address and/or an IPv6 prefix has been assigned to the fixed device and/or 3GPP UE. + +In route mode configuration with NATed RG, the session is initiated after the RG has been connected to the network and has been assigned an IPv4 address and/or IPv6 Prefix. The IPv4 address and/or IPv6 Prefix are assigned as per Broadband Forum specifications and it is out of scope of 3GPP. + +In bridge mode, the session is initiated after the device has been authenticated has been assigned an IPv4 address and/or IPv6 address or IPv6 Prefix by the Fixed Broadband access. + +Operator policies in the PCEF indicate if dynamic policy control is provided. In addition, the NSWO-APN is also configured for subscribers on a PLMN basis. + +The PCEF located in the IP-Edge includes in the IP-CAN Session establishment message the Subscriber-Id, NSWO-APN if available, IP-CAN type, the Default QoS if available, the PLMN id if available and the location information as defined in S.6.1.1.1. + +The IP-Edge maps the Default-Access-Profile QoS to Default-QoS as defined in clause S.5.5.1. + +The PCRF may provision a Default QoS or a Default QoS profile, PCC Rules to activate and Events Triggers to report. + +## S.7.3 IP-CAN Session Termination + +This procedure is in accordance with clause 7.3.2 with the exceptions listed in this Annex. The UE-initiated IP-CAN session termination is not applicable to Fixed Broadband Access. + +The IP-CAN session termination is triggered by PCEF when Subscriber IP session is terminated. The trigger to terminate the Subscriber IP session may be HSS/AAA request to detach the UE or may be Broadband Forum specific (e.g. RG switch off, loss of transmission, IP address lease expiration PPPoE session termination, etc) and out of the scope of 3GPP. + +In routed mode configuration with NAT this procedure is applicable only when IP session from RG is terminated, e.g. when RG switches off or when public IP address assigned to the RG is released, etc. + +NOTE: In routed mode with NAT, the termination of connection from a device in LAN, e.g. when device releases the local IP address or it disconnects from WLAN does not trigger the IP-CAN session termination for IP session from RG. + +## S.7.4 IP-CAN Session Modification + +### S.7.4.1 PCEF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification + +This clause is related to IP-CAN session modification initiated by IP-Edge/PCEF for IP session. This procedure is in accordance with clause 7.4.1 with the exceptions listed in this Annex. + +In routed mode with NAT, this procedure can be triggered when new device connects to the RG, for example when UE requests a local IP address to the RG or when a UE disconnects from WLAN. + +The IP-Edge reports that an Event was met, including the Event Trigger and the affected PCC Rule. If TDF applies, the PCRF may provide ADC Rules and Event Triggers to the TDF and may provide PCC Rule, Event Triggers and a Default QoS or a Default QoS profile to PCEF. + +### S.7.4.2 PCRF-Initiated IP-CAN Session Modification + +This procedure is in accordance with clause 7.4.2 with the exceptions listed in this Annex. + +The PCRF may also provide a Default QoS or a Default QoS profile to PCEF. + +## S.7.5 Update of the subscription information in the PCRF + +This procedure is in accordance with clause 7.5. when the UE's (i.e. RG, fixed device or 3GPP UE) profile changes. + +## S.7.6 PCRF Discovery and selection + +PCRF discovery and selection follows the principles defined in clause 7.6 with the following modification: + +- The Subscriber ID specified in clause S.5.1.2 is used as user identity. +- For a 3GPP UE, the NSWO-APN is also available. +- The IPv6 address may be included in the IP-CAN session establishment in the case of bridge-mode RG. + +--- + +## S.8 Charging using AAA signalling + +The architecture shall provide charging for traffic exchanged by fixed devices and NSWO traffic to/from 3GPP UEs using AAA signalling. + +In this release in case of AAA-based charging the BBF AAA server is used for performing accounting of fixed device as defined by BBF specifications TR-101 [35] and TR-146 [36]. + +NOTE: The AAA-based accounting for fixed device is not applicable in roaming scenario. + +For the charging session over Gya and Gza, the user identifier is the same that is issued over the Gx session + +### S.8.1 Reference architecture - Non-Roaming + +![PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access convergence when AAA-based accounting is used](48413ff094bab82a1633755e150bbc33_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows the PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access convergence. The components and their interfaces are as follows: + +- Subscription Profile Repository (SPR)** connects to the **Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF)** via the **Sp** interface. +- AF** connects to the **PCRF** via the **Rx** interface. +- Online Charging System (OCS)** connects to the **PCRF** via the **Sy** interface and to the **BBF AAA Server/Proxy** via the **Gya** interface. +- PCRF** connects to the **PCEF** (within **IPEdge**) via the **Gx** interface and to the **TDF** via the **Sd** interface. +- A dashed box labeled **BBF defined Fixed Broadband Access** contains the **IPEdge** (which includes **PCEF**) and part of the **BBF AAA Server/Proxy**. +- IPEdge** connects to the **Acc IF** (within **BBF AAA Server/Proxy**) via the **B** interface. +- Offline Charging System (OFCS)** connects to the **Acc IF** via the **Gza** interface. + +PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access convergence when AAA-based accounting is used + +**Figure S.8.1: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access convergence when AAA-based accounting is used** + +### S.8.2 Reference architecture - Roaming + +![PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access convergence (roaming) when AAA-based accounting is used. The diagram shows the interaction between various network functions across VPLMN and HPLMN domains.](3251603ae4c2acad0c594342913a6862_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access convergence (roaming) when AAA-based accounting is used. It is divided into two main domains: VPLMN (Visited PLMN) and HPLMN (Home PLMN), separated by a dashed vertical line. + +- HPLMN (Home PLMN):** + - Contains the **Subscription Profile Repository (SPR)** and **Policy and Charging Rules Function (H-PCRF)**. + - An **AF (Application Function)** is connected to the H-PCRF via the **Rx** reference point. + - The SPR is connected to the H-PCRF via the **Sp** reference point. + - The H-PCRF is connected to the V-PCRF via the **S9** reference point. + - The H-PCRF is also connected to the **Online Charging System (OCS)** via the **Sy** reference point. +- VPLMN (Visited PLMN):** + - Contains the **Policy and Charging Rules Function (V-PCRF)**, **IP Edge** (with **PCEF**), **TDF**, **Offline Charging System (OFCS)**, and **BBF AAA Server/Proxy** (with **Acc IF**). + - An **AF** is connected to the V-PCRF via the **Rx** reference point. + - The V-PCRF is connected to the IP Edge via the **Gx** reference point. + - The V-PCRF is connected to the TDF via the **Sd** reference point. + - The IP Edge is connected to the BBF AAA Server/Proxy via the **B** reference point. + - The BBF AAA Server/Proxy is connected to the OFCS via the **Gza** and **Gya** reference points. + - The OCS is connected to the OFCS via a solid line. +- BBF defined Fixed Broadband Access:** A dashed box labeled "BBF defined Fixed Broadband Access" contains the IP Edge, PCEF, and TDF. + +PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access convergence (roaming) when AAA-based accounting is used. The diagram shows the interaction between various network functions across VPLMN and HPLMN domains. + +Figure S.8.2: PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access convergence (roaming) when AAA-based accounting is used + +### S.8.3 Gza Reference Point + +To transport charging information about 3GPP UE, the Gza reference point is located between Accounting Interworking function in the BBF defined network and the 3GPP offline charging system OFCS located in the VPLMN (roaming scenario) or in the HPLMN (non-roaming scenario). + +To transport charging information about fixed devices, the Gza reference point is located between the Accounting Interworking function in the BBF defined network and the 3GPP offline charging system located in the HPLMN (only non-roaming scenario). + +NOTE: The detailed definition of Gza reference point and diagram flows for supporting AAA-based charging is outside the scope of this specification. See SA WG5 specifications for further details. + +## S.8.4 Gya Reference Point + +The Gya reference point is located between the Accounting Interworking function in the BBF defined Access Network and the 3GPP online charging system OCS located in the HPLMN and it transports charging information for 3GPP UE. + +The Gya reference point is located between the Accounting Interworking function in the BBF defined Access Network and the 3GPP online charging system located in the HPLMN and it transports charging information for fixed device. + +NOTE: The definition of Gya reference point and diagram flows for supporting AAA-based charging is outside the scope of this specification. See SA WG5 specifications for further details. + +## S.8.5 B Reference Point + +This reference point is defined in BBF TR-300 [37]. + +NOTE: The definition of this reference point is out of the scope of 3GPP. + +## S.8.6 AAA based charging + +The charging support for NSWO traffic for 3GPP UE and fixed devices can be provided when the BBF network reports per-user accounting data via B and Gya/Gza reference points. + +Offline and online charging may be supported by the 3GPP and BBF domain. In this Release, in case of AAA-based charging, the Online charging is supported based on existing capability supported by B reference point and IP-Edge with limitation based on AAA RADIUS/Diameter accounting in the BBF network (e.g. BNG capability, usage of RADIUS over B reference point). + +For RG in routed mode configuration with NAT, the single devices (i.e. fixed device and 3GPP UE) connected behind a RG can not be recognised, so the accounting is performed only for the RG. + +In case of RG bridge mode configuration and in routed mode configuration without NAT the AAA based charging is performed per single devices having a Subscriber IP session. + +In order to allow performing charging for fixed devices, the following assumptions are made about functionality in the Fixed Broadband Network: + +- The BBF network is able to collect per user accounting data for fixed devices and periodically report this data via the B reference point. + +## S.8.7 Accounting Interworking Function + +The Accounting Interworking Function that performs translation of the accounting signalling and parameters that are understood by the IP-Edge into the credit management signalling and parameters that are understood by the OCS and the OFCS is defined in BBF TR-300 [37]. + +## S.8.8 Procedures AAA based charging using accounting signalling + +### S.8.8.0 General + +This clause describes the AAA-based charging. The basic assumption is that B interface is not modified. + +### S.8.8.1 Charging Session Initiation + +This procedure is performed for initiation of charging session + +![Sequence diagram for AAA-based Charging Session Initiation showing interactions between BNG (PCEF), AAA (ACC IF), TDF, Roaming Scenarios (V-PCRF, H-PCRF), AAA/HSS, AF, SPR, and OCS. The diagram is divided into three main steps: 1. 3GPP UE / Fixed device authentication; 2. IP-CAN session establishment procedure (steps 1-14); 3. IP-CAN session establishment procedure (steps 15-17). Blocks A and B show alternative charging interaction triggers and credit requests during the IP-CAN establishment.](c309ad79954e7cd28c19b0de8d638888_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the interaction for AAA-based charging session initiation. The lifelines are BNG (PCEF), AAA (ACC IF), TDF, Roaming Scenarios (V-PCRF, H-PCRF), AAA/HSS, AF, SPR, and OCS. The process is as follows: + +- Step 1:** 3GPP UE / Fixed device authentication. This is a general interaction across the lifelines. +- Step 2:** IP-CAN session establishment procedure in clause S.7.2 steps 1-14. This step contains two alternative blocks, A and B, which are mutually exclusive. + - Block A:** + - A.1 Charging interaction trigger (from ACC IF to V-PCRF). + - A.2 Acc IF Initiated Credit Request (from ACC IF to OCS). + - A.3 Credit Response (from OCS to ACC IF). + - Block B:** + - B.1 Charging interaction trigger (from ACC IF to V-PCRF). + - B.2 Acc IF Initiated Credit Request (from ACC IF to OCS). + - B.3 Credit Response (from OCS to ACC IF). +- Step 3:** IP-CAN session establishment procedure in clause S.7.2 steps 15-17. + +Sequence diagram for AAA-based Charging Session Initiation showing interactions between BNG (PCEF), AAA (ACC IF), TDF, Roaming Scenarios (V-PCRF, H-PCRF), AAA/HSS, AF, SPR, and OCS. The diagram is divided into three main steps: 1. 3GPP UE / Fixed device authentication; 2. IP-CAN session establishment procedure (steps 1-14); 3. IP-CAN session establishment procedure (steps 15-17). Blocks A and B show alternative charging interaction triggers and credit requests during the IP-CAN establishment. + +Figure S.8.8.1: AAA-based Charging Session Initiation + +The steps included in Block A and B are mutually exclusive. + +1. The 3GPP UE EAP-based authentication or BBF Fixed device authentication is performed. + +NOTE 1: Authentication for fixed device is out of the scope of 3GPP specifications. + +- A.1 If AAA-based accounting applies, the 3GPP UE/BBF device is successfully authenticated and this triggers the interaction with the OCS system. This step is outside the 3GPP scope. + +A.2. The Accounting Interworking Function that will activate the online-charging session, and provide relevant input information for the OCS decision. i.e. subscriber identifier and charging keys obtained in step A.1. + +A.3. If online charging is applicable, the OCS provides the possible credit information to the Accounting Interworking Function and may provide re-authorisation triggers for each of the credits. + +NOTE 2: The Only Credit Reauthorization triggers that can be reported are "Credit Reauthorization time expired". + +2. If PCC is supported, the IP-CAN session establishment procedure may be established as defined in clause S.7.2. The steps from 1 to 14 defined in clause 7.2 are performed with the following exception: + +- Steps 9 - 10 are performed only if TDF based accounting is supported and AAA-based accounting is not supported. +- Steps 13 - 14 are performed only if PCEF accounting is supported and AAA-based accounting is not supported. + +B.1. If AAA-based accounting applies, the start of accounting session is triggered in BBF AAA. This step is out of the scope of 3GPP specifications. + +NOTE 3: This step may occur anytime in parallel to steps from 1 to 14 of clause 7.2 + +B.2. The same step as step A.1 + +B.3. The same step as step A.2 + +3 The IP-CAN session establishment as defined in clause 7.2 steps from 15 to 17 are performed. + +## S.8.8.2 Charging Session Modification + +This procedure is performed for updating the charging information, such as the available quota. + +![Sequence diagram for AAA-based Charging Session modification. Lifelines: BNG (PCEF), AAA (ACC IF), TDF, Roaming Scenarios (V-PCRF), H-PCRF, AAA/HSS, AF, SPR, OCS. The diagram shows four steps: 1. BNG (PCEF) sends a RADIUS-Start-Accounting message / RADIUS-Intermediate-accounting message to AAA (ACC IF). 2. AAA (ACC IF) sends a Charging interaction trigger to BNG (PCEF). 3. AAA (ACC IF) sends an Initiated Credit Request to OCS. 4. OCS sends a Credit Response to AAA (ACC IF).](663989df4542a7cc15c6cbf6fe16649f_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BNG as BNG (PCEF) + participant AAA as AAA (ACC IF) + participant TDF as TDF + participant RS as Roaming Scenarios (V-PCRF) + participant H-PCRF as H-PCRF + participant AAA_HSS as AAA/HSS + participant AF as AF + participant SPR as SPR + participant OCS as OCS + + Note right of AAA: Charging interaction trigger + BNG->>AAA: 1 RADIUS-Start-Accounting message / RADIUS-Intermediate-accounting message. + AAA-->>BNG: 2 Charging interaction trigger + AAA->>OCS: 3. Acc IF Initiated Credit Request + OCS-->>AAA: 4. Credit Response + +``` + +Sequence diagram for AAA-based Charging Session modification. Lifelines: BNG (PCEF), AAA (ACC IF), TDF, Roaming Scenarios (V-PCRF), H-PCRF, AAA/HSS, AF, SPR, OCS. The diagram shows four steps: 1. BNG (PCEF) sends a RADIUS-Start-Accounting message / RADIUS-Intermediate-accounting message to AAA (ACC IF). 2. AAA (ACC IF) sends a Charging interaction trigger to BNG (PCEF). 3. AAA (ACC IF) sends an Initiated Credit Request to OCS. 4. OCS sends a Credit Response to AAA (ACC IF). + +Figure S.8.8.2: AAA-based Charging Session modification + +1. The BNG can send a RADIUS-Start accounting message or a RADIUS-Intermediate-Accounting message. + +- 2 When the Accounting Interworking Function receives the message, it determines if it is required to update the accounting information which triggers an interaction with the OCS. +- 3 The Accounting Interworking Function may contact the OCS to request credit for new charging keys and/or to issue final report and return remaining credit for charging keys no longer active, i.e. when the accounting session is terminated. +- 4 The OCS may instruct the Accounting Interworking Function on the further handling of the session (terminate, continue, etc), provide credit information (possibly with re-authorisation trigger), and/or acknowledge the credit report. + +### S.8.8.3 Charging Session Termination + +#### S.8.8.3.1 Charging Session Termination BNG-initiated + +This procedure is performed when BNG send a stop accounting message to the Accounting Interworking Function, for example the IP-CAN session termination procedure is initiated by PCRF or when Subscriber IP session terminated (for example when the 3GPP UE disassociates from the fixed broadband network, the RG is switched off, etc.). + +![Sequence diagram for AAA-based Charging Session Termination (BNG-initiated).](7c00bda63ea430550572749be66ce926_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the sequence of messages for AAA-based Charging Session Termination initiated by the BNG. The lifelines involved are BNG (PCEF), AAA (containing ACC IF), TDF, Roaming Scenarios (containing V-PCRF), H-PCRF, AAA/HSS, AF, SPR, and OCS. The sequence is as follows: + +1. Termination of Subscriber IP Session (internal to BNG) +2. RADIUS-Stop-accounting (BNG to ACC IF) +3. Charging interaction trigger (internal to ACC IF) +4. Credit Final Report (ACC IF to OCS) +5. Credit Acknowledge (OCS to ACC IF) + +Sequence diagram for AAA-based Charging Session Termination (BNG-initiated). + +**Figure S.8.8.3.1-1: AAA-based Charging Session Termination** + +1. The BNG determines that the Subscriber IP session is terminated (e.g. the device has left the fixed broadband network) and consequently a PCEF-Initiated IP-CAN session termination is initiated or it shall be terminated, when PCRF-Initiated IP-CAN session termination procedure is performed. +2. The BNG send a RADIUS-Stop-accounting message to the ACC\_If. This step is outside the scope of 3GPP specifications. +- 3 The Accounting Interworking Function determines that the Accounting Session shall be terminated. +4. The Accounting Interworking Function shall issue the final reports and return the remaining credit to the OCS. +5. The OCS acknowledges the credit report and terminates the online charging session. + +--- + +## Annex T (informative): How to accumulate PCC/ADC Rule usage in multiple monitoring groups + +If usage for a PCC/ADC rule is accumulated in multiple Monitoring Groups, the following solution re-uses the capabilities defined in the main body of this specification, the steps are described below: + +1. The PCRF retrieves the total group allowance for the Monitoring Group and the set of services belonging to the Monitoring Group from the SPR. +2. For dynamic PCC/ADC Rules, the PCRF selects a Monitoring Key for those services that belongs to more than one Monitoring Group but does not have an individual Monitoring Key assigned. +3. For pre-configured PCC/ADC Rules the PCRF selects the PCC/ADC Rules for each of the services that belong to the monitoring group. For pre-configured PCC/ADC Rules, the PCEF is configured with an individual Monitoring Key that monitors the usage. +4. The PCRF calculates a usage threshold for each of these Monitoring Keys taking into account the minimum of the individual service allowance and the monitoring group allowance(s) the service belongs to. +5. The PCRF installs or activates the PCC/ADC Rule. The PCRF provides a usage threshold for each Monitoring Key. +6. When the PCRF receives a usage report for a Monitoring Key from the requested node (PCEF or TDF), the PCRF shall deduct the value from the corresponding group allowances and from the individual allowance if needed. +7. As long as all group usage allowances are not reached, the PCRF calculates a new usage threshold for the Monitoring Key based on the corresponding group allowances the service belongs to. + +## Annex U (normative): Policy and charging control in the downlink direction for traffic marked with DSCP by the TDF + +In order to provide policy and charging control (e.g. QoS enforcement) in the downlink direction for applications with non-deducible service data flows detected by the TDF, in addition to the solution described in clause 4.5, the following solution is defined: + +The TDF shall be able to mark detected downlink application traffic with a DSCP value received within an installed ADC Rule matching this traffic. + +- NOTE 1: Unless a class of applications matches the definition of a DSCP value standardised by IETF, DSCP values with no standardised meaning in IETF are used. DSCP values in ranges reserved by IANA for "experimental or Local Use" are suitable. +- NOTE 2: Using DSCP values with no standardised meaning in IETF prevents any IP router between TDF and PCEF to perform differentiated service scheduling for related IP packets unless it is updated or configured to support those DSCP values. This implies that sufficient network capacity must be guaranteed along the path between the TDF and PCEF so that the disabling of DiffServ packet forwarding has no detrimental impact on the end-to-end QoS. +- NOTE 3: Marking of DSCP bits for this purpose can interfere with appropriate traffic handling in some operator transport networks. The DSCP marking may also get remarked by routing entities within the operator networks. +- NOTE 4: If the application sets DSCP marking that is used for policy and charging control in the PCEF, either no ADC Rule is installed in the TDF matching this application traffic or if an ADC Rule is installed, then DSCP marking is not enabled. When TDF sets DSCP to values used for policy and charging control, network configuration needs to prevent an untrusted source from getting unplanned QoS and charging and also prevent remapping of this traffic between the application and the TDF. + +To ensure that the DSCP value used for service data flow detection is not visible to the operator's transport network, based on operator configuration, a tunnelling protocol may be used between TDF and PCEF. + +In case tunnelling is used then the DSCP value used for service data flow detection shall be carried in the inner IP header. The DSCP marking used in the operator's transport network is carried in the outer IP header of the tunnel. + +- NOTE 5: The tunnel connections are preconfigured in the IP infrastructure connecting the TDF and the PCEF. The operator needs to ensure the same tunnel configuration is used for the TDF and for the PCEF. The tunnel protocol can be any applicable IP-based tunnel depending on operator's choice. + +In order to support policy and charging control in the downlink direction by the PCEF/BBERF for an application detected by the TDF (typically for services with non-deducible service data flows), the PCRF shall either install a dynamic PCC/QoS Rule or activate a pre-defined PCC rule, which identifies traffic based on the corresponding DSCP value (provided by the ToS/Traffic Class mask field within the service data flow filter). In case tunnelling is used, the PCEF shall use the inner header's DSCP for the service data flow detection defined in clause 6.2.2.2. + +- NOTE 6: This solution is particularly useful for QoS enforcement in the downlink direction procedures performed by the PCEF/BBERF. The TDF may still perform application detection and control as per received ADC Rules, including application detection reporting to the PCRF, enforcement control, usage monitoring control and charging, while applying DSCP marking. The PCEF/BBERF may also perform then policy and charging control in the downlink direction. + +--- + +## Annex V (informative): Policy Control for Remote UEs behind a ProSe UE-to-Network Relay UE + +With the Proximity-based services, in accordance with TS 23.303 [44], a UE acting as a Remote UE can connect to a PDN via a ProSe UE-to-Network Relay UE, using an IP-CAN session that the Relay UE has established. + +The Relay UE is assigned an IPv6 prefix that is shorter than /64. + +The PCRF does not get any Remote UE identity and is not required to be aware of the Remote UE but is expected to validate Remote UE related service information from the AF and generate any necessary PCC rules according to standard procedures already defined. PCC rule authorizations may be static (e.g. predefined PCC rules) or rely on AF provided service information. + +An AF serving a remote UE reaches the appropriate PCRF based on the IPv6 prefix that the UE-to-Network Relay UE has assigned to the remote UE. The AF reaches the appropriate PCRF by performing a PLMN lookup for the IPv6 prefix and using the Network Realm/Domain, as defined in TS 23.003 [16], associated with the PLMN. + +In order to make a PCC rule specific for a certain Remote UE, the SDF filters used for traffic detection need to include the attribute Local Address and Mask with a value that corresponds to the Remote UE only. The value is normally an IPv6 prefix that is longer than the prefix assigned for the IP-CAN session (i.e. for the ProSe UE-to-Network Relay UE). + +--- + +Annex W (informative): +Void + +## Annex X (informative): Encrypted traffic detection by using domain name matching + +For the cases when it is required to detect and enforce/charge sponsored services within encrypted traffic, and those sponsored services are uniquely identifiable by a list of {IP address ranges, domain name matching strings, match type (absolute/suffix)} set, while either element in the pair of {IP address ranges, domain name matching strings} can be "any", as applicable, but not both elements simultaneously, the domain name matching solution described below may be used. + +NOTE 1: L3 information (IP address ranges) is visible even if traffic is encrypted. + +The following assumptions apply for the solution: + +- There exists an agreement between the operator and sponsored data connectivity content provider. +- Content provider uses HTTPS as a transport mechanism, using Web Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). + +The set of information {IP address ranges, domain name matching strings, match type (absolute/suffix)} required to identify encrypted traffic is defined in the PCEF/TDF either by using pre-defined PCC/ADC Rules or by using dynamic PCC/ADC Rules that include Application Identifiers, as applicable. The detection logic to which Application Identifier in the PCEF/TDF refers to, is extended to cover ({IP address ranges, domain name matching strings, match type (absolute/suffix)} information. If such a pre-defined or dynamic PCC/ADC Rule is active for an IP-CAN/TDF session, the PCEF/TDF shall check IP address ranges, and, in case of compliancy with the received/preconfigured value (see note 2), match domain name strings, either absolutely or by suffix, against the following fields in the initial HTTPS handshake: + +- TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) extension, when available (see [47]); or, if not available. +- Server certificate's Subject Alternative Name x.509 extension DNS name, when available. All relevant values shall be examined for matching; or if not available or no match was found. +- Server certificate's Subject Common Name (CN). + +NOTE 2: If the IP address ranges equals "Any", then any traffic is said to be compliant. + +The information required for the detection of sponsored HTTPS (i.e. defined in Annex X to be pre-configured in the PCEF/TDF and either the TLS SNI extension or the Server certificate's Subject Alternative Name x.509 DNS name or Server certificate's Subject CN) is verified with the corresponding server IP address/prefix of the IP packets by the PCEF/TDF. The PCEF/TDF uses implementation specific logic to perform this verification. + +--- + +## Annex Y (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2014-06 | SP-64 | SP-140273 | 0885 | 5 | B | PCC Rules sharing resources | 13.0.0 | +| 2014-06 | SP-64 | SP-140383 | 0885 | 6 | B | PCC Rules sharing resources
MCC Update to use correct approved revision of the Rel-13 CR. | 13.0.1 | +| 2014-09 | SP-65 | SP-140428 | 0896 | 2 | B | Addition of RAN user plane congestion handling feature into the specification | 13.1.0 | +| 2014-09 | SP-65 | SP-140428 | 0897 | 2 | B | Np reporting restrictions | 13.1.0 | +| 2014-09 | SP-65 | SP-140428 | 0899 | 2 | B | Aggregation of Np messages | 13.1.0 | +| 2014-09 | SP-65 | SP-140421 | 0907 | 2 | A | Clarifications for PRA reporting | 13.1.0 | +| 2014-09 | SP-65 | SP-140431 | 0908 | 2 | F | Clarification of resource sharing for different Rx sessions | 13.1.0 | +| 2014-09 | SP-65 | SP-140441 | 0914 | - | A | QCI values for Public Safety services | 13.1.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140674 | 0904 | 3 | A | Clarifications for TFT handling | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140689 | 0915 | - | C | Applicability of congestion information reporting for certain APNs only | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140689 | 0916 | 2 | F | Clarifying details of deferred services | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140671 | 0920 | 2 | A | Support for IPv6 prefix retrieve by the HSGW during the eHRPD pre-registration procedure | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140694 | 0921 | 3 | B | Introducing the feature of excluding Usage of a Service/Application from IP-CAN session/TDF session Usage into the specification | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140690 | 0922 | 2 | B | Indication to share resources in the UL or DL or both directions | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140685 | 0924 | 4 | A | Charging correlation identifier for the IP-CAN session | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140694 | 0925 | 1 | D | New Annex: Monitor service usage in multiple groups | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140689 | 0926 | 3 | C | Np mobility handling | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140689 | 0927 | - | C | Resolution of Editor's note on bandwidth limitation. | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140678 | 0930 | 2 | A | QoS handling at inter-RAT mobility | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140668 | 0939 | 1 | A | Correct Reference to 3GPP2 X.S0057 | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140678 | 0946 | 2 | A | Correction to Delay Budget for first packets in a data burst | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140689 | 0950 | 2 | F | Transfer of location information on Np | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140689 | 0952 | - | F | Removal of Editor Note on logical PCRF id | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140693 | 0953 | 3 | C | TDF support for downlink's bearer selection and bearer binding procedures | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140686 | 0955 | 2 | A | Proposal to solve the discussion on how QoS change of default bearer affects PCC Rules bound to the default bearer | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140693 | 0958 | 3 | B | Activate PCC function per UE based on subscription information | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140689 | 0961 | 2 | F | Clarifying reporting of no congestion state | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140693 | 0963 | 2 | B | TWAN release cause for Trusted WLAN | 13.2.0 | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140679 | 0964 | - | F | Stage 3 alignment for Fixed Broadband Access | 13.2.0 | +| 2015-03 | SP-67 | SP-150027 | 0966 | 3 | B | Removing restrictions to report RAT type to the AF | 13.3.0 | +| 2015-03 | SP-67 | SP-150027 | 0968 | 1 | B | Activate PCC function per UE based on subscription information when BBERF is deployed | 13.3.0 | +| 2015-03 | SP-67 | SP-150109 | 0971 | 1 | A | Correction to support of I-WLAN in TS 23.203 | 13.3.0 | +| 2015-06 | SP-68 | SP-150230 | 0905 | 6 | A | Priority of Default Bearer | 13.4.0 | +| 2015-06 | SP-68 | SP-150230 | 0941 | 5 | A | Clarifications for QoS change of default bearer | 13.4.0 | +| 2015-06 | SP-68 | SP-150235 | 0975 | 2 | B | Resource management for background data transfer via Rx | 13.4.0 | +| 2015-06 | SP-68 | SP-150232 | 0976 | 3 | F | Configuring AF application identifier value in PCRF to avoid SRVCC | 13.4.0 | +| 2015-06 | SP-68 | SP-150239 | 0977 | 1 | F | Session/bearer release cause over S2b | 13.4.0 | +| 2015-06 | SP-68 | SP-150231 | 0978 | 2 | F | Alignment of RUCI reporting restrictions' basis for UPON | 13.4.0 | +| 2015-09 | SP-69 | SP-150492 | 0980 | 3 | B | Introduction of Flexible Mobile Service Steering feature into PCC architecture | 13.5.0 | +| 2015-09 | SP-69 | SP-150498 | 0981 | 1 | F | Adding Nt reference point to architecture | 13.5.0 | +| 2015-09 | SP-69 | SP-150503 | 0985 | 2 | B | Location to Support Emergency services over WLAN access to EPC | 13.5.0 | +| 2015-09 | SP-69 | SP-150497 | 0986 | 3 | B | PCC Support of NBIFOM | 13.5.0 | +| 2015-09 | SP-69 | SP-150491 | 0988 | 1 | A | Clarifications for PCC rule actions | 13.5.0 | +| 2015-09 | SP-69 | SP-150492 | 0989 | 3 | B | Update the architecture to support the FMSS for EPC-routed scenario | 13.5.0 | +| 2015-09 | SP-69 | SP-150492 | 0990 | 4 | B | Definition of Traffic Steering Control Information | 13.5.0 | +| 2015-09 | SP-69 | SP-150505 | 0991 | 2 | F | Removal of OCS proxy in LBO roaming scenario | 13.5.0 | +| 2015-09 | SP-69 | SP-150492 | 0992 | 3 | B | High level requirement and function description of FMSS | 13.5.0 | +| 2015-09 | SP-69 | SP-150500 | 0994 | 1 | F | Addition of resource sharing indication | 13.5.0 | +| 2015-09 | SP-69 | SP-150492 | 0995 | 3 | B | PCC architecture enhancement for traffic steering using St and TSSF | 13.5.0 | +| 2015-09 | SP-69 | SP-150550 | 0983 | 4 | B | PCC Procedures and Flows including Traffic Steering | 13.5.0 | +| 2015-09 | - | - | - | - | - | MCC correction to implementation of CR0986R3 | 13.5.1 | +| 2015-12 | SP-70 | SP-150604 | 1000 | 3 | B | Policy Control for remote UE behind relay UE | 13.6.0 | +| 2015-12 | SP-70 | SP-150607 | 1002 | 3 | F | Bearer binding, usage monitoring and other impacts due to NBIFOM | 13.6.0 | +| 2015-12 | SP-70 | SP-150608 | 1004 | 1 | F | Clarify Nt Reference Point | 13.6.0 | + +| | | | | | | | | +|---------|-------|-----------|------|---|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| 2015-12 | SP-70 | SP-150614 | 1006 | 1 | F | Update of the PCC rules during the addition of an access procedure | 13.6.0 | +| 2015-12 | SP-70 | SP-150617 | 1007 | 1 | F | Conveying to the EPC the IMEI of devices accessing a trusted or untrusted WLAN | 13.6.0 | +| 2015-12 | SP-70 | SP-150613 | 1008 | 1 | F | Transfer of User Location Information at Create Session Request over S2b | 13.6.0 | +| 2015-12 | SP-70 | SP-150600 | 1012 | - | A | Correction of definition of QCI 65, 66, 69 and 70 | 13.6.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160162 | 1009 | 7 | B | APN AMBR change at a certain time on Gx | 13.7.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160162 | 1018 | 2 | F | Bitrate variations | 13.7.0 | +| 2016-06 | SP-72 | SP-160298 | 1013 | 7 | C | Priority sharing for concurrent sessions | 13.8.0 | +| 2016-06 | SP-72 | SP-160294 | 1021 | 1 | F | Clarification of the decision of NBIFOM mode | 13.8.0 | +| 2016-06 | SP-72 | SP-160291 | 1023 | 1 | F | Transfer of traffic steering policy control information for TSSF | 13.8.0 | +| 2016-06 | SP-72 | SP-160291 | 1026 | - | F | Corrections to FMSS related descriptions | 13.8.0 | +| 2016-06 | SP-72 | SP-160287 | 1029 | 2 | B | Update of 23.203 for C IoT | 13.8.0 | +| 2016-06 | SP-72 | SP-160294 | 1030 | 2 | F | Clarifications and Corrections for NBIFOM | 13.8.0 | +| 2016-06 | SP-72 | SP-160304 | 1022 | 2 | B | Subscription to notification of PLMN id change over Rx | 14.0.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160653 | 1025 | 3 | B | Reporting entering or leaving a set of PRAs | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160653 | 1031 | 9 | B | Support of Multiple PRAs | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160655 | 1032 | - | C | Support of sponsored data connectivity for TDF | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160655 | 1033 | 5 | B | Encrypted traffic detection by using domain name matching | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160645 | 1034 | 4 | C | Support of traffic steering control for 3rd party service function | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160651 | 1035 | 3 | B | Provision of EPC-level identities for IMS emergency sessions over Rx | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160655 | 1036 | 7 | B | Management of PFDs to PCEF/TDF | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160644 | 1037 | 1 | A | Provisioning of the Source port and ePDG IP address | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160641 | 1039 | 1 | A | Setting the RR identifier alignment with stage 3 | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160655 | 1041 | 3 | B | Architecture enhancement to support SDCI | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160655 | 1043 | 6 | B | PFD retrieval and the procedures for sponsored data connectivity enhancement | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160641 | 1045 | 3 | A | Details of PCEF Routing Rule operations | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160638 | 1050 | 2 | A | Extending the IE for application detection within the ADC Rules | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160655 | 1051 | 3 | B | Sponsored HTTP traffic detection by using domain name matching | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160658 | 1052 | 1 | B | Adding ENODEB_CHANGE event trigger | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160655 | 1053 | 3 | B | Rx enhancement for SDCI | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160646 | 1058 | 2 | B | New QCI values for V2X services | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160658 | 1060 | 2 | B | Predictable pre-emption of media flows | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160638 | 1066 | 2 | A | Overlapping IP Addresses with FMSS | 14.1.0 | +| 2016-12 | SP-74 | SP-160812 | 1070 | 1 | A | Remove "same media type" requirement for Priority Sharing | 14.2.0 | +| 2016-12 | SP-74 | SP-160818 | 1071 | 3 | F | Modification of PRA information over Gx reference point | 14.2.0 | +| 2016-12 | SP-74 | SP-160826 | 1076 | 4 | B | Introduction of 3GPP PS Data Off | 14.2.0 | +| 2016-12 | SP-74 | SP-160818 | 1077 | 3 | F | Corrections on the usage of set of PRA | 14.2.0 | +| 2016-12 | SP-74 | SP-160818 | 1079 | 1 | F | Configuration of multiple PRAs | 14.2.0 | +| 2016-12 | SP-74 | SP-160908 | 1073 | 3 | C | Service input for the setting of the ARP-PCI and ARP-PVI | 14.2.0 | +| 2016-12 | SP-74 | SP-160921 | 1068 | 5 | C | Deferred default EPS bearer QCI and ARP change | 14.2.0 | +| 2017-03 | SP-75 | SP-170052 | 1081 | 1 | C | TS 23.203 support for transport level packet marking | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-06 | SP-76 | SP-170370 | 1082 | 3 | F | Updating the description of 3GPP PS Data Off feature | 14.4.0 | +| 2017-06 | SP-76 | SP-170368 | 1086 | 7 | F | Clarification of caching time | 14.4.0 | +| 2017-06 | SP-76 | SP-170368 | 1090 | 2 | F | Corrections to handling of partial and full updates | 14.4.0 | +| 2017-09 | SP-77 | SP-170719 | 1093 | 1 | F | Correction to event trigger Data Off Change | 14.5.0 | +| 2017-09 | SP-77 | SP-170720 | 1094 | 2 | F | Corrections to PFD removal | 14.5.0 | +| 2017-09 | SP-77 | SP-170732 | 1092 | 2 | C | Enhancement on Sy reference point | 15.0.0 | +| 2017-09 | SP-77 | SP-170729 | 1099 | 2 | C | 23.203 PCEF Support for Data Off phase 2 | 15.0.0 | +| 2017-12 | SP-78 | SP-170921 | 1106 | 3 | C | Support for Unsynchronized lists | 15.1.0 | +| 2017-12 | SP-78 | SP-170926 | 1107 | 5 | B | Enhanced VoLTE performance CR for TS 23.203 | 15.1.0 | +| 2017-12 | SP-78 | SP-170924 | 1110 | 3 | C | Use of ARP priority level in addition to QCI for packet handling | 15.1.0 | +| 2017-12 | SP-78 | SP-170929 | 1111 | 2 | C | Extension on QCI for MC Video | 15.1.0 | +| 2017-12 | SP-78 | SP-170920 | 1112 | 4 | B | Introduction of new QCIs for low latency with normal reliability requirements | 15.1.0 | +| 2017-12 | SP-78 | SP-170924 | 1113 | 2 | F | Clarify MBMS and other use of PCC/QoS specification | 15.1.0 | +| 2018-03 | SP-79 | SP-180110 | 1116 | 1 | C | QCIs for URLLC | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-06 | SP-80 | SP-180472 | 1119 | 4 | A | Application detection report when the PFDs are removed | 15.3.0 | +| 2018-06 | SP-80 | SP-180496 | 1120 | 5 | F | Policy update when UE is suspended | 15.3.0 | +| 2018-06 | SP-80 | SP-180494 | 1121 | - | F | Updates to URLLC QCIs to align with SA1's updated requirements | 15.3.0 | +| 2018-09 | SP-81 | SP-180726 | 1122 | 1 | F | Corrections for low latency QCIs | 15.4.0 | +| 2018-09 | SP-81 | SP-180729 | 1123 | 1 | F | Removal of incorrect definition of WB-E-UTRAN | 15.4.0 | +| 2019-03 | SP-83 | SP-190175 | 1124 | 3 | C | New QCIs for Enhanced Framework for Uplink Streaming | 16.0.0 | +| 2019-03 | SP-83 | SP-190163 | 1125 | 2 | B | Support for Restricted Local Operator Services in 23.203 | 16.0.0 | +| 2019-06 | SP-84 | SP-190404 | 1127 | 2 | A | Multiple PFD filters, alignment with stage 3 | 16.1.0 | +| 2019-12 | SP-86 | SP-191089 | 1130 | 1 | F | Aligning TS 23.203 with the CHEM feature of SA4 | 16.2.0 | + +| | | | | | | | | +|---------|--------|-----------|------|---|---|------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 2021-12 | SP-94E | SP-211279 | 1137 | 1 | F | 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b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23204/f6e8acf9f931452d01688d311b5c0364_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ef618e8adc11b404325f4ddfec229008abf312b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23204/f6e8acf9f931452d01688d311b5c0364_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:bab0fcf54a94e89c780fb401a0af607527266ae95479a94087712a009a226f60 +size 39434 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23204/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23204/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3fa3cbc87539ad0a587631f45a35ced9af218b9f --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23204/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,2179 @@ +# 3GPP TS 23.204 V16.0.0 (2019-12) --- + +*Technical Specification* + +## **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Support of Short Message Service (SMS) over generic 3GPP Internet Protocol (IP) access; Stage 2 (Release 16)** --- + +## --- **Keywords** + +--- + +UMTS, SMS, IP, Access + +### **3GPP** + +### --- **Postal address** + +### --- **3GPP support office address** + +--- + +650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis +Valbonne - FRANCE +Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 + +### --- **Internet** + +--- + + + +## --- **Copyright Notification** + +--- + +No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. +The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. + +© 2019, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC). +All rights reserved. + +UMTS™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members +3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association + +# Contents + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 5 | +| Introduction ..... | 5 | +| 1 Scope..... | 6 | +| 2 References..... | 6 | +| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 7 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 7 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 8 | +| 4 Void..... | 8 | +| 4a Architecture Requirements ..... | 8 | +| 4a.1 General ..... | 8 | +| 4a.2 Transport-level interworking..... | 9 | +| 4a.3 Service-level interworking ..... | 9 | +| 4a.4 SMS without MSISDN..... | 10 | +| 4a.5 SMS without MSISDN interworking with Non-supporting MSISDN-less SMS UE..... | 10 | +| 5 Architecture model and reference points ..... | 11 | +| 5.1 Reference architecture..... | 11 | +| 5.2 Reference points..... | 11 | +| 5.2.1 General ..... | 11 | +| 5.2.2 C/S6c interface ..... | 12 | +| 5.2.3 Interface between the IP-SM-GW and the HLR/HSS ..... | 12 | +| 5.2.4 E/Gd/Gdd/SGd interface ..... | 12 | +| 5.2.5 ISC interface..... | 12 | +| 5.2.6 Void ..... | 12 | +| 5.3 Functional entities ..... | 12 | +| 5.3.1 IP-Short-Message-Gateway (IP-SM-GW) ..... | 12 | +| 5.3.1.1 General..... | 12 | +| 5.3.1.2 Transport-level interworking..... | 13 | +| 5.3.1.3 Service-level interworking..... | 14 | +| 5.3.2 HSS/UDM ..... | 14 | +| 6 Procedures..... | 15 | +| 6.0 General ..... | 15 | +| 6.0a SMS without MSISDN in IMS ..... | 15 | +| 6.0a.1 MO-SMS without MSISDN in IMS..... | 15 | +| 6.0a.2 MT-SMS without MSISDN in IMS ..... | 15 | +| 6.1 Registration procedure ..... | 16 | +| 6.2 De-registration procedure..... | 17 | +| 6.2.1 UE initiated..... | 17 | +| 6.2.2 Network initiated..... | 17 | +| 6.3 Transport-level interworking: Successful encapsulated Short Message origination procedure with MSISDN..... | 18 | +| 6.3a Transport-level interworking: Short Message origination procedure without MSISDN ..... | 19 | +| 6.3a.1 Initial delivery of SMS without MSISDN..... | 19 | +| 6.3a.2 Subsequent re-delivery of SMS without MSISDN ..... | 20 | +| 6.4 Transport-level interworking: Successful encapsulated Short Message termination procedure from SMS-GMSC ..... | 21 | +| 6.4a Transport-level interworking: Short Message termination procedure without MSISDN from IMS network..... | 23 | +| 6.5 Transport-level interworking: Delivery Report procedure..... | 24 | +| 6.5a Unsuccessful SM termination procedure ..... | 24 | +| 6.5b Alert Service Centre procedure when UE is available..... | 27 | +| 6.6 Transport-level interworking: Alert service centre procedure when memory capacity is available..... | 28 | +| 6.7 Service-level Interworking: IM or CPM capable UE sends an Instant Message to an SMS user ..... | 29 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| 6.8 | Interaction between transport-level and service-level Interworking..... | 30 | +| 6.8.1 | General ..... | 30 | +| 6.8.2 | IMS Originating..... | 30 | +| 6.8.3 | IMS Terminating ..... | 32 | +| 6.9 | Service-level Interworking: Concatenated Short Messages delivered as a large Instant Message..... | 32 | +| 6.10 | Service-level interworking: Status Report procedure for Instant Message to Short Message interworking .... | 35 | +| 6.11 | IM or CPM user sends an Instant Message to an SMSIP UE ..... | 36 | +| 6.12 | Delivery report for an Instant Message delivered as encapsulated Short Message ..... | 37 | +| 6.13 | Service-level interworking: IM or CPM capable UE sends an Instant Message to an SMS user with
Interworking in the terminating side ..... | 38 | +| 6.14 | Service-level interworking: IM or CPM user receives Short Message from an SMS user..... | 39 | +| 6.15 | Service-level Interworking: CPM capable UE sends a Chat session invitation to an SMS user ..... | 41 | +| 6.15.1 | IP-SM-GW in the originating network..... | 41 | +| 6.15.2 | IP-SM-GW in the terminating network ..... | 43 | +| 6.16 | Service-level Interworking: CPM capable UE tearing down a Chat session between a CPM user and an
SMS user ..... | 45 | +| 6.16.1 | IP-SM-GW in the originating network ..... | 45 | +| 6.16.2 | IP-SM-GW in the terminating network ..... | 45 | +| 6.17 | Service-level Interworking: SMS user requesting the IP-SM-GW to tear down the Chat session between
a CPM user and an SMS user..... | 47 | +| 6.17.1 | IP-SM-GW in the originating network..... | 47 | +| 6.17.2 | IP-SM-GW in the terminating network ..... | 47 | +| 6.18 | Service-level interworking: Status Report procedure for chat session message to Short Message
interworking ..... | 49 | +| Annex A (informative): | Service-level interworking: IM or CPM user sends an Instant Message to
a group list including SMS users ..... | 51 | +| Annex B (informative): | Group chat sessions ..... | 53 | +| B.1 | Service-level interworking: IM or CPM user initiates a group chat and sends an Instant Message
to a group list including SMS users ..... | 53 | +| B.2 | Service-level interworking: CPM user extends a one-to-one chat session into a group chat session.... | 56 | +| B.3 | Service-level interworking: IP-SM-GW informs SMS users about group chat participant changes.... | 57 | +| Annex C (informative): | Change History ..... | 59 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- Introduction + +The Short Message Service (SMS) has have enjoyed great success in cellular networks. At the same time, specifications have been and are being developed for extending 3GPP services to non-cellular IP Connectivity Access Networks (IP-CANs). In this same spirit, this specification describes the capabilities needed to support SMS for generic IP-CANs. + +SMS over generic IP access can be used to support applications and services that use SMS when a generic IP access is used. + +# 1 Scope + +The present document specifies the new capabilities and enhancements needed to support SMS over a generic IP Connectivity Access Network (IP-CAN) using IMS capabilities (TS 23.228 [9]). These include (but are not limited) to: + +- 1 Enhancements to the HSS; +- 2 Communication between the SMS-GMSC/SMS-IWMSC and the HSS; +- 3 Authentication of service usage and registration; +- 4 Transfer of UE Terminated SMS, UE Originated SMS, and Delivery reports; +- 5 Mechanisms to handle SMS when there is more than one IP connection active with the UE, etc. +- 6 Mechanisms to handle MT-SMS without MSISDN to IMS UE, and SMS between IMS UEs that support MSISDN-less SMS operation. + +The document also specifies the capabilities and enhancements needed to support the service level interworking for the Short Message service as defined in the TS 23.040 [2] and in this specification and the Instant Messaging service as defined in OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12]. The features supported from the IM specification are limited to the exchange of short or large immediate messages in pager mode. + +NOTE: The page-mode immediate message as defined in TS 24.247[14] is considered as a subset of OMA-TS-SIMPLE-IM-V1\_0 [12]. + +The document also specifies the capabilities and enhancements needed to support service level interworking for the Short Message service, as defined in the TS 23.040 [2] and in this specification and the OMA CPM service as defined in OMA-TS-CPM\_Conv\_Fnct-V1\_0 [17]. The features supported from the CPM specification are the exchange of short or large immediate messages in pager mode, as well as session-based messaging. + +The service requirements are described in TS 22.340 [18]. + +# 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TS 23.040: "Technical realization of the Short Message Service (SMS) Point to Point (PP)". +- [3] Void. +- [4] Void. +- [5] Void. +- [6] 3GPP TS 29.002: "Mobile Application Part (MAP) specification". +- [7] Void. +- [8] Void. + +- [9] 3GPP TS 23.228: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2". +- [10] Void. +- [11] Void. +- [12] OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0: "Instant Messaging using SIMPLE", . +- [13] IETF RFC 5438: "Instant Message Disposition Notification", February, 2009. +- [14] 3GPP TS 24.247: "Messaging service using the IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem; Stage 3". +- [15] OMA-RD-CPM-V1\_0: "CPM Requirements", . +- [16] OMA-AD-CPM-V1\_0: "CPM Architecture", . +- [17] OMA-TS-CPM\_Conv\_Fnct-V1\_0: "CPM Conversation Functions", . +- [18] 3GPP TS 22.340: "IP Multimedia System (IMS) messaging; Stage 1". +- [19] IETF RFC 4975: "The Message Session Relay Protocol (MSRP)", September 2007. +- [20] 3GPP TS 23.682: "Architecture enhancements to facilitate communications with packet data networks and applications". +- [21] 3GPP TS 23.060: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service description; Stage 2". +- [22] 3GPP TS 23.272: "Circuit Switched (CS) fallback in Evolved Packet System (EPS); Stage 2". +- [23] 3GPP TS 23.501: "System Architecture for the 5G System; Stage 2". +- [24] 3GPP TS 23.502: "Procedures for the 5G System; Stage 2". + +# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following definitions apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]: + +**Converged IP Messaging:** as defined in OMA-RD-CPM-V1\_0 [15]. Converged IP Messaging supports one-to-one, one-to-many personal communications, and also communication with Applications. + +**CPM Message:** as defined in OMA-RD-CPM-V1\_0 [15]: Information that is sent to one or more recipients. A CPM Message can contain several discrete Media (e.g. text, images, audio-clips, video-clips). + +**CPM AS:** An application server supporting the functionality of a CPM Participating Function and/or a CPM Controlling Function as defined in OMA-RD-CPM-V1\_0 [15]. + +**IM origination:** origination of an Instant Message by an IMS UE. + +**IM termination:** termination of an Instant Message by an IMS UE. + +**IMS core:** refers to the core session control elements of the IM CN Subsystem, i.e. the CSCFs, and the IBCF. + +**Instant Message:** an Instant Message as defined in the OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12] and TS 24.247 [14]. The term Instant Message is also used to designate a CPM Message. + +**Interworking Selection Function:** as defined in OMA-AD-CPM-V1\_0 [16]. The Interworking Selection Function selects an Interworking Function that should perform the actual interworking between CPM and SMS. + +**MSISDN-less SMS operation:** operation to support SMS communication without the need of MSISDN in the UE's IMS subscription profile. + +**MSISDN-less Correlation ID:** information element which consists of Receiver Identity (i.e. SIP-URI of B party), Sender Identity (i.e. SIP-URI of A party), and HLR Identity (i.e., HLR that serves the B party). + +**Non-supporting MSISDN-less SMS UE:** a UE which does not support MSISDN-less SMS operation as defined in this specification. + +**SIMPLE IM service:** the Instant Messaging Service as defined in the OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12]. + +**SM origination:** origination of a Short Message (including SMS over IP) by an SMS capable UE, as defined in TS 23.040 [2] and this specification. + +**SM termination:** termination of a Short Message (including SMS over IP) by an SMS capable UE, as defined in TS 23.040 [2] and this specification. + +**SMS:** the Short Message Service as defined in the TS 23.040 [2]. + +**SMSF:** the SMS Function as defined in TS 23.501 [23]. + +**SMSIP MESSAGE:** an immediate message as defined in TS 23.228 [9], which encapsulates a SM in its text body. + +**SMSIP UE:** a UE which supports SMSIP MESSAGE. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply: + +| | | +|----------|------------------------------------------| +| CPM | Converged IP Messaging | +| IM | Instant Message | +| IMDN | Instant Message Disposition Notification | +| IP-SM-GW | IP-Short-Message-Gateway | +| ISF | Interworking Selection Function | +| SM | Short Message | + +# --- 4 Void + +## --- 4a Architecture Requirements + +### 4a.1 General + +The SMS-IP architecture supports the following: + +- Notification shall be sent to the HSS that a previously unreachable UE is now reachable. +- Functionality is required to be able to select the domain for message delivery between IMS and CS/PS, and to have the message delivered to the selected domain. +- Functionality is required to determine whether to transform the message format or not, and to perform the transformation of the message format when determined. +- The interworking function shall generate the appropriate charging-related information and provide the appropriate online charging mechanism (if it is applied for the Short Message Service and/or SIMPLE IM services and/or CPM based services) for the interworking services. + +### 4a.2 Transport-level interworking + +For transport-level interworking , the architecture allows for the following: + +- A registration and de-registration mechanism shall be supported where UEs are required to explicitly indicate their ability to send and receive encapsulated Short Messages. +- It shall provide for the transport of Short Message Service TP layer PDUs (TS 23.040 [2]) and associated RP layer information. + +### 4a.3 Service-level interworking + +For service-level interworking, the architecture allows for the following: + +- The service-level interworking is a value added service which requires service subscription. In addition, it shall also take the operator's policy, if available, into account, e.g. checking on the barring setting of the subscriber to determine whether to provide this interworking or not, so the service authorisation shall be supported before the interworking is executed. +- The service-level interworking applies as a fallback only if the users cannot communicate with each other using their chosen messaging service according to the user preference and operator policy. The location of the interworking service can be in the originating network and in the terminating network. +- The service-level interworking shall support interworking between OMA SIMPLE IM service as defined in OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12] and Short Message Service, as defined in the TS 23.040 [2] and in the current specification. +- The service-level interworking shall support interworking between OMA CPM service as defined in OMA-TS-CPM\_Conv\_Fnct-V1\_0 [17] and Short Message Service, as defined in the TS 23.040 [2] and in the current specification. +- The service-level interworking shall take the capability of the terminating UE into account when possible. +- The service level interworking shall be transparent to the end user. +- The service-level interworking shall minimize the impact on the IMS architecture. +- The service-level interworking shall not impact existing functionality of the Short Message Service as described in TS 23.040 [2] or of the SIMPLE IM service enabler as described in OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12] or of the CPM service enabler as described in OMA TS CPM\_Conv\_Fnct-V1\_0 [17]. Existing security mechanisms for the SIMPLE IM service, the Converged IP Messaging service and the Short Message Service shall be reused. +- The interworking function shall be aware if the message should be interworked or not, e.g. specific types of Short Messages such as an over the air configuration message, shall not be interworked at service-level, but shall be instead transported as a Short Message via IMS, CS or PS. +- If an SMS user requests an SMS status report that the message was delivered to the recipient, then an SMS status report shall be generated when the message is delivered using Instant Message. +- If an IMS user requests a notification that the message was delivered to the recipient and the Instant Message is interworked to Short Message on the originating side, an SMS status report shall be interworked to a delivery notification when the message is delivered. +- The interworking functionality shall be executed in the following cases: + - Originating network: + - The sender is an IM user or a CPM user who has subscribed to the interworking function and the recipient is not routable in IMS; + - The operator policy on the originating side has been set to send the Instant Messages via Short Message Service. + - Terminating network: + +- The user preferences and/or the operator policy of the recipient have been set to receive the incoming Instant Messages via Short Message Service; +- The received message is a Short Message and the recipient is an IM user or a CPM user and has subscribed to the interworking service. + +NOTE: For ensuring the integrity of the response messages from the IM UE or the CPM UE, it is strongly recommended that in networks where the IP-SM-GW is deployed, no intermediate nodes modify or terminate the message between the IP-SM-GW and the terminating IM UE or CPM UE. If intermediate nodes are deployed, they can send response messages that do not reflect the final response from the IM UE or CPM UE. Final responses from the IM UE or CPM UE are necessary to ensure correct charging and delivery reports on the Short Message Service side. + +### 4a.4 SMS without MSISDN + +For SMS without MSISDN interworking, the architecture allows for the following in addition to clause 4a.2: + +- It shall provide for the transport of Mobile Terminating Short Message Service to UE without the need of MSISDN in the UE's IMS subscription profile. +- It shall provide for the transport of Mobile Originating Short Message Service from IMS UE that supports MSISDN-less SMS operation to other IMS UE. + +### 4a.5 SMS without MSISDN interworking with Non-supporting MSISDN-less SMS UE + +This version of the specification does not require the support of SMS communication between IMS UE that supports MSISDN-less SMS operation as defined in this specification and non-supporting MSISDN-less SMS UE. + +NOTE: It is up to implementation on the IMS network that supports the MSISDN-less SMS operation to determine how to interwork with non-supporting MSISDN-less SMS UE if required. + +# 5 Architecture model and reference points + +### 5.1 Reference architecture + +Figure 5.1 below shows the overall architecture for providing SMS over a generic IP CAN. + +![Figure 5.1: Architecture for providing SMS over a generic IP-CAN. The diagram shows a vertical stack of network elements: SME at the top, followed by SC, then SMS-GMSC / SMS-IWMSC. Below this is the IP-SM-GW, which is connected to CGF / CDF (via Rf), OCS (via Ro), HSS (via Sh, J / S6c, and Cx), and the IMS Core (via ISC). The IMS Core contains S-CSCF and P-CSCF connected by Mw. The P-CSCF is connected to the UE via the Gm interface. The SMS-GMSC / SMS-IWMSC is also connected to the IP-SM-GW via E / Gd / Gdd / SGd.](5e92d9e8e9ce204e405bff2367f88176_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + SME[SME] --> SC[SC] + SC --> SMSGMSC[SMS-GMSC / SMS-IWMSC] + SMSGMSC -- "E / Gd / Gdd / SGd" --> ISMGW[IP-SM-GW] + CGFCDF[CGF / CDF] -- "Rf" --> ISMGW + OCS[OCS] -- "Ro" --> ISMGW + HSS[HSS] -- "C / S6c" --> SMSGMSC + HSS -- "Sh" --> ISMGW + HSS -- "J / S6c" --> ISMGW + HSS -- "Cx" --> SCSCF[S-CSCF] + ISMGW -- "ISC" --> IMSCore[IMS Core] + subgraph IMSCore [IMS Core] + SCSCF -- "Mw" --> PCSCF[P-CSCF] + end + PCSCF -- "Gm" --> UE[UE] + +``` + +Figure 5.1: Architecture for providing SMS over a generic IP-CAN. The diagram shows a vertical stack of network elements: SME at the top, followed by SC, then SMS-GMSC / SMS-IWMSC. Below this is the IP-SM-GW, which is connected to CGF / CDF (via Rf), OCS (via Ro), HSS (via Sh, J / S6c, and Cx), and the IMS Core (via ISC). The IMS Core contains S-CSCF and P-CSCF connected by Mw. The P-CSCF is connected to the UE via the Gm interface. The SMS-GMSC / SMS-IWMSC is also connected to the IP-SM-GW via E / Gd / Gdd / SGd. + +**Figure 5.1: Architecture for providing SMS over a generic IP-CAN** + +NOTE: Nodes specific to the CPM functions such as ISF are either collocated with the IP-SM-GW or else are not shown. + +### 5.2 Reference points + +#### 5.2.1 General + +The clauses below describe the needed enhancements and specific considerations to existing interfaces in order to support SMS over a generic IP-CAN. + +#### 5.2.2 C/S6c interface + +The C or S6c interface allows the SMS-GMSC, using MAP or a Diameter based protocol, to obtain the address of the IP-Message-GW via mechanisms described in clause 5.3. + +#### 5.2.3 Interface between the IP-SM-GW and the HLR/HSS + +The interface(s) between the IP-SM-GW and the HLR/HSS is used for: + +- Supporting the registration and de-registration from the IP-SM-GW to the HLR/HSS for SMS delivery. +- Forwarding of the Send Routeing Information for Short Message requests from HLR/HSS to IP-SM-GW in order to return the address where the SM should be forwarded. +- Interrogating the HLR/HSS using Send Routeing Information for Short Message to retrieve the IMSI and the current MSC, SGSN, MME and/or SMSF addresses. +- Informing the HLR/HSS when a memory capacity exceeded condition ceases. +- Retrieving SMS related data from the HLR/HSS: subscriber data of the short message service similar to the data for the current CS/PS domain and additional service data on the service authorisation of the encapsulated short message delivery via IMS, SC address for service-level interworking from Instant Message to Short Message if the SC address is stored in the HLR/HSS. + +Both a Sh interface and either a J or S6c interface can be deployed between the IP-SM-GW and the HLR/HSS. During the functional allocation the change on existing MAP functions, when used, should be minimized. The deployment of the J or S6c interface is mandatory, since it is used for forwarding the SRI for SM message. + +#### 5.2.4 E/Gd/Gdd/SGd interface + +The E/Gd/Gdd/SGd interface allows the IP-SM-GW to connect to the SMS-GMSC, appearing to the SMS-GMSC as an MSC, SGSN, MME or SMSF. + +For interworking with SMS in MME as defined in TS 23.272 [22], Annex C, an IWF may be used as described in that clause. + +For interworking with an SGSN supporting the Gdd interface, an IWF may be used as described in TS 23.060 [21]. + +#### 5.2.5 ISC interface + +The ISC interface allows the IP-SM-GW to forward the receiving message to the SIP based UE via IMS core. + +#### 5.2.6 Void + +### 5.3 Functional entities + +#### 5.3.1 IP-Short-Message-Gateway (IP-SM-GW) + +#### 5.3.1.1 General + +The IP-SM-GW shall provide the protocol interworking for delivery of the short message between the IP-based UE and the SMS-SC. The message is routed to the SMS-SC for delivery to the SMS-based user or the message is received from the SMS-SC of an SMS-based UE for delivery to an IP-based UE. + +The general functions of the IP-SM-GW are: + +- to determine the domain (CS/PS or IMS) for delivery of a Short Message; + +- to connect to the SMS-GMSC using established MAP or Diameter based protocols, appearing to the SMS-GMSC as an MSC, SGSN, MME or SMSF using the E, Gd/Gdd or SGd interfaces; +- to respond to Send Routeing Information for Short Message requests made by the SMS-GMSC, and forwarded from the HSS, with its own address; +- to connect to the SMS-IWMSC using established MAP or Diameter based protocols, appearing to the SMS-IWMSC as an MSC, SGSN, MME or SMSF using the E, Gd/Gdd or SGd interfaces; +- to connect to the HSS using established MAP or Diameter based protocols , to obtain the address of MSC/SGSN/MME/SMSF address(es) for SM termination in CS/PS; + +NOTE: The IP-SM-GW need not support all of the functionality defined in MAP in TS 29.002 [6]. + +- to acquire and maintain knowledge of the association between the MSISDN, IMSI and the address of the S-CSCF serving of the user; +- to check that it has a valid address in SMS for the sender as well as the recipient when receiving an IMS message for an SMS user. The IP-SM-GW shall obtain a valid address for both from the SIP headers of the IMS message (e.g. the sender would be identified in the asserted id in form of TEL URI); +- for terminating procedures: + - if TEL URI is available, it maps the recipient's address from an MSISDN/IMSI to TEL URI format when receiving an SMS for an IP-based UE, and then it is the responsibility of the IMS core to perform any further mapping towards a SIP URI as required; + - if TEL URI is not available, it maps the recipient's address from an IMSI to SIP URI format when receiving an SMS for an IP-based UE. +- to act as an Application Server towards the IMS core; +- to perform domain selection to choose the appropriate domain to deliver a message to a recipient and to obtain the MSC, SGSN, MME and/or SMSF addresses from the HSS; and +- to manage flags indicating user availability for SMS termination in the HSS and in IP-SM-GW. +- for MSISDN-less SMS operation: + - if the recipient is not addressed with MSISDN but with SIP-URI, the originating IP-SM-GW sends the SM toward to the target IMS network, + - if delivery to target UE failed, the terminating IP-SM-GW returns MSISDN-less correlation ID to allow the originating IMS network to retry later, + - if originating IP-SM-GW receives temporary delivery failure with MSISDN-less correlation ID from target IMS network, it forwards the SM along with the MSISDN-less correlation ID to SMSC for store and forwarding. + +#### 5.3.1.2 Transport-level interworking + +The additional functions of the IP-SM-GW when interworking is done by carrying encapsulated Short Messages in IMS messages are: + +- to communicate with the UE using IMS messaging as transport while maintaining the format and functionality of the Short Message; +- to carry the SMS status messages as encapsulated bodies of IMS messages; +- to store the subscriber data of the short message service similar to the data for the current CS/PS domain and to perform the short message authorization as performed by the MSC/SGSN/MME/SMSF, as well as to store additional service data on the service authorisation of the encapsulated Short Message delivery via IMS and to perform the service authorization. + +NOTE 1: The short message subscriber data of the CS/PS domain and additional service data on the authorisation of encapsulated Short Message delivery via IMS are retrieved from the HLR/HSS via third party registration procedure as specified in the clause 6.1. The IP-SM-GW can request the HSS to send a notification whenever the subscriber data and/or additional service data is updated, which the IP-SM-GW can then retrieve. + +NOTE 2: The mechanism for prioritizing whether the short message is delivered via a GSM/UMTS or other IP-CAN connection when the terminal is simultaneously connected to both access networks is outside the scope of this specification. + +#### 5.3.1.3 Service-level interworking + +The additional functions of the IP-SM-GW when service-level interworking is done between Short Messages and Instant Messages in IMS are: + +- to determine whether to transform the message format or not, and to perform the transformation of the message format when determined. +- to use the SC address retrieved either as part of the subscriber data from the HSS at registration or as provisioned by configuration, when transforming the Instant Message into Short Message. +- to perform the authorization for service-level interworking. + +The additional functions of the IP-SM-GW when service-level interworking is done between Short Messages and CPM Messages in IMS are the same as functions performed for Instant Messages in IMS and additionally: + +- to translate a chat session invitation to a short message including instructions for the SMS user how to react (accept/reject) the chat session invitation, if operator policy mandates the consent of the SMS user. Otherwise the IP-SM-GW shall respond a chat session invitation on behalf of the SMS user (accept/reject), according to operator policy; +- to translate the SMS user's answer to a chat session invitation to a proper response for the chat session invitation request; +- to inform SMS user about the changes of group chat session parameters; +- to translate a chat session teardown request to a short message, if operator policy mandates it; and +- to translate the SMS user's request to leave a chat session to a proper CPM request. + +#### 5.3.2 HSS/UDM + +In order to support SMS over generic IP access, the HSS/UDM shall support the following functions: + +- storing the pre-configured address of the IP-SM-GW on a subscriber basis; + +NOTE: If all subscribers are assigned to a single IP-SM-GW address, the IP-SM-GW address does not need to be pre-configured in the HSS. + +- handling an indication that the terminal is registered with an IP-SM-GW for delivery of SMS; +- storing the SMSF address when the SMSF registers with the UDM as specified in TS 23.502 [24]; +- responding to the "send routing information for short message" query from IP-SM-GW with the address of the MSC/SGSN/MME/SMSF; +- forwarding the Send Routeing Information for Short Message, from an SMS-GMSC, towards the IP-SM-GW and forwarding any responses to the originator of the Send Routeing Information for Short Message; +- returning the IMSI and the MSC, SGSN, MME and/or SMSF addresses as a response to Send Routeing Information for Short Message required from IP-SM-GW; +- alerting the SCs stored in the message waiting data when the terminal is registered with an IP-SM-GW for delivery of short message; + +- reporting notification to the IP-SM-GW of the reachability of a UE at the transport layer after a delivery failure; +- accepting delivery status reports from IP-SM-GWs instead of SMS-GMSC. + +# --- 6 Procedures + +## 6.0 General + +The clause describes the procedures for the support of transport-level interworking between Short Message service and encapsulated Short Message via IP service, for the support of the service-level interworking for the Short Message service and Instant Messaging service as defined in OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12], for the support of the service-level interworking for the Short Message service and Converged IP Messaging service as defined in OMA-TS-CPM\_Conv\_Fnct-V1\_0 [17] and for the support of receiving MT-SMS to a UE without MSISDN. Clauses only applying to either transport-level interworking or service-level interworking are indicated as such. + +NOTE: In the procedures in the following clauses, the I-CSCF, P-CSCF and ASs such as IM AS, as well as nodes specific to CPM functions such as ISF, are not shown in the figures. + +### 6.0a SMS without MSISDN in IMS + +#### 6.0a.1 MO-SMS without MSISDN in IMS + +For MO-SMS without MSISDN, the IP-SM-GW of the originating side fills the RP-OA field with a value that indicates UE is MSISDN-less to satisfy the protocol requirement. If the originating UE does not have MSISDN or the recipient UE is addressed with SIP-URI (i.e., recipient is not addressed with MSISDN) then IP-SM-GW first tries to deliver the SMS directly to the terminating IMS network. If the terminating IMS network does not accept SMS delivery without MSISDN and responds with a permanent error indication, then IP-SM-GW shall abort any further re-attempt and responds back to sender that SMS delivery has failed. + +If the terminating IMS network indicates the SMS delivery failed due to temporary reasons (e.g. UE is not reachable) and the response has included the MSISDN-less correlation ID for the recipient then IP-SM-GW forwards both the SM and MSISDN-less correlation ID to the SMSC for storage and for subsequent retries. + +#### 6.0a.2 MT-SMS without MSISDN in IMS + +For device triggering, the selection of IMS to deliver MT-SMS without MSISDN is defined in TS 23.682 [20]. + +For SMS between IMS UEs without MSISDN, the delivery of MT-SMS to the recipient is based on the identity from the SIP MESSAGE received from the originating IMS network or retrieved using the MSISDN-less correlation ID from the Forward-Short-Message received from SMSC. + +This clause describes the additional functionality required for the delivery of MT-SMS toward a UE in IMS without MSISDN. + +During UE IMS registration procedure, the serving IP-SM-GW obtains IMSI of the UE from the S-CSCF and the serving IP-SM-GW address is indicated to HSS as defined in clause 6.1 and HSS stores this IP-SM-GW address. IP-SM-GW subscribes to event registration package to receive UE's IMPU (i.e. SIP URI). UE which does not have MSISDN will have at least one SIP-URI as IMPU. When IP-SM-GW receives SM from SMSC with IMSI as the recipient address (i.e. device triggering as defined in TS 23.682 [20]), IP-SM-GW shall try to deliver the MT-SMS via IMS without retrying to other domain. + +When IP-SM-GW receives a SM from originating IMS network via SIP MESSAGE and IP-SM-GW failed to deliver the SM to the recipient and future retry is allowed and possible, then IP-SM-GW shall return a MSISDN-less correlation ID along with an indication of temporary error pointing to unsuccessful delivery attempt to the originating IMS network. This MSISDN-less Correlation ID includes sender's SIP URI, recipient's SIP URI, and HLR-Id which identifies receiver's HLR. + +## 6.1 Registration procedure + +![Sequence diagram of the Registration procedure showing interactions between HSS, IP-SM-GW (AS), S-CSCF, and UE.](16152cf1d84aea10848758f51a91ff6a_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant S-CSCF + participant IP-SM-GW (AS) + participant HSS + + Note right of UE: 1. Establishment of IP connection + Note right of UE: 2. IMS Registration + Note right of S-CSCF: 3. Check initial Filter criteria + S-CSCF->>IP-SM-GW (AS): 4. Register + IP-SM-GW (AS)-->>S-CSCF: 5. OK + IP-SM-GW (AS)->>HSS: 6. IP-SM-GW Register Req + HSS-->>IP-SM-GW (AS): 7. IP-SM-GW Register Res + Note left of HSS: 8. Check message waiting data + +``` + +Sequence diagram of the Registration procedure showing interactions between HSS, IP-SM-GW (AS), S-CSCF, and UE. + +Figure 6.1: Registration procedure + +- 1) The UE establishes IP connection. +- 2) At any time after the establishment of the IP connection, the UE registers at the S-CSCF according to the IMS registration procedures. + +NOTE 1: For simplicity, not all messages between UE and S-CSCF and between S-CSCF and HSS are shown in detail. + +- 3) S-CSCF checks the initial filter criteria retrieved from the HSS during the IMS registration procedure. +- 4) After successful IMS registration and based on the retrieved initial filter criteria, the S-CSCF informs the IP-SM-GW (AS) about the registration of the user. IMSI is informed to the IP-SM-GW (AS) when there is no MSISDN in the UE's IMS subscription profile. +- 5) The IP-SM-GW (AS) returns OK to the S-CSCF. +- 6) The IP-SM-GW (AS) sends IP-SM-GW Register Req to the HSS. +- 7) The HSS stores the received IP-SM-GW address if necessary or for MT-SMS without MSISDN (see clause 6.0a.2), uses it as an indication that the UE is available to be accessed via the IMS to trigger an Alert service centre message if the message waiting flag is set, and responds to the IP-SM-GW (AS) with IP-SM-GW Register Res. IP-SM-GW gets the IMPU (SIP URI) for SMS delivery without TEL-URI from registration event package. + +NOTE 2: IP-SM-GW Register Res can include the SC address to be used for this user in the subscriber data (see also clause 6.7). + +NOTE 3: If the IP-SM-GW address stored in the HSS via registration procedure is not the same as the preconfigured IP-SM-GW address (if any), then the short message delivery attempted during registration can be unnecessarily delayed. + +- 8) After successful registration of the IP-SM-GW address at the HSS the HSS checks whether message waiting data are stored and alerts all SCs using procedures described in TS 23.040 [2] (see also clause 6.5b). + +### 6.2 De-registration procedure + +#### 6.2.1 UE initiated + +![Sequence diagram for UE initiated de-registration procedure. The diagram shows four participants: HSS, IP-SM-GW (AS), S-CSCF, and UE. The sequence of messages is: 1. UE sends 'De-register' to S-CSCF; 2. S-CSCF responds with 'OK'; 3. S-CSCF performs an internal 'Check initial filter criteria'; 4. S-CSCF sends 'De-register' to IP-SM-GW (AS); 5. IP-SM-GW (AS) responds with 'OK'; 6. IP-SM-GW (AS) sends 'IP-SM-GW De-register Req' to HSS; 7. HSS responds with 'IP-SM-GW De-register Res'.](33a8f3f01dfa8bce75d23017855a13c5_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant S-CSCF + participant IP-SM-GW (AS) + participant HSS + Note right of S-CSCF: 3. Check initial filter criteria + UE->>S-CSCF: 1. De-register + S-CSCF-->>UE: 2. OK + S-CSCF->>IP-SM-GW (AS): 4. De-register + IP-SM-GW (AS)-->>S-CSCF: 5. OK + IP-SM-GW (AS)->>HSS: 6. IP-SM-GW De-register Req + HSS-->>IP-SM-GW (AS): 7. IP-SM-GW De-register Res + +``` + +Sequence diagram for UE initiated de-registration procedure. The diagram shows four participants: HSS, IP-SM-GW (AS), S-CSCF, and UE. The sequence of messages is: 1. UE sends 'De-register' to S-CSCF; 2. S-CSCF responds with 'OK'; 3. S-CSCF performs an internal 'Check initial filter criteria'; 4. S-CSCF sends 'De-register' to IP-SM-GW (AS); 5. IP-SM-GW (AS) responds with 'OK'; 6. IP-SM-GW (AS) sends 'IP-SM-GW De-register Req' to HSS; 7. HSS responds with 'IP-SM-GW De-register Res'. + +**Figure 6.2: UE initiated de-registration procedure** + +- 1) At any time after the registration procedure, the UE may initiate a de-registration procedure. The UE sends a De-Register request (Register request with Expires header having value 0) to the S-CSCF. +- 2) S-CSCF responds to the UE with OK. +- 3) S-CSCF checks the initial filter criteria retrieved from the HSS during the IMS registration procedure. +- 4) Based on initial filter criteria the S-CSCF informs the IP-SM-GW (AS) about the de-registration of the user. +- 5) The IP-SM-GW (AS) returns OK to the S-CSCF. +- 6) The IP-SM-GW (AS) de-registers the UE at the HSS sending a De-register Req. +- 7) The HSS de-registers the UE and responds to the IP-SM-GW (AS) with De-register Res. + +NOTE: The pre-configured IP-SM-GW address in the HSS, if any, is not removed, as it is used for subsequent SM termination. + +#### 6.2.2 Network initiated + +![Sequence diagram for Network initiated de-registration procedure. The diagram shows four participants: HSS, IP-SM-GW (AS), S-CSCF, and UE. The sequence of messages is: 1. IP-SM-GW (AS) sends 'IP-SM-GW De-register Req' to HSS; 2. HSS responds with 'IP-SM-GW De-register Res'.](90ee16ccc0ad16aeca48087797d7b07f_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant IP-SM-GW (AS) + participant HSS + IP-SM-GW (AS)->>HSS: 1. IP-SM-GW De-register Req + HSS-->>IP-SM-GW (AS): 2. IP-SM-GW De-register Res + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Network initiated de-registration procedure. The diagram shows four participants: HSS, IP-SM-GW (AS), S-CSCF, and UE. The sequence of messages is: 1. IP-SM-GW (AS) sends 'IP-SM-GW De-register Req' to HSS; 2. HSS responds with 'IP-SM-GW De-register Res'. + +**Figure 6.2a: Network initiated de-registration procedure** + +- 1) After receiving a trigger (e.g. De-Register message from the S-CSCF), the IP-SM-GW shall de-register the IP-SM-GW of a subscriber from the HSS sending a De-Register Req. +- 2) The HSS de-registers the UE and responds to the IP-SM-GW (AS) with De-register Res. + +## 6.3 Transport-level interworking: Successful encapsulated Short Message origination procedure with MSISDN + +![Sequence diagram showing the successful encapsulated Short Message origination procedure with MSISDN. The diagram involves six lifelines: SMS-SC, SMS-IWMSC, HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE. The process starts with an IMS registration/re-registration procedure between the UE and S-CSCF. The UE then sends a Message to the S-CSCF, which is forwarded by the S-CSCF to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW sends an Accepted response back to the S-CSCF, which is then forwarded to the UE. The IP-SM-GW also sends a Forward Short Message to the SMS-IWMSC, which in turn sends a Message transfer to the SMS-SC. The SMS-SC sends a Submit report to the SMS-IWMSC, which is then forwarded by the SMS-IWMSC to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW sends a Submit report to the S-CSCF, which is then forwarded to the UE. The UE sends an OK response to the S-CSCF, which is then forwarded by the S-CSCF to the IP-SM-GW.](9b9d2abd741ed4bafe7f78f89961c663_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant S-CSCF + participant IP-SM-GW + participant HSS + participant SMS-IWMSC + participant SMS-SC + + Note over HSS, UE: 1. IMS registration / re-registration procedure + UE->>S-CSCF: 2. Message + S-CSCF->>IP-SM-GW: 3. Message + IP-SM-GW->>S-CSCF: 4. Accepted + S-CSCF->>UE: 5. Accepted + IP-SM-GW->>SMS-IWMSC: 6. Forward Short Message + SMS-IWMSC->>SMS-SC: 7. Message transfer + SMS-SC->>SMS-IWMSC: 8. Submit report + SMS-IWMSC->>IP-SM-GW: 9. Submit report + IP-SM-GW->>S-CSCF: 10. Submit report + S-CSCF->>UE: 11. Submit report + UE->>S-CSCF: 12. OK + S-CSCF->>IP-SM-GW: 13. OK + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the successful encapsulated Short Message origination procedure with MSISDN. The diagram involves six lifelines: SMS-SC, SMS-IWMSC, HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE. The process starts with an IMS registration/re-registration procedure between the UE and S-CSCF. The UE then sends a Message to the S-CSCF, which is forwarded by the S-CSCF to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW sends an Accepted response back to the S-CSCF, which is then forwarded to the UE. The IP-SM-GW also sends a Forward Short Message to the SMS-IWMSC, which in turn sends a Message transfer to the SMS-SC. The SMS-SC sends a Submit report to the SMS-IWMSC, which is then forwarded by the SMS-IWMSC to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW sends a Submit report to the S-CSCF, which is then forwarded to the UE. The UE sends an OK response to the S-CSCF, which is then forwarded by the S-CSCF to the IP-SM-GW. + +**Figure 6.3: Successful encapsulated Short Message origination procedure** + +- 1) The UE registers to S-CSCF according the IMS registration procedure. Note that I-CSCF and P-CSCF are not shown in this figure. +- 2) UE submits the encapsulated Short Message (SMS-SUBMIT, SC Address) to the S-CSCF using an appropriate SIP method. +- 3) S-CSCF forwards the encapsulated Short Message (SMS- SUBMIT, SC Address) to IP-SM-GW (AS) based on stored iFC. +- 4) IP-SM-GW (AS) acknowledges the SIP message. +- 5) SIP message acknowledge is forwarded by S-CSCF to UE. +- 6) The IP-SM-GW performs service authorization based on the stored subscriber data as described in the clause 6.1. The IP-SM-GW shall check whether the subscriber is authorised to use the short message service (e.g. Operator Determined Barring settings), similar to the authorization performed by MSC/SGSN in case the Short Message is delivered via CS or PS domain. In addition, the IP-SM-GW shall also check whether the user is authorised to use the encapsulated Short Message delivery via IMS. If the result of service authorization is negative, the IP-SM-GW shall not forward the message, and shall return the appropriate error information to the UE in a failure report. Otherwise, the IP-SM-GW (AS) extracts the Short Message (SMS- SUBMIT) and forwards it towards the SMS-SC (SC Address) via the SMS-IWMSC using standard MAP or Diameter based (SGd/Gdd) signalling (as described in TS 23.040 [2]). +- 7) The SMS-IWMSC forwards the Short Message (SMS-SUBMIT) to the SMS-SC (see TS 23.040 [2]). +- 8) SMS-SC sends a Submit report (SMS-SUBMIT-REPORT) to SMS-IWMSC (see TS 23.040 [2]). +- 9) SMS-IWMSC sends the Submit report to IP-SM-GW (AS) (see TS 23.040 [2]). +- 10) IP-SM-GW (AS) sends the Submit report to S-CSCF, encapsulated in an appropriate SIP request. +- 11) The S-CSCF sends the Submit report to the UE. +- 12) The UE acknowledges the SIP request. + +13) The S-CSCF forwards the acknowledgement of the SIP request to IP-SM-GW (AS). + +### 6.3a Transport-level interworking: Short Message origination procedure without MSISDN + +#### 6.3a.1 Initial delivery of SMS without MSISDN + +Figure 6.3a.1 shows the initial SM delivery by IP-SM-GW during MO-SMS operation without MSISDN. + +![Sequence diagram of Short Message origination procedure for MSISDN-less operation. Lifelines: Terminating IMS network, HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, UE-A. The process starts with IMS registration, followed by message submission from UE-A to S-CSCF, then to IP-SM-GW, which accepts and reports back. S-CSCF then accepts and reports to UE-A. Finally, IP-SM-GW sends an SMS-DELIVER to the Terminating IMS network, which initiates the MT SMS procedure. Failure or success reports are sent from the Terminating IMS network to IP-SM-GW, which then reports to S-CSCF.](12de9b926df0384ec07702671827c9cd_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE-A + participant S-CSCF + participant IP-SM-GW + participant HSS + participant Terminating IMS network + + Note over HSS, UE-A: 1. IMS registration / re-registration procedure + UE-A->>S-CSCF: 2. Message + S-CSCF->>IP-SM-GW: 3. Message + IP-SM-GW-->>S-CSCF: 4. Accepted + S-CSCF-->>UE-A: 5. Accepted + IP-SM-GW->>Terminating IMS network: 6. Message (SMS-DELIVER) + Note left of Terminating IMS network: 7. MT SMS procedure + Terminating IMS network->>IP-SM-GW: 8a. Permanent failure, or + Terminating IMS network->>IP-SM-GW: 8b. Temp failure (correlation ID), or + Terminating IMS network->>IP-SM-GW: 8c. Successful delivery + IP-SM-GW->>S-CSCF: 9. Report + +``` + +Sequence diagram of Short Message origination procedure for MSISDN-less operation. Lifelines: Terminating IMS network, HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, UE-A. The process starts with IMS registration, followed by message submission from UE-A to S-CSCF, then to IP-SM-GW, which accepts and reports back. S-CSCF then accepts and reports to UE-A. Finally, IP-SM-GW sends an SMS-DELIVER to the Terminating IMS network, which initiates the MT SMS procedure. Failure or success reports are sent from the Terminating IMS network to IP-SM-GW, which then reports to S-CSCF. + +**Figure 6.3a.1: Short Message origination procedure for MSISDN-less operation** + +- 1) The UE-A registers to S-CSCF according the IMS registration procedure. Note that I-CSCF and P-CSCF are not shown in this figure. +- 2) UE-A submits the encapsulated Short Message (SMS-SUBMIT, SC Address) to the S-CSCF using an appropriate SIP method. Since recipient does not have MSISDN, the UE-A fills the TP-DA field with value that indicates recipient UE is addressed without MSISDN, and indicates recipient's SIP URI in SIP MESSAGE (e.g. UE-A sets the R-URI to PSI (SMSC address) and the To header with recipient's SIP URI in the MESSAGE). Based on the existing procedure, P-CSCF fills the UE-A's default URI to p-asserted-identity before sending the MESSAGE to S-CSCF. + +NOTE: It is up to stage 3 to define how recipient's SIP URI is to be indicated in the protocol level. + +- 3) S-CSCF forwards the encapsulated Short Message (SMS-SUBMIT, SC Address) to IP-SM-GW (AS) based on stored iFC. +- 4) IP-SM-GW (AS) acknowledges the SIP message. +- 5) SIP message acknowledge is forwarded by S-CSCF to UE-A. +- 6) The IP-SM-GW performs service authorization based on the stored subscriber data as described in the clause 6.1. The IP SM GW shall check whether the subscriber is authorised to use the short message service (e.g. Operator Determined Barring settings), similar to the authorization performed by MSC/SGSN in case the Short Message is delivered via CS or PS domain. In addition, the IP-SM-GW shall also check whether the user is authorised to use the encapsulated Short Message delivery via IMS. If the result of service authorization is negative, the IP-SM-GW shall not forward the message, and shall return the appropriate error information to the UE in a failure report. Otherwise, the IP-SM-GW (AS) extracts the Short Message (SMS-SUBMIT) and constructs the SMS-DELIVER and sends it towards the terminating IMS network. + +- 7) The terminating IMS network tries to deliver the SM toward the designated recipient (see clause 6.4a). +- 8) Terminating IMS network response with one of the following: + - 8a) Terminating IMS network refuses or does not allow SMS delivery with MSISDN-less operation by sending back a permanent error. + - 8b) Terminating IMS network is not able to deliver the SM to designated recipient and returns a MSISDN-less correlation ID to allow retries at a later time. IP-SM-GW then forwards the SM to SMSC for storage and forward operation (see clause 6.3a.2). + - 8c) Terminating IMS network is successfully deliver the SM toward the designated recipient. +- 9) Proper response as determined in step 8a, 8b, or 8c is returned back to UE-A. For 8a, the response indicates to the UE-A that SMS to this recipient is failed permanently. For 8b, the response is the Submit report received from the SMSC. For 8c, the response indicates a successful delivery of the SM to the recipient. + +#### 6.3a.2 Subsequent re-delivery of SMS without MSISDN + +When the initial delivery attempt failed and retry is possible (see Figure 6.3a.1 step 8b), the IP-SM-GW forwards the SM to SMS-SC for storage and forwarding operation. Figure 6.3a.2 shows the subsequent re-delivery attempt of SM by SMS-SC. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 6.3a.2: Redelivery attempt of SM without MSISDN. The diagram shows five entities: IP-SM-GW (originating), SMS-SC/SMS-IWMSC/SMS-GMSC, HSS-B, IP-SM-GW (terminating), and UE-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. Forward SM (SMS-SUBMIT, Correlation ID) from IP-SM-GW (originating) to SMS-SC/SMS-IWMSC/SMS-GMSC. 2a. Alert received from HSS, HSS query for serving node info (between SMS-SC and HSS-B). 2b. ForwardShortMsg (RP-OA=SMSC-A, RP-DA=B's IP-SM-GW, TP-OA=dummy, SMS-DELIVER, Correlation ID) from SMS-SC/SMS-IWMSC/SMS-GMSC to IP-SM-GW (terminating). 3. SIP MESSAGE (FROM: A's SIP URI, R-URI/TO: B's SIP URI, RP-OA=SMSC-A, TP-OA=dummy, SMS-DELIVER) from IP-SM-GW (terminating) to UE-B.](2eb23c2210154279f8013a1594fbcc5a_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant IP-SM-GW-O as IP-SM-GW (originating) + participant SMS-SC as SMS-SC/SMS-IWMSC/SMS-GMSC + participant HSS-B as HSS-B + participant IP-SM-GW-T as IP-SM-GW (terminating) + participant UE-B as UE-B + + IP-SM-GW-O->>SMS-SC: 1. Forward SM (SMS-SUBMIT, Correlation ID) + Note over SMS-SC, HSS-B: 2a. Alert received from HSS, +HSS query for serving node info + SMS-SC->>IP-SM-GW-T: 2b. ForwardShortMsg (RP-OA=SMSC-A, RP-DA=B's IP-SM-GW, +TP-OA=dummy, SMS-DELIVER, Correlation ID) + IP-SM-GW-T->>UE-B: 3. SIP MESSAGE (FROM: A's SIP URI, R-URI/TO: B's SIP URI, +RP-OA=SMSC-A, TP-OA=dummy, SMS-DELIVER) + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure 6.3a.2: Redelivery attempt of SM without MSISDN. The diagram shows five entities: IP-SM-GW (originating), SMS-SC/SMS-IWMSC/SMS-GMSC, HSS-B, IP-SM-GW (terminating), and UE-B. The sequence of messages is: 1. Forward SM (SMS-SUBMIT, Correlation ID) from IP-SM-GW (originating) to SMS-SC/SMS-IWMSC/SMS-GMSC. 2a. Alert received from HSS, HSS query for serving node info (between SMS-SC and HSS-B). 2b. ForwardShortMsg (RP-OA=SMSC-A, RP-DA=B's IP-SM-GW, TP-OA=dummy, SMS-DELIVER, Correlation ID) from SMS-SC/SMS-IWMSC/SMS-GMSC to IP-SM-GW (terminating). 3. SIP MESSAGE (FROM: A's SIP URI, R-URI/TO: B's SIP URI, RP-OA=SMSC-A, TP-OA=dummy, SMS-DELIVER) from IP-SM-GW (terminating) to UE-B. + +**Figure 6.3a.2: Redelivery attempt of SM without MSISDN** + +- 1) IP-SM-GW forwards the SM along with the MSISDN-less correlation ID received in step 8b of figure 6.3a.1 to SMS-SC/SMS-IWMSC. +- 2a) SMS-SC/SMS-GMSC receives a trigger to re-deliver the SMS from HSS (see clause 6.5b) and queries the HSS for serving node information using the recipient's SIP URI and HLR-id from the MSISDN-less correlation ID. +- 2b) SMS-GMSC forwards the SM along with the MSISDN-less correlation ID to the IP-SM-GW using the address (i.e. IP-SM-GW of UE-B) received from HSS in step 2a. +- 3) IP-SM-GW (terminating) delivers SM to UE-B via the SIP MESSAGE. + +## 6.4 Transport-level interworking: Successful encapsulated Short Message termination procedure from SMS-GMSC + +![Sequence diagram showing the successful encapsulated Short Message termination procedure from SMS-GMSC. The diagram involves six lifelines: SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE. The procedure starts with IMS Registration/Re-registration (1) from UE to HLR/HSS. Then, SMS-SC sends a Message transfer (2) to SMS-GMSC. SMS-GMSC then performs routing information retrieval (3a-3c) via HLR/HSS and IP-SM-GW, or skips interrogation (3d) if pre-configured. Alternatively, it can retrieve routing info from HLR/HSS (3e-3f). Next, SMS-GMSC forwards the Short Message (4) to IP-SM-GW, which performs domain selection (5). The message is then passed to S-CSCF (6) and finally to the UE (7). The UE sends an OK (8) to S-CSCF, which in turn sends an OK (9) back to IP-SM-GW.](a3472689858b068ef469213682965325_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant S-CSCF + participant IP-SM-GW + participant HLR/HSS + participant SMS-GMSC + participant SMS-SC + + Note right of UE: 1. IMS Registration / Re-registration procedure + SMS-SC->>SMS-GMSC: 2. Message transfer + Note right of SMS-GMSC: 3a. Routeing Info + SMS-GMSC->>HLR/HSS: 3a. Routeing Info + Note right of HLR/HSS: 3b. Routeing Info + HLR/HSS->>IP-SM-GW: 3b. Routeing Info + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 3c. Routeing Info + IP-SM-GW->>SMS-GMSC: 3c. Routeing Info + Note right of SMS-GMSC: Or: 3d. Skip Interrogation + Note right of SMS-GMSC: Or: 3e. Routeing Info + SMS-GMSC->>HLR/HSS: 3e. Routeing Info + Note right of HLR/HSS: 3f. Routeing Info + HLR/HSS->>SMS-GMSC: 3f. Routeing Info + SMS-GMSC->>IP-SM-GW: 4. Forward Short Message + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 5. Perform domain selection + IP-SM-GW->>S-CSCF: 6. Message + S-CSCF->>UE: 7. Message + UE->>S-CSCF: 8. OK + S-CSCF->>IP-SM-GW: 9. OK + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the successful encapsulated Short Message termination procedure from SMS-GMSC. The diagram involves six lifelines: SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE. The procedure starts with IMS Registration/Re-registration (1) from UE to HLR/HSS. Then, SMS-SC sends a Message transfer (2) to SMS-GMSC. SMS-GMSC then performs routing information retrieval (3a-3c) via HLR/HSS and IP-SM-GW, or skips interrogation (3d) if pre-configured. Alternatively, it can retrieve routing info from HLR/HSS (3e-3f). Next, SMS-GMSC forwards the Short Message (4) to IP-SM-GW, which performs domain selection (5). The message is then passed to S-CSCF (6) and finally to the UE (7). The UE sends an OK (8) to S-CSCF, which in turn sends an OK (9) back to IP-SM-GW. + +**Figure 6.4: Successful encapsulated Short Message termination procedure** + +- 1) The UE registers to the S-CSCF according to the IMS registration procedure. + - 2) The SMS-SC forwards the Short Message (SMS-DELIVER) to the SMS-GMSC. + - 3) Steps 3a to 3c are performed if SMS GMSC interrogates the HSS with MSISDN. For MT-SMS without MSISDN as defined in clause 6.0a, step 3d is performed if an IP-SM-GW address is available and need not be retrieved, and steps 3e to 3f are performed if an IP-SM-GW address needs to be retrieved. +- 3a) The SMS-GMSC interrogates the HSS (using MSISDN) to retrieve routeing information. Based on the pre-configured IP-SM-GW address for the user, the HSS forwards the request to the corresponding IP-SM-GW. + +NOTE 1: The Send Routeing Info for SM request is not forwarded if it has been sent originally from the IP-SM-GW. + +NOTE 2: If there is only a single IP-SM-GW address, the IP-SM-GW address does not need to be pre-configured in the HSS, the Send Routeing Info for SM request can be forwarded on the STP level. + +3b) The HLR/HSS returns the addresses of the current MSC, SGSN, MME or SMSF to the IP-SM-GW for delivery of the Short Message in CS/PS domain. The HLR/HSS also returns the IMSI, for the IP-SM-GW to correlate the receipt of Short Message from the MT Correlation ID within the IMSI field of the Forward Short Message. + +3c) The IP SM GW creates a MT Correlation ID as per TS 23.040 [2] which associates the Send Routeing Info for SM with the subsequent Forward Short Message messages(s), and stores this along with the IMSI of the receiving subscriber. The IP-SM-GW returns only one address, which is of itself, along with the MT Correlation ID as routeing information to the SMS-GMSC. + +NOTE 3: For the case where the IP-SM-GW address is not pre-configured in the HSS, the Send Routeing Info for SM request will be forwarded on the STP level, the IP-SM-GW returns the address of itself as routeing information to SMS-GMSC upon receipt of the forwarded Send Routeing info for SM request. + +3d) Interrogation is skipped in the context of T4 device triggering if an up to date IP-SM-GW address is already available at the SMS-SC/SMS-GMSC. + +3e) The SMS GMSC interrogates the HSS (using IMSI) to retrieve routeing information. + +3f) HLR/HSS returns the addresses of IP-SM-GW, MSC (MME), SGSN and/or SMSF. If IMS is to be used for MT-SMS then continue with step 4. + +4) If steps 3a to 3c have been taken, SMS-GMSC delivers the Short Message (SMS-DELIVER) to IP-SM-GW (AS) including the MT Correlation ID received from the IP-SM-GW, in the same manner that it delivers the Short Message to an MSC, SGSN, MME or SMSF. Otherwise, SMS-GMSC delivers the Short Message (SMS DELIVER) to IP-SM-GW (AS) including the IMSI. + +5) The IP-SM-GW performs service authorization based on the stored subscriber data described in the clause 6.1. The IP-SM-GW shall check whether the subscriber is authorised to use the short message service (e.g. Operator Determined Barring settings), similar to the authorization performed by MSC/SGSN/MME/SMSF in case the Short Message is delivered via CS or PS domain. In addition, the IP-SM-GW shall also check whether the subscriber is authorised to use the encapsulated Short Message delivery via IMS. If the result of service authorization is negative, the IP-SM-GW shall not forward the message, and shall return the appropriate error information to the SMS-SC in a failure report. Domain selection function is not performed for MT-SMS without MSISDN (i.e. when IMSI is received in step 4) and IMS is used for delivery. Otherwise (i.e. when a MT Correlation ID is received in step 4), the IP-SM-GW performs domain selection function to determine the preferred domain for delivering the message according to operator policy and user preferences. The logic for selecting preferred route for message delivery is a matter of implementation. + +6) If the preferred domain is IMS, the IP-SM-GW (AS) uses the TEL-URI associated with the IMSI of the message received for the target UE to send the Short Message (SMS-DELIVER, SC Address) encapsulated in the appropriate SIP method towards the S-CSCF. If TEL URI is not available, SIP URI is used. + +7) S-CSCF forwards the encapsulated Short Message (SMS-DELIVER, SC Address) to the UE. + +8) The UE acknowledges the SIP request. + +NOTE 4: This is not yet the Delivery report. + +9) The S-CSCF forwards the acknowledgement of the SIP request to the IP-SM-GW (AS). + +### 6.4a Transport-level interworking: Short Message termination procedure without MSISDN from IMS network + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the Short Message termination procedure without MSISDN from IMS network. The diagram shows interactions between five entities: Originating IMS network, HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE-B. The process starts with IMS Registration / Re-registration (1). Then, a SIP MESSAGE (SMS-Deliver) is sent from the Originating IMS network to the IP-SM-GW (2). The IP-SM-GW then sends a SIP MESSAGE (SMS payload) to the UE-B (3). The UE-B sends a successful Ack (4a) to the IP-SM-GW, which in turn sends a successful Ack (4b) to the Originating IMS network. If there is a timeout or other non-permanent error (5a), the IP-SM-GW sends an Ack (temp failure, MSISDN-less correlation ID) (5b) to the Originating IMS network. If there is a permanent failure (6a), the IP-SM-GW sends an Ack (permanent failure) (6b) to the Originating IMS network.](844077b3034f0030b404207db0ad76b4_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant Originating IMS network + participant HSS + participant IP-SM-GW + participant S-CSCF + participant UE-B + + Note right of HSS: 1. IMS Registration / Re-registration procedure + Originating IMS network->>IP-SM-GW: 2. SIP MESSAGE (B's SIP URI, A's SIP URI, SMSC-A address, SMS-Deliver) + IP-SM-GW->>UE-B: 3. SIP MESSAGE (SMS payload) + UE-B-->>IP-SM-GW: 4a Ack (successful) + IP-SM-GW-->>Originating IMS network: 4b Ack (successful) + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 5a. Timeout or other non permanent errors + IP-SM-GW-->>Originating IMS network: 5b. Ack (temp failure, MSISDN-less correlation ID) + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 6a. Permanent failure + IP-SM-GW-->>Originating IMS network: 6b. Ack (permanent failure) + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the Short Message termination procedure without MSISDN from IMS network. The diagram shows interactions between five entities: Originating IMS network, HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE-B. The process starts with IMS Registration / Re-registration (1). Then, a SIP MESSAGE (SMS-Deliver) is sent from the Originating IMS network to the IP-SM-GW (2). The IP-SM-GW then sends a SIP MESSAGE (SMS payload) to the UE-B (3). The UE-B sends a successful Ack (4a) to the IP-SM-GW, which in turn sends a successful Ack (4b) to the Originating IMS network. If there is a timeout or other non-permanent error (5a), the IP-SM-GW sends an Ack (temp failure, MSISDN-less correlation ID) (5b) to the Originating IMS network. If there is a permanent failure (6a), the IP-SM-GW sends an Ack (permanent failure) (6b) to the Originating IMS network. + +**Figure 6.4a: Short Message termination procedure without MSISDN** + +- 1) The UE-B registers to the S-CSCF according to the IMS registration procedure. +- 2) The originating IMS network which received the SM from the UE-A forwards the Short Message (SMS-DELIVER) to the terminating IMS network. It reaches the IP-SM-GW responsible for UE-B. For brevity, the intermediate IMS nodes interactions prior to reaching IP-SM-GW are not shown. +- 3) If local policy allows MSISDN-less SMS operation, IP-SM-GW tries to deliver the SM to UE-B. +- 4a-4b) SM is successfully delivered to UE-B. A success Delivery report is sent to the originating IMS network. +- 5a) If IP-SM-GW tried to deliver the SM but encountered some error (e.g. UE is memory full, UE not reachable, etc) then: + - 5b) IP-SM-GW returns a MSISDN-less Correlation ID to originating IMS network along with an indication of temporary failure. +- 6a-6b) if the IP-SM-GW refuses the MSISDN-less SMS operation due to local policy or other permanent errors (e.g. protocol error), IP-SM-GW returns a permanent error indication to the originating IMS network. + +## 6.5 Transport-level interworking: Delivery Report procedure + +![Sequence diagram of the Delivery Report procedure](4b87467ad9642943235f48f7d4b59449_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the sequence of messages for the Delivery Report procedure. It features five lifelines: SMS-GMSC or Originating IMS Network, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE. The process begins with a grey double-headed arrow labeled '1. SM termination procedure' between the HLR/HSS and the UE. The UE then sends a '2. Delivery report' to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF forwards this as '3. Delivery report' to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW responds with '4. Accepted' to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF then sends '5. Accepted' to the UE. The IP-SM-GW also sends '6. Delivery report' to the SMS-GMSC or Originating IMS Network. Finally, the IP-SM-GW sends '7. Report SM Delivery Status' to the HLR/HSS, which in turn sends '8. Report SM Delivery Status' to the SMS-GMSC or Originating IMS Network. + +Sequence diagram of the Delivery Report procedure + +**Figure 6.5: Delivery report procedure** + +- 1) The UE has received the Short Message as described in clause 6.4 or clause 6.4a. +- 2) The UE sends a Delivery report (SMS-DELIVER-REPORT) to the S-CSCF, including either a positive or a negative acknowledgement to the Short Message received in step 1. +- 3) The S-CSCF forwards the Delivery report to the IP-SM-GW (AS). It shall be ensured that the Delivery report reaches the same IP-SM-GW that forwarded the Short Message in step 1. +- 4) IP-SM-GW (AS) acknowledges, at the SIP level, the Delivery report to S-CSCF. + +NOTE: This is the acknowledgement to the Forward Short Message in the SM termination procedure. + +- 5) S-CSCF forwards the SIP acknowledgement to the Delivery report to the UE. +- 6) The IP-SM-GW (AS) sends a Delivery report to the SMS-GMSC or to originating IMS network for MSISDN-less SMS operation. +- 7) The IP-SM-GW may send a Report SM Delivery Status to the HSS. This may trigger the Alert service centre procedure or an update of the message waiting data in the HSS as described in TS 23.040 [2], if necessary. +- 8) The SMS-GMSC may send a Report SM Delivery Status to the HSS. The HSS shall ignore the information provided in this report. + +## 6.5a Unsuccessful SM termination procedure + +When a Short Message fails to reach the UE via the selected domain, a failure delivery report is returned to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW takes responsibility to re-attempt the delivery of the message in another domain which is listed in the sequence of the priority in the IP-SM-GW while the domain selection is performed during the SM termination procedure. If the message successfully reaches the UE after re-delivery, the IP-SM-GW forwards the received successful Delivery report to the SMS-GMSC. Otherwise, if the message still fails after the IP-SM-GW has tried all selectable domains, the IP-SM-GW forwards the received unsuccessful Delivery report to the SMS-GMSC and sends Report SM Delivery Status message to the HLR/HSS. The HLR/HSS then records the corresponding Messages Waiting Data (MWD), and an Alert service centre procedure may be initiated as described in clause 6.5b or 6.6. The IP-SM-GW sets UE-Not-Reachable-for-IP (UNRI) locally as defined in TS 23.040 [2]. + +The order in which domains are selected for message delivery by the IP-SM-GW is subject to operator policy and/or user preferences and any known or assumed timer values in the SMS-GMSC for the Forward Short Message message (see NOTE 1). + +The following flow shows only an example order of selected domains, i.e. the IMS is the preferred domain, followed by the PS domain, and finally the CS domain. + +NOTE 1: If the timer at the SMS-GMSC has been configured to a short value (near to the minimum value), the IP-SM-GW may not have sufficient time to try the message delivery in all three domains. This problem can be resolved by several implementation solutions, e.g. re-configuring the SMS-GMSC timer to be longer, enhancing the IP-SM-GW to try the delivery only in two or one domain(s). + +![Sequence diagram for Unsuccessful SM termination procedure. Lifelines: SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, SGSN, MSC, MME, SMSF, UE. The procedure starts with '1. SM termination procedure' spanning from SMS-SC to UE. The sequence of messages is: 2. Delivery report (failure) from S-CSCF to IP-SM-GW; 3. Report Ack from IP-SM-GW to S-CSCF; 4. Message transfer from IP-SM-GW to SGSN; 5. Message transfer from SGSN to UE (dashed line); 6. Delivery report (failure) from SGSN to IP-SM-GW; 7. Message transfer from IP-SM-GW to MSC; 8. Message transfer from MSC to UE (dashed line); 9. Delivery report (failure) from MSC to IP-SM-GW; 10. Message transfer from IP-SM-GW to MME; 11. Message transfer from MME to UE (dashed line); 12. Delivery report (failure) from MME to IP-SM-GW; 13. Message transfer from IP-SM-GW to SMSF; 14. Message transfer from SMSF to UE (dashed line); 15. Delivery report (failure) from SMSF to IP-SM-GW; 16. Delivery report (failure) from IP-SM-GW to SMS-GMSC; 17. Report SM Delivery Status from SMS-GMSC to HLR/HSS; 18. Subscribe (UE Reachability) from HLR/HSS to SMS-GMSC; 19. Report SM Delivery Status from SMS-GMSC to HLR/HSS.](4792a2ccd62226861fadc22117edb7b1_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for Unsuccessful SM termination procedure. Lifelines: SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, SGSN, MSC, MME, SMSF, UE. The procedure starts with '1. SM termination procedure' spanning from SMS-SC to UE. The sequence of messages is: 2. Delivery report (failure) from S-CSCF to IP-SM-GW; 3. Report Ack from IP-SM-GW to S-CSCF; 4. Message transfer from IP-SM-GW to SGSN; 5. Message transfer from SGSN to UE (dashed line); 6. Delivery report (failure) from SGSN to IP-SM-GW; 7. Message transfer from IP-SM-GW to MSC; 8. Message transfer from MSC to UE (dashed line); 9. Delivery report (failure) from MSC to IP-SM-GW; 10. Message transfer from IP-SM-GW to MME; 11. Message transfer from MME to UE (dashed line); 12. Delivery report (failure) from MME to IP-SM-GW; 13. Message transfer from IP-SM-GW to SMSF; 14. Message transfer from SMSF to UE (dashed line); 15. Delivery report (failure) from SMSF to IP-SM-GW; 16. Delivery report (failure) from IP-SM-GW to SMS-GMSC; 17. Report SM Delivery Status from SMS-GMSC to HLR/HSS; 18. Subscribe (UE Reachability) from HLR/HSS to SMS-GMSC; 19. Report SM Delivery Status from SMS-GMSC to HLR/HSS. + +**Figure 6.5a: Unsuccessful SM termination procedure** + +- 1) As described in clause 6.4, the Short Message is routed to the UE via S-CSCF after the domain selection is performed in the IP-SM-GW and all the available domains have been listed in the sequence of the priority in the IP-SM-GW. The message fails to reach the UE, e.g. due to the UE not being reachable in IMS, or exceeded memory capacity of the UE. +- 2) The S-CSCF sends an appropriate failure message according to normal IMS procedure as defined in TS 23.228 [9], and sends it to the IP-SM-GW (AS) including an appropriate error value. This Delivery report is an acknowledgement to the Short Message received by the S-CSCF in step 1. + +NOTE 2: When the failure message is sent from the UE, e.g. the UE notifies the network that the UE has been unable to accept a Short Message because its memory capacity has been exceeded, the S-CSCF forwards the failure message to the IP-SM-GW (AS). + +- 3) IP-SM-GW (AS) acknowledges the failure message to S-CSCF. + +- 4) The IP-SM-GW verifies the error cause of the failure delivery report. If the error is due to exceeded memory capacity of the UE, the IP-SM-GW forwards the Delivery report (SMS-DELIVER-REPORT) back to the SMS-GMSC and the procedure continues as described in step 16. Otherwise, the IP-SM-GW forwards the Short Message to the domain which is listed in the second place in its priority list. It is supposed that the SGSN is selected. + +- 5) The SGSN delivers the message to the UE but the message fails to reach the UE, e.g. the UE is not reachable in PS domain. + +NOTE 3: If the delivery succeeds in the PS domain at this point, the procedure for successful message delivery over PS domain is described in clause 6.4. + +6) The SGSN generates a Delivery report (SMS-DELIVER-REPORT) and sends it to the IP-SM-GW, including an appropriate error value. This Delivery report is an acknowledgement to the Short Message received by the SGSN in step 5. + +7) The IP-SM-GW forwards the Short Message to the domain which is listed in the third place in its priority list. It is supposed that the MSC is selected. + +8) The MSC delivers the message to the UE but the message fails to reach the UE, e.g. the UE is not reachable in CS domain. + +NOTE 4: If the delivery succeeds in the CS domain at this point, the procedure for successful message delivery over CS domain is described in clause 6.4. + +9) The MSC generates a Delivery report (SMS-DELIVER-REPORT) and sends it to the IP-SM-GW, including an appropriate error value. This Delivery report is an acknowledgement to the Short Message received by the MSC in step 8. + +10) The IP-SM-GW forwards the Short Message to the domain which is listed in the fourth place in its priority list. It is supposed that the MME is selected. + +11) The MME delivers the message to the UE but the message fails to reach the UE, e.g., the UE is not reachable in PS domain. + +12) The MME generates a Delivery report (SMS-DELIVER-REPORT) and sends it to the IP-SM-GW, including an appropriate error value. This Delivery report is an acknowledgement to the Short Message received by the MME in step 11. + +13) The IP-SM-GW forwards the Short Message to the domain which is listed in the fifth place in its priority list. It is supposed that the SMSF is selected. + +NOTE 5: If the IP-SM-GW acquires two SMSF addresses from the HSS, the IP-SM-GW tries to deliver the message one by one. + +14) The SMSF delivers the message to the UE but the message fails to reach the UE, e.g. the UE is not reachable in PS domain. + +15) The SMSF generates a Delivery report (SMS-DELIVER-REPORT) and sends it to the IP-SM-GW, including an appropriate error value. This Delivery report is an acknowledgement to the Short Message received by the SMSF in step 14. + +16) The IP-SM-GW sends a Delivery report to the SMS-GMSC. + +NOTE 6: The SMS-GMSC is aware of the availability of the UE on only one domain (see clause 6.4), and so will not attempt redelivery to another domain after receiving a failure report. + +17) The IP-SM-GW sends a Report SM Delivery Status to the HSS with accurate results from different domains. The HSS records the corresponding MWD, i.e. the SMS-SC address which stores the un-delivered message and the failure reason which indicates that the message failed to be sent by IP-SM-GW due to the UE not being available or the memory capacity of the UE being exceeded. The IP-SM-GW sets UNRI locally. + +18) The IP-SM-GW subscribes to the HSS for a one-time notification of the UE being reachable again. The HSS records the subscription and instructs the transport layer to report when the UE is reachable. + +19) The SMS-GMSC sends a Report SM Delivery Status to the HSS. The HSS shall ignore the information provided in this report. + +## 6.5b Alert Service Centre procedure when UE is available + +When a Short Message is received in the IP-SM-GW for delivery to an IMS subscriber, the IP-SM-GW shall verify the registration status of the UE. If the UE is not registered in IMS, or is registered in IMS but does not advertise the Converged IP Messaging, SIMPLE IM or SMSIP capability, the Short Message shall not be interworked; neither at service level nor at transport level. Based on operator policy and user preferences, either the message is sent over CS/PS or an error indication is sent back to the SMS-SC. In the latter case, when the UE registers in IMS advertising the + +Converged IP Messaging, SIMPLE IM and/or the SMSIP capability at a later time, this information is sent to the SMS-SC and the delivery is attempted at that time, as an Instant Message or an encapsulated Short Message as appropriate. + +NOTE: The service level or transport level interworking of a message is prohibited as identified in the above scenario in order to prevent the possibility of the message being deferred in the terminating network. + +If the IP-SM-GW detects the UE is reachable for SMS over IP and the UE is registered with support of Converged IP Messaging, SIMPLE IM or SMSIP capability, the IP-SM-GW clears local UNRI and informs HLR/HSS that the UE is available again. + +If the HLR/HSS has recorded the MWD with a failure reason that the message failed to be sent by IP-SM-GW due to the UE not being available, once the HLR/HSS receives a message from any of the domains indicating that the UE is available again, e.g. IMSI attached, or IMS registered, the HLR/HSS initiates an Alert service centre procedure to request the SMS-SC to re-send the stored message. + +The following figure shows an example of how a deferred message is re-transmitted to an IMS UE upon the UE availability. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the Alert service centre procedure when UE is available. The diagram shows interactions between SMS-IWMSC, SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, Transport Network, and UE. The sequence starts with an 'Unsuccessful SM termination procedure' (1) from SMS-SC to IP-SM-GW. This is followed by 'IMS registration' (2a) from UE to S-CSCF. Then, 'UE reachability notification' (2b) is sent from S-CSCF to HLR/HSS. The HLR/HSS then sends a 'Notification (UE reachability)' (2c) to IP-SM-GW and a 'SM Ready message' (2d) to HLR/HSS. Next, the HLR/HSS sends an 'Alert service centre' (3) message to SMS-SC. The SMS-SC then sends an 'Alert service centre' (4) message to SMS-IWMSC. Finally, a 'Successful SM termination procedure' (5) is initiated from SMS-SC to IP-SM-GW.](6324b252294c0f5d4e34dad4a1202075_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant SMS-IWMSC + participant SMS-SC + participant SMS-GMSC + participant HLR/HSS + participant IP-SM-GW + participant S-CSCF + participant Transport Network + participant UE + + Note over SMS-SC, IP-SM-GW: 1. Unsuccessful SM termination procedure + Note over HLR/HSS, UE: 2a. IMS registration + Note over S-CSCF, HLR/HSS: 2b. UE reachability notification + Note over HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW: 2c. Notification (UE reachability) + Note over HLR/HSS, HLR/HSS: 2d. SM Ready message + Note over HLR/HSS, SMS-SC: 3. Alert service centre + Note over SMS-SC, SMS-IWMSC: 4. Alert service centre + Note over SMS-SC, IP-SM-GW: 5. Successful SM termination procedure + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the Alert service centre procedure when UE is available. The diagram shows interactions between SMS-IWMSC, SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, Transport Network, and UE. The sequence starts with an 'Unsuccessful SM termination procedure' (1) from SMS-SC to IP-SM-GW. This is followed by 'IMS registration' (2a) from UE to S-CSCF. Then, 'UE reachability notification' (2b) is sent from S-CSCF to HLR/HSS. The HLR/HSS then sends a 'Notification (UE reachability)' (2c) to IP-SM-GW and a 'SM Ready message' (2d) to HLR/HSS. Next, the HLR/HSS sends an 'Alert service centre' (3) message to SMS-SC. The SMS-SC then sends an 'Alert service centre' (4) message to SMS-IWMSC. Finally, a 'Successful SM termination procedure' (5) is initiated from SMS-SC to IP-SM-GW. + +**Figure 6.5b: Alert service centre procedure when UE is available** + +- The message is transmitted from SMS-SC to IP-SM-GW for delivery to the subscriber, possibly after transport-level and/or service-level interworking. Prior to this interworking, the IP-SM-GW shall check for UE availability. If the UE is not registered in IMS, and delivery over CS/PS is unsuccessful (see clause 6.5a), the IP-SM-GW returns an appropriate error response to SMS-SC. The SMS-SC then informs the HSS/HLR about the unavailability of the UE. After an unsuccessful SM termination procedure due to the UE being unavailable, the HSS records the MWD i.e. the SMS-SC address which stores the un-delivered message and the failure reason which indicates that the message failed to be sent by IP-SM-GW due to the UE not being available, for a subsequent Alert service centre procedure. + +At any time after the unsuccessful SM termination procedure, the UE may attach in the PS and or CS domain again, in which case a Ready for SM message from the SGSN, MSC, MME or SMSF is sent to the HLR/HSS as described in TS 23.040 [2]. The HLR/HSS initiates an Alert service centre procedure to the SM-IWMSC when the user's MWD is not NULL, and the procedure continues as described in step 3. + +- At any time after the unsuccessful SM termination procedure, the status of the UE may indicate that the UE is available due to, e.g. registration in IMS (step 2a). At that point UE-Not-Reachable-for-IP (UNRI) is updated in HLR/HSS, as described in TS 23.040 [2]. After the IMS registration is finished, the procedure continues as described in step 3. + +At any time after the unsuccessful SM termination procedure, the HSS can receive a notification from the transport layer e.g. MME that the UE is reachable again (step 2b). As the IP-SM-GW has subscribed to the event as described in clause 6.5a, the HSS shall notify the IP-SM-GW of the UE being reachable again (step 2c). If the UE is already registered in IMS, the IP-SM-GW shall then send a Ready for SM message to the HLR/HSS + +(step 2d) and the procedure continues as described in step 3. Otherwise, the IP-SM-GW discards the notification message. The procedure will resume when one of the conditions described in steps 1 and 2 is fulfilled. + +- 3) The HLR/HSS checks the user's MWD. If MWD is not Null, the HLR/HSS initiates an Alert service centre message to the SMS-IWMSC. +- 4) The SMS-IWMSC forwards the Alert service centre procedure to the responding SMS-SC. +- 5) Upon receipt of the Alert service centre message, the SMS-SC re-attempts to send the stored Short Message. The message is transmitted to IP-SM-GW and thereafter to the UE after appropriate interworking (transport-level and/or service-level interworking) is performed. The UE acknowledges the reception of the message. + +## 6.6 Transport-level interworking: Alert service centre procedure when memory capacity is available + +If the HLR/HSS has recorded the MWD with a failure reason that the message failed to be sent by IP-SM-GW due to the memory capacity of the UE is exceeded, once the HLR/HSS receives a message from any of the domain indicating that the memory capacity of the UE is available again, e.g. from the IMS, PS or CS domain, the HLR/HSS initiates a Alert service centre procedure to request the SMSC to re-send the stored message. + +The following figure only shows an example where the HLR/HSS invokes the Alert service centre procedure when the memory capacity available message is received from IMS. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the Alert service centre procedure when memory capacity is available. The diagram shows interactions between SMS-IWMSC, SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE. The process starts with a failed SM termination and message queuing in the SMS-SC. The UE then sends a 'Memory capacity available' message to the IP-SM-GW, which notifies the HLR/HSS. The HLR/HSS sends an 'Alert service centre' message to the SMS-IWMSC, which then forwards it to the SMS-SC. The SMS-SC then attempts to send the message to the IP-SM-GW.](d980a3f9608055996a07f31788baf827_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant SMS-IWMSC + participant SMS-SC + participant SMS-GMSC + participant HLR/HSS + participant IP-SM-GW + participant S-CSCF + participant UE + + Note right of SMS-SC: 1. SM termination procedure failed and message queued in SMS-SC + Note right of UE: 2. Memory capacity available + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 3. Ready for SM (Memory capacity available) + Note right of HLR/HSS: 4. Alert service centre + Note right of SMS-IWMSC: 5. Alert service centre + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the Alert service centre procedure when memory capacity is available. The diagram shows interactions between SMS-IWMSC, SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE. The process starts with a failed SM termination and message queuing in the SMS-SC. The UE then sends a 'Memory capacity available' message to the IP-SM-GW, which notifies the HLR/HSS. The HLR/HSS sends an 'Alert service centre' message to the SMS-IWMSC, which then forwards it to the SMS-SC. The SMS-SC then attempts to send the message to the IP-SM-GW. + +**Figure 6.6: Alert service centre procedure when memory capacity is available** + +- 1) If SM termination attempts (via IP-SM-GW) failed because the UE's Memory Capacity Exceeded, the message to be transferred to IP Based UE is queued in the SMS-SC. +- 2) UE sends a message to IP-SM-GW indicating that the UE has memory available to receive one or more Short Messages. +- 3) IP-SM-GW notifies the HLR/HSS of memory being available in the UE. +- 4) If the HLR/HSS receives the indication that the UE has memory available to receive one or more Short Messages, it initiates a Alert service centre procedure with the SC address and the MSISdn-Alert to SMS-IWMSC as described in TS 23.040 [2]. +- 5) The SMS-IWMSC forwards the Alert service centre message to the SMS-SC whose address was provided by the HLR/HSS in step 4. + +## 6.7 Service-level Interworking: IM or CPM capable UE sends an Instant Message to an SMS user + +![Sequence diagram for Successful IM origination to SMS procedure involving SMS-SC, SMS-IWMSC, HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE.](f6d72d7c790e7f585532140f3971639a_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant SMS-SC + participant SMS-IWMSC + participant HSS + participant IP-SM-GW + participant S-CSCF + participant UE + + rect rgb(240, 240, 240) + Note over HSS, UE: 1. IMS registration / re-registration procedure + end + UE->>S-CSCF: 2. Message + S-CSCF->>IP-SM-GW: 3. Message + IP-SM-GW->>HSS: 4. Forward Short Message + IP-SM-GW->>S-CSCF: 5. Accepted + S-CSCF->>UE: 6. Accepted + IP-SM-GW->>SMS-IWMSC: 7. Message transfer + SMS-SC->>SMS-IWMSC: 8. Submit report + SMS-IWMSC->>IP-SM-GW: 9. Submit report + IP-SM-GW->>S-CSCF: 10. Processing notification + S-CSCF->>UE: 11. Processing notification + UE->>S-CSCF: 12. OK + S-CSCF->>IP-SM-GW: 13. OK + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Successful IM origination to SMS procedure involving SMS-SC, SMS-IWMSC, HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE. + +**Figure 6.7: Successful IM origination to SMS procedure** + +- 1) The UE registers to S-CSCF according the IMS registration procedure. +- 2) UE submits the Instant Message to the S-CSCF using an appropriate SIP method. The UE may request to hide its Public User Identity from the recipient within the Instant Message, as described in OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12] or in OMA-TS-CPM\_Conv\_Fnct-V1\_0 [17]. +- 3) S-CSCF forwards the Instant Message to IP-SM-GW based on stored *iFC*. + +**NOTE 1:** Subscribers with no subscription for service level interworking will not be provided with the relevant *iFCs*. + +- 4) The IP-SM-GW shall decide whether to perform service-level interworking depending on SIP request header (e.g. Request-URI), operator policy, when the Instant Message is not routable in the IMS. If an ISF is deployed in the network, the ISF may take the decision to interwork using SMS and sends the message to the IP-SM-GW to perform the interworking. If IP-SM-GW decided to perform service-level interworking, the IP-SM-GW performs service authorization based on the stored subscriber data retrieved from the HLR/HSS at the time of the registration procedure as specified in clause 6.1. The IP-SM-GW shall check whether the originating subscriber is authorised to use the interworking service. If the result of service authorization is negative, the IP-SM-GW shall not forward the message, and shall return the appropriate error information to the UE in a failure report. Otherwise, the IP-SM-GW shall use the SC Address in the subscriber data retrieved from the HSS at registration or provisioned by configuration and translates the Instant Message to a Short Message (SMS- SUBMIT) carrying SC Address, then forwards it towards SMS-SC (SC Address) via the SMS-IWMSC (as described in TS 23.040 [2]). If the size of the content of the Instant Message is larger than the size of the content that one Short Message could transfer, the IP-SM-GW shall split the content of the Instant Message into several parts, translate them to concatenated Short Messages, and forward the concatenated Short Messages to the SMS-SC as described in TS 23.040 [2]. If the sender of the Instant Message requests to hide its Public User Identity from the recipient and operator policy allows for this, the IP-SM-GW shall anonymize the identity of the user to the recipient. Otherwise, if operator policy prohibits this, the IP SM GW shall return an appropriate error to the user. +- 5) If service authorization is successful, the IP-SM-GW acknowledges the Instant Message. +- 6) Instant Message acknowledgement is forwarded by S-CSCF to UE. + +**NOTE 2:** Steps 5 and 6 can occur anytime after the subscriber authorization check has been performed by the IP-SM-GW. + +- 7) The SMS-IWMSC forwards the Short Message (SMS- SUBMIT) to the SMS-SC (see TS 23.040 [2]). +- 8) The SMS-SC sends a Submit report (SMS-SUBMIT REPORT) to the SMS-IWMSC (see TS 23.040 [2]). +- 9) SMS-IWMSC sends a Submit report to IP-SM-GW (see TS 23.040 [2]). + +NOTE 3: The procedure can end in step 9. Steps 10 to 13 occur only if the IM user requested a processing notification in the Instant Message sent in step 2, as described in IETF IMDN RFC 5438 [13]. + +- 10) IP-SM-GW translates the received Submit report to an appropriate Instant Message, and forwards it to the S-CSCF. If the IP-SM-GW sent concatenated Short Messages to SMS-SC in step 4, the IP-SM-GW should wait for the last Submit report, and translate the last Submit report to an appropriate Instant Message, and forward it to the S-CSCF. +- 11) S-CSCF sends the translated Instant Message to the UE. +- 12) UE acknowledges the translated Instant Message. +- 13) Acknowledgement of the translated Instant Message is forwarded by S-CSCF to IP-SM-GW. + +## 6.8 Interaction between transport-level and service-level Interworking + +### 6.8.1 General + +The interaction between transport-level interworking (between SMS over CS/PS and SMS over IMS) and service-level interworking (between Instant Messaging and SMS) depends on the user subscription and authorisation, on the UE capabilities, and on operator policy. + +If a user is only subscribed to either transport-level interworking or service-level interworking, only procedures defined for the subscribed interworking may be performed. + +If a user is subscribed to both transport-level interworking and service-level interworking, but the user is only authorised for one of the interworking when the message is processed, only the authorised interworking may be performed. + +If a user is subscribed to both transport-level interworking and service-level interworking, and is authorised for both, the behaviour of the IP-SM-GW depends on the specific scenario, on the registered capabilities of the UE, and finally is defined by operator policy and user preferences. + +For a user subscribed to service-level interworking, two Application Servers in the network are normally called upon to handle an Instant Message: + +- the IM AS, defined in OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12] or the CPM AS, defined in OMA-TS-CPM\_Conv\_Fnct-V1\_0 [17]. +- the IP-SM-GW. + +The following clauses describe the different interaction scenarios. + +### 6.8.2 IMS Originating + +In the originating network, a UE sends a SIP MESSAGE (Encapsulated Short Message or Instant Message). The originating S-CSCF forwards the SIP MESSAGE to the IP-SM-GW based on the iFC. The subscription of the transport level interworking and the service level interworking applies for different iFC. However, the SIP MESSAGE is forwarded to the IP-SM-GW if the user subscribes to one of the interworking services. If there is no subscription for the interworking service, the S-CSCF continues with the subsequent iFC check. After all the originating iFC triggers have been handled, the S-CSCF attempts to route the message to the terminating IMS network. If it fails, an error is returned to the sender. + +NOTE 1: if an IM AS or a CPM AS is present in the network, Instant Messages are routed to it before going to the IP-SM-GW. + +NOTE 2: An encapsulated Short Message uses the PSI of the SC as the Request-URI. If the user is not subscribed to transport-level interworking and the IP-SM-GW is not invoked, the ENUM query fails, and an error is returned to the sender. + +When the IP-SM-GW receives the SIP MESSAGE, it shall decide which interworking should be performed based on the content of the received SIP MESSAGE, as the IP-SM-GW can distinguish between an encapsulated Short Message and an Instant Message. If an encapsulated Short Message is received and if the subscriber is authorised for the service, the IP-SM-GW maps the encapsulated Short Message to a Short Message. Similarly, when an Instant Message is received, the IP-SM-GW considers performing the service-level interworking if the service is authorized: the IP-SM-GW shall decide whether to send the SIP MESSAGE via interworking service based on SIP request header (e.g., R-URI), operator policy, when the Instant Message is not routeable in the IMS or when the IP-SM-GW is selected to handle the message. + +![Flowchart illustrating the process of performing interworking service on the originating side. The process starts with a SIP MESSAGE received by the originating S-CSCF. It then checks if there is an iFC to the IP-SM-GW (e.g., due to subscription to interworking service). If YES, it sends the message to the IP-SM-GW. If NO, it attempts sending towards the IMS recipient (an error will be returned if this fails). The IP-SM-GW then checks if this is an encapsulated Short Message. If YES, it performs transport-level interworking. If NO, it performs an ENUM query and finds the address routeable in IMS. If YES, it sends the message to the IMS recipient. If NO, it performs service-level interworking.](c0e88e4bd3a209b66ee7cb67e1cec2be_img.jpg) + +``` +graph TD; A[SIP MESSAGE received by originating S-CSCF] --> B{iFC to IP-SM-GW +(e.g. due to subscription +to interworking service) ? +(note 1)}; B -- YES --> C[Send to IP-SM-GW]; B -- NO --> D[Attempt sending towards +IMS recipient (an error will +be returned if this fails)]; C --> E{IP-SM-GW checks +whether this is an +encapsulated +Short Message ?}; E -- YES --> F[Perform transport-level +interworking]; E -- NO --> G{IP-SM-GW performs +an ENUM query +and finds the address +routeable in IMS ?}; G -- YES --> H[Send to IMS recipient]; G -- NO --> I[Perform service-level +interworking]; +``` + +Flowchart illustrating the process of performing interworking service on the originating side. The process starts with a SIP MESSAGE received by the originating S-CSCF. It then checks if there is an iFC to the IP-SM-GW (e.g., due to subscription to interworking service). If YES, it sends the message to the IP-SM-GW. If NO, it attempts sending towards the IMS recipient (an error will be returned if this fails). The IP-SM-GW then checks if this is an encapsulated Short Message. If YES, it performs transport-level interworking. If NO, it performs an ENUM query and finds the address routeable in IMS. If YES, it sends the message to the IMS recipient. If NO, it performs service-level interworking. + +**Figure 6.8.2.1: Performing interworking service on originating side** + +### 6.8.3 IMS Terminating + +When the IP-SM-GW receives a Short Message from the legacy network on the terminating side, it performs the domain selection to determine the preferred domain to transfer the short message. If the selected network is IMS, the IP-SM-GW will determine whether the transport level interworking or the service level interworking is to be performed based on the users' subscription and authorisation, and on the UE capability as indicated during IMS registration. If the user has subscribed to both services, is authorised for both and the UE has indicated its capability to receive both encapsulated Short Messages and Instant messages, the priority between the transport-level interworking and the service-level interworking is based on operator policy and user preferences. + +NOTE 1: If the incoming Short Message is interworked to an Instant Message, the resulting Instant Message could be routed to the IM AS or CPM AS before being sent to the UE. + +![Flowchart illustrating the process of performing interworking service on the terminating side for an incoming Short Message.](dbe553cf16dd14073b89a8263a428664_img.jpg) + +``` +graph TD; A[Short message received by IP-SM-GW] --> B[Perform domain selection]; B --> C{Preferred domain is IMS ?}; C -- YES --> D[Determine which interworking to perform based on user's subscription and authorisation, on the UE capabilities, and on operator policy and user preferences]; C -- NO --> E[Send towards legacy network]; +``` + +Flowchart illustrating the process of performing interworking service on the terminating side for an incoming Short Message. + +**Figure 6.8.3.1: Performing interworking service on terminating side for an incoming Short Message** + +When the IP-SM-GW receives an Instant Message, based on user subscription and authorisation for service-level interworking, on operator policy and user preferences, and on UE capability indicated during IMS registration, the IP-SM-GW may perform service-level interworking to transform the message format to SMS and deliver the message to the UE. If the user is subscribed and authorised for transport-level interworking, and based on UE capability indicated during IMS registration, and on operator policy and user preferences, the message may be delivered as an encapsulated Short Message to the UE over IMS. Otherwise, the Short Message is delivered over CS/PS. + +## 6.9 Service-level Interworking: Concatenated Short Messages delivered as a large Instant Message + +An IMS registered user with IM service or CPM service receives a concatenated short message delivered as two or more short messages. The information below describes the behaviour when the received concatenated Short Message exceeds the maximum payload size of an Instant Message. + +![Sequence diagram for Concatenated Short Messages delivered as an IM large message. Lifelines: SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, UE. The process involves IMS registration, routing info retrieval, message forwarding, service authorization, session invitation, message delivery, and session closure.](e6df2733626a85205c1db682e6259c46_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant S-CSCF + participant IP-SM-GW + participant HLR/HSS + participant SMS-GMSC + participant SMS-SC + + Note right of HLR/HSS: 1. IMS Registration / Re-registration procedure + UE->>S-CSCF: + S-CSCF->>HLR/HSS: + HLR/HSS->>S-CSCF: + Note left of HLR/HSS: + SMS-SC->>SMS-GMSC: 2. Message transfer + SMS-GMSC->>HLR/HSS: 3a. Routeing Info + HLR/HSS->>IP-SM-GW: 3b. Routeing Info + IP-SM-GW->>HLR/HSS: 3c. Routeing Info + HLR/HSS->>IP-SM-GW: + IP-SM-GW->>SMS-GMSC: + SMS-GMSC->>IP-SM-GW: 4. Forward Short Message + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 5. Check service authorization + IP-SM-GW->>SMS-GMSC: 6. Delivery report + SMS-GMSC->>HLR/HSS: 7. Report SM Delivery Status + HLR/HSS->>SMS-SC: 8. Delivery report + SMS-SC->>SMS-GMSC: 9. Message transfer + SMS-GMSC->>IP-SM-GW: 10. Forward Short Message + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 11. Check service authorization + IP-SM-GW->>S-CSCF: 12. Session invitation + S-CSCF->>UE: 13. Session invitation + Note right of UE: 14. Message delivery + UE->>S-CSCF: + S-CSCF->>IP-SM-GW: 15. Session closure + IP-SM-GW->>UE: 16. Session closure + IP-SM-GW->>SMS-GMSC: 17. Delivery report + SMS-GMSC->>HLR/HSS: 18. Report SM Delivery Status + HLR/HSS->>SMS-SC: 19. Report SM Delivery Status + SMS-SC->>SMS-GMSC: 20. Delivery report + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Concatenated Short Messages delivered as an IM large message. Lifelines: SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, UE. The process involves IMS registration, routing info retrieval, message forwarding, service authorization, session invitation, message delivery, and session closure. + +**Figure 6.9: Concatenated Short Messages delivered as an IM large message** + +- 1) The UE registers to the S-CSCF according to the IMS registration procedure. +- 2) The SMS-SC forwards a Short Message that is part of a concatenation of two or more Short Messages to the SMS-GMSC. +- 3a) The SMS GMSC interrogates the HSS to retrieve routeing information. Based on the pre-configured IP-SM-GW address for the user, the HSS forwards the request to the corresponding IP-SM-GW. +- 3b) The HLR/HSS returns the IMSI and the address(es) of the current MSC, SGSN, MME and/or SMSF to the IP-SM-GW for delivery of the SMS SM in CS/PS domain. +- 3c) The IP-SM-GW creates a MT Correlation ID as per TS 23.040 [2], which associates the Routeing Info retrieval with the subsequent Forward Short Message messages(s), and stores this along with the IMSI of the receiving subscriber. The IP-SM-GW returns to the SMS-GMSC the address of itself, along with the MT Correlation ID in the IMSI field, as routeing information. Alternatively, the IP-SM-GW may return the address(es) of the current MSC, SGSN, MME and/or SMSF, in which case, the subsequent procedure to forward the message is the same as defined in TS 23.040 [2]. +- 4) The SMS-GMSC delivers the Short Message to the IP-SM-GW in the same manner that it delivers the Short Message to an MSC, SGSN, MME or SMSF, including the MT Correlation ID received from the IP-SM-GW, in place of the IMSI. + +- 5) The IP-SM-GW checks whether the recipient is authorized for the interworking service. If the user is authorized, the IP-SM-GW recognizes that the received message is part of a concatenated Short Message and stores the received message. + +NOTE 1: The IP-SM-GW needs to have access to a persistent storage in order to aggregate all the Short Message parts. + +- 6) The IP-SM-GW acknowledges the Forward Short Message to the SMS-GMSC. +- 7) The SMS-GMSC may send a Report SM Delivery Status to the HSS. The HSS shall ignore the information provided in this report. +- 8) The SMS-GMSC sends a Delivery report (SMS-DELIVER-REPORT) to the SMS-SC. +- 9) The SMS-SC forwards the next Short Message that is part of a concatenation of two or more Short Messages to the SMS-GMSC. + +NOTE 2: If this is not the last Short Message of the concatenation, then processing continues at step 4. + +- 10) If this is the last Short Message of the concatenation, then the SMS GMSC delivers the Short Message to the IP-SM-GW in the same manner that it delivers the Short Message to an MSC, SGSN, MME or SMSF, including the MT Correlation ID received from the IP-SM-GW, in place of the IMSI. +- 11) The IP-SM-GW checks whether the recipient is authorized for the interworking service. If the user is authorized, the IP-SM-GW recognizes that the received message is part of a concatenated Short Message and stores it. +- 12-13) Once all the segments have been received, the IP-SM-GW establishes an MSRP session with the recipient's UE to deliver the message. The session invitation is sent to the recipient UE. + +NOTE 3: As a matter of implementation efficiency, the IP-SM-GW may initiate the connection towards the recipient after receiving the first Forward Short Message and passing a service authorization check. This may help prevent timeouts at the SMS GMSC (while it waits for the final Delivery report) but may also result in unnecessary session initiation signalling if there is a failure in a service check for subsequently received Short Messages. + +- 14) The IP-SM-GW delivers the message in one or more MSRP SEND requests to the recipient UE. +- 15) -16) The IP-SM-GW closes the session after message delivery is complete. +- 17) The IP-SM-GW acknowledges the Forward Short Message to the SMS-GMSC. +- 18) The IP-SM-GW may send a Report SM Delivery Status to the HLR/HSS for either of the following cases: + - setting of the Message Waiting flags when the Forward Short Message was unsuccessful; + - clearing of the Message Waiting flags in HLR/HSS when the Forward Short Message was successful, but had previously failed. + +NOTE 4: See TS 23.040 [2] for a full explanation of when the Message Waiting flags are set and unset. + +- 19) The SMS-GMSC may send a Report SM Delivery Status to the HSS. The HSS shall ignore the information provided in this report. +- 20) The SMS-GMSC sends a Delivery report (SMS-DELIVER-REPORT) to the SMS-SC. + +## 6.10 Service-level interworking: Status Report procedure for Instant Message to Short Message interworking + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the Status Report procedure for Instant Message to Short Message interworking. The diagram shows the interaction between SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE. The process starts with a successful IM to SM delivery (step 1). The SMS-SC sends a status report (step 2) to the SMS-GMSC. The SMS-GMSC then sends routing info (steps 3a, 3b, 3c) to the HLR/HSS, which returns it to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW then forwards the short message (step 4) to the SMS-GMSC. The IP-SM-GW also makes a decision on message delivery means (step 5) and sends a delivery notification (step 6) to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a delivery notification (step 7) to the UE. The UE sends an OK (step 9) to the S-CSCF, which sends an OK (step 9) to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW sends a delivery report (step 10) to the SMS-GMSC, which sends a delivery report (step 11) to the SMS-SC.](1439cb942d9e363bbb3161b5540dd8c6_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant SMS-SC + participant SMS-GMSC + participant HLR/HSS + participant IP-SM-GW + participant S-CSCF + participant UE + + Note over all: 1. Successful Instant Message to Short Message delivery procedure + SMS-SC->>SMS-GMSC: 2. Status report + SMS-GMSC->>HLR/HSS: 3a. Routeing Info + HLR/HSS->>IP-SM-GW: 3b. Routeing Info + IP-SM-GW->>HLR/HSS: 3c. Routeing Info + IP-SM-GW->>SMS-GMSC: 4. Forward Short Message + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 5. Decision on message delivery means + IP-SM-GW->>S-CSCF: 6. Delivery notification + S-CSCF->>UE: 7. Delivery notification + UE->>S-CSCF: 9. OK + S-CSCF->>IP-SM-GW: 9. OK + IP-SM-GW->>SMS-GMSC: 10. Delivery report + SMS-GMSC->>SMS-SC: 11. Delivery report + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the Status Report procedure for Instant Message to Short Message interworking. The diagram shows the interaction between SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE. The process starts with a successful IM to SM delivery (step 1). The SMS-SC sends a status report (step 2) to the SMS-GMSC. The SMS-GMSC then sends routing info (steps 3a, 3b, 3c) to the HLR/HSS, which returns it to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW then forwards the short message (step 4) to the SMS-GMSC. The IP-SM-GW also makes a decision on message delivery means (step 5) and sends a delivery notification (step 6) to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a delivery notification (step 7) to the UE. The UE sends an OK (step 9) to the S-CSCF, which sends an OK (step 9) to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW sends a delivery report (step 10) to the SMS-GMSC, which sends a delivery report (step 11) to the SMS-SC. + +**Figure 6.10: Status report procedure for Instant Message to Short Message interworking** + +- 1) An Instant Message from the UE is successfully delivered to the SMS user after service-level interworking. The original Instant Message requested a Disposition Notification. + +NOTE 1: A Disposition Notification can be requested in the message sent by the UE in step 1 as described in IETF IMDN draft-ietf-simple-imdn [13]. If the requested Disposition Notification by the IM user is a request for a read notification, the IP-SM-GW ignores the request. + +- 2) The SMS-SC sends a Status report to the SMS-GMSC. + +NOTE 2: The Status report will, from the SMS-GMSC's point of view be treated as any SM termination. + +NOTE 3: The Status report is an optional message. + +- 3a) The SMS GMSC interrogates the HLR/HSS to retrieve routing information. Based on the pre-configured IP-SM-GW address for the user, the HLR/HSS forwards the request to the corresponding IP-SM-GW. + +- 3b) The HLR/HSS returns the IMSI and the address(es) of the current MSC, SGSN, MME and/or SMSF to the IP-SM-GW for delivery of the Short Message in CS/PS domain. + +- 3c) The IP-SM-GW creates a MT Correlation ID as per TS 23.040 [2], which associates the Routing Info retrieval with the subsequent Forward Short Message messages(s), and stores this along with the IMSI of the receiving subscriber. The IP-SM-GW returns to the SMS-GMSC the address of itself, along with the MT Correlation ID in the IMSI field, as routing information. Alternatively, the IP-SM-GW may return the address(es) of the current MSC, SGSN, MME and/or SMSF, in which case, the subsequent procedure to forward the message is the same as defined in TS 23.040 [2]. + +- 4) The SMS-GMSC sends the status report in the Forward Short Message to the IP-SM-GW. + +NOTE 4: Steps 5 to 11 only occur if the original IM requested a delivery notification in the Disposition Notification. + +- 5) The IP-SM-GW translates and maps the Status report in the Forward Short Message into an Instant Message carrying a Delivery Notification as described in the IETF IMDN draft-ietf-simple-imdn [13]. The IP-SM-GW should keep the message id for a message for which IMDN was requested so it can send the message id to the UE in the IMDN. +- 6-7) The IP-SM-GW sends a Delivery Notification within an Instant Message to the S-CSCF, which sends the Instant Message to the UE. +- 8-9) The UE acknowledges receipt of the Instant Message containing the Delivery Notification to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends the acknowledgment to the IP-SM-GW. +- 10) The IP-SM-GW sends a Delivery report (SMS-DELIVER-REPORT) to the SMS-GMSC. +- 11) The SMS-GMSC sends an acknowledgement back to the SMS-SC. + +## 6.11 IM or CPM user sends an Instant Message to an SMSIP UE + +An IMS registered user with SIMPLE IM service or CPM service sends an Instant Message via service-level interworking as an encapsulated Short Message to an SMSIP UE, which did not indicate support for SIMPLE IM or CPM when registering to IMS. + +NOTE 1: Based upon user subscription and depending on network deployment, other Application Servers could be processing the incoming Instant Message before the IP-SM-GW. The behaviour of the IM AS is described in OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12]. The behaviour of the CPM AS is described in OMA-TS-CPM\_Conv\_Fnct-V1\_0 [17]. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the successful UE termination Instant Message to encapsulated Short Message procedure. The diagram shows five lifelines: IM or CPM UE, S-CSCF#1, S-CSCF#2, IP-SM-GW, and SMSIP UE. The sequence of messages is: 1. Message (UE to S-CSCF#1), 2. Message (S-CSCF#1 to S-CSCF#2), 3. Message (S-CSCF#2 to IP-SM-GW), 4. Check service authorisation (IP-SM-GW internal), 5. Message (IP-SM-GW to S-CSCF#2), 6. Message (S-CSCF#2 to SMSIP UE), 7. OK (SMSIP UE to S-CSCF#2), 8. OK (S-CSCF#2 to IP-SM-GW), 9. OK (IP-SM-GW to S-CSCF#2), 10. OK (S-CSCF#2 to S-CSCF#1), 11. OK (S-CSCF#1 to UE).](3ad00ce93ad9dea9ee0f47535e5355e6_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE as IM or CPM UE + participant S1 as S-CSCF#1 + participant S2 as S-CSCF#2 + participant GW as IP-SM-GW + participant SMSIP as SMSIP UE + + Note right of GW: 4. Check service authorisation + + UE->>S1: 1. Message + S1->>S2: 2. Message + S2->>GW: 3. Message + GW->>S2: 5. Message + S2->>SMSIP: 6. Message + SMSIP->>S2: 7. OK + S2->>GW: 8. OK + GW->>S2: 9. OK + S2->>S1: 10. OK + S1->>UE: 11. OK + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the successful UE termination Instant Message to encapsulated Short Message procedure. The diagram shows five lifelines: IM or CPM UE, S-CSCF#1, S-CSCF#2, IP-SM-GW, and SMSIP UE. The sequence of messages is: 1. Message (UE to S-CSCF#1), 2. Message (S-CSCF#1 to S-CSCF#2), 3. Message (S-CSCF#2 to IP-SM-GW), 4. Check service authorisation (IP-SM-GW internal), 5. Message (IP-SM-GW to S-CSCF#2), 6. Message (S-CSCF#2 to SMSIP UE), 7. OK (SMSIP UE to S-CSCF#2), 8. OK (S-CSCF#2 to IP-SM-GW), 9. OK (IP-SM-GW to S-CSCF#2), 10. OK (S-CSCF#2 to S-CSCF#1), 11. OK (S-CSCF#1 to UE). + +**Figure 6.11: Successful UE termination Instant Message to encapsulated Short Message procedure** + +- 1) IM or CPM UE sends an Instant Message to the S-CSCF#1. The UE may request to hide its Public User Identity from the recipient within the Instant Message, as described in OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12] and in OMA-TS-CPM\_Conv\_Fnct-V1\_0 [17]. +- 2) The S-CSCF#1 forwards the Instant Message to the S-CSCF#2. +- 3) The S-CSCF#2 forwards the Instant Message to the IP-SM-GW based on iFC. +- 4) Based on user subscription and authorisation for service-level interworking, on operator policy and user preferences, and on UE capability indicated during IMS registration, the IP-SM-GW shall decide whether to perform service-level interworking. If the user is subscribed and authorised for transport-level interworking, and based on UE capability indicated during IMS registration, and on operator policy and user preferences, the + +message may be delivered as an encapsulated Short Message to the UE over IMS. Otherwise, the Short Message is delivered over CS/PS, as described in clause 6.13. If the sender of the Instant Message requests to hide its Public User Identity from the recipient and operator policy allows for this, the IP-SM-GW shall anonymise the identity of the user to the recipient. Otherwise, if operator policy prohibits this, the IP-SM-GW shall return an appropriate error to the user. + +NOTE 2: If a delivery notification was requested in the message sent by the UE in step 1 as described in IETF IMDN RFC 5438 [13], the procedure for delivery report described in clause 6.12 applies. Otherwise IP-SM-GW will just acknowledge, at the SIP level, the Delivery report received from the SMSIP UE. + +- 5) The IP-SM-GW forwards the encapsulated Short Message to the S-CSCF#2. +- 6) The S-CSCF#2 forwards the encapsulated Short Message to the SMSIP UE. +- 7) The SMSIP UE acknowledges the translated encapsulated Short Message. +- 8) The S-CSCF forwards the acknowledgement of the translated encapsulated Short Message to the IP-SM-GW. +- 9-11) The IP-SM-GW forwards the acknowledgement of the translated encapsulated Short Message to the originating IM UE or CPM UE. + +## 6.12 Delivery report for an Instant Message delivered as encapsulated Short Message + +This procedure follows the procedure described in clause 6.11, when the original Instant Message included a delivery notification request. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 6.12: Delivery report after a successful Instant Message to encapsulated Short Message procedure. The diagram shows five lifelines: IM or CPM UE, S-CSCF#1, S-CSCF#2, IP-SM-GW, and SMSIP UE. The sequence of messages is: 1. Delivery report (SMSIP UE to S-CSCF#2), 2. Delivery report (S-CSCF#2 to IP-SM-GW), 3. Accepted (IP-SM-GW to S-CSCF#2), 4. Accepted (S-CSCF#2 to SMSIP UE), 5. Message (IP-SM-GW to S-CSCF#2), 6. Message (S-CSCF#2 to S-CSCF#1), 7. Message (S-CSCF#1 to IM or CPM UE), 8. OK (IM or CPM UE to S-CSCF#1), 9. OK (S-CSCF#1 to S-CSCF#2), 10. OK (S-CSCF#2 to IP-SM-GW).](f6e8acf9f931452d01688d311b5c0364_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant IM or CPM UE + participant S-CSCF#1 + participant S-CSCF#2 + participant IP-SM-GW + participant SMSIP UE + + Note right of SMSIP UE: 1. Delivery report + SMSIP UE->>S-CSCF#2: 1. Delivery report + Note right of S-CSCF#2: 2. Delivery report + S-CSCF#2->>IP-SM-GW: 2. Delivery report + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 3. Accepted + IP-SM-GW->>S-CSCF#2: 3. Accepted + Note right of S-CSCF#2: 4. Accepted + S-CSCF#2->>SMSIP UE: 4. Accepted + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 5. Message + IP-SM-GW->>S-CSCF#2: 5. Message + Note right of S-CSCF#2: 6. Message + S-CSCF#2->>S-CSCF#1: 6. Message + Note right of S-CSCF#1: 7. Message + S-CSCF#1->>IM or CPM UE: 7. Message + Note right of IM or CPM UE: 8. OK + IM or CPM UE->>S-CSCF#1: 8. OK + Note right of S-CSCF#1: 9. OK + S-CSCF#1->>S-CSCF#2: 9. OK + Note right of S-CSCF#2: 10. OK + S-CSCF#2->>IP-SM-GW: 10. OK + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure 6.12: Delivery report after a successful Instant Message to encapsulated Short Message procedure. The diagram shows five lifelines: IM or CPM UE, S-CSCF#1, S-CSCF#2, IP-SM-GW, and SMSIP UE. The sequence of messages is: 1. Delivery report (SMSIP UE to S-CSCF#2), 2. Delivery report (S-CSCF#2 to IP-SM-GW), 3. Accepted (IP-SM-GW to S-CSCF#2), 4. Accepted (S-CSCF#2 to SMSIP UE), 5. Message (IP-SM-GW to S-CSCF#2), 6. Message (S-CSCF#2 to S-CSCF#1), 7. Message (S-CSCF#1 to IM or CPM UE), 8. OK (IM or CPM UE to S-CSCF#1), 9. OK (S-CSCF#1 to S-CSCF#2), 10. OK (S-CSCF#2 to IP-SM-GW). + +**Figure 6.12: Delivery report after a successful Instant Message to encapsulated Short Message procedure** + +NOTE: An encapsulated Short Message has been sent successfully according to the procedure described in clause 6.11 before the procedure below can be performed. + +- 1-2) The SMSIP UE has received the Short Message as described in clause 6.11 and sends a Delivery report (SMS-DELIVER-REPORT) to the IP-SM-GW via the S-CSCF. +- 3-4) The IP-SM-GW acknowledges, at the SIP level, the Delivery report to the SMSIP UE via the S-CSCF. +- 5-7) The IP-SM-GW sends a Delivery Notification to the IM UE or CPM UE. +- 8-10) The IM UE or CPM UE acknowledges the reception of the Delivery Notification. + +## 6.13 Service-level interworking: IM or CPM capable UE sends an Instant Message to an SMS user with Interworking in the terminating side + +This procedure describes the delivery of an Instant Message to a registered or an un-registered IMS subscriber. For the unregistered case, the S-CSCF forwards the Instant Message to the IP-SM-GW based on the unregistered iFC of the subscriber. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the successful IM terminating to SMS procedure with interworking in the terminating side. The diagram shows the flow of messages between an IM or CPM UE, S-CSCF#1, S-CSCF#2, IM or CPM AS, IP-SM-GW, HLR/HSS, MSC/SGSN/MME/SMSF, and UE.](9b6b5924b48bf2fd5f347f88f06f45b3_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE as IM or CPM UE + participant S1 as S-CSCF#1 + participant S2 as S-CSCF#2 + participant AS as IM or CPM AS + participant GW as IP-SM-GW + participant HSS as HLR/HSS + participant MSC as MSC/SGSN/MME/SMSF + participant TargetUE as UE + + Note right of AS: 4. Invoke terminating IM services + Note right of GW: 7. Service authorisation and domain selection + + UE->>S1: 1. Message + S1->>S2: 2. Message + S2->>AS: 3. Message + AS->>S2: 5a. Message + AS->>GW: 5b. Message + S2->>GW: 6. Message + GW->>HSS: 8. Routing Info + HSS->>GW: + GW->>MSC: 9. Forward Short Message + MSC->>TargetUE: 10. Message Transfer + TargetUE->>MSC: 11. Delivery report + MSC->>GW: 12. Delivery report + GW->>S2: 13. OK + S2->>AS: 14. OK + AS->>S2: 15. OK + S2->>S1: 16. OK + S1->>UE: 17. OK + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the successful IM terminating to SMS procedure with interworking in the terminating side. The diagram shows the flow of messages between an IM or CPM UE, S-CSCF#1, S-CSCF#2, IM or CPM AS, IP-SM-GW, HLR/HSS, MSC/SGSN/MME/SMSF, and UE. + +**Figure 6.13: Successful IM terminating to SMS procedure with Interworking in the Terminating Side** + +- 1) UE submits an Instant Message, destined to another IM user or CPM user in another IMS domain, using an appropriate SIP method. The UE may request to hide its Public User Identity from the recipient within the Instant Message, as described in OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12] and in OMA-TS-CPM\_Conv\_Fnct-V1\_0 [17]. +- 2) The S-CSCF resolves the destination domain and routes the message towards the S-CSCF in the terminating network ("Terminating S-CSCF"). +- 3) The terminating S-CSCF forwards the Instant Message to the IM AS ("Terminating IM AS") or to the CPM AS ("Terminating CPM AS") based on stored iFC. + +NOTE: Depending on iFC configuration, it is possible that the IM AS or CPM AS is not triggered for the unregistered subscribers. + +- 4) The terminating IM AS or CPM AS invokes terminating IM or CPM services as applicable for the destination IM or CPM user. + +- 5a) The IM AS or CPM AS can forward the Instant Message back to the terminating S-CSCF, e.g. the terminating IM user is offline or the CPM user has no terminating interworking user preferences. +- 5b) In the case of the CPM AS, if terminating interworking user preferences are set, the Instant Message is routed directly to the IP-SM-GW in which case the procedure continues with step 7. +- 6) The terminating S-CSCF forwards the Instant Message to the IP-SM-GW, e.g. based on stored iFC. +- 7) If the user is authorized, the IP-SM-GW performs service-level interworking by converting the Instant Message to Short Message. The IP-SM-GW shall obtain the routing information for the UE from the HLR/HSS and deliver the message to the UE. If the sender of the Instant Message requests to hide its Public User Identity from the recipient and operator policy allows for this, the IP-SM-GW shall anonymise the identity of the user to the recipient. Otherwise, if operator policy prohibits this, the IP-SM-GW shall return an appropriate error to the user. +- 8) The IP-SM-GW obtains the routing information for the destination UE from the HLR/HSS. +- 9) The IP-SM-GW sends the Forward Short Message message to the target MSC/SGSN/MME/SMSF. +- 10) The MSC/SGSN/MME/SMSF sends the Short Message to the UE. +- 11) The UE acknowledges the receipt of the Short Message. +- 12) The MSC/SGSN/MME/SMSF sends a Delivery report (SMS-DELIVER-REPORT) to the IP-SM-GW. +- 13) The IP-SM-GW sends OK response to the terminating S-CSCF. +- 14) The S-CSCF forwards the OK to the terminating IM AS or CPM AS. +- 15) The terminating IM AS or CPM AS forwards the OK response back to the terminating S-CSCF. +- 16) The terminating S-CSCF forwards the OK back towards the originating S-CSCF. +- 17) The originating S-CSCF forwards the OK to the originating UE. + +## 6.14 Service-level interworking: IM or CPM user receives Short Message from an SMS user + +An IMS registered user with SIMPLE IM or CPM service receives a Short Message formatted via service-level interworking to an Instant Message. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating Successful IM termination after service-level interworking. The diagram shows interactions between SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE. The process starts with a 'Successful IMS registration' (1) from UE to HLR/HSS. Then, SMS-SC sends a 'Message transfer' (2) to SMS-GMSC. SMS-GMSC sends 'Routeing Info' (3a, 3b, 3c) to HLR/HSS and IP-SM-GW. IP-SM-GW sends 'Forward Short Message' (4) to SMS-GMSC. IP-SM-GW also sends 'Check service authorisation / domain selection' (5) to HLR/HSS. IP-SM-GW sends 'Message' (6) to S-CSCF. S-CSCF sends 'Message' (7) to UE. UE sends 'OK' (8) to S-CSCF. S-CSCF sends 'OK' (9) to IP-SM-GW. IP-SM-GW sends 'Delivery report' (10) to SMS-GMSC. SMS-GMSC sends 'Delivery report' (11) to SMS-SC. IP-SM-GW sends 'Report SM Delivery Status' (12) to HLR/HSS. HLR/HSS sends 'Report SM Delivery Status' (13) to SMS-GMSC.](8307f6b04df072c9332f9987e034272c_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant S-CSCF + participant IP-SM-GW + participant HLR/HSS + participant SMS-GMSC + participant SMS-SC + + Note right of UE: 1. Successful IMS registration + Note left of HLR/HSS: 1. Successful IMS registration + Note left of SMS-SC: 2. Message transfer + Note right of SMS-GMSC: 3a. Routeing Info + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 3b. Routeing Info + Note left of HLR/HSS: 3c. Routeing Info + Note right of SMS-GMSC: 4. Forward Short Message + Note right of HLR/HSS: 5. Check service authorisation / domain selection + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 6. Message + Note right of S-CSCF: 7. Message + Note left of S-CSCF: 8. OK + Note left of IP-SM-GW: 9. OK + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 10. Delivery report + Note left of SMS-SC: 11. Delivery report + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 12. Report SM Delivery Status + Note left of HLR/HSS: 13. Report SM Delivery Status + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating Successful IM termination after service-level interworking. The diagram shows interactions between SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE. The process starts with a 'Successful IMS registration' (1) from UE to HLR/HSS. Then, SMS-SC sends a 'Message transfer' (2) to SMS-GMSC. SMS-GMSC sends 'Routeing Info' (3a, 3b, 3c) to HLR/HSS and IP-SM-GW. IP-SM-GW sends 'Forward Short Message' (4) to SMS-GMSC. IP-SM-GW also sends 'Check service authorisation / domain selection' (5) to HLR/HSS. IP-SM-GW sends 'Message' (6) to S-CSCF. S-CSCF sends 'Message' (7) to UE. UE sends 'OK' (8) to S-CSCF. S-CSCF sends 'OK' (9) to IP-SM-GW. IP-SM-GW sends 'Delivery report' (10) to SMS-GMSC. SMS-GMSC sends 'Delivery report' (11) to SMS-SC. IP-SM-GW sends 'Report SM Delivery Status' (12) to HLR/HSS. HLR/HSS sends 'Report SM Delivery Status' (13) to SMS-GMSC. + +**Figure 6.14: Successful IM termination after service-level interworking** + +- 1) The UE registers to the S-CSCF according to the IMS registration procedure. + - 2) The SMS-SC forwards a Short Message to the SMS-GMSC. + - 3a) The SMS GMSC interrogates the HSS to retrieve routeing information. Based on the pre-configured IP-SM-GW address for the user, the HSS forwards the request to the corresponding IP-SM-GW. + - 3b) The HLR/HSS returns the IMSI and the address(es) of the current MSC, SGSN, MME and/or SMSF to the IP-SM-GW for delivery of the SM in CS/PS domain. + - 3c) The IP-SM-GW creates a MT Correlation ID as per TS 23.040 [2], which associates the Routing Info retrieval with the subsequent Forward Short Message messages(s), and stores this along with the IMSI of the receiving subscriber. The IP-SM-GW returns to the SMS-GMSC the address of itself, along with the MT Correlation ID in the IMSI field, as routeing information. + - 4) The SMS-GMSC delivers the Short Message to the IP-SM-GW in the same manner that it delivers the Short Message to an MSC, SGSN, MME or SMSF, including the MT Correlation ID received from the IP-SM-GW, in place of the IMSI. + - 5) The IP-SM-GW checks whether the recipient is authorized for the interworking service. +- NOTE 1: The IP-SM-GW will determine whether the transport-level interworking or the service-level interworking is to be performed according to clause 6.8.3. +- 6) If the user is authorized for service-level interworking, the IP-SM-GW converts the Short Message to an Instant Message. It sends the Instant Message using the appropriate SIP method towards the S-CSCF. + - 7) The S-CSCF forwards the Instant Message to the UE. + - 8) The UE acknowledges the SIP request to the S-CSCF. + - 9) The S-CSCF forwards the acknowledgement of the SIP request to the IP-SM-GW. + - 10) The IP-SM-GW acknowledges the Forward Short Message to the SMS-GMSC. + - 11) The SMS-GMSC sends a Delivery report (SMS-DELIVER-REPORT) to the SMS-SC. + - 12) The IP-SM-GW may send a Report SM Delivery Status to the HLR/HSS. + +13) The SMS-GMSC may send a Report SM Delivery Status to the HSS. The HSS shall ignore the information provided in this report. + +## 6.15 Service-level Interworking: CPM capable UE sends a Chat session invitation to an SMS user + +### 6.15.1 IP-SM-GW in the originating network + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 6.15.1: Chat session invitation to SMS user and Message data exchange (IP-SM-GW in originating network).](8592a32c2fdf17c1e562f0ba6b7e8e1a_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant CPM_UE as CPM UE + participant S_CSCF as S-CSCF + participant IP_SM_GW as IP-SM-GW + participant HSS as HSS + participant SMS_IWMSC as SMS-IWMSC + participant SMS_GMSC as SMS-GMSC + participant CPM_SMS_SC as CPM User's SMS-SC + participant SMS_SMS_SC as SMS User's SMS-SC + + Note right of IP_SM_GW: 1. IMS registration / re-registration procedure + CPM_UE->>S_CSCF: 2. Chat session invitation + S_CSCF->>IP_SM_GW: 3. Chat session invitation + IP_SM_GW->>HSS: 4. Service authorisation + IP_SM_GW->>SMS_IWMSC: 5. Forward Short Message + SMS_IWMSC->>SMS_GMSC: 6. Message transfer + Note left of SMS_GMSC: 7. Message transfer as described in a subset of the steps in clause 6.14 + IP_SM_GW->>S_CSCF: 8. OK + S_CSCF->>CPM_UE: 9. OK + CPM_UE->>IP_SM_GW: 10. Message data + IP_SM_GW->>SMS_IWMSC: 11. Forward Short Message + SMS_IWMSC->>SMS_GMSC: 12. Message transfer + Note left of SMS_GMSC: 13. Message transfer as described in a subset of the steps in clause 6.14 + +``` + +The sequence diagram illustrates the interaction for a chat session invitation from a CPM UE to an SMS user, with the IP-SM-GW in the originating network. The lifelines are: SMS User's SMS-SC, CPM User's SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, SMS-IWMSC, HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and CPM UE. The process starts with an IMS registration/re-registration procedure (1). The CPM UE sends a chat session invitation (2) to the S-CSCF, which forwards it (3) to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW performs service authorization (4) with the HSS, then forwards the short message (5) to the SMS-IWMSC, which transfers it (6) to the SMS-GMSC (7). The IP-SM-GW sends an OK (8) to the S-CSCF, which in turn sends an OK (9) to the CPM UE. The CPM UE then sends message data (10) to the IP-SM-GW, which forwards it (11) to the SMS-IWMSC, which transfers it (12) to the SMS-GMSC (13). + +Sequence diagram for Figure 6.15.1: Chat session invitation to SMS user and Message data exchange (IP-SM-GW in originating network). + +**Figure 6.15.1: Chat session invitation to SMS user and Message data exchange (IP-SM-GW in originating network)** + +- 1) The UE registers to S-CSCF according to the IMS registration procedure. +- 2) The UE sends a session invitation request for a chat session to the S-CSCF, using the appropriate SIP method. The UE may request to hide its Public User Identity from the recipient within the session invitation. +- 3) S-CSCF forwards the session invitation to the IP-SM-GW based on stored iFC. + +NOTE 1: Subscribers with no subscription for service level interworking will not be provided with the relevant iFCs. + +- 4) The IP-SM-GW performs service authorization based on the stored subscriber data retrieved from the HLR/HSS at the time of the registration procedure as specified in clause 6.1. The IP-SM-GW shall check whether the originating subscriber is authorised to use the interworking service. If the result of service authorization is negative, the IP-SM-GW shall not forward the message, and shall return the appropriate error information to the UE in a failure report. If the sender of the session invitation asks to hide its Public User Identity from the recipient and operator policy allows for this, the IP-SM-GW shall anonymize the identity of the user in all messages it sends to the recipient. If operator policy prohibits anonymity, the IP-SM-GW shall not perform interworking and shall send back an appropriate response. + +NOTE 2: Steps 5 to 7 are only executed if the operator policy is to check back with the SMS user before accepting the invitation on behalf of the SMS user. Otherwise, the process continues with step 8, as if the SMS user has responded with an acceptance of the chat session invitation. + +- 5) Otherwise, the IP-SM-GW correlates an MSISDN to this chat session. Any SMS sent from the SMS user to this MSISDN should be interworked into the chat session with which this MSISDN is correlated. The IP-SM-GW shall use the SC Address in the subscriber data retrieved from the HSS at registration or provisioned by configuration and translates the chat session invitation request to a Short Message (SMS- SUBMIT) carrying an SC Address, then forwards it towards the SMS-SC (SC Address) via the SMS-IWMSC (as described in TS 23.040 [2]). The text in the Short Message is defined by the operator and should convey information to the SMS user that he is invited to send and receive messages in the context of a chat session, and include instructions on how to accept, reject and end the session. If no response is received in time, the IP-SM-GW will consider the session rejected and send an appropriate response to the session invitation. + +NOTE 3: The MSISDN used as the sender of the Short Message is either the MSISDN of the CPM user or one that is assigned by the IP-SM-GW, depending on operator configuration. + +- 6) The SMS-IWMSC forwards the Short Message (SMS- SUBMIT) to the SMS-SC and the SMS is delivered to the SMS user using standard SMS procedures (see TS 23.040 [2]). +- 7) A Short Message is sent by the SMS user via the SMS-GMSC to the IP-SM-GW in accordance to steps 2 to 4 and steps 10 to 13 from clause 6.14. +- 8) If the answer is positive, the IP-SM-GW acknowledges the session invitation. Otherwise the IP-SM-GW will consider the session rejected and send back an appropriate response. +- 9) Session invitation acknowledgement is forwarded by S-CSCF to the CPM UE. + +NOTE 4: The following steps are executed only if an SMS with a positive answer is received from the SMS user or if the operator policy indicated that the session is accepted without SMS user interaction. If a negative response to the invitation is received or if no response from the SMS user is received within an operator defined time, the IP-SM-GW will send a negative response to the chat invitation. + +NOTE 5: Steps 10 to 12 are repeated for each message sent from the CPM user towards the SMS user, and steps 13 to 14 are repeated for each message sent from the SMS user towards the CPM user. + +- 10) The CPM user sends a message within the chat session containing data to the recipient SMS user. +- 11) The IP-SM-GW transforms the received message into a Short Message and sends a Short Message (SMS- SUBMIT) carrying the SC Address, then forwards it towards the SMS-SC (SC Address) via the SMS-IWMSC (as described in TS 23.040 [2]). According to operator policy, each SMS generated for the SMS user may include text instructions on how to leave the chat session. +- 12) The SMS-IWMSC forwards the Short Message (SMS- SUBMIT) to the SMS-SC and the SMS is delivered to the SMS user using standard SMS procedures (see TS 23.040 [2]). +- 13) A Short Message is sent by the SMS user via the SMS-GMSC to the IP-SM-GW in accordance to steps 2 to 13 from clause 6.14. + +NOTE 6: Step 5 of the flow in clause 6.14 becomes this: The IP-SM-GW identifies that a session exists between the SMS user and the CPM user. + +### 6.15.2 IP-SM-GW in the terminating network + +The SMS user (SMS UE B) in this flow is a CPM user (CPM user B) whose preferences are set in his home network to receive his incoming chat sessions as Short Messages. + +![Sequence diagram showing the interaction between various network elements for a chat session invitation and message data exchange. The elements are: SMS user's SMS-SC, SMS UE B, SMS - GMSC, MSC, HLR / HSS, IP-SM-GW, terminating S-CSCF, and CPM user A's originating network.](3da1a07cb87051bf616c9876db958cf0_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant SMS-SC as SMS user's SMS-SC + participant UEB as SMS UE B + participant GMSC as SMS - GMSC + participant MSC as MSC + participant HSS as HLR / HSS + participant IPSMGW as IP-SM-GW + participant SCSCF as terminating S-CSCF + participant CPMA as CPM user A's originating network + + CPMA->>SCSCF: 1. Chat session invitation + SCSCF->>IPSMGW: 2. Chat session invitation + Note over IPSMGW: 3. Service authorisation + IPSMGW->>HSS: 4. Routeing info + HSS->>IPSMGW: 4. Routeing info + HSS->>IPSMGW: 5. Forward Short Message + IPSMGW->>MSC: 6. Message transfer + Note over UEB, IPSMGW: 7. Message transfer as described in a subset of the steps in clause 6.14 + IPSMGW->>SCSCF: 8. OK + SCSCF->>CPMA: 9. OK + CPMA->>IPSMGW: 10. Message data + IPSMGW->>HSS: 11. Routeing info + HSS->>IPSMGW: 11. Routeing info + HSS->>IPSMGW: 12. Forward Short Message + IPSMGW->>MSC: 13. Message transfer + Note over UEB, IPSMGW: 14. Message transfer as described in a subset of the steps in clause 6.14 + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the interaction between various network elements for a chat session invitation and message data exchange. The elements are: SMS user's SMS-SC, SMS UE B, SMS - GMSC, MSC, HLR / HSS, IP-SM-GW, terminating S-CSCF, and CPM user A's originating network. + +**Figure 6.15.2: Chat session invitation to SMS user and message data exchange (IP-SM-GW in terminating network)** + +- 1) The originating network for CPM user A sends a session invitation request for a chat session to a CPM user (CPM user B) in another IMS domain, using the appropriate SIP method. The UE may request to hide its Public User Identity from the recipient within the session invitation. The originating S-CSCF (not shown) resolves the destination domain and routes the session invitation towards the S-CSCF in the terminating network ("terminating S-CSCF"). + +- 2) The terminating S-CSCF forwards the session invitation to the IP-SM-GW based on stored iFC. + +NOTE 1: Subscribers with no subscription for service level interworking will not be provided with the relevant iFCs. + +- 3) Authorization to continue is checked. If the sender of the session invitation asks to hide its Public User Identity from the recipient and operator policy allows for this, the IP SM GW shall anonymize the identity of the user in all messages it sends to the recipient. If operator policy prohibits anonymity, or if the IP-SM-GW cannot identify the sending party and the operator prohibits session invitations from unidentified users, the IP SM GW shall not perform interworking and send back an appropriate response. + +NOTE 2: Steps 5 to 7 are only executed if the operator policy is to check back with the SMS user before accepting the invitation on behalf of the SMS user. Otherwise, the process continues with step 8, as if the SMS user has responded with an acceptance of the chat session invitation. + +- 4) The IP-SM-GW performs service-level interworking by converting the chat session invitation request to a Short Message. The IP-SM-GW obtains the routing information for the destination UE from the HLR/HSS. +- 5) The IP-SM-GW sends the Forward Short Message message to the target MSC. The IP-SM-GW assigns an MSISDN representing the chat session to ensure that the reply to this SMS is sent back to this particular IP-SM-GW. Any SMS sent from the SMS user to this MSISDN should be interworked into the chat session with which this MSISDN is correlated. The text in the Short Message is defined by the operator and should convey information to the SMS user that he is invited to send and receive messages in the context of a chat session, and include instructions on how to accept, reject and end the session. The identity of the original sender (CPM user or group) is included as part of the operator provided invitation text. If no response is received in time, the IP-SM-GW will consider the session rejected and send an appropriate response to the session invitation. +- 6) The MSC/SGSN/MME/SMSF sends the Short Message to the SMS user. +- 7) A Short Message is received via the SMS-GMSC from the SMS user by the IP-SM-GW, in accordance to steps 2 to 4 and steps 10 to 13 of clause 6.14, indicating the response to the chat session invitation. The message is targeted to the MSISDN representing the chat session which was assigned in step 5. +- 8) If the answer is positive, the IP-SM-GW acknowledges the session invitation. Otherwise the IP-SM-GW will consider the session rejected and send back an appropriate response. +- 9) The session invitation acknowledgement is forwarded by S-CSCF to the CPM UE. + +NOTE 3: The following steps are executed only if an SMS with a positive answer is received from the SMS user or if the operator policy indicated that the session is accepted without SMS user interaction. In case a negative response to the invitation is received or if no response from the SMS user is received within an operator defined time, the IP-SM-GW will send a negative response to the chat invitation. + +NOTE 4: Steps 10 to 13 are repeated for each message sent from the CPM user towards the SMS user, and step 14 is repeated for each message sent from the SMS user towards the CPM user. + +- 10) The CPM user sends a message within the chat session containing data to the recipient SMS user. +- 11) The IP-SM-GW transforms the received message into a Short Message and obtains the routing information for the destination UE from the HLR/HSS. +- 12) The IP-SM-GW sends a Short Message (SMS- DELIVER) towards the MSC/SGSN/MME/SMSF, as described in TS 23.040 [2]. The IP-SM-GW inserts the MSISDN representing the chat session as the sender of the message, to ensure that the reply to this SMS is sent back to it. +- 13) The MSC/SGSN/MME/SMSF forwards the Short Message (SMS- DELIVER) to the SMS user, and the SMS is delivered to the SMS user using standard SMS procedures as described in TS 23.040 [2]). +- 14) A Short Message is received via the SMS-GMSC from the SMS user by the IP-SM-GW, in accordance to steps 2 to 13 from clause 6.14. The message is targeted to the MSISDN representing the chat session which was assigned in step 5. + +NOTE 5: Step 5 of the flow in clause 6.14 becomes this: "The IP-SM-GW identifies that a session exists between the SMS user and the CPM user". + +## 6.16 Service-level Interworking: CPM capable UE tearing down a Chat session between a CPM user and an SMS user + +### 6.16.1 IP-SM-GW in the originating network + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 6.16.1: Chat session teardown request to SMS (IP-SM-GW in originating network). The diagram shows six lifelines: CPM user's SMS-SC, SMS-IWMSC, HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and CPM UE. The sequence of messages is: 1. CPM UE sends a 'Chat session teardown request' to S-CSCF; 2. S-CSCF sends a 'Chat session teardown request' to IP-SM-GW; 3. IP-SM-GW sends a 'Forward Short Message' to SMS-IWMSC; 4. SMS-IWMSC sends a 'Message transfer' to CPM user's SMS-SC; 5. IP-SM-GW sends an 'OK' response to S-CSCF; 6. S-CSCF sends an 'OK' response to CPM UE.](7d3d5fb5d09c0cd35a9d637be241651e_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant CPM_UE as CPM UE + participant S_CSCF as S-CSCF + participant IP_SM_GW as IP-SM-GW + participant HSS as HSS + participant SMS_IWMSC as SMS-IWMSC + participant CPM_SMS_SC as CPM user's SMS-SC + + Note right of CPM_UE: 1. Chat session teardown request + CPM_UE->>S_CSCF: + Note right of S_CSCF: 2. Chat session teardown request + S_CSCF->>IP_SM_GW: + Note right of IP_SM_GW: 3. Forward Short Message + IP_SM_GW->>SMS_IWMSC: + Note right of SMS_IWMSC: 4. Message transfer + SMS_IWMSC->>CPM_SMS_SC: + Note right of IP_SM_GW: 5. OK + IP_SM_GW->>S_CSCF: + Note right of S_CSCF: 6. OK + S_CSCF->>CPM_UE: + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure 6.16.1: Chat session teardown request to SMS (IP-SM-GW in originating network). The diagram shows six lifelines: CPM user's SMS-SC, SMS-IWMSC, HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and CPM UE. The sequence of messages is: 1. CPM UE sends a 'Chat session teardown request' to S-CSCF; 2. S-CSCF sends a 'Chat session teardown request' to IP-SM-GW; 3. IP-SM-GW sends a 'Forward Short Message' to SMS-IWMSC; 4. SMS-IWMSC sends a 'Message transfer' to CPM user's SMS-SC; 5. IP-SM-GW sends an 'OK' response to S-CSCF; 6. S-CSCF sends an 'OK' response to CPM UE. + +**Figure 6.16.1: Chat session teardown request to SMS (IP-SM-GW in originating network)** + +- 1) The CPM UE sends a SIP BYE for an ongoing session to the S-CSCF. +- 2) S-CSCF forwards the session teardown request to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW performs service-level interworking by converting the session teardown request to a Short Message (SMS-SUBMIT) carrying the SC Address and including operator provided teardown text. The IP-SM-GW uses the SC Address in the subscriber data retrieved from the HSS at registration or provisioned by configuration. +- 3) The IP-SM-GW forwards the Short Message towards the SMS-SC (SC Address) via the SMS-IWMSC (as described in TS 23.040 [2]). The text in the Short Message is defined by the operator and should convey information to the SMS user that the chat session is ending. + +NOTE 1: The MSISDN used as the sender of the Short Message is either the MSISDN of the CPM user or one that was assigned by the IP-SM-GW at session establishment, depending on operator configuration. + +- 4) The SMS-IWMSC forwards the Short Message (SMS- SUBMIT) to the SMS-SC (see TS 23.040 [2]). + +NOTE 2: Steps 3 to 4 are only executed if the operator policy requires that the SMS user be told the session is being torn down. Otherwise, the process continues with step 5. + +- 5) The IP-SM-GW acknowledges the session teardown request and tears down the associated resources. +- 6) The session teardown acknowledgement is forwarded by the S-CSCF to the CPM UE. + +### 6.16.2 IP-SM-GW in the terminating network + +The SMS user (SMS user B) in this flow is a CPM user (CPM user B) who has set his preferences in his home network to receive his incoming chat sessions as Short Messages. + +![Sequence diagram for Chat session teardown request to SMS (IP-SM-GW in terminating network).](eb03559a4d92ea9ebd63ea9be663c50a_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant CPM as CPM user's originating network + participant S-CSCF as terminating S-CSCF + participant IP-SM-GW as IP-SM-GW + participant HLR as HLR / HSS + participant MSC as MSC + participant GMSC as SMS-GMSC + participant SMS as SMS user + + Note right of CPM: 1. Chat session teardown request + CPM->>S-CSCF: + Note right of S-CSCF: 2. Chat session teardown request + S-CSCF->>IP-SM-GW: + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 3. Routeing info + IP-SM-GW->>HLR: + Note right of HLR: 4. Forward Short Message + HLR->>MSC: + Note right of MSC: 5. Message transfer + MSC->>SMS: + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 6. OK + IP-SM-GW->>S-CSCF: + Note right of S-CSCF: 7. OK + S-CSCF->>CPM: + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Chat session teardown request to SMS (IP-SM-GW in terminating network). + +**Figure 6.16.2: Chat session teardown request to SMS (IP-SM-GW in terminating network)** + +- 1) The CPM user's originating network sends a session teardown request for an ongoing chat session to the terminating S-CSCF. +- 2) The terminating S-CSCF forwards the session teardown request to the IP-SM-GW serving the SMS user. The IP-SM-GW performs service-level interworking by converting the session teardown request to a Short Message including operator provided teardown text. +- 3) The IP-SM-GW obtains the routeing information for the destination UE from the HLR/HSS. +- 4) The IP-SM-GW sends the Forward Short Message to the target MSC/SGSN/MME/SMSF. The IP-SM-GW inserts the MSISDN it had previously assigned to represent this chat session as the sender of the message. + +NOTE: Steps 3 to 5 are only executed if the operator policy requires that the SMS user be told the session is being torn down. Otherwise, the process continues with step 6. + +- 5) The MSC/SGSN/MME/SMSF sends the Short Message to the SMS user. +- 6) The IP-SM-GW acknowledges the session teardown request and tears down the associated resources. +- 7) The session teardown acknowledgement is forwarded by S-CSCF towards the CPM user's originating network. + +## 6.17 Service-level Interworking: SMS user requesting the IP-SM-GW to tear down the Chat session between a CPM user and an SMS user + +### 6.17.1 IP-SM-GW in the originating network + +![Sequence diagram for chat session teardown request to CPM UE (IP-SM-GW in originating network).](7e1c9b51e067a48cd0fcc9748d8bd8d8_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant SMS_user's_SMS-SC as SMS user's SMS-SC + participant SMS-GMSC as SMS-GMSC + participant SMS-IWMSC as SMS-IWMSC + participant HSS as HSS + participant IP_SM_GW as IP-SM-GW + participant S-CSCF as S-CSCF + participant CPM_UE as CPM UE + + Note over SMS_user's_SMS-SC, IP_SM_GW: 1. Message transfer as described in a subset of the steps in clause 6.14 + IP_SM_GW->>S-CSCF: 2. Chat session teardown request + S-CSCF->>CPM_UE: 3. Chat session teardown request + CPM_UE-->>S-CSCF: 4. OK + S-CSCF-->>IP_SM_GW: 5. OK +``` + +The diagram illustrates a sequence of interactions between seven network entities. From left to right, they are: SMS user's SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, SMS-IWMSC, HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and CPM UE. The sequence begins with a message transfer (step 1) from the SMS user's SMS-SC through the SMS-GMSC and SMS-IWMSC to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW then sends a 'Chat session teardown request' (step 2) to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF forwards this request (step 3) to the CPM UE. The CPM UE responds with an 'OK' (step 4) to the S-CSCF, which in turn forwards the 'OK' (step 5) back to the IP-SM-GW. + +Sequence diagram for chat session teardown request to CPM UE (IP-SM-GW in originating network). + +**Figure 6.17.1: Chat session teardown request to CPM UE (IP-SM-GW in originating network)** + +- 1) A message is received from the SMS user via the SMS-GMSC by the IP-SM-GW, in accordance to steps 2 to 4 and steps 10 to 13 of clause 6.14, with the operator defined Short Message indicating the SMS user wants to leave the chat session. +- 2) The IP-SM-GW performs service-level interworking by recognizing that the Short Message corresponds to the operator defined teardown text indicating the SMS user wants to leave the chat session, so the IP-SM-GW sends a chat session teardown request. +- 3) The session teardown request is forwarded by S-CSCF to the CPM UE. +- 4) The CPM UE acknowledges the session teardown request. +- 5) The acknowledgement is forwarded by the S-CSCF to the IP-SM-GW. + +### 6.17.2 IP-SM-GW in the terminating network + +The SMS user in this flow is a CPM user who has set his preferences in his home network to receive his incoming chat sessions as Short Messages. + +![Sequence diagram for chat session teardown request to CPM UE (IP-SM-GW in terminating network).](26d664119ad25250780f554633444e54_img.jpg) + +The diagram is a sequence diagram showing the interaction between seven entities: SMS user's SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, MSC, HLR / HSS, IP-SM-GW, Terminating S-CSCF, and CPM user's originating network. The sequence of messages is as follows: + +1. Message transfer as described in a subset of the steps in clause 6.14 (represented by a wide grey arrow from SMS user's SMS-SC to IP-SM-GW). +2. Chat session teardown request (from IP-SM-GW to Terminating S-CSCF). +3. Chat session teardown request (from Terminating S-CSCF to CPM user's originating network). +4. OK (from CPM user's originating network to Terminating S-CSCF). +5. OK (from Terminating S-CSCF to IP-SM-GW). + +Sequence diagram for chat session teardown request to CPM UE (IP-SM-GW in terminating network). + +**Figure 6.17.2: Chat session teardown request to CPM UE (IP-SM-GW in terminating network)** + +- 1) A message is received from the SMS user via the SMS-GMSC by the IP-SM-GW, in accordance to steps 2 to 4 and steps 10 to 13 of clause 6.14, with the operator provided teardown text indicating the SMS user wants to leave the chat session. +- 2) The IP-SM-GW performs service-level interworking by recognizing that the Short Message corresponds to the operator provided teardown text indicating the SMS user wants to leave the chat session, so the IP-SM-GW sends a chat session teardown request. +- 3) The session teardown request is forwarded by the S-CSCF towards the CPM user's originating network. +- 4) The CPM user's originating network acknowledges the session teardown request and tears down the associated resources. +- 5) The acknowledgement is forwarded by the S-CSCF to the IP-SM-GW. + +## 6.18 Service-level interworking: Status Report procedure for chat session message to Short Message interworking + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the Status Report procedure for chat session message to Short Message interworking. The diagram shows the interaction between SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE. The process starts with a 'Successful Chat Session Message to Short Message delivery procedure' (1). The SMS-SC sends a 'Status report' (2) to the SMS-GMSC. The SMS-GMSC sends 'Routeing Info' (3a) to the HLR/HSS, which returns 'Routeing Info' (3b) to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW returns 'Routeing Info' (3c) to the SMS-GMSC. The SMS-GMSC sends a 'Forward Short Message' (4) to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW makes a 'Decision on message delivery means' (5). The IP-SM-GW sends a 'Delivery report' (6) to the SMS-GMSC, which then sends a 'Delivery report' (7) to the SMS-SC. The IP-SM-GW also sends a 'Success or failure report' (8) to the S-CSCF, which then sends a 'Success or failure report' (9) to the UE.](58f4167687de8d7339594e5f6fbe0bc6_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant SMS-SC + participant SMS-GMSC + participant HLR/HSS + participant IP-SM-GW + participant S-CSCF + participant UE + + Note over all: 1. Successful Chat Session Message to Short Message delivery procedure + SMS-SC->>SMS-GMSC: 2. Status report + SMS-GMSC->>HLR/HSS: 3a. Routeing Info + HLR/HSS-->>IP-SM-GW: 3b. Routeing Info + IP-SM-GW-->>SMS-GMSC: 3c. Routeing Info + SMS-GMSC->>IP-SM-GW: 4. Forward Short Message + Note right of IP-SM-GW: 5. Decision on message delivery means + IP-SM-GW->>SMS-GMSC: 6. Delivery report + SMS-GMSC->>SMS-SC: 7. Delivery report + IP-SM-GW->>S-CSCF: 8. Success or failure report + S-CSCF->>UE: 9. Success or failure report + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the Status Report procedure for chat session message to Short Message interworking. The diagram shows the interaction between SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, HLR/HSS, IP-SM-GW, S-CSCF, and UE. The process starts with a 'Successful Chat Session Message to Short Message delivery procedure' (1). The SMS-SC sends a 'Status report' (2) to the SMS-GMSC. The SMS-GMSC sends 'Routeing Info' (3a) to the HLR/HSS, which returns 'Routeing Info' (3b) to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW returns 'Routeing Info' (3c) to the SMS-GMSC. The SMS-GMSC sends a 'Forward Short Message' (4) to the IP-SM-GW. The IP-SM-GW makes a 'Decision on message delivery means' (5). The IP-SM-GW sends a 'Delivery report' (6) to the SMS-GMSC, which then sends a 'Delivery report' (7) to the SMS-SC. The IP-SM-GW also sends a 'Success or failure report' (8) to the S-CSCF, which then sends a 'Success or failure report' (9) to the UE. + +**Figure 6.18: Status report procedure for chat session message to Short Message interworking** + +- 1) A chat session message from the UE is successfully delivered to the SMS user after service-level interworking according to clause 6.15. The chat session message requested a success or failure delivery report. + +NOTE 1: A Request for success or failure delivery report can be requested in a chat session message sent by the UE as described in IETF RFC 4975 [19]. + +- 2) The SMS-SC sends a Status report to the SMS-GMSC. + +NOTE 2: The Status report, from the SMS-GMSC's point of view, will be treated as any SM termination. + +NOTE 3: The Status report is an optional message. + +- 3a) The SMS GMSC interrogates the HLR/HSS to retrieve routeing information. Based on the pre-configured IP-SM-GW address for the user, the HLR/HSS forwards the request to the corresponding IP-SM-GW. +- 3b) The HLR/HSS returns the IMSI and the address(es) of the current MSC, SGSN, MME and/or SMSF to the IP-SM-GW for delivery of the Short Message in CS/PS domain. +- 3c) The IP-SM-GW creates a MT Correlation ID as per TS 23.040 [2], which associates the Routing Info retrieval with the subsequent Forward Short Message messages(s), and stores this along with the IMSI of the receiving subscriber. The IP-SM-GW returns to the SMS-GMSC the address of itself, along with the MT Correlation ID in the IMSI field, as routeing information. Alternatively, the IP-SM-GW may return the address(es) of the current MSC, SGSN, MME and/or SMSF, in which case, the subsequent procedure to forward the message is the same as defined in TS 23.040 [2]. +- 4) The SMS-GMSC sends the status report in the Forward Short Message to the IP-SM-GW. +- 5) The IP-SM-GW translates and maps the Status report in the Forward Short Message into a report request as described in MSRP IETF RFC 4975 [19]. +- 6) The IP-SM-GW sends a Delivery report (SMS-DELIVER-REPORT) to the SMS-GMSC. + +7) The SMS-GMSC sends an acknowledgement back to the SMS-SC. + +8-9) The IP-SM-GW sends a success or failure report based on the value in the status report. + +NOTE 4: Step 6 and 8 can happen independently of each other. + +## Annex A (informative): Service-level interworking: IM or CPM user sends an Instant Message to a group list including SMS users + +![Sequence diagram showing service-level interworking for an Instant Message to a group list including SMS users. Lifelines: SMS-SC, SMS-IWMSC, HSS, IP-SM-GW, Group delivery AS, S-CSCF, UE. The process starts with IMS registration, followed by message submission, group handling, multiple message delivery, and final notifications and OK responses.](eb5677b570ab2a3e9d8f5d35ca5b8a4d_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant S-CSCF + participant Group delivery AS + participant IP-SM-GW + participant HSS + participant SMS-IWMSC + participant SMS-SC + + Note over HSS: 1. IMS registration / re-registration procedure + UE->>S-CSCF: 2. Message + S-CSCF->>Group delivery AS: 3. Message + Note over Group delivery AS: 4. Group handling + Group delivery AS->>S-CSCF: 5. Multiple messages + S-CSCF->>IP-SM-GW: 6. Multiple messages + IP-SM-GW->>SMS-IWMSC: 7. Forward messages + SMS-IWMSC->>Group delivery AS: 8. Accepted + Group delivery AS->>S-CSCF: 9. Accepted + S-CSCF->>Group delivery AS: 10. Accepted + S-CSCF->>UE: 11. Accepted + SMS-IWMSC->>SMS-SC: 12. Messages transfer + SMS-SC->>SMS-IWMSC: 13. Submit reports + SMS-IWMSC->>IP-SM-GW: 14. Submit reports + Group delivery AS->>S-CSCF: 15. Notifications + S-CSCF->>Group delivery AS: 16. Notifications + Note over Group delivery AS: 17. Notifications aggregation + Group delivery AS->>S-CSCF: 18. Notification + S-CSCF->>UE: 19. Notification + UE->>S-CSCF: 20. OK + S-CSCF->>Group delivery AS: 21. OK + Group delivery AS->>S-CSCF: 22. OK + S-CSCF->>IP-SM-GW: 23. OK + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing service-level interworking for an Instant Message to a group list including SMS users. Lifelines: SMS-SC, SMS-IWMSC, HSS, IP-SM-GW, Group delivery AS, S-CSCF, UE. The process starts with IMS registration, followed by message submission, group handling, multiple message delivery, and final notifications and OK responses. + +**Figure A.1: IM user sends an Instant Message to a group list via service-level interworking** + +- 1) The UE registers to S-CSCF according to the IMS registration procedure. +- 2) UE generates Instant Message which includes group information, e.g. Group identifier in the Request-URI and/or recipient list in the body of the Instant Message. UE submits the Instant Message to the S-CSCF using an appropriate SIP method. +- 3) Based on the stored iFC, S-CSCF forwards the Instant Message to an AS in charge of the group delivery, e.g., the controlling function server defined in OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12] or the controlling function server defined in OMA-TS-CPM\_Conv\_Fnct-V1\_0 [17]. + +- 4) The group delivery AS replicates per Instant Message for per recipient according to the group information it obtains acting as a B2BUA. See detail in OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12] or in OMA-TS-CPM\_Conv\_Fnct-V1\_0 [17]. +- 5) The group delivery AS sends the generated multiple Instant Messages to S-CSCF (e.g., the Instant Messages can be delivered as what the list server does defined in the TS 24.247 [14]). +- 6) The S-CSCF forwards the Instant Messages to the IP-SM-GW based on the stored iFC. +- 7) The IP-SM-GW shall decide whether to perform service-level interworking depending on SIP request header (e.g. Request-URI), operator policy, when the Instant Message is not routeable in the IMS. If IP-SM-GW decided to perform service-level interworking, the IP-SM-GW performs service authorization based on the stored subscriber data retrieved from the HLR/HSS at the time of the third party registration procedure as described in the clause 6.1. The IP-SM-GW shall check whether the originating subscriber is authorised to use the interworking service .If the result of service authorization is negative, the IP-SM-GW shall not forward the message, and shall return the appropriate error information to the UE in a failure report. Otherwise, the IP-SM-GW shall translate the IMS message to a Short Message (SMS- SUBMIT) and forwards it towards the SMS-SC (SC Address) via the SMS-IWMSC (as described in TS 23.040 [2]). +- 8) If service authorization is successful, the IP-SM-GW acknowledges the Instant Messages. +- 9-11) Instant Message acknowledgement is forwarded by S-CSCF to UE. +- 12) The SMS-IWMSC forwards the Short Messages (SMS- SUBMIT) to the SMS-SC (see TS 23.040 [2]). +- 13) The SMS-SC sends multiple Submit reports (SMS-SUBMIT REPORT) to SMS-IWMSC (see TS 23.040 [2]). +- 14) SMS-IWMSC sends the Submit reports to IP-SM-GW (see TS 23.040 [2]). +- 15) IP-SM-GW translates the received Submit reports to appropriate IMS delivery notifications defined in RFC 5438 [13], and forwards the IMS delivery notifications to the S-CSCF. +- 16) The S-CSCF forwards the IMS delivery notifications to the group delivery AS. +- 17) The group delivery AS aggregates the delivery notifications of the same type from different recipients into a single delivery notification. +- 18) The group delivery AS sends the delivery notification to the S-CSCF. +- 19) The S-CSCF forwards the delivery notification to the UE. +- 20-23) Acknowledgement of the delivery notification is forwarded by S-CSCF to IP-SM-GW. + +## --- Annex B (informative): Group chat sessions + +## B.1 Service-level interworking: IM or CPM user initiates a group chat and sends an Instant Message to a group list including SMS users + +The flow in this clause is the same as that described in clause 6.15.1 with the difference that it is required that the IP-SM-GW assign an MSISDN for this group chat session so that it is clear for the SMS user that any message sent to the assigned MSISDN will be delivered to the group chat session participants, not just to the CPM UE that invited the SMS user. + +In this flow, the IP-SM-GW is in the PLMN of the CPM UE, but it could also be in the PLMN of the SMS user if that user was also a CPM user and had terminating user preferences to deliver the session invitation via SMS. + +![Sequence diagram showing the interaction between various network elements for CPM group chat initiation and message exchange.](00504fc688ebcf131ccbeff94dfc9939_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant CPM UE + participant S-CSCF + participant Group chat AS + participant IP-SM-GW + participant HSS + participant SMS-IWMSC + participant SMS-GMSC + participant Group chat session's SMS-SC + participant SMS User's SMS-SC + + Note over HSS, CPM UE: 1. IMS registration / re-registration procedure + CPM UE->>S-CSCF: 2. Group chat session Invitation + S-CSCF->>Group chat AS: 3. Group chat session Invitation + Note over Group chat AS: 4. Group conference handling + Group chat AS->>S-CSCF: 5. Group chat session invitation + S-CSCF->>IP-SM-GW: 6. Group chat session invitation + IP-SM-GW->>SMS-IWMSC: 7. Forward Short Message + SMS-IWMSC->>Group chat session's SMS-SC: 8. Message transfer + Note over Group chat session's SMS-SC: 9. Message transfer as described in the subset of the steps in clause 6.14 + Group chat AS->>S-CSCF: 10. OK + S-CSCF->>Group chat AS: 11. OK + Group chat AS->>S-CSCF: 12. OK + S-CSCF->>CPM UE: 13. OK + IP-SM-GW->>S-CSCF: 14. Subscribe + S-CSCF->>Group chat AS: 15. Subscribe + Group chat AS->>S-CSCF: 16. OK + S-CSCF->>IP-SM-GW: 17. OK + CPM UE->>Group chat AS: 18. Message data + Group chat AS->>IP-SM-GW: 19. Message data + IP-SM-GW->>SMS-IWMSC: 20. Forward Short Message + SMS-IWMSC->>Group chat session's SMS-SC: 21. Message transfer + Note over Group chat session's SMS-SC: 22. Message transfer as described in the subset of the steps in clause 6.14 + IP-SM-GW->>Group chat AS: 23. Message data + Group chat AS->>S-CSCF: 24. Message data + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the interaction between various network elements for CPM group chat initiation and message exchange. + +**Figure B.1: CPM user initiates a group chat and messages are exchanged within the group chat via service-level interworking** + +- 1) The UE registers to S-CSCF according to the IMS registration procedure. +- 2) The UE generates a chat session invitation which includes group information, e.g. Group identifier in the Request-URI and/or recipient list in the body of the chat session invitation. UE submits the Instant Message to the S-CSCF using an appropriate SIP method. +- 3) Based on the stored iFC, S-CSCF forwards the session invitation to an AS in charge of handling group chat requests, e.g., the controlling function server defined in OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12] or the controlling function server defined in OMA-TS-CPM\_Conv\_Fnct-V1\_0 [17]. +- 4) The group chat AS replicates a session invitation per recipient according to the group information it obtains acting as a B2BUA. See details in OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12] or in OMA-TS-CPM\_Conv\_Fnct-V1\_0 [17]. +- 5) The group chat AS sends the generated multiple session invitations to the S-CSCF. + +- 6) The group chat AS forwards one of the chat session invitations to the IP-SM-GW according to normal routing procedures (e.g., via S-CSCF). + +NOTE 1: Nodes specific to the CPM functions such as ISF are either collocated with the IP-SM-GW or else are not shown. + +- 7) The IP-SM-GW translates the chat session invitation request to a Short Message (SMS- SUBMIT) and forwards it towards the group chat SMS-SC (SC Address) via the SMS-IWMSC (as described in TS 23.040 [2]). The IP-SM-GW assigns an MSISDN representing the group chat session to ensure that the reply to this SMS is sent back to this particular IP-SM-GW. Any SMS sent from the SMS user to this MSISDN will be interworked into the group chat session with which this MSISDN is correlated. The text in the Short Message is defined by the operator and conveys information to the SMS user that he is invited to send and receive messages in the context of a group chat session, and includes instructions on how to accept, reject and end the session. The identity of the original sender (CPM user or group) is included as part of the operator provided invitation text. +- 8) The SMS-IWMSC forwards the Short Messages (SMS- SUBMIT) to the group chat SMS-SC and the SMS is delivered to the SMS user using standard SMS procedures (see TS 23.040 [2]). +- 9) A Short Message is received from the SMS user via the SMS-GMSC by the IP-SM-GW, in accordance to steps 2 to 4 and steps 10 to 13 from clause 6.14, indicating the response to the group chat session invitation. The message is targeted to the MSISDN representing the group chat session which was assigned in step 7. +- 10) If the answer is positive or if operator policy is to accept the session invitation on behalf of the SMS user, the IP-SM-GW acknowledges the session invitation. Otherwise the IP-SM-GW will consider the session rejected and send back an appropriate response. +- 11) The session invitation acknowledgement is forwarded by S-CSCF to the group chat AS. +- 12-13) The group chat AS responds back to the group chat session initiator once the first user joins the group chat session. + +NOTE 2: The following steps are executed only if an SMS with a positive answer is received from the SMS user or if the operator policy indicated that the session is accepted without SMS user interaction. In case a negative response to the invitation is received or if no response from the SMS user is received within an operator defined time, the IP-SM-GW shall send a negative response to the chat invitation. + +- 14-17) The IP-SM-GW subscribes to the participant information changes. + +NOTE 3: Steps 18 to 21 are repeated for each message sent from any group chat session participant towards the SMS user, and steps 22 to 24 are repeated for each message sent from the SMS user towards the group chat session participants. + +- 18) The CPM UE (or any group chat session participant) sends a message containing data to the group chat AS. +- 19) For the group chat session participant who is an SMS user, the message is routed towards the IP-SM-GW. + +- 20) The IP-SM-GW identifies that a session exists between the SMS user and group chat AS and transforms the received message into a Short Message and sends a Short Message (SMS- SUBMIT) carrying the SC Address, then forwards it towards the group chat SMS-SC (SC Address) via the SMS-IWMSC (as described in TS 23.040 [2]). The IP-SM-GW inserts the address representing the group chat session as the sender of the message to ensure that the reply to this SMS is sent back to this particular IP-SM-GW. + +- 21) The SMS-IWMSC forwards the Short Message (SMS- SUBMIT) to the group chat SMS-SC and the SMS is delivered to the SMS user using standard SMS procedures (see TS 23.040 [2]). + +- 22) A Short Message is received from the SMS user via the SMS-GMSC by the IP-SM-GW, in accordance to steps 2 to 13 from clause 6.14. The message is targeted to the MSISDN representing the group chat session which was assigned in step 7. + +NOTE 4: Step 5 of the flow in clause 6.14 becomes this: The IP-SM-GW identifies that a session exists between the SMS user and the CPM user. Steps 6 and 7 of the flow in clause 6.14 are replaced by steps 23 and 24 in this flow. + +- 23) The IP-SM-GW identifies that a session exists between the SMS user and the group chat AS and transforms the received message into message data and sends it within the session towards the group chat AS. + +24) The group chat AS forwards the message to all group chat participants. + +## B.2 Service-level interworking: CPM user extends a one-to-one chat session into a group chat session + +This flow is the same as that described in clause 6.15.1 with the difference that it is required that the IP-SM-GW assign an MSISDN when this group chat session starts if one was not assigned before, so that it is clear for the SMS user that any message sent to the assigned MSISDN will be delivered to the group chat session participants, not just to the CPM UE that invited the SMS user. + +In this flow, the IP-SM-GW is in the PLMN of the CPM UE, but it could also be in the PLMN of the SMS user if that user was also a CPM user and had terminating user preferences to deliver the session invitation via SMS. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the service-level interworking where a CPM user extends a one-to-one chat session into a group chat session. The diagram shows the interaction between various network elements: SMS User's SMS-SC, Group chat session's SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, SMS-IWMSC, HSS, IP-SM-GW, Group chat AS, S-CSCF, and CPM UE. The process starts with an existing 1-1 chat session. The CPM UE sends a group chat session invitation to the Group chat AS. The Group chat AS handles the invitation and sends multiple group chat session invitations to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF then sends OK responses to the Group chat AS, which in turn sends OK responses to the CPM UE. The Group chat AS also sends a group chat session invitation to the IP-SM-GW, which then forwards a short message to the SMS-IWMSC. The SMS-IWMSC then performs a message transfer to the Group chat session's SMS-SC, which in turn performs a message transfer to the SMS User's SMS-SC. The message transfer steps are described in section 6.14.](b904ac2472cab80892d1e783e6230d6e_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant SMS User's SMS-SC + participant Group chat session's SMS-SC + participant SMS-GMSC + participant SMS-IWMSC + participant HSS + participant IP-SM-GW + participant Group chat AS + participant S-CSCF + participant CPM UE + + Note over SMS User's SMS-SC, CPM UE: 1. 1-1 chat session + CPM UE->>Group chat AS: 2. Group chat session Invitation + Group chat AS->>Group chat AS: 4. Group conference handling + Group chat AS->>S-CSCF: 5. Multiple Group chat session invitations + S-CSCF->>Group chat AS: 10. OK + Group chat AS->>S-CSCF: 11. OK + S-CSCF->>Group chat AS: 12. OK + Group chat AS->>CPM UE: 13. OK + Group chat AS->>IP-SM-GW: 6. Group chat session invitation + IP-SM-GW->>SMS-IWMSC: 7. Forward Short Message + SMS-IWMSC->>Group chat session's SMS-SC: 8. Message transfer + Note over SMS User's SMS-SC, Group chat session's SMS-SC: 9. Message transfer as described in the subset of steps in section 6.14 + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the service-level interworking where a CPM user extends a one-to-one chat session into a group chat session. The diagram shows the interaction between various network elements: SMS User's SMS-SC, Group chat session's SMS-SC, SMS-GMSC, SMS-IWMSC, HSS, IP-SM-GW, Group chat AS, S-CSCF, and CPM UE. The process starts with an existing 1-1 chat session. The CPM UE sends a group chat session invitation to the Group chat AS. The Group chat AS handles the invitation and sends multiple group chat session invitations to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF then sends OK responses to the Group chat AS, which in turn sends OK responses to the CPM UE. The Group chat AS also sends a group chat session invitation to the IP-SM-GW, which then forwards a short message to the SMS-IWMSC. The SMS-IWMSC then performs a message transfer to the Group chat session's SMS-SC, which in turn performs a message transfer to the SMS User's SMS-SC. The message transfer steps are described in section 6.14. + +**Figure B.2: CPM user modifies a one-to-one chat session into a group chat session** + +- 1) A one-to-one chat session is established between the CPM user and the SMS user. +- 2) The UE generates a chat session invitation which includes a recipient list in the body of the chat session invitation. The original SMS user who is part of the one-to-one chat session is included in that list An indication + +is added for the original SMS user in the list that the existing one-to-one session is to be replaced by the new session. The UE submits the chat session invitation to the S-CSCF. + +- 3) Based on the stored iFC, S-CSCF forwards the session invitation to an AS in charge of handling group chat requests, e.g., the controlling function server defined in OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12] or the controlling function server defined in OMA-TS-CPM\_Conv\_Fnct-V1\_0 [17]. +- 4) The group chat AS replicates a session invitation per recipient according to the group information it obtains acting as a B2BUA. See details in OMA-TS-SIMPLE\_IM-V1\_0 [12] or in OMA-TS-CPM\_Conv\_Fnct-V1\_0 [17]. +- 5) The group chat AS sends the generated multiple session invitations to the S-CSCF. +- 6) The group chat AS sends one of the chat session invitations to the IP-SM-GW according to normal routing procedures (e.g., via S-CSCF). The chat session invitation will indicate that the existing session is to be replaced with a new session. +- 7) The IP-SM-GW translates the chat session invitation request to a Short Message (SMS- SUBMIT) and forwards it towards the group chat SMS-SC (SC Address) via the SMS-IWMSC (as described in TS 23.040 [2]). The IP-SM-GW assigns an MSISDN representing the group chat session, if one was not assigned for the one-to-one chat session, to ensure that the reply to this SMS is sent back to this particular IP-SM-GW. Any SMS sent from the SMS user to this MSISDN will be interworked into the group chat session with which this MSISDN is correlated. The text in the Short Message is defined by the operator and conveys information to the SMS user that the one-to-one session has been transformed into a group session and that he is invited to send and receive messages in the context of a group chat session, and includes instructions on how to accept, reject and end the session. The identity of the original sender (CPM user or group) is included as part of the operator provided invitation text. +- 8) The SMS-IWMSC forwards the Short Messages (SMS- SUBMIT) to the group chat SMS-SC and the SMS is delivered to the SMS user using standard SMS procedures (see TS 23.040 [2]). +- 9) A Short Message is received from the SMS user via the SMS-GMSC by the IP-SM-GW, in accordance to steps 2 to 4 and steps 10 to 13 from clause 6.14, indicating the response to the group chat session invitation. The message is targeted to the MSISDN representing the group chat session which was assigned in step 7. +- 10) If the answer is positive or if operator policy is to accept the session invitation on behalf of the SMS user, the IP-SM-GW acknowledges the session invitation. Otherwise the IP-SM-GW will consider the session rejected and sends back an appropriate response. +- 11) The session invitation acknowledgement is forwarded by S-CSCF to the group chat AS. +- 12-13) The group chat AS responds back to the group chat session initiator once the first user joins the group chat session. + +## --- B.3 Service-level interworking: IP-SM-GW informs SMS users about group chat participant changes + +In this flow, the IP-SM-GW is in the PLMN of the CPM UE, but it could also be in the PLMN of the SMS user if that user was also a CPM user and had terminating user preferences to deliver the session invitation via SMS. + +![Sequence diagram showing the interaction between Group chat session's SMS-SC, SMS-IWMSC, IP-SM-GW, Group chat AS, S-CSCF, and CPM-UE for sending participant information changes.](6e15fc9ea763541c5913d26f85072ae1_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant Group chat session's SMS-SC + participant SMS-IWMSC + participant IP-SM-GW + participant Group chat AS + participant S-CSCF + participant CPM-UE + + Note over Group chat session's SMS-SC, CPM-UE: 1. Group chat session setup including SMS user(s) + Note over Group chat AS: 2. Detect participant change + Group chat AS->>S-CSCF: 3. Participant information notification + S-CSCF->>IP-SM-GW: 4. Participant information notification + IP-SM-GW->>S-CSCF: 5. OK + S-CSCF->>Group chat AS: 6. OK + IP-SM-GW->>SMS-IWMSC: 7. Forward SM + SMS-IWMSC->>Group chat session's SMS-SC: 8. Message transfer + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the interaction between Group chat session's SMS-SC, SMS-IWMSC, IP-SM-GW, Group chat AS, S-CSCF, and CPM-UE for sending participant information changes. + +**Figure B.3: Sending participant information changes to an SMS user in a group chat session** + +- 1) A group chat session including SMS user(s) set up by an IM or CPM user as described in clause B.1 steps 1-17. +- 2) The group chat AS detects change in participants of the group chat session (e.g. participant added or left the group chat session, that event is not shown in the flow). +- 3-4) As the IP-SM-GW has subscribed to participant information changes, the group chat AS notifies the IP-SM-GW about the participant change through the S-CSCF using an appropriate SIP method. +- 5-6) The IP-SM-GW acknowledges the notification. +- 7) According to operator policy, the IP-SM-GW translates the participant change notification to a Short Message (SMS- SUBMIT) and forwards it towards the group chat SMS-SC (SC Address) via the SMS-IWMSC (as described in TS 23.040 [2]). The text in the Short Message is defined by the operator and conveys appropriate information to the SMS user. +- 8) The SMS-IWMSC forwards the Short Messages (SMS- SUBMIT) to the group chat SMS-SC and the SMS is delivered to the SMS user using standard SMS procedures (see TS 23.040 [2]). + +# Annex C (informative): Change History + +| Change history | | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|--| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | | +| 2007-12 | SP-38 | SP-070898 | 0036 | 1 | B | New Annex: IM user sends an Instant Message to a group list including SMS users | 8.0.0 | | +| 2007-12 | SP-38 | SP-070898 | 0037 | 3 | B | IM capable UE sends an Instant Message to an SMS user | 8.0.0 | | +| 2007-12 | SP-38 | SP-070898 | 0038 | 4 | B | Relationship between SMSIP and Service level interworking | 8.0.0 | | +| 2007-12 | SP-38 | SP-070898 | 0039 | 4 | B | Definition, Symbol, Abbreviation Clauses | 8.0.0 | | +| 2007-12 | SP-38 | SP-070898 | 0041 | 5 | B | Status Report for IM to SMS IW | 8.0.0 | | +| 2007-12 | SP-38 | SP-070898 | 0043 | 2 | B | Updating the scope for TS 23.204 | 8.0.0 | | +| 2007-12 | SP-38 | SP-070898 | 0044 | 2 | B | Concatenated Short Messages delivered as an large Instant Message | 8.0.0 | | +| 2007-12 | SP-38 | SP-070898 | 0045 | 2 | B | IP-SM-GW Additional Features | 8.0.0 | | +| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080109 | 0047 | 2 | C | SC address retrieval for IM MO | 8.1.0 | | +| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080108 | 0050 | 2 | A | Correction to Reference | 8.1.0 | | +| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080109 | 0053 | - | D | Implementing the documentation guidance from SA#38 | 8.1.0 | | +| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080109 | 0056 | - | F | IM to SM interworking procedure corrections | 8.1.0 | | +| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080109 | 0058 | 2 | B | Procedures when disposition notification is requested by IMS UE | 8.1.0 | | +| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080109 | 0059 | 3 | C | Adding architecture requirement for service level interworking | 8.1.0 | | +| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080109 | 0060 | 2 | C | Implementing the functionality for SC address retrieval | 8.1.0 | | +| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080109 | 0061 | 1 | F | General cleanup of the specification | 8.1.0 | | +| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080109 | 0062 | 3 | C | General cleanup of new clauses agreed in SA2#62 | 8.1.0 | | +| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080109 | 0063 | 3 | C | Correctly adding SMS to IM interworking procedures and clean up | 8.1.0 | | +| 2008-06 | SP-40 | SP-080368 | 0064 | 1 | C | Adding privacy functionality to the service level interworking | 8.2.0 | | +| 2008-06 | SP-40 | SP-080368 | 0065 | 2 | C | IM delivery to unregistered IMS subscriber | 8.2.0 | | +| 2008-06 | SP-40 | SP-080368 | 0066 | 1 | F | General Cleanup (cont'd) | 8.2.0 | | +| 2008-06 | SP-40 | SP-080368 | 0067 | 4 | F | Deferred message when SMS is transport or service level interworked | 8.2.0 | | +| 2008-06 | SP-40 | SP-080368 | 0068 | 1 | F | Corrections for IM termination call flow | 8.2.0 | | +| 2008-06 | SP-40 | SP-080368 | 0070 | 1 | F | Architectural requirement corrections | 8.2.0 | | +| 2008-06 | SP-40 | SP-080368 | 0072 | - | F | SMS delivery correction | 8.2.0 | | +| 2008-09 | SP-41 | SP-080585 | 0074 | 3 | B | Update of TS 23.204 for SMS over IP procedures for E-UTRAN | 8.3.0 | | +| 2009-03 | SP-43 | SP-090111 | 0077 | 4 | A | Correction of procedure for SM termination through the home network | 8.4.0 | | +| 2009-03 | SP-43 | SP-090106 | 0078 | 1 | F | Reduction of unnecessary signalling | 8.4.0 | | +| 2009-12 | SP-46 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-9 version (MCC) | 9.0.0 | | +| 2010-03 | SP-47 | SP-100157 | 0085 | - | B | IP-SM-GW enhancements for interworking with OMA CPM
(Rel-9 CR0087 not included as instructed on the Rel-9 CR) | 10.0.0 | | +| 2010-06 | SP-48 | SP-100336 | 0088 | - | F | Scope and References Corrections of CPM-SMS IW | 10.1.0 | | +| 2010-06 | SP-48 | SP-100336 | 0089 | - | F | Clarify routing of messages for processing in the IP-SM-GW | 10.1.0 | | +| 2010-09 | SP-49 | SP-100557 | 0090 | 1 | F | NOTE corrections | 10.2.0 | | +| 2011-06 | SP-52 | SP-110343 | 0091 | - | F | IP-SM-GW address handling clarification | 11.0.0 | | +| 2011-09 | SP-53 | SP-110469 | 0092 | - | F | MCC Implementation correction to CR0091 | 11.1.0 | | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120240 | 0093 | 5 | B | Server to MSISDN-less IMS UE direction in IMS | 11.2.0 | | +| 2012-12 | SP-58 | SP-120717 | 0095 | 2 | F | Nokia Siemens Networks, LG Electronics | 11.3.0 | | +| 2012-12 | SP-58 | SP-120727 | 0096 | 2 | B | SMS for IMS UE to IMS UE without MSISDN | 12.0.0 | | +| 2013-03 | SP-59 | SP-130091 | 0097 | 1 | F | Clarification on MSISDN-less SMS operation | 12.1.0 | | +| 2013-06 | SP-60 | SP-130322 | 0101 | 2 | A | Adding the interface between IP-SM-GW and MME | 12.2.0 | | +| 2013-09 | SP-61 | SP-130370 | 0103 | 1 | A | IP-SM-GW with Diameter interfaces for SMS in MME | 12.3.0 | | +| 2013-12 | SP-62 | SP-130535 | 0104 | - | B | IP-SM-GW and Gdd interface | 12.4.0 | | +| 2015-12 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-13 version (MCC) | 13.0.0 | | +| 2016-06 | SP-72 | SP-160284 | 0108 | - | A | SMS w/o MSISDN with removal of Sh interaction | 13.1.0 | | +| 2017-03 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-14 version (MCC) | 14.0.0 | | +| 2018-03 | SP-79 | SP-180094 | 0109 | 1 | F | MT SMS domain selection by IP-SM-GW | 15.0.0 | | +| 2018-03 | SP-79 | SP-180094 | 0110 | 2 | F | Addition of description on SMSF address | 15.0.0 | | +| 2019-12 | SP-86 | SP-191089 | 0119 | 1 | F | Alignment to 23.040 on UE reachability notification from IP-SM-GW | 16.0.0 | | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23259/0236eff05bcb8f3a343ea7933aaa306b_img.jpg 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56421 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23259/ff0952ef692c9d960ce5f6708bcc9711_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23259/ff0952ef692c9d960ce5f6708bcc9711_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8672cb872ca5943747099b51f63431974e7dfb9c --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23259/ff0952ef692c9d960ce5f6708bcc9711_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:6d0cb017ad8307b51f268a8284ec8c7a026f570ed90d6fa026ef78d45566ac4d +size 35950 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23259/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23259/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..80f2628bb7b83ee9be34f8e37f25483aee60a3df --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23259/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,1437 @@ +# Contents + +| | | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 5 | +| 1 Scope..... | 5 | +| 2 References..... | 5 | +| 3 Definitions and Abbreviations. .... | 6 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 6 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 7 | +| 4 PNM overview ..... | 7 | +| 4.1 General ..... | 7 | +| 4.2 PN access control concepts ..... | 7 | +| 5 Procedures and information flows for PN configuration ..... | 9 | +| 5.1 PN-registration ..... | 9 | +| 5.1.1 General ..... | 9 | +| 5.1.2 PN-registration procedure in the IM CN subsystem ..... | 9 | +| 5.1.3 PN-registration procedure in the CS domain..... | 10 | +| 5.1.4 PN-registration procedure for PNE other than a PN UE ..... | 11 | +| 5.2 PN-deregistration ..... | 11 | +| 5.2.1 General ..... | 11 | +| 5.2.2 PN-deregistration procedure in the IM CN subsystem..... | 12 | +| 5.2.3 PN-deregistration procedure in the CS domain..... | 12 | +| 5.2.4 PN-deregistration procedure for PNE other than a PN UE ..... | 14 | +| 5.3 PN-configuration ..... | 14 | +| 5.3.1 General ..... | 14 | +| 5.3.2 PN-configuration procedure in the IM CN subsystem..... | 15 | +| 5.3.3 PN-configuration procedure for PNE other than a PN UE in the IM CN subsystem..... | 17 | +| 5.4 PN-deconfiguration ..... | 18 | +| 5.4.1 General ..... | 18 | +| 5.4.2 PN-deconfiguration procedure in the IM CN subsystem ..... | 18 | +| 5.5 PN-query ..... | 19 | +| 5.5.1 General ..... | 19 | +| 5.5.2 PN query procedure..... | 19 | +| 6 Procedures and information flows for PN redirection ..... | 20 | +| 6.1 Procedures and information flows in the IP CN subsystem..... | 20 | +| 6.1.1 General ..... | 20 | +| 6.1.2 Procedures and information flows for PN UE redirection in the IM CN subsystem ..... | 20 | +| 6.1.3 Procedures and information flows for PNE redirection in the IM CN subsystem ..... | 24 | +| 6.2 Procedures and information flows in the CS domain..... | 25 | +| 6.2.1 General ..... | 25 | +| 6.2.2 Procedures and information flows for PN UE redirection in the CS domain ..... | 25 | +| 6.3 Procedures and information flows in the domain interworking ..... | 28 | +| 6.3.1 General ..... | 28 | +| 6.3.2 Procedures and information flows for PN UE redirection from IM CN subsystem to CS domain ..... | 28 | +| 6.3.3 Procedures and information flows for PN UE redirection from CS domain to IM CN subsystem..... | 29 | +| 7 Procedures and information flows for PN access control..... | 31 | +| 7.1 General ..... | 31 | +| 7.2 PN access control procedures in the IM CN subsystem..... | 33 | +| 7.3 PN access control procedure in the IM CN subsystem ..... | 34 | +| 7.3.1 General ..... | 34 | +| 7.3.2 PN access control based on query logic in the IM CN subsystem ..... | 34 | +| 7.3.3 PN access control based on access control lists ..... | 35 | +| 7.4 PN access control procedure in the CS domain ..... | 38 | +| 7.4.1 General ..... | 38 | +| 7.4.2 PN access control procedure (When the caller is not in the PN access control list) ..... | 38 | +| 7.4.3 PN access control procedure in CS domain (When the caller is in the PN access control list) ..... | 41 | + +Annex A (informative): Change history................................................................................................................ 43 + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document provides the procedure details and the information flows for support of Personal Network Management and Personal Area Network, including the PN redirection and PN access control applications enabled by Personal Network Management (PNM). + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. + - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. + - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. +- [1] 3GPP TS 22.259: "Service requirements for Personal Network Management (PNM)". +- [2] 3GPP TS 23.002: "Network architecture". +- [3] 3GPP TS 23.218: "IP Multimedia (IM) Session Handling; IM call model". +- [4] 3GPP TS 23.228: "IP multimedia subsystem; Stage 2". +- [5] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [6] 3GPP TS 22.002: "Bearer Services Supported by a Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN)". +- [7] 3GPP TS 22.003: "Circuit Teleservices Supported by a Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN)". +- [8] 3GPP TS 23.078: "Customized Applications for Mobile network Enhanced Logic (CAMEL) Phase 4; Stage 2". + +- [9] 3GPP TS 33.222: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Access to network application functions using Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security (HTTPS)". +- [10] 3GPP TS 23.018: "Basic Call Handling; Technical realization". +- [11] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic bootstrapping architecture". +- [12] 3GPP TS 23.090: "Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD); Stage 2". +- [13] 3GPP TS 22.085: "Closed User Group (CUG) Supplementary Services; Stage 1". +- [14] 3GPP TS 23.085: "Closed User Group (CUG) supplementary service; Stage 2". + +# --- 3 Definitions and Abbreviations. + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 22.259 [1] subclauses 3.1 and 4.2.1 apply: + +**Personal Area Network (PAN)** +**Personal Network (PN)** +**Personal Network Element (PNE)** +**PN UE redirection** +**PN access control** +**PN-user** +**PNE redirection** +**default UE** + +For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 23.002 [2] apply: + +**Application Server (AS)** + +For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 23.218 [3] subclause 3.1 apply: + +**Initial filter criteria** +**Initial Request** + +For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 23.228 [4] subclause 3.1 apply: + +**Public user identity** +**Private user identity** +**Proxy-CSCF (P-CSCF)** +**Serving-CSCF (S-CSCF)** + +For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [5] apply: + +**User Equipment (UE)** + +For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 22.085 [13] apply: + +**Incoming Access (IA)** +**Outgoing Access (OA)** + +For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: + +**PN UE name:** A name selected by a PN-user for a PN UE of the PN-user's PN and recorded together with other subscription data like the public/private user identity/identities by the operator in the HSS and the PNM AS by means of provisioning. A PN UE name (e.g., "MeinSchatz") for a PN UE is unique within the PN-user's PN. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply. + +| | | +|-----|-----------------------------| +| CUG | Closed User Group | +| PAN | Personal Area Network | +| PN | Personal Network | +| PNE | Personal Network Element | +| PNM | Personal Network Management | + +# 4 PNM overview + +## 4.1 General + +Personal Network Management (PNM) is a home network-based application and provides the home network-based management of Personal Network (PN) consisting of multiple devices belonging to a single PN-user, as described in 3GPP TS 22.259 [1]. These home network-based management functions cover the configuration of the PN-user's PN such as PN-registration, PN-deregistration, PN-configuration, PN-deconfiguration and PN-query procedures, and the operation of the PN-user's PN. Functionality enabled by the PNM comprises the PN UE redirection and the PN access control applications as described in 3GPP TS 22.259 [1]. In order to provide the PN UE redirection and the PN access control applications, the PNM is realized as an AS in the IM CN subsystem as described in 3GPP TS 23.002 [2] and as a CAMEL service in the CS domain as described in 3GPP TS 23.078 [4]. + +## 4.2 PN access control concepts + +The PN access control is one of the PNM applications specified in 3GPP TS 22.259 [1] that enables PN-users to exercise access control to restrict accesses to certain UE(s) of their PNs. The PN may consist of UEs which are only privately accessed, that is each UE may be accessed only by other UEs of the PN. The PN-User may additionally modify the access levels of each UE of the PN to be public or private. In this regard the PN behaves similar to a CUG as specified in 3GPP TS 22.085 [13] and 3GPP TS 23.085 [14], with Outgoing Access and whether Incoming Access is allowed for the PN UE is dependent on the PN access control list for that PN UE. + +In order to perform such PN access control the PN-users need to configure a PN access control list for each UE of the PN. The configuration can be done either in a static or a dynamic way. Besides other additional information, the PN access control list of a UE within a PN contains all identities (e.g., a SIP URI) which are permitted to be used to initiate sessions to that UE. In this document, the UE of a PN that is used by the PN-user to exercise access control is referred to controller UE, whereas the UE of the PN, over which an access control is enabled, is referred to controllee UE. The controller UE of a PN-user's PN is assigned by provisioning and the controller UE can configure any UE of the PN as controllee UE. The PN access control list of the controllee UE is only configurable by the controller UE. + +![Diagram illustrating the relationship of various service profiles in PN access control. It shows an IMS Subscription connected to two UEs: UE 1b (Controllee) and UE 1a (Controller). UE 1b has a Private User Identity 1, Public User Identities a and b, and a CONTROLLED Service Profile. UE 1a has a Private User Identity 2, Public User Identities c and d, and a CONTROLLER Service Profile. The PNM AS contains an Access List. Arrows indicate control flow: UE 1a sends 'Configuration over Ut' to the PNM AS, which updates the 'Access List'. The PNM AS sends 'Query-response' back to UE 1a. UE 1a sends 'Access Control' to UE 1b.](78d5774278a3f4a614f8c0ae485ce8d9_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + IMS[IMS Subscription] --- UE1b[UE 1b] + IMS --- UE1a[UE 1a] + subgraph UE1b [UE 1b] + PU1[Private User Identity 1] --- PUA1[Public User Identity a] + PU1 --- PUB1[Public User Identity b] + PUA1 --- CSP[CONTROLLED Service Profile] + PUB1 --- CSP + end + subgraph UE1a [UE 1a] + PU2[Private User Identity 2] --- PUC1[Public User Identity c] + PU2 --- PUD1[Public User Identity d] + PUC1 --- CSP1[CONTROLLER Service Profile] + PUD1 --- CSP1 + end + UE1a -- "Configuration over Ut" --> PNMAS[PNM AS] + PNMAS -- "Query-response" --> UE1a + PNMAS -- "Access Control" --> UE1b + subgraph PNMAS [PNM AS] + AL[Access List] + end + +``` + +Diagram illustrating the relationship of various service profiles in PN access control. It shows an IMS Subscription connected to two UEs: UE 1b (Controllee) and UE 1a (Controller). UE 1b has a Private User Identity 1, Public User Identities a and b, and a CONTROLLED Service Profile. UE 1a has a Private User Identity 2, Public User Identities c and d, and a CONTROLLER Service Profile. The PNM AS contains an Access List. Arrows indicate control flow: UE 1a sends 'Configuration over Ut' to the PNM AS, which updates the 'Access List'. The PNM AS sends 'Query-response' back to UE 1a. UE 1a sends 'Access Control' to UE 1b. + +**Figure 4.2-1: Relationship of various service profiles in PN access control** + +An example of the service profiles configuration for PN access control is shown in the above figure 4.2-1. The arrows indicate the direction of control. Some of the aspects involved are: + +- A PN-user's PN consists of two UEs, i.e., UE 1a and UE 1b, where UE 1b is the controllee UE and UE 1a is the controller UE. +- The service profile of UE 1b is referred to as the controllee UE Service Profile. +- The service profile of UE 1a is referred to as the controller UE Service Profile. +- The assignment of controller UE service profile is done during provisioning. +- Access control of UE 1b by UE 1a is performed with the help of a SIP Application Server (AS), referred to as PNM AS. +- From UE 1a, the PN-user configures a PN access control list that contains details of PN access control regarding UE 1b's service profile. This configuration is done over the Ut interface. For example: this PN access control list can contain a list of UE identities that are allowed to initiate sessions with UE 1b. +- The PNM AS executes the actual PN access control procedures. +- The PNM AS performs PN access control by utilizing the PN access control list. +- If inadequate information present in the access control list to enable PN access control, the PNM AS can query the controller UE about the information with how to precede the received initial request. + +# 5 Procedures and information flows for PN configuration + +## 5.1 PN-registration + +### 5.1.1 General + +The PN-registration is a procedure where the PN-user requests authorization to use PNM applications. As a result of a successful registration, the UE capabilities can be conveyed to the PNM AS. + +### 5.1.2 PN-registration procedure in the IM CN subsystem + +![Sequence diagram of the successful PN-registration procedure in the IM CN subsystem. Lifelines: S-CSCF (Registrar), HSS, and PNM AS. The sequence starts with a 'Register' message from an external source to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a 'Cx Query/Response' to the HSS. The HSS returns a response to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF then sends a 'Register' message to the PNM AS. The PNM AS sends a 'Subscribe' message to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a 'Notify' message to the PNM AS. The PNM AS sends an 'Authorization' message to the HSS. Finally, the PNM AS performs an internal step '7. Verify and enrol the public user identity'.](a234352dfaccdc24745c88eef7724cc6_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant External + participant S-CSCF as S-CSCF (Registrar) + participant HSS + participant PNM AS + Note right of PNM AS: 7. Verify and enrol the public user identity + + External->>S-CSCF: 1. Register + S-CSCF->>HSS: 2. Cx Query/Response + HSS-->>S-CSCF: + S-CSCF->>PNM AS: 3. Register + PNM AS->>S-CSCF: 4. Subscribe + S-CSCF->>PNM AS: 5. Notify + PNM AS-->>HSS: 6. Authorization +``` + +Sequence diagram of the successful PN-registration procedure in the IM CN subsystem. Lifelines: S-CSCF (Registrar), HSS, and PNM AS. The sequence starts with a 'Register' message from an external source to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a 'Cx Query/Response' to the HSS. The HSS returns a response to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF then sends a 'Register' message to the PNM AS. The PNM AS sends a 'Subscribe' message to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a 'Notify' message to the PNM AS. The PNM AS sends an 'Authorization' message to the HSS. Finally, the PNM AS performs an internal step '7. Verify and enrol the public user identity'. + +**Figure 5.1.2-1: Successful PN-registration procedure in the IM CN subsystem** + +1. The Register information flow sent by a UE arrives at the S-CSCF/Registrar. The Register information flow contains the private user identity and the public user identity of the UE. +2. The S-CSCF sends a Cx-Put/Cx-Pull containing the private user identity and public user identity to the HSS and the HSS returns the information flow (eg. the initial filter criteria) to the S-CSCF. +3. Based on the initial filter criteria, the S-CSCF sends a Register information flow to the PNM AS. If the PNM AS specific data, for instance the PN UE name or the private user identity, which is associated with the initial filter criteria, is received from the HSS in Step 2, it is delivered to the PNM AS in the Register information flow. +4. The PNM AS sends a Subscribe information flow to obtain the public user identity received in the Register information flow in Step 3. +5. The S-CSCF sends a Notify information flow to the PNM AS containing the public user identities and the UE capabilities. If the S-CSCF assigned a GRUU for the UE during the registration, then the GRUU of the UE is delivered in the Notify information flow. + +**NOTE:** At the same time as Steps 4) and 5) the AS can also contact the HSS using Sh to obtain the information. Where identical information is received from both sources, it is implementation specific how this is combined. + +6. Optionally, the PNM AS authorizes the PN-registration by querying the HSS. It is done by sending the private user identity to the HSS. The HSS checks the public user identity/identities tied to the private user identity and sends the public user identity/identities and the private user identity back to the PNM AS. +7. The PNM AS then verifies the PN-registration by comparing the public user identity/identities and the PN UE name or with the other received from S-CSCF in the Step 3. As a result of a successful verification, the PNM AS enrols the public user identity and the PN UE name or as registered in the data base. + +### 5.1.3 PN-registration procedure in the CS domain + +![Sequence diagram showing the successful PN-registration procedure in the CS domain. The diagram involves four main entities: MSC/VLR, HSS, gsmSCF (CAMEL Service for PNM), and PNM AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. MSC/VLR receives a Location Update Request from a UE. 2. MSC/VLR sends a MAP_UPDATE_LOCATION message to the HSS. 3. HSS sends a MAP-INSERT-SUBSCRIBER-DATA message back to the MSC/VLR. 4. MSC/VLR sends a MAP_NOTE_MM_EVENT message to the gsmSCF. 5. gsmSCF performs an internal action: 'Setup the UE registration status in the PN'. 6. gsmSCF sends a 'UE status' message to the PNM AS. A dashed line connects the gsmSCF and the PNM AS, indicating an unspecified interface.](b8661c6c54f72ecc7ff6cb05e47b2891_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant MSC/VLR + participant HSS + participant gsmSCF as gsmSCF (CAMEL Service for PNM) + participant PNM AS + + Note left of MSC/VLR: 1. Receive a Location Update Request + MSC/VLR->>HSS: 2.MAP_UPDATE_LOCATION + HSS-->>MSC/VLR: 3.MAP-INSERT-SUBSCRIBER-DATA + MSC/VLR->>gsmSCF: 4.MAP_NOTE_MM_EVENT + Note right of gsmSCF: 5. Setup the UE registration status in the PN + gsmSCF->>PNM AS: 6. UE status +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the successful PN-registration procedure in the CS domain. The diagram involves four main entities: MSC/VLR, HSS, gsmSCF (CAMEL Service for PNM), and PNM AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. MSC/VLR receives a Location Update Request from a UE. 2. MSC/VLR sends a MAP\_UPDATE\_LOCATION message to the HSS. 3. HSS sends a MAP-INSERT-SUBSCRIBER-DATA message back to the MSC/VLR. 4. MSC/VLR sends a MAP\_NOTE\_MM\_EVENT message to the gsmSCF. 5. gsmSCF performs an internal action: 'Setup the UE registration status in the PN'. 6. gsmSCF sends a 'UE status' message to the PNM AS. A dashed line connects the gsmSCF and the PNM AS, indicating an unspecified interface. + +**Figure 5.1.3-1: Successful PN-registration in the CS domain** + +1. The VLR receives a location update request from a UE. +2. The VLR sends the MAP\_UPDATE\_LOCATION message to the HSS to request the subscription information of the UE. +3. The HSS sends the MAP\_INSERT\_SUBSCRIBER\_DATA message back to update the VLR with the PNM subscriber data. +4. The VLR changes the status of the UE to 'attached' and sends the MAP\_NOTE\_MM\_EVENT message to the gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) to report the mobile event. + +NOTE: To support the mobility management event, the CAMEL Phase 3 or later is required. + +5. The gsmSCF setups the UE registration status in the PN to 'registered'. +6. The gsmSCF will send the UE status to the PNM AS. + +NOTE: The interface between the gsmSCF and the PNM AS is unspecified. + +### 5.1.4 PN-registration procedure for PNE other than a PN UE + +![Sequence diagram for PN-registration procedure for PNE other than a PN UE. Lifelines: PNE, UE, S-CSCF, PNM AS. The process starts with PNE sending a Register Request to UE. UE then sends a Register to S-CSCF. S-CSCF sends a Register Response to UE, which UE forwards to PNE. S-CSCF also sends a Register to PNM AS, which PNM AS responds with a Subscribe. S-CSCF then sends a Notify to PNM AS, which finally enrolls the PNE.](d26959f4514c26ca19c3d6f00da85956_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant PNE + participant UE + participant S-CSCF + participant PNM AS + Note right of UE: 2. User Decision + PNE->>UE: 1. Register Request + UE->>S-CSCF: 3. Register + S-CSCF-->>UE: 4. Register Response + UE-->>PNE: 5. Register Response + S-CSCF->>PNM AS: 6. Register + PNM AS->>S-CSCF: 7. Subscribe + S-CSCF->>PNM AS: 8. Notify + PNM AS->>PNE: 9. Enrol the PNE + +``` + +Sequence diagram for PN-registration procedure for PNE other than a PN UE. Lifelines: PNE, UE, S-CSCF, PNM AS. The process starts with PNE sending a Register Request to UE. UE then sends a Register to S-CSCF. S-CSCF sends a Register Response to UE, which UE forwards to PNE. S-CSCF also sends a Register to PNM AS, which PNM AS responds with a Subscribe. S-CSCF then sends a Notify to PNM AS, which finally enrolls the PNE. + +**Figure 5.1.4-1: UE initiates the registration on behalf of the PNE** + +1. The PNE sends a register request to the UE including its capabilities via the PAN internal communication means. +2. Optionally, based on the user decision, the PNE is allowed to be added to the PAN. +3. The UE sends a SIP register request on behalf of the PNE to the S-CSCF. The Register information flow contains the private user identity and the public user identity of the UE, the PNE identifier, and the PNE capabilities. +4. The S-CSCF sends the register response back to the UE. +5. UE forwards the register response to the PNE via the PAN internal communication means. +6. Based on the initial filter criteria, the S-CSCF sends a third party Register information flow to the PNM AS. +7. The PNM AS sends a Subscribe information flow to obtain the public user identities, PNE identifier and the PNE capabilities. +8. The S-CSCF sends a Notify information flow to the PNM AS containing the public user identities, PNE identifier and PNE capabilities. +9. The PNM AS enrolls the PNE identifier into the PAN. + +## 5.2 PN-deregistration + +### 5.2.1 General + +Information shall be offered to the user by sending the status if the de-registered UE is the only default UE of the PN. + +Figure 5.2.2-1 provides the procedure in the IM CN subsystem to inform the PN-user about De-registration of the only default UE in the PN. + +Figure 5.2.3-1 provides the procedure in the CS domain to inform the PN-user about De-registration of the only default UE in the PN. + +Figure 5.2.4-1 provides the procedure to inform the UE about De-registration of the PNE. + +### 5.2.2 PN-deregistration procedure in the IM CN subsystem + +![Sequence diagram of the successful PN-deregistration procedure in the IM CN subsystem. The diagram shows three lifelines: S-CSCF (Registrar), HSS, and PNM AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. Register (from UE to S-CSCF), 2. De-Register (from S-CSCF to PNM AS), 3. Authorization (from PNM AS to HSS), 4. Verify and de-register the public user identity (internal to PNM AS), 5. Unsubscribe (from PNM AS to S-CSCF), 6. Cx Put/Response (from S-CSCF to HSS), and 7. Status (from HSS to PNM AS).](08441fa90c5fd11994626f662ac13f19_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant S-CSCF as S-CSCF (Registrar) + participant HSS + participant PNM AS + Note right of PNM AS: 4. Verify and de-register the public user identity + UE->>S-CSCF: 1. Register + S-CSCF->>PNM AS: 2. De-Register + PNM AS->>HSS: 3. Authorization + PNM AS->>PNM AS: 4. Verify and de-register the public user identity + PNM AS->>S-CSCF: 5. Unsubscribe + S-CSCF->>HSS: 6. Cx Put/Response + HSS->>PNM AS: 7. Status + +``` + +Sequence diagram of the successful PN-deregistration procedure in the IM CN subsystem. The diagram shows three lifelines: S-CSCF (Registrar), HSS, and PNM AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. Register (from UE to S-CSCF), 2. De-Register (from S-CSCF to PNM AS), 3. Authorization (from PNM AS to HSS), 4. Verify and de-register the public user identity (internal to PNM AS), 5. Unsubscribe (from PNM AS to S-CSCF), 6. Cx Put/Response (from S-CSCF to HSS), and 7. Status (from HSS to PNM AS). + +**Figure 5.2.2-1: Successful PN-deregistration procedure in the IM CN subsystem** + +1. To de-register, the UE sends a new Register information flow with an expiration value of zero seconds. The Register information flow contains the private user identity and the public user identity of the UE. +2. Based on the initial filter criteria, the S-CSCF sends Register information flow with an expiration value of zero seconds to the PNM AS. +3. Optionally, the PNM AS authorizes the PN-registration by querying the HSS. It is done by sending the private user identity to the HSS. The HSS checks the public user identity/identities tied to the private user identity and sends it back to the PNM AS. +4. The PNM AS then verifies the PN-registration by comparing the public user identity/identities with the other received from S-CSCF in the Step 2. As a result of a successful verification, the PNM AS enrols the public user identity as de-registered in the data base and removes the stored configuration setting related to this specific public user identity. +5. The PNM AS sends an Unsubscribe information flow to unsubscribe to the service subscription notification of the public user identity. +6. The S-CSCF sends a Cx-Put/Cx-Pull containing the private user identity, public user identity and clear/keep S-CSCF name to the HSS base on operator choice and the HSS returns response to the S-CSCF. +7. If the UE ties to this specific public user identity registered as the only default UE, then the PNM AS sends the status to these UEs of the PN to inform this change. + +### 5.2.3 PN-deregistration procedure in the CS domain + +The PN-deregistration in the CS domain relies on the notification procedure of mobility management event and is accomplished by a notification with the event type of IMSI detach. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the procedure to inform the PN-user about the PN-deregistration of the default UE. The diagram shows four lifelines: MSC/VLR, HSS, gsmSCF (PNM Application), and UE. The sequence of messages is: 1. MSC/VLR sends MAP_NOTE_MM_EVENT to gsmSCF; 2. gsmSCF sets UE registration status in the PN; 3. gsmSCF sends USSD Notify to HSS; 4. HSS sends USSD Notify to MSC/VLR; 5. MSC/VLR sends USSD Notify to UE.](ff0952ef692c9d960ce5f6708bcc9711_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant MSC/VLR + participant HSS + participant gsmSCF as gsmSCF (PNM Application) + participant UE + Note right of gsmSCF: 2. Set the UE registration status in the PN + MSC/VLR->>gsmSCF: 1.MAP_NOTE_MM_EVENT + gsmSCF->>HSS: 3.USSD Notify + HSS->>MSC/VLR: 4. .USSD Notify + MSC/VLR->>UE: 5. .USSD Notify +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the procedure to inform the PN-user about the PN-deregistration of the default UE. The diagram shows four lifelines: MSC/VLR, HSS, gsmSCF (PNM Application), and UE. The sequence of messages is: 1. MSC/VLR sends MAP\_NOTE\_MM\_EVENT to gsmSCF; 2. gsmSCF sets UE registration status in the PN; 3. gsmSCF sends USSD Notify to HSS; 4. HSS sends USSD Notify to MSC/VLR; 5. MSC/VLR sends USSD Notify to UE. + +**Figure 5.2.3-1: Procedure to inform the PN-user about the PN-deregistration of the default UE** + +1. After IMSI detach procedure, the VLR sends the MAP\_NOTE\_MM\_EVENT message to the gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) to report the mobile event. +2. The gsmSCF sets up the PN UE registration status in the PN to 'Deregistered'. +3. The gsmSCF checks whether the PN UE was the only default UE in the PN or not. If it was the only default UE in the PN, the gsmSCF generates the USSD Notify message to the HSS. +- 4-5. The HSS forwards this message to the PN UE via MSC/VLR according to 3GPP TS 23.090 [12]. + +### 5.2.4 PN-deregistration procedure for PNE other than a PN UE + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the PN-deregistration procedure for PNE other than a PN UE. The diagram shows four lifelines: PNE, UE, S-CSCF, and PNM AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. De-Register Request from PNE to UE; 2. Register from UE to S-CSCF; 3. Register Response from S-CSCF to UE; 4. De-Register Response from UE to PNE; 5. De-Register from S-CSCF to PNM AS; 6. Verify and de-register the PNE (internal to PNM AS); 7. Notify from PNM AS to S-CSCF.](bd671b21db63e6fdb2196e9b18502aac_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant PNE + participant UE + participant S-CSCF + participant PNM AS + Note right of PNM AS: 6. Verify and de-register the PNE + PNE->>UE: 1. De-Register Request + UE->>S-CSCF: 2. Register + S-CSCF-->>UE: 3. Register Response + UE-->>PNE: 4. De-Register Response + S-CSCF->>PNM AS: 5. De-Register + PNM AS->>S-CSCF: 7. Notify + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the PN-deregistration procedure for PNE other than a PN UE. The diagram shows four lifelines: PNE, UE, S-CSCF, and PNM AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. De-Register Request from PNE to UE; 2. Register from UE to S-CSCF; 3. Register Response from S-CSCF to UE; 4. De-Register Response from UE to PNE; 5. De-Register from S-CSCF to PNM AS; 6. Verify and de-register the PNE (internal to PNM AS); 7. Notify from PNM AS to S-CSCF. + +**Figure 5.2.4-1: PN-deregistration procedure for PNE other than a PN UE** + +1. The PNE sends a de-register request to the UE via the PAN internal communication means. +2. The UE sends a register request on behalf of the PNE to the S-CSCF with an expiration value of zero seconds. +3. The S-CSCF sends the register response back to the UE. +4. The UE sends the de-register response to the PNE via the PAN internal communication means. +5. Based on the initial filter criteria, the S-CSCF sends a De-Register information flow to the PNM AS. +6. The PNM AS then verifies the PN-deregistration by comparing the PNE identifier with the other received from S-CSCF. As a result of a successful verification, the PNM AS enrols the PNE identifier as de-registered in the data base and removes the stored configuration setting related to this specific PNE identifier. +7. The PNM AS sends a Notify information flow to the S-CSCF containing the register status of PNE. + +## 5.3 PN-configuration + +### 5.3.1 General + +The PN-configuration procedures enable the PN-user to configure UEs as the default UE for terminating requests addressed to any UE belonging to the same PN and to configure the PN access control list. The PN-configuration can be done in three levels in IM CN subsystem and two levels in CS domain. They are a global level for all services supported by the UE capabilities and subscriptions, a per service basis for selected services supported by the UE capabilities and subscriptions, and a per service component basis for the different media of a supported service for the UE. + +The following subclause describes the PN-configuration procedures in the IM CN subsystem. The signalling flow in figure 5.3.2-1 describes the information flow exchange between UE and NAF/PNM AS when the UE performs the PN-configuration. + +### 5.3.2 PN-configuration procedure in the IM CN subsystem + +![Sequence diagram of the successful PN-configuration procedure in the IM CN subsystem. The diagram shows three lifelines: UE, HSS, and NAF/PNM AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. PN-configuration request from UE to NAF/PNM AS; 2. Authentication and Authorization within NAF/PNM AS; 3. Service Subscription Query Request from NAF/PNM AS to HSS; 4. Service Subscription Query Response from HSS to NAF/PNM AS; 5. Check UE's Capability Subscription within NAF/PNM AS; 6. Service Subscription Subscribe Request from NAF/PNM AS to HSS; 7. Service Subscription Subscribe Response from HSS to NAF/PNM AS; 8. Store the Configuration Setting within NAF/PNM AS; 9. PN-configuration response from NAF/PNM AS to UE.](75f0cb39f1cd165dfe4a6aa6c4d9388d_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant HSS + participant NAF/PNM AS + Note right of NAF/PNM AS: 2. Authentication and Authorization + Note right of NAF/PNM AS: 5. Check UE's Capability Subscription + Note right of NAF/PNM AS: 8. Store the Configuration Setting + UE->>NAF/PNM AS: 1. PN-configuration request + NAF/PNM AS->>HSS: 3. Service Subscription Query Request + HSS-->>NAF/PNM AS: 4. Service Subscription Query Response + NAF/PNM AS->>HSS: 6. Service Subscription Subscribe Request + HSS-->>NAF/PNM AS: 7. Service Subscription Subscribe Response + NAF/PNM AS-->>UE: 9. PN-configuration response + +``` + +Sequence diagram of the successful PN-configuration procedure in the IM CN subsystem. The diagram shows three lifelines: UE, HSS, and NAF/PNM AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. PN-configuration request from UE to NAF/PNM AS; 2. Authentication and Authorization within NAF/PNM AS; 3. Service Subscription Query Request from NAF/PNM AS to HSS; 4. Service Subscription Query Response from HSS to NAF/PNM AS; 5. Check UE's Capability Subscription within NAF/PNM AS; 6. Service Subscription Subscribe Request from NAF/PNM AS to HSS; 7. Service Subscription Subscribe Response from HSS to NAF/PNM AS; 8. Store the Configuration Setting within NAF/PNM AS; 9. PN-configuration response from NAF/PNM AS to UE. + +**Figure 5.3.2-1: Successful PN-configuration procedure in the IM CN subsystem** + +The signalling flow in figure 5.3.2-1 describes the signal flow between UE and NAF/PNM AS when the UE wants to configure the PN. The procedure shall only take place after a successful bootstrapping procedure (as described in 3GPP TS 33.220 [11]) in which case the bootstrapped security association has been established before Step 1. + +1. UE sends a PN-configuration request to the NAF/PNM AS informing the PNM AS about its desirable settings for the PN UE redirection applications and/or the PN access control list. The PN-configuration request contains the public user identity/identities of the UE, and the PN UE names of the UEs to be configured. The relevant parameters for executing the PN UE redirection application (e.g configuration level and the priority value) may be included. The controller UE and controllee UE, and the PN access control list including either the public user identities (if reachable in the IM CN subsystem) and/or the directory number (if reachable in the CS domain) may be included. + +**Editor's note: Whether routing information is needed is FFS.** + +2. Upon receiving this Configuration request message, the NAF/PNM AS authenticates the PN-configuration request according to the 3GPP TS 33.222 [9]. After a successful authentication, the NAF inserts the private user identity of the UE and forwards the request to the PNM AS. The PNM AS authorizes the Configuration request message by comparing the public user identity and the PN UE name with those ones that are registered in the PN by means of the PN-registration procedure. +3. The NAF/PNM AS sends a Service Subscription Query request to the HSS in order to obtain the service subscription tied to the public user identity received in the PN-configuration request. +4. The HSS sends a Service Subscription Query response back to the NAF/PNM AS with the service subscription tied to the public user identity. +5. Upon receiving the Service Subscription Query response, the NAF/PNM AS verifies the UE capability and the service subscription of the public user identity. + +6. The NAF/PNM AS sends the Service Subscription Subscribe request to the HSS. +7. The HSS sends the Service Subscription Subscribe Response to the NAF/PNM AS. +8. The NAF/PNM AS stores the configuration settings. +9. The NAF/PNM AS sends the PN-configuration response to the UE. + +### 5.3.3 PN-configuration procedure for PNE other than a PN UE in the IM CN subsystem + +![Sequence diagram showing the PN-configuration procedure for PNE in the IM CN subsystem. The diagram involves four lifelines: PNE, UE, HSS, and NAF/PNM AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. PNE sends a PN-configuration request to the UE; 2. UE forwards the request to the NAF/PNM AS; 3. NAF/PNM AS performs Authentication and Authorization; 4. NAF/PNM AS sends a Service Subscription Query Request to the HSS; 5. HSS returns a Service Subscription Query Response; 6. NAF/PNM AS checks the UE's subscription; 7. NAF/PNM AS sends a Service Subscription Subscribe Request to the HSS; 8. HSS returns a Service Subscription Subscribe Response; 9. NAF/PNM AS stores the configuration setting; 10. NAF/PNM AS sends a PN-configuration response to the UE; 11. UE forwards the response to the PNE.](df82d77a0d2637cbf2da9ea920a554fa_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant PNE + participant UE + participant HSS + participant NAF/PNM AS + Note right of NAF/PNM AS: 3. Authentication and Authorization + Note right of NAF/PNM AS: 6. Check UE's Subscription + Note right of NAF/PNM AS: 9. Store the Configuration Setting + PNE->>UE: 1. PN-configuration request + UE->>NAF/PNM AS: 2. PN-configuration request + NAF/PNM AS->>HSS: 4. Service Subscription Query Request + HSS->>NAF/PNM AS: 5. Service Subscription Query Response + NAF/PNM AS->>HSS: 7. Service Subscription Subscribe Request + HSS->>NAF/PNM AS: 8. Service Subscription Subscribe Response + NAF/PNM AS->>UE: 10. PN-configuration response + UE->>PNE: 11. PN-configuration response + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the PN-configuration procedure for PNE in the IM CN subsystem. The diagram involves four lifelines: PNE, UE, HSS, and NAF/PNM AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. PNE sends a PN-configuration request to the UE; 2. UE forwards the request to the NAF/PNM AS; 3. NAF/PNM AS performs Authentication and Authorization; 4. NAF/PNM AS sends a Service Subscription Query Request to the HSS; 5. HSS returns a Service Subscription Query Response; 6. NAF/PNM AS checks the UE's subscription; 7. NAF/PNM AS sends a Service Subscription Subscribe Request to the HSS; 8. HSS returns a Service Subscription Subscribe Response; 9. NAF/PNM AS stores the configuration setting; 10. NAF/PNM AS sends a PN-configuration response to the UE; 11. UE forwards the response to the PNE. + +**Figure 5.3.3-1: PN-configuration procedure for PNE in the IM CN subsystem** + +The signalling flow in figure 5.3.3-1 describes the signalling flow between PNE and NAF/PNM AS through the UE when the PNE wants to configure the PN. + +1. PNE sends a PN-configuration request to the UE contains the public user identity/identities of the UE, and the PN identifier of the PNE to be configured. The relevant parameters for executing the PN redirection application (e.g configuration level and the priority value) may be included. The PN access control list including either the public user identities (if reachable in the IM CN subsystem) and/or the directory number (if reachable in the CS domain) may be included. + +NOTE: The interface between PNE and UE is out of scope. + +2. UE forwards the PN-configuration request to the NAF/PNM AS informing the PNM AS about the desirable settings of PNE. +3. Upon receiving this Configuration request message, the NAF/PNM AS authenticates the PN-configuration request according to the 3GPP TS 33.222 [9]. After a successful authentication, the NAF inserts the private user identity of the UE and forwards the request to the PNM AS. The PNM AS authorizes the Configuration request + +message by comparing the public user identity and the PN UE name with those ones that are registered in the PN by means of the PN-registration procedure. + +4. The NAF/PNM AS sends a Service Subscription Query request to the HSS in order to obtain the service subscription tied to the public user identity received in the PN-configuration request. +5. The HSS sends a Service Subscription Query response back to the NAF/PNM AS with the service subscription tied to the public user identity. +6. Upon receiving the Service Subscription Query response, the NAF/PNM AS verifies the PNE service subscription of the public user identity. +7. The NAF/PNM AS sends the Service Subscription Subscribe request to the HSS. +8. The HSS sends the Service Subscription Subscribe Response to the NAF/PNM AS. +9. The NAF/PNM AS stores the configuration settings. +10. The NAF/PNM AS sends the PN-configuration response to the UE. +11. UE forwards the PN-configuration response to the PNE. + +## 5.4 PN-deconfiguration + +### 5.4.1 General + +The PN-deconfiguration procedure enables the PN-user to deconfigure the default UE of a PN. Corresponding to the configuration procedure described in subclause 5.3, the PN-deconfiguration can be done in three levels in IM CN subsystem and two levels in CS domain. + +The following subclauses describe the PN-deconfiguration procedure in the IM CN subsystem. + +### 5.4.2 PN-deconfiguration procedure in the IM CN subsystem + +![Sequence diagram of the successful PN-deconfiguration procedure in the IM CN Subsystem. The diagram shows the interaction between UE, HSS, and NAF/PNM AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. PN-deconfiguration Request from UE to NAF/PNM AS; 2. PN Authentication and Authorization within NAF/PNM AS; 3. Service Subscription Unsubscribe Request from NAF/PNM AS to HSS; 4. Service Subscription Unsubscribe Response from HSS to NAF/PNM AS; 5. Remove the Configuration Settings within NAF/PNM AS; 6. PN-deconfiguration Response from NAF/PNM AS to UE; 7. Status from NAF/PNM AS to HSS (dashed line).](124c6108c63173818afb8ed49521e22d_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant HSS + participant NAF/PNM AS + Note right of NAF/PNM AS: 2. PN Authentication and Authorization + Note right of NAF/PNM AS: 5. Remove the Configuration Settings + UE->>NAF/PNM AS: 1. PN-deconfiguration Request + NAF/PNM AS->>HSS: 3. Service Subscription Unsubscribe Request + HSS-->>NAF/PNM AS: 4. Service Subscription Unsubscribe Response + NAF/PNM AS-->>UE: 6. PN-deconfiguration Response + NAF/PNM AS-->>HSS: 7. Status +``` + +Sequence diagram of the successful PN-deconfiguration procedure in the IM CN Subsystem. The diagram shows the interaction between UE, HSS, and NAF/PNM AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. PN-deconfiguration Request from UE to NAF/PNM AS; 2. PN Authentication and Authorization within NAF/PNM AS; 3. Service Subscription Unsubscribe Request from NAF/PNM AS to HSS; 4. Service Subscription Unsubscribe Response from HSS to NAF/PNM AS; 5. Remove the Configuration Settings within NAF/PNM AS; 6. PN-deconfiguration Response from NAF/PNM AS to UE; 7. Status from NAF/PNM AS to HSS (dashed line). + +**Figure 5.4.2-1: Successful PN-deconfiguration procedure in the IM CN Subsystem** + +The signalling flow in figure 5.4.2-1 describes the signal flow between UE and NAF/PNM AS when the UE wants to deconfigure the PN. The messaging shall only take place after a successful bootstrapping procedure (as described in 3GPP TS 33.220 [11]) in which case the bootstrapped security association has been established before Step 1. + +1. In order to remove its configuration settings for the PN UE redirection applications from the PN, a UE sends a Deconfiguration request message to the PNM AS containing the public user identity/identities of the UEs to be deconfigured. Additionally, other relevant parameters for executing the PN UE redirection application such as the configuration level and the priority value can be included. +2. Upon receiving the PN-deconfiguration request, the NAF/PNM AS authenticates the PN-deconfiguration Request according to the 3GPP TS 33.222 [9]. After a successful authentication, the NAF inserts the private user identity of the UE and forwards it to the PNM AS. The PNM AS authorizes the PN-deconfiguration request by comparing the public user identity with those ones that are registered in the PN by means of the PN-registration procedure. +3. The PNM AS sends the Unsubscribe request to the HSS. +4. The HSS sends the Unsubscribe response to the PNM AS. +5. The PNM AS removes the stored configuration setting. +6. The PNM AS sends the PN-deconfiguration response to the UE. +7. If the UE ties to this specific public user identity registered as the only default UE, then the NAF/PNM AS sends the Status message request to these UEs of the PN to inform this change. + +## 5.5 PN-query + +### 5.5.1 General + +Figure 5.5.2-1 shows a successful PN-query procedure that is used by the PN-users to enquire their PN settings information which is stored in the PNM AS after performing the PN-registration and PN-configuration procedures. + +### 5.5.2 PN query procedure + +The PN setting information belonging to a PN-user can be categorized into: + +- information about the registered public user identities, +- settings for PN UE redirection, such as the default UEs, service level settings and redirection priority. +- settings for the PN access control, such as a PN access control list. + +![Sequence diagram of the successful PN query procedure in the IM CN subsystem. The diagram shows three lifelines: UE, HSS, and NAF/PNM AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. PN-query Request from UE to NAF/PNM AS; 2. PN Authentication and Authorization from NAF/PNM AS to HSS; 3. PN-query Response from NAF/PNM AS to UE.](327ba94498e3381cf08eb41e3fd3d77f_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant HSS + participant NAF/PNM AS + Note right of NAF/PNM AS: 2. PN Authentication and Authorization + UE->>NAF/PNM AS: 1. PN-query Request + NAF/PNM AS->>HSS: 2. PN Authentication and Authorization + NAF/PNM AS->>UE: 3. PN-query Response +``` + +Sequence diagram of the successful PN query procedure in the IM CN subsystem. The diagram shows three lifelines: UE, HSS, and NAF/PNM AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. PN-query Request from UE to NAF/PNM AS; 2. PN Authentication and Authorization from NAF/PNM AS to HSS; 3. PN-query Response from NAF/PNM AS to UE. + +**Figure 5.5.2-1: Successful PN query procedure in the IM CN subsystem** + +The signalling flow in figure 5.5.2-1 describes the signal flow between UE and NAF/PNM AS when the UE wants to query the PN settings. The procedure shall only take place after a successful bootstrapping procedure (as described in 3GPP TS 33.220 [11]) in which case the bootstrapped security association has been established before Step 1. + +1. UE sends a PNquery request to the NAF/PNM AS in order to obtain the PN setting information classified above for the PNM applications by including the public user identity/identities of the UEs. +2. Upon receiving the PN-query request, the NAF/PNM AS authenticates the PN-query request according to the 3GPP TS 33.222 [9]. After a successful authentication, the NAF/PNM AS inserts the private user identity + +associated with the public user identity/identities of the UE and forwards the message to the NAF/PNM AS. The NAF/PNM AS authorizes the PN-query request by comparing the public user identity with those ones that are registered in the PN by means of the PN-registration procedure. + +3. The NAF/PNM AS sends the PNquery response message to the UE containing the PN settings information for the PNM applications as asked by the UE. + +# --- 6 Procedures and information flows for PN redirection + +## 6.1 Procedures and information flows in the IP CN subsystem + +### 6.1.1 General + +One of the functionalities enabled by the PNM AS in the IM CN subsystem is called PNUE redirection that redirects sessions destined for any UEs of a PN to the default UE of the same PN as described in 3GPP TS 22.259 [1]. The PN UE redirection applies only to the initial request for a UE-terminating call. The procedures for supporting the PN UE redirection in the IM CN subsystem take advantage of the interface between an S-CSCF and an AS in the IM CN subsystem described in 3GPP TS 23.002 [2] and the procedures described in 3GPP TS 23.218 [3]. + +When receiving an initial request for a UE-terminating call, the S-CSCF performs the procedure defined in 3GPP TS 23.218 [3] to route the initial request for the UE-terminating call to the PNM AS based on matching of initial filter criteria before performing any other routing procedures to the terminating UE. The PNM AS then executes the redirection of the initial request to the default UE of the PN based on the PN-user's PN configuration as described in clause 6. The redirection of the initial request for the UE-terminating call can be executed either on an IP multimedia application basis or on the media component(s) of an IP multimedia application basis supported by the terminating UE capabilities and the PN-user subscriptions. + +If the PN-user configured a UE list of different priorities for the PN UE redirection, the PNM AS shall execute the session redirection for a particular UE based on the configuration in a decreasing order of the priority. If the session redirection for a UE of a higher priority fails, the PNM AS shall perform the PNM session redirection for the other UE of the next lower priority. + +### 6.1.2 Procedures and information flows for PN UE redirection in the IM CN subsystem + +Figure 6.1.2-1 describes the procedures and information flows for handling the PN UE redirection in the IM CN subsystem. Without loss of generality, it is assumed for figure 6.2.1-1 that a PN-user's PN consists of two UEs, i.e., the UE-1 and the UE-2. The UE-2 is the default UE according to PN-user's PN configuration as described in clause 6. Furthermore, it is assumed that the two UEs have different public user identities. + +![Sequence diagram showing interactions between S-CSCF #1, S-CSCF #2, and PNM AS. It details the flow of Initial Requests for UE-1 and UE-2, including service control logic and redirection steps.](79e1709a7317ead45379cbb8ff3ba802_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant External + participant S-CSCF1 as S-CSCF #1 + participant S-CSCF2 as S-CSCF #2 + participant PNM AS + + Note left of S-CSCF1: 2. Service Control Logic for UE-1 + Note right of PNM AS: 4. PNM Redirection Service Control + Note left of S-CSCF2: 7. Service Control Logic for UE-2 + Note right of PNM AS: 9. PNM Redirection Service Control + + External->>S-CSCF1: 1. Initial Request (Request-URI of UE-1) + S-CSCF1->>PNM AS: 3. Initial Request (Request-URI of UE-1) + PNM AS->>S-CSCF1: 5. Initial Request (Request-URI of UE-2) + S-CSCF1->>S-CSCF2: 6. Initial Request (Request-URI of UE-2) + S-CSCF2->>PNM AS: 8. Initial Request (Request-URI of UE-2) + PNM AS->>S-CSCF2: 10. Initial Request (Request-URI of UE-2) + S-CSCF2->>External: 11. Initial Request (Request-URI of UE-2) +``` + +The sequence diagram illustrates the interaction between three entities: S-CSCF #1, S-CSCF #2, and PNM AS. The process begins with an external 'Initial Request (Request-URI of UE-1)' sent to S-CSCF #1. S-CSCF #1 then performs 'Service Control Logic for UE-1' and forwards the request to PNM AS. PNM AS performs 'PNM Redirection Service Control' and returns an 'Initial Request (Request-URI of UE-2)' to S-CSCF #1. S-CSCF #1 then forwards this request to S-CSCF #2. S-CSCF #2 performs 'Service Control Logic for UE-2' and forwards the request to PNM AS. PNM AS performs 'PNM Redirection Service Control' again and returns the 'Initial Request (Request-URI of UE-2)' to S-CSCF #2. Finally, S-CSCF #2 forwards the request to the external destination. + +Sequence diagram showing interactions between S-CSCF #1, S-CSCF #2, and PNM AS. It details the flow of Initial Requests for UE-1 and UE-2, including service control logic and redirection steps. + +**Figure 6.1.2-1: Initial request to UE-1 and redirected to UE-2 by the PNM AS in the IM CN subsystem** + +1. An initial request to the UE-1 containing the Request-URI of the UE-1 public user identity arrives at the S-CSCF #1. +2. The S-CSCF #1 determines that the initial request is for a UE-terminated case, invokes the termination service control logic required for the UE-1 and evaluates the initial filter criteria, which results in re-routing the initial request to the PNM AS. +3. As a result of the termination service control logic invocation for the UE-1, the S-CSCF #1 forwards the initial request to the PNM AS. +4. The PNM AS executes the PN UE redirection control logic based on the PN-user's PN configurations as described in clause 6. The PNM AS decides to redirect the initial request to the default UE of the PN, i.e., to the UE-2. +5. As a result of the PN UE redirection control logic execution, the PNM AS sends the redirected initial request containing the Request-URI of the UE-2 public user identity to the S-CSCF #1. +6. The S-CSCF #1 treats the redirected initial request as a UE-originated case, and forwards the redirected initial request to the S-CSCF #2. The S-CSCF #1 and the S-CSCF #2 can be the same entity. +7. The S-CSCF #2 treats the redirected initial request as a UE-terminated case, invokes the termination service control logic required for the UE-2 and evaluates the initial filter criteria, which may results in re-routing the redirected initial request to the other ASs. +- 8-10. The S-CSCF #2 forwards the redirected request to the PNM AS as the result of the termination service control logic for the UE-2. The PNM AS executes the PN UE redirection control logic and decides to forward the request as the UE-2 is the default UE of the PN. +11. The S-CSCF#2 continues the redirected initial request based on the standard call setup procedures as described in 3GPP TS 23.228 [4]. + +Figure 6.1.2-2 describes the procedures and information flows for handling the PN UE redirection in the IM CN subsystem when the default UE (in this example the UE-2) in the PN shares the same public user identity with the UE-1. + +NOTE: It's assumed that the UE-2 can support GRUU. + +![Sequence diagram showing the flow of an initial request from an external source to S-CSCF, then to PNM AS, and back through S-CSCF for redirection to UE-2 using GRUU.](c2ddad56c1553f2499aaf7ef8cef6777_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant Ext as External Source + participant S as S-CSCF + participant P as PNM AS + + Ext->>S: 1. Initial Request (Request-URI of UE-1) + Note over S: 2. Service Control Logic for UE-1 + S->>P: 3. Initial Request (Request-URI of UE-1) + Note over P: 4. PNM Redirection Service Control + P->>S: 5. Initial Request (Request-URI:GRUU of UE-2) + S->>Ext: 6. Initial Request (Request-URI:GRUU of UE-2) + +``` + +The diagram shows a sequence of six steps. 1: An initial request for UE-1 enters the S-CSCF. 2: S-CSCF performs service control logic for UE-1. 3: S-CSCF forwards the request to PNM AS. 4: PNM AS performs redirection service control. 5: PNM AS sends a redirected request for UE-2 (using GRUU) back to S-CSCF. 6: S-CSCF forwards the redirected request out. + +Sequence diagram showing the flow of an initial request from an external source to S-CSCF, then to PNM AS, and back through S-CSCF for redirection to UE-2 using GRUU. + +**Figure 6.1.2-2: Initial request to UE-1 and redirected to UE-2 by the PNM AS in the IM CN subsystem when the UE-2 shares the same public user identity with the UE-1** + +1. An initial request to the UE-1 containing the Request-URI of the UE-1 public user identity arrives at the S-CSCF. +2. The S-CSCF determines that the initial request is for a UE-terminated case, invokes the termination service control logic required for the UE-1 and evaluates the initial filter criteria, which results in re-routing the initial request to the PNM AS. +3. As a result of the termination service control logic invocation for the UE-1, the S-CSCF forwards the initial request to the PNM AS. +4. The PNM AS executes the PNM redirection service control logic based on the User's PN configurations as described in clause 6. The PNM AS decides to redirect the initial request to the default UE of the PN, i.e., to the UE-2. +5. As a result of the PNM redirection service logic execution, the PNM AS sends the redirected initial request containing the Request-URI which is set to the GRUU of the UE-2 to the S-CSCF. +6. The S-CSCF continues the redirected initial request procedure based on the standard call setup procedures as described in 3GPP TS 23.228 [4]. + +Figure 6.1.2-3 describes the procedures and information flows for handling the PN UE redirection in the IM CN subsystem when the default UE (in this example the UE-2) in the PN cannot setup the session. Consequently, the PNM AS performs the PNM session redirection for the other UE of the next lower priority (in this example the UE-3). + +![Sequence diagram showing the initial request flow from UE-1 to UE-3 via S-CSCF#1, S-CSCF#2, and PNM AS, with redirection logic at the PNM AS.](69edc2887e907309499ac95b47ab6905_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE-1 + participant S-CSCF#1 + participant S-CSCF#2 + participant PNM AS + participant UE-2 + Note right of S-CSCF#1: 2. Service Control Logic of UE-1 + Note right of S-CSCF#2: 7. Service Control Logic of UE-2 + Note right of PNM AS: 4. PNM Redirection Service Control + Note right of PNM AS: 9. PNM Redirection Service Control + Note right of PNM AS: 14. Choose a UE of lower priority + + UE-1->>S-CSCF#1: 1. Initial Request(UE-1) + S-CSCF#1->>PNM AS: 3. Initial Request(UE-1) + PNM AS->>S-CSCF#1: 5. Initial Request(UE-2) + S-CSCF#1->>S-CSCF#2: 6. Initial Request(UE-2) + S-CSCF#2->>PNM AS: 8. Initial Request(UE-2) + PNM AS->>S-CSCF#2: 10. Initial Request(UE-2) + S-CSCF#2->>UE-2: 11. Initial Request(UE-2) + UE-2-->>S-CSCF#2: 12. Error Response + S-CSCF#2-->>PNM AS: 13. Error Response + PNM AS->>S-CSCF#2: 15. Initial Request(UE-3) + S-CSCF#2->>UE-3: 16. Initial Request(UE-3) + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the initial request flow from UE-1 to UE-3 via S-CSCF#1, S-CSCF#2, and PNM AS, with redirection logic at the PNM AS. + +**Figure 6.1.2-3: Initial request to UE-1 and redirected to UE-3 by the PNM AS in the IM CN subsystem when the initial request to UE-2 fails** + +1. An initial request to the UE-1 containing the Request-URI of the UE-1 public user identity arrives at the S-CSCF #1. +2. The S-CSCF #1 determines that the initial request is for a UE-terminated case, invokes the termination service control logic required for the UE-1 and evaluates the initial filter criteria, which results in re-routing the initial request to the PNM AS. +3. As a result of the termination service control logic invocation for the UE-1, the S-CSCF #1 forwards the initial request to the PNM AS. +4. The PNM AS executes the PN UE redirection control logic based on the PN-user's PN configurations as described in clause 6. The PNM AS decides to redirect the initial request to the default UE of the PN, i.e., to the UE-2. +5. As a result of the PN UE redirection control logic execution, the PNM AS sends the redirected initial request containing the Request-URI of the UE-2 public user identity to the S-CSCF #1. +6. The S-CSCF #1 treats the redirected initial request as a UE-originated case, and forwards the redirected initial request to the S-CSCF #2. The S-CSCF #1 and the S-CSCF #2 can be the same entity. + +7. The S-CSCF #2 treats the redirected initial request as a UE-terminated case, invokes the termination service control logic required for the UE-2 and evaluates the initial filter criteria, which may results in re-routing the redirected initial request to the other ASs. +- 8-10. The S-CSCF #2 forwards the redirected request to the PNM AS as the result of the termination service control logic for the UE-2. The PNM AS executes the PN UE redirection control logic and decides to forward the request as the UE-2 is the default UE of the PN. +11. The S-CSCF#2 continues the redirected initial request which is forwarded to UE-2. +- 12-13. UE-2 cannot setup the session and returns an error response back to PNM AS. +14. The PNM AS executes the PN UE redirection control logic for the other UE of the next lower priority which in this example is UE-3. +- 15-16. As a result of the PN UE redirection control logic execution, the PNM AS forwards the redirected initial request containing the Request-URI of the UE-3 public user identity to the UE-3. + +### 6.1.3 Procedures and information flows for PNE redirection in the IM CN subsystem + +Figure 6.1.3-1 describes the procedures and information flows for handling the PNE redirection in the IM CN subsystem. Without loss of generality, it is assumed for figure 6.1.3-1 that a PN-user's PN consists of three PNEs, i.e., the UE-1, the UE-2 and PNE-1. UE-2 and PNE-1 belong to a PAN. The PNE-1 is the default PNE according to PN-user's PN configuration as described in clause 6. Furthermore, it is assumed that the two UEs have different public user identities. + +![Sequence diagram showing the initial request and redirection process in the IM CN subsystem. Lifelines: S-CSCF#1, S-CSCF#2, PNM AS, UE-2, and PNE-1. The process starts with an initial request to UE-1 at S-CSCF#1, which is then redirected through various service controls and ASes until it reaches PNE-1 via UE-2.](12a6537c92844d5b393104c02e8dfc2f_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant External + participant S-CSCF#1 + participant S-CSCF#2 + participant PNM AS + participant UE-2 + participant PNE-1 + + Note left of S-CSCF#1: 1. Initial Request (Request URI of UE-1) + S-CSCF#1->>S-CSCF#1: 2. Service Control Logic for UE-1 + S-CSCF#1->>PNM AS: 3. Initial Request (Request URI of UE-1) + Note right of PNM AS: 4. PNM redirection Service Control + PNM AS->>S-CSCF#1: 5. Initial Request (Request URI of PNE-1) + S-CSCF#1->>S-CSCF#2: 6. Initial Request (Request URI of PNE-1) + Note right of S-CSCF#2: 7. Service Control Logic for UE-2 + S-CSCF#2->>PNM AS: 8. Initial Request (Request URI of PNE-1) + Note right of PNM AS: 9. PNM redirection Service Control + PNM AS->>S-CSCF#2: 10. Initial Request (Request URI of PNE-1) + S-CSCF#2->>UE-2: 11. Initial Request (Request URI of PNE-1) + UE-2->>PNE-1: 12. Initial Request to PNE-1 + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the initial request and redirection process in the IM CN subsystem. Lifelines: S-CSCF#1, S-CSCF#2, PNM AS, UE-2, and PNE-1. The process starts with an initial request to UE-1 at S-CSCF#1, which is then redirected through various service controls and ASes until it reaches PNE-1 via UE-2. + +**Figure 6.1.3-1: Initial request to UE-1 and redirected to PNE-1 by the PNM AS in the IM CN subsystem** + +1. An initial request to the UE-1 containing the Request-URI of the UE-1 public user identity arrives at the S-CSCF #1. +2. The S-CSCF #1 determines that the initial request is for a UE-terminated case, invokes the termination service control logic required for the UE-1 and evaluates the initial filter criteria, which results in re-routing the initial request to the PNM AS. + +3. As a result of the termination service control logic invocation for the UE-1, the S-CSCF #1 forwards the initial request to the PNM AS. +4. The PNM AS executes the PNE redirection control logic based on the PN-user's PN configurations as described in clause 6. The PNM AS decides to redirect the initial request to the default UE of the PN, i.e., to the PNE-1. +5. As a result of the PNE redirection control logic execution, the PNM AS sends the redirected initial request containing the Request-URI of the GRUU of UE-2 and the identity of PNE-1 to the S-CSCF #1. +6. The S-CSCF #1 treats the redirected initial request as a UE-originated case, and forwards the redirected initial request to the S-CSCF #2. The S-CSCF #1 and the S-CSCF #2 can be the same entity. +7. The S-CSCF #2 treats the redirected initial request as a UE-terminated case, invokes the termination service control logic required for the UE-2 and evaluates the initial filter criteria, which can result in re-routing the redirected initial request to the other ASs. +- 8-10. The S-CSCF #2 forwards the redirected request to the PNM AS as the result of the termination service control logic for the UE-2. The PNM AS executes the PN UE redirection control logic and decides to forward the request as the PNE-1 is the default UE of the PN. +11. The S-CSCF#2 forwards the initial request including identity of PNE-1 to the UE-2. +12. The UE-2 forwards the initial request to the PNE-1 via the PAN internal interface. + +## 6.2 Procedures and information flows in the CS domain + +### 6.2.1 General + +Similar to the functionality described in the subclause 6.1.1, the gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) can redirect calls destined for any UEs of a PN in the CS domain to the default UE of the same PN. The procedures for supporting the PNM call redirection in the CS domain takes advantage of the interface between a GMSC and a gsmSCF in the CS domain described in 3GPP TS 23.078 [8] and the procedures described in 3GPP TS 23.018 [10]. + +When receiving a call request for a UE in the PN, the GMSC performs the procedure defined in 3GPP TS 23.078 [8] to route the request to the gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) based on the T\_CSI configured to the UE before performing any other routing procedures to the terminating UE. The gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) then executes the redirection of the request based on the PN-user's PN configuration as described in clause 6. + +If the PN-user configured a UE list of different priorities for the PNM call redirection, the gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) shall execute the call redirection for a particular UE based on the configuration in a decreasing order of the priority. If the call redirection for a UE of a higher priority fails, the gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) shall perform the PNM call redirection for the other UE of the next lower priority. + +### 6.2.2 Procedures and information flows for PN UE redirection in the CS domain + +Figure 6.2.2-1 describes the procedures and information flows for handling the PNM call redirection in the CS domain. Without loss of generality, it is assumed for figure 6.2.2-1 that a PN-user's PN consists of two UEs, i.e., the UE-1 and the UE-2. The UE-2 is the default UE according to PN-user's PN configuration as described in clause 6. + +![Sequence diagram showing the initial request to UE-1 and redirection to UE-2 by the gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) in the CS domain. The diagram involves four main entities: GMSC#1, HSS, gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM), and GMSC#2. The process starts with a Setup message for UE-1 arriving at GMSC#1. GMSC#1 sends a MAP SRI to the HSS, which responds with MAP SRI_ACK and a Retrieve T_CSI for terminating UE message. GMSC#1 then sends a CAMEL IDP to the gsmSCF. The gsmSCF executes PNM Redirection Service Control and responds with a CAMEL CONNECT message containing the MSISDN of UE-2. GMSC#1 then sends an Initial Setup Message for UE-2 to GMSC#2. GMSC#2 sends a MAP SRI to the HSS, which responds with MAP SRI_ACK. GMSC#2 then sends a CAMEL IDP to the gsmSCF. The gsmSCF executes PNM Redirection Service Control and responds with a CAMEL CONTINUE message. Finally, GMSC#2 sends a Setup message for UE-2.](88b0f3f4393228e9ea4d6542aef7c399_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant External + participant GMSC1 as GMSC#1 + participant HSS + participant gsmSCF as gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) + participant GMSC2 as GMSC#2 + + External->>GMSC1: 1. Setup (MSISDN of UE-1) + GMSC1->>HSS: 2. MAP SRI + HSS-->>GMSC1: 4. MAP SRI_ACK + Note right of HSS: 3. Retrieve T_CSI for terminating UE + GMSC1->>gsmSCF: 5. CAMEL IDP + Note right of gsmSCF: 6. PNM Redirection Service Control + gsmSCF->>GMSC1: 7. CAMEL CONNECT (MSISDN of UE-2) + GMSC1->>GMSC2: 8. Initial Setup Message (MSISDN of UE-2) + GMSC2->>HSS: 9. MAP SRI + HSS-->>GMSC2: 10. MAP SRI_ACK + GMSC2->>gsmSCF: 11. CAMEL IDP + Note right of gsmSCF: 12. PNM Redirection Service Control + gsmSCF->>GMSC2: 13. CAMEL CONTINUE + GMSC2->>External: 14. Setup (MSISDN of UE-2) + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the initial request to UE-1 and redirection to UE-2 by the gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) in the CS domain. The diagram involves four main entities: GMSC#1, HSS, gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM), and GMSC#2. The process starts with a Setup message for UE-1 arriving at GMSC#1. GMSC#1 sends a MAP SRI to the HSS, which responds with MAP SRI\_ACK and a Retrieve T\_CSI for terminating UE message. GMSC#1 then sends a CAMEL IDP to the gsmSCF. The gsmSCF executes PNM Redirection Service Control and responds with a CAMEL CONNECT message containing the MSISDN of UE-2. GMSC#1 then sends an Initial Setup Message for UE-2 to GMSC#2. GMSC#2 sends a MAP SRI to the HSS, which responds with MAP SRI\_ACK. GMSC#2 then sends a CAMEL IDP to the gsmSCF. The gsmSCF executes PNM Redirection Service Control and responds with a CAMEL CONTINUE message. Finally, GMSC#2 sends a Setup message for UE-2. + +**Figure 6.2.2-1: Initial request to UE-1 and redirected to UE-2 by the gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) in the CS domain** + +1. A call request to the UE-1 containing the MSISDN of the UE-1 as the called party number arrives at the GMSC #1. +2. On receipt of the incoming call request, the GMSC#1 queries the HSS for routing information. +3. The HSS provides information including the T-CSI information element that contains information configured for the PNM subscriber, identifying the subscriber as having terminating CAMEL services. +4. The HSS returns the T-CSI information element to the GMSC#1 in response to the query for routing information (SRI). +5. The GMSC#1 triggers a CAMEL activity which results in sending a CAMEL IDP message to the GSM Service Control Function (gsmSCF). +6. The gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) executes the PN UE redirection control logic based on the PN-user's PN configurations as described in clause 6. The gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) decides to redirect the call request to the default UE of the PN, i.e., to the UE-2. +7. As a result of the PN UE redirection control logic execution, the gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) to respond to the CAMEL IDP message with a CAMEL CONNECT message containing the MSISDN of the UE-2 as the called party number. +8. The GMSC#1 initiates the CS call towards the GMSC#2 by sending an Initial Setup Message (e.g. ISUP IAM, BICC IAM, and SIP-I Invite). + +9-13. The GMSC#2 queries the HSS for routing information and triggers a CAMEL activity to the gsmSCF. The gsmSCF executed the PNM redirection service control logic and decides to forward the request as the UE-2 is the default UE of the PN, so it responds with a CMAEL CONTINUE message to the GMSC#2. + +14. The GMSC#2 continues the redirected call request based on the standard call setup procedures as described in 3GPP TS 23.018 [10]. + +Figure 6.2.2-2 describes the procedures and information flows for handling the PN UE redirection in the CS domain when the default UE (in this example the UE-2) in the PN cannot setup the session. Consequently, the gsmSCF performs the PNM session redirection for the other UE of the next lower priority (in this example the UE-3). + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the initial request to UE-1 and redirection to UE-3 by the gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) in the CS domain when the initial request to UE-2 fails. The diagram shows interactions between GMSC#1, HSS, gsmSCF, GMSC#2, and UE-2.](0236eff05bcb8f3a343ea7933aaa306b_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant External + participant GMSC#1 + participant HSS + participant gsmSCF as gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) + participant GMSC#2 + participant UE-2 + + External->>GMSC#1: 1. Setup(UE-1) + GMSC#1->>HSS: 2. MAP SRI + HSS->>gsmSCF: 3. Retrieve T_CSI for terminating UE + HSS->>GMSC#1: 4. MAP SRI_ACK + HSS->>gsmSCF: 5. CAMEL IDP + gsmSCF->>gsmSCF: 6. PNM Redirection Service Control + gsmSCF->>GMSC#1: 7. CAMEL CONNECT (UE-2) + gsmSCF->>GMSC#2: 8. Initial Setup Message (UE-2) + GMSC#2->>HSS: 9. MAP SRI + HSS->>GMSC#2: 10. MAP SRI_ACK + HSS->>gsmSCF: 11. CAMEL IDP + gsmSCF->>gsmSCF: 12. PNM Redirection Service Control + gsmSCF->>GMSC#2: 13. CAMEL CONNECT (UE-2) + GMSC#2->>UE-2: 14. Setup(UE-2) + UE-2->>GMSC#2: 15. Error Response + GMSC#2->>gsmSCF: 16. EventReport BCSM + gsmSCF->>gsmSCF: 17. Choose a UE of lower priority + gsmSCF->>GMSC#2: 18. CAMEL CONNECT (UE-3) + GMSC#2->>External: 19. Setup(UE-3) + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the initial request to UE-1 and redirection to UE-3 by the gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) in the CS domain when the initial request to UE-2 fails. The diagram shows interactions between GMSC#1, HSS, gsmSCF, GMSC#2, and UE-2. + +**Figure 6.2.2-2: Initial request to UE-1 and redirected to UE-3 by the gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) in the CS domain when the initial request to UE-2 fails** + +1. A call request to the UE-1 containing the MSISDN of the UE-1 as the called party number arrives at the GMSC #1. +2. On receipt of the incoming call request, the GMSC#1 queries the HSS for routing information. +3. The HSS provides information including the T-CSI information element that contains information configured for the PNM subscriber, identifying the subscriber as having terminating CAMEL services. + +4. The HSS returns the T-CSI information element to the GMSC#1 in response to the query for routing information (SRI). +5. The GMSC#1 triggers a CAMEL activity which results in sending a CAMEL IDP message to the GSM Service Control Function (gsmSCF). +6. The gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) executes the PN UE redirection control logic based on the PN-user's PN configurations as described in clause 6. The gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) decides to redirect the call request to the default UE of the PN, i.e., to the UE-2. +7. As a result of the PN UE redirection control logic execution, the gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) to respond to the CAMEL IDP message with a CAMEL CONNECT message containing the MSISDN of the UE-2 as the called party number. +8. The GMSC#1 initiates the CS call towards the GMSC#2 by sending an Initial Setup Message (e.g. ISUP IAM, BICC IAM, and SIP-I Invite). +- 9-13. The GMSC#2 queries the HSS for routing information and triggers a CAMEL activity to the gsmSCF. The gsmSCF executed the PNM redirection service control logic and decides to forward the request as the UE-2 is the default UE of the PN, so it responds with a CAMEL CONTINUE message to the GMSC#2. +14. The GMSC#2 continues the redirected call request based on the standard call setup procedures as described in 3GPP TS 23.018 [10]. +15. UE-2 cannot setup the session and generates an error response. +16. GMSC#2 sends the EventReportBCSM message to the gsmSCF. +17. The gsmSCF executes the PN UE redirection control logic for the other UE of the next lower priority which in this example is UE-3. +- 18-19. As a result of the PN UE redirection control logic execution, the gsmSCF forwards the redirected initial request containing the MSISDN of the UE-3 as the called party number to the UE-3. + +## 6.3 Procedures and information flows in the domain interworking + +### 6.3.1 General + +After the PNM AS executes the redirection of the initial request based on the PN-user's PN configuration, the initial request could be routed to different domain, i.e. from IM CN subsystem to CS domain or from CS domain to IM CN subsystem. + +The procedures for supporting the interworking between IM CN subsystem and CS domain in the PNM session redirection take advantage of the procedures specified in 3GPP TS 23.228 [4]. + +NOTE: If the UE-2 is attached both in the CS domain and the IM CN subsystem, how the PNM AS selects the particular domain for the PN UE redirection is out of the scope of this document. + +### 6.3.2 Procedures and information flows for PN UE redirection from IM CN subsystem to CS domain + +Figure 6.3.2-1 describes the procedures and information flows for handling the PNM Session redirection from IM CN subsystem to CS domain. Without loss of generality, it is assumed for figure 6.3.2-1 that a PN-user's PN consists of two UEs, i.e., the UE-1 and UE-2 and the UE-2 attached in CS domain doesn't have the subscription to IMS is the default UE according to PN-user's PN configuration as described in clause 6. + +![Sequence diagram showing the initial request in IM CN subsystem and redirection to UE-2 in CS domain by the PNM AS. The diagram involves four main entities: S-CSCF, PNM AS, MGCF, and GMSC. The process starts with an initial request for UE-1 arriving at the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF invokes Service Control Logic, which then forwards the request to the PNM AS. The PNM AS executes PNM Redirection Service Control, deciding to redirect the request to UE-2. The PNM AS sends the redirected request back to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF then forwards the request to the MGCF, which sends an IAM message to the GMSC, which finally continues the call setup.](b3baf3a29b67c7425d2562ddbc52f0cc_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant External + participant S-CSCF + participant PNM AS + participant MGCF + participant GMSC + + Note left of S-CSCF: 2. Service Control Logic + Note right of PNM AS: 4. PNM Redirection Service Control + + External->>S-CSCF: 1. Initial Request (Request URI of UE-1) + S-CSCF->>PNM AS: 3. Initial Request (Request URI of UE-1) + PNM AS->>S-CSCF: 5. Initial Request (Request URI of UE-2) + S-CSCF->>MGCF: 6. Initial Request (Request URI of UE-2) + MGCF->>GMSC: 7. IAM(MSISDN of UE-2) + GMSC->>External: 8. IAM(MSISDN of UE-2) + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the initial request in IM CN subsystem and redirection to UE-2 in CS domain by the PNM AS. The diagram involves four main entities: S-CSCF, PNM AS, MGCF, and GMSC. The process starts with an initial request for UE-1 arriving at the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF invokes Service Control Logic, which then forwards the request to the PNM AS. The PNM AS executes PNM Redirection Service Control, deciding to redirect the request to UE-2. The PNM AS sends the redirected request back to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF then forwards the request to the MGCF, which sends an IAM message to the GMSC, which finally continues the call setup. + +**Figure 6.3.2-1: Initial request in IM CN subsystem and redirected to UE-2 in CS domain by the PNM AS** + +1. An initial request destined to the UE-1 containing the Request-URI of the UE-1 public user identity arrives at the S-CSCF. +2. The S-CSCF determines that the initial request if for a UE-terminated case, invokes the termination service control logic required for the UE-1 and evaluates the initial filter criteria, which results in re-routing the initial request to the PNM AS. +3. As a result of the termination service control logic invocation for the UE-1, the S-CSCF forwards the initial request to the PNM AS. +4. The PNM AS executes the PN UE redirection control logic based on the PN-user's PN configurations as described in clause 6. The PNM AS decides to redirect the initial request to the default UE of the PN, i.e., to the UE-2 which in this example can be found in the CS domain only. +5. As a result of the PN UE redirection control logic execution, the PNM AS sends the redirected initial request containing the Request-URI of the UE-2 public user identity to the S-CSCF. +6. The S-CSCF treats the redirected request as a UE-originated case and performs the domain transit procedure specified in 3GPP TS 23.228 [4]. Eventually, the session initiation arrives to an MGCF. +7. The MGCF sends an IAM message containing the MSISDN of the UE-2 as the called party number towards GMSC. +8. The GMSC continues the redirected call request based on the standard call setup procedures as described in 3GPP TS 23.018 [10]. + +### 6.3.3 Procedures and information flows for PN UE redirection from CS domain to IM CN subsystem + +Figure 6.3.3-1 describes the procedures and information flows for handling the PN UE redirection from CS domain to IM CN subsystem. Without loss of generality, it is assumed for figure 6.3.3-1 that a PN-user's PN consists of two UEs, i.e., the UE-1 and UE-2 and the UE-2 registered only in IM CN subsystem is the default UE according to PN-user's PN configuration as described in clause 6. + +![Sequence diagram showing the initial request in CS domain and redirection to UE-2 in IM CN subsystem by the gsmSCF. The diagram involves five main entities: GMSC, HSS, gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM), MGCF, and S-CSCF. The process starts with a Setup message from an external source to the GMSC. The GMSC then sends a MAP SRI to the HSS, which responds with a MAP SRI ACK. The GMSC then sends a CAMEL_IDP message to the gsmSCF. The gsmSCF performs PN Redirection Service Control and sends a Connect message (with the MSISDN of UE-2) back to the GMSC. The GMSC then sends an IAM message (with the MSISDN of UE-2) to the MGCF. The MGCF sends an Invite (Request URI of UE-2) to the S-CSCF, which continues the request.](e6df2733626a85205c1db682e6259c46_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant External + participant GMSC + participant HSS + participant gsmSCF as gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) + participant MGCF + participant S-CSCF + + External->>GMSC: 1. Setup (MSISDN of UE-1) + GMSC->>HSS: 2. MAP SRI + HSS-->>GMSC: 3. MAP SRI ACK + GMSC->>gsmSCF: 4. CAMEL_IDP + Note right of gsmSCF: 5. PN Redirection Service Control + gsmSCF->>GMSC: 6. Connect (MSISDN of UE-2) + GMSC->>MGCF: 7. IAM (MSISDN of UE-2) + MGCF->>S-CSCF: 8. Invite (Request URI of UE-2) + S-CSCF->>External: 9. Invite (Request URI of UE-2) + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the initial request in CS domain and redirection to UE-2 in IM CN subsystem by the gsmSCF. The diagram involves five main entities: GMSC, HSS, gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM), MGCF, and S-CSCF. The process starts with a Setup message from an external source to the GMSC. The GMSC then sends a MAP SRI to the HSS, which responds with a MAP SRI ACK. The GMSC then sends a CAMEL\_IDP message to the gsmSCF. The gsmSCF performs PN Redirection Service Control and sends a Connect message (with the MSISDN of UE-2) back to the GMSC. The GMSC then sends an IAM message (with the MSISDN of UE-2) to the MGCF. The MGCF sends an Invite (Request URI of UE-2) to the S-CSCF, which continues the request. + +**Figure 6.3.3-1: Initial request in CS domain and redirected to UE-2 in IM CN subsystem by the gsmSCF** + +1. A call request to the UE-1 containing the MSISDN of the UE-1 as the called party number arrives at the GMSC. +2. On receipt of the incoming call request, the GMSC queries the HSS for routing information. +3. The HSS returns the T-CSI information element that contains information configured for the PNM subscriber to the GMSC#1 in response to the query for routing information (SRI). +4. The GMSC triggers a CAMEL activity which results in sending a CAMEL IDP message to the gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM). +5. The gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) executes the PN UE redirection control logic based on the PN-user's PN configurations as described in clause 6. The gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) decides to redirect the call request to the default UE of the PN, i.e., to the UE-2 which in this example can be found in IM CN subsystem only. +6. As a result of the PN UE redirection control logic execution, the gsmSCF (CAMEL service for PNM) responds to the CAMEL IDP message with a CAMEL CONNECT message containing the MSISDN of the UE-2 as the called party number. +7. The GMSC initiates the call to the MGCF with an IAM message containing the MSISDN of UE-2 as the called party number. +8. The MGCF initiates a SIP INVITE request with the request URI of UE-2 public user identity towards the S-CSCF. +9. The S-CSCF continues the redirected initial request based on the standard call setup procedures as described in 3GPP TS 23.228 [4]. + +# 7 Procedures and information flows for PN access control + +## 7.1 General + +Upon receiving a UE-terminating initial request, the PNM AS shall first check whether the request originates from another PN UE within the same PN as the terminating PN UE and if so the PNM AS shall allow the session establishment to continue. If the request does not originate from another PN UE within the same PN as the terminating PN UE the PNM AS shall invoke the PN access control application if it is enabled. If no access control list exists for the terminating UE, and if the PNM AS does not invoke the PN UE redirection for the terminating UE, the PNM AS sends the initial request to the terminating UE (i.e., a UE of a PN). Otherwise, the PNM AS verifies whether the originating UE of the initial request is a valid entry contained in the PN access control list for the terminating UE, before it initiates session towards the terminating UE. With a successful verification, the PNM AS sends the initial request to the terminating UE. With an unsuccessful verification, if the terminating UE is not a controllee UE, then the PNM AS rejects the initial request. If the terminating UE is a controllee UE, the PNM AS queries the controller UE whether the session to the controllee UE is allowed to be established. If it is allowed, and if the PNM AS does not invoke the PN UE redirection for the terminating UE, the PNM AS sends the initial request to the controllee UE. Otherwise, the PNM AS rejects the initial request. Figure 7.1-1 gives a snapshot of the scenario. + +![Figure 7.1-1: Overview of privacy based access control Procedures and Information Flows. The diagram shows the PNM AS, IMS Network, Controller (UE 1a), Controllee (UE 1b), UE 2 (Not configured in access control list), and UE 3 (Configured in access control list). Solid lines represent Session Initiation, and dashed lines represent Access Control. The PNM AS has an Access Control List. The IMS Network is connected to the PNM AS and the Controller/Controllee. UE 2 and UE 3 are connected to the IMS Network. The Controller (UE 1a) and Controllee (UE 1b) are connected to the IMS Network. The PNM AS sends a Confirmation with Controlled UE (if caller information is absent) to the Controller (UE 1a).](5e92d9e8e9ce204e405bff2367f88176_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the network architecture and information flows for privacy-based access control. On the left, the PNM AS (Packet Network Management AS) contains an 'Access Control List'. In the center, the 'IMS Network' is shown as an oval. At the bottom, 'Controller (UE 1a)' and 'Controllee (UE 1b)' are shown within a shaded oval. On the right, 'UE 2 - Not configured in access control list' and 'UE 3 - Configured in access control list' are shown. A legend at the top left indicates that a thin dashed line represents 'Session Initiation' and a thick solid line represents 'Access Control'. The PNM AS is connected to the IMS Network by a solid line. The IMS Network is connected to the Controller/Controllee by a solid line. The IMS Network is connected to UE 2 and UE 3 by dashed lines. A solid line with a double-headed arrow connects the PNM AS to the Controller (UE 1a), labeled 'Confirmation with Controlled UE (if caller information is absent)'. + +Figure 7.1-1: Overview of privacy based access control Procedures and Information Flows. The diagram shows the PNM AS, IMS Network, Controller (UE 1a), Controllee (UE 1b), UE 2 (Not configured in access control list), and UE 3 (Configured in access control list). Solid lines represent Session Initiation, and dashed lines represent Access Control. The PNM AS has an Access Control List. The IMS Network is connected to the PNM AS and the Controller/Controllee. UE 2 and UE 3 are connected to the IMS Network. The Controller (UE 1a) and Controllee (UE 1b) are connected to the IMS Network. The PNM AS sends a Confirmation with Controlled UE (if caller information is absent) to the Controller (UE 1a). + +**Figure 7.1-1: Overview of privacy based access control Procedures and Information Flows** + +NOTE: The Solid line refers to access control handled by the PNM AS itself, since the identity of the originating caller is present in the access control list of the PNM AS. The dashed line refers to access control handled by the controller UE when the identity of the caller is not present in the access control list of the PNM AS. + +The procedures at the PNM AS to accomplish the PN access control execution are described with the assistance of figure 7.1-2. + +When the PNM AS receives a SIP initial request and its PN access control logic is switched-on, if the Request URI of the initial request identifies with the controllee UE(s), the PNM AS shall further decide whether the Request URI uniquely identify a controllee UE within a PN: + +- 1) if a controllee UE is uniquely identifiable, the PNM AS shall check whether the Caller is in the PN access control list; + - a) if the Caller is in the PN access control list, the PNM AS shall send the initial request to the controllee UE; + - b) if the Caller is not in the PN access control list, + - i) if there is no need to interrogate the controller UE, the PNM AS shall reject the initial request; + +- ii) if there is a need to interrogate the controller UE, the PNM AS shall interrogate the controller UE and handle the initial request message based on the interrogation results from the PN-user. + +**Editor's note: The use of GRUU as described in 3GPP TS 23.228 [4] can assist the PNM AS with uniquely identifying a controllee UE.** + +- 2) if a controllee UE is not uniquely identifiable, the PNM AS shall perform the PN access control without invoking the controller UE (i.e., without any PN-user interaction) and check whether the Caller is in the PN access control list; + - a) if the Caller is in the PN access control list, the PNM AS shall send the initial request back to the S-CSCF (see 3GPP TS 23.228 [4]); + - b) if the Caller is not in the PN access control list, the PNM AS shall reject the initial request. + +![Flowchart of PN access control execution flow at the PNM AS.](08441fa90c5fd11994626f662ac13f19_img.jpg) + +``` +graph TD; A[Initial request from a non member of the PN received in the PNM AS] --> B{PN AC logic switched-on?}; B -- NO --> G[Not performing PN AC]; B -- YES --> C{Request URI in incoming initial request identifies with a controllee UE?}; C -- NO --> G; C -- YES --> D{Request URI in incoming initial request uniquely identifies a controllee UE?}; D -- YES --> E{Caller in the PN ACL?}; D -- NO --> F{Caller in the PN ACL?}; E -- YES --> H[Forward the initial request to the controllee UE.]; E -- NO --> I{Invoking controller UE?}; I -- YES --> J[Interrogating the controller UE]; I -- NO --> K[Reject the initial request]; F -- YES --> L[Send the initial request back to the S-CSCF]; F -- NO --> M[Reject the initial request]; +``` + +The flowchart illustrates the PN access control execution flow at the PNM AS. It begins with an 'Initial request from a non member of the PN received in the PNM AS'. The first decision point is 'PN AC logic switched-on?'. If 'NO', the process leads to 'Not performing PN AC'. If 'YES', the next decision is 'Request URI in incoming initial request identifies with a controllee UE?'. If 'NO', it also leads to 'Not performing PN AC'. If 'YES', the next decision is 'Request URI in incoming initial request uniquely identifies a controllee UE?'. If 'YES', the process checks 'Caller in the PN ACL?'. If 'YES', it 'Forward the initial request to the controllee UE.'. If 'NO', it checks 'Invoking controller UE?'. If 'YES', it 'Interrogating the controller UE'. If 'NO', it 'Reject the initial request'. If the URI does not uniquely identify a controllee UE (NO), it checks 'Caller in the PN ACL?'. If 'YES', it 'Send the initial request back to the S-CSCF'. If 'NO', it 'Reject the initial request'. + +Flowchart of PN access control execution flow at the PNM AS. + +**Figure 7.1-2: PN access control execution flow at the PNM AS (AC and ACL stand for Access Control and Access Control List, respectively)** + +## 7.2 PN access control procedures in the IM CN subsystem + +Without lack of generality, the following assumptions have been made with respect to the terminals and the network. + + + +- PN-user 1 has two UEs – UE 1a & UE 1b in the PN, containing identities [user1\\_public1@home1.net](#) and [user1\\_public2@home1.net](#) respectively, and having a subscription with the home network providing PNM service. +- UE 1b is configured as controllee UE and UE 1a as controller UE by the PN-user 1. +- The originating UE which initiates the request may belong to the same/different network where the PNM AS is located. The originating UE of the initial request needs not be aware of the setting of the access control done by PN-user 1. +- PN-user 1 has configured UE2 with [user2\\_public@home2.net](#) as the only entry in the access control list related to the controllee UE in this example. When the PNM AS receives initial requests not coming from UE2, the PNM AS can query the controller UE and the continuation of the initial request depends on the outcome of the query. +- The following table summarizes the above assumptions. + +**Table 1: Example of a simple access control table PN** + +| PN Of user | controllee UE | controller UE | Access List entries | +|----------------------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------------------------------------| +| (UE 1a)
user1_public1@home1.net | No | N/A | N/A | +| (UE 1b)
user1_public2@home1.net | Yes | UE 1a | (UE 2)
user2_public@home2.net | + + + +- PN-user's home network provides PN access control, which allows PN-users to configure identities (e.g., a SIP URI) which are permitted to initiate sessions to the UE of the PN. +- This service is hosted by the PNM Server which is a SIP application server, serving scscf#1. +- For simple illustration, in this example, both identities of the PN are shown to be registered with the same S-CSCF (S-CSCF#1) to improve efficiency in signalling, which might be the case in most implementations. +- The PNM AS stores access control lists of controllee UE and the controller UE can process access control requests during dynamic procedures. + +UE 3 sends an initial request to UE 1b ([user1\\_public2@home1.net](#)). But, UE 3 hasn't been configured by the PN-user in the access control list. Therefore, the PNM AS queries the controller UE (i.e., UE 1a) about the information as to how to process this initial request. + +## 7.3 PN access control procedure in the IM CN subsystem + +### 7.3.1 General + +An inherent problem in the Access control list case is the need for the PN-user to configure each originating UE that the PN-user feels appropriate. This may not be a scalable solution where tens of UEs may try to access the controllee UE. In order to solve this problem, the PN-user may configure a controller UE, after processing of this decision normal session initiation procedures may be continued. Once the controller UE has been chosen, to handle all session initiation requests from UEs whose identities are not configured in the access control list, a query can be directed to the particular controller UE. + +The controller UE in turn is capable of checking the access control information of this query. Options may be given to the PN-user to either accept the call himself, or answer the query by allowing the call to go through to the intended destination (controllee UE) or deny the call. In addition the user may be given an option of saving this policy for future call requests by the same source. Once the user makes the decision, a response message carrying this information may be sent directing the session back to the original destination. + +The PNM AS receives the response message from the S-CSCF. If the decision of the PN-user was to allow the call, it sends the original initial request message. If required to save (based on user response) it saves the settings for the originating UE in the access control list + +### 7.3.2 PN access control based on query logic in the IM CN subsystem + +In figure 7.3.2-1 it is assumed that the originating UE (i.e., UE 3) is not configured in the access control list of the controllee UE (i.e., UE 1b). When the PNM AS receives an Initial Request from S-CSCF# 1, the PNM AS verifies whether UE 3 matches an entry in the access control list of UE 1b. In this case, the PNM AS sends a Query to the controller UE1a to determine the handling. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the high level sequence of PN access control. The diagram shows interactions between UE 3 (Originating Network), S-CSCF#1 (Home Network), PNM AS (Home Network), UE 1a (Terminating Home Network), and UE 1b (Terminating Home Network).](d17f75945bbb3feb84a153ecfedb9b81_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE3 as UE 3 + participant S-CSCF1 as S-CSCF#1 + participant PNM AS as PNM AS + participant UE1a as UE 1a + participant UE1b as UE 1b + + Note left of UE3: Originating Network + Note left of S-CSCF1: Home Network + Note left of UE1a: Terminating Home Network + + UE3->>S-CSCF1: 1. initial request + S-CSCF1->>S-CSCF1: 2. Service Control + S-CSCF1->>PNM AS: 3. initial request + PNM AS->>PNM AS: 4. Logic: Privacy mode processing + PNM AS->>S-CSCF1: 5. Query + S-CSCF1->>UE1a: 6. Query + UE1a->>UE1a: 7. Privacy decision processing + UE1a->>S-CSCF1: 8. Query Response + S-CSCF1->>PNM AS: 9. Query Response + PNM AS->>PNM AS: 10. Logic: Privacy mode processing + PNM AS->>S-CSCF1: 11. initial request + S-CSCF1->>UE1b: 12. initial request + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the high level sequence of PN access control. The diagram shows interactions between UE 3 (Originating Network), S-CSCF#1 (Home Network), PNM AS (Home Network), UE 1a (Terminating Home Network), and UE 1b (Terminating Home Network). + +Figure 7.3.2-1: High level sequence of PN access control + +1. UE 3 sends an Initial Request towards UE 1b. +2. S-CSCF#1 invokes whatever service logic is appropriate for this session setup attempt. + +3. In this case, the initial filter criterion is triggered and the initial request message is forwarded to the corresponding PNM AS. +4. The PNM AS receives the initial request and the privacy mode processing is executed. + +The PNM AS extracts the source and destination addresses. It confirms that the destination UE is a controllee UE. Using this as a key, it searches its database for the particular PN to find if UE 3 is configured in the access control list as allowed to initiate sessions with UE 1b. + +If the originating UE has been configured in the access control list, normal processing is continued. If there is no information regarding the address of the originating UE, the PNM AS may then send a Query to the controller UE, i.e., UE 1a in this example, containing the access request of UE 1b by UE 3. This Query can be processed by UE 1a. + +5. As a result of Step 4, the PNM AS queries the controller UE about the information of how to precede with the Initial Request by sending a Query to S-CSCF#1. +6. S-CSCF#1 validates the service profile, and invokes any termination service logic required for UE 1a and forwards the Query to UE 1a. +7. In the privacy decision processing, the information contained in the Query is indicated to the PN-user. (Example: UE 3 calling UE 1b, 1: Allow, 2: Deny 3: Allow and save policy 4: Deny and save policy 5: Accept). The PN-user may then allow/disallow and possibly save this option for future calls. This information is sent in the Query Response. +8. The decision of the user is sent in the Query Response. +9. The S-CSCF#1 forwards the Query Response towards the PNM AS. +10. In the privacy response processing step, the PNM AS determines the action directed by the user. If the PN-user has allowed the Initial Request to pass to the UE 1b, the Initial Request is sent to UE 1b. + +NOTE 1: If the user has chosen to save the policy, the policy is stored in the access control list of the controllee UE using the PN-configuration procedure. + +11. The PNM AS sends the original Initial Request to the S-CSCF#1 +12. The S-CSCF#1 forwards the initial request message to UE 1b. + +NOTE 2: Interaction with other services; The privacy service is to authorize the call where the authorization apart from normal authorization procedures involved in the network, requires real time consent from the user. All other supplementary features or other services may follow once this authorization is received. + +### 7.3.3 PN access control based on access control lists + +In figure 7.3.3-1 it is assumed that the originating UE (i.e., UE 2) is configured in the access control list of the controllee UE (i.e., UE 1b). When the PNM AS receives an Initial Request from S-CSCF# 1, the PNM AS verifies whether UE 2 matches an entry in the access control list of UE 1b. In this case, the PNM AS sends the Initial Request message to UE 1b. + +![Sequence diagram for PN access control in case of PNM AS alone. Lifelines: UE 2 (Originating Network), S-CSCF#1 (Home Network), PNM AS (Home Network), UE 1a (Terminating Home Network), UE 1b (Terminating Home Network). The sequence shows: 1. initial request from UE 2 to S-CSCF#1; 2. Service Control from S-CSCF#1; 3. initial request from S-CSCF#1 to PNM AS; 4. Logic: Privacy mode processing from PNM AS; 5. initial request from PNM AS to S-CSCF#1; 6. initial request from S-CSCF#1 to UE 1b.](1a827b10290f33d4fec04d0e8ef7a897_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE 2 + participant S-CSCF#1 + participant PNM AS + participant UE 1a + participant UE 1b + Note left of S-CSCF#1: Service Control + Note right of PNM AS: Logic: Privacy mode processing + UE 2->>S-CSCF#1: 1. initial request + S-CSCF#1->>PNM AS: 3. initial request + PNM AS->>S-CSCF#1: 5. initial request + S-CSCF#1->>UE 1b: 6. initial request + +``` + +Sequence diagram for PN access control in case of PNM AS alone. Lifelines: UE 2 (Originating Network), S-CSCF#1 (Home Network), PNM AS (Home Network), UE 1a (Terminating Home Network), UE 1b (Terminating Home Network). The sequence shows: 1. initial request from UE 2 to S-CSCF#1; 2. Service Control from S-CSCF#1; 3. initial request from S-CSCF#1 to PNM AS; 4. Logic: Privacy mode processing from PNM AS; 5. initial request from PNM AS to S-CSCF#1; 6. initial request from S-CSCF#1 to UE 1b. + +**Figure 7.3.3-1: PN access control in case of PNM AS alone** + +1. S-CSCF#1 receives an Initial Request from UE 2 to UE 1b. +2. S-CSCF#1 invokes the termination service control logic required for the UE 1b and evaluates the initial filter criteria. +3. S-CSCF#1 forwards the Initial Request to the PNM AS as a result of executing the initial filter criteria. +4. In the privacy mode processing step, the PNM AS extracts the source and destination addresses. It confirms that UE 1b is a controllee UE. Using this as a key, it searches its database for the PN of UE 1b to find if UE 2 is configured in the access control list. In this case, it is assumed that UE 2 is allowed to initiate sessions with UE 1b. +5. The PNM AS sends the Initial Request message to the S-CSCF#1. +6. The S-CSCF#1 routes the Initial Request message to the UE 1b. + +In figure 7.3.3-2 it is assumed that the originating guest UE (i.e., UE 2) is configured in the access control list of the controllee PNE (i.e., PNE-1). UE1b and PNE-1 form a PAN. When the PNM AS receives an Initial Request from S-CSCF# 1, the PNM AS verifies whether UE 2 matches an entry in the access control list of PNE-1. In this case, the PNM AS sends the Initial Request message to the PNE-1 via UE 1b. + +![Sequence diagram for PNE access control. Lifelines: UE2 (Originating Network), S-CSCF#1 (Home Network), PNM AS (Home Network), UE1a (Terminating Home Network), UE1b (Terminating Home Network), PNE-1 (Terminating Home Network). The sequence shows: 1. initial request from UE2 to S-CSCF#1; 2. Service Control from S-CSCF#1; 3. initial request from S-CSCF#1 to PNM AS; 4. Logic: Privacy mode processing from PNM AS; 5. initial request from PNM AS to S-CSCF#1; 6. initial request from S-CSCF#1 to UE1b; 7. initial request from UE1b to PNE-1.](cb4cfa42ce34febde7bdb882f3fc3094_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE2 + participant S-CSCF#1 + participant PNM AS + participant UE1a + participant UE1b + participant PNE-1 + Note left of S-CSCF#1: Service Control + Note right of PNM AS: Logic: Privacy mode processing + UE2->>S-CSCF#1: 1. initial request + S-CSCF#1->>PNM AS: 3. initial request + PNM AS->>S-CSCF#1: 5. initial request + S-CSCF#1->>UE1b: 6. initial request + UE1b->>PNE-1: 7. initial request + +``` + +Sequence diagram for PNE access control. Lifelines: UE2 (Originating Network), S-CSCF#1 (Home Network), PNM AS (Home Network), UE1a (Terminating Home Network), UE1b (Terminating Home Network), PNE-1 (Terminating Home Network). The sequence shows: 1. initial request from UE2 to S-CSCF#1; 2. Service Control from S-CSCF#1; 3. initial request from S-CSCF#1 to PNM AS; 4. Logic: Privacy mode processing from PNM AS; 5. initial request from PNM AS to S-CSCF#1; 6. initial request from S-CSCF#1 to UE1b; 7. initial request from UE1b to PNE-1. + +**Figure 7.3.3-2: PNE access control** + +1. S-CSCF#1 receives an Initial Request from UE 2 containing the identity of PNE-1. +2. S-CSCF#1 invokes the termination service control logic required and evaluates the initial filter criteria. +3. S-CSCF#1 forwards the Initial Request to the PNM AS as a result of executing the initial filter criteria. +4. In the privacy mode processing step, the PNM AS extracts the source and destination addresses. It confirms that PNE-1 is a controllee PNE. Using this as a key, it searches its database for the PN of PNE to find if UE 2 is configured in the access control list. In this case, it is assumed that UE 2 is allowed to initiate sessions with PNE-1. +5. The PNM AS sends the Initial Request message to the S-CSCF#1. +6. PNE-1 accesses the network via UE1b, then the S-CSCF#1 routes the Initial Request message to the UE 1b. +7. The UE1b sends the Initial Request message to the PNE-1 via the PAN internal interface. + +## 7.4 PN access control procedure in the CS domain + +### 7.4.1 General + +PN access control deals with a user having access control over his Personal Network, wherein he may restrict access to his UEs. These UEs of the PN, over which access control has been enabled, are configured as controllee UE. To initiate sessions with these controllee UEs, the originating UEs need to be configured by the PN-user in a PN access control list. For information regarding the originating UEs that are configured in the PN access control list, which is the case in majority of the scenarios, the user nominates a controller UE to handle the access control. In this case, the network queries the user whether the call to the controllee UE may be allowed to go through. If the user allows it, the network allows the call to go through. + +### 7.4.2 PN access control procedure (When the caller is not in the PN access control list) + +If the caller is not in the PN access control list the gsmSCF interacts with the controller UE in order to route the call to the Controllee UE. Figure 7.4.2-1 shows the implementation of access control procedure in CS domain when the caller is not in PN access control list. + +![Sequence diagram showing the PN access control procedure in the CS domain involving GMSC, HSS, gsmSCF (PNM application), MSC/VLR, and Controller.](51db757d054ce1ce83c436a3578b56ca_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant GMSC + participant HSS + participant gsmSCF as gsmSCF +PNM application + participant MSC/VLR + participant Controller + + Note left of GMSC: 1.Setup Message +(MSISDN of UE) + GMSC->>HSS: 2.MAP SRI + Note over HSS: Retrieve T-CSI for +terminating UE + HSS-->>GMSC: 3.MAP SRI Ack + GMSC->>gsmSCF: 4.Camel IDP + Note over gsmSCF: PNM Private Service +Control + gsmSCF->>HSS: 5.USSD Request + HSS->>MSC/VLR: 6.USSD Request + MSC/VLR->>Controller: 7.USSD Request + Controller-->>MSC/VLR: 8.USSD Response + MSC/VLR-->>HSS: 9.USSD Response + HSS-->>gsmSCF: 10.USSD Response + gsmSCF-->>GMSC: 11.Camel Continue/Release Call + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the PN access control procedure in the CS domain involving GMSC, HSS, gsmSCF (PNM application), MSC/VLR, and Controller. + +**Figure 7.4.2-1: PN access control Procedure in CS domain** + +1. A call request to the UE located in PN containing the MSISDN of the UE arrives at the GMSC. +2. GMSC queries the HSS for routing Information by sending MAP SRI. +3. HSS checks the subscription information for the called party. Further the HSS provides the information for the PNM subscriber including the T-CSI. The HSS returns the T-CSI to the GMSC in the response (MAP-SRI-ACK) +4. The GMSC triggers a CAMEL activity which results in sending a CAMEL IDP to gsmSCF. + +- 5-7. The gsmSCF executes the PN access control logic and will check with the controller UE about the acceptability of call request by sending USSD request message to the controller UE via HSS and MSC/VLR. + +NOTE: This USSD message includes the call Information such as the public user Identity of caller and terminating UE. + +8. The controller UE displays the text provided and awaits user input. The user decides whether the call request is allowed or not and accordingly the controller UE will send the USSD response message to MSC/VLR. +- 9-10. The MSC/VLR will forward this USSD response message to gsmSCF via HSS. +11. The gsmSCF will continue the call or release the call by sending the CAMEL continue message/release call message to the GMSC according to the controller UE's response. Based on the decision by the controller UE the call will established or released. + +Figure 7.4.2-2 provides a solution for the time delay problem which can occur during interaction between the network and the controller UE. + +![Sequence diagram of PN access control procedure in CS domain with delay handling. Lifelines: GMSC, HSS, gsmSCF (PNM application), MSC/VLR, Controller UE. The process involves setup, routing, subscription check, CAMEL IDP, PN access control, timer setting, USSD requests, timer expiration, announcements, and call release.](81a4cbf0b3c4cbc065efdf8f800dadde_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant External + participant GMSC + participant HSS + participant gsmSCF as gsmSCF (PNM application) + participant MSC/VLR + participant Controller UE + + External->>GMSC: 1. Setup Message (MSISDN of UE) + GMSC->>HSS: 2. MAP SRI + Note right of HSS: 3. check subscription (PNM, T-CSI) for terminating UE + HSS->>GMSC: 4. MAP SRI Ack + GMSC->>gsmSCF: 5. Camel IDP + Note right of gsmSCF: 6. PN Access Control + Note right of gsmSCF: 7. Set Timer + gsmSCF->>HSS: 8. USSD Request + HSS->>MSC/VLR: 9. USSD Request + MSC/VLR->>Controller UE: 10. USSD Request + Note right of gsmSCF: 11. Timer Expire + gsmSCF->>GMSC: 12. Play Announcement + GMSC->>External: 13. ACM + Controller UE->>MSC/VLR: 14. USSD Response + MSC/VLR->>HSS: 15. USSD Response + HSS->>gsmSCF: 16. USSD Response + gsmSCF->>GMSC: 17. Camel Continue/Release Call + +``` + +Sequence diagram of PN access control procedure in CS domain with delay handling. Lifelines: GMSC, HSS, gsmSCF (PNM application), MSC/VLR, Controller UE. The process involves setup, routing, subscription check, CAMEL IDP, PN access control, timer setting, USSD requests, timer expiration, announcements, and call release. + +**Figure 7.4.2-2: PN access control procedure in CS domain with delay handling.** + +1. A call request to a UE containing the MSISDN of the UE arrives at the GMSC. +2. The GMSC queries the HSS for routing Information by sending MAP SRI. +- 3-4 The HSS checks the subscription information for the called party. Further the HSS provides the information for the PNM subscriber including the T-CSI. The HSS returns the T-CSI to the GMSC in the response. +5. The GMSC triggers a CAMEL activity which results in sending a CAMEL IDP to gsmSCF. + +6. & 8-10 The gsmSCF executes the PN access control logic and will check with the controller UE about the acceptability of the call request by sending USSD request message to the controller UE via HSS and MSC/VLR. + +NOTE: This USSD message includes the call Information such as the public user Identity of the originating and the terminating UE. + +7. The gsmSCF will start the Timer. + +11. Supervision of the started timer by the gsmSCF. + +12-13. If the time out occurs because no response from the controller UE, the gsmSCF will send the Play Announcement message to the GMSC and the GMSC will send an early ACM to the originating UE. + +NOTE: Step 12-13 can be skipped if the controller UE responds before timer out occurs. No ACM will be send. + +14. The controller UE displays the text provided and awaits user input. The user decides whether the call request is allowed or not and accordingly the controller UE will send the USSD response message to MSC/VLR. + +15-16. The MSC/VLR will forward this USSD response message to the gsmSCF via the HSS. + +17. The gsmSCF will send a message to GMSC to stop playing the announcement if it is generated. The gsmSCF will continue the call or release the call by sending the CAMEL continue message/release call message to the GMSC according to the controller UE's response. + +### 7.4.3 PN access control procedure in CS domain (When the caller is in the PN access control list) + +Figure 7.4.3-1 shows the PN access control procedure when the caller is in PN access control list. + +![Sequence diagram of PN access control procedure in the CS domain. Lifelines: GMSC, HSS, gsmSCF (with PNM application), and MSC/VLR. The sequence shows 11 steps: 1. Setup Message (MSISDN of UE) to GMSC; 2. MAP SRI from GMSC to HSS; 3. Retrieve T-CSI for terminating UE in HSS; 4. MAP SRI Ack from HSS to GMSC; 5. Camel IDP from GMSC to gsmSCF; 6. PNM Private Service Control in gsmSCF; 7. Camel Continue from gsmSCF to GMSC; 8. MAP SRI from GMSC to HSS; 9. Retrieve MSRN for terminating UE in HSS; 10. MAP SRI Ack from HSS to GMSC; 11. Setup Message (MSRN of Terminating UE) from GMSC to MSC/VLR.](e180f2b5fcbe8001554a7c0677cd3f82_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant External + participant GMSC + participant HSS + participant gsmSCF as gsmSCF +PNM application + participant MSC_VLR as MSC/VLR + + External->>GMSC: 1. Setup Message (MSISDN of UE) + GMSC->>HSS: 2. MAP SRI + Note right of HSS: 3. Retrieve T-CSI for terminating UE + HSS->>GMSC: 4. MAP SRI Ack + GMSC->>gsmSCF: 5. Camel IDP + Note right of gsmSCF: 6. PNM Private Service Control + gsmSCF->>GMSC: 7. Camel Continue + GMSC->>HSS: 8. MAP SRI + Note right of HSS: 9. Retrieve MSRN for terminating UE + HSS->>GMSC: 10. MAP SRI Ack + GMSC->>MSC_VLR: 11. Setup Message (MSRN of Terminating UE) + +``` + +Sequence diagram of PN access control procedure in the CS domain. Lifelines: GMSC, HSS, gsmSCF (with PNM application), and MSC/VLR. The sequence shows 11 steps: 1. Setup Message (MSISDN of UE) to GMSC; 2. MAP SRI from GMSC to HSS; 3. Retrieve T-CSI for terminating UE in HSS; 4. MAP SRI Ack from HSS to GMSC; 5. Camel IDP from GMSC to gsmSCF; 6. PNM Private Service Control in gsmSCF; 7. Camel Continue from gsmSCF to GMSC; 8. MAP SRI from GMSC to HSS; 9. Retrieve MSRN for terminating UE in HSS; 10. MAP SRI Ack from HSS to GMSC; 11. Setup Message (MSRN of Terminating UE) from GMSC to MSC/VLR. + +**Figure 7.4.3-1 PN access control procedure in the CS domain (Caller is in the PN access control list)** + +1. A call request to the PN UE containing the MSISDN of the UE arrives at the GMSC. +2. The GMSC queries the HSS for routing Information by sending MAP SRI. +- 3-4. The HSS checks the subscription information for the called party. Further the HSS provides the information for the PNM subscriber including the T-CSI. The HSS returns the T-CSI to the GMSC in the response. +5. The GMSC triggers a CAMEL activity which results in sending a CAMEL IDP to gsmSCF. +6. The gsmSCF executes the PN access control logic for access control procedure. The calling party is part of the access control list for this PN. +7. Based on the positive result, the gsmSCF send the CAMEL CONTINUE message to GMSC to continue the call. +8. The GMSC queries the HSS for routing Information by sending MAP SRI with 'Suppress T-CSI' set. +9. The HSS returns the retrieved MSRN to the GMSC in response by sending MAP SRI\_ACK. +10. The GMSC generates a call request message containing MSRN and sends it to MSC/VLR. + +# --- Annex A (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | | +|----------------|-------|----------|----|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|--| +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | Old | New | | +| 2007-02 | | | | | Skeleton of the TS (C1-070122) | - | 0.0.0 | | +| 2007-02 | | | | | Version 0.1.0 created as a result of incorporating the following contributions at CT1#45.

C1-070568 - Personal UE Networks management -UE registration procedure
C1-070569 - Personal UE Networks Management - UE activation procedure | 0.0.0 | 0.1.0 | | +| 2007-03 | | | | | Version 0.2.0 created as a result of incorporating the following contributions at CT1#46.

C1-070655 - CR against TS 23.259 Clause 2 References
C1-070661 - CR against TS 23.259 Clause 6-tide-up
C1-070896 - CR against TS 23.259 Clause 4 PNM overview
C1-070897 - CR against TS 23.259 Clause 5.1 Procedures & Information Flow
C1-070898 - CR against TS 23.259 Clause 5.2 Procedures & Information
C1-070900 - CR against TS 23.259 Clause 3 Definitions and Abbreviations
C1-070906 - CR against TS 23.259 Clause 6.4
C1-071005 - CR against TS 23.259 Clause 7 Procedures and Information Flows for Private Network Services | 0.1.0 | 0.2.0 | | +| 2007-05 | | | | | Version 0.3.0 created as a result of incorporating the following contributions at CT1#47.

C1-071073 - Discussion on no re-invoking of PNM AS after session/call redirection
C1-071312 - CR against TS 23.259 Clause 6.3 Procedures and Information Flows for PN-Configuration in CS domain
C1-071348 - PN-Configuration Procedure
C1-071472 - CR against TS 23.259 Clause 5.2 Procedures and Information Flows for call redirection in CS domain
C1-071473 - PN-Registration Procedure | 0.2.0 | 0.3.0 | | +| 2007-08 | | | | | Version 0.4.0 created as a result of incorporating the following contributions at CT1#48.

C1-071645 - PNM private network service
C1-072004 - CR against TS 23.259 Clause 6.1.3 Procedures and Information Flows for PN-Registration and PN-Deregistration in CS Domain
C1-072007 - CR against TS 23.259 Procedures and Information Flows for Domain Interworking in PNM Session Redirection
C1-072010 - PNM IMPI
C1-072011 - PNM Query
C1-072100 - Information message in PNM message
C1-072101 - Clarification to UEs in the Configuration Request
C1-072171 - Access control procedures in the CS domain | 0.3.0 | 0.4.0 | | +| 2007-09 | | | | | Version 1.0.0 created for presentation to TSG | 0.4.0 | 1.0.0 | | +| 2007-10 | | | | | C1-072242 - Overview of PNM in the CS domain
C1-072543 - No Re-invoking of PNM CAMEL service after Session Redirection in the CS domain
C1-072544 - No Re-invoking of PNM AS after Session/Call Redirection in the IM CN subsystem
C1-072547 - PN Access Control List Configuration
C1-072548 - Access Control in CS domain(Caller is in Access List)
C1-072694 - TS23.259-100-cleanup
C1-072719 - Information Message in CS domain
C1-072720 - Access Control Procedure in CS domain to Avoid the Call release | 1.0.0 | 1.1.0 | | + +| | | | | | | | | +|---------|-------|-----------|------|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------| +| 2007-11 | | | | | C1-072780 - TS 23.259 Subclause 7.4 update CS domain
C1-073086 - PN-registration
C1-073087 - PN-configuration
C1-073088 - Cleanup
C1-073090 - GRUU in reg event package
C1-073091 - Using GRUU in the PN UE redirection
C1-073092 - PN UE redirection based on UE priority | 1.1.0 | 1.2.0 | +| 2008-02 | | | | | C1-080187 - PN Configuration Procedures Editorials
C1-080188 - PN Registration and Configuration Restructuring
C1-080237 - Clause 6 Update
C1-080458 - Clarifying PNM Scope
C1-080461 - Error procedures for the priority handling of the session redirection in IMS
C1-080462 - Error procedures for the priority handling of the session redirection in the CS domain
C1-080463 - PN Configuration Consolidation
C1-080465 - PNM AC Logic
C1-080573 - PN Access Control Cleanup | 1.2.0 | 1.3.0 | +| 2008-03 | CT#39 | CP-080076 | | | Version 2.0.0 created by MCC for presentation to CT#39 for approval | 1.3.0 | 2.0.0 | +| 2008-03 | | | | | Version 2.0.0 approved in CT#39 and version 8.0.0 created by MCC for publication | 2.0.0 | 8.0.0 | +| 2008-06 | CT#40 | CP-080352 | 0004 | 1 | Domain Interworking Update | 8.0.0 | 8.1.0 | +| 2008-12 | CT#42 | CP-080859 | 0005 | 3 | PNM Closed User Group functionality | 8.1.0 | 8.2.0 | +| 2008-12 | CT#42 | | | | Editorial clean up by MCC | 8.1.0 | 8.2.0 | +| 2009-06 | CT#44 | CP-090431 | 0007 | 1 | Scope of Rel-9 TS 23.259 | 8.2.0 | 9.0.0 | +| 2009-09 | CT#45 | CP-090683 | 0009 | 1 | Procedures of TE registration | 9.0.0 | 9.1.0 | +| 2009-09 | CT#45 | CP-090683 | 0010 | 1 | Procedures of PNE configuration | 9.0.0 | 9.1.0 | +| 2009-09 | CT#45 | CP-090683 | 0011 | 1 | Definitions Update | 9.0.0 | 9.1.0 | +| 2009-09 | CT#45 | CP-090683 | 0012 | 1 | Procedures of PNE redirection | 9.0.0 | 9.1.0 | +| 2009-09 | CT#45 | CP-090683 | 0013 | 1 | Procedures of PNE Access Control | 9.0.0 | 9.1.0 | +| 2009-12 | CT#46 | CP-090924 | 0014 | 1 | Corrections to TS 23.259 | 9.1.0 | 9.2.0 | +| 2009-12 | CT#46 | CP-090924 | 0015 | 1 | Editorial corrections | 9.1.0 | 9.2.0 | +| 2009-12 | CT#46 | CP-090924 | 0022 | 2 | Addition of PN-deregistration procedure for PNE | 9.1.0 | 9.2.0 | +| 2009-12 | CT#46 | | | | Editorial cleanup by MCC | 9.1.0 | 9.2.0 | +| 2010-03 | CT#47 | CP-100136 | 0023 | 1 | PNE definition in 23.259 | 9.2.0 | 9.3.0 | +| 2010-03 | CT#47 | CP-100136 | 0024 | 1 | Addtion of the general description of PN-deregistration procedure for PNE | 9.2.0 | 9.3.0 | +| 2010-03 | CT#47 | CP-100237 | 0025 | 1 | Update the scope of PAN | 9.2.0 | 9.3.0 | +| 2010-06 | CT#48 | CP-100356 | 0027 | 1 | Correction of PNE registration | 9.3.0 | 9.4.0 | +| 2011-03 | CT#51 | | | | Upgrade to Rel-10 by MCC | 9.4.0 | 10.0.0 | +| 2012-09 | CT#57 | | | | Upgrade to Rel-11 by MCC | 10.0.0 | 11.0.0 | +| 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0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ad3dd752a14a31738eff82fbe45a97d37d219b2e --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/23_series/23261/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,606 @@ + + + + + + +# Contents + +| | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 4 | +| 1 Scope..... | 5 | +| 2 References..... | 5 | +| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 6 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 6 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 6 | +| 4 Architecture model and concepts..... | 6 | +| 4.1 General concepts ..... | 6 | +| 4.2 Architecture reference model..... | 7 | +| 4.2.1 Non-roaming architecture..... | 7 | +| 4.2.1 Roaming architecture..... | 7 | +| 4.3 High level functions ..... | 7 | +| 4.3.1 S2c and H1 extensions for IP flow mobility ..... | 7 | +| 4.3.1.1 General..... | 7 | +| 4.3.1.2 DSMIPv6 enhancements..... | 7 | +| 4.3.2 Policy provisioning for Inter-system mobility and WLAN offload ..... | 8 | +| 4.3.3 Policy Control and Charging support..... | 9 | +| 4.3.4 Local Operating Environment Information ..... | 9 | +| 5 IP Flow Mobility procedures and flows..... | 9 | +| 5.1 General ..... | 9 | +| 5.2 PDN connection establishment over first access..... | 9 | +| 5.2.1 General ..... | 9 | +| 5.2.2 PDN connection establishment over 3GPP access..... | 9 | +| 5.2.3 PDN connection establishment over WLAN ..... | 10 | +| 5.3 Addition of an access to a PDN connection..... | 11 | +| 5.3.1 General ..... | 11 | +| 5.3.2 Addition of WLAN access ..... | 12 | +| 5.3.3 Addition of 3GPP access ..... | 13 | +| 5.4 IP flow mobility within a PDN connection..... | 15 | +| 5.4.1 General ..... | 15 | +| 5.4.2 IP flow mobility within a PDN connection with network-initiated dynamic PCC ..... | 15 | +| 5.4.3 IP flow mobility within a PDN connection with UE-initiated resource request ..... | 16 | +| 5.5 Removal of an access from a PDN connection..... | 18 | +| 5.5.1 UE-initiated removal of an access from a PDN connection..... | 18 | +| 5.5.2 HA-initiated removal of an access from a PDN connection ..... | 19 | +| 5.6 Addition of one access for multiple PDN connections to the same APN ..... | 21 | +| 5.7 Detach and PDN disconnection procedures ..... | 21 | +| Annex A (informative): Change history..... | 22 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +x the first digit: + +- 1 presented to TSG for information; +- 2 presented to TSG for approval; +- 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. + +y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. + +z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- 1 Scope + +This document specifies the Stage 2 system description for IP flow mobility between a 3GPP and a WLAN. The technical solution is based on the working principles of DSMIPv6 [2] and it is applicable to both the Evolved Packet System and the I-WLAN mobility architecture. + +The specification covers the system description of seamless WLAN offload and IP flow mobility between 3GPP and WLAN as well as the respective interactions with the PCC and ANDSF frameworks. The system description for non seamless WLAN offload is covered in 3GPP TS 23.402 [3]. + +This document specifies also the detailed extensions to S2c [3] and H1 [4] reference points for IP flow mobility. The extensions to the PCC and to the ANDSF framework are specified respectively in 3GPP TS 23.203 [5] and in 3GPP TS 23.402 [3]. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] IETF RFC 5555 (June 2009): "Mobile IPv6 support for dual stack Hosts and Routers (DSMIPv6)". +- [3] 3GPP TS 23.402: "Architecture enhancements for non-3GPP accesses". +- [4] 3GPP TS 23.327: "Mobility between 3GPP-Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking and 3GPP systems". +- [5] 3GPP TS 23.203: "Policy and Charging Control architecture". +- [6] IETF RFC 4877 (April 2007): "Mobile IPv6 Operation with IKEv2 and the Revised IPsec Architecture". +- [7] IETF RFC 5648 (October 2009): "Multiple Care-of Addresses Registration". +- [8] IETF RFC 6089 (January 2011): "Flow Bindings in Mobile IPv6 and Network Mobility (NEMO) Basic Support". +- [9] 3GPP TS 23.234: "3GPP System to Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Interworking; System Description". +- [10] 3GPP TS 23.401: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access". +- [11] 3GPP TS 23.060: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service description; Stage 2". +- [12] IETF RFC 6088 (January 2011): "Traffic Selectors for Flow Bindings". +- [13] IETF RFC 5846 (June 2010): "Binding Revocation for IPv6 Mobility". +- [14] IETF RFC 6275 (July 2011): "Mobility Support in IPv6". + +# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. + +The following terms used in this Technical Specification are defined in RFC 6275 [14]: Home Address, Care-of Address, binding cache, binding cache entry. + +The following terms used in this Technical Specification are defined in TS 23.402 [3]: Home network prefix. + +**Home Agent:** The Home Agent functionality consists in the DSMIPv6 anchor point functionality described in RFC 5555 [2] and in RFC 4877 [6] and the extensions defined in RFC 5648 [7] and RFC 6089 [8]. As per TS 23.402 [3], the HA functionality is located in the PDN Gateway. As per TS 23.327 [4] the HA functionality can be either a standalone entity or co-located with the GGSN or with the PDG. + +**Local Operating Environment Information:** This is a set of implementation specific parameters which describe the local environment in which the UE is operating. + +**routing address:** A routable IP address. In DSMIPv6 this is either the CoA (visited link case) or the HoA (in home link case). + +**routing filter:** A set of packet flow IP header parameter values/ranges used to identify one or more IP flows for routing purposes. + +**routing rule:** The association of a routing filter with a routing address. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. + +| | | +|---------|-----------------------------| +| BID | Binding Identifier | +| CoA | Care-of Address | +| DSMIPv6 | Dual-Stack Mobile IPv6 | +| EPC | Evolved Packet Core | +| ePDG | Evolved Packet Data Gateway | +| EPS | Evolved Packet System | +| FID | Flow Identifier | +| GW | Gateway | +| HA | Home Agent | +| HoA | Home Address | +| UE | User Equipment | + +# --- 4 Architecture model and concepts + +## 4.1 General concepts + +This document specifies a mechanism for a UE to simultaneously connect to 3GPP access and WLAN and exchange different IP flows belonging to the same PDN connection through different accesses. The mechanism also enables seamless IP flow mobility, with IP flows belonging to the same or different applications being moved seamlessly between a 3GPP access and WLAN. + +The solution allows the operator to indicate how the IP flows are routed through the available access systems and to selectively offload some traffic (e.g. best effort traffic) to WLAN while using UTRAN or E-UTRAN for other traffic (e.g. traffic with specific QoS requirements). This is usually referred to as WLAN offload. + +The technical solution is based on DSMIPv6, RFC 5555 [2] and is applicable to both the Evolved Packet System and the I-WLAN mobility architecture. Since the solution is based on DSMIPv6, IP address preservation and session continuity is provided when moving IP flows from one access to the other. + +## 4.2 Architecture reference model + +### 4.2.1 Non-roaming architecture + +The baseline architecture reference model for IP flow mobility when EPS is deployed in the non roaming case is specified in TS 23.402 [3]. + +The baseline architecture reference model for IP flow mobility when I-WLAN mobility is deployed in the non roaming case is specified in TS 23.327 [4]. + +The baseline Non-roaming architecture for I-WLAN is specified in TS 23.234 [9]. + +The baseline Non-roaming architecture for ANDSF is specified in TS 23.402 [3]. + +### 4.2.1 Roaming architecture + +The baseline architecture reference model for IP flow mobility when EPS is deployed in the roaming case is specified in TS 23.402 [3]. + +The baseline architecture reference model for IP flow mobility when I-WLAN mobility is deployed in the roaming case is specified in TS 23.327 [4]. + +The baseline roaming architecture for I-WLAN is specified in TS 23.234 [9]. + +The baseline roaming architecture for ANDSF is specified in TS 23.402 [3]. + +## 4.3 High level functions + +### 4.3.1 S2c and H1 extensions for IP flow mobility + +#### 4.3.1.1 General + +The granularity of access system connectivity and inter system mobility based on TS 23.402 [3] and TS 23.327 [4] is per PDN connection basis. This implies that when a handover occurs all the IP flows belonging to the same PDN connection are moved from the source access system to the target access system. + +With IP flow mobility it is possible to have a finer granularity in access system connectivity and inter system mobility: the handover procedures can be applied to a single or multiple IP flows belonging to the same PDN connection. This implies that some IP flows of one PDN connection can be routed via one access system while simultaneously some IP flows of the same PDN connection can be routed via another access system. + +To achieve IP flow mobility the inter-system mobility signalling is enhanced in order to carry routing filters. The extensions to DSMIPv6 mobility signalling needed to carry routing filters when the UE is connected to multiple accesses simultaneously are specified in RFC 5648 [7] and RFC 6089 [8] and are applicable to both S2c and H1. + +#### 4.3.1.2 DSMIPv6 enhancements + +When a UE configures different IP addresses on multiple accesses, it can register these addresses with the HA as CoAs using multiple bindings as specified in IETF RFC 5648 [7]. + +To register multiple bindings, the UE generates a Binding ID (BID) for each CoA and stores the BID in the binding update list. The UE then registers its CoAs by sending a Binding Update (BU) with a Binding Identifier mobility option. The BID is included in the Binding Identifier mobility option. When the UE is on the home link in one of the access, the CoA field is set to the HoA in the respective BID. + +When the HA receives the BU with a Binding Identifier mobility option, it copies the BID from the mobility option to the corresponding field in the Binding Cache entry. If there is an existing Binding Cache entry for the UE, and if the BID in the BU does not match the one with the existing entry, the HA creates a new Binding Cache entry for the new CoA and BID. + +Based on this extension, a typical Binding Cache in HA according to this specification in case the UE is not on the home link is shown in Table 4.3.1.2-1. + +NOTE: A BID is only unique for a given HoA, i.e. different mobile nodes can use the same BID value. + +**Table 4.3.1.2-1: Binding Cache in HA supporting multiple CoAs registration** + +| Home Address | Care-of Address | Binding ID | Priority | +|--------------|-----------------|------------|----------| +| HoA1 | CoA1 | BID1 | x | +| HoA1 | CoA2 | BID2 | y | +| ... | ... | ... | ... | + +In order to route IP flows through a specific access, the UE needs to request to store routing filters for that access at the HA: the UE includes the Flow Identification (FID) mobility option in the BU message as defined in RFC 6089 [8]. The FID option defines a routing rule which contains a routing filter and a routing address. The routing address (either CoA or HoA) is indicated by the BID. The routing filter is included in the DSMIPv6 signalling as described in RFC 6088 [12]. The routing filters are unidirectional and can be different for uplink and downlink traffic. + +It is assumed that between UE and the Home Agent function there is always a default routing address via which packets not matching any specific routing filter are routed. The UE provides a relative priority with each BID, where the BID with the highest priority is the default route. The UE may update the priority of a BID during IP flow mobility procedures. + +To install/remove/move an IP flow, the UE shall create a new IP flow binding or remove/update the IP flow binding at the HA by using DSMIPv6 signalling as specified in RFC 5555 [2], RFC 5648 [7] and RFC 6089 [8]. + +An example of a typical Binding Cache in HA with routing filters is shown in Table 4.3.1.2-2. Note that a FID is only unique for a given HoA, i.e. different PDN connections can use the same FID value. Each flow binding entry contains a relative priority. + +**Table 4.3.1.2-2: Binding Cache in HA supporting flow bindings** + +| Home Address | Routing Address | Binding ID | BID Priority | Flow ID | FID Priority | Routing Filter | +|--------------|-----------------|------------|--------------|---------|--------------|----------------------------| +| HoA1 | CoA1 | BID1 | x | FID1 | a | Description of IP flows... | +| | | | | FID2 | b | Description of IP flows... | +| HoA1 | CoA2 | BID2 | y | FID3 | ... | ... | + +NOTE: This clause shows only a conceptual representation of the binding cache. The actual format is implementation specific. + +### 4.3.2 Policy provisioning for Inter-system mobility and WLAN offload + +In order to allow the operator to indicate to the UE through which access technology IP flows are expected to be routed, inter system routing policies are introduced in TS 23.402 [3]. Such policies can be defined per APN, per IP flow class under any APN or per IP flow class under a specific APN and can be provided to the UE either through ANDSF or by means of static pre-configuration. + +For IP flows that are routed over WLAN, the inter system routing policies also specify whether the traffic should be routed through the HA or directly via the WLAN access, bypassing the HA. + +The normative procedures for ANDSF and UE can be found in TS 23.402 [3]. + +### 4.3.3 Policy Control and Charging support + +When IP flow mobility is used and PCC is deployed, the PCC architecture is enhanced to handle multiple simultaneous access connections for a single IP-CAN session. These enhancements require the PDN GW to keep the PCRF up to date about the current routing address for each IP flow. + +The detailed description of the normative procedures for PCC enhancements can be found in TS 23.203 [5]. + +### 4.3.4 Local Operating Environment Information + +In addition to operator policy and user preferences, the UE may take into account the Local Operating Environment Information when deciding which access to use for an IP flow. + +The actual Local Operating Environment Information is implementation dependent and may comprise of such items as, radio environment information, quality of IP connection, application specific requirements, power considerations, etc. + +# 5 IP Flow Mobility procedures and flows + +## 5.1 General + +This clause describes the IP flow mobility procedures for different scenarios. The call flows are described in a common way for I-WLAN and EPS and the procedures which are applicable to EPS only are marked as optional and identified as not applicable to an I-WLAN mobility deployment. Furthermore the call flows do not differentiate between trusted or untrusted accesses as the IP flow mobility procedures are common as soon as the UE configures a Care-of Address. + +## 5.2 PDN connection establishment over first access + +### 5.2.1 General + +This clause specifies the additional UE procedures when establishing a PDN connection through a 3GPP or through a WLAN access when the UE supports IP flow mobility. In these flows it is assumed that the UE has not established the PDN connection through any access yet. + +NOTE: In the rest of the document the PDN connection establishment procedure is meant to be PDP context activation procedure in case of I-WLAN mobility architecture. + +### 5.2.2 PDN connection establishment over 3GPP access + +The UE performs the initial PDN connection establishment to a 3GPP access as shown in Figure 5.2.2-1. This procedure applies independently whether the UE attaches to EPS or GPRS. + +![Sequence diagram of PDN connection establishment over 3GPP access. Lifelines: UE, GERAN/UTRAN/EUTRAN, HA/PDN GW, AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, hPCRF. The diagram shows four steps: 1. 3GPP PDN connection establishment (solid line), 2. HA discovery, DSMIPv6 bootstrapping and Home Link Detection (solid line), 3. Binding Update (dashed line from UE to HA/PDN GW), 4. Binding Acknowledgement (dashed line from HA/PDN GW to UE). A 'Roaming Scenario' box covers the AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF lifelines.](2ba086df3506f81bae3a9b53725dcfea_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram of PDN connection establishment over 3GPP access. Lifelines: UE, GERAN/UTRAN/EUTRAN, HA/PDN GW, AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, hPCRF. The diagram shows four steps: 1. 3GPP PDN connection establishment (solid line), 2. HA discovery, DSMIPv6 bootstrapping and Home Link Detection (solid line), 3. Binding Update (dashed line from UE to HA/PDN GW), 4. Binding Acknowledgement (dashed line from HA/PDN GW to UE). A 'Roaming Scenario' box covers the AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF lifelines. + +Figure 5.2.2-1: PDN connection procedure over 3GPP access + +1. The initial PDN establishment procedure is performed by the UE according to TS 23.401 [10] or TS 23.060 [11], depending if the PDN connection establishment is to EPS or GPRS. During this step an IPv4 address and/or an IPv6 address/prefix is assigned to the UE. +2. The UE performs HA discovery, DSMIPv6 bootstrapping and the home link detection procedure as described in TS 23.402 [3] or TS 23.327 [4]. + +If the UE requests the home network prefix in the Protocol Configuration Option (as in TS 23.402 [3]), the UE shall request in the Protocol Configuration Option an indication of HA support of IP flow mobility. + +If the UE obtains the home network prefix using the IKEv2 procedure, the UE shall use IKEv2 signaling to indicate IFOM support. The HA supporting IFOM shall use IKEv2 signaling to confirm the IFOM support. + +If the HA does not support IFOM, the UE shall disable IFOM capabilities for that PDN connection. + +The presence of ANDSF inter-system routing policies for a given PLMN may be considered by the UE as an implicit indication that the Home Agents of that PLMN support IP flow mobility. If the UE has ANDSF inter-system routing policies, the UE may skip the IKEv2 and PCO procedures to check the IFOM support of the PDN GW for the PDN GWs residing in the PLMN where the ANDSF policies are valid. + +- If the UE detects it is not on the home link, the UE sends a DSMIPv6 Binding Update (HoA, CoA, Lifetime, BID) message to the HA as specified in RFC 5555 [2] and RFC 5648 [7]. The inclusion of the BID mobility option at this stage is an indication that the UE supports IP Flow Mobility extensions. The UE may also include some FID mobility options as described in RFC 6089 [8]. + +NOTE: This step cannot happen in case IP flow mobility is used in EPS as 3GPP is always the home link in EPS. + +- The HA validates the BU, installs the IP flow mobility routing rules, establishes the DSMIPv6 bindings and sends a BA to the UE per RFC 5555 [2], RFC 5648 [7] and RFC 6089 [8]. + +### 5.2.3 PDN connection establishment over WLAN + +The UE performs the initial PDN connection establishment over a WLAN access as shown in Figure 5.2.3-1. + +![Sequence diagram for PDN connection procedure over non-3GPP access. The diagram shows vertical lifelines for UE, Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG, HA/PDN GW, and a 'Roaming Scenario' group containing AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. Six steps are illustrated: 1. WLAN link establishment and IP address assignment (box across UE and Access); 2. GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure (dashed box across Access and Roaming Scenario); 3. HA discovery, DSMIPv6 bootstrapping and Home Link Detection (box across UE, Access, and HA); 4. Binding Update (arrow from UE to HA); 5. IP-CAN session establishment procedure (dashed box across HA and Roaming Scenario); 6. Binding Acknowledgement (arrow from HA to UE).](b0211cee4b20034939d883ac0d70f696_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant Access as Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG + participant HA as HA/PDN GW + box Roaming Scenario + participant AAA as AAA Proxy + participant vPCRF + participant HSS as HSS/AAA + participant hPCRF + end + + Note over UE, Access: 1. WLAN link establishment and IP address assignment + Note over Access, hPCRF: 2. GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure + Note over UE, HA: 3. HA discovery, DSMIPv6 bootstrapping and Home Link Detection + UE->>HA: 4. Binding Update + Note over HA, hPCRF: 5. IP-CAN session establishment procedure + HA->>UE: 6. Binding Acknowledgement + +``` + +Sequence diagram for PDN connection procedure over non-3GPP access. The diagram shows vertical lifelines for UE, Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG, HA/PDN GW, and a 'Roaming Scenario' group containing AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. Six steps are illustrated: 1. WLAN link establishment and IP address assignment (box across UE and Access); 2. GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure (dashed box across Access and Roaming Scenario); 3. HA discovery, DSMIPv6 bootstrapping and Home Link Detection (box across UE, Access, and HA); 4. Binding Update (arrow from UE to HA); 5. IP-CAN session establishment procedure (dashed box across HA and Roaming Scenario); 6. Binding Acknowledgement (arrow from HA to UE). + +**Figure 5.2.3-1: PDN connection procedure over non-3GPP access** + +- The UE connects to the WLAN and configures an IPv4 address and/or an IPv6 address/prefix. Depending on the specific scenario considered the UE attaches either to a trusted WLAN, an ePDG via an untrusted WLAN or to a PDG via a I-WLAN access as specified in TS 23.402 [3] or TS 23.327 [4]. If the UE connects to PDG or ePDG, an IPv4 address and/or an IPv6 address/prefix is assigned to the UE. +- If the UE connects to a Trusted non-3GPP access and dynamic PCC is deployed, a GW control session may be established as specified in TS 23.203 [5]. +- The UE performs HA discovery, DSMIPv6 bootstrapping and the home link detection procedure as described in TS 23.402 [3] or TS 23.327 [4]. + +During the home link detection procedure in IKEv2, the UE shall use IKEv2 signalling to indicate IFOM support. The HA supporting IFOM shall use IKEv2 signalling to confirm the IFOM support. + +If the HA does not support IFOM, the UE shall disable IFOM capabilities for that PDN connection. + +The presence of ANDSF inter-system routing policies for a given PLMN may be considered by the UE as an implicit indication that the Home Agents of that PLMN support IP flow mobility. If the UE has ANDSF inter-system routing policies, the UE may skip the IKEv2 and PCO procedures to check the IFOM support of the PDN GW for the PDN GWs residing in the PLMN where the ANDSF policies are valid. + +- If the UE detects it is not on the home link, the UE sends a DSMIPv6 Binding Update (HoA, CoA, Lifetime, BID) message to the HA as specified in RFC 5555 [2] and RFC 5648 [7]. The inclusion of the BID mobility option at this stage is an indication that the UE supports IP Flow Mobility extensions. The BID mobility option + +contains the Binding ID of the WLAN access. The UE may also include some FID mobility options as described in RFC 6089 [8]. + +5. If the HA function is located in the PDN GW and dynamic PCC is deployed, the PDN GW performs an IP-CAN session establishment procedure with the PCRF as specified in TS 23.203 [5]. +6. The HA validates the BU, installs the IP flow mobility routing rules, establishes the DSMIPv6 bindings and sends a BA to the UE per RFC 5555 [2], RFC 5648 [7] and RFC 6089 [8]. + +## 5.3 Addition of an access to a PDN connection + +### 5.3.1 General + +This clause specifies the additional procedures for adding an access to an existing PDN connection over a 3GPP access or a WLAN access when the UE supports IP flow mobility. In these flows it is assumed that the UE has performed a PDN Connection establishment procedure through one access as specified in clause 5.2. Subsequently the UE attaches to a second access and starts using both accesses for the same PDN connection. As a result the UE is simultaneously connected via both accesses and a set of traffic flows are routed through one access while the remaining traffic flows are routed through the other access. + +Non-roaming, home routed roaming and Local Breakout cases are supported by this procedure. The AAA proxy and vPCRF are only used in the case of home routed roaming and Local Breakout. In non-roaming scenarios, the AAA proxy and vPCRF are not involved. + +The optional interaction steps between the gateways and the PCRF in the procedures only occur if dynamic policy provisioning is deployed in EPC. These steps are never present when the solution is applied to I-WLAN mobility architecture according to TS 23.327 [4]. + +### 5.3.2 Addition of WLAN access + +After successfully attachment to 3GPP access, the UE has established a PDN connection over 3GPP access as specified in clause 5.2.2. Subsequently the UE performs the WLAN attachment, and requests to establish a PDN connection using the same APN, and attempts to use both accesses for the same PDN connection simultaneously. The WLAN access may be considered as the UE's foreign link from DSMIPv6 perspective. + +![Sequence diagram showing the addition of WLAN access to the PDN connection. The diagram involves a UE, Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG, GERAN UTRAN/EUTRAN, PDN GW/HA, AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. The process includes 8 steps: 1. WLAN link establishment and IP address assignment; 2. HA discovery, DSMIPv6 bootstrapping and Home Link Detection; 3. Binding Update from UE to PDN GW/HA; 4. IP-CAN session modification request from PDN GW/HA to hPCRF; 5. IP-CAN session modification response from hPCRF to PDN GW/HA; 6. Binding Acknowledgement from PDN GW/HA to UE; 7. GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure (dashed line between PDN GW/HA and vPCRF); 8. 3GPP resource release. A 'Roaming Scenario' is indicated for the AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF components.](27b06ec9f42b5d727a2630f61a5f1861_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram showing the addition of WLAN access to the PDN connection. The diagram involves a UE, Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG, GERAN UTRAN/EUTRAN, PDN GW/HA, AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. The process includes 8 steps: 1. WLAN link establishment and IP address assignment; 2. HA discovery, DSMIPv6 bootstrapping and Home Link Detection; 3. Binding Update from UE to PDN GW/HA; 4. IP-CAN session modification request from PDN GW/HA to hPCRF; 5. IP-CAN session modification response from hPCRF to PDN GW/HA; 6. Binding Acknowledgement from PDN GW/HA to UE; 7. GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure (dashed line between PDN GW/HA and vPCRF); 8. 3GPP resource release. A 'Roaming Scenario' is indicated for the AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF components. + +**Figure 5.3.2-1: Addition of WLAN access to the PDN connection** + +The signalling flow above shows the particular case where the UE is first connected to a 3GPP access and then it requests addition of a WLAN access. + +1. The UE discovers a WLAN and connects to it and configures an IPv4 address and/or an IPv6 address/prefix according to TS 23.402 [3] or TS 23.327 [4], depending whether the WLAN access is used in the context of EPC or I-WLAN mobility architecture. +2. The UE performs HA discovery, DSMIPv6 bootstrapping and DSMIPv6 home link detection procedure according to TS 23.402 [3] unless already performed in the 3GPP access. +3. The UE sends a DSMIPv6 Binding Update (HoA, CoA, Lifetime, BID, FID, flow description) message to the HA over the WLAN access. The UE may include the requested routing rules via the FID mobility option with both the routing filters and the BID (which includes the routing address) as specified in IETF RFC 5555 [2], IETF RFC 5648 [7] and RFC 6089 [8]. The UE can include more than one routing rule by including multiple FID mobility options in the Binding Update. The DSMIPv6 Binding Update also contains an indication which indicates that the home link (3GPP access) is still connected and also the BID mobility options which identify that one binding is associated with the home address (3GPP access) and the other with the Care-of-Address from the WLAN access. The UE also indicates in the Binding Update which is the default binding where the HA should route packets not matching any FID as specified in RFC 6089 [8]. +4. In case the HA function is located in the PDN GW and dynamic PCC is deployed, the PDN GW sends an IP-CAN session modification request to the PCRF. In this request, the PDN GW provides the updated routing rules to the PCRF. The PCRF stores the mapping between each SDF and its routing address. +5. If the HA function is located in the PDN GW, based on the successful establishment of resources at the BBERF, the PCRF sends an acknowledgement to the PDN GW, including updated PCC rules if appropriate. +6. The HA creates a DSMIPv6 binding, installs the IP flow routing rules and sends a Binding Acknowledgment (Lifetime, HoA, CoA, BID, FID) as specified in RFC 5555 [2], RFC 5648 [7] and RFC 6089 [8], to indicate which routing rules requested by the UE are accepted. + +The PDN GW may send message 6 before receiving the reply from PCRF in message 5. + +7. Based on the IP-CAN session modification request (if step 4 was performed), the PCRF ensures that the relevant QoS rules for the SDFs are installed in the target BBERF. This is done by a GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure as specified in TS 23.203 [5]. +8. In case the HA function is located in the PDN GW, appropriate 3GPP resource release procedures are executed for the resources associated with the flows that were moved away from the 3GPP source access. This procedure may be triggered by the PCRF via a GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure if PMIPv6 is used on S5 and it may be triggered by the PDN GW in case GTP is used on S5. + +If the HA function is implemented in I-WLAN mobility, the UE may initiate GPRS resource release procedures for those resources that were moved away from the 3GPP source access, as specified in TS 23.060 [11]. + +### 5.3.3 Addition of 3GPP access + +After successfully attachment to WLAN access, the UE has established a PDN connection over WLAN as specified in clause 5.2.3. As the UE detected the WLAN access is not the home link from DSMIPv6 perspective, DSMIPv6 signalling was triggered over the WLAN access. + +Subsequently, as described in this clause, the UE performs the initial attachment procedure or PDN Connection establishment procedure over a 3GPP access and establishes a PDN connection using the same APN, as described in TS 23.060 [11], TS 23.401 [10] or TS 23.402 [3]. As the UE has indicated IP flow mobility during the initial attachment over WLAN, the 3GPP access attachment completion shall not trigger the DSMIPv6 binding deregistration. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the addition of 3GPP access to the PDN connection. The diagram shows the interaction between the UE, Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG, UTRAN/EUTRAN, PDN GW/HA, AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. The process starts with 3GPP PDN connection establishment (step 1). The UE then sends a Binding Update (step 2) to the PDN GW/HA. The PDN GW/HA sends an IP-CAN session modification request (step 3) to the vPCRF. The vPCRF sends an IP-CAN session modification response (step 4) to the PDN GW/HA. The PDN GW/HA sends a Binding Acknowledgement (step 5) to the UE. The PDN GW/HA and vPCRF perform a GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure (step 6). Finally, the PDN GW/HA performs a 3GPP bearer setup or modification (step 7).](4636adff5682a064f0ae5f13a1d464a6_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG + participant UTRAN/EUTRAN + participant PDN GW/HA + participant AAA Proxy + participant vPCRF + participant HSS/AAA + participant hPCRF + + Note right of AAA Proxy: Roaming Scenario + Note over UE, PDN GW/HA: 1. 3GPP PDN connection establishment as defined in TS 23.401 or TS 23.060 + UE->>PDN GW/HA: 2. Binding Update + PDN GW/HA-->>vPCRF: 3. IP-CAN session modification request + vPCRF-->>PDN GW/HA: 4. IP-CAN session modification response + PDN GW/HA-->>UE: 5. Binding Acknowledgement + Note over PDN GW/HA, vPCRF: 6. GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure + Note over UE, PDN GW/HA: 7. 3GPP bearer setup or modification + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the addition of 3GPP access to the PDN connection. The diagram shows the interaction between the UE, Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG, UTRAN/EUTRAN, PDN GW/HA, AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. The process starts with 3GPP PDN connection establishment (step 1). The UE then sends a Binding Update (step 2) to the PDN GW/HA. The PDN GW/HA sends an IP-CAN session modification request (step 3) to the vPCRF. The vPCRF sends an IP-CAN session modification response (step 4) to the PDN GW/HA. The PDN GW/HA sends a Binding Acknowledgement (step 5) to the UE. The PDN GW/HA and vPCRF perform a GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure (step 6). Finally, the PDN GW/HA performs a 3GPP bearer setup or modification (step 7). + +**Figure 5.3.3-1: Addition of 3GPP access to the PDN connection** + +The signalling flow above shows the particular case where the UE is first connected to a WLAN access and then it requests addition of a 3GPP access. + +1. The UE discovers a 3GPP access and performs the Attach or PDN Connection establishment procedure according to TS 23.401 [10] or TS 23.060 [11]. Specifically, the UE sets the Request Type to Handover to facilitate the MME selects the same PDN GW/HA as the UE connects in WLAN Access. Since the UE has indicated IP flow mobility support during the initial attachment over WLAN, the HA shall not deregister the DSMIPv6 binding by sending a Binding Revocation Indication towards the WLAN access. +2. The UE sends a DSMIPv6 Binding Update (HoA, CoA, Lifetime, BID, FID, flow description) message to the HA over the 3GPP access. The UE may include the requested routing rules via the FID mobility option with both the routing filters and the BID (which includes the routing address) as specified in RFC 5555 [2], RFC 5648 [7] and RFC 6089 [8]. If the 3GPP access is the home link, the UE sets the 'H' flag in the respective BID mobility + +option, as specified in RFC 6089 [8]. The UE can include more than one routing rule by including multiple FID mobility options in the Binding Update. The UE also indicates in the Binding Update which is the default binding where the HA should route packets not matching any FID as specified in RFC 6089 [8]. + +3. In case the HA function is located in the PDN GW and dynamic PCC is deployed, the PDN GW sends an IP-CAN session modification request to the PCRF. In this request, the PDN GW provides the updated routing rules to the PCRF. The PCRF stores the mapping between each SDF and its routing address. +4. If the HA function is located in the PDN GW, based on the successful establishment of resources at the BBERF, the PCRF sends an acknowledgement to the PDN GW, including updated PCC rules if appropriate. +5. The HA sends a Binding Acknowledgment (Lifetime, HoA, CoA, BID, FID) as specified in RFC 5555 [2], RFC 5648 [7] and RFC 6089 [8], to indicate which routing rules requested by the UE are accepted. + +The PDN GW/HA may send message 5 before receiving the reply from PCRF in message 4. + +6. Based on the IP-CAN session modification request (if step 3 was performed), the PCRF ensures that the relevant QoS rules for the SDFs are installed in the target BBERF. This is done by a GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure as specified in TS 23.203 [5]. +7. In case the HA function is located in the PDN GW, appropriate 3GPP bearer setup or modification procedures are executed for the resources associated with the flows that were moved onto the 3GPP access. This procedure may be triggered by the PCRF via a GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure if PMIPv6 is used on S5 and it may be triggered by the PDN GW in case GTP is used on S5. + +If the HA function is implemented in I-WLAN mobility, the UE may initiate GPRS bearer setup or modification procedures for those resources that were moved onto the 3GPP access, as specified in TS 23.060 [11]. + +## 5.4 IP flow mobility within a PDN connection + +### 5.4.1 General + +This clause specifies the IP flow mobility procedures within a PDN connection. In these procedures the UE is assumed to simultaneously connect via a 3GPP access and a WLAN access. The UE is using both the accesses for the same PDN connection. Subsequently, the UE adds/modifies/deletes/moves between accesses IP flows using DSMIPv6 messages. + +Non-roaming, home routed roaming and Local Breakout cases are supported by this procedure. The AAA proxy and vPCRF shown in Figure 5.4.2-1 are only used in the case of home routed roaming and Local Breakout. In non-roaming scenarios, the AAA proxy and vPCRF are not involved. + +The optional interaction steps between the gateways and the PCRF in the procedures only occur if dynamic policy provisioning is deployed in EPC. These steps are not present when the solution is applied to I-WLAN mobility architecture according to TS 23.327 [4]. + +There are two scenarios, depending on UE initiates the QoS establishment in the target access or the network performs the QoS establishment when the IP flow is moved. + +### 5.4.2 IP flow mobility within a PDN connection with network-initiated dynamic PCC + +In this scenario the UE moves one or more IP flow(s) from one access to the other access and network-initiated dynamic PCC is used to set up or remove appropriate resources. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating IP Flow Mobility and network initiated dynamic PCC. The diagram shows interactions between UE, Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG, UTRAN/EUTRAN, HA/PDN GW, AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. A 'Roaming Scenario' is indicated for the AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. The sequence of messages is: 1. UE is connected simultaneously to 3GPP and non 3GPP accesses and multiple bindings and multiple IP flows are registered at the HA; 2. Binding Update from UE to HA/PDN GW; 3. IP-CAN session modification request from HA/PDN GW to vPCRF; 4. IP-CAN session modification response from vPCRF to HA/PDN GW; 5. Binding Acknowledgement from HA/PDN GW to UE; 6. GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure between HA/PDN GW and vPCRF; 7. 3GPP EPS resource release or 3GPP EPS bearer setup or modification from HA/PDN GW to UE.](7efae06af3af43ffe5d4b956a679cf54_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram illustrating IP Flow Mobility and network initiated dynamic PCC. The diagram shows interactions between UE, Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG, UTRAN/EUTRAN, HA/PDN GW, AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. A 'Roaming Scenario' is indicated for the AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. The sequence of messages is: 1. UE is connected simultaneously to 3GPP and non 3GPP accesses and multiple bindings and multiple IP flows are registered at the HA; 2. Binding Update from UE to HA/PDN GW; 3. IP-CAN session modification request from HA/PDN GW to vPCRF; 4. IP-CAN session modification response from vPCRF to HA/PDN GW; 5. Binding Acknowledgement from HA/PDN GW to UE; 6. GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure between HA/PDN GW and vPCRF; 7. 3GPP EPS resource release or 3GPP EPS bearer setup or modification from HA/PDN GW to UE. + +**Figure 5.4.2-1: IP Flow Mobility and network initiated dynamic PCC** + +1. The UE is simultaneously connected to a 3GPP access and a WLAN access based on the procedures specified in clauses 5.2 and 5.3. Based on current routing rules some traffic is routed through the 3GPP access and some other traffic through the WLAN access. +2. The UE sends a Binding Update (HoA, BID, FID) as specified in RFC 5555 [2], RFC 5648 [7] and RFC 6089 [8] to the HA to install a new routing rule or to modify the routing address of an existing routing rule to route the respective traffic (identified by the included FID) through one particular access (identified by the included BID) or to remove an existing routing rule. In case of new routing rule with a new FID mobility option, the UE includes the routing filter description. + +NOTE: The UE can send the Binding Update either from the 3GPP or from the WLAN access irrespective of which access the IP flow is moved to. + +3. In case the HA function is implemented in EPC, the PDN GW sends an IP-CAN session modification request to the PCRF. In this request the PDN GW provides the updated routing rules to the PCRF. The PCRF stores the updated mapping between routing addresses and SDFs. +4. If the HA function is implemented in EPC, based on the successful establishment of resources in the WLAN access, the PCRF sends an acknowledgement to the PDN GW, including updated PCC rules if appropriate. +5. The HA sends a Binding Acknowledgment (Lifetime, HoA, BID, FID) as specified in RFC 5555 [2], RFC 5648 [7] and RFC 6089 [8], to indicate which routing rules requested by the UE are accepted. + +The PDN GW/HA may send message 5 before receiving the reply from PCRF in message 4. + +6. If the HA function is implemented in EPC, based on the IP-CAN session modification request, the PCRF ensures that the relevant QoS rules are installed in the target access or the relevant QoS rules are uninstalled from the source access. For non-3GPP access, this is done by a GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure as specified in TS 23.203 [5]. +7. If the HA function is implemented in EPC, appropriate EPS resource release procedures are executed for those resources that were moved away from the 3GPP source access or appropriate EPS resource allocation procedures are executed for those resources that were moved onto the 3GPP access, as specified in TS 23.402 [3]. This procedure may be triggered by the PCRF via a GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure if PMIPv6 is used on S5 and it may be triggered by the PDN GW in case GTP is used on S5. + +### 5.4.3 IP flow mobility within a PDN connection with UE-initiated resource request + +In this scenario the UE requests for resources in the target access with UE-initiated procedures and when the resources are provided, the UE moves one or more IP flow(s) to the target access. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating IP Flow Mobility and UE initiated resource request. The diagram shows interactions between UE, Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG, GERAN/UTRAN/EUTRAN, HA/PDN GW, AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. A 'Roaming Scenario' box covers the AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. The sequence of steps is: 1. UE is connected simultaneously to 3GPP and non 3GPP accesses and multiple bindings and multiple IP flows are registered at the HA. 2. UE requested bearer resource modification as specified in TS 23.401, clause 5.4.5 or in TS 23.060, clause 9.2.2.1.1 or 9.2.2.1.1A. 3. Binding Update from UE to HA/PDN GW. 4. IP-CAN session modification request from HA/PDN GW to hPCRF. 5. IP-CAN session modification request from hPCRF to AAA Proxy. 6. Binding Acknowledgement from HA/PDN GW to UE. 7. GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure (dashed line) between HA/PDN GW and vPCRF.](a83ba9e3e2c1e21dd69953a7b09e45b4_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram illustrating IP Flow Mobility and UE initiated resource request. The diagram shows interactions between UE, Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG, GERAN/UTRAN/EUTRAN, HA/PDN GW, AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. A 'Roaming Scenario' box covers the AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. The sequence of steps is: 1. UE is connected simultaneously to 3GPP and non 3GPP accesses and multiple bindings and multiple IP flows are registered at the HA. 2. UE requested bearer resource modification as specified in TS 23.401, clause 5.4.5 or in TS 23.060, clause 9.2.2.1.1 or 9.2.2.1.1A. 3. Binding Update from UE to HA/PDN GW. 4. IP-CAN session modification request from HA/PDN GW to hPCRF. 5. IP-CAN session modification request from hPCRF to AAA Proxy. 6. Binding Acknowledgement from HA/PDN GW to UE. 7. GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure (dashed line) between HA/PDN GW and vPCRF. + +**Figure 5.4.3-1: IP Flow Mobility and UE initiated resource request** + +1. The UE is simultaneously connected to a 3GPP access and a WLAN access based on the procedures specified in clauses 5.2 and 5.3. Based on current routing rules some traffic is routed through the 3GPP access and some other traffic through the WLAN access. +2. Before moving an IP flow currently routed over WLAN to the 3GPP access, the UE requests appropriate resources in the 3GPP access. This is done as specified in clause 5.4.5 of TS 23.401 [10] or in clause 9.2.2.1.1 or 9.2.2.1.1A of TS 23.060 [11]. In this procedure the UE includes the packet filters related to the requested resources. In this step if the HA function is implemented in EPC, the PDN GW may interact with the PCRF to trigger the appropriate PCC decision. The PCRF can authorize the resource establishment but since there is no change in the routing rules provided by the PDN GW. + +NOTE 1: After this step and until step 5 is performed, resources are allocated in two accesses for the same SDF. + +3. The UE sends a Binding Update (HoA, BID, FID) as specified in RFC 5555 [2], RFC 5648 [7] and RFC 6089 [8] to the HA to install a new routing rule or to modify the routing address of an existing routing rule to route the respective traffic (identified by the included FID) through one particular access (identified by the included BID) or to remove an existing routing rule. In case of new routing rule with a new FID mobility option, the UE includes the routing filter description. + +NOTE 2: The UE can send the Binding Update either from the 3GPP or from the WLAN access irrespective of which access the IP flow is moved to. + +NOTE 3: The routing filters included in the BU can be different from the packet filters included in step 2 by the UE. QoS will be provided only based on the packet filters installed in step 2 but the UE can include different, e.g. more generic, routing filters in this operation. + +4. In case the HA function is implemented in EPC, the PDN GW sends an IP-CAN session modification request to the PCRF. In this request the PDN GW provides the updated routing rules to the PCRF. The PCRF stores the updated mapping between routing addresses and SDFs. + +5. If the HA function is implemented in EPC, based on the successful establishment of resources in the WLAN access, the PCRF sends an acknowledgement to the PDN GW, including updated PCC rules if appropriate. +6. The HA sends a Binding Acknowledgment (Lifetime, HoA, BID, FID) as specified in RFC 5555 [2], RFC 5648 [7] and RFC 6089 [8], to indicate which routing rules requested by the UE are accepted. + +The PDN GW may send message 6 before receiving the reply from PCRF in message 5. + +7. If the HA function is implemented in EPC, based on the IP-CAN session modification request, the PCRF ensures that the resources associated with the routing filters moved to the 3GPP access are released. This is done by a GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure as specified in TS 23.203 [5]. + +## 5.5 Removal of an access from a PDN connection + +### 5.5.1 UE-initiated removal of an access from a PDN connection + +In this scenario, the UE is attached to a 3GPP access and a WLAN access and is using both the accesses for the same PDN connection. Subsequently, the UE moves all IP flows associated with one access to another access and disconnects from the one access (e.g. due to loss of coverage or by an explicit detach). + +The optional interaction steps between the gateways and the PCRF in the procedures only occur if dynamic policy provisioning is deployed in EPC. These steps are never present when the solution is applied to I-WLAN mobility architecture according to TS 23.327 [4]. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the removal of one access from the PDN connection. The diagram shows interactions between UE, Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG, GERAN/UTRAN/EUTRAN, PDN GW/HA, AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. A 'Roaming Scenario' is indicated for the AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. The sequence of messages is: 1. UE is connected simultaneously to 3GPP and non 3GPP accesses and multiple bindings and multiple IP flows are registered at the HA; 2. Binding Update from UE to PDN GW/HA; 3. IP-CAN session modification procedure (dashed line) between PDN GW/HA and vPCRF; 4. Binding Acknowledgement from PDN GW/HA to UE; 5. GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure (dashed line) between PDN GW/HA and vPCRF; 6. 3GPP resource release from PDN GW/HA to UE.](90ee16ccc0ad16aeca48087797d7b07f_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG + participant GERAN/UTRAN/EUTRAN + participant PDN GW/HA + participant AAA Proxy + participant vPCRF + participant HSS/AAA + participant hPCRF + + Note over AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, hPCRF: Roaming Scenario + + Note over UE, PDN GW/HA: 1. UE is connected simultaneously to 3GPP and non 3GPP accesses and multiple bindings and multiple IP flows are registered at the HA + + UE->>PDN GW/HA: 2. Binding Update + PDN GW/HA-->>vPCRF: 3. IP-CAN session modification procedure + PDN GW/HA->>UE: 4. Binding Acknowledgement + PDN GW/HA-->>vPCRF: 5. GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure + PDN GW/HA->>UE: 6. 3GPP resource release + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the removal of one access from the PDN connection. The diagram shows interactions between UE, Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG, GERAN/UTRAN/EUTRAN, PDN GW/HA, AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. A 'Roaming Scenario' is indicated for the AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. The sequence of messages is: 1. UE is connected simultaneously to 3GPP and non 3GPP accesses and multiple bindings and multiple IP flows are registered at the HA; 2. Binding Update from UE to PDN GW/HA; 3. IP-CAN session modification procedure (dashed line) between PDN GW/HA and vPCRF; 4. Binding Acknowledgement from PDN GW/HA to UE; 5. GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure (dashed line) between PDN GW/HA and vPCRF; 6. 3GPP resource release from PDN GW/HA to UE. + +**Figure 5.5-1: Removal of one access from the PDN connection** + +1. The UE is simultaneously connected to a 3GPP access and a WLAN access based on the procedures specified in clauses 5.2 and 5.3. Based on current routing rules some IP flows are routed through the 3GPP access and some other IP flows through the WLAN access. +2. The UE decides to move all IP flows to one access and to disconnect from the other access (e.g. due to loss of coverage, based on internal trigger, based on updated policies from ANDSF). + - a. If UE disconnects one access (either a home link or a foreign link) and maintains the other access which is the foreign link, the UE sends a Binding Update (Lifetime, HoA, BID) to the HA with lifetime set to 0 to remove the BID of the access it disconnects from. Or, alternatively, the UE sends a Binding Update (HoA, BID) over the maintained foreign link to the HA with lifetime set to non-zero, the BID of the maintained foreign link, and "O" flag set. + +- b. If the UE disconnects the WLAN access which is a foreign link and maintains only the 3GPP access which is the home link, the UE sends a Binding Update with lifetime 0 without any BID. This de-registration Binding Update can be sent from any available access. +3. In case the HA function is located in the PDN GW, the PDN GW initiates the IP-CAN session modification procedure with the PCRF. In this procedure, the PDN GW removes the routing address related to the removed BID associated with the IP-CAN session. + 4. The HA sends a Binding Acknowledgment (Lifetime, HoA, BID) as specified in RFC 5555 [2], RFC 5648 [7] and RFC 6089 [8]. +- NOTE 1: As specified in RFC 6089 [8] the routing rules which point to a routing address which is not registered become inactive and don't influence the routing of the packets, i.e. there is no need for the UE to change the routing rules as all packets will be anyway routed to the only existing binding. +5. If the HA function is located in the PDN GW, as part of the IP-CAN session modification procedure initiated in step 3, the PCRF ensures that the relevant QoS rules for the SDFs are installed in the target BBERF. This is done by a GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure as specified in TS 23.203 [5]. + 6. If in step 2 the UE has removed the BID associated with the 3GPP access and maintained the BID for the WLAN access, the PDN GW shall initiate the PDN GW Initiated PDN Disconnection procedure in 3GPP access as defined in TS 23.402 [3], clause 5.6.2.2 or the PDN GW Initiated Bearer Deactivation procedure as defined in TS 23.401 [10], clause 5.4.4.1. The PDN GW shall set the release cause to 'RAT changed from 3GPP to Non-3GPP' to avoid the MME remove the PDN GW ID from the HSS. In case of I-WLAN mobility architecture and the UE has removed the BID associated with the 3GPP access, the UE may initiate PDP Context Deactivation as described in TS 23.060 [11]. + +If the BID associated with the WLAN access is removed, according to TS 23.402 [3] the security associations between the UE and the HA should not be immediately deleted. As the security associations were created dynamically using IKEv2 they will be automatically deleted when they expire. Similarly, for I-WLAN mobility architecture, the H2 session between the HA and the AAA Server should not be immediately deleted. The H2 session will be deleted by the HA immediately after security associations are deleted. In case of I-WLAN mobility architecture, the UE may initiate release of the IKEv2 security association with the PDG according to TS 23.234 [9]. + +NOTE 2: In case a detach from 3GPP access needs to be triggered, e.g. based on O&M, a PDN GW initiated PDN disconnection procedure is used instead of a MME/SGSN-initiated detach/PDN disconnection procedure. + +### 5.5.2 HA-initiated removal of an access from a PDN connection + +In this scenario, the UE is attached to a 3GPP access and a WLAN access and is using both the accesses for the same PDN connection. The HA disconnects the UE from the one access (e.g. due to change of subscription) . + +The optional interaction steps between the gateways and the PCRF in the procedures only occur if dynamic policy provisioning is deployed in EPC. These steps are never present when the solution is applied to I-WLAN mobility architecture according to TS 23.327 [4]. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the removal of one access from the PDN connection. The diagram shows interactions between UE, Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG, GERAN/UTRAN/EUTRAN, PDN GW/HA, AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. The process involves six steps: 1. UE connected to 3GPP and non 3GPP accesses; 2. BRI (B/D) from HA to UE; 3. BRA from UE to HA; 4. IP-CAN session modification procedure (HA to vPCRF); 5. GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure (HA to vPCRF); 6. 3GPP resource release.](8fa679f79a1bb1f527cba9f29e784e89_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates a sequence of messages for removing one access from a PDN connection. At the top, a box labeled 'Roaming Scenario' contains AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. Below this, a box labeled 'PDN GW/HA' is shown. To the left, 'GERAN/UTRAN/EUTRAN' and 'Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG' are shown. On the far left is the 'UE'. The sequence of messages is as follows: + +- UE is connected simultaneously to 3GPP and non 3GPP accesses and multiple bindings and multiple IP flows are registered at the HA. +- A message labeled '2. BRI (B/D)' is sent from the PDN GW/HA to the UE. +- A message labeled '3. BRA' is sent from the UE to the PDN GW/HA. +- A dashed box labeled '4. IP-CAN session modification procedure' is shown between the PDN GW/HA and the vPCRF. +- A dashed box labeled '5. GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure' is shown between the PDN GW/HA and the vPCRF. +- A message labeled '6. 3GPP resource release' is shown at the bottom, spanning from the UE to the PDN GW/HA. + +Sequence diagram illustrating the removal of one access from the PDN connection. The diagram shows interactions between UE, Trusted non-3GPP IP Access/PDG/ePDG, GERAN/UTRAN/EUTRAN, PDN GW/HA, AAA Proxy, vPCRF, HSS/AAA, and hPCRF. The process involves six steps: 1. UE connected to 3GPP and non 3GPP accesses; 2. BRI (B/D) from HA to UE; 3. BRA from UE to HA; 4. IP-CAN session modification procedure (HA to vPCRF); 5. GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure (HA to vPCRF); 6. 3GPP resource release. + +**Figure 5.5-1: Removal of one access from the PDN connection** + +- The UE is simultaneously connected to a 3GPP access and a WLAN access based on the procedures specified in clauses 5.2 and 5.3. Based on current routing rules some IP flows are routed through the 3GPP access and some other IP flows through the WLAN access. + - The HA sends a BRI message including a BID mobility option to remove only one of the binding registered for the UE as defined in IETF RFC 5846 [13]. +- NOTE: If HA disconnects the UE from the WLAN access and the 3GPP access is the home link, alternatively the HA can terminate the DSMIPv6 session omitting the BID mobility option. +- The UE replies with a BRA message and removes the BID indicated by the HA as defined in IETF RFC 5846 [13]. + - In case the HA function is located in the PDN GW, the PDN GW initiates the IP-CAN session modification procedure with the PCRF. In this procedure, the PDN GW removes the routing address related to the removed BID associated with the IP-CAN session. + - If the HA function is located in the PDN GW, as part of the IP-CAN session modification procedure initiated in step 3, the PCRF ensures that the relevant QoS rules for the SDFs are installed in the target BBERF. This is done by a GW control session and QoS rules provision procedure as specified in TS 23.203 [5]. + - If in step 2 the HA has removed the BID associated with the 3GPP access and maintained the BID for the WLAN access, the PDN GW shall initiate the PDN GW Initiated PDN Disconnection procedure in 3GPP access as defined in TS 23.402 [3], clause 5.6.2.2 or the PDN GW Initiated Bearer Deactivation procedure as defined in TS 23.401 [10], clause 5.4.4.1. The PDN GW shall set the release cause to 'RAT changed from 3GPP to Non-3GPP' to avoid the MME remove the PDN GW ID from the HSS. In case of I-WLAN mobility architecture and the UE has removed the BID associated with the 3GPP access, the UE may initiate PDP Context Deactivation as described in TS 23.060 [11]. + +If the BID associated with the WLAN access is removed, according to TS 23.402 [3] the security associations between the UE and the HA should not be immediately deleted. As the security associations were created dynamically using IKEv2 they will be automatically deleted when they expire. + +For I-WLAN mobility architecture, the H2 session between the HA and the AAA Server should not be immediately deleted. The H2 session will be deleted by the HA immediately after security associations are deleted. In case of I-WLAN mobility architecture, the UE may initiate release of the IKEv2 security association with the PDG according to TS 23.234 [9]. + +## 5.6 Addition of one access for multiple PDN connections to the same APN + +When a UE having multiple PDN connections to the same APN via one access attaches to a second access, the UE needs to decide which of the multiple PDN connections the UE has would use both accesses simultaneously. + +When the UE having multiple PDN connections to the same APN via a 3GPP access attaches to a WLAN, the UE shall perform DSMIPv6 procedures only for the PDN connections for which it will use IP flow mobility. + +When the UE having multiple PDN connections to the same APN via the WLAN attaches to the 3GPP access, the UE should only establish the PDN connections for which it will use IP flow mobility. However, due to the restriction that the UE cannot indicate which PDN connection is to establish, the UE shall repeat UE PDN Connectivity Request until the desired PDN connections have been established and shall perform DSMIPv6 procedures for the desired PDN connections. + +## 5.7 Detach and PDN disconnection procedures + +When the UE is attached to the same PDN through two accesses and a detach or PDN disconnection procedure is required, the following considerations apply: + +- In case of UE initiated PDN disconnection the UE-initiated PDN disconnection procedure described in clause 6.5.2 of TS 23.402 [3] shall be performed (in case of untrusted access the procedure described in clause 7.5.2 of TS 23.402 [3] shall be performed). When this procedure is completed, UE-initiated Detach procedure described in clause 5.3.8.2 of TS 23.401 [10] shall be performed. +- In case of HSS initiated detach, the HSS-initiated Detach procedure described in 6.5.3 of TS 23.402 [3] shall be performed (in case of untrusted access the procedure described in clause 7.5.3 of TS 23.402 [3] shall be performed). When this procedure is completed, the HSS-initiated Detach procedure described in clause 5.3.8.4 of TS 23.401 [10] shall be performed. +- In case of PDN-GW initiated PDN disconnection procedure, the procedure in clause 6.5.4 of TS 23.402 [3] shall be performed (in case of untrusted access the procedure described in clause 7.5.4 of TS 23.402 [3] shall be performed). When this procedure is completed, the PDN GW Initiated Bearer Deactivation procedure as defined in TS 23.401 [10], clause 5.4.4.1, shall be performed. + +When the UE is attached to I-WLAN architecture through 3GPP and WLAN accesses and a detach or PDN disconnection procedure is required, similar considerations as above apply with reference to the procedures described in TS 23.327 [4] and TS 23.060 [11]. + +# --- Annex A (informative): Change history + +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | Old | New | +|---------|-------|-----------|------|-----|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|---------------| +| 06-2010 | SP-48 | SP-100353 | - | - | - | MCC Update to version 2.0.0 for presentation to TSG SA for approval | 1.1.0 | 2.0.0 | +| 06-2010 | SP-48 | - | - | - | - | MCC Update to version 10.0.0 after approval at TSG SA (Release 10) | 2.0.0 | 10.0.0 | +| 09-2010 | SP-49 | SP-100547 | 0003 | 2 | F | PDN GW capability check in IFOM | 10.0.0 | 10.1.0 | +| 09-2010 | SP-49 | SP-100547 | 0004 | - | F | Inter System Routing Policies | 10.0.0 | 10.1.0 | +| 09-2010 | SP-49 | SP-100547 | 0005 | - | B | PDN GW imitated BID removal | 10.0.0 | 10.1.0 | +| 09-2010 | SP-49 | SP-100547 | 0007 | - | F | Addition of the Reference and Miscellaneous corrections | 10.0.0 | 10.1.0 | +| 03-2012 | SP-55 | SP-120071 | 0011 | - | F | IETF reference update for TS 23.261 | 10.1.0 | 10.2.0 | +| 2012-09 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-11 version (MCC) | 10.2.0 | 11.0.0 | +| 2014-09 | SP-65 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-12 version (MCC) | 11.0.0 | 12.0.0 | +| 2015-12 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-13 version (MCC) | 12.0.0 | 13.0.0 | +| 2017-03 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-14 version (MCC) | 13.0.0 | 14.0.0 | +| 2018-06 | SP-80 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-15 version (MCC) | 14.0.0 | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 15.0.0 | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff 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4.2 Service consistency ..... | 13 | +| 4.3 Service continuity..... | 13 | +| 4.4 Session scenarios..... | 13 | +| 4.4.1 Overview ..... | 13 | +| 4.4.2 ICS UE Session Scenarios..... | 13 | +| 4.5 Service settings data management..... | 14 | +| 4.6 Identities ..... | 14 | +| 4.6.1 Identities used by an ICS UE..... | 14 | +| 4.6.2 Identities used by an MSC Server enhanced for ICS ..... | 14 | +| 4.7 Coexistence of an ICS UE and a non ICS UE..... | 14 | +| 4.8 Routing of originated calls to IMS..... | 15 | +| 4.9 Void..... | 15 | +| 5 Architecture model and reference points ..... | 15 | +| 5.1 Overview ..... | 15 | +| 5.2 Reference architecture..... | 15 | +| 5.3 Functional Entities..... | 16 | +| 5.3.1 SCC AS ..... | 16 | +| 5.3.2 UE enhanced for ICS..... | 17 | +| 5.3.3 MSC Server enhancements for ICS..... | 18 | +| 5.3.4 Emergency CSCF (E-CSCF)..... | 19 | +| 5.4 Reference points..... | 19 | +| 5.4.1 Reference Point UE – SCC AS (I1) ..... | 19 | +| 5.4.2 Reference Point MSC Server – CSCF (I2)..... | 19 | +| 5.4.3 Reference Point MSC server – CS-MGW (Mc)..... | 19 | +| 5.4.4 Reference Point MSC Server - TAS (I3)..... | 19 | +| 5.4.5 Reference Point MSC Server - E-CSCF (I6)..... | 19 | +| 6 Functional description..... | 20 | +| 6.1 Common IMS Functions ..... | 20 | +| 6.1.1 P-CSCF procedures ..... | 20 | +| 6.1.2 IMS ALG procedures ..... | 20 | +| 6.1.3 S-CSCF procedures ..... | 20 | +| 6.1.4 IBCF procedures..... | 20 | +| 7 Procedures and flows ..... | 20 | +| 7.0 General ..... | 20 | +| 7.1 Signalling and bearer paths ..... | 20 | +| 7.1.1 Sessions established using the Gm or I1 reference point ..... | 20 | +| 7.1.2 Sessions established using CS call control and MSC Server ..... | 22 | +| 7.2 Registration ..... | 22 | +| 7.2.1 IMS registration via CS access..... | 22 | +| 7.2.1.1 Overview..... | 22 | +| 7.2.1.2 Registration using I2 reference point..... | 24 | +| 7.2.1.3 Deregistration using I2 reference point ..... | 25 | +| 7.2.1.4 Registration after Deregistration using I2 reference point..... | 26 | +| 7.2.1.5 Registration before Deregistration using I2 reference point..... | 27 | +| 7.2.2 IMS Registration via IP-CAN ..... | 28 | +| 7.3 Originations..... | 28 | + +| | | | +|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| 7.3.1 | Originating sessions that use PS media ..... | 28 | +| 7.3.2 | Originating sessions that use CS media..... | 28 | +| 7.3.2.1 | Non ICS UE originating sessions that use CS media ..... | 28 | +| 7.3.2.1.1 | Overview ..... | 28 | +| 7.3.2.1.2 | Origination using I2 reference point ..... | 29 | +| 7.3.2.1.3 | Origination when using an MSC Server ..... | 29 | +| 7.3.2.2 | ICS UE Originating sessions that use CS media ..... | 31 | +| 7.3.2.2.1 | Overview ..... | 31 | +| 7.3.2.2.2 | Originations with CS media when using I1 ..... | 32 | +| 7.3.2.2.3 | Originations with CS media when not using I1 ..... | 37 | +| 7.3.2.2.4 | Originations with CS media using the Gm reference point ..... | 37 | +| 7.3.2.3 | CS Emergency call interworking with IMS..... | 40 | +| 7.4 | Terminations..... | 40 | +| 7.4.1 | Terminating sessions that use PS media..... | 40 | +| 7.4.1.1 | Full duplex speech via PS..... | 40 | +| 7.4.1.2 | Void ..... | 40 | +| 7.4.1.3 | Void ..... | 40 | +| 7.4.2 | Terminating sessions that use CS media ..... | 40 | +| 7.4.2.1 | Non ICS UE terminating sessions that use CS media ..... | 40 | +| 7.4.2.1.1 | Overview ..... | 40 | +| 7.4.2.1.2 | Termination using I2 reference point..... | 41 | +| 7.4.2.1.3 | Termination to non ICS UE not registered in IMS ..... | 42 | +| 7.4.2.2 | ICS UE Terminating sessions that use CS media ..... | 44 | +| 7.4.2.2.1 | Overview ..... | 44 | +| 7.4.2.2.2 | Terminations with CS media using the Gm reference point ..... | 44 | +| 7.4.2.2.3 | Terminations with CS media using the I1 reference point..... | 49 | +| 7.4.2.2.4 | Terminations with CS media using CS control with I1 augmentation..... | 54 | +| 7.4.2.2.5 | Terminations with CS media when not using Gm or I1 ..... | 54 | +| 7.4.2.2.6 | Void..... | 54 | +| 7.4.2.2.7 | Terminating access network reselection – fallback to alternate access ..... | 54 | +| 7.4.3 | Terminating sessions over Gm rejected by the UE ..... | 55 | +| 7.5 | Service continuity..... | 57 | +| 7.5.1 | Service continuity for ICS UE..... | 57 | +| 7.5.1.1 | Service continuity while maintaining the use of CS access for the media ..... | 57 | +| 7.5.1.1.1 | IMS sessions established using Gm reference point ..... | 57 | +| 7.5.1.2 | Service continuity when transferring the media of IMS sessions between PS and CS access ..... | 58 | +| 7.5a | Addition of Gm service control to existing call ..... | 58 | +| 7.5a.1 | Overview ..... | 58 | +| 7.5a.2 | Augmentation call flow ..... | 58 | +| 7.6 | Consistency of Supplementary Services ..... | 59 | +| 7.6.0 | General ..... | 59 | +| 7.6.1 | Supplementary Services for ICS UE ..... | 59 | +| 7.6.1.1 | Overview..... | 59 | +| 7.6.1.2 | IMS sessions using CS bearer..... | 60 | +| 7.6.1.2.1 | Overview ..... | 60 | +| 7.6.1.2.2 | Use of Gm reference point ..... | 60 | +| 7.6.1.2.3 | Use of I1 reference point..... | 68 | +| 7.6.1.2.4 | When use of Gm or I1 reference point is not possible due to VPLMN limitations ..... | 78 | +| 7.6.1.3 | User configuration of Supplementary Services ..... | 78 | +| 7.6.2 | Supplementary service invocation using the MSC Server enhanced for ICS ..... | 78 | +| 7.6.2.1 | Overview..... | 78 | +| 7.6.2.2 | Line ID Services (OIP, OIR, TIP, TIR) ..... | 78 | +| 7.6.2.3 | Communication Diversion Services ..... | 78 | +| 7.6.2.3.1 | Communication Forwarding Unconditional (CFU) ..... | 78 | +| 7.6.2.3.2 | Communication Forwarding Busy (CFB)..... | 78 | +| 7.6.2.3.3 | Communication Forwarding No Reply (CFNR)..... | 79 | +| 7.6.2.3.4 | Communication Forwarding on Not Logged-in (CFNL)..... | 79 | +| 7.6.2.3.5 | Communication Deflection (CD)..... | 79 | +| 7.6.2.3.6 | Communication Forwarding on Subscriber Not Reachable (CFNRc)..... | 79 | +| 7.6.2.3.7 | Communication Diversion Notification (CDIVN)..... | 79 | +| 7.6.2.3.8 | Diversion notifications to originating users ..... | 79 | +| 7.6.2.4 | Communication Barring ..... | 79 | + +| | | | +|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 7.6.2.5 | Communication Hold/Resume..... | 79 | +| 7.6.2.6 | Communication Waiting..... | 81 | +| 7.6.2.7 | Explicit Communication Transfer ..... | 82 | +| 7.6.2.8 | Conferencing..... | 87 | +| 7.6.2.9 | User configuration of communication service settings..... | 89 | +| 7.6.2.9.1 | TAS procedures..... | 89 | +| 7.6.2.9.2 | UE supporting multimedia telephony ..... | 89 | +| 7.6.2.9.3 | MSC Server enhanced for ICS..... | 89 | +| 7.6.2.10 | Customized Alerting Tone (CAT)..... | 89 | +| 7.6.2.11 | Communication Completion on Busy Subscriber/No Reply/Not Logged In ..... | 89 | +| 7.6.2.11.1 | Communication Completion Terminated at Served User ..... | 89 | +| 7.6.2.11.2 | Communication Completion Originated at Served User..... | 91 | +| 7.6.3 | Service consistency for non ICS UE when attached to an MSC Server not enhanced with ICS ..... | 92 | +| 7.6.3.1 | Line ID Services (OIP, OIR, TIP, TIR)..... | 92 | +| 7.6.3.2 | Communication Diversion Services ..... | 92 | +| 7.6.3.2.1 | Communication Diversion services; CFU, CFNL ..... | 92 | +| 7.6.3.2.2 | Communication Diversion services; CFNR, CFB ..... | 92 | +| 7.6.3.2.2a | Communication Diversion services; CFNRc ..... | 92 | +| 7.6.3.2.3 | Communication Diversion services; Communication Deflection..... | 92 | +| 7.6.3.3 | Communication Barring ..... | 92 | +| 7.6.3.4 | Communication Hold/Resume..... | 92 | +| 7.6.3.5 | Explicit Communication Transfer ..... | 93 | +| 7.6.3.6 | Conferencing..... | 93 | +| 7.6.3.7 | User configuration of Supplementary Services ..... | 93 | +| 7.6.3.7.1 | UE not supporting multimedia telephony ..... | 93 | +| 7.6.3.7.2 | UE supporting multimedia telephony ..... | 93 | +| 7.6.3.8 | Customized Alerting Tone (CAT)..... | 93 | +| 7.6.3.9 | Communication Waiting..... | 93 | +| 7.6.3.10 | Communication Completion on Busy Subscriber/No Reply/Not Logged In ..... | 93 | +| 7.6.3.10.1 | Communication Completion Terminated at Served User ..... | 93 | +| 7.6.3.10.2 | Communication Completion Originated at Served User..... | 95 | +| 7.7 | Session Release ..... | 96 | +| 7.7.1 | Session Release for ICS UE ..... | 96 | +| 7.7.1.1 | General Gm Procedures ..... | 96 | +| 7.7.1.2 | Session Release for Gm and I1 ..... | 96 | +| 7.7.1.3 | Release of the Service Control Signalling Session when using I1 ..... | 97 | +| 7.7.1.3.1 | ICS UE Initiated Release..... | 97 | +| 7.7.1.3.2 | Network Initiated Release..... | 98 | +| 7.7.1.3.3 | Far End Initiated Release ..... | 99 | +| 7.7.2 | Session Release for MSC Server enhanced for ICS..... | 100 | +| 7.7.2.1 | General..... | 100 | +| 7.7.2.2 | Session Release by served UE..... | 100 | +| 7.7.2.3 | Session Release by far-end ..... | 101 | +| 7.7.2.4 | Network initiated Session Release..... | 101 | +| 7.8 | Loss of Gm capability ..... | 102 | +| 7.9 | Addition/Removal of video media flow..... | 103 | +| 7.9.1 | Addition/Removal of video media flow for Non ICS UE ..... | 103 | +| 7.9.1.1 | Overview..... | 103 | +| 7.9.1.2 | Addition/Removal of video media flow through SCUDIF using I2 reference point..... | 103 | +| 7.9.1.3 | Addition/Removal of video media flow through SCUDIF via the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS ..... | 104 | +| 7.9.2 | Addition/Removal of video media flow for ICS UE ..... | 105 | +| 7.9.2.1 | Overview..... | 105 | +| 7.9.2.2 | Addition/Removal of video media flow through SCUDIF using Gm Reference Point ..... | 105 | +| 7.9.2.3 | Addition/Removal of video media flow through SCUDIF using I1 Reference Point ..... | 105 | +| 7.9.2.4 | Addition/Removal of video media flow through redial using Gm Reference Point ..... | 106 | +| 7.9.2.5 | Addition/Removal of video media flow through redial using I1 Reference Point ..... | 108 | +| 8 | Charging..... | 111 | +| 8.1 | General description ..... | 111 | +| 8.2 | Offline charging ..... | 111 | +| 8.3 | On-line charging..... | 111 | + +| | | | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 9 | Security Considerations ..... | 111 | +| 9.1 | Access security ..... | 111 | +| 9.2 | Network Domain Security..... | 111 | +| Annex A (informative): Service Consistency ..... | 113 | | +| Annex B (informative): ICS functions in different deployment scenarios..... | 114 | | +| Annex C (informative): Communication Deflection support when call has been delivered using CS call control..... | 116 | | +| Annex D (informative): Conditional Call Forwarding support when call has been delivered using CS call control..... | 117 | | +| Annex E (informative): Using MRF for media process ..... | 118 | | +| Annex F (informative): Call diversion from CS to IMS ..... | 119 | | +| F.1 | General..... | 119 | +| F.2 | Implementation options for call diversion from CS to the IMS ..... | 119 | +| F.3 | Implementation options for prevention of circular looping of CS Terminations ..... | 120 | +| Annex G (normative): Combined CS Access Authentication and IMS Registration Procedure for non-roaming UEs..... | 122 | | +| G.1 | General..... | 122 | +| G.2 | Procedure for registration utilizing IMS Authorization ..... | 122 | +| Annex H (informative): Service Domain Centralization in IMS (SeDoC)..... | 125 | | +| H.1 | High level description and principles..... | 125 | +| H.2 | Architecture model and reference points ..... | 125 | +| H.2.1 | Reference architecture..... | 125 | +| H.2.2 | Functional Entities..... | 126 | +| H.2.2.1 | MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC..... | 126 | +| H.2.2.1.1 | Main differences to MSC Server enhanced for ICS ..... | 126 | +| H.2.2.1.2 | Call control solely done in IMS..... | 126 | +| H.2.2.1.3 | No VLR functionality ..... | 126 | +| H.2.2.1.4 | Mapping of CS procedures to IMS procedures ..... | 126 | +| H.2.2.1.5 | Call Control procedures ..... | 126 | +| H.2.2.1.6 | Supplementary Services Management procedures ..... | 127 | +| H.2.2.1.7 | Mapping of IMS procedures to CS procedures ..... | 127 | +| H.2.2.1.8 | Procedures which can be handled without IMS interaction ..... | 127 | +| H.2.2.1.9 | SMS support considerations ..... | 127 | +| H.2.2.1.10 | Location ..... | 127 | +| H.2.2.1.11 | CS Data support..... | 127 | +| H.2.2.2 | ICS Interworking Function ..... | 128 | +| H.2.3 | Reference points..... | 128 | +| H.2.3.1 | Reference Point MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC - CSCF (I2' Reference Point)..... | 128 | +| H.2.3.2 | Reference Point MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC - TAS (I3 Reference Point)..... | 128 | +| H.2.3.3 | Reference Point ICS-IWF - CSCF (Cx' Reference Point)..... | 128 | +| H.2.3.4 | Reference Point ICS-IWF - AS (Sh' Reference Point)..... | 128 | +| H.4 | Procedures and flows for non roaming users ..... | 128 | +| H.4.1 | Authentication/Registration for own users not roaming ..... | 128 | +| H.4.2 | Originating session for own users not roaming..... | 128 | +| H.4.3 | Terminating session for own users not roaming ..... | 129 | +| H.4.4 | SMS-MO for own users not roaming..... | 129 | +| H.5 | Interworking with networks not supporting IMS and/or ICS ..... | 130 | +| H.5.1 | Overview ..... | 130 | +| H.5.2 | Inbound-roaming support..... | 130 | + +| | | | +|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| H.5.2.1 | Roaming Architecture with legacy home network ..... | 130 | +| H.5.2.2 | IMS Centralized Services Interworking Function (ICS-IWF) Features ..... | 131 | +| H.5.2.3 | Call Flows for Inbound roamer ..... | 132 | +| H.5.2.3.1 | Authentication/Registration for Inbound roamers ..... | 132 | +| H.5.2.4 | Originating session for Inbound roamer ..... | 133 | +| H.5.2.5 | Terminating session for Inbound roamer ..... | 133 | +| H.5.3 | Outbound-roaming support ..... | 134 | +| H.5.3.1 | Call flows for outbound-roamers ..... | 134 | +| H.5.3.1.1 | Attach/Registration Procedure for outbound roamer ..... | 134 | +| H.5.3.1.2 | Originating session for own users roaming (outbound roamer) ..... | 135 | +| H.5.3.1.3 | Terminating session for own users roaming (outbound roamer) ..... | 135 | +| H.5.3.1.4 | Call flow for outbound-roamers to a not enhanced network ..... | 135 | +| Annex I (informative): Change history ..... | | 137 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- 1 Scope + +This document specifies the architectural requirements for delivery of consistent services to the user regardless of the attached access type (e.g. CS domain access, or IP-CAN). This is achieved by implementing the services in the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS). + +Consideration is given to how to access specified IMS-based services (see clause 22.4 of TS 22.101 [9]) whilst still allowing other, bespoke services to be offered by the home operator. + +IMS control of services related to those defined in clause 22.4 of TS 22.101 [9] are part of the present scope of this specification. + +The scope of the specification includes: + +- Session establishment when using CS access for media transmission for an IMS service. +- Support of Service Continuity as specified in TS 23.237 [12]. +- Support of Single Radio Voice Call Continuity as specified in TS 23.216 [36]. +- Access Domain Selection (ADS). +- IMS control of services where the media is transported via the CS network (e.g. managing of mid-call services). +- Service data management. + +The solution is applicable for UEs with or without ICS functionality, and is applicable for the following deployment scenarios: + +- An operator who supports for their subscribers only UEs that have ICS functionality. +- An operator who supports for their subscribers only UEs that do not have ICS functionality. +- An operator who supports for their subscribers UEs which do and do not have ICS functionality (to different subscribers and the same subscribers) ensuring the coexistence of UEs that have and do not have ICS functionality. +- Inbound roaming subscribers on an operator's network that supports either the same or different ICS functionality that the inbound roaming subscriber is using, ensuring the coexistence of UEs that have and do not have ICS functionality. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. + - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. + - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TS 23.228: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS)". +- [3] 3GPP TS 23.002: "Network architecture". +- [4] 3GPP TS 22.173: "IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem (IMS) Multimedia Telephony Service and supplementary services". + +- [5] 3GPP TS 23.003: "Numbering, addressing and identification". +- [6] 3GPP TS 24.008: "Mobile radio interface Layer 3 specification; Core network protocols; Stage 3". +- [7] 3GPP TS 23.218: "IP Multimedia (IM) session handling; IM call model; Stage 2". +- [8] 3GPP TS 24.173: "IMS Multimedia Telephony Communication Service and Supplementary Services; Stage 3". +- [9] 3GPP TS 22.101: "Services Aspects; Service Principles". +- [10] 3GPP TS 23.221: "Architectural requirements". +- [11] 3GPP TS 29.163: "Interworking between the IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem and Circuit Switched (CS) networks". +- [12] 3GPP TS 23.237: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) service continuity". +- [13] 3GPP TS 24.081: "Line Identification Supplementary Services - Stage 3". +- [14] 3GPP TS 24.082: "Call Forwarding supplementary service; Stage 3". +- [15] 3GPP TS 24.072: "Call Deflection (CS) Supplementary Service; Stage 3". +- [16] 3GPP TS 24.088: "Call Barring (CB) Supplementary Service - Stage 3". +- [17] 3GPP TS 26.114: "A IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Multimedia Telephony; Media handling and interaction". +- [18] 3GPP TS 24.083: "Call Waiting (CW) and Call Hold (HOLD) supplementary services; Stage 3". +- [19] 3GPP TS 24.091: "Explicit Call Transfer (ECT) supplementary service; Stage 3". +- [20] 3GPP TS 24.084: "Multi Party supplementary service - Stage 3". +- [21] 3GPP TS 24.147: "Conferencing using the IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem; Stage 3". +- [22] 3GPP TS 23.009: "Handover Procedures". +- [23] 3GPP TS 25.413: "UTRAN Iu interface Radio Access Network Application Part (RANAP) signalling". +- [24] OMA-ERELD-DM-V1\_2-20060602-C: "Enabler Release Definition for OMA Device Management, Candidate Version 1.2". +- [25] 3GPP TS 23.167: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) emergency sessions". +- [26] 3GPP TS 24.604: "Communication Diversion (CDIV) using IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem Protocol specification". +- [27] 3GPP2 C.S0001-D: "Introduction to cdma2000 Spread Spectrum Systems - Revision D". +- [28] 3GPP TS 24.611: "Anonymous Communication Rejection (ACR) and Communication Barring (CB); using IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem Protocol specification". +- [29] 3GPP TS 24.096: "Name identification supplementary services; Stage 3". +- [30] 3GPP TS 24.010: "Mobile radio interface layer 3 Supplementary services specification; General aspects". +- [31] 3GPP TS 24.229: "IP Multimedia Call Control Protocol based on SIP and SDP; Stage 3". +- [32] 3GPP TS 33.203: "Access security for IP-based services". +- [33] 3GPP TS 33.210: "Network Domain Security; IP network layer security". + +- [34] 3GPP TS 23.401: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access". +- [35] 3GPP TS 23.060: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service description". +- [36] 3GPP TS 23.216: "Single Radio Voice Call Continuity (SRVCC); Stage 2". +- [37] 3GPP TS 23.172: "Technical realization of Circuit Switched (CS) multimedia service; UDI RDI fallback and service modification; Stage 2". +- [38] 3GPP2 C.S0042: "Circuit-Switched Video Conferencing Services". +- [39] 3GPP TR 23.903: "Redial solution for voice-video switching". +- [40] Void. +- [41] 3GPP TS 22.004: "General on supplementary services". +- [42] 3GPP TS 24.182: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Customized Alerting Tones (CAT)". +- [43] 3GPP TS 29.292: "Interworking between the IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem and MSC Server for IMS Centralized Services (ICS)". +- [44] 3GPP TS 23.272: "Circuit Switched (CS) fallback in Evolved Packet System (EPS); Stage 2". +- [45] 3GPP TS 29.002: "Mobile Application Part (MAP) specification". +- [46] 3GPP TS 23.083: "Call Waiting (CW) and Call Hold (HOLD) supplementary services; Stage 2". +- [47] 3GPP TS 24.093: "Completion of Calls to Busy Subscriber (CCBS); Stage 3". +- [48] 3GPP TS 29.328: "IP Multimedia (IM) Subsystem Sh Interface; Signalling flows and message contents". +- [49] 3GPP TS 23.018: "Basic call handling; Technical realization". +- [50] 3GPP TS 23.040: "Technical realization of the Short Message Service (SMS); Stage 2". +- [51] 3GPP TS 23.204: "Support of Short Message Service (SMS) over generic 3GPP Internet Protocol (IP) access; Stage 2". +- [52] 3GPP TS 24.341: "Support of SMS over IP networks; Stage 3". +- [53] 3GPP TS 24.011: "Point-to-Point (PP) Short Message Service (SMS) support on mobile radio interface; Stage 3". +- [54] 3GPP TS 23.278: "Customised Applications for Mobile network Enhanced Logic (CAMEL) Phase 4; Stage 2; IM CN Interworking; Stage 2". +- [55] 3GPP TS 23.501: "System Architecture for the 5G System; Stage 2". + +# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]. + +**Access Leg:** The call leg between the UE and the SCC AS. + +**Correlation MSISDN:** An MSISDN used for correlation of sessions. + +**CS Bearer Control Signalling Path:** Signalling path used to control the call established to set up the CS media bearer between the UE and IMS. + +**CS domain Routing Number (CSRN):** A CS Domain Routing Number (CSRN) is a routable number that is used to route a call from the IM CN subsystem to the UE in the CS domain. See TS 23.003 [5] for more information. + +**ICS UE:** An IMS capable UE with additional ICS-specific functionality. + +**ICS User:** An ICS user is an IMS subscriber that receives communication services centralized in IMS, regardless of the attached access type (e.g. CS domain access, or IP-CAN). + +**IMS Centralized Services:** See definition in TS 22.101 [9]. + +**IP Multimedia Routing Number (IMRN):** See definition in TS 23.237 [12]. + +**MSC Server enhanced for ICS:** An MSC Server that supports the network based ICS functionality. + +**Remote Leg:** The call leg formed between the SCC AS and the remote end for presentation of the SIP UA behaviour to IMS on behalf of the UE. The TAS, and other Application Servers are invoked on the Remote Leg. + +**Service Control Signalling Path:** Signalling path established between the UE and the SCC AS, either directly via an IP-CAN or via CS network elements for service control signalling. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]. + +| | | +|----------|----------------------------------------------------------| +| 5GC | 5G Core Network | +| ADS | Access Domain Selection | +| CAA | CS Access Adaptation | +| CGI | Cell Global Identifier | +| C-MSISDN | Correlation MSISDN | +| CSRN | CS domain Routing Number. | +| DN | Directory Number (e.g. MSISDN) | +| ICS | IMS Centralized Services | +| IMRN | IP Multimedia Routing Number. | +| IN | Intelligent Network | +| IUA | ICS User Agent | +| MMTel | Multimedia Telephony | +| SAI | Service Area Identification | +| SCC AS | Service Centralization and Continuity Application Server | +| T-ADS | Terminating ADS | +| TAS | Telephony Application Server | +| UDM | Unified Data Management | +| UE T-ADS | UE assisted Terminating ADS | + +# --- 4 High level principles and requirements + +## 4.1 General + +IMS Centralized Services (ICS) provides communication services such that all services, and service control, are only based on IMS mechanisms and enablers. It enables IMS services when using CS access (e.g. TS 24.008 [6], 3GPP2 C.S0001-D [27]) for the media bearer. + +With ICS, the user services are provided by IMS only. User sessions are controlled in IMS via PS or CS access and can be any of those defined in clause 22.4 of TS 22.101 [9]. + +When using a CS access network, or when using a PS access network that does not support the full duplex speech/video component of an IMS-based service, the CS core network is utilized to establish a circuit bearer for use as media for IMS sessions. The transmission of both bidirectional and unidirectional real-time video media flows shall be supported. + +NOTE: The establishment of unidirectional real-time video media flow for originating sessions requires the ICS UE capabilities. + +If the PS access network does support the full duplex speech component of an IMS service then existing IMS session procedures are used as specified in TS 23.228 [2]. + +ICS provides mechanisms to support the use of CS media bearer for IMS sessions. With ICS, IMS sessions using CS media are treated as standard IMS sessions for the purpose of service control and service continuity. + +ICS defines signalling mechanisms between the UE and IMS for transport of information required for service continuity when using CS access for media transport. + +## 4.2 Service consistency + +IMS services as defined in clause 22.4 of TS 22.101 [9] shall be consistently provided when using a CS or a PS access network for the media of the IMS service subject to the capability of the UE and the access network. + +## 4.3 Service continuity + +Service continuity shall be provided when underlying mobility results in a change of access network capabilities, e.g. support of Gm reference point in conjunction with CS bearer may not be possible after handover from UTRAN to GERAN. + +## 4.4 Session scenarios + +### 4.4.1 Overview + +### 4.4.2 ICS UE Session Scenarios + +When a user accesses IMS services over a CS network, or a PS network which does not support the full duplex speech or video media flow component of an IMS service, the following IMS session scenarios shall be supported according to the procedures specified in TS 23.228 [2], along with the solution specified in this document. + +- Basic voice or voice and video service origination and terminating sessions. +- Voice or voice and video origination and termination service sessions with Line ID services (e.g. OIP, OIR, TIP, TIR) controlled in IMS. +- Voice or voice and video origination and termination service sessions with Communication Barring services controlled in IMS. +- Voice or voice and video termination service sessions with Communication Diversion services controlled in IMS. +- Voice or voice and video origination and termination service sessions with mid-call services (e.g. Hold/Resume, Conferencing, CW, ECT) controlled in IMS. +- Communication services setting modifications (e.g., changing forwarding info or activating barring services, etc). +- The solution shall provide for an ICS UE, generic capabilities to enable introduction of new IMS services utilizing CS bearers without further standardisation. +- Adding/removing real time video media flow over CS access to/from an IMS session (see TS 22.173 [4]). + +## 4.5 Service settings data management + +An ICS UE supporting multimedia telephony shall manage the IMS multimedia telephony communication service settings data as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. + +For a UE not supporting multimedia telephony, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS may implement a communication service setting conversion function between CS signalling (e.g., as described in TS 24.010 [30]) and communication service setting procedures (e.g. as defined in TS 24.173 [8]); see also clause 7.6.2.9. + +NOTE: A downloadable application can enable a UE not supporting multimedia telephony to perform service data management. + +For a UE not supporting multimedia telephony, if the MSC Server enhanced for ICS does not implement a communication service setting conversion function or if the UE is connected to an MSC server not enhanced for ICS, refer to clause 7.6.3.7.1. + +Mechanisms that allow data to be synchronized between the HSS and the TAS when legacy CS signalling is used towards the HSS for service settings data management are not specified. + +## 4.6 Identities + +### 4.6.1 Identities used by an ICS UE + +Identities for the ICS UE are handled according to clause 4.3.3 of TS 23.228 [2]. + +### 4.6.2 Identities used by an MSC Server enhanced for ICS + +For registration to IMS, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall use only a Private User Identity and Public User Identity specifically reserved for IMS registrations from an MSC Server. For systems with a CS domain access based on TS 24.008 [6], the subscriber identity used shall be as defined in clause 20.3 of TS 23.003 [5]. + +NOTE 1: This is to avoid conflicts in IMS registration by a UE and an MSC Server enhanced for ICS registering on behalf of the same subscriber. + +Similar to the temporary Public User Identity (see clause 13.4 of TS 23.003 [5]), the ICS specific Public User Identity shall be prohibited from being used to originate sessions and shall be prohibited from being used to identify a terminating subscriber for incoming sessions. + +An MSC Server shall use only those Public User Identities representing E.164 numbers from the subscriber's IMS profile to originate and terminate calls. + +NOTE 2: The subscriber's IMS profile will need to be provisioned with a Tel URI, either as the default Public User Identity or associated with it, equivalent to a DN (e.g. MSISDN) in the subscriber's CS profile associated with speech/audio (e.g. TS11). + +## 4.7 Coexistence of an ICS UE and a non ICS UE + +It shall be possible to provide ICS for an ICS UE and a non ICS UE in home and in visited networks. + +Home and visited networks with an MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall support call originations and terminations for ICS UEs and non ICS UEs. + +The MSC Server enhanced for ICS avoids conflicts with other IMS registrations (which includes that used by an ICS UE) by using a Private User Identity and Public User Identity specifically reserved for use by MSC Server registrations. See clause 4.6.2 for more information. An IMS operator who provides services for its subscribers, using both ICS UE's and MSC Servers enhanced for ICS needs to make the following provisions in order to avoid registration conflicts: + +- Configure the ICS specific Private User Identity, as defined in clause 4.6.2 to point to the subscriber's implicit registration set; and +- Add the ICS specific Public User Identity, as defined in clause 4.6.2 to the subscriber's implicit registration set. + +## 4.8 Routing of originated calls to IMS + +When the ICS UE establishes the Service Control Signalling Path over I1 or Gm prior to the establishment of the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path, the ICS UE shall use the routing number provided by the network in response to service control signalling as the B-Party number for establishing the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. + +## 4.9 Void + +# 5 Architecture model and reference points + +## 5.1 Overview + +ICS enables IMS services when using CS access for media transport. Users are provided with a consistent experience of services. + +When using PS access networks which support the full duplex speech media component of an IMS service, procedures defined in TS 23.228 [2] are used to provide IMS services. + +For other access networks, media established via the CS domain is used in conjunction with IMS service control. When using a UE that has been enhanced for ICS, IMS service control is enabled by a transparent control channel (the Service Control Signalling Path) between the UE and IMS. When using a UE which has not been enhanced for ICS, IMS service control can be enabled by an MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + +For systems with a CS domain access based on TS 24.008 [6], CAMEL shall be used for implementing the IN triggers. + +## 5.2 Reference architecture + +Figure 5.2-1 provides the reference architecture for IMS sessions established using CS bearers. + +![Figure 5.2-1: IMS Service Centralization and Continuity Reference Architecture diagram. The diagram shows the following components and interfaces: UE (User Equipment) on the left, connected to CS Access. CS Access is connected to MSC Server. UE is also connected to CSCF via the Gm interface. CSCF is connected to SCC AS via the ISC interface and to MSC Server via the I2 interface. MSC Server is connected to TAS via the I3 interface and to CS-MGW via the Mc interface. E-CSCF is connected to CSCF via the I6 interface and to MSC Server via the I6 interface. SCC AS is connected to UE via the I1 interface.](3f1987804d7d78bc3b3bc560e974280a_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + UE[UE] --- CSAccess[CS Access] + UE --- CSCF[CSCF] + CSAccess --- MSCServer[MSC Server] + CSCF --- SCCAS[SCC AS] + CSCF --- MSCServer + MSCServer --- TAS[TAS] + MSCServer --- CS-MGW[CS-MGW] + CSCF --- ECSCF[E-CSCF] + MSCServer --- ECSCF + UE ---|I1| SCCAS + UE ---|Gm| CSCF + CSCF ---|ISC| SCCAS + CSCF ---|I2| MSCServer + MSCServer ---|I3| TAS + MSCServer ---|Mc| CS-MGW + CSCF ---|I6| ECSCF + MSCServer ---|I6| ECSCF + +``` + +Figure 5.2-1: IMS Service Centralization and Continuity Reference Architecture diagram. The diagram shows the following components and interfaces: UE (User Equipment) on the left, connected to CS Access. CS Access is connected to MSC Server. UE is also connected to CSCF via the Gm interface. CSCF is connected to SCC AS via the ISC interface and to MSC Server via the I2 interface. MSC Server is connected to TAS via the I3 interface and to CS-MGW via the Mc interface. E-CSCF is connected to CSCF via the I6 interface and to MSC Server via the I6 interface. SCC AS is connected to UE via the I1 interface. + +**Figure 5.2-1: IMS Service Centralization and Continuity Reference Architecture** + +The architecture introduces the following: + +- The SCC AS, which provides functions specific to IMS Service Centralization and Continuity. +- Enhancements to the MSC Server for ICS. +- Enhancements to the UE for ICS +- Enhancements to the MSC Server for ICS to interwork with IMS emergency architecture as defined in TS 23.167 [25] + +Not all of the above are required in a network implementing ICS. + +## 5.3 Functional Entities + +### 5.3.1 SCC AS + +The SCC AS is a home network based IMS Application that provides functionality required to enable IMS Centralized Services. The SCC AS is inserted in the session path using originating and terminating iFCs; it is configured as the first AS in the originating iFC and as the last AS in the terminating iFC chain. The SCC AS may also be invoked through the use of PSI termination procedures when using CS access. + +The SCC AS implements one or more of the following functionalities: + +- **ICS User Agent (IUA):** The ICS User Agent (IUA) function provides SIP UA behaviour on behalf of the UE for setup and control of IMS sessions using CS bearers that are established with or without the use of Gm or I1 between the UE and the SCC AS. For sessions established using Gm or I1 between the ICS UE and the SCC AS the IUA combines the service control signalling with the description of the bearer, e.g. SDP, established via the CS access to present a standard IMS session on behalf of the UE. An SCC AS may support I1 reference point. If supporting the I1 reference point, and before initiating an I1 Service Control Signalling Path flow, the SCC AS shall ensure that the ICS UE supports I1 and the PLMN the UE is in supports transport of network initiated I1 signalling. +- **CS Access Adaptation (CAA):** The CS Access Adaptation (CAA) is an adaptation function for the service control signalling communicated transparently via the CS domain between the UE and the SCC AS. The CAA processes the service control signalling received via the CS access for interworking with other IMS functional elements. The CAA is only used when using the CS network for communication of service control signalling. +- **Terminating Access Domain Selection (T-ADS):** Terminating Access Domain Selection (T-ADS) provides: + - Directs an incoming session to an ICS User; + - For one or more UEs of an ICS User: + - Influences the selection of one or more contacts amongst the registered contacts and; + - Influences the selection of an access network for delivery of the incoming session to the selected contact, or; + - Performs breakout to the CS Domain by fetching the CSRN. + +T-ADS shall take into account the access network's capabilities, UE capabilities, IMS registration status, CS status, existing active sessions, user preferences, UE 3GPP PS Data Off status (active/inactive), 3GPP PS Data Off Exempted Service configuration setting, operator policies such as access network specific voice domain preferences and the media component types, and whether there is an ongoing IMS voice over PS session. In addition, T-ADS may take into account the access network information provided directly by the UE. + +The UE may assist the T-ADS. The UE assisted T-ADS (UE T-ADS), based on configuration that takes into account operator policy, user preferences and local access network capabilities, performs the following: + +- Detect media that is candidate for delivery over the CS domain associated with an incoming session. +- Identify the domain in which the session is to be established (CS or PS). +- Determines the mechanism to complete the establishment (origination or termination) - applicable to sessions to be established in the CS domain only. +- Notifies the SCC AS of the mechanism the establishment will be completed on - if possible. + +For delivery of an incoming session to non ICS UE, the SCC AS may deliver the session in other domain if call delivery in the originally selected domain fails, e.g. delivers the call in CS domain when session establishment in the PS domain does not succeed. + +For delivery of an incoming session to an ICS User, the T-ADS shall perform the following: + +1. Assists in delivery of an incoming session, whether to: + - Deliver all media via PS. + - Deliver speech media via CS and use Gm for service control. + - Deliver speech media via CS and use I1 for service control. + - Deliver speech media via MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + - Deliver speech media via MSC Server not enhanced for ICS. + +2. It assists in selection of an access network for delivery of the incoming session to the ICS User contact address(es). Selection criteria as specified in TS 23.221 [10] clause 7.2b, Access Domain Selection for terminating sessions are used for access network selection. + +For incoming sessions with bi-directional speech media destined to a selected contact: + +- For 3GPP access, the SCC AS shall retrieve from the serving PLMN via the HSS (+UDM in case of 5GC as specified in TS 23.501 [55]) the most recent access network capabilities ("IMS voice over PS Session Supported Indication", current RAT type) unless there is, for the same UE, an existing IMS voice over PS session or an existing speech session using the CS bearer that is not using the Gm service control signalling path. +- For networks which support WLAN access, and if WLAN access is allowed to support IMS voice based on operator policy, the SCC AS shall additionally take the time of the most recent IMS 3rd party registration or re-registration via WLAN access into account. + +If the most recent access network capabilities can be retrieved, then: + +- If the most recently used PS access network (including WLAN access) indicates that IMS voice over PS is supported then bi-directional speech media can be delivered on this access. +- If the most recently used PS access network indicates that IMS voice over PS is not supported, then bi-directional speech media shall not be delivered on this access. +- If the current RAT type indicates that simultaneous transfer on PS and CS domains is supported, then speech media can be delivered via CS and Gm can be used for service control. +- If the current RAT type indicates that simultaneous transfer on PS and CS domains is not supported, then Gm shall not be used for service control. + +If there is an existing speech session using the CS bearer that is not using the Gm service control signalling path then Gm shall not be used for service control. + +3. For delivery of incoming sessions to the UE registered in CS domain via standard MSC Server, it fetches the CSRN for breakout to the CS domain. + +If a UE has an ongoing IMS voice over PS session, the T-ADS shall select the PS domain when delivering an incoming session to the same UE. + +When using Gm reference point, T-ADS for ICS UE sessions may be executed in the ICS UE in conjunction with the network, based on user preferences, operator policy and taking into account its own capabilities and those of the access network. + +### 5.3.2 UE enhanced for ICS + +The ICS UE is an IMS UE that has additional ICS-related capability, which includes the following functions: + +- Communication with the SCC AS for service control signalling. +- Establishment of the Bearer Control Signalling Path to setup the media through the CS domain. +- Execution of ADS for originating sessions as specified in TS 23.221 [10] clause 7.2a. +- Assisting the SCC AS in the execution of T-ADS when Gm is used. + +The ICS UE supports the Gm reference point (as defined in TS 23.228 [2]) and shall use the Gm reference point when using the PS network for service control signalling. + +NOTE 1: Since an ICS UE is based on an IMS UE, the Gm reference point is always supported on an ICS UE. + +The ICS UE may support the I1 reference point (as defined in clause 5.4.1). If the ICS UE supports the I1 reference point, it shall be used only when: + +- the home operator has preconfigured it to be used; and + +- use of the Gm reference point is not possible due to the PS network not being available (e.g. due to the ICS UE camping on a GERAN with no DTM available). + +Otherwise, the Gm reference point or standard CS procedures shall be used. + +If the ICS UE supports Gm ICS and has a single call for which CS procedures are being used and Gm is not being used for service control then it may add the Gm service control signalling path, as described in clause 7.5a. If the ICS UE that supports Gm ICS does not add the Gm service control signalling path then it shall continue to use CS procedures for service control and for establishing additional calls until all ongoing calls end. + +NOTE 2: An ICS UE that supports Gm ICS may have a call for which Gm is not being used for service control if, for example, a handover has occurred from an access network that doesn't support Gm, or after CSFB, as described in TS 23.272 [44]. + +### 5.3.3 MSC Server enhancements for ICS + +The MSC Server (e.g. as described in TS 23.002 [3]) may be enhanced for the support of ICS. + +In addition to the standard MSC Server behaviour, an MSC Server that has been enhanced for ICS shall provide the following for an identified ICS user: + +- Processes the user-network signalling received over the CS access (e.g. A/Iu and E interface) for interworking with IMS SIP and vice versa. +- Controls the MGW functions described in TS 23.002 [3] to enable the interworking between CS access and RTP bearers. +- Performs the interworking to support multimedia call and emergency call in ICS. +- May implement a communication service setting conversion function between CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.010 [30] for systems based on TS 24.008 [6]) and communication service setting procedures (as defined in TS 24.173 [8]). +- Disregard any supplementary services or IN (e.g. CAMEL) triggers that may be present in the user profile. + +NOTE 1: These can be present in the user profile for the case where the user is served by an MSC Server not enhanced for ICS. + +- Adds the User Location Information (e.g. CGI or SAI) and/or UE Time Zone Information to IMS signalling. + +For subscribers not identified as ICS users and for subscribers identified as ICS users but using a media type not listed in clause 22.4 of TS 22.101 [9] and TS 22.173 [4], the MSC Server functionality is unchanged. + +In addition to the standard MSC Server behaviour, an MSC Server that has been enhanced for ICS may support the Combined CS Access Authentication procedure as specified in Annex G. + +NOTE 2: If the Combined CS Access Authentication procedure is used all users of this MSC Server shall be authenticated by this procedure only. + +If users are authenticated utilizing the Combined CS Access Authentication procedure, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall verify that 3G CS authentication parameters that are retrieved from the S-CSCF. + +NOTE 3: 3G authentication can be performed also over 2G radio (GERAN). + +MSC Server enhancements for ICS are not required for the support of an ICS UE. + +### 5.3.4 Emergency CSCF (E-CSCF) + +E-CSCF is defined in TS 23.167 [25]. + +## 5.4 Reference points + +### 5.4.1 Reference Point UE – SCC AS (I1) + +The I1 reference point is used between the UE and the SCC AS for service control signalling over CS access. All I1 Service Control Signalling Path flows shall be uniquely identifiable from other signalling flows on the same bearer. + +The I1 reference point performs the following functions: + +- optional session set up via CS access for mobile originating and terminating sessions; +- optional signalling for additional IMS parameter exchange during session setup; +- IMS services control via CS access. + +### 5.4.2 Reference Point MSC Server – CSCF (I2) + +The I2 reference point shall be used to route service control signalling between the MSC Server enhanced for ICS and the home IMS. The Mw reference point specified in TS 23.228 [2] together with ICS specific extensions shall be used over the I2 reference point. + +### 5.4.3 Reference Point MSC server – CS-MGW (Mc) + +The Mc reference point, as defined in TS 23.002 [3], is established between the MSC Server enhanced for ICS and the CS-MGW. + +### 5.4.4 Reference Point MSC Server - TAS (I3) + +The I3 reference point shall be used between the MSC Server enhanced for ICS and the TAS to interwork CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.010 [30] for systems based on TS 24.008 [6]) and communication service setting procedures (as defined in TS 24.173 [8]). + +### 5.4.5 Reference Point MSC Server - E-CSCF (I6) + +The I6 reference point shall be used to route emergency service control signalling between the MSC Server enhanced for ICS and the E-CSCF. The Mw reference point specified in TS 23.228 [2] together with ICS specific extensions shall be used over the I6 reference point. + +# --- 6 Functional description + +## 6.1 Common IMS Functions + +### 6.1.1 P-CSCF procedures + +If CS media is present as part of the SIP/SDP message, the P-CSCF shall not use this information when allocating resources for the media. + +### 6.1.2 IMS ALG procedures + +If CS media is present as part of the SIP/SDP message, the IMS ALG shall not use this information for media related functions such as IP address translation. + +### 6.1.3 S-CSCF procedures + +If CS media is present as part of the SIP/SDP message, the S-CSCF shall allow such media to be used for the service. + +### 6.1.4 IBCF procedures + +If CS media is present as part of the SIP/SDP message, the IBCF used in roaming scenarios shall not allocate resources for the media. The IBCF shall take CS media into account in other media control related functions. + +# 7 Procedures and flows + +## 7.0 General + +This clause details the procedures and flows for network based ICS and UE based ICS. + +In the flows that pertain to I1 it is assumed that: + +- both the ICS UE and SCC AS support, and are configured to use I1; and +- transport of I1 signalling is supported by the MSC Server. + +## 7.1 Signalling and bearer paths + +### 7.1.1 Sessions established using the Gm or I1 reference point + +A Service Control Signalling Path is used to transport service control signalling between the ICS UE and the SCC AS, for enabling IMS services when using CS or PS access. The Service Control Signalling Path is used when needed, e.g. on session establishment and/or service control of IMS sessions using CS voice bearers. + +For ICS UE sessions, the SCC AS combines the service control signalling received over the Service Control Signalling Path with the description of the bearer established via the CS network to present an IMS session on behalf of the UE. The service control signalling elements from Gm / I1 such as A party address shall be used together with the bearer description signalling received via CS bearer control signalling path to construct the signalling for the remote leg. + +The Service Control Signalling Path is established via the PS or CS network. + +Figure 7.1.1-1 illustrates how signalling and bearer paths established by the ICS UE are combined at the SCC AS when the Service Control Signalling Path is established via the PS network using the Gm reference point. + +![Diagram illustrating the ICS UE session signalling and bearer path using Gm over PS network for Service Control Signalling Path. The diagram shows three horizontal paths originating from the ICS UE on the left. The top path is a dashed line labeled 'Service Control Signalling Path via IP-CAN'. The middle path is a dashed line labeled 'CS Bearer Control Signalling Path via CS network'. The bottom path is a solid line labeled 'Media via CS & IMS network'. These paths converge at a central block labeled 'SCC AS'. Inside the SCC AS, the top path connects to an oval labeled 'Access Leg', and the middle path connects to an oval labeled 'Remote Leg'. The SCC AS is connected to a block labeled 'AS' on the right. Below the SCC AS, a block labeled 'CSCF' is connected to the 'Remote Leg' and extends to the right.](1bf34e86af3591c80bfbc1c318f811c0_img.jpg) + +Diagram illustrating the ICS UE session signalling and bearer path using Gm over PS network for Service Control Signalling Path. The diagram shows three horizontal paths originating from the ICS UE on the left. The top path is a dashed line labeled 'Service Control Signalling Path via IP-CAN'. The middle path is a dashed line labeled 'CS Bearer Control Signalling Path via CS network'. The bottom path is a solid line labeled 'Media via CS & IMS network'. These paths converge at a central block labeled 'SCC AS'. Inside the SCC AS, the top path connects to an oval labeled 'Access Leg', and the middle path connects to an oval labeled 'Remote Leg'. The SCC AS is connected to a block labeled 'AS' on the right. Below the SCC AS, a block labeled 'CSCF' is connected to the 'Remote Leg' and extends to the right. + +**Figure 7.1.1-1: ICS UE session signalling and bearer path using Gm over PS network for Service Control Signalling Path** + +Upon session initiation, the ICS UE or the SCC AS establishes the Service Control Signalling Path for communication of service control signalling via the PS network using the Gm reference point. + +The ICS UE also sets up the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path using standard CS network procedures to establish the circuit media. + +The SCC AS combines the service control signalling received over the Service Control Signalling Path with the description of the bearer established using the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path by acting as a B2BUA as below: + +- Access Leg: The Access Leg is formed with a combination of the Service Control Signalling Path and the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. + +- Remote Leg: The Remote Leg is presented by the SCC AS to the CSCF as an IMS session using IMS SIP signalling on behalf of the UE. + +The TAS and other Application Servers are executed on the Remote Leg as part of standard service execution logic at the CSCF. + +The SIP UA at the UE maintains the SIP/SDP state machine with the SCC AS also maintaining a copy of the state data. + +Figure 7.1.1-2 illustrates how signalling and bearer paths established by the UE are combined at the SCC AS when the Service Control Signalling Path is established via the CS network using the I1 reference point. + +![Diagram of ICS UE session signalling and bearer path using I1 over CS network for Service Control Signalling Path](73dff6b45b2b9ffd384bab3235f869af_img.jpg) + +This diagram illustrates the session signalling and bearer paths for an ICS UE. On the left, the ICS UE is shown. Three paths originate from it: + + +- Service Control Signalling Path via CS network:** A dashed line that connects the ICS UE to the SCC AS via the CSCF. +- CS Bearer Control Signalling Path via CS network:** A dashed line that connects the ICS UE to the CSCF. +- Media via CS & IMS network:** A solid line that connects the ICS UE to the CSCF. + + At the CSCF, the paths are further processed: + + +- The Service Control Signalling Path is split into an **Access Leg** (dashed line to SCC AS) and a **Remote Leg** (solid line to AS). +- The CS Bearer Control Signalling Path and the Media path both continue from the CSCF. + +Diagram of ICS UE session signalling and bearer path using I1 over CS network for Service Control Signalling Path + +**Figure 7.1.1-2: ICS UE session signalling and bearer path using I1 over CS network for Service Control Signalling Path** + +Upon session initiation, the ICS UE or the SCC AS establishes the Service Control Signalling Path for communication of service control signalling via the CS network using the I1 reference point. In parallel, the ICS UE or the SCC AS sets up the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path using standard CS network procedures to establish the circuit media. The SCC AS combines the Service Control Signalling Path with the bearer established using the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path by acting as a B2BUA as described above for the case of Service Control Signalling Path established via the PS network. + +### 7.1.2 Sessions established using CS call control and MSC Server + +Figure 7.1.2-1 illustrates signalling and bearer paths for sessions which are established using standard CS call control procedures and MSC Server . + +![Diagram of session signalling and bearer path using CS call control](35127fe87029df6f5f0b2ee85f6193f1_img.jpg) + +This diagram illustrates the session signalling and bearer paths when using CS call control. On the left, the UE is shown. Two paths originate from it: + + +- CS Bearer Control Signalling Path via CS network:** A dashed line that connects the UE to the CSCF. +- Media via CS & IMS network:** A solid line that connects the UE to the CSCF. + + At the CSCF, the paths are further processed: + + +- The CS Bearer Control Signalling Path is split into an **Access Leg** (dashed line to SCC AS) and a **Remote Leg** (solid line to AS). +- The Media path continues from the CSCF. + +Diagram of session signalling and bearer path using CS call control + +**Figure 7.1.2-1: Session signalling and bearer path using CS call control** + +Upon session initiation, the UE or the remote end sets up a call and the call is directed to IMS using standard CS procedures; IN (e.g. CAMEL) triggers are used to redirect CS originated calls to IMS. The SCC AS acts a B2BUA for presentation of the UA behaviour on behalf of the UE to IMS. + +The TAS and other Application Servers are executed on the Remote Leg as part of standard service execution logic at the CSCF. + +## 7.2 Registration + +### 7.2.1 IMS registration via CS access + +#### 7.2.1.1 Overview + +If the MSC Server enhanced for ICS implements the Combined CS Access Authentication procedure as specified in Annex G, the UE accessing the network via CS domain shall be authenticated and registered by this procedure, otherwise the following applies. + +The UE may register (attach) in the CS domain whenever in CS coverage. The existing mobility management mechanisms are used in the UE and the CS network. + +When performing a successful Location Update for the UE, the MSC Server has received the subscriber data from the HSS/HLR. This subscriber data may include an optional flag per VPLMN. + +An MSC Server that is enhanced for ICS shall then perform the following: + +- If the flag is received and is supported by the MSC Server, then the MSC Server shall analyse the value of the flag as follows: + - If the flag is set to true and optionally if the MSC Server is configured to know that the VPLMN has a suitable roaming agreement with the HPLMN of the UE, the MSC Server shall attempt the IMS registration using the I2 reference point. + - If the flag is set to false, the MSC Server shall not attempt the IMS registration. +- If the flag is not received or is not supported, the MSC Server may perform some pre-screening (e.g. IMSI range analysis) based on operator-policy in order to determine whether or not to attempt IMS registration for this subscriber. + +NOTE 1: Exact pre-screening procedures are operator specific. + +NOTE 2: An MSC Server that is not enhanced for ICS will ignore the flag and thus will continue normal CS operation. + +If the MSC Server decides not to perform registration in the IMS, the MSC Server falls back to the behaviour of an MSC Server that is not enhanced for ICS. + +If the network is in NMO I configuration, the mobility management procedures using Gs interface triggers the MSC Server enhanced for ICS to perform IMS registration. + +When attempting initial IMS registration on behalf of the ICS User, the MSC Server shall derive a home IMS domain name using the identity of the subscriber (e.g. IMSI). This domain name identifies the node (e.g. I-CSCF or IBCF) to which the MSC Server shall send the IMS registration. The MSC Server shall also derive IMS user identities required for the registration from this identity. The MSC Server shall derive these identities in a manner that prevents collisions with other identities automatically derived from the same subscriber identity. See clause 4.6.2 of the present document for more information on the identities used. + +The MSC Server then initiates a registration on behalf of the ICS User towards the home IMS indicating support for GRUU and including an InstanceID. If a GRUU is received, the MSC Server shall store it. The MSC Server shall not apply the mechanism for multiple simultaneous registrations. + +NOTE 3: IMS authorization of registrations from an MSC Server enhanced for ICS is defined in clause 9. + +The MSC Server shall indicate in the registration the media capabilities that it supports (as listed in TS 22.101 [9]). + +The routing of the registration messaging is performed by standard IMS routing procedures. The S-CSCF shall perform 3rd party registration towards the SCC AS. The SCC AS shall obtain from the S-CSCF the necessary information related to the contact address for performing T-ADS. + +If the S-CSCF receives IMS de-registration from MSC, or receives IMS registration from new MSC while there is a valid IMS registration from old MSC, the S-CSCF releases the existing sessions which includes early session as defined in TS 24.229 [31]. + +If IMS registration is successful, then subsequent IMS sessions described in clause 4.4.2 shall be supported in IMS using the MSC Server procedures described in this specification. + +The success or failure of the IMS registration shall not impact the CS attach status of the UE. + +The MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall initiate IMS re-registration as necessary to maintain an active IMS registration during the period of time in which the UE is attached to the CS domain. + +NOTE 4: Due to the MSC Server not applying the mechanism for multiple simultaneous registrations, this results in the behaviour of when a UE attaches to a new MSC Server enhanced for ICS and the old MSC Server enhanced for ICS has not deregistered the user, the new registration over-writes the existing one in the S-CSCF. + +After successful initial IMS registration, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall subscribe to the registration event package described in TS 23.228 [2] on behalf of the ICS User. The MSC Server shall use the default Public User Identity received during initial IMS registration for subscription to this package. The MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall refresh this subscription as necessary during the period of time in which its IMS registration on behalf of the ICS User is active. + +The MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall initiate IMS deregistration on behalf of the ICS User upon receipt of any indication that the UE is no longer considered active at this MSC Server (e.g. Location Cancellation procedure, Purge MS procedure, etc.). In order to ensure that the registration request from the target MSC Server arrives at the S-CSCF prior to the deregistration request from the source MSC Server, the MSC Server should delay the deregistration procedure, such as by starting a timer. If the S-CSCF finds an existing binding upon receiving the deregistration request as specified in TS 24.229 [31] and identifies that is a request initiated by the MSC Server enhanced for ICS on behalf of the ICS User, the S-CSCF shall compare the contact address in the deregistration request with the contact address in the existing binding using the URI comparison rules. If it agrees, the S-CSCF will remove the existing binding. Otherwise, the de-registration request fails. Per operator policy, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall also initiate IMS re-registrations to obtain additional temporary-GRUUs as need. + +Upon receipt of a network-initiated deregistration from the IMS, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall remove all registration details relating to the Public User Identities contained in the deregistration. Network-initiated deregistration from IMS shall not impact the UE's CS registration status. + +#### 7.2.1.2 Registration using I2 reference point + +Figure 7.2.1.2-1 describes how IMS registration is performed by the MSC Server enhanced for ICS upon receiving of a Location Update Request. + +![Sequence diagram for Initial IMS Registration via CS Access. Lifelines: UE, MSC Server, I-CSCF, HSS/HLR, S-CSCF, SCC AS. The process involves a Location Update Request from UE to MSC Server, followed by CS Location Update and authentication. The MSC Server then sends IMS Registration Decision and IMS Address Discovery to the UE. The MSC Server sends a REGISTER to the I-CSCF, which performs Cx-Query and Cx-Select with the HSS/HLR. The I-CSCF then sends a REGISTER to the S-CSCF, which performs Cx-Put and Cx-Pull with the HSS/HLR. Finally, the S-CSCF sends a REGISTER to the SCC AS, and the registration signaling is completed.](ae53f90bb87d6d09e2d6b5278d7c338f_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant MSC Server + participant I-CSCF + participant HSS/HLR + participant S-CSCF + participant SCC AS + + Note left of UE: 1. Location Update Request + UE->>MSC Server: 1. Location Update Request + Note right of MSC Server: 2. CS Location Update, Authentication and obtain Subscriber Data + MSC Server->>HSS/HLR: 2. CS Location Update, Authentication and obtain Subscriber Data + Note left of UE: 3. Location Update Accept + MSC Server->>UE: 3. Location Update Accept + Note right of MSC Server: 4. IMS Registration Decision + MSC Server->>UE: 4. IMS Registration Decision + Note right of MSC Server: 5. IMS Address Discovery + MSC Server->>UE: 5. IMS Address Discovery + Note right of MSC Server: 6. REGISTER + MSC Server->>I-CSCF: 6. REGISTER + Note right of I-CSCF: 7. Cx-Query + Cx-Select-Pull / Resp + I-CSCF->>HSS/HLR: 7. Cx-Query + Cx-Select-Pull / Resp + Note right of I-CSCF: 8. REGISTER + I-CSCF->>S-CSCF: 8. REGISTER + Note right of S-CSCF: 9. Cx-Put + Cx-Pull / Resp + S-CSCF->>HSS/HLR: 9. Cx-Put + Cx-Pull / Resp + Note right of S-CSCF: 10. REGISTER + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 10. REGISTER + Note right of SCC AS: 11. Completion of Registration Signaling + SCC AS->>MSC Server: 11. Completion of Registration Signaling + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Initial IMS Registration via CS Access. Lifelines: UE, MSC Server, I-CSCF, HSS/HLR, S-CSCF, SCC AS. The process involves a Location Update Request from UE to MSC Server, followed by CS Location Update and authentication. The MSC Server then sends IMS Registration Decision and IMS Address Discovery to the UE. The MSC Server sends a REGISTER to the I-CSCF, which performs Cx-Query and Cx-Select with the HSS/HLR. The I-CSCF then sends a REGISTER to the S-CSCF, which performs Cx-Put and Cx-Pull with the HSS/HLR. Finally, the S-CSCF sends a REGISTER to the SCC AS, and the registration signaling is completed. + +**Figure 7.2.1.2-1: Initial IMS Registration via CS Access** + +1. The UE sends a Location Update Request towards the CS network. + +NOTE 1: Combined RA/LA Update Request (as specified in TS 23.060 [35]) can be used instead when the network is in MNO I configuration. + +NOTE 2: Combined TA/LA Update procedure (as specified in TS 23.272 [44]) can be used instead when the network supports EMM combined procedures. + +2. The MSC Server enhanced for ICS performs standard CS location update, authentication and obtains subscriber data. + +3. A Location Area Update Accept is returned to the UE. + +NOTE 3: If Combined RA/LA Update Request is used in Step 1, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS does not return Location Area Update Accept to the UE but returns Location Update Accept to SGSN, as specified in TS 23.060 [35]. + +NOTE 4: If Combined TA/LA Update procedure is used in Step 1, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS does not return Location Area Update Accept to the UE but returns Location Update Accept to MME, as specified in TS 23.272 [44]. + +4. The MSC Server enhanced for ICS decides to initiate IMS registration for this subscriber. If the subscriber is already registered via this MSC Server enhanced for ICS, no IMS registration is sent. + +5. The MSC Server enhanced for ICS derives a domain name from the subscriber's identity (e.g. IMSI) and discovers the address of the appropriate I-CSCF/IBCF. + +6. The MSC Server enhanced for ICS sends a SIP REGISTER to the IMS with a private and temporary Public User Identity derived from the subscriber's IMSI as well as an InstanceID. The REGISTER also contains information indicating the capabilities (e.g. media types) supported and characteristics of the MSC Server as a SIP User Agent Client. The I-CSCF verifies that the incoming REGISTER originates from a trusted MSC Server (in the same way it would check that a normal REGISTER originates from a trusted P-CSCF). + +7. The I-CSCF initiates standard procedures for S-CSCF location/allocation. + +8. The I-CSCF forwards the REGISTER to the S-CSCF. +9. The S-CSCF identifies the REGISTER as being from the MSC Server. The S-CSCF skips any further authentication procedures and performs registration procedures with the HSS. +10. The S-CSCF performs standard service control execution procedures. Filter criteria directs the S-CSCF to send a REGISTER to the SCC AS. +11. IMS registration procedures are completed. + +#### 7.2.1.3 Deregistration using I2 reference point + +Figure 7.2.1.3-1 describes how IMS deregistration is performed by an MSC Server enhanced for ICS upon detection of the Location Cancellation procedure. In this scenario, the UE is moving away from an MSC Server enhanced for ICS to an MSC Server not enhanced for ICS. Identical IMS deregistration procedures are initiated by the source MSC Server enhanced for ICS upon receiving of any other indication that the UE is no longer considered registered. + +![Sequence diagram of IMS Deregistration via CS Access by source MSC Server enhanced for ICS when moving to an MSC Server not enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows the interaction between UE, MSC Server (target), MSC Server (source), I-CSCF, HSS/HLR, S-CSCF, and SCC AS. The process starts with a Location Updating from UE to MSC Server (target), followed by CS Location Update and Authentication procedures between MSC Server (target) and HSS/HLR. The HSS/HLR then sends a Cancel Location to MSC Server (source). The MSC Server (source) sends a De-REGISTER to the I-CSCF. The I-CSCF performs Cx-Query + Cx-Select-Pull / Resp with the HSS/HLR. The I-CSCF then sends a De-REGISTER to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF performs Cx-Put + Cx-Pull / Resp with the HSS/HLR. Finally, the S-CSCF sends a De-REGISTER to the SCC AS, and the process concludes with Completion of De-registration Signaling.](2734e7f9be3e1dc046f14be2e6c9a085_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant MSC Server (target) + participant MSC Server (source) + participant I-CSCF + participant HSS/HLR + participant S-CSCF + participant SCC AS + + Note over MSC Server (target), HSS/HLR: 2. CS Location Update and Authentication procedures + Note over I-CSCF, HSS/HLR: 5. Cx-Query + Cx-Select-Pull / Resp + Note over I-CSCF, S-CSCF: 7. Cx-Put + Cx-Pull / Resp + Note over MSC Server (source), I-CSCF, S-CSCF, SCC AS: 9. Completion of De-registration Signaling + + UE->>MSC Server (target): 1. Location Updating + MSC Server (target)->>HSS/HLR: 2. CS Location Update and Authentication procedures + HSS/HLR->>MSC Server (source): 3. Cancel Location + MSC Server (source)->>I-CSCF: 4. De-REGISTER + I-CSCF->>HSS/HLR: 5. Cx-Query + Cx-Select-Pull / Resp + I-CSCF->>S-CSCF: 6. De-REGISTER + S-CSCF->>HSS/HLR: 7. Cx-Put + Cx-Pull / Resp + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 8. De-REGISTER + +``` + +Sequence diagram of IMS Deregistration via CS Access by source MSC Server enhanced for ICS when moving to an MSC Server not enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows the interaction between UE, MSC Server (target), MSC Server (source), I-CSCF, HSS/HLR, S-CSCF, and SCC AS. The process starts with a Location Updating from UE to MSC Server (target), followed by CS Location Update and Authentication procedures between MSC Server (target) and HSS/HLR. The HSS/HLR then sends a Cancel Location to MSC Server (source). The MSC Server (source) sends a De-REGISTER to the I-CSCF. The I-CSCF performs Cx-Query + Cx-Select-Pull / Resp with the HSS/HLR. The I-CSCF then sends a De-REGISTER to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF performs Cx-Put + Cx-Pull / Resp with the HSS/HLR. Finally, the S-CSCF sends a De-REGISTER to the SCC AS, and the process concludes with Completion of De-registration Signaling. + +**Figure 7.2.1.3-1: IMS Deregistration via CS Access by source MSC Server enhanced for ICS when moving to an MSC Server not enhanced for ICS** + +1. The UE initiates standard location updating procedures toward the CS network. +2. The CS network performs standard CS location updating and authentication procedures. +3. The HSS initiates location cancellation procedures towards the source MSC Server that is enhanced for ICS. +4. On receipt of the Cancel Location, the source MSC Server should delay the deregistration procedure for a short period of time, e.g. by starting a timer. + +NOTE: The delay mentioned in step 4 is used to reduce the signalling at S-CSCF when UE moves between MSC Servers enhanced for ICS (see clause 7.2.1.4). The delay needs to be long enough to ensure that the deregistration request from the source MSC Server arrives at the S-CSCF after the registration request from target MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + +5. The I-CSCF initiates standard procedures for S-CSCF location/allocation. +6. The I-CSCF forwards the REGISTER to the S-CSCF. +7. The S-CSCF identifies the REGISTER as being from an MSC Server enhanced for ICS that is a trusted network node. The S-CSCF skips any further authentication procedures and performs deregistration procedures with the HSS. + +8. The S-CSCF performs the procedures as described in clause 7.2.1.1. As the contact address in the REGISTER is the same with the contact address in the existing binding, the S-CSCF performs standard service control execution procedures. Filter criteria directs the S-CSCF to send a REGISTER to the SCC AS. +9. IMS deregistration procedures are completed. + +#### 7.2.1.4 Registration after Deregistration using I2 reference point + +Figure 7.2.1.4-1 describes how IMS deregistration is performed by the MSC Server enhanced for ICS upon detection of the Location Cancellation procedure. In this scenario, the UE is moving between two MSC Servers enhanced for ICS. Identical IMS deregistration procedures are initiated by the source MSC Server enhanced for ICS upon receiving of any other indication that the UE is no longer considered registered. The registration request from the target MSC Server enhanced for ICS arrives at the S-CSCF after the deregistration request from the source MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Deregistration via CS Access by source MSC Server enhanced for ICS when moving to a target MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows the interaction between UE, MSC Server (target), MSC Server (source), I-CSCF, HSS/HLR, S-CSCF, and SCC AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. Location Updating from UE to MSC Server (target); 2. CS Location Update and Authentication procedures between MSC Server (target) and HSS/HLR; 3. Cancel Location from HSS/HLR to MSC Server (source); 4. IMS De-registration Signaling from MSC Server (source) to SCC AS; 5. IMS Registration Signalling from MSC Server (target) to SCC AS.](392a79ccd95e682ccd08f35ab2e64144_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant MSC_T as MSC Server (target) + participant MSC_S as MSC Server (source) + participant I_CSCF as I-CSCF + participant HSS_HLR as HSS/HLR + participant S_CSCF as S-CSCF + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + + Note over UE, MSC_T: 1. Location Updating + UE->>MSC_T: + Note over MSC_T, HSS_HLR: 2. CS Location Update and Authentication procedures + MSC_T->>HSS_HLR: + HSS_HLR->>MSC_S: 3. Cancel Location + Note over MSC_S, SCC_AS: 4. IMS De-registration Signaling + MSC_S->>SCC_AS: + Note over MSC_T, SCC_AS: 5. IMS Registration Signalling + MSC_T->>SCC_AS: + +``` + +Sequence diagram for IMS Deregistration via CS Access by source MSC Server enhanced for ICS when moving to a target MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows the interaction between UE, MSC Server (target), MSC Server (source), I-CSCF, HSS/HLR, S-CSCF, and SCC AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. Location Updating from UE to MSC Server (target); 2. CS Location Update and Authentication procedures between MSC Server (target) and HSS/HLR; 3. Cancel Location from HSS/HLR to MSC Server (source); 4. IMS De-registration Signaling from MSC Server (source) to SCC AS; 5. IMS Registration Signalling from MSC Server (target) to SCC AS. + +**Figure 7.2.1.4-1: IMS Deregistration via CS Access by source MSC Server enhanced for ICS when moving to a target MSC Server enhanced for ICS** + +1. The UE initiates standard location updating procedures towards the CS network. + +NOTE 1: Combined RA/LA Update Request (as specified in TS 23.060 [35]) can be used when the network is in MNO I configuration. + +NOTE 2: Combined TA/LA Update procedure (as specified in TS 23.272 [44]) can be used instead when the network supports EMM combined procedures. + +2. The CS network performs standard CS location updating and authentication procedures. +3. The HSS initiates location cancellation procedures towards the source MSC Server enhanced for ICS. +4. The source MSC Server enhanced for ICS initiates IMS de-registration as described in clause 7.2.1.3. The S-CSCF removes the existing binding related to the source MSC Server enhanced for ICS. +5. The target MSC Server that is also enhanced for ICS initiates IMS registration as described in clause 7.2.1.2. The S-CSCF establishes a new binding related to the target MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + +NOTE 3: If step 5 is performed before step 4, the de-registration of the source MSC Server enhanced for ICS does not affect the new registered contact of the target MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + +#### 7.2.1.5 Registration before Deregistration using I2 reference point + +Figure 7.2.1.5-1 describes how IMS deregistration is performed by the MSC Server enhanced for ICS upon detection of the Location Cancellation procedure. In this scenario, the UE is moving between two MSC Servers enhanced for ICS. Identical IMS deregistration procedures are initiated by the source MSC Server enhanced for ICS upon receiving of any other indication that the UE is no longer considered registered. The registration request from the target MSC Server + +enhanced for ICS arrives at the S-CSCF before the deregistration request from the source MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Deregistration via CS Access by source MSC Server enhanced for ICS when moving to a target MSC Server enhanced for ICS.](e90987faabad6a6665cd8ed1151dc474_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant MSC_T as MSC Server (target) + participant MSC_S as MSC Server (source) + participant I-CSCF + participant HSS/HLR + participant S-CSCF + participant SCC AS + + UE->>MSC_T: 1. Location Updating + rect rgb(255, 255, 255) + Note over MSC_T, HSS/HLR: 2. CS Location Update and Authentication procedures + end + HSS/HLR->>MSC_S: 3. Cancel Location + rect rgb(255, 255, 255) + Note over MSC_T, SCC AS: 4. IMS Registration Signalling + end + MSC_S->>I-CSCF: 5. De-REGISTER + I-CSCF->>HSS/HLR: 6. Cx-Query + Cx-Select-Pull / Resp + HSS/HLR->>I-CSCF: + I-CSCF->>S-CSCF: 7. De-REGISTER + S-CSCF->>MSC_S: 8. Error Response + +``` + +Sequence diagram for IMS Deregistration via CS Access by source MSC Server enhanced for ICS when moving to a target MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + +**Figure 7.2.1.5-1: IMS Deregistration via CS Access by source MSC Server enhanced for ICS when moving to a target MSC Server enhanced for ICS** + +1. The UE initiates standard location updating procedures towards the CS network. +- NOTE 1: Combined RA/LA Update Request (as specified in TS 23.060 [35]) can be used when the network is in MNO I configuration. +- NOTE 2: Combined TA/LA Update procedure (as specified in TS 23.272 [44]) can be used instead when the network supports EMM combined procedures. +2. The CS network performs standard CS location updating and authentication procedures. + 3. The HSS initiates location cancellation procedures towards the source MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + 4. The target MSC Server that is also enhanced for ICS initiates IMS registration as described in clause 7.2.1.2. The S-CSCF updates a existing binding related to the source MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + 5. The source MSC Server that is enhanced for ICS initiates IMS deregistration for this subscriber. + 6. The I-CSCF initiates standard procedures for S-CSCF location/allocation. + 7. The I-CSCF forwards the REGISTER to the S-CSCF. + 8. The S-CSCF identifies the REGISTER as being from an MSC Server enhanced for ICS that is a trusted network node. The S-CSCF skips any further authentication procedures and performs deregistration procedures as described in clause 7.2.1.1. As the contact address in the REGISTER differs from the contact address in the existing binding related to the target MSC Server, the S-CSCF returns an error response to the source MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + +### 7.2.2 IMS Registration via IP-CAN + +Whenever the ICS UE acquires IP connectivity via an IP-CAN, the UE shall register in the IMS if not already registered in IMS. Registration with IMS is in accordance with the procedure as defined in TS 23.228 [2]. + +3rd-party registration shall be performed by the S-CSCF via the ISC interface towards the SCC AS. This supports ADS functionality in the SCC AS. + +1. The UE registers in the IMS as described in clause 5.2.2.3 of TS 23.228 [2] indicating its abilities to use ICS. + +NOTE: Access networks capabilities could be taken into account when sending any indications. + +2. The S-CSCF informs the SCC AS about the registration, using the procedures defined in clause 6.3 of TS 23.218 [7]. + +IMS registration via IP-CAN is performed independently of the UE's CS state. + +Information regarding home network support of ICS shall be configured in the ICS UE, e.g. via OMA DM [24]. + +## 7.3 Originations + +### 7.3.1 Originating sessions that use PS media + +When the ICS UE has access to a PS network that supports the full duplex speech component of an IMS service, the originating IMS procedures (as described in clause 5.6 of TS 23.228 [2]) shall be used to set up the session. The S-CSCF shall insert the SCC AS in the IMS session path using originating initial filter criteria. The SCC AS shall be the first AS inserted into the session path. + +### 7.3.2 Originating sessions that use CS media + +#### 7.3.2.1 Non ICS UE originating sessions that use CS media + +##### 7.3.2.1.1 Overview + +Originating sessions that use CS media made by non ICS UEs that have been successfully registered in IMS by the MSC Server can utilize IMS service control. The non ICS UE initiates a standard CS originating session toward the MSC Server enhanced for ICS, which in turn can initiate an IMS originating session using the I2 reference point. + +For these sessions, the MSC Server shall perform interworking between the I2 reference point and CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.008 [6]). The MSC Server shall also control a CS-MGW using the Mc reference point to perform interworking between CS access bearers and RTP bearers on the Mb reference point. For emergency sessions, the MSC Server may perform existing MSC Server emergency call handling procedures or interworking with IMS as specified in clause 7.3.2.3. + +For video call originating sessions that use CS media, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall also, after the multimedia connection is established, perform the video codec negotiation for the non ICS UE and set up the video media bearer based upon the procedures defined in TS 29.163 [11] for 3GPP systems and based on procedures defined in 3GPP2 C.S0042 [38] for 3GPP2 systems. + +The SCC AS shall be inserted in the IMS session path using the iFC. + +##### 7.3.2.1.2 Origination using I2 reference point + +Figure 7.3.2.1.2-1 describes how IMS originations are performed via CS access for non ICS UE. This call flow also applies for an ICS UE CS origination with CS media without use of I1 and with use of an MSC server enhanced for ICS, as specified in clause 7.3.2.2.3. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Origination via CS Access for non ICS UE. Lifelines: non ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE B. The sequence shows: 1. CS call setup (B) from UE A to MSC Server; 2. INVITE (B, SDP from CS-MGW) from MSC Server to S-CSCF; 3. INVITE (B, SDP from CS-MGW) from S-CSCF to SCC AS; 4. INVITE (B, SDP from CS-MGW) from SCC AS to S-CSCF; 5. INVITE (B, SDP from CS-MGW) from S-CSCF to UE B; 6. Completion of Session Setup Procedures. Below the sequence, a 'CS domain bearer' is shown between UE A and MGW, and an 'IMS bearer' is shown between MGW and UE B, with a switch symbol at the MGW.](28d75f39a24203712ee907b32cf0bbe5_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for IMS Origination via CS Access for non ICS UE. Lifelines: non ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE B. The sequence shows: 1. CS call setup (B) from UE A to MSC Server; 2. INVITE (B, SDP from CS-MGW) from MSC Server to S-CSCF; 3. INVITE (B, SDP from CS-MGW) from S-CSCF to SCC AS; 4. INVITE (B, SDP from CS-MGW) from SCC AS to S-CSCF; 5. INVITE (B, SDP from CS-MGW) from S-CSCF to UE B; 6. Completion of Session Setup Procedures. Below the sequence, a 'CS domain bearer' is shown between UE A and MGW, and an 'IMS bearer' is shown between MGW and UE B, with a switch symbol at the MGW. + +**Figure 7.3.2.1.2-1: IMS Origination via CS Access for non ICS UE** + +1. The UE A sends a CS call setup message containing the B-party number to the MSC Server enhanced for ICS according to standard CS originating procedures. +2. The MSC Server sends an INVITE to the S-CSCF with the Request-URI set to the B-party number. If a GRUU is to be included as described in TS 23.228 [2], then include a temporary-GRUU as the contact address if privacy has been requested or a public-GRUU if privacy has not been requested. The INVITE also contains SDP received from the CS-MGW. The MSC Server adds the User Location Information (e.g. CGI or SAI) and/or UE Time Zone Information to the INVITE. For a roaming user, when the Roaming Architecture for Voice over IMS with Local Breakout is supported according to clause 4.15a of TS 23.228 [2], the MSC Server may, based on operator policy, add a reference to the preferred Transit and Roaming Function. +3. The S-CSCF performs standard service control execution procedures. Filter criteria direct the S-CSCF to send the INVITE to the SCC AS. +4. The SCC AS invokes a B2BUA, terminating the UE A Leg and originating the Remote Leg for presentation of an IMS session towards the B-party on behalf of UE A. The SCC AS creates an INVITE containing the SDP received in the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path, indicating CS voice or voice and video media. The INVITE request is routed from the SCC AS to the S-CSCF. +5. The S-CSCF continues with standard IMS originated session processing and routes the request onwards to the B-party. +6. Completion of the session and bearer control setup procedures. For video call, to complete the session and bearer setup, the specific handling as described in clause 7.3.2.1.1 applies. + +##### 7.3.2.1.3 Origination when using an MSC Server + +Figure 7.3.2.1.3-1 describes how IMS originations are performed via CS access for non ICS UE attached to a legacy MSC or MSC-Server which has not been enhanced for ICS. This call flow also applies for an ICS UE CS origination with CS media without use of I1 and with use of an MSC server, as specified in clause 7.3.2.2.3. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating IMS Origination via CS Access for non IMS UE. The diagram shows the interaction between UE A, MSC, CS-MGW, MGCF, IMS-MGW, CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. The process involves CS call setup, Call Proceeding, IAM (IMRN), INVITE (IMRN, SDP from IMS-MGW), and completion of bearer control signalling set-up procedures. The bottom part of the diagram shows the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths.](dd5771673aececa53d42ece89218299d_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant MSC + participant CS-MGW + participant MGCF + participant IMS-MGW + participant CSCF + participant SCC AS + participant UE B + + Note left of UE A: 1. CS call setup (B-party) + UE A->>MSC: 1. CS call setup (B-party) + MSC-->>UE A: 2. Call Proceeding + MSC->>MGCF: 3. IAM (IMRN) + MGCF->>IMS-MGW: 4. INVITE (IMRN, SDP from IMS-MGW) + IMS-MGW->>CSCF: 5. INVITE (IMRN, SDP from IMS-MGW) + CSCF->>SCC AS: 6. INVITE (B, SDP from IMS-MGW) + SCC AS->>CSCF: 7. INVITE (B, SDP from IMS-MGW) + Note right of UE B: 8. Completion of Bearer Control Signalling set-up procedures + CSCF->>UE B: 8. Completion of Bearer Control Signalling set-up procedures + + Note bottom: CS Domain Bearer | CS Domain Bearer | IMS Bearer + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating IMS Origination via CS Access for non IMS UE. The diagram shows the interaction between UE A, MSC, CS-MGW, MGCF, IMS-MGW, CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. The process involves CS call setup, Call Proceeding, IAM (IMRN), INVITE (IMRN, SDP from IMS-MGW), and completion of bearer control signalling set-up procedures. The bottom part of the diagram shows the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths. + +**Figure 7.3.2.1.3-1: IMS Origination via CS Access for non IMS UE** + +1. The UE A originates a call in the CS domain to party-B according to standard origination procedures. +2. The MSC Server responds with a Call Proceeding message and begins to set up the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. +3. The MSC-Server fetches an IP Multimedia Routing Number (IMRN) via IN (e.g. CAMEL) and routes the call towards the user's home IMS network using the IMRN via an MGCF. +4. The MGCF initiates an INVITE towards the I-CSCF in the home IMS of the originating ICS user. +5. The I-CSCF routes the INVITE based on one of the following standard procedures specified in "PSI based Application Server termination - direct and PSI based Application Server termination – indirect" procedures in TS 23.228 [2] either directly to the SCC AS or via the S-CSCF. +6. When the INVITE arrives at the SCC AS, it invokes a B2BUA, terminating the UE A leg and originating the Remote Leg for presenting an IMS session towards the B-party on behalf of UE A. The SCC AS creates an INVITE containing the SDP received from MGCF, indicating CS voice or voice and video media. The original called number and the calling party number are used to setup the outgoing call leg to party-B in accordance with the AS origination procedure defined in clause 5.6.5 of TS 23.228 [2]. If required the SCC AS adds User Location Information (e.g. CGI or SAI) and/or UE Time Zone Information to the INVITE. The SCC AS sends the INVITE back to S-CSCF. + +NOTE 1: The method for discovery of original called number and calling party number at the SCC AS if ISUP does not provide this information is implementation dependant. This can be realized by interactions between the SCC AS and the SCF (e.g. gsmSCF); however this interaction is outside the scope of this specification. + +NOTE 2: The method for determining User Location Information (e.g. CGI or SAI) and/or UE Time Zone Information at the SCC AS is implementation dependant. This can be realized by interactions between the SCC AS and the SCF (e.g. gsmSCF). The SCC AS can also retrieve the User Location Information (e.g. CGI or SAI) and/or UE Time Zone Information from the MSC via the HSS as specified in TS 29.328 [48] and as described in clause 4.2.4a of TS 23.228 [2]. + +- 7-8. The S-CSCF sends the INVITE further for completion of the call toward the remote end. For video call, to complete the session and bearer setup, the specific handling as described in clause 7.3.2.1.1 applies. + +#### 7.3.2.2 ICS UE Originating sessions that use CS media + +##### 7.3.2.2.1 Overview + +IMS service control is used for ICS UE originated sessions that use a CS media bearer. + +When using the Gm reference point, the ICS UE initiates a standard IMS originating session indicating use of CS media bearer for the session. The SCC AS is inserted in the IMS session path using originating iFC. The ICS UE also sets up a standard CS originated session addressing a PSI DN associated with the SCC AS to establish the CS bearer if a CS bearer is not available for the ICS UE. The CS bearer shall be reused if already established using the Gm reference point. The service control signalling is combined with the description of the CS bearer at the SCC AS for presentation of the IMS originating session to the S-CSCF over the Remote Leg. + +When a subsequent session origination with different CS bearer requirement occurs (i.e. CS audio bearer is changed to CS video bearer, or vice versa), the CS bearer shall be updated if possible through SCUDIF or redial (refer to clause 7.9.2). + +The ICS UE should be able to detect an emergency session establishment request. If the ICS UE using a CS access detects the request for the establishment of an emergency session, the ICS UE shall attempt to initiate a CS emergency call. + +If the ICS UE could not detect an emergency call and originates the session with CS media using Gm reference point, it will forward an IMS session establishment request to the P-CSCF. If the P-CSCF detects such an emergency call, it rejects the request with an indication that this is for an emergency session as described in TS 23.167 [25]. + +NOTE: If the P-CSCF is not ICS aware, it is assumed that some other node in the emergency session path will detect the unsupported media and reject it or the call will be delivered to the PSAP without voice media component. Normal error handling applies in this case. + +As described in TS 23.167 [25], an ICS UE that initiated a non UE detectable emergency session will receive an indication in responses from which it can deduce that the session is for emergency. Upon receiving an emergency session rejection or session rejection with this indication, the ICS UE shall fall back to CS according to TS 23.167 [25]. + +When not using the Gm reference point, the following apply: + +- For sessions originated using a B party's SIP URI (not using user = phone), the ICS UE initiates a dialogue with the SCC AS over the I1 reference point indicating session origination. The ICS UE also sets up a CS originated session addressing a PSI DN associated with the SCC AS to establish the CS bearer. The service control signalling is combined with the description of the CS bearer at the SCC AS for presentation of the IMS originating session to the S-CSCF over the Remote Leg. +- For all other cases, the ICS UE initiates a standard CS originating call using B party's E.164 number. The call is routed to IMS via a standard MSC Server using IN (e.g. CAMEL) based redirection or an MSC Server enhanced with ICS. If the B party number is detected by the MSC Server as an emergency number then it will be handled as per existing MSC Server call handling procedures. Additionally, the ICS UE may use the I1 reference point for communication of additional parameters. + +For video call originating sessions that use CS media, the following apply: + +- When the ICS UE is attached to the MSC Server enhanced for ICS, after the multimedia connection is established, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the video codec negotiation for the ICS UE and set up the video media bearer based upon the procedures defined in TS 29.163 [11] for 3GPP systems and based on the procedures defined in 3GPP2 C.S0042 [38] for 3GPP2 systems; +- When the ICS UE is attached to the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS, the MGCF/IMS-MGW shall perform the video codec negotiation for the ICS UE and set up the video media bearer as specified in TS 29.163 [11] for 3GPP systems and as specified in 3GPP2 C.S0042 [38] for 3GPP2 systems. + +The following clauses show pairs of flows, one for an ICS UE when using an MSC Server and the other for an MSC Server enhanced for ICS. They are for the most part identical except that in the case of an MSC Server enhanced for ICS the INVITE towards the SCC AS is sent directly from the MSC Server whereas an MSC Server sends an ISUP IAM and the MGCF interworks this to an INVITE towards the SCC AS. + +A "Gm origination with CS media" policy may be provisioned by the operator and communicated to the ICS UE during initial provisioning or via OMA Device Management [24]. + +NOTE 1: Operators who choose to make use of ICS UEs may update this policy in order to optimize the user experience depending on knowledge of the capabilities of the Home PLMN and Visited PLMN (if roaming), in particular whether the MSC Server is enhanced for ICS, whether IN re-routing is possible and whether the ICS UE may be handed over to a non DTM-enabled GERAN. + +For originating sessions that use CS media, when the use of the Gm reference point is possible, the ICS UE shall behave as follows, depending on the "Gm origination with CS media" policy: + +- if this policy is set to "Gm disabled", then the ICS UE shall not use the procedure specified in clause 7.3.2.2.4. +- if this policy is set to "Gm enabled but not preferred", then: + - if the destination is a Tel URI or a SIP-URI representing a telephone number, and the exchange of additional SIP parameters is not required, then the ICS UE shall not use the procedure specified in clause 7.3.2.2.4; + - otherwise, the ICS UE shall use the procedure specified in clause 7.3.2.2.4. +- if this policy is set to "Gm enabled", then the ICS UE shall use the procedure specified in clause 7.3.2.2.4. + +NOTE 2: When setting the "Gm origination with CS media" policy to the ICS UE, the home operator is able to consider whether the MSC in VPLMN has been enhanced for ICS or not, and in the latter case the operator can enable the Gm reference point for ICS service control. When roaming, the Home operator can update this policy depending on the VPLMN, e.g. based on roaming agreements. + +##### 7.3.2.2.2 Originations with CS media when using I1 + +###### 7.3.2.2.2.1 Originations to a SIP URI + +Figure 7.3.2.2.2.1-1 provides an example flow for a session origination by an ICS UE when a SIP-URI is used to address the called party and when the ICS UE is attached to an MSC Server enhanced for ICS and the user is identified as an ICS user. + +![Sequence diagram for ICS UE Origination with CS media addressing a SIP-URI when using an MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, I/S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It is divided into two bearer paths: CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer.](b5335262987c819d7f71ce40f99cb71b_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS_UE_A as ICS UE A + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGW as MGW + participant I_S_CSCF as I/S-CSCF + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + participant UE_B as UE B + + Note right of SCC_AS: 2. Allocate SCC AS PSI DN + + ICS_UE_A->>MSC_Server: 1. I1: ICS Call Initiation (UE-B) + MSC_Server->>SCC_AS: 1. I1: ICS Call Initiation (UE-B) + SCC_AS-->>SCC_AS: 2. Allocate SCC AS PSI DN + SCC_AS->>ICS_UE_A: 3. I1: ICS Call Initiation Result (SCC AS PSI DN) + ICS_UE_A->>MSC_Server: 4. CS call setup (SCC AS PSI DN) + MSC_Server->>ICS_UE_A: 5. Call Proceeding + MSC_Server->>I_S_CSCF: 6. INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) + I_S_CSCF->>SCC_AS: 7. INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) + SCC_AS->>I_S_CSCF: 8. INVITE (B, SDP-MGW) + I_S_CSCF->>UE_B: 9. INVITE (B, SDP-MGW) + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: 10. Completion of the session and bearer set-up procedures + + Note left of MGW: CS Domain Bearer + Note right of MGW: IMS Bearer + +``` + +Sequence diagram for ICS UE Origination with CS media addressing a SIP-URI when using an MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, I/S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It is divided into two bearer paths: CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer. + +**Figure 7.3.2.2.2.1-1: ICS UE Origination with CS media addressing a SIP-URI when using an MSC Server enhanced for ICS** + +NOTE 1: 4, 5, 6 and 7 are related to the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. The other steps are related to the CS Service Control Signalling Path. + +1. The ICS UE A initiates a call by sending an ICS Call Initiation Request over the I1 reference point containing the UE B address. +2. The SCC AS performs the necessary adaptation of the signalling received over the I1 reference point. The SCC AS allocates a PSI DN and sends it to the ICS UE A. +3. The SCC AS sends the SCC AS PSI DN to the UE over the I1 reference point. +4. The ICS UE A uses standard CS originating procedures to establish a CS Bearer Control Signalling Path with the SCC AS by sending a SETUP message to the MSC Server containing the SCC AS PSI DN. +5. The MSC Server responds with a Call Proceeding message and begins to set up the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. +6. The MSC Server sends an INVITE to the S-CSCF with the Request-URI set to the SCC AS PSI. If a GRUU is to be included as described in TS 23.228 [2], then include a temporary-GRUU as the contact address if privacy has been requested or public-GRUU if privacy has not been requested. The MSC Server adds the User Location Information (e.g. CGI or SAI) and/or UE Time Zone Information to the INVITE. +7. The S-CSCF carries out standard processing of originating initial filter criteria and sends the INVITE to the SCC AS. The SCC AS is the first AS inserted in the session path. +8. The SCC AS invokes a B2BUA, terminating the UE Leg and originating the Remote Leg for presentation of an IMS session towards the B-party on behalf of ICS UE A. The SCC AS correlates the CS bearer control signalling session with the service control signalling session using the SCC AS PSI and creates a SIP INVITE + +containing the SDP received in the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path, indicating CS voice or voice and video media. The INVITE request is routed from the SCC AS to the S-CSCF. + +9. The S-CSCF continues with standard IMS originated session processing and routes the request onwards to the B-party. +10. Completion of the Service Control Signalling Path and the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path setup procedures. For video call, to complete the session and bearer setup, the specific handling as described in clause 7.3.2.2.1 applies. + +Figure 7.3.2.2.2.1-2 provides an example flow for a session origination by an ICS UE when a SIP-URI is used to address the called party and when the ICS UE is attached to an MSC Server. + +![Sequence diagram for ICS UE Origination with CS media addressing a SIP-URI when using an MSC Server. The diagram shows the interaction between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, I/S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. The process involves call initiation, result handling, CS call setup, call proceeding, IAM, and a series of INVITE messages leading to the completion of session and bearer control signalling. Below the sequence, a diagram shows the bearer paths: CS Domain Bearer from UE A to MGW, and IMS Bearer from MGW to UE B.](a1890b9a9b85f13e67ed59bbad623659_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS_UE_A as ICS UE A + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGCF + participant MGW + participant I_S_CSCF as I/S-CSCF + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + participant UE_B as UE B + + Note right of SCC_AS: 2. Allocate SCC AS PSI DN + + ICS_UE_A->>SCC_AS: 1. I1: ICS Call Initiation (UE-B) + SCC_AS-->>SCC_AS: 2. Allocate SCC AS PSI DN + SCC_AS->>ICS_UE_A: 3. I1: ICS Call Initiation Result (SCC AS PSI DN) + ICS_UE_A->>MSC_Server: 4. CS call setup (SCC AS PSI DN) + MSC_Server-->>ICS_UE_A: 5. Call Proceeding + MSC_Server->>MGCF: 6. IAM (SCC AS PSI DN) + MGCF->>I_S_CSCF: 7. INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) + I_S_CSCF->>SCC_AS: 8. INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) + SCC_AS->>I_S_CSCF: 9. INVITE (B, SDP-MGW) + I_S_CSCF->>UE_B: 10. INVITE (B, SDP-MGW) + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: 11. Completion of Session Control and Bearer Control Signalling set-up procedures + + Note right of MGW: CS Domain Bearer + Note left of MGW: IMS Bearer + +``` + +Sequence diagram for ICS UE Origination with CS media addressing a SIP-URI when using an MSC Server. The diagram shows the interaction between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, I/S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. The process involves call initiation, result handling, CS call setup, call proceeding, IAM, and a series of INVITE messages leading to the completion of session and bearer control signalling. Below the sequence, a diagram shows the bearer paths: CS Domain Bearer from UE A to MGW, and IMS Bearer from MGW to UE B. + +**Figure 7.3.2.2.2.1-2: ICS UE Origination with CS media addressing a SIP-URI when using an MSC Server** + +NOTE 2: Steps 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are related to the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. The other steps are related to the setup of the Service Control Signalling Path. + +Steps 1-5 in Figure 7.3.2.2.2.1-2 are identical to steps 1-5 in Figure 7.3.2.2.2.1-1. + +At Steps 6 and 7, the MSC Server sends the IAM using the SCC AS PSI DN to an MGCF which is subsequently interworked to an INVITE. + +Steps 8-11 in Figure 7.3.2.2.2.1-2 are identical to steps 7-10 in Figure 7.3.2.2.2.1-1. + +###### 7.3.2.2.2.2 Originations to a B-party number other than SIP-URI + +Figure 7.3.2.2.2.2-1 provides an example flow for a session origination by an ICS UE where the I1 reference point is used to set up the session and the user dials a E.164 number, Tel-URI or SIP-URI user=phone, and when the ICS UE is attached to an MSC Server enhanced for ICS and the user is identified as an ICS user. + +![Sequence diagram for ICS UE Origination with CS media using an E.164 number, Tel-URI or SIP-URI user=phone and an MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, I/S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It details the signaling path for call initiation and the setup of CS and IMS bearers.](6e15fc9ea763541c5913d26f85072ae1_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS_UE_A as ICS UE A + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGW as MGW + participant I_S_CSCF as I/S-CSCF + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + participant UE_B as UE B + + Note right of SCC_AS: 2. Note SCC AS PSI not used for this session + + ICS_UE_A->>SCC_AS: 1. I1: ICS Call Initiation (B-party DN, additional info) + SCC_AS-->>SCC_AS: 2. Note SCC AS PSI not used for this session + SCC_AS-->>ICS_UE_A: 3. I1: ICS Call Initiation Result + ICS_UE_A->>MSC_Server: 4. CS call setup (B) + MSC_Server-->>ICS_UE_A: 5. Call Proceeding + MSC_Server->>I_S_CSCF: 6. INVITE (B, SDP-MGW) + I_S_CSCF->>SCC_AS: 7. INVITE (B, SDP-MGW) + SCC_AS-->>I_S_CSCF: 8. INVITE (B, SDP-MGW) + I_S_CSCF->>UE_B: 9. INVITE (B, SDP-MGW) + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: 10. Completion of the session and bearer set-up procedures + + Note left of MGW: CS Domain Bearer + Note right of MGW: IMS Bearer + +``` + +Sequence diagram for ICS UE Origination with CS media using an E.164 number, Tel-URI or SIP-URI user=phone and an MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, I/S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It details the signaling path for call initiation and the setup of CS and IMS bearers. + +**Figure 7.3.2.2.2.2-1: ICS UE Origination with CS media using a E.164 number, Tel-URI or SIP-URI user=phone and an MSC Server enhanced for ICS** + +NOTE 1: Steps 4, 5, 6 and 7 are related to the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. The other steps are related to the setup of the Service Control Signalling Path. + +1. The ICS UE A initiates a call by sending an ICS Call Initiation Request over the I1 reference point containing the UE B address. The ICS UE A also indicates in the I1 message that an SCC AS PSI DN is not needed for this session. +2. The SCC AS performs the necessary adaptation of the signalling received over the I1 reference point. The SCC AS notes the SCC AS PSI DN is not used for this session. +3. The SCC AS returns an ICS Call Initiation Result to ICS UE A over the I1 reference point. +4. The ICS UE A uses standard CS originating procedures to establish a CS Bearer Control Signalling Path with the IUA of the SCC AS by sending a SETUP message to the MSC Server containing the B-party-number. If the B party number is detected by the MSC Server as an emergency number then it will be handled as per existing MSC Server call handling procedures. + +When the user dials a Non-UE detectable Emergency DN or Emergency URI but I1 has been established, or if the CS origination fails to be routed into IMS, a timer running at the SCC AS will expire as the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path was not established towards the SCC AS and an appropriate indication is returned to the UE. The UE shall not release the CS bearer on receipt of this indication and the UE shall not use the Service Control Signalling Path further for the call. + +5. The MSC Server responds with a Call Proceeding message and begins to set up the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. +6. The MSC Server sends an INVITE to the S-CSCF with the destination set to the called party number and the source to the calling party. If a GRUU is to be included as described in TS 23.228 [2], then include a temporary-GRUU as the contact address if privacy has been requested or public-GRUU if privacy has not been requested. + +The MSC Server adds the User Location Information (e.g. CGI or SAI) and/or UE Time Zone Information to the INVITE. + +7. The S-CSCF carries out standard processing of originating initial filter criteria and sends the INVITE to the SCC AS. +8. The SCC AS invokes a B2BUA, terminating the UE Leg and originating the Remote Leg for presentation of an IMS session towards the B-party on behalf of ICS UE A. The IUA correlates the CS bearer control signalling session with the service control signalling session and creates a SIP INVITE containing the SDP received in the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path, indicating CS voice or voice and video media and routes the INVITE request to the S-CSCF. If the SCC AS obtains the calling party identity from step 1, then the SCC AS shall use this identity from step 1 as the calling party identity. Otherwise, then the SCC AS shall use the calling party identity received in step 6. +9. The S-CSCF continues with standard IMS originated session processing and routes the request onwards to the B-party. +10. Completion of the Service Control Signalling Path and the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path setup procedures. For video call, to complete the session and bearer setup, the specific handling as described in clause 7.3.2.2.1 applies. + +Figure 7.3.2.2.2.2-2 provides an example flow for a session origination by an ICS UE where the I1 reference point is used to set up the session and the user dials a E.164 number, Tel-URI or SIP-URI user=phone and when the ICS UE is attached to an MSC Server. + +![Sequence diagram for ICS UE Origination with CS media using a E.164 number, Tel-URI or SIP-URI user=phone and an MSC Server. The diagram shows the interaction between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, I/S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. The process involves call initiation, result, setup, proceeding, IAM, and multiple INVITE messages. A note indicates that SCC AS PSI is not used for this session. The bottom part shows the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths.](ac31fdfebb9751f7f10416dfe33bc872_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS_UE_A as ICS UE A + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGCF + participant MGW + participant I_S-CSCF as I/S-CSCF + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + participant UE_B as UE B + + Note right of SCC_AS: 2. Note SCC AS PSI not used for this session + + ICS_UE_A->>SCC_AS: 1. I1: ICS Call Initiation (B-party DN, additional info) + SCC_AS-->>ICS_UE_A: 3. I1: ICS Call Initiation Result + ICS_UE_A->>MSC_Server: 4. CS call setup (B) + ICS_UE_A->>MSC_Server: 5. Call Proceeding + MSC_Server->>MGCF: 6. IAM (IMRN) + MGCF->>I_S-CSCF: 7. INVITE (IMRN, SDP-MGW) + I_S-CSCF->>SCC_AS: 8. INVITE (IMRN, SDP-MGW) + SCC_AS->>I_S-CSCF: 9. INVITE (B, SDP-MGW) + I_S-CSCF->>UE_B: 10. INVITE (B, SDP-MGW) + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: 11. Completion of Session Control and Bearer Control Signalling set-up procedures + + Note left of ICS_UE_A: CS Domain Bearer + Note right of MGW: IMS Bearer + +``` + +Sequence diagram for ICS UE Origination with CS media using a E.164 number, Tel-URI or SIP-URI user=phone and an MSC Server. The diagram shows the interaction between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, I/S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. The process involves call initiation, result, setup, proceeding, IAM, and multiple INVITE messages. A note indicates that SCC AS PSI is not used for this session. The bottom part shows the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths. + +**Figure 7.3.2.2.2.2-2: ICS UE Origination with CS media using a E.164 number, Tel-URI or SIP-URI user=phone and an MSC Server** + +NOTE 2: Steps 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are related to the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. The other steps are related to the setup of the Service Control Signalling Path. + +Steps 1-5 in Figure 7.3.2.2.2.2-2 are identical to steps 1-5 in Figure 7.3.2.2.2.2-1. + +In Steps 6 and 7, IN (e.g. CAMEL) origination triggers are used at the MSC Server for fetching of an IP Multimedia Routing Number (IMRN). The MSC Server sends an IAM to an MGCF using the IMRN which is subsequently inter-worked to an INVITE. + +In Step 8, the S-CSCF carries out standard processing of originating initial filter criteria and sends the INVITE to the SCC AS. This step is skipped if the I-CSCF routes the INVITE request directly to the SCC AS. + +Steps 9-11 in Figure 7.3.2.2.2.2-2 are identical to steps 8-10 in Figure 7.3.2.2.2.2-1. + +NOTE 3: The method for discovery of original called number and calling party number at the SCC AS if ISUP does not provide this information is implementation dependant. This can be realized by interactions between the SCC AS and the SCF (e.g. gsmSCF); however this interaction is outside the scope of this specification. + +##### 7.3.2.2.3 Originations with CS media when not using I1 + +This procedure may be used when the ICS User dials an E.164 number, a Tel URI or a SIP-URI user=phone, and the exchange of additional SIP parameters is not required. The ICS UE initiates a standard CS originating using the B-party's E.164 number or a number derived from the Tel-URI. The call is routed to IMS via an MSC Server which is enhanced to support ICS or a standard MSC Server using IN (e.g. CAMEL) based re-direction. + +Figure 7.3.2.1.2-1 provides an example flow for a session origination by an ICS UE where the I1 reference point is not required to set up the session and a MSC Server enhanced for ICS is used to set-up the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path and the user is identified as an ICS user. + +For a session origination by an ICS UE where the I1 reference point is not required to set up the session and a MSC Server enhanced for ICS is not used to set-up the CS bearer control signalling, an example call flow is shown in Figure 7.3.2.1.3-1. + +##### 7.3.2.2.4 Originations with CS media using the Gm reference point + +Figure 7.3.2.2.4-1 provides an example flow for a session origination by an ICS UE attached to an MSC Server enhanced for ICS where the Gm reference point is used to set up the session with the CS media bearer. + +![Sequence diagram for ICS UE Origination with CS media using Gm reference point when using an MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows the interaction between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. The process involves SIP INVITE requests, SCC AS PSI DN allocation, and CS call setup procedures. The bottom part of the diagram illustrates the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths.](6629e8a87e7552e2454b7c3e9f6d73a0_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS_UE_A as ICS UE A + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGW as MGW + participant S-CSCF as S-CSCF + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + participant UE_B as UE B + + Note right of SCC_AS: 3. Allocate SCC AS PSI DN + + ICS_UE_A->>S-CSCF: 1. INVITE (B, SDP-A) + S-CSCF->>SCC_AS: 2. INVITE (B, SDP-A) + SCC_AS-->>S-CSCF: 4. Reliable Provisional Response (SCC AS PSI DN) + S-CSCF->>ICS_UE_A: 5. Reliable Provisional Response (SCC AS PSI DN) + ICS_UE_A->>MSC_Server: 6. CS call setup (SCC AS PSI DN) + MSC_Server->>ICS_UE_A: 7. Call Proceeding + MSC_Server->>S-CSCF: 8. INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) + S-CSCF->>SCC_AS: 9. INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) + S-CSCF->>UE_B: 10. INVITE (B, SDP-MGW) + S-CSCF->>UE_B: 11. INVITE (B, SDP-MGW) + + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: 12. Completion of the session and bearer set-up procedures + + Note right of MGW: CS Domain Bearer + Note left of MGW: IMS Bearer + +``` + +Sequence diagram for ICS UE Origination with CS media using Gm reference point when using an MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows the interaction between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. The process involves SIP INVITE requests, SCC AS PSI DN allocation, and CS call setup procedures. The bottom part of the diagram illustrates the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths. + +**Figure 7.3.2.2.4-1: ICS UE Origination with CS media using Gm reference point when using an MSC Server enhanced for ICS** + +NOTE 1: Steps 6, 7, 8 and 9 are related to the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. The other steps are related to the setup of the Service Control Signalling Path. + +1. The ICS UE A sets up a Service Control Signalling Path by initiating a standard IMS origination session towards the UE B. A SIP INVITE request (indicating the use of CS media for the session) is sent to the S-CSCF serving the UE A in the home IMS network. +2. The SCC AS is inserted in the IMS session path using originating initial filter criteria at the S-CSCF. The SCC AS is the first AS inserted in the session path. +3. The SCC AS allocates a PSI DN and sends it to the ICS UE A. +4. The SCC AS returns the SCC AS PSI DN in a reliable provisional response to the S-CSCF +5. The S-CSCF forwards the provisional response (containing the SCC AS PSI DN) to ICS UE A. +6. The ICS UE uses standard CS originating procedures to establish the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path with the SCC AS by sending a CS call setup message to the MSC Server containing the SCC AS PSI DN. + +NOTE 2: The UE waits for the SIP response (step 5) before the UE generates the CS call setup. + +7. The MSC Server responds with a Call Proceeding message and begins to set up the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. + +8. The MSC Server sends an INVITE to the S-CSCF with the Request-URI set to the SCC AS PSI. If a GRUU is to be included as described in TS 23.228 [2], then include a temporary-GRUU as the contact address if privacy has been requested or public-GRUU if privacy has not been requested. The MSC Server adds the User Location Information (e.g. CGI or SAI) and/or UE Time Zone Information to the INVITE. +9. The S-CSCF carries out standard processing of originating initial filter criteria and sends the INVITE to the SCC AS. +10. The SCC AS invokes a B2BUA, terminating the Access Leg and originating the Remote Leg for presentation of an IMS session towards the B-party on behalf of ICS UE A. The SCC AS correlates the CS bearer control signalling with the service control signalling and combines both the SDP offers into one offer towards the UE B. The SCC AS inserts the SDP received on the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path into the INVITE indicating CS media towards the B-party. The INVITE request is routed from the SCC AS to the S-CSCF. +11. The S-CSCF continues with standard IMS originated session processing and routes the request onwards to the B-party +12. Completion of the Service Control Signalling Path and the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path setup procedures. For video call, to complete the session and bearer setup, the specific handling as described in clause 7.3.2.2.1 applies. + +Figure 7.3.2.2.4-2 provides an example flow for a session origination by an ICS UE attached to an MSC Server where the Gm reference point is used to set up the session with the CS media bearer. + +![Sequence diagram for ICS UE Origination with CS media using Gm reference point when using an MSC Server. The diagram shows 13 steps of signaling between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. Below the sequence, a bar labeled '13. Completion of the session and bearer set-up procedures' spans across all participants. At the bottom, three bearer segments are shown: 'CS Domain Bearer' between ICS UE A and MGW, 'CS Domain Bearer' between MGW and S-CSCF, and 'IMS Bearer' between S-CSCF and UE B.](4ff00a489baaa34a0c01070de1d613db_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS_UE_A as ICS UE A + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGCF + participant MGW + participant S-CSCF + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + participant UE_B as UE B + + Note right of ICS_UE_A: Steps 1-7 identical to 7.3.2.2.4-1 + ICS_UE_A->>MSC_Server: 1. INVITE (B, SDP-A) + MSC_Server->>S-CSCF: 2. INVITE (B, SDP-A) + S-CSCF->>SCC_AS: 3. Allocate SCC AS PSI DN + SCC_AS->>S-CSCF: 4. Reliable Provisional Response (SCC AS PSI DN) + S-CSCF->>MSC_Server: 5. Reliable Provisional Response (SCC AS PSI DN) + MSC_Server->>ICS_UE_A: 6. CS call setup (SCC AS PSI DN) + ICS_UE_A->>MSC_Server: 7. Call Proceeding + MSC_Server->>MGCF: 8. IAM (SCC AS PSI DN) + MGCF->>MGW: 9. INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) + MGW->>S-CSCF: 10. INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) + S-CSCF->>SCC_AS: 11. INVITE (B, SDP-MGW) + SCC_AS->>UE_B: 12. INVITE (B, SDP-MGW) + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: 13. Completion of the session and bearer set-up procedures + + Note bottom: Bearer setup + ICS_UE_A-->>MGW: CS Domain Bearer + MGW-->>S-CSCF: CS Domain Bearer + S-CSCF-->>UE_B: IMS Bearer + +``` + +Sequence diagram for ICS UE Origination with CS media using Gm reference point when using an MSC Server. The diagram shows 13 steps of signaling between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. Below the sequence, a bar labeled '13. Completion of the session and bearer set-up procedures' spans across all participants. At the bottom, three bearer segments are shown: 'CS Domain Bearer' between ICS UE A and MGW, 'CS Domain Bearer' between MGW and S-CSCF, and 'IMS Bearer' between S-CSCF and UE B. + +**Figure 7.3.2.2.4-2: ICS UE Origination with CS media using Gm reference point when using an MSC Server** + +NOTE 3: Steps 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 are related to the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. The other steps are related to the setup of the Service Control Signalling Path. + +Steps 1-7 in Figure 7.3.2.2.4-2 are identical to steps 1-7 in Figure 7.3.2.2.4-1. + +At Steps 8 and 9, the MSC server sends the IAM using the SCC AS PSI DN to an MGCF which is subsequently interworked to an INVITE. + +Steps 10-13 in Figure 7.3.2.2.4-2 are identical to steps 9-12 in Figure 7.3.2.2.4-1. + +#### 7.3.2.3 CS Emergency call interworking with IMS + +If the MSC Server enhanced with ICS supports I6, it may perform the following procedure to interwork with IMS for handling CS emergency call to PSAP. + +If the MSC Server detects a CS emergency call (i.e., due to CS setup with emergency indication or detection of locally defined emergency number) from an UE that has already been registered in this MSC Server using I2 registration procedure, then MSC Server shall perform a registration for the support of emergency services (emergency registration) to IMS via I2. The MSC Server then proceeds with emergency session establishment request to E-CSCF via I6. + +If MSC Server is required to handle anonymous emergency call (i.e., based on local regulation), MSC Server shall not perform any registration procedure to IMS and shall directly proceed with anonymous emergency requests toward E-CSCF via I6. + +If the MSC Server detects that the CS emergency call is tagged with eCall indication from the UE, MSC Server shall include the IMS eCall indication in the emergency session establishment request to E-CSCF via I6. The UE transfers the MSD using in-band modem as defined for CS eCall. The MSC Server and IMS shall transfer the MSD data in an end to end fashion, UE to PSAP, in the form generated by the UE. + +For UE that has been registered to this MSC Server but IMS registration using I2 has not been performed then MSC Server shall fall back to the behaviour of an MSC Server that is not enhanced for ICS in handling CS emergency call. + +## 7.4 Terminations + +### 7.4.1 Terminating sessions that use PS media + +#### 7.4.1.1 Full duplex speech via PS + +When the ICS UE has access to a PS network that supports the full duplex speech component of an IMS service, terminating IMS procedures (as described in clause 5.7 of TS 23.228 [2]) shall be used to terminate the session to the ICS UE. The S-CSCF shall insert the SCC AS in the IMS session path using terminating initial filter criteria. The SCC AS shall be the last AS inserted into the session path. + +#### 7.4.1.2 Void + +#### 7.4.1.3 Void + +### 7.4.2 Terminating sessions that use CS media + +#### 7.4.2.1 Non ICS UE terminating sessions that use CS media + +##### 7.4.2.1.1 Overview + +All ICS User incoming sessions are directed to IMS for delivery to the ICS User. + +Non ICS UEs which have been successfully registered in IMS by the MSC Server will have a registration binding at the S-CSCF containing the MSC Server as the contact address. + +The SCC AS shall be inserted in the IMS session path using the terminating iFC. The SCC AS performs T-ADS for selection of an access and returns information to assist with S-CSCF selection of a registered contact address. When the T-ADS function selects the MSC Server enhanced for ICS, the SCC AS directs the IMS terminating session towards the contact address of the MSC Server. + +On receipt of the session initiation message, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the necessary interworking between the I2 reference point and CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.008 [6]). The MSC Server + +shall also control a CS-MGW using the Mc reference point to perform the necessary interworking between RTP bearers on the Mb reference point and CS access bearers and adds the User Location Information (e.g. CGI or SAI) and/or UE Time Zone Information to the response to the session initiation. + +The SCC AS may select to breakout an incoming session to the CS domain in following cases: + +- A non ICS UE is not registered in IMS but can be attached to the CS network at an MSC Server. In this case, terminating iFC forwards the call to the SCC AS. +- A non ICS UE is registered in IMS, the access network does not support the media type (as defined in clause 22.4 of TS 22.101 [9]), but the UE still can be attached to the CS network at an MSC Server. In this case, terminating iFC forwards the call to the SCC AS. + +For both scenarios the SCC AS shall retrieve from the HSS the C-MSISDN(s) associated with all the IMPIs that are associated with the IMPU that is the target of the session. The SCC AS shall select a single C-MSISDN and shall use it to fetch a CSRN for routing the call to the CS domain. The INVITE shall be sent to the S-CSCF which then performs CS breakout according to standard IMS procedures. The INVITE may include an indication that this is an ICS session, which can be used by the MGCF to handle this session in a specific manner, for example to make a different cause mapping between ISUP/BICC and SIP than a normal session breakout would do. The SCC AS may also retrieve the User Location Information (e.g. CGI or SAI) and/or UE Time Zone Information from the HSS at this time or at the reception of the response, to include it into the response to the session initiation. + +NOTE: The algorithm used by the SCC AS to select a C-MSISDN is implementation dependent. + +For video call terminating sessions that use CS media, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall also, after the multimedia connection is established, perform the video codec negotiation for the non ICS UE and set up the video media bearer based upon the procedures defined in TS 29.163 [11] for 3GPP systems and based on procedures defined in 3GPP2 C.S0042 [38] for 3GPP2 systems. If the UE does not support video, or the access network is not capable of video, then the video component of the session shall not be accepted by the MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + +For voice call terminating sessions that use CS media via I2,, re-routing from the terminating MSC Server enhanced for ICS to another MSC (ICS enhanced or not) may be triggered (i.e. due to Mobile Terminating Roaming Retry Call procedure as defined in TS 23.018 [49], Roaming Retry for CS fallback or Roaming Forwarding for CS fallback as defined in TS 23.272 [44] is triggered). + +If the SCC AS receives from the new MSC (enhanced for ISC- see clause 7.2.1.2) a new IMS registration for the UE for which the SCC AS just delivered a session, then: + +- S-CSCF releases the current terminating session setup toward SCC AS/T-ADS as defined in TS 24.229 [31]; and +- T-ADS redirects the session to the new MSC. + +If the old MSC (terminating MSC) performs IMS deregistration over I2 (see clause 7.2.1.3), then: + +- S-CSCF releases the current terminating session setup toward SCC AS/T-ADS as defined in TS 24.229 [31]; +- Based on operator policy, T-ADS may start a timer. The timer is stopped when new registration is received for the UE; +- If the T-ADS stopped the timer itself, T-ADS redirects the session to the new MSC; +- If the timer expires, T-ADS may invoke other procedure to redeliver the call (e.g. routing the call to the CS domain). + +##### 7.4.2.1.2 Termination using I2 reference point + +Figure 7.4.2.1.2-1 describes how IMS terminations are performed via CS access for non ICS UE registered in IMS. This call flow also applies for an ICS UE attached to an MSC Server enhanced for ICS where the incoming session is delivered to the ICS UE using standard CS terminating procedures, as specified in clause 7.4.2.2.5. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Termination via CS Access for non ICS UE registered in IMS. The diagram shows the interaction between UE B, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE A. The sequence of messages is: 1. INVITE (B) from UE A to I/S-CSCF; 2. INVITE (B) from I/S-CSCF to SCC AS; 3. T-ADS from SCC AS; 4. INVITE (B) from SCC AS to I/S-CSCF; 5. INVITE (B) from I/S-CSCF to MSC Server; 6. CS call setup from MSC Server to UE B; 7. Completion of Session Setup Procedures. Below step 7, a 'CS domain bearer' is shown between UE B and MGW, and an 'IMS bearer' is shown between MGW and UE A, with a break in the MGW.](9252ccfbbe9e34cb108f0060f2b563f1_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant I/S-CSCF + participant SCC AS + participant MGW + participant MSC Server + participant UE B + + Note right of UE A: Error! No text of specified style in + UE A->>I/S-CSCF: 1. INVITE (B) + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 2. INVITE (B) + Note right of SCC AS: 3. T-ADS + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 4. INVITE (B) + I/S-CSCF->>MSC Server: 5. INVITE (B) + MSC Server->>UE B: 6. CS call setup + Note over UE B, UE A: 7. Completion of Session Setup Procedures + Note left of MGW: CS domain bearer + Note right of MGW: IMS bearer + +``` + +Sequence diagram for IMS Termination via CS Access for non ICS UE registered in IMS. The diagram shows the interaction between UE B, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE A. The sequence of messages is: 1. INVITE (B) from UE A to I/S-CSCF; 2. INVITE (B) from I/S-CSCF to SCC AS; 3. T-ADS from SCC AS; 4. INVITE (B) from SCC AS to I/S-CSCF; 5. INVITE (B) from I/S-CSCF to MSC Server; 6. CS call setup from MSC Server to UE B; 7. Completion of Session Setup Procedures. Below step 7, a 'CS domain bearer' is shown between UE B and MGW, and an 'IMS bearer' is shown between MGW and UE A, with a break in the MGW. + +**Figure 7.4.2.1.2-1: IMS Termination via CS Access for non ICS UE registered in IMS** + +1. An incoming INVITE is received at the S-CSCF of the B-party via the I-CSCF. +2. The S-CSCF performs standard service control execution procedures. Filter criteria direct the S-CSCF to send the INVITE to the SCC AS. +3. The SCC AS performs terminating access domain selection. The SCC AS chooses the CS access network and the MSC Server contact address, amongst the registered contact addresses for the UE B, for the setup of the media. +4. The SCC AS establishes a new session by sending an INVITE to the UE B via the S-CSCF. +5. The S-CSCF forwards the INVITE to the MSC Server based on the contact address stored during registration, using standard IMS procedures. +6. The MSC Server sends a Setup message to the UE B. +7. Completion of the session and bearer control setup procedures. For video call, to complete the session and bearer setup, the specific handling as described in clause 7.4.2.1.1 applies. The MSC Server adds the User Location Information (e.g. CGI or SAI) and/or UE Time Zone Information of the terminating user to the session initiation response message. + +##### 7.4.2.1.3 Termination to non ICS UE not registered in IMS + +Figure 7.4.2.1.3-1 describes how IMS terminations are performed via CS access for non ICS UE not registered in IMS. This call flow also applies for an ICS UE attached to an MSC Server where the incoming session is delivered to the ICS UE using standard CS terminating procedures, as specified in clause 7.4.2.2.5. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Termination via CS Access for non ICS UE not registered in IMS. The diagram shows the interaction between UE B, MSC Server, CS-MGW, MGCF, IMS-MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE A. The process involves an INVITE (B) from UE A to I/S-CSCF, which is then routed through SCC AS, IMS-MGW, MGCF, and CS-MGW to the MSC Server, which finally sends a CS call setup to UE B. The bottom part of the diagram illustrates the bearer paths: CS Domain Bearer from UE B to CS-MGW, CS Domain Bearer from CS-MGW to IMS-MGW, and IMS Bearer from IMS-MGW to UE A.](8269648391c59363ea61243864a2adf7_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant I/S-CSCF + participant SCC AS + participant IMS-MGW + participant MGCF + participant CS-MGW + participant MSC Server + participant UE B + + Note right of SCC AS: 3. T-ADS + + UE A->>I/S-CSCF: 1. INVITE (B) + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 2. INVITE (B) + Note right of SCC AS: 3. T-ADS + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 4. INVITE (CSRN) + I/S-CSCF->>MGCF: 5. INVITE (CSRN) + MGCF->>MSC Server: 6. IAM + MSC Server->>UE B: 7. CS call setup + Note over all: 8. Completion of session and bearer set-up procedures + +``` + +Sequence diagram for IMS Termination via CS Access for non ICS UE not registered in IMS. The diagram shows the interaction between UE B, MSC Server, CS-MGW, MGCF, IMS-MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE A. The process involves an INVITE (B) from UE A to I/S-CSCF, which is then routed through SCC AS, IMS-MGW, MGCF, and CS-MGW to the MSC Server, which finally sends a CS call setup to UE B. The bottom part of the diagram illustrates the bearer paths: CS Domain Bearer from UE B to CS-MGW, CS Domain Bearer from CS-MGW to IMS-MGW, and IMS Bearer from IMS-MGW to UE A. + +**Figure 7.4.2.1.3-1: IMS Termination via CS Access for non ICS UE not registered in IMS** + +1. An incoming INVITE is received at the S-CSCF of the B-party. +2. The S-CSCF performs standard unregistered service control execution procedures. The terminating iFC direct the INVITE to the SCC AS for terminating access domain selection. +3. The T-ADS function chooses breakout to the CS domain. A CSRN is fetched for routing to the CS domain. If the SCC AS interacts with the HSS to fetch the CSRN, it may also indicate to the HSS the support of MTRR as specified in TS 23.018 [49]. + +NOTE 1: At this point, the SCC AS can, as an implementation option, interact with the HSS to obtain location information. + +NOTE 2: Fetching the CSRN is implementation specific. + +NOTE 3: If Sh is used for interaction with the HSS and SCC AS indicates support of MTRR, the SCC AS also provides its MAP address to the HSS. + +4. The SCC AS establishes a new session by sending an INVITE containing the CSRN and ICS indicator towards the S-CSCF. +5. The S-CSCF then performs CS breakout according to existing IMS procedures. The call is routed to the CS domain via the BGCF/MGCF. +6. The MGCF sends an IAM to the MSC Server. +7. The MSC Server performs paging procedures and sends the CS call setup message to the UE B. If the UE does not respond to the paging request as meanwhile it has performed registration with a new MSC Server, the network may either use the MTRF or MTRR feature as specified in TS 23.018 [49] in order to re-direct the call towards the new MSC Server. If MTRR is used the SCC AS emulates GMSC behavior and may request to to re-restart call handling from step 3 onwards. +8. Completion of the session and bearer control setup procedures. To complete the session and bearer setup for a video call the specific handling as described in clause 7.4.2.1.1 applies. The MGCF may map cause codes received over the CS leg differently compared to normal CS breakout. If the SCC AS has User Location Information (e.g. CGI or SAI) and/or UE Time Zone Information available (e.g. from step 3, or by interacting with the HSS at this time), it adds it to the SIP response. + +#### 7.4.2.2 ICS UE Terminating sessions that use CS media + +##### 7.4.2.2.1 Overview + +IMS service control is used for ICS UE terminating sessions that use CS media. + +All ICS User incoming sessions are directed to IMS for delivery to the ICS User. The SCC AS is inserted in the IMS session path using the terminating iFCs. The SCC AS performs T-ADS for selection of a contact address amongst the registered contact addresses for the ICS User and subsequently selects an access network for delivery of the session to the selected contact address. + +When using the Gm reference point for delivery of the incoming session to the ICS UE, the SCC AS directs the IMS terminating session toward the ICS User's selected contact indicating use of CS bearer for the session. On receipt of the session initiating message, the ICS UE sets up a standard CS originated session addressing a PSI DN associated with the SCC AS to establish the CS bearer if a CS bearer is not available for the ICS UE. The CS bearer shall be reused if already established using the Gm reference point. The service control signalling is combined with the description of the CS bearer at the SCC AS for presentation of IMS terminating session to the S-CSCF over the Remote Leg. + +When a subsequent session termination with different CS bearer requirement occurs (i.e. CS audio bearer is changed to CS video bearer, or vice versa), the CS bearer shall be updated if possible through SCUDIF or redial (refer to clause 7.9.2). + +The following clauses show pairs of flows, one for an ICS UE when using an MSC Server and the other for an MSC Server enhanced for ICS. They are for the most part identical except that in the case of an MSC Server enhanced for ICS the INVITE towards the SCC AS is sent directly from the MSC Server otherwise an MSC sends an ISUP IAM and the MGCF interworks this to an INVITE towards the SCC AS. + +For video call terminating sessions that use CS media, the following apply: + +- When the ICS UE is attached to the MSC Server enhanced for ICS, after the multimedia connection is established, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the video codec negotiation for the ICS UE and set up the video media bearer based upon the procedures defined in TS 29.163 [11] for 3GPP systems and based on the procedures defined in 3GPP2 C.S0042 [38] for 3GPP2 systems; +- When the ICS UE is attached to the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS, the MGCF/IMS-MGW shall perform the video codec negotiation for the ICS UE and set up the video media bearer as specified in TS 29.163 [11] for 3GPP systems and as specified in 3GPP2 C.S0042 [38] for 3GPP2 systems. + +##### 7.4.2.2.2 Terminations with CS media using the Gm reference point + +Figure 7.4.2.2.2-1 provides an example flow for a call destined to an ICS UE attached to an MSC server enhanced for ICS, where the incoming session is delivered over the Gm reference point and the media is established via the CS network. + +![Sequence diagram for ICS UE Terminations with CS media information flows using Gm reference point when using an MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE B, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE A. It includes two alternatives (Alt 1 and Alt 2) for the session setup process, followed by CS bearer set-up and session set-up completion. The bottom part of the diagram illustrates the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths.](8e80de0cac529b2c3775d677c5203133_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS UE B + participant MSC Server + participant MGW + participant SCC AS + participant I/S-CSCF + participant UE A + + UE A->>I/S-CSCF: 1. INVITE (B, SDP-A) + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 2. INVITE (B, SDP-A) + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 3. Session Progress + I/S-CSCF->>UE A: 4. Session Progress + + rect rgb(255, 255, 255) + Note over ICS UE B, I/S-CSCF: Alt 1 + SCC AS->>SCC AS: 5a. T-ADS + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 6a. INVITE (B, SCC AS PSI DN) + I/S-CSCF->>ICS UE B: 7a. INVITE (B, SCC AS PSI DN) + end + + rect rgb(255, 255, 255) + Note over ICS UE B, I/S-CSCF: Alt 2 + SCC AS->>SCC AS: 5b. Initial T-ADS + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 6b. INVITE (B, SCC AS PSI DN) + I/S-CSCF->>ICS UE B: 7b. INVITE (B, SCC AS PSI DN) + ICS UE B->>ICS UE B: 8. UE T-ADS + ICS UE B->>I/S-CSCF: 9. Session Progress + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 10. Session Progress + end + + ICS UE B->>MSC Server: 11. CS call setup (SCC AS PSI DN) + MSC Server->>ICS UE B: 12. Call Proceeding + MSC Server->>I/S-CSCF: 13. INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 14. INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) + + Note over SCC AS, UE A: 15. Continuation of the session set-up with UE-A + Note over ICS UE B, MGW: 16. Completion of the CS bearer set-up procedures + Note over ICS UE B, UE A: 17. Completion of the session set-up procedures + + Note over ICS UE B, MGW: CS Domain Bearer + Note over MGW, UE A: IMS Bearer + +``` + +Sequence diagram for ICS UE Terminations with CS media information flows using Gm reference point when using an MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE B, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE A. It includes two alternatives (Alt 1 and Alt 2) for the session setup process, followed by CS bearer set-up and session set-up completion. The bottom part of the diagram illustrates the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths. + +**Figure 7.4.2.2.2-1: ICS UE Terminations with CS media information flows using Gm reference point when using an MSC Server enhanced for ICS** + +NOTE 1: Steps 11, 12, 13 and 14 are related to the setup of the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. The other steps are related to the setup of the Service Control Signalling Path. + +1. An incoming SIP INVITE is received at the S-CSCF of the B party from UE A. + +2. The S-CSCF executes terminating initial filter criteria and forwards the INVITE to the SCC AS. +3. The SCC AS sends a Session Progress response to the S-CSCF. +4. The S-CSCF forwards the Session Progress response to UE A. + +Steps 5a – 7a are for the case of T-ADS performed by the SCC AS. + +- 5a. The SCC AS performs Terminating Access Domain Selection and chooses the CS domain for the setup of the media. +- 6a. The SCC AS terminates the session from the A-party and establishes a new session by sending an INVITE to the B-party via the I/S-CSCF. This INVITE contains an indication to inform the UE to initiate the CS bearer establishment procedure. The INVITE also contains a dynamic SCC AS PSI to enable the SCC AS to later on correlate the outgoing service control signalling with the incoming CS bearer control signalling. When the T-ADS function selects the Gm reference point for service control the SCC AS prevents the S-CSCF from selecting the contact address of the MSC Server, and the S-CSCF selects the IP-CAN +- 7a. The I/S-CSCF sends the INVITE to B-party. + +Steps 5b – 10 are for the case of UE T-ADS. + +- 5b. Alternatively, in the case of UE T-ADS as defined in clause 5.3.1, the SCC AS performs initial T-ADS selecting IMS for the service control signalling when UE-B is registered in the IMS. +- 6b The SCC AS terminates the session from the A-party and establishes a new session by sending an INVITE to the B-party via the I/S-CSCF. The INVITE contains options that enable UE-B to choose a CS bearer for bidirectional speech media transport if it determines that this is not supported by serving PS Access Network. The INVITE also contains a dynamic SCC AS PSI to enable the SCC AS to later on correlate the outgoing service control signalling with the incoming CS bearer control signalling. When the T-ADS function selects the Gm reference point for service control, the SCC AS prevents the S-CSCF from selecting the contact address of the MSC Server, and the S-CSCF selects the IP-CAN. +- 7b. The I/S-CSCF sends the INVITE to B-party. +- 8-10 UE-B responds with a Session Progress message. In the case that the PS access network does not support bidirectional speech media and in the event the "IMS voice over PS session supported indication" indicates voice is not supported as defined in clause 4.3.5.8 of TS 23.401 [34], UE-B shall indicate in the Session Progress message that a CS bearer is required for the bidirectional speech component of the session and that the Gm reference point is used for service control. The S-CSCF forwards the Session Progress message to the SCC AS. +11. If the establishment mechanism is for UE originated, the ICS UE sends a CS call setup message to the MSC Server using the SCC AS PSI DN to establish the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. This will establish the circuit bearer between the UE and IMS. +12. The MSC Server responds with a call proceeding message and begins to set up the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. +13. The MSC Server sends an INVITE towards the I/S-CSCF containing the SCC AS PSI and an SDP Offer with the media description from the MGW. The MSC Server adds the User Location Information (e.g. CGI or SAI) and/or UE Time Zone Information to the INVITE. +14. The I/S-CSCF forwards the INVITE to the SCC AS. +15. The SCC AS continues the session setup towards the A-party for the original INVITE in Step 1. The response contains an SDP answer with the media description from the SDP offer received in Step 13. +16. The SCC AS completes the set-up of the CS Bearer Signalling Path towards ICS UE B which involves sending a 200 OK in response to the INVITE in Step 14. The ICS UE B, the MSC Server and the SCC AS complete the setup of the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path and the Service Control Signalling Path with UE A. +17. The ICS UE B continues with the set-up of the Service Control Signalling Path towards the UE A which includes sending a Ringing response to the SCC AS via the S-CSCF. The ICS UE B then completes the set-up of the Service Control Signalling Path towards the Remote End which includes sending a final 200 OK message in response to the INVITE received at steps 7a or 7b. + +For video call, in Steps 16 and 17, to complete the session and bearer setup, the specific handling as described in clause 7.4.2.2.1 applies. + +Figure 7.4.2.2.2-2 provides an example flow for a call destined to an ICS UE attached to an MSC server, where the incoming session is delivered over the Gm reference point and the media is established via the CS network. + +![Sequence diagram for ICS UE Terminations with CS media information flows using Gm reference point when using an MSC Server. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE B, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE A. It includes two alternatives (Alt 1 and Alt 2) for the initial INVITE handling. Alt 1 involves T-ADS and INVITE (B, SCC AS PSI DN) messages. Alt 2 involves Initial T-ADS and INVITE (B, SCC AS PSI DN) messages. Both alternatives lead to CS call setup, call proceeding, IAM, and INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) messages. The diagram concludes with the completion of CS bearer set-up and session set-up procedures, showing CS Domain Bearers and an IMS Bearer.](a003ffe7299e0a48bceb7f1e45a4f1a3_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant I/S-CSCF + participant SCC AS + participant MGW + participant MGCF + participant MSC Server + participant ICS UE B + + Note right of UE A: 1. INVITE (B, SDP-A) + UE A->>I/S-CSCF: 1. INVITE (B, SDP-A) + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 2. INVITE (B, SDP-A) + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 3. Session Progress + I/S-CSCF->>UE A: 4. Session Progress + + alt Alt 1: T-ADS + Note right of SCC AS: 5a. T-ADS + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 6a. INVITE (B, SCC AS PSI DN) + I/S-CSCF->>MGCF: 7a. INVITE (B, SCC AS PSI DN) + MGCF->>ICS UE B: + else Alt 2: Initial T-ADS + Note right of SCC AS: 5b. Initial T-ADS + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 6b. INVITE (B, SCC AS PSI DN) + I/S-CSCF->>MGCF: 7b. INVITE (B, SCC AS PSI DN) + MGCF->>ICS UE B: + end + + Note left of ICS UE B: 8. UE T-ADS + ICS UE B->>I/S-CSCF: 9. Session Progress + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 10. Session Progress + + ICS UE B->>MSC Server: 11. CS call setup (SCC AS PSI DN) + MSC Server->>ICS UE B: 12. Call Proceeding + MSC Server->>MGCF: 13. IAM (SCC AS PSI DN) + MGCF->>I/S-CSCF: 14. INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 15. INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) + + Note right of SCC AS: 16. Continuation of the session set-up with UE-A + Note over MGW, SCC AS: 17. Completion of the CS bearer set-up procedures + Note over MGW, SCC AS, MGCF, MSC Server: 18. Completion of the session set-up procedures + + Note over ICS UE B, MGCF: CS Domain Bearer + Note over MGCF, MGW: CS Domain Bearer + Note over MGW, I/S-CSCF, UE A: IMS Bearer + +``` + +Sequence diagram for ICS UE Terminations with CS media information flows using Gm reference point when using an MSC Server. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE B, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE A. It includes two alternatives (Alt 1 and Alt 2) for the initial INVITE handling. Alt 1 involves T-ADS and INVITE (B, SCC AS PSI DN) messages. Alt 2 involves Initial T-ADS and INVITE (B, SCC AS PSI DN) messages. Both alternatives lead to CS call setup, call proceeding, IAM, and INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) messages. The diagram concludes with the completion of CS bearer set-up and session set-up procedures, showing CS Domain Bearers and an IMS Bearer. + +**Figure 7.4.2.2.2-2: ICS UE Terminations with CS media information flows using Gm reference point when using an MSC Server** + +NOTE 2: Steps 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 are related to the setup of the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. The other steps are related to the setup of the Service Control Signalling Path. + +Steps 1-12 in Figure 7.4.2.2.2-2 are identical to steps 1-12 in Figure 7.4.2.2.2-1. + +At Steps 13 and 14, the MSC server sends the IAM to an MGCF using the SCC AS PSI DN which is subsequently inter-worked to an INVITE containing the SCC AS PSI and an SDP Offer from the MGW. + +Steps 15-18 in Figure 7.4.2.2.2-2 are identical to steps 14-17 in Figure 7.4.2.2.2-1. + +##### 7.4.2.2.3 Terminations with CS media using the I1 reference point + +Figure 7.4.2.2.3-1 provides an example flow for a call destined to an ICS UE attached to an MSC server enhanced for ICS, where the incoming session is delivered over the I1 reference point and the media is established via the CS network. + +![Sequence diagram for ICS UE Terminations with CS media information flows using I1 reference point when using an MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE B, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE A. It includes SIP signaling (INVITE, Session Progress, T-ADS, CS Call Setup, Call Proceeding, Ringing, Connecting, 200 OK) and CS bearer setup procedures. Two alternatives (Alt 1 and Alt 2) are shown for the T-ADS handling. The diagram is divided into CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer sections at the bottom.](3442f31a562d1ef45bfa18b18a6a1ddc_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant I/S-CSCF + participant SCC AS + participant MGW + participant MSC Server + participant ICS UE B + + Note right of UE A: 1. INVITE (B, SDP-A) + UE A->>I/S-CSCF: 1. INVITE (B, SDP-A) + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 2. INVITE (B, SDP-A) + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 3. Session Progress + I/S-CSCF->>UE A: 4. Session Progress + + alt Alt 1: T-ADS + Note right of SCC AS: 5a. T-ADS + SCC AS->>MSC Server: 6a. I1: ICS Incoming Call (B, SCC AS PSI DN) + else Alt 2: Initial T-ADS + Note right of SCC AS: 5b. Initial T-ADS + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 6b. INVITE (B, SCC AS PSI DN) + I/S-CSCF->>MSC Server: 7. INVITE (B, SCC AS PSI DN) + Note right of ICS UE B: 8. UE T-ADS + ICS UE B->>MGW: 9. Session Progress + MGW->>SCC AS: 10. Session Progress + end + + Note right of ICS UE B: 11. CS Call Setup (SCC AS PSI DN) + ICS UE B->>MSC Server: 11. CS Call Setup (SCC AS PSI DN) + Note right of ICS UE B: 12. Call Proceeding + ICS UE B->>MSC Server: 12. Call Proceeding + + MSC Server->>I/S-CSCF: 13. INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 14. INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) + + Note right of SCC AS: 15. Continuation of the session set-up with UE-A + SCC AS->>UE A: 15. Continuation of the session set-up with UE-A + + Note right of MGW: 16. Completion of the CS bearer set-up procedures + MGW->>SCC AS: 16. Completion of the CS bearer set-up procedures + + Note right of ICS UE B: 17. I1: Ringing + ICS UE B->>SCC AS: 17. I1: Ringing + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 18. Ringing + I/S-CSCF->>UE A: 19. Ringing + + Note right of ICS UE B: 20. I1: Connecting + ICS UE B->>SCC AS: 20. I1: Connecting + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 21. 200 OK + I/S-CSCF->>UE A: 22. 200 OK + + Note right of MGW: CS Domain Bearer + Note right of I/S-CSCF: IMS Bearer + +``` + +Sequence diagram for ICS UE Terminations with CS media information flows using I1 reference point when using an MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE B, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE A. It includes SIP signaling (INVITE, Session Progress, T-ADS, CS Call Setup, Call Proceeding, Ringing, Connecting, 200 OK) and CS bearer setup procedures. Two alternatives (Alt 1 and Alt 2) are shown for the T-ADS handling. The diagram is divided into CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer sections at the bottom. + +**Figure 7.4.2.2.3-1: ICS UE Terminations with CS media information flows using I1 reference point when using an MSC Server enhanced for ICS** + +NOTE 1: Steps 1-10, 15 and 17-22 are related to the setup of the Service Control Signalling Path. Steps 11-14 and 16 are related to the setup of the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. + +1. An incoming SIP INVITE is received at the S-CSCF of the B party from UE A. +2. The S-CSCF executes terminating initial filter criteria and forwards the INVITE to the SCC AS. + +3. The SCC AS sends a Session Progress response to the S-CSCF. +4. The S-CSCF forwards the Session Progress response to UE A. + +Steps 5a – 6a are for the case of T-ADS performed by the SCC AS. + +- 5a. The SCC AS performs Terminating Access Domain Selection and if informed of the UE capability for I1 during IMS registration, chooses the CS domain for the setup of the media. + +NOTE 2: Conveyance of UE capability of support for I1 does not imply that I1 can be established (e.g. the visited network does not support I1). + +- 6a. The SCC AS terminates the session from the A-party and establishes a new session over I1 by sending an Incoming Call Request to the B-party via the HSS and MSC Server. The Incoming Call Request contains an indication to inform the UE to initiate the CS bearer establishment procedure. The Incoming Call Request also contains a dynamic SCC AS PSI (DN) to enable the SCC AS to later on correlate the outgoing service control signalling with the incoming CS bearer control signalling. + +Steps 5b – 10 are for the case of UE assisted T-ADS. + +- 5b. Alternatively, in the case of UE assisted T-ADS the SCC AS performs initial T-ADS selecting IMS for the service control signalling when UE-B is registered in the IMS. +- 6b The SCC AS terminates the session from the A-party and establishes a new session by sending an INVITE to the B-party via the I/S-CSCF. The INVITE contains options that enable UE-B to choose a CS bearer for bidirectional speech media transport if it determines that this is not supported by serving PS Access Network. The INVITE also contains a dynamic SCC AS PSI (DN) to enable the SCC AS to later on correlate the outgoing service control signalling with the incoming CS bearer control signalling. When the T-ADS function selects the Gm reference point for service control, the SCC AS prevents the S-CSCF from selecting the contact address of the MSC server, and the S-CSCF selects the IP-CAN. +- 7b. The I/S-CSCF sends the INVITE to B-party. +- 8-10. In the case where the access network does not support simultaneous PS and CS, UE-B responds with a Session Progress message and in the event the "IMS voice over PS session supported indication" indicates voice is not supported as defined in TS 23.401 [34]. UE-B shall indicate in the Session Progress message that a CS bearer is required for the session and that further signalling for the session will be via I1. The S-CSCF forwards the Session Progress message to the SCC AS. +11. The ICS UE sends a CS Setup message to the MSC Server using the SCC AS PSI DN to establish the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. This will establish the circuit bearer between the UE and IMS. +12. The MSC Server responds with a call proceeding message and begins to set up the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. +13. The MSC Server sends an INVITE towards the I/S-CSCF containing the SCC AS PSI and an SDP Offer with the media description from the MGW. The MSC Server adds the User Location Information (e.g. CGI or SAI) and/or UE Time Zone Information to the INVITE. +14. The I/S-CSCF forwards the INVITE to the SCC AS. +15. The SCC AS continues the session setup towards the A-party for the original INVITE in Step 1. The response contains an SDP answer with the media description from the SDP offer received in Step 13. +16. The SCC AS completes the set-up of the CS Bearer Signalling Path towards ICS UE B which involves sending a 200 OK in response to the INVITE in Step 14. The ICS UE B, the MSC Server and the SCC AS complete the setup of the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path and the Service Control Signalling Path with UE A. +17. UE-B sends a Ringing indication to the SCC AS via I1. +- 18-19. The SCC AS sends a Ringing message to the remote end. +20. UE-B sends a Connecting message to the SCC AS via I1. + +21-22. The SCC AS sends a 200 OK message to the remote end in response to the INVITE received at step 2. For video call, to complete the session and bearer setup, the specific handling as described in clause 7.4.2.2.1 applies. + +Figure 7.4.2.2.3-2 provides an example flow for a call destined to an ICS UE attached to an MSC server where the incoming session is delivered over the I1 reference point and the media is established via the CS network. + +![Sequence diagram for ICS UE Terminations with CS media information flows using I1 reference point when using an MSC Server. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE B, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE A. It includes message exchanges for INVITE, Session Progress, T-ADS, CS Call Setup, Call Proceeding, IAM, Ringing, Connecting, and 200 OK. The bottom part shows the completion of CS bearer set-up procedures and the transition from CS Domain Bearers to IMS Bearers.](a0e8fe7862a6d7341faf5dac275277cc_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS UE B + participant MSC Server + participant MGCF + participant MGW + participant SCC AS + participant I/S-CSCF + participant UE A + + UE A->>I/S-CSCF: 1. INVITE (B, SDP-A) + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 2. INVITE (B, SDP-A) + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 3. Session Progress + I/S-CSCF->>UE A: 4. Session Progress + + rect rgb(240, 240, 240) + Note over ICS UE B, UE A: Alt 1 + SCC AS->>SCC AS: 5a. T-ADS + SCC AS->>ICS UE B: 6a. I1: ICS incoming call (B, SCC AS PSI DN) + end + + rect rgb(240, 240, 240) + Note over ICS UE B, UE A: Alt 2 + SCC AS->>SCC AS: 5b. Initial T-ADS + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 6b. INVITE (B, SCC AS PSI DN) + I/S-CSCF->>ICS UE B: 7b. INVITE (B, SCC AS PSI DN) + Note over ICS UE B: 8. UE T-ADS + ICS UE B->>I/S-CSCF: 9. Session Progress + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 10. Session Progress + end + + ICS UE B->>MSC Server: 11. CS Call Setup (SCC AS PSI DN) + MSC Server->>ICS UE B: 12. Call Proceeding + MSC Server->>MGCF: 13. IAM (SCC AS PSI DN) + MGCF->>I/S-CSCF: 14. INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 15. INVITE (SCC AS PSI, SDP-MGW) + + Note over SCC AS, UE A: 16. Continuation of the session set-up with UE-A + Note over ICS UE B, SCC AS: 17. Completion of the CS bearer set-up procedures + + ICS UE B->>SCC AS: 18. I1: Ringing + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 19. Ringing + I/S-CSCF->>UE A: 20. Ringing + + ICS UE B->>SCC AS: 21. I1: Connecting + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 22. 200 OK + I/S-CSCF->>UE A: 23. 200 OK + + Note over ICS UE B, MSC Server: CS Domain Bearer + Note over MSC Server, MGW: CS Domain Bearer + Note over MGW, UE A: IMS Bearer + +``` + +Sequence diagram for ICS UE Terminations with CS media information flows using I1 reference point when using an MSC Server. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE B, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE A. It includes message exchanges for INVITE, Session Progress, T-ADS, CS Call Setup, Call Proceeding, IAM, Ringing, Connecting, and 200 OK. The bottom part shows the completion of CS bearer set-up procedures and the transition from CS Domain Bearers to IMS Bearers. + +**Figure 7.4.2.2.3-2: ICS UE Terminations with CS media information flows using I1 reference point when using an MSC Server** + +NOTE 3: Steps 1-10, 16 and 18-23 are related to the setup of the Service Control Signalling Path. Steps 11-15 and 17 are related to the setup of the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. + +Steps 1-12 in Figure 7.4.2.2.3-2 are identical to steps 1-12 in Figure 7.4.2.2.3-1. + +At Steps 13 and 14, the MSC server sends the IAM to an MGCF using the SCC AS PSI DN which is subsequently inter-worked to an INVITE containing the SCC AS PSI and an SDP Offer from the MGW. + +Steps 15-23 in Figure 7.4.2.2.3-2 are identical to steps 14-22 in Figure 7.4.2.2.3-1. + +##### 7.4.2.2.4 Terminations with CS media using CS control with I1 augmentation + +Standard CS terminating procedures are used to deliver the incoming session to the ICS UE as described in Figure 7.4.2.2.3-1 when the ICS UE is attached to an MSC server enhanced for ICS, and in Figure 7.4.2.2.3-2 when the ICS UE is attached to an MSC server. Additional IMS parameters can be optionally communicated to the ICS UE using I1 after the incoming session has been delivered. + +##### 7.4.2.2.5 Terminations with CS media when not using Gm or I1 + +Figure 7.4.2.1.2-1 provides an example flow for a call destined to an ICS UE attached to an MSC server enhanced for ICS, where the incoming session is delivered using standard CS terminating procedures. + +If an ICS UE is attached to an MSC server where the incoming session is delivered to it using standard CS terminating procedures, an example call flow is shown in Figure 7.4.2.1.3-1. + +##### 7.4.2.2.6 Void + +##### 7.4.2.2.7 Terminating access network reselection – fallback to alternate access + +When using the Gm reference point for delivery of the incoming session to the ICS UE, if it fails to set up the bearer in the selected terminating access network and other access network(s) is available for the service, the UE may send a message to the SCC AS indicating the failure of bear setup with the information required for access network reselection (e.g. the information of available access network(s)), or indicate a newly selected access network. The SCC AS can then, based on the message and operator policy, update the relevant decision information for T-ADS if necessary and reselect a new access network for bearer setup to complete the terminating session establishment. + +Figure 7.4.2.2.7-1 gives an example flow of terminating access reselection for ICS UE terminating session establishment using Gm reference point. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 7.4.2.2.7-1: Access reselection for ICS UE termination over Gm reference point. The diagram shows the interaction between ICS UE B, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE A. The process involves an incoming call from UE A to UE B, a failed bearer setup in the first selected network, a failure indication to the I/S-CSCF, a reselection by the SCC AS, a new invite to UE B, a successful bearer setup in the new network, and the completion of session setup procedures.](9e8ebf03cae78f4f81b697548c2d7250_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant I/S-CSCF + participant SCC AS + participant MGW + participant MGCF + participant MSC Server + participant ICS UE B + + Note right of UE A: 1. An incoming call from UE A to UE B, T-ADS is executed by the SCC AS and an access network is chosen for bearer establishment. Refer to Figure 7.4.2.2.2-1 step 1-7a. + Note left of ICS UE B: 2. Bearer setup fails in the selected access network + ICS UE B->>I/S-CSCF: 3. Bearer setup failure indication, with info of other available access network(s) + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 4. Bearer setup failure indication + Note right of SCC AS: 5. T-ADS (reselection) + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 6. Invite + I/S-CSCF->>MSC Server: 7. Invite + Note left of ICS UE B: 8. Bearer setup in the newly selected access network + Note right of UE A: 9. Completion of session setup procedures + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure 7.4.2.2.7-1: Access reselection for ICS UE termination over Gm reference point. The diagram shows the interaction between ICS UE B, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE A. The process involves an incoming call from UE A to UE B, a failed bearer setup in the first selected network, a failure indication to the I/S-CSCF, a reselection by the SCC AS, a new invite to UE B, a successful bearer setup in the new network, and the completion of session setup procedures. + +**Figure 7.4.2.2.7-1: Access reselection for ICS UE termination over Gm reference point** + +1. An incoming call arrives at UE B from UE A. T-ADS is executed by the SCC AS and an access network is chosen for bearer establishment (refer to Steps 1-7a in Figure 7.4.2.2.2-1). +2. Bearer setup fails in the selected access network. +3. UE B sends a message to the I/S-CSCF indicating the failure of bearer setup. Information required for the SCC AS to re-execute T-ADS and to select a new access network is provided (e.g. info of access network(s) available for the service), or a new access network selected by the UE for bearer setup is indicated. +4. The I/S-CSCF forwards the message to the SCC AS based on originating initial filter criteria. +5. The SCC AS updates the relevant decision information for T-ADS and re-executes T-ADS to select a new access network for bearer setup of the session if no new access network is selected by the UE. +- 6-7. The SCC AS sends an Invite message to UE B via the S-CSCF to establish the session, with the newly selected access network for bearer setup indicated or confirmed (if selected by the UE). +8. Bearer setup in the newly selected terminating access network for the session. +9. Completion of session setup procedures between UE A and UE B. + +### 7.4.3 Terminating sessions over Gm rejected by the UE + +Figure 7.4.3-1 provides an example flow for a call destined to a UE-2 and where the incoming session is delivered over the Gm reference point offering either PS speech media, CS media, or PS speech media with alternative CS media, because the SCC AS is unable to accurately determine that the CS domain should be used, e.g. when ISR according to TS 23.401 [34] is active and if the UE hasn't re-registered in the IMS. In this example call flow the UE-2 rejects the incoming session and T-ADS in the SCC AS selects CS domain for termination. The flow applies to both ICS UE and non ICS UE. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the terminating session rejected by the UE. The diagram shows the interaction between UE 2, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE 1. The process starts with an INVITE from UE 1 to S-CSCF, followed by service control, forwarding to SCC AS, session anchoring, and subsequent INVITE messages to UE 2 via the MSC Server. The diagram also shows the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths.](2cf3896394a2342a2b46c504ab9a8830_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE2 as UE 2 + participant MSC as MSC Server + participant MGW as MGW + participant SCSCF as S-CSCF + participant SCCAS as SCC AS + participant UE1 as UE 1 + + UE1->>SCSCF: 1. INVITE + Note over SCSCF: 2. Perform service control + SCSCF->>SCCAS: 3. INVITE + Note over SCCAS: 4. Anchor the Session and perform T-ADS + SCCAS->>SCSCF: 5. INVITE + SCSCF->>UE2: 6. INVITE + UE2->>SCSCF: 7. Response + SCSCF->>SCCAS: 8. Response + Note over SCCAS: 9. Perform T-ADS + SCCAS->>SCSCF: 10. INVITE + SCSCF->>MSC: 11. INVITE + Note over UE2, MSC: 12. Terminating CS call establishment + +``` + +The diagram illustrates the sequence of messages for a terminating session rejected by the UE. At the bottom, a horizontal double-headed arrow spans from UE 2 to UE 1, with a cross at the MGW. The left part of the arrow is labeled 'CS Domain Bearer' and the right part is labeled 'IMS Bearer'. + +Sequence diagram illustrating the terminating session rejected by the UE. The diagram shows the interaction between UE 2, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE 1. The process starts with an INVITE from UE 1 to S-CSCF, followed by service control, forwarding to SCC AS, session anchoring, and subsequent INVITE messages to UE 2 via the MSC Server. The diagram also shows the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths. + +**Figure 7.4.3-1: Terminating session rejected by the UE** + +1. The request is received at S-CSCF following normal IMS session set up procedures. +- 2~3. The service logic with iFC causes the request to be forwarded to the SCC AS. +4. The SCC AS anchors the session. T-ADS is executed and the PS access is selected for termination. +- 5~6. The SIP INVITE is forwarded to the UE via the selected PS access. Paging is triggered if the UE is in Idle state. +- 7~8. The UE determines that PS access cannot be used for a session with the offered media and it returns a response to the IMS indicating the error condition. The S-CSCF forwards the message to the SCC AS. +9. On receiving the response, the SCC AS reattempts the terminating call establishment directly towards the same UE over CS domain if possible. +- 10~11. The SIP INVITE is forwarded to UE-2 via the MSC Server enhanced for ICS (or via MGCF and MSC if the MSC is not enhanced for ICS). +12. Terminating CS call establishment. + +NOTE: If the UE determines that PS access cannot be used for the media flows it might be worth providing the caller party with a courtesy tone generated by the IMS while the termination is being re-attempted. + +## 7.5 Service continuity + +### 7.5.1 Service continuity for ICS UE + +#### 7.5.1.1 Service continuity while maintaining the use of CS access for the media + +### 7.5.1.1.1 IMS sessions established using Gm reference point + +###### 7.5.1.1.1.1 Overview + +When the CS bearer is used for the media of the IMS session, the Gm reference point may be used for communication of service control signalling, contingent upon the VPLMN support of the Gm reference point. A change of access network due to handover (e.g. as described in TS 23.009 [22] and TS 25.413 [23]), may result in an inability to use the PS access for the Gm reference point while the use of CS access for the media of the IMS session is still possible; under such circumstance, the service continuity is maintained by switching the signalling transport over to the CS access, e.g. by switching the use of Gm with the I1 reference point or to not using Gm or I1. + +###### 7.5.1.1.1.2 Use of Gm reference point possible after handover + +Standard Handover procedures, that are specific to different access networks (e.g. as described in TS 23.009 [22] and TS 25.413 [23]), are used for handover of the Service Control Signalling Path and the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path along with the associated circuit bearer to the target access network. + +The use of Gm reference point for Service Control Signalling Path is maintained upon handover. + +###### 7.5.1.1.1.3 Use of Gm reference point not possible after Handover + +Standard CS handover procedures, that are specific to different access networks (e.g. as described in TS 23.009 [22] and TS 25.413 [23]), are used to relocate the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path and the associated circuit bearer to the target access network. Upon completion of the handover of the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path and the associated circuit bearer to the target access, the UE sends a handover notification message to the SCC AS to indicate use of I1 for the Service Control Signalling Path if the I1 reference point is available in the target access network or to fallback to not using Gm or I1. + +After handover, the I1 reference point is used for service control signalling in networks supporting the I1 reference point; the non ICS UE procedures apply in networks not supporting the I1 reference point. + +###### 7.5.1.1.1.3a Use of Service Control Signalling Path not possible after Handover + +###### 7.5.1.1.1.3a.1 MSC Server assisted mid-call feature not used + +If the SCC AS detects that the ICS UE is not reachable over the Service Control Signalling Path and if the UE or the network does not support the MSC Server assisted mid-call feature as specified in TS 23.237 [12], the SCC AS shall: + +- clear any held sessions related to the user and update the remote leg if necessary; and +- clear any active session that is a conference initiated by the user and hosted in the IMS. + +NOTE 1: Detecting the loss of the Service Control Signalling Path is an implementation issue. + +NOTE 2: In order to avoid an unintentional release of an ongoing ICS session, an ICS UE can re-register its Public User Identity with the IMS at a time chosen to minimize the probability of its IMS registration expiring during an ongoing ICS session when Gm is not available. To prevent the ICS UE requesting re-registration with unacceptable frequency, the Registrar in a network implementing ICS would need to set the IMS registration expiry timer to an appropriate value. + +Figure 7.5.1.1.1.3a-1 is an example call flow of releasing the aforementioned session at the SCC AS when the SCC AS detects that the ICS UE is not reachable over Service Control Signalling Path and the UE or the network does not support the MSC Server assisted mid-call feature as specified in TS 23.237 [12]. + +![Sequence diagram showing the release of held sessions at SCC AS when Service Control Signalling Path is unavailable. The diagram involves ICS UE A, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE B, and UE C. A session between ICS UE A & UE B is active, and session(s) between UE A & UE C are on hold, and/or a session between ICS UE A & a conference hosted in IMS is active. The SCC AS detects the unavailability of the Service Control Signalling Path, releases the held session(s), sends an UPDATE to the S-CSCF, which then forwards it to UE B.](3337af75dfee8af7687b4f49914d6c93_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS_UE_A as ICS UE A + participant MSC as MSC + participant MGCF as MGCF + participant MGW as MGW + participant S-CSCF as S-CSCF + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + participant UE_B as UE B + participant UE_C as UE C + + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_C: Session between ICS UE A & UE B active and session(s) between UE A & UE C on hold, and/or Session between ICS UE A & conference hosted in IMS + + SCC_AS->>S-CSCF: 1. Detection of Service Control Signaling Path unavailable + SCC_AS->>S-CSCF: 2. Release of held session(s) and/or active sessions that are a conference initiated by UE A hosted in the IMS + S-CSCF-->>UE_B: 3. Update + S-CSCF-->>UE_B: 4. Update + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the release of held sessions at SCC AS when Service Control Signalling Path is unavailable. The diagram involves ICS UE A, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE B, and UE C. A session between ICS UE A & UE B is active, and session(s) between UE A & UE C are on hold, and/or a session between ICS UE A & a conference hosted in IMS is active. The SCC AS detects the unavailability of the Service Control Signalling Path, releases the held session(s), sends an UPDATE to the S-CSCF, which then forwards it to UE B. + +**Figure 7.5.1.1.1.3a-1: release of held sessions at SCC AS when Service Control Signalling Path unavailable** + +1. The SCC AS detects that the ICS UE is not reachable over Service Control Signalling Path. +2. The SCC AS releases the held session between UE A and UE C and/or the active session that is a conference initiated by UE A and hosted in the IMS. +3. The SCC AS sends the UPDATE to the S-CSCF. +4. The S-CSCF forwards the UPDATE to the UE B to update the remote leg. + +#### 7.5.1.1.1.3a.2 MSC Server assisted mid-call feature used and MSC Server supports ICS + +See TS 23.237 [12] IMS Service Continuity. + +### 7.5.1.2 Service continuity when transferring the media of IMS sessions between PS and CS access + +See TS 23.237 [12] IMS Service Continuity. + +## 7.5a Addition of Gm service control to existing call + +### 7.5a.1 Overview + +A call can be established by an ICS UE that supports Gm, but without using the Gm reference point (for example, as a result of CSFB, or when in non-DTM GERAN coverage). If Gm is available after call establishment, or becomes available (for example, as a result of a change of access network due to handover), no mid-call services are applicable to the call, and the call is anchored in the SCC AS as described in clause 7.3.2.1 or 7.4.2.1, the UE may augment the ongoing CS call in order to be able to use Gm for service control signalling. + +If the UE does augment the ongoing CS call with Gm service control signalling then the UE shall use Gm when establishing additional calls, or for any mid-call signalling. The UE shall continue to use Gm procedures until the existing calls end. + +If the UE does not augment the ongoing CS call with Gm service control signalling then the UE shall use CS procedures when establishing additional calls, or for any mid-call signalling. The UE shall continue to use CS procedures until the existing calls end. + +### 7.5a.2 Augmentation call flow + +If configured to do so the ICS UE may invoke IMS signalling to add Gm service control to the ongoing session. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the augmentation of a CS call with Gm. The diagram shows three lifelines: UE (divided into PS and CS), I / S-CSCF, and SCC AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. INVITE (STI, SDP speech and media) from UE to I / S-CSCF; 2. INVITE (STI, SDP speech and media) from I / S-CSCF to SCC AS; 3. Remote Leg Update from SCC AS.](9b1ec0090070bdf52ea28763b8d52477_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + subgraph UE + PS + CS + end + participant I_S_CSCF as I / S-CSCF + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + Note right of SCC_AS: 3. Remote Leg Update + UE->>I_S_CSCF: 1. INVITE (STI, SDP speech and media) + I_S_CSCF->>SCC_AS: 2. INVITE (STI, SDP speech and media) + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the augmentation of a CS call with Gm. The diagram shows three lifelines: UE (divided into PS and CS), I / S-CSCF, and SCC AS. The sequence of messages is: 1. INVITE (STI, SDP speech and media) from UE to I / S-CSCF; 2. INVITE (STI, SDP speech and media) from I / S-CSCF to SCC AS; 3. Remote Leg Update from SCC AS. + +**Figure 7.5a.2-1: Augmentation with Gm** + +1. When the UE determines a need to augment a CS call with Gm, the UE initiates registration with IMS via the new PS access (if not already registered). It initiates the augmentation by sending an INVITE to establish the service control signalling via the PS access. The INVITE includes the SDP for speech or speech and video and non-real-time media flow(s) and the static (provisioned) STI, as defined in TS 23.237 [12]. +2. Standard procedures are used at S-CSCF for routing of the INVITE to the SCC AS. +3. The SCC AS identifies the session to be augmented using the STI. If the INVITE request contains additional PS media the SCC AS also performs the Remote Leg Update to update the combined session towards the Remote Leg. + +## 7.6 Consistency of Supplementary Services + +### 7.6.0 General + +The applicability of Supplementary Services to the different media types that apply for ICS (as defined in clause 22.4 of TS 22.101 [9]) are specified in Annex A of TS 22.004 [41]. + +### 7.6.1 Supplementary Services for ICS UE + +#### 7.6.1.1 Overview + +When the IP-CAN is used for the media of the IMS session, IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply for IMS services. + +When the CS bearer is used for the media of the IMS session, the Gm or the I1 reference point is used for communication of service control signalling; IMS services are provided to the ICS UE with the IUA of the SCC AS combining the service control signalling with the description of the CS bearer for execution of service control over the Remote Leg. + +#### 7.6.1.2 IMS sessions using CS bearer + +##### 7.6.1.2.1 Overview + +When the CS bearer is used for the media of the IMS Multimedia Telephony service, see TS 22.173 [4], the procedures specified in this clause apply. + +### 7.6.1.2.2 Use of Gm reference point + +#### 7.6.1.2.2.1 Line ID Services (OIP, OIR, TIP, TIR) + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply with the SCC AS combining the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the Gm reference point as specified in clause 7.1. + +#### 7.6.1.2.2.2 Communication Diversion Services + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply with the IUA of the SCC AS combining the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the Gm reference point as specified in clause 7.1. + +#### 7.6.1.2.2.3 Communication Barring + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply with the SCC AS combining the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the Gm reference point as specified in clause 7.1. + +#### 7.6.1.2.2.4 Communication Hold/Resume + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply with the SCC AS combining the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the Gm reference point as specified in clause 7.1. + +Additionally, the SCC AS may employ an MRF for control of media as needed for execution of the Communication Hold/Resume. + +NOTE 1: Annex E describes several implementation options on how to process media using MRF. + +During communication hold, if a held session is resumed with the same service type/bearer requirement (i.e. voice or video) as the existing CS bearer, the CS bearer shall be reused; otherwise, the CS bearer shall be updated if possible through SCUDIF or redial mechanism (refer to clause 7.9). + +Figure 7.6.1.2.2.4-1 provides the ICS Communication Hold/Resume flow over Gm reference point for the ICS UE. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the ICS Communication Hold/Resume flow over Gm reference point. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, IMS-MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE B. The process starts with an active session between ICS UE A and UE B. The flow consists of two main parts: Hold and Resume. In the Hold part, ICS UE A sends a Hold request to I/S-CSCF (1), which is forwarded to SCC AS (2), then to IMS-MGW (3), then to UE B (4). SCC AS sends a Media Update to I/S-CSCF (5), which is forwarded to MGCF (6). The completion of the hold is indicated by a message from I/S-CSCF to ICS UE A (7). In the Resume part, ICS UE A sends a Resume request to I/S-CSCF (8), which is forwarded to SCC AS (9), then to IMS-MGW (10), then to UE B (11). SCC AS sends a Media Update to I/S-CSCF (12), which is forwarded to MGCF (13). The completion of the resume is indicated by a message from I/S-CSCF to ICS UE A (14).](d344e2567def9141040128932d6aec49_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram illustrating the ICS Communication Hold/Resume flow over Gm reference point. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, IMS-MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE B. The process starts with an active session between ICS UE A and UE B. The flow consists of two main parts: Hold and Resume. In the Hold part, ICS UE A sends a Hold request to I/S-CSCF (1), which is forwarded to SCC AS (2), then to IMS-MGW (3), then to UE B (4). SCC AS sends a Media Update to I/S-CSCF (5), which is forwarded to MGCF (6). The completion of the hold is indicated by a message from I/S-CSCF to ICS UE A (7). In the Resume part, ICS UE A sends a Resume request to I/S-CSCF (8), which is forwarded to SCC AS (9), then to IMS-MGW (10), then to UE B (11). SCC AS sends a Media Update to I/S-CSCF (12), which is forwarded to MGCF (13). The completion of the resume is indicated by a message from I/S-CSCF to ICS UE A (14). + +**Figure 7.6.1.2.2.4-1: ICS Communication Hold/Resume over Gm reference point** + +1. The ICS UE A sends a Hold request to the S-CSCF as specified in TS 23.228 [2] and TS 24.173 [8]. The hold request indicates whether the media shall continue to be sent to the remote party or not. +2. The S-CSCF forwards the Hold request to the SCC AS based upon filter criteria. +3. The SCC AS sends the Hold request to the S-CSCF indicating the remote party shall stop sending the media and, according to the hold request, continue or stop receiving media from the invoking UE. + +4. The S-CSCF sends the Hold request to UE B. +5. The SCC AS sends a media update request to the S-CSCF indicating the media is held. +6. The S-CSCF forwards the media update request to the MGCF. Depending on what information is exactly contained in the request, MGCF could send call hold request towards the CS network according to TS 29.163 [11]. If the ICS UE A receives this request from MGCF, it shall ignore it. + +NOTE 2: Steps 5-6 can be executed in parallel with steps 3-4. + +7. Completion of communication hold between UE A and UE B based on the procedures specified in TS 23.228 [2]. +8. The ICS UE A sends a Resume request to the S-CSCF as specified in TS 23.228 [2] and TS 24.173 [8]. +9. The S-CSCF forwards the Resume request to the SCC AS based upon filter criteria. +10. The SCC AS sends the Resume request to the S-CSCF. +11. The S-CSCF sends the Resume request to UE B. +12. The SCC AS sends a media update request to the S-CSCF indicating the media is resumed. +13. The S-CSCF forwards the media update request to the MGCF. + +NOTE 3: Steps 12-13 can be executed in parallel with steps 10-11. + +14. Completion of communication resume between UE A and UE B based on the procedures specified in TS 23.228 [2]. + +NOTE 4: If MSC Server enhanced for ICS is deployed rather than the MSC Server and MGCF, the same flows apply and the MSC Server enhanced for ICS plays the role of MSC Server and MGCF. + +#### 7.6.1.2.2.5 Explicit Communication Transfer + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply with the SCC AS combining the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the Gm reference point as specified in clause 7.1 of this document. + +Additionally, the SCC AS may employ an MRF for control of media as needed for execution of the Explicit Communication Transfer. + +##### 7.6.1.2.2.5.1 Consultative ECT using Gm reference point, ICS UE as transfer recipient + +Figure 7.6.1.2.2.5.1-1 describes how IMS consultative ECT is performed when ICS UE B is playing the role of transfer recipient using Gm interface. The UE A has a held call with UE C and an ongoing call with ICS UE B before transfer. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Consultative ECT via Gm for ICS UE (transfer recipient). The diagram shows the interaction between ICS UE B, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE C, and UE A. It details the steps for transferring a session from UE A to UE C while maintaining an active session with ICS UE B.](56a5265d174ce056c1dbe5e7a60839fc_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the IMS Consultative ECT process via Gm for an ICS UE acting as the transfer recipient. The participants involved are ICS UE B, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE C, and UE A. The process begins with a session between ICS UE B and UE A active, and a session between UE A and UE C on hold. UE A initiates the transfer by sending a REFER request to UE C. The S-CSCF then sends the REFER to the SCC AS, which in turn sends it to the S-CSCF, and finally to the ICS UE B. The ICS UE B initiates session establishment towards UE C by sending an INVITE message. The S-CSCF filters this and sends the INVITE to the SCC AS, which then routes it to the S-CSCF, and finally to UE C. UE C responds with session progress messages (Progress) back to the ICS UE B via the S-CSCF and SCC AS. The SCC AS sends a backward message to the MGCF to update the MGW port for connecting with UE C. Once the session is established between the ICS UE B and UE C, the ICS UE B sends a NOTIFY message (transfer complete) to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF then sends the NOTIFY to the SCC AS, which sends it back to the S-CSCF, and finally to UE A. UE A initiates the session release with ICS UE B and releases the session. The completion of the session establishment between the ICS UE B and UE C is indicated by a horizontal bar. The session release between UE C and UE A is also indicated by a horizontal bar. + +Sequence diagram for IMS Consultative ECT via Gm for ICS UE (transfer recipient). The diagram shows the interaction between ICS UE B, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE C, and UE A. It details the steps for transferring a session from UE A to UE C while maintaining an active session with ICS UE B. + +**Figure 7.6.1.2.2.5.1-1: IMS Consultative ECT via Gm for ICS UE (transfer recipient)** + +1. UE A initiates transfer of ICS UE B to UE C by sending a REFER request as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +2. The S-CSCF sends the REFER to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +3. The SCC AS sends the REFER to the S-CSCF. +4. The S-CSCF sends the REFER to the ICS UE B. +5. The ICS UE B initiates session establishment towards UE C by initiating an INVITE message. +6. Filter criteria directs the S-CSCF to send the INVITE to the SCC AS. +7. The INVITE is sent to the S-CSCF. +8. The S-CSCF routes the request to UE C. +- 9.-12. UE C sends back session progress messages to the ICS UE B via S-CSCF and SCC AS. +13. SCC AS sends a backward message to MGCF to update MGW port for connecting with UE C. +14. A session is established between the ICS UE B and UE C. +15. UE C release the session with UE A. +16. The ICS UE B provides indication that the communication transfer is complete by sending a NOTIFY message as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +17. The S-CSCF sends the NOTIFY to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +18. The SCC AS sends the NOTIFY to the S-CSCF. +19. The NOTIFY is sent to UE A. +20. The UE A initiates session release with ICS UE B and release the session. + +NOTE: If MSC Server enhanced for ICS is deployed rather than the MSC Server and MGCF, the same flows apply and the MSC Server enhanced for ICS plays the role of MSC Server and MGCF. + +#### 7.6.1.2.2.5.2 Blind ECT using Gm reference point, ICS UE as transfer recipient + +Figure 7.6.1.2.2.5.2-1 describes how IMS blind ECT is performed when ICS UE is playing the role of transfer recipient using Gm interface. The UE A has a held call with ICS UE B and no session with UE C before transfer. + +Additionally, the SCC AS may employ an MRF for control of media as needed for execution of the Communication ECT. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS blind ECT via Gm for ICS UE (transfer recipient).](9d49325b5cb2d7a1431cb30637b5a7c9_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the sequence of messages for IMS blind ECT via Gm for ICS UE (transfer recipient). The participants are ICS UE B, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE A, and UE C. + +**Initial State:** session between ICS UE B & UE A on hold, no session between UE B & UE C + +**Sequence of Messages:** + +- UE A sends a REFER (B to C) to S-CSCF. +- S-CSCF sends a REFER (B to C) to SCC AS. +- SCC AS sends a REFER (B to C) to S-CSCF. +- S-CSCF sends a REFER (B to C) to ICS UE B. +- ICS UE B sends an Accept to S-CSCF. +- S-CSCF sends an Accept to SCC AS. +- SCC AS sends an Accept to S-CSCF. +- SCC AS sends an Accept to UE A. +- UE A sends a Bye to S-CSCF. +- S-CSCF sends a Bye to SCC AS. +- SCC AS sends a Bye to S-CSCF. +- S-CSCF sends a Bye to ICS UE B. + +**Intermediate State:** 13. session released between A & B while CS bearer between UE B & MGW is kept + +**Sequence of Messages (continued):** + +- ICS UE B sends an Invite (C) to S-CSCF. +- S-CSCF sends an Invite (C) to SCC AS. +- SCC AS sends an Invite (C) to S-CSCF. +- S-CSCF sends an Invite (C) to UE C. +- UE C sends a Progress to S-CSCF. +- S-CSCF sends a Progress to SCC AS. +- SCC AS sends a Progress to S-CSCF. +- S-CSCF sends a Progress to ICS UE B. +- SCC AS sends an Update to S-CSCF. +- S-CSCF sends an Update to MGCF. + +**Final State:** 23. completion of establishing the session between B & C + +**Sequence of Messages (continued):** + +- ICS UE B sends a Notify (transfer complete) to S-CSCF. +- S-CSCF sends a Notify (transfer complete) to SCC AS. +- SCC AS sends a Notify (transfer complete) to S-CSCF. +- S-CSCF sends a Notify (transfer complete) to UE A. + +Sequence diagram for IMS blind ECT via Gm for ICS UE (transfer recipient). + +Figure 7.6.1.2.2.5.2-1: IMS blind ECT via Gm for ICS UE (transfer recipient) + +1. UE A initiates transfer of ICS UE B to UE C by sending a REFER as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +2. The S-CSCF sends the REFER to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +3. The SCC AS acknowledges the REFER message as a blind transfer request for ICS UE B and sends the REFER to the S-CSCF. +4. The S-CSCF sends the REFER to the ICS UE B. +5. ICS UE B accepts the transfer request. + +6. The S-CSCF sends the accept message to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +7. The SCC AS sends the accept message to the S-CSCF. +8. The S-CSCF sends the accept message to the UE A. +9. On reception of the accept message from the ICS UE B, UE A initiates the session release with the ICS UE B by initiating a BYE message to ICS UE B. +10. The S-CSCF sends the BYE to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. On reception of the BYE, the SCC AS releases only the PS session signalling path with UE A and keeps the CS bearer between ICS UE B and the MGW. +11. The SCC AS sends the BYE to the S-CSCF. +12. The S-CSCF sends the BYE to the ICS UE B. +13. Session between UE A and ICS UE B is released. The CS bearer from ICS UE B and MGW is kept for further reuse. +14. The ICS UE B initiates session establishment towards UE C by initiating an INVITE message. +15. Filter criteria directs the S-CSCF to send the INVITE to the SCC AS. +16. The INVITE with the MGW SDP received from the MSC Server/ MGCF upon UE A-UE B session establishment is sent to the S-CSCF. +17. The S-CSCF routes the request onwards to UE C. +- 18.-21. UE C sends back session progress messages to the ICS UE B via S-CSCF and SCC AS. +22. SCC AS sends a backward message to MGCF to update the MGW port for connecting with UE C. +23. A session is established between the ICS UE B and UE C. +24. The ICS UE B provides indication that the communication transfer is complete by sending a NOTIFY as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +25. The S-CSCF sends the NOTIFY to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +26. The SCC AS sends the NOTIFY to the S-CSCF. +27. The NOTIFY is sent to UE C as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. + +NOTE: If MSC Server enhanced for ICS is deployed rather than the MSC server and MGCF, the same flows apply and the MSC Server enhanced for ICS plays the role of MSC Server and MGCF. + +#### 7.6.1.2.2.6 Conferencing + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply with the SCC AS combining the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the Gm reference point as specified in clause 7.1. + +Additionally, the SCC AS may employ an MRF for control of media as needed for execution of the Conferencing. + +Figure 7.6.1.2.2.6-1 describes how ICS UE executes the IMS conferencing when using Gm interface. The ICS UE A has a held call with UE B and a held call with UE C before it initiates a conference. + +![Sequence diagram showing the IMS Conferencing process via Gm interface between ICS UE A, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, Conference AS/MRFC, MRFP, UE B, and UE C.](61a7f401eb46fe99a71f27bc37493f04_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS_UE_A as ICS UE A + participant MSC as MSC + participant MGCF as MGCF + participant MGW as MGW + participant S-CSCF as S-CSCF + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + participant Conference_AS_MRFC as Conference AS/MRFC + participant MRFP as MRFP + participant UE_B as UE B + participant UE_C as UE C + + Note right of Conference_AS_MRFC: 5. Interaction for creating a conference + Note right of UE_B: 15. Session establishment between UE B and Conference AS + + ICS_UE_A->>S-CSCF: 1. Invite(Conf Fac URI) + S-CSCF->>SCC_AS: 2. Invite(Conf Fac URI) + SCC_AS->>S-CSCF: 3. Invite(Conf Fac URI) + S-CSCF->>Conference_AS_MRFC: 4. Invite(Conf Fac URI) + Note right of Conference_AS_MRFC: 5. Interaction for creating a conference + Conference_AS_MRFC->>S-CSCF: 6. OK + S-CSCF->>SCC_AS: 7. OK + SCC_AS->>S-CSCF: 8. OK + S-CSCF->>MGCF: 9. OK + SCC_AS->>MGCF: 10. Update + ICS_UE_A->>S-CSCF: 11. Refer(B to Conf) + S-CSCF->>SCC_AS: 12. Refer(B to Conf) + SCC_AS->>S-CSCF: 13. Refer(B to Conf) + S-CSCF->>UE_B: 14. Refer(B to Conf) + Note right of UE_B: 15. Session establishment between UE B and Conference AS + UE_B->>S-CSCF: 16. Notify (transfer complete) + S-CSCF->>SCC_AS: 17. Notify (transfer complete) + SCC_AS->>S-CSCF: 18. Notify (transfer complete) + S-CSCF->>MSC: 19. Notify (transfer complete) + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: 20. Session between UE A and UE B is released + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_C: 21. Refer C to the Conference AS + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the IMS Conferencing process via Gm interface between ICS UE A, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, Conference AS/MRFC, MRFP, UE B, and UE C. + +**Figure 7.6.1.2.2.6-1: ICS UE executes the IMS Conferencing via Gm** + +1. The ICS UE A initiates a session with the conference AS by sending an INVITE to S-CSCF. +2. The S-CSCF sends the INVITE to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +3. The SCC AS sends the INVITE to the S-CSCF. +4. The INVITE is sent to the conference AS. +5. A conference connection is created as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +- 6.-9. Conference AS sends an OK response containing the conference URI to the ICS UE A via S-CSCF and SCC AS. +10. SCC AS sends a backward message to MGCF to update the MGW port for connecting with the conference AS. +11. The ICS UE A initiates a REFER message indicating UE B transferring the current session to the conference AS using Gm interface as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +12. The S-CSCF sends the REFER to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +13. The SCC AS sends the REFER to the S-CSCF. + +14. The S-CSCF sends the REFER to UE B. +15. A session is established between the conference AS and UE B as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +- 16.-19. UE B sends a NOTIFY indicating the transfer completed back to ICS UE A via S-CSCF and SCC AS. +20. The media between the ICS UE A and UE B is released. +21. Step 11-20 are repeated for UE C. + +NOTE 1: UE B and UE C can be referred to the conference in parallel. + +NOTE 2: If the MSC Server enhanced for ICS is deployed rather than the MSC Server and MGCF, the same flows apply and the MSC Server enhanced for ICS plays the role of the MSC Server and the MGCF. + +#### 7.6.1.2.2.7 Communication Waiting + +Figure 7.6.1.2.2.7-1 provides the ICS communication waiting flow over Gm reference point for the ICS UE. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the ICS UE Communication Waiting flow over Gm reference point. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, UE B, and UE C. The process starts with a session between ICS UE A and UE B active. UE C sends an INVITE(A) to I/S-CSCF. I/S-CSCF forwards it to SCC AS, which performs T-ADS and sends INVITE(A) back to I/S-CSCF. I/S-CSCF sends INVITE(A) to ICS UE A. ICS UE A sends a call waiting indication to I/S-CSCF, which is passed to SCC AS and then to UE C. ICS UE A sends a Hold (B) message to I/S-CSCF, putting the session with UE B on hold. Finally, the session establishment between ICS UE A and UE C is completed.](2438c4dd81a8b76ec881d47d87b11fc3_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS_UE_A as ICS UE A + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGW as MGW + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + participant I_S_CSCF as I/S-CSCF + participant UE_B as UE B + participant UE_C as UE C + + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: Session between ICS UE A and UE B active + UE_C->>I_S_CSCF: 1. INVITE(A) + I_S_CSCF->>SCC_AS: 2. INVITE(A) + Note over SCC_AS: 3. T-ADS + SCC_AS->>I_S_CSCF: 4. INVITE(A) + I_S_CSCF->>ICS_UE_A: 5. INVITE(A) + ICS_UE_A->>I_S_CSCF: 6. Call waiting indication + I_S_CSCF->>SCC_AS: 7. Call waiting indication + SCC_AS->>I_S_CSCF: 8. Call waiting indication + I_S_CSCF->>UE_C: 9. Call waiting indication + ICS_UE_A->>I_S_CSCF: 10. Hold (B) + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: 11. Session hold between A and B + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_C: 12. Completion of session establishment between A and C + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the ICS UE Communication Waiting flow over Gm reference point. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, UE B, and UE C. The process starts with a session between ICS UE A and UE B active. UE C sends an INVITE(A) to I/S-CSCF. I/S-CSCF forwards it to SCC AS, which performs T-ADS and sends INVITE(A) back to I/S-CSCF. I/S-CSCF sends INVITE(A) to ICS UE A. ICS UE A sends a call waiting indication to I/S-CSCF, which is passed to SCC AS and then to UE C. ICS UE A sends a Hold (B) message to I/S-CSCF, putting the session with UE B on hold. Finally, the session establishment between ICS UE A and UE C is completed. + +**Figure 7.6.1.2.2.7-1: ICS UE Communication Waiting over Gm Reference Point** + +1. An incoming INVITE message is received at the S-CSCF of the ICS UE A. +2. The S-CSCF executes terminating initial filter criteria and forwards the INVITE message to the SCC AS. +3. The SCC AS performs terminating access domain selection and chooses the CS access network for the setup of the media. +4. The SCC AS sends the INVITE message to the S-CSCF. +5. The S-CSCF sends the INVITE message to UE A. +6. The ICS UE A sends to the S-CSCF an indication that the call is waiting. +7. The S-CSCF sends the indication of call waiting to the SCC AS. +8. The SCC AS sends the indication of call waiting to the S-CSCF. +9. The S-CSCF forwards the indication of call waiting to UE C. +10. The ICS UE A sends a Hold message to the S-CSCF as specified in TS 23.228 [2]. +11. The session between UE A and UE B is put on hold as described in clause 7.6.1.2.2.2 Communication Hold/Resume. +12. Completion of the session establishment between UE A and UE C. The existing CS bearer can be reused. + +#### 7.6.1.2.2.8 Customized Alerting Tone (CAT) + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.182 [42] apply with the SCC AS combining the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the Gm reference point as specified in clause 7.1. + +The CS bearer is used for the media of the customized alerting tone, as well as the media of the regular session. And the CS bearer shall be reused if already established using the Gm reference point as specified in clause 7.3.2.2.1. + +If the ICS UE originates an ICS session reusing the existing CS bearer as specified in clause 7.3.2.2.1, the SCC AS shall send the early session media info to the MSC Server/MGCF in the form of regular session media info (i.e. a SDP without early media indication). Then the SCC AS sends the regular session media info of the remote party to the MSC Server/MGCF for the session communication when receiving the 200 OK (acceptance of the session) from the remote party, if the early session or forking model is used for the CAT service. + +#### 7.6.1.2.3 Use of I1 reference point + +##### 7.6.1.2.3.1 Line ID Services (OIP, OIR, TIP, TIR) + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply. The SCC AS combines the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the I1 reference point, as specified in clause 7.1 of this document. The information specific to Line ID services is communicated over the I1 reference point when the I1 reference point is used at session setup. + +##### 7.6.1.2.3.2 Communication Diversion Services + +###### 7.6.1.2.3.2.1 Communication Forwarding Unconditional (CFU) + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply. The SCC AS combines the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the I1 reference point, as specified in clause 7.1. + +###### 7.6.1.2.3.2.2 Communication Forwarding on Not Logged-in (CFNL) + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply. The SCC AS combines the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the I1 reference point, as specified in clause 7.1. + +###### 7.6.1.2.3.2.3 Communication Forwarding Busy (CFB) + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply. The SCC AS combines the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the I1 reference point, as specified in clause 7.1. When I1 is used for session set-up, the information specific to CFB is communicated over the I1 reference point; the SCC AS performs the necessary interworking between the I1 signalling and IMS to allow execution of CFB in IMS. + +Figure 7.6.1.2.3.2.3-1 provides the Communication Forwarding Busy (CFB) flow over the I1 reference point for an ICS UE. + +![Sequence diagram for Communication Forwarding on Busy User flow over the I1 reference point for an ICS UE. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE B, MSC Server, SCC AS, TAS, S-CSCF, and UE A. The flow starts with an INVITE from UE A to S-CSCF, which is then forwarded to TAS and SCC AS. The SCC AS sends an incoming call request to ICS UE B via the MSC Server. ICS UE B responds with 'User Busy', which is then processed by the SCC AS and returned as a SIP response to the TAS. The TAS then executes CFB logic.](db39acbd11df5eb7e79ab84562fb8f74_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant S-CSCF + participant TAS + participant SCC AS + participant MSC Server + participant ICS UE B + + Note right of UE A: 1. INVITE + UE A->>S-CSCF: 1. INVITE + Note right of S-CSCF: 2. INVITE + S-CSCF->>TAS: 2. INVITE + Note right of TAS: 3. INVITE + TAS->>S-CSCF: 3. INVITE + Note right of S-CSCF: 4. INVITE + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 4. INVITE + Note right of SCC AS: 5. I1: Incoming Call + SCC AS->>MSC Server: 5. I1: Incoming Call + Note right of MSC Server: 6. User Busy + MSC Server->>SCC AS: 7. I1: User Determined User Busy + Note right of SCC AS: 8. SIP Response (user busy) + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 8. SIP Response (user busy) + Note right of S-CSCF: 9. SIP Response (user busy) + S-CSCF->>TAS: 9. SIP Response (user busy) + Note right of TAS: 10. CFB Logic + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Communication Forwarding on Busy User flow over the I1 reference point for an ICS UE. The diagram shows interactions between ICS UE B, MSC Server, SCC AS, TAS, S-CSCF, and UE A. The flow starts with an INVITE from UE A to S-CSCF, which is then forwarded to TAS and SCC AS. The SCC AS sends an incoming call request to ICS UE B via the MSC Server. ICS UE B responds with 'User Busy', which is then processed by the SCC AS and returned as a SIP response to the TAS. The TAS then executes CFB logic. + +**Figure 7.6.1.2.3.2.3-1 Communication Forwarding on Busy User flow over the I1 reference point for an ICS UE.** + +1 An incoming SIP INVITE is received at the S-CSCF of the B party from the A party. + +2-4 The S-CSCF forwards the INVITE to the TAS and SCC AS. + +5 The SCC AS sends an incoming Call Request to the UE over I1 via the MSC server. + +6-7 The UE rejects the incoming call request as the user is busy and sends a User Determine User Busy (UDUB) response over I1 to the SCC AS. + +8-9 The SCC AS inter-works the UDUB response over I1 into an appropriate SIP Response to indicate that the B party is busy, and sends the SIP Response to the TAS via the CSCF. + +10 The TAS processes the SIP Response and executes the CFB logic. + +#### 7.6.1.2.3.2.4 Communication Forwarding No Reply (CFNR) + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply. The SCC AS combines the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the I1 reference point, as specified in clause 7.1. The information specific to CFNR is communicated over the I1 reference point when the I1 reference point is used at session setup. + +Figure 7.6.1.2.3.2.4-1 provides the Communication Forwarding No Reply flow over the I1 reference point for an ICS UE. + +![Sequence diagram showing Communication Forwarding No Reply flow over the I1 reference point for an ICS UE. The diagram involves six lifelines: ICS UE B, MSC Server, SCC AS, TAS, S-CSCF, and UE A. The sequence of messages is: 1. INVITE from UE A to S-CSCF; 2. INVITE from S-CSCF to TAS; 3. Start Timer at TAS; 4. INVITE from TAS to S-CSCF; 5. INVITE from S-CSCF to SCC AS; 6. I1: Incoming Call from SCC AS to ICS UE B; 7. CS Bearer Setup procedures between ICS UE B and MSC Server; 8. No Answer from ICS UE, Timer Expires at the TAS; 9. CFNR Logic at TAS.](e2c120be98ede6deb60dd341f5a9803b_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant S-CSCF + participant TAS + participant SCC AS + participant MSC Server + participant ICS UE B + + Note right of UE A: 1. INVITE + UE A->>S-CSCF: 1. INVITE + Note right of S-CSCF: 2. INVITE + S-CSCF->>TAS: 2. INVITE + Note right of TAS: 3. Start Timer + TAS->>TAS: 3. Start Timer + Note right of TAS: 4. INVITE + TAS->>S-CSCF: 4. INVITE + Note right of S-CSCF: 5. INVITE + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 5. INVITE + Note right of SCC AS: 6. I1: Incoming Call + SCC AS->>ICS UE B: 6. I1: Incoming Call + Note right of ICS UE B: 7. CS Bearer Setup procedures + ICS UE B->>MSC Server: 7. CS Bearer Setup procedures + Note right of TAS: 8. No Answer from ICS UE. Timer Expires at the TAS + TAS->>TAS: 8. No Answer from ICS UE. Timer Expires at the TAS + Note right of TAS: 9. CFNR Logic + TAS->>TAS: 9. CFNR Logic + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing Communication Forwarding No Reply flow over the I1 reference point for an ICS UE. The diagram involves six lifelines: ICS UE B, MSC Server, SCC AS, TAS, S-CSCF, and UE A. The sequence of messages is: 1. INVITE from UE A to S-CSCF; 2. INVITE from S-CSCF to TAS; 3. Start Timer at TAS; 4. INVITE from TAS to S-CSCF; 5. INVITE from S-CSCF to SCC AS; 6. I1: Incoming Call from SCC AS to ICS UE B; 7. CS Bearer Setup procedures between ICS UE B and MSC Server; 8. No Answer from ICS UE, Timer Expires at the TAS; 9. CFNR Logic at TAS. + +**Figure 7.6.1.2.3.2.4-1: Communication Forwarding No Reply flow over the I1 reference point for an ICS UE** + +1. An incoming SIP INVITE is received at the S-CSCF of the B party from the A party. +2. The S-CSCF forwards the INVITE to the TAS and SCC AS. +3. The SCC AS starts a supervisory timer for the call. +- 4-5 The TAS forwards the INVITE to the SCC AS via the S-CSCF. +6. The SCC AS sends an incoming Call Request to the ICS UE over I1. +7. The ICS UE performs CS bearer set-up procedures. +8. The SCC AS does not receive an answer from the ICS UE and the timer at the TAS expires. +9. The TAS executes the CFNR logic. + +#### 7.6.1.2.3.2.5 Communication Forwarding on Subscriber Not Reachable (CFNRc) + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply. The SCC AS combines the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the I1 reference point, as specified in clause 7.1. When I1 is used for call set-up, the SCC AS performs the necessary interworking between the I1 signalling response and SIP to allow execution of CFNRc in IMS. + +Figure 7.6.1.2.3.2.5-1 provides the Communication Forwarding on Subscriber Not Reachable flow over the I1 reference point for an ICS UE. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the Communication Forwarding Not Reachable flow over the I1 reference point for an ICS UE. The diagram shows the interaction between ICS UE B, MSC Server, SCC AS, TAS, S-CSCF, and UE A. The flow starts with an INVITE from UE A to S-CSCF, which is then forwarded to TAS and SCC AS. The SCC AS determines the user is not reachable (step 5). The SCC AS sends a SIP response (user unreachable) to the TAS via the S-CSCF (step 6). The TAS processes the response and executes CFNRc logic (step 8).](0f6e3cdce0f01d6ccceabcced508bb5b_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant S-CSCF + participant TAS + participant SCC AS + participant MSC Server + participant ICS UE B + + Note right of UE A: 1. INVITE + UE A->>S-CSCF: 1. INVITE + Note right of S-CSCF: 2. INVITE + S-CSCF->>TAS: 2. INVITE + Note right of TAS: 3. INVITE + TAS->>S-CSCF: 3. INVITE + Note right of S-CSCF: 4. INVITE + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 4. INVITE + Note over ICS UE B, MSC Server, SCC AS: 5. User not reachable + Note right of SCC AS: 6. SIP response (user unreachable) + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 6. SIP response (user unreachable) + Note right of S-CSCF: 7. SIP response (user unreachable) + S-CSCF->>TAS: 7. SIP response (user unreachable) + Note over TAS: 8. CFNRc Logic + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the Communication Forwarding Not Reachable flow over the I1 reference point for an ICS UE. The diagram shows the interaction between ICS UE B, MSC Server, SCC AS, TAS, S-CSCF, and UE A. The flow starts with an INVITE from UE A to S-CSCF, which is then forwarded to TAS and SCC AS. The SCC AS determines the user is not reachable (step 5). The SCC AS sends a SIP response (user unreachable) to the TAS via the S-CSCF (step 6). The TAS processes the response and executes CFNRc logic (step 8). + +**Figure 7.6.1.2.3.2.5-1: Communication Forwarding Not Reachable flow over the I1 reference point for an ICS UE** + +1. An incoming SIP INVITE is received at the S-CSCF of the B party from the A party. +- 2-4. The S-CSCF forwards the INVITE to the TAS and SCC AS. +5. The SCC AS, MSC Server or another node in the Service Control Signalling Path (e.g. HSS or HLR) determines that the user is not reachable, for example: + - The MSC Server pages the ICS UE B and no response to the page message is received. + - The MSC Server itself determines that the user is not reachable (e.g. IMSI detach). + - The MSC Server pages the ICS UE B and a page response is received but the CS bearer set up procedures fail. +- 6-7. The SCC AS sends an appropriate SIP response that indicates that the user is unreachable to the TAS via the CSCF. +8. The TAS processes the SIP response and executes the CFNRc logic. + +#### 7.6.1.2.3.2.6 Communication Deflection (CD) + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply. The SCC AS combines the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the I1 reference point, as specified in clause 7.1. When I1 is used for call set-up, the information specific to CD is communicated over the I1 reference point; the SCC AS performs the necessary interworking between the I1 signalling and SIP to allow execution of CD in IMS. + +Figure 7.6.1.2.3.2.6-1 provides the Communication Deflection (CD) flow over the I1 reference point for an ICS UE. + +![Sequence diagram showing Communication Deflection flow over the I1 reference point for an ICS UE. The diagram involves six lifelines: ICS UE B, MSC Server, SCC AS, TAS, S-CSCF, and UE A. The sequence of messages is: 1. INVITE from UE A to S-CSCF; 2. INVITE from S-CSCF to TAS; 3. INVITE from TAS to S-CSCF; 4. INVITE from S-CSCF to SCC AS; 5. I1: Incoming Call from SCC AS to ICS UE B; 6. User Deflects Call (internal to ICS UE B); 7. I1: Call Deflection Request (C-party) from ICS UE B to SCC AS; 8. SIP Response (C-party) from SCC AS to S-CSCF; 9. SIP Response (C-party) from S-CSCF to TAS; 10. CD Logic (internal to TAS).](5e9af8986a5845504f251d3079da8078_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant S-CSCF + participant TAS + participant SCC AS + participant MSC Server + participant ICS UE B + + Note right of UE A: 1. INVITE + UE A->>S-CSCF: 1. INVITE + S-CSCF->>TAS: 2. INVITE + TAS->>S-CSCF: 3. INVITE + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 4. INVITE + SCC AS->>MSC Server: 5. I1: Incoming Call + Note left of ICS UE B: 6. User Deflects Call + ICS UE B->>SCC AS: 7. I1: Call Deflection Request (C-party) + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 8. SIP Response (C-party) + S-CSCF->>TAS: 9. SIP Response (C-party) + Note right of TAS: 10. CD Logic + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing Communication Deflection flow over the I1 reference point for an ICS UE. The diagram involves six lifelines: ICS UE B, MSC Server, SCC AS, TAS, S-CSCF, and UE A. The sequence of messages is: 1. INVITE from UE A to S-CSCF; 2. INVITE from S-CSCF to TAS; 3. INVITE from TAS to S-CSCF; 4. INVITE from S-CSCF to SCC AS; 5. I1: Incoming Call from SCC AS to ICS UE B; 6. User Deflects Call (internal to ICS UE B); 7. I1: Call Deflection Request (C-party) from ICS UE B to SCC AS; 8. SIP Response (C-party) from SCC AS to S-CSCF; 9. SIP Response (C-party) from S-CSCF to TAS; 10. CD Logic (internal to TAS). + +**Figure 7.6.1.2.3.2.6-1 Communication Deflection flow over the I1 reference point for an ICS UE** + +1 An incoming SIP INVITE is received at the S-CSCF of the B party from the A party. + +2-4 The S-CSCF forwards the INVITE to the TAS and SCC AS. + +5 The SCC AS sends an incoming Call Request to the UE over I1 via the MSC server. + +6-7 The user decides to deflect the call and the UE returns a Call Deflection Request to the SCC AS over I1 indicating the deflected-to party. + +8-9 The SCC AS inter-works the Call Deflection Request received over I1 into an appropriate SIP response and sends the SIP response to the TAS via the CSCF. + +10 The TAS processes the SIP response and executes the CD logic. + +#### 7.6.1.2.3.2.7 Communication Diversion Notification (CDIVN) + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply. The SCC AS combines the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the I1 reference point, as specified in clause 7.1. + +When I1 is used for call set-up, the SCC AS performs the necessary interworking between the I1 signalling and SIP to subscribe to the comm-div-info event package at the TAS on behalf of the UE and to receive and propagate to the UE, the notification that the call was diverted. + +#### 7.6.1.2.3.3 Communication Barring + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply. The SCC AS combines the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the I1 reference point, as specified in clause 7.1. + +#### 7.6.1.2.3.4 Communication Hold/Resume + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply. The SCC AS combines the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the I1 reference point, as specified in clause 7.1 of this document. + +Additionally, the SCC AS may employ an MRF for control of media as needed for execution of the Communication Hold/Resume. + +NOTE: Annex E describes several implementation options on how to process media using MRF. + +During communication hold, if a held session is resumed with the same service type/bearer requirement (i.e. voice or video) as the existing CS bearer, the CS bearer shall be reused; otherwise, the CS bearer shall be updated if possible through SCUDIF or redial mechanism (refer to clause 7.9). + +Figure 7. 6.1.2.3.4-1 describes how IMS session hold and resume is performed via I1 interface for ICS UE. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS communication Hold and Resume by ICS UE. Lifelines: ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE B. The sequence starts with an ongoing session between ICS UE A and UE B. Step 1: ICS UE A sends an 'I1: hold' message to SCC AS. Step 2: Completion of session hold between ICS UE A & UE B. Step 3: ICS UE A sends an 'I1: resume' message to SCC AS. Step 4: Completion of session resume between ICS UE A & UE B.](f06d7a2fad72d80fe12fca1b65fc805b_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for IMS communication Hold and Resume by ICS UE. Lifelines: ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE B. The sequence starts with an ongoing session between ICS UE A and UE B. Step 1: ICS UE A sends an 'I1: hold' message to SCC AS. Step 2: Completion of session hold between ICS UE A & UE B. Step 3: ICS UE A sends an 'I1: resume' message to SCC AS. Step 4: Completion of session resume between ICS UE A & UE B. + +**Figure 7. 6.1.2.3.4-1: IMS communication Hold and Resume by ICS UE** + +1. The ICS UE A sends a Hold message to the SCC AS via I1 reference point. +2. The session between ICS UE A and UE B is held as specified in clause 7.6.1.2.2.4. +3. The ICS UE A sends a Resume message to the SCC AS via I1 reference point. +4. The session between ICS UE A and UE B is resumed as specified in clause 7.6.1.2.2.4. + +#### 7.6.1.2.3.5 Explicit Communication Transfer + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply. The SCC AS combines the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the I1 reference point, as specified in clause 7.1. + +Additionally, the SCC AS may employ an MRF for control of media as needed for execution of the Explicit Communication Transfer. + +##### 7.6.1.2.3.5.1 Consultative Explicit Communication Transfer + +Figure 7. 6.1.2.3.5.1-1 describes how IMS consultative ECT is performed when ICS UE A is playing the role of transfer initiator using I1 interface. The ICS UE A has a held call with UE B and an ongoing call with UE C before transfer. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Consultative ECT via I1 for ICS UE (transfer initiator). Lifelines: ICS UE A, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE B, UE C. The sequence starts with ICS UE A having an ongoing call with UE C and holding the call with UE B. Step 1: ICS UE A sends an 'I1: refer B to C' message to SCC AS. Step 2: Refer B to C. Step 3: ICS UE A sends an 'I1: transfer complete' message to SCC AS. Step 4: Session release between A & B.](d31e6cf9a987586abee2f530b7812041_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for IMS Consultative ECT via I1 for ICS UE (transfer initiator). Lifelines: ICS UE A, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE B, UE C. The sequence starts with ICS UE A having an ongoing call with UE C and holding the call with UE B. Step 1: ICS UE A sends an 'I1: refer B to C' message to SCC AS. Step 2: Refer B to C. Step 3: ICS UE A sends an 'I1: transfer complete' message to SCC AS. Step 4: Session release between A & B. + +**Figure 7. 6.1.2.3.5.1-1: IMS Consultative ECT via I1 for ICS UE (transfer initiator)** + +1. The ICS UE A initiates transfer of UE B to UE C by sending a transfer message to SCC AS using I1 interface. +2. Completion of referring UE B to UE C as specified in TS 24.173 [8] and releasing the session between the ICS UE A and UE C. +3. The SCC AS sends the transfer complete message to ICS UE A via I1 interface. +4. The ICS UE A releases the calls between it and UE B. + +Figure 7.6.1.2.3.5.1-2 describes how IMS consultative ECT is performed when ICS UE is playing the role of transfer recipient using I1 interface. The UE A has a held call with UE C and also has a held call with ICS UE B before transfer. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Consultative ECT via I1 for ICS UE (transfer recipient).](aa6e28822419dba9f22129fee66c9c4c_img.jpg) + +The diagram is a sequence diagram showing the interaction between eight entities: ICS UE B, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE C, and UE A. The sequence of messages is as follows: + +- Initial State:** UE A puts UE B on hold; UE A puts UE C on hold. +- Step 1:** UE A sends a REFER (B to C) message to SCC AS. +- Step 2:** SCC AS sends a REFER (B to C) message to S-CSCF. +- Step 3:** S-CSCF sends an I1: refer B to C message to ICS UE B. +- Step 4:** ICS UE B sends an I1: call initiation to C message to SCC AS. +- Step 5:** SCC AS sends a REFER B to C and session release between C & A message to ICS UE B. +- Step 6:** ICS UE B sends an I1: transfer complete message to SCC AS. +- Step 7:** SCC AS sends a NOTIFY (transfer complete) message to S-CSCF. +- Step 8:** S-CSCF sends a NOTIFY (transfer complete) message to UE A. +- Step 9:** UE A initiates a session release between A & B. + +Sequence diagram for IMS Consultative ECT via I1 for ICS UE (transfer recipient). + +**Figure 7.6.1.2.3.5.1-2: IMS Consultative ECT via I1 for ICS UE (transfer recipient)** + +1. UE A initiates transfer of ICS UE B to UE C by sending a REFER request as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +2. The S-CSCF sends the REFER to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +3. The S-CSCF sends a transfer message to the ICS UE B via I1 interface. +4. The ICS UE B initiates a call initiation message to SCC AS via I1 interface. +5. Completion of referring the ICS UE B to UE C as specified in TS 24.173 [8] and releasing the session between the UE A and UE C. +6. The ICS UE B provides an indication that the communication transfer is complete to SCC AS via I1 interface. +7. The SCC AS sends a NOTIFY message to the S-CSCF. +8. The NOTIFY is sent to UE A. +9. The UE A initiates session release with ICS UE B and release the session. + +Figure 7.6.1.2.3.5.1-3 describes how IMS consultative ECT is performed when ICS UE is playing the role of transfer target using I1 interface. The UE A has a held call with UE C and also has a held call with ICS UE B before transfer. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Consultative ECT via I1 for ICS UE (transfer target). Lifelines: ICS UE C, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE B, UE A. The process starts with UE A putting UE B on hold and then UE C on hold. UE A sends a REFER (B to C) to UE B. UE B sends an INVITE(C) to S-CSCF. S-CSCF forwards the INVITE(C) to SCC AS. SCC AS sends an I1 incoming call (replace: session ID) to ICS UE C. A bar indicates the completion of session setup between B and C and session release between C & A. Finally, UE A sends a session release between B & A to UE B.](694df81535f89c7bfb9ef0df6f130dc0_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for IMS Consultative ECT via I1 for ICS UE (transfer target). Lifelines: ICS UE C, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE B, UE A. The process starts with UE A putting UE B on hold and then UE C on hold. UE A sends a REFER (B to C) to UE B. UE B sends an INVITE(C) to S-CSCF. S-CSCF forwards the INVITE(C) to SCC AS. SCC AS sends an I1 incoming call (replace: session ID) to ICS UE C. A bar indicates the completion of session setup between B and C and session release between C & A. Finally, UE A sends a session release between B & A to UE B. + +**Figure 7.6.1.2.3.5.1-3: IMS Consultative ECT via I1 for ICS UE (transfer target)** + +1. UE A initiates transfer of UE B to ICS UE C by sending a REFER request as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +2. An INVITE is sent by UE B upon reception of the REFER request as specified in TS 24.173 [8], and received at the S-CSCF of the ICS UE C. +3. The S-CSCF executes terminating initial filter criteria and forwards the INVITE message to the SCC AS. +4. The SCC AS sends an incoming call request to the ICS UE C over I1 reference point. The incoming call request indicates that a new session between UE C and UE B is to replace the current session between UE C and UE A. +5. Completion of referring UE B to the ICS UE C as specified in TS 24.173 [8] and releasing the session between UE A and the ICS UE C. +6. UE A initiates session release with UE B and releases the session. + +#### 7.6.1.2.3.5.2 Blind Explicit Communication Transfer + +Figure 7.6.1.2.3.5.2-1 describes how IMS Blind ECT is performed when ICS UE A is playing the role of transfer initiator using I1 interface. The ICS UE A has a held call with UE B before transfer. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Blind ECT via I1 for ICS UE (transfer initiator). Lifelines: ICS UE A, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE B, UE C. The process starts with ICS UE A holding the call with UE B and no session between ICS UE A and UE C. ICS UE A sends an I1: refer B to C message to SCC AS. A bar indicates the completion of referring B to C and session release between A and B. Finally, SCC AS sends an I1: transfer complete message to ICS UE A.](45578bd3ed11d45af63ce00e28bab2f8_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for IMS Blind ECT via I1 for ICS UE (transfer initiator). Lifelines: ICS UE A, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE B, UE C. The process starts with ICS UE A holding the call with UE B and no session between ICS UE A and UE C. ICS UE A sends an I1: refer B to C message to SCC AS. A bar indicates the completion of referring B to C and session release between A and B. Finally, SCC AS sends an I1: transfer complete message to ICS UE A. + +**Figure 7.6.1.2.3.5.2-1: IMS Blind ECT via I1 for ICS UE (transfer initiator)** + +1. The ICS UE A initiates transfer of UE B to UE C by sending a transfer message to SCC AS using the I1 interface. +2. Completion of referring UE B to UE C as specified in TS 24.173 [8] and releasing the session between the ICS UE A and UE B. +3. The SCC AS sends the transfer complete message to ICS UE A via the I1 interface. + +Figure 7.6.1.2.3.5.2-2 describes how IMS blind ECT is performed when ICS UE A is playing the role of transfer recipient using the I1 interface. The UE A has a held call with ICS UE B before transfer. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Blind ECT via I1 for ICS UE (transfer recipient).](9f50279046b74a4e66a1a0144c3b1d11_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the sequence of messages for IMS Blind ECT via I1 for ICS UE (transfer recipient). The participants are ICS UE B, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, UE A, and UE C. The process starts with a session between ICS UE B & UE A on hold, with no session between UE B & UE C. The sequence of steps is as follows: + +- UE A sends a REFER (B to C) request to the S-CSCF. +- The S-CSCF sends a REFER (B to C) message to the SCC AS. +- The SCC AS sends an I1: refer B to C message to the ICS UE B. +- Session continuation occurs between UE A and ICS UE B. +- The ICS UE B initiates session establishment towards UE C by sending a call initiation message to the SCC AS via the I1 interface. +- Completion of session establishment between the ICS UE B and UE C. +- The ICS UE B provides an indication that the communication transfer is complete to the SCC AS via the I1 interface. +- The SCC AS sends a NOTIFY (transfer complete) message to the S-CSCF. +- The NOTIFY is sent to UE A. + +Sequence diagram for IMS Blind ECT via I1 for ICS UE (transfer recipient). + +**Figure 7.6.1.2.3.5.2-2: IMS Blind ECT via I1 for ICS UE (transfer recipient)** + +1. UE A initiates transfer of ICS UE B to UE C by sending a REFER request as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +2. The S-CSCF sends the REFER to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +3. The S-CSCF sends a transfer message to the ICS UE B via I1 interface. +4. Session continuation between UE A and ICS UE B as specified in clause 7.6.1.2.2.5.2, steps 5-12. +5. The ICS UE B initiates session establishment towards UE C by initiating a call initiation message to SCC AS via I1 interface. +6. Completion of session establishment between the ICS UE B and UE C as specified in clause 7.6.1.2.2.5.2, steps 15-22. +7. The ICS UE B provides indication that the communication transfer is complete to SCC AS via I1 interface. +8. The SCC AS sends a NOTIFY message to the S-CSCF. +9. The NOTIFY is sent to UE A. + +#### 7.6.1.2.3.6 Conferencing + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply. The SCC AS combines the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the I1 reference point, as specified in clause 7.1. + +Additionally, the SCC AS may employ an MRF for control of media as needed for execution of the Conferencing. + +Figure 7.6.1.2.3.6-1 describes how ICS UE executes the IMS conferencing when using I1 interface. The ICS UE A has a held call with UE B and a held call with UE C before it initiates a conference. + +![Sequence diagram for ICS UE executing IMS Conferencing via I1. Lifelines: ICS UE A, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, Conference AS/MRFC, MRFP, UE B, UE C. The sequence shows: 1. ICS UE A sends '1. I1: conf initiation, Fac URI' to SCC AS. 2. SCC AS has an 'Interaction for creating a conference' with Conference AS/MRFC. 3. SCC AS sends '3. I1: OK' to ICS UE A. 4. SCC AS sends '4. Update' to MGCF. 5. ICS UE A sends '5. I1: refer B to conf' to SCC AS. 6. SCC AS has 'Refer B to the Conference AS' interaction with Conference AS/MRFC. 7. SCC AS sends '7. I1: transfer complete' to ICS UE A. 8. A session between UE A and UE B is released. 9. SCC AS has 'Refer C to the Conference AS' interaction with Conference AS/MRFC.](0931f3e098bd4539041de11c50cec2d2_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for ICS UE executing IMS Conferencing via I1. Lifelines: ICS UE A, MSC, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, Conference AS/MRFC, MRFP, UE B, UE C. The sequence shows: 1. ICS UE A sends '1. I1: conf initiation, Fac URI' to SCC AS. 2. SCC AS has an 'Interaction for creating a conference' with Conference AS/MRFC. 3. SCC AS sends '3. I1: OK' to ICS UE A. 4. SCC AS sends '4. Update' to MGCF. 5. ICS UE A sends '5. I1: refer B to conf' to SCC AS. 6. SCC AS has 'Refer B to the Conference AS' interaction with Conference AS/MRFC. 7. SCC AS sends '7. I1: transfer complete' to ICS UE A. 8. A session between UE A and UE B is released. 9. SCC AS has 'Refer C to the Conference AS' interaction with Conference AS/MRFC. + +**Figure 7.6.1.2.3.6-1: ICS UE executes the IMS Conferencing via I1** + +1. The ICS UE A initiates a session with the conference AS by sending a conference invitation message to SCC AS via I1 interface. +2. The SCC AS continues session establishment towards the conference AS and the conference connection is created as specified in clause 7.6.1.2.2.6, steps 3 to 7. +3. On receipt of an OK message from the Conference AS, the SCC AS sends an OK message to the ICS UE via the I1 interface. +4. The SCC AS sends a backward message to the MGCF to update the MGW port for connecting with the conference AS. +5. The ICS UE A initiates a message to the SCC AS via I1 interface indicating UE B transferring the current session to the conference AS. +6. UE B is referred to the conference AS as specified in clause 7.6.1.2.2.6. +7. On receipt of a Notify message from UE B indicating transfer complete, the SCC AS sends a transfer completed message to ICS UE A via I1 interface. +8. The session between the ICS UE A and UE B is released. +9. Steps 5-8 is repeated for UE C. + +NOTE 1: UE B and UE C can be referred to the conference in parallel. + +NOTE 2: As specified in TS 24.147 [21], another alternative for this scenario is that ICS UE sends the Party B and Party C numbers to the conference AS via SCC AS. Consequently, the conference AS invites Party B and Party C to the conference. + +#### 7.6.1.2.3.7 Communication Waiting + +IMS procedures as defined in TS 24.173 [8] apply The SCC AS combines the description of the CS bearer with the service control signalling communicated over the I1 reference point, as specified in clause 7.1. + +#### 7.6.1.2.4 When use of Gm or I1 reference point is not possible due to VPLMN limitations + +##### 7.6.1.2.4.1 When attached to an MSC Server enhanced with ICS + +Procedures specified in clause 7.6.2 Service Consistency for non ICS UE apply. + +#### 7.6.1.2.4.2 When attached to an MSC Server not enhanced with ICS + +Procedures specified in clause 7.6.3 apply. + +### 7.6.1.3 User configuration of Supplementary Services + +An ICS UE supporting multimedia telephony shall manage the IMS multimedia telephony communication service settings data as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. I1 does not support configuration of supplementary services. + +## 7.6.2 Supplementary service invocation using the MSC Server enhanced for ICS + +### 7.6.2.1 Overview + +For IMS sessions established by non ICS UEs using the MSC Server enhanced for ICS, the I2 reference point is used for communication of service control signalling. The MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the necessary interworking between the I2 reference point and CS signalling to allow the IMS to provide the IMS Multimedia Telephony Service as defined in TS 22.173 [4]. + +### 7.6.2.2 Line ID Services (OIP, OIR, TIP, TIR) + +For IMS sessions established by UEs using the I2 reference point, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the necessary interworking between the I2 reference point and CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.081 [13]) to allow OIP, OIR, TIP and TIR as described in TS 24.173 [8] to be controlled by the IMS. + +For OIP, the MSC Server may interwork any display name received in conjunction with the TEL URI or SIP URI to the CS signalling specified for the calling name presentation (CNAP) service (e.g. as described in TS 24.096 [29]). + +NOTE 1: The ability to interwork identity information from the I2 reference point to CS signalling is limited to scenarios where the IMS identity is a TEL URI or its SIP URI equivalent as described in TS 23.228 [2] or to where a display name is received and the MSC Server supports the interworking described in this clause + +NOTE 2: A terminating UE using CS signalling is not able to temporarily override default settings for the TIP/TIR supplementary service. + +NOTE 3: Interworking of display name received in conjunction with a Tel URI or SIP URI to calling name presentation using CNAP is subject to local regulatory requirements on calling line identity and whether the originating network of the call is trusted to provide an authentic identity. + +### 7.6.2.3 Communication Diversion Services + +For IMS sessions established by UEs using the I2 reference point, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the necessary interworking between the I2 reference point and CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.082 [14]) to allow Communication Diversion (CDIV) services to be executed in the IMS. + +#### 7.6.2.3.1 Communication Forwarding Unconditional (CFU) + +Communication Forwarding Unconditional (CFU) is provided as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. + +#### 7.6.2.3.2 Communication Forwarding Busy (CFB) + +Communication Forwarding network determined user Busy (CFB) is provided as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. + +For Communication Forwarding user determined Busy (CFB), the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the necessary interworking between CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.082 [14]) and the I2 reference point to allow the IMS to execute CFB. + +#### 7.6.2.3.3 Communication Forwarding No Reply (CFNR) + +Communication Forwarding No Reply (CFNR) is provided as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. + +The MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall allow the IMS to control the length of time allowed for the UE to reply to the communication request prior to invoking CFNR. + +#### 7.6.2.3.4 Communication Forwarding on Not Logged-in (CFNL) + +Communication Forwarding on Not Logged-in (CFNL) is provided as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. + +#### 7.6.2.3.5 Communication Deflection (CD) + +For Communication Deflection (CD), the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the necessary interworking between CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.072 [15]) and the I2 reference point to allow the UE to deflect an incoming call back to the IMS for redirection to another user. + +#### 7.6.2.3.6 Communication Forwarding on Subscriber Not Reachable (CFNRc) + +For Communication Forwarding on Subscriber Not Reachable (CFNRc), the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall return the appropriate reply to the offered session to allow the IMS to execute CFNRc, (e.g. as specified in TS 24.604 [26]). + +#### 7.6.2.3.7 Communication Diversion Notification (CDIVN) + +The support of interworking between CS signalling and the IMS for the CDIVN service is not supported at the MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + +#### 7.6.2.3.8 Diversion notifications to originating users + +For IMS sessions originated by UEs using the I2 reference point, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the necessary interworking between the I2 reference point and CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.082 [14] and TS 24.072 [15]) to allow the UE to receive notification that an origination was diverted, for use in networks which support this subscription option. This is applicable to all CDIV services. + +NOTE: Direct mapping between IMS diversion conditions and CS domain supplementary service codes might not be possible for all services (e.g. CFNL). + +#### 7.6.2.4 Communication Barring + +For IMS sessions established by UEs using the I2 reference point, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the necessary interworking between the I2 reference point and CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.088 [16]) to provide the UE with notification that a Communications Barring (CB) service was invoked. + +NOTE: Unique mappings between SIP responses defined in TS 24.611 [28] and CS domain supplementary service codes are not possible for OCB and ICB. + +#### 7.6.2.5 Communication Hold/Resume + +For IMS sessions established by UEs using CS media, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the necessary interworking between the I2 reference point and CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.083 [18]) to allow communication hold and resume to be controlled by the IMS. + +Figure 7.6.2.5-1 describes how IMS communication hold and resume is performed via the MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Communication Hold and Resume via MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows the interaction between UE A, MSC Server, CS-MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. The process starts with a call already established between UE A and UE B. UE A sends a 'Hold (B)' message to the MSC Server. The MSC Server then sends a 'Modify' message to the CS-MGW. The MSC Server sends a 'Hold' message to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a 'Hold' message to the SCC AS. The SCC AS sends a 'Hold' message back to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF then sends a 'Hold' message to UE B. When the user wants to resume, UE A sends a 'Retrieve (B)' message to the MSC Server. The MSC Server sends a 'Modify' message to the CS-MGW. The MSC Server sends a 'Resume' message to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a 'Resume' message to the SCC AS. The SCC AS sends a 'Resume' message back to the S-CSCF. Finally, the S-CSCF sends a 'Resume' message to UE B.](3198cdf0dbe501c46fe0e4073c7d8451_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant MSC Server + participant CS-MGW + participant S-CSCF + participant SCC AS + participant UE B + + Note over all participants: Call between UE A and UE B established previously + + UE A->>MSC Server: 1. Hold (B) + MSC Server->>CS-MGW: 2. Modify + MSC Server->>S-CSCF: 3. Hold + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 4. Hold + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 5. Hold + S-CSCF->>UE B: 6. Hold + + UE A->>MSC Server: 7. Retrieve (B) + MSC Server->>CS-MGW: 8. Modify + MSC Server->>S-CSCF: 9. Resume + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 10. Resume + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 11. Resume + S-CSCF->>UE B: 12. Resume + +``` + +Sequence diagram for IMS Communication Hold and Resume via MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows the interaction between UE A, MSC Server, CS-MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. The process starts with a call already established between UE A and UE B. UE A sends a 'Hold (B)' message to the MSC Server. The MSC Server then sends a 'Modify' message to the CS-MGW. The MSC Server sends a 'Hold' message to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a 'Hold' message to the SCC AS. The SCC AS sends a 'Hold' message back to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF then sends a 'Hold' message to UE B. When the user wants to resume, UE A sends a 'Retrieve (B)' message to the MSC Server. The MSC Server sends a 'Modify' message to the CS-MGW. The MSC Server sends a 'Resume' message to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a 'Resume' message to the SCC AS. The SCC AS sends a 'Resume' message back to the S-CSCF. Finally, the S-CSCF sends a 'Resume' message to UE B. + +**Figure 7.6.2.5-1: IMS Communication Hold and Resume via MSC Server enhanced for ICS** + +1. UE A sends a Hold message to the CS network (e.g. as specified in TS 24.083 [18]). +2. The MSC Server initiates interaction with the CS-MGW over the Mc reference point instructing it to stop sending the media stream toward UE B but to keep the resources for the session reserved. +3. The MSC Server sends the Hold message to the S-CSCF indicating the session is being put on hold as described in TS 24.173 [8]. + +NOTE 1: For point-to-point speech-only sessions, the SDP offer in the Hold message shall also include RTCP bandwidth modifiers with values greater than zero to allow the remote end to detect that the link is alive during hold, as specified in clause 7.3.1 of TS 26.114 [17]. + +4. The S-CSCF sends the Hold message to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +5. The SCC AS sends the Hold message to the S-CSCF. +6. The Hold message is forwarded to UE B. + +7. UE A sends a Retrieve message on the CS network (e.g. as specified in TS 24.083 [18]). + +8. The MSC Server initiates interaction with the CS-MGW over the Mc reference point instructing it to resume sending the media stream toward UE B. + +9. The MSC Server sends a Resume message to the S-CSCF indicating the session is being resumed as described in TS 24.173 [8]. + +NOTE 2: For point-to-point speech-only sessions, the SDP offer in the Resume message may also include RTCP bandwidth modifiers with values equal to zero to turn off RTCP as specified in clause 7.3.1 of TS 26.114 [17]. + +10. The S-CSCF sends the Resume message to the SCC AS. +11. The SCC AS sends the Resume message to the S-CSCF. + +12. The Resume message is forwarded to UE B. + +### 7.6.2.6 Communication Waiting + +For IMS sessions established by UEs using the I2 reference point, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the necessary interworking between the I2 reference point and CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.083 [18]) to allow Communication Waiting (CW) to be controlled by the IMS. A UE may reject a waiting call. + +Figure 7.6.2.6-1 describes how IMS CW is performed via the MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating IMS Communication Waiting via MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows the interaction between UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, TAS, SCC AS, UE B, and UE C.](bd50d56ae2c12a92466ba2aea1a78040_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant MSC Server + participant MGW + participant S-CSCF + participant TAS + participant SCC AS + participant UE B + participant UE C + + Note over UE A, UE B: Session between UE A and UE B active + UE C->>S-CSCF: 1. INVITE (A) + S-CSCF->>TAS: 1a. INVITE (A) + TAS-->>S-CSCF: 1b. INVITE (A) with call waiting indication + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 2. INVITE (A) with call waiting indication + SCC AS-->>S-CSCF: 3. INVITE (A) with call waiting indication + S-CSCF->>MSC Server: 4. INVITE (A) with call waiting indication + MSC Server->>UE A: 5. Setup + UE A->>MSC Server: 6. Alerting + MSC Server->>S-CSCF: 7. Call is Waiting Indication + S-CSCF->>TAS: 8. Call is Waiting Indication + TAS-->>SCC AS: 9. Call is Waiting Indication + SCC AS-->>S-CSCF: 9a. Call is Waiting Indication + S-CSCF-->>TAS: 9b. Call is waiting indication + TAS-->>UE C: 10. Call is Waiting Indication + UE A->>MSC Server: 11. Hold (B) + Note over MSC Server, UE B: 12. Session hold between UE A and UE B + UE A->>MSC Server: 13. Connect (C) + Note over MSC Server, UE C: 14. Session establishment between UE A and UE C + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating IMS Communication Waiting via MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows the interaction between UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, TAS, SCC AS, UE B, and UE C. + +**Figure 7.6.2.6-1: IMS Communication Waiting via MSC Server enhanced for ICS** + +1. An incoming INVITE is received at the S-CSCF of UE A. +- 1a. S-CSCF forwards the INVITE to TAS. +- 1b. The TAS detects the CW condition and inserts Call waiting indication into the INVITE request. The TAS sends the INVITE to S-CSCF. +2. Filter criteria direct the S-CSCF to send the INVITE to the SCC AS. +3. The SCC AS sends the INVITE to the S-CSCF. +4. The S-CSCF forwards the INVITE to the MSC Server based on the contact address stored during registration. +5. The MSC Server sends a Setup message to UE A to inform it of the waiting call (e.g. as specified in TS 24.083 [18]). +6. UE A sends an Alerting message for the waiting call. +7. The MSC Server sends an indication that the call is waiting. + +8. The S-CSCF forwards the indication that the call is waiting to the SCC AS. +9. The SCC AS forwards the indication that the call is waiting to the S-CSCF. +- 9a. The S-CSCF forwards the indication that the call is waiting to the TAS. +- 9b. The TAS forwards the indication that the call is waiting to the S-CSCF. +10. The S-CSCF forwards the indication that the call is waiting to UE C. +11. The ICS User accepts the call and UE A sends a Hold message to put the existing session on hold. +12. The existing session between the MSC Server and UE B is put on hold as described in clause 7.6.2.5 of this specification. +13. UE A sends a Connect message for the waiting call. +14. Completion of the IMS session setup procedures. + +### 7.6.2.7 Explicit Communication Transfer + +For IMS sessions established by UEs using CS media, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the necessary interworking between the I2 reference point and CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.091 [19]) to allow Explicit Communication Transfer (ECT) to be controlled by the IMS. + +When the UE initiates ECT via CS access, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall support consultative transfer and shall play the initiator role as described in TS 23.228 [2] on behalf of the UE. The MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall also support the recipient and target roles on behalf of the UE for consultative transfer as described in TS 23.228 [2]. + +The MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall support the recipient and target roles on behalf of the UE for blind transfer as described in TS 23.228 [2]. + +The MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall support the recipient and target roles on behalf of the UE for assured transfer as described in TS 23.228 [2]. + +Figure 7.6.2.7-1 describes how IMS consultative ECT is performed via CS access, with the MSC Server enhanced for ICS playing the role of transfer initiator on behalf of the UE. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Consultative ECT via MSC Server enhanced for ICS (transfer initiator). The diagram shows the interaction between UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, TAS, UE B, and UE C. The process starts with UE A sending a Call Transfer to the MSC Server. The MSC Server sends a REFER (B to C) to the S-CSCF, which then propagates through the SCC AS and TAS back to the S-CSCF, and finally to UE B. UE B initiates session establishment with UE C. UE C then initiates session release with UE A. UE B sends NOTIFY (transfer complete) messages back through the chain. The MSC Server receives a Release call from UE A and initiates session release between UE A and UE B.](e7010c66da16316c2935dfbbef5056b3_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant MSC Server + participant MGW + participant S-CSCF + participant SCC AS + participant TAS + participant UE B + participant UE C + + Note over UE A, UE C: Session between UE A and UE B on hold, Session between UE A and UE C active + + UE A->>MSC Server: 1. Call Transfer + MSC Server->>S-CSCF: 2. REFER (B to C) + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 3. REFER (B to C) + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 4. REFER (B to C) + S-CSCF->>TAS: 5. REFER (B to C) + TAS->>S-CSCF: 6. REFER (B to C) + S-CSCF->>UE B: 7. REFER (B to C) + Note right of UE B: 8. Session establishment between UE B and UE C + Note over UE C, UE A: 9. Session release between UE C and UE A + UE B->>TAS: 10. NOTIFY (transfer complete) + TAS->>S-CSCF: 11. NOTIFY (transfer complete) + S-CSCF->>TAS: 12. NOTIFY (transfer complete) + TAS->>S-CSCF: 13. NOTIFY (transfer complete) + S-CSCF->>TAS: 14. NOTIFY (transfer complete) + TAS->>MSC Server: 15. NOTIFY (transfer complete) + UE A->>MSC Server: 16. Release call + Note over UE A, UE B: 17. Session release between UE A and UE B + +``` + +Sequence diagram for IMS Consultative ECT via MSC Server enhanced for ICS (transfer initiator). The diagram shows the interaction between UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, TAS, UE B, and UE C. The process starts with UE A sending a Call Transfer to the MSC Server. The MSC Server sends a REFER (B to C) to the S-CSCF, which then propagates through the SCC AS and TAS back to the S-CSCF, and finally to UE B. UE B initiates session establishment with UE C. UE C then initiates session release with UE A. UE B sends NOTIFY (transfer complete) messages back through the chain. The MSC Server receives a Release call from UE A and initiates session release between UE A and UE B. + +**Figure 7.6.2.7-1: IMS Consultative ECT via MSC Server enhanced for ICS (transfer initiator)** + +1. UE A initiates transfer of UE B to UE C by sending a call transfer message (e.g. as specified in TS 24.091 [19]). +2. The MSC Server sends a REFER to the S-CSCF. The REFER indicates that UE B is to be transferred to UE C and that this new session is to replace the current session between UE A and UE B. +3. The S-CSCF sends the REFER to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +4. The SCC AS sends the REFER to the S-CSCF. +5. The S-CSCF sends the REFER to the TAS for service execution. +6. The TAS sends the REFER to the S-CSCF. +7. The REFER is sent to UE B as the transfer recipient. +8. UE B initiates session establishment with UE C as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +9. UE C initiates session release with UE A as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +10. UE B provides indication that the communication transfer is complete as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +11. The S-CSCF sends the NOTIFY to the TAS. +12. The TAS sends the NOTIFY to the S-CSCF. +13. The S-CSCF sends the NOTIFY to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +14. The SCC AS sends the NOTIFY to the S-CSCF. + +15. The MSC Server, as transfer initiator, receives notification that communication transfer is complete. +16. The MSC Server releases the calls (A-B and A-C) toward UE A and indicates transfer success (e.g. as specified in TS 24.091 [19]). +17. The MSC Server, as transfer initiator, initiates release of the IMS session with UE B. + +Figure 7.6.2.7-2 describes how IMS consultative ECT is performed via CS access, with the MSC Server enhanced for ICS playing the role of transfer recipient on behalf of the UE. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Consultative ECT via MSC Server enhanced for ICS (transfer recipient).](967e98a12645f89cb4a7620f42bf8c2e_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the interaction between UE B, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, TAS, UE C, and UE A. The initial state shows an active session between UE A and UE B, and a held session between UE A and UE C. + +1. REFER (B to C) from UE A to UE C +2. REFER (B to C) from UE C to S-CSCF +3. REFER (B to C) from S-CSCF to TAS +4. REFER (B to C) from TAS to S-CSCF +5. REFER (B to C) from S-CSCF to SCC AS +6. REFER (B to C) from SCC AS to MSC Server +7. INVITE (C, SDP from CS-MGW) from MSC Server to S-CSCF +8. INVITE (C, SDP from CS-MGW) from S-CSCF to SCC AS +9. INVITE (C, SDP from CS-MGW) from SCC AS to S-CSCF +10. INVITE (C, SDP from CS-MGW) from S-CSCF to TAS +11. INVITE (C, SDP from CS-MGW) from TAS to S-CSCF +12. INVITE (C, SDP from CS-MGW) from S-CSCF to UE C +13. Session establishment between MSC Server (on behalf of UE B) and UE C +14. Session release between UE A and UE C +15. NOTIFY (transfer complete) from UE C to MSC Server +16. NOTIFY (transfer complete) from MSC Server to S-CSCF +17. NOTIFY (transfer complete) from S-CSCF to SCC AS +18. NOTIFY (transfer complete) from SCC AS to TAS +19. NOTIFY (transfer complete) from TAS to S-CSCF +20. NOTIFY (transfer complete) from S-CSCF to UE A +21. Notification of Call Transfer from MSC Server to UE B +22. Session release between UE A and MSC Server (on behalf of UE B) + +Sequence diagram for IMS Consultative ECT via MSC Server enhanced for ICS (transfer recipient). + +**Figure 7.6.2.7-2: IMS Consultative ECT via MSC Server enhanced for ICS (transfer recipient)** + +1. UE A initiates transfer of UE B to UE C by sending a REFER as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +2. The S-CSCF sends the REFER to the TAS for service execution. +3. The TAS sends the REFER to the S-CSCF. +4. The S-CSCF sends the REFER to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +5. The SCC AS sends the REFER to the S-CSCF within the dialog created for the session between UE A and UE B. +6. The REFER is sent to the MSC Server as the transfer recipient. +7. On behalf of UE B, the MSC Server initiates session establishment towards UE C. +8. Filter criteria directs the S-CSCF to send the INVITE to the SCC AS. +9. The SCC AS sends the INVITE to the S-CSCF. + +10. The S-CSCF sends the INVITE to the TAS. +11. The TAS sends the INVITE to the S-CSCF. +12. The S-CSCF continues with originated session processing as specified in TS 23.228 [2] and routes the request onwards to UE C. +13. A session is established between the MSC Server (on behalf of UE B) and UE C. +14. UE C initiates session release with UE A as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +15. The MSC Server provides indication that the communication transfer is complete by sending a NOTIFY. +16. The S-CSCF sends the NOTIFY to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +17. The SCC AS sends the NOTIFY to the S-CSCF. +18. The S-CSCF sends the NOTIFY to the TAS. +19. The TAS sends the NOTIFY to the S-CSCF. +20. The NOTIFY is sent to UE A as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +21. The MSC Server sends a message with notification of ECT invocation to UE B (e.g. as specified in TS 24.091 [19]). +22. UE A initiates session release with the MSC Server as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. + +Figure 7.6.2.7-3 describes how IMS blind ECT is performed via CS access, with the MSC Server enhanced for ICS playing the role of transfer recipient on behalf of the UE. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Blind ECT via MSC Server enhanced for ICS (transfer recipient).](c07e21a8d65991db04263322f859c94f_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the interaction between UE B, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, TAS, UE C, and UE A for an IMS Blind ECT procedure. The process is divided into three main phases: + +- Session between UE A and UE B on hold, no session between UE A and UE C:** UE A sends a REFER (B to C) to UE C (1). UE C sends a REFER (B to C) to the TAS (2). The TAS sends a REFER (B to C) to the S-CSCF (3). The S-CSCF sends a REFER (B to C) to the SCC AS (4). The SCC AS sends a REFER (B to C) to the S-CSCF (5). The S-CSCF sends a REFER (B to C) to the MGW (6). +- Session release between UE A and MSC Server (on behalf of UE B):** UE A initiates the release (7). The MSC Server sends an INVITE (C, SDP from CS-MGW) to the S-CSCF (8). The S-CSCF sends an INVITE (C, SDP from CS-MGW) to the SCC AS (9). The SCC AS sends an INVITE (C, SDP from CS-MGW) to the S-CSCF (10). The S-CSCF sends an INVITE (C, SDP from CS-MGW) to the TAS (11). The TAS sends an INVITE (C, SDP from CS-MGW) to the S-CSCF (12). The S-CSCF sends an INVITE (C, SDP from CS-MGW) to UE C (13). +- Session establishment between MSC Server (on behalf of UE B) and UE C:** The MSC Server sends a NOTIFY (transfer complete) to the S-CSCF (15). The S-CSCF sends a NOTIFY (transfer complete) to the SCC AS (16). The SCC AS sends a NOTIFY (transfer complete) to the S-CSCF (17). The S-CSCF sends a NOTIFY (transfer complete) to the TAS (18). The TAS sends a NOTIFY (transfer complete) to the S-CSCF (19). The S-CSCF sends a NOTIFY (transfer complete) to UE C (20). Finally, the MSC Server sends a Notification of Call Transfer to UE B (21). + +Sequence diagram for IMS Blind ECT via MSC Server enhanced for ICS (transfer recipient). + +**Figure 7.6.2.7-3: IMS Blind ECT via MSC Server enhanced for ICS (transfer recipient)** + +1. UE A initiates transfer of UE B to UE C by sending a REFER as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. +2. The S-CSCF sends the REFER to the TAS for service execution. +3. The TAS sends the REFER to the S-CSCF. +4. The S-CSCF sends the REFER to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +5. The SCC AS sends the REFER to the S-CSCF within the dialog created for the session between UE A and UE B. +6. The REFER is sent to the MSC Server as the transfer recipient. +7. UE A initiates release of the existing session with the MSC Server which is acting on behalf of UE B. +8. On behalf of UE B, the MSC Server initiates session establishment towards UE C. +9. Filter criteria directs the S-CSCF to send the INVITE to the SCC AS. +10. The SCC AS sends the INVITE to the S-CSCF. +11. The S-CSCF sends the INVITE to the TAS. +12. The TAS sends the INVITE to the S-CSCF. +13. The S-CSCF continues with originated session processing as specified in TS 23.228 [2] and routes the request onwards to UE C. + +14. A session is established between the MSC Server (on behalf of UE B) and UE C. +15. The MSC Server sends a NOTIFY to provide indication that the communication transfer is complete. +16. The S-CSCF sends the NOTIFY to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +17. The SCC AS sends the NOTIFY to the S-CSCF. +18. The S-CSCF sends the NOTIFY to the TAS. +19. The TAS sends the NOTIFY to the S-CSCF. +20. The NOTIFY is sent to UE A. +21. The MSC Servers sends a message with notification of ECT invocation to UE B (e.g. as specified in TS 24.091 [19]). + +### 7.6.2.8 Conferencing + +For IMS sessions established by UEs using CS media, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the necessary interworking between the I2 reference point and CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.084 [20]) to allow Conferencing to be controlled by the IMS. + +When the UE initiates three-way session creation via CS access, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall support the initiator role as described in TS 23.228 [2] on behalf of the UE. The MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall be able to derive a conference factory URI, e.g. using components from the subscriber's identity (e.g. IMSI). + +Once a conference is created, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall support adding parties to or removing parties from the conference on behalf of the UE. + +The MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall also support joining a conference on behalf of the UE upon receiving an invitation from a remote party or conference focus. + +If the conference is being managed by a UE using CS media, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall not allow the UE to create a private conversation with a remote party by splitting that party from the conference. + +NOTE 1: Interworking is blocked due to no multiparty split service being defined for MMTel. + +The MSC Server enhanced for ICS may subscribe to the conference related events in IMS. And when the MSC server receives the conference related events, it should inform the UE of the events. + +Figure 7.6.2.8-1 describes how conference creation can be performed via CS access, with the MSC Server enhanced for ICS playing the role of conference initiator on behalf of the UE. This flow does not preclude the use of other mechanisms for inviting remote parties to the conference as specified in TS 24.147 [21]. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Conferencing via MSC Server enhanced for ICS (initiator). The diagram shows the interaction between UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, Conf AS / MRFC, UE B, and UE C. The process involves session setup, conference creation, and subsequent REFER and NOTIFY messages to join the conference.](49fe8fe978c0f7e73112d231feb377eb_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the IMS Conferencing process via an MSC Server enhanced for ICS (initiator). The participants involved are UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, Conf AS / MRFC, UE B, and UE C. The initial state is a session between UE A and UE B on hold, with a session between UE A and UE C active. + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant MSC Server + participant MGW + participant S-CSCF + participant SCC AS + participant Conf AS / MRFC + participant UE B + participant UE C + + Note over UE A, UE C: Session between UE A and UE B on hold, Session between UE A and UE C active + + UE A->>MSC Server: 1. Multiparty call setup + MSC Server->>S-CSCF: 2. INVITE (Conf Fac URI) + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 3. INVITE (Conf Fac URI) + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 4. INVITE (Conf Fac URI) + S-CSCF->>Conf AS / MRFC: 5. INVITE (Conf Fac URI) + Note right of Conf AS / MRFC: 6. Conference creation + Conf AS / MRFC->>S-CSCF: 7. 200 OK (Conf URI) + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 8. 200 OK (Conf URI) + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 9. 200 OK (Conf URI) + S-CSCF->>MSC Server: 10. 200 OK (Conf URI) + MSC Server->>S-CSCF: 11. REFER (B to Conf) + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 12. REFER (B to Conf) + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 13. REFER (B to Conf) + S-CSCF->>UE B: 14. REFER (B to Conf) + Note right of UE B: 15. UE B joins conference + UE B->>Conf AS / MRFC: 16. NOTIFY (transfer complete) + Conf AS / MRFC->>S-CSCF: 17. NOTIFY (transfer complete) + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 18. NOTIFY (transfer complete) + SCC AS->>MSC Server: 19. NOTIFY (transfer complete) + Note over MSC Server, UE B: 20. Session Release between UE-B and MSC-Server + Note over MSC Server, UE C: 21. UE C referred to conference + MSC Server->>UE A: 22. Ack + +``` + +Sequence diagram for IMS Conferencing via MSC Server enhanced for ICS (initiator). The diagram shows the interaction between UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, Conf AS / MRFC, UE B, and UE C. The process involves session setup, conference creation, and subsequent REFER and NOTIFY messages to join the conference. + +**Figure 7.6.2.8-1: IMS Conferencing via MSC Server enhanced for ICS (initiator)** + +1. UE A initiates creation of the conference by sending a multiparty call setup message (e.g. Build MPTY message as specified in TS 24.084 [20]). +2. The MSC Server derives a conference factory URI and sends an INVITE to the S-CSCF. +3. Filter criteria directs the S-CSCF to send the INVITE to the SCC AS. +4. The SCC AS sends the INVITE to the S-CSCF. +5. The S-CSCF sends the INVITE to the Conferencing AS / MRFC. +6. The Conferencing AS / MRFC creates a conference connection as specified in TS 24.147 [21]. +7. The Conferencing AS / MRFC returns the conference URI to the S-CSCF. +8. The S-CSCF sends the response to the SCC AS. +9. The SCC AS sends the response to the S-CSCF. +10. The S-CSCF sends the response to the MSC Server. +11. The MSC Server sends a REFER to UE B to refer that party to the conference. +12. The S-CSCF sends the REFER to the SCC AS as it was inserted at session establishment. +13. The SCC AS sends the REFER to the S-CSCF. +14. The S-CSCF sends the REFER to UE B. + +15. UE B joins the conference as specified in TS 24.147 [21]. + +16. UE B sends a NOTIFY indicating transfer to the conference is complete. + +17. The S-CSCF sends the NOTIFY to the SCC AS. + +18. The SCC AS sends the NOTIFY to the S-CSCF. + +19. The S-CSCF sends the NOTIFY to the MSC Server. + +20. UE B initiates a session release. + +21. Steps 11 to 20 are repeated for UE C. + +NOTE 2: UE B and UE C can be referred to the conference in parallel. + +22. The MSC Server sends an acknowledgement to UE A (e.g. Build MPTY Acknowledgement as specified in TS 24.084 [20]). + +## 7.6.2.9 User configuration of communication service settings + +### 7.6.2.9.1 TAS procedures + +The TAS shall allow an ICS User to manipulate the communication service settings using only one of the following mechanisms: + +- communication service settings via the MSC Server enhanced for ICS as described in clause 7.6.2.9.3; +- communication service settings directly from the UE as described in TS 24.173 [8], with following enhancements: + - it shall be possible for a user subscription to provision only a subset of the MMTel services, e.g. corresponding to the PSTN/ISDN and CS supplementary service set; + - the subset of MMTel services that are available to the user is provided to the UE by the network. + +The TAS shall reject the manipulation of the communication service settings via the prohibited mechanism. + +### 7.6.2.9.2 UE supporting multimedia telephony + +Clause 7.6.1.3 applies. + +### 7.6.2.9.3 MSC Server enhanced for ICS + +The MSC Server enhanced for ICS may implement a communication service setting conversion function between CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.010 [30] for systems based on TS 24.008 [6]) and communication service setting procedures (as defined in TS 24.173 [8]). + +## 7.6.2.10 Customized Alerting Tone (CAT) + +For origination sessions established by UEs using the I2 reference point, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform early media procedures as specified in TS 29.292 [43]. + +## 7.6.2.11 Communication Completion on Busy Subscriber/No Reply/Not Logged In + +### 7.6.2.11.1 Communication Completion Terminated at Served User + +For IMS sessions established by UEs, where the I2 reference point is used, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the necessary interworking between the I2 reference point and CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.093 [47]) to allow Communication Completion to be controlled by the IMS. + +Figure 7.6.2.11.1-1 describes how IMS CCBS is performed via the MSC Server enhanced for ICS. CCNR and CCNL follow the same principles. The following Figure assumes that UE A has an ongoing call. + +![Sequence diagram showing IMS Communication Completion to Busy Subscriber via MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram illustrates the interaction between UE A, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, TAS, S-CSCF, UE B, and UE C. It starts with an active session between UE A and UE B. UE C sends an INVITE to UE A, which is routed through S-CSCF, TAS, and SCC AS to the MSC Server. The MSC Server sends a Setup to UE A, which responds with a Release Complete. The MSC Server maps this to a SIP Busy message, which is forwarded through SCC AS and S-CSCF to the TAS. The TAS adds a CC possible indicator and forwards the Busy response to UE C. UE C then sends a CC Invocation Request to the S-CSCF, which is forwarded to the TAS. The TAS accepts the request, sends a CC Invocation Response to UE C, and begins supervising UE A. Finally, the session between UE A and UE B terminates, and the call set-up proceeds.](750b1652a4f4791b84c02aa755a1dedd_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant MSC Server + participant MGW + participant SCC AS + participant TAS + participant S-CSCF + participant UE B + participant UE C + + Note over MGW, SCC AS: Session between UE A and UE B active + + UE C->>S-CSCF: 1. INVITE (A) + S-CSCF->>TAS: 2. INVITE (A) + TAS->>S-CSCF: 3. INVITE (A) + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 4. INVITE (A) + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 5. INVITE (A) + SCC AS->>MSC Server: 6. INVITE (A) + MSC Server->>UE A: 7. Setup + UE A->>MSC Server: 8. Release Complete + MSC Server->>SCC AS: 9. Busy + SCC AS->>TAS: 10. Busy + TAS->>SCC AS: 11. Busy + TAS->>S-CSCF: 12. Busy + TAS->>S-CSCF: 13. Busy, CC possible + S-CSCF->>UE C: 14. Busy, CC possible + UE C->>S-CSCF: 15. CC Invocation Request + S-CSCF->>TAS: 16. CC Invocation Request + TAS->>S-CSCF: 17. CC Invocation Response + S-CSCF->>UE C: 18. CC Invocation Response + Note over UE A, UE B: 19. Session between UE A and UE B terminates + TAS->>S-CSCF: 20. CC Ready + S-CSCF->>UE C: 21. CC Ready + UE C->>S-CSCF: 22. INVITE (A) + S-CSCF->>TAS: 23. INVITE (A) + TAS->>S-CSCF: 24. INVITE (A) + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 25. INVITE (A) + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 26. INVITE (A) + SCC AS->>MSC Server: 27. INVITE (A) + MSC Server->>UE A: 28. Setup + Note over UE A, UE B: 29. Call set-up proceeds in accordance with normal procedures + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing IMS Communication Completion to Busy Subscriber via MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram illustrates the interaction between UE A, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, TAS, S-CSCF, UE B, and UE C. It starts with an active session between UE A and UE B. UE C sends an INVITE to UE A, which is routed through S-CSCF, TAS, and SCC AS to the MSC Server. The MSC Server sends a Setup to UE A, which responds with a Release Complete. The MSC Server maps this to a SIP Busy message, which is forwarded through SCC AS and S-CSCF to the TAS. The TAS adds a CC possible indicator and forwards the Busy response to UE C. UE C then sends a CC Invocation Request to the S-CSCF, which is forwarded to the TAS. The TAS accepts the request, sends a CC Invocation Response to UE C, and begins supervising UE A. Finally, the session between UE A and UE B terminates, and the call set-up proceeds. + +**Figure 7.6.2.11.1-1: IMS Communication Completion to Busy Subscriber via MSC Server enhanced for ICS** + +There is an ongoing session between UE A and UE B. + +1. An incoming INVITE is received at the S-CSCF of UE A. +- 2-6. Via Initial Filter Criteria the INVITE is forwarded to the TAS and the SCC AS, before it is forwarded to the MSC Server. +7. The MSC Server enhanced for ISC sends a Setup message to UE A to inform it of the incoming call. Depending on CW settings the MSC Server enhanced for ICS may send a Busy response immediately. +8. UE A responds with a Release Complete message with cause "user busy". +9. The MSC Server enhanced for ISC maps the Release Complete message to a SIP Busy message. +- 10-12. The SIP Busy message is forwarded via SCC AS and S-CSCF to the TAS. +13. The TAS adds a CC possible indicator to the Busy response. +14. The Busy response is forwarded towards UE C. +15. A CC Invocation Request is received at the S-CSCF of UE A. +16. The CC Invocation Request is forwarded to the TAS. +17. The TAS accepts the CC Invocation Request, sends a CC Invocation Response towards UE C and begins supervising UE A for becoming not busy. +18. The CC Invocation Response is forwarded by the S-CSCF towards UE C. +19. The Session between UE A and UE B terminates. + +20. After an appropriate time to allow UE A to initiate a call, the TAS sends a CC Ready notification towards UE C. +21. The CC ready notification is forwarded by the S-CSCF towards UE C. +22. An INVITE Request resulting from the CC ready notification is received by the S-CSCF. +23. The INVITE Request is received by the TAS. +24. After appropriate checking that the INVITE request is resulting from the CC ready notification the TAS forwards the INVITE request to the S-CSCF. +- 25-29. The call set-up proceeds in accordance with normal procedures. + +### 7.6.2.11.2 Communication Completion Originated at Served User + +For IMS sessions established by UEs, where the I2 reference point is used, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the necessary interworking between the I2 reference point and CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.093 [47]) to allow Communication Completion to be controlled by the IMS. + +Figure 7.6.2.11.2-1 describes how IMS CCBS is performed via the MSC Server enhanced for ICS. CCNR and CCNL follow the same principles. The following Figure assumes that UE B has an ongoing call. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Communication Completion via MSC Server enhanced for ICS. Lifelines: UE A, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, TAS, S-CSCF, UE B. The sequence shows a call setup from UE A to UE B, which results in a busy condition. The TAS then offers Communication Completion to UE A, who accepts. The TAS then invokes the CC service towards UE B, receives a busy confirmation, and then receives a CC Ready notification when UE B becomes free. Finally, the TAS initiates a new call setup to UE B.](832a0ce332e784fe80289e9f00f56574_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant MSC Server + participant MGW + participant SCC AS + participant TAS + participant S-CSCF + participant UE B + + UE A->>MSC Server: 1. Setup + MSC Server->>SCC AS: 2. INVITE (A) + SCC AS->>TAS: 3. INVITE (A) + TAS->>SCC AS: 4. INVITE (A) + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 5. INVITE (A) + S-CSCF->>S-CSCF: 6. INVITE (A) + S-CSCF->>UE B: 7. INVITE (A) + UE B-->>S-CSCF: 8. Busy, CC possible + S-CSCF-->>TAS: 9. Busy, CC possible + Note over UE A, TAS: 10. TAS offers User A to invoke CC using an early announcement . User A accepts to invoke CC . + Note over TAS, UE B: 11. TAS invokes the CC service towards UE B and receives a confirmation of successful invocation . + TAS->>S-CSCF: 12. Busy + S-CSCF-->>SCC AS: 13. Busy + SCC AS-->>TAS: 14. Busy + TAS-->>MSC Server: 15. Busy + MSC Server-->>UE A: 16. Disconnect + UE A->>MSC Server: 17. Release + MSC Server-->>UE A: 18. Release Complete + Note over TAS, UE B: 19. TAS receives a CC Ready notification indicating UE B is free . + TAS->>S-CSCF: 20. REFER (AtoB) + S-CSCF-->>SCC AS: 21. REFER (AtoB) + SCC AS-->>TAS: 22. REFER (AtoB) + TAS->>MSC Server: 23. REFER (AtoB) + MSC Server-->>UE A: 24. CM Service Prompt + UE A->>MSC Server: 25. Start CC + MSC Server-->>UE A: 26. CC establishment + MSC Server-->>UE A: 27. CC establishment Confirmed + MSC Server-->>UE A: 28. Recall + UE A->>MSC Server: 29. Setup + MSC Server->>S-CSCF: 30. INVITE (A) + Note over UE A, UE B: 31. Call set-up proceeds in accordance with normal procedures . + +``` + +Sequence diagram for IMS Communication Completion via MSC Server enhanced for ICS. Lifelines: UE A, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, TAS, S-CSCF, UE B. The sequence shows a call setup from UE A to UE B, which results in a busy condition. The TAS then offers Communication Completion to UE A, who accepts. The TAS then invokes the CC service towards UE B, receives a busy confirmation, and then receives a CC Ready notification when UE B becomes free. Finally, the TAS initiates a new call setup to UE B. + +**Figure 7.6.2.11.2-1: IMS Communication Completion via MSC Server enhanced for ICS** + +There is an ongoing session between UE A and UE B. + +- 1-9. A normal call set-up results in a Busy condition at user B. The TAS serving user A receives a Communication Completion possible indication. +10. The TAS offers Communication Completion to user A who accepts. The offer is by means of an early announcement. +11. The TAS invokes the CC service towards user B. The TAS is notified that the invocation is successful. + +- 12-18. The Busy response without Communication Completion possible indication is sent towards UE-A. The MSC server enhanced for ICS terminates the session towards UE A without giving a the option of activating CCBS request. +19. TAS receives a CC ready notification indicating that UE B is free. +- 20-23. To start the recall procedure the TAS sends a REFER towards UE A. +- 24-28. The MSC server enhanced for ICS starts the recall following normal procedures. +29. After notification of the user and confirmation that CC call is desired UE A sends a Setup towards the MSC server enhanced for ICS. +30. The MSC server enhanced for ICS maps the Setup to an INVITE in accordance with normal procedures and forwards the request towards the S-CSCF. +31. Call set-up continues in accordance with normal procedures. + +### 7.6.3 Service consistency for non ICS UE when attached to an MSC Server not enhanced with ICS + +#### 7.6.3.1 Line ID Services (OIP, OIR, TIP, TIR) + +The service control for the Line ID services may be provided by the CS domain if they are provisioned in the CS domain. + +#### 7.6.3.2 Communication Diversion Services + +##### 7.6.3.2.1 Communication Diversion services; CFU, CFNL + +Standard IMS procedures apply toward IMS on behalf of the non-ICS UE. + +##### 7.6.3.2.2 Communication Diversion services; CFNR, CFB + +IMS control of the CFNR and CFB services are provided toward IMS on behalf of the non-ICS UE. + +NOTE: Annex D describes several implementation options which may be used for the execution of these services. + +##### 7.6.3.2.2a Communication Diversion services; CFNRc + +IMS control of the CFNRc service is provided on behalf of non-ICS UE. The MGCF may use the ICS indication as means to map cause codes received over the CS leg to appropriate IMS error code so that CFNRc can be triggered in the IMS domain. + +##### 7.6.3.2.3 Communication Diversion services; Communication Deflection + +The service control for the Call Deflection service may be provided by the CS domain (if it is provisioned in the CS domain) or may be provided by IMS. + +NOTE: Annex C describes an implementation option which may be used for the execution of this service in IMS. + +#### 7.6.3.3 Communication Barring + +Standard IMS procedures apply toward IMS on behalf of the non-ICS UE. + +#### 7.6.3.4 Communication Hold/Resume + +The service control for the Call Hold and Retrieve services may be provided by the CS domain if they are provisioned in the CS domain. + +#### 7.6.3.5 Explicit Communication Transfer + +The service control for the Explicit Call Transfer service may be provided by the CS domain if it is provisioned in the CS domain. + +### 7.6.3.6 Conferencing + +The service control for the Multiparty service may be provided by the CS domain if it is provisioned in the CS domain. + +If the access transfer from PS to CS has been performed, the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS may subscribe to the conference related events in IMS. And if the UE has a subscription for the conference event package, the MSC server should send the conference related events to UE. + +### 7.6.3.7 User configuration of Supplementary Services + +#### 7.6.3.7.1 UE not supporting multimedia telephony + +When using procedures as defined in TS 24.010 [30], and the MSC Server enhanced for ICS does not implement a communication service setting conversion function or the UE is using MSC Server not enhanced for ICS, the following apply: + +- No activation or deactivation of supplementary services shall be allowed by the CS network. +- Interrogations of CFU and CNFL (clause 7.6.3.2.1), CFNR, CFNRc and CFB (clause 7.6.3.2.2) and Communication Barring (clause 7.6.3.3) shall not be allowed by the CS network. + +NOTE 1: The service interrogation, activation, and deactivation are prevented for services which are not provisioned for the subscriber in CS domain. + +NOTE 2: If an ICS User uses a non ICS UE not supporting multimedia telephony, a downloadable application can be used to manage IMS multimedia telephony communication service settings data as specified in TS 24.173 [8]. + +#### 7.6.3.7.2 UE supporting multimedia telephony + +Refer to clause 7.6.1.3. + +### 7.6.3.8 Customized Alerting Tone (CAT) + +Standard IMS procedures apply toward IMS on behalf of the non-ICS UE. + +### 7.6.3.9 Communication Waiting + +A network provider may allow UE based CW by activating CW in the CS service profile as specified in TS 23.083 [46]. + +### 7.6.3.10 Communication Completion on Busy Subscriber/No Reply/Not Logged In + +#### 7.6.3.10.1 Communication Completion Terminated at Served User + +For IMS sessions established by UEs in the IMS network, where on the terminating side the MSC Server is not enhanced for ICS and the UE is in the CS domain the CC services can be provided by the IMS network. + +Figure 7.6.3.10.1-1 describes a call flow via an MSC Server not enhanced for ICS. CCNR and CCNL follow the same principles. + +![Sequence diagram showing IMS Communication Completion to Busy Subscriber via MSC Server not enhanced for ICS. The diagram illustrates the interaction between UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, SCC AS, TAS, S-CSCF, UE B, and UE C. It starts with an ongoing session between UE A and UE B. UE C sends an INVITE (A) to UE A via S-CSCF. The INVITE is routed through TAS, SCC AS, and MGCF to the MSC Server. The MSC Server sends a Setup message to UE A, which responds with a Release Complete message. The MSC Server maps this to a REL message, which the MGCF maps to a SIP Busy message. This Busy message is forwarded through SCC AS and S-CSCF to the TAS. The TAS adds a CC possible indicator and forwards the Busy response to UE C. UE C then sends a CC Invocation Request to UE A via S-CSCF, which is forwarded to the TAS. The TAS accepts the request, sends a CC Invocation Response to UE C, and begins supervising UE A. Finally, the session between UE A and UE B terminates, and the call set-up proceeds.](11f18bf0233d812ad2604f88f3385d60_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant MSC Server + participant MGCF + participant SCC AS + participant TAS + participant S-CSCF + participant UE B + participant UE C + + Note over MGCF, UE B: Session between UE A and UE B active + + UE C->>S-CSCF: 1. INVITE (A) + S-CSCF->>TAS: 2. INVITE (A) + TAS->>TAS: 3. INVITE (A) + TAS->>SCC AS: 4. INVITE (A) + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 5. INVITE (A) + S-CSCF->>MGCF: 6. INVITE (A) + MGCF->>MSC Server: 7. IAM + MSC Server->>UE A: 8. Setup + UE A->>MSC Server: 9. Release Complete + MSC Server->>MGCF: 10. REL + MGCF->>SCC AS: 11. Busy + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 12. Busy + S-CSCF->>TAS: 13. Busy + TAS->>TAS: 14. Busy + TAS->>S-CSCF: 15. Busy, CC possible + S-CSCF->>UE C: 16. Busy, CC possible + UE C->>S-CSCF: 17. CC Invocation Request + S-CSCF->>TAS: 18. CC Invocation Request + TAS->>TAS: 19. CC Invocation Response + TAS->>UE C: 20. CC Invocation Response + Note over UE A, UE B: 21. Session between UE A and UE B terminates + TAS->>S-CSCF: 21. CC Ready + S-CSCF->>UE C: 22. CC Ready + UE C->>S-CSCF: 23. INVITE (A) + S-CSCF->>TAS: 24. INVITE (A) + TAS->>TAS: 25. INVITE (A) + TAS->>SCC AS: 26. INVITE (A) + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 27. INVITE (A) + S-CSCF->>MGCF: 28. INVITE (A) + MGCF->>MSC Server: 29. IAM + MSC Server->>UE A: 30. Setup + Note over UE A, UE B: 31. Call set-up proceeds in accordance with normal procedures + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing IMS Communication Completion to Busy Subscriber via MSC Server not enhanced for ICS. The diagram illustrates the interaction between UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, SCC AS, TAS, S-CSCF, UE B, and UE C. It starts with an ongoing session between UE A and UE B. UE C sends an INVITE (A) to UE A via S-CSCF. The INVITE is routed through TAS, SCC AS, and MGCF to the MSC Server. The MSC Server sends a Setup message to UE A, which responds with a Release Complete message. The MSC Server maps this to a REL message, which the MGCF maps to a SIP Busy message. This Busy message is forwarded through SCC AS and S-CSCF to the TAS. The TAS adds a CC possible indicator and forwards the Busy response to UE C. UE C then sends a CC Invocation Request to UE A via S-CSCF, which is forwarded to the TAS. The TAS accepts the request, sends a CC Invocation Response to UE C, and begins supervising UE A. Finally, the session between UE A and UE B terminates, and the call set-up proceeds. + +**Figure 7.6.3.10.1-1: IMS Communication Completion to Busy Subscriber via MSC Server not enhanced for ICS** + +There is an ongoing session between UE A and UE B. + +1. An incoming INVITE is received at the S-CSCF of UE A. +- 2-6. Via Initial Filter Criteria the INVITE is forwarded to the TAS and the SCC AS, before it is forwarded to the MGCF. +7. The MGCF sends an IAM message to the MSC Server to inform it of the incoming call. +8. The MSC Server sends a Setup message to UE A to inform about the incoming call. Depending on CW settings the MSC Server may send a REL response immediately. +9. UE A responds with a Release Complete message with cause #17 "user busy". +10. The MSC Server maps the Release Complete message to a REL message. +11. The MGCF maps the REL message to a SIP Busy message. +- 12-14. The SIP Busy message is forwarded via SCC AS and S-CSCF to the TAS. +15. The TAS adds a CC possible indicator to the Busy response. +16. The Busy response is forwarded towards UE C. +17. A CC Invocation Request is received at the S-CSCF of UE A. +18. The CC Invocation Request is forwarded to the TAS. +19. The TAS accepts the CC Invocation Request, sends a CC Invocation Response towards UE C and begins supervising UE A for becoming not busy. + +20. The CC Invocation Response is forwarded by the S-CSCF towards UE C. +21. The Session between UE A and UE B terminates. +22. After an appropriate time to allow UE A to initiate a call, the TAS sends a CC Ready notification towards UE C. +23. The CC ready notification is forwarded by the S-CSCF towards UE C. +24. An INVITE Request resulting from the CC ready notification is received by the S-CSCF. +25. The INVITE Request is received by the TAS. +26. After appropriate checking that the INVITE request is resulting from the CC ready notification the TAS forwards the INVITE request to the S-CSCF. +- 27-31. The call set-up proceeds in accordance with normal procedures. + +### 7.6.3.10.2 Communication Completion Originated at Served User + +For IMS sessions established by UEs in the CS domain and the MSC Server is not enhanced for ICS the Communication Completion can be controlled by the IMS provided that the originating TAS performs a specific 3pc procedure to initiate the CC call. + +Figure 7.6.3.10.2-1 describes a call flow via an MSC Server not enhanced for ICS. CCNR and CCNL follow the same principles. + +![Sequence diagram for IMS Communication Completion via MSC Server not enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows the interaction between UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, SCC AS, TAS, S-CSCF, and UE B. The process involves an initial call from UE A to UE B, which is busy. The TAS then offers Communication Completion (CC) to UE A via an early announcement. UE A accepts, and the TAS invokes the CC service towards UE B. UE B responds with a busy indication. The TAS then receives a CC Ready notification from UE B, indicating it is free. The TAS reserves MRFP resources and sends an INVITE request to UE A. UE A responds with an OK. The TAS then sends an SDP answer from the MRFP to UE A, indicating the CC call is proceeding. The TAS then sends an INVITE request to UE B. UE B responds with an OK. The TAS then sends an SDP offer to UE A. UE A responds with an OK. The call set-up proceeds in accordance with normal procedures.](0e252770f8f0573617e0112b36a93d2f_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant MSC Server + participant MGCF + participant SCC AS + participant TAS + participant S-CSCF + participant UE B + + Note left of UE A: 1. Setup + UE A->>MSC Server: 1. Setup + MSC Server->>MGCF: 2. IAM + MGCF->>SCC AS: 3. INVITE (A) + SCC AS->>TAS: 4. INVITE (A) + TAS->>SCC AS: 5. INVITE (A) + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 6. INVITE (A) + S-CSCF->>UE B: 8. INVITE (A) + UE B-->>S-CSCF: 9. Busy, CC possible + S-CSCF-->>TAS: 10. Busy, CC possible + Note right of TAS: 11. TAS offers User A to invoke CC using an early announcement . User A accepts to invoke CC . + Note right of TAS: 12. TAS invokes the CC service towards UE B and receives a confirmation of successful invocation . + TAS->>S-CSCF: 13. Busy + S-CSCF-->>TAS: 14. Busy + TAS->>SCC AS: 15. Busy + SCC AS-->>MGCF: 16. Busy + MGCF-->>MSC Server: 17. REL + MSC Server-->>UE A: 18. Disconnect + UE A->>MSC Server: 19. Release + MSC Server-->>UE A: 20. Release Complete + Note right of TAS: 21. TAS receives a CC Ready notification indicating UE B is free . TAS reserves MRFP resources for an announcement . + TAS->>S-CSCF: 22. INVITE A , no SDP + S-CSCF-->>TAS: 23. INVITE A + TAS->>SCC AS: 24. INVITE A + SCC AS-->>MGCF: 25. INVITE A , no SDP + MGCF-->>MSC Server: 26. IAM + MSC Server-->>UE A: 27. Setup + UE A->>MSC Server: 28. Connect + MSC Server->>MGCF: 29. ANM + MGCF->>SCC AS: 30. OK, SDP offer + SCC AS-->>TAS: 31. OK + TAS->>SCC AS: 32. OK + SCC AS-->>S-CSCF: 33. OK + Note right of TAS: 34. TAS sends SDP answer from MRFP in an ACK and begins to play an announcement towards UE A to inform that the CC call is proceeding . + TAS->>S-CSCF: 35. INVITE B , no SDP + S-CSCF-->>UE B: 36. INVITE A + UE B->>S-CSCF: 37. SDP offer + S-CSCF-->>TAS: 38. OK + Note right of TAS: 39. To connect the two legs , TAS sends the SDP offer towards UE A . + TAS->>SCC AS: 40. OK + SCC AS-->>MGCF: 41. OK + MGCF-->>MSC Server: 42. OK + MSC Server-->>UE A: 43. OK + +``` + +Sequence diagram for IMS Communication Completion via MSC Server not enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows the interaction between UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, SCC AS, TAS, S-CSCF, and UE B. The process involves an initial call from UE A to UE B, which is busy. The TAS then offers Communication Completion (CC) to UE A via an early announcement. UE A accepts, and the TAS invokes the CC service towards UE B. UE B responds with a busy indication. The TAS then receives a CC Ready notification from UE B, indicating it is free. The TAS reserves MRFP resources and sends an INVITE request to UE A. UE A responds with an OK. The TAS then sends an SDP answer from the MRFP to UE A, indicating the CC call is proceeding. The TAS then sends an INVITE request to UE B. UE B responds with an OK. The TAS then sends an SDP offer to UE A. UE A responds with an OK. The call set-up proceeds in accordance with normal procedures. + +**Figure 7.6.3.10.2-1: IMS Communication Completion via MSC Server not enhanced for ICS** + +There is an ongoing session between UE A and UE B. + +- 1-10. UE A initiates a call towards UE B, which responds with Busy and a CC possible indication. +11. The TAS offers Communication Completion via announcement and in-band activation to user A who accepts. + +12. The TAS invokes the CC service towards user B. The TAS is notified that the invocation is successful. +- 13-20. The Busy response without Communication Completion possible indication is sent towards UE-A. The call terminates following normal procedures. +21. TAS receives a CC ready notification indicating that UE B is free. The TAS can reserve announcement resources now or after step 33. +- 22-27. To start the recall procedure the TAS sends an INVITE without SDP towards UE A. +- 28-33. UE A answers the call, information is sent to the TAS. The MGCF includes an SDP offer in the OK message. +35. After completion of announcement, the INVITE without SDP is sent towards B. After receipt of Ringing response, a ring tone is played towards UE A. +37. UE B answers the call and includes an SDP offer. +39. The TAS uses this SDP offer to update the SDP towards UE A. UE A and UE B are now connected, and the announcement resources can be released. + +## 7.7 Session Release + +### 7.7.1 Session Release for ICS UE + +#### 7.7.1.1 General Gm Procedures + +If receiving a session release from the CS access leg for the ICS UE using Gm while the PS access leg is still active, the SCC AS shall release the CS access leg. The SCC AS shall further update the remote leg, and if applicable, the PS access leg, to reflect the change of media. + +NOTE: Race conditions may occur where the session release of the CS access leg could arrive prior an update over Gm from the UE removing the CS media. + +#### 7.7.1.2 Session Release for Gm and I1 + +Figure 7.7.1.2-1 provides a call flow illustrating the session release procedures for an ICS UE attached to an MSC Server enhanced for ICS, which has an ICS session already established. This call flow applies when either Gm or I1 have been used to set up the Service Control Signalling Path. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the session release for Gm and I1 when using an MSC server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows the interaction between ICS UE B, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE A. The MGW is shown with a crossed-out 'X' over the CS Domain Bearer path, indicating its release. The IMS Bearer path remains active between the MGW and UE A.](18003425d0e8638dde4acc9c5c468c5c_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS_UE_B as ICS UE B + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGW as MGW + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + participant I_S_CSCF as I/S-CSCF + participant UE_A as UE A + + Note over ICS_UE_B, UE_A: CS Domain Bearer (crossed out) | IMS Bearer + Note over ICS_UE_B, UE_A: 1. Release of the last Service Control signalling session + Note over MSC_Server, SCC_AS: 2. Initiation of the release of the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path + Note over ICS_UE_B, MSC_Server: 3. CS Session Release + Note over MSC_Server, SCC_AS: 4. Completion of the release of the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the session release for Gm and I1 when using an MSC server enhanced for ICS. The diagram shows the interaction between ICS UE B, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE A. The MGW is shown with a crossed-out 'X' over the CS Domain Bearer path, indicating its release. The IMS Bearer path remains active between the MGW and UE A. + +**Figure 7.7.1.2-1: Session Release for Gm and I1 when using an MSC server enhanced for ICS** + +1. IMS procedures are executed for the release of the service control signalling session when using the Gm reference point as defined in clause 5.10 of TS 23.228 [2]. When using I1, the procedure for the release of the service control signalling session is documented in clause 7.7.1.3. +2. The SCC AS initiates release of the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. +3. The MSC Server releases the CS Session with the ICS UE. +4. After confirmation of the session release from the ICS UE, the MSC Server completes the release of the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path with the SCC AS. Step 4 does not have to wait for step 3 to complete. + +Alternatively the ICS UE may initiate release of the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path. The SCC AS and the ICS UE shall gracefully handle the case when both the SCC AS and ICS UE initiate the release procedure. + +The call flow in Figure 7.7.1.2-1 also applies when the ICS UE is attached to an MSC server. + +### 7.7.1.3 Release of the Service Control Signalling Session when using I1 + +#### 7.7.1.3.1 ICS UE Initiated Release + +Figure 7.7.1.3.1-1 provides a call flow illustrating the release of the service control signalling session by an ICS UE regardless of whether the ICS UE is attached to MSC server enhanced for ICS or not, when using I1. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the ICS UE initiated release of the service control signalling session over I1. The diagram shows six steps: 1. ICS UE B sends a Release over I1 to SCC AS; 2. SCC AS sends a BYE to I/S-CSCF; 3. I/S-CSCF forwards the BYE to UE A; 4. UE A sends an OK back to I/S-CSCF; 5. I/S-CSCF forwards the OK to SCC AS; 6. SCC AS sends a Release-ack over I1 to ICS UE B. The diagram also indicates the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths.](0dfdff10c725fe9c332b07ade9d23a5e_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS_UE_B as ICS UE B + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGW as MGW + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + participant I_S_CSCF as I/S-CSCF + participant UE_A as UE A + + Note over ICS_UE_B, MGW: CS Domain Bearer + Note over MGW, UE_A: IMS Bearer + + ICS_UE_B->>SCC_AS: 1. I1: Release + SCC_AS->>I_S_CSCF: 2. BYE + I_S_CSCF->>UE_A: 3. BYE + UE_A->>I_S_CSCF: 4. OK + I_S_CSCF->>SCC_AS: 5. OK + SCC_AS->>ICS_UE_B: 6. I1: Release-ack +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the ICS UE initiated release of the service control signalling session over I1. The diagram shows six steps: 1. ICS UE B sends a Release over I1 to SCC AS; 2. SCC AS sends a BYE to I/S-CSCF; 3. I/S-CSCF forwards the BYE to UE A; 4. UE A sends an OK back to I/S-CSCF; 5. I/S-CSCF forwards the OK to SCC AS; 6. SCC AS sends a Release-ack over I1 to ICS UE B. The diagram also indicates the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths. + +**Figure 7.7.1.3.1-1: ICS UE initiated release of the service control signalling session over I1** + +1. The ICS UE sends a release over I1. +- 2 The The SCC AS sends a SIP BYE to the I/S-CSCF serving the ICS UE. +3. The S-CSCF forward the SIP BYE to UE A. +- 4-5. UE A sends a SIP OK to the SCC AS via the S-CSCF of the UE B. +6. The SCC AS completes the session release procedure by sending a release-ack over I1. + +NOTE: If this is the release of the last service control signalling session, then the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path is released as described in Clause 7.7.1.2 + +### 7.7.1.3.2 Network Initiated Release + +Figure 7.7.1.3.2-1 provides a call flow illustrating the release of a service control signalling session by the home IMS network regardless of whether the ICS UE is attached to MSC server enhanced for ICS or not, when using I1. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the network initiated release of a service control signalling session. The diagram shows seven steps: 1. Session Termination (internal to I/S-CSCF), 2. BYE (I/S-CSCF to SCC AS), 3. I1: Release (SCC AS to ICS UE B), 4. I1: Release-ack (ICS UE B to SCC AS), 5. OK (SCC AS to I/S-CSCF), 6. BYE (I/S-CSCF to UE A), and 7. OK (UE A to I/S-CSCF). The diagram also indicates the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths.](ffe0fef452a0ae9a20253c319c54e13c_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS_UE_B as ICS UE B + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGW as MGW + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + participant I_S_CSCF as I/S-CSCF + participant UE_A as UE A + + Note right of I_S_CSCF: 1. Session Termination + I_S_CSCF->>SCC_AS: 2. BYE + SCC_AS->>ICS_UE_B: 3. I1: Release + ICS_UE_B->>SCC_AS: 4. I1: Release-ack + SCC_AS->>I_S_CSCF: 5. OK + I_S_CSCF->>UE_A: 6. BYE + UE_A->>I_S_CSCF: 7. OK + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the network initiated release of a service control signalling session. The diagram shows seven steps: 1. Session Termination (internal to I/S-CSCF), 2. BYE (I/S-CSCF to SCC AS), 3. I1: Release (SCC AS to ICS UE B), 4. I1: Release-ack (ICS UE B to SCC AS), 5. OK (SCC AS to I/S-CSCF), 6. BYE (I/S-CSCF to UE A), and 7. OK (UE A to I/S-CSCF). The diagram also indicates the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths. + +**Figure 7.7.1.3.2-1: Network initiated release of a service control signalling session initiated using I1** + +1. The S-CSCF decides the session should be terminated due to administrative reasons or due to service expiration. Steps 2-5 occur in parallel to Steps 6-7. + +2. The S-CSCF sends a SIP BYE message to the SCC AS. +3. The SCC AS sends a release message over I1 to the ICS UE. +4. The ICS UE sends a release-ack to the SCC AS over I1. +5. The SCC AS sends a SIP OK to the I/S-CSCF. +6. The S-CSCF sends a SIP BYE message to UE A. +7. UE-A acknowledges receipt of the SIP BYE and sends a SIP OK back to the S-CSCF. + +NOTE: If this is the release of the last service control signalling session, then the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path is released as described in Clause 7.7.1.2 + +### 7.7.1.3.3 Far End Initiated Release + +Figure 7.7.1.3.3-1 provides a call flow illustrating the release of a service control signalling session by the far end regardless of whether the ICS UE is attached to MSC server enhanced for ICS or not, when using I1. + +![Sequence diagram for Far End release of a service control signalling session initiated using I1. The diagram shows six steps: 1. UE A sends a SIP BYE to I/S-CSCF; 2. I/S-CSCF sends a SIP BYE to SCC AS; 3. SCC AS sends an I1: Release to ICS UE B; 4. ICS UE B sends an I1: Release-ack to SCC AS; 5. SCC AS sends a SIP OK to I/S-CSCF; 6. I/S-CSCF sends a SIP OK to UE A. The diagram also indicates the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths.](a963ca41bde1669b18a4b783616f228b_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant I/S-CSCF + participant SCC AS + participant MGW + participant MSC Server + participant ICS UE B + + Note right of UE A: CS Domain Bearer | IMS Bearer + UE A->>I/S-CSCF: 1. BYE + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 2. BYE + SCC AS->>ICS UE B: 3. I1: Release + ICS UE B->>SCC AS: 4. I1: Release-ack + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 5. OK + I/S-CSCF->>UE A: 6. OK + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Far End release of a service control signalling session initiated using I1. The diagram shows six steps: 1. UE A sends a SIP BYE to I/S-CSCF; 2. I/S-CSCF sends a SIP BYE to SCC AS; 3. SCC AS sends an I1: Release to ICS UE B; 4. ICS UE B sends an I1: Release-ack to SCC AS; 5. SCC AS sends a SIP OK to I/S-CSCF; 6. I/S-CSCF sends a SIP OK to UE A. The diagram also indicates the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths. + +**Figure 7.7.1.3.3-1: Far End release of a service control signalling session initiated using I1** + +1. UE A terminates the session by sending a SIP BYE (via its own S-CSCF) towards the I/S-CSCF of ICS UE B. +2. The S-CSCF sends a SIP BYE message to the SCC AS. +3. The SCC AS sends a release message over I1 to the ICS UE. +4. The ICS UE sends a release-ack to the SCC AS over I1. +5. The SCC AS sends a SIP OK to the I/S-CSCF. +6. The S-CSCF sends a SIP OK message to UE A. + +NOTE: If this is the release of the last service control signalling session, then the CS Bearer Control Signalling Path is released as described in Clause 7.7.1.2 + +## 7.7.2 Session Release for MSC Server enhanced for ICS + +### 7.7.2.1 General + +If receiving a CS session release from the non ICS UE the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall release the session towards IMS. The SCC AS shall further update the remote leg, to reflect the change of media. If receiving a session release from the IMS, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall release the CS session with the UE. + +### 7.7.2.2 Session Release by served UE + +Figure 7.7.2.2-1 provides a call flow illustrating the session release procedures initiated by an UE attached to an MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 7.7.2.2-1: Session Release initiated by UE A. The diagram shows six lifelines: UE A, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE B. A 'CS Domain Bearer' is shown between UE A and MGW, and an 'IMS Bearer' is shown between MGW and UE B. The MGW has a large 'X' over it, indicating a break in the bearer path. The sequence of messages is: 1. CS Session release (UE A to MSC Server), 2. IMS Session release (MSC Server to SCC AS), and 3. Remote leg release or update (SCC AS to I/S-CSCF).](de63e4b6d8b0aa76b85e1fe3236eac27_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for Figure 7.7.2.2-1: Session Release initiated by UE A. The diagram shows six lifelines: UE A, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, and UE B. A 'CS Domain Bearer' is shown between UE A and MGW, and an 'IMS Bearer' is shown between MGW and UE B. The MGW has a large 'X' over it, indicating a break in the bearer path. The sequence of messages is: 1. CS Session release (UE A to MSC Server), 2. IMS Session release (MSC Server to SCC AS), and 3. Remote leg release or update (SCC AS to I/S-CSCF). + +**Figure 7.7.2.2-1: Session Release initiated by UE A when using an MSC server enhanced for ICS** + +1. The UE releases CS Session. +2. The MSC Server releases the IMS Session. Step 2 does not have to wait for step 1 to complete. +3. The SCC AS updates or releases the remote leg depending on whether other media components remain in the remote leg after removal of speech media. + +### 7.7.2.3 Session Release by far-end + +Figure 7.7.2.3-1 provides a call flow illustrating the session release procedures initiated by far end for an UE attached to an MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 7.7.2.3-1: Session Release initiated by far end. The diagram shows the same six lifelines and bearers as Figure 7.7.2.2-1. The sequence of messages is: 1. IMS Session release initiated by UE B (UE B to SCC AS), 2. CS Session release (MSC Server to UE A), and 3. IMS Session release completion (SCC AS to I/S-CSCF).](ff3417b75213b8688e6504a21220b430_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for Figure 7.7.2.3-1: Session Release initiated by far end. The diagram shows the same six lifelines and bearers as Figure 7.7.2.2-1. The sequence of messages is: 1. IMS Session release initiated by UE B (UE B to SCC AS), 2. CS Session release (MSC Server to UE A), and 3. IMS Session release completion (SCC AS to I/S-CSCF). + +**Figure 7.7.2.3-1: Session Release initiated by far end when using an MSC server enhanced for ICS** + +1. The UE B initiates session release. +2. The MSC Server releases CS session with UE A. +3. Completion of session release initiated by far end. Step 3 does not have to wait for step 2 to complete. + +### 7.7.2.4 Network initiated Session Release + +Figure 7.7.2.4-1 provides a call flow illustrating the session release procedures initiated by the home IMS network for an UE attached to an MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + +![Sequence diagram for network initiated session release. Lifelines: UE A, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, UE B. The diagram shows four steps: 1. Session Termination (internal to I/S-CSCF), 2. IMS Session release initiated by S-CSCF, 3. CS Session release (MSC Server to UE A), 4. IMS Session release completion. A crossed-out 'X' is shown over the MGW lifeline, separating the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths.](e16bfa31d748f4d99ec4ae3d16656926_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for network initiated session release. Lifelines: UE A, MSC Server, MGW, SCC AS, I/S-CSCF, UE B. The diagram shows four steps: 1. Session Termination (internal to I/S-CSCF), 2. IMS Session release initiated by S-CSCF, 3. CS Session release (MSC Server to UE A), 4. IMS Session release completion. A crossed-out 'X' is shown over the MGW lifeline, separating the CS Domain Bearer and IMS Bearer paths. + +**Figure 7.7.2.4-1: Network initiated Session Release when using an MSC server enhanced for ICS** + +1. The S-CSCF decides the session should be terminated due to administrative reasons or due to service expiration. +2. The S-CSCF initiates a session release towards UE B and MSC server. +3. The MSC Server releases CS session with UE A. +4. Completion of session release is provided from UE B and MSC Server to S-CSCF. Step 4 does not have to wait for step 3 to complete. + +## 7.8 Loss of Gm capability + +The Figure 7.8-1 provides an example flow for transfer of Service Control Signalling Path from Gm to I1 when the UE discovers Gm is not available and UE supports I1. + +![Sequence diagram for service control signalling path handover. Lifelines: ICS UE, SCC AS. The diagram shows three steps: 1. Match the Conditions for Session Control Signaling transfer (internal to ICS UE), 2. I1: Service Control Signaling Path transfer notification (ICS UE to SCC AS), 3. I1: Acknowledgement (SCC AS to ICS UE). Above the steps, two horizontal bars represent the 'Service Control (over Gm) and CS Bearer Control Signalling Path' and the 'Media Bearer'.](20e1585db1a707a774877194c689de82_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for service control signalling path handover. Lifelines: ICS UE, SCC AS. The diagram shows three steps: 1. Match the Conditions for Session Control Signaling transfer (internal to ICS UE), 2. I1: Service Control Signaling Path transfer notification (ICS UE to SCC AS), 3. I1: Acknowledgement (SCC AS to ICS UE). Above the steps, two horizontal bars represent the 'Service Control (over Gm) and CS Bearer Control Signalling Path' and the 'Media Bearer'. + +**Figure 7.8-1: Service Control Signalling Path handover from Gm to I1** + +1. Upon detecting that there is a loss of Gm reference point, the ICS UE prepares to trigger the service control signalling path transfer. +2. ICS UE sends the service control signalling path transfer notification to the SCC AS over I1 requesting a switch to I1 for Service Control Signalling Path. +3. SCC AS accepts the transfer request, and returns the acknowledgement to ICS UE over I1. + +After the above steps, the Service Control Signalling Path is switched from the Gm reference point to the I1 reference point. + +## 7.9 Addition/Removal of video media flow + +### 7.9.1 Addition/Removal of video media flow for Non ICS UE + +#### 7.9.1.1 Overview + +The procedures in this clause and the following clauses are applicable only to 3GPP systems. + +For IMS sessions that use CS media established by the non ICS UE, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the necessary interworking between the I2 reference point and CS SCUDIF signalling described in TS 23.172 [37] and TS 24.008 [6] to add/remove the video media flow through SCUDIF if supported by the CS access network. + +In the case that the non ICS UE is attached to the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS, the MGCF shall perform the service change procedures to add/remove the video media flow as specified in TS 29.163 [11]. + +The non ICS UE can also use the redial mechanism as defined in TR 23.903 [39] for switching between voice and video services. + +#### 7.9.1.2 Addition/Removal of video media flow through SCUDIF using I2 reference point + +Figure 7.9.1.2-1 describes how a video media flow is added to an ongoing speech session for the non ICS UE via the MSC Server enhanced for ICS. Change from multimedia (i.e. speech and video) to speech can be achieved in a similar way. + +![Sequence diagram showing the addition of video media flow for non ICS UE via the MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram illustrates the interaction between non ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It starts with an active speech call between UE A and UE B. UE A sends a Modify(MuMe) message to the MSC Server. The MSC Server sends a Modify Bearer Characteristics message to the MGW. The MGW sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to the SCC AS. The SCC AS sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to the MGW. The MGW sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to the MSC Server. The MSC Server sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to UE A. The MSC Server then performs the completion of the session and bearer setup procedures. Finally, a video call between UE A and UE B is established.](ed99c577aacc48b3e3ef5060d0048041_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant non ICS UE A + participant MSC Server + participant MGW + participant S-CSCF + participant SCC AS + participant UE B + + Note over non ICS UE A, UE B: Speech call between non ICS UE A and UE B active + + non ICS UE A->>MSC Server: 1.Modify(MuMe) + MSC Server->>MGW: 2.Modify Bearer Characteristics + MSC Server->>S-CSCF: 3.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 4.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + SCC AS->>S-CSCF: 5.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + S-CSCF->>MGW: 6.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + MGW->>MSC Server: 6.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + MSC Server->>non ICS UE A: 6.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + + Note over non ICS UE A, UE B: 7. Completion of the session and bearer setup procedures + + Note over non ICS UE A, UE B: Video call between non ICS UE A and UE B established + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the addition of video media flow for non ICS UE via the MSC Server enhanced for ICS. The diagram illustrates the interaction between non ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It starts with an active speech call between UE A and UE B. UE A sends a Modify(MuMe) message to the MSC Server. The MSC Server sends a Modify Bearer Characteristics message to the MGW. The MGW sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to the SCC AS. The SCC AS sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to the MGW. The MGW sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to the MSC Server. The MSC Server sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to UE A. The MSC Server then performs the completion of the session and bearer setup procedures. Finally, a video call between UE A and UE B is established. + +**Figure 7.9.1.2-1: Addition of video media flow for non ICS UE via the MSC Server enhanced for ICS** + +1. The non ICS UE A sends a MODIFY message requesting service change from speech to multimedia (i.e. video and voice) as specified in TS 23.172 [37]. + +2. The MSC Server initiates interaction with the MGW instructing it to modify bearer characteristics. +3. The MSC Server sends a re-INVITE message that offers the adding of the video media to the ongoing speech session to the S-CSCF. +4. The S-CSCF sends the re-INVITE to the SCC AS which has been inserted at session establishment. +5. The SCC AS sends the re-INVITE to the S-CSCF. +6. The S-CSCF forwards the re-INVITE to UE B. +7. Completion of the session and bearer setup procedures, where upon the establishment of the multimedia connection, the MSC Server shall perform the video codec negotiation and set up the multimedia bearer based on the procedures defined in TS 29.163 [11]. + +### 7.9.1.3 Addition/Removal of video media flow through SCUDIF via the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS + +Figure 7.9.1.3-1 describes how a video media flow is added to an ongoing speech session for the non ICS UE via the MSC Server which is not enhanced for ICS. Change from multimedia (i.e. speech and video) to speech can be achieved in a similar way. + +![Sequence diagram showing the addition of video media flow for non ICS UE via the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS. The diagram illustrates the interaction between non ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, I/S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It starts with an active speech call between non ICS UE A and UE B. The process involves several steps: 1. non ICS UE A sends a Modify(MuMe) message to the MSC Server; 2. the MSC Server sends a Modify Codec(Selected Codec = MuMe) message to the MGCF; 3. the MGCF sends a Modify Bearer Characteristics message to the MGW; 4. the MGCF sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to the I/S-CSCF; 5. the I/S-CSCF sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to the SCC AS; 6. the SCC AS sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to the I/S-CSCF; 7. the I/S-CSCF sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to UE B; 8. Completion of the session and bearer setup procedures. The final state is a video call between non ICS UE A and UE B established.](5a01395925fc88802da68fb5ac0f31ff_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant non ICS UE A + participant MSC Server + participant MGCF + participant MGW + participant I/S-CSCF + participant SCC AS + participant UE B + + Note over all: Speech call between non ICS UE A and UE B active + + non ICS UE A->>MSC Server: 1.Modify(MuMe) + MSC Server->>MGCF: 2.Modify Codec(Selected Codec = MuMe) + MGCF->>MGW: 3.Modify Bearer Characteristics + MGCF->>I/S-CSCF: 4.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 5.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 6.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + I/S-CSCF->>UE B: 7.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + Note over all: 8. Completion of the session and bearer setup procedures + + Note over all: Video call between non ICS UE A and UE B established + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the addition of video media flow for non ICS UE via the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS. The diagram illustrates the interaction between non ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, I/S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It starts with an active speech call between non ICS UE A and UE B. The process involves several steps: 1. non ICS UE A sends a Modify(MuMe) message to the MSC Server; 2. the MSC Server sends a Modify Codec(Selected Codec = MuMe) message to the MGCF; 3. the MGCF sends a Modify Bearer Characteristics message to the MGW; 4. the MGCF sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to the I/S-CSCF; 5. the I/S-CSCF sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to the SCC AS; 6. the SCC AS sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to the I/S-CSCF; 7. the I/S-CSCF sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) message to UE B; 8. Completion of the session and bearer setup procedures. The final state is a video call between non ICS UE A and UE B established. + +**Figure 7.9.1.3-1: Addition of video media flow for non ICS UE via the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS** + +1. The non ICS UE A sends a MODIFY message requesting service change from speech to multimedia (i.e. video and voice) as specified in TS 23.172 [37]. +2. The MSC Server sends the Modify Codec message to the MGCF indicating the change from speech to multimedia (i.e. video and voice). +3. The MGCF initiates interaction with the IMS-MGW instructing it to modify bearer characteristics. +4. The MGCF sends the re-INVITE that offers the adding of the video media to the ongoing speech session to the S-CSCF. +- 5-7. Steps 5-7 in Figure 7.9.1.3-1 are identical to Steps 4-6 in Figure 7.9.1.2-1. +8. Completion of the session and bearer setup procedures, where upon the establishment of the multimedia connection, the MGCF/IMS-MGW shall perform the procedures as specified in TS 29.163 [11] to set up the multimedia bearer. + +## 7.9.2 Addition/Removal of video media flow for ICS UE + +### 7.9.2.1 Overview + +The procedures in this clause and the following clauses are applicable only to 3GPP systems. + +For the IMS sessions that use CS media established by the ICS UE, adding/removing of video media flow can be made by updating the CS access leg through SCUDIF procedures as specified in TS 23.172 [37], or by using redial mechanism over the CS access leg as defined in TR 23.903 [39] if SCUDIF is not supported. + +### 7.9.2.2 Addition/Removal of video media flow through SCUDIF using Gm Reference Point + +Figure 7.9.2.2-1 describes how a video media flow is added to an ongoing speech session through SCUDIF for the ICS UE over the Gm reference point. Change from multimedia (i.e. speech and video) to speech can be achieved in a similar way. + +![Sequence diagram showing the addition of video media flow for ICS UE through SCUDIF using Gm reference point. The diagram illustrates the interaction between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It starts with an active speech call between ICS UE A and UE B. ICS UE A sends a Re-INVITE message (1) to S-CSCF. S-CSCF forwards it (2) to SCC AS. SCC AS responds (3) with 200 OK. S-CSCF forwards (4) the 200 OK to ICS UE A. Finally, service change procedures are completed (5), establishing a video call between ICS UE A and UE B.](bc3d1c04d342094c893d5064974c9ee7_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS_UE_A as ICS UE A + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGW as MGW + participant S-CSCF as S-CSCF + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + participant UE_B as UE B + + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: Speech call between ICS UE A and UE B active + ICS_UE_A->>S-CSCF: 1.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + S-CSCF->>SCC_AS: 2.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + SCC_AS-->>S-CSCF: 3.200 OK + S-CSCF-->>ICS_UE_A: 4.200 OK + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: 5. Completion of service change procedures + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: Video call between ICS UE A and UE B established +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the addition of video media flow for ICS UE through SCUDIF using Gm reference point. The diagram illustrates the interaction between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It starts with an active speech call between ICS UE A and UE B. ICS UE A sends a Re-INVITE message (1) to S-CSCF. S-CSCF forwards it (2) to SCC AS. SCC AS responds (3) with 200 OK. S-CSCF forwards (4) the 200 OK to ICS UE A. Finally, service change procedures are completed (5), establishing a video call between ICS UE A and UE B. + +**Figure 7.9.2.2-1: Addition of video media flow for ICS UE through SCUDIF using Gm reference point** + +1. The ICS UE A sends a re-INVITE message that offers the adding of the video media to the ongoing speech session to the S-CSCF. +2. The S-CSCF sends the re-INVITE message to the SCC AS. +3. The SCC AS sends a 200 OK message to the S-CSCF. +4. The S-CSCF forwards the 200 OK to the ICS UE A. +5. Completion of service change from speech to video call as specified in clause 7.9.1.2 if the ICS UE is attached to the MSC Server enhanced for ICS, or as specified in clause 7.9.1.3 if the ICS UE is attached to the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS. + +### 7.9.2.3 Addition/Removal of video media flow through SCUDIF using I1 Reference Point + +Figure 7.9.2.3-1 describes how a video media flow is added to an ongoing speech session through SCUDIF for the ICS UE over the I1 reference point. Change from multimedia (i.e. speech and video) to speech can be achieved in a similar way. + +![Sequence diagram showing the addition of video media flow for ICS UE through SCUDIF using I1 reference point. The diagram shows a speech call between ICS UE A and UE B active. ICS UE A sends an I1: ICS Call Modify(MuMe) message to the SCC AS. The SCC AS sends an I1: ICS Call Modify Response message to the ICS UE A. The completion of service change procedures is then shown. Finally, a video call between ICS UE A and UE B is established.](d04c50badc78d5ba47bf4e352af4a754_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates a sequence of interactions between seven network entities: ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. The sequence begins with a horizontal bar indicating an active 'Speech call between ICS UE A and UE B'. Step 1 shows a message '1. I1: ICS Call Modify(MuMe)' from ICS UE A to SCC AS. Step 2 shows a response '2. I1: ICS Call Modify Response' from SCC AS back to ICS UE A. Step 3 is a horizontal bar labeled '3. Completion of service change procedures'. The sequence concludes with another horizontal bar indicating a 'Video call between ICS UE A and UE B established'. + +Sequence diagram showing the addition of video media flow for ICS UE through SCUDIF using I1 reference point. The diagram shows a speech call between ICS UE A and UE B active. ICS UE A sends an I1: ICS Call Modify(MuMe) message to the SCC AS. The SCC AS sends an I1: ICS Call Modify Response message to the ICS UE A. The completion of service change procedures is then shown. Finally, a video call between ICS UE A and UE B is established. + +**Figure 7.9.2.3-1: Addition of video media flow for ICS UE through SCUDIF using I1 reference point** + +1. The ICS UE A sends a Call MODIFY message to the SCC AS requesting service change from speech to multimedia (i.e. video and voice). +2. The SCC AS sends a Call MODIFY Response message to the ICS UE A. +3. Completion of service change from speech to video call as specified in clause 7.9.1.2 if the ICS UE is attached to the MSC Server enhanced for ICS, or as specified in clause 7.9.1.3 if the ICS UE is attached to the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS. + +#### 7.9.2.4 Addition/Removal of video media flow through redial using Gm Reference Point + +Figure 7.9.2.4-1 describes how a video media flow is added to an ongoing speech session through redial for the ICS UE which is attached to the MSC Server enhanced for ICS over the Gm reference point. Change from multimedia (i.e. speech and video) to speech can be achieved in a similar way. + +![Sequence diagram showing the addition of video media flow for ICS UE via the MSC Server enhanced for ICS through radial using Gm reference point. The diagram illustrates the interaction between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It starts with a speech call between ICS UE A and UE B active. ICS UE A sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) to the SCC AS. The SCC AS sends a 200 OK to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a 200 OK to the ICS UE A. The ICS UE A sends a CS call disconnect to the MSC Server. The MSC Server sends a BYE to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a BYE to the SCC AS. The completion of the CS access leg release procedures occurs. The ICS UE A sends a CS call setup(MuMe) to the MSC Server. The MSC Server sends an INVITE(m=audio; m=video) to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends an INVITE(m=audio; m=video) to the SCC AS. The SCC AS sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) to the UE B. The completion of the session and bearer setup procedures occurs. A video call between ICS UE A and UE B is established.](e18841eb4a995df8354a793459e12fd0_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS_UE_A as ICS UE A + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGW as MGW + participant S-CSCF as S-CSCF + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + participant UE_B as UE B + + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: Speech call between ICS UE A and UE B active + + ICS_UE_A->>S-CSCF: 1.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + S-CSCF->>SCC_AS: 2.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + SCC_AS-->>S-CSCF: 3.200 OK + S-CSCF-->>ICS_UE_A: 4.200 OK + ICS_UE_A->>MSC_Server: 5.CS call disconnect + MSC_Server->>S-CSCF: 6.BYE + S-CSCF->>SCC_AS: 7.BYE + Note over ICS_UE_A, SCC_AS: 8. Completion of the CS access leg release procedures + ICS_UE_A->>MSC_Server: 9.CS call setup(MuMe) + MSC_Server->>S-CSCF: 10.INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + S-CSCF->>SCC_AS: 11.INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + SCC_AS-->>S-CSCF: 12.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + S-CSCF->>UE_B: 13.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: 14. Completion of the session and bearer setup procedures + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: Video call between ICS UE A and UE B established + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the addition of video media flow for ICS UE via the MSC Server enhanced for ICS through radial using Gm reference point. The diagram illustrates the interaction between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It starts with a speech call between ICS UE A and UE B active. ICS UE A sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) to the SCC AS. The SCC AS sends a 200 OK to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a 200 OK to the ICS UE A. The ICS UE A sends a CS call disconnect to the MSC Server. The MSC Server sends a BYE to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a BYE to the SCC AS. The completion of the CS access leg release procedures occurs. The ICS UE A sends a CS call setup(MuMe) to the MSC Server. The MSC Server sends an INVITE(m=audio; m=video) to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends an INVITE(m=audio; m=video) to the SCC AS. The SCC AS sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) to the UE B. The completion of the session and bearer setup procedures occurs. A video call between ICS UE A and UE B is established. + +**Figure 7.9.2.4-1: Addition of video media flow for ICS UE via the MSC Server enhanced for ICS through radial using Gm reference point** + +1. The ICS UE A sends a re-INVITE message that offers the adding of the video media to the ongoing speech session to the S-CSCF. +2. The S-CSCF sends the re-INVITE message to the SCC AS which has been inserted at session establishment. +- 3-4. The SCC AS sends 200 OK to the ICS UE A via the S-CSCF. +5. The ICS UE A sends a CS call disconnect message to the MSC server to release the existing CS access leg. +6. The MSC server sends the BYE message to the S-CSCF. +7. The S-CSCF forwards the BYE message to the SCC AS. +8. Completion of the CS access leg release procedure. +9. The ICS UE A sends a CS call setup message to the MSC server to establish a new CS access leg supporting video and speech media. +10. The MSC server sends an INVITE message to the S-CSCF. +11. The S-CSCF sends the INVITE to the SCC AS. +12. The SCC AS sends a re-INVITE message to the S-CSCF that offers the adding of the video media to the ongoing speech session to update the remote leg. +13. The S-CSCF sends the re-INVITE to UE B. +14. Completion of the session and bearer setup procedures, where upon the establishment of the multimedia connection, the MSC Server shall perform the video codec negotiation and set up the multimedia bearer based on the procedures defined in TS 29.163 [11]. + +Figure 7.9.2.4-2 describes how a video media flow is added to an ongoing speech session through redial for the ICS UE which is attached to the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS over the Gm reference point. Change from multimedia (i.e. speech and video) to speech can be achieved in a similar way. + +![Sequence diagram showing the addition of video media flow for ICS UE via the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS through redial using Gm reference point. The diagram involves seven lifelines: ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, I/S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It is divided into three main phases: 1. Speech call between ICS UE A and UE B active; 2. Completion of the CS access leg release procedure; 3. Video call between ICS UE A and UE B established. The sequence of messages includes Re-INVITE, OK, CS call disconnect, REL, BYE, CS call setup(MuMe), IAM(MuMe), INVITE, and Re-INVITE messages.](199a8b4c5c620006757a17e930769566_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS UE A + participant MSC Server + participant MGCF + participant MGW + participant I/S-CSCF + participant SCC AS + participant UE B + + Note over all: Speech call between ICS UE A and UE B active + ICS UE A->>I/S-CSCF: 1.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 2.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 3.200 OK + I/S-CSCF->>ICS UE A: 4.200 OK + ICS UE A->>MSC Server: 5.CS call disconnect + MSC Server->>MGCF: 6.REL + MGCF->>I/S-CSCF: 7.BYE + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 8.BYE + Note over all: 9. Completion of the CS access leg release procedure + ICS UE A->>MSC Server: 10.CS call setup(MuMe) + MSC Server->>MGCF: 11.IAM(MuMe) + MGCF->>I/S-CSCF: 12.INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + I/S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 13.INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + SCC AS->>I/S-CSCF: 14.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + I/S-CSCF->>UE B: 15.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + Note over all: 16. Completion of the session and bearer setup procedures + Note over all: Video call between ICS UE A and UE B established + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the addition of video media flow for ICS UE via the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS through redial using Gm reference point. The diagram involves seven lifelines: ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, I/S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It is divided into three main phases: 1. Speech call between ICS UE A and UE B active; 2. Completion of the CS access leg release procedure; 3. Video call between ICS UE A and UE B established. The sequence of messages includes Re-INVITE, OK, CS call disconnect, REL, BYE, CS call setup(MuMe), IAM(MuMe), INVITE, and Re-INVITE messages. + +**Figure 7.9.2.4-2: Addition of video media flow for ICS UE via the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS through redial using Gm reference point** + +1-5. Steps 1-5 in Figure 7.9.2.4-2 are identical to Steps 1-5 in Figure 7.9.2.4-1. + +6. The MSC server sends a REL message to the MGCF. + +7. The MGCF sends a BYE message to the S-CSCF. + +8-10. Steps 8-10 in Figure 7.9.2.4-2 are identical to Steps 7-9 in Figure 7.9.2.4-1. + +11. The MSC server sends an IAM message to the MGCF. + +12. The MGCF sends an INVITE message to the S-CSCF. + +13-15. Steps 13-15 in Figure 7.9.2.4-2 are identical to Steps 11-13 in Figure 7.9.2.4-1. + +16. Completion of the session and bearer setup procedures, where upon the establishment of the multimedia connection, the MGCF/IMS-MGW shall perform the procedures as specified in TS 29.163 [11] to set up the multimedia bearer. + +## 7.9.2.5 Addition/Removal of video media flow through redial using I1 Reference Point + +Figure 7.9.2.5-1 describes how a video media flow is added to an ongoing speech session through redial for the ICS UE which is attached to the MSC Server enhanced for ICS over the I1 reference point. Change from multimedia (i.e. speech and video) to speech can be achieved in a similar way. + +![Sequence diagram showing the addition of video media flow for ICS UE via the MSC Server enhanced for ICS through radial using I1 reference point. The diagram involves six lifelines: ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It starts with an active speech call between ICS UE A and UE B. The process involves modifying the call to add video, disconnecting the CS access leg, and then re-establishing the session with video support.](69467ece0a576b4c2ec3e0c89ba61527_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS UE A + participant MSC Server + participant MGW + participant S-CSCF + participant SCC AS + participant UE B + + Note over ICS UE A, UE B: Speech call between ICS UE A and UE B active + + ICS UE A->>SCC AS: 1. I1:ICS Call Modify(MuMe) + SCC AS-->>ICS UE A: 2. I1:ICS Call Modify Response + ICS UE A->>MSC Server: 3. CS call disconnect + MSC Server->>S-CSCF: 4.BYE + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 5.BYE + Note over ICS UE A, SCC AS: 6. Completion of the CS access leg release procedure + ICS UE A->>MSC Server: 7. CS call setup(MuMe) + MSC Server->>S-CSCF: 8.INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + S-CSCF->>SCC AS: 9.INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + SCC AS-->>S-CSCF: 10.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + S-CSCF->>UE B: 11.Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + Note over ICS UE A, UE B: 12. Completion of the session and bearer setup procedures + Note over ICS UE A, UE B: Video call between ICS UE A and UE B established + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the addition of video media flow for ICS UE via the MSC Server enhanced for ICS through radial using I1 reference point. The diagram involves six lifelines: ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGW, S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It starts with an active speech call between ICS UE A and UE B. The process involves modifying the call to add video, disconnecting the CS access leg, and then re-establishing the session with video support. + +**Figure 7.9.2.5-1: Addition of video media flow for ICS UE via the MSC Server enhanced for ICS through radial using I1 reference point** + +1. The ICS UE A sends a Call MODIFY message that offers the adding of the video media to the ongoing speech session to the SCC AS. +2. The SCC AS sends a Call MODIFY Response message to the ICS UE A. +3. The ICS UE A sends a CS call disconnect message to the MSC server to release the existing CS access leg. +4. The MSC server sends the BYE message to the S-CSCF. +5. The S-CSCF forwards the BYE message to the SCC AS. +6. Completion of the CS access leg release procedure. +7. The ICS UE A sends a CS call setup message to the MSC server to establish a new CS access leg supporting video and speech media. +8. The MSC server sends the INVITE to the S-CSCF. +9. The S-CSCF sends the INVITE to the SCC AS. +10. The SCC AS sends a re-INVITE to the S-CSCF that offers the adding of the video media to the ongoing speech session to update the remote leg. +11. The S-CSCF sends the re-INVITE to UE B. +12. Completion of the session and bearer setup procedures, where upon the establishment of the multimedia connection, the MSC Server shall perform the video codec negotiation and set up the multimedia bearer based on the procedures defined in TS 29.163 [11]. + +Figure 7.9.2.5-2 describes how a video media flow was added to an ongoing speech session through radial for the ICS UE which is attached to the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS over the I1 reference point. Change from multimedia (i.e. speech and video) to speech can be achieved in a similar way. + +![Sequence diagram showing the addition of video media flow for ICS UE via the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS through redial using I1 reference point. The diagram illustrates the interaction between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, I/S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It starts with an active speech call, followed by a Call MODIFY request from UE A to SCC AS, a response, a CS call disconnect from UE A to MSC Server, and subsequent release messages (REL, BYE) through MGCF and I/S-CSCF. After the CS access leg release, a new CS call setup (IAM) is initiated from MSC Server to MGCF, followed by INVITE and Re-INVITE messages to set up the video session. The diagram concludes with the completion of session and bearer setup procedures, establishing a video call between UE A and UE B.](ba676d18b6a00f27c5bfaec9eeec20be_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ICS_UE_A as ICS UE A + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGCF + participant MGW + participant I_S_CSCF as I / S-CSCF + participant SCC_AS as SCC AS + participant UE_B as UE B + + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: Speech call between ICS UE A and UE B active + ICS_UE_A->>SCC_AS: 1. I1:ICS Call Modify(MuMe) + SCC_AS-->>ICS_UE_A: 2. I1:ICS Call Modify Response + ICS_UE_A->>MSC_Server: 3. CS call disconnect + MSC_Server->>MGCF: 4. REL + MGCF->>I_S_CSCF: 5. BYE + I_S_CSCF->>SCC_AS: 6. BYE + Note over ICS_UE_A, SCC_AS: 7. Completion of the CS access leg release procedure + ICS_UE_A->>MSC_Server: 8. CS call setup(MuMe) + MSC_Server->>MGCF: 9. IAM(MuMe) + MGCF->>I_S_CSCF: 10. INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + I_S_CSCF->>SCC_AS: 11. INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + SCC_AS-->>I_S_CSCF: 12. Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + I_S_CSCF->>UE_B: 13. Re-INVITE(m=audio; m=video) + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: 14. Completion of the session and bearer setup procedures + Note over ICS_UE_A, UE_B: Video call between ICS UE A and UE B established + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the addition of video media flow for ICS UE via the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS through redial using I1 reference point. The diagram illustrates the interaction between ICS UE A, MSC Server, MGCF, MGW, I/S-CSCF, SCC AS, and UE B. It starts with an active speech call, followed by a Call MODIFY request from UE A to SCC AS, a response, a CS call disconnect from UE A to MSC Server, and subsequent release messages (REL, BYE) through MGCF and I/S-CSCF. After the CS access leg release, a new CS call setup (IAM) is initiated from MSC Server to MGCF, followed by INVITE and Re-INVITE messages to set up the video session. The diagram concludes with the completion of session and bearer setup procedures, establishing a video call between UE A and UE B. + +**Figure 7.9.2.5-2: Addition of video media flow for ICS UE via the MSC Server not enhanced for ICS through redial using I1 reference point** + +1. The ICS UE A sends a Call MODIFY message that offers the adding of the video media to the ongoing speech session to the SCC AS. +2. The SCC AS sends a Call MODIFY Response message to the ICS UE A. +3. The ICS UE A sends a CS call disconnect message to the MSC Server to release the existing CS access leg. +4. The MSC Server sends a REL message to the MGCF. +5. The MGCF sends a BYE message to the S-CSCF. +- 6-8. Steps 6-8 in Figure 7.9.2.5-2 are identical to Steps 5-7 in Figure 7.9.2.5-1. +9. The MSC Server sends an IAM message to the MGCF. +10. The MGCF sends the INVITE to the S-CSCF. +- 11-13. Steps 11-13 in Figure 7.9.2.5-2 are identical to Steps 9-11 in Figure 7.9.2.5-1. +14. Completion of the session and bearer setup procedures, where upon the establishment of the multimedia connection, the MGCF/IMS-MGW shall perform the procedures as specified in TS 29.163 [11] to set up the multimedia bearer. + +## 8 Charging + +### 8.1 General description + +The charging strategy applied in ICS shall ensure complete and correct charging of the access leg that is used for an ICS call. An ICS subscriber may establish or accept a call through CS access or through an IP access network (IP-CAN). The charge that is levied against an ICS subscriber for a call shall encompass the usage of the access network (CS access or IP-CAN) as well as the usage of the IMS network, further depending on the destination of the call and other call related aspects. The access related charge for an ICS call, i.e. the CS access network related charge or IP-CAN related charge, shall be included in the charging record generated by SCC AS. + +The charge of a SIP call or session may be adapted when this call or session is subject to a value added service (e.g. number translation, call diversion) or is subject to a supplementary service (e.g. call forwarding, call transfer, conference call). + +Standard inter-operator reconciliation mechanisms for CS and IMS can and should be used. Additional reconciliation for I1 flows can also be applied, due to such flows being uniquely identifiable from other flows over the same bearer (see clause 5.4.1 for more information). + +### 8.2 Offline charging + +Charging record generated by the SCC AS may be correlated with charging records generated in the MSC Server or with charging records in the IP-CAN, where applicable. The combination of charging records from SCC AS with charging records from MSC Server or IP-CAN is used for determining access charge for the call or multimedia session. The combination of these charging records may further be correlated with other IMS-based charging records generated by S-CSCF or other functional entities in the IMS network, for the purpose of generating an overall charge for a call or multimedia session, including access related charge. + +Where PS to CS transfer has occurred, at least in roaming situations, the visited network shall correlate the charging records from MSC Server and any visited network IMS functions. The information used for correlation is described in TS 23.237 [12]. + +### 8.3 On-line charging + +When on-line charging is applied for an ICS subscriber, this on-line charging should be performed strictly in IMS. CS network based on-line charging service (e.g., CAMEL prepaid), for example, shall not be invoked for ICS subscribers. + +NOTE: If for an ICS subscriber a call that is established in CS is not anchored in IMS network, i.e. no ICS is applied for that call, then on-line charging in CS access can be applied for that call. + +## 9 Security Considerations + +### 9.1 Access security + +ICS re-uses the CS domain security described in the detailed access specific specification. + +Access using MSC Server enhanced for ICS is secured by the combination of the CS access security and the IMS Network Domain Security. The MSC Server enhanced for ICS also performs the trusted node authentication procedures according to TS 33.203 [32]. + +### 9.2 Network Domain Security + +Network domain security with the MSC server enhanced for ICS shall be provided by NDS/IP according to TS 33.210 [33] for the I2 reference point. + +NOTE: If the control plane interfaces are trusted (e.g. physically protected), there is no need to use protection according to TS 33.210 [33]. + +## Annex A (informative): Service Consistency + +IMS Centralized Services (ICS) provides communication services such that all services, and service control, are based on IMS mechanisms and enablers. It enables IMS services when using CS access for the media bearer. + +With ICS, the user services are provided by IMS. User sessions are controlled in IMS via PS or CS access. When using CS access network, or when using PS access networks which do not support full duplex speech component of an IMS service, the CS core network is utilized to establish a circuit bearer for use as media for IMS sessions. + +Functionality is needed to provide IMS Centralized Services to devices using a circuit switched access network for media transport. Two fundamentally different approaches are enabled in this specification. One approach supports legacy UEs by placing new functional elements in the MSC Server. Another approach provides new functionality in the UE. The following figure depicts the provision of IMS Centralized Services for these approaches from the user's perspective. This figure is intended to be illustrative in nature, and is not intended to depict a complete or definitive identification of the various IMS Centralized Services that may be provided using different access networks or solutions. + +![Diagram of IMS Centralized Services architecture showing the flow from IMS Centralized Services through various CS and PS access networks to different types of User Equipment (UE) and the services they receive.](34cbe6293693bd7fa95f2755c16b66bd_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the IMS Centralized Services architecture, organized into three horizontal layers: + +- Core Network:** At the top is the **IMS Centralized Services** block. +- Access Network:** Below the Core Network, five branches represent different access paths: + - ICS enhanced CS MSC** connected to **GSM + GPRS, EDGE, CDMA-1X** access, which connects to a **Legacy UE**. + - Legacy (or ICS enhanced) CS MSC** connected to **GSM + GPRS, EDGE, CDMA-1X** access, which connects to an **ICS UE**. + - UMTS/HSPA** access, which connects to an **ICS UE**. + - WLAN** access, which connects to an **ICS UE**. + - LTE/HRPD/ Wired Access**, which connects to an **ICS UE**. +- IMS Centralized Services Provided to User:** The bottom layer lists the services provided to the user through each access path: + - Legacy UE:** CS Voice, CS Equiv MMTEL SS. + - ICS UE (via Legacy CS MSC):** CS Voice, Partial MMTEL SS, Data IP Services. + - ICS UE (via UMTS/HSPA):** CS Voice, **FULL MMTEL SS**, Hi Speed Data, **Rich IP Services**, **IMS Video**. + - ICS UE (via WLAN):** **VoIP**, **FULL MMTEL SS**, Hi Speed Data, **Rich IP Services**, **IMS Video**. + - ICS UE (via LTE/HRPD/ Wired Access):** **QoS VoIP**, **FULL MMTEL SS**, Hi Speed Data, **Rich IP Services**, **IMS Video**, **Real Time Services (Gaming)**. + +A bracket at the bottom indicates that the **Common Device Client provides Consistent User View** and **Service Capabilities Grow with Access Capabilities**. + +Diagram of IMS Centralized Services architecture showing the flow from IMS Centralized Services through various CS and PS access networks to different types of User Equipment (UE) and the services they receive. + +Figure A-1: IMS Centralized Services + +## Annex B (informative): ICS functions in different deployment scenarios + +The following tables provides guidance on which of the functions and functionalities are needed in the different deployment scenarios. + +**Scenario 1:** An operator who only supports UEs that have ICS functionality for their ICS Users: + +| | MSC Server
with ICS
enhancements | ICS UE | Transparent control
channel | | SCC AS | | | +|-----------------|----------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----|-------| +| | | | I1 | Gm | CAA | IUA | T-ADS | +| Required | No | Yes | As driven by operator policy and VPLMN support. | As driven by operator policy and VPLMN support. | Yes, only if I1 is supported | Yes | Yes | + +ICS Users using a non-ICS UE (e.g. after SIM swap) will not make use of the transparent control channel; non ICS UE originated calls are routed to the home IMS using IN (e.g. CAMEL) signalling in conjunction with CS signalling (e.g. TS 24.008 [6]) for call origination. + +**Scenario 2:** An operator who only supports non ICS UEs for their ICS Users: + +| | MSC Server
with ICS
enhancements | ICS UE | Transparent control
channel | | SCC AS | | | +|-----------------|----------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------|----|--------|--------------|-------| +| | | | I1 | Gm | CAA | IUA | T-ADS | +| Required | Yes | No | No | No | No | Conditional* | Yes | + +\* Required if the operator supports IN (e.g. CAMEL) redirection of CS originated calls. + +**Scenario 3:** An operator who supports UE's for their ICS Users that do, and do not, have ICS functionality (to different subscribers and the same subscribers) ensuring the coexistence of UEs that have and do not have ICS functionality: + +| | MSC Server
with ICS
enhancements | ICS UE | Transparent control
channel | | SCC AS | | | +|-----------------|----------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----|-------| +| | | | I1 | Gm | CAA | IUA | T-ADS | +| Required | Yes | Yes | As driven by operator policy and VPLMN support. | As driven by operator policy and VPLMN support. | Yes, if I1 is supported | Yes | Yes | + +### Scenario 4: Inbound roaming - operator supports ICS + +Inbound roaming subscribers on an operator's network that supports either the same or different ICS functionality that the inbound roaming subscriber is using, ensuring the coexistence of UEs that have and do not have ICS functionality. + +**Sub case 4.1:** Subscriber from operator supporting scenario 1 roams into network of scenario 1 + +Same functions and functionalities in roaming in-network as in scenario 1. No additional functions or functionalities. + +**Sub case 4.2:** Subscriber from operator supporting scenario 2 roams into network of scenario 2 + +Same functions and functionalities in roaming in-network as in scenario 2. No additional functions or functionalities. + +**Sub case 4.3:** Subscriber from operator supporting scenario 1 roams into network of scenario 2 + +Same functions and functionalities in roaming in-network as in scenario 2. No additional functions or functionalities. Roaming agreement, operator policy and access network restrictions decide on the use of the transparent control channel between ICS UE and SCC AS in the home network. + +ICS Users using a non-ICS UE (e.g. after SIM swap) will not make use of the transparent control channel; non ICS UE originated calls are routed to the home IMS using IN (e.g. CAMEL) signalling in conjunction with CS signalling (e.g. TS 24.008 [6]) for call origination. + +**Sub case 4.4:** Subscriber from operator supporting scenario 2 roams into network of scenario 1 + +Same functions and functionalities in roaming in-network as in scenario 1: No additional functions or functionalities. Roaming agreement and operator policy decide on the fallback solution, i.e., whether or not originated calls are routed to the home IMS using IN (e.g. CAMEL) signalling in conjunction with CS signalling (e.g. TS 24.008 [6]) for call origination. + +**Scenario 5: Inbound roaming - operator does not support ICS** + +Inbound roaming subscribers on an operator's network that does not support ICS. + +**Sub case 5.1:** Subscriber from operator supporting scenario 1 roams into an operator's network that does not support ICS. + +Roaming agreement, operator policy and access network restrictions decide on the use of the transparent control channel between ICS UE and SCC AS in the home network. + +ICS Users using a non-ICS UE (e.g. after SIM swap) will not make use of the transparent control channel; non ICS UE originated calls are routed to the home IMS using IN (e.g. CAMEL) signalling in conjunction with CS signalling (e.g. TS 24.008 [6]) for call origination. + +**Sub case 5.2** Subscriber from operator supporting scenario 2 roams into an operator's network that does not support ICS. + +Roaming agreement and operator policy decide on the fallback solution, i.e., whether or not originated calls are routed to the home IMS using IN (e.g. CAMEL) signalling in conjunction with CS signalling (e.g. TS 24.008 [6]) for call origination. + +--- + +## Annex C (informative): Communication Deflection support when call has been delivered using CS call control + +When a call has been delivered to a non ICS UE using CS call control, Communication Deflection service can be centralized and executed in IMS by using IN (e.g. O-CSI CAMEL) if it is supported by the network and user subscription. + +--- + +## Annex D (informative): + +# Conditional Call Forwarding support when call has been delivered using CS call control + +When a call has been delivered to an UE using CS call control, conditional call forwarding services can be centralized and executed in IMS by one of (or a combination of) the following implementation options. + +### **Solution 1: Default PSIs** + +In this solution, Conditional CF is configured in IMS with default service configuration in the CS domain. The Conditional CF services are configured in the HLR. The different forwarded number can be set in HLR to indicate the type of CF. The VMSC redirects the call to IMS for appropriate handling of the service in IMS. + +### **Solution 2: MAP suppression-of-announcements** + +In this solution, Conditional CF is configured and provisioned in IMS domain exclusively, according to IMS Centralized Service principle. It provides means to suppress the announcement in CS domain at the MSC for the conditional call forwarding services. MGCF provides the appropriate responses to TAS on behalf of the ICS user in CS domain. The MGCF can use the ICS indication if available to map cause codes received over the CS leg to appropriate IMS error codes. + +For support of CFNRy, the TAS starts a supervisory no-reply timer on receipt of Alerting from the called party. If the timer expires without receipt of the Connect from the called party, the TAS invokes the CFNRy service. + +### **Solution 3: IN** + +In this solution, Conditional CF is configured in IMS with default service configuration in the CS domain so that the VMSC invokes the CF service in the CS domain upon detection of CF triggers. IN (e.g. O-CSI CAMEL service) is configured in the HLR to redirect service control to IMS for processing of CF. + +--- + +## Annex E (informative): Using MRF for media process + +After the session between ICS UE and other party ( Party B) is hold, if the SCC AS receives the new session request, it can use MRF for media process. The following three options give details on how to implement it. + +### **Solution 1: using MRFP by SCC AS for held party** + +In this solution, if the SCC AS receives the new session request after the session between ICS UE and other party (Party B) is hold, it changes the MGW media path from Party B to the third party (Party C), and connects Party B to MRF for playing announcement. + +### **Solution 2: using MRFP by SCC AS for active and Held party** + +In this solution, if the SCC AS receives the new session request after the session between ICS UE and other party (Party B) is hold, it changes the MGW media path to MRF, and then connects Party B to MRF for playing announcement and connects the third party (Party C) to MRF to communicate with ICS UE. + +### **Solution 3: using MRFP by TAS for Held call** + +In this solution, TAS is always kept in ICS UE A's remote leg. After the TAS receives the Hold request from the ICS UE via the SCC AS, it performs communication Hold procedure as described in TS 24.147 [21]. The MRF is connected to Party B for playing announcement. + +--- + +## Annex F (informative): Call diversion from CS to IMS + +### F.1 General + +An incoming call for a subscriber with a service provided by the IMS (e.g. ICS, SC, SR-VCC) can be received either through the CS domain or IMS. For such a subscriber, certain calls that are received through the CS domain need to be routed to the IMS for anchoring at the SCC AS, prior to the onward routing of the call to the subscriber. Solutions for this are discussed in clause F.2. + +NOTE: Requirements and preconditions for anchoring of CS calls for a subscriber with a service provided by the IMS are documented in clause 7.4 of the present document. + +When an incoming CS call is anchored at the SCC AS using certain implementation options described in clause F.2, then as a result of domain selection, the call can be routed back to the CS domain to determine the CSRN for CS termination. In this case, the call can be treated as a new incoming call from the CS network, and then be re-routed to the IMS for anchoring again, thus creating a circular loop. Solutions for this are discussed in clause F.3. + +--- + +### F.2 Implementation options for call diversion from CS to the IMS + +Several techniques available in the current CS networks can be used to implement the call diversion from CS to IMS, as detailed below: + +#### 1 Use of CAMEL for call diversion to IMS + +This option applies to configurations requiring handling of incoming calls at the GMSC function. Upon receipt of an incoming call, the GMSC queries the HSS for routing information via the Send Routing Information (SRI) query. The user profile in the HSS is configured to return T-CSI including a gsmSCF address to the GMSC in response to the SRI query. When handling calls for a subscriber with a service provided by the IMS, the subsequent processing at the gsmSCF and the GMSC results in routing of the call to the IMS using the IMRN. The call is routed to the SCC AS according to standard IMS routing procedures. In order to determine the necessary information to complete the call, the SCC AS uses the IMRN or the ISUP information mapped to SIP headers. + +#### 2 HSS directed call diversion to IMS + +This option also applies to configurations requiring handling of incoming calls at the GMSC function. Upon receipt of an incoming call, the GMSC queries the HSS for routing information using the MAP Send Routing Information (SRI) procedure (as defined in TS 29.002 [45]). Based on a non-standardized mechanism, the user profile in the HSS is configured to return an IP Multimedia Routing Number (IMRN) to the GMSC in response to the SRI query, when the call is directed to a subscriber with a service provided by the IMS. The subsequent processing at the GMSC results in routing of the call to IMS using the IMRN. Two methods can then be used to ensure correlation between the IMRN and the original called party. + +- Cooperative allocation/deallocation: In this method, the IMS is made aware of the assigned IMRN and when a call is received for that number, the original number is retrieved. This method is similar to the Provide Roaming Number procedure in MAP (see TS 29.002 [45]). +- Algorithmic: In this method, a known algorithm is used to derive the IMRN at the CS, and to deduce the original called number from the IMRN at the IMS. One method of performing such an algorithm could be use of a prefix. In such a case, care is required in the network configuration to avoid call looping for the case when the call is subsequently routed from the IMS to the CS domain for call termination (see clause F.3 for possible solutions to prevent call looping). + +#### 3 Static diversion from GMSC with dedicated trunk groups + +This option also applies to configurations requiring handling of incoming calls at the GMSC function. Dedicated trunk groups can be used at the GMSC to divert CS terminations to the MGCF. + +NOTE 1: The handling of call types that an operator has not centralised the services into the IMS need to be taken into account if this solution is chosen. + +#### 4 Static diversion using Local Number Portability + +This option can be used for routing of calls originating in PSTN networks to IMS. A Local Number Portability database dip can be used to reroute incoming calls to a subscriber with a service provided by the IMS with calls to the MGCF. + +NOTE 2: The handling of calls other than calls needs to be taken into account if this solution is chosen. + +#### 5 Direct routing to IMS + +Translations can be set up in the PSTN network to route the incoming call to a subscriber with a service provided by the IMS to the MGCF. This way the normal IMS routing technique specified in TS 23.228 [2] can be used. + +NOTE 3: The handling of call types that an operator has not centralised the services into the IMS need to be taken into account if this solution is chosen. + +NOTE 4: With some of the aforementioned options, care must be taken to avoid a circular loop which can occur when used in conjunction with certain techniques applied to route the call from IMS to the terminating user via CS network. Techniques for the prevention of circular looping are described in clause F.3. + +--- + +## F.3 Implementation options for prevention of circular looping of CS Terminations + +Several implementation techniques can be used to avoid circular looping, as detailed below: + +### 1 Use of SCC AS for retrieving the CSRN + +When the SCC AS decides that the call is to be terminated in the CS domain, the SCC AS retrieves the CSRN from the MSC/MSC-Server via the HSS using the following method: + +- MAP SRI Query: This option makes use of a MAP Interface between the SCC AS and the HSS to request allocation of a CSRN from the HSS for routing of the call to the MSC/MSC-Server currently serving the subscriber. +- Sh UDR Query: This option makes use of the Sh interface between the SCC AS and the HSS. The SCC AS sends a Sh UDR query to the HSS to request allocation of a CSRN for routing of the call to the MSC/MSC-Server currently serving the subscriber. + +### 2 Use of a specific CSRN to indicate the anchored call + +When the SCC AS decides that the call is to be terminated in the CS domain, the SCC AS allocates a specific CSRN. The specific CSRN can be an MSISDN with added prefix digits. The SCC AS uses the specific CSRN to route the call to the CS network. The following options are available to resolve the MSISDN of original called party from the CSRN. + +- MGCF resolution: In this option, the SCC AS forwards the call to the MGCF (which has a GMSC function). The specific CSRN is used by the MGCF to recognise that the SCC AS has already anchored the call in IMS, and that the call will be terminated in the CS domain. The MGCF resolves the MSISDN from the CSRN and invokes GMSC functionality integrated in the MGCF for handling the CS call terminating procedure. In particular, the MGCF/GMSC includes the "Suppress T-CSI" parameter in the MAP SRI sent to the HSS. +- GMSC resolution: In this option, the SCC AS forwards the call to the MGCF, which then forwards the call on to GSMC. The specific CSRN is used by the GSMC to recognise that the SCC AS has already anchored the call in IMS, and that the call will be terminated in the CS domain. The GMSC resolves the MSISDN from the CSRN and invokes the CS call terminating procedure. In particular, the GMSC includes the "Suppress T CSI" parameter in the MAP SRI sent to the HSS. +- HSS resolution: In this option, the SCC AS forwards the call to the GMSC. The GMSC treats the call as a normal terminating call and sends a MAP SRI request to the HSS for the specific CSRN. The specific CSRN is used by the HSS to recognise that the SCC AS has already anchored the call in IMS, and that the call will + +be terminated in the CS domain. The HSS resolves the MSISDN from the CSRN and uses CS call terminating procedures to obtain routing information from the MSC/MSC-Server. + +### 3 Use of a dynamically allocated CSRN to route via the GMSC + +This option uses a dynamically allocated CSRN to divert the call to the appropriate GMSC as described below: + +- The SCC AS allocates a CSRN that maps to an appropriate GMSC. Standard CS termination procedures are then executed at the GMSC. +- The GMSC is configured with N-CSI and criteria corresponding to the CSRN. This causes the GMSC to issue an InitialDP containing the CSRN to the gsmSCF. +- The gsmSCF performs a function on the CSRN to obtain the MSISDN of the called party number and the MSISDN is returned to the GMSC in a CONNECT operation together with the CSRN as a Re-direction ID. +- The GMSC continues the normal CS call termination procedure by issuing an SRI to the HSS using the MSISDN, which causes T-CSI to be returned back to the GMSC. +- The GMSC issues another InitialDP containing both MSISDN and CSRN to the gsmSCF. The gsmSCF recognises that it has been triggered for the second time (due to the presence of the CSRN) and therefore returns a CONTINUE for the MSISDN, thus avoiding a circular loop. +- The GMSC sends a MAP SRI query to the HSS with the "Suppress T CSI" parameter, thus allowing the HSS to obtain the MSRN through standard call terminating procedures. + +--- + +## Annex G (normative): Combined CS Access Authentication and IMS Registration Procedure for non-roaming UEs + +### G.1 General + +An MSC enhanced for ICS may support the Combined CS Access Authentication procedure. This procedure enables to authenticate and register all users accessing a network via CS access within the IMS domain as the only service domain. When this is done this annex is used instead of clause 7.2.1.1. + +If the MSC enhanced for ICS supports the Combined CS Access Authentication all users within this MSC domain shall be authenticated utilizing this procedure. + +The main additional function of MSC Server enhanced for ICS is: + +- Receiving 3G CS authentication parameters from the S-CSCF. + +Other functions are similar with the existing MSC Server enhanced for ICS, e.g. Controls the MGW functions described in TS 23.002 [3] to enable the interworking between CS access and RTP bearers. + +In this solution, the IMS will perform authentication procedure as normal IMS registration. + +--- + +### G.2 Procedure for registration utilizing IMS Authorization + +Figure G.2-1 describes how IMS registration is performed by the MSC Server upon receiving of a Location Update Request. + +![Sequence diagram for registration utilizing IMS Authorization. Lifelines: UE, MSC Server, I-CSCF, HSS, S-CSCF. The process involves a Location Update, Identity Request/Response, REGISTER, Cx-Query/Select-Pull, Cx-AuthDataReq, Authentication vector creation, Cx-AuthDataResp, 401 Unauthorised, Auth. Request/Response, REGISTER response, Cx-Put/Pull, 200 OK, and Loc. Upd. Acc.](da85343976fdbb19f866d9ddbdad0eae_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant MSC Server + participant I-CSCF + participant HSS + participant S-CSCF + + Note right of HSS: Authentication vector creation + Note right of S-CSCF: Authentication + + UE->>MSC Server: 1. Location Update + MSC Server-->>UE: 2. Identity Req. + UE-->>MSC Server: 3. Identity Rsp. + MSC Server->>I-CSCF: 4. REGISTER + I-CSCF->>HSS: 5. Cx-Query / Cx-Select-Pull + HSS-->>I-CSCF: 6. Cx-Query Resp / Cx-Select-Pull Resp + I-CSCF->>S-CSCF: 7. REGISTER + S-CSCF->>HSS: 8. Cx-AuthDataReq + Note right of HSS: Authentication vector creation + HSS-->>S-CSCF: 9. Cx-AuthDataResp (Authentication Information) + S-CSCF-->>I-CSCF: 10. 401 Unauthorised (Authentication Information) + I-CSCF-->>MSC Server: 11. 401 Unauthorised (Authentication Information) + MSC Server-->>UE: 12. Auth. Request (Authentication Information) + UE-->>MSC Server: 13. Auth. Response (response) + MSC Server->>I-CSCF: 14. REGISTER (response) + I-CSCF->>HSS: 15. Cx-Query / Cx-Select-Pull + HSS-->>I-CSCF: 16. Cx-Query Resp / Cx-Select-Pull Resp + I-CSCF->>S-CSCF: 17. REGISTER (response) + Note right of S-CSCF: Authentication + S-CSCF->>HSS: 18. Cx-Put / Cx-Pull + HSS-->>S-CSCF: 19. Cx-Put Resp / Cx-Pull Resp + S-CSCF-->>I-CSCF: 20. 200 OK + I-CSCF-->>MSC Server: 21. 200 OK + MSC Server-->>UE: 22. Loc. Upd. Acc. + +``` + +Sequence diagram for registration utilizing IMS Authorization. Lifelines: UE, MSC Server, I-CSCF, HSS, S-CSCF. The process involves a Location Update, Identity Request/Response, REGISTER, Cx-Query/Select-Pull, Cx-AuthDataReq, Authentication vector creation, Cx-AuthDataResp, 401 Unauthorised, Auth. Request/Response, REGISTER response, Cx-Put/Pull, 200 OK, and Loc. Upd. Acc. + +**Figure G.2-1: Procedure for registration utilizing IMS Authorization** + +1. The UE sends a Location Update Request towards CS network. + - 2-3. Upon receipt of location update request, MSC Server enhanced for ICS performs standard identity request if needed. + 4. The MSC Server enhanced for ICS decides to initiate IMS registration for this subscriber and derives a domain name from the subscriber's identity (e.g. IMSI) and discovers the address of the appropriate I-CSCF/IBCF. + - 5-7. The I-CSCF verifies that the incoming REGISTER originates from a trusted MSC Server (in the same way it would check that a normal REGISTER originates from a trusted P-CSCF). The I-CSCF compares the MNC/MCC in the IMPI/IMPU to detect whether the UE is an inbound roamer or not. For HPLMN subscribers the I-CSCF selects the HSS and for inbound roamers follows the procedure in Annex H, clause H.5.2.3.1. +- For HPLMN SeDoC subscribers, the I-CSCF indicates to the HSS that the REGISTER is coming from an MSC and the HSS selects the appropriate S-CSCF which is able to handle the CS authentication. The I-CSCF initiates standard procedures for S-CSCF location/allocation and forwards the REGISTER to S-CSCF. +- 8-9. The S-CSCF identifies the REGISTER as being from the MSC Server enhanced for ICS. +- During these procedures, authentication parameters for a given subscriber will be carried. The parameters contain an Authentication Quintuplet (Rand, Xres, Ck, Ik, Autn). +- 10-11. The S-CSCF sends a SIP 401 i.e. an authentication challenge towards the UE including the challenge RAND, the authentication token AUTN, and also the integrity key IK and the cipher key CK to MSC Server enhanced for ICS. + 12. Upon receipt of 401 from IMS, MSC Server enhanced for ICS initiates the authentication procedure by transferring an AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message across the radio interface. The AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message contains the parameters necessary to calculate the response parameters. + +13. The UE processes the challenge information and sends back an AUTHENTICATION RESPONSE message to the network. +14. The MSC Server enhanced for ICS should send REGISTER with authentication result (XRES) to I-CSCF. +- 15-21. I-CSCF forwards the authentication response to the S-CSCF. Upon receiving the message, the S-CSCF check the authentication response sent by the UE. If the user has been successfully authenticated, the S-CSCF sends 200 OK to MSC Server enhanced for ICS via I-CSCF. +22. On receiving a 200 (OK) response to the REGISTER request, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS generates a TMSI for the UE and sends Location Update Accept towards the UE. + +## Annex H (informative): Service Domain Centralization in IMS (SeDoC) + +### H.1 High level description and principles + +This annex describes an optional architecture configuration that centralizes all services, including emergency calls and SMS, within the IMS domain for all users roaming in that network independent of access used, i.e. it replaces service execution of the CS service domain with service logic execution in IMS only. The service profile for all users is solely provided by the IMS domain. For inbound roamers not supporting IMS or ICS in HPLMN therefore a temporary IMS subscription is created and service is handled locally in the VPLMN. + +The architecture configuration utilizes the "Registration and Authentication procedure utilizing IMS Authorization", which enables the option to remove subscriber related data from the VLR and use data of the IMS domain instead, e.g. the HSS. An interworking function provides the support for inbound and outbound roaming in networks not supporting IMS or ICS. + +This architecture configuration has no impact to UEs, no impact to interconnection interfaces of the roaming partner, no impact access networks (e.g. CS access) and does not require changes of specifications (e.g. TS 24.008 [6]). + +The basic principles of this solution are that CS access is mapped to IMS and PS access uses "native" IMS (VoLTE) but there is a single service domain for both accesses in IMS. The user profile is solely provided by IMS domain. For the migration phase the SeDoC enabled network operator is required to provide legacy support for inbound roamers. Long term target is that the service for inbound roamer be provided by the HPLMN, i.e. the VPLMN IMS-GWs (IBCFs) would relay towards home IMS service infrastructure. + +### H.2 Architecture model and reference points + +#### H.2.1 Reference architecture + +The basic principles described in previous clause require the introduction of a CS access to IMS gateway function, i.e. the MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC and an interworking function (ICS IWF) to the reference architecture. The MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC maps GSM access procedures to IMS procedures but does not store user profile data, i.e. the VLR functionality is extracted and is placed for own users into the HSS and for inbound roamer into an ICS-IWF. By doing this the internal IMS architecture does not need to introduce new interfaces. + +![Figure H.2-1: Reference architecture diagram showing the network components and interfaces for Service Domain Centralization in IMS (SeDoC).](9ff197cc407757d6a88e5e9f353864d0_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the reference architecture for SeDoC. It shows the following components and interfaces: + +- UE (User Equipment):** Connected to the **MSC enh. SeDoC** via **CS Access** interfaces. +- MSC enh. SeDoC:** The central component, connected to the **AS (Application Server)** via the **I3** interface, to the **CSCF (CSCF)** via the **I2'** interface, and to the **MGW (Media Gateway)** via a direct connection. +- AS (Application Server):** Connected to the **HSS (Home Subscriber Server)** via the **Sh** interface and to the **IWF (Interworking Function)** via the **Sh'** interface. +- HSS (Home Subscriber Server):** Connected to the **CSCF** via the **ISC** interface. +- CSCF (CSCF):** Connected to the **MGW** via the **Cx** interface and to the **IWF** via the **Cx'** interface. +- MGW (Media Gateway):** Connected to the **UE** via **CS Access** interfaces and to the **CSCF** via the **Cx** interface. +- IWF (Interworking Function):** Connected to the **AS** via the **Sh'** interface and to the **CSCF** via the **Cx'** interface. + +Figure H.2-1: Reference architecture diagram showing the network components and interfaces for Service Domain Centralization in IMS (SeDoC). + +Figure H.2-1: Reference architecture + +NOTE: Does only show the principle architecture, i.e. it does not show all interfaces. + +## H.2.2 Functional Entities + +### H.2.2.1 MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC + +The MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC terminates CS Access and maps it to respective IMS procedures. + +NOTE: When only a single profile in the IMS is used for service definition then a MSC Server enhanced for ICS (as defined in clause 7.6.2.9.3) is not used, instead a MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC is used in its place. + +At high level the MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC performs the following functionality on the control plane: + +- towards the UE: + - terminates the A (GERAN) and Iu-cs interfaces (UTRAN) when the UE accesses via a CS RAT. +- towards the IP Multimedia Subsystem: + - Terminates the I2' interface to the x-CSCF. + - Terminates I3 to the Telephony Application Server. +- towards legacy networks: + - terminates the G and E interface towards MSC Servers. + - terminates ISUP signalling towards PSTN. + +On the media plane the MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC controls Mc to the Media gateway. + +#### H.2.2.1.1 Main differences to MSC Server enhanced for ICS + +The MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC is based on the MSC Server enhanced for ICS, associated MGW as defined in clause 5.3.3 of this specification, TS 23.216 [36] and TS 23.237 [12] with the following amendments. + +#### H.2.2.1.2 Call control solely done in IMS + +Call Control (CC) functionality is essentially required only for the A/Iu-cs side of the MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC. Some local call control i.e. to treat "non UE detected emergency call" (Germany: 110) as emergency call and route to E-CSCF is required. Remaining Call Control functionality is done by IMS in the same way as for PS calls. Therefore the MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC behaves as P-CSCF/ATCF from viewpoint of I/S/E-CSCF, SCC-AS and MSC. + +Radio Resource Management (RR) and Mobility Management (MM) remain unchanged. + +#### H.2.2.1.3 No VLR functionality + +MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC does not include VLR functionality, i.e. there is also no D-Interface to the HLR. User Service Profile data and user service profile (i.e. identity, supplementary services) are handled in the IMS domain only. MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC just need to store user data related to radio access and RR/MM/CC procedures (e.g. IMSI, IMEI, TMSI, etc.). + +#### H.2.2.1.4 Mapping of CS procedures to IMS procedures + +The MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC terminates CS Access and maps it to respective IMS procedures. + +#### H.2.2.1.5 Call Control procedures + +Call Control procedures from the mobile CS user interface (A, Iu) are mapped towards IMS interface, i.e. I2 (SIP) towards IMS core in order to support the mapping of: + +- MOC & MTC based on A/Iu to respective IMS procedures +- SMS-MO & SMS-MT based on A/Iu to respective IMS/IP-SM procedures + +### H.2.2.1.6 Supplementary Services Management procedures + +Supplementary Services Management procedures from the mobile CS user interface (A, Iu) are mapped towards IMS interfaces, i.e. I3-IF (Ut, XCAP) towards IMS MMTEL AS. + +### H.2.2.1.7 Mapping of IMS procedures to CS procedures + +IMS specific procedures that need to be mapped to appropriate GSM procedures are: + +- early media (uni/bi-directional through-connect of media path). +- multiple early dialogues (due to forking on remote side (e.g. MSIM scenario): + - i.e. MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC serving the originating user needs to map multiple early SIP dialogues to one GSM dialogue towards the GSM device. + +SRVCC is supported as specified for GSM MSC (TS 23.216 [36]), i.e. via Sv Interface to MME and via I2 Interface to ATCF. Reverse SRVCC is supported as specified for GSM MSC (TS 23.216 [36]). + +CSFB support for Voice and SMS over SGs interface to MME, in case of combined attach to EPC and CS (via SGs), the MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC needs to interact with the IMS core similar as for CS attached voice terminals (e.g. map Location Update to IMS Registration, etc.) + +### H.2.2.1.8 Procedures which can be handled without IMS interaction + +Various MSC-Server procedures which can be handled without IMS interaction remain within the MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC. This includes e.g. handover to/from other MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC or VMSC (original MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC remains anchor after handover). + +### H.2.2.1.9 SMS support considerations + +In order to properly support SMS a SIP based replacement for MAP based SMS alerting procedures (reachability check) is needed, i.e. to set "not reachable" flag in case of unsuccessful SMS-MT and re-register if user is reachable again. + +Upon unsuccessful SMS-MT delivery (no response from terminal) the MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC needs to activate a "Not Reachable" (NR) flag (similar to GSM MSC). In case of "NR flag = TRUE" and receipt of any message from the terminal, the MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC needs to re-register towards IMS-Core. + +In case of unsuccessful SMS-MT to an attached user, the IP-SM-GW shall not initiate supervision in packet core network (Sh request to HSS). + +After unsuccessful SMS-MT delivery, the IP-SM-GW sets a "Not Reachable" flag. Due to this flag a re-registration (and other messages received from the terminal) will trigger the standard retry mechanisms. + +### H.2.2.1.10 Location + +MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC provides with PANI header the network provided location information according to cell-id received from radio access network (RAN). This information may be used by applications to differentiate between 2/3G Access via MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC and 4G Access via P-CSCF. + +### H.2.2.1.11 CS Data support + +CS Data is used analogously to a voice call: A data terminal equipment (modem) establishes a connection to another terminal (modem). The connection setup is controlled by the IMS Core, the data stream can be transported transparently with already available codecs (e.g., "clear mode"/G7.11). + +## H.2.2.2 ICS Interworking Function + +The ICS interworking function is introduced in order to support inbound and outbound roamers in networks that do not support IMS or ICS. Detailed in clause H.5.2.2. + +## H.2.3 Reference points + +### H.2.3.1 Reference Point MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC - CSCF (I2' Reference Point) + +The I2' reference point is based on I2 functionality as defined in TS 23.216 [36], TS 23.237 [12] and in clause 5.4.2. + +Additionally it supports the "Registration and Authentication procedure utilizing IMS Authorization" as specified in annex G. + +### H.2.3.2 Reference Point MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC - TAS (I3 Reference Point) + +The I3 is used between the MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC and the TAS to interwork CS signalling and communication service setting procedures, as defined in clause 4.5 of this specification. + +### H.2.3.3 Reference Point ICS-IWF - CSCF (Cx' Reference Point) + +The Cx' reference point is based on Cx functionality similar to the procedures of S-CSCF - HSS communication. It supports information transfer between CSCF and ICS-IWF. + +The main procedures that require information transfer between CSCF and ICS-IWF are: + +- 1) Procedures related to Serving CSCF assignment +- 2) Procedures related to routing information retrieval from ICS-IWF to CSCF +- 3) Procedures related to authorisation (e.g. checking of roaming agreement) +- 4) Procedures related to authentication: transfer of security parameters of the subscriber between ICS-IWF and CSCF +- 5) Procedures related to filter control: transfer of filter parameters of the subscriber from ICS-IWF to CSCF + +Further information on the Cx reference point is provided in TS 23.228 [2]. + +### H.2.3.4 Reference Point ICS-IWF - AS (Sh' Reference Point) + +The Sh' reference point is based on Sh functionality similar to the procedures of AS - HSS communication. It supports information transfer between AS and HSS. + +--- + +## H.4 Procedures and flows for non roaming users + +### H.4.1 Authentication/Registration for own users not roaming + +For authentication/registration procedure for own users not roaming please refer to annex G of this specification. + +### H.4.2 Originating session for own users not roaming + +Session origination for own users is specified in clause 7.3.2.1.2 Origination using I2 reference point + +### H.4.3 Terminating session for own users not roaming + +Session termination for own users is specified in clause 7.4.2.1.2 Termination using I2 reference point + +## H.4.4 SMS-MO for own users not roaming + +![Sequence diagram for SMS-MO for own users not roaming. The diagram shows the interaction between five entities: non ICS UE A, MSC Server enh. for SeDoC, S-CSCF, IP SM GW, and SMSC. The process involves 12 steps: 1. SMS-MO from UE to MSC; 2. MESSAGE (encapsulated) from MSC to S-CSCF; 3. MESSAGE from S-CSCF to IP SM GW; 4. OK from IP SM GW to S-CSCF; 5. OK from S-CSCF to MSC; 6. MAP FORWARD SM from IP SM GW to SMSC; 7. MAP FSM Confirm from SMSC to IP SM GW; 8. MESSAGE from IP SM GW to S-CSCF; 9. MESSAGE from S-CSCF to MSC; 10. SMS-MO Confirmation from MSC to UE; 11. OK from MSC to S-CSCF; 12. OK from S-CSCF to IP SM GW. A mapping box indicates GSM SMS <-> IP SM. A bottom bar indicates 'Behaviour according to GSM Standards' for the UE and MSC, and 'Behaviour according to TS 23.204 and TS 24.341 (IP-SM)' for the S-CSCF, IP SM GW, and SMSC.](6b0035ff72f9d3c2ef6141caf9a6c743_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for SMS-MO for own users not roaming. The diagram shows the interaction between five entities: non ICS UE A, MSC Server enh. for SeDoC, S-CSCF, IP SM GW, and SMSC. The process involves 12 steps: 1. SMS-MO from UE to MSC; 2. MESSAGE (encapsulated) from MSC to S-CSCF; 3. MESSAGE from S-CSCF to IP SM GW; 4. OK from IP SM GW to S-CSCF; 5. OK from S-CSCF to MSC; 6. MAP FORWARD SM from IP SM GW to SMSC; 7. MAP FSM Confirm from SMSC to IP SM GW; 8. MESSAGE from IP SM GW to S-CSCF; 9. MESSAGE from S-CSCF to MSC; 10. SMS-MO Confirmation from MSC to UE; 11. OK from MSC to S-CSCF; 12. OK from S-CSCF to IP SM GW. A mapping box indicates GSM SMS <-> IP SM. A bottom bar indicates 'Behaviour according to GSM Standards' for the UE and MSC, and 'Behaviour according to TS 23.204 and TS 24.341 (IP-SM)' for the S-CSCF, IP SM GW, and SMSC. + +**Figure H.4.4-1 SMS-MO for own users not roaming** + +- 1) UE submits the standard CS Short Message (as described in TS 23.040 [50] and TS 24.011 [53]) to the MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC. +- 2) MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC encapsulates the Short Message (SMS-SUBMIT, SC Address) and submits it to the S-CSCF using an appropriate SIP method (as described in TS 23.204 [51] and TS 24.341 [52]). +- 3) S-CSCF forwards the encapsulated Short Message (SMS-SUBMIT, SC Address) to IP-SM-GW (AS) based on stored iFC. +- 4) IP-SM-GW (AS) acknowledges the SIP message. +- 5) SIP message acknowledge is forwarded by S-CSCF to MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC. +- 6) The IP-SM-GW performs service authorization based on the stored subscriber data. The IP SM GW checks whether the subscriber is authorised to use the short message service. The IP-SM-GW (AS) extracts the Short Message (SMS-SUBMIT) and forwards it towards the SMS-SC (SC Address) using standard MAP or Diameter based (SGd/Gdd) signalling (as described in TS 23.040 [50]). +- 7) The SMS-SC sends a Submit report (SMS-SUBMIT REPORT) to IP-SM-GW (AS) (see TS 23.040 [50]). +- 8) IP-SM-GW (AS) sends the Submit report to S-CSCF, encapsulated in an appropriate SIP request. +- 9) The S-CSCF sends the encapsulated Submit report to the MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC. +- 10) MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC sends the Submit report to the UE. +- 11) The MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC acknowledges the SIP request. +- 12) The S-CSCF acknowledges the SIP request. + +## H.5 Interworking with networks not supporting IMS and/or ICS + +### H.5.1 Overview + +In this scenario, one network is fully supporting IMS and SeDoC but the interworking network does not support IMS or ICS. + +For inbound roamers, the basic enhancement is to provide VLR services towards the HLR in the HPLMN in an interworking function for inbound roamers, which has the role of a centralized VLR. + +The architecture is similar to the normal ICS architecture with the difference that the ICS Interworking Function is shared by all SeDoC -MSCs to support inbound roamers without IMS roaming agreement. The inbound roamers will have a temporary IMS subscription for the VPLMN, all services are executed in the VPLMN. + +For outbound roaming UEs, it is the opposite way, i.e. the interworking function provides HLR services to the VLR in the VPLMN and in addition provides interworking of the IMS/CS profile and the service settings. The interworking function provides also signalling interworking towards the MSC in the VPLMN. + +### H.5.2 Inbound-roaming support + +#### H.5.2.1 Roaming Architecture with legacy home network + +For the migration phase the SeDoC enabled network operator is required to provide legacy support for inbound roamers. The architecture proposed in this solution is for the SeDoC enabled visited network to emulate a VLR and allocate to the inbound CS roaming subscriber a temporary IMS identity so that they can also be served by the IMS domain. + +CAMEL can be supported by collocating the IP Multimedia Service Switching Function (IM SSF) with the AS. The IM SSF retrieves the CAMEL Subscription Information (CSI) from the ICS IWF at the time of the Attach of the UE. The IM SSF would perform the normal CAMEL requests to the gsmSCF in the HPLMN as specified in TS 23.278 [54]. + +The detailed architecture diagram is depicted in Figure H.5.2.1-1. + +![Architecture diagram for inbound roamer support showing the interaction between UE, MSC enh. SeDoC, MGW, CSCF, AS, HSS, IWF, and HLR across VPLMN and HPLMN domains.](c11773d09ceffdb3b486f2055afa7c3c_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the network architecture for inbound roamer support, divided into two domains: VPLMN (Visited Packet-Limited Network) and HPLMN (Home Packet-Limited Network), separated by a dashed vertical line. + +- UE (User Equipment):** Connected to the VPLMN via two "CS Access" paths. One path leads to the **MSC enh. SeDoC** and the other to the **MGW**. +- MSC enh. SeDoC:** Located in the VPLMN. It has an **I3** interface to the **AS**, an **I2'** interface to the **CSCF**, and a connection to the **MGW**. +- MGW:** Located in the VPLMN, connected to the **UE** and the **MSC enh. SeDoC**. +- CSCF:** Located in the VPLMN, connected to the **MSC enh. SeDoC** (I2'), the **AS** (ISC), and the **HSS** (Cx). +- AS:** Located in the VPLMN, connected to the **MSC enh. SeDoC** (I3), the **CSCF** (ISC), and the **IWF** (Sh'). +- HSS:** Located in the VPLMN, connected to the **CSCF** (Cx) and the **AS** (Sh). +- IWF:** Located in the VPLMN, connected to the **AS** (Sh'), the **CSCF** (Cx'), and the **HLR** in the HPLMN (C', D'). +- HLR:** Located in the HPLMN, connected to the **IWF** via the **C', D'** interface. + +Architecture diagram for inbound roamer support showing the interaction between UE, MSC enh. SeDoC, MGW, CSCF, AS, HSS, IWF, and HLR across VPLMN and HPLMN domains. + +Figure H.5.2.1-1: Architecture for inbound roamer support + +## H.5.2.2 IMS Centralized Services Interworking Function (ICS-IWF) Features + +The ICS-IWF is necessary to support roaming scenarios. The interworking function terminates: + +the Cx' interface towards the I-CSCF to provide the role of HSS for procedures related to Serving CSCF assignment. + +the Cx' interface towards the S-CSCF for procedures related to routing information retrieval from ICS-IWF to CSCF and procedures related to authorisation (e.g. checking of roaming agreement) and procedures related to authentication: transfer of security parameters of the subscriber between ICS-IWF and CSCF + +the C interface towards HLR for inbound roamer during migration phase to provide the role as VLR towards HLR to retrieve authentication and subscription data during authentication/registration procedure and to retrieve routing information for the terminating case + +the Sh' interface for the role as HSS towards AS in VPLMN for local IMS registration, + +The ICS-IWF provides the several roles: + +- role as VLR towards HPLMN HLR, i.e. in course of registration the ICS-IWF retrieves the user profile from HPLMN and creates a temporary user profile. The temporary user profile may be updated due to MAP ISD or deleted due to MAP Cancel or IMS de-registration or IMS registration time out. +- role as HSS towards the S-CSCF in VPLMN for local IMS registration. +- role as AS towards HSS in VPLMN for 3rd party IMS registration to enable terminating session routing to the VPLMN. +- maps supplementary services management commands for inbound roamers to the respective CS MAP command to the HLR +- role as HLR towards VLR for outbound roamers in a legacy network. + +## H.5.2.3 Call Flows for Inbound roamer + +### H.5.2.3.1 Authentication/Registration for Inbound roamers + +The main difference to the procedure for own users is that for inbound roamers the registration flow goes through an ICS IWF that acts as a HSS towards the I-CSCF and S-CSCF in the VPLMN and as a VLR towards the HPLMN HLR. + +![Sequence diagram showing the Authentication/Registration procedure for an inbound roamer between UE, MSC Server, I-CSCF, S-CSCF, IWF, and HLR.](536768a30136cd5c2d57f46c25d1d804_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant MSC as MSC Server Enh SeDoC + participant ICSCF as I-CSCF + participant SCSCF as S-CSCF + participant IWF + participant HLR + + Note over UE, HLR: VPLMN | HPLMN + + UE->>MSC: 1. Location Update + MSC-->>UE: 2. Identity Req. + UE-->>MSC: 3. Identity Rsp. + MSC->>ICSCF: 4. REGISTER + ICSCF->>IWF: 5. Cx-Query / Cx-Select-Pull + IWF-->>ICSCF: 6. Cx-Query Resp / Cx-Select-Pull Resp + ICSCF->>SCSCF: 7. REGISTER + SCSCF->>IWF: 8. Cx-AuthDataReq + IWF->>HLR: 9. AuthParameterReq/Resp + Note right of IWF: Creates subscriber record for +inbound roamer and +authentication vector + IWF->>HLR: 10. Update Location + HLR-->>IWF: 11. InsertSubscriberData/ISDRes + IWF->>HLR: 12. Update Location ACK + IWF-->>SCSCF: 13. Cx-AuthDataResp (Authentication Information) + SCSCF-->>ICSCF: 14. 401 Unauthorised (Authentication Information) + ICSCF-->>MSC: 15. 401 Unauthorised (Authentication Information) + MSC-->>UE: 16. Auth. Request (Authentication Information) + UE-->>MSC: 17. Auth. Response (response) + MSC->>ICSCF: 18. REGISTER (response) + ICSCF->>IWF: 19. Cx-Query / Cx-Select-Pull + IWF-->>ICSCF: 20. Cx-Query Resp / Cx-Select-Pull Resp + ICSCF->>SCSCF: 21. REGISTER (response) + Note over SCSCF: Authentication + SCSCF->>IWF: 22. Cx-Put / Cx-Pull + IWF-->>SCSCF: 23. Cx-Put Resp / Cx-Pull Resp + SCSCF-->>ICSCF: 24. 200 OK + ICSCF-->>MSC: 25. 200 OK + MSC-->>UE: 26. Loc. Upd. Acc. + Note over UE, MSC: Ciphering + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the Authentication/Registration procedure for an inbound roamer between UE, MSC Server, I-CSCF, S-CSCF, IWF, and HLR. + +**Figure H.5.2.3.1-1: Authentication/Registration procedure for inbound roamer** + +1. -7. Same as steps as in Annex G of this specification with the difference that in step 5, the I-CSCF detects the inbound roaming UE based on a comparison of the MNC/MCC in the IMPI/IMPU. The I-CSCF queries the IWF which may look up a database whether the MNC/MCC operator network (HPLMN of the inbound roaming UE) has an IMS roaming agreement or not. If there is no IMS roaming agreement or any other related Service Level Agreements (SLA) in place with this network, then the IWF selects an S-CSCF which is able to handle the CS authentication procedure and provides the S-CSCF address to the I-CSCF. I-CSCF marks the SIP REGISTER with an inbound roaming indication towards the S-CSCF. + +NOTE 1: SeDoC is a homogeneous service and all MSC Servers in the PLMN need to support it. + +8. The S-CSCF identifies the REGISTER as being from the MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC for an inbound roamer. The S-CSCF requests the authentication info from the ICS IWF which acts as a HSS towards the S-CSCF. + +- 9.-13. The ICS-IWF acting as VLR retrieves the Authentication Info parameters (authentication quintets required for UMTS AKA) from the HLR. The ICS IWF retrieves the service profile via the D interface, i.e. it behaves like a VLR towards the HPLMN HLR by performing an Update Location Procedure and Insert Subscriber Data Procedure. The ICS IWF creates a temporary record (subscription profile). For invoking other AS(s), the ICS IWF generates the corresponding iFC(s). + +NOTE 2: SeDoC does not support 2G authentication. + +- 14-26. Same as steps 10.-22 Annex G of this specification. + +### H.5.2.4 Originating session for Inbound roamer + +The Origination session for inbound roamers is very similar to the Origination using I2 reference point as described in clause 7.3.2.1.2 of this specification with the difference that the S-CSCF and AS is located in the VPLMN. + +## H.5.2.5 Terminating session for Inbound roamer + +UEs which have been successfully registered in IMS by the MSC Server have a registration binding at the S-CSCF containing the MSC Server as the contact address. + +The SCC AS shall be inserted in the IMS session path using the terminating iFC. The SCC AS performs T-ADS for selection of an access and returns information to assist with S-CSCF selection of a registered contact address. When the T-ADS function selects the MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC, the SCC AS directs the IMS terminating session towards the contact address of the MSC Server. + +On receipt of the session initiation message, the MSC Server enhanced for ICS shall perform the necessary interworking between the I2 reference point and CS signalling (e.g. as described in TS 24.008 [6]). The MSC Server shall also control a CS-MGW using the Mc reference point to perform the necessary interworking between RTP bearers on the Mb reference point and CS access bearers and adds the User Location Information (e.g. CGI or SAI) and/or UE Time Zone Information to the response to the session initiation. + +The SCC AS selects to breakout an incoming session to the CS domain in case UE is registered in IMS as being attached to the CS network at an MSC Server enhanced for SeDoC. In this case, terminating iFC forwards the call to the SCC AS. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure H.5.2.5-1: Terminating session via CS Access for inbound roamer.](0f7b03b21dac874ee58514bd91fe600b_img.jpg) + +``` + + Sequence Flow: + 1. UE A -> GMSC: CS Call Setup (B) + 2. GMSC -> HLR: MAP SRI + 3. HLR -> IWF: MAP PRN + [Note: IWF provides MSRN which is assigned to inbound roamer registered within VPLMN] + 4. IWF -> HLR: MAP PRN Res : MSRN + 5. HLR -> GMSC: MAP SRI Res + 6. GMSC -> MGCF: CS Call Setup (IAM) with CdNr = MSRN + 7. MGCF -> I-CSCF: Invite + 8. I-CSCF -> IWF: LIR + 9. IWF -> I-CSCF: LIR Res + [Note: provide S-CSCF to which the inbound roamer has been registered by the MSC-S enh SeDoC] + 10. I-CSCF -> S-CSCF: Invite + 11. S-CSCF -> AS: Invite + 12. AS -> S-CSCF: Invite + 13. S-CSCF -> MSC Server enh SeDoC: Invite + 14. MSC Server enh SeDoC -> UE B: CS call setup + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure H.5.2.5-1: Terminating session via CS Access for inbound roamer. + +**Figure H.5.2.5-1: Terminating session via CS Access for inbound roamer** + +1. The UE A originates a call in the CS domain to party-B according to standard origination procedures. +2. The GMSC sends a Send Routing Information (SRI) request to the HLR. +- 3.-4. The HLR fetches a MSRN from the ICS-IWF acting as VLR by a Provide Roaming Number (PRN) request/response sequence. +5. The HLR forward the MSRN in the SRI Res. message. +6. The GMSC sets up the call towards the MGCF of the VPLMN with the received MSRN. +7. The MGCF initiates an INVITE towards the I-CSCF in the visited IMS of the UE B. +- 8.-9. The I-CSCF retrieves the address assigned to the SeDoC user from the ICS-IWF. For the LIR the I-CSCF uses the called party from the INVITE which is the MSRN. The IWF has assigned this MSRN according to the called user (MSISDN) (step 3,4) and has stored the relation MSISDN/MSRN. +10. The I-CSCF routes the INVITE to the S-CSCF. +11. The S-CSCF performs standard service control execution procedures. Filter criteria direct the S-CSCF to send the INVITE to the SCC AS. + +12. . The SCC AS performs terminating access domain selection. The SCC AS chooses the CS access network and the MSC Server contact address, amongst the registered contact addresses for the UE B, for the setup of the media. The SCC AS establishes a new session by sending an INVITE to the UE B via the S-CSCF. +13. The S-CSCF forwards the INVITE to the MSC Server based on the contact address stored during registration, using standard IMS procedures. +14. The MSC Server sends a Setup message to the UE B. + +## H.5.3 Outbound-roaming support + +### H.5.3.1 Call flows for outbound-roamers + +#### H.5.3.1.1 Attach/Registration Procedure for outbound roamer + +![Sequence diagram showing the Attach/Registration Procedure for an outbound roamer in a SeDoC enhanced network. The diagram is split into two domains: VPLMN (left) and HPLMN (right). Entities involved are UE, MSC Server enh SeDoC, I-CSCF, HSS, and S-CSCF. The process involves a Location Update from UE to MSC Server, followed by a REGISTER request from MSC Server to I-CSCF. I-CSCF interacts with HSS via Cx-Query/Cx-Select-Pull. S-CSCF is then registered via a REGISTER request from I-CSCF. HSS provides authentication information via Cx-AuthDataResp. I-CSCF sends a 401 Unauthorised response to MSC Server, which then sends an Auth. Request to UE. UE responds with Auth. Response. I-CSCF sends a REGISTER response to MSC Server. S-CSCF performs authentication and updates HSS via Cx-Put/Cx-Pull. Finally, 200 OK responses are sent from S-CSCF and I-CSCF to MSC Server, which then sends Loc. Upd. Acc. to UE.](493539f7472fd8510b2c6dcb59339ad5_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server enh SeDoC + participant I-CSCF + participant HSS + participant S-CSCF + + Note left of I-CSCF: VPLMN + Note right of I-CSCF: HPLMN + + UE->>MSC_Server: 1. Location Update + MSC_Server-->>UE: 2. Identity Req + MSC_Server-->>UE: 3. Identity Rsp + MSC_Server->>I-CSCF: 4. REGISTER + I-CSCF->>HSS: 5. Cx-Query / Cx-Select-Pull + HSS-->>I-CSCF: 6. Cx-Query Resp / Cx-Select-Pull Resp + I-CSCF->>S-CSCF: 7. REGISTER + S-CSCF->>HSS: 8. Cx-AuthDataReq + Note right of HSS: Authentication vector creation + HSS-->>S-CSCF: 9. Cx-AuthDataResp (Authentication Information) + S-CSCF-->>I-CSCF: 10. 401 Unauthorised (Authentication Information) + I-CSCF-->>MSC_Server: 11. 401 Unauthorised (Authentication Information) + MSC_Server->>UE: 12. Auth. Request (Authentication Information) + UE-->>MSC_Server: 13. Auth. Response (response) + MSC_Server->>I-CSCF: 14. REGISTER (response) + I-CSCF->>HSS: 15. Cx-Query / Cx-Select-Pull + HSS-->>I-CSCF: 16. Cx-Query Resp / Cx-Select-Pull Resp + I-CSCF->>S-CSCF: 17. REGISTER (response) + Note right of S-CSCF: Authentication + S-CSCF->>HSS: 18. Cx-Put / Cx-Pull + HSS-->>S-CSCF: 19. Cx-Put Resp / Cx-Pull Resp + S-CSCF-->>I-CSCF: 20. 200 OK + I-CSCF-->>MSC_Server: 21. 200 OK + MSC_Server-->>UE: 22. Loc. Upd. Acc. + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the Attach/Registration Procedure for an outbound roamer in a SeDoC enhanced network. The diagram is split into two domains: VPLMN (left) and HPLMN (right). Entities involved are UE, MSC Server enh SeDoC, I-CSCF, HSS, and S-CSCF. The process involves a Location Update from UE to MSC Server, followed by a REGISTER request from MSC Server to I-CSCF. I-CSCF interacts with HSS via Cx-Query/Cx-Select-Pull. S-CSCF is then registered via a REGISTER request from I-CSCF. HSS provides authentication information via Cx-AuthDataResp. I-CSCF sends a 401 Unauthorised response to MSC Server, which then sends an Auth. Request to UE. UE responds with Auth. Response. I-CSCF sends a REGISTER response to MSC Server. S-CSCF performs authentication and updates HSS via Cx-Put/Cx-Pull. Finally, 200 OK responses are sent from S-CSCF and I-CSCF to MSC Server, which then sends Loc. Upd. Acc. to UE. + +Figure H.5.3.1.1-1: Authentication/Registration for outbound roamer in a SeDoC enhanced network + +- 1.-22. The flow description is the same as in annex XXX of this specification. + +#### H.5.3.1.2 Originating session for own users roaming (outbound roamer) + +For session origination for own users please refer to clause 7.3.2.1.2 of this specification. + +#### H.5.3.1.3 Terminating session for own users roaming (outbound roamer) + +For session termination for own users please refer to clause 7.4.2.1.2 of this specification. + +### H.5.3.1.4 Call flow for outbound-roamers to a not enhanced network + +The ICS-IWF acts as a HLR towards the not enhanced MSC in the VPLMN, the procedures between MSC and ICS-IWF follow the normal VLR - HLR procedures. + +NOTE: The interaction between ICS-IWF and HSS is implementation specific. + +![Sequence diagram showing the authentication and registration process for an outbound roamer in a not enhanced network. The diagram is split into two domains: VPLMN (left) and HPLMN (right). In the VPLMN, there are lifelines for UE and MSC Server. In the HPLMN, there are lifelines for IWF and HSS/HLR. The sequence of messages is: 1. UE to MSC Server: Location Update; 2. MSC Server to IWF: Authentication Parameter Req.; 3. IWF to HSS/HLR: Retrieve Authentication Info; 4. HSS/HLR to IWF: Authentication Information; 5. IWF to MSC Server: Auth. Request (Authentication Information); 6. MSC Server to UE: Auth. Response (response); 7. MSC Server to IWF: Update Location; 8. IWF to HSS/HLR: Retrieve subscriber profile; 9. HSS/HLR to IWF: Insert Subscriber Data; 10. MSC Server to UE: Start Ciphering (dashed line); 11. MSC Server to UE: Loc. Upd. Acc.; 12. IWF to MSC Server: Insert Subscriber Data Ack; 13. IWF to MSC Server: Update Location Ack.](93699fb71e95b4df5a3871fdcf818982_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant MSC Server + participant IWF + participant HSS/HLR + + Note left of UE: VPLMN + Note right of HSS/HLR: HPLMN + + UE->>MSC Server: 1. Location Update + MSC Server->>IWF: 2. Authentication Parameter Req. + IWF->>HSS/HLR: 3. Retrieve Authentication Info + HSS/HLR-->>IWF: 4. Authentication Information + IWF->>MSC Server: 5. Auth. Request (Authentication Information) + MSC Server->>UE: 6. Auth. Response (response) + MSC Server->>IWF: 7. Update Location + IWF->>HSS/HLR: 8. Retrieve subscriber profile + HSS/HLR-->>IWF: 9. Insert Subscriber Data + MSC Server-->>UE: 10. Start Ciphering + MSC Server->>UE: 11. Loc. Upd. Acc. + IWF->>MSC Server: 12. Insert Subscriber Data Ack + IWF->>MSC Server: 13. Update Location Ack + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the authentication and registration process for an outbound roamer in a not enhanced network. The diagram is split into two domains: VPLMN (left) and HPLMN (right). In the VPLMN, there are lifelines for UE and MSC Server. In the HPLMN, there are lifelines for IWF and HSS/HLR. The sequence of messages is: 1. UE to MSC Server: Location Update; 2. MSC Server to IWF: Authentication Parameter Req.; 3. IWF to HSS/HLR: Retrieve Authentication Info; 4. HSS/HLR to IWF: Authentication Information; 5. IWF to MSC Server: Auth. Request (Authentication Information); 6. MSC Server to UE: Auth. Response (response); 7. MSC Server to IWF: Update Location; 8. IWF to HSS/HLR: Retrieve subscriber profile; 9. HSS/HLR to IWF: Insert Subscriber Data; 10. MSC Server to UE: Start Ciphering (dashed line); 11. MSC Server to UE: Loc. Upd. Acc.; 12. IWF to MSC Server: Insert Subscriber Data Ack; 13. IWF to MSC Server: Update Location Ack. + +**Figure H.5.3.2-1: Authentication/Registration for outbound roamer in a not enhanced network** + +1. The UE sends a Location Update Request message to the MSC-Server in the VPLMN and includes its IMSI and the LAI. In case of a combined attach, or CSFB etc., then the Location Update Request may be sent from the MME or the SGSN of the VPLMN. +2. The MSC detects based on the IMSI that the UE does not belong to the own network and is an inbound roamer. If the request is coming from the MME/SGSN, then the CS authentication may be skipped. The MSC contacts the ICS IWF, acting as a HLR of the HPLMN, indicating that CS authentication is required with a Authentication Parameter Request. +3. The ICS IWF retrieves the CS authentication data from the HSS. +4. The ICS IWF (acting as HLR to the MSC-Server) provides the Authentication Info parameters to the MSC-Server. The MSC-Server stores the parameters and triggers the CS authentication procedure. +5. The MSC-Server sends a Authentication Request with the RAND value to the UE. +6. The UE computes the SRES and provides it back to the MSC-Server in the Authentication Response. +7. The MSC-Server sends an Update Location Request with the IMSI and MSRN to the ICS-IWF, acting as the HLR of the HPLMN. + +8. The ICS IWF retrieves the subscription profile and service settings from the HSS and maps them into a CS profile with CS settings. +9. The ICS IWF replies with the Insert Subscriber Data message according to normal VLR-HLR procedures. +10. The MSC Server starts ciphering according to normal procedures. +11. The MSC-Server provides a Location Update Accept message to the UE (or MME, SGSN if originated request comes from here) according to the normal procedures. +12. The MSC-Server exchanges the Subscriber Data Insert Acknowledgement and Location Update Acknowledgement according to normal VLR-HLR procedures. + +## Annex I (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|--| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | | +| 2010-03 | SP-47 | SP-100161 | 0142 | 1 | B | Support for additional media types in network based ICS | 10.0.0 | | +| 2010-06 | SP-48 | SP-100350 | 0155 | 3 | B | Incorporate CAT supplementary service | 10.1.0 | | +| 2010-09 | SP-49 | SP-100592 | 0162 | - | A | Clarification of Gm use | 10.2.0 | | +| 2010-09 | SP-49 | SP-100558 | 0156 | 4 | F | Mid-call service continuity for ICS UE handover | 10.2.0 | | +| 2010-09 | SP-49 | SP-100558 | 0157 | 1 | F | Collocation of I1 requirements | 10.2.0 | | +| 2010-09 | SP-49 | SP-100558 | 0161 | 1 | B | Addition of annex on diverting incoming CS calls to IMS for anchoring at SCC AS | 10.2.0 | | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110076 | 0166 | - | F | Correcting the Mobile Station behaviour for Communication Diversion | 10.3.0 | | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110076 | 0169 | 1 | F | Clarification of the behaviour of the MSC Server enhanced for ICS | 10.3.0 | | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110064 | 0172 | 1 | A | Correction to correlation of charging information collected at the MSC for SRVCC in roaming scenarios | 10.3.0 | | +| 2011-06 | SP-52 | SP-110343 | 0173 | 4 | B | Selection by the ICS UE of the origination procedure with CS media | 11.0.0 | | +| 2011-12 | SP-54 | SP-110738 | 0177 | 1 | A | Correction of roaming procedures for ICS | 11.1.0 | | +| 2011-12 | SP-54 | SP-110748 | 0178 | 1 | F | Support for Completion of Communication Services | 11.1.0 | | +| 2011-12 | SP-54 | SP-110738 | 0180 | 1 | A | Communication Waiting correction for ICS | 11.1.0 | | +| 2011-12 | SP-54 | SP-110738 | 0182 | - | A | CR for Terminated Case of Video Call Domain Selection | 11.1.0 | | +| 2011-12 | SP-54 | SP-110738 | 0184 | - | A | ICS and usage of Sh for CSRN fetching | 11.1.0 | | +| 2012-03 | SP-55 | SP-120081 | 0185 | 1 | B | Location information provision during ICS origination/termination procedures | 11.2.0 | | +| 2012-03 | SP-55 | SP-120075 | 0187 | - | A | Clarifications on supported media | 11.2.0 | | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120243 | 0188 | - | F | Removal of CSG ID as a network provided location information parameter | 11.3.0 | | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120251 | 0189 | 1 | F | Correction on CFNRc usage for ICS | 11.3.0 | | +| 2012-09 | SP-57 | SP-120481 | 0190 | 1 | F | RAVEL clarifications for MSC enhanced for ICS | 11.4.0 | | +| 2012-12 | SP-58 | SP-120728 | 0193 | 2 | F | Mobility Management Procedures via Gs Interfaces for Non-ICS UE | 12.0.0 | | +| 2013-03 | SP-59 | SP-130088 | 0196 | 1 | A | Correction on the Call Waiting in the ICS | 12.1.0 | | +| 2013-06 | SP-60 | SP-130223 | 0198 | 3 | A | Support of MTRR feature for T-ADS | 12.2.0 | | +| 2013-06 | SP-60 | SP-130223 | 0200 | - | A | Clarification regarding conference call participants leaving the conference | 12.2.0 | | +| 2014-03 | SP-63 | SP-140100 | 0203 | 2 | A | ICS Indicator to support MSC not enhanced for ICS | 12.3.0 | | +| 2014-03 | SP-63 | SP-140100 | 0205 | 1 | A | IMS registration via I2 upon Combined Attach via SGs | 12.3.0 | | +| 2014-06 | SP-64 | SP-140249 | 0211 | 1 | A | Access Domain Selection when an ongoing IMS voice over PS session | 12.4.0 | | +| 2014-06 | SP-64 | SP-140274 | 0213 | 2 | C | Synchronizing service settings data management between CS and IMS | 13.0.0 | | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140686 | 0220 | 2 | A | Subscription for conference event package | 13.1.0 | | +| 2015-06 | SP-68 | SP-150239 | 0228 | 1 | F | Notify UE conference event package after SRVCC | 13.2.0 | | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160643 | 0230 | - | F | Correcting the Figure Label for Communication Completion Originated at Served User call flow
NOTE: MCC also corrected the figure number to 7.6.3.10.2-1. | 13.3.0 | | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160642 | 0229 | 5 | B | Extend T-ADS to support WLAN access | 14.0.0 | | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160660 | 0232 | 5 | F | Clarification on the T-ADS with the failed resources allocation | 14.0.0 | | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160654 | 0235 | 2 | B | Allowing ICS MSC to interact with IMS for IMS emergency call handling. | 14.0.0 | | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160654 | 0236 | 2 | B | Registration and Authentication procedure utilizing IMS Authorization | 14.0.0 | | +| 2016-09 | SP-73 | SP-160654 | 0237 | 2 | B | Introduction of Service Domain Centralization feature | 14.0.0 | | +| 2016-12 | SP-74 | SP-160819 | 0239 | 1 | F | Correction of ICS IWF behaviour for inbound roamers | 14.1.0 | | +| 2016-12 | SP-74 | SP-160809 | 0240 | 3 | A | ICS MSC with I2 and T-ADS handling interaction | 14.1.0 | | +| 2016-12 | SP-74 | SP-160826 | 0243 | 1 | B | SCC AS/T-ADS Support for 3GPP PS Data off for SIP-Based Service | 14.1.0 | | +| 2017-03 | SP-75 | SP-170048 | 0245 | 3 | F | Inbound roamer detection at I/S-CSCF | 14.2.0 | | +| 2018-06 | SP-80 | SP-180475 | 0246 | 1 | F | Support of 5GS in T-ADS | 15.0.0 | | +| 2020-07 | SP-88E | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 16.0.0 | | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31101/22b127dfdf650562ffc121fe88693c85_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31101/22b127dfdf650562ffc121fe88693c85_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..557db18bc539a1f09228816d3e88d0451d01021f --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31101/22b127dfdf650562ffc121fe88693c85_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:b4b87d15fd6ddcc9b21c315938d8ddab5f684299941151e742ee6aa72bb15344 +size 43785 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31101/5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31101/5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b28ca3c7956e772610bdd6bda6159a794f40f61d --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31101/5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:8e746007ad653d8805630c0836e20234870e10b8f8b038d2938ce597e9f4aa78 +size 7806 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31101/64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31101/64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a875c1e967573c7cdf6b85cfbe651a0933fdc93e --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31101/64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:b466e63ab430422b262fecde3d350d5d09624dfcc009901dfe9364e3272b6fba +size 5767 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31101/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31101/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a9a0227922eb1d40f1b385d56992bfc15748f228 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31101/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,1008 @@ + + +# 3GPP TS 31.101 V16.2.0 (2021-06) + +*Technical Specification* + +## **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; UICC-terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics (Release 16)** + +![5G logo](64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg) + +The 5G logo, consisting of the text "5G" in a bold, black, sans-serif font. Above the "5G" text are three green curved lines representing signal waves. + +5G logo + +![3GPP logo](5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg) + +The 3GPP logo, featuring the letters "3GPP" in a stylized, bold, black font. The "3" and "G" are connected at the top, and the "P" and "P" are connected at the top. Below the "G" is a red signal wave icon. To the right of the "P" is a small "TM" symbol. + +3GPP logo + +A GLOBAL INITIATIVE + +The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP. The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organizational Partners and shall not be implemented. This Specification is provided for future development work within 3GPP only. The Organizational Partners accept no liability for any use of this Specification. Specifications and Reports for implementation of the 3GPP™ system should be obtained via the 3GPP Organizational Partners' Publications Offices. + +## **3GPP** + +--- + +Postal address + +--- + +3GPP support office address + +--- + +650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis +Valbonne - FRANCE +Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 + +--- + +Internet + +--- + + + +## --- **Copyright Notification** --- + +No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. +The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. + +© 2021, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC). +All rights reserved. + +UMTS™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members +3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association + +# Contents + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 6 | +| Introduction ..... | 7 | +| 1 Scope..... | 8 | +| 2 References..... | 8 | +| 3 Definitions, symbols, abbreviations and coding ..... | 9 | +| 4 General 3GPP platform requirements ..... | 9 | +| 4.1 GSM/USIM application interaction and restrictions..... | 9 | +| 4.2 3GPP platform overview ..... | 9 | +| 4.3 TS 102 221 UICC/terminal interface ..... | 10 | +| 4.4 TS 102 600 Inter-Chip USB UICC/terminal interface..... | 10 | +| 4A Physical Characteristics ..... | 10 | +| 5 Physical and logical characteristics..... | 10 | +| 5.1 Transmission speed ..... | 10 | +| 5.2 Voltage classes ..... | 10 | +| 5.3 File Control Parameters (FCP)..... | 11 | +| 5.3.1 Minimum application clock frequency..... | 11 | +| 5.4 Interface protocol ..... | 11 | +| 5A Electrical specifications of the UICC – Terminal interface..... | 11 | +| 5A.1 Class A operating conditions..... | 11 | +| 5A.2 Class B operating conditions..... | 11 | +| 5A.3 Class C operating conditions..... | 11 | +| 6 Application protocol ..... | 11 | +| 6A Initial communication establishment procedures..... | 11 | +| 6A.1 UICC activation and deactivation ..... | 11 | +| 6A.2 Supply voltage switching ..... | 11 | +| 6A.3 Answer To Reset content ..... | 12 | +| 6A.3.1 Coding of historical bytes..... | 12 | +| 6A.3.2 Speed enhancement ..... | 12 | +| 6A.3.3 Global Interface bytes..... | 12 | +| 6A.4 PPS procedure ..... | 12 | +| 6A.5 Reset procedures ..... | 12 | +| 6A.6 Clock stop mode..... | 12 | +| 6A.7 Bit/character duration and sampling time ..... | 12 | +| 6A.8 Error handling ..... | 12 | +| 6A.9 Compatibility..... | 12 | +| 7 User verification and file access conditions..... | 13 | +| 7A Transmission protocols ..... | 13 | +| 7A.1 Physical layer ..... | 13 | +| 7A.2 Data link layer ..... | 13 | +| 7A.3 Transport layer ..... | 13 | +| 7A.4 Application layer..... | 13 | +| 8 Application and file structure..... | 14 | +| 8.0 General ..... | 14 | +| 8.1 Contents of the EFs at the MF level..... | 14 | +| 8.2 File types ..... | 14 | +| 8.3 File referencing ..... | 14 | +| 8.4 Methods for selecting a file ..... | 14 | +| 8.5 Application characteristics ..... | 14 | +| 8.6 Reservation of file IDs ..... | 15 | + +| | | | +|-------------|---------------------------------------------------|----| +| 8.7 | Logical channels..... | 15 | +| 8.8 | Shareable versus not-shareable files ..... | 15 | +| 8.9 | Secure channels..... | 15 | +| 9 | Security features..... | 15 | +| 9.1 | Supported security features ..... | 15 | +| 9.2 | Security architecture..... | 15 | +| 9.3 | Security environment ..... | 15 | +| 9.4 | PIN definitions ..... | 15 | +| 9.5 | PIN and key reference relation ship..... | 15 | +| 9.6 | User verification and file access conditions..... | 15 | +| 10 | Structure of commands and responses..... | 16 | +| 10.1 | Command APDU structure ..... | 16 | +| 10.1.1 | Coding of Class Byte..... | 16 | +| 10.1.2 | Coding of Instruction Byte ..... | 16 | +| 10.1.3 | Coding of parameter bytes..... | 17 | +| 10.1.4 | Coding of Lc byte..... | 17 | +| 10.1.5 | Coding of data part ..... | 17 | +| 10.1.6 | Coding of Le byte..... | 17 | +| 10.2 | Response APDU structure..... | 17 | +| 10.2.1 | Status conditions returned by the UICC..... | 17 | +| 10.2.1.1 | Normal processing ..... | 17 | +| 10.2.1.2 | Postponed processing..... | 17 | +| 10.2.1.3 | Warnings..... | 17 | +| 10.2.1.4 | Execution errors ..... | 17 | +| 10.2.1.5 | Checking errors..... | 17 | +| 10.2.1.5.1 | Functions in CLA not supported..... | 17 | +| 10.2.1.5.2 | Command not allowed ..... | 17 | +| 10.2.1.5.3 | Wrong parameters ..... | 17 | +| 10.2.1.6 | Application errors ..... | 18 | +| 10.2.2 | Status words of the commands ..... | 18 | +| 10.3 | Logical channels..... | 19 | +| 11 | Commands ..... | 19 | +| 11.1 | Generic commands ..... | 19 | +| 11.1.1 | SELECT ..... | 19 | +| 11.1.1.1 | Functional description..... | 19 | +| 11.1.1.2 | Command parameters and data..... | 19 | +| 11.1.1.3 | Response Data..... | 19 | +| 11.1.1.4 | File control parameters ..... | 19 | +| 11.1.1.4.1 | File size ..... | 19 | +| 11.1.1.4.2 | Total file size..... | 19 | +| 11.1.1.4.3 | File Descriptor..... | 19 | +| 11.1.1.4.4 | File identifier ..... | 19 | +| 11.1.1.4.5 | DF name ..... | 19 | +| 11.1.1.4.6 | Proprietary information ..... | 19 | +| 11.1.1.4.7 | Security attributes..... | 20 | +| 11.1.1.4.8 | Short file identifier ..... | 20 | +| 11.1.1.4.9 | Life cycle status integer..... | 20 | +| 11.1.1.4.10 | PIN status template DO..... | 20 | +| 11.1.2 | STATUS..... | 20 | +| 11.1.3 | READ BINARY ..... | 20 | +| 11.1.4 | UPDATE BINARY ..... | 20 | +| 11.1.5 | READ RECORD ..... | 20 | +| 11.1.6 | UPDATE RECORD ..... | 20 | +| 11.1.7 | SEARCH RECORD ..... | 20 | +| 11.1.8 | INCREASE..... | 20 | +| 11.1.9 | VERIFY PIN ..... | 20 | +| 11.1.10 | CHANGE PIN ..... | 21 | +| 11.1.11 | DISABLE PIN ..... | 21 | +| 11.1.12 | ENABLE PIN ..... | 21 | +| 11.1.13 | UNBLOCK PIN ..... | 21 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| 11.1.14 | DEACTIVATE FILE ..... | 21 | +| 11.1.15 | ACTIVATE FILE..... | 21 | +| 11.1.16 | AUTHENTICATE ..... | 21 | +| 11.1.17 | MANAGE CHANNEL ..... | 21 | +| 11.1.18 | GET CHALLENGE ..... | 21 | +| 11.1.19 | TERMINAL CAPABILITY ..... | 21 | +| 11.1.20 | MANAGE SECURE CHANNEL ..... | 21 | +| 11.1.21 | TRANSACT DATA..... | 21 | +| 11.1.22 | SUSPEND UICC..... | 21 | +| 11.2 | CAT commands..... | 21 | +| 11.3 | Data Oriented commands..... | 22 | +| 12 | Transmission oriented commands..... | 22 | +| 13 | Application independent files ..... | 22 | +| 14 | Application independent protocol..... | 22 | +| 14.1 | Application independent protocol ..... | 22 | +| 14.2 | CAT commands..... | 22 | +| 15 | Support of APDU-based UICC applications over USB..... | 22 | +| Annex A (normative): | UCS2 coding of Alpha fields for files residing on the UICC..... | 23 | +| Annex B (informative): | Main states of a UICC ..... | 24 | +| Annex C (informative): | APDU protocol transmission examples ..... | 25 | +| Annex D (informative): | ATR examples..... | 26 | +| Annex E (informative): | Security attributes mechanisms and examples ..... | 27 | +| Annex F (informative): | Example of contents of EFARR '2F06' ..... | 28 | +| Annex G (informative): | Access Rules Referencing (ARR)..... | 28 | +| Annex H (normative): | List of SFI Values ..... | 29 | +| Annex I (informative): | Resets and modes of operation ..... | 30 | +| Annex J (informative): | Example of the use of PINs..... | 31 | +| Annex K (informative): | Examples of the PIN state transition on multi verification capable UICC..... | 32 | +| Annex L (informative): | Examples of SET DATA and RETRIEVE DATA usage ..... | 33 | +| Annex M (informative): | Examples of ODD AUTHENTICATE instruction code usage..... | 34 | +| Annex N (informative): | PCB layout for the MFF ..... | 35 | +| Annex O (normative): | Allocated 3GPP PIX numbers ..... | 35 | +| Annex P (informative): | Change history ..... | 36 | + +# Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings: + +- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something +- shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something + +The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports. + +The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document. + +- should** indicates a recommendation to do something +- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something +- may** indicates permission to do something +- need not** indicates permission not to do something + +The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended. + +- can** indicates that something is possible +- cannot** indicates that something is impossible + +The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not". + +- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +In addition: + +**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements. + +# --- Introduction + +The present document defines a generic Terminal/Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) interface for 3GPP applications. The present document is based on ETSI TS 102 221 [1], which defines a generic platform for any IC card application. The functionality provided by this platform may be operated either over the electrical interface specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [1], or by transporting APDUs over the Inter-Chip USB Terminal/ICC interface specified in ETSI TS 102 600 [7]. + +Requirements that are common to all 3GPP smart card based applications are also listed in this specification. + +The aim of the present document is to ensure interoperability between an ICC and a terminal independently of the respective manufacturer, card issuer or operator. The present document does not define any aspects related to the administrative management phase of the ICC. Any internal technical realisation of either the ICC or the terminal is only specified where these are reflected over the interface. + +Application specific details for applications residing on an ICC are specified in the respective application specific documents. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document specifies the interface between the UICC and the Terminal for 3GPP telecom network operation. + +The present document specifies: + +- the requirements for the physical characteristics of the UICC; +- the electrical interface between the UICC and the Terminal; +- the initial communication establishment and the transport protocols; +- the model which serves as a basis for the logical structure of the UICC; +- the communication commands and the procedures; +- the application independent files and protocols. + +The administrative procedures and initial card management are not part of the present document. + +For the avoidance of doubt, references to clauses of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] include all the clauses of that clause, unless specifically mentioned. + +The target specification ETSI TS 102 221 [1] contains material that is outside of the scope of 3GPP requirements and the present document indicates which parts are in the scope and which are not. + +A 3GPP ME may support functionality that is not required by 3GPP, but the requirements to do so are outside of the scope of 3GPP. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] ETSI TS 102 221 V15.2.0: "Smart Cards; UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics ". +- [2] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the USIM Application". +- [3] ETSI TS 101 220: "Smart cards; ETSI numbering system for telecommunication application providers". +- [4] Void. +- [5] ITU-T Recommendation T.50: "International Reference Alphabet (IRA) (Formerly International Alphabet No. 5 or IA5) - Information technology - 7-bit coded character set for information interchange". +- [6] 3GPP TS 24.008: "Mobile Radio Interface Layer 3 specification; Core Network Protocols; Stage 3". +- [7] ETSI TS 102 600 V7.6.0: "Smart cards; UICC-Terminal interface; Characteristics of the USB interface". + +- [8] 3GPP TS 31.111: "USIM Application Toolkit (USAT)". +- [9] ETSI TS 102 671 V9.2.0: "Smart Cards; Machine to Machine UICC; Physical and logical characteristics". + +# 3 Definitions, symbols, abbreviations and coding + +All definitions, symbols, abbreviations applicable to the terminal are specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] and ETSI TS 102 600 [7]. + +The coding of Data Objects in the present document is according to ETSI TS 102 221 [1]. + +'XX': Single quotes indicate hexadecimal values. Valid elements for hexadecimal values are the numbers '0' to '9' and 'A' to 'F'. + +Within the context of the present document, the term "terminal" used in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] refers to the Mobile Equipment (ME). + +Within the context of the present document, the term "NAA" used in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] refers to the (U)SIM or the ISIM. + +# 4 General 3GPP platform requirements + +## 4.1 GSM/USIM application interaction and restrictions + +Activation of a USIM session excludes the activation of a GSM session. In particular, this implies that once a USIM application session has been activated, commands sent to the UICC with CLAss byte set to 'A0' shall return SW1SW2 '6E 00' (class not supported) to the terminal. + +Similarly, activation of a GSM session excludes the activation of a USIM session. + +At most one USIM session can be active at the same time. + +## 4.2 3GPP platform overview + +The UICC/terminal interface shall support the interface specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [1]. In addition, the UICC/terminal interface may support the Inter-Chip USB interface defined in ETSI TS 102 600 [7]. + +3GPP ICC based applications (e.g. USIM, USIM Application Toolkit, ISIM, SIM) are supported over both interfaces (see figure 1). + +![Diagram of Terminal/UICC interface layers showing APDU applications, ICC platform, and physical/USB interface options.](22b127dfdf650562ffc121fe88693c85_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + A["APDU-based 3GPP applications (e.g. USIM as defined in TS 31.102 [2])"] --> B["ICC platform (based on TS 102 221 [1] logical aspects)"] + B --> C["APDU-level encapsulation (based on TS 102 600 [7])"] + B --> D["Terminal/ICC interface (based on TS 102 221 [1] physical aspects)"] + C -.- E["USB Terminal/ICC interface (based on TS 102 600 [7])"] + +``` + +Diagram of Terminal/UICC interface layers showing APDU applications, ICC platform, and physical/USB interface options. + +**Figure 1: Terminal/UICC interface** + +## 4.3 TS 102 221 UICC/terminal interface + +The UICC/terminal interface shall comply with all requirements stated in ETSI TS 102 221 [1]. Where options are indicated in ETSI TS 102 221 [1], the present document specifies which options are to be used for a ETSI TS 102 221 [1] UICC/terminal interface where the UICC supports a 3GPP application. + +## 4.4 TS 102 600 Inter-Chip USB UICC/terminal interface + +If the Inter-Chip USB UICC/terminal interface is supported, it shall comply with ETSI TS 102 600 [7]. Where options are indicated in ETSI TS 102 600 [7], the present document specifies which options are to be used for an Inter-Chip USB UICC/terminal interface where the UICC supports a 3GPP application. + +The protocol stack for APDU-level exchanges that are described in ETSI TS 102 600 [7] allow the transmission of APDUs. USB UICCs and USB UICC-enabled terminals shall comply with the functionality of the ETSI TS 102 221 [1] interface. Where options are indicated in ETSI TS 102 221 [1], the present document specifies which options are to be used for APDU-based applications where the UICC supports a 3GPP application. + +The mapping of APDU into TPDU (see ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 7.3.1.1) and transmission oriented commands (see ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 12) do not apply in the USB context as the APDU commands and responses are transmitted over USB as encoded at the application layer (i.e. C-APDU and R-APDU are directly encapsulated). + +In the context of UICC applications running over USB, the card activation and deactivation process, the cold and warm reset procedures and the request for additional processing time as described in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] shall be performed by USB commands as described in ETSI TS 102 600 [7]. Any reference to the above procedures shall be interpreted in a USB context according to ETSI TS 102 600 [7]. When an ATR is received then the corresponding provisions and error handling procedures of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] apply. + +# --- 4A Physical Characteristics + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 4 apply. + +In addition to the form factors described in clause 4.0 of ETSI TS 102 221 [1], the form factors defined in ETSI TS 102 671 [9] clause 6.2 are applicable. + +The usage of contact C6 for contactless as defined in ETSI 102 221 [1] is not required by 3GPP. This impacts the following clauses: + +ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 4.5.1.1 + +ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 4.5.1.2 + +ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 4.5.2.1 + +ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 4.5.2.2 + +ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 4.5.3 + +# --- 5 Physical and logical characteristics + +## 5.1 Transmission speed + +See clause 6A.3.2. + +## 5.2 Voltage classes + +See clause 6A.2. + +## 5.3 File Control Parameters (FCP) + +See clause 11.1.1.4. + +### 5.3.1 Minimum application clock frequency + +See clause 11.1.1.4.6. + +## 5.4 Interface protocol + +See clause 6A.3. + +# --- 5A Electrical specifications of the UICC – Terminal interface + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 5 apply. + +## 5A.1 Class A operating conditions + +Class A operating conditions as specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 5.1 is not required by 3GPP then MEs, except GSM ME, shall not support class A on the ME – UICC interface. + +## 5A.2 Class B operating conditions + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 5.2 apply. + +## 5A.3 Class C operating conditions + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 5.3 apply. + +# --- 6 Application protocol + +See clause 7A.4. + +# --- 6A Initial communication establishment procedures + +## 6A.1 UICC activation and deactivation + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 6.1 apply. + +## 6A.2 Supply voltage switching + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 6.2 apply. + +In addition, a UICC holding a 3GPP application shall support at least two consecutive voltage classes as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 6.2.1, e.g. AB or BC. If the UICC supports more than two classes, they shall all be consecutive, e.g. ABC + +## 6A.3 Answer To Reset content + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 6.3 apply. + +In addition, no extra guard time, indicated in TC1 in the ATR, needs to be supported when sending characters from the terminal to the card. The terminal may reject a UICC indicating values other than 0 or 255 in TC1. + +### 6A.3.1 Coding of historical bytes + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 6.3.1 apply. + +### 6A.3.2 Speed enhancement + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 6.3.2 apply. + +In addition, cards and terminals supporting an application based on the present specification shall support the transmission factor $(F,D)=(512,32)$ . + +It is recommended that terminals and cards supporting Multimedia Message storage functionality (see TS 31.102 [2]) support the transmission factor $(F,D)=(512,64)$ in addition to those specified in the present document. + +### 6A.3.3 Global Interface bytes + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 6.3.3 apply. + +## 6A.4 PPS procedure + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 6.4 apply. + +## 6A.5 Reset procedures + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 6.5 apply. + +## 6A.6 Clock stop mode + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 6.6 apply. + +## 6A.7 Bit/character duration and sampling time + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 6.7 apply. + +## 6A.8 Error handling + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 6.8 apply. + +## 6A.9 Compatibility + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 6.9 are not required by 3GPP. + +# --- 7 User verification and file access conditions + +See clause 9.6. + +# --- 7A Transmission protocols + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 7 apply. + +## 7A.1 Physical layer + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 7.1 apply. + +## 7A.2 Data link layer + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 7.2 apply. + +## 7A.3 Transport layer + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 7.3 apply. + +## 7A.4 Application layer + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 7.4 apply. + +In addition, when involved in administrative management operations, a 3GPP application interfaces with appropriate equipment. These operations are outside the scope of the present document. + +When involved in network operations a 3GPP application interfaces with a terminal with which messages are exchanged. A message can be a command or a response. + +- A 3GPP Application command/response pair is a sequence consisting of a command and the associated response. +- A 3GPP Application procedure consists of one or more 3GPP Application command/response pairs which are used to perform all or part of an application-oriented task. A procedure shall be considered as a whole, that is to say that the corresponding task is achieved if and only if the procedure is completed. The terminal shall ensure that, when operated according to the manufacturer's manual, any unspecified interruption of the sequence of command/response pairs which realise the procedure, leads to the abortion of the procedure itself. +- A 3GPP application session is the interval of time starting at the completion of the 3GPP application initialisation procedure and ending either with the start of the 3GPP session termination procedure, or at the first instant the link between the UICC and the terminal is interrupted. + +During the 3GPP network operation phase, the terminal plays the role of the master and the 3GPP application plays the role of the slave. + +A 3GPP application specification may specify some commands defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] as optional or define additional commands. The 3GPP application shall execute all applicable commands in such a way as not to jeopardise, or cause suspension, of service provisioning to the user. This could occur if, for example, execution of the AUTHENTICATE is delayed in such a way which would result in the network denying or suspending service to the user. + +# --- 8 Application and file structure + +## 8.0 General + +This clause specifies general requirements for EFs for 3GPP applications. + +EFs contain data items. A data item is a part of an EF which represents a complete logical entity. The 3GPP application specification defines the access conditions, data items and coding for each file. + +EFs or data items having an unassigned value, or which are cleared by the terminal, shall have their bytes set to 'FF'. After the administrative phase all data items shall have a defined value or have their bytes set to 'FF', unless specified otherwise in other 3GPP specifications. For example, for a deleted LAI in the EFLOCI file defined in TS 31.102 [2], the last byte takes the value 'FE' (refer to TS 24.008 [6]). If a data item is modified by the allocation of a value specified in another 3GPP TS, then this value shall be used and the data item is not unassigned. + +EFs are mandatory (M), optional (O), or conditional (C). A conditional file is mandatory if required by a supported feature, as defined by the 3GPP application (e.g. PBR in TS 31.102 [2]). The file size of an optional EF may be zero. All implemented EFs with a file size greater than zero shall contain all mandatory data items. Optional data items may either be filled with 'F', or, if located at the end of an EF, need not exist. + +When the coding is according to ITU-T Recommendation T.50 [5], bit 8 of every byte shall be set to 0. + +## 8.1 Contents of the EFs at the MF level + +See clause 13. + +## 8.1A UICC application structure + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 8.1 apply. + +## 8.2 File types + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 8.2 apply. + +## 8.3 File referencing + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 8.3 apply. + +## 8.4 Methods for selecting a file + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 8.4 apply. + +## 8.5 Application characteristics + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 8.5 apply. + +## 8.6 Reservation of file IDs + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 8.6 apply. + +## 8.7 Logical channels + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 8.7 apply. + +## 8.8 Shareable versus not-shareable files + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 8.8 apply. + +## 8.9 Secure channels + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 8.9 apply. + +# --- 9 Security features + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9 apply. + +## 9.1 Supported security features + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9.1 apply. + +## 9.2 Security architecture + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9.2 apply. + +## 9.3 Security environment + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9.3 apply. + +## 9.4 PIN definitions + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9.4 apply. + +## 9.5 PIN and key reference relation ship + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9.5 apply. + +## 9.6 User verification and file access conditions + +A 3GPP application uses 2 PINs for user verification, PIN and PIN2. PIN2 is used only in the ADF. The PIN and PIN2 are mapped into key references as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9.5.1. The Universal PIN shall be associated with a usage qualifier, and other key references may also be associated with a usage qualifier as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9.5.2. The PIN status is indicated in the PS\_DO, which is part of the FCP response when an ADF/DF is selected. The coding of the PS\_DO is defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9.5.2. + +PIN and PIN2 are coded on 8 bytes. Only (decimal) digits (0-9) shall be used, coded in ITU-T T.50 [5] with bit 8 set to zero. The minimum number of digits is 4. If the number of digits presented by the user is less than 8 then the ME shall pad the presented PIN with 'FF' before sending it to the 3GPP application. + +The coding of the UNBLOCK PINs is identical to the coding of the PINs. However, the number of (decimal) digits is always 8. + +The security architecture as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9 applies to 3GPP applications with the following definitions and additions: + +- A 3GPP application may reside on either a single-verification capable UICC or a multi-verification capable UICC. +- A 3GPP application residing on a multi-verification capable UICC shall support the replacement of its application PIN with the Universal PIN, key reference '11', as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9.4.1. Only the Universal PIN is allowed as a replacement. +- A multi-verification capable UICC holding a 3GPP application shall support the referenced format using SEID as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9.2.7. +- Every file related to a 3GPP application shall have a reference to an access rule stored in EFARR. +- Disabling of PIN2 is allowed if supported by the 3GPP application, unless indicated otherwise. + +The security architecture as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9 applies to terminals supporting 3GPP applications with the following definitions and requirements: + +- A terminal shall support the use of level 1 and level 2 user verification requirements as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9.1. +- A terminal shall support the multi-application capabilities as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9.1. +- A terminal shall support the replacement of a 3GPP application PIN with the Universal PIN, key reference '11', as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9.4.1. +- A terminal shall support the security attributes defined using tag's '8C', 'AB' and '8B' as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9.2.4. In addition both the referencing methods indicated by tag '8B' shall be supported as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 9.2.7. + +The access rule is referenced in the FCP using tag '8B'. The TLV object contains the file ID (the file ID of EFARR) and record number, or file ID (the file ID of EFARR), SEID and record number, pointer to the record in EFARR where the access rule is stored. Each SEID refers to a record number in EFARR. EFs having the same access rule use the same record reference in EFARR. For an example EFARR, see ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 13.4. + +# --- 10 Structure of commands and responses + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10 apply. + +## 10.1 Command APDU structure + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.1 apply. + +### 10.1.1 Coding of Class Byte + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.1.1 apply. + +### 10.1.2 Coding of Instruction Byte + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.1.2 apply except for the coding of the Instruction byte of the following commands which are not required by 3GPP: + +- GET CHALLENGE + +### 10.1.3 Coding of parameter bytes + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.1.3 apply. + +### 10.1.4 Coding of Lc byte + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.1.4 apply. + +### 10.1.5 Coding of data part + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.1.5 apply. + +### 10.1.6 Coding of Le byte + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.1.6 apply. + +## 10.2 Response APDU structure + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.2 apply. + +### 10.2.1 Status conditions returned by the UICC + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.2.1 apply. + +#### 10.2.1.1 Normal processing + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.2.1.1 apply. + +#### 10.2.1.2 Postponed processing + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.2.1.2 apply. + +#### 10.2.1.3 Warnings + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.2.1.3 apply. + +#### 10.2.1.4 Execution errors + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.2.1.4 apply. + +#### 10.2.1.5 Checking errors + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.2.1.5 apply. + +##### 10.2.1.5.1 Functions in CLA not supported + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.2.1.5.1 apply. + +##### 10.2.1.5.2 Command not allowed + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.2.1.5.2 apply. + +##### 10.2.1.5.3 Wrong parameters + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.2.1.5.3 apply. + +#### 10.2.1.6 Application errors + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.2.1.6 apply. + +### 10.2.2 Status words of the commands + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.2.2 apply with the following exceptions which are not required by 3GPP: + +- column 'GET CHALLENGE' of table 10.16 + +## 10.3 Logical channels + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 10.3 apply. + +# --- 11 Commands + +## 11.1 Generic commands + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1 apply. + +### 11.1.1 SELECT + +#### 11.1.1.1 Functional description + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.1 apply. + +#### 11.1.1.2 Command parameters and data + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.2 apply. + +#### 11.1.1.3 Response Data + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.3 apply. + +#### 11.1.1.4 File control parameters + +This clause defines the contents of the data objects which are part of the FCP information where there is a difference compared to the values as specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.4. Where options are indicated in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.4, this clause specifies the values to be used in the FCP related to 3GPP applications. + +##### 11.1.1.4.1 File size + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.4.1 apply. + +##### 11.1.1.4.2 Total file size + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.4.2 apply. + +##### 11.1.1.4.3 File Descriptor + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.4.3 apply. + +##### 11.1.1.4.4 File identifier + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.4.4 apply. + +##### 11.1.1.4.5 DF name + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.4.5 apply. + +##### 11.1.1.4.6 Proprietary information + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.4.6 apply, with the exception of provisions relative to 'Platform to Platform CAT Secured APDU' and clause 11.1.1.4.6.10. + +The Minimum application clock frequency data object is indicated by tag '82' in the proprietary constructed data object in the FCP information, identified by tag 'A5', as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.4.6. This data object specifies the minimum clock frequency to be provided by the terminal during the 3GPP application session. The value indicated in this data object shall not exceed 3 MHz, corresponding to '1E'. The terminal shall use a clock frequency between the value specified by this data object and the maximum clock frequency for the UICC as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.4.6.3. If this data object is not present in the FCP response or the value is 'FF' then the terminal shall assume that the minimum clock frequency is 1 MHz. + +##### 11.1.1.4.7 Security attributes + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.4.7 apply. + +##### 11.1.1.4.8 Short file identifier + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.4.8 apply. + +##### 11.1.1.4.9 Life cycle status integer + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.4.9 apply. + +##### 11.1.1.4.10 PIN status template DO + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.1.4.10 apply. + +### 11.1.2 STATUS + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.2 apply. + +### 11.1.3 READ BINARY + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.3 apply. + +### 11.1.4 UPDATE BINARY + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.4 apply. + +### 11.1.5 READ RECORD + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.5 apply. + +### 11.1.6 UPDATE RECORD + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.6 apply. + +### 11.1.7 SEARCH RECORD + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.7 apply. + +### 11.1.8 INCREASE + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.8 apply. + +### 11.1.9 VERIFY PIN + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.9 apply. + +### 11.1.10 CHANGE PIN + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.10 apply. + +### 11.1.11 DISABLE PIN + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.11 apply. + +### 11.1.12 ENABLE PIN + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.12 apply. + +### 11.1.13 UNBLOCK PIN + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.13 apply. + +### 11.1.14 DEACTIVATE FILE + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.14 apply. + +### 11.1.15 ACTIVATE FILE + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.15 apply. + +### 11.1.16 AUTHENTICATE + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.16 apply. + +### 11.1.17 MANAGE CHANNEL + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.17 apply. + +### 11.1.18 GET CHALLENGE + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.18 are not required by 3GPP. + +### 11.1.19 TERMINAL CAPABILITY + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.19 apply. + +### 11.1.20 MANAGE SECURE CHANNEL + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.20 apply. + +### 11.1.21 TRANSACT DATA + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.21 apply. + +### 11.1.22 SUSPEND UICC + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.1.22 apply. + +## 11.2 CAT commands + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.2 apply. + +## 11.3 Data Oriented commands + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 11.3 apply. + +# --- 12 Transmission oriented commands + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 12 apply. + +# --- 13 Application independent files + +There are five EFs at the Master File (MF) level specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 13 (EFICCID; EFDIR, EFPL, EFARR and EFUMPC), which are all mandatory for 3GPP. + +The DFCD at the Master File (MF) level specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 13.5 is optional for 3GPP. + +The EFDIR file contains the Application Identifiers (AIDs) and the Application Labels of the 3GPP applications present on the card as mandatory elements. The AIDs of 3GPP applications are defined in Annex O. The 3GPP applications can only be selected by means of the AID selection. The EFDIR entry shall not contain a path object for application selection. It is recommended that the application label does not contain more than 32 bytes. + +# --- 14 Application independent protocol + +## 14.1 Application independent protocol + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 14 apply with the following exceptions: + +- clause 14.6.2 of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] is replaced by clause 14.2. + +## 14.2 CAT commands + +During idle mode the terminal shall send STATUS commands to the UICC at intervals no longer than: + +- when the extended DRX cycle bit in the EFAD is set to 1: the maximum between the interval negotiated with the UICC (see TS 31.111 [8]) and the extended idle mode DRX cycle received from the network (see TS 24.008 [6]) +- in all other cases: the interval negotiated with the UICC (see TS 31.111 [8]) + +During a call the UICC presence detection applies. The default value for the proactive polling is the same as for the presence detection procedure. + +# --- 15 Support of APDU-based UICC applications over USB + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] clause 15 apply taking into account clauses 6A.3, 7A.4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14 in the present document. + +# --- Annex A (normative): UCS2 coding of Alpha fields for files residing on the UICC + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] annex A apply. + +# --- Annex B (informative): Main states of a UICC + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] annex B apply. + +# --- Annex C (informative): APDU protocol transmission examples + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] annex C apply. + +# --- Annex D (informative): ATR examples + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] annex D apply. + +# --- Annex E (informative): Security attributes mechanisms and examples + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] annex E apply. + +# --- Annex F (informative): Example of contents of EFARR '2F06' + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] annex F apply. + +# --- Annex G (informative): Access Rules Referencing (ARR) + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] annex G apply. + +# --- Annex H (normative): List of SFI Values + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] annex H apply. + +# --- Annex I (informative): Resets and modes of operation + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] annex I apply. + +# --- Annex J (informative): Example of the use of PINs + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] annex J apply. + +# --- Annex K (informative): Examples of the PIN state transition on multi verification capable UICC + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] annex K apply. + +# --- Annex L (informative): Examples of SET DATA and RETRIEVE DATA usage + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] annex L apply. + +# --- Annex M (informative): Examples of ODD AUTHENTICATE instruction code usage + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 221 [1] annex M apply. + +# --- Annex N (informative): PCB layout for the MFF + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 671 [9] annex A apply. + +# --- Annex O (normative): Allocated 3GPP PIX numbers + +The provisions of ETSI TS 101 220 [3] annex E apply. + +# Annex P (informative): Change history + +| Date | Meeting | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New | +|---------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 2002-12 | TP-18 | TP-020279 | 0027 | - | D | Gather all 3GPP-specific card platform requirements in TS 31.101. | 6.1.0 | +| 2003-06 | TP-20 | TP-030120 | 0028 | - | F | Clarification on the support of extra guardtime | 6.2.0 | +| 2004-09 | TP-25 | TP-040180 | 0029 | - | B | Requirement for higher UICC/Terminal interface speed | 6.3.0 | +| | | TP-040180 | 0030 | - | B | Move "GSM/USIM application interactions and restrictions" from ETSI TS 102 221 | 6.3.0 | +| 2004-12 | TP-26 | TP-040255 | 0033 | - | F | Correction of non specific references | 6.4.0 | +| 2004-12 | TP-26 | | | | | Reinstatement of original bullets in reference clause | 6.4.1 | +| 2005-06 | CT-28 | CP-050136 | 0034 | - | F | ISO/IEC 7816-Series Revision | 6.5.0 | +| 2006-01 | | | | | | Correction of CR-number from CP-28 | 6.5.1 | +| 2007-06 | CT-36 | CP-070480 | 0037 | 7 | B | Introduction of the new High Speed ME-UICC Interface | 7.0.0 | +| 2007-06 | - | - | - | - | - | MCC correction of implementation of CR0037R7, clause 4.3 | 7.0.1 | +| ----- | - | - | - | - | - | Upgrade to copyright, keywords and logo for LTE | 8.0.0 | +| 2009-12 | CT-46 | CP-091011 | 0040 | 2 | F | References update | 8.1.0 | +| 2009-12 | CT-46 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-9 | 9.0.0 | +| 2010-06 | CT-48 | CP-090390 | 0049 | 2 | F | Restructuration of the specification to map the clauses of ETSI TS 102 221 | 9.1.0 | +| 2011-01 | | | | | | Editorial release: formatting of clause 13 header corrected | 9.1.1 | +| 2011-04 | CT-51 | CP-110235 | 0065 | 1 | B | Introduction of Secure Channel for relay nodes | 10.0.0 | +| 2011-06 | | | | | | Editorial release: Unnumbered reference corrected | 10.0.1 | +| 2012-09 | SP-57 | | | | | Automatic upgrade of the specification to Rel-11 | 11.0.0 | +| 2014-10 | SP-65 | | | | | Automatic upgrade of the specification to Rel-12 | 12.0.0 | +| 2014-12 | CT-66 | CP-140986 | 0078 | 1 | F | Update reference to ETSI TS 102 221 version 12.0.0 for execution time | 12.1.0 | +| 2015-06 | CT-68 | CP-150388 | 0081 | 1 | F | Update of reference to ETSI TS 102 221 | 12.2.0 | +| 2015-06 | CT-69 | CP-150563 | 0082 | 1 | C | Replacement of EF LAUNCH SCWS with EF LAUNCH PAD | 13.0.0 | +| 2015-12 | CT-70 | CP-150833 | 0083 | 5 | C | Alignment of UICC polling interval with eDRX cycle | 13.1.0 | +| 2016-05 | CT-72 | CP-160347 | 0087 | | F | Update of reference of ETSI TS 102 221 | 13.2.0 | +| 2016-12 | CT-74 | CP-160789 | 0088 | 1 | B | Usage of non-removable UICC | 14.0.0 | +| 2017-03 | CT-75 | CP-170213 | 0089 | 1 | B | Introduction of SUSPEND UICC command | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-12 | CT-78 | CP-173150 | 0090 | - | D | Correction of clause numbering | 14.2.0 | +| 2018-06 | SA#80 | | | | | Automatic update to Rel-15 | 15.0.0 | +| 2018-10 | CT#81 | CP-182185 | 0092 | 1 | F | Remove GET IDENTITY command defined already in ETSI TS 102.221. | 15.1.0 | +| 2019-09 | CT#85 | CP-192014 | 0093 | 1 | F | Update of reference to ETSI TS 102 221 | 15.2.0 | +| 2020-06 | CT#88e | CP-201147 | 0094 | 3 | F | Update the scope of 31.101 to cover 2/4/5G aspects | 15.3.0 | +| 2020-06 | CT#88e | CP-201288 | 0095 | - | F | Dedicated AID for USIM Applications with non-IMSI based SUPI Types | 16.0.0 | +| 2021-03 | CT#91e | CP-210083 | 0096 | 1 | F | Clause 13 correction on reference to TS 31.101 Annex O | 16.1.0 | +| 2021-06 | CT#92e | CP-211098 | 0097 | 1 | F | Removal of 3GPP USIM (non-IMSI SUPI Type) after PIX report to ETSI TS 101.220 | 16.2.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31103/220869911a1ecfa1dd4aa6d750319aad_img.jpg 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+1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:bbc48a76877c465ec68030fa1d019dd76ab0be4c490895a2f5d6ec1295a48c20 +size 30076 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31103/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31103/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..81b29a2c959db67e272a45120f924d05f5d3499f --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31103/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,2480 @@ + + +# 3GPP TS 31.103 V16.1.0 (2020-09) + +*Technical Specification* + +## **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Characteristics of the IP Multimedia Services Identity Module (ISIM) application (Release 16)** + +![5G logo](64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg) + +The 5G logo, consisting of the text "5G" in a bold, black, sans-serif font. Above the "5G" text are three green curved lines representing signal waves. + +5G logo + +![3GPP logo](5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg) + +The 3GPP logo, featuring the letters "3GPP" in a stylized, bold, black font. The "P" is larger and has a red signal wave icon at its base. + +3GPP logo + +A GLOBAL INITIATIVE + +The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP. The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organizational Partners and shall not be implemented. This Specification is provided for future development work within 3GPP only. The Organizational Partners accept no liability for any use of this Specification. Specifications and Reports for implementation of the 3GPP™ system should be obtained via the 3GPP Organizational Partners' Publications Offices. + +## **3GPP** + +Postal address + +--- + +3GPP support office address + +--- + +650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis +Valbonne - FRANCE +Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 + +Internet + +--- + + + +## --- **Copyright Notification** --- + +No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. +The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. + +© 2020, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC). +All rights reserved. + +UMTS™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members +3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association + +# Contents + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 5 | +| Introduction ..... | 6 | +| 1 Scope..... | 7 | +| 2 References..... | 7 | +| 3 Definitions, symbols, abbreviations and coding conventions..... | 9 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 9 | +| 3.2 Symbols..... | 9 | +| 3.3 Abbreviations ..... | 9 | +| 3.4 Coding Conventions..... | 10 | +| 4 Files..... | 11 | +| 4.1 Contents of the EFs at the MF level..... | 11 | +| 4.2 Contents of files at the ISIM ADF (Application DF) level..... | 11 | +| 4.2.1 Void ..... | 11 | +| 4.2.2 EF IMPI (IMS private user identity) ..... | 11 | +| 4.2.3 EF DOMAIN (Home Network Domain Name) ..... | 12 | +| 4.2.4 EF IMPU (IMS public user identity) ..... | 12 | +| 4.2.5 EF AD (Administrative Data)..... | 13 | +| 4.2.6 EF ARR (Access Rule Reference) ..... | 14 | +| 4.2.7 EF IST (ISIM Service Table) ..... | 14 | +| 4.2.8 EF P-CSCF (P-CSCF Address)..... | 16 | +| 4.2.9 EF GBBP (GBA Bootstrapping parameters) ..... | 17 | +| 4.2.10 EF GBANL (GBA NAF List) ..... | 17 | +| 4.2.11 EF NAFKCA (NAF Key Centre Address)..... | 18 | +| 4.2.12 EF SMS (Short messages)..... | 19 | +| 4.2.13 EF SMSS (SMS status)..... | 20 | +| 4.2.14 EF SMSR (Short message status reports) ..... | 21 | +| 4.2.15 EF SMSP (Short message service parameters) ..... | 22 | +| 4.2.16 EF UICCIARI (UICC IARI) ..... | 23 | +| 4.2.17 EF FromPreferred (From Preferred)..... | 24 | +| 4.2.18 EF IMSConfigData (IMS Configuration Data) ..... | 24 | +| 4.2.19 EF XCAPConfigData (XCAP Configuration Data)..... | 26 | +| 4.2.20 EF WebRTCURI (WebRTC URI)..... | 29 | +| 4.2.21 EF MuDAndMiDConfigData (MuD and MiD Configuration Data)..... | 30 | +| 4.3 ISIM file structure ..... | 31 | +| 4.4 Contents of EFs at the TELECOM level..... | 31 | +| 4.4.1 EF PSISMSC (Public Service Identity of the SM-SC) ..... | 32 | +| 4.5 Contents of DFs at the TELECOM level..... | 32 | +| 4.5.1 Contents of files at the DF MCS level..... | 32 | +| 5 Application protocol ..... | 32 | +| 5.1 ISIM management procedures ..... | 32 | +| 5.1.1 Initialisation..... | 32 | +| 5.1.1.1 ISIM application selection..... | 32 | +| 5.1.1.2 ISIM initialisation ..... | 32 | +| 5.1.2 ISIM Session termination ..... | 33 | +| 5.1.3 ISIM application closure ..... | 33 | +| 5.1.4 UICC presence detection..... | 33 | +| 5.1.5 Administrative information request..... | 33 | +| 5.2 ISIM security related procedures ..... | 34 | +| 5.2.1 Authentication procedure ..... | 34 | +| 5.2.2 IMPI request ..... | 34 | +| 5.2.3 IMPU request..... | 34 | +| 5.2.4 SIP Domain request..... | 34 | +| 5.2.5 Void ..... | 34 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| 5.2.6 | ISIM Service Table request ..... | 34 | +| 5.2.7 | P-CSCF address request ..... | 34 | +| 5.2.8 | Generic Bootstrapping architecture (Bootstrap) ..... | 34 | +| 5.2.9 | Generic Bootstrapping architecture (NAF Derivation) ..... | 34 | +| 5.2.10 | HTTP-Digest security request ..... | 34 | +| 5.2.11 | NAF Key Centre Address request ..... | 35 | +| 5.3 | Subscription related procedures ..... | 35 | +| 5.3.1 | SM-over-IP ..... | 35 | +| 5.3.2 | Communication Control for IMS by ISIM ..... | 35 | +| 5.3.3 | UICC access to IMS ..... | 35 | +| 5.3.4 | From Preferred related procedures ..... | 35 | +| 5.3.5 | IMS Configuration Data related procedures ..... | 35 | +| 5.3.6 | XCAP Configuration Data related procedures ..... | 35 | +| 5.4 | MCS related procedures ..... | 36 | +| 5.5 | WebRTC related procedures ..... | 36 | +| 6 | Security features ..... | 36 | +| 6.1 | User verification and file access conditions ..... | 36 | +| 7 | ISIM Commands ..... | 36 | +| 7.1 | AUTHENTICATE ..... | 36 | +| 7.1.1 | Command description ..... | 36 | +| 7.1.1.1 | IMS AKA security context ..... | 37 | +| 7.1.1.2 | GBA security context (Bootstrapping Mode) ..... | 37 | +| 7.1.1.3 | GBA security context (NAF Derivation Mode) ..... | 38 | +| 7.1.1.4 | HTTP-Digest security context ..... | 39 | +| 7.1.1.5 | Local Key Establishment security context (Key Derivation mode) ..... | 39 | +| 7.1.1.6 | Local Key Establishment security context (Key Availability Check mode) ..... | 39 | +| 7.1.2 | Command parameters and data ..... | 40 | +| 7.1.2.1 | IMS AKA security context ..... | 41 | +| 7.1.2.2 | HTTP Digest security context ..... | 42 | +| 7.1.2.3 | GBA security context (Bootstrapping Mode) ..... | 42 | +| 7.1.2.4 | GBA security context (NAF Derivation Mode) ..... | 43 | +| 7.1.2.5 | Local Key Establishment security context (All Modes) ..... | 43 | +| 7.1.2.5.1 | Local Key Establishment security context (Key Derivation mode) ..... | 43 | +| 7.1.2.5.2 | Local Key Establishment security context (Key Availability Check mode) ..... | 45 | +| 7.1.3 | Status Conditions Returned by the ISIM ..... | 46 | +| 7.1.3.1 | Security management ..... | 46 | +| 7.1.3.2 | Status Words of the Commands ..... | 47 | +| 7.2 | GET CHALLENGE ..... | 47 | +| 8 | Void ..... | 47 | +| Annex A (informative): | EF changes via Data Download or USAT applications ..... | 48 | +| Annex B (informative): | Tags defined in 31.103 ..... | 49 | +| Annex C (informative): | Suggested contents of the EFs at pre-personalization ..... | 50 | +| Annex D (informative): | List of SFI Values ..... | 51 | +| D.1 | List of SFI Values at the ISIM ADF Level ..... | 51 | +| Annex E (informative): | ISIM Application Session Activation / Termination ..... | 52 | +| Annex F (informative): | Change History ..... | 53 | + +# Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings: + +- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something +- shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something + +The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports. + +The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document. + +- should** indicates a recommendation to do something +- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something +- may** indicates permission to do something +- need not** indicates permission not to do something + +The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended. + +- can** indicates that something is possible +- cannot** indicates that something is impossible + +The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not". + +- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +In addition: + +**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements. + +# --- Introduction + +The present document defines the IM Services Identity Module (ISIM) application. This application resides on the UICC, an IC card specified in TS 31.101 [3]. In particular, TS 31.101 [3] specifies the application independent properties of the UICC/terminal interface such as the physical characteristics and the logical structure. + +TS 31.101 [3] is one of the core documents for this specification and is therefore referenced in many places in the present document. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document defines the ISIM application for access to IMS services. + +The present document specifies: + +- specific command parameters; +- file structures; +- contents of EFs (Elementary Files); +- security functions; +- application protocol to be used on the interface between UICC (ISIM) and Terminal. + +This is to ensure interoperability between an ISIM and Terminal independently of the respective manufacturer, card issuer or operator. + +The present document does not define any aspects related to the administrative management phase of the ISIM. Any internal technical realisation of either the ISIM or the Terminal is only specified where these are reflected over the interface. The present document does not specify any of the security algorithms that may be used. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions that, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TS 21.111: "USIM and IC Card Requirements". +- [2] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the USIM Application". +- [3] 3GPP TS 31.101: "UICC-Terminal Interface, Physical and Logical Characteristics". +- [4] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3G Security; Security Architecture". +- [5] 3GPP TS 33.103: "3G Security; Integration Guidelines". +- [6] ISO/IEC 7816-4: "Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards, Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange". +- [7] Void. +- [8] Void. +- [9] 3GPP TS 23.003: "Numbering, Addressing and Identification". +- [10] Void. +- [11] Void. +- [12] 3GPP TS 25.101: "UE Radio Transmission and Reception (FDD)". +- [13] 3GPP TS 23.228: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2". + +- [14] 3GPP TS 33.203: "3G security; Access security for IP-based services". +- [15] 3GPP TS 24.228: "Signalling flows for the IP multimedia call control based on SIP and SDP; Stage 3". +- [16] IETF RFC 3261: "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol". +- [17] 3GPP TS 23.038: "Alphabets and language-specific information". +- [18] Void +- [19] 3GPP TS 51.011 Release 4: "Specification of the Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment (SIM-ME) interface". +- [20] ISO/IEC 8825-1 (2008): "Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules : Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)". +- [21] 3GPP TS 22.101: "Service aspects; Service principles". +- [22] Void. +- [23] ETSI TS 101 220: "Smart cards; ETSI numbering system for telecommunication application providers". +- [24] IETF RFC 2486: "The Network Access Identifier". +- [25] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic bootstrapping architecture". +- [26] IETF RFC 2617: "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication". +() +- [27] IETF RFC 3629 (2003): "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646". +- [28] 3GPP TS 33.110: "Key establishment between a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) and a terminal". +- [29] 3GPP TS 23.040: "Technical realization of the Short Message Service (SMS)". +- [30] 3GPP TS 24.011: "Point-to-Point (PP) Short Message Service (SMS) support on mobile radio interface". +- [31] 3GPP TS 31.111: "USIM Application Toolkit (USAT)". +- [32] 3GPP TS 24.229: "IP multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); Stage 3". +- [33] Void +- [34] 3GPP TS 24.607: "Originating Identification Presentation (OIP) and Originating Identification Restriction (OIR) using IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem; Protocol specification". +- [35] 3GPP TS 24.167: "3GPP IMS Management Object (MO); Stage 3". +- [36] 3GPP TS 24.341: "Support of SMS over IP networks; Stage 3". +- [37] OMA-DDS-DM\_ConnMO\_3GPPPS-V1\_0-20081024-A: " Standardized Connectivity Management Objects 3GPP Packet Switched Bearer Paramaters". +- [38] OMA-DDS-DM\_ConnMO-V1\_0-20081107-A: " Standardized Connectivity Management Objects". +- [39] 3GPP TS 24.424: "Management Object (MO) for Extensible Markup Language (XML) Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP) over the Ut interface for Manipulating Supplementary Services (SS)". + +- [40] 3GPP TS 24.623: "Extensible Markup Language (XML) Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP) over the Ut interface for Manipulating Supplementary Services". +- [41] OMA OMA-TS-XDM\_MO-V1\_1-20080627-A: "OMA Management Object for XML Document Management". +- [42] void. +- [43] 3GPP TS 24.483: "Mission Critical Services(MCS) Management Object (MO)". +- [44] 3GPP TS 24.175: "Management Object (MO) for Multi-Device and Multi-Identity in IMS". +- [45] 3GPP TS 24.174: "Support of Multi-Device and Multi-Identity in IMS; Stage 3". + +# 3 Definitions, symbols, abbreviations and coding conventions + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: + +**ISIM:** application residing on the UICC, an IC card specified in TS 31.101 [3] + +In particular, TS 31.101 [3] specifies the application independent properties of the UICC/terminal interface such as the physical characteristics and the logical structure + +The AID of ISIM is defined in ETSI TS 101 220 [23] and is stored in EFDIR. + +**ADM:** access condition to an EF which is under the control of the authority which creates this file + +## 3.2 Symbols + +For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: + +| | | +|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | Concatenation | +| ⊕ | Exclusive or | +| f1 | Message authentication function used to compute MAC | +| f1* | A message authentication code (MAC) function with the property that no valuable information can be inferred from the function values of f1* about those of f1, ... , f5 and vice versa | +| f2 | Message authentication function used to compute RES and XRES | +| f3 | Key generating function used to compute CK | +| f4 | Key generating function used to compute IK | +| f5 | Key generating function used to compute AK | + +## 3.3 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: + +| | | +|-------|------------------------------------------------| +| 3GPP | 3 rd Generation Partnership Project | +| AC | Access Condition | +| ADF | Application Dedicated File | +| AID | Application IDentifier | +| AK | Anonymity Key | +| AKA | Authentication and Key Agreement | +| ALW | ALWays | +| AMF | Authentication Management Field | +| ASN.1 | Abstract Syntax Notation One | +| AuC | Authentication Centre | +| AUTN | AUthentication Token | + +| | | +|---------|----------------------------------------------------------| +| BER-TLV | Basic Encoding Rule - TLV | +| B-TID | Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier | +| CK | Cipher Key | +| DF | Dedicated File | +| EF | Elementary File | +| FFS | For Further Study | +| FQDN | Fully Qualified Domain Name | +| HE | Home Environment | +| HN | Home Network | +| IARI | IMS Application Reference Identifier | +| ICC | Integrated Circuit Card | +| ID | Identifier | +| IK | Integrity Key | +| IM | IP Multimedia | +| IMPI | IM Private Identity | +| IMPU | IM Public identity | +| IMS | IP Multimedia Subsystem | +| ISIM | IM Services Identity Module | +| K | long-term secret Key shared between the ISIM and the AuC | +| KSI | Key Set Identifier | +| LI | Language Indication | +| LSB | Least Significant Bit | +| MAC | Message Authentication Code | +| MCData | Mission Critical Data | +| MCPTT | Mission Critical Push To Talk | +| MCS | Mission Critical Services | +| MCVideo | Mission Critical Video | +| MF | Master File | +| MiD | Multi-iDentity | +| MSB | Most Significant Bit | +| MuD | Multi-Device | +| NAI | Network Access Identifier | +| NEV | NEVer | +| PIN | Personal Identification Number | +| PL | Preferred Languages | +| PS_DO | PIN Status Data Object | +| RAND | RANDom challenge | +| RES | user RESponse | +| RFU | Reserved for Future Use | +| RST | ReSeT | +| SDP | Session Description Protocol | +| SFI | Short EF Identifier | +| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol | +| SQN | SeQuence Number | +| SW | Status Word | +| TLV | Tag Length Value | +| UE | User Equipment | +| WebRTC | Web Real-Time Communication | +| WWSF | WebRTC Web Server Function | +| XRES | eXpected user RESponse | + +## 3.4 Coding Conventions + +The following coding conventions apply to the present document. + +All lengths are presented in bytes, unless otherwise stated. Each byte is represented by bits b8 to b1, where b8 is the most significant bit (MSB) and b1 is the least significant bit (LSB). In each representation, the leftmost bit is the MSB. + +The coding of Data Objects in the present document is according to TS 31.101 [3]. + +'XX': Single quotes indicate hexadecimal values. Valid elements for hexadecimal values are the numbers '0' to '9' and 'A' to 'F'. + +# 4 Files + +This clause specifies the EFs for the IMS session defining access conditions, data items and coding. A data item is a part of an EF which represents a complete logical entity. + +For an overview containing all files see figure 4.1. + +## 4.1 Contents of the EFs at the MF level + +There are four EFs at the Master File (MF) level. These EFs are specified in TS 31.101 [3]. + +## 4.2 Contents of files at the ISIM ADF (Application DF) level + +The EFs in the ISIM ADF contain service and network related information and are required for UE to operate in an IP Multimedia Subsystem. + +The File IDs '6F1X' (for EFs), '5F1X' and '5F2X' (for DFs) with X ranging from '0' to 'F' are reserved under the ISIM ADF for administrative use by the card issuer. + +### 4.2.1 Void + +### 4.2.2 EFIMPI (IMS private user identity) + +This EF contains the private user identity of the user. + +| | | | | | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|-----------|---------|--|--| +| Identifier: '6F02' | Structure: transparent | Mandatory | | | | +| SFI: '02' | | | | | | +| File size: X bytes | Update activity: low | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ                                PIN
UPDATE                            ADM
DEACTIVATE                    ADM
ACTIVATE                        ADM | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O | Length | | | +| 1 to X | NAI TLV data object | M | X bytes | | | + +#### - NAI + +Contents: + +- Private user identity of the user. + +Coding: + +- For contents and syntax of NAI TLV data object values see IETF RFC 2486 [24]. The NAI shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in IETF RFC 3629 [27]. The tag value of the NAI TLV data object shall be '80'. + +### 4.2.3 EFDOMAIN (Home Network Domain Name) + +This EF contains the home operator's network domain name. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-----------|---------|------|-----|--------|-----|------------|-----|----------|-----| +| Identifier: '6F03' | Structure: transparent | Mandatory | | | | | | | | | | +| SFI: '05' | | | | | | | | | | | | +| File size: X bytes | Update activity: low | | | | | | | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ PIN
UPDATE ADM
DEACTIVATE ADM
ACTIVATE ADM
| | | | READ | PIN | UPDATE | ADM | DEACTIVATE | ADM | ACTIVATE | ADM | +| READ | PIN | | | | | | | | | | | +| UPDATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | +| DEACTIVATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | +| ACTIVATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O | Length | | | | | | | | | +| 1 to X | Home Network Domain Name TLV data object | M | X bytes | | | | | | | | | + +#### - URI + +Contents: + +- Home Network Domain Name. + +Coding: + +- For contents and syntax of Home Network Domain Name TLV data object values see TS 23.003 [9]. The Home Network Domain Name, i.e. FQDN shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in IETF RFC 3629 [27]. The tag value of the Home Network Domain Name TLV data object shall be '80'. + +### 4.2.4 EFIMPU (IMS public user identity) + +This EF contains one or more records, with each record able to hold a public SIP Identity (SIP URI) of the user. The first (or only) record in the EF shall be used when performing emergency registration; or as the default SIP Identity in case that no record is explicitly selected either in the current session or as a carryover from a prior session. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------|---------|------|-----|--------|-----|------------|-----|----------|-----| +| Identifier: '6F04' | Structure: linear fixed | Mandatory | | | | | | | | | | +| SFI: '04' | | | | | | | | | | | | +| Record length: X bytes | Update activity: low | | | | | | | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ PIN
UPDATE ADM
DEACTIVATE ADM
ACTIVATE ADM
| | | | READ | PIN | UPDATE | ADM | DEACTIVATE | ADM | ACTIVATE | ADM | +| READ | PIN | | | | | | | | | | | +| UPDATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | +| DEACTIVATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | +| ACTIVATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O | Length | | | | | | | | | +| 1 to X | URI TLV data object | M | X bytes | | | | | | | | | + +#### - URI + +Contents: + +- SIP URI by which other parties know the subscriber. + +Coding: + +- For contents and syntax of URI TLV data object values see IETF RFC 3261 [16]. The URI shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in IETF RFC 3629 [27]. The tag value of the URI TLV data object shall be '80'. + +### 4.2.5 EFAD (Administrative Data) + +This EF contains information concerning the mode of operation according to the type of ISIM, such as normal (to be used by IMS subscribers for IMS operations), type approval (to allow specific use of the Terminal during type approval procedures of e.g. the network equipment), manufacturer specific (to allow the Terminal manufacturer to perform specific proprietary auto-test in its Terminal during e.g. maintenance phases). + +It also provides an indication of whether some Terminal features should be activated during normal operation. + +| | | | | | | | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-----------|--|--|--| +| Identifier: '6FAD' | | Structure: transparent | | Mandatory | | | | +| SFI: '03' | | | | | | | | +| File size: 3+X bytes | | | Update activity: low | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ                               ALW
UPDATE                           ADM
DEACTIVATE                   ADM
ACTIVATE                       ADM | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | | M/O | Length | | | | +| 1 | UE operation mode | | M | 1 byte | | | | +| 2 to 3 | Additional information | | M | 2 bytes | | | | +| 4 to 3+X | RFU | | O | X bytes | | | | + +- UE operation mode: + +Contents: + +- mode of operation for the UE + +Coding: + +- Initial value + - '00' normal operation. + - '80' type approval operations. + - '01' normal operation + specific facilities. + - '81' type approval operations + specific facilities. + - '02' maintenance (off line). + +- Additional information: + +Coding: + +- specific facilities (if b1=1 in byte 1); + +Bytes 2 and 3 (first byte of additional information): + +![](ea37ab05b033e59cfdf7b074161aaf5a_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-------------------------| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | +| | | | | | | | | RFU (see TS 31.101 [3]) | + +### 4.2.6 EFARR (Access Rule Reference) + +This EF contains the access rules for files located under the ISIM ADF in the UICC. If the security attribute tag '8B' is indicated in the FCP it contains a reference to a record in this file. + +#### Structure of EFARR at ADF-level + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------|---------|------|-----|--------|-----|------------|-----|----------|-----| +| Identifier: '6F06' | Structure: Linear fixed | Mandatory | | | | | | | | | | +| SFI: '06' | | | | | | | | | | | | +| Record Length: X bytes | Update activity: low | | | | | | | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ ALW
UPDATE ADM
DEACTIVATE ADM
ACTIVATE ADM
| | | | READ | ALW | UPDATE | ADM | DEACTIVATE | ADM | ACTIVATE | ADM | +| READ | ALW | | | | | | | | | | | +| UPDATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | +| DEACTIVATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | +| ACTIVATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O | Length | | | | | | | | | +| 1 to X | Access Rule TLV data objects | M | X bytes | | | | | | | | | + +This EF contains one or more records containing access rule information according to the reference to expanded format as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 [6]. Each record represents an access rule. Unused bytes in the record are set to 'FF'. + +If the card cannot access EFARR, any attempt to access a file with access rules indicated in this EFARR shall not be granted. + +### 4.2.7 EFIST (ISIM Service Table) + +This EF indicates which optional services are available. If a service is not indicated as available in the ISIM, the ME shall not select this service. The presence of this file is mandatory if optional services are provided in the ISIM. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------|--------|------|-----|--------|-----|------------|-----|----------|-----| +| Identifier: '6F07' | Structure: transparent | Optional | | | | | | | | | | +| SFI: '07' | | | | | | | | | | | | +| File size: X bytes, X >= 1 | Update activity: low | | | | | | | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ PIN
UPDATE ADM
DEACTIVATE ADM
ACTIVATE ADM
| | | | READ | PIN | UPDATE | ADM | DEACTIVATE | ADM | ACTIVATE | ADM | +| READ | PIN | | | | | | | | | | | +| UPDATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | +| DEACTIVATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | +| ACTIVATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O | Length | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | Services n° 1 to n° 8 | M | 1 byte | | | | | | | | | +| 2 | Services n° 9 to n° 16 | O | 1 byte | | | | | | | | | +| 3 | Services n° 17 to n° 24 | O | 1 byte | | | | | | | | | +| 4 | Services n° 25 to n° 32 | O | 1 byte | | | | | | | | | +| etc. | | | | | | | | | | | | +| X | Services n° (8X-7) to n° (8X) | O | 1 byte | | | | | | | | | + +#### -Services + +| | | | +|-----------|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Contents: | Service n°1: | P-CSCF address | +| | Service n°2 | Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) | +| | Service n°3 | HTTP Digest | +| | Service n°4 | GBA-based Local Key Establishment Mechanism | +| | Service n°5 | Support of P-CSCF discovery for IMS Local Break Out | +| | Service n°6 | Short Message Storage (SMS) | +| | Service n°7 | Short Message Status Reports (SMSR) | +| | Service n°8 | Support for SM-over-IP including data download via SMS-PP as defined in TS 31.111 [31] | +| | Service n°9 | Communication Control for IMS by ISIM | +| | Service n°10 | Support of UICC access to IMS | +| | Service n°11 | URI support by UICC | +| | Service n°12 | Media Type support | +| | Service n°13 | IMS call disconnection cause | +| | Service n°14 | URI support for MO SHORT MESSAGE CONTROL | +| | Service n°15 | Mission Critical Services | +| | Service n°16 | URI support for SMS-PP DOWNLOAD as defined in 3GPP TS 31.111 [31] | +| | Service n°17 | From Preferred | +| | Service n°18 | IMS configuration data | +| | Service n°19 | XCAP Configuration Data | +| | Service n°20 | WebRTC URI | +| | Service n°21 | MuD and MiD configuration data | + +The EF shall contain at least one byte. Further bytes may be included, but if the EF includes an optional byte, then it is mandatory for the EF to also contain all bytes before that byte. Other services are possible in the future and will be coded on further bytes in the EF. The coding falls under the responsibility of the 3GPP. + +#### Coding: + +1 bit is used to code each service: + +bit = 1: service available; + +bit = 0: service not available. + +- Service available means that the ISIM has the capability to support the service and that the service is available for the user of the ISIM. + +Service not available means that the service shall not be used by the ISIM user, even if the ISIM has the capability to support the service. + +##### First byte: + +![Diagram of the first byte structure showing bits b8 to b1 and their corresponding services n°1 to n°8.](e4c6fa93821e3546ee9fcae897ae2771_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows the first byte of the service list, divided into 8 bits: b8, b7, b6, b5, b4, b3, b2, b1. Each bit is connected by a line to a specific service number: b1 to Service n°1, b2 to Service n°2, b3 to Service n°3, b4 to Service n°4, b5 to Service n°5, b6 to Service n°6, b7 to Service n°7, and b8 to Service n°8. + +Diagram of the first byte structure showing bits b8 to b1 and their corresponding services n°1 to n°8. + +##### Second byte: + +![Diagram of the second byte structure showing bits b8 to b1 and their corresponding services n°9 to n°16.](220869911a1ecfa1dd4aa6d750319aad_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows the second byte of the service list, divided into 8 bits: b8, b7, b6, b5, b4, b3, b2, b1. Each bit is connected by a line to a specific service number: b1 to Service n°9, b2 to Service n°10, b3 to Service n°11, b4 to Service n°12, b5 to Service n°13, b6 to Service n°14, b7 to Service n°15, and b8 to Service n°16. + +Diagram of the second byte structure showing bits b8 to b1 and their corresponding services n°9 to n°16. + +etc. + +### 4.2.8 EFP-CSCF (P-CSCF Address) + +If service no1 and/or service no5 is "available", this file shall be present. + +A UE supporting IMS Local Breakout shall use this EF only if EFIST indicates that service no5 is "available". + +This EF contains one or more Proxy Call Session Control Function addresses. The first record in the EF shall be considered to be of the highest priority. The last record in the EF shall be considered to be the lowest priority. + +| | | | | | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------|---------|--|--| +| Identifier: '6F09' | Structure: linear fixed | Optional | | | | +| Record length: X bytes | Update activity: low | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ                                PIN
UPDATE                            ADM
DEACTIVATE                    ADM
ACTIVATE                        ADM | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O | Length | | | +| 1 to X | P-CSCF Address TLV data object | M | X bytes | | | + +#### P-CSCF + +Contents: + +- Address of Proxy Call Session Control Function, in the format of a FQDN, an IPv4 address, or an IPv6 address. + +Coding: + +- The tag value of this P-CSCF address TLV data object shall be '80'. The format of the data object is as follows: + +| Field | Length (bytes) | +|----------------|----------------| +| Tag | 1 | +| Length | 1 | +| Address Type | 1 | +| P-CSCF Address | Address Length | + +Address Type: Type of the P-CSCF address. + +This field shall be set to the type of the P-CSCF address according to the following: + +| Value | Name | +|-------------------------------|------| +| '00' | FQDN | +| '01' | IPv4 | +| '02' | IPv6 | +| All other values are reserved | | + +P-CSCF Address: Address of the Proxy Call Session Control Function + +This field shall be set to the address of the Proxy Call Session Control Function. When the P-CSCF type is set to '00', the corresponding P-CSCF Address shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in IETF RFC 3629 [27]. + +Unused bytes shall be set to 'FF'. + +### 4.2.9 EFGBABP (GBA Bootstrapping parameters) + +If service n°2 is "available", this file shall be present. + +This EF contains the AKA Random challenge (RAND) and Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier (B-TID) associated with a GBA bootstrapping procedure. + +| | | | | | | | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------|--|--|--| +| Identifier: '6FD5' | | Structure: transparent | | Optional | | | | +| File length: L+X+N+3 bytes | | | Update activity: low | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ                                PIN
UPDATE                            PIN
DEACTIVATE                    ADM
ACTIVATE                        ADM | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | | M/O | Length | | | | +| 1 | Length of RAND (16) | | M | 1 byte | | | | +| 2 to (X+1) | RAND | | M | X bytes | | | | +| X+2 | Length of B-TID (L) | | M | 1 byte | | | | +| (X+3) to (X+2+L) | B-TID | | M | L bytes | | | | +| X+L+3 | Length of key lifetime | | M | 1 byte | | | | +| (X+L+4) to (X+L+N+3) | Key lifetime | | M | N bytes | | | | + +- Length of RAND +Contents: number of bytes, not including this length byte, of RAND field +- RAND +Contents: Random challenge used in the GBA\_U bootstrapping procedure. +Coding: as defined in TS 33.103 [5]. +- Length of B-TID +Contents: number of bytes, not including this length byte, of B-TID field +- B-TID +Content: Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier the GBA\_U bootstrapped keys +Coding: As defined in TS 33.220 [25] +- Length of key lifetime +Contents: number of bytes, not including this length byte, of key lifetime field +- Key lifetime +Content: Lifetime of the GBA\_U bootstrapped keys +Coding: As defined in TS 33.220 [25] + +### 4.2.10 EFGBANL (GBA NAF List) + +If service n°2 is "available", this file shall be present. + +This EF contains the list of NAF\_ID and B-TID associated to a GBA NAF derivation procedure. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------|---------|------|-----|--------|-----|------------|-----|----------|-----| +| Identifier: '6FD7' | Structure: Linear fixed | Optional | | | | | | | | | | +| Record length: Z bytes | Update activity: low | | | | | | | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ PIN
UPDATE ADM
DEACTIVATE ADM
ACTIVATE ADM
| | | | READ | PIN | UPDATE | ADM | DEACTIVATE | ADM | ACTIVATE | ADM | +| READ | PIN | | | | | | | | | | | +| UPDATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | +| DEACTIVATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | +| ACTIVATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O | Length | | | | | | | | | +| 1 to Z | NAF Key Identifier TLV objects | M | Z bytes | | | | | | | | | + +NAF Key Identifier tags + +| Description | Tag Value | +|-------------|-----------| +| NAF_ID Tag | '80' | +| B-TID Tag | '81' | + +NAF Key Identifier information + +| Description | Value | M/O | Length (bytes) | +|------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-----|----------------| +| NAF_ID Tag | '80' | M | 1 | +| Length | X | M | Note | +| NAF_ID value | -- | M | X | +| B-TID Tag | '81' | M | 1 | +| Length | Y | M | Note | +| B-TID value | -- | M | Y | +| NOTE: The length is coded according to ISO/IEC 8825-1 [20] | | | | + +- NAF\_ID Tag '80' + +Contents: + +- Identifier of Network Application Function used in the GBA\_U NAF Derivation procedure. + +Coding: + +- As defined in TS 33.220 [25] + +- B-TID Tag '81' + +Content: + +- Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier of the GBA\_U bootstrapped key + +Coding: + +- As defined in TS 33.220 [25] + +Unused bytes shall be set to 'FF' + +### 4.2.11 EFNAFKCA (NAF Key Centre Address) + +If service n°2 and service n°4 are "available", this file shall be present. + +This EF contains one or more NAF Key Centre addresses. The first record in the EF shall be considered to be of the highest priority. The last record in the EF shall be considered to be the lowest priority. + +| | | | | | | | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|----------|--|--|--| +| Identifier: '6FDD' | | Structure: Linear fixed | | Optional | | | | +| Record length: Z bytes | | | Update activity: low | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ PIN
UPDATE ADM
DEACTIVATE ADM
ACTIVATE ADM | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | | M/O | Length | | | | +| 1 to Z | NAF Key Centre TLV object | | M | Z bytes | | | | + +Unused bytes shall be set to 'FF'. + +NAF Key Centre tags + +| Description | Tag Value | +|----------------------------|-----------| +| NAF Key Centre address Tag | '80' | + +NAF Key Centre information + +| Description | Value | M/O | Length (bytes) | +|------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------------| +| NAF Key Centre address Tag | '80' | M | 1 | +| Length | X | M | Note | +| NAF Key Centre address value | -- | M | X | +| Note: | The length is coded according to ISO/IEC 8825-1 [20] | | | + +- NAF Key Centre Address value (Tag '80') + +Contents: + +Fully qualified Domain Name (FQDN) of the NAF Key Centre used in the Local Key Establishment procedures (see TS 33.110 [28]). + +Coding: + +Encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as described in IETF RFC 3629 [27]. + +### 4.2.12 EFSMS (Short messages) + +This file shall be present if and only if service n°6 and n°8 are "available". + +This EF contains information in accordance with TS 23.040 [29] comprising short messages (and associated parameters) which have either been received by the UE from the network, or are to be used as an UE originated message. + +| | | | | | | | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------|--|--|--| +| Identifier: '6F3C' | | Structure: linear fixed | | Optional | | | | +| Record length: 176 bytes | | | Update activity: low | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ PIN
UPDATE PIN
DEACTIVATE ADM
ACTIVATE ADM | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | | M/O | Length | | | | +| 1 | Status | | M | 1 byte | | | | +| 2 to 176 | Remainder | | M | 175 bytes | | | | + +- Status. + +#### Contents: + +Status byte of the record which can be used as a pattern in the SEARCH RECORD command. For UE originating messages sent to the network, the status shall be updated when the UE receives a status report, or sends a successful SMS Command relating to the status report. + +#### Coding: + +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---------------------------------------------------------| +| | | | | | X | X | 0 | free space | +| | | | | | X | X | 1 | used space | +| | | | | | 0 | 0 | 1 | message received by UE from network; message read | +| | | | | | 0 | 1 | 1 | message received by UE from network; message to be read | +| | | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | UE originating message; message to be sent | +| | | | | | | | | RFU (see TS 31.101 [3]) | + +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------| +| | | | X | X | 1 | 0 | 1 | UE originating message; message sent to the network: | +| | | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Status report not requested | +| | | | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Status report requested but not (yet) received; | +| | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Status report requested, received but not stored
in EF-SMSR; | +| | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Status report requested, received and stored
in EF-SMSR; | +| | | | | | | | | RFU (see TS 31.101 [3]) | + +- Remainder. + +#### Contents: + +This data item commences with the TS-Service-Centre-Address as specified in TS 24.011 [30]. The bytes immediately following the TS-Service-Centre-Address contain an appropriate short message TPDU as specified in TS 23.040 [29], with identical coding and ordering of parameters. + +#### Coding: + +according to TS 23.040 [29] and TS 24.011 [30]. Any TP-message reference contained in an UE originated message stored in the ISIM, shall have a value as follows: + +Value of the TP-message-reference: + message to be sent: 'FF'. + message sent to the network: the value of TP-Message-Reference used in the message sent to the network. + +Any bytes in the record following the TPDU shall be filled with 'FF'. + +It is possible for a TS-Service-Centre-Address of maximum permitted length, e.g. containing more than 18 address digits, to be associated with a maximum length TPDU such that their combined length is 176 bytes. In this case the ME shall store in the ISIM the TS-Service-Centre-Address and the TPDU in bytes 2 to 176 without modification, except for the last byte of the TPDU, which shall not be stored. + +### 4.2.13 EFSMS (SMS status) + +This file shall be present if and only if service n°6 and n°8 are "available". + +This EF contains status information relating to the short message service. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------|----------------------|----------|---------|------|-----|--------|-----|------------|-----|----------|-----| +| Identifier: '6F43' | | Structure: transparent | | Optional | | | | | | | | | | +| File size: 2+X bytes | | | Update activity: low | | | | | | | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READPIN
UPDATEPIN
DEACTIVATEADM
ACTIVATEADM
| | | | | | READ | PIN | UPDATE | PIN | DEACTIVATE | ADM | ACTIVATE | ADM | +| READ | PIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| UPDATE | PIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| DEACTIVATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| ACTIVATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | | Description | | M/O | Length | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | | Last Used TP-MR | | M | 1 byte | | | | | | | | | +| 2 | | SMS "Memory Cap. Exceeded" Not. Flag | | M | 1 byte | | | | | | | | | +| 3 to 2+X | | RFU | | O | X bytes | | | | | | | | | + +- Last Used TP-MR. + +Contents: + +- the value of the TP-Message-Reference parameter in the last mobile originated short message, as defined in TS 23.040 [29]. + +Coding: + +- as defined in TS 23.040 [29]. + +- SMS "Memory Capacity Exceeded" Notification Flag. + +Contents: + +- this flag is required to allow a process of flow control, so that as memory capacity in the UE becomes available, the Network can be informed. The process for this is described in TS 23.040 [29]. + +Coding: + +b1=1 means flag unset; memory capacity available; + +b1=0 means flag set; + +b2 to b8 are reserved and set to 1. + +### 4.2.14 EFSMSR (Short message status reports) + +This file shall be present if and only if service n°7 and n°8 are "available". + +This EF contains information in accordance with TS 23.040 [29] comprising short message status reports which have been received by the UE from the network. + +Each record is used to store the status report of a short message in a record of EFSMS. The first byte of each record is the link between the status report and the corresponding short message in EFSMS. + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------|----------------------|----------|----------|------|-----|--------|-----|------------|-----|----------|-----| +| Identifier: '6F47' | | Structure: linear fixed | | Optional | | | | | | | | | | +| Record length: 30 bytes | | | Update activity: low | | | | | | | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READPIN
UPDATEPIN
DEACTIVATEADM
ACTIVATEADM
| | | | | | READ | PIN | UPDATE | PIN | DEACTIVATE | ADM | ACTIVATE | ADM | +| READ | PIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| UPDATE | PIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| DEACTIVATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| ACTIVATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | | Description | | M/O | Length | | | | | | | | | +| 1 | | SMS record identifier | | M | 1 | | | | | | | | | +| 2 to 30 | | SMS status report | | M | 29 bytes | | | | | | | | | + +- SMS record identifier. + +Contents: + +- this data item identifies the corresponding SMS record in EFSMS, e.g. if this byte is coded '05' then this status report corresponds to the short message in record #5 of EFSMS. + +Coding: + +- '00' - empty record; +- '01' to 'FF' - record number of the corresponding SMS in EFSMS. + +- SMS status report: + +Contents: + +- this data item contains the SMS-STATUS-REPORT TPDU as specified in TS 23.040 [29], with identical coding and ordering of parameters. + +Coding: + +- according to TS 23.040 [29]. Any bytes in the record following the TPDU shall be filled with 'FF'. + +### 4.2.15 EFSMSP (Short message service parameters) + +If service n°8 is "available", this file shall be present. + +This EF contains values for Short Message Service header Parameters (SMSP), which can be used by the ME for user assistance in preparation of mobile originated short messages. For example, a service centre address will often be common to many short messages sent by the subscriber. + +The EF consists of one or more records, with each record able to hold a set of SMS parameters. The first (or only) record in the EF shall be used as a default set of parameters, if no other record is selected. + +To distinguish between records, an alpha-identifier may be included within each record, coded on Y bytes. + +The SMS parameters stored within a record may be present or absent independently. When a short message is to be sent from the UE, the parameter in the ISIM record, if present, shall be used when a value is not supplied by the user. + +| Identifier: '6F42' | | Structure: linear fixed | | Optional | | | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|----------|--|--|--| +| Record length: 28+Y bytes | | | Update activity: low | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ                                    PIN
UPDATE                                PIN
DEACTIVATE                        ADM
ACTIVATE                              ADM | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | | M/O | Length | | | | +| 1 to Y | Alpha-Identifier | | O | Y bytes | | | | +| Y+1 | Parameter Indicators | | M | 1 byte | | | | +| Y+2 to Y+13 | TP-Destination Address | | M | 12 bytes | | | | +| Y+14 to Y+25 | TS-Service Centre Address | | M | 12 bytes | | | | +| Y+26 | TP-Protocol Identifier | | M | 1 byte | | | | +| Y+27 | TP-Data Coding Scheme | | M | 1 byte | | | | +| Y+28 | TP-Validity Period | | M | 1 byte | | | | + +Storage is allocated for all of the possible SMS parameters, regardless of whether they are present or absent. Any bytes unused, due to parameters not requiring all of the bytes, or due to absent parameters, shall be set to 'FF'. + +- Alpha-Identifier. + +Contents: + +Alpha Tag of the associated SMS-parameter. + +Coding: + +see TS 31.102 [2] (EFADN). + +NOTE: The value of Y may be zero, i.e. the alpha-identifier facility is not used. By using the command GET RESPONSE the ME can determine the value of Y. + +- Parameter Indicators. + +Contents: + +each of the default SMS parameters which can be stored in the remainder of the record are marked absent or present by individual bits within this byte. + +Coding: + +allocation of bits: + +bit number    Parameter indicated. + +- 1    TP-Destination Address. +- 2    TS-Service Centre Address. +- 3    TP-Protocol Identifier. +- 4    TP-Data Coding Scheme. +- 5    TP-Validity Period. +- 6    reserved, set to 1. +- 7    reserved, set to 1. +- 8    reserved, set to 1. + +Bit value    Meaning. + +- 0    Parameter present. +- 1    Parameter absent. + +- TP-Destination Address. + +Contents and Coding: + +as defined for SM-TL address fields in TS 23.040 [29]. + +- TP-Service Centre Address. + +Contents and Coding: + +as defined for RP-Destination address Centre Address in TS 24.011 [30]. + +- TP-Protocol Identifier. + +Contents and Coding: + +as defined in TS 23.040 [29]. + +- TP-Data Coding Scheme. + +Contents and Coding: + +as defined in TS 23.038 [17]. + +- TP-Validity Period. + +Contents and Coding: + +as defined in TS 23.040 [29] for the relative time format. + +### 4.2.16 EFUICCIARI (UICC IARI) + +If service n°10 is "available", this file shall be present. + +As specified in TS 24.229 [32] a ME includes the list of IARIs for the IMS applications it intends to use when sending an initial registration or when sending subsequent registrations to the IMS in the form of a SIP REGISTER request. + +This EF contains a list of IARIs associated with active applications installed on the UICC that are included in the SIP REGISTER request in accordance with the procedures of TS 24.229 [32]. + +NOTE:    If this file is present in both the USIM and the ISIM, the file in the ISIM is used. It is assumed that the presence of this file in the USIM when an ISIM is present on the UICC is an incorrect configuration of the UICC. + +| Identifier: '6FE7' | | Structure: linear fixed | | Optional | | | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|-------------------------|----------------------|----------|---------|--|--| +| Record length: X bytes. | | | Update activity: low | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ                               PIN
UPDATE                           ADM
ACTIVATE                       ADM
DEACTIVATE                  ADM | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | | Description | | M/O | Length | | | +| 1 to X | | IARI TLV object | | M | X bytes | | | + +IARI TLV object: + +Contents: + +- The content and coding is defined below. + +#### Coding of the IARI TLV objects + +| Length | Description | Value | Status | +|---------|----------------|-------|--------| +| 1 byte | IARI TLV TAG | '80' | M | +| 1 byte | Length of IARI | Y | M | +| Y bytes | IARI value | - | M | + +- Coding: + +IMS Application Reference Identifier: shall be coded as specified in TS 24.229 [32]. + +Unused bytes shall be set to 'FF'. + +### 4.2.17 EFFromPreferred (From Preferred) + +If service n°17 is "available", this file shall be present. + +It shall be possible to define if the UE uses the From header field for the determination of the originating party identity in the OIP service. For more detailed description see 3GPP TS 24.607 [34] clause 4.5.2.12. + +NOTE: If this file is present in both the USIM and the ISIM, the file in the ISIM is used. It is assumed that the presence of this file in the USIM when an ISIM is present on the UICC is an incorrect configuration of the UICC. + +For the structure, content and coding of this file, see EFFromPreferred in 3GPP TS 31.102 [2] + +### 4.2.18 EFIMSConfigData (IMS Configuration Data) + +If service n°18 is "available", this file shall be present. + +This EF contains the IMS configuration data object as specified in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. + +| | | | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|---------| +| Identifier: '6FF8' | Structure: BER-TLV | Optional | | +| File size: X bytes | | Update activity: low | | +| Access Conditions:
READ                          PIN
UPDATE                        ADM
DEACTIVATE                 ADM
ACTIVATE                     ADM | | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O | Length | +| N/A | IMS configuration data encoding | M | 3 bytes | +| N/A | IMS configuration data | O | Y bytes | + +IMS configuration data object tags: + +| IMS configuration data objects | Tag Values | +|---------------------------------|------------| +| IMS configuration data encoding | '80' | +| IMS configuration data | '81' | + +Coding of the IMS configuration data encoding object + +Contents: + +Indicates the coding used for all the IMS configuration management objects stored in the EFIMSConfigData. + +Coding: + +A value of '00' indicates the XML format described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. All other values are reserved. + +Unused bytes shall be set to 'FF'. + +IMS configuration data object: + +#### Coding of the IMS Configuration data object + +| Length | Description | Value | Status | +|---------|--------------------------------------|-------|--------| +| 1 byte | IMS configuration data object Tag | '81' | M | +| X byte | IMS configuration data object Length | Y | M | +| Y bytes | IMS configuration data | - | M | + +Contents: + +The IMS configuration data can contain the following nodes and associated parent node from 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]: + +- 1 Default\_EPS\_bearer\_context\_usage\_restriction\_policy node and its descendant nodes as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in 3GPP TS 24.229 [32] clause L.2.2.5.1D. +- 2 Media\_type\_restriction\_policy node and its descendant nodes as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in 3GPP TS 24.229 [32] clause 6.1.1. +- 3 Reliable\_18x\_policy node and its descendant nodes as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in TS 24.229 [32] clause 5.1.4.2. +- 4 EPS\_initial\_attach\_ConRefs node and its descendant nodes as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in TS 24.229 [32] clause L.2.2.1. +- 5 Precondition\_disabling\_policy node and its descendant nodes as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in TS 24.229 [32] clause 5.1.5A. +- 6 Timer\_Emerg-reg leaf as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in TS 24.229 [32] clause 5.1.6.1. +- 7 EPC\_via\_untrusted\_WLAN\_mean\_rekeying\_time leaf as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in TS 24.229 [32] Annex R.2.2.1. +- 8 EPC\_via\_untrusted\_WLAN\_NAT\_keep\_alive\_time leaf as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in TS 24.229 [32] Annex R.2.2.1. +- 9 EPC\_via\_untrusted\_WLAN\_timeout\_period\_for\_liveness\_check leaf as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in TS 24.229 [32] Annex R.2.2.1. +- 10 Policy\_on\_local\_numbers node and its descendant nodes as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in TS 24.229 [32] clause 5.1.2A.1.5A. +- 11 SMSoIP\_usage\_policy leaf as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in TS 24.341 [36] clause 5.2.1.3. +- 12 Timer\_Emerg-request leaf as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in TS 24.229 [32] clause 5.1.6.8.1. +- 13 IMS\_Registration\_Policy node as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in TS 24.229 [32] Annex B.3.1.0a and TS 24.229 [32] Annex L.3.1.0a. +- 14 Default\_QoS\_Flow\_usage\_restriction\_policy node and its descendant nodes as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in 3GPP TS 24.229 [32] clause U.2.2.5.1D. +- 15 Timer\_Emerg\_non3gpp leaf as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in 3GPP TS 24.229 [32] Annex R.2.2.6.1 and W.2.2.6.1. + +16 Allow\_Handover\_PDN\_connection\_WLAN\_and\_EPS node as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in TS 24.229 [32] Annex L.2.2.1 and TS 24.229 [32] Annex R.3.1.0. + +17 SMS\_Over\_IP\_Networks\_Indication leaf as described in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. Procedures for use of this policy are described in TS 24.341 [36] clause 5.2.1.3 and in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35] clauses 5.28 and 5.71. + +Other nodes from 3GPP TS 24.167 [35] can be present in the IMS configuration data, however the ME shall ignore them. + +Coding: + +As specified in 3GPP TS 24.167 [35]. + +### 4.2.19 EFXCAPConfigData (XCAP Configuration Data) + +If service n°19 is "available", this file shall be present. + +This EF contains the XCAP configuration data object as specified in 3GPP TS 24.424 [39], OMA OMA-TS-XDM\_MO-V1\_1-20080627-A [41] and OMA-DDS-DM\_ConnMO-V1\_0-20081107-A [38]: + +| | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------| +| Identifier: '6FFC' | Structure: BER-TLV | Optional | +| File size: X bytes | Update activity: low | | +| Access Conditions:
READ                               PIN
UPDATE                           ADM
DEACTIVATE                 ADM
ACTIVATE                      ADM | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O    Length | +| 1-X | XCAP_conn_params_policy data object | M       X bytes | + +Data object tags: + +| Data objects | Tag Values | Coding | +|-------------------------|------------|---------------------| +| XCAP_conn_params_policy | '80' | As specified below. | + +Coding of the XCAP\_conn\_params\_policy data object: + +#### Coding of the XCAP\_conn\_params\_policy data object + +| Length | Description | Value | Status | +|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------|--------| +| 1 byte | XCAP_conn_params_policy TLV TAG | 'A0' | M | +| X bytes | Length of XCAP_conn_params_policy | | M | +| 1 | AccessForXCAP Tag | '81' | M | +| 1 | AccessForXCAP Length | - | M | +| 1 | AccessForXCAP | - | M | +| 1 | Number of XCAP connection parameters policy part TLV's Tag | '82' | M | +| 1 | Number of XCAP connection parameters policy part TLV's Length | - | M | +| 1 | Number of XCAP connection parameters policy part TLV's | - | M | +| 1 | XCAP connection parameters policy part TLV | 'A1' | M | + +Coding of the AccessForXCAP + +Contents: + +Contains an access type used for XCAP. + +Coding: + +See 3GPP TS 24.424 [39] AccessForXCAP leaf for coding. + +Coding Number of XCAP connection parameters policy part TLV's + +Contents: + +Contains the number of instances of the XCAP connection parameters policy part TLV container. + +The following fields may appear multiple times + +XCAP connection parameters policy part: + +#### **Coding of the XCAP connection parameters object TLV container** + +| Length | Description | Value | Status | +|---------|-----------------------------------------------|-------|--------| +| 1 | XCAP connection parameters policy part TLV | 'A1' | M | +| Y bytes | Length XCAP connection parameters policy part | | M | +| 1 | Access Tag | '81' | M | +| 1 | Access Length | | | +| 1 | Access | | | +| 1 | Application name Tag | '82' | O | +| 1 or 2 | Length Application name | | | +| A bytes | Application name | | | +| 1 | Provider-ID Tag | '83' | O | +| 1 or 2 | Length Provider ID | | | +| B bytes | Provider ID | | | +| 1 | URI Tag | '84' | M | +| 1 or 2 | Length URI | | | +| C bytes | URI | | | +| 1 | XCAP Authentication User Name Tag | '85' | O | +| 1 or 2 | Length XCAP Authentication User Name | | | +| D bytes | XCAP Authentication User Name | | | +| 1 | XCAP Authentication Password Tag | '86' | O | +| 1 or 2 | Length XCAP Authentication Password | | | +| E bytes | XCAP Authentication Password | | | +| 1 | XCAP Authentication type Tag | '87' | O | +| 1 | Length XCAP Authentication type | | | +| 1 | XCAP Authentication type | | | +| 1 | Address Type Tag | '88' | O | +| 1 | Length Address Type | | | +| F bytes | Address Type | | | +| 1 | Address Tag | '89' | O | +| 1 or 2 | Length Address | | | +| G bytes | Address | | | +| 1 | PDPAuthenticationType Tag | '8A' | O | +| 1 | Length PDPAuthenticationType | | | +| 1 | PDPAuthenticationType | | | +| 1 | PDPAuthentication Name Tag | '8B' | O | +| 1 or 2 | Length PDPAuthentication Name | | | +| I bytes | PDPAuthentication Name | | | +| 1 | PDPAuthentication secret Tag | '8C' | O | +| 1 or 2 | Length PDPAuthentication secret | | | +| J bytes | PDPAuthentication secret | | | + +Coding of the Access + +Contents: + +Contains an access identifier. + +Coding: + +See 3GPP TS 24.424 [39] Access leaf for coding. + +#### Coding of the Application name + +Contents and coding see: + +See OMA OMA-TS-XDM\_MO-V1\_1-20080627-A [41] Name leaf for coding. + +#### Coding of the Provider-ID + +Contents and coding see: + +See OMA OMA-TS-XDM\_MO-V1\_1-20080627-A [41] ProviderID leaf for coding. + +#### Coding of the URI + +Contents and coding see: + +See OMA OMA-TS-XDM\_MO-V1\_1-20080627-A [41] URI leaf for coding. + +#### Coding of the XCAP Authentication User Name + +Contents and coding see: + +See OMA OMA-TS-XDM\_MO-V1\_1-20080627-A [41] AAUTHNAME leaf for coding. + +#### Coding of the XCAP Authentication Password + +Contents and coding see: + +See OMA OMA-TS-XDM\_MO-V1\_1-20080627-A [41] AAUTHSECRET leaf for coding. + +#### Coding of the XCAP Authentication type + +Contents and coding see: + +See OMA OMA-TS-XDM\_MO-V1\_1-20080627-A [41] AAUTHTYPE leaf for authentication types allowed: + +![Diagram showing the bit-level coding for the XCAP Authentication type. It consists of a row of 8 bits (b8 to b1) with lines connecting each bit to its corresponding value or RFU label. Bit b1 is connected to 'Value 1: Use GAA' and 'Value 0: Do not use GAA'. Bit b2 is connected to 'Value 1: Use HTTP Digest' and 'Value 0: Do not use HTTP Digest'. Bits b3 through b8 are each connected to an 'RFU' label.](6a2e2baec34f100da144da7f261651b0_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| RFU | RFU | RFU | RFU | RFU | RFU | Value 1: Use HTTP Digest
Value 0: Do not use HTTP Digest | Value 1: Use GAA
Value 0: Do not use GAA | + +Diagram showing the bit-level coding for the XCAP Authentication type. It consists of a row of 8 bits (b8 to b1) with lines connecting each bit to its corresponding value or RFU label. Bit b1 is connected to 'Value 1: Use GAA' and 'Value 0: Do not use GAA'. Bit b2 is connected to 'Value 1: Use HTTP Digest' and 'Value 0: Do not use HTTP Digest'. Bits b3 through b8 are each connected to an 'RFU' label. + +#### Coding of the Address type + +Contents and coding see: + +See OMA-DDS-DM\_ConnMO-V1\_0-20081107-A [38] AddrType leaf node and OMA-DDS-DM\_ConnMO\_3GPPPS-V1\_0-20081024-A [37] clause 6.2 AddrType for coding. + +#### Coding of the Address + +Contents and coding see: + +See OMA-DDS-DM\_ConnMO-V1\_0-20081107-A [38] Addr leaf node and OMA-DDS-DM\_ConnMO\_3GPPPS-V1\_0-20081024-A [37] clause 6.2 AddrType for coding. + +#### Coding of the PDPAuthentication type + +Contents and coding see: + +See OMA-DDS-DM\_ConnMO-V1\_0-20081107-A [38] AuthInfo/AuthType leaf node and OMA-DDS-DM\_ConnMO\_3GPPPS-V1\_0-20081024-A [37] clause 6.2 AuthType for authentication types allowed. + +![Diagram showing the bit mapping for PDPAuthentication type. It consists of 8 bits (b8 to b1) and their corresponding values. b1 is PAP (1: Use PAP, 0: Do not use PAP). b2 is CHAP (1: Use CHAP, 0: Do not use CHAP). b3 is MD5 (1: Use MD5, 0: Do not use MD5). b4, b5, b6, b7, and b8 are all marked as RFU (Reserve For Future Use).](f0a97d0d3818a253c1d2a009966081b1_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| RFU | RFU | RFU | RFU | RFU | Value 1: Use MD5
Value 0: Do not use MD5 | Value 1: Use CHAP
Value 0: Do not use CHAP | Value 1: Use PAP
Value 0: Do not use PAP | + +Diagram showing the bit mapping for PDPAuthentication type. It consists of 8 bits (b8 to b1) and their corresponding values. b1 is PAP (1: Use PAP, 0: Do not use PAP). b2 is CHAP (1: Use CHAP, 0: Do not use CHAP). b3 is MD5 (1: Use MD5, 0: Do not use MD5). b4, b5, b6, b7, and b8 are all marked as RFU (Reserve For Future Use). + +#### Coding of the PDPAuthentication Name + +Contents and coding see: + +See OMA-DDS-DM\_ConnMO-V1\_0-20081107-A [38] AuthInfo/AuthName leaf node for coding. + +#### Coding of the PDPAuthentication Secret + +Contents and coding see: + +See OMA-DDS-DM\_ConnMO-V1\_0-20081107-A [38] AuthInfo/AuthSecret leaf node for coding. + +### 4.2.20 EFWebRTCURI (WebRTC URI) + +If service n°20 is "available", this file shall be present. + +This EF contains URI of the WWSF. + +| Identifier: '6FFA' | | Structure: linear fixed | | Optional | | | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|----------|--|--|--| +| Record length: X bytes | | | Update activity: low | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ                                      PIN
UPDATE                                    ADM
DEACTIVATE                            ADM
ACTIVATE                                ADM | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | | M/O | Length | | | | +| 1 to X | URI TLV data object | | M | X bytes | | | | + +- URI + +Contents: + +- URI of the WebRTC WWSF. + +Coding: + +- For contents and syntax of URI TLV data object values see IETF RFC 3261 [16]. The URI shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in IETF RFC 3629 [27]. The tag value of the URI TLV data object shall be '80'. + +### 4.2.21 EFMuDMiDConfigData (MuD and MiD Configuration Data) + +If service n°21 is "available", this file shall be present. + +This EF contains the Multi-Device and Multi-Identity configuration data object as specified in 3GPP TS 24.175 [44]: + +| | | | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------------------|---------| +| Identifier: '6FFE' | Structure: BER-TLV | Optional | | +| File size: X bytes | | Update activity: low | | +| Access Conditions:
READ                                PIN
UPDATE                            ADM
DEACTIVATE                    ADM
ACTIVATE                        ADM | | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O | Length | +| N/A | MuD and MiD configuration data encoding | M | 3 bytes | +| N/A | MuD and MiD configuration data | O | Y | + +Data object tags: + +| Data objects | Tag Values | Coding | +|-----------------------------------------|------------|---------------------| +| MuD_and_MiD_configuration_data encoding | '80' | As specified below. | +| MuD and MiD configuration data | '81' | | + +Coding of the MuD\_and\_MiD\_configuration\_data encoding object + +#### Coding of the MuD\_and\_MiD\_configuration\_data encoding object + +| Length | Description | Value | Status | +|--------|-------------------------------------------------------|-------|--------| +| 1 byte | MuD_and_MiD_configuration_data encoding object Tag | '80' | M | +| 1 byte | MuD_and_MiD_configuration_data encoding object Length | 1 | M | +| 1 byte | MuD_and_MiD_configuration_data encoding object | - | M | + +Contents: + +Indicates the coding used for all the MuD and Mid configuration objects stored in the EFIMSConfigData. + +Coding: + +A value of '00' indicates the XML format described in 3GPP TS 24.175 [44]. All other values are reserved. + +MuD\_and\_MiD\_configuration\_data object + +#### Coding of the MuD\_and\_MiD\_configuration\_data object + +| Length | Description | Value | Status | +|---------|----------------------------------------------|-------|--------| +| 1 byte | MuD and MiD configuration data object Tag | '81' | M | +| X bytes | MuD_and_MiD_configuration_data object Length | Y | M | +| Y bytes | MuD and MiD configuration data object | - | M | + +Contents: + +Contains the management object as specified in 3GPP TS 24.175 [44]. + +Coding: + +As specified in the MuD\_and\_MiD\_configuration\_data encoding object above. + +## 4.3 ISIM file structure + +This clause contains a figure depicting the file structure of the ADFISIM. ADFISIM shall be selected using the AID and information in EFDIR. + +![Figure 1: File identifiers and directory structures of ISIM. The diagram shows a hierarchical tree structure starting with ADF_ISIM at the root. It branches into four levels of files. Level 1: EF_IST (6F07), EF_IMPI (6F02), EF_DOMAIN (6F03), EF_IMPU (6F04). Level 2: EF_AD (6FAD), EF_ARR (6F06), EF_P-CSCF (6F09), EF_GBAP (6FD5). Level 3: EF_GBANL (6FD7), EF_NAFKCA (6FDD), EF_UICCIARI (6FE7). Level 4: EF_SMS (6F3C), EF_SMSS (6F43), EF_SMSR (6F47), EF_SMSP (6F42). Level 5: EF_FromPreferred (6FF7), EF IMSConfigData (6FF8), EF_XCAPConfigData (6FFC), EF_WebRTCURI (6FFA). Finally, a separate box for EF_MuDMiDConfig Data (6FFE) is shown below the main hierarchy.](ca5dc5fde2061d0ca2051ef7840fc842_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + ADF_ISIM[ADFISIM] --> EF_IST["EFIST +'6F07'"] + ADF_ISIM --> EF_IMPI["EFIMPI +'6F02'"] + ADF_ISIM --> EF_DOMAIN["EFDOMAIN +'6F03'"] + ADF_ISIM --> EF_IMPU["EFIMPU +'6F04'"] + EF_IST --> EF_AD["EFAD +'6FAD'"] + EF_IST --> EF_ARR["EFARR +'6F06'"] + EF_IST --> EF_P_CSCF["EFP-CSCF +'6F09'"] + EF_IST --> EF_GBAP["EFGBAP +'6FD5'"] + EF_IMPI --> EF_GBANL["EFGBANL +'6FD7'"] + EF_IMPI --> EF_NAFKCA["EFNAFKCA +'6FDD'"] + EF_IMPI --> EF_UICCIARI["EFUICCIARI +'6FE7'"] + EF_DOMAIN --> EF_SMS["EFSMS +'6F3C'"] + EF_DOMAIN --> EF_SMSS["EFSMSS +'6F43'"] + EF_DOMAIN --> EF_SMSR["EFSMSR +'6F47'"] + EF_DOMAIN --> EF_SMSP["EFSMSP +'6F42'"] + EF_IMPU --> EF_FromPreferred["EFFromPreferred +'6FF7'"] + EF_IMPU --> EF IMSConfigData["EFIMSConfigData +'6FF8'"] + EF_IMPU --> EF_XCAPConfigData["EFXCAPConfigData +'6FFC'"] + EF_IMPU --> EF_WebRTCURI["EFWebRTCURI +'6FFA'"] + ADF_ISIM --> EF_MuDMiDConfig["EFMuDMiDConfig +Data +'6FFE'"] + +``` + +Figure 1: File identifiers and directory structures of ISIM. The diagram shows a hierarchical tree structure starting with ADF\_ISIM at the root. It branches into four levels of files. Level 1: EF\_IST (6F07), EF\_IMPI (6F02), EF\_DOMAIN (6F03), EF\_IMPU (6F04). Level 2: EF\_AD (6FAD), EF\_ARR (6F06), EF\_P-CSCF (6F09), EF\_GBAP (6FD5). Level 3: EF\_GBANL (6FD7), EF\_NAFKCA (6FDD), EF\_UICCIARI (6FE7). Level 4: EF\_SMS (6F3C), EF\_SMSS (6F43), EF\_SMSR (6F47), EF\_SMSP (6F42). Level 5: EF\_FromPreferred (6FF7), EF IMSConfigData (6FF8), EF\_XCAPConfigData (6FFC), EF\_WebRTCURI (6FFA). Finally, a separate box for EF\_MuDMiDConfig Data (6FFE) is shown below the main hierarchy. + +Figure 1: File identifiers and directory structures of ISIM + +NOTE: The value '6FF9' under ADFISIM was used in earlier versions of this specification, and should not be re-assigned in future versions. + +## 4.4 Contents of EFs at the TELECOM level + +The EFs in the Dedicated File DFTELECOM contain service related information as defined in TS 31.102 [2]. + +The structure of DF TELECOM is defined in TS 31.102 [2]. + +### 4.4.1 EFPSISMSC (Public Service Identity of the SM-SC) + +If service n°8 is "available", this file shall be present. + +Coding and usage of this EF is defined in TS 31.102 [2]. + +This EF can be found in DF TELECOM with an identifier equal to '6FE5' as defined in TS 31.102 [2]. + +## 4.5 Contents of DFs at the TELECOM level + +DFs may be present as child directories of DFTELECOM as defined in 3GPP TS 31.102 [2]. + +If service n°15 is "available", DFMCS as defined in 3GPP TS 31.102 [2] shall be present. + +### 4.5.1 Contents of files at the DFMCS level + +The EFs in the Dedicated File DFMCS contain management objects related to Mission Critical Services, as specified in 3GPP TS 24.483 [432]. + +The coding, usage and conditions for presence for these EFs are defined in 3GPP TS 31.102 [2]. + +# --- 5 Application protocol + +The requirements stated in the corresponding clause of TS 31.101 [3] apply to the ISIM application. + +The procedures listed in clause "ISIM management procedures" are required for execution of the procedures in the subsequent clause "ISIM security related procedures". The procedures authentication procedure, IMPI request, IMPU request and SIPdomain request, which are listed in clause "ISIM security related procedures" are mandatory. If an ISIM Service table is available, the additional procedures are only executable if these services are indicated as "service available" in the ISIM Service table. However, if the procedures are implemented, it shall be in accordance with clause " ISIM security related procedures". + +## 5.1 ISIM management procedures + +### 5.1.1 Initialisation + +#### 5.1.1.1 ISIM application selection + +If the Terminal wants to engage in IMS operation, then after UICC activation (see TS 31.101 [3]), the Terminal shall select an ISIM application, if an ISIM application is listed in the EFDIR file, using the SELECT by DF name as defined in TS 31.101 [3]. + +After a successful ISIM application selection, the selected ISIM (AID) is stored on the UICC. This application is referred to as the last selected ISIM application. The last selected ISIM application shall be available on the UICC after a deactivation followed by an activation of the UICC. + +If a ISIM application is selected using partial DF name, the partial DF name supplied in the command shall uniquely identify a ISIM application. Furthermore if a ISIM application is selected using a partial DF name as specified in TS 31.101 [3] indicating in the SELECT command the last occurrence the UICC shall select the ISIM application stored as the last ISIM application. If, in the SELECT command, the options first, next/previous are indicated, they have no meaning if an application has not been previously selected in the same session and shall return an appropriate error code. + +#### 5.1.1.2 ISIM initialisation + +The ISIM shall not indicate any language preference. It shall use the language indicated by any other application currently active on the UICC or by default, choose a language from EFPL at the MF level according the procedure defined in TS 31.101 [3]. + +If the terminal does not support the languages of EFPL, then the terminal shall use its own internal default selection. + +The Terminal then runs the user verification procedure. If the procedure is not performed successfully, the ISIM initialisation stops. + +Then the Terminal performs the administrative information request. + +If all these procedures have been performed successfully then the ISIM session shall start. In all other cases the ISIM session shall not start. + +After the previous procedures have been completed successfully, the Terminal runs the following procedures: + +- IMPI request. +- IMPU request. +- SIP Domain request. +- ISIM Service Table request. If the ISIM Service Table is not present, the terminal shall assume that no optional services are available. +- P-CSCF address request + +After the ISIM initialisation has been completed successfully, the Terminal is ready for an ISIM session and shall indicate this to the ISIM by sending a particular STATUS command. + +### 5.1.2 ISIM Session termination + +NOTE 1: This procedure is not to be confused with the deactivation procedure in TS 31.101 [3]. + +The ISIM session is terminated by the Terminal as follows. + +The Terminal shall indicate to the ISIM by sending a particular STATUS command that the termination procedure is starting. + +Finally, the ME deletes all these subscriber related information elements from its memory. + +NOTE 2: If the Terminal has already updated any of the subscriber related information during the ISIM session, and the value has not changed until ISIM session termination, the Terminal may omit the respective update procedure. + +To actually terminate the session, the Terminal shall then use one of the mechanisms described in TS 31.101 [3]. + +### 5.1.3 ISIM application closure + +After termination of the ISIM session as defined in clause 5.1.2, the ISIM application may be closed by closing the logical channels that are used to communicate with this particular ISIM application. + +### 5.1.4 UICC presence detection + +The Terminal checks for the presence of the UICC according to TS 31.101 [3] within all 30 s periods of inactivity on the UICC-Terminal interface during a IMS session. If the presence detection according to TS 31.101 [3] fails the session shall be terminated as soon as possible but at least within 5s after the presence detection has failed. + +### 5.1.5 Administrative information request + +The Terminal performs the reading procedure with EFAD. + +## 5.2 ISIM security related procedures + +### 5.2.1 Authentication procedure + +The Terminal selects an ISIM application and uses the AUTHENTICATE command (see clause 7.1). The response is sent to the Terminal (in case of the T=0 protocol when requested by a subsequent GET RESPONSE command). + +### 5.2.2 IMPI request + +The Terminal performs the reading procedure with EFIMPI. + +### 5.2.3 IMPU request + +The Terminal performs the reading procedure with EFIMPU. + +### 5.2.4 SIP Domain request + +The Terminal performs the reading procedure with EFDOMAIN. + +### 5.2.5 Void + +### 5.2.6 ISIM Service Table request + +Requirement: ISIM Service Table available in the ISIM + +Request: The ME performs the reading procedure with EFIST. + +### 5.2.7 P-CSCF address request + +Requirement: ISIM Service n°1 and/or ISIM Service n°5 "available". + +Request: The ME performs the reading procedure with EFP-CSCF. + +### 5.2.8 Generic Bootstrapping architecture (Bootstrap) + +Requirement: ISIM Service n°2 "available". + +The Terminal uses the AUTHENTICATE command in GBA security context (Bootstrapping Mode) (see 7.1.1). The response is sent to the Terminal. + +After a successful GBA\_U Procedure, the Terminal shall update the B-TID field and the Key Life Time field in EFGBABP. + +### 5.2.9 Generic Bootstrapping architecture (NAF Derivation) + +Requirement: ISIM Service n°2 "available". + +The Terminal shall first read EFGBABP. The Terminal then uses the AUTHENTICATE command in GBA security context (NAF Derivation Mode) (see 7.1.1). The response is sent to the Terminal. + +### 5.2.10 HTTP-Digest security request + +Requirement: ISIM Service n°3 "available". + +This HTTP-Digest security request does not apply for 3GPP and shall not be used by a terminal using a 3GPP access network or a 3GPP Interworking WLAN. + +### 5.2.11 NAF Key Centre Address request + +Requirement: Service n°2 and service n°4 "available". + +Request: The ME performs the reading procedure with EFNAFKCA. + +## 5.3 Subscription related procedures + +### 5.3.1 SM-over-IP + +Requirement: Service n°8 "available". + +Request: the ME performs the reading procedure with EFPSISMSC. + +Update: The ME performs the updating procedure with EFPSISMSC. + +### 5.3.2 Communication Control for IMS by ISIM + +Requirement: ISIM Service n°9 "available". + +The procedures and commands for Communication Control for IMS by ISIM are the same as Communication Control for IMS by USIM defined in TS 31.111 [31]. It is mandatory for the ME to perform the procedures if it has indicated that it supports Communication Control for IMS by USIM in the TERMINAL PROFILE command. + +### 5.3.3 UICC access to IMS + +Requirement: Service n°10 "available". + +Request: The terminal performs the reading procedure with EFUICCIARI. + +The procedures and command for "UICC access to IMS" are defined in TS 31.111 [31]. An ME supporting UICC access to IMS shall perform the reading procedure with EFUICCIARI prior to sending a registration to the IMS. + +### 5.3.4 From Preferred related procedures + +Requirement: service n°17 is "available" in the ISIM Service Table. + +Request: The ME performs the reading procedure with EFFromPreferred. The UE then shall use the From Preferred value in the EFFromPreferred as described in 3GPP TS 24.607 [34] clause 4.5.2.12. + +### 5.3.5 IMS Configuration Data related procedures + +Requirement: service n°18 is "available" in the ISIM Service Table. + +Request: The ME may perform the reading procedure with EFIMSConfigData. If the ME performs the reading procedure with EFIMSConfigData, the UE shall use the IMS Configuration Data in the EFIMSConfigData as described in 3GPP TS 24.229 [32] clause L.2.2.5.1D and 3GPP TS 24.229 [32] clause 6.1.1. + +### 5.3.6 XCAP Configuration Data related procedures + +Requirement: service n°19 is "available" in the ISIM Service Table. + +Request: The ME may perform the reading procedure with EFXCAPConfigData. If the ME performs the reading procedure with EFXCAPConfigData, the UE shall use the EFXCAPConfigData as described in TS 24.623 [40] clause 5.2.1.3 and TS 24.623 [40] clause B.2. + +## 5.4 MCS related procedures + +Requirement: ISIM Service n°15 "available". + +The MCS related procedures by ISIM are the same as MCS related procedures by USIM defined in 3GPP TS 31.102 [2]. + +## 5.5 WebRTC related procedures + +Requirement: ISIM Service n°20 "available". + +Request: The ME may perform the reading procedure with EFWebRTCURI. + +# --- 6 Security features + +The security aspects of IMS are specified in TS 33.203 [14]. This clause gives information related to security features supported by the ISIM with respect to user verification and file access conditions. + +## 6.1 User verification and file access conditions + +The security architecture as defined in TS 31.101 [3] applies to the ISIM and UICC with the following definitions and additions: + +- The ISIM application shall use a global key reference as PIN1 as specified in TS 31.101 [3]. +- For access to DFTELECOM the PIN shall be verified. +- The only valid usage qualifier is '08' which means user authentication knowledge based (PIN) as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 [6]. + +# --- 7 ISIM Commands + +The commands specified in TS 31.101 [3] are supported by ISIM, with the restrictions identified in this clause. + +## 7.1 AUTHENTICATE + +### 7.1.1 Command description + +The function can be used in several different contexts: + +- an IMS AKA security context during the procedure for authenticating the ISIM to its HN and vice versa when IMS AKA authentication data are available. The function shall be used whenever an IMS context shall be established, i.e. when the terminal receives a challenge from the IMS. A cipher key and an integrity key are calculated. For the execution of the command the ISIM uses the subscriber authentication key K, which is stored in the ISIM. +- a HTTP Digest security context, when HTTP Digest authentication data are available. Digest authentication operations are described in IETF RFC 2617 [26]. +- a GBA\_U security context, when a GBA bootstrapping procedure is requested. In this context the function is used in two different modes: + - a) Bootstrapping Mode: during the procedure for mutual authenticating of the ISIM and the Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF) and for deriving Bootstrapped key material from the AKA run. + +- b) NAF Derivation Mode: during the procedure for deriving Network Application Function (NAF) specific keys from previous bootstrapped key material. + - a Local Key Establishment security context, when a Local Key Establishment procedure is requested. + +The function is related to a particular ISIM and shall not be executable unless the ISIM application has been selected and activated, and the current directory is the ISIM ADF or any subdirectory under this ADF and a successful PIN verification procedure has been performed (see clause 5). + +#### 7.1.1.1 IMS AKA security context + +The ISIM first computes the anonymity key $AK = f5_k(RAND)$ and retrieves the sequence number $SQN = (SQN \oplus AK) \oplus AK$ . + +Then the ISIM computes $XMAC = f1_k(SQN \parallel RAND \parallel AMF)$ and compares this with the MAC which is included in AUTN. If they are different, the ISIM abandons the function. + +Next the ISIM verifies that the received sequence number SQN is previously unused. If it is unused and its value is lower than $SQN_{MS}$ , it shall still be accepted if it is among the last 32 sequence numbers generated. A possible verification method is described in TS 33.102 [4]. + +NOTE: This implies that the ISIM has to keep a list of the last used sequence numbers and the length of the list is at least 32 entries. + +If the ISIM detects the sequence numbers to be invalid, this is considered as a synchronisation failure and the ISIM abandons the function. In this case the command response is AUTS, where: + +- $AUTS = Conc(SQN_{MS}) \parallel MACS$ ; +- $Conc(SQN_{MS}) = SQN_{MS} \oplus f5^*_k(RAND)$ is the concealed value of the counter $SQN_{MS}$ in the ISIM; and +- $MACS = f1^*_k(SQN_{MS} \parallel RAND \parallel AMF)$ where: +- $RAND$ is the random value received in the current user authentication request; + +the AMF assumes a dummy value of all zeroes so that it does not need to be transmitted in clear in the resynchronisation message. + +If the sequence number is considered in the correct range, the ISIM computes $RES = f2_k(RAND)$ , the cipher key $CK = f3_k(RAND)$ and the integrity key $IK = f4_k(RAND)$ and includes these in the command response. Note that if this is more efficient, RES, CK and IK could also be computed earlier at any time after receiving RAND. + +The use of AMF is HN specific and while processing the command, the content of the AMF has to be interpreted in the appropriate manner. The AMF may e.g. be used for support of multiple algorithms or keys or for changing the size of lists, see TS 33.102 [4]. + +#### 7.1.1.2 GBA security context (Bootstrapping Mode) + +ISIM operations in GBA security context are supported if service n°2 is "available". + +The ISIM receives the RAND and AUTN\*. The ISIM first computes the anonymity key $AK = f5_k(RAND)$ and retrieves the sequence number $SQN = (SQN \oplus AK) \oplus AK$ . + +The ISIM calculates $IK = f4_k(RAND)$ and MAC (by performing the MAC modification function described in TS 33.220 [25]). Then the ISIM computes $XMAC = f1_k(SQN \parallel RAND \parallel AMF)$ and compares this with the MAC previously produced. If they are different, the ISIM abandons the function. + +Then the ISIM performs the remaining checking of AUTN\* as in IMS security context. If the ISIM detects the sequence numbers to be invalid, this is considered as a synchronisation failure and the ISIM abandons the function. In this case the command response is AUTS, which is computed as in ISIM security context. + +If the sequence number is considered in the correct range, the ISIM computes $RES = f2_k(RAND)$ and the cipher key $CK = f3_k(RAND)$ . + +The ISIM then derives and stores GBA\_U bootstrapped key material from CK, IK values. The ISIM also stores RAND in the RAND field of EFGBABP + +The ISIM stores GBA\_U bootstrapped key material from only one bootstrapping procedure. The previous bootstrapped key material, if present, shall be replaced by the new one. This key material is linked with the data contained in EFGBABP : RAND, which is updated by the ISIM and B-TID, which shall be further updated by the ME. + +NOTE: According to TS 33.220 [25], NAF-specific keys that may be stored on the ISIM are not affected by this bootstrapping operation. + +RES is included in the command response after flipping the least significant bit. + +Input: + +- RAND, AUTN\* + +Output: + +- RES + +or + +- AUTS + +#### 7.1.1.3 GBA security context (NAF Derivation Mode) + +ISIM operations in GBA security context are supported if service n°2 is "available". + +The ISIM receives the NAF\_ID. + +The ISIM performs Ks\_ext\_NAF and Ks\_int\_NAF derivation as defined in TS 33.220 [25] using the key material from the previous GBA\_U bootstrapping procedure and the IMPI value from EFIMPI + +If no key material is available this is considered as a GBA Bootstrapping failure and the ISIM abandons the function. The status word '6985' (Conditions of use not satisfied) is returned. + +Otherwise, the ISIM stores Ks\_int\_NAF and associated B-TID together with NAF\_ID in its memory. The Ks\_int\_NAF keys related to other NAF\_IDs, which are already stored in the ISIM, shall not be affected. The ISIM updates EFGBANL as follows: + +- If a record with the given NAF\_ID already exists, the ISIM updates the B-TID field of this record with the B-TID value associated to the GBA\_U bootstrapped key involved in this GBA\_U NAF derivation procedure. +- If a record with the given NAF\_ID does not exist, the ISIM uses an empty record to store the NAF\_ID and the B-TID value associated to the GBA\_U bootstrapped key involved in this GBA\_U NAF Derivation procedure. + +NOTE: According to TS 33.220 [25], the ISIM can contain several Ks\_int\_NAF together with the associated B-TID and NAF\_ID, but there is at most one pair of Ks\_int\_NAF and associated B-TID stored per NAF\_ID. + +- In case no empty record is available the ISIM shall overwrite an existing record to store the NAF\_ID and the B-TID value associated to the GBA\_U bootstrapped key involved in this GBA\_U NAF Derivation procedure. To determine the record to overwrite, the ISIM shall construct a list of record numbers by storing in the list first position the record number of the last used (i.e. involved in an Authentication command) or derived Ks\_int\_NAF and by shifting down the remaining list elements. The last record number in this list corresponds to the record to overwrite when the ISIM runs out of free records. If an existing record corresponding to a Ks\_int\_NAF key in use is overwritten, the application Ks\_int\_NAF shall not be affected. + +Then, the ISIM returns Ks\_ext\_NAF. + +Input: + +- NAF\_ID + +Output: + +- Ks\_ext\_NAF + +#### 7.1.1.4 HTTP-Digest security context + +ISIM operations in HTTP-Digest security context are supported if service n°3 is "available". + +#### 7.1.1.5 Local Key Establishment security context (Key Derivation mode) + +ISIM operations in this security context are supported if service n°2 and service n°4 are "available". + +The ISIM receives the NAF\_ID corresponding to the NAF Key Centre, the Terminal\_ID, the Terminal\_appli\_ID, the UICC\_appli\_ID, RANDx, the Counter Limit value and the MAC as described in TS 33.110 [28]. + +The ISIM uses the NAF\_ID to identify the Ks\_int\_NAF associated to the NAF Key Centre. If no valid Ks\_int\_NAF is available, this is considered as a Key Establishment failure and the ISIM abandons the function. The status word '6A88' (Referenced data not found) is returned. + +If the Ks\_local key derivation is not authorized by the local UICC policy (e.g. Terminal\_appli\_ID/UICC\_appli\_ID association not authorized or Terminal\_ID value not authorized), the ISIM abandons the function. The status word '6985' (Conditions of use not satisfied) is returned. + +Otherwise, the ISIM retrieves the appropriate Ks\_int\_NAF, derives Ks\_local as described in TS 33.110 [28]. The ISIM verifies the MAC value received from the Terminal as described in TS 33.110 [28]: + +- If the verification is unsuccessful, the ISIM abandons the function and returns the status word '9862' (Authentication error, incorrect MAC). +- If the verification is successful, the ISIM stores Ks\_local and associated parameters Terminal\_ID, Terminal\_appli\_ID, UICC\_appli\_ID, RANDx and the Ks\_local Counter Limit. The ISIM returns the Local Key Establishment Operation Response TLV (indicating a successful Key Derivation operation) and a response MAC, which is derived as described in TS 33.110 [28]. + +The minimum number of Local keys that can be stored by the ISIM shall be defined by the service provider at the pre-issuance of the card. + +In case the maximum number of Local Key was already reached or there is not enough available memory in the ISIM, the ISIM shall overwrite a Local Key and its associated data in order to store the new one. To determine the Ks\_local to overwrite, the ISIM shall construct a list of Ks\_local identifiers by storing in the list first position the Ks\_local identifier of the last used or derived Ks\_local and by shifting down the remaining list elements. The last Ks\_local identifier in this list corresponds to the Ks\_local to overwrite when the ISIM runs out of free memory or when the maximum number of Ks\_local keys is reached. If an existing Ks\_local in use is overwritten, the application using Ks\_local shall not be affected. + +Input: + +Local Key Establishment Mode (Key Derivation mode), Counter Limit, request MAC, Key Identifier (i.e. NAF\_ID, Terminal\_ID, Terminal\_appli\_ID, UICC\_appli\_ID, RANDx) + +Output: + +- Key Derivation operation status, response MAC. + +#### 7.1.1.6 Local Key Establishment security context (Key Availability Check mode) + +ISIM operations in this security context are supported if service n°2 and service n°4 are "available". + +The ISIM receives a Ks\_local identifier. The ISIM checks if a corresponding valid Ks\_local is available. If a valid Ks\_local key is available the Local Key Establishment Operation Response TLV (indicating a successful Key Availability Check operation) is returned. In case no valid Ks\_local key is available the command fails and the status word '6A88' (Referenced data not found) is returned. + +Input: + +Local Key Establishment Mode (Key Availability Check mode), Key identifier (i.e. NAF\_ID, Terminal\_ID, Terminal\_appli\_ID, UICC\_appli\_ID, RANDx). + +Output: + +- Key Availability Check Operation Status. + +### 7.1.2 Command parameters and data + +This command can be used with an EVEN or an ODD instruction (INS) code. The EVEN instruction code can be used when the challenge data provided by the terminal is not TLV encapsulated data and the length of the challenge data provided by the terminal is less than 256 bytes. + +The ODD instruction code shall be used with the security context specified in table 1, when challenge and response data is TLV encapsulated regardless of their length. Terminals and UICCs that do not support security context requiring TLV format (e.g. for Local Key Establishment), do not have to support AUTHENTICATE command with ODD instruction code. + +EVEN INS code + +| Code | Value | +|------|------------------------------------------------------| +| CLA | As specified in TS 31.101 [3] | +| INS | '88' | +| P1 | '00' | +| P2 | See table below | +| Lc | See below | +| Data | See below | +| Le | '00', or maximum length of data expected in response | + +Parameter P2 specifies the authentication context as follows: + +Coding of the reference control P2: + +| Coding b8-b1 | Meaning | +|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| '1-----' | Specific reference data (e.g. DF specific/application dependent key) | +| '-XXXX---' | '0000' | +| '-----XXX' | Authentication context:
000 Reserved
001 IMS AKA
010 HTTP Digest
100 GBA context | + +All other codings are RFU. + +ODD INS code + +The authentication data and the authentication response data are encapsulated in BER-TLV objects structured using tag '73' for BER-TLV structured data and tag '53' otherwise. + +How this command can chain successive blocks of authentication data, or authentication response data is described in TS 31.101 [3]. + +If P1 indicates "First block of authentication data" or "Next block of authentication data": + +Input: + +- Authentication data encapsulated in a BER-TLV data object. + +Output: + +- None. + +| Code | Value | +|------|-------------------------------------| +| CLA | As specified in TS 31.101 [3] | +| INS | '89' | +| P1 | As specified in TS 31.101 [3] | +| P2 | See table 1 below | +| Lc | Length of the subsequent data field | +| Data | Authentication related data | +| Le | Not present | + +If P1 indicates "First block of authentication response data" or "Next block of authentication response data": + +Input: + +- None. + +Output: + +- Authentication response data encapsulated in a BER-TLV data object. + +| Code | Value | +|------|-------------------------------| +| CLA | As specified in TS 31.101 [3] | +| INS | '89' | +| P1 | As specified in TS 31.101 [3] | +| P2 | See table 1 below | +| Lc | Not present | +| Data | Not present | +| Le | Length of the response data | + +Parameter P1 is used to control the data exchange between the terminal and the UICC as defined in TS 31 101 [3]. + +Parameter P2 specifies the authentication context as follows: + +**Table 1: Coding of the reference control P2** + +| Coding b8-b1 | Meaning | +|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------| +| '1-----' | Specific reference data (e.g. DF specific/application dependent key) | +| '---- XXX' | Authentication context:
110 Local Key Establishment mode | + +All other codings are RFU. + +Command parameters/data: + +#### 7.1.2.1 IMS AKA security context + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------------------|---------------------|--------| +| 1 | Length of RAND (L1) | 1 | +| 2 to (L1+1) | RAND | L1 | +| (L1+2) | Length of AUTN (L2) | 1 | +| (L1+3) to (L1+L2+2) | AUTN | L2 | + +The coding of AUTN is described in TS 33.102 [4]. The most significant bit of RAND is coded on bit 8 of byte 2. The most significant bit of AUTN is coded on bit 8 of byte (L1+3). + +Response parameters/data, case 1, command successful: + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | "Successful 3G authentication" tag = 'DB' | 1 | +| 2 | Length of RES (L3) | 1 | +| 3 to (L3+2) | RES | L3 | +| (L3+3) | Length of CK (L4) | 1 | +| (L3+4) to (L3+L4+3) | CK | L4 | +| (L3+L4+4) | Length of IK (L5) | 1 | +| (L3+L4+5) to (L3+L4+L5+4) | IK | L5 | + +The most significant bit of RES is coded on bit 8 of byte 3. The most significant bit of CK is coded on bit 8 of byte (L3+4). The most significant bit of IK is coded on bit 8 of byte (L3+L4+5). + +Response parameters/data, case 2, synchronization failure: + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|-------------|--------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | "Synchronisation failure" tag = 'DC' | 1 | +| 2 | Length of AUTS (L1) | 1 | +| 3 to (L1+2) | AUTS | L1 | + +The coding of AUTS is described in TS 33.102 [4]. The most significant bit of AUTS is coded on bit 8 of byte 3. + +#### 7.1.2.2 HTTP Digest security context + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------------------------|-----------------------|--------| +| 1 | Length of realm (L1) | 1 | +| 2 to (L1+1) | Realm | L1 | +| (L1+2) | Length of nonce (L2) | 1 | +| (L1+3) to (L1+L2+2) | Nonce | L2 | +| (L1+L2+3) | Length of cnonce (L3) | 1 | +| (L1+L2+4) to (L1+L2+L3+3) | Cnonce | L3 | + +The coding of realm, nonce and cnonce are described in IETF RFC 2617 [26]. + +Response parameters/data command successful: + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------------------|------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | "HTTP Digest context reponse" tag = 'DB' | 1 | +| 2 | Length of Response(L4) | 1 | +| 3 to (L4+2) | Response | L4 | +| (L4+3) | Length of Session Key (L5) | 1 | +| (L4+4) to (L4+L5+3) | Session Key | L5 | + +#### 7.1.2.3 GBA security context (Bootstrapping Mode) + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------------------|------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | "GBA Security Context Bootstrapping Mode" tag = 'DD' | 1 | +| 2 | Length of RAND (L1) | 1 | +| 3 to (L1+2) | RAND | L1 | +| (L1+3) | Length of AUTN (L2) | 1 | +| (L1+4) to (L1+L2+3) | AUTN | L2 | + +Response parameters/data, GBA security context (Bootstrapping Mode), synchronisation failure: + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|-------------|--------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | "Synchronisation failure" tag = 'DC' | 1 | +| 2 | Length of AUTS (L1) | 1 | +| 3 to (L1+2) | AUTS | L1 | + +AUTS coded as for IMS Security context. + +Response parameters/data, GBA security context (Bootstrapping Mode), command successful: + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------|---------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | "Successful GBA operation" tag = 'DB' | 1 | +| 2 | Length of RES (L) | 1 | +| 3 to (L+2) | RES | L | + +RES coded as for IMS Security context. + +#### 7.1.2.4 GBA security context (NAF Derivation Mode) + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | "GBA Security Context NAF Derivation Mode" tag = 'DE' | 1 | +| 2 | Length of NAF ID (L1) | 1 | +| 3 to (L1+2) | NAF ID | L1 | + +Response parameters/data, GBA security context (NAF Derivation Mode), command successful: + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------|---------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | "Successful GBA operation" tag = 'DB' | 1 | +| 2 | Length of Ks_ext_NAF (L) | 1 | +| 3 to (L+2) | Ks_ext_NAF | L | + +Coding of Ks\_ext\_NAF as described in TS 33.220 [25]. + +#### 7.1.2.5 Local Key Establishment security context (All Modes) + +The Local Key Establishment Control TLV is included in the command data to indicate the security context mode. The Local Key Establishment Control TLV is also included in the response data to indicate the operation status. + +**Table 2: Coding of the Local Key Establishment Control TLV** + +| Tag Value | Length | Value / Meaning | +|-----------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| '80' | Coded according to ISO/IEC 8825-1 [20] | Local Key Establishment context:
'01': Key Derivation mode
'02': Key Availability Check mode

Operation Status:
'DB': Successful Operation | + +##### 7.1.2.5.1 Local Key Establishment security context (Key Derivation mode) + +Command parameters/data: + +| Byte(s) | Description | Coding | Length | +|------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Key Derivation Data Object tag ('73') | As defined in TS 31.101 [3] for BER-TLV data object | 1 | +| 2 to A+1 bytes (A ≤ 4) | Key Derivation Data Object length (L) | As defined in TS 31.101 [3] for BER-TLV data object | A | +| A+2 to (A+L+1) | Key Derivation Data Object | | L | + +- Key Derivation Data Object content: The TLVs defined in table 3 are included in the Key Derivation Data Object. + +**Table 3: Coding of the Key Derivation Data Object** + +| Description | Value | M/O | Length (bytes) | +|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------------| +| Local Key Establishment Control TLV | Coded as defined in clause 7.1.2.5. The value field shall be set to '01' | M | B | +| Counter Limit tag | '81' | M | 1 | +| Length | C | M | Note 1 | +| Counter Limit | Coded as defined in TS 33.110 [28] | M | C | +| Request MAC tag | '82' | M | 1 | +| Length | D | M | Note 1 | +| Request MAC | Coded as defined in TS 33.110 [28] | M | D (see Note 3) | +| Key Identifier tag | 'A0' | M | 1 | +| Length | E (see Note 2) | M | Note 1 | +| NAF_ID tag | '83' | M | 1 | +| Length | F | M | Note 1 | +| NAF_ID | Coded as defined in TS 33.220 [25] | M | F | +| Terminal_ID tag | '84' | M | 1 | +| Length | G | M | Note 1 | +| Terminal_ID | Coded as defined in TS 33.110 [28] | M | G | +| Terminal_appli_ID tag | '85' | M | 1 | +| Length | H | M | Note 1 | +| Terminal_appli_ID | Coded as defined in TS 33.110 [28] | M | H | +| UICC_appli_ID tag | '86' | M | 1 | +| Length | I | M | Note 1 | +| UICC_appli_ID | Coded as defined in TS 33.110 [28] | M | I | +| RANDx tag | '87' | M | 1 | +| Length | J | M | Note 1 | +| RANDx | Coded as defined in TS 33.110 [28] | M | J (see Note 4) | +| Note 1: | The length is coded according to ISO/IEC 8825-1 [20] | | | +| Note 2: | The Key Identifier TLV is a constructed TLV containing the following primitive TLVs: NAF_ID, Terminal_ID, Terminal_appli_ID, UICC_appli_ID and RANDx. E is the length of the constructed Key Identifier value. | | | +| Note 3: | The most significant bit of the request MAC is coded on bit 8 of the first byte following the MAC Length. | | | +| Note 4: | The most significant bit of the RANDx is coded on bit 8 of the first byte following the RANDx Length. | | | + +Response parameters/data, Local Key Establishment security context (Key Derivation mode), command successful: + +| Byte(s) | Description | Coding | Length | +|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Key Derivation Operation Response Data Object tag ('73') | As defined in TS 31.101 [3] for BER-TLV data object | 1 | +| 2 to A1+1 bytes (A1 ≤ 4) | Key Derivation Operation Response Data Object length (L1) | As defined in TS 31.101 [3] for BER-TLV data object | A1 | +| A1+2 to (A1+L1+1) | Key Derivation Operation Response Data Object | | L1 | + +- Key Derivation Operation Response Data Object content: The TLVs defined in table 4 are included in the Key Derivation Operation Response Data Object. + +**Table 4: Coding of the Key Derivation Operation Response Data Object** + +| Description | Value | M/O | Length (bytes) | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------------| +| Local Key Establishment Control TLV | Coded as defined in clause 7.1.2.5. The value field shall be set to 'DB' | M | B | +| Response MAC tag | '82' | M | 1 | +| Length | C | M | Note 1 | +| Response MAC | Coded as defined in TS 33.110 [28] | M | C (see Note 2) | +| Note 1: The length is coded according to ISO/IEC 8825-1 [20]
Note 2: The most significant bit of the response MAC is coded on bit 8 of the first byte following the MAC length. | | | | + +##### 7.1.2.5.2 Local Key Establishment security context (Key Availability Check mode) + +Command parameters/data: + +| Byte(s) | Description | Coding | Length | +|------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Key Availability Check Data Object tag ('73') | As defined in TS 31.101 [3] for BER-TLV data object | 1 | +| 2 to 1+A bytes (A ≤ 4) | Key Availability Check Data Object length (L) | As defined in TS 31.101 [3] for BER-TLV data object | A | +| A+2 to (A+L+1) | Key Availability Check Data Object | | L | + +- Key Availability Check Data Object content: The TLVs defined in table 5 are included in the Key Availability Check Data Object. + +**Table 5: Coding of the Key Availability Check Data Object** + +| Description | Value | M/O | Length (bytes) | +|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------------| +| Local Key Establishment Control TLV | Coded as defined in clause 7.1.2.5. The value field shall be set to '02' | M | B | +| Key Identifier TLV | Coded as defined in clause 7.1.2.5.1 | M | C | + +Response parameters/data, Local Key Establishment security context (Key Availability Check mode), command successful: + +| Byte(s) | Description | Coding | Length | +|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Key Availability Check Operation Response Data Object tag ('73') | As defined in TS 31.101 [3] for BER-TLV data object | 1 | +| 2 to 1+A1 bytes (A1 ≤ 4) | Key Availability Check Operation Response Data Object length (L1) | As defined in TS 31.101 [3] for BER-TLV data object | A1 | +| A1+2 to (A1+L1+1) | Key Availability Check Operation Response Data Object | | L1 | + +- Key Availability Check Operation Response Data Object content: The TLV defined in table 6 is included in the Key Availability Check Operation Response Data Object. + +**Table 6: Coding of the Key Availability Check Operation Response Data Object** + +| Description | Value | M/O | Length (bytes) | +|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------------| +| Local Key Establishment Control TLV | Coded as defined in clause 7.1.2.5. The value field shall be set to 'DB' | M | B | + +### 7.1.3 Status Conditions Returned by the ISIM + +Status of the card after processing of the command is coded in the status bytes SW1 and SW2. This clause specifies coding of the status bytes in the following tables. + +#### 7.1.3.1 Security management + +| SW1 | SW2 | Error description | +|------|------|--------------------------------------------------------| +| '98' | '62' | - Authentication error, incorrect MAC | +| '98' | '64' | - Authentication error, security context not supported | + +#### 7.1.3.2 Status Words of the Commands + +The following table shows for each command the possible status conditions returned (marked by an asterisk \*). + +**Commands and status words** + +| Status Words | AUTHENTICATE | +|--------------------------|--------------| +| 90 00 | * | +| 91 XX | * | +| 93 00 | | +| 98 50 | | +| 98 62 | * | +| 98 64 | * | +| 62 00 | * | +| 62 81 | | +| 62 82 | | +| 62 83 | | +| 62 F1 | * | +| 62 F3 | * | +| 63 CX | | +| 63 F1 | * | +| 64 00 | * | +| 65 00 | * | +| 65 81 | * | +| 67 00 | * | +| 67 XX – (see note) | * | +| 68 00 | * | +| 68 81 | * | +| 68 82 | * | +| 69 81 | | +| 69 82 | * | +| 69 83 | | +| 69 84 | * | +| 69 85 | * | +| 69 86 | | +| 6A 80 | | +| 6A 81 | * | +| 6A 82 | | +| 6A 83 | | +| 6A 86 | * | +| 6A 87 | | +| 6A 88 | * | +| 6B 00 | * | +| 6E 00 | * | +| 6F 00 | * | +| 6F XX – (see note) | * | +| NOTE: Except SW2 = '00'. | | + +## 7.2 GET CHALLENGE + +The GET CHALLENGE command is optional for the ISIM application. + +# --- 8 Void + +# Annex A (informative): EF changes via Data Download or USAT applications + +This annex defines if changing the content of an EF by the network (e.g. by sending an SMS) or by a USAT Application is advisable. Updating of certain EFs "over the air" could result in unpredictable behaviour of the UE; these are marked "Caution" in the table below. Certain EFs are marked "No"; under no circumstances should "over the air" changes of these EFs be considered. + +| File identification | Description | Change advised | +|---------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------| +| '6F02' | IMS private user identity | Caution (note 1) | +| '6F03' | Home Network Domain Name | Caution (note 1) | +| '6F04' | IMS public user identity | Caution (note 1) | +| '6FAD' | Administrative Data | Caution | +| '6F06' | Access Rule Reference | Caution | +| '6F07' | ISIM Service Table | Caution | +| '6F09' | P-CSCF address | Caution (note 1) | +| '6FD5' | GBA Bootstrapping parameters | Caution | +| '6FD7' | GBA NAF List | Caution | +| '6FDD' | NAF Key Centre Address | Caution | +| '6F3C' | Short messages | Yes | +| '6F42' | SMS parameters | Yes | +| '6F43' | SMS status | Yes | +| '6F47' | Short message status reports | Yes | +| '6FE5' | Public Service Identity of the SM-SC | Yes | +| '6FE7' | UICC IARI | Caution (note 2) | +| '6FF7' | From Preferred | Yes | +| '6FF8' | IMSConfigData | Caution (note 1) | +| '6FFC' | XCAP Configuration Data | Yes | +| '6FFA' | WebRTC URI | Yes | +| '6FFE' | MuD and MiD configuration data | Yes | + +NOTE 1: If EFIMPI, EFIMPU, EFDOMAIN, P-CSCF or IMSConfigData are changed, the UICC should issue a REFRESH command. + +NOTE 2: If EFUICCIARI is changed, the UICC shall issue a REFRESH command as defined in TS 31.111 [31]. The ME shall read the updated list of IARIs associated with active applications installed on the UICC. + +# Annex B (informative): Tags defined in 31.103 + +| Tag | Name of Data Element | Usage | +|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| '80' | NAF_ID | EF GBANL | +| '80' | NAI TLV data object | EF IMPI | +| '80' | P-CSCF TLV data object | EF P-CSCF | +| '80' | URI TLV data object | EF IMPU , EF DOMAIN , EF WebRTCURI | +| '80' | XCAP_conn_params_policy TLV TAG | EF XCAPConfigData | +| '80' | IMS configuration data encoding | EF IMSConfigData | +| '80' | MuD and MiD configuration data encoding | EF MuDMiDConfigData | +| '81' | IMS configuration data | EF IMSConfigData | +| '81' | B-TID | EF GBANL | +| '81' | MuD and MiD configuration data | EF MuDMiDConfigData | +| 'A0' | XCAP_conn_params_policy part tag
The following tags are encapsulated within 'A0'
'81' AccessForXCAP Tag
'82' Number of XCAP connection parameters policy part TLV's Tag
'A1' XCAP connection parameters policy part tag | EF XCAPConfigData | +| 'A1' | XCAP connection parameters policy part tag
The following tags are encapsulated within 'A1'
'81' Access Tag
'82' Application name Tag
'83' Provider ID Tag
'84' URI Tag
'85' XCAP Authentication User Name Tag
'86' XCAP Authentication password Tag
'87'...XCAP Authentication type Tag
'88'...Address type Tag
'89'...Address Tag
'8A'...PDP Authentication type Tag
'8B'...PDP Authentication Name Tag
'8C'...PDP Authentication Secret Tag | EF XCAPConfigData | +| 'DB' | Successful IMS authentication | Response to AUTHENTICATE "IMS AKA security context" | +| 'DB' | HTTP Digest Context response | Response to AUTHENTICATE "HTTP Digest security context" | +| 'DB' | Successful GBA operation | Response to AUTHENTICATE "GBA security context" | +| 'DC' | Synchronisation failure | Response to AUTHENTICATE "IMS AKA security context" or "GBA security context (Bootstrapping Mode)" | +| 'DD' | GBA Security Context Bootstrapping Mode | AUTHENTICATE "GBA security context" | +| 'DE' | GBA Security Context NAF Derivation Mode | AUTHENTICATE "GBA security context" | + +NOTE: the value 'FF' is an invalid tag value. For ASN.1 tag assignment rules see ISO/IEC 8825-1 [20] + +# Annex C (informative): Suggested contents of the EFs at pre-personalization + +If EFs have an unassigned value, it may not be clear from the main text what this value should be. This annex suggests values in these cases. + +| File Identification | Description | Value | +|---------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------| +| '6F02' | IMS private user identity | '8000FF...FF' | +| '6F03' | Home Network Domain Name | '8000FF...FF' | +| '6F04' | IMS public user identity | '8000FF...FF' | +| '6FAD' | Administrative Data | Operator dependent | +| '6F06' | Access Rule Reference | Card issuer/operator dependent | +| '6FD5' | GBA Bootstrapping parameters | 'FF...FF' | +| '6F07' | ISIM Service Table | Operator dependent | +| '6F09' | P-CSCF address | Operator dependent | +| '6FD7' | GBA NAF List | 'FF...FF' | +| '6FDD' | NAF Key Centre Address | 'FF...FF' | +| '6FE7' | UICC IARI | Operator dependent | +| '6FF7' | From Preferred | '00' | +| '6FF8' | IMSConfigData | Operator dependent | +| '6FFC' | XCAP Configuration Data | Operator dependent | +| '6FFA' | WebRTC URI | Operator dependent | +| '6FFE' | MuD and MiD Configuration Data | Operator dependent | + +# --- Annex D (informative): List of SFI Values + +This annex lists SFI values assigned in the present document. + +## --- D.1 List of SFI Values at the ISIM ADF Level + +| File Identification | SFI | Description | +|---------------------|------|---------------------------| +| '6F02' | '02' | IMS private user identity | +| '6F03' | '05' | Home Network Domain Name | +| '6F04' | '04' | IMS public user identity | +| '6FAD' | '03' | Administrative Data | +| '6F06' | '06' | Access Rule Reference | +| '6F07' | '07' | ISIM Service Table | + +All other SFI values are reserved for future use. + +# Annex E (informative): ISIM Application Session Activation / Termination + +The purpose of this annex is to illustrate the different Application Session procedures. + +![Sequence diagram of ISIM Application Session Activation procedure](aeb2a26a07219661191294dba528067a_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram illustrating the ISIM Application Session Activation procedure between a Terminal and a UICC. + +The diagram shows the following steps: + +- Application selection**: The Terminal sends a **Select AID=ISIM** command to the UICC. +- Application initialisation procedure**: The Terminal sends a series of commands to the UICC, including **Select File**, **Read Binary**, and ellipsis (**...**). +- Application initialisation procedure is terminated**: The Terminal sends a **Status (P1='01')** command to the UICC. + +Sequence diagram of ISIM Application Session Activation procedure + +**Figure E.1: ISIM Application Session Activation procedure** + +![Sequence diagram of ISIM Application Session Termination procedure](adc59ed6840bcb2d392ea323abfccedc_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram illustrating the ISIM Application Session Termination procedure between a Terminal and a UICC. + +The diagram shows the following steps: + +- Application termination procedure is started**: The Terminal sends a **Status (P1='02')** command to the UICC. +- Application termination procedure**: The Terminal sends a series of commands to the UICC, including **Select File**, **Update Binary**, and ellipsis (**...**). +- Application closure**: The Terminal sends a **Select AID=ISIM (P2='4X')** command to the UICC. + +Sequence diagram of ISIM Application Session Termination procedure + +**Figure E.2: ISIM Application Session Termination procedure** + +# Annex F (informative): Change History + +The table below indicates all CRs that have been incorporated into the present document since it was initially approved. + +| TSG # | TSG TD# | WG TD# | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New | +|---------|-----------|-----------|------|-----|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| TP-16 | TP-020124 | - | - | - | - | Initial version for information and approval in one step
Comment:
T#16 approved the specification to be part of Rel-5. The only changes to v1.0.0 are in the references clause for the reference in [16] | 1.0.0 | +| TP-17 | TP-020211 | - | 001 | - | F | Corrections | 5.1.0 | +| TP-18 | TP-020281 | - | 002 | - | F | Replace reference to TS 31.110 by reference to ETSI TS 101 220 | 6.0.0 | +| TP-18 | TP-020281 | - | 003 | - | F | Management of last selected ISIM | | +| TP-18 | TP-020281 | - | 004 | - | D | Gather all 3GPP-specific card platform requirements into TS 31.101, and remove them from TS 31.103.
NOTE: This CR created Rel-6 of TS 31.103. | | +| TP-19 | TP-030019 | - | 006 | - | F | Alignment with the Stage 2 terminology | 6.1.0 | +| TP-20 | TP-030122 | - | 008 | - | A | Clarification that the home operator's network domain name is a SIP URI. | 6.2.0 | +| TP-23 | TP-040025 | - | 012 | - | | Essential corrections to remove Session Keys | 6.3.0 | +| TP-23 | TP-040025 | - | 014 | - | | Creation of an ISIM Service Table | | +| TP-23 | TP-040067 | - | 013 | - | | New EF for P-CSCF Addresses in ISIM | | +| TP-24 | TP-040102 | - | 015 | - | F | Clarification that the P-CSCF address shall not be used by a 3GPP terminal accessing a Interworking WLAN | 6.4.0 | +| TP-25 | TP-040182 | - | 017 | - | B | GBAU ME-ISIM interface | 6.5.0 | +| TP-25 | TP-040182 | - | 016 | - | B | New 3GPP2 IMS authentication context in ISIM | 6.5.0 | +| TP-26 | TP-040257 | - | 019 | - | B | Storage of the lifetime of the GBA_U bootstrapped keys | 6.6.0 | +| TP-26 | TP-040257 | - | 021 | - | F | Correction of non specific references | 6.6.0 | +| TP-27 | TP-050019 | T3-050126 | 022 | - | A | Reservation of file IDs under ADF ISIM | 6.7.0 | +| TP-27 | TP-050019 | T3-050182 | 024 | - | F | Completion of GBA_U-related procedures | 6.7.0 | +| TP-27 | TP-050019 | T3-050185 | 025 | - | F | Storage of NAF-keys identifiers in GBA_U | 6.7.0 | +| CT-28 | TP-050136 | C6-050416 | 027 | - | A | ISO/IEC 7816-series revision | 6.8.0 | +| CT-29 | CP-050330 | C6-050731 | 029 | 1 | A | Default Record for EFIMPU | 6.9.0 | +| CT-29 | CP-050335 | C6-050693 | 030 | - | F | Corrections of EFIST Service No. referencing | 6.9.0 | +| CT-29 | CP-050335 | C6-050694 | 031 | - | F | Changes in Application Protocol due to the use of ISIM Service Table | 6.9.0 | +| CT-30 | CP-050492 | C6-050885 | 035 | - | F | Subscription related procedures | 6.10.0 | +| CT-30 | CP-050492 | C6-050904 | 033 | - | F | Encoding of IMPI, IMPU and Domain | 6.10.0 | +| CT-32 | CP-060243 | C6-060282 | 0036 | - | F | Add missing EF in ISIM file structure | 7.0.0 | +| CT-32 | CP-060243 | C6-060319 | 0037 | - | F | Update of the table summarizing the tags defined in 31.103 | 7.0.0 | +| CT-33 | CP-060386 | C6-060511 | 0040 | 1 | | Correction of ISIM Service Table | 7.1.0 | +| CT-33 | CP-060386 | C6-060514 | 0043 | 1 | | Coding of P2 | 7.1.0 | +| CT-36 | CP-070294 | C6-070314 | 0045 | 1 | A | HTTP-Digest security request | 7.2.0 | +| CT-36 | CP-070291 | C6-070317 | 0048 | - | A | Correction of coding of home network domain name in EF-DOMAIN | 7.2.0 | +| CT-36 | CP-070465 | - | 0050 | - | A | GBA NAF Keys storage policy | 7.2.0 | +| 2007-06 | - | - | - | - | - | MCC correction to CR0048 implementation (reference to [9]) | 7.2.1 | +| CT-37 | CP-070620 | C6-070418 | 0051 | 2 | B | Key Establishment mechanism: alignment with TS 33.110 | 7.3.0 | +| CT-41 | CP-080584 | C6-080416 | 0055 | 1 | A | Authentication of GBA | 7.4.0 | +| CT-41 | CP-080585 | C6-080274 | 0053 | 1 | B | Introduction of support for IMS local breakout | 8.0.0 | +| ----- | - | - | - | - | - | - correction of change history
- correction of formatting in file structure (clause 4.3)
- update of front cover/copyright/logos for LTE | 8.0.1 | +| CT-43 | CP-090453 | C6-090174 | 0057 | - | A | IMS public user identity for emergency registration | 8.1.0 | +| CT-46 | CP-091011 | C6-090479 | 0065 | 1 | F | References update | 8.2.0 | +| CT-46 | CP-091012 | C6-090461 | 0063 | 1 | F | Correction to application session termination | 9.0.0 | +| -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | Corrupted clauses numbering fixed | 9.0.1 | +| CT-49 | CP-100585 | C6-100402 | 0067 | 1 | A | Introduction of a DF_TELECOM EF to support Public Service Identity for SMS over IP | 9.1.0 | +| CT-50 | CP-100824 | C6-100627 | 0068 | - | B | Addition of CALL CONTROL indicator in the IST | 10.0.0 | +| CT-51 | CP-110241 | C6-110073 | 0071 | 1 | A | Introduction of Data Download via SMS-PP service indication in EF IST | 10.1.0 | +| CT-51 | CP-110306 | | 0072 | 2 | B | Introduction of the IARI list in the ISIM | 10.1.0 | +| SP-57 | | | | | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-11 | 11.0.0 | +| CT-58 | CP-120870 | C6-120520 | 0080 | 1 | F | Update of reference to ASN.1 coding specification | 11.1.0 | +| CT-58 | | | | | | Sanity check according to C6-120554 agreed at C6 #66. | 11.1.0 | + +| | | | | | | | | +|---------|-----------|-----------|--------|---|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| CT-60 | CP-130363 | C6-130171 | 0081 | 1 | C | Add support for 98 64 status words for AUTHENTICATE command | 12.0.0 | +| CT-63 | CP-140163 | C6-140094 | 0093 | | A | Correction of SMS storage procedures for ISIM | 12.1.0 | +| CT-64 | CP-140424 | C6-140277 | 0086 | 2 | A | New UICC service in IST for URI support | 12.2.0 | +| CT-68 | CP-150381 | C6-140291 | 0094 | 1 | B | URI support for SMS indicator in ISIM | 13.0.0 | +| CT-68 | CP-150394 | C6-140312 | 0095 | 2 | B | Support of Enhanced IMS Call Control by ISIM | 13.0.0 | +| CT-72 | CP-160350 | C6-160275 | 0099 | | B | Addition of MCPTT configuration parameters | 13.1.0 | +| CT-74 | CP-160789 | C6-160623 | 0101 | 3 | B | URI support for SMS-PP DOWNLOAD indicator in IST | 14.0.0 | +| CT-74 | CP-160795 | C6-160620 | 0105 | 1 | B | Support of OIP OIR Policy
Note: reference to 3GPP TS 24.417 not added during implementation as not used in the CR. | 14.0.0 | +| CT-74 | CP-160820 | | 0102 | 4 | B | Default EPS bearer context usage restriction policy configuration | 14.0.0 | +| CT-75 | CP-170166 | CP-170047 | 0075 | | F | Geolocalization API document alignment | 14.1.0 | +| | | | | | | Implementation error (Version updated) | 14.1.1 | +| CT-76 | CP-171162 | C6-170276 | 0112 | 1 | B | New Emerg-request timer defined with configurable values | 14.2.0 | +| CT-76 | CP-171162 | C6-170295 | 0107 | 5 | B | XCAP configuration parameters | 14.2.0 | +| CT-76 | CP-171166 | C6-170268 | 0108 | 1 | B | Estimated P-CSCF recover time node | 14.2.0 | +| CT-77 | CP-172066 | C6-170486 | 0113 | 2 | B | WebRTC Web Server Function discovery | 15.0.0 | +| CT-78 | CP-173143 | C6-170715 | 0109r4 | 4 | B | Registration handling when VoPS not supported node | 15.1.0 | +| CT-78 | CP-173135 | C6-170704 | 0119 | 1 | A | Correction of file ID for EFXCAPConfigData | 15.1.0 | +| CT78 | CP-173136 | C6-170707 | 0120 | 1 | A | Propagation of MCPTT fixes to Rel-15 | 15.1.0 | +| CT-79 | CP-180128 | C6-180053 | 0123 | 1 | A | Removal of Estimated P-CSCF Recover Time timer | 15.2.0 | +| CT-79 | CP-180131 | C6-180073 | 0124 | 1 | B | Configuration parameter for handover between WLAN and EPS | 15.2.0 | +| CT-81 | CP-182187 | C6-180537 | 0126 | 2 | B | Mission Critical Services configuration data update to ISIM | 15.3.0 | +| CT-82 | CP-183142 | C6-180614 | 0128 | - | F | Default QoS flow usage restriction policy | 15.4.0 | +| CT-82 | CP-183141 | C6-180680 | 0129 | 2 | F | New Timer for emergency call attempt in non-3GPP access | 15.4.0 | +| CT-82 | CP-183141 | C6-180691 | 0130 | 1 | F | Correction on implementation of CR0125 | 15.4.0 | +| 2019-03 | CP-190044 | C6-190024 | 0132 | - | A | Fix omission of SMS_Over_IP_Networks_Indication in EFIMSConfigData | 15.5.0 | +| 2020-01 | | | | | | 5G logo updated in a cover page as agreed in CT#86 | 15.5.1 | +| 2020-03 | CP-200089 | C6-200183 | 0133 | 1 | B | Configuration file for MuD and MiD services | 16.0.0 | +| 2020-09 | CP-202130 | C6-200648 | 0134 | 1 | A | Update of spec. reference | 16.1.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31104/4dadfd8b8240e9d83f974e3f0fdd18df_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31104/4dadfd8b8240e9d83f974e3f0fdd18df_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..19c147af31e19596f3e23debf3be3bd3552164b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31104/4dadfd8b8240e9d83f974e3f0fdd18df_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:d6cf9fcd003141791fa88a241f9f911970a5c7e0dfbb0c07d1b97829003a01a6 +size 27196 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31104/55a593259a0749ce342bd5eac2ba6b58_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31104/55a593259a0749ce342bd5eac2ba6b58_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b7a95f705f9221715add5b78fccba00b9e8ff57a --- /dev/null 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+1,693 @@ + + + + + + +# Contents + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 5 | +| Introduction ..... | 5 | +| 1 Scope..... | 6 | +| 2 References..... | 6 | +| 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations..... | 7 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 7 | +| 3.2 Symbols..... | 7 | +| 3.3 Abbreviations ..... | 7 | +| 3.4 Coding Conventions..... | 8 | +| 4 Files..... | 8 | +| 4.0 Overview ..... | 8 | +| 4.1 Contents of the Efs at the MF level..... | 8 | +| 4.2 Contents of files at the HPSIM ADF (Application DF) level..... | 8 | +| 4.2.0 HPSIM ADF overview and card issuer-reserved file identifiers..... | 8 | +| 4.2.1 EF ARR (Access Rule Reference) ..... | 9 | +| 4.2.2 EF IMSI (IMSI)..... | 9 | +| 4.2.3 EF AD (Administrative Data)..... | 9 | +| 4.3 HPSIM file structure ..... | 11 | +| 5 Application Protocol ..... | 11 | +| 5.0 Overview of HPSIM selection and HPSIM-related procedures..... | 11 | +| 5.1 HPSIM management procedures..... | 11 | +| 5.1.1 Initialisation..... | 11 | +| 5.1.1.1 HPSIM application selection ..... | 11 | +| 5.1.1.2 HPSIM initialisation ..... | 11 | +| 5.1.2 HPSIM Session termination ..... | 12 | +| 5.1.3 HPSIM application closure..... | 12 | +| 5.1.4 UICC presence detection..... | 12 | +| 5.2 HPSIM security related procedures..... | 12 | +| 5.2.1 Authentication procedure ..... | 12 | +| 5.2.2 IMSI request ..... | 12 | +| 5.3 Subscription related procedures ..... | 13 | +| 5.3.1 Location Information acquisition procedures..... | 13 | +| 6 Security features..... | 13 | +| 6.0 Generic security..... | 13 | +| 6.1 User verification and file access conditions..... | 13 | +| 7 HPSIM commands ..... | 14 | +| 7.0 Generic commands..... | 14 | +| 7.1 AUTHENTICATE ..... | 14 | +| 7.1.1 Command description..... | 14 | +| 7.1.2 Command parameters and data..... | 14 | +| 7.1.3 Status Conditions Returned by the HPSIM ..... | 16 | +| 7.1.3.0 Status Condition structure..... | 16 | +| 7.1.3.1 Security management..... | 16 | +| 7.1.3.2 Status Words of the Commands..... | 16 | +| 8 HPSIM remote management..... | 17 | +| 8.1 General functionality..... | 17 | +| 8.2 Remote application and file management..... | 17 | +| 8.3 Bearer Independent Protocol..... | 17 | +| 8.4 Proactive Polling ..... | 17 | +| 8.5 Polling a remote server..... | 17 | + +**Annex A (informative): EF changes via remote management or USAT application..... 18** + +**Annex B (informative): Suggested content of the Efs at pre-personalization..... 19** + +**Annex C (informative): List of SFI values..... 20** + +C.1 List of SFI Values at the HPSIM ADF Level..... 20 + +**Annex D (informative): Change history..... 21** + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- Y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- Z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- Introduction + +The present document defines the Hosting Party Subscription Identity Module (HPSIM) application. This application resides on the UICC, an IC card specified in TS 31.101 [3]. In particular, TS 31.101 [3] specifies the application independent properties of the UICC/terminal interface such as the physical characteristics and the logical structure. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document applies to a H(e)NB supporting the HPSIM for H(e)NB Hosting Party authentication. The present document defines the HPSIM application, the UICC application residing in the Hosting Party Module for H(e)NB Hosting Party authentication and provisioning. + +The present document specifies + +- identification of the Hosting Party +- security mechanism, e.g. authentication based on EAP-AKA method +- support of information for the initial provisioning (e.g. O&M system contact) +- initialisation procedure on H(e)NB-UICC interface +- O&M procedure + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TS 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TS 33.320: "Security of Home Node B (HNB)/ Home evolved Node B (HeNB)". +- [3] 3GPP TS 31.101: "UICC-Terminal Interface, Physical and Logical Characteristics". +- [4] 3GPP TS 22.220: "Service requirements for Home Node B (HNB)/ Home eNode B (HeNB)". +- [5] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3G Security; Security Architecture". +- [6] ISO/IEC 7816-4: "Integrated circuit cards, Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange". +- [7] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the USIM application". +- [8] 3GPP TS 25.467: "UTRAN architecture for 3G Home NodeB (HNB)". +- [9] IETF RFC 3629 (2003): "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646". +- [10] ISO/IEC 8825-1 (2008): "Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules : Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)". +- [11] ETSI TS 101 220: "Smart Cards; ETSI numbering system for telecommunication application providers". +- [12] Void. +- [13] 3GPP TS 33.401: "3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security architecture". +- [14] 3GPP TS 32.583: "Telecommunications management; Home Node B (HNB) Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning (OAM&P); Procedure flows for Type 1 interface HNB to HNB Management System (HMS)". + +- [15] 3GPP TS 32.593: "Telecommunications management; Home Node B (HeNB) Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning (OAM&P); Procedure flows for Type 1 interface HeNB to HeNB Management System (HeMS)". +- [16] Void. +- [17] 3GPP TS 36.413, "S1 Application Protocol". +- [18] 3GPP TS 31.115: "Secured packet structure for (U)SIM Toolkit applications" +- [19] 3GPP TS 31.116: "Remote APDU structure for (U)SIM Toolkit applications" +- [20] 3GPP TS 31.111: "USIM application toolkit" + +# 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [1], TS 22.220 [4] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1] and TS 22.220 [4]. + +**HPSIM:** UICC application residing on the Hosting Party Module, providing necessary mechanism for H(e)NB Hosting Party authentication and provisioning. + +## 3.2 Symbols + +For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: + +| | | +|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | Concatenation | +| ⊕ | Exclusive or | +| f1 | Message authentication function used to compute MAC | +| f1* | A message authentication code (MAC) function with the property that no valuable information can be inferred from the function values of f1* about those of f1, ... , f5 and vice versa | +| f2 | Message authentication function used to compute RES and XRES | +| f3 | Key generating function used to compute CK | +| f4 | Key generating function used to compute IK | +| f5 | Key generating function used to compute AK | + +## 3.3 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]. + +| | | +|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------| +| FQDN | Fully Qualified Domain Name | +| HeMS | Home eNodeB Management System | +| HeNB | Home evolved NodeB | +| HeNB-GW | HeNB Gateway | +| HMS | HNB Management System | +| HNB | Home NodeB | +| HNB-GW | Home NodeB Gateway | +| HPSIM | Hosting Party Subscription Identity Module. | +| H(e)MS | HMS or HeMS | +| H(e)NB | HNB or HeNB | +| H(e)NB-GW | HNB-GW or HeNB-GW | +| K | Long-term secret Key shared between the HPSIM and the AuC | +| MME | Mobility Management Entity | + +## 3.4 Coding Conventions + +The following coding conventions apply to the present document. + +All lengths are presented in bytes, unless otherwise stated. Each byte is represented by bits b8 to b1, where b8 is the most significant bit (MSB) and b1 is the least significant bit (LSB). In each representation, the leftmost bit is the MSB. + +The coding of Data Objects in the present document is according to TS 31.101 [3]. + +'XX': Single quotes indicate hexadecimal values. Valid elements for hexadecimal values are the numbers '0' to '9' and 'A' to 'F'. + +# 4 Files + +## 4.0 Overview + +Clause 4 of the present document specifies the Efs for the H(e)NB session defining access conditions, data items and coding. A data item is a part of an EF which represents a complete logical entity. + +## 4.1 Contents of the Efs at the MF level + +There are four Efs at the Master File (MF) level. These Efs are specified in TS 31.101 [3]. + +## 4.2 Contents of files at the HPSIM ADF (Application DF) level + +### 4.2.0 HPSIM ADF overview and card issuer-reserved file identifiers + +The Efs in the HPSIM ADF contain service and network related information and are required for H(e)NB to operate in a 3GPP environment. + +The File Ids '6F1X' (for Efs), '5F1X' and '5F2X' (for DFs) with X ranging from '0' to 'F' are reserved under the HPSIM ADF for administrative use by the card issuer. + +### 4.2.1 EFARR (Access Rule Reference) + +This EF contains the access rules for files located under the HPSIM ADF in the UICC. If the security attribute tag '8B' is indicated in the FCP it contains a reference to a record in this file. + +**Structure of EFARR at ADF-level** + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------|---------|------|-----|--|--|--------|-----|--|--|------------|-----|--|--|----------|-----|--|--| +| Identifier: '6F06' | Structure: Linear fixed | Mandatory | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| SFI: '06' | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| Record Length: X bytes | Update activity: low | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ ALW
UPDATE ADM
DEACTIVATE ADM
ACTIVATE ADM
| | | | READ | ALW | | | UPDATE | ADM | | | DEACTIVATE | ADM | | | ACTIVATE | ADM | | | +| READ | ALW | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| UPDATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| DEACTIVATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| ACTIVATE | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O | Length | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 1 to X | Access Rule TLV data objects | M | X bytes | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + +This EF contains one or more records containing access rule information according to the reference to expanded format as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 [6]. Each record represents an access rule. Unused bytes in the record are set to 'FF'. + +If the card cannot access EFARR, any attempt to access a file with access rules indicated in this EFARR shall not be granted. + +### 4.2.2 EFIMSI (IMSI) + +This EF contains the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI). + +An HPSIM shall be provisioned with an IMSI value as defined in TS 33.320 [2]. + +| | | | | | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|-----------|---------|--|--| +| Identifier: '6F07' | Structure: transparent | Mandatory | | | | +| SFI: '07' | | | | | | +| File size: 9 bytes | Update activity: low | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ                                PIN
UPDATE                            ADM
DEACTIVATE                    ADM
ACTIVATE                        ADM | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O | Length | | | +| 1 | Length of IMSI | M | 1 byte | | | +| 2 to 9 | IMSI | M | 8 bytes | | | + +For the content and coding, refer to TS 31.102 [7]. + +### 4.2.3 EFAD (Administrative Data) + +This EF contains information concerning the mode of operation according to the type of HPSIM, such as normal (to be used by Hosting Party for H(e)NB operation), type approval (to allow specific use of the H(e)NB during type approval procedures of e.g. the network equipment), manufacturer specific (to allow the H(e)NB manufacturer to perform specific proprietary auto-test in its H(e)NB during e.g. maintenance phases). + +It also provides an indication of whether some H(e)NB features should be activated during normal operation. + +| | | | | | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------|---------|--|--| +| Identifier: '6FAD' | Structure: transparent | Mandatory | | | | +| SFI: '03' | | | | | | +| File size: 4+X bytes | Update activity: low | | | | | +| Access Conditions:
READ                                ALW
UPDATE                            ADM
DEACTIVATE                    ADM
ACTIVATE                        ADM | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O | Length | | | +| 1 | H(e)NB operation mode | M | 1 byte | | | +| 2 to 3 | Additional information | M | 2 bytes | | | +| 4 | length of MNC in the IMSI | M | 1 byte | | | +| 5 to 4+X | RFU | O | X bytes | | | + +- H(e)NB operation mode: + +Contents: + +- mode of operation for the H(e)NB. + +Coding: + +- Initial value + - '00' normal operation. + - '80' type approval operations. + - '01' normal operation + specific facilities. + - '81' type approval operations + specific facilities. + - '02' maintenance (off line). + +- Additional information: + +Coding: + +- specific facilities (if b1=1 in byte 1); + +Bytes 2 and 3 (first byte of additional information): + +![](c2fc2621e8206d24427b56bcb2398fc0_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | B3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | | + +RFU (see TS 31.101 [31]) + +- Length of MNC in the IMSI: + +Contents: + +The length indicator refers to the number of digits, used for extracting the MNC from the IMSI + +Coding: + +Byte 4: + +![](4dadfd8b8240e9d83f974e3f0fdd18df_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | B2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | | + +This value codes the number of digits of the MNC in the IMSI. Only the values '0010' and '0011' are currently specified, all other values are reserved for future use. +RFU (see TS 31.101 [31]) + +## 4.3 HPSIM file structure + +This clause contains a figure depicting the file structure of the ADFHPSIM. + +![Diagram showing the file structure of the ADF_HPSIM directory. The root is ADF_HPSIM, which branches into three files: EF_ARR (6F06), EF_IMSI (6F07), and EF_AD (6FAD).](55a593259a0749ce342bd5eac2ba6b58_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + ADF_HPSIM[ADFHPSIM] --> EF_ARR["EFARR +'6F06'"] + ADF_HPSIM --> EF_IMSI["EFIMSI +'6F07'"] + ADF_HPSIM --> EF_AD["EFAD +'6FAD'"] + +``` + +Diagram showing the file structure of the ADF\_HPSIM directory. The root is ADF\_HPSIM, which branches into three files: EF\_ARR (6F06), EF\_IMSI (6F07), and EF\_AD (6FAD). + +Figure 1: File identifiers and directory structure of the HPSIM + +# 5 Application Protocol + +## 5.0 Overview of HPSIM selection and HPSIM-related procedures + +The requirements stated in the corresponding clause of TS 31.101 [3] apply to the HPSIM application. The ADFHPSIM shall be selected using the AID and information in EFDIR. + +The procedures listed in clause "5.1 HPSIM management procedures" are required for execution of the procedures in the subsequent clause "HPSIM security related procedures". The procedures authentication procedure, IMSI request, which are listed in clause "HPSIM security related procedures" are mandatory. + +## 5.1 HPSIM management procedures + +### 5.1.1 Initialisation + +#### 5.1.1.1 HPSIM application selection + +After UICC activation (see TS 31.101 [3]), the H(e)NB shall select an HPSIM application. If no HPSIM applications are found in the UICC, the H(e)NB shall abort the HPSIM initialisation procedure. + +An HPSIM compliant to the present document shall have an AID with a PIX value starting with '3G application code' ='100A', see ETSI TS 101 220 [11]. + +After a successful HPSIM application selection, the selected HPSIM (AID) is stored on the UICC. This application is referred to as the last selected application. The last selected application shall be available on the UICC after a deactivation followed by an activation of the UICC. + +If a HPSIM application is selected using partial DF name, the partial DF name supplied in the command shall uniquely identify a HPSIM application. Furthermore if a HPSIM application is selected using a partial DF name as specified in TS 31.101 [3] indicating in the SELECT command the last occurrence the UICC shall select the application stored as the last application. If, in the SELECT command, the options first, next/previous are indicated, they have no meaning if an application has not been previously selected in the same session and shall return an appropriate error code. + +#### 5.1.1.2 HPSIM initialisation + +The HPSIM shall not indicate any language preference. + +If the H(e)NB provides an user interface, the H(e)NB shall choose a language from EFPL at the MF level according the procedure defined in TS 31.101 [3]. If the H(e)NB does not support the languages of EFPL, the H(e)NB shall use its own internal default parameters. + +If supported by H(e)NB, the H(e)NB runs the PIN verification procedure. If the procedure is not performed successfully, the HPSIM initialisation stops. + +If both the application selection and the PIN verification procedures have been performed successfully then the HPSIM session starts. In all other cases the HPSIM session shall not start. + +After the previous procedures have been completed successfully, the H(e)NB runs the following procedures: + +- Administrative information request, by reading the EFAD. +- IMSI request. + +After the HPSIM initialisation has been completed successfully, the H(e)NB shall indicate this to the HPSIM by sending a particular STATUS command. + +#### 5.1.2 HPSIM Session termination + +NOTE 1: This procedure is not to be confused with the deactivation procedure in TS 31.101 [3]. + +The HPSIM session is terminated by the H(e)NB as follows. + +The H(e)NB shall indicate to the HPSIM by sending a particular STATUS command that the termination procedure is starting. + +The H(e)NB deletes all the subscription related information elements from its memory. + +NOTE 2: If the H(e)NB has already updated any of the subscriber related information during the session, and the value has not changed until session termination, the H(e)NB may omit the respective update procedure. + +To actually terminate the session, the H(e)NB shall use one of the mechanisms described in TS 31.101 [3]. + +### 5.1.3 HPSIM application closure + +After termination of the HPSIM session as defined in clause 5.1.2, the HPSIM application may be closed by closing the logical channels that are used to communicate with this particular HPSIM application. + +### 5.1.4 UICC presence detection + +The H(e)NB checks for the presence of the UICC according to TS 31.101 [3] within all 30 s periods of inactivity on the UICC-Terminal interface. If the presence detection according to TS 31.101 [3] fails, then the H(e)NB shall follow the requirements listed in TS 33.220 [2] for the removal of the HPM within 5s after the presence detection has failed. + +### 5.2 HPSIM security related procedures + +### 5.2.1 Authentication procedure + +The H(e)NB selects a HPSIM application and uses the AUTHENTICATE command (see clause 7.1). + +### 5.2.2 IMSI request + +Request: The H(e)NB performs the reading procedure with EFIMSI. + +## 5.3 Subscription related procedures + +### 5.3.1 Location Information acquisition procedures + +The support of Location Information acquisition procedures is optional for both the HPSIM and the H(e)NB. However, if implemented, it shall be according to the present clause. + +For the purpose of Location Information acquisition, a H(e)NB shall support the PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION proactive command as specified below. + +An HPSIM and a H(e)NB supporting Location Information acquisition procedure shall support the following mechanism defined in TS 31.111 [20]. + +- PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION, H(e)NB IP address (letter class "v"). + +Additionally, the HPSIM and H(e)NB may support one or both of the following mechanism defined in TS 31.111 [20]. + +- PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION, H(e)NB surrounding macrocells (letter class "w") +- Geographical Location Reporting (letter class "n"). + +The support of any other option of the PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION proactive command is not required. + +The HPSIM retrieves location information using one or a combination of the USAT commands listed above. + +The HPSIM shall only require location information after HPSIM initialisation procedure, and at regular intervals as Operator policy requires. + +Note : IP address change procedures are defined in TS 32.583 [14] for HNB and in TS 32.593 [15] for HeNB. + +# --- 6 Security features + +## 6.0 Generic security + +The security aspects of H(e)NB are specified in TS 33.320 [2]. Clause 6 of the present document gives information related to security features supported by the HPSIM with respect to user verification and file access conditions. + +## 6.1 User verification and file access conditions + +The User of the HPSIM is the H(e)NB Hosting Party. + +The security architecture as defined in TS 31.101 [3] applies to the HPSIM and UICC with the following definitions and additions: + +- The HPSIM application shall use a global key reference PIN1 as specified in TS 31.101 [3]. + +- The only valid usage qualifier is '08' which means user authentication knowledge based (PIN) as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 [6]. + +In order to restrict the access to the HPSIM, the PIN may be enabled. + +# 7 HPSIM commands + +## 7.0 Generic commands + +The commands specified in TS 31.101 [3] are supported by HPSIM, with the restrictions identified in clause 7 of the present document. + +## 7.1 AUTHENTICATE + +### 7.1.1 Command description + +The function can be used in the following security context: + +- AKA security context during the procedure for authenticating the HPSIM to the Home Network and vice versa when AKA authentication data are available. The function shall be used whenever an AKA context shall be established, i.e. when the terminal receives a challenge from the AKA. A cipher key and an integrity key are calculated. For the execution of the command the HPSIM uses the subscriber authentication key K, which is stored in the HPSIM. The same AKA security context is used for HNB and H(e)NB authentication. + +The function is related to a particular HPSIM and shall not be executable unless the HPSIM application has been selected and activated, and the current directory is the HPSIM ADF or any subdirectory under this ADF and a successful PIN verification procedure has been performed (see clause 6.1). + +The HPSIM first computes the anonymity key $AK = f5_K(RAND)$ and retrieves the sequence number $SQN = (SQN \oplus AK) \oplus AK$ . + +Then the HPSIM computes $XMAC = f1_K(SQN \parallel RAND \parallel AMF)$ and compares this with the MAC which is included in AUTN. If they are different, the HPSIM abandons the function. + +Next the HPSIM verifies that the received sequence number SQN is previously unused. If it is unused and its value is lower than $SQN_{MS}$ , it shall still be accepted if it is among the last 32 sequence numbers generated. A possible verification method is described in TS 33.102 [5]. + +NOTE: This implies that the HPSIM has to keep a list of the last used sequence numbers and the length of the list is at least 32 entries. + +If the HPSIM detects the sequence numbers to be invalid, this is considered as a synchronisation failure and the HPSIM abandons the function. In this case the command response is AUTS, where: + +- $AUTS = Conc(SQN_{MS}) \parallel MACS$ ; +- $Conc(SQN_{MS}) = SQN_{MS} \oplus f5*_K(RAND)$ is the concealed value of the counter $SQN_{MS}$ in the HPSIM; and +- $MACS = f1*_K(SQN_{MS} \parallel RAND \parallel AMF)$ where: +- $RAND$ is the random value received in the current user authentication request; + +If the sequence number is considered in the correct range, the HPSIM computes $RES = f2_K(RAND)$ , the cipher key $CK = f3_K(RAND)$ and the integrity key $IK = f4_K(RAND)$ and includes these in the command response. Note that if this is more efficient, RES, CK and IK could also be computed earlier at any time after receiving RAND. + +The use of AMF is HN specific and while processing the command, the content of the AMF has to be interpreted in the appropriate manner. The AMF may e.g. be used for support of multiple algorithms or keys or for changing the size of lists, see TS 33.102 [5]. The AMF contains the EPS AKA indication bit, see TS 33.401 [13]. This bit is not interpreted by HPSIM. + +### 7.1.2 Command parameters and data + +*Editor's note : HPSIM does not need to support ODD instruction code.* + +| Code | Value | +|------|------------------------------------------------------| +| CLA | As specified in TS 31.101 [3] | +| INS | '88' | +| P1 | '00' | +| P2 | See table below | +| Lc | See below | +| Data | See below | +| Le | '00', or maximum length of data expected in response | + +Parameter P2 specifies the authentication context as follows: + +Coding of the reference control P2: + +| Coding b8-b1 | Meaning | +|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------| +| '1-----' | Specific reference data (e.g. DF specific/application dependant key) | +| '-XXXX--' | '0000' | +| '-----XXX' | Authentication context:
001 AKA | + +All other codings are RFU. + +Parameter P1 is used to control the data exchange between the terminal and the UICC as defined in TS 31.101 [3]. + +Parameter P2 is set to '81'. + +Command parameters/data: + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------------------|---------------------|--------| +| 1 | Length of RAND (L1) | 1 | +| 2 to (L1+1) | RAND | L1 | +| (L1+2) | Length of AUTN (L2) | 1 | +| (L1+3) to (L1+L2+2) | AUTN | L2 | + +The coding of AUTN is described in TS 33.102 [5]. The most significant bit of RAND is coded on bit 8 of byte 2. The most significant bit of AUTN is coded on bit 8 of byte (L1+3). + +Response parameters/data, case 1, command successful: + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | "Successful 3G authentication" tag = 'DB' | 1 | +| 2 | Length of RES (L3) | 1 | +| 3 to (L3+2) | RES | L3 | +| (L3+3) | Length of CK (L4) | 1 | +| (L3+4) to (L3+L4+3) | CK | L4 | +| (L3+L4+4) | Length of IK (L5) | 1 | +| (L3+L4+5) to (L3+L4+L5+4) | IK | L5 | + +The most significant bit of RES is coded on bit 8 of byte 3. The most significant bit of CK is coded on bit 8 of byte (L3+4). The most significant bit of IK is coded on bit 8 of byte (L3+L4+5). + +Response parameters/data, case 2, synchronization failure: + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|-------------|--------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | "Synchronisation failure" tag = 'DC' | 1 | +| 2 | Length of AUTS (L1) | 1 | +| 3 to (L1+2) | AUTS | L1 | + +The coding of AUTS is described in TS 33.102 [5]. The most significant bit of AUTS is coded on bit 8 of byte 3. + +### 7.1.3 Status Conditions Returned by the HPSIM + +#### 7.1.3.0 Status Condition structure + +Status of the card after processing of the command is coded in the status bytes SW1 and SW2. Clause 7.1.3 of the present document specifies coding of the status bytes in the following tables. + +#### 7.1.3.1 Security management + +| SW1 | SW2 | Error description | +|------|------|---------------------------------------| +| '98' | '62' | - Authentication error, incorrect MAC | + +#### 7.1.3.2 Status Words of the Commands + +The following table shows for each command the possible status conditions returned (marked by an asterisk \*). + +**Commands and status words** + +| Status Words | AUTHENTICATE | +|--------------------------|--------------| +| 90 00 | * | +| 91 XX | * | +| 93 00 | | +| 98 50 | | +| 98 62 | * | +| 62 00 | * | +| 62 81 | | +| 62 82 | | +| 62 83 | | +| 62 F1 | * | +| 62 F3 | * | +| 63 CX | | +| 63 F1 | * | +| 64 00 | * | +| 65 00 | * | +| 65 81 | * | +| 67 00 | * | +| 67 XX – (see note) | * | +| 68 00 | * | +| 68 81 | * | +| 68 82 | * | +| 69 81 | | +| 69 82 | * | +| 69 83 | | +| 69 84 | * | +| 69 85 | * | +| 69 86 | | +| 6A 80 | | +| 6A 81 | * | +| 6A 82 | | +| 6A 83 | | +| 6A 86 | * | +| 6A 87 | | +| 6A 88 | * | +| 6B 00 | * | +| 6E 00 | * | +| 6F 00 | * | +| 6F XX – (see note) | * | +| NOTE: Except SW2 = '00'. | | + +# 8 HPSIM remote management + +## 8.1 General functionality + +To support HPSIM remote management the H(e)NB and the HPSIM shall support the Profile Download mechanism as specified in TS 31.111 [20] and a subset of USAT functionality that is described in the following clauses. + +An HPSIM shall support "Additional TERMINAL PROFILE after UICC activation" as defined in TS 31.111 [20] and allow the H(e)NB to send multiple Terminal Profile downloads. + +## 8.2 Remote application and file management + +HPSIM remote management shall use RAM/RFM over HTTP mechanism described in TS 31.115 [18], TS 31.116 [19]. + +## 8.3 Bearer Independent Protocol + +The H(e)NB shall support BIP in UICC client mode, and indicate it in TERMINAL PROFILE command as specified in TS 31.111 [20]. After HPSIM management procedures, the UICC shall open a BIP channel in UICC client mode and send a polling message to a remote server for registration. + +## 8.4 Proactive Polling + +The H(e)NB shall support the proactive polling mechanism defined in TS 31.101 [3]. + +## 8.5 Polling a remote server + +It is assumed that the UICC will send a polling message to a remote server at regular intervals, in order to check for updates. The UICC will send a TIMER MANAGEMENT command with appropriate value, in order to be informed when the next polling message shall be sent. + +# Annex A (informative): EF changes via remote management or USAT application + +This annex defines if changing the content of an EF by the network (e.g. remote management) or by a USAT Application is advisable. Updating of certain Efs remotely could result in unpredictable behaviour of the H(e)NB; these are marked "Caution" in the table below. Certain Efs are marked "No"; under no circumstances should remote changes of these Efs be considered. + +| File identification | Description | Change advised | +|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------| +| '2F00' | Application directory | Caution | +| '2F05' | Preferred languages | Yes | +| '2F06' | Access rule reference | Caution | +| '2FE2' | ICC identification | No | +| '6F06' | Access rule reference (under ADF HPSIM ) | Caution | +| '6F07' | IMSI | Caution | +| '6FAD' | Administrative Data | Caution | + +# Annex B (informative): Suggested content of the Efs at pre-personalization + +If Efs have an unassigned value, it may not be clear from the main text what this value should be. This annex suggests values in these cases. + +| File Identification | Description | Value | +|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------| +| '2F00' | Application directory | Card issuer / operator dependent | +| '2F05' | Preferred languages | 'FF..FF' | +| '2F06' | Access rule reference | Card issuer / operator dependent | +| '2FE2' | ICC identification | Card issuer / operator dependent | +| '6F06' | Access rule reference (under ADF HPSIM ) | Card issuer / operator dependent | +| '6F07' | IMSI | Operator dependent | +| '6FAD' | Administrative Data | Operator dependant | + +# --- Annex C (informative): List of SFI values + +This annex lists SFI values assigned in the present document. + +## --- C.1 List of SFI Values at the HPSIM ADF Level + +| File Identification | SFI | Description | +|---------------------|------|-----------------------| +| '6F06' | '06' | Access Rule Reference | +| '6F07' | '07' | IMSI | +| '6FAD' | '03' | Administrative Data | + +All other SFI values are reserved for future use. + +# Annex D (informative): Change history + +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | New | +|---------|--------|-----------|------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 2012-06 | CT-56 | CP-120405 | | | Specification approved at TSG CT. First publication as v11.0.0 | 11.0.0 | +| 2012-07 | - | - | | | Correction of formatting errors noticed at CT-56 (removal of hanging paragraphs).
Indication of correct letter classes for proactive commands mentioned in clause 5.3.1 | 11.0.1 | +| 2012-09 | CT-57 | CP-120621 | 001 | | Correction of reference to ASN.1 coding specification | 11.1.0 | +| 2013-12 | CT-62 | CP-130790 | 002 | 1 | Correction to delete a duplicate reference | 11.2.0 | +| 2014-10 | SA-65 | | | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-12 | 12.0.0 | +| 2015-03 | CT-67 | CP-150157 | 004 | 1 | Allocation of 3G application code for the HPSIM | 12.1.0 | +| 2015-12 | SA-70 | | | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-13 | 13.0.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA-75 | - | - | - | Automatic Upgrade to Rel-14 | 14.0.0 | +| 2018-07 | SA-80 | | | | Automatic Upgrade to Rel-15 | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | CT#88e | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 16.0.0 | +| 2020-09 | CT#89 | CP-202130 | 0005 | 1 | Update of spec. reference | 16.1.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31111/02f3fc8e346370e82afa09b56ad7f83b_img.jpg 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Above the "5G" text are three green curved lines representing signal waves. + +5G logo + +![3GPP logo](5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg) + +The 3GPP logo, featuring the letters "3GPP" in a stylized, bold, black font. The "3" and "G" are connected at the top. Below the "P" is a red signal icon. Underneath the logo, the text "A GLOBAL INITIATIVE" is written in a smaller, all-caps, sans-serif font. + +3GPP logo + +The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP. The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organizational Partners and shall not be implemented. This Specification is provided for future development work within 3GPP only. The Organizational Partners accept no liability for any use of this Specification. Specifications and Reports for implementation of the 3GPP™ system should be obtained via the 3GPP Organizational Partners' Publications Offices. + +## **3GPP** + +Postal address + +--- + +3GPP support office address + +--- + +650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis +Valbonne - FRANCE +Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 + +Internet + +--- + + + +## --- **Copyright Notification** --- + +No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. +The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. + +© 2023, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC). +All rights reserved. + +UMTSTM is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members +3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association + +# --- Contents + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword..... | 13 | +| 1 Scope..... | 14 | +| 2 References..... | 14 | +| 3 Definitions, abbreviations and symbols..... | 17 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 17 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations..... | 17 | +| 3.3 Symbols..... | 18 | +| 4 Overview of USAT..... | 18 | +| 4.1 Profile Download..... | 19 | +| 4.2 Proactive UICC..... | 19 | +| 4.3 Data download to UICC..... | 19 | +| 4.4 Menu selection..... | 19 | +| 4.5 Call control by USIM..... | 19 | +| 4.6 MO Short Message control by USIM..... | 19 | +| 4.7 Event download..... | 19 | +| 4.8 Security..... | 20 | +| 4.9 Multiple card..... | 20 | +| 4.10 Timer Expiration..... | 20 | +| 4.11 Bearer Independent Protocol..... | 20 | +| 4.12 Description of the access technology indicator mechanism..... | 20 | +| 4.13 Description of the network search mode mechanism..... | 20 | +| 4.14 Geographical location discovery..... | 20 | +| 4.15 Operation in reduced USAT capable terminals..... | 20 | +| 4.16 Tag allocation guidelines..... | 20 | +| 4.17 USAT over the AT interface..... | 21 | +| 4.18 USAT facilities provided by eCAT clients..... | 21 | +| 4.19 Negotiation of Poll Interval..... | 21 | +| 4.20 ProSe usage information reporting..... | 21 | +| 5 Profile download..... | 21 | +| 5.1 Procedure..... | 21 | +| 5.2 Structure and coding of TERMINAL PROFILE..... | 21 | +| 5.3 Definition of display parameters in Profile download..... | 27 | +| 6 Proactive UICC..... | 27 | +| 6.1 Introduction..... | 27 | +| 6.2 Identification of ME support..... | 27 | +| 6.3 General procedure..... | 27 | +| 6.4 Proactive UICC commands and procedures..... | 28 | +| 6.4.1 DISPLAY TEXT..... | 28 | +| 6.4.2 GET INKEY..... | 28 | +| 6.4.3 GET INPUT..... | 28 | +| 6.4.4 MORE TIME..... | 28 | +| 6.4.5 PLAY TONE..... | 28 | +| 6.4.6 POLL INTERVAL..... | 28 | +| 6.4.7 REFRESH..... | 28 | +| 6.4.7.1 EF IMSI changing procedure..... | 28 | +| 6.4.7.2 Generic Bootstrapping Procedure Request..... | 29 | +| 6.4.7.3 EF UICCARI changing procedure..... | 29 | +| 6.4.7.4 Steering of roaming and steering of roaming for I-WLAN procedure..... | 29 | +| 6.4.7.5 Steering of roaming via NAS messages..... | 29 | +| 6.4.7.6 Routing Indicator Data update via NAS messages..... | 29 | +| 6.4.8 SET UP MENU..... | 29 | +| 6.4.9 SELECT ITEM..... | 30 | +| 6.4.10 SEND SHORT MESSAGE..... | 30 | + +| | | | +|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| 6.4.11 | SEND SS..... | 30 | +| 6.4.12 | SEND USSD..... | 31 | +| 6.4.12.1 | MMI Mode..... | 31 | +| 6.4.12.2 | Application Mode..... | 32 | +| 6.4.13 | SET UP CALL..... | 33 | +| 6.4.14 | POLLING OFF..... | 34 | +| 6.4.15 | PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION..... | 34 | +| 6.4.16 | SET UP EVENT LIST..... | 36 | +| 6.4.17 | PERFORM CARD APDU..... | 37 | +| 6.4.18 | POWER OFF CARD..... | 37 | +| 6.4.19 | POWER ON CARD..... | 37 | +| 6.4.20 | GET READER STATUS..... | 37 | +| 6.4.21 | TIMER MANAGEMENT..... | 37 | +| 6.4.22 | SET UP IDLE MODE TEXT..... | 37 | +| 6.4.23 | RUN AT COMMAND..... | 37 | +| 6.4.24 | SEND DTMF..... | 37 | +| 6.4.25 | LANGUAGE NOTIFICATION..... | 37 | +| 6.4.26 | LAUNCH BROWSER..... | 37 | +| 6.4.27 | OPEN CHANNEL..... | 37 | +| 6.4.27.1 | OPEN CHANNEL related to CS bearer..... | 37 | +| 6.4.27.2 | OPEN CHANNEL related to GPRS/UTRAN packet service/E-UTRAN/NG-RAN..... | 38 | +| 6.4.27.3 | OPEN CHANNEL related to local bearer..... | 38 | +| 6.4.27.4 | OPEN CHANNEL related to Default (network) Bearer..... | 38 | +| 6.4.27.5 | OPEN CHANNEL related to (I-)WLAN bearer..... | 39 | +| 6.4.27.6 | OPEN CHANNEL related to Terminal Server Mode..... | 40 | +| 6.4.27.7 | OPEN CHANNEL related to UICC Server Mode..... | 40 | +| 6.4.27.8 | OPEN CHANNEL for IMS..... | 40 | +| 6.4.28 | CLOSE CHANNEL..... | 41 | +| 6.4.29 | RECEIVE DATA..... | 41 | +| 6.4.30 | SEND DATA..... | 41 | +| 6.4.31 | GET CHANNEL STATUS..... | 41 | +| 6.4.32 | SERVICE SEARCH..... | 41 | +| 6.4.33 | GET SERVICE INFORMATION..... | 41 | +| 6.4.34 | DECLARE SERVICE..... | 41 | +| 6.4.35 | RETRIEVE MULTIMEDIA MESSAGE..... | 41 | +| 6.4.36 | SUBMIT MULTIMEDIA MESSAGE..... | 41 | +| 6.4.37 | DISPLAY MULTIMEDIA MESSAGE..... | 41 | +| 6.4.38 | SET FRAMES..... | 41 | +| 6.4.39 | GET FRAME STATUS..... | 42 | +| 6.4.40 | Geographical Location Request..... | 42 | +| 6.4.41 | ACTIVATE..... | 43 | +| 6.4.42 | CONTACTLESS STATE CHANGED..... | 43 | +| 6.4.43 | COMMAND CONTAINER..... | 43 | +| 6.4.44 | ENCAPSULATED SESSION CONTROL..... | 43 | +| 6.5 | Common elements in proactive UICC commands..... | 43 | +| 6.5.1 | Command number..... | 43 | +| 6.5.2 | Device identities..... | 43 | +| 6.5.3 | Alpha identifier..... | 43 | +| 6.5.4 | Icon identifiers..... | 43 | +| 6.5.5 | Text attribute..... | 43 | +| 6.5.6 | Frame identifier..... | 43 | +| 6.6 | Structure of proactive UICC commands..... | 43 | +| 6.6.1 | DISPLAY TEXT..... | 43 | +| 6.6.2 | GET INKEY..... | 44 | +| 6.6.3 | GET INPUT..... | 44 | +| 6.6.4 | MORE TIME..... | 44 | +| 6.6.5 | PLAY TONE..... | 44 | +| 6.6.6 | POLL INTERVAL..... | 44 | +| 6.6.7 | SET-UP MENU..... | 44 | +| 6.6.8 | SELECT ITEM..... | 44 | +| 6.6.9 | SEND SHORT MESSAGE..... | 44 | + +| | | | +|----------|----------------------------------------------|----| +| 6.6.10 | SEND SS..... | 45 | +| 6.6.11 | SEND USSD..... | 45 | +| 6.6.12 | SET UP CALL..... | 45 | +| 6.6.13 | REFRESH..... | 46 | +| 6.6.14 | POLLING OFF..... | 46 | +| 6.6.15 | PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION..... | 46 | +| 6.6.16 | SET UP EVENT LIST..... | 47 | +| 6.6.17 | PERFORM CARD APDU..... | 47 | +| 6.6.18 | POWER OFF CARD..... | 47 | +| 6.6.19 | POWER ON CARD..... | 47 | +| 6.6.20 | GET READER STATUS..... | 47 | +| 6.6.21 | TIMER MANAGEMENT..... | 47 | +| 6.6.22 | SET UP IDLE MODE TEXT..... | 47 | +| 6.6.23 | RUN AT COMMAND..... | 47 | +| 6.6.24 | SEND DTMF COMMAND..... | 47 | +| 6.6.25 | LANGUAGE NOTIFICATION..... | 47 | +| 6.6.26 | LAUNCH BROWSER..... | 47 | +| 6.6.27 | OPEN CHANNEL..... | 47 | +| 6.6.27.1 | OPEN CHANNEL related to (I-)WLAN Bearer..... | 48 | +| 6.6.27.2 | OPEN CHANNEL for IMS..... | 48 | +| 6.6.28 | CLOSE CHANNEL..... | 48 | +| 6.6.29 | RECEIVE DATA..... | 49 | +| 6.6.30 | SEND DATA..... | 49 | +| 6.6.31 | GET CHANNEL STATUS..... | 49 | +| 6.6.32 | SERVICE SEARCH..... | 49 | +| 6.6.33 | GET SERVICE INFORMATION..... | 49 | +| 6.6.34 | DECLARE SERVICE..... | 49 | +| 6.6.35 | RETRIEVE MULTIMEDIA MESSAGE..... | 49 | +| 6.6.36 | SUBMIT MULTIMEDIA MESSAGE..... | 49 | +| 6.6.37 | DISPLAY MULTIMEDIA MESSAGE..... | 49 | +| 6.6.38 | SET FRAMES..... | 49 | +| 6.6.39 | GET FRAMES STATUS..... | 49 | +| 6.6.40 | Geographical Location Request..... | 49 | +| 6.6.41 | ACTIVATE..... | 50 | +| 6.6.42 | CONTACTLESS STATE CHANGED..... | 50 | +| 6.6.43 | COMMAND CONTAINER..... | 50 | +| 6.6.44 | ENCAPSULATED SESSION CONTROL..... | 50 | +| 6.7 | Command results..... | 50 | +| 6.8 | Structure of TERMINAL RESPONSE..... | 51 | +| 6.8.0 | Overall structure of TERMINAL RESPONSE..... | 51 | +| 6.8.1 | Command details..... | 52 | +| 6.8.2 | Device identities..... | 52 | +| 6.8.3 | Result..... | 53 | +| 6.8.4 | Duration..... | 53 | +| 6.8.5 | Text string..... | 53 | +| 6.8.6 | Item identifier..... | 53 | +| 6.8.7 | Local information..... | 53 | +| 6.8.8 | Call control requested action..... | 54 | +| 6.8.9 | Result data object 2..... | 54 | +| 6.8.10 | Card reader status..... | 54 | +| 6.8.11 | Card ATR..... | 54 | +| 6.8.12 | R-APDU..... | 54 | +| 6.8.13 | Timer identifier..... | 54 | +| 6.8.14 | Timer value..... | 54 | +| 6.8.15 | AT Response..... | 54 | +| 6.8.16 | Text string 2..... | 54 | +| 6.8.17 | Channel data..... | 54 | +| 6.8.18 | Channel status..... | 55 | +| 6.8.19 | Channel data length..... | 55 | +| 6.8.20 | Bearer description..... | 55 | +| 6.8.21 | Buffer size..... | 55 | + +| | | | +|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| 6.8.22 | Total Display Duration..... | 55 | +| 6.8.23 | Service Availability..... | 55 | +| 6.8.24 | Service Record..... | 55 | +| 6.8.25 | Other address (local address)..... | 55 | +| 6.8.26 | Frames Information..... | 55 | +| 6.9 | Proactive UICC session and ME display interaction..... | 55 | +| 6.10 | Handling of unknown, unforeseen and erroneous messages..... | 55 | +| 6.11 | Proactive commands versus possible Terminal response..... | 55 | +| 7 | ENVELOPE Commands..... | 57 | +| 7.1 | Data download to UICC..... | 57 | +| 7.1.1 | SMS-PP data download..... | 57 | +| 7.1.1.1 | Procedure..... | 57 | +| 7.1.1.1a | Procedure for SMS-PP data download via REGISTRATION ACCEPT or DL NAS TRANSPORT messages..... | 57 | +| 7.1.1.2 | Structure of ENVELOPE (SMS-PP DOWNLOAD)..... | 58 | +| 7.1.2 | Cell Broadcast data download..... | 59 | +| 7.1.2.1 | Procedure..... | 59 | +| 7.1.2.2 | Structure of ENVELOPE (CELL BROADCAST DOWNLOAD)..... | 60 | +| 7.2 | Menu Selection..... | 60 | +| 7.3 | Call Control and MO SMS control by USIM..... | 60 | +| 7.3.1 | Call Control by USIM..... | 60 | +| 7.3.1.1 | Procedure for mobile originated calls..... | 60 | +| 7.3.1.2 | Procedure for Supplementary Services and USSD..... | 62 | +| 7.3.1.3 | Indication to be given to the user..... | 62 | +| 7.3.1.4 | Interaction with Fixed Dialling Number..... | 63 | +| 7.3.1.5 | Support of Barred Dialling Number (BDN) service..... | 64 | +| 7.3.1.6 | Structure of ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL)..... | 64 | +| 7.3.1.7 | Procedure for PDP Context Activation..... | 67 | +| 7.3.1.8 | Procedure for EPS PDN connection Activation..... | 68 | +| 7.3.1.9 | Procedure for IMS communications establishment..... | 68 | +| 7.3.1.10 | Procedure for PDU session establishment..... | 69 | +| 7.3.2 | MO Short Message Control by USIM..... | 69 | +| 7.3.2.1 | Description..... | 69 | +| 7.3.2.2 | Structure of ENVELOPE (MO SHORT MESSAGE CONTROL)..... | 70 | +| 7.3.2.3 | Indication to be given to the user..... | 71 | +| 7.3.2.4 | Interaction with Fixed Dialling Number..... | 71 | +| 7.4 | Timer Expiration..... | 71 | +| 7.5 | Event download..... | 71 | +| 7.5.1 | (I-)WLAN Access status event..... | 72 | +| 7.5.1.1 | Procedure..... | 72 | +| 7.5.1.2 | Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – (I-)WLAN Access Status)..... | 72 | +| 7.5.1A | MT Call event..... | 72 | +| 7.5.1A.1 | Procedure..... | 72 | +| 7.5.1A.2 | Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD - MT call)..... | 72 | +| 7.5.2 | Network Rejection event..... | 74 | +| 7.5.2.1 | Procedure..... | 74 | +| 7.5.2.2 | Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – Network Rejection)..... | 74 | +| 7.5.2A | Call connected event..... | 75 | +| 7.5.2A.1 | Procedure..... | 75 | +| 7.5.2A.2 | Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD - call connected)..... | 75 | +| 7.5.3 | CSG Cell Selection event..... | 75 | +| 7.5.3.1 | Procedure..... | 76 | +| 7.5.3.2 | Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – CSG Cell Selection)..... | 76 | +| 7.5.3A | Call disconnected event..... | 77 | +| 7.5.3A.1 | Procedure..... | 77 | +| 7.5.3A.2 | Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD - call disconnected)..... | 77 | +| 7.5.4 | Location status event..... | 78 | +| 7.5.5 | User activity event..... | 78 | +| 7.5.6 | Idle screen available event..... | 78 | +| 7.5.7 | Card reader status event..... | 78 | +| 7.5.8 | Language selection event..... | 78 | + +| | | | +|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| 7.5.9 | Browser termination event..... | 78 | +| 7.5.10 | Data available event..... | 78 | +| 7.5.11 | Channel status event..... | 78 | +| 7.5.12 | Access Technology Change Event..... | 78 | +| 7.5.13 | Display parameters changed event..... | 78 | +| 7.5.14 | Local Connection event..... | 78 | +| 7.5.15 | Network Search Mode Change Event..... | 78 | +| 7.5.16 | Browsing status event..... | 79 | +| 7.5.17 | Frames Information changed event..... | 79 | +| 7.5.18 | HCI connectivity event..... | 79 | +| 7.5.19 | Contactless state request..... | 79 | +| 7.5.20 | Incoming IMS Data event..... | 79 | +| 7.5.20.1 | Procedure..... | 79 | +| 7.5.20.2 | Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – Incoming IMS Data)..... | 79 | +| 7.5.21 | IMS Registration Event..... | 80 | +| 7.5.21.1 | Procedure..... | 80 | +| 7.5.21.2 | Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – IMS Registration)..... | 80 | +| 7.5.22 | Profile Container..... | 80 | +| 7.5.23 | Envelope Container..... | 80 | +| 7.5.24 | Poll Interval Negotiation..... | 81 | +| 7.5.25 | Data Connection Status Change Event..... | 81 | +| 7.5.25.1 | Procedure..... | 81 | +| 7.5.25.2 | Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – Data Connection Status Change)..... | 81 | +| 7.6 | USSD Data Download..... | 82 | +| 7.6.1 | Procedure..... | 82 | +| 7.6.2 | Structure of ENVELOPE (USSD Data Download)..... | 83 | +| 7.7 | MMS Transfer Status..... | 83 | +| 7.8 | MMS notification download..... | 83 | +| 7.9 | Terminal Applications..... | 83 | +| 7.10 | Geographical Location Reporting..... | 83 | +| 7.10.1 | Procedure..... | 83 | +| 7.10.2 | Structure of ENVELOPE (Geographical Location Reporting)..... | 84 | +| 7.11 | Void..... | 85 | +| 7.12 | ProSe usage information reporting..... | 85 | +| 7.12.1 | Procedure..... | 85 | +| 7.12.2 | Structure of ENVELOPE (ProSe Report)..... | 85 | +| 8 | COMPREHENSION-TLV data objects..... | 86 | +| 8.1 | Address..... | 86 | +| 8.2 | Alpha identifier..... | 86 | +| 8.3 | Subaddress..... | 86 | +| 8.4 | Capability configuration parameters..... | 86 | +| 8.5 | Cell Broadcast Page..... | 86 | +| 8.6 | Command details..... | 86 | +| 8.7 | Device identities..... | 87 | +| 8.8 | Duration..... | 87 | +| 8.9 | Item..... | 88 | +| 8.10 | Item identifier..... | 88 | +| 8.11 | Response length..... | 88 | +| 8.12 | Result..... | 88 | +| 8.12.1 | Additional information for SEND SS..... | 88 | +| 8.12.2 | Additional information for ME problem..... | 89 | +| 8.12.3 | Additional information for network problem..... | 89 | +| 8.12.4 | Additional information for SS problem..... | 89 | +| 8.12.5 | Additional information for SMS problem..... | 89 | +| 8.12.6 | Not used..... | 89 | +| 8.12.7 | Additional information for USSD problem..... | 89 | +| 8.12.8 | Additional information for interaction with call control or MO SM control..... | 90 | +| 8.12.9 | Additional information for MultipleCard commands..... | 90 | +| 8.12.10 | Additional information for launch browser problem..... | 90 | +| 8.12.11 | Additional information for Bearer Independent Protocol..... | 90 | +| 8.12.12 | Additional information for Frames commands..... | 90 | + +| | | | +|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 8.12.13 | Additional information for SUBMIT and RETRIEVE MULTIMEDIA MESSAGE..... | 90 | +| 8.13 | SMS TPDU..... | 90 | +| 8.14 | SS string..... | 91 | +| 8.15 | Text string..... | 91 | +| 8.16 | Tone..... | 91 | +| 8.17 | USSD string..... | 91 | +| 8.18 | File List..... | 91 | +| 8.19 | Location Information..... | 92 | +| 8.19.1 | Location Information for GERAN..... | 92 | +| 8.19.2 | Location Information for UTRAN..... | 92 | +| 8.19.3 | Location Information for E-UTRAN..... | 92 | +| 8.19.4 | Location Information for NG-RAN..... | 93 | +| 8.19.5 | Location Information when no surrounding macrocell is detected..... | 93 | +| 8.20 | IMEI..... | 93 | +| 8.21 | Help Request..... | 93 | +| 8.22 | Network Measurement Results..... | 93 | +| 8.23 | Default Text..... | 96 | +| 8.24 | Items Next Action Indicator..... | 96 | +| 8.25 | Event list..... | 96 | +| 8.26 | Cause..... | 96 | +| 8.27 | Location status..... | 97 | +| 8.28 | Transaction identifier..... | 97 | +| 8.29 | BCCH channel list..... | 97 | +| 8.30 | Call control requested action..... | 98 | +| 8.31 | Icon Identifier..... | 98 | +| 8.32 | Item Icon Identifier list..... | 99 | +| 8.33 | Card reader status..... | 99 | +| 8.34 | Card ATR..... | 99 | +| 8.35 | C-APDU..... | 99 | +| 8.36 | R-APDU..... | 99 | +| 8.37 | Timer identifier..... | 99 | +| 8.38 | Timer value..... | 99 | +| 8.39 | Date-Time and Time zone..... | 99 | +| 8.40 | AT Command..... | 99 | +| 8.41 | AT Response..... | 100 | +| 8.42 | BC Repeat indicator..... | 100 | +| 8.43 | Immediate response..... | 100 | +| 8.44 | DTMF string..... | 100 | +| 8.45 | Language..... | 100 | +| 8.46 | Timing Advance..... | 100 | +| 8.47 | Browser Identity..... | 101 | +| 8.48 | URL..... | 101 | +| 8.49 | Bearer..... | 101 | +| 8.50 | Provisioning File Reference..... | 101 | +| 8.51 | Browser Termination Cause..... | 101 | +| 8.52 | Bearer description..... | 101 | +| 8.52.0 | Structure of Bearer description..... | 101 | +| 8.52.1 | Bearer parameters for CSD..... | 102 | +| 8.52.2 | Bearer parameters for GPRS / UTRAN Packet Service / E-UTRAN / NG-RAN..... | 102 | +| 8.52.3 | Bearer parameters for UTRAN Packet Service with extended parameters / HSDPA / E-UTRAN / NG-RAN..... | 103 | +| 8.52.4 | Bearer parameters for (I-)WLAN..... | 104 | +| 8.52.5 | Bearer parameters for E-UTRAN / NG-RAN / mapped UTRAN packet service..... | 104 | +| 8.52.6 | Bearer parameters for NG-RAN..... | 105 | +| 8.53 | Channel data..... | 105 | +| 8.54 | Channel data length..... | 105 | +| 8.55 | Buffer size..... | 105 | +| 8.56 | Channel status..... | 105 | +| 8.57 | Card reader identifier..... | 106 | +| 8.58 | Other Address..... | 106 | +| 8.59 | UICC/ME interface transport level..... | 106 | + +| | | | +|-------|----------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 8.60 | AID..... | 106 | +| 8.61 | Network Access Name..... | 106 | +| 8.62 | Access Technology..... | 106 | +| 8.63 | Display parameters..... | 106 | +| 8.64 | Service Record..... | 107 | +| 8.65 | Device Filter..... | 107 | +| 8.66 | Service Search..... | 107 | +| 8.67 | Attribute Information..... | 107 | +| 8.68 | Service Availability..... | 107 | +| 8.69 | Remote Entity Address..... | 107 | +| 8.70 | Text Attribute..... | 107 | +| 8.71 | Item Text Attribute List..... | 107 | +| 8.72 | PDP context Activation parameters..... | 107 | +| 8.73 | UTRAN/E-UTRAN/NG-RAN Measurement Qualifier..... | 108 | +| 8.74 | Multimedia Message Reference..... | 108 | +| 8.75 | Multimedia Message Identifier..... | 108 | +| 8.76 | Multimedia Message Transfer status..... | 108 | +| 8.77 | MM Content Identifier..... | 108 | +| 8.78 | Multimedia Message Notification..... | 108 | +| 8.79 | Last Envelope..... | 108 | +| 8.80 | Frames Layout..... | 109 | +| 8.81 | Frames Information..... | 109 | +| 8.82 | Frames identifier..... | 109 | +| 8.83 | I-WLAN Identifier..... | 109 | +| 8.84 | (I-)WLAN Access Status..... | 109 | +| 8.85 | IMEISV..... | 109 | +| 8.86 | Network search mode..... | 109 | +| 8.87 | Battery State..... | 109 | +| 8.88 | Browsing status..... | 110 | +| 8.89 | Registry application data..... | 110 | +| 8.90 | PLMNwAcT List..... | 110 | +| 8.91 | Routing Area Identification..... | 110 | +| 8.92 | Update/Attach/Registration Type..... | 110 | +| 8.93 | Rejection Cause Code..... | 111 | +| 8.94 | Geographical Location Parameters..... | 112 | +| 8.95 | GAD shapes..... | 114 | +| 8.96 | NMEA sentence..... | 114 | +| 8.97 | PLMN List..... | 115 | +| 8.98 | EPS PDN connection activation parameters..... | 115 | +| 8.99 | Tracking Area Identification..... | 115 | +| 8.100 | CSG ID list identifier..... | 116 | +| 8.101 | CSG cell selection status..... | 116 | +| 8.102 | CSG ID..... | 117 | +| 8.103 | HNB name..... | 117 | +| 8.104 | Activate descriptor..... | 117 | +| 8.105 | Broadcast Network information..... | 117 | +| 8.106 | Contactless state request..... | 117 | +| 8.107 | Contactless functionality state..... | 118 | +| 8.108 | IMS URI..... | 118 | +| 8.109 | Extended registry application data..... | 118 | +| 8.110 | IARI..... | 118 | +| 8.111 | IMPU List..... | 118 | +| 8.112 | IMS status code..... | 119 | +| 8.113 | eCAT client profile..... | 119 | +| 8.114 | eCAT client identity..... | 119 | +| 8.115 | Encapsulated envelope type..... | 119 | +| 8.116 | Void..... | 119 | +| 8.117 | Void..... | 119 | +| 8.118 | PLMN ID..... | 119 | +| 8.119 | E-UTRAN Inter-frequency Network Measurement Results..... | 119 | +| 8.120 | Call control result..... | 120 | + +| | | | +|-------|-------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 8.121 | eCAT sequence number..... | 120 | +| 8.122 | Encrypted TLV list..... | 120 | +| 8.123 | MAC..... | 120 | +| 8.124 | SA template..... | 120 | +| 8.125 | CAT service list..... | 120 | +| 8.126 | Refresh enforcement policy..... | 120 | +| 8.127 | DNS Server Address..... | 120 | +| 8.128 | ProSe Report Data..... | 121 | +| 8.129 | SSID..... | 121 | +| 8.130 | BSSID..... | 121 | +| 8.131 | HESSID..... | 121 | +| 8.132 | Media Type..... | 121 | +| 8.133 | IMS call disconnection cause..... | 122 | +| 8.134 | E-UTRAN Primary Timing Advance Information..... | 122 | +| 8.135 | URI truncated..... | 123 | +| 8.136 | Extended Rejection Cause Code..... | 123 | +| 8.137 | Data connection status..... | 123 | +| 8.138 | Data connection type..... | 123 | +| 8.139 | (E/5G)SM cause..... | 124 | +| 8.140 | IP address list..... | 124 | +| 8.141 | Surrounding macrocells..... | 125 | +| 8.142 | PDP/PDN/PDU type..... | 125 | +| 8.143 | PDU Session Establishment parameters..... | 126 | +| 8.144 | NG-RAN Primary Timing Advance Information..... | 126 | +| 8.145 | Slices information..... | 126 | +| 9 | Tag values..... | 127 | +| 9.1 | BER-TLV tags in ME to UICC direction..... | 127 | +| 9.2 | BER-TLV tags in UICC TO ME direction..... | 127 | +| 9.3 | COMPREHENSION-TLV tags in both directions..... | 128 | +| 9.4 | Type of Command and Next Action Indicator..... | 129 | + +| | | | +|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| 10 | Allowed Type of command and Device identity combinations..... | 129 | +| 11 | Security requirements..... | 129 | +| | Annex A (normative): Support of USAT by Mobile Equipment..... | 130 | +| | Annex B (informative): Example of DISPLAY TEXT Proactive UICC Command..... | 132 | +| | Annex C (normative): Structure of USAT communications..... | 133 | +| | Annex D (informative): ME display in proactive UICC session..... | 134 | +| | Annex E (informative): Help information feature processing..... | 135 | +| | Annex F (informative): Monitoring of events..... | 136 | +| | Annex G (normative): Support of Multiple Card Operation..... | 137 | +| | Annex H (informative): Multiple Card proactive command examples..... | 138 | +| | Annex I (informative): Bearer independent protocol proactive command examples..... | 139 | +| | Annex J (informative): WAP References..... | 140 | +| | Annex K (informative): Use of USAT Bearer independent protocol for local links Bluetooth case..... | 141 | +| | Annex L (informative): Bluetooth Service Discovery protocol..... | 142 | +| | Annex M (informative): Use of USAT Bearer independent protocol for local links, server case..... | 143 | +| | Annex N (informative): USSD information flow between the Network, the ME and the UICC..... | 144 | +| N.1 | MMI Mode..... | 144 | +| N.2 | Application Mode..... | 146 | +| N.3 | USSD Data Download..... | 148 | +| | Annex O (informative): Geographical location information discovery information flow between
the ME and the UICC..... | 148 | +| | Annex P (normative): Support of USAT by Terminals with reduced feature capabilities..... | 150 | +| | Annex Q (normative): Default routing for USAT over AT interface..... | 151 | +| Q.0 | 3GPP-specific facilities..... | 151 | +| Q.1 | Default routing mechanism..... | 151 | +| Q.2 | Combination rules for terminal profiles..... | 152 | +| | Annex R (informative): UICC access to IMS, command flow examples..... | 153 | + +| | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| R.1 | Discovery of the UICC's IARI and IMS Registration..... | 153 | +| R.2 | Notification of Incoming IMS data..... | 154 | +| R.3 | UICC originating a SIP message..... | 155 | +| Annex S (normative): 3GPP PS data off and Bearer Independent Protocol..... | | 155 | +| Annex T (informative): Data Connection Status change event, command flow examples..... | | 156 | +| T.1 | Introduction..... | 156 | +| T.2 | Success activation of PDP/PDN/PDU request flow example..... | 156 | +| T.3 | Rejected activation of PDP/PDN/PDU request flow example..... | 157 | +| T.4 | PDP/PDN/PDU Data connection deactivated flow example..... | 158 | +| Annex U (informative): Change History..... | | 161 | + +## Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings: + +- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something +- shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something + +The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports. + +The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document. + +- should** indicates a recommendation to do something +- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something +- may** indicates permission to do something +- need not** indicates permission not to do something + +The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended. + +- can** indicates that something is possible +- cannot** indicates that something is impossible + +The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not". + +- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +In addition: + +**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements. + +--- + +## 1 Scope + +The present document defines the interface between the UICC and the Mobile Equipment (ME), and mandatory ME procedures, specifically for "USIM Application Toolkit". + +The present document refers in its majority to the ETSI TS 102 223 [32], which describes the generic aspects of application toolkits within the UICC. + +USAT is a set of commands and procedures for use during 3GPP network operation phase, in addition to those defined in TS 31.101 [13]. + +Specifying the interface is to ensure interoperability between a UICC and an ME independently of the respective manufacturers and operators. + +The present document defines for: + +- the commands; +- the application protocol; +- the mandatory requirements on the UICC and ME for each procedure. + +The present document does not specify any aspects related to the administrative management phase. Any internal technical realization of either the UICC or the ME are only specified where these reflect over the interface. The present document does not specify any of the security algorithms which may be used. + +For the avoidance of doubt, references to clauses of ETSI TS 102 223 [32] include all the clauses of that clause, unless specifically mentioned. + +The target specification ETSI TS 102 223 [32] contains material that is outside of the scope of 3GPP requirements and the present document indicates which parts are in the scope and which are not. + +A 3GPP ME may support functionality that is not required by 3GPP, but the requirements to do so are outside of the scope of 3GPP. + +--- + +## 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document. + +- [1] 3GPP TS 22.002: "Circuit Bearer Services (BS) supported by a Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN)". + +- [2] 3GPP TS 22.030: "Man-Machine Interface (MMI) of the User Equipment (UE)". +- [3] 3GPP TS 22.042: "Network Identity and Time Zone (NITZ); Service description; Stage 1". +- [4] 3GPP TS 23.038: "Alphabets and language-specific information". +- [5] 3GPP TS 23.040: "Technical realization of the Short Message Service (SMS)". +- [6] 3GPP TS 23.041: "Technical realization of Cell Broadcast Service (CBS)". +- [7] 3GPP TS 23.122: "Non-Access Stratum functions related to Mobile Station (MS) in idle mode". +- [8] 3GPP TS 24.007: "Mobile radio interface signalling layer 3; General aspects". +- [9] 3GPP TS 24.008: "Mobile radio interface layer 3 specification; Core network protocols; Stage 3". +- [10] 3GPP TS 24.011: "Point-to-Point (PP) Short Message Service (SMS) support on mobile radio interface". +- [11] 3GPP TS 24.080: "Mobile radio layer 3 supplementary services specification; Formats and coding". +- [12] 3GPP TS 27.007: "AT command set for User Equipment (UE)". +- [13] 3GPP TS 31.101: "UICC-terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics". +- [14] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the USIM application". +- [15] Void. +- [16] Void. +- [17] Void. +- [18] Void. +- [19] Void. +- [20] Void. +- [21] Void. +- [22] 3GPP TS 22.001: "Principles of circuit telecommunication services supported by a Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN)". +- [23] Void. +- [24] Void. +- [25] Void. +- [26] Void. +- [27] 3GPP TS 44.018: "Mobile radio interface Layer 3 specification; Radio Resource Control Protocol". +- [28] Void. +- [29] Void. +- [30] 3GPP TS 23.003: "Numbering, addressing and identification". +- [31] Void. +- [32] ETSI TS 102 223 V15.2.0: "Smart Cards; Card Application Toolkit". +- [33] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP specifications". + +- [34] 3GPP TS 22.101: "Service aspects; Service principles". +- [35] 3GPP TS 25.401: "UTRAN overall description". +- [36] 3GPP TS 25.413: "UTRAN Iu interface RANAP signalling". +- [37] 3GPP TS 24.090: "Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) - Stage 3". +- [38] 3GPP TS 25.331: "Radio Resource Control (RRC) Protocol Specification". +- [39] 3GPP TS 25.133: "Requirements for support of radio resource management". +- [40] Void. +- [41] 3GPP TS 31.115: "Secured packet structure for the (U)SIM Toolkit applications". +- [42] 3GPP TS 24.234 Release 12: "3GPP System to WLAN Interworking; UE to Network protocols; Stage 3". +- [43] ETSI TS 101 220: "Smart Cards; ETSI numbering system for telecommunication application providers". +- [44] 3GPP TS 23.032: "Universal Geographical Area Description (GAD)". +- [45] IEC 61162-1: "Maritime navigation and radio communication equipment and systems – Digital interfaces". +- [46] 3GPP TS 24.301: "Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for Evolved Packet Systems (EPS): Stage 3". +- [47] 3GPP TS 23.203: "Policy and charging control architecture". +- [48] 3GPP TS 36.401: "Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN); Architecture description". +- [49] 3GPP TS 36.331: "Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Radio Resource Control (RRC); Protocol specification". +- [50] 3GPP TS 36.133: "Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Requirements for support of radio resource management". +- [51] 3GPP TS 31.116: "Remote APDU Structure for (U)SIM Toolkit applications". +- [52] 3GPP TS 24.229 "IP multimedia call control protocol based on SIP and SDP; stage 3" +- [53] IETF RFC 3261: "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol". +- [54] IETF RFC 3629 (2003): "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646". +- [55] IETF RFC 3680 (2004): "A Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Event Package for Registrations". +- [56] 3GPP TS 31.104: "Characteristics of the Hosting Party Subscription Identity Module (HPSIM) application". +- [57] 3GPP TS 32.582: "Telecommunications management; Home Node B (HNB) Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning (OAM&P); Information model for Type 1 interface HNB to HNB Management System (HMS)". +- [58] 3GPP TS 32.592: "Telecommunications management; Home Node B (HeNB) Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning (OAM&P); Information model for Type 1 interface HeNB to HeNB Management System (HeMS)". +- [59] 3GPP TS 25.304: "User Equipment (UE) procedures in idle mode and procedures for cell reselection in connected mode". +- [60] 3GPP TS 36.304: "Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); User Equipment (UE) procedures in idle mode". + +- [61] 3GPP TS 24.334: "Proximity-services (ProSe) User Equipment (UE) to ProSe function protocol aspects; Stage 3". +- [62] 3GPP TS 31.103: "Characteristics of the IP Multimedia Services Identity Module (ISIM) application". +- [63] 3GPP TS 24.302: "Access to the 3GPP Evolved Packet Core (EPC) via non-3GPP access networks; Stage 3". +- [64] IEEE Std 802.11™-2012: "Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications". +- [65] 3GPP TS 24.341: "Support of SMS over IP networks; Stage 3". +- [66] 3GPP TS 36.211: "Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Physical channels and modulation". +- [67] 3GPP TS 22.011: "Service accessibility" +- [68] 3GPP TS 24.368: "Non-Access Stratum (NAS) configuration Management Object (MO)" +- [69] 3GPP TS 38.413: "NG-RAN; NG Application Protocol (NGAP)" +- [70] 3GPP TS 24.501: "Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for 5G System (5GS); Stage 3". +- [71] 3GPP TS 38.331: "NR; Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol specification". +- [72] 3GPP TS 38.133: "NR; Requirements for support of radio resource management". +- [73] 3GPP TS 38.211: "NR; Physical channels and modulation". +- [74] 3GPP TS 23.501: "System architecture for the 5G System (5GS); Stage 2". + +--- + +## 3 Definitions, abbreviations and symbols + +### 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 3.1 and TR 21.905 [33] apply. + +Within the context of the present document, the term "terminal" used in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] refers to the Mobile Equipment (ME). + +Within the context of the present document, the term "NAA" used in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] refers to the USIM. + +Within the context of the present document, the term "CAT" used in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] refers to the USAT. + +Within the context of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 22.011 [67] apply: + +**3GPP PS data off** +**3GPP PS data off exempt service** + +### 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purpose of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] and TR 21.905 [33] and the following apply: + +| | | +|-------|------------------------------| +| 5GS | 5G System | +| ADN | Abbreviated Dialling Number | +| BCCH | Broadcast Control Channel | +| BSSID | Basic Service Set Identifier | + +| | | +|---------|-------------------------------------------------------| +| CB | Cell Broadcast | +| CBMID | Cell Broadcast Message Identifier | +| CSG | Closed Subscriber Group | +| DNN | Data Network Name | +| EGPRS | EDGE General Packet Radio Service | +| EPS | Evolved Packet System | +| E-UTRAN | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network | +| FDN | Fixed Dialling Number | +| GGSN | Gateway GPRS Support Node | +| GPRS | General Packet Radio Service | +| GSM | Global System for Mobile communications | +| H(e)NB | Home Node B or Home evolved Node B | +| HESSID | Homogenous Extended Service Set Identifier | +| HPSIM | Hosting Party Subscription Identity Module | +| HSDPA | High Speed Downlink Packet Access | +| IARI | IMS Application Reference Identifier | +| IMPU | IMS Public User Identity | +| MM | Multimedia Message | +| MMS | Multimedia Messaging Service | +| MMI | Man Machine Interface | +| NA | No Audio-alerting capability | +| ND | No Display capability | +| NG-RAN | Next Generation – Radio Access Network | +| NK | No Keypad capability | +| NL | No support of multiple Languages | +| NR | New Radio | +| NS | No Speech-call capability | +| NSSAI | Network Slice Selection Assistance Information | +| PDN | Packet Data Network | +| PDP | Packet Data Protocol, e.g., Ip or X25 or PPP | +| PDU | Protocol Data Unit | +| ProSe | Proximity-based Services | +| PS | Packet Switched | +| RFU | Reserved for Future Use | +| SD | Slice Differentiator | +| S-NSSAI | Single Network Slice Selection Assistance Information | +| SS | Supplementary Service | +| SSC | Supplementary Service Control string | +| SSID | Service Set Identifier | +| SST | Slice/Service Type | +| USAT | USIM Application Toolkit | +| USIM | Universal Subscriber Identity Module | +| USSD | Unstructured Supplementary Service Data | +| WSID | WLAN Specific Identifier | + +### 3.3 Symbols + +For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: + +'0' to '9' and 'A' to 'F' The sixteen hexadecimal digits. + +--- + +## 4 Overview of USAT + +The USAT provides mechanisms which allow applications, existing in the UICC, to interact and operate with any ME which supports the specific mechanism(s) required by the application. + +The following mechanisms have been defined. These mechanisms are dependent upon the commands and protocols relevant to USAT in TS 31.101 [13]. + +## 4.1 Profile Download + +Profile downloading provides a mechanism for the ME to tell the UICC what it is capable of. + +## 4.2 Proactive UICC + +Proactive UICC gives a mechanism whereby the UICC can initiate actions to be taken by the ME. The supported functions are specified in clause 6.4. + +For each command involved in the dialog with the user, a help information may be available, either for each item of a list of items proposed to the user, or with each command requesting a response from the user. If a proactive command involved in the dialog with the user indicates the availability of the help feature, the support of this feature is optional for the terminal. + +## 4.3 Data download to UICC + +Data downloading to the UICC uses either dedicated commands (the transport mechanisms of SMS point-to-point and Cell Broadcast) or the Bearer independent protocol. Transferral of information over the UICC-ME interface uses the ENVELOPE command. + +## 4.4 Menu selection + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 4.4. + +## 4.5 Call control by USIM + +When this service is activated by the USIM, all dialled digit strings, supplementary service control strings and USSD strings, PDP context parameters, PDN connection parameters, PDU session establishment parameters or IMS communications parameters are first passed to a USIM application before the ME sets up the call, the supplementary service operation or the USSD operation, establishes the PDP context, the PDN connection, the PDU session or initiates IMS communications. The ME shall also pass to the USIM application at the same time its current serving cell. The USIM application has the ability to allow, bar or modify the call, the supplementary service operation or, the USSD operation, PDP context activation, PDN connection activation, PDU session establishment or IMS communication set up by another context activation. The USIM application also has the ability to replace a call request, a supplementary service operation or a USSD operation by another call request or supplementary service operation or USSD operation. + +EXAMPLE: A call request can be replaced by a supplementary service operation or a USSD operation, and vice-versa. + +## 4.6 MO Short Message control by USIM + +When this service is activated by the USIM, all MO short messages are first passed to the USIM application before the ME sends the short message. The ME shall also pass to the USIM application at the same time its current serving cell. The USIM application shall have the ability to allow the sending, bar the sending or modify the destination address of the short message before sending it. + +## 4.7 Event download + +In addition to the set of events defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 4.7, the following event may also be reported to the UICC: + +- Network Rejection +- CSG cell selection (if class "q" is supported) +- Incoming IMS Data (if classes "e" and "t" are supported) + +- IMS Registration (if classes "e" and "t" are supported) +- Data Connection Status Change (if class "e" is supported) + +## 4.8 Security + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 4.8. + +## 4.9 Multiple card + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 4.9. + +## 4.10 Timer Expiration + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 4.10. + +## 4.11 Bearer Independent Protocol + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 4.11. + +## 4.12 Description of the access technology indicator mechanism + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 4.12. + +## 4.13 Description of the network search mode mechanism + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 4.14. + +## 4.14 Geographical location discovery + +The proactive command Geographical Location Request and the envelope command Geographical Location Reporting allows the UICC to request and receive the current geographical location information from the ME when the ME is equipped with a positioning feature and it is enabled (e.g. autonomous GPS, Assisted GPS or Assisted GNSS). + +## 4.15 Operation in reduced USAT capable terminals + +This specification takes into account terminal types corresponding to the following capabilities: + +- no display capability +- no keypad available +- no audio alerting capability +- no speech call capability +- no support of multiple languages. + +These terminal types are used to identify which USAT features are not available for each type of reduced functionality. + +Note: Terminal types details are in Annex P. + +## 4.16 Tag allocation guidelines + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 4.13. + +## 4.17 USAT over the AT interface + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 4.16. + +## 4.18 USAT facilities provided by eCAT clients + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 4.19 Negotiation of Poll Interval + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 4.18. + +## 4.20 ProSe usage information reporting + +When the UICC supports the ProSe usage information reporting functionality, the ProSe-enabled Public Safety UE stores in the UICC the information to provide information necessary for composing of charging events related to the ProSe direct communication. The UICC is responsible for communicating those reports to the ProSe Function CTF (ADF) using BIP mechanism. + +# 5 Profile download + +## 5.1 Procedure + +The profile download instruction is sent by the ME to the UICC as part of the UICC initialization procedure. The UICC initialization procedure is specified in TS 31.101 [13]. If class "s" is supported, the profile download instruction is sent also every time the TE accessing USAT functionalities over the AT interface is connected or disconnected or changes its profile. If the terminal supports class "s" the profile download instruction shall combine capabilities supported by the MT and the TE according to Annex Q. + +If the UICC indicates the support of "Additional TERMINAL PROFILE after UICC activation" in its USIM Service Table, the ME shall handle the profile download procedure as specified in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.1. + +If the UICC does not indicate the support of "Additional TERMINAL PROFILE after UICC activation" in its USIM Service Table, the profile download instruction shall only be sent by the ME to the UICC as part of the UICC initialization procedure. However, if a USIM initialisation procedure is performed due to a refresh proactive command, the USIM initialisation procedure may also include a profile download. + +The profile(s) sent by the ME shall state the facilities relevant to USAT that are supported by the ME. + +## 5.2 Structure and coding of TERMINAL PROFILE + +Direction: ME to UICC. + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13]. + +Command parameters/data: + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Length | +|-------------|--------|-------|--------| +| Profile | - | M | lgth | + +- Profile: + +Contents: + +- The list of USAT facilities that are supported by the ME. + +Coding: + +- 1 bit is used to code each facility: + - bit = 1: facility supported by ME. + - bit = 0: facility not supported by ME. + +NOTE: several bits may need to be set to 1 for the support of the same facility. This is because of backward compatibility with SAT: several options existed in SAT for a given facility, and they are mandatory in USAT when this facility is supported. + +First byte (Download): + +![Diagram of the first byte (Download) showing bit positions b1 to b8 and their corresponding facility descriptions. Lines connect each bit position to its description on the right.](90ddf538ef276510e2b631f7b96654e6_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | | + +- b1: See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- b2: SMS-PP data download +- b3: Cell Broadcast data download +- b4: See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- b5: Bit = 1 if SMS-PP data download is supported +- b6: See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- b7: Bit = 1 if Call Control by USIM is supported +- b8: Bit = 1 if Call Control by USIM is supported + +Diagram of the first byte (Download) showing bit positions b1 to b8 and their corresponding facility descriptions. Lines connect each bit position to its description on the right. + +Second byte (Other): + +![Diagram of the second byte (Other) showing bit positions b1 to b8 and their corresponding facility descriptions. Lines connect each bit position to its description on the right.](627c5195eaae3bc7e34cbc4dbdb6f9a8_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | | + +- b1: See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- b2: Call Control by USIM +- b3: Bit = 1 if Call Control by USIM is supported +- b4: MO short message control by USIM +- b5: Bit = 1 if Call Control by USIM is supported +- b6: See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- b7: See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- b8: See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 + +Diagram of the second byte (Other) showing bit positions b1 to b8 and their corresponding facility descriptions. Lines connect each bit position to its description on the right. + +Third byte (Proactive UICC): + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Fourth byte (Proactive UICC): + +![Diagram of the fourth byte (Proactive UICC) showing bit positions b1 to b8 and their corresponding facility descriptions. Lines connect each bit position to its description on the right.](8ed7f57cc317f6574bec781d01ae6ad2_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | | + +- b1: See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- b2: Proactive UICC: SEND SHORT MESSAGE +- b3: Proactive UICC: SEND SS +- b4: Proactive UICC: SEND USSD +- b5: See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- b6: See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- b7: See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- b8: Proactive UICC: PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (NMR) - in 3GPP terms, this indicates support for GERAN + +Diagram of the fourth byte (Proactive UICC) showing bit positions b1 to b8 and their corresponding facility descriptions. Lines connect each bit position to its description on the right. + +Fifth byte (Event driven information): + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Sixth byte (Event driven information extensions): + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Seventh byte (Multiple card proactive commands) for class "a": + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Eighth byte (Proactive UICC): + +![Diagram of the Eighth byte (Proactive UICC) showing bits b1 through b8 and their corresponding descriptions.](d9c0a780cd22626253dab4aa41699e2f_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----------------------------------------------| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 | +| | | | | | | | See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 | +| | | | | | | | See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 | +| | | | | | | | See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 | +| | | | | | | | See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 | +| | | | | | | | See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 | +| | | | | | | | See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 | +| | | | | | | | Bit = 1 if Call Control by USIM is supported | + +Diagram of the Eighth byte (Proactive UICC) showing bits b1 through b8 and their corresponding descriptions. + +Ninth byte: + +![Diagram of the Ninth byte showing bits b1 through b8 and their corresponding descriptions.](86b4670fc1a5a694821ee92b99c1209a_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|------------------------------------------------------------| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 | +| | | | | | | | See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 | +| | | | | | | | See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 | +| | | | | | | | See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 | +| | | | | | | | Proactive UICC: PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (Timing Advance) | +| | | | | | | | See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 | +| | | | | | | | See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 | +| | | | | | | | See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 | + +Diagram of the Ninth byte showing bits b1 through b8 and their corresponding descriptions. + +Tenth byte (Soft keys support) for class "d": + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Eleventh byte: (Soft keys information): + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Twelfth byte (Bearer Independent protocol proactive commands) for class "e": + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Thirteenth byte (Bearer Independent protocol supported bearers) for class "e": + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Fourteenth byte: (Screen height): + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Fifteenth byte: (Screen width): + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Sixteenth byte: (Screen effects): + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Seventeenth byte (Bearer independent protocol supported transport interface/bearers) for class "e": + +![Diagram of the Seventeenth byte showing bits b1 through b8 and their corresponding descriptions.](5659cf9ad9e9ff0feb1c1f20fa915500_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|--------------------------------| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 | +| | | | | | | | E-UTRAN | +| | | | | | | | HSDPA | + +Diagram of the Seventeenth byte showing bits b1 through b8 and their corresponding descriptions. + +Eighteenth byte: + +![](4b87467ad9642943235f48f7d4b59449_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | | + +See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +CALL CONTROL on GPRS +See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 + +Nineteenth byte: (reserved for TIA/EIA-136 facilities): + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Twentieth byte: (reserved for TIA/EIA/IS-820 facilities): + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Twenty-first byte (Extended Launch Browser Capability) for class "c": + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Twenty second byte: + +![](14515d82ffeec9475b9add3036ff26ab_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | | + +Support of UTRAN PS with extended parameters +See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +Toolkit-initiated GBA +See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 + +Twenty third byte: + +![](4412857e90dfaa9a3df8836bcbde534b_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | | + +See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +Geographical Location Reporting (if class "n" is supported) +See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +Proactive UICC: PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (NMR(UTRAN/E-UTRAN)) +USSD Data download and application mode (if class "p" is supported) + +Twenty fourth byte for class "i": + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Twenty-fifth byte (Event driven information extensions): + +![](4f1e31870533b39c6af586ef01764a07_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | | + +See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +Event: I-WLAN Access status (if class "e" is supported) +Event: Network Rejection for GERAN/UTRAN +Reserved by ETSI SCP: HCI connectivity event (i.e. class "m" is supported) +Event: Network Rejection for E-UTRAN +See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 + +Twenty-sixth byte (Event driven information extensions): + +![Bit map diagram for the 26th byte showing bits b8 through b1. Lines connect b1 to the first feature, b2 to the second, b3 to the third, b4 to the fourth, b5 to the fifth, b6 to the sixth, b7 to the seventh, and b8 to the eighth feature.](e354b57563dae469c00b412b2abdf765_img.jpg) + +Bit map diagram for the 26th byte showing bits b8 through b1. Lines connect b1 to the first feature, b2 to the second, b3 to the third, b4 to the fourth, b5 to the fifth, b6 to the sixth, b7 to the seventh, and b8 to the eighth feature. + +Event : CSG Cell Selection (if class "q" is supported) + Reserved by ETSI SCP: Contactless state request (if class "r" is supported) + See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 + +Twenty-seventh byte (Event driven information extensions): + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Twenty-eighth byte (Text attributes): + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Twenty-ninth byte (Text attributes): + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Thirtieth byte: + +![Bit map diagram for the 30th byte showing bits b8 through b1. Lines connect b1 to the first feature, b2 to the second, b3 to the third, b4 to the fourth, b5 to the fifth, b6 to the sixth, b7 to the seventh, and b8 to the eighth feature.](c8e5b3ef81948bb13d5c6c3c326799ea_img.jpg) + +Bit map diagram for the 30th byte showing bits b8 through b1. Lines connect b1 to the first feature, b2 to the second, b3 to the third, b4 to the fourth, b5 to the fifth, b6 to the sixth, b7 to the seventh, and b8 to the eighth feature. + +I-WLAN bearer support (if class "e" is supported) + Proactive UICC: PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (WSID of the current I-WLAN connection) + TERMINAL APPLICATIONS (i.e. class "k" is supported) + "Steering of Roaming" REFRESH support + Reserved by ETSI SCP: Proactive UICC command + ACTIVATE (i.e class "l" is supported) + Proactive UICC: Geographical Location Request (if class "n" is supported) + See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 + "Steering of Roaming for I-WLAN" REFRESH support + +Thirty-first byte: + +![Bit map diagram for the 31st byte showing bits b8 through b1. Lines connect b1 to the first feature, b2 to the second, b3 to the third, b4 to the fourth, b5 to the fifth, b6 to the sixth, b7 to the seventh, and b8 to the eighth feature.](ced309874aec0546651b0976d5030a42_img.jpg) + +Bit map diagram for the 31st byte showing bits b8 through b1. Lines connect b1 to the first feature, b2 to the second, b3 to the third, b4 to the fourth, b5 to the fifth, b6 to the sixth, b7 to the seventh, and b8 to the eighth feature. + +See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 + Support of CSG cell discovery (if class "q" is supported) + See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 + Communication Control for IMS + See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 + Support for Incoming IMS Data event (if classes "e" and "t" are supported) + Support for IMS Registration event (if classes "e" and "t" are supported) + Reserved by ETSI SCP: Proactive UICC: Profile Container, Envelope Container, COMMAND CONTAINER and ENCAPSULATED SESSION CONTROL (if class "u" is supported) + +Thirty-second byte: + +![](90ddb84c323b956e2d50a54d3f870566_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| + +![Line diagram connecting bits b1 through b8 of the 32nd byte to their respective descriptions.](58f4167687de8d7339594e5f6fbe0bc6_img.jpg) + +Line diagram connecting bits b1 through b8 of the 32nd byte to their respective descriptions. + +- IMS support (if class "e" and "t" are supported) +- Support of PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION, H(e)NB IP address (if class "v" is supported) +- support of PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION, H(e)NB surrounding macrocells (if class "w" is supported) +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 + +Thirty-third byte: + +![](20136850feb70fd71c7d41cdae203ebb_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| + +![Line diagram connecting bits b1 through b8 of the 33rd byte to their respective descriptions.](9b686adccf125267a013fa25721231a3_img.jpg) + +Line diagram connecting bits b1 through b8 of the 33rd byte to their respective descriptions. + +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- ProSe usage information reporting (used only if class "e" is supported) +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- Event: WLAN Access status (if class "e" is supported) +- WLAN bearer support (if class "e" is supported) +- Proactive UICC: PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (WLAN identifier of the current WLAN connection) + +Thirty-fourth byte: + +![](ceb48bd7cc8cbb0fa401b366532bbdb0_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| + +![Line diagram connecting bits b1 through b8 of the 34th byte to their respective descriptions.](e05c1a13b44ab41505609d82b00cf4df_img.jpg) + +Line diagram connecting bits b1 through b8 of the 34th byte to their respective descriptions. + +- URI support for SEND SHORT MESSAGE +- IMS URI supported for SET UP CALL (if class "ae" is supported) +- Media Type "Voice" supported for SET UP CALL and Call Control by USIM +- Media Type "Video" supported for SET UP CALL and Call Control by USIM +- Proactive UICC: PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (E-UTRAN Timing Advance Information) +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- Extended Rejection Cause Code in Event: Network Rejection for E-UTRAN +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 + +Thirty-fifth byte: + +![](62e0e858742d9a9ea4cfdc52e448e8bb_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| + +![Line diagram connecting bits b1 through b8 of the 35th byte to their respective descriptions.](b0d322b2e75c75e1f21bfc0df841beaa_img.jpg) + +Line diagram connecting bits b1 through b8 of the 35th byte to their respective descriptions. + +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- Data Connection Status Change Event support - PDP Connection +- Data Connection Status Change Event support - PDN Connection +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 +- See TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2 + +Thirty sixth byte: + +![](e90987faabad6a6665cd8ed1151dc474_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | | + +Data Connection Status Change Event support - PDU Connection + Event: Network Rejection for NG-RAN + Non-IP Data Delivery support (if class "e" and class "ai" are supported) + Support of PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION, Slice information + Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) + +Thirty seventh byte: + +![](088921fa3f5a44c8551815122517eefd_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | | + +Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) + +Thirty eighth byte: + +![](356eb99ab9489bbd647223390a913903_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | | + +Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) + +Thirty ninth byte: + +![](db5ab5d386827a5d5f5fad0f45612b90_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | | + +Proactive UICC: PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (NG-RAN/Satellite NG-RAN Timing Advance Information) + Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) + +Subsequent bytes: + +- See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.2. + +Response parameters/data: + +- None. + +## 5.3 Definition of display parameters in Profile download + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 5.3. + +# 6 Proactive UICC + +## 6.1 Introduction + +TS 31.101 [13] defines the communication protocols between the ME and the UICC, and defines a mechanism to transport "proactive" commands using these protocols. Details about how this mechanism is used for USAT are defined in TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.1. The supported proactive commands are specified in clause 6.4. of the present document. + +If the UICC issues an instruction to the ME to initiate a Mobile Originated transaction (e.g. SEND SMS, SEND SS, SEND USSD or SEND DTMF), then unless explicitly stated elsewhere in the present document or in TS 31.101 [13], the content supplied by the UICC for onward transmission by the ME shall not be altered by the ME. + +## 6.2 Identification of ME support + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.2. + +## 6.3 General procedure + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.3. + +## 6.4 Proactive UICC commands and procedures + +### 6.4.1 DISPLAY TEXT + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.1. + +### 6.4.2 GET INKEY + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.2. + +### 6.4.3 GET INPUT + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.3. + +### 6.4.4 MORE TIME + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.4. + +### 6.4.5 PLAY TONE + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.5. + +NOTE: Some supervisory tones are optional for mobile equipment (see TS 22.001 [22]). + +### 6.4.6 POLL INTERVAL + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.6. + +### 6.4.7 REFRESH + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.7 except for: + +- "eUICC Profile State Change" and "Application Update" which are not required by 3GPP; +- "3G Session Reset" and "Steering of Roaming" which are defined as follows. + +#### 3G Session Reset: + +This mode causes the ME to reset the 3G session, in accordance with the 3G session reset procedure defined in TS 31.102 [14]. Subsequently, the ME performs the "USIM Initialization and File Change Notification" procedure and the MM Restart procedure as defined in TS 23.122 [7]. + +#### Steering of Roaming: + +This mode triggers a steering of roaming procedure as defined in TS 23.122 [7] or a steering of roaming for I-WLAN procedure as defined in TS 24.234 [42]. + +#### 6.4.7.1 EFIMSI changing procedure + +When an EFIMSI is changed via Data Download or a USAT application and a REFRESH command is issued by the UICC the following rules apply to the UICC and ME: + +- USIM Initialization. This command shall not be used if an EFIMSI is changed, as the behaviour of the UE is unpredictable; +- File Change Notification. This command shall not be used if an EFIMSI is changed, as the behaviour of the UE is unpredictable; +- USIM Initialization and File Change Notification. This command shall not be used if an EFIMSI is changed, as the behaviour of the UE is unpredictable; +- USIM Initialization and Full File Change Notification. This command shall not be used if an EFIMSI is changed, as the behaviour of the UE is unpredictable; +- UICC Reset. Normal UICC Reset procedure is carried out; +- USIM Application Reset. Normal USIM Application Reset procedure is carried out; +- 3G Session Reset. Normal 3G Session Reset procedure is carried out. + +If an EFIMSI is to be updated, neither EFIMSI, EFPSLOCI, EFEPSLOCI, EFLOCI, EF5GS3GPPLOCI nor EF5GSN3GPPLOCI shall be updated in the UICC before the 3G session termination procedure has been completed by the ME. + +#### 6.4.7.2 Generic Bootstrapping Procedure Request + +If Toolkit-initiated GBA is supported by the ME, as indicated in the TERMINAL PROFILE, then the following applies: + +When the UICC issues a REFRESH command implying a File Change Notification on EFGBABP (GBA Bootstrapping parameters) under ADF USIM or ADF ISIM the ME shall perform a GBA bootstrapping procedure (as defined in TS 31.102 [14] or TS 31.103 [62]). + +This procedure applies to REFRESH command only in the following modes: USIM File Change Notification; USIM Initialization and File Change Notification; and 3G Session Reset. + +#### 6.4.7.3 EFUICCIARI changing procedure + +When an EFUICCIARI is changed in either the USIM or the ISIM via Data Download or a USAT application and a REFRESH command is issued by the UICC the following rule applies to the ME: + +The ME shall read the updated list of IARIs associated with active applications installed on the UICC and follow the procedures defined in TS 24.229 [52]. + +#### 6.4.7.4 Steering of roaming and steering of roaming for I-WLAN procedure + +The steering of roaming procedures defined in TS 23.122 [7] and in TS 24.234 [42] might take a long time. In order to avoid blocking the Toolkit interface, the ME shall send the TERMINAL RESPONSE (Command performed successfully) immediately after starting the steering of roaming procedure, without waiting for its completion. The ME shall send TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME unable to process command or other appropriate code) in case it fails to start the steering of roaming procedure. + +#### 6.4.7.5 Steering of roaming via NAS messages + +When the ME receives an SOR transparent container, as specified in 3GPP TS 24.501 [70] clause 9.11.3.51, via a REGISTRATION ACCEPT message (see 3GPP TS 23.122 [7] Annex C.2) or via a DL NAS TRANSPORT message (see 3GPP TS 23.122 [7] Annex C.3), with the indication that the transparent container shall be forwarded to the USIM using SMS-PP data download, and the integrity check of the message was successful, the ME shall pass the transparent container to the USIM by using the procedure for SMS-PP data download via REGISTRATION ACCEPT or DL NAS TRANSPORT messages as described in clause 7.1.1.1a + +#### 6.4.7.6 Routing Indicator Data update via NAS messages + +When the ME receives a secure packet in a UE parameters update data set with UE parameters update data set type set to Routing Indicator update data as specified in 3GPP TS 24.501 [70] clause 9.11.3.53A, via a DL NAS TRANSPORT message, and the integrity check of the message was successful, the ME shall pass the transparent container to the USIM by using the procedure for SMS-PP data download via DL NAS TRANSPORT messages as described in clause 7.1.1.1a. Upon successfully processing the Routing Indicator data from the secure packet on the UICC, the UICC shall issue a File Change Notification REFRESH. + +### 6.4.8 SET UP MENU + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.8. + +### 6.4.9 SELECT ITEM + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.9. + +### 6.4.10 SEND SHORT MESSAGE + +This command requests the ME to send a short message. + +Two types are defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.10 and apply as follows within the context of the present document: + +- a short message to be sent to the network in an SMS-SUBMIT message, or an SMS-COMMAND message, where the user data can be passed transparently; +- a short message to be sent to the network in an SMS-SUBMIT message where the text needs to be packed by the ME. + +Where the text has been packed, the text string provided by the UICC shall not be longer than 160 characters. It shall use the SMS default 7-bit coded alphabet, packed into 8-bit octets, in accordance with TS 23.038 [4]. The data coding indication contained in the Data Coding Scheme byte shall be "default alphabet". The text length (which is part of the SMS TPDU) given by the UICC shall state the number of 7-bit characters in the text string. The command details shall indicate "packing not required". + +8-bit data Short Messages may be sent by the UICC. The command shall indicate packing not required. The data coding indication contained in the Data Coding Scheme byte shall be "8 bit". The string shall not be longer than 140 bytes, and the length (in SMS TPDU) shall state the number of bytes in the string. + +If UCS2 is supported by the ME, 16-bit data Short Messages may be sent by the UICC. The text string provided by the UICC shall not be longer than 70 characters. It shall use the 16-bit UCS2 alphabet format, in accordance with TS 23.038 [4]. The text length (which is part of the SMS TPDU) given by the UICC shall state the number of 16-bit characters in the text string. The command details shall indicate "packing not required". + +SMS commands may be sent by the UICC. These shall count as packed text message. The SMS TPDU from the UICC shall indicate SMS-COMMAND. The command details shall indicate "packing not required". + +Where packing by the ME is required, the text string provided by the UICC shall not be longer than 160 characters. It shall use the SMS default 7-bit coded alphabet as defined in TS 23.038 [4] with bit 8 set to 0. The text length given by the UICC shall state the number of characters in the text string. The ME shall pack the text string and modify the Data Coding Scheme byte to "default alphabet" in accordance with TS 23.038 [4] before submitting the message to the network. + +Optionally, the UICC may include in this command an alpha identifier. See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.10 for the use of this alpha identifier. + +If the ME is capable of SMS-MO, then it shall send the data as a Short Message TPDU to the destination address. The ME shall give the result to the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (indicating successful or unsuccessful transmission of the Short Message) after receiving an SMS RP-ACK or RP-Error from the network. If an alpha identifier was provided by the UICC, the ME should not give any information to the user at the reception of SMS RP-ACK or RP-Error. + +If the Short Message TPDU is unsuccessfully received by the network (e.g. the reception of a CP-ERROR), the ME shall inform the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (network currently unable to process command). If a null alpha identifier was provided by the UICC, the ME should not give any information to the user at the unsuccessful network reception. + +## 6.4.11 SEND SS + +Upon receiving this command, the ME shall decide if it is able to execute the command. Examples are given below, but the list is not exhaustive: + +- if the command is rejected because the ME is busy on an SS transaction, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME unable to process command - currently busy on SS transaction); +- if the command is rejected because the ME is busy on a USSD transaction, the ME shall inform the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME unable to process command - currently busy on USSD transaction); +- if the command is rejected because the ME does not support that Supplementary Service, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (Command beyond ME's capabilities). + +If the ME is able to send the SS request, the ME shall: + +- send the SS request immediately, without need to alert the user first; +- optionally, the UICC may include in this command an alpha-identifier. The use of this alpha-identifier by the ME is described below: + - if the alpha identifier is provided by the UICC and is not a null data object, the ME shall use it to inform the user. This is also an indication that the ME should not give any other information to the user on the fact that the ME is sending a SS request. If an icon is provided by the UICC, the icon indicated in the command may be used by the ME to inform the user, in addition to, or instead of the alpha identifier, as indicated with the icon qualifier (see clause 6.5.4); + - if the alpha identifier is provided by the UICC and is a null data object (i.e. length = '00' and no value part), this is an indication that the ME should not give any information to the user on the fact that the ME is sending an SS request; + - if the alpha identifier is not provided by the UICC, the ME may give information to the user concerning what is happening. +- once an SS Return Result message not containing an error has been received from the network, the ME shall inform the UICC that the command has been successfully executed, using TERMINAL RESPONSE. This command shall include the contents of SS Return Result as additional data. +If a null alpha identifier was provided by the UICC, the ME should not give any information to the user at the reception of an SS Return Result message; +- if the command is rejected because the network cannot support or is not allowing the Supplementary Service request, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (SS Return Result error code). +If a null alpha identifier was provided by the UICC, the ME should not give any information to the user at the reception of a SS Return Result message; +- if the SS request is unsuccessfully received by the network, the ME shall inform the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (network currently unable to process command), and not retry to send the request. +If a null alpha identifier was provided by the UICC, the ME should not give any information to the user at the reception of a SS Return Result message. + +A terminal of type ND shall ignore any alpha identifier provided together with this command. The terminal shall respond with "command performed successfully" upon successful completion of the command. A terminal of type ND + +shall also ignore any icon provided together with this command. The terminal shall respond with "command performed successfully but requested icon could not be displayed" upon successful completion of the command. + +If the ME supports the Outgoing Call Information service, the ME shall not store in EFOCI the supplementary service control string sent by the UICC in this command. + +The supplementary service control string included in the SEND SS proactive command shall not be checked against those of the FDN list, even if the Fixed Dialling Number service is enabled. + +## 6.4.12 SEND USSD + +### 6.4.12.1 MMI Mode + +Upon receiving this command, the ME shall decide if it is able to execute the command. Examples are given below, but the list is not exhaustive: + +- if the command is rejected because the ME is busy on a USSD transaction, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME unable to process command - currently busy on USSD transaction); +- if the command is rejected because the ME is busy on a SS transaction, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME unable to process command - currently busy on SS transaction). + +If the ME is able to send the USSD request, the ME shall: + +- send the USSD immediately, without need to alert the user first; +- optionally, the UICC may include in this command an alpha-identifier. The use of this alpha-identifier by the ME is described below: + - if the alpha identifier is provided by the UICC and is not a null data object, the ME shall use it to inform the user. This is also an indication that the ME should not give any other information to the user on the fact that the ME is sending a USSD request. If an icon is provided by the UICC, the icon indicated in the command may be used by the ME to inform the user, in addition to, or instead of the alpha identifier, as indicated with the icon qualifier (see clause 6.5.4); + - if the alpha identifier is provided by the UICC and is a null data object (i.e. length = '00' and no value part), this is an indication that the ME should not give any information to the user on the fact that the ME is sending a USSD request; + - if the alpha identifier is not provided by the UICC, the ME may give information to the user concerning what is happening. + +A terminal of type ND shall ignore any alpha identifier provided together with this command. The terminal shall respond with "command performed successfully" upon successful completion of the command. A terminal of type ND shall also ignore any icon provided together with this command. The terminal shall respond with "command performed successfully but requested icon could not be displayed" upon successful completion of the command. + +- once the USSD transaction is initiated, a dialogue between the network and the user may occur which involves the MMI of the ME. If an alpha identifier was initially provided by the UICC, this alpha identifier may be discarded during this dialogue; +- once a RELEASE COMPLETE message containing the USSD Return Result message not containing an error has been received from the network, the ME shall inform the UICC that the command has been successfully executed, using TERMINAL RESPONSE. This command shall include the text contained in the USSD Return Result in a Text String data object. If a null alpha identifier was provided by the UICC, the ME should not give any information to the user at the reception of a USSD Return Result message; +- if the UE clears the transaction by sending a RELEASE COMPLETE upon request of the user, the ME shall inform the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (USSD transaction terminated by user); +- if the USSD operation is rejected because the network cannot support or is not allowing mobile initiated USSD, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (USSD Return Result error code). If a null alpha + +identifier was provided by the UICC, the ME should not give any information to the user at the reception of a USSD Return Result message; + +- if the USSD request is unsuccessfully received by the network, the ME shall inform the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (network currently unable to process command), and not retry to send the request. If a null alpha identifier was provided by the UICC, the ME should not give any information to the user at the reception of a USSD Return Result message. + +## 6.4.12.2 Application Mode + +This clause applies if class "p" is supported. + +A USSD is considered as Application Mode (Send USSD used for the transport of Data to the network) if the service "data download via USSD and USSD application mode" is allocated and activated in the USIM Service Table (see TS 31.102 [14]) and the DCS coding within the USSD string TLV is set to 8 bit data. + +Upon receiving this command, the ME shall decide if it is able to execute the command. Examples are given below, but the list is not exhaustive: + +- if the command is rejected because the ME is busy on a USSD transaction, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME unable to process command - currently busy on USSD transaction); +- if the command is rejected because the ME is busy on a SS transaction, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME unable to process command - currently busy on SS transaction). + +If the ME is able to send the USSD request then the ME shall: + +- send the USSD immediately, without need to alert the user first; +- optionally, the UICC may include in this command an alpha-identifier. The use of this alpha-identifier by the ME is described below: + - if the alpha identifier is provided by the UICC and is not a null data object, the ME shall use it to inform the user. This is also an indication that the ME should not give any other information to the user on the fact that the ME is sending a USSD request. If an icon is provided by the UICC, the icon indicated in the command may be used by the ME to inform the user, in addition to, or instead of the alpha identifier, as indicated with the icon qualifier (see clause 6.5.4); + - if the alpha identifier is provided by the UICC and is a null data object (i.e. length = '00' and no value part), this is an indication that the ME should not give any information to the user on the fact that the ME is sending a USSD request; + - if the alpha identifier is not provided by the UICC, the ME may give information to the user concerning what is happening. +- once a FACILITY (including RELEASE COMPLETE) message containing a USSD Request message has been received from the network, the ME shall inform the UICC that the network requests more information , using the command ENVELOPE (USSD Data Download). This command shall include the text contained in the USSD Request in a Text String data object. If a null alpha identifier was provided by the UICC, the ME should not give any information to the user at the reception of a USSD Request message. + +A terminal of type ND shall ignore any alpha identifier provided together with this command. The terminal shall respond with "command performed successfully" upon successful completion of the command. A terminal of type ND shall also ignore any icon provided together with this command. The terminal shall respond with "command performed successfully but requested icon could not be displayed" upon successful completion of the command. + +## 6.4.13 SET UP CALL + +This command is issued by the UICC to request a call set up. The procedure is defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.13, except when stated otherwise in the present document. + +The UICC may request the use of an automatic redial mechanism according to TS 22.001 [22] + +In addition to the rules given in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.13 the following applies: + +- If the UICC supplies a number stored in EFECC, this shall not result in an emergency call. + +Upon receiving this command, the ME shall decide if it is able to execute the command. Examples are given below, but the list is not exhaustive: + +- if the command is rejected because the ME is busy on another call, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME unable to process command - currently busy on call); +- if the command is rejected because the ME is busy on a SS transaction, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME unable to process command - currently busy on SS transaction); +- if the command is rejected because the ME cannot support Call Hold, or because the ME does not support the capability configuration parameters requested by the UICC, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (Command beyond ME's capabilities); +- if the command is rejected because the network cannot support or is not allowing Call Hold of a multi party call, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (SS Return Result error code); +- if the command is rejected because the network cannot support or is not allowing Call Hold of a single call, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (Network currently unable to process command). + +If the ME supports the Outgoing Call Information service, the ME shall not store in EFOCT and in EFOCT the call set-up details (called party number and associated parameters) sent by the UICC in this command. + +## 6.4.14 POLLING OFF + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.14. + +## 6.4.15 PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION + +This command requests the ME to send current local information to the UICC. At present, this information is restricted to: + +- location information: the mobile country code (MCC), mobile network code (MNC), location area code/tracking area code (LAC/TAC) and cell ID of the current serving cell; + +NOTE: For UTRAN the cell ID returned in terminal response is the last known cell ID which may not be the current serving cell, when the ME is on a dedicated channel. + +- the IMEI or IMEISV of the ME; +- the Network Measurement Results (and the BCCH channel list if connected to GERAN); +- the current date, time and time zone; +- the current ME language setting; +- the Timing Advance, suitable for GERAN, E-UTRAN and NG-RAN +- the current access technology; +- the current network search mode; +- the charge state of the battery (if class "g" is supported); +- the WSID of the current I-WLAN connection; +- the WLAN identifier of the current WLAN connection; +- the CSG ID list and corresponding HNB names (if available in the broadcasted information to the ME) of detected CSG or Hybrid cells in the Allowed CSG list or the Operator CSG list (if class "q" is supported); +- the H(e)NB IP address. (if class "v" is supported); +- the list of location information for surrounding macrocells (if class "w" is supported); + +- the list of slice(s) information. + +The above information can be requested only if supported by the ME as indicated in the TERMINAL PROFILE. + +The ME shall return the requested local information within a TERMINAL RESPONSE. + +Where location information or Network Measurement Results has been requested and no service is currently available, then the ME shall return TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME currently unable to process command - no service). + +Where location information or Network Measurement Results has been requested and the ME is on limited service (e.g. emergency calls only), the ME shall return the data requested in the TERMINAL RESPONSE with the general result (Limited Service). + +Where Network Measurement Results has been requested and the ME is connected to a different access technology to the one requested (e.g. UTRAN Measurement Qualifier included when ME is connected to a GERAN), then the ME shall return TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME currently unable to process command - no service). + +Network Measurement Results are available on a per access technology basis and indicated as such in the Terminal Profile. + +Network Measurement Results for a GERAN: + +If the NMR are requested and a call is in progress, the value of all the returned parameters provided by the ME in the response to the command will be valid. The NMR returned when a call is in progress from Mes supporting multiband operation, shall be according to the value of the multiband reporting parameter as defined in TS 44.018 [27]. If a call is not in progress (i.e. ME is in idle mode) some of the returned parameters (e.g. RXQUAL) may be invalid. In idle mode, Mes supporting multiband operation shall ignore the value of the multiband reporting parameter and the NMR returned shall be as defined in TS 44.018 [27] when the multiband reporting parameter equals zero. + +NOTE 1: When in idle mode, the only information element on which it is possible to rely on is the RXLEV-FULL-SERVING-CELL, which contains the value of the received signal strength on the BCCH of the current serving cell. + +NOTE 2: Network Measurement Results are defined in TS 44.018 [27] as Measurement Results. + +The BCCH channel list is only available if the ME is connected to a GERAN. + +Network Measurement Results for a UTRAN: + +The USIM request for measurement information shall not trigger any measurement activities in ME in addition to those requested by UTRAN. + +The ME shall only report measurement results that are valid according to the current RRC state or the UTRAN configuration requested. + +NOTE 3: The returned parameters provided by the ME, in the response to the command, are subject to the ME capability, currently used radio configuration, current RRC state and the UTRAN configuration requested as defined in the TS 25.331 [38]. + +NOTE 4: Network Measurement Results are defined in TS 25.331 [38] as the MEASUREMENT REPORT message. + +Network Measurement Results for a E-UTRAN: + +The USIM request for measurement information shall not trigger any measurement activities in ME in addition to those requested by E-UTRAN. + +The ME shall only report measurement results that are valid according to the current RRC state or the E-UTRAN configuration requested. + +NOTE 5: The returned parameters provided by the ME, in the response to the command, are subject to the ME capability, currently used radio configuration, current RRC state and the E-UTRAN configuration requested as defined in the TS 36.331 [49]. + +NOTE 6: Network Measurement Results are defined in TS 36.331 [49] as the *MeasurementReport* message. + +Network Measurement Results for a NG-RAN: + +The USIM request for measurement information shall not trigger any measurement activities in ME in addition to those requested by NG-RAN. + +The ME shall only report measurement results that are valid according to the current RRC state or the NG-RAN configuration requested. + +NOTE 7: The returned parameters provided by the ME, in the response to the command, are subject to the ME capability, currently used radio configuration, current RRC state and the NG-RAN configuration requested as defined in the TS 38.331 [71]. + +NOTE 8: Network Measurement Results are defined in TS 38.331 [71] as the *MeasurementReport* message. + +The ME shall return the current date and time as set by the user. An ME of type NK or type ND may return the date and time received from the network with the NITZ feature (see TS 22.042 [3]), if this is available. If available, the ME shall also return the time zone known from the network with the NITZ feature (see TS 22.042 [3]). If the time zone information is not available, the ME shall return 'FF' for this element. + +If language setting is requested, the ME shall return the currently used language. + +Timing advance is available if the ME is connected to a GERAN, E-UTRAN or NG-RAN. If the Timing Advance is requested, the ME shall return the timing advance value that was received from the BTS, eNodeB or gNodeB during the last active dedicated connection (e.g. for call or SMS). Timing advance is defined for GERAN in TS 44.018 [27], for E-UTRAN in 3GPP TS 36.211 [66] and for NG-RAN in 3GPP TS 38.211 [73]. An ME supporting the Timing Advance feature shall be able to store the last value of timing advance. In addition to the timing advance value, the ME shall return its current status (i.e. ME is in idle mode or not) in order for the application to be aware of potential misinterpretation of the timing advance value. Caution should be taken if using the Timing Advance value for distance measurement as reflections from the external environment (buildings etc.) may affect the accuracy. + +If the access technology is requested, the ME shall return the current access technology that the ME is using. + +The WSID or the WLAN identifier is only available if the ME is connected to a I-WLAN or a WLAN respectively. If the WSID or the WLAN identifier is requested, the ME shall return the WSID or the WLAN identifier respectively of the currently connected I-WLAN or a WLAN respectively. Where a WSID or the WLAN identifier has been requested and no I-WLAN or WLAN respectively is currently connected, then the ME shall return TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME currently unable to process command - no service). + +When CSG ID list is requested, the ME shall return the CSG ID list and the corresponding HNB name (if available in the broadcasted information to the ME). If the CSG ID list has been requested, and the ME is currently not camped on a CSG or Hybrid cell, the ME shall return TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME currently not able to process command – no service). + +The proactive command PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION – H(e)NB IP address is issued on the H(e)NB-HPSIM interface, see TS 31.104 [56]. + +When the IP address is requested, the H(e)NB shall return the IP address reported to H(e)MS and/or HNB-GW for location verification based on IP address (which may be a local IP address). If no such IP address is available to the H(e)NB, the H(e)NB shall return TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME currently not able to process command – no service). If several such IP addresses are available, the H(e)NB provides all of them to the UICC. + +The proactive command PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION – H(e)NB surrounding macrocell is issued on the H(e)NB-HPSIM interface, see TS 31.104 [56]. + +When the list of surrounding macrocells is requested, the H(e)NB shall provide the list of location information for detected macrocells. + +- For the HNB, all cell information contained in: intra-frequency neighbor list, inter-frequency neighbor list, inter-RAT neighbor list, that are reported to the HMS, see TS 32.582 [57] sec 6.1.1. + +- For the HeNB, all cell information contained in: LTE cell neighbor list, UMTS cell neighbor list, GSM cell neighbor list, that are reported to the HeMS, see TS 32.592 [58] sec 6.1.15. + +Location information contains the mobile country code (MCC), mobile network code (MNC), location area code/tracking area code (LAC/TAC) and cell ID. The list of surrounding macrocells is provided for all access technologies supported by the H(e)NB, up to the limit of the TERMINAL RESPONSE APDU command size. + +NOTE 9: the HPSIM request for H(e)NB surrounding macrocell does not trigger a network scan; the H(e)NB reports available information to the HPSIM. + +When the list of slice(s) information is requested, the Serving PLMN S-NSSAIs list shall be returned. + +An S-NSSAI, as specified in 3GPP TS 23.003 [30], is comprised of,: + +- A Slice/Service type (SST) +- A Slice Differentiator (SD) + +## **6.4.16 SET UP EVENT LIST** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.16. + +## **6.4.17 PERFORM CARD APDU** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.17. + +## **6.4.18 POWER OFF CARD** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.18. + +## **6.4.19 POWER ON CARD** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.19. + +## **6.4.20 GET READER STATUS** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.20. + +## **6.4.21 TIMER MANAGEMENT** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.21. + +## **6.4.22 SET UP IDLE MODE TEXT** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.22. + +## **6.4.23 RUN AT COMMAND** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.23. + +## **6.4.24 SEND DTMF** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.24. + +## **6.4.25 LANGUAGE NOTIFICATION** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.25. + +## 6.4.26 LAUNCH BROWSER + +This command is used to request a browser inside a browser-enabled ME to interpret the content corresponding to a URL. See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.26. + +Upon receiving this command, the ME shall decide if it is able to execute the command. In addition to the examples given in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.26 the following example applies: + +- if the command is rejected because the ME is busy on a SS transaction, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME unable to process command - ME currently unable to process command); + +## 6.4.27 OPEN CHANNEL + +### 6.4.27.1 OPEN CHANNEL related to CS bearer + +This command is issued by the UICC to request a channel opening. The procedure is defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.27.1, except when stated otherwise in the present document. + +The UICC may request the use of an automatic reconnection mechanism according to TS 22.001 [22]. + +Upon receiving this command, the ME shall decide if it is able to execute the command. In addition to the examples given in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.27.1 the following example applies: + +- if the command is rejected because the ME is busy on a SS transaction, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME unable to process command - currently busy on SS transaction). The operation is aborted. + +The "Bearer description" provided in the command gives recommended values for parameters that the ME should use to establish the data link. However if the ME or network does not support these values, the ME selects the most appropriate values. + +### 6.4.27.2 OPEN CHANNEL related to GPRS/UTRAN packet service/E-UTRAN/NG-RAN + +The procedures defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.27.2 apply, understanding that: + +- "packet data service" means GPRS, UTRAN packet service, E-UTRAN or NG-RAN, +- "activation of packet data service" means activation of a PDP context or EPS PDN connection or PDU session. + +The UICC provides to the terminal a list of parameters necessary to activate a packet data service. The UICC has three ways to indicate to the ME the QoS it requires: + +- either use a Bearer Description called "Bearer description for GPRS/UTRAN Packet Service/E-UTRAN", which is valid for GPRS, UTRAN packet service and E-UTRAN +- or use a Bearer Description called "Bearer description for UTRAN Packet Service with extended parameters and HSDPA" which is valid for a UTRAN packet service, HSDPA and E-UTRAN. +- or use a Bearer Description called "Bearer description for E-UTRAN and mapped UTRAN packet service", which is valid for UTRAN packet service and E-UTRAN. + +For NG-RAN, Quality of Service parameters are not applicable + +Upon receiving this command, the ME shall decide if it is able to execute the command. + +If the 3GPP PS data off status is "active", and the UE is not configured with indication that Bearer Independent Protocol is a 3GPP PS data off exempt service (see Annex S), then the ME shall send the TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME currently unable to process command) immediately. The operation is aborted. + +In addition to the examples given in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.27.2 the following example applies: + +- if the command is rejected because the ME is busy on an SS transaction and unable to activate a PDP context in parallel with this SS transaction, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME unable to process command - currently busy on SS transaction). The operation is aborted. + +The "Bearer description" provided in the command gives recommended values for parameters that the ME should use to establish the data link. However if the ME or network does not support these values, the ME selects the most appropriate values. + +If class "ai" is supported, the "Bearer description" provided in the command shall indicate a Non-IP PDP Type in order to establish a Non-IP data link. The UICC shall provide the Network Access Name data object. + +#### 6.4.27.3 OPEN CHANNEL related to local bearer + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.27.3. + +#### 6.4.27.4 OPEN CHANNEL related to Default (network) Bearer + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.27.4. + +Additionally, if the 3GPP PS data off status is "active", and the UE is not configured with indication that Bearer Independent Protocol is a 3GPP PS data off exempt service (see Annex S), then the ME shall send the TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME currently unable to process command) immediately. The operation is aborted. + +If class "ai" is supported, the "Bearer description" provided in the command shall indicate Non-IP PDP Type in order to establish a Non-IP data link. The UICC shall provide the Network Access Name data object. + +#### 6.4.27.5 OPEN CHANNEL related to (I-)WLAN bearer + +This clause applies if class "e" is supported. + +Upon receiving this command, the ME shall decide if it is able to execute the command. The UICC shall indicate whether the ME should establish the link immediately, in background mode or upon receiving the first transmitted data (on demand). + +The UICC provides to the ME a list of parameters necessary to activate a (I-)WLAN service. + +The ME shall attempt at least one (I-)WLAN service activation. + +Upon receiving this command, the ME shall decide if it is able to execute the command. Examples are given below, but the list is not exhaustive: + +- if immediate or background (I-)WLAN service activation is requested and the ME is unable to set-up a channel using the exact parameters provided by the UICC, the ME sets up the channel according to TS 24.234 [42] for a I-WLAN service activation or according to TS 24.302 [63] for a WLAN service activation and informs the UICC of the I-WLAN identifier or the WLAN identifier respectively and the modified parameters using TERMINAL RESPONSE (Command performed with modification); +- if immediate (I-)WLAN service activation is requested and the ME is unable to activate the I-WLAN service with the network using the exact parameters provided by the UICC, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (Network currently unable to process command). The operation is aborted; +- if background mode (I-)WLAN service activation is requested and the ME is unable to activate the I-WLAN service with the network using the exact parameters provided by the UICC, the ME informs the UICC using a channel status event (link not established - no further info). The operation is aborted; +- if the command is rejected because the ME has no channel left with the requested bearer capabilities, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (Bearer independent protocol error). The operation is aborted; +- if the user does not accept the channel set-up, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (User did not accept the proactive command). The operation is aborted; + +- if the user has indicated the need to end the proactive UICC session, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (Proactive UICC session terminated by the user). The operation is aborted; +- if background mode (I-)WLAN service activation is requested, the ME allocates buffers, starts activation of (I-)WLAN service, informs the UICC and reports the channel identifier immediately using TERMINAL RESPONSE (Command performed successfully). At the end of activation, the ME shall send a channel status event (link established or link not established - no further info). + +The ME shall inform the UICC that the command has been successfully executed using TERMINAL RESPONSE: + +- if immediate (I-)WLAN service activation is requested, the ME allocates buffers, activates the (I-)WLAN service and informs the UICC and reports the channel identifier using TERMINAL RESPONSE (Command performed successfully); +- if on demand (I-)WLAN service activation is requested, the ME allocates buffers, informs the UICC and reports the channel identifier using TERMINAL RESPONSE (Command performed successfully). + +If the ME is able to set up the channel on the serving network, the ME shall then enter the confirmation phase described hereafter; optionally, the UICC may include in this command an alpha-identifier. The use of this alpha-identifier by the ME is described below: + +- if the alpha identifier is provided by the UICC and is not a null data object, the ME shall use it during the user confirmation phase. This is also an indication that the ME should not give any other information to the user during the user confirmation phase. If an icon is provided by the UICC, the icon indicated in the command may be used by the terminal to inform the user, in addition to, or instead of the alpha identifier, as indicated with the icon qualifier (see clause 6.5.4); +- if the alpha identifier is provided by the UICC and is a null data object (i.e. length = '00' and no value part), this is an indication that the ME should not give any information to the user or ask for user confirmation; +- if the alpha identifier is not provided by the UICC, the ME may give information to the user; + +A terminal of type ND shall ignore any alpha identifier provided together with this command. The terminal shall respond with "command performed successfully" upon successful completion of the command. A terminal of type ND shall also ignore any icon provided together with this command. The terminal shall respond with "command performed successfully but requested icon could not be displayed" upon successful completion of the command. + +- if the user doesn't reject the channel, the ME shall then set up a channel. A terminal of type NK or type ND may not alert the user and may open the channel without explicit confirmation by the user; +- if the user does not accept the channel or rejects the channel, then the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (user did not accept the proactive command). The operation is aborted; +- if the user has indicated the need to end the proactive UICC session, the ME shall send a TERMINAL RESPONSE with (Proactive UICC session terminated by the user) result value; +- optionally, during packet data service activation, the ME can give some audible or display indication concerning what is happening; +- if the user stops the (I-)WLAN service activation attempt before a result is received from the network, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (user cleared down call before connection or network release). + +#### 6.4.27.6 OPEN CHANNEL related to Terminal Server Mode + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.27.6. + +#### 6.4.27.7 OPEN CHANNEL related to UICC Server Mode + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.27.5. + +#### 6.4.27.8 OPEN CHANNEL for IMS + +The following applies if classes "e" and "t" are supported. + +After a successful registration to IMS specified in TS 24.229 [52] and after the ME has informed the UICC of this successful registration, the UICC may attempt to open a channel to communicate with the IMS. + +The UICC will include in the OPEN CHANNEL for IMS command the IARI representing an active application installed on the UICC. This IARI shall be known to the ME and populated in the EFUICCIARI as specified in TS 31.102 [14]. + +The ME shall encapsulate all subsequent SIP communications intended for the IMS application running on the UICC. The ME shall decapsulate all subsequent messages received from the IMS application running on the UICC. Once the application is no longer available for SIP communications the UICC shall send the CLOSE CHANNEL command for the current channel ID. + +If network conditions changed after a successful IMS registration, upon receiving this command, the ME shall decide if it is able to execute the command. If the ME is unable to process the command (the list is not exhaustive) + +- if the command is unable to proceed due to the absence of an active IMS PDP/PDN context, the ME shall inform the UICC using the TERMINAL RESPONSE (network currently unable to process command) upon receipt of this failure cause, the UICC shall wait until the next IMS registration event before sending another OPEN CHANNEL for IMS command to the ME. +- if the command is unable to proceed due to the inability to contact IMS, the ME shall inform the UICC using the TERMINAL RESPONSE (network currently unable to process command) upon receipt of this failure cause, the UICC shall wait until the next IMS registration event before sending another OPEN CHANNEL for IMS command to the ME. +- If the command is unable to proceed because there is no channel available, the ME shall inform the UICC using the TERMINAL RESPONSE (Bearer Independent Protocol error - no channel available). + +The ME shall inform the UICC that the command has been successfully executed using TERMINAL RESPONSE (Command performed successfully) + +#### 6.4.28 CLOSE CHANNEL + +ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.28 applies, with the following addition. + +In case of OPEN CHANNEL for IMS, the UICC shall send a CLOSE CHANNEL command to close the BIP channel at the end of the SIP dialog. + +#### 6.4.29 RECEIVE DATA + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.29. + +#### 6.4.30 SEND DATA + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.30. + +#### 6.4.31 GET CHANNEL STATUS + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.31. + +#### 6.4.32 SERVICE SEARCH + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.32. + +## 6.4.33 GET SERVICE INFORMATION + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.33. + +## 6.4.34 DECLARE SERVICE + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.34. + +## 6.4.35 RETRIEVE MULTIMEDIA MESSAGE + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.37. + +## 6.4.36 SUBMIT MULTIMEDIA MESSAGE + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.38. + +## 6.4.37 DISPLAY MULTIMEDIA MESSAGE + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.39. + +## 6.4.38 SET FRAMES + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.35. + +## 6.4.39 GET FRAME STATUS + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.36. + +## 6.4.40 Geographical Location Request + +This clause applies if class "n" is supported. + +This command requests an ME that is equipped with a positioning feature to report the location information of the ME within a specified quality of service. + +As the determination of the geographical location information may take some time, the geographical location information report is sent by the ME to the UICC using the command ENVELOPE (Geographical Location Reporting). The ME reporting can be performed either in the format of GAD shapes defined in TS 23.032 [44] or in the format of NMEA sentences defined in IEC 61162-1 [45]. + +The horizontal coordinates represent the minimum set of information to be sent to the UICC (i.e. latitude and longitude). The UICC may request additional geographical location information (i.e. vertical coordinate and velocity). The UICC may request a preferred quality of service (e.g. preferred accuracy, preferred maximum response time). However if the ME does not support the requested preferred parameters, the ME selects the most appropriate quality of service parameters. + +Upon receiving this command, the ME shall decide if it is able to execute the command. Examples are given below, but the list is not exhaustive: + +- if the command is rejected because the ME is not equipped with a positioning feature, the ME informs the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (Command beyond ME's capabilities); +- if the command is rejected because the ME is currently unable to get the location information (e.g. due to lack of GPS coverage or due to a deactivated GPS receiver), the ME shall inform the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE (ME currently unable to process command); + +If the ME is able to attempt to retrieve the geographical location information, the ME shall: + +- inform the UICC that the command has been successfully executed, using TERMINAL RESPONSE. + +- once the requested location information is available, the ME shall send this information to the UICC using the command ENVELOPE (Geographical Location Reporting). +- optionally, the UICC may include in this command an alpha-identifier. The use of this alpha-identifier by the ME is described below: + - if the alpha identifier is provided by the UICC and is not a null data object, the ME shall use it to inform the user. This is also an indication that the ME should not give any other information to the user on the fact that the ME is processing the location information request for the UICC. If an icon is provided by the UICC, the icon indicated in the command may be used by the ME to inform the user, in addition to, or instead of the alpha identifier, as indicated with the icon qualifier (see clause 6.5.4); + - if the alpha identifier is provided by the UICC and is a null data object (i.e. length = '00' and no value part), this is an indication that the ME should not give any information to the user on the fact that the ME is determining the location information for the UICC; + +A terminal of type ND shall ignore any alpha identifier provided together with this command. The terminal shall respond with "command performed successfully" upon successful completion of the command. A terminal of type ND shall also ignore any icon provided together with this command. The terminal shall respond with "command performed successfully but requested icon could not be displayed" upon successful completion of the command. + +- if the alpha identifier is not provided by the UICC, the ME may give information to the user concerning what is happening. + +If the ME receives a "Geographical Location Request" command during the processing of a previous "Geographical Location Request" command (i.e. after the reception of a location request and before sending the "Geographical Location Reporting" ENVELOPE command), the latest location request shall be ignored. + +#### 6.4.41 ACTIVATE + +Not required by 3GPP. + +#### 6.4.42 CONTACTLESS STATE CHANGED + +Not required by 3GPP. + +#### 6.4.43 COMMAND CONTAINER + +Not required by 3GPP. + +#### 6.4.44 ENCAPSULATED SESSION CONTROL + +Not required by 3GPP. + +### 6.5 Common elements in proactive UICC commands + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.5. + +#### 6.5.1 Command number + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.5.1. + +#### 6.5.2 Device identities + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.5.2. + +### 6.5.3 Alpha identifier + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.5.3. + +### 6.5.4 Icon identifiers + +The display of icons is optional for the terminal on a per command basis, see ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.5.4. + +### 6.5.5 Text attribute + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.5.5. + +### 6.5.6 Frame identifier + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.5.6. + +## 6.6 Structure of proactive UICC commands + +The general structure of proactive UICC commands using TLV objects is described in annex C. + +### 6.6.1 DISPLAY TEXT + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.1. + +### 6.6.2 GET INKEY + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.2. + +### 6.6.3 GET INPUT + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.3. + +### 6.6.4 MORE TIME + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.4. + +### 6.6.5 PLAY TONE + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.5. + +### 6.6.6 POLL INTERVAL + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.6. + +### 6.6.7 SET-UP MENU + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.7. + +### 6.6.8 SELECT ITEM + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.8. + +## 6.6.9 SEND SHORT MESSAGE + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|--------------------------------------|--------------|-------|-----|--------| +| Proactive UICC command Tag | 9.2 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Command details | 8.6 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| Alpha identifier | 8.2 | O | N | C | +| Address data object 1 | 8.1 or 8.108 | O | N | D | +| SMS TPDU (SMS-SUBMIT or SMS-COMMAND) | 8.13 | M | Y | E | +| Icon identifier | 8.31 | O | N | F | +| Text attribute | 8.70 | C | N | G | +| Frame Identifier | 8.82 | O | N | H | +| Address data object 2 | 8.108 | C | N | I | + +The address data object holds the RP\_Destination\_Address of the Service Centre. If no RP\_Destination\_Address is transferred, then the ME shall insert the default Service Centre address. + +The address data object 1 may optionally hold the Public Service Identity of the SM-SC in URI format that the ME shall use to submit the SMS over IP as defined in 3GPP TS 24.341 [65]. + +In case Address data object 1 holds a Public Service Identity, the address data object 2 shall be present and holds the URI of the receiver of the short message. If the address data object 2 is present, the ME shall use the address data object 2 to submit the SMS over IP as defined in 3GPP TS 24.341 [65] clause 5.3.1.4.2. + +When Address data object 2 is present, the UICC shall set the TP\_Destination\_Address field in the SMS TPDU to the dummy MSISDN value as specified in 24.341 [65]. + +The Text attribute applies to the Alpha Identifier. It may be present only if the Alpha Identifier is present. + +## 6.6.10 SEND SS + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|----------------------------|--------|-------|-----|--------| +| Proactive UICC command Tag | 9.2 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D+E+F+G) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Command details | 8.6 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| Alpha identifier | 8.2 | O | N | C | +| SS string | 8.14 | M | Y | D | +| Icon identifier | 8.31 | O | N | E | +| Text attribute | 8.70 | C | N | F | +| Frame Identifier | 8.82 | O | N | G | + +The Text attribute applies to the Alpha Identifier. It may be present only if the Alpha Identifier is present. + +## 6.6.11 SEND USSD + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|----------------------------|--------|-------|-----|--------| +| Proactive UICC command Tag | 9.2 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D+E+F+G) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Command details | 8.6 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| Alpha identifier | 8.2 | O | N | C | +| USSD String | 8.17 | M | Y | D | +| Icon identifier | 8.31 | O | N | E | +| Text attribute | 8.70 | C | N | F | +| Frame Identifier | 8.82 | O | N | G | + +The Text attribute applies to the Alpha Identifier. It may be present only if the Alpha Identifier is present. + +## 6.6.12 SET UP CALL + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|--------------------------------------------|--------------|-------|-----|--------| +| Proactive UICC command Tag | 9.2 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length
(A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L+M+N) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Command details | 8.6 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| Alpha identifier (user confirmation phase) | 8.2 | O | N | C | +| Address or IMS URI | 8.1 or 8.108 | M | Y | D | +| Capability configuration parameters | 8.4 | O | N | E | +| Subaddress | 8.3 | O | N | F | +| Duration | 8.8 | O | N | G | +| Icon identifier (user confirmation phase) | 8.31 | O | N | H | +| Alpha identifier (call set up phase) | 8.2 | O | N | I | +| Icon identifier (call set up phase) | 8.31 | O | N | J | +| Text Attribute (user confirmation phase) | 8.72 | C | N | K | +| Text Attribute (call set up phase) | 8.72 | C | N | L | +| Frame Identifier | 8.80 | O | N | M | +| Media Type | 8.132 | O | N | N | + +If the capability configuration parameters are not present, the ME shall assume the call is a speech call. + +If the subaddress is not present, the ME shall not provide a called party subaddress to the network. + +If the duration is not present, the UICC imposes no restrictions on the ME of the maximum duration of redials. + +The Text Attribute (user confirmation phase) applies to the Alpha Identifier (user confirmation phase). The Text Attribute (call set up phase) applies to the Alpha identifier (call set up call phase). One Text Attribute may be present only if at least one Alpha Identifier is present. Both Text Attributes may be present only if both Alpha Identifiers are present. If only one Text Attribute data object is present, it shall apply to the first or unique Alpha identifier present in the command. + +The IMS URI data object holds the SIP URI or tel URI, as defined in TS 24.229 [52], of the called party (if class "ae" is supported). + +When the Media Type data object is present, it indicates the type of media the ME shall use, if supported by the ME to set up the communication. If the ME is unable to set up the call as requested, it shall return an error code reflecting the cause of the error. For example, in case of failure due to network constraints, the error code "Access Technology unable to process command" shall be used. + +## 6.6.13 REFRESH + +For all REFRESH modes except "Steering of Roaming", see ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.13. + +For "Steering of Roaming": + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|----------------------------|--------|----------------|-----|--------| +| Proactive UICC command Tag | 9.2 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Command details | 8.6 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| Alpha identifier | 8.2 | O | N | C | +| Icon identifier | 8.31 | O | N | D | +| Text Attribute | 8.70 | C | N | E | +| Frame Identifier | 8.82 | O | N | F | +| PLMNwAcT List | 8.90 | C (see Note 1) | N | G | +| PLMN List | 8.97 | C (see Note 2) | N | H | + +Note 1: This parameter is required in case of steering of roaming (according to TS 23.122 [7]). +Note 2: This parameter is required in case of steering of roaming for I-WLAN (according to TS 24.234 [42]). + +The Text attribute applies to the Alpha Identifier. It may be present only if the Alpha Identifier is present. + +## 6.6.14 POLLING OFF + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.14. + +## 6.6.15 PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|--------------------------------------------|--------|-------|-----|--------| +| Proactive UICC command Tag | 9.2 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Command details | 8.6 | M | Y | A | +| Device Identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| UTRAN/E-UTRAN/NG-RAN Measurement Qualifier | 8.73 | C | N | C | + +UTRAN/E-UTRAN/NG-RAN Measurement Qualifier: This data object applies when the Command Qualifier in Command details is set to indicate "Network Measurement results". It shall be included to indicate to the ME that "Network Measurement Results for a UTRAN" or "Network Measurement Results for a E-UTRAN" or "Network Measurement Results for a NG-RAN" is required. It shall be excluded to indicate to the ME that "Network Measurement Results for a GERAN" is required. It shall only be included/excluded if the ME has indicated that it supports the implied access technology via the respective Terminal Profile setting. + +## 6.6.16 SET UP EVENT LIST + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.16. + +## 6.6.17 PERFORM CARD APDU + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.17. + +## 6.6.18 POWER OFF CARD + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.18. + +## 6.6.19 POWER ON CARD + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.19. + +## 6.6.20 GET READER STATUS + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.20. + +## 6.6.21 TIMER MANAGEMENT + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.21. + +## 6.6.22 SET UP IDLE MODE TEXT + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.22. + +## 6.6.23 RUN AT COMMAND + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.23. + +## 6.6.24 SEND DTMF COMMAND + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.24. + +## 6.6.25 LANGUAGE NOTIFICATION + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.25. + +## 6.6.26 LAUNCH BROWSER + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.26. + +## 6.6.27 OPEN CHANNEL + +The structure of the OPEN CHANNEL command is defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.27, with the addition of the following: + +### 6.6.27.1 OPEN CHANNEL related to (I-)WLAN Bearer + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|-----------------------------------------|--------|-------|-----|--------| +| Proactive UICC command Tag | 9.2 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Command details | 8.6 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| Alpha identifier | 8.2 | O | N | C | +| Icon identifier | 8.31 | O | N | D | +| Bearer description | 8.52 | M | Y | E | +| Buffer size | 8.55 | M | Y | F | +| I-WLAN Identifier | 8.83 | O | N | G | +| Other address (local address) | 8.58 | O | N | H | +| UICC/terminal interface transport level | 8.59 | O | N | I | +| Data destination address | 8.58 | C | Y | J | +| Text Attribute | 8.72 | C | N | K | +| Frame Identifier | 8.82 | O | N | L | + +When OPEN CHANNEL is related to I-WLAN bearer: + +- The I-WLAN Identifier may be requested. +- If the parameter is not present, the ME shall select the I-WLAN according to TS 24.234 [42] using the Automatic PLMN Selection Mode Procedure. + +When OPEN CHANNEL is related to WLAN bearer, the ME shall select the WLAN according to TS 24.302 [63] using the automatic mode WLAN selection procedure and ignore the I-WLAN Identifier, if provided. + +The local address parameter provides information to the ME necessary to identify the local device. If the parameter is present and length is not null, it provides an IP address that identifies the USAT application in the address area applicable to the PDN. If local address length is null, dynamic local address allocation is required for the USAT application. If parameter is not present, the ME may use the ME default local address configuration. + +If the UICC/ME interface transport level is present in the command, then the ME shall provide the requested transport layer protocols under the channel and shall use this object containing a set of parameters required to make the transport connection. The data that is exchanged at the UICC/ME interface in the RECEIVE DATA/SEND DATA commands are SDUs. When the USAT application sends an SDU, the transport layer within the ME is in charge to add the transport header to the SDU in order to build the Transport-PDU. When the USAT application requests to receive an SDU, the transport layer within the ME is in charge to remove the transport header of the Transport-PDU, and to forward the SDU to the USAT. If the parameter is not present, the UICC/ME interface is the bearer level (serial link or packet link), and the USAT application is in charge of the network and transport layer. + +The Data destination address is the end point destination address of sent data. This data destination address is requested when a UICC/ME interface transport is present, otherwise it is ignored. The data destination address is a data network address (e.g. IP address). + +Text Attribute applies to the Alpha Identifier. It may be present only if the Alpha Identifier is present. + +## 6.6.27.2 OPEN CHANNEL for IMS + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|----------------------------|--------|-------|-----|--------| +| Proactive UICC command Tag | 9.2 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Command details | 8.6 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| Buffer size | 8.55 | M | Y | C | +| IARI | 8.110 | M | Y | D | + +## 6.6.28 CLOSE CHANNEL + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.28. + +## 6.6.29 RECEIVE DATA + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.29. + +## 6.6.30 SEND DATA + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.30. + +## 6.6.31 GET CHANNEL STATUS + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.31. + +## 6.6.32 SERVICE SEARCH + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.32. + +## 6.6.33 GET SERVICE INFORMATION + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.33. + +## 6.6.34 DECLARE SERVICE + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.34. + +## 6.6.35 RETRIEVE MULTIMEDIA MESSAGE + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.37. + +## 6.6.36 SUBMIT MULTIMEDIA MESSAGE + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.38. + +## 6.6.37 DISPLAY MULTIMEDIA MESSAGE + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.39. + +## 6.6.38 SET FRAMES + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.35. + +## 6.6.39 GET FRAMES STATUS + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.6.36. + +## 6.6.40 Geographical Location Request + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|----------------------------------|--------|-------|-----|--------| +| Proactive UICC command Tag | 9.2 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D+E) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Command details | 8.6 | M | Y | A | +| Device Identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| Alpha identifier | 8.2 | O | N | C | +| Icon identifier | 8.31 | O | N | D | +| Geographical Location Parameters | 8.94 | M | N | E | + +## 6.6.41 ACTIVATE + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 6.6.42 CONTACTLESS STATE CHANGED + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 6.6.43 COMMAND CONTAINER + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 6.6.44 ENCAPSULATED SESSION CONTROL + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 6.7 Command results + +Once the ME has made its attempt to execute a proactive command from the UICC, the ME shall inform the UICC of the success or otherwise of that command, by using TERMINAL RESPONSE. + +This procedure is defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.7, and applies here except for the following statements. + +Temporary problems are defined as: + +- ME is currently unable to process the command. Specific causes for this are listed in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.7; in addition to these, the following causes may be returned within the USAT context: + - ME currently busy on SS transaction; + - ME currently busy on USSD operation; + - access control class barred on serving network; +- if none of these can be made to apply, a "no cause can be given" value can be used; +- network is currently unable to process the command. Within the USAT context, specific cause values are the cause values given by the network, as defined in TS 24.008 [9]; +- in some proactive commands, the ME is required to solicit and receive approval of the user before executing the proactive command. In the case that the user does not give approval for the execution of the proactive command, it shall not be executed by the ME and the terminal response "user did not accept the proactive command" shall be returned by the ME to the UICC; +- the user cleared down the call, before the call connected (CONNECT received from network, as defined in TS 24.008 [9]) or before the network released the call; +- action in contradiction with the current timer state. This is where the UICC requests an action for a timer to be taken by the ME and the state of the timer does not allow that action; +- interaction with call control by USIM, temporary problem. This is sent by the ME to indicate that call control modified the type of request indicated in the proactive command, and that the action requested by call control encounters a temporary problem. + +Permanent problems are defined as in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.7, with the addition of: + +- SS Return Error. This is given to the UICC when the network returns a SS error in response to a previous SS command. Specific cause values are the same as given by the network in the Return Error message; +- USSD Return Error. This is given to the UICC when the network returns a USSD error in response to a previous USSD command. Specific cause values are the same as given by the network in a Return Error message; +- SMS RP-ERROR. This is given to the UICC when the network returns an error in response to the ME trying to send a short message. Specific cause values are the same as the cause value of RP-Cause in an RP-ERROR message; +- interaction with MO short message control by USIM, permanent problem. This is sent by the ME to indicate that: + +MO short message control by USIM does not allow the action corresponding to the proactive command; or + +MO short message control by USIM has modified the type of request indicated in the proactive command and that the action requested by call control encounters a permanent problem. + +## 6.8 Structure of TERMINAL RESPONSE + +### 6.8.0 Overall structure of TERMINAL RESPONSE + +Direction: ME to UICC. + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13]. Length (A+B+ ... +AE) is indicated by P3 of the header. + +Command parameters/data. + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-----|-----------------------------| +| Command details | 8.6 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | N | B | +| Result | 8.12 | M | Y | C | +| Duration (only required in response to a POLL INTERVAL proactive command) | 8.8 | C | N | D | +| Text string (only required in response to a GET INKEY or GET INPUT or SEND USSD proactive command) | 8.15 | C | N | E | +| Item identifier (only required in response to SELECT ITEM proactive command) | 8.10 | C | N | F | +| Local information (only required in response to PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION proactive command) | 8.19, 8.20, 8.29, 8.39, 8.45, 8.46, 8.62, 8.83, 8.85, 8.86, 8.87, 8.100, 8.129, 8.130, 8.131, 8.134, 8.140, 8.141, 8.144 | C | N | G | +| Local information (only required in response to PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (Network Measurement Results) proactive command) | 8.22, 8.119 | C | N | AB or $AB_0 + \dots + AB_n$ | +| Local information (only required in response to PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (H(e)NB IP address request) proactive command) | 8.58 | C | N | AC or $AC_0 + \dots + AC_n$ | +| Local information (only required in response to PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (list of surrounding macrocells) proactive command) | 8.19, 8.62 | C | N | AD or $AD_0 + \dots + AD_n$ | +| Call control requested action (only required if call control by USIM has modified a proactive command SET UP CALL, SEND SS or SEND USSD in another type of request). | 8.30 | C | N | H | +| Result data object 2 (only required if call control by USIM has modified a proactive command SET UP CALL, SEND SS or SEND USSD in another type of request). | 8.12 | C | N | I | +| Card reader status (only required in response to GET READER STATUS command). According to the requested information, one Card reader status object for each card interface reported, or one Card reader identifier object is required.. | 8.33, 8.57 | C | N | $J_0 + \dots + J_n$ or J | +| Card ATR (only required in response to POWER ON CARD). | 8.34 | C | N | K | +| R-APDU (only required in response to PERFORM CARD APDU). | 8.36 | C | N | L | +| Timer identifier (only required in response to a TIMER MANAGEMENT proactive command) | 8.37 | C | N | M | +| Timer value (only required in response to a TIMER MANAGEMENT proactive command) | 8.38 | C | N | N | +| AT Response (only required in response to RUN AT COMMAND proactive command) | 8.41 | C | N | P | +| Text string2 (only required if call control by USIM has modified the proactive command SET UP CALL or SEND SS into a USSD request) | 8.15 | C | N | Q | +| Channel data (only required in response to RECEIVE DATA) | 8.53 | C | N | R | + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------|-----|-----------------------------| +| Channel status (only required in response to GET CHANNEL STATUS or OPEN CHANNEL proactive command) | 8.56 | C | N | $S_0 + \dots + S_n$ | +| Channel data length (only required in response to RECEIVE DATA or SEND DATA proactive command) | 8.54 | C | N | T | +| Bearer description (only required in response to OPEN CHANNEL proactive command) | 8.52 | C | N | U | +| Buffer size (only required in response to OPEN CHANNEL proactive command) | 8.55 | C | N | V | +| Total display duration (only required in response to a GET INKEY proactive command) | 8.8 | C | N | W | +| Service availability (only required in response to SERVICE SEARCH proactive command) | 8.68 | C | N | X | +| Service record (only required in response to GET SERVICE INFORMATION proactive command) | 8.64 | C | N | Y | +| Other address (local address) (only required in response to OPEN CHANNEL proactive command with dynamic local address request) | 8.58 | C | N | Z | +| Frames Information (only required in response to SET FRAMES or GET FRAMES STATUS proactive commands) | 8.81 | C | N | AA | +| Slices Information (only required in response to PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (list of slice(s) information) proactive command) | 8.145 | C | N | AE or $AE_0 + \dots + AE_n$ | + +Specific rules apply for the coding of the TERMINAL RESPONSE, see ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8. + +Response parameters/data: None. + +### 6.8.1 Command details + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.1. + +### 6.8.2 Device identities + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.2. + +### 6.8.3 Result + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.3. + +### 6.8.4 Duration + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.4. + +### 6.8.5 Text string + +ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.5 applies, with the addition of the following procedure. + +When the ME issues a successful TERMINAL RESPONSE for a SEND USSD command, it shall supply the text returned within the Return Result message from the network, no matter what type of string was returned. + +### 6.8.6 Item identifier + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.6. + +## 6.8.7 Local information + +For Local Information values defined in clause 8.6 then ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.7 applies, with the addition of the following procedures: + +- Where the UICC has requested the Network Measurement Results, the TERMINAL RESPONSE shall contain + - for GERAN: The NMR data object and the BCCH channel list data object + - for UTRAN: The Network Measurement Results are coded as the MEASUREMENT REPORT message as defined in TS 25.331 [38]. + - for E-UTRAN: The Network Measurement Results are coded as the *MeasurementReport* message defined in TS 36.331 [49] + - for NG-RAN: The Network Measurement Results are coded as the *MeasurementReport* message defined in TS 38.331 [71] +- Where the UICC has requested the Network Measurement Results for multiple access technologies, TERMINAL RESPONSE shall contain the Access Technology data object listing all current access technologies, followed by one NMR data object and one BCCH channel list data object for each current access technology in the same sequence. The BCCH channel list data object shall immediately follow the NMR data object, even if not supported by a network access technology. If no NMR data or no BCCH channel list is available for an access technology, the respective data object shall have length zero. +- Where the UICC has requested the Timing Advance, the TERMINAL RESPONSE shall contain the Timing Advance data object if supported by the network access technology. +- Where the UICC has requested the WLAN Specific Identifier, the TERMINAL RESPONSE shall contain the WSID of the current I-WLAN connection. +- Where the UICC has requested the WLAN Identifier, the TERMINAL RESPONSE shall contain the SSID, the BSSID when available, and the HESSID when available, of the current WLAN connection. +- Where the UICC has requested the CSG ID list Identifier, the TERMINAL RESPONSE shall contain the CSG ID list and the corresponding HNB name (if available in the broadcasted information to the ME) of the detected CSG or Hybrid cells in the Allowed CSG list or the Operator CSG list. (if class "q" is supported) +- Where the UICC has requested the H(e)NB IP address, the TERMINAL RESPONSE shall contain the list of all IP addresses available on the H(e)NB-network interface, as a sequence of "Other Address" Data Objects in the TERMINAL RESPONSE. (if class "v" is supported) +- Where the UICC has requested the list of surrounding macrocells, the TERMINAL RESPONSE shall contain, for all supported access technologies, the Access Technology data object listing all current access technologies, followed by one location information data object for each current access technology in the same sequence, up to the limit of the TERMINAL RESPONSE APDU command size. If no location information is available for an access technology, the respective data object shall have length zero. (if class "w" is supported). +- Where the UICC has requested the list of slice(s) information, the TERMINAL RESPONSE shall contain the slices information data object listing all slice(s) information, up to the limit of the TERMINAL RESPONSE APDU command size. If no slice information is available, the respective data object shall have length zero. + +## 6.8.8 Call control requested action + +When the ME issues a TERMINAL RESPONSE for a proactive command SET UP CALL, SEND SS or SEND USSD which has been modified by call control by USIM in another type of request, it shall supply the response data given in response to the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL). + +## 6.8.9 Result data object 2 + +When the ME issues a TERMINAL RESPONSE for a proactive command SET UP CALL, SEND SS or SEND USSD which has been modified by call control by USIM in another type of request, it shall supply the Result data object it + +would have supplied for the proactive command equivalent to the action requested by call control, and given in the Call control request data element. + +## 6.8.10 Card reader status + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.10. + +## 6.8.11 Card ATR + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.11. + +## 6.8.12 R-APDU + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.12. + +## 6.8.13 Timer identifier + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.13. + +## 6.8.14 Timer value + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.14. + +## 6.8.15 AT Response + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.15. + +## 6.8.16 Text string 2 + +When the ME issues a successful TERMINAL RESPONSE for a proactive command SET UP CALL or SEND SS which has been modified by "call control" by USIM into a USSD request ('05' result value), it shall supply the Text string 2. The Text string 2 shall contain the text returned within the Return Result message from the network for the USSD response. Text string 2 is equivalent to the Text string in the Terminal Response to a SEND USSD command. + +## 6.8.17 Channel data + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.17. + +## 6.8.18 Channel status + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.18. + +## 6.8.19 Channel data length + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.19. + +## 6.8.20 Bearer description + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.20. + +## 6.8.21 Buffer size + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.21. + +## 6.8.22 Total Display Duration + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.22. + +## 6.8.23 Service Availability + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.23. + +## 6.8.24 Service Record + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.24. + +## 6.8.25 Other address (local address) + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.25. + +## 6.8.26 Frames Information + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.8.26. + +## 6.9 Proactive UICC session and ME display interaction + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.9. + +## 6.10 Handling of unknown, unforeseen and erroneous messages + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.10. + +## 6.11 Proactive commands versus possible Terminal response + +Table 6.1 shows for each proactive command the possible terminal response returned (marked by a "•" character), in addition to those defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.11. + +The commands "COMMAND CONTAINER" and "ENCAPSULATED SESSION CONTROL" listed in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] are not required by 3GPP. + +**Table 6.1: Proactive commands versus possible terminal response** + +| TERMINAL RESPONSE | PROACTIVE COMMAND | | | | | | | | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|---------|-----------|----------|-------------------------------|--|--|--|--| +| | SET UP CALL | SEND SS | SEND USSD | SEND SMS | Geographical Location Request | | | | | +| | '10' | '11' | '12' | '13' | '16' | | | | | +| 00 Command performed successfully | • | • | • | • | • | | | | | +| 01 Command performed with partial comprehension | • | • | • | • | • | | | | | +| 02 Command performed, with missing information | • | • | • | • | • | | | | | +| 03 REFRESH performed with additional Efs read | | | | | | | | | | +| 04 Command performed successfully, but requested icon could not be displayed | • | • | • | • | • | | | | | +| 05 Command performed, but modified by call control by USIM | • | | • | | | | | | | +| 06 Command performed successfully, limited service | | | | | | | | | | +| 07 Command performed with modification | | | | | | | | | | +| 08 REFRESH performed but indicated USIM was not active | | | | | | | | | | +| 09 Command performed successfully, tone not played | | | | | | | | | | +| 10 Proactive UICC session terminated by the user | • | | | | | | | | | +| 11 Backward move in the proactive UICC session requested by the user | | | | | | | | | | +| 12 No response from user | | | | | • | | | | | +| 13 Help information required by the user | | | | | | | | | | +| 14 USSD or SS Transaction terminated by user | • | • | • | | | | | | | +| 15 Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | | | | | | | | | | +| 16 Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | | | | | | | | | | +| 20 ME currently unable to process command | • | • | • | • | • | | | | | +| 21 Network currently unable to process command | • | • | • | • | • | | | | | +| 22 User did not accept the proactive command | • | | | | • | | | | | +| 23 User cleared down call before connection or network release | • | | | | | | | | | +| 24 Action in contradiction with the current timer state | | | | | | | | | | +| 25 Interaction with call control by USIM, temporary problem | • | • | • | | | | | | | +| 26 Launch browser generic error | | | | | | | | | | +| 27 MMS Temporary Problem | | | | | | | | | | +| 28 Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | | | | | | | | | | +| 29 Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | | | | | | | | | | +| 30 Command beyond Mes capabilities | • | • | • | • | • | | | | | +| 31 Command type not understood by ME | • | • | • | • | • | | | | | +| 32 Command data not understood by ME | • | • | • | • | • | | | | | +| 33 Command number not known by ME | • | • | • | • | • | | | | | +| 34 SS Return Error | • | • | | | | | | | | +| 35 SMS RPERROR | | | | • | | | | | | +| 36 Error, required values are missing | • | • | • | • | • | | | | | +| 37 USSD return error | | | • | | | | | | | +| 38 Multiple Card command error | | | | | | | | | | +| 39 Interaction with call/SM control by USIM, permanent problem | • | • | • | • | | | | | | +| 3A Bearer Independent Protocol error | | | | | | | | | | +| 3B Access Technology unable to process command | | | | | | | | | | +| 3C Frames error | • | • | • | • | | | | | | +| 3D MMS Error | | | | | | | | | | +| 3E Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | | | | | | | | | | +| 3F Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | | | | | | | | | | + +## 7 ENVELOPE Commands + +### 7.1 Data download to UICC + +#### 7.1.1 SMS-PP data download + +##### 7.1.1.1 Procedure + +If the service "data download via SMS Point-to-point" is allocated and activated in the USIM Service Table (see TS 31.102 [14]), then the ME shall follow the procedure below: + +- when the ME receives a Short Message with: +protocol identifier = SIM data download; and +data coding scheme = class 2 message; or +- when the ME receives a Short Message with: +protocol identifier=ANSI-136 R-DATA (see TS 23.040 [5]); and +data coding scheme = class 2 message, and the ME chooses not to handle the message (e.g. Mes not supporting EGPRS over TIA/EIA-136 do not need to handle the message). +- then the ME shall pass the message transparently to the UICC using the ENVELOPE (SMS-PP DOWNLOAD) command as defined below; +- the ME shall not display the message, or alert the user of a short message waiting; +- the ME shall wait for an acknowledgement from the UICC; +- When receiving a secured Command Packet (as specified in TS 31.115 [41]) requesting a Proof of Receipt (PoR), the UICC shall verify the authenticity of the sender. If the authentication of the sender fails, no further processing related to the Proof of Receipt shall take place. +- if the UICC responds with '90 00' or '6F XX' or '62 XX' or '63 XX', the ME shall acknowledge the receipt of the short message to the network using an RP-ACK message. The response data from the UICC will be supplied by the ME in the TP-User-Data element of the RP-ACK message it will send back to the network (see TS 23.040 [5] and TS 24.011 [10]). The values of protocol identifier and data coding scheme in RP-ACK shall be as in the original message; +- if the UICC responds with '93 00', the ME shall either retry the command or send back an RP-ERROR message to the network with the TP-FCS value indicating 'SIM Application Toolkit Busy' (see TS 23.040 [5]). + +If the service "data download via SMS-PP" is not available in the USIM Service Table, and the ME receives a Short Message with the protocol identifier = SIM data download and data coding scheme = class 2 message, then the ME shall store the message in EFSMS in accordance with TS 31.102 [14]. + +##### 7.1.1.1a Procedure for SMS-PP data download via REGISTRATION ACCEPT or DL NAS TRANSPORT messages + +If the service "data download via SMS Point-to-point" is allocated and activated in the USIM Service Table (see 3GPP TS 31.102 [14]), then the ME shall follow the procedure below: + +- when the ME receives a: + - REGISTRATION ACCEPT message or a DL NAS TRANSPORT message that includes an SOR transparent container information element with list type with value "0"= secure packet; or + +- DL NAS TRANSPORT message that includes a UE parameters update transparent container containing a UE parameters update data set with UE parameters update data set type with value "1"=Routing Indicator update data +- containing a secured packet constructed as a single SMS-Deliver TPDU or concatenation of several SMS-Deliver TPDU (as specified in 3GPP TS 23.040 [5]) with: + - protocol identifier = SIM data download; and + - data coding scheme = class 2 message +- and the integrity check of the message was successful +- then the ME shall pass the message(s) transparently to the UICC using the ENVELOPE (SMS-PP DOWNLOAD) command as defined in clause 7.1.1.2; +- the ME shall not display or alert the user +- the secure packet is coded as a Command Packet formatted as Short Message Point to Point (as specified in 3GPP TS 31.115 [41])) + +NOTE: The command packet should not request a Proof of Receipt (PoR) + +### 7.1.1.2 Structure of ENVELOPE (SMS-PP DOWNLOAD) + +Direction: ME to UICC. + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13]. + +Command parameters/data. + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|------------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------| +| SMS-PP download tag | 9.1 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D+E) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | A | +| Address | 8.1 or 8.108 | C(see note2) | N(see note1) | B | +| URI truncated | 8.135 | C | N | C | +| SMS TPDU (SMS-DELIVER) | 8.13 | M | Y | D | +| Originating Address | 8.108 | C | N (see note1) | E | + +NOTE1: The UICC shall be able to manage the situation when the address field is not present, in order to ensure backwards compatibility with previous releases of this specification. + NOTE2: The address data object shall not be present when SMS-PP data download is transporting SOR transparent container information element received from REGISTRATION ACCEPT or DL NAS TRANSPORT message as such message does not contain the address of a service center. + +- Device identities: the ME shall set the device identities to: + - source: Network; + - destination: UICC. +- Address: The address data object holds the RP\_Originating\_Address of the Service Centre (TS-Service-Centre-Address), as defined in 3GPP TS 24.011 [10]. If the USIM or the ISIM Service Table indicates URI support for SMS-PP DOWNLOAD, then this address data object may contain the Public Service Identity of the Service Center. If the URI is longer than the maximum length that can be transmitted to the UICC, then the URI shall be truncated to the maximum length that can be transmitted to the UICC and the request shall contain a URI truncated tag. +- Originating Address: If the USIM or the ISIM Service Table indicates URI support for SMS-PP DOWNLOAD, then the Originating Address data object may be present and contain the Public Identity (IMPU) of the sender of + +the short message. If the URI is longer than the maximum length that can be transmitted to the UICC, then the Originating Address data object shall not be sent. + +Response parameters/data. + +It is permissible for the UICC not to provide response data. If the UICC provides response data, the following data is returned. + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------------------|----------------------|--------| +| 1-X ( $X \leq 128$ ) | UICC Acknowledgement | X | + +## 7.1.2 Cell Broadcast data download + +### 7.1.2.1 Procedure + +If the service "data download via SMS-CB" is available in the USIM Service Table (see TS 31.102 [14]), then the ME shall follow the procedure below: + +- when the ME receives a new Cell Broadcast message, the ME shall compare the message identifier of the Cell Broadcast message with the message identifiers contained in EFCBMID; +- In the case of a GSM Cell Broadcast message, if the message identifier is found in EFCBMID, the cell broadcast page is passed to the UICC using the ENVELOPE (CELL BROADCAST DOWNLOAD) command, defined below. The ME shall not display the message; +- In the case of a UMTS Cell Broadcast message, if the message identifier is found in EFCBMID, the ME shall deconstruct the UMTS Cell Broadcast message Parameter into its Cell Broadcast pages, and reconstruct each page in the format of the GSM Cell Broadcast Message Parameter, as described below, and according to the definition of the Cell Broadcast message structure in TS 23.041[6]: + - 1) From the Number-of-Pages byte of the UMTS message, the ME shall obtain the number of Cell Broadcast pages to be constructed. + - 2) For each page the ME shall reconstruct GSM Cell Broadcast Page header as follows: + - The 2-byte Serial Number of the UMTS message shall be mapped to the reconstructed GSM message Serial Number. + - The 2-byte Message ID of the UMTS message shall be mapped to the reconstructed GSM message Message ID. + - The 1-byte Data Coding Scheme of the UMTS message shall be mapped to the reconstructed GSM message Data Coding Scheme. + - The 1-byte Number-Of-Pages of the UMTS message in combination with the current page's sequence number (based on the order of the pages in the UMTS message) shall be formatted into the reconstructed GSM message Page Parameter byte, as described in TS 23.041[6]. + - The respective 82 byte CBS-Message-Information-Page shall be mapped to the reconstructed GSM message content. + +**Table: Cell Broadcast Message Parameter Element mapping** + +| Network – ME (UMTS Cell Broadcast Message) | ME-USAT interface (GSM Cell Broadcast Message Format) | +|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------| +| Message ID | Message ID | +| Serial Number | Serial Number | +| Data Coding Scheme | Data Coding Scheme | +| Number-Of –Pages | Page Parameter (Note) | +| CBS-Message-Information-Page | Content of Message | + +NOTE: The Page Parameter byte is constructed from the total number of pages as indicated in the UMTS CB message, in combination with the current page's sequence number (based on the order of the pages in the UMTS message). + +- Each of the resulting pages shall then be passed to the UICC using the ENVELOPE (CELL BROADCAST DOWNLOAD) command, defined below. The ME shall not display the message; +- if the message identifier of the incoming cell broadcast message is not found in EFCBMID, then the ME shall determine if the message should be displayed, by following the procedures in TS 23.041 [6] and TS 31.102 [14]. +- if the UICC responds with '93 00', the ME shall consider that the Cell Broadcast page has not been delivered successfully. The ME may retry to deliver the same Cell Broadcast page. + +The ME shall identify new cell broadcast pages by their message identifier, serial number and page values. + +### 7.1.2.2 Structure of ENVELOPE (CELL BROADCAST DOWNLOAD) + +Direction: ME to UICC. + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13]. + +Command parameters/data. + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|-----------------------------|--------|-------|-----|--------| +| Cell Broadcast Download tag | 9.1 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | A | +| Cell Broadcast page | 8.5 | M | Y | B | + +- Device identities: the ME shall set the device identities to: + - source: Network; + - destination: UICC. + +Response parameters/data: None for this type of ENVELOPE command. + +## 7.2 Menu Selection + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.2. + +If the UICC responds with '93 00', the ME shall not re-issue this particular envelope. + +## 7.3 Call Control and MO SMS control by USIM + +### 7.3.1 Call Control by USIM + +#### 7.3.1.1 Procedure for mobile originated calls + +If the service "call control" is available in the USIM Service Table (see TS 31.102 [14]), then the ME shall follow the procedure described in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.3.1.1 with the additional rules listed here: + +- when the user is dialling "112" or an emergency call code stored in EFECC, the ME shall set up an emergency call instead of passing the call set-up details to the UICC; +- if the UICC provides response data, then in addition to the response data listed by ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.3.1.6, the response data from the UICC may indicate to the ME to send instead a supplementary service or USSD operation using the data supplied by the UICC. It is then mandatory for the ME to perform the supplementary service or USSD operation in accordance with the data from the UICC, if it is within the ME's + +capabilities to do so. If the UICC requires a supplementary service or USSD operation that is beyond the ME's capabilities, then the ME shall not perform the supplementary service or USSD operation at all. + +- If, as a result of the procedure, the UICC supplies a number stored in EFECC, this shall not result in an emergency call. + +This procedure is applicable also in the case where the call is originated over IMS and the service "communication control for IMS by USIM" is not available in the USIM Service Table (see TS 31.102 [14]). If the call is originated over IMS and the service "communication control for IMS by USIM" is available in the USIM Service Table, only the procedure for IMS communications establishment (clause 7.3.1.9) shall be used. + +In the case where the initial call set-up request results from a proactive command SET UP CALL: + +- if the call control result is "not allowed", the ME shall inform the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE "interaction with call control by USIM or MO short message control by USIM, permanent problem; action not allowed"; +- if the call set-up request is changed by call control in a supplementary service or USSD operation, and if the supplementary service or USSD operation is within the ME's capabilities, then the ME shall send this request to the network. The ME shall then send back a TERMINAL RESPONSE to the SET UP CALL command at the same time it would have done for the proactive command equivalent to the action requested by call control (i.e. SEND SS or SEND USSD). However, in that case, the TERMINAL RESPONSE shall contain the response data given in the response to ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) and a second Result TLV identical to the one given in response to the proactive command equivalent to the action requested by call control (i.e. SEND SS or SEND USSD). The mapping between the general result in the first Result TLV and the general result in the second Result TLV is given below: + +the general result "command performed, but modified by call control by USIM" shall be given in the first Result TLV if the general result of the second Result TLV is '0X' or '1X'; + +the general result "interaction with call control by USIM, temporary problem" shall be given in the first Result TLV if the general result of the second Result TLV is '2X'; + +the general result "interaction with call control by USIM or MO short message control by USIM, permanent problem" shall be given in the first Result TLV if the general result of the second Result TLV is '3X'; + +- if the call set-up request is changed by call control into a supplementary service or USSD operation, and if the supplementary service or USSD operation is beyond the ME's capabilities, then the ME shall send back a TERMINAL RESPONSE to the SET UP CALL command, without performing the supplementary service or USSD operation at all. In that case, the TERMINAL RESPONSE shall contain the response data given in the response to ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) and a second Result TLV identical to the one given in response to the proactive command equivalent to the action requested by call control (i.e. SEND SS or SEND USSD). The mapping between the general result in the first Result TLV and the general result in the second Result TLV is given below: + +the general result "interaction with call control by USIM or MO short message control by USIM, permanent problem" shall be given in the first Result TLV, and the general result "command beyond ME's capabilities" shall be given in the second Result TLV. + +The ME shall then follow the call set-up procedure defined in TS 24.008 [9] or the supplementary service or USSD operation procedure defined in TS 24.080 [11]. + +### 7.3.1.2 Procedure for Supplementary Services and USSD + +If the service "call control" is available in the USIM Service Table (see TS 31.102 [14]), then for all supplementary service and USSD operations (including those resulting from a SEND SS or SEND USSD proactive UICC command), the ME shall first pass the supplementary service or USSD control string (corresponding to the supplementary service or USSD operation and coded as defined in TS 22.030 [2], even if this SS or USSD operation has been performed via a specific menu of the ME) to the UICC, using the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) command defined below. The ME shall also pass to the UICC in the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) command the current serving cell. + +The UICC shall respond in the same way as for mobile originated calls. The ME shall interpret the response as follows: + +- if the UICC responds with '90 00', the ME shall send the supplementary service or USSD operation with the information as sent to the UICC; +- if the UICC responds with any status code indicating an error, the ME shall not send the supplementary service or USSD; +- if the UICC responds with '93 00', the ME shall not send the supplementary service or USSD operation and may retry the command; +- if the UICC provides response data, then the response data from the UICC shall indicate to the ME whether to send the supplementary service or USSD operation as proposed, not send the SS or USSD operation, send the SS or USSD operation using the data supplied by the UICC, or instead set up a call using the data supplied by the UICC. It is mandatory for the ME to perform the supplementary service or USSD operation or the call set-up request in accordance with the data from the UICC, if it is within the ME's capabilities to do so. If the UICC requires a call set-up or supplementary service or USSD operation that is beyond the ME's capabilities (e.g. the UICC maps a USSD operation to a data call, and the ME does not support data calls), then the ME shall not perform the call set-up request or supplementary service or USSD operation at all. + +In the case where the initial SS or USSD request results from a proactive command SEND SS or SEND USSD: + +- if the call control result is "not allowed", the ME shall inform the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE ("interaction with call control by USIM or MO short message control by USIM, permanent problem; action not allowed"); +- if the SS or USSD request is changed by call control in a call set-up request, then the ME shall set up the call using the data given by the UICC, if it is within the ME's capabilities to do so. If the UICC requires a call set-up that is beyond the ME's capabilities (e.g. the UICC maps a USSD operation to a data call, and the ME does not support data calls), then the ME shall not set up the call at all. The ME shall send back a TERMINAL RESPONSE to the initial proactive command at the same time it would have done for the proactive command equivalent to the action requested by call control (i.e. SET UP CALL). However, in that case, the TERMINAL RESPONSE shall contain the response data given in the response to ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) and a second Result TLV identical to the one given in response to the proactive command equivalent to the action requested by call control (i.e. SET UP CALL). The mapping between the general result in the first Result TLV and the general result in the second Result TLV is the same as the one described in clause 7.3.1.1. + +If the ME supports the Outgoing Call Information service, the ME shall update EFOCT with the supplementary service or USSD control string corresponding to the initial user request. + +The ME shall then follow the supplementary service or USSD operation procedure defined in TS 24.080 [11] or the call set-up procedure defined in TS 24.008 [9]. + +### 7.3.1.3 Indication to be given to the user + +The UICC may optionally include an alpha-identifier in the response data to the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) message, in order to inform the user at the time the response is received by the ME. The use of this alpha identifier by the ME is described below: + +- if the UICC responds with "allowed, no modification", then: + +if the alpha identifier is provided by the UICC and is not a null data object, the ME shall use it to inform the user during the PDP/PDN context activation, PDU session establishment or call set-up; + +if the alpha identifier is provided by the UICC and is a null data object (i.e. length = '00' and no value part), this is an indication that the ME should not modify the display corresponding to the initial user request; + +if the alpha identifier is not provided by the UICC, the ME may give information to the user concerning what is happening; + +- if the UICC responds with "not allowed", then: + +if the alpha identifier is provided by the UICC and is not a null data object, the ME shall use it to inform the user. This is also an indication that the ME should not give any other information to the user on the reason of the barring; + +if the alpha identifier is provided by the UICC and is a null data object (i.e. length = '00' and no value part), the ME may give information to the user concerning what is happening; + +if the alpha identifier is not provided by the UICC, the ME may give information to the user concerning what is happening. + +- if the UICC responds with "allowed, with modifications", and the modified request is within the ME's capabilities, then: + +if the alpha identifier is provided by the UICC and is not a null data object, the ME shall use it to inform the user. The ME shall then not display the destination address or SS string given by the UICC. This is also an indication that the ME should not give any other information to the user on the changes made by the UICC to the initial user request; + +if the alpha identifier is provided by the UICC and is a null data object (i.e. length = '00' and no value part), this is an indication that the ME should not give any information to the user on the changes made by the UICC to the initial user request. The ME shall not display the destination address or SS string given by the UICC. The ME should not modify the display corresponding to the initial user request; + +if the alpha identifier is not provided by the UICC, the ME may indicate to the user that the initial user request has been changed. + +- if the UICC responds with "allowed, with modifications" to a user-initiated request (i.e. a request not initiated by a proactive command), and the modified user request is beyond the ME's capabilities, then the ME may give information to the user on the modified request and the fact that the modified request is beyond the ME's capabilities, optionally using the alpha identifier, if one is provided by the UICC; +- if the UICC responds with "allowed, with modifications" to a request by a proactive command SET UP CALL, SEND SS, SEND USSD or OPEN CHANNEL where GPRS is selected, and the modified request is beyond the ME's capabilities, then the ME shall not give any information to the user on the fact that the modified request is beyond the ME's capabilities, and shall give a TERMINAL RESPONSE to the proactive command (i.e. SET UP CALL, SEND SS, SEND USSD or OPEN CHANNEL) as detailed in clauses 7.3.1.1, 7.3.1.2 and 7.3.1.3. The responsibility to inform the user in this case lies with the UICC application which sent the proactive command. + +A terminal of type ND shall ignore any alpha identifier provided together with the response data to the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) message. + +#### 7.3.1.4 Interaction with Fixed Dialling Number + +The procedure defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.3.1.4 for calls applies. In addition, it shall apply in the same way for supplementary service operations, the supplementary service control string being checked as if it was a called number. + +The ME shall check the number (or the supplementary service control string) in accordance with TS 22.101 [34]. + +When the called address is an IMS URI, the ME shall check the destination address using the FDN stored in EFFDNURI, in addition to the EFFDN entries, following the same principle as defined in the Fixed Dialling Number description in TS 22.101 [34] applied to URIs, and as described in TS 31.102[14] clause 4.2.97. + +### 7.3.1.5 Support of Barred Dialling Number (BDN) service + +The procedure defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.3.1.5 for calls applies. In addition, it shall apply in the same way for supplementary service operations, the supplementary service control string being checked as if it was a called number. + +The ME shall check the number (or the supplementary service control string) in accordance with TS 22.101 [34]. + +When the called address is an IMS URI, the ME shall check the destination address using the BDN stored in EFBDNURI, in addition to the EFBDN entries, following the same principle as defined in the Barring Dialling Number description in TS 22.101 [34] applied to URIs, and as described in TS 31.102[14] clause 4.2.98. + +### 7.3.1.6 Structure of ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) + +Direction: ME to UICC. + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13]. + +Command parameters/data. + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-------|-----|--------| +| Call control tag | 9.1 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | A | +| Address or SS string or USSD string or PDP context activation parameters or EPS PDN connection activation parameters or IMS URI or PDU session establishment parameters | 8.1, 8.14 or 8.17 or 8.72 or 8.98 or 8.108 or 8.143 | M | Y | B | +| Capability configuration parameters 1 | 8.4 | O | N | C | +| Subaddress | 8.3 | O | N | D | +| Location information | 8.19 | C | N | E | +| Capability configuration parameters 2 | 8.4 | O | N | F | +| Media Type | 8.132 | C | N | G | +| URI truncated | 8.135 | C | N | H | + +- Device identities: the ME shall set the device identities to: + +source: ME; + +destination: UICC. + +- Address or SS string or USSD string or PDP context activation parameters or EPS PDN connection activation parameters or IMS URI or PDU session establishment parameters: only one data object shall be sent to the UICC: + +for a call set-up, the address data object is used and holds the Called Party Number, as defined in TS 24.008 [9], to which the ME is proposing setting up the call; + +for a supplementary service, the SS string data object is used and holds the corresponding supplementary service; + +for a USSD operation, the USSD string data object is used and holds the corresponding USSD control string; + +USIM Applications and MEs should take into account that early implementations of USAT use the SS string data object for coding of USSD control strings (instead of the USSD string data object). This behaviour is only possible for USSD control strings consisting of digits (0-9, \*, #). The UICC can identify MEs having this early implementation by evaluating the indication "USSD string data object supported in Call Control" in the TERMINAL PROFILE. The ME can identify USIMs having this early implementation by evaluating the indication "USSD string data object supported in Call Control" in the USIM Service Table. + +For a PDP context activation, the Activate PDP context request parameters are used, as defined in TS 24.008 [9]. Except for the following parameters: + +- Requested QoS; + +- Access Point Name; and +- Protocol configuration options, + +the UICC should not modify any other parameters included in the ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT REQUEST message as defined in TS 24.008 [9] to avoid that the UE sends a value of any of these parameters that is not compliant to TS 24.008 [9]; + +for an EPS PDN connection activation, the PDN Connectivity Request parameters are used, as defined in TS 24.301 [46]. Except for the following parameters: + +- Access Point Name; and +- Protocol configuration options, + +the UICC should not modify any other parameters included in the PDN CONNECTIVITY REQUEST message as defined in TS 24.301 [46] to avoid that the UE sends a value of any of these parameters that is not compliant to TS 24.301 [46]; + +for an IMS communication establishment, the IMS Request-URI field is used and the IMS URI data object holds the SIP URI or tel URI, as defined in TS 24.229[52], to which the ME is proposing setting up the communication. If the URI is longer than the maximum length that can be transmitted to the UICC, then the URI shall be truncated to the maximum length that can be transmitted to the UICC and the request shall contain a URI truncated tag. + +for a PDU session establishment, the PDU Session Establishment Request parameters are used, as defined in TS 24.501 [70]. Except for the following parameters: + +- SM PDU DN request container; and +- operator specific parameters in Extended Protocol configuration options, + +the UICC should not modify any other parameters included in the PDU SESSION ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST message as defined in TS 24.501 [70] to avoid that the UE sends a value of any of these parameters that is not compliant to TS 24.501 [70]. + +- Capability configuration parameters: Only used for a call set-up, this contains the Bearer capabilities that the ME is proposing to send to the network. The first capability configuration parameters corresponds to the bearer capability 1 information element of a mobile originating SETUP message, as defined in TS 24.008 [9]. The second capability configuration parameters correspond to the bearer capability 2 information element of a mobile originating SETUP message, as defined in TS 24.008 [9]. If no capability configuration parameters are present, this shall indicate a speech call. +- Subaddress: Only used for a call set-up, this contains the called party subaddress that the ME is proposing to send to the network. If one is not present, this shall indicate that the ME is proposing not to send this information element to the network. +- Location information: This data object contains the identification (MCC, MNC, LAC/TAC, Cell Identity) of the current serving cell of the UE. The comprehension required flag of this data object in this command shall be set to '0'. This data object shall be present if the call is performed over GERAN, UTRAN, E-UTRAN or NG-RAN. +- Media Type: This data object indicates the type of media the ME is proposing using to set up the communication. If the type of media to be used by the ME is one of those listed in the Terminal Profile and if the "Media Type support" service is allocated and activated in the USIM or ISIM Service Table, the Media Type data object shall be present. +- URI truncated: This data object indicates that the URI in the request was truncated because too long to be transmitted to the UICC. + +Response parameters/data. + +It is permissible for the UICC to provide no response data, by responding with SW1/SW2 = '90 00'. If the UICC does not provide any response data, then this shall have the same meaning as "allowed, no modification". + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-------|-----|--------| +| Call control result | - | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D+E+F+G) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Address or SS string or USSD string or PDP context activation parameters or EPS PDN connection activation parameters or IMS URI or PDU session establishment parameters | 8.1, 8.14 or 8.17 or 8.72 or 8.98 or 8.108 or 8.143 | O | N | A | +| Capability configuration parameters 1 | 8.4 | O | N | B | +| Subaddress | 8.3 | O | N | C | +| Alpha identifier | 8.2 | O | N | D | +| BC repeat indicator | 8.42 | C | N | E | +| Capability configuration parameters 2 | 8.4 | O | N | F | +| Media Type | 8.132 | O | N | G | + +- Call control result: + +Contents: + +- The command that the UICC gives to the ME concerning whether to allow, bar or modify the proposed call (or supplementary service operation); + +Coding: + +- '00' = Allowed, no modification; +- '01' = Not allowed; +- '02' = Allowed with modifications. + +- Address or SS string or USSD string or PDP context/EPS PDN connection activation parameters or IMS URI or PDU session establishment parameters: Only one data object may be included if the UICC requests the call (or supplementary service or USSD operation or PDP context/EPS PDN connection activation or IMS communication establishment or PDU session establishment parameters) details to be modified: + +for a call set-up, if the address data object is not present, then the ME shall assume the Dialling number is not to be modified; + +if the SS string data object or address data object is present and the ME receives wild values according to TS 31.102 [14], then the ME shall not process the command. + +For a supplementary service, if the SS string data object is not present, then the ME shall assume that SS is not to be modified; + +for a USSD operation, if the USSD string data object is not present, then the ME shall assume that the USSD operation is not to be modified; + +for a PDP context activation, if the PDP context activation parameters object is not present, then the ME shall assume that the PDP context activation is not to be modified; + +for an EPS PDN connection activation, if the EPS PDN connection activation parameters object is not present, then the ME shall assume that the EPS PDN connection activation is not to be modified; + +for an IMS communication establishment, if the IMS URI data object is not present, then the ME shall assume that neither the SIP URI nor the tel URI are to be modified. + +for a PDU session establishment, if the PDU session establishment parameters object is not present, then the ME shall assume that the PDU session establishment is not to be modified. + +- Capability configuration parameters: Only used for a call set-up, this data object is only required if the USIM application requests the call details to be modified. The first capability configuration parameters corresponds to the bearer capability 1 information element of a mobile originating SETUP message, as defined in TS 24.008 [9]. The second capability configuration parameters corresponds to the bearer capability 2 + +information element of a mobile originating SETUP message, as defined in TS 24.008 [9]. If the capability configuration parameters are not present, then the ME shall assume the parameters are not to be modified. + +- Subaddress: Only used for a call set-up, this data object is only required if the USIM application requests the call details to be modified. If the subaddress is not present, then the ME shall assume the called party subaddress is not to be modified. If the subaddress supplied by the USIM application is a null data object, then the ME shall not provide a called party subaddress to the network. A null data object shall have length = '00' and no value part. +- Alpha identifier: this data object is only required if the UICC requests a particular indication to be given to the user. The handling of this data object by the ME is described in clause 7.3.1.3. The comprehension required flag of this data object shall be set to '0'. +- BC repeat indicator: indicates how the associated bearers shall be interpreted. The change of bearer occurs on a network event. This BC repeat indicator is conditioned to the presence of the second capability configuration parameters and is coded as defined in TS 24.008 [9]. +- Media Type: this data object is only required if the UICC requests the media type of the call to be modified. If the Media Type is not present then the ME shall assume the media type of the call is not to be modified. + +It is mandatory for the UICC to provide at least one of the optional data objects if it has set the Call control result to "allowed with modifications". + +### 7.3.1.7 Procedure for PDP Context Activation + +If the service "call control on GPRS by USIM" is available in the USIM Service Table (see TS 31.102 [14]), then for all PDP Context activation (including those resulting from a OPEN CHANNEL proactive UICC command where GPRS is selected), the ME shall first pass the corresponding Activate PDP Context message (see TS 24.008 [9]) to the UICC, using the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) command defined below. The ME shall also pass to the UICC in the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) command the current serving cell. + +When the ME performs an emergency PDP context activation, the ME shall not send the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) command to the UICC. + +The UICC shall respond in the same way as for mobile originated calls. The ME shall interpret the response as follows: + +- if the UICC responds with '90 00', the ME shall send the Activate PDP Context message with the information as sent to the UICC; +- if the UICC responds with '93 00', the ME shall not send the Activate PDP Context message and may retry the command; +- if the UICC provides response data, then the response data from the UICC shall indicate to the ME whether to send the Activate PDP Context message as proposed, not send the Activate PDP Context message or send the Activate PDP Context message using the data supplied by the UICC. It is mandatory for the ME to perform the PDP Context Activation in accordance with the data from the UICC, if it is within the ME's capabilities to do so. If the UICC requires PDP Context Activation that is beyond the ME's capabilities, then the ME shall not perform PDP Context Activation at all. + +In the case where the initial PDP Context Activation request results from a proactive command OPEN CHANNEL where GPRS is selected: + +- if the call control result is "not allowed", the ME shall inform the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE ("interaction with call control by USIM or MO short message control by USIM, permanent problem; action not allowed"); +- if the PDP Context Activation data is changed by call control, then the ME shall activate the PDP context using the data given by the UICC, if it is within the ME's capabilities to do so. If the UICC requires a PDP Context Activation that is beyond the ME's capabilities (e.g. the UICC requests a QoS that the ME cannot handle ), then the ME shall not activate the PDP context at all. + +### 7.3.1.8 Procedure for EPS PDN connection Activation + +If the service "call control on EPS PDN connection by USIM" is available in the USIM Service Table (see TS 31.102 [14]), then for all EPS PDN connection activation (including those resulting from a OPEN CHANNEL proactive UICC command where E-UTRAN is selected), the ME shall first pass the corresponding PDN Connectivity Request message (see TS 24.301 [46]) to the UICC, using the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) command defined above. The ME shall also pass to the UICC in the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) command the current serving cell. + +When the ME performs an emergency EPS PDN connection activation, the ME shall not send the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) command to the UICC. + +The UICC shall respond in the same way as for mobile originated calls. The ME shall interpret the response as follows: + +- if the UICC responds with '90 00', the ME shall send the PDN Connectivity Request message with the information as sent to the UICC; +- if the UICC responds with '93 00', the ME shall not send the PDN Connectivity Request message and may retry the command; +- if the UICC provides response data, then the response data from the UICC shall indicate to the ME whether to send the PDN Connectivity Request message as proposed, not send the PDN Connectivity Request message or send the PDN Connectivity Request message using the data supplied by the UICC. It is mandatory for the ME to perform the EPS PDN Connection Activation in accordance with the data from the UICC, if it is within the ME's capabilities to do so. If the UICC requires EPS PDN Connection Activation that is beyond the ME's capabilities, then the ME shall not perform EPS PDN Connection Activation at all. + +In the case where the initial PDN Connectivity Request results from a proactive command OPEN CHANNEL where E-UTRAN is selected: + +- if the call control result is "not allowed", the ME shall inform the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE ("interaction with call control by USIM or MO short message control by USIM, permanent problem; action not allowed"); +- if the EPS PDN Connection Activation data is changed by call control, then the ME shall activate the EPS PDN Connection using the data given by the UICC, if it is within the ME's capabilities to do so. If the UICC requires a EPS PDN Connection Activation that is beyond the ME's capabilities, then the ME shall not activate the EPS PDN Connection at all. + +### 7.3.1.9 Procedure for IMS communications establishment + +If the service "communication control for IMS by USIM" is available in the USIM Service Table (see TS 31.102 [14]), then for all IMS communication establishment, the ME shall first pass the corresponding IMS Request-URI contained in SIP INVITE message (see TS24.229 [52]) to the UICC, using the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) command defined above. The ME shall also pass to the UICC in the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) command the current serving cell if the IMS communication is established over GERAN, UTRAN, E-UTRAN or NG-RAN. If the type of media to be used by the ME is one of those listed in the Terminal Profile and if the "Media Type support" service is allocated and activated in the USIM or ISIM Service Table, the ME shall pass to the UICC in the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) command the media type of the SIP communication session it is setting up. + +This procedure replaces the call control by USIM using the Address TLV (clause 8.1) when the call is originated over IMS and the service "communication control for IMS by USIM" is available in the USIM Service Table (see TS 31.102 [14]). + +When the ME detects that an IMS emergency call is being initiated, the ME shall set up an emergency call without sending the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) command to the UICC. + +The UICC shall respond in the same way as for mobile originated communications. The ME shall interpret the response as follows: + +- if the UICC responds with '90 00', the ME shall send the SIP INVITE message with the information as sent to the UICC; +- if the UICC responds with '93 00', the ME shall not send SIP INVITE message and may retry the command; + +- if the UICC provides response data, then the response data from the UICC shall indicate to the ME whether to send the SIP INVITE message as proposed, not send the SIP INVITE message or send the SIP INVITE message using the IMS-Request URI supplied by the UICC. It is mandatory for the ME to perform the SIP INVITE request in accordance with the data from the UICC, if it is within the ME's capabilities to do so. If the UICC requires SIP INVITE request that is beyond the ME's capabilities, then the ME shall not send SIP INVITE request at all. + +### 7.3.1.10 Procedure for PDU session establishment + +If the service "call control on PDU session by USIM" is available in the USIM Service Table (see TS 31.102 [14]), then for all PDU session establishment (including those resulting from a OPEN CHANNEL proactive UICC command where NG-RAN is selected), the ME shall first pass the corresponding PDU Session Establishment Request message (see TS 24.501 [70]) to the UICC, using the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) command defined above. The ME shall also pass to the UICC in the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) command the current serving cell. + +When the ME performs an emergency PDU session establishment, the ME shall not send the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) command to the UICC. + +The UICC shall respond in the same way as for mobile originated calls. The ME shall interpret the response as follows: + +- if the UICC responds with '90 00', the ME shall send the PDU Session Establishment Request message with the information as sent to the UICC; +- if the UICC responds with '93 00', the ME shall not send the PDU Session Establishment Request message and may retry the command; +- if the UICC provides response data, then the response data from the UICC shall indicate to the ME whether to send the PDU Session Establishment Request message as proposed, not send the PDU Session Establishment Request message or send the PDU Session Establishment Request message using the data supplied by the UICC. It is mandatory for the ME to perform the PDU session establishment in accordance with the data from the UICC, if it is within the ME's capabilities to do so. If the UICC requires PDU session establishment that is beyond the ME's capabilities, then the ME shall not perform PDU session establishment at all. + +In the case where the initial PDU Session Establishment Request results from a proactive command OPEN CHANNEL where NG-RAN is selected: + +- if the call control result is "not allowed", the ME shall inform the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE ("interaction with call control by USIM or MO short message control by USIM, permanent problem; action not allowed"); +- if the PDU session establishment data is changed by call control, then the ME shall establish the PDU session using the data given by the UICC, if it is within the ME's capabilities to do so. If the UICC requires a PDU session establishment that is beyond the ME's capabilities, then the ME shall not establish the PDU session at all. + +## 7.3.2 MO Short Message Control by USIM + +### 7.3.2.1 Description + +If the service "MO Short Message Control" is available in the USIM Service Table (see TS 31.102 [14]), then the ME shall follow the procedure below: + +- for all MO short message attempts (even those resulting from a SEND SM proactive UICC command), the ME shall first pass the RP\_destination\_address of the service centre and the TP\_Destination\_Address to the UICC, using the ENVELOPE (MO SHORT MESSAGE CONTROL) command defined below. The ME shall also pass to the UICC in the ENVELOPE (MO SHORT MESSAGE CONTROL) command the current serving cell; +- if the UICC responds with '90 00', the ME shall send the short message with the addresses unchanged; +- if the UICC responds with any other status code indicating an error, the ME shall not send the short message; +- if the UICC responds with '93 00', the ME shall not send the short message and may retry the command; + +- if the UICC provides response data, then the response data from the UICC shall indicate to the ME whether to send the short message as proposed, not send the short message or send a short message using the data supplied by the UICC. It is mandatory for the ME to perform the MO short message request in accordance with the data from the UICC. + +The ME shall then follow the MO Short Message procedure defined in TS 24.011 [10]. + +In the case where the initial MO short message request results from a proactive command SEND SHORT MESSAGE, if the MO short message control result is "not allowed", the ME shall inform the UICC using TERMINAL RESPONSE, "interaction with call control by USIM or MO short message control by USIM, permanent problem; action not allowed". + +### 7.3.2.2 Structure of ENVELOPE (MO SHORT MESSAGE CONTROL) + +Direction: ME to UICC. + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13]. + +Command parameters/data. + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|------------------------------|--------------|-------|-----|--------| +| MO Short Message control tag | 9.1 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | A | +| Address data object 1 | 8.1 or 8.108 | M | Y | B | +| Address data object 2 | 8.1 or 8.108 | M | Y | C | +| Location information | 8.19 | C | Y | D | + +- Device identities: the ME shall set the device identities to: + +source: ME; + +destination: UICC. + +- Address data object 1: this address data object 1 contains the RP\_Destination\_Address of the Service Centre to which the ME is proposing to send the short message. If the USIM or the ISIM Service Table indicates URI support for MO SHORT MESSAGE CONTROL, then the address data object 1 may contain the Public Service Identity of the SM-SC to which the ME is proposing to send the short message. The type of address data object shall not be modified. +- Address data object 2: this address data object 2 contains the TP\_Destination\_Address to which the ME is proposing to send the short message. If the USIM or the ISIM Service Table indicates URI support for MO SHORT MESSAGE CONTROL, then the address data object 2 may contain the Public Identity (IMPU) of the receiver to which the ME is proposing to send the short message. The type of address data object shall not be modified. +- Location information: this data object contains the identification (MCC, MNC, LAC/TAC, Cell Identity) of the current serving cell of the UE. This data object shall be present if the short message is sent over GERAN, UTRAN, E-UTRAN or NG-RAN. + +Response parameters/data. + +It is permissible for the UICC to provide no response data, by responding with SW1/SW2 = '90 00'. If the UICC does not provide any response data, then this shall have the same meaning as "allowed, no modification". + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|---------------------------------|--------------|--------------|-----|--------| +| MO short message control result | - | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Address data object 1 | 8.1 or 8.108 | O (see note) | N | A | +| Address data object 2 | 8.1 or 8.108 | O (see note) | N | B | +| Alpha identifier | 8.2 | O | N | C | + +NOTE: The UICC shall provide the two optional address data objects if it has set the MO Short Message control result to "allowed with modifications". + +- MO Short Message control result: + +Contents: + +- The command that the UICC gives to the ME concerning whether to allow, bar or modify the proposed short message; + +Coding: + +- '00' = Allowed, no modification; +- '01' = Not allowed; +- '02' = Allowed with modifications. +- if the ME receives wild values according to TS 31.102 [14] in either the Address data object 1 or Address data object 2, then the ME shall not process the command. +- Alpha identifier: this data object is only required if the UICC requests a particular indication to be given to the user. The handling of this data object by the ME is described in clause 7.3.2.3. + +### 7.3.2.3 Indication to be given to the user + +The UICC may optionally include an alpha-identifier in the response data to the ENVELOPE (MO SHORT MESSAGE CONTROL) message, in order to inform the user at the time the response is received by the ME. The use of this alpha identifier by the ME is identical to the one described in clause 7.3.1.3 relative to call control by USIM. + +### 7.3.2.4 Interaction with Fixed Dialling Number + +It is permissible for the Fixed Dialling Number service to be enabled (see TS 31.102 [14]) at the same time as MO Short Message Control is available (in the USIM Service Table). If FDN is enabled, the ME shall follow the procedure for Call Control (see clause 7.3.1.4), where the number or called address (i.e. IMS URI) in the procedure refers to both the SMS destination address and the SMSC address. + +## 7.4 Timer Expiration + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.4. + +## 7.5 Event download + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5. + +Regarding all the call events, the following equivalences shall apply: + +- the "call setup message" is the SETUP message as defined in TS 24.008 [09]; +- the "call connect message" is the CONNECT message as defined in TS 24.008 [09]; +- the "disconnect messages" are the DISCONNECT, RELEASE, RELEASE COMPLETE messages as defined in TS 24.008 [09]; +- the "NULL state" is the CC-U0 state as defined in TS 24.008 [09]. + +Regarding the location status event, the following equivalence shall apply: + +- the "idle" state is the MM-IDLE state as defined in TS 24.008 [09] for GERAN/UTRAN, the EMM-IDLE state as defined in TS 24.301 [46] for E-UTRAN and 5GMM-IDLE state as defined in TS 24.501 [70] for NG-RAN. + +Where events occur and the UICC responds with '93 00', the ME shall retry to deliver the event download messages to the UICC. + +## 7.5.1 (I-)WLAN Access status event + +### 7.5.1.1 Procedure + +If the (I-)WLAN Access Status event is part of the current event list (as set up by the last SET UP EVENT LIST command, see clause 6.4.16), then, when the terminal detects a change in its current I-WLAN access or WLAN access respectively the terminal shall inform the UICC that this has occurred, by using the ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – (I-)WLAN Access Status) command as defined in clause 7.5.1.2. + +### 7.5.1.2 Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – (I-)WLAN Access Status) + +Direction: terminal to UICC. + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13]. + +Command parameters/data. + +| Description | Clause | M/O | Min | Length | +|------------------------|--------|-----|-----|--------| +| Event download tag | 9.1 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Event list | 8.25 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| (I-)WLAN Access Status | 8.84 | M | Y | C | + +Event list: the Event list data object shall contain only one event (value part of length 1 byte), and terminal shall set the event to: + +(I-)WLAN Access Status. + +Device identities: the terminal shall set the device identities to: + +source: terminal; + +destination: UICC. + +(I-)WLAN Access Status: this data object shall contain the (I-)WLAN Access status of the terminal. + +Response parameters/data: None for this type of ENVELOPE command. + +## 7.5.1A MT Call event + +### 7.5.1A.1 Procedure + +If the MT call event is part of the current event list (as set up by the last SET UP EVENT LIST command, see clause 6.4.16), then when the ME receives an incoming call setup message, the ME shall inform the UICC that this has occurred, by using the ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD - MT call) command as defined in clause 7.5.1A.2. + +### 7.5.1A.2 Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD - MT call) + +Direction: ME to UICC. + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13]. + +Command parameters/data. + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|--------------------------|--------|-------|-----|--------| +| Event download tag | 9.1 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Event list | 8.25 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| Transaction identifier | 8.28 | M | N | C | +| Address | 8.1 | C | N | D | +| Subaddress | 8.3 | C | N | E | +| IMS URI | 8.108 | C | N | F | +| Media Type | 8.132 | C | N | G | +| URI truncated | 8.135 | C | N | H | + +Event list: the event list object shall contain only one event (value part of length 1 byte), and ME shall set the event to: + +- MT call. + +Device identities: the ME shall set the device identities to: + +- source: network; +- destination: UICC. + +Transaction identifier: the transaction identifier data object shall contain one transaction identifier, and this shall be the Transaction Identifier as defined in clause 8.28. + +Address: the address data object holds the Calling Party number received by the ME in the call setup message. If the Calling Party number is included in the call setup message, the ME shall include the Address object. Otherwise the ME shall not include the Address object. + +Subaddress: The Subaddress data object holds the Calling Party Subaddress as received by the ME in the call setup message. If the Calling Party Subaddress is included in the call setup message, the ME shall include the Subaddress object, otherwise the terminal shall not include the Subaddress object. + +IMS URI: The IMS URI data object is a SIP or TEL URI of the Calling Party received by the ME in the call setup message. This data object will be present only if the "URI support by UICC" Service is present in the USIM or the ISIM Service Table. The IMS URI data object shall contain the SIP URI or tel URI indicated in the P-Asserted-Identity field as defined in TS 24.229 [52]. In case the P-Asserted-Identity field is missing the SIP URI or tel URI indicated in the From header field shall be used. If the URI is longer than the maximum length that can be transmitted to the UICC, then the URI shall be truncated to the maximum length that can be transmitted to the UICC and the request shall contain a URI truncated tag. + +Media Type: The Media Type indicates the type of media of the incoming call session and shall be coded as defined in clause 8.132. The Media Type data object shall be present, if the "Media Type support" service is allocated and activated in the USIM or ISIM Service Table. + +Response parameters/data: + +- none. + +## 7.5.2 Network Rejection event + +### 7.5.2.1 Procedure + +If the Network Rejection event is part of the current event list (as set up by the last SET UP EVENT LIST command, see ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 6.4.16), then, in the case of GERAN/UTRAN if the terminal receives a LOCATION UPDATING REJECT message or a GPRS ATTACH REJECT message or a ROUTING AREA UPDATE REJECT message (as defined in TS 24.008 [9]) or in the case of E-UTRAN if the terminal receives an EMM ATTACH REJECT message or TRACKING AREA UPDATE REJECT message (as defined in TS 24.301 [46]), or in the case of NG-RAN if the terminal receives a REGISTRATION REJECT message (as defined in TS 24.501 [70]), the terminal shall inform the UICC that this has occurred, by using the ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – Network Rejection Event) command as defined below. + +## 7.5.2.2 Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – Network Rejection) + +Direction: ME to UICC. + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13]. + +Command parameters/data. + +| Description | Clause | M/O | Min | Length | +|---------------------------------|--------|-----|-----|--------| +| Event download tag | 9.1 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I) | - | M | Y | 1 | +| Event list | 8.25 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| Location Information | 8.19 | C | N | C | +| Routing Area Identification | 8.91 | C | N | D | +| Tracking Area Identification | 8.99 | C | N | E | +| Access Technology | 8.62 | M | Y | F | +| Update/Attach/Registration Type | 8.92 | M | Y | G | +| Rejection Cause Code | 8.93 | M | Y | H | +| Extended Rejection Cause Code | 8.136 | C | N | I | + +- Event list: the Event list data object shall contain only one event (value part of length 1 byte), and terminal shall set the event to: + - Network Rejection Event. +- Device identities: the terminal shall set the device identities to: + - source: Network; + - destination: UICC. +- Location information: This data object shall only be present when the ME receives a LOCATION UPDATING REJECT message, and shall contain the identification (MCC, MNC, and LAC) of the rejecting network. +- Routing Area Identification: This data object shall only be present when the ME receives a GPRS ATTACH REJECT message or a ROUTING AREA UPDATE REJECT message and shall contain the identification (MCC, MNC, LAC and RAC) of the rejecting network. +- Tracking Area Identification: This data object shall only be present when the ME receives an EMM ATTACH REJECT or a TRACKING AREA UPDATE REJECT or a REGISTRATION REJECT message and shall contain the identification (MCC, MNC and TAC) of the rejecting network. +- Access Technology: This data object shall contain the access technology of the rejecting network. +- Update/Attach/Registration Type: This data object contains the location updating or attach or update or EPS attach or EPS update or 5GS registration type that was used in the LOCATION UPDATING REQUEST or GPRS ATTACH REQUEST or ROUTING AREA UPDATE REQUEST or EMM ATTACH REQUEST or TRACKING AREA UPDATE REQUEST or REGISTRATION REQUEST message. +- Rejection Cause Code: This data object contains the cause code value that was received in the LOCATION UPDATING REJECT or GPRS ATTACH REJECT or ROUTING AREA UPDATE REJECT or EMM ATTACH REJECT or TRACKING AREA UPDATE REJECT or REGISTRATION REJECT message. +- Extended Rejection Cause Code: This data object contains the extended cause code value that was received in the EMM ATTACH REJECT or TRACKING AREA UPDATE REJECT message. + +Response parameters/data: None for this type of ENVELOPE command. + +## 7.5.2A Call connected event + +### 7.5.2A.1 Procedure + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.2.1. + +### 7.5.2A.2 Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD - call connected) + +Direction: ME to UICC. + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13]. + +Command parameters/data. + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|------------------------|--------|-------|-----|--------| +| Event download tag | 9.1 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Event list | 8.25 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| Transaction identifier | 8.28 | M | Y | C | +| Media Type | 8.132 | O | N | D | + +Event list: the event list object shall contain only one event (value part of length 1 byte), and the ME shall set the event to: + +- call connected. + +Device identities: + +- in the case of connecting at the near end (an MT call), the ME shall set the device identities to: + - source: ME; + - destination: UICC. +- in the case of connecting at the far end (an MO call), the ME shall set the device identities to: + - source: network; + - destination: UICC. + +Transaction identifier: the Transaction identifier data object shall contain one transaction identifier. + +Media Type: The Media Type indicates the type of media of the call session and shall be coded as defined in clause 8.132. The Media Type data object shall be present, if the "Media Type support" service is allocated and activated in the USIM or ISIM Service Table. + +Response parameters/data: + +- none. + +## 7.5.3 CSG Cell Selection event + +The following clause applies if class "q" is supported + +### 7.5.3.1 Procedure + +If the CSG Cell Selection event is part of the current event list (as set up by the last SET UP EVENT LIST command, see ETSI TS 102.223 [32]), then, when the ME detects a change in its current CSG or Hybrid cell selection status, the ME shall inform the UICC that it has occurred, using ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – CSG Cell Selection) as defined below. + +### 7.5.3.2 Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – CSG Cell Selection) + +Direction : ME to UICC + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13] + +Command parameters/data + +| Description | Clause | M/O | Min | Length | +|---------------------------|--------|-----|-----|--------| +| Event download tag | 9.1 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D+E+F+G) | - | M | Y | 1 | +| Event list | 8.25 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| Access Technology | 8.62 | C | Y | C | +| CSG cell selection status | 8.101 | M | Y | D | +| CSG ID | 8.102 | C | N | E | +| HNB name | 8.103 | C | N | F | +| PLMN ID | 8.118 | O | N | G | + +- Event list: the Event list data object shall contain only one event (value part of length 1 byte), and terminal shall set the event to: + - CSG Cell Selection. +- Device identities: the terminal shall set the device identities to: + - source: Network; + - destination: UICC. +- Access Technology: This data object shall contain the access technology of the current serving cell. If the device is not camping on any cell, this data object shall not be present. +- CSG cell selection status: this data object shall contain CSG or Hybrid cell selection status. The ME should send the event indicating that it is not camped on a CSG or Hybrid cell only after a previous event that indicated that UE was camped on a CSG or Hybrid cell. +- CSG ID: If the UE is camping on a CSG or Hybrid cell in the Allowed CSG list or the Operator CSG list, this data object shall be present, and shall contain CSG id of the current serving CSG or Hybrid cell. In all other cases this data object shall not be present. +- HNB name: If the UE is camping on a CSG or Hybrid cell in the Allowed CSG list or the Operator CSG list and the HNB name of the cell is available in the broadcasted information to the ME, this data object shall be present, and shall contain the broadcasted HNB name of the current serving CSG or Hybrid cell. In all other cases this data object shall not be present. +- PLMN ID: If the UE is camping on a CSG or Hybrid cell that is listed in the Allowed CSG list or the Operator CSG list, this data object may be present, and, if present, shall contain the PLMN identity of the current serving CSG or Hybrid cell. + +Response parameters/data: None for this type of ENVELOPE command. + +### 7.5.3A Call disconnected event + +#### 7.5.3A.1 Procedure + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.3.1. + +#### 7.5.3A.2 Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD - call disconnected) + +Direction: ME to UICC. + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13]. + +Command parameters/data. + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|------------------------------|--------|-------|-----|--------| +| Event download tag | 9.1 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D+E+F) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Event list | 8.25 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| Transaction identifier | 8.28 | M | Y | C | +| Cause | 8.26 | O | N | D | +| Media Type | 8.132 | C | N | E | +| IMS call disconnection cause | 8.133 | O | N | F | + +Event list: the event list object shall contain only one event (value part of length 1 byte), and the ME shall set the event to: + +- call disconnected. + +Device identities: + +- in the case of "near end" disconnection, the ME shall set the device identities to: + - source: ME; + - destination: UICC. +- in the case of "far end" disconnection, the ME shall set the device identities to: + - source: network; + - destination: UICC. + +Transaction identifier: the transaction identifier data object shall contain a list of the transaction identifiers for each of the calls being disconnected. + +Cause: the cause shall reflect the cause information element sent or received in the disconnect message triggering the ENVELOPE command. If the cause information element was not present in the message, or the cause data object shall not be included. In the case of a radio link timeout, the cause data object shall be included, with a value part of zero length. + +Media Type: The Media Type indicates the type of media of the call session and shall be coded as defined in clause 8.132. The Media Type data object shall be present if the "Media Type support" service is allocated and activated in the USIM or ISIM Service Table. + +IMS call disconnection cause: The IMS call disconnection cause shall reflect the Reason header field in the SIP message triggering the ENVELOPE command. If the Reason header field is not present in the SIP message, the IMS call disconnection cause data object shall not be included. The cause and corresponding protocol shall not be present in the ENVELOPE command within a corresponding IMS call disconnection cause data object if the "IMS call disconnection cause" service is neither allocated and activated in the USIM nor ISIM Service Table. + +Response parameters/data: + +- none. + +## 7.5.4 Location status event + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.4. + +If a location status is already available in the UE when the UICC supplies an event list with location status event (by using the SET UP EVENT LIST command), the ME shall immediately send the ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD - location status) command (after the TERMINAL RESPONSE), providing the Location status and the Location information. + +### **7.5.5 User activity event** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.5. + +### **7.5.6 Idle screen available event** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.6. + +### **7.5.7 Card reader status event** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.7. + +### **7.5.8 Language selection event** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.8. + +### **7.5.9 Browser termination event** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.9. + +### **7.5.10 Data available event** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.10. + +### **7.5.11 Channel status event** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.11. + +### **7.5.12 Access Technology Change Event** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.12. + +If a access technology is already available in the UE when the UICC supplies an event list with Access Technology Change event (by using the SET UP EVENT LIST command), the ME shall immediately send the ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD - Access Technology Change) command (after the TERMINAL RESPONSE), providing the Access Technology. + +### **7.5.13 Display parameters changed event** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.13. + +### **7.5.14 Local Connection event** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.14. + +### **7.5.15 Network Search Mode Change Event** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.15. + +### **7.5.16 Browsing status event** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.16. + +### **7.5.17 Frames Information changed event** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.17. + +## 7.5.18 HCI connectivity event + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 7.5.19 Contactless state request + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 7.5.20 Incoming IMS Data event + +The following clauses apply if classes "e" and "t" are supported. + +### 7.5.20.1 Procedure + +If the Incoming IMS data event is part of the current event list (as set up by the last SET UP EVENT LIST command, see ETSI TS 102 223 [32]), then, in the case of an incoming IMS message to an IARI (see TS 24.229 [52]) associated to an application installed on the UICC and no open channel is available for IMS communication, see 3GPP TS 31.102 [14], the terminal shall inform the UICC that this has occurred, by using the ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – Incoming IMS data) command as defined below. + +### 7.5.20.2 Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – Incoming IMS Data) + +Direction : ME to UICC + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13] + +Command parameters/data + +| Description | Clause | M/O | Min | Length | +|--------------------|--------|-----|-----|--------| +| Event download tag | 9.1 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Event list | 8.25 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| IARI | 8.110 | M | Y | C | + +- Event list: the Event list data object shall contain only one event (value part of length 1 byte), and terminal shall set the event to: + - Incoming IMS Data event. +- Device identities: the terminal shall set the device identities to: + - source: Network; + - destination: UICC. +- IARI: This data object contains the IARI included in the Accept-Contact (see TS 24.229 [52]) header field of the incoming SIP INVITE IMS message destined for the UICC. + +Response parameters/data: None for this type of ENVELOPE command. + +## 7.5.21 IMS Registration Event + +The following clauses apply if classes "e" and "t" are supported. + +### 7.5.21.1 Procedure + +If the IMS Registration event is part of the current event list (as set up by the last SET UP EVENT LIST command, see ETSI TS 102 223 [32]) and the SIP REGISTER message contains the IARIs defined in EF-UICCIARI, then, upon receiving the 200 OK (see 3GPP TS 24.229 [52]) message in response to the SIP REGISTER message (see 3GPP + +TS 24.229 [52]) or upon receiving any status code (see 3GPP TS 24.229 [52]) indicating a failure in response to the SIP REGISTER message, the terminal shall inform the UICC that this event has occurred, by using the ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – IMS Registration) command as defined below. + +### 7.5.21.2 Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – IMS Registration) + +Direction : ME to UICC + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13] + +Command parameters/data + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|--------------------|--------|-------|-----|--------| +| Event download tag | 9.1 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Event list | 8.25 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| IMPU list | 8.111 | C | Y | C | +| IMS status code | 8.112 | C | Y | D | + +- Event list: the Event list data object shall contain only one event (value part of length 1 byte), and terminal shall set the event to: + - IMS Registration Event. +- Device identities: the terminal shall set the device identities to: + - source: Network; + - destination: UICC. +- IMPU list: This data object shall contain the list of IMPUs built from the URIs from the aor (address of record) attributes for which within the same registration element at least one of the ME's contact URIs has the status "active" (see RFC 3680 [55]) received in the registration event package (see 3GPP TS 24.229 [52]) of the SIP NOTIFY request. This data object shall only be present in the case of a successful registration. If the network indicates, using the SIP NOTIFY request containing the registration event package, that there are no aor attributes that for which within the same registration element at least one of the ME's contact URIs has the status "active" then the ME shall send an empty list of IMPUs to the UICC. +- Status Code: This data object shall contain the Status-code (see 3GPP TS 24.229 [52]) received from the IMS network in response to a SIP REGISTER message. This data object shall only be present to indicate that a failure occurred during an IMS registration. + +Response parameters/data: None for this type of ENVELOPE command. + +### 7.5.22 Profile Container + +Not required by 3GPP. + +### 7.5.23 Envelope Container + +Not required by 3GPP. + +### 7.5.24 Poll Interval Negotiation + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.5.22. + +## 7.5.25 Data Connection Status Change Event + +### 7.5.25.1 Procedure + +This and the following clauses apply if class "e" is supported. + +If the Data Connection Status Change event is part of the current event list (as set up by the last SET UP EVENT LIST command, see clause 8.25 of this document), then, upon detection by the ME of a change in the data connection status, the terminal shall inform the UICC that this event has occurred, by using the ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – Data Connection Status Change) command as defined below. + +### 7.5.25.2 Structure of ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – Data Connection Status Change) + +Direction: ME to UICC + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13]. + +Command parameters/data + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|----------------------------------|--------|-------|-----|--------| +| Event download tag | 9.1 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J+K+L) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Event list | 8.25 | M | Y | A | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | B | +| Data connection status | 8.137 | M | Y | C | +| Data connection type | 8.138 | M | Y | D | +| (E/5G)SM cause | 8.139 | C | Y | E | +| Transaction identifier | 8.28 | M | Y | F | +| Date-Time and Time zone | 8.39 | C | Y | G | +| Location Information | 8.19 | C | Y | H | +| Access Technology | 8.62 | C | Y | I | +| Location status | 8.27 | M | Y | J | +| Network Access Name | 8.61 | C | Y | K | +| PDP/PDN/PDU type | 8.142 | C | Y | L | + +- Event list: the Event list data object shall contain only one event (value part of length 1 byte), and the ME shall set the event to: + - Data Connection Status Change. +- Device identities: the terminal shall set the device identities to: + - source: Network for network originated messages. ME for ME originated messages; + - destination: UICC. +- Data connection status: This data object shall contain the status of the data connection. +- Data connection type: This data object shall contain the type of data connection. +- (E/5G)SM cause: If an (E/5G)SM cause is available, this data object shall contain either the SM cause as defined in 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] or the ESM cause as defined in 3GPP TS 24.301 [46], or the 5GSM cause as defined in 3GPP TS 24.501 [70]. +- Transaction identifier: The Transaction identifier data object shall contain one transaction identifier as defined in clause 8.28. +- Date-Time and Time zone: If the date-time and time zone information is available in the ME, this data object is mandatory and shall contain the Date-Time and Time zone at the ME detected moment of occurrence of the event. + +- Location Information: This data object contains the identification (MCC, MNC, LAC/TAC, Cell Identity) of the current serving cell of the UE. The comprehension required flag of this data object in this command shall be set to '0'. This data object shall be present if the data connection is performed over GERAN, UTRAN, E-UTRAN or NG-RAN. +- Access Technology: This data object shall contain the access technology of the rejecting or accepting network. +- Location Status: This data object indicates the current service state of the terminal. +- Network Access Name: This data object shall contain the Access Point Name value present in the Activate PDP context request (for a PDP context activation, as defined in TS 24.008 [9]) or the PDN connectivity request (for an EPS PDN connection activation, as defined in TS 24.301 [46]), or it shall contain the Data Network Name value present in the UL NAS TRANSPORT message for PDU Session Establishment request, as defined in TS 24.501 [70]. It is present only when Data connection status is either successful or rejected. +- PDP/PDN/PDU type: This data object shall contain the PDP/PDN/PDU type requested in the Activate PDP context request (for a PDP context activation, as defined in TS 24.008 [9]) or the PDN connectivity request (for an EPS PDN connection activation, as defined in TS 24.301 [46]), or the PDU Session Establishment request (as defined in TS 24.501 [70]). It is present only when Data connection status is either successful or rejected. + +Response parameters/data: None for this type of ENVELOPE command. + +## 7.6 USSD Data Download + +This clause applies if class "p" is supported. + +### 7.6.1 Procedure + +If the service "data download via USSD and USSD application mode" is allocated and activated in the USIM Service Table (see TS 31.102 [14]), then the ME shall follow the procedure below: + +- When the ME receives a USSD packet it shall pass the message transparently to the USIM using the ENVELOPE (USSD DOWNLOAD) if the Data Coding Scheme of the USSD message (as defined for the CBS Data Coding Scheme in TS 23.038 [4]) indicate the USIM as the target (Bit 0 set to 0 and Bit 1 set to 1): +- The ME shall wait for an acknowledgement from the USIM: + - if the UICC responds with '90 00', the ME shall acknowledge the receipt of USSD message to the network using a FACILITY message. The ME will supply the response data from the UICC in the USSD String of the return result component of the FACILITY message it will send back to the network (see TS 24.090 [37]). The alphabet and language indicators shall be those used in the original message. + - if the USIM responds with '93 00', the ME shall either retry the command or send back a FACILITY message to the network. The ME will supply the status word followed by the response data from the UICC in the USSD String of the return result component of the FACILITY message it will send back to the network (see TS 24.090 [37]). The alphabet and language indicators shall be those used in the original message. + - if the UICC responds with '62 XX' or '63 XX', the ME shall acknowledge the receipt of the USSD message to the network using a FACILITY message. The ME will supply the status word followed by the response data from the UICC in the USSD String of the return result component of the FACILITY message it will send back to the network (see TS 24.090 [37]). The alphabet and language indicators shall be those used in the original message. + +If the service "data download via USSD and USSD application mode " is not allocated and activated in the USIM Service Table, and the ME receives a USSD message with a Data Coding Scheme indicating that the destination is the card (as defined above), the ME shall return a FACILITY message to the network. The ME will supply the status word '6D 00' (i.e. Instruction code not supported or invalid) in the USSD String of the return result component of the FACILITY message it will send back to the network (see TS 24.090 [37]). The alphabet and language indicators shall be those used in the original message. + +## 7.6.2 Structure of ENVELOPE (USSD Data Download) + +Direction: ME to UICC + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13]. + +Command parameters/data: + +| Description | Clause | M/O | Min | Length | +|-------------------|--------|-----|-----|--------| +| USSD Download tag | 9.1 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | A | +| USSD string | 8.17 | M | Y | B | + +- Device identities: the ME shall set the device identities to: + +Source: Network + +Destination: UICC + +Response parameters/data: + +It is permissible for the UICC not to provide response data. If the UICC provides response data, the following data is returned. + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------------------|---------------|--------| +| 1-X ( $X \leq 182$ ) | UICC response | X | + +## 7.7 MMS Transfer Status + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.6. + +## 7.8 MMS notification download + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32]. + +Considering the addressing mechanism to the UICC indicated in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.7, the UICC shall be targeted using the following application identifier: "uicc.3gpp.org". + +## 7.9 Terminal Applications + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 7.8. + +## 7.10 Geographical Location Reporting + +### 7.10.1 Procedure + +This clause applies if class "n" is supported. + +If the ME has processed the proactive command "Geographical Location Request" successfully, then the ME shall send the ENVELOPE (Geographical Location Reporting). + +It is acceptable for the ME to send the envelope even if the requested accuracy has not been achieved. + +Note: some GAD Shapes contain the actual accuracy. + +If positioning data cannot be provided, the envelope command shall neither include the GAD shape TLV nor the NMEA-sentence TLV. + +If positioning data can be provided, the envelope command shall include either a GAD shape TLV or a NMEA-sentence TLV. The information sent by the ME is deemed fresh. + +## 7.10.2 Structure of ENVELOPE (Geographical Location Reporting) + +Direction: ME to UICC. + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13]. + +Command parameters/data. + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|-------------------------------------|--------|-------|-----|--------| +| Geographical Location Reporting tag | 9.1 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | A | +| GAD shape | 8.95 | C | N | B | +| NMEA sentence | 8.96 | C | N | C | + +- Device identities: the ME shall set the device identities to: + - source: ME; + - destination: UICC. +- GAD shape: This data object contains the location information. +- NMEA sentence: This data object contains the location information. + +Response parameters/data: None for this type of ENVELOPE command. + +## 7.11 Void + +## 7.12 ProSe usage information reporting + +### 7.12.1 Procedure + +If the service "ProSe Usage Information Reporting configuration" and service "UICC ProSe Direct Communication usage information reporting" are allocated and activated in the ProSe Service Table (see TS 31.102 [14]), then a ProSe-enabled Public Safety ME that supports "ProSe usage information reporting" shall store the ProSe usage information to be sent over the PC3ch interface (see 3GPP TS 24.334 [61]) in the UICC. This is performed using the ENVELOPE (ProSe Report). + +A UICC supporting the "ProSe usage information reporting" shall also support BIP. The UICC is responsible to transmit the collected reports to the ProSe Function CTF (ADF) using BIP mechanism, following the same procedure described in TS 24.334 [61] clause 10.3.1 and using the communication security described in TS 24.334 [61] clause 4.1. The address of the ProSe Function CTF (ADF) is available in the EFPROSE\_UIRC (see TS 31.102 [14]). + +The UICC shall store the received ProSe usage information until a USAGE\_INFORMATION\_REPORT\_LIST\_RESPONSE is received with transaction ID set to the value of the transaction ID included in the USAGE\_INFORMATION\_REPORT\_LIST message. + +If one envelope is not enough to transmit all the information (i.e. the ProSe usage information is more than 243 bytes), the information shall be split into several ENVELOPE (ProSe Report). The final envelope is indicated by containing a Last Envelope TLV. Intermediate envelopes shall not contain this TLV. + +If one envelope is enough to transmit the information, this envelope shall contain a Last Envelope TLV. + +NOTE: If the usage information report list sending procedure is unsuccessfully completed, the USIM behaviour is according to what is specified for the UE in 3GPP TS 24.334 [61], clause 10.3.2.1.6. + +### 7.12.2 Structure of ENVELOPE (ProSe Report) + +Direction: ME to UICC. + +The command header is specified in TS 31.101 [13]. + +Command parameters/data. + +| Description | Clause | M/O/C | Min | Length | +|-------------------|--------|-------|-----|--------| +| ProSe Report tag | 9.1 | M | Y | 1 | +| Length (A+B+C) | - | M | Y | 1 or 2 | +| Device identities | 8.7 | M | Y | A | +| ProSe Report | 8.128 | M | Y | B | +| Last Envelope | 8.79 | C | N | C | + +- Device identities: the ME shall set the device identities to: + - source: ME; + - destination: UICC. +- ProSe Report Data: This data object contains the ProSe Report. +- Last Envelope: Indicates that the last information concerning the ProSe Report has been sent. + +Response parameters/data: None for this type of ENVELOPE command. + +The UICC may respond with status word '69 82' if the PIN verification has not been performed successfully. + +NOTE: The handling of the case where the USIM cannot process the ENVELOPE command (e.g. when there is not enough memory for storing a ProSe Report) is implementation-specific. + +## 8 COMPREHENSION-TLV data objects + +The coding of the TLV objects is as described in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8, except when stated otherwise in the present document. + +### 8.1 Address + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.1. + +### 8.2 Alpha identifier + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.2. + +### 8.3 Subaddress + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.3. + +### 8.4 Capability configuration parameters + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------------------|-----------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Capability configuration parameters tag | 1 | +| 2 to (Y-1)+2 | Length (X) | Y | +| (Y-1)+3 to (Y-1)+X+2 | Capability configuration parameters | X | + +Capability configuration parameters are coded as for EFCCP. If it is being provided by the UICC, the UICC shall supply all information required to complete the Bearer Capability Information Element in the Call Set-up message (see TS 24.008 [9]). Any unused bytes at the end of the value part shall be coded 'FF'. + +See TS 31.102 [14] for the coding of all Efs. + +NOTE: The second byte of this TLV contains the Length of the TLV and the third byte contains the Length of the bearer capability contents, followed by the actual contents. + +### 8.5 Cell Broadcast Page + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|----------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Cell Broadcast page tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '58' (88 decimal) | 1 | +| 3 - 90 | Cell Broadcast page | 88 | + +The Cell Broadcast page is formatted in the same way as the GSM Cell Broadcast Message Parameter, as described in TS 23.041 [6]. + +### 8.6 Command details + +The content and the coding of the Command Details TLV object is defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.6, except for the following. + +The coding of the Command Qualifier is defined for the following commands: + +- SEND SS: + +this byte is RFU. + +- SEND USSD: + +this byte is RFU. + +- PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION. + +The following additional values are defined: + +'00' = Location Information (MCC, MNC, LAC/TAC, Cell Identity and Extended Cell Identity). + +'02' = Network Measurement results. + +'05' = Timing Advance. + +'0C' = current WSSID. + +'11' = CSG ID list and corresponding HNB name. + +'12' = H(e)NB IP address. + +'13' = H(e)NB surrounding macrocells. + +'14' = current WLAN identifier. + +'15' = slices information. + +'16' to '19' = reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) + +The following values do not apply + +'07' = Reserved by ETSI (ESN) + +'0B' = Reserved by ETSI (MEID) + +- REFRESH. The following additional values are defined: + +'07' = Steering of Roaming as defined in TS 23.122 [7]. + +'08' = Steering of Roaming for I-WLAN as defined in TS 24.234 [42]. + +- Geographical Location Request: + +this byte is RFU. + +- OPEN CHANNEL related to CS bearer, GPRS/UTRAN packet service/E-UTRAN/NG-RAN, local bearer, Default (network) bearer, I-WLAN bearer, WLAN bearer, Terminal Server Mode, UICC Server Mode: + +- As defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] + +- OPEN CHANNEL for IMS: + +this byte is RFU. + +## 8.7 Device identities + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.7. + +## 8.8 Duration + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.8. + +## 8.9 Item + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.9. + +## 8.10 Item identifier + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.10. + +## 8.11 Response length + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.11. + +## 8.12 Result + +For the general result byte coding the following values are defined in addition to or replacement of those in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.12: + +- '14' = USSD or SS transaction terminated by the user +- '34' = SS Return Error; +- '35' = SMS RP-ERROR; +- '37' = USSD Return Error; +- '39' = Interaction with call control by USIM or MO short message control by USIM, permanent problem; + +In addition, the following values are reserved for 3GPP for future usage: + +- '15' = reserved for 3GPP (for future usage); +- '16' = reserved for 3GPP (for future usage); +- '28' = reserved for 3GPP (for future usage); +- '29' = reserved for 3GPP (for future usage); +- '3E' = reserved for 3GPP (for future usage); +- '3F' = reserved for 3GPP (for future usage); + +Additional information: + +Contents: + +- For the general result "Command performed successfully", some proactive commands require additional information in the command result. This is defined in the clauses below. For the general result values '20', '21', '34', '35', '37', and '39', it is mandatory for the ME to provide a specific cause value as additional information, as defined in the clauses below. For other values, see ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.12. + +### 8.12.1 Additional information for SEND SS + +When the ME issues a successful general result for a SEND SS proactive command, it shall also include the Operation Code and Parameters included in the Return Result component from the network, as additional information. + +The first byte of the additional information shall be the SS Return Result Operation code, as defined in TS 24.080 [11]. + +The rest of the additional information shall be the SS Return Result Parameters, as defined in TS 24.080 [11]. + +## 8.12.2 Additional information for ME problem + +For the general result "ME currently unable to process command", it is mandatory for the ME to provide additional information, the first byte of which to be as defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.12.2, with the addition of the following value: + +- '03' = ME currently busy on SS transaction; +- '08' = ME currently busy on USSD transaction. + +## 8.12.3 Additional information for network problem + +For the general result "network currently unable to process command", it is mandatory for the ME to provide additional information. The first byte shall be the cause value of the Cause information element returned by the network (as defined in TS 24.008 [9]). Bit 8 shall be set to '1'. One further value is defined: + +- '00' = No specific cause can be given. + +All other values shall be interpreted by the UICC as '00'. The coding '00' shall only be used by the ME if no others apply. + +## 8.12.4 Additional information for SS problem + +For the general result "SS Return Error", it is mandatory for the ME to provide additional information. The first byte shall be the error value given in the Facility (Return Error) information element returned by the network (as defined in TS 24.080 [11]). One further value is defined: + +- '00' = No specific cause can be given. + +All other values shall be interpreted by the UICC as '00'. The coding '00' shall only be used by the ME if no others apply. + +## 8.12.5 Additional information for SMS problem + +For the general result "SMS RP-ERROR", it is mandatory for the ME to provide additional information. The first byte shall be the cause value given in the RP-Cause element of the RP-ERROR message returned by the network (as defined in TS 24.011 [10]), with bit 8 = 0. One further value is defined: + +- '00' = No specific cause can be given. + +All other values shall be interpreted by the UICC as '00'. Specific cause '00' shall only be used by the ME if no others apply. + +## 8.12.6 Not used + +## 8.12.7 Additional information for USSD problem + +For the general result "USSD Return Error", the ME shall provide additional information. The first byte shall be the error value given in the Facility (Return Error) information element returned by the network (as defined in TS 24.080 [11]). One further value is defined: + +- '00' = No specific cause can be given. + +All other values shall be interpreted by the UICC as '00'. + +The coding '00' shall only be used by the ME if no others apply. + +## 8.12.8 Additional information for interaction with call control or MO SM control + +For the general result "interaction with call control by USIM or MO short message control by USIM, permanent problem", it is mandatory for the ME to provide additional information, the first byte of which to be as defined below: + +- '00' = No specific cause can be given; +- '01' = Action not allowed; +- '02' = The type of request has changed. + +All other values shall be interpreted by the UICC as '00'. The coding '00' shall only be used by the ME if no others apply. + +## 8.12.9 Additional information for MultipleCard commands + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.12.9. + +## 8.12.10 Additional information for launch browser problem + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.12.10. + +## 8.12.11 Additional information for Bearer Independent Protocol + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.12.11. + +## 8.12.12 Additional information for Frames commands + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.12.12. + +## 8.12.13 Additional information for SUBMIT and RETRIEVE MULTIMEDIA MESSAGE + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.12.13. + +## 8.13 SMS TPDU + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------------------|--------------|--------| +| 1 | SMS TPDU tag | 1 | +| 2 to (Y-1)+2 | Length (X) | Y | +| (Y-1)+3 to (Y-1)+X+2 | SMS TPDU | X | + +The TPDU is formatted as described in TS 23.040 [5]. + +Where the TPDU is being sent from the UICC to the ME (to be forwarded to the network), and where it includes a TP-Message-Reference which is to be incremented by the ME for every outgoing message, the TP-Message-Reference as provided by the UICC need not be the valid value. TP-Message-Reference shall be checked and corrected by the ME to the value described in TS 23.040 [5]. + +## 8.14 SS string + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------------------|-------------------|--------| +| 1 | SS string tag | 1 | +| 2 to (Y-1)+2 | Length (X) | Y | +| (Y-1)+3 | TON and NPI | 1 | +| (Y-1)+4 to (Y-1)+X+2 | SS or USSD string | X - 1 | + +TON/NPI and SS or USSD control string are coded as for EFADN, where the ADN record relates to a Supplementary Service Control string. See TS 31.102 [14] for the coding of EFADN. + +## 8.15 Text string + +Content and coding is defined ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.15, with the following requirement: + +Data coding scheme is coded as for SMS Data coding scheme defined in TS 23.038 [4]. Parts of the data coding scheme other than the character set indication shall be ignored. + +## 8.16 Tone + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.16. + +NOTE: Standard supervisory tones for 3G are specified in TS 22.001 [22]. + +## 8.17 USSD string + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------------------|--------------------|--------| +| 1 | USSD string tag | 1 | +| 2 to (Y-1)+2 | Length (X) | Y | +| (Y-1)+3 | Data coding scheme | 1 | +| (Y-1)+4 to (Y-1)+X+2 | USSD string | X-1 | + +The Data coding scheme is coded as for Cell Broadcast defined in TS 23.038 [4]. The coding of the USSD string is defined in TS 22.030 [2]. + +NOTE 1: The MMI mode uses a 7 bit character set, the Application mode uses a 8 bit character set. + +NOTE2: The DCS is set to 0x96 to indicate that the USSD string is formatted according to TS 31.115 [41]. + +## 8.18 File List + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.18. + +## 8.19 Location Information + +### 8.19.1 Location Information for GERAN + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|--------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Location Information tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '07' or '05' (see Note) | 1 | +| 3 – 5 | Mobile Country & Network Codes (MCC & MNC) | 3 | +| 6 – 7 | Location Area Code (LAC) | 2 | +| 8 – 9 | Cell Identity Value (Cell ID) (see Note) | 2 | + +NOTE: When this object is used in the Network Rejection event download, the Cell Identity Value (Cell ID) field shall not be present and the length field shall be set to '05'. + +The Mobile Country Code (MCC), the Mobile Network Code (MNC) and the Location Area Code (LAC) are coded as in TS 24.008 [9]. + +For GERAN, the Cell Identity Value is coded as in TS 24.008 [9]. + +### 8.19.2 Location Information for UTRAN + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|--------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Location Information tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '09' or '05' (see Note) | 1 | +| 3 – 5 | Mobile Country & Network Codes (MCC & MNC) | 3 | +| 6 – 7 | Location Area Code (LAC) | 2 | +| 8 – 9 | Cell Identity Value (Cell ID) (see Note) | 2 | +| 10 – 11 | Extended Cell identity Value (see Note) | 2 | + +NOTE: When this object is used in the Network Rejection event download, the Cell Identity Value (Cell ID) and Extended Cell identity Value fields shall not be present and the length field shall be set to '05'. + +The Mobile Country Code (MCC), the Mobile Network Code (MNC) and the Location Area Code (LAC) are coded as in TS 24.008 [9]. + +Only the C-id part of the UC-id is returned in the Cell Identity Value (i.e. the 16 least significant bits of the UC-id), as defined in TS 25.401 [35] and TS 25.413 [36]. + +The Extended Cell identity Value is coded as the RNC-id part of the UC-id, as defined in TS 25.401 [35] and TS 25.413 [36]. It is left padded with zeros (this means that byte 10 contains the 4 most significant bits of the RNC-id value, and byte 11 contains the 8 least significant bits of the RNC-id value). + +### 8.19.3 Location Information for E-UTRAN + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|--------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Location Information tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '09' or '05' (see Note) | 1 | +| 3 – 5 | Mobile Country & Network Codes (MCC & MNC) | 3 | +| 6 – 7 | Tracking Area Code (TAC) | 2 | +| 8 – 11 | E-UTRAN Cell Identifier (ECI) (see Note) | 4 | + +NOTE: When this object is used in the Network Rejection event download, the E-UTRAN Cell Identifier (ECI) field shall not be present and the length field shall be set to '05'. + +The Mobile Country Code (MCC), the Mobile Network Code (MNC) is coded as in TS 24.008 [9]. + +The Tracking Area Code (TAC) for E-UTRAN is coded in 2 bytes as specified in TS 24.301 [46]. + +The E-UTRAN Cell Identifier (ECI) is coded as defined in TS 36.401 [48]. ECI has a length of 28 bits. The most significant bit of ECI is coded on the most significant bit of byte 8. The least significant bit of ECI is coded on the 4th bit of byte 11. The 4 least significant bits of byte 11 shall be set to 1. + +#### 8.19.4 Location Information for NG-RAN + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Location Information tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '0B' or '03' (see Note) | 1 | +| 3 – 5 | Mobile Country & Network Codes (MCC & MNC) | 3 | +| 6 – 8 | Tracking Area Code (TAC) (see Note) | 3 | +| 9 – 13 | NR Cell Identifier (NCI) (see Note) | 5 | +| NOTE: When this object is used in the Network Rejection event download, the Tracking Area Code (TAC) and the NR Cell Identifier (NCI) fields shall not be present and the length field shall be set to '03'. | | | + +The Mobile Country Code (MCC), the Mobile Network Code (MNC) is coded as in TS 24.008 [9]. + +The Tracking Area Code (TAC) for NG-RAN is coded in 3 bytes as specified in TS 24.501 [70]. The most significant bit of TAC is coded on the most significant bit of byte 6. The least significant bit of TAC is coded on the least significant bit of byte 8. + +NR Cell Identifier (NCI) Value is coded on 36 bits as referenced in TS 38.413 [69] clause 9.3.1.7. The most significant bit of NCI is coded on the most significant bit of byte 9. The least significant bit of NCI is coded on the 4th bit of byte 13. The 4 least significant bits of byte 13 shall be set to 1. + +#### 8.19.5 Location Information when no surrounding macrocell is detected + +When PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION with command qualifier '13' is used and no surrounding macrocell is detected for an Access Technology, a location information data object with length set to '00' shall be present. + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|--------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Location Information tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '00' | 1 | + +### 8.20 IMEI + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.20. + +### 8.21 Help Request + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.21. + +### 8.22 Network Measurement Results + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------|---------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Network Measurement Results tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length (X) of bytes following | 1 | +| 3 – to X+2 | Network Measurement Results | X | + +For GERAN: The Network Measurement Results are coded as for the Measurement Results information element in TS 44.018 [27], starting at octet 2 (the IEI is removed, as this information is duplicated by the data object tag). The Length shall be set to '10' (16 decimal). + +For UTRAN: The Network Measurement Results are coded as for the "MeasurementReport" information element as defined in the ASN.1 description of TS 25.331 [38], according to the following: + +- The "Measurement identity" field in the MEASUREMENT REPORT shall be set to the value '1'. +- If "intra-frequency measurements" are requested by USIM, the ME shall, in the MEASUREMENT REPORT, include IE "Intra-frequency measured results list" in IE "Measured Results". The ME shall report CPICH Ec/No, CPICH RSCP and pathloss for the up to 6 strongest (highest Ec/No value) intra-frequency cells, if available in the ME according to TS 25.331 [38] and TS 25.133 [39]. +- If "inter-frequency measurements" are requested by USIM, the ME shall, in the MEASUREMENT REPORT, include IE "inter-frequency measured results list" in IE "Measured Results". The ME shall report CPICH Ec/No, CPICH RSCP and pathloss for the up to 6 strongest (highest Ec/No value) inter-frequency cells per monitored frequency, if available in the ME according to TS 25.331 [38] and TS 25.133 [39]. +- If "inter-RAT (GERAN) measurements" are requested by USIM, the ME shall, in the MEASUREMENT REPORT, include IE "inter-RAT measured results list" in IE "Measured Results". The ME shall report GSM carrier RSSI for up to 8 strongest (highest RSSI value) inter-RAT GERAN cells (identified by the BCCH ARFCN), if available in the ME according to TS 25.331 [38] and TS 25.133 [50]. +- If "inter-RAT (E-UTRAN)" are requested by USIM, the ME shall, in the MEASUREMENT REPORT, include IE "E-UTRA measured results". The ME shall report RSRP and RSRQ for the up to 4 strongest (highest RSRQ value) inter-RAT E-UTRAN cells per monitored frequency, if available in the ME according to TS 25.331 [38] and TS 25.133 [39]. +- All other optional fields in the *MeasurementReport* shall be set to be absent. + +For E-UTRAN: + +Intra-frequency & inter-RAT (GERAN): the Network Measurement Results are coded as for the *MeasurementReport* information element as defined in the ASN.1 description of TS 36.331 [49], according to the following: + +- The "measId" field in the "measResults" shall be set to the value '1'. +- the ME shall include IE "measResultServCell" with RSRP and RSRQ of the serving cell. +- If "intra-frequency measurements" are requested by USIM, the ME shall, in the *MeasurementReport*, include IE "measResultListEUTRA" in IE "measResults". The ME shall report RSRP, RSRQ, Physical Cell ID and IE "cgi-Info" for the up to 8 strongest (highest RSRQ value) intra-frequency cells, if available in the ME according to TS 36.331 [49] and TS 36.133 [50]. +- If "inter-RAT (GERAN) measurements" are requested by USIM, the ME shall, in the *MeasurementReport*, include IE "measResultListGERAN" in IE "measResults". The ME shall report GERAN carrier RSSI and Physical Cell ID for the up to 8 strongest (highest RSSI value) inter-RAT GERAN cells (identified by the BCCH ARFCN) and IE "cgi-Info", if available in the ME according to TS 36.331 [49] and TS 36.133 [50]. +- All other optional fields in the *MeasurementReport* shall be set to be absent. + +Inter-frequency & inter-RAT (UTRAN): the ME can send more than one Network Measurement Results TLV object, each containing the results of one frequency. Each Network Measurement Results shall include 2 bytes with the frequency value coded as the ARFCN-ValueEUTRA for inter-frequency measurements or as the ARFCN-ValueUTRA for inter-RAT (UTRAN) measurements as defined in TS 36.331 [49], followed by the *MeasurementReport* information element as defined in the ASN.1 description of TS 36.331 [49], according to the following: + +- The "measId" field in the "measResults" shall be set to the value '1'. +- the ME shall include IE "measResultServCell" with RSRP and RSRQ of the serving cell. +- If "inter-frequency measurements" are requested by the USIM, the ME shall, in the *MeasurementReport*, include IE "measResultListEUTRA" in IE "measResults". The ME shall report RSRP, RSRQ, Physical Cell ID and IE "cgi-Info" for the up to 8 strongest (highest RSRQ value) inter-frequency cells per monitored frequency, if available in the ME according to TS 36.331 [49] and TS 36.133 [50]. + +- If "inter-RAT (UTRAN) measurements" are requested by the USIM, the ME shall, in the *MeasurementReport*, include IE "measResultListUTRA" in IE "measResults". The ME shall report CPICH Ec/No, CPICH RSCP, Physical Cell ID and IE "cgi-Info" for the up to 8 strongest (highest Ec/No value) inter-RAT UTRAN cells per monitored frequency, if available in the ME according to TS 36.331 [49] and TS 36.133 [50]. +- All other optional fields in the *MeasurementReport* shall be set to be absent. + +For inter-frequency measurement results with EARFCN that exceeds maxEARFCN, the ME shall use the E-UTRAN Inter-frequency Network Measurement Results TLV objects if the service "extended EARFCN" is available in the USIM Service Table (see TS 31.102 [14]) or not include them otherwise. + +Inter-RAT (NR): the ME can send more than one Network Measurement Results TLV object, each containing the results of one frequency. Each Network Measurement Results shall include 4 bytes containing the frequency value coded as the ARFCN-ValueNR for inter-RAT (NR) measurements as defined in TS 36.331 [49], where the least significant byte of the frequency value is stored in the least significant byte of this 4 byte field and the unused bytes of these 4 byte field are set to 0, followed by the *MeasurementReport* information element as defined in the ASN.1 description of TS 36.331 [49], according to the following: + +- The "measId" field in the "measResults" shall be set to the value '1'. +- the ME shall include IE "measResultServCell" with RSRP and RSRQ of the serving cell. +- If "inter-RAT (NR) measurements" are requested by the USIM, the ME shall, in the *MeasurementReport*, include IE "measResultNeighCellListNR" in IE "measResults". The ME shall report Physical Cell ID, related RSRP, RSRQ and SINR for the up to 8 strongest inter-RAT NR cells per monitored frequency, if available in the ME according to TS 36.331 [49] and TS 36.133 [50]. +- All other optional fields in the *MeasurementReport* shall be set to be absent. + +For NG-RAN: + +Intra-frequency : the Network Measurement Results are coded as for the *MeasurementReport* information element as defined in the ASN.1 description of TS 38.331 [71], according to the following: + +- The "measId" field in the "measResults" shall be set to the value '1'. +- the ME shall include IE "measResultServingCell" with RSRP, RSRQ and the available SINR of the serving cell. +- If "intra-frequency measurements" are requested by USIM, the ME shall, in the *MeasurementReport*, include IE "MeasResultListNR" in IE "measResults". The ME shall report Physical Cell ID, related RSRP, RSRQ, SINR and IE "cgi-Info" for the up to 8 strongest intra-frequency cells, if available in the ME according to TS 38.331 [71] and TS 38.133 [72]. +- All other optional fields in the *MeasurementReport* shall be set to be absent. + +Inter-frequency and inter-RAT (E-UTRAN): the ME can send more than one Network Measurement Results TLV object, each containing the results of one frequency. Each Network Measurement Results shall include 3 bytes containing the frequency value coded as the ARFCN-ValueNR for Inter-frequency measurements or as the ARFCN-ValueEUTRA for inter-RAT (E-UTRAN) measurements as defined in TS 38.331 [71]. The Network Measurement Results are coded as for the *MeasurementReport* information element as defined in the ASN.1 description of TS 38.331 [71], according to the following: + +- The "measId" field in the "measResults" shall be set to the value '1'. +- the ME shall include IE "measResultServingCell" with RSRP, RSRQ and the available SINR of the serving cell. +- If "inter-frequency measurements" are requested by USIM, the ME shall, in the *MeasurementReport*, include IE "MeasResultListNR" in IE "measResults". The ME shall report Physical Cell ID, related RSRP, RSRQ, SINR and IE "cgi-Info" for the up to 8 strongest inter-frequency cells per monitored frequency, if available in the ME according to TS 38.331 [71] and TS 38.133 [72]. + +- If "inter-RAT (E-UTRAN)" are requested by the USIM, the ME shall, in the *MeasurementReport*, include IE "measResultListEUTRA" in IE "measResults". The ME shall report RSRP, RSRQ, SINR, Physical Cell ID and IE "cgi-Info" for the up to 8 strongest inter-RAT E-UTRAN cells per monitored frequency, if available in the ME according to TS 38.331 [71] and TS 38.133 [72]. +- All other optional fields in the *MeasurementReport* shall be set to be absent. + +## 8.23 Default Text + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.23. + +## 8.24 Items Next Action Indicator + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.24. + +## 8.25 Event list + +For the event list byte coding, the following value are defined in addition to those in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.25: + +- '11' = (I-)WLAN Access Status. +- '12' = Network Rejection +- '15' = CSG cell selection +- '17' = IMS Registration +- '18' = Incoming IMS data +- '1D' = Data Connection Status Change + +In addition, the following events are reserved for 3GPP for future usage: + +- '1E' = reserved for 3GPP (for future usage); +- '1F' = reserved for 3GPP (for future usage); +- '20' = reserved for 3GPP (for future usage); +- '21' = reserved for 3GPP (for future usage); +- '22' = reserved for 3GPP (for future usage); + +## 8.26 Cause + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Cause tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length (X) of bytes following. X=0, or $2 \leq X \leq 30$ . | 1 | +| 3 to X+2 | Cause | X | + +The Cause data object is coded as for the Cause call control information element in TS 24.008 [9], starting at octet 3 (the IEI and Length information are removed, as this information is duplicated by the data object tag and length). + +Radio Link Timeout is indicated by the Cause data object having a value part of zero length (only the Tag and Length components are sent). + +## 8.27 Location status + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.27. + +## 8.28 Transaction identifier + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------|-------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Transaction identifier tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length (X) of bytes following | 1 | +| 3 to X+2 | Transaction identifier list | X | + +- Transaction identifier list: + +Contents: + +- A list of transaction identifiers, of variable length. Each byte in the list defines a transaction identifier. Each transaction identifier shall not appear more than once within the list; + +Coding: + +- Each byte in the transaction identifier list shall be coded as defined below: + - bits 1 to 4 = RFU; + - bits 5 to 7 = TI value; + - bit 8 = TI flag. + +If the terminal supports IMS: + +- TI value is an identifier generated by the terminal to uniquely identify the call, regardless of the bearer of the call. +- TI flag is: + - Call connected event: "1" + - MT Call event: "0" + - Call disconnected event: "0" if caller disconnects the call, "1" otherwise + +If the terminal does not support IMS: + +- Call connected event: Transaction Identifier in the corresponding call connect message +- MT Call event: Transaction Identifier in the corresponding call setup message from the network +- Call disconnected event: Transaction Identifier in the corresponding disconnect message triggering the ENVELOPE command, or in case of radio link failure, the Transaction Identifier as in an ME initiated disconnect message. +- TI value and TI flag are coded as defined in TS 24.007 [8]. + +In case of Data Connection Status Change event, the transaction identifier is encoded as: + +- TI value is an identifier generated by the terminal to uniquely identify the PDP or PDN or PDU data connection, regardless of the bearer of the connection. +- TI flag is always 0 in this data connection transaction identifier. + +## 8.29 BCCH channel list + +This information is only available when the ME is connected to a GSM access network. + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------|-------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | BCCH channel list tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length (X) of bytes following | 1 | +| 3 to X+2 | BCCH channel list | X | + +- BCCH channel list: + +Contents: + +- The list of absolute RF channels for BCCH carriers, as known by the ME from the SYSTEM INFORMATION messages. The BCCH channel list is composed of one to three BCCH channel sub lists, each sub list is derived from the set of frequencies defined by reference neighbour cells description information element or elements. In the latter case the set is the union of the different subsets defined by the neighbour cells description information elements (see TS 44.018 [27]). The length of the BCCH channel list field depends on the length of the received BCCH channel list derived from the different SYSTEM INFORMATION messages to be considered. + +Coding: + +- Each ARFCN is represented by 10 bits. Spare bit(s) are to be filled with 0. + +| | Bit 8 | Bit 7 | Bit 6 | Bit 5 | Bit 4 | Bit 3 | Bit 2 | Bit 1 | +|----------|----------------------|-------|---------------------|-------|---------------------|-------|---------------|---------------| +| Byte 1 | ARFCN#1 (high part) | | | | | | | | +| Byte 2 | ARFCN#1 (low part) | | ARFCN#2 (high part) | | | | | | +| Byte 3 | ARFCN#2 (low part) | | | | ARFCN#3 (high part) | | | | +| ... | ... | | | | | | | | +| Byte X-1 | ARFCN#m-1 (low part) | | | | ARFCN#m (high part) | | | | +| Byte X | ARFCN#m (low part) | | | | | | Spare bit (0) | Spare bit (0) | + +## 8.30 Call control requested action + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------------------|-----------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Call control requested action tag | 1 | +| 2 to (Y-1)+2 | Length (X) | Y | +| (Y-1)+3 to (Y-1)+X+2 | Call control requested action | X | + +- Call control requested action: + +Contents: + +- The action given in response to the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL). It may contain, in the same order as given by the UICC, the address or SS string, the capability configuration parameters, the called party sub-address and the alpha identifier, or the IMS Request-URI; + +Coding: + +- As described in clause 7.3.1.6, starting with the first optional element given in the response data to the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL). + +## 8.31 Icon Identifier + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.31. + +## 8.32 Item Icon Identifier list + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.32. + +## 8.33 Card reader status + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.33. + +## 8.34 Card ATR + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.34. + +## 8.35 C-APDU + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.35. + +## 8.36 R-APDU + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.36. + +## 8.37 Timer identifier + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.37. + +## 8.38 Timer value + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.38. + +## 8.39 Date-Time and Time zone + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.39. + +NOTE: coding is as for the Time Zone and Time information element in TS 24.008 [9], starting at octet 2. + +## 8.40 AT Command + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------------------|-------------------|--------| +| 1 | AT Command tag | 1 | +| 2 to (Y-1)+2 | Length (X) | Y | +| (Y-1)+3 to (Y-1)+3+X-1 | AT Command string | X | + +Contents: + +- The AT Command string is structured exactly as the AT Command line as defined in TS 27.007 [12], which may contain single or concatenated AT commands. + +## 8.41 AT Response + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------------------|--------------------|--------| +| 1 | AT Response tag | 1 | +| 2 to (Y-1)+2 | Length (X) | Y | +| (Y-1)+3 to (Y-1)+3+X-1 | AT Response string | X | + +Contents: + +- The AT Response string is structured exactly as the response to a command line as defined in TS 27.007 [12], which may contain single or concatenated responses appropriate to the issued AT command. +- If the AT Response string is longer than the maximum length capable of being transmitted to the UICC then the AT Response string shall be truncated to this length by the ME. + +## 8.42 BC Repeat indicator + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|----------------------------|--------| +| 1 | BC repeat indicator tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '01' | 1 | +| 3 | BC repeat indicator values | 1 | + +Contents & coding: + +- The BC repeat indicator is structured exactly as defined in 3GPP TS 24.008 [09]. + +## 8.43 Immediate response + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.43. + +## 8.44 DTMF string + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.44. + +## 8.45 Language + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.45. + +## 8.46 Timing Advance + +This information is only available when the ME is connected to a GSM access network. + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|--------------------|--------| +| 1 | Timing Advance tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '02' | 1 | +| 3 | ME Status | 1 | +| 4 | Timing Advance | 1 | + +Coding of ME status: + +- '00' = ME is in the idle state; +- '01' = ME is not in idle state; + +- '02' to 'FF'= reserved values. + +The Timing Advance is coded as for the Timing Advance information element in TS 44.018 [27], starting at octet 2 (the IEI is removed, as this information is duplicated by the data object tag). + +## 8.47 Browser Identity + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.37. + +## 8.48 URL + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.48. + +## 8.49 Bearer + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------------------|------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Bearer tag | 1 | +| 2 to (Y + 1) | Length (X) | Y | +| (Y+2) to (Y + X + 1) | List of bearers in order of priority requested | X | + +The ME shall use this list to choose which bearers are allowed in order of priority. + +Coding of the bearers: + +- '00' = SMS; +- '01' = CSD; +- '02' = USSD; +- '03' = GPRS/UTRAN packet service/E-UTRAN/NG-RAN; +- '04' to 'FF' = RFU. + +## 8.50 Provisioning File Reference + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.50. + +## 8.51 Browser Termination Cause + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.51. + +## 8.52 Bearer description + +### 8.52.0 Structure of Bearer description + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------|------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Bearer description tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length (X+1) | 1 | +| 3 | Bearer type | 1 | +| 4 to (3+X) | Bearer parameters | X | + +- Bearer Type coding: in addition to the values defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32], the following are defined: + +'01' = CSD; + +'02' = GPRS / UTRAN packet service / E-UTRAN / NG-RAN. + +'09' = UTRAN packet service with extended parameters / HSDPA / E-UTRAN / NG-RAN. + +'0A' = (I-)WLAN. + +'0B' = E-UTRAN / NG-RAN / mapped UTRAN packet service. + +'0C' = NG-RAN + +'0D' and '0E' = reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) + +- Bearer parameters coding: see the following clauses. + +## 8.52.1 Bearer parameters for CSD + +Contents: parameters specific to the bearer. + +In this case X=3. + +NOTE: The default values of the subparameters are manufacturer specific since they depend on the purpose of the device and data services provided by it. Not all combinations and values of these subparameters are supported by GSM (see TS 22.002 [1]). + +Coding: + +- The following values are as defined in the TS 27.007 [12] for the select service bearer type "+CBST" extended command. They are coded in hexadecimal. + +Coding of Byte 4: + +- Data rate: same as the "speed" subparameter defined in TS 27.007 [12]. + +Coding of byte 5: + +- Bearer service: same as the "name" subparameter defined in TS 27.007 [12]. + +Coding of Byte 6: + +- Connection element: same as the "ce" subparameter defined in TS 27.007 [12]. + +## 8.52.2 Bearer parameters for GPRS / UTRAN Packet Service / E-UTRAN / NG-RAN + +Contents: parameters describing the Quality of Service (QoS) and the type of PDP. This is an element of the PDP context. These parameters can be used for 3GPP network packet service. + +In this case X=6. + +Coding: + +- The following values are as defined in the TS 27.007 [12], for the "+CGQREQ" extended command. They are coded in hexadecimal. + +Coding of Byte 4: + +- Precedence class: same as the "precedence" subparameter, defined in TS 27.007 [12]. + +Coding of Byte 5: + +- Delay class: same as the "delay" subparameter, defined in TS 27.007 [12]. + +Coding of Byte 6: + +- Reliability class: same as the "reliability" subparameter, defined in TS 27.007 [12]. + +Coding of Byte 7: + +- Peak throughput class: same as the "peak" subparameter, defined in TS 27.007 [12]. + +Coding of Byte 8: + +- Mean throughput class: same as the "mean" subparameter, defined in TS 27.007 [12]. + +Coding of Byte 9: + +- Packet data protocol type (PDP type): +'02' = IP (Internet Protocol, IETF STD 5); +'07' = Non-IP (Transfer of Non-IP data to external packet data network); +all other values are reserved. + +NOTE 1: The mapping between the UTRAN and E-UTRAN QoS parameters are defined in TS 23.203 [47]. + +NOTE 2: For NG-RAN, QoS parameters are not applicable. + +### 8.52.3 Bearer parameters for UTRAN Packet Service with extended parameters / HSDPA / E-UTRAN / NG-RAN + +Contents: parameters describing the Quality of Service (QoS) and the type of PDP. This is an element of the PDP context. + +In this case X=17. + +Coding: + +- The following values are as defined in the TS 27.007 [12], for the "+CGEQREQ" extended command. They are coded in hexadecimal. + +Coding of Byte 4: + +- Traffic class: same as the "Traffic class" subparameter, defined in TS 27.007 [12]. + +Coding of Byte 5 and 6: + +- Maximum bitrate UL: same as the "Maximum bitrate UL" subparameter, defined in TS 27.007 [12]. The ME shall fill all octets with 'FF' in case the value exceeds the maximum that can be represented. + +Coding of Byte 7 and 8: + +- Maximum bitrate DL: same as the "Maximum bitrate DL" subparameter, defined in TS 27.007 [12]. The ME shall fill all octets with 'FF' in case the value exceeds the maximum that can be represented. + +Coding of Byte 9 and 10: + +- Guaranteed bitrate UL: same as the "Guaranteed bitrate UL" subparameter, defined in TS 27.007 [12]. The ME shall fill all octets with 'FF' in case the value exceeds the maximum that can be represented. + +Coding of Byte 11 and 12: + +- Guaranteed bitrate DL: same as the "Guaranteed bitrate DL" subparameter, defined in TS 27.007 [12]. The ME shall fill all octets with 'FF' in case the value exceeds the maximum that can be represented. + +Coding of Byte 13: + +- Delivery order: same as the "Delivery order" subparameter, defined in TS 27.007 [12]. + +Coding of Byte 14: + +- Maximum SDU size: same as the "Maximum SDU size" subparameter, defined in TS 24.008 [9]. + +Coding of Byte 15: + +- SDU error ratio: same as the "SDU error ratio" subparameter, defined in TS 24.008 [9], coded in the first 4 bits. The 4 most significant bits shall be set to 0. + +Coding of Byte 16: + +- Residual bit error ratio: same as the "Residual bit error ratio" subparameter, defined in TS 24.008 [9], coded in the first 4 bits. The 4 most significant bits shall be set to 0. + +Coding of Byte 17: + +- Delivery of erroneous SDUs: same as the "Delivery of erroneous SDUs" subparameter, defined in TS 27.007 [12]. + +Coding of Byte 18: + +- Transfer delay: same as the "Transfer delay" subparameter, defined in TS 24.008 [9], coded in the first 6 bits. The 2 most significant bits shall be set to 0. + +Coding of Byte 19: + +- Traffic handling priority: same as the "Traffic handling priority" subparameter, defined in TS 27.007 [12]. + +Coding of Byte 20: + +- PDP\_type: same as the "PDP type" subparameter, defined in TS 24.008 [9] for ETSI or IETF allocated address. + +NOTE 1: HSDPA parameters and UTRAN Packet Service parameters are the same except for the maximum bitrate DL and the guaranteed bitrate DL, which can be higher for HSDPA (see TS 24.008 [9]). + +NOTE 2: The mapping between the UTRAN and E-UTRAN QoS parameters are defined in TS 23.203 [47]. + +NOTE 3: For NG-RAN, QoS parameters are not applicable. + +## 8.52.4 Bearer parameters for (I-)WLAN + +Content: parameters specific to the bearer. RFU. + +In this case X=0 + +## 8.52.5 Bearer parameters for E-UTRAN / NG-RAN / mapped UTRAN packet service + +Contents: parameters describing the Quality of Service (QoS) and the type of PDP. This is an element of the PDP context. + +In this case X=2 or X=6 or X=10 or X=14, depending on the size of the "EPS quality of service" information element and the resource type (GBR or non-GBR). + +In case of a non-GBR QCI, the QoS octets in the "EPS quality of service" information element are ignored by the UE, as specified in TS 24.301 [46]. In this case, the UE shall use X=2, passing only the QCI value. + +Coding of Byte 4 to Byte X+2: + +Byte 4 same as "octet 3" of the "EPS quality of service" information element, defined in TS 24.301 [46]. + +For a GBR QCI each subsequent Byte shall be present only if the corresponding next octet in the "EPS quality of service" information element is present. The coding of the corresponding bytes shall be the same. + +Coding of Byte X+3: + +- PDP\_type: same as the "PDP type" subparameter, defined in TS 24.008 [9] for ETSI or IETF allocated address. + +NOTE 1: the UICC should handle the cases with $X > 14$ gracefully, ignoring additional octets. + +NOTE 2: For NG-RAN, QoS parameters are not applicable. + +## 8.52.6 Bearer parameters for NG-RAN + +Contents: parameters describing the type of PDU session. This is an element of the PDU session context. + +When the ME has successfully established PDU session it shall include this Bearer parameter in the TERMINAL RESPONSE to inform the USIM. + +The Bearer parameters for NR shall contain the PDU session type. + +Length: + +- 1 to X Bytes + +Coding: + +- Coding of Byte 4: + +PDU session type: same as the "PDU session type", defined in Figure 9.11.4.11.1 of TS 24.501 [70]. + +- Coding of further Bytes: + +RFU + +## 8.53 Channel data + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.53. + +## 8.54 Channel data length + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.54. + +## 8.55 Buffer size + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.55. + +## 8.56 Channel status + +ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.56 applies, with the following addition. + +In case of an OPEN CHANNEL for IMS, the coding is as follows: + +Coding : + +- byte 3 : +- Bit 1 to 3 : Channel identifier 1 to 7; + +Channel identifier 0 means "no channel available". + +- Bit 4 to 7 : RFU +- Bit 8 : 0 = BIP channel not established; +1 = BIP channel established. +- byte 4: +'00' = No further info can be given; +'01' = Not used; +'02' = Not used; +'03' = Not used; +'04' = Not used; +'05' = Link dropped (network failure or user cancellation); +all other values are reserved. + +## 8.57 Card reader identifier + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.57. + +## 8.58 Other Address + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.58. + +## 8.59 UICC/ME interface transport level + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.59. + +## 8.60 AID + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.60. + +## 8.61 Network Access Name + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------|-------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Network Access Name tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length (X) | 1 | +| 3 to 3+X-1 | Network Access Name | X | + +Content: + +- The Network Access Name is used to identify the Gateway entity (GGSN) or a Packet Data Network Gateway (PDN-GW) or a User Plane Function (UPF), which provides interworking with an external packet data network. For GPRS, UTRAN packet service and E-UTRAN, the Network Access Name is an APN. For NG-RAN, the Network Access Name is a DNN (which is coded same as an APN). + +Coding: + +- As defined in TS 23.003 [30]. + +## 8.62 Access Technology + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.61. + +## 8.63 Display parameters + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.62. + +## 8.64 Service Record + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.63. + +## 8.65 Device Filter + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.64. + +## 8.66 Service Search + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.65. + +## 8.67 Attribute Information + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.66. + +## 8.68 Service Availability + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.67. + +## 8.69 Remote Entity Address + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.68. + +## 8.70 Text Attribute + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.72. + +## 8.71 Item Text Attribute List + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.73. + +## 8.72 PDP context Activation parameters + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------------|---------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | PDP context Activation parameters tag | 1 | +| 2 to (Y+1) | Length (X) | Y | +| (Y+2) to (Y+X+1) | PDP context Activation parameters | X | + +The PDP context Activation parameters are coded as the ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT REQUEST message, refer to TS 24.008 [9]. + +NOTE: If the "Protocol configuration options" in the ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT REQUEST message is too large (i.e. greater than 229-L, where L is the sum of the length of the Requested QoS Information Element, the Requested PDP address Information Element, and the Access point name Information Element), the ME may decide not to include the "Protocol configuration options" and any subsequent information elements of the ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT REQUEST message inside the "PDP context Activation parameters". + +## 8.73 UTRAN/E-UTRAN/NG-RAN Measurement Qualifier + +This information is only available when the ME is connected to a UTRAN or an E-UTRAN or NG-RAN. + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | UTRAN/E-UTRAN/NG-RAN Measurement Qualifier tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length (1) | 1 | +| 3 | UTRAN/E-UTRAN/NG-RAN Measurement Qualifier | 1 | + +### UTRAN/E-UTRAN/NG-RAN Measurement Qualifier + +Contents: Qualifier specific to the UTRAN/E-UTRAN/NG-RAN NMR + +#### Coding + +| | | +|------|-----------------------------------------| +| '01' | UTRAN Intra-frequency measurements | +| '02' | UTRAN Inter-frequency measurements | +| '03' | UTRAN Inter-RAT (GERAN) measurements | +| '04' | UTRAN Inter-RAT (E-UTRAN) measurements | +| '05' | E-UTRAN Intra-frequency measurements | +| '06' | E-UTRAN Inter-frequency measurements | +| '07' | E-UTRAN Inter-RAT (GERAN) measurements | +| '08' | E-UTRAN Inter-RAT (UTRAN) measurements | +| '09' | E-UTRAN Inter-RAT (NR) measurements | +| '0A' | NG-RAN Intra-frequency measurements | +| '0B' | NG-RAN Inter-frequency measurements | +| '0C' | NG-RAN Inter-RAT (E-UTRAN) measurements | + +All other values are reserved + +## 8.74 Multimedia Message Reference + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.82. + +## 8.75 Multimedia Message Identifier + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.83. + +## 8.76 Multimedia Message Transfer status + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.84. + +## 8.77 MM Content Identifier + +In addition to ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.85, the codinf of the MM Content Data Object tag is done according to TS 31.102[14]. + +## 8.78 Multimedia Message Notification + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.86. + +## 8.79 Last Envelope + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.87. + +## 8.80 Frames Layout + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.78. + +## 8.81 Frames Information + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.79. + +## 8.82 Frames identifier + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.80. + +## 8.83 I-WLAN Identifier + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------|-----------------------|--------| +| 1 | I-WLAN Identifier tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length (X) | 1 | +| 3 to (2+X) | WSID value | X | + +The WSID Value is coded as the WLAN Specific Identifier (WSID) defined in TS 24.234 [42]. + +## 8.84 (I-)WLAN Access Status + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|----------------------------|--------| +| 1 | (I-)WLAN Access Status tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length (1) | 1 | +| 3 | Access status | 1 | + +Coding of Access status: + +- '00' = No current (I-)WLAN coverage; +- '01' = (I-)WLAN coverage available, no current connection; +- '02' = (I-)WLAN coverage available, connection on-going; +- '03' to 'FF' = reserved values. + +## 8.85 IMEISV + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.74. + +## 8.86 Network search mode + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.75. + +## 8.87 Battery State + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.76. + +## 8.88 Browsing status + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.77. + +## 8.89 Registry application data + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.88. + +## 8.90 PLMNwAcT List + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------------|---------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | PLMNwAcT List tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length (5n) | 1 | +| 3 to 5 | 1 st PLMN Identifier(highest priority) | 3 | +| 6 to 7 | 1 st PLMN Access Technology Identifier | 2 | +| : | : | | +| (5n-2) to (5n) | nth PLMN Identifier (lowest priority) | 3 | +| (5n+1) to (5n+2) | nth PLMN Access Technology Identifier | 2 | + +Coding of PLMN Identifier: + +As for PLMN within EFPLMNwAcT in TS 31.102 [14]. + +Coding of PLMN Access Technology Identifier: + +As for Access Technology Identifier within EFPLMNwAcT in TS 31.102 [14]. + +## 8.91 Routing Area Identification + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|--------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Routing Area Information Tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length | 1 | +| 3 - 5 | Mobile Country & Network Codes (MCC & MNC) | 3 | +| 6 - 7 | Location Area Code (LAC) | 2 | +| 8 | Routing Area code (RAC) | 1 | + +When present, this object shall contain the Routing Area Identification information of rejecting network. The RAI is coded in the same manner as the value part of the Routing Area Identification information element as specified in TS 24.008 [9]. + +## 8.92 Update/Attach/Registration Type + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|-------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Update/Attach/Registration Type Tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length | 1 | +| 3 | Update/Attach/Registration Type | 1 | + +## Contents: + +- In the case of GERAN/UTRAN, the terminal shall use this information as a mechanism to indicate to the UICC the location updating type that was sent in the LOCATION UPDATING REQUEST message or the attach type that was sent in the GPRS ATTACH REQUEST message or the update type that was sent in the ROUTING AREA UPDATING REQUEST message, as specified in TS 24.008 [9]. +- In the case of E-UTRAN, the terminal shall use this information as a mechanism to indicate to the UICC the EPS attach type that was sent in the EMM ATTACH REQUEST message or the EPS update type that was sent in the TRACKING AREA UPDATE REQUEST message, as specified in TS 24.301 [46]. +- In the case of NG-RAN, the terminal shall use this information as a mechanism to indicate to the UICC the 5GS registration type that was sent in the REGISTRATION REQUEST message, as specified in TS 24.501 [70]. + +## Coding: + +- '00' = "Normal Location Updating" in the case of a LOCATION UPDATING REQUEST message; +- '01' = "Periodic Updating" in the case of a LOCATION UPDATING REQUEST message; +- '02' = "IMSI Attach" in the case of a LOCATION UPDATING REQUEST message; +- '03' = "GPRS Attach" in the case of a GPRS ATTACH REQUEST message; +- '04' = "Combined GPRS/IMSI Attach" in the case of a GPRS ATTACH REQUEST message; +- '05' = "RA Updating" in the case of a ROUTING AREA UPDATE REQUEST message; +- '06' = "Combined RA/LA Updating" in the case of a ROUTING AREA UPDATE REQUEST message; +- '07' = "Combined RA/LA Updating with IMSI Attach" in the case of a ROUTING AREA UPDATE REQUEST message; +- '08' = "Periodic Updating" in the case of a ROUTING AREA UPDATE REQUEST message +- '09' = "EPS Attach" in the case of an EMM ATTACH REQUEST message +- '0A' = "Combined EPS/IMSI Attach" in the case of an EMM ATTACH REQUEST message +- '0B' = "TA updating " in the case of an EMM TRACKING AREA UPDATE REQUEST message +- '0C' = "Combined TA/LA updating" in the case of an EMM TRACKING AREA UPDATE REQUEST message +- '0D' = "Combined TA/LA updating with IMSI attach" in the case of an EMM TRACKING AREA UPDATE REQUEST message +- '0E' = "Periodic updating" in the case of an EMM TRACKING AREA UPDATE REQUEST message +- '0F' = "Initial Registration" in the case of a 5GMM REGISTRATION REQUEST message +- '10' = "Mobility Registration updating" in the case of a 5GMM REGISTRATION REQUEST message +- '11' = "Periodic Registration updating" in the case of a 5GMM REGISTRATION REQUEST message +- All other values are reserved for future use + +## 8.93 Rejection Cause Code + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|--------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Rejection Cause Code Tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length | 1 | +| 3 | Rejection Cause Code | 1 | + +For GERAN/UTRAN, in the case of a LOCATION UPDATING REJECT message, this object shall contain the Reject Cause as received in the LOCATION UPDATING REJECT message. The Reject Cause is coded in the same manner as the value part of the Reject Cause information element as specified in TS 24.008 [9] + +For GERAN/UTRAN, in the case of a GPRS ATTACH REJECT message or a ROUTING AREA UPDATE REJECT message, this object shall contain the GMM Cause as received in the GPRS ATTACH REJECT message or ROUTING AREA UPDATE REJECT message. The GMM Cause is coded in the same manner as the value part of the GMM Cause information element as specified in TS 24.008 [9]. + +For E-UTRAN, in the case of an EMM ATTACH REJECT message or an EMM TRACKING AREA UPDATE REJECT message, this object shall contain the EMM Cause as received in the EMM ATTACH REJECT message or EMM TRACKING AREA UPDATE REJECT message. The EMM Cause is coded in the same manner as the value part of the EMM Cause information element as specified in TS 24.301 [46]. + +For NG-RAN, in the case of a 5GMM REGISTRATION REJECT message, this object shall contain the 5GMM Cause as received in the 5GMM REGISTRATION REJECT message. The 5GMM Cause is coded in the same manner as the value part of the 5GMM Cause information element as specified in TS 24.501 [70]. + +## 8.94 Geographical Location Parameters + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|--------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Geographical Location Parameters Tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length | 1 | +| 3 | Horizontal accuracy | 1 | +| 4 | Vertical coordinate | 1 | +| 5 | Velocity | 1 | +| 6 | Preferred GAD shapes | 1 | +| 7 | Preferred NMEA sentences | 1 | +| 8 | Preferred Maximum Response Time | 1 | + +Horizontal accuracy: + +Contents: + +- the preferred horizontal accuracy. + +Coding: + +- '81': horizontal accuracy not specified / best effort; +- 'xx' where $00' \leq xx' \leq 7F'$ : 'xx' represents the uncertainty for longitude and latitude as described in TS 23.032 [44]. A value in this range may be specified in the parameters of the "Geographical Location Request" command. The horizontal location error should be less than the error indicated by the horizontal accuracy with 67% confidence. +- All other values are reserved. + +Vertical coordinate: + +Contents: + +- indicates if the vertical coordinate (altitude) is requested and potentially indicate the preferred vertical coordinate accuracy. + +Coding: + +- '80': vertical coordinate is not requested (i.e. 2D location fix is acceptable); +- '81': vertical coordinate is requested, (i.e. 3D location fix is preferred) but accuracy is not specified (best effort); +- 'xx' where $00' \leq xx' \leq 7F'$ : vertical coordinate is requested and 'xx' represents the altitude uncertainty as described in TS 23.032 [44]. A value in this range may be specified in the parameters of the "Geographical + +Location Request" command. The vertical location error should be less than the error indicated by the vertical accuracy with 67% confidence. + +- All other values are reserved. + +#### Velocity: + +##### Contents: + +- indicates if a velocity and a velocity uncertainty are requested. When a velocity type or an uncertainty are requested, the corresponding bit shall be set to 1. Otherwise the bit is set to 0. If b1 is set to zero, b2, b3 and b4 shall be ignored. If b2 is set to zero, b4 shall be ignored. + +##### Coding: + +![](41fa90d03d7195caa162c74d289817a4_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----------------------------------------------| +| b8 | B7 | b6 | B5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | +| | | | | | | | | Horizontal velocity requested | +| | | | | | | | | Vertical velocity requested | +| | | | | | | | | Uncertainty of horizontal velocity requested | +| | | | | | | | | Uncertainty of vertical velocity requested | +| | | | | | | | | RFU, bit = 0 | +| | | | | | | | | RFU, bit = 0 | +| | | | | | | | | RFU, bit = 0 | +| | | | | | | | | RFU, bit = 0 | + +#### Preferred GAD shapes: + +##### Contents: + +- the preferred GAD shape(s). When a GAD shape is indicated as "preferred", the corresponding bit shall be set to 1. Otherwise the bit is set to 0. The UICC application should be capable of extracting the needed information from all GAD shapes indicated in the bit map below. + +##### Coding: + +![](5e8695a5cb02b85924ffb323810f20ce_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---------------------------------------------------------| +| b8 | B7 | b6 | B5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | +| | | | | | | | | Ellipsoid point | +| | | | | | | | | Ellipsoid point with uncertainty circle | +| | | | | | | | | Ellipsoid point with uncertainty ellipse | +| | | | | | | | | Ellipsoid point with altitude | +| | | | | | | | | Polygon | +| | | | | | | | | Ellipsoid point with altitude and uncertainty ellipsoid | +| | | | | | | | | Ellipsoid arc | +| | | | | | | | | RFU, bit = 0 | + +#### Preferred NMEA sentences: + +##### Contents: + +- the preferred NMEA sentence(s). When a NMEA sentence is indicated as "preferred", the corresponding bit shall be set to 1. Otherwise the bit is set to 0. The UICC application should be capable of extracting the needed information from all NMEA sentences indicated in the bit map below. + +##### Coding: + +![Diagram showing the mapping of bits b1 through b8 to specific flags and reserved fields. b1 is connected to $--RMC. b2 is connected to $--GGA. b3 is connected to $--GLL. b4 is connected to $--GNS. b5, b6, b7, and b8 are each connected to a line labeled 'RFU, bit = 0'.](eabcb2f8b9acedb194571d5bc734b463_img.jpg) + +Diagram showing the mapping of bits b1 through b8 to specific flags and reserved fields. b1 is connected to \$--RMC. b2 is connected to \$--GGA. b3 is connected to \$--GLL. b4 is connected to \$--GNS. b5, b6, b7, and b8 are each connected to a line labeled 'RFU, bit = 0'. + +Preferred Maximum Response Time: + +Contents: + +- indicates the preferred maximum response time. This hint may be used by the ME to make trade-offs between requirements for positioning accuracy and response time. + +Coding: + +- 'xx' where '02' $\leq$ 'xx' $\leq$ '07': $2^{xx}$ represents the preferred maximum response time in seconds. +- All other values are reserved; + +## 8.95 GAD shapes + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|--------------|---------------------|--------| +| 1 | GAD shapes Tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length | 1 | +| 3 | Length of GAD shape | 1 | +| 4 to X+3 | GAD shape | X | +| X+4 | Length of Velocity | 1 | +| X+5 to X+Y+4 | Velocity | Y | + +Length of GAD shape: + +Contents: + +- the length of the GAD shape. + +Coding: + +- binary. + +GAD shape: + +Contents: + +- universal geographical area description shape. + +Coding: + +- shape encoded as described in TS 23.032 [44] with the first byte of the shape (i.e. octet 1 containing the type shape) encoded on byte 4. + +Length of Velocity: + +Contents: + +- the length of the velocity. This byte shall be set to '00' when the Velocity is not available. + +Coding: + +- binary. + +Velocity: + +Contents: + +- velocity. + +Coding: + +- velocity encoded as described in TS 23.032 [44] with the first byte of the velocity (i.e. octet 1 containing the velocity shape) encoded on byte X+5. + +## 8.96 NMEA sentence + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------|-------------------|--------| +| 1 | NMEA sentence Tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length | 1 | +| 3 to X+2 | NMEA sentence | X | + +NMEA sentence: + +Contents: + +- NMEA sentence as defined in IEC 61162-1 [45]. The ME should use one of the Preferred NMEA sentences indicated in the "Geographical Location Parameters" by the UICC. Otherwise, one of the NMEA sentences listed in clause 8.94 shall be used. + +Coding: + +ASCII; + +## 8.97 PLMN List + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------------|---------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | PLMN List tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length (3n) | 1 | +| 3 to 5 | 1 st PLMN Identifier(highest priority) | 3 | +| : | : | : | +| (3n) to (3n+2) | n th PLMN Identifier (lowest priority) | 3 | + +Coding of PLMN Identifier: + +As for PLMN within EFOPLMNWLAN in TS 31.102 [14]. + +## 8.98 EPS PDN connection activation parameters + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | EPS PDN connection Activation parameters tag | 1 | +| 2 to (Y+1) | Length (X) | Y | +| (Y+2) to (Y+X+1) | EPS PDN connection Activation parameters | X | + +The EPS PDN connection Activation parameters are coded as the PDN CONNECTIVITY REQUEST message, refer to TS 24.301 [46]. + +NOTE: If the "Protocol configuration options" in the PDN CONNECTIVITY REQUEST message is too large (i.e. greater than 229-L, where L is the length of the Access point name Information Element), the ME may decide not to include the "Protocol configuration options" and any subsequent information elements of the PDN CONNECTIVITY REQUEST message inside the "EPS PDN connection Activation parameters". + +## 8.99 Tracking Area Identification + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Tracking Area Identification Tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length | 1 | +| 3 - 5 | Mobile Country & Network Codes (MCC & MNC) | 3 | +| 6 - X | Tracking Area Code (TAC) (See NOTE) | X - 5 | +| NOTE: TAC is coded in 2 bytes for E-UTRAN and in 3 bytes for NG-RAN | | | + +This object shall contain the Tracking Area Identification information of rejecting network (i.e. MCC, MNC and TAC). The value part of this object is coded in the same manner as the value part of the Tracking Area Identity information element as specified in TS 24.301 [46] for E-UTRAN, or as the value part of the Tracking Area Identity information element as specified in TS 24.501 [70] for NG-RAN. + +## 8.100 CSG ID list identifier + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------------|----------------------------|---------| +| 1 | CSG ID list Identifier tag | 1 | +| 2 to 1+Y | Length | Y | +| (Y+2) to (Y+X+1) | CSG ID List | X (X>1) | + +CSG ID List: + +| Description | Value | M/O | Length (bytes) | +|---------------------|-------|-----|----------------| +| PLMN Tag | '80' | M | 1 | +| Length | A | M | 1 | +| PLMN | -- | M | A | +| CSG ID and Name Tag | '81' | M | 1 | +| Length | B | M | 1 | +| CSG ID and Name | - | M | B | + +The CSG ID List TLV object shall contain one PLMN TLV object, Tag '80', followed by at least one CSG ID and Name TLV, Tag '81'. The CSG ID List TLV object can contain more than one PLMN TLV objects. Each CSG ID and Name TLV belongs to the previous PLMN. + +Coding of PLMN object (Tag '80'): + +Content: + +Mobile Country Code (MCC) followed by the Mobile Network Code (MNC). + +Coding: + +according to TS 24.008 [9]. + +Coding of CSG ID and name (Tag '81'): + +Content: + +CSG ID and HNB Name + +Coding: + +| | | | | +|--------|----------|---|-----------| +| 1 to 4 | CSG ID | M | 4 bytes | +| 5 to B | HNB Name | M | B-4 bytes | + +CSG ID: as in EFACSG, in TS 31.102 [14]. + +HNB Name: as for HNB name in EFHNB in TS 31.102 [14]. + +## 8.101 CSG cell selection status + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|-------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | CSG cell selection status tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length | 1 | +| 3 | CSG cell selection status | 2 | + +Coding of CSG cell selection status: + +Byte 1 : general information + +- '00' = not camped on a CSG or Hybrid cell in the Allowed CSG list or the Operator CSG list +- '01' = camped on a CSG or Hybrid cell of the Operator CSG list or Allowed CSG list +- other values are RFU + +Byte 2 : additional information + +This byte may contain additional information. If additional information is present, bit b1 shall be set to 1. If b1 is set to 0, this byte shall be ignored. + +Bits b7 and b8 indicate the CSG selection mechanism used; see TS 25.304 [59] and TS 36.304 [60]. + +![Diagram of Byte 2 bit structure. The byte is divided into 8 bits: B8, b7, b6, b5, b4, b3, b2, b1. Bit b1 is labeled 'Additional information presence bit'. Bit b2 is labeled 'RFU'. Bit b3 is labeled 'RFU'. Bit b4 is labeled 'RFU'. Bit b5 is labeled 'RFU'. Bit b6 is labeled 'RFU'. Bit b7 is labeled 'Result of a manual CSG selection'. Bit b8 is labeled 'Result of another CSG selection type'.](db6adf216c948c2b545e513aba13a16a_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| B8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| Additional information presence bit
RFU
RFU
RFU
RFU
RFU
Result of a manual CSG selection
Result of another CSG selection type | | | | | | | | + +Diagram of Byte 2 bit structure. The byte is divided into 8 bits: B8, b7, b6, b5, b4, b3, b2, b1. Bit b1 is labeled 'Additional information presence bit'. Bit b2 is labeled 'RFU'. Bit b3 is labeled 'RFU'. Bit b4 is labeled 'RFU'. Bit b5 is labeled 'RFU'. Bit b6 is labeled 'RFU'. Bit b7 is labeled 'Result of a manual CSG selection'. Bit b8 is labeled 'Result of another CSG selection type'. + +## 8.102 CSG ID + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------|-------------|--------| +| 1 | CSG ID tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length | 1 | +| 3 to X+2 | CSG ID | X | + +Coding of CSG ID: + +As for CSG ID in EFACSG, in TS 31.102 [14] + +## 8.103 HNB name + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------|--------------|--------| +| 1 | HNB name tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length | 1 | +| 3 to 2+X | HNB name | X | + +Coding of HNB name: + +As for HNB name in EFHNB in TS 31.102 [14] + +## 8.104 Activate descriptor + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 8.105 Broadcast Network information + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 8.106 Contactless state request + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 8.107 Contactless functionality state + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 8.108 IMS URI + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------------|----------------|--------| +| 1 | IMS URI Tag | 1 | +| 2 to (Y+1) | Length | Y | +| (Y+2) to (Y+X+1) | IMS URI (IMPU) | X | + +Content : + +IMS URI shall take the form of IMPU, which is SIP URI or tel URI, as defined in TS 24.229 [52] + +Coding of IMS URI + +As defined in TS 24.229 [52] + +## 8.109 Extended registry application data + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.93. + +## 8.110 IARI + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------------|-------------|--------| +| 1 | IARI Tag | 1 | +| 2 to (Y+1) | Length | Y | +| (Y+2) to (Y+X+1) | IARI value | X | +| NOTE: X>0 | | | + +Coding: + +- IARI value shall be coded as specified in TS 24.229 [52]. + +## 8.111 IMPU List + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------------|----------------|--------| +| 1 | IMPU List Tag | 1 | +| 2 to (Y+1) | Length | Y | +| Y+2 | URI TLV tag | 1 | +| (Y+3) to (Y+Z+2) | URI TLV length | Z | +| .. | : | ... | +| ... | ... | ... | + +Coding: + +- For contents and syntax of URI TLV data object values see IETF RFC 3261 [53]. The URI shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in IETF RFC 3629 [54]. The tag value of the URI TLV data object shall be '80'. + +## 8.112 IMS status code + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|-----------|---------------------|--------| +| 1 | IMS Status-code Tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length | 1 | +| 3 to X+2 | IMS Status-code | X | +| NOTE: X>0 | | | + +Content + +- IMS status code as specified in 3GPP TS 24.229 [52] + +Coding: + +- Sequence of digits in ASCII format. + +## 8.113 eCAT client profile + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 8.114 eCAT client identity + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 8.115 Encapsulated envelope type + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 8.116 Void + +## 8.117 Void + +## 8.118 PLMN ID + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|-------------------|--------| +| 1 | PLMN Identity Tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length | 1 | +| 3 to 5 | PLMN identity | 3 | + +PLMN ID TLV object shall contain PLMN identity Tag followed by Length and PLMN identity, containing Mobile Country Code (MCC) and Mobile Network Code (MNC), coded according to TS 24.008 [9]. + +## 8.119 E-UTRAN Inter-frequency Network Measurement Results + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------|---------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | E-UTRAN Inter-frequency Network Measurement Results tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length (X) of bytes following | 1 | +| 3 – 6 | Frequency value | 4 | +| 7 – to X+6 | Measurement Report information | X | + +The ME can send more than one E-UTRAN Inter-frequency Network Measurement Results TLV object, each containing the results of one frequency. This TLV object shall be used only if the service "extended EARFCN" is available in the USIM Service Table (see TS 31.102 [14]). + +The frequency value shall be coded as the ARFCN-ValueEUTRA-v9e0 as defined in TS 36.331 [49]. + +The Measurement Report information shall be coded as *MeasurementReport* information element defined in the ASN.1 description of TS 36.331 [49], according to the following: + +- The "measId" field in the "measResults" shall be set to the value '1'. +- the ME shall include IE "measResultServCell" with RSRP and RSRQ of the serving cell. +- the ME shall, in the *MeasurementReport*, include IE "measResultListEUTRA" in IE "Measured Results". The ME shall report RSRP, RSRQ, Physical Cell ID and IE "cgi-Info" for the up to 6 strongest (highest RSRQ value) inter-frequency cells per monitored frequency, if available in the ME according to TS 36.331 [49] and TS 36.133 [50]. +- All other optional fields in the *MeasurementReport* shall be set to be absent. + +## 8.120 Call control result + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 8.121 eCAT sequence number + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 8.122 Encrypted TLV list + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 8.123 MAC + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 8.124 SA template + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 8.125 CAT service list + +Not required by 3GPP. + +## 8.126 Refresh enforcement policy + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.103. + +## 8.127 DNS Server Address + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 8.104. + +## 8.128 ProSe Report Data + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|--------------|-----------------------|------------| +| 1 | ProSe Report Data Tag | 1 | +| 2 to (X+1) | Length | X (1 or 2) | +| X+2 to X+1+Y | ProSe Report Data | Y | + +Contents: + +- Contains the ProSe Report + +Coding: + +- Coded according to the XML schema defined in TS 24.334 [61] with element as the root element and one element inside it. + +## 8.129 SSID + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------|-------------|--------| +| 1 | SSID tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length (X) | 1 | +| 3 to (2+X) | SSID Value | X ≤ 32 | + +The SSID value is coded as specified for the SSID field in IEEE 802.11 [64]. + +## 8.130 BSSID + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|---------------|--------| +| 1 | BSSID tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '06' | 1 | +| 3 to 8 | BSSID value | 6 | + +The BSSID value is coded as specified for the BSSID field in IEEE 802.11 [64]. + +## 8.131 HESSID + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|---------------|--------| +| 1 | HESSID tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '06' | 1 | +| 3 to 8 | HESSID value | 6 | + +The HESSID value is coded as specified for the HESSID field in IEEE 802.11 [64]. + +## 8.132 Media Type + +The Media Type data element indicates the media type of the communication. + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|------------------|--------| +| 1 | Media type tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '01' | 1 | +| 3 | Media type value | 1 | + +Coding: + +- The Media type value is coded as a bitmap + +First byte (conversational communication): + +![Diagram showing the bit mapping for the first byte of the Media Type value. The byte is divided into 8 bits (b8 to b1). Bit b1 is for voice, bit b2 is for video, and bits b3 through b8 are reserved for future use (RFU).](f36118fd962bd69a26082021de657b71_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| + +Bit = 1 if the type of media is voice + Bit = 1 if the type of media is video + Bit = 0: RFU + Bit = 0: RFU + Bit = 0: RFU + Bit = 0: RFU + Bit = 0: RFU + Bit = 0: RFU + +Diagram showing the bit mapping for the first byte of the Media Type value. The byte is divided into 8 bits (b8 to b1). Bit b1 is for voice, bit b2 is for video, and bits b3 through b8 are reserved for future use (RFU). + +## 8.133 IMS call disconnection cause + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|---------------|--------| +| 1 | IMS cause tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '03' | 1 | +| 3 | Protocol | 1 | +| 4 to 5 | Cause | 2 | + +Protocol is the value of the protocol header field parameter in the Reason header field of the SIP message triggering the call disconnect event. It is coded on 1 byte as follows: + +- '01' for SIP +- '02' for Q.850 +- Other values are RFU + +Cause is the value of the cause header field parameter in the Reason header field of the SIP message triggering the call disconnect event. It is coded as 2-bytes integer, e.g. a value of "603" translates to '025B'. + +## 8.134 E-UTRAN Primary Timing Advance Information + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|--------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | E-UTRAN Timing Advance tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '03' | 1 | +| 3 | ME Status | 1 | +| 4 - 5 | E-UTRAN Primary Timing Advance value | 2 | + +Coding of ME status: + +- '00' = ME is in the idle state; +- '01' = ME is not in idle state; +- '02' to 'FF' = reserved values. + +The E-UTRAN Primary Timing Advance value is equal to the total "Timing offset between uplink and downlink radio frames at the UE, expressed in units of Ts" (Basic time unit), as defined in TS 36.211 [66]. + +If the ME has never been in E-UTRAN RRC connected mode on the current cell, the value of the E-UTRAN Primary Timing Advance shall be set to 'FF FF'. + +## 8.135 URI truncated + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|-------------------|--------| +| 1 | URI truncated tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '0' | 1 | + +## 8.136 Extended Rejection Cause Code + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|-----------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Extended Rejection Cause Code Tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length | 1 | +| 3 | Extended Rejection Cause Code | 1 | + +For E-UTRAN, in the case of an EMM ATTACH REJECT message or an EMM TRACKING AREA UPDATE REJECT message, if the Extended EMM Cause is available, then this object shall contain the Extended EMM Cause as received in the EMM ATTACH REJECT message or EMM TRACKING AREA UPDATE REJECT message. The Extended EMM Cause is coded in the same manner as the value part of the Extended EMM Cause information element as specified in TS 24.301 [46]. + +## 8.137 Data connection status + +This data object shall contain the result of the PDP request procedure, PDN request procedure or PDU establishment procedure as defined in 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] for GERAN & UTRAN, 3GPP TS 24.301 [46] for E-UTRAN or 3GPP TS 24.501 [70] for NG-RAN. + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Data connection status tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '01' | 1 | +| 3 | Data connection status value | 1 | + +Data connection status value coding: + +- '00' = Data connection successful; Successful means accepted by the network and completed by the device. +- '01' = Data connection rejected; +- '02' = Data connection dropped or deactivated. +- Other values RFU + +## 8.138 Data connection type + +This data object shall contain the type of procedure, PDP request procedure, PDN request procedure or PDU establishment procedure, as defined in 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] for GERAN & UTRAN, 3GPP TS 24.301 [46] for E-UTRAN or 3GPP TS 24.501 [70] for NG-RAN. + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|--------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Data connection type tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '01' | 1 | +| 3 | Data connection type | 1 | + +Data connection type coding: + +- '00' = PDP connection +- '01' = PDN connection +- '02' = PDU connection +- Other values RFU + +## 8.139 (E/5G)SM cause + +This data object shall contain the value of the SM cause for PDP as defined in 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] for GERAN & UTRAN, the ESM Cause for PDN as defined in 3GPP TS 24.301 [46] for E-UTRAN or the 5GSM Cause for PDU as defined in 3GPP TS 24.501 [70] for NG-RAN. + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|----------------------|--------| +| 1 | (E/5G)SM cause tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '01' | 1 | +| 3 | (E/5G)SM cause value | 1 | + +(E/5G)SM cause value coding: + +For PDP procedures: + +The coding of the cause is defined in 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] + +- If the data connection (i.e. request procedure) is accepted, (E/5G)SM cause value is the SM cause value contained in the message for PS session management (i.e. ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT ACCEPT message) coded as in TS 24.008 [9] clause 10.5.6.6a; +- If the data connection (i.e. request procedure) fails or is deactivated, (E/5G)SM cause value is the SM cause value contained in the messages for PS session management (i.e. ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT REJECT + +message or REQUEST PDP CONTEXT ACTIVATION REJECT message or the DEACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT REQUEST message) and is coded as in TS 24.008 [9] clause 10.5.6.6. + +For PDN procedures: + +The coding of the cause is defined in 3GPP TS 24.301 [46]. + +- If the data connection (i.e. request procedure) fails or is deactivated, (E/5G)SM cause value is the ESM cause value contained in the message types for EPS session management (ie. in the PDN CONNECTIVITY REJECT message or ACTIVATE DEFAULT EPS BEARER CONTEXT REJECT message or the DEACTIVATE EPS BEARER CONTEXT REQUEST message) and is coded as in TS 24.301 [46] clause 9.9.4.4. + +For PDU procedures: + +The coding of the cause is defined in 3GPP TS 24.501 [70]. + +- If the data connection (i.e. request procedure) fails or is deactivated/released, (E/5G)SM cause value is the 5GSM cause value contained in the message types for 5GS session management (ie. in the PDU SESSION ESTABLISHMENT REJECT message or in the PDU SESSION RELEASE REQUEST message) and is coded as in TS 24.501 [70] clause 9.11.4.2. + +## 8.140 IP address list + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|------------|-----------------------------|--------| +| 1 | IP address list Tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length | 1 | +| 3 to (2+X) | Other address TLV object(s) | X | + +Content : + +- List of IP addresses on the H(e)NB-network interface. + +Coding: + +- coding of Other address : see clause 8.58. + +## 8.141 Surrounding macrocells + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------|------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | Surrounding macrocell list Tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length | 1 | +| 3 to 5 | Access Technology TLV object(s) | 3 | +| 6 to 6+X | Location information TLV object(s) | X | + +Content : + +- List of surrounding macrocells, per access technology + +Coding: + +- coding of Access Technology : see clause 8.62. +- coding of Location Information : see clause 8.19. + +## 8.142 PDP/PDN/PDU type + +This data object shall contain the PDP, PDN or PDU Session type, as defined in 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] for GERAN and UTRAN, in 3GPP TS 24.301 [46] for E-UTRAN or in 3GPP TS 24.501 [70] for NG-RAN. + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | PDP/PDN/PDU type tag (see Note) | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '01' | 1 | +| 3 | PDP/PDN type or PDU Session type | 1 | +| NOTE: Interpretation of the type depends on the value for the Access Technology (see clause 8.62) | | | + +PDP/PDN type coding: + +- '00' = IPv4 +- '01' = IPv6 +- '03' = IPv4v6 +- '04' = PPP +- '05' = non IP + +All other values are RFU. + +PDU Session type coding: + +- '00' = IPv4 +- '01' = IPv6 +- '03' = IPv4v6 +- '04' = Unstructured +- '05' = Ethernet + +All other values are RFU. + +## 8.143 PDU Session Establishment parameters + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|----------------------|------------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | PDU Session Establishment parameters tag | 1 | +| 2 to (Y+1) | Length (Z+X) | Y | +| (Y+2) to (Y+Z+1) | DNN | Z | +| (Y+Z+2) to (Y+Z+X+1) | PDU Session Establishment parameters | X | + +The DNN is coded as specified in TS 24.501 [70] clause 9.11.2.1B. + +The PDU Session Establishment parameters are coded as the PDU SESSION ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST message as specified in TS 24.501 [70]. + +NOTE: If the "SM PDU DN request container" in the PDU SESSION ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST message is too large (i.e. greater than $207-Z$ , where Z is the length of the DNN Information Element), the ME may decide not to include the "SM PDU DN request container" and any subsequent information elements of the PDU SESSION ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST message inside the "PDU Session Establishment parameters". If the "Extended protocol configuration options" in the PDU SESSION ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST message is too large (i.e. greater than $207-Z-L$ , where Z is the length of the DNN Information Element, L is the length of the "SM PDU DN request container", and $L \le (207-Z)$ ), the ME may decide not to include the "Extended protocol configuration options" inside the "PDU Session Establishment parameters". + +## 8.144 NG-RAN Primary Timing Advance Information + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | +|---------|-------------------------------------|--------| +| 1 | NG-RAN Timing Advance tag | 1 | +| 2 | Length = '04' | 1 | +| 3 | ME Status | 1 | +| 4 - 6 | NG-RAN Primary Timing Advance value | 3 | + +Coding of ME status: + +- '00' = ME is in the idle state; +- '01' = ME is in inactive state; +- '02' = ME is in connect state; +- '03' to 'FF' = reserved values. + +The NG-RAN Primary Timing Advance value is equal to the total "Timing offset between uplink and downlink radio frames at the UE, expressed in units of Ts" (Basic time unit), as defined in TS 38.211 [73]. + +If the ME has never been in NG-RAN RRC connected mode on the current cell, the value of the NG-RAN Primary Timing Advance shall be set to 'FF FF FF'. + +## 8.145 Slices information + +This data object contain a list of slice information. + +Each slice information element is a S-NSSAI as specified in 3GPP TS 23.003 [30]. + +| Byte(s) | Description | Length | M/O/C | +|--------------------|----------------------------------------|--------|-----------------| +| 1 | Slices information tag | 1 | M | +| 2 | Length (X = 1 + 4n) of bytes following | 1 | M | +| 3 | Number of Served S-NSSAIs (n) | 1 | M | +| 4 to 7 | Served S-NSSAI 1 – SST + SD | 4 | C
(see Note) | +| | ... | ... | C
(see Note) | +| (X - 1) to (X + 2) | Served S-NSSAI n - SST + SD | 4 | C
(see Note) | + +NOTE : if no Served S-NSSAI is available, this field is not present + +Number of Served S-NSSAIs + +- Contents: + - Value set to 0 if no Served S-NSSAI is available else this is the number of Served S-NSSAI that will be described in the following list. + +Served S-NSSAI + +- Coding: + +S-NSSAI shall be coded on 32 bits. + +- As specified in TS 23.003 [30], SD reserved value "no SD value associated with the SST" defined as hexadecimal FFFFFFFF shall be used to pad value to 32 bits + +## 9 Tag values + +This clause specifies the tag values used to identify the BER-TLV and COMPREHENSION-TLV data objects used in the present document, in addition to those defined in ETSI TS 101 220 [43]. + +### 9.1 BER-TLV tags in ME to UICC direction + +| Description | Length of tag | Value | +|--------------------------------------|---------------|-------| +| SMS-PP download tag | 1 | 'D1' | +| Cell Broadcast download tag | 1 | 'D2' | +| MO Short message control tag | 1 | 'D5' | +| USSD download tag | 1 | 'D9' | +| Geographical Location Reporting tag | 1 | 'DD' | +| ProSe Report tag | 1 | 'DF' | +| Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | 1 | 'E0' | +| Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | 1 | 'E1' | +| Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | 1 | 'E2' | +| Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | 1 | 'E3' | + +### 9.2 BER-TLV tags in UICC TO ME direction + +No additional tag is defined. + +## 9.3 COMPREHENSION-TLV tags in both directions + +| Description | Length of tag | Tag value, bits 1-7
(Range: '01' - '7E') | Tag
(CR and Tag value) | Reassign
(see NOTE) | +|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------| +| SS string tag | 1 | '09' | '09' or '89' | yes | +| BSSID tag | | | | | +| PLMN ID tag | 1 | '09' | '09' or '89' | yes | +| E-UTRAN Timing Advance tag | | | | | +| USSD string tag | 1 | '0A' | '0A' or '8A' | yes | +| HESSID tag | | | | | +| SMS TPDU tag | 1 | '0B' | '0B' or '8B' | yes | +| PDP/PDN/PDU type tag | | | | | +| Cell Broadcast page tag | 1 | '0C' | '0C' or '8C' | yes | +| PDU session establishment parameters tag | | | | | +| Cause tag | 1 | '1A' | '1A' or '9A' | yes | +| BCCH channel list tag | 1 | '1D' | '1D' or '9D' | yes | +| Data connection status tag | | | | | +| BC Repeat Indicator tag | 1 | '2A' | '2A' or 'AA' | yes | +| Data connection type tag | | | | | +| Timing Advance tag | 1 | '2E' | '2E' or 'AE' | yes | +| (E/5G)SM cause tag | | | | | +| PDP context Activation parameters tag | 1 | '52' | '52' or 'D2' | yes | +| Surrounding macrocells tag | | | | | +| UTRAN/E-UTRAN/NG-RAN
Measurement Qualifier tag | 1 | '69' | '69' or 'E9' | yes | +| IP address list tag | | | | | +| I-WLAN Identifier tag | 1 | '4A' | '4A' or 'CA' | yes | +| SSID tag | | | | | +| (I-)WLAN Access Status tag | 1 | '4B' | '4B' or 'CB' | yes | +| PLMNwAcT List tag | 1 | '72' | '72' or 'F2' | yes | +| Routing Area Information tag | 1 | '73' | '73' or 'F3' | yes | +| URI truncated | | | | | +| Update/Attach Type tag | 1 | '74' | '74' or 'F4' | yes | +| ProSe Report Data Tag | | | | | +| Rejection Cause Code tag | 1 | '75' | '75' or 'F5' | yes | +| Geographical Location Parameters tag | 1 | '76' | '76' or 'F6' | yes | +| IARI tag | | | | | +| GAD shapes tag | 1 | '77' | '77' or 'F7' | yes | +| IMPU list tag | | | | | +| NMEA sentence tag | 1 | '78' | '78' or 'F8' | yes | +| IMS Status-Code tag | | | | | +| PLMN List tag | 1 | '79' | '79' or 'F9' | yes | +| E-UTRAN Inter-frequency Network
Measurement Results tag | | | | | +| EPS PDN connection Activation
parameters tag | 1 | '7C' | '7C' or 'FC' | yes | +| Tracking Area Identification tag | 1 | '7D' | '7D' or 'FD' | yes | +| CSG ID list tag | 1 | '7E' | '7E' or 'FE' | yes | +| Media type tag | | | | | +| CSG cell selection status tag | 1 | '55' | '55' or 'D5' | yes | +| IMS call disconnection cause tag | | | | | +| CSG ID tag | 1 | '56' | '56' or 'D6' | yes | +| Slice information tag | | | | | +| HNB name tag | 1 | '57' | '57' or 'D7' | yes | +| Extended rejection cause code tag | | | | | +| IMS URI tag | 1 | '31' | '31' or 'B1' | yes | +| NG-RAN Primary Timing Advance
Information | | | | | + +NOTE: Starting from Release 10, tag values are assigned in a context specific manner, i.e. the same tag value can be used for different data objects, provided that the object can be uniquely identified from the context of the proactive command or ENVELOPE command in which it is used. + +The column "Reassign" indicates whether it is expected that a tag can be reassigned in a context specific manner (yes), whether that is not recommended (NR) because of potential future conflicts or if this shall not be done (no). + +## 9.4 Type of Command and Next Action Indicator + +The table below shows the values which shall be used for Type of Command coding (see clause 8.6) and Next Action Indicator coding (see clause 8.24) in addition to those defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 9.4. + +| Value | Name | used for Type of Command coding | used for Next Action Indicator coding | +|-------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------| +| '11' | SEND SS | X | X | +| '12' | SEND USSD | X | X | +| '16' | Geographical Location Request | X | | +| '75' | reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | not available | not available | +| '76' | reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | not available | not available | +| '77' | reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | not available | not available | +| '78' | reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | not available | not available | + +--- + +## 10 Allowed Type of command and Device identity combinations + +Only certain types of commands can be issued with certain device identities. These combinations are defined below, in addition to ETSI TS 102 223 [32] clause 10. + +| Command description | Source | Destination | +|-------------------------------|---------|-------------| +| CELL BROADCAST DOWNLOAD | Network | UICC | +| MO SHORT MESSAGE CONTROL | ME | UICC | +| SEND SS | UICC | Network | +| SEND USSD | UICC | Network | +| (I-)WLAN Access Status | ME | UICC | +| Network Rejection | Network | UICC | +| Geographical Location Request | UICC | ME | + +--- + +## 11 Security requirements + +TS 31.115 [41] and TS 31.116 [51] specify standardized methods of securing the content of application messages. If it is necessary to secure application messaging to Toolkit applications, then TS 31.115 [41] and TS 31.116 [51] may be used. + +--- + +## Annex A (normative): Support of USAT by Mobile Equipment + +Support of USAT is optional for Mobile Equipment. However, if an ME states conformance with a specific 3GPP release, it is mandatory for the ME to support all functions of that release, with the exception of the functions: + +- "Alpha identifier in REFRESH command supported by terminal"; +- "Event Language Selection"; +- "Proactive UICC: PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (language)"; and +- "Proactive UICC: LANGUAGE NOTIFICATION". + +The support of USAT implies the support of CAT (ETSI TS 102 223 [32]). + +The support of letter classes, which specify mainly ME hardware dependent features, is optional for the ME and may supplement the USAT functionality described in the present document. If an ME states conformance to a letter class, it is mandatory to support all functions within the respective letter class. + +The table below indicates the commands and functions of the optional letter classes. + +| Letter classes | Command/function description | +|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| a to m | See TS 102 223 [32].
Class "e" also includes the Event Download: Data Connection Status Change Event. | +| n | Proactive command: Geographical Location Request
Envelope command: Geographical Location Reporting | +| o | See TS 102 223 [32] | +| p | USSD Data download in application mode | +| q | Proactive command : Provide Local Information (CSG cell discovery)
Event download : CSG cell selection | +| r | See TS 102 223 [32] | +| s | See TS 102 223 [32] | +| t | Event download: Incoming IMS Data
Event download: IMS Registration
Proactive command : OPEN CHANNEL for IMS | +| u | See TS 102 223 [32] | +| v | Proactive command : Provide Local Information (H(e)NB IP address) | +| w | Proactive command : Provide Local Information (H(e)NB surrounding macrocells) | +| x | Security for Profile Container, Envelope Container, COMMAND CONTAINER and ENCAPSULATED SESSION CONTROL (reserved by ETSI SCP – not needed by 3GPP) | +| y | Envelope command: Service List Retrieval (reserved by ETSI SCP – not needed by 3GPP) | +| z | Indication of subsequent link with same Network Access Name in CLOSE CHANNEL. See TS 102 223 [32] | +| aa | DNS server address request for OPEN CHANNEL. See TS 102 223 [32] | +| ab | Proactive command: LAUNCH BROWSER. See TS 102 223 [32] | +| ac | Extended Launch Browser Capability
Event download: Browser termination event
Event download: Browsing status event.
See TS 102 223 [32] | +| ad | Event download: Poll Interval Negotiation. See TS 102 223 [32] | +| ae | URI support for SET UP CALL proactive command | +| af | Proactive Command: REFRESH with "Application Update" mode. See TS 102 223 [32] | +| ag | Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | +| ah | Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | +| ai | Non-IP Data Delivery support over BIP | +| aj | Reserved for 3GPP (for future usage) | +| ak | Proactive command: eUICC OPERATION. See TS 102 223 [32] | + +--- + +## Annex B (informative): Example of DISPLAY TEXT Proactive UICC Command + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] Annex B. + +--- + +## Annex C (normative): Structure of USAT communications + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] Annex C. + +--- + +## Annex D (informative): ME display in proactive UICC session + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] Annex D. + +--- + +## Annex E (informative): Help information feature processing + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] Annex E. + +--- + +## Annex F (informative): Monitoring of events + +In addition to ETSI TS 102 223 [32] Annex F. , the following is defined: + +| Event | Continuously reported | Reported once | +|------------------------|-----------------------|---------------| +| (I-)WLAN Access Status | X | | +| Network Rejection | X | | +| CSG cell selection | X | | + +--- + +## Annex G (normative): Support of Multiple Card Operation + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] Annex G. + +--- + +## Annex H (informative): Multiple Card proactive command examples + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] Annex H. + +--- + +## Annex I (informative): Bearer independent protocol proactive command examples + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] Annex I. + +--- + +## Annex J (informative): WAP References + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] Annex J. + +--- + +## Annex K (informative): Use of USAT Bearer independent protocol for local links Bluetooth case + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] Annex K. + +--- + +## Annex L (informative): Bluetooth Service Discovery protocol + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] Annex L. + +--- + +## **Annex M (informative): Use of USAT Bearer independent protocol for local links, server case** + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] Annex M. + +# Annex N (informative): USSD information flow between the Network, the ME and the UICC + +## N.1 MMI Mode + +Mobile initiated USSD operation, Network does not request further information + +![Sequence diagram showing USSD information flow between Network, ME, and UICC in MMI mode.](ef86416097668984aee7611317e77bb9_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the interaction between the Network, ME (Mobile Equipment), and UICC (Universal Integrated Circuit Card) for a mobile-initiated USSD operation. The sequence of messages is as follows: + +- SEND USSD:** The ME sends a message to the UICC. The payload consists of `ussd-DCS(7 bits)` and `ussd-String`. +- REGISTER:** The ME sends a `REGISTER` message to the Network. The payload is a `Facility (Invoke = ProcessUnstructuredSS-Request (ussd-DCS, ussd-String))`. +- Release Complete:** The Network sends a `Release Complete` message to the ME. +- Facility (Return result):** The Network sends a `Facility (Return result = ProcessUnstructuredSS-Request (ussd-DCS, ussd-String))` message to the ME. +- TERMINAL RESPONSE:** The ME sends a `TERMINAL RESPONSE` message to the UICC. The payload is `DCS, text string data object`. + +Sequence diagram showing USSD information flow between Network, ME, and UICC in MMI mode. + +Figure N.1 + +Mobile initiated USSD operation, Network requests further information + +![Sequence diagram showing Mobile initiated USSD operation between Network, ME, and UICC.](da87c1b628b63a046d8a0d0fc2c058ea_img.jpg) + +The diagram is a sequence diagram with three lifelines: **Network**, **ME**, and **UICC**. The sequence of messages is as follows: + +- SEND USSD**: A message from the ME to the UICC. The return message contains `ussd-DCS(7 bits), ussd-String`. +- REGISTER**: A message from the Network to the ME. The return message contains `Facility (Invoke = ProcessUnstructuredSS-Request (ussd-DCS, ussd-String))`. +- FACILITY**: A message from the Network to the ME. The return message contains `Facility (Invoke = UnstructuredSS-Request (ussd-DCS, ussd-String))`. +- FACILITY**: A message from the Network to the ME. The return message contains `Facility (Return result = UnstructuredSS-Request (ussd-DCS, ussd-String))`. +- Release Complete**: A message from the Network to the ME. The return message contains `Facility (Return result = ProcessUnstructuredSS-Request (ussd-DCS, ussd-String))`. +- TERMINAL RESPONSE**: A message from the UICC to the ME. The return message contains `DCS, text string data object`. + +Sequence diagram showing Mobile initiated USSD operation between Network, ME, and UICC. + +Figure N.2 + +## N.2 Application Mode + +Mobile initiated USSD operation, Network does not request further information + +![Sequence diagram showing Mobile initiated USSD operation between Network, ME, and UICC.](0ad1b90f313a822e42d66a872e981b42_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the interaction between the Network, ME (Mobile Equipment), and UICC (Universal Integrated Circuit Card) for a mobile-initiated USSD operation. The sequence of messages is as follows: + +- REGISTER:** A message from the ME to the Network. The Network responds with a **Facility (Invoke = ProcessUnstructuredSS-Request (ussd-DCS, ussd-String))**. +- SEND USSD:** A message from the ME to the UICC. The UICC responds with **ussd-DCS(8 bits), ussd-String**. +- TERMINAL RESPONSE:** A message from the UICC to the ME. The ME responds with **DCS, text string data object**. +- Release Complete:** A message from the Network to the ME. The ME responds with **Facility (Return result = ProcessUnstructuredSS-Request (ussd-DCS, ussd-String))**. +- ENVELOPE(USSD Data Download):** A message from the ME to the UICC. The UICC responds with **ussd-DCS, ussd-String**. + +Sequence diagram showing Mobile initiated USSD operation between Network, ME, and UICC. + +Figure N.3 + +Mobile initiated USSD operation, Network requests further information + +![Sequence diagram showing interactions between Network, ME, and UICC for USSD processing.](2ed8cadf211f7d2dba5eecc5f0ad1876_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the sequence of messages between a Network, a Mobile Equipment (ME), and a UICC for USSD processing. The sequence is as follows: + +- REGISTER:** The Network sends a REGISTER message to the ME. The ME responds with a **SEND USSD** message to the UICC. The UICC returns **ussd-DCS(8 bits), ussd-String** to the ME. The ME then sends a **Facility (Invoke = ProcessUnstructuredSS-Request (ussd-DCS, ussd-String))** message to the Network. +- FACILITY:** The Network sends a FACILITY message to the ME. The ME responds with a **TERMINAL RESPONSE** message to the UICC. The UICC returns **DCS, text string data object** to the ME. The ME then sends a **Facility (Invoke = UnstructuredSS-Request (ussd-DCS, ussd-String))** message to the Network. +- ENVELOPE(USSD Data Download):** The ME sends an **ENVELOPE(USSD Data Download)** message to the UICC. The UICC returns **ussd-DCS, ussd-String** to the ME. +- SEND USSD:** The ME sends another **SEND USSD** message to the UICC. The UICC returns **ussd-DCS, ussd-String** to the ME. +- FACILITY:** The Network sends a FACILITY message to the ME. The ME responds with a **TERMINAL RESPONSE** message to the UICC. The UICC returns **DCS, text string data object** to the ME. The ME then sends a **Facility (Return result = UnstructuredSS-Request (ussd-DCS, ussd-String))** message to the Network. +- Release Complete:** The Network sends a Release Complete message to the ME. The ME responds with a **Facility (Return result = ProcessUnstructuredSS-Request (ussd-DCS, ussd-String))** message to the Network. Finally, the ME sends an **ENVELOPE(USSD Data Download)** message to the UICC. + +Sequence diagram showing interactions between Network, ME, and UICC for USSD processing. + +![Diagram showing a dashed arrow pointing from a central vertical line to a right vertical line, labeled 'ussd-DCS, ussd-String'.](6059b0a3a051cc20b414d51a4e412f3e_img.jpg) + +The diagram consists of three vertical lines. The leftmost line is a solid black line. The middle line is a solid black line. The rightmost line is a solid black line. A dashed horizontal arrow points from the middle line to the rightmost line. Below the arrow, the text "ussd-DCS, ussd-String" is written. + +Diagram showing a dashed arrow pointing from a central vertical line to a right vertical line, labeled 'ussd-DCS, ussd-String'. + +**Figure N.4** + +--- + +## N.3 USSD Data Download + +Network initiated USSD operation + +![](893d65bf826925a7283359b1672010a0_img.jpg) + +| Network | ME | UICC | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|------| +| REGISTER
-----> | | | +| Facility (Invoke = UnstructuredSS-Request (ussd-DCS, ussd-String)) | ENVELOPE(USSD Data Download)
-----> | | +| | ussd-DCS, ussd-String | | +| | Status word
-----> | | +| | e.g. 61 XX | | +| | GET RESPONSE
-----> | | +| | Data, Status word
-----> | | +| FACILITY
-----> | | | +| Facility (Return result = UnstructuredSS-Request (ussd-DCS, ussd-String(data))) | | | +| Release Complete
-----> | | | +| Facility (Return result = ProcessUnstructuredSS-Request (ussd-DCS, ussd-String)) | ENVELOPE(USSD Data Download)
-----> | | + +![](137bcfed81ada68ca5162ca5afed35c7_img.jpg) + +| | | | +|--|------------------------------------------------------------------------|--| +| | ussd-DCS, ussd-String


Status word
<--------------------- | | +|--|------------------------------------------------------------------------|--| + +Figure N.5 + +## Annex O (informative): Geographical location information discovery information flow between the ME and the UICC + +The ME accepts the parameters provided by the UICC + +![](8f2d2d466bb3a096c1872fbc29ff4063_img.jpg) + +| Positioning system | ME | UICC | +|--------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| +| | Geographical Location Request
<--------------------------------------------------
'81' (horizontal accuracy: best effort), '81' (vertical
coordinate requested; vertical accuracy: best effort),
'01' (horizontal velocity requested), '01' (Preferred
GAD shape: Ellipsoid point), '01' (Preferred NMEA
sentence: RMC), '07' (Preferred Maximum Response
Time = 27) | | +| | Terminal Response (OK)
--------------------------------------------------> | | +| Acquiring GPS location
---------------------------------> | | | +| | ENVELOPE (Geographical Location Reporting)
-------------------------------------------------->

NMEA sentence
(tag68\$GPRMC,175544,V,3957.5751,N,07511.5938,
W,0.0,0.0,25052,12.4,W,S*24) | | + +Figure O.1 + +## Annex P (normative): Support of USAT by Terminals with reduced feature capabilities. + +See ETSI TS 102 223 [32] Annex S except for USAT-specific commands which are defined as follows. + +Table P.1 provides the applicability of USAT-specific envelope commands for the different terminal types. + +Table P.2 provides an overview of USAT-specific affected commands. + +**Table P.1: Envelope applicability table** + +| Envelope | ND type | NK type | NA type | NS type | NL type | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| +| SMS-PP data download | | | | | | +| Cell Broadcast data download | | | | | | +| Call Control by USIM | Note 2 | | | | | +| MO Short Message Control by USIM | Note 2 | | | | | +| EVENT DOWNLOAD - (I-)WLAN Access status | | | | | | +| EVENT DOWNLOAD - Network Rejection | | | | | | +| USSD Data Download | | | | | | +| Geographical Location Reporting | | | | | | +| ProSe Report | | | | | | +| Note 1: "O" means proactive command is optional, No indication means that the proactive command is fully applicable. | | | | | | +| Note 2: If an alpha identifier is provided by the UICC in the response, it shall be ignored by the terminal. | | | | | | + +**Table P.2: Overview of affected commands** + +| Command | ND type | NK type | NA type | NS type | NL type | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| +| SEND SS | partial | | | | | +| SEND USSD - MMI Mode | partial | | | | | +| SEND USSD - Application Mode | partial | | | | | +| OPEN CHANNEL related to (I-)WLAN bearer | partial | | | | | +| Geographical Location Request | partial | | | | | +| Note: "O" means support of this command is optional, "partial" means parts of the command are affected. No indication means that the proactive command is fully applicable. | | | | | | + +## Annex Q (normative): Default routing for USAT over AT interface + +### Q.0 3GPP-specific facilities + +The provisions of ETSI TS 102 223 [32] Annex T apply with the extensions given below. + +In addition to the facilities given in ETSI TS 102 223 [32], the facilities given in table Q.1 may be supported by multiple entities at the same time. + +**Table Q.1: Additional facilities that may be supported by multiple entities** + +| Facility | Remarks | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| +| Proactive UICC: REFRESH | | +| Proactive UICC: SET UP EVENT LIST | | +| Event: Data available | Note 2 | +| Event: Channel status | Note 2 | +| Event: Local connection | Note 2 | +| Proactive UICC: OPEN CHANNEL | Note 1 | +| Proactive UICC: CLOSE CHANNEL | Note 2 | +| Proactive UICC: RECEIVE DATA | Note 2 | +| Proactive UICC: SEND DATA | Note 2 | +| Proactive UICC: GET CHANNEL STATUS | Note 2 | +| Proactive UICC: SERVICE SEARCH | Note 2 | +| Proactive UICC: GET SERVICE INFORMATION | Note 2 | +| Proactive UICC: DECLARE SERVICE | Note 2 | +| Number of channels supported by terminal | Note 3 | +| TCP, UICC in client mode, remote connection | Note 2 | +| UDP, UICC in client mode, remote connection | Note 2 | +| Note 1: Uniqueness is provided by means of the bearer type. | | +| Note 2: Uniqueness is provided by means of the channel identifier. | | +| Note 3: The total number of channels supported shall be sum of the respective number of supported channels by each entity, limited to a maximum of 7. | | + +The list of facilities given in ETSI TS 102 223 [32] that can be provided by the MT only shall be considered a default list that applies if EFUFC does not exist (see TS 31.102 [14]). If EFUFC exists, the list coded in this file applies. However, the facilities below are inherent to MT operation and shall be considered MT only even if not indicated so in EFUFC. + +- PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (MCC, MNC, LAC/TAC, Cell Identity and Extended Cell Identity) +- PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (NMR) +- POLL INTERVAL +- POLLING OFF +- PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (IMEI) +- PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (IMEISV) +- PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (Search Mode change) +- PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (NMR(UTRAN/E-UTRAN)) + +### Q.1 Default routing mechanism + +In addition to the mechanism defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32], the MT shall route USAT commands as follows: + +- SET UP EVENT LIST shall be routed to all entities supporting the command, each containing only the events supported by the entity, even if the list is empty (which allows for proper deregistration of events set up earlier). For the TERMINAL RESPONSE to the UICC, the responses from the MT and the TE have to be combined as follows: + - The MT shall check if it is able to set up the events it supports itself. If the MT is currently unable to process command or if the set up of the events would fail, the MT shall send this result in the TERMINAL RESPONSE without forwarding the command to the TE. + - If the MT is capable of setting up the MT events, the list of TE events shall be forwarded to the TE and the TE shall send its TERMINAL RESPONSE. + - If the TE command was successful, the MT shall set up its events and report that the command was performed in the TERMINAL RESPONSE. If the MT or the TE or both have performed the command with partial comprehension or with missing information, this shall be reflected in the TERMINAL RESPONSE; if one reported partial comprehension and the other missing information, the MT response takes precedence. + - If the TE reports that it is currently unable to process command or the command failed, the MT shall report this in the TERMINAL RESPONSE. +- REFRESH shall be routed to all entities supporting the command to inform them about modified Efs; only the MT shall perform other activities indicated in the command (e.g. UICC reset). For the TERMINAL RESPONSE to the UICC, the responses from the MT and the TE have to be combined as follows: + - The MT shall check if it is able to perform the REFRESH. If the MT is currently unable to process the command or the command would fail, the MT shall send this result in the TERMINAL RESPONSE without forwarding the command to the TE. + - If the MT is capable of performing the REFRESH, the command shall be forwarded to the TE and the TE shall send its TERMINAL RESPONSE, but if there is a refresh action to be performed by the MT (e.g. USIM initialisation), the MT shall send its response to the TE's TERMINAL RESPONSE only after the refresh action has started to avoid that the TE tries to access the UICC before the refresh action. + - If the TE command was successful, the MT shall perform the REFRESH and report that the command was performed in the TERMINAL RESPONSE. If the MT or the TE have performed the command with a limitation (partial comprehension, missing information, additional Efs read, requested icon could not be displayed or USIM/ISIM was not active) this shall be reflected in the TERMINAL RESPONSE; if both reported different limitations, the MT response takes precedence. + - If the TE reports that it is currently unable to process command or the command failed, the MT shall report this in the TERMINAL RESPONSE. +- OPEN CHANNEL shall be routed according to the indicated bearer type. To avoid conflicts in channel identifier assignment, the MT shall replace the destination device identity by an available channel identifier and the entity providing the bearer type shall use this channel identifier in its response. +- Subsequent BIP commands shall be routed according to the channel identifier. + +--- + +## Q.2 Combination rules for terminal profiles + +In addition to the mechanism defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [32], the MT shall proceed as follows when combining the MT and TE profiles: + +- Number of channels supported by terminal for BIP: Here the indicated numbers of the different entities shall be added and the sum, limited to a maximum of 7, shall be provided in the combined terminal profile. + +## Annex R (informative): UICC access to IMS, command flow examples + +This annex applies if class "e" and "t" are supported. + +The flowcharts provided in this annex are illustrative examples. The listing of commands is not exhaustive and the timing/order of commands may differ. All SIP requests and responses received by the ME within the SIP dialog established by the SIP INVITE request are sent to the UICC. + +### R.1 Discovery of the UICC's IARI and IMS Registration + +![](02f3fc8e346370e82afa09b56ad7f83b_img.jpg) + +| UICC | ME | IMS network | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| ← TERMINAL PROFILE (support of UICC access to IMS) | | | +| SET UP EVENT LIST (IMS Registration, Incoming IMS data, Data Available) → | | | +| ← READ BINARY (ISIM Service Table) | | | +| Support of IARI list, SW=9000 → | | | +| ← READ BINARY (IARI list) | | | +| IARI list, SW=9000 → | | | +| | SIP REGISTER (UICC IARI(s), ME IARI(s)) → | | +| | ← SIP : 200 OK | | +| | SIP SUBSCRIBE (Registration event package) → | | +| | ← SIP : 200 OK | | +| | ← SIP : NOTIFY (Registration event package – active IMPU/contacts list) | | +| | SIP : 200 OK → | | +| ← ENVELOPE (Event download – IMS Registration) IMPU list | | | + +Figure R.1 + +If the ISIM is present, the list of IARIs associated with active applications installed on the UICC is located in the ISIM. Otherwise, the list of IARIs associated with active applications installed on the UICC is located in the USIM. The case where the ISIM is supported is shown in the command flow. + +The ME will register the IARI(s) associated with active applications installed on the UICC and the IARI(s) of applications installed in the ME. The ME does not need to wait for SET UP EVENT LIST command to register to IMS. Therefore it is recommended that the UICC sends the SET UP EVENT LIST as soon as possible to avoid the case where the ME registers to the IMS network before the UICC can be informed of this. + +Since the IMS Registration and Incoming IMS data events may occur at anytime, it is assumed that the UICC will keep monitoring both events. + +## R.2 Notification of Incoming IMS data + +![](18b87e4ce7ef441f5620b8d6539a2939_img.jpg) + +| UICC | ME | IMS network | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|---------------------------------------------------------| +| | | ← SIP : INVITE (UICC IARI) | +| ← ENVELOPE (event download : Incoming IMS data) with the IARI | | | +| OPEN CHANNEL for IMS →
IARI, buffer size | | | +| ← Terminal Response (Channel identifier) | | | +| ← ENVELOPE (event download : Data Available) | | | +| RECEIVE DATA → | | | +| ← Terminal Response (SIP INVITE message) | | | +| SEND DATA (Immediate, Data) → | | SIP : 200 OK → | +| ← Terminal Response (OK) | | | +| | | [Messages specific to the current SIP dialog not shown] | +| SEND DATA (Immediate, Data) → | | SIP : BYE → | +| ← Terminal Response (OK) | | ← SIP : 200 OK | +| ← ENVELOPE (event download : Data available) with the Channel identifier | | | +| RECEIVE DATA → | | | +| ← Terminal Response (OK) | | | +| CLOSE CHANNEL(Channel identifier) → | | | +| ← Terminal Response(OK) | | | + +Figure R.2 + +When an incoming SIP message is received, the ME checks the IARI to see if the destination application resides on ME or on the UICC. If the IARI is associated with an active application installed on the UICC and there is not any channel to the UICC associated with that IARI, the ME informs the UICC with an ENVELOPE Incoming IMS data event command. The UICC sends an Open Channel for IMS proactive command upon reception of this ENVELOPE command. At end of the SIP dialog, the UICC closes the channel to free resources. + +This flowchart occurs after a successful IMS registration is completed and the UICC is registered to the Incoming IMS data event. Otherwise the ME discards the incoming SIP INVITE message. + +## R.3 UICC originating a SIP message + +![](991dd3ca8ff5bdb023220b1d44775e1d_img.jpg) + +| UICC | ME | IMS network | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|---------------------------------------------------------| +| OPEN CHANNEL for IMS -->
IARI, buffer size | | | +| <-- Terminal Response (Channel identifier) | | | +| SEND DATA (store, Data) --> | | | +| <-- Terminal Response (OK) | | | +| SEND DATA (Immediate, Data) --> | | SIP : INVITE --> | +| <-- Terminal Response (OK) | | <-- SIP : 200 OK | +| | | [Messages specific to the current SIP dialog not shown] | +| | | <-- SIP : BYE | +| <-- ENVELOPE (event download : Data available) with the Channel identifier | | | +| RECEIVE DATA --> | | | +| <-- Terminal Response (OK) | | | +| SEND DATA (Immediate, Data) --> | | SIP : 200 OK --> | +| CLOSE CHANNEL(Channel identifier) --> | | | +| <-- Terminal Response(OK) | | | + +Figure R.3 + +The UICC will close the channel at the end of the SIP dialog. + +## Annex S (normative): 3GPP PS data off and Bearer Independent Protocol + +This annex applies if class "e" is supported. + +The UE may support the 3GPP PS data off. + +If the UE supports the 3GPP PS data off, the UE may be configured with an indication whether the Bearer Independent Protocol is a 3GPP PS data off exempt service using one or more of the following methods: + +- the Bearer Independent Protocol indication of the EF3GPPPSDATAOFF file described in 3GPP TS 31.102 [14]; +- the 3GPP\_PS\_data\_off/Bearer\_independent\_protocol node of 3GPP TS 24.368 [68]. + +If the UE is configured with both the BIP\_exempt node of 3GPP TS 24.368 [68] and the Bearer Independent Protocol indication of the EF3GPPSDATAOFF file described in 3GPP TS 31.102 [14], then the Bearer Independent Protocol indication of the EF3GPPSDATAOFF file shall take precedence. + +--- + +## Annex T (informative): Data Connection Status change event, command flow examples + +### T.1 Introduction + +This annex applies if class "e" is supported. + +The flowcharts provided in this annex are illustrative examples. The listing of commands is not exhaustive and the timing/order of commands may differ. They are illustrating how after a completion of PDP, PDN or PDU procedure, initiated by Network or by the ME, a new Data connection status change event is sent to the UICC. + +--- + +### T.2 Success activation of PDP/PDN/PDU request flow example + +![Sequence diagram for successful PDP context activation. Lifelines: UICC, ME, Network. The process starts with 'Initial status - PDP Inactive' at the ME. The ME sends an 'ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT REQUEST' to the Network. The Network responds with 'ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT ACCEPT' to the ME. Finally, the ME sends a 'DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT (Status : Data connection successful)' to the UICC, resulting in 'Final Status - PDP active' at the ME.](f4e64712104f326ff259928d8126f1f6_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UICC + participant ME + participant Network + Note right of ME: Initial status - PDP Inactive + ME->>Network: ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT REQUEST + Network-->>ME: ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT ACCEPT + ME-->>UICC: DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT (Status : Data connection successful) + Note right of ME: Final Status - PDP active +``` + +Sequence diagram for successful PDP context activation. Lifelines: UICC, ME, Network. The process starts with 'Initial status - PDP Inactive' at the ME. The ME sends an 'ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT REQUEST' to the Network. The Network responds with 'ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT ACCEPT' to the ME. Finally, the ME sends a 'DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT (Status : Data connection successful)' to the UICC, resulting in 'Final Status - PDP active' at the ME. + +Figure T.2.1 Successful PDP context activation procedure + +![Sequence diagram for successful PDN connectivity activation. Lifelines: UICC, ME, Network. The process starts with 'Initial status - Bearer context Inactive' at the ME. The ME sends a 'PDN CONNECTIVITY REQUEST' to the Network. The Network responds with 'ACTIVATE DEFAULT CONTEXT REQUEST' to the ME. The ME then sends 'ACTIVATE DEFAULT CONTEXT ACCEPT' to the Network.](0bad255f79e25d544189cfab0e84bf3a_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UICC + participant ME + participant Network + Note right of ME: Initial status - Bearer context Inactive + ME->>Network: PDN CONNECTIVITY REQUEST + Network-->>ME: ACTIVATE DEFAULT CONTEXT REQUEST + ME-->>Network: ACTIVATE DEFAULT CONTEXT ACCEPT +``` + +Sequence diagram for successful PDN connectivity activation. Lifelines: UICC, ME, Network. The process starts with 'Initial status - Bearer context Inactive' at the ME. The ME sends a 'PDN CONNECTIVITY REQUEST' to the Network. The Network responds with 'ACTIVATE DEFAULT CONTEXT REQUEST' to the ME. The ME then sends 'ACTIVATE DEFAULT CONTEXT ACCEPT' to the Network. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure T.2.2 showing the successful PDN context activation procedure. It features three vertical lifelines. The central lifeline has a message '← DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT (Status : Data connection successful)' and a status label 'Final Status – Bearer context active'.](27c9c38b326b85de631d54a9ff1e2bd4_img.jpg) + +← DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT +(Status : Data connection successful) + +Final Status – Bearer context active + +Sequence diagram for Figure T.2.2 showing the successful PDN context activation procedure. It features three vertical lifelines. The central lifeline has a message '← DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT (Status : Data connection successful)' and a status label 'Final Status – Bearer context active'. + +**Figure T.2.2 Successful PDN context activation procedure** + +![](e3026761f1da20ee91832039701984dd_img.jpg) + +| UICC | ME | Network | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------| +| | Initial status – PDU session not established | | +| | | PDU SESSION ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST → | +| | | ← PDU SESSION ESTABLISHMENT ACCEPT | +| ← DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT
(Status : Data connection successful) | | | +| | Final Status – PDU session established | | + +**Figure T.2.3 Successful PDU session establishment procedure** + +### T.3 Rejected activation of PDP/PDN/PDU request flow example + +![](dc79f71c6bae35b5d62f636dbc7f9bb9_img.jpg) + +| UICC | ME | Network | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------| +| | Initial status – PDP Inactive | | +| | | ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT REQUEST → | +| | | ← ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT REJECT | +| ← DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT
(Status: Data connection rejected) | | | +| | Final status – PDP inactive | | + +**Figure T.3.1 Rejected PDP context activation procedure when initiated by the ME** + +![](ef8cc1aaa5bf706cad5af7fe7c7d640d_img.jpg) + +| UICC | ME | Network | +|------|----|---------| +|------|----|---------| + +![Sequence diagram for rejected PDN context activation initiated by the ME. It shows the ME sending a PDN CONNECTIVITY REQUEST, the Network responding with an ACTIVATE DEFAULT CONTEXT REQUEST, and the ME then sending an ACTIVATE DEFAULT CONTEXT REJECT. A DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT is then sent to the UICC with the status 'Data connection rejected'. The process starts with 'Initial status - Bearer context Inactive' and ends with 'Final Status - Bearer context inactive'.](e01c6273c4177746475715ee9c17a882_img.jpg) + +Initial status - Bearer context Inactive + +PDN CONNECTIVITY REQUEST --> + +--> ACTIVATE DEFAULT CONTEXT REQUEST + +ACTIVATE DEFAULT CONTEXT REJECT --> + +--> DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT +(Status : Data connection rejected) + +Final Status - Bearer context inactive + +Sequence diagram for rejected PDN context activation initiated by the ME. It shows the ME sending a PDN CONNECTIVITY REQUEST, the Network responding with an ACTIVATE DEFAULT CONTEXT REQUEST, and the ME then sending an ACTIVATE DEFAULT CONTEXT REJECT. A DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT is then sent to the UICC with the status 'Data connection rejected'. The process starts with 'Initial status - Bearer context Inactive' and ends with 'Final Status - Bearer context inactive'. + +Figure T.3.2 Rejected PDN context activation procedure when initiated by the ME + +![](d579d14979ebeaa676740df2e3dbe024_img.jpg) + +| UICC | ME | Network | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------| +| Initial status - PDU session not established | | | +| | PDU SESSION ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST --> | | +| | --> PDU SESSION ESTABLISHMENT REJECT | | +| --> DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT
(Status : Data connection rejected) | | | +| Final Status - PDU session not established | | | + +Figure T.3.3 Rejected PDU session establishment procedure when initiated by the ME + +## T.4 PDP/PDN/PDU Data connection deactivated flow example + +![](05b0f658f02a1301691b547d089c485a_img.jpg) + +| UICC | ME | Network | +|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|---------| +| Initial status - PDP/Bearer Context Active | | | +| | DEACTIVATE PDP/REQUEST / PDN DISCONNECT REQUEST --> | | +| | --> DEACTIVATE PDP/EPS BEARER CONTEXT ACCEPT | | + +![Sequence diagram for MS Initiated PDP/PDN context deactivation procedure. It shows a 'DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT (Status: Data connection deactivated)' occurring, leading to a 'Final status – PDP/Bearer Context Inactive'.](4f7470055bfc22c4aa6b007a4056940e_img.jpg) + +←– DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT +(Status: Data connection deactivated) + +Final status – PDP/Bearer Context Inactive + +Sequence diagram for MS Initiated PDP/PDN context deactivation procedure. It shows a 'DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT (Status: Data connection deactivated)' occurring, leading to a 'Final status – PDP/Bearer Context Inactive'. + +**Figure T.4.1 MS Initiated PDP/PDN context deactivation procedure** + +![Sequence diagram for Network Initiated PDP/PDN context deactivation procedure. It shows the Network sending a 'DEACTIVATE PDP/EPS BEARER CONTEXT REQUEST' to the ME, which responds with 'DEACTIVATE PDP/EPS BEARER CONTEXT ACCEPT'. This is followed by a 'DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT (Status: Data connection deactivated)' and the 'Final status – PDP/Bearer context Inactive'.](2df1e34671c73d7c0d047d4e9009251e_img.jpg) + +| UICC | ME | Network | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|-------------------------------------------------| +| Initial status – PDP/Bearer context Active | | | +| | | DEACTIVATE PDP/EPS BEARER CONTEXT REQUEST
←– | +| | | →→DEACTIVATE PDP/EPS BEARER CONTEXT ACCEPT | +| ←– DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT
(Status: Data connection deactivated) | | | +| Final status – PDP/Bearer context Inactive | | | + +Sequence diagram for Network Initiated PDP/PDN context deactivation procedure. It shows the Network sending a 'DEACTIVATE PDP/EPS BEARER CONTEXT REQUEST' to the ME, which responds with 'DEACTIVATE PDP/EPS BEARER CONTEXT ACCEPT'. This is followed by a 'DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT (Status: Data connection deactivated)' and the 'Final status – PDP/Bearer context Inactive'. + +**Figure T.4.2 Network Initiated PDP/PDN context deactivation procedure** + +![Sequence diagram for MS Initiated PDU session release procedure. It shows the ME sending a 'PDU SESSION RELEASE REQUEST' to the Network, which responds with 'PDU SESSION RELEASE COMMAND' and then 'PDU SESSION RELEASE COMPLETE'. This is followed by a 'DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT (Status: Data connection deactivated)' and the 'Final status – PDU session released'.](4a0766e76be1050af738d0a7e9e5c9fb_img.jpg) + +| UICC | ME | Network | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|-----------------------------------| +| Initial status – PDU session established | | | +| | | PDU SESSION RELEASE REQUEST → | +| | | PDU SESSION RELEASE COMMAND
←– | +| | | PDU SESSION RELEASE COMPLETE→ | +| ←– DATA CONNECTION STATUS
EVENT
(Status: Data connection deactivated) | | | +| Final status – PDU session released | | | + +Sequence diagram for MS Initiated PDU session release procedure. It shows the ME sending a 'PDU SESSION RELEASE REQUEST' to the Network, which responds with 'PDU SESSION RELEASE COMMAND' and then 'PDU SESSION RELEASE COMPLETE'. This is followed by a 'DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT (Status: Data connection deactivated)' and the 'Final status – PDU session released'. + +**Figure T.4.3 MS Initiated PDU session release procedure** + +![](c0438093a10a593c42106b1e5dbb4331_img.jpg) + +| UICC | ME | Network | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|-----------------------------------| +| Initial status – PDU session established | | | +| | | PDU SESSION RELEASE COMMAND
←← | +| | | PDU SESSION RELEASE COMPLETE→→ | +| ←← DATA CONNECTION STATUS EVENT
(Status: Data connection deactivated) | | | +| Final status – PDU session released | | | + +**Figure T.4.4 Network Initiated PDU session release procedure** + +--- + +## Annex U (informative): Change History + +| Date | TSG TD# | TSG | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New | +|-------|-----------|-----|-------|-------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| CT-28 | CP-050141 | | 144 | - | F | Clarification on the coding of the DCS field for USSD data download | 7.0.0 | +| CT-29 | CP-050341 | | 149 | - | F | Transfer MMS commands to SCP | 7.1.0 | +| CT-30 | CP-050500 | | 152 | - | A | Missing data objects concerning Frames | 7.2.0 | +| CT-30 | CP-050500 | | 150 | - | A | Correction of the length of Bearer parameters for UTRAN Packet Service | 7.2.0 | +| CT-30 | CP-050497 | | 153 | - | B | Extension of BIP bearers with I-WLAN | 7.2.0 | +| CT-31 | CP-060019 | | 155 | - | A | Corrections to align TS 31.111 with ETSI TS 102 223 and ETSI TS 101 220 | 7.3.0 | +| CT-31 | CP-060019 | | 157 | - | A | Introduction of HSDPA in BIP | 7.3.0 | +| CT-31 | CP-060024 | | 158 | - | D | Editorial corrections | 7.3.0 | +| CT-31 | CP-060024 | | 159 | - | F | Alignment with SCP specifications | 7.3.0 | +| CT-31 | CP-060157 | | 161 | - | A | Correction on "USIM Service table" in data SMS-PP download | 7.3.0 | +| CT-32 | CP-060244 | | 0162 | - | F | Incorrect Service Table referenced | 7.4.0 | +| CT-33 | CP-060476 | | 0167 | - | A | UTRAN NMR encoding and Local Information clarifications | 7.5.0 | +| CT-35 | CP-070060 | | 0169 | 1 | A | Removal of re-introduced text for Call Control User indication | 7.6.0 | +| CT-36 | CP-070300 | | 0176 | 2 | F | Correction of possible Terminal Responses to the Send SMS command | 7.7.0 | +| CT-36 | CP-070300 | | 0181 | 2 | F | Addition of missing Frame Identifiers to proactive commands | 7.7.0 | +| CT-36 | CP-070300 | | 0184 | - | F | Correction for the general results "SS Return Error" and "USSD Return Error" | 7.7.0 | +| CT-37 | CP-070616 | | 0185 | 1 | F | Incomplete Launch Application command definition | 7.8.0 | +| CT-37 | CP-070612 | | 0187 | - | A | Correction to UTRAN Network Measurement Results | 7.8.0 | +| CT-37 | CP-070661 | | 0188 | 5 | B | Steering of Roaming Refresh Command | 7.8.0 | +| CT-38 | CP-070842 | | 0190 | 5 | B | Addition of EVENT: Network Rejection | 8.0.0 | +| CT-39 | CP-080169 | | 0191 | - | F | Correction to RAC in Event : Network Rejection | 8.1.0 | +| ----- | ----- | | ----- | ----- | --- | Numbering of clauses corrected | 8.1.1 | +| | - | | | | --- | | | +| | | | | | - | | | +| CT-40 | CP-080386 | | 0193 | 2 | F | Explicit definition of Provide Local Information values | 8.2.0 | +| CT-41 | CP-080658 | | 0196 | 4 | B | Introduction of a geographical location discovery mechanism in the USIM Toolkit | 8.3.0 | +| CT-41 | CP-080586 | | 0197 | - | F | Correction of a missing closing parenthesis in 31.111 8.19. | 8.3.0 | +| CT-42 | CP-080903 | | 0198 | 3 | B | I-WLAN Steering of Roaming Refresh Command | 8.4.0 | +| CT-42 | CP-080908 | | 0199 | 1 | F | Correct Geographical Location Request Terminal response value | 8.4.0 | +| ----- | ----- | | ----- | ----- | --- | Upgrade to copyright, keywords and logo for LTE | 8.4.0 | +| | - | | | | --- | | | +| | | | | | - | | | +| CT-43 | CP-090188 | | 201 | 2 | B | Support of EPS in USAT: BIP, Provide Local Information, Call control | 8.5.0 | +| CT-43 | CP-090188 | | 207 | 1 | B | Definition of the "idle" state in Event Download (Location Status) to include E-UTRAN | 8.5.0 | +| CT-43 | CP-090190 | | 206 | 1 | A | Download of Data download via USSD and USSD application mode | 8.5.0 | +| CT-43 | CP-090197 | | 203 | - | F | Correction of formatting error in Terminal Profile and in clause titles | 8.5.0 | +| CT-43 | CP-090240 | | 200 | 1 | B | Support of EPS in Network Rejection Event | 8.5.0 | +| CT-43 | CP-090242 | | 202 | 1 | F | Reduced USAT capable terminals | 8.5.0 | +| | | | | | | Correction to history table version entries ex CT-43. | 8.5.1 | +| CT-43 | CP-090455 | | 209 | 1 | A | Correction to OPEN CHANNEL | 8.6.0 | +| CT-43 | CP-090456 | | 212 | - | F | NMEA sentence reference | 8.6.0 | +| CT-43 | CP-090452 | | 213 | 1 | F | IMSI changing procedure | 8.6.0 | +| CT-43 | CP-090456 | | 214 | - | F | Network Rejection Event for GERAN/UTRAN | 8.6.0 | +| CT-43 | CP-090452 | | 215 | 1 | F | Support of E-UTRAN in Provide Local Information for NMR | 8.6.0 | +| CT-45 | CP-090716 | | 225 | - | A | Correction of an open reference and clarification of display icon | 8.7.0 | +| CT-45 | CP-090715 | | 226 | - | F | Correction of missing reference to 3GPP specification | 8.7.0 | +| CT-46 | CP-090994 | | 220 | 2 | B | Discovery of surrounding CSG cells | 9.0.0 | +| CT-46 | CP-090994 | | 227 | 1 | B | CSG cell selection event | 9.0.0 | +| CT-47 | CP-100186 | | 235 | - | F | Completion of implementation of CR 0227 (tag values) | 9.1.0 | +| CT-47 | CP-100186 | | 236 | - | F | Correction of erroneous use of the "H(e)NB" term | 9.1.0 | +| CT-47 | CP-100181 | | 231 | 2 | A | ETSI SCP references correction | 9.1.0 | +| CT-48 | CP-100392 | | 0243 | 1 | F | Update of the specification and of references to SCP specifications | 9.2.0 | +| CP-48 | CP-100393 | | 0240 | 1 | A | Correction to security requirement references | 9.2.0 | +| CP-48 | CP-100393 | | 0248 | 1 | A | Correction of TERMINAL RESPONSE | 9.2.0 | +| CP-49 | CP-100596 | | 0254 | - | F | HNB name corrections | 9.3.0 | +| CP-49 | CP-100595 | | 0257 | - | D | Editorial correction in Comprehension-TLV Tag list | 10.0.0 | +| CP-50 | CP-100828 | | 0272 | 1 | A | Reference update and restoration of the Terminal Profile's bytes with letter class | 10.1.0 | +| CP-50 | CP-100828 | | 0271 | 1 | A | Essential corrections to NMR and UTRAN/E-UTRAN Measurement Qualifier | 10.1.0 | +| CP-50 | CP-100825 | | 0270 | 2 | B | Communication control for IMS | 10.1.0 | +| CP-50 | CP-100841 | | 0274 | - | A | Clarification on EVENT DOWNLOAD - CSG cell selection | 10.1.0 | +| CP-51 | CP-110239 | | 0275 | 1 | B | Rules for multiple entities providing USAT facilities | 10.2.0 | +| CP-51 | CP-110243 | | 0276 | 1 | C | Addition of Direct Communication Channel for BIP terminal server mode | 10.2.0 | +| CP-51 | CP-110238 | | 0279 | 1 | B | Introduction of the IARI based Incoming IMS Data event | 10.2.0 | +| CP-51 | CP-110238 | | 0280 | 1 | B | Introduction of ME behaviour during a REFRESH of EF_UICCIARI | 10.2.0 | +| CP-51 | CP-110238 | | 0281 | - | B | Introduction of the IARI based IMS Registration event | 10.2.0 | +| CP-51 | CP-110298 | | 0282 | 4 | B | Introduction of the IARI based Open Channel command | 10.2.0 | +| CP-51 | CP-110243 | | 0290 | 1 | C | Enable Re-assignment of tag values | 10.2.0 | +| CP-51 | CP-110217 | | 0292 | - | A | Essential corrections to the CSG cell selection status event and command
PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION related to CSG | 10.2.0 | + +| Date | TSG TD# | TSG | CR | Rev | C at | Subject/Comment | New | +|-------|-----------|-----|------|-----|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| CP-52 | CP-110530 | | 0291 | 2 | F | Essential correction on the length size for the IMS Registration Event envelope command | 10.3.0 | +| CP-52 | CP-110530 | | 0292 | 2 | F | Correction to IMS Registration event letter class | 10.3.0 | +| CP-52 | CP-110530 | | 0294 | 3 | F | Reservation of a bit in Terminal profile for Open Channel for IMS | 10.3.0 | +| CP-52 | CP-110499 | | 0296 | 2 | A | Removal of the mandatory Home eNodeB name support in USAT | 10.3.0 | +| CP-53 | CP-110596 | | 0297 | 2 | F | Corrections to IMS Registration Event and Open Channel for IMS USAT commands | 10.4.0 | +| CP-54 | CP-110901 | | 0300 | 1 | F | Essential correction to call control by USIM using IMS Request-URI parameter | 10.5.0 | +| CP-54 | CP-110901 | | 0304 | 1 | F | Alignment with ETSI TS 102 223 regarding eCAT | 10.5.0 | +| CP-54 | CP-110901 | | 0303 | 1 | F | Correction of USAT over AT commands | 10.5.0 | +| CP-54 | CP-110901 | | 0301 | 2 | A | Essential correction to call control by USIM using IMS Request-URI parameter | 11.0.0 | +| CP-54 | CP-110900 | | 0299 | 2 | C | Definition of procedures for Steering of Roaming | 11.0.0 | +| CP-55 | CP-120146 | | 0313 | 1 | A | Update of reference to ETSI TS 102 223 | 10.6.0 | +| CP-55 | CP-120147 | | 0317 | | A | Correction to channel status data object | 10.6.0 | +| CP-56 | CP-120387 | | 321 | 1 | A | Correction of bearer parameters for E-UTRAN / mapped UTRAN packet service | 10.7.0 | +| CP-56 | CP-120388 | | 322 | 1 | D | Deletion of COMPREHENSION-TLV tag value from 3GPP specification | 10.7.0 | +| CP-56 | CP-120388 | | 324 | 1 | D | Correction in the Geographical location information discovery information flow between the ME and the UICC | 10.7.0 | +| CP-56 | CP-120406 | | 315 | 3 | B | Addition of Provide local information, H(e)NB IP address | 10.7.0 | +| CP-56 | CP-120406 | | 316 | 4 | B | Addition of Provide local information, H(e)NB surrounding macrocells | 10.7.0 | +| CP-57 | CP-120624 | | 0328 | | A | Correction of length of CSG ID | 11.3.0 | +| CP-57 | CP-120624 | | 0331 | 1 | A | Correction of CSG ID list identifier | 11.3.0 | +| CP-57 | CP-120624 | | 0334 | 1 | A | Changes in ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD - CSG Cell Selection) | 11.3.0 | +| CP-57 | CP-120625 | | 0344 | 1 | A | Clarification of the use of the Incoming IMS Data event | 11.3.0 | +| CP-57 | CP-120623 | | 0349 | 2 | C | Enhancements to the security of the SMS OTA download mechanisms | 11.3.0 | +| CP-57 | CP-120626 | | 0338 | 1 | D | Correction to reference for 'OPEN CHANNEL related to UICC Server Mode' | 11.3.0 | +| CP-58 | CP-120871 | | 0348 | 2 | A | Essential correction on NMR in E-UTRAN | 11.4.0 | +| CP-58 | CP-120871 | | 0353 | 1 | A | Call control for emergency PDN | 11.4.0 | +| CP-58 | CP-120871 | | 0356 | 2 | A | Correction of padding for ECI in Location Information | 11.4.0 | +| CP-58 | CP-120872 | | 0359 | 1 | A | Essential correction on CSG reselection | 11.4.0 | +| CP-58 | CP-120873 | | 0350 | | F | Location Information for call control | 11.4.0 | +| CP-59 | CP-130146 | | 0363 | 1 | F | Update of reference to ETSI TS 102 223 specification | 11.5.0 | +| CP-60 | CP-130364 | | 0364 | | F | Location Information for MO Short Message Control | 11.6.0 | +| CP-60 | CP-130365 | | 0367 | | A | Clarification on the IMS Registration Event | 11.6.0 | +| CP-60 | CP-130366 | | 0365 | 2 | D | Optional fields in MO Short Message control response | 12.0.0 | +| CP-60 | CP-130366 | | 0368 | 1 | D | Correction in call control by USIM text | 12.0.0 | +| CP-61 | CP-130534 | | 0370 | 1 | C | PLMN ID to "CSG Cell Selection" ENVELOPE COMMAND | 12.1.0 | +| CP-62 | CP-130787 | | 0381 | 1 | A | Essential correction for IMS emergency call in call control by USIM | 12.2.0 | +| CP-62 | CP-130788 | | 0377 | 1 | A | Correction for call control for IMS communications by USIM | 12.2.0 | +| CP-63 | CP-140164 | | 0391 | | A | Correction of location information in case of call control for IMS | 12.3.0 | +| CP-63 | CP-140165 | | 0398 | | D | Correction of editorial errors in TS 31.111 | 12.3.0 | +| CP-63 | CP-140166 | | 0388 | 1 | A | Essential correction to default routing for USAT over AT interface references | 12.3.0 | +| CP-63 | CP-140167 | | 0395 | 1 | A | Essential correction in communication control for IMS by USIM | 12.3.0 | +| CP-63 | CP-140168 | | 0392 | 1 | B | Addition of POLL INTERVAL ENVELOPE command | 12.3.0 | +| CP-63 | CP-140169 | | 0399 | | A | Change PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION procedure for HPSIM | 12.3.0 | +| CP-64 | CP-140422 | | 0401 | 2 | F | Coding of PDP type in the Bearer parameters | 12.4.0 | +| CP-64 | CP-140422 | | 0406 | | F | Introduction of BCCH and Timing Advance Local Information | 12.4.0 | +| CP-64 | CP-140425 | | 0396 | 4 | B | URI support in MT Call event | 12.4.0 | +| CP-64 | CP-140425 | | 0400 | 1 | B | Modification to TI value | 12.4.0 | +| CP-64 | CP-140427 | | 0404 | 1 | F | E-UTRAN inter-frequency measurements that exceeds maxEARFCN | 12.4.0 | +| CP-65 | CP-140702 | | 0384 | 3 | A | Essential corrections for MTC on PDP / EPS PDN context activation | 12.5.0 | +| CP-65 | CP-140700 | | 0408 | 1 | C | Reference ETSI Specifications for the POLL INTERVAL Negotiation procedure | 12.5.0 | +| CP-65 | CP-140707 | | 0407 | | D | Removal of references to EF LND | 12.5.0 | +| CP-65 | CP-140707 | | 0409 | 1 | C | Update of reference to ETSI TS 102 223 | 12.5.0 | +| CP-66 | CP-140958 | | 0410 | 1 | F | Description of Transaction Identifier for terminals not supporting IMS | 12.6.0 | +| CP-66 | CP-140960 | | 0413 | 1 | F | Update of reference to ETSI TS 102 223 V11.3.0 | 12.6.0 | +| CP-66 | CP-140959 | | 0416 | 1 | F | Correction of COMPREHENSION-TLV data objects list | 12.6.0 | +| CP-67 | CP-150158 | | 0420 | 2 | B | ENVELOPE for ProSe usage information reporting | 12.7.0 | +| CP-67 | CP-150159 | | 0425 | 2 | F | Essential correction to the value of the Transaction Identifier in Call disconnect event | 12.7.0 | +| CP-67 | CP-150159 | | 0426 | | F | Update of reference to ETSI TS 102 223 | 12.7.0 | +| CP-68 | CP-150388 | | 0427 | | F | Support for toolkit initiated GBA bootstrap using refresh on ISIM | 12.8.0 | +| CP-68 | CP-150388 | | 0428 | 1 | F | Update of tags allocated by ETSI SCP | 12.8.0 | +| CP-68 | CP-150380 | | 0432 | | A | Correction of PDP context activation parameters | 12.8.0 | +| CP-68 | CP-150388 | | 0433 | 1 | F | URI support by USAT clarification on the interactions with FDN_URI and BDN_URI | 12.8.0 | +| CP-68 | CP-150388 | | 0437 | 1 | F | Update of reference to ETSI TS 102 223 | 12.8.0 | +| CP-68 | CP-150394 | | 0424 | 6 | B | WLAN Bearer alignment of USAT | 13.0.0 | +| CP-68 | CP-150381 | | 0434 | 2 | B | URI support by USAT SMS related features | 13.0.0 | +| CP-68 | CP-150386 | | 0429 | 3 | C | Removal of mandatory clause | 13.0.0 | +| CP-68 | CP-150394 | | 0435 | 2 | B | Enhanced IMS Call Control | 13.0.0 | + +| Date | TSG TD# | TSG | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New | +|---------|-----------|-----|-------|-----|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| CP-69 | CP-150563 | | 0436 | 3 | B | Alignment of Provide Local Information for Timing Advance to E-UTRAN radio technology | 13.1.0 | +| | | | | | | Hole in CR numbering between 437 and 626 | | +| CP-69 | CP-150563 | | 0627 | | F | Correction to Bearer parameters for UTRAN and EUTRAN | 13.1.0 | +| CP-70 | CP-150831 | | 0629 | 1 | A | Handling of a too long IMS URI | 13.2.0 | +| CP-70 | CP-150827 | | 0630 | 1 | C | Condition to send Location status and access technology change events | 13.2.0 | +| CP-71 | CP-160142 | | 0631 | 1 | B | Handling of long URI for IMS call control | 13.3.0 | +| CP-71 | CP-160144 | | 0632 | | B | Handling of long URI for MT Call event | 13.3.0 | +| CP-72 | CP-160348 | | 0635 | 1 | A | Correction / clarification of ProSe usage information reporting | 13.4.0 | +| CP-73 | CP-160549 | | 0636 | 1 | B | Adding of Extended EMM Cause to the EVENT DOWNLOAD – Network Rejection | 13.4.0 | +| CP-74 | CP-160787 | | 0644 | | A | Location Information for MO Short Message Control | 14.1.0 | +| CP-74 | CP-160788 | | 0652 | | A | Update of reference to ETSI TS 102 223 | 14.1.0 | +| CP-74 | CP-160788 | | 0654 | | A | Correction of I-WLAN specification references | 14.1.0 | +| CP-74 | CP-160790 | | 0648 | 1 | A | Essential Correction to Envelope(ProSe Report) for access control | 14.1.0 | +| CP-74 | CP-160789 | | 0653 | | D | Clarification of the encoding of the IMS Status Code | 14.1.0 | +| CP-74 | CP-160789 | | 0638 | 4 | B | URI support by USAT SMS-PP-Download | 14.1.0 | +| CP-74 | CP-160790 | | 0649 | 1 | D | Error handling by USIM in ProSe usage information reporting procedure | 14.1.0 | +| CP-74 | CP-160790 | | 0650 | 2 | D | Clarification of Envelope(ProSe Report) for error handling | 14.1.0 | +| CP-75 | CP-170212 | | 0655 | 1 | B | 3GPP PS Data Off and BIP | 14.2.0 | +| CP-75 | CP-170213 | | 0656 | 6 | B | New Event Download for Data Connection Status | 14.2.0 | +| CP-76 | CP-171165 | | 0658 | - | A | Essential correction for the Timing Advance for E-UTRAN | 14.3.0 | +| CP-76 | CP-171166 | | 0663 | - | F | Corrections for the Event Download for Data Connection Status | 14.3.0 | +| CP-77 | CP-172064 | | 0664 | 1 | D | Fixed wrong implementation of CR 0315, CR 0316 and CR 0655 | 14.4.0 | +| CP-77 | CP-172064 | | 0664a | 1 | F | Update of reference to TS 102 223 | 14.4.0 | +| CP-77 | CP-172064 | | 0665 | 1 | F | Date and time for MTC devices | 14.4.0 | +| CP-77 | CP-172064 | | 0667 | 1 | F | New class for URI support in the SET UP CALL | 14.4.0 | +| CP-78 | CP-173143 | | 0671 | 1 | B | Definition of values reserved by ETSI SCP for 3GPP usage | 14.5.0 | +| CP-78 | CP-173143 | | 0672 | 2 | B | Support of Non-IP Data Delivery by ME | 14.5.0 | +| CP79 | CP-180134 | | 0673 | 1 | B | Enhance Location Information object for NG-RAN Cell Identity | 15.1.0 | +| CP-79 | CP-180134 | | 0674 | 1 | B | Enhance Bearer object in Toolkit spec to accommodate 5GS | 15.1.0 | +| CP-80 | CP-181152 | | 0677 | 1 | A | Make Date and Time field conditional in Data Connection Status Change event in 31.111. | 15.1.0 | +| CP-80 | CP-181152 | | 0679 | 1 | A | Remove ambiguity in Location Status Event and Access Tech Event related text in 31.111. | 15.1.0 | +| CP-80 | CP-181155 | | 0680 | 2 | B | Update the UICC Toolkit Data Connection Status Change Event for 5GS | 15.3.0 | +| CP-80 | CP-181155 | | 0681 | 1 | B | Update the UICC Toolkit Network Reject Event for 5GS | 15.3.0 | +| CP-80 | CP-181155 | | 0682 | 2 | B | 5G support for the OPEN CHANNEL command | 15.3.0 | +| CP-80 | CP-181155 | | 0683 | 2 | B | Call Control update for PDU sessions | 15.3.0 | +| CP-80 | CP-181155 | | 0686 | 4 | B | 5G support for the OPEN CHANNEL command | 15.3.0 | +| | | | | | | Wrong Specification Numbering | 15.3.1 | +| 2018-09 | CP-182185 | | 0684 | 4 | B | Network Measurement Report update for NR | 15.4.0 | +| 2018-09 | CP-182185 | | 0687 | 2 | B | Update the version number of ETSI TS 102223 to latest | 15.4.0 | +| 2018-09 | CP-182185 | | 0689 | 4 | B | Update the UICC Toolkit Data Connection Status Change Event for 5GS | 15.4.0 | +| 2018-09 | CP-182184 | | 0690 | 2 | A | Overview clause of Call control by USIM missing PDN related overview. | 15.4.0 | +| 2018-09 | CP-182185 | | 0691 | 2 | B | Enhance Location Information object to accommodate 3 byte TAC for 5GS. | 15.4.0 | +| 2018-09 | CP-182185 | | 0692 | 4 | D | Correction to Annex U | 15.4.0 | +| 2018-09 | CP-182185 | | 0693 | 3 | B | SMS-PP Data download procedure to support SoR using 5G NAS | 15.4.0 | +| 2018-09 | CP-182185 | | 0694 | 1 | B | Fix implementation error for USIM Call Control procedure and allow updating only the operator specific ePCOs. | 15.4.0 | +| 2018-09 | CP-182189 | | 0695 | 1 | F | Correct implementation error for terminal profile bits for non-IP data delivery | 15.4.0 | +| 2018-09 | CP-182185 | | 0705 | - | B | Addition of DNN object in PDU session establishment parameters | 15.4.0 | +| 2018-12 | CP-183185 | | 0706 | 3 | C | Enable procedure for update of Routing ID data in the UICC, as triggered by the UDM. | 15.5.0 | +| 2018-12 | CP-183185 | | 0707 | 1 | F | 5G Call Control by USIM shall take into account SM PDU DN container length. | 15.5.0 | +| 2018-12 | CP-183185 | | 0708 | - | F | Change NR ARFCN length in NMR from 3 to 4 to be future proof. | 15.5.0 | +| 2018-12 | CP-183185 | | 0710 | 1 | F | Correction to CALL CONTROL command for PDU session establishment | 15.5.0 | +| 2018-12 | CP-183185 | | 0711 | 1 | F | Correction due to incorrect TS 24.501 clause referred | 15.5.0 | +| 2018-12 | CP-183185 | | 0713 | 1 | F | Correction to address data field in SMS-PP DOWNLOAD command | 15.5.0 | +| 2019-03 | CP-190047 | | 0716 | - | F | Align Routing Indicator data update procedure with CT1 referring to data as data set. | 15.6.0 | +| 2019-03 | CP-190047 | | 0717 | 2 | C | Update Routing Indicator data update procedure to indicate REFRESH type. | 15.6.0 | +| 2019-03 | CP-190046 | | 0718 | - | F | Correction of specification version in Annex U | 15.6.0 | +| 2019-03 | CP-190044 | | 0721 | - | F | Correction of the reference used in cl. 8.143 | 15.6.0 | +| 2019-03 | CP-190046 | | 0720 | - | A | Update Annex A to align with letter classes allocated by ETSI SCP | 15.6.0 | +| 2019-09 | CP-192014 | | 0723 | 1 | F | Update reference to Rel-15 version of ETSI TS 102.223 in 3GPP TS 31.111 | 15.7.0 | +| 2019-12 | CP-193076 | | 0726 | 1 | F | Specify the 'data connection type' in command parameters/data definition in clause 7.5.25.2. | 15.8.0 | +| 2020-03 | CP-200087 | | 0725 | 6 | F | Correction to Bearer Description data object | 16.0.0 | +| 2020-03 | CP-200087 | | 0727 | 2 | B | Introducing Network Measurement Results for NG-RAN | 16.0.0 | +| 2020-03 | CP-200087 | | 0729 | 2 | | Alignment of Provide Local Information for Timing Advance to NG-RAN radio technology | 16.0.0 | +| 2020-03 | CP-200087 | | 0730 | - | B | PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION to get Slice(s) information | 16.0.0 | + +| Date | TSG TD# | TSG | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New | +|---------|-----------|--------|------|-----|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 2020-06 | CP-201154 | | 0732 | 7 | A | Update the scope of 31.111 to cover 2/5G aspects | 16.1.0 | +| 2020-06 | CP-201154 | | 0735 | 1 | A | Essential correction to network measurement results for E-UTRAN | 16.1.0 | +| 2020-06 | CP-201154 | | 0737 | 3 | A | Update the Network Rejection event and Update/Attach/Registration Type | 16.1.0 | +| 2020-06 | CP-201141 | | 0734 | 1 | D | Make more clear that the value part of the Tracking Area Identity information element specified in TS 24.501 is for NG-RAN. | 16.1.0 | +| 2020-09 | CP-202137 | | 0740 | - | F | Update of routing indicator, TAC and update/attach | 16.2.0 | +| 2020-09 | CP-202137 | | 0743 | - | F | Missing tags in clause 9.3 | 16.2.0 | +| 2020-09 | CP-202137 | | 0744 | - | F | Correction on the coding of PDU session Type from Bearer description for NG-RAN | 16.2.0 | +| 2020-12 | CP-203088 | | 0747 | - | F | Correction to 8.22 Network Measurement Result (Rel 16) | 16.3.0 | +| 2020-12 | CP-203089 | | 0746 | 2 | F | Update Measurement Qualifier for NGRAN | 16.3.0 | +| 2021-03 | CP-210079 | | 0750 | - | A | Address parameter not present for SoR use case on ENVELOPE PP-DD command | 16.4.0 | +| 2021-12 | CP-213165 | CT#94 | 0754 | - | F | Correction of ENVELOPE commands | 16.5.0 | +| 2022-03 | CP-220131 | CT#95 | 0763 | - | F | Reallocation of TAG VALUE for 'NG-RAN Primary Timing Advance Information' | 16.6.0 | +| 2022-03 | CP-220131 | CT#95 | 0767 | 1 | F | Correction of byte usage in clause 5.2 | 16.6.0 | +| 2022-12 | CP-223076 | CT#98e | 0778 | 2 | A | Update for the procedure of SMS-PP data download via REGISTRATION ACCEPT or DL NAS TRANSPORT messages. | 16.7.0 | +| 2022-12 | CP-223078 | CT#98e | 0780 | 3 | F | 31.111 corrections Rel-16 to TERMINAL PROFILE bits name and TERMINAL RESPONSE command length and Slice information length | 16.7.0 | +| 2023-03 | CP-233100 | CT#99 | 0784 | - | A | Update of 5G EFs for EFIMSI changing procedure in Rel-16 | 16.8.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31115/33a8f3f01dfa8bce75d23017855a13c5_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31115/33a8f3f01dfa8bce75d23017855a13c5_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..88125fcec5282af6a69d80db6b939450f45b488b --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31115/33a8f3f01dfa8bce75d23017855a13c5_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version 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@@ -0,0 +1,637 @@ + + +# 3GPP TS 31.115 V16.0.0 (2020-03) + +*Technical Specification* + +## **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Secured packet structure for (Universal) Subscriber Identity Module (U)SIM Toolkit applications (Release 16)** + +![LTE Advanced Pro logo](64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg) + +The logo for LTE Advanced Pro, featuring the letters 'lte' in a bold, lowercase font. Above the 'e' is the text 'Advanced Pro' in a smaller font. To the right of the 'e' is a green signal strength icon with four bars. + +LTE Advanced Pro logo + +![3GPP logo](5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg) + +The 3GPP logo, consisting of the letters '3GPP' in a stylized, bold font. Below the 'P' is a red signal strength icon with three bars. Below the logo, the text 'A GLOBAL INITIATIVE' is written in a smaller, uppercase font. + +3GPP logo + +The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP. The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organizational Partners and shall not be implemented. This Specification is provided for future development work within 3GPP only. The Organizational Partners accept no liability for any use of this Specification. Specifications and Reports for implementation of the 3GPP™ system should be obtained via the 3GPP Organizational Partners' Publications Offices. + +## **3GPP** + +--- + +Postal address + +--- + +3GPP support office address + +--- + +650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis +Valbonne - FRANCE +Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 + +--- + +Internet + +--- + + + +## --- **Copyright Notification** --- + +No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. +The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. + +© 2020, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC). +All rights reserved. + +UMTS™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members +3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association + +# --- Contents + +| | | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| Foreword ..... | 4 | +| Introduction ..... | 5 | +| 1 Scope..... | 6 | +| 2 References..... | 6 | +| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 7 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 7 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 7 | +| 4 Implementation for SMS-PP..... | 7 | +| 4.1 Structure of the UDH in a secured Short Message Point to Point..... | 7 | +| 4.2 Structure of the Command Packet contained in a Single Short Message Point to Point ..... | 8 | +| 4.3 A Command Packet contained in Concatenated Short Messages Point to Point ..... | 9 | +| 4.4 Structure of the Response Packet..... | 10 | +| 4.5 A Response Packet contained in Concatenated Short Messages Point to Point ..... | 11 | +| 5 Implementation for SMS-CB..... | 12 | +| 5.1 Structure of the CBS page in the SMS-CB Message ..... | 12 | +| 5.2 A Command Packet contained in a SMS-CB message..... | 12 | +| 5.3 Structure of the Response Packet for a SMS-CB Message..... | 13 | +| 6 Implementation for USSD ..... | 13 | +| 6.1 Structure of the Command Packet contained in a Single USSD Message..... | 14 | +| 6.2 Structure of the Command Packet contained in concatenated USSD Messages ..... | 14 | +| 6.3 Structure of the Response Packet..... | 14 | +| 6.4 Structure of the Response Packet contained in concatenated USSD Messages..... | 15 | +| 7 Specific Response Status Codes ..... | 16 | +| 8 Implementation for HTTP..... | 16 | +| Annex A (normative): USSD String format..... | 17 | +| Annex B (informative): Change History ..... | 19 | + +# Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings: + +- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something +- shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something + +The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports. + +The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document. + +- should** indicates a recommendation to do something +- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something +- may** indicates permission to do something +- need not** indicates permission not to do something + +The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended. + +- can** indicates that something is possible +- cannot** indicates that something is impossible + +The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not". + +- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +In addition: + +**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements. + +# --- Introduction + +The present document is the result of a split of TS 23.048 Release 5 between the generic part and the bearers specific application. The generic part has been transferred to SCP. The present document is the bearers specific part. + +# 1 Scope + +The present document specifies the structure of the Secured Packets in implementations using Short Message Service Point to Point (SMS-PP), Short Message Service Cell Broadcast (SMS-CB), Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) and and Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) based on ETSI TS 102 225 [9]. + +The structure of the Secured Packets shall comply with the one defined in ETSI TS 102 225 [9]. The present document only contains additional requirements or explicit limitations for SIM/USIM applications. + +It is applicable to the exchange of secured packets between an entity in a PLMN and an entity in the (U)SIM. + +Secured Packets contain application messages to which certain mechanisms according to ETSI TS 102 224 [2] have been applied. Application messages are commands or data exchanged between an application resident in or behind the PLMN and on the (U)SIM. The Sending/Receiving Entity in the PLMN and the UICC are responsible for applying the security mechanisms to the application messages and thus turning them into Secured Packets. + +# 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. + - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. + - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] ETSI TS 102 224 V8.0.0: "Smart Cards; Security mechanisms for UICC based Applications – Functional requirements". +- [3] 3GPP TS 23.040: "Technical realization of the Short Message Service (SMS)". +- [4] 3GPP TS 24.011: "Point-to-Point (PP) Short Message Service (SMS) support on mobile radio interface". +- [5] ETSI TS 101 220 "Smart Cards; ETSI numbering system for telecommunication application providers". +- [6] 3GPP TS 23.041: "Technical realization of Cell Broadcast Service (CBS)". +- [7] 3GPP TS 24.012: "Short Message Service Cell Broadcast (SMSCB) support on the mobile radio interface". +- [8] 3GPP TS 23.038: "Alphabets and language-specific information". +- [9] ETSI TS 102 225 V12.1.0: "Smart Cards; Secured packet structure for UICC based applications". +- [10] 3GPP TS 24.090: "Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) – Stage 3". + +# 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in ETSI TS 102 225 [9] and the following apply: + +**Message Identifier:** two-octet field used to identify the source and type of the message + +**Page Parameter:** single octet field used to represent the CBS page number in the sequence and the total number of pages in the SMS-CB message + +**Serial Number:** two octet field which identifies a particular message +It is linked to the Message Identifier and is altered every time the message is changed + +**Short Message:** information that may be conveyed by means of the SMS Service as defined in TS 23.040 [3]. + +**USSD message:** information that may be conveyed in the USSD-String field of a Facility message as defined in TS 24.090 [10]. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purpose of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TS 102 225 [9] and the following apply: + +| | | +|--------|--------------------------------------------| +| CBC | Cipher Block Chaining | +| CBS | Cell Broadcast Service | +| CCF | Concatenation Control Field | +| DCS | Data Coding Scheme | +| IEI | Information Element Identifier | +| IEIDL | Information Element Identifier Data Length | +| IED | Information Element Data | +| MID | Message Identifier | +| MO-SMS | Mobile Originated Short Message Service | +| MT-SMS | Mobile Terminated Short Message Service | +| PFI | Packet Format Information | +| PLMN | Public Land Mobile Network | +| PP | Page Parameter | +| SIM | Subscriber Identity Module | +| SM | Short Message | +| SMS | Short Message Service | +| SMS-PP | Short Message Service – Point to Point | +| SMS-CB | Short Message Service – Cell Broadcast | +| SMS-SC | Short Message Service – Service Centre | +| SN | Serial Number | +| UM | USSD message | +| USIM | Universal Subscriber Identity Module | +| USSD | Unstructured Supplementary Service Data | + +# 4 Implementation for SMS-PP + +## 4.1 Structure of the UDH in a secured Short Message Point to Point + +The coding of the SMS-DELIVER, SMS-SUBMIT, SMS-DELIVER-REPORT header shall indicate that the data is binary (8 bit data), and not 7 bit or 16 bit. In order to invoke the UDH functionality of relevant SMS element, the UDH bit shall be set as defined in TS 23.040 [3]. + +However, in the case of a Response Packet originating from the UICC, due to the inability of the UICC to indicate to a ME that the UDHI bit should be set, the Response Packet SMS will not have the UDHI bit set, and the Sending Entity shall treat the Response Packet as if the UDHI bit was set. + +The generalised structure of the UDH in the Short Message element is contained in the User Data part of the Short Message element and is described in TS 23.040 [3]. The Command Packet and the Response Packet are partially mapped into this UDH structure. + +Information Element Identifiers (IEI's) values range '70 – 7F' are reserved in TS 23.040 [3] for use in the present document and allocated as follows: + +- '70' and '71' are specified in the present document +- values '72 – 7D' are reserved for future use +- '7E' and '7F' are for proprietary implementations. + +If a Response Packet (Response Header + Data) is too large to be contained in a single Short Message (including the Response Header), it shall be concatenated according to TS 23.040 [3]. + +If it is indicated in the SPI2 of a Command Packet to send back a PoR using SMS-DELIVER-REPORT and if the Response Packet is too large to be contained in a single SMS-DELIVER-REPORT – TP element, then: + +- One single Response Packet shall be sent back to the SE using SMS-DELIVER-REPORT. This Response Packet: + - Shall not contain any additional response data. + - Shall contain the Response Status Code set to "Actual response data to be sent using SMS-SUBMIT". + - The security applied to this Response Packet shall follow the coding and rules as defined in ETSI TS 102 225 [9]. +- This shall be followed by a complete Response Packet, contained in one SMS-SUBMIT element or in a concatenated Short Message composed of several SMS-SUBMIT elements. + +## 4.2 Structure of the Command Packet contained in a Single Short Message Point to Point + +CPI identifies the Command Packet and indicates that the first portion of the SM (8 bit data) contains the Command Packet Length (CPL), the Command Header Length (CHL) followed by the remainder of the Command Header: the Secured Data follows on immediately as the remainder of the SM element. + +The relationship between the Command Packet and its inclusion in the UDH structure of a single Short Message defined in TS 23.040 [3] is as following: + +- CPI is mapped to IEIa defined in TS 23.040 [3] and shall be set to '70'. +- IEDa defined in TS 23.040 [3] shall be a null field and its length IEIDL a shall be set to '00'. + +The following Table 1 indicates the Command Packet contained in a single SMS-PP. It is a particular implementation for single SMS-PP of the generic Command Packet structure described in ETSI TS 102 225 [9]. + +**Table 1: Structure of the Command Packet contained in the SM (8 bit data)** + +| Command Packet Elements | Length | Description | +|---------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Command Packet Length | 2 octets (see NOTE) | Length of the Command Packet (CPL), coded over 2 octets, and shall not be coded as the length of BER-TLV data objects described in ETSI TS 101 220 [5]. | +| Command Header Identifier | Null field | (CHI) Null field. | +| Command Header Length | 1 octet | Length of the Command Header (CHL), coded over one octet, and shall not be coded as the length of BER-TLV data objects described in ETSI TS 101 220 [5]. | +| SPI to RC/CC/DS in the Command Header | Variable | The remainder of the Command Header as described in ETSI TS 102 225 [9]. | +| Secured Data | Variable | Application Message, including possible padding octets as described in ETSI TS 102 225 [9]. | + +NOTE: Whilst not absolutely necessary in this particular instance, this field is necessary for the case where concatenated Short Message is employed (see clause 4.3). + +It is recognised that most checksum algorithms require input data in modulo 8 length. In order to achieve a modulo 8 length of the data before the RC/CC/DS field in the Command Header the Length of the Command Packet and the Length of the Command Header shall be included in the calculation of RC/CC/DS if used. These fields shall not be ciphered. + +When receiving a secured Command Packet requesting a Proof of Receipt (PoR), the Receiving Entity shall follow the coding and rules as defined in ETSI TS 102 225 [9]. The Receiving Entity shall verify the authenticity of the Sending Entity. If the Receiving Entity cannot authenticate the Sending Entity, the Receiving Entity shall not send any Response Packet and discard the Command Packet with no further action being taken, as described in ETSI TS 102 225 [9], clause 4.1. + +The SPI shall be coded as specified in ETSI TS 102 225 [9]. The b6 of the second octet is used for SMS only and shall be coded as followed: + +Second Octet: + +![](99bae07626f60f9ede10e2e387ef7051_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | | | | +| | | | | | | | | Coded as defined in ETSI TS 102 225 [9] | | | | +| | | | | | | | | | Coded as defined in ETSI TS 102 225 [9] | | | +| | | | | | | | | | | Coded as defined in ETSI TS 102 225 [9] | | +| | | | | | | | | | | | For SMS only
0: PoR response shall be sent using
SMS-DELIVER-REPORT
1: PoR response shall be sent using SMS-SUBMIT | +| | | | | | | | | | | | | + +## 4.3 A Command Packet contained in Concatenated Short Messages Point to Point + +If a Command Packet is longer than 140 octets (including the Command Header), it shall be concatenated according to TS 23.040 [3]. + +The relationship between the Command Packet and its inclusion in the structure of a concatenated Short Message defined in TS 23.040 [3] is as following: + +- The entire Command Packet including the Command Header shall be separated into its component concatenated parts. The structure of the Command Packet contained in a concatenated SMS-PP is as described in Table 1 of this specification. +- The first Short Message shall contain the Concatenation Control Header as defined in TS 23.040 [3] identified by IEIa and the Command Packet Identifier (CPI) in the User Data Header. The relationship between the Command Packet and its inclusion in the structure of the first concatenated Short Message is as described in clause 4.2 for a single Short Message. + +NOTE: The ordering of the various elements of the UDH defined in TS 23.040 [3] is not important. + +- In each subsequent Short Message in the concatenated series, the Concatenation Control Header shall be present. The Concatenation Control Header shall be set as defined in TS 23.040[3]. The CPI, CPL and Command Header shall not be present. + +Example of concatenation, 8-bit reference number: + +if in the first Short Message the Concatenation Control Header is identified by IEIa, the CPI is mapped to IEIb and no other IEI is present, then the UDHL field contains the length of the total User Data Header i.e the Concatenation Control Header, the CPI and IEIDLb (UDHL shall be set to '07' with IEIa set to '00'). In subsequent Short Message's in the concatenated series, the UDHL contains the length of the Concatenation Control Header only, as there is no subsequent Command Packet Information Element CPI and IEIDLb). + +If the data is ciphered, then it is ciphered as described above, before being broken down into individual concatenated elements. The Concatenation Control Header of the UDH in each SM shall not be ciphered. + +In order to achieve a modulo 8 length of the data before the RC/CC/DS field in the Command Header, the Length of the Command Packet and the Length of the Command Header shall be included in the calculation of RC/CC/DS if used. These fields shall not be ciphered. + +The SPI shall be coded and shall follow the rules as specified in TS 102 225 [9]. The b6 of the second octet is used only for SMS and shall be coded as described for a single short message. + +An example illustrating the relationship between a Command Packet split over a sequence of three Short Messages is shown below. + +![Diagram illustrating the structure of a Command Packet split over three Short Messages (SMS).](fc69ceb1dee1da7e33bd6c38fc4ceab9_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows a Command Packet (CH) and Secured data split across three Short Messages (SMS). The top row shows the original packet structure: CH, Secured data, and Padding. The bottom row shows the split structure across three SMS: + +- First SMS in sequence:** Contains CC1, CH, and a portion of the Secured data. +- Second SMS:** Contains CC2 and a portion of the Secured data. +- Third and final SMS:** Contains CC3 and the remaining portion of the Secured data. + +Lines connect the CH and Secured data segments from the top row to their respective positions in the bottom row. Vertical bars indicate the boundaries between the SMS segments. + +Diagram illustrating the structure of a Command Packet split over three Short Messages (SMS). + +where CCn = Concatenation Control (1,2,3) +CH = Command Header + +The Command Header includes here CPL, CHL, SPI to RC/CC/DS + +**Figure 2: Example of command split using concatenated point to point SMS** + +## 4.4 Structure of the Response Packet + +The Response Packet is as follows. This message is generated by the Receiving Entity and possibly includes some data supplied by the Receiving Application, and returned to the Sending Entity/Sending Application. In the case where the Receiving Entity is the UICC, depending on bit 6 of the second octet of the SPI, this Response Packet is generated on the UICC, either: + +- retrieved by the ME from the UICC, and included in the User-Data part of the SMS-DELIVER-REPORT returned to the network; or +- fetched by the ME from the UICC after the Send Short Message proactive command. + +The structure of an SMS-DELIVER/SUBMIT User Data object is defined in TS 23.040 [3]. + +RPI identifies the Response Packet and indicates that the first portion of the SM (8 bit data) contains the Response Packet Length (RPL), the Response Header Length (RHL) followed by the remainder of the Response Header: the Secured Data follows on immediately as the remainder of the SM element. + +The relationship between the Response Packet and its inclusion in the UDH structure of a single Short Message defined in TS 23.040 [3] is as following: + +- RPI is mapped to IEIa defined in TS 23.040 [3] and shall be set to '71'. +- IEDa defined in TS 23.040 [3] shall be a null field and its length IEIDL a shall be set to '00'. + +The following Table 3 indicates the Response Packet contained in a single SMS-PP. It is a particular implementation for single SMS-PP of the generic Response Packet structure described in ETSI TS 102 225 [9]. + +**Table 3: Structure of the Response Packet contained in the SM (8 bit data)** + +| Generalised Response Packet Elements (Refer to table 3) | Length | Description | +|---------------------------------------------------------|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Response Packet Length | 2 octets | Length of the Response Packet (RPL), coded over 2 octets, and shall not be coded as the length of BER-TLV data objects described in ETSI TS 101 220 [5]. (see note) | +| Response Header Identifier | | (RHI) Null field. | +| Response Header Length | 1 octet | Length of the Response Header (RHL), coded over one octet, and shall not be coded as the length of BER-TLV data objects described in ETSI TS 101 220 [5]. | +| TAR to RC/CC/DS elements in the Response Header | Variable | The remainder of the Response Header as described in ETSI TS 102 225 [9].
Response Status Codes are defined in clause 7. | +| Secured Data | Variable | Additional Response Data (optional), including padding octets as described in ETSI TS 102 225 [9]. | + +NOTE: This field is not absolutely necessary but is placed here to maintain compatibility with the structure of the Command Packet when included in a SMS-SUBMIT or SMS-DELIVER. + +In order to achieve a modulo 8 length of the data before the RC/CC/DS field in the Response Header, the Length of the Response Packet, the Length of the Response Header and the three preceding octets (UDHL, IEIa and IEIDL a defined in TS 23.040 [3]) shall be included in the calculation of RC/CC/DS if used. These fields shall not be ciphered. + +## 4.5 A Response Packet contained in Concatenated Short Messages Point to Point + +- The relationship between the Response Packet and its inclusion in the structure of a concatenated Short Message defined in TS 23.040 [3] is as following: The entire Response Packet including the Response Header shall be separated into its component concatenated parts. The structure of the Response Packet contained in a concatenated SMS-PP is as described in Table 5 of this specification. +- The first Short Message shall contain the Concatenation Control Header as defined in TS 23.040 [3] identified by IEIa and the Response Packet Identifier (RPI) in the User Data Header. The relationship between the Response Packet and its inclusion in the structure of the first concatenated Short Message is as described in clause 4.4 for a single Short Message. + +NOTE: The ordering of the various elements of the UDH defined in TS 23.040 [3] is not important. + +- In each subsequent Short Message in the concatenated series, the Concatenation Control Header shall be present. The concatenation Control Header shall be set as defined in TS 23.040 [3]. The RPI, RPL and Response Header shall not be present. + +Example of concatenation, 8-bit reference number: + +if in the first Short Message the Concatenation Control Header is identified by IEIa, the RPI is mapped to IEIb and no other IEI is present, then the UDHL field contains the length of the total User Data Header i.e the Concatenation Control Header, the RPI and IEIDLb (UDHL shall be set to '07' with IEIa set to '00'). In subsequent Short Message's in the concatenated series, the UDHL contains the length of the Concatenation Control Header only, as there is no subsequent Response Packet Information Element (RPI and IEIDLb). + +**Table 5: Structure of the Response Packet contained in the SM (8 bits data)** + +| SMS-REPORT specific Elements (Refer to table 3) | Length | Comments | +|-------------------------------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| RPL | 2 octets | Length of the Response Packet (RPL), coded over 2 octets, and shall not be coded as the length of BER-TLV data objects described in ETSI TS 101 220 [5]. | +| RHI | | (RHI) Null field. | +| RHL | 1 octet | Length of the Response Header (RHL), coded over one octet, and shall not be coded as the length of BER-TLV data objects described in ETSI TS 101 220 [5]. | +| TAR to RC/CC/DS elements in the Response Header | Variable | The remainder of the Response Header as described in ETSI TS 102 225 [9]. | +| Secured Data | Variable | Additional Response Data (optional), including padding octets as described in ETSI TS 102 225 [9]. | + +If the data is ciphered, then it is ciphered as specified in ETSI TS 102 225 [9], before being broken down into individual concatenated elements. The concatenation Control Header of the UDH in each SM shall not be ciphered. + +In order to achieve a modulo 8 length of the data before the RC/CC/DS field in the Response Header, the RPL, the RHL and three octets set to '02' '71' '00', which precede the RPL, shall be included in the calculation of RC/CC/DS if used. These fields shall not be ciphered. + +# 5 Implementation for SMS-CB + +## 5.1 Structure of the CBS page in the SMS-CB Message + +The CBS page sent to the MS by the BTS is a fixed block of 88 octets as coded in TS 24.012 [7]. The 88 octets of CBS information consist of a 6-octet header and 82 user octets. + +The 6-octet header is used to indicate the message content as defined in TS 23.041 [6]. This information is required to be transmitted unsecured in order for the ME to handle the message in the correct manner (e.g. interpretation of the DCS). + +The content of the message shall be secured as defined in this clause. + +A range of values has been reserved in TS 23.041 [6] to indicate SMS-CB Data Download messages that are secured and unsecured. A subset of these values is used to indicate the Command Packet for CBS messages. + +## 5.2 A Command Packet contained in a SMS-CB message + +The relationship between the Command Packet and its inclusion in the SMS-CB message structure defined in TS 23.041 [6] is the following: + +- CPI coded on 2 octets is mapped to MID defined in TS 23.041 [6] and the range is from (hexadecimal) '1080' to '109F'. This range is reserved in TS 23.041 [6]. + +NOTE: Generally, the CPI is coded on 1 octet, as specified in table 1 of ETSI TS 102 225 [9]. However, the CPI for the SMS-CB message is coded on 2 octets as the values reserved in TS 23.041 [6] to identify the Command Packet are MID values which are coded on 2 octets. + +- SN, DCS, PP shall be coded as defined in TS 23.041 [6] for Cell Broadcast. + +The structure of the Command Packet contained in the Content of Message of the first CBS page is as described in Table 1 of this specification. + +It is recognised that most checksum algorithms require input data in modulo 8 length. In order to achieve a modulo 8 length of the data before the RC/CC/DS field in the Command Header the Length of the Command Packet and the Length of the Command Header shall be included in the calculation of RC/CC/DS if used. These fields shall not be ciphered. + +Securing of the complete CBS message is achieved outside the 3GPP specifications by the Sending Entity. The Secured CBS message is formatted in accordance with the 3GPP specifications and transmitted to the MS as CBS pages. The CBS pages are received by the ME and sent directly to the UICC, by analysing the MID value. The UICC shall then reassemble, decrypt and process the message. + +An example illustrating the relationship between a Command Packet split over a sequence of three SMS-CB pages is shown below. + +![Diagram illustrating the split of a Command Packet over three concatenated CBS pages. The top row shows a single Command Packet structure with three fields: CH (Command Header), Secured Data, and Padding. Below this, three separate CBS pages are shown. Each page has a Header field. The first page's Header is connected to the CH field of the Command Packet. The second and third pages' Headers are connected to the Secured Data field. The Padding field is connected to the third page's Header. The labels below the pages are 'First CBS page in the sequence', 'Second CBS page', and 'Third and final CBS page'.](4636adff5682a064f0ae5f13a1d464a6_img.jpg) + +Diagram illustrating the split of a Command Packet over three concatenated CBS pages. The top row shows a single Command Packet structure with three fields: CH (Command Header), Secured Data, and Padding. Below this, three separate CBS pages are shown. Each page has a Header field. The first page's Header is connected to the CH field of the Command Packet. The second and third pages' Headers are connected to the Secured Data field. The Padding field is connected to the third page's Header. The labels below the pages are 'First CBS page in the sequence', 'Second CBS page', and 'Third and final CBS page'. + +In the above figure, Header = 6 Octet header as defined in TS 23.041 [6] (i.e. SN, MID, DCS and PP) and CH = Command Header includes here the CPL, CHL, SPI to RC/CC/DS. + +**Figure 3: Example of command split using concatenated CB SMS** + +## 5.3 Structure of the Response Packet for a SMS-CB Message + +As there is no response mechanism defined for SMS-CB, there is no defined structure for the (Secured) Response Packet. However, if a (Secured) Response Packet is sent via another bearer the structure shall be defined by the Receiving Application. + +# 6 Implementation for USSD + +The USSD application mode enables the transparent transport of data between an application residing in the network and a UICC based application. In such a case, to secure the payload of USSD operations, security mechanisms defined in TS 102 225 [9] shall be applied to the USSD messages. Generic secured Command Packet and secured Response Packet as defined in TS 102 225 [9] are contained, as defined hereafter, in the UM part of the USSD String. The USSD String shall be formatted according to annex X, where the PFI byte indicates that Application Data are formatted according to the present document. + +The Data Coding Scheme of the USSD String (as defined in TS 23.038 [8]) shall be set to 0x96 (DCS = '10010110') to indicate that data is binary (8 bit data), and formatted according to annex X. In USSD Application mode, which uses an 8-bit character set, the maximum length of the USSD String field is 160 bytes. + +Command and Response packets exceeding 159 bytes shall be segmented as described in clauses 6.2 and 6.4. + +## 6.1 Structure of the Command Packet contained in a Single USSD Message + +The UM field of an USSD String contains the Command Packet. + +The Command Packet shall be coded as the generic Command Packet described in TS 102 225 [9]. + +In the Command Packet, the Command Packet Identifier (CPI) value is '03' and the Command Header Identifier (CHI) is a Null field. + +CPI, CPL and CHL shall be included in the calculation of the RC/CC/DS. + +The SPI shall be coded as specified in TS 102 225 [9]. + +## 6.2 Structure of the Command Packet contained in concatenated USSD Messages + +If the Command Packet, which is structured as described in clause 6.1, is longer than 159 bytes (including the Command Header) then it shall be handled as follows. + +- The entire Command Packet including the Command Header shall be separated into its component concatenated parts. +- The Command Packet is handled as a Concatenated USSD Message as described in annex X of the present document. +- The Command Packet Header will only be present in the first segment of a concatenated message. + +If the data is ciphered, then it is ciphered as described above, before being broken down into individual concatenated elements. + +CPI, CPL and CHL shall be included in the calculation of the RC/CC/DS. + +The SPI shall be coded as specified in TS 102 225 [9]. + +An example illustrating a Command Packet split over a sequence of three messages is shown below. + +![Diagram showing a Command Packet split into three USSD messages. The original packet consists of CH, Secured Data, and Padding. Message 1 contains PFI, CCF1, CH, and the first part of Secured Data. Message 2 contains PFI, CCF2, and the second part of Secured Data. Message 3 contains PFI, CCF3, the final part of Secured Data, and Padding.](7c836a1c6836ec9b57b35aa4b2b66375_img.jpg) + +``` + + graph TD + subgraph "Original Command Packet" + CP[CH | Secured Data | Padding] + end + + CP --> M1[PFI | CCF1 | CH | Secured Data Part 1] + CP --> M2[PFI | CCF2 | Secured Data Part 2] + CP --> M3[PFI | CCF3 | Secured Data Part 3 | Padding] + + M1 --- T1[First message in sequence] + M2 --- T2[Second message] + M3 --- T3[Third and last message] + +``` + +Where CCFn = Concatenation Control Field (1,2,3) + PFI = Packet Format Information (see Annex) + CH = Command Header + +Diagram showing a Command Packet split into three USSD messages. The original packet consists of CH, Secured Data, and Padding. Message 1 contains PFI, CCF1, CH, and the first part of Secured Data. Message 2 contains PFI, CCF2, and the second part of Secured Data. Message 3 contains PFI, CCF3, the final part of Secured Data, and Padding. + +**Figure 4: Example of command split using concatenated USSD messages** + +## 6.3 Structure of the Response Packet + +The Response Packet is generated by the Receiving Entity and possibly includes some data supplied by the Receiving Application, and returned to the Sending Entity/Sending Application. In the case where the Receiving Entity is the + +UICC, this Response Packet is generated on the UICC, retrieved by the ME from the UICC, and included in the Return Result Component of a Facility message (see TS 24.090 [10]) returned to the network. + +The USSD operations are defined in TS 24.090 [10]. + +The UM field of an USSD String contains the Response Packet. + +The Response Packet shall be coded as the generic Response Packet described in TS 102 225 [9]. + +In the Response Packet, the Response Packet Identifier (RPI) value is '04' and the Response Header Identifier (RHI) is a Null field. + +RPI, RPL and RHL shall be included in the calculation of the RC/CC/DS. + +Coding of Response Status Codes is defined in clause 7. + +## 6.4 Structure of the Response Packet contained in concatenated USSD Messages + +If the Response Packet, which is structured as described in clause 6.3, is longer than 159 bytes (including the Response Header) then it shall be handled as follows. + +- The entire Response Packet including the Response Header shall be separated into its component concatenated parts. +- The Response Packet is handled as a Concatenated USSD Message as described in annex X of the present document. +- The Response Packet Header will only be present in the first segment of a concatenated message. + +If the data is ciphered, then it is ciphered as described above, before being broken down into individual concatenated elements. + +RPI, RPL and RHL shall be included in the calculation of the RC/CC/DS. + +An example illustrating a Response Packet split over a sequence of three messages is shown below. + +![Diagram illustrating the structure of a response packet split into three concatenated USSD messages. The top row shows the original packet structure: RH (Response Header), Secured Data (Optional), and Padding. The bottom row shows the split structure across three messages. Each message contains a PFI (Packet Format Information), a CCFn (Concatenation Control Field), and a portion of the data. The first message includes the RH. The second and third messages include the CCFn and the remaining data. A legend box at the bottom left defines the fields: CCFn = Concatenation Control Field (1,2,3), PFI = Packet Format Information (see Annex), and RH = Response Header.](57f8e374b0e99c488f68c46b713ffc64_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|---------------------------|------|-------------------------|--|----------------|-----|------|--|------------------------|-----|------|--|--| +| RH | | Secured Data (Optional) | | | | | | Padding | | | | | +| PFI | CCF1 | RH | | | PFI | CCF2 | | | PFI | CCF3 | | | +| First message in sequence | | | | Second message | | | | Third and last message | | | | | + +Where CCFn = Concatenation Control Field (1,2,3) + PFI = Packet Format Information (see Annex) + RH = Response Header + +Diagram illustrating the structure of a response packet split into three concatenated USSD messages. The top row shows the original packet structure: RH (Response Header), Secured Data (Optional), and Padding. The bottom row shows the split structure across three messages. Each message contains a PFI (Packet Format Information), a CCFn (Concatenation Control Field), and a portion of the data. The first message includes the RH. The second and third messages include the CCFn and the remaining data. A legend box at the bottom left defines the fields: CCFn = Concatenation Control Field (1,2,3), PFI = Packet Format Information (see Annex), and RH = Response Header. + +**Figure 5: Example of Response split using concatenated USSD messages** + +If it is indicated in the SPI2 of a Command Packet to send back a PoR and if the Response Packet is too large to be contained in a single USSD String, then: + +- One single Response Packet shall be sent back to the SE using the Return Result Component contained in the subsequent Facility message. This Response Packet: + - Shall not contain any additional response data + +- Shall contain the Response Status Code set to '0C' ('Actual response data to be sent using a ProcessUnstructuredSS-Request invoke component (i.e. using SEND USSD proactive command) '). +- The security applied to this Response Packet shall be the one indicated in the SPI2 of the Command Packet. +- This shall be followed by a complete Response Packet, contained in a concatenated USSD Message as defined above + +# --- 7 Specific Response Status Codes + +| Status Code (hexadecimal) | Meaning | +|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| '00' to '0A' | See TS 102 225 [9] | +| '0B' | Actual response data to be sent using SMS-SUBMIT. See clause 4.4. | +| '0C' | Actual response data to be sent using a ProcessUnstructuredSS-Request invoke component (i.e. using Send USSD proactive command). See clause 6.3 | +| '0D' – 'FF' | See TS 102 225 [9] | + +**Specific Response Status Codes** + +# --- 8 Implementation for HTTP + +The security for data exchange over TCP is provided by TLS. The HTTP protocol is used on top of TLS to provide encapsulation of the data and information about the receiving entity. + +See ETSI TS 102 225 [9] + +# Annex A (normative): USSD String format + +For the purpose of UICC-based application, the USSD String shall be coded as follows: + +![Diagram of USSD String format showing Header (PFI, CCF) and UM (USSD Message) fields.](33a8f3f01dfa8bce75d23017855a13c5_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows a horizontal bar representing the USSD String format. It is divided into three main sections: 'Header', 'PFI', and 'UM (USSD Message)'. The 'Header' section is indicated by a double-headed arrow above the 'PFI' and 'CCF' fields. The 'PFI' field is a single byte, and the 'CCF' field is a 3-byte optional field. The 'UM (USSD Message)' field follows the header. + +Diagram of USSD String format showing Header (PFI, CCF) and UM (USSD Message) fields. + +Figure 6: USSD String format + +The header of an USSD Message may contain two fields: + +- A mandatory PFI field, which is coded on 1 byte. The PFI contains information on the format of the USSD String. +- An optional CCF field, which is coded on 3 bytes. The CCF field presence is indicated by the PFI. + +The PFI is coded as follows. + +| B8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | | | | | X | 0 | 0 | Proprietary Application Data format | +| | | | | | X | 0 | 1 | Application Data formatted according to the present document.
If b2 b1 = '01' (Application Data formatted according to the present document), then b3 shall be coded as follows: | +| | | | | | 0 | 0 | 1 | No CCF field | +| | | | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | CCF field present | +| | | | | | | | | Reserved for future use | + +The usage of CCF field allows USSD Messages to be concatenated to form a longer message. The CCF field contains information set by the application so that the receiving entity is able to re-assemble the received UMs in the correct order. Additionally, the CCF contains a reference number, which allows the receiving entity to discriminate between messages. The CCF octets shall be coded as follows. + +Octet 1: Concatenated USSD Message reference number. + +This octet shall contain a modulo-256 counter indicating the reference number for a particular USSD Message, Concatenated or not. This reference number shall remain constant for every USSD Message that makes up a particular Concatenated USSD Message. + +Octet 2: Total number of USSD Messages in the Concatenated USSD Message. + +This octet shall contain a value in the range 1 to 255 indicating the total number of USSD Messages constituting the Concatenated USSD Message. The value shall start at 1 and remain constant for every USSD Message that makes up the Concatenated USSD message. If the value is zero then the receiving entity shall ignore the whole USSD Message. + +Octet 3: Sequence number of the current USSD Message. + +This octet shall contain a value in the range 1 to 255 indicating the sequence number of a particular USSD Message within the Concatenated USSD Message. The value shall start at 1 and increment by one for every USSD Message sent within the Concatenated USSD Message. If the value is zero or the value is greater than the value in octet 2 then the receiving entity shall ignore the whole USSD Message. + +The UM field contains the actual application data (e.g. secure Command/Response Packets coded according to the present document). + +In each USSD String in a concatenated series, the PFI and CCF fields shall be present. + +# Annex B (informative): Change History + +| Change history | | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | | New version | +| 2005-06 | CP-28 | CP-050141 | 0005 | - | B | Introduction of secured data download for USSD | | 7.0.0 | +| 2007-06 | CP-36 | CP-070301 | 0007 | 1 | F | Correction of the reference to ETSI TS 102 225 | | 7.1.0 | +| 2008-12 | CP-42 | CP-080907 | 0008 | 1 | B | Introduction of AES and deprecation of DES | | 8.0.0 | +| 2009-03 | - | - | - | - | - | Figure 2 fixed | | 8.0.1 | +| 2009-12 | CT-46 | CP-091011 | 0010 | 1 | F | References update | | 8.1.0 | +| 2009-12 | CT-46 | CP-090995 | 0011 | 1 | B | Secured message structure for HTTP | | 9.0.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | | | | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-10 | | 10.0.0 | +| 2012-03 | CT-55 | CP-120148 | 0014 | 1 | A | Correction to ETSI TS 102 225 reference | | 10.1.0 | +| 2012-09 | CT-57 | CP-120623 | 0016 | 3 | C | Enhancements to the security of the SMS OTA download mechanisms | | 11.0.0 | +| 2013-03 | CT-59 | CP-120148 | 0023 | 2 | B | Update of references to ETSI TS 102 225 and 3GPP TS 24.090 specifications | | 12.0.0 | +| 2014-12 | CT-66 | CP-140961 | 0025 | - | F | Correction of handling of Proof of Receipt | | 12.1.0 | +| 2015-06 | CT-68 | CP-150388 | 0026 | - | F | Correction of handling of Proof of Receipt | | 12.2.0 | +| 2015-12 | SP-70 | | | - | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-13 | | 13.0.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA-75 | - | - | - | - | Automatic upgrade to Rel-14 | | 14.0.0 | +| 2019-01 | CT-81 | | | - | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-15 | | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-03 | CT#87e | CP-200088 | 0034 | - | | Secured packet usability in networks beyond GSM and 3G | | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31116/3b621c21b0af3a504a28d2547e87138f_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31116/3b621c21b0af3a504a28d2547e87138f_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..929b9703e8750980fdc3d33197a70923c7331c09 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31116/3b621c21b0af3a504a28d2547e87138f_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:2ab452e0cff4316cb6a691e917eae944af960fff6a16a92ab91e2bf301a1ec0d +size 21418 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31116/7affafe7362a2d2d072e9d4bf515f0bb_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31116/7affafe7362a2d2d072e9d4bf515f0bb_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4c84f0eb61bc3eb63eeebebba90502558e964c97 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31116/7affafe7362a2d2d072e9d4bf515f0bb_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:d739fba1f85187fa2aad6e43bd42d6e34027caaa6acc5cd7a9a07daa9dc841a8 +size 21301 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31116/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31116/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8239be53c396234dd3ede3e3a76a9981063f10a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31116/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,307 @@ + + + + + + +# --- Contents + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 4 | +| Introduction ..... | 4 | +| 1 Scope..... | 5 | +| 2 References..... | 5 | +| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 5 | +| 4 Remote APDU Format..... | 6 | +| 4.1 Remote command coding..... | 6 | +| 4.2 Response coding..... | 6 | +| 4.2.1 (U)SIM specific behaviour for Response Packets (Using SMS-PP)..... | 6 | +| 4.2.2 Void ..... | 6 | +| 5 Remote File Management (RFM) ..... | 6 | +| 5.1 SIM Remote File Management ..... | 6 | +| 5.2 USIM Remote File Management ..... | 7 | +| 5.3 UICC Shared File System Remote File Management..... | 7 | +| 5.4 ISIM Remote File Management..... | 7 | +| 6 Remote Applet Management ..... | 7 | +| 6.1 SIM File System Access Domain Parameter ..... | 7 | +| 6.1.1 SIM Access Mechanism ..... | 8 | +| 7 Additional command for push..... | 9 | +| 7.1 USIM specific behaviour for responses using SMS-PP..... | 9 | +| 7.2 USIM specific behaviour for response using HTTP ..... | 9 | +| Annex A (informative): Change History..... | 10 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- Y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- Introduction + +The present document is the result of a split of TS 23.048 Release 5 between the generic part and the bearers specific application. The generic part has been transferred to SCP. The present document is the bearers specific part. + +2019 + +# --- Scope + +The present document defines the remote management of files and applets on the SIM/USIM/ISIM. + +It describes the APDU format for remote management. + +Furthermore the document specifies: + +- a set of commands coded according to this APDU structure and used in the remote file management on the SIM/USIM specified in TS 51.011 [1], TS 31.101 [2], TS 31.102 [3], TS 31.103 [6]. +- a set of commands coded according to this APDU structure and used in the remote applet management on the SIM/USIM. This is based on ETSI TS 102 226 [4]. + +The remote APDU structure for SIM/USIM/ISIM applications shall comply with the one defined in ETSI TS 102 226 [4]. The present document only contains additional requirements or explicit limitations for SIM/USIM/ISIM applications. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TS 51.011 Release 4: “Specification of the Subscriber Identity Module – Mobile Equipment (SIM-ME) interface”. +- [2] 3GPP TS 31.101: “UICC-Terminal Interface; Physical and Logical Characteristics”. +- [3] 3GPP TS 31.102: “Characteristics of the USIM Application”. +- [4] ETSI TS 102 226 V13.1.0: “Smart Cards; Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications”. +- [5] ISO/IEC 7816-4: “Information technology – Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards, Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange”. +- [6] 3GPP TS 31.103: “Characteristics of the IP Multimedia Services Identity Module (ISIM) application”. +- [7] ETSI TS 102 483 V8.1.0: “Internet Protocol connectivity between UICC and terminal” + +# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations, terms and definitions given in ETSI TS 102 226 [4] apply. + +# --- 4 Remote APDU Format + +## 4.1 Remote command coding + +The SIM/USIM/ISIM Remote command coding shall comply with the Remote command coding of ETSI TS 102 226 [4]. + +## 4.2 Response coding + +The SIM/USIM/ISIM Response coding shall comply with the Response coding of ETSI TS 102 226 [4], added features are defined below. + +### 4.2.1 (U)SIM specific behaviour for Response Packets (Using SMS-PP) + +If PoR is not requested, no data shall be returned by the (U)SIM's RE/RA and the (U)SIM's RE/RA shall indicate to the terminal to issue an RP-ACK. + +If PoR is requested, data shall be returned by the (U)SIM's RE/RA. The (U)SIM's RE/RA shall indicate to the terminal to issue an RP-ACK. + +The data returned by the (U)SIM is the complete Response Packet to be included in the User Data part of the SMS-DELIVER-REPORT. + +Because the (U)SIM is unable to indicate to the Terminal that the TP-UDHI bit is to be set, the Sending Entity receiving the Response Packet shall expect the UDH structure in any event. + +If a proof of Receipt is required by the sending entity, the Additional Response Data sent by the Remote Management Application shall be formatted according to ETSI TS 102 226 [4]. + +### 4.2.2 Void + +# --- 5 Remote File Management (RFM) + +When using remote APDUs to perform RFM over HTTPS, the HTTP header fields shall be set as specified in ETSI TS 102 226 [4] + +## 5.1 SIM Remote File Management + +Command and Response formats are defined in ETSI TS 102 226 [4]. Nevertheless, the list of commands defined in ETSI TS 102 226 [4] for Remote File Management does not apply for SIM application. All the SIM Remote File Management commands are defined below. + +The standardised commands are listed in table 5.1. The commands are as defined in TS 51.011 [1], except that the SELECT command is extended from the one in TS 51.011 [1] to include “SELECT by path” as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 [6]. + +**Table 5.1: SIM Remote File Management Commands** + +| Operational command | +|----------------------------| +| SELECT | +| UPDATE BINARY | +| UPDATE RECORD | +| SEEK | +| INCREASE | +| VERIFY CHV | +| CHANGE CHV | +| DISABLE CHV | +| ENABLE CHV | +| UNBLOCK CHV | +| INVALIDATE | +| REHABILITATE | +| READ BINARY | +| READ RECORD | + +To retrieve the Response parameters/data of a case 4 command the GET RESPONSE command defined in TS 51.011 [1] shall be issued (Class Byte is 'A0'). + +The GET RESPONSE and any case 2 command (i.e. READ BINARY, READ RECORD) shall only occur once in a command string and, if present, shall be the last command in the string. The Response Data shall be placed in the Additional Response Data element of the Response Packet. + +## 5.2 USIM Remote File Management + +USIM Remote File Management shall comply with ETSI TS 102 226 [4]. + +The standardised commands are listed in ETSI TS 102 226 [4]. + +## 5.3 UICC Shared File System Remote File Management + +UICC Shared File System Remote File Management shall comply with ETSI TS 102 226 [4]. + +The standardised commands are listed in ETSI TS 102 226 [4]. + +## 5.4 ISIM Remote File Management + +ISIM Remote File Management shall comply with ETSI TS 102 226 [4]. + +The standardised commands are listed in ETSI TS 102 226 [4]. + +# --- 6 Remote Applet Management + +SIM/USIM Remote Applet Management shall comply with ETSI TS 102 226 [4], added features are defined below. + +When using remote APDUs to perform RAM over HTTPS, ETSI TS 102 226 [4] applies for the HTTP header fields values and the encoding of the body part. + +## 6.1 SIM File System Access Domain Parameter + +This parameter indicates the mechanism used to control the applet instance access to the SIM File System. It is a parameter of the INSTALL [for install] command described in ETSI TS 102 226 [4]. + +This parameter shall be used only if the “SIM File Access and Toolkit Application Specific Parameters” TLV object (Tag ‘CA’) is present. + +| Value | Name | Support | ADD length | +|--------------|----------------------|----------|------------| +| ‘00’ | See TS 102 226 [4] | - | - | +| ‘01’ | SIM access mechanism | Optional | 2 | +| ‘02’ to ‘FF’ | See TS 102 226 [4] | - | - | + +### 6.1.1 SIM Access Mechanism + +This mechanism shall be used, if supported, by the framework if the Access Domain Parameter value is ‘01’. It shall use the Access Domain Data passed at applet instantiation to define the access conditions fulfilled while the toolkit applet is running. + +The APDU Access Domain Data is a bit map combination of the file access condition levels described in TS 51.011 [1]. When the bit is set the associated Access Condition is granted. + +The APDU Access Domain Data is coded as follows: + +Byte 1: + +![Diagram of Byte 1 bit map showing bits b8 through b1 and their corresponding access domain conditions.](7affafe7362a2d2d072e9d4bf515f0bb_img.jpg) + +Diagram of Byte 1 bit map. The byte is divided into 8 bits: b8, b7, b6, b5, b4, b3, b2, b1. The mapping of bits to access domain conditions is as follows: + +| Bit | Access Domain Condition | +|-----|-------------------------| +| b1 | ADM4 | +| b2 | ADM5 | +| b3 | ADM6 | +| b4 | ADM7 | +| b5 | ADM8 | +| b6 | ADM9 | +| b7 | ADM10 | +| b8 | RFU | + +Diagram of Byte 1 bit map showing bits b8 through b1 and their corresponding access domain conditions. + +Byte 2: + +![Diagram of Byte 2 bit map showing bits b8 through b1 and their corresponding access domain conditions.](3b621c21b0af3a504a28d2547e87138f_img.jpg) + +Diagram of Byte 2 bit map. The byte is divided into 8 bits: b8, b7, b6, b5, b4, b3, b2, b1. The mapping of bits to access domain conditions is as follows: + +| Bit | Access Domain Condition | +|-----|-------------------------| +| b1 | ALWays | +| b2 | CHV1 | +| b3 | CHV2 | +| b4 | RFU | +| b5 | ADM0 | +| b6 | ADM1 | +| b7 | ADM2 | +| b8 | ADM3 | + +Diagram of Byte 2 bit map showing bits b8 through b1 and their corresponding access domain conditions. + +EXAMPLE: Possible combinations of fulfilled Access Conditions are shown below: + +| ADD value | Applet access condition fulfilled | +|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| +| '00 00' | No access | +| '00 01' | ALWays | +| '00 02' | CHV1 | +| '00 03' | ALWays and CHV1 | +| '00 04' | CHV2 | +| '00 05' | ALWays and CHV2 | +| '00 06' | CHV1 and CHV2 | +| : | : | +| '00 10' | ADM0 | +| : | : | +| '00 20' | ADM1 | +| : | : | +| '00 22' | ADM1 and CHV1 | +| : | : | +| '01 00' | ADM4 | +| : | : | +| '40 00' | ADM10 | +| : | : | +| '41 37' | ADM10 and ADM4 and ADM1 and
ADM0 and CHV2 and CHV1 and
ALWays | +| : | : | + +# 7 Additional command for push + +The PUSH command behaviour shall comply with ETSI TS 102 226 [4]. The specific behaviour of USIM Toolkit applications is stated below. + +## 7.1 USIM specific behaviour for responses using SMS-PP + +The behaviour for responses shall comply with ETSI TS 102 226 [4]. + +As the processing of the PUSH command may result in proactive commands being issued, the PUSH command result may be sent back in the additional response data of a response packet using SMS-SUBMIT. + +## 7.2 USIM specific behaviour for response using HTTP + +The behaviour for responses shall comply with ETSI TS 102 226 [4] + +As the processing of the PUSH command may result in proactive commands being issued, the PUSH command result may be sent back in the additional response data of a response packet using SMS-SUBMIT. + +The request for a TCP connection allows a remote entity to ask an application on the UICC to establish a TCP connection as defined in TS 102 483 [7]. + +When Network Access Name, Text String (User Login), Text String (User Password) data object are present in PUSH command, the TCP connection shall be opened with these parameters. + +When Network Access Name, Text String (User Login), Text String (User Password) data object are not present in PUSH command, the TCP connection shall be opened respectively with Access Point Name Value, Login Value, Password Value stored in EF\_NCP-IP (Network Connectivity Parameters for USIM IP connection), see 3GPP TS 31.102 [3]. + +# Annex A (informative): Change History + +| Meeting / Date | Plenary doc | WG doc | CR | Rev | Cat | Changes | New | +|----------------|-------------|---------------------------|------|-----|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| TP-16 | - | - | - | - | - | T#16 approved the specification for Rel-6 | 6.0.0 | +| TP-17 | TP-020209 | - | 001 | - | F | USIM specific behaviour for Response Packets (Using SMS-PP) | 6.1.0 | +| TP-18 | TP-020284 | - | 002 | - | F | Alignment with TS 23.048 Release 5: Correction of the Specific behaviour for Response Packets (Using SMS-PP) | 6.2.0 | +| TP-19 | TP-030025 | - | 003 | - | A | Correction on behaviour for Response Packet | 6.3.0 | +| TP-23 | TP-040027 | - | 004 | - | C | Clarification on the usage of SIM Remote File Management commands | 6.4.0 | +| TP-25 | TP-040185 | - | 006 | - | B | Alignment with TS 102 226 V6.8.0 | 6.5.0 | +| TP-26 | TP-040261 | - | 007 | - | F | Correction of non-specific references to SCP documents | 6.6.0 | +| TP-27 | TP-050021 | T3-050164 | 008 | - | F | Correction of reference to TS 102226 | 6.7.0 | +| TP-27 | TP-050021 | T3-050167 | 009 | - | F | USIM specific behaviour for PUSH mechanism using SMS-PP | 6.7.0 | +| CP-28 | CP-050136 | C6-050477 | 011 | - | F | ISO/IEC 7816-Series Revision | 6.8.0 | +| CP-28 | CP-050139 | C6-050447 | 010 | - | B | Introduction of an explicit description of the ISIM RFM mechanism | 6.8.0 | +| CP-36 | CP-070296 | C6-070325 | 012 | - | F | Correction of the reference to ETSI TS 102 226 | 7.0.0 | +| CT-42 | CP-080907 | C6-080457 | 0013 | 1 | B | Introduction of AES and automatic detection of application data format | 8.0.0 | +| CT-46 | CP-091011 | C6-090491 | 0015 | 1 | F | References update | 8.1.0 | +| CT-46 | CP-090996 | C6-090473 | 0016 | - | B | Remote APDU structure over HTTP | 9.0.0 | +| SP-51 | | | | | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-10 | 10.0.0 | +| CT-54 | CP-110902 | C6-110603 | 0018 | 2 | A | Update of reference to ETSI TS 102 226 | 10.1.0 | +| CT-55 | CP-120149 | C6-120079 | 0021 | 1 | A | Correction to ETSI TS 102 226 reference | 10.2.0 | +| CT-57 | CP-120627 | C6-120428 | 0024 | 1 | C | Update of references to ETSI TS 102 226 | 11.0.0 | +| CT-57 | CP-120623 | C6-120428 | 0025 | 2 | C | Enhancements to the security of the SMS OTA download mechanisms. (CR renumbered from 0021 to 0025) | 11.0.0 | +| CT-60 | CP-120367 | C6-130138 | 0027 | | A | Update of reference to ETSI TS 102 226 specification | 11.1.0 | +| SP-65 | | | | | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-12 | 12.0.0 | +| CT6-68 | CP-150388 | C6-150272 | 0033 | 1 | F | Update of reference to ETSI TS 102 226 | 12.1.0 | +| SP-70 | | | | | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-13 | 13.0.0 | +| CT-75 | CP-170166 | C6-170142 | 0034 | 2 | F | Update of reference to ETSI TS 102 226 | 13.1.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA-75 | - | - | - | | Automatic Upgrade to Rel-14 | 14.0.0 | +| 2019-01 | CT-81 | | | | | Automatic Upgrade to Rel-15 | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | CT-88e | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31120/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31120/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ea07e0a9d718242a57b1dacf9910636e3158f9f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31120/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ + + + + + + +# --- Contents + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| +| Foreword ..... | 4 | +| Introduction ..... | 4 | +| 1 Scope..... | 5 | +| 2 References..... | 5 | +| 3 Definitions, symbols, abbreviations and coding ..... | 5 | +| 4 Physical Characteristic Tests ..... | 5 | +| 5 Electrical Characteristic Tests..... | 5 | +| 6 Initial Communication Tests ..... | 6 | +| 7 Transmission Protocol Tests ..... | 6 | +| 8 Application independent procedures..... | 6 | +| Annex A (normative): UICC simulator functional requirement..... | 7 | +| Annex B (informative):      Change history..... | 8 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- Y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- Introduction + +The present document defines the interface tests for the Terminal / UICC interface. + +The aim of the present document is to ensure interoperability between an UICC and a Terminal independently of the respective manufacturer, card issuer or operator. + +Application specific tests for applications residing on an UICC are specified in document TS 31.121 [2]. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document specifies the interface test for the Terminal / UICC. + +The present document specifies the tests of: + +- physical characteristics of the UICC; +- the electrical interface between the UICC and the Terminal; +- the initial communication establishment and the transport protocols; +- the application independent procedures. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] ETSI TS 102 230 V7.0.0: "Smart cards; UICC-Terminal interface; Physical, electrical and logical test specification". +- [2] 3GPP TS 31.121: "UICC-terminal interface; USIM Application Test Specification". + +# --- 3 Definitions, symbols, abbreviations and coding + +All definitions, symbols, abbreviations and coding conventions applicable to the terminal are specified in ETSI TS 102 230 [1]. + +# --- 4 Physical Characteristic Tests + +All tests within the scope of this clause are specified in ETSI TS 102 230 [1]. + +# --- 5 Electrical Characteristic Tests + +All tests within the scope of this clause are specified in ETSI TS 102 230 [1]. + +# --- 6 Initial Communication Tests + +All tests within the scope of this clause are specified in ETSI TS 102 230 [1]. + +# --- 7 Transmission Protocol Tests + +All tests within the scope of this clause are specified in ETSI TS 102 230 [1]. + +# --- 8 Application independent procedures + +All tests within the scope of this clause are specified in ETSI TS 102 230 [1]. + +# --- Annex A (normative): UICC simulator functional requirement + +All requirements within the scope of this clause are specified in ETSI TS 102 230 [1]. + +# --- Annex B (informative): Change history + +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New | +|---------|--------|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----------------------------------------|--------| +| 2000-12 | TP-10 | TP-000204 | | | | Final draft was approved at TSG-T #10 | 3.0.0 | +| 2004-12 | TP-26 | TP-040262 | 001 | | F | Alignment to ETSI TS 102 230 | 3.1.0 | +| 2004-12 | TP-26 | | | | | Upgrade to Rel-6 | 6.0.0 | +| 2007-06 | CT-36 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade to Rel-7 (MCC) | 7.0.0 | +| 2008-12 | CT-42 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade to Rel-8 + addition of LTE logo | 8.0.0 | +| 2009-12 | CT-46 | CP-091011 | 002 | 1 | F | References update | 8.1.0 | +| 2009-12 | CT-46 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-9 | 9.0.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-10 | 10.0.0 | +| 2012-09 | SP-57 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-11 | 11.0.0 | +| 2014-10 | SP-65 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-12 | 12.0.0 | +| 2015-12 | SP-70 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-13 | 13.0.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA-75- | - | - | - | - | Automatic upgrade to Rel-14 | 14.0.0 | +| 2018-07 | SA-80 | - | - | - | - | Automatic upgrade to Rel-15 | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | CT#88e | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31122/20136850feb70fd71c7d41cdae203ebb_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31122/20136850feb70fd71c7d41cdae203ebb_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..944d29e69d95388adbb3302f29a6a42b7441a55a --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31122/20136850feb70fd71c7d41cdae203ebb_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:7281b1149d21cd7fef938c496d6ce5e83c98664156b83f21e240845f3cb77008 +size 131408 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31122/5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31122/5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ca3d5478bd804d9dcf01c43430f8288903162781 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31122/5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:6fb1833a5d36f0f06ffc9bffb5a34f5507f555337d976b825a5b789514c744a7 +size 9573 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31122/64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31122/64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e3f00881c49ab5ac402a64cb89fb71bf7266d43b --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31122/64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:b45d31bfa82b865a03925111f9ff056e69d14b5fdebac19b29a5068e7069690d +size 6492 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31122/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31122/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..591685edc669f56936b1ba9271c5fcb291a6353d --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31122/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,1858 @@ + + +# 3GPP TS 31.122 V16.4.0 (2022-03) + +*Technical Specification* + +## **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) conformance test specification (Release 16)** + +![LTE Advanced Pro logo](64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg) + +The logo for LTE Advanced Pro, featuring the letters 'lte' in a bold, lowercase font. Above the 'e' is the text 'Advanced Pro' in a smaller font. To the right of the 'e' is a green signal strength icon with four bars. + +LTE Advanced Pro logo + +![3GPP logo](5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg) + +The 3GPP logo, consisting of the letters '3GPP' in a stylized, bold font. Below the 'P' is a red signal strength icon with three bars. Below the logo, the text 'A GLOBAL INITIATIVE' is written in a smaller, uppercase font. + +3GPP logo + +The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP. The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organizational Partners and shall not be implemented. This Specification is provided for future development work within 3GPP only. The Organizational Partners accept no liability for any use of this Specification. Specifications and Reports for implementation of the 3GPP™ system should be obtained via the 3GPP Organizational Partners' Publications Offices. + +## **3GPP** + +Postal address + +--- + +3GPP support office address + +--- + +650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis +Valbonne - FRANCE +Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 + +Internet + +--- + + + +## --- ***Copyright Notification*** --- + +No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. +The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. + +© 2022, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC). +All rights reserved. + +UMTSTM is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members +3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association + +# Contents + +| | | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 6 | +| 1 Scope..... | 7 | +| 2 Normative References..... | 7 | +| 3 Definitions, symbols, abbreviations and coding ..... | 8 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 8 | +| 3.2 Symbols..... | 8 | +| 3.3 Abbreviations ..... | 8 | +| 3.4 Coding Conventions..... | 8 | +| 3.5 Applicability..... | 9 | +| 3.5.1 Applicability of the present document ..... | 9 | +| 3.5.2 Applicability to the UICC ..... | 9 | +| 3.5.3 Applicability of the individual tests ..... | 9 | +| 3.5.4 Applicability of conformance requirements ..... | 9 | +| 3.6 Table of optional features..... | 10 | +| 3.7 Applicability table ..... | 12 | +| 4 Test environment..... | 23 | +| 4.1 Test equipment ..... | 23 | +| 4.1.1 ME simulator ..... | 23 | +| 4.1.2 Signal generation device..... | 23 | +| 4.1.2.1 Vcc..... | 23 | +| 4.1.2.2 RST ..... | 23 | +| 4.1.2.3 CLK ..... | 23 | +| 4.1.2.4 I/O ..... | 24 | +| 4.1.3 Precision force-inducing contacting device..... | 24 | +| 4.1.4 Temperature controllable environment ..... | 24 | +| 4.1.5 Temperature measuring device..... | 24 | +| 4.1.6 Voltage measuring device ..... | 24 | +| 4.1.7 Precision measuring device ..... | 24 | +| 4.1.8 Current measuring device..... | 24 | +| 4.1.9 Timing Measurements on contact I/O ..... | 25 | +| 4.2 IUT default conditions ..... | 25 | +| 4.3 Default data formatting ..... | 25 | +| 4.4 Test definition and applicability..... | 25 | +| 4.5 Initial conditions..... | 26 | +| 4.6 Test procedure..... | 27 | +| 4.7 Test requirement..... | 28 | +| 5 Void..... | 28 | +| 6 Test Procedure (TS 102.221) ..... | 28 | +| 6.1 Physical characteristics ..... | 29 | +| 6.2 Electrical specifications of the UICC – Terminal interface ..... | 29 | +| 6.3 Initial communication establishment procedure ..... | 29 | +| 6.4 Transmission Protocols ..... | 29 | +| 6.5 Application and File structure ..... | 29 | +| 6.6 Security features..... | 29 | +| 6.7 Structure of commands and responses ..... | 29 | +| 6.8 Commands..... | 29 | +| 6.9 Transmission Oriented Commands ..... | 29 | +| 6.10 Application independent files..... | 29 | +| 7 Test Procedure (31.102)..... | 29 | +| 7.1 Contents of the Elementary Files (EF)..... | 30 | +| 7.1.1 Definition and applicability ..... | 30 | +| 7.1.2 Conformance requirement ..... | 30 | +| 7.1.3 Test purpose..... | 30 | + +| | | | +|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------|----| +| 7.1.4 | Method of test..... | 30 | +| 7.2 | Security features..... | 33 | +| 7.2.1 | Definition and applicability ..... | 33 | +| 7.2.2 | Conformance requirement ..... | 33 | +| 7.2.3 | Test purpose..... | 34 | +| 7.2.4 | Method of test..... | 34 | +| 7.3 | USIM commands..... | 34 | +| 7.3.1 | AUTHENTICATE ..... | 34 | +| 7.3.1.1 | Definition and applicability ..... | 34 | +| 7.3.1.2 | Conformance requirement ..... | 34 | +| 7.3.1.3 | Test purpose..... | 35 | +| 7.3.1.4 | Method of test..... | 35 | +| 7.3.2 | Status Conditions Returned by the USIM ..... | 35 | +| 7.3.2.1 | Security management..... | 35 | +| 7.3.2.1.1 | Definition and applicability..... | 35 | +| 7.3.2.1.2 | Conformance requirement..... | 36 | +| 7.3.2.1.3 | Test purpose ..... | 36 | +| 7.3.2.1.4 | Method of test..... | 36 | +| 7.3.2.2 | Status Words of the Commands..... | 36 | +| 7.3.2.2.1 | Definition and applicability..... | 36 | +| 7.3.2.2.2 | Conformance requirement..... | 36 | +| 7.3.2.2.3 | Test purpose ..... | 36 | +| 7.3.2.2.4 | Method of test..... | 36 | +| 7.3.3 | GET IDENTITY ..... | 37 | +| 7.3.3.1 | Definition and applicability ..... | 37 | +| 7.3.3.2 | Conformance requirement ..... | 37 | +| 7.3.3.3 | Test purpose..... | 37 | +| 7.3.3.4 | Method of test..... | 37 | +| 7.4 | Void..... | 40 | +| 8 | Test Procedure (31.101)..... | 40 | +| 8.1 | General 3GPP platform requirements ..... | 40 | +| 8.1.1 | GSM/USIM application interaction and restrictions ..... | 40 | +| 8.1.1.1 | Definition and applicability ..... | 40 | +| 8.1.1.2 | Conformance requirement ..... | 40 | +| 8.1.1.3 | Test purpose..... | 40 | +| 8.1.1.4 | Method of test..... | 41 | +| 8.2 | Physical and logical characteristics..... | 41 | +| 8.2.1 | Transmission speed ..... | 41 | +| 8.2.1.1 | Definition and applicability ..... | 41 | +| 8.2.1.2 | Conformance requirement ..... | 41 | +| 8.2.1.3 | Test purpose..... | 41 | +| 8.2.1.4 | Method of test..... | 41 | +| 8.2.2 | Voltage classes ..... | 42 | +| 8.2.2.1 | Definition and applicability ..... | 42 | +| 8.2.2.2 | Conformance requirement ..... | 42 | +| 8.2.2.3 | Test purpose..... | 42 | +| 8.2.2.4 | Method of test..... | 42 | +| 8.2.3 | File Control Parameters (FCP) ..... | 42 | +| 8.2.3.1 | Definition and applicability ..... | 42 | +| 8.2.3.2 | Conformance requirement ..... | 42 | +| 8.2.3.3 | Test purpose..... | 42 | +| 8.2.3.4 | Method of test..... | 43 | +| 8.3 | User verification and file access conditions..... | 43 | +| 8.3.1 | Definition and applicability..... | 43 | +| 8.3.2 | Conformance requirement ..... | 43 | +| 8.3.3 | Test purpose..... | 43 | +| 8.3.4 | Method of test..... | 43 | +| 8.4 | Files ..... | 44 | +| 8.4.1 | Contents of the EFs at the MF level ..... | 44 | +| 8.4.1.1 | Definition and applicability ..... | 44 | +| 8.4.1.2 | Conformance requirement ..... | 44 | + +8.4.1.3 Test purpose..... 44 +8.4.1.4 Method of test..... 44 +**Annex A (informative): Change history..... 46** + +# Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings: + +- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something +- shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something + +The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports. + +The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document. + +- should** indicates a recommendation to do something +- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something +- may** indicates permission to do something +- need not** indicates permission not to do something + +The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended. + +- can** indicates that something is possible +- cannot** indicates that something is impossible + +The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not". + +- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +In addition: + +**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document provides the Conformance Test Specification for a Universal IC Card (UICC) defined in TS 31.101 [2] with Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) defined in TS 31.102 [3]. + +# --- 2 Normative References + +The following documents contain provisions, which through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference to a non-3GPP document, the latest version applies. +- For a non-specific reference to a 3GPP document, the latest version in the same release as the implementation release of the UICC under test applies. + +- [1] ETSI TS 102 221: "UICC-Terminal Interface; Physical and Logical Characteristics". +- [2] 3GPP TS 31.101: "UICC-Terminal Interface; Physical and Logical Characteristics". +- [3] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the USIM application". +- [4] ISO/IEC 7816-1: "Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 1: Physical characteristics". +- [5] ISO/IEC 7816-2: "Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 2: Card with contacts - Dimensions and locations of the contacts". +- [6] ISO/IEC 7816-3: "Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 3: Electronic signals and transmission protocols". +- [7] ISO/IEC 7816-4: "Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange". +- [8] Void +- [9] Void +- [10] Void +- [11] Void +- [12] ISO/IEC 7811-1: "Identification cards - Recording technique - Part 1: Embossing" +- [13] Void +- [14] 3GPP TS 11.11: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Specification of the Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment (SIM - ME) interface". + +- [15] ETSI TS 101 220: "Smart cards; ETSI numbering system for telecommunication application providers". +- [16] ETSI TS 102 221 Release 99: "UICC-Terminal Interface; Physical and Logical Characteristics". +- [17] ETSI TS 102 221 Release 4: "UICC-Terminal Interface; Physical and Logical Characteristics". +- [18] ETSI TS 102 221 Release 5: "UICC-Terminal Interface; Physical and Logical Characteristics". +- [19] ISO/IEC 9646-7 (1995): "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Conformance testing methodology and framework - Part 7: Implementation Conformance Statements". +- [20] ETSI TS 102 230-2 v13.0.0: "UICC-Terminal interface; Physical, electrical and logical test specification; Part 2: UICC features". + +# 3 Definitions, symbols, abbreviations and coding + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the following definitions apply in addition to the terms defined in TS 102.221 [1] and TS 31.102 [3]. + +**Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS):** A statement made by the supplier of an implementation or system claimed to conform to a given specification, stating which capabilities have been implemented. The ICS can take several forms: protocol ICS, profile ICS, profile specific ICS, information object ICS, etc. + +**ICS proforma:** A document, in the form of a questionnaire, which when completed for an implementation or system becomes an ICS. + +## 3.2 Symbols + +For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: + +| | | +|----------|-----------------------| +| $t_f$ | fall time | +| $t_r$ | rise time | +| $V_{IH}$ | Input Voltage (high) | +| $V_{IL}$ | Input Voltage (low) | +| $V_{OH}$ | Output Voltage (high) | +| $V_{OL}$ | Output Voltage (low) | + +## 3.3 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: + +| | | +|------|--------------------------------------| +| CRn | Conformance Requirement 'n' | +| IUT | Implementation Under Test | +| ME | Mobile Equipment | +| TS | Test Specification | +| UICC | Universal Integrated Circuit Card | +| USIM | Universal Subscriber Identity Module | + +## 3.4 Coding Conventions + +The following coding conventions apply to the present document: + +All lengths are presented in bytes, unless otherwise stated. Each byte is represented by bit b8 to b1, where b8 is the most significant bit (MSB) and b1 is the least significant bit (LSB). In each representation, the leftmost bit is the MSB. + +## 3.5 Applicability + +### 3.5.1 Applicability of the present document + +The present document applies to a UICC which supports one or more USIMs. + +### 3.5.2 Applicability to the UICC + +The applicability to a UICC supporting one or more USIMs is specified in table B.1, unless otherwise specified in the specific clause. + +### 3.5.3 Applicability of the individual tests + +Table B.1 lists the optional, conditional or mandatory features for which the supplier of the implementation states the support. As pre-condition the supplier of the implementation shall state the support of possible options in table A.1. + +The "Release XY UICC" columns shows the status of the entries as follows: + +The following notations, defined in ISO/IEC 9646-7 [19], are used for the status column: + +- | | | +|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| M | mandatory - the capability is required to be supported. | +| O | optional - the capability may be supported or not. | +| N/A | not applicable - in the given context, it is impossible to use the capability. | +| X | prohibited (excluded) - there is a requirement not to use this capability in the given context. | +| O.i | qualified optional - for mutually exclusive or selectable options from a set. "i" is an integer which identifies an unique group of related optional items and the logic of their selection which is defined immediately following the table. | +| Ci | conditional - the requirement on the capability ("M", "O", "X" or "N/A") depends on the support of other optional or conditional items. "i" is an integer identifying an unique conditional status expression which is defined immediately following the table. For nested conditional expressions, the syntax "IF ... THEN (IF ... THEN ... ELSE...) ELSE ..." shall be used to avoid ambiguities. | + +#### References to items + +For each possible item answer (answer in the support column) there exists a unique reference, used, for example, in the conditional expressions. It is defined as the table identifier, followed by a solidus character "/", followed by the item number in the table. If there is more than one support column in a table, the columns shall be discriminated by letters (a, b, etc.), respectively. + +EXAMPLE: A.1/4 is the reference to the answer of item 4 in table A.1. + +### 3.5.4 Applicability of conformance requirements + +All conformance requirements are annotated with their applicability. This clause defines the notation used. + +The basic notation is as follows: + +(DefinedRelease) ReleaseRange: Options + +The components of the notation are as follows: + +| Component | Content | Example content | +|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------| +| DefinedRelease | Contains a single release.
Optional (along with the surrounding parentheses).
If present, it indicates the release of the core specification in which the conformance requirement was first defined. This is intended for conformance requirements which were defined in a certain release of the core specification but for which tests were not introduced into this document until a later release.
If absent, this indicates that the conformance requirement was introduced in the first release contained in ReleaseRange. | R99
Rel-6 | +| ReleaseRange | Contains a single release or a range of releases. An ellipsis (...) in the right-hand part indicates the current release of this document.
Optional; but at least one of ReleaseRange and Options must be present.
If present, it indicates the range of releases for which the conformance requirement is tested.
If absent, it is equivalent to "R99 - ...". | R99
R99 - Rel-5
Rel-6 - ... | +| Options | A comma-separated list containing at least one of the options in table A.1.
Optional (along with the preceding colon); but at least one of ReleaseRange and Options must be present.
If present, this indicates that the conformance requirement is only applicable to UICCs supporting all of the specified options.
If absent, this indicates that the conformance requirement applies to all UICCs. | O_LOG_CHANS

O_LOG_CHANS,
O_SHAREABLE | + +An additional shortcut notation for "R99 - ..." is specified: "M". This indicates that the conformance requirement is mandatory for all UICCs of all releases. + +Examples of the notation are as follows: + +| Example | Meaning | +|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| (Rel-4) Rel-6 - ...:
O_LOG_CHANS | Conformance requirement introduced in Rel-4, but not tested until Rel-6, where it is only applicable if O_LOG_CHANS is supported. | +| (Rel-4) Rel-6 - ...:
O_LOG_CHANS,
O_SHAREABLE | Conformance requirement introduced in Rel-4, but not tested until Rel-6, where it is only applicable if O_LOG_CHANS and O_SHAREABLE are supported. | +| Rel-6 - ...:
O_LOG_CHANS | Conformance requirement introduced in Rel-6, where it is only applicable if O_LOG_CHANS is supported. | +| Rel-6 - ...:
O_LOG_CHANS,
O_SHAREABLE | Conformance requirement introduced in Rel-6, where it is only applicable if O_LOG_CHANS and O_SHAREABLE are supported. | +| R99 - Rel-5 | Mandatory for all UICCs from R99 to Rel-5. | +| Rel-6 - ... | Mandatory for all UICCs from all releases up to and including the current release of this document. | +| O_MONO_APP | Applies to all releases, but only applicable if O_MONO_APP is supported by the UICC. | +| M | Mandatory for all releases; equivalent to "R99 - ...". | + +## 3.6 Table of optional features + +Support of several features is optional, release dependent or configuration dependent for the UICC. However, if a UICC states conformance with a specific 3GPP release, it is mandatory for the UICC to support all mandatory functions of that release, as stated in table A.1. + +The "Option defined in Releases" column indicates the releases of the relevant core specification(s) in which the option is defined. + +The supplier of the implementation shall state the support of possible options in table A.1. + +A supplier may choose to use a single UICC and reconfigure it as required for each test; or may choose to use a number of UICCs which are based on the same platform but are configured differently. The supplier shall state the chosen solution and in the latter case shall confirm usage of identical platforms. + +**Table A.1: Options** + +| Option | Status | Option defined in Release | Support | Mnemonic | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------| +| ID-1 UICC | O.1 | R99 | | O ID1_UICC | +| Plug-in UICC | O.1 | R99 | | O PLUG_IN_UICC | +| Type 1 (i.e. UICC which always enters the negotiable mode after a warm reset) | O.2 | R99 | | O_TYPE_1 | +| Type 2 (UICC which always enters the specific mode after a warm reset) | O.2 | R99 | | O_TYPE_2 | +| T=0 | O.3 | R99 | | O T0 | +| T=1 | O.3 | R99 | | O T1 | +| Mono application UICC | O.4 | R99 | | O_MONO_APP | +| Multi-application UICC | O.4 | R99 | | O_MULTI_APP | +| Single verification capable UICC | O.5 | R99 | | O_SINGLE_VER | +| Multi-verification capable UICC | O.5 | R99 | | O_MULTI_VER | +| More than one logical channel supported | O | Rel-4 | | O_LOG_CHANS | +| More than two logical channels supported | O | Rel-4 | | O_LOG_CHANS_34 | +| Shareable files | O | Rel-4 | | O_SHAREABLE | +| Non-shareable files | O | Rel-4 | | O_NON_SHAREABLE | +| GET CHALLENGE | O | Rel-4 | | O_GET_CHALLENGE | +| Mini-UICC | O.1 | Rel-6 | | O_MINI_UICC | +| (F, D) = (512, 64) | O | Rel-6 | | O F D 512 64 | +| Low impedance drivers | O | Rel-6 | | O_LOW_IMPEDANCE | +| BER-TLV structure EFs | O | Rel-6 | | O_BER_TLV_FILES | +| GET IDENTITY when SUCI calculation performed by the USIM | O | Rel-15 | | O_GET_IDENTITY_SUCI | +| USIM supporting non-IMSI SUPI type | O | Rel-16 | | O_NON IMSI_SUPI | + +## 3.7 Applicability table + +**Table B.1: Applicability of tests** + +| Clause | Description | Test procedure | Tested features defined in Release | R99 UICC | Rel-4 UICC | Rel-5 UICC | Rel-6 UICC | Rel-7 UICC | Rel-8 UICC | Rel-9 UICC | Rel-10 UICC | Rel-11 UICC | Rel-12 UICC | Rel-13 UICC | Rel-14 UICC | Rel-15 UICC | Rel-16 UICC | Support | +|---------|---------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------| +| 6.1.1 | ID-1 UICC | 1 | R99 | C001 | C001 | C001 | C001 | C001 | C001 | C001 | C001 | C001 | C001 | C001 | C001 | C001 | C001 | | +| 6.1.2 | Plug-in UICC | 1 | R99 | C002 | C002 | C002 | C002 | C002 | C002 | C002 | C002 | C002 | C002 | C002 | C002 | C002 | C002 | | +| 6.1.3 | Temperature range for card operation | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| | | 2 | Rel-6 | | | | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.1.4 | Contacts | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 6.1.5 | Mini-UICC | 1 | Rel-6 | | | | C003 | C003 | C003 | C003 | C003 | C003 | C003 | C003 | C003 | C003 | C003 | | +| 6.2.1.1 | Vcc – Voltage limits | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.2.1.2 | Vcc - Idle current limits | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.2.1.3 | Vcc - Current limits in clk-stop-mode | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.2.2.1 | RST - Static operation | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.2.3.1 | Vpp - Static operation | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.2.4.1 | CLK - Frequency and duty cycle | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.2.4.2 | Voltage and current | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.2.5.1 | I/O - Voltage and current | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | C018 | C018 | C018 | C018 | C018 | C018 | C018 | C018 | C018 | C018 | C018 | | +| | | 2 | Rel-6 | | | | C019 | C019 | C019 | C019 | C019 | C019 | C019 | C019 | C019 | C019 | C019 | | +| | | 3 | Rel-6 | | | | C020 | C020 | C020 | C020 | C020 | C020 | C020 | C020 | C020 | C020 | C020 | | +| 6.3.1.1 | Supply voltage switching - Supply voltage classes | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + +| Clause | Description | Test procedure | Tested features defined in Release | R99 UICC | Rel-4 UICC | Rel-5 UICC | Rel-6 UICC | Rel-7 UICC | Rel-8 UICC | Rel-9 UICC | Rel-10 UICC | Rel-11 UICC | Rel-12 UICC | Rel-13 UICC | Rel-14 UICC | Rel-15 UICC | Rel-16 UICC | Support | +|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------| +| 6.3.1.2 | Supply voltage switching - Power consumption of the UICC during ATR | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.3.1.3 | Supply voltage switching - Application related electrical parameters | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.3.2.1 | ATR - Major capabilities | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.3.2.2 | ATR - Speed enhancement | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.3.2.3 | Global Interface bytes | 1 | Rel-6 | | | | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.3.3 | PPS procedure | 1 | R99 | | | | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.3.4 | Reset procedures | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 2 | R99 | | | | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 3 | R99 | | | | C004 | C004 | C004 | C004 | C004 | C004 | C004 | C004 | C004 | C004 | C004 | | +| | | 4 | R99 | | | | C005 | C005 | C005 | C005 | C005 | C005 | C005 | C005 | C005 | C005 | C005 | | +| 6.3.5 | Clock stop mode | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.3.6 | Bit/character duration and sampling time | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 6.3.7 | Error handling | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.3.8 | Compatibility | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 6.4.1 | Physical Layer | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 6.4.2.1 | Character Frame | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.4.2.2 | Transmission Protocol T=0 | 1 | R99 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | | +| 6.4.2.3.1.1 | T=1 - Information field size | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | + +| Clause | Description | Test procedure | Tested features defined in Release | R99 UICC | Rel-4 UICC | Rel-5 UICC | Rel-6 UICC | Rel-7 UICC | Rel-8 UICC | Rel-9 UICC | Rel-10 UICC | Rel-11 UICC | Rel-12 UICC | Rel-13 UICC | Rel-14 UICC | Rel-15 UICC | Rel-16 UICC | Support | +|---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------| +| 6.4.2.3.1.2 | T=1 - Character waiting integer | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 6.4.2.3.1.3 | T=1 - Character waiting time | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 6.4.2.3.1.4 | T=1 - Block guard time | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 6.4.2.3.1.5 | T=1 - Waiting time extension | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 6.4.2.3.1.6 | T=1 - Error detection code | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 6.4.2.3.2.1.1 | T=1 - Prologue field - Node address byte | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 6.4.2.3.2.1.2 | T=1 - Prologue field - Protocol Control Byte | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 6.4.2.3.2.1.3 | T=1 - Prologue field - Length | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 6.4.2.3.2.1.4 | T=1 - Information field | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 6.4.2.3.2.3 | T=1 - Epilogue field | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 6.4.2.3.3 | T=1 - Error free operation | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 6.4.2.3.4.1 | T=1 - Error Handling - Protocol initialisation | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 6.4.2.3.4.2.1 | T=1 - Error Handling - Sending invalid blocks to the UICC | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 6.4.2.3.5 | T=1 - Chaining | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 6.4.3.1.1 | Transportation of an APDU using T=0 - Case 1 | 1 | R99 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | | + +| Clause | Description | Test procedure | Tested features defined in Release | R99 UICC | Rel-4 UICC | Rel-5 UICC | Rel-6 UICC | Rel-7 UICC | Rel-8 UICC | Rel-9 UICC | Rel-10 UICC | Rel-11 UICC | Rel-12 UICC | Rel-13 UICC | Rel-14 UICC | Rel-15 UICC | Rel-16 UICC | Support | +|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------| +| 6.4.3.1.2 | Transportation of an APDU using T=0 - Case 2 | 1 | R99 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | | +| 6.4.3.1.3 | Transportation of an APDU using T=0 - Case 3 | 1 | R99 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | | +| 6.4.3.1.4 | Transportation of an APDU using T=0 - Case 4 | 1 | R99 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | | +| 6.4.3.1.5.1 | Use of Procedure Bytes '61xx' and '6Cxx' - Case 2 Commands | 1 | R99 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | | +| 6.4.3.1.5.2 | Use of Procedure Bytes '61xx' and '6Cxx' - Case 4 Commands | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 6.4.3.2.1 | Transportation of an APDU using T=1 - Case 1 | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 6.4.3.2.2 | Transportation of an APDU using T=1 - Case 2 | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 6.4.3.2.3 | Transportation of an APDU using T=1 - Case 3 | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 6.4.3.2.4 | Transportation of an APDU using T=1 - Case 4 | 1 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | + +| Clause | Description | Test procedure | Tested features defined in Release | R99 UICC | Rel-4 UICC | Rel-5 UICC | Rel-6 UICC | Rel-7 UICC | Rel-8 UICC | Rel-9 UICC | Rel-10 UICC | Rel-11 UICC | Rel-12 UICC | Rel-13 UICC | Rel-14 UICC | Rel-15 UICC | Rel-16 UICC | Support | +|-----------|---------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------| +| 6.4.4 | Application Layer | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 6.5.1 | UICC Application structure | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.5.2.1 | Dedicated files | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 6.5.2.2.1 | Transparent EF | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.5.2.2.2 | Linear fixed EF | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.5.2.2.3 | Cyclic EF | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.5.2.2.4 | BER-TLV structure EF | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 6.5.3 | File referencing | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 6.5.4.1 | SELECT by File Identifier Referencing | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.5.4.2 | SELECT by Path Referencing | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.5.4.3 | Short File Identifier | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.5.5.1.1 | SELECT by DF Name | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.5.5.1.2 | SELECT by partial DF Name | 1 | R99 | | | | C009 | C009 | C009 | C009 | C009 | C009 | C009 | C009 | C009 | C009 | C009 | | +| | | 2 | R99 | C008 | C008 | C008 | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| | | 3 | R99 | | | | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | | +| 6.5.5.2 | Application session activation | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.5.5.3 | Application session termination | 1 | R99 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | C008 | | +| | | 2 | R99 | M | M | M | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| | | 3 | Rel-6 | | | | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 4 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 5 | Rel-4 | | | | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | | +| 6.5.5.4 | Application session reset | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | + +| Clause | Description | Test procedure | Tested features defined in Release | R99 UICC | Rel-4 UICC | Rel-5 UICC | Rel-6 UICC | Rel-7 UICC | Rel-8 UICC | Rel-9 UICC | Rel-10 UICC | Rel-11 UICC | Rel-12 UICC | Rel-13 UICC | Rel-14 UICC | Rel-15 UICC | Rel-16 UICC | Support | +|---------|----------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------| +| 6.5.5.5 | GSM/USIM application interaction and restrictions | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 6.5.6 | Reservation of file IDs | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 2 | R99 | M | M | M | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| | | 3 | R99 | | | | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.5.7.1 | No Logical Channel Support | 1 | Rel-4 | | | | C011 | C011 | C011 | C011 | C011 | C011 | C011 | C011 | C011 | C011 | C011 | | +| 6.5.7.2 | Logical Channels - Basic Behaviour | 1 | Rel-4 | | | | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | | +| | | 2 | Rel-4 | | | | C012 | C012 | C012 | C012 | C012 | C012 | C012 | C012 | C012 | C012 | C012 | | +| 6.5.7.3 | Opening a Logical Channel from the Basic Channel | 1 | Rel-4 | | | | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | | +| 6.5.7.4 | Opening a Logical Channel from a Non-Basic Channel | 1 | Rel-4 | | | | C013 | C013 | C013 | C013 | C013 | C013 | C013 | C013 | C013 | C013 | C013 | | +| 6.5.7.5 | Opening a Logical Channel on Non-Shareable Files | 1 | Rel-4 | | | | C014 | C014 | C014 | C014 | C014 | C014 | C014 | C014 | C014 | C014 | C014 | | +| 6.5.7.6 | Logical Channels and Shareable Files | 1 | Rel-6 | | | | C014 | C014 | C014 | C014 | C014 | C014 | C014 | C014 | C014 | C014 | C014 | | +| | | 2 | Rel-4 | | | | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | | +| 6.5.7.7 | Logical channels - Command Interdependencies | 1 | Rel-4 | | | | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | | + +| Clause | Description | Test procedure | Tested features defined in Release | R99 UICC | Rel-4 UICC | Rel-5 UICC | Rel-6 UICC | Rel-7 UICC | Rel-8 UICC | Rel-9 UICC | Rel-10 UICC | Rel-11 UICC | Rel-12 UICC | Rel-13 UICC | Rel-14 UICC | Rel-15 UICC | Rel-16 UICC | Support | +|---------|------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------| +| 6.5.7.8 | Logical channels - Consistency of File Updates | 1 | Rel-4 | | | | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | C015 | | +| 6.6.1 | Supported security features | 1 | R99 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | | +| | | 2 | R99 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | | +| 6.6.2 | Security architecture | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 2 | R99 | | | | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.6.3 | Security environment | 1 | R99 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | | +| 6.6.4 | PIN definitions | 1 | R99 | C016 | C016 | C016 | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| | | 2 | R99 | | | | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | | +| | | 3 | R99 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | | +| 6.6.5 | PIN and key reference relationship | 1 | R99 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | | +| | | 2 | R99 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | | +| 6.7.1 | Mapping principles | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.7.2.1 | Status Conditions Returned by the UICC | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.7.2.2 | Status Words of the Commands | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 6.7.3 | Logical Channels | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 6.8.1.1 | SELECT | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 2 | R99 | | | | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.8.1.2 | STATUS | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.8.1.3 | READ BINARY | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.8.1.4 | UPDATE BINARY | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.8.1.5 | READ RECORD | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 2 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 3 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | + +| Clause | Description | Test procedure | Tested features defined in Release | R99 UICC | Rel-4 UICC | Rel-5 UICC | Rel-6 UICC | Rel-7 UICC | Rel-8 UICC | Rel-9 UICC | Rel-10 UICC | Rel-11 UICC | Rel-12 UICC | Rel-13 UICC | Rel-14 UICC | Rel-15 UICC | Rel-16 UICC | Support | +|----------|-----------------|----------------|------------------------------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------| +| 6.8.1.6 | UPDATE RECORD | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 2 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 3 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.8.1.7 | SEARCH RECORD | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 2 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 3 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 4 | R99 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 6.8.1.8 | INCREASE | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.8.1.9 | VERIFY PIN | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 2 | Rel-4 | | | | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | | +| | | 3 | R99 | | | | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.8.1.10 | CHANGE PIN | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 2 | Rel-4 | | | | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | | +| 6.8.1.11 | DISABLE PIN | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.8.1.12 | ENABLE PIN | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.8.1.13 | UNBLOCK PIN | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 2 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 3 | R99 | | | | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 4 | Rel-4 | | | | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | C010 | | +| 6.8.1.14 | DEACTIVATE FILE | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.8.1.15 | ACTIVATE FILE | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.8.1.16 | AUTHENTICATE | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 6.8.1.17 | MANAGE CHANNEL | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 6.8.1.18 | GET CHALLENGE | 1 | Rel-4 | | | | C021 | C021 | C021 | C021 | C021 | C021 | C021 | C021 | C021 | C021 | C021 | | +| 6.8.2.1 | RETRIEVE DATA | 1 | Rel-6 | | | | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | | +| | | 2 | Rel-6 | | | | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | | +| | | 3 | Rel-6 | | | | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | | +| 6.8.2.2 | SET DATA | 1 | Rel-6 | | | | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | | +| | | 2 | Rel-6 | | | | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | | +| | | 3 | Rel-6 | | | | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | | +| | | 4 | Rel-6 | | | | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | | + +| Clause | Description | Test procedure | Tested features defined in Release | R99 UICC | Rel-4 UICC | Rel-5 UICC | Rel-6 UICC | Rel-7 UICC | Rel-8 UICC | Rel-9 UICC | Rel-10 UICC | Rel-11 UICC | Rel-12 UICC | Rel-13 UICC | Rel-14 UICC | Rel-15 UICC | Rel-16 UICC | Support | +|---------|---------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------| +| 6.8.2.3 | BER-TLV structure files | 1 | Rel-6 | | | | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | | +| | | 2 | Rel-6 | | | | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | | +| | | 3 | Rel-6 | | | | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | C022 | | +| 6.8.2.4 | Logical channel interactions | 1 | Rel-6 | | | | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | | +| | | 2 | Rel-6 | | | | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | | +| | | 3 | Rel-6 | | | | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | C023 | | +| 6.9.1.1 | GET RESPONSE | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 6.10 | Application independent files | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 7.1 | Contents of the Elementary Files (EF) | 1 | R99 | | | | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| | | 2 | R99 | M | M | M | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| | | 3 | Rel-16 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | C025 | | +| | | 4 | Rel-16 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | C026 | | +| 7.2 | Security features | 1 | R99 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | | +| 7.3.1 | AUTHENTICATE | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 7.3.2.1 | Security management | 1 | R99 | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 7.3.2.2 | Status Words of the Commands | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| 7.3.3 | GET IDENTITY | 1 | Rel-15 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | C024 | C024 | | +| 8.1.1 | GSM/USIM application interaction and restrictions | 1 | Rel-6 | | | | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 8.2.1 | Transmission speed | 1 | Rel-6 | | | | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | C006 | | +| | | 2 | Rel-6 | | | | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | C007 | | +| 8.2.2 | Voltage classes | 1 | Rel-6 | | | | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | + +| Clause | Description | Test procedure | Tested features defined in Release | R99 UICC | Rel-4 UICC | Rel-5 UICC | Rel-6 UICC | Rel-7 UICC | Rel-8 UICC | Rel-9 UICC | Rel-10 UICC | Rel-11 UICC | Rel-12 UICC | Rel-13 UICC | Rel-14 UICC | Rel-15 UICC | Rel-16 UICC | Support | +|--------|----------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------| +| 8.2.3 | File Control Parameters (FCP) | 1 | Rel-6 | | | | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | +| 8.3 | User verification and file access conditions | 1 | Rel-6 | | | | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | C016 | | +| | | 2 | Rel-6 | | | | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | C017 | | +| 8.4.1 | Contents of the EFs at the MF level | 1 | Rel-6 | | | | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | | + +Table B.1: Applicability of tests (continued) + +| | | +|------|----------------------------------------------------------------------| +| C001 | IF O_ID1_UICC THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C002 | IF O_PLUG_IN_UICC THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C003 | IF O_MINI_UICC THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C004 | IF O_TYPE_1 THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C005 | IF O_TYPE_2 THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C006 | IF O_T0 THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C007 | IF O_T1 THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C008 | IF O_MULTI_APP THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C009 | IF O_MONO_APP THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C010 | IF O_LOG_CHANS THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C011 | IF (NOT O_LOG_CHANS) THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C012 | IF O_LOG_CHANS_34 THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C013 | IF (O_LOG_CHANS_34 AND O_SHAREABLE) THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C014 | IF (O_LOG_CHANS AND O_NON_SHAREABLE) THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C015 | IF (O_LOG_CHANS AND O_SHAREABLE) THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C016 | IF O_MULTI_VER THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C017 | IF O_SINGLE_VER THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C018 | IF (NOT O_F_D_512_64) THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C019 | IF O_F_D_512_64 THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C020 | IF O_LOW_IMPEDANCE THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C021 | IF O_GET_CHALLENGE THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C022 | IF O_BER_TLV_FILES THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C023 | IF (O_BER_TLV_FILES AND O_LOG_CHANS AND O_SHAREABLE) THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C024 | IF O_GET_IDENTITY_SUCI THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C025 | IF (NOT O_NON_IMSI_SUPI) THEN M ELSE N/A | +| C026 | IF O_NON_IMSI_SUPI THEN M ELSE N/A | + + + +# 4 Test environment + +This clause specifies several requirements which shall be met, and a number of rules which shall be adhered to before testing can proceed. + +## 4.1 Test equipment + +This clause recommends a minimum specification for each of the items of test equipment referenced in the tests. + +### 4.1.1 ME simulator + +This item of equipment shall allow T = 0 and T = 1 protocol communications to take place on both ID-1 and plug-in UICCs. It shall be able to generate and send any command APDU and receive any of the possible responses. These commands may be generated manually, one at a time, or automatically from a predefined batch procedure containing one or more commands. + +The ME simulator shall be able to support clock stop modes. + +The ME simulator shall be able to accept an external clock signal to drive CLK (contact C3) of the UICC. + +It shall be possible to access all the UICC contacts either directly or through test points. + +### 4.1.2 Signal generation device + +#### 4.1.2.1 Vcc + +The voltage level for Vcc (contact C1) of the UICC shall be adjustable between -0,5 V and 6,0 V to an accuracy of 1% of the nominal Vcc voltage (e.g. 50 mV for class A operating conditions). + +The ME simulator shall be able to source current on the Vcc contact in the range -2 mA to 12 mA statically and to deliver charges of > 400 nAs without lowering the Vcc voltage for more than 10 % of Vcc nominal. + +#### 4.1.2.2 RST + +The generated voltage level for RST (contact C2) of the UICC shall be adjustable between -0,5 V and 6,0 V to an accuracy of 50 mV. + +The rise and fall times shall be adjustable from 0 µs to 500 µs with an accuracy of 5 µs. *(to check if the USIM works with the defined rise and fall times.)* + +The beginning of the rising edge shall be programmable from 1 clk-cycle to 50,000 clk-cycles after enabling the clk-line. + +#### 4.1.2.3 CLK + +This item of equipment shall be able to generate square wave signals for the clock on the UICC, any of which can be a single-shot or continuous signal, in the range 1 MHz to 5 MHz. The voltage levels for both high and low states shall be adjustable between -0,5 V and 6,0 V to an accuracy of 0,1 V. The duty cycle of the clock signal shall be adjustable between 40 % and 60 % to an accuracy of 1 %. It shall also provide control over the following parameters: + +The voltage levels for both high and low states shall be adjustable between 0 V and 6 V to an accuracy of 1% of the nominal Vcc voltage. The duty cycle of the clock signal shall be adjustable between 40 % and 60 % to an accuracy of 1 % or 5 ns whichever is the worst. + +It shall also provide control over the following parameters: + +- rise and fall time to an accuracy of 1 % or 5 ns whichever is the worst. *(5 ns = 2,5 % accuracy for $f_{max} = 5$ MHz).* + +#### 4.1.2.4 I/O + +The equipment shall be able to generate I/O-Signals according to TS 102.221 [1] + +The voltage levels for high and low states shall be adjustable between -0,5 V and 6,0 V to an accuracy of 1 % of the nominal Vcc voltage. The I/O line in transmission mode (high bit) shall be programmable between state A (active driven output) and state Z (I/O-voltage-driver inactive, current source I-I/O-high active). + +It shall also provide control over the rise and fall time of 100 ns to 1 000 ns with an accuracy of 50 ns. + +The ME simulator shall be able to source and sink currents on the I/O contact in the range -20 µA to +20 µA in state high and 0 mA to -1 mA in state low (receiving mode) and shall be able to switch in transmission mode (outputting a high bit) between voltage and current driving mode. + +The timing of the bitstream (jitter, guardtime, etu-value, etc.) on the I/O-Line shall be programmable with an accuracy of $\leq 0,01$ etu or 2 clk-cycles whichever is the worst. + +### 4.1.3 Precision force-inducing contacting device + +This item of equipment shall be able to apply a prescribed and maintained level of force onto one or more contacts of the UICC. The range shall be between 0 and 0,5 N and accurate to 0,01 N. + +### 4.1.4 Temperature controllable environment + +This item of equipment shall be able to control the temperature of a chamber large enough to enclose the UICC and the card reader. The range of temperature control shall be between -25 °C and +85 °C to an accuracy of 0,5 °C. + +### 4.1.5 Temperature measuring device + +This item of equipment shall be able to measure the temperature of the UICC to within 0,5 °C. The range of this device shall allow measurement of temperatures between -25 °C and +85 °C. + +### 4.1.6 Voltage measuring device + +This item of equipment shall be able to measure static and transient voltages on any one of the contacts of the UICC. The measurable voltage range shall be between -2 V and +7 V to an accuracy of 1% of the nominal Vcc voltage (e.g. 30 mV for class B operating conditions) with a timebase accuracy of 25 ns. + +### 4.1.7 Precision measuring device + +This item of equipment shall be able to measure both linear and radius of curvature dimensions to an accuracy of 0,01 mm. + +### 4.1.8 Current measuring device + +This item of equipment shall be able to supervise the current levels for any one of the contacts of the USIM. + +The simulator shall be able to detect an over - or underload with a time resolution of $\leq 100$ ns. + +| Channel | Minimum | Maximum | Resolution | +|--------------------|-----------|-----------|------------| +| Vcc high | -2 mA | +12,5 mA | 125 µA | +| Vcc low | -2 mA | +12,5 mA | 125 µA | +| Vcc Burst | 12 mA | +250 mA | 2,5 mA | +| RST/CLK High state | -50 µA | +50 µA | 1 µA | +| RST/CLK Low state | -250 µA | +250 µA | 2,5 µA | +| I/O high state | -50 µA | +50 µA | 1 µA | +| I/O low state | -1 500 µA | +1 500 µA | 15 µA | + +### 4.1.9 Timing Measurements on contact I/O + +To verify the timing of the I/O transmission from the UICC, the ME simulator shall be able to measure the I/O-Bit-Timing in clk-cycles with an accuracy of $\leq 0,01$ etu or 2 clk-cycles whichever is the worst. + +## 4.2 IUT default conditions + +Unless otherwise stated, the following is default: + +- The voltage level for Vcc (contact C1) shall be set to 3,0 V. +- The voltage levels for CLK (contact C3) shall be set to 0 V and 3,0 V for low and high respectively. +- The clock frequency CLK (contact C3) shall be set to 5 MHz with duty cycle 50 %. +- The ME simulator generated low transmission voltage level for I/O (contact C7) shall be set to 0 V and the current sources for high transmission and reception shall be set to -20 µA and +20 µA respectively +- Any level 1 user verification requirement (PIN) on the UICC shall be enabled with three VERIFY PIN attempts and ten UNBLOCK PIN attempts remaining. +- Any level 2 user verification requirement (PIN2) on the UICC shall be enabled with three VERIFY PIN2 attempts and ten UNBLOCK PIN2 attempts remaining, if assigned. +- A Universal PIN on the UICC shall be enabled, if IUT is a multi-verification capable UICC. + +## 4.3 Default data formatting + +All numeric data enclosed in single quotes ( ' ' ) in this document are hexadecimal data. + +Where 'X' is used in place of a hexadecimal digit, X ranges from '0' to 'F'. For example, the data '6X' ranges from '60' to '6F' inclusive. + +Where data is expressed as a group of bytes, it shall be in the following format: 'XX XX XX... XX', indicating first byte, second byte, third byte etc. in that order. + +A string of digits shall be formatted with a continuous string of numeric data and enclosed with single quotes. For example, the string 'XXXXXXXX' where X ranges from 0 to 9 inclusive. + +## 4.4 Test definition and applicability + +The following statements are applicable to the test definition and applicability clause for all test purposes contained within the present document: + +- Unless otherwise stated, tests apply to both plug-in and ID-1 UICC cards. +- Unless otherwise stated, tests apply to each protocol supported by the UICC. + +- The tests are performed on a UICC as defined in TS 31.101 [2] with a USIM application as defined in TS 31.102 [3]. The tests to check the requirement of TS 31.101 [2] use the files as defined in TS 31.102 [3]. +- Unless otherwise stated, the tests apply to single and multi-verification capable UICCs with USIM application(s). In the case of a multi-verification capable UICC, there shall be only one application. + +## 4.5 Initial conditions + +Unless otherwise stated, all the PINs used in the test procedures shall be initially enabled. + +Figure 1 shows the files in the UICC which shall be used for the test procedures, in the case where the EFs are not mandatory, they may be replaced with other EFs of the same file structure. + +Unless otherwise stated, all the EFs used in the test procedure shall be activated. + +![Figure 1: File identifiers and directory structures of UICC. The diagram shows the hierarchical structure of files on a UICC, starting from the Master File (MF) and branching into various directories and elementary files (EFs).](20136850feb70fd71c7d41cdae203ebb_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + MF["MF +'3F00'"] --> DFTELECOM["DFTELECOM +'7F10'"] + MF --> EFDIR["EFDIR +'2F00'"] + MF --> EFPL["EFPL +'2F05'"] + MF --> EFArr["EFARR +'2F06'"] + MF --> EFICCID["EFICCID +'2FE2'"] + DFTELECOM --> EFArr6F06["EFARR +'6F06'"] + DFTELECOM --> EFADN6F3A["EFADN +'6F3A'"] + ADFUSIM["ADFUSIM"] --> DFPHONEBOOK["DFPHONEBOOK +'5F3A'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFPBR["EFPBR +'4F30'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFADN4F3A["EFADN +'4F3A'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFArr6F06_2["EFARR +'6F06'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFIMSI["EFIMSI +'6F07'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFKeys["EFKeys +'6F08'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFKeysPS["EFKeysPS +'6F09'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFHPLMN["EFHPLMN +'6F31'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFUST["EFUST +'6F38'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFPUCT["EFPUCT +'6F41'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFSTART_HFN["EFSTART-HFN +'6F5B'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFTHRESHOLD["EFTHRESHOLD +'6F5C'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFLOCIPS["EFLOCIPS +'6F73'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFAcc["EFACC +'6F78'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFPPLMN["EFPPLMN +'6F7B'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFLOCI["EFLOCI +'6F7E'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFAD["EFAD +'6FAD'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFBCC["EFBCC +'6FB7'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFDN["EFDN +'6F3B'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFCI["EFCI +'6F80'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFCOP2["EFCOP2 +'6F4F'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFSMS["EFSMS +'6F3C'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFSMSS["EFSMSS +'6F43'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFACMmax["EFACMmax +'6F37'"] + DFPHONEBOOK --> EFACM["EFACM +'6F39'"] + +``` + +Figure 1: File identifiers and directory structures of UICC. The diagram shows the hierarchical structure of files on a UICC, starting from the Master File (MF) and branching into various directories and elementary files (EFs). + +Figure 1: File identifiers and directory structures of UICC + +The initial conditions for some of the EFs are given in the followings: + +- PIN shall be set to '00000000'. + +- PIN2 shall be set to '11111111'. +- Universal PIN shall be set to '22222222', if supported. +- EFFPLMN shall contain the data string: '55 AA 0F 00 F0 FF 00 F0 FF 00 F0 FF'. +- EFLOCI shall contain the data string: 'A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 00 00'. +- The records in EFSMS shall contain the following data for the first 20 bytes: + +``` + +1st record 'A0 A1 A2 B0 B1 B2 A0 A1 A2 A0 A1 A2 FF A0 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6' +2nd record 'B0 B1 B2 A0 A1 A2 A0 A1 A2 B0 B1 B2 FF B0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6' +3rd record 'B0 B1 B2 A0 A1 A2 B0 B1 B2 A0 A1 A2 FF C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6' +4th record 'A0 A1 A2 B0 B1 B2 B0 B1 B2 B0 B1 B2 FF D0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6' + +``` + +The data for the remainder of these four records and for all other records shall be 'FF'. + +- The records in EFFDN shall contain the following data for the first 10 bytes: + +``` + +1st record 'A0 A1 A2 B0 B1 B2 A0 A1 A2 A0' +2nd record 'B0 B1 B2 A0 A1 A2 A0 A1 A2 B0' +3rd record 'B0 B1 B2 A0 A1 A2 B0 B1 B2 A0' +4th record 'A0 A1 A2 B0 B1 B2 B0 B1 B2 B0' + +``` + +The data for the remainder of these four records and for all other records (if any) shall be 'FF'. + +- The records in EFCCP2 shall contain the following data: + +``` + +1st record '10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E' +2nd record '20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E' +2nd last record 'E0 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 EA EB EC ED EE' +Last record 'F0 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 FA FB FC FD FE' + +``` + +- The records in EFACM shall contain the following data, if it is supported: + +``` + +1st record '00 00 01' (last updated record) +2nd record '00 00 02' +3rd record '00 00 03' +Xth record '00 00' followed by byte value X (first updated record) + +``` + +- The records in EFICI shall contain the following data: + +``` + +1st record '01' for all bytes +2nd record '02' for all bytes +3rd record '03' for all bytes +Xth record byte value X for all bytes + +``` + +- The records in EFECC shall contain the following data: + +``` + +1st record '21 F2 FF 54 45 53 54 00' +All other records 'FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 00' + +``` + +## 4.6 Test procedure + +The following statements are applicable to the test procedure clause for all test purposes contained within the present document: + +- Unless otherwise stated, all steps within the test procedure shall be carried out in order. +- Unless otherwise stated, all test procedures shall be applicable to both T = 0 and T = 1 protocols. +- Where steps indicate that a ME simulator shall select a particular DF or EF using an unspecified number of SELECT commands, the ME simulator is to send the correct sequence of SELECT commands in order to select the required file ID from the current file ID (this may be achieved most easily by selecting from the MF down each time). + +- Unless otherwise stated, the Le (P3) for all READ RECORD commands and Lc (P3) for all UPDATE RECORD commands sent by the ME simulator is to be that of the record length of the EF currently selected. In the case where an EF is not currently selected, the length sent is to be 1 unless otherwise stated. +- Unless otherwise stated, the offset for all READ BINARY and UPDATE BINARY commands sent by the ME simulator is to be '00 00'. +- Unless otherwise specified, when the T = 0 protocol is used, the necessary GET RESPONSE commands are assumed to be sent, or the same command header is assumed to be resent with P3 = LUICC at the transport layer level in order to retrieve the available response data from the UICC. +- Unless otherwise stated, the length (Le) for all SELECT, STATUS and GET RESPONSE commands sent by the ME simulator is to be such that all available data is read. +- Unless otherwise stated, the PIN and Unblock PIN presented for VERIFY PIN, CHANGE PIN, DISABLE PIN, ENABLE PIN and UNBLOCK PIN commands sent by the ME simulator is to be correct. +- Unless otherwise stated, a SELECT command sent to the UICC to select ADFUSIM is with the application's AID, indicating in the command parameter that the application shall be activated. +- Unless otherwise stated, a SELECT command sent to the UICC is with P2 = '04', indicating that the FCP shall be returned. +- Unless otherwise stated, all RETRIEVE DATA commands sent to the UICC shall be with P2 indicating "current EF". +- Unless otherwise stated, all SET DATA commands sent to the UICC shall be with P2 indicating "current EF". +- Unless otherwise stated, all SET DATA commands sent to the UICC shall be sent with the maximum amount of data possible according to the data object being transmitted. + +## 4.7 Test requirement + +Where steps within a test procedure involve a ME simulator sending one or more commands to the UICC, these commands are required to be correctly executed, with the UICC responding with status conditions of '90 00', unless otherwise stated in the clause for the test. + +# --- 5 Void + +# --- 6 Test Procedure (TS 102.221) + +This clause details all the tests for testing the IUT against TS 102.221 [1]. This test suite allows testing of the IUT against the base specification with respect to: + +- Physical characteristics +- Electrical specifications of the UICC - Terminal interface +- Initial communication establishment procedure +- Transmission protocols +- Application and File structure +- Security features +- Structure of commands and responses +- Commands + +- Transmission Oriented Commands +- Application independent files + +## 6.1 Physical characteristics + +See ETSI TS 102 230 - 2 [20]. + +## 6.2 Electrical specifications of the UICC – Terminal interface + +See ETSI TS 102 230 - 2 [20]. + +## 6.3 Initial communication establishment procedure + +See ETSI TS 102 230 - 2 [20]. + +## 6.4 Transmission Protocols + +See ETSI TS 102 230 - 2 [20]. + +## 6.5 Application and File structure + +See ETSI TS 102 230 - 2 [20]. + +## 6.6 Security features + +See ETSI TS 102 230 - 2 [20]. + +## 6.7 Structure of commands and responses + +See ETSI TS 102 230 - 2 [20]. + +## 6.8 Commands + +See ETSI TS 102 230 - 2 [20]. + +## 6.9 Transmission Oriented Commands + +See ETSI TS 102 230 - 2 [20]. + +## 6.10 Application independent files + +See ETSI TS 102 230 - 2 [20]. + +# --- 7 Test Procedure (31.102) + +This clause details all the tests for testing the IUT against TS 31.102 [3]. This test suite allows testing of the IUT against the base specification with respect to: + +- Contents of the Elementary Files + +- Security Features supported by USIM +- USIM commands. + +## 7.1 Contents of the Elementary Files (EF) + +The clause provides tests to ensure that the IUT contains all of the EFs need for a Telecom session. + +### 7.1.1 Definition and applicability + +See clause 3.5.3. + +### 7.1.2 Conformance requirement + +The following conformance requirements refer to the tables for each EF in TS 31.102 [3], clause 4. + +| | | | +|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| +| CR1 | Each existing EF shall be selectable under the respective DF using the identifier given in the table for that EF. | M | +| CR2 | All mandatory EFs shall exist on the UICC. | M | +| CR3 | The identifier of the EF shall be that given in the table for that EF. | M | +| CR4 | The type and structure of the EF shall be that given in the table for that EF. | M | +| CR5 | The file size shall be at least that given in the table for that EF. | M | +| CR6 | The short file identifier shall be those given in the table for that EF. | M | +| CR7 | The short file identifier shall exist if it is mandatory in the table for that EF. This includes EFs with SFI indicated by 'YY'. | (R99)
Rel-6 - ... | +| CR8 | The access conditions shall be those given in the table for that EF. | M | +| CR9 | If no SFI is indicated in the table for the EF, the EF shall not have an SFI. | (R99)
Rel-6 - ... | +| CR10 | The short file identifier shall exist if it is mandatory in the table for that EF. | M | +| CR11 | If USIM supporting non-IMSI SUPI type service n°130 is "available", EF SUPI_NAI shall be present, EF IMSI shall not be available and the length of the MNC in the IMSI coded in EF AD shall be set to 0. | Rel-16-... | +| CR12 | If IMSI based USIM service n°130 is "not available", EF SUPI_NAI shall not be present, EF IMSI shall be available and the length of the MNC in the IMSI shall be identical to the value coded in EF AD . | Rel-16-... | + +Reference: TS 31.102 [3], clause 4. + +### 7.1.3 Test purpose + +To verify that the UICC conforms to the above requirements. + +NOTE: The contents and coding of the data within the files are not tested, but shall conform to the respective contents and coding of the data given for each file in TS 31.102 [3], clause 4. + +### 7.1.4 Method of test + +#### Initial conditions 1 + +- 1) The UICC shall be connected to a ME simulator. + +#### Test procedure 1 + +- a) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- b) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the respective DF for the first EF in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3]. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '90', SW2 = '00' - normal ending of the command [CR1].* + +- c) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the first EF in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3]. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '90', SW2 = '00' - normal ending of the command [CR1, CR2].* + +*The following shall be true of the response data:* + +- *TLV DO with tag '83' shall indicate the identifier of the file selected [CR3];* + - *TLV DO with tag '82' shall not be '38' and '78' indicating EF [CR4];* + - *TLV DO with tag '82' shall indicate the structure given in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3] [CR4];* + - *TLV DO with tag '80' shall be at least the minimum file size given in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3]. if the EF is transparent [CR5];* + - *Byte 5 and 6 of TLV DO with tag '82' shall be in accordance with the record length given in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3]. if the EF is linear fixed or cyclic [CR5];* + - *TLV DO with tag '80' shall be an integer multiple of the record length if the EF is linear fixed or cyclic [CR5];* + - *If a value for the SFI is specified in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3] and the value of the specified SFI is equal to the 5 least significant bits (bits b5 to b1) of the file identifier for the file, then the TLV DO with tag '88' shall either be absent, or shall be present with the specified SFI value [CR6, CR7];* + - *If a value for the SFI is specified in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3] and the value of the specified SFI is not equal to the 5 least significant bits (bits b5 to b1) of the file identifier for the file, then the TLV DO with tag '88' shall be present with the specified SFI value [CR6, CR7];* + - *If an SFI is specified in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3] but no actual value is specified (i.e. 'YY' is used), then the TLV DO with tag '88' shall either be absent, or shall be present with a value of length 1 [CR6, CR7];* + - *If no SFI is specified in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3], then the TLV DO with tag '88' shall be present with an empty value [CR9]* + - *TLV DO with tag '86' or '8B' or '8C' or 'AB' shall indicate the access conditions given in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3] [CR8].* +- Note: if the access conditions indicate referenced security, the referenced record in the EFARR may be read at this point if necessary. + +- d) Steps a) to c) shall be repeated for the remaining mandatory EFs clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3]. +- e) Steps a) to c) shall be repeated for the existing optional EFs clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3]. + +#### Test procedure 2 + +- a) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- b) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the respective DF for the first EF in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3]. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '90', SW2 = '00' - normal ending of the command [CR1].* + +- c) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the first EF in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3]. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '90', SW2 = '00' - normal ending of the command [CR1, CR2].* + +*The following shall be true of the response data:* + +- *TLV DO with tag '83' shall indicate the identifier of the file selected [CR3];* + +- *TLV DO with tag '82' shall not be '38' and '78' indicating EF [CR4];* + - *TLV DO with tag '82' shall indicate the structure given in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3] [CR4];* + - *TLV DO with tag '80' shall be at least the minimum file size given in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3]. if the EF is transparent [CR5];* + - *Byte 5 and 6 of TLV DO with tag '82' shall be in accordance with the record length given in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3]. if the EF is linear fixed or cyclic [CR5];* + - *TLV DO with tag '80' shall be an integer multiple of the record length if the EF is linear fixed or cyclic [CR5];* + - *TLV DO with tag '88' shall indicate the short file identifier given in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3] [CR6, CR10];* + - *TLV DO with tag '86' or '8B' or '8C' or 'AB' shall indicate the access conditions given in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3] [CR8].* +- Note: if the access conditions indicate referenced security, the referenced record in the EFARR may be read at this point if necessary. + +- d) Steps a) to c) shall be repeated for the remaining mandatory EFs clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3]. +- e) Steps a) to c) shall be repeated for the existing optional EFs clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3]. + +#### Initial conditions 2 + +- 1) The UICC shall be connected to a ME simulator. +- 2) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- 3) The ME simulator selects a Rel-16 or upwards IMSI based USIM in accordance to Annex N of TS 31.102 [3]; Service n°130 shall be "not available" in the USIM. + +#### Test procedure 3 + +- a) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select EFIMSI. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '90', SW2 = '00' - normal ending of the command [CR1, CR2].* + +*The following shall be true of the response data:* + +- *TLV DO with tag '83' shall indicate the identifier of the file selected [CR3];* + - *TLV DO with tag '82' shall not be '38' and '78' indicating EF [CR4];* + - *TLV DO with tag '82' shall indicate the structure given in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3] [CR4];* + - *TLV DO with tag '80' shall be at least the minimum file size given in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3] [CR5];* + - *TLV DO with tag '88' shall be present with the SFI value: '07' [CR6, CR7];* + - *TLV DO with tag '86' or '8B' or '8C' or 'AB' shall indicate the access conditions given in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3] [CR8].* +- Note: if the access conditions indicate referenced security, the referenced record in the EFARR may be read at this point if necessary. + +- b) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select DF5GS. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '90', SW2 = '00' - normal ending of the command [CR1].* + +- c) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select EFSUPI\_NAI. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '6A', SW2 = '82' - File not found [CR11].* + +#### Initial conditions 3 + +- 1) The UICC shall be connected to a ME simulator. +- 2) The AID provided in EFDIR has a PIX coding as defined in Annex O of 3GPP TS 31.101 [2]. +- 3) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- 4) The selected USIM is a Rel-16 or upwards USIM supporting non-IMSI SUPI Type in accordance to Annex N of TS 31.102; Service n°130 shall be "available" in the USIM. + +#### Test procedure 4 + +- a) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select EFIMSI. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '6A', SW2 = '82' - File not found and the length of the MNC in the IMSI coded in EFAD shall be set to 0 [CR11].* + +- b) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select DF5GS. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '90', SW2 = '00' - normal ending of the command [CR1].* + +- c) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select EFSUPI\_NAI. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '90', SW2 = '00' - normal ending of the command [CR1, CR11]. The following shall be true of the response data:* + +- *TLV DO with tag '83' shall indicate the identifier of the file selected [CR3];* +- *TLV DO with tag '82' shall not be '38' and '78' indicating EF [CR4];* +- *TLV DO with tag '82' shall indicate the structure given in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3] [CR4];* +- *TLV DO with tag '80' shall be at least the minimum file size given in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3] [CR5];* +- *TLV DO with tag '88' shall be present with the SFI value: '09' [CR6, CR7];* +- *TLV DO with tag '86' or '8B' or '8C' or 'AB' shall indicate the access conditions given in the table for the file in clause 4 of TS 31.102 [3] [CR8].* + +Note: if the access conditions indicate referenced security, the referenced record in the EFARR may be read at this point if necessary. + +## 7.2 Security features + +### 7.2.1 Definition and applicability + +See clause 3.5.3. + +### 7.2.2 Conformance requirement + +| | | | +|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| CR1 | The USIM application shall use a global key reference as PIN and a local key reference as PIN2. | M | +| CR2 | Access with PIN2 shall be limited to the ADF (USIM). | M | +| CR3 | For a USIM application on a multi-verification capable UICC, the only valid values for the usage qualifiers shall be '00' (verification requirement is not used) and '08' (user authentication knowledge based (PIN)) as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 [7]. | O_MULTI_VER | +| CR4 | Void | N/A | +| CR5 | Void | N/A | + +| | | | +|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| CR6 | Void | N/A | +| CR7 | Void | N/A | +| CR8 | For access to DF TELECOM the PIN shall be verified. | M | + +Reference: TS 31.102 [3], clause 6.4. + +### 7.2.3 Test purpose + +To verify that the UICC conforms to the above requirements. + +NOTE 1: CR1, CR2 are tested in the clause 6.6.4. + +NOTE 2: CR8 is not currently tested. + +### 7.2.4 Method of test + +No test procedure is currently required for a single verification capable UICC. + +#### Initial conditions + +- 1) The UICC shall be connected to a ME simulator. + +#### Test procedure 1 + +- a) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- b) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select and activate USIM application. + +*The following shall be true of the response data:* + +- *TLV DO with tag 'C6' (PS Template DO) shall contain for the Universal PIN the TLV DO with tag '95' (Usage Qualifier) and the value of this TLV shall be '00' or '08' [CR3];* + +## 7.3 USIM commands + +### 7.3.1 AUTHENTICATE + +#### 7.3.1.1 Definition and applicability + +See clause 3.5.3. + +#### 7.3.1.2 Conformance requirement + +| | | | +|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---| +| CR1 | This function shall cause the UICC to run the f1, f2, f3, f4, f5, and f1* algorithms using a 16 bytes random number, AUTN, and the subscriber authentication key K stored in the UICC. | M | +| CR2 | If the received sequence number SQN is in the correct range, the function shall return the response RES, cipher key CK, and integrity key IK. | M | +| CR3 | If the UICC detects the sequence numbers are not in the valid range, the function shall return the signed response AUTS. | M | +| CR4 | The function shall not be executable unless a particular USIM application has been selected as the Current Directory and activated and the current directory is the USIM ADF or any subdirectory under this ADF. | M | +| CR5 | The function shall not be executable unless a successful PIN verification procedure has been performed. | M | +| CR6 | The function shall not be executable unless the expected MAC-A is received. | M | +| CR7 | If the UICC does not support 'GSM context' which is indicated in parameter P2, the function shall not be executable. | M | + +Reference: TS 31.102 [3], clause 7.1. + +#### 7.3.1.3 Test purpose + +To verify that the UICC conforms to the above requirements. + +#### 7.3.1.4 Method of test + +##### Initial conditions + +- 1) The UICC shall be connected to a ME simulator. + +##### Test procedure 1 + +- a) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- b) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the USIM application. +- c) The ME simulator shall send an AUTHENTICATE command to the UICC. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '69', SW2 = '82' - security status not satisfied [CR5].* + +- d) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- e) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the USIM application. +- f) The ME simulator shall send a VERIFY PIN command with PIN to the UICC. +- g) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the MF. +- h) The ME simulator shall send an AUTHENTICATE command to the UICC. + +*The command shall be aborted [CR4].* + +- i) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the current ADF ('7FFF'). +- j) The ME simulator shall send an AUTHENTICATE command to the UICC with incorrect signed data. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '98', SW2 = '62' - authentication error, incorrect MAC [CR6].* + +- k) If the 'GSM context' is not supported, the ME simulator shall send an AUTHENTICATE command with parameter P2 indicating 'GSM context'. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '98', SW2 = '64' - authentication error, GSM security context not supported [CR7].* + +- l) The ME simulator shall send an AUTHENTICATE command to the UICC with incorrect sequence number SQN. + +*The data field returned shall begin with the tag 'DC', and the data shall be correct for the given f1\* and f5 algorithms and K stored in the UICC [CR1, CR3].* + +- m) The ME simulator shall send an AUTHENTICATE command to the UICC with correct data. + +*The data field returned shall begin with the tag 'DB', and the data shall be correct for the given f2, f3 and f4 algorithms and K stored in the UICC [CR1, CR2].* + +### 7.3.2 Status Conditions Returned by the USIM + +#### 7.3.2.1 Security management + +##### 7.3.2.1.1 Definition and applicability + +See clause 3.5.3. + +##### 7.3.2.1.2 Conformance requirement + +| | | | +|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---| +| CR1 | The UICC shall respond with the correct SW1 and SW2 status words for commands which produce authentication errors. | M | +|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---| + +Reference: TS 31.102 [3], clause 7.3.1. + +##### 7.3.2.1.3 Test purpose + +To verify that the UICC conforms to the above requirements when issuing SW1 and SW2 status words. + +##### 7.3.2.1.4 Method of test + +##### Initial conditions + +- 1) The UICC shall be connected to a ME simulator. + +##### Test procedure 1 + +- a) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- b) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the USIM application. +- c) The ME simulator shall send a VERIFY PIN command with relevant PIN to the UICC. +- d) The ME simulator shall send an AUTHENTICATE command to the UICC with incorrect MAC. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '98', SW2 = '62' - authentication error, incorrect MAC [CR1].* + +- e) If the 'GSM context' is not supported, the ME simulator shall send an AUTHENTICATE command with parameter P2 indicating 'GSM context'. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '98', SW2 = '64' - authentication error, GSM security context not supported [CR1].* + +#### 7.3.2.2 Status Words of the Commands + +##### 7.3.2.2.1 Definition and applicability + +See clause 3.5.3. + +##### 7.3.2.2.2 Conformance requirement + +| | | | +|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---| +| CR1 | Table in TS 31.102 [3], clause 7.3.2 shows for each command the possible status conditions returned (marked by an asterisk *). The UICC shall not generate status conditions other than those allowed for each command. | M | +|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---| + +Reference: TS 31.102 [3], clause 7.3.2. + +##### 7.3.2.2.3 Test purpose + +To verify for each command that the UICC will only generate the allowed status conditions. + +NOTE: CR1 shall not be tested as it is not possible to force the UICC to generate all of the allowed and disallowed status conditions for each command. + +##### 7.3.2.2.4 Method of test + +##### Initial conditions + +N/A + +###### Test procedure + +N/A + +### 7.3.3 GET IDENTITY + +#### 7.3.3.1 Definition and applicability + +See clause 3.5.3. + +#### 7.3.3.2 Conformance requirement + +| | | | +|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---| +| CR1 | The function can be used to retrieve the SUCI when "SUCI calculation is to be performed by the USIM" (i.e. Service n°124 and Service n°125 are "available"). | M | +| CR2 | The function shall not be executable unless a particular USIM application has been selected as the Current Directory and activated and the current directory is the USIM ADF or any subdirectory under this ADF. | M | +| CR3 | The function shall not be executable unless a successful PIN verification procedure has been performed. | M | +| CR4 | The command returns the SUCI which is a privacy preserving identifier containing the concealed SUPI. | M | +| CR5 | The SUCI is designed for one-time use, however, the freshness and randomness of SUCI returned upon each call of the command depends on the protection scheme configured. There is the special case where the protection scheme used is null-scheme, in such case SUCI contains the non concealed SUPI. | M | +| CR6 | If the home network public key is not provisioned in the USIM, the SUCI shall be calculated using the null-scheme irrespective of the protection scheme stored in the USIM. | M | +| CR7 | If SUCI context is supported and:
- Service n°124 is not "available" or:
- "SUCI calculation is to be performed by the ME" (i.e. Service n°124 is "available", and Service n°125 is not "available")
the status word '6985' (Conditions of use not satisfied) shall be returned. | M | + +Reference: TS 31.102 [3], clause 7.5. + +#### 7.3.3.3 Test purpose + +To verify that the UICC conforms to the above requirements. + +#### 7.3.3.4 Method of test + +##### Initial conditions 1 + +- 1) Service n°124 and service n°125 are both "available" in the USIM. +- 2) The Profile B protection scheme is configured to be used in the USIM, and the corresponding home network public key (compressed or uncompressed) is provisioned in the USIM. +- 3) The USIM supports ECIES scheme profile B. +- 4) The UICC shall be connected to an ME simulator. + +##### Test procedure 1 + +- a) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- b) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the USIM application. +- c) The ME simulator shall send a GET IDENTITY command to the UICC. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '69', SW2 = '82' - security status not satisfied [CR3], or, SW1 = '69', SW2 = '85' - conditions of use not satisfied [CR7].* + +- d) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- e) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the USIM application. +- f) The ME simulator shall send a VERIFY PIN command with PIN to the UICC. +- g) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the MF. +- h) The ME simulator shall send a GET IDENTITY command to the UICC. + +*The command shall be aborted [CR2].* + +- i) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the current ADF ('7FFF'). +- j) The ME simulator shall send a GET IDENTITY command to the UICC with correct data. + +*The data field returned shall begin with the tag 'A1', and the data shall be correct for the ECIES scheme profile B and home network public key stored in the UICC [CR1, CR2, CR3, CR4].* + +- k) The ME simulator shall send a GET IDENTITY command to the UICC with correct data. + +*The data field returned shall begin with the tag 'A1', and the data shall be correct for the ECIES scheme profile B and home network public key stored in the UICC [CR1, CR2, CR3, CR4].* + +*The data shall be different with j) [CR5].* + +##### Initial conditions 2 + +- 1) Service n°124 and service n°125 are both "available" in the USIM. +- 2) The Profile A protection scheme is configured to be used in the USIM, and the corresponding home network public key (compressed or uncompressed) is provisioned in the USIM. +- 3) The USIM supports ECIES scheme profile A. +- 4) The UICC shall be connected to an ME simulator. + +##### Test procedure 2 + +- a) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- b) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the USIM application. +- c) The ME simulator shall send a GET IDENTITY command to the UICC. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '69', SW2 = '82' - security status not satisfied [CR3].* + +- d) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- e) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the USIM application. +- f) The ME simulator shall send a VERIFY PIN command with PIN to the UICC. +- g) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the MF. +- h) The ME simulator shall send a GET IDENTITY command to the UICC. + +*The command shall be aborted [CR2].* + +- i) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the current ADF ('7FFF'). +- j) The ME simulator shall send a GET IDENTITY command to the UICC with correct data. + +*The data field returned shall begin with the tag 'A1', and the data shall be correct for the ECIES scheme profile A and home network public key stored in the UICC [CR1, CR2, CR3, CR4].* + +- k) The ME simulator shall send a GET IDENTITY command to the UICC with correct data. + +*The data field returned shall begin with the tag 'A1', and the data shall be correct for the ECIES scheme profile A and home network public key stored in the UICC [CR1, CR2, CR3, CR4]* + +*The data shall be different with j) [CR5].* + +##### Initial conditions 3 + +- 1) Service n°124 and service n°125 are both "available" in the USIM. +- 2) The home network public key is not provisioned, or null-scheme is configured to be used in the USIM. +- 3) The UICC shall be connected to an ME simulator. + +##### Test procedure 3 + +- a) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- b) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the USIM application. +- c) The ME simulator shall send a GET IDENTITY command to the UICC. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '69', SW2 = '82' - security status not satisfied [CR3].* + +- d) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- e) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the USIM application. +- f) The ME simulator shall send a VERIFY PIN command with PIN to the UICC. +- g) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the MF. +- h) The ME simulator shall send a GET IDENTITY command to the UICC. + +*The command shall be aborted [CR2].* + +- i) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the current ADF ('7FFF'). +- j) The ME simulator shall send a GET IDENTITY command to the UICC with correct data. + +*The data field returned shall begin with the tag 'A1', and the data shall be correct for the given Null-scheme [CR6].* + +- k) The ME simulator shall send a GET IDENTITY command to the UICC with correct data. + +*The data field returned shall begin with the tag 'A1', and the data shall be correct for the given Null-scheme [CR6].* + +*The data shall be the same with j) [CR5].* + +##### Initial conditions 4 + +- 1) Service n°124 is not "available" in the USIM, or Service n°124 is "available", and Service n°125 is not "available" in the USIM. +- 2) The home network public key is provisioned in the USIM. +- 3) The UICC shall be connected to an ME simulator. + +##### Test procedure 4 + +- a) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- b) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the USIM application. +- c) The ME simulator shall send a GET IDENTITY command to the UICC. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '69', SW2 = '85' - conditions of use not satisfied [CR7].* + +- d) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- e) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the USIM application. +- f) The ME simulator shall send a VERIFY PIN command with PIN to the UICC. +- g) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the MF. +- h) The ME simulator shall send a GET IDENTITY command to the UICC. + +*The command shall be aborted [CR2].* + +- i) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the current ADF ('7FFF'). +- j) The ME simulator shall send a GET IDENTITY command to the UICC with correct data. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '69', SW2 = '85' - conditions of use not satisfied [CR7].* + +## 7.4 Void + +# 8 Test Procedure (31.101) + +This clause details each of the tests in each of the test groups within the Test Group Ts 31.101 [2]. This test suite allows testing of the IUT against the base specification with respect to: + +- General 3GPP platform requirements +- Physical and logical characteristics +- User verification and file access conditions +- Files. + +## 8.1 General 3GPP platform requirements + +### 8.1.1 GSM/USIM application interaction and restrictions + +#### 8.1.1.1 Definition and applicability + +See clause 3.5.3. + +#### 8.1.1.2 Conformance requirement + +| | | | +|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| CR1 | Activation of a USIM session shall exclude the activation of a GSM session. | Rel-6 - ... | +| CR2 | Once a USIM application session has been activated, commands sent to the UICC with CLA byte set to 'A0' shall return SW1SW2 '6E 00' (class not supported) to the ME. | Rel-6 - ... | +| CR3 | Activation of a GSM session shall exclude the activation of a USIM session. | Rel-6 - ... | + +Reference: TS 31.101 [2], clause 4.1. + +#### 8.1.1.3 Test purpose + +To verify that the UICC conforms to the above requirements. + +NOTE: CR3 is not tested as it is out of the scope of the present document. + +#### 8.1.1.4 Method of test + +##### Initial conditions + +- 1) The UICC shall be connected to a ME simulator. + +##### Test procedure 1 + +- a) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- b) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select and activate USIM application. +- c) The ME simulator shall send a STATUS command with 'A0' as the class byte. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '6E', SW2 = '00' – class not supported [CR1, CR2].* + +- d) The ME simulator shall send a STATUS command with '80' as the class byte. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '90', SW2 = '00' – normal ending of a command [CR1].* + +## 8.2 Physical and logical characteristics + +### 8.2.1 Transmission speed + +#### 8.2.1.1 Definition and applicability + +See clause 3.5.3. + +#### 8.2.1.2 Conformance requirement + +| | | | +|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| CR1 | The UICC shall support (F, D) = (512, 32) in addition to those required by TS 102.221 [1]. | Rel-6 - ... | +|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| + +Reference: TS 31.101 [2], clause 5.1. + +#### 8.2.1.3 Test purpose + +To verify that the UICC conforms to the above requirements. + +#### 8.2.1.4 Method of test + +##### Initial conditions + +- 1) The UICC shall be connected to a ME simulator. + +##### Test Procedure 1 + +- a) The ME simulator shall cold reset the UICC. +- b) The ME simulator shall send a PPS-Request to the UICC, selecting T = 0 protocol and (F, D) = (512, 32). + +*The UICC shall send a valid PPS-Response indicating support for the requested parameters.* + +- c) The ME simulator shall send a STATUS command with P2 = '00' at (F, D) = (512, 32). + +*The UICC shall send a status word indicating successful command execution [CR1].* + +##### Test Procedure 2 + +- a) The ME simulator shall cold reset the UICC. +- b) The ME simulator shall send a PPS-Request to the UICC, selecting T = 1 protocol and (F, D) = (512, 32). + +*The UICC shall send a valid PPS-Response indicating support for the requested parameters.* + +- c) The ME simulator shall send a STATUS command with P2 = '00' at (F, D) = (512, 32). + +*The UICC shall send a status word indicating successful command execution [CRI].* + +### 8.2.2 Voltage classes + +#### 8.2.2.1 Definition and applicability + +See clause 3.5.3. + +#### 8.2.2.2 Conformance requirement + +| | | | +|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| CR1 | A UICC holding a USIM application shall support at least two consecutive voltage classes as defined in TS 102.221 [1], e.g. AB or BC. | Rel-6 - ... | +| CR2 | If the UICC supports more than two classes, they shall all be consecutive, e.g. ABC. | Rel-6 - ... | + +Reference: TS 31.101 [2], clause 5.2. + +#### 8.2.2.3 Test purpose + +To verify that the UICC conforms to the above requirements. + +#### 8.2.2.4 Method of test + +##### Initial conditions + +- 1) The UICC shall be connected to a ME simulator. + +##### Test procedure 1 + +- a) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. + +*The UICC shall send the ATR sequence.* + +*The supply voltage class indicator (the lower 6 bits in TA(i) after the first occurrence of T = 15 in TD(i-1) for $i > 2$ ) shall be exist and one of the following values:* + +- '03', '06', '07' [CR1, CR2]. + +### 8.2.3 File Control Parameters (FCP) + +#### 8.2.3.1 Definition and applicability + +See clause 3.5.3. + +#### 8.2.3.2 Conformance requirement + +| | | | +|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| CR1 | The value indicated in the Minimum application clock frequency object shall not exceed 3 MHz, corresponding to '1E'. | Rel-6 - ... | +|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| + +Reference: TS 31.101 [2], clause 5.3. + +#### 8.2.3.3 Test purpose + +To verify that the UICC conforms to the above requirements. + +#### 8.2.3.4 Method of test + +##### Initial conditions + +- 1) The UICC shall be connected to a ME simulator. + +##### Test procedure 1 + +- a) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- b) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command with AID to the UICC to select and activate the USIM application. + +*The status returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '90', SW2 = '00' – normal ending of the command.* + +*If the returned FCP contains the Proprietary Information object (Tag 'A5') and the Proprietary Information object contains the Minimum application clock frequency object (Tag '82') then:* + +- *The Application minimum clock frequency value shall not exceed '1E', which corresponds to 3 MHz. [CR1]* + +## 8.3 User verification and file access conditions + +### 8.3.1 Definition and applicability + +See clause 3.5.3. + +### 8.3.2 Conformance requirement + +| | | | +|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------| +| CR1 | Every file related to a 3GPP application shall have a reference to an access rule stored in EF ARR . | Rel-6 - ... | +| CR2 | A multi-verification capable UICC holding a 3GPP application shall support the referenced format using SEID as defined in TS 102 221 [1]. | Rel-6 - ...:
O_MULTI_VER | +| CR3 | A 3GPP application residing on a multi-verification capable UICC shall support the replacement of its application PIN with the Universal PIN, key reference '11', as defined in TS 102 221 [1]. | Rel-6 - ...:
O_MULTI_VER | +| CR4 | Only the Universal PIN is allowed as a replacement. | Rel-6 - ...:
O_MULTI_VER | + +Reference: TS 31.101 [2], clause 7. + +### 8.3.3 Test purpose + +To verify that the UICC conforms to the above requirements. + +NOTE 1: CR3 is tested in the clause 6.6.3. + +NOTE 2: CR4 is not currently tested in this document. + +### 8.3.4 Method of test + +#### Initial conditions + +- 1) The UICC shall be connected to a ME simulator. + +#### Test procedure 1 + +- a) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- b) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select and activate USIM application. +- c) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the first EF in the USIM application. + +*The response data shall contain the TLV DO with tag '8B' indicating Referenced Security Attributes and shall contain the file ID and EFARR record numbers for SEID = 0 and SEID = 1 [CR1, CR2].* + +- d) Step c) shall be repeated for all the EFs under the selected USIM in the UICC. + +#### Test procedure 2 + +- a) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- b) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select and activate USIM application. +- c) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select the first EF in the USIM application. + +*The response data shall contain the TLV DO with tag '8B' indicating Referenced Security Attributes [CR1].* + +- d) Step c) shall be repeated for all the EFs under the selected USIM in the UICC. + +## 8.4 Files + +### 8.4.1 Contents of the EFs at the MF level + +#### 8.4.1.1 Definition and applicability + +See clause 3.5.3. + +#### 8.4.1.2 Conformance requirement + +| | | | +|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| CR1 | EF ARR under MF is mandatory. | Rel-6 - ... | +| CR2 | EF DIR entries for 3GPP applications shall contain the Application Identifier and the Application Label as mandatory elements. | Rel-6 - ... | +| CR3 | EF DIR entries for 3GPP applications shall not contain a path object for application selection. | Rel-6 - ... | + +Reference: TS 31.101 [2], clause 8.1. + +#### 8.4.1.3 Test purpose + +To verify that the Elementary Files within the UICC application structure conform to the above requirements. + +#### 8.4.1.4 Method of test + +##### Initial conditions + +- 1) The UICC shall be connected to a ME simulator. + +##### Test procedure 1 + +- a) The ME simulator shall reset the UICC. +- b) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select EFARR. + +*The status condition returned by the UICC shall be SW1 = '90', SW2 = '00' – normal ending of the command [CR1].* + +- c) The ME simulator shall send a SELECT command to the UICC to select EFDIR. +- d) Step c) shall be repeated for each record in EFDIR. +- e) The ME simulator shall send a READ RECORD command with NEXT mode to the UICC. + +*If the EFDIR entry contains a 3GPP application (i.e. contains an AID matching the AID of a 3GPP application as defined in TS 101 220 [15]), then:* + +- *the Application Label shall be present [CR2];* +- *a File Reference (tag '51') TLV DO shall not be present [CR3].* + +# Annex A (informative): Change history + +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New | +|---------|-------|-----------|------|-----|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 2000-12 | TP-10 | TP-000206 | - | - | - | Final draft was approved at TSG-T #10 | 3.0.0 | +| 2001-12 | TP-10 | TP-010247 | 001 | - | F | Corrections | 3.1.0 | +| 2001-12 | TP-10 | TP-010247 | 004 | 1 | F | Change test for TLV DO with tag '82' and '83' | 3.1.0 | +| 2002-03 | TP-15 | TP-020067 | 005 | - | F | Removal of an invalid transfer protocol test case | 3.2.0 | +| 2002-03 | TP-15 | TP-020067 | 006 | - | F | Corrections | 3.2.0 | +| 2002-06 | TP-16 | TP-020118 | 007 | - | F | General Corrections | 3.3.0 | +| 2002-06 | TP-16 | TP-020118 | 008 | - | F | Removal of test for use of procedure byte '61xx' for case 2 commands | 3.3.0 | +| 2002-09 | TP-17 | TP-020216 | 009 | - | F | Expected remainder of returned data string | 3.4.0 | +| 2002-09 | TP-17 | TP-020216 | 010 | - | F | Corrections and Clarifications | 3.4.0 | +| 2002-09 | TP-17 | TP-020216 | 011 | - | F | Correction of error in read binary test case for T=0 | 3.4.0 | +| 2002-09 | TP-17 | TP-020216 | 012 | - | F | Alignment of conformance requirement due to CR 088 on TS 102 221 | 3.4.0 | +| 2002-09 | TP-17 | TP-020216 | 013 | - | F | Correction of case 3/case 4 command tests in case of wrong P1-P2. | 3.4.0 | +| 2002-12 | TP-18 | TP-020287 | 014 | - | F | Correction of test of Read Record on Linear Fixed EF and T=1 test | 3.5.0 | +| 2003-03 | TP-19 | TP-030029 | 015 | - | F | Correction to the returned FCP of the SELECT and the STATUS command | 3.6.0 | +| 2003-12 | TP-22 | TP-030256 | 016 | - | D | Editorial Corrections | 3.7.0 | +| 2004-12 | TP-26 | TP-040264 | 017 | - | F | Correction of non specific references | 3.8.0 | +| 2004-12 | TP-26 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade to Rel-4 | 4.0.0 | +| 2005-06 | CT-28 | CP-050136 | 018 | - | A | Correction of ISO/IEC 7816 Series References | 4.1.0 | +| 2005-06 | CT-28 | CP-050136 | 020 | - | A | ISO/IEC 7811 Series Revision | 4.1.0 | +| 2005-09 | CT-29 | CP-050337 | 021 | - | F | CR to TS 31.122, Release 4: Creation of a Release 6 Version of TS 31.122 | 6.0.0 | +| 2006-03 | CT-31 | CP-060158 | 022 | 1 | F | Essential Corrections to many test cases, which would cause the USIM to fail essential tests | 6.1.0 | +| 2006-09 | CT-33 | CP-060477 | 0023 | 2 | F | Updates to Physical characteristics tests | 6.2.0 | +| 2006-09 | CT-33 | CP-060477 | 0032 | 1 | F | Updates based on changes to 31.102 | 6.2.0 | +| 2006-09 | CT-33 | CP-060477 | 0026 | 2 | F | Updates to Protocol Tests | 6.2.0 | +| 2006-09 | CT-33 | CP-060477 | 0031 | 1 | F | Refinement of tests for shareable files | 6.2.0 | +| 2006-09 | CT-33 | CP-060477 | 0027 | 1 | F | Removal of Test Groups | 6.2.0 | +| 2006-09 | CT-33 | CP-060477 | 0029 | 1 | F | Addition of tests for current file after application session termination | 6.2.0 | +| 2006-09 | CT-33 | CP-060477 | 0030 | 3 | F | Addition of tests for 31.101 | 6.2.0 | +| 2006-11 | CT-34 | CP-060726 | 0028 | 5 | F | Addition of tests for BER-TLV structure files and Data Oriented commands | 6.3.0 | +| 2006-11 | CT-34 | CP-060726 | 0029 | - | F | Addition of tests for (F, D) = (512, 64) and introduction of Test Cases related to Low Impedance Drivers | 6.3.0 | +| 2007-03 | CT-35 | CP-070061 | 0036 | 2 | F | Creation of combined R99 – Rel-6 version, by addition of applicability tables | 6.4.0 | +| 2007-06 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-7 version (MCC) | 7.0.0 | +| 2007-09 | CT-37 | CP-070618 | 0037 | - | F | Addition of applicability column for Rel-7 | 7.1.0 | +| 2007-09 | CT-37 | CP-070618 | 0039 | 1 | F | Essential corrections to various tests | 7.1.0 | +| 2007-09 | CT-37 | CP-070618 | 0040 | 1 | F | Correction to test for Reservation of file IDs | 7.1.0 | +| 2007-09 | CT-37 | CP-070618 | 0041 | 1 | F | Replacement of EF SMS with EF ECC for SEARCH RECORD (SFI) test | 7.1.0 | +| 2007-09 | CT-37 | CP-070618 | 0046 | 1 | F | Essential correction of FCP content in test 6.8.1.2 | 7.1.0 | +| 2009-03 | CT-42 | | | | | Upgraded without technical change to Rel-8 | 8.0.0 | +| 2009-04 | | | | | | Update history box | 8.0.1 | +| 2009-12 | CT-46 | | | | | Upgraded without technical change to Rel-9 | 9.0.0 | +| 2010-09 | CT-49 | CP-100588 | 0049 | 1 | F | Essential correction of SET DATA, Delete Tag test case | 9.1.0 | +| 2010-12 | CT-50 | CP-100832 | 0050 | 1 | F | Correction to RETRIEVE DATA test sequence | 9.2.0 | +| 2010-12 | SP-51 | | | | | Upgraded without technical change to Rel-10 | 10.0.0 | +| 2012-09 | SP-57 | | | | | Upgraded without technical change to Rel-11 | 11.0.0 | +| 2013-06 | CT-60 | CP-130369 | 0051 | 1 | F | Correction of a misleading note for threshold measurements on contact C3 (CLK). | 11.1.0 | +| 2014-10 | SP-65 | | | | | Upgraded without technical change to Rel-12 | 12.0.0 | +| 2015-12 | CT-70 | CP-150828 | 0056 | 3 | F | Specify the status condition returned if search pattern can not be found in any of the records | 13.0.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA-75 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-14 version (MCC) | 14.0.0 | +| 2018-06 | CT-80 | CP-181155 | 0057 | -1 | F- | Remove platform related testcases from 31.122 as they are added to ETSI specification 102.230-2. | 15.0.0 | +| 2019-06 | CT-84 | CP-191015 | | 1 | F | Add missing Rel-8 onwards applicability in the | 15.1.0 | + +| | | | | | | | | +|---------|--------|-----------|------|---|---|---------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| | | | | | | applicability table | | +| 2019-06 | CT-84 | CP-191019 | | 3 | B | Extend the scope of 31.122 to cover USIM Command GET IDENTITY | 15.1.0 | +| 2020-06 | CT#88e | CP-201150 | 0065 | 1 | B | Update test case of 7.3.3 GET IDENTITY | 15.2.0 | +| 2020-07 | SA-89e | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 16.0.0 | +| 2020-09 | CT#89e | CP-202130 | 0066 | 1 | A | Update of spec. reference | 16.1.0 | +| 2020-12 | CT#90e | CP-203093 | 0068 | 1 | F | Correction of a reference to ETSI TS 102 230-2 | 16.2.0 | +| 2021-06 | CT#92e | CP-211099 | 0070 | - | F | Correction of test case 7.3.3 | 16.3.0 | +| 2022-03 | CT#95e | CP-220132 | 0072 | 1 | B | Update TC of Contents of the Elementary Files (EF) | 16.4.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31130/5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31130/5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5d8ffe06d184ab87f0769c0c64338b55755ae66d --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31130/5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:26f948d02c5b6a2808fc931a92cbcbbe8ae51b66b47c5da1791018cbcb62ca4f +size 8182 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31130/64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31130/64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0e9dd22eed1459c4e928235ca8f012d27218a51a --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31130/64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:f965115a017d5eac5db13c8af3f3d4411d30c91dbd53d9f300c8b47529913d49 +size 5777 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31130/d793cf7c174b89eb024d132f00679787_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31130/d793cf7c174b89eb024d132f00679787_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5a09d86220a3722ac7cb054e7a2cac9dc1bdb6b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31130/d793cf7c174b89eb024d132f00679787_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:cfc431ae0045fd649e1de50f3066641eacf10a00a11b0fbd828835d962577596 +size 135384 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31130/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31130/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1445cd9e8b96f5770dc36a0b5b1e3087de38c256 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31130/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,702 @@ + + +# 3GPP TS 31.130 V16.0.0 (2020-07) + +*Technical Specification* + +## **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; (U)SIM Application Programming Interface (API); (U)SIM API for Java™ Card; (Release 16)** + +![5G logo](64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg) + +The 5G logo, featuring the text "5G" in a bold, black, sans-serif font. Above the "5" and "G" are three green curved lines representing signal waves. + +5G logo + +![3GPP logo](5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg) + +The 3GPP logo, featuring the text "3GPP" in a bold, black, stylized font. The "3" and "G" are connected at the top, and the "P" has a red signal wave icon below it. + +3GPP logo + +A GLOBAL INITIATIVE + +The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP. The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organizational Partners and shall not be implemented. This Specification is provided for future development work within 3GPP only. The Organizational Partners accept no liability for any use of this Specification. Specifications and Reports for implementation of the 3GPP™ system should be obtained via the 3GPP Organizational Partners' Publications Offices. + +## **3GPP** + +--- + +Postal address + +--- + +3GPP support office address + +--- + +650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis +Valbonne - FRANCE +Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 + +--- + +Internet + +--- + + + +## --- **Copyright Notification** --- + +No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. +The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. + +© 2020, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC). +All rights reserved. + +UMTSTM is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members +3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association + +# --- Contents + +| | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| Foreword ..... | 4 | +| 1 Scope..... | 5 | +| 2 References..... | 5 | +| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 6 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 6 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 6 | +| 4 Description..... | 6 | +| 4.0 Overview ..... | 6 | +| 4.1 (U)SIM Java Card™ Architecture ..... | 7 | +| 5 File Access API..... | 7 | +| 6 (U)SAT Framework..... | 7 | +| 6.0 Overview ..... | 7 | +| 6.1 Applet triggering ..... | 8 | +| 6.1.1 Exception Handling ..... | 8 | +| 6.2 Definition of Events ..... | 8 | +| 6.3 Registration ..... | 12 | +| 6.4 Proactive command handling..... | 12 | +| 6.5 Envelope response handling..... | 12 | +| 6.6 System Handler management..... | 13 | +| 6.7 (U)SAT Framework behaviour ..... | 14 | +| 7 UICC toolkit applet..... | 14 | +| 8 Geo Location API ..... | 14 | +| 9 SUCI API ..... | 14 | +| Annex A (normative): Java Card™ (U)SIM API ..... | 15 | +| Annex B (normative): Java Card™ (U)SIM API identifiers ..... | 16 | +| Annex C (normative): (U)SIM API package version management..... | 17 | +| Annex D (normative): USIM API jar files..... | 19 | +| Annex E (informative): Change History ..... | 20 | + +# Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings: + +- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something +- shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something + +The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports. + +The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document. + +- should** indicates a recommendation to do something +- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something +- may** indicates permission to do something +- need not** indicates permission not to do something + +The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended. + +- can** indicates that something is possible +- cannot** indicates that something is impossible + +The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not". + +- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +In addition: + +**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document defines the (U)SIM Application Programming Interface extending the "UICC API for Java Card™" [2]. + +This API allows to develop a (U)SAT application running together with a (U)SIM application and using 3GPP network features. + +The present document includes information applicable to 3GPP network operators, service providers, server – (U)SIM – database manufacturers. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] ETSI TS 101 220: "Integrated Circuit Cards (ICC); ETSI numbering system for telecommunication; Application providers (AID)". +- [2] ETSI TS 102 241 V15.0.0: "UICC API for Java Card™" +- [3] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the USIM Application". +- [4] 3GPP TS 51.011 Release 4: "Specification of the Subscriber Identity Module- Mobile Equipment (SIM – ME) interface". +- [5] 3GPP TS 23.041: "Technical realization of Cell Broadcast Service (CBS)". +- [6] 3GPP TS 31.101: "UICC-terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics". +- [7] 3GPP TS 31.111: "USIM Application Toolkit (USAT)". +- [8] 3GPP TS 51.014 Release 4: "Specification of the SIM Application Toolkit for the Subscriber Identity Module – Mobile Equipment (SIM – ME) interface". +- [9] 3GPP TS 31.115: "Secured packet structure for the (U)SIM Toolkit applications". +- [10] 3GPP TS 23.040: "Technical realization of the Short Message Service (SMS)". +- [11] ORACLE "Application Programming Interface, Java Card™ Platform, 3.0.1 Classic Edition". +- [12] ORACLE "Runtime Environment Specification, Java Card™ Platform, 3.0.1 Classic Edition". + +[13] ORACLE "Virtual Machine Specification Java Card™ Platform, 3.0.1 Classic Edition". + +Note: ORACLE Java Card™ Specifications can be downloaded at + + +[14] 3GPP TS 23.032: "Universal Geographical Area Description (GAD)". + +[15] IEC 61162-1: "Maritime navigation and radio communication equipment and systems – Digital interfaces". + +# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions defined in ETSI TS 102 241 [2] apply. + +**(U)SAT Framework :** (U)SAT extension of the CAT Runtime Environment. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations defined in ETSI TS 102 241 [2] apply. + +# --- 4 Description + +# 4.0 Overview + +This API is an extension to the ETSI TS 102 241 [2] "UICC API for Java Card™" and requires the implementation of this specification. + +The classes and interfaces described in this specification inherit functionality from the classes and interfaces specified in the "UICC API for Java Card™". + +The (U)SAT Framework described in this specification is an extension of the CAT Runtime Environment defined in ETSI TS 102 241 [2]. + +## 4.1 (U)SIM Java Card™ Architecture + +The overall architecture of the (U)SIM API is based on the "UICC API for Java Card™" defined in ETSI TS 102 241 [2]. + +![Diagram of (U)SIM Java Card™ Architecture showing layers from UICC File System Server down to the CAT Runtime Environment.](d793cf7c174b89eb024d132f00679787_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the (U)SIM Java Card™ Architecture, organized into several layers: + +- Top Layer (Applications):** + - UICC File System Server** + - 102 221 based Applications** (e.g. SIM Applet or USIM Applet) and **ADF File System Server** + - Other Applications not based on 102 221** + - Toolkit Applet** (e.g. Toolkit service, Remote Management Applications, Browser Applications) +- Second Layer (Packages):** + - Java Card™ Packages** + - uicc.access package** + - uicc.toolkit package** + - uicc.system package** +- Third Layer (Runtime Environments):** + - Java Card™ Runtime Environment** + - (U)SAT Framework** (containing **USATEnvelopeHandler**) + - CAT Runtime Environment** (containing **Toolkit Handlers**, **Toolkit Registry**, and **Triggering Entity**) +- Bottom Layer:** An empty rectangular box representing the base layer. + +**Legend:** A grey rectangle indicates "Items that are defined in this specification". + +Diagram of (U)SIM Java Card™ Architecture showing layers from UICC File System Server down to the CAT Runtime Environment. + +Figure 1: (U)SIM Java Card™ Architecture + +# 5 File Access API + +The (U)SIM file access API consists of the package *uicc.usim.access*. This package defines additional constants to those defined in the *uicc.access* package from ETSI TS 102 241 [2]. The access to the file system, defined in TS 51.011 [4] and TS 31.102 [3], is the one specified in ETSI TS 102 241 [2] via the UICC *FileView* Interface. When selecting a cyclic file the current record number is defined, this applies also to files located under DFGSM. + +# 6 (U)SAT Framework + +# 6.0 Overview + +The (U)SIM toolkit API consists of the *uicc.usim.toolkit* package for toolkit features defined in TS 31.111 [7] and TS 51.014 [8], and is based on the *uicc.toolkit* package defined in ETSI TS 102 241 [2]. + +## 6.1 Applet triggering + +See ETSI TS 102 241 [2]. + +### 6.1.1 Exception Handling + +The following clause describes the handling of exceptions by the (U)SAT Framework in addition to the behaviour defined in ETSI TS 102 241 [2] for the CAT Runtime Environment. + +If an Applet triggered by EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV event throws an ISOException with the reason code (0x6FXX), it shall be sent to the terminal. + +Other Exceptions shall not be propagated to the terminal. + +## 6.2 Definition of Events + +The following events can trigger a Toolkit Applet in addition to the events defined in ETSI TS 102 241 [2], all short values are reserved in ETSI TS 102 241 [2]: + +**Table 1: (U)SAT event list** + +| Event Name | Reserved short value | +|-----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| +| EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV | 2 | +| EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | 3 | +| EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV | 4 | +| EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | 5 | +| EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB | 6 | +| EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_NAA | 10 | +| EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB | 24 | +| EVENT_EVENT_DOWNLOAD_IWLAN_ACCESS_STATUS | 30 | +| EVENT_EVENT_DOWNLOAD_NETWORK_REJECTION | 31 | +| EVENT_EVENT_DOWNLOAD_CSG_CELL_SELECTION | 33 | +| EVENT_EVENT_DOWNLOAD_DATA_CONNECTION_STATUS_CHANGE | 37 | +| EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD | 121 | +| EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD | 122 | +| EVENT_EVENT_DOWNLOAD IMS_REGISTRATION | 119 | +| EVENT_EVENT_DOWNLOAD_INCOMING IMS_DATA | 120 | + +*EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV, EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV, +EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD, EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD* + +There are two ways for a card to receive a Short Message Point to Point: via an ENVELOPE(SMS-PP DOWNLOAD) APDU as defined in TS 31.111 [7] and TS 51.014 [8] or an UPDATE RECORD EFSMS APDU as defined in TS 31.102 [3] and TS 51.011 [4]. The EFSMS can be either located under the DFTelecom or under any ADF as defined in TS 31.102 [3] and TS 51.011 [4]. + +The received Short Message may be: + +- formatted according to TS 31.115 [9] or an other protocol to identify explicitly the toolkit applet for which the message is sent; +- unformatted (e.g. a toolkit applet specific protocol ) then the (U)SAT Framework will pass this data to all registered toolkit applets. + +When the Short Message is received as Concatenated Short Messages as defined in TS 23.040 [10], it is the responsibility of the (U)SAT Framework to link single Short Messages together to re – assemble the original message before any further processing. The original Short Message shall be placed in one SMS TPDU TLV (with TP-UDL field coded on one octet) included in the *USATEnvelopeHandler*. The concatenation control headers used to re-assemble the short messages in the correct order shall not be present in the SMS TPDU. The TP-elements of the SMS TPDU and the Address (TS – Service-Centre-Address) shall correspond to the ones in the last received Short Message (independently of the Sequence number of Information-Element-Data). + +The minimum requirement for the (U)SAT Framework is to process a concatenated short message with the following properties: + +- the Information Element Identifier is equal to the 8-bit reference number. +- it contains uncompressed 8 bit data or uncompressed UCS2 data. + +#### EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV + +Upon reception of a TS 31.115 [9] formatted Short Message Point to Point (Single or Concatenated) via an ENVELOPE, the (U)SAT Framework shall: + +- verify the security of the Short Message as per TS 31.115 [9]; +- trigger the toolkit applet registered with the corresponding TAR; +- take the optional Application Data posted by the triggered toolkit applet if present; +- secure and send the response packet using SMS-DELIVER-REPORT or SMS-SUBMIT. + +When the toolkit applet is triggered, data shall be provided deciphered. + +#### EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV + +Upon reception of an unformatted Short Message Point to Point (Single or Concatenated) via an ENVELOPE, the (U)SAT Framework shall trigger all the Toolkit Applets registered to this event. + +NOTE: As a consequence of the *EnvelopeResponseHandler* availability rules specified in clause 6.6, only the first triggered toolkit applet is guaranteed to be able to send back a response. + +#### EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD + +Upon reception of a TS 31.115 [9] formatted Short Message Point to Point (Single or Concatenated) via an UPDATE RECORD EFSMS, the (U)SAT Framework shall: + +- update the EFSMS file with the data received, it is then up to the receiving toolkit applet to change the SMS stored in the file (i.e. the toolkit applet need to have access to the EFSMS file) +- verify the security of the Short Message as per TS 31.115 [9]; +- convert the UPDATE RECORD EFSMS APDU into a COMPREHENSION TLV List; +- trigger the toolkit applet registered with the corresponding TAR; + +When the toolkit applet is triggered, data shall be provided deciphered. + +The *USATEnvelopeHandler* provided to the applet shall: + +- return *BTAG\_SMS\_PP\_DOWNLOAD* to the *getTag()* method call; +- return the Comprehension TLV list length to the *getLength()* method call; + +The *USATEnvelopeHandler* provided to the applet shall contain the following COMPREHENSION TLVs: + +- Device Identities TLV + +The Device Identities Comprehension TLV is used to store the information about the absolute record number in the EFSMS file and the value of the EFSMS record status byte, and is formatted as defined below: + +| | +|--------------------------------------------| +| Device identities Comprehension TLV | +| Device Identities tag | +| length = 02 | +| Absolute Record Number | +| Record Status | + +With the absolute record number the toolkit applet can update EFSMS in absolute mode to change the received SMS (e.g. in a readable text). + +For Concatenated Short Message the Absolute Record Number and the Record Status will correspond to the last UPDATE RECORD EFSMS APDU received. + +- Address TLV + +The value is the TS-Service-Centre-Address (RP-OA) of the last UPDATE RECORD EFSMS APDU. + +- SMS TPDU TLV + +The value is the SMS TPDU provided deciphered and reassembled, if needed + +- AID TLV + +The AID comprehension TLV is present only if the EFSMS file updated is under an ADF. The value is the AID of the ADF as defined TS 31.111 [7]. + +The order of the TLVs given in the *USATEnvelopeHandler* is not specified, + +NOTE: To get each COMPREHENSION TLV, it is recommended that the applet uses the *ViewHandler.findTLV()* methods + +#### *EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD* + +Upon reception of an unformatted Short Message Point to Point (Single or Concatenated) via UPDATE RECORD EFSMS APDU, the (U)SAT Framework shall : + +- update the EFSMS file with the data received; +- convert the UPDATE RECORD EFSMS APDU data into a COMPREHENSION TLV List (as described for *EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD*); +- trigger all the Toolkit Applets registered to this event. + +The content of EFSMS may have been modified by a previously triggered Toolkit Applet.. + +#### *EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB, EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_CB* + +The received Cell Broadcast Message, via an ENVELOPE (CELL BROADCAST DOWNLOAD) APDU as defined in TS 31.111 [7] and TS 51.014 [8] and, can be either: + +- formatted according to TS 31.115 [9] or an other protocol to identify explicitly the toolkit applet for which the message is sent; +- unformatted ( e.g. using a toolkit applet specific protocol ), then the (U)SAT Framework will pass this data to all registered toolkit applets. + +When the Cell Broadcast Message is received as multiple pages as defined in TS 23.041 [5], it is the responsibility of the (U)SAT Framework to link single pages together to re-assemble the original message before any further processing. The original Cell Broadcast message shall be placed in one Cell Broadcast page TLV included in the *USATEnvelopeHandler*. The message parameters shall correspond to the ones in the last received Cell Broadcast page (independently of the Page Parameter). + +#### *EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB* + +Upon reception of a TS 31.115 [9] formatted Cell Broadcast message, the (U)SAT Framework shall: + +- verify the security of the Cell Broadcast message as per TS 31.115 [9]; +- trigger the toolkit applet registered with the corresponding TAR; + +When the toolkit applet is triggered, data shall be provided deciphered. + +#### *EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_CB* + +Upon reception of an unformatted Cell Broadcast message, the (U)SAT Framework shall trigger all the Toolkit Applets registered to this event. + +#### *EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_NAA* + +Upon reception of an ENVELOPE (MO SHORT MESSAGE CONTROL defined in TS 51.014 [8] and TS 31.111 [7]) APDU as defined in TS 31.101 [6] and TS 51.011 [4] the (U)SAT Framework shall trigger the Toolkit Applet registered to this event. The (U)SAT Framework shall not allow more than one Toolkit Applet to be registered to this event at a time (e.g. if a Toolkit Applet is registered to this event but not in selectable state the (U)SAT Framework shall not allow another Toolkit Applet to register to this event). + +#### *EVENT\_FORMATTED\_USSD, EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_USSD* + +The received USSD String, via an ENVELOPE (USSD Data Download) APDU as defined in TS 31.111 [7], may be: + +- formatted according to TS 31.115 [9] or an other protocol to identify explicitly the toolkit applet for which the message is sent; +- unformatted (e.g. a toolkit applet specific protocol) then the (U)SAT Framework will pass this data to all registered toolkit applets. + +When the USSD Message is received as concatenated as defined in TS 31.115 [9], it is the responsibility of the (U)SAT Framework to link single USSD Messages together to re-assemble the original message before any further processing. The original USSD message shall be placed in one USSD String TLV included in the *USATEnvelopeHandler*. The USSD String parameters (DCS, PFI, CCF) shall correspond to the ones in the last received USSD String (independently of the CCF Sequence number). + +#### *EVENT\_FORMATTED\_USSD* + +Upon reception of a TS 31.115 [9] formatted USSD Message via an ENVELOPE, the (U)SAT Framework shall: + +- verify the security of the USSD Message as per TS 31.115 [9]; +- trigger the toolkit applet registered with the corresponding TAR; +- take the optional Application Data posted by the triggered toolkit applet if present; +- secure and send the response packet. + +When the toolkit applet is triggered, data shall be provided deciphered. + +#### *EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_USSD* + +Upon reception of an unformatted USSD String via an ENVELOPE, the (U)SAT Framework shall trigger all the Toolkit Applets registered to this event. + +NOTE: As a consequence of the *EnvelopeResponseHandler* availability rules specified in clause 6.6, only the first triggered toolkit applet is guaranteed to be able to send back a response. + +#### *EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_IWLAN\_ACCESS\_STATUS* + +#### *EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_NETWORK\_REJECTION* + +#### *EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_CSG\_CELL\_SELECTION* + +#### *EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD IMS\_REGISTRATION* + +#### *EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_INCOMING IMS\_DATA* + +#### *EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_DATA\_CONNECTION\_STATUS\_CHANGE* + +Upon reception of an ENVELOPE (Event Download) APDU command as defined in TS 31.111 [7] the (U)SAT Framework shall trigger all the Toolkit applets registered to the corresponding event. + +The following events defined in TS 31.111 [7] shall be raised upon reception of the corresponding APDU defined in either TS 51.011 [4] or TS 31.101 [6]. + +#### *EVENT\_PROFILE\_DOWNLOAD* + +#### *EVENT\_MENU\_SELECTION, EVENT\_MENU\_SELECTION\_HELP\_REQUEST* + +#### *EVENT\_CALL\_CONTROL\_BY\_NAA* + +EVENT\_TIMER\_EXPIRATION +EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_MT\_CALL +EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_CALL\_CONNECTED +EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_CALL\_DISCONNECTED +EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_LOCATION\_STATUS +EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_USER\_ACTIVITY +EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_IDLE\_SCREEN\_AVAILABLE +EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_CARD\_READER\_STATUS +EVENT\_STATUS\_COMMAND +EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_LANGUAGE\_SELECTION +EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_BROWSER\_TERMINATION +EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_DATA\_AVAILABLE +EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_CHANNEL\_STATUS +EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_ACCESS\_TECHNOLOGY\_CHANGE +EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_DISPLAY\_PARAMETER\_CHANGED +EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_LOCAL\_CONNECTION +EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_NETWORK\_SEARCH\_MODE\_CHANGE +EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_BROWSING\_STATUS +EVENT\_PROACTIVE\_HANDLER\_AVAILABLE +EVENT\_EXTERNAL\_FILE\_UPDATE +EVENT\_FIRST\_COMMAND\_AFTER\_ATR +EVENT\_UNRECOGNIZED\_ENVELOPE + +## 6.3 Registration + +A Toolkit Applet shall register to events described in 6.2 as defined in ETSI TS 102 241 [2]. + +Constants for these events are available in *uicc.usim.toolkit.ToolkitConstants* interface in Annex A. + +The *uicc.toolkit.ToolkitException* TAR\_NOT\_DEFINED shall be thrown if a Toolkit Applet has no TAR defined and registers to events: EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV, EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD, EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB, EVENT\_FORMATTED\_USSD. + +The *uicc.toolkit.ToolkitException.EVENT\_ALREADY\_REGISTERED* shall be thrown if there is another Toolkit Applet already registered to *EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_NAA*. + +## 6.4 Proactive command handling + +There is no extension of the CAT Runtime Environment by the (U)SAT Framework for proactive command handling. + +## 6.5 Envelope response handling + +For the events defined in the present document, the following rules apply: + +A Toolkit Applet can post a response by using the *post()* method or the *postAsBERTLV()* method defined in ETSI TS 102 241 [2]. The (U)SAT Framework shall return the Status Word as defined in TS 31.111 [7] and in TS 51.014 [8] depending on the current NAA. + +Case of *EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_NAA*: + +- The rules defined for *EVENT\_CALL\_CONTROL\_BY\_NAA* in ETSI TS 102 241 [2] apply. + +Case of *EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV*: + +- See ETSI TS 102 241 [2]. + +Case of *EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV*: + +- When the *post()* or the *postAsBERTLV()* method is invoked, the (U)SAT Framework shall, according to bit 6 of the second octet of the SPI defined in TS 31.115 [9], build a SMS-DELIVER-REPORT or a SMS-SUBMIT. + +In case of a SMS-DELIVER-REPORT and if the post response is too large to be contained in a SMS-DELIVER-REPORT, the (U)SAT Framework shall issue Response Packets as defined in TS 31.115 [9]. + +In case of a SMS-DELIVER-REPORT, the (U)SAT Framework shall return the Status Word for RP-ACK or RP-ERROR as defined in TS 31.111 [7] and in TS 51.014 [8] depending on the current NAA. + +In case of SMS-SUBMIT the boolean value method parameter shall be ignored by the (U)SAT Framework. If the SMS-SUBMIT is to be used, the (U)SAT Framework shall build and issue a Send Short Message proactive command as defined in TS 31.111 [7] and in TS 51.014 [8] depending on the current NAA . + +Case of *EVENT\_FORMATTED\_USSD*: + +- When the *post()* or the *postAsBERTLV()* method is invoked, the (U)SAT Framework shall build a USSD String to be sent back in the Return Result Component contained in the subsequent Facility message. In that case the (U)SAT Framework shall return the Status Word as defined in TS 31.111 [7]. + +Case of *EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_USSD*: + +- See ETSI TS 102 241 [2]. + +## 6.6 System Handler management + +For the handler management of the *ProactiveHandler*, the *ProactiveResponseHandler*, the *EnvelopeHandler* and the *EnvelopeResponseHandler*, the rules defined in ETSI TS 102 241 [2] apply. + +*USATEnvelopeHandler*: + +The single system instance of the *USATEnvelopeHandler* and the single system instance of the *EnvelopeHandler* are two distinct objects instances. + +- When available the *USATEnvelopeHandler* shall remain available and its content shall remain unchanged from the invocation to the termination of the *processToolkit()* method. +- The TLV List provided in the *USATEnvelopeHandler* are the same as in the *EnvelopeHandler*. +- The handler availability of the *USATEnvelopeHandler* is the same handler availability as the *EnvelopeHandler* including all the events defined in ETSI TS 102 241 [2]. + +The following table describes the minimum availability of the handlers for all the events at the invocation of the *processToolkit()* method of the Toolkit Applet. The rules described in this table apply in addition to the rules described in "UICC API for Java Card™" + +Table 2: Handler availability for each event + +| EVENT_ | Reply busy allowed | EnvelopeHandler / USATEnvelopeHandler | EnvelopeResponse Handler | Nb of triggered / registered Applet | +|---------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------| +| FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV | Y
(see Note 1) | Y | Y | 1 / n (per TAR) | +| FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | N | Y | N | 1 / n (per TAR) | +| UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV | Y | Y | Y | n / n | +| UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | N | Y | N | n / n | +| FORMATTED_SMS_CB | Y | Y | N | 1/n (per TAR) | +| UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB | Y | Y | N | n / n | +| MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_NAA | N | Y | Y | 1 / 1 | +| FORMATTED_USSD | Y | Y | Y | 1 / n (per TAR) | +| UNFORMATTED_USSD | Y | Y | Y | n / n | +| EVENT_DOWNLOAD | | | | | +| IWLAN_ACCESS_STATUS | Y | Y | N | n/n | +| NETWORK_REJECTION | Y | Y | N | n/n | +| IMS_REGISTRATION | Y | Y | N | n/n | +| INCOMING IMS_DATA | Y | Y | N | n/n | +| DATA_CONNECTION_STATUS_CHANGE | Y | Y | N | n/n | + +NOTE 1: The framework may reply busy and not trigger the toolkit applet if e.g. a PoR using SMS SUBMIT is required in the incoming message and a proactive session is ongoing. + +## 6.7 (U)SAT Framework behaviour + +The (U)SAT Framework is a (U)SAT extension of the CAT Runtime Environment as defined in ETSI TS 102 241 [2]. In addition, the (U)SAT Framework shall consider the EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_\* defined in this specification when issuing the SET UP EVENT LIST system proactive command. + +# 7 UICC toolkit applet + +See ETSI TS 102 241 [2]. + +# 8 Geo Location API + +The Geo Location API consists of the package *uicc.usim.geolocation*. This package defines services to allow an Applet to perform a geographical location operation, depending of the ME capabilities. When a geographical location operation is requested, the API will follow a defined way to choose either "Geographical Location Request" toolkit command or "Provide Local Information" toolkit command as defined in TS 31.111 [7] to determine the location information. The result is formatted using GAD shapes as defined in TS 23.032 [14] or in the format of NMEA sentences defined in IEC 61162-1 [15]. + +# 9 SUCI API + +The SUCI API consists of the package *uicc.usim.suci*. This package defines services to allow an Applet to perform a SUCI computation upon reception of terminal request. + +If an applet has registered an object implementing the interface *SUCICalculator* to the USIM application, then when the ME sends a GET IDENTITY APDU Command in SUCI context to this USIM application, the (U)SAT framework shall invoke the *getSUCI* method in order to retrieve the SUCI to be returned to the ME. Only one object can be registered per USIM application. The reference to the object is needed to dereference the object. If no object is registered, the USIM shall return the SUCI computed by its own means, according to the USIM configuration. + +If an exception is raised, the (U)SAT framework behaviour is implementation specific. + +# --- Annex A (normative): Java Card™ (U)SIM API + +The attached files "31130\_Annex\_A\_Java.zip", and "31130\_Annex\_A\_HTML.zip" contains source files and html documentation for the Java Card™ (U)SIM API. + +# --- Annex B (normative): Java Card™ (U)SIM API identifiers + +The attached file "31130\_Annex\_B\_Export\_files.zip" contains the export files for the uicc.usim.\* package. + +# Annex C (normative): (U)SIM API package version management + +The following table describes the relationship between each TS 31.130 specification version and its packages AID and Major, Minor versions defined in the export files. + +| uicc.usim.access package | | | +|--------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------------| +| TS 31.130 | Major, Minor | AID | +| | 1.0 | A000000087 1005 FFFF FFFF 89 13 100000 | +| 7.7.1 | 1.1 | | +| 8.3.0 | 1.2 | | +| 9.1.0 | 1.3 | | +| 12.0.0 | 1.4 | | + +| uicc.usim.toolkit package | | | +|---------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------------| +| TS 31.130 | Major, Minor | AID | +| | 1.0 | A000000087 1005 FFFF FFFF 89 13 200000 | +| 7.1.0 | 1.1 | | +| 7.2.1 | 1.2 | | +| 7.7.1 | 1.3 | | +| 7.9.0 | 1.4 | | +| 8.3.0 | 1.5 | | +| 9.1.0 | 1.6 | | +| 9.4.0 | 1.7 | | +| 10.4.0 | 1.8 | | +| 14.2.0 | 1.9 | | + +| uicc.usim.geolocation package | | | +|-------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------------| +| TS 31.130 | Major, Minor | AID | +| | 1.0 | A000000087 1005 FFFF FFFF 89 13 300000 | +| 13.1.0 | 2.0 | | + +| uicc.usim.suci package | | | +|------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------------| +| TS 31.130 | Major, Minor | AID | +| 15.1.0 | 1.0 | A000000087 1005 FFFF FFFF 89 13 400000 | + +The package AID coding is defined in ETSI TS 101 220 [1]. The (U)SIM API packages' AID are not modified by changes to Major or Minor Version. + +The Major Version shall be incremented if a change to the specification introduces byte code incompatibility with the previous version. + +The Minor Version shall be incremented if a change to the specification does not introduce byte code incompatibility with the previous version. + +For a table describing the versioning of a package, a line is introduced only upon changes of Major or Minor version of its package. + +The package *uicc.usim.access* contains only constants, therefore it may not be loaded on the UICC. + +# --- Annex D (normative): USIM API jar files + +The attached files "31130\_Annex\_D.jar", contains class files for the Java Card™ (U)SIM API. + +# Annex E (informative): Change History + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| | TP-27 | | | | | Generation of Version 7.0.0 based on version 6.2.0 | 7.0.0 | +| | TP-27 | TP-050023 | 009 | | | Allow passing of specified status words through the (U)SAT Framework | 7.0.0 | +| | CT-28 | CP-050139 | 011 | | | Allign paragraph numbering between TS 31.130 and ETSI TS 102 241 | 7.1.0 | +| | CT-28 | CP-050139 | 013 | | | Delete version and author info from the Java source code | 7.1.0 | +| | CT-28 | CP-050141 | 014 | | | Addition of new events EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD and EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD | 7.1.0 | +| | CT-29 | CP-050340 | 016 | | | Adding missing constant values | 7.2.0 | +| | | | | | | 2005-11: Adds missing attachment files and adds line to table in annex C. | 7.2.1 | +| | CT-33 | CP-060391 | 019 | 1 | | Correction of misnamed constant | 7.3.0 | +| | | | 020 | 1 | | Addition of missing event download I-WLAN access status | | +| | CT-34 | CP-060546 | 022 | 2 | | Clarification on getShortMessageLength() method when applied on a SMS Cell Broadcast. | 7.4.0 | +| | | CP-050548 | 024 | 1 | | Correction of the USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem method prototype | | +| | CT-35 | CP-070068 | 027 | 1 | | Correction of Annex A JAVA.zip, package uicc.usim.toolkit | 7.5.0 | +| | | | 028 | 2 | | Update the reference to Java Card 2.2.2 | | +| | CT-36 | CP-070302 | 029 | - | | Correction of the reference to ETSI TS 102 241 | 7.6.0 | +| | | CP-070298 | 029 | - | | Correction of references to ETSI TS 102 223 and ETSI TS 102 221 | | +| | CT-38 | CP-070844 | 032 | 1 | | Introduction of new constant values for files in the USIM application | 7.7.0 | +| | | | | | | Annex A and B attachments provided (2008-08) | 7.7.1 | +| | CT-42 | CP-080908 | 034 | 2 | | Introduction of a geographical location discovery Java Card™ API | 8.0.0 | +| | CT-43 | CP-090196 | 035 | 1 | | Introduction of missing constant values for USIM files | 8.1.0 | +| | CT-45 | CP-090719 | 039 | 2 | | Alignment of constants with 31.111 | 8.2.0 | +| | CT-46 | CP-090788 | 040 | 1 | | References update | 8.3.0 | +| | CT-46 | CP-091013 | 042 | 1 | | Support of missing event
EVENT_EVENT_DOWNLOAD_NETWORK_REJECTION | 8.3.0 | +| | CT-46 | CP-091013 | 045 | 1 | | Support of missing constants in USAT Terminal Profile | 8.3.0 | +| | CT-46 | - | - | - | | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-9 | 9.0.0 | +| | CT-47 | CP-100185 | 047 | 1 | | Addition of missing constant values | 9.1.0 | +| | CT-47 | CP-100198 | 048 | 2 | | Supporting operator controlled CSG list for H(e)NB | 9.1.0 | +| | CT-47 | CP-100198 | 049 | 2 | | Support of CSG cell discovery and CSG selection event | 9.1.0 | +| | ----- | | | | | Spec reissued as v9.1.1 due to a bad version number on the cover sheet | 9.1.1 | +| | CT-50 | CP-100836 | 046 | 1 | | Update reference to "Java Card 3.0.1 Classic" reference | 9.2.0 | +| | SP-51 | - | - | - | | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-10 | 10.0.0 | +| | CT-52 | CP-110507 | 050 | 1 | | Addition of events and reservation of constant values for Java API | 10.1.0 | +| | CT-54 | CP-110905 | 053 | - | | Correction to TAG_CSG_SELECTION_STATUS | 10.2.0 | +| | CT-54 | CP-110905 | 054 | - | | Correction to constant value in TerminalProfile.java | 10.2.0 | +| | CT-55 | CP-120154 | 059 | | | Correction to TAG_CSG_SELECTION_STATUS | 10.3.0 | +| | CT-55 | CP-120154 | 060 | | | Correction to constant value in TerminalProfile.java | 10.3.0 | +| | CT-55 | CP-120154 | 058 | 1 | | Update the reference to ETSI TS 102 241 | 10.3.0 | +| | ----- | | | | | Editorial version correcting the three lines above | 10.3.1 | +| | CT-56 | CP-120393 | 061 | 1 | | Correct implementation of CR 0059 for
TAG_CSG_SELECTION_STATUS_N | 10.4.0 | +| | CT-56 | CP-120392 | 062 | 1 | | Adding a constant value in USATTerminalProfile.java for the indication of IMS support | 10.4.0 | +| | CT-56 | CP-120393 | 063 | 1 | | Adding constant values in USIMConstants.java for missing file identifiers | 10.4.0 | +| | SP-57 | | | | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-11 | 11.0.0 | +| | SP-65 | | | | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-12 | 12.0.0 | +| | CT-70 | CP-150827 | 071 | | | Missing rule for SMS_PP envelope response handling | 13.0.0 | +| | CT-73 | CP-160550 | 072 | 5 | | Geo Location API corrections
Note 1: known problem within the change request, to be fixed at CT-74
Note 2: in the CR, the body of the CR and the attached annexes are not identical. The body of the CR contains the correct text and is implemented. | 13.1.0 | +| | CT-74 | CP-160788 | 073 | 1 | | Geo Location API format alignment | 13.2.0 | + +| | | | | | | | | +|---------|--------|-----------|------|---|---|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| | CT-75 | CP-170166 | 0075 | | | Geolocalization API document alignment | 13.3.0 | +| | SA-75 | | | | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-14 | 14.0.0 | +| | CT-78 | CP-173150 | 0077 | - | | Update of reference to ETSI TS 102 241 | 14.1.0 | +| | CT-78 | CP-173150 | 0078 | - | | Editorial change of Java Card reference | 14.1.0 | +| | CT-78 | CP-173143 | 0076 | 3 | | Corrections in Annex C | 15.0.0 | +| | | | | | | Added missing attachments | 15.0.1 | +| 2019-03 | CT#83 | TP-050023 | 0081 | 1 | F | SUCI Package | 15.1.0 | +| 2019-09 | CT#85 | CP-192013 | 0085 | 1 | F | Add support for ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD - Data Connection Status Change) | 15.2.0 | +| 2019-09 | CT#85 | CP-192014 | 0083 | 1 | F | Update of reference to ETSI TS 102 241 | 15.2.0 | +| 2019-09 | CT#85 | CP-192014 | 0084 | - | F | Clarification for SUCI API | 15.2.0 | +| 2020-01 | | | | | | 5G logo updated in a cover page as agreed in CT#86 | 15.2.1 | +| 2020-02 | | | | | | Attachments updated | 15.2.2 | +| 2020-06 | CT#88e | CP-201148 | 0086 | 3 | F | Update the scope of 31.130 to cover 4/5G aspects | 15.3.0 | +| 2020-07 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31131/99bae07626f60f9ede10e2e387ef7051_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31131/99bae07626f60f9ede10e2e387ef7051_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1b6ea5d5198059673e787009ac87e290c11a2f97 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31131/99bae07626f60f9ede10e2e387ef7051_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:1424081b3dfbe0130a026ac2f4f4756ddadf143588b78fb0c0ab88e33c25b402 +size 71041 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31131/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31131/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1c5d0740cc861bf546e078717053e829b4fffce2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31131/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,3172 @@ + + + + + + +# Contents + +| | | +|-----------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 6 | +| 1 Scope..... | 7 | +| 2 References..... | 7 | +| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 8 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 8 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 8 | +| 4 Description..... | 9 | +| 4.1 Overview ..... | 9 | +| 4.2 Design Rationale and Upward Compatibility ..... | 10 | +| 4.3 Application Triggering..... | 10 | +| 4.4 Proactive command handling..... | 13 | +| 4.5 Application Loading..... | 13 | +| 5 'C'-language binding for (U)SIM API..... | 13 | +| 5.1 Overview ..... | 13 | +| 5.2 Toolkit Application Functions ..... | 14 | +| 5.2.1 main ..... | 14 | +| 5.2.2 CatGetFrameworkEvent ..... | 15 | +| 5.2.3 CatExit..... | 15 | +| 5.3 Registry ..... | 16 | +| 5.3.1 CatSetMenuString ..... | 16 | +| 5.3.2 CatNotifyOnFrameworkEvent ..... | 16 | +| 5.3.3 CatNotifyOnEnvelope ..... | 17 | +| 5.3.4 CatNotifyOnEvent..... | 17 | +| 5.4 Man-Machine Interface..... | 17 | +| 5.4.1 CatAddItem ..... | 17 | +| 5.4.2 CatSelectItem ..... | 17 | +| 5.4.3 CatEndSelectItem ..... | 18 | +| 5.4.4 CatDisplayText..... | 18 | +| 5.4.5 CatGetInKey ..... | 18 | +| 5.4.6 CatGetInput ..... | 19 | +| 5.4.7 CatSetupIdleModeText..... | 19 | +| 5.4.8 CatPlayTone ..... | 20 | +| 5.5 Timers ..... | 20 | +| 5.5.1 CatGetTimer ..... | 20 | +| 5.5.2 CatFreeTimer..... | 20 | +| 5.5.3 CatStartTimer ..... | 20 | +| 5.5.4 CatGetTimerValue ..... | 21 | +| 5.6 Supplementary Card Reader Management..... | 21 | +| 5.6.1 CatPowerOnCard..... | 21 | +| 5.6.2 CatPowerOffCard..... | 21 | +| 5.6.3 CatPerformCardAPDU ..... | 22 | +| 5.6.4 CatGetReaderStatus..... | 22 | +| 5.7 UICC File Store Access ..... | 22 | +| 5.7.1 CatSelect..... | 23 | +| 5.7.2 CatStatus..... | 23 | +| 5.7.3 CatGetCHVStatus ..... | 23 | +| 5.7.4 CatReadBinary ..... | 23 | +| 5.7.5 CatUpdateBinary ..... | 24 | +| 5.7.6 CatReadRecord..... | 24 | +| 5.7.7 CatUpdateRecord ..... | 24 | +| 5.7.8 CatSearch..... | 25 | +| 5.7.9 CatIncrease ..... | 25 | +| 5.7.10 CatInvalidate..... | 25 | +| 5.7.11 CatRehabilitate ..... | 25 | +| 5.8 Miscellaneous..... | 26 | + +| | | | +|---------|---------------------------------------|----| +| 5.8.1 | CatGetTerminalProfile ..... | 26 | +| 5.8.2 | CatMoreTime ..... | 26 | +| 5.8.3 | CatPollingOff ..... | 26 | +| 5.8.4 | CatPollInterval..... | 26 | +| 5.8.5 | CatRefresh ..... | 27 | +| 5.8.6 | CatLanguageNotification ..... | 27 | +| 5.8.7 | CatLaunchBrowser ..... | 27 | +| 5.9 | Low-level Interface ..... | 28 | +| 5.9.1 | CatResetBuffer ..... | 28 | +| 5.9.2 | CatStartProactiveCommand ..... | 29 | +| 5.9.3 | CatSendProactiveCommand..... | 29 | +| 5.9.4 | CatOpenEnvelope..... | 29 | +| 5.9.5 | CatSendEnvelopeResponse ..... | 29 | +| 5.9.6 | CatSendEnvelopeErrorResponse..... | 29 | +| 5.9.7 | CatPutData..... | 29 | +| 5.9.8 | CatPutByte..... | 30 | +| 5.9.9 | CatPutTLV ..... | 30 | +| 5.9.10 | CatPutBytePrefixedTLV ..... | 30 | +| 5.9.11 | CatPutOneByteTLV ..... | 30 | +| 5.9.12 | CatPutTwoByteTLV ..... | 30 | +| 5.9.13 | CatGetByte ..... | 31 | +| 5.9.14 | CatGetData ..... | 31 | +| 5.9.15 | CatFindNthTLV ..... | 31 | +| 5.9.16 | CatFindNthTLVInUserBuffer ..... | 31 | +| 5.10 | Network Services ..... | 32 | +| 5.10.1 | CatGetLocationInformation ..... | 32 | +| 5.10.2 | CatGetTimingAdvance..... | 32 | +| 5.10.3 | CatGetIMEI ..... | 32 | +| 5.10.4 | CatGetNetworkMeasurementResults ..... | 32 | +| 5.10.5 | CatGetDateTimeAndTimeZone ..... | 33 | +| 5.10.6 | CatGetLanguage ..... | 33 | +| 5.10.7 | CatSetupCall..... | 33 | +| 5.10.8 | CatSendShortMessage..... | 34 | +| 5.10.9 | CatSendSS ..... | 35 | +| 5.10.10 | CatSendUSSD ..... | 35 | +| 5.10.11 | CatOpenCSChannel..... | 36 | +| 5.10.12 | CatOpenGPRSChannel ..... | 37 | +| 5.10.13 | CatCloseChannel..... | 39 | +| 5.10.14 | CatReceiveData ..... | 39 | +| 5.10.15 | CatSendData ..... | 40 | +| 5.10.16 | CatGetChannelStatus..... | 40 | +| 5.10.17 | CatServiceSearch..... | 40 | +| 5.10.18 | CatGetServiceInformation..... | 41 | +| 5.10.19 | CatDeclareService ..... | 41 | +| 5.10.20 | CatRunATCommand..... | 41 | +| 5.10.21 | CatSendDTMFCommand..... | 42 | +| 5.11 | Supporting Data Types..... | 42 | +| 5.11.1 | CatRecordAccessMode ..... | 42 | +| 5.11.2 | CatSearchMode ..... | 42 | +| 5.11.3 | CatFrameworkEventType..... | 42 | +| 5.11.4 | CatEnvelopeTagType ..... | 43 | +| 5.11.5 | CatEventType ..... | 43 | +| 5.11.6 | CatTextString ..... | 43 | +| 5.11.7 | CatAlphaString ..... | 43 | +| 5.11.8 | CatIconIdentifier..... | 43 | +| 5.11.9 | CatIconOption ..... | 44 | +| 5.11.10 | CatDCSValue ..... | 44 | +| 5.11.11 | CatDisplayTextOptions ..... | 44 | +| 5.11.12 | CatGetInKeyOptions ..... | 44 | +| 5.11.13 | CatGetInputOptions..... | 44 | +| 5.11.14 | CatSelectItemOptions..... | 45 | +| 5.11.15 | CatTimeUnit..... | 45 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| 5.11.16 | CatTone ..... | 45 | +| 5.11.17 | CatRefreshOptions ..... | 45 | +| 5.11.18 | CatGetReaderStatusOptions ..... | 45 | +| 5.11.19 | CatDevice ..... | 46 | +| 5.11.20 | CatGeneralResult ..... | 46 | +| 5.11.21 | CatTimerValue ..... | 47 | +| 5.11.22 | CatTimeInterval ..... | 47 | +| 5.11.23 | CatFileStatus ..... | 47 | +| 5.11.24 | CatLanguageNotificationOptions ..... | 48 | +| 5.11.25 | CatLocationInformation ..... | 48 | +| 5.11.26 | CatTimingAdvance ..... | 48 | +| 5.11.27 | CatLaunchBrowserOptions ..... | 48 | +| 5.11.28 | CatSetupCallOptions ..... | 48 | +| 5.11.29 | CatTypeOfNumberAndNumberingPlanIdentifier ..... | 49 | +| 5.11.30 | CatSendShortMessageOptions ..... | 49 | +| 5.11.31 | CatSendDataOptions ..... | 49 | +| 5.11.32 | CatMEInterfaceTransportLevelType ..... | 50 | +| 5.11.33 | CatBearer ..... | 50 | +| 5.11.34 | CatOpenChannelOptions ..... | 50 | +| 5.11.35 | CatAddressType ..... | 50 | +| 5.11.36 | CatFID ..... | 50 | +| 5.11.37 | CatTextFormat ..... | 51 | +| 5.11.38 | CatTextForegroundColour ..... | 51 | +| 5.11.39 | CatTextBackgroundColour ..... | 51 | +| Annex A (normative): | Application executable architecture ..... | 52 | +| Annex B (informative): | Example ..... | 54 | +| Annex C (informative): | Change history ..... | 56 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- 1 Scope + +A Subscriber Identity Module Application Programming Interface (SIM API) has been defined in TS 42.019 [4] as a technology-independent API by which toolkit applications and (U)SIMs co-operate. That specification is independent of the programming language technology used to create the application, the platform used to host the application and the runtime environment used to execute the application. + +The present document includes information applicable to (U)SIM toolkit application developers creating applications using the C programming language ISO/IEC 9899 [7]. The present document describes an interface between toolkit applications written in the C programming language and the (U)SIM in order to realize the co-operation set forth in TS 42.019 [4]. In particular, the API described herein provides the service of assembling proactive commands and disassembling the responses to these commands for the application programmer. + +Software tools, integrated software development environments and software management systems that may be used to create application programs are explicitly out of scope of the present document. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TS 31.111: "USIM Application Toolkit (USAT)". +- [3] 3GPP TS 23.048: "Security Mechanisms for the (U)SIM application toolkit; Stage 2". +- [4] 3GPP TS 42.019: "Subscriber Identity Module Application Programming Interface (SIM API); Stage 1". +- [5] ISO 639 (1988): "Code for the representation of names of languages". +- [6] 3GPP TS 23.038: "Alphabets and language-specific information". +- [7] ISO/IEC 9899: "Programming Languages - C". +- [8] 3GPP TS 11.14: "Specification of the SIM Application Toolkit for the Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment (SIM – ME) interface". +- [9] Tool Interface Standard (TIS) Executable and Linking Format Specification Version 1.2. +- [10] SYSTEM V Application Binary Interface, Edition 4.1. +- [11] 3GPP TS 51.011: "Specification of the Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment (SIM-ME) interface". +- [12] Void. +- [13] 3GPP TS 31.115: "Secured packet structure for (U)SIM Toolkit applications". +- [14] 3GPP TS 31.116: "Remote APDU Structure for (U)SIM Toolkit applications". +- [15] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the USIM Application". +- [16] 3GPP TS 31.101: "UICC-Terminal Interface, Physical and Logical Characteristics". + +# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: + +**application:** computer program that defines and implements a useful domain-specific functionality + +The term may apply to the functionality itself, to the representation of the functionality in a programming language, or to the realization of the functionality as executable code. + +**application executable:** representation of an application as collection of executable codes + +**application program:** representation of an application in a programming language such as assembly language, C, Java, WML or XHTML + +**Application Programming Interface (API):** collection of entry points and data structures that an application program can access when translated into an application executable + +**byte code:** processor-independent representation of a basic computer operation such as "increment by one" that is executed by computer program called a byte code interpreter + +**data structure:** memory address that can be accessed by an application executable in order to read or write data + +**entry point:** memory address that can be branched to by an application executable in order to access functionality defined by an application-programming interface + +Depending on the software technology, an entry point is also called a subroutine, a function or a method. + +**executable code:** generic term for either byte code or native code + +**framework:** defines a set of Application Programming Interface (API) functions for developing applications and for providing system services to those applications + +**loadfile:** representation of an application executable that is transmitted from the terminal to the smart card operating system + +A loadfile typically includes information about the application executable in addition to the application executable itself. + +**native code:** processor-dependent representation of a basic computer operation such as "increment by one" that is executed by the hardware circuitry of a computer's central processing unit + +**toolkit application:** uses the commands described in TS 31.111 [2] and TS 11.14 [8] + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purpose of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: + +| | | +|------|------------------------------------------| +| APDU | Application Protocol Data Unit | +| API | Application Programming Interface | +| CAT | Card Application Toolkit | +| CS | Circuit Switched | +| DCS | Digital Cellular System | +| DF | Dedicated File | +| DTMF | Dual Tone Multiple Frequency | +| EF | Elementary File | +| ELF | Executable and Linkable Format | +| FID | File Identifier | +| GSM | Global System for Mobile communications | +| ME | Mobile Equipment | +| NAA | Network Access Application (SIM or USIM) | +| OTA | Over The Air | +| SIM | Subscriber Identity Module | +| SMS | Short Message Service | +| STK | SIM ToolKit | + +| | | +|------|------------------------------------------| +| SW | Status Word | +| TAR | Toolkit Application Reference | +| TLV | Tag, Length, Value | +| TPDU | Transport Protocol Data Unit | +| UICC | (not an acronym) | +| URL | Uniform Resource Locator | +| USIM | Universal Subscriber Identity Module | +| USSD | Unstructured Supplementary Services Data | + +# 4 Description + +The (U)SIM Application consists of the following: + +- APDU handlers for communicating with the ME; +- File system and file access control; +- Toolkit Framework that provides services to Toolkit applications. + +The present document describes the C programming language binding for the interface between the (U)SIM application and toolkit applications described in TS 42.019 [4]. This API allows application programmers using the C programming language to access functions and data described in TS 31.111 [2] and TS 11.14 [8], such that the (U)SIM-based applications and the services they implement can be developed and loaded onto ICCs. If required and supported by the underlying smart card technology, toolkit applications can be loaded or deleted remotely, after the card has been issued. + +## 4.1 Overview + +The 'C'-binding for (U)SIM API shall provide function calls for pro-active functions and transport functions. The figure below shows the interactions between a typical toolkit application (shown in blue) and the various functional blocks of the (U)SIM (shown in orange). The C-bindings for these APIs are presented in subclause 4.2. + +![Figure 1: Diagram illustrating the interactions between a typical toolkit application (shown in blue) and the various functional blocks of the (U)SIM (shown in orange).](99bae07626f60f9ede10e2e387ef7051_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the interactions between a Mobile Equipment (ME) and a Toolkit application. The ME is shown on the left, and the Toolkit application is a central blue box. Various functional blocks (handlers and systems) are shown in orange, interacting with both the ME and the Toolkit application. + +- Mobile Equipment (ME)** sends an **APDU** to the **APDU handler**, which then sends a **Toolkit event** to the **Toolkit application triggering** block, which in turn sends a **Registered event or install** message to the **Toolkit application**. +- The **ME** sends a **91 xx** response to the **APDU handler**. +- The **ME** sends a **Fetch command** to the **Proactive command handler**, which sends a **Proactive command** to the **Toolkit application**. +- The **ME** sends a **Proactive command** to the **Proactive response handler**, which sends **Terminal response data** to the **Toolkit application**. +- The **ME** sends a **Terminal response** to the **Envelope response handler**, which sends **Response data** to the **Toolkit application**. +- The **Toolkit application** sends an **Update Information Request** to the **Registry handler**, which interacts with the **Registry** (containing **Toolkit application information**). +- The **Toolkit application** sends a **File access Request** to the **NAA file access** block, which interacts with the **NAA File system** (containing **Allowed Access/Command**). +- External actions on the **Toolkit application** include **Load/delete Toolkit Application 03.48** and **Create new Toolkit application from SMS-PP**, leading to a **New Toolkit application** (dashed box). + +Figure 1: Diagram illustrating the interactions between a typical toolkit application (shown in blue) and the various functional blocks of the (U)SIM (shown in orange). + +Figure 1 + +## 4.2 Design Rationale and Upward Compatibility + +Some functions on the C SIM API take parameters that correspond to optional TLVs in TS 31.111 [2] and TS 11.14 [8]. If the actual parameter value passed to the function is NULL, the corresponding TLV is not passed to the ME; an example of an optional parameter is CatIconIdentifier that corresponds to the ICON IDENTIFIER TLV. + +Some proactive commands have a very large number of optional TLVs, such as SETUP CALL. Therefore, this API offers two variants that address this aspect, CatSetupCall and CatSetupCallEx. The first function, CatSetupCall, takes as parameters everything that is necessary to issue a successful SETUP CALL proactive command (i.e. everything required to construct the mandatory TLVs as required by TS 31.111 [2] and TS 11.14 [8]) and also includes optional user interface TLVs (title and icon) for ease of use. + +The second function, CatSetupCallEx, takes a parameter block that can be extended in future versions of the present specification. The parameter block contains members that correspond to all mandatory and optional TLVs for the SETUP CALL proactive command. + +The reason for introducing the "...Ex" variants is threefold: + +- Rather than extend the parameter list of a function to take a large number of optional parameters for each call, it is preferable to set up the parameters using named structure members before issuing the call to the function. +- If a future version of TS 31.111 [2] or TS 11.14 [8] extends the optional parameters for a proactive command, the corresponding parameter block can be extended to encompass these parameters without changing the function prototype. +- Any source code written for an older version of this C SIM API can be recompiled with a later version without change and will remain upwardly compatible at the source as long as the suggested coding standards are adhered to. + +## 4.3 Application Triggering + +The application-triggering portion of the SIM Toolkit Framework is responsible for the activation of toolkit applications, based on the APDU received by the card. + +The ME shall not be adversely affected by the presence of applications on the (U)ICC card. For instance a syntactically correct Envelope shall not result in an error status word in case of a failure of an application. The only application as seen by the ME is the (U)SIM application. As a result, a toolkit application may return an error, but this error will not be sent to the ME. + +The difference between an application and a toolkit application is that a toolkit application does not typically handle APDUs directly. It will handle higher-level messages. Furthermore the execution of a function could span over multiple APDUs, in particular, the proactive protocol commands. + +All the applications that have registered interest in the event are triggered in order of their priority. + +- The current context is switched to the toolkit application. +- A pending transaction is aborted. +- The current file context of the toolkit application is the MF. +- The current file context of the current selected application is unchanged. + +On termination of a toolkit application execution of CatExit(): + +- The context switches back to the context of the current selected application, the NAA application. +- A pending toolkit application transaction is aborted. + +Here after are the events that can trigger a toolkit application: + +### *EVENT\_PROFILE\_DOWNLOAD* + +Upon reception of the Terminal Profile command by the (U)SIM, the Toolkit Framework stores the ME profile and then triggers the registered toolkit application that may want to change their registry. A toolkit application may not be able to issue a proactive command. + +### *EVENT\_MENU\_SELECTION, EVENT\_MENU\_SELECTION\_HELP\_REQUEST* + +A toolkit application might be activated upon selection in the ME's menu by the user, or request help on this specific menu. + +In order to allow the user to choose in a menu, the Toolkit Framework shall have previously issued a SET UP MENU proactive command. When a toolkit application changes a menu entry of its registry object, the Toolkit Framework shall dynamically update the menu stored in the ME during the current card session. The SIM Toolkit Framework shall use the data of the EFsume file (TS 51.011 [11] and TS 31.102 [15]) when issuing the SET UP MENU proactive command. + +The positions of the toolkit application menu entries in the item list, the requested item identifiers and the associated limits (e.g. maximum length of item text string) are defined at the loading of the toolkit application. + +If at least one toolkit application registers to EVENT\_MENU\_SELECTION\_HELP\_REQUEST, the SET UP MENU proactive command sent by the Toolkit Framework shall indicate to the ME that help information is available. A toolkit application registered for one or more menu entries may be triggered by the event EVENT\_MENU\_SELECTION\_HELP\_REQUEST, even if it is not registered to this event. A toolkit application registered for one or more menu entries should provide help information. + +*EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV, EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV,* + +*EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD, EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD* + +A toolkit application can be activated upon the reception of a short message. There are two ways for a card to receive an SMS: via the Envelope SMS-PP Data Download or the UpdateRecord EFsms instruction. + +The reception of the SMS by the toolkit application cannot be guaranteed for the Update Record EFsms instruction. + +The received SMS may be: + +- formatted according to TS 23.048 [3] or an other protocol to identify explicitly the toolkit application for which the message is sent; +- unformatted or using a toolkit application specific protocol the Toolkit Framework will pass this data to all registered toolkit applications. + +*EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV* + +This event is triggered by an envelope APDU containing an SMS\_DATADOWNLOAD BER TLV with an SMS\_TPDU simple TLV according to TS 23.048 [3]. + +The Toolkit Framework shall: + +- verify the TS 23.048 [3] security of the SMS TPDU; +- trigger the toolkit application registered with the corresponding TAR defined at application loading; +- take the optional Application Data posted by the triggered toolkit application if present; +- secure and send the response packet. + +The toolkit application will only be triggered if the TAR is known and the security verified. Application data will also be deciphered. + +*EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV* + +The registered toolkit applications will be triggered by this event and get the data transmitted in the APDU envelope SMS\_DATADOWNLOAD. + +*EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD* + +This event is triggered by Update Record EFsms with an SMS TP-UD field formatted according to TS 23.048 [3]. + +The Toolkit Framework shall: + +- update the EFsms file with the data received, it is then up to the receiving toolkit application to change the SMS stored in the file (i.e. the toolkit application need to have access to the EFsms file); +- verify the TS 23.048 [3] security of the SMS TPDU; +- convert the Update Record EFsms in a TLV List, an EnvelopeHandler; + +- trigger the toolkit application registered with the corresponding TAR defined at application loading. + +### *EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD* + +The SIM Toolkit Framework will first update the EFsms file, convert the received APDU as described above, and then trigger all the registered toolkit applications. All of them may modify the content of EFsms (i.e. the toolkit applications need to have access to the EFsms file). + +### *EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_CB* + +When the ME receives a new cell broadcast message, the cell broadcast page may be passed to the card using the envelope command. e.g. the application may then read the message and extract a meaningful piece of information that could be displayed to the user, for instance. + +### *EVENT\_CALL\_CONTROL\_BY\_SIM* + +When the NAA is in call control mode and when the user dials a number, this number is passed to the Toolkit Framework. Only one toolkit application can handle the answer to this command: call barred, modified or accepted. + +### *EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_MT\_CALL, EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_CALL\_CONNECTED,* + +### *EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_CALL\_DISCONNECTED, EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_LOCATION\_STATUS,* + +### *EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_USER\_ACTIVITY, EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_IDLE\_SCREEN\_AVAILABLE,* + +### *EVENT\_EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_CARD\_READER\_STATUS* + +The toolkit application will be triggered by the registered event download trigger, upon reception of the corresponding Envelope command. In order to allow the toolkit application to be triggered by these events, the Toolkit Framework shall have previously issued a SET UP EVENT LIST proactive command. When a toolkit application changes one or more of these requested events of its registry, the Toolkit Framework shall dynamically update the event list stored in the ME during the current card session. + +### *EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_SIM* + +Before sending an SMS MO entered by the user, the SMS is submitted to the Toolkit framework. Only one toolkit application can register to this event. + +### *EVENT\_TIMER\_EXPIRATION* + +This event is registered when the application executes a successful Toolkit CatGetTimer(). The toolkit application can then manage this (these) timer(s), and it will be triggered at the reception of the APDU Envelope TIMER EXPIRATION. The Toolkit Framework shall reply busy to this Envelope APDU if it cannot guarantee to trigger the corresponding toolkit application. + +### *EVENT\_UNRECOGNIZED\_ENVELOPE* + +The application registered to this event shall be triggered by the framework if the BER-TLV tag contained in the ENVELOPE APDU is not defined in the associated release of TS 31.111 [2] and TS 11.14 [8] and if no corresponding constant is defined in the list of the ToolkitConstants interface. By providing the means to transfer an arbitrary block of data, the Unrecognized Envelope Event will allow a toolkit application to handle the evolution of the specifications TS 31.111 [2] and TS 11.14 [8]. + +### *EVENT\_STATUS\_COMMAND* + +At reception of a STATUS APDU command, the SIM Toolkit Framework shall trigger the registered toolkit application. + +A range of events is reserved for experimental and proprietary usage (from -128 to -1). As the definition of these events is not standardized, the use of these events may make the toolkit application behave differently on different platforms. + +The toolkit application shall be triggered for the registered events upon reception, and shall be able to access to the data associated to the event using OpenEnvelope() or the low-level functions. + +The order of triggering the toolkit application shall follow the priority level of each toolkit application defined at its loading. If several toolkit applications have the same priority level, the last loaded toolkit application takes precedence. + +## 4.4 Proactive command handling + +The (U)SIM application toolkit protocol (i.e. 91xx, Fetch, Terminal Response) is handled by the network access application and the Toolkit Framework. The toolkit application shall not handle those events. + +The network access application and the Toolkit Framework shall handle the transmission of the proactive command to the ME, and the reception of the response. The Toolkit Framework will then return in the toolkit application just after the proactive command. It shall then provide to the toolkit application the values as indicated in the function parameters. It also provides the raw return information so that the toolkit application can analyse the response. + +The proactive command is sent to the ME as defined and constructed by the toolkit library without any check of the Toolkit Framework. + +The toolkit application shall not issue the following proactive commands: SET UP MENU, SET UP EVENT LIST, POLL INTERVAL, POLLING OFF; as those are system proactive commands that will affect the services of the Toolkit Framework. + +## 4.5 Application Loading + +Applications compliant to the present document are represented for loading as loadfiles in the Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) described in Tool Interface Standard (TIS) Executable and Linking Format Specification [9] and SYSTEM V Application Binary Interface [10]. The application executable in the ELF loadfile may be either native code or byte code that has been created through a process of compiling the representation of the application program in the C programming language. + +The e\_machine entry in the ELF header is set to according to the table in annex A and indicates the architecture for which the application executable in the loadfile has been prepared. + +Coding for other processors, processor instruction set extensions and byte code interpreters will be defined as needed processor-specific or interpreter-specific supplements to SYSTEM V Application Binary Interface [10] may also be provided as needed. + +Loadfile linkers, loaders and installers, whether on-card or off-card, return an error condition if the application representation in the loadfile cannot be accommodated or if resources requested by the application are not available. + +The over-the-air application loading mechanism, protocol and application life cycle are defined in TS 23.028 [3]. + +# --- 5 'C'-language binding for (U)SIM API + +## 5.1 Overview + +This subclause presents the 'C'-language binding to (U)SIM API. It is divided into sections as follows: + +- Toolkit application entry and exit. +- Man-Machine Interface. +- Timers. +- Supplementary card reader. +- UICC file store access. +- Registry. +- Miscellaneous. +- Low-level functions. +- Network services. +- Supporting data types. + +For each function, the prototype is given followed by a table describing the parameters and whether they are input [in] or output [out] parameters. There is explanatory text which explains the function's purpose and whether it is a proactive command or not. + +## 5.2 Toolkit Application Functions + +Toolkit applications will start by executing the application-defined function *main*. There are no arguments to *main*, nor are there any return results. The application can find out why it was invoked using the *CatGetFrameworkEventt* function. The Framework events that can cause an application to be invoked can be split into the following groups: + +- Command monitoring. +- ME monitor events. +- Application lifecycle change. + +Command monitoring enables applications to be invoked when the framework receives commands from the ME. Currently supported commands that can be monitored are: + +- TERMINAL PROFILE: monitoring this command enables an application to be invoked when the ME is powered on. +- STATUS: monitoring this command enables an application to be invoked when the ME polls for proactive commands. +- ENVELOPE: monitoring this command enables the application to be informed of specific envelope type arrival for example call control envelopes can be monitored. + +ME monitor events are events that the framework can ask the ME to monitor; for example an event can be sent on call connection. ME monitored events are delivered to the application in the EVENT DOWNLOAD envelope as received from the ME. + +The application lifecycle event enables the framework to invoke an application when the application status has changed. This is mainly to enable an application to be run at installation time so that it can set up its registry entries. The details of the application lifecycle events are provided in TS 31.116 [14]. + +### 5.2.1 main + +``` +void +main (void); +``` + +The main function is the application entry point. The application should not return from *main*; it must call the *CatExit* function. + +An example main function is given below: + +``` +void main(void) +{ + switch (CatGetFrameworkEvent()) + { + case EVENT_APPLICATION_LIFECYCLE_INSTALL: + // set up registry for this application + CatSetMenuString(...); + CatNotifyOnEnvelope(SMS_PP_DOWNLOAD_TAG,1); + CatNotifyOnEvent(CARD_READER_STATUS,1); + break; + case EVENT_ENVELOPE_COMMAND: + { + BYTE length; + switch (CatOpenEnvelope(&length)) + { + case MENU_SELECTION_TAG: + // search for help request .... + break; + case SMS_PP_DOWNLOAD_TAG: + .... + break; + case EVENT_DOWNLOAD_TAG: + // search for card reader status event .... + break; + } + } + } +} +``` + +``` + default: + CatExit(); + } +} +break; +default: + CatExit(); + break; +} +CatExit(); +} +``` + +### 5.2.2 CatGetFrameworkEvent + +``` +CatFrameworkEventType +CatGetFrameworkEvent(void); +``` + +| | | +|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| RETURN | Framework event type that caused the application to run; see CatFrameworkEventType for details. | +|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| + +### 5.2.3 CatExit + +``` +void +CatExit(void); +``` + +*CatExit* causes the application to terminate execution and return control to the framework. When the application is restarted, it enters at *main*. + +## 5.3 Registry + +The menu entry(ies) of the application, together with the set of framework events that the application is interested in, may be registered using the functions defined in this subclause. + +### 5.3.1 CatSetMenuString + +``` +void +CatSetMenuString (BYTE MenuID, + BYTE MenuStringLength, const void *MenuString, + const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier, + BYTE HelpAvailable, + BYTE NextAction); +``` + +| | | | +|-------------------------|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| MenuID | [in] | The menu ID by which this entry is known. | +| MenuStringLength | [in] | The length, in bytes, of MenuString. | +| MenuString | [in] | The menu entry to be placed in the registry. If MenuString is NULL or MenuStringLength is zero, any existing menu entry associated with MenuID is removed and is not displayed by the ME. | +| IconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| HelpAvailable | [in] | If non zero the application can supply help. | +| NextAction | [in] | The (optional) next action value | + +*CatSetMenuString* allows the application to define a menu entry together with an icon. A non-zero value can be supplied if a next action indicator is required. This function will implicitly request that the application is notified of menu selection envelopes i.e. there is no requirement to call the *CatNotifyOnEnvelope* function. An application can have several menu entries and must examine the menu selection envelope to decide which menu selection caused it to be invoked. + +The ordering of menu entries within a menu presented by the ME is based on increasing integer values of identifiers selected by the application. Note that any application's menu item ordering may be further overridden by an external source, e.g. card issuer, via a request to the SIM Toolkit framework this mechanism is beyond the scope of the present document. + +### 5.3.2 CatNotifyOnFrameworkEvent + +``` +void +CatNotifyOnFrameworkEvent(CatFrameworkEventType Event, BYTE Enabled); +``` + +| | | | +|----------------|------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Event | [in] | A framework event the application is interested in, see CatFrameworkEventType for details. | +| Enabled | [in] | If non-zero the framework event is monitored otherwise the framework event isn't monitored. By default only application lifecycle events are monitored. | + +*CatNotifyOnFrameworkEvent* enables the application to add/remove a framework event to/from the set of framework events that it is interested in. + +### 5.3.3 CatNotifyOnEnvelope + +``` +void +CatNotifyOnEnvelope(CatEnvelopeTagType Tag, BYTE Enabled); +``` + +| | | | +|----------------|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Tag | [in] | The particular envelope type to monitor; see CatEnvelopeTagType for details. | +| Enabled | [in] | If non-zero the envelope type is monitored otherwise the envelope type isn't monitored. | + +*CatNotifyOnEnvelope* enables the application to add/remove an envelope monitoring event to/from the set of the envelope monitoring events it is interested in. Note that the monitoring of MENU SELECTION, TIMER EXPIRATION and EVENT DOWNLOAD envelopes is handled by the framework. + +### 5.3.4 CatNotifyOnEvent + +``` +void +CatNotifyOnEvent(CatEventType EventType, BYTE Enabled); +``` + +| | | | +|------------------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| EventType | [in] | The particular event type to monitor; see CatEventType for details. | +| Enabled | [in] | If non-zero the event type is monitored otherwise the event isn't monitored. | + +*CatNotifyOnEvent* enables the application to add/remove an ME monitored event to/from the set of ME monitored events it is interested in. + +## 5.4 Man-Machine Interface + +### 5.4.1 CatAddItem + +``` +void +CatAddItem(BYTE ItemTextLength, const void *ItemText, BYTE ItemIdentifier); +``` + +| | | | +|-----------------------|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| ItemTextLength | [in] | The length in bytes of the following ItemText field. | +| ItemText | [in] | Text associated with item. | +| ItemIdentifier | [in] | Specifies a unique identifier to be associated with this selection. This value is returned in the SelectedItem parameter of CatSelectItem if this item is selected from the menu. | + +*CatAddItem* adds an item to a list for the user to select. See *CatSelectItem* below for details on the construction of a display list. + +### 5.4.2 CatSelectItem + +``` +void +CatSelectItem (BYTE TitleLength, const void *Title, + CatSelectItemOptions Options); +``` + +| | | | +|--------------------|------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TitleLength | [in] | The length in bytes of Title . | +| Title | [in] | Title of the list of choices. | +| Options | [in] | Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatSelectItemOptions . | + +*CatSelectItem* initiates the construction of a list of items to be displayed to the user and from which the user is expected to select exactly one entry. After *CatSelectItem* has been called, entries are added to the list one at a time using the *CatAddItem* entry point above. When all items have been added to the list, the list is sent to the ME using the *CatEndSelectItem* entry point below. *CatEndSelectItem* causes the list to be displayed and returns to the caller the item selected. + +### 5.4.3 CatEndSelectItem + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatEndSelectItem (BYTE *SelectedItem, + const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier); +``` + +| | | | +|-----------------------|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| SelectedItem | [out] | Index of item selected by user.
Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If | +| IconIdentifier | [in] | IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the SELECT ITEM proactive command. | + +*CatEndSelectItem* issues the proactive command SELECT ITEM that displays on the ME a list of items for the user to choose from. The terminal response is parsed and if successful the *SelectedItem* parameter is set to the index of the item chosen. See *CatSelectItem* above for details on the construction of a display list. + +### 5.4.4 CatDisplayText + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatDisplayText (CatDCSValue TextDCS, BYTE TextLength, const void *Text, + CatDisplayTextOptions TextOptions, + CatTextFormat TextFormat, + CatForegroundColor ForegroundColour, + CatBackgroundColour BackgroundColour, + const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier, + BYTE ImmediateResponse); +``` + +| | | | +|--------------------------|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TextDCS | [in] | The data coding scheme for Text . Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatDCSValue . | +| TextLength | [in] | The length in bytes of Text . | +| Text | [in] | String to display on ME. | +| TextOptions | [in] | Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatDisplayTextOptions . | +| TextFormat | [in] | Format of text; e.g. bold, italic, etc. | +| ForegroundColour | [in] | Foreground colour of text; i.e. colour of the letters. | +| BackgroundColour | [in] | Background colour of text; i.e. colour filled in behind the letters. | +| IconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| ImmediateResponse | [in] | True-program continues execution as soon as ME receives instruction.
False-program waits until text is cleared on the ME before continuing, and the Immediate Response TLV is not passed to the ME. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the DISPLAY TEXT proactive command. | + +### 5.4.5 CatGetInKey + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatGetInKey (CatDCSValue TitleDCS, BYTE TitleLength, const void *Title, + CatGetInKeyOptions Options, + const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier, + CatDCSValue *DCSOut, void *KeyOut); +``` + +| | | | +|-----------------------|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TitleDCS | [in] | The data-coding scheme for Title . Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatDCSValue . | +| TitleLength | [in] | The length in bytes of Title . | +| Title | [in] | String to display on ME. | +| Options | [in] | Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatGetInKeyOptions . | +| IconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| DcsOut | [out] | The packing type of the returned key. This parameter is set to one of the values listed in CatDCSValue . | +| KeyOut | [out] | The key pressed. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the GET INKEY proactive command. | + +*CatGetInKey* issues the proactive command GET INKEY. The terminal response is parsed and if successful the *DCSOut* and *KeyOut* parameters are updated. + +### 5.4.6 CatGetInput + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatGetInput(CatDCSValue TitleDCS, BYTE TitleLength, const void *Title, + CatGetInputOptions Options, + CatDCSValue DefaultReplyDCS, + BYTE DefaultReplyLength, const void *DefaultReply, + BYTE MinimumResponseLength, + BYTE MaximumResponseLength, + const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier, + CatDCSValue *MsgOutDCS, BYTE *MsgOutLength, void *MsgOut); +``` + +| | | | +|------------------------------|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TitleDCS | [in] | The data-coding scheme for Title . Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatDCSValue . | +| TitleLength | [in] | The length in bytes of Title . | +| Title | [in] | String to display on ME while waiting for the user to press a key. | +| Options | [in] | Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatGetInputOptions . | +| DefaultReplyDCS | [in] | The data-coding scheme for DefaultReply . Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatDCSValue . | +| DefaultReplyLength | [in] | The length in bytes of DefaultReply . | +| DefaultReply | [in] | Default response string; use NULL for "no reply"-no Default Reply tag length value (TLV) is sent to the ME. | +| MinimumResponseLength | [in] | Minimum allowed length for the response, in either characters or digits. | +| MaximumResponseLength | [in] | Maximum allowed length for the response, in either characters or digits. | +| IconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| MsgOutDCS | [out] | Packing type of the returned data. This parameter is set to one of the values listed in CatDCSValue . | +| MsgOutLength | [out] | Length of the returned message in bytes. | +| MsgOut | [out] | A pointer to where the returned string or message is placed. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the GET INPUT proactive command. | + +*CatGetInput* issues the proactive command GET INPUT. The terminal response is parsed and if successful *MsgOutDCS*, *MsgOutLength*, *MsgOut* parameters are updated. + +### 5.4.7 CatSetupIdleModeText + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatSetupIdleModeText (CatDCSValue TextDCS, BYTE TextLength, const void *Text, + const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier); +``` + +| | | | +|-----------------------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TextDCS | [in] | The data-coding scheme for Text . Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatDCSValue . | +| TextLength | [in] | The length in bytes of Text . | +| Text | [in] | String to display while ME is idle. | +| IconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the SETUP IDLE MODE TEXT proactive command. | + +*CatSetupIdleModeText* issues the proactive command SET UP IDLE MODE TEXT that sets the ME's default text string. + +### 5.4.8 CatPlayTone + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatPlayTone (BYTE TextLength, const void *Text, + CatTone Tone, + CatTimeUnit Units, BYTE Duration, + const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier); +``` + +| | | | +|-----------------------|------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TextLength | [in] | The length in bytes of the string Text to display on the ME. | +| Text | [in] | String to display on ME while sound is being played. | +| Tone | [in] | Specifies tone to play. Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatTone . | +| Units | [in] | Unit of time specified for duration parameter. Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatTimeUnit . | +| Duration | [in] | Amount of time to play the tone, in units specified in the Units parameter | +| IconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the PLAY TONE proactive command. | + +*CatPlayTone* issues the proactive command PLAY TONE. + +## 5.5 Timers + +### 5.5.1 CatGetTimer + +``` +BYTE +CatGetTimer (void); +``` + +| | | +|---------------|------------------------------| +| RETURN | The identifier of the timer. | +|---------------|------------------------------| + +*CatGetTimer* returns the ID of a timer that is not currently in use. If no timer is available, this function returns zero. Timer identifiers are assigned by the framework. + +### 5.5.2 CatFreeTimer + +``` +void +CatFreeTimer (BYTE TimerID); +``` + +| | | | +|----------------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TimerID | [in] | ID of timer to free; obtained from CatGetTimer . | +|----------------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------| + +*CatFreeTimer* frees the handle to the specified timer, making it available for the next request. It is not a proactive command. No information is passed to the ME by this function. + +### 5.5.3 CatStartTimer + +``` +void +CatStartTimer (BYTE TimerID, CatTimerValue *TimerValue); +``` + +| | | | +|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TimerID | [in] | ID of the timer to initialize; obtained from CatGetTimer . | +| TimerValue | [in] | Initial value of the timer. The value is specified in a structure of type CatTimerValue . | +| RETURN | The GeneralResult code of the TIMER MANAGEMENT proactive command. | | + +*CatStartTimer* issues a proactive TIMER MANAGEMENT command to initialize a timer to the parameter values. + +### 5.5.4 CatGetTimerValue + +``` +void +CatGetTimerValue (BYTE TimerID, CatTimerValue *TimerValue); +``` + +| | | | +|-------------------|-------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TimerID | [in] | ID of the timer from which to obtain values; obtained from CatGetTimer | +| TimerValue | [out] | The time remaining to run of timer TimerID . The value is returned in a structure of type CatTimerValue . | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the TIMER MANAGEMENT proactive command. | + +*CatGetTimerValue* issues a proactive TIMER MANAGEMENT command to obtain the timer's current value. + +## 5.6 Supplementary Card Reader Management + +These functions access the supplementary card-reader on a dual-slot ME. + +### 5.6.1 CatPowerOnCard + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatPowerOnCard (CatDevice DeviceID, BYTE *ATRLength, void *ATR); +``` + +| | | | +|------------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| DeviceID | [in] | The device to power on. An acceptable value for this parameter is a card reader device selected from CatDevice . | +| ATRLength | [in/out] | Size of the ATR buffer on input and the number of bytes returned by the card as the ATR on output. | +| ATR | [out] | Pointer to where answer to reset (ATR) will be stored. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the POWER ON CARD proactive command. | + +*CatPowerOnCard* issues the proactive command POWER ON CARD that powers on a supplementary card reader. The terminal response is parsed and if successful the *ATR* and *ATRLength* parameters are. + +### 5.6.2 CatPowerOffCard + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatPowerOffCard (CatDevice DeviceID); +``` + +| | | | +|-----------------|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| DeviceID | [in] | The device to power off. An acceptable value for this parameter is a card reader device selected from CatDevice . | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the POWER OFF CARD proactive command. | + +*CatPowerOffCard* issues the proactive command POWER OFF CARD that turns off the supplementary card reader. + +### 5.6.3 CatPerformCardAPDU + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatPerformCardAPDU (CatDevice DeviceID, + BYTE CAPDULength, const void *CAPDU, + BYTE *RAPDULength, void *RAPDU); +``` + +| | | | +|--------------------|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| DeviceID | [in] | The device to send the command APDU (C-APDU) to. An acceptable value for this parameter is a card reader device selected from CatDevice .
Pointer to the command C-APDU to be sent to the additional card device. | +| CAPDU | [in] | | +| CAPDULength | [in] | The number of bytes in the C-APDU. | +| RAPDU | [out] | Pointer to the buffer that will contain the response APDU (R-APDU) returned by the card in the additional card reader. You must allocate enough space to hold the R-APDU sent by the card. | +| RAPDULength | [out] | The number of bytes returned by the card in the additional card reader. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the PERFORM CARD APDU proactive command. | + +*CatPerformCardAPDU* issues the proactive command PERFORM CARD APDU that sends application program data units (APDU) to the supplementary card reader. The terminal response is parsed and if successful the *RAPDU* and *RAPDULength* parameters are updated. + +### 5.6.4 CatGetReaderStatus + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatGetReaderStatus (CatDevice DeviceID, CatReaderStatusOptions Options, + BYTE *Status); +``` + +| | | | +|-----------------|-------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| DeviceID | [in] | Device to detect status of. An acceptable value for this parameter is a card reader device selected from CatDevice . | +| Options | [in] | Selects what type of status information to return. An acceptable value for this parameter is selected from CatGetReaderStatusOptions . | +| Status | [out] | Status of additional card reader. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the GET READER STATUS proactive command. | + +*CatGetReaderStatus* issues the proactive command GET READER STATUS that retrieves the status of the additional card readers on the ME. The terminal response is parsed and if successful the *Status* parameter is updated. + +## 5.7 UICC File Store Access + +The abstract type FID is used to denote the file and a set of pre-processor macros are defined that enumerate all of the standard files of a NAA file store. A FID could be implemented as an unsigned 16-bit number as follows: + +- typedef unsigned short FID; +- #define FID\_MF 0x3F00 + +The starting file-context of a Toolkit application is the MF. When a Toolkit application exits, the file-context is lost. + +The Access Control privileges of the application are granted during installation according to the level of trust. When an application requests access to UICC or operator specific files, the Toolkit Framework checks if this access is allowed by examination of the file control information stored on the card. If access is granted the Toolkit Framework will process the access request, if access is not granted, an appropriate status word will be returned. + +Contents and coding of the file(s) containing access control information are defined in 3GPP TS 31.101 [16]. + +All UICC functions return the status bytes according to 3GPP TS 31.101 [16], where 90 00 represents success. + +### 5.7.1 CatSelect + +``` +UINT16 +CatSelect (CatFID FileIdentifier, CatFileStatus *Status); +``` + +| | | | +|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------| +| FileIdentifier | [in] | The file to select. | +| Status[out] | Useful information about the directory or file if it is successfully selected. The returned 16-bit unsigned value is a concatenation of the SW response bytes with SW1 as the high byte and SW2 as the low byte, so a successful execution would return 0x9000. | | +| RETURN | | | + +*CatSelect* selects the specified file as the current working file. + +### 5.7.2 CatStatus + +``` +UINT16 +CatStatus (CatFileStatus *Status); +``` + +| | | | +|---------------------|-------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| NumBytes | [out] | The number of bytes written. | +| Status [out] | | The status of the currently selected file.
The returned 16-bit unsigned value is a concatenation of the SW response bytes with SW1 as the high byte and SW2 as the low byte, so a successful execution would return 0x9000. | +| RETURN | | | + +*CatStatus* returns the file status of the currently selected file as specified in 3GPP TS 31.101 [16]. + +### 5.7.3 CatGetCHVStatus + +``` +void +CatGetCHVStatus (BYTE CHVStatus[4]); +``` + +| | | | +|------------------|-------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| CHVStatus | [out] | Updates the CHVStatus array with the status of CHV1, CHV2, UNBLOCKCHV1, and UNBLOCKCHV2 with CHV1 at array element zero. | +|------------------|-------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| + +*CatGetCHVStatus* returns the current CHV status values. The format of the returned bytes is specified in 3GPP TS 31.101 [16]. + +### 5.7.4 CatReadBinary + +``` +UINT16 +CatReadBinary (DWORD Offset, + DWORD *NumBytes, + void *Buffer); +``` + +| | | | +|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Offset | [in] | The offset into the file. | +| NumBytes | [in/out] | The number of bytes to be read on input and the actual number read on output | +| Buffer[out] | The buffer into which the data is written. | | +| RETURN | The returned 16-bit unsigned value is a concatenation of the SW response bytes with SW1 as the high byte and SW2 as the low byte, so a successful execution would return 0x9000. | | + +*CatReadBinary* reads *NumBytes* from position *Offset* in the currently selected file into *Buffer*. + +### 5.7.5 CatUpdateBinary + +``` +UINT16 +CatUpdateBinary (DWORD Offset, + DWORD NumBytes, + const void *Buffer); +``` + +| | | | +|-------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------| +| Offset | [in] | The offset into the file. | +| NumBytes | [in] | The number of bytes to write. | +| Buffer[in] | The buffer containing the data to write to the file. | | +| RETURN | The returned 16-bit unsigned value is a concatenation of the SW response bytes with SW1 as the high byte and SW2 as the low byte, so a successful execution would return 0x9000. | | + +*CatUpdateBinary* writes *NumBytes* contained in *Buffer* to position *Offset* in the currently selected file. + +### 5.7.6 CatReadRecord + +``` +UINT16 +CatReadRecord (DWORD RecordNumber, + CatRecordAccessMode Mode, + DWORD Offset, DWORD *NumBytes, + void *Buffer); +``` + +| | | | +|---------------------|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| RecordNumber | [in] | The record number from which to read when Mode is ABSOLUTE or 0 otherwise. | +| Mode [in] | | Indication of which record is to be read; viz. NEXT, PREVIOUS, CURRENT or ABSOLUTE. | +| Offset | [in] | The offset into the record. | +| NumBytes | [in/out] | The number of bytes to be read from the record on input and the number of bytes actually read on output | +| Buffer [out] | | The buffer into which the data is read. The returned 16-bit unsigned value is a concatenation of the SW response bytes with SW1 as the high byte and SW2 as the low byte, so a successful execution would return 0x9000. | +| RETURN | | | + +*CatReadRecord* reads *NumBytes* from the record *RecordNumber* of the currently selected file into *Buffer*. + +### 5.7.7 CatUpdateRecord + +``` +UINT16 +CatUpdateRecord (DWORD RecordNumber, + CatRecordAccessMode Mode, + DWORD Offset, DWORD NumBytes, + const void *Buffer); +``` + +| | | | +|---------------------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| RecordNumber | [in] | The record number to which to write when Mode is ABSOLUTE or 0 otherwise | +| Mode [in] | | Indication of which record is to be read; viz. NEXT, PREVIOUS, CURRENT or ABSOLUTE. | +| Offset | [in] | The offset into the record. | +| NumBytes | [in] | The number of bytes to write into the record. | +| Buffer [out] | | The buffer containing the data to write to the record. | +| RETURN | | The returned 16-bit unsigned value is a concatenation of the SW response bytes with SW1 as the high byte and SW2 as the low byte, so a successful execution would return 0x9000. | + +*CatUpdateRecord* writes *NumBytes* into the record *RecordNumber* of the currently selected file from *Buffer*. + +### 5.7.8 CatSearch + +``` +UINT16 +CatSearch (CatSearchModes Mode, + DWORD Offset, DWORD PatternLength, + const void *Pattern); +``` + +| | | | +|---------------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Mode | [in] | Defines the seek method, One of
SEEK_FROM_BEGINNING_FORWARD,
SEEK_FROM_END_BACKWARD,
SEEK_FROM_NEXT_FORWARD,
SEEK_FROM_PREVIOUS_BACKWARD | +| Offset | [in] | The offset into the record at which to being pattern matching. | +| PatternLength | [in] | The size in bytes of the pattern to search for. | +| Pattern | [in] | The buffer containing the pattern to search for. The returned 16-bit unsigned value is a concatenation of the SW response bytes with SW1 as the high byte and SW2 as the low byte, so a successful execution would return 0x9000. | +| RETURN | | | + +*CatSearch* searches records in the currently selected file starting at Offset for the pattern of length *PatternLength* contained in *Pattern*. If the pattern is found the current record is set appropriately. + +### 5.7.9 CatIncrease + +``` +UINT16 +CatIncrease (DWORD Increment, + DWORD *Value); +``` + +| | | | +|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------| +| Increment | [in] | The value to increase by. | +| Value | [out] | The new value. | +| RETURN |

The returned 16-bit unsigned value is a concatenation of the SW response bytes with SW1 as the high byte and SW2 as the low byte, so a successful execution would return 0x9000.

| | + +*CatIncrease* adds *Increment* to the current record of the selected cyclic file and returns the new *Value*. The most significant byte of *Increment* is ignored. + +### 5.7.10 CatInvalidate + +``` +UINT16 +CatInvalidate (void); +``` + +| | | +|---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| RETURN |

The returned 16-bit unsigned value is a concatenation of the SW response bytes with SW1 as the high byte and SW2 as the low byte, so a successful execution would return 0x9000.

| +|---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| + +*CatInvalidate* invalidates the selected file. + +### 5.7.11 CatRehabilitate + +``` +UINT16 +CatRehabilitate (void) ; +``` + +| | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +|

RETURN

The returned 16-bit unsigned value is a concatenation of the SW response bytes with SW1 as the high byte and SW2 as the low byte, so a successful execution would return 0x9000.

| +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| + +*CatRehabilitate* rehabilitates the selected file. + +## 5.8 Miscellaneous + +### 5.8.1 CatGetTerminalProfile + +``` +void +CatGetTerminalProfile (BYTE *ProfileOutLength, BYTE *Profile); +``` + +| | | | +|-------------------------|-------|-------------------------------------------------------| +| ProfileOutLength | [out] | The number of bytes written to Profile. | +| Profile | [out] | The address at which the terminal profile is written. | + +*CatGetTerminalProfile* returns the stored terminal profile in *Profile*. + +### 5.8.2 CatMoreTime + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatMoreTime (void); +``` + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +|

RETURN

The GeneralResult code of the MORE TIME proactive command.

| +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| + +*CatMoreTime* issues the proactive command MORE TIME to the ME that it needs more time to process an application. + +### 5.8.3 CatPollingOff + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatPollingOff (void); +``` + +| | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +|

RETURN

The GeneralResult code of the POLLING OFF proactive command.

| +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| + +*CatPollingOff* issues the proactive command POLLING OFF that disables proactive polling; this essentially turns off *CatPollInterval*. + +### 5.8.4 CatPollInterval + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatPollInterval (CatTimeUnit Unit, BYTE Interval, + CatTimeInterval *ActualIntervalOut); +``` + +| | | | +|--------------------------|-------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Unit | [in] | Desired time interval. Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatTimeUnit . | +| Interval | [in] | Interval in units . | +| ActualIntervalOut | [out] | Response from ME negotiating the interval. This may or may not be the same as Unit and Interval . The value returned is in a structure of type CatTimeInterval . | +| RETURN | | The
GeneralResult code of
the POLL
INTERVAL
proactive
command. | + +*CatPollInterval* issues the proactive command POLL INTERVAL that requests the ME to set a time interval between status application program data units (APDU) that the ME sends to the UICC. The ME responds with a time interval of its own that most closely matches the application programming interface (API) request. + +Polling can be disabled by using *CatPollingOff*. + +### 5.8.5 CatRefresh + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatRefresh (CatRefreshOptions Options); +CatGeneralResult +CatRefreshWithFileList (CatRefreshOptions Options, + BYTE FileListLength, + const void *FileList); +``` + +| | | | +|-----------------------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Options | [in] | Informs the ME of what needs refreshing. Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatRefreshOptions . | +| FileListLength | [in] | The length, in bytes , of FileList . | +| FileList | [in] | The file identifiers of the files that have changed. | +| RETURN | | The
GeneralResult code of
the
REFRESH
proactive
command. | + +*CatRefresh* issues the proactive command REFRESH that informs ME that the NAA has changed configuration due to UICC activity (such as an application running). + +### 5.8.6 CatLanguageNotification + +``` +void +CatLanguageNotification (CatLanguageNotificationOptions Options, + const void *Language); +``` + +| | | | +|-----------------|------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Options | [in] | Language options. An acceptable value for this parameter is a card reader device selected from CatLanguageNotificationOptions . | +| Language | [in] | The 2-character language code as defined by ISO 639 [5], encoded using SMS default 7-bit coded alphabet as defined by TS 23.038 [6]. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the LANGUAGE NOTIFICATION ON proactive command. | + +*CatLanguageNotification* issues the proactive command LANGUAGE NOTIFICATION that notifies the ME about the language currently used for any text string within proactive commands or envelope command responses. + +### 5.8.7 CatLaunchBrowser + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatLaunchBrowser (CatLaunchBrowserOptions Options, + BYTE TitleLength, const void *Title, + BYTE URLLength, const void *URL, + const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier); +``` + +| | | | +|-----------------------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Options [in] | | Options used to launch the browser. Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatLaunchBrowserOptions . | +| TitleLength | [in] | The length in bytes of the string Title | +| Title | [in] | String to display on the ME during the user confirmation phase. | +| URLLength | [in] | The length in bytes of URL . | +| URL | [in] | The URL to open the browser at. | +| IconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the LAUNCH BROWSER proactive command. | + +*CatLaunchBrowser* and *CatLaunchBrowserEx* issue the proactive command LAUNCH BROWSER that launches a browser on the ME. + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatLaunchBrowserEx (const CatLaunchBrowserExParams *params); +``` + +The structure *CatLaunchBrowserExParams* has the following members: + +``` +typedef struct +{ + // Mandatory fields + CatLaunchBrowserOptions Options, + BYTE URLLength; + const void *URL; + // Optional fields + BYTE BrowserIdentityLength; + const void *BrowserIdentity; + BYTE BearerLength; + const BYTE *Bearer; + BYTE NumProvisioningFileReferences; + BYTE *ProvisioningFileReferenceLengths; + const BYTE **ProvisioningFileReferences; + BYTE GatewayProxyIdLength; + const void * GatewayProxyId; + CatAlphaString Title; + CatIconIdentifier IconIdentifier; +} CatLaunchBrowerExParams; +``` + +with the following members: + +| | | | +|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| URLLength [in] | The length in bytes of URL . | | +| URL [in] | The URL to open the browser at. | | +| BrowserIdentityLength | [in] | Length in bytes of BrowserIdentity . | +| BrowserIdentity | [in] | The browser identity. If BrowserIdentity is NULL, no BROWSER IDENTITY TLV is sent to the ME. | +| BearerLength | [in] | Length in bytes of Bearer . | +| Bearer | [in] | The list of bearers in order of priority requested. The type CatBearer defines the values acceptable. If Bearer is NULL, no BEARER TLV is sent to the ME. | +| NumProvisioningFileReferences | [in] | The number of Provisioning File References. | +| ProvisioningFileReferenceLengths | [in] | A pointer to the array of Provisioning File References lengths. | +| ProvisioningFileReferences | [in] | A pointer to the array of Provisioning File References. | +| GatewayProxyIdLength | [in] | Length in bytes of GatewayProxyId . | +| GatewayProxyId | [in] | The gateway or proxy identity. If GatewayProxyId is NULL, no TEXT STRING TLV describing the gateway/proxy is sent to the ME. | +| Title | [in] | String to display on the ME; see CatAlphaString . | +| IconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | + +## 5.9 Low-level Interface + +This subclause presents a low-level programming interface that allows you to: + +- Construct proactive commands and send them to the ME. +- Access the terminal response from the ME. +- Search the terminal response and contents of envelopes for specified TLVs. +- Unpack the contents of envelopes from the ME and send responses. + +These functions are provided so that functionality that is not provided in the high level API is still accessible. All of these functions work on a single data buffer that has a single data pointer and can only be accessed sequentially. The high-level proactive functions may make use of the data buffer so consequently the high-level proactive functions should not be used whilst using the low-level functions. + +### 5.9.1 CatResetBuffer + +``` +void +CatResetBuffer(void); +``` + +This function resets the data pointer to the beginning of the buffer. + +### 5.9.2 CatStartProactiveCommand + +``` +void +CatStartProactiveCommand(BYTE Command, + BYTE Options, + BYTE To); +``` + +| | | | +|----------------|------|---------------------------------------| +| Command | [in] | Command byte of proactive command. | +| Options | [in] | Command options of proactive command. | +| To | [in] | The destination device identity. | + +*CatStartProactiveCommand* resets the data pointer and starts the construction of a proactive command by writing the command tag, command details and device identities to the data buffer. The data pointer is left pointing after the device identities so that proactive command specific data can be written. + +### 5.9.3 CatSendProactiveCommand + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatSendProactiveCommand (BYTE *Length); +``` + +| | | | +|---------------|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Length | [out] | Pointer that is updated with the length of the terminal response | +| RETURN | | The general result byte of the terminal response | + +*CatSendProactiveCommand* sends the contents of the data buffer as a proactive command and updates the data buffer with the terminal response. The general result byte of the terminal response is returned by this function. The length of the terminal response is written to *\*Length*. The data pointer is set to point to the additional information of the terminal response. + +### 5.9.4 CatOpenEnvelope + +``` +CatEnvelopeTagType +CatOpenEnvelope (BYTE *Length); +``` + +| | | | +|---------------|-------|---------------------------------------------------------| +| Length | [out] | Pointer that is updated with the length of the envelope | +| RETURN | | The envelope tag | + +*CatOpenEnvelope* returns the envelope tag of the data buffer and the length of the envelope data. The data pointer is set to point to the envelope data. + +### 5.9.5 CatSendEnvelopeResponse + +``` +void +CatSendEnvelopeResponse (void); +``` + +*CatSendEnvelopeResponse* sends the contents of the data buffer as a successful envelope response. + +### 5.9.6 CatSendEnvelopeErrorResponse + +``` +void +CatSendEnvelopeErrorResponse (void); +``` + +This function sends the contents of the data buffer as an unsuccessful envelope response. + +### 5.9.7 CatPutData + +``` +void +CatPutData (BYTE Length, + const void *Data); +``` + +| | | | +|---------------|------|-----------------| +| Length | [in] | Length of Data | +| Data | [in] | Pointer to Data | + +*CatPutData* appends *Length* bytes of data to the data buffer. + +### 5.9.8 CatPutByte + +``` +void +CatPutByte (BYTE Data); +``` + +| | | | +|-------------|------|------------| +| Data | [in] | Data byte. | +|-------------|------|------------| + +*CatPutByte* appends the supplied data byte to the data buffer. + +### 5.9.9 CatPutTLV + +``` +void +CatPutTLV (BYTE Tag, + BYTE Length, + const void *Value); +``` + +| | | | +|---------------|------|-------------------------| +| Tag | [in] | Tag byte. | +| Length | [in] | Length of value. | +| Value | [in] | A pointer to the value. | + +*CatPutTLV* appends a general TLV to the data buffer. + +### 5.9.10 CatPutBytePrefixedTLV + +``` +void +CatPutBytePrefixedTLV (BYTE Tag, + BYTE Prefix, + BYTE Length, + const void *Value); +``` + +| | | | +|---------------|------|-------------------------| +| Tag | [in] | Tag byte. | +| Prefix | [in] | Prefix byte. | +| Length | [in] | Length of value. | +| Value | [in] | A pointer to the value. | + +*CatPutBytePrefixedTLV* appends a TLV to the data buffer with a single byte placed before the Value. + +### 5.9.11 CatPutOneByteTLV + +``` +void +CatPutOneByteTLV (BYTE Tag, + BYTE Value); +``` + +| | | | +|--------------|------|------------------| +| Tag | [in] | Tag byte. | +| Value | [in] | Value byte. | + +*CatPutOneByteTLV* appends a single byte valued TLV to the data buffer. + +### 5.9.12 CatPutTwoByteTLV + +``` +void +CatPutTwoByteTLV (BYTE Tag, + BYTE Value1, + BYTE Value2); +``` + +| | | | +|---------------|------|--------------------| +| Tag | [in] | Tag byte. | +| Value1 | [in] | First Value byte. | +| Value2 | [in] | Second Value byte. | + +*CatPutTwoByteTLV* appends a two byte valued TLV to the data buffer. + +### 5.9.13 CatGetByte + +``` +BYTE +CatGetByte (void); +``` + +| | | +|---------------|------------| +| RETURN | Data byte. | +|---------------|------------| + +*CatGetByte* returns the byte at the current data pointer and increments the data pointer by one. + +### 5.9.14 CatGetData + +``` +const void * +CatGetData (BYTE Length); +``` + +| | | | +|---------------|------|------------------| +| Length | [in] | Length of Data | +| RETURN | | Pointer to Data. | + +*CatGetData* returns the current data pointer and increments the data pointer by *Length* bytes. + +### 5.9.15 CatFindNthTLV + +``` +const void * +CatFindNthTLV (BYTE Tag, + BYTE Occurrence, + BYTE *Length); +``` + +| | | | +|-------------------|-------|-----------------------------------------------------| +| Tag | [in] | Tag to find. | +| Occurrence | [in] | Occurrence of Tag to find with "1" being the first. | +| Length | [out] | Length of found TLV. | +| RETURN | | Pointer to data of found TLV | + +*CatFindNthTLV* finds the nth TLV that matches Tag in the data buffer, where nth is specified by the *Occurrence* parameter. If a match is found the data pointer is updated to the found TLV, the function returns a pointer to the found value and updates *Length* with the data length. If no match was found the function returns the null pointer and the data pointer is left unchanged. + +### 5.9.16 CatFindNthTLVInUserBuffer + +``` +const void * +CatFindNthTLVInUserBuffer (BYTE BufferLen, + const void *Buffer, + BYTE Tag, + BYTE Occurrence, + BYTE *Length); +``` + +| | | | +|-------------------|-------|-----------------------------------------------------| +| BufferLen | [in] | Length of buffer | +| Buffer | [in] | Buffer to search | +| Tag | [in] | Tag to find. | +| Occurrence | [in] | Occurrence of Tag to find with "1" being the first. | +| Length | [out] | Length of found TLV. | +| RETURN | | Pointer to data of found TLV | + +*CatFindNthTLVInUserBuffer* finds the nth TLV that matches *Tag* is the supplied buffer. The function returns a pointer to the found value and updates *Length* with the data length. If no match was found the function returns the null pointer. + +## 5.10 Network Services + +### 5.10.1 CatGetLocationInformation + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatGetLocationInformation (CatLocationInformation *LocationInformation); +``` + +| | | | +|----------------------------|-------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| LocationInformation | [out] | A pointer to where the location information from the ME is placed. Refer to the CatLocalInformation section for member details. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION proactive command.
The GeneralResult code of the DISPLAY TEXT proactive command. | + +*CatProvideLocationInformation* requests the ME to send location information to the (U)SIM using the PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION proactive command. + +### 5.10.2 CatGetTimingAdvance + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatGetTimingAdvance (CatTimingAdvance *TimingAdvance); +``` + +| | | | +|----------------------|-------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TimingAdvance | [out] | A pointer to where the timing advance information from the ME is placed. Refer to the CatTimingAdvance section for member details. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION proactive command. | + +*CatProvideTimingAdvance* requests the ME to send timing advance information to the (U)SIM using the PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION proactive command. + +### 5.10.3 CatGetIMEI + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatGetIMEI (BYTE IMEI[8]); +``` + +| | | | +|---------------|-------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| IMEI | [out] | A pointer to where the IMEI of the ME is placed. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION proactive command. | + +*CatGetIMEI* requests the ME to send the IMEI to the (U)SIM using the PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION proactive command. + +### 5.10.4 CatGetNetworkMeasurementResults + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatGetNetworkMeasurementResults (BYTE MeasurementResults[10]); +``` + +| | | | +|---------------------------|-------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| MeasurementResults | [out] | A pointer to where the network measurement results from the ME is placed. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION proactive command. | + +*CatGetNetworkMeasurementResults* requests the ME to send the network measurement results to the (U)SIM using the PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION proactive command. + +### 5.10.5 CatGetDateTimeAndTimeZone + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatGetDateTimeAndTimeZone (BYTE DateTimeAndTimeZone [7]); +``` + +| | | | +|----------------------------|-------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| DateTimeAndTimeZone | [out] | A pointer to where the date, time, and time zone from the ME is placed. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION proactive command. | + +*CatGetDateTimeAndTimeZones* requests the ME to send the date, time, and time zone information to the (U)SIM using the PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION proactive command. + +### 5.10.6 CatGetLanguage + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatGetLanguage (BYTE Language[2]); +``` + +| | | | +|----------------------------|-------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| DateTimeAndTimeZone | [out] | A pointer to where the language from the ME is placed. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION proactive command. | + +*CatGetLanguage* requests the ME to send the language information to the (U)SIM using the PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION proactive command. + +### 5.10.7 CatSetupCall + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatSetupCall (BYTE CallSetupMessageLength, const void *CallSetupMessage, + CatTypeOfNumberAndNumberingPlanIdentifier TONandNPI, + BYTE DiallingNumberLength, const void *DiallingNumber, + CatSetupCallOptions Options, + const CatIconIdentifier *UserConfirmationIconIdentifier, + BYTE CallSetupMessageLength, const void *CallSetupMessage, + const CatIconIdentifier *CallSetupIconIdentifier); +``` + +| | | | +|---------------------------------------|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| UserConfirmationMessageLength | [in] | Length in bytes of UserConfirmationMessage . | +| UserConfirmationMessage | [in] | Message to display for user confirmation or NULL. | +| TONandNPI | [in] | Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatTypeOfNumberAndNumberingPlanIdentifier . | +| DiallingNumberLength | [in] | Length in bytes of DiallingNumber . | +| DialingNumber | [in] | Number to call is coded as binary-coded decimal. | +| Options | [in] | Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatSetupCallOptions . | +| UserConfirmationIconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier to use during the user confirmation phase; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If UserConfirmationIconIdentifier is NULL or if UserConfirmationIconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no user confirmation phase icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| CallSetupMessageLength | [in] | Length in bytes of CallSetupMessage . | +| CallSetupMessage | [in] | Message to display for call set up or NULL. | +| CallSetupIconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier to use during the call setup phase; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If CallSetupIconIdentifier is NULL or if CallSetupIconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no call setup phase icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the SET UP CALL proactive command. | + +*CatSetupCall* and *CatSetupCallEx* issue the SET UP CALL proactive command to the ME. + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatSetupCallEx (const CatSetupCallExParams *Params); +``` + +The type *CatSetupCallExParams* is defined as follows: + +``` +typedef struct +{ + // Mandatory fields + CatSetupCallOptions Options; + CatTypeOfNumberAndNumberingPlanIdentifier TONandNPI; + BYTE DiallingNumberLength; + const void *DialingNumber; + // Optional fields + CatAlphaString UserConfirmationMessage; + BYTE CapabilityConfigParamsLength; + const void *CapabilityConfigParams; + BYTE CalledPartySubaddressLength; + const void *CalledPartySubaddress; + CatTimeInterval RedialMaximumDuration; + CatIconOption UserConfirmationIcon; + CatAlphaString CallSetupMessage; + CatIconOptions CallSetupIcon; +} CatSetupCallExParams; +``` + +With the following members: + +| | | +|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Options | Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatSetupCallOptions . | +| TONandNPI | Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatTypeOfNumberAndNumberingPlanIdentifier . | +| DiallingNumberLength | Length in bytes of DiallingNumber . | +| DialingNumber | Number to call is coded as binary-coded decimal. | +| UserConfirmationMessage | String to display during the user confirmation phase; see CatAlphaString . If this parameter is null, no user confirmation message TLV is passed to the ME. | +| CapabilityConfigParamsLength | Length in bytes of CapabilityConfigParams . | +| CapabilityConfigParams | A pointer to the capability configuration parameters as coded for EF CCP . | +| CalledPartySubaddressLength | Length in bytes of CalledPartySubaddress . | +| CalledPartySubaddress | The called party subaddress. | +| RedialMaximumDuration | An optional maximum duration for the redial mechanism. If the timeInterval member of this structure is zero, no duration TLV is sent to the ME. | +| UserConfirmationIcon | The icon to display during the user confirmation phase. If the UseIcon member of this structure is zero, no user confirmation icon TLV is sent to the ME. | +| CallSetupMessage | String to display during the call set up phase; see CatAlphaString . | +| CallSetupIcon | The icon to display during the call setup phase. | + +Optional parameters are specifically chosen to use an all-zero binary representation. This means that it is simple to set up only the required members of the *SetupCallExParams* structure by zeroing the whole structure using *memset*, filling in the required members, and sending the result to *CatSetupCallEx*. As all optional parameters use a zero binary representation, the *memset* serves to *initialise* them all to the "not present" status. + +### 5.10.8 CatSendShortMessage + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatSendShortMessage (BYTE TitleLength, const void *Title, + CatTypeOfNumberAndNumberingPlanIdentifier TONandNPI, + BYTE AddressLength, const void *Address, + BYTE SmstPDULength, const void *SmstPDU, + CatSendShortMessageOptions Options, + const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier); +``` + +| | | | +|-----------------------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TitleLength | [in] | Length in bytes of Title . | +| Title | [in] | String to display while ME is sending a message. | +| TONandNPI | [in] | Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatTypeOfNumberAndNumberingPlanIdentifier . | +| AddressLength | [in] | Length in bytes of Address . | +| Address | [in] | Address of the service center where message is being sent. | +| SmsTPDULength | [in] | Length in bytes of SmsTPDU . | +| SmTPDU | [in] | Formatted short message service (SMS) message to send. | +| Options | [in] | Specifies who packs the message. Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatSendShortMessageOptions . | +| IconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the SEND SHORT MESSAGE proactive command. | + +*CatSendShortMessage* issues the SEND SHORT MESSAGE proactive command. + +### 5.10.9 CatSendSS + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatSendSS (BYTE TitleLength, const void *Title, + CatTypeOfNumberAndNumberingPlanIdentifier TONandNPI, + BYTE SSStringLength, const void *SSString, + const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier); +``` + +| | | | +|-----------------------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TitleLength | [in] | Length in bytes of Title . | +| Title | [in] | String to display while ME is sending a message. | +| TONandNPI | [in] | Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatTypeOfNumberAndNumberingPlanIdentifier . | +| SSStringLength | [in] | Length in bytes of SSString . | +| SSString | [in] | SS string to ME. | +| IconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the SEND SS proactive command. | + +*CatSendSS* issues the SEND SS proactive command to the ME. + +### 5.10.10 CatSendUSSD + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatSendUSSD (BYTE TitleLength, const void *Title, + CatDCSValue MessageDCS, BYTE MessageLength, const void *Message, + CatDCSValue *MsgOutDCS, BYTE *MsgOutLength, void *MsgOut, + const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier); +``` + +| | | | +|-----------------------|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TitleLength | [in] | The length in bytes of Title . | +| Title | [in] | String to display while ME is sending a message. | +| MessageDCS | [in] | The data-coding scheme for Message . Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatDCSValue . | +| MessageLength | [in] | The length in bytes of Message . | +| Message | [in] | Message to send. | +| MsgOutDCS | [out] | Identifies type of DCS for the returned message. | +| MsgOutLength | [out] | Length of the returned message in bytes. | +| MsgOut | [out] | Returned string or message. | +| IconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the SEND USSD proactive command. | + +*CatSendUSSD* issues the SEND USSD proactive command. The terminal response is parsed and if successful the *MsgOutDCS*, *MsgOutLength* and *MsgOut* parameters are updated. + +### 5.10.11 CatOpenCSChannel + +``` + +CatGeneralResult +CatOpenCSChannel(CatOpenChannelOptions Options, + BYTE UserConfirmationLength, const void *UserConfirmation, + const CatIconIdentifier *UserConfirmationIconIdentifier, + CatTypeOfNumberAndNumberingPlanIdentifier TONandNPI, + BYTE DiallingNumberLength, const void *DiallingNumber, + BYTE BearerDescription[3], + UINT16 *BufferSize, + CatDevice *ChannelIdentifier); + +``` + +| | | | +|---------------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Options | [in] | Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatOpenChannelOptions . | +| UserConfirmationLength | [in] | Length in bytes of UserConfirmation . | +| UserConfirmation | [in] | String to display when ME alerts user that channel is to be opened. Optional icon identifier to use during the user confirmation phase; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If UserConfirmationIconIdentifier is NULL or if UserConfirmationIconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no user confirmation phase icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| UserConfirmationIconIdentifier | [in] | | +| TONandNPI | [in] | Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatTypeOfNumberAndNumberingPlanIdentifier . | +| DiallingNumberLength | [in] | Length in bytes of DiallingNumber . | +| DialingNumber | [in] | Number to call is coded as binary-coded decimal. Initially contains the bearer description parameters (data rate, bearer service and connection element) and is modified to the actual bearer description as allocated by the ME. | +| BearerDescription | [in/out] | | +| BufferSize | [in/out] | Initially contains the desired buffer size and is modified to the actual buffer size as allocated by the ME. | +| ChannelIdentifier | [out] | The channel identifier that has been allocated by the ME. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the OPEN CHANNEL proactive command. | + +``` + +CatGeneralResult +CatOpenCSChannelEx(const CatOpenCSChannelExParams *Params, + CatDevice *ChannelIdentifier, + BYTE BearerDescription[3], + UINT16 *BufferSize); + +``` + +| | | | +|--------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Params | [in] | Constant parameter set as defined below. | +| ChannelIdentifier | [out] | The channel identifier that has been allocated by the ME. | +| BearerDescription | [out] | An array to which the actual bearer description allocated by the ME will be written. | +| BufferSize | [out] | The actual buffer size allocated by the ME. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the OPEN CHANNEL proactive command. | + +*CatOpenCSChannel* and *CatOpenCSChannelEx* issue the proactive command OPEN CHANNEL related to a CS bearer. The terminal response is parsed and if the command was successful the *BearerDescription*, *BufferSize* and *ChannelIdentifier* parameters are updated. + +The type *CatOpenCSChannelExParams* is defined as follows: + +``` + +typedef struct +{ + // Mandatory fields + CatOpenChannelOptions Options; + BYTE AddressLength; + const BYTE *Address; + BYTE BearerDescription[3]; + UINT16 BufferSize; + // Optional fields + CatAlphaString UserConfirmationMessage; + CatIconIdentifier UserConfirmationIconIdentifier; + BYTE SubAddressLength; + const BYTE *SubAddress; + BYTE Duration1Defined; +} + +``` + +``` + +CatTimeInterval Duration1; +BYTE Duration2Defined; +CatTimeInterval Duration2; +CatAddressType LocalAddress; +CatTextString UserLogin; +CatTextString UserPassword; +CAT_MEInterfaceTransportLevelType CAT_MEInterfaceTransportLevel; +CatAddressType DataDestinationAddress; +} CatOpenCSChannelExParams; + +``` + +With the following members: + +| | | +|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Options | Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatOpenChannelOptions . This field is mandatory. | +| AddressLength | Length in bytes of Address . This field is mandatory. | +| Address | The address to call. This field is mandatory. | +| BearerDescription | The desired bearer parameters (data rate, bearer service and connection element). This field is mandatory. | +| BufferSize | The desired buffer size. This field is mandatory. | +| UserConfirmationMessage | String to display during the user confirmation phase; see CatAlphaString . If this parameter is null, no user confirmation message TLV is passed to the ME. If UserConfirmationMessage is not null but UserConfirmationMessageLength is zero, a user confirmation message TLV is passed to the ME with the length component set to zero. | +| UserConfirmationIconIdentifier | The icon to display during the user confirmation phase. If the UseIcon member of this structure is zero, no user confirmation icon TLV is sent to the ME. | +| SubAddressLength | Length in bytes of SubAddress . | +| SubAddress | The subaddress to call. | +| Duration1Defined | Set to nonzero if Duration1 is defined. | +| Duration1 | Duration of reconnect tries; see CatTimeInterval. | +| Duration2Defined | Set to nonzero if Duration2 is defined. | +| Duration2 | Duration of timeout; see CatTimeInterval. | +| LocalAddress | The LocalAddress; see CatAddressType. | +| UserLogin | The user login string. | +| UserPassword | The user password string. | +| CAT_MEInterfaceTransportLevel | See CAT_MEInterfaceTransportLevelType . | +| DataDestinationAddress | The DataDestinationAddress ; see CatAddressType . | + +### 5.10.12 CatOpenGPRSChannel + +``` + +CatGeneralResult +CatOpenGPRSChannel (CatOpenChannelOptions Options, + BYTE UserConfirmationLength, const void *UserConfirmation, + const CatIconIdentifier *UserConfirmationIconIdentifier, + BYTE BearerDescription[8], + UINT16 *BufferSize, + CatDevice *ChannelIdentifier); + +``` + +| | | | +|---------------------------------------|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Options | [in] | Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatOpenChannelOptions . | +| UserConfirmationLength | [in] | Length in bytes of UserConfirmation . | +| UserConfirmation | [in] | String to display when ME alerts user that channel is to be opened. Optional icon identifier to use during the user confirmation phase; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If | +| UserConfirmationIconIdentifier | [in] | UserConfirmationIconIdentifier is NULL or if UserConfirmationIconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no user confirmation phase icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| BearerDescription | [in/out] | Initially contains the bearer description and is modified to the actual bearer description as allocated by the ME. | +| BufferSize | [in/out] | Initially contains the desired buffer size and is modified to the actual buffer size as allocated by the ME. | +| ChannelIdentifier | [out] | The channel identifier that has been allocated by the ME. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the OPEN CHANNEL proactive command. | + +``` + +CatGeneralResult +CatOpenGPRSChannelEx(const CatOpenGPRSChannelExParams *Params, + CatDevice *ChannelIdentifier, + BYTE ActualBearerDescription[8], + UINT16 *ActualBufferSize); + +``` + +| | | | +|--------------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Params | [in] | Constant parameter set as defined below. | +| ChannelIdentifier | [out] | The channel identifier that has been allocated by the ME. | +| ActualBearerDescription | [out] | An array to which the actual bearer description allocated by the ME will be written. | +| ActualBufferSize | [out] | The actual buffer size allocated by the ME. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the OPEN CHANNEL proactive command. | + +*CatOpenGPRSChannel* and *CatOpenGPRSChannelEx* issue the proactive command OPEN CHANNEL related to a GPRS bearer. The terminal response is parsed and if the command was successful the *BearerDescription*, *BufferSize* and *ChannelIdentifier* parameters are updated. + +The type *CatOpenGPRSChannelExParams* is defined as follows: + +``` + +typedef struct +{ + // Mandatory fields + GsmOpenChannelOptions Options; + BYTE AddressLength; + const BYTE *Address; + BYTE BearerDescription[8]; + UINT16 BufferSize; + // Optional fields + CatAlphaString UserConfirmationMessage; + CatIconIdentifier UserConfirmationIconIdentifier; + BYTE AccessPointNameLength; + const BYTE *AccessPointName; + CatAddressType LocalAddress; + CAT_ME_InterfaceTransportLevelType CAT_ME_InterfaceTransportLevel; + CatAddressType DataDestinationAddress; +} GsmOpenGPRSChannelExParams; + +``` + +With the following members: + +| | | +|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Options | Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatOpenChannelOptions . This field is mandatory. | +| AddressLength | Length in bytes of Address . This field is mandatory. | +| Address | The address to call. This field is mandatory. | +| BearerDescription | The desired bearer. This field is mandatory. | +| BufferSize | The desired buffer size. This field is mandatory. | +| UserConfirmationMessage | String to display during the user confirmation phase; see CatAlphaString . If this parameter is null, no user confirmation message TLV is passed to the ME. If UserConfirmationMessage is not null but UserConfirmationMessageLength is zero, a user confirmation message TLV is passed to the ME with the length component set to zero. | +| UserConfirmationIconIdentifier | The icon to display during the user confirmation phase. If the UseIcon member of this structure is zero, no user confirmation icon TLV is sent to the ME. | +| AccessPointNameLength | The length in bytes of AccessPointName. | +| AccessPointName | The Access Point Name. | +| LocalAddress | See CatAddressType. | +| CAT_ME_InterfaceTransportLevel | See CAT_ME_InterfaceTransportLevelType . | +| DataDestinationAddress | See CatAddressType . | + +### 5.10.13 CatCloseChannel + +``` + +CatGeneralResult +CatCloseChannel (CatDevice ChannelIdentifier, + BYTE TitleLength, const void *Title, + const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier); + +``` + +| | | +|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| ChannelIdentifier [in] | The channel identifier as returned from one of the open commands | +| TitleLength | [in] The length in bytes of Title . | +| Title | [in] String to display while ME is closing the channel. | +| IconIdentifier | [in] Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| RETURN | The GeneralResult code of the CLOSE CHANNEL proactive command. | + +*CatCloseChannel* issues a CLOSE CHANNEL proactive command that closes an open channel. + +### 5.10.14 CatReceiveData + +``` + +CatGeneralResult +CatReceiveData (CatDevice ChannelIdentifier, + BYTE TitleLength, const void *Title, + BYTE RequestedChannelDataLength, + const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier, + BYTE *ChannelData, + BYTE *NumChannelBytesRead, + BYTE *NumChannelBytesLeft); + +``` + +| | | +|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| ChannelIdentifier [in] | The channel identifier as returned from one of the open commands | +| TitleLength | [in] The length in bytes of Title . | +| Title | [in] String to display while ME is receiving data. | +| RequestedChannelDataLength | [in] The number of bytes requested to be read. | +| IconIdentifier | [in] Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| ChannelData | [out] Received channel data. | +| NumChannelBytesRead | [out] The number of bytes received as channel data. | +| NumChannelBytesLeft | [out] The number of bytes remaining to be read from the channel buffer, or 255 if there are more than 255 bytes left to be read. | +| RETURN | The GeneralResult code of the RECEIVE DATA proactive command. | + +*CatReceiveData* issues a RECEIVE DATA proactive command that receives data from an open channel. The terminal response is parsed and if the command is successful the received data is copied into the *ChannelData* array and the *NumChannelBytesRead* and *NumChannelBytesLeft* parameters are updated. + +### 5.10.15 CatSendData + +``` + +CatGeneralResult +CatSendData (CatDevice ChannelIdentifier, + +``` + +``` + +CatSendDataOptions Options, +BYTE TitleLength, const void *Title, +BYTE ChannelDataLength, +const void *ChannelData, +const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier, +BYTE *ActualBytesSent); + +``` + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| ChannelIdentifier [in] | | The channel identifier as returned from one of the open commands | +| TitleLength | [in] | The length in bytes of Title . | +| Title | [in] | String to display while ME is receiving data. | +| Options | [in] | Specifies who packs the message. Acceptable values for this parameter are listed in CatSendDataOptions . | +| ChannelDataLength | [in] | The number of bytes to be sent from ChannelData . | +| ChannelData | [in] | The data to be sent. | +| IconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| ActualBytesSent | [out] | The number of bytes sent (derived from the CHANNEL DATA LENGTH TLV in the TERMINAL RESPONSE). | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the SEND DATA proactive command. | + +*CatSendData* issues the proactive command SEND DATA that sends data to an open channel. + +### 5.10.16 CatGetChannelStatus + +``` + +CatGeneralResult +CatGetChannelStatus (CatDevice ChannelIdentifier, void *ChannelStatus); + +``` + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|-------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| +| ChannelIdentifier [in] | | The channel identifier. | +| ChannelStatus | [out] | Returned channel status bytes. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the GET CHANNEL STATUS proactive command. | + +*CatGetChannelStatus* issues a proactive command GET CHANNEL STATUS. The terminal response is parsed if the command is successful to find the status of the supplied channel. + +### 5.10.17 CatServiceSearch + +``` + +CatGeneralResult +CatServiceSearch (CatBearer BearerId, + BYTE AttributeLength, void *Attributes, + void *ServiceAvailability); + +``` + +| | | | +|----------------------------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| BearerId | [in] | The identifier of the bearer whose services will be searched. | +| AttributeLength | [in] | The length of the following attribute array. | +| Attributes | [in] | Attributes that describe bearer services, typically in a bearer specific format. | +| ServiceAvailability | [in] | List of services offered by the bearer that satisfy the attributes, typically in a bearer specific format. | + +*CatServiceSearch* searches for a particular service on a bearer. + +### 5.10.18 CatGetServiceInformation + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatGetServiceInformation (BYTE TitleLength, const BYTE *Title, + const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier, + CatBearer BearerId, + BYTE *AttributeLength, void *Attributes, + void *ServiceInformation); +``` + +| | | | +|---------------------------|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TitleLength | [in] | The length in bytes of Title . | +| Title | [in] | String to display acquiring service information. | +| IconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| BearerId | [in] | The identifier of the bearer whose service information is requested. | +| AttributeLength | [in] | The number of bytes in the following attribute array. | +| Attributes | [in] | Attributes describing the service information requested. | +| ServiceInformation | [out] | The requested information. | + +*CatGetServiceInformation* retrieves information about a particular service on a bearer. + +### 5.10.19 CatDeclareService + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatDeclareService (CatBearer BearerId, BYTE ServiceId, + CatTransportProtocol TransportProtocol, + WORD *PortNumber, + BYTE ServiceRecordLength, + void *ServiceRecord); +``` + +| | | | +|----------------------------|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------| +| BearerId | [in] | The identifier of the bearer for which this service is being offered. | +| TransportProtocol | [in] | The transport protocol on which the service is provided. | +| PortNumber | [in] | The port on which the service is provided. | +| ServiceRecordLength | [in] | The number of bytes in the following service record. | +| ServiceRecord | [in] | The service record describing the service. | + +*CatDeclareService* describes a new service. + +### 5.10.20 CatRunATCommand + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatRunATCommand (BYTE TitleLength, const void *Title, + BYTE CommandLength, const void *Command, + const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier, + void *Response, BYTE *ResponseLength); +``` + +| | | | +|-----------------------|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TitleLength | [in] | Length in bytes of Title . | +| Title | [in] | String to display on ME while command is executing. | +| CommandLength | [in] | Length in bytes of Command . | +| Command | [in] | AT command string | +| IconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| Response | [out] | ME response string. | +| ResponseLength | [out] | Length in bytes of ME response string. | +| RETURN | | The GeneralResult code of the RUN AT COMMAND proactive command. | + +*CatRunATCommand* issues the proactive command RUN AT COMMAND that sends an AT command to the ME. The terminal response is parsed and if successful the parameters *Response* and *ResponseLength* are updated. + +### 5.10.21 CatSendDTMFCommand + +``` +CatGeneralResult +CatSendDTMFCommand (BYTE TitleLength, const void *Title, + BYTE DTMFCodeLength, const void *DTMFCode, + const CatIconIdentifier *IconIdentifier); +``` + +| | | | +|-----------------------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TitleLength | [in] | The length in bytes of Title . | +| Title | [in] | Title displayed while the DTMF string is sent to the network. | +| DTMFCodeLength | [in] | The length in bytes of DTMFCode . | +| DTMFCode | [in] | DTMF string sent to the network. | +| IconIdentifier | [in] | Optional icon identifier; see CatIconIdentifier for member details. If IconIdentifier is NULL or if IconIdentifier.UseIcon is zero, no icon identifier is sent to the ME. | +| RETURN | | The
GeneralResult
code of the
SEND DTMF
COMMAND
proactive
command. | + +*CatSendDTMF* issues the proactive command SEND DTMF COMMAND that sends a dual tone multiple frequency (DTMF) string to the network. + +## 5.11 Supporting Data Types + +- typedef unsigned char BYTE. +- typedef unsigned short WORD. +- typedef unsigned long int DWORD. + +### 5.11.1 CatRecordAccessMode + +``` +typedef enum { + NEXT = 0x02, + PREVIOUS = 0x03, + CURRENT = 0x04, + ABSOLUTE = 0x04 +} CatRecordAccessMode; +``` + +### 5.11.2 CatSearchMode + +``` +typedef enum { + BEGINNING_FORWARD, + END_BACKWARD, + NEXT_FORWARD, + PREVIOUS_BACKWARD +} CatSearchMode; +``` + +### 5.11.3 CatFrameworkEventType + +``` +typedef enum { + // Command monitoring events + EVENT_TERMINAL_PROFILE_COMMAND, + EVENT_STATUS_COMMAND, + EVENT_ENVELOPE_COMMAND, + // Application lifecycle events start here + EVENT_APPLICATION_LIFECYCLE_INSTALL = 0x20 + // Framework fabricated events start here + EVENT_UPDATE_EF_SMS = 0x40 + EVENT_PROFILE_DOWNLOAD, +``` + +``` + +EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD, +EVENT_STATUS_COMMAND, +EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD, +EVENT_MENU_SELECTION, +EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV, +EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV, +EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_CB, +EVENT_MENU_SELECTION_HELP_REQUEST, +EVENT_CALL_CONTROL_BY_SIM, +EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM, +EVENT_TIMER_EXPIRATION, +EVENT_DOWNLOAD_MT_CALL_EVENT, +EVENT_DOWNLOAD_CALL_CONNECTED_EVENT, +EVENT_DOWNLOAD_CALL_DISCONNECTED_EVENT, +EVENT_DOWNLOAD_LOCATION_STATUS_EVENT, +EVENT_DOWNLOAD_USER_ACTIVITY_EVENT, +EVENT_DOWNLOAD_IDLE_SCREEN_AVAILABLE_EVENT, +EVENT_DOWNLOAD_CARD_READER_STATUS_EVENT, +EVENT_DOWNLOAD_LANGUAGE_SELECTION_EVENT, +EVENT_DOWNLOAD_BROWSER_TERMINATION_EVENT, +EVENT_DOWNLOAD_DATA_AVAILABLE_EVENT, +EVENT_DOWNLOAD_CHANNEL_STATUS_EVENT, +EVENT_UNRECOGNIZED_ENVELOPE, +EVENT_TERMINAL_RESPONSE, +EVENT_APPLICATION_INSTALL +} CatFrameworkEventType; + +``` + +### 5.11.4 CatEnvelopeTagType + +``` + +typedef enum { + SMS_PP_DOWNLOAD_TAG = 0xD1, + CELL_BROADCAST_TAG = 0xD2, + MENU_SELECTION_TAG = 0xD3, + CALL_CONTROL_TAG = 0xD4, + MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_TAG = 0xD5, + EVENT_DOWNLOAD_TAG = 0xD6, + TIMER_EXPIRATION = 0xD7 +} CatEnvelopeTagType; + +``` + +### 5.11.5 CatEventType + +``` + +typedef enum { + MT_CALL_EVENT = 0x00, + CALL_CONNECTED_EVENT = 0x01, + CALL_DISCONNECTED_EVENT = 0x02, + LOCATION_STATUS_EVENT = 0x03, + USER_ACTIVITY_EVENT = 0x04, + IDLE_SCREEN_AVAILABLE = 0x05, + CARD_READER_STATUS = 0x06, + LANGUAGE_SELECTION = 0x07, + BROWSER_TERMINATION = 0x08, + DATA_AVAILABLE = 0x09, + CHANNEL_STATUS = 0x0A +} CatEventType; + +``` + +### 5.11.6 CatTextString + +``` + +typedef struct +{ + CatDCSValue DCSValue; + BYTE TextStringLength; + const void *TextString; +} CatTextString; + +``` + +### 5.11.7 CatAlphaString + +``` + +typedef struct +{ + BYTE AlphaStringLength; + const void *AlphaString; +} CatTextString; + +``` + +### 5.11.8 CatIconIdentifier + +``` +typedef struct +{ + BYTE UseIcon; + BYTE IconIdentifier; + BYTE IconOptions; +} CatIconIdentifier; +``` + +The *CatIconIdentifier* structure is defined as follows: + +| | | +|-----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| UseIcon | If zero, the icon identifier is not used in the proactive command. If non-zero, the IconIdentifier and IconOption members are used in the proactive command. | +| IconIdentifier | Index of the icon to display. | +| IconOptions | Options with which to display the icon selected from CatIconOption . This is specified as a BYTE rather than CatIconOptions as, in C, an enumeration uses the same storage as an int which is at least 16 bits, whereas the proactive commands that use these identifiers use 8-bit quantities. | + +### 5.11.9 CatIconOption + +``` +typedef enum +{ + SHOW_WITHOUT_TEXT = 0x00, + SHOW_WITH_TEXT = 0x01 +} CatIconOption; +``` + +### 5.11.10 CatDCSValue + +``` +typedef enum +{ + DCS_SMS_PACKED = 0x00, + DCS_SMS_UNPACKED = 0x04, + DCS_SMS_UNICODE = 0x08 +} CatDCSValue; +``` + +### 5.11.11 CatDisplayTextOptions + +``` +typedef enum +{ + NORMAL_PRIORITY_AUTO_CLEAR = 0x00, + NORMAL_PRIORITY_USER_CLEAR = 0x80, + HIGH_PRIORITY_AUTO_CLEAR = 0x01, + HIGH_PRIORITY_USER_CLEAR = 0x81 +} CatDisplayTextOptions; +``` + +### 5.11.12 CatGetInKeyOptions + +``` +typedef enum +{ + YES_NO_OPTION_NO_HELP = 0x04, + YES_NO_OPTION_WITH_HELP = 0x84, + DIGITS_ONLY_NO_HELP = 0x00, + DIGITS_ONLY_WITH_HELP = 0x80, + SMS_CHARACTER_NO_HELP = 0x01, + SMS_CHARACTER_WITH_HELP = 0x81, + UCS2_CHARACTER_NO_HELP = 0x03, + UCS2_CHARACTER_WITH_HELP = 0x83 +} CatGetInKeyOptions; +``` + +### 5.11.13 CatGetInputOptions + +``` +typedef enum +{ + PACKED_DIGITS_ONLY_NO_HELP = 0x08, + PACKED_DIGITS_ONLY_WITH_HELP = 0x88, +} CatGetInputOptions; +``` + +``` + + PACKED_DIGITS_ONLY_NO_ECHO_NO_HELP = 0x0C, + PACKED_DIGITS_ONLY_NO_ECHO_WITH_HELP = 0x8C, + UNPACKED_DIGITS_ONLY_NO_HELP = 0x00, + UNPACKED_DIGITS_ONLY_WITH_HELP = 0x80, + UNPACKED_DIGITS_ONLY_NO_ECHO_NO_HELP = 0x04, + UNPACKED_DIGITS_ONLY_NO_ECHO_WITH_HELP = 0x84, + PACKED_SMS_ALPHABET_NO_HELP = 0x09, + PACKED_SMS_ALPHABET_WITH_HELP = 0x89, + PACKED_SMS_ALPHABET_NO_ECHO_NO_HELP = 0x0D, + PACKED_SMS_ALPHABET_NO_ECHO_HELP = 0x8D, + UNPACKED_SMS_ALPHABET_NO_HELP = 0x01, + UNPACKED_SMS_ALPHABET_WITH_HELP = 0x81, + UNPACKED_SMS_ALPHABET_NO_ECHO_NO_HELP = 0x05, + UNPACKED_SMS_ALPHABET_NO_ECHO_WITH_HELP = 0x85, + UCS2_ALPHABET_NO_HELP = 0x03, + UCS2_ALPHABET_WITH_HELP = 0x83, + UCS2_ALPHABET_NO_ECHO_NO_HELP = 0x07, + UCS2_ALPHABET_NO_ECHO_WITH_HELP = 0x87 +} CatGetInputOptions; + +``` + +### 5.11.14 CatSelectItemOptions + +``` + +typedef enum +{ + PRESENT_AS_DATA_VALUES_NO_HELP = 0x01, + PRESENT_AS_DATA_VALUES_WITH_HELP = 0x81, + PRESENT_AS_NAVIGATION_OPTIONS_NO_HELP = 0x03, + PRESENT_AS_NAVIGATION_OPTIONS_WITH_HELP = 0x83, + DEFAULT_STYLE_NO_HELP = 0x00, + DEFAULT_STYLE_WITH_HELP = 0x80 +} CatSelectItemOptions; + +``` + +### 5.11.15 CatTimeUnit + +``` + +typedef enum +{ + GSM_MINUTES = 0x00, + GSM_SECONDS = 0x01, + GSM_TENTHS_OF_SECONDS = 0x02 +} CatTimeUnit; + +``` + +### 5.11.16 CatTone + +``` + +typedef enum +{ + DIAL_TONE = 0x01, + CALLER_BUSY = 0x02, + CONGESTION = 0x03, + RADIO_PATH_ACKNOWLEDGE = 0x04, + CALL_DROPPED = 0x05, + SPECIAL_INFORMATION_OR_ERROR = 0x06, + CALL_WAITING_TONE = 0x07, + RINGING_TONE = 0x08, + GENERAL_BEEP = 0x10, + POSITIVE_ACKNOWLEDGE_TONE = 0x11, + NEGATIVE_ACKNOWLEDGE_TONE = 0x12 +} CatTone; + +``` + +### 5.11.17 CatRefreshOptions + +``` + +typedef enum +{ + REFRESH_SIM_INIT_AND_FULL_FILE_CHANGE_NOTIFICATION = 0x00, + REFRESH_FILE_CHANGE_NOTIFICATION = 0x01, + REFRESH_SIM_INIT_AND_FILE_CHANGE_NOTIFICATION = 0x02, + REFRESH_SIM_INIT = 0x03, + REFRESH_SIM_RESET = 0x04 +} CatRefreshOptions; + +``` + +### 5.11.18 CatGetReaderStatusOptions + +``` +typedef enum +{ + CARD_READER_STATUS = 0x00, + CARD_READER_IDENTIFIER = 0x01 +} CatGetReaderStatusOptions; +``` + +### 5.11.19 CatDevice + +``` +typedef enum +{ + DEVICE_KEPAD = 0x01, + DEVICE_DISPLAY = 0x02, + DEVICE_EARPIECE = 0x03, + DEVICE_CARD_READER_0 = 0x10, + DEVICE_CARD_READER_1 = 0x11, + DEVICE_CARD_READER_2 = 0x12, + DEVICE_CARD_READER_3 = 0x13, + DEVICE_CARD_READER_4 = 0x14, + DEVICE_CARD_READER_5 = 0x15, + DEVICE_CARD_READER_6 = 0x16, + DEVICE_CARD_READER_7 = 0x17, + DEVICE_CHANNEL_1 = 0x21, + DEVICE_CHANNEL_2 = 0x22, + DEVICE_CHANNEL_3 = 0x23, + DEVICE_CHANNEL_4 = 0x24, + DEVICE_CHANNEL_5 = 0x25, + DEVICE_CHANNEL_6 = 0x26, + DEVICE_CHANNEL_7 = 0x27, + DEVICE_SIM = 0x81, + DEVICE_ME = 0x82, + DEVICE_NETWORK = 0x83 +} CatDevice; +``` + +### 5.11.20 CatGeneralResult + +``` +typedef enum +{ + CAT_COMMAND_SUCCESSFUL = 0x00, + CAT_COMMAND_SUCCESSFUL WITH PARTIAL COMPREHENSION = 0x01, + CAT_COMMAND_SUCCESSFUL WITH MISSING INFORMATION = 0x02, + CAT_REFRESH_SUCCESSFUL WITH ADDITIONAL EFS_READ = 0x03, + CAT_COMMAND_SUCCESSFUL BUT ICON NOT FOUND = 0x04, + CAT_COMMAND_SUCCESSFUL BUT MODIFIED BY CALL_CONTROL = 0x05, + CAT_COMMAND_SUCCESSFUL BUT LIMITED SERVICE = 0x06, + CAT_COMMAND_SUCCESSFUL WITH MODIFICATION = 0x07, + CAT_ABORTED_BY_USER = 0x10, + CAT_BACKWARD = 0x11, + CAT_NO_RESPONSE = 0x12, + CAT_HELP_REQUIRED = 0x13, + CAT_USSD_ABORTED_BY_USER = 0x14, + CAT_ME_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_COMMAND = 0x20, + CAT_NETWORK_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_COMMAND = 0x21, + CAT_USER_REJECTED_SETUP_CALL = 0x22, + CAT_USER_CLEARED_BEFORE_RELEASE = 0x23, + CAT_ACTION_CONTRADICT_TIMER_STATE = 0x24, + CAT_TEMP_PROBLEM_IN_CALL_CONTROL = 0x25, + CAT_LAUNCH_BROWSER_ERROR = 0x26, + CAT_COMMAND_BEYOND_ME_CAPABILITIES = 0x30, + CAT_COMMAND_TYPE NOT UNDERSTOOD = 0x31, + CAT_COMMAND_DATA NOT UNDERSTOOD = 0x32, + CAT_COMMAND_NUMBER NOT KNOWN = 0x33, + CAT_SS_RETURN_ERROR = 0x34, + CAT_SMS_RP_ERROR = 0x35, + CAT_REQUIRED_VALUES_MISSING = 0x36, + CAT_USSD_RETURN_ERROR = 0x37, + CAT_MULTIPLE_CARD_COMMAND_ERROR = 0x38, + CAT_PERMANENT_PROBLEM IN SMS OR_CALL CONTROL = 0x39, + CAT_BEARER_INDEPENDENT_PROTOCOL_ERROR = 0x3A +} CatGeneralResult; +``` + +### 5.11.21 CatTimerValue + +``` +typedef struct +{ + BYTE hour; + BYTE minute; + BYTE second; +} CatTimerValue; +``` + +The *CatTimerValue* data type has three one-byte values: + +| | | +|---------------|------------------------| +| hour | Hours part of timer. | +| Minute | Minutes part of timer. | +| Second | Seconds part of timer. | + +### 5.11.22 CatTimeInterval + +``` +typedef struct +{ + BYTE timeUnit; + BYTE timeInterval; +} CatTimeInterval; +``` + +The *CatTimInterval* data type has two one-byte values: + +| | | +|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| timeUnit | One of the CatTimeUnit enumeration values. This is specified as a BYTE rather than CatTimeUnit as, in C, an enumeration uses the same storage as an int which is at least 16 bits, whereas the proactive commands that use these identifiers use 8-bit quantities. | +| TimeInterval | The number of timeUnits. | + +### 5.11.23 CatFileStatus + +``` +typedef struct +{ + ; + WORD recordLength; + WORD numberOfRecords; + BYTE lengthOfTrailer; + BYTE trailer[]; +} CatEFStatus; + +typedef struct +{ + BYTE numberOfDFs; + BYTE numberOfEFs; + + BYTE CHV1Status; + BYTE unblockCHV1Status; + BYTE CHV2Status; + BYTE unblockCHV2Status; + + BYTE lengthOfTrailer; + BYTE trailer[]; +} CatDFStatus; + +typedef struct +{ + ; +} +``` + +``` + DWORD totalFileSize; + UINT16 fileID; + BYTE fileDescriptorByte; + BYTE fileType; // 00=RFU, 01=MF, 02=DF, 04=EF + BYTE fileLifeCycleStatus; + union + { + CatEFStatus ef; + CatDFStatus df; + } u; +} CatFileStatus; +``` + +### 5.11.24 CatLanguageNotificationOptions + +``` +typedef enum +{ + LANGUAGE_NON_SPECIFIC_NOTIFICATION = 0x00, + LANGUAGE_SPECIFIC_NOTIFICATION = 0x01 +} CatLanguageNotificationOptions; +``` + +### 5.11.25 CatLocationInformation + +``` +typedef struct +{ + BYTE mobileCountryNetworkCodes[3]; + BYTE LAC[2]; + BYTE cellID[2]; +} CatLocationInformation; +``` + +### 5.11.26 CatTimingAdvance + +``` +typedef struct +{ + BYTE MEStatus; + BYTE timingAdvance; +} CatTimingAdvance; +``` + +### 5.11.27 CatLaunchBrowserOptions + +``` +typedef enum +{ + LAUNCH_BROWSER_IF_NOT_ALREADY_LAUNCHED = 0x00, + USE_EXISTING_BROWSER = 0x02, + CLOSE_EXISTING_BROWSER_AND_LAUNCH_NEW_BROWSER = 0x03 +} CatLaunchBrowserOptions; +``` + +### 5.11.28 CatSetupCallOptions + +``` +typedef enum +{ + CALL_ONLY_IF_NOT_BUSY = 0x00, + CALL_ONLY_IF_NOT_BUSY_WITH_REDIAL = 0x01, + CALL_AND_PUT_ALL_OTHER_CALLS_ON_HOLD = 0x02, + CALL_AND_PUT_ALL_OTHER_CALLS_ON_HOLD_WITH_REDIAL = 0x03, + CALL_AND_DISCONNECT_ALL_OTHER_CALLS = 0x04, + CALL_AND_DISCONNECT_ALL_OTHER_CALLS_WITH_REDIAL = 0x05 +} CatSetupCallOptions; +``` + +### 5.11.29 CatTypeOfNumberAndNumberingPlanIdentifier + +``` +typedef enum +{ + TON_UNKNOWN_AND_NPI_UNKNOWN = 0x80, + TON_INTERNATIONAL_AND_NPI_UNKNOWN = 0x90, + TON_NATIONAL_AND_NPI_UNKNOWN = 0xA0, + TON_NETWORK_AND_NPI_UNKNOWN = 0xB0, + TON_SUBSCRIBER_AND_NPI_UNKNOWN = 0xC0, + + TON_UNKNOWN_AND_NPI_TELEPHONE = 0x81, + TON_INTERNATIONAL_AND_NPI_TELEPHONE = 0x91, + TON_NATIONAL_AND_NPI_TELEPHONE = 0xA1, + TON_NETWORK_AND_NPI_TELEPHONE = 0xB1, + TON_SUBSCRIBER_AND_NPI_TELEPHONE = 0xC1, + + TON_UNKNOWN_AND_NPI_DATA = 0x83, + TON_INTERNATIONAL_AND_NPI_DATA = 0x93, + TON_NATIONAL_AND_NPI_DATA = 0xA3, + TON_NETWORK_AND_NPI_DATA = 0xB3, + TON_SUBSCRIBER_AND_NPI_DATA = 0xC3, + + TON_UNKNOWN_AND_NPI_TELEX = 0x84, + TON_INTERNATIONAL_AND_NPI_TELEX = 0x94, + TON_NATIONAL_AND_NPI_TELEX = 0xA4, + TON_NETWORK_AND_NPI_TELEX = 0xB4, + TON_SUBSCRIBER_AND_NPI_TELEX = 0xC4, + + TON_UNKNOWN_AND_NPI_NATIONAL = 0x88, + TON_INTERNATIONAL_AND_NPI_NATIONAL = 0x98, + TON_NATIONAL_AND_NPI_NATIONAL = 0xA8, + TON_NETWORK_AND_NPI_NATIONAL = 0xB8, + TON_SUBSCRIBER_AND_NPI_NATIONAL = 0xC8, + + TON_UNKNOWN_AND_NPI_PRIVATE = 0x89, + TON_INTERNATIONAL_AND_NPI_PRIVATE = 0x99, + TON_NATIONAL_AND_NPI_PRIVATE = 0xA9, + TON_NETWORK_AND_NPI_PRIVATE = 0xB9, + TON_SUBSCRIBER_AND_NPI_PRIVATE = 0xC9, + + TON_UNKNOWN_AND_NPI_ERMES = 0x8A, + TON_INTERNATIONAL_AND_NPI_ERMES = 0x9A, + TON_NATIONAL_AND_NPI_ERMES = 0xAA, + TON_NETWORK_AND_NPI_ERMES = 0xBA, + TON_SUBSCRIBER_AND_NPI_ERMES = 0xCA +} CatTypeOfNumberAndNumberingPlanIdentifier; +``` + +### 5.11.30 CatSendShortMessageOptions + +``` +typedef enum +{ + PACKING_NOT_REQUIRED = 0x00, + PACKING_BY_THE_ME_REQUIRED = 0x01 +} CatSendShortMessageOptions; +``` + +### 5.11.31 CatSendDataOptions + +``` +typedef enum +{ + STORE_DATA_IN_TX_BUFFER = 0x00, + SEND_DATA_IMMEDIATELY = 0x01 +} CatSendDataOptions; +``` + +### 5.11.32 CatMEInterfaceTransportLevelType + +``` +typedef struct +{ + enum + { + UDP = 0x01, + TCP = 0x02 + } TransportProtocolType; + UINT16 CAT_ME_PortNumber; +} CAT_MEInterfaceTransportLevelType; +``` + +### 5.11.33 CatBearer + +``` +typedef enum +{ + BEARER_SMS = 0x00, + BEARER_CSD = 0x01, + BEARER_USSD = 0x02, + BEARER_GPRS = 0x03 +} CatBearer; +``` + +### 5.11.34 CatOpenChannelOptions + +``` +typedef enum +{ + ON_DEMAND_LINK_ESTABLISHMENT = 0x00, + IMMEDIATE_LINK_ESTABLISHMENT = 0x01 +} CatOpenChannelOptions; +``` + +### 5.11.35 CatAddressType + +``` +typedef struct +{ + enum + { + IPV4 = 0x21, + IPV6 = 0x97 + } AddressType; + BYTE AddressLength; + const void *Address; +} CatAddressType; +``` + +### 5.11.36 CatFID + +``` +#define FID_DF_GRAPHICS 0x5F50 +#define FID_DF_TELECOM 0x7F10 +#define FID_EF_ADN 0x6F3A +#define FID_EF_ARR 0x2F06 +#define FID_EF_BDN 0x6F4D +#define FID_EF_CCP 0x6F3D +#define FID_EF_DIR 0x2F00 +#define FID_EF_EXT1 0x6F4A +#define FID_EF_EXT2 0x6F4B +#define FID_EF_EXT3 0x6F4C +#define FID_EF_EXT4 0x6F4E +#define FID_EF_FDN 0x6F3B +#define FID_EF_ICCID 0x2FE2 +#define FID_EF_IMG 0x4F20 +#define FID_EF_LND 0x6F44 +#define FID_EF_MSISDN 0x6F40 +#define FID_EF_PL 0x2F05 +#define FID_EF_SDN 0x6F49 +#define FID_EF_SMS 0x6F3C +#define FID_EF_SMSP 0x6F42 +#define FID_EF_SMSR 0x6F47 +#define FID_EF_SMSS 0x6F43 +``` + +### 5.11.37 CatTextFormat + +``` +#define TEXT_FORMAT_LEFT 0x00 +#define TEXT_FORMAT_CENTER 0x01 +#define TEXT_FORMAT_RIGHT 0x02 +#define TEXT_FORMAT_LANGUAGE_DEPENDENT 0x03 +#define TEXT_FORMAT_NORMAL_SIZE 0x00 +#define TEXT_FORMAT_LARGE_SIZE 0x04 +#define TEXT_FORMAT_SMALL_SIZE 0x08 +#define TEXT_FORMAT_BOLD 0x10 +#define TEXT_FORMAT_ITALIC 0x20 +#define TEXT_FORMAT_UNDERLINED 0x40 +#define TEXT_FORMAT_STRIKETHROUGH 0x80 +``` + +### 5.11.38 CatTextForegroundColour + +``` +typedef enum { +BLACK = 0x00, +DARK_GREY = 0x01, +DARK_RED = 0x02, +DARK_YELLOW = 0x03, +DARK_GREEN = 0x04, +DARK_CYAN = 0x05, +DARK_BLUE = 0x06, +DARK_MAGENTA = 0x07, +GREY = 0x08, +WHITE = 0x09, +BRIGHT_RED = 0x0A, +BRIGHT_YELLOW = 0x0B, +BRIGHT_GREEN = 0x0C, +BRIGHT_CYAN = 0x0D, +BRIGHT_BLUE = 0x0E, +BRIGHT_MAGENTA = 0x0F +} CatTextForegroundColour; +``` + +### 5.11.39 CatTextBackgroundColour + +``` +typedef enum { +BLACK = 0x00, +DARK_GREY = 0x10, +DARK_RED = 0x20, +DARK_YELLOW = 0x30, +DARK_GREEN = 0x40, +DARK_CYAN = 0x50, +DARK_BLUE = 0x60, +DARK_MAGENTA = 0x70, +GREY = 0x80, +WHITE = 0x90, +BRIGHT_RED = 0xA0, +BRIGHT_YELLOW = 0xB0, +BRIGHT_GREEN = 0xC0, +BRIGHT_CYAN = 0xD0, +BRIGHT_BLUE = 0xE0, +BRIGHT_MAGENTA = 0xF0 +} CatTextBackgroundColour; +``` + +# --- Annex A (normative): Application executable architecture + +| Name | Value | Meaning | +|----------------|-------|-------------------------------------| +| EM_NONE | 0 | No machine | +| EM_M32 | 1 | AT&T WE 32100 | +| EM_SPARC | 2 | SPARC | +| EM_386 | 3 | Intel 80386 | +| EM_68K | 4 | Motorola 68000 | +| EM_88K | 5 | Motorola 88000 | +| RESERVED | 6 | Reserved for future use | +| EM_860 | 7 | Intel 80860 | +| EM_MIPS | 8 | MIPS I Architecture | +| EM_S370 | 9 | IBM System/370 Processor | +| EM_MIPS_RS3_LE | 10 | MIPS RS3000 Little-endian | +| RESERVED | 11-14 | Reserved for future use | +| EM_PARISC | 15 | Hewlett-Packard PA-RISC | +| RESERVED | 16 | Reserved for future use | +| EM_VPP500 | 17 | Fujitsu VPP500 | +| EM_SPARC32PLUS | 18 | Enhanced instruction set SPARC | +| EM_960 | 19 | Intel 80960 | +| EM_PPC | 20 | PowerPC | +| EM_PPC64 | 21 | 64-bit PowerPC | +| RESERVED | 22-35 | Reserved for future use | +| EM_V800 | 36 | NEC V800 | +| EM_FR20 | 37 | Fujitsu FR20 | +| EM_RH32 | 38 | TRW RH-32 | +| EM_RCE | 39 | Motorola RCE | +| EM_ARM | 40 | Advanced RISC Machines ARM | +| EM_ALPHA | 41 | Digital Alpha | +| EM_SH | 42 | Hitachi SH | +| EM_SPARCV9 | 43 | SPARC Version 9 | +| EM_TRICORE | 44 | Infineon Tricore embedded processor | +| EM_ARC | 45 | Argonaut RISC Core | +| EM_H8_300 | 46 | Hitachi H8/300 | +| EM_H8_300H | 47 | Hitachi H8/300H | +| EM_H8S | 48 | Hitachi H8S | +| EM_H8_500 | 49 | Hitachi H8/500 | +| EM_IA_64 | 50 | Intel IA-64 processor architecture | +| EM_MIPS_X | 51 | Stanford MIPS-X | +| EM_COLDFIRE | 52 | Motorola ColdFire | +| EM_68HC12 | 53 | Motorola M68HC12 | +| EM_MMA | 54 | Fujitsu MMA Multimedia Accelerator | +| EM_PCP | 55 | Siemens PCP | +| EM_NCPU | 56 | Sony nCPU embedded RISC processor | +| EM_NDR1 | 57 | Denso NDR1 microprocessor | +| EM_STARCORE | 58 | Motorola Star*Core processor | + +| Name | Value | Meaning | +|-------------|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------| +| EM_ME16 | 59 | Toyota ME16 processor | +| EM_ST100 | 60 | STMicroelectronics ST100 processor | +| EM_TINYJ | 61 | Advanced Logic Corp. TinyJ embedded processor family | +| Reserved | 62-65 | Reserved for future use | +| EM_FX66 | 66 | Infineon FX66 microcontroller | +| EM_ST9PLUS | 67 | STMicroelectronics ST9+ 8/16 bit microcontroller | +| EM_ST7 | 68 | STMicroelectronics ST7 8-bit microcontroller | +| EM_68HC16 | 69 | Motorola MC68HC16 Microcontroller | +| EM_68HC11 | 70 | Motorola MC68HC11 Microcontroller | +| EM_68HC08 | 71 | Motorola MC68HC08 Microcontroller | +| EM_68HC05 | 72 | Motorola MC68HC05 Microcontroller | +| EM_SVX | 73 | Silicon Graphics SVx | +| EM_ST19 | 74 | STMicroelectronics ST19 8-bit microcontroller | +| EM_VAX | 75 | Digital VAX | +| EM_CRIS | 76 | Axis Communications 32-bit embedded processor | +| EM_JAVELIN | 77 | Infineon Technologies 32-bit embedded processor | +| EM_FIREPATH | 78 | Element 14 64-bit DSP Processor | +| EM_ZSP | 79 | LSI Logic 16-bit DSP Processor | +| EM_MMIX | 80 | Donald Knuth's educational 64-bit processor | +| EM_HUANY | 81 | Harvard University machine-independent object files | +| EM_PRISM | 82 | SiTera Prism | +| EM_MEL | 83 | Multos Executable Language (MEL) byte codes | +| EM_RTE | 84 | Microsoft Smart Card for Windows Runtime Environment byte codes | + +# Annex B (informative): Example + +``` + +/** + ** Example of Toolkit Application written for the C SIM API + */ + +#pragma AID A0000000090001 + +#include +#include "application.h" +#include "cat.h" +#include "catlow.h" + +#define DF_GSM 0x7F20 +#define EF_PUCT 0x6F41 + +const BYTE SERVER_OPERATION = 0x0F; +const BYTE EXIT_REQUESTED_BY_USER = 0x10; +static const char menuEntry[] = "Service1"; +static const char menuTitle[] = "MyMenu"; +static char item1[] = "ITEM1"; +static char item2[] = "ITEM2"; +static char item3[] = "ITEM3"; +static char item4[] = "ITEM4"; +static char textDText[] = "Hello, world"; +static char textGInput[] = "Your name?"; +BYTE ItemIdentifier; +static BYTE * byteptr; +static void * bufptr; +static BYTE buffer[10]; +static BYTE itemId; +static BYTE result; +static BYTE repeat; + +void main(void) +{ + switch (CatGetFrameworkEvent()) + { + case EVENT_APPLICATION_LIFECYCLE_INSTALL: + // Define the application Menu Entry and register to the EVENT_MENU_SELECTION + CatSetMenuString (1,sizeof(menuEntry),(const void *)MenuEntry,NULL,0,0); + // register to the EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV + CatNotifyOnEnvelope(SMS_PP_DOWNLOAD_TAG,1); + break; + case EVENT_ENVELOPE_COMMAND: + { + BYTE length; + switch (CatOpenEnvelope(&length)) + { + case MENU_SELECTION_TAG: + // Prepare the Select Item proactive command + // Append the Menu Title + CatSelectItem (sizeof(MenuTitle), +(const void *)MenuTitle, +DEFAULT_STYLE_NO_HELP); + // add all the Item + CatSelectAddItem(sizeof(item1),(const void *)item1,1); + CatSelectAddItem(sizeof(item2),(const void *)item2,2); + CatSelectAddItem(sizeof(item3),(const void *)item3,3); + CatSelectAddItem(sizeof(item4),(const void *)item4,4); + // ask the CAT Toolkit Framework to send +//the proactive command and check the result + if (!CatEndSelectItem(&ItemId,NULL)) + { + switch(ItemId) + { + case 1: + case 2: + case 3: // DisplayText + CatDisplayText (DCS_SMS_UNPACKED, + sizeof(textDText), +(const void *) textDText, + NORMAL_PRIORITY_USER_CLEAR, NULL, 0); + break; + } + } + } + } + } +} + +``` + +``` + case 4: // Ask the user to enter data and display it + repeat=0; + do + { + if (CatGetInput(DCS_SMS_UNPACKED, + sizeof(textGInput), + (const void *) textGInput, + UNPACKED_SMS_ALPHABET_NO_HELP, + DCS_SMS_UNPACKED, 0, NULL, + 0, sizeof(buffer), NULL, + (CatDCSValue *)&result, + &repeat, + (void *)buffer)==EXIT_REQUESTED_BY_USER) + break; + // display the entered text + CatDisplayText ((CatDCSValue )result, + repeat, (const void *) buffer, + NORMAL_PRIORITY_USER_CLEAR, NULL, 0); + } while (repeat); + } + break; + case EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV: + CatOpenEnvelope(&result); + byterptr=(BYTE *)catGetData(1); /* go to numberlength */ + result=(*byterptr)>>1; + /* calculate numberlength, rounded up */ + if ((*byterptr)&1) result++; + catGetData(result+12); /* move to the beginning of the data */ + // get the offset of the instruction in the TP-UD field + CatGetData(SERVER_OPERATION); + result=CatGetBYTE(); + switch(result) + { + case 0x41 : // Update of a gsm file + + bufptr=CatGetData(3); + // write these data in the Efpuct + CatSelect(FID_DF_GSM); + CatSelect(FID_EF_PUCT); + CatUpdateBinary(0,3,bufptr); + break; + case 0x36 : // change the MenuTitle for the SelectItem + + bufptr=CatGetData(sizeof(menuTitle)); + memcpy(bufptr,menuTitle,sizeof(menuTitle)); + } + } + break; + default: + CatExit(); + break; + } + CatExit(); +} +``` + +# --- Annex C (informative): Change history + +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New | +|---------|--------|-----------|-----|-----|-----|----------------------------------------|--------| +| 2003-03 | TP-19 | TP-030023 | 001 | | D | Editorial Corrections | 6.1.0 | +| 2007-06 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-7 version (MCC) | 7.0.0 | +| 2009-03 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-8 version (MCC) | 8.0.0 | +| 2009-12 | CT-46 | CP-091011 | 002 | 1 | F | References update | 8.1.0 | +| 2009-12 | CT-46 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-9 | 9.0.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-10 | 10.0.0 | +| 2012-09 | SP-57 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-11 | 11.0.0 | +| 2014-10 | SP-65 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-12 | 12.0.0 | +| 2015-12 | SP-70 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-13 | 13.0.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA-75 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-14 version (MCC) | 14.0.0 | +| 2019-01 | CT-81 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-15 version (MCC) | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | CT-88e | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31133/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31133/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2d82fe7f80196aa4d8caf7f0a25c4a760bcf742a --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31133/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ + + + + + + +# --- Contents + +| | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| Foreword ..... | 4 | +| 1 Scope..... | 5 | +| 2 References..... | 5 | +| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 5 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 5 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 5 | +| 4 Description..... | 5 | +| 4.0 Overview ..... | 5 | +| 4.1 ISIM Java Card™ architecture..... | 6 | +| 5 File Access API..... | 6 | +| Annex A (normative): Java Card™ ISIM API..... | 7 | +| Annex B (normative): Java Card™ ISIM API identifiers..... | 8 | +| Annex C (normative): ISIM API package version management ..... | 9 | +| Annex D (normative): ISIM API jar files..... | 10 | +| Annex E (informative): Change History..... | 11 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- Y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document defines the ISIM Application Programming Interface extending the "UICC API for Java Card™" [2]. + +This API allows to develop an application running together with a ISIM application. + +The present document includes information applicable to network operators, service providers, server -,–ISIM – and database 5anufactures. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] ETSI TS 101 220: "Smart Cards; ETSI numbering system for telecommunication application providers". +- [2] ETSI TS 102 241 V13.0.0: "Smart Cards; UICC Application Programming Interface (UICC API) for Java Card™". +- [3] 3GPP TS 31.103: "Characteristics of the IP Multimedia Services Identity Module (ISIM) application". + +# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions defined in ETSI TS 102 241 [2] apply. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations defined in ETSI TS 102 241 [2] apply. + +# --- 4 Description + +# 4.0 Overview + +This API is an extension to the ETSI TS 102 241 [2] "UICC API for Java Card™" and requires the implementation of this specification. + +The classes and interfaces described in this specification inherit functionality from the classes and interfaces specified in ETSI TS 102 141[2] "UICC API for Java Card™". + +## 4.1 ISIM Java Card™ architecture + +The overall architecture of the ISIM API is based on the "UICC API for Java Card™" defined in ETSI TS 102 241[2]. + +# --- 5 File Access API + +The ISIM file access API consists of the package *uicc.isim.access*. This package defines additional constants to those defined in the *uicc.access* package from ETSI TS 102 241 [2]. The access to the file system, defined in TS 31.103 [3] is the one specified in ETSI TS 102 241 [2] via the UICC *FileView* Interface. + +# --- Annex A (normative): Java Card™ ISIM API + +The attached files "31133\_Annex\_A\_Java.zip", and "31133\_Annex\_A\_HTML.zip" contain source files and html documentation for the Java Card™ ISIM API. + +# --- Annex B (normative): Java Card™ ISIM API identifiers + +The attached file "31133\_Annex\_B\_Export\_files.zip" contains the export files for the uicc.isim.access package. + +# --- Annex C (normative): ISIM API package version management + +The following table describes the relationship between each TS 31.133 specification version and its packages AID and Major, Minor versions defined in the export files. + +| TS 31.133 | uicc.isim.access package | | +|-----------|----------------------------------------------------|-----------------| +| | AID | Major,
Minor | +| | A0 00 00 00 87 10 05 FF FF FF FF 89 14
10 00 00 | 1.1 | + +The package AID coding is defined in ETSI TS 101 220 [1]. The ISIM API packages AID are not modified by changes to Major or Minor Version. + +The Major Version shall be incremented if a change to the specification introduces byte code incompatibility with the previous version. + +The Minor Version shall be incremented if a change to the specification does not introduce byte code incompatibility with the previous version. + +The package *uicc.isim.access* contains only constants, therefore it may not be loaded on the UICC. + +# --- Annex D (normative): ISIM API jar files + +The attached file "31133\_Annex\_D.jar" contains class files for the Java Card™ ISIM API. + +# Annex E (informative): Change History + +| TSG / Date | TSG doc | WG doc | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | New | +|------------|---------------------------------------|------------|------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 2005-08 | | | | | Initial presentation during CT6#36 Plenary | 0.1.0 | +| 2005-08 | | | | | Presented during CT6#36 Plenary with editorial changes | 0.2.0 | +| 2005-08 | | | | | Agreed in CT6#36 Plenary to send for information to CT plenary | 0.2.1 | +| 2006-05 | CP-060246
(not presented at CT#32) | | | | Agreed in CT6#39 Plenary to send for information to CT plenary | 1.0.0 | +| 2006-11 | | | | | Presented during CT6#41 for approval | 2.0.0 | +| 2006-11 | | | | | Presented during CT6#41 for approval | 2.1.0 | +| 2006-11 | | | | | Agreed during CT6#41 to send for approval to CT | 2.1.1 | +| 2006-12 | CP-060703 | | | | Approved at CT#34 | 7.0.0 | +| 2007-06 | CP-070303 | C6-070262 | 0001 | - | Correction of the reference to ETSI TS 102 241 | 7.1.0 | +| CT-38 | CP-070845 | C6-070565 | 0002 | 1 | Introduction of a new constant value for a file in the ISIM application | 7.2.0 | +| | | | | | [2008-08] Attachments for annexes A and B supplied | 7.2.1 | +| | | | | | [2008-10] History box previous entry supplied (!) | 7.2.2 | +| -----
- | -----
- | -----
- | -----
- | | Upgrade to copyright, keywords and logo for LTE | 8.0.0 | +| CT-46 | CP-091011 | C6-090497 | 0004 | - | References upgrade | 8.1.0 | +| CT-46 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-9 | 9.0.0 | +| CT-50 | CP-100836 | C6-100602 | 0005 | 1 | Update reference to TS 102 241 v9.0.0 reference | 9.1.0 | +| CT-51 | CP-110234 | C6-110067 | 0008 | 1 | uicc.isim.access package version update | 9.2.0 | +| SP-51 | | | | | Automatic upgrade from previous version 9.2.0 | 10.0.0 | +| SP-57 | | | | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-11 | 11.0.0 | +| SP-65 | | | | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-12 | 12.0.0 | +| SP-70 | | | | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-13 | 13.0.0 | +| SA-75 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-14 version (MCC) | 14.0.0 | +| CT-78 | CP-173150 | C6-170659 | 0009 | - | Update of reference to ETSI TS 102 241 | 14.1.0 | +| | | | | | Missing attachments | 14.1.1 | +| SA80 | | | | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-15 | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31213/5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31213/5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fd23805020ba639edbdd9192a163297601ee67a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31213/5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:9fbf4a45e4e00f7815249262ea511f036ee876684056e3566d2a3c3e81b78013 +size 9958 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31213/64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31213/64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..39a39a1e671af20859ad5517b385ebdf3592453d --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31213/64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:f73d7a7ff8719469dc25e9b8953239437d9718b1a0cbd53e7faa0c48d3012c12 +size 5625 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31213/e6df2733626a85205c1db682e6259c46_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31213/e6df2733626a85205c1db682e6259c46_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a6fbeb91bb3bdf03c8a63d44fafba30dfe175ddf --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31213/e6df2733626a85205c1db682e6259c46_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:64183792ba1ff796239e3c2bd054a5b7cae1ada4b3c9ff83ef02e2e60db29ea5 +size 118963 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31213/ff0952ef692c9d960ce5f6708bcc9711_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31213/ff0952ef692c9d960ce5f6708bcc9711_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8d7dae601c8ed55fdd90c50bc8f986f6bb649096 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31213/ff0952ef692c9d960ce5f6708bcc9711_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:9b7e60c0f63748a9bf96f9bfffd093bd9eaa133ca3140411813cfa7dbf6cb308 +size 31096 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31213/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31213/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8c70d133f619a89eecc5f0f16381867a8eb065cd --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31213/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,4930 @@ + + +# 3GPP TS 31.213 V16.1.0 (2020-09) + +*Technical Specification* + +## **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Test specification for (U)SIM; Application Programming Interface (API) for Java Card™ (Release 16)** + +![5G logo with three green signal waves above the text '5G'](64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg) + +5G logo with three green signal waves above the text '5G' + +![3GPP logo with 'A GLOBAL INITIATIVE' text below](5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg) + +3GPP logo with 'A GLOBAL INITIATIVE' text below + +The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP. +The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organizational Partners and shall not be implemented. +This Specification is provided for future development work within 3GPP only. The Organizational Partners accept no liability for any use of this Specification. +Specifications and Reports for implementation of the 3GPP™ system should be obtained via the 3GPP Organizational Partners' Publications Offices. + +# **3GPP** + +Postal address + +--- + +3GPP support office address + +--- + +650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis + Valbonne - FRANCE + Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 + +Internet + +--- + + + +# --- ***Copyright Notification*** + +--- + +No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. + The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. + +© 2020, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC). + All rights reserved. + +UMTSTM is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members + 3GPPTM is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners + LTETM is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners + GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association + +# Contents + +| | | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword........................................................................................................................................................... | 6 | +| 1 Scope......................................................................................................................................................... | 7 | +| 2 References................................................................................................................................................. | 7 | +| 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations.................................................................................................... | 8 | +| 3.1 Definitions.................................................................................................................................................. | 8 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations............................................................................................................................................. | 8 | +| 4 Test environment....................................................................................................................................... | 9 | +| 4.1 Applicability............................................................................................................................................... | 9 | +| 4.2 Test environment description..................................................................................................................... | 9 | +| 4.3 Tests format.............................................................................................................................................. | 10 | +| 4.3.1 Test area reference.................................................................................................................................... | 10 | +| 4.3.1.1 Conformance requirements....................................................................................................................... | 11 | +| 4.3.1.2 Test area files............................................................................................................................................ | 11 | +| 4.3.1.3 Test procedure........................................................................................................................................... | 11 | +| 4.3.1.4 Test coverage............................................................................................................................................ | 12 | +| 4.4 Initial conditions....................................................................................................................................... | 12 | +| 4.5 Package name........................................................................................................................................... | 12 | +| 4.6 AID coding............................................................................................................................................... | 12 | +| 4.7 Test equipment......................................................................................................................................... | 13 | +| 4.7.1 Test tool.................................................................................................................................................... | 13 | +| 4.7.2 Interfaces and classes use......................................................................................................................... | 13 | +| 4.7.3 Util package.............................................................................................................................................. | 14 | +| 4.7.4 Java Software Development kit version................................................................................................... | 14 | +| 5 Test plan................................................................................................................................................... | 14 | +| 5.1 Package uicc.usim.access package........................................................................................................... | 14 | +| 5.1.1 Interface SIMConstants............................................................................................................................ | 14 | +| 5.1.2 Interface USIMConstants......................................................................................................................... | 14 | +| 5.2 Package uicc.usim.toolkit package........................................................................................................... | 14 | +| 5.2.1 Interface ToolkitConstants....................................................................................................................... | 14 | +| 5.2.2 Interface USATEnvelopeHandler............................................................................................................ | 14 | +| 5.2.2.1 Method getSecuredDataLength................................................................................................................. | 14 | +| 5.2.2.2 Method getSecuredDataOffset.................................................................................................................. | 19 | +| 5.2.2.3 Method getShortMessageLength.............................................................................................................. | 22 | +| 5.2.2.4 Method getShortMessageOffset............................................................................................................... | 25 | +| 5.2.2.5 Method getTPUDLOffset......................................................................................................................... | 29 | +| 5.2.2.6 Method getUserDataLength...................................................................................................................... | 31 | +| 5.2.2.7 Method getItemIdentifier.......................................................................................................................... | 34 | +| 5.2.2.8 Method getChannelIdentifier.................................................................................................................... | 35 | +| 5.2.2.9 Method getChannelStatus......................................................................................................................... | 38 | +| 5.2.2.10 Method getSize.......................................................................................................................................... | 40 | +| 5.2.2.11 Method getTag.......................................................................................................................................... | 41 | +| 5.2.2.12 Method compareValue.............................................................................................................................. | 42 | +| 5.2.2.13 Method copy.............................................................................................................................................. | 44 | +| 5.2.2.14 Method copyValue.................................................................................................................................... | 46 | +| 5.2.2.15 Method findAndCompareValue(byte tag, byte[] compareBuffer, short compareOffset)......................... | 49 | +| 5.2.2.16 Method findAndCompareValue(byte tag, byte occurrence, short valueOffset, byte[] compareBuffer, short compareOffset, short compareLength)................................................................... | 51 | +| 5.2.2.17 Method findAndCopyValue(byte tag, byte[] dstBuffer, short dstOffset)................................................. | 54 | +| 5.2.2.18 Method findAndCopyValue(byte tag, byte occurrence, short valueOffset, byte[] dstBuffer, short dstOffset, short dstLength)...................................................................................................................... | 56 | +| 5.2.2.19 Method findTLV...................................................................................................................................... | 59 | +| 5.2.2.20 Method getCapacity.................................................................................................................................. | 61 | +| 5.2.2.21 Method getLength..................................................................................................................................... | 62 | +| 5.2.2.22 Method getValueByte............................................................................................................................... | 63 | + +| | | +|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 5.2.2.23 | Method getValueLength..................................................................................................................................64 | +| 5.2.2.24 | Method getValueShort...................................................................................................................................65 | +| 5.2.3 | Interface USATTerminalProfile......................................................................................................................66 | +| 5.2.4 | Class USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem..............................................................................................................66 | +| 5.2.4.1 | Method getTheHandler.........................................................................................................................66 | +| 5.2.5 | Interface ToolkitRegistry................................................................................................................................67 | +| 5.2.5.1 | Method clearEvent................................................................................................................................67 | +| 5.2.5.2 | Method isEventSet................................................................................................................................69 | +| 5.2.5.3 | Method setEvent...................................................................................................................................70 | +| 5.2.5.4 | Method setEventList.............................................................................................................................72 | +| 5.3 | (U)SAT Framework........................................................................................................................................76 | +| 5.3.1 | Minimum handler availability................................................................................................................76 | +| 5.3.1.1 | ProactiveHandler..................................................................................................................................76 | +| 5.3.1.2 | ProactiveResponseHandler...................................................................................................................81 | +| 5.3.1.3 | EnvelopeHandler..................................................................................................................................91 | +| 5.3.1.4 | EnvelopeResponseHandler...................................................................................................................94 | +| 5.3.1.5 | USATEnvelopeHandler.......................................................................................................................103 | +| 5.3.1.6 | Applet triggering with ongoing proactive session...............................................................................106 | +| 5.3.2 | Handler integrity..................................................................................................................................111 | +| 5.3.2.1 | ProactiveResponseHandler.................................................................................................................111 | +| 5.3.2.2 | EnvelopeHandler................................................................................................................................112 | +| 5.3.2.3 | USATEnvelopeHandler.......................................................................................................................123 | +| 5.3.3 | Exception handling...............................................................................................................................140 | +| 5.3.3.1 | General Behaviour..............................................................................................................................140 | +| 5.3.3.2 | Interaction with Multiple Triggering..................................................................................................142 | +| 5.3.4 | Applet triggering..................................................................................................................................143 | +| 5.3.4.1 | EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV.........................................................................................143 | +| 5.3.4.2 | EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV.....................................................................................145 | +| 5.3.4.3 | EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD.........................................................................................147 | +| 5.3.4.4 | EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD.....................................................................................149 | +| 5.3.4.5 | EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB...................................................................................................152 | +| 5.3.4.6 | EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB.............................................................................................153 | +| 5.3.4.7 | EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD.........................................................................................................154 | +| 5.3.4.8 | EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD...................................................................................................156 | +| 5.3.5 | Envelope response posting...................................................................................................................157 | +| 5.3.5.1 | EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM..............................................................157 | +| 5.3.6 | Toolkit installation...............................................................................................................................159 | +| 5.3.6.1 | Minimum security level......................................................................................................................159 | +| 5.3.6.2 | TAR....................................................................................................................................................161 | +| 5.3.6.3 | Access domain....................................................................................................................................164 | +| 5.3.7 | Other parts transferred to (U)SAT framework from API.....................................................................165 | +| 5.3.7.1 | A handler is a temporary JCRE Entry Point object............................................................................165 | +| 5.3.8 | Framework security management.........................................................................................................166 | +| 5.3.8.1 | Input data............................................................................................................................................167 | +| 5.3.8.2 | Output data.........................................................................................................................................174 | +| 5.3.9 | Concatenated SMS...............................................................................................................................175 | +| 5.3.9.1 | Concatenation processing...................................................................................................................175 | +| 5.3.9.2 | Test area files......................................................................................................................................176 | +| 5.3.9.3 | Test coverage......................................................................................................................................176 | +| 5.3.9.4 | Test procedure....................................................................................................................................176 | +| 5.3.10 | Cell Broadcast Service..........................................................................................................................178 | +| 5.3.10.1 | Multiple message reassembling..........................................................................................................178 | +| 5.3.10.2 | Test area files......................................................................................................................................178 | +| 5.3.10.3 | Test coverage......................................................................................................................................178 | +| 5.3.11 | Concatenated USSD.............................................................................................................................179 | +| 5.3.11.1 | Concatenation processing...................................................................................................................179 | +| 5.3.11.2 | Test area files......................................................................................................................................180 | +| 5.3.11.3 | Test coverage......................................................................................................................................180 | +| 5.3.11.4 | Test procedure....................................................................................................................................180 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| Annex A (normative): | Class, methods and USATFramework tests acronyms................................... | 182 | +| A.1 | Toolkit part.................................................................................................................. | 182 | +| A.1.1 | USATEnvelopeHandler interface......................................................................... | 182 | +| A.1.2 | USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem method.............................................................. | 182 | +| A.1.3 | ToolkitRegistry methods...................................................................................... | 183 | +| A.2 | Acronyms for USATFramework tests....................................................................... | 183 | +| A.2.1 | Minimum handler availability.............................................................................. | 183 | +| A.2.2 | Handler integrity.................................................................................................. | 183 | +| A.2.3 | Applet triggering.................................................................................................. | 183 | +| A.2.4 | Exception handling............................................................................................... | 183 | +| A.2.5 | Envelope response posting................................................................................... | 184 | +| A.2.6 | Toolkit installation............................................................................................... | 184 | +| A.2.7 | Other parts transferred from API to CAT RE...................................................... | 184 | +| A.2.8 | Framework security.............................................................................................. | 184 | +| A.2.9 | Concatenated SMS............................................................................................... | 184 | +| A.2.10 | Cell Broadcast Service.......................................................................................... | 184 | +| Annex B (normative): | Global prepersonalization....................................................................................... | 185 | +| Annex C (normative): | Test file description.................................................................................................. | 186 | +| Annex D (normative): | uicc.usim.test.util package, (U)SIM interfaces and testing script example....................................................................................................................... | 187 | +| Annex E (normative): | Test Area files........................................................................................................... | 188 | +| Annex F (informative): | Change history.......................................................................................................... | 189 | + +# Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings: + +- shall**                 indicates a mandatory requirement to do something +- shall not**           indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something + +The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports. + +The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document. + +- should**               indicates a recommendation to do something +- should not**          indicates a recommendation not to do something +- may**                  indicates permission to do something +- need not**            indicates permission not to do something + +The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended. + +- can**                   indicates that something is possible +- cannot**               indicates that something is impossible + +The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not". + +- will**                   indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- will not**             indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- might**                indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +In addition: + +**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document covers the minimum characteristics considered necessary in order to provide compliance to TS 31.130 [2]. + +The present document describes the technical characteristics and methods of test for testing the (U)SIM API for Java Card™ (TS 31.130 [2]) implemented in the (U)SIM. It specifies the following parts: + +- test applicability; +- test environment description; +- tests format; +- test area reference; +- conformance requirements; +- test suite files; +- test procedure; +- test coverage; and +- a description of the associated testing tools that shall be used. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] ETSI TS 101 220: "Integrated Circuit Cards (ICC); ETSI numbering system for telecommunication; Application providers (AID)". +- [2] 3GPP TS 31 130 Release 6: "(U)SIM API for Java Card™" +- [3] Void. +- [4] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the USIM Application". +- [5] 3GPP TS 51.011 Release 4: "Specification of the Subscriber Identity Module- Mobile Equipment (SIM – ME) interface". + +- [6] 3GPP TS 23.041: "Technical realization of Cell Broadcast Service (CBS)". +- [7] Void. +- [8] 3GPP TS 31.111: "USIM Application Toolkit (USAT)". +- [9] Void. +- [10] 3GPP TS 31.115: "Secured packet structure for the (U)SIM Toolkit applications". +- [11] 3GPP TS 23.040: "Technical realization of the Short Message Service (SMS)". +- [12] Sun Microsystems Java Card™ Specification: "Java Card™ 2.2.1 Application Programming Interface". +- [13] Sun Microsystems Java Card™ Specification: "Java Card™ 2.2.1 Runtime Environment (JCRE) Specification". +- [14] Sun Microsystems Java Card™ Specification: "Java Card™ 2.2.1 Virtual Machine Specification". +SUN Java Card™ Specifications can be downloaded at +- [15] ETSI TS 102 268 V6.1.0: "Test specification for UICC Application Programming Interface for Java Card (TM) ". +- [16] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". + +# --- 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [16] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [16]. + +**applet installation parameters:** values for applet installation parameters + +**Conformance Requirement Reference (CRR):** description of the expected card behaviour according to TS 31.130 [2] + +**expected state:** state in which the (U)SIM is supposed to be after the execution of the test procedure applied on the relevant initial conditions + +**security parameters:** minimum security requirements defined for the applet installation process + +**test area:** set of Test Cases applicable to a specific part (class method, CAT RE behaviour, etc) of the TS 31.130 [2]. + +**test case:** elementary test that checks for compliance with one or more Conformance Requirement References + +**test procedure:** sequence of actions/commands to perform all the test cases defined in a test area + +**test source file:** java file containing methods that will load and install test applet in the card, execute and verify the test results, and restore the Default Initial Conditions on the (U)SIM (when possible). + +**test toolkit applet:** applet designed to test a specific functionality of the USIM API (TS 31.130 [2]) + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [16] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [16]. + +| | | +|------|--------------------------------| +| AID | Application Identifier | +| APDU | Application Protocol Data Unit | + +| | | +|--------|---------------------------------------------------| +| API | Application Programming Interface | +| CAT RE | Card Application Toolkit Runtime Environment | +| CRR | Conformance requirements Reference | +| CRRC | Conformance requirement Reference Context Error | +| CRRN | Conformance requirement Reference Normal | +| CRRP | Conformance requirement Reference Parameter Error | +| FFS | For Further Study | + +# --- 4 Test environment + +This clause specifies requirements that shall be met and the testing rules that shall be followed during the test procedure. + +## 4.1 Applicability + +The tests defined in the present document shall be performed taking into account the services supported by the card as specified in the EFSST file. + +The test defined in the present document are applicable to cards implementing TS 31.130 [2] unless otherwise stated. + +The tests defined in the present document require that the card support the concatenation process with 2 concatenated SMS. + +## 4.2 Test environment description + +The general architecture for the test environment is: + +![Architecture diagram of the Test Suite showing interactions between Terminal, Java Card Runtime, and CAT Runtime Environment.](e6df2733626a85205c1db682e6259c46_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the architecture of the Test Suite. A legend at the top right defines line colors: a blue line indicates the "Scope of the Test Suite" and a red line indicates "Elements of the Test Suite". + +The architecture is divided into several functional blocks: + +- TERMINAL Block:** Contains a **Converter** and a **Loader**. It interfaces with **APDU I/O**. Inputs include **ETSI TS 102 241 and Java Card™**, **Conversion parameters**, **Test Toolkit Applet**, **Applet .cap**, **Applet installation parameter**, and **Test Source**. It outputs **Output test result**. +- System Services:** Includes **UICC File System Server**, **102 221 and 31 130 based Applications (e.g. SIM Applet or USIM Applet)** with **ADF File system Server**, **Other Applications not based on 102 221 and 31 130**, and **Toolkit Applet (e.g. Toolkit Service, Remote Management Applications, Browser Applications)**. +- API Packages:** A row of packages including **Java Card™ package**, **uicc.access packages**, **uicc.toolkit package**, **uicc.system package**, **uicc.usim.access package**, and **uicc.usim.toolkit package**. +- Runtime Environments:** + - Java Card™ Runtime Environment** + - (U)SATFramework** and **USAT EnvelopeHandler** + - CAT Runtime Environment** containing **Toolkit Handlers**, **Toolkit Registry**, and **Triggering Entity**. + +Communication flows via **APDU** commands between the Terminal's APDU I/O and the Runtime Environments. + +Architecture diagram of the Test Suite showing interactions between Terminal, Java Card Runtime, and CAT Runtime Environment. + +## 4.3 Tests format + +### 4.3.1 Test area reference + +Each test area is referenced as follows: + +For API testing: + +**API Testing: 'API\_[package name]\_[classname]\_[methodname]'** where + +package name: + +uicc.usim.access package: '1' + +uicc.usim.toolkit package: '2' + +class name: + +yyy: 3 letters for each class. + +See Annex A for full classes acronyms list. + +method name: + +zzzz[input parameters]: + +See Annex A for full methods name acronyms list. + +For Framework testing: + +FWK: framework testing + +Chapter name: + +xxx: 3 letters for each chapter + +See annex F for full chapter acronyms list + +Subchapter name + +yyyy: : 4 letters for each subchapter + +See annex F for full subchapter acronyms list + +#### 4.3.1.1 Conformance requirements + +The conformance requirements are expressed in the following way: + +- Method prototype as listed in TS 31.130 [2]. +- Normal execution: + - Contains normal execution and correct parameters limit values, each referenced as a Conformance Requirement Reference Normal (CRRN). +- Parameters error: + - Contains parameter errors and incorrect parameter limit values, each referenced as a Conformance Requirement Reference Parameter Error (CRRP). +- Context error: + - Contains errors due to the context the method is used in, each referenced as a Conformance Requirement Reference Context Error (CRRC). + +#### 4.3.1.2 Test area files + +The files included in the Test Area use the following naming convention: + +- Test Source: Test\_[Test Area Reference].java +- Test Applet: [Test Area Reference]\_[Test applet number].java +- Cap File: [Test Area Reference].cap + +The applet numbers start from '1'. + +The test source shall use common interfaces defined in Annex D. + +The Cap File format is described in Java Card™ Virtual Machine Specification [4]. + +Test files can be run in any order. + +All files from the same test area are located in the same subfolder. + +#### 4.3.1.3 Test procedure + +Each test procedure contains a table to indicate the expected responses from the API and/or the APDU level as follows: + +| Test Case | | | | +|-----------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------| +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +| | Test Case detailed description | API and/or (U)SAT Framework expected behaviour. | Expected response at APDU level. | + +#### 4.3.1.4 Test coverage + +The table above each test procedure indicates the correspondence between the Conformance Requirements Reference (CRR) and the different test cases. + +## 4.4 Initial conditions + +The Initial Conditions are a set of general prerequisites for the (U)SIM prior to the execution of testing. For each test procedure described in the present document, the following rules apply to the Initial Conditions: + +- unless otherwise stated, the file system and the files' content shall fulfil the requirements described in annex B; +- unless otherwise stated, before installing the applet(s) relevant to the current test procedure, all packages specific to other test procedures shall not be present. + +When both statements apply, a test procedure is said to be in the "Default Initial Conditions" state. + +## 4.5 Package name + +Java packages integrating this Test Suite shall follow this naming convention: + +**uicc.usim.test.access.[Test Area Reference]:** Java Card packages containing Test Area References for the TS 31.130 [2] uicc.access package. + +**uicc.usim.test.toolkit.[Test Area Reference]:** Java Card packages containing Test Area References for the TS 31.130 [2] uicc.toolkit package. + +**uicc.usim.test.usatframework.[Test Area Reference]:** Java Card packages containing Test Area References for the TS 31.130 [2] USAT Framework. + +**uicc.usim.test.util:** for the Test util package defined in this Test Suite. + +where the Test Area Reference is written in lower case. + +EXAMPLE: The package *../uicc.usim.test.access.[Test Area Reference]* creates the following directory structure *../uiccusim//test/access/[Test Area Reference]/Api\_1\_...\_[1..n].\**, where *'Api\_1\_...\_[1..n].\*'* are the different test applets Java source files used in *[Test Area Reference]*. + +## 4.6 AID coding + +The AID coding for the Test Packages, Applet classes and Applets shall be as specified in ETSI TS 101 220 [5]. In addition, the following TAR and Application Provider specific data values are defined for use within the present document: + +AID coding + +| Byte 1 | _ _ _ _ | Byte 12 | Byte 13 | Byte 14 | Byte 15 | Byte 16 | | +|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|------------------------------------| +| | | | | | | | Application Provider specific data | +| | | | | | | | TAR | +| | | | | | | | Specified in ETSI TS 101 220 [5] | + +TAR coding (3 bytes/ 24 bits): + +![Diagram showing bit mapping for AID components](ff0952ef692c9d960ce5f6708bcc9711_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows the mapping of bits b1 through b24 to specific identifiers: + +| Bit Range | Identifier | +|-----------|------------------------| +| b17 - b24 | Applet instance number | +| b13 - b16 | Applet class number | +| b9 - b12 | Package number | +| b5 - b8 | RFU | +| b1 - b4 | Test Part Identifier | + +Diagram showing bit mapping for AID components + +Applet instance number, Applet Class number, Package number: + +For package AID, package number shall start from 0 and class and instance numbers shall be 0. + +For class AID, package number is the number of the class package, class number shall start from 1 and instance shall be 0. + +For instance AID, package and class number are the number of class and package of which instance belongs, and instance number shall start from 1. + +Test part Identifier (bits b1-b4): + +- 0000 reserved (as TAR= '00.00.00' is reserved for Issuer Security Domain) +- 0010 API uicc.usim.toolkit +- 0101 USAT Framework +- 1110 USIM ADF +- 1111 uicc.util +- other values are RFU + +Application Provider specific data (1 byte): + +- '00' for Package +- '01' for Applet class +- '02' for Applet Instance + +**EXAMPLE:** The AID of Package uicc.usim.util is 'A0 00 00 00 87 10 05 FF FF FF FF 89 F0 00 00 00'. + +## 4.7 Test equipment + +These clauses recommend a minimum specification for each of the items of test equipment referenced in the tests. + +### 4.7.1 Test tool + +This test tool shall meet the following requirements: + +- be able to send and receive APDU command to the USIM; +- the result of I/O commands must be presented at the application layer; +- be able to provide results of the tests; +- shall send and/or compare all data specified in test file. + +### 4.7.2 Interfaces and classes use + +The USIM test tool extends the UICC test tool defined in ETSI TS 102 268 [15]. Then The USIM test tool cannot be run without having implemented the UICC test tool. + +The USIM test tool shall use some interfaces and classes, defined in Annex D. They define the only allowed methods to write the test sources. + +Interfaces and classes are defined as follow: + +- USimToolkitService defines methods to manage toolkit commands, +- USimAPITestService defines methods to send envelopes defined in TS 31.111 [8], +- USimAPITestCardService defines the static method to get a reference of the class implementing all interfaces. + +### 4.7.3 Util package + +Annex D includes java source code of *TestToolkitApplet* abstract class of the *uicc.usim.util* package. Each test applet shall extend this abstract class in order to retrieve test results when selecting it. + +### 4.7.4 Java Software Development kit version + +Java software development kit (SDK) version supported by Java Card 2.2.1 specifications ([12], [13], [14]) is 1.4.1. + +# 5 Test plan + +The test plan is divided according to the (U)SIM API specification, that way the tests will follow the class hierarchy for the *uicc.usim.toolkit* and *uicc.usim.access* package; for the SIM Toolkit framework this test plan describes the different points that will be tested with the present test specification. + +## 5.1 Package uicc.usim.access package + +### 5.1.1 Interface SIMConstants + +The constants in Java are resolved at compilation time, therefore a runtime test is not useful. No test of constants will be performed. + +### 5.1.2 Interface USIMConstants + +The constants in Java are resolved at compilation time, therefore a runtime test is not useful. No test of constants will be performed. + +## 5.2 Package uicc.usim.toolkit package + +### 5.2.1 Interface ToolkitConstants + +The constants in Java are resolved at compilation time, therefore a runtime test is not useful. No test of constants will be performed. + +### 5.2.2 Interface USATEnvelopeHandler + +#### 5.2.2.1 Method getSecuredDataLength + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gsdl + +##### 5.2.2.1.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public short getSecuredDataLength() + throws uicc.toolkit.ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.1.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The method shall return the length of the Secured Data from the Command Packet in the SMS TPDU (simple or concatenated) or Cell Broadcast Page Comprehension TLV contained in the Envelope handler. +- CRRN2: The length is from the first SMS TPDU TLV, USSD String TLV or Cell Broadcast Page Comprehension TLV. +- CRRN3: The length should not include padding bytes. +- CRRN4: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV and if the SMS TP UD is formatted according to TS 31.115 [10] Single or Concatenated Short Message. +- CRRN5: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD and if the SMS TP UD is formatted according to TS 31.115 [10] Single or Concatenated Short Message. +- CRRN6: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB and if the Cell Broadcast Page is formatted according to TS 31.115 [10]. +- CRRN7: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_USSD and if the USSD String id is formatted according to TS 31.115 [10] +- CRRN8: If the method is successful and if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV, the selected TLV should be the SMS TPDU TLV. +- CRRN9: If the method is successful and if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD, the selected TLV should be the SMS TPDU TLV. +- CRRN10: If the method is successful and if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB, the selected TLV should be the Cell Broadcast Page TLV. +- CRRN11: If the method is successful and if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_USSD, the selected TLV should be the USSD String TLV. + +###### 5.2.2.1.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.2.2.1.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRC1: The method shall throw ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT in case of unavailable SMS TPDU TLV, USSD String TLV element or Cell Broadcast Page Comprehension TLV. +- CRRC2: The method shall throw ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT in case of wrong data format. + +##### 5.2.2.1.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: + +- FORMATTED SMS CB. +- UNFORMATTED SMS CB. +- FORMATTED SMS PP ENV. +- UNFORMATTED SMS PP ENV. +- FORMATTED SMS PP UPD. +- FORMATTED USSD ENV. +- UNFORMATTED USSD ENV. + +- For Formatted triggering if CC/RC/DS is used, the security parameters are the one defined in clause "5.3.8 Framework Security Management". + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gsdl.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gsdl\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gsdl.cap + +##### 5.2.2.1.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|-------------------|-------------------------| +| N1 | 1 to 42 | + +| | | +|-----|----------------------| +| N2 | 13, 30 | +| N3 | 6, 7, 23, 24, 37, 38 | +| N4 | 1 to 17 | +| N5 | 18 to 34 | +| N6 | 35 to 42 | +| N7 | 43 to 56 | +| N8 | 17 | +| N9 | 34 | +| N10 | 42 | +| N11 | 56 | +| C1 | 57 | +| C2 | 58 | +| C3 | 59 | + +##### 5.2.2.1.4                 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework
Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------| +| FORMATTED SMS PP ENV Triggering | | | | +| 1 | Test with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV and TP-OA length of 2 | Returns 0x002A | | +| 2 | Test with TP-OA length of 6 | Returns 0x002A | | +| 3 | Test with TP-OA length of 12 | Returns 0x002A | | +| 4 | Test with RC/CC/DS length of 0 | Returns 0x0010 | | +| 5 | Test with RC/CC/DS length of 8 | Returns 0x0010 | | +| 6 | Test with PCNTR = 0 | Returns 0x0010 | | +| 7 | Test with PCNTR = 7 (ciphering shall be used) | Returns 0x0003 | | +| 8 | Test with Secured Data Length = 00 | Returns 0x0000 | | +| 9 | Test with Secured Data Length = 0x33 | Returns 0x0033 | | +| 10 | Test with Secured Data Length = 0x6C (UDL = 0x7F) | Returns 0x006C | | +| 11 | Test with Secured Data Length = 0x6D (UDL = 0x80) | Returns 0x006D | | +| 12 | Test with Secured Data Length = maximum length for one envelope : 0x79 (UDL = 0x8C) | Returns 0x0079 | | +| 13 | Verify it is the first TPDU TLV:
Send a SMS PP with 2 TPDU TLV and inside two different secured data lengths: 5 and 10 | Returns 0x0005 | | +| 14 | Test with secured data length = 0x7F (2 concatenated envelopes are needed) | Returns 0x007F | | +| 15 | Test with secured data length = 0x80 (2 concatenated envelopes are needed) | Returns 0x0080 | | +| 16 | Test with secured data length = maximum length for 2 concatenated envelopes : 0xFA | Returns 0x00FA | | +| 17 | Test with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV
Verify after call of the method the current TLV is the TPDU TLV:
findTLV device identities, getSecuredDataLength and then getValueByte to verify that the current TLV is the TPDU TLV | getValueByte returns 0x0040 | | +| FORMATTED SMS PP UPD Triggering | | | | +| 18 | Same test as 1 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x002A | | +| 19 | Same test as 2 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x002A | | +| 20 | Same test as 3 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x002A | | +| 21 | Same test as 4 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x0010 | | +| 22 | Same test as 5 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x0010 | | +| 23 | Same test as 6 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x0010 | | +| 24 | Same test as 7 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x0003 | | +| 25 | Same test as 8 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x0000 | | +| 26 | Same test as 9 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x0033 | | +| 27 | Same test as 10 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x006C | | +| 28 | Same test as 11 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x006D | | +| 29 | Same test as 12 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x0079 | | +| 30 | Same test as 13 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x0005 | | +| 31 | Test with secured data length = 0x7F (2 concatenated envelopes are needed) | Returns 0x007F | | +| 32 | Test with secured data length = 0x80 (2 concatenated envelopes are needed) | Returns 0x0080 | | +| 33 | Test with secured data length = maximum length for 2 concatenated envelopes : 0xFA | Returns 0x00FA | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework
Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------| +| 34 | Test with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD
Verify after call of the method the current TLV is the TPDU TLV:
findTLV device identities, getSecuredDataLength and then getValueByte to verify that the current TLV is the TPDU TLV | getValueByte returns 0x0040 | | +| FORMATTED SMS CB Triggering | | | | +| 35 | Same test as 4 but with FORMATTED_SMS_CB | Returns 0x0010 | | +| 36 | Same test as 5 but with FORMATTED_SMS_CB | Returns 0x0010 | | +| 37 | Same test as 6 but with FORMATTED_SMS_CB | Returns 0x0010 | | +| 38 | Same test as 7 but with FORMATTED_SMS_CB | Returns 0x0003 | | +| 39 | Same test as 8 but with FORMATTED_SMS_CB | Returns 0x0000 | | +| 40 | Same test as 9 but with FORMATTED_SMS_CB | Returns 0x0033 | | +| 41 | Same test as 12 but with maximum secured data length: 0x42, and FORMATTED_SMS_CB | Returns 0x0042 | | +| 42 | Test with FORMATTED_SMS_CB
Verify after call of the method the current TLV is the Cell Broadcast Page TLV:
findTLV device identities, getSecuredDataLength and then getValueByte to verify that the current TLV is the Cell Broadcast Page TLV | getValueByte returns 0x00 | | +| FORMATTED USSD Triggering | | | | +| 43 | Test with formatted USSD and RC/CC/DS length of 0 | Returns 0x0010 | | +| 44 | Test with RC/CC/DS length of 8 | Returns 0x0010 | | +| 45 | Test with PCNTR = 0 | Returns 0x0010 | | +| 46 | Test with PCNTR = 7 (ciphering shall be used) | Returns 0x0003 | | +| 47 | Test with Secured Data Length = 00 | Returns 0x0000 | | +| 48 | Test with Secured Data Length = 0x33 | Returns 0x0033 | | +| 49 | Test with Secured Data Length = 0x6C (UDL = 0x7F) | Returns 0x006C | | +| 50 | Test with Secured Data Length = 0x6D (UDL = 0x80) | Returns 0x006D | | +| 51 | Test with Secured Data Length = maximum length for one envelope : 0x79 (UDL = 0x8C) | Returns 0x0079 | | +| 52 | Verify it is the first String TLV:
Send a USSD with 2 USSD String TLV and inside two different secured data lengths: 5 and 10 | Returns 0x0005 | | +| 53 | Test with secured data length = 0x7F (2 concatenated envelopes are needed) | Returns 0x007F | | +| 54 | Test with secured data length = 0x80 (2 concatenated envelopes are needed) | Returns 0x0080 | | +| 55 | Test with secured data length = maximum length for 2 concatenated envelopes : 0xFA | Returns 0x00FA | | +| 56 | Test with FORMATTED_USSD
Verify after call of the method the current TLV is the USSD String TLV:
findTLV device identities, getSecuredDataLength and then getValueByte to verify that the current TLV is the USSD String TLV | getValueByte returns 0x0040 | | +| Error tests | | | | +| 57 | Send an envelope SMS CB, getSecuredDataLength | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT | | +| 58 | Send an envelope SMS PP unformatted | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT | | +| 59 | Send an envelope USSD unformatted | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT | | + +#### 5.2.2.2 Method getSecuredDataOffset + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gsdo + +##### 5.2.2.2.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public short getSecuredDataOffset() + throws uicc.toolkit.ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.2.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The method shall return the offset of the secured data first byte contained in a SMS TPDU TLV or USSD String TLV. +- CRRN2: The offset is from the first SMS TPDU TLV or USSD String TLV. +- CRRN3: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV and if the SMS TP-UD is formatted according to TS 31.115 [10]. +- CRRN4: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD and if the SMS TP-UD is formatted according to TS 31.115 [10]. +- CRRN5: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB and if the Cell Broadcast Page is formatted according to TS 31.115 [10]. +- CRRN6: If the method is successful and if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV, the selected TLV should be the SMS TPDU TLV. +- CRRN7: If the method is successful and if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD, the selected TLV should be the SMS TPDU TLV. +- CRRN8: If the method is successful and if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB, the selected TLV should be the Cell Broadcast Page TLV. +- CRRN9: If the method is successful and if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_USSD, the selected TLV should be the USSD String TLV. +- CRRN10: If the Secured Data length is zero the value returned shall be the offset of the first byte following the TS 31.115 [10] Command Packet structure. + +###### 5.2.2.2.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.2.2.2.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRC1: The method shall throw ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT in case of unavailable SMS TPDU TLV or USSD String TLV element. +- CRRC2: The method shall throw ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT in case of wrong data format. + +##### 5.2.2.2.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: + +- FORMATTED SMS CB. +- UNFORMATTED SMS CB. +- FORMATTED SMS PP UPD. +- FORMATTED SMS PP ENV. +- UNFORMATTED SMS PP ENV. +- FORMATTED USSD ENV. + +- UNFORMATTED USSD ENV. +- For Formatted triggering if CC/RC/DS is used, the security parameters are the one defined in clause "5.3.8 Framework Security Management". + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gsdo.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gsdo\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gsdo.cap + +##### 5.2.2.2.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 1 to 20 | +| N2 | 5, 13 | +| N3 | 1 to 8 | +| N4 | 9 to 16 | +| N5 | 17, 18, 19, 20 | +| N6 | 7 | +| N7 | 15 | +| N8 | 20 | +| N9 | 21 to 25 | +| N10 | 6, 14, 19 | +| C1 | 26 | +| C2 | 27 | + +##### 5.2.2.2.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------| +| | FORMATTED SMS PP ENV triggering | | | + +| Id | Description | API(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | Test with TP-OA length of 2 and RC/CC/DS length is 0 | Returns 0x21 | | +| 2 | Test with TP-OA length of 6 and RC/CC/DS length is 0 | Returns 0x23 | | +| 3 | Test with TP-OA length of 12 and RC/CC/DS length is 0 | Returns 0x26 | | +| 4 | Test with RC/CC/DS length of 8 and TP-OA length is 2 | Returns 0x29 | | +| 5 | Send a SMS PP with 2 TPDU TLV and inside two different secured data offsets | Returns 0x24 ( the first offset ) | | +| 6 | Same test as 1 but without any secured data | Returns 0x21 | | +| 7 | Test with FORMATTED_SMS_PP ENV
Verify after call of the method the current TLV is the TPDU TLV:
findTLV device identities, getSecuredDataOffset and then getValueByte to verify that the current TLV is the TPDU TLV | Returns 0x40 | | +| 8 | Same test as 1, but with a concatenated SMS (2 Short Messages and maximum Secured Data Length = 0x00FA) | Returns 0x21 | | +| FORMATTED SMS PP UPR triggering | | | | +| 9 | Same test as 1 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x21 | | +| 10 | Same test as 2 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x23 | | +| 11 | Same test as 3 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x26 | | +| 12 | Same test as 4 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x29 | | +| 13 | Same test as 5 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x24 ( the first offset ) | | +| 14 | Same test as 6 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x21 | | +| 15 | Test with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD
Verify after call of the method the current TLV is the TPDU TLV:
findTLV device identities, getSecuredDataOffset and then getValueByte to verify that the current TLV is the TPDU TLV | Returns 0x40 | | +| 16 | Same test as 8, but with a concatenated SMS (2 Short Messages and maximum Secured Data Length = 0x00FA) | Returns 0x21 | | +| FORMATTED SMS CB triggering | | | | +| 17 | Same test as 2 but with FORMATTED_SMS_CB | Returns 0x16 | | +| 18 | Same test as 4 but with FORMATTED_SMS_CB | Returns 0x1E | | +| 19 | Same test as 6 but with FORMATTED_SMS_CB | Returns 0x16 | | +| 20 | Test with FORMATTED_SMS_CB
Verify after call of the method the current TLV is the Cell Broadcast Page TLV:
findTLV device identities, getSecuredDataOffset and then getValueByte to verify that the current TLV is the Cell Broadcast Page TLV | Returns 0x00 | | +| FORMATTED USSD triggering | | | | +| 21 | Test with RC/CC/DS length of 8 | Returns 0x29 | | +| 22 | Send a USSD with 2 USSD StringTLV and inside two different secured data offsets | Returns 0x24 ( the first offset ) | | +| 23 | Same test as 1 but without any secured data | Returns 0x21 | | +| 24 | Test with FORMATTED_USSD
Verify after call of the method the current TLV is the String TLV:
findTLV device identities, getSecuredDataOffset and then getValueByte to verify that the current TLV is the StringTLV | Returns 0x40 | | +| 25 | Same test as 1, but with a concatenated SMS (2 USSD message and maximum Secured Data | Returns 0x21 | | + +| Id | Description | API(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------| +| | Length = 0x00FA) | | | +| | UNFORMATTED Triggering | | | +| 26 | Send an UNFORMATTED SMS CB envelope, getSecuredDataOffset | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT | | +| 27 | Send an UNFORMATTED SMS PP envelope, getSecuredDataOffset | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT | | +| 28 | Send an UNFORMATTED USSD envelope, getSecuredDataOffset | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT | | + +#### 5.2.2.3 Method getShortMessageLength + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gsml + +##### 5.2.2.3.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public short getShortMessageLength() + throws uicc.toolkit.ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.3.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The method shall return the length of the Short Message from the User Data part in the SMS TPDU (simple or concatenated) or Cell Broadcast Page Comprehension TLV contained in the USATEnvelopeHandler. +- CRRN2: The length is from the first SMS TPDU TLV or Cell Broadcast Page Comprehension TLV. +- CRRN3: The length should not include padding bytes. +- CRRN4: The length should not include the UDH if any. +- CRRN5: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV or EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP. +- CRRN6: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD or EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_UPD. +- CRRN7: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB or EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_CB. +- CRRN8: If the method is successful and if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV or EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP, the selected TLV should be the SMS TPDU TLV. +- CRRN9: If the method is successful and if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD or EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_UPD, the selected TLV should be the SMS TPDU TLV. +- CRRN10: If the method is successful and if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB or EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_CB, the selected TLV should be the Cell Broadcast Page TLV. +- CRRN11: If the Short Message Length is zero, no exception shall be thrown. + +###### 5.2.2.3.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.2.2.3.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRC1: The method shall throw ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT in case of unavailable SMS TPDU TLV element or Cell Broadcast Page Comprehension TLV. +- CRRC2: The method shall throw ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT in case of wrong data format. + +##### 5.2.2.3.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: + +- FORMATTED SMS CB. +- UNFORMATTED SMS CB. +- FORMATTED SMS PP UPD. +- UNFORMATTED SMS PP UPD. +- FORMATTED SMS PP ENV. +- UNFORMATTED SMS PP ENV. +- UNRECOGNIZED\_ENVELOPE. +- For Formatted triggering if CC/RC/DS is used, the security parameters are the one defined in clause "5.3.8 Framework Security Management". + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gsml.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gsml\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gsml.cap + +##### 5.2.2.3.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|-----------------------| +| N1 | 1 to 46 | +| N2 | 8, 18, 26, 34, 41, 45 | +| N3 | 4, 14, 22 | +| N4 | 1 to 27 | +| N5 | 1 to 10 and 28 to 35 | +| N6 | 11 to 20 and 36 to 43 | +| N7 | 21 to 27 and 44 to 46 | +| N8 | 9, 35 | +| N9 | 19, 43 | +| N10 | 27, 46 | +| N11 | 6, 16, 24, 30, 38 | +| C1 | 47 | +| C2 | Not applicable | + +##### 5.2.2.3.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------| +| FORMATTED SMS PP ENV Triggering | | | | +| 1 | Test with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV and TP-OA length of 2 and secured data length of 0x2A with no padding byte (PCNTR = 0, no RC/CC/DS) | Returns 0x003A | | +| 2 | Test with TP-OA length of 12 and secured data length of 0x2A with no padding byte (PCNTR = 0, no RC/CC/DS) | Returns 0x003A | | +| 3 | Test with PCNTR = 0, no RC/CC/DS and data length of 0x10 | Returns 0x0020 | | +| 4 | Test with PCNTR = 7, no RC/CC/DS and data length of 0x03 (ciphering shall be used) | Returns 0x001A | | +| 5 | Test with PCNTR = 0, with RC/CC/DS length of 8 and secured data length of 0x10 | Returns 0x0028 | | +| 6 | Test with PCNTR = 0, no RC/CC/DS and SecuredDataLength = 00 | Returns 0x0010 | | +| 7 | Test with PCNTR = 0, no RC/CC/DS and | Returns 0x0089 | | + +| Id | Description | API(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | UserDataLength = maximum length (0x8C) for a single SMS | | | +| 8 | Verify it is the first TPDU TLV:
Send a SMS PP with 2 TPDU TLV with two different user data lengths: 0x18 and 0x23 (with PCNTR = 0, no RC/CC/DS) | Returns 0x0015 | | +| 9 | Send envelope SMS-PP Formatted.
FindTLV() with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES.
getShortMessageLength() and then getValueByte() with offset 0 | getValueByte() returns 0x40(TS 23.040 [11] first byte) | | +| 10 | Test with UserDataLength = maximum length (0x010D) with 2 concatenated SMS | Returns 0x010A | | +| | FORMATTED SMS PP UPD Triggering | | | +| 11 | Test with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD and TP-OA length of 2 and secured data length of 0x2A with no padding byte (PCNTR = 0) | Returns 0x003A | | +| 12 | Test with TP-OA length of 12 and secured data length of 0x2A with no padding byte (PCNTR = 0) | Returns 0x003A | | +| 13 | Test with PCNTR = 0, no RC/CC/DS and data length of 0x10 | Returns 0x0020 | | +| 14 | Test with PCNTR = 7, no RC/CC/DS and data length of 0x03 (ciphering shall be used) | Returns 0x001A | | +| 15 | Test with PCNTR = 0, with RC/CC/DS length of 8 and secured data length of 0x10 | Returns 0x0028 | | +| 16 | Test with PCNTR = 0, no RC/CC/DS and SecuredDataLength = 00 | Returns 0x0010 | | +| 17 | Test with PCNTR = 0, no RC/CC/DS and UserDataLength = maximum length (0x8C) for a single SMS | Returns 0x0089 | | +| 18 | Verify it is the first TPDU TLV:
Send a SMS PP with 2 TPDU TLV with two different user data lengths: 0x18 and 0x23 (with PCNTR = 0, no RC/CC/DS) | Returns 0x0015 | | +| 19 | Send envelope SMS-PP Formatted.
FindTLV() with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES.
GetShortMessageLength() and then getValueByte() with offset 0 | GetValueByte() returns 0x40(TS 23.040 [11] first byte) | | +| 20 | Test with UserDataLength = maximum length (0x010D) with 2 concatenated SMS | Returns 0x0010A | | +| | FORMATTED SMS CB Triggering | | | +| 21 | Test with PCNTR = 0, no RC/CC/DS and data length of 0x10 | Returns 0x0052 | | +| 22 | Test with PCNTR = 7, no RC/CC/DS and data length of 0x03 (ciphering shall be used) | Returns 0x0052 | | +| 23 | Test with PCNTR = 0, with RC/CC/DS length of 8 and secured data length of 0x10 | Returns 0x0052 | | +| 24 | Test with PCNTR = 0, no RC/CC/DS and SecuredDataLength = 00 | Returns 0x0052 | | +| 25 | Test with PCNTR = 0, no RC/CC/DS and UserDataLength = maximum length (0x58) for a single SMS CB | Returns 0x0052 | | +| 26 | Verify it is the first Cell Broadcast Page TLV:
Send a SMS CB with 2 Cell Broadcast Page TLV with two different user data lengths: 0x18 and 0x23 (with PCNTR = 0, no RC/CC/DS) | Returns 0x0052 and GetValueShort(6) returns 0x0016 (UDL of first Page TLV) | | +| 27 | Send envelope SMS-CB Formatted.
FindTLV() with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES.
GetShortMessageLength() and then getValueByte() with offset 0 | GetValueByte() returns 0x00 (TS 23.041 first byte) | | +| | UNFORMATTED SMS PP ENV Triggering | | | +| 28 | Test with UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV and TP-OA length of 2, and user data length of 0x3D | Returns 0x003D | | +| 29 | Test with TP-OA length of 12, and user data length of 0x3D | Returns 0x003D | | +| 30 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x00 | Returns 0x0000 with no exception | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 31 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x7F | Returns 0x007F | | +| 32 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x80 | Returns 0x0080 | | +| 33 | Test with UserDataLength = maximum length: 0x8C for a single SMS | Returns 0x008C | | +| 34 | Verify it is the first TPDU TLV:
Send a SMS PP with 2 TPDU TLV with two different user data lengths: 0x18 and 0x23 | Returns 0x0018 | | +| 35 | Send envelope SMS-PP Unformatted.
FindTLV() with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES.
getShortMessageLength() and then
getValueByte() with offset 0 (first user data = 0x55) | getValueByte() returns 0x00
(TS 23.040 [11] first byte) | | +| UNFORMATTED SMS PP UPD Triggering | | | | +| 36 | Test with UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD and TP-OA length of 2, and user data length of 0x3D | Returns 0x003D | | +| 37 | Test with TP-OA length of 12, and user data length of 0x3D | Returns 0x003D | | +| 38 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x00 | Returns 0x0000 with no exception | | +| 39 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x7F | Returns 0x007F | | +| 40 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x80 | Returns 0x0080 | | +| 41 | Verify it is the first TPDU TLV:
Send a SMS PP with 2 TPDU TLV with two different user data lengths: 0x18 and 0x23 | Returns 0x0018 | | +| 42 | Test with UserDataLength = maximum length: 0x8C for a single SMS | Returns 0x008C | | +| 43 | Send envelope SMS-PP Formatted.
FindTLV() with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES.
GetShortMessageLength() and then
getValueByte() with offset 0 | getValueByte() returns 0x00
(TS 23.040 [11] first byte) | | +| UNFORMATTED SMS CB Triggering | | | | +| 44 | Test with UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB | Returns 0x0052 | | +| 45 | Verify it is the first Cell Broadcast Page TLV:
Send a SMS CB with 2 Cell Broadcast Page TLV with two different user data lengths: 0x58 and 0x23 | Returns 0x0052 | | +| 46 | Send envelope SMS-CB Formatted.
FindTLV() with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES.
GetShortMessageLength() and then
getValueByte() with offset 0 | getValueByte() returns 0x00 (TS 23.041 first byte) | | +| Unrecognized Envelope Triggering | | | | +| 47 | Send an Unrecognized Envelope with neither TPDU TLV nor Cell Broadcast Page TLV, then call the method. | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT | | + +#### 5.2.2.4 Method getShortMessageOffset + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gsmo + +##### 5.2.2.4.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public short getShortMessageOffset() + throws uicc.toolkit.ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.4.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The method shall return the offset of the Short Message first byte contained in the User Data part of the SMS TPDU TLV contained in the USATEnvelopeHandler. +- CRRN2: The offset is from the first SMS TPDU TLV. + +- CRRN3: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV or EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV. +- CRRN4: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD or EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD. +- CRRN5: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB or EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_CB. +- CRRN6: If the method is successful and if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV or EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV, the selected TLV should be the SMS TPDU TLV. +- CRRN7: If the method is successful and if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD or EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD, the selected TLV should be the SMS TPDU TLV. +- CRRN8: If the method is successful and if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB or EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_CB, the selected TLV should be the Cell Broadcast Page TLV. +- CRRN9: The method returns the offset of the first byte after the UDH, if any. + +###### **5.2.2.4.1.2 Parameter errors** + +No requirements. + +###### **5.2.2.4.1.3 Context errors** + +- CRRC1: The method shall throw ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT in case of unavailable SMS TPDU TLV or Cell Broadcast Page Comprehension TLV element. +- CRRC2: The method shall throw ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT in case of wrong data format. + +##### **5.2.2.4.2 Test area files** + +Specific triggering: + +- FORMATTED SMS CB. +- UNFORMATTED SMS CB. +- FORMATTED SMS PP UPD. +- UNFORMATTED SMS PP UPD. +- FORMATED SMS PP ENV. +- UNFORMATED SMS PP ENV. +- UNRECOGNIZED\_ENVELOPE. +- For Formatted triggering if CC/RC/DS is used, the security parameters are the one defined in clause "5.3.8 Framework Security Management". + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gsm0.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gsm0\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gsm0.cap + +##### **5.2.2.4.3 Test coverage** + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 1 to 30 | + +| | | +|----|----------------------| +| N2 | 4, 11, 21, 26 | +| N3 | 1 to 7 and 19 to 23 | +| N4 | 8 to 14 and 24 to 28 | +| N5 | 15 to 18, 29, 30 | +| N6 | 6, 22 | +| N7 | 13, 27 | +| N8 | 18, 30 | +| N9 | 1 to 18, 23, 28 | +| C1 | 31 | +| C2 | Not applicable | + +##### 5.2.2.4.4 + +##### Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------| +| | FORMATTED SMS PP ENV triggering | | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | Test with TP-OA length of 2 and RC/CC/DS length is 0 | Returns 0x11 | | +| 2 | Test with TP-OA length of 12 and RC/CC/DS length is 0 | Returns 0x16 | | +| 3 | Test with RC/CC/DS length of 8 and TP-OA length is 2 | Returns 0x11 | | +| 4 | Send a SMS PP with 2 TPDU TLV and inside two different secured data offsets | Returns 0x14 ( the first offset ) | | +| 5 | Same test as 1 but without any secured data | Returns 0x11 | | +| 6 | Test with FORMATTED_SMS_PP ENV
Verify after call of the method the current TLV is the TPDU TLV:
findTLV device identities, getSecuredDataOffset and then getValueByte to verify that the current TLV is the TPDU TLV | Returns 0x40 | | +| 7 | Same test as 1, but with a concatenated SMS (2 Short Messages and maximum Secured Data Length = 0x00FA) | Returns 0x15 | | +| FORMATTED SMS PP UPD triggering | | | | +| 8 | Same test as 1 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x11 | | +| 9 | Same test as 2 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x16 | | +| 10 | Same test as 3 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x11 | | +| 11 | Same test as 4 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x14 ( the first offset ) | | +| 12 | Same test as 5 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x11 | | +| 13 | Test with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD
Verify after call of the method the current TLV is the TPDU TLV:
findTLV device identities, getSecuredDataOffset and then getValueByte to verify that the current TLV is the TPDU TLV | Returns 0x40 | | +| 14 | Same test as 10, but with a concatenated SMS (2 Short Messages and maximum Secured Data Length = 0x00FA) | Returns 0x21 | | +| FORMATTED SMS CB triggering | | | | +| 15 | Same test as 1 but with FORMATTED_SMS_CB | Returns 0x06 | | +| 16 | Same test as 3 but with FORMATTED_SMS_CB | Returns 0x06 | | +| 17 | Same test as 5 but with FORMATTED_SMS_CB | Returns 0x06 | | +| 18 | Test with FORMATTED_SMS_CB
Verify after call of the method the current TLV is the Cell Broadcast Page TLV:
FindTLV() device identities, getSecuredDataOffset() and then getValueByte() to verify that the current TLV is the Cell Broadcast Page TLV | Returns 0x00 | | +| UNFORMATTED SMS PP ENV triggering | | | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 19 | Test with TP-OA length of 2 | Returns 0x0E | | +| 20 | Test with TP-OA length of 12 | Returns 0x13 | | +| 21 | Send a SMS PP with 2 TPDU TLV and inside two different UDL offsets | Returns 0x11 (the first offset) | | +| 22 | Test with UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP ENV
Verify after call of the method the current TLV is the TPDU TLV:
findTLV device identities, getShortMessageOffset and then getValueByte to verify that the current TLV is the TPDU TLV | Returns 00 | | +| 23 | Same test as 19, but with a concatenated SMS (2 Short Messages and maximum User Data Length = 0x0102) | Returns 0x0E or 0x0F (depending of UDHI implementation) | | +| UNFORMATTED SMS PP UPD triggering | | | | +| 24 | Same test as 19 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x0E | | +| 25 | Same test as 20 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x13 | | +| 26 | Same test as 21 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x11 ( the first offset ) | | +| 27 | Test with FORMATTED_SMS_UPD
Verify after call of the method the current TLV is the TPDU TLV:
findTLV device identities, getShortMessageOffset and then getValueByte to verify that the current TLV is the TPDU TLV | Returns 0x11 | | +| 28 | Same test as 25, but with a concatenated SMS (2 Short Messages and maximum Secured Data Length = 0x00FA) | Returns 0x0E or 0x0F (depending of UDHI implementation) | | +| UNFORMATTED SMS CB Triggering | | | | +| 29 | Test with UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB | Returns 0x06 | | +| 30 | Send envelope SMS-CB Unformatted.
FindTLV() with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES.
getShortMessageOffset() and then getValueByte() with offset 0 | GetValueByte() returns 0x00 (TS 23.041 first byte) | | +| Unrecognized Envelope Triggering | | | | +| 31 | Send an Unrecognized Envelope with neither TPDU TLV nor Cell Broadcast Page TLV, then call the method. | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT | | + +#### 5.2.2.5 Method getTPUDLOffset + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gtpo + +##### 5.2.2.5.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public short getTPUDLOffset() + throws uicc.toolkit.ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.5.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The method shall return the TPUDL offset in a SMS TPDU TLV. +- CRRN2: The offset is from the first SMS TPDU TLV. +- CRRN3: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV. +- CRRN4: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD. +- CRRN5: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV. + +- CRRN6: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD. +- CRRN7: If the method is successful, the selected TLV should be the SMS TPDU TLV. + +###### 5.2.2.5.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.2.2.5.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRC1: The method shall throw ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT in case of unavailable SMS TPDU TLV element. +- CRRC2: The method shall throw ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT if the TPUDL field does not exist. + +##### 5.2.2.5.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: + +- FORMATTED SMS PP UPD. +- UNFORMATTED SMS PP UPD. +- UNFORMATTED SMS PP ENV. +- FORMATTED SMS PP ENV. +- UNFORMATTED SMS CB. + +Test Source     Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gtpo.java + +Test Applet:    Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gtpo\_1.java + +Cap File:       Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gtpo.cap + +##### 5.2.2.5.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|--------------------| +| N1 | 1 to 21. | +| N2 | 4, 10, 15, 20. | +| N3 | 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 | +| N4 | 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 | +| N5 | 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 | +| N6 | 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 | +| N7 | 6 | +| C1 | 22 | +| C2 | Not testable | + +##### 5.2.2.5.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------| +| | FORMATTED SMS PP ENV triggering | | | + +| | | | | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--| +| 1 | Test with TP-OA length of 2 | Returns 0x0D | | +| 2 | Test with TP-OA length of 6 | Returns 0x0F | | +| 3 | Test with TP-OA length of 12 | Returns 0x12 | | +| 4 | Send a SMS PP with 2 TPDU TLV and inside two different UDL offsets | Returns 0x10 (the first offset) | | +| 5 | Same test as 1, but with a concatenated SMS (2 Short Messages and maximum Secured Data Length = 0x00FA) | Returns 0x0D | | +| 6 | Verify after call of the method the current TLV is the TPDU TLV:
findTLV device identities, getTPUDLOffset and then getByte to verify that the current TLV is the TPDU TLV | Returns 0x40 | | +| | FORMATTED SMS PP UPD triggering | | | +| 7 | Same test as 1 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x0D | | +| 8 | Same test as 2 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x0F | | +| 9 | Same test as 3 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x12 | | +| 10 | Same test as 4 but with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x10 (the first offset) | | +| 11 | Same test as 7, but with a concatenated SMS (2 Short Messages and maximum Secured Data Length = 0x00FA) | Returns 0x0D | | +| | UNFORMATTED SMS PP UPD triggering | | | +| 12 | Same test as 1 but with UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x0D | | +| 13 | Same test as 2 but with UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x0F | | +| 14 | Same test as 3 but with UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x12 | | +| 15 | Same test as 4 but with UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD | Returns 0x12 (the first offset) | | +| 16 | Same test as 12, but with a concatenated SMS (2 Short Messages and maximum User Data Length = 0x010C) | Returns 0x0D | | +| | UNFORMATTED SMS PP ENV triggering | | | +| 17 | Same test as 1 but with UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV | Returns 0x0D | | +| 18 | Same test as 2 but with UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV | Returns 0x0F | | +| 19 | Same test as 3 but with UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV | Returns 0x12 | | +| 20 | Same test as 4 but with UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV | Returns 0x10 (the first offset) | | +| 21 | Same test as 17, but with a concatenated SMS (2 Short Messages and maximum User Data Length = 0x010C) | Returns 0x0D | | +| | UNFORMATTED SMS CB triggering | | | +| 22 | Send an envelope Unformatted SMS CB, getTPUDLOffset | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT | | + +#### 5.2.2.6 Method getUserDataLength + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gudl + +##### 5.2.2.6.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public short getUserDataLength() + throws uicc.toolkit.ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.6.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The method shall return the length of the User Data contained in the SMS TPDU TLV element. +- CRRN2: The length is from the first SMS TPDU TLV element. +- CRRN3: If the SMS TPDU TLV element is available, it becomes the selected TLV +- CRRN4: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV. +- CRRN5: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD. +- CRRN6: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_UNFORMATED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV. +- CRRN7: The method can be used if the event is EVENT\_UNFORMATED\_SMS\_PP\_UDP. + +###### 5.2.2.6.1.2 Context errors + +- CRRC1: The method shall throw UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT in case of unavailable TPDU TLV element. +- CRRC2: The method shall throw UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT in case of wrong data format. + +##### 5.2.2.6.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: + +- FORMATTED SMS PP UPD. +- UNFORMATTED SMS PP UPD. +- FORMATED SMS PP ENV. +- UNFORMATED SMS PP ENV. +- For Formatted triggering if CC/RC/DS is used, the security parameters are the one defined in clause "5.3.8 Framework Security Management". + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gudl.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gudl\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gudl.cap + +##### 5.2.2.6.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|--------------------------------| +| N1 | All test cases excepted:
53 | +| N2 | 11, 26, 37, 45 | +| N3 | 12, 27, 38, 46 | +| N4 | 1 to 15 | +| N5 | 16 to 30 | +| N6 | 31 to 38 | +| N7 | 39 to 46 | +| C1 | 47 | +| C2 | Not applicable | + +##### 5.2.2.6.4 + +###### Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| FORMATTED SMS PP ENV Triggering | | | | +| 1 | Test with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV and TP-OA length of 2 and user data length of 0x3D | Returns 0x003D | | +| 2 | Test with TP-OA length of 12 and user data length of 0x3D | Returns 0x003D | | +| 3 | Test with RC/CC/DS length of 0 and secured data length of 0x10 | Returns 0x0023 | | +| 4 | Test with RC/CC/DS length of 8 and secured data length of 0x10 | Returns 0x002B | | +| 5 | Test with PCNTR = 0, no RC/CC/DS and data length of 0x10 | Returns 0x0023 | | +| 6 | Test with PCNTR = 7, no RC/CC/DS and data length of 0x03 (ciphering shall be used) | Returns 0x001D | | +| 7 | Test with SecuredDataLength = 00 and no RC/CC/DS | Returns 0x0013 | | +| 8 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x7F | Returns 0x007F | | +| 9 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x80 | Returns 0x0080 | | +| 10 | Test with UserDataLength = maximum length (0x8C) for a single SMS | Returns 0x008C | | +| 11 | Verify it is the first TPDU TLV:
Send a SMS PP with 2 TPDU TLV with two different user data lengths: 0x18 and 0x23 | Returns 0x0018 | | +| 12 | Send envelope SMS-PP Formatted.
FindTLV() with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES.
GetUserDataLength() and then getValueByte() with offset 0 | GetValueByte() returns 0x40(TS 23.040 [11] first byte) | | +| 13 | Test with UserDataLength = 0xFF with 2 concatenated SMS | Returns 0x00FF | | +| 14 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x100 with 2 concatenated SMS | Returns 0x0100 | | +| 15 | Test with UserDataLength = maximum length (0x010D) with 2 concatenated SMS | Returns 0x010D | | +| FORMATTED SMS PP UPD Triggering | | | | +| 16 | Test with FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD and TP-OA length of 2 and user data length of 0x3D | Returns 0x003D | | +| 17 | Test with TP-OA length of 12 and user data length of 0x3D | Returns 0x003D | | +| 18 | Test with RC/CC/DS length of 0 and secured data length of 0x10 | Returns 0x0023 | | +| 19 | Test with RC/CC/DS length of 8 and secured data length of 0x10 | Returns 0x002B | | +| 20 | Test with PCNTR = 0, no RC/CC/DS and data length of 0x10 | Returns 0x0023 | | +| 21 | Test with PCNTR = 7, no RC/CC/DS and data length of 0x03 (ciphering shall be used) | Returns 0x001D | | +| 22 | Test with SecuredDataLength = 00 and no RC/CC/DS | Returns 0x0013 | | +| 23 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x7F | Returns 0x007F | | +| 24 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x80 | Returns 0x0080 | | +| 25 | Test with UserDataLength = maximum length(0x8C) for a single SMS | Returns 0x008C | | +| 26 | Verify it is the first TPDU TLV:
Send a SMS PP with 2 TPDU TLV with two different user data lengths: 0x18 and 0x23 | Returns 0x0018 | | +| 27 | Send envelope SMS-PP Formatted.
FindTLV() with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES.
GetUserDataLength() and then getValueByte() with offset 0 | GetValueByte() returns 0x40(TS 23.040 [11] first byte) | | +| 28 | Test with UserDataLength = 0xFF with 2 concatenated SMS | Returns 0x00FF | | +| 29 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x100 with 2 concatenated SMS | Returns 0x0100 | | + +| | | | | +|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|--| +| 30 | Test with UserDataLength = maximum length (0x010D) with 2 concatenated SMS | Returns 0x010D | | +| UNFORMATTED SMS PP ENV Triggering | | | | +| 31 | Test with UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV and TP-OA length of 2, and user data length of 0x3D | Returns 0x003D | | +| 32 | Test with TP-OA length of 12, and user data length of 0x3D | Returns 0x003D | | +| 33 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x00 | Returns 0x0000 | | +| 34 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x7F | Returns 0x007F | | +| 35 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x80 | Returns 0x0080 | | +| 36 | Test with UserDataLength = maximum length: 0x8C for a single SMS | Returns 0x008C | | +| 37 | Verify it is the first TPDU TLV:
Send a SMS PP with 2 TPDU TLV with two different user data lengths: 0x18 and 0x23 | Returns 0x0018 | | +| 38 | Send envelope SMS-PP Unformatted.
FindTLV() with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES.
GetUserDataLength() and then getValueByte() with offset 0 (first user data = 0x55) | GetValueByte() returns 0x00
(TS 23.040 [11] first byte) | | +| UNFORMATTED SMS PP UPD Triggering | | | | +| 39 | Test with UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD and TP-OA length of 2, and user data length of 0x3D | Returns 0x003D | | +| 40 | Test with TP-OA length of 12, and user data length of 0x3D | Returns 0x003D | | +| 41 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x00 | Returns 0x0000 | | +| 42 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x7F | Returns 0x007F | | +| 43 | Test with UserDataLength = 0x80 | Returns 0x0080 | | +| 44 | Test with UserDataLength = maximum length: 0x8C for a single SMS | Returns 0x008C | | +| 45 | Verify it is the first TPDU TLV:
Send a SMS PP with 2 TPDU TLV with two different user data lengths: 0x18 and 0x23 | Returns 0x0018 | | +| 46 | Send envelope SMS-PP Unformatted.
FindTLV() with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES.
GetUserDataLength() and then getValueByte() with offset 0 | GetValueByte() returns 0x00
(TS 23.040 [11] first byte) | | +| UNRECOGNIZED ENVELOPE Triggering | | | | +| 47 | Test with an UNRECOGNIZED_ENVELOPE | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT | | + +#### 5.2.2.7 Method getItemIdentifier + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Giid + +##### 5.2.2.7.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public byte getItemIdentifier() + throws ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.7.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The method shall return the item identifier byte value. +- CRRN2: The item identifier byte value returned shall be from the first Item Identifier TLV element. +- CRRN3: If the element is available it becomes the TLV selected. +- CRRN4: The item identifier is available for all triggered toolkit applets from the invocation to the termination of their processToolkit method if the USATEnvelopeHandler is available. + +###### 5.2.2.7.1.2 Parameter Errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.2.2.7.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRC1: The method shall throw `ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT` if the item identifier TLV is not present. +- CRRC2: The method shall throw `ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES` if the item identifier byte is missing in the Item Identifier Comprehension TLV. + +##### 5.2.2.7.2 Test area files + +Test Source: `Test_Api_2_Ueh_Giid.java` + +Test Applet: `Api_2_Ueh_Giid_1.java` + +Cap File: `Api_2_Ueh_Giid.cap` + +##### 5.2.2.7.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 1, 2, 3 | +| N2 | 2, 3 | +| N3 | 4 | +| N4 | 6 | +| C1 | 5 | +| C2 | 7 | + +##### 5.2.2.7.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | Send envelope formatted SMS with an item identifier TLV and identifier value of 03 | Returns 03 | | +| 2 | Send envelope formatted SMS with two item identifier TLV with first value FF and second 44 | Returns FF | | +| 3 | Send envelope formatted SMS with two item identifier TLV with first value 81 and second 44, call twice the method getItemIdentifier() | Returns 81
Returns 81 | | +| 4 | Send envelope formatted SMS with item identifier TLV and value of 66. FindTLV() with TAG 02. getItemIdentifier() and then getValueByte() with offset 0 | getItemIdentifier()=getValueByte() | | +| 5 | Send envelope formatted SMS without item identifier TLV and getItemIdentifier() | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT | | +| 6 | Send envelope formatted SMS with item identifier TLV (66), send proactive command. Then getItemIdentifier() | Returns 66 | | +| 7 | Send envelope formatted SMS with item identifier TLV but without item number | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES | | + +#### 5.2.2.8 Method `getChannelIdentifier` + +Test Area Reference: `Api_2_Ueh_Gcid` + +##### 5.2.2.8.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public byte getChannelIdentifier() + throws ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.8.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The method shall return the channel identifier byte value. +- CRRN2: The channel identifier byte value returned shall be from the first Channel status TLV element. +- CRRN3: If the element is available it becomes the currently selected TLV. +- CRRN4: The channel identifier is available for all triggered toolkit applets from the invocation to the termination of their processToolkit method if the USATEnvelopeHandler is available. + +###### 5.2.2.8.1.2 Context errors + +- CRRC1: The method shall throw ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT if the Channel status TLV is not present. +- CRRC2: The method shall throw ToolkitException.OUT\_OF\_TLV\_BOUNDARIES if the Comprehension TLV Channel Status length is equal to 0. + +##### 5.2.2.8.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gcid.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gcid\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gcid.cap + +##### 5.2.2.8.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 1, 2 | +| N2 | 3 | +| N3 | 3 | +| N4 | 5 | +| C1 | 4 | +| C2 | 6 | + +##### 5.2.2.8.4 + +##### Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 0 | 1- Applet1 is installed with maximum number of channel = 07.
2- Applet1 builds proactive commands OPEN CHANNEL with init() method in order to open all channels.
ProactiveHandler.send() method is called. | | 2- OPEN CHANNEL proactive command is fetched

TERMINAL RESPONSE is issued with Channel Id from 01 to 07 | +| 1 | Successful Call

1- Send envelope Event Download Channel Status with channel status TLV:
channel status value = 0x8100.

2- Call USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelIdentifier() method | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- Returns 0x01 | | +| 2 | Two channel status elements

1- Send envelope Event Download Channel Status with two channel status TLV:
first value = 0x8400
second value = 0x8500.

2- Call twice the USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelIdentifier() method | 2- Returns twice 0x04 | | +| 3 | Verify current TLV

1- Send envelope Event Download Channel Status with channel status TLV:
Channel Status value = 0x0605

ViewHandler.FindTLV() with Device Identity Tag.

2- Call USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelIdentifier() method.

3- Compare USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelIdentifier() and then ViewHandler.getValueByte(0). | 2- Returns 0x06

3- GetChannelIdentifier() =getValueByte(0) | | +| 4 | UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT exception

1- Send envelope Menu Selection without Channel Status TLV.

2- Call USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelIdentifier() method. | 2- A Toolkit exception UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT is thrown. | | +| 5 | Successful Call

1- Send Envelope Event Download Channel Status with Channel Status TLV:
Channel status value = 0x0600

2- Call USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelIdentifier() method. | 1- Returns 0x06 | | +| 6 | OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES exception

1- Send unrecognized envelope with a Channel Status TLV having a length equal to 0.

2- Call USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelIdentifier() method. | 2- A Toolkit exception OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown. | | + +#### 5.2.2.9 Method getChannelStatus + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gcst + +##### 5.2.2.9.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public short getChannelStatus(byte channelIdentifier) + throws ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.9.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The method shall return the value of the first Channel Status TLV element whose channel identifier is equal to the channelIdentifier parameter. +- CRRN2: The Channel Status value returned shall be from the element whose channel identifier is equal to the ChannelIdentifier parameter. +- CRRN3: If the element is available it becomes the currently selected TLV. +- CRRN4: The channel status is available for all triggered toolkit applets from the invocation to the termination of their processToolkit method if the USATEnvelopeHandler is available. + +###### 5.2.2.9.1.2 Context errors + +- CRRN1: The method shall throw ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT if no Channel Status TLV element with the right identifier could be found. +- CRRN2: The method shall throw ToolkitException.OUT\_OF\_TLV\_BOUNDARIES if a Channel Status TLV element with the right identifier could be found but its value is less than 2 bytes long. + +##### 5.2.2.9.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gcst.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gcst\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gcst.cap + +##### 5.2.2.9.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 6 | +| N2 | 5, 7 | +| N3 | 8 | +| N4 | 9 | +| C1 | 1, 2 | +| C2 | 3, 4 | + +##### 5.2.2.9.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------|----------------------------------|------------------| +|----|-------------|----------------------------------|------------------| + +| | | | | +|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 0 | 1- Applet1 is installed with maximum number of channel = 01.
2- Applet1 builds proactive commands OPEN CHANNEL with init() method in order to open a channel.
ProactiveHandler.send() method is called. | | 2- OPEN CHANNEL proactive command is fetched

TERMINAL RESPONSE is issued with channel status value = 0x8100 | +| 1 | Channel status TLV is not present

1- Send envelope unrecognized

2- Call USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelStatus(0x01) method. | 2- UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT
ToolkitException is thrown | | +| 2 | Channel status TLV with the identifier is not present

1- Send envelope Event Download Channel Status with Channel status Value = 0x8100

2- Call USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelStatus(0x02) method. | 2- UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT
ToolkitException is thrown | | +| 3 | Channel status TLV with a length equal to 0

1- Send envelope unrecognized with Channel status TLV with a length equal to 0.

2- Call USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelStatus(0x01) method. | 2- UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT
ToolkitException is thrown | | +| 4 | Channel status TLV with a length equal to 1

1- - Send envelope unrecognized with Channel status TLV with a length equal to 1.

2- Call USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelStatus(0x01) method. | 2- OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES
ToolkitException is thrown | | +| 5 | Get channel status value

1- Send envelope Event Download Channel Status with Channel status value=0x8100.

2- Call USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelStatus(0x01) method. | 2- Returns 0x8100 | | +| 6 | Get channel status value with 2 TLV

1- Send envelope Event Download Channel Status with 2 channel status value: 0x8100 and 0x8101.

2- Call USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelStatus(0x01) method. | 2- Returns 0x8100 | | +| 7 | Get channel status value with 2 TLV

1- Send envelope Event Download Channel | | | + +| | | | | +|---|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |

Status with 2 channel status value: 0x8100 and 0x8201.

2- Call
USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelStatus(0x02)
method.

| 2- Returns 0x8201 | | +| 8 |

Channel status TLV is currently selected TLV

1- Send envelope Event Download Channel Status with channel status value 0x8100.
Call ViewHandler.FindTLV() method with Device Identity Tag.

2- Call
USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelStatus(0x01)
method.

3- Compare
USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelStatus(0x01)
and ViewHandler.getValueShort(0) method
results.

|

2- Returns 0x8100

3- Check getChannelStatus()
=getValueShort(0)

| | +| 9 |

Get channel status value after a proactive command

1- Send envelope Event Download Channel Status with Channel status value=0x8100.

2- Call
USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelStatus(0x01)
method.

3- Send a proactive command display text

4- Call
USATEnvelopeHandler.getChannelStatus(0x01)
method.

|

2- Returns 0x8100

4- Returns 0x8100

|

3- DISPLAY TEXT proactive
command is fetched

TERMINAL RESPONSE is
issued

| + +#### 5.2.2.10 Method getSize + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gtsz + +##### 5.2.2.10.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public short getSize() +``` + +###### 5.2.2.10.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: Returns the BER TLV size, this includes the tag and the length. + +###### 5.2.2.10.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements + +###### 5.2.2.10.1.3 Context errors + +No requirements + +##### 5.2.2.10.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: Unrecognized Envelope + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gtsz.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gtsz\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gtsz.cap + +##### 5.2.2.10.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| 1 | 1, 2 | + +##### 5.2.2.10.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------| +| 0 | Send an unrecognized envelope of length 0x33 (including tag and length) | | | +| 1 | Call getSize() method just after triggering of the application. | Returns 0x33 | | +| 2 | Call getSize() method after a proactive command. | Returns 0x33 | | + +#### 5.2.2.11 Method getTag + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gttg + +##### 5.2.2.11.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public short getTag() +``` + +###### 5.2.2.11.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: Returns the BER Tag of the BER TLV list. + +###### 5.2.2.11.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.2.2.11.1.3 Context errors + +No requirements. + +##### 5.2.2.11.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: Unrecognized Envelope + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gttg.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gttg\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gttg.cap + +##### 5.2.2.11.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| 1 | 1, 2 | + +##### 5.2.2.11.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------| +| 0 | Send an unrecognized envelope | | | +| 1 | Call getTag() method just after triggering of the application. | Returns 0x01 | | +| 2 | Call getTag() method after a proactive command. | Returns 0x01 | | + +#### 5.2.2.12 Method compareValue + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Cprv + +##### 5.2.2.12.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public byte compareValue(short valueOffset, + byte[] compareBuffer, + short compareOffset, + short compareLength) + throws java.lang.NullPointerException, + java.lang.ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException, + ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.12.1.1 Normal execution + +Compares the last found TLV element with a buffer: + +- CRRN1: returns 0 if identical. +- CRRN2: returns -1 if the first miscomparing byte in Comprehension TLV List is less than that in compareBuffer. +- CRRN3: returns 1 if the first miscomparing byte in Comprehension TLV List is greater than that in compareBuffer. + +###### 5.2.2.12.1.2 Parameter errors + +- CRRP1: if compareBuffer is null NullPointerException shall be thrown. +- CRRP2: if compareOffset or compareLength or both would cause access outside array bounds, or if compareLength is negative ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException shall be thrown. +- CRRP3: if valueOffset, dstLength or both are out of the current TLV an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.OUT\_OF\_TLV\_BOUNDARIES. + +###### 5.2.2.12.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRRC1: if the handler is busy an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.HANDLER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE. +- CRRRC2: in case of unavailable TLV element an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT. + +##### 5.2.2.12.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: Unrecognized Envelope + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Cprv.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Cprv\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Cprv.cap + +##### 5.2.2.12.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|-------------------------------------------| +| N1 | 12, 15 | +| N2 | 13, 16, 18 | +| N3 | 14, 17 | +| P1 | 1 | +| P2 | 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 | +| P3 | 7, 8, 9, 10 | +| C1 | Does not apply for
USATEnvelopeHandler | +| C2 | 11 | + +##### 5.2.2.12.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | Search TLV 02h
compareValue() with a null compareBuffer | NullPointerException is thrown | | +| 2 | Search TLV 0Bh
compareOffset ≥ compareBuffer.length
compareValue()
compareBuffer.length = 5
compareOffset = 5
compareLength = 1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 3 | compareOffset < 0
compareValue()
compareBuffer.length = 5
compareOffset = -1
compareLength = 1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 4 | compareLength > compareBuffer.length
compareValue()
compareBuffer.length = 5
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 6 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 5 | compareOffset + compareLength > compareBuffer.length
compareValue()
compareBuffer.length = 5
compareOffset = 3
compareLength = 3 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 6 | compareLength < 0
compareValue()
compareBuffer.length = 5
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = -1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 7 | Search TLV 06h
valueOffset ≥ TLV Length
compareValue()
valueOffset = 6
compareBuffer.length = 15
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 1 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 8 | valueOffset < 0
compareValue()
valueOffset = -1
compareBuffer.length = 15 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 1 | | | +| 9 | compareLength > TLV length
compareValue()
valueOffset = 0
compareBuffer.length = 15
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 7 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 10 | valueOffset + compareLength > TLV length
compareValue()
valueOffset = 2
compareBuffer.length = 15
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 5 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 11 | Search TLV 01h
compareValue() | Result is TLV_NOT_FOUND
ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT is thrown | | +| 12 | Search TLV 06h
Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
81 11 22 33 44 F5 | | | +| | Compare buffers
compareValue()
valueOffset = 0
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 6 | Result is 00h | | +| 13 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
7F 11 22 33 44 F5 | | | +| | Compare buffers with same parameters | Result is -1 | | +| 14 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
83 11 22 33 44 F5 | | | +| | Compare buffers with same parameters | Result is -1 | | +| 15 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
55 55 55 81 11 22 33 44 F5
55 55 55 55 55 | | | +| | Compare buffers
compareValue()
valueOffset = 1
compareOffset = 4
compareLength = 5 | Result is 00h | | +| 16 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
55 55 55 81 10 22 33 44 F5
55 55 55 55 55 | | | +| | Compare buffers with same parameters | Result is +1 | | +| 17 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
55 55 55 81 12 22 33 44 F5
55 55 55 55 55 | | | +| | Compare buffers with same parameters | Result is -1 | | +| 18 | Successful call, compareValue() with length=0
CompareBuffer.length = 15
CompareOffset = 15
CompareLength = 0 | Result of compareValue() is 0 | | + +#### 5.2.2.13 Method copy + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Copy + +##### 5.2.2.13.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public short copy(byte[] dstBuffer, +``` + +``` + + short dstOffset, + short dstLength) + throws java.lang.NullPointerException, + java.lang.ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException, + ToolkitException + +``` + +###### 5.2.2.13.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: copies the Comprehension TLV list contained in the handler to the destination byte array. +- CRRN2: returns dstOffset + dstLength. + +###### 5.2.2.13.1.2 Parameter errors + +- CRRP1: if dstBuffer is null a NullPointerException is thrown. +- CRRP2: if dstOffset or dstLength or both would cause access outside array bounds, or if dstLength is negative, an ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown. +- CRRP3: if dstLength is greater than the length of the Comprehension TLV List, an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException. OUT\_OF\_TLV\_BOUNDARIES. + +###### 5.2.2.13.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRC1: if the handler is busy an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.HANDLER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE. + +##### 5.2.2.13.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: Unrecognized Envelope + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Copy.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Copy\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Copy.cap + +##### 5.2.2.13.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|-------------------------------------------| +| N1 | 9, 11, 13, 15 | +| N2 | 8, 10, 12, 14, 16 | +| P1 | 1 | +| P2 | 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 | +| P3 | 7 | +| C1 | Does not apply for
USATEnvelopeHandler | + +##### 5.2.2.13.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | NULL as parameter to dstBuffer | NullPointerException is thrown | | +| 2 | dstOffset ≥ dstBuffer.length
copy()
dstBuffer.length = 5
dstOffset = 5
dstLength = 1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 3 | dstOffset < 0
copy()
dstBuffer.length = 5
dstOffset = -1
dstLength = 1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 4 | dstLength > dstBuffer.length
copy()
dstBuffer.length = 5
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 6 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 5 | DstOffset + dstLength > dstBuffer.length
copy()
DstBuffer.length = 5
DstOffset = 3
DstLength = 3 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 6 | dstLength < 0
copy()
dstBuffer.length = 5
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = -1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 7 | DstLength > length of the Comprehension TLV list
copy()
DstBuffer.length = 48
DstOffset = 0
DstLength = 48 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 8 | Successful call, dstBuffer is the whole buffer
copy()
DstBuffer.length = 47
DstOffset = 0
DstLength = 47 | Result of copy() is 0X0047 | | +| 9 | Compare the buffer | Result of arrayCompare() is 0 | | +| 10 | Successful call, dstBuffer is part of a buffer
copy()
DstBuffer.length = 50
dstOffset = 3
dstLength = 47 | Result of copy() is 0X0032 | | +| 11 | Compare the whole buffer | Result of arrayCompare() is 0 | | +| 12 | Successful call, dstBuffer is part of a buffer
copy()
dstBuffer.length = 15
dstOffset = 3
dstLength = 6 | Result of copy() is 0X0009 | | +| 13 | Compare the whole buffer | Result of arrayCompare() is 0 | | +| 14 | Successful call, dstBuffer is part of a buffer
copy()
dstBuffer.length = 260
dstOffset = 257
dstLength = 3 | Result of copy() is 0X0104 | | +| 15 | Compare the whole buffer | Result of arrayCompare() is 0 | | +| 16 | Successful call, copy() with length =0
dstBuffer.length = 260
dstOffset = 260
dstLength = 0 | Result of copy() is 0x104 | | + +#### 5.2.2.14 Method copyValue + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Cpyv + +##### 5.2.2.14.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant with its definition in the API. + +``` +public short copyValue(short valueOffset, + byte[] dstBuffer, + short dstOffset, + short dstLength) +throws java.lang.NullPointerException, +java.lang.ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException, +ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.14.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: copies a part of the last TLV element which has been found, into a destination. buffer. +- CRRN2: returns dstOffset + dstLength. + +###### 5.2.2.14.1.2 Parameter errors + +- CRRP1: if dstBuffer is null NullPointerException is thrown. +- CRRP2: if dstOffset or dstLength or both would cause access outside array bounds, or if dstLength is negative ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown. +- CRRP3: if valueOffset, dstLength or both are out of the current TLV an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException OUT\_OF\_TLV\_BOUNDARIES. + +###### 5.2.2.14.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRC1: if the handler is busy an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.HANDLER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE. +- CRRC2: in case of unavailable TLV element an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT. + +##### 5.2.2.14.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: Unrecognized Envelope + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Cpyv.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Cpyv\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Cpyv.cap + +##### 5.2.2.14.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|-------------------------------------------| +| N1 | 13, 15 | +| N2 | 12, 14, 16 | +| P1 | 1 | +| P2 | 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 | +| P3 | 7, 8, 9, 10 | +| C1 | Does not apply for
USATEnvelopeHandler | +| C2 | 11 | + +##### 5.2.2.14.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | Search TLV 02h
copyValue() with a null dstBuffer | NullPointerException is thrown | | +| 2 | Search TLV 0Bh
dstOffset ≥ dstBuffer.length
copyValue()
dstBuffer.length = 5
dstOffset = 5
dstLength = 1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 3 | dstOffset < 0
copyValue()
dstBuffer.length = 5
dstOffset = -1
dstLength = 1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 4 | dstLength > dstBuffer.length | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | copyValue()
dstBuffer.length = 5
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 6 | n is thrown | | +| 5 | dstOffset + dstLength > dstBuffer.length
copyValue()
dstBuffer.length = 5
dstOffset = 3
dstLength = 3 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 6 | dstLength < 0
copyValue()
dstBuffer.length = 5
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = -1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 7 | Search TLV 06h | | | +| | valueOffset ≥ TLV Length
copyValue()
valueOffset = 6
dstBuffer.length = 15
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 1 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 8 | valueOffset < 0
copyValue()
valueOffset = -1
dstBuffer.length = 15
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 1 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 9 | dstLength > TLV length
copyValue()
valueOffset = 0
dstBuffer.length = 15
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 7 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 10 | valueOffset + dstLength > TLV length
copyValue()
valueOffset = 2
dstBuffer.length = 15
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 5 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 11 | Search TLV 01h | | | +| | copyValue() | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT is thrown on the copyValue() method call. | | +| 12 | Search TLV 06h | | | +| | Successful call
copyValue()
valueOffset = 0
dstBuffer.length = 6
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 6 | Result of copyValue() is 0x0006 | | +| 13 | Compare buffer
buffer = 81 11 22 33 44 F5 | Result is 00h | | +| 14 | initialize dstBuffer
dstBuffer = 55 55 ... 55 | | | +| | Successful call
copyValue()
valueOffset = 1
dstBuffer.length = 20
dstOffset = 3
dstLength = 4 | Result of copyValue() is 0x0007 | | +| 15 | Compare buffer
buffer =
55 55 55 11 22
33 44 55 55 55
55 55 55 55 55
55 55 55 55 55 | Result is 00h | | +| 16 | Successful call, copy with length =0
dstBuffer.length = 20
dstOffset = 20
dstLength = 0 | Result of copyValue() is 20 | | + +#### 5.2.2.15 Method findAndCompareValue(byte tag, byte[] compareBuffer, short compareOffset) + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Facrb\_Bs + +##### 5.2.2.15.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public byte findAndCompareValue(byte tag, + byte[] compareBuffer, + short compareOffset) + throws java.lang.NullPointerException, + java.lang.ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException, + ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.15.1.1 Normal execution + +Looks for the first occurrence of a TLV element from beginning of a TLV list and compare its value with a buffer: + +- CRRN1: if no TLV element is found, the UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT exception is thrown and the current TLV is no longer defined. +- CRRN2: if the method is successful then the corresponding TLV becomes current. +- CRRN3: if identical returns 0. +- CRRN4: if the first miscomparing byte in Comprehension TLV is less than that in compareBuffer returns -1. +- CRRN5: if the first miscomparing byte in Comprehension TLV is greater than that in compareBuffer returns 1. +- CRRN6: The search method is comprehension required flag independent. + +###### 5.2.2.15.1.2 Parameter errors + +- CRRP1: if compareBuffer is null NullPointerException shall be thrown. +- CRRP2: if compareOffset would cause access outside array bounds ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException shall be thrown. + +###### 5.2.2.15.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRP1: if the handler is busy an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.HANDLER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE. + +##### 5.2.2.15.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: Unrecognized Envelope + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Facrb\_Bs.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Facrb\_Bs\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Facrb\_Bs.cap + +##### 5.2.2.15.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 6,7 | +| N2 | 9 | +| N3 | 8, 12, 13 | +| N4 | 10, 14 | +| N5 | 11, 15 | +| N6 | 16, 17 | +| P1 | 1 | + +| | | +|----|-------------------------------------------| +| P2 | 2, 3, 4, 5 | +| C1 | Does not apply for
USATEnvelopeHandler | + +##### 5.2.2.15.4 + +##### Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | Fill the Unrecognized Envelope with TLV: Tag 02, Value 83 81, Tag 06, Value 81 11 22 33 44 F5, Tag 02 Value 22 44 Tag 33, Length C4 Value 01 02 ... | | | +| 1 | findAndCompareValue() with a null dstBuffer | NullPointerException is thrown | | +| 2 | compareOffset ≥ compareBuffer.length
findAndCompareValue()
tag = 06h
compareBuffer.length = 12
compareOffset = 12 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 3 | compareOffset < 0
findAndCompareValue()
compareBuffer.length = 12
compareOffset = -1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 4 | length > compareBuffer.length
findAndCompareValue()
compareBuffer.length = 05
compareOffset = 0 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 5 | compareOffset + length > compareBuffer.length
findAndCompareValue()
compareBuffer.length = 12
compareOffset = 7 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 6 | Select a TLV (tag 02h) | | | +| | findAndCompareValue()
tag = 03h | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT is thrown | | +| 7 | Call the getValueLength() method | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT is thrown. | | +| 8 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer = 81 11 22 33 44 F5 | | | +| | Compare buffers
findAndCompareValue()
tag = 06h
compareOffset = 0 | Result is 00h | | +| 9 | Verify current TLV
getValueLength() | Result is 06 | | +| 10 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer = 81 11 22 33 44 F4 | | | +| | Compare buffers with same parameters | Result is +1 | | +| 11 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer = 81 11 22 33 44 F6 | | | +| | Compare buffers with same parameters | Result is -1 | | +| 12 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
55 55 81 11 22 33 44 F5 55 55 55 55 | | | +| | Compare buffers
findAndCompareValue()
compareOffset = 2 | Result is 00h | | +| 13 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
55 55 83 81 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 | | | +| | Compare buffers
findAndCompareValue()
compareOffset = 2 | Result is 00h | | +| 14 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
55 55 83 80 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 | | | +| | Compare buffers
findAndCompareValue()
compareOffset = 2 | Result is +1 | | +| 15 | Initialize compareBuffer | | | + +| | | | | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|--| +| | compareBuffer =
55 55 83 82 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 | | | +| | Compare buffers
findAndCompareValue()
compareOffset = 2 | Result is -1 | | +| 16 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
83 81 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 | | | +| | Successful call (with tag 02h)
findAndCompareValue()
tag = 02h
compareBuffer.length = 12
compareOffset = 0 | Result is 00h | | +| 17 | Initialize compareBuffer
CompareBuffer = 01 02 ... C4 | | | +| | Successful call (with tag B3h)
findAndCompareValue()
Tag = B3h
CompareBuffer.length = C4
CompareOffset = 0 | Result is 00h | | + +#### 5.2.2.16 Method findAndCompareValue(byte tag, byte occurrence, short valueOffset, byte[] compareBuffer, short compareOffset, short compareLength) + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Facrbbs\_Bss + +##### 5.2.2.16.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public byte findAndCompareValue(byte tag, + byte occurrence, + short valueOffset, + byte[] compareBuffer, + short compareOffset, + short compareLength) + throws java.lang.NullPointerException, + java.lang.ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException, + ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.16.1.1 Normal execution + +Looks for the indicated occurrence of a TLV element from the beginning of a TLV list and compare its value with a buffer: + +- CRRN1: if no TLV element is found, the UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT exception is thrown and the current TLV is no longer defined. +- CRRN2: if the method is successful then the corresponding TLV becomes current. +- CRRN3: if identical 0 is returned. +- CRRN4: if the first miscomparing byte in Comprehension TLV is less than that in compareBuffer -1 is returned. +- CRRN5: if the first miscomparing byte in Comprehension TLV is greater than that in compareBuffer 1 is returned +- CRRN6: The search method is comprehension required flag independent. + +###### 5.2.2.16.1.2 Parameter errors + +- CRRP1: if compareBuffer is null NullPointerException shall be thrown. +- CRRP2: if compareOffset or compareLength or both would cause access outside array bounds, or if compareLength is negative ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException shall be thrown. +- CRRP3: if valueOffset, compareLength or both are out of the current TLV an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.OUT\_OF\_TLV\_BOUNDARIES. + +- CRRP4: if an input parameter is not valid (e.g. occurrence = 0) an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.BAD\_INPUT\_PARAMETER. + +###### 5.2.2.16.1.3 Context errors + +- CRR1: if the handler is busy an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.HANDLER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE. + +##### 5.2.2.16.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: Unrecognized Envelope + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Facrbbs\_Bss.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Facrbbs\_Bss\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Facrbbs\_Bss.cap + +##### 5.2.2.16.3 Test coverage + +| CRN number | Test case number | +|------------|----------------------------------------| +| N1 | 12, 13 | +| N2 | 15 | +| N3 | 14, 18, 21, 22, 26 | +| N4 | 16, 20 | +| N5 | 17, 19, 23 | +| N6 | 24, 25 | +| P1 | 1 | +| P2 | 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 | +| P3 | 7, 8, 9, 10 | +| P4 | 11 | +| C1 | Does not apply for USATEnvelopeHandler | + +##### 5.2.2.16.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | Fill the Unrecognized Envelope with TLV: Tag 02, Value 83 81, Tag 06, Value 81 11 22 33 44 F5, Tag 02 Value 22 44 Tag 33, Length C4 Value 01 02 ... | | | +| 1 | findAndCompareValue() with a null compareBuffer | NullPointerException is thrown | | +| 2 | compareOffset ≥ compareBuffer.length
findAndCompareValue()
tag = 06h, occurrence = 1
valueOffset = 0
compareBuffer.length = 6
compareOffset = 6
compareLength = 1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 3 | compareOffset < 0
findAndCompareValue()
compareBuffer.length = 6
compareOffset = -1
compareLength = 1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 4 | compareLength > compareBuffer.length
findAndCompareValue()
compareBuffer.length = 5
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 6 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 5 | compareOffset + compareLength > compareBuffer.length
findAndCompareValue()
compareBuffer.length = 5 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | compareOffset = 3
compareLength = 3 | | | +| 6 | compareLength < 0
findAndCompareValue()
compareBuffer.length = 5
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = -1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 7 | valueOffset ≥ Value Length
findAndCompareValue()
tag = 06h, occurrence = 1
valueOffset = 6
compareBuffer.length = 15
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 1 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 8 | valueOffset < 0
findAndCompareValue()
valueOffset = -1
compareBuffer.length = 15
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 1 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 9 | compareLength > Value length
findAndCompareValue()
valueOffset = 0
compareBuffer.length = 15
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 7 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 10 | valueOffset + compareLength > Value length
findAndCompareValue()
valueOffset = 2
compareBuffer.length = 15
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 5 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 11 | Invalid parameter
findAndCompareValue()
occurrence = 0 | ToolkitException.BAD_INPUT_PARAMETER is thrown | | +| 12 | Select a TLV (tag 02h)
findAndCompareValue()
tag = 06h
occurrence = 2 | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT is thrown | | +| 13 | Call the getValueLength() method | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT is thrown. | | +| 14 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer = 81 11 22 33 44 F5
findAndCompareValue()
tag = 06h, occurrence = 1
valueOffset = 0
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 6 | Result is 00h | | +| 15 | Verify current TLV
getValueLength() | Result is 0006 | | +| 16 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer = 81 11 22 33 44 F4
Compare buffers with same parameters | Result is +1 | | +| 17 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer = 81 11 22 33 44 F6
Compare buffers with same parameters | Result is -1 | | +| 18 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
55 55 55 22 33 44 F5 55 55 55 55
Compare buffers
findAndCompareValue()
valueOffset = 2
compareOffset = 3
compareLength = 4 | Result is 00h | | +| 19 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
55 55 55 22 33 45 F5 55 55 55 55
Compare buffers with same parameters | Result is -1 | | +| 20 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
55 55 55 22 33 43 F5 55 55 55 55 | | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|------------------| +| | Compare buffers with same parameters | Result is +1 | | +| 21 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
83 81 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 | | | +| | findAndCompareValue()
tag = 02h, occurrence = 1
valueOffset = 0
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 2 | Result is 00h | | +| 22 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
22 44 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 | | | +| | findAndCompareValue()
tag = 02h, occurrence = 2
valueOffset = 0
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 2 | Result is 00h | | +| 23 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
22 45 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 | | | +| | findAndCompareValue()
tag = 02h, occurrence = 2
valueOffset = 0
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 2 | Result is -1 | | +| 24 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer =
83 81 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 | | | +| | Successful call (with tag 02h)
findAndCompareValue()
tag = 02h, occurrence = 1
valueOffset = 0
compareBuffer.length = 12
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 2 | Result is 00h | | +| 25 | Initialize compareBuffer
compareBuffer = 01 02 ... C4 | | | +| | Successful call (with tag B3h)
findAndCompareValue()
tag = B3h, occurrence = 1
valueOffset = 0
compareBuffer.length = 00C4
compareOffset = 0
compareLength = 00C4 | Result is 00h | | +| 26 | Successful call, findAndCompareValue() with length =0
DstBuffer.length = C4
DstOffset = C4
DstLength = 0 | Result of findAndCompareValue() is 00h | | + +#### 5.2.2.17 Method findAndCopyValue(byte tag, byte[] dstBuffer, short dstOffset) + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Facyb\_Bs + +##### 5.2.2.17.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public short findAndCopyValue(byte tag, + byte[] dstBuffer, + short dstOffset) +throws java.lang.NullPointerException, +java.lang.ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException, +ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.17.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: looks for the first occurrence of a TLV element from the beginning of a TLV list and copy its value into a destination buffer. +- CRRN2: if no TLV element is found, the UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT exception is thrown and the current TLV is no longer defined. +- CRRN3: if the method is successful then the corresponding TLV becomes current and dstOffset + length of the copied value is returned. +- CRRN4: The search method is comprehension required flag independent. + +###### 5.2.2.17.1.2 Parameter errors + +- CRRP1: if dstBuffer is null NullPointerException shall be thrown. +- CRRP2: if dstOffset would cause access outside array bounds ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException shall be thrown. + +###### 5.2.2.17.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRN1: if the handler is busy an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.HANDLER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE. + +##### 5.2.2.17.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: Unrecognized Envelope + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Facyb\_Bs.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Facyb\_Bs\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Facyb\_Bs.cap + +##### 5.2.2.17.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|-------------------------------------------| +| N1 | 9, 11, 13 | +| N2 | 6, 7 | +| N3 | 8, 10, 12 | +| N4 | 14, 15, 16, 17 | +| P1 | 1 | +| P2 | 2, 3, 4, 5 | +| C1 | Does not apply for
USATEnvelopeHandler | + +##### 5.2.2.17.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | Fill the Unrecognized Envelope with TLV: Tag 02, Value 83 81, Tag 06, Value 81 11 22 33 44 F5, Tag 02 Value 22 44 Tag 33, Length C4 Value 01 02 ... | | | +| 1 | FindAndCopyValue() with a null dstBuffer | NullPointerException is thrown | | +| 2 | dstOffset ≥ dstBuffer.length
findAndCopyValue()
tag = 06h
dstBuffer.length = 06
dstOffset = 06 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 3 | dstOffset < 0
findAndCopyValue() | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | dstBuffer.length = 06
dstOffset = -1 | | | +| 4 | length > dstBuffer.length
findAndCopyValue()
dstBuffer.length = 05
dstOffset = 0 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 5 | DstOffset + length > dstBuffer.length
findAndCopyValue()
DstBuffer.length = 06
DstOffset = 1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 6 | Select a TLV (tag 02h)
findAndCopyValue() | | | +| | tag = 03h | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT is thrown | | +| 7 | Call the getValueLength() method | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT is thrown. | | +| 8 | Successful call
findAndCopyValue()
Tag = 06h
DstBuffer.length = 06
DstOffset = 0 | Result of findAndCopyValue () is 0006 | | +| 9 | Compare buffer
buffer = 81 11 22 33 44 F5 | Result is 00h | | +| 10 | Initialize dstBuffer
dstBuffer = 55 55 ... 55 | | | +| | Successful call
findAndCopyValue()
dstBuffer.length = 12
dstOffset = 2 | Result of findAndCopyValue () is 0008 | | +| 11 | Compare buffer
buffer = 55 55 81 11 22 33 44 F5 55 55 55 55 | Result is 00h | | +| 12 | Successful call
findAndCopyValue()
tag = 02h
dstBuffer.length = 2
dstOffset = 0 | Result of findAndCopyValue () is 0002 | | +| 13 | Compare buffer
buffer = 83 81 | Result is 00h | | +| 14 | Successful call (with tag 82h)
findAndCopyValue()
tag = 82h
dstBuffer.length = 02
dstOffset = 0 | Result of findAndCopyValue () is 0002 | | +| 15 | Compare buffer
buffer = 83 81 | Result is 00h | | +| 16 | Successful call (with tag B3h)
findAndCopyValue()
tag = B3h
dstBuffer.length = C4
dstOffset = 0 | Result of findAndCopyValue () is 00C4 | | +| 17 | Compare buffer
buffer = 01 02 ... C4 | Result is 00h | | + +#### 5.2.2.18 Method findAndCopyValue(byte tag, byte occurrence, short valueOffset, byte[] dstBuffer, short dstOffset, short dstLength) + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Facybbs\_Bss + +##### 5.2.2.18.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public short findAndCopyValue(byte tag, + byte occurrence, + short valueOffset, +``` + +``` + + byte[] dstBuffer, + short dstOffset, + short dstLength) + throws java.lang.NullPointerException, + java.lang.ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException, + ToolkitException + +``` + +###### 5.2.2.18.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: looks for the indicated occurrence of a TLV element from the beginning of a TLV list and copy its value into a destination buffer. +- CRRN2: if no TLV element is found, the UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT exception is thrown and the current TLV is no longer defined. +- CRRN3: if the method is successful then the corresponding TLV becomes current and dstOffset + dstLength is returned. +- CRRN4: The search method is comprehension required flag independent. + +###### 5.2.2.18.1.2 Parameter errors + +- CRRP1: if dstBuffer is null NullPointerException shall be thrown. +- CRRP2: if dstOffset or dstLength or both would cause access outside array bounds, or if dstLength is negative ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException shall be thrown. +- CRRP3: if valueOffset, dstLength or both are out of the current TLV an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.OUT\_OF\_TLV\_BOUNDARIES. + +###### 5.2.2.18.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRN1: if the handler is busy an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.HANDLER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE. + +##### 5.2.2.18.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: Unrecognized Envelope + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Facybbs\_Bss.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Facybbs\_Bss\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Facybbs\_Bss.cap + +##### 5.2.2.18.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|-------------------------------------------| +| N1 | 14, 15, 17, 19, 20 | +| N2 | 11, 12 | +| N3 | 13, 15, 17, 19, 25 | +| N4 | 21, 22, 23, 24 | +| P1 | 1 | +| P2 | 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 | +| P3 | 7, 8, 9, 10 | +| C1 | Does not apply for
USATEnvelopeHandler | + +##### 5.2.2.18.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------| +| | Fill the Unrecognized Envelope with TLV: Tag | | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | 02, Value 83 81, Tag 06, Value 81 11 22 33 44 F5, Tag 02 Value 22 44 Tag 33, Length C4 Value 01 02 ... | | | +| 1 | findAndCopyValue() with a null dstBuffer | NullPointerException is thrown | | +| 2 | dstOffset ≥ dstBuffer.length
findAndCopyValue()
tag = 06h, occurrence = 1
valueOffset = 0
dstBuffer.length = 5
dstOffset = 5
dstLength = 1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 3 | dstOffset < 0
findAndCopyValue()
dstBuffer.length = 5
dstOffset = -1
dstLength = 1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 4 | dstLength > dstBuffer.length
findAndCopyValue()
dstBuffer.length = 5
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 6 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 5 | dstOffset + dstLength > dstBuffer.length
findAndCopyValue()
dstBuffer.length = 5
dstOffset = 3
dstLength = 3 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 6 | dstLength < 0
findAndCopyValue()
dstBuffer.length = 5
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = -1 | ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException is thrown | | +| 7 | valueOffset ≥ Value Length
findAndCopyValue()
tag = 06h, occurrence = 1
valueOffset = 6
dstBuffer.length = 15
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 1 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 8 | valueOffset < 0
findAndCopyValue()
valueOffset = -1
dstBuffer.length = 15
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 1 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 9 | dstLength > Value length
findAndCopyValue()
valueOffset = 0
dstBuffer.length = 15
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 7 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 10 | valueOffset + dstLength > Text String length
findAndCopyValue()
valueOffset = 2
dstBuffer.length = 15
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 5 | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 11 | Select a TLV (tag 02h)
findAndCopyValue()
tag = 06h
occurrence = 2 | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT is thrown | | +| 12 | Call the getValueLength() method | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT is thrown. | | +| 13 | Successful call
findAndCopyValue()
tag = 06h, occurrence = 1
valueOffset = 0
dstBuffer.length = 06
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 06 | Result of findAndCopyValue() is 6 | | +| 14 | Compare buffer
buffer = 81 11 22 33 44 F5 | Result is 00h | | + +| Id | Description | API(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------| +| 15 | Initialize dstBuffer
dstBuffer = 55 55 ... 55 | | | +| | Successful call
findAndCopyValue()
tag = 06h, occurrence = 1
valueOffset = 2
dstBuffer.length = 12
dstOffset = 3
dstLength = 04 | Result of findAndCopyValue () is 0007 | | +| 16 | Compare buffer
buffer = 55 55 55 22 33 44 F5 55 55 55 55 55 | Result is 00h | | +| 17 | Successful call
findAndCopyValue()
tag = 02h, occurrence = 1
valueOffset = 0
dstBuffer.length = 12
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 2 | Result of findAndCopyValue() is 0002 | | +| 18 | Compare buffer
buffer = 83 81 55 ... 55 | Result is 00h | | +| 19 | Successful call
findAndCopyValue()
tag = 02h, occurrence = 2
valueOffset = 0
dstBuffer.length = 12
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 2 | Result of findAndCopyValue() is 0002 | | +| 20 | Compare buffer
buffer = 22 44 55 ... 55 | Result is 00h | | +| 21 | Successful call (with tag 82h)
findAndCopyValue()
tag = 82h
occurrence = 1
valueOffset = 0
dstBuffer.length = 12
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 02 | Result of findAndCopyValue () is 0002 | | +| 22 | Compare buffer
buffer = 83 81 55 ... 55 | Result is 00h | | +| 23 | Successful call (with tag 82h)
findAndCopyValue()
tag = 82h
occurrence = 2
valueOffset = 0
dstBuffer.length = 12
dstOffset = 0
dstLength = 02 | Result of findAndCopyValue () is 0002 | | +| 24 | Compare buffer
Buffer = 22 44 55 ... 55 | Result is 00h | | +| 25 | Successful call, findAndCopyValue() with length =0
DstBuffer.length = 12
dstOffset = 12
dstLength = 0 | Result of findAndCopyValue () is 12 | | + +#### 5.2.2.19 Method findTLV + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Find + +##### 5.2.2.19.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public byte findTLV(byte tag, + byte occurrence) +throws ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.19.1.1 Normal execution + +Looks for the indicated occurrence of a TLV element from the beginning of the TLV list (handler buffer): + +- CRRN1: the method is successful if the required occurrence exists then the corresponding TLV becomes current. +- CRRN2: if the method is successful then it returns TLV\_FOUND\_CR\_SET when Comprehension Required flag is set. +- CRRN3: if the method is successful then it returns TLV\_FOUND\_CR\_NOT\_SET when Comprehension Required flag is not set. +- CRRN4: if the required occurrence of the TLV element does not exist, the current TLV is no longer defined and TLV\_NOT\_FOUND is returned. +- CRRN5: The search method is comprehension required flag independent. + +###### 5.2.2.19.1.2 Parameter errors + +- CRRP1: if an input parameter is not valid (e.g. occurrence = 0) an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.BAD\_INPUT\_PARAMETER. + +###### 5.2.2.19.1.3 Context errors + +- CRR1: if the handler is busy an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.HANDLER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE. + +##### 5.2.2.19.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: Unrecognized Envelope + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Find.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Find\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Find.cap + +##### 5.2.2.19.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|----------------------------------------| +| N1 | 3, 5 | +| N2 | 2, 4 | +| N3 | 10, 11 | +| N4 | 6, 7, 8, 9 | +| N5 | 12, 13 | +| P1 | 1 | +| C1 | Does not apply for USATEnvelopeHandler | + +##### 5.2.2.19.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | Trigger the applet with Unrecognized Envelope including:
Tag 82, tag 86, tag 8B, tag 02 and tag 04 | | | +| 1 | Invalid input parameter
findTLV()
Occurrence = 0 | ToolkitException.BAD_INPUT_PARAMETER is thrown | | +| 2 | Search 1st TLV
findTLV()
Tag = 02h | Result is TLV_FOUND_CR_SET | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | Occurrence = 1 | | | +| 3 | Call the getValLength() method | Result is 0x02 | | +| 4 | Search 2nd TLV
findTLV()
Tag = 06h
Occurrence = 1 | Result is TLV_FOUND_CR_SET | | +| 5 | Call the getValLength() method | Result is 0x05h | | +| 6 | Select a TLV (tag 02h) | | | +| | Search a wrong tag
findTLV()
Tag = 03h
Occurrence = 1 | Result is TLV_NOT_FOUND | | +| 7 | Call the getValLength() method | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT is thrown. | | +| 8 | Search a tag with wrong occurrence
findTLV()
Tag = 02h
Occurrence = 3 | Result is TLV_NOT_FOUND | | +| 9 | Call the getValLength() method | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT is thrown. | | +| 10 | Search the TLV
findTLV()
Tag = 02h
Occurrence = 2 | Result is TLV_FOUND_CR_NOT_SET | | +| 11 | Search the TLV
findTLV()
Tag = 04h
Occurrence = 1 | Result is TLV_FOUND_CR_NOT_SET | | +| 12 | Search tag 86h
findTLV()
Tag = 86h
Occurrence = 1 | Result is TLV_FOUND_CR_SET | | +| 13 | Search tag 84h
findTLV()
Tag = 84h
Occurrence = 1 | Result is TLV_FOUND_CR_NOT_SET | | + +#### 5.2.2.20 Method getCapacity + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gcap + +##### 5.2.2.20.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public byte getCapacity() +``` + +###### 5.2.2.20.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The method shall return the maximum size of the Comprehension TLV list managed by the handler. + +###### 5.2.2.20.1.2 Parameter Errors + +No requirements + +###### 5.2.2.20.1.3 Context errors + +No requirements + +##### 5.2.2.20.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gcap.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gcap\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gcap.cap + +##### 5.2.2.20.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 1 | + +##### 5.2.2.20.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | USATEnvelopeHandler available

1 - Send envelope Menu Selection
2 - The applet calls the getLength() method
3 - The applet calls the getCapacity() method | 1 - Applet is triggered
2 - No exception is thrown
3 - No exception is thrown; the capacity is greater than the BER
TLV Length | | + +#### 5.2.2.21 Method getLength + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Glen + +##### 5.2.2.21.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public short getLength() +throws ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.21.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: returns the length in bytes of the TLV list. + +###### 5.2.2.21.1.2 Parameter Errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.2.2.21.1.3 Context errors + +- CRR1: if the handler is busy an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.HANDLER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE. + +##### 5.2.2.21.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: Unrecognized envelope + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Glen.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Glen\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Glen.cap + +##### 5.2.2.21.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|----------------------------------------| +| N1 | 1, 2, 3, 4 | +| C1 | Does not apply for USATEnvelopeHandler | + +##### 5.2.2.21.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | Send an Unrecognized Envelope with BER length of 0x31 | Result of getLength() is 0x0031 | | +| 2 | Send an Unrecognized Envelope with BER length of 0x7F | Result of getLength() is 0x007Fh | | +| 3 | Send an Unrecognized Envelope with BER length of 81 80 | Result of getLength() is 0x0080h | | +| 4 | Send an Unrecognized Envelope with BER length of 81 FC | Result of getLength() is 0x00FCh | | + +#### 5.2.2.22 Method getValueByte + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gvby + +##### 5.2.2.22.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public byte getValueByte(short valueOffset) + throws ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.22.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: Gets a byte from the last TLV element which has been found in the handler and returns its value (1 byte). + +###### 5.2.2.22.1.2 Parameter errors + +- CRRP1: if valueOffset is out of the current TLV an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.OUT\_OF\_TLV\_BOUNDARIES. + +###### 5.2.2.22.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRc1: if the handler is busy an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.HANDLER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE. +- CRRc2: in case of unavailable TLV element an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT. + +##### 5.2.2.22.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: Unrecognized Envelope + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gvby.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gvby\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gvby.cap + +##### 5.2.2.22.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|-------------------------------------------| +| N1 | 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 | +| P1 | 2 | +| C1 | Does not apply for
USATEnvelopeHandler | +| C2 | 1 | + +##### 5.2.2.22.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | Fill the Unrecognized envelope with TLV: Tag 02, length 02, value 83 81, Tag 06, length 06, Tag 0B, length 21, Tag 33, Length C8 Value 01 02 ... | | | +| 1 | getValueByte(0) | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT is thrown | | +| 2 | Search TLV 02h
getValueByte(2) | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 3 | Search TLV 02h
getValueByte(1) | Result is 0x81 | | +| 4 | Search TLV 02h (Device Identities TLV)
getValueByte(0) | Result is 83h (Source) | | +| 5 | Search TLV 33h
getValueByte(7E) | Result is 0x7F | | +| 6 | Search TLV 33h
getValueByte(80) | Result is 0x81 | | +| 7 | getValueByte(7F) | Result is 0x80 | | +| 8 | Search TLV B3h
getValueByte(C7) | Result is 0xC8 | | + +#### 5.2.2.23 Method getValueLength + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gvle + +##### 5.2.2.23.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public short getValueLength() + throws ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.23.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: gets and returns the binary length of the value field for the last TLV element which has been found in the handler. + +###### 5.2.2.23.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.2.2.23.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRC1: if the handler is busy an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.HANDLER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE. +- CRRC2: in case of unavailable TLV element an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT. + +##### 5.2.2.23.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: Unrecognized Envelope + +Test source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gvle.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gvle\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gvle.cap + +##### 5.2.2.23.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|-------------------------------------------| +| N1 | 2, 3, 4 | +| C1 | Does not apply for
USATEnvelopeHandler | +| C2 | 1 | + +##### 5.2.2.23.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | Fill the Unrecognized envelope with TLV: Tag 02, length 02, Tag 06, length 05, Tag 0B, length 24, Tag 33, Length C8 | | | +| 1 | getValueLength() | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT is thrown | | +| 2 | Search TLV 02h | | | +| | getValueLength() | Result is 0X0002 | | +| 3 | Search TLV 0Bh | | | +| | getValueLength() | Result is 0X0024 | | +| 4 | Search TLV 33h | | | +| | getValueLength() | Result is 0X00C8 | | + +#### 5.2.2.24 Method getValueShort + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gvsh + +##### 5.2.2.24.1 Conformance requirement + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public short getValueShort(short valueOffset) + throws ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.2.24.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: Gets a short from the last TLV element which has been found in the handler and returns its value (1 short). + +###### 5.2.2.24.1.2 Parameter errors + +- CRRP1: if valueOffset is out of the current TLV an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.OUT\_OF\_TLV\_BOUNDARIES. + +###### 5.2.2.24.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRC1: if the handler is busy an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.HANDLER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE. +- CRRC2: in case of unavailable TLV element an instance of ToolkitException shall be thrown. The reason code shall be ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE\_ELEMENT. + +##### 5.2.2.24.2 Test area files + +Specific triggering: Unrecognized Envelope + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gvsh.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gvsh\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Ueh\_Gvsh.cap + +##### 5.2.2.24.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|-------------------------------------------| +| N1 | 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 | +| P1 | 2 | +| C1 | Does not apply for
USATEnvelopeHandler | +| C2 | 1 | + +##### 5.2.2.24.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | Fill the Unrecognized envelope with TLVs:
Tag 02, Length 02 Value 83 81
Tag 06, Length 06 Value 81 11 22 33 44 F5
Tag 33, Length C9 Value 01 02 ... | | | +| 1 | getValueShort(0) | ToolkitException.UNAVAILABLE_ELEMENT is thrown | | +| 2 | Search TLV 02h
getValueShort(2) | ToolkitException.OUT_OF_TLV_BOUNDARIES is thrown | | +| 3 | Search TLV 02h
getValueShort(0) | Result is 0x83 0x81 | | +| 4 | Search TLV 06h
getValueShort(1) | Result is 0x11 0x22 | | +| 5 | Search TLV 33h
getValueShort(7E) | Result is 0x7F 0x80 | | +| 6 | Search TLV 33h
getValueShort(80) | Result is 0x81 0x82 | | +| 7 | getValueShort(7F) | Result is 0x80 0x81 | | +| 8 | Search TLV B3h
getValueShort(C7) | Result is 0xC8 0xC9 | | + +### 5.2.3 Interface USATTerminalProfile + +The constants in Java are resolved at compilation time, therefore a runtime test is not useful. No test of constants will be performed + +### 5.2.4 Class USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem + +#### 5.2.4.1 Method getTheHandler + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Ues\_Gthd + +##### 5.2.4.1.1 Conformance requirements + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public static USATEnvelopeHandler getTheHandler() + throws uicc.toolkit.ToolkitException +``` + +###### 5.2.4.1.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The method shall return the single system instance of the class implementing the USATEnvelopeHandler interface. + +- CRRN2: The USATEnvelopeHandler is a Temporary JCRE Entry Point Object (see Java Card 2.2.1 Runtime Environment (JCRE) Specification []) + +###### 5.2.4.1.1.2 Parameter Errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.2.4.1.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRC1: The method shall throw ToolkitException.HANDLER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE if the handler is busy. + +##### 5.2.4.1.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Ues\_Gthd.java + Test Applet: Api\_2\_Ues\_Gthd\_1.java + Cap File: Api\_2\_Ues\_Gthd.cap + +##### 5.2.4.1.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| N1 | 1, 2, 3 | +| N2 | Tested in clause 5.3.7.1, other parts transferred to (U)SAT framework from API. | +| C1 | Tested in clause 5.3.1.5, Minimum Handler Availability on USATEnvelopeHandler. | + +##### 5.2.4.1.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | Call GetTheHandler() method twice | The returned objects shall be the same | | +| 2 | Verify that getTheHandler() method returns an USATEnvelopeHandler | The reference returned shall be an object implementing the USATEnvelopeHandler interface (check cast) | | +| 3 | Verify the returned value is not null | The reference returned shall not be null. | | + +### 5.2.5 Interface ToolkitRegistry + +#### 5.2.5.1 Method clearEvent + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Tkr\_Cevt + +##### 5.2.5.1.1 Conformance requirement: + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public void clearEvent(short event) + throws ToolkitException, + javacard.framework.TransactionException +``` + +###### 5.2.5.1.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: A call to isEventSet() method for a cleared event should return false after a call to clearEvent. +- CRRN2: The (U)SAT Framework shall not trigger the applet on the occurrence of the cleared event anymore. + +- CRRN3: if event was EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_SIM and after the call, no applet is registered to it, The (U)SAT Framework shall allow an applet to register to this event. +- CRRN4: if event was EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_SIM and one applet is still registered to this event, The (U)SAT Framework shall not allow an applet to register to this event. + +###### 5.2.5.1.1.2 Parameter Errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.2.5.1.1.3 Context errors + +- CRR1: shall throw javacard.framework.TransactionException - if the operation would cause the commit capacity to be exceeded. + +##### 5.2.5.1.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Tkr\_Cevt.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Tkr\_Cevt\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Tkr\_Cevt.cap + +##### 5.2.5.1.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 1 | +| N2 | 2 | +| N3 | Framework | +| N4 | Framework | +| C1 | not testable | + +##### 5.2.5.1.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | Clear ALLOWED events

Install Applet registered to
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV event

For events (2 to 6, 10 and 24) defined in
TS 31.130 [2]:

EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB
EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB
EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD
EVENT_DOWNLOAD_IWLAN_ACCESS_STATUS
The applet calls:

1- Call clearEvent() method

2- Call isEventSet() method | 1- No exception is thrown each time.

2- Shall return false each time. | | +| 2 | Checking applet isn't triggered by an ENVELOPE(EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV) command

1 - reset and initialize the card
2 - An | Applet is not triggered by an | | + +| | | | +|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--| +| ENVELOPE(EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV) is sent. | ENVELOPE(EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV) command | | +|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--| + +#### 5.2.5.2 Method isEventSet + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Tkr\_Ievs + +##### 5.2.5.2.1 Conformance requirement: + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public boolean isEventSet(short event) +``` + +###### 5.2.5.2.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: shall return true if the event is set in the Toolkit Registry for the applet. +- CRRN2: shall return false if the event is not set in the Toolkit Registry for the applet. + +###### 5.2.5.2.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.2.5.2.1.3 Context errors + +No requirements. + +##### 5.2.5.2.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Tkr\_Ievs.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Tkr\_Ievs\_1.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Tkr\_Ievs.cap + +##### 5.2.5.2.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 2 | +| N2 | 1 | + +##### 5.2.5.2.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 |

Install Applet only registered to EVENT_EVENT_DOWNLOAD_USER_ACTIVITY

Test that events are not set

Applet calls isEventSet() method for each event ranging from (2 to 6, 10 and 24)

| Shall return false each time. | | +| 2 |

Setting events

For the following events defined in TS 31.130 [2] for setEvent() method:

EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB

| | | + +| | | | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|--| +| EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD
EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB
EVENT_DOWNLOAD_IWLAN_ACCESS_STATUS
applet calls:

1- Call setEvent() method

2- Call isEventSet() method | 1- No exception shall be thrown.

2- Shall return true each time. | | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|--| + +#### 5.2.5.3 Method setEvent + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Tkr\_SevT + +##### 5.2.5.3.1 Conformance requirement: + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public void setEvent(short id) + throws ToolkitException, + javacard.framework.TransactionException +``` + +###### 5.2.5.3.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: a following call to isEventSet() method with the same event id shall answer true for the applet. +- CRRN2: the (U)SAT Framework shall trigger the applet if an occurrence of the set event happens. + +###### 5.2.5.3.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.2.5.3.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRN1: shall throw a ToolkitException with EVENT\_ALREADY\_REGISTERED if event is EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_SIM but another applet is already registered to it. +- CRRN2: shall throw a ToolkitException with EVENT\_ALREADY\_REGISTERED if event is EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_SIM but another applet that it is not in selectable state is already registered to it. +- CRRN3: shall throw a ToolkitException with TAR\_NOT\_DEFINED if event is FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV and the applet has no TAR defined. +- CRRN4: shall throw a ToolkitException with TAR\_NOT\_DEFINED if event is FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD and the applet has no TAR defined. +- CRRN5: shall throw a ToolkitException with TAR\_NOT\_DEFINED if event is FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB and the applet has no TAR defined. +- CRRN6: shall throw a ToolkitException with TAR\_NOT\_DEFINED if event is FORMATTED\_USSD and the applet has no TAR defined. + +##### 5.2.5.3.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Tkr\_SevT.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Tkr\_SevT\_1.java + +Api\_2\_Tkr\_SevT\_2.java + +Api\_2\_Tkr\_SevT\_3.java + +The load script installs the 3 instances. + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Tkr\_Sevt.cap + +##### 5.2.5.3.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 1 | +| N2 | 2, 3 | +| C1 | 4 | +| C2 | 5 | +| C3 | 6 | +| C4 | 6 | +| C5 | 6 | +| C6 | 6 | + +##### 5.2.5.3.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | Setting events
1- For events (2 to 6, 10 and 24) defined in TS 31.130 [2]:
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB
EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB
EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD
EVENT_IWLAN_ACCESS_STATUS
1.1- Call clearEvent(event)
1.2- Call isEventSet(event)
1.3- Call setEvent(event)
1.4- Call isEventSet(event)
1.5- Call clearEvent(event) | 1.1- No exception shall be thrown.
1.2- Shall return false.
1.3- No exception shall be thrown.
1.4- Shall return true.
1.5- No exception shall be thrown. | | +| 2 | Setting
EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM
Call
setEvent(EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM) | No Exception shall be thrown | | +| 3 | Check applet is triggered by an ENVELOPE
(EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM
)
Trigger the applet | Applet is triggered by an ENVELOPE (EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM) | | +| 4 | Applet2 registers to
EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM
but it is already assigned
1- Trigger Applet2 by
ENVELOPE(EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV)
2- Applet2 call
setEvent(EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM) | 2- Shall throw a ToolkitException with EVENT_ALREADY_REGISTERED reason code. | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 5 | Applet2 registers to EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM but it is already assigned to another applet in not selectable state

1- Set the Applet1 in the lock state

2- Applet2 call setEvent (EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM)

3- Set the Applet1 in the make selectable state | 2- Shall throw a ToolkitException with EVENT_ALREADY_REGISTERED reason code. | | +| 6 | Applet3 with no TAR defined registers to EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB event

1- send unformatted ENVELOPE (CELL_BROADCAST_DATA_DOWNLOAD)

2- setEvent (EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV)

3- setEvent (EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD)

4- setEvent (EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB)

5- setEvent (EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD) | 1- Applet3 shall be triggered

2- ToolkitException with reason code TAR_NOT_DEFINED shall be thrown

3- ToolkitException with reason code TAR_NOT_DEFINED shall be thrown

4- ToolkitException with reason code TAR_NOT_DEFINED shall be thrown

5- ToolkitException with reason code TAR_NOT_DEFINED shall be thrown | | + +#### 5.2.5.4 Method setEventList + +Test Area Reference: Api\_2\_Tkr\_Sevl + +##### 5.2.5.4.1 Conformance requirement: + +The method with following header shall be compliant to its definition in the API. + +``` +public void setEventList(short[] eventList, + short offset, + short length) +throws java.lang.NullPointerException, + java.lang.ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException, + ToolkitException, + javacard.framework.TransactionException +``` + +###### 5.2.5.4.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: for all events set successfully by this method, a call to isEventSet() method should return true. +- CRRN2: the (U)SAT Framework shall trigger the applet if an occurrence of one of the successfully registered events happens. + +###### 5.2.5.4.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.2.5.4.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRC1: shall throw a ToolkitException with EVENT\_ALREADY\_REGISTERED if eventList contains EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_SIM but another applet is already registered to it. + +- CRRC2: shall throw a ToolkitException with EVENT\_ALREADY\_REGISTERED if event is EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_SIM but another applet that it is not in selectable state is already registered to it. +- CRRC3: shall throw a ToolkitException with TAR\_NOT\_DEFINED if event is FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV and the applet has no TAR defined. +- CRRC4: shall throw a ToolkitException with TAR\_NOT\_DEFINED if event is FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD and the applet has no TAR defined. +- CRRC5: shall throw a ToolkitException with TAR\_NOT\_DEFINED if event is FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB and the applet has no TAR defined. +- CRRC6: shall throw a ToolkitException with TAR\_NOT\_DEFINED if event is FORMATTED\_USSD and the applet has no TAR defined + +##### 5.2.5.4.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Api\_2\_Tkr\_Sevl.java + +Test Applet: Api\_2\_Tkr\_Sevl\_1.java + +Api\_2\_Tkr\_Sevl\_2.java + +Cap File: Api\_2\_Tkr\_Sevl.cap + +##### 5.2.5.4.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 1,2 | +| N2 | 3, 4 | +| C1 | 5 | +| C2 | 6 | +| C3 | 7 | +| C4 | 7 | +| C5 | 7 | +| C6 | 7 | + +##### 5.2.5.4.4 + +###### Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 |

Applet1 registers all eventList buffer

 EventList = events (2 to 6, 10 and 24) defined in TS 31.130 [2]:  EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD EVENT_DOWNLOAD_IWLAN_ACCESS_STATUS  1- For each event in EventList     clearEvent(event)  2- Call setEventList(eventList)  Offset = 0 Length = eventList.length  3- For all events in eventList     isEventSet(event)  4- For each event in EventList     clearEvent(event)
|

1- No exception shall be thrown.

2- No exception shall be thrown.

3- Each time shall return true.

4- No exception shall be thrown.

| | +| 2 |

Registering part of eventList buffer

 EventList = events (2 to 6, 10 and 24) defined in TS 31.130 [2]:  EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD EVENT_DOWNLOAD_IWLAN_ACCESS_STATUS  1- For each event in EventList     clearEvent(event)  2- setEventList(eventList, offset, length)  Offset > 0 Length = eventList.lentgh - offset  3- For all events in eventList:      Call isEventSet(event)  4- For each event in EventList:     clearEvent(event)
|

1- No exception shall be thrown.

2- No exception shall be thrown.

3- Each time shall return true for events ranging from offset to offset+length else shall return false.

4- No exception shall be thrown.

| | +| 3 |

Setting EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM

 Call setEventList(MonoEventList, 0, 1) with MonoEventList containing EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM
|

Shall not throw an exception

| | +| 4 |

Check applet1 is triggered by an ENVELOPE (EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM)

 Reset and initialize the card
|

Applet is triggered by an ENVELOPE (EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM)

| | + +| Id | Description | API(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | Trigger the applet | | | +| 5 | Applet 2 registers to
EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_
CONTROL_BY_SIM
but it is already assigned
Call setEventList(MonoEventList,0,1) with MonoEventList containing EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM | Shall throw a ToolkitException with EVENT_ALREADY_REGISTERED reason code. | | +| 6 | Applet2 registers to
EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SI
M
but it is already assigned to another applet in not
selectable state

1- Set the Applet1 in the lock state

2- Applet2 calls setEventList(MonoEventList,0,1) with MonoEventList containing EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM

3- Set the Applet1 in the make selectable state | 2- Shall throw a ToolkitException with EVENT_ALREADY_REGISTERED reason code. | | +| 7 | Applet3 with no TAR defined registers to
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB event

1- send unformatted ENVELOPE(CELL_BROADCAST_DATA_DOWNLOAD)

2- setEventList(EventList,0,1) with EventList containing EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

3- setEventList (EventList,1,1) with EventList containing EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

4- setEventList (EventList,2,1) with EventList containing EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB

5- isEventSet(EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV)
6- isEventSet(EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD)
7- isEventSet(EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB)
8- isEventSet(EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD) | 1- Applet3 shall be triggered

2- ToolkitException with reason code TAR_NOT_DEFINED shall be thrown

3- ToolkitException with reason code TAR_NOT_DEFINED shall be thrown

4- ToolkitException with reason code TAR_NOT_DEFINED shall be thrown

5- method shall return FALSE
6- method shall return FALSE
7- method shall return FALSE
8- method shall return FALSE | | + +## 5.3 (U)SAT Framework + +### 5.3.1 Minimum handler availability + +#### 5.3.1.1 ProactiveHandler + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Mha\_Pahd + +##### 5.3.1.1.1 Conformance requirements + +###### 5.3.1.1.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: If a proactive session is not ongoing the *ProactiveHandler* is available from the invocation to the termination of the *processToolkit()* method for the following events: + +EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV +EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD +EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV +EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD +EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_CB +EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_SIM +EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB +EVENT\_FORMATTED\_USSD +EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_USSD +EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_IWLAN\_ACCESS\_STATUS + +- CRRN2: A *ProactiveHandler* is considered available when no **HANDLER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE** *ToolkitException* is thrown when the corresponding *getTheHandler()* method is called or a method of the handler is called. +- CRRN3: When available the *ProactiveHandler* shall remain available until the termination of the *processToolkit()* method. +- CRRN4: If a proactive command is pending the *ProactiveHandler* may not be available. + +###### 5.3.1.1.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.3.1.1.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRN1: The *ProactiveHandler* shall not be available if the Terminal Profile command has not yet been processed by the (U)SAT Framework. + +##### 5.3.1.1.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Mha\_Pahd.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Mha\_Pahd\_1.java + +Ufw\_Mha\_Pahd\_2.java + +Cap File: Ufw\_Mha\_Pahd.cap + +##### 5.3.1.1.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| N1 | 1 to 10 | +| N2 | 11 to 20 | +| N3 | 1 to 11 | +| N4 | Not testable | +| C1 | 12 to 17 and also tested in Test Cases 8 to 14 in Ufw_Mha_Prhd.
Applicable only if the applet is triggered when no terminal profile has been previously received. | + +##### 5.3.1.1.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | ProactiveHandler availability with
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Envelope SMS-PP Download formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

Applet1 finalizes | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 2 | ProactiveHandler availability with
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EF SMS instruction formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

Applet1 finalizes | | +| 3 | ProactiveHandler availability with
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Envelope SMS-PP Download unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet2 gets the ProactiveHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered

3- No exception is thrown. | | +| 4 | ProactiveHandler availability with
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EF SMS instruction unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet2 gets the ProactiveHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

Applet1 finalizes

3- Applet2 is triggered

4- No exception is thrown. | | +| 5 | ProactiveHandler availability with
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- Envelope Cell Broadcast Download unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet2 gets the ProactiveHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered

3- No exception is thrown | | +| 6 | ProactiveHandler availability with
EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_B
Y_SIM

1- Envelope MO short message control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown | | +| 7 | ProactiveHandler availability with
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- Envelope Cell Broadcast Download formatted is sent to the (U)SIM | 1- Applet1 is triggered | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | 2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler | 2-No exception is thrown
Applet1 finalizes | | +| 8 | ProactiveHandler availability with
EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD

1- Envelope USSD formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

Applet1 finalizes | | +| 9 | ProactiveHandler availability with
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD

1- Envelope USSD unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet2 gets the ProactiveHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered

3- No exception is thrown. | | +| 10 | ProactiveHandler availability with
EVENT_DOWNLOAD_IWLAN_ACCESS_STATUS

1- Envelope DOWNLOAD_IWLAN_ACCESS_STATUS is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet2 gets the ProactiveHandler | Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered

3- No exception is thrown. | | +| 11 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before
the Terminal Profile with
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Reset the card without sending the Terminal Profile

2- Envelope SMS-PP Download formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

3- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler | 2- Applet1 is triggered

3- A ToolkitException
HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes | | +| 12 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before
the Terminal Profile with
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EF SMS instruction formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- A ToolkitException
HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes | | +| 13 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before
the Terminal Profile with
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV | 1- Applet1 is triggered | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | 1- Envelope SMS-PP Download unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM
2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet2 gets the ProactiveHandler | 2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered

3- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet2 finalizes | | +| 14 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before the Terminal Profile with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EF sms instruction unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM
2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet2 gets the ProactiveHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered

3- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet2 finalizes | | +| 15 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before the Terminal Profile with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- Envelope Cell Broadcast Download unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM
2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet2 gets the ProactiveHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered

3- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet2 finalizes | | +| 16 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before the Terminal Profile with EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_B_Y_SIM

1- Envelope MO short message control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM
2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes | | +| 17 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before the Terminal Profile with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- Envelope Cell Broadcast Download formatted is sent to the (U)SIM
2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes | | +| 18 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before the Terminal Profile with EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD
1- Envelpe USSD formatted is sent to the | 1- Applet1 is triggered | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | (U)SIM
2- Applet gets the ProactiveHandler | 2- A ToolkitException
HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown
Applet1 finalizes | | +| 19 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before the Terminal Profile with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD
1- Envelope USSD unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM
2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler
3- Applet2 gets the ProactiveHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered
2- A ToolkitException
HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown
Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered
3- A ToolkitException
HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown
Applet2 finalizes | | +| 20 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before the Terminal Profile with EVENT_DOWNLOAD_IWLNA_ACCESS_STATUS
1- Envelope Download Iwlan Access Status h n is sent to the (U)SIM
2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler
3- Applet2 gets the ProactiveHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered
2- A ToolkitException
HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown
Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered
3- A ToolkitException
HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown
Applet2 finalizes | | + +#### 5.3.1.2 ProactiveResponseHandler + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Mha\_Prhd + +##### 5.3.1.2.1 Conformance requirements + +###### 5.3.1.2.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The *ProactiveResponseHandler* is available as soon as the *ProactiveHandler* is available and remains available until the termination of the *processToolkit()* method for the following events: + +EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV + EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD + EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV + EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD + EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_CB + +EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_SIM + EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB + EVENT\_FORMATTED\_USSD + EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_USSD + EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_IWLAN\_ACCESS\_STATUS + +- CRRN2: A *ProactiveResponseHandler* is considered available when no HANDLER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE ToolkitException is thrown when the corresponding *getTheHandler()* method is called or a method of the handler is called. + +###### 5.3.1.2.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.3.1.2.1.3 Context errors + +- CRRC1: The *ProactiveResponseHandler* shall not be available if the *ProactiveHandler* is not available. + +##### 5.3.1.2.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Mha\_Prhd.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Mha\_Prhd\_1.java + +Ufw\_Mha\_Prhd\_2.java + +Cap File: Ufw\_Mha\_Prhd.cap + +##### 5.3.1.2.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| N1 | 1 to 10 | +| N2 | 1 to 20 | +| C1 | 8 to 20.
Applicable only if the applet is triggered when no terminal profile has been previously received. | + +##### 5.3.1.2.4 + +###### Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1 | ProactiveResponseHandler availability with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Envelope SMS-PP Download formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

Applet builds a proactive command DISPLAY TEXT

2- ProactiveHandler.send() method is called

3- ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called | 1- Applet1 is triggered






3- No exception is thrown |






2- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is fetched

TERMINAL RESPONSE | +| 2 | ProactiveResponseHandler availability with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EF sms instruction formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

Applet builds a proactive command DISPLAY TEXT

2- ProactiveHandler.send() method is called

3- ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called | 1- Applet1 is triggered






3- No exception is thrown |






2- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is fetched

TERMINAL RESPONSE | +| 3 | ProactiveResponseHandler availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Envelope SMS-PP Download unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

Applet1 builds a proactive command DISPLAY TEXT

2- ProactiveHandler.send() method is called

3- ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called


Applet2 builds a proactive command DISPLAY TEXT

4- ProactiveHandler.send() method is called

5- ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called | 1- Applet1 is triggered






3- No exception is thrown

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered






5- No exception is thrown |






2- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is fetched

TERMINAL RESPONSE






4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is fetched

TERMINAL RESPONSE | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 4 |

ProactiveResponseHandler availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EFSMS instruction unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

Applet1 builds a proactive command DISPLAY TEXT

2- ProactiveHandler.send() method is called

3- ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

Applet2 builds a proactive command DISPLAY TEXT

4- ProactiveHandler.send() method is called

5- ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

|

1- Applet1 is triggered

3- No exception is thrown

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered

5- No exception is thrown

|

2- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is fetched

TERMINAL RESPONSE

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is fetched

TERMINAL RESPONSE

| +| 5 |

ProactiveResponseHandler availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- Envelope Cell Broadcast Download unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

Applet1 builds a proactive command DISPLAY TEXT

2- ProactiveHandler.send() method is called

3- ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called.

Applet2 builds a proactive command DISPLAY TEXT

4- ProactiveHandler.send() method is called

5- ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

|

1- Applet1 is triggered

3- No exception is thrown

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered

5- No exception is thrown

|

2- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is fetched

TERMINAL RESPONSE

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is fetched

TERMINAL RESPONSE

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 6 | ProactiveResponseHandler availability with EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM

1- Envelope MO short message control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

Applet builds a proactive command DISPLAY TEXT

2- ProactiveHandler.send() method is called

3- ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called | 1- Applet1 is triggered




3- No exception is thrown |



2- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is fetched
TERMINAL RESPONSE | +| 7 | ProactiveResponseHandler availability with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- Envelope Cell Broadcast Download formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

Applet1 builds a proactive command DISPLAY TEXT

2- ProactiveHandler.send() method is called

3- ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called. | 1- Applet1 is triggered




3- No exception is thrown |



2- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is fetched
TERMINAL RESPONSE | +| 8 | ProactiveResponseHandler availability with EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD

1- Envelope USSD formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

Applet builds a proactive command DISPLAY TEXT

2- ProactiveHandler.send() method is called

3- ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called | 1- Applet1 is triggered




3- No exception is thrown |



2- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is fetched
TERMINAL RESPONSE | +| 9 | ProactiveResponseHandler availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD

1- Envelope USSD unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

Applet1 builds a proactive command DISPLAY TEXT

2- ProactiveHandler.send() method is called

3- ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

4- Applet2 builds a proactive command DISPLAY TEXT

4- ProactiveHandler.send() method is called

5- ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler() | 1- Applet1 is triggered




3- No exception is thrown

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered |



2- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is fetched
TERMINAL RESPONSE



4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is fetched
TERMINAL RESPONSE | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|-----------|--------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------| +| | method is called | 5- No exception is thrown | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 10 | ProactiveResponseHandler availability with EVENT_DOWNLOAD_IWLAN_ACCESS_STATUSES
1- Envelope USSD unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM
Applet1 builds a proactive command DISPLAY TEXT
2- ProactiveHandler.send() method is called
3- ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called
4- Applet2 builds a proactive command DISPLAY TEXT
4- ProactiveHandler.send() method is called
5- ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called | 1- Applet1 is triggered


3- No exception is thrown

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered |


2- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is fetched

TERMINAL RESPONSE


4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is fetched

TERMINAL RESPONSE | +| 11 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before the Terminal Profile with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV
1- Reset the card without sending the Terminal Profile
2- Envelope SMS-PP Download formatted is sent is sent to the (U)SIM
3- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

4- Applet1 gets the ProactiveResponseHandler |

2- Applet1 is triggered
3- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown
4- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes | | +| 12 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before the Terminal Profile with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD
1- Update Record EF SMS instruction formatted is sent to the (U)SIM
2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet1 gets the ProactiveResponseHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered
2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown
3- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes | | +| 13 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before the Terminal Profile with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV
1- Envelope SMS-PP Download unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM
2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet1 gets the | 1- Applet1 is triggered
2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown
3- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| |

ProactiveResponseHandler

4- Applet2 gets the ProactiveHandler

5- Applet2 gets the ProactiveResponseHandler

|

thrown

Applet1 finalizes

Applet2 is triggered

4- A ToolkitException
HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

5- A ToolkitException
HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet2 finalizes

| | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 14 |

The ProactiveHandler is not available before the Terminal Profile with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EFSMS instruction unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet1 gets the ProactiveResponseHandler

4- Applet2 gets the ProactiveHandler

5- Applet2 gets the ProactiveResponseHandler

|

1- Applet1 is triggered

2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

3- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered

4- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

5- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet2 finalizes

| | +| 15 |

The ProactiveHandler is not available before the Terminal Profile with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- Envelope Cell Broadcast Download unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet1 gets the ProactiveResponseHandler

4- Applet2 gets the ProactiveHandler

5- Applet2 gets the ProactiveResponseHandler

|

1- Applet1 is triggered

2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

3- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered

4- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

5- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet2 finalizes

| | +| 16 |

The ProactiveHandler is not available before the Terminal Profile with EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_B Y_SIM

1- Envelope MO short message control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet1 gets the ProactiveResponseHandler

|

1- Applet1 is triggered

2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

3- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes

| | +| 17 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before | | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| |

the Terminal Profile with
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- Envelope Cell Broadcast Download formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet1 gets the ProactiveResponseHandler

|

1- Applet1 is triggered

2- A ToolkitException
HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

3- A ToolkitException
HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes

| | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 18 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before the Terminal Profile with EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD

1- Envelope USSD formatted is sent is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet1 gets the ProactiveResponseHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

3- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes | | +| 19 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before the Terminal Profile with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD

1- Envelope USSD unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet1 gets the ProactiveResponseHandler

4- Applet2 gets the ProactiveHandler

5- Applet2 gets the ProactiveResponseHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

3- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered

4- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

5- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet2 finalizes | | +| 20 | The ProactiveHandler is not available before the Terminal Profile with EVENT_DOWNLOAD_IWLAN_ACCESS_STATU S

1- Envelope Download Iwlan Access Status is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 gets the ProactiveHandler

3- Applet1 gets the ProactiveResponseHandler

4- Applet2 gets the ProactiveHandler

5- Applet2 gets the ProactiveResponseHandler | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

3- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered

4- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

5- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------|----------------------------------|------------------| +| | | Applet2 finalizes | | + +#### 5.3.1.3 EnvelopeHandler + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Mha\_EnhD + +##### 5.3.1.3.1 Conformance requirements + +###### 5.3.1.3.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The *EnvelopeHandler* and its content are available for all toolkit applets triggered from the invocation to the termination of their *processToolkit()* method for the following events: + +EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV + +EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD + +EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV + +EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD + +EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_CB + +EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_SIM + +EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB + +EVENT\_FORMATTED\_USSD + +EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_USSD + +EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_IWLAN\_ACCESS + +- CRRN2: An *EnvelopeHandler* is considered available when no HANDLER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE ToolkitException is thrown when the corresponding *getTheHandler()* method is called or a method of the handler is called. + +###### 5.3.1.3.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.3.1.3.1.3 Context Errors + +No requirements. + +##### 5.3.1.3.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Mha\_EnhD.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Mha\_EnhD\_1.java + +Ufw\_Mha\_EnhD\_2.java + +Cap File: Ufw\_Mha\_EnhD.cap + +##### 5.3.1.3.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 1 to 10 | +| N2 | 1 to 10 | + +##### 5.3.1.3.4 + +###### Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | EnvelopeHandler availability with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Envelope SMS-PP Download formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown. | | +| 2 | EnvelopeHandler availability with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EF SMS instruction formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown. | | +| 3 | EnvelopeHandler availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Envelope SMS-PP Download unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

3- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet2 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

Applet1 finalizes

3- Applet2 is triggered

4- No exception is thrown. | | +| 4 | EnvelopeHandler availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EF SMS instruction unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

3- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet2 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered

3- No exception is thrown. | | +| 5 | EnvelopeHandler availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- Envelope Cell Broadcast Download unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

3- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown

Applet1 finalizes

3- Applet2 is triggered | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | is called by Applet2 | 4- No exception is thrown | | +| 6 | EnvelopeHandler availability with
EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_B
Y_SIM

1- Envelope MO short message control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is throw | | +| 7 | EnvelopeHandler availability with
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- Envelope Cell Broadcast Download formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2-No exception is thrown | | +| 8 | EnvelopeHandler availability with
EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD

1- Envelope USSD formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2-No exception is thrown | | +| 9 | EnvelopeHandler availability with
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD

1- Envelope USSD unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

3- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet2 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.
Applet1 finalizes

3- Applet2 is triggered

4- No exception is thrown | | +| 10 | EnvelopeHandler availability with
DOWNLOAD_IWLAN_ACCESS_STATUS

1- Envelope Download Iwlan Access Status is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

3- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet2 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.
Applet1 finalizes

3- Applet2 is triggered

4- No exception is thrown | | + +#### 5.3.1.4 EnvelopeResponseHandler + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Mha\_Erhd + +##### 5.3.1.4.1 Conformance requirements + +###### 5.3.1.4.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The handler is available for all triggered toolkit applets from the invocation of the *processToolkit()* method of the toolkit applet until a toolkit applet has posted an envelope response or the first invocation of the *ProactiveHandler.send()* method for the following events: + +EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV + +EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV + +EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_SIM + +EVENT\_FORMATTED\_USSD + +EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_USSD + +- CRRN2: An *EnvelopeResponseHandler* is considered available when no HANLDER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE ToolkitException is thrown when the corresponding *getTheHandler()* method is called or a method of the handler is called. + +###### 5.3.1.4.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.3.1.4.1.3 Context Errors + +- CRR1: The handler is not available for the following events: + +EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD + +EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD + +EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_CB + +EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB + +EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_IWLAN\_ACCESS\_STATUS + +##### 5.3.1.4.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Mha\_Erhd.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Mha\_Erhd\_1.java + +Ufw\_Mha\_Erhd\_2.java + +Cap File: Ufw\_Mha\_Erhd.cap + +##### 5.3.1.4.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 5 to 10 | +| N2 | 1 to 10 | +| C1 | 1 to 11 | + +##### 5.3.1.4.4 + +###### Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | EnvelopeResponseHandler availability with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EF SMS instruction formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- The applet1 is triggered.

2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown | | +| 2 | EnvelopeResponseHandler availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EF SMS instruction unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- Applet1 is triggered.

2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown | | +| 3 | EnvelopeResponseHandler availability with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- Envelope Cell Broadcast Download formatted is sent to the SIM

2- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- The applet1 is triggered.

2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown | | +| 4 | EnvelopeResponseHandler availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- Envelope Cell Broadcast Download unformatted is sent to the SIM

2- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- Applet1 is triggered.

2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown | | + +| | | | | +|---|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 5 | EnvelopeResponseHandler availability with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Envelope SMS-PP Download formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

3- Applet1 builds an additional information for response packet and it calls the post() method

4- Applet1 calls all methods of the EnvelopeResponseHandler (including inherited methods)

5- A EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

6- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

7- Applet1 builds a proactive command and it calls the send() method

8- Applet1 calls all methods of the EnvelopeResponseHandler (including inherited methods) | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.




4- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown for each method

Applet1 finalizes
5- Applet1 is triggered

6- No Exception is thrown



8- ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown for each method |




3- The response packet is sent







7- The proactive command is sent | +| 6 | EnvelopeResponseHandler availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Envelope SMS-PP Download unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

3- Applet1 builds the envelope response and it calls the post() method

4- Applet1 calls all methods of the EnvelopeResponseHandler (including inherited methods)

5- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- An unformatted SMS PP envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

7- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called.

8- Applet1 builds a proactive command and it calls the send() method

9- Applet1 calls all methods of the | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.



4- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown for each method
Applet1 finalizes

5- Applet2 is triggered.

A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown.

Applet2 finalizes

6- Applet1 is triggered.

7- No exception is thrown. |




3- The envelope response is sent











9- The proactive command is fetched and the Terminal | + +| | | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------| +|

EnvelopeResponseHandler (including inherited methods)


10- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet2

|

9- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown for each method.

Applet1 finalizes

10- Applet2 is triggered.


A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown.

|

response is issued.

| +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------| + +| | | | | +|---|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 7 |

EnvelopeResponseHandler availability with
EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_B
Y_SIM

1- Envelope MO short message control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

3- Applet1 builds the envelope response and it calls the postAsBERTLV() method

4- Applet1 calls all methods of the EnvelopeResponseHandler (including inherited methods)

5- Envelope MO short message control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

6- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

7- Applet1 builds a proactive command and it calls the send method

8- Applet1 calls all methods of the EnvelopeResponseHandler (including inherited methods)

|

1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.



4- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown for each method

Applet1 finalizes

5- Applet1 is triggered


6- No exception is thrown



8- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown for each method

|



3-The envelope response is sent







7- The proactive command is fetched and the Terminal Response is issued

| +| 8 |

EnvelopeResponseHandler availability with
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV in case
of multi-triggering

1- Envelope SMS-PP Download unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1




5- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet 2


6- Applet2 calls the post() method

|


1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- Applet1 finalizes

4- Applet2 is triggered.

5- No Exception is thrown




Applet2 finalizes

|









6- The response is checked.

| +| 9 |

EnvelopeResponseHandler availability with
EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD

1- Envelope USSD formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

|

1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

| | + +| | | | | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |

3- Applet1 builds an additional information for response packet and it calls the post() method

4- Applet1 calls all methods of the EnvelopeResponseHandler (including inherited methods)

5- EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

6- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

7- Applet1 builds a proactive command and it calls the send() method

8- Applet1 calls all methods of the EnvelopeResponseHandler (including inherited methods)

|

4- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown for each method

Applet1 finalizes

5- Applet1 is triggered

6- No Exception is thrown

8- ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown for each method

|

3- The response packet is sent

7- The proactive command is sent

| +| 10 |

EnvelopeResponseHandler availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV in case of multi-triggering

1- Envelope USSD unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

5- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet 2

6- Applet2 calls the post() method

|

1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- Applet1 finalizes

4- Applet2 is triggered.

5- No Exception is thrown

Applet2 finalizes

|

6- The response is checked.

| +| 11 |

EnvelopeResponseHandler availability with EVENT_DOWNLOAD_IWLAN_ACCESS_STATUS

1- Envelope Download Iwlan Access Status is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

|

1- The applet1 is triggered.

2- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

| | + +#### 5.3.1.5 USATEnvelopeHandler + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Mha\_Uehd + +##### 5.3.1.5.1 Conformance requirements + +###### 5.3.1.5.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The *UsatEnvelopeHandler* and its content are available for all toolkit applets triggered from the invocation to the termination of their *processToolkit()* method for the following events: + +EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV + EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD + EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV + EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD + EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_CB + EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_SIM + EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB + EVENT\_FORMATTED\_USSD + EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_USSD + EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_IWLAN\_ACCESS\_STATUS + +- CRRN2: An *UsatEnvelopeHandler* is considered available when no HANLDER\_NOT\_AVAILABLE ToolkitException is thrown when the corresponding *getTheHandler()* method is called or a method of the handler is called. + +###### 5.3.1.5.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.3.1.5.1.3 Context Errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.3.1.5.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Mha\_Uehd.java + Test Applet: Ufw\_Mha\_Uehd\_1.java + Ufw\_Mha\_Uehd\_2.java + Cap File: Ufw\_Mha\_Uehd.cap + +#### 5.3.1.5.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 1 to 10 | +| N2 | 1 to 10 | + +#### 5.3.1.5.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | USATEnvelopeHandler availability with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Envelope SMS-PP Download formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown. | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 2 | USATEnvelopeHandler availability with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EF SMS instruction formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown. | | +| 3 | USATEnvelopeHandler availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Envelope SMS-PP Download unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

3- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet2 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

Applet1 finalizes

3- Applet2 is triggered

4- No exception is thrown. | | +| 4 | USATEnvelopeHandler availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EF SMS instruction unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

3- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet2 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

Applet1 finalizes
Applet2 is triggered

3- No exception is thrown. | | +| 5 | USATEnvelopeHandler availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- Envelope Cell Broadcast Download unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

3- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet2 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown

Applet1 finalizes

3- Applet2 is triggered

4- No exception is thrown | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 6 | USATEnvelopeHandler availability with EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM

1- Envelope MO short message control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is throw | | +| 7 | USATEnvelopeHandler availability with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- Envelope Cell Broadcast Download formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2-No exception is thrown | | +| 8 | USATEnvelopeHandler availability with EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD

1- Envelope USSD formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown. | | +| 9 | USATEnvelopeHandler availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD

1- Envelope USSD unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

3- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet2 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

Applet1 finalizes

3- Applet2 is triggered

4- No exception is thrown. | | +| 10 | USATEnvelopeHandler availability with EVENT_DOWNLOAD_IWLAN_ACCESS_STATU S

1- Envelope USSD unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

3- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet2 | 1- Applet1 is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

Applet1 finalizes

3- Applet2 is triggered

4- No exception is thrown | | + +### 5.3.1.6 Applet triggering with ongoing proactive session + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Mha\_Rent + +### 5.3.1.6.1 Conformance requirements + +#### 5.3.1.6.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: *EnvelopeHandler* and *USATEnvelopeHandler* are available for all events. + - EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV + - EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV + - EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_SIM + - EVENT\_FORMATTED\_USSD + - EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_USSD +- CRRN2: *EnvelopeResponseHandler* is available for the following events: + - EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD + - EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD + - EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_SIM + +#### 5.3.1.6.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +#### 5.3.1.6.1.3 Context Errors + +- CRRN1: *EnvelopeResponseHandler* is not available for the following events: + - EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD + - EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD + - EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_CB + - EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB + - EVENT\_DOWNLOAD\_IWLAN\_ACCESS\_STATUS + +### 5.3.1.6.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Mha\_Rent.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Mha\_Rent\_1.java + +Cap File: Ufw\_Mha\_Rent.cap + +### 5.3.1.6.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|------------------------| +| N1 | 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 | +| N2 | 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 | +| N3 | 1, 2, 3 | +| C1 | 1, 2, 6, 7, 10 | + +5.3.1.6.4 + +Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1 |

Handlers availability with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Envelope unrecognized is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 builds a proactive command and calls the send() method

3- Update Record EFsms instruction formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

4- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() and USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() methods are called by Applet1

5- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

|

1- Applet1 is triggered

3- Applet1 is triggered again

4- No exception is thrown

5- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes

|

2- 91 XX

6- The proactive command is fetched and the Terminal Response is issued.

| +| 2 |

Handlers availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Envelope unrecognized is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 builds a proactive command and calls the send() method

3- Update Record EFsms instruction unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

4- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() and USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() methods are called by Applet1

5- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

|

1- Applet1 is triggered

3- Applet1 is triggered again

4- No exception is thrown

5- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes

|

2- 91 XX

6- The proactive command is fetched and the Terminal Response is issued.

| +| 3 |

Handlers availability with EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_B Y_SIM

1- Envelope unrecognized is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 builds a proactive command and calls the send() method

3- Envelope MO short message control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

4- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() and USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() methods are called by Applet1

5- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

|

1- Applet1 is triggered

3- Applet1 is triggered again

4- No exception is thrown

5- No exception is thrown

Applet1 finalizes

|

2- 91 XX

6- The proactive command is fetched and the Terminal Response is issued.

| +| 4 |

Handlers availability with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Envelope unrecognized is sent to the (U)SIM

|

1- Applet1 is triggered

| | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |

2- Applet1 builds a proactive command and calls the send() method

3- Envelope SMS-PP Download formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

4- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() and USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() methods are called by Applet1

5- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

|

3- Applet1 is triggered again

4- No exception is thrown

5- No exception is thrown

Applet1 finalizes

|

2- 91 XX

6- The proactive command is fetched and the Terminal Response is issued.

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 5 | Handlers availability with
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Envelope unrecognized is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 builds a proactive command and calls the send() method

3- Envelope SMS-PP Download unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

4- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() and USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() methods are called by Applet1

5- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- Applet1 is triggered




3- Applet1 is triggered again

4- No exception is thrown

5- No exception is thrown

Applet1 finalizes |




2- 91 XX





6- The proactive command is fetched and the Terminal Response is issued. | +| 6 | Handlers availability with
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- Envelope unrecognized is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 builds a proactive command and calls the send() method

3- Envelope CB Download formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

4- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() and USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() methods are called by Applet1

5- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- Applet1 is triggered




3- Applet1 is triggered again

4- No exception is thrown

5- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes |




2- 91 XX





6- The proactive command is fetched and the Terminal Response is issued. | +| 7 | Handlers availability with
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- Envelope unrecognized is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 builds a proactive command and calls the send() method

3- Envelope CB Download unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

4- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() and USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() methods are called by Applet1

5- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1 | 1- Applet1 is triggered




3- Applet1 is triggered again

4- No exception is thrown

5- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes |




2- 91 XX





6- The proactive command is fetched and the Terminal Response is issued. | +| 8 | Handlers availability with
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_USSD

1- Envelope unrecognized is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 builds a proactive command and | 1- Applet1 is triggered |

2- 91 XX | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |

calls the send() method

3- Envelope USSD formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

4- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() and USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() methods are called by Applet1

5- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

|

3- Applet1 is triggered again

4- No exception is thrown

5- No exception is thrown

Applet1 finalizes

|

6- The proactive command is fetched and the Terminal Response is issued.

| +| 9 |

Handlers availability with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD

1- Envelope unrecognized is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 builds a proactive command and calls the send() method

3- Envelope USSD unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

4- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() and USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() methods are called by Applet1

5- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

|

1- Applet1 is triggered

3- Applet1 is triggered again

4- No exception is thrown

5- No exception is thrown

Applet1 finalizes

|

2- 91 XX

6- The proactive command is fetched and the Terminal Response is issued.

| +| 10 |

Handlers availability with EVENT_DOWNLOAD_IWLAN_ACCESS_STATUSS

1- Envelope unrecognized is sent to the (U)SIM

2- Applet1 builds a proactive command and calls the send() method

3- Envelope Download Iwlan Access Status is sent to the (U)SIM

4- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() and USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() methods are called by Applet1

5- EnvelopeResponseHandler.getTheHandler() method is called by Applet1

|

1- Applet1 is triggered

3- Applet1 is triggered again

4- No exception is thrown

5- A ToolkitException HANDLER_NOT_AVAILABLE is thrown

Applet1 finalizes

|

2- 91 XX

6- The proactive command is fetched and the Terminal Response is issued.

| + +## 5.3.2 Handler integrity + +### 5.3.2.1 ProactiveResponseHandler + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Hin\_Prhd + +## 5.3.2.1.1 Conformance requirements + +## 5.3.2.1.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The *ProactiveResponseHandler* TLV list shall be empty before the first call to the *ProactiveHandler.send()* method. + +## 5.3.2.1.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +## 5.3.2.1.1.3 Context Errors + +No requirements. + +## 5.3.2.1.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Hin\_Prhd.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Hin\_Prhd\_1.java + +Cap File: Ufw\_Hin\_Prhd.cap + +## 5.3.2.1.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 1 | + +## 5.3.2.1.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 |

Applet registration and ProactiveResponseHandler obtaining

1- Applet is registered to all events defined in TS 31.130 [2].
Using the method setEventList() for all the events.

Terminal Profile command is sent to the (U)SIM without the facilities of SET_EVENT_LIST , SETUP_IDLE_MODE_TEXT, SETUP_MENU and POLL_INTERVAL.

2- For each event/triggering:

3- ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler() is called

4- ProactiveResponseHandler.getLength() is called

|

1- No exception is thrown

2- Applet is triggered.

3- No exception is thrown

4- The return value is 0

| | + +## 5.3.2.2 EnvelopeHandler + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Hin\_Enhhd + +### 5.3.2.2.1 Conformance requirements + +#### 5.3.2.2.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: When available, the *EnvelopeHandler* shall remain available and its content shall remain unchanged from the invocation to the termination of the *processToolkit()* method. +- CRRN2: The *EnvelopeHandler* TLV list is filled with the Comprehension TLV data objects of the ENVELOPE APDU command. The Comprehension TLV data objects shall be provided in the order given in the ENVELOPE command data. + +#### 5.3.2.2.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +#### 5.3.2.2.1.3 Context Errors + +No requirements. + +#### 5.3.2.2.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Hin\_Enhd.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Hin\_Enhd\_1.java + +Cap File: Ufw\_Hin\_Enhd.cap + +#### 5.3.2.2.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 1 to 10 | +| N2 | 1 to 10 | + +### 5.3.2.2.4 + +### Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1 |

EnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- A formatted SMS PP envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using EnvelopeHandler.copy()

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_SMS_TPDUs

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- Check that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in the envelope call control using EnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the TAG_SMS_TPDUs is the TLV selected

7- The content of EnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.

5- Applet is triggered

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1

|

4- 91 XX

Proactive command Display Text is fetched
The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| +| 2 |

EnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EFSMS instruction single and formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using EnvelopeHandler.copy()

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_SMS_TPDUs

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

|

1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.

5- Applet is triggered

|

4- 91 XX

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |

6- Checked that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in envelope call control using EnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_SMS_TPDUs

Call Control execution is finished.

Checked that the TAG_SMS_TPDUs is the TLV selected

7- The content of EnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1

|

Proactive command Display Text is fetched

The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 3 |

EnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- A unformatted SMS PP envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using EnvelopeHandler.copy()

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- Check that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in the envelope call control using EnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES is the TLV selected

7- The content of EnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.





5- Applet is triggered



6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM






7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1.

|






4- 91 XX










Proactive command Display Text is fetched

The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| +| 4 |

EnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EFSMS instruction single and unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using EnvelopeHandler.copy()

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV method is called with TAG_SMS_TPDU

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

|

1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.




5- Applet is triggered

|





4- 91 XX

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |

EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- Check that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in envelope call control using EnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the SMS_TPDU is the TLV selected

7- The content of EnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1.

|

Proactive command Display Text is fetched

The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 5 |

EnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- An unformatted cell broadcast envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using EnvelopeHandler.copy()

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_CELLBROADCAST_PAGE

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- Checked that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in envelope call control using EnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the TAG_CELLBROADCAST_PAGE is the TLV selected

7- The content of EnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.

4- 91 XX

5- Applet is triggered

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1.

|

Proactive command Display Text is fetched

The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| +| 6 |

EnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM

1- A MO short message control by SIM envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using EnvelopeHandler.copy()

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_ADDRESS

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

|

1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.

4- 91 XX

5- Applet is triggered

| | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |

EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- Checked that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in envelope call control using EnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the TAG_ADDRESS is the TLV selected

7- The content of EnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1.

|

Proactive command Display Text is fetched

The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 7 |

EnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- A formatted cell broadcast envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using EnvelopeHandler.copy()

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_CELLBROADCAST_PAGE

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- Checked that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in envelope call control using EnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the TAG_CELLBROADCAST_PAGE is the TLV selected

7- The content of EnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.

4- 91 XX

5- Applet is triggered

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1.

|

Proactive command Display Text is fetched

The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| +| 8 |

EnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD

1- A formatted USSD envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using EnvelopeHandler.copy()

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_USSD_STRING

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

|

1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.

4- 91 XX

5- Applet is triggered

| | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |

EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- Check that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in the envelope call control using EnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the TAG_USSD_STRING is the TLV selected

7- The content of EnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1

|

Proactive command Display Text is fetched
The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 9 |

EnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD

1- A unformatted USSD envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using EnvelopeHandler.copy()

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- Check that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in the envelope call control using EnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES is the TLV selected

7- The content of EnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.

5- Applet is triggered

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1.

|

4- 91 XX

Proactive command Display Text is fetched

The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| +| 10 |

EnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_DOWNLOAD_IWLAN_ACCESS_STATU S

1- An Download Iwlan Access Status envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

2- EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using EnvelopeHandler.copy()

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_WLAN_ACCESS_STATUS (0x4B)

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is

|

1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.

5- Applet is triggered

|

4- 91 XX

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |

called

6- Checked that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in envelope call control using EnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The EnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the TAG_WLAN_ACCESS_STATUS is the TLV selected

7- The content of EnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1.

|

Proactive command Display Text is fetched

The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| + +### 5.3.2.3 USATEnvelopeHandler + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Hin\_Uehd + +#### 5.3.2.3.1 Conformance requirements + +##### 5.3.2.3.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: When available, the *USATEnvelopeHandler* shall remain available and its content shall remain unchanged from the invocation to the termination of the *processToolkit()* method. +- CRRN2: The *USATEnvelopeHandler* TLV list is filled with the Comprehension TLV data objects of the ENVELOPE APDU command. The Comprehension TLV data objects shall be provided in the order given in the ENVELOPE command data. +- CRRN3: The (U)SAT Framework shall convert the UPDATE RECORD EFSMS APDU into a COMPREHENSION TLV List containing Device Identities TLV, Address TLV, SMS TPDU TLV and AID TLV (only if the EFSMS file updated is under an ADF). +- CRRN4: The *getEnvelopeTag()* method shall return BTAG\_SMS\_PP\_DOWNLOAD. +- CRRN5: The *getLength()* method shall return the Comprehension TLV list length. +- CRRN6: The Device Identity Simple TLV is used to store the information about the absolute record number in the EFSMS file and the value of the EFSMS record status byte. + +##### 5.3.2.3.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +##### 5.3.2.3.1.3 Context Errors + +No requirements. + +#### 5.3.2.3.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Hin\_Uehd.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Hin\_Uehd\_1.java + +Cap File: Ufw\_Hin\_Uehd.cap + +## 5.3.2.3.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|--------------------| +| N1 | 1 to 7, 14, 15, 16 | +| N2 | 1 to 7, 14, 15, 16 | +| N3 | 8, 11 | +| N4 | 10, 13 | +| N5 | 9, 12 | +| N6 | 8, 11 | + +## 5.3.2.3.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1 | USATEnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- A formatted SMS PP envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy()

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_SMS_TPDU

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- Check that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in the envelope call control using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the TAG_SMS_TPDU is the TLV selected

7- The content of USATEnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare() | 1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.



5- Applet is triggered

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1 | 4- 91 XX

Proactive command Display Text is fetched
The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM | +| 2 | USATEnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EF SMS instruction single and formatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called | 1- Applet is triggered | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy()

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_SMS_TPDU

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- Checked that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in envelope call control using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_SMS_TPDU

Call Control execution is finished.

Checked that the TAG_SMS_TPDU is the TLV selected

7- The content of USATEnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.

5- Applet is triggered

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1

|

4- 91 XX

Proactive command Display Text is fetched
The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 3 |

USATEnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- A unformatted SMS PP envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy()

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- Check that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in the envelope call control using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES is the TLV selected

7- The content of USATEnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.

5- Applet is triggered

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1.

|

4- 91 XX

Proactive command Display Text is fetched

The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| +| 4 |

USATEnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- Update Record EFsms instruction single and unformatted is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy()

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV method is called with TAG_SMS_TPDU

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method

|

1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.

5- Applet is triggered

|

4- 91 XX

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |

is called

6- Check that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in envelope call control using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES is the TLV selected

7- The content of USATEnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1.

|

Proactive command Display Text is fetched

The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 5 |

USATEnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- An unformatted cell broadcast envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy()

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_CELLBROADCAST_PAGE

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- Checked that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in envelope call control using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the TAG_CELLBROADCAST_PAGE is the TLV selected

7- The content of USATEnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.

4- 91 XX

5- Applet is triggered

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1.

|

Proactive command Display Text is fetched

The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| +| 6 |

USATEnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM

1- A MO short message control by SIM envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy()

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_ADDRESS

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

|

1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.

4- 91 XX

5- Applet is triggered

| | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |

USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- Checked that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in envelope call control using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the TAG_ADDRESS is the TLV selected

7- The content of USATEnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1.

|

Proactive command Display Text is fetched

The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 7 |

USATEnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB

1- A formatted cell broadcast envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy()

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_CELLBROADCAST_PAGE

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- Checked that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in envelope call control using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the TAG_CELLBROADCAST_PAGE is the TLV selected

7- The content of USATEnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.

4- 91 XX

5- Applet is triggered

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1.

|

Proactive command Display Text is fetched

The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| +| 8 |

Check the TLV list conversion for EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- An EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD is sent to the (U)SIM.

2- The findTLV(tag == device identities Tag) method is called.

3- The getValueByte(offset == 0) method is called.

4- The getValueByte(offset == 1) method is called.

5- The findTLV(tag == address Tag) method is called.

6- Check the content.

7- The findTLV(tag == SMS TPDU Tag) method is called.

8- Check the content.

|

1- Applet is triggered.

2- No exception is thrown.

3- return the absolute record.

4- return the record status.

5- No exception is thrown.

7- No exception is thrown.

| | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 9 | getLength() call
Call getLength() method | return the Comprehension TLV list length | | +| 10 | getEnvelopeTag() call
Call getTag() method | return
BTAG_SMS_PP_DOWNLOAD | | +| 11 | Check the TLV list conversion for
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1- An EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD is sent to the (U)SIM.

2- The findTLV(tag == device identities Tag) method is called.

3- The getValueByte(offset == 0) method is called.

4- The getValueByte(offset == 1) method is called.

5- The findTLV(tag == address Tag) method is called.

6- Check the content.

7- The findTLV(tag == SMS TPDU Tag) method is called.

8- Check the content. | 1- Applet is triggered.

2- No exception is thrown.

3- return the absolute record.

4- return the record status.

5- No exception is thrown.

7- No exception is thrown. | | +| 12 | getLength() call
Call getLength() method | return the Comprehension TLV list length | | +| 13 | getEnvelopeTag() call
Call getEnvelopeTag() method | return
BTAG_SMS_PP_DOWNLOAD | | +| 14 | USATEnvelopeHandler integrity checks with
EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD

1- A formatted USSD envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy()

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_USSD_STRING

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- Check that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in the envelope call control using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished. | 1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.

4- 91 XX

5- Applet is triggered

6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |

Check that the TAG_USSD_STRING is the TLV selected

7- The content of USATEnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1

|

Proactive command Display Text is fetched

The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 15 |

USATEnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD

1- A unformatted USSD envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy()

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM

USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

6- Check that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in the envelope call control using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES is the TLV selected

7- The content of USATEnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

1- Applet is triggered

2- No exception is thrown.

3- No exception is thrown.





5- Applet is triggered




6- No exception is thrown and the handler contains the envelope call control by SIM





7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1.

|







4- 91 XX











Proactive command Display Text is fetched

The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| +| 16 |

USATEnvelopeHandler integrity checks with EVENT_DOWNLOAD_IWLAN_ACCESS_STATUSS

1- A Download Iwlan Access Status envelope is sent to the (U)SIM

2- USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called


3- Copy the content of the EnvelopeHandler in buffer1 using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy()


The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

4- A proactive command DISPLAY TEXT is sent

5- Envelope call control by SIM is sent to the (U)SIM


USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method is called

|

1- Applet is triggered


2- No exception is thrown.


3- No exception is thrown.




5- Applet is triggered



6- No exception is thrown and the

|






4- 91 XX

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |

6- Check that EnvelopeHandler content is the same as in the envelope call control using USATEnvelopeHandler.copy() and Util.arrayCompare() methods

The USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() method is called with TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES

Call Control execution is finished.

Check that the TAG_DEVICE_IDENTITIES is the TLV selected

7- The content of USATEnvelopeHandler is compared with buffer1 using Util.arrayCompare()

|

handler contains the envelope call control by SIM

7- The contents of the EnvelopeHandler shall be the same as stored in buffer1.

|

Proactive command Display Text is fetched

The terminal Response of DISPLAY TEXT is sent to the (U)SIM

| + +### 5.3.3 Exception handling + +#### 5.3.3.1 General Behaviour + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Exh\_Genb + +##### 5.3.3.1.1 Conformance requirement + +###### 5.3.3.1.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: If more than one Applet shall be triggered by the currently processed event all Exceptions shall be caught by the USAT Framework and shall not be sent to the terminal. The USAT Framework shall proceed with the triggering. +- CRRN2: If only one Applet shall be triggered by the currently processed event and an ISOException with the reason code REPLY\_BUSY is thrown, it shall be sent to the terminal using the Status Word 0x9300. +- CRRN3: If only one Applet shall be triggered by the currently processed event other Exceptions than an ISOException with the reason code REPLY\_BUSY shall not be propagated to the terminal. + +###### 5.3.3.1.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +###### 5.3.3.1.1.3 Context errors + +No requirements. + +##### 5.3.3.1.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Exh\_Genb.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Exh\_Genb\_1.java + +Ufw\_Exh\_Genb\_2.java + +Cap File: ufw\_exh\_genb.cap + +## 5.3.3.1.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 | 1, 2, 3, 4 | + +## 5.3.3.1.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------| +| 0 |

Applet1 is installed and registers to
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV
EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD
and

Applet2 is installed and registers to
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV and
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD

| | | +| 1 |

ISOException REPLY_BUSY is not sent to the terminal in multi triggering

1- Send an envelope Event Unformatted SMS PP ENV (multi triggering event, multi registered applets)

4- Send an envelope Event Unformatted SMS PP ENV (multi triggering event, multi registered applets)

|

1- Applet1 is triggered

2- Applet1 sends a ISOException with the reason code REPLY_BUSY then finalizes

Applet2 is triggered, does nothing and finalizes

4- Applet1 is triggered, does nothing and finalizes

Applet2 is triggered, sends a ISOException with the reason code REPLY_BUSY then finalizes

|

3- SW = 90 00

5- SW = 90 00

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------| +| 2 | ISOException REPLY_BUSY is sent to the terminal in single triggering SMS PP

1- Send an envelope Event formatted SMS PP ENV to trigger Applet1 (single triggering event)

2- Send an envelope Event Unformatted SMS CB (multi triggering event, single registered applet) | 1- Applet1 is triggered, sends a ISOException with the reason code REPLY_BUSY then finalizes

2- Applet2 is triggered, sends a ISOException with the reason code REPLY_BUSY then finalizes | 1- SW = 93 00

2- SW = 93 00 | +| 3 | Other exception than ISOException REPLY_BUSY are not sent to the terminal

1- Send an envelope Event formatted SMS PP ENV to trigger Applet1 (single triggering event)

2- Send an envelope Event formatted SMS PP ENV to trigger Applet1 (single triggering event) | 1- Applet1 is triggered, sends a ISOException with reason code different to REPLY_BUSY then finalizes

2- Applet1 is triggered, sends a ToolkitException then finalizes | 1- SW = 90 00

2- SW = 90 00 | +| 4 | ISOException REPLY_BUSY is sent to the terminal in single triggering USSD

1- Send an envelope Event formatted USSD to trigger Applet1 (single triggering event)

2- Send an envelope Event unformatted SMS CB (multi triggering event, single registered applet) | 1- Applet1 is triggered, sends a ISOException with the reason code REPLY_BUSY then finalizes

2- Applet2 is triggered, sends a ISOException with the reason code REPLY_BUSY then finalizes | 1- SW = 93 00

2- SW = 93 00 | + +### 5.3.3.2 Interaction with Multiple Triggering + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Exh\_Imtg + +#### 5.3.3.2.1 Conformance requirement + +##### 5.3.3.2.1.1 Normal execution: + +- CRRN1: An exception thrown by a toolkit applet, will not influence toolkit applets registered to the same event. + +##### 5.3.3.2.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +##### 5.3.3.2.1.3 Context errors + +No requirements. + +#### 5.3.3.2.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Exh\_Imtg.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Exh\_Imtg\_1.java + +Ufw\_Exh\_Imtg\_2.java + +Cap File: ufw\_exh\_imtg.cap + +## 5.3.3.2.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 | 1, 2, 3, 4 | + +## 5.3.3.2.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 0 | Load/install 2 toolkit applets registered to
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV,
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD,
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB,
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD

Applet1: Priority= 0x01,
Applet2: Priority= 0x02,
(i.e. Applet1 is triggered before Applet2) | | | +| 1 | UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV is sent | 1- Applet1 is triggered
2- NullPointerException is thrown
3- Applet2 is triggered | | +| 2 | UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD is sent | 1- Applet1 is triggered
2- NullPointerException is thrown
3- Applet2 is triggered | | +| 3 | UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB is sent | 1- Applet1 is triggered
2- NullPointerException is thrown
3- Applet2 is triggered | | +| 4 | UNFORMATTED_USSD is sent | 1- Applet1 is triggered
2- NullPointerException is thrown
3- Applet2 is triggered | | + +## 5.3.4 Applet triggering + +## 5.3.4.1 EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Apt\_Efse + +## 5.3.4.1.1 Conformance requirement + +## 5.3.4.1.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The applet is triggered by the `EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV` once: + - it has been registered to this event; + - a Short Message Point to Point (Single or Concatenated) is received by Envelope APDU(s) and is formatted according to TS 31.115 [10]; + - the toolkit applet to be triggered is registered with the corresponding TAR in the SMS TPDU; + - the security is verified. +- CRRN2: The applet is not triggered by the `EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV` once it has deregistered from this event. + +## 5.3.4.1.1.2 Parameters error + +No requirements. + +## 5.3.4.1.1.3 Context Errors + +No requirements. + +## 5.3.4.1.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Apt\_Efse.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Apt\_Efse\_1.java + +Cap File: ufw\_apt\_efse.cap + +## 5.3.4.1.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 (See note) | 1, 2 | +| CRRN2 | 2 | + +NOTE: The security checks are not relevant to the test designed in this test area; they will be checked in the "Framework Security Management" clause. + +## 5.3.4.1.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 |

Applet registration to EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV and triggering

Applet is registered to EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV and EVENT_UNRECOGNIZED_ENVELOPE

1- A Single Short Message SMS-PP Formatted Data Download is sent to the USIM.

2- A Concatenated Short Message SMS-PP Formatted Data Download is sent to the USIM (composed of 2 Short Messages. The UDL for the first Short Message is 70 and

| 1- Applet is triggered | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | for the second 70) | 2- Applet is triggered | | +| 2 |

Applet deregistration

ToolkitRegistry.clearEvent() method is called for EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- A Single Short Message SMS-PP Data Download is sent to the USIM.

2- A Concatenated Short Messages SMS-PP Data Download is sent to the USIM (composed of 2 Short Messages. The UDL for the first Short Message is 70 and for the second 70).

An unrecognized envelope is sent to the USIM

ToolkitRegistry.setEvent() method is called for EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

3- A Single Short Messages SMS-PP Data Download is sent to the USIM.

4- A Concatenated Short Messages SMS-PP Data Download is sent to the USIM (composed of 2 Short Messages. The UDL for the first Short Message is 70 and for the second 70).

|

1- Applet is not triggered

2- Applet is not triggered

3- Applet is triggered

4- Applet is triggered

| | + +### 5.3.4.2 EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Apt\_Euse + +#### 5.3.4.2.1 Conformance requirement + +##### 5.3.4.2.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The applets registers are triggered by the EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV once a Short Message Point to Point (Single or Concatenated) is received by Envelope APDU(s) and is unformatted. +- CRRN2: The applet is not triggered by the EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_ENV once it has deregistered from this event. + +##### 5.3.4.2.1.2 Parameters error + +No requirements. + +##### 5.3.4.2.1.3 Context Errors + +No requirements. + +#### 5.3.4.2.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Apt\_Euse.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Apt\_Euse\_1.java + +Cap File: ufw\_apt\_euse.cap + +## 5.3.4.2.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 | 1, 2 | +| CRRN2 | 2 | + +## 5.3.4.2.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 |

Applet registration to EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV and triggering

Applet is registered to the EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV and EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV.

1-ToolkitRegistry.isEventSet() method is called for EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

2- A Single and Unformatted SMS-PP Data Download Envelope is sent to the USIM.

3- A Concatenated and Unformatted SMS-PP Data Download Envelope is sent to the USIM (composed of 2 Short Messages. The UDL for the first Short Message is 70 and for the second 70)

|

1- The method returns true

2- Applet is triggered

3- Applet is triggered

| | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 2 |

Applet deregistration

ToolkitRegistry.clearEvent() method is called for EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- A Single and Unformatted SMS-PP Data Download Envelope is sent to the USIM.

2- A Concatenated and Unformatted SMS-PP Data Download Envelope is sent to the USIM (composed of 2 Short Messages. The UDL for the first Short Message is 70 and for the second 70)

An unrecognized envelope is sent to the USIM

ToolkitRegistry.setEvent() method is called for EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

3- A Single and Unformatted SMS-PP Data Download Envelope is sent to the USIM.

4- A Concatenated and Unformatted SMS-PP Data Download Envelope is sent to the USIM (composed of 2 Short Messages. The UDL for the first Short Message is 70 and for the second 70)

|

1- Applet isn't triggered

2- Applet isn't triggered

3- Applet is triggered

4- Applet is triggered

| | + +### 5.3.4.3 EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Apt\_Efsu + +#### 5.3.4.3.1 Conformance requirement + +##### 5.3.4.3.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The applet is triggered by the EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD once: + - it has been registered to this event, + - a Short Message Point to Point (Single or Concatenated) is received by Update Record EFSMS APDU(s) and is formatted according to TS 31.115[10], + - the toolkit applet to be triggered is registered with the corresponding TAR in the SMS TPDU, +- CRRN2: The applets are not triggered by the EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD once it has deregistered from this event. + +##### 5.3.4.3.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Apt\_Efsu.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Apt\_Efsu\_1.java + +Cap File: ufw\_apt\_efsu.cap + +## 5.3.4.3.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 (See note) | 1,2 | +| CRRN2 | 2 | + +NOTE: The security checks are not relevant to the test designed in this test area; they will be checked in the "Framework Security Management" clause. + +## 5.3.4.3.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 |

Applet registration to EVENT FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD and triggering

Applet is registered to
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD and
EVENT_UNRECOGNIZED_ENVELOPE

1. ToolkitRegistry.isEventSet() method is called for EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

2. Short Message Point to Point Single and Formatted is received by Update Record EFSMS APDU.

3. Short Message Point to Point Concatenated Formatted is received by Update Record EFSMS APDU(s) (The Concatenated Message is composed of 2 Short Messages. The UDL for the first Short Message is 70 and for the second 70).

|

1- The method returns true.

2- Applet is triggered.

3- Applet is triggered on reception of the last concatenated SMS

| | +| 2 |

Applet deregistration

ToolkitRegistry.clearEvent() method is called for EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1. Short Message Point to Point Single and Formatted is received by Update Record EFSMS APDU.

2. Short Message Point to Point Concatenated and Formatted is received by Update Record EFSMS APDU(s). (The Concatenated Message is composed of 2 Short Messages. The UDL for the first Short Message is 70 and for the second 70).

An unrecognized envelope is sent to the USIM

ToolkitRegistry.setEvent() method is called for EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

3. Short Message Point to Point Single and Formatted is received by Update Record EFSMS APDU.

4. Short Message Point to Point Concatenated Formatted is received by Update Record EFSMS APDU(s). (The Concatenated Message is composed of 2 Short Messages. The UDL for the first Short Message is 70 and for the second 70).

|

1- Applet is not triggered

2- Applet is not triggered

3- Applet is triggered

4- Applet is triggered on reception of the last concatenated SMS.

| | + +## 5.3.4.4 EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Apt\_Eusu + +#### 5.3.4.4.1 Conformance requirement + +##### 5.3.4.4.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The applets registers are triggered by the EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD once a Short Message Point to Point (Single or Concatenated) is received by Update Record EFSMS APDU(s) and is unformatted. +- CRRN2: The applets are not triggered by the EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_PP\_UPD once it has deregistered from this event. + +##### 5.3.4.4.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Apt\_Eusu.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Apt\_Eusu\_1.java + +Cap File: ufw\_apt\_eusu.cap + +##### 5.3.4.4.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 | 1,2 | +| CRRN2 | 2 | + +## 5.3.4.4.4 + +## Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 |

Applet registration to EVENT UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD and triggering

Applet is registered to
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD and
EVENT_UNRECOGNIZED_ENVELOPE

1. ToolkitRegistry.isEventSet() method is called for EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

2. Short Message Point to Point Single and Unformatted is received by Update Record EFSMS APDU

3. Short Message Point to Point Concatenated and Unformatted is received by Update Record EFSMS APDU (The Concatenated Message is composed of 2 Short Messages. The UDL for the first Short Message is 70 and for the second 70).

|

1- Applet is not triggered

2- Applet is triggered.

3- Applet is triggered on reception of the last concatenated SMS.

| | +| 2 |

Applet deregistration

ToolkitRegistry.clearEvent() method is called for EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

1. Short Message Point to Point Single and Unformatted is received by Update Record EFSMS APDU

2. Short Message Point to Point Concatenated and Unformatted is received by Update Record EFSMS APDU(s) (The Concatenated Message is composed of 2 Short Messages. The UDL for the first Short Message is 70 and for the second 70).

An unrecognized envelope is sent to the USIM

ToolkitRegistry.setEvent() method is called for EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_UPD

3. Short Message Point to Point Single and Unformatted is received by Update Record EFSMS APDU

4. Short Message Point to Point Concatenated and Unformatted is received by Update Record EFSMS APDU(s) (The Concatenated Message is composed of 2 Short Messages. The UDL for the first Short Message is 70 and for the second 70).

|

1- Applet is not triggered

2- Applet is not triggered.

3- Applet is triggered

4- Applet is triggered on reception of the last concatenated SMS

| | + +### 5.3.4.5 EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Apt\_Efcb + +#### 5.3.4.5.1 Conformance requirement + +##### 5.3.4.5.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The applet is triggered by the EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB once: + - it has been registered to this event; + - an envelope APDU carrying a Cell Broadcast Page, formatted according to TS 31.115[10] , is received; + - the toolkit applet to be triggered is registered with the corresponding TAR in the CB page; + - the security is verified. +- CRRN2: The applet is not triggered by the EVENT\_FORMATTED\_SMS\_CB once it has deregistered from this event. + +##### 5.3.4.5.1.2 Parameters error + +No requirements. + +##### 5.3.4.5.1.3 Context Errors + +No requirements. + +#### 5.3.4.5.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Apt\_Efcb.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Apt\_Efcb\_1.java + +Cap File: ufw\_apt\_efcb.cap + +#### 5.3.4.5.3 Test coverage + +| CR Number | Test Case Number | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 (See note) | 1, 2 | +| CRRN2 | 2 | +| NOTE: The security checks are not relevant to the test designed in this test area; they will be checked in clause 6.3.6. | | + +#### 5.3.4.5.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | Applet registration to
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB and triggering

Applet is registered to
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB and
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV | | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | 1-An Envelope EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB is sent to the USIM. | 1-Applet is triggered | | +| 2 | Applet deregistration

ToolkitRegistry.clearEvent() method is called for EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB

1-A formatted SMS CB envelope is sent to the USIM.

2-An envelope SMS-PP formatted is sent to the USIM

ToolkitRegistry.setEvent() method is called for EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB

3-An Envelope FORMATTED_SMS_CB is sent to the USIM |



1- Applet is not triggered

2- Applet is triggered



3- Applet is triggered | | + +### 5.3.4.6 EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_SMS\_CB + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Apt\_Eucb + +#### 5.3.4.6.1 Conformance requirement + +##### 5.3.4.6.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The applet is triggered by the `EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB` once it has registered to this event and an Envelope Cell Broadcast Download is received. +- CRRN2: The applet is not triggered by the `EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB` once it has deregistered from this event. + +##### 5.3.4.6.1.2 Parameters error + +No requirements. + +##### 5.3.4.6.1.3 Context Errors + +No requirements. + +#### 5.3.4.6.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Apt\_Eucb.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Apt\_Eucb\_1.java + +Cap File: ufw\_apt\_eucb.cap + +#### 5.3.4.5.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 | 1, 2 | +| CRRN2 | 2 | + +## 5.3.4.6.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 |

Applet registration to EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB and triggering

Applet is registered to the
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB and
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV.

event= EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB
1-ToolkitRegistry.isEventSet() method is
called.
2-An Envelope UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB is sent
to the USIM.

|

1- Method returns true.
2- Applet is triggered

| | +| 2 |

Applet deregistration

ToolkitRegistry.ClearEvent()method is
called for EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB

1-An Envelope UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB is sent
to the USIM.

An Envelope formatted SMS pp envelope is
sent to the USIM

event= EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB

ToolkitRegistry.setEvent() method is called
for EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB

2-An Envelope UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB is sent
to the USIM.

|

1- Applet isn't triggered

2- Applet is triggered

| | + +## 5.3.4.7 EVENT\_FORMATTED\_USSD + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Apt\_Efud + +## 5.3.4.7.1 Conformance requirement + +## 5.3.4.7.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The applet is triggered by the EVENT\_FORMATTED\_USSD once: + - it has been registered to this event; + - formatted according to TS 31.115 [10] or an other protocol to identify explicitly the toolkit applet for which the message is sent; + - the toolkit applet to be triggered is registered with the corresponding TAR in the USSD String TLV; + - the security is verified. +- CRRN2: The applet is not triggered by the EVENT\_FORMATTED\_USSD once it has deregistered from this event. + +5.3.4.7.1.2 Parameters error + +No requirements. + +5.3.4.7.1.3 Context Errors + +No requirements. + +5.3.4.7.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Apt\_Efud.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Apt\_Efud\_1.java + +Cap File: ufw\_apt\_Efud.cap + +5.3.4.7.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 | 1,2 | +| CRRN2 | 2 | + +NOTE: The security checks are not relevant to the test designed in this test area; they will be checked in the "Framework Security Management" clause. + +5.3.4.7.4 Test coverage + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | Applet registration to EVENT FORMATTED_USSD and triggering

Applet is registered to EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD and EVENT_UNRECOGNIZED_ENVELOPE

1- A Single USSD Formatted Envelope is sent to the USIM.

2- A Concatenated USSD is sent to the USIM (composed of 2 USSD messages. The UDL for the first Short Message is 70 and for the second 70) | 1- Applet is triggered

2- Applet is triggered | | +| | Applet deregistration

ToolkitRegistry.clearEvent() method is called for EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD

1- A formatted USSD message is sent to the USIM.

2- A Concatenated USSD message is sent to the USIM (composed of 2 USSD Messages. The UDL for the first USSD message is 70 and for the second 70).

An unrecognized envelope is sent to the USIM

ToolkitRegistry.setEvent() method is called for EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD

3- A Single formatted USSD is sent to the | 1- Applet is not triggered







2- Applet is not triggered | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | USIM.

4- A Concatenated USSD message is sent to the USIM (composed of 2 Messages. The UDL for the first USSD message is 70 and for the second 70). | 3- Applet is triggered

4- Applet is triggered | | + +### 5.3.4.8 EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_USSD + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Apt\_Euud + +#### 5.3.4.8.1 Conformance requirement + +##### 5.3.4.8.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The applets registers are triggered by the EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_USSD once a unformatted USSD is received by Envelope APDU(s) and is unformatted. +- CRRN2: The applet is not triggered by the EVENT\_UNFORMATTED\_USSD once it has deregistered from this event. + +##### 5.3.4.8.1.2 Parameters error + +No requirements. + +##### 5.3.4.8.1.3 Context Errors + +No requirements. + +#### 5.3.4.8.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Apt\_Euud.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Apt\_Euud\_1.java + +Cap File: ufw\_apt\_euud.cap + +#### 5.3.4.8.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 | 1,2 | +| CRRN2 | 2 | + +#### 5.3.4.8.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | Applet registration to EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD and triggering

Applet is registered to the EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD and EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD

1-ToolkitRegistry.isEventSet() method is called for EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD

2- A Single and Unformatted USSD message is sent to the USIM. | 1- The method returns true

2- Applet is triggered | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | 3- A Concatenated and Unformatted USSD message is sent to the USIM (composed of 2 USSD messages. The UDL for the first message is 70 and for the second 70) | 3- Applet is triggered | | +| | Applet deregistration

ToolkitRegistry.clearEvent() method is called for EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD

1- A Single and Unformatted USSD message is sent to the USIM.

2- A Concatenated and Unformatted USSD message is sent to the USIM (composed of 2 USSD messages. The UDL for the first Message is 70 and for the second 70)

An unrecognized envelope is sent to the USIM

ToolkitRegistry.setEvent() method is called for EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD

3- A Single and Unformatted USSD Envelope is sent to the USIM.

4- A Concatenated and Unformatted USSD Envelope is sent to the USIM (composed of 2 messages. The UDL for the first message is 70 and for the second 70) | 1- Applet is not triggered





2- Applet is not triggered





3- Applet is triggered





4- Applet is triggered | | + +### 5.3.5 Envelope response posting + +#### 5.3.5.1 EVENT\_MO\_SHORT\_MESSAGE\_CONTROL\_BY\_SIM + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Erp\_Emcn + +##### 5.3.5.1.1 Conformance requirement + +###### 5.3.5.1.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The (U)SAT Framework can't reply busy when an Envelope(MO-Short Message Control) is sent to the (U)SAT. + +##### 5.3.6.2.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +##### 5.3.6.2.1.3 Context errors + +No requirements. + +##### 5.3.5.1.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Erp\_Emcn.scr + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Erp\_Emcn\_1.java +Ufw\_Erp\_Emcn\_2.java +Ufw\_Erp\_Emcn\_3.java +Cap File: Ufw\_Erp\_Emcn.cap + +5.3.5.1.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 | 1, 2 | + +## 5.3.5.1.4 + +## Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1 |

Applet1 is registered on the EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM; Applet2 is registered and triggered on the EVENT_MENU_SELECTION.

1- Applet2 invokes the method send() and no fetch is performed

2- Envelope(MO-SM control) is sent to the (U)SAT

3- Applet1 calls the method EnvelopeResponseHandler.postAsBERTLV() to change any incoming TP_Destination_Address and any RP_Destination_Address of the Service Center into +11 22 33 44

4- A Fetch command is sent to the (U)SAT

5- A Terminal Response command is sent to the (U)SAT

6- Delete Applet1 & Applet2

7- Install Applet3

|

1- Applet2 is suspended

2- Applet1 is triggered.

5- Applet2 execution shall continue.

|

3- The U(SAT) answers 91xx to the Envelope(MO-Short Message Control)
The new TP_Destination_Address and RP_Destination_Address are retrieved.

| +| 2 |

Applet3 is registered on both the events EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM and EVENT_MENU_SELECTION.

1- Applet3 invokes the method send() and no fetch is performed

2- Envelope(MO-SM control) is sent to the (U)SAT

3- Applet3 calls the method EnvelopeResponseHandler.postAsBERTLV() to change any incoming TP_Destination_Address and any RP_Destination_Address of the Service Center into +11 22 33 44.

4- A Fetch command is sent to the (U)SAT

5- A Terminal Response command is sent to the (U)SAT

|

1- Applet3 is suspended on the send() method

2- Applet3 is triggered on the EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM.

5- Applet3 execution shall continue.

|

3- The U(SAT) answers 91xx to the Envelope(MO-Short Message Control)
The new TP_Destination_Address and RP_Destination_Address are retrieved.

| + +## 5.3.6 Toolkit installation + +## 5.3.6.1 Minimum security level + +Test Area Reference: ufw\_tin\_msl + +### 5.3.6.1.1 Conformance requirements + +#### 5.3.6.1.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The Receiving Entity shall check the Minimum Security Level during processing the security of the Command Packet. +- CRRN2: The Receiving Entity shall reject the message if the MSL check fails. +- CRRN3: If the MSL check fails, a Response Packet with the 'Insufficient Security Level' Response Status Code shall be sent if required. +- CRRN4: If the length of the Minimum Security Level field is greater than zero, the Minimum Security Level is used to specify the minimum level to be applied to Secured Packets. The first byte shall be the MSL Parameter, other bytes shall be the MSL Data. +- CRRN5: If the length of the Minimum Security Level field is zero, no minimum security level check shall be performed by the receiving entity. + +#### 5.3.6.1.2 Test area files + +Test source: Test\_Ufw\_Tin\_Msl\_1.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Tin\_Msl\_1.java + +Cap file: ufw\_tin\_msl.cap + +#### 5.3.6.1.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 | Not applicable | +| CRRN2 | 2, 4 | +| CRRN3 | 2, 4 | +| CRRN4 | 2, 4 | +| CRRN5 | 1, 4 | + +## 5.3.6.1.4 + +## Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1 | Installation with MSL length of 0 FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Install (install) applet with a MSL length = 0
2- Send formatted SMS PP ENV with no RC/CC/DS, no Ciphering and counter mode 0 (not checked)
3- Send a formatted SMS PP ENV with CC, ciphering and counter mode 1 (counter available and no checking)
4- Delete the applet instance | 2- Applet is triggered

3- Applet is triggered | 1- SW = 9000 | +| 2 | Installation with correct MSL value FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Install (install) applet with MSL field set to 02 (CC needed).
2- Send formatted SMS PP ENV with no RC/CC/DS, no Ciphering and counter mode 0 (not checked)
3- Send a formatted SMS PP ENV with CC, no ciphering and counter mode 1 counter available and no checking)
4- Send a formatted SMS PP ENV with PoR required and no CC, ciphered with DES and counter mode 0 counter available and no checking)
5- Delete the applet instance | 2- Applet is not triggered

3- Applet is triggered

4- Applet is not triggered | 1- SW = 9000

2- SW = 61 XX, Response status code shall be '0A', insufficient security level.
or
SW = 9000

4- SW = 61 00, Response status code shall be '0A', insufficient security level
or
SW = 9000 | +| 3 | Installation with MSL length of 0 FORMATTED_USSD

1- Install (install) applet with a MSL length = 0
2- Send formatted USSD with no RC/CC/DS, no Ciphering and counter mode 0 (not checked)
3- Send a formatted USSD with CC, ciphering and counter mode 1 (counter available and no checking)
4- Delete the applet instance | 2- Applet is not triggered

3- Applet is triggered

4- Applet is not triggered | 1- SW = 9000

2- SW = 61 XX, Response status code shall be '0A', insufficient security level.
or
SW = 9000

4- SW = 61 XX, Response status code shall be '0A', insufficient security level.
or
SW = 9000 | +| 4 | Installation with correct MSL value FORMATTED_USSD

1- Install (install) applet with MSL field set to 02 (CC needed).
2- Send formatted SMS PP ENV with no RC/CC/DS, no Ciphering and counter mode 0 (not checked)
3- Send a formatted SMS PP ENV with CC, no ciphering and counter mode 1 counter available and no checking)
4- Send a formatted SMS PP ENV with PoR required and no CC, ciphered with DES and counter mode 0 counter available and no checking)
5- Delete the applet instance | 2- Applet is not triggered

3- Applet is triggered

4- Applet is not triggered | 1- SW = 9000

2- SW = 61 XX, Response status code shall be '0A', insufficient security level.
or
SW = 9000

4- SW = 61 00, Response status code shall be '0A', insufficient security level
or
SW = 9000 | + +## 5.3.6.2 TAR + +Test Area Reference: ufw\_tin\_tar + +### 5.3.6.2.1 Conformance requirements + +#### 5.3.6.2.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: It is possible to define several TAR values at the installation of the Toolkit Application . +- CRRN2: If the length of the TAR value is zero, the TAR may be taken out of the AID if any. +- CRRN3: If the length of the TAR value is greater than zero then the application instance shall be installed with the TAR value field defined in parameter and the TAR indicated in the AID if any shall be ignored. +- CRRN4: If the TAR value(s) is already assigned on the card for the Toolkit Application instance the card shall return the status word '6A 80', incorrect parameter in data field. +- CRRN5: If the length of the TAR value(s) field is incorrect, the card shall return the status word '6A 80', incorrect parameter in data field. + +#### 5.3.6.2.2 Test area files + +Test source: Test\_Ufw\_Tin\_Tar\_1.scr + +Test Applet: ufw\_tin\_tar\_1.java + +Cap file: ufw\_tin\_tar.cap + +#### 5.3.6.2.3 Test Coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 | 1 | +| CRRN2 | 2 | +| CRRN3 | 3 | +| CRRN4 | 4 | +| CRRN5 | 5 | + +5.3.6.2.4 + +Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | Installation with several TAR value FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Install (install) applet with no TAR defined in the AID but TAR values set to 11 11 11, 22 22 22
2- Send formatted SMS PP ENV with TAR set to 11 11 11.
3- Send formatted SMS PP ENV with TAR set to 22 22 22.
4- Delete the applet instance. | 2- Applet is triggered

3- Applet is triggered | 1- SW = 9000 | +| 2 | Installation without TAR value in install parameter FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Install (install) applet with TAR value length set to 0 in install parameters.
2- Send formatted SMS PP ENV with the TAR value defined in applet AID.
3- Delete the applet instance | 2- Applet is triggered | 1- SW = 9000 | +| 3 | Installation with TAR value within AID different from the one define in install parameters FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Install (install) applet with applet AID TAR set to XX YY ZZ and TAR value set to 11 11 11.
2- Send formatted SMS PP ENV with the TAR value set to the one defined in applet AID.
3- Send formatted SMS PP ENV with the TAR value set to 11 11 11. | 2- Applet is not triggered.

3- Applet is triggered | | +| 4 | Installation with TAR value already assigned FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Install (install) applet with no TAR in applet AID and TAR value in install parameters set to 11 11 11. | 1- Applet is not installed | 1- SW = 6A80 | +| 5 | Installation with incorrect TAR value length in install parameters FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV

1- Install (install) applet with no TAR in applet AID and TAR value length set to 02 and TAR value set to 11 11.
2- Install (install) applet with no TAR in applet AID and TAR value length set to 05 and TAR value set to 11 11 11, 22 22 22. | 1- Applet is not installed

2- Applet is not installed | 1- SW = 6A80 | +| 7 | Installation with several TAR value FORMATTED_USSD

1- Install (install) applet with no TAR defined in the AID but TAR values set to 33 33 33, 44 44 44
2- Send formatted USSD with TAR set to 33 33 33.
3- Send formatted USSD with TAR set to 44 44 44.
4- Delete the applet instance. | 2- Applet is triggered

3- Applet is triggered | 1- SW = 9000 | +| 8 | Installation without TAR value in install parameter FORMATTED_USSD

1- Install (install) applet with TAR value length set to 0 in install parameters.
2- Send formatted USSD with the TAR value defined in applet AID.
3- Delete the applet instance | 2- Applet is triggered | 1- SW = 9000 | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 9 | Installation with TAR value within AID different from the one defined in install parameters FORMATTED_USSD

1- Install (install) applet with applet AID TAR set to XX YY ZZ and TAR value set to 33 33 33.
2- Send formatted USSD with the TAR value set to the one defined in applet AID.
3- Send formatted USSD with the TAR value set to 33 33 33. | 2- Applet is not triggered.

3- Applet is triggered | | +| 10 | Installation with TAR value already assigned FORMATTED_USSD

1- Install (install) applet with no TAR in applet AID and TAR value in install parameters set to 33 33 33. | 1- Applet is not installed | 1- SW = 6A80 | +| 11 | Installation with incorrect TAR value length in install parameters FORMATTED_USSD

1- Install (install) applet with no TAR in applet AID and TAR value length set to 02 and TAR value set to 11 11.
2- Install (install) applet with no TAR in applet AID and TAR value length set to 05 and TAR value set to 11 11 11, 22 22. | 1- Applet is not installed

2- Applet is not installed | 1- SW = 6A80 | + +### 5.3.6.3 Access domain + +Test Area Reference: ufw\_tin\_acdo + +#### 5.3.6.3.1 Conformance requirements + +##### 5.3.6.3.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The USAT framework shall grant files access to the application instance according to the USAT Framework access parameters. +- CRRN2: The access rights granted to an application and defined in the access parameter shall be independent from the access rights granted at the USAT Framework/Terminal interface level. +- CRRN3: If an application with access domain parameter set to 'FF' tries to access a file, the USAT framework shall throw an exception. +- CRRN4: An application with access domain parameter set to '00' can perform all actions on files, except the ones with NEVER access conditions. +- CRRN5: If a requested Access Domain is not supported, the card shall return the Status word '6A 80' to the Install(install) command. +- CRRN6: The card shall at least support the following Access Domain Parameter values: + - '00' : Full access to the file system + - '02' : UICC access mechanism + - 'FF' : No access to the file system + +### 5.3.6.3.2 Test area files + +Test source: Test\_Ufw\_Tin\_Acdo\_1.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Tin\_Acdo\_1.java + +Cap file: ufw\_tin\_acdo.cap + +### 5.3.6.3.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 | 1,2,3 | +| CRRN2 | 1 | +| CRRN3 | 2 | +| CRRN4 | 3 | +| CRRN5 | Not testable | +| CRRN6 | 1,2,3 | + +### 5.3.6.3.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 |

The access granted to an application shall be independent from the USAT Framework/Terminal interface

1- Install (install) applet with Access domain parameter set to PIN1
2- Block PIN1 by sending unsuccessful verify pin command.
3- Trigger the installed applet and try to increase EF_CUAC file with uicc.access.increase() method.
4- Delete the applet instance.

| 3- no exception is thrown | | +| 2 |

Access domain parameter set to 'FF'

1- Install (install) applet with access domain parameter set to 'FF'.
2- Trigger the installed applet and try to access EF_TARU file with uicc.access.readBinary() method.
3- Delete the applet instance

| 2- UICException.
SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED is thrown | | +| 3 |

Access domain parameter set to '00'

1- Install (install) applet with access domain parameter set to '00'.
2- Trigger the installed applet and try to access EF_TARU file using uicc.access.readBinary() method.
3- Trigger the applet and try to access the EF_TNU file using uicc.access.updateBinary() method.
4- Delete the applet instance

| 2- No exception is thrown.

3- UICException.
SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED is thrown | | + +## 5.3.7 Other parts transferred to (U)SAT framework from API + +### 5.3.7.1 A handler is a temporary JCRE Entry Point object + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Api\_Hepo + +## 5.3.7.1.1 Conformance requirement + +## 5.3.7.1.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The *USATEnvelopeHandler* is a Temporary JCRE Entry Point Object (see Java Card 2.2.1 Runtime Environment (JCRE) Specification [13]). + +## 5.3.7.1.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +## 5.3.7.1.1.3 Context errors + +No requirements. + +## 5.3.7.1.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Api\_Hepo.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Api\_Hepo\_1.java + +Cap File: Ufw\_Api\_Hepo.cap + +## 5.3.7.1.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 | 1, 2 | + +## 5.3.7.1.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------| +| 1 | Storage in a static object

Call USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method and store it in a static field of the toolkit applet | SecurityException is thrown | | +| 2 | Storage in a non-static object

Call USATEnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler() method and store it in a non-static field of the toolkit applet | SecurityException is thrown | | + +## 5.3.8 Framework security management + +Security parameters + +The table that follows contains the security parameters that shall be used when the TS 31.115[10] security is required in the test cases developed in the current clause. + +| Parameter | Value in hexadecimal | +|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| KIC | Value as described in the TS 31.115 [10] (recommended value: 15) | +| KID | Value as described in the TS 31.115 [10] (recommended value: 15) | +| CNTR | 00 00 00 00 01 | +| Key for ciphering | Corresponding to KIC (recommended value: 01 41 42 7F DA E8 91 A7 02 41 42 7F DA E8 91 A7) | +| Key for RC/CC/DS | Corresponding to KID (recommended value: 01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF EF CD AB 89 67 45 23 01) | + +If a parameter is not listed explicitly in the above table, the default values of Annex B apply. + +### 5.3.8.1 Input data + +Test Area Reference: ufw\_fws\_inda + +#### 5.3.8.1.1 Conformance requirements + +##### 5.3.8.1.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: If the USAT Framework receives an envelope APDU containing a Short Message Point to Point formatted according to TS 31.115 [10], it shall verify the security of the SMS TPDU and trigger the applet registered with the corresponding TAR. +- CRRN2: The toolkit applet will only be triggered if the TAR is known and the security verified. +- CRRN3: If the USAT Framework receives an envelope APDU containing a Short message Cell Broadcast formatted according to TS 31.115 [10], it shall verify the security of the cell broadcast page and trigger the applet registered with the corresponding TAR. +- CRRN4: If the USAT Framework receives an Update Record EFSMS instruction formatted according to TS 31.115 [10], it shall verify the security of the SMS and trigger the applet registered with the corresponding TAR. +- CRRN5: The USAT Framework shall provide the input data deciphered. + +##### 5.3.8.1.1.2 Parameter errors + +No requirements. + +##### 5.3.8.1.1.3 Context errors + +No requirements. + +#### 5.3.8.1.2 Test area files + +Test source: Test\_ufw\_fws\_inda\_1.java + +Test Applet: ufw\_fws\_inda\_1.java + +ufw\_fws\_inda\_2.java + +ufw\_fws\_inda\_3.java + +ufw\_fws\_inda\_4.java + +ufw\_fws\_inda\_5.java + +ufw\_fws\_inda\_6.java + +Cap file: ufw\_fws\_inda.cap + +#### 5.3.8.1.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 | 1, 2, 3 | +| CRRN2 | 3,6,9 | +| CRRN3 | 4, 5, 6 | +| CRRN4 | 7,8,9 | +| CRRN5 | 1,2,4,5,7,8 | + +## 5.3.8.1.4 + +## Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1 |

Framework checks the Cryptographic checksum and deciphers the data SMS-PP

Applet1 is loaded and installed

1-Envelope(SMS-PP) single and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework with this features:
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet1;
Data = 01

2- Short Message concatenated and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework by an Envelope (SMS PP)with these features:
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet1;
Data length is 150.

|

1- Applet1 is triggered and the value integrity is checked.

2- Applet1 is triggered and the value integrity is checked

|

1- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

2- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 2 |

Triggering two different applets with different security

Applet2 is installed

1-Envelope(SMS-PP) single and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework with this features:
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet1
Data = 03

2- Short Message concatenated and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework by an Envelope (SMS PP)with these features:
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet1
Data length = 150

3-Envelope(SMS-PP) single and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework with this features:
No ciphering;
No cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet2
Data = 05

4- Short Message concatenated and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework by an Envelope (SMS PP)with these features:
No ciphering;
No cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet2
Data length = 150.

|

1- Applet1 is triggered and the value integrity is checked

2- Applet1 is triggered and the value integrity is checked

3- Applet2 is triggered and the value integrity is checked

4- Applet2 is triggered and the value integrity is checked

|

1- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

2- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

3- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

4- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

| +| 3 |

Envelope(SMS-PP) formatted with wrong cryptographic checksum

1-Envelope 03.48 single and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework with this features:
No ciphering;
Wrong cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet1
Data = 07

2- Short Message concatenated and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework by an Envelope (SMS PP)with these features:
No ciphering;
Wrong cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet1
Data length = 150

|

1- No applet is triggered.

2- No applet is triggered.

|

1- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 4 |

Framework checks the Cryptographic checksum and decipheres the data

Applet3 is loaded and installed

1-Envelope(SMS-CB) formatted is sent to the USAT Framework with this features:
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
Data = 01

|

1- Applet3 is triggered and the value integrity is checked

|

1- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

| +| 5 |

Triggering two different applets with different security on Envelope(SMS-CB) formatted

Applet4 is installed

1-Envelope(SMS-CB) formatted is sent to the USAT Framework with this features:
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet3
Data = 02

2-Envelope(SMS-CB) formatted is sent to the USAT Framework with this features:
No ciphering;
No cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet4
Data = 03

|

1- Applet3 is triggered and the value integrity is checked

2- Applet4 is triggered and the value integrity is checked

|

1- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

2- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

| +| 6 |

Envelope(SMS-CB) formatted with wrong cryptographic checksum

No ciphering;
Wrong Cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet3
Data = 04

|

No applet is triggered

|

1- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 7 |

Framework checks the Cryptographic checksum and decipheres the data

Applet5 is installed

1- Short Message single and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework by Update Record EFSMS instruction with these features:
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet5;
Data = 01

2- Short Message concatenated and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework by Update Record EFSMS instruction with these features:
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet5;
Data length = 150.

|

1- Applet5 is triggered and the value integrity is checked.

2- Applet5 is triggered and the value integrity is checked

|

1- The USAT Framework answers to the Update Record EFSMS instruction with status words 9000

2- The USAT Framework answers to the Update Record EFSMS instruction with status words 9000

| +| 8 |

Triggering two different applets with different security

Applet6 is installed

1- Short Message single and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework by Update Record EFSMS instruction with these features:
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet5
Data = 03

2- Short Message concatenated and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework by Update Record EFSMS instruction with these features:
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet5
Data length = 150.

3- Short Message single and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework by Update Record EFSMS instruction with these features:
No ciphering;
No cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet6;
Data = 05

4- Short Message concatenated and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework by Update Record EFSMS instruction with these features:
No ciphering;
No cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet6;
Data length = 150.

|

1- Applet5 is triggered and the value integrity is checked.

2- Applet5 is triggered and the value integrity is checked.

3- Applet6 is triggered and the value integrity is checked.

4- Applet6 is triggered and the value integrity is checked.

|

1- The USAT Framework answers to the Update Record EFSMS instruction with status words 9000

2- The USAT Framework answers to the Update Record EFSMS instruction with status words 9000

3- The USAT Framework answers to the Update Record EFSMS instruction with status words 9000

4- The USAT Framework answers to the Update Record EFSMS instruction with status words 9000

| + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|-----------|--------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------| +| | | | | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 9 | Update Record EFSMS instruction formatted with wrong cryptographic checksum
1- Short Message single and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework by Update Record EF SMS instruction with these features: No ciphering; Wrong Cryptographic checksum; No proof of receipt; TAR of Applet5 Data = 07
2- Short Message concatenated and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework by Update Record EF SMS instruction with these features: No ciphering; Wrong Cryptographic checksum; No proof of receipt; TAR of Applet5 Data length = 150 | 1- No applet is triggered.

2- No applet is triggered. | 1- The USAT Framework answers to the Update Record EF SMS instruction with status words 9000

2- The USAT Framework answers to the Update Record EF SMS instruction with status words 9000 | +| 10 | Framework checks the Cryptographic checksum and decipheres the data USSD
Applet1 is loaded and installed
1-Envelope(USSD) single and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework with this features: Ciphering; Cryptographic checksum; No proof of receipt; TAR of Applet1; Data = 01
2- USSD Message concatenated and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework by an Envelope (USSD)with these features: Ciphering; Cryptographic checksum; No proof of receipt; TAR of Applet1; Data length is 150. | 1- Applet1 is triggered and the value integrity is checked.

2- Applet1 is triggered and the value integrity is checked | 1- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

2- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000 | +| 11 | Triggering two different applets with different security USSD
Applet2 is installed
1-Envelope(USSD) single and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework with this features: Ciphering; Cryptographic checksum; No proof of receipt; TAR of Applet1 Data = 03
2- Short Message concatenated and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework by | 1- Applet1 is triggered and the value integrity is checked

2- Applet1 is triggered and the | 1- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

2- The USAT Framework | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |

an Envelope (USSD) with these features:
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet1
Data length = 150

3-Envelope(USSD) single and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework with this features:
No ciphering;
No cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet2
Data = 05

4- Concatenated and formatted USSD is sent to the USAT Framework by an Envelope (USSD) with these features:
No ciphering;
No cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet2
Data length = 150.

|

value integrity is checked

3- Applet2 is triggered and the value integrity is checked

4- Applet2 is triggered and the value integrity is checked

|

answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

3- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

4- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

| +| 12 |

USSD formatted with wrong cryptographic checksum USSD

1-Formatted USSD is sent to the USAT Framework with this features:
No ciphering;
Wrong cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet1
Data = 07

2- USSD concatenated and formatted is sent to the USAT Framework by an Envelope (USSD) with these features:
No ciphering;
Wrong cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
TAR of Applet1
Data length = 150

|

1- No applet is triggered.

2- No applet is triggered.

|

1- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

| +| 13 |

Framework checks the Cryptographic checksum and decipher the data USSD

Applet3 is loaded and installed

1-USSD formatted is sent to the USAT Framework with this features:
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
No proof of receipt;
Data = 01

|

1- Applet3 is triggered and the value integrity is checked

|

1- The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with status words 9000

| + +### 5.3.8.2 Output data + +Test Area Reference: ufw\_fws\_ouda + +#### 5.3.8.2.1 Conformance requirements + +##### 5.3.8.2.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: The USAT Framework Toolkit Framework shall secure and send the response packet. + +##### 5.3.8.2.1.2 Parameters errors + +No requirements. + +##### 5.3.8.2.1.3 Context errors + +No requirements. + +#### 5.3.8.2.2 Test Area Files + +Test source: Test\_Ufw\_Fws\_Ouda\_1.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Fws\_Ouda\_1.java + +Cap file: Ufw\_Fws\_Ouda.cap + +#### 5.3.8.2.3 Test coverage + +| CRR Number | Test Case Number | +|------------|------------------| +| CRRN1 | 1, 2, 3, 4 | + +#### 5.3.8.2.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1 | Envelope(SMS-PP) formatted
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
proof of receipt response shall be sent using SMS-Deliver-Report;
no security applied to proof of receipt
Data in plain text = "APPLET1" | The applet is triggered and sends a "Display Text" proactive command with the data received in the Envelope. | The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with a PoR which is retrieved and checked. The PoR has no application data. The USAT Framework answers with status words 91xx to issue a Display Text "APPLET1". | +| 2 | Envelope(SMS-PP) formatted
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
proof of receipt response shall be sent using SMS-Deliver-Report;
no security applied to proof of receipt
Data in plain text = "APPLET1" | The applet posts application data. It does not call the ProactiveHandler.send() method | The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with a PoR which is retrieved and checked. The PoR has the application data posted by the application. | +| 3 | Envelope(SMS-PP) formatted
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
proof of receipt response shall be sent using SMS-Deliver-Report;
no security applied to proof of receipt
Data in plain text = "TEST" | The applet posts application data and calls the ProactiveHandler.send() method to send a "Display Text" proactive command with the data received in the Envelope. | The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with a PoR which is retrieved and checked. The PoR has the application data posted by the application. The USAT Framework answers with status words 91xx to issue the Display | + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | | | Text "TEST". | +| 4 | Envelope(SMS-PP) formatted
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
proof of receipt response shall be sent using SMS-Deliver-Report;
proof of receipt shall be ciphered
Data in plain text = "TEST" | The applet posts application data and calls the ProactiveHandler.send() method to send a "Display Text" proactive command with the data received in the Envelope. | The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with a PoR which is retrieved and checked. The PoR has the application data posted by the application. The USAT Framework answers with status words 91xx to issue the Display Text "TEST". | +| 5 | Envelope(USSD) formatted
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
proof of receipt response shall be sent and no security shall be applied
Data in plain text = "APPLET1" | The applet is triggered and sends a "Display Text" proactive command with the data received in the Envelope. | The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with a PoR which is retrieved and checked. The PoR has no application data. The USAT Framework answers with status words 91xx to issue a Display Text "APPLET1". | +| 6 | Envelope(USSD) formatted
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
proof of receipt response shall be sent using SMS-Deliver-Report;
no security applied to proof of receipt
Data in plain text = "APPLET1" | The applet posts application data. It does not call the ProactiveHandler.send() method | The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with a PoR which is retrieved and checked. The PoR has the application data posted by the application. | +| 7 | Envelope(USSD) formatted
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
proof of receipt response shall be sent and no security applied to proof of receipt
Data in plain text = "TEST" | The applet posts application data and calls the ProactiveHandler.send() method to send a "Display Text" proactive command with the data received in the Envelope. | The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with a PoR which is retrieved and checked. The PoR has the application data posted by the application. The USAT Framework answers with status words 91xx to issue the Display Text "TEST". | +| 8 | Envelope(USSD) formatted
Ciphering;
Cryptographic checksum;
proof of receipt response shall be sent and it shall be ciphered
Data in plain text = "TEST" | The applet posts application data and calls the ProactiveHandler.send() method to send a "Display Text" proactive command with the data received in the Envelope. | The USAT Framework answers to the Envelope with a PoR which is retrieved and checked. The PoR has the application data posted by the application. The USAT Framework answers with status words 91xx to issue the Display Text "TEST". | + +### 5.3.9 Concatenated SMS + +#### 5.3.9.1 Concatenation processing + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Csm\_Proc + +## 5.3.9.1.1 Conformance requirements: + +## 5.3.9.1.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: When a Short Message is received as a Concatenated Short Message as defined in TS 23.040 [11], it is the responsibility of the (U)SAT Framework to link single Short Messages to reassemble the original message before any further processing. +- CRRN2: The concatenation control headers, used to reassemble the short messages in the correct order, shall not be present in the SMS TPDU. +- CRRN3: The TP-elements of the SMS TPDU and the Address (TS-Service-Centre-Address) shall correspond to the ones in the last received Short Message (independently of the Sequence number of Information-Element-Data). +- CRRN4: The original Short Message shall be placed in one SMS TPDU TLV (with TP-UDL field coded on one octet) included in the USATEnvelopeHandler. +- CRRN5: The (U)SAT Framework shall be able to process messages with the following properties as a minimum requirement: + - the Information Element Identifier is equal to the 8-bit reference number + - it contains uncompressed 8 bit data or uncompressed UCS2 data + +## 5.3.9.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Csm\_Proc.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Csm\_Proc\_1.java + +Cap File: ufw\_csm\_proc.cap + +## 5.3.9.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|-------------------------------------------------------| +| N1 | 1,2, 3, 4, , 7, 8, 9,10, , 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22 | +| N2 | 5,17 | +| N3 | 8,11, 20, 19 | +| N4 | 5,17 | +| N5 | 12,24 | + +## 5.3.9.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------| +| | Applet registration to
EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV and triggering
Applet is registered to EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV and EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV events
A concatenated formatted SMS_PP is sent to the (U)SIM (composed of three segments). | | | +| 1 | The second segment of a concatenated short message is sent to the (U)SIM. | Applet is not triggered. | | +| 2 | The first segment of the concatenated short message is sent to the (U)SIM. | Applet is not triggered. | | +| 3 | The third segment of the concatenated short message is sent to the (U)SIM | Applet is triggered. | | + +| | | | | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--| +| 4 | Call USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem.getTheHandler(). | No exception is thrown. | | +| 5 | Call the USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() to select the Dev Id, the address and the TPDU TLV and the USATEnvelopeHandler.compareValue() to check each content. | Check that the message has been re-assembled in the correct order. Check that TP-UDL field is coded in one octet. Check that the concatenation control header is not present in the message. Check the integrity of the message. | | +| 6 | A new concatenated formatted short message is sent to the USIM composed of three segments. The Address fields of the first, second and the third segment are different. | Applet is triggered. | | +| 7 | Call USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem.getTheHandler(). | No exception is thrown. | | +| 8 | Call USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem.findTLV() to select the address TLV and the USATEnvelopeHandler.compareValue() to check its content. | Check that the address field of the message is equal to the address field of the third segment. | | +| 9 | A new concatenated formatted short message is sent to the (U)SIM composed of three segments. Some TP elements of the TPDU of the first, second and third segment are different among themselves. | Applet is triggered. | | +| 10 | Call USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem.getTheHandler(). | No exception is thrown. | | +| 11 | Call USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() to select the TP_DU TLV and USATEnvelopeHandler.compareValue() to check its TP elements. | Check that the TP elements of the message are equal to the ones of the third segment. | | +| 12 | Send a concatenated formatted short message (composed of 3 segments) with uncompressed 8 bit data. | Applet is triggered. | | +| | Applet registration to
EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_PP_ENV and triggering

Same test as above but with an unformatted SMS_PP envelope.

A concatenated unformatted SMS_PP is sent to the (U)SIM (composed of three segments). | | | +| 13 | The second segment of a concatenated short message is sent to the (U)SIM. | Applet is not triggered. | | +| 14 | The first segment of the concatenated short message is sent to the (U)SIM. | Applet is not triggered. | | +| 15 | The third segment of the concatenated short message is sent to the (U)SIM. | Applet is triggered. | | +| 16 | Call USATEnvelopeHanlderSystem.getTheHandler() | No exception is thrown. | | +| 17 | Call USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() to select the Dev Id, the address and the TPDU TLV and the USATEnvelopeHandler.compareValue() to check each content. | Check that the message has been reassembled in the correct order. Check that TP-UDL field is coded one octet. Check that the concatenation control header is not present in the message. Check the integrity of the message. | | +| 18 | A new concatenated formatted short message is sent to the (U)SIM composed of three segments. The Address field of the first segment is different from the address field in the second segment. | Applet is triggered. | | +| 19 | Call USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem.getTheHandler(). | No exception is thrown. | | +| 20 | Call USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() to select the address TLV and the USATEnvelopeHandler.compareValue() to check its content. | Check that the address field of the message is equal to the address field of the second segment. | | + +| | | | | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--| +| 21 | A new concatenated unformatted short message is sent to the (U)SIM composed of two segments. Some TP_elements of the TPDU of the first, second and third segment are different. | Applet is triggered. | | +| 22 | Call USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem.getTheHandler() | No exception is thrown. | | +| 23 | Call USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() to select the TPDU TLV and the USATEnvelopeHandler.compareValue() to check its TP elements. | Check that the TP elements of the message are equal to the ones of the third segment. | | +| 24 | Send a concatenated unformatted short message (composed of 3 segments) with uncompressed UCS2 data. | Applet is triggered. | | + +## 5.3.10 Cell Broadcast Service + +### 5.3.10.1 Multiple message reassembling + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Cbs\_Mmra + +#### 5.3.10.1.1 Conformance requirements: + +##### 5.3.10.1.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: When a Cell Broadcast Message is received as multiple pages as defined in TS 23.041 [6], it is the responsibility of the (U)SAT Framework to link single pages together to re- assemble the original message before any further processing. +- CRRN2: The original Cell Broadcast message shall be placed in one Cell Broadcast page TLV included in the USATEnvelopeHandler. +- CRRN3: The message parameters shall correspond to the ones in the last received Cell Broadcast page (independently of the Page Parameter). + +### 5.3.10.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Cbs\_Mmra.java + +Test Applet: Ufw\_Cbs\_Mmra\_1.java + +Cap File: Ufw\_Cbs\_Mmra.cap + +### 5.3.10.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 1 – 10 | +| N2 | 5, 10 | +| N3 | 5, 10 | + +### 5.3.10.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------| +| | Applet registration to EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB and triggering

Applet is registered to EVENT_FORMATTED_SMS_CB_ENV and EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB_ENV events

A multi page formatted SMS_CB is sent to the (U)SIM (composed of three segments). | | | + +| | | | | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--| +| 1 | The first segment of a multi page formatted CB short message is sent to the (U)SIM. | Applet is not triggered. | | +| 2 | The second segment of a multi page formatted CB short message is sent to the USIM. | Applet is not triggered. | | +| 3 | The third segment of the multi page formatted CB short message is sent to the USIM. | Applet is triggered. | | +| 4 | Call USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem.getTheHandler(). | No exception is thrown. | | +| 5 | Call USATEnvelopeHandler.compareValue() to check message parameter, message integrity and message content. | The message is re- assembled in the correct order with Message Parameter of the third SMS_CB which was sent at last. | | +| | Applet registration to EVENT_UNFORMATTED_SMS_CB and triggering

A multi page unformatted SMS_CB is sent to the (U)SIM (composed of three segments). | | | +| 6 | The second segment of a multi page unformatted SMS_CB is sent to the (U)SIM. | Applet is not triggered. | | +| 7 | The third segment of a multi page unformatted SMS_CB is sent to the (U)SIM. | Applet is not triggered. | | +| 8 | The first segment of a concatenated unformatted SMS_CB is sent to the (U)SIM. | Applet is triggered. | | +| 9 | Call USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem.getTheHandler(). | No exception is thrown. | | +| 10 | Call USATEnvelopeHandler.compareValue() to check message parameter, message integrity and message content. | The message is re- assembled in the correct order with Page Parameter of first SMS_CB which was sent at last. | | + +## 5.3.11 Concatenated USSD + +### 5.3.11.1 Concatenation processing + +Test Area Reference: Ufw\_Fusd\_Proc + +#### 5.3.11.1.1 Conformance requirements: + +##### 5.3.11.1.1.1 Normal execution + +- CRRN1: When a USSD Message is received as concatenated as defined in TS 31.115 [X], it is the responsibility of the (U)SAT Framework to link single USSD Messages together to re-assemble the original message before any further processing. +- CRRN2: The original USSD message shall be placed in one USSD String TLV included in the USATEnvelopeHandle. +- CRRN3: The USSD String parameters (DCS, PFI, CCF) shall correspond to the ones in the last received USSD String (independently of the CCF Sequence number). +- CRRN4: The (U)SAT Framework shall be able to process messages with the following properties as a minimum requirement: + - the Information Element Identifier is equal to the 8-bit reference number + - it contains uncompressed 8 bit data or uncompressed UCS2 data + +### 5.3.11.2 Test area files + +Test Source: Test\_Ufw\_Fusd\_Proc.java + +Test Applet: Ufw Fusd Proc\_1.java + +Cap File: ufw fusd proc.cap + +### 5.3.11.3 Test coverage + +| CRR number | Test case number | +|------------|------------------| +| N1 | 1 to 9, | +| N2 | 1 to 9 | +| N3 | 6, 10 to 18 | +| N4 | 9,18 | + +### 5.3.11.4 Test procedure + +| Id | Description | API/(U)SAT Framework Expectation | APDU Expectation | +|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| | Applet registration to EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD and triggering

Applet is registered to EVENT_FORMATTED_USSD and EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD events

A concatenated formatted USSD is sent to the (U)SIM (composed of three segments). | | | +| 1 | The second segment of a concatenated USSD is sent to the (U)SIM. | Applet is not triggered. | | +| 2 | The first segment of the concatenated USSD is sent to the (U)SIM. | Applet is not triggered. | | +| 3 | The third segment of the concatenated USSD is sent to the (U)SIM | Applet is triggered. | | +| 4 | Call USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem.getTheHandler(). | No exception is thrown. | | +| 5 | Call the USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() to select the Dev Id, the alpha id and the USSD String and the USATEnvelopeHandler.compareValue() to check each content. | Check that the message has been re-assembled in the correct order. Check that TP-UDL field is coded in one octet. Check that the concatenation control header is not present in the message. Check the integrity of the message. | | +| 6 | A new concatenated formatted USSD is sent to the (U)SIM composed of three segments. DCS, PFI, CCF of the of the first, second and third segment are different among themselves. | Applet is triggered. | | +| 7 | Call USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem.getTheHandler(). | No exception is thrown. | | +| 8 | Call USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() to select the TP_DU TLV and USATEnvelopeHandler.compareValue() to check its TP elements. | Check that the TP elements of the message are equal to the ones of the third segment. | | +| 9 | Send a concatenated USSD (composed of 3 segments) with uncompressed 8 bit data. | Applet is triggered. | | +| | Applet registration to EVENT_UNFORMATTED_USSD and triggering

Same test as above but with an unformatted USSD
A concatenated unformatted SMS_PP is sent to the (U)SIM (composed of three segments). | | | + +| | | | | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--| +| 10 | The second segment of a concatenated USSD message is sent to the (U)SIM. | Applet is not triggered. | | +| 11 | The first segment of the concatenated USSD message is sent to the (U)SIM. | Applet is not triggered. | | +| 12 | The third segment of the concatenated USSD message is sent to the (U)SIM. | Applet is triggered. | | +| 13 | Call USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem.getTheHandler() | No exception is thrown. | | +| 14 | Call USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() to select the Dev Id, USSD String TLV and the USATEnvelopeHandler.compareValue() to check each content. | Check that the message has been reassembled in the correct order. Check that TP-UDL field is coded one octet. Check that the concatenation control header is not present in the message. Check the integrity of the message. | | +| 15 | A new concatenated unformatted USSD is sent to the (U)SIM composed of two segments. Some TP elements of the TPDU of the first, second and third segment are different. | Applet is triggered. | | +| 16 | Call USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem.getTheHandler() | No exception is thrown. | | +| 17 | Call USATEnvelopeHandler.findTLV() to select the TPDU TLV and the USATEnvelopeHandler.compareValue() to check its TP elements. | Check that the TP elements of the message are equal to the ones of the third segment. | | +| 18 | Send a concatenated unformatted USSD (composed of 3 segments) with uncompressed UCS2 data. | Applet is triggered. | | + +## Annex A (normative): Class, methods and USATFramework tests acronyms + +### A.1 Toolkit part + +| | | +|---------------------------|-----| +| USATEnvelopeHandler | Ueh | +| USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem | Ues | +| ToolkitRegistry | Tkr | + +#### A.1.1 USATEnvelopeHandler interface + +| Method name | Acronyms | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| short getSecuredDataLength() | GsdL | +| short getSecuredDataOffset() | GsdO | +| short getShortMessageLength() | Gsml | +| short getShortMessageOffset() | GsmO | +| short getTPUDLOffset() | GtpO | +| short getUserDataLength() | GudL | +| | | +| Inherited method name: EnvelopeHandler | Acronyms | +| byte getChannelIdentifier() | Gcid | +| short getChannelStatus(byte channelIdentifier) | Gcst | +| byte getItemIdentifier() | Giid | +| | | +| Inherited method name: BERTLViewHandler | Acronyms | +| short getSize() | Gtsz | +| byte getTag() | Gttg | +| | | +| Inherited method name: ViewHandler | Acronyms | +| byte compareValue(short valueOffset, byte[] compareBuffer, short compareOffset, short compareLength) | Cprv | +| short copy(byte[] dstBuffer, short dstOffset, short dstLength) | Copy | +| short copyValue(short valueOffset, byte[] dstBuffer, short dstOffset, short dstLength) | Cpyv | +| byte findAndCompareValue(byte tag, byte[] compareBuffer, short compareOffset) | Facrb_Bs | +| byte findAndCompareValue(byte tag, byte occurrence, short valueOffset, byte[] compareBuffer, short compareOffset, short compareLength) | Facrbbs_Bss | +| short findAndCopyValue(byte tag, byte[] dstBuffer, short dstOffset) | Facyb_Bs | +| short findAndCopyValue(byte tag, byte occurrence, short valueOffset, byte[] dstBuffer, short dstOffset, short dstLength) | Facybbs_Bss | +| byte findTLV(byte tag, byte occurrence) | Find | +| short getCapacity() | Gcap | +| short getLength() | Glen | +| byte getValueByte(short valueOffset) | Gvby | +| short getValueLength() | Gvle | +| short getValueShort(short valueOffset) | Gvsh | + +#### A.1.2 USATEnvelopeHandlerSystem method + +| Method Name | Acronyms | +|---------------------------------------------------|----------| +| public static USATEnvelopeHandler getTheHandler() | Gthd | + +### A.1.3 ToolkitRegistry methods + +| Method Name | Acronyms | +|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| +| void clearEvent(short event) | Cevt | +| boolean isEventSet(short event) | Ievs | +| void setEvent(short event) | Sevt | +| void setEventList(short[] eventList, short offset, short length) | Sevl | + +## A.2 Acronyms for USATFramework tests + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------|-----| +| Minimum handler availability | Mha | +| Handler integrity | Hin | +| Applet triggering | Apt | +| Exception handling | Exh | +| Envelope response posting | Erp | +| Toolkit installation | Tin | +| Other parts transferred from API to CAT RE | Api | +| Framework Security | Ufs | +| Concatenated SMS | Csm | +| Cell Broadcast Service | Cbs | + +### A.2.1 Minimum handler availability + +| Test Area within the chapter | Acronyms | +|--------------------------------------------------|----------| +| ProactiveHandler | Pahd | +| ProactiveResponseHandler | Prhd | +| EnvelopeHandler | Enhd | +| EnvelopeResponseHandler | Erhd | +| USATEnvelopeHandler | Uehd | +| Applet triggering with ongoing proactive session | Rent | + +### A.2.2 Handler integrity + +| Test Area within the chapter | Acronyms | +|------------------------------|----------| +| ProactiveResponseHandler | Prhd | +| EnvelopeHandler | Enhd | +| USATEnvelopeHandler | Uehd | + +### A.2.3 Applet triggering + +| Test Area within the chapter | Acronyms | +|------------------------------|----------| +| | | + +### A.2.4 Exception handling + +| Method Name | Acronyms | +|--------------------------------------|----------| +| General Behaviour | Genb | +| Interaction with Multiple Triggering | Imtg | + +## A.2.5 Envelope response posting + +| Method Name | Acronyms | +|---------------------------------------|----------| +| EVENT_MO_SHORT_MESSAGE_CONTROL_BY_SIM | Emcn | + +## A.2.6 Toolkit installation + +| Method Name | Acronyms | +|--------------------------------------------------|----------| +| Access Domain | Acdo | +| Minimum Security Level | Mslv | +| TAR Value(s) of the Toolkit Application instance | Tarv | + +## A.2.7 Other parts transferred from API to CAT RE + +| Method Name | Acronyms | +|--------------------------------------------------|----------| +| A handler is a temporary JCRE Entry Point object | Hepo | + +## A.2.8 Framework security + +| Method Name | Acronyms | +|-------------|----------| +| Input Data | Inda | +| Output Data | Ouda | + +## A.2.9 Concatenated SMS + +| Method Name | Acronyms | +|--------------------------|----------| +| Concatenation processing | Proc | + +## A.2.10 Cell Broadcast Service + +| Method Name | Acronyms | +|-------------------------------|----------| +| Multiple message reassembling | Mmra | + +## Annex B (normative): Global prepersonalization + +The file system used to pass the test suite is described in ETSI TS 102 268 [15] Annex B, with one exception for file EFSMS. + +| Name | Identifier | Description | Special Notes | +|-------------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| EF SMS | 6F3C | 1 st record: 00 FF ... FF(length 176)
2 nd record: 00 FF ... FF(length 176)
3 rd record: 00 FF ... FF(length 176) | The file EF SMS should be present under both MF/DF TELECOM and directly under ADF1. One of these two EF SMS files must be linked to the other one. | + +Additionally, the following values must be used: + +| Parameter | Value in hexadecimal | +|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| KIC | Value as described in the TS 31.115 [10] (recommended value: 15) | +| KID | Value as described in the TS 31.115 [10] (recommended value: 15) | +| CNTR | 00 00 00 00 01 | +| Key for ciphering | Corresponding to KIC (recommended value: 01 41 42 7F DA E8 91 A7 02 41 42 7F DA E8 91 A7) | +| Key for RC/CC/DS | Corresponding to KID (recommended value: 01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF EF CD AB 89 67 45 23 01) | + +The value for Application PIN 1(Global PIN 1) shall be "0x31 0x31 0x31 0x31 0xFF 0xFF 0xFF 0xFF" and its state shall be 'disabled' during test applets execution. + +The value for Application PIN 1 block shall be "0x33 0x33 0x33 0x33 0x33 0x33 0x33 0x33" and its state shall be 'disabled' during test applets execution. + +--- + +## Annex C (normative): Test file description + +Every test source is written in JAVA™ and shall use methods defined in Annex D interfaces to communicate with the card, or to check status word or received data. + +In order to be more readable, data specified as method string parameters shall be presented in 4 blocks of 4 bytes per line. Every block is separated by a space character. Every string line is appended to previous one and shall be aligned. An example is provided in Annex D. + +Every test file shall start with a call to reset() method. + +--- + +## Annex D (normative): uicc.usim.test.util package, (U)SIM interfaces and testing script example + +See attached files: + +- Annex\_D\_UsimTestUtil.zip +- Annex\_D\_UsimInterfaces.zip +- Annex\_D\_Example.zip + +--- + +## Annex E (normative): Test Area files + +See attached file: + +- Annex\_E\_SourceCode.zip + +## Annex F (informative): Change history + +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | R ev | Subject/Comment | New | +|---------|--------|-----------|------|------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 2007-03 | CT-35 | CP-070066 | - | - | | 2.0.0 | +| 2007-03 | CT-35 | CP-070066 | - | - | | 6.0.0 | +| 2007-06 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-7 version (MCC) | 7.0.0 | +| 2008-09 | CP-41 | CP-080589 | 002 | - | Correction and completion of JavaTM files in Annex D | 7.1.0 | +| 2009-03 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-8 version (MCC) | 8.0.0 | +| 2009-12 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-9 version (MCC) | 9.0.0 | +| 2010-03 | CP-47 | CP-100180 | 005 | 1 | References update and cleanup | 9.1.0 | +| 2010-03 | CP-47 | CP-100182 | 007 | 1 | Addition of Rel-7 tests | 9.1.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | - | - | - | Update to Rel-10 version (MCC) | 10.0.0 | +| 2012-09 | SP-57 | - | - | - | Update to Rel-11 version (MCC) | 11.0.0 | +| 2013-06 | CP-60 | CP-130373 | 0009 | 1 | Improvement of results reporting | 11.1.0 | +| 2013-09 | CP-61 | CP-130529 | 0015 | 2 | Modification of the statements on security parameters | 11.2.0 | +| 2014-10 | SP-65 | - | - | - | Update to Rel-12 version (MCC) | 12.0.0 | +| 2015-12 | SP-70 | - | - | - | Update to Rel-13 version (MCC) | 13.0.0 | +| 2016-12 | CP-74 | CP-160791 | 0016 | - | Correction of CB download command coding | 13.1.0 | +| 2017-03 | -SA-75 | - | - | - | Update to Rel-14 version (MCC) | 14.0.0 | +| 2018-07 | SA-80 | | | | Update to Rel-15 version (MCC) | 15.0.0 | +| 2019-12 | CP-86 | CP-193078 | 0017 | 2 | Test case 5.2.2.3, Id 22: correction of envelope content | 15.1.0 | +| 2020-07 | CP-88e | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 16.0.0 | +| 2020-09 | CP-89e | CP-202136 | 0020 | - | Correction Test Case 5.3.6.1 Minimum security level | 16.1.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31220/2a0f333f04f8e672bebf288c511c1db5_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31220/2a0f333f04f8e672bebf288c511c1db5_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..76474150cb5d601a7767717edb2ee3b992d865a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31220/2a0f333f04f8e672bebf288c511c1db5_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:b5c7981ce65838d21e7cefd78a50279013be29a5ef09e031a160406ad71867b6 +size 9109 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31220/78d5774278a3f4a614f8c0ae485ce8d9_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31220/78d5774278a3f4a614f8c0ae485ce8d9_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..de772e66eda1910d093a5b4057a731a992bb3de2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31220/78d5774278a3f4a614f8c0ae485ce8d9_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:78a43669c3ffc20699ab9f3c8fa3d91421bcb91067f2cfe1ef8d01ccde0be11b +size 55300 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31220/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31220/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9e345e51c795aebe8fba0e0fc4724222946b3576 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31220/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,590 @@ + + + + + + +# --- Contents + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 5 | +| Introduction ..... | 5 | +| 1 Scope..... | 6 | +| 2 References..... | 6 | +| 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations..... | 7 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 7 | +| 3.2 Symbols..... | 7 | +| 3.3 Abbreviations ..... | 7 | +| 4 Contact Manager External interface characteristics..... | 7 | +| 4.1 Reference model..... | 7 | +| 4.2 External interface definition..... | 8 | +| 4.2.1 General ..... | 8 | +| 4.2.2 Contact Manager Server capabilities..... | 8 | +| 4.2.3 Contact Manager External client capabilities..... | 8 | +| 4.2.4 Contact Manager Server and External Client capabilities..... | 8 | +| 4.3 Access rules..... | 9 | +| 4.4 Server configuration..... | 9 | +| 4.5 External Client configuration ..... | 10 | +| 4.5.1 Framework..... | 10 | +| 4.5.2 Basic configuration..... | 10 | +| 4.5.3 User Actions configuration..... | 10 | +| 4.6 Contacts grouping ..... | 10 | +| 4.7 3GPP specific contacts elements..... | 11 | +| 4.8 Synchronization with an external device ..... | 11 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| Annex A (normative): | Contact Manager Provisioning DTD..... | 12 | +| A.1 | Document Type Definition ..... | 12 | +| A.2 | DTD Description..... | 12 | +| Annex B (normative): | User Actions DTD..... | 13 | +| B.1 | Document Type Definition ..... | 13 | +| B.2 | DTD Description..... | 13 | +| Annex C (normative): | Groups definition DTD ..... | 15 | +| C.1 | Document Type Definition ..... | 15 | +| C.2 | DTD Description..... | 15 | +| Annex D (normative): | vCard properties requirements and extensions..... | 15 | +| D.1 | vCard properties requirements ..... | 15 | +| D.2 | vCard 3GPP extensions..... | 16 | +| Annex E (informative): | Mapping of OMA DS functionalities and the Contact Manager ..... | 17 | +| Annex F (informative): | Contact Manager XML files examples..... | 19 | +| F.1 | Provisioning XML file example ..... | 19 | +| F.2 | User Actions XML file example..... | 19 | +| F.3 | Groups Definition XML file ..... | 20 | +| Annex G (informative): | Change history..... | 21 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +x the first digit: + +- 1 presented to TSG for information; +- 2 presented to TSG for approval; +- 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. + +Y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. + +z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- Introduction + +The present document defines the external interface characteristics of the Contact Manager for 3GPP UICC applications (e.g. USIM [3] and ISIM [4]). The Contact Manager provides an interface for the management of contact information including rich content without any structural limitations. + +The Contact Manager Server application resides on the UICC, an IC card specified in TS 31.101 [2]. TS 31.101 [2] specifies the application independent properties of the UICC/terminal interface such as the physical characteristics. + +The external interface between the Contact Manager Server application on the UICC and the Contact Manager Client application on the ME enables the synchronization of the contact information, contacts grouping, configuration of contact structure, configuration of the triggering mechanism, and configuration of user actions which may be performed using contact information. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document defines the Contact Manager for 3GPP UICC applications based on OMA DS [7]. + +The present document specifies the external interface between the Contact Manager Server in the UICC and the Contact Manager External Client in the ME; + +Any internal technical realization of either the Contact Manager Server or clients is only specified where these are reflected over the interfaces. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. + - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. + - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TS 31.101: "UICC-Terminal Interface, Physical and Logical Characteristics". +- [3] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) application". +- [4] 3GPP TS 31.103: "Characteristics of the IP Multimedia Services Identity Module (ISIM) application". +- [5] 3GPP TS 31.111: "USIM Application Toolkit (USAT)". +- [6] OMA SCWS: "OMA TS Smartcard Web Server v1\_0-20070209-C", [www.openmobilealliance.org](http://www.openmobilealliance.org) +- [7] OMA DS: "OMA TS DS Protocol V1.2", [www.openmobilealliance.org](http://www.openmobilealliance.org) +- [8] OMA vObject Profile: "OMA TS vObject OMA Profile V1.0", [www.openmobilealliance.org](http://www.openmobilealliance.org) +- [9] ETSI TS 102 483 V8.1.0: "UICC-Terminal interface; Internet Protocol connectivity between UICC and Terminal" +- [10] OMA DS Folder: "Folder data object specification v1.2", [www.openmobilealliance.org](http://www.openmobilealliance.org) +- [11] OMA DS File: "File data object specification v1.2", [www.openmobilealliance.org](http://www.openmobilealliance.org) +- [12] OMA SAN: "SyncML Server Alerted Notification v1.2", +- [13] IETF RFC 3629: "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646". +- [14] Void + +# --- 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]. + +**Contact Manager External Client:** The Contact Manager client application that resides on the ME. This client application acts as an OMA DS client. + +**Contact Manager Server:** An application residing on the UICC that provides services to the External clients. It acts as an OMA DS server for the Contact Manager External Client. + +**Contact Manager External Interface:** the interface between the Contact Manager Server residing on the UICC and the Contact Manager External Client. + +## 3.2 Symbols + +For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: + +|| Concatenation + +## 3.3 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]. + +| | | +|------|--------------------------------| +| DS | Data Synchronization | +| DTD | Document Type Definition | +| OMA | Open Mobile Alliance | +| PIN | Personal Identification Number | +| SCWS | Smart Card Web Server | +| URL | Universal Resource Location | +| XML | eXtensible Markup Language | + +# 4 Contact Manager External interface characteristics + +## 4.1 Reference model + +The following figure shows the architecture of the interface between the Contact Manager Server and the Contact Manager External Client. + +![Reference model diagram showing the architecture of the interface between the Contact Manager Server and the Contact Manager External Client.](78d5774278a3f4a614f8c0ae485ce8d9_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the reference model for the Contact Manager External interface, showing the architecture of the interface between the Contact Manager Server (on the UICC) and the Contact Manager External Client (on the ME). The diagram is split vertically by a dashed line representing the interface, with the UICC on the left and the ME on the right. + +**UICC (Left Side):** + +- Top layer: **Contact Manager Server** +- Second layer: **HTTP** +- Third layer: **BIP (TCP server mode)** and **TCP/IP** +- Fourth layer: **TS 102 221 based interface** and **High-Speed Interface** + +**ME (Right Side):** + +- Top layer: **Contact Manager External Client** +- Second layer: **HTTP** +- Third layer: **TCP/IP** and **BIP (TCP server mode)** +- Fourth layer: **High-Speed Interface** and **TS 102 221 based interface** + +**Interface and Connections:** + +- A dashed double-headed arrow labeled **Application layer** connects the **Contact Manager Server** and the **Contact Manager External Client**. +- A dashed double-headed arrow labeled **SCWS** connects the **HTTP** layers on both sides. +- Solid arrows point from the bottom layers of the UICC to the bottom layers of the ME, specifically from **TS 102 221 based interface** to **High-Speed Interface** and from **High-Speed Interface** to **TS 102 221 based interface**. + +Reference model diagram showing the architecture of the interface between the Contact Manager Server and the Contact Manager External Client. + +**Figure 1: External interface reference model** + +## 4.2 External interface definition + +### 4.2.1 General + +This clause defines the Contact Manager External Interface. + +In case both the ME and the 3GPP UICC application support both the 3G Phone Book (i.e. as defined in TS 31.102 [3]) and the Contact Manager, the Contact Manager should be used. + +### 4.2.2 Contact Manager Server capabilities + +The Contact Manager Server shall implement the mandatory OMA DS server functionalities defined in OMA DS [7]. The Contact Manager Server shall also support the following functionalities: + +- The Contact Manager Server shall support at least two External clients. +- The Contact Manager Server shall use the same contact database account if more than one client is used. + +### 4.2.3 Contact Manager External client capabilities + +The Contact Manager External client shall implement the mandatory OMA DS client functionalities defined in OMA DS [7]. The Contact Manager client shall also support the following functionalities: + +- The Contact Manager External client shall support an automatic triggering mechanism based on a policy. A default policy may be based either on time or on number of updated contacts. The default policy parameters shall be stored in "Provisioning.xml". If the default policy parameters are present in "Provisioning.xml" they shall be used unless otherwise configured by the user. Otherwise, the triggering mechanism shall be based on ME local policy. The synchronization initiated by this mechanism shall be totally transparent for the end-user (i.e. without any display, popup or progress bar). + +### 4.2.4 Contact Manager Server and External Client capabilities + +Both the Contact Manager Server and the Contact Manager External Client shall support the following functionalities: + +- The Contact Manager Server and External client shall support the Field Level Filtering functionality as defined in OMA DS [7]. +- The Contact Manager Server and External Client shall support and use the Device Memory Management mechanism defined in OMA DS [7]. The Contact Manager Server and External Client shall indicate their dynamic memory capabilities using and elements as described in OMA DS [7]. The Contact Manager Server and External Client shall indicate their permanent memory capabilities using , and elements as described in OMA DS [7]. +- The Contact Manager Server and External Client shall comply with the vCard2.1 Minimum Interoperability Profile guidelines specified in OMA vObject Profile [8]. The vCard profile shall also comply with the implementation requirements in Annex D. +- The Contact Manager Server and External Client should comply with vCard 3.0. If vCard 3.0 is supported, the Contact Manager Server and External Client shall comply with the vCard2.1 Minimum Interoperability Profile guidelines specified in OMA vObject Profile [8]. The vCard profile shall also comply with the implementation requirements in Annex D. +- The Contact Manager Server and External Client shall specify the and elements in their Device Information for the vCard Properties. The receiving device shall not send more than the specified number of property values/bytes for this property. +- The Contact Manager Server and External Client shall support the HTTP transport binding as defined in OMA DS [7]. +- The Contact Manager Server and External Client shall support the Smart Card Web Server as defined in OMA SCWS [6]. + +- For the support of the exchange of device capabilities functionality as defined in OMA DS [7], the following requirements apply: + - The Contact Manager Client shall be able to process and use the server device information. + - The Contact Manager Server and Client shall send all its content type capabilities with each of its supported properties, e.g.: it shall send all its supported properties name and value of vCard 2.1. + - The Contact Manager Server shall not send all its device specific data if it is clear that the Contact Manager External Client cannot utilize it. E.g., if the client indicates that it does not support the vCard3.0 content format, the server shall not send the supported properties of vCard3.0 although the server supports it. + +## 4.3 Access rules + +The Contact Manager Server may be associated with one or several UICC applications by including the associated UICC applications AIDs in "Provisioning.xml". + +If the access conditions of one of the associated UICC applications are fulfilled (e.g. PIN disabled or PIN verified), the Contact Manager Server shall not initiate an MD5 Digest authentication with the client (see OMA DS [7]). + +If none of the associated UICC applications corresponding to the Contact Manager is activated, and if the PIN is not disabled, the Contact Manager Client shall successfully verify the PIN of one of the associated UICC applications. + +## 4.4 Server configuration + +The device type of the Contact Manager Server shall be set to "3GPPCM": 3GPPCM + +The device identifier of the Contact Manager Server shall be set to the "ICCID": ICCID. The ICCID shall be encoded as described in TS 31.101 [2]. + +The relative contacts database URI of the Contact Manager Server shall be set to "./contacts/3GPPCM": ./contacts/3GPPCM . + +The absolute Contact Manager Server address shall be set to [http://\[SCWS @\]/3GPPCM](http://[SCWS @]/3GPPCM). For example, when the external interface is implemented over the APDU interface, the server address is: . + +The Contact Manager configuration parameters shall not be editable by the user. + +The absolute Contact Manager Server address and other provisioning parameters may be configured using OMA CP SmartCard Provisioning or OMA DM SmartCard bootstrapping mechanism as described in OMA DS [7]. + +## 4.5 External Client configuration + +### 4.5.1 Framework + +The Contact Manager Server and External Client shall support: + +- the OMA DS Folder [10] and OMA DS File [11]. +- the Large Object handling functionality as defined in OMA DS [7]. + +The 3GPPCM folder is organized as depicted hereafter: + +![](2a0f333f04f8e672bebf288c511c1db5_img.jpg) + +``` + +3GPPCM/ +| +|____ Provisioning.xml +| +|____ Actions.xml +| +|____ GroupsDefinition.xml + +``` + +### 4.5.2 Basic configuration + +When present, the "Provisioning.xml" file shall be accessible under "3GPPCM/". This file shall be "readable" only. The "ctype" (see OMA DS File [11]) shall be set to "text/xml". + +This file contains the triggering mechanisms parameters, the associated UICC applications AIDs and the contacts structure. + +If the ME supports the "vCardProperties" element defined in "Provisioning.xml" (see annex A), the Contact Manager External Client shall: + +- only use the properties that are provided in "vCardProperties" element and that are supported by the ME +- use the Labels provided in the "vCardProperties" element +- display the contact fields in the order of their appearance in the "vCardProperties" element. + +The DTD of the "Provisioning.xml" file is provided in annex A of the present document. + +### 4.5.3 User Actions configuration + +When present, the "Actions.xml" file shall be accessible under "3GPPCM/". This file shall be "readable" only. The "ctype" (see OMA DS File [11]) shall be set to "text/xml". + +If the Contact Manager External client supports the User Actions configuration, and if the ME supports one or more applications required for the execution of these actions, it shall present the supported actions to the user when the contact is selected. + +The DTD of the "Actions.xml" file is provided in annex B of the present document. + +## 4.6 Contacts grouping + +When present, the "GroupsDefinition.xml" file shall be accessible under "3GPPCM/". This file shall be "readable" and "writable" only. The "ctype" (see OMA DS File [11]) shall be set to "text/xml". + +A group definition shall at least contain a Unique Identifier and a Label. A group definition may additionally contain multimedia elements or links to multimedia elements (e.g. a picture, a ring tone, a voice tag and/or a video). The DTD of the "GroupsDefinition.xml" file is provided in annex C of the present document. + +3GPP-specific vCard Type may be used to associate a vCard with a group defined in "GroupsDefinition.xml". For that purpose, the "X-3GPP-GroupUID" Type shall be inserted in the vCard to point to the corresponding group definition in the "GroupsDefinition.xml" file. + +If "X-3GPP-GroupUID" contains a group Unique Identifier that does not exist in "GroupsDefinition.xml" (e.g. because it was deleted), then the Contact Manager External Client shall remove "X-3GPP-GroupUID" from the vCard(s). + +"X-3GPP-GroupUID" is defined in Annex D. + +The DTD of the "GroupsDefinition.xml" file is provided in annex C of the present document. + +## 4.7 3GPP specific contacts elements + +3GPP-specific vCard Types may be used to associate additional multimedia elements to a vCard (e.g. a ring tone, a voice tag and/or a video) or to store additional contact information in a vCard (e.g. SIP URI, TEL URI). In this case, the 3GPP-specific vCard Types are used. + +The 3GPP-specific vCard Types are defined in Annex D. + +## 4.8 Synchronization with an external device + +The support of synchronization with an external device (e.g. a Laptop Computer connected to the ME through a local link) is optional. + +An ME supporting synchronization with an external device shall play the role of an IP router (i.e. port forwarding and address translation in IPv4), as described in TS 102 483 [9]. + +# Annex A (normative): Contact Manager Provisioning DTD + +## A.1 Document Type Definition + +The Document Type Definition, according to XML syntax definitions, is defined hereafter: + +``` + + DESELECTED : create instance + DESELECTED --> SELECTED : select(object) + SELECTED --> DESELECTED : deselect + +``` + +State diagram showing two states: DESELECTED and SELECTED. An initial state (black dot) leads to DESELECTED via 'create instance'. A transition from DESELECTED to SELECTED is labeled 'select(object)'. A transition from SELECTED back to DESELECTED is labeled 'deselect'. + +Figure 1: state diagram + +- In the DESELECTED state, the instance does not represent any existing group, contact, field or field descriptor in the contact manager. It can be used to store values for a new object to be created subsequently. +- In the SELECTED state, the instance represents an group, contact, field or field descriptor in the contact manager. + +The select operation occurs when the following methods are invoked: + +| Interface | select occurs when the following methods are invoked | +|---------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| GroupView | GroupsListView.selectGroup()
GroupsListView.selectNextGroup()
GroupsListView.addGroup() | +| ContactView | ContactsListView.selectContact()
ContactsListView.selectNextContact()
ContactsListView.addContact()
GroupView.selectContact()
GroupView.selectNextContact() | +| FieldView | ContactView.selectField()
ContactView.selectNextField() | +| FieldDescriptorView | FieldDescriptorsListView.selectFieldDescriptor()
FieldDescriptorsListView.selectNextFieldDescriptor()
FieldDescriptorsListView.addFieldDescriptor() | + +The deselect operation occurs when the following events occur: + +- UICC RESET +- *deselect()* method of the appropriate View is invoked. + +#### 4.4.2.4 Access control + +The API shall only accept requests from trusted applets, defined as follows: + +- Security Domains of UICC applications defined in chapter 4.3 of [2] are trusted by the API. + +- Any applet of any trusted Security Domain is trusted by the API. + +### 4.4.3 API classes and interfaces detailed description + +Annex A provides the detailed description of the classes and interfaces that constitute the Services Invocation API. + +# --- Annex A (normative): Java Card™ platform Contact Manager API + +The attached files "31221\_Annex\_A\_Java.zip", and "31221\_Annex\_A\_HTML.zip" contains source files and html documentation for the Java Card™ Contact Manager API. + +# --- Annex B (normative): Java Card™ platform Contact Manager API identifiers + +The attached file "31221\_Annex\_B\_Export\_files.zip" contains the export files for the uicc.contactmanager.\* package. + +# --- Annex C (normative): Java Card™ platform Contact Manager API package version management + +The following table describes the relationship between each TS 31.221 specification version and its packages AID and Major, Minor versions defined in the export files. + +**Table 1** + +| TS 31.221 | uicc. contactmanager package | | +|-----------|-------------------------------------------------|--------------| +| | AID | Major, Minor | +| | A0 00 00 00 87 10 07 FF FF FF FF 89 14 10 00 00 | 2.0 | + +The package AID coding is defined in ETSI TS 101 220 [7]. The Contact Manager API packages' AID are not modified by changes to major or minor version. + +The major version shall be incremented if a change to the specification introduces byte code incompatibility with the previous version. + +The minor version shall be incremented if a change to the specification does not introduce byte code incompatibility with the previous version. + +# --- Annex D (informative): Example of Java Card™ platform Contact Manager API use + +The attached file "31221\_Annex\_D\_Example.zip" contains an example of use of the Java™ Card Contact Manager API. + +# --- Annex E (informative): Change history + +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | New | +|---------|--------|-----------|------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 2008-12 | CT #42 | CP-080900 | | | Approval of the specification | 8.0.0 | +| 2009-01 | ----- | | | | Re-publication with attached Java™ annexes | 8.0.1 | +| 2009-03 | CT #43 | CP-090195 | 0001 | | Correction of ContactEventListener interface | 8.1.0 | +| 2009-12 | CT #46 | | | | Upgrade to Rel-9 with no changes (MCC) | 9.0.0 | +| 2010-12 | CT #50 | CP-100836 | 0003 | 1 | Update reference to "Java Card 3.0.1 Classic" reference | 9.1.0 | +| 2011-04 | CT #51 | | | | Upgrade to Rel-10 with no changes (MCC) | 10.0.0 | +| 2012-09 | CT #52 | | | | Upgrade to Rel-11 with no changes (MCC) | 11.0.0 | +| 2014-10 | SP#65 | | | | Upgrade to Rel-12 with no changes (MCC) | 12.0.0 | +| 2015-12 | SP#70 | | | | Upgrade to Rel-13 with no changes (MCC) | 13.0.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA-75 | - | - | - | Update to Rel-14 version (MCC) | 14.0.0 | +| 2018-07 | SA-80 | - | - | - | Update to Rel-15 version (MCC) | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | CT#88e | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31890/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31890/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..38e38b406c34ef38680ffdda2ebacce38e61c777 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31890/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,377 @@ + + + + + + +# Contents + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 5 | +| 1 Scope..... | 6 | +| 2 References..... | 6 | +| 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations ..... | 7 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 7 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 7 | +| 4 Platform..... | 7 | +| 4.1 UICC ..... | 7 | +| 4.2 SSP ..... | 7 | +| 5 Security aspects..... | 8 | +| 5.1 Extension of the AUTHENTICATE command ..... | 8 | +| 5.1.1 Introduction ..... | 8 | +| 5.1.2 Keys in the USIM..... | 8 | +| 5.1.3 Input parameters ..... | 8 | +| 5.1.4 Output parameters ..... | 8 | +| 5.2 5G NAS security context..... | 8 | +| 5.2.2 Introduction ..... | 8 | +| 6 Storage capability to support 5G system..... | 9 | +| 6.1 Existing EFs ..... | 9 | +| 6.1.1 Introduction ..... | 9 | +| 6.1.2 EFs related to PLMN selection..... | 9 | +| 6.1.2.1 PLMN selection ..... | 9 | +| 6.1.2.2 EF HPPLMN (Higher Priority PLMN search period)..... | 9 | +| 6.1.2.3 EF PLMNwACT (User controlled PLMN selector with Access Technology)..... | 9 | +| 6.1.2.4 EF OPPLMNwACT (Operator controlled PLMN selector with Access Technology)..... | 9 | +| 6.1.2.5 EF HPLMNwACT (HPLMN selector with Access Technology)..... | 9 | +| 6.1.3 Other EFs..... | 9 | +| 6.1.3.1 CSG Lists..... | 9 | +| 6.2 New EFs ..... | 10 | +| 6.2.1 Forbidden areas ..... | 10 | +| 6.2.2 Network slices ..... | 10 | +| 6.2.3 Multimedia Priority Services..... | 10 | +| 6.2.4 Subscriber Permanent Identifier ..... | 10 | +| 6.2.5 5G Globally Unique Temporary Identity ..... | 11 | +| 7 Other functionalities related to 5G system..... | 11 | +| 7.1 Public warning system ..... | 11 | +| 7.2 eCall over IMS Emergency Services ..... | 11 | +| 8 Toolkit aspects ..... | 11 | +| 8.1 Introduction ..... | 11 | +| 8.2 Existing commands and objects ..... | 11 | +| 8.2.1 Access Technology..... | 11 | +| 8.2.2 Location Information..... | 11 | +| 8.2.3 Timing Advance ..... | 12 | +| 8.2.4 Network Measurement Results..... | 12 | +| 8.2.5 Network Rejection event ..... | 12 | +| 8.2.6 Bearer Independent Protocol ..... | 12 | +| 8.2.7 Call control on PDU connection establishment by USIM..... | 13 | +| 8.2.8 Data Connection Status Change Event..... | 13 | +| 8.2.9 LAUNCH BROWSER ..... | 13 | +| 8.3 Backward compatibility ..... | 13 | +| Annex A: Change history ..... | 13 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document discusses and describes the CT6 aspects of the 5G System phase 1. One objective of the document is to describe the impact of decisions taken in other 3GPP groups on the existing specifications maintained by CT6. + +The present document is intended as a placeholder for CT6 material until it stabilises sufficiently to be moved to appropriate 3GPP technical specifications. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. + - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. + - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TS 31.101: "UICC-terminal interface; UICC-terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics". +- [3] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) application". +- [4] 3GPP TS 31.111: "Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) Application Toolkit (USAT)". +- [5] ETSI TS 102 221 V13.1.0: "Smart Cards; UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics". +- [6] 3GPP TR 33.899: "Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Study on the security aspects of the next generation system". +- [7] 3GPP TS 31.801: "Technical requirements for a secure platform for 3GPP applications". +- [8] 3GPP TS 33.501: "Security Architecture and Procedures for 5G System". +- [9] 3GPP TS 23.501: "System Architecture for the 5G System; Stage 2". +- [10] 3GPP TS 23.502: "Procedures for the 5G System; Stage 2". +- [11] 3GPP TR 24.890: "5G System – Phase 1; CT WG1 Aspects". +- [12] ETSI TS 102 223 V13.1.0: "Smart Cards; Card Application Toolkit". +- [13] 3GPP TS 22.011: "Service accessibility". +- [14] 3GPP TS 23.122: "Non-Access-Stratum functions related to Mobile Station (MS) in idle mode". +- [15] 3GPP TS 22.153: "Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Multimedia priority service" +- [16] 3GPP TS 38.321: "NR Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol specification". +- [17] 3GPP TS 38.211: "NR Physical channels and modulation" +- [18] 3GPP TS 38.122: "NR; Requirements for support of radio resource management" +- [19] 3GPP TS 38.213: "NR; Physical layer procedures for control" + +- [20] 3GPP TS 24.501: "Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for 5G System (5GS); Stage 3" +- [21] 3GPP TS 24.501: "Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for 5G System (5GS); Stage 3" + +# --- 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1]. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1], in 3GPP TS 31.102 [3] and the following apply. + +An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1]. + +# --- 4 Platform + +## 4.1 UICC + +The UICC platform defined by ETSI SCP in TS 102 221 [5] was adopted by 3GPP in TS 31.101 [2] and has been used to host the 3GPP applications, including the USIM and the ISIM, for many years, starting from Rel.99. + +It is evident that the platform could be improved in many aspects, as described in the TR 31.801 [7]. Anyway, it remains a valid and appropriate solution to host the 3GPP applications also in a UE capable of registering on a 5G system. + +The continued usage of the UICC platform helps avoiding issues for users when upgrading their device to a 5G capable one. + +## 4.2 SSP + +In the latest available version of TS 33.899 [6], SA3 has approved a requirement for the storage and processing of the subscription credentials in a 5G system, adding more flexibility in addition to the existing UICC platform, already in use within the 3GPP eco-system. This is reflected in the interim agreement described in clause E.5.1.1.2, indicating that solutions for the credential storage and processing in Phase 1 shall be the UICC and the new SSP (Smart Secure Platform) under discussion in ETSI SCP. + +**Editor's Note:** The agreement depends on the availability of an SSP specification published by ETSI in time to be included in the Rel.15. ETSI SCP has indicated the intention to do its best to provide a solution in the Rel.15 timeframe, as documented in SCP(17)000061r1 (C6-170253). + +**Editor's Note:** The possibility to include the SSP needs to be reviewed in light of the progress done by ETSI SCP on the topic. + +# --- 5 Security aspects + +## 5.1 Extension of the AUTHENTICATE command + +### 5.1.1 Introduction + +The following clauses describe the impact of the 5G system on the existing AUTHENTICATE command, as defined in TS 31.102 [3]. + +### 5.1.2 Keys in the USIM + +TS 33.501 [8] clause 6.1.1.3 describes the binding of the anchor key $K_{\text{SEAF}}$ to the serving network, to prevent one serving network from claiming to be a different serving network, and indicates that the anchor key provided to the serving network shall be specific to the authentication having taken place between the UE and a 5G core network. + +As per TS 33.501 [8] clause 6.1.1.1, there is also another key $K_{\text{AUSF}}$ , that is left on the AUSF based on the home operator's policy on using such key for authentication and key agreement procedures. As per TS 33.501 [8] clause 6.2.2.2, the ME shall generate the $K_{\text{AUSF}}$ from the CK, IK received from the USIM. The ME shall then generate the $K_{\text{SEAF}}$ from $K_{\text{AUSF}}$ . The ME shall then generate the $K_{\text{AMF}}$ . If the USIM supports 5G parameters storage, the $K_{\text{AUSF}}$ , $K_{\text{SEAF}}$ and $K_{\text{AMF}}$ shall be stored in the USIM. + +New EF(s) need to be defined in the USIM for the storage of the keys listed above. A bit also needs to be reserved in the USIM Service Table to indicate the support for 5G parameters storage. + +The USIM shall store the same long-term key K that is stored in the ARPF. + +### 5.1.3 Input parameters + +No new input parameters are needed for AUTHENTICATE command as the AKA procedures leverage authentication procedure as in 3G Security Context procedure. RES\* calculation as part of 5G-AKA procedure is not performed on the USIM. SA3 has clarified with [S3-180796](#) that RES\* is computed in the ME. + +### 5.1.4 Output parameters + +No new output parameters are needed for AUTHENTICATE as the AKA procedures leverage authentication procedure as in 3G Security Context procedure. RES\* calculation as part of 5G-AKA procedure is not performed on the USIM. SA3 has clarified with [S3-180796](#) that RES\* is computed in the ME. + +## 5.2 5G NAS security context + +### 5.2.2 Introduction + +As per TS 33.501 [8] clause 6.3.4.1, the ME shall store two different 5G security contexts on the USIM if the USIM supports the 5G parameters storage. + +In order to implement this requirement, a new bit in the USIM Service Table and an EF for storing 5G NAS security context may be needed in the USIM. + +# --- 6 Storage capability to support 5G system + +## 6.1 Existing EFs + +### 6.1.1 Introduction + +The following clauses describe the impact of 5G system on existing EFs stored in the USIM application. + +### 6.1.2 EFs related to PLMN selection + +#### 6.1.2.1 PLMN selection + +According to TR 24.890 [11] clause 5.2.2, the same procedures for PLMN selection applicable for the GSM, UTRAN and E-UTRAN access technologies as described in 3GPP TS 22.011 [13] and 3GPP TS 23.122 [14] also apply for 5G-RAN, with only few exceptions. + +#### 6.1.2.2 EFHPPLMN (Higher Priority PLMN search period) + +According to the text in TS 31.102 [3] clause 4.2.6, the EFHPPLMN contains the interval of time between searches for a higher priority PLMN. The coding of this EF varies depending on the device that reads it. In particular for those MEs that only support NB-IoT, GERAN EC-GSM-IoT and Category M1 of E-UTRAN enhanced-MTC, or a combination of those, the values calculated from the EFHPPLMN are much longer. + +Based on existing text in TR 24.890 [11], no changes are anticipated due to the introduction of 5G. + +#### 6.1.2.3 EFPLMNwACT (User controlled PLMN selector with Access Technology) + +According to the text in TS 31.102 [3] clause 4.2.5, the EFPLMNwACT contains the list of PLMNs and access technologies controlled by the user to be used during PLMN selection procedure. This access technology of each PLMN is coded as a bitmask. + +5G system needs to be added to the coding of the access technology, using one of the existing RFU bits. Based on the response from SA1 in S1-173550, the UE does not need to differentiate between NR connected to 5GC and E-UTRA connected to 5GC. The UE however does need to differentiate between E-UTRA connected to 5GC and E-UTRA connected to EPC. Hence, the existing E-UTRAN bits in TS 31.102 [3] clause 4.2.5 correspond to E-UTRAN over EPC. A new coding is required for EUTRAN/NR over 5GC. + +#### 6.1.2.4 EFOPLMNwACT (Operator controlled PLMN selector with Access Technology) + +The file EFOPLMNwACT specified in TS 31.102 [3] clause 4.2.53 is coded in the same way as the EFPLMNwACT described in clause 6.1.2.3 of this document. For this reason, the same conclusions and coding apply to this EF as well. + +#### 6.1.2.5 EFHPLMNwACT (HPLMN selector with Access Technology) + +The file EFHPLMNwACT specified in TS 31.102 [3] clause 4.2.54 is coded in the same way as the EFPLMNwACT described in clause 6.1.2.3 of this document. For this reason, the same conclusions and coding apply to this EF as well. + +### 6.1.3 Other EFs + +#### 6.1.3.1 CSG Lists + +TS 31.102 [3] clause 4.4.6 contains the description of several EFs related to the usage of CSG functionality. + +Support of CSG is not included in Rel-15 and might be added in the future releases. + +## 6.2 New EFs + +### 6.2.1 Forbidden areas + +According to TR 24.890 [11] clause 5.2.2, the UE maintains a list of "forbidden areas" where the UE shall not send any signalling or user data. Anyway, according to the current text, this list is deleted when the UE is switched off or the USIM is removed. + +In order to properly implement the last requirement, such list cannot be stored in the USIM, and in general, there would not be any advantage in storing it inside the USIM application. + +### 6.2.2 Network slices + +According to TR 24.890 [11] clause 13.2, a network slice is identified by an S-NSSAI, which is comprised of a slice/service type (SST) and an optional slice differentiator (SD). A set of S-NSSAI is called NSSAI and there are multiple types of NSSAI, that may be provided by the HPLMN to the UE per PLMN. + +Section 13.2.2 further clarifies the details for the storage of the NSSAI, indicating that the configured NSSAI(s) and/or allowed NSSAI(s) shall be stored in a non-volatile memory in the ME together with the SUPI from the USIM per PLMN, and that the configured NSSAI(s) and/or allowed NSSAI(s) can only be used if the SUPI from the USIM matches the SUPI stored in the non-volatile memory of the ME; else the UE shall delete them. + +### 6.2.3 Multimedia Priority Services + +TS 22.153 [15] specifies the service requirements for Multimedia Priority Service (MPS). MPS allows certain subscribers priority access to system resources in situations such as during congestion, creating the ability to deliver or complete sessions of a high priority nature. + +According to TS 24.890 [11] clause 12.1.5.2, an MPS-subscribed UE is configured with at least one access class in the range 11-15 on the USIM. Since Access Control Classes 11-15 are already defined in TS 31.102 [3], no new requirement is present for USIM for Multimedia Priority Services. + +### 6.2.4 Subscriber Permanent Identifier + +According to TS 23.501 [9] clause 5.9.1, each subscriber in the 5G system shall be allocated one 5G Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI). As per TS 24.501 [yy] clause 5.3.2, the SUPI can be the IMSI or a Network Access Identifier (NAI). Though non-IMSI based SUPIs are possible by using NAI, the IMSI can be contained within the NAI for the SUPI. + +A new USIM service table bit may be needed to indicate if the USIM supports SUPI types other than IMSI. If the USIM supports SUPI types other than IMSI, CT6 needs to create a new EF for that. + +According to TR 33.899 [6] clause E.7.2.1.2, SA3 agreed that privacy for the 5G permanent subscription identifier is part of 5G system Phase 1. Furthermore, SA3 also agreed that subscription identifier privacy shall be based upon HN asymmetric key solution, as indicated in TR 33.899 [6] clause E.7.2.6.2. SA3 has also agreed in TS 33.501 [8] clause 5.1.5 that the home network public key shall be stored on the tamper resistant secure hardware component. Anyway, SA3 has not concluded in which entities (e.g. ME, USIM) the calculation of SUCI is done. + +CT6 needs to expand the USIM capabilities depending on the SA3 decision about the calculation of SUCI: + +- if the calculation is done on the USIMUICC, then a new mechanism to calculate the SUCI is required, either extending one of the existing commands or with the introduction of a new command. Moreover, CT6 may decide to create a new EF that is not accessible by the ME to store the home network public key, in order to allow a standardized way to manage it; +- if the calculation is performed in the ME, then CT6 needs to add a new EF for the storage of the home network public key. + +**Editor's Note:** This section needs to be revised considering the SA3 decisions made in TS 33.501 [8]. + +### 6.2.5 5G Globally Unique Temporary Identity + +In all previous access technologies, the temporary identities, in the form of TMSI, P-TMSI or GUTI, was stored in the USIM. TS 23.501 [9] clause 5.9.4 defines a new 5G-GUTI, that is allocated by the AMF and is common to both 3GPP and non-3GPP access. As mentioned in TS 24.501 [xx] Annex C, 5G-GUTI shall be stored in the USIM, if the corresponding file is present on the USIM. + +So, a new USIM service table bit needs to be introduced for 5G mobility management parameters. A new EF also needs to be introduced to store the 5G mobility management parameters, including 5G-GUTI. + +# --- 7 Other functionalities related to 5G system + +## 7.1 Public warning system + +According to TS 24.890 [11] clause 12.1.1, 5G PWS will have the same functionality as E-UTRAN PWS for 4G. It is expected that the same technology framework is used for the realization of PWS in 5GS and for this reason no additional impact is expected on the USIM. + +## 7.2 eCall over IMS Emergency Services + +TS 31.102 [3] clause 5.3.40 describes the usage of EFFDN, EFFDNURI, EFSDN and EFSDNURI to store the eCall test number/URI and the eCall reconfiguration number/URI to be used in case of eCall over IMS Emergency Services using the PS domain in E-UTRAN. + +Based on the text in TS 23.501 [9] clause 5.16.4.10, eCall over IMS Emergency Services needs to be supported also on 5GS. + +# --- 8 Toolkit aspects + +## 8.1 Introduction + +The following clauses describe the impact of the 5G system on the existing USIM Application Toolkit, as defined in TS 31.111 [4]. + +## 8.2 Existing commands and objects + +### 8.2.1 Access Technology + +TS 31.111 [4] lists all possible access technologies communicated to the UICC in clause 8.62, which points to a clause of ETSI TS 102 223 [12]. The introduction of 5G system requires the addition of a new item in that list. + +Such addition needs to be done using one of the bits reserved by ETSI SCP for 3GPP for the definition of new access technologies. + +### 8.2.2 Location Information + +The TLV containing the Location Information is defined in TS 31.111 [4] clause 8.19. This is used in several USAT messages sent from the ME to the UICC. The content of this object is populated by the terminal with the identification (MCC, MNC, LAC/TAC, Cell Identity) of the current serving cell of the UE, when the UE is on GERAN, UTRAN or E-UTRAN. + +The existing text defines the coding of the TAC and the Cell Identity with reference to E-UTRAN specifications, and a new definition of the coding for 5G System is required. + +The cell identity for NR is specified as 36 bits long in TS 38.413 clause 9.3.1.7. This change would require an extension of the Location Information data object in TS 31.111, that is currently defined with only 32 bits for the Cell Identity value. + +### 8.2.3 Timing Advance + +According to TS 31.111 [4], the UICC can retrieve the Timing Advance (TA) information from the terminal. This information can be used by the UICC for a rough estimate of the location of the user. This mechanism is currently defined for GERAN and E-UTRAN. + +As per TS 38.321 [16], the Timing Advance feature is applicable to NR as well. As per frame structure in TS 38.211 [17] clause 4.3, the definitions of Random Access Response TA and MAC-CE TA in TS 38.213 [18] clause 4.2 and the TA offset values defined in TS 38.133 [19], the maximum value of Timing Advance ( $N_{TA}$ ) may be derived. That derived value will require 21 bits for $N_{TA}$ . TS 31.111 [4] clause 8.46 currently reserves 1 byte for Timing Advance. That needs to be expanded to 3 bytes to accommodate maximum Timing Advance value in 5GS. + +### 8.2.4 Network Measurement Results + +According to TS 31.111 [4], the UICC can request the Network Measurement Results (NMR) from the terminal. The UICC can request both intra-RAT and inter-RAT measurements, that might be available for the terminal. + +The type of measurement requested by the UICC is specified in TS 31.111 [4] clause 8.73 that lists all possible requests. This list needs to be expanded to include new possible inter-RAT and intra-RAT measurement requests due to the new 5G RAT. + +The results of the requested measurement is returned by the terminal to the UICC using the Network Measurement Results object, defined in clause 8.22. The definition of this object needs to be expanded to include the new network measurement results related to 5G RAT. + +### 8.2.5 Network Rejection event + +According to TS 31.111 [4] clause 7.5.2.1, the ME informs the UICC about a network reject event when it receives an ATTACH REJECT message or TRACKING AREA UPDATE REJECT message in E-UTRAN and if the UICC has requested this information using the SET UP EVENT LIST proactive command. + +The event contains several items that can potentially be impacted by the 5G System: + +- the Tracking Area identification of the rejecting network (see also clause 8.2.2 above) +- the Access technology (see clause 8.2.1 above) +- the (Extended) Rejection Cause Code with the EMM Cause +- Update/Attach Type indicating the specific message that was rejected by the network + +**Editor's Note:** The impact of the 5G System for each of the items listed above needs to be determined, based on the protocol defined by CT1. + +### 8.2.6 Bearer Independent Protocol + +According to TS 31.111 [4], the UICC can provide a Bearer description object, as specified in TS 31.111 [4] clause 8.52, when it opens a BIP channel using OPEN CHANNEL, in order to request a specific QoS. In case of E-UTRAN, this object includes the "EPS quality of service" information element and the resource type (GBR or non-GBR). + +The need for the QoS parameter in OPEN CHANNEL for BIP in 5GS is to be further evaluated in CT6, taking into consideration the adoption of the feature on the existing Radio Access Technologies. + +### 8.2.7 Call control on PDU connection establishment by USIM + +When the UICC supports it, the ME passes the PDN Connectivity Request message to the UICC for all EPS PDN connection activations (including those resulting from a OPEN CHANNEL proactive UICC command) using the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) command. The UICC can modify some of the fields in the message (Access Point Name and Protocol configuration options) before the terminal sends the request to the network, as specified in TS 31.111 [4] clause 7.3.1.6. + +The payload of the ENVELOPE (CALL CONTROL) needs to be expanded for the 5G System with a new data object called PDU connection establishment parameters. This new data object needs to be defined based on the PDU CONNECTION ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST message, defined in TS 24.890 [11] clause 9.6. + +A new sub-clause 7.3.1.x needs to be added in TS 31.111 [4] with the procedure for call control for PDU connection establishment. + +The need for a new bit in the USIM service table in TS 31.102 [3] for "call control on PDU connection for 5GS by USIM" is to be evaluated. + +### 8.2.8 Data Connection Status Change Event + +When the UICC has registered for the event, the ME notifies the UICC after each change in the data connection status, using the ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD – Data Connection Status Change) command. + +The description of the Data connection status object in TS 31.111 [4] clause 8.137 and the Data connection type object in TS 31.111 [4] clause 8.138 needs to be expanded to include the 5GS PDU connection establishment procedure. + +The (E)SM cause data object in TS 31.111 [4] clause 8.129 needs to be expanded to include the 5GSM cause values as mentioned in TS 24.890 [11] clause 9.7.6. + +Annex T of TS 31.111 [4] also needs to be updated to include PDU connection establishment scenarios related to 5GS as detailed in TS 24.890 [11]. + +### 8.2.9 LAUNCH BROWSER + +When the UICC sends the LAUNCH BROWSER proactive command, it can optionally include a Bearer object. This is specified in TS 31.111 [4] clause 8.49. The value '03' indicates GPRS/UTRAN packet service/E-UTRAN. + +It is recommended to add 5G system to the existing value '03' without further expanding the list. + +## 8.3 Backward compatibility + +It is expected that the UE might be able to access the 5G system with the existing UICC cards already in the market. For this reason, it is possible that the UE camps on a 5G system, while the card is not capable of recognizing it. + +In order to handle this scenario, a new bit in the USIM Service Table is required to indicate support of 5G System, so that terminal can adjust its behaviour to what the UICC supports. Similarly, a new bit in the TERMINAL PROFILE is required, so that the ME can inform the card of the 5G support. + +In order to provide a smooth transition, CT6 needs to study which fields defined in TS 31.111 [4] are impacted by the transition and if there is a possibility of conversion of 5G specific values into corresponding values that are already defined and that can be interpreted by an existing card. Such study needs to be performed on each of the fields listed in clause 8.2 and appropriate text needs to be added in TS 31.111 [4] as needed. + +# Annex A: Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | R ev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2017-08 | CT6#85 | C6-170491 | | | | Draft skeleton provided by the rapporteur. | 0.0.0 | +| 2017-08 | CT6#85 | C6-170492
C6-170493
C6-170508
C6-170498
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C6-170500 | | | | Implementing the p-CRs agreed by CT6 during CT6 #85 | 0.1.0 | +| 2017-08 | CT6#85 | C6-170516 | | | | Draft for presentation to CT Plenary | 1.0.0 | +| 2017-11 | CT6#86 | C6-170665
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C6-170720 | | | | Draft for presentation to CT Plenary | 2.0.0 | +| 2017-11 | CT6#86 | C6-170665
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C6-170720 | | | | | 15.0.0 | +| 2018-04 | CT#79 | C6-180036
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C | Updates to 5G extension of AUTHENTICATE command
5G NAS Security Context on USIM
Updates to impact on Timing Advance in 5G Toolkit
Updates to impact on Location Information clause in 5G Toolkit | 15.1.0 | +| 2018-04 | CT#80 | C6-180125
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B | Calculation of RES* as part of 5G-AKA procedure
Updates to the section regarding calculation of SUCI
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mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1c0d9617a15e0e410e19b1c0b7d84cfe4da927a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31900/ac31fdfebb9751f7f10416dfe33bc872_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:bcf837308f576e47e3b50912c101d8e06ffe10566099cbe5fbdb1cbcd5b87297 +size 95680 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31900/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31900/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4e716b312c4cdf4f623e882d4eae7c1855dbba81 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31900/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,1076 @@ + + + + + + +# --- Contents + +| | | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 5 | +| Introduction ..... | 5 | +| 1 Scope..... | 6 | +| 2 References..... | 6 | +| 3 Abbreviations ..... | 7 | +| 4 Primary clarifications and definitions ..... | 7 | +| 4.1 2G and 3G ..... | 7 | +| 4.2 SIM, USIM and UICC ..... | 8 | +| 4.3 Types of ME..... | 8 | +| 4.4 Types of VLR/SGSN and HLR/AuC ..... | 8 | +| 4.5 Security related terms..... | 9 | +| 5 Interworking between the ME and the ICC ..... | 9 | +| 5.1 3G ME and UICC..... | 10 | +| 5.2 2G ME and UICC..... | 11 | +| 5.2.1 2G ME of Rel-4 (or earlier) without USIM support..... | 11 | +| 5.2.2 2G ME of R99 or Rel-4 with USIM support or of Rel-5 ..... | 11 | +| 5.3 3G ME and SIM ..... | 11 | +| 5.3.1 3G ME of R99 or Rel-4 ..... | 11 | +| 5.3.2 3G ME of Rel-5 ..... | 11 | +| 5.4 2G ME and SIM ..... | 11 | +| 5.4.1 2G ME of Rel-4 (or earlier)..... | 11 | +| 5.4.2 2G ME of Rel-5 ..... | 12 | +| 6 Authentication and key agreement in mixed networks..... | 12 | +| 6.1 With 3G ME and UICC..... | 12 | +| 6.2 With 2G ME and UICC..... | 15 | +| 6.2.1 2G ME of Rel-4 (or earlier) without USIM support..... | 15 | +| 6.2.2 2G ME of R99 or Rel-4 with USIM support or of Rel-5 ..... | 16 | +| 6.3 With 3G ME and SIM ..... | 18 | +| 6.3.1 3G ME of R99 or Rel-4 ..... | 18 | +| 6.3.2 3G ME of Rel-5 ..... | 20 | +| 6.4 With 2G ME and SIM ..... | 20 | +| 6.4.1 2G ME of Rel-4 (or earlier)..... | 20 | +| 6.4.2 2G ME of Rel-5 ..... | 21 | +| 7 Interworking between a SIM application and a USIM application on a UICC ..... | 21 | +| 7.1 IMSI, secret key and authentication algorithm ..... | 22 | +| 7.2 File mapping..... | 23 | +| 7.3 Access conditions..... | 23 | +| 7.4 Secret codes..... | 23 | +| 7.5 Activation of 2G and 3G operation modes..... | 24 | +| 7.6 Selection of cyclic files ..... | 25 | +| 7.7 Enabling/disabling procedures for dialling numbers ..... | 25 | + +| | | | +|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| 8 | Interworking between USIM applications on a UICC ..... | 25 | +| 9 | SIM and UICC Interworking on the Card/Terminal Interface ..... | 26 | +| Annex A: | Interworking table..... | 27 | +| Annex B: | Features for security interworking ..... | 31 | +| B.1 | Conversion functions ..... | 31 | +| B.2 | 3G algorithm execution modes ..... | 31 | +| Annex C: | SIM/USIM file mapping table ..... | 33 | +| Annex D: | CHV mapping ..... | 35 | +| D.1 | In a single-verification capable UICC ..... | 36 | +| D.2 | In a multi-verification capable UICC (static mapping) ..... | 36 | +| D.3 | In a multi-verification capable UICC (dynamic mapping) ..... | 36 | +| Annex E: | Change history ..... | 38 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1: presented to TSG for information; + - 2: presented to TSG for approval; + - 3: or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- Introduction + +This document describes the different cases of interaction between an Identity Module (GSM-SIM or a 3G-UICC) and a GSM or 3G mobile equipment with a special focus on the diverse situations that can apply in a mixed 2G/3G network environment. + +Depending on the technical properties of other involved network elements, particularly during authentication and key agreement, the ICC and the ME may or must support some specific features to allow for compatibility. This is a complex matter and has generated some amount of confusion as the basic conditions implied by the 3G UICC are not always as clearly understood as they should be. The present document gives guidance by summarising the important details and applying them to the (theoretically) possible cases of security interworking along the transmission chain. + +The document further tries to explain the options of interworking that exist internally when a SIM and one or more USIM(s) are implemented together on a single UICC. + +As this document is a technical report and not a technical specification, none of its contents have the character of a requirement. Merely they should be seen as a clarifying summary and straightforward interpretation of the underlying core specifications. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document describes + +- the different cases of interworking between a 2G or 3G ICC and a 2G or 3G ME. +- the different cases of interworking between any given ME/ICC combination and the rest of the network +- the possibilities of interworking between a SIM and a USIM together on a single UICC +- the possibilities of interworking between several USIMs on a single UICC + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. + +- [1] 3GPP TS 31.101: "UICC-Terminal Interface; Physical and Logical Characteristics". +- [2] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the USIM Application". +- [3] 3GPP TS 21.111: "USIM and IC Card Requirements". +- [4] 3GPP TS 22.100: "UMTS Phase 1". +- [5] 3GPP TS 22.101: "Service Aspects; Service Principles". +- [6] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3G Security; Security Architecture". +- [7] 3GPP TS 11.11: "Specification of the Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment Interface". +- [8] 3GPP TS 51.011: "Specification of the Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment Interface". + +# --- 3 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: + +| | | +|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 2G | 2 nd Generation | +| 3G | 3 rd Generation | +| AKA | Authentication and Key Agreement | +| AuC | Authentication Centre | +| AUTN | Authentication Token | +| BSS | Base Station Subsystem | +| CHV | Card Holder Verification | +| CK | Ciphering Key in 3G | +| DF | Dedicated File | +| EF | Elementary File | +| GERAN | GSM/EDGE Radio Access Network | +| GSM | Global System for Mobile Communication | +| HLR | Home Location Register | +| ICC | Integrated Circuit Card | +| IK | Integrity Key | +| IMSI | International Mobile Subscriber Identity | +| K | Secret Key in 3G | +| Kc | Ciphering Key in 2G | +| Ki | Secret Key in 2G | +| MAC | Message Authentication Code | +| ME | Mobile Equipment | +| PIN | Personal Identification Number | +| RAND | Random Challenge | +| RES | Authentication value returned by the USIM in 3G AKA or delivered by the 2G HLR/AuC | +| SGSN | Serving GPRS Support Node | +| SIM | Subscriber Identity Module | +| SRES | Authentication value returned by the SIM or by the USIM in 2G AKA | +| SQN | Sequence Number | +| TS | Technical Specification | +| TR | Technical Report | +| UICC | Universal Integrated Circuit Card | +| UMTS | Universal Mobile Telecommunication System | +| USIM | Universal Subscriber Identity Module | +| VLR | Visitor Location Register | +| XMAC | Expected Message Authentication Code calculated in the USIM in 3G AKA | +| XRES | Expected Authentication value delivered by the 3G HLR/AuC | + +# --- 4 Primary clarifications and definitions + +For the purpose of this report, the following clauses clarify the meaning of some important terms. + +## 4.1 2G and 3G + +The abbreviation 2G stands for 2nd generation technology and characterises elements of a mobile communication system which are based on the GSM standard, i.e. 2G technical specifications or their equivalent successors under the 3GPP administration. A 2G entity only comprises the mandatory and optional functionality specified in GSM and does not ensure any forward compatibility with 3G, with a particular exception: 2G terminals of R99 and Rel-4 may and from Rel-5 onwards have to support the 3G USIM. + +The abbreviation 3G stands for 3rd generation technology and characterises elements of a mobile communication system which are based on 3GPP technical specifications. A 3G entity only comprises the mandatory and optional functionality specified in 3G, features for 2G backward compatibility are only included if explicitly required by the relevant 3G specifications. + +Some 3G specifications differentiate the functional extent of a mobile network entity between releases 98 and earlier (R98-) and releases 99 and later (R99+). As for example a GSM ME exists in both release categories while a 3G ME is only defined from release 99 onwards, this split does not make sense without mentioning the respective technology. For the purpose of this document it therefore appears more appropriate to differentiate between 2G and 3G only, with the relationship given by + +2G = GSM = GSM R98- or GSM R99+ + +3G = 3G R99+ + +## 4.2 SIM, USIM and UICC + +The most general term for a smart card, i.e. a micro-controller based access module, not only for mobile communication purposes, is "ICC". It is always a physical and logical entity and, in the context of this document, either a SIM or a UICC. + +The SIM is the ICC defined for 2G. It has originally been specified as one physical and logical entity, not distinguishing platform and application. In 3G, the SIM may also be an application on the 3G UICC, then of course only represented by its logical characteristics. If the SIM application is active, the UICC is functionally identical to a 2G SIM. The SIM (or SIM application on a UICC) does only accept 2G commands. It is specified in GSM TS 11.11 [7] / TS 51.011 [8]. + +Unlike the SIM, the USIM is not a physical entity, but a purely logical application that resides on a UICC. It does only accept 3G commands and is therefore not compatible with a 2G ME. The USIM may provide mechanisms to support 2G authentication and key agreement to allow a 3G ME to access a 2G network. It is specified in 3G TS 31.102 [2]. + +The UICC is the physical and logical platform for the USIM. It does at least contain one USIM application and may additionally contain a SIM application. Further to that, the UICC may contain additional USIMs and other applications, e.g. for mobile banking or mobile commerce purposes, if these fit with the basic physical and logical characteristics of the UICC. It is specified in 3G TS 31.101 [1]. + +## 4.3 Types of ME + +For the purpose of this document, the following definitions apply for the ME: + +- A 3G ME is either a 3G single mode ME that only supports a 3G radio access network or a 2G/3G dual mode ME that supports both, a 2G radio access network (GSM) and a 3G radio access network, which ever is present. In either case it can handle 3G AKA and 2G AKA and is able to interwork with either a USIM application on a UICC or a SIM. For better understanding, explicit usage of the term "2G/3G dual mode ME" points out particular requirements. +- A 2G ME does only support a 2G radio access network (GSM). + - If it is of R98 or earlier, it can only handle 2G AKA and is only able to interwork with either a SIM application on a UICC or a SIM. Then the card interface complies to GSM TS 11.11 [7]. + - If it is of R99 or Rel-4, it can handle 2G AKA and is able to interwork with either a SIM application on a UICC or a SIM. Then the card interface complies to GSM TS 11.11 [7] / TS 51.011 [8]. Additionally, it may support 3G AKA and be capable to interwork with a USIM application on a UICC. In this optional mode, the card interface complies to 3G TS 31.101 [1] and 3G TS 31.102 [2]. + - If it is of Rel-5 or later, it can handle 2G AKA and 3G AKA (depending on the current network situation) and is capable to work with a USIM application on a UICC. On the card interface, it behaves just like a 3G ME, i.e. it complies to 3G TS 31.101 [1] and 3G TS 31.102 [2]. As a recommended option, the 2G ME of Rel-5 and onwards may additionally support a 2G SIM. + +## 4.4 Types of VLR/SGSN and HLR/AuC + +For the purpose of this document, the following definitions apply for the VLR/SGSN and HLR/AuC: + +- A 2G HLR/AuC supports triplet generation for 2G subscriptions, but does not support quintet generation. Only 2G AKA can be performed. A triplet consists of RAND, RES and Kc, while a quintet comprises RAND, XRES, CK, IK and AUTN. A 2G HLR/AuC does not support any conversion functions. + +- A 3G HLR/AuC supports quintet generation for 3G subscriptions. To support 2G AKA, i.e. to convert quintets into triplets, it shall support conversion functions c2 and c3 as defined in 3G TS 33.102 [6]. It may additionally support pure triplet generation for 2G subscriptions. +- A 2G VLR/SGSN only supports 2G AKA and can only be attached to a 2G BSS. It does not support any conversion functions. +- A 3G VLR/SGSN supports 3G AKA and 2G AKA. It can be attached to a 3G BSS and/or a 2G BSS. To convert quintets from a 3G HLR/AuC into triplets necessary for 2G AKA, it shall support conversion functions c2 and c3 as defined in 3G TS 33.102 [6]. + +## 4.5 Security related terms + +2G AKA is the procedure to provide authentication of an ICC to a serving network domain and to generate the key Kc in accordance to the mechanisms specified in TS 03.20. In a mixed 2G/3G network environment 2G AKA is performed when - except for the BSS - at least one other element is 2G. + +3G AKA is the procedure to provide mutual authentication between an ICC and a serving network domain and to generate the keys CK and IK in accordance to the mechanisms specified in 3G TS 33.102 [6]. For 3G AKA all involved elements - except for the BSS - have to be 3G. + +2G Security Context is a state that is established between a user and a serving network domain (i.e. between the ICC and the VLR/SGSN) after the execution of 2G AKA, with ciphering Kc available at either side. + +3G Security Context is a state that is established between a user and a serving network domain (i.e. between the ICC and the VLR/SGSN) after the execution of 3G AKA, with ciphering and integrity protection keys CK and IK available at either side. 3G Security Context is still given, if these keys are converted into Kc to work with a 2G BSS. + +# --- 5 Interworking between the ME and the ICC + +The 3G system is designed to be compatible with GSM and several interworking requirements apply. Regarding the ICC/ME interface, some basic requirements can be identified in the 3G standards. They are differing between the subsequent releases: + +For R99, the following applies: + +- In 3G TS 22.100 [4]: "The UMTS mobile terminal shall support phase 2 and phase 2+ GSM SIMs as access modules to UMTS networks." In other words: A R99 3G ME shall support a 2G ICC. +- In 3G TS 22.101 [5]: "It shall be possible to use the UICC in 2G terminals to provide access to GSM networks. In order to achieve that option, it shall be possible to store a module containing 2G access functionalities on the UICC which shall be accessed via the standard GSM SIM-terminal interface." In other words: The R99 UICC may contain a SIM application. +- Additionally, a 2G terminal of R99 may provide a USIM interface. For Rel-4, 3G TS 22.100 [4] does not exist. There are however similar statements in 3G TS 22.101 [5]: + - "The basic mandatory UE requirements are: Support for GSM phase 2 and 2+ SIM cards [...]", meaning that also a Rel-4 ME does work with a 2G ICC. + - "It shall be possible to use the UICC in 2G terminals to provide access to networks supporting GERAN (including networks based on earlier GSM specifications). In order to achieve that option, it shall be possible to store a module containing 2G access functionalities on the UICC, which shall be accessed via the standard SIM-terminal interface." In other words: The Rel-4 UICC may contain a SIM application. + - Additionally, a 2G terminal of Rel-4 may provide a USIM interface. + +Therefore, in R99 and Rel-4 we have the same situation. Note that it is not a mandatory requirement in R99 and Rel-4 that a USIM has to be supported by a 2G ME. However, it is optional and in addition to the 2G SIM interface. In order to allow a 3G UICC to work in a 2G ME where the USIM is not supported, it is feasible to put a SIM application (according to TS 11.11 [7] / TS 51.011 [8]) onto the UICC in addition to the USIM. + +For Rel-5, the requirement for 2G MEs to support 2G ICCs was deleted from 3G TS 22.101[5], instead the following statements were inserted: + +- "In Release 5 and later, terminals supporting only GERAN shall support USIM." with a note "It is strongly recommended that manufacturers implement SIM support on GERAN only terminals until the population of SIMs in the market is reduced to a low level." +- "The basic mandatory UE requirements are: Support for USIM. Optional support of GSM phase 2, 2+, 3GPP Release 99 and Release 4 SIM cards. [...] Support for the SIM is optional for the UE, however, if it is supported, all the mandatory requirements for SIM shall be supported in the UE [...]." + +This means basically that for 2G and 3G MEs of Rel-5 the support of 2G SIMs is now optional and it is mandatory (in particular for the 2G ME) to support the USIM. Note that although a SIM application on the UICC is no longer mentioned, it is still essential (and certainly allowed) to support Rel-4 and earlier terminals that do not optionally accept a USIM with a SIM application on Rel-5 UICCs. In this case, the Rel-4 SIM specifications apply. + +For the ICC/ME interface, with two main types of ME (3G and 2G) and two main types of ICC (UICC and SIM), four different scenarios can be identified. They are described in the following sections with appropriate splits into sub-sections if release specific differences have to be taken into account. + +## 5.1 3G ME and UICC + +Any 3G ME, independent of the release, has to support the UICC. 3G TS 31.101 [1] and 3G TS 31.102 [2] apply. + +According to 3G TS 21.111 [3] a 3G ME does not support a 5V ME/UICC interface. As laid out in the same specification, a UICC does always support at least two voltage classes, i.e. a 5V only UICC cannot exist. + +In case of a UICC inserted in a 3G ME, nothing but the 3G command set (as defined in 3G TS 31.101 [1] and 3G TS 31.102 [2]) can be used by the ME. In particular, the 2G command RUN GSM ALGORITHM is not available. + +To support a 2G/3G dual mode ME in a 2G radio access network, the USIM may provide functions for 2G backward compatibility. Two particular USIM services are defined for such purposes: + +1. **Service n° 27: "GSM Access".** This service is essential when a 2G BSS is involved and ciphering is active in the BSS. The USIM additionally generates the 2G ciphering key Kc required by the 2G air interface. From the security point of view, this behaviour can be characterised as "**3G + Kc mode**" (see below). Further, the USIM supports some additional 2G data storage elements that are necessary for 2G radio access. If service n° 27 is not available in the USIM, the lack of Kc prevents operation with a 2G BSS when ciphering is active. No ciphering key derivation is done by the ME. +2. **Service n° 38: "GSM Security Context".** This service is required when a 2G VLR/SGSN and/or a 2G HLR/AuC is involved. The USIM performs 2G AKA, i.e. it accepts 2G input data and generates 2G output data. From the security point of view, this behaviour can be characterised as "**virtual 2G mode**" (see below). If service n° 38 is not available in the USIM, 2G AKA is not supported and network access is impossible with a 2G VLR/SGSN and/or a 2G HLR/AuC. + +A 2G VLR/SGSN never goes with a 3G BSS. Hence when a 2G VLR/SGSN is involved, then a 2G BSS is always part of the transmission chain and service n° 27 is additionally required, i.e. services n° 27 and n° 38 have to be available at the same time. + +If services n° 27 and n° 38 are not supported by the USIM (which the ME can detect from the USIM Service Table during the USIM activation procedure) network access is impossible in a mixed 2G/3G environment, even if a SIM application is available on the UICC. A 3G ME only accesses the USIM application on the UICC. + +From the security point of view, the compatibility services are connected to up to three different operation modes (see also Annex B): + +- **Normal 3G mode:** The results of the 3G algorithm are sent to the ME without any change. The USIM receives RAND and AUTN and responds with RES, CK and IK. This mode applies if service n° 27 is not available. +- **3G + Kc mode:** The 2G ciphering key Kc (derived from CK, IK) is additionally included in the response. The USIM receives RAND and AUTN and responds with RES, CK, IK and Kc. This requires conversion function c3 to be supported by the USIM. If service n° 27 is available in the USIM, this mode is always active and the ME picks the relevant values from the USIM response according to the present network situation. + +- **Virtual 2G mode:** The USIM receives a 2G authentication request with RAND and returns a 2G authentication response with SRES (derived from RES) and ciphering key Kc (derived from CK, IK). This requires a particular algorithm execution mode plus conversion functions c2 and c3 to be supported by the USIM. If service n° 38 is available in the USIM, this mode is not always active. The ME may switch the USIM from normal 3G mode or 3G + Kc mode to virtual 2G mode by sending a particular command parameter according to the present network situation. + +The services n° 27 and n° 38 are both optional. Network operators can decide whether to include them into their USIMs and hence to allow network access with lower security level. It should be noted that this access limitation also affects emergency call set-up and handover. + +## 5.2 2G ME and UICC + +As explained in the beginning of paragraph 5, the interworking of this combination is dependent on the actual specification release, the terminal complies to. + +### 5.2.1 2G ME of Rel-4 (or earlier) without USIM support + +A 2G ME of Rel-4 (or earlier) is not required to support a USIM, however in R99 and Rel-4 this is allowed as an option. If it does not support a USIM, this combination will only work if a SIM application is provided by the UICC. TS 11.11 [7] / TS 51.011 [8] applies. + +### 5.2.2 2G ME of R99 or Rel-4 with USIM support or of Rel-5 + +A 2G ME of R99 or Rel-4 can and a 2G ME of Rel-5 must support the UICC and interwork with a USIM application on it. In this case, the mechanisms described in section 5.1 above apply with the following additional remark: + +The USIM services n° 27 and n° 38 are still optional for the USIM. However, as a 2G ME can only access a 2G BSS, a 2G ciphering key Kc is always required and thus service n° 27 becomes mandatory. If further a 2G VLR/SGSN and/or a 2G HLR/AuC is involved (a common situation in 2G networks), service n° 38 is also necessary. It is therefore recommended to the card issuer who wants to support this ME/ICC combination to have both services activated in the USIMs. + +## 5.3 3G ME and SIM + +This combination is depending on the actual 3GPP release the terminal is compliant to. + +### 5.3.1 3G ME of R99 or Rel-4 + +A 3G ME of R99 or Rel-4 supports a 2G SIM. For this purpose it has to provide 2G SIM interface in addition to the 3G UICC interface. Access is possible to both 3G and 2G networks. The services that can be provided in this case may be limited to GSM like services. It is up to the 3G network operator to accept or reject the use of GSM SIMs as access modules to his network. TS 11.11 [7] / TS 51.011 [8] applies. + +According to 3G TS 21.111 [3] and TS 22.100 [4] a 3G ME does not support a 5V ME/UICC or a 5V ME/SIM interface. This means that a 3G ME is not compatible with 5V only SIMs. + +### 5.3.2 3G ME of Rel-5 + +For a 3G ME of Rel-5 support of the 2G SIM is only optional. If this option is taken (strongly recommended as there are huge quantities of legacy 2G SIMs in almost all major markets), there is no difference to section 5.3.1. Otherwise this combination does not work. + +## 5.4 2G ME and SIM + +This combination is depending on the actual 3GPP release the terminal is compliant to. + +### 5.4.1 2G ME of Rel-4 (or earlier) + +This is the well-known 2G case. TS 11.11 [7] / TS 51.011 [8] applies. Access to 3G networks is not possible with this combination. + +### 5.4.2 2G ME of Rel-5 + +For a 2G ME of Rel-5 support of the 2G SIM is only optional. If this option is taken (strongly recommended as there are huge quantities of legacy 2G SIMs in almost all major markets), there is no difference to section 5.4.1. Otherwise this combination does not work. + +# 6 Authentication and key agreement in mixed networks + +The authentication and key agreement procedure basically involves five network components (ICC, ME, BSS, VLR/SGSN and HLR), each of which can be either 2G or 3G. Not all combinations work due to missing compatibility, and some require specific support by the ICC. The following sections give an overview on the theoretically possible combinations when a given ICC/ME pair is used. Again, release-dependent differences on the ME side have to be taken into account. A summary list is included in Annex A. + +## 6.1 With 3G ME and UICC + +When both ICC and ME are 3G (i.e. the ICC is a UICC), eight different combinations (security scenarios) of the other three network components remain. They are given in the following table: + +| Case | ICC | ME | BSS | VLR/SGSN | HLR/AuC | Service | Figure 1 | +|------|-----|------------------------|-----|----------|---------|-----------|----------| +| 1 | 3G | 3G
(any
release) | 3G | 3G | 3G | yes | A | +| 2 | | | 2G | 3G | 3G | yes 1) 3) | B | +| 3 | | | 3G | 2G | 3G | no | | +| 4 | | | 2G | 2G | 3G | yes 2) 3) | C | +| 5 | | | 3G | 3G | 2G | no | F | +| 6 | | | 2G | 3G | 2G | yes 2) 3) | E | +| 7 | | | 3G | 2G | 2G | no | | +| 8 | | | 2G | 2G | 2G | yes 2) 3) | D | + +Note: 1) requires service n° 27 supported by the USIM +2) requires services n° 27 and n° 38 supported by the USIM +3) only with 2G/3G dual mode ME + +**Case 1:** All system elements are 3G and thus capable of handling the related security mechanisms. 3G AKA is executed and 3G security context established. The USIM receives parameters RAND and AUTN and responds with RES, CK and IK. + +**NOTE:** If service n° 27 is active in the USIM (to support mixed 2G/3G scenarios), Kc is generated by conversion function c3 and additionally included in the response. However, Kc is not needed in this security scenario and can be discarded by the ME. + +This scenario is marked with A in figure 1. + +**Case 2:** All system elements are 3G, except for the radio interface, which is 2G. This applies when a 3G subscriber roams into a 2G radio access network, which is connected to a 3G VLR/SGSN (e.g. when in the start phase of a 3G network not yet all existing 2G BSS are replaced by 3G technology, while the VLR/SGSN is already 3G). + +3G AKA is executed. The 2G BSS is transparent for 3G authentication parameters but not capable of handling ciphering and integrity protection keys CK and IK. Therefore the 3G VLR/SGSN and the 3G ICC have to compute Kc from CK, IK with conversion function c3 and send it to the BSS and to the ME. Despite a 2G radio access network is involved, 3G security context is established. No service with a 3G single mode ME. + +The USIM receives parameters RAND and AUTN and calculates RES, CK and IK. If service n° 27 is available, Kc is generated by conversion function c3 and additionally included in the response. The keys CK and IK are not needed in this security scenario and can be discarded by the ME. If the USIM does not support service n° 27, network access is not possible. + +This scenario is marked with B in figure 1. + +**Case 3:** All system elements are 3G, except for the VLR/SGSN which is 2G. As a 2G VLR/SGSN and a 3G BSS are not compatible, this theoretical combination cannot exist. No service in this case. + +**Case 4:** ME, ICC and HLR/AuC are 3G, BSS and VLR/SGSN are 2G. This applies when a 3G subscriber roams into a 2G network - a very common case as networks will introduce 3G technology at different times or not at all. + +Upon request by a 2G VLR/SGSN the 3G HLR/AuC produces 2G triplets RAND, RES, Kc out of 3G quintets RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTN. It therefore applies conversion function c2 to generate RES from XRES and conversion function c3 to generate Kc from CK and IK. RAND is left unchanged and AUTN is discarded. The 2G triplet is then sent to the VLR/SGSN. Between the VLR/SGSN and the USIM 2G AKA is executed, i.e. using RAND in the request and SRES in the response. No service with a 3G single mode ME. + +To handle 2G AKA, the USIM must be capable to accept a request with RAND and return a response with SRES and Kc. The support of the virtual 2G mode is indicated by service n° 38 in the USIM Service Table. Since a 2G BSS is involved, service n° 27 is also necessary. In case the USIM does not support services n° 27 and n° 38, network access is not possible. + +This scenario is marked with C in figure 1. + +![Figure 1: Possible interworking scenarios of a 3G ME and UICC with different network environments. The diagram shows six scenarios (A-F) for a 3G ME and UICC connected to different network elements. Scenarios A and B are grouped under 'UMTS Security Context', while C, D, E, and F are under 'GSM Security Context'. The diagram illustrates the flow of authentication messages (RAND, XRES, RES, CK, IK, Kc, AUTN) between the HLR/AuC, VLR/SGSN, BSS, ME, and UICC.](a33da0f14e456f92539ce3e9b7d81f9a_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates six possible interworking scenarios (A-F) for a 3G ME and UICC. The network elements involved are 3G HLR/AuC, 2G HLR/AuC, 3G VLR/SGSN, 2G VLR/SGSN, 3G BSS, 2G BSS, 3G ME, and 3G ICC (UICC) USIM Application. The scenarios are categorized into two security contexts: UMTS Security Context (A, B) and GSM Security Context (C, D, E, F). The flow of authentication messages (RAND, XRES, RES, CK, IK, Kc, AUTN) is shown between the network elements and the ME/UICC. + +Figure 1: Possible interworking scenarios of a 3G ME and UICC with different network environments. The diagram shows six scenarios (A-F) for a 3G ME and UICC connected to different network elements. Scenarios A and B are grouped under 'UMTS Security Context', while C, D, E, and F are under 'GSM Security Context'. The diagram illustrates the flow of authentication messages (RAND, XRES, RES, CK, IK, Kc, AUTN) between the HLR/AuC, VLR/SGSN, BSS, ME, and UICC. + +**Figure 1: Possible interworking scenarios of a 3G ME and UICC with different network environments** + +**Case 5:** All system elements are 3G, except for the HLR/AuC, which is 2G. This scenario would result into 2G AKA, but although the necessary conversions would be technically feasible, this combination is not a valid option as it would violate a basic security requirement in 3G TS 33.102 [6]: A 3G ME with a UICC inserted with a USIM activated and attached to a 3G BSS shall only participate in 3G AKA and shall not participate in 2G AKA. Accordingly the ME shall deny service in this case. + +This scenario is marked with F in figure 1. + +**NOTE:** There is one main consequence from this scenario: If a network operator issues UICCs in order to enable his customers to use a 3G access network (at home or while roaming), the related subscriptions should be installed in a 3G HLR/AuC. Otherwise authentication will fail as a 3G ME should not participate in 2G AKA. + +**Case 6:** All system elements are 3G, except for the BSS and the HLR/AuC, which are 2G. It is possible to keep a 3G subscription in a 2G HLR/AuC, however on request by a 3G VLR/SGSN this can only deliver 2G triplets RAND, RES and Kc. The 3G VLR/SGSN is backward compatible and behaves like a 2G VLR/SGSN: Between the VLR/SGSN and the USIM 2G AKA is executed, i.e. using RAND in the request and SRES in the response. No service with a 3G single mode ME. + +To handle 2G AKA, the USIM must be capable to accept a request with RAND and return a response with SRES and Kc. The support of the virtual 2G mode is indicated by service n° 38 in the USIM Service Table. Since a 2G BSS is involved, service n° 27 is also necessary. In case the USIM does not support services n° 27 and n° 38, network access is not possible. + +This scenario is marked with E in figure 1. + +**Case 7:** All involved system elements are 3G, except for the VLR/SGSN and the HLR/AuC, which are 2G. The situation is the same as in case 3 above: As a 2G VLR/SGSN a 3G BSS are not compatible, this theoretical combination cannot exist. No service in this case. + +**Case 8:** ICC and ME are 3G and BSS, VLR/SGSN and HLR/AuC are 2G. The situation is actually very similar to case 4, but here the 2G HLR/AuC is delivering the necessary 2G triplets directly. No service with a 3G single mode ME. + +Again this mixed network environment requires the virtual 2G mode in the USIM, indicated by service n° 38. As a 2G BSS is involved, service n° 27 is also necessary. If the USIM does not support services n° 27 and n° 38, network access is not possible. + +This scenario is marked with D in figure 1. + +## 6.2 With 2G ME and UICC + +### 6.2.1 2G ME of Rel-4 (or earlier) without USIM support + +When the ME is 2G and of Rel-4 (or earlier) and does not support a USIM while the ICC is 3G (i.e. it is a UICC), this pair will only interoperate if a SIM application is provided by the UICC. The USIM application is not relevant in this case. Again eight different combinations of the remaining three network components are existing. They are given in the following table: + +| Case | ICC | ME | BSS | VLR/SGSN | HLR/AuC | Service | Figure 2 | +|----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|-----|----------|---------|---------|----------| +| 1 | 3G
with
SIM Appl. | 2G
(without
USIM
support) | 3G | 3G | 3G | no | | +| 2 | | | 2G | 3G | 3G | yes 1) | G | +| 3 | | | 3G | 2G | 3G | no | | +| 4 | | | 2G | 2G | 3G | yes 1) | H | +| 5 | | | 3G | 3G | 2G | no | | +| 6 | | | 2G | 3G | 2G | yes 1) | J | +| 7 | | | 3G | 2G | 2G | no | | +| 8 | | | 2G | 2G | 2G | yes 1) | I | +| Note: 1) No service if UICC does not contain a SIM application | | | | | | | | + +**Cases 1, 3, 5, 7:** A 2G ME cannot interwork with a 3G BSS. Further, in cases 3 and 7, a 3G BSS does not work in combination with a 2G VLR/SGSN. No service in these cases. + +**Case 2:** ME and BSS are 2G, the rest is 3G. This applies when a 3G subscriber with a 2G ME roams into a 2G radio access network, which is connected to a 3G VLR/SGSN (e.g. when in the start phase of a 3G network not yet all of the existing 2G BSS is replaced by 3G technology, while the VLR/SGSN is already 3G). + +Upon request from a 3G VLR/SGSN, the 3G HLR/AuC delivers quintets. The VLR/SGSN, as it does not know what type of ME it is communicating with, forwards RAND and AUTN. The 2G ME simply ignores AUTN, therefore the UICC only receives RAND and responds with SRES for 2G AKA. After determination that 2G AKA is to be executed, the 3G VLR/SGSN generates Kc from CK/IK (conversion function c3) and RES from XRES (conversion function c2). It then also performs 2G AKA. In the UICC only the SIM application is active. + +This scenario is marked with G in figure 2. + +**Case 4:** ME, BSS and VLR/SGSN are 2G, ICC and HLR/AuC are 3G. This applies when a 3G subscriber with a 2G ME roams into a 2G network. + +Upon request from a 2G VLR/SGSN, the 3G HLR/AuC must produce 2G triplets out of 3G quintets. It therefore applies conversion function c2 to generate RES from XRES and conversion function c3 to generate Kc from CK, IK. RAND is left unchanged and AUTN is discarded. The 2G triplet is sent to the VLR/SGSN. The authentication and key agreement procedure is performed according to 2G specifications, i.e. using RAND in the request and SRES in the response. In the UICC only the SIM application is active. + +This scenario is marked with H in figure 2. + +![Figure 2: Possible interworking scenarios of a 2G ME and UICC with different network environments. The diagram shows four vertical paths (G, H, I, J) representing different network configurations. At the top are 3G HLR/AuC and 2G HLR/AuC. Below them are 3G VLR/SGSN, 2G VLR/SGSN, and 3G VLR/SGSN. All three connect to a common 2G BSS. At the bottom is the 3G ICC (UICC) SIM Application. Arrows show signaling messages like RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTN, RES, and SRES, and key derivation functions like CK, IK -> Kc and XRES -> RES. A bracket at the bottom groups all four paths under the label 'GSM Security Context'.](1a827b10290f33d4fec04d0e8ef7a897_img.jpg) + +Figure 2: Possible interworking scenarios of a 2G ME and UICC with different network environments. The diagram shows four vertical paths (G, H, I, J) representing different network configurations. At the top are 3G HLR/AuC and 2G HLR/AuC. Below them are 3G VLR/SGSN, 2G VLR/SGSN, and 3G VLR/SGSN. All three connect to a common 2G BSS. At the bottom is the 3G ICC (UICC) SIM Application. Arrows show signaling messages like RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTN, RES, and SRES, and key derivation functions like CK, IK -> Kc and XRES -> RES. A bracket at the bottom groups all four paths under the label 'GSM Security Context'. + +**Figure 2: Possible interworking scenarios of a 2G ME and UICC with different network environments** + +**Case 6:** ME, BSS and HLR/AuC are 2G, ICC and VLR/SGSN are 3G. This applies when e.g. in the start-up phase of a 3G network a UICC (with SIM application) is introduced as the first migration step, while the rest of the network is still 2G and a user roams into another starting 3G network with 3G VLR/SGSN and 2G BSS technology. + +Since the 3G VLR/SGSN is transparent for 2G AKA and the SIM application is active on the UICC, the system works entirely like 2G. + +This scenario is marked with J in figure 2. + +**Case 8:** ME, BSS, VLR/SGSN and HLR/AuC are 2G, only the ICC is a 3G UICC. This applies when in the start-up phase of a 3G network a UICC (with SIM application) is introduced as the first migration step, while the rest of the network is still 2G. With the UICC virtually being a SIM, this case can be seen as entirely 2G. + +This scenario is marked with I in figure 2. + +### 6.2.2 2G ME of R99 or Rel-4 with USIM support or of Rel-5 + +When the ME is 2G of R99 or Rel-4 with USIM support or of Rel-5 and the ICC is 3G (i.e. it is a UICC), a SIM application on the UICC is not necessary since the ME can interwork with the USIM. It also supports 3G AKA. Again eight different combinations of the remaining three network components are existing. They are given in the following table: + +| Case | ICC | ME | BSS | VLR/SGSN | HLR/AuC | Service | Figure 3 | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------|-----|----------|---------|---------|----------| +| 1 | 3G | 2G
(with
USIM
support) | 3G | 3G | 3G | no | | +| 2 | | | 2G | 3G | 3G | yes 1) | B' | +| 3 | | | 3G | 2G | 3G | no | | +| 4 | | | 2G | 2G | 3G | yes 2) | C' | +| 5 | | | 3G | 3G | 2G | no | | +| 6 | | | 2G | 3G | 2G | yes 2) | E' | +| 7 | | | 3G | 2G | 2G | no | | +| 8 | | | 2G | 2G | 2G | yes 2) | D' | +| Note: 1) requires service n° 27 supported by the USIM
2) requires services n° 27 and n° 38 supported by the USIM | | | | | | | | + +**Cases 1, 3, 5, 7:** A 2G ME cannot interwork with a 3G BSS. Further, in cases 3 and 7, a 3G BSS does not work in combination with a 2G VLR/SGSN. No service in these cases. + +**Case 2:** All system elements are 3G, except for the terminal and the radio interface, which are 2G. This applies when a 3G UICC in a 2G ME roams into a 2G radio access network, which is connected to a 3G VLR/SGSN (e.g. when in the start phase of a 3G network not yet all existing 2G BSS are replaced by 3G technology, while the VLR/SGSN is already 3G). + +The 2G ME with USIM support or the Rel-5 2G ME and the 2G BSS are transparent for 3G authentication parameters. To derive the ciphering key Kc for the 2G BSS, the 3G VLR/SGSN and the 3G ICC have to compute Kc from CK, IK with conversion function c3 and send it to the BSS and to the ME. Despite a 2G radio access network is involved, 3G security context is established. + +The USIM receives parameters RAND and AUTN and calculates RES, CK and IK. If service n° 27 is available, Kc is generated by conversion function c3 and additionally included in the response. The keys CK and IK are not needed in this security scenario and can be discarded by the ME. If the USIM does not support service n° 27, network access is not possible. + +This scenario is marked with B' in figure 3. + +**Case 4:** ICC and HLR/AuC are 3G, ME, BSS and VLR/SGSN are 2G. This applies when a 3G UICC in a 2G ME roams into a 2G network - a very common case as networks will introduce 3G technology at different times or not at all. + +Upon request by a 2G VLR/SGSN the 3G HLR/AuC produces 2G triplets RAND, RES, Kc out of 3G quintets RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTN. It therefore applies conversion function c2 to generate RES from XRES and conversion function c3 to generate Kc from CK and IK. RAND is left unchanged and AUTN is discarded. The 2G triplet is then sent to the VLR/SGSN. Between the VLR/SGSN and the USIM 2G AKA is executed, i.e. using RAND in the request and SRES in the response. + +To handle 2G AKA, the USIM must be capable to accept a request with RAND and return a response with SRES and Kc. The support of the virtual 2G mode is indicated by service n° 38 in the USIM Service Table. Since a 2G BSS is involved, service n° 27 is also necessary. In case the USIM does not support services n° 27 and n° 38, network access is not possible. + +This scenario is marked with C' in figure 3. + +**Case 6:** All system elements are 2G, except for the ICC and the VLR/SGSN, which are 3G. It is possible to keep a 3G subscription in a 2G HLR/AuC, however on request by a 3G VLR/SGSN this can only deliver 2G triplets RAND, RES and Kc. The 3G VLR/SGSN is backward compatible and behaves like a 2G VLR/SGSN: Between the VLR/SGSN and the USIM 2G AKA is executed, i.e. using RAND in the request and SRES in the response. + +To handle 2G AKA, the USIM must be capable to accept a request with RAND and return a response with SRES and Kc. The support of the virtual 2G mode is indicated by service n° 38 in the USIM Service Table. Since a 2G BSS is involved, service n° 27 is also necessary. In case the USIM does not support services n° 27 and n° 38, network access is not possible. + +This scenario is marked with E' in figure 3. + +**Case 8:** ICC is 3G, ME, BSS, VLR/SGSN and HLR/AuC are 2G. The situation is actually very similar to case 4, but here the 2G HLR/AuC is delivering the necessary 2G triplets directly. + +Again this mixed network environment requires the virtual 2G mode in the USIM, indicated by service n° 38. As a 2G BSS is involved, service n° 27 is also necessary. If the USIM does not support services n° 27 and n° 38, network access is not possible. + +This scenario is marked with D' in figure 3. + +![Figure 3: Possible interworking scenarios of a 2G ME and UICC with different network environments. The diagram shows four scenarios (B', C', D', E') for a 2G ME with USIM support connected to a 2G BSS. The BSS is connected to three types of VLR/SGSN: 3G, 2G, and 3G. These are further connected to 3G and 2G HLR/AuC. The diagram illustrates the flow of authentication vectors (RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTN) and cryptographic keys (Kc, RES, SRES) between the HLR/AuC, VLR/SGSN, BSS, and the 3G ICC (UICC) USIM Application. Brackets at the bottom group the scenarios into 'UMTS Security Context' (B') and 'GSM Security Context' (C', D', E').](8592a32c2fdf17c1e562f0ba6b7e8e1a_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates four possible interworking scenarios (B', C', D', E') for a 2G ME with USIM support. The architecture consists of HLR/AuC at the top, VLR/SGSN in the middle, a 2G BSS below that, and a 3G ICC (UICC) USIM Application at the bottom. + +- Scenario B' (UMTS Security Context):** The 3G ICC (UICC) USIM Application is connected to a 3G VLR/SGSN, which is connected to a 3G HLR/AuC. The 3G HLR/AuC sends RAND, XRES, CK, IK, and AUTN to the 3G VLR/SGSN. The 3G VLR/SGSN stores CK, IK, and Kc. The 3G VLR/SGSN sends RAND and AUTN to the 2G BSS. The 2G BSS sends SRES to the 3G VLR/SGSN. The 3G VLR/SGSN sends Kc to the 2G BSS. The 2G BSS sends RAND to the 2G ME (with USIM support). The 2G ME sends SRES to the 2G BSS. The 2G ME sends CK, IK, and Kc to the 3G ICC (UICC) USIM Application. +- Scenario C' (GSM Security Context):** The 3G ICC (UICC) USIM Application is connected to a 2G VLR/SGSN, which is connected to a 2G HLR/AuC. The 2G HLR/AuC sends RAND, RES, and Kc to the 2G VLR/SGSN. The 2G VLR/SGSN stores RES and Kc. The 2G VLR/SGSN sends RAND to the 2G BSS. The 2G BSS sends SRES to the 2G VLR/SGSN. The 2G VLR/SGSN sends Kc to the 2G BSS. The 2G BSS sends RAND to the 2G ME (with USIM support). The 2G ME sends SRES to the 2G BSS. The 2G ME sends Kc to the 3G ICC (UICC) USIM Application. +- Scenario D' (GSM Security Context):** The 3G ICC (UICC) USIM Application is connected to a 3G VLR/SGSN, which is connected to a 2G HLR/AuC. The 2G HLR/AuC sends RAND, RES, and Kc to the 3G VLR/SGSN. The 3G VLR/SGSN stores RES and Kc. The 3G VLR/SGSN sends RAND to the 2G BSS. The 2G BSS sends SRES to the 3G VLR/SGSN. The 3G VLR/SGSN sends Kc to the 2G BSS. The 2G BSS sends RAND to the 2G ME (with USIM support). The 2G ME sends SRES to the 2G BSS. The 2G ME sends Kc to the 3G ICC (UICC) USIM Application. +- Scenario E' (GSM Security Context):** The 3G ICC (UICC) USIM Application is connected to a 2G VLR/SGSN, which is connected to a 3G HLR/AuC. The 3G HLR/AuC sends RAND, XRES, CK, IK, and AUTN to the 2G VLR/SGSN. The 2G VLR/SGSN stores CK, IK, and Kc. The 2G VLR/SGSN sends RAND to the 2G BSS. The 2G BSS sends SRES to the 2G VLR/SGSN. The 2G VLR/SGSN sends Kc to the 2G BSS. The 2G BSS sends RAND to the 2G ME (with USIM support). The 2G ME sends SRES to the 2G BSS. The 2G ME sends Kc to the 3G ICC (UICC) USIM Application. + +Brackets at the bottom indicate that B' is the UMTS Security Context, and C', D', and E' are GSM Security Contexts. + +Figure 3: Possible interworking scenarios of a 2G ME and UICC with different network environments. The diagram shows four scenarios (B', C', D', E') for a 2G ME with USIM support connected to a 2G BSS. The BSS is connected to three types of VLR/SGSN: 3G, 2G, and 3G. These are further connected to 3G and 2G HLR/AuC. The diagram illustrates the flow of authentication vectors (RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTN) and cryptographic keys (Kc, RES, SRES) between the HLR/AuC, VLR/SGSN, BSS, and the 3G ICC (UICC) USIM Application. Brackets at the bottom group the scenarios into 'UMTS Security Context' (B') and 'GSM Security Context' (C', D', E'). + +**Figure 3: Possible interworking scenarios of a 2G ME and UICC with different network environments** + +## 6.3 With 3G ME and SIM + +This combination is depending on the actual 3GPP release the terminal is compliant to. + +### 6.3.1 3G ME of R99 or Rel-4 + +Any 3G ME, not only if it is a 2G/3G dual mode ME, is required to work with a 2G SIM. Again eight different combinations of the remaining three network components are existing. These can be reduced to four, as the technology of the HLR/AuC is not relevant: A 2G HLR/AuC will always deliver 2G triplets and a 3G HLR/AuC will do the same because a 2G subscriber (his IMSI is linked to 2G functionality) is involved. The remaining four cases are given in the following table: + +| Case | ICC | ME | BSS | VLR/SGSN | HLR/AuC | Service | Figure 3 | +|--------------------------------------|-----|----|-----|----------|----------|---------|----------| +| 1 | 2G | 3G | 3G | 3G | 2G or 3G | yes | K | +| 2 | | | 2G | 3G | | yes 1) | L | +| 3 | | | 3G | 2G | | no | | +| 4 | | | 2G | 2G | | yes 1) | M | +| Note: 1) 2G/3G dual mode ME required | | | | | | | | + +**Case 1:** ME, BSS and VLR/SGSN are 3G, the ICC is 2G (i.e. a SIM). This applies when e.g. a 2G subscriber with a 3G ME roams in a 3G network. + +Any HLR/ AuC will deliver triplets to the 3G VLR/SGSN. The 3G BSS requires CK and IK, so the VLR/SGSN applies conversion function c3 to generate them from Kc. The SIM can only perform 2G AKA and returns SRES, Kc to the ME which also applies c3 to generate CK, IK. Despite the usage of CK and IK, security is based on Kc, i.e. 2G security context is established. + +This scenario is marked with K in figure 3. + +**Case 2:** ME and VLR/SGSN are 3G, ICC and BSS are 2G. This applies when e.g. a 2G subscriber with 3G ME roams in a 3G network with 2G BSS. + +The situation is like in case 1, except that with a 2G BSS there is no need to derive CK, IK from Kc in the VLR/SGSN and in the ME. Both, the 3G VLR/SGSN and a 2G/3G dual mode ME can work with 2G AKA. No service with a 3G single mode ME. + +This scenario is marked with L in figure 3. + +**Case 3:** ME and BSS are 3G, ICC and VLR/SGSN are 2G. As a 2G VLR/SGSN and a 3G BSS are not compatible, this theoretical combination cannot exist. No service in this case. + +**Case 4:** ICC, BSS and VLR/SGSN are 2G, the ME is 3G. This applies when e.g. a 2G subscriber with a 3G ME roams in a 2G network. + +2G AKA is performed just like in a plain 2G situation. A 2G/3G dual mode ME is transparent for 2G AKA. No service with a 3G single mode ME. + +This scenario is marked with M in figure 3. + +![Diagram illustrating possible interworking scenarios of a 3G ME and SIM with different network environments. The diagram shows five layers: 2G or 3G HLR/AuC at the top, followed by 3G VLR/SGSN and 2G VLR/SGSN. Below these are 3G BSS and 2G BSS. The next layer is 3G ME, and the bottom layer is 2G ICC (SIM). Arrows indicate signaling and data flow between layers, with labels like RAND, RES, Kc, CK, IK, and SRES. A bracket at the bottom groups the layers as 'GSM Security Context' with sub-labels K, L, and M.](81a4cbf0b3c4cbc065efdf8f800dadde_img.jpg) + +Diagram illustrating possible interworking scenarios of a 3G ME and SIM with different network environments. The diagram shows five layers: 2G or 3G HLR/AuC at the top, followed by 3G VLR/SGSN and 2G VLR/SGSN. Below these are 3G BSS and 2G BSS. The next layer is 3G ME, and the bottom layer is 2G ICC (SIM). Arrows indicate signaling and data flow between layers, with labels like RAND, RES, Kc, CK, IK, and SRES. A bracket at the bottom groups the layers as 'GSM Security Context' with sub-labels K, L, and M. + +**Figure 4: Possible interworking scenarios of a 3G ME and SIM with different network environments** + +### 6.3.2 3G ME of Rel-5 + +For a 3G ME of Rel-5 support of the 2G SIM is only optional. If this option is taken (strongly recommended as there are huge quantities of legacy 2G SIMs in almost all major markets), there is no difference to section 6.3.1. Otherwise this combination does not work. + +## 6.4 With 2G ME and SIM + +This combination is depending on the actual 3GPP release the terminal is compliant to. + +### 6.4.1 2G ME of Rel-4 (or earlier) + +This ME/ICC combination results more or less in the "old" 2G case. Like in section 6.3 the HLR/AuC is not relevant, so theoretically 4 cases remain as given in the following table: + +| Case | ICC | ME | BSS | VLR/SGSN | HLR/AuC | Service | Figure 4 | +|------|-----|----|-----|----------|----------|---------|----------| +| 1 | 2G | 2G | 3G | 3G | 2G or 3G | no | | +| 2 | | | 2G | 3G | | yes | N | +| 3 | | | 3G | 2G | | no | | +| 4 | | | 2G | 2G | | yes | O | + +**Case 1:** A 2G ME cannot interwork with a 3G BSS. No service in this case. + +**Case 2:** The VLR/SGSN is 3G, the HLR is 2G or 3G and the rest is 2G. The VLR/SGSN is backwards compatible and enters 2G mode. 2G AKA is executed. + +This scenario is marked with N in figure 4. + +**Case 3:** A 2G ME cannot interwork with a 3G BSS. Further, a 3G BSS does not work in combination with a 2G VLR/SGSN. No service in this case. + +**Case 4:** The HLR is 2G or 3G and the rest is 2G. There is no difference to the well-known classic 2G case. 2G AKA is executed. + +This scenario is marked with O in figure 4. + +![A schematic diagram showing network interworking. At the top is a box labeled 'HLR'. Below it are two boxes labeled 'BSS'. Below the BSSs is a box labeled 'VLR/SGSN'. Below the VLR/SGSN is a box labeled 'RNC'. At the bottom is a box labeled 'UE'. Arrows indicate bidirectional communication between the HLR and each BSS, between each BSS and the VLR/SGSN, between the VLR/SGSN and each RNC, and between each RNC and the UE. A bracket at the bottom groups the RNC and UE components.](75e4b78ee25f885d73120e3066a5253e_img.jpg) + +A schematic diagram showing network interworking. At the top is a box labeled 'HLR'. Below it are two boxes labeled 'BSS'. Below the BSSs is a box labeled 'VLR/SGSN'. Below the VLR/SGSN is a box labeled 'RNC'. At the bottom is a box labeled 'UE'. Arrows indicate bidirectional communication between the HLR and each BSS, between each BSS and the VLR/SGSN, between the VLR/SGSN and each RNC, and between each RNC and the UE. A bracket at the bottom groups the RNC and UE components. + +**Figure 5: Possible interworking scenarios of a 2G ME and SIM with different network environments** + +### 6.4.2 2G ME of Rel-5 + +For a 2G ME of Rel-5 support of the 2G SIM is only optional. If this option is taken (strongly recommended as there are huge quantities of legacy 2G SIMs in almost all major markets), there is no difference to section 6.4.1. Otherwise this combination does not work. + +# 7 Interworking between a SIM application and a USIM application on a UICC + +A SIM application and a USIM application which are implemented together on a single UICC can never be active at the same time. Neither can they be switched from one to the other. Their activity solely depends on the type of ME in + +which they are inserted: A 2G ME will always activate the SIM application, while a 3G ME only uses the USIM application. Hence a direct way of interworking does not exist. + +However, both applications may share certain elements, either to enable an intended basic subscription mode of the UICC (single or double subscription) or to optimise memory consumption, but still both applications have to be virtually independent from a functional point of view. This means that a 2G ME can interwork with the SIM application without any influence from the USIM, while a 3G ME finds all the mandatory characteristics of the USIM application. Naturally, independence ends if one application changes shared data which is later accessed by the other application because the UICC was inserted into another type of ME. This has to be taken into account. + +The following sections describe the possible options. + +## 7.1 IMSI, secret key and authentication algorithm + +In the HLR/AuC, a single subscription is identified by a particular IMSI, which is connected to a particular secret key (given by "Ki" for 2G, "K" for 3G) and to one type of authentication algorithm ("A3/A8" for 2G, "f1-f5" for 3G). At no time, a single IMSI may be connected to more than one secret key or algorithm. This is valid for both 2G and 3G contexts. Further, it applies that + +- Length and Format (IMSI2G) = Length and Format (IMSI3G) +- Length (Ki) = Length (K) +- 2G-Type Algorithm = Part of 3G Algorithm + Conversion Functions c2, c3 + +For the third "equation" see Annex B2 or 3G TS 31.102 [2] and 3G TS 33.102 [6]. This 2G behaviour of the 3G algorithm is the same as the virtual 2G mode described in section 5.1. If it is always active, e.g. in a SIM application or in a 2G HLR/AuC, it shall in the following be called a fixed virtual 2G mode. Then, in fact, it is a 2G algorithm. + +There are three possible options for the UICC: + +1. **Separate IMSI & Separate Secret Key:** This case applies if the network operator - for some reason - wants to administrate the 2G and the 3G subscription, i.e. the usage of a 2G or 3G ME, fully independent. The two subscriptions can be maintained in either in a single 2G or 3G HLR/AuC or in different dedicated 2G and 3G HLR/AuC. Then USIM and SIM applications also have to keep separate IMSIs, i.e. IMSI3G ≠ IMSI2G. The secret keys have to be different as well, i.e. K ≠ Ki. Of course, the algorithms in the UICC have to correspond to the algorithms associated with the IMSIs in the HLR/AuC. The USIM application needs a 3G algorithm, while for the SIM application it can either be + - a 2G algorithm on its own or + - a 3G algorithm in fixed virtual 2G mode. In that case the UICC needs to implement a 3G algorithm only, which from the SIM application is executed in 2G mode. The HLR/AuC must support this option accordingly. +2. **Separate IMSI & Shared Secret Key:** From a functional point of view, this option is identical to option 1, except that the UICC saves 128 bits for the storage of a second secret key. On the other hand, the deliberate assignment of the same secret key to two different IMSIs would require particular solutions during secret key generation and pre-personalization. +3. **Shared IMSI & Shared Secret Key:** This case applies if the network operator wants to have one single subscription for a user, independent of the usage of a 2G or 3G ME. Consequently the UICC has to carry the same identification details, i.e. IMSI and secret key, in both SIM and USIM applications. On the network side there is a single entry consisting of one IMSI and one secret key in either a 2G or a 3G HLR/AuC, i.e. IMSI3G = IMSI2G and K = Ki. In a 2G HLR the algorithm has to be a 3G-type in fixed virtual 2G mode (a 3G algorithm does not fit into a 2G HLR and a 2G algorithm does not fit with the USIM application on the UICC) while in a 3G HLR the algorithm is a 3G-type. On the UICC side there is not much choice: The USIM application essentially needs a 3G algorithm while for the SIM application it can only be a 3G-algorithm in (fixed) 2G mode as there is no 2G-type in the network. Again this has the advantage of having only one shared 3G algorithm on the UICC, which from the SIM application is executed in 2G mode. + +The fourth theoretical combination, namely shared IMSI & separate secret keys, is not a valid option as a single IMSI cannot be associated with more than one secret key simultaneously. + +## 7.2 File mapping + +When comparing the file structure of a SIM in TS 11.11 [7] / TS 51.011 [8] with that of a USIM in 3G TS 31.102 [2] it strikes that many not only have the same name and file identifier (although under different DFs) but are entirely equal by size and content parameters. This generally allows for memory efficient implementation of a SIM together with a USIM as these files can be shared by both applications, i.e. necessary storage capacity is only required once. Further, shared files speed up the pre-personalization process as they save valuable programming time. + +Therefore files should be mapped as far as possible, i.e. in all cases where basic properties are equal and identical contents do not conflict with the access by either a 2G or a 3G ME or with intended subscription differences when separate IMSIs are used (cases 1 or 2 in section 7.1). Mapping is not possible, when the content is clearly subscription dependent like in case of IMSI, Kc, KcGPRS or MSISDN in a double subscription UICC. + +Annex C gives an overview on the SIM and USIM files that potentially can be mapped. A case by case decision should be conducted by the network operator / card manufacturer for each UICC implementation. Caution: It should be noted that file identifiers may differ between the SIM and USIM applications, while all other file properties are exactly the same, e.g. for EFEXT4. + +## 7.3 Access conditions + +If a EF or DF is accessible in both 2G and 3G operation modes (e.g. in the MF: EF-PL in the UICC can be identical to EF-ELP in the SIM), then independent 2G and 3G access conditions may be defined for the file. The UICC does not check the consistency of the access conditions in both modes. + +Therefore it is possible that the same EF or DF has different security attributes in 2G and 3G operation mode. It is the responsibility of the network operator and the card manufacturer to ensure at the personalisation stage that the security attributes for 2G and 3G session are the same, if necessary. + +## 7.4 Secret codes + +In 3G mode, 8 Application PINs with global key references are available and the UICC also supports up to 8 Local PINs with specific key references. Local PINs can only be used within an ADF. Further, up to 10 administrative PINs can be defined. A replacement PIN, called Universal PIN, may also exist. + +In 2G mode, only CHV1 and CHV2 are available. They apply to files in DF-GSM and DF-TELECOM. Additionally, up to 11 administrative PINs can be defined. + +Mapping of PINs between 2G and 3G operation modes, so that activation, deactivation or changing of a PIN in one operation mode has the same effect in the other operation mode, follow the following principles: + +### - **Mapping of CHV1** + +CHV1 in the SIM application can be mapped to any USIM application PIN with a global key reference (or to the Universal PIN, if the UICC is multi-verification capable), but to only one at a time. + +When the UICC is single-verification capable, CHV1 can only be mapped to a USIM application PIN. Then, if the USIM application PIN is disabled, the CHV1 is also disabled and vice versa. See also Annex D.1. + +When the UICC is multi-verification capable, different mappings of CHV1 are possible, depending on the standards release to which the UICC is compliant to: + +- **Static mapping:** CHV1 is always mapped to a USIM application PIN. If the USIM application PIN is disabled and replaced by the Universal PIN, then also CHV1 is disabled. Thus when using the USIM, the user will have to verify the Universal PIN. When using the SIM, there will be no verification. Therefore, in this case the SIM and the USIM behave differently regarding the PIN/CHV1 verification from the user's point of view. Static mapping is only possible for R99 and REL-4 UICCs. See also Annex D.2. +- **Dynamic mapping:** CHV1 is mapped to the USIM application PIN but the mapping can change to the Universal PIN. When the USIM application PIN is enabled, then CHV1 is also enabled. If the USIM application PIN is disabled and not replaced, then CHV1 is disabled. If the USIM application PIN is disabled and replaced by the Universal PIN, then CHV1 is mapped to the Universal PIN, i.e. the mapping changes from the application PIN to its replacement. In this case the behaviour of the SIM and the USIM is exactly + +the same regarding the PIN/CHV1 verification from the user's point of view. Dynamic mapping is possible for UICCs of any 3G release. See also Annex D.3. + +### - Mapping of CHV2 + +CHV2 in the SIM application can be mapped to the corresponding local key reference belonging to the USIM application to which the CHV1 is mapped. In the 2G operation mode, this PIN is considered to be global, in the 3G operation mode, it is seen as a being local. If mapped, then, with respect to the requirement in TS 11.11 [7] / TS 51.011 [8] for CHV2, this PIN cannot be disabled in either operation mode. The UICC will return an appropriate error condition in that case. + +### - Mapping of Local PINs + +A SIM does not support Local PINs, hence there is no correspondence in 2G operation mode. Local PINs cannot be mapped. + +### - Mapping of administrative PINs + +The mapping of administrative PINs between the 2G and 3G operation modes is fully under the discretion of each network operator and card manufacturer. + +## 7.5 Activation of 2G and 3G operation modes + +After a cold reset has been performed (i.e. during UICC activation), the ATR sent by the UICC is compliant to 3G TS 31.101 [1]. No particular operation mode is active at this stage. The selection and activation of either 2G operation mode (i.e. the SIM application) or 3G operation mode (i.e. the USIM application), is implicitly done by the ME when sending the first command. The following table describes the different possible cases. + +| UICC / ME Combination | Class Byte of First Command | Resulting UICC Operation Mode | Remark | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| UICC with or without a SIM application

in a 3G or 2G/3G dual mode ME

or in a 2G ME of R99 or Rel-4 with USIM support

or in a 2G ME of Rel-5 | '0X' or '8X' | 3G | The USIM application rejects commands with class byte = 'A0'.

First command right after ATR can be SELECT or STATUS. | +| UICC with a SIM application

in a 2G ME of Rel-4 or earlier without USIM support | 'A0' | 2G | The SIM application rejects commands with class byte = '0X' or '8X'.

First command right after ATR can be SELECT, STATUS or GET RESPONSE. | +| UICC without a SIM application

in a 2G ME of Rel-4 or earlier without USIM support | 'A0' | No operation! | All further commands with class byte = 'A0' will be rejected. | + +A 3G or 2G/3G dual mode ME or a 2G ME of R99 or Rel-4 with USIM support or a 2G ME of Rel-5 will only send commands with class byte = '0X' or '8X'. A 2G ME of Rel-4 (or earlier) without USIM support will only send commands with class byte = 'A0'. The operation mode selection takes place regardless of the result of the command (i.e. if it was successful or not). + +## 7.6 Selection of cyclic files + +As the SIM application and the USIM application are based on individual specifications, a particular difference applies for the selection of cyclic files. + +For the SIM, TS 11.11 [7] / TS 51.011 [8] specifies that "After selection of a cyclic file (for either operation), the record pointer shall address the record updated or increased last.", whereas for the USIM it is required in 3G TS 31.101 [1] that "After a successful selection the record pointer is undefined.". In the latter case, the record pointer is set implicitly by the subsequent access command. + +Therefore, in the case of a selection of cyclic files, the UICC will behave corresponding to its current operation mode, i.e. comply to 2G requirements when the SIM application is active and to 3G requirements when the USIM application is active. + +A 3G ME shall handle this situation accordingly, i.e. depending on whether a SIM or a UICC is inserted. + +## 7.7 Enabling/disabling procedures for dialling numbers + +Enabling/disabling procedures of restricted dialling numbers services (e.g. FDN or BDN) are different between SIM and USIM. In fact, simply mapping the files associated with such services between the SIM and USIM will not ensure consistent behaviour in GSM and 3G modes, and can actually allow the user to bypass the associated security by switching the UICC between a 2G and a 3G terminal. Therefore, if a dialling number file (e.g. EFFDN or EFBDN) is mapped between a SIM and a USIM, the corresponding enabling/disabling procedures should also be linked. + +This means that the enabling/disabling of a restricted dialling numbers service in one mode (SIM or USIM) is reflected in the other mode (respectively USIM or SIM); i.e. any modification of the activation status of such service (e.g. FDN or BDN) for the USIM in EFEST should affect the validation status of the file associated with this service (e.g. EFADN or EFBDN respectively) for the SIM accordingly, and vice-versa. + +The linking mechanism can only apply if the initial conditions are consistent for interworking, i.e. if the associated service (e.g. FDN or BDN) is available in the USIM Service Table (EFUST) and allocated and activated in the SIM Service Table (EFSST). . + +NOTE: If the status of a restricted dialling numbers service is modified Over The Air in the SIM or USIM Service Table (EFSST or EFUST), the linking mechanism may not be able to maintain the synchronization of the service status between SIM and USIM. + +# --- 8 Interworking between USIM applications on a UICC + +If a UICC contains more than one USIM application, these are normally related to separate subscriptions, either from the same or from different network operators. In that case IMSIs and secret keys are different and cannot be shared. The authentication algorithm may be shared if the nature of the subscriptions does not require different algorithms. + +Concerning the mapping of files between multiple USIMs, only the following guidelines can be given: + +- If the UICC is intended to be used by a single user, all user relevant files (that can be updated by the user) could be mapped. The phonebook will preferably be located under DF TELECOM, to enable global access from all applications. In a multi-user model, user relevant files should not be mapped and a specific phonebook will be under each DF USIM. +- All directly subscription relevant files (like Kc or MSISDN) or those needed to differentiate the subscriptions should not be mapped. +- All other files: Mapping depends on conditions of use in a multi-subscription environment. + +If a SIM application is existing in addition to multiple USIM applications, mapping can be done according to section 7 and Annex C with one of the USIM applications. + +As it is not possible to cover all specific situations that might require multiple USIMs on a UICC, such design decisions should be taken on a case by case basis by considering each data field and its possible use. + +# --- 9 SIM and UICC Interworking on the Card/Terminal Interface + +The SIM specification in TS 11.11 [7] / TS 51.011 [8] and the UICC/USIM specification in TS 31.101 [1] contain some different requirements affecting the physical card/terminal interface. + +As the interface behaviour needs to be independent of the applications supported, a UICC holding both a SIM and a USIM application, or a terminal accepting both legacy SIM and UICCs, satisfies all the requirements from all the specifications they are complying with. + +TS 11.11 [7] / TS 51.011 [8] and TS 31.101 [1] contain no contradictory requirements, but the strongest requirements from these two sets of specifications need to apply. + +In particular, such cards and terminals are ready to receive data 12 etus after they begin sending their last outgoing character (to comply with the SIM specification) but do not start transmitting outgoing data less than 16 etus after they begin receiving the last incoming character (to comply with the USIM specification). + +This implies that a 12 etu reception turnaround guardtime is supported at all speeds supported, as indicated by the card in the ATR, + +The highest speed supported is compliant with the requirements of TS 31.101 [1]. + +The ATR of a 31.101 [1] compliant UICC always includes T=15 parameters. This applies for a UICC that only contains a USIM application (TS 31.102 [2]), it applies for a UICC that only contains a SIM application (TS 51.011 [8]) and it also applies for a UICC that contains both a USIM and a SIM application. + +An ATR of a SIM as defined in TS 11.11 [7] may contain these T=15 parameters even though these parameters are not requested by TS 11.11 [7]. + +# --- Annex A: Interworking table + +The following table lists the complete set of interworking scenarios introduced by the two possible types of generation (2G or 3G) with each of the main network elements involved in authentication and key agreement. These are ICC, ME, BSS, VLR/SGSN and HLR/AuC. + +In each case the function of the network elements is commented when the behaviour is particular for the case. No comment means that the behaviour is not special for the purpose of interworking. If a case was identified as not functional, i.e. interworking fails somewhere through the transmission chain, this is indicated by grey background. A more detailed explanation of each case can be found in section 6 of this document. The character in the last column refers to figures 1 to 4 in section 6. + +| I
C
C | M
E | B
S
S | V
L
R | A
U
C | ICC | ME | BSS | VLR/SGSN | HLR/AuC | Sec
urit
y
Con | Fig
ure
1-4 | +|-------------|---------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----|---------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------| +| 2 | 2
5) | 2 | 2 | 2 | | | | | | 2G | O | +| 2 | 2
5) | 2 | 2 | 3 | | | | | 3G HLR/AC generates 2G triplets for 2G IMSI | 2G | O | +| 2 | 2
5) | 2 | 3 | 2 | | | | 3G VLR/SGSN transparent for 2G AKA | | 2G | N | +| 2 | 2
5) | 2 | 3 | 3 | | | | | 3G HLR/AC generates 2G triplets for 2G IMSI | 2G | N | +| 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | | | 3G BSS incompatible with 2G ME and 2G VLR/SGSN | | | | | +| 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | | | 3G BSS incompatible with 2G ME and 2G VLR/SGSN | | | | | +| 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | | | 3G BSS incompatible with 2G ME | | | | | +| 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | | | 3G BSS incompatible with 2G ME | | | | | +| 2 | 3
6) | 2 | 2 | 2 | | 3G ME transparent for 2G AKA 2) | | | | 2G | M | +| 2 | 3
6) | 2 | 2 | 3 | | 3G ME transparent for 2G AKA 2) | | | 3G HLR/AC generates 2G triplets for 2G IMSI | 2G | M | +| 2 | 3
6) | 2 | 3 | 2 | | 3G ME transparent for 2G AKA 2) | | 3G VLR/SGSN transparent for 2G AKA | | 2G | L | +| 2 | 3
6) | 2 | 3 | 3 | | 3G ME transparent for 2G AKA 2) | | 3G VLR/SGSN transparent for 2G AKA | 3G HLR/AC generates 2G triplets for 2G IMSI | 2G | L | +| 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | | | 3G BSS incompatible with 2G VLR/SGSN | | | | | +| 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | | | 3G BSS incompatible with 2G VLR/SGSN | | | | | +| 2 | 3
6) | 3 | 3 | 2 | | 3G ME transparent for 2G AKA, generates CK, | 3G BSS transparent for 2G AKA | 3G VLR/SGSN transparent for 2G AKA, generates CK, | | 2G | K | + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | +|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|----|----| +| 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | | 3G ME transparent for 2G AKA, generates CK, | 3G BSS transparent for 2G AKA | 3G VLR/SGSN transparent for 2G AKA, generates CK, | 3G HLR/AC generates 2G triplets for 2G IMSI | 2G | K | +| 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | | | | | | | D' | +| 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | | | | | 3G HLR/AC generates Kc from CK, IK and RES from XRES | | C' | +| 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | | | | 3G VLR/SGSN transparent for 2G AKA | | | E' | +| 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | | | | 3G VLR/SGSN generates Kc from CK, IK | | | B' | +| 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | | | 3G BSS incompatible with 2G ME | | | | | +| 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | | | 3G BSS incompatible with 2G ME | | | | | +| 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | | | 3G BSS incompatible with 2G ME | | | | | +| 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | | | 3G BSS incompatible with 2G ME | | | | | +| 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2G mode 4) | 3G ME transparent for 2G AKA 2) | | | | 2G | D | +| 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2G mode 4) | 3G ME transparent for 2G AKA 2) | | | 3G HLR/AC generates Kc from CK, IK and RES from XRES | 2G | C | +| 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2G mode 4) | 3G ME transparent for 2G AKA 2) | | 3G VLR/SGSN transparent for 2G AKA | | 2G | E | +| 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3G + Kc mode 2) | 3) | | 3G VLR/SGSN generates Kc from CK, IK | | 3G | B | +| 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | | | 3G BSS incompatible with 2G VLR/SGSN | | | | | +| 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | | | 3G BSS incompatible with 2G VLR/SGSN | | | | | +| 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | | 3G ME with UICC shall not execute 2G AKA when attached to a 3G BSS | | | | | F | + +| | | | | | | | | | | | | +|---------|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|------------------|--|------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|----|---| +| 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | | | | | | 3G | A | +| 3
1) | 2
8) | 2 | 2 | 2 | SIM appl. active | | | | | 2G | I | +| 3
1) | 2
8) | 2 | 2 | 3 | SIM appl. active | | | | 3G HLR/AC generates Kc from CK, IK and RES from XRES | 2G | H | +| 3
1) | 2
8) | 2 | 3 | 2 | SIM appl. active | | | 3G VLR/SGSN transparent for 2G AKA | | 2G | J | +| 3
1) | 2
8) | 2 | 3 | 3 | SIM appl. active | | | 3G VLR/SGSN generates Kc from CK, IK and RES from XRES | | 2G | G | +| 3
1) | 2
8) | 3 | 2 | 2 | | | 3G BSS incompatible with 2G ME and 2G VLR/SGSN | | | | | +| 3
1) | 2
8) | 3 | 2 | 3 | | | 3G BSS incompatible with 2G ME and 2G VLR/SGSN | | | | | +| 3
1) | 2
8) | 3 | 3 | 2 | | | 3G BSS incompatible with 2G ME | | | | | +| 3
1) | 2
8) | 3 | 3 | 3 | | | 3G BSS incompatible with 2G ME | | | | | +| NOTE: | 1) | UICC with SIM application | | | | | | | | | | +| NOTE: | 2) | 2G/3G dual mode ME required, no service otherwise | | | | | | | | | | +| NOTE: | 3) | Support of service n° 27 required in the USIM, no service otherwise | | | | | | | | | | +| NOTE: | 4) | Support of services n° 27 and n° 38 required in the USIM, no service otherwise | | | | | | | | | | +| NOTE: | 5) | 2G ME of Rel-4 (or earlier) or of Rel-5 with (optional) SIM support | | | | | | | | | | +| NOTE: | 6) | 3G ME of Rel-4 (or earlier) or of Rel-5 with (optional) SIM support | | | | | | | | | | +| NOTE: | 7) | 2G ME of R99 or Rel-4 with USIM support or of Rel-5 | | | | | | | | | | +| NOTE: | 8) | 2G ME of Rel-4 (or earlier) without USIM support | | | | | | | | | | + +# --- Annex B: Features for security interworking + +The following sections summarise the features defined to convert security parameters between 2G and 3G or vice versa. For more information see 3G TS 33.102 [6]. + +--- + +## B.1 Conversion functions + +**Conversion function c1** converts a 128 bit 3G random challenge into a 128 bit 2G random challenge. Both values have the same format, i.e. they are equal. + +$$c1: \quad RAND_{2G} = RAND_{3G}$$ + +**Conversion function c2** converts a 3G expected authentication response XRES into a 2G expected authentication response RES (in the AuC or the VLR/SGSN) or a 3G authentication response RES into a 2G authentication response SRES (in the USIM). + +$$\begin{aligned} c2: \quad RES_{2G} &= XRES_{3G, 1} [xor XRES_{3G, 2} [xor XRES_{3G, 3} [xor XRES_{3G, 4}]]] \\ SRES_{2G} &= RES_{3G, 1} [xor RES_{3G, 2} [xor RES_{3G, 3} [xor RES_{3G, 4}]]] \end{aligned}$$ + +where $RES_{3G, i}$ or $XRES_{3G, i}$ are 32 bits long and $(X)RES_{3G} = (X)RES_{3G, 1} [ \parallel (X)RES_{3G, 2} [ \parallel (X)RES_{3G, 3} [ \parallel (X)RES_{3G, 4} ] ] ] ]$ depending on the length of $(X)RES_{3G}$ (a multiple of 32 bit or else be padded with "0"). In the USIM, conversion function c2 must be supported in connection with conversion function c3 and the ability to execute a "reduced" 3G algorithm. This optional service is indicated by service n° 38 in the USIM Service Table. + +**Conversion function c3** converts the 128 bit 3G ciphering and integrity protection keys CK and IK into the 64 bit 2G ciphering key Kc. This function is applied in the AuC or VLR/SGSN and in the USIM. + +$$c3: \quad Kc = CK_1 \text{ xor } CK_2 \text{ xor } IK_1 \text{ xor } IK_2$$ + +where $CK_i$ and $IK_i$ are both 64 bits long and $CK = CK_1 \parallel CK_2$ and $IK = IK_1 \parallel IK_2$ . In the USIM, the optional support of conversion function c3 is indicated by service n° 27 in the USIM Service Table. + +**Conversion function c4** converts a 64 bit 2G Kc into a 128 bit 3G CK. This function is applied in the ME and in the VLR/SGSN. + +$$c4: \quad CK = Kc \parallel Kc$$ + +**Conversion function c5** converts a 64 bit 2G Kc into a 128 bit 3G IK. This function is applied in the ME and in the VLR/SGSN. + +$$c5: \quad IK = (Kc_1 \text{ xor } Kc_2) \parallel Kc \parallel (Kc_1 \text{ xor } Kc_2)$$ + +where $Kc_i$ are both 32 bits long and $Kc = Kc_1 \parallel Kc_2$ . + +--- + +## B.2 3G algorithm execution modes + +The 3G algorithm in the USIM consists of five sub-functions that have to be executed in order to verify the received data and generate the necessary responses. For more information see 3G TS 31.102 [2] and 3G TS 33.102 [6]. + +In **normal 3G mode** the input is given by RAND and AUTN. The USIM computes + +- f5 to get the anonymity key AK. AK is then used to retrieve the sequence number SQN. +- f1 to derive XMAC. XMAC is then used to verify the authenticity of the home environment. +- f2 to calculate the 3G authentication response RES +- f3 to get the 3G ciphering key CK + +- f4 to get the 3G integrity protection key IK + +The USIM returns RES, CK and IK. + +In **3G + Kc mode** the input is also given by RAND and AUTN. The USIM computes the same sequence of functions but in the end applies conversion function c3 to generate a 2G Kc from CK and IK. The USIM returns RES, CK, IK and Kc. Kc is always returned if this mode is active in the USIM. If not needed, the ME may discard the additional Kc. + +In **virtual 2G mode** the input is only given by RAND. The USIM skips functions f5 and f1 and only executes f2, f3 and f4 ("reduced" 3G algorithm). Subsequently it applies conversion function c3 to generate 2G Kc from CK, IK and conversion function c2 to generate 2G SRES from RES. The USIM returns SRES and Kc. The ME can require the USIM to operate in this mode by sending a specific command parameter. If it is not supported by the USIM, an error indication is returned. + +NOTE: The 3G algorithm in 2G mode is virtually (i.e. by input and output) identical to a 2G algorithm. A UICC with USIM and SIM applications may make use of that and implement a 3G algorithm only, which from the SIM application is executed in 2G mode. + +# Annex C: SIM/USIM file mapping table + +The following table lists all SIM and USIM files that can be mapped in a UICC. It should be noted that most files are optional and these files are not necessarily present in the SIM or USIM application. Files not mentioned do not have a corresponding file in both applications. Mapping with multiple USIMs is not considered. + +| SIM Application
DF / EF | USIM Application
DF / EF | Mapping possible | | +|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------| +| | | single
subscription UICC | double
subscription UICC | +| GSM / IMSI | USIM / IMSI | yes | no | +| GSM / HPLMN | USIM / HPLMN | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / ACM | USIM / ACM | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / ACMmax | USIM / ACMmax | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / PUCT | USIM / PUCT | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / GID1 | USIM / GID1 | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / GID2 | USIM / GID2 | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / SPN | USIM / SPN | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / CBMI | USIM / CBMI | yes | | +| GSM / CBMIR | USIM / CBMIR | yes | | +| GSM / CBMID | USIM / CBMID | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / ACC | USIM / ACC | yes | no | +| GSM / FPLMN | USIM / FPLMN | yes, 7) | yes, 1) | +| GSM / LOCI | USIM / LOCI | yes, 8) | no | +| GSM / LOCIGPRS | USIM / PSLOCI | yes, 5) 8) | no | +| GSM / AD | USIM / AD | yes | | +| GSM / eMLPP | USIM / eMLPP | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / AAeM | USIM / AAeM | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / DCK | USIM / DCK | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / CNL | USIM / CNL | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / PLMNwACT | USIM / PLMNwACT | yes | | +| GSM / OPLMNwACT | USIM / OPLMNwACT | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / HPLMNwACT | USIM / HPLMNwACT | yes, 3) | | +| GSM / SUME | TELECOM / SUME | yes | | +| GSM / Kc | USIM / GSM / Kc | yes | no | +| GSM / KcGPRS | USIM / GSM / KcGPRS | yes | no | +| GSM / CPBCCH | USIM / GSM / CPBCCH | yes | | +| GSM / INVSCAN | USIM / GSM / INVSCAN | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / PNN | USIM / PNN | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / OPL | USIM / OPL | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / MBDN | USIM / MBDN | yes | no | +| GSM / EXT6 | USIM / EXT6 | yes | no | +| GSM / MBI | USIM / MBI | yes | no | +| GSM / MWIS | USIM / MWIS | yes | no | +| GSM / CFIS | USIM / CFIS | yes | no | +| GSM / EXT7 | USIM / EXT7 | yes | no | +| GSM / SPDI | USIM / SPDI | yes | yes, 1) | + +| | | | | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|---------| +| TELECOM / SMS | USIM / SMS | yes | | +| TELECOM / SMSP | USIM / SMSP | yes | yes, 1) | +| TELECOM / SMSS | USIM / SMSS | yes | | +| TELECOM / SMSR | USIM / SMSR | yes | | +| TELECOM / SDN | USIM / SDN | yes | yes, 1) | +| TELECOM / FDN | USIM / FDN | yes | | +| TELECOM / BDN | USIM / BDN | yes | | +| TELECOM / CMI | USIM / CMI | yes, 6) | | +| TELECOM / MSISDN | USIM / MSISDN | yes, 4) | no | +| TELECOM / EXT2 | USIM / EXT2 | yes | | +| TELECOM / EXT3 | USIM / EXT3 | yes | yes, 1) | +| TELECOM / EXT4 | USIM / EXT4 | yes, 5) | | +| TELECOM / ADN | ... / PHONEBOOK / ADN | yes, required, 2) | | +| TELECOM / EXT1 | ... / PHONEBOOK / EXT1 | yes, required, 2) | | +| TELECOM / ECCP | ... / PHONEBOOK / CCP1 | yes, required, 2) | | +| GSM / MEXE / all files | USIM / MEXE / all files | yes | yes, 1) | +| GSM / SoLSA / all files | USIM / SoLSA / all files | yes | yes, 1) | +| NOTE 1: No mapping, if subscription specific differences are required | | | | +| NOTE 2: SIM file to be mapped with related USIM file either in DF PHONEBOOK under DF USIM or in DF PHONEBOOK under DF TELECOM | | | | +| NOTE 3: Only if the same settings apply to 2G and 3G operation | | | | +| NOTE 4: No mapping of EF-MSISDN if EF-EXT1 is used in the SIM and / or EF-EXT5 is used in the USIM | | | | +| NOTE 5: Caution: Different file identifiers in SIM and USIM | | | | +| NOTE 6: No mapping if coding "FF" is used in the content | | | | +| NOTE 7: Mapping is possible only if the size of FPLMN is 12 bytes | | | | +| NOTE 8: Mapping recommended to keep LAIs / RAIs in SIM and USIM synchronised in order to avoid potential network malfunction when changing the UICC between 2G and 3G operation. | | | | + +# --- Annex D: CHV mapping + +This annex illustrates the possible CHV mappings for a single-verification capable and a multi-verification capable UICC. In the diagrams D.2 and D.3, the gray box highlights the difference between the two solutions. + +## D.1 In a single-verification capable UICC + +![State transition diagram for a single-verification capable UICC. It shows two states: 'PIN enabled' and 'PIN disabled'. Transitions are labeled with actions like 'Disable CHV1 or disable PIN no replacement' and 'Enable CHV1 or Enable PIN'. ME instructions for 2G and 3G are provided in red text.](1cac1845cf99a3f64ae00cd2bb4f9ed7_img.jpg) + +``` + +stateDiagram-v2 + [*] --> PIN_enabled : PIN enabled + PIN_enabled --> PIN_enabled : disable PIN with replacement NOT possible + PIN_enabled --> PIN_disabled : Disable CHV1 or disable PIN no replacement + PIN_disabled --> PIN_enabled : Enable CHV1 or Enable PIN + + state "PIN enabled" as PIN_enabled + PIN_enabled : 2G ME: enter value of PIN +3G ME: enter value of PIN + + state "PIN disabled" as PIN_disabled + PIN_disabled : 2G ME: enter no PIN +3G ME: enter no PIN + +``` + +PIN: USIM application PIN + +State transition diagram for a single-verification capable UICC. It shows two states: 'PIN enabled' and 'PIN disabled'. Transitions are labeled with actions like 'Disable CHV1 or disable PIN no replacement' and 'Enable CHV1 or Enable PIN'. ME instructions for 2G and 3G are provided in red text. + +## D.2 In a multi-verification capable UICC (static mapping) + +![State transition diagram for a multi-verification capable UICC with static mapping. It shows four states based on PIN and UPIN enabled/disabled status. Transitions include actions like 'Disable CHV1 or disable PIN no replacement', 'Enable CHV1 or Enable PIN', 'Disable UPIN', 'Enable UPIN', and 'disable PIN with replacement'. ME instructions for 2G and 3G are provided in red text.](ac31fdfebb9751f7f10416dfe33bc872_img.jpg) + +``` + +stateDiagram-v2 + [*] --> PIN_disabled_1 : PIN disabled, UPIN disabled UQ=08, CHV1 disabled mapped to UPIN + PIN_disabled_1 --> PIN_disabled_2 : Enable PIN + PIN_disabled_1 --> PIN_enabled_1 : Enable UPIN or enable CHV1 + PIN_disabled_1 --> PIN_disabled_3 : disable UPIN or disable CHV1 + + PIN_disabled_2 --> PIN_disabled_1 : Disable UPIN + PIN_disabled_2 --> PIN_enabled_1 : Enable UPIN + PIN_disabled_2 --> PIN_disabled_3 : disable PIN with replacement + PIN_disabled_2 --> PIN_disabled_2 : disable PIN with replacement NOT possible + + PIN_enabled_1 --> PIN_disabled_1 : Disable CHV1 or disable PIN no replacement + PIN_enabled_1 --> PIN_disabled_2 : Enable CHV1 or Enable PIN + PIN_enabled_1 --> PIN_disabled_3 : Enable UPIN + PIN_enabled_1 --> PIN_disabled_2 : Disable UPIN + + PIN_disabled_3 --> PIN_disabled_1 : Enable PIN + PIN_disabled_3 --> PIN_enabled_1 : Disable CHV1 or disable PIN no replacement + PIN_disabled_3 --> PIN_disabled_2 : Enable CHV1 or Enable PIN + PIN_disabled_3 --> PIN_disabled_3 : disable PIN with replacement + + state "PIN disabled, UPIN disabled UQ=08, CHV1 disabled mapped to UPIN" as PIN_disabled_1 + PIN_disabled_1 : 2G ME: enter no PIN +3G ME: enter no PIN + + state "PIN enabled, UPIN disabled UQ=00 or 08, CHV1 enabled mapped to PIN" as PIN_enabled_1 + PIN_enabled_1 : 2G ME: enter value of PIN +3G ME: enter value of PIN + + state "PIN disabled, UPIN disabled UQ=00, CHV1 disabled mapped to PIN" as PIN_disabled_2 + PIN_disabled_2 : 2G ME: enter no PIN +3G ME: enter no PIN + + state "PIN disabled, UPIN enabled UQ=08, CHV1 enabled mapped to UPIN" as PIN_disabled_3 + PIN_disabled_3 : 2G ME: enter value of UPIN +3G ME: enter value of UPIN + + state "PIN disabled, UPIN enabled UQ=00, CHV1 disabled mapped to PIN" as PIN_disabled_3 + PIN_disabled_3 : 2G ME: enter no PIN +3G ME: enter no PIN + +``` + +PIN: USIM application PIN +UPIN: Universal PIN +UQ: usage qualifier + +State transition diagram for a multi-verification capable UICC with static mapping. It shows four states based on PIN and UPIN enabled/disabled status. Transitions include actions like 'Disable CHV1 or disable PIN no replacement', 'Enable CHV1 or Enable PIN', 'Disable UPIN', 'Enable UPIN', and 'disable PIN with replacement'. ME instructions for 2G and 3G are provided in red text. + +## D.3 In a multi-verification capable UICC (dynamic mapping) + +![State transition diagram for PIN and UPIN management. It shows four states: PIN enabled (UPIN disabled), PIN disabled (UPIN disabled), PIN enabled (UPIN enabled), and PIN disabled (UPIN enabled). Transitions are labeled with actions like 'Enable PIN', 'Disable PIN', 'Enable UPIN', 'Disable UPIN', 'Disable CHV1 or disable PIN no replacement', and 'Enable CHV1 or Enable PIN'. ME instructions for 2G and 3G are provided in blue and red text respectively.](78ff716475b2f65bf01c3a4d02d89fc4_img.jpg) + +``` +stateDiagram-v2 + [*] --> S0 : Enable PIN + S0 --> S0 : disable PIN with replacement NOT possible + S0 --> S1 : Disable CHV1 or disable PIN no replacement + S1 --> S0 : Enable CHV1 or Enable PIN + S0 --> S2 : Enable UPIN + S2 --> S0 : Disable UPIN + S1 --> S3 : Enable UPIN + S3 --> S1 : Disable UPIN + S2 --> S3 : Disable CHV1 or disable PIN no replacement + S3 --> S2 : Enable CHV1 or Enable PIN + S2 --> S0 : Disable UPIN + S0 --> S2 : Enable UPIN + S3 --> S0 : disable PIN with replacement + S0 --> S3 : Enable UPIN or enable CHV1 + S3 --> S0 : disable UPIN or disable CHV1 + + state "PIN enabled
UPIN disabled UQ=00 or 08
CHV1 enabled mapped to PIN
2G ME: enter value of PIN
3G ME: enter value of PIN" as S0 + state "PIN disabled
UPIN disabled UQ=00
CHV1 disabled mapped to PIN
2G ME: enter no PIN
3G ME: enter no PIN" as S1 + state "PIN enabled
UPIN enabled UQ=00 or 08
CHV1 enabled mapped to PIN
2G ME: enter value of PIN
3G ME: enter value of PIN" as S2 + state "PIN disabled
UPIN enabled UQ=08
CHV1 enabled mapped to UPIN
2G ME: enter value of UPIN
3G ME: enter value of UPIN" as S3 +``` + +**State Details:** + +- S0 (PIN enabled, UPIN disabled):** UPIN disabled UQ=00 or 08, CHV1 enabled mapped to PIN. 2G ME: enter value of PIN, 3G ME: enter value of PIN. +- S1 (PIN disabled, UPIN disabled):** UPIN disabled UQ=00, CHV1 disabled mapped to PIN. 2G ME: enter no PIN, 3G ME: enter no PIN. +- S2 (PIN enabled, UPIN enabled):** UPIN enabled UQ=00 or 08, CHV1 enabled mapped to PIN. 2G ME: enter value of PIN, 3G ME: enter value of PIN. +- S3 (PIN disabled, UPIN enabled):** UPIN enabled UQ=08, CHV1 enabled mapped to UPIN. 2G ME: enter value of UPIN, 3G ME: enter value of UPIN. + +**Legend:** + +- PIN: USIM application PIN +- UPIN: Universal PIN +- UQ: usage qualifier + +State transition diagram for PIN and UPIN management. It shows four states: PIN enabled (UPIN disabled), PIN disabled (UPIN disabled), PIN enabled (UPIN enabled), and PIN disabled (UPIN enabled). Transitions are labeled with actions like 'Enable PIN', 'Disable PIN', 'Enable UPIN', 'Disable UPIN', 'Disable CHV1 or disable PIN no replacement', and 'Enable CHV1 or Enable PIN'. ME instructions for 2G and 3G are provided in blue and red text respectively. + +# Annex E: Change history + +| TSG # / Date | TSG Doc. | Doc 2nd level | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | New | +|--------------|-----------|---------------|-----|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| TP-11 | TP-010045 | | - | - | Presented for information to TSG-T #11 | 1.0.0 | +| - | - | | - | - | Version after T3 AdHoc #37 (Joint with SA3), new section 4.4 inserted, section 6.1, case 5 modified | 1.1.0 | +| - | - | | - | - | Version during T3#19. Minor modifications. | 1.1.1 | +| - | - | | - | - | Version after T3#19 plenary presentation. Editorial modifications. | 1.1.2 | +| TP-12 | TP-010113 | | | | Presented to TSG-T #12 for approval | 2.0.0 | +| TP-12 | - | | | | Approved version (includes editorial changes compared to 2.0.0) | 3.0.0 | +| TP-13 | TP-010205 | | 001 | - | Sharing of enabling/disabling procedure between SIM and USIM | 3.1.0 | +| TP-15 | TP-020068 | | 002 | - | Correction to SIM/USIM file mapping table | 5.0.0 | +| | | | 004 | | CHV mapping, Annex D | | +| TP-16 | TP-020119 | | 006 | | Extension of Annex C - SIM/USIM file mapping table | 5.1.0 | +| | | | 007 | | FDN and BDN interworking mechanism between GSM and 3G | | +| | | | 008 | | Health warning concerning possibly different file IDs in SIM and USIM | | +| TP-19 | TP-030030 | | 009 | | Clarifying notes to SIM/USIM File Mapping Table | 5.2.0 | +| TP-21 | TP-030182 | | 010 | | Clarification of SIM/USIM file mapping table | 5.3.0 | +| | | | 011 | | Consequences if USIM services n° 27 and n° 38 are not available. | | +| | | | 012 | | Clarification on the interface protocol when SIM and USIM cohabit on a UICC | | +| TP-22 | TP-030254 | | 013 | | Inclusion of Rel-5 ME requirements for SIM / USIM support | 5.4.0 | +| TP-25 | TP-040188 | | 014 | | Correction of card operation modes | 5.5.0 | +| TP-26 | TP-040266 | | 015 | | Inclusion of additional USIM support for 2G terminals of R99 and Rel-4 | 6.0.0 | +| TP-26 | - | | - | | TSG-T decided to upgrade this spec to Rel-6 and withdraw Rel-5 | 6.0.0 | +| TP-27 | TP-050024 | T3-050168 | 016 | F | Additional USIM Support for 2G Terminals of R99 and Rel-4 | 6.1.0 | +| CT-30 | CP-050501 | C6-050833 | 017 | F | Mapping of EF_LOCI for SIM and USIM application | 7.0.0 | +| CT-31 | CP-060025 | C6-060168 | 022 | D | Removal of 'all-release applicability' statement | 7.1.0 | +| | | C6-060169 | 023 | F | Mapping of EF-LOCIGPRS and EF-PSLOCI between SIM | | +| | | C6-060170 | 024 | B | Handling of ATR information for SIM and UICC | | +| CT-42 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade to Rel-8 + addition of LTE logo | 8.0.0 | +| CT-46 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-9 | 9.0.0 | +| SP-51 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-10 | 10.0.0 | +| SP-57 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-11 | 11.0.0 | +| SP-65 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-12 | 12.0.0 | +| SP-70 | - | - | - | - | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-13 | 13.0.0 | +| SA-75 | | | | | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-14 | 14.0.0 | +| SA-80 | | | | | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-15 | 15.0.0 | +| CT-88e | | | | | Upgrade of the specification to Rel-16 | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31970/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31970/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5b5a7625d0ba89f7c23445bd2f7a1bdcc2d7ace9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/31_series/31970/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,415 @@ + + + + + + +# --- Contents + +| | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 4 | +| 1 Scope..... | 5 | +| 2 References..... | 5 | +| 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations ..... | 5 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 5 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 6 | +| 4 Use cases..... | 6 | +| 5 Power considerations related to the UICC ..... | 7 | +| 5.1 Causes of power consumption related to the UICC ..... | 7 | +| 5.1.1 Introduction ..... | 7 | +| 5.1.2 Presence detection polling..... | 7 | +| 5.1.3 Proactive polling..... | 7 | +| 5.1.4 Power absorbed by the UICC in idle state..... | 8 | +| 5.2 Comparisons..... | 8 | +| 5.2.1 Introduction ..... | 8 | +| 5.2.2 Power required to initialize a UICC ..... | 8 | +| 5.2.3 Comparison..... | 9 | +| 5.2.4 Conclusions ..... | 9 | +| 5.3 Objective ..... | 10 | +| 6 Proposed solution..... | 10 | +| 6.1 UICC suspension..... | 10 | +| 6.1.1 Overview ..... | 10 | +| 6.1.2 New commands ..... | 10 | +| 6.1.2.1 Introduction..... | 10 | +| 6.1.2.2 SUSPEND UICC ..... | 10 | +| 6.1.2.2.1 Functional description..... | 10 | +| 6.1.2.3 RESUME UICC..... | 11 | +| 6.1.2.3.1 Functional description..... | 11 | +| 7 Considerations on proposed solutions..... | 11 | +| 7.1 UICC suspension..... | 11 | +| 7.1.1 Introduction ..... | 11 | +| 7.1.2 Security..... | 11 | +| 7.1.3 Toolkit ..... | 12 | +| 7.1.3.1 Proactive UICC session ..... | 12 | +| 7.1.3.2 BIP session..... | 12 | +| 7.1.3.3 Timers ..... | 12 | +| 7.1.3.4 Other events ..... | 12 | +| 7.1.4 Internal events ..... | 12 | +| 7.1.5 Duration..... | 13 | +| 7.1.6 Impact on ME ..... | 13 | +| 8 Conclusions..... | 13 | +| 8.1 UICC platform..... | 13 | +| 8.2 Impact on 3GPP network access applications..... | 13 | +| Annex A: Change history..... | 13 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document has the objective to describe the power consumption caused by UICC when it is idle and identify the potential solutions to allow the reduction or removal of the UICC power supply in order to save power when the UICC is not required for long periods of time. + +This document identifies conditions which might need to be applied to the UICC platform. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TR 41.001: "GSM Release specifications". +- [3] 3GPP TS 31.101 V13.0.0: "UICC-terminal interface; UICC-terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics". +- [4] 3GPP TS 31.102 V13.1.0: "Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) application". +- [5] 3GPP TS 31.111 V13.1.0: "Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) Application Toolkit (USAT)". +- [6] ETSI TS 102 221 V13.0.0: "Smart Cards; UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics". +- [7] ETSI TS 102 223 V12.3.0: "Smart Cards; Card Application Toolkit". +- [8] 3GPP TS 22.368 V13.1.0: "Service requirements for Machine-Type Communications (MTC); Stage 1" +- [9] 3GPP TR 23.887 V12.0.0: "Study on Machine-Type Communications (MTC) and other mobile data applications communications enhancements" +- [10] 3GPP TS 23.682 V13.4.0: "Architecture enhancements to facilitate communications with packet data networks and applications" + +# --- 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1]. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1], in 3GPP TS 31.102 [4] and the following apply. + +An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1]. + +# --- 4 Use cases + +Use cases are described in Annex A of TS 22.368 [8]. Some examples are copied below: + +## **Extra Low Power Consumption Use Case** + +For high mobility case, tracking MTC devices such as animal tracking MTC devices in natural world with high mobility require extra low power consumption because it is almost impossible to replace the battery or recharge the battery for animal tracking MTC device. Compared to the tracking devices installed in the cars and trucks because cars and trucks could generate electricity by themselves, extra low power consumption for these MTC devices is required. + +For cargo tracking, the cargo with a tracking MTC device could move very fast such as on a train or lorry and could stand still such as in the dock before loading or unloading. It is not desired to either change its battery or replace battery during the transport period, so extra low power consumption MTC devices are also required. + +For prisoner tracking MTC devices are already used by police, prisoners will not cooperate with police and would wish the MTC devices have flat batteries; therefore, extra low power consumption feature is required for these MTC devices. For the tracking MTC devices of elder people who have memory problem, children or pets, even the batteries of these MTC devices could be replaced or charged, however, considering the worst scenario – if they are missing, it requires the MTC devices with extra low power consumption and long working time in order to find them. + +For low mobility case, the gas meter MTC devices must be battery powered. Extra low power consumption for gas MTC devices is much more critical than electricity meters. + +## **Extra Low Power Consumption with Time Controlled MTC Devices Use Case** + +Time Controlled MTC Devices which send or receive data only at certain pre-defined periods may be operated in one or more modes that minimize power consumption. + +An MTC Device may be operated in a mode where it is expected to receive non-periodic messages (e.g. emergency messages or notifications of altered access period as with the MTC Feature Time Controlled outside the time controlled periods. The MTC Device should minimize power consumption while in a mode to support this. + +If the application requires the MTC Device to send or receive data within pre-defined periods and receive non-periodic messages outside these periods, operation at the lowest possible power consumption level to extend battery life should be achieved. + +Such use cases justify the overall system requirement present in TS 22.368 [8]: + +The system shall provide mechanisms to lower power consumption of MTC Devices. + +Some solutions to lower the overall power consumption in such scenarios are already defined within 3GPP, as described in TR 23.887 [9] clause 7. These include: + +- Extended DRX cycle, introduced in Rel-13, as described in TS 23.682 [10] clause 4.5.13. + +# --- 5 Power considerations related to the UICC + +## 5.1 Causes of power consumption related to the UICC + +### 5.1.1 Introduction + +During the power cycle of the ME, there are only some short periods of time during which the UICC is actively used by the terminal and that activity normally occurs in bursts. Examples of this include: + +- The ME reads configuration parameters set by the MNO and stored in the UICC +- The ME performs authentication command +- The ME reads data stored in the UICC by the end user (i.e. phonebook or SMS) +- The ME writes data to the UICC +- Proactive sessions, as defined in TS 31.111 [5] +- Toolkit events, as defined in TS 31.111 [5] + +During the rest of the time, the UICC is not actively used by the terminal. There are three distinct causes of power consumption that are related to the presence of the UICC that contains a USIM when not actively used. + +### 5.1.2 Presence detection polling + +The presence detection mechanism is defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [6] clause 14.5.2 and referenced by 3GPP TS 31.101 [3]: + +If an application present on the UICC has the requirement to ensure that the UICC has not been removed during a card session the following procedure applies. The terminal sends, at frequent intervals, a STATUS command on the UICC-terminal interface. The STATUS command shall be issued within a period of inactivity on the UICC-terminal interface. [...] This procedure shall be used in addition to a mechanical or other device used to detect the removal of a UICC. + +According to TS 31.102 [4] clause 5.1.9, presence detection polling is required by the USIM only in case of a call, including active PDP context, and can be suspended if the ME has not exchanged any data with the network within a 30s period of inactivity on the UICC-ME interface. + +The ME may suspend the UICC presence detection based on STATUS commands in case it has an active PDP context or an active EPS bearer context, but has not exchanged any data with the network within a 30s period of inactivity on the UICC-ME interface, and resume it as soon as data is exchanged with the network, sending immediately a new STATUS command. + +As a consequence of changes agreed in Release 12 as part of the MTCE-UEPCOP-CT Work Item, the presence detection polling is not a concern for devices that are not actively exchanging data with the network. + +### 5.1.3 Proactive polling + +The proactive polling mechanism is defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [6] clause 14.6.2 and referenced by 3GPP TS 31.101 [3]: + +During idle mode the terminal shall send STATUS commands to the UICC at intervals no longer than the interval negotiated with the UICC (see TS 102 223 [7]). During a call the UICC presence detection applies. The default value for the proactive polling is the same as for the presence detection procedure. + +The interval of the proactive polling can be negotiated between UICC and ME: + +- the UICC can completely disable proactive polling using the POLLING OFF proactive command, defined in TS 31.111 [5]; +- the UICC can mandate a longer polling interval using the POLL INTERVAL proactive command, defined in TS 31.111 [5]; +- the ME can request an optimal polling interval using the Poll Interval Negotiation procedure, defined in TS 31.111 [5]. + +In a deployment where power saving is very important, it is reasonable to expect that polling is disabled by the UICC or that at least an optimal polling interval requested by the ME is negotiated. As a consequence, the power consumption related to proactive polling is not a concern for those devices. + +### 5.1.4 Power absorbed by the UICC in idle state + +The UICC consumes power at all times, also when the clock is stopped and the UICC is in idle state. This power consumption is summarized in table 1 for different classes of UICC, based on values indicated in ETSI 102 221 [6]: + +Table 1: power when the clock is stopped + +| Class | Clause | Power consumption | +|-----------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Class "B" | 5.2.1 | When the UICC is in idle state, the current consumption shall not exceed 200 µA at 1 MHz at +25 °C. When the UICC is in clock stop mode and no other interface is active, the current consumption shall not exceed 100 µA at +25 °C. | +| Class "C" | 5.3.1 | When the UICC is in idle state, the current consumption shall not exceed 200 µA at 1 MHz at +25 °C. When the UICC is in clock stop mode and no other interface is active, the current consumption shall not exceed 100 µA at +25 °C. | + +Measurements taken in the field on UICC cards without special applications (for example, payment applications) show a consumption of about 15 µA in clock stop mode. This value is used as reference in the rest of this document. + +In addition to the numbers indicated above, note that the overall power consumption of the ME to provide the necessary current to the UICC is significantly higher, as it needs to keep the voltage regulator active. + +Even if these numbers seem to be low, they become significant over a large period of time, which is a common use case for some devices. + +## 5.2 Comparisons + +### 5.2.1 Introduction + +The objective of this clause is to compare the power consumed by the terminal in two distinct cases: during the initialization of the UICC and an attach procedure to the network, and the while keeping the UICC in idle mode without exchanging any APDU. + +The goal of this comparison is to define the best strategy from a power perspective for a UE that only needs to exchange data with the network rarely. + +For this comparison, it will be assumed a UICC card with only a USIM, as commonly seen in commercial deployments for devices that do not have voice capabilities. + +### 5.2.2 Power required to initialize a UICC + +The amount of time taken by the ME to initialize a UICC and the USIM application in it varies significantly, depending on the number of factors, including: + +- services that are enabled in the USIM application (as the number of EFs that needs to be read is directly related to the initialization time); +- capabilities of the terminal (for example, a device without voice capabilities might not cache the phonebook stored in the UICC) +- speed of the ISO interface +- delay of the UICC to respond back for APDU requests + +An overall initialization time of about 2 seconds can be considered as an average delay for devices that initialize a UICC containing a simple USIM, without many additional services. + +During this delay, the power consumption of the UE is the sum of two components: + +- Power consumption of the USIM +- Power consumption of the ME + +In the absence of specific negotiation with the UICC using the TERMINAL CAPABILITY command, which is the most common case in the market today and most likely scenario for M2M terminals, the USIM has a maximum power consumption of 10 mA, as specified by ETSI TS 102 221 [6]. + +The estimate of the power consumption of the ME is not simple, as it vary greatly and has evolved rapidly in the last years. Anyway, for the purpose of this document, a power consumption of 100 mA will be considered. + +### 5.2.3 Comparison + +The following clause analyzes the power consumption related to the UICC for these two approaches: + +- terminal keeps the UICC powered up in clock stop mode and the UICC consumes 15 $\mu$ A for the entire duration +- UE switches off the UICC and re-activates it only when needed + +The comparison is done for two separate cases, respectively with duration of 1 day and 1 week. + +The additional power consumption of the ME is not considered in table 2, as it would be the same in both cases. + +**Table 2: Comparison of power consumption** + +| | 1 day | | 1 week | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------| +| | UICC powered up in clock stop mode | UICC switched off | UICC powered up in clock stop mode | UICC switched off | +| USIM | 15 $\mu$ A * 24 h =
0.360 mAh | 10 mA * 2 s =
0.005 mAh | 15 $\mu$ A * 168 h =
2.520 mAh | 10 mA * 2 s =
0.005 mAh | +| ME | 0 mAh (see note 1) | 100 mA * 2 s =
0.055 mAh | 0 mAh (see note 1) | 100 mA * 2 s =
0.055 mAh | +| Total | 0.360 mAh | 0.060 mAh | 2.520 mAh | 0.060 mAh | +| NOTE: This value assumes the best case without any leak in the ME to keep the UICC powered up. | | | | | + +In addition to power consumed for the UICC, there is also a difference in the power required for signalling over the network. An accurate estimate of the power required for this is difficult to perform: it varies greatly based on network conditions and delays, and it might also change a lot for each product. Anyway it is reasonable to consider them similar and it should be noted that this contribution to the total power becomes less and less relevant with the increase of the duration. + +### 5.2.4 Conclusions + +From the comparison above, it is evident that there is no incentive from a power perspective to keep the UICC powered up in clock stop mode. + +## 5.3 Objective + +The objective of this document is to define a UICC platform level solution that can be used to reduce the power consumption of the UE when the UICC is not actively used, removing the power component caused by the UICC in idle state. + +The document focuses on M2M use cases. In this context, it is assumed that the UICC has limited functionalities and does not include applications often seen for smartphones (for example, for mobile payments). + +# --- 6 Proposed solution + +## 6.1 UICC suspension + +### 6.1.1 Overview + +3GPP has already agreed text to allow the UE to switch off the UICC card as described in 3GPP TS 31.102 [4] clause 5.1.10 in order to reduce power consumption, as per previous sections. This has two impacts: + +- The ME needs to re-initialize the UICC and the USIM from the beginning when the USIM is required +- The UICC would lose its context, which could potentially have impact on the applications in the UICC + +For these reasons, it is proposed a solution where the UICC can be suspended in a way that allows the ME to remove the power, while still keeping the status of the card. + +It is clear that a solution where the UICC is suspended needs to be specified at platform level, so it is appropriate that such solution is defined by ETSI SCP. + +The following section describes a high-level proposal as discussed in CT6. The final solution might be different from what is described below, as long as it meets the overall requirements discussed in this document. + +### 6.1.2 New commands + +#### 6.1.2.1 Introduction + +The proposal is to introduce two new commands in the UICC platform, as specified below: + +- SUSPEND UICC +- RESUME UICC + +#### 6.1.2.2 SUSPEND UICC + +##### 6.1.2.2.1 Functional description + +This function is used to store the internal status of the UICC so that power supply to the UICC can be switched off. When the UICC receives the command, it stores the complete UICC status to a non-volatile memory. The UICC status includes at least the following items: + +- status of selected NAA on each logical channel +- security conditions for each NAA +- selected EF and record for each logical channel +- status of toolkit applications + +The ME does not issue the command if the UICC suspension mechanism is not indicated as supported by the UICC (for example, by means of a bit in the EFUMPC). + +The UICC generates a Resume information and stores it with the complete status to its non-volatile memory. The method of generation and the length of the Resume information need to be defined. + +The UICC deletes or invalidates the saved status if it receives any APDU after responding to the SUSPEND UICC command. This implies that the UICC may have at most one stored status at any time. + +NOTE: the execution of this command might take a significant amount of time. + +The input parameters of the function include at least the following items: + +- Maximum duration of the suspension proposed by the ME + +The output parameters of the function include at least the following items: + +- Negotiated duration of the suspension decided by the UICC +- Resume information + +#### 6.1.2.3 RESUME UICC + +##### 6.1.2.3.1 Functional description + +This function is used to restore the status of the UICC that was previously stored to non-volatile memory of the UICC. The UICC shall delete the stored UICC status after execution of the command, irrespective of the result. + +The ME does not issue this command if the UICC suspension mechanism is not indicated as supported by the UICC (for example, by means of a bit in the EFUMPC). + +The UICC deletes or invalidates the stored status if a normal initialization is performed by the UICC. For example, the UICC might delete or invalidate the stored status if it receives a TERMINAL PROFILE command or any SELECT by DF name command. The UICC rejects the RESUME UICC command if it does not have a valid status to resume (for example, returning status word '6985'). + +The UICC compares the Resume information passed by the terminal with the key stored in the non-volatile memory. The UICC responds with an error if the Resume information passed by the ME does not match (for example, returning status word '6982'). The UICC restores the previous status and return '9000' if the Resume information passed by the ME is validated. + +NOTE: the execution of this command might take a significant amount of time. + +The input parameters of the function include at least the following items: + +- Resume information + +# --- 7 Considerations on proposed solutions + +## 7.1 UICC suspension + +### 7.1.1 Introduction + +The following clauses describe the considerations related to the UICC suspension proposal. + +### 7.1.2 Security + +The main security objective of the feature is to prevent that a UICC can be suspended, removed from the ME and then resumed in a separate ME, where it can be used bypassing the initialization and, potentially, the PIN verification. The "Resume information" described in the sections above solves the problem, allowing only the ME that has the "Resume information" to be able to issue the RESUME UICC command successfully. + +The alternative where the UICC is powered down and re-initialized when needed by the terminal should be considered less secure, because it is applicable only to the case where PIN is disabled. For this reason, that creates an incentive to keep the PIN disabled in the USIM. + +### 7.1.3 Toolkit + +#### 7.1.3.1 Proactive UICC session + +The proactive UICC session is defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [7] clause 3.1: + +**proactive UICC session:** sequence of related CAT commands and responses which starts with the status response '91XX' (proactive command pending) and ends with a status response of '90 00' (normal ending of command) after Terminal Response + +The suspension of the UICC during a proactive UICC session might potentially lead to problems to the application, especially if there are time-sensitive operations. Moreover, even if the interface between ME and UICC might be idle during a proactive UICC session, it is logically incorrect to assume that entire UICC is idle. + +For this reason, the solution should prevent the suspension of the UICC during a proactive UICC session. + +#### 7.1.3.2 BIP session + +BIP is used to establish a data connection between the UICC and a server on the network, using the connectivity provided by the ME. It is possible that the proactive UICC session is ended during an active BIP session (i.e., while waiting a response from the network). + +In order to avoid any impact on network elements, the SUSPEND mechanism should not be used if any BIP channel is opened. + +NOTE: these considerations do not apply for the OPEN CHANNEL related to UICC Server Mode. + +#### 7.1.3.3 Timers + +The UICC is able to manage timers running physically in the terminal with the proactive command TIMER MANAGEMENT and be informed when the timer expires. Timers are normally used for time-sensitive operations. + +The solution should not have impact on the handling of timers. The solution should: + +- Either prevent the UICC suspension when one or more timers are running, +- or guarantee that UICC is resumed before any timer expires. + +#### 7.1.3.4 Other events + +In the case where the ME needs to send an ENVELOPE command to the UICC when it is suspended, the ME should immediately resume the UICC and then send the ENVELOPE. + +### 7.1.4 Internal events + +It is possible that specific applications (e.g. USIM, ISIM, CAT applications) inside the UICC can not tolerate the suspension of the UICC in a specific state or might need to perform specific operations before the UICC is suspended. For this reason, the solution should have a mechanism to inform the applications in the UICC about the SUSPEND command and allow each interested application to return a temporary error or reject it. A temporary error gives to the ME the indication that SUSPEND can be retried later. A mechanism to avoid a repeated trial and error approach by the ME should be considered (e.g. by allowing the UICC to indicate a period of time after which the ME may retry successfully to issue a SUSPEND command or a mechanism for the UICC to explicitly state it is ready to be suspended). + +### 7.1.5 Duration + +It is considered useful for the UICC to know the estimate of the duration of the suspension. The ME might not be in a position to know it exactly, as this might vary based on external inputs, but the ME is able to provide the maximum duration. + +The UICC should be able to negotiate such duration, proposing a smaller value, if it has the need to be resumed at a specific time to perform time-critical activities (for example, report to a server at a certain time). + +### 7.1.6 Impact on ME + +The ME should not use any of the values contained in the UICC and previous cached (e.g., value of IMSI) until it has successfully resumed the UICC. + +The ME should also maintain the status related to toolkit operations. This includes maintaining the poll interval negotiated with the UICC, the list of events received in the last SET UP EVENT LIST proactive command and the toolkit menu received in the last SET UP MENU proactive command. These should be removed from the ME only in case of failure to resume the UICC successfully. + +# --- 8 Conclusions + +## 8.1 UICC platform + +A solution for the UICC suspension requires support by the UICC platform. For this reason, ETSI SCP should be requested to provide the required commands. + +## 8.2 Impact on 3GPP network access applications + +Based on the solution adopted by ETSI SCP, 3GPP would need to further expand its specifications to incorporate necessary changes to allow a UICC containing 3GPP network access applications (for example, USIM and ISIM) to be suspended. The overall impact will be assessed when the platform-level changes are available. + +# --- Annex A: Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|--------|----------|----|-----|--------------------------------------------|--------|--------| +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | Old | New | +| 2016-03 | CT#71 | | - | - | First publication of the Technical Report. | | 14.0.0 | +| 2018-07 | SA#80 | | | | Automatic upgrade to Rel-15 | 14.0.0 | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | CT#88e | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 15.0.0 | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33106/1c94fd3cebf58af136144f14160d128e_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33106/1c94fd3cebf58af136144f14160d128e_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eb2a9c575b7c744e81fe2eab13d09911ad7c0a15 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33106/1c94fd3cebf58af136144f14160d128e_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:e79014ac206704938d7a8947ae0d5362264706fa67a9d0793e58cf8da7027609 +size 93053 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33106/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33106/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d140f049c13b9df75cfbda557af65e7e38e338cc --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33106/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,743 @@ + + + + + + +# Contents + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| Foreword ..... | 4 | +| Introduction ..... | 4 | +| 1 Scope..... | 5 | +| 2 References..... | 5 | +| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 6 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 6 | +| 3.2 Void..... | 7 | +| 3.3 Abbreviations ..... | 7 | +| 4 Relationship to regional requirements ..... | 8 | +| 5 Requirements ..... | 8 | +| 5.1 Description of requirements ..... | 8 | +| 5.1.1 General technical requirements ..... | 9 | +| 5.1.2 General principles..... | 9 | +| 5.1.3 Applicability to telecommunication services ..... | 10 | +| 5.1.4 Interception within the Home and Visited Networks for roaming scenarios ..... | 10 | +| 5.2 Normal operation..... | 11 | +| 5.2.1 Intercept administration requirements ..... | 11 | +| 5.2.1.1 Activation of LI ..... | 11 | +| 5.2.1.2 Deactivation of LI..... | 11 | +| 5.2.1.3 Security of processes ..... | 12 | +| 5.2.2 Intercept invocation ..... | 12 | +| 5.2.2.0 General..... | 12 | +| 5.2.2.1 Invocation events for lawful interception ..... | 12 | +| 5.2.2.2 Invocation and removal of interception regarding services..... | 12 | +| 5.2.2.3 Correlation of information and product ..... | 13 | +| 5.2.2.4 Timing..... | 13 | +| 5.3 Exceptional procedures ..... | 13 | +| 5.4 Interworking considerations..... | 13 | +| 5.5 Charging aspects ..... | 14 | +| 5.6 Minimum service requirements..... | 14 | +| 5.7 LI Requirements for encrypted services..... | 14 | +| 5.8 Lawful Interception for Customized Alerting Tone (CAT) ..... | 15 | +| 5.9 Lawful Interception for Customized Ringing Signal (CRS)..... | 15 | +| 5.10 Lawful Interception for Home Node B and Home enhanced Node B (H(e)NB)..... | 16 | +| 5.11 Location information..... | 17 | +| 5.11.1 General ..... | 17 | +| 5.11.2 Location Services ..... | 17 | +| 5.12 LI requirements for IMS VoIP Service ..... | 18 | +| 5.13 Delivery requirements for messaging ..... | 18 | +| 5.14 LI requirements for management of IMS supplementary services settings ..... | 18 | +| 5.15 LI requirements for IMS Video Service..... | 18 | +| 5.16 LI requirements for IMS based Push-to-Talk ..... | 18 | +| 6 Handover interface requirements..... | 19 | +| Annex A (informative): Bibliography ..... | 20 | +| Annex B (normative): Lawful access usage of Location Services (LCS)..... | 20 | +| Annex C (informative): Change history..... | 22 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- Introduction + +This Technical Specification was produced by the 3GPP TSG SA to allow for the standardisation in the area of Lawful Interception (LI) of telecommunications. This document describes in general the requirements for lawful interception for legacy 2G, 3G and 4G systems, implemented using Rel-14 and earlier specifications. + +Laws of individual nations and regional institutions (e.g. European Union), and sometimes licensing and operating conditions define a need to intercept telecommunications traffic and related information in modern telecommunications systems. It has to be noted that lawful interception shall always be done in accordance with the applicable national or regional laws and technical regulations. + +This specification is replaced by TS 33.126 [28] from Rel-15 onwards and should only be used as a historical reference to pre Rel-15 LI requirements. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document contains historical Stage 1 lawful interception requirements within a 3GPP network for Rel-14 and earlier. + +This specification is replaced by TS 33.126 [28] from Rel-15 onwards and should only be used as a historical reference to pre Rel-15 LI requirements. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] - [3] Void. +- [4] ETSI ES 201 671(V3.1.1 May 2007): "Handover Interface for the lawful interception of telecommunications traffic". +- [5] - [7] Void. +- [8] ANSI J-STD-025-A: (April 2003): "Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance". +- [9] 3GPP TS 33.107: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Lawful interception architecture and functions". +- [10] 3GPP TS 33.108: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Handover interface for Lawful Interception". +- [11] 3GPP TS 22.220: "Service Requirements for Home NodeBs and Home eNodeBs". +- [12] 3GPP TS 22.182: "Customized Alerting Tones (CAT) Requirements; Stage 1". +- [13] 3GPP TR 23.872: "Study on Architecture of IP Multimedia subsystem (IMS) based Customized Alerting Tone (CAT)". +- [14] 3GPP TS 24.182: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Customized Alerting Tones (CAT); Protocol Specification". +- [15] 3GPP TR 29.882: "Customized Alerting Tone (CAT) in 3G CS Domain". +- [16] 3GPP TS 22.183: "Customized Ringing Signal (CRS) Requirements; Stage 1". +- [17] 3GPP TS 24.183: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) customized Ringing Signal (CRS); Protocol Specification". +- [18] ETSI TS 101 671 (V3.11.1 November 2012): "Lawful Interception (LI) Handover Interface for the lawful interception of telecommunications traffic". +- [19] 3GPP TR 21.905: " 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [20] ETSI TS 102 232-7 (V3.1.1 June 2012): " Service-specific details for Mobile Services" +- [21] 3GPP TS 23.040: "Technical realization of the Short Message Service (SMS)". + +- [22] OMA OMA-AD-MMS-V1\_3-20110913-A:"Multimedia Messaging Service Architecture". +- [23] 3GPP TS 22.071: "Location Services (LCS); Service description; Stage 1". +- [24] 3GPP TS 23.271: "Functional stage 2 description of Location Services (LCS)". +- [25] 3GPP TS 22.173: "IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem (IMS) Multimedia Telephony Service and supplementary services; Stage 1". +- [26] 3GPP TS 22.179: "Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) over LTE; Stage 1". +- [27] OMA - OMA-TS-PoC\_System\_Description-V2\_1-20110802-A: "OMA PoC System Description" +- [28] 3GPP TS 33.126: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Lawful Interception Requirements". + +# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +This specification has been replaced by TS 33.126 [28] from Rel-15 onwards and should only be used as a historical reference to pre Rel-15 LI requirements. + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [19] and the following terms apply. + +**Content of Communication:** information exchanged between two or more users of a telecommunications service, excluding intercept related information. This includes information which may, as part of some telecommunications service, be stored by one user for subsequent retrieval by another. + +**Customized Alerting Tone:** An indication that is customized by the called party or the calling subscriber that is played to the calling party during call establishment or during an established call session indicating that the called party is being alerted, the progress of a communication request, or any alerting event during a call session. A Customized Alerting Tone may be a piece of recorded or composed music, greeting words, voice, advertisement or video. + +**Customized Ringing Signal:** An indication to the called party as an incoming communication indication during the establishment of a communication that is customized by the calling party or the called party. A Customized Ringing Signal (CRS) may e.g. be a picture, a piece of recorded or composed music, greeting words, voice, advertisement or video. + +**Intercept Related Information:** information or data associated with telecommunication services involving the target identity, specifically communication associated information or data (e.g. unsuccessful communication attempts), service associated information or data, and location information. + +**Interception Area:** is a subset of the Public Lands Mobile Network (PLMN) service area comprised of a set of cells which define a geographical zone. + +**Location Dependent Interception:** is interception within a PLMN service area that is restricted to one or several Interception Areas (IA). + +**Lawful Access Location Services:** action (based on the law), performed by a network operator/access provider/service provider, of making available Location Services (LCS) and providing that information to a law enforcement monitoring facility. Depending of legislation this can be part of interception or an additional action. + +**Lawful Interception (LI):** the action (based on the law) for specific target identity(s), by a network operator/access provider/service provider, of accessing and delivering in real-time certain current information to a Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF). This information includes Intercept Related Information (IRI) and Content of Communications (CC). + +**LCS (Location Services):** LCS is a service concept in system (e.g. GSM, UMTS, UTRAN or EUTRAN) standardization. LCS specifies all the necessary network elements and entities, their functionalities, interfaces, as well as communication messages, due to implement the positioning functionality in a cellular network. Note that LCS does + +not specify any location based (value added) services except locating of emergency calls and Lawful Access Services. + +**LCS Client:** Software and/or hardware entity that interacts with a LCS Server for the purpose of obtaining location information for one or more Mobile Stations. LCS Clients subscribe to LCS in order to obtain location information. LCS Clients may or may not interact with human users. The LCS Client is responsible for formatting and presenting data and managing the user interface (dialogue). + +**LI-LCS Client:** describes the instance used by PLMN to provide LEA access to LCS services. + +**Location Dependent Interception:** is interception within a PLMN service area that is restricted to one or several Interception Areas (IA). + +**Location Information:** information relating to the geographic, physical or logical location of a target identity. + +**Push-to-Talk:** provides direct one-to-one and one-to-many voice communication service with speaker floor control based on half-duplex VoIP technology in the cellular network. + +**Subject Based Interception:** Interception that is invoked using a specific Target Identity + +**Target Identity:** A technical identity that uniquely identifies a target of interception. One target may have one or several identities. + +## 3.2 Void + +## 3.3 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [19] and the following apply: + +| | | +|--------|-------------------------------------| +| CAT | Customized Alerting Tone | +| CC | Content of Communication | +| CRS | Customized Ringing Signal | +| CS | Circuit Switched | +| CSG | Closed Subscriber Group | +| CSP | Communications Service Provider | +| HeNB | Home eNodeB | +| H(e)NB | HNB and HeNB | +| HNB | Home NodeB | +| IA | Interception Area | +| IP | Internet Protocol | +| IRI | Intercept Related Information | +| LALS | Lawful Access Location Services | +| LDI | Location Dependent Interception | +| LEA | Law Enforcement Agency | +| LEMF | Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility | +| LI | Lawful Interception | +| MMS | Multimedia Messaging Services | +| MS | Mobile Station | +| PS | Packet Switched | +| PTT | Push to Talk | +| QoS | Quality of Service | +| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol | +| UTC | Coordinated Universal Time | +| WLAN | Wireless Local Area Network | + +# --- 4 Relationship to regional requirements + +Interception requirements are subject to national law and international treaties and should be interpreted in accordance with applicable national policies. + +Requirements universally called out in regional interception regulatory requirements are supported by the system defined in this document. Requirements unique to a specific region are not addressed (some examples are given in + +Section 2 as references). + +The intercept system defined here provides subject based interception. Other techniques are outside the scope of this specification. + +This specification is replaced by TS 33.126 [28] from Rel-15 onwards and should only be used as a historical reference to pre Rel-15 LI requirements. + +# 5 Requirements + +## 5.1 Description of requirements + +The present subclause gives the general description of historical lawful interception requirements for Rel-14 and earlier 3GPP networks. + +### 5.1.1 General technical requirements + +Figure 1 shows the general system for interception. Technical interception is implemented within a 3GPP network by special functionality on network elements shown in the figure. Specific lawful interception architecture and functions are found in TS 33.107 [9]. + +![Figure 1: General model for interception. The diagram shows the interaction between a Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) and a 3GPP Network. The LEA contains a LEMF (Law Enforcement Monitoring Function). The 3GPP Network contains an Administration Function, a Delivery Function, 3GPP Network Nodes, and User Equipment (represented by a car, laptop, and mobile phone). The LEMF sends an INTERCEPT REQUEST to the Administration Function. The Administration Function sends an INTERCEPT REQUEST to the 3GPP Network Nodes. The 3GPP Network Nodes send IRI (Intercept Related Information) and CC (Content of Communications) to the Delivery Function. The Delivery Function sends IRI and CC to the LEMF. The LEMF and the 3GPP Network are separated by a TECHNICAL INTERCEPTION HANDOVER INTERFACE.](1c94fd3cebf58af136144f14160d128e_img.jpg) + +``` +graph LR + subgraph LEA + LEMF[LEMF] + end + subgraph 3GPP_Network [3GPP Network] + Admin[Administration Function] + Delivery[Delivery Function] + Nodes[3GPP Network Nodes] + UE[User Equipment] + Admin -- "INTERCEPT REQUEST" --> Nodes + Nodes -- "IRI" --> Delivery + Nodes -- "CC" --> Delivery + Delivery -- "IRI" --> LEMF + Delivery -- "CC" --> LEMF + end + LEMF -- "INTERCEPT REQUEST" --> Admin + LEA & 3GPP_Network --- Interface[TECHNICAL INTERCEPTION HANDOVER INTERFACE] +``` + +Figure 1: General model for interception. The diagram shows the interaction between a Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) and a 3GPP Network. The LEA contains a LEMF (Law Enforcement Monitoring Function). The 3GPP Network contains an Administration Function, a Delivery Function, 3GPP Network Nodes, and User Equipment (represented by a car, laptop, and mobile phone). The LEMF sends an INTERCEPT REQUEST to the Administration Function. The Administration Function sends an INTERCEPT REQUEST to the 3GPP Network Nodes. The 3GPP Network Nodes send IRI (Intercept Related Information) and CC (Content of Communications) to the Delivery Function. The Delivery Function sends IRI and CC to the LEMF. The LEMF and the 3GPP Network are separated by a TECHNICAL INTERCEPTION HANDOVER INTERFACE. + +Figure 1: General model for interception + +### 5.1.2 General principles + +A 3GPP network shall provide access to the intercepted Content of Communications (CC) and the Intercept Related Information (IRI) of the mobile target and services related to the target (e.g. Call Forwarding) on behalf of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). + +A target of a given 3GPP network can be a user subscribed to and operating in that 3GPP network, a user equipment operating in that 3GPP network (which is either the HPLMN or a VPLMN), or a user roaming from another 3GPP network or from any other network capable of using that 3GPP network. The intercepted CC and the IRI can only be delivered for activities on that given 3GPP network. + +Interception may be performed in the network access (all or selected APNs) and/or by intercepting a specific service at the application layer (e.g. VoIP). When interception is done on a per-service basis, only the IRI and CC defined for that service shall be delivered to the LEA, if authorized. To the extent that this is feasible, the intercept shall not include separated services not authorized by the warrant and provided by the same CSP. National regulations will define the service to be intercepted. + +For interception, there needs to be a means of identifying the target, correspondent and initiator and related parties of any targeted communication. A means shall exist for the operator to intercept communications based on long term or permanent identifiers associated with a target service or equipment, as identified by the LEA. To achieve interception, the operator may need to translate these into further associated identifiers, in order to identify the data to be intercepted. Target identities used for interception for each domain and service are target service and equipment associated with target use or any derived IDs from such elements that are to be defined in TS 33.107 [9] and TS 33.108 [10]. Examples of these identities are IMSI, MSISDN, NAI, Tel URI, SIP URI, for the target service and IMEI, MAC for the equipment. + +NOTE 1: Identifiers available in 3GPP networks may have different levels of authenticity. For LI purposes, no additional authentication procedures for target identities are required. + +In many cases, national regulation will require that LI activity is performed entirely within a particular legal jurisdiction, in line with the requirements in 5.1.2 and 5.1.4. + +It is not permitted for a CSP to rely on another CSP or jurisdiction to ensure LI activity can occur. For example, a serving network shall not share LI target identities with a home network in the case of roaming or vice versa (as described in clause 5.1.4). + +NOTE 2: LEAs will continue to specify the target of interception using long-term identifiers, such as IMEI or IMSI, even if the network uses other derived or temporary identifiers to identify the correct traffic due to the concealment of long-term identifiers for privacy reasons. + +When encryption is provided and managed by the network, it shall be a national option as to whether the network provides the intercepted communication to the LEA decrypted, or encrypted with keys and additional information to make decryption possible. End-to-end encryption implemented in the user equipment based on encryption features provided by the operator is considered to be a network-managed encryption and is subject to the same requirements. See subclause 5.7 for additional requirements. + +Encryption not provided or managed by the network, e.g. user provided end-to-end encryption, cannot be removed by the network. In the case that the Communication Service Provider (CSP) provides encryption keys to the subscriber or customer but does not provide the encryption itself, the CSP shall provide the keys to the LEA if required by national regulations. + +When compression is provided and managed by the network, it shall be a national option as to whether the network provides the intercepted communication to the LEA decompressed, or compressed with information to make decompression possible. + +When encoding is provided and managed by the network, it shall be a national option as to whether the network provides the intercepted communication to the LEA decoded, or encoded with capability (e.g., codec information) to make decoding possible. + +Location Dependent Interception, (LDI) allows a 3GPP network to service multiple interception jurisdictions within its service area. Multiple law enforcement agencies with their own interception areas can be served by the 3GPP network. All the information or rules given for interception within a 3GPP network apply to interception within an Interception Area (IA) when LDI is invoked. A target may be marked in one or more different IAs within the same 3GPP network. Interception is neither required nor prohibited by this standard when LDI is active and the location of the target is unknown or unavailable. + +National regulations may require that an operator is able to intercept any communication passing through its network based on any visible identity not connected to the operator network. It shall be based on a match between this target identity and identity type (e.g. IMPU) with the detected party fields. This identity is referred as a Non-Local Identity. + +### 5.1.3 Applicability to telecommunication services + +The requirement for lawful interception is that all telecommunications services in the 3GPP network standards should be capable of meeting the requirements within this document. + +It is a national option that LI, as delivered to the LEMF, may be restricted to specific target subscribed services offered by the CSP or third party providers with a service level agreement with the CSP. + +### 5.1.4 Interception within the Home and Visited Networks for roaming scenarios + +The requirements in this clause are additional to the requirements described elsewhere in this specification which apply to the home network in a roaming scenario. + +National regulations cover the definition of services and the definition of service provider categories which are subject to LI obligations. This can include how and which IMS services are considered to be covered. For the purpose of roaming, IMS VoIP Service or other 3GPP operator services (CS voice replacement) shall be considered equivalent to a CS voice service and therefore all requirements applicable to legacy CS voice (e.g. interception of voice in isolation from other services) shall be applicable to IMS VoIP Service or other equivalent services. + +It shall be possible to intercept all basic voice, data and messaging services provided to a target by a network. The visited network shall be able to support the interception of all services without home network assistance or visibility, using the identifiers provided by an LEA as described in section 5.1.2. However, the visited network is not required to be able to intercept supplementary services (e.g. voicemail, home network based call forwarding) or 3rd party services not directly provided by the visited network. However, national regulation may specify minimum LI capabilities, if such services are in the visited network then they shall be considered in scope for interception (subject to an applicable lawful authorisation). National regulations may require interception to take place in the home network for outbound roamers, where the user session is routed via the home network. There is no requirement to force traffic to the home network for this purpose. + +National regulations may limit delivery of communications (CC and communications-associated IRI) of an outbound international roaming target by the HPLMN based on roaming specific interception constraints (e.g., roaming outside national border). To support these scenarios, it is a national option for the HPLMN to be able to support a mechanism to apply on a per-warrant/per-intercept to limit the delivery of the communications (CC and communications-associated IRI) to LE of an outbound international roaming target based on roaming specific interception constraints (e.g., roaming outside a national border). The default setting is determined based on a national option. Communications originated by the roaming target are subject to this mechanism. Communications incoming to the target that are answered by the target are subject to this mechanism. Communications incoming to the target that are not answered by the target (e.g., due to call forwarding) are not subject to this mechanism. Non-communications-associated IRI (e.g., serving system event) are not affected by this requirement. + +All these requirements are based on conditions and definitions contained in national regulations. + +**NOTE:** The requirement of interception by serving network of non 3GPP access and associated services are not covered by the present document. + +## 5.2 Normal operation + +This section gives the expected operation for lawful interception. + +### 5.2.1 Intercept administration requirements + +As depicted in Figure 1, the Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) provides the intercept request (e.g., lawful authorization or warrant) to the CSP. The intercept request identifies, at a minimum, the target, the type of intercept (i.e., IRI-only, or IRI and CC); the service to be intercepted (e.g. 3G PS network access(es) and/ or the services (e.g. VoIP)) that is authorized, the authorized period for interception, and the LEA delivery address(es) for the intercepted information + +**NOTE:** In some situations IRI may contain CC-information. In case of a IRI only intercept the IRI delivery may take place without the CC-information. +In other situations the CC-delivery may provide metadata not sent in the IRI. In case of a IRI only intercept the CC-delivery may take place without the actual content. +It is upon national regulations to implement any of these options. + +The CSP shall securely administer the intercept (e.g., to activate, deactivate, show, or list targets) within the 3GPP network as quickly as possible. The CSP's administration function shall use appropriate authentication and audit procedures. When LDI is used, the administration function shall allow specific IAs to be associated with targets. + +#### 5.2.1.1 Activation of LI + +For the specified target and based on the warrant, the 3GPP network shall activate the delivery of either IRI, or both the IRI and the CC to the designated LEA destination addresses. + +#### 5.2.1.2 Deactivation of LI + +As a result of deactivation, the 3GPP network shall stop all, or a part of, interception activities for the specified target. + +#### 5.2.1.3 Security of processes + +The intercept function shall only be accessible by authorised personnel. + +Only authorised personnel can be aware that an intercept function has been activated on a target. No indication shall be given to any person except authorised personnel that the intercept function has been activated on a target. To be effective, interception must take place without the knowledge of any party to the communication. + +Authentication, encryption, log files and other mechanisms may be used to maintain security in the system. + +CSPs shall ensure that its equipment, facilities, or services that provide a subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications are capable of facilitating authorized communications interceptions and access to intercept related information unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with any subscriber's telecommunications service and in a manner that protects: + +- the privacy and security of communications (both signalling and content of communication) not authorized to be intercepted; and +- information regarding the LEA's interception of communications. + +Audit procedures, performed by the CSP, should have access to accurate logs of administration commands and accesses to functions and interception information. Log files shall only be accessible by authorised personnel. + +National regulation may require methods to reduce overloading of the LEMF or LI equipment (e.g. ICEs). + +### 5.2.2 Intercept invocation + +#### 5.2.2.0 General + +The 3GPP network shall provide the means to allow correlation of different phases (e.g. changes in domains or radio access) of a target's intercepted communication. + +#### 5.2.2.1 Invocation events for lawful interception + +In general, Lawful interception should be invoked when the transmission of information or an event takes place that involves the target. Examples of when Lawful interception could be invoked are when: + +- A voice call request is originated from, terminated to, or redirected by the target; +- Location information related to the target facility is modified by the subscriber attaching or detaching from the network, or if there is a change in location; +- An SMS transfer is requested - either originated from or terminated to the target; +- An MMS transfer is requested - either originated from or terminated to the target; +- A data packet is transmitted to or from a target; +- A Conference Call is targeted; +- Modification and management of the target's IMS supplementary service settings (e.g., multimedia telephony supplementary service settings as defined in TS 22.173 [25]). + +#### 5.2.2.2 Invocation and removal of interception regarding services + +The invocation of lawful interception shall not alter the operation of a target's services or provide indication to any party involved in a target's communication or to any others (e.g., non-authorized personnel). Lawful interception shall not alter the services available for the subscribers. + +If lawful interception is activated during a CS service, the currently active CS service is not required to be intercepted. If lawful interception is deactivated during a CS service, all ongoing intercepted activities may continue until they are completed. + +If lawful interception is activated when a packet switched (PS) service is already in use, the next packets transmitted shall be intercepted. If lawful interception is deactivated during a PS service, the next packets shall not be transmitted to the LEMF. + +If lawful interception is activated during an IMS session (including IMS VoIP), the currently active IMS session is required to be intercepted. However, reporting of call information (e.g., identities of parties) by the CSP depends on its availability. If lawful interception is deactivated during an IMS session, interception should be ceased expeditiously. + +#### 5.2.2.3 Correlation of information and product + +When only IRI is delivered, an unambiguous correlation shall be established between associated IRI within the single domain for the same communication or session (for example, different legs in CS). + +When both IRI and CC are delivered, an unambiguous correlation shall be established between associated IRI, IRI and CC, and associated CC within the single domain (for example different legs in CS or different packets in PS). + +Correlation shall be provided to the target's intercepted communications that undergo access technology change or a domain change with Service Continuity. + +#### 5.2.2.4 Timing + +The IRI and CC shall be delivered in as near real time as possible. + +NOTE: There may be regional or national requirements on the timing requirements for delivery of IRI and CC. This includes the requirement for the CSP to timestamp IRI and CC delivery with a time zone indication (e.g., UTC offset) as part of the timestamp. + +## 5.3 Exceptional procedures + +A failure with the establishment of the connection towards the LEMF shall not result in any interruption of the target's on-going telecommunications service. + +It is a national option to have buffering of IRI and/or CC to cope with interruptions in the connection to the LEMF. + +## 5.4 Interworking considerations + +The 3GPP network, home or visited, shall not be responsible to interpret the protocol used by the target, or to remove user level compression or encryption if these were not provided by the 3GPP network. + +If the target accesses the 3GPP network via another access network the 3GPP network shall provide the LEA with the identity of the access network (as known by the 3GPP operator). When the target's communications or signalling information is no longer available to the 3GPP network due to redirection or handover to another network operator, it is a national option that the 3GPP network shall provide, when available, the LEA with the identity of the network operator that has access to the target's communications or signalling information. + +National regulations may require the home network to report: + +- subscriber profile change events such as change of identifiers associated with a target (i.e. HLR/HSS target identity change); +- location related events related to the target in the visited network: + - register location / registration/access control to a new serving network even if such information is coming from a non 3GPP network; or from the previous serving network, happening after the provisioning of the + +target by the CSP with the received warrant; + +- cancel or purge location; +- location information request or query from other 3GPP networks. + +NOTE: Some other national regulations may prohibit the interception when the target is physically outside the jurisdiction of the warrant. + +## 5.5 Charging aspects + +The 3GPP network shall be capable of producing charging data related to interception, including the following mechanisms: + +- Use of network resources; +- Activation and deactivation of the target; +- Every intercept invocation; +- Flat rate charging. + +It shall be possible to produce this data in such a way that access by non-authorised personnel or the target is precluded. + +## 5.6 Minimum service requirements + +Quality of service (QoS), capacity, and, integrity of the delivered IRI and CC are the subject of bilateral agreement between the relevant authorities and the CSP. Security is an attribute of the negotiated delivery mechanism between the CSP and the LEA. The QoS towards the delivery function provided by the network must be at a minimum, the same QoS as what the network provides to the target. + +The LI service's need to provide high availability and high reliability of the near-real-time transport mechanism of the LI data from the CSP to LEMF is subject to bilateral agreement between the relevant authorities and the CSP. + +## 5.7 LI Requirements for encrypted services + +Clause 5.1.2 provides a general description of requirements relating to network applied encryption. The additional requirements in this section do not apply where encryption is provided by the network between any network nodes or user equipment (e.g., hop by hop IMS signaling security or End to Access Edge radio bearer encryption), where this encryption does not affect the ability of the core network to perform interception according to the requirements provided by this specification. In addition to the general requirements, the following additional LI requirements shall apply to network provided and/or network administered end to end or end to middle encryption, where this encryption prevents en-clair capture of communications required to be intercepted. + +1. When an encryption service is provided by the PLMN, lawful interception shall take place as for an unencrypted communications. + - a. In addition, encrypted communications shall be decrypted, or the decryption keys and any required associated information (see Note 0) shall be provided to the LEMF; + - b. For the specific case where a key server based solution is used, it is a national option for the operator to make keys and any associated information (see Note 0) directly available to the LEMF to support the decryption of communications. + +NOTE 0: Examples of associated encryption information: encryption algorithm, key length, block cipher mode of operation, initialization vector, salt, crypto parameters, padding or roll over counters. + +2. Interception shall be performed in such a manner as to avoid detectability by the Target or others. In particular: + - a. There shall be no significant difference in latency during call setup or during communications compared to a non-intercepted communications; + - b. Interception of a Target shall not prevent the use of key exchange applications which provide a user key confirmation mechanism; + +NOTE 1: Key confirmation mechanisms such as an authentication string to be exchanged verbally are commonly used to provide additional assurance of authentication. + +- c. Should interception fail during a call (or during call setup), the call shall be unaffected. +3. Where the CSP provides decryption of the communication, it is the operator's choice where in the network this decryption is performed. However, following decryption, all IRI and CC shall be provided to the LEMF using handover mechanisms as per an unencrypted communication. +4. An encryption solution shall not prohibit commencement of Interception and decryption of an existing communication. +5. If key material and any associated information are available, it shall be possible to retrospectively decrypt encrypted communications. + +NOTE 2: If the associated IRI and CC have been delivered to the LEMF, the operator is not required to retain key material or any target related communications after the end of a communication unless national regulations require otherwise. + +For requirements in the present clause and clause 5.1.2, the CSP is not obligated to comply with the requirements for any encryption which a Target may use which is outside the control of the CSP (e.g. 3rd party end to end VOIP software). + +## 5.8 Lawful Interception for Customized Alerting Tone (CAT) + +CAT is a service defined in TS 22.182 [12], TR 23.872 [13], TS 24.182 [14], and TR 29.882 [15]. The target may participate in the service as either the calling or the called party. The CSP providing the CAT service, and doing the interception, should report the following: + +- When the target activates, modifies (e.g., changes to content, content descriptors, and timing descriptors), and deactivates CAT settings; +- When the target invokes the function of copying of another subscriber's CAT; +- When the target invokes the up loading or down loading CAT and is not part of CAT delivery to the calling party, the CAT should be delivered to the LEMF; +- The identity whose CAT is played to the target. + +Additionally, when the target is a User, the CSP providing the CAT service, and doing the interception, should report the following: + +- The CAT sent to the calling party; +- When another subscriber copies the target's CAT; +- When available, the access method (e.g., via UE or web) the target used to activate, modify, and deactivate their CAT settings. + +Intercepted CAT may, depending on national regulations, be: + +- "played" as part of the CC, during a call set up or; +- Delivered as a file in the IRI Record. + +NOTE: Depending on national regulations, intercepted CAT media may be considered content or a signalling. + +## 5.9 Lawful Interception for Customized Ringing Signal (CRS) + +CRS is a service defined in TS 22.183 [16] and TS 24.183 [17]. The target may participate in the service as either the calling or the called party. The CSP providing the CRS service, and doing the interception, should report the following: + +- The CRS, when invoked by the target, is sent to the called party; +- When the target activates, modifies (e.g., changes to content, content descriptors, and timing descriptors), and deactivates their CRS settings; + +- When the target invokes the function of copying another subscriber's CRS; +- When the target invokes the up loading or down loading CRS, and is not part of CRS delivery to the called party the CRS should be delivered; + +The identity whose CRS is played to the target. + +Additionally, for when the target is a User, the CSP providing the CRS service, and doing the interception, should report the following: + +- When another subscriber copies the target's CRS; +- When available, the access method (e.g., via UE or web) the target used to activate, modify, and deactivate their CRS settings. + +Intercepted CRS may, depending on national regulations, be: + +- "played" as part of the CC, during a call set up or; +- Delivered as a file in the IRI Record. + +NOTE: Depending on national regulations, intercepted CRS media may be considered content or a signalling. + +## 5.10 Lawful Interception for Home Node B and Home enhanced Node B (H(e)NB) + +HNB and HeNB are jointly referred to as H(e)NB, as defined in TS 22.220 [11]. The location of the H(e)NB is the location information used by the operator to verify the location for H(e)NB activation. + +For the purpose of LI, a target may be a user or user equipment attached to a H(e)NB, a Closed Subscriber Group (CSG), or it is a national option to allow targeting a H(e)NB itself. + +The LI requirements for H(e)NB local routing, selected IP traffic offload (SIPTO) or local IP access (LIPA) are FFS. + +Interception should be done in such a manner to avoid detectability by the target or others. + +When a target receives service from the PLMN via a H(e)NB, the following applies: + +- the interception capabilities shall take place as for normal PLMN use; +- H(e)NB information (e.g., location and identification) shall also be provided to the LEMF; +- If available, the location reported for the target attached to a H(e)NB is the H(e)NB's location; +- Target attachment to the H(e)NB and handovers to/from the H(e)NB shall be reported to the LEMF; +- There may be national requirements to identify specific information that is required to be reported. + +When the target is the CSG, the CSP shall report the following: + +- modifications (e.g., additions, deletions, changes in time limits for temporary CSG Members) of the CSG list for the H(e)NB; +- When available, the access method (e.g. via UE or web) the H(e)NB Hosting Party used to modify the CSG list, if multiple access methods are allowed; +- CSG member's handovers to/from the H(e)NB; +- CSG members attachments to the H(e)NB; +- CSG members communications via the H(e)NB; +- It is a national option whether interception on CSG members' communications continues after handover occurs from the H(e)NB. + +NOTE 1: The requirements for the CSG are not covered by the present document. + +When the target is the H(e)NB, then the CSP shall report the following: + +- activation and deactivation of the targeted H(e)NB; +- IP address information regarding the secure tunnel endpoints between the H(e)NB and the Femto Security Gateway in the home network; +- modifications (e.g., additions, deletions, changes in time limits for temporary CSG Members) of the CSG list for the H(e)NB; +- When available, the access method (e.g. via UE or web) the target used for the modification of the CSG list, if multiple access methods are allowed; +- handovers to/from the H(e)NB; +- UE registrations on the H(e)NB; +- communications via the H(e)NB; +- It is a national option whether interception on H(e)NB communications continues after handover occurs from the H(e)NB. + +NOTE 2: The requirements for the CSG are not covered by the present document. + +## 5.11 Location information + +### 5.11.1 General + +Depending on national requirements, the CSP may be required to report the location of the Target at the beginning and end of CS calls and PS and IMS sessions on a per warrant or per intercept basis. It may also be a national requirement for the CSP to report the location of the Target : + +- during on-going communications; +- for any mobility management event detected in the 3GPP core network which includes a target's location change or update. + +NOTE 1: Currently, in some cases, the location of the Target might not be available. + +The location information associated with target communication reported to the LEMF shall be at least location information trusted by the 3GPP network (i.e. the location information is either 3GPP network derived or verified). + +National regulation may require that the location information source be provided if known by the CSP. + +The 3GPP access network derived or verified location information shall be the location(s) of the access point(s) to which the Target is connected in the access network(s). The location shall be the access network identifier like the radio cell identity. + +For non 3GPP access networks, the location information shall be at least the identity of entry point into the 3GPP core network (e.g. fire wall or security gateway). The location information of the non-3GPP access network shall be provided if this information is available to the CSP. + +National regulation may require that third party provided location information associated with target communication, that may be available in the 3GPP network, is reported to the LEMF. + +If required by national regulation the geographic location and/or civic address information shall be reported to the LEMF. This can include additional radio coverage information. + +### 5.11.2 Location Services + +In addition to the 3GPP network derived or verified location information as described in 5.11.1. target location information from Location Services (LCS, as described in 3GPP TS 22.071 [23] and 3GPP TS 23.271 [24]) may be used additionally to provide location information to the LEMF if available. Additional requirements applicable are in Annex B. + +## 5.12 LI requirements for IMS VoIP Service + +The 3GPP network shall be able to support the delivery of IMS VoIP, and the IMS VoIP supplementary services (e.g., call forwarding), to the LEMF via one of the following two methods: + +- Intercepted IMS VoIP communications (e.g. IRI or IRI/CC) are delivered separately from other IMS services; +- Intercepted IMS VoIP communications are delivered as part of all other services. + +It is a national option as to which of the two options is applicable. + +If a 3GPP network operator voice service replaces a legacy CS voice service, or is equivalent to a CS voice service, then it shall be considered to be a CS voice service for LI purposes. This also applies to new 3GPP networks without legacy CS voice service. + +Subsequently, (at least) the following voice service LI capabilities shall be ensured in IMS VoIP; as they are in CS: + +- Location information shall be able to be reported to the LEMF; +- If for a given implementation, the IRI related to the CC is not delivered in near real time (within the time delay allowance defined by national regulation), then the media related information (e.g. SDP) shall be delivered along with the CC to allow the CC content to be decoded or interpreted, without needing to wait for the IRI; +- If available, activation or modifications of IMS supplementary services shall be reported to LEMF (if authorized). + +NOTE 1: Void. + +NOTE 2: Void. + +## 5.13 Delivery requirements for messaging + +The 3GPP network shall be able to support the separate delivery of intercept information (IRI or IRI/CC) for messaging services, to the LEMF from other targeted services. This requirement is applicable for the following messaging services: + +- SMS (3GPP TS 23.040 [21]); and +- MMS ([22]). + +Message service delivery is independent from network access technology. + +## 5.14 LI requirements for management of IMS supplementary services settings + +The IMS network and related service platforms shall be able to support the reporting of IRI for the modification and management of the target's IMS supplementary services settings. + +## 5.15 LI requirements for IMS Video Service + +In case of IMS video service, all clause 5.12 requirements shall apply. + +## 5.16 LI requirements for IMS based Push-to-Talk + +The 3GPP network shall be able to support interception of IMS based Push-to-Talk (PTT). + +- Services as defined in TS 22.179 [26] or OMA PoC System Description [27] and shall support Location reporting of the target; +- Intercepted IMS PTT communications (e.g. IRI or IRI/CC) shall be able to be delivered separately from other IMS services; +- Intercepted IMS PTT communications media types such as PTT Speech, PTT Audio (e.g. music), Video and + +Discrete Media (e.g. still image, formatted and non-formatted text, file) shall be able to be delivered as separated services. + +The requirements for Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) service as defined in TS 22.179 [26] and the OMA PoC System Description [27], may also form the basis for a non-mission critical Push To Talk (PTT) service; those capabilities in either standard can be used as a basis for the service definitions. If the CSP offers both MCPTT and non-mission critical PTT services, the service shall be able to separate the interception based on the type of service offering. + +# --- 6 Handover interface requirements + +This specification is replaced by TS 33.126 [28] from Rel-15 onwards and should only be used as a historical reference to pre Rel-15 LI requirements. + +Handover interface requirements are defined in TS 33.108 [10]. There may be national or regional specifications (e.g. see ETSI ES 201 671 [4] , ETSI TS 101 671 [18], ETSI TS 102 232-7 [20] and J-STD-025-A [8]. + +# --- Annex A (informative): Bibliography + +The documents listed below are not explicitly cited in this specification but are provided for background and for historical information. + +3GPP TR 41.033: "Lawful Interception requirements for GSM". + +3GPP TS 42.033: "Lawful Interception - stage 1". + +3GPP TS 43.033: "Lawful Interception; stage 2". + +European Union Council Resolution on the Lawful Interception of Telecommunications (17 January 1995). + +ETSI TS 101 331: "Lawful Interception (LI); Requirements of Law Enforcement Agencies". + +ETSI ES 201 158: "Lawful Interception; Requirements for network functions". + +# --- Annex B (normative): Lawful access usage of Location Services (LCS) + +This specification is replaced by TS 33.126 [28] from Rel-15 onwards and should only be used as a historical reference to pre Rel-15 LI requirements. + +Additional Location information can be reported for various instances; the use of services; the use of network and or radio resources, the loss of a service; requested commercial LCS queries by the user, associates, or other application; and or from network and radio functions providing varying degrees of granularity and accuracy. + +Location Service may provide a higher degree of location granularity and accuracy than the existing network based Lawful Interception location capabilities described in clause 5.11.1. + +National regulation may impose the following requirements defined in TS 22.071 [23] apply to LCS when invoked as part of LALS (Lawful Access Location Services): + +- Any UE (including inbound roamers) served by the PLMN and supported by the serving PLMN LCS (including coverage) shall be targetable by LALS; +- If the location positioning for the target UE has failed, the LCS server shall report the reason for failure, if known; +- For LALS Target UEs may be positioned under all circumstances required by national regulatory requirements; +- The target UE user shall not be notified of any LALS location attempt; +- LALS location information provided should be the most recent if requested and available; +- The invocation, use and collection of LALS location should not cause target User service interruptions except for LCS priority described in clauses 4.5 and 7.3 of TS 22.071 [23]. In the case of LCS priority, national regulations may override the definitions in TS 22.071 [23]; +- Support for LALS Location shall apply for both active and idle UEs; +- LCS shall support LALS requests for the current (updated), or the last known position of an UE; +- The network should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate evolving LCS enabling mechanisms and LALS service requirements; +- Only authorized LALS network functions, resources and LI-LCS Clients shall provide LALS information; +- LALS shall support location of UEs in either circuit switched and packet switched domains. + +NOTE: For the purposes of this specification, the portion of LALS dealing with positioning of a target can be considered equivalent to lawful intercept use of LCS described in TS 22.071 [23]. Other aspects such as delivering a target's position to a LEA are beyond the scope of TS 22.071 [23]. + +National regulations may impose the following requirements in addition to those defined in TS 22.071 [23] to apply to LCS when invoked as part of LALS: + +- No LCS subscription is required for any UE within the PLMN for providing LALS location; +- The LALS positioning information shall be provided to the collection functions in a secure and reliable manner, such that the location information is neither lost, corrupted, nor made available to any unauthorized third party; +- The LI-LCS Client shall support periodic target UE location reporting to the LEA; +- LALS shall support different location update periods per target for multiple LEAs; +- LALS shall support identifying a target UE using any one of the following: + - MSISDN + - Tel URI/SIP URI + - IMPI / IMPU + - IMSI + - IMEI +- Providing LALS location of an UE attached to a 3GPP network, using an IMEI identifier is required by some national regulations. In such case, IMEI may be mapped dynamically by a suitable identity such as IMSI or MSISDN (but is beyond the scope of this standard). Target identities which may be provided by the LI-LCS client to the LCS server are specified by TS 22.071 [23] and TS 23.271 [24]; +- LALS shall re-use LCS supported positioning technologies defined in 3GPP, including positioning technology specific limitations, policies, procedures and operations. The specific positioning technology selected and deployed to support LCS and LALS will vary from operator to operator and even PLMN to PLMN; +- National Regulation may require LALS provide higher accuracy and security than Commercial LCS Services; +- LALS shall support multiple requests and obtain the location of the same target UE at the same time from different LEAs. + +NOTE 1: The Location Services load which may include LALS for specific target UE(s) (e.g. multiple requests, multiple periodic updates, short period updates) may impact network and UE performance (e.g. UE battery performance) and may require establishing operator imposed limits to LALS Location Services requests. + +NOTE 2: Void. + +# --- Annex C (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | +|-----------------------|----------------|-----------|----------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TSG SA# | Version | CR | Tdoc SA | New Version | Subject/Comment | +| SA#04 | 1.0.0 | | | 3.0.0 | Approved at SA#4 and placed under TSG SA Change Control | +| SA#06 | 3.0.0 | 0001 | | 3.1.0 | | +| SP-11 | 3.1.0 | 0002 | SP-010135 | 4.0.0 | Update of TS 33.106 for Release 4 | +| SP-11 | 3.1.0 | 0003 | SP-010136 | 5.0.0 | Release 5 updates | +| SP-17 | 5.0.0 | 0004 | SP-020510 | 5.1.0 | Changes to 33.106 to clarify interception capabilities | +| SP-22 | 5.1.0 | 0006 | SP-030589 | 6.0.0 | Correction to lawful interception references (Rel-6) | +| SP-24 | 6.0.0 | 0007 | SP-040396 | 6.1.0 | Clarification on delivery of IRI and CC | +| SP-29 | 6.1.0 | 0008 | SP-050569 | 7.0.0 | Correlation for IMS interception | +| | 7.0.0 | | | 7.0.1 | 2006-01: Editorial to show correct version on cover | +| SP-38 | 7.0.1 | 0009 | SP-070788 | 8.0.0 | Clarification of requirements | +| SP-39 | 8.0.0 | 0010 | SP-080171 | 8.1.0 | Alignment of CC encryption statement in ETSI TS 101 671 | +| 2009-12 | 8.1.0 | - | | 9.0.0 | Update to Rel-9 version (MCC) | +| SP-48 | 9.0.0 | 0011 | SP-100253 | 10.0.0 | Encryption Requirements | +| SP-48 | 9.0.0 | 0012 | SP-100253 | 10.0.0 | CAT LI Support | +| SP-48 | 9.0.0 | 0013 | SP-100253 | 10.0.0 | CRS LI Support | +| SP-48 | 9.0.0 | 0014 | SP-100440 | 10.0.0 | H(e)NB LI Support | +| SP-52 | 10.0.0 | 0016 | SP-110425 | 11.0.0 | Update | +| SP-53 | 11.0.0 | 0017 | SP-110511 | 11.1.0 | Requirement for Specific Service Delivery | +| SP-53 | 11.0.0 | 0018 | SP-110511 | 11.1.0 | IMS VoIP LI Requirement and Correlation for domain and radio access changes for Service Continuity | +| -- | 11.1.0 | -- | -- | 11.1.1 | Editorial corrections | +| SP-59 | 11.1.1 | 0019 | SP-130034 | 12.0.0 | Adding ETSI TS102 232 reference | +| SP-61 | 12.0.0 | 0129 | SP-130401 | 12.1.0 | Adding version to non 3GPP references | +| SP-62 | 12.1.0 | 0130 | SP-130661 | 12.2.0 | Stage 1 enhancements for IMEI targeted LI capabilities | +| | | 0131 | | | Addition of Separate Delivery of Messaging | +| SP-63 | 12.2.0 | 0132 | SP-140020 | 12.3.0 | Civic Address usages as a new location information | +| SP-65 | 12.3.0 | 0133 | SP-140586 | 12.4.0 | Encryption clarification | +| | | 0134 | | | Location requirements | +| | | 0135 | | | Clarifying Service requirement and editorial alignment of term | +| SP-66 | 12.4.0 | 0136 | SP-140821 | 12.5.0 | Adding the interception feature of any modification of target's supplementary services management of 3GPP services | +| SP-68 | 12.5.0 | 0139 | SP-150296 | 12.6.0 | Correction to voice and roaming requirement | +| | 12.6.0 | 0140 | SP-150296 | 13.0.0 | Correction to voice and roaming requirement | +| | | 0141 | SP-150298 | | Activation and Deactivation of LI for IMS Services | +| | | 0142 | SP-150298 | | High Availability and Reliability of the LI Data Delivery Transport Mechanism | +| SP-69 | 13.0.0 | 0143 | SP-150470 | 13.1.0 | Removing examples of IWLan as this is no longer accurate | +| | | 0144 | | | Interception of messages to and from HSS/HLR/AAA during interworking or any activities related to the target from any access network | +| | | 0145 | | | Location information and interception of message between two nodes that contain the target's id | +| SP-70 | 13.1.0 | 0147 | SP-150835 | 13.2.0 | Addition of Location Service | + +| | | | | | | +|-------|--------|------|-----------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| SP-71 | 13.2.0 | 0150 | SP-160050 | 13.3.0 | Scope Purpose Improvements | +| SP-71 | 13.2.0 | 0151 | SP-160050 | 13.3.0 | Text changes required to provide distinction between traditional location in LI and LCS services | +| SP-71 | 13.2.0 | 0152 | SP-160050 | 13.3.0 | Text changes to address Note 7, 8 in Annex B | +| SP-71 | 13.2.0 | 0153 | SP-160050 | 13.3.0 | Text changes to address Note 4 provided in SP-150835 | +| SP-71 | 13.2.0 | 0154 | SP-160050 | 13.3.0 | Legal Interception of non local identity | +| SP-71 | 13.2.0 | 0157 | SP-160050 | 13.3.0 | Authenticity of identifiers | +| SP-71 | 13.2.0 | 0158 | SP-160050 | 13.3.0 | Clarification of "Lawful Interception" | + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160384 | 0159 | 2 | C | Cleanup and reorganization of Appendix B (LCS requirements) | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160384 | 0160 | 3 | B | Requirement to Toggle Interception for an outbound international roaming Target by the HPLMN | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160384 | 0161 | - | C | Stage 1: Clarification on the stage 1 requirement on security of process | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160384 | 0162 | 2 | F | Per Service Interception Clarification | 13.4.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA#75 | SP-170037 | 0163 | 1 | B | National requirements related to SDP info in HI3 | 14.0.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA#75 | SP-170037 | 0164 | - | C | Reconfirming LI requirements | 14.0.0 | +| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170342 | 0165 | 1 | C | Separation of Services | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170342 | 0166 | 1 | B | Push to Talk over Cellular Service | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-12 | SA#78 | SP-170843 | 0167 | 1 | F | Administrative changes | 15.0.0 | +| 2018-06 | SA#80 | SP-180290 | 0189 | 2 | C | Final Update | 15.1.0 | +| 2020-07 | SA#88-e | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Upgraded to Rel-16 as it was frozen | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33107/00504fc688ebcf131ccbeff94dfc9939_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33107/00504fc688ebcf131ccbeff94dfc9939_img.jpg new file mode 100644 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Scope..... | 18 | +| 2 References..... | 18 | +| 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations..... | 21 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 21 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations..... | 22 | +| 4 Functional architecture..... | 24 | +| 5 Activation, deactivation and interrogation..... | 32 | +| 5.0 General..... | 32 | +| 5.1 Activation..... | 34 | +| 5.1.0 General..... | 34 | +| 5.1.1 X1_1-interface..... | 34 | +| 5.1.2 X1_2-interface (IRI)..... | 35 | +| 5.1.3 X1_3-interface (CC)..... | 36 | +| 5.2 Deactivation..... | 37 | +| 5.2.0 General..... | 37 | +| 5.2.1 X1_1-interface..... | 37 | +| 5.2.2 X1_2-interface (IRI)..... | 38 | +| 5.2.3 X1_3-interface (CC)..... | 38 | +| 5.3 Interrogation..... | 39 | +| 5.3.0 General..... | 39 | +| 5.3.1 Interrogation of the 3G ICEs..... | 39 | +| 5.3.2 Interrogation of Delivery Functions..... | 39 | +| 5A X Interfaces..... | 40 | +| 5A.1 General..... | 40 | +| 5A.2 X1..... | 40 | +| 5A.2.1 General..... | 40 | +| 5A.2.2 X1 Detail..... | 40 | +| 5A.3 X2..... | 41 | +| 5A.3.1 General..... | 41 | +| 5A.4 X3..... | 41 | +| 5A.4.1 General..... | 41 | +| 6 Invocation of Lawful Interception (LI) for Circuit Switched (CS) services..... | 41 | +| 6.0 General..... | 41 | +| 6.1 Provision of Intercept CC - Circuit Switched..... | 43 | +| 6.2 Provision of CC - Short Message Service..... | 44 | +| 6.3 Provision of Intercept Related Information..... | 44 | +| 6.3.0 General..... | 44 | +| 6.3.1 X2-interface..... | 45 | +| 6.3.2 Structure of the events..... | 45 | +| 6.3.3 Call Related events..... | 48 | +| 6.3.3.1 Call establishment..... | 48 | +| 6.3.3.2 Answer..... | 48 | +| 6.3.3.3 Supplementary Services..... | 49 | +| 6.3.3.4 Handover..... | 49 | +| 6.3.3.5 Release..... | 49 | +| 6.3.4 Non Call Related events..... | 50 | +| 6.3.4.1 SMS..... | 50 | +| 6.3.4.2 Location update..... | 50 | +| 6.3.4.3 Subscriber Controlled Input (SCI)..... | 50 | +| 6.3.5 HLR Related events..... | 50 | +| 6.3.5.1 Serving system..... | 50 | + +| | | | +|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| 6.3.5.2 | HLR subscriber record change..... | 51 | +| 6.3.5.3 | Cancel location..... | 51 | +| 6.3.5.4 | Register location..... | 51 | +| 6.4 | Intercept cases for circuit switched supplementary services..... | 53 | +| 6.4.1 | Interception of Multiparty call..... | 53 | +| 6.4.2 | Interception for Call Forwarding / Call Deflection / ECT..... | 53 | +| 7 | Invocation of Lawful Interception for GSN Packet Data services..... | 54 | +| 7.0 | General..... | 54 | +| 7.1 | Provision of Intercept Product - Short Message Service..... | 55 | +| 7.2 | Provision of Intercepted Content of Communications - Packet data GSN services..... | 56 | +| 7.2.0 | General..... | 56 | +| 7.2.1 | X3-interface..... | 56 | +| 7.3 | Provision of Intercept Related Information..... | 57 | +| 7.3.0 | General..... | 57 | +| 7.3.1 | X2-interface..... | 58 | +| 7.3.2 | Structure of the events..... | 58 | +| 7.4 | Packet Data related events..... | 61 | +| 7.4.1 | Mobile Station Attach..... | 61 | +| 7.4.2 | Mobile Station Detach..... | 62 | +| 7.4.3 | Packet Data PDP context activation..... | 62 | +| 7.4.4 | Start of interception with PDP context active..... | 63 | +| 7.4.5 | Packet Data PDP context deactivation..... | 63 | +| 7.4.6 | RA update..... | 64 | +| 7.4.7 | SMS..... | 64 | +| 7.4.8 | Packet Data PDP context modification..... | 64 | +| 7.4.9 | Serving System..... | 65 | +| 7.4.10 | Start of interception with mobile station attached..... | 65 | +| 7.4.11 | Packet Data Header Information..... | 65 | +| 7.4.11.0 | Introduction..... | 65 | +| 7.4.11.1 | Packet Data Header Report..... | 65 | +| 7.4.11.2 | Packet Data Summary Report..... | 66 | +| 7.4.12 | HLR subscriber record change..... | 67 | +| 7.4.13 | Cancel location..... | 68 | +| 7.4.14 | Register location..... | 68 | +| 7.4.15 | Location information request..... | 68 | +| 7.4.16 | Void..... | 68 | +| 7.5 | Void..... | 68 | +| 7.6 | Interception of the Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS)..... | 69 | +| 7A | Invocation of Lawful Interception for Packet Data Multi-media Service..... | 69 | +| 7A.1 | Provision of content of communications..... | 69 | +| 7A.1.A | Decryption for IMS Media Plane Security..... | 69 | +| 7A.2 | Provision of IRI..... | 70 | +| 7A.2.1 | Provision of IRI with SIP messaging..... | 70 | +| 7A.2.2 | Provision of IRI with XCAP messages..... | 70 | +| 7A.2.3 | Provision of IRI with Diameter or MAP messages related to HSS..... | 71 | +| 7A.2.3.0 | General..... | 71 | +| 7A.2.3.1 | Serving system..... | 72 | +| 7A.2.3.2 | Subscriber record change..... | 73 | +| 7A.2.3.3 | Registration Termination..... | 74 | +| 7A.2.4 | Provision of IRI for WebRTC..... | 75 | +| 7A.3 | Multi-media events..... | 75 | +| 7A.3.0 | General..... | 75 | +| 7A.3.1 | Mid IMS Session Interception..... | 77 | +| 7A.3.1.0 | General..... | 77 | +| 7A.3.1.1 | SDES Media Security..... | 78 | +| 7A.4 | Multi-media Call State Control Service Scenarios..... | 78 | +| 7A.5 | Push to talk over Cellular (PoC)..... | 78 | +| 7A.6 | SMS over IMS..... | 78 | +| 7A.7 | LI for KMS based IMS Media Security..... | 78 | +| 7A.7.1 | LI Architecture and functions..... | 78 | + +| | | | +|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 7A.7.2 | Signalling over the Xk interfaces and LI events..... | 79 | +| 7A.7.3 | Cooperating KMSs..... | 80 | +| 7A.7.4 | Security..... | 80 | +| 7A.7.5 | Start of interception for an already established IMS media secured session..... | 80 | +| 7A.8 | IMS IMEI Interception..... | 81 | +| 7A.9 | Void..... | 81 | +| 8 | Security..... | 82 | +| 8.0 | General..... | 82 | +| 8.1 | Administration security..... | 82 | +| 8.2 | IRI security..... | 82 | +| 8.2.1 | Normal operation..... | 82 | +| 8.2.2 | Communication failure..... | 82 | +| 8.3 | CC security..... | 83 | +| 8.4 | Security aspects of Lawful Interception (LI) billing..... | 83 | +| 8.5 | Other security issues..... | 83 | +| 8.5.1 | Log files..... | 83 | +| 8.5.2 | Data consistency..... | 83 | +| 9 | Invocation of Lawful Interception (LI) for 3GPP WLAN interworking services..... | 83 | +| 9.0 | General..... | 83 | +| 9.1 | Provision of Intercept Product - Short Message Service..... | 84 | +| 9.2 | Provision of Intercepted Content of Communications - 3GPP WLAN Interworking services..... | 84 | +| 9.2.0 | General..... | 84 | +| 9.2.1 | X3-interface..... | 85 | +| 9.3 | Provision of Intercept Related Information..... | 85 | +| 9.3.0 | General..... | 85 | +| 9.3.1 | X2-interface..... | 86 | +| 9.3.2 | 3GPP WLAN Interworking LI Events and Event Information..... | 86 | +| 9.4 | Structure of I-WLAN Events..... | 91 | +| 9.4.1 | I-WLAN Access Initiation..... | 91 | +| 9.4.2 | WLAN Access Termination..... | 92 | +| 9.4.3 | I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment..... | 92 | +| 9.4.4 | I-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect..... | 93 | +| 9.4.5 | Start of Intercept with I-WLAN Communication Active..... | 94 | +| 9.4.6 | Packet Data Header Information..... | 95 | +| 9.4.6.0 | Introduction..... | 95 | +| 9.4.6.1 | Packet Data Header Report..... | 95 | +| 9.4.6.2 | Packet Data Summary Report..... | 96 | +| 10 | Interception of Multimedia Broadcast/MultiCast Service (MBMS)..... | 98 | +| 10.0 | General..... | 98 | +| 10.1 | Provision of Content of Communications..... | 98 | +| 10.2 | Provision of Intercept Related Information..... | 98 | +| 10.2.0 | General..... | 98 | +| 10.2.1 | X2-interface..... | 99 | +| 10.2.2 | MBMS LI Events and Event Information..... | 99 | +| 10.3 | Structure of MBMS Events..... | 101 | +| 10.3.1 | Service Joining..... | 101 | +| 10.3.2 | Service Leaving..... | 101 | +| 10.3.3 | Start of Interception with Service Active..... | 102 | +| 10.3.4 | Subscription Activation..... | 102 | +| 10.3.5 | Subscription Modification..... | 102 | +| 10.3.6 | Subscription Termination..... | 103 | +| 11 | IMS Conference Services..... | 103 | +| 11.1 | Background for IMS Conference Services..... | 103 | +| 11.1A | Start of Interception for IMS Conference Services..... | 104 | +| 11.2 | Provision of Intercepted Content of Communication - IMS Conference Services..... | 104 | +| 11.2.0 | General..... | 104 | +| 11.2.1 | X3-interface..... | 105 | +| 11.3 | Provision of Intercept Related Information for IMS Conference Service..... | 105 | +| 11.3.0 | General..... | 105 | + +| | | | +|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 11.3.1 | X2-interface..... | 106 | +| 11.3.2 | IMS Conference Events and Event Information..... | 106 | +| 11.3.3 | Structure of Conference Events..... | 109 | +| 11.3.3.1 | Start of Conference..... | 109 | +| 11.3.3.2 | Party Join..... | 109 | +| 11.3.3.3 | Party Leave..... | 110 | +| 11.3.3.3A | Conference Bearer Modification..... | 110 | +| 11.3.3.4 | Start of Intercept on an Active Conference..... | 111 | +| 11.3.3.5 | Conference End..... | 111 | +| 11.3.3.6 | Creation of Conference..... | 112 | +| 11.3.3.7 | Update of Conference..... | 112 | +| 12 | Lawful Interception for Evolved Packet System..... | 113 | +| 12.1 | LI functional architecture for EPS..... | 113 | +| 12.2 | Functional requirements for LI in case of E-UTRAN access and GTP based S5/S8..... | 116 | +| 12.2.0 | General..... | 116 | +| 12.2.1 | Provision of Intercept Related Information..... | 117 | +| 12.2.1.0 | General..... | 117 | +| 12.2.1.1 | X2-interface..... | 117 | +| 12.2.1.2 | Structure of the events..... | 117 | +| 12.2.2 | X3-interface..... | 121 | +| 12.2.3 | EPS related events..... | 122 | +| 12.2.3.1 | Attach..... | 122 | +| 12.2.3.2 | Detach..... | 122 | +| 12.2.3.3 | Bearer activation..... | 123 | +| 12.2.3.4 | Bearer deactivation..... | 123 | +| 12.2.3.5 | Bearer modification..... | 124 | +| 12.2.3.6 | Start of interception with active bearer..... | 125 | +| 12.2.3.7 | Tracking Area/EPS Location Update..... | 125 | +| 12.2.3.8 | Serving Evolved Packet System..... | 126 | +| 12.2.3.9 | UE requested PDN connectivity..... | 126 | +| 12.2.3.10 | UE requested PDN disconnection..... | 126 | +| 12.2.3.11 | UE requested Bearer Resource Modification..... | 127 | +| 12.2.3.12 | Void..... | 127 | +| 12.2.3.13 | Start of interception with E-UTRAN attached UE..... | 127 | +| 12.2.3.14 | Packet Data Header Information..... | 128 | +| 12.2.3.14.0 | Introduction..... | 128 | +| 12.2.3.14.1 | Packet Data Header Report..... | 128 | +| 12.2.3.14.2 | Packet Data Summary Report..... | 129 | +| 12.2.3.15 | HSS subscriber record change..... | 130 | +| 12.2.3.16 | Cancel location..... | 131 | +| 12.2.3.17 | Register location..... | 131 | +| 12.2.3.18 | Location information request..... | 131 | +| 12.3 | Functional requirements for LI in case of E-UTRAN access and PMIP based S5/S8 interfaces..... | 131 | +| 12.3.0 | General..... | 131 | +| 12.3.1 | Provision of intercept related information..... | 132 | +| 12.3.1.0 | General..... | 132 | +| 12.3.1.1 | X2 interface..... | 132 | +| 12.3.1.2 | Structure of the events..... | 133 | +| 12.3.2 | X3-interface..... | 135 | +| 12.3.3 | LI events for E-UTRAN access with PMIP-based S5 or S8..... | 135 | +| 12.3.3.1 | Initial E-UTRAN Attach and UE PDN requested connectivity with PMIP-based S5 or S8..... | 135 | +| 12.3.3.2 | Detach and PDN disconnection for PMIP-based S5/S8..... | 136 | +| 12.3.3.3 | Start of interception with active tunnel for PMIP based S5/S8..... | 136 | +| 12.3.3.4 | Dedicated Bearer Procedures for E-UTRAN Access with PMIP-based S5/S8..... | 136 | +| 12.3.3.5 | PDN-GW initiated PDN-disconnection Procedure..... | 136 | +| 12.3.3.6 | PMIP Session modification..... | 137 | +| 12.3.3.7 | Packet Data Header Information..... | 137 | +| 12.3.3.7.0 | Introduction..... | 137 | +| 12.3.3.7.1 | Packet Data Header Report..... | 137 | +| 12.3.3.7.2 | Packet Data Summary Report..... | 138 | +| 12.4 | Functional requirements for LI in case of trusted non-3GPP IP access..... | 139 | + +| | | | +|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 12.4.0 | General..... | 139 | +| 12.4.1 | Provision of Intercept Related Information..... | 140 | +| 12.4.1.0 | General..... | 140 | +| 12.4.1.1 | X2-interface..... | 140 | +| 12.4.1.2 | Structure of the events..... | 140 | +| 12.4.2 | X3-interface..... | 144 | +| 12.4.3 | LI events for trusted Non-3GPP IP access..... | 144 | +| 12.4.3.1 | Initial Attach and PDN connection activation with PMIPv6 on S2a..... | 144 | +| 12.4.3.2 | Initial Attach and PDN connection activation procedures with MIPv4 FCoA on S2a..... | 145 | +| 12.4.3.3 | Initial Attach and PDN connection activation procedures with DSMIPv6 over S2c..... | 145 | +| 12.4.3.4 | Detach and PDN disconnection with PMIPv6 on S2a..... | 146 | +| 12.4.3.5 | Detach and PDN disconnection with MIPv4 FCoA..... | 146 | +| 12.4.3.6 | Detach and PDN disconnection with DSMIPv6 on S2c..... | 146 | +| 12.4.3.7 | PDN-GW reallocation upon initial attach on s2c..... | 147 | +| 12.4.3.8 | PDN GW initiated Resource Allocation Deactivation with S2a PMIP..... | 147 | +| 12.4.3.9 | PDN GW initiated Resource Allocation Deactivation with S2a MIP v4..... | 147 | +| 12.4.3.10 | Serving Evolved Packet System..... | 148 | +| 12.4.3.11 | Start of interception with active tunnel or bearer..... | 148 | +| 12.4.3.12 | PMIP session modification..... | 148 | +| 12.4.3.13 | DSMIP session modification..... | 148 | +| 12.4.3.14 | Bearer activation..... | 149 | +| 12.4.3.15 | Bearer deactivation..... | 149 | +| 12.4.3.16 | Bearer modification..... | 149 | +| 12.4.3.17 | Packet Data Header Information..... | 149 | +| 12.4.3.17.0 | Introduction..... | 149 | +| 12.4.3.17.1 | Packet Data Header Report..... | 149 | +| 12.4.3.17.2 | Packet Data Summary Report..... | 150 | +| 12.4.3.18 | HSS subscriber record change..... | 151 | +| 12.4.3.19 | Registration Termination..... | 152 | +| 12.4.3.20 | Location Information request..... | 152 | +| 12.5 | Functional requirements for LI in case of untrusted non-3GPP IP access..... | 153 | +| 12.5.0 | Introduction..... | 153 | +| 12.5.1 | Provision of Intercept Related Information..... | 153 | +| 12.5.1.0 | General..... | 153 | +| 12.5.1.1 | X2-interface..... | 154 | +| 12.5.1.2 | Structure of the events..... | 154 | +| 12.5.2 | X3-interface..... | 158 | +| 12.5.3 | LI events for untrusted Non-3GPP IP access..... | 158 | +| 12.5.3.1 | Initial Attach and PDN connection activation with PMIPv6 on S2b..... | 158 | +| 12.5.3.2 | Initial attach and PDN connection activation for S2c in untrusted non-3GPP IP access..... | 159 | +| 12.5.3.3 | UE/ePDG-initiated Detach Procedure and UE Requested PDN disconnection with PMIP..... | 159 | +| 12.5.3.4 | Detach and PDN Disconnection for S2c in Un-trusted Non-3GPP IP access..... | 160 | +| 12.5.3.5 | Serving Evolved Packet System..... | 160 | +| 12.5.3.6 | Start of interception with active tunnel/bearer..... | 160 | +| 12.5.3.7 | PDN-GW reallocation upon initial attach on s2c..... | 161 | +| 12.5.3.8 | PDN GW initiated Resource Allocation Deactivation with S2b PMIP..... | 161 | +| 12.5.3.9 | PMIP session modification..... | 161 | +| 12.5.3.10 | DSMIP session modification..... | 161 | +| 12.5.3.11 | Packet Data Header Information..... | 162 | +| 12.5.3.11.0 | General..... | 162 | +| 12.5.3.11.1 | Packet Data Header Report..... | 162 | +| 12.5.3.11.2 | Packet Data Summary Report..... | 163 | +| 12.5.3.12 | Bearer activation..... | 164 | +| 12.5.3.13 | Bearer deactivation..... | 164 | +| 12.5.3.14 | Bearer modification..... | 164 | +| 12.5.3.15 | HSS subscriber record change..... | 164 | +| 12.5.3.16 | Registration Termination..... | 165 | +| 12.5.3.17 | Location Information request..... | 165 | +| 12.6 | Functional requirements for LI in case of Handovers between E-UTRAN and CDMA2000 Accesses..... | 166 | +| 12.7 | Functional requirements for LI in case of interworking between SGSN and EPS nodes over S4/S12 interfaces..... | 166 | + +| | | | +|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 12.8 | Functional requirements for LI in case of interworking between SGSN and PDN-GW over Gn/Gp interfaces..... | 166 | +| 12.9 | Functional Requirements for LI in case of Control and User Plane Separation..... | 167 | +| 12.9.1 | Background..... | 167 | +| 12.9.2 | LI Architecture with CUPS..... | 167 | +| 12.9.2.1 | Overview..... | 167 | +| 12.9.2.2 | Packet detection rules..... | 167 | +| 12.9.2.3 | Forwarding action rules..... | 168 | +| 12.9.2.4 | Intercepted packet identification rules..... | 168 | +| 12.9.3 | Provision of Content of Communications..... | 168 | +| 12.9.3.1 | Interception for Serving Gateway..... | 168 | +| 12.9.3.2 | Interception for PDN Gateway..... | 168 | +| 12.9.4 | Provision of Intercept Related Information..... | 169 | +| 12.9.4.1 | Interception at the Serving Gateway..... | 169 | +| 12.9.4.2 | Interception at the PDN Gateway..... | 169 | +| 13 | Lawful Interception for 3GPP H(e)NBs..... | 169 | +| 13.0 | General..... | 169 | +| 13.1 | Provision of Intercepted Content of Communications for 3GPP H(e)NBs..... | 170 | +| 13.2 | Provision of Intercept Related Information for 3GPP H(e)NBs..... | 170 | +| 13.2.1 | X2-interface..... | 170 | +| 13.3 | 3GPP H(e)NB LI Events and Event Information..... | 170 | +| 13.4 | UMTS Home Node B (HNB)..... | 171 | +| 13.4.0 | General..... | 171 | +| 13.4.1 | Intercepted Content of Communications for 3GPP UMTS HNBs..... | 172 | +| 13.4.2 | Intercept Related Information..... | 172 | +| 13.4.2.0 | General..... | 172 | +| 13.4.2.1 | X2-interface..... | 172 | +| 13.4.3 | 3GPP UMTS HNB LI Events and Event Information..... | 173 | +| 13.4.4 | Structure of HNB Events..... | 173 | +| 13.4.4.1 | Target UE Registration to HNB..... | 173 | +| 13.4.4.2 | Target UE De-Registration from HNB..... | 174 | +| 13.4.4.3 | Start of Intercept with HNB attached UE..... | 174 | +| 13.4.4.4 | Target UE HNB Handover..... | 174 | +| 13.5 | Home enhanced Node B (HeNB)..... | 175 | +| 14 | Interception of Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) Secured Communications..... | 176 | +| 14.1 | Introduction..... | 176 | +| 14.2 | Provision of Content of Communications..... | 176 | +| 14.3 | Provision of Intercept Related Information..... | 176 | +| 14.3.1 | Provision of Intercept Related Information Data Flow..... | 176 | +| 14.3.2 | X2-interface..... | 177 | +| 14.3.3 | GBA LI Events and Event Information..... | 177 | +| 14.4 | Structure of GBA Events..... | 178 | +| 14.4.1 | Bootstrapping..... | 178 | +| 14.4.2 | Query from NAF..... | 179 | +| 14.4.3 | Start of Interception with GBA key..... | 179 | +| 15 | Invocation of Lawful Interception for IMS-based VoIP..... | 179 | +| 15.1 | Overview of VoIP Interception..... | 179 | +| 15.2 | Provision of Content of Communications..... | 180 | +| 15.2.0 | Overview..... | 180 | +| 15.2.1 | General Principles of CC Interception..... | 180 | +| 15.2.1.1 | Intercept Trigger..... | 180 | +| 15.2.1.2 | X3-Interface..... | 181 | +| 15.2.2 | VoIP CC Interception..... | 181 | +| 15.2.3 | Media Information Associated with the CC..... | 183 | +| 15.2.4 | CC Interception in HPLMN with IMS Roaming..... | 183 | +| 15.2.5 | CC Interception with CUPS..... | 184 | +| 15.3 | Provision of Intercept Related Information for VoIP..... | 184 | +| 15.4 | Lawful interception in the VPLMN with IMS roaming..... | 184 | +| 15.4.1 | Local breakout with P-CSCF in the VPLMN..... | 184 | +| 15.5 | Constraints for IMS VoIP Roaming Interception..... | 184 | + +| | | | +|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 16 | LI for Group Communications using GCSE..... | 185 | +| 16.1 | Background..... | 185 | +| 16.2 | GCSE AS in Operator Network..... | 185 | +| 16.2.0 | General..... | 185 | +| 16.2.1 | Provision of Content of Communications..... | 185 | +| 16.2.1.0 | General..... | 185 | +| 16.2.1.1 | X3-interface..... | 186 | +| 16.2.2 | Provision of Intercept Related Information..... | 186 | +| 16.2.2.0 | General..... | 186 | +| 16.2.2.1 | X2-interface..... | 187 | +| 16.2.2.2 | GCSE AS LI Events and Event Information..... | 187 | +| 16.2.2.2.0 | General..... | 187 | +| 16.2.2.2.1 | Activation of GCSE Communications Group..... | 188 | +| 16.2.2.2.2 | Deactivation of GCSE Communications Group..... | 189 | +| 16.2.2.2.3 | User Added..... | 189 | +| 16.2.2.2.4 | User Dropped..... | 190 | +| 16.2.2.2.5 | Start of Intercept with an Active GCSE Communications Group..... | 190 | +| 16.2.2.2.6 | End of Intercept with an Active GCSE Communications Group..... | 191 | +| 16.2.2.2.7 | Modification of Target Connection to GCS AS..... | 191 | +| 16.3 | GCS AS outside Intercepting CSP Network..... | 192 | +| 17 | Interception for Proximity Services..... | 192 | +| 17.1 | ProSe Direct Discovery..... | 192 | +| 17.1.1 | General..... | 192 | +| 17.1.2 | Provision of Interception of Call Content..... | 193 | +| 17.1.3 | Provision of Intercept Related Information..... | 193 | +| 17.1.3.1 | General..... | 193 | +| 17.1.3.2 | X2-interface..... | 193 | +| 17.1.3.3 | ProSe LI Events and Event Information..... | 193 | +| 17.1.3.3.1 | ProSe LI Events..... | 193 | +| 17.1.3.3.2 | ProSe LI Event Information..... | 194 | +| 17.1.3.3.3 | Structure of ProSe Events..... | 195 | +| 17.1.3.3.3.1 | Discovery Request..... | 195 | +| 17.1.3.3.3.2 | Match Report..... | 195 | +| 17.2 | ProSe One To Many Communications..... | 195 | +| 17.2.1 | General..... | 195 | +| 17.2.2 | Provision of Intercept Product - One-To-Many Communications..... | 196 | +| 17.2.2.1 | General..... | 196 | +| 17.2.2.2 | X2-interface..... | 197 | +| 17.2.2.3 | ProSe LI One-To-Many Events and Event Information..... | 197 | +| 17.2.2.3.1 | Overview of ProSe LI One-To-Many Events..... | 197 | +| 17.2.2.3.2 | Structure of ProSe LI One-To-Many Event Information..... | 197 | +| 17.2.2.3.3 | ProSe LI One-To-Many Events..... | 199 | +| 17.3 | ProSe Remote UE Communications..... | 200 | +| 17.3.1 | General..... | 200 | +| 17.3.2 | The ProSe Remote UE is a target for interception..... | 200 | +| 17.3.3 | The ProSe UE-to-NW Relay is a target for interception..... | 201 | +| 17.3.4 | X2-interface..... | 201 | +| 17.3.4.1 | Structure of the events..... | 201 | +| 17.3.5 | ProSe UE-to-NW Relay events..... | 202 | +| 17.3.5.1 | ProSe Remote UE Report..... | 202 | +| 17.3.5.2 | ProSe Remote UE Start of Communication..... | 203 | +| 17.3.5.3 | ProSe Remote UE End of Communication..... | 203 | +| 17.3.5.4 | Start of interception with ProSe Remote UE ongoing communication..... | 203 | +| 17.3.5.5 | Start of interception for ProSe UE-to-NW Relay..... | 204 | +| 17.3.6 | X3-interface..... | 204 | +| 18 | Invocation of Lawful Interception for messaging services..... | 204 | +| 18.1 | Overview of messaging services interception..... | 204 | +| 18.2 | SMS..... | 205 | +| 18.2.1 | Introduction..... | 205 | +| 18.2.2 | SMS over GPRS/UMTS..... | 205 | + +| | | | +|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 18.2.3 | SMS over IP..... | 205 | +| 18.2.4 | SMS over NAS..... | 206 | +| 18.2.4.0 | Introduction..... | 206 | +| 18.2.4.1 | Structure of the events..... | 206 | +| 18.2.4.2 | SMS over NAS Events..... | 206 | +| 18.2.4.3 | SMS over NAS..... | 207 | +| 18.3 | MMS..... | 208 | +| 18.3.1 | Background..... | 208 | +| 18.3.2 | MMS Architecture IRI/CC Events..... | 209 | +| 18.3.3 | MMS Events..... | 212 | +| 18.3.3.1 | MMS Send..... | 212 | +| 18.3.3.2 | MMS Notification & Response..... | 213 | +| 18.3.3.3 | MMS Retrieval & Acknowledgement..... | 215 | +| 18.3.3.4 | MMS Forwarding..... | 217 | +| 18.3.3.5 | MMS Store..... | 218 | +| 18.3.3.6 | MMS Upload..... | 218 | +| 18.3.3.7 | MMS Delete (Stored in MMBox or in Proxy-Relay)..... | 219 | +| 18.3.3.8 | MMS Delivery..... | 219 | +| 18.3.3.9 | MMS Read Reply..... | 220 | +| 18.3.3.10 | MMS Cancel..... | 221 | +| 18.3.3.12 | MMS MMBox Viewing..... | 221 | +| 19 | Lawful Access Location Services (LALS)..... | 223 | +| 19.1 | General..... | 223 | +| 19.2 | Target Positioning..... | 224 | +| 19.2.1 | General..... | 224 | +| 19.2.1 | Immediate Location Provision..... | 224 | +| 19.2.2 | Periodic Location Provision..... | 225 | +| 19.3 | Enhanced Location for IRI..... | 225 | +| 19.3.1 | General..... | 225 | +| 19.3.2 | LALS Triggering Function..... | 226 | +| 19.4 | X2-interface for Target Positioning and Enhanced Location..... | 226 | +| 19.4.1 | General..... | 226 | +| 19.4.2 | LALS Information Elements..... | 227 | +| 19.4.3 | Structure of LALS Records..... | 227 | +| 19.4.3.1 | Target Positioning Reporting..... | 227 | +| 19.4.3.2 | Triggered Location Reporting..... | 228 | +| 20 | Lawful interception in the VPLMN with S8HR Roaming Architecture..... | 228 | +| 20.1 | Architecture..... | 228 | +| 20.1.1 | Overview..... | 228 | +| 20.1.2 | LI specific Reference Points..... | 229 | +| 20.1.3 | LI Specific Functions..... | 229 | +| 20.1.3.1 | Void..... | 229 | +| 20.1.3.2 | BBIFF: Bearer Binding Intercept and Forward Function..... | 229 | +| 20.1.3.3 | LMISF: LI Mirror IMS State Function..... | 230 | +| 20.2 | Provision of Content of Communications..... | 231 | +| 20.2.1 | Overview..... | 231 | +| 20.2.1.1 | General..... | 231 | +| 20.2.1.2 | S-GW/BBIFF Procedures for CC Interception..... | 232 | +| 20.2.1.3 | Void..... | 233 | +| 20.2.1.4 | LMISF Procedures for CC Interception..... | 233 | +| 20.2.2 | X3-Interface..... | 233 | +| 20.3 | Provision of Intercept Related Information..... | 233 | +| 20.3.1 | Overview..... | 233 | +| 20.3.1.1 | General..... | 233 | +| 20.3.1.2 | Void..... | 234 | +| 20.3.1.3 | S-GW/BBIFF Procedures for IRI interception..... | 234 | +| 20.3.1.4 | LMISF Procedures for IRI interception..... | 234 | +| 20.3.2 | IRI Events..... | 235 | +| 20.3.2.1 | General..... | 235 | +| 20.3.2.2 | IMEI-based interception..... | 235 | + +| | | | +|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 20.3.2.3 | Mid-call Interception..... | 235 | +| 20.3.2.4 | Signalling Compression..... | 235 | +| 20.3.2.5 | Limitations..... | 235 | +| 20.3.3 | X2-Interface..... | 236 | +| 20.4 | Lawful Interception with CUPS architecture..... | 236 | +| 20.5 | S8HR LI and Target UE Mobility..... | 238 | +| 20.5.1 | Overview..... | 238 | +| 20.5.2 | S-GW Relocation..... | 238 | +| 21 | Invocation of Lawful Interception for Push to talk over Cellular services..... | 238 | +| 21.0 | General..... | 238 | +| 21.1 | Provision of IRI – PTC Service..... | 239 | +| 21.1.0 | Introduction..... | 239 | +| 21.1.1 | Decryption for PTC services..... | 240 | +| 21.1.2 | Signalling over the Xk interfaces and LI events..... | 241 | +| 21.2 | Provision of Content – PTC Service..... | 242 | +| 21.3 | Provision of Interception..... | 242 | +| 21.3.1 | X3-Interface..... | 242 | +| 21.3.2 | X2-interface..... | 243 | +| 21.3.3 | LI Defined Events..... | 243 | +| 21.3.3.1 | IRI Defined Events..... | 243 | +| 21.3.3.2 | Communication Content (CC) Event..... | 244 | +| 21.3.4 | Events Elements..... | 244 | +| 21.3.4.1 | IRI Event Elements..... | 244 | +| 21.3.4.2 | CC Event Elements..... | 246 | +| 21.4 | PTC Surveillance Events..... | 247 | +| 21.4.0 | PTC General..... | 247 | +| 21.4.1 | PTC Service Registration..... | 248 | +| 21.4.2 | PTC Serving System..... | 248 | +| 21.4.3 | PTC Session Initiation..... | 248 | +| 21.4.4 | PTC Session Abandon..... | 249 | +| 21.4.5 | PTC Session Start..... | 249 | +| 21.4.6 | PTC Session End..... | 249 | +| 21.4.7 | PTC Start of Interception..... | 250 | +| 21.4.8 | PTC Pre-Established Session..... | 250 | +| 21.4.9 | PTC Instant Personal Alert..... | 250 | +| 21.4.10 | PTC Party Join event..... | 251 | +| 21.4.11 | PTC Party Drop..... | 251 | +| 21.4.12 | PTC Party Hold..... | 251 | +| 21.4.13 | PTC Party Retrieve..... | 252 | +| 21.4.14 | PTC Media Modification..... | 252 | +| 21.4.15 | PTC Group Advertisement..... | 252 | +| 21.4.16 | PTC Floor Control..... | 253 | +| 21.4.17 | PTC Target Presence..... | 253 | +| 21.4.18 | PTC Associate Presence..... | 254 | +| 21.4.19 | PTC List Management Events..... | 254 | +| 21.4.20 | PTC Access Policy event..... | 254 | +| 21.4.21 | PTC Media Type Notification..... | 255 | +| 21.4.22 | PTC Encryption Message..... | 256 | +| 21.5 | PTC Group Calls..... | 257 | +| 21.5.1 | General..... | 257 | +| 21.5.2 | Group Call Request..... | 257 | +| 21.5.3 | Group Call Response..... | 257 | +| 21.5.4 | PTC Group Interrogate..... | 257 | +| 21.6 | MCPTT Priority Calls and Alerts Messages..... | 258 | +| 21.6.0 | Background..... | 258 | +| 21.6.1 | General..... | 258 | +| 21.6.2 | MCPTT Emergency Group Call..... | 258 | +| 21.6.3 | MCPTT Emergency Group Call Cancel..... | 258 | +| 21.6.4 | MCPTT Emergency Group Alert..... | 259 | +| 21.6.5 | MCPTT Emergency Group State..... | 259 | +| 21.6.6 | MCPTT Imminent Peril Group Call..... | 259 | + +| | | | +|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 21.7 | PTC Communication Content (CC)..... | 260 | +| 21.7.0 | General..... | 260 | +| 21.7.1 | Communication Content (CC)..... | 260 | +| 22 | Cell Supplemental Information Reporting..... | 260 | +| 22.1 | General..... | 260 | +| 22.2 | Cell Site Report Delivery..... | 261 | +| 22.3 | LI_CELL_INFO Interface..... | 261 | +| 22.4 | Cell Site Report..... | 261 | +| 23 | Lawful Interception for Non-IP Data Delivery (NIDD) using SCEF..... | 262 | +| 23.1 | Overview..... | 262 | +| 23.2 | Provision of Content of Communications..... | 263 | +| 23.2.1 | X3-interface..... | 263 | +| 23.3 | Provision of Intercept Related Information..... | 263 | +| 23.3.1 | General..... | 263 | +| 23.3.2 | X2-interface..... | 264 | +| 23.3.3 | Structure of the events..... | 264 | +| 23.3.4 | NIDD using SCEF related events..... | 267 | +| 23.3.4.1 | MME related events..... | 267 | +| 23.3.4.1.1 | IoT UE Attach for NIDD using SCEF..... | 267 | +| 23.3.4.1.2 | IoT UE Detach for NIDD using SCEF..... | 268 | +| 23.3.4.1.3 | IoT UE Tracking Area Update for NIDD using SCEF..... | 268 | +| 23.3.4.1.4 | IoT UE requested PDN connectivity..... | 268 | +| 23.3.4.1.5 | IoT UE requested PDN disconnection..... | 269 | +| 23.3.4.1.6 | SCEF requested PDN disconnection..... | 269 | +| 23.3.4.1.7 | Start of interception with attached IoT UE active NIDD connection..... | 270 | +| 23.3.4.2 | SGSN related events..... | 270 | +| 23.3.4.2.1 | IoT UE Attach for NIDD using SCEF..... | 270 | +| 23.3.4.2.2 | IoT UE Detach for NIDD using SCEF..... | 271 | +| 23.3.4.2.3 | IoT UE Routing Area Update for NIDD using SCEF..... | 271 | +| 23.3.4.2.4 | IoT UE requested PDP context activation for NIDD using SCEF..... | 271 | +| 23.3.4.2.5 | IoT UE requested PDP context deactivation for NIDD using SCEF..... | 272 | +| 23.3.4.2.6 | SCEF requested PDP context deactivation..... | 273 | +| 23.3.4.2.7 | Start of interception with PDP context active..... | 273 | +| 23.3.4.3 | SCEF related events..... | 274 | +| 23.3.4.3.1 | MME/SGSN originated connection request..... | 274 | +| 23.3.4.3.2 | MME/SGSN originated connection update..... | 274 | +| 23.3.4.3.3 | SCEF originated connection update..... | 274 | +| 23.3.4.3.4 | MME/SGSN originated disconnection request..... | 275 | +| 23.3.4.3.5 | SCEF originated disconnection request..... | 275 | +| 23.3.4.3.6 | Start of interception with connected UE..... | 275 | +| 23.3.4.3.7 | Non-IP Packet Data Header Information..... | 276 | +| 23.3.4.4 | IWK-SCEF related events..... | 277 | +| 23.3.4.4.1 | MME/SGSN originated connection request..... | 277 | +| 23.3.4.4.2 | MME/SGSN originated connection update..... | 278 | +| 23.3.4.4.3 | SCEF originated connection update..... | 278 | +| 23.3.4.4.4 | MME/SGSN originated disconnection request..... | 279 | +| 23.3.4.4.5 | SCEF originated disconnection request..... | 279 | +| 23.3.4.4.6 | Start of interception with connected UE..... | 279 | +| 23.3.4.5 | HSS related events..... | 280 | +| 23.3.4.5.1 | Serving Evolved Packet System for IoT UE..... | 280 | +| 23.3.4.5.2 | HSS subscriber record change for IoT UE..... | 280 | +| 23.3.4.5.3 | Cancel location for IoT UE..... | 280 | +| 23.3.4.6 | HLR related events..... | 282 | +| 23.3.4.6.1 | Serving System for IoT UE..... | 282 | +| 23.3.4.6.2 | Subscriber record change for IoT UE..... | 282 | +| 23.3.4.6.3 | Cancel location for IoT UE..... | 282 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| Annex A (informative): | Information flows for Lawful Interception invocation of circuit switched services..... | 283 | +|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| + +| | | | +|-----|-----------------------------------------------|-----| +| A.1 | Mobile originated circuit switched calls..... | 283 | +|-----|-----------------------------------------------|-----| + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| A.2 | Mobile terminated circuit switched calls..... | 284 | +| A.3 | Call hold / call waiting..... | 285 | +| A.4 | Multipart calls..... | 287 | +| A.5 | Call forwarding / call deflection..... | 290 | +| A.5.0 | General..... | 290 | +| A.5.1 | Unconditional call forwarding..... | 290 | +| A.5.2 | Call forwarding on not reachable (IMSI detached)..... | 291 | +| A.5.3 | Call forwarding on busy (network determined)..... | 292 | +| A.5.4 | Call forwarding on not reachable (no response to paging/radio channel failure)..... | 293 | +| A.5.5 | Call forwarding on no reply..... | 293 | +| A.5.6 | Call forwarding on busy (user determined)/call deflection..... | 294 | +| A.5.7 | Call waiting / call forwarding on no reply..... | 295 | +| A.6 | Explicit call transfer..... | 298 | +| Annex B (informative): | Information flows for Lawful Interception invocation of GSN Packet Data services..... | 300 | +| B.0 | General..... | 300 | +| B.1 | Mobile Station Attach..... | 300 | +| B.2 | Mobile Initiated Mobile Station Detach..... | 301 | +| B.3 | Network initiated Mobile Station Detach..... | 301 | +| B.4 | Intra 3G GSN Routing Area Update..... | 302 | +| B.5 | Inter 3G GSN Routing Area Update..... | 302 | +| B.6 | PDP Context Activation..... | 303 | +| B.7 | Start of interception with PDP context active..... | 303 | +| B.8 | MS initiated PDP Context Deactivation..... | 304 | +| B.9 | Network initiated PDP Context Deactivation..... | 304 | +| B.10 | SMS..... | 305 | +| Annex C (informative): | Information flows for the invocation of Lawful Interception for Packet Data with multimedia..... | 307 | +| C.0 | General..... | 307 | +| C.1 | Multimedia registration..... | 307 | +| C.2 | Multimedia Session Establishment and Answer..... | 309 | +| C.3 | Multimedia Release..... | 310 | +| C.4 | Multimedia with Supplementary Service - Call Forwarding..... | 310 | +| C.5 | Multimedia with Supplementary Service - Explicit Call Transfer..... | 310 | +| C.6 | Multimedia with Supplementary Service - Subscriber Controlled input..... | 310 | +| Annex D (informative): | Information flows for Lawful Interception invocation at the MGW using H.248..... | 311 | +| D.0 | General..... | 311 | +| D.1 | Mobile to Mobile call, originating side is target..... | 311 | +| Annex E (Informative): | IMS-based VoIP Lawful Interception call scenarios..... | 313 | +| E.1 | Overview..... | 313 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| E.2 | Background..... | 313 | +| E.3 | Originating Call from the Target with CC Interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN..... | 316 | +| E.3.0 | General..... | 316 | +| E.3.1 | Originating Call from the Target with CC Interception at the MRF..... | 317 | +| E.4 | Originating Call from the Target with CC Interception at the IMS-AGW..... | 317 | +| E.5 | Terminating Call to the Target with CC Interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN..... | 319 | +| E.5.0 | General..... | 319 | +| E.5.1 | Terminating Call to the Target with CC Interception at the MRF..... | 319 | +| E.6 | Terminating Call to the Target with CC Interception at the IMS-AGW..... | 321 | +| E.7 | Intra-CSP Forwarded Call with CC Interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN..... | 322 | +| E.7.0 | General..... | 322 | +| E.7.1 | Intra-CSP Forwarded Call with CC Interception at the MRF..... | 322 | +| E.8 | Intra-CSP Forwarded Call with CC Interception at the IMS-AGW..... | 324 | +| E.9 | Inter-CSP Forwarded Call to a CS Domain..... | 325 | +| E.10 | Inter-CSP Forwarded Call to an IMS Domain..... | 326 | +| E.11 | Originating Call from the Target with IMS Roaming..... | 327 | +| E.12 | Terminating Call to the Target with IMS Roaming..... | 328 | +| E.13 | Intra-CSP Forwarded Call with IMS Roaming..... | 329 | +| E.14 | Lawful interception in the VPLMN with IMS roaming..... | 329 | +| E.14.1 | Local Breakout (LBO) with P-CSCF in VPLMN..... | 329 | +| E.14.1.1 | General..... | 329 | +| E.14.1.2 | Originating call from an Inbound Roaming Target with CC Interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN..... | 330 | +| E.14.1.3 | Originating Call from an Inbound Roaming Target with CC Interception at the IMS-AGW..... | 331 | +| E.14.1.4 | Terminating Call to an Inbound Roaming Target with the CC Interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN..... | 332 | +| E.14.1.5 | Terminating Call to an Inbound Roaming Target with CC Interception at the IMS-AGW..... | 333 | +| Annex F (informative): | Examples of IMS-based VoIP Lawful Interception (LI) call flows..... | 334 | +| F.1 | General remarks..... | 334 | +| F.2 | Call Originations from Target in Home CSP..... | 334 | +| F.2.0 | Introduction..... | 334 | +| F.2.1 | Target Originated Call - Target (Party_A) Calls Party_B..... | 335 | +| F.2.2 | Target Originated Call - Target (Party_A) dials a Special Number..... | 336 | +| F.3 | Call Terminations to Target - Home CSP..... | 336 | +| F.3.0 | Introduction..... | 336 | +| F.4 | Call Forwarding - Non Roaming..... | 337 | +| F.4.0 | Introduction..... | 337 | +| F.4.1 | Intra-CSP Call Forwarding Unconditional..... | 338 | +| F.4.2 | Intra-CSP Call Forwarding No Answer..... | 339 | +| F.4.3 | Inter-CSP Call Forwarding Unconditional..... | 341 | +| F.5 | IMS Roaming..... | 341 | +| F.5.0 | General..... | 341 | +| F.5.1 | Roaming Target Originates a Call..... | 342 | +| F.5.1A | CC Unavailable in Home CSP due to Optimal Media Routing..... | 343 | +| F.5.2 | Call Termination to a Roaming Target..... | 344 | +| F.6 | Interception in Visited CSP..... | 344 | +| F.6.0 | General..... | 344 | +| F.6.1 | Interception in Visited CSP - Target Originated Call..... | 345 | +| F.6.2 | Interception in Visited CSP - Target Terminating Calls..... | 346 | +| F.6.3 | Incoming Call to Roaming Target is forwarded due to Call Forwarding No Answer..... | 347 | +| F.7 | Ad-Hoc Conference Calls established by the Target..... | 347 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| F.7.0 | Introduction..... | 347 | +| F.7.1 | Party_A (target) creates the conference..... | 348 | +| F.7.2 | Party_C joins the conference..... | 348 | +| F.7.3 | Party_B joins the conference..... | 350 | +| F.7.4 | Party_C drops out of the conference..... | 353 | +| F.7.5 | Reconfiguration from Conference to two-party call..... | 354 | +| F.7.6 | Party_A (target) places Conference on hold..... | 355 | +| F.7.7 | Party_A (target) retrieves Conference from hold..... | 356 | +| Annex G (informative): | Examples of CC interception for transcoded media..... | 357 | +| G.1 | Introduction..... | 357 | +| G.2 | CC Interception of transcoded media..... | 357 | +| G.3 | CC Interception of transcoded media with e2ae encryption..... | 358 | +| G.4 | CC Interception of transcoded media with e2e hop-by-hop encryption..... | 359 | +| G.5 | CC Interception of transcoded media at the TrGW..... | 360 | +| Annex H (informative): | Location only warrant..... | 362 | +| H.1 | General..... | 362 | +| H.2 | Location only warrant..... | 362 | +| H.3 | Immediate Location warrant..... | 362 | +| Annex I (informative): | Interception of Targets with Non-Local IDs..... | 363 | +| I.1 | Introduction..... | 363 | +| I.2 | Interception of outgoing calls..... | 363 | +| I.2.1 | General..... | 363 | +| I.2.2 | Interception at S-CSCF or P-CSCF..... | 363 | +| I.2.3 | Interception at the IBCF/MGCF..... | 364 | +| I.3 | Interception of incoming calls..... | 365 | +| I.3.1 | General..... | 365 | +| I.3.2 | Interception at S-CSCF or P-CSCF..... | 365 | +| I.3.3 | Interception at the IBCF/MGCF..... | 366 | +| Annex J (informative): | Lawful Interception Illustrations in VPLMN with S8HR..... | 368 | +| J.1 | Overview..... | 368 | +| J.2 | Process Flow..... | 369 | +| J.3 | Call Flows..... | 372 | +| J.3.1 | General..... | 372 | +| J.3.2 | Originating call..... | 373 | +| J.3.3 | Terminating call..... | 373 | +| J.3.4 | Mid-Call Interception..... | 374 | +| J.3.5 | Lawful Interception without CC..... | 376 | +| J.3.6 | S-GW Relocation..... | 376 | +| J.4 | Correlation of CC and IRI..... | 378 | +| J.5 | UE Location Reporting..... | 378 | +| Annex L (informative): | IP-based Handover Interface for CC of CS Intercepts..... | 379 | +| L.1 | Background..... | 379 | +| L.2 | Options for X3..... | 379 | +| L.3 | Information delivered along with the CC..... | 380 | + +**Annex M (Normative): Virtualised Implementations.....381** +M.1 General.....381 +Annex N (informative): Change history.....382 + +--- + +## Foreword + +This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +--- + +## Introduction + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3GPP TSG SA to allow for the standardisation in the area of lawful interception of telecommunications. This document describes in general the architecture and functions for lawful interception. Laws of individual nations and regional institutions (e.g. European Union), and sometimes licensing and operating conditions define a need to intercept telecommunications traffic and related information in modern telecommunications systems. It has to be noted that lawful interception shall always be done in accordance with the applicable national or regional laws and technical regulations. + +--- + +# 1 Scope + +The present document describes the architecture and functional requirements within a Third Generation Mobile Communication System (3GMS) and the Evolved Packet System (EPS). + +The present document shows the service requirements from a Law Enforcement point of view only. The aim of this document is to define a 3GMS and EPS interception system that supports a number of regional interception regulations, but these regulations are not repeated here as they vary. Regional interception requirements shall be met by using specific (regional) mediation functions allowing only required information to be transported. + +The handover interfaces for Lawful Interception (LI) of Packet-Data Services, Circuit Switched Services, and Multimedia Services within the UMTS network and Evolved Packet System for Stage 3 are described in TS 33.108 [11]. + +--- + +# 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] Void +- [2] ETSI ES 201 158 (V1.2.1 April 2002): "Lawful Interception; Requirements for network functions". +- [3] ETSI ES 201 671 (V3.1.1 May 2007): "Handover Interface for the lawful interception of telecommunications traffic". +- [4] Void +- [5] Void +- [6] Void +- [7] 3GPP TS 33.106: "3G Security; Lawful Interception Requirements". +- [8] ANSI J-STD-025-A (April 2003): "Lawfully Authorised Electronic Surveillance". +- [9] Void +- [10] 3GPP TS 23.060: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service description". +- [11] 3GPP TS 33.108: "3G Security; Handover interface for Lawful Interception". +- [12] Void +- [13] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [14] 3GPP TS 23.234: "3GPP system to Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Interworking; System Description". +- [15] 3GPP TS 23.008: "Organization of subscriber data". +- [16] 3GPP TS 29.234: "3GPP system to Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking; Stage 3". + +- [17] 3GPP TS 24.234: "3GPP system to Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking; User Equipment (UE) to network protocols; Stage 3". +- [18] IETF RFC 1122 (October 1989): "Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Communication Layers". +- [19] IETF RFC 1123 (October 1989): "Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Application and Support". +- [20] 3GPP TS 23.246: "Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS); Architecture and Functional Description". +- [21] 3GPP TS 24.147: "Conferencing Using the IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem 3GPP Stage 3". +- [22] 3GPP TS 23.401: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access". +- [23] 3GPP TS 23.402: "Architecture enhancements for non-3GPP accesses". +- [24] 3GPP TS 29.273: "Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Evolved Packet System (EPS); 3GPP EPS AAA interfaces". +- [25] 3GPP TS 33.328: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) media plane security". +- [26] 3GPP TS 29.212: "Policy and Charging Control (PCC); Reference points". +- [27] Void +- [28] 3GPP TS 33.310: "Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)". +- [29] 3GPP TS 33.210: "Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security". +- [30] 3GPP TS 23.272: " Circuit Switched (CS) fallback in Evolved Packet System (EPS); Stage 2" +- [31] 3GPP TS 22.220: " Service Requirements for Home NodeBs and Home eNodeBs". +- [32] 3GPP TS 36.300: "Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN); Overall description; Stage 2". +- [33] 3GPP TS 25.467: "UTRAN architecture for 3G Home Node B (HNB); Stage 2" +- [34] 3GPP TS 33.320: "Security of Home Node B (HNB) / Home evolved Node B (HeNB) ". +- [35] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA)". +- [36] IETF RFC 3966 (December 2004): "The Tel URILs for Telephone Numbers ". +- [37] 3GPP TS 29.060: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) across the Gn and Gp interface". +- [38] 3GPP TS 29.274: "3GPP Evolved Packet System (EPS); Evolved General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) Tunnelling Protocol for Control plane (GTPv2-C); Stage 3". +- [39] IETF RFC 791: "Internet Protocol". +- [40] IETF RFC 2460: "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification". +- [41] IETF RFC 3697: "IPv6 Flow Label Specification". +- [42] 3GPP TS 29.334: "IMS Application Level Gateway (IMS-ALG) - IMS Access Gateway (IMS-AGW); Iq Interface (Stage 3)". +- [43] 3GPP TS 23.228: "IP Multimedia Subsystem; Stage 2". +- [44] 3GPP TS 23.203: "Policy Charging and Control Architecture". +- [45] 3GPP TS 23.237: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Service Continuity; Stage 2". + +- [46] 3GPP TS 29.162: "Interworking between IM CN subsystem and IP Networks". +- [47] 3GPP TS 29.163:"Interworking between IP Multimedia Core Network (CN) subsystem and Circuit Switched (CS) Networks" +- [48] 3GPP TS 23.334: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Application Level Gateway (IMS-ALG) - IMS Access Gateway (IMS-AGW) interface: Procedures descriptions". +- [49] 3GPP TS 24.229: "IP multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); Stage 3". +- [50] 3GPP TS 22.278: "Service requirements for the Evolved Packet System (EPS)". +- [51] 3GPP TS 22.468: "Group Communication System Enablers for LTE (GCSE\_LTE)". +- [52] 3GPP TS 23.303: "Proximity-based services (ProSe); Stage 2". +- [53] 3GPP TS 23.468: "Group Communication System Enablers for LTE (GCSE\_LTE); Stage 2". +- [54] Void. +- [55] 3GPP TS 24.623: "Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Extensible Markup Language (XML) Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP) over the Ut interface for Manipulating Supplementary Services". +- [56] IETF RFC 4825: "The Extensible Markup Language (XML) Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)". +- [57] 3GPP TS 33.303: "Proximity-based Services (ProSe); Security aspects". +- [58] 3GPP TS 24.333: "Proximity-services (ProSe) Management Objects (MO)". +- [59] 3GPP TS 32.277: "Telecommunication management; Charging management; Proximity-based Services (ProSe) charging". +- [60] 3GPP TS 22.101: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Service aspects; Service principles". +- [61] 3GPP TS 29.002: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Mobile Application Part (MAP) specification ". +- [62] 3GPP TS 29.228: "Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; IP Multimedia (IM) Subsystem Cx and Dx interfaces; Signalling flows and message contents". +- [63] 3GPP TS 29.328: "Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; IP Multimedia (IM) Subsystem Sh interface; Signalling flows and message contents". +- [64] Void. +- [65] GSMA IR.61: "Wi-Fi Roaming Guidelines". +- [66] 3GPP TS 29.329: " Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Evolved Packet System (EPS); 3GPP EPS AAA interfaces ". +- [67] 3GPP TS 22.071: "Location Services (LCS); Service description; Stage 1". +- [68] 3GPP TS 23.271: "Functional stage 2 description of Location Services (LCS)". +- [69] IETF RFC 3320: "Signaling Compression (SigComp)". +- [70] IETF RFC 4896: "Signaling Compression (SigComp) Corrections and Clarifications". +- [71] GSMA IR.65: "IMS Roaming and Interworking Guidelines". +- [72] MMS Architecture OMA-AD-MMS-V1\_3-20110913-A. +- [73] Multimedia Messaging Service Encapsulation Protocol OMA-TS-MMS\_ENC-V1\_3-20110913-A. + +- [74] 3GPP TS 22.140: "Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS); Stage 1". +- [75] 3GPP TS 23.214 "Architecture enhancements for control and user plane separation of EPC; Stage 2". +- [76] OMA MLP TS: "Mobile Location Protocol", []. +- [77] IETF RFC 2822: "Internet Message Format". +- [78] 3GPP TS 23.228: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS);Stage 2". +- [79] 3GPP TS 32.272: "Push-to-talk over Cellular (PoC) charging". +- [80] 3GPP TS 24.379 "Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) call control; Protocol specification". +- [81] OMA-TS-PoC\_System\_Description-V2\_1-20110802-A. +- [82] OMA-AD-PoC-V2\_1-20110802-A. +- [83] OMA-TS-PoC UserPlane-V2\_1-20110802-A. +- [84] 3GPP TS 23.179 "Functional architecture and information flows to support MCPTT Stage 2". +- [85] 3GPP TS 22.179 "Mission Critical Push to Talk (MCPTT) over LTE; Stage 1". +- [86] IETF RFC 3550: "Real Time Transport Protocol". +- [87] IETF RFC 3998: "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) User Part (ISUP) to Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Mapping". +- [88] IETF RFC 3261: "Session Initiation Protocol". +- [89] ETSI TS 103 221-1 (V1.1.1): "Lawful Interception (LI); Internal Network Interface X1 for Lawful Interception". +- [90] 3GPP TS 33.127: "Lawful Interception (LI) Architecture and Functions". +- [91] 3GPP TS 36.413: "Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN); S1 Application Protocol (S1AP)". + +--- + +## 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations. + +### 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [13] and the following apply. + +**Application layer:** As defined by Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in RFC 1123 [19]. + +**Closed access mode:** H(e)NB provides services only to its associated CSG members. A H(e)NB configured for closed access broadcasts a CSG Indicator and a specific CSG Identity. + +**CUPS:** As defined in 3GPP TS 23.214 [75], represents PLMN with architecture enhancements for control and user plane separation of EPC nodes. + +**Hybrid access mode:** H(e)NB provides services to its associated CSG members and to non-CSG members. A H(e)NB configured for hybrid access does not broadcast a CSG Indicator but does broadcast a CSG Identity. + +**IP layer:** As defined by Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in RFC 1122 [18]. + +**Interception Area:** is a subset of the network service area comprised of a set of cells which defines a geographical zone. + +**Location Dependent Interception:** is interception of a target mobile within a network service area that is restricted to one or several Interception Areas (IA). + +**MCPTT Identity:** Attributes configured in the MCPTT service that relate to the human user of the MCPTT service. + +**Non-Local Identity:** As defined by clause 5.1.2 General principles in TS 33.106 [7]. + +**Open access mode:** H(e)NB operates as a normal NodeB or eNodeB. A H(e)NB configured for open access does not broadcast either a CSG Indicator or CSG Identity. + +**Push to Talk over Cellular (PTC):** This term, when used in the present document, represents either a PoC or MCPTT type service. + +**S8 Home Routed (S8HR):** The term as used in this standard represents a roaming architecture where PDN-GW and P-CSCF are located in the HPLMN and therefore, UE IMS signalling and media are routed directly to the HPLMN through S8 reference point. Roaming architecture with S8HR for VoLTE is described in GSMA IR.65 [71] clause 2.4.3. + +Other LI specific definitions are given in TS 33.108 [11]. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [13] and the following apply: + +| | | +|---------|--------------------------------------------------| +| 3GMS | 3rd Generation Mobile Communications System | +| 3G GGSN | 3rd Generation Gateway GPRS Support Node | +| 3G GSN | 3rd Generation GPRS Support Node (GGSN/SGSN) | +| 3G MSC | 3rd Generation Mobile Switching Centre | +| 3G SGSN | 3rd Generation Serving GPRS Support Node | +| 3G UMSC | 3rd Generation Unified Mobile Switching Centre | +| AAA | Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting | +| ADMF | Administration Function | +| AGW | Access Gateway | +| AN | Access Network | +| AP | Access Provider | +| AS | Application Server | +| BBIFF | Bearer Binding Intercept and Forwarding Function | +| BM-SC | Broadcast-Multicast Service Centre | +| BSF | Bootstrapping Serving Function | +| B-TID | Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier | +| CC | Content of Communication | +| CS | Circuit Switched | +| CSCF | Call Session Control Function | +| CSG | Closed Subscriber Group | +| CSP | Communications Service Provider | +| CSR | Cell Site Report | +| CUPS | Control and User Plane Separation of EPC nodes | +| DF | Delivery Function | +| DSMIP | Dual Stack Mobile IP | +| ECT | Explicit Call Transfer | +| EPC | Evolved Packet Core | +| ePDG | Evolved PDG | +| EPS | Evolved Packet System | +| E-UTRAN | Evolved UTRAN | +| FTP | File Transfer Protocol | +| GBA | Generic Bootstrapping Architecture | +| GGSN | Gateway GPRS Support Node | +| GPRS | General Packet Radio Service | +| GSM | Global System for Mobile communications | +| GSN | GPRS Support Node (SGSN or GGSN) | +| HA | Home Agent | +| HeMS | HeNB Management System | +| HeNB | Home enhanced NodeB | +| HeNB GW | HeNB Gateway | +| H(e)NB | Home and Home enhanced NodeB | +| HI | Handover Interface | +| HLR | Home Location Register | + +| | | +|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| HMS | HNB Management System | +| HNB | Home NodeB | +| HNB GW | HNB Gateway | +| HRPD | High Rate Packet Data | +| HSS | Home Subscriber Server | +| IA | Interception Area | +| IBCF | Interconnecting Border Control Function | +| ICEs | Intercepting Control Elements (3G MSC Server, 3G GMSC Server, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, SGSN, GGSN, HLR, AAA Server, PDG, MME, S-GW, PDN-GW, HSS) | +| IETF | Internet Engineering Task Force | +| IM-MGW | IMS Media Gateway | +| IMEI | International Mobile station Equipment Identity | +| IMPI | IP Multimedia Private Identity | +| IMPU | IP Multimedia Public Identity | +| IMS | IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem | +| IMS-AGW | IMS Access Gateway | +| IMSI | International Mobile Subscriber Identity | +| INEs | Intercepting Network Elements (3G MSC Server, 3G GMSC Server, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, SGSN, GGSN, MGW, HLR, AAA Server, PDG) | +| IP | Internet Protocol | +| IP-SM-GW | IP-Short-Message-Gateway | +| IRI | Intercept Related Information | +| I-WLAN | Interworking WLAN (3GPP WLAN interworking subnetwork) | +| LALS | Lawful Access Location Services | +| LAN | Local Area Network | +| LBO | Local Breakout | +| LCS | Location Services | +| LDI | Location Dependent Interception | +| LEA | Law Enforcement Agency | +| LEMF | Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility | +| LIPA | Local IP Access | +| LMISF | LI Mirror IMS State Function | +| LTE | Long Term Evolution | +| MBMS | Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service | +| MC ID | Mission Critical User Identity | +| MCPTT | Mission Critical Push-To-Talk | +| MCPTT ID | Mission Critical Push to Talk Identity | +| MF | Mediation Function | +| MGCF | Media Gateway Control Function | +| MGW | Media Gateway | +| ME | Mobile Entity | +| MIP | Mobile IP | +| MM | Multimedia Message | +| MMBox | Multimedia Message Box | +| MME | Mobility Management Entity | +| MN | Mobile Node | +| MRF | Media Resource Function | +| MSISDN | Mobile Subscriber ISDN Number | +| NAF | Network Application Function | +| NAI | Network Access Identifier | +| NO | Network Operator | +| PCRF | Policy and Charging Rules Function | +| P-CSCF | Proxy CSCF | +| PDG | Packet Data Gateway | +| PDN | Packet Data Network | +| PDN-GW | PDN Gateway | +| PMIP | Proxy Mobile IP | +| PoC | Push to talk over Cellular | +| PS | Packet Switched | +| PTC | Push to Talk over Cellular | +| RA | Routing Area | + +| | | +|---------|-------------------------------------------| +| RAI | Routing Area Identity | +| S8HR | S8 Home Routing | +| SAI | Service Area Identity | +| S-CSCF | Serving CSCF | +| SeGW | Security Gateway | +| SGSN | Serving GPRS Support Node | +| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol | +| SMS | Short Message Service | +| S-GW | Serving Gateway | +| SR-VCC | Single Radio Voice Call Continuity | +| SX3LIF | Split X3 LI Interworking Function | +| TEL URI | "tel" URI, as defined in RFC 3966 [ 36] | +| TLS | Transport Layer Security | +| TrGW | Transit Gateway | +| TRF | Transit Routing Function | +| TWAN | Trusted WLAN Access Network | +| UE | User Equipment | +| UMTS | Universal Mobile Telecommunication System | +| URI | Universal Resource Identifier | +| URL | Universal Resource Locator | +| VoIP | Voice over IP | +| VoLTE | Voice over LTE | +| WLAN | Wireless LAN | +| WAF | WebRTC Authorisation Function | +| WebRTC | Web Real Time Communications | +| WIC | WebRTC IMS Client | +| WWSF | WebRTC Web Server Function | + +## 4 Functional architecture + +The following figures contain the reference configuration for the lawful interception. The circuit-switched configuration is shown in figure 1a. The packet-switched configuration is shown in figure 1b. Intercept configurations for HLR and IMS are shown in figures 1c and 1d. The WLAN interworking configuration is shown in figure 1e. The intercept configurations for IMS conferencing is shown in figure 1f. The CC intercept configuration for IMS-based VoIP is shown in figure 1g. Intercept configurations for LALS are shown in figure 1h. The intercept configuration for Non-Local ID at IBCF and MGCF is shown in figure 1i. The intercept configuration for S8HR VoLTE in the visited PLMN is shown in figure 1j. The intercept configuration for Push to Talk over Cellular (PTC) is shown in figure 1k and 1l. Within the present document PTC encompasses PoC as a service and Mission Critical Push-To-Talk (MCPTT) services. The CSP Cell Supplemental Information configuration is shown in figure 1m. The various entities and interfaces are described in more detail in the succeeding clauses. The additional intercept configurations for Evolved 3GPP Packet Switching Domain are described in clause 12. + +NOTE 0: WLAN Interworking specifications (TS 23.234 [14], TS 24.234 [17] and TS 29.234 [16]) are no longer maintained for Release 12 onwards. This clause is therefore no longer maintained for WLAN Interworking. + +PS domain of the UMTS system (GSN and Multimedia Packet Data services), 3GPP-WLAN interworking network and Evolved Packet Switching Domain provide UMTS/GSM/EPS customer's mobile equipment (UE) with connectivity service to another end of the communication. Another end of the communication may be a network element (server) or another UE. Therefore, UMTS/EPS system provides IP layer TS 23.008 [15] services. Hence, UMTS/EPS NO/AP is responsible only for IP layer interception of CC data. In addition to CC data, the LI solution for UMTS/EPS offers generation of IRI records from respective control plane (signalling) messages. The IP layer connectivity service is needed to support application layer TS 29.234 [16] service provision to UMTS/GSM/EPS customers. For instance, the following are examples of application layer services: email service; web browsing service; FTP service; audio services (e.g. VoIP, PoC); other multimedia services (MBMS, video telephony); The majority of the application layer services require addition of respective server functionality to the network. Note that it is not necessary that such application layer SP should be the same commercial entity as the UMTS/EPS AP/NO in question. + +When location information of the target is delivered by an ICE, the MF may need to add the civic address associated with the access network point as known by the CSP. The method used to obtain the civic address will depend on the CSP implementation. (e.g. by accessing a remote database). National regulations define whether the civic address needs to be provided. + +NOTE 1: For instance in MBMS a BM-SC and especially content providing server might be operated by different commercial entity than UMTS network. + +The LALS provides LCS information of the target on-demand, independently of the target's activity/events. Additionally, LALS may be triggered by any IRI event detected by an ICE to provide LCS location information of the target correlated to the triggering event. + +When IA is provisioned LCS may provide enhanced geographic capabilities + +For all UE locations obtained, generated or reported to the MF/DF, the ICE shall report the time at which the location was established by the location source (e.g. MME or HSS) and provide this to the MF/DF along with the location information. If this information cannot be provided by the location source the ICE shall indicate that the time is not available. If the information in the MME received over S1 (TS 36.413 [91]) includes one or more cell IDs, then all cell IDs shall be reported to the LEMF whenever location reporting is triggered at the MME. + +![Diagram of circuit switched intercept configuration showing connections between UE, RNC, MSC, and LEMF.](e7c6a6e4c3047dac05a3b92e396e9794_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the circuit switched intercept configuration. It features five main components represented by rectangular boxes: 'UE' (User Equipment), 'RNC' (Radio Network Controller), 'MSC' (Mobile Switching Center), 'MF' (Monitoring Function), and 'LEMF' (Location Management Entity). The connections are as follows: a vertical arrow points from the UE to the RNC; a horizontal double-headed arrow connects the RNC and the MSC; a horizontal arrow points from the MSC to the MF; and a vertical arrow points from the MF to the LEMF. Additionally, there is a horizontal double-headed arrow between the UE and the MF, and a vertical double-headed arrow between the RNC and the LEMF. + +Diagram of circuit switched intercept configuration showing connections between UE, RNC, MSC, and LEMF. + +Figure 1a: Circuit switched intercept configuration + +![Packet Switched Intercept configuration diagram showing LEMF, ADMF, and Proxy-Relay components.](90ddb84c323b956e2d50a54d3f870566_img.jpg) + +This diagram illustrates the Packet Switched Intercept configuration. On the left, a stack of three rectangles represents the LEMF (Lawful Intercept Management Function). Three horizontal lines, labeled HI1, HI2, and HI3, extend from the LEMF to three separate ADMF (ADMiralty Interception Management Function) blocks. Each ADMF block contains a 'Mediation Function' box. The top ADMF block has an output labeled X1\_1. The middle ADMF block has outputs labeled X1\_2 and X1\_3. The bottom ADMF block has a 'Delivery Function 3' box and an output labeled X3. A 'Proxy-Relay' block is on the right. Arrows indicate data flow: X1\_1 from the top ADMF to the Proxy-Relay, X1\_2 from the middle ADMF to the Proxy-Relay, X1\_3 from the middle ADMF to the Proxy-Relay, and X3 from the bottom ADMF to the Proxy-Relay. The middle ADMF block also contains a 'Delivery Function 2' box, which receives an arrow from the Proxy-Relay. + +Packet Switched Intercept configuration diagram showing LEMF, ADMF, and Proxy-Relay components. + +Figure 1b: Packet Switched Intercept configuration + +![HLR Intercept configuration diagram showing a stack of rectangles and a box with an internal rectangle.](e821c3d8a87ee2a9ff6b8644ffe6bdae_img.jpg) + +This diagram illustrates the HLR Intercept configuration. It shows a stack of three rectangles on the left, similar to the LEMF in Figure 1b. To the right of the stack is a large rectangle containing a smaller rectangle in its upper-left corner. + +HLR Intercept configuration diagram showing a stack of rectangles and a box with an internal rectangle. + +Figure 1c: HLR Intercept configuration + +![IMS-CSCF Intercept configuration diagram showing a stack of rectangles and a box with an internal rectangle.](20136850feb70fd71c7d41cdae203ebb_img.jpg) + +This diagram illustrates the IMS-CSCF Intercept configuration. It shows a stack of three rectangles on the left, similar to the LEMF in Figure 1b. To the right of the stack is a large rectangle containing a smaller rectangle in its upper-left corner, identical to the configuration in Figure 1c. + +IMS-CSCF Intercept configuration diagram showing a stack of rectangles and a box with an internal rectangle. + +Figure 1d: IMS-CSCF Intercept configuration + +![Figure 1e: WLAN Interworking Intercept configuration diagram showing LEMF, HI1, HI2, Mediation ADMF Function, Mediation Delivery Function 2, X1_1, X1_2, X2, and AAA components.](2ae3eae1bd80a90f192f568ae246a9a6_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the WLAN Interworking Intercept configuration. On the left, a stack of three rectangles represents the LEMF (Lawful Intercept Management Function), with two specific interfaces labeled HI1 and HI2. These interfaces connect to two mediation functions: the 'Mediation ADMF Function' (top) and the 'Mediation Delivery Function 2' (bottom). The ADMF function has an output labeled X1\_1 pointing to the right, towards an 'AAA' (Authentication, Authorization, Accounting) server. The Delivery Function 2 has an output labeled X1\_2 pointing to the right, which then connects to an 'X2' interface. The X2 interface is located to the left of a vertical dashed line and has an arrow pointing left towards the Delivery Function 2. To the right of the dashed line, another arrow points from the X2 interface to the 'AAA' server. + +Figure 1e: WLAN Interworking Intercept configuration diagram showing LEMF, HI1, HI2, Mediation ADMF Function, Mediation Delivery Function 2, X1\_1, X1\_2, X2, and AAA components. + +Figure 1e: WLAN Interworking Intercept configuration + +![Figure 1f: IMS Conferencing Intercept configuration diagram showing LEMF, HI1, HI2, Mediation ADMF Function, Mediation Delivery Function 2, X1_1, X1_2, X2, and AS/MRFC components.](4cde160bcc69b7b6c81b648dd0e4252e_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the IMS Conferencing Intercept configuration. It follows a similar structure to Figure 1e. On the left, the LEMF stack has interfaces HI1 and HI2 connecting to the 'Mediation ADMF Function' and the 'Mediation Delivery Function 2'. The ADMF function outputs X1\_1 to the right, towards an 'AS/MRFC' (Application Server/Media Resource Function Controller). The Delivery Function 2 outputs X1\_2 to the right, leading to an 'X2' interface. The X2 interface is to the left of a vertical dashed line and has an arrow pointing left towards the Delivery Function 2. To the right of the dashed line, an arrow points from the X2 interface to the 'AS/MRFC'. + +Figure 1f: IMS Conferencing Intercept configuration diagram showing LEMF, HI1, HI2, Mediation ADMF Function, Mediation Delivery Function 2, X1\_1, X1\_2, X2, and AS/MRFC components. + +Figure 1f: IMS Conferencing Intercept configuration + +![Diagram of VoIP CC Intercept Configuration showing LEMF, ADMF, and various functions.](9c1d3678db4a12d5864cb2a4def1135d_img.jpg) + +This diagram illustrates the VoIP CC Intercept Configuration. On the left, a stack of three rectangles represents the LEMF (Lawful Intercept Management Function). Two horizontal lines, labeled HI1 and HI2, extend from the LEMF to two separate boxes. The top box contains a 'Mediation Function' and is labeled 'ADMF' (Access and Delivery Management Function). It has two output ports, X1\_1 and X1\_2. The bottom box contains a 'Mediation Function' and a 'Delivery Function 2', and is labeled X2. An arrow points from the X1\_1 port of the top box to a square box on the right. Another arrow points from the X2 label of the bottom box to the same square box on the right. + +Diagram of VoIP CC Intercept Configuration showing LEMF, ADMF, and various functions. + +Figure 1g: VoIP CC Intercept Configuration + +![Diagram of LALS configuration showing a network of five interconnected boxes.](759c7d62402f0b4651ddce292be5bdef_img.jpg) + +This diagram illustrates the LALS configuration. It consists of five square boxes connected by double-headed arrows. At the bottom left, two boxes are connected horizontally. The right box of this pair has an arrow pointing upwards to a third box. This third box is connected horizontally to a fourth box located to its right. Finally, the fourth box has an arrow pointing downwards to a fifth box located at the bottom right. The overall structure shows a central node (the third box) connected to three other nodes. + +Diagram of LALS configuration showing a network of five interconnected boxes. + +Figure 1h: LALS configuration + +![Diagram of interception at IBCF and MGCF](28d75f39a24203712ee907b32cf0bbe5_img.jpg) + +This diagram illustrates the interception process at the IBCF and MGCF for non-local target IDs. On the left, a vertical stack of three boxes represents the LEMF (Lawful Interception Management Function). To its right, three horizontal boxes represent the ADMF (Access Management Function) and Delivery Functions. The first ADMF box contains a 'Mediation Function' and has input HI1 and output X1\_1. The second box contains 'Mediation Function' and 'Delivery Function 2', with input HI2 and output X2. The third box contains 'Mediation Function' and 'Delivery Function 3', with input HI3 and output X3. A 'Proxy-Relay' box on the far right receives signals from X1\_1, X2, and X3. Vertical dashed lines separate the LEMF, ADMF/Delivery Function blocks, and the Proxy-Relay. Additional labels X1\_2 and X1\_3 are present between the ADMF and Proxy-Relay. + +Diagram of interception at IBCF and MGCF + +Figure 1i: Interception at IBCF and MGCF (only for Non-Local Target ID) + +![Diagram of S8HR VoLTE intercept configuration in the VPLMN](6ca05954842b17f14dfd52f26b9d43d2_img.jpg) + +This diagram shows the S8HR VoLTE intercept configuration in the VPLMN. It features a vertical stack of three boxes on the left, representing the LEMF. To the right of the LEMF is a large rectangular box representing the S8HR interface. Inside this large box, there is a smaller rectangular box in the upper-left corner, representing the MGCF or IBCF component. Vertical dashed lines are used to separate the LEMF from the S8HR interface box. + +Diagram of S8HR VoLTE intercept configuration in the VPLMN + +Figure 1j: S8HR VoLTE Intercept Configuration in the VPLMN + +![Diagram for Figure 1k: PTC Interception configuration. It shows a vertical stack of three rectangles on the left, with the top two overlapping. To the right of the top rectangle is a larger horizontal rectangle containing a smaller rectangle in its top-left corner. There are four small dots arranged vertically between the stack of rectangles and the larger horizontal rectangle.](dd5771673aececa53d42ece89218299d_img.jpg) + +Diagram for Figure 1k: PTC Interception configuration. It shows a vertical stack of three rectangles on the left, with the top two overlapping. To the right of the top rectangle is a larger horizontal rectangle containing a smaller rectangle in its top-left corner. There are four small dots arranged vertically between the stack of rectangles and the larger horizontal rectangle. + +Figure 1k: PTC Interception configuration + +![Diagram for Figure 1l: PTC Interception configuration (Shared servers). This diagram is identical to Figure 1k, showing a vertical stack of three rectangles on the left and a horizontal rectangle on the right containing a smaller rectangle, with four dots between them.](7d2d1d3870cd224c4430d19334557716_img.jpg) + +Diagram for Figure 1l: PTC Interception configuration (Shared servers). This diagram is identical to Figure 1k, showing a vertical stack of three rectangles on the left and a horizontal rectangle on the right containing a smaller rectangle, with four dots between them. + +Figure 1l: PTC Interception configuration (Shared servers) + +![Figure 1m: CSP Cell Supplemental Information Database configuration diagram. The diagram shows a network architecture for lawful interception. At the top, an 'Inbound Roaming Target' is connected to a 'Serving GW/BBIFF'. The 'Serving GW/BBIFF' is connected to an 'Other Party' and has two downward interfaces: 'Xia' and 'Xib'. The 'Xia' interface connects to an 'LMISF' (Lawful Interception Management and Supervision Function). The 'Xib' interface also connects to the 'LMISF'. The 'LMISF' is connected to two 'Delivery Function' blocks: 'Delivery Function 2' and 'Delivery Function 3'. These delivery functions are connected to a 'LEMF' (Law Enforcement Management Function) via interfaces 'HI2' and 'HI3'. The 'LMISF' is also connected to the 'Delivery Function' blocks via interfaces 'X2' and 'X3'.](00504fc688ebcf131ccbeff94dfc9939_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + InboundRoamingTarget[Inbound Roaming Target] --- ServingGW[BBIFF/Serving GW] + ServingGW --- OtherParty[Other Party] + ServingGW -- Xia --> LMISF[LMISF] + ServingGW -- Xib --> LMISF + LMISF -- X2 --> DF2[Delivery Function 2] + LMISF -- X3 --> DF3[Delivery Function 3] + DF2 -- HI2 --> LEMF[LEMF] + DF3 -- HI3 --> LEMF + +``` + +Figure 1m: CSP Cell Supplemental Information Database configuration diagram. The diagram shows a network architecture for lawful interception. At the top, an 'Inbound Roaming Target' is connected to a 'Serving GW/BBIFF'. The 'Serving GW/BBIFF' is connected to an 'Other Party' and has two downward interfaces: 'Xia' and 'Xib'. The 'Xia' interface connects to an 'LMISF' (Lawful Interception Management and Supervision Function). The 'Xib' interface also connects to the 'LMISF'. The 'LMISF' is connected to two 'Delivery Function' blocks: 'Delivery Function 2' and 'Delivery Function 3'. These delivery functions are connected to a 'LEMF' (Law Enforcement Management Function) via interfaces 'HI2' and 'HI3'. The 'LMISF' is also connected to the 'Delivery Function' blocks via interfaces 'X2' and 'X3'. + +**Figure 1m: CSP Cell Supplemental Information Database configuration** + +The LALS Triggering Function depicted in Figure 1h may be implemented as a part of either an ICE or a DF2. + +See clause 20 for the definitions of LMISF and BBIFF. These functions are specifically defined for LI in reference to the interception voice services in the VPLMN when S8HR approach is used as the VoLTE roaming architecture. + +The reference configuration is only a logical representation of the entities involved in lawful interception and does not mandate separate physical entities. + +Regional Mediation Functions, which may be transparent or part of the administration and delivery functions, are used to convert information on the HI1, HI2 and HI3 interfaces in the format described in various national or regional specifications. For example, if ETSI ES 201 671 [3] or ANSI J-STD-025 [8] is used, then the adaptation to HI1, HI2 and HI3 will be as defined in those specifications. + +There is one Administration Function (ADMF) in the network. Together with the delivery functions it is used to hide from the 3G ICEs that there might be multiple activations by different Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) on the same target. The administration function may be partitioned to ensure separation of the provisioning data from different agencies. + +See the remaining clauses of this document for definitions of the X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3, X2, X3, LALS\_T, Xia and Xib interfaces. These interfaces are specifically defined for LI and are not related to other interfaces/reference points having the same name specified in other 3GPP specifications (such as e.g. X2 interface specified in the e-UTRAN architecture). + +Interception at the Gateways is a national option. However, if 3G direct tunnel functionality with the GGSN is used in the network, as defined in TS 23.060 [10], then the GGSN shall perform the interception of IRI and the content of communications. + +In figure 1a DF3 is responsible for two primary functions: + +- Call Control (Signalling) for the Content of Communication (CC); and +- Bearer Transport for the CC. + +HI3 is the interface towards the LEMF. It shall be able to handle the signalling and the bearer transport for CC. + +In figures 1a, 1b, 1e, 1f, 1g, 1h, 1i and 1j, the HI2 and HI3-interfaces represent the interfaces between the LEA and two delivery functions. The delivery functions are used: + +- to distribute the Intercept Related Information (IRI) to the relevant LEA(s) via HI2 (based on IAs, if defined); +- to distribute the Content of Communication (CC) to the relevant LEA(s) via HI3 (based on IAs, if defined). + +In figures 1c, 1d and 1h the HI2 interface represents the interface between the LEA and the delivery function. The delivery function is used to distribute the Intercept Related Information (IRI) to the relevant LEA(s) via HI2. + +Figure 1g shows the CC interception configuration for VoIP. The trigger for the CC interception is provided by a SIP signalling node and identified within the figures as CC Interception Triggering Function. + +Figure 1m shows the CSP Cell Supplemental Information configuration that has an optional interface (shown as LI\_CELL\_INFO) connecting the DF2 and the CSP maintained record(s). This interface is implementation specific to the operator. This is used to obtain cell supplemental information held by the CSP and provide it to the LEA. In particular it delivers geo-location or civic location of the cell site to the LEA. More detail is contained in clause 22. + +NOTE 2: With reference to figure 1c, CC interception does not apply to HLR. + +NOTE 3: For IMS, figure 1d relates to the provision of IRI for SIP messages handled by the CSCF. Interception of CC for this case can be done at the GSN under a separate activation and invocation, according to the architecture in Figure 1b (see also clause 7.A.1). For CC interception of VoIP, see figure 1g. + +NOTE 4: If an operator is required to support "HI1 notification over HI2" TS 33.108 [11], the X1\_2 interface carries the information coming from the ADMF to the DF2/MF that will be conveyed to the LEMF. + +## 5 Activation, deactivation and interrogation + +### 5.0 General + +Figure 2 is an extraction from the reference intercept configuration shown in figures 1a through to 1j which is relevant for activation, deactivation and interrogation of the lawful interception. + +![Functional model for Lawful Interception activation, deactivation and interrogation diagram](0977b81510f7649846289ee785d20e74_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates a functional model for lawful interception. It features a central vertical stack of five rectangular blocks. The top block is connected to two external blocks on its left and right via horizontal double-headed arrows. Below the top block, a vertical double-headed arrow connects it to the second block. The second block is connected to a third block below it by a downward-pointing arrow. The third block is connected to a fourth block below it by a downward-pointing arrow. The fourth block is connected to the fifth (bottom) block by a downward-pointing arrow. To the right of the second block, a horizontal line extends to the right, with a vertical line branching down to a horizontal bar. To the right of the third block, a horizontal line extends to the right, with a vertical line branching down to a horizontal bar. To the right of the fourth block, a horizontal line extends to the right, with a vertical line branching down to a horizontal bar. To the right of the fifth block, a horizontal line extends to the right, with a vertical line branching down to a horizontal bar. + +Functional model for Lawful Interception activation, deactivation and interrogation diagram + +**Figure 2: Functional model for Lawful Interception activation, deactivation and interrogation** + +In addition to the typical 3G ICEs functional entities, a new functional entity is introduced - the ADMF - the Lawful Interception administration function. The ADMF: + +- interfaces with all the LEAs that may require interception in the intercepting network; +- keeps the intercept activities of individual LEAs separate; +- interfaces to the intercepting network. + +Every physical 3G ICE is linked by its own X1\_1-interface to the ADMF. Consequently, every single 3G ICE performs interception (activation, deactivation, interrogation as well as invocation) independently from other 3G ICEs. The HI1-interface represents the interface between the requester of the lawful interception and the Lawful administration function; it is included for completeness, but is beyond the scope of standardisation in this document. + +For VoIP CC Interception, the CC Interception Triggering Function and the CC Intercept Function are treated as one 3G + +ICE from a Lawful Interception administration perspective. + +The target identities for 3GMS CS and PS interception at the SGSN, GGSN, 3G MSC Server and 3G GMSC Server can be at least one of the following: IMSI, MSISDN (or E.164 number for optional Non-Local ID) or IMEI. + +NOTE 1: Some communication content during a mobility procedure might not be intercepted when interception is based on MSISDN (only PS interception) or IMEI. The use of the IMSI does not have this limitation. For the availability of the target identities IMSI, MSISDN and IMEI (PS interception), refer to TS 23.060 [10]. + +The target identities for multi-media at the CSCF can be one or more of the following: SIP URI, TEL URI, or IMEI. Other identities are not defined in this release. The same identities (where available) are used as target identities for VoLTE interception in the VPLMN with S8HR. For VoLTE interception in the VPLMN with S8HR, the ADMF shall provision LMISF with the target identities. + +The target identities for 3GPP WLAN Interworking interception can be MSISDN, IMSI or NAI. For the availability of the target identities in the I-WLAN nodes (AAA server, PDG, WAG), refer to TS 23.234 [14], TS 23.008 [15], TS 29.234 [16] and TS 24.234 [17]. + +NOTE 2: The NAI might be a temporary ID, therefore the use of MSISDN or IMSI is recommended. + +NOTE 3: Void + +NOTE 3A: WLAN Interworking specifications (TS 23.234 [14], TS 24.234 [17] and TS 29.234 [16]) are no longer maintained for Release 12 onwards. This clause is therefore no longer maintained for WLAN Interworking. + +The target identities for 3GPP HNB interception can be IMSI, MSISDN (or E.164 number for optional Non-Local ID), IMEI, or ME Id. + +Use of the HNB ID or the CSG Identity as a target identity is FFS. + +In the case of location dependent interception the following network/national options exist: + +- target location versus Interception Areas (IAs) check in the 3G ICEs and Delivery Functions (DFs); +- target location versus IAs check in the DFs (physical collocation of the DFs to the 3G ICEs may be required by national law); +- location dependent interception is not applicable to CSCF. + +NOTE 4: Void + +The IA is previously defined by a set of cells. From the location of the target this set of cells permits to find the relevant IA. + +NOTE 5: Void + +It is not required that the 3G GMSC or the 3G GGSN are used for interception when Location Dependent Interception is invoked and the location of the target is not available. + +NOTE 6: Location dependent intercept for the 3G MSC Server is not defined for this release. + +The ADMF shall be able to provision P-CSCFs independently from S-CSCFs. If both P-CSCFs and S-CSCFs are administered within the network for intercept, redundant multi-media IRI may be presented to the agency as a result. + +When Non-Local ID interception is required by national regulation, the ADMF shall be able to provision S-CSCF, P-CSCF, IBCF and MGCF independently of each other with the Non-Local ID as the target ID along with an indication that it is for a Non-Local ID interception, and nature of the interception (i.e. incoming calls and/or outgoing calls). + +## 5.1 Activation + +### 5.1.0 General + +Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the information flow for the activation of Lawful Interception. + +### 5.1.1 X1\_1-interface + +The messages sent from the ADMF to the 3G ICEs (X1\_1-interface) contain the: + +- target identities (MSISDN, IMSI, IMEI, SIP URI or TEL URI, NAI) (see notes 4, 5, 6); +- information whether the Content of Communication (CC) shall be provided (see note 1); +- address of Delivery Function 2 (DF2) for the intercept related information (see note 2); +- address of Delivery Function 3 (DF3) for the intercepted content of communications (see note 3); +- IA in the case of location dependent interception; +- indication whether the LALS Enhanced Location for IRI shall be provided. This indication is used to arm the LALS Triggering Function in the case when the LALS Triggering Function is associated with the ICE; +- type of location report required (immediate or periodic) in the case of Target Positioning provision; +- address of SX3LIF if CUPS is supported. + +NOTE 1: Void + +As an option, the filtering whether intercept content of communications and/or intercept related information has to be provided can be part of the delivery functions. (Note that intercept content of communications options do not apply at the CSCF, HLR, LI LCS Client and AAA server). If the option is used, the corresponding information can be omitted on the X1\_1-interface, while "information not present" means "intercept content of communications and related information has to be provided" for the ICE. Furthermore the delivery function which is not requested has to be "pseudo-activated", in order to prevent error cases at invocation. + +NOTE 2: Void + +As an option, only a single DF2 is used by and known to every 3G ICE. In this case the address of DF2 can be omitted. + +NOTE 3: Void + +As an option, only a single DF3 is used by and known to every 3G ICE (except at the CSCFs, HLR, LI LCS Client and AAA server). In this case the address of DF3 can be omitted. + +NOTE 4: Since the IMEI is not available, interception based on IMEI is not applicable at the 3G Gateway. Moreover, in case the IMEI is not available, interception based on IMEI is not applicable at 3G ICEs. + +NOTE 5: Void + +Interception at the CSCFs is based upon either SIP URI, TEL URI or IMEI. The interception at the LMISF is also based on SIP URI, TEL URI or IMEI. SIP URI and TEL URI as target identities are not supported by the other ICEs. The related CC interception also uses the SIP URI, TEL URI or IMEI. + +NOTE 6: Interception based on NAI is only applicable at AAA server, PDG, and WAG. As the NAI could be encrypted or based on temporary identity at the PDG and WAG, interception based on the NAI is not applicable in those cases in these nodes. + +NOTE 7: Void + +If after activation subsequent Content of Communications (CC) or Intercept Related Information (IRI) has to be activated (or deactivated) an "activation change request" with the same identity of the target is to be sent. + +![Figure 3: Information flow on X1_1-interface for Lawful Interception activation. The diagram shows a vertical sequence of four rectangular boxes connected by downward arrows. Above the first box is a large black rectangle. To the right of the second and third boxes are smaller grey rectangles. The flow starts from the top, passes through the first box, then the second, then the third, and finally the fourth box at the bottom.](6e15fc9ea763541c5913d26f85072ae1_img.jpg) + +Figure 3: Information flow on X1\_1-interface for Lawful Interception activation. The diagram shows a vertical sequence of four rectangular boxes connected by downward arrows. Above the first box is a large black rectangle. To the right of the second and third boxes are smaller grey rectangles. The flow starts from the top, passes through the first box, then the second, then the third, and finally the fourth box at the bottom. + +**Figure 3: Information flow on X1\_1-interface for Lawful Interception activation** + +Interception of a target can be activated on request from different LEAs and each LEA may request interception via a different identity. In this case, each target identity on which to intercept will need to be sent via separate activation messages from ADMF to the 3G ICEs on the X1\_1-interface. Each activation can be for IRI only, or both CC and IRI. + +When several LEAs request activation on the same identity and the ADMF determines that there is an existing activation on the identity, the ADMF may (as an implementation option) send additional activation message(s) to the 3G ICEs. When the activation needs to change from IRI only to CC and IRI an activation change message will be sent to the 3G ICEs. + +In the case of a secondary interception activation only the relevant LEAs will get the relevant IRIs. + +### 5.1.2 X1\_2-interface (IRI) + +For the activation of IRI the message sent from the ADMF to the DF contains: + +- the target identity; +- the address(es) for delivery of IRI (= LEMF address); + - optionally multiple addresses for distributed delivery of IRI to a single LEMF; + - optionally a primary and failover address(es) for delivery of IRI to either a single LEMF or two different LEMFs for the same LIID. +- Which subset of information shall be delivered; +- an indication whether the LALS Enhanced Location for IRI shall be delivered. This indication is used to arm the LALS Triggering Function in the case when the LALS Triggering Function is associated with the DF; +- a DF2 activation identity, which uniquely identifies the activation for DF2 and is used for further interrogation or deactivation, respectively; +- the IA in case of location dependent interception; +- interception of international outbound roaming IMS VoIP interception (allowed/not allowed); +- the warrant reference number if required by national option. + +If a target is intercepted for several LEAs and/or several identities simultaneously, a single activation of delivery is necessary for each combination of LEA and identity. + +![Figure 4: Information flow on X1_2-interface for Lawful Interception activation. The diagram shows a vertical stack of three rectangular blocks on the left. To their right, a central rectangular block has arrows pointing to it from the top two blocks on the left and from a grey rectangular block on the far right. Below the central block is another rectangular block, which has an arrow pointing to it from the central block and an arrow pointing to the bottom block on the left. The far-right grey block has a bidirectional arrow with a shaded rectangular block below it. This shaded block contains two smaller rectangular blocks, with arrows pointing between them and from the top one to the central block.](2837ffdadcdb1e5bababa56b564e56ed_img.jpg) + +Figure 4: Information flow on X1\_2-interface for Lawful Interception activation. The diagram shows a vertical stack of three rectangular blocks on the left. To their right, a central rectangular block has arrows pointing to it from the top two blocks on the left and from a grey rectangular block on the far right. Below the central block is another rectangular block, which has an arrow pointing to it from the central block and an arrow pointing to the bottom block on the left. The far-right grey block has a bidirectional arrow with a shaded rectangular block below it. This shaded block contains two smaller rectangular blocks, with arrows pointing between them and from the top one to the central block. + +**Figure 4: Information flow on X1\_2-interface for Lawful Interception activation** + +### 5.1.3 X1\_3-interface (CC) + +For the activation of intercepted Content of Communications the message sent from the ADMF to the Delivery Function contains: + +- the target identity; +- the address(es) of delivery for CC (= LEMF address); + - optionally multiple addresses for delivery of CC to a single LEMF; + - optionally a primary and failover address(es) for delivery of CC to either a single LEMF or two different LEMFs for the same LIID. +- A DF3 activation identity, which uniquely identifies the activation for DF3 and is used for further interrogation or deactivation, respectively; +- the IA in case of location dependent interception; +- interception of international outbound roaming IMS VoIP interception (allowed/not allowed); +- the warrant reference number if required by national option. + +If a target is intercepted by several LEAs and/or several identities simultaneously, a single activation of delivery is necessary for each combination of LEA and identity. + +![Figure 5: Information flow on X1_3-interface for Lawful Interception activation. The diagram shows four rectangular blocks at the top: 'SIP CORE', 'HSS', 'PoC/MCPTT', and 'Shared XDMS/MCPTT Common Core Servers'. The 'PoC/MCPTT' block has a bidirectional arrow with the 'Shared XDMS/MCPTT Common Core Servers' block. Below these four blocks is a wide rectangular block labeled 'DF 2'. Arrows point from each of the four top blocks down to the 'DF 2' block. Below the 'DF 2' block is a rectangular block labeled 'LEMF', with an arrow pointing from the 'DF 2' block down to it.](c85b57b2414f341860dfc338e1cf2509_img.jpg) + +Figure 5: Information flow on X1\_3-interface for Lawful Interception activation. The diagram shows four rectangular blocks at the top: 'SIP CORE', 'HSS', 'PoC/MCPTT', and 'Shared XDMS/MCPTT Common Core Servers'. The 'PoC/MCPTT' block has a bidirectional arrow with the 'Shared XDMS/MCPTT Common Core Servers' block. Below these four blocks is a wide rectangular block labeled 'DF 2'. Arrows point from each of the four top blocks down to the 'DF 2' block. Below the 'DF 2' block is a rectangular block labeled 'LEMF', with an arrow pointing from the 'DF 2' block down to it. + +**Figure 5: Information flow on X1\_3-interface for Lawful Interception activation** + +## 5.2 Deactivation + +### 5.2.0 General + +Figures 6, 7 and 8 show the information flow for the deactivation of the Lawful interception. + +#### 5.2.1 X1\_1-interface + +The messages sent from the ADMF to the 3G ICEs for deactivation contain: + +- the target identity; +- the possible relevant IAs in case of location dependent interception. + +![Figure 6: Information flow on X1_1-interface for Lawful Interception deactivation. The diagram shows the interaction between LEMF, ADMF, PTC Server, and KMS. LEMF sends HI1 to ADMF's Mediation Function and HI2 to Delivery Function 2's Mediation Function. ADMF sends X1_1 to PTC Server. Delivery Function 2 sends X2 to PTC Server. PTC Server sends Xk to KMS, which then sends a message back to Delivery Function 2.](9ff1b32449ea068bba9647d71904bd59_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant LEMF + participant ADMF + participant PTC Server + participant KMS + + Note left of LEMF: HI1 + LEMF->>ADMF: HI1 + Note left of LEMF: HI2 + LEMF->>DF2: HI2 + Note right of ADMF: X1_1 + ADMF->>PTC Server: X1_1 + Note right of DF2: X2 + DF2->>PTC Server: X2 + Note right of PTC Server: Xk + PTC Server->>KMS: Xk + KMS->>DF2: + +``` + +Figure 6: Information flow on X1\_1-interface for Lawful Interception deactivation. The diagram shows the interaction between LEMF, ADMF, PTC Server, and KMS. LEMF sends HI1 to ADMF's Mediation Function and HI2 to Delivery Function 2's Mediation Function. ADMF sends X1\_1 to PTC Server. Delivery Function 2 sends X2 to PTC Server. PTC Server sends Xk to KMS, which then sends a message back to Delivery Function 2. + +**Figure 6: Information flow on X1\_1-interface for Lawful Interception deactivation** + +If interception of a target has been activated via different identities then a separate deactivation message will need to be sent from the ADMF to the 3G ICEs for each identity. + +When several LEAs requested activation on the same identity and subsequently request deactivation then the ADMF determines that there are remaining activations on the identity. In this case, the ADMF will not send a deactivation message to the 3G ICEs except when the activation needs to change from CC and IRI to IRI only. In that case an activation change message will be sent to the 3G ICEs. + +#### 5.2.2 X1\_2-interface (IRI) + +The message(s) sent from the ADMF to Delivery Function 2 for the deactivation of the Intercept Related Information contains: + +- a DF2 activation ID, which uniquely identifies the activation to be deactivated for DF2. + +If a target is intercepted by several LEAs and/or several identities simultaneously, a single deactivation is necessary for each combination of LEA and identity. + +![Figure 7: Information flow on X1_2-interface for Lawful Interception deactivation](6629e8a87e7552e2454b7c3e9f6d73a0_img.jpg) + +A block diagram showing information flow. At the top, a box labeled 'PoC/MCPTT Server' contains a sub-box 'Duplicator of Packets'. Arrows point from this sub-box to 'Target' on the left and 'Other Party' on the right. A downward arrow from the 'PoC/MCPTT Server' box points to a box labeled 'Delivery Function 3'. Another downward arrow from 'Delivery Function 3' points to a box labeled 'LEMF'. + +Figure 7: Information flow on X1\_2-interface for Lawful Interception deactivation + +Figure 7: Information flow on X1\_2-interface for Lawful Interception deactivation + +### 5.2.3 X1\_3-interface (CC) + +For deactivating the delivery of the CC the message(s) sent from the ADMF to DF3 contains: + +- a DF3 activation ID, which uniquely identifies the activation to be deactivated for DF3. + +![Figure 8: Information flow on X1_3-interface for Lawful Interception deactivation](d8698aacaeead6dfed9a1e448670a2e4_img.jpg) + +A diagram showing information flow on the X1\_3-interface. On the left, three overlapping vertical rectangles represent a stack of messages. On the right, two horizontal rectangles represent protocol layers. The top rectangle has a smaller rectangle inside its left side. The bottom rectangle also has a smaller rectangle inside its left side. Vertical lines connect the top rectangle to the bottom rectangle, and a vertical line extends downwards from the bottom rectangle. + +Figure 8: Information flow on X1\_3-interface for Lawful Interception deactivation + +Figure 8: Information flow on X1\_3-interface for Lawful Interception deactivation + +## 5.3 Interrogation + +### 5.3.0 General + +Interrogation provides the current status of the interception activation in the system. Interrogation of all activations for a given LEA is an ADMF function. + +### 5.3.1 Interrogation of the 3G ICEs + +Figure 9 shows the information flow for the interrogation of the Lawful Interception. It shall be possible to interrogate: + +- a specific activation at each relevant 3G ICEs; +- all activations at each relevant 3G ICEs. + +As a result of the interrogation the activation status and data are returned. + +![Figure 9: Interrogation of the Lawful Interception (3G ICEs). A block diagram showing a 'Target' box on the left and an 'other party' box on the right. Arrows from both point into a central box labeled 'SCEF, IWK-SCEF'. Inside this box, a dashed box points to a 'Duplicator of packets' box. Below the 'SCEF, IWK-SCEF' box, an arrow points down to 'Delivery Function 3', which in turn points down to 'LEA'.](9f6dec4d4e9fde40bce018861ef1278e_img.jpg) + +Figure 9: Interrogation of the Lawful Interception (3G ICEs). A block diagram showing a 'Target' box on the left and an 'other party' box on the right. Arrows from both point into a central box labeled 'SCEF, IWK-SCEF'. Inside this box, a dashed box points to a 'Duplicator of packets' box. Below the 'SCEF, IWK-SCEF' box, an arrow points down to 'Delivery Function 3', which in turn points down to 'LEA'. + +Figure 9: Interrogation of the Lawful Interception (3G ICEs) + +### 5.3.2 Interrogation of Delivery Functions + +Figure 10 shows the information flow for the interrogation of the Lawful Interception. It shall be possible to interrogate: + +- a specific activation at a DF; +- all activations at a DF for a given target identity; +- all activations at a DF. + +As a result of the interrogation the activation status and data are returned. + +![Figure 10: Interrogation of the Lawful Interception (Delivery Functions). A sequence diagram with lifelines for DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signalling, MS A, MSC Server, MGW, and B. The sequence shows call establishment (SETUP, IAM, ACM, CPG(alert), ANM, CONNECT, ALERTING, DISCONNECT, REL) and bearer establishment/release (Prepare Bearer Establishment/Establish Bearer, Bearer Establishment, Call Establishment Attempt, Stublines contain CC of AB, Release Bearer/Release Resource, release of stublines, Bearer Release, Release).](24b1ac9eb58a2f22801620b9e2ea8bd3_img.jpg) + +Figure 10: Interrogation of the Lawful Interception (Delivery Functions). A sequence diagram with lifelines for DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signalling, MS A, MSC Server, MGW, and B. The sequence shows call establishment (SETUP, IAM, ACM, CPG(alert), ANM, CONNECT, ALERTING, DISCONNECT, REL) and bearer establishment/release (Prepare Bearer Establishment/Establish Bearer, Bearer Establishment, Call Establishment Attempt, Stublines contain CC of AB, Release Bearer/Release Resource, release of stublines, Bearer Release, Release). + +Figure 10: Interrogation of the Lawful Interception (Delivery Functions) + +## 5A X Interfaces + +### 5A.1 General + +X interfaces as defined in clause 4 and used throughout the present document, are used to control interception (X1), transport intercepted IRI (X2) and CC (X3) to the MF/DF. This clause defines the use of standardised X interfaces. + +X1, X2 and X3 as defined in the present document shall support the requirements in clause 5A.2, 5A.3 and 5A.4. + +When circuit switched services defined in clause 6, are supported, requirements in 5A.2, 5A.3, and 5A.4 are optional for CS functions defined in clause 6. + +ADMFs, MFs/DFs and points of interception (e.g. ICEs) may support already existing proprietary X interfaces. + +NOTE: Deployments need to ensure that X interfaces are only provided in network functions which are specifically required to support LI in a given CSP implementation. + +## 5A.2 X1 + +### 5A.2.1 General + +The X1 interface is used to activate, manage and terminate interception as defined in clause 5. The present document defines three X1 interfaces as follows: + +X1\_1 between the ADMF and the points of interception; + +X1\_2 between the ADMF and the MF/DF2; + +X1\_3 between the ADMF and the MF/DF3. + +X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3 shall support the use of ETSI TS 103 221-1 [89] for transport of X1 messages / information. However, default configurations, information element formats and other parameters as defined in the present document shall apply regardless of generic default options specified in TS 103 221-1 [89]. + +### 5A.2.2 X1 Detail + +Editor's Note: This clause will define 3GPP specific use of TS 103 221-1 [89], including header parameters, mandatory parameters and other 3GPP specific issues. X1 message contents are defined in applicable service specific sections. + +## 5A.3 X2 + +### 5A.3.1 General + +The X2 interface is used to transport IRI from the point of interception to the MF/DF2. In the present document, service specific IRI required to be transported over the X2 interface is defined in subsequent network access or service clauses. + +Support for fully standardised X2 is not defined in the present document. + +## 5A.4 X3 + +### 5A.4.1 General + +The X3 interface is used to transport CC from the point of interception to the MF/DF3. In the present document, service specific CC required to be transported over the X3 interface is defined in subsequent network access or service clauses. + +Support for fully standardised X3 is not defined in the present document. + +## 6 Invocation of Lawful Interception (LI) for Circuit Switched (CS) services + +### 6.0 General + +Figure 11 shows an extraction from the reference configuration in figure 1a which is relevant for the invocation of the lawful interception. + +![Figure 11: Functional model for Lawful Interception invocation. This sequence diagram illustrates the interaction between seven entities: DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signalling, MS B, MSC Server, MGW, and A. The sequence starts with an IAM message from A to MGW. MGW sends 'Prepare Bearer Establishment/Establish Bearer' to DF3 Bearer, which in turn sends 'setup of stublines' to DF3 Signalling. DF3 Signalling sends 'Call Establishment Attempt' to DF2. DF2 sends 'ACM' to MSC Server. MSC Server sends 'SETUP' to MS B, which responds with 'ALERTING'. MSC Server then sends 'CPG(alert)' to MGW, which sends 'CONNECT' to MS B. MS B responds with 'Answer' to DF3 Signalling. DF3 Signalling sends 'stublines contain CC of AB' to DF2. MSC Server sends 'DISCONNECT' to MS B, which responds with 'REL'. MGW sends 'Release Resource/Release Bearer' to DF3 Bearer, which sends 'release of stublines' to DF3 Signalling. DF3 Signalling sends 'Bearer Release' to DF3 Bearer, which finally sends 'Release' to DF2.](8c880d6b715587bd710a9ba8414469b1_img.jpg) + +Figure 11: Functional model for Lawful Interception invocation. This sequence diagram illustrates the interaction between seven entities: DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signalling, MS B, MSC Server, MGW, and A. The sequence starts with an IAM message from A to MGW. MGW sends 'Prepare Bearer Establishment/Establish Bearer' to DF3 Bearer, which in turn sends 'setup of stublines' to DF3 Signalling. DF3 Signalling sends 'Call Establishment Attempt' to DF2. DF2 sends 'ACM' to MSC Server. MSC Server sends 'SETUP' to MS B, which responds with 'ALERTING'. MSC Server then sends 'CPG(alert)' to MGW, which sends 'CONNECT' to MS B. MS B responds with 'Answer' to DF3 Signalling. DF3 Signalling sends 'stublines contain CC of AB' to DF2. MSC Server sends 'DISCONNECT' to MS B, which responds with 'REL'. MGW sends 'Release Resource/Release Bearer' to DF3 Bearer, which sends 'release of stublines' to DF3 Signalling. DF3 Signalling sends 'Bearer Release' to DF3 Bearer, which finally sends 'Release' to DF2. + +**Figure 11: Functional model for Lawful Interception invocation** + +The HI2 and HI3 interfaces represent the interfaces between the LEMF and two delivery functions. Both interfaces are subject to national requirements. They are included for completeness, but are beyond the scope of standardization in this document. The delivery functions are used: + +- to convert the information on the X2-interface to the corresponding information on the HI2-interface; +- to convert the information on the X3-interface to the corresponding information on the HI3-interface; +- to distribute the intercept related information to the relevant LEA(s) (based on IAs, if defined); +- to distribute the intercept content of communications to the relevant LEA(s) (based on IAs, if defined). + +For the delivery of the CC and IRI, the 3G MSC Server provides a correlation number and target identity to the DF2 and DF3 which is used to select the different LEAs to which the product shall be delivered. + +NOTE: Void + +If interception has been activated for both parties of the call both CC and IRI will be delivered for each party as separate intercept activity. + +The Mc interface between the 3G MSC Server and MGW is used to establish intercept and deliver the bearer to DF3. + +When the Gateway MSC is anchoring the call and the call to target cannot be intercepted by the serving MSC within the same network, the Gateway MSC shall have the capability to limit interception to the following cases: + +- call forwarding unconditional; +- roaming in another CSP's network. + +For Location Dependent Interception, the location dependency check occurs at the establishment of each call. Subsequent dependency checks for simultaneous calls are not required, but can be a national option. + +If a target is marked using an IA in the 3G MSC Server, the 3G MSC Server shall perform a location dependency check at call set-up. Only if the target's location matches the IA then the call is intercepted. + +If a target is marked using an IA in the DF2, the DF2 shall perform a location dependency check at reception of the first IRI for the call. Only if the target's location matches the IA for certain LEAs is IRI the relayed to these LEAs. All subsequent IRIs for the call are sent to the same LEAs. + +If a target is marked using an IA in the DF3, the DF3 signalling function shall perform a location dependency check at reception of the CC. Only if the target's location matches the IA for certain LEAs is the CC relayed to these LEAs. + +National regulations may require the interception based in the HLR, using the DF2 with a delivery through the HI2 interface. + +When LALS is used to report location for CS services, the LI LCS Client shall deliver this using the DF2 through the HI2 interface. This is further defined in Clause 19. + +## 6.1 Provision of Intercept CC - Circuit Switched + +Figure 12 shows the access method for the delivering of CC. The access method shall be a bridged/ T-connection. Based on the mutual agreement between the intercepting CSPs and the LEAs, the CC may be delivered to the LEAs over CS-based or an IP-based handover interface. The system shall be able to support both handover methods for an intercepted call, since there can be multiple LEAs intercept the same call and the chosen approach for the handover interface may be different for different LEAs. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the delivery configuration to the LEMF for the interception of a circuit switched call. The diagram shows interactions between DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS A, MSC Server, MGW, B, and C. Key messages include SETUP(AB), Answer(AB), Call Establishment Attempt(CA, CWAIT), SETUP(CA), ALERTING(CA), HOLD(AB), HOLD ACK(AB), Suppl. Service(AB, CHOLD), CONNECT(CA), Answer(CA), DISCONNECT(CA), Release(CA), RETRIEVE(AB), RETRIEVE ACK(AB), Suppl. Service(AB, CRETR), DISCONNECT(AB), and Release(AB). Stubs indicate the delivery of Call Content (CC) to the LEMF.](23b48e0b60d0b6deb0cc9862ff4b8ead_img.jpg) + +The diagram is a sequence diagram showing the interaction between various network elements for call interception. The lifelines are DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS A, MSC Server, MGW, B, and C. The sequence of messages is as follows: + +- MS A sends **SETUP(AB)** to MSC Server. +- A box indicates: "... setup and interception of AB call as in figure A1 ..." +- MSC Server sends **Answer(AB)** to MS A. +- A horizontal line (stubline) from the DF3 Signaling/Bearer area to DF2 is labeled *Stublines contain CC of AB*. +- MSC Server sends **Call Establishment Attempt(CA, CWAIT)** to MGW. +- MGW sends **IAM** to B. +- MSC Server sends **SETUP(CA)** to MS A. +- MS A sends **ALERTING(CA)** to MSC Server. +- MGW sends **CPG(alert)** to B. +- MSC Server sends **HOLD(AB)** to MS A. +- MS A sends **HOLD ACK(AB)** to MSC Server. +- MSC Server sends **Suppl. Service(AB, CHOLD)** to MS A. +- MSC Server sends **CONNECT(CA)** to MS A. +- MS A sends **Answer(CA)** to MSC Server. +- MGW sends **ANM** to B. +- A horizontal line (stubline) from the DF3 Signaling/Bearer area to DF2 is labeled *stublines contain CC of CA*. +- MSC Server sends **DISCONNECT(CA)** to MS A. +- MGW sends **REL** to B. +- MSC Server sends **Release(CA)** to MS A. +- MSC Server sends **RETRIEVE(AB)** to MS A. +- MS A sends **RETRIEVE ACK(AB)** to MSC Server. +- MSC Server sends **Suppl. Service(AB, CRETR)** to MS A. +- A horizontal line (stubline) from the DF3 Signaling/Bearer area to DF2 is labeled *Stublines contain CC of AB*. +- MSC Server sends **DISCONNECT(AB)** to MS A. +- MGW sends **REL** to B. +- A box indicates: "... release of AB call and interception as in figure A1 ..." +- MSC Server sends **Release(AB)** to MS A. + +Sequence diagram illustrating the delivery configuration to the LEMF for the interception of a circuit switched call. The diagram shows interactions between DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS A, MSC Server, MGW, B, and C. Key messages include SETUP(AB), Answer(AB), Call Establishment Attempt(CA, CWAIT), SETUP(CA), ALERTING(CA), HOLD(AB), HOLD ACK(AB), Suppl. Service(AB, CHOLD), CONNECT(CA), Answer(CA), DISCONNECT(CA), Release(CA), RETRIEVE(AB), RETRIEVE ACK(AB), Suppl. Service(AB, CRETR), DISCONNECT(AB), and Release(AB). Stubs indicate the delivery of Call Content (CC) to the LEMF. + +**Figure 12: Example of delivery configuration to the LEMF for the interception of a circuit switched call** + +The figure 12 shows that CS-MGW provides the access point for the CC irrespective of the method used at the handover interface. With CS-based handover interface, the CC is delivered over CS circuits to the LEAs. With IP-based handover interface, the payload of the CC may be in the RTP (RFC 3550 [86]) format. The payload description (e.g. codec information) is sent along with the CC to the LEAs. + +See Annex L for informative architectural descriptions related to the use of IP-based handover interface for delivering the CC to LEAs. + +The signals of both parties of the configuration to be intercepted are delivered separately to the LEMF. The delivery function has no impact on the connection between the subscribers. + +The two stublines towards the LEMF are established in parallel to the call set up. For both stublines the address is used which has been provided during activation. + +Bearer, and only bearer, is sent from the MGW to the bearer function of DF3. + +NOTE 1: Void + +For data calls it is necessary to provide means for fast call establishment towards the LEMF to help ensure that the beginning of the data transmission is delivered. + +The following information needs to be transferred from the 3G MSC Server to the DF3 in order to allow the DF3 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity (MSISDN or E. 164 Number (for optional Non-Local ID), IMSI or IMEI, for DF3 internal use only); +- the target location (if available) or the IAs in case of location dependent interception; +- date/time of location (if target location provided); +- correlation number (IRI <-> CC); +- direction indication - (Signal from target or signal to target). + +NOTE 2: Void. + +Additional information may be provided if required by national laws. + +## 6.2 Provision of CC - Short Message Service + +Figure 14 shows an SMS transfer from the 3G MSC Server to the LEMF. Quasi-parallel to the delivery from / to the mobile subscriber a message, which contains the contents of the SMS with the header, is generated and sent via the Delivery Function 2 to the LEMF in the same way as the Intercept Related Information. + +The IRI will be delivered to the LEMF: + +- for a SMS-MO. Dependent on national requirements, delivery shall occur in the following cases: + - when the 3G MSC receives the SMS from the target MS, or when the 3G MSC detects that an SMS is to the Non-Local ID target. + - when the 3G MSC receives notification that the SMS-Centre successfully received the SMS that was originated from the target MS, or sent to the Non-Local ID target. +- for a SMS-MT. Dependent on national requirements, delivery shall occur in the following cases: + - when the 3G MSC receives the SMS from the SMS-Centre when the SMS was originated from a Non-Local ID target, or will have to be sent to a target MS. + - when the 3G MSC receives notification that recipient MS has received the SMS successfully. The recipient MS is the target MS when the SMS is sent to the target. The recipient MS may not be the target when the SMS was originating from a Non-Local ID target. + +![Diagram showing the provision of content of communication for Short Message Service. It features three boxes: 'Target', '3G MSC', and 'SMS Service center'. The 'Target' box is connected to the '3G MSC' box. The '3G MSC' box is connected to the 'SMS Service center' box. The 'SMS Service center' box is connected to the 'Target' box. The '3G MSC' box is also connected to the 'Target' box.](048e5a8baf735b071833f28b58d22e4f_img.jpg) + +**Figure 14: Provision of Content of Communication - Short Message Service** + +Diagram showing the provision of content of communication for Short Message Service. It features three boxes: 'Target', '3G MSC', and 'SMS Service center'. The 'Target' box is connected to the '3G MSC' box. The '3G MSC' box is connected to the 'SMS Service center' box. The 'SMS Service center' box is connected to the 'Target' box. The '3G MSC' box is also connected to the 'Target' box. + +## 6.3 Provision of Intercept Related Information + +### 6.3.0 General + +Intercept Related Information (Events) are necessary at the Begin and End of the call, for all supplementary services during a call and for information which is not call associated. There are call related events and non-call related events. + +On top of IRI generated by events from the 3G MSC Server, national regulations may require to complement them by IRI produced by a Delivery Function 2 associated to the HLR and/ or LI LCS Client. + +Figure 15 shows the transfer of intercept related information to the DF2. If an event for / from a mobile subscriber occurs, the 3G MSC Server sends the relevant data to the DF2. + +![Diagram showing the provision of intercept related information from a 3G MSC to a Target and an Other party.](09e20a17ecd8042b3d9b7fd462f2d9b4_img.jpg) + +The diagram consists of three rectangular boxes arranged horizontally. The left box is labeled 'Target', the middle box is labeled '3G MSC', and the right box is labeled 'Other'. There are no lines or arrows connecting these boxes in this specific image fragment. + +Diagram showing the provision of intercept related information from a 3G MSC to a Target and an Other party. + +**Figure 15: Provision of Intercept Related Information** party + +### 6.3.1 X2-interface + +The following information needs to be transferred from the 3G MSC Server or the HLR and/ or LI LCS Client to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity (MSISDN, IMSI or IMEI); +- in case of location dependent interception, the IAs and/or target cell ID shall be provided; +- events and associated parameters as defined in clauses 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 may be provided. + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 with a reliable transport mechanism. + +### 6.3.2 Structure of the events + +The information sent to DF2 is triggered by different call related and non-call related events/reports. Details are described in following clause. The events and reports for interception are configurable (if they are sent to DF2) in the 3G MSC Server, HLR and LI LCS Client. They can be suppressed in the DF2. The events are listed as follows: + +Call Related Events (applicable to the 3G MSC Server): + +- Call Establishment; +- Answer; +- Supplementary Service; +- Handover; +- Release. + +Non Call Related Events (applicable to the 3G MSC Server): + +- SMS; +- Location Update; + +- Subscriber Controlled Input. + +HLR Related Events: + +- Serving System; +- HLR subscriber record change; +- Cancel location; +- Register location; +- Location information request; + +LALS Reports (see Clause 19): + +- Report for LALS Target Positioning; +- Report for LALS Enhanced Location for IRI. + +Table 1 below shows the set of information that can be associated with the events. The events and LALS reports trigger the transmission of the information from the 3G MSC Server, HLR or from the LI LCS Client to DF2. Available IEs from this set of information can be extended in the 3G MSC Server, HLR or in the LI LCS Client, if this is necessary in a specific country. DF2 can extend available information if this is necessary in a specific country e.g. a unique number for each surveillance warrant. + +**Table 1: Information Elements for Circuit Event records** + +| | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN
Target Identifier with the MSISDN of the target. | +| Observed IMSI
Target Identifier with the IMSI of the target. | +| Observed IMEI
Target Identifier with the IMEI of the target.
It shall be checked for each call over the radio interface | +| Observed Non-Local ID
Target Identifier with the E. 164 number of Non-Local ID target. | +| event type
Description which type of event is delivered: Establishment, Answer, Supplementary service, Handover, Release, SMS, Location update, Subscriber controlled input, HLR subscriber record change, ServingSystem, cancel location, register location, location information request. In case of LALS report the event type is absent. | +| event date
Date of the event generation in the 3G MSC Server or in the HLR, or the report generation in the LI LCS Client | +| event time
Time of the event generation in the 3G MSC Server or in the HLR, the report generation in the LI LCS Client | +| dialled number
Dialled phone number before digit modification, IN-modification etc. | +| Connected number
Number of the answering party | +| other party address
Directory number of the other party for MOC
Calling party for MTC | +| call direction
Information if the target is calling or called e.g. MOC/MTC or originating/ terminatingin or/out | +| Correlation number
Unique number for each call sent to the DF, to help the LEA, to have a correlation between eachCall and the IRI | +| Network Element Identifier
Unique identifier for the element reporting the ICE. | +| Location Information
Location information is the service area identity and/or location area identity that is present at the 3G MSC Server or at the HLR, and/ or as provided by the LI LCS Client at the time of event or report record production.
Country and network IDs can be considered as location information.
In some traffic cases the available location information can be the one received from the MME, i.e. the TrackingArea Identity (TAI) and/or the E-UTRAN Cell Global Identification (ECGI) as specified in the TS 23.272 [30]. | +| Time of Location
Date/Time of location. The time when location was obtained by the location source node. | +| basic service
Information about Tele service or bearer service. | +| Supplementary service
Supplementary services used by the target e.g. CF, CW, ECT | +| Forwarded to number
Forwarded to number at CF | +| call release reason
Call release reason of the target call | +| SMS initiator
SMS indicator whether the SMS is MO, MT, or undefined | +| SMS Message
The SMS content with header which is sent with the SMS-service | +| Redirecting number
The number which invokes the call forwarding towards the target. This is provided if available. | +| SCI
Non call related Subscriber Controlled Input (SCI) which the 3G MSC Server receives from the ME | +| Other update:
Carrier specific information related to its implementation or subscription process on its HLR. | +| location error code
LALS positioning error identification code | + +### 6.3.3 Call Related events + +#### 6.3.3.1 Call establishment + +For call establishment a call establishment-event is generated. This event is generated at the beginning of a call when the 3G MSC Server attempts to reach the subscriber. This information will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed Non-Local ID | +| event type | +| event date | +| event time | +| dialled number | +| other party address | +| call direction | +| Correlation number | +| Redirecting number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| basic service | +| Supplementary service | + +#### 6.3.3.2 Answer + +If the called party answers, an answer- event is generated. This information will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed Non-Local ID | +| event type | +| event date | +| event time | +| dialled number | +| other party address | +| Connected party | +| call direction | +| Correlation number | +| Redirecting number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| basic service | +| Supplementary service | + +### 6.3.3.3 Supplementary Services + +For supplementary services events are generated with the information which supplementary service is used e.g. Call Forwarding (CF), Call Waiting (CW), Explicit Call Transfer (ECT), Multi Party (MPTY), Call Hold and information correlated to the service like the forwarded to number. This information will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed Non-Local ID | +| event type | +| event date | +| event time | +| dialled number | +| other party address | +| call direction | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| basic service | +| Supplementary service | +| Forwarded to number | + +### 6.3.3.4 Handover + +For each handover that is realised at the 3G MSC Server due to a change in target location information, a handover-event with the new location information is generated. This information will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| event type | +| event date | +| event time | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | + +### 6.3.3.5 Release + +For the release or failed attempt of a target call, a release event with the following information is generated. This information will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed Non-Local ID | +| event type | +| event date | +| event time | +| dialled number | +| other party address | +| call direction | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| basic service | +| call release reason | + +## 6.3.4 Non Call Related events + +### 6.3.4.1 SMS + +For MO-SMS the event is generated in the 3G MSC Server. Dependent on national requirements, event generation shall occur either when the 3G MSC Server receives the SMS from the target MS (or from the party of the Non-Local ID target) or when the 3G MSC Server receives notification that the SMSC successfully receives the SMS; for MT-SMS the event is generated in the 3G MSC Server. Dependent on national requirements, event generation shall occur either when the 3G MSC Server receives the SMS from the SMSC or when the 3G MSC Server receives notification that the target MS (or from the party of the Non-Local ID target) successfully received the message. This information will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed Non-Local ID | +| event type | +| event date | +| event time | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| SMS initiator | +| SMS Message | + +### 6.3.4.2 Location update + +For location updates a Location update-event is generated, with the new location information. This information will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| observed IMSI | +| event type | +| event date | +| event time | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | + +### 6.3.4.3 Subscriber Controlled Input (SCI) + +SCI includes subscriber initiated changes in service activation and deactivation. SCI does not include any information available in the CC. For subscriber controlled inputs - a SCI-event is generated with information about the SCI. This information will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|----------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | +| observed IMSI | +| event type | +| event date | +| event time | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| SCI | + +## 6.3.5 HLR Related events + +### 6.3.5.1 Serving system + +The Serving System report event is generated at the HLR, when the HLR has detected that the target has roamed, mainly with messages such as MAP\_UPDATE\_LOCATION (clause 8.1.2 of TS 29.002 [61]) or + +MAP\_SEND\_AUTHENTICATION\_INFO (clause 8.5 of TS 29.002 [61]). The elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|----------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Serving System Address (VLR Number...) | + +### 6.3.5.2 HLR subscriber record change + +This event will be used to report any change of association between IMSI or MSISDN or IMEI of the target, mainly with messages such as MAP\_INSERT\_SUBSCRIBER\_DATA or MAP\_DELETE\_SUBSCRIBER\_DATA (clause of 8.8 of TS 29.002 [61]). + +The following elements, such as old and new IMSI or MSISDN or IMEI will be delivered to DF2, if available: + +| | +|----------------------------------------| +| New Observed MSISDN | +| Observed MSISDN | +| New Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMSI | +| New Observed IMEI (if available) | +| Observed IMEI (if available) | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HLR id...) | +| IMSI or MSISDN or IMEI change type | +| Other update: carrier specific | + +NOTE: The change of IMEI can be detected by the HLR. Automatic Device Detection function clause 7.4 of TS 22.101 [60], may require IMEI to be notified to HLR especially in case of update location service, clause 8.1.2 TS 29.002 [61]. + +### 6.3.5.3 Cancel location + +This event "Cancel Location" will be used to report to DF2 when HLR send to the 3G MSC Server one cancel location or purge to serving system. Any typical MAP message such as "MAP\_CANCEL\_LOCATION" (clause 8.1 of TS 29.002 [61]) or such as "MAP\_PURGE\_MS" (clause 8.1.6 of TS 29.002 [61]) could trigger the generation of information to the DF2, as soon as it has the following elements below, and least the previous serving system identifiers of the target. + +The following elements will be delivered to DF2: + +| | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HLR Id...) | +| Previous serving system identifiers (VPLMN id, VLR Number, MSC Number...) | + +### 6.3.5.4 Register location + +This event will be used to report one update location message to the HLR for a target. A typical MAP message such as "MAP\_SEND\_AUTHENTICATION" (clause 8.5 of TS 29.002 [61]) could trigger the generation of information to the DF2. The elements of previous and current serving system ID will be delivered to DF2, if available: + +| | +|--------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HLR id...) | +| Previous serving system identifier (Previous VPLMN id) | +| Current serving system identifier (Current VPLMN id) | + +### 6.3.5.5 Location Information request + +This event will be used to report any location information of the target request activity from any interworking node, such as SMS Centre or IP-SM-GW or GMLC or from a GMSC (case of call transfer or ported number) that are not a part of HPLMN. Typical messages that have to trigger the transfer of information to DF2 are MAP-ANY-TIME-INTERROGATION (clause 8.11.1 of TS 29.002 [61]) or MAP-SEND-ROUTING-INFO (clause 10.1.2 of TS 29.002 [61]) or MAP-SEND-ROUTING-INFO-FOR-SM (clause 12.1 of TS 29.002 [61]), but only in roaming case. + +The elements, observed IMSI, MSISDN, the identifier of the requesting node type and network, will be delivered to DF2, if available: + +| | +|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Requesting network identifier (country identifier included) | +| Requesting node type | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HLR id...) | + +NOTE: Void + +In addition to the E 164 identity of a location requesting network node, i.e. MT SMS Target Node identity or SMS Router, the presence of Diameter Name/Realm shall be provided (clause 12.1.4 of TS 29.002 [61]). + +## 6.4 Intercept cases for circuit switched supplementary services + +### 6.4.1 Interception of Multiparty call + +![Figure 16: Interception of Multiparty for CC. This diagram shows the flow of call content (CC) for a multiparty call interception. On the left, a stack of boxes represents the LEMF. Two horizontal lines, HI1 and HI2, represent interfaces. HI1 connects to a box containing 'Mediation Function' and 'ADMF'. HI2 connects to a box containing 'Mediation Function' and 'Delivery Function 2'. From the ADMF box, two output lines are labeled X1_1 and X1_2. X1_1 points to a box labeled 'ProSe Function or ProSe Key Management Function'. X1_2 points to the 'Delivery Function 2' box. From the 'Delivery Function 2' box, an output line labeled X2 points to the 'ProSe Function or ProSe Key Management Function' box.](aeb2a26a07219661191294dba528067a_img.jpg) + +Figure 16: Interception of Multiparty for CC. This diagram shows the flow of call content (CC) for a multiparty call interception. On the left, a stack of boxes represents the LEMF. Two horizontal lines, HI1 and HI2, represent interfaces. HI1 connects to a box containing 'Mediation Function' and 'ADMF'. HI2 connects to a box containing 'Mediation Function' and 'Delivery Function 2'. From the ADMF box, two output lines are labeled X1\_1 and X1\_2. X1\_1 points to a box labeled 'ProSe Function or ProSe Key Management Function'. X1\_2 points to the 'Delivery Function 2' box. From the 'Delivery Function 2' box, an output line labeled X2 points to the 'ProSe Function or ProSe Key Management Function' box. + +**Figure 16: Interception of Multiparty for CC** + +Figure 16 shows the delivery of CC from intercepted multiparty call where party A is the target of interception. + +One pair of call content channels are delivered to the delivery function. Party A is delivered to the DF3 on one channel and the sum of the balance of the parties, B,C and D is delivered on the second channel. + +It should be noted that if parties B,C or D is a target of interception, that intercept is treated as a simple call intercept. + +The events contain information about B, C and D if subscriber A is monitored. If one of B, C or D is monitored, events contain the information about A but not the other parties of the conference. + +### 6.4.2 Interception for Call Forwarding / Call Deflection / ECT + +![Figure 17: Interception for Call Forwarding / Deflection / ECT. This diagram illustrates the interception process for call forwarding, deflection, or ECT. At the top, a 'Target' box points to a 'ProSe UEA' box. 'ProSe UEA' has a bidirectional 'Signalling' connection to a 'ProSe Function or PKMF' box. 'ProSe Function or PKMF' has an 'X2 interface' connection to a 'DF2' box. 'DF2' has an 'HI2' connection to a 'LEMF' box at the bottom. Below 'ProSe UEA', there is a 'Communication' connection between 'ProSe UEB' and 'ProSe UEC' boxes.](2c38051409fe1c92ed774b445a768886_img.jpg) + +Figure 17: Interception for Call Forwarding / Deflection / ECT. This diagram illustrates the interception process for call forwarding, deflection, or ECT. At the top, a 'Target' box points to a 'ProSe UEA' box. 'ProSe UEA' has a bidirectional 'Signalling' connection to a 'ProSe Function or PKMF' box. 'ProSe Function or PKMF' has an 'X2 interface' connection to a 'DF2' box. 'DF2' has an 'HI2' connection to a 'LEMF' box at the bottom. Below 'ProSe UEA', there is a 'Communication' connection between 'ProSe UEB' and 'ProSe UEC' boxes. + +**Figure 17: Interception for Call Forwarding / Deflection / ECT** + +The interception of party B once the supplementary service is invoked is a national option. + +For Intercept Related Information it depends who is monitored: + +- If subscriber A is monitored the number of A and B are mandatory in the event information and the number of C if available. +- If subscriber B is monitored the number of B and C are mandatory in the event information and the number of A if available. +- If subscriber C is monitored the number of C is mandatory in the event information and the number of A and B if available. + +Intercept requirements for CS multi-media is not defined in this release. + +## 7 Invocation of Lawful Interception for GSN Packet Data services + +### 7.0 General + +Figure 18 shows the extract from the reference configuration which is relevant for the invocation of the Lawful Interception of the packet data GSN network. + +![Figure 18: Functional model for Packet Data GSN Network Lawful Interception invocation. The diagram shows a stack of three LEMF (Lawful Interception Management Function) units on the left. Each LEMF is connected to an ADMF (ADMiralty Interception Management Function) via an interface labeled HI1. Each ADMF contains a 'Mediation Function'. The output of the first ADMF's Mediation Function is labeled X1_1. The output of the second ADMF's Mediation Function is labeled X1_2. The output of the third ADMF's Mediation Function is labeled X1_3. The output of the second ADMF's Mediation Function is also connected to a 'Delivery Function 2'. The output of the third ADMF's Mediation Function is also connected to a 'Delivery Function 3'. The outputs of Delivery Function 2 and Delivery Function 3 are labeled X2 and X3 respectively. All three outputs (X1_1, X2, X3) are connected to a 'Proxy-Relay' unit on the right. The Proxy-Relay unit is also connected to the LEMF stack via an interface labeled HI2. The Proxy-Relay unit is also connected to the LEMF stack via an interface labeled HI3.](42e18c25bfd455a5a57f207bacfcb970_img.jpg) + +Figure 18: Functional model for Packet Data GSN Network Lawful Interception invocation. The diagram shows a stack of three LEMF (Lawful Interception Management Function) units on the left. Each LEMF is connected to an ADMF (ADMiralty Interception Management Function) via an interface labeled HI1. Each ADMF contains a 'Mediation Function'. The output of the first ADMF's Mediation Function is labeled X1\_1. The output of the second ADMF's Mediation Function is labeled X1\_2. The output of the third ADMF's Mediation Function is labeled X1\_3. The output of the second ADMF's Mediation Function is also connected to a 'Delivery Function 2'. The output of the third ADMF's Mediation Function is also connected to a 'Delivery Function 3'. The outputs of Delivery Function 2 and Delivery Function 3 are labeled X2 and X3 respectively. All three outputs (X1\_1, X2, X3) are connected to a 'Proxy-Relay' unit on the right. The Proxy-Relay unit is also connected to the LEMF stack via an interface labeled HI2. The Proxy-Relay unit is also connected to the LEMF stack via an interface labeled HI3. + +**Figure 18: Functional model for Packet Data GSN Network Lawful Interception invocation** + +The HI2 and HI3 interfaces represent the interfaces between the LEA and two delivery functions. Both interfaces are subject to national requirements. They are included for completeness, but are beyond the scope of this specification. The delivery functions are used: + +- to convert the information on the X2-interface to the corresponding information on the HI2 interface; +- to distribute the intercept related information to the relevant LEA(s); +- to distribute the intercept product to the relevant LEA(s). + +For the delivery of the CC and IRI the 3G SGSN and/or, per national option 3G GGSN provides correlation number and target identity to the DF2 and DF3 which is used there in order to select the different LEAs where the product shall be delivered. When the SGSN connects an UE to a S-GW through the S4 interface (TS 23.060 [10], see also note 3), the SGSN is not required to provide CC for that communication (see note 4). + +The correlation number is unique in the whole PLMN and is used to correlate CC with IRI and the different IRI's of one PDP context. + +The correlation number shall be generated by using existing parameters related to the PDP context. + +When the SGSN connects an UE to a S-GW through the S4 interface (TS 23.060 [10], see also note 3), the SGSN is not required to provide IRIs for PDP contexts associated with CC and correlation for that communication (see note 4). + +NOTE 1: Void + +If interception has been activated for both parties of the Packet Data communication both CC and IRI shall be delivered for each party as separate intercept activity. + +In case of location dependent interception: + +- for each target, the location dependency check occurs at each Packet Data session establishment or release and at each Routing Area (RA) update to determine permanently the relevant IAs (and deduce, the possible LEAs within these IAs); +- concerning the IRI: + - when an IA is left, either a Mobile Station Detach event is sent when changing servicing 3G GSNs, or an RA update event is sent; + - RA update event is sent to DF2 when changing IAs inside the same servicing 3G SGSN; + - when a new IA is entered a RA update event is sent to DF2 and, optionally, a "Start of interception with PDP context active" event for each PDP context; +- concerning the CC, when crossing IAs, the CC is not sent anymore to the DF3 of the old IA but sent to the DF3 of the new IA. + +Both in case of location dependent and location independent interception: + +"Start of interception with PDP context active" event is sent by the new SGSN if an Inter-SGSN RA update procedure, which involves different PLMNs, takes place for a target, which has at least one active PDP context. + +NOTE 2: An SGSN can differentiate "Inter PLMN" type of Inter-SGSN RA update procedure from "Intra PLMN" type of Inter-SGSN RA update procedure by inspecting the old RAI parameter, which is being received by the SGSN as part of the procedure (see TS 23.060 [10], clause 6.9.1.2.2 and TS 23.003, clause 4.2). + +Optionally, it is possible to send "Start of interception with PDP context active" for all cases of inter- SGSN RA update when at least one PDP context is active. + +NOTE 3: S4 is an intra-PLMN reference point between the SGSN and the S-GW. + +NOTE 4: Void + +When the SGSN connects an UE to a S-GW through the S4 interface, the S-GW provides IRI, CC and correlation for the EPS bearer associated to the PDP context, as specified in clause 12. + +National regulations on a per interception basis may limit delivery of communications (CC and IRI) of an outbound international roaming target by the HPLMN as described in clause 5.1.4 of TS 33.106 [7]. + +If roaming interception is not allowed in the HPLMN and it is determined that the target is outside the country, the HPLMN shall not report IRI and CC for the target's. + +Non-communications-associated IRI (e.g. those identified by the HSS) are not affected by this requirement. + +## 7.1 Provision of Intercept Product - Short Message Service + +Figure 19 shows an SMS transfer from the 3G SGSN node to the LEA. Quasi-parallel to the delivery from / to the mobile subscriber a SMS event, which contains the content and header of the SMS, is generated and sent via the Delivery Function 2 to the LEA in the same way as the Intercept Related Information. National regulations and warrant type determine if a SMS event shall contain only SMS header, or SMS header and SMS content. Non-Local ID targeting is optional and may require traffic analysis. + +The IRI will be delivered to the LEA: + +- for a MO-SMS. Dependent on national requirements, delivery shall occur in the following cases: + - when the 3G SGSN receives the SMS from the target MS, or when the 3G SGSN detects that an SMS is to the Non-Local ID target. + - when the 3G SGSN receives notification that the SMS-Centre successfully received the SMS that was originated from the target MS, or sent to the Non-Local ID target; +- for a MT-SMS. Dependent on national requirements, delivery shall occur in the following cases: + - when the 3G SGSN receives the SMS from the SMS-Centre when the SMS was originated from a Non-Local ID target, or will have to be sent to a target MS. + +- when the 3G SGSN receives notification that recipient MS has received the SMS successfully. The recipient MS is the target MS when the SMS is sent to the target. The recipient MS may not be the target when the SMS was originating from a Non-Local ID target. + +![Diagram illustrating the provision of Intercept Product - Short Message Service. It shows a vertical stack of three rectangles on the left, representing a sequence of messages. To the right of the stack is a larger rectangle containing a smaller rectangle, representing the interception point or system component.](fe7304192caf64cda93b580c5e7e5c06_img.jpg) + +Diagram illustrating the provision of Intercept Product - Short Message Service. It shows a vertical stack of three rectangles on the left, representing a sequence of messages. To the right of the stack is a larger rectangle containing a smaller rectangle, representing the interception point or system component. + +**Figure 19: Provision of Intercept Product - Short Message Service** + +## 7.2 Provision of Intercepted Content of Communications - Packet data GSN services + +### 7.2.0 General + +The access method for the delivering of Packet Data GSN Intercept Product is based on duplication of packets without modification at 3G GSN. The duplicated packets with additional information in a header, as described in 7.2.1, are sent to DF3 for further delivery to the LEA. + +![Diagram illustrating the configuration for interception of Packet Data GSN product data. It shows a vertical stack of three rectangles on the left, representing a sequence of packets. To the right of the stack is a larger rectangle containing a smaller rectangle, representing the interception point or system component.](b06a4c871dfd0ce034cf801519d0039a_img.jpg) + +Diagram illustrating the configuration for interception of Packet Data GSN product data. It shows a vertical stack of three rectangles on the left, representing a sequence of packets. To the right of the stack is a larger rectangle containing a smaller rectangle, representing the interception point or system component. + +**Figure 20: Configuration for interception of Packet Data GSN product data** + +### 7.2.1 X3-interface + +In addition to the intercepted content of communications, the following information needs to be transferred from the 3G GSN to the DF3 in order to allow the DF3 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity; +- correlation number; +- time stamp - optional; +- direction (indicates whether T-PDU is MO or MT) - optional; + +- the target location (if available) or the IAs in case of location dependent interception; +- date/time of location (if target location provided). + +As a national option, in the case where the 3G GGSN is performing interception of the content of communications, the target is handed off to another SGSN and the same 3G GGSN continues to handle the content of communications subject to roaming agreements, the 3G GGSN shall continue to perform the interception of the content of communication. + +If 3G direct tunnel functionality with the GGSN, as defined in TS 23.060 [10], is used in the network, then the GGSN shall perform the interception of the content of communications. + +## 7.3 Provision of Intercept Related Information + +### 7.3.0 General + +Intercept Related Information (Events) are necessary at the Mobile Station Attach, Mobile Station Detach, PDP Context Activation, Start of intercept with PDP context active, PDP Context Deactivation, RA update, Serving System, Packet Data Header Information, and SMS events. + +Other HLR, Non-Local ID targeting for SMS (e.g. based on traffic analysis), LI LCS Client related and Serving System events reporting are national options. + +Packet Data Header Information reporting is a national option. + +Figure 21 shows the transfer of intercept related information to the DF2. If an event for / from a mobile subscriber occurs, the 3G GSN, LI LCS Client or the Home Location Register (HLR) sends the relevant data to the DF2. For Packet Data Header Information reporting, a 3G GSN either isolates the relevant data and sends it to the DF2 or sends the packet stream to another entity in the network (e.g., DF3) for isolation which then provides the relevant data to the DF2. + +See clause 7A for multi-media Intercept Related Information produced at the CSCF. + +![Diagram illustrating the provision of intercept related information. A vertical stack of three rectangles on the left represents the source (3G GSN, LI LCS Client, or HLR). An arrow points from this stack to a single rectangle on the right, which represents the DF2. The DF2 rectangle contains a smaller rectangle inside it, representing the intercept related information.](15906392337ec83a921988b52f102a44_img.jpg) + +Diagram illustrating the provision of intercept related information. A vertical stack of three rectangles on the left represents the source (3G GSN, LI LCS Client, or HLR). An arrow points from this stack to a single rectangle on the right, which represents the DF2. The DF2 rectangle contains a smaller rectangle inside it, representing the intercept related information. + +**Figure 21: Provision of Intercept Related Information** + +### 7.3.1 X2-interface + +The following information needs to be transferred from the 3G GSN, LI LCS Client or the HLR to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity (MSISDN or E. 164 number for Non-Local ID, IMSI, IMEI); + +- events and associated parameters as defined in clauses 7.3.2 and 7.4 may be provided; +- the target location (if available) or the IAs in case of location dependent interception; +- date/time of location (if target location provided); +- Correlation number; +- Quality of Service (QoS) identifier; +- Encryption parameters (keys and associated parameters for decrypting CC), if available and necessary. + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 using a reliable transport mechanism. + +The 3G GSN detects packets containing packet data header information in the communications path but the information needed for Packet Data Header Information reporting may need to be transferred from the 3G GSN either directly to the DF2 or via another entity in order to allow the DF2 to perform its functionality. + +### 7.3.2 Structure of the events + +There are several different events in which the information is sent to the DF2 if this is required. Details are described in the following clause. The events for interception are configurable (if they are sent to DF2) in the 3G GSN, LI LCS Client or the HLR and can be suppressed in the DF2. + +#### **The following events are applicable to 3G SGSN:** + +- Mobile Station Attach; +- Mobile Station Detach; +- PDP context activation; +- Start of interception with mobile station attached (national option); +- Start of intercept with PDP context active; +- PDP context modification; +- PDP context deactivation; +- RA update; +- SMS; +- Packet Data Header Information. + +NOTE: Void + +3G GGSN interception is a national option. Location information may not be available in this case. If interception is performed at the 3G GGSN, then Packet Data Header Information reporting shall also be performed at the 3G GGSN and not at the 3G SGSN. + +If 3G direct tunnel functionality with the GGSN, as defined in TS 23.060 [10], is used in the network, then both the SGSN and the GGSN shall perform the interception of intercept related information. + +When the SGSN connects an UE to a S-GW through the S4 interface (TS 23.060 [10]), the SGSN is not required to report events PDP context activation (successful), Start of intercept with PDP context active, PDP context modification, PDP context deactivation; the SGSN shall report unsuccessful PDP context activation event. + +#### **The following events are applicable to the 3G GGSN:** + +- PDP context activation; +- PDP context modification; +- PDP context deactivation; +- Start of interception with PDP context active; + +- Packet Data Header Information. + +**The following events are applicable to the HLR:** + +- Serving System; +- HLR subscriber record change; +- Cancel location; +- Register location; +- Location information request. + +**The following LALS Reports are applicable to Packet Data services (see Clause 19):** + +- Report for LALS Target Positioning; +- Report for LALS Enhanced Location for IRI. + +A set of elements as shown below can be associated with the events. The events trigger the transmission of the information from 3G GSN, LI LCS Client or HLR to DF2, perhaps via a MF in the case of Packet Data Header Information. Available IEs from this set of elements as shown below can be extended in the 3G GSN or HLR, if this is necessary as a national option. DF2 can extend available information if this is necessary as a national option e.g. a unique number for each surveillance warrant. + +**Table 2: Information Elements for Packet Data Event Records** + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN
MSISDN of the target. | +| Observed IMSI
IMSI of the target. | +| Observed IMEI
IMEI of the target, it shall be checked for each activation over the radio interface. | +| Old observed MSISDN
Old MSISDN of the target before a change. | +| Old observed IMSI
Old IMSI of the target before a change. | +| Observed Non-Local ID | +| Event type
Description which type of event is delivered: MS attach, MS detach, PDP context activation, Start of intercept with PDP context active, PDP context deactivation, SMS, Serving System, Packet Data Header Information, Cell and/or RA update, HLR subscriber record change, Cancel location, Register location, Location information request. In case of LALS report the event type is absent. | +| Event date
Date of the event generation in the 3G GSN or the HLR, or the report generation in the LI LCS Client. | +| Event time
Time of the event generation in the 3G GSN or the HLR, or the report generation in the LI LCS Client. Timestamp shall be generated relative to GSN or HLR internal clock. | +| PDP address
The PDP address of the target. Note that this address might be dynamic. In case the PDP type is IPv4v6, the parameter may carry two IP addresses. | +| Access Point Name
The APN of the access point. (Typically the GGSN of the other party). | +| Location Information
Location Information is the Service Area Identity (SAI), RAI and/or location area identity that is present at the GSN or present in the LI LCS Client at the time of event record production. Country and network IDs can be considered as location information. | +| Time of Location
Date/Time of location. The time when location was obtained by the location source node. | +| Old Location Information
Location Information of the subscriber before Routing Area Update | +| PDP Type
The used PDP type. | +| Correlation Number
The correlation number is used to correlate CC and IRI. | +| SMS
The SMS content with header which is sent with the SMS-service. The header also includes the SMS-Centre address. | +| Network Element Identifier
Unique identifier for the element reporting the ICE. | +| Failed attach reason
Reason for failed attach of the target. | +| Failed context activation reason
Reason for failed context activation of the target. | +| IA's
The observed Interception Areas. | +| Initiator
The initiator of the PDP context activation, deactivation or modification request either the network or the 3G MS. | +| SMS Initiator
SMS indicator whether the SMS is MO or MT or undefined. | +| Deactivation / termination cause
The termination cause of the PDP context. | +| QoS
This field indicates the Quality of Service associated with the PDP Context procedure. | +| Serving System Address
Information about the serving system (e.g. serving SGSN number or serving SGSN address). | +| NSAPI
Network layer Service Access Point Identifier
The NSAPI information element contains an NSAPI identifying a PDP Context in a mobility management context specified by the Tunnel Endpoint Identifier Control Plane.
This is an optional parameter to help DF/MF and LEA's to distinguish between the sending mobile access networks when the GGSN is used as element of the PDG according TS 23.234 [14], Annex F. | +| ULI Timestamp | + +| | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Destination IP Address
The IP address, including type IPv4 or IPv6, of the destination of the IP packet. | +| Destination Port Number
The port number of the destination of the IP packet. | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only)
The field in the IPv6 header that is used by a source to label packets of a flow (see RFC 3697 [41]). | +| Packet Count
The number of packets detected and reported (for a particular summary period). | +| Packet Data Summary Reason
The reason for a Packet Data Summary message being sent to the LEMF (e.g., timed out, counter expiration, end of session) | +| Packet Size
The size of the packet. (i.e. Total Length Field in IPv4 or Payload Length field in IPv6) | +| Source IP Address
The IP address, including type IPv4 or IPv6, of the source of the IP packet. | +| Source Port Number
The port number of the source of the IP packet. | +| Sum of Packet Sizes (for a particular summary period)
The sum of values contained in the Total Length fields of the IPv4 packets or the sum of the values contained in the Payload Length fields of the IPv6 packets. | +| Summary Period
Includes the dates and times of the first and last packets in a particular packet data interval. | +| Transport Protocol (e.g. TCP)
The identification of the transport protocol of the packet or packet flow being reported. | +| Other update:
Carrier specific information related to its implementation or subscription process on its HLR. | +| IMSI or MSISDN or IMEI change type
Identifies the type of subscriber information change in the HLR. | +| Previous serving system identifier
The VPLMN ID of the previous serving system. | +| Current serving system identifier
The VPLMN ID of the current serving system. | +| Requesting network identifier
Is the identifier (including country identifier) of the network requesting the target's location. | +| Requesting node type
Identifies the type of node in the requesting network that is requesting the target's location. | +| location error code
LALS positioning error identification code | + +## 7.4 Packet Data related events + +### 7.4.1 Mobile Station Attach + +For attach an attach-event is generated. When an attach activation is generated from the mobile to serving 3G G SN this event is generated. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| Failed attach reason | +| IAAs (if applicable) | + +## 7.4.2 Mobile Station Detach + +For detach a detach-event is generated, this is for the common (end) detach. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| IAs (if applicable) | + +## 7.4.3 Packet Data PDP context activation + +When a PDP context activation is generated a PDP context activation-event is generated. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|----------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| PDP address of observed party | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Access Point Name | +| PDP Type | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| Failed context activation reason | +| IAs (if applicable) | +| Initiator (optional) | +| QoS (optional) | +| NSAPI (optional) | + +## 7.4.4 Start of interception with PDP context active + +This event will be generated if interception for a target is started and if the target has at least one PDP context active. If more than one PDP context is open, for each of them an event record is generated. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|-------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| PDP address of observed party | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Access Point Name | +| PDP Type | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| Old Location Information (optional) | +| IAs (if applicable) | +| QoS (optional) | +| Initiator (optional) | +| NSAPI (optional) | + +Presence of the optional Old Location Information field indicates that PDP context was already active, and being intercepted. However, the absence of this information does not imply that interception has not started in the old location SGSN for an active PDP context. + +Start of interception with PDP context active shall be sent regardless of whether a Start of interception with mobile station attached has already been sent. + +## 7.4.5 Packet Data PDP context deactivation + +At PDP context deactivation a PDP context deactivation-event is generated. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|-------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| PDP address of observed party | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Access point name | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| IAs (if applicable) | +| Deactivation cause | +| Initiator (optional) | +| NSAPI (optional) | +| ULI Timestamp | + +## 7.4.6 RA update + +For each RA update an update-event with the elements about the new location is generated. New SGSN shall send the event, and the old SGSN may optionally send the event as well. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|--------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information (only for the new SGSN) | +| Time of Location | +| Old Location Information (only for the old SGSN) | +| IAIs (if applicable) | + +NOTE: Once target moves out of the interception area, an RAU event reported by the old SGSN may not be comprehensive since normally, the old SGSN does not receive the new SGSN's RAI, while the new SGSN does receive the old SGSN's RAI from UE with the RAU Request message. + +## 7.4.7 SMS + +For SMS-MO, the event is generated in the 3G SGSN. Dependent on national requirements, event generation shall occur in the following cases: + +- when the 3G SGSN receives the SMS from the target MS, or when the 3G SGSN detects that an SMS is to the Non-Local ID target. +- when the 3G SGSN receives notification that the SMS-Centre successfully received the SMS that was originated from the target MS, or sent to the Non-Local ID target. + +For SMS-MT, the event is generated in the 3G SGSN. Dependent on national requirements, event generation shall occur in the following cases: + +- when the 3G SGSN receives the SMS from the SMS-Centre when the SMS was originated from a Non-Local ID target, or will have to be sent to a target MS. +- when the 3G SGSN receives notification that recipient MS has received the SMS successfully. The recipient MS is the target MS when the SMS is sent to the target. The recipient MS may not be the target when the SMS was originating from a Non-Local ID target. + +These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed Non-Local ID | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| SMS | +| SMS Initiator | +| IAIs (if applicable) | + +## 7.4.8 Packet Data PDP context modification + +This event will be generated if an active PDP context for the target is modified. These elements will be delivered to the + +DF2 if available: + +| | +|-------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| PDP address of observed party | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Access Point Name | +| PDP Type | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| IAAs (if applicable) | +| Initiator | +| QoS | + +## 7.4.9 Serving System + +The Serving System report event is generated at the HLR, when the HLR has detected that the target has roamed. The elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Serving System Address | + +## 7.4.10 Start of interception with mobile station attached + +This event will be generated if interception has started for the already attached target. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| IAAs (if applicable) | + +## 7.4.11 Packet Data Header Information + +### 7.4.11.0 Introduction + +Packet Data Header Information reporting can be done either on a per-packet (i.e., non-summarized) basis or in a summary report. + +### 7.4.11.1 Packet Data Header Report + +This event is used to provide packet header reports on a per packet basis (non-summarized reporting) and is triggered by each packet sent or received by the target. These elements will be delivered either directly to DF2 or via another + +network entity if available: + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| PDP address of observed party | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation Number | +| Access Point Name | +| PDP Type | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Source IP Address | +| Source Port Number | +| Destination IP Address | +| Destination Port Number | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP) | +| Packet Size | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only) | + +## 7.4.11.2 Packet Data Summary Report + +This event is used to report: + +- 1) the source and destination information derived from the packet headers, including: + - a) source and destination IP Addresses, + - b) IP next-layer protocol, + - c) Layer-4 ports, and + - d) Flow label, if the packet is IPv6 +- 2) summary information for the number of packets and bytes transmitted or received by the target for each unique packet flow within a PDP context, and +- 3) the date and the time of the first and last packets associated with that packet flow. A packet flow is defined as the 6-tuple of source/destination IP address/port number and the layer 4 protocol, and PDP Context. + +IP addresses and the IP next-layer protocol are always reported, the flow label is reported if the packet is IPv6, and the layer-4 ports are reported. + +The event provides packet summary reports for each unique packet data session (PDP context) and packet flow, and is triggered by one of the following: + +- start of a packet flow associated with a PDP Context +- an interim report for a packet flow associated with a PDP Context is to be reported +- end of a packet flow associated with a PDP Context (including end of the PDP Context itself). + +An interim report can be triggered by + +- The expiration of a configurable timer per intercept (called a Summary Timer). The Summary Timer is configurable in units of seconds; +- A per-intercept configurable count threshold is reached. + +These elements will be delivered either directly to DF2 or via an MF for each packet flow if available: + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| PDP address of observed party | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation Number | +| Access Point Name | +| PDP Type | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Source IP Address | +| Source Port Number | +| Destination IP Address | +| Destination Port Number | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP) | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only) | +| Summary Period | +| Packet Count (for this summary period) | +| Sum of Packet Sizes (for this summary period) | + +If the packets are IPv4, the sum of all observed packet sizes is the sum of the values contained in the Total Length field of each packet as specified in IETF RFC 791[39]. + +If the packet is IPv6, the sum of all observed packet sizes is the sum of the values contained in the Payload Length field for each packet as specified in IETF RFC 2460 [40]. + +If no packets were detected for the duration of the Summary Timer, then the Packet Data Summary Report shall not be sent. + +## 7.4.12 HLR subscriber record change + +This event will be used to report any change of association between IMSI or MSISDN of the target. + +The following elements, such as old and new IMSI or MSISDN will be delivered to DF2, if available: + +| | +|----------------------------------------| +| New observed MSISDN | +| New observed IMSI | +| New observed IMEI | +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HLR id...) | +| IMSI or MSISDN or IMEI change type | +| Other update: carrier specific | + +### 7.4.13 Cancel location + +This event "Cancel Location" will be used to report to DF2 when HLR send to SGN one cancel location or purge to serving system. + +The following elements such as the previous serving system of the target will be delivered to DF2: + +| | +|--------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HLR Id...) | +| Previous serving system identifier (VPLMN id...) | + +### 7.4.14 Register location + +This event will be used to report one update location message to the HLR for a target. The elements of previous and current serving system ID will be delivered to DF2, if available: + +| | +|--------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HLR id...) | +| Previous serving system identifier (Previous VPLMN id) | +| Current serving system identifier (Current VPLMN id) | + +### 7.4.15 Location information request + +This event will be used to report any location information of the target request activity. + +The elements, observed IMSI, MSISDN, the identifier of the requesting node type and network, will be delivered to DF2, if available: + +| | +|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Requesting network identifier (country identifier included) | +| Requesting node type | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HLR id...) | + +### 7.4.16 Void + +## 7.5 Void + +## 7.6 Interception of the Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) + +The Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) is a service running over the 3GPP PS-domain. Both mobile originating and mobile terminating MMS messages shall pass through PS domain GSN nodes en route to or from Multimedia Message + +Service Centres (MMSCs). Therefore, interception of MMS messages shall be performed at the GSN in exactly the same way as for other PS-domain bearer services. + +The GSN is not responsible for recovering individual MMS messages from the user PDP context IP stream. + +No MMS specific HI2 records are defined to be delivered to the LEMF over the DF2 other than those listed in clause 7.4 of this specification. CC records shall be sent to the LEMF over the DF3 as specified in clause 7.3. + +Interception of a user PDP context IP stream will occur as described in clause 7.2. Such a stream may or may not contain MMS messages. + +--- + +## 7A Invocation of Lawful Interception for Packet Data Multi-media Service + +### 7A.1 Provision of content of communications + +Interception of the content of communications for GSN packet data services is explained in clause 7.2.. Activation and invocation of lawful interception for multi-media service only at the CSCF(s) does not produce interception of content of communications. Consequently, a separate activation and invocation of lawful interception shall occur at a node that has access to the CC (e.g., in case of GPRS / UMTS (PS domain) interception of CC occurs at the GSN). + +Interception at the GSN is only possible for a basic call. For the interception of content of communications of IMS-based voice services including CC for forwarded and transferred calls, refer to clause 15. + +#### 7A.1.A Decryption for IMS Media Plane Security + +This clause describes how the TSP can meet the national requirements in Clause 5.1.2 of TS 33.106 [7] to deliver intercepted communications decrypted when the TSP uses TS 33.328 [25] IMS Media Plane Security options. If an ICE, in TSP IMS network using Security options TS 33.328 [25], allows interception of Content of Communication in clear then this clause does not apply. + +If Session Description Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media Streams (SDES) is used, the DF2 shall identify the SDES keys from the SDP offer and SDP answer messages and provide the DF3 with the necessary SDES related parameters. In this case, the DF3 shall perform the decryption prior to delivery to the LEMF. For the CC delivered to the LEMF in a decrypted form, the DF2 shall remove the SDES keys when present from the SDP offer and SDP answer messages sent to the LEMF over HI2. The interface between the DF2 and DF3 to support the transfer of session keys is outside the scope of this specification. + +When SDES is used in end-to-access edge mode, the P-CSCF shall intercept SDES keys from SDP messages and shall deliver them to the DF2. + +If a Key Management Service (KMS) and Multimedia Internet KEYing ticket (MIKEY-TICKET) is used, the TSP may use the mechanism as defined in Clause 7A.7.1, which results in the DF2 receiving the sessions keys needed to decrypt the intercepted communications. Clause 7A.7.1 defines that the DF2 delivers the keys to the LEMF as IRI in order for the LEMF to decrypt the intercepted traffic. + +If the network is to decrypt the content of communications prior to delivery to the LEMF via HI3, the DF2 shall provide the DF3 with the sessions keys as defined in Clause 7A.7.1 instead of to the LEMF. In this case, the DF3 shall perform the decryption prior to delivery to the LEMF. The interface between the DF2 and DF3 to support the transfer of session keys is outside the scope of this specification. + +## 7A.2 Provision of IRI + +### 7A.2.1 Provision of IRI with SIP messaging + +SIP messaging is reported as Intercept Related Information for the interception of multi-media service. As shown in figure 22 below, all SIP messages executed on behalf of a target are subject to intercept at the S-CSCF and Optionally P-CSCF. Based upon network configuration, the ADMF shall provision P-CSCFs, or S-CSCFs, or both P-CSCFs and S-CSCFs with SIP URI, TEL URI, or IMEI target identifiers. For Non-Local ID interception, the target identifiers are SIP URI or TEL URI. These resulting intercepted SIP messages shall be sent to DF2 for mediation prior to transmittal across the HI2 interface. + +For roaming scenarios, interception at the P-CSCF shall be Mandatory, in order to provide IRI Interception in the visited network, where the P-CSCF is located in the Visited Network. Where the P-CSCF is located in the Home Network, interception at the P-CSCF shall be Optional, subject to national regulation. When S8HR is the roaming architecture, the P-CSCF is located in the HPLMN. Refer to clause 20 for the description of related lawful interception capabilities. + +![Figure 22: Provision of Intercept Related Information for multi-media. The diagram shows a network architecture with several boxes representing network elements. At the top, three boxes are connected horizontally. The middle box has a vertical line extending downwards to a fourth box. This fourth box is connected to two boxes on its left, which are in turn connected to a fifth box on the far left. Arrows indicate the flow of information from the top right box, through the middle box, down to the fourth box, and then leftwards through the two intermediate boxes to the far left box.](331afcb1534110b4c4f6ddf553a0f7e0_img.jpg) + +Figure 22: Provision of Intercept Related Information for multi-media. The diagram shows a network architecture with several boxes representing network elements. At the top, three boxes are connected horizontally. The middle box has a vertical line extending downwards to a fourth box. This fourth box is connected to two boxes on its left, which are in turn connected to a fifth box on the far left. Arrows indicate the flow of information from the top right box, through the middle box, down to the fourth box, and then leftwards through the two intermediate boxes to the far left box. + +**Figure 22: Provision of Intercept Related Information for multi-media** + +When Non-Local ID interception is required for incoming calls, ICE shall trigger interception by target id in any of the SIP headers used to identify the calling party information and redirecting party information present in the incoming SIP message. The examples are: P-Asserted Id, From headers and History-Info, Diversion headers. + +When Non-Local ID interception is required for outgoing calls, ICE shall trigger interception by target id in any of the SIP headers used to identify the called party information present in the outgoing SIP message. The examples are: Request URI and To headers. + +## 7A.2.2 Provision of IRI with XCAP messages + +The AS that store the XCAP data of the target shall intercept and transmit to the DF2 any XCAP based messages related to actions by the target, related to the supplementary service and other target's service settings, defined in TS 24.623 [55]: + +- on the Ut interface, +- on other interface to any AS with XCAP server capability that uses XCAP protocol. + +The DF2 will encapsulate the information as an IRI to the LEMF. + +NOTE 1: The XCAP services separation through XCAP filtering or the application of Operator Policy function for national regulation is outside of the scope of this specification as an implementation issue. + +Every successful or unsuccessful IMS supplementary services setting modification management request and response between UEs and IMS service nodes, or from other access to the target's XCAP servers shall be reported. In case of IRI only, any filtering of XCAP messages based on operator policy or national regulation is for further studies. + +NOTE 2: Report of events related to target's XCAP data and resources access by non XCAP protocol are for further studies. + +## 7A.2.3 Provision of IRI with Diameter or MAP messages related to HSS + +### 7A.2.3.0 General + +National regulations may require IRI produced by a Delivery Function 2 associated to the HSS. + +HSS shall support LI based on SIP-URI, Tel-URI, IMPI. + +IMSI shall be supported as target identity if it is available in the subscription data stored in the HSS and the association + +with IMS identities can be done. + +IMEI and MSISDN shall be supported as target identities if the HSS is shared with access services (e.g. PS, EPS) and the association with IMS identities can be done. + +Intercept Related Information (Events) are listed as follows: + +- Serving System; +- When IMPU or IMPI is changed in a HSS subscriber record change +- Registration termination +- Location information request. + +Table 7A.2.3.0 below shows the set of information that may be associated with the events if available. The events trigger the transmission of the information from the HSS to DF2. + +**Table 7A.2.3.0: Information Elements for HSS Event records** + +| | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMPI or Tel URI or SIP URI
Target Identifier with the IMPI, Tel URI or SIP URI of the target (if available). | +| Observed IMSI
Target Identifier with the IMSI of the target. | +| Observed IMEI
Target Identifier with the IMEI of the target (if available). | +| Observed MSISDN
Target Identifier with the MSISDN of the target (if available). | +| Event type
Description which type of event is delivered: Subscriber record change, Serving System, Registration Termination, location information request. | +| Event date
Date of the event generation in the HSS. | +| Event time
Time of the event generation in the HSS. | +| Network Code (Country Code included)
In case of roaming, the country code and the network code of the serving network, or of a third network in the diameter message to or from the HSS (AVP name such as Visited-PLMN-Id) | +| Network Element Identifier
Unique identifier for the element reporting the ICE. | +| Reason of de-registration (Deregistration-Reason AVP, Reason-code AVP) | +| Serving System Identifier
Provides an identifier that allows the home network to identify the visited network. | +| Any Associated-Identities (AVP Name):
any change of any associated identities of the target | +| Other Public User Identities
Other IMPU or IMPI that was allocated to Target and will be deregistered (if available) | +| Requesting network identifier
The requesting network identifier PLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Code). | +| Requesting node identifier
The identifier of the node requesting location/routing information for a target to the HSS | +| Requesting node type
It indicates the type of node that requests the location of the target (if available) | + +### 7A.2.3.1 Serving system + +The Serving System report event is generated at the HSS during the IMS registration process, when the HSS has detected that the target has roamed. + +In addition, the event shall be provided in case of mobility events between different access types, if they are visible at the HSS, unless they are already provided by the HSS itself at access level (e.g. PS, EPS). + +Such events could be mainly triggered by Diameter messages such as: + +- Through Cx interface, Query and Select Pull in case of command of User-Authorization-Request from I-CSCF + +to HSS: see clause A.2 of TS 29.228 [62]; + +- Through Cx interface, AuthDataReq in case of command of Multimedia-Authentication-Request from S-CSCF to HSS: see clause A.2 of TS 29.228 [62]; +- Through Sh interface, Pull in case of User-Data-Request from AS (with interworking to AS from target) to HSS: see clause A.2 of TS 29.328 [63]. +- Through Cx interface, Server-Assignment-Request in case of command of S-CSCF to HSS (see clause A.2 of TS 29.228 [62]); +- Through SWx interface, Server-Assignment-Request in case of command of 3GPP AAA to HSS (see clause A of TS 29.273 [24], and clause 5 of GSMA IR.61 [65]). + +The elements of table 7A.2.3.1 will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 7A.2.3.1: Information Elements for Serving System Event** + +| | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Current Serving System Identifier (AVP name such as Visited-PLMN-Id) | +| Any other IMPU or IMPI of the target (if available) | + +### 7A.2.3.2 Subscriber record change + +This event will be only used to report when there is a change of association between IMSI, MSISDN/IMPU/IMPI/TEL URI/ SIP URI, or IMEI of the target. It is induced mainly by Subscriber Profile management by the HSS or the CSP administration tools through the HSS. + +Such events could be mainly triggered by Diameter messages such as: + +- Through Sh interface, Pull Resp in case of command of User-Data-Answer from HSS to AS, see clause A.2 of TS 29.328 [63]; +- Through Sh interface, Update Resp in case of command of Profile-Update-Answer from HSS to AS, see clause A.2 of TS 29.328 [63]; +- Through Sh interface, Subs-Notif Resp in case of command of Subscribe-Notifications-Answer from HSS to AS, see clause A.2 of TS 29.328 [63]; +- Through Sh interface, Notif Resp in case of command of Push Notification-Answer from AS to HSS, see clause A.2 of TS 29.328 [63]; +- Through Cx interface, Update\_Subscr\_Data Resp in case of command that update the target profile from S-CSCF to HSS. The message may include the elements, such as old and new IMSI or MSISDN/TEL URI/SIP URI or IMEI: see clause A.2 of TS 29.228 [62]; +- Through Cx interface, Push-Profile-Answer This message is sent by the HSS to S-CSCF to update profile on S-CSCF if profile is changed by administrator at HSS: see clause A.2 of TS 29.228 [62]; +- Through SWx interface, -Push-Profile-Request (PPR) in case of command of HSS to 3GPP AAA Server: see clause A of TS 29.273 [24]. + +The elements of table 7A.2.3.2 will be delivered to DF2, if available. + +**Table 7A.2.3.2: Information Elements for Subscriber Record Change Event** + +| | +|----------------------------------------| +| New observed MSISDN | +| New observed TEL URI | +| New observed SIP URI | +| New observed IMSI | +| New Observed IMEI (if available) | +| New observed IMPI | +| Old observed MSISDN | +| Old observed TEL URI | +| Old observed SIP URI | +| Old observed IMSI | +| Old observed IMEI (if available) | +| Old observed IMPI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HSS id...) | +| Other update: carrier specific. | + +NOTE: The change of IMEI can be detected by the HSS. Automatic Device Detection function clause 7.4 of TS 22.101 [60], can cause the IMEI to be notified to HLR especially in case of update location service, clause 8.1.2 TS 29.002 [61]. + +### 7A.2.3.3 Registration Termination + +This event "Registration Termination" will be used to report to DF2 when HSS send to S-CSCF or 3GPP AAA Server. It is the equivalent of cancel location or purge to serving system in CS domain. This kind of event is induced by the registration of the target. The event will be triggered by the following Diameter messages: + +- Through Cx interface, Server-Assignment-Request indicating deregistration from S-CSCF to HSS: see clause A.2 of TS 29.228 [62]; +- Through Cx interface, Registration-Termination- Request from HSS to S-CSCF: see clause A.2 of TS 29.228 [62]; +- Through SWx interface, Server-Assignment-Request indicating deregistration from 3GPP AAA Server to HSS: see clause A of TS 29.273 [24]; +- Through SWx interface, Registration-Termination- Request from HSS to 3GPP AAA Server: see clause A of TS 29.273 [24]. + +The elements of table 7A.2.3.3 such as the previous serving system of the target will be delivered to DF2. + +**Table 7A.2.3.3: Information Elements for Registration Termination Event** + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Other Public User Identities | +| Other IMPU or IMPI that was allocated to Target and will be deregistered (if available) | +| Reason of de-registration (Deregistration-Reason AVP, Reason-code AVP) (if available) | +| Network Element Identifier (HSS Id...) | +| Previous serving system identifier (VPLMN id...) (if available) | + +### 7A.2.3.4 Location Information request + +This event will be used, if required by national regulations, to report any location information request on the IMS target by a node outside the HPLMN to HSS. As example, a location information request could be generated by a GMLC from another Network through a MAP request to the HSS of the target. The event will be triggered by any message coming from outside the HPLMN requesting routing or location information for the target. + +This event shall not be generated when the request is issued from a node belonging to the HPLMN. + +The elements included in table 7A.2.3.4 will be delivered to DF2, if available. + +**Table 7A.2.3.4: Information Elements for Location Information Request Event** + +| | +|----------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Requesting node identifier | +| Requesting network identifier | +| Requesting node type | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HSS id...) | +| Any other IMPU or IMPI (if available) | + +### 7A.2.4 Provision of IRI for WebRTC + +The enhanced P-CSCF (eP-CSCF) shall adhere to all LI requirements pertaining to the P-CSCF described in clause 7A.2.1. Any additional LI requirements pertaining to the support of WebRTC Interworking, as specified in TS 23.228 [43], that only apply to the eP-CSCF are described distinctly. + +WebRTC Web Server Function (WWSF), if provided by the CSP, is an ICE that is used to copy and transmit via the DF to the LEMF the IP address and port used by the target as viewed by the WWSF. This IP address may be a public or private address depending on how the target accesses the WWSF. + +WebRTC Authorisation Function (WAF), if provided by the CSP, is an ICE that creates a time-stamped authentication event associated with the target including relevant information such as the user's identity provided to the WAF. + +Further details of the WWSF and WAF are FFS. + +## 7A.3 Multi-media events + +### 7A.3.0 General + +- All SIP messages to or from a target, and all SIP messages executed on behalf of a target for multi-media session control are intercepted by the S-CSCF and Optionally P-CSCF and sent to DF2. The target identifier used to trigger the intercept will also be sent with the SIP message. This standard does not require nor prohibit redundant information from being reported to DF2. +- Where a CSCF which provides lawful interception makes changes to a SIP message, sent to or from or executed on behalf of a target then the CSCF shall report both the original message and the modified message to the DF2. +- Where a CSCF which provides lawful interception changes identities within a SIP message ( e.g. IMPI/IMPU changes or due to call forwarding etc.) and the new identity is the target, then both the original and modified SIP messages shall be reported to DF2. +- Where a CSCF which provides lawful interception changes identities within a SIP message (e.g. IMPI/IMPU changes or due to call forwarding etc.) and the new identity is not the target, then both the original and modified SIP messages shall be reported to DF2. + +- P-CSCF event reports may be redundant with S-CSCF event reports when the P-CSCF and S-CSCF reside in the same network, however, this standard does not require nor prohibit redundant information from being reported to DF2. +- Non-Local ID interception will be made by S-CSCF or P-CSCF (optional in a non-roaming case, and mandatory in the roaming case when LBO approach is used as the roaming architecture). As national option, the interception functions may also be provided by the IBCF or MGCF for a non-roaming case. Of the two approaches S-CSCF/P-CSCF Vs IBCF/MGCF used for non-roaming case, only one approach is required to be supported within a CSP's network. With S8HR as the roaming architecture, the Non-Local ID interception in the VPLMN will be made by the LMISF (see clause 20). +- For interception of incoming calls of Non-Local ID, any of the SIP headers used to identify the calling party information and redirecting party information present in the incoming SIP message. The examples are: P-Asserted Id, From headers and History-Info, Diversion headers. +- For interception of outgoing calls of Non-Local ID, any of the SIP headers used to identify the called party information present in the outgoing SIP message. The examples are: Request URI and To headers. +- The IRI should be sent to DF2 with a reliable transport mechanism. +- Correlation for SIP to bearer shall be supported within the domain of one provider. +- An intercepted SIP event sent to DF2 is shown below: + - Observed SIP URI + - Observed TEL URI + - Observed IMEI (Not in the case of Non-Local ID interception) + - Event Time and Date + - Network element identifier + - SIP Message Header + - SIP Message Payload + - VPLMN ID + +NOTE 1: The Observed IMEI is obtained from the +sip.instance.id of the intercepted SIP message (as defined in TS 24.229 [49]). + +- All IMS XCAP messages to or from a target for multi-media or supplementary services are intercepted by the AS, or the group of AS in charge to transmit, manipulate and store any IMS XCAP of that target. The data have to be transmitted either "en clair" or encrypted with all elements to let the LEMF decrypt the data. The generated IRI should be sent in any case to DF2. + +NOTE 2: The data related to XCAP management and the XCAP documents modification of the target, as supplementary services, or as the 3GPP or OMA presence services (TS 24.141 , OMA Presence SIMPLE specification and IETF RFC 4827), are reported through the DF2. However, these are points are currently not covered: + +- 1) other data (XCAP management and the XCAP documents modification by the target) to be transmitted but related to other multimedia services; + - 2) the case of XCAP messages that are based on different interfaces than Ut interface; + - 3) the specific architecture related to encrypted data; + - 4) Detailed XCAP events, related to authentication. +- An intercepted XCAP report sent to DF2 is shown below: + - Observed SIP URI or Tel URI, based on XUI (described in IETF RFC 4825 [56]) or information in the XCAP payload (if available). + +- Observed XUI or any other identities (if available). +- Event Time and Date. +- Network element identifier. +- XCAP Message (the entire elements of the HTTP Header and the XCAP payload). + +NOTE 3: Void. + +The interpretation of XCAP messages, such as HTTP request through the Ut interface between the target's UE and related XCAP server may sometime be insufficient to let the LEA to understand what was modified as directed by the UE, therefore a later HTTP response is needed to understand the success or failure of the request. + +Specific Diameter messages, to or from or related to a target, are intercepted by the HSS in charge of that target. The generated IRI should be sent in any case to DF2. Events and IRI are described below: + +Such events are: + +- Serving System; +- When IMPU or IMPI is changed in a HSS subscriber record change; +- Registration termination +- Location information request. + +Contents of such IRI report related to HSS sent to DF2, is shown below: + +- Observed SIP URI or Tel URI or IMSI; +- Observed any other identities (if available); +- Event Time and Date; +- Network element identifiers; +- Network Identifier (if available and only in case of roaming) +- Target profile or data elements (if available). + +## 7A.3.1 Mid IMS Session Interception + +### 7A.3.1.0 General + +Mid IMS Session interception functionality applies in addition to other IMS LI functional requirements as defined in section 7A. + +Where LI is activated on a target within a CSCF after an IMS session has already been established the CSCF shall do one of the following; + +- Where the CSCF has stored the media session information which occurred prior to the interception activation, the CSCF shall provide a "start of interception with IMS session" event message, to the DF2/MF over the X2 interface, including the parameter and information listed in table 7A.3.1, if available. +- Where the CSCF has not stored media session information which occurred prior to the interception activation, the CSCF shall report all future SIP messages which the CSCF is able to identify as associated with an ongoing target session. In this case, the event "start of interception with IMS session" is not applicable. + +It is a national option whether the CSCF shall be mandated to store the necessary information to support reporting of session establishment parameters, in order to support mid IMS session interception, or whether the CSCF shall only report SIP messages which occur after the interception is applied and the CSCF is able to identify as related to an ongoing target session. If information is stored then it shall be possible to set a maximum storage time according to national and/or operator requirements. + +**Table 7A.3.1 Start of interception with established IMS session event** + +| | +|----------------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URL | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| SIP message header offer (NOTE) | +| SIP message header answer (NOTE) | +| SDP offer | +| SDP answer | +| Correlation information | +| VPLMN ID | + +NOTE: Void. + +The SIP messages that carry the SDP offer and answer shall be reported. In case there are multiple SDP offers/answers during the session establishment, the SIP messages that carry the latest SDP offer/answer shall be provided. + +The points above on requirements in this clause applicable to CSCF support of mid IMS Session interception, shall apply to IBCF which incorporate ICE for Non-Local ID interception. + +#### 7A.3.1.1 SDES Media Security + +If an SDES crypto attribute is included in the SDP, the DF2/MF forwards the "start of interception with IMS session" event message to the LEMF over HI2 without additional key processing. + +NOTE: The SDES Crypto attribute contains the cryptographic key required for decrypting the encrypted IMS media. + +If SDES mid session support is required then storing of media information as per 7A.3.1 is mandatory. + +### 7A.4 Multi-media Call State Control Service Scenarios + +Annex C shows examples of the delivery of intercepted events and product under various call scenarios. + +### 7A.5 Push to talk over Cellular (PoC) + +PoC is a service of the IMS Domain and interception is accomplished according to the definitions in clause 7A.3. Interception of CC is possible with the current implementations in the GSNs. + +This clause applies if regulatory requirements require separate reporting of Push to Talk over Cellular (PTC). PTC consists of Push to talk over Cellular (PoC) [82], and Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) [85]. + +### 7A.6 SMS over IMS + +SMS over IMS shall be intercepted in accordance with normal IMS interception as described in 7A.3, also for Non-Local ID interception. SMS IRI (including originating and destination addresses, SMS direction, and SMS Centre Address) are reported, if available, for IRI-only intercepts. + +### 7A.7 LI for KMS based IMS Media Security + +#### 7A.7.1 LI Architecture and functions + +KMS based IMS media security is specified in TS 33.328 [25]. The present clause specifies LI architecture and functions needed to provide session encryption keys generated by the KMS to protect IMS media for a subscriber who is a target for interception in the IMS nodes. This section is applicable to the cases in which the KMS is under responsibility of the Operator providing the IMS network infrastructure. Other scenarios such as the one in which the KMS is run by an independent legal entity are outside the scope of this specification. + +NOTE 1: It is FFS whether the Xk interface defined in this section can be used also by the LEMF to directly query the KMS as an additional option. + +NOTE 2: This section covers the scenario in which encrypted content of communication is provided to the LEMF together with encryption keys, to allow decryption at LEMF. + +Figure 7A.7.1 shows the LI architecture for the case in which decryption is performed by the LEMF and a KMS is used to support IMS media security, with a Xk interface defined between the DF2/MF and the KMS, in addition to the interfaces and functional entities needed to support LI in the P-CSCF/S-CSCF. + +![Figure 7A.7.1: KMS Intercept configuration. The diagram shows a vertical stack of functional entities. At the top, a central rectangle has bidirectional arrows to two side rectangles. Below the central rectangle is another rectangle, connected by a downward arrow. To the right of this second rectangle is a long horizontal bar. Below the second rectangle is a third rectangle, connected by a downward arrow. To the right of this third rectangle is another long horizontal bar. Below the third rectangle is a fourth rectangle, connected by a downward arrow. To the right of this fourth rectangle is a third long horizontal bar. A vertical arrow points from the second rectangle up to the central rectangle. The long horizontal bars represent data flows or interfaces.](cc893412ff9ca2426705e878c75548ba_img.jpg) + +Figure 7A.7.1: KMS Intercept configuration. The diagram shows a vertical stack of functional entities. At the top, a central rectangle has bidirectional arrows to two side rectangles. Below the central rectangle is another rectangle, connected by a downward arrow. To the right of this second rectangle is a long horizontal bar. Below the second rectangle is a third rectangle, connected by a downward arrow. To the right of this third rectangle is another long horizontal bar. Below the third rectangle is a fourth rectangle, connected by a downward arrow. To the right of this fourth rectangle is a third long horizontal bar. A vertical arrow points from the second rectangle up to the central rectangle. The long horizontal bars represent data flows or interfaces. + +**Figure 7A.7.1: KMS Intercept configuration** + +When LI has been activated in the P/S-CSCF for a target, the node will report SIP messages events on the X2 interface, as specified in section 7.A and subsections. The DF2/MF shall extract from the intercepted SIP signalling the information related to the encryption and send a request over the Xk interface to the KMS to derive the encryption keys; the request will carry also the reference to the ticket transferred by the SIP signalling between the parties involved in the communication. The KMS shall then, based on the information received from the DF2, resolve the ticket and provide the session keys to the DF2/MF over the Xk interface. + +## 7A.7.2 Signalling over the Xk interfaces and LI events + +The following messages are defined over the Xk interface: + +- get\_keys +- get\_keys\_response + +The message get\_keys shall be sent by the DF2/MF to the KMS in order to ask the KMS to provide session keys for an ongoing communication. + +The message get\_keys\_response shall be sent by the KMS to the DF2/MF in order to provide the session keys. + +The message get\_key\_response defines a LI event provided by the KMS to the DF2/MF which shall then be sent by the DF2/MF to the LEMF in a proper IRI record over the HI2 interface. + +Table 7A.7.2.1 provides the list of parameters, which shall be carried by the message get\_keys, in order to transfer to the KMS the information, as specified in TS 33.328 [25], needed to provide the session encryption keys: + +**Table 7A.7.2.1: Parameters and information in message get\_keys** + +| | +|----------------------------------------| +| Public KMS Identity of the target user | +| TRANSFER_INIT | +| TRANSFER_RESP | + +Upon reception of get\_keys message, the KMS shall verify that the key management information is related to the targeted user. + +A timer may be defined in the DF2/MF in order to specify the amount of time that the DF2/MF shall wait for the response from the KMS. If this timer expires, a failure indication shall be sent to the LEMF. + +Table 7A.7.2.2 provides the list of parameters, which shall be carried by the message get\_keys\_response, in order to provide the DF2/MF with the session keys: + +**Table 7A.7.2.2: Parameters and information in message get\_keys\_response** + +| | +|-------------------------------| +| Crypto Session ID | +| Session key | +| Salt | +| Failure indication (optional) | + +With reference to table 7A.7.2.2, in case of failure in providing any of the decryption information, the KMS may provide a decryption failure indication. + +Upon reception of get\_keys\_response message or in case of timer expiry, the following information shall be provided to the LEMF by the DF2/MF: + +- Lawful interception identifier +- Observed target identity(ies) +- Correlation number (in order to correlate the keys to IMS session under interception at the CSCF(s)) +- Event type (session encryption keys available) +- Crypto Session ID (if provided by the KMS) +- Session key (if provided by the KMS) +- Salt (if provided by the KMS) +- MediaSec key retrieval failure indication (in case of e.g. timer expiry, or failure indication received from the KMS). + +## 7A.7.3 Cooperating KMSs + +As specified in TS 33.328 [25], in some scenarios the parties involved in an encrypted IMS based communication may use two different KMSs. In these cases, no additional LI specific signalling between the KMSs shall take place. The KMS may need to cache the session keys retrieved as result of the ticket resolution for possible LI needs at later stage. + +## 7A.7.4 Security + +Xk interface and its configuration shall only be accessible to authorized personnel. + +The Xk interface shall have strong integrity and confidentiality protection. The Xk interface shall be protected by TLS unless protected by IPsec for LI purposes. TLS and certificate profiling shall be according to TS 33.310 [28]; IPsec profiling shall be according to TS 33.310 [28] and TS 33.210 [29]. + +## 7A.7.5 Start of interception for an already established IMS media secured session + +This function is invoked when LI is activated in the network for a target who has already established an IMS session with secure media. + +In order to provide information needed to decrypt the content of communication, the LI function in the CSCF needs to have access to SDP information and SIP headers exchanged in the SIP signalling between the parties during the IMS session setup for possible later retrieval in case LI is activated during the ongoing session. + +With reference to fig. 7A.7.1, if LI is activated by the ADMF over the X1\_1 interface for a target, the CSCF shall check if the given target has an ongoing IMS media secured session. In this case, the CSCF shall provide a "Start of interception with established IMS session" event message to the DF2/MF over the X2 interface, as specified in section 7A.3.1. + +Upon reception of Start of interception with established IMS secure session event, the DF2/MF shall check if a MIKEY-TICKET is included in the SDP. In this case the DF2/MF, in addition to forwarding the event to the LEMF over HI2, shall contact the KMS to resolve the ticket and retrieve the session keys and additional encryption related information as specified in section 7A.7.2. + +## 7A.8 IMS IMEI Interception + +The use of Instance ID in TS 24.229 [49] is mandatory in IMS in order to support IMEI based LI in the CSCF. The CSCF is required to have access to the Instance IDs for all active IMS registrations regardless of whether LI has been requested prior to UE registration for a given IMEI. The CSCF shall be responsible for extracting the IMEI from the Instance ID where required for a specific target interception and providing the IMEI to the DF2. The IMEI (when available) shall be provided by the CSCF to the DF2 for all intercepted communication regardless of whether the IMEI or another identifier has been used as the target for interception. + +Based on the national regulations, IMEI-based LI shall be possible for IMS sessions originated from, or terminated to, the UE with that IMEI. + +## 7A.9 Void + +## 8 Security + +### 8.0 General + +The security requirements are valid for the whole Lawful Interception system, i.e. rules and procedures shall be used for all involved entities, such as 3G GSN and the DF. + +### 8.1 Administration security + +The administration of the LI function, i.e. Activation, Deactivation and Interrogation of Lawful Interception, in the 3G ICEs and the DFs shall be done securely as described below: + +- It shall be possible to configure the authorised user access within the serving network to Activate, Deactivate and Interrogate Lawful Interception separately for every physical or logical port at the 3G ICEs and DF. It shall be possible to password protect user access. +- Only the ADMF is allowed to have access to the LI functionality in the 3G ICEs and DF. +- The communication links between ADMF, 3G GSN, 3G MSC Servers or any ICEs of this specification, LI LCS Client, CSCF, DF2, and DF3 may be required by national option to support security mechanisms. Options for security mechanisms include: + - CUG / VPN; + - COLP; + - CLIP; + - authentication; + - encryption. + +Through the use of user access restrictions, no unauthorised network entities or remote equipment shall be able to view or manipulate LI data in the 3G GSN, 3G MSC Server, LI LCS Client, CSCF, 3GPP ICE, any 3GPP nodes, and Administration nodes of this specification or the DFs. + +### 8.2 IRI security + +#### 8.2.1 Normal operation + +The transmission of the IRI shall be done in a secure manner. + +When DFs are physically separate from the 3G ICEs or any nodes described in this specification for IRI creations, the X2-interface may be required by national option to support security mechanisms. Options for security mechanisms include: + +- CUG/VPN; +- COLP; +- CLIP; +- authentication; +- encryption. + +#### 8.2.2 Communication failure + +Depending on the national law in case of communication failure IRI may be buffered in the 3G INEs or other node elements used in this specification. After successful transmission of IRI the whole buffer shall be deleted. It shall be possible to delete the content buffer via command or a timer, in an un-restorable fashion. + +## 8.3 CC security + +The transmission of the CC shall be done in a secure manner. + +When DFs are physically separate from the 3G INEs or any other nodes used for interception mentioned in this specification, the X3-interface may be required by national option to support security mechanisms. Options for security mechanisms include: + +- CUG/VPN; +- COLP; +- CLIP; +- authentication; +- encryption. + +In case of transmission failure no buffering is required within the intercepting network. + +## 8.4 Security aspects of Lawful Interception (LI) billing + +Billing information may be suppressed or made available at the DFs and the ADMF. Billing information for Lawful Interception shall be separated from "regular" billing data. + +Billing data transmission to the Lawful Interception billing system may be done in a secure manner per national option. + +In case of transmission failure billing-data shall be buffered/stored in a secure way. After successful transmission billing data shall be deleted in an un-restorable fashion. + +## 8.5 Other security issues + +### 8.5.1 Log files + +Log files shall be generated by the ADMF, DF2, DF3, 3G MSC Servers, or any 3GPP nodes of this specification, LI LCS Client, CSCF and the 3G GSN. All log files are retrievable by the ADMF, and are maintained by the ADMF in a secure manner. + +### 8.5.2 Data consistency + +The administration function in the 3GMS or any nodes described in this specification shall be capable of performing a periodic consistency check to ensure that the target list of target identities in all involved 3G MSC Servers or any 3GPP nodes of this specification, LI LCS Client, CSCFs, 3G GSNs in the 3GMS and the DFs contain the appropriate target Ids consistent with the intercept orders in the ADMF. The reference data base is the ADMF data base. + +--- + +## 9 Invocation of Lawful Interception (LI) for 3GPP WLAN interworking services + +### 9.0 General + +WLAN Interworking specifications (TS 23.234 [14], TS 24.234 [17] and TS 29.234 [16]) are no longer maintained for Release 12 onwards. + +This clause 9 is therefore no longer maintained. + +Figure 23 shows the extract from the reference configuration which is relevant for the invocation of the Lawful Interception of the packet data 3GPP WLAN Interworking network. + +![Functional model for invocation of Lawful Interception for 3GPP WLAN Interworking Services diagram](e7010c66da16316c2935dfbbef5056b3_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates a functional model for lawful interception. At the top, a large black rectangular block represents a network element. Below it, a vertical sequence of four smaller rectangular blocks is shown, connected by downward-pointing arrows. To the right of the second and third blocks in the sequence, there are horizontal lines extending to the right, representing interfaces. The first block has a line extending to the left, and the fourth block has a line extending to the right. This layout represents the flow of intercepted data through various delivery functions. + +Functional model for invocation of Lawful Interception for 3GPP WLAN Interworking Services diagram + +**Figure 23: Functional model for invocation of Lawful Interception for 3GPP WLAN Interworking Services** + +The HI2 and HI3 interfaces represent the interfaces between the LEA and two delivery functions. Both interfaces are subject to national requirements. They are included for completeness, but are beyond the scope of this specification. + +The delivery functions are used: + +- to convert the information on the X2-interface to the corresponding information on the HI2 interface; +- to distribute the intercept related information to the relevant LEA(s); +- to distribute the intercept product to the relevant LEA(s). + +Interception at a WAG applies for the roaming users where the PDG is not in the visited network. + +For most WLAN Interworking cases, the Packet Data Gateway (PDG) handles the bearer level interception, specifically interception of CC and IRI related to tunnel establishment and release in which case there is no need to perform interception at a WAG. This includes the case where the PDG is in the intercepting carrier's network (whether it be home or visited). For the case where a visited network is to intercept WLAN related tunnel and the PDG for the tunnel is not in the visited network, the Wireless Access Gateway (WAG) is used to intercept the CC and IRI related to tunnel establishment and release. It should be noted that the CC available at the WAG may be encrypted. + +## 9.1 Provision of Intercept Product - Short Message Service + +LI for SMS in the 3GPP-WLAN Interworking case is described in Clause 7A.4. + +## 9.2 Provision of Intercepted Content of Communications - 3GPP WLAN Interworking services + +### 9.2.0 General + +The access method for the delivering of 3GPP WLAN Interworking Intercept Product is based on duplication of packets without modification at the PDG or WAG. The duplicated packets with additional information in the header, as described in the following sections, are sent to DF3 for further delivery. Note that CC available at the WAG is likely to be encrypted. + +![Figure 24: Configuration for interception of 3GPP WLAN Interworking product data. The diagram shows a network architecture with several components: a vertical rectangle on the left (PDG/WAG), a top horizontal rectangle (WLAN), a middle horizontal rectangle (DF3), a right horizontal rectangle (DF2), and a bottom shaded box containing two smaller rectangles (DF1 and DF2). Arrows indicate data flow: from the top WLAN rectangle to the left PDG/WAG, to the middle DF3, and to the right DF2. From the right DF2, an arrow points down to the bottom shaded box. From the bottom shaded box, an arrow points up to the right DF2. From the right DF2, an arrow points left to the middle DF3. From the middle DF3, an arrow points left to the left PDG/WAG. From the left PDG/WAG, an arrow points down to the bottom shaded box.](dbd4bab54b57e8d1abf80e3de6471130_img.jpg) + +Figure 24: Configuration for interception of 3GPP WLAN Interworking product data. The diagram shows a network architecture with several components: a vertical rectangle on the left (PDG/WAG), a top horizontal rectangle (WLAN), a middle horizontal rectangle (DF3), a right horizontal rectangle (DF2), and a bottom shaded box containing two smaller rectangles (DF1 and DF2). Arrows indicate data flow: from the top WLAN rectangle to the left PDG/WAG, to the middle DF3, and to the right DF2. From the right DF2, an arrow points down to the bottom shaded box. From the bottom shaded box, an arrow points up to the right DF2. From the right DF2, an arrow points left to the middle DF3. From the middle DF3, an arrow points left to the left PDG/WAG. From the left PDG/WAG, an arrow points down to the bottom shaded box. + +**Figure 24: Configuration for interception of 3GPP WLAN Interworking product data** + +### 9.2.1 X3-interface + +In addition to the intercepted content of communications, the following information needs to be transferred from the PDG or WAG to the DF3 in order to allow the DF3 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity; +- correlation number; +- time stamp - optional; +- direction (indicates whether T-PDU is MO or MT) - optional; +- the target location (if available in the intercepting node). + +## 9.3 Provision of Intercept Related Information + +### 9.3.0 General + +Figure 25 shows the transfer of intercept related information to the DF2. If an event for / from a mobile subscriber occurs, the PDG, WAG, or the AAA Server sends the relevant data to the DF2. Packet Data Header Information reporting is a national option. For Packet Data Header Information reporting, a PDG/WAG either isolates the relevant data and sends it to the DF2 or sends the packet stream to another entity in the network (e.g., DF3) for isolation which then provides the relevant data to the DF2. + +![Diagram illustrating the provision of intercept related information. It shows three main components: Target, AAA Server, and PDG/WAG. The AAA Server is connected to the PDG/WAG. An arrow points from the AAA Server to the PDG/WAG. The PDG/WAG is connected to the Target. An arrow points from the PDG/WAG to the Target. The PDG/WAG is also connected to an Other Party. An arrow points from the PDG/WAG to the Other Party.](4806f9f95fff13a30d6523bd6ffeac63_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph LR + AAA[AAA Server] --> PDG[PDG/WAG] + PDG --> Target[Target] + PDG --> Other[Other Party] + +``` + +Diagram illustrating the provision of intercept related information. It shows three main components: Target, AAA Server, and PDG/WAG. The AAA Server is connected to the PDG/WAG. An arrow points from the AAA Server to the PDG/WAG. The PDG/WAG is connected to the Target. An arrow points from the PDG/WAG to the Target. The PDG/WAG is also connected to an Other Party. An arrow points from the PDG/WAG to the Other Party. + +**Figure 25: Provision of Intercept Related Information** + +### 9.3.1 X2-interface + +The following information needs to be transferred from the PDG, WAG or the AAA server to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity (IMSI, NAI, or MSISDN); +- events and associated parameters as defined in section 9.3.2 may be provided; +- the target location (if available); +- Correlation number; +- Quality of Service (QoS) identifier (if available). + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 using a reliable transport mechanism. + +The PDG/WAG detects packets containing packet data header information in the communications path but the information needed for Packet Data Header Information reporting may need to be transferred from the PDG/WAG either directly to the DF2 or via another network entity in order to allow the DF2 to perform its functionality. + +### 9.3.2 3GPP WLAN Interworking LI Events and Event Information + +The following events are applicable to AAA Server: + +- I-WLAN Access Initiation; +- I-WLAN re-authentication, +- I-WLAN Access Termination; +- I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment; +- I-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect; +- Start of Intercept with I-WLAN Communication Active; + +The following events are applicable to the PDG and WAG: + +- I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment; +- I-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect; + +- Start of Intercept with I-WLAN Communication Active. +- Packet Data Header Information. + +A set of possible elements as shown below is used to generate the events. Information associated with the events are transmitted from the PDG, WAG or AAA server to DF2. + +NOTE: Void. + +Some of these parameters apply to the PDG or WAG and some apply to the AAA server. Parameters sent from the PDG, WAG or AAA server is dependent on what is available at the network element. If interception is performed at the PDG, then Packet Data Header Information reporting shall also be performed at the PDG and not at the WAG. + +**Table 3: Information Events for WLAN Interworking Event Records** + +| Element | PDG | AAA Server | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN
MSISDN of the target. | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| Observed NAI
NAI of the target. | Not available | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| Observed IMSI
IMSI of the target. | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| Event type
Description which type of event is delivered: I-WLAN Access Initiation, I-WLAN Access Termination, I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment, I-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect, Start of Intercept with I-WLAN Communication Active, Packet Data Header Information. | Available from ICE | Available from ICE | +| Event date
Date of the event generation in the PDG or the AAA server. | Available from ICE | Available from ICE | +| Event time
Time of the event generation in the PDG or the AAA server. Timestamp shall be generated relative to the PDG or AAA server internal clock. | Available from ICE | Available from ICE | +| WLAN UE Local IP address
The WLAN UE Local IP address of observed party. The WLAN UE Local IP address field specified in TS 24.234 [17] and IETF RFC 2409, represents the IPv4/IPv6 address of the WLAN UE in the WLAN AN. It is an address used to deliver the packet to a WLAN UE in a WLAN AN. Note that this address might be dynamic. | Available, see TS 24.234 [17] and IETF RFC 2409 | Not available | +| WLAN UE MAC address
The WLAN MAC address of the target. Note that this address might be dynamic and the validity of the MAC Address is outside of the scope of 3GPP. | Not available | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| WLAN UE Remote IP address
The WLAN UE Remote IP address of observed party. The WLAN UE Remote IP address field specified in TS 24.234 [17], represents the IPv4/IPv6 address of the WLAN UE in the network being accessed by the WLAN AN. It is an address used in the data packet encapsulated by the WLAN UE-initiated tunnel and is the source address used by applications in the WLAN UE. Note that this address might be dynamic. | Available, see TS 24.234 [17] | Not available | +| WLAN Access Point Name
The W-APN of the access point. | Available, see TS 24.234 [17] | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| WLAN Operator Name
The name of the WLAN operator name serving the target. | Not available | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| WLAN Location Data
The location of the WLAN serving the target (e.g., string like "coffee shop" or "airport", etc.). | Not available | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| WLAN Location Information
Location Information regarding the WLAN as provided in RADIUS or DIAMETER signalling exchanged with the AAA server. | Not available | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| Correlation Number
The correlation number is used to correlate CC and IRI. The correlation number is also used to allow the correlation of IRI records. In case of the AAA server, the Correlation Number is only used to correlate IRI records. | Generated for LI by PDG | Generated for LI by AAA server | +| Network Element Identifier
Unique identifier for the element reporting the ICE. | Generated for LI by PDG | Generated for LI by AAA server | +| Initiator
The initiator of the request either the network or the WLAN UE. | Generated for LI by PDG | Generated for LI by AAA server | +| NAS IP/IPv6 address
The IP or IPv6 address of the NAS in the WLAN. | Not available | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | + +| | | | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------| +| Visited PLMN ID
Identity of the visited PLMN to which the user is terminating their WLAN tunnels or through which the user is establishing their WLAN tunnels. | Not available | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| Session Alive Time
The amount of time in seconds during which the target can be registered for WLAN access. | Not available | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| Failed access reason
Provides the reason for why a WLAN access attempt failed ("Authentication Failed"). | Not available | Available from ICE | +| Session termination reason
Provides a reason for why a WLAN access session is terminated. | Not available | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| Failed tunnel establishment reason
Provides a reason for why a WLAN tunnel establishment failed ("Authentication failed" or "Authorization failed"). | Available from ICE | Available from ICE | +| NSAPI
Network layer Service Access Point Identifier
The NSAPI information element contains an NSAPI identifying a PDP Context in a mobility management context specified by the Tunnel Endpoint Identifier Control Plane.
This is an optional parameter to help DF/MF and LEA's to distinguish between the sending mobile access networks | Optional available according TS 23.234 [14] Annex F; defined TS 29.060 [37] 7.7.17 | Not available | +| Destination IP Address
The IP address, including type IPv4 or IPv6, of the destination of the IP packet. | Available from ICE | Available from ICE | +| Destination Port Number
The port number of the destination of the IP packet. | Available from ICE | Available from ICE | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only)
The field in the IPv6 header that is used by a source to label packets of a flow (see RFC 3697 [41]). | Available from ICE | Available from ICE | +| Packet Count
The number of packets detected and reported (for a particular summary period). | Available from ICE | Available from ICE | +| Packet Data Summary Reason
The reason for a Packet Data Summary message being sent to the LEMF (e.g., timed out, counter expiration, end of session) | Available from ICE | Available from ICE | +| Packet Size
The size of the packet. (i.e., Total Length Field in IPv4 or Payload Length field in IPv6) | Available from ICE | Available from ICE | +| Source IP Address
The IP address, including type IPv4 or IPv6, of the source of the IP packet. | Available from ICE | Available from ICE | +| Source Port Number
The port number of the source of the IP packet. | Available from ICE | Available from ICE | +| Sum of Packet Sizes (for a particular summary period)
The sum of values contained in the Total Length fields of the IPv4 packets or the sum of the values contained in the Payload Length fields of the IPv6 packets. | Available from ICE | Available from ICE | +| Summary Period
Includes the dates and times of the first and last packets in a particular packet data interval. | Available from ICE | Available from ICE | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP)
The identification of the transport protocol of the packet or packet flow being reported. | Available from ICE | Available from ICE | + +**Table 3a: Information Events for WLAN Interworking Event Records - WAG** + +| Element | WAG | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN
MSISDN of the target. | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| Observed IMSI
IMSI of the target. | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| Event type
Description which type of event is delivered: I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment, I-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect, Start of Intercept with I-WLAN Communication Active, Packet Data Header Information. | Available from ICE | +| Event date
Date of the event generation in the PDG/WAG or the AAA server. | Available from ICE | +| Event time
Time of the event generation in the PDG/WAG or the AAA server. Timestamp shall be generated relative to the PDG/WAG or AAA server internal clock. | Available from ICE | +| WLAN UE IP address
The WLAN UE IP address of observed party. The WLAN UE IP address field contains the IPv4/IPv6 address (specified by TS 29.234 [16]) of the WLAN UE tunnel endpoint as seen by the WAG. Note that this address might be dynamic. | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| WLAN PDG Tunnel Endpoint IP address
The WLAN PDG Tunnel Endpoint IP address field contains the IPv4/IPv6 address of the PDG (as specified in TS 29.234 [16]) as seen by the WAG. Note that this address might be dynamic. | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| WLAN Access Point Name
The W-APN of the access point. | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| Correlation Number
The correlation number is used to correlate CC and IRI. The correlation number is also used to allow the correlation of IRI records. | Generated for LI by WAG | +| Network Element Identifier
Unique identifier for the element reporting the ICE. | Generated for LI by WAG | +| NAS IP/IPv6 address
The IP or IPv6 address of the NAS in the WLAN. | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| Tunnel Protocol
The Tunnel Protocol as defined in the Routing-Policy AVP in TS 29.234 [16]. | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| Source Ports
The list or range of source ports as specified in the Routing-Policy AVP provided by the AAA server in TS 29.234 [16]. | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| Destination Ports
The list or range of destination ports as specified in the Routing-Policy AVP provided by the AAA server in TS 29.234 [16]. | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| Session Alive Time
The amount of time in seconds during which the target can be registered for WLAN access. | Available, see TS 29.234 [16] | +| Destination IP Address
The IP address, including type IPv4 or IPv6, of the destination of the IP packet. | Available from ICE | +| Destination Port Number
The port number of the destination of the IP packet. | Available from ICE | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only)
The field in the IPv6 header that is used by a source to label packets of a flow (see RFC 3697 [41]). | Available from ICE | +| Packet Count
The number of packets detected and reported (for a particular summary period). | Available from ICE | +| Packet Data Summary Reason
The reason for a Packet Data Summary message being sent to the LEMF (e.g., timed out, counter expiration, end of session) | Available from ICE | + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------| +| Packet Size
The size of the packet. (i.e., Total Length Field in IPv4 or Payload Length field in IPv6) | Available from ICE | +| Source IP Address
The IP address, including type IPv4 or IPv6, of the source of the IP packet. | Available from ICE | +| Source Port Number
The port number of the source of the IP packet. | Available from ICE | +| Sum of Packet Sizes (for a particular summary period)
The sum of values contained in the Total Length fields of the IPv4 packets or the sum of the values contained in the Payload Length fields of the IPv6 packets. | Available from ICE | +| Summary Period
Includes the dates and times of the first and last packets in a particular packet data interval. | Available from ICE | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP)
The identification of the transport protocol of the packet or packet flow being reported. | Available from ICE | + +## 9.4 Structure of I-WLAN Events + +### 9.4.1 I-WLAN Access Initiation + +For I-WLAN Access Initiation including I-WLAN re-authentication, for both I-WLAN Access Initiation-event is generated. The elements, shown in Table 4, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the AAA server. + +**Table 4: I-WLAN Access Initiation - AAA Server** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed NAI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| WLAN Operator Name | +| WLAN LocationData | +| WLAN Location Information | +| NAS IP/IPv6 Address | +| WLAN UE MAC Address | +| Visited PLMN ID | +| Session Alive Time | +| Failed Access reason | + +## 9.4.2 WLAN Access Termination + +For WLAN Access Termination or the immediate purging of a user from a WLAN access, a WLAN access termination-event is generated. The elements, shown in Table 5, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the AAA server. + +**Table 5: I-WLAN Access Termination - AAA Server** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed NAI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| WLAN Operator Name | +| WLAN Location Data | +| WLAN Location Information | +| NAS IP/IPv6 Address | +| WLAN UE MAC Address | +| Session Termination reason | + +## 9.4.3 I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment + +For I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment, a I-WLAN tunnel establishment-event is generated. The elements, shown in Table 6, 6a, and Table 7, will be delivered to the DF2 if available, by the PDG, WAG or AAA server, respectively. + +**Table 6: I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment - PDG** + +| | +|------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed NAI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| WLAN UE Local IP address | +| WLAN UE Remote IP address | +| WLAN Access Point Name | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Failed tunnel establishment reason | +| NSAPI (optional) | + +**Table 6a: I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment - WAG** + +| | +|-------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| WLAN UE IP address | +| WLAN PDG Tunnel Endpoint IP address | +| WLAN Access Point Name | +| NAS IP/IPv6 address | +| Tunnel Protocol | +| Source Ports | +| Destination Ports | +| Session Alive Time | +| Network Element Identifier | + +**Table 7: I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment - AAA Server** + +| | +|------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed NAI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| WLAN Access Point Name | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Visited PLMN ID | +| Failed tunnel establishment reason | + +#### 9.4.4 I-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect + +At I-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect, a I-WLAN tunnel disconnect event is generated. The elements, shown in Table 8, 8a, and Table 9, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the PDG, WAG or AAA server, respectively. + +**Table 8: I-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect - PDG** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed NAI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| WLAN UE Local IP Address | +| WLAN UE Remote IP address | +| WLAN Access Point Name | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Initiator (optional) | + +**Table 8a: I-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect - WAG** + +| | +|-------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| WLAN UE IP address | +| WLAN PDG Tunnel Endpoint IP address | +| WLAN Access Point Name | +| NAS IP/IPv6 address | +| Tunnel Protocol | +| Source Ports | +| Destination Ports | +| Network Element Identifier | + +**Table 9: I-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect - AAA Server** + +| | +|----------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed NAI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Tunnel address of observed party | +| WLAN Access Point Name | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Initiator (optional) | + +### 9.4.5 Start of Intercept with I-WLAN Communication Active + +This event will be generated if interception for a target is started and if the target has one or more active I-WLAN Access sessions or one or more I-WLAN Tunnels established. The elements, shown in Table 10, 10a, and Table 11, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the PDG, WAG or AAA server, respectively. + +**Table 10: Start of Intercept with I-WLAN Communication Active - PDG** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed NAI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation Number | +| WLAN UE Local IP Address | +| WLAN UE Remote IP address | +| WLAN Access Point Name | +| Network Element Identifier | + +**Table 10a: Start of Intercept with I-WLAN Communication Active - WAG** + +| | +|-------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| WLAN UE IP address | +| WLAN PDG Tunnel Endpoint IP address | +| WLAN Access Point Name | +| NAS IP/IPv6 address | +| Tunnel Protocol | +| Source Ports | +| Destination Ports | +| Session Alive Time | +| Network Element Identifier | + +**Table 11: Start of Intercept with I-WLAN Communication Active - AAA Server** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed NAI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation Number | +| WLAN Access Point Name | +| Network Element Identifier | +| WLAN Operator Name | +| WLAN Location Data | +| WLAN Location Information | +| NAS IP/IPv6 address | +| Visited PLMN ID | + +## 9.4.6 Packet Data Header Information + +### 9.4.6.0 Introduction + +Packet Data Header Information reporting can be done either on a per-packet (i.e., non-summarized) basis or in a summary report. + +### 9.4.6.1 Packet Data Header Report + +This event is used to provide packet header reports on a per packet basis (non-summarized reporting) and is triggered by each packet sent or received by the target. These elements will be delivered either directly to DF2 or via another network entity if available: + +**Table A: I-WLAN Packet Data Header Report - PDG** + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed NAI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| WLAN UE Local IP Address | +| WLAN UE Remote IP address | +| WLAN Access Point Name | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Initiator (optional) | +| Source IP Address | +| Source Port Number | +| Destination IP Address | +| Destination Port Number | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP) | +| Packet Size | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only) | + +**Table B: I-WLAN Packet Data Header Report - WAG** + +| | +|-------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| WLAN UE IP address | +| WLAN PDG Tunnel Endpoint IP address | +| WLAN Access Point Name | +| NAS IP/IPv6 address | +| Tunnel Protocol | +| Source Ports | +| Destination Ports | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Source IP Address | +| Source Port Number | +| Destination IP Address | +| Destination Port Number | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP) | +| Packet Size | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only) | + +#### 9.4.6.2 Packet Data Summary Report + +This event is used to report: + +- 1) the source and destination information derived from the packet headers, including: + - a) source and destination IP Addresses, + - b) IP next-layer protocol, + - c) Layer-4 ports, and + - d) Flow label, if the packet is IPv6 + - 2) summary information for the number of packets and bytes transmitted or received by the target for each unique packet flow within a WLAN tunnel, and + - 3) the date and the time of the first and last packets associated with that packet flow. A packet flow is defined as the 6-tuple of source/destination IP address/port number and the layer 4 protocol and WLAN tunnel. +- IP addresses and the IP next-layer protocol are always reported, the flow label is reported if the packet is IPv6, and the layer-4 ports are reported. + +The event provides packet summary reports for each unique packet data session (PDP context) and packet flow, and is triggered by one of the following: + +- start of a packet flow associated with a WLAN Tunnel +- an interim report for a packet flow associated with a WLAN Tunnel is to be reported +- end of a packet flow associated with a WLAN Tunnel (including end of the WLAN Tunnel itself). + +An interim report can be triggered by + +- The expiration of a configurable timer per intercept (called a Summary Timer). The Summary Timer is configurable in units of seconds; +- A per-intercept configurable count threshold is reached. + +These elements will be delivered either directly to DF2 or via an MF for each packet flow if available: + +**Table C: I-WLAN Packet Data Summary Report - PDG** + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed NAI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| WLAN UE Local IP Address | +| WLAN UE Remote IP address | +| WLAN Access Point Name | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Initiator (optional) | +| Source IP Address | +| Source Port Number | +| Destination IP Address | +| Destination Port Number | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP) | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only) | +| Summary Period | +| Packet Count (for this summary period) | +| Sum of Packet Sizes (for this summary period) | + +**Table D: I-WLAN Packet Data Summary Report - WAG** + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| WLAN UE IP address | +| WLAN PDG Tunnel Endpoint IP address | +| WLAN Access Point Name | +| NAS IP/IPv6 address | +| Tunnel Protocol | +| Source Ports | +| Destination Ports | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Source IP Address | +| Source Port Number | +| Destination IP Address | +| Destination Port Number | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP) | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only) | +| Summary Period | +| Packet Count (for this summary period) | +| Sum of Packet Sizes (for this summary period) | + +If the packets are IPv4, the sum of all observed packet sizes is the sum of the values contained in the Total Length field of each packet as specified in IETF RFC 791 [39]. + +If the packet is IPv6, the sum of all observed packet sizes is the sum of the values contained in the Payload Length field for each packet as specified in IETF RFC 2460 [40]. + +If no packets were detected for the duration of the Summary Timer, then the Packet Data Summary Report shall not be sent. + +# 10 Interception of Multimedia Broadcast/MultiCast Service (MBMS) + +## 10.0 General + +MBMS provides video or similar streamed services via either point to point multicast or cell broadcast mechanisms between an operator content server (BM-SC) and UEs as defined in TS 23.246 [20]. This section details the stage 2 Lawful Interception requirements for MBMS. + +NOTE: Generic Broadcast services where the UE receives the broadcast in IDLE mode and there is no subscription relationship between the UE and the BM-SC are out of scope. In addition 3rd party BM-SC services where the operator is not responsible for content encryption and subscription management are out of scope. + +Figure 10.1 shows the extract from the reference configuration which is relevant for the invocation of the Lawful Interception of the MBMS Services. + +![Figure 10.1: Functional model for invocation of Lawful Interception for MBMS Services. The diagram shows a stack of three boxes labeled LEMF on the left. Two dashed lines, labeled HI1 and HI2, connect the LEMF stack to two separate boxes. The top box contains 'Mediation Function' and 'ADMF'. The bottom box contains 'Mediation Function' and 'Delivery Function 2'. Arrows labeled X1_1, X1_2, and X2 point from the top box, the bottom box, and the LEMF stack respectively to a single empty box on the right.](986e77e2df3c318680a569774888f4aa_img.jpg) + +Figure 10.1: Functional model for invocation of Lawful Interception for MBMS Services. The diagram shows a stack of three boxes labeled LEMF on the left. Two dashed lines, labeled HI1 and HI2, connect the LEMF stack to two separate boxes. The top box contains 'Mediation Function' and 'ADMF'. The bottom box contains 'Mediation Function' and 'Delivery Function 2'. Arrows labeled X1\_1, X1\_2, and X2 point from the top box, the bottom box, and the LEMF stack respectively to a single empty box on the right. + +Figure 10.1: Functional model for invocation of Lawful Interception for MBMS Services + +## 10.1 Provision of Content of Communications + +Interception of the content of communications for MBMS services if available, may be provided by the underlying transport bearer interception functionality (e.g. GSN, PDG or NGN network) and is therefore subject to the current transport bearer interception functionality detailed in other parts of this specification. + +## 10.2 Provision of Intercept Related Information + +### 10.2.0 General + +Figure 10.2 shows the transfer of intercept related information to the DF2. If an event for / from a mobile subscriber occurs, the BM-SC shall send the relevant data to the DF2. + +![A block diagram showing the flow of Intercept Related Information between several functional entities. The diagram consists of five rectangular boxes connected by arrows. The top row has three boxes, and the bottom row has two. Arrows indicate bidirectional and unidirectional communication paths between the entities.](a963ca41bde1669b18a4b783616f228b_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the provision of Intercept Related Information between various network entities. It consists of five functional blocks connected by arrows representing interfaces. The top row contains three blocks, and the bottom row contains two. A central block in the top row has bidirectional arrows connecting to blocks on its left and right. The block on the far right of the top row has a downward arrow pointing to a block in the bottom row. The two blocks in the bottom row are connected by a horizontal line. + +A block diagram showing the flow of Intercept Related Information between several functional entities. The diagram consists of five rectangular boxes connected by arrows. The top row has three boxes, and the bottom row has two. Arrows indicate bidirectional and unidirectional communication paths between the entities. + +**Figure 10.2: Provision of Intercept Related Information** + +### 10.2.1 X2-interface + +The following information needs to be transferred from the BM-SC to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity; +- events and associated parameters as defined in clauses 10.3.2 may be provided; +- For Further Study:- Encryption parameters (keys and associated parameters for decrypting CC), if available and necessary. + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 using a reliable transport mechanism. + +## 10.2.2 MBMS LI Events and Event Information + +Intercept Related Information (Events) are necessary for the following; + +- Service Joining. +- Service Leaving. +- Start of Interception with Service Active. +- Subscription Activation. +- Subscription Modification. +- Subscription Termination. + +Events shall include changes resulting from direct communication between the UE and BM-SC and off-line subscription changes (e.g. changes made by operator customer services on behalf of the subscriber). + +A set of possible elements as shown in Table 10.2.2 are used to generate the events. + +**Table 10.2.2: Information Events for MBMS Event Records** + +| Element | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI
IMSI of the target. | +| Observed Other Identity
Other Identity of the target. | +| Event type
Description which type of event is delivered:- Service Joining; Service Leaving; Subscription Activation; Subscription Modification; Subscription Termination. | +| Event date
Date of the event generation in the BM-SC. | +| Event time
Time of the event generation in the BM-SC. Timestamp shall be generated relative to the BM-SC server internal clock. | +| MBMS Subscribed Service
Details of the MBMS Service to which the target has subscribed. | +| MBMS Service Joining Time
Requested MBMS Service Joining Time | +| MBMS Service Subscription List
List of all users subscribed to MBMS Service to which target has requested Joining. | +| Correlation Number
The correlation number is used to correlate CC and IRI. The correlation number is also used to allow the correlation of IRI records. | +| Network Element Identifier
Unique identifier for the element reporting the ICE. | +| Initiator
The initiator of the request either the UE or Off-line BM-SC access (eg customer services agent or internet). | +| Visited PLMN ID
Identity of the visited PLMN to which the user is registered | +| APN
Access Point Name on which this IP multicast address is defined. | +| Multicast/Broadcast Mode
MBMS bearer service in broadcast or multicast mode | +| IP IP/IPv6 multicast address(multicast mode only)
IP or IPv6 multicast address identifying the MBMS bearer described by this MBMS Bearer Context. | +| List of Downstream Nodes
List of downstream nodes that have requested the MBMS bearer service and to which notifications and MBMS data have to be forwarded. | +| MBMS Leaving Reason
Indicates whether UE initiated/requested leaving, or whether BM-SC/network terminated the Service to the UE (e.g. GSN session dropped or BM-SC subscription expired etc). | + +NOTE: Generation of Correlation Number is FFS. + +## 10.3 Structure of MBMS Events + +### 10.3.1 Service Joining + +For MBMS Service Joining, a Service Joining event is generated. The elements, shown in Table 10.3.1 will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the BM-SC. A new Service Joining Event shall be generated for each individual service joined. + +**Table 10.3.1: Service Joining** + +| | | +|--------------------------------|-----------------| +| Observed IMSI | | +| Event Type | | +| Event Time | | +| Event Date | | +| MBMS Subscribed Service | | +| MBMS Service Joining Time | | +| Network Element Identifier | | +| Initiator | | +| IP/IPv6 Multicast Address | (If Applicable) | +| Visited PLMN ID | (If Applicable) | +| Multicast/Broadcast Mode | | +| APN (If Available) | | +| List of Downstream Nodes | (If Available) | +| MBMS Service Subscription List | (Optional) | + +### 10.3.2 Service Leaving + +For MBMS Service Leaving, a Service Leaving event is generated. The elements, shown in Table 10.3.2 will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the BM-SC. A new Service Leaving Event shall be generated for each individual service leaving. + +**Table 10.3.2: Service Leaving** + +| | | +|--------------------------------|-----------------| +| Observed IMSI | | +| Event Type | | +| Event Time | | +| Event Date | | +| MBMS Subscribed Service | | +| Network Element Identifier | | +| Initiator | | +| IP/IPv6 Multicast Address | (If Applicable) | +| Visited PLMN ID | (If Applicable) | +| MBMS Service Subscription List | (Optional) | +| MBMS Service Leaving Reason | | + +### 10.3.3 Start of Interception with Service Active + +For Start of Interception where MBMS Service Joining has already occurred prior to start of interception, a Start of Interception with Service Active event is generated. The elements, shown in Table 10.3.3 will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the BM-SC. A new Start of Interception with Service Active Event shall be generated for each individual service the target is subscribed to. + +**Table 10.3.3: Start of Interception with Service Active** + +| | | +|--------------------------------|-----------------| +| Observed IMSI | | +| Event Type | | +| Event Time | | +| Event Date | | +| MBMS Subscribed Service | | +| MBMS Service Joining Time | | +| Network Element Identifier | | +| Initiator | | +| IP/IPv6 Multicast Address | (If Applicable) | +| Visited PLMN ID | (If Applicable) | +| Multicast/Broadcast Mode | | +| APN (If Available) | | +| List of Downstream Nodes | (If Available) | +| MBMS Service Subscription List | (Optional) | + +### 10.3.4 Subscription Activation + +For MBMS Subscription Activation, a Subscription Activation event is generated. The elements, shown in Table 10.3.4 will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the BM-SC. If Subscription Activation is performed simultaneously for more than one service, a separate event shall be generated for each service activated. + +**Table 10.3.4: Subscription Activation** + +| | | +|--------------------------------|-----------------| +| Observed IMSI | | +| Event Type | | +| Event Time | | +| Event Date | | +| MBMS Subscribed Service | | +| Network Element Identifier | | +| Initiator | | +| IP/IPv6 Address | (If Applicable) | +| Visited PLMN ID | (If Applicable) | +| MBMS Service Subscription List | (Optional) | + +### 10.3.5 Subscription Modification + +For MBMS Subscription Modification, a Subscription Modification event is generated. The elements, shown in Table 10.3.5, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the BM-SC. If Subscription Modification is performed simultaneously for more than one service, a separate event shall be generated for each service modified. + +**Table 10.3.5: Subscription Modification** + +| | | +|--------------------------------|-----------------| +| Observed IMSI | | +| Event Type | | +| Event Time | | +| Event Date | | +| MBMS Subscribed Service | | +| Network Element Identifier | | +| Initiator | | +| IP/IPv6 Address | (If Applicable) | +| Visited PLMN ID | (If Applicable) | +| MBMS Service Subscription List | (Optional) | + +## 10.3.6 Subscription Termination + +For MBMS Subscription Termination, a Subscription Termination event is generated. The elements, shown in Table 10.3.6 will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the BM-SC. If Subscription Termination is performed simultaneously for more than one service, a separate event shall be generated for each service performed. + +**Table 10.3.6: Subscription Modification** + +| | | +|--------------------------------|-----------------| +| Observed IMSI | | +| Event Type | | +| Event Time | | +| Event Date | | +| MBMS Subscribed Service | | +| Network Element Identifier | | +| Initiator | | +| IP/IPv6 Address | (If Applicable) | +| Visited PLMN ID | (If Applicable) | +| MBMS Service Subscription List | (Optional) | + +--- + +# 11 IMS Conference Services + +## 11.1 Background for IMS Conference Services + +The entire clause 11 is a national option and is subject to national regulations. The covered cases are where the conference services are in the domain of the intercepting operator. The following cases are covered. + +1. A target's conference call is the target. This may be where the target is the head of the conference. IRI and CC for this conference is reported. The following are examples of information that is reported. + - a. For example, the starting and ending of a conference as well as any parties joined or removed from the conference call are reported. + - b. Reporting of CC for held conferences initiated by the target. +2. A conference that itself is directly the target of interception. This case is applicable only provided that the conference is identified by a proper identity for LI in IMS domain (Conference URI or Conference Factory URI). The IRI and CC for this conference is reported. + - a. For example, the starting and ending or a conference as well as any parties joined or removed from the conference call are reported. + +The case when an target joins an associate's conference is for further study. + +The key elements for interception of conference services are the AS/MRFC and MRFP. IRI associated with the conference services that are to be intercepted is reported by the AS/MRFC while the CC associated with the conference service is reported by the MRFP. + +National regulations on a per interception basis may limit delivery of communications (CC and IRI) of an outbound international roaming target by the HPLMN as described in clause 5.1.4 of TS 33.106 [7]. + +If roaming interception is not allowed and it is determined that the target is outside the country, the HPLMN shall act as follows: + +- The HPLMN shall not report IRI and CC for the target's conferencing services while the target is in the VPLMN and is connected to the HPLMN conferencing service. + +Non-communications-associated IRI (e.g. those identified by the HSS) are not affected by this requirement. + +## 11.1A Start of Interception for IMS Conference Services + +Interception (as defined in 11.1) for IMS Conference Services is started when the first of any one of the following occurs: + +- When a target requests that a conference be created +- When a target successfully provisions a conference +- When a target provisioned or requested conference is started (i.e., the first party is joined to the conference) +- When a conference that is a target of interception is started (i.e., the first party is joined to the conference) +- When interception is activated (on a conference or a conference owner) during an ongoing conference +- When parties have joined a conference and communication is started or enabled by the conference server in cases where the conference is a target of interception or when it is a target's conference. + +If the target of interception has provisioned or requested a conference to be created, interception on IMS Conference Services shall begin regardless whether the target of interception has joined the conference. Interception of IMS Conference Services shall continue if the target of interception is on hold and the conference continues. + +## 11.2 Provision of Intercepted Content of Communication - IMS Conference Services + +### 11.2.0 General + +The access method for the delivery of IMS conference services intercept content of communication (CC) is based on duplication of packets without modification at the MRFP for conferences that are to be intercepted. The duplicated packets with additional information in the header, as described in the following sections, are sent to DF3 for further delivery. For a target's conference call held by the target, the MRFP duplicates the CC for conference call held by the target, in accordance with national regulations. For a conference call that is the target of interception, the MRFP duplicates the CC for the conference. + +NOTE: Void + +There is an issue of combined versus separated delivery. With combined delivery, one method for intercepting the CC would be to create a virtual conference port (not visible to others) through which a copy of the combined CC is passed over the X3 interface (Y conferees means 1 content stream). With the separated delivery approach, each conferee's connection to the conference shall be intercepted and passed over the X3 interface (Y conferees, means Y pairs of bi-directional content streams). + +![Diagram illustrating the configuration for interception of IMS Conference Services CC. A box labeled 'Duplicator of packets' is shown on the left. A double-headed arrow points from this box to a central point. From this central point, four arrows point outwards to the right, representing the distribution of intercepted content to multiple parties.](28c9ad0c8e37b81cae44d36ea9855386_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows a 'Duplicator of packets' block on the left. A horizontal double-headed arrow connects it to a central point. From this central point, four arrows radiate outwards to the right, representing the distribution of intercepted content to multiple parties. + +Diagram illustrating the configuration for interception of IMS Conference Services CC. A box labeled 'Duplicator of packets' is shown on the left. A double-headed arrow points from this box to a central point. From this central point, four arrows point outwards to the right, representing the distribution of intercepted content to multiple parties. + +Figure 11.1: Configuration for interception of IMS Conference Services CC + +### 11.2.1 X3-interface + +In addition to the intercepted content of communications, the following information may need to be transferred from the MRFP to the DF3 in order to allow the DF3 to perform its functionality: + +- identity used for interception; +- correlation number. + +NOTE 1: Void. + +Information passed between the MRFC and MRFP for correlation shall uniquely identify the mixing of associated media streams for a conference distinct from any other mixing or media handling. An example is how H.248 uses a context identifier to do this. + +- the identity of source (i.e., conference party identity) of a media stream; +- time stamp - optional; +- direction (incoming or outgoing stream) - optional. + +NOTE 2: When the media is delivered in a mixed format, the identity of the media stream source might be unknown. + +## 11.3 Provision of Intercept Related Information for IMS Conference Service + +### 11.3.0 General + +Figure 11.2 shows the transfer of intercept related information to the DF2. If an event for / from or associated with a conference server occurs, the AS/MRFC sends the relevant data to the DF2. + +NOTE: Reporting of non-transmission related actions of a target's subscriber controlled input (e.g., signalling "mute" commands) is for further study. + +![Diagram illustrating the provision of intercept related information for IMS conferencing. The diagram shows five functional blocks: Target (top left), AS/MRFC (top center), DF2 (top right), UE (bottom left), and UE (bottom right). Arrows indicate the flow of information: Target to AS/MRFC (double-headed), AS/MRFC to DF2 (double-headed), AS/MRFC to UE (bottom left) (double-headed), and DF2 to UE (bottom right) (single-headed).](5e3888db7cda1becbce099b7304a44fa_img.jpg) + +Diagram illustrating the provision of intercept related information for IMS conferencing. The diagram shows five functional blocks: Target (top left), AS/MRFC (top center), DF2 (top right), UE (bottom left), and UE (bottom right). Arrows indicate the flow of information: Target to AS/MRFC (double-headed), AS/MRFC to DF2 (double-headed), AS/MRFC to UE (bottom left) (double-headed), and DF2 to UE (bottom right) (single-headed). + +Figure 11.2: Provision of Intercept Related Information for IMS Conferencing + +### 11.3.1 X2-interface + +The following information may need to be transferred from the AS/MRFC to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity (IMPU, IMPI, Conference URI); +- events and associated parameters as defined in section 11.3.3 "Structure of Conference Events" may be provided; + +- Correlation number; +- Bandwidth and media descriptions (e.g., as associated with SDP negotiation) associated with the parties' bearer connection to the conference. + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 using a reliable transport mechanism. + +### 11.3.2 IMS Conference Events and Event Information + +The following events are applicable to AS/MRFC: + +- Start of Conference +- Party Join; +- Party Leave; +- Conference Bearer Modification; +- Start of Intercept on an Active Conference; +- End of Conference; +- Creation of Conference; +- Update of Conference. + +NOTE 1: Reporting of Floor Control events from the MRFP is FFS. + +A set of possible elements as shown below that may be reported with the events. Information associated with the events is transmitted from the AS/MRFC server to DF2. + +**Table 11.3.1: Information Elements for Conference Events** + +| Element | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMPU
IMS Public User identity (IMPU) of the target. In some cases, this identity may not be observed by the MRFC. Also see Note 1. | +| Observed IMPI
IMS Private User identity (IMPI) of the target. In some cases, this identity may not be observed by the MRFC. Also see Note 1. | +| Observed Other Identity
Target Identifier with the NAI of the target. | +| Event Type
Description which type of event is delivered: Start of Conference, Party Join, Party Leave, Start of Intercept on an Active Conference, Conference End. | +| Event Date
Date of the event generation in the AS/MRFC. | +| Event Time
Time of the event generation in the AS/MRFC server. Timestamp shall be generated relative to the AS/MRFC internal clock. | +| Correlation Number
The correlation number is used to correlate CC and IRI. The correlation number is also used to allow the correlation of IRI records. | +| Network Element Identifier
Unique identifier for the element reporting the ICE. | +| Initiator
The initiator of a request, for example, the target, the network, a conferee. | +| Join Party ID
Identity of the party successfully joining or attempting to join the conference. | +| Leave Party ID
Identity of the party leaving or being requested to leave the conference. | +| List of Potential Conferees
Identifies each of the parties to be invited to a conference or permitted to join the conference (if available). | +| Observed Conference URI
A URI associated with the conference being monitored. | +| Temporary Conference URI
A temporarily allocated URI associated with a conference being monitored. | +| List of Conferees
Identifies each of the conferees currently on a conference (e.g., via SIP URI or TEL URI). | +| Failed Conference Start Reason
Provides a reason for why a conference start attempt failed. | +| Failed Party Join Reason
Provides a reason for why a party join attempt failed. | +| Party Leave Reason
Provides a reason for the party leaving. | +| Failed Party Leave reason
Provides a reason for why a party leave attempt failed. | +| Conference End Reason
Provides a reason for why the conference ended. | +| Potential Conference Start Date and Time
The expected start date and time of the conference, if start time information is configured in the system. | +| Potential Conference End Date and Time
The expected end date and time of the conference, if such end information is configured in the system. | +| Recurrence Information
Information indicating the recurrence pattern for the event as configured for the created conference. | +| Identity(ies) of Conference Controller
Identifies the parties that have control privileges on the conference, if such information is configured in the system. | +| Bearer Modify ID
Identifies the party modifying a conference bearer. | +| Failed Bearer Modify Reason
Provides a reason for a bearer modification attempt failed. | +| Failed Conference End Reason
Provides a reason why a conference end attempt failed. | +| Join Party Supported Bearers
Identifies the bearer types supported by the party joining the conference. | +| List of Waiting Conferees
Identifies each of the parties that have called into a conference but have not yet joined. | +| Media Modification
Identifies how the media was modified (i.e., added, removed, changed) | +| Parties Affected by Bearer Modification | + +| | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Identifies all conference party identities affected by the bearer modification. | +| Supported Bearers
Identifies all bearer types supported by a conferee in a conference. | +| Update Type
Indicates what update was done to a conference (e.g., update List of Potential Conferees, update of Start Time, update of End Time, Update of Recurrence Information, Cancellation of Conference, etc.). | + +NOTE 2: In most cases, either the IMPU or IMPI may be available, but not necessarily both. + +### 11.3.3 Structure of Conference Events + +#### 11.3.3.1 Start of Conference + +For the start of a conference, a Start of Conference-event is generated in the following cases: + +- When a target provisioned or requested conference or a conference that is the target of interception is started. The conference is started when the first party is joined to the conference.; +- When a conference that is a target of interception or when a target provisioned or requested conference fails to start. + +The fields, shown in Table 11.3.2, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the AS/MRFC. + +**Table 11.3.2: Start of Conference** + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed IMPU | +| Observed IMPI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation Number | +| List of Potential Conferees | +| List of Conferees | +| List of Waiting Conferees | +| Supported Bearers | +| Observed Conference URI | +| Temporary Conference URI | +| Failed Conference Start Reason | + +#### 11.3.3.2 Party Join + +A Party Join-event is generated in the following cases: + +- When a party successfully joins the target's conference or a conference that is the target of interception. +- When a party unsuccessfully attempts to join the target's conference or a conference that is the target of interception. + +The fields, shown in Table 11.3.3, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the AS/MRFC. + +**Table 11.3.3: Party Join** + +| | +|------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMPU | +| Observed IMPI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation Number | +| Join Party ID | +| Join Party Supported Bearers | +| Initiator (of the Party Join request) | +| Observed Conference URI | +| Temporary Conference URI | +| Failed Party Join Reason (e.g., not available) | + +### 11.3.3.3 Party Leave + +A Party Leave-event is generated in the following cases: + +- When a party leaves a target's conference or a conference that is the target of interception. This includes situations where the party simply disconnects themselves from the conference (hang up), the party's connection to the conference is broken (e.g., party leaves wireless coverage area), and where the party's connection to the conference is forcefully terminated due to another party's drop request or operator policy. +- When a party unsuccessfully attempts to drop another party from the conference. This applies to all the conferencing scenarios described earlier. + +The fields, shown in Table 11.3.4, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the AS/MRFC. + +**Table 11.3.4: Party Leave** + +| | +|----------------------------------------| +| Observed IMPU | +| Observed IMPI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation Number | +| Leave Party ID | +| Supported Bearers (of Leaving Party) | +| Initiator (of the Party Leave request) | +| Observed Conference URI | +| Temporary Conference URI | +| Party Leave Reason - see Note. | +| Failed Party Leave Reason | + +NOTE: A party could drop off the conference for normal reasons (e.g., just hang up) or could be removed by a conference controller. + +### 11.3.3.3A Conference Bearer Modification + +A Conference Bearer Modification-event is generated for the following cases: + +- When a party to a conference successfully modifies (i.e., add, remove, change) a bearer stream in the conference; +- When a party to a conference unsuccessfully attempts to modify (i.e., add, remove, change) a bearer stream in the conference. + +The fields, shown in Table 11.3.4A, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the AS/MRFC. + +**Table 11.3.4A: Conference Bearer Modification** + +| | +|-----------------------------------------| +| Observed IMPU | +| Observed IMPI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation Number | +| Observed Conference URI | +| Temporary Conference URI | +| Bearer Modify ID | +| Media Modification | +| Parties Affected by Bearer Modification | +| Failed Bearer Modify Reason | + +### 11.3.3.4 Start of Intercept on an Active Conference + +A Start of Intercept on an Active Conference-event (a conference with at least one party) is generated for the following cases: + +- When interception is activated during an ongoing conference call. + +The fields, shown in Table 11.3.5, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the AS/MRFC. + +**Table 11.3.5: Start of Intercept with an Active Conference** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed IMPU | +| Observed IMPI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation Number | +| List of Conferees | +| Supported Bearers | +| Observed Conference URI | +| Temporary Conference URI | + +### 11.3.3.5 Conference End + +When a conference is terminated, a Conference End-event is generated in the following cases: + +- When a target provisioned or requested conference is terminated. This occurs when the last party on the conference leaves or the conference is terminated by the conference server; +- When there is an unsuccessful attempt to terminate a target provisioned or requested conference or a conference that is the target of interception. + +The fields, shown in Table 11.3.6, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the AS/MRFC. + +**Table 11.3.6 End of Conference** + +| | +|--------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMPU | +| Observed IMPI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation Number | +| Initiator (e.g., target, network, conferee) - see Note | +| Observed Conference URI | +| Temporary Conference URI | +| Conference End Reason | +| Failed Conference End Reason | + +NOTE: The initiator can indicate that the decision to end the conference was the target or conferee, if the target or conferee sends an explicit command to end the conference. It could be the network, if it determines the time length for the conference is ended. + +### 11.3.3.6 Creation of Conference + +When a conference is created, a Creation of Conference-event is generated in the following cases: + +- When a target successfully provisions or requests a conference to be created. + +This event is applicable provided that at least one of the two identities (IMPU, IMPI) are available at the AS/MRFC. Other scenarios, such as in case the creation is done via a web interface and the IMPU/IMPI cannot be seen are outside the scope of this specification. + +The fields, shown in Table 11.3.7, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the AS/MRFC. + +**Table 11.3.7 Creation of Conference** + +| | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMPU | +| Observed IMPI | +| Observed Other Identity | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| List of Potential Conferees (if available) | +| Observed Conference URI | +| Temporary Conference URI | +| Potential Conference Start Date and Time (if available) - See Note 1 | +| Potential Conference End Date and Time (if available) - See Note 1 | +| Recurrence Information - See Note 2. | +| Identity(ies) of Conference Controller | + +NOTE 1: This information is statically provisioned information and is not correlated to the timestamp requirements for LI. + +NOTE 2: Recurrence information indicates the frequency or pattern of recurrence of the created conference. + +### 11.3.3.7 Update of Conference + +When a conference is updated, an Update of Conference-event is generated in the following cases: + +- When a target successfully provisions or requests a conference to be updated (e.g., changes to List of Potential Conferees, Start Time, End Time, Recurrence Information, or Cancellation of Conference). + +This event is applicable provided that at least one of the two identities (IMPU, IMPI) are available at the AS/MRFC. Other scenarios, such as in case the update is done via a web interface and the IMPU/IMPI cannot be seen are outside the scope of this specification. + +The fields, shown in Table 11.3.8, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the AS/MRFC. + +**Table 11.3.8 Update of Conference** + +| | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMPU | +| Observed IMPI | +| Observed Other Identity | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Update Type | +| List of Potential Conferees (if available) | +| Observed Conference URI | +| Temporary Conference URI | +| Potential Conference Start Date and Time (if available) - See Note 1 | +| Potential Conference End Date and Time (if available) - See Note 1 | +| Recurrence Information - See Note 2. | +| Identity(ies) of Conference Controller | + +NOTE 1: This information is statically provisioned information and is not correlated to the timestamp requirements for LI. + +NOTE 2: Recurrence information indicates the frequency or pattern of recurrence of the created conference. + +## 12 Lawful Interception for Evolved Packet System + +### 12.1 LI functional architecture for EPS + +In addition to the reference configurations applicable to PS interception, the following figures contain the reference configuration applicable for the lawful interception in the EPS nodes (TS 23.401 [22], TS 23.402 [23]): + +![Figure 12.1.1: MME Intercept configuration diagram showing the flow of intercepted data from the LEMF through the ADMF and Delivery Functions to the Proxy-Relay.](02ff9af2c63fedce97679915681f3475_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the MME Intercept configuration. On the left, the LEMF (Lawful Interception Management Function) is shown with three stacked boxes, connected via interfaces HI1, HI2, and HI3 to the ADMF (Access and Management Function). The ADMF contains three 'Mediation Function' blocks. The first Mediation Function is connected to the ADMF via interface X1\_1. The second Mediation Function is connected to the ADMF via interface X1\_2 and to the Delivery Function 2 via interface X2. The third Mediation Function is connected to the ADMF via interface X1\_3 and to the Delivery Function 3 via interface X3. The Delivery Functions 2 and 3 are connected to the Proxy-Relay via interfaces X2 and X3 respectively. The Proxy-Relay is connected to the ADMF via interface X1\_1. + +Figure 12.1.1: MME Intercept configuration diagram showing the flow of intercepted data from the LEMF through the ADMF and Delivery Functions to the Proxy-Relay. + +**Figure 12.1.1: MME Intercept configuration** + +![Placeholder diagram for Figure 12.1.1a showing a stack of rectangles on the left and a large rectangle on the right.](6e9d059430baba0c363e33749f68b107_img.jpg) + +This diagram is a placeholder for Figure 12.1.1a. It consists of a vertical stack of three rectangles on the left side and a single large horizontal rectangle on the right side. No text or other elements are present. + +Placeholder diagram for Figure 12.1.1a showing a stack of rectangles on the left and a large rectangle on the right. + +Figure 12.1.1a: Configuration for Intercept of HeNB + +![Detailed block diagram of HSS Intercept configuration showing components like LEMF, HI1, HI2, ADMF, Delivery Function 2, IRI ICE, LTF, and LI-L Clie with signal flow arrows.](57134800ac3a97b6212b27b93aa196ac_img.jpg) + +This block diagram illustrates the HSS Intercept configuration. On the left, a vertical stack of three rectangles is labeled 'LEMF'. Two sets of horizontal lines, labeled 'HI1' and 'HI2', extend from the LEMF to two separate blocks. The top block contains a 'Mediation Function' and 'ADMF'. The bottom block contains a 'Mediation Function' and 'Delivery Function 2'. Arrows indicate signal flow: 'X1\_2' from the ADMF to the Delivery Function 2; 'X1\_1' (dashed line) from the ADMF to a 'LI-L Clie' block; 'X2' from the Delivery Function 2 to the 'LI-L Clie' block; and another 'X2' (dashed line) from the Delivery Function 2 to an 'IRI ICE' block. The 'IRI ICE' block contains an 'LTF' sub-block. An arrow labeled 'LALS\_' points from the 'LTF' sub-block to the 'LI-L Clie' block. + +Detailed block diagram of HSS Intercept configuration showing components like LEMF, HI1, HI2, ADMF, Delivery Function 2, IRI ICE, LTF, and LI-L Clie with signal flow arrows. + +Figure 12.1.2: HSS Intercept configuration + +![Placeholder diagram for Figure 12.1.3 showing S-GW, PDN-GW, and ePDG intercept configuration.](eabcb2f8b9acedb194571d5bc734b463_img.jpg) + +A placeholder diagram consisting of several overlapping rectangular boxes, indicating where the original figure would have been displayed. + +Placeholder diagram for Figure 12.1.3 showing S-GW, PDN-GW, and ePDG intercept configuration. + +**Figure 12.1.3: S-GW, PDN-GW, ePDG Intercept configuration** + +![Diagram for Figure 12.1.4 showing intercept configuration for SGW and PGW with CUPS.](ef0faba51289e3a364ba51e5ef4d1a43_img.jpg) + +A block diagram illustrating the intercept configuration for SGW and PGW with CUPS. At the top, three rectangular blocks are arranged horizontally. The left block is connected to the middle block. The middle block is connected to the right block and has a downward-pointing arrow leading to a large rectangular block in the center. The right block also has a downward-pointing arrow leading to the same large central block. Below the large central block, there are two smaller rectangular blocks stacked vertically. Each of these smaller blocks has a horizontal arrow pointing to it from the left, and another horizontal arrow pointing from it to the left. Additionally, there are two vertical arrows pointing from the large central block down to each of the two smaller rectangular blocks. + +Diagram for Figure 12.1.4 showing intercept configuration for SGW and PGW with CUPS. + +**Figure 12.1.4: Intercept Configuration for SGW and PGW with CUPS** + +The definition of the LI functional entities (ADMF, DF, MF, LEMF) and interfaces (X, HI) is the same as for 3G as given in chapter 4. Packet Header Information Reporting is a national option. For Packet Data Header Information reporting, a S-GW/PDN-GW either isolates the relevant data and sends it to the DF2 or sends the packet stream to another entity in the network (e.g., DF3) for isolation which then provides the relevant data to the DF2. + +National regulations on a per interception basis may limit delivery of communications (CC and IRI) of an outbound international roaming target by the MME/S-GW/PDN-GW as described in clause 5.1.4 of TS 33.106 [7]. + +If roaming is not allowed and it is determined that the target is outside the country, the HPLMN shall act as follows: + +- all session related EPS events defined in clause 12 are subject to this mechanism; +- the HPLMN shall not report IRI and CC for Evolued Packet services while the target is in the VPLMN. + +Non-communications-associated IRI (e.g. those identified by the HSS) are not affected by this requirement. + +Procedures for LI activation, deactivation and interrogation are the same as for 3G as given in chapter 5, provided that: + +- the 3G ICE is replaced by the EPS node; +- the proper target identity applicable to EPS node is used. + +When the SGSN is used as node in the Evolved Packet System, to support 2G/3G access and mobility between E-UTRAN and pre-E-UTRAN 3GPP radio access technologies, it is subjected to all the related PS requirements specified throughout this document. + +Figure 12.1.1a depicts how the HeNB location information is transferred from the HeNB location verifying node per TS 33.320 [34] to the DF2 via an Xv interface, in order to allow the DF2 to perform its functionality. The public IP Address of the HeNB is provided to the HeNB location verifying node. The manner that the HeNB location verifying node provides the DF2 with the HeNB location and HeNB IP Address is outside the scope of this document. Additional information on HeNB interception is found in Clause 13. + +Figure 12.1.4 depicts the LI configuration for SGW and PGW with PLMN implementing CUPS (see 3GPP TS 23.214 [75]). This is described in subclause 12.9. The Sxa' and SXb' are the LI specific instances of Sxa and Sxb reference points. The X2 reference point support at SX3LIF is required only if the first option described in sub-clauses 12.9.4.1 and 12.9.4.2 are used to generate the IRI events that require access to the user plane packets (e.g. packet data header information). The IRI events generated by the SX3LIF are therefore limited to the IRI events that require access to user plane packets. The administrative information passed onto the SX3LIF is to provide the DF2 and DF3 addresses to enable SX3LIF to deliver those IRI events to the DF2, and the CC to the DF3. + +The target identities for 3GPP HeNB interception can be IMSI, MSISDN, IMEI, or ME Id. Use of the HeNB ID or the CSG ID as a target identity is FFS. + +## 12.2 Functional requirements for LI in case of E-UTRAN access and GTP based S5/S8. + +### 12.2.0 General + +The target identities for interception at the MME, HSS, S-GW, PDN-GW and LI LCS Client are IMSI, MSISDN and ME (Mobile Equipment) Identity. + +NOTE 1: Void. + +Details about information included in the ME Identity and the relationship with IMEI needs to be considered. The term Mobile Equipment Identity is used in this text according to TS 23.401 [22] so as to indicate that the EPC should support multiple equipment identity formats (e.g. those from 3GPP2, WiMAX, etc) as well as the IMEISV. + +NOTE 2: In case of local breakout the PDN Gateway is in the VPLMN. In this case LI relevant information in the H-PLMN might be available at the H-PCRF. Interception at the H-PCRF is FFS. + +NOTE 3: In case the ME Identity and/or MSISDN is not available in a node, interception based on the missing identity is not applicable at that node. + +NOTE 4: MSISDN is a possible identity available in the EPC nodes, which may be provided by the HSS to the MME and then forwarded to the S-GW/PDN-GW. + +As the MME only handles control plane, interception of Content of Communication is applicable only at the S-GW and PDN-GW. As the HSS only handles signaling, interception of Content of Communication is not applicable at this node. + +LI in the PDN-GW is a national option. + +For the delivery of the CC and IRI the S-GW and/or, per national option PDN-GW provides correlation number and target identity to the DF2 and DF3 which is used there in order to select the different LEAs where the product shall be delivered. + +The correlation number is unique in the whole PLMN and is used to correlate CC with IRI and the different IRI's of one EPS bearer. + +The correlation number shall be generated by using existing parameters related to the EPS bearer. + +NOTE 5: Void. + +If interception has been activated for both parties of the Packet Data communication both CC and IRI shall be delivered for each party as separate intercept activity. + +**Editor's note: Location Dependent Interception for EPC is FFS.** + +NOTE 6: For LALS, any UE (including inbound roamers) served by the PLMN can be targeted. + +## 12.2.1 Provision of Intercept Related Information + +### 12.2.1.0 General + +Intercept Related Information (Events) shall be sent at the Mobile Entity Attach, Mobile Entity Detach, Tracking Area/EPS Location Update, LALS Location Report, Bearer activation (valid for both Default and Dedicated bearer), Start of Intercept with bearer active, Start of Interception with E-UTRAN attached UE, Bearer Modification, Bearer Deactivation, Serving Evolved Packet System (applicable to the HSS), UE requested PDN connectivity, UE requested PDN disconnection, and UE requested bearer resource modification. + +Serving Evolved Packet System and HSS related events event reporting are national options. + +#### 12.2.1.1 X2-interface + +The following information needs to be transferred from the EPS nodes or the HSS to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity (IMSI, MSISDN, ME identity); +- events and associated parameters as defined in clauses 12.2.1.2 and 12.2.3 may be provided; +- the target location (if available) or the IAs in case of location dependent interception; +- date/time of Location (if target location provided); +- correlation number; +- Quality of Service (QoS) information (if available); +- encryption parameters (keys and associated parameters for decrypting CC), if available and necessary. + +For HeNB interception, the MME shall provide in addition the following: + +- HeNB Identity; +- HeNB location. + +HeNB location information needs to be transferred from the HeNB location verifying node to the DF2 in order to allow the DF2 to perform its functionality. + +The EPS nodes detect packets containing packet header information in the communications path but the information needed for Packet Header Information Reporting may need to be transferred from the EPS nodes either directly to the DF2 or via another network entity in order to allow the DF2 to perform its functionality. + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 using a reliable transport mechanism. + +#### 12.2.1.2 Structure of the events + +There are several different events in which the information is sent to the DF2 if this is required. Details are described in the following clause. The events for interception are configurable (if they are sent to DF2) in the EPC nodes or the HSS and can be suppressed in the DF2. The network procedures for which the events are generated are defined in TS 23.401 [22]. + +**The following events are applicable to the MME:** + +- Attach; + +- Detach; +- Tracking Area/EPS Location Update; +- UE requested PDN connectivity; +- UE Requested PDN disconnection; +- Start of interception with E-UTRAN attached UE. + +**The following events are applicable to the Serving GW and PDN GW:** + +- Bearer activation (valid for both Default and Dedicated bearer); +- Start of intercept with bearer active; +- Bearer modification; +- Bearer deactivation; +- UE Requested Bearer Resource Modification; +- Packet Data Header Information. + +**The following events are applicable to the HSS:** + +- Serving Evolved Packet System. +- HSS subscriber record change; +- Cancel location +- Register location; +- Location information request. + +**The following LALS Reports are applicable to the EPS (see Clause 19):** + +- Report for LALS Target Positioning; +- Report for LALS Enhanced Location for IRI. + +A set of elements as shown below can be associated with the events. The events trigger the transmission of the information from the nodes to DF2. Available IEs from this set of elements as shown below can be extended in the nodes, if this is necessary as a national option. DF2 can extend available information if this is necessary as a national option. If interception is performed at the PDN GW, then Packet Data Header Information reporting shall also be performed at the PDN GW and not at the Serving GW. + +A number of elements shown below can be also associated with the LALS reports. The transmission of the information from the LI LCS Client to DF2 is triggered by an LCS Server/GMLC response to the LI LCS Client request. + +**Table 12.2.1.2 Elements associated with EPS events** + +| | | +|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | MSISDN of the target. | +| Observed IMSI | IMSI of the target. | +| Observed ME Id | ME Id of the target; when it coincides with the IMEI, it shall be checked for each activation over the radio interface. | +| Event type | Indicates which type of event is delivered: Attach, Detach, Tracking Area Update, UE requested PDN connectivity, UE Requested PDN disconnection, UE Requested Bearer Resource Modification, Bearer activation, Start of intercept with bearer active, Start of interception with E-UTRAN attached UE, Bearer deactivation, Bearer modification, Serving Evolved Packet System, Packet Data Header Information, HSS subscriber record change, Cancel location, Register location, Location information request. In case of LALS report the event type is absent. | +| Event date | Date of the event generation in the ICE. | +| Event time | Time of the event generation in the ICE. Timestamp shall be generated relative to ICE internal clock. | +| Change Type | This indicates what has been changed (MSISDN, A-MSISDN or IMSI) in the Subscriber Change Record | +| PDN Type | The parameter is applicable to the MME only and provides the IP version (IPv4, IPv4/IPv6, IPv6) requested by the UE. | +| PDN Address Allocation | The parameter is applicable to the S-GW and PDN-GW; it provides the IP version (IPv4, IPv4/IPv6, IPv6) and IP address(es) allocated for the UE. | +| Protocol Configuration Options | Are used to transfer parameters between the UE and the PDN-GW (e.g. Address Allocation Preference by DHCP). | +| Attach type | Indicates the type of attach (may carry indication of handover in case of mobility with non-3GPP access). | +| Location Information | Location Information is the Tracking Area Identity (TAI), TA List assigned to the UE, E-CGI and/or location area identity or the derived Location from the LI LCS Client that is present at the node at the time of event record production. In case of Tracking Area Update event, the last visited TAI of the UE may be applicable. Country and network IDs can be considered as location information, by some national regulations. If the information in the MME received over S1 (TS 36.413 [91]) includes one or more cell IDs, then all cell IDs shall be reported to the LEMF whenever location reporting is triggered at the MME. | +| Time of Location | Date/Time of location. The time when location was obtained by the location source node. | +| PDN address(es) | The UE IP address(es) for the PDN connection. | +| APN | When provided by the MME, the parameter carries the Access Point Name provided by the UE. When provided by the S-GW/PDN-GW, it is the Access Point Name used for the connection. | +| RAT type | The Radio Access Type | +| APN-AMBR | The Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate for the APN. | +| Handover indication | Provides information from the GTPv2 protocol that the procedure is triggered as part of a handover. | +| Procedure Transaction Identifier | Identifies a set of messages belonging to the same procedure; the parameter is dynamically allocated by the UE. | +| EPS bearer identity | An EPS bearer identity uniquely identifies an EPS bearer for one UE accessing via E-UTRAN. The EPS Bearer Identity is allocated by the MME. | +| Bearer activation/deactivation type | Indicates the type of bearer being activated/deactivated, i.e. default or dedicated. | +| Linked EPS bearer identity | Indicates, in case of dedicated bearer, the EPS bearer identity of the default bearer. | +| Initiator | The initiator of the procedure, either the network, HeNB, or the UE. | +| Switch off indicator | Indicates whether a detach procedure is due to a switch off situation or not. | +| Detach type | Parameter sent by the network to the UE to indicate the type of detach. | +| Traffic Flow Template (TFT) | The EPS bearer traffic flow template (TFT) is the collection of all packet filters associated with that EPS bearer. | +| Traffic Aggregate Description (TAD) | The TAD consists of the description of the packet filter(s) for the traffic flow aggregate. | + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Serving MME address | The address of the serving MME. | +| Old Location Information | Location Information of the subscriber before Tracking Area Update. If the information in the MME (TS 36.413 [91]) received over S1 includes one or more cell IDs, then all cell IDs shall be reported to the LEMF whenever location reporting is triggered at the MME. | +| Correlation Number | The correlation number is used to correlate CC and IRI. | +| Network Element Identifier | Unique identifier for the ICE reporting the event. | +| Logical Function Information | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Failed attach reason | Reason for failed attach of the target. | +| Failed bearer activation reason | Reason for failed bearer activation for the target. | +| Failed Bearer Modification reason | The reason for failure of Bearer Modification. | +| IA | The observed Interception Areas. | +| Bearer Deactivation cause | The cause of deactivation of the PDP context. | +| EPS Bearer QoS | This field indicates the Quality of Service associated with the Bearer procedure. | +| Request type | Indicates the type of request in an UE requested PDN connectivity, i.e. initial request or handover. | +| CSG Identity | Uniquely identifies a CSG within one PLMN. Note: Open HeNBs do not have associated CSGs. | +| CSG List | Identifies the membership of a given CSG (i.e., CSG Identities and associated expiration data for the UEs). | +| HeNB Identity | Uniquely identifies a HeNB (i.e., HeNB equipment ID and HeNB name). | +| HeNB IP Address | The public IP address of the HeNB provided to the HeNB location verifying node | +| HeNB Location | Reports the location of the HeNB used during location verification. | +| ISP Operator Identity | Identifies the ISP through which the HeNB is connected to the SeGW (e.g., IP address). | +| Security Gateway IP Address | The IP Address of the Security Gateway that terminates the tunnel from the HeNB. | +| Tunnel Protocol | The tunnel protocol used between the HeNB and the SeGW. | +| ULI Timestamp | Indicates the time when the User Location Information was acquired.
The parameter is specified in TS 29.274 [38]. | +| Destination IP Address | The IP address, including type IPv4 or IPv6, of the destination of the IP packet. | +| Destination Port Number | The port number of the destination of the IP packet. | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only) | The field in the IPv6 header that is used by a source to label packets of a flow (see RFC 3697 [41]). | +| Packet Count | The number of packets detected and reported (for a particular summary period). | +| Packet Data Summary Reason | The reason for a Packet Data Summary message being sent to the LEMF (e.g., timed out, counter expiration, end of session) | +| Packet Size | The size of the packet. (i.e., Total Length Field in IPv4 or Payload Length field in IPv6) | +| Source IP Address | The IP address, including type IPv4 or IPv6, of the source of the IP packet. | +| Source Port Number | The port number of the source of the IP packet. | +| Sum of Packet Sizes (for a particular summary period) | The sum of values contained in the Total Length fields of the IPv4 packets or the sum of the values contained in the Payload Length fields of the IPv6 packets. | +| Summary Period | Includes the dates and times of the first and last packets in a particular packet data interval. | + +| | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP)
The identification of the transport protocol of the packet or packet flow being reported. | +| UE Local IP Address
The UE local IP address (IP SEC terminal Point) reported over GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [38] based on local policy for Fixed Broadband access network interworking. | +| UE UDP Port
Used in case of GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [38] if NAT is detected and UE Local IP Address is present for Fixed Broadband access network interworking. | +| WLAN location information
Used in case of GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [38]. Provides location information in form of TWAN Identifier, if available at ePDG/PDN-GW. | +| WLAN location timestamp
Used in case of GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [38]. Provides location information timestamp in form of TWAN Identifier Timestamp, if available at ePDG/PDN-GW. | +| ProSe Remote UE IDs
The identities of the ProSe remote UE connected to the Prose UE-to-NW Relay, see clause 17.3. | +| ProSe Remote UE IP info
The IP address(es) of the ProSe Remote UE connected to the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay, see clause 17.3. | +| location error code
LALS positioning error identification code | +| Secondary RAT Usage Indication
This is only reported by the S-GW. | + +## 12.2.2 X3-interface + +The access method for the delivering of S-GW and/or PDN-GW Intercept Product is based on duplication of packets without modification at the S-GW and/or PDN-GW. The duplicated packets with additional information in a header are sent to DF3 for further delivery to the LEA. + +![Diagram illustrating the configuration for interception of S-GW/PDN-GW product data. It shows a vertical stack of five rectangular boxes representing network elements. The top box has two horizontal arrows pointing to it from the left and right. The second box down has a vertical arrow pointing down to the third box. The third box has a vertical arrow pointing down to the fourth box. The fourth box has a vertical arrow pointing down to the fifth box. To the right of the second, third, and fourth boxes are horizontal bars, and to the right of the third and fourth boxes are vertical bars, representing data paths or interception points.](f99313b06c15e9882079b773ce50a7b2_img.jpg) + +Diagram illustrating the configuration for interception of S-GW/PDN-GW product data. It shows a vertical stack of five rectangular boxes representing network elements. The top box has two horizontal arrows pointing to it from the left and right. The second box down has a vertical arrow pointing down to the third box. The third box has a vertical arrow pointing down to the fourth box. The fourth box has a vertical arrow pointing down to the fifth box. To the right of the second, third, and fourth boxes are horizontal bars, and to the right of the third and fourth boxes are vertical bars, representing data paths or interception points. + +**Figure 12.2.2.1: Configuration for interception of S-GW/PDN-GW product data** + +In addition to the intercepted content of communication, the following information needs to be transferred from the S-GW and/or the PDN-GW to the DF3 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity; +- correlation number; +- time stamp (optional); +- direction (indicates whether T-PDU is MO or MT) - optional; +- the target location (if available) or the IAs in case of location dependent interception; + +- date/time of Location (if target location provided). + +NOTE: Location dependent interception for EPC is FFS. + +## 12.2.3 EPS related events + +### 12.2.3.1 Attach + +When an attach activation is generated from the mobile an attach event is generated by the MME. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|-----------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| Failed attach reason | +| IAAs (if applicable) | +| PDN Type | +| APN | +| Protocol Configuration Options | +| Attach type | +| EPS bearer identity | +| CSG Identity (if closed/hybrid H(e)NB)* | +| CSG List (if closed/hybrid H(e)NB)* | +| HeNB Identity* | +| HeNB IP Address* | +| HeNB Location* | +| Security Gateway IP address* | +| Tunnel Protocol* | +| ISP Operator Identity* | + +\* These elements are applicable for HeNB interception only. + +### 12.2.3.2 Detach + +For detach a detach-event is generated. The following elements will be delivered by the MME to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| IAAs (if applicable) | +| Detach initiator | +| Switch off indicator | +| Detach type | +| CSG Identity (if closed or hybrid HeNB)* | +| HeNB Identity* | +| HeNB IP Address* | +| HeNB Location* | + +\* These elements are applicable for HeNB interception only. + +### 12.2.3.3 Bearer activation + +When a bearer activation is generated a bearer activation-event is generated by the S-GW/PDN-GW. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|---------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| RAT type (note 1) | +| PDN address allocation (note 1) | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| APN (Access Point Name) (note 1) | +| Bearer activation Type (default, dedicated) | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| Failed bearer activation reason | +| IAs (if applicable) | +| EPS bearer QoS (note 2) | +| APN-AMBR (note 3) | +| EPS bearer id (NSAPI) | +| Protocol Configuration Options | +| Initiator | +| Procedure Transaction Identifier | +| Linked EPS bearer identity (note 2) | +| Traffic Flow Template(s) (TFT) ( note 4) | +| Handover indication | +| UE Local IP Address (note 5) | +| UE UDP Port (note 5) | +| WLAN location information (note 5) | +| WLAN location timestamp (note 5) | + +NOTE 1: Only in case of default bearer activation; the parameter includes both PDN type and PDN address(es). + +NOTE 2: In case of unsuccessful default bearer activation, the parameter carries the requested EPS bearer QoS, otherwise it carries the EPS bearer QoS associated to the established bearer. + +NOTE 3: In case of unsuccessful default bearer activation, the parameter carries the subscribed APN-AMBR, otherwise it carries the APN-AMBR used for the established bearer. + +NOTE 4: TFT is applicable only in the case of dedicated bearer. + +NOTE 5: Applicable only to ePDG and PDN-GW in case of S2b interface. + +NOTE 6: Void. + +### 12.2.3.4 Bearer deactivation + +When a bearer deactivation is generated a bearer deactivation-event is generated by the S-GW/PDN-GW. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Bearer deactivation Type (default, dedicated) | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| IAs (if applicable) | +| EPS bearer id | +| Initiator | +| Procedure Transaction Identifier | +| Bearer deactivation Cause (note ) | +| ULI Timestamp | +| UE Local IP Address | +| UE UDP Port | +| WLAN location information | +| WLAN location timestamp | + +In case all the bearers belonging to the same PDN connection are released at the same time, one event shall be sent for each bearer. + +NOTE: Cause can be present e.g. in case of inter S-GW TAU, when the new S-GW sends a bearer deactivation request to the old S-GW. + +### 12.2.3.5 Bearer modification + +When a bearer modification is detected, a bearer modification event shall be generated. These elements will be delivered by the S-GW/PDN-GW to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|-----------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| IAs (if applicable) | +| Initiator | +| EPS Bearer QoS (Note 1) | +| EPS bearer id | +| Procedure Transaction Identifier | +| RAT type | +| APN-AMBR (Note 2) | +| Traffic Flow Template(s) (TFT) | +| Handover indication | +| Failed Bearer Modification reason | +| UE Local IP Address | +| UE UDP Port | +| WLAN location information | +| WLAN location timestamp | +| Second RAT Usage Indication | + +NOTE 1: In case of unsuccessful default bearer modification, the parameter carries the requested EPS bearer QoS, otherwise it carries the EPS bearer QoS associated to the modified bearer. + +NOTE 2: In case of unsuccessful default bearer modification, the parameter carries the subscribed APN-AMBR, otherwise it carries the APN-AMBR used for the modified bearer. + +The event may also be used by the PDN-GW to indicate a handover between different accesses. In this case, the RAT type indicates the new access after the handover. + +### 12.2.3.6 Start of interception with active bearer + +This event will be generated if interception for a target is started and if the target has at least the default bearer active. If more than one bearer is active, for each of them an event record is generated. The parameters which are defined for bearer activation (see related section) will be sent, if available, by the S-GW/PDN-GW to the DF2. + +As an option, in case the event is sent due to a change of the involved S-GW, the new S-GW may provide as additional parameter, the "old location information". However, the absence of this information does not imply that interception has not started in the old location S-GW for an active bearer. + +### 12.2.3.7 Tracking Area/EPS Location Update + +For each TA/EPS Location Update an update-event with the elements about the new location is generated. The event shall be sent in case of Tracking Area Update, UE triggered Service Request, X2 based handover, S1 based handover, as specified in TS 23.401 [22], and when the MME receives location information over S1. In case of change of MME, the new MME shall send the event, and the old MME may optionally send the event as well. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|-------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information (only for the new MME) | +| Old Location Information (only for the old MME) | +| Time of Location | +| IAs (if applicable) | +| Failure reason | +| HeNB Identity (NOTE1) | +| HeNB IP Address (NOTE1) | +| HeNB Location (NOTE1) | +| ProSe Remote UE(s) IDs (NOTE 2) | +| ProSe Remote UE(s) IP Info (NOTE 2) | + +NOTE 1: These elements are applicable for HeNB interception only. + +NOTE 2: These elements identify the ProSe remote UEs connected to the ProSe UE-to-NW relay when the ProSe UE-to-NW relay is the target and are applicable only in case the target UE is a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay, see clause 17.3. + +### 12.2.3.8 Serving Evolved Packet System + +The Serving Evolved Packet System report event is generated at the HSS, when the HSS has detected that the target has roamed. The elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Serving MME Address | + +### 12.2.3.9 UE requested PDN connectivity + +When a PDN connectivity is requested from the mobile to allow multiple PDN connections (TS 23.401 [22]), an UE requested PDN connectivity event is generated by the MME. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| APN | +| Request type | +| PDN type | +| Failed reason | +| IAAs (if applicable) | +| Protocol Configuration Options | +| EPS bearer identity | +| HeNB Identity* | +| HeNB IP Address* | +| HeNB Location* | + +\* These elements are applicable for HeNB interception only. + +### 12.2.3.10 UE requested PDN disconnection + +When a PDN disconnection is requested from the mobile to request for disconnection from one PDN (TS 23.401 [22]), an UE requested PDN disconnection event is generated by the MME. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| IA(s) (if applicable) | +| Linked EPS bearer identity | +| HeNB Identity* | +| HeNB IP Address* | +| HeNB Location* | + +\* These elements are applicable for HeNB interception only. + +### 12.2.3.11 UE requested Bearer Resource Modification + +When UE requested Bearer Resource Modification TS 23.401 [22] is detected at the S-GW/PDN-GW, an UE requested Bearer Resource Modification event is generated. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|-----------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| IA(s) (if applicable) | +| Linked EPS bearer identity | +| EPS bearer identity | +| Procedure Transaction Identifier | +| EPS bearer QoS | +| Traffic Aggregate Description | +| Failed Bearer Modification reason | +| Protocol Configuration Options | + +### 12.2.3.12 Void + +### 12.2.3.13 Start of interception with E-UTRAN attached UE + +This event will be generated if interception for a target is started and if the target is already E-UTRAN attached. If there are multiple PDN connections active for the target then for each them an event report is generated. + +These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|-------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| APN | +| PDN type | +| IAs (if applicable) | +| EPS bearer identity of the default bearer | +| CGS Identity (if closed or hybrid HeNB)* | +| CSG List (if closed or hybrid HeNB)* | +| HeNB Identity* | +| HeNB IP Address* | +| HeNB Location * | +| Security Gateway IP address* | +| Tunnel Protocol* | +| ISP Operator Identity* | + +\* These elements are applicable for HeNB interception only. + +## 12.2.3.14 Packet Data Header Information + +### 12.2.3.14.0 Introduction + +Packet Data Header Information reporting can be done either on a per-packet (i.e., non-summarized) basis or in a summary report. + +### 12.2.3.14.1 Packet Data Header Report + +This event is used to provide packet header reports on a per packet basis (non-summarized reporting) and is triggered by each packet sent or received by the target. These elements will be delivered by the S-GW/PDN-GW either directly to DF2 or via another network entity, if available: + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| IAs (if applicable) | +| Initiator | +| EPS bearer id | +| Handover indication | +| PDN Address Allocation | +| PDN address(es) | +| APN | +| Source IP Address | +| Destination IP Address | +| Destination Port Number | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP) | +| Packet Size | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only) | + +#### 12.2.3.14.2 Packet Data Summary Report + +This event is used to report: + +- 1) the source and destination information derived from the packet headers, including: + - a) source and destination IP Addresses, + - b) IP next-layer protocol, + - c) Layer-4 ports, and + - d) Flow label, if the packet is IPv6 +- 2) summary information for the number of packets and bytes transmitted or received by the target for each unique packet flow within an EPS bearer, and +- 3) the date and the time of the first and last packets associated with that packet flow. A packet flow is defined as the 6-tuple of source/destination IP address/port number and the layer 4 protocol and EPS bearer. + +IP addresses and the IP next-layer protocol are always reported, the flow label is reported if the packet is IPv6, and the layer-4 ports are reported. + +The event provides packet summary reports for each unique packet data session (EPS bearer) and packet flow, and is triggered by one of the following: + +- start of a packet flow associated with an EPS bearer +- an interim report for a packet flow associated with an EPS bearer is to be reported +- end of a packet flow associated with an EPS bearer (including end of the EPS bearer itself). + +An interim report can be triggered by + +- The expiration of a configurable timer per intercept (called a Summary Timer). The Summary Timer is configurable in units of seconds; +- A per-intercept configurable count threshold is reached. + +These elements will be delivered either directly to DF2 or via a MF for each packet flow if available: + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| IAIs (if applicable) | +| Initiator | +| EPS bearer id | +| Handover indication | +| PDN Address Allocation | +| PDN address(es) | +| APN | +| Care of address | +| Source IP Address | +| Source Port Number | +| Destination IP Address | +| Destination Port Number | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP) | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only) | +| Summary Period | +| Packet Count (for this summary period) | +| Sum of Packet Sizes (for this summary period) | + +If the packets are IPv4, the sum of all observed packet sizes is the sum of the values contained in the Total Length field of each packet as specified in IETF RFC 791[39]. + +If the packet is IPv6, the sum of all observed packet sizes is the sum of the values contained in the Payload Length field for each packet as specified in IETF RFC 2460 [40]. + +If no packets were detected for the duration of the Summary Timer, then the Packet Data Summary Report shall not be sent. + +### 12.2.3.15 HSS subscriber record change + +This event will be used to report any change of association between IMSI or MSISDN of the target. + +The following elements, such as old and new IMSI or MSISDN will be delivered to DF2, if available: + +| | +|----------------------------------------| +| New observed MSISDN or A MSISDN | +| New observed IMSI | +| Old observed MSISDN or A MSISDN | +| Old observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Change Type (MSISDN, A-MSISDN or IMSI) | +| Network Element Identifier (HSS id...) | +| Other update: carrier specific | + +### 12.2.3.16 Cancel location + +This event "Cancel Location" will be used to report to DF2 when HSS send to MME one cancel location or purge to serving system. + +The following elements such as the old serving system of the target will be delivered to DF2: + +| | +|----------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HSS Id...) | +| Previous visited MME Identifier | + +### 12.2.3.17 Register location + +This event will be used to report one update location to the HSS for a target. The elements of previous and current serving system id will be delivered to DF2, if available: + +| | +|----------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HSS id...) | +| Previous visited MME Identifier | +| Current visited MME Identifier | + +### 12.2.3.18 Location information request + +This event will be used to report any location information of the target request activity. + +The elements, observed IMSI, MSISDN, the identifier of the requesting node type and network, will be delivered to DF2, if available: + +| | +|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Requesting network identifier (country identifier included) | +| Requesting node type | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HSS id...) | + +## 12.3 Functional requirements for LI in case of E-UTRAN access and PMIP based S5/S8 interfaces + +### 12.3.0 General + +Functional requirements for LI in the MME, S-GW, LI LCS Client and HSS do not differ from the ones applicable to the case of GTP based S5-S8 interfaces, as specified in clause 12.2 and subclauses. + +LI in the PDN-GW is a national option. + +Interception in the PDN-GW and in the LI LCS Client shall be based on one or more of NAI, MSISDN, IMEI. + +For the delivery of the CC and IRI, the PDN-GW provides correlation number and target identity to the DF2 and DF3 which is used there in order to select the different LEAs where the product shall be delivered. + +The correlation number is unique in the whole PLMN and is used to correlate CC with IRI and the different IRI's of one IP-CAN session. However, when different protocols (i.e. GTP and PMIP) are used in the network, different values can be generated by different nodes. + +The correlation number shall be generated by using existing parameters related to the IP-CAN session. + +NOTE: Void + +If interception has been activated for both parties of the Packet Data communication both CC and IRI shall be delivered for each party as separate intercept activity. + +## 12.3.1 Provision of intercept related information + +### 12.3.1.0 General + +Intercept Related Information (Events) shall be sent at attach/tunnel activation, detach/tunnel deactivation, start of interception with active PMIP tunnel, PMIP session modification, PDN-GW initiated PDN-disconnection, UE requested PDN connectivity, Serving Evolved Packet System, subscriber record change, registration termination, location information request , and LALS Location Report. + +LI based on HSS reporting is a national option. Requirements on the HSS specified in section 12.2 and subsections apply also to the case in which S5/S8 interfaces are PMIP based. + +#### 12.3.1.1 X2 interface + +The following information needs to be transferred from the PDN-GW to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity; +- events and associated parameters as defined in clause 12.3.1.2 and 12.3.3 may be provided; +- the target location (if available) or the IAs in case of location dependent interception; (FFS); +- date/time of Location (if target location provided); +- correlation number; +- Quality of Service (QoS) information, if available; +- encryption parameters (keys and associated parameters for decrypting CC), if available and necessary. + +The PDN-GW detect packets containing packet data header information in the communications path but the information needed for Packet Data Header Information reporting may need to be transferred from the PDN-GW either directly to the DF2 or via another network entity in order to allow the DF2 to perform its functionality. + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 using a reliable transport mechanism. + +For the LALS Reports the following information needs to be transferred from the LI LCS Client to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identities; +- the target location (if available); +- date/time of Location (if target location provided); +- error code (if positioning fails); +- Correlation Identifier (in the case of report for Enhanced Location for IRI). + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 using a reliable transport mechanism. + +#### 12.3.1.2 Structure of the events + +There are several different events in which the information is sent to the DF2 if this is required. The events for + +interception are configurable (if they are sent to DF2) in the PDN-GW, LI LCS Client and can be suppressed in the DF2. The network procedures for which the events are generated are defined in TS 23.402 [23]. + +**The following events are applicable to the PDN-GW:** + +- PMIP Attach/tunnel activation; +- PMIP Detach/tunnel deactivation; +- PMIP session modification +- Start of interception with active PMIP tunnel; +- PMIP PDN-GW initiated PDN-disconnection; +- Packet Data Header Information. + +A set of elements as shown below can be associated with the events. The events trigger the transmission of the information from the nodes to DF2. Available IEs from this set of elements as shown below can be extended in the nodes, if this is necessary as a national option. DF2 can extend available information if this is necessary as a national option. + +| | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI
The Network Access Identifier of the Mobile Node (target identity). | +| Observed MSISDN
MSISDN of the target. | +| Observed IMEI
IMEI of the target | +| Event type
Indicates which type of event is delivered: PMIP attach/tunnel activation, PMIP detach/tunnel deactivation, PMIP Session modification, Start of interception with active PMIP tunnel, PMIP PDN-GW initiated PDN disconnection, , Packet Data Header Information. | +| Event time
Time of the event generation in the ICE. Time stamp shall be generated relative to ICE internal clock. | +| Event date
Date of the event generation in the ICE. | +| Correlation number
The correlation number is used to correlate CC and IRI. | +| Network Element Identifier
Unique identifier for the ICE reporting the event. | +| Logical Function Information
Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lifetime
Indicates the lifetime of the tunnel; it is set to a nonzero value in the case of registration; is set to zero in case of deregistration. | +| Failed attach reason
Reason for the failed attach/tunnel deactivation of the target. | +| Access technology type
Indicates the Radio Access Type. | +| Handover indicator
Provides information on whether the procedure is triggered as part of a handover. | +| APN
The Access Point Name used for the connection. | +| UE address info
Includes one or more IP addresses allocated to the UE. | +| Additional Parameters
Additional information provided by the UE, such as protocol configuration options. | +| PDN address(es)
The UE IP address(es) for the PDN connection. | +| Revocation trigger
Indicates the reason which triggered the PDN-GW initiated PDN-disconnection procedure | +| Serving Network
Identifies the serving network the UE is attached to | +| DHCP v4 Address Allocation Indication
Indicates that DHCPv4 is to be used to allocate the IPv4 address to the UE | +| Location Information
Provides, if received from the PCRF, and/ or from the LI LCS Client, location information of the target. | +| Time of Location
Date/Time of location. The time when location was obtained by the location source node. | +| Destination IP Address
The IP address, including type IPv4 or IPv6, of the destination of the IP packet. | +| Destination Port Number
The port number of the destination of the IP packet. | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only)
The field in the IPv6 header that is used by a source to label packets of a flow (see RFC 3697 [41]). | +| Packet Count
The number of packets detected and reported (for a particular summary period). | +| Packet Data Summary Reason
The reason for a Packet Data Summary message being sent to the LEMF (e.g., timed out, counter expiration, end of session) | +| Packet Size
The size of the packet. (i.e., Total Length Field in IPv4 or Payload Length field in IPv6) | +| Source IP Address
The IP address, including type IPv4 or IPv6, of the source of the IP packet. | +| Source Port Number
The port number of the source of the IP packet. | +| Sum of Packet Sizes (for a particular summary period)
The sum of values contained in the Total Length fields of the IPv4 packets or the sum of the values contained in the Payload Length fields of the IPv6 packets. | +| Summary Period | + +Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP) + +The identification of the transport protocol of the packet or packet flow being reported. + +## 12.3.2 X3-interface + +The access method for the delivering of PDN-GW Intercept Product is based on duplication of packets without modification at the PDN-GW. The duplicated packets with additional information in a header are sent to DF3 for further delivery to the LEA. + +![Diagram illustrating the configuration for interception of PDN-GW product data. A large black rectangle at the top represents the PDN-GW. Below it, a vertical sequence of three white rectangles represents the DF3 (Data Flow 3) components. Arrows indicate the flow of data from the PDN-GW, through the DF3 components, and finally to the LEA (Law Enforcement Agency).](a1b35c85c93d7a2e30d1feea2faac2e6_img.jpg) + +Diagram illustrating the configuration for interception of PDN-GW product data. A large black rectangle at the top represents the PDN-GW. Below it, a vertical sequence of three white rectangles represents the DF3 (Data Flow 3) components. Arrows indicate the flow of data from the PDN-GW, through the DF3 components, and finally to the LEA (Law Enforcement Agency). + +**Figure 12.3.2.1: Configuration for interception of PDN-GW product data** + +In addition to the intercepted content of communication, the following information needs to be transferred from the PDN-GW to the DF3 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity; +- correlation number; +- time stamp (optional); +- direction (indicates whether T-PDU is MO or MT) - optional; +- the target location (if available) or the IAs in case of location dependent interception; +- date/time of Location (if target location provided). + +NOTE: Location dependent interception for EPC is FFS. + +## 12.3.3 LI events for E-UTRAN access with PMIP-based S5 or S8 + +### 12.3.3.1 Initial E-UTRAN Attach and UE PDN requested connectivity with PMIP-based S5 or S8 + +When the E-UTRAN Attach or UE requested PDN connectivity is detected at the PMIP based PDN-GW, a **PMIP attach/tunnel activation** event shall be generated by the PDN-GW. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|--------------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Lifetime | +| Failed attach reason | +| Access Technology Type | +| Handover Indicator | +| APN | +| UE Address Info | +| Additional Parameters | +| Serving Network | +| DHCPv4 Address Allocation Indication | +| Location information | +| Time of Location | + +### 12.3.3.2 Detach and PDN disconnection for PMIP-based S5/S8 + +When the Detach or PDN disconnection is detected at the PMIP based PDN-GW, a **PMIP detach/tunnel deactivation** event shall be generated by the PDN-GW. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Correlation number | +| APN | +| Additional Parameters | +| Failed reason | +| Location information | +| Time of Location | + +### 12.3.3.3 Start of interception with active tunnel for PMIP based S5/S8 + +This event shall be generated by the PDN-GW if interception for a target is started and if the target has an active PMIP tunnel. If more than one connection is active, for each of them an event record is generated. The parameters which are defined for PMIP attach/tunnel activation (see related section) will be sent, if available, by the PDN-GW to the DF2. + +### 12.3.3.4 Dedicated Bearer Procedures for E-UTRAN Access with PMIP-based S5/S8 + +All the procedures can be intercepted at the S-GW according to the requirements specified for LI in case of GTP based S5/S8. + +PDN-GW is not involved in these procedures, except for the case of **PDN-GW initiated PDN-disconnection Procedure**. + +### 12.3.3.5 PDN-GW initiated PDN-disconnection Procedure + +When a PDN-GW initiated PDN-disconnection procedure is detected, a **PMIP PDN-GW initiated PDN-disconnection** event shall be generated by the PDN-GW. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Correlation number | +| PDN Address(es) | +| Revocation trigger | +| Location information | +| Time of Location | + +### 12.3.3.6 PMIP Session modification + +When a session modification is detected at the PDN-GW, a **PMIP Session modification** event shall be generated by the PDN-GW. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2: + +| | +|--------------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Correlation number | +| Lifetime | +| UE Address Info | +| Access Technology Type | +| Additional Parameters | +| Failed reason | +| Serving Network | +| Handover indicator | +| DHCPv4 Address Allocation Indication | +| Location information | +| Time of Location | + +### 12.3.3.7 Packet Data Header Information + +#### 12.3.3.7.0 Introduction + +Packet Data Header Information reporting can be done either on a per-packet (i.e., non-summarized) basis or in a summary report. + +#### 12.3.3.7.1 Packet Data Header Report + +This event is used to provide packet header reports on a per packet basis (non-summarized reporting) and is triggered by each packet sent or received by the target. These elements will be delivered by the PDN-GW either directly to DF2 or via another network entity if available: + +| | +|--------------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Correlation number | +| Lifetime | +| UE Address Info | +| Access Technology Type | +| Additional Parameters | +| Serving Network | +| Handover indicator | +| DHCPv4 Address Allocation Indication | +| Location information | +| Time of Location | +| Source IP Address | +| Destination IP Address | +| Destination Port Number | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP) | +| Packet Size | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only) | + +### 12.3.3.7.2 Packet Data Summary Report + +This event is used to report: + +- 1) the source and destination information derived from the packet headers, including: + - a) source and destination IP Addresses, + - b) IP next-layer protocol, + - c) Layer-4 ports, and + - d) Flow label, if the packet is IPv6 +- 2) summary information for the number of packets and bytes transmitted or received by the target for each unique packet flow within an EPS bearer, and +- 3) the date and the time of the first and last packets associated with that packet flow. A packet flow is defined as the 6-tuple of source/destination IP address/port number and the layer 4 protocol and EPS bearer. + +IP addresses and the IP next-layer protocol are always reported, the flow label is reported if the packet is IPv6, and the layer-4 ports are reported. + +The event provides packet summary reports for each unique packet data session (EPS bearer) and packet flow, and is triggered by one of the following: + +- start of a packet flow associated with an EPS bearer +- an interim report for a packet flow associated with an EPS bearer is to be reported +- end of a packet flow associated with an EPS bearer (including end of the EPS bearer itself). + +An interim report can be triggered by + +- The expiration of a configurable timer per intercept (called a Summary Timer). The Summary Timer is configurable in units of seconds; +- A per-intercept configurable count threshold is reached. + +These elements will be delivered either directly to DF2 or via DF3 for each packet flow if available: + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Correlation number | +| Lifetime | +| UE Address Info | +| Access Technology Type | +| Additional Parameters | +| Serving Network | +| Handover indicator | +| DHCPv4 Address Allocation Indication | +| Location information | +| Time of Location | +| Source IP Address | +| Source Port Number | +| Destination IP Address | +| Destination Port Number | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP) | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only) | +| Summary Period | +| Packet Count (for this summary period) | +| Sum of Packet Sizes (for this summary period) | +| Packet Summary Reason | + +If the packets are IPv4, the sum of all observed packet sizes is the sum of the values contained in the Total Length field of each packet as specified in IETF RFC 791[39]. + +If the packet is IPv6, the sum of all observed packet sizes is the sum of the values contained in the Payload Length field for each packet as specified in IETF RFC 2460 [40]. + +If no packets were detected for the duration of the Summary Timer, then the Packet Data Summary Report shall not be sent. + +## 12.4 Functional requirements for LI in case of trusted non-3GPP IP access + +### 12.4.0 General + +Differently to what happens in E-UTRAN case, in which the user traffic passes through the S-GW and then through the PDN-GW, there are two cases of access to the network through S2a (trusted Non-3GPP access) that require additional consideration. Specifically, the PDN-GW is the only possible ICE in the 3GPP network in the case of non-roaming (PDN-GW in the HPLMN) and in the case of roaming with local breakout (PDN-GW is located in the VPLMN). Therefore, in these cases, interception at the PDN-GW is required. + +LI based on HSS reporting is a national option. Requirements on the HSS specified in clause 7A.2 and subsections apply also to the case in which non-3GPP IP access and 3GPP AAA server are based. Intercept Related Information (Events) are in such case: serving system, subscriber record change, registration termination, and location information request. In case of access to the network through S2a (trusted Non-3GPP access) for roaming without local breakout (PDN-GW in the HPLMN and S-GW in the VPLMN), interception at the PDN-GW is a national option. + +Interception in the S-GW and PDN-GW shall be based on IMSI or NAI. + +NOTE 1: The NAI may be a temporary ID, therefore the use of IMSI is recommended. + +For the delivery of the CC and IRI, the S-GW and/or PDN-GW provides correlation number and target identity to the DF2 and DF3 which is used there in order to select the different LEAs where the product shall be delivered. + +The correlation number is unique in the whole PLMN and is used to correlate CC with IRI and the different IRI's of one + +IP-CAN session. However, when different protocols (i.e. GTP and PMIP) are used in the network, different values can be generated by different nodes + +The correlation number shall be generated by using existing parameters related to the IP-CAN session. + +NOTE 2: Void. + +If interception has been activated for both parties of the Packet Data communication both CC and IRI shall be delivered for each party as separate intercept activity. + +## 12.4.1 Provision of Intercept Related Information + +### 12.4.1.0 General + +Intercept Related Information (Events) shall be sent at attach/tunnel activation on interfaces s2a and s2c, session modification, detach/tunnel deactivation, start of interception with active tunnel, PDN-GW reallocation upon initial attach on s2c, PDN GW initiated resource allocation Deactivation on s2a, Serving Evolved Packet System. + +Serving Evolved Packet System reporting is a national option. + +### 12.4.1.1 X2-interface + +The following information needs to be transferred from the S-GW, PDN-GW or the HSS to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity; +- events and associated parameters as defined in clause 12.4.1.2 and 12.4.3 may be provided; +- the target location (if available) or the IAs in case of location dependent interception; (FFS) +- date/time of Location (if target location provided); +- correlation number; +- Quality of Service (QoS) information, if available; +- encryption parameters (keys and associated parameters for decrypting CC), if available and necessary. + +The PDN-GW/S-GW detect packets containing packet header information in the communications path but the information needed for Packet Data Header Information Reporting may need to be transferred from the PDN-GW/S-GW either directly to the DF2 or via another network entity in order to allow the DF2 to perform its functionality. + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 using a reliable transport mechanism. + +### 12.4.1.2 Structure of the events + +There are several different events in which the information is sent to the DF2 if this is required. The events for interception are configurable (if they are sent to DF2) in the S-GW, PDN-GW or the HSS and can be suppressed in the DF2. + +**The following events are applicable to the S-GW:** + +- PMIP attach/tunnel activation; +- PMIP detach/tunnel deactivation; +- PMIP session modification; +- Start of interception with active PMIP tunnel; +- Packet Data Header Information. + +**The following events are applicable to the PDN-GW:** + +- PMIP attach/tunnel activation; + +- PMIP detach/tunnel deactivation; +- PMIP session modification; +- Start of interception with active PMIP tunnel; +- MIP registration/tunnel activation; +- DSMIP registration/tunnel activation; +- DSMIP session modification; +- MIP deregistration/tunnel deactivation; +- DSMIP deregistration/tunnel deactivation; +- Start of interception with active MIP tunnel; +- Start of interception with active DSMIP tunnel; +- DSMIP HA Switch; +- PMIP Resource Allocation Deactivation; +- MIP Resource Allocation Deactivation; +- Bearer activation; +- Bearer deactivation; +- Bearer modification; +- Start of interception with active bearer; +- Packet Data Header Information. + +NOTE: Bearer activation, bearer deactivation, bearer modification and start of interception with active bearer are applicable to trusted non-3GPP access when the GTP protocol is used over s2a interface as specified in TS 23.402 [23]. + +**The following event is applicable to the HSS, which may be requested by national regulations:** + +- Serving Evolved Packet System; +- Subscriber record change; +- Registration termination; +- Location information request. + +A set of elements as shown below can be associated with the events. The events trigger the transmission of the information from the nodes to DF2. Available IEs from this set of elements as shown below can be extended in the nodes, if this is necessary as a national option. DF2 can extend available information if this is necessary as a national option. In case GTP protocol is used over s2a interface, elements from table 12.2.1.2 are included in the applicable events. If interception is performed at the PDN GW, then Packet Data Header Information reporting shall also be performed at the PDN GW and not at the Serving GW. + +**Table 12.4.1.2: elements included to trusted Non-3GPP access Events** + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | The Network Access Identifier of the Mobile Node (target identity). | +| Observed IMSI | The IMSI of the target | +| New observed MN NAI | The new Network Access Identifier of the Mobile Node (target identity). | +| New observed IMSI | The new IMSI of the target | +| Old observed MN NAI of the target (if available) | | +| Old observed IMSI of the target (if available) | | +| Event type | Indicates which type of event is delivered: PMIP attach/tunnel activation, PMIP detach/tunnel deactivation, PMIP session modification, Start of interception with active PMIP tunnel, MIP registration/tunnel activation, DSMIP registration/tunnel activation, DSMIP session modification, MIP deregistration/tunnel deactivation, DSMIP deregistration/tunnel deactivation, Start of interception with active MIP tunnel, Start of interception with active DSMIP tunnel, DSMIP HA Switch, PMIP resource Allocation Deactivation, MIP Resource Allocation Deactivation, Serving Evolved Packet System, Subscriber record change, Registration termination, Location information request, Packet Data Header Information. | +| Event time | Time of the event generation in the ICE. Time stamp shall be generated relative to ICE internal clock. | +| Event date | Date of the event generation in the ICE. | +| Change type | This indicates what has been changed (MSISDN, IMSI, or IMEI) in the Subscriber Change Record | +| Correlation number | The correlation number is used to correlate CC and IRI. | +| Network Element Identifier | Unique identifier for the ICE reporting the event. | +| Logical Function Information | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lifetime | Indicates the lifetime of the tunnel; shall be set to a nonzero value in the case of registration or lifetime extension; is set to zero in case of deregistration. | +| Failed attach reason | Reason for the failed attach/tunnel deactivation of the target. | +| Session modification failure reason | Reason for a failure of a session modification attempt for the target | +| Access technology type | Indicates the Radio Access Type. | +| Handover indicator | Provides information on whether the triggered as part of a handover. | +| APN | The Access Point Name used for the connection. | +| UE address info | Includes one or more IP addresses allocated to the UE. | +| Additional Parameters | Additional information provided by the UE, such as protocol configuration options. | +| PDN address(es) | The UE IP address(es) for the PDN connection. | +| Home address | Contains the UE Home IP address. | +| Home Agent address | Contains the IP address of the Home Agent. | +| Requested IPv6 Home Prefix | The IPv6 Home Prefix requested by the UE. | +| IPv6 home prefix | The IPv6 home prefix assigned by the PDN GW to the UE. | +| Care of Address | The Local IP address assigned to the UE by the Access Network, used as Care of Address for DSMIPv6 over S2c reference point. | +| HSS/AAA address | The address of the HSS/AAA triggering the PDN-GW reallocation. | +| Target PDN-GW address | The address of the PDN-GW which the UE will be reallocated to. | +| Revocation trigger | Contains the cause for the revocation procedure. | +| Foreign domain address | | + +| | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| The relevant IP address in the foreign domain. | +| Visited network identifier
An identifier that allows the home network to identify the visited network TS 29.273 [24] | +| Location Information
Location information of the target, e.g. 3GPP2-BSID TS 29.212 [26]. Provided if available from the PCRF. | +| Time of Location
Date/Time of location. The time when location was obtained by the location source node. | +| Initiator
The initiator of the procedure, either the network or the UE. | +| Destination IP Address
The IP address, including type IPv4 or IPv6, of the destination of the IP packet. | +| Destination Port Number
The port number of the destination of the IP packet. | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only)
The field in the IPv6 header that is used by a source to label packets of a flow (see RFC 3697 [41]). | +| Packet Count
The number of packets detected and reported (for a particular summary period). | +| Packet Data Summary Reason
The reason for a Packet Data Summary message being sent to the LEMF (e.g., timed out, counter expiration, end of session) | +| Packet Size
The size of the packet. (i.e., Total Length Field in IPv4 or Payload Length field in IPv6) | +| Source IP Address
The IP address, including type IPv4 or IPv6, of the source of the IP packet. | +| Source Port Number
The port number of the source of the IP packet. | +| Sum of Packet Sizes (for a particular summary period)
The sum of values contained in the Total Length fields of the IPv4 packets or the sum of the values contained in the Payload Length fields of the IPv6 packets. | +| Summary Period
Includes the dates and times of the first and last packets in a particular packet data interval. | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP)
The identification of the transport protocol of the packet or packet flow being reported. | +| Any User-Data (AVP Name): any change in the profit and identities of the target (if available in the Diameter message) | +| Any Associated-Identities (AVP Name): any change of any associated identities of the target | +| Request direction : Information if the serving node is requesting to the HSS, or requested by the HSS. | +| Other update: carrier specific of target's data that are in the intercepted diameter messages | +| Other Public User Identities
Other IMPU or IMPI that was allocated to Target and will be deregistered (if available) | +| Requesting node identifier (I CSCF; AS) that are interfaced directly in the HSS and transmitting a diameter message from a network | +| Requesting network node identifier such as IP-SM-GW Id, GMSC Id, SGSN Id, MME Id GMLC Id (country identifier is included in such request) that are in the different diameter messages related to location request for information (to route the right SMS or Call attempt, or GMLC based location request, to the right node on which is attached the target.) | +| Requesting node type (IP-SM-GW AS, GMSC, SGSN, MME, GMLC) (if available) | + +## 12.4.2 X3-interface + +The access method for the delivering of S-GW and/or PDN-GW Intercept Product is based on duplication of packets without modification at the S-GW and/or PDN-GW. The duplicated packets with additional information in a header are sent to DF3 for further delivery to the LEA. + +![Figure 12.4.2.1: Configuration for interception of S-GW/PDN-GW product data. The diagram shows a network architecture with several components. On the left, a vertical rectangle represents the UE (User Equipment). In the center, there are two stacked rectangles representing the S-GW (Serving Gateway) and PDN-GW (PDN Gateway). To the right, a shaded rectangle represents the DF3 (Data Function 3). Below the DF3, another shaded area contains two stacked rectangles representing the LEA (Lawful Interception Agency). Arrows indicate the flow of data: from the UE to the S-GW, from the S-GW to the PDN-GW, and from the PDN-GW to the DF3. There are also arrows indicating control or signaling messages between the UE, S-GW, PDN-GW, and DF3.](c68899cd90617f1d48caa06f4b8faeb0_img.jpg) + +Figure 12.4.2.1: Configuration for interception of S-GW/PDN-GW product data. The diagram shows a network architecture with several components. On the left, a vertical rectangle represents the UE (User Equipment). In the center, there are two stacked rectangles representing the S-GW (Serving Gateway) and PDN-GW (PDN Gateway). To the right, a shaded rectangle represents the DF3 (Data Function 3). Below the DF3, another shaded area contains two stacked rectangles representing the LEA (Lawful Interception Agency). Arrows indicate the flow of data: from the UE to the S-GW, from the S-GW to the PDN-GW, and from the PDN-GW to the DF3. There are also arrows indicating control or signaling messages between the UE, S-GW, PDN-GW, and DF3. + +**Figure 12.4.2.1: Configuration for interception of S-GW/PDN-GW product data** + +In addition to the intercepted content of communication, the following information needs to be transferred from the S-GW and/or the PDN-GW to the DF3 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity; +- correlation number; +- time stamp (optional); +- direction (indicates whether T-PDU is MO or MT) - optional; +- the target location (if available) or the IAs in case of location dependent interception; +- date/time of Location (if target location provided). + +NOTE: location dependent interception for EPC is FFS. + +## 12.4.3 LI events for trusted Non-3GPP IP access + +### 12.4.3.1 Initial Attach and PDN connection activation with PMIPv6 on S2a + +When the Attach or PDN connectivity activation is detected over PMIP at the S-GW, PDN-GW, a **PMIP attach/tunnel activation** event shall be generated. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Lifetime | +| Failed attach reason | +| Access Technology Type | +| Handover Indicator | +| APN | +| UE Address Info | +| Additional Parameters | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | + +### 12.4.3.2 Initial Attach and PDN connection activation procedures with MIPv4 FACoA on S2a + +When the Attach or PDN connectivity activation is detected over MIP at the PDN-GW, a **MIP registration/tunnel activation** event shall be generated. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Lifetime | +| Failed attach reason | +| Home Address | +| Care of Address | +| Home Agent Address | +| APN | + +NOTE: Void. + +As the S-GW has no Home Agent function, the event is not applicable to the S-GW. The use of MIPv4 in roaming case requires Local Breakout (PDN-GW in VPLMN), so LI in the PDN-GW is mandatory in order to intercept in this scenario. + +### 12.4.3.3 Initial Attach and PDN connection activation procedures with DSMIPv6 over S2c + +When the Attach or PDN connectivity activation is detected over DSMIP at the PDN-GW, a **DSMIP registration/tunnel activation** event shall be generated. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Date | +| Event Time | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Lifetime | +| Requested IPv6 home prefix | +| Home address | +| APN | +| Care of Address | +| Failed attach reason | + +#### 12.4.3.4 Detach and PDN disconnection with PMIPv6 on S2a + +When a Detach or PDN disconnection is detected over PMIP at the S-GW, PDN-GW, a **PMIP detach/tunnel deactivation** event shall be generated. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Date | +| Event Time | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| APN | +| Initiator | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | + +#### 12.4.3.5 Detach and PDN disconnection with MIPv4 FACoA + +When a Detach or PDN disconnection is detected over MIP at the PDN-GW, a **MIP deregistration/tunnel deactivation** event shall be generated. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Date | +| Event Time | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Home Address | +| Home Agent Address | +| Care of address | +| Initiator | + +#### 12.4.3.6 Detach and PDN disconnection with DSMIPv6 on S2c + +When a Detach or PDN disconnection is detected over DSMIP at the PDN-GW, a **DSMIP deregistration/tunnel deactivation** event shall be generated. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Date | +| Event Time | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Home Address | +| Initiator | + +### 12.4.3.7 PDN-GW reallocation upon initial attach on s2c + +When a PDN GW reallocation procedure is detected by the PDN-GW, a **DSMIP HA Switch event** shall be generated. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Date | +| Event Time | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| HSS/AAA address | +| Target PDN-GW address | + +### 12.4.3.8 PDN GW initiated Resource Allocation Deactivation with S2a PMIP + +When a PDN GW initiated resource allocation deactivation is detected by the S-GW/PDN-GW, a **PMIP Resource Allocation Deactivation** event shall be sent. The following elements will be delivered to DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Date | +| Event Time | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Revocation trigger | +| UE address info | +| Correlation number | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | + +### 12.4.3.9 PDN GW initiated Resource Allocation Deactivation with S2a MIP v4 + +When a PDN GW initiated resource allocation deactivation is detected, a **MIP Resource Allocation Deactivation** event shall be sent. The following elements will be delivered to DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Date | +| Event Time | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Home Address | +| Foreign domain address | +| Correlation number | + +### 12.4.3.10 Serving Evolved Packet System + +The Serving Evolved Packet System report event is generated at the HSS, when the HSS has detected that the target has roamed. Such events could be mainly triggered by Diameter messages such as: + +- Through SWx interface, Server-Assignment-Request in case of command of 3GPP AAA to HSS (see clause A of TS 29.273 [24], and clause 5 of GSMA IR.61 [65]). + +The elements of table 12.4.3.10 will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +**Table 12.4.3.10: Information Elements for Serving Evolved Packet Event** + +| | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Identity | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Visited Network Identifier (for example: AVP name such as Visited-PLMN-Id) | + +### 12.4.3.11 Start of interception with active tunnel or bearer + +When interception is started at the S-GW, PDN-GW and the target has an already active tunnel or bearer, a start of interception with active tunnel/bearer shall be generated. Separate events are defined for the different protocols. The event shall be detected by the same node for which tunnel/bearer activation reporting is applicable and reported with the same parameters required for the specific protocol (PMIP, MIP, DSMIP, GTP) tunnel/bearer activation event, as defined in the related sections. One event shall be sent for each active tunnel/bearer. + +### 12.4.3.12 PMIP session modification + +When a session modification is detected at the S-GW/PDN-GW, a **PMIP session modification** event shall be generated by the S-GW/PDN-GW. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|--------------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Correlation number | +| Lifetime | +| UE Address Info | +| Access Technology Type | +| Additional Parameters | +| Session modification failure reason | +| Serving Network | +| Handover indicator | +| DHCPv4 Address Allocation Indication | +| Location information | +| Time of Location | + +### 12.4.3.13 DSMIP session modification + +When the session modification is detected over DS-MIPv6 at the PDN-GW, a **DSMIP session modification** event shall be generated. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|-------------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Lifetime | +| Session modification failure reason | +| Home address | +| Care of Address | +| APN | +| Requested IPv6 Home Prefix | + +#### 12.4.3.14 Bearer activation + +When the Initial attach in WLAN on GTP S2a (TS 23.402 [23]) or the Dedicated bearer activation in WLAN on GTP S2a (TS 23.402 [23]) is detected in the PDN-GW, a **Bearer activation** event shall be generated. The elements listed in the section 12.2.3.3 will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +#### 12.4.3.15 Bearer deactivation + +When the Detach and PDN disconnection in WLAN on GTP S2a (TS 23.402 [23]) or the PDN GW initiated Resource Allocation Deactivation in WLAN on GTP S2 (TS 23.402 [23]) is detected in the PDN-GW, a **Bearer deactivation** event shall be generated. The elements listed in the section 12.2.3.4 will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +#### 12.4.3.16 Bearer modification + +When the Network initiated bearer modification in WLAN on GTP S2a (TS 23.402 [23]) is detected in the PDN-GW, a **Bearer modification** event shall be generated. The elements listed in the section 12.2.3.5 will be delivered by the PDN-GW to the DF2 if available. + +#### 12.4.3.17 Packet Data Header Information + +##### 12.4.3.17.0 Introduction + +Packet Data Header Information reporting can be done either on a per-packet (i.e., non-summarized) basis or in a summary report. + +##### 12.4.3.17.1 Packet Data Header Report + +This event is used to provide packet header reports on a per packet basis (non-summarized reporting) and is triggered by each packet sent or received by the target. These elements will be delivered by the S-GW/PDN-GW either directly to the DF2 or via another network entity if available: + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Correlation number | +| Lifetime | +| UE Address Info | +| Access Technology Type | +| Serving Network | +| Home address | +| Care of Address | +| APN | +| Location information | +| Time of Location | +| Source IP Address | +| Source Port Number | +| Destination IP Address | +| Destination Port Number | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP) | +| Packet Size | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only) | + +#### 12.4.3.17.2 Packet Data Summary Report + +This event is used to report: + +- 1) the source and destination information derived from the packet headers, including: + - a) source and destination IP Addresses, + - b) IP next-layer protocol, + - c) Layer-4 ports, and + - d) Flow label, if the packet is IPv6 +- 2) summary information for the number of packets and bytes transmitted or received by the target for each unique packet flow within an EPS bearer, and +- 3) the date and the time of the first and last packets associated with that packet flow. A packet flow is defined as the 6-tuple of source/destination IP address/port number and the layer 4 protocol and EPS bearer. + +IP addresses and the IP next-layer protocol are always reported, the flow label is reported if the packet is IPv6, and the layer-4 ports are reported. + +The event provides packet summary reports for each unique packet data session (EPS bearer) and packet flow, and is triggered by one of the following: + +- start of a packet flow associated with an EPS bearer +- an interim report for a packet flow associated with an EPS bearer is to be reported +- end of a packet flow associated with an EPS bearer (including end of the EPS bearer itself). + +An interim report can be triggered by + +- The expiration of a configurable timer per intercept (called a Summary Timer). The Summary Timer is configurable in units of seconds; +- A per-intercept configurable count threshold is reached. + +These elements will be delivered either directly to the DF2 or via a MF for each packet flow if available: + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Correlation number | +| Lifetime | +| UE Address Info | +| Access Technology Type | +| Serving Network | +| Home address | +| Care of Address | +| APN | +| Location information | +| Time of Location | +| Source IP Address | +| Source Port Number | +| Destination IP Address | +| Destination Port Number | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP) | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only) | +| Summary Period | +| Packet Count (for this summary period) | +| Sum of Packet Sizes (for this summary period) | + +If the packets are IPv4, the sum of all observed packet sizes is the sum of the values contained in the Total Length field of each packet as specified in IETF RFC 791[39]. + +If the packet is IPv6, the sum of all observed packet sizes is the sum of the values contained in the Payload Length field for each packet as specified in IETF RFC 2460 [40]. + +If no packets were detected for the duration of the Summary Timer, then the Packet Data Summary Report shall not be sent. + +#### 12.4.3.18 HSS subscriber record change + +This event will be only used to report when there is a change of association between IMSI, MSISDN or IMEI of the target. It is induced mainly by Subscriber Profile management by the HSS or the CSP administration tools through the HSS. + +Such events could be mainly triggered by Diameter messages such as: + +Through SWx interface, -Push-Profile-Request (PPR) in case of command of HSS to 3GPP AAA Server: see clause A of TS 29.273 [24]. + +The elements of table 12.4.3.18 will be delivered to DF2, if available. + +**Table 12.4.3.18: Information Elements for Subscriber Record Change Event** + +| | +|----------------------------------------| +| New observed MSISDN | +| New observed IMSI | +| New Observed IMEI (if available) | +| Old observed MSISDN | +| Old observed IMSI | +| Old observed IMEI (if available) | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HSS id...) | +| Change Type (MSISDN, IMSI or IMEI) | +| Other update: carrier specific. | + +### 12.4.3.19 Registration Termination + +This event "Registration Termination" will be used to report to DF2 when HSS send to 3GPP AAA Server It is the equivalent of cancel location or purge to serving system in CS domain. This kind of event is induced by the registration of the target. The event will be triggered by the following Diameter messages: + +- Through SWx interface, Server-Assignment-Request indicating deregistration from 3GPP AAA Server to HSS: see clause A of TS 29.273 [24]; +- Through SWx interface, Registration-Termination- Request from HSS to 3GPP AAA Server: see clause A of TS 29.273 [24]. + +The elements of table 12.4.3.19 will be delivered to DF2. + +**Table 12.4.3.19: Information Elements for Termination Request Event** + +| | +|---------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HSS Id...) | +| Previous serving system identifier (if available) | + +### 12.4.3.20 Location Information request + +This event will be used to report any location information request on the target by a node to HSS, when the target is connected to trusted non-3GPP IP access. A location information request could be generated by an IP-SM-GW AS (as an SMS Centre) or GMSC or SGSN or MME from another Network through a diameter request transmitted by either an AS or the I CSCF of the home network to the HSS of the target. The event will be triggered by the following Diameter messages: + +- Through Sh interface, User Data Request with content related to update location from AS to HSS, see clause A.2 of TS 29.328 [63] and TS 29.329 [66]; +- Through Cx interface, Location Info Request from I CSCF to HSS; see clause A.2 of TS 29.228 [62]. + +The elements, observed IMSI, MSISDN, the identifier of the requesting node type and network, of table 12.4.3.20 will be delivered to DF2, if available. + +**Table 12.4.3.20: Information Elements for Location Information Request Event** + +| | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Requesting network identifier such as PLMN Id (country identifier included), | +| Requesting node type (IP-SM-GW AS, GMSC, SGSN, MME, GMLC) | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HSS id...) | + +## 12.5 Functional requirements for LI in case of untrusted non-3GPP IP access + +### 12.5.0 Introduction + +This clause specifies functional requirements applicable to the PDN-GW and HSS. In addition, this clause specifies requirements applicable to the ePDG in case this node is using a GTPv2 based protocol over s2b interface as specified in TS 23.402 [23]. + +The e-PDG not using a GTPv2 based protocol over s2b interface and the AAA server are subjected to all the requirements specified in this document for PDG and AAA server for the case of I-WLAN interworking. + +NOTE 1: WLAN Interworking specifications (TS 23.234 [14], TS 24.234 [17] and TS 29.234 [16]) are no longer maintained for Release 12 onwards. This clause is therefore no longer maintained for WLAN Interworking. + +Interception in the PDN-GW is a national option. + +Interception in the PDN-GW shall be based on IMSI or NAI. In case of GTPv2 based protocol, interception at the ePDG and PDN-GW shall be based on IMSI. + +NOTE 2: The NAI may be a temporary ID, therefore the use of IMSI is recommended. + +For the delivery of the CC and IRI, the PDN-GW and ePDG provides correlation number and target identity to the DF2 and DF3 which is used there in order to select the different LEAs where the product shall be delivered. + +LI based on HSS reporting is a national option. Requirements on the HSS specified in clause 7A.2 and subsections apply also to the case in which non-3GPP IP access and 3GPP AAA server are based. Intercept Related Information (Events) are serving system, subscriber record change, registration termination, and location information request. + +### 12.5.1 Provision of Intercept Related Information + +#### 12.5.1.0 General + +Intercept Related Information (Events) shall be sent at attach/tunnel activation on interfaces s2b and s2c, detach/tunnel deactivation, session modification, start of interception with active tunnel, Serving Evolved Packet System. + +In case of GTPv2 based s2b, Intercept Related Information shall be sent at attach/bearer activation, detach/bearer deactivation, bearer modification and start of interception with active bearer. + +The following event is applicable to the HSS, which is a national option: + +- Serving Evolved Packet System; +- Subscriber record change; +- Registration termination; +- Location information request. + +### 12.5.1.1 X2-interface + +The following information needs to be transferred from the PDN-GW, ePDG or the HSS to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity; +- events and associated parameters as defined in clause 12.5.1.2 and 12.5.3 may be provided; +- the target location (if available) or the IAs in case of location dependent interception; (FFS) +- date/time of Location (if target location provided); +- correlation number; +- Quality of Service (QoS) information, if available; +- encryption parameters (keys and associated parameters for decrypting CC), if available and necessary. + +The PDN-GW detect packets containing packet header information in the communications path but the information needed for Packet Data Header Information reporting may need to be transferred from the PDN-GW either directly to the DF2 or via another network entity in order to allow the DF2 to perform its functionality. + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 using a reliable transport mechanism. + +### 12.5.1.2 Structure of the events + +There are several different events in which the information is sent to the DF2 if this is required. The events for interception are configurable (if they are sent to DF2) in the PDN-GW, ePDG or the HSS and can be suppressed in the DF2. + +**The following events are applicable to the PDN-GW:** + +- PMIP attach/tunnel activation; +- PMIP detach/tunnel deactivation; +- PMIP session modification; +- Start of interception with active PMIP tunnel; +- DSMIP registration/tunnel activation; +- DSMIP deregistration/tunnel deactivation; +- DSMIP session modification; +- Start of interception with active DSMIP tunnel; +- DSMIP HA Switch; +- PMIP Resource Allocation Deactivation ; +- Packet Data Header Information +- Bearer activation; +- Bearer deactivation; +- Bearer modification; +- Start of interception with active bearer. + +**The following events are applicable to the ePDG:** + +- Bearer activation; +- Bearer deactivation; + +- Bearer modification; +- Start of interception with active bearer. + +**The following events are applicable to the HSS, which is national option:** + +- Serving Evolved Packet System; + - Subscriber record change; + - Registration termination; + - Location information request. + +A set of elements as shown below can be associated with the events. The events trigger the transmission of the information from the nodes to DF2. Available IEs from this set of elements as shown below can be extended in the nodes, if this is necessary as a national option. DF2 can extend available information if this is necessary as a national option. When the GTP protocol is used over the s2b interface, elements from table 12.2.1.2 are included in the applicable events. + +**Table 12.5.1.2: Elements that are Associated to Events of Untrusted Non-3GPP IP Access Events** + +| | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI
The Network Access Identifier of the Mobile Node (target identity). | +| Observed IMSI
The IMSI of the target. | +| New observed MN NAI
The Network Access Identifier of the Mobile Node (target identity). | +| New observed IMSI
The IMSI of the target | +| Old observed IMSI of the target (if available) | +| Old observed MN NAI of the target (if available) | +| Any other IMPU or IMPI (if available) available in the diameter message associated to the target | +| Event type
Indicates which type of event is delivered: PMIP attach/tunnel activation, PMIP detach/tunnel deactivation, Start of interception with active PMIP tunnel, DSMIP registration/tunnel activation, DSMIP deregistration/tunnel deactivation, Start of interception with active DSMIP tunnel, DSMIP HA Switch, PMIP resource Allocation Deactivation, Serving Evolved Packet System, Subscriber record change, Registration termination, Location information request, Packet Data Header Information. | +| Event time
Time of the event generation in the ICE. Time stamp shall be generated relative to ICE internal clock. | +| Event date
Date of the event generation in the ICE. | +| Change Type
This indicates what has been changed (MSISDN, IMSI, or IMEI) in the Subscriber Change Record | +| Correlation number
The correlation number is used to correlate CC and IRI. | +| Network Element Identifier
Unique identifier for the ICE reporting the event. | +| Logical Function Information
Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lifetime
Indicates the lifetime of the tunnel; shall be set to a nonzero value in the case of registration or lifetime extension; is set to zero in case of deregistration. | +| Failed attach reason
Reason for the failed attach/tunnel deactivation of the target. | +| Session modification failure reason
Reason for a failure of a session modification attempt for the target | +| Access technology type
Indicates the Radio Access Type. | +| Handover indicator
Provides information on whether the triggered as part of a handover. | +| APN
The Access Point Name used for the connection. | +| UE address info
Includes one or more IP addresses allocated to the UE. | +| Additional Parameters
Additional information provided by the UE, such as protocol configuration options. | +| Home Agent address
Contains the IP address of the Home Agent. | +| Care of Address
The Local IP address assigned to the UE by the Access Network, used as Care of Address for DSMIPv6 over S2c reference point. | +| HSS/AAA address
The address of the HSS/AAA triggering the PDN-GW reallocation. | +| Target PDN-GW address
The address of the PDN-GW which the UE will be reallocated to. | +| Revocation trigger
Contains the cause for the revocation procedure. | +| Foreign domain address
The relevant IP address in the foreign domain. | +| Visited network identifier
An identifier that allows the home network to identify the visited network TS 29.273 [24]. | +| Requested IPv6 Home Prefix
The IPv6 Home Prefix requested by the UE. | +| IPv6 home prefix
The IPv6 home prefix assigned by the PDN GW to the UE. | +| Home address
Contains the UE Home IP address. | + +| | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Destination IP Address
The IP address, including type IPv4 or IPv6, of the destination of the IP packet. | +| Destination Port Number
The port number of the destination of the IP packet. | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only)
The field in the IPv6 header that is used by a source to label packets of a flow (see RFC 3697 [41]). | +| Packet Count
The number of packets detected and reported (for a particular summary period). | +| Packet Data Summary Reason
The reason for a Packet Data Summary message being sent to the LEMF (e.g., timed out, counter expiration, end of session) | +| Packet Size
The size of the packet. (i.e., Total Length Field in IPv4 or Payload Length field in IPv6) | +| Source IP Address
The IP address, including type IPv4 or IPv6, of the source of the IP packet. | +| Source Port Number
The port number of the source of the IP packet. | +| Sum of Packet Sizes (for a particular summary period)
The sum of values contained in the Total Length fields of the IPv4 packets or the sum of the values contained in the Payload Length fields of the IPv6 packets. | +| Summary Period
Includes the dates and times of the first and last packets in a particular packet data interval. | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP)
The identification of the transport protocol of the packet or packet flow being reported. | +| Any User-Data (AVP Name): any change in the profile and identities of the target (if available in the Diameter message) | +| Any Associated-Identities (AVP Name): any change of any associated identities of the target | +| Request direction : Information if the serving node is requesting to the HSS, or requested by the HSS. | +| Other update: carrier specific of target's data that are in the intercepted diameter messages | +| Other Public User Identities
Other IMPU or IMPI that was allocated to Target and will be deregistered (if available) | +| Requesting node identifier (I CSCF; AS) that are interfaced directly in the HSS and transmitting a diameter message from a network | +| Requesting network node identifier such as IP-SM-GW Id, GMSC Id, SGSN Id, MME Id GMLC Id (country identifier is included in such request) that are in the different diameter messages related to location request for information (to route the right SMS or Call attempt, or GMLC based location request, to the right node on which is attached the target.) | +| Requesting node type (IP-SM-GW AS, GMSC, SGSN, MME, GMLC) (if available) | + +## 12.5.2 X3-interface + +The access method for the delivering of PDN-GW and/or ePDG Intercept Product is based on duplication of packets without modification at the intercepting node. The duplicated packets with additional information in a header are sent to DF3 for further delivery to the LEA. + +![Diagram illustrating the configuration for interception of PDN-GW, ePDG product data. A box labeled 'Duplication of packets' contains a 'party' label and a dashed box representing a packet. An arrow points from this box to a junction. From the junction, one arrow points horizontally to the right, representing the original data flow. Another arrow points vertically downwards, representing the duplicated data flow. A third arrow points diagonally downwards and to the right, representing another duplicated data flow.](8fce89f02626b8a0c50e2245bc3e7ce7_img.jpg) + +Diagram illustrating the configuration for interception of PDN-GW, ePDG product data. A box labeled 'Duplication of packets' contains a 'party' label and a dashed box representing a packet. An arrow points from this box to a junction. From the junction, one arrow points horizontally to the right, representing the original data flow. Another arrow points vertically downwards, representing the duplicated data flow. A third arrow points diagonally downwards and to the right, representing another duplicated data flow. + +**Figure 12.5.2.1: Configuration for interception of PDN-GW, ePDG product data** + +In addition to the intercepted content of communication, the following information needs to be transferred from the PDN-GW and/or ePDG to the DF3 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity; +- correlation number; +- time stamp (optional); +- direction (indicates whether T-PDU is MO or MT) - optional; +- the target location (if available) or the IAs in case of location dependent interception; +- date/time of Location (if target location provided); + +NOTE: Location dependent interception for EPC is FFS. + +## 12.5.3 LI events for untrusted Non-3GPP IP access + +### 12.5.3.1 Initial Attach and PDN connection activation with PMIPv6 on S2b + +In the VPLMN, LI shall be done at the ePDG according to LI requirements for I-WLAN; no additional requirement applies to the S-GW for this case. + +NOTE: WLAN Interworking specifications (TS 23.234 [14], TS 24.234 [17] and TS 29.234 [16]) are no longer maintained for Release 12 onwards. This clause is therefore no longer maintained for WLAN Interworking. + +When the attach or PDN connectivity activation is detected over PMIP at the PDN-GW, a **PMIP attach/tunnel activation** event shall be generated. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Logical Function Information | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Lifetime | +| Failed attach reason | +| Access Technology Type | +| Handoff Indicator | +| APN | +| UE Address Info | +| Additional Parameters | + +### 12.5.3.2 Initial attach and PDN connection activation for S2c in untrusted non-3GPP IP access + +In the VPLMN, LI shall be done at the ePDG according to LI requirements for PDG for I-WLAN. + +NOTE: WLAN Interworking specifications (TS 23.234 [14], TS 24.234 [17] and TS 29.234 [16]) are no longer maintained for Release 12 onwards. This clause is therefore no longer maintained for WLAN Interworking. + +When the attach or PDN connectivity activation is detected over DS-MIPv6 at the PDN-GW, a **DSMIP registration/tunnel activation** event shall be generated. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Lifetime | +| Failed attach reason | +| Home address | +| Care of Address | +| APN | +| Requested IPv6 Home Prefix | + +### 12.5.3.3 UE/ePDG-initiated Detach Procedure and UE Requested PDN disconnection with PMIP + +In the VPLMN, LI shall be done at the ePDG according to LI requirements for PDG for I-WLAN; no additional requirement applies to the S-GW for this case. + +NOTE: WLAN Interworking specifications (TS 23.234 [14], TS 24.234 [17] and TS 29.234 [16]) are no longer maintained for Release 12 onwards. This clause is therefore no longer maintained for WLAN Interworking. + +When the detach or UE requested PDN disconnection is detected over PMIP at the PDN-GW, a **PMIP detach/tunnel deactivation** event shall be generated. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| APN | + +### 12.5.3.4 Detach and PDN Disconnection for S2c in Un-trusted Non-3GPP IP access + +In the VPLMN, LI shall be done at the ePDG according to LI requirements for PDG for I-WLAN. + +When the detach or PDN disconnection is detected over DS-MIPv6 at the PDN-GW, a **DSMIP deregistration/tunnel deactivation** event shall be generated. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Home address | +| Logical Function Information | +| Initiator | +| Care of Address | + +### 12.5.3.5 Serving Evolved Packet System + +The Serving Evolved Packet System report event is generated at the HSS, when the HSS has detected that the target has roamed. Such events could be mainly triggered by Diameter messages such as: + +- Through SWx interface, Server-Assignment-Request in case of command of 3GPP AAA to HSS (see clause A of TS 29 273 [24], and clause 5 of GSMA IR.61 [65]). + +The elements of table 12.5.3.5 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 12.5.3.5: Information Elements for Serving Evolved Packet Event** + +| | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Identity | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Visited Network Identifier (for example, AVP name such as Visited-PLMN-Id) | + +### 12.5.3.6 Start of interception with active tunnel/bearer + +When interception is started at the PDN-GW/ePDG and the target has an already active tunnel/bearer, a start of interception with active tunnel/bearer shall be generated. The event shall be detected by the same node for which tunnel/bearer activation reporting is applicable and reported. Separate events are defined for the specific protocol (PMIP, DSMIP, GTP). When the GTP protocol is used for the s2b interface, the event Start of interception with active bearer is applicable as specified in section 12.2.3.6. The parameter applicable to the tunnel activation event, as defined in the related sections, will be delivered to the DF2 if available. One event shall be sent for each active tunnel. + +### 12.5.3.7 PDN-GW reallocation upon initial attach on s2c + +When a PDN GW reallocation procedure is detected by the PDN-GW, a **DSMIP HA Switch event** shall be generated. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Date | +| Event Time | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| HSS/AAA address | +| Target PDN-GW address | + +### 12.5.3.8 PDN GW initiated Resource Allocation Deactivation with S2b PMIP + +When a PDN GW initiated resource allocation deactivation is detected, a **PMIP Resource Allocation Deactivation** event shall be sent. The following elements will be delivered to DF2 if available: + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Date | +| Event Time | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Revocation trigger | +| UE address info | +| Correlation number | + +### 12.5.3.9 PMIP session modification + +In the VPLMN, LI shall be done at the ePDG according to LI requirements for PDG for I-WLAN; no additional requirement applies to the S-GW for this case. + +NOTE: WLAN Interworking specifications (TS 23.234 [14], TS 24.234 [17] and TS 29.234 [16]) are no longer maintained for Release 12 onwards. This clause is therefore no longer maintained for WLAN Interworking. + +When a session modification is detected at the PDN-GW, a **PMIP session modification** event shall be generated by the PDN-GW. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|-------------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Correlation number | +| Lifetime | +| UE Address Info | +| Access Technology Type | +| Additional Parameters | +| Session failure modification reason | +| Handover indicator | + +### 12.5.3.10 DSMIP session modification + +In the VPLMN, LI shall be done at the ePDG according to LI requirements for PDG for I-WLAN. + +NOTE: WLAN Interworking specifications (TS 23.234 [14], TS 24.234 [17] and TS 29.234 [16]) are no longer maintained for Release 12 onwards. This clause is therefore no longer maintained for WLAN Interworking. + +When the session modification is detected over DS-MIPv6 at the PDN-GW, a **DSMIP session modification** event shall be generated. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|-------------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Lifetime | +| Session failure modification reason | +| Home address | +| Care of Address | +| APN | +| Requested IPv6 Home Prefix | + +## 12.5.3.11 Packet Data Header Information + +### 12.5.3.11.0 General + +Packet Data Header Information reporting can be done either on a per-packet (i.e., non-summarized) basis or in a summary report. + +### 12.5.3.11.1 Packet Data Header Report + +This event is used to provide packet header reports on a per packet basis (non-summarized reporting) and is triggered by each packet sent or received by the target. These elements will be delivered by the PDN-GW either directly to the DF2 or via another network entity if available: + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation number | +| Logical Function Information | +| Lifetime | +| UE Address Info | +| Access Technology Type | +| Serving Network | +| Home address | +| Care of Address | +| APN | +| Location information | +| Source IP Address | +| Source Port Number | +| Destination IP Address | +| Destination Port Number | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP) | +| Packet Size | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only) | + +### 12.5.3.11.2 Packet Data Summary Report + +This event is used to report: + +- 1) the source and destination information derived from the packet headers, including: + - a) source and destination IP Addresses, + - b) IP next-layer protocol, + - c) Layer-4 ports, and + - d) Flow label, if the packet is IPv6 +- 2) summary information for the number of packets and bytes transmitted or received by the target for each unique packet flow within an EPS bearer, and +- 3) the date and the time of the first and last packets associated with that packet flow. A packet flow is defined as the 6-tuple of source/destination IP address/port number and the layer 4 protocol and EPS bearer. + +IP addresses and the IP next-layer protocol are always reported, the flow label is reported if the packet is IPv6, and the layer-4 ports are reported. + +The event provides packet summary reports for each unique packet data session (EPS bearer) and packet flow, and is triggered by one of the following: + +- start of a packet flow associated with an EPS bearer +- an interim report for a packet flow associated with an EPS bearer is to be reported +- end of a packet flow associated with an EPS bearer (including end of the EPS bearer itself). + +An interim report can be triggered by + +- The expiration of a configurable timer per intercept (called a Summary Timer). The Summary Timer is configurable in units of seconds; +- A per-intercept configurable count threshold is reached. + +These elements will be delivered either directly to DF2 or via DF3 for each packet flow if available: + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------| +| Observed MN NAI | +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Correlation number | +| Lifetime | +| UE Address Info | +| Access Technology Type | +| Serving Network | +| Home address | +| Care of Address | +| APN | +| Location information | +| Source IP Address | +| Source Port Number | +| Destination IP Address | +| Destination Port Number | +| Transport Protocol (e.g., TCP) | +| Flow Label (IPv6 only) | +| Summary Period | +| Packet Count (for this summary period) | +| Sum of Packet Sizes (for this summary period) | + +If the packets are IPv4, the sum of all observed packet sizes is the sum of the values contained in the Total Length field of each packet as specified in IETF RFC 791[39]. + +If the packet is IPv6, the sum of all observed packet sizes is the sum of the values contained in the Payload Length field for each packet as specified in IETF RFC 2460 [40]. + +If no packets were detected for the duration of the Summary Timer, then the Packet Data Summary Report shall not be sent. + +### 12.5.3.12 Bearer activation + +When the Attach is handled by the ePDG over the GTP based s2b interface (TS 23.402 [23]), or the Dedicated bearer activation on the GTP based S2b interface (TS 23.402 [23]) is detected by the ePDG, or a Bearer activation is detected at the PDN-GW, a **Bearer activation** event shall be generated. The elements listed in section 12.2.3.3 will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +### 12.5.3.13 Bearer deactivation + +When the Detach is handled by the ePDG over GTP S2b interface (TS 23.402 [23]), or a Bearer deactivation is detected at the PDN-GW, or the PDN GW initiated Resource Allocation Deactivation is detected by the ePDG on GTP based s2b interface, a **Bearer deactivation** event shall be generated. The elements listed in section 12.2.3.4 will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +### 12.5.3.14 Bearer modification + +When a Bearer Modification is handled by the ePDG over GTP S2b interface (TS 23.402 [23]), or a Bearer modification is detected at the PDN-GW, a **Bearer modification** event shall be generated. The elements listed in section 12.2.3.5 will be delivered by the ePDG to the DF2 if available. + +### 12.5.3.15 HSS subscriber record change + +This event will be only used to report when there is a change of association between IMSI, MSISDN or IMEI of the target. It is induced mainly by Subscriber Profile management by the HSS or the CSP administration tools through the HSS. + +Such events could be mainly triggered by Diameter messages such as: + +- Through SWx interface, -Push-Profile-Request (PPR) in case of command of HSS to 3GPP AAA Server: see clause A of TS 29.273 [24]. + +The elements of table 12.5.3.15 will be delivered to DF2, if available. + +**Table 12.5.3.15: Information Elements for Subscriber Record Change Event** + +| | +|----------------------------------------| +| New observed MSISDN | +| New observed IMSI | +| New Observed IMEI (if available) | +| Old observed MSISDN | +| Old observed IMSI | +| Old observed IMEI (if available) | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HSS id...) | +| Change Type (MSISDN, IMSI or IMEI) | +| Other update: carrier specific. | + +### 12.5.3.16 Registration Termination + +This event "Registration Termination" will be used to report to DF2 when HSS send to 3GPP AAA Server It is the equivalent of cancel location or purge to serving system in CS domain. This kind of event is induced by the registration of the target. + +The event will be triggered by the following Diameter messages: + +- Through SWx interface, Server-Assignment-Request indicating deregistration from 3GPP AAA Server to HSS: see clause A of TS 29.273 [24]; +- Through SWx interface, Registration-Termination- Request from HSS to 3GPP AAA Server: see clause A of TS 29.273 [24]. + +The following elements of table 12.5.3.16 such as the previous serving system of the target will be delivered to DF2. + +**Table 12.5.3.16: Information Elements for Registration Termination Event** + +| | +|---------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HSS Id...) | +| Previous serving system identifier (if available) | + +### 12.5.3.17 Location Information request + +This event will be used to report any location information request on the target by a node to HSS, when the target is connected to trusted non-3GPP IP access. A location information request could be generated by an IP-SM-GW AS (as an SMS Centre) or GMSC or SGSN or MME from another Network through a diameter request transmitted by either an AS or the I CSCF of the home network to the HSS of the target. The event will be triggered by the following Diameter messages: + +- Through Sh interface, User Data Request with content related to update location from AS to HSS, see clause A.2 of TS 29.328 [63] and TS 29.329 [66]; +- Through Cx interface, Location Info Request from I CSCF to HSS; see clause A.2 of TS 29.228 [62]. + +The elements of table 12.5.3.17, observed IMSI, MSISDN, the identifier of the requesting node type and network, will be delivered to DF2, if available. + +**Table 12.5.3.17: Information Elements for Location Information Request Event** + +| | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Requesting network identifier such as PLMN Id (country identifier included), | +| Requesting node type (IP-SM-GW AS, GMSC, SGSN, MME, GMLC) | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HSS id...) | + +## 12.6 Functional requirements for LI in case of Handovers between E-UTRAN and CDMA2000 Accesses. + +When an handover is performed from CDMA2000 Access to E-UTRAN, the MME shall intercept the attach event received from the HRPD AN based on IMSI. + +Interception at S-GW and PDN-GW shall be done according to the requirements given in section 12.2 or 12.3 and related subsections, depending on the protocol used over the S5/S8 interface. + +## 12.7 Functional requirements for LI in case of interworking between SGSN and EPS nodes over S4/S12 interfaces + +The SGSN and the HSS are subjected to the requirements applicable to these nodes for PS interception, as specified throughout this document. + +The S-GW is subjected to the requirements specified in section 12.2 and subsections. The applicable events shall be reported also when received from the SGSN over S4 interface. CC shall be also reported when received over S4/S12 interfaces. The network procedures for which the events applicable to the S-GW, defined in section 12.2 and subsections, are generated when the S-GW is connected over S4/S12 interfaces to a SGSN are defined in TS 23.060 [10]. + +The PDN-GW is subjected to the requirements specified in section 12.2 or 12.3 and related subsections, depending on the protocol used on S5/S8 interfaces, which are applicable also to the case in which the PDN-GW is involved for a target for which a S4 based SGSN is used. + +## 12.8 Functional requirements for LI in case of interworking between SGSN and PDN-GW over Gn/Gp interfaces + +According to TS 23.060 [10] and TS 23.401 [22] a PDN-GW may provide a Gn/Gp interface for interworking with the SGSN. When this interface is provided, from LI perspective the PDN-GW acts as a GGSN towards the involved SGSN. In this case, in addition to the requirements specified in this clause, all the requirements specified by this document for the GGSN are applicable to the PDN-GW. + +The PDN-GW shall use the same correlation number in records when the PDP context/EPS bearer modification signalling is detected due to the handover between different accesses involving a Gn/Gp interface (i.e. from E-UTRAN to 2G/3G and vice versa). After the handover, the PDN-GW shall report the events applicable to the new access and continue to use the same correlation number inside the same PDP context/EPS bearer. + +The SGSN is subjected to the requirements applicable to this node for PS interception, as specified throughout this document. + +## 12.9 Functional Requirements for LI in case of Control and User Plane Separation + +### 12.9.1 Background + +As defined in 3GPP TS 23.214 [75], the Serving Gateway and PDN Gateway may have separated control plane and user plane functions. The control plane (CP) functions (Serving Gateway-C and PDN Gateway-C) provide the traffic forwarding rules (referred to as Forward Action Rules in 3GPP TS 23.214 [75]) to the user plane (UP) functions (Serving Gateway-U and PDN Gateway-U). The UP functions forward the user plane traffic as per the Forward Action Rules. + +As defined in subclause 12.1 of the present document, the Serving Gateway and PDN Gateway provide the LI functions for the EPC packet data interception. As defined in subclause 15.2, a PDN Gateway can also provide the CC Intercept Function for an IMS-based VoLTE. As defined in clause 20, the BBIFF functions of an S8HR LI functions may be implemented within a Serving Gateway. Therefore, the LI functions available in the Serving Gateway and PDN Gateway shall be carried over to the split Serving Gateway and PDN Gateway with the new CUPS architecture. + +### 12.9.2 LI Architecture with CUPS + +#### 12.9.2.1 Overview + +The LI architecture for EPC packet data interception with CUPS is depicted in figure 12.1.4. + +With CUPS, all the signalling related interfaces (i.e., control plane data) terminate at the Serving Gateway C and PDN Gateway-C. Therefore, the IRI related LI functions provided within a Serving Gateway and PDN Gateway for EPC packet data interception shall be provided by the Serving Gateway-C and PDN Gateway-C respectively. The X2 reference point terminates at the Serving Gateway-C and PDN Gateway-C. + +With CUPS, user plane data pass through the Serving Gateway-U and PDN Gateway-U. Therefore, the duplication of user plane data to support the CC interception for EPC packet data shall be done at the Serving Gateway-U and PDN Gateway-U. A new LI specific functional element referred to as Split X3 LI Interworking Function (SX3LIF) is defined. + +NOTE 1: The SX3LIF can be co-located with a UP function or a CP function or can be a standalone point. + +The UP function duplicates the user plane packets of the traffic to be intercepted (identified by the packet detection rules) as instructed by the CP function and then sends the duplicated user plane packets to the SX3LIF over the X3u reference point. The CP function also provides the forwarding action rules to the UP function which enables the UP function to determine how to send the duplicated user plane packets over the X3u reference point to the SX3LIF. The CP function provides the intercept control information (such as correlation identifier, target identity, and intercepted packet identification rules) to the SX3LIF over the X3c reference point. The SX3LIF receives the user plane packets from the UP function (over the X3u reference point), associates the user plane packets to the target interception based on the intercept related information that it received from the CP function (over the X3c reference point) and then delivers the CC to the DF3 over the X3 reference point. + +NOTE 2: The present document defines an LI architecture for CUPS where CUPS has been applied to single operator PLMN. + +Figure 12.1.4 also shows an X2 reference point between SX3LIF and DF2. Only the IRI events that require access to the user plane packets (e.g. packet data header information) are passed on this X2 reference point from SX3LIF to DF2. In an alternate option, when such IRI events are generated by the DF3, this X2 reference point between SX3LIF and DF2 is not necessary. + +Figure 12.1.4 also shows an X1\_1 reference point between ADMF and the SX3LIF. This reference point is used to provide the DF2 address and DF3 address to the SX3LIF. Provision of DF2 address is required only when the IRI events that require access to the user plane packets are generated by the SX3LIF. + +#### 12.9.2.2 Packet detection rules + +The packet detection rules allow the UP function to determine which user plane packets are duplicated and sent to the SX3LIF. + +NOTE: The packet detection rules may be different for Serving Gateway-U and PDN Gateway-U. For example, the packet detection Rules for a Serving Gateway-U may be based on the GTP tunnel Id of the bearer from which the user plane packets are to be duplicated and forwarded to SX3LIF. The Packet detection rules for a PDN Gateway-U may be based e.g. on the UE IP address sent to, received from, which the user plane packets are to be duplicated and forwarded to SX3LIF. + +#### 12.9.2.3 Forwarding action rules + +The forwarding action rules indicate how the UP function is to forward the duplicated packets to the SX3LIF over the X3u reference point. The information such as the destination IP address at the SX3LIF and the GTP tunnel Id of the tunnel toward which the duplicated packets are sent on the X3u reference point may be part of the forwarding action rules. + +#### 12.9.2.4 Intercepted packet identification rules + +The intercepted packet identification rules allow the SX3LIF to identify and associate the user plane packets received over the X3u reference point to the target intercept information. Part of the forwarding action rules (e.g. the information such as destination IP address of X3u tunnel, GTP tunnel Id of the X3u tunnel), target identity and correlation identifier are part of the intercepted packet identification rules. + +The SX3LIF uses the IP address and the GTP tunnel Id of the tunnel on the X3u reference point to associate the received user plane packets with the target intercept information that it receives from the CP function over X3c reference point. + +### 12.9.3 Provision of Content of Communications + +#### 12.9.3.1 Interception for Serving Gateway + +When the CC interception is required and is to be done at the Serving Gateway, the Serving Gateway-C shall send/activate the following information to the Serving Gateway-U: + +- Packet detection rules as described in subclause 12.9.2.2 +- Forwarding action rules as described in 12.9.2.3 +- An indication to perform the packet duplication and forward the same to the SX3LIF. + +In addition, the Serving Gateway-C shall send the following information to the SX3LIF: + +- target identity +- correlation identifier +- Intercepted packet identification rules as described in subclause 12.9.2.4. + +The Serving Gateway-U shall identify the user plane packets as per the packet detection rules (subclause 12.9.2.2) and shall forward the packets to the SX3LIF over the X3u reference point as per the forwarding action rules (subclause 12.9.2.3). The SX3LIF shall associate the user plane packets to the target interception as per the intercepted packet identification rules and shall deliver the CC to DF3 over the X3 reference point as defined in the subclause 12.2.2 and subclause 12.4.2. + +#### 12.9.3.2 Interception for PDN Gateway + +When the CC interception is required and is to be done at the PDN Gateway, the PDN Gateway-C shall/activate send the following information to the PDN Gateway-U. + +- Packet detection rules as described in 12.9.2.2 +- Forwarding action rules as described in 12.9.2.3 +- An indication to perform the packet duplication and forward the same to the SX3LIF. + +In addition, the PDN Gateway-C shall send the following information to the SX3LIF: + +- target identity +- correlation identifier +- Intercepted packet identification rules as described in 12.9.2.4. + +The PDN Gateway-U shall identify the user plane packets as per the packet detection rules (subclause 12.9.2.2) and shall forward the packets to the SX3LIF over the X3u reference point as per the forwarding action rules (subclause 12.9.2.3). The SX3LIF shall associate the user plane packets to the target interception as per the intercepted packet identification rules and shall deliver the CC to DF3 over the X3 reference point as defined subclause 12.4.2 and subclause 12.5.2. + +### 12.9.4 Provision of Intercept Related Information + +#### 12.9.4.1 Interception at the Serving Gateway + +When the IRI interception is to be done at the Serving Gateway, the Serving Gateway-C shall deliver the IRI over the X2 reference point to DF2 as defined in subclause 12.2.3, and subclause 12.4.3. + +When the IRI events are to be generated from the user plane packets, the Serving Gateway-C shall provide the information to the Serving Gateway-U as it does for the CC interception in accordance to 12.9.3.1. The IRI event that requires access to the user plane packets (e.g. packet data header information) can be generated in one of the following + +two ways: + +- Serving Gateway-C informing the SX3LIF to generate the IRI events that require access to the user plane packets (e.g. packet data header information), and SX3LIF delivering the IRI events that require access to the user plane packets (e.g. packet data header information) to the DF2 +- DF3 generating the IRI event based on the user plane packets and then delivering the event to the DF2. + +When the second approach (i.e. DF3-based) is used, SX3LIF does not require to support the X2 reference point. + +#### 12.9.4.2 Interception at the PDN Gateway + +When the IRI interception is to be done at the PDN Gateway, the PDN Gateway-C shall deliver the IRI over the X2 reference point to DF2 as defined in subclause 12.2.3, subclause 12.3.3, subclause 12.4.3 and subclause 12.5.3. + +When the IRI events are to be generated from the user plane packets, the PDN Gateway-C shall provide the information to the PDN Gateway-U as it does for the CC interception in accordance to 12.9.3.2. The IRI event that requires access to the user plane packets (e.g. packet data header information) can be generated in one of the following two ways: + +- PDN Gateway-C informing the SX3LIF to generate the IRI events that require access to the user plane packets (e.g. packet data header information), and SX3LIF delivering the IRI events that require access to the user plane packets (e.g. packet data header information) to the DF2 +- DF3 generating the IRI event based on the user plane packets and then delivering the event to the DF2. + +When the second approach (i.e. DF3-based) is used, SX3LIF does not require to support the X2 reference point. + +# --- 13 Lawful Interception for 3GPP H(e)NBs + +## 13.0 General + +Home Node B (HNB) and Home enhanced Node B (HeNB) are jointly referred to as H(e)NB as defined in TS 22.220 [31]. As identified in TS 33.106 [7], lawful interception for 3GPP H(e)NBs can be based on three different targets: a target accessing a H(e)NB, a target CSG of a H(e)NB, and a target H(e)NB. + +LI for a target CSG is FFS. + +LI for a target H(e)NB is FFS. + +LI for Local IP Access (LIPA) via a H(e)NB is FFS. + +## 13.1 Provision of Intercepted Content of Communications for 3GPP H(e)NBs + +The access method for the delivery of intercepted content of communications (CC) is based on duplication of packets without modification. + +See clause 13.4 for UMTS HNB specifics and 13.5 for HeNB specifics. + +NOTE: In the case where the UE is the target of intercept, from the perspective of the core network, a H(e)NB is treated the same as a NodeB or eNodeB for CC interception purposes (i.e., no additional LI functionality is required). + +## 13.2 Provision of Intercept Related Information for 3GPP H(e)NBs + +### 13.2.1 X2-interface + +The following information needs to be transferred to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity (IMSI, IMEI, MSISDN, ME Id); +- events and associated parameters as defined in sections 13.4.3 may be provided; + +- the H(e)NB location (if available); +- date/time of H(e)NB location (if H(e)NB location provided); +- H(e)NB ID. + +H(e)NB location information needs to be transferred from the location verifying nodes per TS 33.320 [34]to the DF2 in order to allow the DF2 to perform its functionality. The manner that the location verifying node provides the DF2 with the H(e)NB location is outside the scope of this document. + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 using a reliable transport mechanism. + +## 13.33GPP H(e)NB LI Events and Event Information + +For a target UE that is attached to any H(e)NB, LI events and messages for 3GPP H(e)NBs defined in this clause shall be reported in addition to the LI events and messages defined in other clauses of this document. H(e)NB LI events and event information are included in 13.4 for UMTS HNBs and 13.5 for HeNBs. + +A set of possible elements as shown below is used to generate the events. Information associated with the events is transmitted from the IRI ICES to DF2. + +**Table 13: Information Events for H(e)NB Event Records** + +| Element | Definition/Usage | +|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Cause | Reason for an error or an action | +| Context-Id | Unique identifier for a UE used by the HNB and HNB GW. | +| CSG Identity | Uniquely identifies a CSG within one PLMN. Note: Open H(e)NBs do not have associated CSGs. | +| CSG List | Identifies the membership of a given CSG (i.e., CSG Identities and associated expiration data for the UEs). | +| Destination cell ID | Resultant cell ID after handover (HNB ID or PLMN cell ID) | +| Event type | Description which type of event is delivered | +| Event date | Date of the event generation | +| Event time | Time of the event generation. | +| Handover Direction | Identifies if the handover is inbound (from macro network to H(e)NB), outbound (from H(e)NB to macro network) or intra-H(e)NB (between H(e)NBs). | +| H(e)NB Identity | Uniquely identifies a H(e)NB (i.e., H(e)NB equipment ID and H(e)NB name) | +| H(e)NB IP Address | Reports the location of the H(e)NB used during location verification.. | +| H(e)NB Location | When authorized, reports the location of the H(e)NB used during location verification prior to H(e)NB activation. | +| H(e)NB Time of Location | Date/Time of H(e)NB location. The time when location was obtained by the location source node. | +| IAs | The observed Interception Areas | +| Initiator | The initiator of an action (e.g., network or specific network entity, target, associate) | +| ISP Operator Identity | Identifies the ISP through which the H(e)NB is connected to the SeGW | +| Network Identifier | Unique identifier for the operator and the element carrying out the LI operations | +| Observed MSISDN | MSISDN of the target. | +| Observed IMSI | IMSI of the target. | +| Observed IMEI | IMEI of the target. | +| Observed ME Id | ME Id of the target; when it coincides with the IMEI, it shall be checked for each activation over the radio interface | +| Security Gateway IP Address | The IP Address of the Security Gateway used by the H(e)NB to terminate the tunnel from the H(e)NB | +| Source Cell ID | Original cell ID prior to handover (HNB ID or PLMN cell ID) | +| Tunnel Protocol | The tunnel protocol used between the H(e)NB and the SeGW | + +## 13.4 UMTS Home Node B (HNB) + +### 13.4.0 General + +Figures 13-1 shows the reference architectures upon which Lawful Interception for 3GPP HNBs is based. + +![Figure 13-1: 3GPP UMTS HNB Architecture Basis for Lawful Interception. The diagram shows a 'Target ProSe UE A' connected via 'Signalling' to a 'ProSe Function or PKMF'. The 'ProSe Function or PKMF' is connected via an 'X2 interface' to a 'DF2'. The 'DF2' is connected via an 'HI2' to a 'LEMF'. Additionally, 'ProSe UE B' and 'ProSe UE C' are connected via 'Communication' to 'Target ProSe UE A'.](997233d405f0d4b89ddeb7683e047f66_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + Target[Target ProSe UE A] <--> Signalling[ProSe Function or PKMF] + Signalling -- X2 interface --> DF2[DF2] + DF2 -- HI2 --> LEMF[LEMF] + UE_B[ProSe UE B] <--> Communication[ProSe UE C] + Communication --> Target + +``` + +Figure 13-1: 3GPP UMTS HNB Architecture Basis for Lawful Interception. The diagram shows a 'Target ProSe UE A' connected via 'Signalling' to a 'ProSe Function or PKMF'. The 'ProSe Function or PKMF' is connected via an 'X2 interface' to a 'DF2'. The 'DF2' is connected via an 'HI2' to a 'LEMF'. Additionally, 'ProSe UE B' and 'ProSe UE C' are connected via 'Communication' to 'Target ProSe UE A'. + +**Figure 13-1: 3GPP UMTS HNB Architecture Basis for Lawful Interception** + +### 13.4.1 Intercepted Content of Communications for 3GPP UMTS HNBs + +*Editor's note: This section is a place holder for the scenarios where the target of interception is either a CSG or a HNB.* + +### 13.4.2 Intercept Related Information + +#### 13.4.2.0 General + +Figures 13-2 show the transfer of intercept related information to the DF2. + +![Figure 13-2: Provision of Intercept Related Information for 3GPP UMTS HNB. The diagram shows a 'Target' connected to an 'HPLMN-I ProSe Function', which is connected to a 'Delivery Function 2'. The 'Delivery Function 2' is connected via a dashed line to a 'LEMF'. Below the 'Target' is an 'Other subscriber' connected to an 'HPLMN-O ProSe Function'. The 'HPLMN-O ProSe Function' is connected to the 'HPLMN-I ProSe Function'.](e2c1c672349c10dccb2563eff6d8260e_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + Target[Target] <--> HPLMN_I[HPLMN-I ProSe Function] + HPLMN_I --> DF2[Delivery Function 2] + DF2 -.-> LEMF[LEMF] + OtherSub[Other subscriber] <--> HPLMN_O[HPLMN-O ProSe Function] + HPLMN_O <--> HPLMN_I + Target <--> OtherSub + +``` + +Figure 13-2: Provision of Intercept Related Information for 3GPP UMTS HNB. The diagram shows a 'Target' connected to an 'HPLMN-I ProSe Function', which is connected to a 'Delivery Function 2'. The 'Delivery Function 2' is connected via a dashed line to a 'LEMF'. Below the 'Target' is an 'Other subscriber' connected to an 'HPLMN-O ProSe Function'. The 'HPLMN-O ProSe Function' is connected to the 'HPLMN-I ProSe Function'. + +**Figure 13-2: Provision of Intercept Related Information for 3GPP UMTS HNB** + +#### 13.4.2.1 X2-interface + +The following information needs to be transferred from the HNB GW to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity (IMSI, IMEI, MSISDN, ME Id); +- events and associated parameters as defined in section 13.4.3 may be provided; +- the HNB location (if available); +- date/time of HNB location (if HNB location provided); + +- HNB Identity. + +HNB location information needs to be transferred from the location verifying node to the DF2 in order to allow the DF2 to perform its functionality. + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 using a reliable transport mechanism. + +### 13.4.3 3GPP UMTS HNB LI Events and Event Information + +The following events are applicable at the HNB GW: + +- Target UE Registration to HNB; +- Target UE De-Registration from HNB; +- Start of Interception with HNB attached UE; +- Target UE HNB Handover. + +A set of possible elements used to generate the events is found in clause 13.3 in Table 13. Information associated with the events is transmitted from the HNB GW to DF2. + +### 13.4.4 Structure of HNB Events + +#### 13.4.4.1 Target UE Registration to HNB + +This event reports when a target UE is attempting to register to any HNB. This event is generated when + +- a HNB GW sends a UE REGISTRATION ACCEPT message towards a target UE, or +- a HNB GW sends a UE REGISTRATION REJECT message towards a target UE, or +- a HNB GW receives an SCCP Connection Confirm (CC) or Connection Refused (CREF) messages from the Core Network + +The elements, shown in Table 13a, will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 13a: UE Registration to HNB** + +| | +|------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Identifier | +| Context-ID (for successful connection) | +| H(e)NB Identity | +| H(e)NB Location | +| H(e)NB Time of Location | +| H(e)NB IP Address | +| Security Gateway IP address | +| Tunnel Protocol | +| ISP Operator Identity | +| Cause (of failed connection, e.g., "Refusal Cause" of SCCP CREF) | +| CSG Identity (if closed/hybrid HNB) | +| CSG List (if closed/hybrid HNB) - See Note 1 | +| IAIs (if applicable) | + +NOTE: In a HNB GW, the CSG List is the Access Control List. + +#### 13.4.4.2 Target UE De-Registration from HNB + +This event reports a when a target UE is de-registered to any HNB. This event is generated when + +- a HNB GW receives a UE DE-REGISTER message from the HNB, or +- a HNB GW receives a RANAP Release Iu Connection Command message from the Core Network + +The elements, shown in Table 13b, will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 13b: UE De-Registration from HNB** + +| | +|---------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed ME Id | +| CSG Identity (if closed or hybrid H(e)NB) | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Identifier | +| H(e)NB Identity | +| H(e)NB Location | +| H(e)NB Time of Location | +| Initiator (i.e., HNB or Network) | +| Cause (of de-registration action, if known) | +| IArs (if applicable) | + +#### 13.4.4.3 Start of Intercept with HNB attached UE + +This event will be generated if interception for a target UE is started when the target UE has already registered and is receiving service from a HNB. The elements, shown in Table 13c, will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 13c: Start of Intercept with Target UE active on a HNB** + +| | +|-------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed ME Id | +| H(e)NB Identity | +| CSG Identity (if closed or hybrid H(e)NB) | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Identifier | +| H(e)NB IP Address | +| Security Gateway IP address | +| Tunnel Protocol | +| ISP Operator Identity | +| CSG List (if closed or hybrid HNB) - See Note 1 | +| H(e)NB Location | +| H(e)NB Time of Location | +| IArs (if applicable) | + +NOTE: In a HNB GW, the CSG List is the Access Control List. + +#### 13.4.4.4 Target UE HNB Handover + +This event reports a when a registered target UE moves from a cell on the serving PLMN to a HNB, from a HNB to a cell on the serving PLMN, or from a HNB to another HNB. This event is generated when + +- a HNB GW receives an inbound UE relocation trigger (e.g., RANAP Relocation Request message from the Core Network), or +- a HNB GW receives a HNBAP: UE RELOCATION COMPLETE message from the Destination HNB (i.e., the + +"Target HNB" per TS 25.467 [33]) , or + +- a HNB GW acts as a Iurh proxy and sends a RADIO LINK RESTORE INDICATION message from the "Drift HNB" to the "Serving HNB" per TS 25.467 [33]) (i.e., a target UE is involved in a soft handover between HNBs) + +The elements, shown in Table 13d, will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 13d: UE Handover** + +| | +|------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Identifier | +| Context-ID (for successful connection) | +| Cause (of failed connection, e.g., "Refusal Cause" of SCCP CREF) | +| CSG Identity (if closed/hybrid HNB) | +| CSG List (if closed/hybrid HNB) - See Note 1 | +| Handover Direction | +| Source cell ID (HNB ID or PLMN cell ID) | +| Destination cell ID (HNB ID or PLMN cell ID) | +| IAs (if applicable) | + +NOTE 1: In a HNB GW, the CSG List is the Access Control List. + +NOTE 2: The soft handover between HNBs that are directly connected and the HNB GW is not involved is not part of 3GPP specifications. + +## 13.5 Home enhanced Node B (HeNB) + +Figure 13-3 show the reference architectures upon which Lawful Interception for 3GPP HeNBs is based. Per TS 36.300 [32], HeNB GW is optional. + +![Figure 13-3: 3GPP HeNBs Architecture Basis for Lawful Interception. The diagram shows a stack of HeNBs (labeled LEMF) connected to a Mediation Function via HI1 and HI2 interfaces. HI1 leads to a Mediation Function which connects to an ADMF. HI2 leads to a Mediation Function which connects to a Delivery Function 2. The ADMF connects to the ProSe Function or ProSe Key Management Function via X1_1. The Delivery Function 2 connects to the ProSe Function via X2. There is also an X1_2 interface between ADMF and Delivery Function 2.](fc69ceb1dee1da7e33bd6c38fc4ceab9_img.jpg) + +Figure 13-3: 3GPP HeNBs Architecture Basis for Lawful Interception. The diagram shows a stack of HeNBs (labeled LEMF) connected to a Mediation Function via HI1 and HI2 interfaces. HI1 leads to a Mediation Function which connects to an ADMF. HI2 leads to a Mediation Function which connects to a Delivery Function 2. The ADMF connects to the ProSe Function or ProSe Key Management Function via X1\_1. The Delivery Function 2 connects to the ProSe Function via X2. There is also an X1\_2 interface between ADMF and Delivery Function 2. + +**Figure 13-3: 3GPP HeNBs Architecture Basis for Lawful Interception** + +In the case where the UE is the target of intercept, LI functionality is specified in clause 12. + +# 14 Interception of Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) Secured Communications + +## 14.1 Introduction + +The Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) is defined in the TS 33.220 [35]. This section details the stage 2 Lawful Interception architecture and functions that are needed to provide the GBA based application specific encryption keys. + +from the GBA architecture towards the DF2 for a subscriber that is target of interception. + +Figure 14.1 shows the LI architecture for the GBA where the BSF provides the events and associated information towards the DF2 over the X2 interface. + +![Figure 14.1: GBA Intercept Configuration. This diagram shows the architecture for GBA interception. A 'Target' (ProSe UE A) is connected to a 'ProSe Function or PKMF' via a 'Signalling' interface. The 'ProSe Function or PKMF' is connected to a 'DF2' via an 'X2 interface'. The 'DF2' is connected to a 'LEMF' via an 'HI2' interface. Additionally, 'ProSe UE B' and 'ProSe UE C' are connected to each other via a 'Communication' interface, and 'ProSe UE B' is also connected to the 'Target' (ProSe UE A) via a 'Communication' interface.](7e670a2b556b53ea9002dfff3a420e08_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + Target[Target +ProSe UE A] <-- Signalling --> ProSe[ProSe Function +or PKMF] + ProSe -- X2 interface --> DF2[DF2] + DF2 -- HI2 --> LEMF[LEMF] + ProSeUEB[ProSe UE B] <-- Communication --> ProSeUEC[ProSe UE C] + ProSeUEB <-- Communication --> Target + +``` + +Figure 14.1: GBA Intercept Configuration. This diagram shows the architecture for GBA interception. A 'Target' (ProSe UE A) is connected to a 'ProSe Function or PKMF' via a 'Signalling' interface. The 'ProSe Function or PKMF' is connected to a 'DF2' via an 'X2 interface'. The 'DF2' is connected to a 'LEMF' via an 'HI2' interface. Additionally, 'ProSe UE B' and 'ProSe UE C' are connected to each other via a 'Communication' interface, and 'ProSe UE B' is also connected to the 'Target' (ProSe UE A) via a 'Communication' interface. + +Figure 14.1: GBA Intercept Configuration + +## 14.2 Provision of Content of Communications + +The GBA interception provides the application specific cryptographic keys (aka GBA application specific keys) which are used to decrypt the intercepted communication secured using those GBA application specific keys. Interception of the content of communications for GBA secured services is not part of this section and can be achieved via other methods outlined in this specification. The Ua protocol Id and the NAF Id along with the GBA application specific keys will allow the LEMF to decrypt the received intercepted packets. + +NOTE 1: The details of LI capabilities for GBA in a roaming scenario is for further study. + +NOTE 2: The delivery by the CSP of intercepted packets in a decrypted form is for further study. + +## 14.3 Provision of Intercept Related Information + +### 14.3.1 Provision of Intercept Related Information Data Flow + +Figure 14.2 shows the transfer of intercept related information to the DF2. If an event related to a target occurs, the BSF shall send the relevant data to the DF2. + +![Figure 14.2: Provision of Intercept Related Information. This diagram illustrates the data flow for intercept related information. A 'Target' is connected to an 'HPLMN-I ProSe Function', which is in turn connected to a 'Delivery Function 2'. The 'Delivery Function 2' is connected to a 'LEMF' via a dashed line. Additionally, an 'Other subscriber' is connected to an 'HPLMN-O ProSe Function', which is connected to the 'HPLMN-I ProSe Function'. The 'Target' is also connected to the 'Other subscriber'.](536951b2bbd94325ae266d8d1363df8f_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + Target[Target] <--> HPLMN_I[HPLMN-I +ProSe +Function] + HPLMN_I --> DF2[Delivery +Function 2] + DF2 -.-> LEMF[LEMF] + OtherSub[Other +subscriber] <--> HPLMN_O[HPLMN-O +ProSe +Function] + HPLMN_O <--> HPLMN_I + Target <--> OtherSub + +``` + +Figure 14.2: Provision of Intercept Related Information. This diagram illustrates the data flow for intercept related information. A 'Target' is connected to an 'HPLMN-I ProSe Function', which is in turn connected to a 'Delivery Function 2'. The 'Delivery Function 2' is connected to a 'LEMF' via a dashed line. Additionally, an 'Other subscriber' is connected to an 'HPLMN-O ProSe Function', which is connected to the 'HPLMN-I ProSe Function'. The 'Target' is also connected to the 'Other subscriber'. + +Figure 14.2: Provision of Intercept Related Information + +### 14.3.2 X2-interface + +The following information needs to be transferred from the BSF to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity; +- events and associated parameters as defined in clauses 14.3.3 may be provided; + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 using a reliable transport mechanism. + +### 14.3.3 GBA LI Events and Event Information + +Intercept Related Information (Events) are necessary for the following; + +- Bootstrapping +- Query from NAF +- Start of interception with GBA key + +A set of possible elements as shown in Table 14.3.1 are used to generate the events. + +**Table 14.3.1: Information Events for GBA Event Records** + +| Element | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI
IMSI of the target. | +| Observed Other Identity
Other Identity of the target. | +| Event type
Description which type of event is delivered: Bootstrapping, Query from NAF,
Start of interception with GBA key | +| Event date
Date of the event generation in the BSF | +| Event time
Time of the event generation in the BSF. | +| Network Element Identifier
Unique identifier for the element reporting the BSF. | +| B-TID
Bootstrapping transaction identifier, TS 33.220 [35]. | +| Key lifetime
The lifetime of the key material is set according to the local policy of the BSF, TS 33.220 [35]. | +| Bootstrapping time
The timestamp of the bootstrapping event. | +| Ks_int_NAF
GBA application specific key (internal), if GBA_U has been used, TS 33.220 [35]. | +| Ks_ext_NAF
GBA application specific key (external), if GBA_U has been used, TS 33.220 [35]. | +| Ks_NAF
GBA application specific key, if GBA_ME has been used, TS 33.220 [35]. | +| Ua protocol id
Ua interface security protocol id defined in clause Annex H in TS 33.220 [35]. | +| NAF_Id
The FQDN of the NAF, concatenated with the Ua security protocol identifier, TS 33.220 [35]. | + +## 14.4 Structure of GBA Events + +### 14.4.1 Bootstrapping + +This event will be generated when the UE triggers a bootstrapping procedure towards the BSF when the UE wants to interact with a NAF. The actual bootstrapping procedure is defined in the TS 33.220 [35], in sections 4.5.2 and in 5.3.2. + +The information elements shown in Table 14.4.1 table, if available, will be delivered to the DF2, by the BSF. + +**Table 14.4.1: Bootstrapping** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed Other Identity | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| B-TID | +| Key lifetime | +| Bootstrapping time | + +### 14.4.2 Query from NAF + +The Query from NAF event is generated when the BSF receives an application specific key query from a NAF in order to retrieve GBA based application specific keys and related information. A new event is generated for each individual query events. The information elements shown in Table 14.4.2 will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the BSF. + +**Table 14.4.2: Query from NAF** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed Other Identity | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Ks_ext_NAF | +| NAF_id | +| Ks_int_NAF | +| Ks_NAF | +| Key lifetime | +| Bootstrapping time | +| Ua_protocol_id | + +### 14.4.3 Start of Interception with GBA key + +For start of interception where GBA application specific key is already in use a Start of Interception with GBA key event is generated. The elements, shown in Table 14.4.3 will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the BSF. + +**Table 14.4.3: Start of Interception with GBA key** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed Other Identity | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| B-TID [Note] | +| NAF_id [Note] | +| Ks_ext_NAF [Note] | +| Ks_int_NAF [Note] | +| Ks_NAF [Note] | +| Key lifetime [Note] | +| Bootstrapping time [Note] | +| Ua_protocol_id [Note] | + +NOTE: These are repeated for each GBA application specific key associated with the target. + +# 15 Invocation of Lawful Interception for IMS-based VoIP + +## 15.1 Overview of VoIP Interception + +The capabilities defined in this clause apply when the interception of content of communications for IMS-based VoIP is to be separated from the interception of content of communication at the packet data network. Non-Local ID targeting described in clause 7.A is also valid in such case. + +The network nodes, involved in providing the interception of an IMS-based VoIP call, shall be determined based on the deployment configuration and the call scenario. The scenarios where the media transport nodes and signalling nodes are handled by different CSPs are beyond the scope of this standard. + +NOTE: Lawful interception of VoIP as it applies SR-VCC (see TS 23.237 [45]) is for further study. + +The interception of IRI for a VoIP call shall be done according to 15.3. The interception of VoIP CC shall be done according to 15.2. + +## 15.2 Provision of Content of Communications + +## 15.2.0 Overview + +As the interception of CC needs to be done at a network node that has access to the voice media, and that interception of CC is required for all targeted calls, including forwarded calls and transferred calls, the CSP needs to support the capability to dynamically trigger CC interception for a call at a network node that has access to the voice media. Depending on the CSP's network configuration and the call scenario, different network elements will intercept the CC. + +The interception and delivery of CC for VoIP may be done at the following functional element: + +- 1) PDN-GW/GGSN; +- 2) IMS-AGW; +- 3) TrGW; +- 4) IM-MGW; +- 5) MRF. + +NOTE 2: Other functional elements may also be applicable in specific deployment scenarios. + +NOTE 3: The redirection of target communications to a specific network element purely for LI purposes is undesirable. + +The functional elements that provide the signalling to generate the trigger for the CC interception may be any of the following functional elements: + +- P-CSCF, for PDN-GW/GGSN and IMS-AGW; +- IBCF for TrGW; +- MGCF for IM-MGW; +- S-CSCF or AS for MRF. + +At any given time, for a specific target and for any given call, only one functional element is required to provide the CC interception. The functional element that provides the CC interception may vary, primarily, based on the call scenario. + +Annex E shows scenarios where the use of the above functional elements is applicable. + +### 15.2.1 General Principles of CC Interception + +#### 15.2.1.1 Intercept Trigger + +As the interception of IRI and CC is required for all targeted VoIP calls, including forwarded and transferred calls, the + +CC shall be correlated with the IRI. The CC Interception Triggering Function triggers the CC interception for a call at the CC Intercept Function. The placement of the CC Interception Triggering Function is dependent on CSP network implementation, the call scenario, and the placement of network nodes that have access to the voice media. + +The CC Interception Triggering Functions sends a CC intercept trigger to the CC Interception Function to activate CC interception for a call. + +The intercept trigger, at the minimum, shall consist of the following: + +- Correlation Identifier; +- Media Identifier + +The Correlation Identifier is used correlate the CC with the corresponding IRI data and is delivered from the CC Intercept Function in the intercepted media packet (i.e., CC) over the X3 interface to the Delivery Function 3. + +The Media Identifier is used to identify the media packets that have to be intercepted. The technique used in defining the Media Identifier is implementation specific. + +The information passed in this CC intercept trigger shall adhere to the security requirements outlined in clause 8. + +The mechanism used to provide the correlation between CC and IRI is implementation specific. For instance: + +- The CC Interception Triggering Function may send the correlation identifier value to the CC Interception Function that forwards it to DF3 onto X3 interface; +- The CC Interception Triggering Function may send the correlation identifier (onto X2 interface) to the DF2 that forwards it to DF3. In this case the SDP information may be used to associate the CC packets with the IRI. + +#### 15.2.1.2 X3-Interface + +For the delivery of intercepted media packets, the following information shall be passed from the CC Intercept Function to the Delivery Function 3 in addition to the intercepted media packets: + +- target identity; +- correlation identifier; +- SDP information (optional); +- time stamp (optional); +- direction (indicates media is from or to the target) - optional; + +The Delivery Function 3 delivers the information to the LEMF over the HI3 interface based on the national regulations. + +### 15.2.2 VoIP CC Interception + +The capabilities defined in this clause apply for the following cases: + +- When a target originates a call or receives an incoming call - the target's media passes through the indicated CC Intercept Function. +- When an incoming call to the target is forwarded, the media of the forwarded call passes through the indicated CC Intercept Function. + +The term "CC Intercept Function" is a generic term used to denote a network function that has access to the voice media of an intercepted call. The term "CC Interception Triggering Function" is a generic term used to denote a network function that provides a trigger to intercept the CC. The examples of CC Intercept Function and CC Interception Triggering Function are listed at the beginning of clause 15.2 + +Figure 15.1 illustrates the CC interception at the CC Intercept Function for a basic call. Figure 15.2 illustrates the CC interception at the CC Intercept Function for a forwarded call. + +![Diagram of VoIP CC Interception for basic calls showing Target, Other subscriber, HPLMN-I ProSe Function, HPLMN-O ProSe Function, Delivery Function 2, and LEMF.](1a827b10290f33d4fec04d0e8ef7a897_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the VoIP CC Interception for basic calls. It features six rectangular blocks. At the top left is 'Target'. Below it is 'Other subscriber'. To the right of 'Target' is 'HPLMN-I ProSe Function', connected by a double-headed horizontal arrow. Below 'HPLMN-I ProSe Function' is 'HPLMN-O ProSe Function', connected by a double-headed vertical arrow. To the right of 'HPLMN-I ProSe Function' is 'Delivery Function 2', connected by a single-headed horizontal arrow pointing right. Below 'Delivery Function 2' is 'LEMF', connected by a dashed vertical arrow pointing down. A double-headed vertical arrow connects 'Target' and 'Other subscriber'. A double-headed horizontal arrow connects 'Other subscriber' and 'HPLMN-O ProSe Function'. + +Diagram of VoIP CC Interception for basic calls showing Target, Other subscriber, HPLMN-I ProSe Function, HPLMN-O ProSe Function, Delivery Function 2, and LEMF. + +**Figure 15.1: VoIP CC Interception for basic calls** + +In figure 15.1, the Target is the target and the Other Party is the called party when the target originates a call; and the Other Party is the calling party when the target receives an incoming call. In both cases, the media passes through the CC Intercept Function present on the side of target's access network. + +In figure 15.2 (below), there is no Target (i.e., target) shown because this is the scenario where an incoming call to a target gets forwarded. The figure 15.2 shows the calling party who originated call and the forwarded-to-party who receives the forwarded call. The media passes through the CC Intercept Function associated with the forwarded-to-party. + +![Figure 15.2: VoIP CC Interception for forwarded calls. The diagram shows a flow starting from the CC Interception Triggering Function at the top, pointing down to the CC Intercept Function. The CC Intercept Function has a dashed box labeled 'X3' and an arrow pointing to 'Forwarded-to-Party'. Below the CC Intercept Function, an arrow labeled 'X3' points to 'Delivery Function 3'. From 'Delivery Function 3', an arrow labeled 'HI3' points to 'LEMF'. A 'Duplicator of Media Packets' is shown with an arrow pointing to the 'X3' path. A 'Calling Party' is shown on the left with an arrow pointing to the CC Intercept Function.](8307f6b04df072c9332f9987e034272c_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + CITF[CC Interception Triggering Function] --> CIF[CC Intercept Function] + CIF <--> CP[Calling Party] + CIF <--> FTP[Forwarded-to-Party] + CIF -- X3 --> DF3[Delivery Function 3] + DF3 -- HI3 --> LEMF[LEMF] + DMP[Duplicator of Media Packets] --> CIF + +``` + +Figure 15.2: VoIP CC Interception for forwarded calls. The diagram shows a flow starting from the CC Interception Triggering Function at the top, pointing down to the CC Intercept Function. The CC Intercept Function has a dashed box labeled 'X3' and an arrow pointing to 'Forwarded-to-Party'. Below the CC Intercept Function, an arrow labeled 'X3' points to 'Delivery Function 3'. From 'Delivery Function 3', an arrow labeled 'HI3' points to 'LEMF'. A 'Duplicator of Media Packets' is shown with an arrow pointing to the 'X3' path. A 'Calling Party' is shown on the left with an arrow pointing to the CC Intercept Function. + +**Figure 15.2: VoIP CC Interception for forwarded calls** + +The CC Interception Triggering Function sends the CC intercept trigger to the CC Intercept Function according 15.2.1.1. The CC Intercept Function intercepts media packets for the call (identified based on the Media Identifier information received over the intercept trigger) and delivers the media packets as according to 15.2.1.2. + +See Annex E and Annex F for details of Call Forwarding related scenarios and call flows. + +### 15.2.3 Media Information Associated with the CC + +When the media description known through the SDP offer and answer at the IRI ICE is different from the media description known to the CC Intercept Function, then CC Intercept Triggering Function may have to send the media description to the DF2 for reporting to the LEMF. See Annex G for illustrative examples. + +NOTE: In case the CC Intercept Triggering Function is included in the P-CSCF this may be achieved by using the X2 interface between the P-CSCF and DF2/MF. + +The media description associated with the CC delivered to the LEMF over HI3 shall also be reported to the LEMF in case it is different from both of the above indicated media descriptions. + +### 15.2.4 CC Interception in HPLMN with IMS Roaming + +For roaming targets who are physically not in the legal jurisdiction of the home network, depending on the roaming architecture deployed, media of the target may not enter the HPLMN for certain call scenarios. In such situations, based on the national option, the HPLMN served with the intercept order shall do the following: + +- Perform the interception without the CC and report to the LEMF that the CC is unavailable due to target's roaming situation. Note that the Evolved Serving System message (when EPS is part of the IP-CAN) also indicates to the LEMF that the target is roaming. + +See TS 33.108 [11] for the method used to report the CC unavailability indication. + +### 15.2.5 CC Interception with CUPS + +With control and user plane separation of PDN-GW, the LI architecture defined in subclause 12.9 shall be used to provide the CC Intercept Function at the PDN-GW with the following extensions: + +- The PDN Gateway-C shall receive the CC intercept trigger from the CC Intercept Triggering Function. +- The PDN Gateway-C shall use the target identity and correlation identifier received from the CC Intercept Triggering Function to notify the SX3LIF. +- The PDN Gateway-C shall send the packet detection rules (as described in subclause 12.9.2) to intercept the user plane packets from the media bearer to the PDN Gateway-U. + +The PDN Gateway-U shall forward user plane packets to the SX3LIF as described in subclause 12.9. The SX3LIF shall deliver the CC to the DF3 over X3 as described in subclause 12.9 and subclause 15.2. + +## 15.3 Provision of Intercept Related Information for VoIP + +See clause 7.A. + +## 15.4 Lawful interception in the VPLMN with IMS roaming + +### 15.4.1 Local breakout with P-CSCF in the VPLMN + +LBO (as defined in TS 23.228 [43]) as a roaming architecture used for VoLTE is one of the examples of IMS roaming. Local Breakout architecture has several options (LBO Home Routing, LBO Visited Routing: the interception of IRI and CC in the VPLMN are independent of such options). + +When an inbound roaming target originates a call or receives a terminating call, the P-CSCF present in the VPLMN provides IRI interception functions as described in clause 7A. The PDN-GW/GGSN or the IMS-AGW deployed in the VPLMN provides the CC interception as described in clause 15.2. The P-CSCF sends the CC intercept trigger to the PDN-GW/GGSN or to the IMS-AGW as described in clause 15.2. + +**NOTE:** The extent of the LI capabilities available in the VPLMN is limited to the information available in the VPLMN. In addition, almost all the supplement services are handled in the HPLMN. Hence, where supplementary services are exclusively handled in the HPLMN and information related to that service is not available in the VPLMN, LI for that service might be limited or even not available in the VPLMN. For example, when an incoming call to the inbound roaming target is forwarded (by the HPLMN), the VPLMN is not involved in that call forwarding and therefore, no reporting will be done by the VPLMN. For call forwarding no answer, the initial reporting might be done, however, once the forwarding happens, the VPLMN reports that the call has ended. + +Annex E illustrates a few scenarios of lawful interception in the VPLMN for inbound roaming target. + +## 15.5 Constraints for IMS VoIP Roaming Interception + +National regulations may limit delivery of communications (CC and communications-associated IRI) of an outbound international roaming target by the HPLMN as described in clause 5.1.4 of TS 33.106 [7]. + +If roaming interception is allowed, IMS VoIP interception and delivery to the LEMF by the HPLMN shall proceed normally as described elsewhere in this specification when the target is roaming outside the country as well as when the target is within the country. + +If roaming interception is not allowed and it is determined that the target is outside the country, the HPLMN shall act as follows: + +The HPLMN shall report IRI and CC for IMS VoIP sessions where the target is not participating in the IMS VoIP services which can be the result of the activation, invocation, or operation of any supplemental services that are performed entirely by the HPLMN. This can include invocation before an IMS VoIP session, at the beginning of an IMS VoIP session, mid IMS VoIP session, or at the end of an IMS VoIP session. Examples of such supplemental services include diversion services such as call forwarding (all calls, busy calls, etc.). Services where the target is still participating in the IMS VoIP session would not be reported (e.g., call hold, conferencing). + +# 16 LI for Group Communications using GCSE + +## 16.1 Background + +There are several scenarios possible for the interception of group communications involving GCSE (see TS 22.468 [51] and TS 23.468 [53]). First is where the GCSE AS is part of an operator's network. Second is where the GCSE AS is outside of the intercepting operator's network. This clause specifies LI solutions for both cases. + +## 16.2 GCSE AS in Operator Network + +### 16.2.0 General + +In the case where the GCSE AS is in the operator's network, the ICE in this case will be the GCSE AS as it is fully aware of the group communications as well as the parties on the communications. The solution is very similar to the conferencing solution specified in Clause 11, where the main difference is that a single functional entity (the GCSE AS) is utilized for GCSE, rather than two functional entities. + +![Figure 16.1: GCSE AS Intercept configuration diagram](04f51626e2e10a16e3eb2c4b33cb2742_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows the intercept configuration for GCSE AS. ProSe UE A is designated as the Target. It has a signalling connection to the ProSe Function or PKMF. The ProSe Function or PKMF connects to DF2 via an X2 interface. DF2 connects to the LEMF via an HI2 interface. ProSe UE A also has communication links with ProSe UE B and ProSe UE C. + +``` + +graph TD + subgraph Target_Group + Target[Target] --> UEA[ProSe UE A] + end + UEA <-- Signalling --> PF[ProSe Function or PKMF] + PF -- "X2 interface" --> DF2[DF2] + DF2 -- HI2 --> LEMF[LEMF] + UEA <-- Communication --> UEB[ProSe UE B] + UEA <-- Communication --> UEC[ProSe UE C] + UEB <-- Communication --> UEC + +``` + +Figure 16.1: GCSE AS Intercept configuration diagram + +Figure 16.1: GCSE AS Intercept configuration + +### 16.2.1 Provision of Content of Communications + +#### 16.2.1.0 General + +Figure 16.2 shows the interception of the content of communications for GCSE at the GCSE AS is performed based on identifying the target of interception being a member of a group communication at the GCSE AS. + +![Figure 16.2: Provision of Intercept Product from GCSE AS. This diagram shows three stacked boxes representing LEMF entities. Each box contains an HI interface on the left, a 'Mediation Function' block, and a delivery function block (ADMF for the top one, 'Delivery Function 2' for the middle, and 'Delivery Function 3' for the bottom). Interfaces X1_1, X1_2, X1_3, X2, and X3 are shown on the right side of the delivery functions. A 'Proxy-Relay' block is on the far right. Arrows indicate data flow: X1_1 from ADMF to Proxy-Relay, X2 from Proxy-Relay to Delivery Function 2, and X3 from Proxy-Relay to Delivery Function 3.](81a4cbf0b3c4cbc065efdf8f800dadde_img.jpg) + +Figure 16.2: Provision of Intercept Product from GCSE AS. This diagram shows three stacked boxes representing LEMF entities. Each box contains an HI interface on the left, a 'Mediation Function' block, and a delivery function block (ADMF for the top one, 'Delivery Function 2' for the middle, and 'Delivery Function 3' for the bottom). Interfaces X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3, X2, and X3 are shown on the right side of the delivery functions. A 'Proxy-Relay' block is on the far right. Arrows indicate data flow: X1\_1 from ADMF to Proxy-Relay, X2 from Proxy-Relay to Delivery Function 2, and X3 from Proxy-Relay to Delivery Function 3. + +**Figure 16.2: Provision of Intercept Product from GCSE AS** + +#### 16.2.1.1 X3-interface + +In addition to the intercepted content of communications, the following information may need to be transferred from the GCSE AS to the DF3 in order to allow the DF3 to perform its functionality: + +- identity used for interception include IMSI, IMEI, ProSe UE ID (see TS 22.278 [50] and TS 23.303 [52]); +- correlation number; +- the identity of source (i.e. group communications party identity) of a media stream; +- time stamp; +- direction (from target or to target). + +### 16.2.2 Provision of Intercept Related Information + +#### 16.2.2.0 General + +Figure 16.3 shows the transfer of intercept related information to the DF2. If an event for / from a GCSE user occurs, the GCSE AS shall send the relevant data to the DF2. + +![Figure 16.3: Provision of Intercept Related Information. This diagram shows two stacked boxes representing LEMF entities. The top box contains an HI1 interface, a 'Mediation Function' block, and an ADMF block. The bottom box contains an HI2 interface, a 'Mediation Function' block, and a 'Delivery Function 2' block. Interfaces X1_1, X1_2, X2, and Le are shown. A 'LI-CS Client' block is on the right, and an 'LCS Server/GMLC' block is at the bottom right. Arrows indicate data flow: X1_1 from ADMF to LI-CS Client, X1_2 from ADMF to Delivery Function 2, X2 from LI-CS Client to Delivery Function 2, and a bidirectional arrow between LI-CS Client and LCS Server/GMLC labeled Le.](d79d33da852cb7bca3e87b400a15c3e8_img.jpg) + +Figure 16.3: Provision of Intercept Related Information. This diagram shows two stacked boxes representing LEMF entities. The top box contains an HI1 interface, a 'Mediation Function' block, and an ADMF block. The bottom box contains an HI2 interface, a 'Mediation Function' block, and a 'Delivery Function 2' block. Interfaces X1\_1, X1\_2, X2, and Le are shown. A 'LI-CS Client' block is on the right, and an 'LCS Server/GMLC' block is at the bottom right. Arrows indicate data flow: X1\_1 from ADMF to LI-CS Client, X1\_2 from ADMF to Delivery Function 2, X2 from LI-CS Client to Delivery Function 2, and a bidirectional arrow between LI-CS Client and LCS Server/GMLC labeled Le. + +**Figure 16.3: Provision of Intercept Related Information** + +#### 16.2.2.1 X2-interface + +The following information needs to be transferred from the GCSE AS to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity include IMSI, IMEI, ProSe UE ID; +- events and associated parameters as defined in clauses 12.2.1.2 and 12.2.3 may be provided. + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 using a reliable transport mechanism. + +#### 16.2.2.2 GCSE AS LI Events and Event Information + +##### 16.2.2.2.0 General + +Intercept Related Information events to be reported by the GCS AS include: + +- When GCSE communications group involving a target of interception is activated (enabled for communications) +- When GCSE communications group involving a target of interception is deactivated (no longer enabled for communications) +- When a User is added to an active GCSE communications group +- When a User is dropped from an active GCSE communications group +- Start of Interception with an Active GCSE communications Group +- End of Interception with an Active GCSE communications Group +- Modification of Target Connection to GCS AS. + +A set of possible elements as shown in Table 16.4 are used to generate the events. + +**Table 16.4: Information Events for GCS AS Event Records** + +| Element | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI
IMSI of the target. | +| Observed IMEI
IMEI of the target. | +| Observed ProSe UE ID
ProSe UE ID of the target. | +| Observed Other Identity
Other Identity of the target | +| Event type
Description which type of event is delivered: Group Activated, Group Deactivated. Group Add Member, Group Drop Member, Start of Intercept with Active Group, End of Intercept with Active Group, Modification of Active Group. | +| Event date
Date of the event generation in the GCS AS. | +| Event time
Time of the event generation in the GCS AS. Timestamp shall be generated relative to the GCS AS internal clock. | +| Observed Communications Group ID
Identifies the GCSE communications group at the GCS AS. | +| GCSE Group Communication Characteristics
Details of the Group Communications Service to which the Target is a member including such characteristics such as voice, video, and data communications. | +| GCSE Communications Group Membership List
List of all users that are members of the GCSE communications group. Not all members may be participants in a group communications. | +| GCSE Communications Group Participants
List of all users that are participating in the GCSE communications group. | +| Correlation Number
The correlation number is used to correlate CC and IRI. The correlation number is also used to allow the correlation of IRI records. | +| Network Element Identifier
Unique identifier for the element reporting the ICE. | +| Added User ID
Identity of the party successfully added to an active GCSE Communications Group. | +| Dropped User ID
Identity of the party successfully dropped from an active GCSE Communications Group. | +| Target Connection Method
Identifies the current target connection method with the GCS AS including whether the target is connected at all. | +| Modified Target Connection Method
Identifies the modified target connection method with the GCS AS when the target connection method changes including whether the target is connected at all. | +| Identity of Visited Network
Identifies the visited network from which the target is connecting to the GCS AS. | +| Length of TMGI Reservation Time
Identifies the length of time reserved for use of a TMGI for a GCSE Communications Group. | +| Reserved TMGI
Identifies the TMGI reserved for use by a GCSE Communications Group. | +| Location information
Location information of the target, e.g., Cell ID as known by the GCS AS. | +| Time of Location
Date/Time of location. The time when location was obtained by the location source node. | + +NOTE: Generation of Correlation Number is FFS. + +##### 16.2.2.2.1 Activation of GCSE Communications Group + +When a GCSE communications group is activated at the GCS AS (i.e., enabled for communications), an Activation of GCSE Communications Group event is generated in the following cases: + +- When the GCS AS successfully activates a GCSE communications group in which a member is a target of interception. + +The fields, shown in Table 16.5, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the GCS AS. + +**Table 16.5: Activation of GCSE Communications Group** + +| | +|--------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed ProSe UE ID | +| Observed Other Identity | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation Number | +| Target Connection Method | +| GCSE communications group membership list | +| GCSE communications group participants | +| Group Communications Characteristics | +| Observed Communications Group ID | +| Reserved TMGI | +| Length of TMGI reservation time (if known) | +| Identity of Visited Network (if known) | + +##### 16.2.2.2.2 Deactivation of GCSE Communications Group + +When a GCSE communications group is deactivated (not enabled for communications) at the GCS AS, a Deactivation of GCSE Communications Group event is generated in the following cases: + +- When the GCS AS successfully releases a GCSE communications group in which a member is a target of interception. + +The fields, shown in Table 16.6, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the GCS AS. + +**Table 16.6: Deactivation of GCSE Communications Group** + +| | +|--------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| ProSe UE ID | +| Observed Other Identity | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation Number | +| GCSE communications group membership list | +| Observed Communications Group ID | +| Reserved TMGI | +| Length of TMGI reservation time (if known) | +| Identity of Visited Network (if known) | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | + +##### 16.2.2.2.3 User Added + +A User Added-event is generated in the following cases: + +- When a user is successfully added to a GCSE communications group in which a member is a target of interception. + +The fields, shown in Table 16.7, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the GCS AS. + +**Table 16.7: User Added** + +| | +|-------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed ProSe UE ID | +| Observed Other Identity | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation Number | +| Added User ID | +| GCSE communications group membership list | +| Observed Communications Group ID | +| GCSE communications group participants | +| Reserved TMGI | +| Identity of Visited Network (if known) | + +##### 16.2.2.2.4 User Dropped + +A User Dropped-event is generated in the following cases: + +- When a user is successfully dropped from a GCSE communications group in which a member is a target of interception. + +The fields, shown in Table 16.8, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the GCS AS. + +**Table 16.8: User Dropped** + +| | +|-------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed ProSe UE ID | +| Observed Other Identity | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation Number | +| Dropped User ID | +| GCSE communications group membership list | +| Observed Communications Group ID | +| GCSE communications group participants | +| Reserved TMGI | +| Identity of Visited Network (if known) | + +##### 16.2.2.2.5 Start of Intercept with an Active GCSE Communications Group + +When an intercept is started with an active GCSE communications group, a Start of Intercept for GCSE Communications Group event is generated in the following cases: + +- When a target of interception is successfully added to an active GCSE communications group. +- When interception is activated for a target of interception who is already a member of an active GCSE communications group. + +The fields, shown in Table 16.9, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the GCS AS. + +**Table 16.9: Start of Intercept with an Active GCSE Communications Group** + +| | +|--------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed ProSe UE ID | +| Observed Other Identity | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation Number | +| Target Connection Method | +| GCSE communications group membership list | +| Group Communications Characteristics | +| Observed Communications Group ID | +| GCSE communications group participants | +| Reserved TMGI | +| Length of TMGI reservation time (if known) | +| Identity of Visited Network (if known) | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | + +##### 16.2.2.2.6 End of Intercept with an Active GCSE Communications Group + +When an intercept is ended with an active GCSE communications group, an End of Intercept for GCSE Communications Group event is generated in the following cases: + +- When a target of interception is successfully dropped from an active GCSE communications group. + +The fields, shown in Table 16.10, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the GCS AS. + +**Table 16.10: End of Intercept with an Active GCSE Communications Group** + +| | +|--------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed ProSe UE ID | +| Observed Other Identity | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation Number | +| GCSE communications group membership list | +| Observed Communications Group ID | +| GCSE communications group participants | +| Reserved TMGI | +| Length of TMGI reservation time (if known) | +| Identity of Visited Network (if known) | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | + +##### 16.2.2.2.7 Modification of Target Connection to GCS AS + +When a modification to a target connection to the GCS AS occurs, a Modification of Target Connection event is generated in the following cases: + +- When a target of interception changes the current downlink communications reception method to now receive only via a unicast link, only via a multicast link, or via both unicast and multicast links. +- When the target of interception changes the uplink and downlink connection method from not connected to one of the connected connection methods, and vice versa. + +The fields, shown in Table 16.11, will be delivered to the DF2, if available, by the GCS AS. + +**Table 16.11: Modification of Target Connection to GCSE AS** + +| | +|--------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed ProSe UE ID | +| Observed Other Identity | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation Number | +| Modified Target Connection Method | +| GCSE communications group membership list | +| Group Communications Characteristics | +| Observed Communications Group ID | +| GCSE communications group participants | +| Reserved TMGI | +| Length of TMGI reservation time (if known) | +| Identity of Visited Network (if known) | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | + +## 16.3 GCS AS outside Intercepting CSP Network + +Interception of group communications by the intercepting CSP when the GCS AS is outside of the CSP's network, is not provided in this release. Packet data interception capabilities can be used to intercept and report a target's communication. + +# 17 Interception for Proximity Services + +## 17.1 ProSe Direct Discovery + +### 17.1.1 General + +Proximity Service (ProSe) are specified in TS 23.303 [52]. This includes Direct Discovery where two UEs may discover that they are in proximity using direct signalling between the UEs, where such signalling both controlled by and reported to the ProSe Function. + +![Figure 17.1-1: ProSe Direct Discovery Intercept configuration](e05c1a13b44ab41505609d82b00cf4df_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the ProSe Direct Discovery Intercept configuration. On the left, a vertical block labeled LEMF is connected via two main interface paths, HI1 and HI2, to the central functional blocks. HI1 connects to a 'Mediation Function' within an 'ADMF' block. HI2 connects to another 'Mediation Function' which feeds into a 'Delivery Function 2' block. The ADMF has a control interface X1\_1. The Delivery Function 2 has an interface X1\_2 connecting from the ADMF and an output interface X2. Both the ADMF and Delivery Function 2 connect to a block containing 'IRI ICE' and 'LTF'. This block has an output labeled 'LALS\_T' and connects to an 'LI-LCS Client'. The 'LI-LCS Client' is connected via an 'Le' interface to the 'LCS Server/GMLC' block. + +Figure 17.1-1: ProSe Direct Discovery Intercept configuration + +**Figure 17.1-1: ProSe Direct Discovery Intercept configuration** + +Figure 17.1-1 shows the IRI interception configuration for ProSe Direct Discovery. The HI2 interface represents the + +interface between the LEA and the delivery function. The delivery function is used to distribute the Intercept Related Information (IRI) to the relevant LEA(s) via HI2. See Clause 4 for more information on the ADMF and other interfaces. + +The target identity for ProSe Direct Discovery interception is the IMSI. The activation, deactivation, and interrogation of interception regarding the ProSe Function shall follow the requirements of Clause 5. + +### 17.1.2 Provision of Interception of Call Content + +Interception of direct discovery does not have a call content component as all the information useful to the LEA is provided as part of the IRI interception. + +### 17.1.3 Provision of Intercept Related Information + +#### 17.1.3.1 General + +Figure 17.1.3.1-1 shows the transfer of intercept related information (IRI) to the DF2. If an event involving a target occurs, the ProSe Function shall send the relevant data to the DF2. A UE always contacts the ProSe Function in its HPLM, which then contacts the other relevant ProSe Functions to complete the UE's request. In the case of Match Report event, it is possible that a non-target monitoring UE will trigger interception of a target UE when it reports a code announced by that target UE. + +This is illustrated in the following figure where it should be noted that only one subscriber to HPLMN ProSe Function interaction is needed to trigger an interception event. + +![Figure 17.1.3.1-1: Provision of Intercept Related Information for discovery. The diagram shows a flow of information from a Target UE to a Delivery Function 2 via HPLMN-I ProSe Function, with a feedback loop to the Target via Other subscriber and HPLMN-O ProSe Function. A dashed arrow also points from Delivery Function 2 to LEMF.](82b40cb8b2a5ac361973859400fa128a_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + Target[Target] <--> HPLMN_I[HPLMN-I ProSe Function] + HPLMN_I --> DF2[Delivery Function 2] + DF2 -.-> LEMF[LEMF] + Target <--> Other[Other subscriber] + Other <--> HPLMN_O[HPLMN-O ProSe Function] + HPLMN_O <--> HPLMN_I + +``` + +Figure 17.1.3.1-1: Provision of Intercept Related Information for discovery. The diagram shows a flow of information from a Target UE to a Delivery Function 2 via HPLMN-I ProSe Function, with a feedback loop to the Target via Other subscriber and HPLMN-O ProSe Function. A dashed arrow also points from Delivery Function 2 to LEMF. + +**Figure 17.1.3.1-1: Provision of Intercept Related Information for discovery** + +#### 17.1.3.2 X2-interface + +The following information needs to be transferred from the ProSe Function to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity (IMSI); +- events and associated parameters, as defined in section 17.1.3.3; + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 using a reliable transport mechanism. + +#### 17.1.3.3 ProSe LI Events and Event Information + +##### 17.1.3.3.1 ProSe LI Events + +The following events are applicable to the interception of direct discovery: + +- Discovery Request +- Match Report + +Interception of these events is mandatory in the ProSe Function of the PLMN that is used for direct discovery. + +##### 17.1.3.3.2 ProSe LI Event Information + +A set of possible elements as shown below is used to generate the events. + +**Table: 17.1.3.3.2-1: Information Events for ProSe Event Records** + +| Element | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI
IMSI of the target | +| Event type
Description which type of event is delivered:- Discovery Request, Match Report | +| Event date
Date of the event generation in the ProSe Function | +| Event time
Time of the event generation in the ProSe Function. Timestamp shall be generated relative to the ProSe Function internal clock. | +| Role of the target
Whether the target is an announcing or a monitoring UE | +| Discovery PLMN identity
PLMN used or to be used for the discovery | +| ProSe Application ID Name
Identity of a user within the context of a specific application | +| Metadata
Metadata relating to a ProSe Application ID Name of the announcing UE | +| Network Element Identifier
Unique identifier for the element reporting the ICE. | +| Timer
The "Validity Timer" or "Time to Live" value assigned by the network to a specific ProSe Application Code or Filter, that controls how long the UE can announce/monitor it | +| Identity of the other UE
In Match reports, there is a second UE involved. | +| ProSe Application Code
Bitstring that is actually announced over the air or included in a discovery filter applied by UE | +| ProSe App Mask
Bitmask that allows the monitoring UE to perform full or partial matching. Multiple Masks may be included in a Discovery Filter. The length of the mask is the same as the length of ProSe Application Code | + +##### 17.1.3.3.3 Structure of ProSe Events + +###### 17.1.3.3.3.1 Discovery Request + +For ProSe Discovery Requests, a Discovery Request event is generated. The elements shown in Table 17.1.3.3.1-1 will be delivered by the ProSe Function to the DF2, if available. A new Discovery Request Event shall be generated for each individual ProSe Discovery Request received by the ProSe Function. + +**Table 17.1.3.3.1-1: Discovery Request** + +| | | +|----------------------------|-----------------| +| Observed IMSI | | +| Event Type | | +| Event Time | | +| Event Date | | +| Role of the target | | +| Network Element Identifier | | +| Discovery PLMN identity | | +| ProSe Application ID Name | | +| Timer | | +| Metadata | (If Applicable) | +| ProSe Application Code | | +| ProSe App Mask | (If Applicable) | + +###### 17.1.3.3.3.2 Match Report + +For ProSe Match Report, a Match Report event is generated. The elements shown in Table 17.1.3.3.2-1 will be delivered by the ProSe Function to the DF2, if available. A new Match Report Event shall be generated for each + +individual ProSe Match Report received by the ProSe Function. + +**Table 17.1.3.3.3.2-1: Match Report** + +| | | +|----------------------------|-----------------| +| Observed IMSI | | +| Event Type | | +| Event Time | | +| Event Date | | +| Role of the target | | +| Network Element Identifier | | +| Discovery PLMN identity | | +| ProSe Application ID Name | | +| Timer | | +| Metadata | (If Applicable) | +| Identity of the other UE | (If Available) | +| ProSe Application Code | | + +## 17.2 ProSe One To Many Communications + +### 17.2.1 General + +Proximity Service (ProSe) are specified in TS 23.303 [52]. This includes one to many communications among Public Safety ProSe UEs with such communication occurring while the UEs are in proximity. There are several procedures that takes place with network elements as part of a typical one-to-many communication. The UE needs to be authorised by the ProSe Function, and receive keys from the ProSe Key Management Function (PKMF - see TS 33.303 [57], TS 23.228 [43]). After such a communication, the UE reports the relevant usage information to the ProSe Function. This subclause details the interception at the ProSe Function and ProSe Key Management Function. + +NOTE: The present document does not provide a solution for the interception of content of communication. + +Editor's note: Interception of ProSe one-to-many communication with the group as the target is FFS. + +![Diagram of the ProSe One To Many Communications Intercept configuration showing LEMF connected via HI1 and HI2 to Mediation Functions, which then connect to ADMF and Delivery Function 2. ADMF controls the ProSe Function/PKMF via X1_1 and Delivery Function 2 via X1_2. The ProSe Function/PKMF sends IRI data to Delivery Function 2 via X2.](1c29dadab94c3fa552d270434db09c81_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph LR + subgraph LEMF_Stack [LEMF] + L1[ ] + L2[ ] + L3[ ] + end + + L1 -- HI1 --- MF1[Mediation Function] + MF1 --- ADMF[ADMF] + L2 -- HI2 --- MF2[Mediation Function] + MF2 --- DF2[Delivery Function 2] + + ADMF -- X1_1 --> PS[ProSe Function or +ProSe Key Management +Function] + ADMF -- X1_2 --> DF2 + PS -- X2 --> DF2 + +``` + +Diagram of the ProSe One To Many Communications Intercept configuration showing LEMF connected via HI1 and HI2 to Mediation Functions, which then connect to ADMF and Delivery Function 2. ADMF controls the ProSe Function/PKMF via X1\_1 and Delivery Function 2 via X1\_2. The ProSe Function/PKMF sends IRI data to Delivery Function 2 via X2. + +**Figure 17.2-1: ProSe One To Many Communications Intercept configuration** + +Figure 17.2-1 shows the IRI interception configuration for ProSe one to many communications. The HI2 interface represents the interface between the LEMF and the delivery function. The delivery function is used to distribute the Intercept Related Information (IRI) to the relevant LEMF(s) via HI2. See clause 4 for more information on the ADMF and other interfaces. + +The target identity for interception is the IMSI. The activation, deactivation, and interrogation of interception regarding the ProSe Function shall follow the requirements of clause 5. + +### 17.2.2 Provision of Intercept Product - One-To-Many Communications + +#### 17.2.2.1 General + +Figure 17.2.2.1-1 shows the transfer of IRI relating to the one to many communications from the ProSe Function and ProSe Key Management Function to the DF2 and to the LEMF. If a target UE interacts with the ProSe Function or ProSe Key Management Function relating to one-to-many communications, a One-To-Many IRI event, is generated and sent via the Delivery Function 2 to the LEMF. + +If an event involving a target occurs, the ProSe Function or ProSe Key Management Function shall send the relevant data to the DF2 for formatting and delivery to the LEMF. + +![Diagram illustrating the provision of intercept product for public safety one-to-many communications. A Target ProSe UE A is shown with a bidirectional 'Signalling' connection to the ProSe Function or PKMF. The ProSe Function or PKMF is connected to the DF2 via an 'X2 interface'. The DF2 is connected to the LEMF via an 'HI2' interface. Two non-target ProSe UEs, B and C, are shown with a bidirectional 'Communication' connection between them. There is also a vertical arrow pointing from ProSe UE B to ProSe UE A.](24c9e038a791677ed33100667b64f7e6_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + UE_A[ProSe UE A] <--> |Signalling| PF[ProSe Function or PKMF] + PF --> |X2 interface| DF2[DF2] + DF2 --> |HI2| LEMF[LEMF] + UE_B[ProSe UE B] <--> |Communication| UE_C[ProSe UE C] + UE_B --> UE_A + +``` + +Diagram illustrating the provision of intercept product for public safety one-to-many communications. A Target ProSe UE A is shown with a bidirectional 'Signalling' connection to the ProSe Function or PKMF. The ProSe Function or PKMF is connected to the DF2 via an 'X2 interface'. The DF2 is connected to the LEMF via an 'HI2' interface. Two non-target ProSe UEs, B and C, are shown with a bidirectional 'Communication' connection between them. There is also a vertical arrow pointing from ProSe UE B to ProSe UE A. + +**Figure 17.2.2.1-1: Provision of Intercept Product for Public Safety One-To-Many Communications** + +NOTE: There is signalling between the non-target ProSe UEs and the ProSe Function and PKMF, which is not shown in figure 17.2.2.1-1. This signalling is not relevant to the interception of the target UE. + +#### 17.2.2.2 X2-interface + +The following information needs to be transferred from the ProSe Function or ProSe Key Management Function to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity (IMSI); +- events and associated parameters, as defined in section 17.2.2.3; +- the target location (if available) or the IAs in case of location dependent interception; +- Quality of Service (QoS) identifier; +- Encryption parameters (keys and associated parameters for decrypting CC), if available and necessary. + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 using a reliable transport mechanism. + +#### 17.2.2.3 ProSe LI One-To-Many Events and Event Information + +##### 17.2.2.3.1 Overview of ProSe LI One-To-Many Events + +The following event are applicable to the interception of one to many communications: + +- ProSe Function sends authorisation to perform one-To-many communications to the target UE. +- ProSe Key Management Function sends keys to use in one-to-many communications to the target UE. +- ProSe Function receives a one-to-many communications usage information report from the target UE. + +Interception of these events is mandatory. . + +##### 17.2.2.3.2 Structure of ProSe LI One-To-Many Event Information + +A set of possible elements as shown below is used to generate the events. + +**Table 17.2.2.3.2-1: Information Elements for Event Records relating to one-to-many communications** + +| Element | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI
IMSI of the target | +| Event date
Date of the event generation. | +| Event time
Time of the event generation. Timestamp shall be generated relative to the intercepting node's internal clock. | +| PLMN Identity
The PLMN that the UE is being authorised to perform one-to-many communication in. | +| Sender ID
Identifies the sender of the One-To-Many Communications - also known as the ProSe UE ID or the Group member identity. | +| ProSe Layer-2 Group ID
Identifies the group of the One-To-Many Communications - also known as the destination ID. | +| Network Identifier
Operator ID plus unique identifier for the element reporting the ICE. | +| IP address type
The type of IP address, i.e IPv4 or IPv6, used for this one-to-many communication. | +| IP multicast address
The IP address to be used when doing one-to-many communication | +| PKMF address
The IP address of the ProSe Key Management Function that will provides keys for this one-to-many communication | +| Source IP address
The IP source address to be used by the UE as a source address | +| Communication Authorisation Validity timer
Indicates in minutes how long the authorisation is valid for | +| Confidentiality algorithm
The confidentiality algorithm used with this group | +| PGK
ProSe Group Key that can be used to protect data for this group | +| PGK ID
The identity of the PGK within this group | +| PGK lifetime
The lifetime of the PGK | +| Location list
List of locations of the UE when in coverage and the corresponding timestamps | +| E-UTRAN coverage timestamps
List of timestamps when the UE goes in/out of E-UTRAN coverage | +| First communication timestamp
Timestamp of the first one-to-many communication transmission/reception | +| Transmitter identities
Identities of the transmitters in the one-to-many communication session | +| Data transmitted in coverage
List of amount of data transmitted by UE when in E-UTRAN coverage at each location, with ECGI and the corresponding timestamps | +| Data transmitted out of coverage
List of amount of data transmitted by UE for each E-UTRAN out of coverage and the corresponding timestamps | +| Data received in coverage
List of amount of data received by UE when in E-UTRAN coverage at each location, with ECGI and the corresponding timestamps | +| Data received out of coverage
List of amount of data received by UE for each out of E-UTRAN coverage period and the corresponding timestamps | + +##### 17.2.2.3.3 ProSe LI One-To-Many Events + +If ProSe Function sends authorisation to use ProSe one-to-many communication to the target UE, a One-To-Many-Auth Event shall be generated. These elements if available will be delivered to the DF2 (see TS 24.333 [58] for more + +information on the elements): + +**Table 17.2.2.3.3-1 One-To-Many-Auth Event** + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Identifier (including network element identifier) | +| PLMN Identity | +| Communication Authorisation Validity timer | +| ProSe Layer-2 Group ID | +| IP address type | +| IP multicast address | +| PKMF address (if applicable) | +| Source IP address (if applicable) | + +If a ProSe Key Management Function sends keys for one-to-many communication to a target UE, a One-To-Many-Keys Event shall be generated. These elements if available will be delivered to the DF2 (see TS 33.303 [57] for more information on the elements): + +**Table 17.2.2.3.3-2 One-To-Many-Keys Event** + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Identifier (including network element identifier) | +| ProSe Layer-2 Group ID | +| Sender ID | +| Confidentiality algorithm | +| PGK | +| PGK ID | +| PGK lifetime | + +If a ProSe Function receives a usage information report for ProSe one-to-many communication to a ProSe Function from a target UE, a One-To-Many-Usage Event shall be generated. These elements if available will be delivered to the DF2 (see TS 32.277 [59] for more information on the elements): + +**Table 17.2.2.3.3-3 One-To-Many-Usage Event** + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Identifier (including network element identifier) | +| Location list | +| E-UTRAN coverage timestamps | +| Sender ID | +| ProSe Layer-2 Group ID | +| IP address type | +| IP multicast address | +| Source IP address (if applicable) | +| First communication timestamp | +| Transmitter identities | +| Data transmitted in coverage | +| Data transmitted out of coverage | +| Data received in coverage | +| Data received out of coverage | + +NOTE: The UE periodically generates usage event reports for charging purposes from which this event is generated. Therefore there may be a significantly delay between the generation of this event and the communications for which the usage report is generated by the UE. + +Editor's note: The above table is based on the stage 2 of the PC3ch interface as described in TS 32.277 [59]. Some of the above information may need to be changed once the stage 3 for PC3ch is complete. + +Editor's note: The application of LI requirements in TS 33.106 [7] to the CTF (TS 32.277 [59]) within the ProSe function when it is physically separated from the ProSe Function is FFS. + +## 17.3 ProSe Remote UE Communications + +### 17.3.1 General + +A ProSe Remote UE can initiate communications via a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay and the core network as described in TS 23.303 [52]. + +From LI perspective, the following scenarios can be identified: + +1. The ProSe Remote UE is a target for interception +2. The ProSe UE-to-NW Relay is a target for interception +3. Both the ProSe Remote UE and the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay are target for interception. + +NOTE: The ProSe Remote UE and the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay are considered target for interception if any of the identities (MSISDN, IMSI, IMEI) related to the UE or the user is target for interception. + +In the following subclauses, scenarios 1 and 2 are addressed, scenario 3 is covered by using both scenario 1 and 2. + +Interception in the PDN-GW is a national option. + +### 17.3.2 The ProSe Remote UE is a target for interception + +When a ProSe Remote UE connects to the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay, the core network (MME, S-GW, PDN-GW) receives the related information from the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. If the ProSe Remote UE is a target, a ProSe Remote UE start of communication event shall be generated by the S-GW, PDN-GW. + +If the warrant requires to intercept also CC, considering that the PDN connection used by the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay can be used also for other, non-target, ProSe Remote UEs, the S-GW/PDN-GW shall isolate the target ProSe remote UE's communication from any content of communication not associated to the remote UE under interception. CC related to the target ProSe Remote UE shall be sent over X3 interface. + +When a target ProSe Remote UE disconnects from the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay, a ProSe Remote UE end of communication event shall be generated by the S-GW, PDN-GW. CC interception for the target ProSe Remote UE shall be stopped. + +In both cases of connection and disconnection of a target ProSe Remote UE, the MME shall generate a ProSe Remote UE Report event. + +In case the whole PDN connection used by the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay is closed for any reason while a target Remote UE is connected to the ProSe UE-to-NW relay, a ProSe Remote UE end of communication event shall be generated by the S-GW/PDN-GW and sent to the DF2. + +If interception is started after that the ProSe remote UE is already connected to the network through a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay, a Start of interception with ProSe Remote UE ongoing communication event shall be provided by the S-GW/PDN-GW. The same event shall also be sent by the new S-GW in case, due to ProSe UE-to-NW Relay mobility, there is a change of S-GW. The ICEs shall then start intercepting the target UE's communication by extracting it from the PDN connection used by the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay UE. + +### 17.3.3 The ProSe UE-to-NW Relay is a target for interception + +The ProSe UE-to-NW Relay uses one or more PDN connections for any activity/communication which is not related to relaying. In such case all the requirements specified for EPS interception in clause 12 apply. In addition, IRIs related + +specified in clause 12 are also applicable to the PDN connection used for relay. + +This clause specifies additional functional requirements which are applicable to the PDN connection(s) established by the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. + +PDN connection(s) used for relaying only carry communications for the ProSe remote UEs. So, unless any of them is also a target for interception (for which clause 17.3.2 apply), no content of communication shall be intercepted from such PDN connection(s), unless required by national regulation, in which case all requirements specified in clause 12 apply also to these PDN connection(s). + +In case ProSe remote UEs are connected to or disconnected from the target ProSe UE-to-NW Relay, the ICEs (MME, S-GW, PDN-GW) shall provide a ProSe Remote UE Report event, including the identities and IP info of ProSe remote UE(s) being connected/ disconnected. + +In case interception is activated for a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay with already connected ProSe remote UE(s), the ICEs shall provide a Start of interception for ProSeUE-to-NW Relay, including the identities and IP info of ProSe remote UEs already connected to the relay. The same event shall also be sent by the new S-GW in case, due to ProSe UE-to-NW Relay mobility, there is a change of S-GW. + +In case a Tracking Area/EPS Location Update event is provided for a target ProSe UE-to-NW Relay, it shall carry also information related to the connected ProSe remote UE(s). + +### 17.3.4 X2-interface + +The following information needs to be transferred from the EPS nodes (MME, S-GW, PDN-GW) to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity (IMSI, MSISDN, IMEI); +- events and associated parameters as defined in clause 17.3.4.1. + +#### 17.3.4.1 Structure of the events + +There are several different events in which the information is sent to the DF2 if this is required. Details are described in the following clauses. The events for interception are configurable (if they are sent to DF2) in the EPC nodes. + +The following event is applicable to the MME: + +- ProSe Remote UE Report; + +The following events are applicable to the S-GW and PDN-GW: + +- ProSe Remote UE start of communication; +- ProSe Remote UE end of communication; +- Start of interception with ProSe Remote UE ongoing communication; +- Start of interception for ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. + +A set of possible elements as shown below is used to generate the events. + +**Table: 17.3.4.1-1: Information Events for ProSe communication Event Records** + +| Element | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN
MSISDN of the target | +| Observed IMSI
IMSI of the target | +| Observed IMEI
IMEI of the target | +| Event type
Indicates which type of event is delivered: ProSe Remote UE Report, ProSe Remote UE start of communication, ProSe Remote UE end of communication, Start of interception with ProSe Remote UE ongoing communication, Start of interception for ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. | +| Event date
Date of the event generation in the ICE | +| Event time
Time of the event generation in the ICE. Timestamp shall be generated relative to the ICE internal clock. | +| Target type
Indicates whether the target is a ProSe Remote UE or a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | +| ProSe Remote UE IDs
The identities of the connected or disconnected ProSe remote UEs. | +| ProSe Remote UE IP info
The IP address(es) of the connected or disconnected ProSe Remote UE(s) provided by the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. | +| APN
The Access Point Name used by the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay for the connection | +| MSISDN of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay (only applicable when the ProSe Remote UE is the target) | +| IMSI of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay (only applicable when the ProSe Remote UE is the target) | +| IMEI of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay (only applicable when the ProSe Remote UE is the target) | +| PDN address(es)
The ProSe UE-to-NW Relay IP address(es) for the PDN connection. | +| Network Element Identifier
Unique identifier for the element reporting the ICE. | +| Correlation number
The correlation number is used to correlate CC and IRI (in case the target is a ProSe remote UE) or IRIs (in case the target is a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay). | +| Location information
The location of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay.
National regulations may require to provide the E-CGI of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay when the target is the ProSe Remote UE. | + +### 17.3.5 ProSe UE-to-NW Relay events + +#### 17.3.5.1 ProSe Remote UE Report + +This event shall be sent by the MME, S-GW and PDN-GW when the node detects that a ProSe Remote UE has been connected to or disconnected from the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay and the ProSe Remote UE or the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay is a target for interception. The following parameters shall be provided if available. + +| | +|-----------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Target type | +| ProSe Remote UE(s) connected IDs | +| ProSe Remote UE(s) connected IP info | +| ProSe Remote UE(s) disconnected IDs | +| ProSe Remote UE(s) disconnected IP info | +| MSISDN of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay | +| IMSI of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay | +| IMEI of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay | +| APN | +| PDN Address(es) | +| Location information | + +#### 17.3.5.2 ProSe Remote UE Start of Communication + +This event shall be sent by the S-GW and PDN-GW when the node detects that a target ProSe Remote UE has been connected to a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. The following parameters shall be provided if available. + +| | +|------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation number | +| MSISDN of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay | +| IMSI of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay | +| IMEI of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay | +| APN | +| PDN Address(es) | +| Location information | + +#### 17.3.5.3 ProSe Remote UE End of Communication + +This event shall be sent by the S-GW and PDN-GW when the node detects that a target ProSe Remote UE has been disconnected from a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. The event shall also be sent in case the PDN connection used for relay used by the target ProSe remote UE is closed. The following parameters shall be provided if available. + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation number | +| Location information | + +#### 17.3.5.4 Start of interception with ProSe Remote UE ongoing communication + +This event shall be sent by the S-GW and PDN-GW when interception is started for a ProSe Remote UE which is already connected to a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. The event shall also be sent by the new S-GW in case, due to ProSe UE-to-NW Relay mobility, there is a S-GW change. The following parameters shall be provided if available. + +| | +|------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Correlation number | +| MSISDN of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay | +| IMSI of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay | +| IMEI of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay | +| APN | +| PDN Address(es) | +| Location information | + +#### 17.3.5.5 Start of interception for ProSe UE-to-NW Relay + +This event shall be sent by the S-GW and PDN-GW when interception is started on a UE which is already acting as ProSe UE-to-NW Relay for any Remote UE. The event shall also be sent by the new S-GW in case, due to ProSe UE-to-NW Relay mobility, there is a S-GW change. The following parameters shall be provided if available. + +| | +|--------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Target type | +| ProSe Remote UE(s) connected IDs | +| ProSe Remote UE(s) connected IP info | +| APN | +| PDN Address(es) | +| Location information | + +### 17.3.6 X3-interface + +Functional requirements specified in clause 12.3.2 are applicable. Interception of CC is subjected to conditions specified in clauses 17.3.2 and 17.3.3. + +# 18 Invocation of Lawful Interception for messaging services + +## 18.1 Overview of messaging services interception + +The capabilities defined in this clause apply when the interception of messaging services shall be separated from the interception of all other services. This clause applies to the messaging services identified in clause 5.13 of TS 33.106 [7]. + +For messaging services, separated delivery when SMS events are detected, the CSP shall be able to use existing intercept capabilities defined in this specification, but isolatable to only deliver messaging services when specified by a lawful authorisation. + +The network nodes, involved in providing the interception of messaging services, shall be determined based on the deployment configuration and the messaging scenario. For SMS over NAS, the MME shall be an ICE. + +When lawfully authorized, Law Enforcement requires access to CC and IRI for the events pertaining to the target's authorization, access to, and use of message services, independent of the deployed service architecture. This includes where the communications between the target and associates are sent and received over separate channels, or may be + +accessed at different ICEs at different geographical locations in the service provider's network. + +For MMS, implementation options considered in this standard are: interception at the MMS level or normal packet session CC interception at an PS/IMS/EPS ICE and transferred to the DF2/DF3 which then subsequently isolates and delivers the MMS IRI and/or CC associated with the messaging service separate from all other services. Details of IRI and CC reporting for MMS events are for further study. + +National regulations on a per interception basis may limit delivery of communications (CC and IRI) of an outbound international roaming target by the messaging service as described in clause 5.1.4 of TS 33.106 [7]. + +If roaming interception is not allowed and it is determined that the target is outside the country, reporting by the HPLMN for messaging services shall be as follows: + +- All related messaging service events defined in this clause are subject to this mechanism with the exception that messaging service events in the HPLMN involving communications to the target that are not transmitted to the target are not subject to this mechanism. + +Non-communications-associated IRI (e.g. those identified by the HSS) are not affected by this requirement. + +## 18.2 SMS + +### 18.2.1 Introduction + +LI for SMS over a GPRS and UMTS access is specified in clause 7. LI for SMS over IP (using IMS SIP signalling handled by the core network) which can be used in conjunction with LTE access as well as other non-3GPP IP based access is defined in clause 7A.6. + +### 18.2.2 SMS over GPRS/UMTS + +For separate delivery of SMS when SMS is used in conjunction with GPRS or UMTS access, the following events shall be reported by the ICE to the DF: + +- 1) SMS (clause 7.4.7) +- 2) HLR Related events + - a. Serving System (clause 7.4.9) + - b. HLR subscriber record change (clause 7.4.12) + - c. Cancel location (clause 7.4.13); + - d. Register location (clause 7.4.14); + - e. Location information request (clause 7.4.15). + +The above events shall be reported from the ICE to the DF independent of any other services that may or may not be intercepted. + +### 18.2.3 SMS over IP + +For separate delivery of SMS when SMS over IP (using IMS SIP signalling handled by the core network) is used, the following events shall be reported by the ICE to the DF: + +- 1) Intercepted SIP event as described in clause 7A.3.0 +- 2) HSS related events + - a. Serving System (clause 7A.2.3.1) for use when roaming + - b. IMPU or IMPI changed in a HSS subscriber record change (clause 7A.2.3.2); + - c. Registration termination (clause 7A.2.3.3); + - d. Location information request (clause 7A.2.3.4). + +The above events shall be able to be reported from the ICE to the DF independent of and to the exclusion of any other services that may or may not be intercepted. + +### 18.2.4 SMS over NAS + +#### 18.2.4.0 Introduction + +SMS over NAS reporting uses the architecture and interfaces defined in Clause 12 *Lawful Interception for Evolved Packet System*. + +#### 18.2.4.1 Structure of the events + +SMS over NAS uses the MME as an ICE. + +**The following events are applicable to the MME:** + +- SMS over NAS Report (Clause 18.2.4.2) + +#### 18.2.4.2 SMS over NAS Events + +For separate delivery of SMS when the NAS infrastructure is used, the following events shall be reported from the MME to the DF: + +- 1) SMS over NAS (clause 18.2.4.3) + +In addition, the following HSS events shall be reported: + +- 2) HSS Related events + - a. Serving Evolved Packet System (clauses 12.2.3.8, 12.4.3.10, 12.5.3.5) + - b. HSS subscriber record change (clauses 12.2.3.15, 12.3.4.18, 12.5.3.15) + - c. Cancel location (clause 12.2.3.16) + - d. Register Termination (clauses 12.3.3.16, 12.3.4.19) + - e. Register location (clauses 12.2.3.17, 12.4.3.20) + - f. Location information request (clauses 12.2.3.18, 12.4.3.20, 12.5.3.17). + +The above events shall be reported from the ICE to the DF independent of any other services that may or may not be intercepted. + +**Table 18.2.4.2. SMS over NAS Information Elements** + +| | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN
MSISDN of the target. | +| Observed IMSI
IMSI of the target. | +| Observed IMEI
IMEI of the target; when it coincides with the IMEI, it shall be checked for each activation over the radio interface. | +| Observed Non-Local ID
Target Identifier with the E. 164 number of Non-Local ID target. | +| Event type indicating SMS over NAS. | +| Event date
Date of the event generation in the ICE. | +| Event time
Time of the event generation in the ICE. Timestamp shall be generated relative to ICE internal clock. | +| Location Information (if available). If the information in the MME received over S1 (TS 36.413 [91]) includes one or more cell IDs, then all cell IDs shall be reported to the LEMF whenever location reporting is triggered at the MME. | +| Time of Location
Date/Time of location. The time when location was obtained by the location source node. | +| Network Element Identifier
Unique identifier for the ICE reporting the event. | +| SMS
The SMS content with SMS header which is sent with the SMS-service. The header also includes the SMS-Centre address. | +| SMS Initiator
SMS indicator whether the SMS is MO or MT or undefined. | +| IA
The observed Interception Areas. | + +#### 18.2.4.3 SMS over NAS + +For SMS-MO, the event is generated in the MME. Dependent on national requirements, event generation shall occur in the following cases: + +- when the MME receives the SMS from the target MS, or when the MME detects that an SMS is to the Non-Local ID target. +- when the SMS that was originated from the target MS, or sent to the Non-Local ID target. + +For SMS-MT, the event is generated in the MME. Dependent on national requirements, event generation shall occur in the following cases: + +- when the MME receives the SMS originated from a Non-Local ID target, or one that will have to be sent to a target MS. +- when the MME receives notification that recipient MS has received the SMS successfully. The recipient MS is the target MS when the SMS is sent to the target. The recipient MS may not be the target when the SMS was originating from a Non-Local ID target. + +Data over NAS for Internet of Things is for further study. + +These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available: + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed Non-Local ID | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| SMS | +| SMS Initiator | +| IAs (if applicable) | + +## 18.3 MMS + +### 18.3.1 Background + +Clause 7.6 defines an interception solution for MMS over GPRS/UMTS whereby the packet IP stream is sent to the DF and onto to the LEMF for LE to extract the MMS information. However, that solution does not allow for the separate delivery of MMS from other services. In fact, that approach necessitates the interception and delivery of a packet data session which may not be authorized for interception. This clause defines an approach to intercept and deliver only MMS related events and deliver those separate from any other services that may or may not be intercepted. + +It is a national option for the CSP and LEA to agree on the maximum size of and MMS to be delivered to the LEMF. If the MMS is bigger than the agreed size it is a national option for what to do (e.g. don't deliver it to the LEMF). + +MMS service is defined in TS 22.140 [74], OMA's MMS Architecture OMA-AD-MMS-V1\_3-20110913-A [72], and OMA's Multimedia Messaging Service Encapsulation Protocol OMA-TS-MMS\_ENC-V1\_3-20110913-A [73]. + +The key network elements involved in the support of MMS is the MMS Proxy-Relay. The MMS Proxy-Relay is responsible for: + +- 1) receiving a MMS from a served UE and forwarding that to the MMS Proxy-Relay of the destination UE, +- 2) receiving a MMS from an originating MMS Proxy-Relay and forwarding this MMS or a notification of it to its served UE, +- 3) receiving a request for retrieval of an MMS from a served UE and delivering that MMS to the served UE, +- 4) providing the served UE with delivery status and read reports of served UE originated MMS +- 5) providing a MMS/Relay of another UE with delivery status and read reports of MMS received for the served UE. + +When a Non-Local Id is used as target identity, the interception shall be performed at the MMS Proxy Relay. For MMS messages originated from a target with Non-Local ID, the target is identified from FROM field. For MMS messages to the target with Non-Local ID, the target are identified from TO, CC and BCC fields. The interception may be triggered on the value address defined in the clause 8 of MMS addressing model of OMA's Multimedia Messaging Service Encapsulation Protocol OMA-TS-MMS\_ENC-V1\_3-20110913-A [73]. + +LI for MMS requires IRI and CC related to the MMS to be detected by the MMS Proxy-Relay and forwarded to the DF. + +![Figure 18.1: MMS Proxy-Relay Intercept configuration. The diagram shows a stack of three LEMF (Line Element Monitoring Function) units on the left. Each LEMF is connected to a horizontal interface line labeled HI1, HI2, and HI3. Above HI1 is the ADMF (Access Management Function) block, which contains a 'Mediation Function' box. Above HI2 is a block containing 'Mediation Function' and 'Delivery Function 2'. Above HI3 is a block containing 'Mediation Function' and 'Delivery Function 3'. To the right of the ADMF block are three vertical dashed lines labeled X1_1, X1_2, and X1_3. To the right of the 'Delivery Function 2' block is a vertical dashed line labeled X2. To the right of the 'Delivery Function 3' block is a vertical dashed line labeled X3. A 'Proxy-Relay' block is on the far right. Arrows indicate data flow: from X1_1 to the Proxy-Relay, from X2 to 'Delivery Function 2', and from X3 to 'Delivery Function 3'.](9252ccfbbe9e34cb108f0060f2b563f1_img.jpg) + +Figure 18.1: MMS Proxy-Relay Intercept configuration. The diagram shows a stack of three LEMF (Line Element Monitoring Function) units on the left. Each LEMF is connected to a horizontal interface line labeled HI1, HI2, and HI3. Above HI1 is the ADMF (Access Management Function) block, which contains a 'Mediation Function' box. Above HI2 is a block containing 'Mediation Function' and 'Delivery Function 2'. Above HI3 is a block containing 'Mediation Function' and 'Delivery Function 3'. To the right of the ADMF block are three vertical dashed lines labeled X1\_1, X1\_2, and X1\_3. To the right of the 'Delivery Function 2' block is a vertical dashed line labeled X2. To the right of the 'Delivery Function 3' block is a vertical dashed line labeled X3. A 'Proxy-Relay' block is on the far right. Arrows indicate data flow: from X1\_1 to the Proxy-Relay, from X2 to 'Delivery Function 2', and from X3 to 'Delivery Function 3'. + +**Figure 18.1: MMS Proxy-Relay Intercept configuration** + +### 18.3.2 MMS Architecture IRI/CC Events + +The MMS architecture is provided in Clause 5 of MMS Architecture [72]. The two interfaces considered in developing the events and event information to be reported are the MMSM interface (between the MMS client and the MMS Proxy-Relay) and the MMSR interface (i.e., between two MMS Proxy-Relay nodes). + +For separate delivery of MMS, the following events shall be reported by the ICE to the DF: + +- 1) MMS Send +- 2) MMS Notification & Confirmation +- 3) MMS Retrieval Confirmation & Acknowledgement +- 4) MMS Forwarding +- 5) MMS Store Requests +- 6) MMS Viewing Requests & Responses +- 7) MMS Deletion Requests (delete from MMBox and Proxy-Relay) +- 8) MMS Cancel Requests +- 9) MMS Delivery Reports +- 10) MMS Read Report. + +The above events shall be reported from the ICE to the DF independent of any other services that may or may not be intercepted. + +The following events shall be reported by the HSS: + +- 1) Serving System (clause 7.4.9) +- 2) Serving Evolved Packet System (clauses 12.2.3.8, 12.4.3.10, 12.5.3.5). + +A set of elements as shown below can be associated with the events. The events trigger the transmission of the information from the nodes to DF2. Available IEs from this set of elements as shown below can be extended in the nodes, if this is necessary as a national option. DF2 can extend available information if this is necessary as a national option. Where MMS CC is available during an event, in addition to the IRI event reported to DF2, an MMS CC event is reported to DF3. + +##### **Table 18.3.2-1 Table of MMS Information Elements** + +| | | +|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | MSISDN of the target. | +| Observed IMSI | IMSI of the target. | +| Observed MMS Address | An address in a format as specified in [73]. This is where a SIP URI would be included. | +| Observed MMS Address for Non-Local ID | An address in a format as specified in [73] that will be intercepted as Non-Local ID target. | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | An IPv4 or IPv6 address of the target. | +| Observed shortcode | An address in a format as specified in [73]. | +| Event type | Indicates which type of event is delivered: MMS Send, MMS Notification, MMS Notification Response, MMS Retrieval, MMS Retrieval Acknowledgement, MMS Forwarding, MMS Store, MMS Upload, MMS Delete from MMBox, MMS Delete from Proxy-Relay, MMS MMBox View, MMS Delivery, MMS Read Reply, MMS Cancel, MMS Cancel Confirm, MMS MMBox View Request, MMS MMBox View Confirm, Serving System, Serving Evolved System. | +| Event time | Time of the event generation in the ICE. Time stamp shall be generated relative to ICE internal clock. | +| Event date | Date of the event generation in the ICE. | +| Network Element Identifier | Unique identifier for the ICE (MMS Relay/Proxy) reporting the event. | +| To Recipient(s) address(es) | Address of a recipient; the "To" field may include addresses of multiple recipients. When address translation occurs, both the pre and post translated addresses (with appropriate correlation) are included. | +| CC Recipient(s) address(es) | Address of a recipient; the "CC" field may include addresses of multiple recipients. When address translation occurs, both the pre and post translated addresses (with appropriate correlation) are included. | +| BCC Recipient(s) address(es) | Address of a recipient; the "BCC" field may include addresses of multiple recipients. When address translation occurs, both the pre and post translated addresses (with appropriate correlation) are included. | +| From address | Address of the sender of the MM or read reply. The sender may be the originator or a forwarding user. When address translation occurs (in the case of a token sent by the client and replaced with a proper address by the MMS Proxy/Relay), both the pre and post translated addresses (with appropriate correlation) are included. | +| MMS Version | The version of MMS used by the target. | +| Transaction ID | An ID used to correlate an MMS request and response between the target and the MMS Proxy-Relay. | +| Message ID | An ID assigned by the MMS Proxy-Relay to uniquely identify an MMS message. | +| Message Reference | A reference, e.g., URI, for the MM which refers to the stored MM within the MMS Proxy-Relay or the MMBox. | +| Stored Message Reference | A reference, e.g., URI, for the MM which refers to the newly stored MM within the MMS Proxy-Relay or the MMBox. | +| MMS Date/Time | Date and Time when the MM was last handled (either originated or forwarded). For origination, included by the sending MMS client or the originating MMS Proxy-Relay. | +| Subject | Subject of the MM. | +| Message Class | Class of the MM. For example, a value of "auto" is automatically generated by the UE. If the field is not present, the class should be interpreted as "personal". | +| Expiry | Length of time the MM will be stored in MMS Proxy- Relay or time to delete the MM. The field has two formats, either absolute or relative. | +| Desired Delivery Time | Date and Time of desired delivery. Indicates the earliest possible delivery of the MM to the recipient. | +| Priority | Priority of the MM assigned by the originator MMS UE. | +| Sender Visibility | An indication that the sender's address should not be delivered to the recipient. | +| Delivery Report | Specifies whether the originator MMS UE requests a delivery report from each recipient. | +| Read Report | Specifies whether the originator MMS UE requests a read report from each recipient. | + +| | | +|------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Store | Specifies whether the originator MMS UE wants the submitted MM to be saved in the user's MMBox, in addition to sending it. | +| Applic-ID | Identification of the originating application of the original MM. | +| Reply-Applic-ID | Identification of the destination application of the original MM. | +| Aux-Applic-Info | Auxiliary application addressing information as indicated in the original MM. | +| Content Class | Classifies the content of the MM to the smallest content class to which the message belongs. | +| DRM Content | Indicates if the MM contains any DRM-protected element. | +| Adaptation Allowed | Indicates if the originator wishes the MM to be adapted or not. This wish can be overridden by DRM protection rules or MMS service provider / network operator configuration. | +| Content Type | The content type of the MM. | +| Previously Sent By | Address of the MMS Client that forwarded or originally sent the message and a sequence number. A higher sequence number indicates a forwarding event at a later point in time. This header field MAY appear multiple times. | +| Previously Sent by Date/Time | Date and time of a forwarding or original send transaction of the message and a sequence number. The sequence number indicates the correspondence to the MMS Client's address in the "X-Mms-Previously- Sent-By" header field with the same sequence number. This header field MAY appear multiple times. | +| MM State | Identifies the value of the MM State associated with a to be stored or stored MM. | +| MM Flags | Identifies a keyword to add or remove from the list of keywords associated with a stored MM. | +| Content Location | This field defines the location of the content to be retrieved. | +| Response Status | MMS specific status. | +| Response Status Text | Text that qualifies the Response Status. | +| Store Status | Indicates if the MM was successfully stored in the MMBox. | +| Store Status Text | Text that qualifies the Store Status. | +| Message Size | Identifies the size of the MM. | +| Distribution Indicator | Identifies whether the originator (e.g., a Value Added Service Provider) allows the MM to be further distributed. A "No" value indicates to the user that the originator requested the content of the MM is not supposed to be distributed further. | +| Element Descriptor | Contains the Content-Reference associated with the corresponding top level message content of the MM waiting for retrieval and MAY additionally contain the type/format of the message content. | +| Retrieval Mode | Indicates whether manual retrieval mode is recommended for the MM. | +| Retrieval Mode Text | Explains why manual retrieval mode is recommended for the MM. | +| Retrieve Status | MMS specific status. | +| Retrieve Status Text | Text that qualifies the Retrieve Status. | +| Replace ID | This field indicates the reference (i.e. Message-ID) of the previous MM that is replaced by the current MM. | +| MMS Status | Provides a MMS status. A status of "retrieved" is only signalled by the retrieving UE after retrieval of the MM. | +| MMS Status Text | Text that qualifies the MMS Status. | +| Report Allowed | Indication whether or not the sending of delivery report is allowed by the recipient MMS Client. | +| MMS Forward Req Date/Time | Date and Time that the MM was requested to be forwarded. | + +| | | +|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Read Status | Status of the MM regarding whether it was read or not, e.g. Read, Deleted without being read. | +| Read Status text | Text explanation corresponding to the Read Status. | +| Cancel ID | This field includes the Message ID identifying the message to be cancelled. | +| Cancel Status | Provides the status of the cancel request. | +| MMS Start | A number, indicating the index of the first MM of those selected to have information returned in the response. | +| MMS Limit | A number indicating the maximum number of selected MMs whose information are to be returned in the response. If this is absent, information elements from all remaining MMs are to be returned. If this is zero then no MM-related information are to be returned. | +| MMS Attributes | A list of information elements that should appear in the view for each selected message. | +| MMS Totals | Indicates a request for or the actual count of messages currently stored in the MMBox. | +| MMS Quotas | Indicates a request for or the actual quotas for the user's MMBox in messages or bytes. | +| MMS Message Count | Identifies the number of messages in the content part of the PDU. | +| Correlation ID | Provides a mechanism to correlate IRI for MMS with CC for MMS based on a single MMS event. | +| MMS Content | The actual contents of the MM that is carried in the payload field of MMS messages. | + +Most of the parameters contained in Table 18.3.2-1 can be mapped to specific parameters defined in [73]. + +**Editor's Note:** Specific mapping for the parameters of Table 18.3.2-1 should be added in an update to the present document. + +Clause 8 of [73] defines procedures for address translation for MMS and it is those procedures that are referenced whenever Clause 18.3 of the present document refers to address translation. + +### 18.3.3 MMS Events + +#### 18.3.3.1 MMS Send + +The MMS Send event is generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay, when the MMS Proxy-Relay sends a M-Send.conf (as defined in [73]) to the target. According to [73], the Proxy-Relay sends a M-Send.conf to the target in response to a M-Send.req (as defined in [73]) received from the target for sending an MM to one or more destination party(ies). + +The elements of Table 18.3.3.1 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.1: Information Elements for MMS Send Event** + +| | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| To Recipient(s) address(es) (untranslated and translated) | +| CC Recipient(s) address(es) (untranslated and translated) | +| BCC Recipient(s) address(es) (untranslated and translated) | +| From address (includes both target provided address and if translation occurs, network substituted post-translation address. | +| MMS Version | +| Transaction ID | +| Message ID | +| MMS Date/Time | +| Message Class | +| Expiry | +| Desired Delivery Time | +| Priority | +| Sender Visibility | +| Delivery Report | +| Read Report | +| Store | +| Applic ID | +| Reply Applic ID | +| Content Class | +| DRM Content | +| Adaptation Allowed | +| Content Type | +| Content Location (from M-Send.conf) | +| Response Status (from M-Send.conf) | +| Response Status Text (from M-Send.conf) | +| Store Status (from M-Send.conf) | +| Store Status Text (from M-Send.conf) | +| Correlation (only if MMS CC is also intercepted) | + +When the MMS Send event is generated and interception of CC is required, the MMS Send CC event is also generated. In this case, the elements of Table 18.3.3.2 will be delivered to the DF3, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.2: Information Elements for MMS Send CC Event** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| MMS Version | +| Correlation ID | +| Subject | +| MMS Content | + +#### 18.3.3.2 MMS Notification & Response + +The MMS Notification report event is generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay, when the MMS Proxy-Relay sends a MMS + +Notification (M-Notification.ind as defined in [73]) to the target indicating the arrival of an MMS for the target. + +The elements of Table 18.3.3.3 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.3: Information Elements for MMS Notification Event** + +| | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| To Recipient(s) addresses | +| CC Recipient(s) addresses | +| BCC Recipient(s) addresses | +| From address (included regardless of anonymity) | +| MMS Version | +| Transaction ID | +| Message ID | +| MMS Date/Time (Timestamp when this MMS was last handled [either originated or forwarded]) | +| Previously Sent By | +| Previously Sent By Date/Time (May appear multiple times) | +| MM State | +| Message Class | +| Priority | +| Message Size | +| Expiry | +| Distribution Indicator | +| Element Descriptor | +| Retrieval Mode | +| Retrieval Mode Text | +| Sender Visibility | +| Delivery Report | +| Applic ID | +| Reply Applic ID | +| Aux Applic Info | +| DRM Content | +| Replace ID | +| Content Location | +| Correlation ID (only if MMS CC is to be delivered) | + +The MMS Notification Response report event is generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay, when the MMS Proxy-Relay receives a MMS Notification Response (M-NotifyResp.ind as defined in [73]) from the target acknowledging the MMS Notification. + +The elements of Table 18.3.3.4 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.4: Information Elements for MMS Notification Response Event** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| MMS Version | +| Transaction ID | +| Message ID | +| MMS Status | +| Report Allowed | + +#### 18.3.3.3 MMS Retrieval & Acknowledgement + +The MMS Retrieval report event is generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay when the MMS Proxy-Relay sends a Retrieve.conf PDU (as defined in [73]) to the target. According to [73], the MMS Proxy-Relay sends a Retrieve.conf PDU to the target in response to a MMS retrieval request from the target. + +The elements of Table 18.3.3.5 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.5: Information Elements for MMS Retrieval Event** + +| | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| To Recipient(s) addresses | +| CC Recipient(s) addresses | +| BCC Recipient(s) addresses | +| From address (included regardless of anonymity) | +| MMS Version | +| Transaction ID | +| Message ID | +| MMS Date/Time (Timestamp when this MMS was last handled [either originated or forwarded]) | +| Previously Sent By | +| Previously Sent By Date/Time (May appear multiple times) | +| MM State | +| Message Class | +| Priority | +| Sender Visibility | +| Delivery Report | +| Read Report | +| Retrieve Status | +| Retrieve Status Text | +| Distribution Indicator | +| Applic ID | +| Reply Applic ID | +| Aux Applic Info | +| Content Class | +| DRM Content | +| Replace ID | +| Correlation ID (only if MMS CC is also intercepted) | + +When the MMS Retrieval event is generated and CC interception is required, the MMS Retrieval CC event shall also be generated. In this case, the elements of Table 18.3.3.6 will be delivered to the DF3, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.6: Information Elements for MMS Retrieval CC Event** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| MMS Version | +| Subject | +| Correlation ID | +| MMS Content | + +The MMS Retrieval Acknowledgement report event is generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay, when the MMS Proxy-Relay receives a MMS Retrieval Acknowledgement (M-Acknowledge.ind as defined in [73]) from the target acknowledging the transaction to the MMS Proxy-Relay. + +The elements of Table 18.3.3.7 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.7: Information Elements for MMS Retrieval Acknowledgement Event** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| MMS Version | +| Transaction ID | +| Message ID | +| Report Allowed | + +#### 18.3.3.4 MMS Forwarding + +The MMS Forwarding report event is generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay, when the MMS Proxy-Relay sends a M-Forward.conf (as defined in [73]) to the target. According to [73], the MMS Proxy-Relay sends a M-Forward.conf (as defined in [73]) to the target is response to a received a MMS Forwarding Request (M-Forward.ind as defined in [73]) from the target. + +The elements of Table 18.3.3.8 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.8: Information Elements for MMS Forwarding Event** + +| | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| To Recipient(s) address(es) (untranslated and translated) | +| CC Recipient(s) address(es) (untranslated and translated) | +| BCC Recipient(s) address(es) (untranslated and translated) | +| From address (includes both target provided address and if translation occurs, network substituted post-translation target address. | +| MMS Version | +| Transaction ID | +| Message ID | +| MMS Forward Req Date/Time | +| Message Class | +| Expiry | +| Desired Delivery Time | +| Priority | +| Sender Visibility | +| Delivery Report Allowed | +| Delivery Report | +| Read Report | +| Store | +| MM State | +| Content Location | +| Response Status (from M-Forward.conf) | +| Response Status Text (from M-Forward.conf) | +| Store Status (from M-Forward.conf) | +| Store Status Text (from M-Forward.conf) | + +#### 18.3.3.5 MMS Store + +The MMS Store report event is generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay, when the MMS Proxy-Relay sends a M-Mmbox-Store.conf (defined in [73]) to the target. According to [73], the Proxy-Relay sends a M-Mmbox-Store.conf) to the target in response to a received MMS Store Request (M-Mmbox-Store.req as defined in [73]) from the target for a MM that has not been retrieved yet. + +The elements of Table 18.3.3.9 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.9: Information Elements for MMS Store Event** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Transaction ID | +| MMS Version | +| Content Location | +| MM State | +| MM Flags | +| Store Status | +| Store Status Text | + +#### 18.3.3.6 MMS Upload + +The MMS Upload report event is generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay, when the MMS Proxy-Relay sends a M-Mmbox-Upload.conf (defined in [73]) to the target. According to [73], the MSM Proxy-Relay sends a M-Mmbox-Upload.conf to the target in response to a received MMS Upload Request (M-Mmbox-Upload.req as (defined in [73]) from the target. + +The elements of Table 18.3.3.10 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.10: Information Elements for MMS Upload Event** + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Transaction ID | +| MMS Version | +| MM State | +| MM Flags | +| Content Type | +| MM Description PDU (see Table 18.3.3.19) | +| Content Location (from M-Mmbox-Upload.conf) | +| Store Status (from M-Mmbox-Upload.conf) | +| Store Status Text (from M-Mmbox-Upload.conf) | +| Correlation ID (only if MMS CC is also intercepted) | + +When the MMS Upload event is generated and CC interception is also required, an MMS Upload CC event is also generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay. In this case, the elements of Table 18.3.3.11 will be delivered to the DF3, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.11: Information Elements for MMS Upload CC Event** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| MMS Version | +| Correlation ID | +| MMS Content | + +#### 18.3.3.7 MMS Delete (Stored in MMBox or in Proxy-Relay) + +The MMS Delete event is generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay when the MMS Proxy-Relay sends a M-Mmbox-Delete.conf (defined in [73]) to the target. According to [73], the MMS Proxy-Relay sends a M-Mmbox-Delete.conf to the target in response to a received a MMS Delete Request (M-Mmbox-Delete.req as defined in [73]) from the target to delete an MM from the target's MMBox. + +The elements of Table 18.3.3.12 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.12: Information Elements for MMS Delete Event** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Transaction ID | +| MMS Version | +| Content Location | +| Response Status | +| Response Status Text | + +#### 18.3.3.8 MMS Delivery + +The MMS Delivery report event is generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay, when the MMS Proxy-Relay sends a MMS Delivery Notification (M-Delivery.ind as defined in [73]) to the target. + +The elements of Table 18.3.3.13 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.13: Information Elements for MMS Delivery Event** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| To Recipient address | +| Handled Date/Time | +| Message ID | +| MMS Status | +| MMS Status text | +| Applic-ID | +| Reply-Applic-ID | +| Aux-Applic-Info | + +#### 18.3.3.9 MMS Read Reply + +The MMS Read Reply-From-Target report event is generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay, when the MMS Proxy-Relay receives a MMS Read Reply Notification (M-Read-Rec.ind as defined in [73]) from the target. The elements of Table 18.3.3.14 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +The MMS Read Reply-To-Target report event is generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay, when the MMS Proxy-Relay sends a MMS Read Reply Notification (M-Read-Orig.ind as defined in [73]) to the target. The elements of Table 18.3.3.15 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.14: Information Elements for MMS Read Reply from Target Event** + +| | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| To (MMS sender's address) | +| From address (includes both target provided address and if translation occurs, network substituted post-translation target address). | +| Message ID | +| Read Status | +| Applic-ID | +| Reply-Applic-ID | +| Aux-Applic-Info | + +**Table 18.3.3.15: Information Elements for MMS Read Reply to Target Event** + +| | +|----------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| To (target's address) | +| From address (address of read reply source). | +| Message ID | +| Read Status | +| Read Status text | +| Applic-ID | +| Reply-Applic-ID | +| Aux-Applic-Info | + +#### 18.3.3.10 MMS Cancel + +The MMS Cancel report event is generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay, when the MMS Proxy-Relay sends a MMS Cancel Request (M-Cancel.req as defined in [73]) to the target. + +The elements of Table 18.3.3.16 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.16: Information Elements for MMS Cancel Event** + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| MMS Version | +| Cancel ID (includes the Message ID identifying the message to be cancelled) | +| Cancel Status | + +#### 18.3.3.12 MMS MMBox Viewing + +The MMS MMBox View Request event is generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay when the MMS Proxy-Relay receives a MMS MMBox Viewing Request (M-Mbox-View.req as defined in [73]) from the target. In this case, the elements of Table 18.3.3.17 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +The MMS MMBox View Confirm event is generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay when the MMS Proxy-Relay sends a M-Mbox-View.conf (defined in [73]). In this case, the elements of Table 18.3.3.18 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.17: Information Elements for MMS MMBox View Request Event** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| MMS Version | +| Transaction ID | +| MM State | +| MM Flags | +| Content Location | +| MMS Start | +| MMS Limit | +| MMS Attributes | +| MMS Totals | +| MMS Quotas | + +**Table 18.3.3.18: Information Elements for MMS MMBox View Confirm Event** + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| MMS Version | +| Transaction ID | +| MM State | +| MM Flags | +| Content Location | +| MMS Start | +| MMS Limit | +| MMS Attributes | +| MMS Totals | +| MMS Quotas | +| Response Status | +| Response Status Text | +| MMS Message Count | +| Content Type | +| Correlation ID (only if MMS CC is also intercepted) | +| MMBox Description PDU (see Table 18.3.3.19) | + +**Table 18.3.3.19: MM Description PDU** + +| | +|----------------------------------------------------------| +| Correlation ID | +| To Recipient(s) addresses | +| CC Recipient(s) addresses | +| BCC Recipient(s) addresses | +| From address (included regardless of anonymity) | +| Message ID | +| MMS Date/Time | +| Previously Sent By (May appear multiple times) | +| Previously Sent By Date/Time (May appear multiple times) | +| MM State | +| MM Flags | +| Message Class | +| Priority | +| Delivery Time | +| Expiry | +| Sender Visibility | +| Delivery Report | +| Read Report | +| Message Size | +| Content Location | +| Content Type | + +When the MMS MMBox View Confirm event is generated at the MMS Proxy-Relay and CC interception is also required, the MMS Proxy-Relay also generates a MMS MMBox View Confirm CC event. In this case, the elements of Table 18.3.3.20 will be delivered to the DF3, if available. + +**Table 18.3.3.20: Information Elements for MMS MMBox View Confirm CC Event** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Observed MMS Address | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| MMS Version | +| Correlation ID | +| MMS Content | + +# 19 Lawful Access Location Services (LALS) + +## 19.1 General + +LALS provides lawful access to the target's location using the Location Services (LCS) capabilities defined in the TS 23.271 [68] and OMA MLP TS [76]. The present clause details the stage 2 Lawful Interception architecture and functions that are needed to provide the LCS information to the DF2 for a target of interception for subsequent delivery to the LEMF. Commercial LCS shall meet Clause 8 security requirements and provide priority to Lawful interception requests. + +NOTE 1: For inbound roamers, if the VPLMN LCS Server/GMLC queries HSS/HLR in the HPLMN, this may cause detectability issues. Similarly for outbound roamers, sending location requests to the VPLMN may cause detectability issues. + +For LALS the subscriber location privacy settings shall be overridden. + +Depending on national requirements and LCS capabilities of the network operator, the location information provided by LALS may vary in location information types (mobile network location format, location shape and geo-coordinates, civic address, or a combination of those), in the set of additional location parameters (map data, motion state, speed, + +etc.), as well as in the accuracy of provided location information. + +NOTE 2: The accuracy of positioning for any particular technology is a trade-off for the location acquisition delay. It also depends on other technology specific factors. + +The parameters controlling the LALS output are either delivered per authorization over HI1/X1 interface or pre-configured in the LI-LCS client. + +There are two types of the location interception defined in the present specification: the Target Positioning and the Enhanced Location for IRI. + +The Target Positioning is used to determine the target's location independently of the services used by the target. + +The Enhanced Location for IRI is used to determine the LCS-based location of the target when specific user service events related to the target occur. + +The authorizations for Target Positioning and for Enhanced Location for the same target may be independent of each other and may be overlapping in time or combined in a single intercept authorization by LEA. + +There may be multiple active LALS authorizations from different LEAs at any given time. + +## 19.2 Target Positioning + +### 19.2.1 General + +There are two Target Positioning provision variants supported in the current specification - the Immediate Location and the Periodic Location. + +Figure 19.2.1 shows the architecture for the LALS where the LI LCS Client provides the target's location and associated information towards the DF2 over the X2 interface fulfilling the Target Positioning ADMF authorization delivered over X1\_1 interface. + +![Figure 19.2.1: LALS Model for Target Positioning. The diagram shows the architecture for LALS. On the left, a vertical stack of boxes represents the LEMF. Two horizontal lines, HI1 and HI2, connect the LEMF to two separate boxes. The top box contains 'Mediation Function' and 'ADMF'. The bottom box contains 'Mediation Function' and 'Delivery Function 2'. Arrows labeled X1_1 and X1_2 point from the 'ADMF' and 'Delivery Function 2' boxes respectively to a box labeled 'LI-LCS Client'. An arrow labeled X2 points from the 'LI-LCS Client' box to the 'Delivery Function 2' box. A double-headed arrow labeled Le connects the 'LI-LCS Client' box to a box labeled 'LCS Server/GMLC'.](a97a427b0f8a6387479a88cd85b2a1a6_img.jpg) + +Figure 19.2.1: LALS Model for Target Positioning. The diagram shows the architecture for LALS. On the left, a vertical stack of boxes represents the LEMF. Two horizontal lines, HI1 and HI2, connect the LEMF to two separate boxes. The top box contains 'Mediation Function' and 'ADMF'. The bottom box contains 'Mediation Function' and 'Delivery Function 2'. Arrows labeled X1\_1 and X1\_2 point from the 'ADMF' and 'Delivery Function 2' boxes respectively to a box labeled 'LI-LCS Client'. An arrow labeled X2 points from the 'LI-LCS Client' box to the 'Delivery Function 2' box. A double-headed arrow labeled Le connects the 'LI-LCS Client' box to a box labeled 'LCS Server/GMLC'. + +Figure 19.2.1: LALS Model for Target Positioning + +### 19.2.1 Immediate Location Provision + +The authorization for Immediate Location provision is delivered to LI LCS Client over X1\_1 interface. Upon receiving the authorization the LI LCS Client initiates a Location Immediate Request (LIR, see TS 23.271 [68]) with the LCS Server/GMLC over Le interface and reports the acquired location to the DF2 over X2. + +During the period of active authorization for Immediate Location the LI LCS client may receive and process additional Immediate Location requests from AMDF over the X1\_1. + +NOTE: The LCS Server/GMLC may be optimized to provide the same single location estimation in response to multiple positioning requests arriving in temporal proximity of each other. + +The resulting Immediate Location intercept product is delivered over X2 to the DF2 and propagated to the LEMF over HI2. + +### 19.2.2 Periodic Location Provision + +The authorization for Periodic Location provision is delivered to LI LCS Client over X1\_1 interface. + +During the Periodic Location authorization the LI LCS Client shall produce the LALS Reports with the specified periodicity. + +The periodicity shall be controlled by the LI LCS Client. The LI LCS Client shall issue a series of Location Immediate Requests (LIR, see TS 23.271 [68]) at required time intervals. + +The LI LCS Client provides the acquired location reports to the DF2 over X2. + +The Request for Periodic Location from ADMF to LI LCS Client may be accompanied by a set of parameters defining the time interval for reporting, report periodicity, etc. The description of the service response parameters is provided in clause 19.4. The Periodic Location intercept product is delivered over X2 to the DF2 and propagated to LEMF over HI2. + +## 19.3 Enhanced Location for IRI + +### 19.3.1 General + +The Enhanced Location for IRI refers to a capability providing LCS-based location information when specific user service events related to the target of interception occur. An example of such service events are the events of IMS session initiation and termination. + +Figure 19.3.1-1 depicts the architecture of Enhanced Location acquisition and delivery for the case when the LTF is associated with an IRI ICE. + +![Figure 19.3.1-1: LALS Model for Enhanced Location for IRI (ICE/LTF option). The diagram shows the flow of location information from the LEMF through various functions to the LI-LCS Client and finally to the LCS Server/GMLC. The LEMF sends data over HI1 to the ADMF's Mediation Function and over HI2 to the Delivery Function 2's Mediation Function. The ADMF sends data over X1_1 to the LI-LCS Client and over X1_2 to the Delivery Function 2. The Delivery Function 2 sends data over X2 to the LI-LCS Client. The LI-LCS Client sends data over Le to the LCS Server/GMLC. The LI-LCS Client also sends data over LALS_T to the IRI ICE and LTF block.](f5d4c136ae38b454ba9212fa9b37193c_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + LEMF[LEMF] -- HI1 --> MF1[Mediation Function] + MF1 --> ADMF[ADMF] + LEMF -- HI2 --> MF2[Mediation Function] + MF2 --> DF2[Delivery Function 2] + ADMF -- X1_1 --> LI_LCS_Client[LI-LCS Client] + ADMF -- X1_2 --> DF2 + DF2 -- X2 --> LI_LCS_Client + LI_LCS_Client -- Le --> LCS_Server_GMLC[LCS Server/GMLC] + LI_LCS_Client -- LALS_T --> IRI_ICE_LTF[IRI ICE LTF] + +``` + +Figure 19.3.1-1: LALS Model for Enhanced Location for IRI (ICE/LTF option). The diagram shows the flow of location information from the LEMF through various functions to the LI-LCS Client and finally to the LCS Server/GMLC. The LEMF sends data over HI1 to the ADMF's Mediation Function and over HI2 to the Delivery Function 2's Mediation Function. The ADMF sends data over X1\_1 to the LI-LCS Client and over X1\_2 to the Delivery Function 2. The Delivery Function 2 sends data over X2 to the LI-LCS Client. The LI-LCS Client sends data over Le to the LCS Server/GMLC. The LI-LCS Client also sends data over LALS\_T to the IRI ICE and LTF block. + +**Figure 19.3.1-1: LALS Model for Enhanced Location for IRI (ICE/LTF option)** + +Figure 19.3.1-2 depicts the architecture of Enhanced Location acquisition and delivery for the case when the LTF is associated with a DF2. + +![Figure 19.3.1-2: LALS Model for Enhanced Location for IRI (DF/LTF option). The diagram shows the interaction between LEMF, ADMF, Delivery Function 2 (DF2), LI-LCS Client, IRI ICE, and LCS Server/GMLC. LEMF connects to ADMF via HI1 and to DF2 via HI2. ADMF sends X1_1 to LI-LCS Client and X1_2 to DF2. DF2 contains Mediation Function, Delivery Function 2, and LTF. IRI ICE sends X2 to LTF. LTF sends LALS_T to LI-LCS Client. LI-LCS Client sends X2 to DF2 and Le to LCS Server/GMLC.](9b1ec0090070bdf52ea28763b8d52477_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + LEMF[LEMF] -- HI1 --> ADMF[ADMF] + LEMF -- HI2 --> DF2[Delivery Function 2] + ADMF -- X1_1 --> LI_LCS_Client[LI-LCS Client] + ADMF -- X1_2 --> DF2 + DF2 -- X2 --> LI_LCS_Client + IRI_ICE[IRI ICE] -- X2 --> LTF[LTF] + LTF -- LALS_T --> LI_LCS_Client + LI_LCS_Client -- Le --> LCS_Server_GMLC[LCS Server/GMLC] + +``` + +Figure 19.3.1-2: LALS Model for Enhanced Location for IRI (DF/LTF option). The diagram shows the interaction between LEMF, ADMF, Delivery Function 2 (DF2), LI-LCS Client, IRI ICE, and LCS Server/GMLC. LEMF connects to ADMF via HI1 and to DF2 via HI2. ADMF sends X1\_1 to LI-LCS Client and X1\_2 to DF2. DF2 contains Mediation Function, Delivery Function 2, and LTF. IRI ICE sends X2 to LTF. LTF sends LALS\_T to LI-LCS Client. LI-LCS Client sends X2 to DF2 and Le to LCS Server/GMLC. + +**Figure 19.3.1-2: LALS Model for Enhanced Location for IRI (DF/LTF option)** + +### 19.3.2 LALS Triggering Function + +The LALS Enhanced Location architecture in Figures 19.3.1-1 and 19.3.1-2 depicts the LALS Triggering Function (LTF). LTF is associated with an IRI ICE or with a DF2/MF and is responsible for triggering the LI LCS Client when a specific event related to the target is observed at the IRI ICE, or received at the DF2. + +The request for Enhanced Location reporting for IRI is delivered from ADMF to either an ICE over X1\_1 or to a DF2 over X1\_2 interface along with other parameters of IRI intercept authorization/activation. The ICE(s) or the DF2 then arm the LTF(s). + +The ICE nodes that may have an associated LTF include P/S-CSCF, IMS AS, HLR, HSS, MSC Server, MME, S/GGSN, P/S-GW. + +The LTF triggers the LI LCS Client over the LALS\_T interface. + +The LALS intercept product is delivered to DF2 from the LI LCS client over X2 interface asynchronously with the associated IRI event reports generated by an IRI ICE. To enable correlation between the LALS Reports and the associated IRI Events the LTF shall include the Correlation Identifier from the IRI Event, if available, into the LALS\_T trigger. + +NOTE 1: The IRI events may contain the location information obtained by other means, e.g. NPLI. The LALS reports are augmenting that information with extra details and accuracy. + +The LALS\_T interface for the LALS intercept trigger shall adhere to the security requirements outlined in Clause 8. + +NOTE 2: Detailed definition of the LALS\_T interface is out of scope of the current specification. + +## 19.4 X2-interface for Target Positioning and Enhanced Location + +### 19.4.1 General + +The following information needs to be transferred from the LI LCS Client to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity; +- other target identities, if available; +- event date/time; + +- target location and extended location parameters, if available; +- date/time of Location (if target location provided); +- correlation information (in case of Extended Location for IRI reporting); +- error code, if the positioning fails. + +### 19.4.2 LALS Information Elements + +A set of possible elements as shown in Table 19.4.2-1 are used to generate the reports. + +**Table 19.4.2-1: Information Elements for LALS Records** + +| | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Element | +| Observed IMSI
IMSI of the target. | +| Observed Other Identities
Other Identities of the target (MSISDN, IMEI, SIP-URI, TEL-URI) | +| Event date
Date of the report generation by the LI LCS Client | +| Event time
Time of the report generation by the LI LCS Client | +| Network Element Identifier
Unique identifier of the LI LCS Client | +| Location Information
Geographical Location and/or Civic Location | +| Time of Location
Date/Time of location. The time when location was obtained by the location source node. | +| Extended Location Parameters
Additional location information and associated QoS information | +| Correlation Identifier
Correlation information to allow the DF2 and/or LEMF to correlate LALS events with the triggering IRI events for the Enhanced Location for IRI | +| Additional location information and associated QoS information | + +### 19.4.3 Structure of LALS Records + +#### 19.4.3.1 Target Positioning Reporting + +This record will be generated when a response to the LIR (Location Immediate Request) is received from LCS for either Immediate or Periodic Target Positioning service. + +If the target cannot be located, i.e. no response is received from the LCS in a predefined period or the LCS indicates failure to position the target, the record will contain an error code instead of the location information. + +NOTE 1: Void + +The information elements shown in Table 19.4.3.1-1, if available, will be delivered to the DF2 by the LI LCS Client. + +**Table 19.4.3.1-1: Target Positioning Report** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed Other Identities | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| Extended Location Parameters | +| Location Error Code | + +NOTE 2: Each target may have multiple active Periodic Location authorizations with different periodicity settings. + +#### 19.4.3.2 Triggered Location Reporting + +This record is generated when an LCS response to LI LCS request triggered by an IRI ICE is received (for Enhanced Location for IRI service). The elements, shown in Table 19.4.3.2-1 will be delivered to the DF2, if available. This record contains a Correlation Identifier parameter allowing to correlate the Location Reports with the corresponding IRI events. + +If the target cannot be located, i.e. no response is received from the LCS in a predefined period after the triggering or the LCS server indicates failure to position the target, the record will contain an error code instead of the location information. + +**Table 19.4.3.2-1: Triggered Location** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed Other Identities | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Location Information | +| Time of Location | +| Extended Location Parameters | +| Correlation Identifier | + +# --- 20 Lawful interception in the VPLMN with S8HR Roaming Architecture + +## 20.1 Architecture + +### 20.1.1 Overview + +When S8HR approach is used as the roaming architecture for VoLTE, all of the IMS nodes reside in the HPLMN. National regulations may require the VPLMN to have the capabilities to perform the lawful interception of voice services involving the inbound roaming targets. The LI capabilities provided in the VPLMN with S8HR approach as the roaming architecture shall be to the same extent as the LI capabilities provided in the VPLMN with LBO approach as the roaming architecture. + +The IMS signalling messages are exchanged between the UE and the P-CSCF (in HPLMN with S8HR) and the media is exchanged between the UE and the PDN-GW (in HPLMN with S8HR). Within the VPLMN with S8HR, the IMS signalling messages are carried over the GTP tunnel that corresponds to the IMS Signalling Bearer and the media packets are carried over the GTP tunnel that corresponds to the Media Bearer. (i.e. a dedicated EPS Bearer used to carry the media packets). The present document assumes that the EPS Bearer ID of the IMS Signalling Bearer is always linked to the dedicated EPS Bearer used as a Media Bearer. + +New LI-specific functions are introduced to examine the packets that flow through the VPLMN packet core network nodes (i.e. S-GW) to generate IRI and CC when the communication involves an inbound roaming target. The LI architecture diagram shown in figure 1j is redrawn below with focus on the new LI specific functions and the reference points. + +NOTE: The overall architecture and functions related to the lawful interception of voice services of inbound roaming targets with S8HR as the roaming architecture is also referred in the present document as S8HR LI. + +![Figure 20.1 S8HR LI Architecture diagram showing the flow of data and control plane information between various network functions.](56a5265d174ce056c1dbe5e7a60839fc_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + Inbound[Inbound Roaming Target] --- Serving[Serving GW/BBIFF] + Serving --- Other[Other Party] + Serving -- Xia --> LMISF[LMISF] + LMISF -- Xib --> Serving + LMISF -- X2 --> DF2[Delivery Function 2] + LMISF -- X3 --> DF3[Delivery Function 3] + DF2 -- HI2 --> LEMF[LEMF] + DF3 -- HI3 --> LEMF + +``` + +The diagram illustrates the S8HR LI Architecture. At the top, an 'Inbound Roaming Target' and an 'Other Party' are connected to a 'Serving GW/BBIFF'. The 'Serving GW/BBIFF' is connected to an 'LMISF' via the 'Xia' reference point. The 'LMISF' sends control plane information back to the 'Serving GW/BBIFF' via the 'Xib' reference point. The 'LMISF' also sends user plane information to two 'Delivery Function' blocks, 'Delivery Function 2' and 'Delivery Function 3', via the 'X2' and 'X3' reference points respectively. These delivery functions then send the information to the 'LEMF' via the 'HI2' and 'HI3' reference points. + +Figure 20.1 S8HR LI Architecture diagram showing the flow of data and control plane information between various network functions. + +**Figure 20.1 S8HR LI Architecture** + +All the functions and reference points shown in figure 20.1 shall adhere to the security requirements specified in clause 8. + +A condition required for the operation of S8HR LI is that the IMS signalling messages and the media packets are not encrypted at S-GW/BBIFF. Furthermore, the S8HR LI solution requires that APNs can be identified as being used for S8HR and therefore those APNs can be used to identify the EPS Bearers used for inbound roamers with S8HR. + +Refer to Annex J for the detailed illustration of this architecture in reference to S8HR, the process flow steps and the call flows. + +### 20.1.2 LI specific Reference Points + +**Xia:** Reference point between S-GW/BBIFF and LMISF. This reference point is used to carry the user plane information from the S-GW/BBIFF to the LMISF. + +**Xib:** Reference point between LMISF and the S-GW/BBIFF. This reference point is used to exchange the control plane information between the LMISF and the S-GW/BBIFF. + +### 20.1.3 LI Specific Functions + +#### 20.1.3.1 Void + +#### 20.1.3.2 BBIFF: Bearer Binding Intercept and Forward Function + +BBIFF is a LI specific function introduced to support the lawful interception of voice services in the VPLMN when S8HR is used as the roaming architecture. + +BBIFF shall provide the following functions: + +- Receive a list of S8HR APNs and the packet forwarding rules that apply to all users from the LMISF over the Xib reference point. +- As per the LMISF instruction, notify the LMISF over Xib reference point whenever the IMS Signalling Bearer or the Media Bearer with S8HR APN is created, modified or deleted. In that notification, the UE location information received from the MME shall be included. +- As per the packet forwarding rules (i.e. as instructed by the LMISF), deliver the packets of all GTP tunnels used for IMS Signalling Bearer with S8HR APN to the LMISF over the Xia reference point. + +- Receive the intercepted IMS Signalling Bearer information from the LMISF over the Xib reference point along with the packet forwarding rules. +- Identify the dedicated EPS Bearer used as the Media Bearer linked to the above-indicated intercepted IMS Signalling Bearer. +- As per the packet forwarding rules (i.e. as instructed by the LMISF), deliver the packets of the GTP tunnel used for Media Bearer associated with the intercepted IMS Signalling Bearer to the LMISF over the Xia reference point. +- When instructed by the LMISF, stop delivering the packets of the GTP tunnels used for Media Bearers associated with the IMS Signalling Bearer with a deactivated interception. + +NOTE: The present document assumes that BBIFF is closely coupled to S-GW in the VPLMN. Therefore, present document refers to BBIFF as S-GW/BBIFF. + +#### 20.1.3.3 LMISF: LI Mirror IMS State Function + +LMISF is a LI specific function introduced to support the lawful interception of voice services in the VPLMN when S8HR is used as the roaming architecture. + +The LMISF shall provide the following functions: + +- Provide S8HR APN information to the S-GW/BBIFF over the Xib reference point. +- Instruct S-GW/BBIFF over Xib reference point to notify (to LMISF) whenever an IMS Signalling Bearer or a Media Bearer with S8HR APN is created, modified or deleted. +- Instruct S-GW/BBIFF over the Xib reference point to start delivering the packets (to LMISF) of all IMS Signalling Bearers with S8HR APN. +- Receive target identity information from the ADMF over the X1\_1 reference point as described in clause 5.1. +- Receive the notification from S-GW/BBIFF over the Xib reference point whenever an IMS Signalling Bearer or a Media Bearer with S8HR APN is created, modified or deleted. +- Store the IMS Signalling Bearer information (e.g. EPS Bearer ID) along with the IMSI associated with the UE to which the IMS Signalling Bearer was created, modified or deleted. Store or update the most recent UE location information received along with the IMS Signalling Bearer or the Media Bearer information. +- Receive and examine the IMS signalling messages delivered by the S-GW/BBIFF over the Xia reference point. +- Receive media packets delivered by the S-GW/BBIFF over the Xia reference point. Identify the intercepted IMS session that relates to the media packets. +- Maintain an IMS signalling state for all inbound roamers with S8HR that are registered to the network or in an IMS session. Part of this function is to track all IMS registrations, re-registrations and de-registrations of inbound roamers with S8HR. +- After examining and determining that the IMS signalling messages involves a target, establish and maintain a map between the target identity and the IMS Signalling Bearer information or the Media Bearer (e.g. EPS Bearer ID along with the IMSI value of the UE). When the IMS signalling messages do not involve a target, establish and maintain a map between the IMS Signalling Bearer or the Media Bearer information and the potential target identities. +- Generate and deliver the IRI to the Delivery Function 2 as described in clause 20.3. +- Inform the S-GW/BBIFF over the Xib reference point with the IMS Signalling Bearer information associated with an intercepted IMS session that requires CC interception and instruct the S-GW/BBIFF to start delivering the packets of the Media Bearer associated with that IMS Signalling Bearer. +- Inform the S-GW/BBIFF over the Xib reference point with the IMS Signalling Bearer information associated with a deactivated interception and instruct the S-GW/BBIFF to stop delivering the packets of the Media Bearer associated with that IMS Signalling Bearer. Generate and deliver the IRI messages to the Delivery Function 2 as described in clause 20.3. + +- Generate and deliver the CC to the Delivery Function 3 as described in clause 20.2. +- When target identity is received from the ADMF, determine whether any IMS Signalling Bearer is associated to the target identity. If yes, start the interception process as described in clause 20.3. +- Provide the decompression of IMS signalling messages upon detecting the compression. + +## 20.2 Provision of Content of Communications + +### 20.2.1 Overview + +#### 20.2.1.1 General + +For interception of content of communications of voice services involving the inbound roamers with S8HR, the following shall occur: + +- For each IMS session that is intercepted, LMISF determines whether a CC interception is required. +- When the CC is interception required, LMISF provides the IMS Signalling Bearer information to the S-GW/BBIFF (as described in clause 20.1.3.3) and instructs the S-GW/BBIFF (as described in clause 20.1.3.3) to start delivering the media packets (i.e. packets from the Media Bearer) associated with that IMS Signalling Bearer. +- S-GW/BBIFF delivers the media packets (i.e. packets from the Media Bearer) associated with the IMS Signalling Bearer (as described in clause 20.1.3.2) to the LMISF. + +The S-GW/BBIFF shall provide the LMISF a means to link the intercepted media packets with the associated IMS Signalling Bearer information provided by the LMISF (e.g. the delivered media packets include the EPS Bearer ID of the IMS Signalling Bearer along with the IMSI value of the UE). + +The LMISF shall include the Correlation Information (associated with the IMS session) in the CC delivered to the Delivery Function 3 over the X3 reference point. A pictorial view of the CC interception is illustrated in figure 20.2 below: + +![Figure 20.2: CC Interception of voice calls involving the inbound roaming target with S8HR. The diagram shows a flow from Inbound Roaming Target to Serving Gateway/BBIFF, then to LMISF, Delivery Function 3, and finally LEMF. It also shows media packets and intercepted IMS signaling bearer information being processed.](61a7f401eb46fe99a71f27bc37493f04_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + InboundRoamingTarget[Inbound Roaming Target] <--> ServingGatewayBBIFF[Serving Gateway/BBIFF] + ServingGatewayBBIFF <--> OtherParty[Other Party] + ServingGatewayBBIFF -- "[Media Packets] Xia" --> LMISF[LMISF] + LMISF -- "Xib [Intercepted IMS Signaling Bearer Information]" --> ServingGatewayBBIFF + LMISF -- "X3 CC with Correlation Identifier" --> DeliveryFunction3[Delivery Function 3] + DeliveryFunction3 -- "HI3 CC with Correlation Identifier" --> LEMF[LEMF] + +``` + +Figure 20.2: CC Interception of voice calls involving the inbound roaming target with S8HR. The diagram shows a flow from Inbound Roaming Target to Serving Gateway/BBIFF, then to LMISF, Delivery Function 3, and finally LEMF. It also shows media packets and intercepted IMS signaling bearer information being processed. + +**Figure 20.2: CC Interception of voice calls involving the inbound roaming target with S8HR** + +The figure 20.2 shows that LMISF provides the IMS Signalling Bearer Information to the S-GW/BBIFF. The S-GW/BBIFF uses the IMS Signalling Bearer information to find the associated Media Bearer. + +When the LMISF identifies that the CC interception is to be stopped, the following shall occur: + +- LMISF stops delivering the CC to Delivery Function 3 over the X3 reference point. +- LMISF provides the IMS Signalling Bearer information to the S-GW/BBIFF with an instruction (as described in clause 20.1.3.3) to stop the delivery of media packets (i.e. packets from the Media Bearer) associated with the IMS Signalling Bearer. +- S-GW/BBIFF stops the delivery of the media packets associated with the IMS Signalling Bearer (as described in clause 20.1.3.2) to the LMISF. + +#### 20.2.1.2 S-GW/BBIFF Procedures for CC Interception + +When instructed by the LMISF, the S-GW/BBIFF shall use the IMS Signalling Bearer information that it received from the LMISF to determine the media packets of which EPS Bearer (i.e. the Media Bearer) has to be delivered to the LMISF (e.g. EPS Bearer ID of IMS Signalling Bearer is linked to the EPS Bearer used as the Media Bearer). Then, the S-GW/BBIFF shall deliver all the octets above the GTP layer of the GTP tunnel used for the Media Bearer to the LMISF. + +S-GW/BBIFF shall indicate to the LMISF whether the media packets were travelling to or from the HPLMN (e.g. based on tunnel end point IDs). + +When instructed by the LMISF, the S-GW/BBIFF shall stop the delivery of media packets to the LMISF. + +#### 20.2.1.3 Void + +#### 20.2.1.4 LMISF Procedures for CC Interception + +Upon determining that the CC interception is required or is to be stopped for an IMS session, LMISF shall pass the IMS Signalling Bearer information to the S-GW/BBIFF with an instruction that indicates to the S-GW/BBIFF whether the packets from the Media Bearer associated with the IMS Signalling Bearer shall be delivered, or not delivered, to the LMISF. + +When the media packets are received from the S-GW/BBIFF, the LMISF shall determine whether the interception is active on the IMS session. If active, the LMISF shall determine the Correlation Identifier (or Correlation Number) associated with the IMS session to which the media corresponds. If the interception is not active, the LMISF shall discard the media packets. + +The LMISF shall construct the CC and deliver the same to the Delivery Function 3 over X3 reference point (see clause 20.2.2). + +### 20.2.2 X3-Interface + +For the delivery of intercepted media packets, the following information shall be passed from the LMISF to the Delivery Function 3 in addition to the intercepted media packets: + +- target identity; +- Correlation identifier; +- Time stamp (optional); +- Direction (indicates media is from or to the target) - optional. + +The Delivery Function 3 delivers the information to the LEMF over the HI3 interface based on the national regulations. + +## 20.3 Provision of Intercept Related Information + +### 20.3.1 Overview + +#### 20.3.1.1 General + +For interception of intercept related information of voice services involving the inbound roaming targets with S8HR, the following shall occur: + +- LMISF provides the S8HR APNs to the S-GW/BBIFF with an indication that all packets from the IMS Signalling Bearer with the S8HR APN are to be delivered to the LMISF. +- S-GW/BBIFF delivers the IMS signalling packets from the S8HR IMS Signalling Bearers to the LMISF. +- LMISF examines whether the IMS signalling messages involve a target and if so, it generates and delivers the IRI to the Delivery Function 2. + +The LMISF shall generate the IRI from the IMS signalling messages and deliver the same to the Delivery Function 2 over X2 reference point. All SIP messages executed on behalf of a target shall be delivered as IRI. + +The S-GW/BBIFF also notifies the LMISF whenever an S8HR IMS Signalling Bearer or a Media Bearer is created, modified, or deleted along with the IMSI value of the target UE and the location of the UE. + +A pictorial view of the general overview of IRI interception is illustrated in figure 20.3 below: + +![Diagram of IRI Interception of voice calls involving the inbound roamer with S8HR. The diagram shows a flow from Inbound Roaming Target to Serving Gateway/BBIFF to Other Party. Below the Serving Gateway/BBIFF, IMS Signalling Packets are sent via the Xia interface to the LMISF. The LMISF sends IRI with Correlation Identifier via the X2 interface to Delivery Function 2. Delivery Function 2 sends IRI with Correlation Identifier via the HI2 interface to the LEMF. The LMISF also sends S8HR APN information via the Xib interface to the Serving Gateway/BBIFF.](5801c19431e76330430e92a598cc7a16_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + InboundRoamingTarget[Inbound Roaming Target] <--> ServingGatewayBBIFF[Serving Gateway/BBIFF] + ServingGatewayBBIFF <--> OtherParty[Other Party] + IMSSignalling[IMS Signalling Packets] -- Xia --> LMISF[LMISF] + LMISF -- Xib --> S8HRAPN[S8HR APN] + LMISF -- Xib --> ServingGatewayBBIFF + LMISF -- X2 --> IRI1[IRI with Correlation Identifier] + IRI1 --> DeliveryFunction2[Delivery Function 2] + DeliveryFunction2 -- HI2 --> IRI2[IRI with Correlation Identifier] + IRI2 --> LEMF[LEMF] + +``` + +Diagram of IRI Interception of voice calls involving the inbound roamer with S8HR. The diagram shows a flow from Inbound Roaming Target to Serving Gateway/BBIFF to Other Party. Below the Serving Gateway/BBIFF, IMS Signalling Packets are sent via the Xia interface to the LMISF. The LMISF sends IRI with Correlation Identifier via the X2 interface to Delivery Function 2. Delivery Function 2 sends IRI with Correlation Identifier via the HI2 interface to the LEMF. The LMISF also sends S8HR APN information via the Xib interface to the Serving Gateway/BBIFF. + +**Figure 20.3: IRI Interception of voice calls involving the inbound roamer with S8HR** + +The figure 20.3 shows that LMISF provides the S8HR APNs to the S-GW/BBIFF. When the IMS signalling messages correspond to a target, the LMISF generates the IRI and deliver the same to the Delivery Function 2 which in turn delivers the IRI to the LEMF. + +To support the mid-call interception, the LMISF maintains the IMS call state (including any necessary information from the SIP messages). When the target identity provisioned into the LMISF is involved in an ongoing IMS call, the LMISF shall start the interception as described in clause 20.3.2. + +#### 20.3.1.2 Void + +#### 20.3.1.3 S-GW/BBIFF Procedures for IRI interception + +When instructed by the LMISF, the S-GW/BBIFF shall notify the LMISF whenever the IMS Signalling Bearer or the Media Bearer with S8HR APN is created, modified or deleted. + +When instructed by the LMISF, the S-GW/BBIFF shall deliver all the octets above the GTP layer of GTP tunnel used for IMS Signalling Bearer to the LMISF along with the associated with IMS Signalling Bearer information. + +#### 20.3.1.4 LMISF Procedures for IRI interception + +The LMISF shall receive the notification from S-GW/BBIFF whenever a GTP tunnel for IMS Signalling Bearer or a Media Bearer with S8HR APN is created, modified or deleted. The LMISF shall store the Tunnel information (Tunnel ID) of the GTP tunnel along with the IMSI associated with the UE to which the GTP tunnel was created. If delivered, the LMISF shall also store the UE location information along with the time that it has received the same from S-GW/BBIFF. + +The LMISF shall receive and examine the IMS signalling messages delivered by the S-GW/BBIFF. After examining and determining that an IMS signalling message involves a target, LMISF shall deliver the SIP message to the Delivery Function 2 over the X2 reference point (see clause 20.3.2). The up-to-date UE location information stored in the LMISF, as available, shall also be delivered to the Delivery Function 2. LMISF shall maintain an IMS call state for all inbound roaming users (for the target identity or potential target identity). The maintained current IMS call state (along + +with the stored necessary information from the SIP messages) shall be sufficient to support the mid-call interception. + +When the received IMS signalling message involves compression, the LMISF shall perform the decompression of SIP messages (as defined in clause 8 of TS 24.229 [49]) and follow the steps used to process the uncompressed SIP messages. + +Refer to clause 20.1.3.3 for a complete list of LMISF functions that also include a few functions that aid the overall interception capabilities of voice services involving the inbound roamers with S8HR as the roaming architecture. + +### 20.3.2 IRI Events + +#### 20.3.2.1 General + +In general, the IRI events applicable to S8HR LI are similar to the IRI events defined in clause 7A except that the LMISF (instead of CSCF) examines and generates the IRI events. However, since the interception in LMISF is used only for S8HR LI (i.e. roaming case), certain events defined in clause 7A are not applicable: + +Any SIP messages sent to, and received from, the target UE as observed at the S-GW/BBIFF shall be delivered as IRI with the additional information as listed in clause 20.3.3. The LMISF shall include the UE location (along with timestamp) received from the Serving Gateway/BBIFF in the appropriate events. + +The provisioned target identity can be a SIP URL, a TEL URL or an IMEI. The method used to verify a target identity is dependent on the call direction. S-GW/BBIFF shall indicate to the LMISF whether the IMS signalling packets were travelling to or from the HPLMN (e.g. based tunnel end point IDs). + +For calls originating from the inbound roaming target, calling party identity (e.g. SIP headers: P-Preferred-Id, From) is used verify the target identity. For calls terminating to the inbound roaming target, called party identity (e.g. SIP headers: Request URI, P-Called-Party-Id, To) is used to verify the target. + +For incoming calls to an inbound roaming user from a Non-Local-Id as the target, calling party identity (P-Asserted-Id, From) or redirecting party identity (History-Info, Diversion) are used to verify the target. For outgoing calls from an inbound roaming user to a Non-Local-Id as the target, the called party identity (Request-URI, To) is used to verify the target. See Annex I for an informative illustration of Non-Local-Id target interception cases. The LMISF will have to provide the functions provided by the P-CSCF (Annex I) in the VPLMN. + +#### 20.3.2.2 IMEI-based interception + +To support the IMEI-based interception, the LMISF shall provide (if possible) the functions equivalent to functions defined for CSCF in clause 7A.8. + +NOTE: The format of the Instance Id used in clause 7A.8 is under the control of HPLMN. + +#### 20.3.2.3 Mid-call Interception + +The mid-call interception is performed using the procedures described in clause 7A.3.1 except that LMISF (instead of CSCF as described in clause 7A.3.1) maintains the IMS call state, stores the SIP messages and generates the IRI. + +When a lawfully authorized interception is deactivated while the target is on an IMS session, the LMISF shall stop delivering the IRI events to the Delivery Function 2. + +#### 20.3.2.4 Signalling Compression + +If compression of the IMS signalling traffic is detected (as defined in RFC 3320 [69] and RFC 4896 [70]), then the SIP messages are first decompressed (as defined in clause 8 of TS 24.229 [49]) and processed with the steps used to process the uncompressed SIP messages. + +#### 20.3.2.5 Limitations + +The limitations described in the NOTE of clause 15.4.1 apply to lawful interception capabilities provided in the VPLMN for voice services involving the inbound roamers with S8HR as the roaming architecture. + +### 20.3.3 X2-Interface + +For the delivery of intercepted SIP messages, the following information shall be passed from the LMISF to the Delivery + +Function 2 on the X2 reference point: + +- Target Identity (SIP URL, TEL URL, IMEI); +- Correlation Identifier; +- Event Time and Date; +- Network Element Identifier; +- UE Location (conditional, as applicable, e.g. IMS session establishment events); +- date/time of Location (if target location provided); +- SIP Header; +- SIP payload. + +The Delivery Function 2 delivers the IRI to the LEMF over the HI2 interface based on the national regulations. + +## 20.4 Lawful Interception with CUPS architecture + +When Control and User Plane Separated (CUPS) architecture is used for S-GW, the S-GW/BBIFF functions may have to be split as shown in figure 20.4. + +![Figure 20.4: CUPS LI architecture for voice services of inbound roamers with S8HR. The diagram shows the flow of information between LEMF, ADMF, Delivery Functions, LMISF, and S-GW/BBIFF components.](236f674770a03c918c0375a74fe950db_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + LEMF[LEMF] -- HI1 --> ADMF[ADMF] + ADMF -- X1_1 --> LMISF[LMISF] + ADMF -- X1_2 --> DF2[Delivery Function 2] + ADMF -- X1_3 --> DF3[Delivery Function 3] + DF2 -- HI2 --> LEMF + DF3 -- HI3 --> LEMF + LMISF -- X2 --> DF2 + LMISF -- X3 --> DF3 + subgraph S_GW_BBIFF [S-GW/BBIFF] + S_GW_BBIFF_C[S-GW/BBIFF-C] + S_GW_BBIFF_U[S-GW/BBIFF-U] + S_GW_BBIFF_C -- "[GTP Tunnel ID]" --> S_GW_BBIFF_U + end + LMISF -- Xia --> S_GW_BBIFF_C + S_GW_BBIFF_C -- Xib --> LMISF + +``` + +Figure 20.4: CUPS LI architecture for voice services of inbound roamers with S8HR. The diagram shows the flow of information between LEMF, ADMF, Delivery Functions, LMISF, and S-GW/BBIFF components. + +**Figure 20.4: CUPS LI architecture for voice services of inbound roamers with S8HR** + +The S-GW/BBIFF-C receives the S8HR APN information over the Xib reference point from the LMISF. + +The S-GW/BBIFF-C shall notify the LMISF over the Xib reference point whenever an IMS Signalling Bearer for S8HR APN is created, modified or deleted along with the IMSI value of the UE. In that notification, the UE location information received from the MME shall be included. + +The S-GW/BBIFF-C shall provide packet detection rules with the GTP tunnel Id of the IMS Signalling Bearer (associated with S8HR APN) to the S-GW/BBIFF-U with an indication to instruct the S-GW/BBIFF-U to send the IMS signalling packets to the LMISF. Accordingly, the S-GW/BBIFF-U shall send the IMS signalling packets to the LMISF over the Xia reference point. + +When the CC interception is required, the LMISF would have passed on the IMS Signalling Bearer Id of the intercepted IMS session to the S-GW/BBIFF-C. The S-GW/BBIFF-C shall determine the GTP tunnel of the Media Bearer linked to that IMS Signalling Bearer and pass the packet detection rules with the GTP tunnel Id of the Media Bearer to the S-GW/BBIFF-U. The S-GW/BBIFF-U shall send the packets of that GTP tunnel (i.e. of Media Bearer) to the LMISF over the Xia reference point. + +The method used to transfer the GTP tunnel Id along with the packet delivery indication from S-GW/BBIFF-C to S-GW/BBIFF-U shall be done as described in subclause 12.9. + +NOTE: The X3c, X3u reference points and the Split X3 LI Interworking Function (SX3LIF) described in subclause 12.9 are not used for S8HR LI when a Serving Gateway is deployed with CUPS architecture. + +## 20.5 S8HR LI and Target UE Mobility + +### 20.5.1 Overview + +During a session (packet data or voice) that involves the target UE, the S-GW/BBIFF that provides the IMS Signalling packets and Media packets to the LMISF can change (i.e. S-GW/BBIFF relocation). + +The lawful interception of voice calls involving the target shall continue when the S-GW/BBIFF relocation happens. The IRI events and the CC delivered before and after the relocation shall be correlated. + +### 20.5.2 S-GW Relocation + +As described in sub-clause 20.1.3.3, the LMISF provides the S8HR APNs to the S-GW/BBIFF and the S-GW/BBIFF notifies the LMISF whenever an IMS Signalling Bearer for the S8HR APN is created, modified or deleted along with the IMSI value of the UE and the UE location. This happens independently of S-GW relocation. When the IMS signalling packets are received from the S-GW/BBIFF, the LMISF delivers the IRI events to the DF2 if the IMS signalling packets are associated with an intercepted IMS session. This, also happens independent of S-GW relocation. + +When a target UE is on an IMS session and if the S-GW that has the associated IMS Signalling Bearer changes, the IMS Signalling Bearer is created at the new S-GW/BBIFF as well. The new S-GW/BBIFF that notifies the LMISF about the IMS Signalling Bearer shall include an indication in the notification to inform the LMISF that a S-GW relocation has occurred. + +The LMISF shall provide the following functions to support the continued and correlated interception for the CC: + +- When a notification is received from the S-GW/BBIFF (over the Xib reference point) indicating that an IMS Signalling Bearer is created due to S-GW relocation, examine to see whether the IMS Signalling Bearer is associated with an IMS session that is being intercepted. +- If the IMS Signalling Bearer is associated with an intercepted IMS session, examine to see whether the intercepted IMS session requires the CC interception. +- If the intercepted IMS session requires CC interception, inform the S-GW/BBIFF (over the Xib reference point) with the IMS Signalling Bearer information (e.g. IMS Signalling Bearer ID, IMSI value) with an instruction to deliver (to LMISF) the packets from the Media Bearer associated with the IMS Signalling Bearer. + +The new S-GW/BBIFF delivers the packets from the Media Bearer associated with the IMS Signalling Bearer to the LMISF as described in sub-clause to 20.2.1.2. The LMISF delivers the received media packets to the DF3 as CC along with the correlation information as described in clause 20.2.1.4. + +The LMISF shall not disrupt the ongoing interception of IRI and CC, if a IMS Signalling Bearer deletion notification is received from the old S-GW/BBIFF. + +# --- 21 Invocation of Lawful Interception for Push to talk over Cellular services. + +## 21.0 General + +In the present clause, "PTC" will be used to reference events or services that occur in either of the two different architectures unless specified otherwise, e.g., MCPTT or PoC. + +The HI2 and HI3 interfaces in clause 4 of the present document, Figures 1k and 1l, represent the interfaces between the LEA and two delivery functions. Both interfaces are subject to national requirements. They are included for completeness, but are beyond the scope of this specification. + +In figure 1l the DF2 delivery function is used: + +- to convert the information on the X2-interface to the corresponding information on the HI2 interface; +- to distribute the intercept related information to the relevant LEAs. + +In figure 1k the DF3 is responsible: + +- for Content of Communication (CC) delivery to the LEA. + +The following is a list of servers which support either type of PTC architecture; any combination of these servers could be deployed together to support both services if the SP chooses to do so. These servers will require an ICE to generate IRI for the events depicted in the following clauses. + +MCPTT servers (Common services core): + +- Group management, Configuration, Identity, Key. + +PoC servers (Shared XDMS): + +- Shared List, Group, Policy, Presence, NW PoC Box, Aggregation Proxy, External Media Content server. + +SIP/IP Core servers: + +- Presence. + +If interception has been activated for one or more parties as per the applicable warrant of the PTC communication both CC and IRI shall be delivered for each party as separate intercept activity. + +## 21.1 Provision of IRI – PTC Service + +### 21.1.0 Introduction + +PoC and MCPTT use similar architectures for service delivery, and LI shall primarily occur at the PoC or MCPTT server for that service. + +Intercept Related Information events are necessary at the PTC Mobile Station Attach, PTC Mobile Station Detach, PTC session Activation, Start of intercept with PTC context active, PTC Context Deactivation, PTC Serving System, and PTC events. + +For PTC services that provide KMS based encryption, clause 21.1.1 specifies LI architecture and functions needed to provide session encryption keys generated by the KMS to protect a UE that is a target for interception. This clause is applicable to the cases in which the KMS is under responsibility of the Operator providing the PTC network infrastructure. Other scenarios such as the one in which the KMS is run by an independent legal entity are outside the scope of the present document. + +Other HSS events, Non-Local ID targeting for PTC events (e.g. based on traffic analysis), related and Serving System events reporting are national options. + +Figure 21.1.1 shows the transfer of intercept related information to the DF2. If an event for / from a PTC MS occurs, the Shared XDMS/MCPTT common core servers or the Home Subscriber Service (HSS) sends the relevant data to the DF2 + +for delivery to the LEA. + +For a PTC MS, dependent on national requirements, delivery shall occur in the following cases: + +- when the PoC/MCPTT server detects a PTC session event (e.g. when receiving a PTC signalling message or sends a PTC signalling message to the PTC target; +- when the Shared XDMS/MCPTT Common Core servers detects the PTC event (e.g. when receiving a PTC signalling message from the target MS, or when sending a PTC signalling message to the PTC target. + +![Diagram showing the provision of intercept related information for PTC. Four boxes (SIP CORE, HSS, PoC/MCPTT, and Shared XDMS/MCPTT Common Core Servers) are at the top. SIP CORE, HSS, and PoC/MCPTT have downward arrows pointing to a horizontal bar labeled DF 2. Shared XDMS/MCPTT Common Core Servers has a double-headed arrow to PoC/MCPTT and a downward arrow to DF 2. DF 2 has a downward arrow pointing to a box labeled LEMF.](4d5d6207a6d444ae745057ebc3ddcd86_img.jpg) + +``` +graph TD; SIP[SIP CORE] --> DF2[DF 2]; HSS[HSS] --> DF2; PoC[PoC/MCPTT] --> DF2; XDMS[Shared XDMS/MCPTT Common Core Servers] <--> PoC; XDMS --> DF2; DF2 --> LEMF[LEMF]; +``` + +Diagram showing the provision of intercept related information for PTC. Four boxes (SIP CORE, HSS, PoC/MCPTT, and Shared XDMS/MCPTT Common Core Servers) are at the top. SIP CORE, HSS, and PoC/MCPTT have downward arrows pointing to a horizontal bar labeled DF 2. Shared XDMS/MCPTT Common Core Servers has a double-headed arrow to PoC/MCPTT and a downward arrow to DF 2. DF 2 has a downward arrow pointing to a box labeled LEMF. + +**Figure 21.1.1: Provision of Intercept Related Information - PTC** + +### 21.1.1 Decryption for PTC services + +This clause describes how the CSP can provide the session encryption keys generated by the KMS to the LEMF when the CSP has PTC services with Security options. If an ICE allows interception of IRI or Content of Communication in clear then this clause does not apply. + +If a Key Management Service (KMS) is used for PTC type services to provide encryption for security, the CSP may use the mechanism as defined in Figure 21.1.1.1 to deliver the session's keys and the specific parameters needed to decrypt the intercepted communications. + +Once this security information is retrieved, DF2 may deliver this security information to the LEMF as IRI in order for the LEMF to decrypt the intercepted traffic. + +The LI architecture and functions needed for delivery of the encryption parameters are shown below to provide session encryption keys and specific parameters generated by the KMS. This section is applicable to the cases in which the KMS is under responsibility of the Operator providing the PTC infrastructure. Other scenarios such as the one in which the KMS is run by an independent legal entity are outside the scope of the present document. + +**NOTE:** This section covers the scenario in which encrypted content of communication is provided to the LEMF together with encryption keys, to allow decryption at LEMF. + +Figure 21.1.1.1 shows the LI architecture for the case in which decryption is performed by the LEMF and a KMS is used to support PTC security with a Xk interface defined between the DF2/MF and the KMS, in addition to the interfaces and functional entities needed to support LI in the SIP core in the P-CSCF/S-CSCF as shown in clause 7A.7.1 and Figure 7A.7.1 within the present document. + +![Figure 21.1.1.1: KMS Intercept configuration. The diagram shows the interaction between LEMF, ADMF, Delivery Function 2, PTC Server, and KMS. LEMF is on the left, connected to ADMF via HI1 and to Delivery Function 2 via HI2. ADMF contains a Mediation Function and is connected to PTC Server via X1_1. Delivery Function 2 also contains a Mediation Function and is connected to PTC Server via X2. Both ADMF and Delivery Function 2 are connected to KMS via Xk. LEMF is shown as a stack of three boxes.](347010b7ac06d3ae97927fde0f784d7c_img.jpg) + +Figure 21.1.1.1: KMS Intercept configuration. The diagram shows the interaction between LEMF, ADMF, Delivery Function 2, PTC Server, and KMS. LEMF is on the left, connected to ADMF via HI1 and to Delivery Function 2 via HI2. ADMF contains a Mediation Function and is connected to PTC Server via X1\_1. Delivery Function 2 also contains a Mediation Function and is connected to PTC Server via X2. Both ADMF and Delivery Function 2 are connected to KMS via Xk. LEMF is shown as a stack of three boxes. + +**Figure 21.1.1.1: KMS Intercept configuration** + +As discussed in clause 7A.7.1 when LI has been activated in the P/S-CSCF for a target, the node will report SIP messages events on the X2 interface, as specified in section 7.A and subsections. The DF2/MF shall extract from the intercepted SIP signalling the information related to the encryption and send a request over the Xk interface to the KMS to derive the encryption keys; the request will carry also the reference to the ticket transferred by the SIP signalling between the parties involved in the communication. The KMS shall then, based on the information received from the DF2, resolve the ticket and provide the session keys to the DF2/MF over the Xk interface. + +### 21.1.2 Signalling over the Xk interfaces and LI events + +The following messages are defined over the Xk interface: + +- get\_keys; +- get\_keys\_response. + +The message get\_keys shall be sent by the DF2/MF to the KMS in order to ask the KMS to provide session keys for an ongoing communication. + +The message get\_keys\_response shall be sent by the KMS to the DF2/MF in order to provide the session keys. + +The message get\_key\_response defines a LI event provided by the KMS to the DF2/MF which shall then be sent by the DF2/MF to the LEMF in a proper IRI record over the HI2 interface. + +Table 21.1.2.1 provides the list of parameters, which shall be carried by the message get\_keys, in order to transfer to the KMS the information, as specified in TS 33.328 [25], needed to provide the session encryption keys: + +**Table 21.1.2.1: Parameters and information in message get\_keys** + +| | +|----------------------------------------| +| Public KMS Identity of the target user | +| TRANSFER_INIT | +| TRANSFER_RESP | + +Upon reception of get\_keys message, the KMS shall verify that the key management information is related to the targeted user. + +A timer may be defined in the DF2/MF in order to specify the amount of time that the DF2/MF shall wait for the response from the KMS. If this timer expires, a failure indication shall be sent to the LEMF. + +Table 21.1.2.2 provides the list of parameters, which shall be carried by the message get\_keys\_response, in order to + +provide the DF2/MF with the session keys: + +**Table 21.1.2.2: Parameters and information in message get\_keys\_response** + +| | +|-------------------------------| +| Crypto Session ID | +| Session key | +| Salt | +| Failure indication (optional) | + +With reference to table 21.1.2.2, in case of failure in providing any of the decryption information, the KMS may provide a decryption failure indication. + +Upon reception of get\_keys\_response message or in case of timer expiry, the following information shall be provided to the LEMF by the DF2/MF: + +- Lawful interception identifier; +- Observed target identity(ies); +- Correlation number (in order to correlate the keys to IMS session under interception at the CSCF(s)); +- Event type (session encryption keys available); +- Crypto Session ID (if provided by the KMS); +- Session key (if provided by the KMS); +- Salt (if provided by the KMS); +- MediaSec key retrieval failure indication (in case of e.g. timer expiry, or failure indication received from the KMS). + +## 21.2 Provision of Content – PTC Service + +The access method for the delivering of PTC Intercept Product is based on duplication of packets without modification at PoC/MCPTT server. The duplicated packets with additional information in a header, as shown in figure 21.2.1, are sent to DF3 for further delivery to the LEA. + +![Figure 21.2.1: Configuration for interception of Content- PTC. The diagram shows a Target box on the left and an Other Party box on the right. Both are connected to a central PoC/MCPTT Server box. Inside the PoC/MCPTT Server box is a Duplicator of Packets box. An arrow points from the Duplicator of Packets box down to a Delivery Function 3 box, which in turn points down to a LEMF box.](4dc0d6f219d7eb8923d60e8cec8cbf0b_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + Target[Target] <--> PoC[PoC/MCPTT Server] + PoC <--> OtherParty[Other Party] + subgraph PoC + Duplicator[Duplicator of Packets] + end + Duplicator --> DF3[Delivery Function 3] + DF3 --> LEMF[LEMF] + +``` + +Figure 21.2.1: Configuration for interception of Content- PTC. The diagram shows a Target box on the left and an Other Party box on the right. Both are connected to a central PoC/MCPTT Server box. Inside the PoC/MCPTT Server box is a Duplicator of Packets box. An arrow points from the Duplicator of Packets box down to a Delivery Function 3 box, which in turn points down to a LEMF box. + +**Figure 21.2.1: Configuration for interception of Content- PTC** + +## 21.3 Provision of Interception + +### 21.3.1 X3-Interface + +In addition to the intercepted content of communications, the following information needs to be transferred from the PTC ICE to the DF3 in order to allow the DF3 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity; + +- correlation number; +- time stamp - optional; +- direction (indicates whether T-PDU is from the target or to the target) - optional; +- identity of source of media (communications content) for group calls; +- the target location (if available) or the IAs in case of location dependent interception; +- date/time of Location (if target location provided). + +### 21.3.2 X2-interface + +The following information needs to be transferred from the SIP Core, or the HSS to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity; +- events and associated parameters as defined in table 21.3.4.1 and 21.4 shall be provided; +- the target location (if available) or the IAs in case of location dependent interception; +- date/time of Location (if target location provided); +- correlation number; +- parameters (keys and associated parameters for decrypting CC), if available and necessary; +- Encryption parameters (keys and associated parameters for decrypting CC), if available and necessary. + +### 21.3.3 LI Defined Events + +#### 21.3.3.1 IRI Defined Events + +The LI event information is sent to the DF2/DF3 is triggered by different PTC session related and non-call related events/reports. Details for each event are described in the following clauses. + +The following events are applicable to both the PoC and MCPTT service ICE: + +- PTC Session Initiation; +- PTC Session Abandon; +- PTC Session Start; +- PTC Session End; +- PTC Start of Interception; +- PTC Pre-Established Session; +- PTC Instant Personal Alert; +- PTC Party Join; +- PTC Party Drop; +- PTC Party Hold; +- PTC Party Retrieve; +- PTC Media Type Notification; +- PTC Group Advertisement; +- PTC Floor Control; + +- PTC Target Presence; +- PTC Associate Presence; +- PTC List Management; +- PTC Access Policy; +- PTC Group Request; +- PTC Encryption. + +The following events are applicable to the HSS: + +- PTC Serving System; +- HSS subscriber record change; +- Cancel location; +- Register location; +- Location information request. + +The following events are applicable to the SIP Core: + +- Service Registration. + +A set of elements as shown below can be associated with the events above. The events trigger the transmission of the information from the PTC server ICE, or HSS to DF2. Available IEs from this set of elements as shown below can be extended in the HSS, if this is a requirement as a national option. DF2 can extend available information if this is necessary as a national option e.g. a unique number for each surveillance warrant. + +#### 21.3.3.2 Communication Content (CC) Event + +The following event information is sent to the DF3 when CC is authorized for delivery. The following are applicable to both the PoC and MCPTT service ICE: + +- PTC Communication Content (CC) Delivery. + +### 21.3.4 Events Elements + +#### 21.3.4.1 IRI Event Elements + +The LI IRI event information is sent to the DF2/DF3 is triggered by different PTC session related and non-call related events/reports. Details for each event are described in the following clauses. + +Within Table 21.3.4.1: IRI Information Elements for PTC Event Records, a provisioned target identity can be a SIP URI, TEL URI , MCPTT ID or an IMEI. + +A PTC Client may support multiple PTC Addresses and be involved in one or more PTC Sessions at the same time using the same or different PTC Addresses. + +A set of elements as shown below can be associated with the events. The events trigger the transmission of the information from PTC ICE to DF2. Available IEs from this set of elements as shown below can be extended in the PTC ICE, if this is necessary as a national option. DF2 can extend available information if this is necessary as a national option e.g. a unique number for each surveillance warrant. + +##### **Table 21.3.4.1: IRI Information Elements for PTC Event Records** + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| AbandonCause - Identifies the reason for the abandoned PTC Session. | +| Access_PolicyFailure - Reports the error code or reason for failure when Access Policy Request is unsuccessful. | +| Access_Policy_Type - Identifies the type of access policy list being managed or queried by the PTC Intercept target. | +| Access_Policy_event - Identifies the choice the target or an associate makes within access policy selection which can be by user or group to allow or block the incoming PTC session, Auto Answer, or allow or block a conference type. | +| Ad-hoc PoC Group Session - A PoC Group Session established by a PoC User to PoC Users listed on the invitation. The list includes PoC Users or PoC Groups or both. | +| Alert indicator - Indicates an emergency alert sent, received or cancelled. | +| AssociatePresenceStatus - Provides the Associate Presence Status, which is a list of:
PresenceID : Identity of PTC Client(s) or PTC group, when known
PresenceType : Identifies type of ID [PTC Client(s) or PTC group].
PresenceStatus : Presence state of each ID. | +| Broadcast indicator - Indicates that the group call request is for a broadcast group call. | +| Charging Correlation ID - PTC supports both subscription based charging and traffic based charging. Provide any charging events, e.g., service activation, correlation ID between the PoC service charging data and the packet data services. | +| Cipher - The name of the cipher. | +| Contact_Identity - Identity of the contact in the list, one contact per Contact List or Group List. | +| CryptoContext - If further information is needed to associate the encryption information with a specific session or stream, this parameter shall be included to identify the context to which this encryption message applies. | +| PTC Party - Join/Drop/Hold/Retrieve, MCPPTT emergency/imminent group/peril etc. | +| Emergency indicator - Indicates the request is an MCPPTT emergency call. | +| Event Date - Date of the event generation in the PTC Server or Client. | +| Event Time - Time of the event generation in the PTC Server or Client | +| Event Type - Description of which type of event is delivered: PTC Session Initiation, Abandon, Start, End, End Cause, Start of Interception, Pre-Established Session, Instant Personal Alert, Floor Control, Target Presence, Associate Presence, a PTC Party Join, Party Drop, Party Hold, Party Retrieve, PTC Media Modification, PTC Group Advertisement. Group Request, Group Response, Group Interrogate, PTC Media Type Notification, Bearer Capability, MCPPTT Emergency Group Call, Cancel, Alert, State, MCPPTT Imminent Peril Group Call. PTC Serving System, PTC List Management and Access Policy. | +| Failure_Code - The reason or code for the failure or closing of the session. | +| Floor_Request - Indicates that the originating client requests the floor. | +| FloorSpeakerIdentity - Identification of the PTC Client that has the Talk Burst. | +| Group_Ad_Receiver - The group administrator who was the receiver of the group call. | +| Group_Ad_Sender - The group administrator who was the originator of the group call. | +| Group_Identity - Identifies the PTC Group Identity, Nick Name, and characteristics. | +| GroupAuthorizationRules - Identifies the action requested by the target to the PTC Group authorization rules. | +| Hold_retrieve_Indication - The PTC Session is put on hold (deactivate Media Bursts) or a new Primary PTC Session is activated or another PTC Session is locked for talking/listening. | +| Hold_Retrieve_user - Identifies the PTC user who removed their PTC Session from hold. | +| Imminent peril indicator - Indicates that the PTC call is an imminent peril call. | +| Implicit floor request - When originating client requests the floor. | +| InitiationCause - The network receives an invitation from the PTC Intercept Target to initiate a PTC session. | +| Invited_PTC_Client - A PTC Client that is invited to a PTC Session | +| Inviting_PTC_user - The PTC User who has been invited to a PTC Session. | +| Key - The key needed to decipher. | +| KeyEncoding - Shall be included to provide the encoding of the key if the encoding is other than binary | +| IPAPartyIdentity - Instant Personal Alert - Identifies the party that receives the Instant Personal Alert from the PTC Intercept target or the associate that sends the Instant Personal Alert to the PTC Intercept target. | +| Join_PTC_user - Identity of the PTC User who has joined the session, i.e., associate identity or targets. | +| ListManagementAction - Identifies the action requested by the PTC Intercept target to the Contact Lists or Group Lists. Identifies the PTC-specific documents stored in the network that the target attempts to modify or that changes were made to the targets PTC-specific documents stored in the network and identifies what action was taken by the target or the associate i.e., create, modify, retrieve, delete, notify. | +| List_ManagementFailure - Reports the error code or reason for failure when List Management modifications should fail, when known i.e., not authorized, time out, etc. | +| ListManagementType - Different PTC Group lists: ContactListManagementAttempt, GroupListManagementAttempt, and GroupListManagementResult. Identifies the PTC-specific documents stored in the network that the target attempts to modify or that changes were made to the targets PTC-specific documents stored in the network and identifies which list was modified i.e., list or group. | +| Location - Report when a PTC Session is initiated by the intercept target. This parameter is not reported when the PTC Intercept Target receives an invitation to join a PTC Session; rather this information is reported by the PTC Session Start event (see PTC Session Start event for usage). Include when reporting of the PTC Intercept Target's location information is authorized and known. | +| Time of Location - Date/Time of location. The time when location was obtained by the location source node. | + +| | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Max_TB_Time - Include the maximum duration value for the talkburst before the permission is revoked, provide when known. | +| MCPTT CorrelationID - Uniquely identifies the MCPTT Session, correlates CII messages, and correlates CII and CC messages. | +| MCPTT group ID - The Mission Critical Push To Talk group Identity. | +| MCPTT ID - Mission Critical Push To Talk identity. | +| MCPTT indicator - Indicates direction of the received request as either from the client or from the group to the client. | +| MCPTT Location - Indicates the location of the target. | +| MCPTT Organization name - Name of the organization that the Mission Critical device belongs to. | +| MediaStream_Availability - Indicates if the PTC intercept target's PTC Client is not able/willing to receive media streams immediately. Provide when Pre-established session is established. | +| Network Element Identifier - Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| Observed IMEI - The provisioned International Mobile Equipment Identity target identity. | +| Observed SIP URI - The provisioned target identity can be a SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI - The provisioned target identity can be a TEL URI | +| Party_Drop - Member of a PTC Group Session and leaves the PTC Session, provide when known. | +| PreEstablishedSessionID - Identifies the PTC Pre-established Session. | +| PreEstablishedStatus - Indicates if the Pre-Established Session is established (setup completed), modified, or released. | +| PTCCorrelationId - Uniquely identifies the PTC Session, correlates CII messages, and correlates CII and CC messages. | +| PTC group ID - The PTC group ID of the group on which the call is initiated. | +| PTCHost - Identifies the PTC participant who has authority to initiate and administrate an active PTC Group Session. Provide when known. | +| PTC_ID_List - The list of PTC IDs of the PTC group members. | +| PTC Location - Indicates the location of the target (if authorized for delivery). | +| PTCOriginatingId - Identifies the originating party. Provided when known. | +| PTCOther - Other information that is required to decrypt the data. | +| PTCParticipants - Identifies the invited PTC participants, when known, if other than the PTC Intercept Target. | +| PTCSessionInfo - Provides PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | +| PTCUserAccessPolicy - Identifies the action requested by the PTC Intercept Target related to the PTC user access policy. | +| Queued_FloorControl - Indicates if queuing is supported by the PTC Server and the intercept target's PTC Client. | +| Queued_Position_Status - If queued floor control is supported, indicates the queue position. | +| RegistrationRequest - Identifies the type of registration request (e.g., register, re-register, de-register). | +| RegistrationOutcome - Identifies success or failure of registration and the failure reason. | +| RTP_Setting - The IP address and the port number at the PTC Server for the RTP Session. | +| Salt - Include to provide the initial salt value if the cipher requires a salt value. | +| SDP - Answer, offer and SDP parameter negotiations. Report when known. | +| SIP_message_header - Answer, offer and SIP parameter negotiations. Report when known. | +| TalkburstControl_Setting - The offered Talk Burst Control Protocol, e.g., Talk Burst parameter(s) and the port numbers. Provide when Pre-established session is established. | +| TargetIdentity - The PTC identifier for the PTC Intercept Target. | +| TargetPresenceStatus - PTC-related presence information of the PTC intercept target. | +| Talk_burst_priority - If more than one level of priority is supported, indicates the talk burst priority level of the PTC Client. | +| Talk_burst_reason_code - Identifies the reason code for the denial or revoke of a talk burst. | +| TBCP_Deny - Indicates that the PTC Server has notified a PTC Client that it has been denied permission to send a Talk Burst. | +| TBCP_Granted - Indicates that the PTC Server has notified the PTC Client that it has been granted permission to send a Talk Burst. | +| TBCP_Idle - Used by the PTC Server to notify all PTC Clients that no one has the permission to send a Talk Burst at the moment and that it may accept the TBCP Talk Burst Request message. | +| TBCP_Queued - Indicates the request to talk is queued, if queued floor control is supported. Include identification of the PTC Client that has the queued Talk Burst, if known. | +| TBCP_Release - Indicates the request to talk has completed. | +| TBCP_Request - Indicates that the PTC Client has requested permission from the PTC Server to send a Talk Burst. | +| TBCP_Revoke - Indicates that the PTC Server has revoked the media resource from a PTC Client and can be used for preemption functionality, but is also used by the system to prevent overly long use of the media resource. | +| TBCP_Taken - Indicates that the PTC Server has notified all PTC Clients, except the PTC Client that has been given permission to send a Talk Burst, that another PTC Client has been given permission to send a Talk Burst. | + +#### 21.3.4.2 CC Event Elements + +The following event information is sent to the DF3 when CC is authorized for delivery. The following events are applicable to both the PoC and MCPTT service ICE. + +**Table 21.3.4.2: CC Information Elements** + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMEI - The provisioned International Mobile Equipment Identity target identity. | +| Observed SIP URI - The provisioned target identity can be a SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI - The provisioned target identity can be a TEL URI | +| MCPTT ID - Mission Critical Push To Talk identity. | +| Event Date - Date of the event generation in the PTC Server or Client. | +| Event Time - Time of the event generation in the PTC Server or Client | +| Event Type - Description of which type of event is delivered: PTC Communication Content (CC). | +| Network Element Identifier - Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| PTC group ID - The PTC group ID of the group on which the call is initiated. | +| MCPTT group ID - The Mission Critical Push To Talk group Identity. | +| PTCSessionInfo - Provides PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | +| PTCCorrelationId - Uniquely identifies the PTC Session, correlates CII messages, and correlates CII and CC messages. | +| PTC Location – Indicates the location of the target (if authorized) | +| Time of Location - Date/Time of location. The time when location was obtained by the location source node. | +| PTC CC Payload – The intercepted communications content encapsulated packet of a PTC session. | + +## 21.4 PTC Surveillance Events + +### 21.4.0 PTC General + +PTC Service events defined below are using the PTC Surveillance Events from Table 21.3. 4.1. These events are deliverable for either type of service provided by the SP, i.e. PoC or MCPTT. + +### 21.4.1 PTC Service Registration + +The PTC Service Registration event occurs when the target registers, re-registers, or deregisters for a PTC service, regardless of whether it is successful or unsuccessful. + +**Table 21.4.1: PTC Service Registration** + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Any other IMPU or IMPI of the target (if available) | +| RegistrationRequest | +| RegistrationOutcome | + +### 21.4.2 PTC Serving System + +A PTC Serving System event is generated when there is a change to the SP serving the PTC target access network (i.e. for mobility). + +**Table 21.4.2: PTC Serving System** + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Serving System Address (AVP name such as Visited-PLMN-Id) | +| Any other IMPU or IMPI of the target (if available) | + +### 21.4.3 PTC Session Initiation + +A PTC Session Initiation event occurs when the PTC target initiates a session or the target receives an invitation to join + +a session regardless of the success or the final disposition of the invitation. + +**Table 21.4.3: PTC Session Initiation** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| PTCCorrelationID | +| PTCSessionInfo | +| TargetIdentity | +| PTCHost | +| PTCOriginatingID | +| PTCParticipants | +| AssociatePresenceStatus | +| Location | +| Time of Location | +| InitiationCause | +| BearerCapability | + +### 21.4.4 PTC Session Abandon + +The PTC Session Abandon event is triggered when the PTC Session is not established and the request is abandoned before the PTC Session established end to end connectivity. + +**Table 21.4.4: PTC Session Abandon** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| PTCorrelationID | +| PTCSessionInfo | +| TargetIdentity | +| PTCOriginatingId | +| PTCParticipants | +| AssociatePresenceStatus: | +| Location | +| Time of Location | +| AbandonCause | + +### 21.4.5 PTC Session Start + +This event occurs when a PTC Session (e.g. One-to-One, One-to-Many, or One-to-Many-to-One) is answered, and + +voice communication begins. The PTC client may use the pre-established session for PTC session Start. + +**Table 21.4.5: PTC Session Start** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| PTCCorrelationID | +| PTCSessionInfo | +| TargetIdentity | +| PTCOriginatingId | +| PTCParticipants | +| AssociatePresenceStatus: | +| Location | +| Time of Location | +| BearerCapability | + +### 21.4.6 PTC Session End + +The PTC Session End event occurs when the PTC Session is released for any reason (i.e. normal or abnormal release) + +and voice communications ends. The PTC client may use the pre-established session for terminating a PTC session. + +**Table 21.4.6: PTC Session End** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| PTCCorrelationID | +| PTCSessionInfo | +| TargetIdentity | +| PTCParticipants | +| Location | +| Time of Location | +| Cause | + +### 21.4.7 PTC Start of Interception + +This event occurs when interception is started and there is an on-going PTC session. + +**Table 21.4.7: PTC Start of Interception** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| PTCCorrelationID | +| PTCSessionInfo | +| TargetIdentity | +| PTCOriginatingID | +| PTCHost | +| PTCParticipants | +| BearerCapability | +| Correlation information | + +### 21.4.8 PTC Pre-Established Session + +This event occurs when a pre-established session is setup between the PTC service client present within the target's UE and the PTC server associated with the PTC client. The PTC client may use the pre-established session for originating or terminating calls after pre-established session establishment, regardless of whether the PTC target is actively + +transmitting or receiving talk bursts. + +**Table 21.4.8: PTC Pre-Established Session** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| TargetIdentity | +| PTC Server URI | +| RTP Setting | +| PTC Media Capability | +| PreEstablishSessionId | +| PreEstablishedStatus | +| TalkburstControl Setting | +| MediaStream Availability | +| Location | +| Time of Location | +| BearerCapability | +| Correlation information | + +### 21.4.9 PTC Instant Personal Alert + +This event occurs when an Instant Personal Alert (i.e. a request for one PTC subscriber to initiate a PTC Session at a later time) is initiated or sent to the PTC target. + +**Table 21.4.9: PTC Instant Personal Alert** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| TargetIdentity | +| IPAPartyIdentity | + +### 21.4.10 PTC Party Join event + +This event occurs when a request to join (or re-joins) a PTC Group Session (i.e. Chat Group) that is already in progress + +is received from the PTC target. + +**Table 21.4.10: PTC Party Join event** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| PTCCorrelationId | +| PTCSessionInfo | +| TargetIdentity | +| Inviting_PTC_user | +| Join_PTC_user | +| AssociatePresenceStatus | +| BearerCapability | + +### 21.4.11 PTC Party Drop + +This occurs when the target is a participating member of a PTC Group Session and leaves the PTC Session in which the + +PTC target is also participating. + +**Table 21.4.11: PTC Party Drop** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| PTCCorrelationID | +| PTCSessionInfo | +| TargetIdentity | +| Party_Drop | +| AssociatePresenceStatus: | + +### 21.4.12 PTC Party Hold + +A PTC Party Hold event occurs when the target places an on-going PTC Session on hold in on-going PTC Session. + +**Table 21.4.12: PTC Party Hold** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| PTCCorrelationID | +| PTCSessionInfo | +| TargetIdentity | +| Hold_Indication | +| Hold_User | + +### 21.4.13 PTC Party Retrieve + +A PTC Party Retrieve event occurs when the target retrieves an on-going PTC Session. + +**Table 21.4.13: PTC Party Retrieve** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| PTCCorrelationID | +| PTCSessionInfo | +| TargetIdentity | +| Retrieve_Indication | +| Retrieve_User | + +### 21.4.14 PTC Media Modification + +During the PTC Session, a PTC Client may modify the voice frame packetization or voice codec mode by Out-of-band signalling using SDP payload within SIP messages. The Media Modification event is generated when a re-negotiation + +of the media parameters occurs during a PTC Session involving the target MS. + +**Table 21.4.14: PTC Media Modification** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| PTCCorrelationID | +| PTCSessionInfo | +| TargetIdentity | +| BearerCapability | + +### 21.4.15 PTC Group Advertisement + +This event is generated when a PTC Intercept Target sends Group Advertisement information to a single PTC user, a list of PTC users or to all members of the Group using the Group Identity. + +**Table 21.4.15: PTC Group Advertisement** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| TargetIdentity | +| Group_Identity | +| Group Ad Sender | +| Group Ad Receiver | +| PTCHost | +| Group Characteristics | + +### 21.4.16 PTC Floor Control + +Floor Control arbitrates requests from the PTC Clients for the right to send media (i.e. the right to speak). Note, the term “Floor Control” is used to mean the same as term “Talk Burst Control”. When the PTC target is participating in a PTC Session, a Floor Control event is generated when the target requests to speak (e.g., presses the PTT mechanism) or the target is given permission to speak in response to a request (e.g. the network responds positively to the PTC Subscriber’s request) or is refused the request to speak and when the target is finished speaking (e.g. the PTC Intercept + +target releases the PTT mechanism). + +**Table 21.4.16: PTC Floor Control** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| TargetIdentity | +| PTCCorrelationID | +| PTCSessionInfo | +| FloorActivity | +| Choice of: | +| TBCP_Request | +| TBCP_Granted | +| TBCP_Deny | +| TBCP_Queued | +| TBCP_Release | +| TBCP_Revoke | +| FloorSpeakerIdentity | +| Queued_FloorControl | +| Queued_Position_Status | +| Max_TB_Time | +| Talk_burst_priority | +| Talk_burst_reason_code | + +### 21.4.17 PTC Target Presence + +If the Presence functionality is supported by the PTC Server and the PTC Server assumes the role of a Presence Source, this event is generated when the PTC Server publishes network presence information to the Presence server on behalf of PTC target. + +**Table 21.4.17: PTC Target Presence** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| TargetIdentity | +| TargetPresenceStatus | + +### 21.4.18 PTC Associate Presence + +This event is generated when the PTC Server receives presence status notifications from the Presence Servers after + +having subscribed to the PTC presence status of other PTC Clients (i.e. Associates of the PTC Intercept target). + +**Table 21.4.18: PTC Associate Presence** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| TargetIdentity | +| AssociatePresenceStatus: | + +### 21.4.19 PTC List Management Events + +This event is generated when the target PTC Client attempts to change their own contact list or their own PTC Group list(s). This event is also generated when the network notifies the Intercept target's PTC Client of changes made to their PTC-specific documents stored in the network (i.e. contact lists or PTC Group lists). + +**Table 21.4.19: PTC List Management Events** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| SIP message header offer | +| SIP message header answer | +| SDP offer | +| SDP answer | +| TargetIdentity | +| ListManagementType | +| Choice of: | +| ContactListManagementAttempt | +| GroupListManagementAttempt | +| ContactListManagementResult | +| GroupListManagementResult | +| Request unsuccessful | +| ListManagementAction | +| Choice of: | +| Create | +| Modify | +| Retrieve | +| Delete | +| Notify | +| Contact_Identity | +| Group_Identity | +| PTCHost | +| List_ManagementFailure | + +### 21.4.20 PTC Access Policy event + +This event is generated when the PTC Intercept target attempts to change the access control lists (e.g. PTC user access policy and PTC Group authorization rules). In addition this event is generated when the network responds to a modification or query by the PTC Intercept target to the access control lists (e.g. PTC user access policy and PTC + +Group authorization rules). + +**Table 21.4.20: PTC Access Policy event** + +| | +|-------------------------------------| +| Observed_SIP_URI | +| Observed_TEL_URI | +| Observed_IMEI | +| MCPTT_ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| TargetIdentity | +| Access_Policy_Type | +| Choice of: | +| PTCUserAccessPolicyAttempt | +| GroupAuthorizationRulesAttempt | +| PTCUserAccessPolicyQuery | +| GroupAuthorizationRulesQuery | +| PTCUserAccessPolicyResult | +| GroupAuthorizationRulesResult | +| Request unsuccessful | +| PTCUserAccessPolicy | +| Choice of: | +| Allow_Incoming_PTC_Session_request | +| Block_Incoming_PTC_Session_request | +| Allow_Auto_Answer_Mode | +| Allow_Override_Manual_Answer_Mode | +| GroupAuthorizationRules | +| Choice of: | +| Allow_Initiating_Conference | +| Block_Initiating_Conference | +| Allow_Joining_Conference | +| Block_Joining_Conference | +| Allow_Add_Participants | +| Block_Add_Participants | +| Allow_Subscription_Conference_State | +| Block_Subscription_Conference_State | +| Allow_Anonymity | +| Forbid_Anonymity | +| Contact_Identity | +| Group_Identity | +| PTCHost | +| Access_PolicyFailure | + +### 21.4.21 PTC Media Type Notification + +This event is generated for media detected at the ICE for media types other than PTC speech (e.g. video, images, text, and files) directed to/from the targets PTC client. Media Types are either real-time or non-real time, i.e., Audio (e.g. music), Video Discrete Media (e.g. still image, formatted and non-formatted text, file), or Real Time Streaming Media (RTSP). Media parameters are SIP/SDP based information exchanged between the PTC server and the targets PTC client, between the PTC server and the PoC Box and between PTC servers that specify the characteristics of the Media + +for a PTC session being established or that already exists. + +**Table 21.4.21: PTC Media Type Notification** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| SIP message header offer | +| SIP message header answer | +| SDP offer | +| SDP answer | +| PTCCorrelationID | +| PTCSessionInfo | +| TargetIdentity | +| BearerCapability | + +### 21.4.22 PTC Encryption Message + +The CSP shall provide the encryption method, specific parameters and the encryption keys to LE when a CSP service uses encryption that is provided or managed by the CSP. + +The Encryption message is sent by the DF2 to the LEMF when there is a need to pass the decryption information associated with intercepted content. If rekeying is deployed, one or more new Encryption messages are sent coincident with the change in keys. + +**Table 21.4.22 Encryption Message Parameters** + +| | +|------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| CryptoContext | +| Cipher | +| Key | +| Salt | +| KeyEncoding | +| PTCOther | + +## 21.5 PTC Group Calls + +### 21.5.1 General + +A PTC Group Session supports a One-to-One, One-to-Many, or One-to-Many-to-One with the following events; Session initiation request/response, Session modification, joining/leaving, termination, voice communication begins, ends, or forced disconnected. When detected at the ICE, these events can originate from the targets PTC Client to the PTC Server or from the PTC Server to the targets PTC Client or PTC server to PTC Server on the behalf of the target. + +### 21.5.2 Group Call Request + +This event is generated when received at the PTC server serving the target or sent to the targets PTC client for a PTC Group Call request to join, rejoin, or release of the group call. This can be a Group Call Request event received at the PTC Server serving the target from a separate PTC server (outside the SP architecture) to the target. This event would + +be generated for each instance as described. + +**Table 21.5.2: Group Call Request** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| PTC group ID | +| PTC ID list | +| SDP offer | +| SDP Answer | +| Floor Request | +| Broadcast indicator | + +### 21.5.3 Group Call Response + +A Group Call Response event is generated upon sending a group call response to the target or received at the PTC Server from the target or on behalf of the target to a separate PTC server (outside the SP architecture). + +**Table 21.5.3: Group Call Response** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| PTC group ID | +| SDP answer | + +### 21.5.4 PTC Group Interrogate + +This event is generated when a group interrogate request or a response is received at the PTC Server serving the target. + +**Table 21.5.4: Group Interrogate** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| PTC group ID | +| PTC ID list | + +## 21.6 MCPTT Priority Calls and Alerts Messages + +### 21.6.0 Background + +MCPTT emergency group calls are defined by TS 23.379 [3] and TS 22.179 [2]. Group calls are enabled in both on-network and off-network but interception of these events are at the on-network MCPTT Server serving the target. Off-network MCPTT interception is for future study (FFS). If there are multiple events for or to the target for each of these + +separate events detected an event report is generated. + +### 21.6.1 General + +A MCPTT Emergency Group Session can support a One-to-One, One-to-Many, or One-to-Many-to-One with the following events; Group Call initiation request/response, Group Call Session modification, joining/leaving, termination, voice communication begins, ends, or forced disconnected, an Imminent Peril Group Call or alerts. When detected at the ICE, these events can originate from the targets MCPTT Client to the MCPTT Server or from the MCPTT Server to the targets MCPTT Client or the targets serving MCPTT server to another domain MCPTT Server on the behalf of the + +target. + +### 21.6.2 MCPTT Emergency Group Call + +When the MCPTT Emergency Group Call Request or Response is detected at the MCPTT Server, it can originate from the targets MCPTT client or be sent to the targets MCPTT client from a MCPTT Group. + +**Table 21.6.2: Emergency Group Call** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| MCPTT group ID | +| Emergency indicator | +| Alert indicator | +| MCPTT group ID | +| MCPTT indicator | +| MCPTT CorrelationID | +| MCPTT Location | +| Time of Location | + +### 21.6.3 MCPTT Emergency Group Call Cancel + +When a MCPTT Emergency Group Call Cancel is detected at the MCPTT Server, it can originate from the targets MCPTT client or towards the targets MCPTT client from a MCPTT Group. + +**Table 21.6.3: Emergency Group Call Cancel** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Emergency indicator | +| Alert indicator | +| MCPTT group ID | +| MCPTT indicator | +| MCPTT CorrelationID | +| MCPTT Location | +| Time of Location | + +### 21.6.4 MCPTT Emergency Group Alert + +When a MCPTT Emergency Alert Notification, Response, Request or Cancel is detected at the MCPTT Server, it can originate from the targets MCPTT client or towards the targets MCPTT client from a MCPTT Group. + +**Table 21.6.4: Emergency Group Alert** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| MCPTT group ID | +| Alert indicator | +| MCPTT Organization name | +| MCPTT CorrelationID | +| MCPTT Location | +| Time of Location | + +### 21.6.5 MCPTT Emergency Group State + +When the MCPTT Emergency State Response, Request or Cancel is detected at the MCPTT Server, it can originate from the targets MCPTT client or to the targets MCPTT client from a MCPTT Group. + +**Table 21.6.5: Emergency Group State** + +| | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| MCPTT group ID | +| Client emergency state inform (See NOTE) | +| Client emergency state response (See NOTE) | +| Client emergency state cancel inform (See NOTE) | +| Client emergency state cancel response (See NOTE) | +| Group emergency condition inform (See NOTE) | +| Group emergency condition response (See NOTE) | +| Group emergency condition cancel request (See NOTE) | +| Group emergency condition cancel response (See NOTE) | +| NOTE: At least one of these information elements shall be present | + +### 21.6.6 MCPTT Imminent Peril Group Call + +When the MCPTT Imminent Peril Group Call Request, Response or Cancel is detected at the MCPTT Server, it can originate from the targets MCPTT client or to the targets MCPTT client from a MCPTT Group. + +**Table 21.6.6: Imminent Peril Group Call** + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| MCPTT group ID | +| MCPTT Imminent peril indicator | +| MCPTT indicator | +| MCPTT CorrelationID | +| MCPTT Location | +| Time of Location | + +## 21.7 PTC Communication Content (CC) + +### 21.7.0 General + +When communication content (CC) delivery is authorized the CSP shall access and deliver communication content for the target for the duration of any of the different types of PTC sessions (i.e., One-to-One, One-to-Many, or One-to-Many-to-One, MCPTT or Private Calls). Any CC that are originated by, redirected by and terminated to the surveillance target's equipment, facilities, or service when the surveillance target is part of the PTC session or the target is connected to the PTC Session under surveillance shall be delivered to the DF3 as identified parameters in table 2.1.3.4.2. + +### 21.7.1 Communication Content (CC) + +The *Communication Content* event is used to encapsulate communications content packets for transfer over the interface to the DF3, in accordance with this standard. + +**Table 21.7.1: Communication Content** + +| | +|----------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | +| Observed TEL URI | +| Observed IMEI | +| MCPTT ID | +| Event type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| PTC Group ID | +| MCPTT group ID | +| PTCSessionInfo | +| PTCCorrelationID | +| PTC Location | +| PTC CC Payload | +| Time of Location | + +# --- 22 Cell Supplemental Information Reporting + +## 22.1 General + +The LEAs, when location reporting is authorized, have a need to identify the geo-location or civic location of cell sites when one or more Cell Identities are provided in IRI. For each Cell Identity provided in the IRI for location, the CSP has an obligation to provide the specific Cell site information servicing the target. A Cell Site Reporting capability is an option for an operator to provide this supplemental cell site location information in automated fashion to the LEAs. Other means may be possible, e.g. the capability to send the all or selected sets of Cell Supplemental Information records directly to the LEMF on a one-way update at a time chosen by the operator, but are not specified here. The DF will be tasked to deliver a Cell Site Report (CSR) that is inclusive of the cell site information retained in a CSP Cell Database. It is assumed that the source of information for this comes from CSP network engineering and network planning facilities. + +For each cell ID encountered in the IRI being reported to the LEA, the CSP may consult internal network records and assemble the geo-location or civic location information, and add this supplemental cell information to the IRI being reported to the LEA, if the IRI event has been sent to the LEMF the DF will generate a CSR. + +## 22.2 Cell Site Report Delivery + +The report process is initiated when a DF determines a Cell Identity is contained in an IRI event and when location reporting is authorized. + +If the specific Cell supplemental information has not been sent for the interception in the IRI event, the DFs reporting process will produce a report called CSR for the Cell Identity reported in the IRI and forward this report to the LEA. + +If the Cell supplemental information for the current Cell Identity has been previously sent for the interception, based on operator policy, the CSR delivery process shall be able to assume that the LEA has retained the Cell supplemental information and not resend this Cell supplemental information. When the Cell Identity changes, during the session for whatever reason, and this new cell supplemental information has changed from what was previously sent for the + +interception, the new Cell site information shall be reported in the location parameter of the new IRI event or a new CSR report based on operator policy will be sent to the LEMF. + +## 22.3 LI\_CELL\_INFO Interface + +The LI\_CELL\_INFO interface is implementation specific between the DF2 and the source(s) of operator's cell site information regarding the PLMN. The source(s) of this cell site information may be consulted to produce the CSR. The details of this interface are outside the scope of this specification. + +## 22.4 Cell Site Report + +Once the Cell site is identified and operator specific cell site information source(s) consulted the DF shall add appropriate cell location related elements within the database to the location parameter in the IRI event or provide the CSR. Once a Cell site is reported during a LI, the operator shall be able to assume that the LEA will retain the Cell site reports for the duration of the LI reportable session and redundant reports may be suppressed based on operator policy. The following parameters in Table 22.4.1 are considered as a high level view of information that can be reported as an example of a report to be sent to the MF/DF. + +**Table 22.4.1: Example Cell Site Report parameters** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description | +|--------------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Cell Identity | M | The Cell Identifier as reported in IRI. | +| AlternativeID | C | If used by CSPs with an alternative naming scheme for cells. | +| Time Stamp | M | Shall include the Date and Time of the report. | +| OperatorID | O | Shall include the Operator ID. | +| Cell Azimuth | C | If known, to include the azimuth of the direction the antenna is pointing (in degrees). | +| Cell_LatAndLong | C | If known, the geo-position of the cell site (latitude and longitude). | +| Civic Address | C | If known, shall include the civic address of the cell site. | +| Other operator specific information | C | Based on operator policy, other information that is CSP specific can be reported as Carrier-specific information whose format is not standardized. If the CSP chooses to report Carrier-specific information the CSP shall provide LE with details of the structure of the information to allow LEA interpretation of the data. | + +# 23 Lawful Interception for Non-IP Data Delivery (NIDD) using SCEF + +## 23.1 Overview + +This clause describes the LI functions for Non-IP Data Delivery using SCEF between the IoT UE and the SCS/AS. The IoT UE accesses the 3GPP network via E-UTRAN or GPRS access and the delivery of Non-IP Data to the SCS/AS is done using the SCEF. + +The present document does not support the interception of Non-IP Data Delivery using a Point-to-Point (PtP) SGi tunnel and the interception of monitoring events requested using SCEF. + +For NIDD using SCEF, the following NFs in the CSP network shall support the interception capabilities: + +- MME (when the access is E-UTRAN); +- SGSN (when the access is GPRS); +- HSS (for non-communication related events); +- HLR (for non-communication related events); +- SCEF (NIDD related events in non-roaming case, or in HPLMN); +- IWK-SCEF (NIDD related events in VPLMN). + +The intercept configuration for MME is shown in figure 12.1.1 (clause 12.1.1). The intercept configuration for SGSN is shown in figure 1b (clause 4). The intercept configuration for HSS is shown in figure 12.1.2 (clause 12.1.1). The intercept configuration for HLR is shown in figure 1c (clause 4). The intercept configuration for SCEF and IWK-SCF is shown in figure 23.1.1 below. + +![Figure 23.1.1: Intercept Configuration for SCEF and IWK-SCEF for NIDD Delivery using SCEF. The diagram shows the flow of interception data from various network functions (NFs) to the SCEF/IWK-SCEF. On the left, the LEMF (Lawful Interception Monitoring Function) is shown with three stacked boxes. It connects to three NFs via HI interfaces: HI1 to the ADMF, HI2 to the SGSN (containing Mediation Function and Delivery Function 2), and HI3 to the HSS (containing Mediation Function and Delivery Function 3). The ADMF has a Mediation Function and connects to the SCEF/IWK-SCEF via the X1_1 interface. The SGSN's Delivery Function 2 connects to the SCEF/IWK-SCEF via the X2 interface. The HSS's Delivery Function 3 connects to the SCEF/IWK-SCEF via the X3 interface. There are also internal interfaces X1_2 and X1_3 between the ADMF and the other NFs. The SCEF/IWK-SCEF is shown as a large box on the right receiving data from all three paths.](327ba94498e3381cf08eb41e3fd3d77f_img.jpg) + +Figure 23.1.1: Intercept Configuration for SCEF and IWK-SCEF for NIDD Delivery using SCEF. The diagram shows the flow of interception data from various network functions (NFs) to the SCEF/IWK-SCEF. On the left, the LEMF (Lawful Interception Monitoring Function) is shown with three stacked boxes. It connects to three NFs via HI interfaces: HI1 to the ADMF, HI2 to the SGSN (containing Mediation Function and Delivery Function 2), and HI3 to the HSS (containing Mediation Function and Delivery Function 3). The ADMF has a Mediation Function and connects to the SCEF/IWK-SCEF via the X1\_1 interface. The SGSN's Delivery Function 2 connects to the SCEF/IWK-SCEF via the X2 interface. The HSS's Delivery Function 3 connects to the SCEF/IWK-SCEF via the X3 interface. There are also internal interfaces X1\_2 and X1\_3 between the ADMF and the other NFs. The SCEF/IWK-SCEF is shown as a large box on the right receiving data from all three paths. + +**Figure 23.1.1: Intercept Configuration for SCEF and IWK-SCEF for NIDD Delivery using SCEF** + +The definition of the LI functional entities (ADMF, DF, MF, LEMF) and interfaces (X, HI) is the same as for 3G as given in chapter 4. + +If roaming interception is allowed, SCEF in the HPLMN shall report IRI and CC while the target is in the VPLMN. For warrants served in the VPLMN, the IWK-SCEF in the VPLMN shall report the IRI and CC. + +The target identities for interception at the HSS, SCEF and IWK-SCEF are IMSI, MSISDN, External Identifier and ME + +(Mobile Equipment) Identity. + +The target identities for interception at the MME and SGSN are IMSI, MSISDN, External Identifier. + +NOTE: In case the ME Identity and/or MSISDN and/or External Identifier is not available in a node, interception based on the missing identity is not applicable at that node. + +For the delivery of the CC and IRI when performing non-IP data delivery using SCEF, the SCEF and IWK-SCEF provide correlation number and target identity to the DF2 and DF3. The correlation number shall be generated by using existing parameters related to the EPS bearer or NSAPI. + +## 23.2 Provision of Content of Communications + +### 23.2.1 X3-interface + +The access method for the delivering of CC related to the NIDD using SCEF is based on duplication of packets without modification of the packets at the SCEF and/or IWK-SCEF. The duplicated packets with additional information in a header are sent to DF3 for further delivery to the LEA. + +![Diagram illustrating the configuration for CC interception of NIDD using SCEF. A 'Target' box is on the left, and an 'other party' box is on the right. A central box labeled 'SCEF, IWK-SCEF' contains a dashed box representing a duplicator. Arrows show traffic from the Target to the SCEF, and from the SCEF to the other party. A solid arrow labeled 'Duplicator of packets' points from the dashed box to a 'Delivery Function 3' box below. A dashed arrow then points from 'Delivery Function 3' to a 'LEA' box at the bottom.](552ca016af3d6240648ab5a2cad97f60_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + Target[Target] --> SCEF[SCEF, IWK-SCEF] + SCEF --> other_party[other party] + subgraph SCEF [SCEF, IWK-SCEF] + Duplicator[Duplicator of packets] + end + Duplicator -- "Duplicator of packets" --> DF3[Delivery Function 3] + DF3 -.-> LEA[LEA] + +``` + +Diagram illustrating the configuration for CC interception of NIDD using SCEF. A 'Target' box is on the left, and an 'other party' box is on the right. A central box labeled 'SCEF, IWK-SCEF' contains a dashed box representing a duplicator. Arrows show traffic from the Target to the SCEF, and from the SCEF to the other party. A solid arrow labeled 'Duplicator of packets' points from the dashed box to a 'Delivery Function 3' box below. A dashed arrow then points from 'Delivery Function 3' to a 'LEA' box at the bottom. + +**Figure 23.2.1: Configuration for CC interception of NIDD using SCEF** + +In addition to the intercepted content of communication, the following information needs to be transferred from the SCEF and/or IWK-SCEF to the DF3: + +- target identity; +- correlation number; +- time stamp (optional); +- direction (indicates whether T-PDU is MO or MT) – optional; +- the target location (if available) or the IAs in case of location dependent interception. + +## 23.3 Provision of Intercept Related Information + +### 23.3.1 General + +IRI events applicable for Lawful Interception of NIDD using SCEF include the events reported by MME, SGSN, HSS, SCEF and IWK-SCEF as described in the following clauses. + +### 23.3.2 X2-interface + +The following information needs to be transferred from the MME, SGSN, SCEF, IWK-SCEF or the HSS to the DF2 in order to allow a DF2 to perform its functionality: + +- target identity (IMSI, MSISDN, External Identifier, ME identity); +- events and associated parameters as defined in clauses 12.A.3.3 and 12.A.3.4 may be provided; +- the target location (if available) or the IAs in case of location dependent interception; +- correlation number (only for SCEF and IWK-SCEF); + +The IRI should be sent to DF2 using a reliable transport mechanism. + +### 23.3.3 Structure of the events + +There are several different events in which the information is sent to the DF2 if this is required. Details are described in the following clause. The events for interception are configurable (if they are sent to DF2) in the MME, SGSN, SCEF or the HSS and can be suppressed in the DF2. The network procedures for which the events are generated are defined in TS 23.060 [10] and TS 23.401 [22]. + +**The following events are applicable to the MME:** + +- IoT UE Attach for NIDD using SCEF; +- IoT UE Detach for NIDD for using SCEF; +- IoT UE Tracking Area Update for NIDD using SCEF; +- IoT UE requested non-IP PDN connectivity; +- IoT UE Requested non-IP PDN disconnection; +- SCEF requested non-IP PDN disconnection +- Start of interception with attached IoT UE with active non-IP PDN connection. + +**The following events are applicable to the SGSN:** + +- IoT UE Attach for NIDD using SCEF; +- IoT UE Detach for NIDD using SCEF; +- IoT UE Routing Area Update for NIDD using SCEF; +- IoT UE requested non-IP PDP context activation; +- IoT UE Requested non-IP PDP context disconnection; +- SCEF requested non-IP PDP context disconnection; +- Start of interception with PDP context active. + +**The following events are applicable to the SCEF:** + +- MME originated connection request; +- MME/SGSN originated connection update; +- SCEF originated connection update; +- MME/SGSN originated disconnection request; +- SCEF originated disconnection request; +- Start of interception with connected UE; + +- Non-IP Packet Data Header Information. + +#### **The following events are applicable to the IWK-SCEF:** + +- MME/SGSN originated connection request; +- MME/SGSN originated connection update; +- SCEF originated connection update; +- MME/SGSN originated disconnection request; +- SCEF originated disconnection request; +- Start of interception with connected UE. + +#### **The following events are applicable to the HSS:** + +- Serving Evolved Packet System for IoT UE; +- HSS subscriber record change for IoT UE; +- Cancel location for IoT UE. + +#### **The following events are applicable to the HLR:** + +- Serving System for IoT UE; +- Subscriber record change for IoT UE; +- Cancel location for IoT UE. + +A set of elements as shown below can be associated with the events. The events trigger the transmission of the information from the nodes to DF2. Available IEs from this set of elements as shown below can be extended in the nodes, if this is necessary as a national option. DF2 can extend available information if this is necessary as a national option. + +**Table 23.3.1: Elements that are Associated to Events of Non-IP Data Delivery using SCEF** + +| | | +|----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | MSISDN of the target. | +| Observed External Identifier | External Identifier of the target. | +| Observed IMSI | IMSI of the target. | +| Observed ME Id | ME Id of the target; when it coincides with the IMEI, it shall be checked for each activation over the radio interface. | +| Event type | Indicates which type of event is delivered: IoT UE Attach for NIDD using SCEF, IoT UE Detach for NIDD using SCEF, IoT UE Tracking Area Update for NIDD using SCEF, IoT UE Routing Area Update for NIDD using SCEF, IoT UE requested non-IP PDN connectivity, IoT UE Requested non-IP PDN disconnection, SCEF Requested non-IP PDN disconnection, IoT UE requested non-IP PDP Context activation, IoT UE Requested non-IP PDP Context disconnection, SCEF Requested non-IP PDP Context disconnection, Start of interception with attached IoT UE with non-IP PDN connection, Start of interception with non-IP PDP context active, MME/SGSN Originated Connection Request, MME/SGSN Originated Connection Update, SCEF Originated Connection Update, MME/SGSN Originated Disconnection Request, SCEF Originated Disconnection Request, Start of interception with Connected UE, Serving Evolved Packet System for IoT UE, Non-IP Packet Data Header Information, HSS subscriber record change for IoT UE, Cancel location for IoT UE, Serving System for IoT UE, Subscriber record change for IoT UE. | +| Event date | Date of the event generation in the ICE. | +| Event time | Time of the event generation in the ICE. Timestamp shall be generated relative to ICE internal clock. | +| Change Type | This indicates what has been changed (MSISDN, External Identifier or IMSI) in the Subscriber Change Record | +| Protocol Configuration Options | Are used to transfer parameters between the UE and the SCEF. | +| Attach type | Indicates the type of attach. | +| Location Information | Location Information is the Tracking Area Identity (TAI), TA List assigned to the UE, E-CGI and/or routing area identity. In case of Tracking Area Update or Routing Area Update event, the last visited TAI or RAI of the UE may be applicable. Country and network IDs can be considered as location information, by some national regulations. | +| APN | When provided by the MME, the parameter carries the Access Point Name provided by the UE. When provided by the S-GW/PDN-GW, it is the Access Point Name used for the connection. | +| SCEF-ID | When provided by the MME, the parameter identifies the SCEF to which the UE has connected. | +| RAT type | The Radio Access Type | +| Procedure Transaction Identifier | Identifies a set of messages belonging to the same procedure; the parameter is dynamically allocated by the UE. | +| Bearer identity | A bearer identity uniquely identifies the T6a or T6b Connection. The Bearer Identity is allocated by the MME/SGSN. | +| Initiator | The initiator of the procedure, either the network or the UE. | +| Switch off indicator | Indicates whether a detach procedure is due to a switch off situation or not. | +| Detach type | Parameter sent by the network to the UE to indicate the type of detach. | +| Serving MME/SGSN address | The address of the serving MME/SGSN. | +| Old Location Information | Location Information of the subscriber before Tracking Area Update or Routing Area Update.. | +| Correlation Number | The correlation number is used to correlate CC and IRI. | +| Network Element Identifier | Unique identifier for the ICE reporting the event. | +| Logical Function Information | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Failed attach reason | Reason for failed attach of the target. | +| IAIs | The observed Interception Areas. | +| Request type | Indicates the type of request in an UE requested PDN connectivity, i.e. initial request or handover. | + +| | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| ULI Timestamp
Indicates the time when the User Location Information was acquired.
The parameter is specified in TS 29.274 [38]. | +| NSAPI
Network layer Service Access Point Identifier
The NSAPI information element contains an NSAPI identifying a PDP Context in a mobility management context specified by the Tunnel Endpoint Identifier Control Plane. | +| SCS/AS Identifier
Identity of the Service Capability Server/Application Server. | +| Reliable Data Service Source Port Number
Source Port Number for a Non-IP Data Packet using the Reliable Data Service | +| Reliable Data Service Destination Port Number
Destination Port Number for a Non-IP Data Packet using the Reliable Data Service | +| Packet Size
The size of the packet. | + +### 23.3.4 NIDD using SCEF related events + +#### 23.3.4.1 MME related events + +##### 23.3.4.1.1 IoT UE Attach for NIDD using SCEF + +When an attach activation is generated from the IoT UE this event is generated by the MME. This event is equivalent to the EPS Attach event defined in clause 12.2.3.1. The following elements are delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.1.1: Information Elements of IoT UE Attach for NIDD using SCEF** + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| Failed attach reason | +| IAAs (if applicable) | +| APN | +| Protocol Configuration Options | +| Attach type | +| EPS Bearer identity | + +##### 23.3.4.1.2 IoT UE Detach for NIDD using SCEF + +When the IoT UE detaches from the EPS, this event is generated. This event is equivalent to the EPS Detach event + +defined in clause 12.2.3.2. The following elements are delivered to the DF2 if available + +**Table 23.3.4.1.2: Information Elements of IoT UE Detach for NIDD using SCEF** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| IAs (if applicable) | +| Detach initiator | +| Switch off indicator | +| Detach type | + +##### 23.3.4.1.3 IoT UE Tracking Area Update for NIDD using SCEF + +For each TA/EPS Location Update an update-event with the elements about the new location is generated. The event shall be sent in case of Tracking Area Update and UE triggered Control Plane Service Request, as specified in TS 23.401 [22]. In case of change of MME, the new MME shall send the event, and the old MME may optionally send the event as well. This event is equivalent to the EPS Tracking Area Update event defined in clause 12.2.3.7. The following elements are delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.1.3: Information Elements of IoT UE Tracking Area Update for NIDD using SCEF** + +| | +|-------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information (only for the new MME) | +| Old Location Information (only for the old MME) | +| IAs (if applicable) | +| Failure reason | + +##### 23.3.4.1.4 IoT UE requested PDN connectivity + +When a PDN connectivity is requested from the IoT UE (TS 23.401 [22]), a UE requested PDN connectivity event is generated by the MME. This event is equivalent to the UE Requested PDN Connectivity event defined in clause 12.2.3.9. The following elements are delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.1.4: Information Elements of IoT UE Requested PDN Connectivity** + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| APN | +| SCEF-ID | +| Request type | +| PDN type | +| Failed reason | +| IA(s) (if applicable) | +| Protocol Configuration Options | +| EPS bearer identity | + +##### **23.3.4.1.5 IoT UE requested PDN disconnection** + +When a PDN disconnection is requested from the UE to request for disconnection from the PDN (TS 23.401 [22]), a UE requested PDN disconnection event is generated by the MME. This event is equivalent to the UE Requested PDN disconnection event defined in clause 12.2.3.10. The following elements are delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.1.5: Information Elements of IoT UE Requested PDN Disconnection** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| IA(s) (if applicable) | +| Linked EPS bearer identity | + +##### **23.3.4.1.6 SCEF requested PDN disconnection** + +When a PDN disconnection is requested from the SCEF to request for disconnection from the PDN (TS 23.401 [22]), a SCEF requested PDN disconnection event is generated by the MME. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.1.6: Information Elements for SCEF Requested PDN Disconnection** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| IA(s) (if applicable) | +| Linked EPS bearer identity | + +##### 23.3.4.1.7 Start of interception with attached IoT UE active NIDD connection. + +This event will be generated if interception for a target is started and if the target is already attached with non-IP PDN connection. + +This event is equivalent to the Start of interception with E-UTRAN attached UE event defined in clause 12.2.3.13. The following elements are delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.1.7: Information Elements for Start of interception with attached IoT UE with active non-IP PDN connection** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| APN | +| SCEF-ID | +| IAAs (if applicable) | +| EPS bearer identity | + +#### 23.3.4.2 SGSN related events + +##### 23.3.4.2.1 IoT UE Attach for NIDD using SCEF + +When an attach activation is generated from an IoT UE this event is generated by the SGSN. This event is equivalent to the Attach event defined in clause 7.4.1 but for an Attach where a GPRS Non-IP Data Delivery Connection using SCEF is requested the following elements are delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.2.1: Information Elements of IoT UE Attach for NIDD using SCEF** + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| Failed attach reason | +| IAAs (if applicable) | +| APN | +| Protocol Configuration Options | +| Attach type | + +##### 23.3.4.2.2 IoT UE Detach for NIDD using SCEF + +For detach from an IoT UE this event is generated. This event is equivalent to the detach event defined in clause 7.4.2 but for a detach for a UE with a GPRS Non-IP Data Delivery Connection using SCEF the following elements are + +delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.2.2: Information Elements of IoT UE Detach for NIDD using SCEF** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| IAs (if applicable) | +| Detach initiator | +| Switch off indicator | +| Detach type | + +##### 23.3.4.2.3 IoT UE Routing Area Update for NIDD using SCEF + +For each Routing Area Update associated with an IoT UE using NIDD using SCEF this event is generated. The event shall be sent in case of Routing Area Update, UE triggered Service Request, as specified in TS 23.060 [10]. In case of change of SGSN, the new SGSN shall send the event, and the old SGSN may optionally send the event as well. This event is equivalent to the EPS Tracking Area Update event defined in clause 7.4.6 but for a Routing Area Update for a UE with a GRPS Non-IP Data Delivery Connection using SCEF the following elements are will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.2.3: Information Elements of Routing Area Update for NIDD using SCEF** + +| | +|--------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information (only for the new SGSN) | +| Old Location Information (only for the old SGSN) | +| IAs (if applicable) | +| Failure reason | + +##### 23.3.4.2.4 IoT UE requested PDP context activation for NIDD using SCEF + +When a PDP context activation is generated for a Non-IP Data Connection this is generated. This event is equivalent to the Packet Data PDP context activation event defined in clause 7.4.3 but for a PDP context activation for a Non-IP Data Delivery Connection using SCEF the following elements are delivered to the DF2 if available: + +**Table 23.3.4.2.4: Information Elements of IoT UE Requested PDP Context Activation for NIDD using SCEF** + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| APN | +| SCEF-ID | +| Request type | +| Failed reason | +| IAAs (if applicable) | +| Protocol Configuration Options | +| NSAPI | + +##### 23.3.4.2.5 IoT UE requested PDP context deactivation for NIDD using SCEF + +At PDP context deactivation for a Non-IP Data Connection this event is generated. This event is equivalent to the Packet Data PDP context deactivation event defined in clause 7.4.5 but for a PDP context deactivation for a Non-IP Data Delivery Connection using SCEF the following elements are delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.2.5: Information Elements for IoT UE Requested PDP Context Deactivation for NIDD using SCEF** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| IAAs (if applicable) | +| NSAPI | + +##### 23.3.4.2.6 SCEF requested PDP context deactivation + +At SCEF requested PDP context deactivation a PDP context deactivation-event is generated. These elements will be + +delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.2.6: Information Elements for SCEF Requested PDP Context Deactivation** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| IAAs (if applicable) | +| NSAPI | + +##### 23.3.4.2.7 Start of interception with PDP context active + +This event will be generated if interception for a target is started and if the target has at least one PDP context for a Non-IP Data Connection active. If more than one PDP context is open, for each of them an event record is generated. This event is equivalent to the Start of interception with PDP context active event defined in clause 7.4.4 but for a PDP context for a Non-IP Data Delivery Connection using SCEF the following elements are delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.1.7: Information Elements for Start of interception with PDP context active** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| APN | +| SCEF-ID | +| IAAs (if applicable) | +| NSAPI | + +#### 23.3.4.3 SCEF related events + +##### 23.3.4.3.1 MME/SGSN originated connection request + +When a Connectivity Request is received by the SCEF an MME/SGSN originated connection request event is generated by the SCEF. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.3.1: Information Elements for MME/SGSN Originated Connection Request** + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation Number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| RAT Type | +| APN | +| Request type | +| Failed reason | +| IAIs (if applicable) | +| Protocol Configuration Options | +| Bearer identity | + +##### **23.3.4.3.2 MME/SGSN originated connection update** + +When a Connectivity Update is received by the SCEF an MME/SGSN originated connection update event is generated by the SCEF. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.3.2: Information Elements for MME/SGSN Originated Connection Update** + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation Number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| RAT Type | +| IAIs (if applicable) | +| Protocol Configuration Options | +| Linked Bearer identity | + +##### **23.3.4.3.3 SCEF originated connection update** + +When a Connectivity Update is sent by the SCEF an SCEF originated connection update event is generated by the SCEF. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.3.3: Information Elements for SCEF Originated Connection Update** + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation Number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| IA (if applicable) | +| Protocol Configuration Options | +| Linked Bearer identity | + +##### **23.3.4.3.4 MME/SGSN originated disconnection request** + +When a Disconnection Request is received by the SCEF an MME/SGSN originated disconnection request event is generated by the SCEF. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.3.4: Information Elements for MME/SGSN Originated Disconnection Request** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation Number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| IA (if applicable) | +| Linked Bearer identity | + +##### **23.3.4.3.5 SCEF originated disconnection request** + +When a Disconnection Request is sent by the SCEF a SCEF originated disconnection request event is generated by the SCEF. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.3.5: Information Elements for SCEF Originated Disconnection Request** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation Number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| IA (if applicable) | +| Linked Bearer identity | + +##### **23.3.4.3.6 Start of interception with connected UE** + +This event will be generated if interception for a target is started and if the target is already connected. If there are multiple PDN connections active for the target then for each of them an event report is generated. + +These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.3.6: Information Elements for Start of Interception with Connected UE** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation Number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Location Information | +| APN | +| IAs (if applicable) | +| Bearer identity | + +##### **23.3.4.3.7 Non-IP Packet Data Header Information** + +###### **23.3.4.3.7.0 Introduction** + +Packet Data Header Information reporting can be done either on a per-packet (i.e., non-summarized) basis or in a summary report. + +###### **23.3.4.3.7.1 Non-IP Packet Data Header Report** + +This event is used to provide packet header reports on a per packet basis (non-summarized reporting) and is triggered by each packet sent or received by the target. These elements will be delivered by the SCEF either directly to DF2 or via another network entity, if available. + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| IAs (if applicable) | +| Initiator | +| EPS bearer id | +| APN | +| SCS/AS Identifier | +| Reliable Data Service Source Port Number | +| Reliable Data Service Destination Port Number | +| Packet Size | + +###### **23.3.4.3.7.2 Non-IP Packet Data Summary Report** + +This event is used to report: + +- 1) the source and destination information derived from the packet headers, including: + - a) SCS/AS Identifier for the communication + - b) Reliable Data Service Source and Destination Ports if applicable +- 2) summary information for the number of packets and bytes transmitted or received by the target for each unique packet flow within an EPS bearer, and +- 3) the date and the time of the first and last packets associated with that packet flow. A packet flow for Non-IP Data Delivery using SCEF is defined as the communication between the target and the connected SCS/AS for a + +particular Non-IP EPS bearer and if the Reliable Data Service is being used the packet flow is specific to a pair of source and destination Reliable Data Service ports. + +The event provides packet summary reports for each unique packet data session (Non-IP EPS bearer) and packet flow, and is triggered by one of the following: + +- start of a packet flow associated with a Non-IP EPS bearer; +- an interim report for a packet flow associated with a Non-IP EPS bearer is to be reported; +- end of a packet flow associated with a Non-IP EPS bearer (including end of the EPS bearer itself or disassociation of the SCS/AS from the EPS Bearer). + +An interim report can be triggered by + +- The expiration of a configurable timer per intercept (called a Summary Timer). The Summary Timer is configurable in units of seconds; +- A per-intercept configurable count threshold is reached. + +These elements will be delivered either directly to DF2 or via a MF for each packet flow if available + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| IAs (if applicable) | +| Initiator | +| EPS bearer id | +| Handover indication | +| APN | +| Reliable Data Service Source Port Number | +| Reliable Data Service Destination Port Number | +| Summary Period | +| Packet Count (for this summary period) | +| Sum of Packet Sizes (for this summary period) | + +If no packets were detected for the duration of the Summary Timer, then the Packet Data Summary Report shall not be sent. + +#### 23.3.4.4 IWK-SCEF related events + +##### 23.3.4.4.1 MME/SGSN originated connection request + +When a Connectivity Request is received by the IWK-SCEF an MME/SGSN originated connection request event is generated by the IWK-SCEF. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.4.1: Information Elements for MME/SGSN Originated Connection Request** + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation Number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| RAT Type | +| APN | +| Request type | +| Failed reason | +| Ias (if applicable) | +| Protocol Configuration Options | +| Bearer identity | + +##### **23.3.4.4.2 MME/SGSN originated connection update** + +When a Connectivity Update is received by the IWK-SCEF from an MME/SGSN, an MME/SGSN originated connection update event is generated by the IWK-SCEF. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.4.2: Information Elements for MME/SGSN Originated Connection Update** + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation Number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| RAT Type | +| Ias (if applicable) | +| Protocol Configuration Options | +| Linked Bearer identity | + +##### **23.3.4.4.3 SCEF originated connection update** + +When a Connectivity Update is received by the IWK-SCEF from an SCEF, an SCEF originated connection update event is generated by the IWK-SCEF. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.4.3: Information Elements for SCEF Originated Connection Update** + +| | +|--------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation Number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Ias (if applicable) | +| Protocol Configuration Options | +| Linked Bearer identity | + +##### **23.3.4.4.4 MME/SGSN originated disconnection request** + +When a Disconnection Request is received by the IWK-SCEF from an MME/SGSN, an MME/SGSN originated disconnection request event is generated by the IWK-SCEF. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.4.4: Information Elements for MME/SGSN Originated Disconnection Request** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation Number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Ias (if applicable) | +| Linked Bearer identity | + +##### **23.3.4.4.5 SCEF originated disconnection request** + +When a Disconnection Request is received by the IWK-SCEF from an SCEF, an SCEF originated disconnection request event is generated by the SCEF. These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.4.5: Information Elements for SCEF Originated Disconnection Request** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation Number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Ias (if applicable) | +| Linked Bearer identity | + +##### **23.3.4.4.6 Start of interception with connected UE** + +This event will be generated if interception for a target is started and if the target is already connected. If there are multiple PDN connections active for the target, then for each of them an event report is generated. + +These elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.4.6: Information Elements for Start of Interception with Connected UE** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Correlation Number | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| APN | +| las (if applicable) | +| Bearer identity | + +#### 23.3.4.5 HSS related events + +##### 23.3.4.5.1 Serving Evolved Packet System for IoT UE + +The Serving Evolved Packet System for IoT UE event is generated at the HSS, when the HSS has detected that the target has roamed. This event can be reported for a target supporting Non-IP Data Delivery using SCEF. This event is equivalent to the Serving Evolved Packet System event defined in clause 12.2.3.8. The following elements will be + +delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.5.1: Information Elements for Serving Evolved Packet System for IoT UE** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed ME Id | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Logical Function Information | +| Serving MME/SGSN Address | + +##### 23.3.4.5.2 HSS subscriber record change for IoT UE + +This event will be used to report any change of association between IMSI or MSISDN or External Identifier of the target. This event can be reported for a target supporting Non-IP Data Delivery using SCEF. This event is equivalent to the Subscriber Record Change event defined in clause 12.2.3.15. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.5.2: Information Elements for HSS Subscriber Record Change for IoT UE** + +| | +|------------------------------------------------------| +| New observed MSISDN | +| New observed External Identifier | +| New observed IMSI | +| Old observed MSISDN or A MSISDN | +| Old observed External Identifier | +| Old observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Change Type (MSISDN, or External Identifier or IMSI) | +| Network Element Identifier (HSS id...) | +| Other update: carrier specific | + +##### 23.3.4.5.3 Cancel location for IoT UE + +This event "Cancel Location for IoT UE" will be used to report to DF2 when HSS sends to MME one cancel location or purge to serving system. This event can be reported for a target supporting Non-IP Data Delivery using SCEF. This event is equivalent to the Cancel Location event defined in clause 12.2.3.16 but for a target supporting Non-IP Data Delivery using SCEF the following elements are will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.5.3: Information Elements for Cancel Location for IoT UE** + +| | +|----------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HSS Id...) | +| Previous visited MME/SGSN Identifier | + +#### 23.3.4.6 HLR related events + +##### 23.3.4.6.1 Serving System for IoT UE + +The Serving System for IoT UE event is generated at the HLR, when the HLR has detected that the target has roamed. This event can be reported for a target supporting Non-IP Data Delivery using SCEF. This event is equivalent to the + +Serving System event defined in clause 7.4.9. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.6.1: Information Elements for Serving System for IoT UE** + +| | +|------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier | +| Serving System Address | + +##### 23.3.4.6.2 Subscriber record change for IoT UE + +This event will be used to report any change of association between IMSI or MSISDN or External Identifier of the target. This event can be reported for a target supporting Non-IP Data Delivery using SCEF. This event is equivalent to the HLR Subscriber Record Change event defined in clause 7.4.12. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.6.2: Information Elements for HSS Subscriber Record Change for IoT UE** + +| | +|----------------------------------------| +| New observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| New observed IMSI | +| New observed IMEI | +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed IMSI | +| Observed IMEI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HLR id...) | +| IMSI or MSISDN or IMEI change type | +| Other update: carrier specific | + +##### 23.3.4.6.3 Cancel location for IoT UE + +This event "Cancel Location for IoT UE" will be used to report to DF2 when HLR sends to SGSN one cancel location or purge to serving system. This event can be reported for a target supporting Non-IP Data Delivery using SCEF. This event is equivalent to the Cancel Location event defined in clause 7.4.12. The following elements will be delivered to the DF2 if available. + +**Table 23.3.4.6.3: Information Elements for Cancel Location for IoT UE** + +| | +|--------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | +| Observed External Identifier | +| Observed IMSI | +| Event Type | +| Event Time | +| Event Date | +| Network Element Identifier (HLR Id...) | +| Previous serving system identifier (VPLMN id...) | + +# Annex A (informative): Information flows for Lawful Interception invocation of circuit switched services + +The following figures show the information flows for the invocation of Lawful Interception for various types of calls. The figures show some of the basic signalling messages of the target calls and the events on the X2 and X3-interfaces. The call control messages to and from the network are shown for informational purposes only; some of them may not be sent or may be combined in certain networks. The handling of the bearers for the basic calls is not shown. The bearer points are established in a manner to minimise content loss without delaying the call to the target. The bearer establishment to agency will be in parallel or immediately following the bearer establishment to the target. The flows portray both forward and backward bearer establishment and release to the agency. + +## A.1 Mobile originated circuit switched calls + +Figure A.1 shows the interception of a basic mobile originated circuit switched speech or data call where the originating mobile (A) is the target for interception. B is not necessarily also a mobile subscriber and resides on a different exchange. + +![Sequence diagram showing information flows for Lawful Interception invocation of circuit switched calls. Lifelines: DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signalling, MS A, MSC Server, MGW, B. The diagram illustrates the flow of messages for call setup, bearer establishment, and call release, with specific points for lawful interception.](52e112d1ba42a3c660bf62a0fea927d3_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant DF2 + participant DF3_Bearer as DF3 Bearer + participant DF3_Signalling as DF3 Signalling + participant MS_A as MS A + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGW + participant B + + Note left of DF2: Call Establishment Attempt + MS_A->>MSC_Server: SETUP + MSC_Server->>MGW: Establish Bearer/Prepare Bearer Establishment + MGW-->>DF3_Signalling: setup of stublines + DF3_Signalling-->>DF3_Bearer: Bearer Establishment + DF3_Bearer-->>DF2: Prepare Bearer Establishment/Establish Bearer + MSC_Server->>B: IAM + B->>MSC_Server: ACM + MSC_Server->>B: CPG(alert) + B->>MSC_Server: ALERTING + MSC_Server->>B: ANM + B->>MS_A: CONNECT + MS_A->>B: Answer + Note left of DF2: Stublines contain CC of AB + B->>MSC_Server: DISCONNECT + MSC_Server->>B: REL + MSC_Server->>MGW: Release Resource/Release Bearer + MGW-->>DF3_Signalling: release of stublines + DF3_Signalling-->>DF3_Bearer: Bearer Release + DF3_Bearer-->>DF2: Release Bearer/Release Resource + Note left of DF2: Release + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing information flows for Lawful Interception invocation of circuit switched calls. Lifelines: DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signalling, MS A, MSC Server, MGW, B. The diagram illustrates the flow of messages for call setup, bearer establishment, and call release, with specific points for lawful interception. + +**Figure A.1: Interception of mobile originated circuit switched calls** + +In figure A.1 the result (answer) of the set-up of the stublines is not shown. This assumes no special action is taken in case of failure. + +## A.2 Mobile terminated circuit switched calls + +Figure A.2 shows the interception of a basic mobile terminated circuit switched speech or data call where the terminating mobile (B) is the target for interception. A is not necessarily also a mobile subscriber and resides on a different exchange. + +![Sequence diagram showing the interception of a mobile terminated circuit switched call. The diagram illustrates the interaction between DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signalling, MS B, MSC Server, MGW, and A. The process involves call setup, bearer establishment, and call release, with interception points indicated by dotted lines from DF2.](e05122559f56af5699789b7118d8fe87_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant A as A + participant MGW as MGW + participant MSC Server as MSC Server + participant MS B as MS B + participant DF3 Signalling as DF3 Signalling + participant DF3 Bearer as DF3 Bearer + participant DF2 as DF2 + + Note right of MGW: IAM + A->>MGW: + MGW->>MSC Server: IAM + MSC Server->>MGW: Establish Bearer/Prepare Bearer Establishment + Note left of MSC Server: setup of stublines + MSC Server-->>DF3 Signalling: + DF3 Signalling-->>DF3 Bearer: Prepare Bearer Establishment/Establish Bearer + Note left of DF3 Bearer: Bearer Establishment + DF3 Bearer-->>DF3 Signalling: + DF3 Signalling-->>DF3 Bearer: + Note left of DF3 Signalling: Call Establishment Attempt + DF3 Signalling-->>DF2: + Note right of MSC Server: ACM + MSC Server->>A: SETUP + MS B->>MSC Server: ALERTING + MSC Server->>A: CPG(alert) + MS B->>MSC Server: CONNECT + Note left of MSC Server: Answer + MSC Server-->>DF2: + Note right of MSC Server: ANM + MSC Server->>A: + Note left of MSC Server: stublines contain CC of AB + MS B->>MSC Server: DISCONNECT + MSC Server->>A: REL + Note right of MGW: Release Resource/Release Bearer + MSC Server-->>DF3 Signalling: release of stublines + DF3 Signalling-->>DF3 Bearer: Release Bearer/Release Resource + Note left of DF3 Bearer: Bearer Release + DF3 Bearer-->>DF3 Signalling: + DF3 Signalling-->>DF2: Release + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the interception of a mobile terminated circuit switched call. The diagram illustrates the interaction between DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signalling, MS B, MSC Server, MGW, and A. The process involves call setup, bearer establishment, and call release, with interception points indicated by dotted lines from DF2. + +Figure A.2: Interception of mobile terminated circuit switched calls + +## A.3 Call hold / call waiting + +Figures A.3 and A.4 show the interception of calls involving call hold / call waiting. Figure A.3 covers the case where one pair of stublines is used per target, figure A.4 covers the case where a separate pair of stublines is used for each + +target call. The mobile that receives the waiting call (A) is the target for interception. + +![Sequence diagram showing call interception for call hold and call waiting. Lifelines: DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS A, MSC Server, MGW, B, C. The diagram illustrates the signaling flow for intercepting a call (AB) while a waiting call (CA) is being established.](ddee3e67e0dfc22e25188fa635a19558_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant DF2 + participant DF3 Bearer + participant DF3 Signaling + participant MS A + participant MSC Server + participant MGW + participant B + participant C + + MS A->>MSC Server: SETUP(AB) + rect rgb(200, 200, 200) + Note over MS A, B: ... setup and interception of AB call as in figure A1 ... + end + MSC Server-->>DF2: Answer(AB) + Note left of DF3 Signaling: Stublines contain CC of AB + C->>MSC Server: IAM + MSC Server-->>DF2: Call Establishment Attempt(CA, CWAIT) + MSC Server->>C: ACM + MSC Server->>MS A: SETUP(CA) + MS A->>MSC Server: ALERTING(CA) + MSC Server->>C: CPG(alert) + MS A->>MSC Server: HOLD(AB) + MSC Server->>MS A: HOLD ACK(AB) + MSC Server-->>DF2: Suppl. Service(AB, CHOLD) + MS A->>MSC Server: CONNECT(CA) + MSC Server-->>DF2: Answer(CA) + Note left of DF3 Signaling: stublines contain CC of CA + MSC Server->>C: ANM + MS A->>MSC Server: DISCONNECT(CA) + MSC Server->>C: REL + MSC Server-->>DF2: Release(CA) + MS A->>MSC Server: RETRIEVE(AB) + MSC Server->>MS A: RETRIEVE ACK(AB) + MSC Server-->>DF2: Suppl. Service(AB, CRETR) + Note left of DF3 Signaling: Stublines contain CC of AB + MS A->>MSC Server: DISCONNECT(AB) + MSC Server->>B: REL + rect rgb(200, 200, 200) + Note over MS A, B: ... release of AB call and interception as in figure A1 ... + end + MSC Server-->>DF2: Release(AB) + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing call interception for call hold and call waiting. Lifelines: DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS A, MSC Server, MGW, B, C. The diagram illustrates the signaling flow for intercepting a call (AB) while a waiting call (CA) is being established. + +**Figure A.3: Interception of call hold / call waiting - stublines per target** + +![Sequence diagram for Figure A.4: Interception of call hold / call waiting - stublines per target call. Lifelines: DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS A, MSC Server, MGW, B, C.](32ff77da4286b58c4778033acaa10836_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the interaction for call interception, specifically for call hold and call waiting with stublines per target call. The lifelines involved are DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS A, MSC Server, MGW, B, and C. + +**Call AB Flow:** + +- MS A sends **SETUP(AB)** to MSC Server. +- Shaded box:* ... setup and interception of AB call as in figure A1 ... +- MSC Server sends **Answer(AB)** to DF3 Signaling. +- DF3 Signaling sends *Stublines' contain CC of AB* to DF2. +- MSC Server sends **IAM** to B. +- DF2 sends **Prepare Bearer Establishment/Establish Bearer** to DF3 Bearer. +- DF3 Bearer sends *setup of stublines"* to MSC Server (dashed line). +- MSC Server sends **Establish Bearer/Prepare Bearer Establishment** to MGW. +- MGW sends **Bearer Establishment** to DF3 Bearer (dashed line). +- DF3 Bearer sends **Call Establishment Attempt(CA, CWAIT)** to DF2. +- B sends **ACM** to C. + +**Call CA Flow:** + +- MSC Server sends **SETUP(CA)** to MS A. +- MS A sends **ALERTING(CA)** to MSC Server. +- MSC Server sends **CPG(alert)** to C. +- MS A sends **HOLD(AB)** to MSC Server. +- MSC Server sends **HOLD ACK(AB)** to MS A. +- MS A sends **Suppl. Service(AB, CHOLD)** to DF3 Signaling. +- DF3 Signaling sends *Stublines' contain CC of CA* to DF2. +- MS A sends **CONNECT(CA)** to MSC Server. +- MSC Server sends **Answer(CA)** to DF3 Signaling. +- DF3 Signaling sends *stublines" contain CC of CA* to DF2. +- MSC Server sends **ANM** to C. +- MS A sends **DISCONNECT(CA)** to MSC Server. +- MSC Server sends **REL** to C. +- MSC Server sends **Release Resource/Release Bearer** to MGW. +- MGW sends *release of stublines"* to DF3 Bearer (dashed line). +- DF3 Bearer sends **Release Bearer/Release Resource** to DF2. +- DF3 Bearer sends **Bearer Release** to MGW (dashed line). +- DF3 Signaling sends **Release(CA)** to DF2. + +**Call AB Flow (continued):** + +- MS A sends **RETRIEVE(AB)** to MSC Server. +- MSC Server sends **RETRIEVE ACK(AB)** to MS A. +- MS A sends **Suppl. Service(AB, CRETR)** to DF3 Signaling. +- DF3 Signaling sends *stublines' contain CC of AB* to DF2. +- MS A sends **DISCONNECT(AB)** to MSC Server. +- MSC Server sends **REL** to B. +- Shaded box:* ... release of AB call and interception as in figure A1 ... +- MS A sends **Release(AB)** to DF3 Signaling. +- DF3 Signaling sends *Stublines' contain CC of AB* to DF2. + +Sequence diagram for Figure A.4: Interception of call hold / call waiting - stublines per target call. Lifelines: DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS A, MSC Server, MGW, B, C. + +**Figure A.4: Interception of call hold / call waiting - stublines per target call** + +## --- A.4 Multiparty calls + +Figures A.5 and A.6 show the interception of multiparty calls. Figure A.5 covers the case where one pair of stublines is used per target, figure A.6 covers the case where a separate pair of stublines is used for each target call. The mobile setting up the multiparty call (A) is the target for interception. + +![](4e85fe330de2c4f5eea6de4b2a53c77f_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram illustrating the interception of multiparty calls with stublines per target. The diagram shows interactions between DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS A, MSC Server, MGW, B, and C. + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant DF2 + participant DF3_Bearer as DF3 Bearer + participant DF3_Signaling as DF3 Signaling + participant MS_A as MS A + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGW + participant B + participant C + + Note right of MS_A: SETUP(AB) + MS_A->>MSC_Server: SETUP(AB) + Note right of MS_A: ... setup and interception of AB call as in figure A1 ... + Note right of MS_A: Answer(AB) + MS_A->>DF3_Signaling: Answer(AB) + Note right of DF3_Signaling: Stublines contain CC of AB + Note right of MS_A: HOLD(AB) + MS_A->>MSC_Server: HOLD(AB) + Note right of MS_A: HOLD ACK(AB) + MSC_Server->>MS_A: HOLD ACK(AB) + Note right of MS_A: Suppl. Service(AB, CHOLD) + MS_A->>DF3_Signaling: Suppl. Service(AB, CHOLD) + Note right of MS_A: SETUP(AC) + MS_A->>MSC_Server: SETUP(AC) + Note right of MS_A: ... setup and interception of AC call as in figure A1 without setup of stublines ... + Note right of MS_A: Answer(AC) + MS_A->>DF3_Signaling: Answer(AC) + Note right of DF3_Signaling: Stublines contain CC of AC + Note right of MS_A: BuildMPTY(AB) + MS_A->>MSC_Server: BuildMPTY(AB) + Note right of MS_A: BuildMPTY ACK(AB) + MSC_Server->>MS_A: BuildMPTY ACK(AB) + Note right of MS_A: Suppl. Service(AB, BMPTY) + MS_A->>DF3_Signaling: Suppl. Service(AB, BMPTY) + Note right of MS_A: Suppl. Service(AC, BMPTY) + MS_A->>DF3_Signaling: Suppl. Service(AC, BMPTY) + Note right of DF3_Signaling: Stublines contain CC of ABC + Note right of MS_A: DISCONNECT(AC) + MS_A->>MSC_Server: DISCONNECT(AC) + Note right of MSC_Server: REL + MSC_Server->>C: REL + Note right of MS_A: ... release of AC call and interception as in figure A1 without release of the stublines ... + Note right of MS_A: Release(AC) + MS_A->>DF3_Signaling: Release(AC) + Note right of MS_A: RetrieveMPTY(AB) + MS_A->>MSC_Server: RetrieveMPTY(AB) + Note right of MS_A: RetrieveMPTY ACK(AB) + MSC_Server->>MS_A: RetrieveMPTY ACK(AB) + Note right of MS_A: Suppl. Service(AB, RMPTY) + MS_A->>DF3_Signaling: Suppl. Service(AB, RMPTY) + Note right of DF3_Signaling: Stublines contain CC of AB + Note right of MS_A: DISCONNECT(AB) + MS_A->>MSC_Server: DISCONNECT(AB) + Note right of MSC_Server: REL + MSC_Server->>B: REL + Note right of MS_A: ... release of AB call and interception as in figure A1 ... + Note right of MS_A: Release(AB) + MS_A->>DF3_Signaling: Release(AB) + +``` + +Figure A.5: Interception of multiparty calls - stublines per target + +![](be3e5fe8be7cc5a74f67a4b8ac93193d_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram illustrating the interception of multiparty calls with stublines per target call. The diagram shows interactions between DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS A, MSC Server, MGW, B, and C. + +**Initial Setup and Call Management:** + +- MS A sends **SETUP(AB)** to MSC Server. +- MSC Server performs **... setup and interception of AB call as in figure A1 ...** (indicated by a shaded box). +- MS A sends **Answer(AB)** to DF3 Signaling. +- DF3 Signaling sends **Stublines' contain CC of AB** to DF2. +- MS A sends **HOLD(AB)** to MSC Server. +- MSC Server sends **HOLD ACK(AB)** to MS A. +- MS A sends **Suppl. Service(AB, CHOLD)** to DF3 Signaling. +- DF3 Signaling sends **Stublines' contain CC of AC** to DF2. +- MS A sends **SETUP(AC)** to MSC Server. +- MSC Server performs **... setup and interception of AC call as in figure A1 ...** (indicated by a shaded box). +- MS A sends **Answer(AC)** to DF3 Signaling. +- DF3 Signaling sends **Stublines" contain CC of AC** to DF2. +- MS A sends **BuildMPTY(AB)** to MSC Server. +- MSC Server sends **BuildMPTY ACK(AB)** to MS A. +- MS A sends **Suppl. Service(AB, BMPTY)** to DF3 Signaling. +- DF3 Signaling sends **Stublines' contain CC of ABC** to DF2. +- MS A sends **Suppl. Service(AC, BMPTY)** to DF3 Signaling. +- DF3 Signaling sends **Stublines" contain CC of ABC** to DF2. + +**Release Phase:** + +- DF2 sends **Release Bearer/Release Resource** to DF3 Bearer. +- MS A sends **Release of stublines** to DF3 Signaling. +- MSC Server sends **Release Bearer/Release Resource** to MGW. +- MS A sends **DISCONNECT(AC)** to MSC Server. +- MSC Server sends **REL** to MGW. +- MSC Server performs **... release of AC call and interception as in figure A1 ... without release of stublines** (indicated by a shaded box). +- MS A sends **Release(AC)** to DF3 Signaling. +- MS A sends **RetrieveMPTY(AB)** to MSC Server. +- MSC Server sends **RetrieveMPTY ACK(AB)** to MS A. +- MS A sends **Suppl. Service(AB, RMPTY)** to DF3 Signaling. +- DF3 Signaling sends **Stublines' contain CC of AB** to DF2. +- MS A sends **DISCONNECT(AB)** to MSC Server. +- MSC Server sends **REL** to MGW. +- MSC Server performs **... release of AB call and interception as in figure A1 ...** (indicated by a shaded box). +- MS A sends **Release(AB)** to DF3 Signaling. + +Figure A.6: Interception of multiparty calls - stublines per target call + +## A.5 Call forwarding / call deflection + +### A.5.0 General + +The following pictures show the information flows for the interception of forwarded calls. Information flows will be given for three typical cases of call forwarding. All other types of call forwarding / call deflection are intercepted similar to one of these. + +#### A.5.1 Unconditional call forwarding + +Figure A.7 shows the interception of unconditionally forwarded calls. The mobile that activated unconditional call forwarding (B) is the target for interception. In this case interception will be performed at the 3G GMSC, where the Service Request Indicator (SRI) request for B is issued and subsequently the SRI response indicating that the call shall be forwarded is received. + +![Sequence diagram showing the interception of unconditional call forwarding. Lifelines: DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, HLR, 3G GMSC, MGW, A, C. The diagram illustrates the flow of signaling and bearer establishment/release between these entities, with interception points at the 3G GMSC.](36fd537a1e39baa2471ecfaaf869751a_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant DF2 + participant DF3_Bearer as DF3 Bearer + participant DF3_Signaling as DF3 Signaling + participant HLR + participant 3G_GMSC as 3G GMSC + participant MGW + participant A + participant C + + Note left of DF2: Call setup for B (forwarded to A) + 3G_GMSC->>A: IAM + A-->>3G_GMSC: ACM + 3G_GMSC->>HLR: SRI request for B + HLR-->>3G_GMSC: SRI response + Note right of 3G_GMSC: Interception point + 3G_GMSC->>MGW: Establish Bearer/Prepare Bearer + MGW-->>DF3_Signaling: setup of stublines + DF3_Signaling-->>DF3_Bearer: Bearer Establishment + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: Call Establishment Attempt + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: Suppl. Service(CFU) + 3G_GMSC->>C: IAM + C-->>3G_GMSC: ACM + 3G_GMSC->>C: CPG(alert) + C-->>3G_GMSC: CPG(alert) + 3G_GMSC->>A: ANM + A-->>3G_GMSC: ANM + Note right of 3G_GMSC: Stublines contains CC of AC + 3G_GMSC->>A: REL + A-->>3G_GMSC: REL + 3G_GMSC->>MGW: Release Resource/Release Bearer + MGW-->>DF3_Signaling: release of stublines + DF3_Signaling-->>DF3_Bearer: Bearer Release + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: Release + DF2-->>DF3_Bearer: Release Bearer/Release Resource + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the interception of unconditional call forwarding. Lifelines: DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, HLR, 3G GMSC, MGW, A, C. The diagram illustrates the flow of signaling and bearer establishment/release between these entities, with interception points at the 3G GMSC. + +Figure A.7: Interception of unconditional call forwarding + +#### A.5.2 Call forwarding on not reachable (IMSI detached) + +Call forwarding on not reachable because the IMSI is detached is also handled on the 3G GMSC. Interception of this + +type of call forwarding is similar to interception of unconditional call forwarding. + +#### A.5.3 Call forwarding on busy (network determined) + +Figure A.8 shows the interception of call forwarding on busy (network determined). The mobile that activated call forwarding on busy (B) is the target for interception. In this case interception will be performed at the 3G MSC where B resides, where the busy condition is detected and the call is forwarded. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the interception of call forwarding on busy (network determined).](4346261cc730a1eb683f35e4ce9deacf_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram shows the interaction between the following entities: DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS B, MSC Server, MGW, A, C, and D. The process involves the following steps: + +- MS B** sends a **SETUP(BD)** message to the **MSC Server**. +- A shaded box indicates the start of the call setup and interception process, labeled "... setup and interception of BD call as in figure A1 ...". +- The **MSC Server** sends an **Answer(BD)** message to **DF3 Signaling**. +- DF3 Signaling** sends a message to **DF2** labeled "stublines' contain CC of BD". +- The **MSC Server** sends an **IAM** message to **A**. +- A** sends a **Prepare Bearer Establishment / Establish Bearer** message to the **MGW**. +- The **MGW** sends a "setup of stublines" message to **DF3 Signaling**. +- DF3 Signaling** sends a **Bearer Establishment** message to **DF3 Bearer**. +- The **MSC Server** sends a **Call Establishment Attempt(AB)** message to **DF3 Signaling**. +- DF3 Signaling** sends a **Suppl. Service(AB, CFB)** message to **DF2**. +- The **MSC Server** sends an **ACM** message to **A**. +- A** sends an **IAM** message to **C**. +- C** sends an **ACM** message back to **A**. +- A** sends a **CPG(alert)** message to the **MSC Server**. +- The **MSC Server** sends another **CPG(alert)** message to **A**. +- A** sends an **ANM** message to the **MSC Server**. +- The **MSC Server** sends an **Answer(AB)** message to **DF3 Signaling**. +- DF3 Signaling** sends a message to **DF2** labeled "Stublines" contain CC of AC". +- The **MSC Server** sends an **ANM** message to **A**. +- The **MSC Server** sends a **REL** message to **A**. +- A** sends a **REL** message to **C**. +- DF2** sends a **Release Bearer/Release Resource** message to **DF3 Bearer**. +- DF3 Signaling** sends a "release of stublines" message to **MGW**. +- MGW** sends a **Bearer Release** message to **DF3 Bearer**. +- DF3 Signaling** sends a **Release(AB)** message to **DF2**. +- MS B** sends a **DISCONNECT(BD)** message to the **MSC Server**. +- The **MSC Server** sends a **REL** message to **D**. +- A shaded box indicates the start of the call release process, labeled "... release of BD call and interception as in figure A1 ...". +- DF3 Signaling** sends a **Release(BD)** message to **DF2**. + +Sequence diagram illustrating the interception of call forwarding on busy (network determined). + +Figure A.8: Interception of call forwarding on busy (network determined) + +#### A.5.4 Call forwarding on not reachable (no response to paging/radio channel failure) + +Call forwarding on not reachable because of no response to paging or radio channel failure is also handled on the 3G MSC similar to call forwarding on busy (network determined). Interception of this type of call forwarding is therefore done in the same way (see clause A.5.3). + +#### A.5.5 Call forwarding on no reply + +Figure A.9 shows the interception of call forwarding on no reply. The mobile that activated call forwarding on no reply (B) is the target for interception. In this case interception will be performed at the 3G MSC where B resides, where the no reply condition is detected and the call is forwarded. Initially, the interception is similar to the interception of a basic mobile terminated circuit switched speech or data call. On no reply time-out, the interception will continue on the forwarded call to C. + +![Sequence diagram for interception of call forwarding on no reply. Lifelines: DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS B, MSC Server, MGW, A, C. The diagram shows the interaction between these entities during a call forwarding attempt that times out and is then intercepted.](187d05bf7ead21e1394b61320d8b3632_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant DF2 + participant DF3_Bearer as DF3 Bearer + participant DF3_Signaling as DF3 Signaling + participant MS_B as MS B + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGW + participant A + participant C + + Note left of DF2: Prepare Bearer Establishment/ Establish Bearer + DF3_Signaling-->DF3_Bearer: setup of stublines + DF3_Signaling-->MSC_Server: Bearer Establishment + DF3_Signaling-->DF2: Call Establishment Attempt + MSC_Server-->A: ACM + MS_B->MSC_Server: SETUP + MS_B->MSC_Server: ALERTING + MSC_Server-->A: CPG(alert) + Note right of MSC_Server: No reply timeout + DF3_Signaling-->DF2: Suppl. Service(CFNR) + MSC_Server-->A: CPG(forward) + MSC_Server-->MGW: IAM + MGW-->C: ACM + MGW-->MSC_Server: CPG(alert) + MSC_Server-->A: CPG(alert) + MSC_Server-->MGW: ANM + MGW-->A: ANM + Note left of DF2: Answer + Note left of DF2: Stublines contain CC of AC + MSC_Server-->MGW: REL + MGW-->A: REL + MGW-->C: REL + Note left of DF2: Release Bearer/Release Resource + DF3_Signaling-->DF3_Bearer: release of stublines + DF3_Signaling-->MGW: Bearer Release + DF3_Signaling-->DF2: Release + +``` + +Sequence diagram for interception of call forwarding on no reply. Lifelines: DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS B, MSC Server, MGW, A, C. The diagram shows the interaction between these entities during a call forwarding attempt that times out and is then intercepted. + +**Figure A.9: Interception of call forwarding on no reply** + +In figure A.9 the release of the stublines is done after the forwarded call is released by A or C. It is a national option not to support interception of forwarded calls. In that case, the release of the stublines is done after the call is forwarded and B is no longer involved. + +#### A.5.6 Call forwarding on busy (user determined)/call deflection + +Call forwarding on busy (user determined) and call deflection are also handled on the 3G MSC similar to call forwarding on no reply. Interception of this type of call forwarding is therefore done in the same way (see A5.5). + +#### A.5.7 Call waiting / call forwarding on no reply + +Figures A.10 and A.11 show the interception of a call involving both call waiting and call forwarding on no reply. + +Figure A.10 covers the case where one pair of stublines is used per target, figure A.11 covers the case where a separate pair of stublines is used for each target call. The mobile that activated call forwarding on no reply and receives the waiting call (B) is the target for interception. In figure A.10 a new pair of stublines needs to be set up when the call is forwarded since the first pair of stublines is still used for the initial call. + +![](a0e8fe7862a6d7341faf5dac275277cc_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram illustrating the interception of call waiting / call forwarding on no reply - stublines per target. + +Participants: DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS B, MSC Server, MGW, A, C, D. + +The diagram shows the interaction between these entities for call setup, interception, and release. + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant DF2 + participant DF3_Bearer as DF3 Bearer + participant DF3_Signaling as DF3 Signaling + participant MS_B as MS B + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGW + participant A + participant C + participant D + + Note right of MS_B: ... setup and interception of BD call as in figure A1 ... + MS_B->>MSC_Server: SETUP(BD) + Note right of MSC_Server: No reply timeout + MSC_Server->>A: IAM + MSC_Server->>A: ACM + MSC_Server->>MS_B: SETUP(AB) + MS_B->>MSC_Server: ALERTING(AB) + MSC_Server->>A: CPG(alert) + Note right of MSC_Server: No reply timeout + MSC_Server->>MGW: Establish Bearer/Prepare Bearer/Establishment + MGW-->>DF3_Signaling: setup of stublines" + DF3_Signaling-->>DF3_Bearer: Bearer Establishment + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: Call Establishment Attempt(AB, CWAIT) + Note right of DF2: stublines' contain CC of BD + MSC_Server->>A: CPG(forward) + MSC_Server->>A: IAM + MSC_Server->>C: ACM + MSC_Server->>A: CPG(alert) + MSC_Server->>A: ANM + MSC_Server->>C: ANM + Note right of DF2: stublines' contain CC of AC + MSC_Server->>A: REL + MSC_Server->>C: REL + MSC_Server->>MGW: Release Resource/Release Bearer + MGW-->>DF3_Signaling: release of stublines" + DF3_Signaling-->>DF3_Bearer: Bearer Release + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: Release(AB) + Note right of DF2: Prepare Bearer Establishment/Establish Bearer + MS_B->>MSC_Server: DISCONNECT(BD) + Note right of MS_B: ... release of BD call and interception as in figure A1 ... + MSC_Server->>D: REL + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: Release(BD) + +``` + +Figure A.10: Interception of call waiting / call forwarding on no reply - stublines per target + +![Sequence diagram for Figure A.11: Interception of call waiting / call forwarding on no reply - stublines per target call. The diagram shows interactions between DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS B, MSC Server, MGW, A, C, and D.](0a73b03fba21af142d619a9a662e6490_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant DF2 + participant DF3_Bearer as DF3 Bearer + participant DF3_Signaling as DF3 Signaling + participant MS_B as MS B + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGW + participant A + participant C + participant D + + MS_B->>MSC_Server: SETUP(BD) + Note over MS_B, D: ... setup and interception of BD call as in figure A1 ... + MSC_Server->>DF2: Answer(BD) + DF2-->>DF3_Signaling: stublines' contain CC of BD + MSC_Server->>A: IAM + DF3_Signaling-->>DF3_Bearer: Prepare Bearer Establishment/ Establish Bearer + MSC_Server-->>DF3_Signaling: setup of stublines" + MSC_Server->>MGW: Establish Bearer/ Prepare Bearer Establishment + DF3_Bearer-->>DF3_Signaling: Bearer Establishment + DF2-->>DF3_Signaling: Call Establishment Attempt(AB, CWAIT) + MSC_Server->>A: ACM + MS_B->>MSC_Server: SETUP(AB) + MS_B->>MSC_Server: ALERTING(AB) + MSC_Server->>A: CPG(alert) + Note over MSC_Server, A: No reply timeout + DF2-->>DF3_Signaling: Suppl. Service(AB, CFNR) + MSC_Server->>A: CPG(forward) + MSC_Server->>C: IAM + MSC_Server->>C: ACM + MSC_Server->>C: CPG(alert) + MSC_Server->>A: CPG(alert) + MSC_Server->>A: ANM + MSC_Server->>C: ANM + MSC_Server->>DF2: Answer(AB) + DF2-->>DF3_Signaling: Stublines" contain CC of AC + MSC_Server->>A: REL + MSC_Server->>C: REL + DF3_Signaling-->>DF3_Bearer: Release Bearer/Release Resource + MSC_Server-->>DF3_Signaling: release of stublines" + MSC_Server->>MGW: Release Resource/ Release Bearer + DF3_Bearer-->>DF3_Signaling: Bearer Release + DF2-->>DF3_Signaling: Release(AB) + MS_B->>MSC_Server: DISCONNECT(BD) + MSC_Server->>D: REL + Note over MS_B, D: ... release of BD call and interception as in figure A1 ... + MSC_Server->>DF2: Release(BD) + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure A.11: Interception of call waiting / call forwarding on no reply - stublines per target call. The diagram shows interactions between DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS B, MSC Server, MGW, A, C, and D. + +**Figure A.11: Interception of call waiting / call forwarding on no reply - stublines per target call** + +### A.6 Explicit call transfer + +Figures A.12 and A.13 show the interception of explicit call transfer. Figure A.12 covers the case where one pair of stublines is used per target, figure A.13 covers the case where a separate pair of stublines is used for each target call. The mobile transferring the call (B) is the target for interception. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure A.12: Interception of explicit call transfer - stublines per target. The diagram shows the interaction between DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS B, MSC Server, MGW, A, and C. The process involves call setup, interception, hold, and transfer signaling.](18e519d1f91133e080347562f681dfb5_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant DF2 + participant DF3_Bearer as DF3 Bearer + participant DF3_Signaling as DF3 Signaling + participant MS_B as MS B + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGW + participant A + participant C + + Note right of MSC_Server: ... setup and interception of AB call as in figure A2 ... + MSC_Server->>A: IAM + Note right of MS_B: ... setup and interception of BC call as in figure A1 without setup of stublines ... + MS_B->>DF3_Signaling: Answer(AB) + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: Stublines contain CC of AB + MS_B->>MSC_Server: HOLD(AB) + MSC_Server->>MS_B: HOLD ACK(AB) + MS_B->>DF3_Signaling: Suppl. Service(AB, CHOLD) + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: + MS_B->>MSC_Server: SETUP(BC) + MS_B->>DF3_Signaling: Answer(BC) + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: stublines contain CC of BC + MS_B->>MSC_Server: ECT(AB) + MS_B->>DF3_Signaling: Suppl. Service(AB, ECT) + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: + MS_B->>DF3_Signaling: Suppl. Service(BC, ECT) + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: Stublines contain CC of AC + MSC_Server->>MGW: REL + MGW->>A: REL + MGW->>C: REL + MSC_Server->>DF3_Signaling: Release Resource/ Release Bearer + DF3_Signaling-->>DF3_Bearer: release of stublines + DF3_Signaling-->>DF3_Bearer: Bearer Release + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: Release(AB) + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: Release(BC) + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure A.12: Interception of explicit call transfer - stublines per target. The diagram shows the interaction between DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS B, MSC Server, MGW, A, and C. The process involves call setup, interception, hold, and transfer signaling. + +Figure A.12: Interception of explicit call transfer - stublines per target + +![Sequence diagram for interception of explicit call transfer - stublines per target call. Lifelines: DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS B, MSC Server, MGW, A, C. The diagram shows the interaction between these entities for call setup, interception, and release.](2cf3896394a2342a2b46c504ab9a8830_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant DF2 + participant DF3_Bearer as DF3 Bearer + participant DF3_Signaling as DF3 Signaling + participant MS_B as MS B + participant MSC_Server as MSC Server + participant MGW + participant A + participant C + + Note right of MSC_Server: ... setup and interception of AB call as in figure A2 ... + Note right of MGW: ... setup and interception of BC call as in figure A1 ... + + A->>MSC_Server: IAM + MSC_Server->>MS_B: ... setup and interception of AB call as in figure A2 ... + MS_B->>DF3_Signaling: Answer(AB) + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: Stublines' contain CC of AB + MS_B->>MSC_Server: HOLD(AB) + MSC_Server->>MS_B: HOLD ACK(AB) + MS_B->>DF3_Signaling: Suppl. Service(AB, CHOLD) + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: + MS_B->>MSC_Server: SETUP(BC) + MSC_Server->>MGW: ... setup and interception of BC call as in figure A1 ... + MGW->>A: + A->>MSC_Server: + MSC_Server->>MS_B: Answer(BC) + MS_B->>DF3_Signaling: + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: Stublines" contain CC of BC + MS_B->>MSC_Server: ECT(AB) + MSC_Server->>DF3_Signaling: Suppl. Service(AB, ECT) + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: + MSC_Server->>DF3_Signaling: Suppl. Service(BC, ECT) + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: + Note right of DF3_Signaling: Stublines' contain CC of AC + Note right of DF3_Signaling: Stublines" contain CC of AC + MSC_Server->>MGW: REL + MGW->>A: REL + A->>C: + MSC_Server->>DF3_Signaling: Release Resource/ Release Bearer + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: release of stublines' + DF3_Signaling-->>DF3_Bearer: Bearer Release + MSC_Server->>DF3_Signaling: Release Resource/ Release Bearer + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: release of stublines" + DF3_Signaling-->>DF3_Bearer: Bearer Release + MSC_Server->>DF3_Signaling: Release(AB) + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: + MSC_Server->>DF3_Signaling: Release(BC) + DF3_Signaling-->>DF2: + +``` + +Sequence diagram for interception of explicit call transfer - stublines per target call. Lifelines: DF2, DF3 Bearer, DF3 Signaling, MS B, MSC Server, MGW, A, C. The diagram shows the interaction between these entities for call setup, interception, and release. + +**Figure A.13: Interception of explicit call transfer - stublines per target call** + +In figures A.12 and A.13 the release of the stublines is done after the transferred call is released by A or C. It is a national option not to support interception of transferred calls. In that case, the release of the stublines is done after the call is transferred and B is no longer involved. + +# --- Annex B (informative): Information flows for Lawful Interception invocation of GSN Packet Data services + +## B.0 General + +The following figures show the information flows for the invocation of Lawful Interception for Packet Data and typical scenarios. The figures show some of the basic signalling messages of the target Packet Data communication and the events on the X2 and X3 interfaces. The dotted lines indicate signalling depending on whether CC and/or IRI information has been requested. The Gateway 3G GGSN may setup/release packet tunnels and send IRI information depending on national requirements. + +The use of the Gateway 3G GGSN for interception is a national option. + +### --- B.1 Mobile Station Attach + +Figure B.1 shows the interception of a basic Mobile Station Attach where the mobile (A) is the target for interception. + +![Sequence diagram for Mobile Station Attach interception](7e74ac663f3e644b589ed28f5fd29398_img.jpg) + +A sequence diagram illustrating the interception of a Mobile Station Attach. The diagram shows four vertical lifelines: DF2, DF3, MS A, and 3G SGSN. The sequence of messages is as follows: 1. MS A sends an 'Attach Request' to 3G SGSN. 2. 3G SGSN sends a 'Signalling' message back to MS A. 3. 3G SGSN sends an 'Attach Accept' message to MS A. 4. MS A sends a 'Mobile Station Attach' message to 3G SGSN. 5. A dotted line indicates a signalling flow from MS A to DF2. The DF2 and DF3 lifelines are shown but do not have any messages sent to them in this sequence. + +Sequence diagram for Mobile Station Attach interception + +Figure B.1: Interception of mobile originated Mobile Station Attachment + +### --- B.2 Mobile Initiated Mobile Station Detach + +Figure B.2 shows the interception of a Mobile Initiated Mobile Station Detach where the originating mobile (A) is the + +target for interception. + +![Sequence diagram for mobile originated Mobile Station Detachment. Lifelines: DF2, DF3, MS A, 3G SGSN. MS A sends a Detach Request to 3G SGSN. A shaded box labeled 'MS initiated PDP Context Deactivation' covers the next steps. 3G SGSN sends a Detach Accept to MS A, followed by a Mobile Station Detach message. A dotted line indicates interception at DF2.](e417ae35ab07134888be901c201d54cd_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant DF2 + participant DF3 + participant MS A + participant 3G SGSN + MS A->>3G SGSN: Detach Request + Note over MS A, 3G SGSN: MS initiated PDP Context Deactivation +See B.8 when context is deactivated + 3G SGSN->>MS A: Detach Accept + 3G SGSN->>MS A: Mobile Station Detach + 3G SGSN-->>DF2: (Interception Signal) + +``` + +Sequence diagram for mobile originated Mobile Station Detachment. Lifelines: DF2, DF3, MS A, 3G SGSN. MS A sends a Detach Request to 3G SGSN. A shaded box labeled 'MS initiated PDP Context Deactivation' covers the next steps. 3G SGSN sends a Detach Accept to MS A, followed by a Mobile Station Detach message. A dotted line indicates interception at DF2. + +**Figure B.2: Interception of mobile originated Mobile Station Detachment** + +### B.3 Network initiated Mobile Station Detach + +Figure B.3 shows the interception of a network initiated (by 3G SGSN or HLR) Mobile Station Detach where the mobile (A) is the target for interception. + +![Sequence diagram for network initiated Mobile Station Detach. Lifelines: DF2, DF3, MS A, 3G SGSN, HLR, MSC/VLR. HLR sends a Cancel Location * to 3G SGSN. 3G SGSN sends a Detach Request to MS A. A shaded box labeled 'Network initiated PDP Context Deactivation' covers the next steps. 3G SGSN sends a Mobile Station Detach Indication to MSC/VLR. MS A sends a Detach Accept to 3G SGSN. 3G SGSN sends a Cancel Location Ack * to HLR. A dotted line indicates interception at DF2.](39536a630fa74c3bcfd1670ee2152809_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant DF2 + participant DF3 + participant MS A + participant 3G SGSN + participant HLR + participant MSC/VLR + HLR->>3G SGSN: Cancel Location * + 3G SGSN->>MS A: Detach Request + Note over MS A, MSC/VLR: Network initiated PDP Context Deactivation +See B.9 when context is deactivated + 3G SGSN->>MSC/VLR: Mobile Station Detach Indication + MS A->>3G SGSN: Detach Accept + 3G SGSN->>HLR: Cancel Location Ack * + 3G SGSN-->>DF2: Mobile Station Detach + +``` + +Sequence diagram for network initiated Mobile Station Detach. Lifelines: DF2, DF3, MS A, 3G SGSN, HLR, MSC/VLR. HLR sends a Cancel Location \* to 3G SGSN. 3G SGSN sends a Detach Request to MS A. A shaded box labeled 'Network initiated PDP Context Deactivation' covers the next steps. 3G SGSN sends a Mobile Station Detach Indication to MSC/VLR. MS A sends a Detach Accept to 3G SGSN. 3G SGSN sends a Cancel Location Ack \* to HLR. A dotted line indicates interception at DF2. + +NOTE: \* Additional signals in case of HLR initiated. + +**Figure B.3: Interception of network initiated Mobile Station Detach** + +### B.4 Intra 3G GSN Routing Area Update + +Figure B.4 shows the interception of an Intra Routing Area Update where the mobile (A) is the target for interception. The sequence is the same for the combined RA / LA Update procedure but additional signalling is performed between + +the current 3G SGSN and the prior 3G SGSN before the Routing Area Update Accept message is sent to the MS. + +![Sequence diagram for Intra Routing Area Update interception. Lifelines: DF2, DF3, MS A, 3G SGSN. The sequence starts with MS A sending a 'Routing Area Update Request' to 3G SGSN. 3G SGSN responds with 'Security functions', 'Routing Area Update Accept', and 'RA update'. A dashed line labeled 'RA update' points from MS A to DF2. Finally, MS A sends 'Routing Area Update Complete' to 3G SGSN.](03d9aaba6c1af8bfd8e42c1d2422ae5c_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant DF2 + participant DF3 + participant MS A + participant 3G SGSN + MS A->>3G SGSN: Routing Area Update Request + 3G SGSN-->>MS A: Security functions + 3G SGSN-->>MS A: Routing Area Update Accept + 3G SGSN-->DF2: RA update + MS A->>3G SGSN: Routing Area Update Complete + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Intra Routing Area Update interception. Lifelines: DF2, DF3, MS A, 3G SGSN. The sequence starts with MS A sending a 'Routing Area Update Request' to 3G SGSN. 3G SGSN responds with 'Security functions', 'Routing Area Update Accept', and 'RA update'. A dashed line labeled 'RA update' points from MS A to DF2. Finally, MS A sends 'Routing Area Update Complete' to 3G SGSN. + +**Figure B.4: Interception of an Intra Routing Area Update** + +### B.5 Inter 3G GSN Routing Area Update + +Figure B.5 shows the interception of an Inter Routing Area Update where the mobile (A) is the target for interception. The sequence is the same for the combined RA / LA Update procedure but additional signalling is performed between the 3G GSN, HLR and the old 3G GSN before the Routing Area Update Accept message is sent to the MS. In case of PDP context not being active less signalling is required. + +![Sequence diagram for Inter Routing Area Update interception. Lifelines: DF2, DF3, MS A, new 3G SGSN, old 3G SGSN, 3G SGSN, HLR. The sequence starts with MS A sending a 'Routing Area Update Request' to new 3G SGSN. new 3G SGSN sends '3G GSN Context Request' to old 3G SGSN, which responds with '3G GSN Context Response'. new 3G SGSN sends 'Security Functions' to MS A and '3G GSN Context Acknowledge' to old 3G SGSN. old 3G SGSN sends 'Release of Packet Data tunnel' to DF3. new 3G SGSN sends 'Additional Signalling' to 3G SGSN and HLR. new 3G SGSN sends 'Routing Area Update Accept' to MS A, which responds with 'Routing Area Update Complete'. new 3G SGSN sends 'RA Update' to DF2. Finally, new 3G SGSN sends 'Set-up of Packet Data tunnel' to DF3.](91b12db3c85bbf466ad27eb3665a1b06_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant DF2 + participant DF3 + participant MS A + participant new 3G SGSN + participant old 3G SGSN + participant 3G SGSN + participant HLR + MS A->>new 3G SGSN: Routing Area Update Request + new 3G SGSN->>old 3G SGSN: 3G GSN Context Request + old 3G SGSN-->>new 3G SGSN: 3G GSN Context Response + new 3G SGSN-->>MS A: Security Functions + new 3G SGSN->>old 3G SGSN: 3G GSN Context Acknowledge + old 3G SGSN-->DF3: Release of Packet Data tunnel + new 3G SGSN->>3G SGSN: Additional Signalling + new 3G SGSN->>HLR: Additional Signalling + new 3G SGSN-->>MS A: Routing Area Update Accept + MS A->>new 3G SGSN: Routing Area Update Complete + new 3G SGSN-->DF2: RA Update + new 3G SGSN-->DF3: Set-up of Packet Data tunnel + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Inter Routing Area Update interception. Lifelines: DF2, DF3, MS A, new 3G SGSN, old 3G SGSN, 3G SGSN, HLR. The sequence starts with MS A sending a 'Routing Area Update Request' to new 3G SGSN. new 3G SGSN sends '3G GSN Context Request' to old 3G SGSN, which responds with '3G GSN Context Response'. new 3G SGSN sends 'Security Functions' to MS A and '3G GSN Context Acknowledge' to old 3G SGSN. old 3G SGSN sends 'Release of Packet Data tunnel' to DF3. new 3G SGSN sends 'Additional Signalling' to 3G SGSN and HLR. new 3G SGSN sends 'Routing Area Update Accept' to MS A, which responds with 'Routing Area Update Complete'. new 3G SGSN sends 'RA Update' to DF2. Finally, new 3G SGSN sends 'Set-up of Packet Data tunnel' to DF3. + +**Figure B.5: Interception of an Inter Routing Area Update** + +### B.6 PDP Context Activation + +Figure B.6 shows the interception of a PDP Context activation where the mobile (A) is the target for interception. The sequence for a network initiated PDP Context activation is analogous but is preceded by the 3G GSN sending a Request + +PDP Context Activation to the MS. + +![Sequence diagram for PDP Context Activation interception. Lifelines: DF2, DF3, MS A, 3G SGSN, 3G GGSN. The diagram shows the flow of messages for activating a PDP context, with interception points at DF2 and DF3.](efbdfb3d9d5a7a7782ef29e131f9f280_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant MS A + participant 3G SGSN + participant 3G GGSN + Note left of MS A: PDP Context Activation to the MS. + MS A->>3G SGSN: Activate PDP Context Request + 3G SGSN-->>MS A: Security functions + 3G SGSN->>3G GGSN: Create PDP Context Request + 3G GGSN-->>3G SGSN: Create PDP Context Response + 3G SGSN-->>DF3: Setup of Packet Data tunnel + Note right of 3G SGSN: PDP Context Activation + 3G SGSN-->>MS A: Activate PDP Context Accept + MS A-->>DF3: Setup of Packet Data tunnel + Note right of MS A: PDP Context Activation + DF3-->>DF2: + Note left of DF2: + DF2-->>DF3: + Note right of DF2: + DF3-->>DF2: + Note left of DF3: + DF2-->>DF3: + Note left of DF2: +``` + +Sequence diagram for PDP Context Activation interception. Lifelines: DF2, DF3, MS A, 3G SGSN, 3G GGSN. The diagram shows the flow of messages for activating a PDP context, with interception points at DF2 and DF3. + +Figure B.6: Interception of a PDP Context Activation + +## B.7 Start of interception with PDP context active + +A tunnel is established to DF3 and an event is sent to DF2. + +## B.8 MS initiated PDP Context Deactivation + +Figure B.7 shows the interception of a MS initiated PDP Context deactivation where the mobile (A) is the target for interception. + +![Sequence diagram for MS initiated PDP Context Deactivation interception. Lifelines: DF2, DF3, MS A, 3G SGSN, 3G GGSN. The diagram shows the flow of messages for deactivating a PDP context initiated by the mobile station, with interception points at DF2 and DF3.](87b70d2e8951032d28b4412d82cf1413_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant MS A + participant 3G SGSN + participant 3G GGSN + Note left of MS A: MS initiated PDP Context Deactivation + MS A->>3G SGSN: Deactivate PDP Context Request + 3G SGSN-->>MS A: Security functions + 3G SGSN->>3G GGSN: Delete PDP Context Request + 3G GGSN-->>3G SGSN: Delete PDP Context Response + 3G SGSN-->>DF3: Release of Packet Data tunnel + Note right of 3G SGSN: PDP Context Deactivation + 3G SGSN-->>MS A: Deactivate PDP Context Accept + MS A-->>DF3: Release of Packet Data tunnel + Note right of MS A: PDP Context Deactivation + DF3-->>DF2: + Note left of DF2: + DF2-->>DF3: + Note left of DF2: + DF3-->>DF2: + Note left of DF3: + DF2-->>DF3: + Note left of DF2: +``` + +Sequence diagram for MS initiated PDP Context Deactivation interception. Lifelines: DF2, DF3, MS A, 3G SGSN, 3G GGSN. The diagram shows the flow of messages for deactivating a PDP context initiated by the mobile station, with interception points at DF2 and DF3. + +Figure B.7: Interception of a PDP Context Deactivation + +## B.9 Network initiated PDP Context Deactivation + +Figure B.8 shows the interception of a Network initiated PDP Context deactivation where the mobile (A) is the target for interception. The 3G GGSN may send, (depending on national requirements) the PDP Context deactivation and release the Packet Data tunnel after the Delete PDP Context Response has been sent or received, (signalling between the 3G SGSN and the 3G GGSN is not shown here). + +![Sequence diagram for Network initiated PDP Context Deactivation interception](68a5a1a1a761c652b4b4c56da7cf9914_img.jpg) + +A sequence diagram illustrating the interception of a Network initiated PDP Context Deactivation. The lifelines are DF2, DF3, MS A, and 3G SGSN. The sequence of messages is as follows: 1. A solid arrow labeled 'Deactivate PDP context Request' points from 3G SGSN to MS A. 2. A solid arrow labeled 'Deactivate PDP Context Accept' points from MS A to 3G SGSN. 3. A dashed arrow labeled 'Release of Packet Data tunnel' points from 3G SGSN to DF3. 4. A dotted arrow labeled 'PDP Context Deactivation' points from DF3 to DF2. + +Sequence diagram for Network initiated PDP Context Deactivation interception + +Figure B.8: Interception of a Network initiated PDP Context Deactivation + +## B.10 SMS + +Figures B.9a and B.9b show the interception of a Mobile-terminated SMS. Figures B.10a and B.10b show the interception of a Mobile-originated SMS. In all the scenarios, the mobile subscriber (A) is the target for interception. + +![Sequence diagram for MT-SMS interception after 3G SGSN receives notification of SMS delivery to MS(A)](8afb16b644b2fe89d5c34251c3e6bf0c_img.jpg) + +A sequence diagram illustrating the interception of a Mobile-terminated SMS. The lifelines are DF2, DF3, MS A, 3G SGSN, and SMSC. The sequence of messages is as follows: 1. A solid arrow labeled 'Forward Short Message' points from SMSC to 3G SGSN. 2. A solid arrow labeled 'Message Transfer' points from 3G SGSN to MS A. 3. A solid arrow labeled 'SMS' points from MS A to 3G SGSN. 4. A dotted arrow labeled 'PDP Context Deactivation' points from DF3 to DF2. 5. A solid arrow labeled 'Forward Short Message Result' points from 3G SGSN to SMSC. + +Sequence diagram for MT-SMS interception after 3G SGSN receives notification of SMS delivery to MS(A) + +Figure B.9a: MT-SMS interception after 3G SGSN receives notification of SMS delivery to MS(A) + +![Sequence diagram for MT-SMS interception after 3G SGSN receives SMS from SMSC. Lifelines: DF2P, DF3P, MS A, 3G SGSN, SMSC. The diagram shows a 'Forward Short Message' from SMSC to 3G SGSN, followed by an 'SMS' message being intercepted by DF2P from the 3G SGSN.](56a5265d174ce056c1dbe5e7a60839fc_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant DF2P + participant DF3P + participant MS A + participant 3G SGSN + participant SMSC + SMSC->>3G SGSN: Forward Short Message + 3G SGSN-->>DF2P: SMS +``` + +Sequence diagram for MT-SMS interception after 3G SGSN receives SMS from SMSC. Lifelines: DF2P, DF3P, MS A, 3G SGSN, SMSC. The diagram shows a 'Forward Short Message' from SMSC to 3G SGSN, followed by an 'SMS' message being intercepted by DF2P from the 3G SGSN. + +Figure B.9b: MT-SMS interception after 3G SGSN receives SMS from SMSC + +![Sequence diagram for MO-SMS interception after 3G SGSN receives notification of SMS delivery from SMSC. Lifelines: DF2, DF3, MS A, 3G SGSN, SMSC. The diagram shows 'Message Transfer' from MS A to 3G SGSN, 'Forward Short Message' from 3G SGSN to SMSC, 'Forward Short Message Result' from SMSC to 3G SGSN, 'Delivery Report' from 3G SGSN to MS A, and finally an 'SMS' message being intercepted by DF2 from the 3G SGSN.](3c04b14104f95eb8f7100f6d497d956e_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant DF2 + participant DF3 + participant MS A + participant 3G SGSN + participant SMSC + MS A->>3G SGSN: Message Transfer + 3G SGSN->>SMSC: Forward Short Message + SMSC-->>3G SGSN: Forward Short Message Result + 3G SGSN-->>MS A: Delivery Report + 3G SGSN-->>DF2: SMS +``` + +Sequence diagram for MO-SMS interception after 3G SGSN receives notification of SMS delivery from SMSC. Lifelines: DF2, DF3, MS A, 3G SGSN, SMSC. The diagram shows 'Message Transfer' from MS A to 3G SGSN, 'Forward Short Message' from 3G SGSN to SMSC, 'Forward Short Message Result' from SMSC to 3G SGSN, 'Delivery Report' from 3G SGSN to MS A, and finally an 'SMS' message being intercepted by DF2 from the 3G SGSN. + +Figure B.10a: MO-SMS interception after 3G SGSN receives notification of SMS delivery from SMSC + +![Sequence diagram for MO-SMS interception after 3G SGSN receives SMS from MS(A). Lifelines: DF2P, DF3P, MS A, 3G SGSN, SMSC. The diagram shows 'Message Transfer' from MS A to 3G SGSN, and then an 'SMS' message being intercepted by DF2P from the 3G SGSN.](6d2057d7e401741861ca63545a5d7d3b_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant DF2P + participant DF3P + participant MS A + participant 3G SGSN + participant SMSC + MS A->>3G SGSN: Message Transfer + 3G SGSN-->>DF2P: SMS +``` + +Sequence diagram for MO-SMS interception after 3G SGSN receives SMS from MS(A). Lifelines: DF2P, DF3P, MS A, 3G SGSN, SMSC. The diagram shows 'Message Transfer' from MS A to 3G SGSN, and then an 'SMS' message being intercepted by DF2P from the 3G SGSN. + +Figure B.10b: MO-SMS interception after 3G SGSN receives SMS from MS(A) + +# --- Annex C (informative): Information flows for the invocation of Lawful Interception for Packet Data with multimedia + +## C.0 General + +The following figures show the information flows for the invocation of Lawful Interception for Packet Data with multimedia. The figures show some of the basic signalling messages of the target Packet Data communication and the events on the X2 interfaces. The dotted lines indicate signalling depending on whether IRI information has been requested. The figures illustrate interception in the visited network. + +The figures in this annex only apply to scenarios where the P-CSCF is located in the visited network. In some operator deployment scenarios, the P-CSCF will be in the Home Network. Where the P-CSCF is located in the Home Network and UE to P-CSCF signalling encryption is applied, all SIP messages between the P-CSCF and the UE will be encrypted within the visited network and therefore plain text interception in the visited network may not be possible. + +### --- C.1 Multimedia registration + +Figures C.1.1 and C.1.2 show the intercept of the Multimedia registration for the case of visited network interception (refer to TS 23.228 [43] clauses 5.3.2.4 and 5.3.2.5). + +![Sequence diagram for Figure C.1.1: Intercept of Start of Multimedia Registration. Lifelines: DF2, UE, P-CSCF (Visited Network); I-CSCF, HSS (Home). The sequence shows a 'Register' message from UE to P-CSCF, which is then forwarded to I-CSCF. I-CSCF sends a 'Cx-Query' to HSS, which returns 'Cx-QueryResp'. I-CSCF then sends 'Cx-Select-pull' to HSS, receiving 'Cx-Select-pull Resp'. A 'Continuation of registration' box is shown between I-CSCF and HSS. A dashed arrow labeled 'Register' points from UE to DF2.](68d50e85fb8de4fae0e0eafaf20e63c0_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for Figure C.1.1: Intercept of Start of Multimedia Registration. Lifelines: DF2, UE, P-CSCF (Visited Network); I-CSCF, HSS (Home). The sequence shows a 'Register' message from UE to P-CSCF, which is then forwarded to I-CSCF. I-CSCF sends a 'Cx-Query' to HSS, which returns 'Cx-QueryResp'. I-CSCF then sends 'Cx-Select-pull' to HSS, receiving 'Cx-Select-pull Resp'. A 'Continuation of registration' box is shown between I-CSCF and HSS. A dashed arrow labeled 'Register' points from UE to DF2. + +Figures C.1.1 and C.1.2 show the intercept of the Multimedia registration for the case of visited network interception, where the P-CSCF is located in the Visited Network (refer to TS 23.228 [43] clauses 5.3.2.4 and 5.3.2.5). + +**Figure C.1.1: Intercept of Start of Multimedia Registration** + +![Sequence diagram for Figure C.1.2: Intercept of Continuation of Multimedia Registration. Lifelines: DF2, UE, P-CSCF (Visited Network); I-CSCF, HSS, S-CSCF (Home). The sequence starts with 'S-CSCF selection' in the Home network. A 'Register' message is sent from I-CSCF to S-CSCF. S-CSCF sends 'Cx-put' to HSS, receiving 'Cx-put Resp'. S-CSCF then sends 'Cx-Pull' to HSS, receiving 'Cx-Pull Resp'. S-CSCF sends '200 OK' to I-CSCF, which in turn sends '200 OK' to P-CSCF. P-CSCF sends '200 OK' to UE, which finally sends '200 OK' to DF2 via a dashed arrow.](8642df2e3828b25d27362bec6d5a0eae_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for Figure C.1.2: Intercept of Continuation of Multimedia Registration. Lifelines: DF2, UE, P-CSCF (Visited Network); I-CSCF, HSS, S-CSCF (Home). The sequence starts with 'S-CSCF selection' in the Home network. A 'Register' message is sent from I-CSCF to S-CSCF. S-CSCF sends 'Cx-put' to HSS, receiving 'Cx-put Resp'. S-CSCF then sends 'Cx-Pull' to HSS, receiving 'Cx-Pull Resp'. S-CSCF sends '200 OK' to I-CSCF, which in turn sends '200 OK' to P-CSCF. P-CSCF sends '200 OK' to UE, which finally sends '200 OK' to DF2 via a dashed arrow. + +**Figure C.1.2: Intercept of Continuation of Multimedia Registration** + +**NOTE:** The same SIP Registration command is used for the initial registration and any registration updates. Registration deletion request is accomplished with a Registration command that indicates a "\*" contact or zero expiration time. + +## C.2 Multimedia Session Establishment and Answer + +Figure C2 shows the intercept of the Multimedia Establishment and Answer in the visited network, where the P-CSCF is located in the Visited Network (refer to TS 23.228 [43], clause 5.7.1). + +![Sequence diagram showing multimedia session establishment and answer between UE and Home Network via P-CSCF in Visited Network.](6d6670b8e65d3ff8126e5ab9aeaffbd8_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the sequence of messages for multimedia session establishment and answer, intercepted at the P-CSCF in the Visited Network. The participants are DF2, UE, and P-CSCF in the Visited Network, and I-CSCF (Firewall), S-CSCF, and Service Control in the Home Network. + +- The UE sends an **INVITE** to the P-CSCF. +- The P-CSCF forwards the **INVITE** to the S-CSCF via the I-CSCF (Firewall). The messages are labeled 'a. INVITE' and 'b1. INVITE'. +- The S-CSCF interacts with the **Service Control** and then sends an **INVITE** to the external destination. +- The external destination responds with an **SDP** to the S-CSCF. +- The S-CSCF forwards the **SDP** back to the P-CSCF via the I-CSCF (Firewall). The messages are labeled 'a. SDP' and 'b2. SDP'. +- The P-CSCF sends an **SDP** to the UE. +- The UE responds with a **Final SDP** to the P-CSCF. +- The P-CSCF sends a **Final SDP** to the S-CSCF via the I-CSCF (Firewall). +- The S-CSCF sends a **Final SDP** to the external destination. +- The P-CSCF initiates **Authorize QoS Resources** and **Resource Reservation** with the UE. +- The UE responds with **Reserv Success** to the P-CSCF. +- The P-CSCF forwards the **Reserv Success** to the S-CSCF via the I-CSCF (Firewall). +- The S-CSCF sends a **Success** and **Ringing** message to the external destination. +- The S-CSCF forwards the **Ringing** message to the P-CSCF via the I-CSCF (Firewall). The messages are labeled 'a. Ringing' and 'b1. Ringing'. +- The P-CSCF sends a **Ringing** message to the UE. +- The UE sends a **Ringback** message to the P-CSCF. +- The P-CSCF sends a **200 OK** message to the UE. +- The P-CSCF forwards the **200 OK** message to the S-CSCF via the I-CSCF (Firewall). The messages are labeled 'a. 200 OK' and 'b2. 200 OK'. +- The S-CSCF sends a **200 OK** message to the external destination. +- The P-CSCF initiates **2Approval of QoS Commit** with the UE. +- The UE responds with a **200 OK** message to the P-CSCF. +- The P-CSCF initiates **Start Media Flow** with the UE. +- The UE sends an **ACK** message to the P-CSCF. +- The P-CSCF forwards the **ACK** message to the S-CSCF via the I-CSCF (Firewall). + +Sequence diagram showing multimedia session establishment and answer between UE and Home Network via P-CSCF in Visited Network. + +Figure C.2 Intercept of Multimedia Establishment and Answer at Visiting Network + +## C.3 Multimedia Release + +Figure C.3 shows the intercept of the Multimedia Release in the visited network, where the P-CSCF is located in the Visited Network (TS 23.228 [43], clause C.2.1 reference available). + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the Multimedia Release process in the visited network. The diagram shows interactions between UE A, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, and UE B across Visited and Home networks.](d244183a8ff3d94b0dcf30140f51020d_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE_A as UE A + participant P_CSCF_V as P-CSCF + participant S_CSCF_H as S-CSCF + participant UE_B as UE B + Note left of UE_A: Visited Network + Note right of UE_B: Visited Network + Note between P_CSCF_V and S_CSCF_H: Home Network + Note between S_CSCF_H and UE_B: Home Network + + UE_A->>P_CSCF_V: Hangup + P_CSCF_V-->>UE_A: SIP OK + UE_A->>GPRS_V: Release PDP + GPRS_V-->>UE_A: Rls Response + P_CSCF_V->>S_CSCF_H: Remove Resource Reservation + S_CSCF_H->>UE_A: Hangup + S_CSCF_H->>S_CSCF_H: Service Control + S_CSCF_H->>P_CSCF_V: Hangup + P_CSCF_V->>S_CSCF_H: Service Control + S_CSCF_H->>P_CSCF_V: Hangup + P_CSCF_V->>S_CSCF_H: Remove Resource Reservation + S_CSCF_H->>UE_B: Hangup + UE_B->>P_CSCF_V: SIP OK + P_CSCF_V->>S_CSCF_H: SIP OK + S_CSCF_H->>P_CSCF_V: SIP OK + P_CSCF_V->>S_CSCF_H: SIP OK + S_CSCF_H->>UE_A: SIP OK + UE_B->>GPRS_V: Release PDP + GPRS_V-->>UE_B: Rls Response + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the Multimedia Release process in the visited network. The diagram shows interactions between UE A, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, and UE B across Visited and Home networks. + +Figure C.3 Intercept of Multimedia Release at Visiting Network + +## C.4 Multimedia with Supplementary Service - Call Forwarding + +Not defined in this release. + +## C.5 Multimedia with Supplementary Service - Explicit Call Transfer + +Not defined in this release. + +## C.6 Multimedia with Supplementary Service - Subscriber Controlled input + +Not defined in this release. + +# Annex D (informative): Information flows for Lawful Interception invocation at the MGW using H.248 + +## D.0 General + +The following figures show the use of H.248 in setting up a bearer intercept point at the MGW. + +## D.1 Mobile to Mobile call, originating side is target + +Figure D.1 shows the network model for interception of a mobile-to-mobile call, where the originating mobile subscriber is the target for interception. + +Figure D.2 message sequence only shows the H.248 elements related to the necessary topology, which could be used in this example. + +Normal call establishment using other H.248 elements shall be in accordance with TS 23.205. It should be noted that other means exist with H.248 to achieve similar interception. + +![Figure D.1: Mobile to Mobile call originating side is target (network model). The diagram shows a network topology with MSC1, MSC2, RNC A, RNC B, MGW1, MGW2, DF3, and LEMF. MSC1 and MSC2 are at the top, connected by a dashed green line (Signalling). MSC1 is connected to RNC A by a dashed green line (Signalling) and a dashed blue line (Mc Interface). MSC2 is connected to RNC B by a dashed green line (Signalling) and a dashed blue line (Mc Interface). RNC A is connected to MGW1 by a dashed green line (Signalling) and a dashed blue line (Mc Interface). RNC B is connected to MGW2 by a dashed green line (Signalling) and a dashed blue line (Mc Interface). MGW1 and MGW2 are connected by a solid red line (Bearer). MGW1 is connected to DF3 by a solid red line (Bearer). MGW2 is connected to DF3 by a solid red line (Bearer). DF3 is connected to LEMF by a solid red line (Bearer). DF3 contains two internal components: DF3 Signalling and DF3 Bearer. DF3 Signalling is connected to DF3 Bearer by a solid blue line (Internal Interface). DF3 Bearer is connected to CTX3 and CTX4 by solid blue lines (Internal Interface). CTX3 and CTX4 are connected to LEMF by solid red lines (Bearer). A legend at the bottom left defines the line types: Mc Interface (dashed blue), Bearer (dashed red), Signalling (dashed green), and Internal Interface (solid blue).](32acdaad6c921e80fd17e42562858b80_img.jpg) + +Figure D.1: Mobile to Mobile call originating side is target (network model). The diagram shows a network topology with MSC1, MSC2, RNC A, RNC B, MGW1, MGW2, DF3, and LEMF. MSC1 and MSC2 are at the top, connected by a dashed green line (Signalling). MSC1 is connected to RNC A by a dashed green line (Signalling) and a dashed blue line (Mc Interface). MSC2 is connected to RNC B by a dashed green line (Signalling) and a dashed blue line (Mc Interface). RNC A is connected to MGW1 by a dashed green line (Signalling) and a dashed blue line (Mc Interface). RNC B is connected to MGW2 by a dashed green line (Signalling) and a dashed blue line (Mc Interface). MGW1 and MGW2 are connected by a solid red line (Bearer). MGW1 is connected to DF3 by a solid red line (Bearer). MGW2 is connected to DF3 by a solid red line (Bearer). DF3 is connected to LEMF by a solid red line (Bearer). DF3 contains two internal components: DF3 Signalling and DF3 Bearer. DF3 Signalling is connected to DF3 Bearer by a solid blue line (Internal Interface). DF3 Bearer is connected to CTX3 and CTX4 by solid blue lines (Internal Interface). CTX3 and CTX4 are connected to LEMF by solid red lines (Bearer). A legend at the bottom left defines the line types: Mc Interface (dashed blue), Bearer (dashed red), Signalling (dashed green), and Internal Interface (solid blue). + +Figure D.1: Mobile to Mobile call originating side is target (network model) + +![Sequence diagram showing mobile to mobile call establishment between UE, RNC A, MGW1, MSC1, MSC2, and DF-3. The diagram includes state transitions for CTX1 on the UE side and message exchanges for call setup, bearer establishment, and topology updates.](aa81b9b80bd1e3d723922b3a033564a2_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the interaction for a mobile-to-mobile call where the originating side is the target. The lifelines are UE, RNC A, MGW1, MSC1, MSC2, and DF-3. The UE maintains a context (CTX1) with various states (T1, T, T5, T2, T6). The process involves call setup, RAB assignment, and subsequent bearer establishment for two different calls. + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant RNC_A as RNC A + participant MGW1 + participant MSC1 + participant MSC2 + participant DF3 as DF-3 + + Note left of UE: CTX1 (T1, T) + UE->>MSC1: Setup + MSC1->>RNC_A: Call Proceeding + RNC_A->>UE: + Note left of UE: CTX1 (T1, T) + MGW1->>MSC1: Ctx=$,Add(T$) + MSC1->>MGW1: Ctx=1,Accept(T1) + MSC1->>RNC_A: RAB AssignmentReq + RNC_A->>MGW1: RAB AssignmentResp + Note left of UE: CTX1 (T1, T5, T) + MGW1->>MSC1: Ctx=1,Topology(T1,T$,oneway),Add(T$) + MSC1->>MGW1: Ctx=1,Accept(T5) + Note right of MSC1: First Outgoing Call and Bearer Establishment between MSC1 and DF3 + Note left of UE: CTX1 (T1, T2, T5, T) + MGW1->>MSC1: Ctx=1,Topology({T*,T$,isolate},{T1,T$,bothway}),Add(T$) + MSC1->>MGW1: Ctx=1,Accept(T2) + Note right of MSC1: Bearer Establishment between MSC1 & MSC2 for AB Call + Note left of UE: CTX1 (T1, T2, T5, T6, T) + MGW1->>MSC1: Ctx=1,Topology({T*,T$,isolate},{T2,T$,oneway}),Add(T$) + MSC1->>MGW1: Ctx=1,Accept(T6) + Note right of MSC1: Second Outgoing Call and Bearer Establishment between MSC1 and DF3 + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing mobile to mobile call establishment between UE, RNC A, MGW1, MSC1, MSC2, and DF-3. The diagram includes state transitions for CTX1 on the UE side and message exchanges for call setup, bearer establishment, and topology updates. + +Figure D.2: Mobile to Mobile call originating side is target + +# --- Annex E (Informative): IMS-based VoIP Lawful Interception call scenarios + +## E.1 Overview + +This informative annex provides the examples of call scenarios that illustrate the interception and delivery of CC interception for an IMS-based VoIP call. + +## --- E.2 Background + +One of the use-cases of IMS-based VoIP service is VoLTE. The term "VoLTE" is used to refer to an IMS-based VoIP service when EPS (see TS 23.401 [22]) happens to be the access network. When EPS is not the access network, the lawful interception capabilities defined in this informative annex applies for any IMS-based VoIP service with the presumption that in those cases the media on the target's access goes through an IMS-AGW (see TS 29.334 [42]) or a PDN-GW (see TS 23.401 [22] and TS 23.402 [23]) or a GGSN (UMTS network). + +NOTE 1: Void. + +Even with the EPS-based access network, the media might still go through the IMS-AGW. And, in this case, a VoLTE shall be treated very similar to any other VoIP service. + +Furthermore, it is presumed that an inter-CSP call enters or leaves an IMS network via an IBCF/TrGW or an MGCF/IM-MGW depending on whether the inter-working CSP network is an IMS-based network or a CS-based network (see TS 23.228 [43]). Also, for an IMS roaming scenario, it is presumed that the signalling and media enters or leaves the home CSP through the IBCF/TrGW. + +The figure E.1 illustrates the VoIP configuration considered for the lawful interception capabilities defined in this clause: + +![Figure E.1: IMS-based VoIP Configuration. This diagram illustrates the network architecture for IMS-based VoIP. On the left, four IMS-UE (User Equipment) units are connected to an 'Access Network' box. Inside this box, the first two IMS-UEs connect to a 'GGSN' (labeled '3GPP Access, no interconnection to EPC'). The third IMS-UE connects to a 'PDN-GW' (labeled 'EPC + LTE'). The fourth IMS-UE connects to a 'Non-3GPP Access, no interconnection to EPC' which then connects to an 'IMS-AGW'. All four IMS-UEs also have direct connections to the 'IMS-AGW'. The 'IMS-AGW' connects to a 'TrGW'. Above the 'Access Network' box, a 'PCRF' is connected to the 'GGSN' and 'PDN-GW' via 'Gx' interfaces. The 'PCRF' connects to a 'P-CSCF' via an 'Rx' interface. The 'P-CSCF' connects to an 'I-BCF' and an 'S-CSCF'. The 'I-BCF' connects to 'Signaling Nodes' (a blue oval) and the 'AS' (Application Server). The 'S-CSCF' connects to the 'I-BCF/ MGCF'. The 'I-BCF/ MGCF' connects to a 'TrGW/ IM-MGW' and to a cloud labeled 'Voice Services offered in another CSP's network'. The 'TrGW/ IM-MGW' connects to 'Media Nodes' (a green oval) and another 'TrGW'. The 'IMS Roaming' cloud (a yellow cloud) connects to the 'IMS-UE' and the 'TrGW'. Various interfaces are labeled: 'Ix', 'Iq', and 'Ix/Mn'.](997233d405f0d4b89ddeb7683e047f66_img.jpg) + +Figure E.1: IMS-based VoIP Configuration. This diagram illustrates the network architecture for IMS-based VoIP. On the left, four IMS-UE (User Equipment) units are connected to an 'Access Network' box. Inside this box, the first two IMS-UEs connect to a 'GGSN' (labeled '3GPP Access, no interconnection to EPC'). The third IMS-UE connects to a 'PDN-GW' (labeled 'EPC + LTE'). The fourth IMS-UE connects to a 'Non-3GPP Access, no interconnection to EPC' which then connects to an 'IMS-AGW'. All four IMS-UEs also have direct connections to the 'IMS-AGW'. The 'IMS-AGW' connects to a 'TrGW'. Above the 'Access Network' box, a 'PCRF' is connected to the 'GGSN' and 'PDN-GW' via 'Gx' interfaces. The 'PCRF' connects to a 'P-CSCF' via an 'Rx' interface. The 'P-CSCF' connects to an 'I-BCF' and an 'S-CSCF'. The 'I-BCF' connects to 'Signaling Nodes' (a blue oval) and the 'AS' (Application Server). The 'S-CSCF' connects to the 'I-BCF/ MGCF'. The 'I-BCF/ MGCF' connects to a 'TrGW/ IM-MGW' and to a cloud labeled 'Voice Services offered in another CSP's network'. The 'TrGW/ IM-MGW' connects to 'Media Nodes' (a green oval) and another 'TrGW'. The 'IMS Roaming' cloud (a yellow cloud) connects to the 'IMS-UE' and the 'TrGW'. Various interfaces are labeled: 'Ix', 'Iq', and 'Ix/Mn'. + +**Figure E.1: IMS-based VoIP Configuration** + +NOTE 2: The configuration scenario where the media does not go through the GGSN, or PDN-GW or the IMS-AGW is outside the scope of this document. + +NOTE 3: Void. + +In the remaining part of this informative annex, the PDN-GW/GGSN are shown in one box and is to be read as either the GGSN (UMTS) or the PDN-GW (EPS). + +In figure E.1, the term "media node" is used to denote the network node present on media path and the term "signalling node" is used to denote the network node present on the signalling path. + +The general concepts of VoIP LI is shown in figure E.2 + +![Figure E.2: General Principles of VoIP Interception. The diagram shows a central LEMF block on the left. To its right are two parallel paths. The top path consists of a 'Delivery Function 2' block connected to the LEMF via an 'HI2' interface, and a 'SIP Signaling Nodes IRI ICE' block connected to 'Delivery Function 2' via an 'X2' interface. The bottom path consists of a 'Delivery Function 3' block connected to the LEMF via an 'HI3' interface, and a 'Media Nodes (CC Intercept Function) CC ICE' block connected to 'Delivery Function 3' via an 'X3' interface. A 'SIP Signaling Nodes (CC Interception Trigger)' block is positioned between the two paths, with an arrow pointing from it to the 'Media Nodes' block.](d0abac95583b52a3b35f74a215567334_img.jpg) + +Figure E.2: General Principles of VoIP Interception. The diagram shows a central LEMF block on the left. To its right are two parallel paths. The top path consists of a 'Delivery Function 2' block connected to the LEMF via an 'HI2' interface, and a 'SIP Signaling Nodes IRI ICE' block connected to 'Delivery Function 2' via an 'X2' interface. The bottom path consists of a 'Delivery Function 3' block connected to the LEMF via an 'HI3' interface, and a 'Media Nodes (CC Intercept Function) CC ICE' block connected to 'Delivery Function 3' via an 'X3' interface. A 'SIP Signaling Nodes (CC Interception Trigger)' block is positioned between the two paths, with an arrow pointing from it to the 'Media Nodes' block. + +**Figure E.2: General Principles of VoIP Interception** + +In clause 15, the SIP signalling nodes provide signalling information to the CC Interception Triggering Function. The CC Interception Triggering Function triggers the CC interception at a media node that implements the CC Intercept Function. + +The following functional elements provide the CC Intercept Function in the example call scenarios: + +- PDN-GW/GGSN; +- IMS-AGW; +- TrGW; +- IM-MGW +- MRF. + +The following functional elements provide the signalling to the CC Intercept Triggering Function: + +- P-CSCF for PDN-GW/GGSN and IMS-AGW; +- IBCF for TrGW; +- MGCF for IM-MGW +- S-CSCF for MRF. + +At any given time, for a specific target and for any given call, only one functional element is required to provide the CC interception. The functional element that provides the CC interception may vary, primarily, based on the CSP network implementation and the call scenario. + +## E.3 Originating Call from the Target with CC Interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN + +### E.3.0 General + +Figure E.3 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC, when a + +target originates a call with PDN-GW (or GGSN) providing the CC interception. + +![Figure E.3: VoIP lawful interception for an originating call with CC interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN. The diagram shows the flow of SIP and Voice Media from a Target's UE through P-CSCF, S-CSCF/AS, and PDN-GW/GGSN to Voice Services and a Called Party. It also illustrates the interception points (X1_1, X1_2, X1_3, X2, X3) and delivery functions (Delivery Function 2, Delivery Function 3, ADMF) that send data to the LEMF via interfaces HI1, HI2, and HI3.](7a0db9703b68b3d06cdaeefc084c0006_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the network architecture for VoIP lawful interception. At the top, a 'Target's UE' sends 'SIP' messages to a 'P-CSCF', which in turn sends them to an 'S-CSCF/AS'. The 'S-CSCF/AS' connects to 'Voice Services' (represented by a cloud) and a 'Called Party'. 'Voice Media' flows from the 'Target's UE' through the 'PDN-GW/GGSN' to the 'Voice Services'. Below the PDN-GW/GGSN, there are three interception points: 'X3' leading to 'Delivery Function 3', 'X2' leading to 'Delivery Function 2', and 'X1\_1' leading to 'ADMF'. 'Delivery Function 3' and 'Delivery Function 2' both contain a 'Mediation Function' and connect to the 'LEMF' via interfaces 'HI3' and 'HI2' respectively. The 'ADMF' also contains a 'Mediation Function' and connects to the 'LEMF' via interface 'HI1'. There are also dashed lines labeled 'X1\_2' and 'X1\_3' indicating additional interception points or data flows between the ADMF and the delivery functions. + +Figure E.3: VoIP lawful interception for an originating call with CC interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN. The diagram shows the flow of SIP and Voice Media from a Target's UE through P-CSCF, S-CSCF/AS, and PDN-GW/GGSN to Voice Services and a Called Party. It also illustrates the interception points (X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3, X2, X3) and delivery functions (Delivery Function 2, Delivery Function 3, ADMF) that send data to the LEMF via interfaces HI1, HI2, and HI3. + +**Figure E.3: VoIP lawful interception for an originating call with CC interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN** + +The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate that the target is making a voice call and the called party can be within the same CSP's network or in another CSP's network. + +Figure E.3 shows that the IRI interception is done at S-CSCF or AS. However, as specified in clause 7A, the IRI interception can also be done at the P-CSCF (not shown in figure E.3). The CC interception is done at the PDN-GW/GGSN. The P-CSCF sends the CC intercept trigger to the PDN-GW/GGSN. + +NOTE 4: PCRF is defined in TS 23.203 [44]. + +The activation of intercept is done by the ADMF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI, TEL URI or IMEI). + +### E.3.1 Originating Call from the Target with CC Interception at the MRF + +Figure E.3.1 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC when a target originates a call with an MRF providing the CC interception. The S-CSCF provides the CC Interception + +Triggering Function for the MRF. + +![Figure E.3.1: VoIP lawful interception for an originating call with CC interception at the MRF. The diagram shows the flow of SIP and Voice Media signals from a Target's UE through various network elements including P-CSCF, S-CSCF, IMS-AGW, MRF, AS, Voice Services, and ADMF, leading to LEMF for interception.](daa4a6fa7e2ba1954258f86b4928eb32_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the network architecture for VoIP lawful interception. At the top, a 'Target's UE' sends 'SIP' signals to a 'P-CSCF', which then forwards them to an 'S-CSCF'. The 'S-CSCF' is connected to an 'AS' (Application Server) via 'SIP' and to 'Voice Services' (represented by a cloud) via 'SIP'. The 'Voice Services' cloud is connected to a 'Called Party' (represented by an oval). Below the 'S-CSCF', 'Voice Media' is routed from the 'Target's UE' through an 'IMS-AGW' to an 'MRF' (Media Resource Function). The 'MRF' is connected to the 'Voice Services' cloud via 'Voice Media'. Below the 'MRF', three vertical paths are shown, labeled 'X3', 'X2', and 'X1\_1' from left to right. These paths lead to three separate boxes: 'Delivery Function 3', 'Delivery Function 2', and 'ADMF'. Each of these boxes contains a 'Mediation Function'. Below each mediation function, the paths are labeled 'HI3', 'HI2', and 'HI1' respectively. All three paths converge at the bottom to a single box labeled 'LEMF' (Lawful Enforcement Management Function). + +Figure E.3.1: VoIP lawful interception for an originating call with CC interception at the MRF. The diagram shows the flow of SIP and Voice Media signals from a Target's UE through various network elements including P-CSCF, S-CSCF, IMS-AGW, MRF, AS, Voice Services, and ADMF, leading to LEMF for interception. + +**Figure E.3.1: VoIP lawful interception for an originating call with CC interception at the MRF** + +The cloud shown with the label "voice services" indicates that the target is making a voice call and the called party can be within the same CSP's network or in another CSP's network. + +IRI interception is done at the S-CSCF. The CC interception is done at an MRF that functions as the CC ICE. + +The MRF is deployed in a network configuration with an IP border access controller that serves to hide the presence of the MRF. The IP access border controller supports IP-level topology hiding for any voice media streams. Specifically, the border gateway supports NAT functionality; always presents its own IP address to the user; prevents ICMP Ping & ICMP Traceroute requests from being forwarded across the gateway; and, resets TTL field in the IP header. + +NOTE 3.1: MRF is defined in TS 23.228 [43]. + +The ADF activates interception at the S-CSCF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI, TEL URI or IMEI). The S-CSCF dynamically triggers CC interception at the MRF for the call. + +## E.4 Originating Call from the Target with CC Interception at the IMS-AGW + +Figure E.4 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC, when a target originates a call with IMS-AGW providing the CC interception. + +![Figure E.4: VoIP lawful interception for an originating call with CC interception at the IMS-AGW. The diagram shows the flow of SIP and Voice Media from a Target's UE through P-CSCF, IMS-AGW, S-CSCF/AS, and Voice Services to a Called Party. Below the IMS, the ADMF (Access Management Function) triggers interception at the IMS-AGW and S-CSCF/AS. The IMS-AGW sends CC (Call Control) interception data (X3) to Delivery Function 3. The S-CSCF/AS sends IRI (Intercepting Related Information) interception data (X2) to Delivery Function 2. The ADMF also sends IRI interception data (X1_1, X1_2, X1_3) to Delivery Functions 2 and 3. All three Delivery Functions then send their respective interception data (HI1, HI2, HI3) to the LEMF (Lawful Enforcement Management Function).](5a4e62bead259c258d069fd3663ea670_img.jpg) + +Figure E.4: VoIP lawful interception for an originating call with CC interception at the IMS-AGW. The diagram shows the flow of SIP and Voice Media from a Target's UE through P-CSCF, IMS-AGW, S-CSCF/AS, and Voice Services to a Called Party. Below the IMS, the ADMF (Access Management Function) triggers interception at the IMS-AGW and S-CSCF/AS. The IMS-AGW sends CC (Call Control) interception data (X3) to Delivery Function 3. The S-CSCF/AS sends IRI (Intercepting Related Information) interception data (X2) to Delivery Function 2. The ADMF also sends IRI interception data (X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3) to Delivery Functions 2 and 3. All three Delivery Functions then send their respective interception data (HI1, HI2, HI3) to the LEMF (Lawful Enforcement Management Function). + +**Figure E.4: VoIP lawful interception for an originating call with CC interception at the IMS-AGW** + +The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate that the target is making a voice call and the called party can be within the same CSP's network or in another CSP's network. + +Figure E.4 shows that the IRI interception is done at S-CSCF or AS. However, as specified in 7A, the IRI interception can also be done at the P-CSCF (not shown in figure E.4). The CC interception is done at the IMS-AGW. The P-CSCF sends the CC intercept trigger to the IMS-AGW. + +The activation of intercept is done by the ADMF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI, TEL URI or IMEI). + +## E.5 Terminating Call to the Target with CC Interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN + +### E.5.0 General + +Figure E.5 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC, when a + +target receives an incoming call with PDN-GW/GGSN providing the CC interception. + +![Figure E.5: VoIP lawful interception for a terminating call with CC interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN. The diagram shows a network architecture with various components and their interactions. At the top, a 'Calling Party' (represented by an oval) connects to 'Voice Services' (a cloud). 'Voice Services' connects to 'S-CSCF/AS' via SIP. 'S-CSCF/AS' connects to 'P-CSCF' via SIP. 'P-CSCF' connects to 'Target's UE' via SIP. 'P-CSCF' also connects to 'PCRF', which in turn connects to 'PDN-GW/GGSN'. 'PDN-GW/GGSN' connects to 'Target's UE' via 'Voice Media'. 'Voice Media' from 'Voice Services' also goes to 'PDN-GW/GGSN'. Below the main network, there's an 'ADMF' (Access and Management Function) containing a 'Mediation Function'. 'ADMF' connects to 'LEMF' (Lawful Enforcement Management Function) via interface 'HI1'. 'ADMF' also connects to 'Delivery Function 2' via interface 'X1_2' and to 'Delivery Function 3' via interface 'X1_3'. 'S-CSCF/AS' connects to 'Delivery Function 2' via interface 'X2'. 'PDN-GW/GGSN' connects to 'Delivery Function 3' via interface 'X3'. 'Delivery Function 2' and 'Delivery Function 3' both contain their own 'Mediation Function' and connect to 'LEMF' via interfaces 'HI2' and 'HI3' respectively. Dashed lines labeled 'X1_1', 'X1_2', 'X1_3', 'X2', 'X3', 'HI1', 'HI2', and 'HI3' indicate various interfaces between the components.](1439cb942d9e363bbb3161b5540dd8c6_img.jpg) + +Figure E.5: VoIP lawful interception for a terminating call with CC interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN. The diagram shows a network architecture with various components and their interactions. At the top, a 'Calling Party' (represented by an oval) connects to 'Voice Services' (a cloud). 'Voice Services' connects to 'S-CSCF/AS' via SIP. 'S-CSCF/AS' connects to 'P-CSCF' via SIP. 'P-CSCF' connects to 'Target's UE' via SIP. 'P-CSCF' also connects to 'PCRF', which in turn connects to 'PDN-GW/GGSN'. 'PDN-GW/GGSN' connects to 'Target's UE' via 'Voice Media'. 'Voice Media' from 'Voice Services' also goes to 'PDN-GW/GGSN'. Below the main network, there's an 'ADMF' (Access and Management Function) containing a 'Mediation Function'. 'ADMF' connects to 'LEMF' (Lawful Enforcement Management Function) via interface 'HI1'. 'ADMF' also connects to 'Delivery Function 2' via interface 'X1\_2' and to 'Delivery Function 3' via interface 'X1\_3'. 'S-CSCF/AS' connects to 'Delivery Function 2' via interface 'X2'. 'PDN-GW/GGSN' connects to 'Delivery Function 3' via interface 'X3'. 'Delivery Function 2' and 'Delivery Function 3' both contain their own 'Mediation Function' and connect to 'LEMF' via interfaces 'HI2' and 'HI3' respectively. Dashed lines labeled 'X1\_1', 'X1\_2', 'X1\_3', 'X2', 'X3', 'HI1', 'HI2', and 'HI3' indicate various interfaces between the components. + +**Figure E.5: VoIP lawful interception for a terminating call with CC interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN** + +The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate that the target is receiving an incoming voice call and the calling party can be within the same CSP's network or in another CSP's network. The network nodes such as I-CSCF, HSS involved in the handling of an incoming call to the target are not shown for simplification of the drawing. + +Figure E.5 shows that the IRI interception is done at S-CSCF or AS. However, as specified in 7A, the IRI interception can also be done at the P-CSCF (not shown in figure Z.5). The CC interception is done at the PDN-GW/GGSN. The P-CSCF sends the CC intercept trigger to the PDN-GW/GGSN. + +The activation of intercept is done by the ADMF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI, TEL URI or IMEI). + +### E.5.1 Terminating Call to the Target with CC Interception at the MRF + +Figure E.5.1 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC when the target receives an incoming call with an MRF providing the CC interception. The S-CSCF provides the CC Interception Triggering Function for the MRF. + +The MRF is deployed in a network configuration with an IP border access controller that serves to hide the presence of the MRF. The IP access border controller supports IP-level topology hiding for any voice media streams. Specifically, the border gateway supports NAT functionality; always presents its own IP address to the user; prevents ICMP Ping & ICMP Traceroute requests from being forwarded across the gateway; and, resets TTL field in the IP header. + +![Diagram of VoIP lawful interception for a terminating call with CC interception at the MRF. The diagram shows the flow of SIP and Voice Media from the Target's UE through P-CSCF, S-CSCF, IMS-AGW, and MRF. It also includes components like AS, Voice Services, Calling Party, Delivery Functions (1, 2, 3), ADMF, and LEMF, with various interfaces labeled X1_1, X1_2, X1_3, X2, X3, HI1, HI2, and HI3.](ff0952ef692c9d960ce5f6708bcc9711_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the network architecture for VoIP lawful interception. At the top, the Target's UE sends SIP and Voice Media signals. The SIP signal passes through P-CSCF to S-CSCF. The Voice Media signal goes from the Target's UE to IMS-AGW, then to MRF. The S-CSCF is connected to AS via SIP and to Voice Services via SIP. The Calling Party is connected to Voice Services. The S-CSCF also connects to Delivery Function 3 via interface X3. Delivery Function 3 contains a Mediation Function and connects to LEMF via interface HI3. The S-CSCF connects to Delivery Function 2 via interface X2. Delivery Function 2 contains a Mediation Function and connects to LEMF via interface HI2. The S-CSCF connects to ADMF via interface X1\_1. ADMF contains a Mediation Function and connects to LEMF via interface HI1. There are also interfaces X1\_2 and X1\_3 between Delivery Function 2 and ADMF. + +Diagram of VoIP lawful interception for a terminating call with CC interception at the MRF. The diagram shows the flow of SIP and Voice Media from the Target's UE through P-CSCF, S-CSCF, IMS-AGW, and MRF. It also includes components like AS, Voice Services, Calling Party, Delivery Functions (1, 2, 3), ADMF, and LEMF, with various interfaces labeled X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3, X2, X3, HI1, HI2, and HI3. + +**Figure E.5.1: VoIP lawful interception for a terminating call with CC interception at the MRF** + +The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate that the target is receiving an incoming voice call and the calling party can be within the same CSP's network or in another CSP's network. The network nodes such as I-CSCF, HSS involved in the handling of an incoming call to the target are not shown for simplification of the figure. + +IRI interception is done at the S-CSCF. The CC interception is done at an MRF that functions as the CC ICE. + +The ADMF activates interception at the S-CSCF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI, TEL URI or IMEI). The S-CSCF dynamically triggers CC interception at the MRF for the call. + +## E.6 Terminating Call to the Target with CC Interception at the IMS-AGW + +Figure E.6 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC, when a + +target receives an incoming call with IMS-AGW providing the CC interception. + +![Figure E.6: VoIP lawful interception for a terminating call with CC interception at the IMS-AGW. The diagram shows the flow of a call from a Calling Party through Voice Services, S-CSCF/AS, P-CSCF, and IMS-AGW to the Target's UE. It also illustrates the interception points for IRI (X1_1, X1_2, X1_3) and CC (X2, X3) at the ADMF, Delivery Functions, and IMS-AGW, with corresponding HI interfaces (HI1, HI2, HI3) to the LEMF.](bd671b21db63e6fdb2196e9b18502aac_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the network architecture for VoIP lawful interception of a terminating call. At the top, a 'Calling Party' (represented by a cloud) sends SIP messages through 'Voice Services' to an 'S-CSCF/AS'. The 'S-CSCF/AS' forwards SIP messages to a 'P-CSCF', which in turn sends SIP messages to the 'Target's UE'. Simultaneously, 'Voice Media' is routed from 'Voice Services' through an 'IMS-AGW' to the 'Target's UE'. Below the IMS layer, an 'ADMF' (Access and Management Function) contains a 'Mediation Function'. It is connected to three 'Delivery Function' blocks (labeled 'Delivery Function 2', 'Delivery Function 3', and an unlabeled one on the left). Each 'Delivery Function' also contains a 'Mediation Function'. These functions are connected to a 'LEMF' (Lawful Interception Management Function) at the bottom. Interception points are marked with dashed lines: 'X1\_1' (IRI) at the S-CSCF/AS, 'X1\_2' (IRI) at the Delivery Function 2, and 'X1\_3' (IRI) at the ADMF. 'X2' (CC) is marked at the IMS-AGW, and 'X3' (CC) is marked at the Delivery Function 3. Interfaces 'HI1', 'HI2', and 'HI3' connect the Mediation Functions in the ADMF, Delivery Function 2, and Delivery Function 3 to the LEMF, respectively. + +Figure E.6: VoIP lawful interception for a terminating call with CC interception at the IMS-AGW. The diagram shows the flow of a call from a Calling Party through Voice Services, S-CSCF/AS, P-CSCF, and IMS-AGW to the Target's UE. It also illustrates the interception points for IRI (X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3) and CC (X2, X3) at the ADMF, Delivery Functions, and IMS-AGW, with corresponding HI interfaces (HI1, HI2, HI3) to the LEMF. + +**Figure E.6: VoIP lawful interception for a terminating call with CC interception at the IMS-AGW** + +The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate that the target is receiving an incoming voice call and the calling party can be within the same CSP's network or in another CSP's network. The network nodes such as I-CSCF, HSS involved in the handling of an incoming call to the target are not shown for simplification of the drawing. + +Figure E.6 shows that the IRI interception is done at S-CSCF or AS. However, as specified in 7A, the IRI interception can also be done at the P-CSCF (not shown in figure E.6). The CC interception is done at the IMS-AGW. The P-CSCF sends the CC intercept trigger to the IMS-AGW. + +The activation of intercept is done by the ADMF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI, TEL URI or IMEI). + +## E.7 Intra-CSP Forwarded Call with CC Interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN + +### E.7.0 General + +Figure E.7 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC, when a target receives an incoming call with PDN-GW/GGSN providing the CC interception and the call is forwarded to + +another IMS subscriber within the CSP's network. + +![Figure E.7: VoIP lawful interception for an intra-CSP forwarded call with CC interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN. The diagram shows a call flow from a Calling Party through Voice Services, S-CSCF/AS, P-CSCF, and PDN-GW/GGSN to a Forward-to-Party's UE. Interception points are marked at X1_1, X1_2, X1_3, X2, X3, HI1, HI2, and HI3. A box indicates that P-CSCF, PCRF, and PDN-GW/GGSN associated with the Target's UE are not used in this interception. The bottom section shows Delivery Functions 2 and 3, Mediation Functions, and the LEMF.](75f0cb39f1cd165dfe4a6aa6c4d9388d_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the VoIP lawful interception architecture for an intra-CSP forwarded call. The call originates from a **Calling Party** and passes through **Voice Services** to an **S-CSCF/AS**. The **S-CSCF/AS** then routes the call via **SIP** to another **S-CSCF/AS**, which in turn routes it via **SIP** to a **P-CSCF**. The **P-CSCF** routes the call via **SIP** to the **Forward-to-Party's UE**. The **Voice Media** flows from the **Voice Services** through the **PDN-GW/GGSN** to the **Forward-to-Party's UE**. The **PDN-GW/GGSN** is also connected to a **PCRF**. A box indicates that the **P-CSCF**, **PCRF**, and **PDN-GW/GGSN** associated with the **Target's UE** are not used in this interception. The call flow is intercepted at several points: **X1\_1** (between **Voice Services** and **S-CSCF/AS**), **X1\_2** (between **S-CSCF/AS** and **PDN-GW/GGSN**), **X1\_3** (between **S-CSCF/AS** and **Delivery Function 2**), **X2** (between **S-CSCF/AS** and **Delivery Function 3**), **X3** (between **PDN-GW/GGSN** and **Delivery Function 3**), **HI1** (between **Mediation Function** and **LEMF**), **HI2** (between **Delivery Function 2** and **LEMF**), and **HI3** (between **Delivery Function 3** and **LEMF**). The **LEMF** (Lawful Interception Management Function) receives the intercepted data from the **Mediation Functions**. + +Figure E.7: VoIP lawful interception for an intra-CSP forwarded call with CC interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN. The diagram shows a call flow from a Calling Party through Voice Services, S-CSCF/AS, P-CSCF, and PDN-GW/GGSN to a Forward-to-Party's UE. Interception points are marked at X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3, X2, X3, HI1, HI2, and HI3. A box indicates that P-CSCF, PCRF, and PDN-GW/GGSN associated with the Target's UE are not used in this interception. The bottom section shows Delivery Functions 2 and 3, Mediation Functions, and the LEMF. + +**Figure E.7: VoIP lawful interception for an intra-CSP forwarded call with CC interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN** + +The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate that the target is receiving an incoming voice call and the calling party can be within the same CSP's network or in another CSP's network. The network nodes such as I-CSCF, HSS involved in the handling of an incoming call to the target and to the forwarded-to-party are not shown for simplification of the drawing. + +Figure E.7 shows that the IRI interception is done at S-CSCF or AS. In this scenario, the IRI interception cannot occur in the P-CSCF since the P-CSCF that provides the proxy functions to the target is not on the signalling path. The CC interception is done at the PDN-GW/GGSN. The P-CSCF (that provides the proxy functions to the forwarded-to-party) sends the CC intercept trigger to the PDN-GW/GGSN. + +The activation of intercept is done by the ADMF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI or TEL URI). + +### E.7.1 Intra-CSP Forwarded Call with CC Interception at the MRF + +Figure E.7.1 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC, when a target receives an incoming call with the MRF providing the CC interception and the call is forwarded to another IMS subscriber within the CSP's network. The S-CSCF provides the CC Interception Triggering Function for the MRF. + +The MRF is deployed in a network configuration with an IP border access controller that serves to hide the presence of the MRF. The IP access border controller supports IP-level topology hiding for any voice media streams. Specifically, the border gateway supports NAT functionality; always presents its own IP address to the user; prevents ICMP Ping & ICMP Traceroute requests from being forwarded across the gateway; and, resets TTL field in the IP header. + +![Figure E.7.1: VoIP lawful interception for an intra-CSP forwarded call with CC interception at the MRF. The diagram shows a call flow from a Calling Party through Voice Services, S-CSCF, AS, MRF, IMS-AGW, and P-CSCF to a Forward-to-Party's UE. Interception points are marked at the S-CSCF (X1_1), MRF (X3), and Delivery Functions (X1_2, X1_3, X2). LEMF is connected to the ADMF and Delivery Functions via HI1, HI3, and HI2 interfaces.](1a827b10290f33d4fec04d0e8ef7a897_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the VoIP lawful interception architecture for an intra-CSP forwarded call. The call flow starts from a **Calling Party** (represented by a circle) within **Voice Services** (represented by a cloud). The call is routed through an **S-CSCF**, which is connected to an **AS** (Application Server). The call then proceeds to an **MRF** (Media Resource Function), which is connected to the **S-CSCF**. From the **MRF**, the call is routed through an **IMS-AGW** (IMS Access Gateway) to another **S-CSCF**, which is also connected to an **AS**. The call then proceeds to a **P-CSCF** (PDN Connection Network) and finally to a **Forward-to-Party's UE** (User Equipment). The call flow is also shown through a series of **Delivery Functions** (Delivery Function 3, Delivery Function 2) and an **ADMF** (ADM Function). The **ADMF** is connected to a **LEMf** (Lawful Interception Management Function) via an **HI1** interface. The **Delivery Functions** are connected to the **LEMf** via **HI3** and **HI2** interfaces. The **ADMF** contains a **Mediation Function**. The **Delivery Functions** also contain **Mediation Functions**. The call flow is marked with several interception points: **X1\_1** (between the **Voice Services** and the **S-CSCF**), **X3** (between the **S-CSCF** and the **MRF**), **X1\_2** (between the **ADMF** and the **Delivery Function 3**), **X1\_3** (between the **ADMF** and the **Delivery Function 2**), and **X2** (between the **Delivery Function 2** and the **LEMf**). + +Figure E.7.1: VoIP lawful interception for an intra-CSP forwarded call with CC interception at the MRF. The diagram shows a call flow from a Calling Party through Voice Services, S-CSCF, AS, MRF, IMS-AGW, and P-CSCF to a Forward-to-Party's UE. Interception points are marked at the S-CSCF (X1\_1), MRF (X3), and Delivery Functions (X1\_2, X1\_3, X2). LEMF is connected to the ADMF and Delivery Functions via HI1, HI3, and HI2 interfaces. + +**Figure E.7.1: VoIP lawful interception for an intra-CSP forwarded call with CC interception at the MRF** + +The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate that the target is receiving an incoming voice call and the calling party can be within the same CSP's network or in another CSP's network. The network nodes such as P-CSCF, IMS-AGW, HSS involved in the handling of an incoming call to the target and to the forwarded-to-party are not shown for simplification of the drawing. + +Figure E.7.1 shows that the IRI interception is done at S-CSCF. The CC interception is done at the MRF that functions as the CC ICE. + +The ADMF activates interception at the S-CSCF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI or TEL URI). The S-CSCF dynamically activates CC interception at the MRF. + +## E.8 Intra-CSP Forwarded Call with CC Interception at the IMS-AGW + +Figure E.8 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC, when a target receives an incoming call with IMS-AGW providing the CC interception and the call is forwarded to another IMS + +subscriber within the CSP's network. + +![Figure E.8: VoIP lawful interception for an intra-CSP forwarded call with CC interception at the IMS-AGW. The diagram shows the flow of SIP and Voice Media signals through various network elements including Calling Party, Voice Services, S-CSCF/AS, P-CSCF, IMS-AGW, ADMF, Delivery Functions, and LEMF. It highlights interception points X1_1, X1_2, X1_3, X2, X3, HI1, HI2, and HI3.](df82d77a0d2637cbf2da9ea920a554fa_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the VoIP lawful interception architecture for an intra-CSP forwarded call. The flow starts with a 'Calling Party' and 'Voice Services' connected to an 'S-CSCF/AS'. The 'S-CSCF/AS' sends SIP signals to another 'S-CSCF/AS', which then sends SIP signals to a 'P-CSCF'. The 'P-CSCF' sends SIP signals to a 'Forward-to-Patý's UE'. The 'Voice Media' flows from the 'S-CSCF/AS' to an 'IMS-AGW', which then sends 'Voice Media' to the 'Forward-to-Patý's UE'. The 'IMS-AGW' is connected to a 'Delivery Function 3', which in turn connects to the 'LEMF'. The 'ADMF' is connected to the 'LEMF' and sends 'HI1' signals to it. The 'ADMF' also sends 'X1\_3' signals to the 'Delivery Function 2', which sends 'X1\_2' signals to the 'LEMF'. The 'Delivery Function 2' sends 'HI2' signals to the 'LEMF'. The 'Delivery Function 3' sends 'X3' signals to the 'LEMF' and 'HI3' signals to it. A note indicates that the 'P-CSCF/IMS-AGW associated with the Target's UE, not used in this interception' is not shown. The diagram also shows 'X1\_1' and 'X2' interception points. + +Figure E.8: VoIP lawful interception for an intra-CSP forwarded call with CC interception at the IMS-AGW. The diagram shows the flow of SIP and Voice Media signals through various network elements including Calling Party, Voice Services, S-CSCF/AS, P-CSCF, IMS-AGW, ADMF, Delivery Functions, and LEMF. It highlights interception points X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3, X2, X3, HI1, HI2, and HI3. + +**Figure E.8: VoIP lawful interception for an intra-CSP forwarded call with CC interception at the IMS-AGW** + +The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate that the target is receiving an incoming voice call and the calling party can be within the same CSP's network or in another CSP's network. The network nodes such as I-CSCF, HSS involved in the handling of an incoming call to the target and to the forwarded-to-party are not shown for simplification of the drawing. + +Figure E.8 shows that the IRI interception is done at S-CSCF or AS. In this scenario, the IRI interception cannot occur in the P-CSCF since the P-CSCF that provides the proxy functions to the target is not on the signalling path. The CC interception is done at the IMS-AGW. The P-CSCF (that provides the proxy functions to the forwarded-to-party) sends the CC intercept trigger to the IMS-AGW. + +The activation of intercept is done by the ADMF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI or TEL URI). + +## E.9 Inter-CSP Forwarded Call to a CS Domain + +Figure E.9 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC, when a + +target receives an incoming call and the call is forwarded to a subscriber on the CS domain of another CSP's network. + +![Figure E.9: VoIP lawful interception for an inter-CSP forwarded call to a CS Domain. The diagram shows the flow of a call from a Calling Party through various network elements including Voice Services, S-CSCF/AS, P-CSCF, IMS-AGW, PDN-GW/GGSN, Target's UE, MGCF, IM-MGW, ADMF, Delivery Functions, and LEMF. It highlights interception points X1_1, X1_2, X1_3, X2, X3, HI1, HI2, and HI3.](9b9d2abd741ed4bafe7f78f89961c663_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the lawful interception architecture for an inter-CSP forwarded call to a CS domain. A 'Calling Party' initiates a call through 'Voice Services' to an 'S-CSCF/AS'. The call is then forwarded via 'SIP' to an 'MGCF'. The 'MGCF' sends 'Signaling (CS)' to 'Voice Services (CS domain)' and 'Voice Media (CS)' to an 'IM-MGW', which then reaches the 'Forwarded-to-Party'. The 'S-CSCF/AS' also connects to a group containing 'P-CSCF', 'PCRF', 'IMS-AGW', 'PDN-GW/GGSN', and 'Target's UE'. A note indicates that the 'P-CSCF, PCRF, PDN-GW/GGSN or IMS-AGW associated with the Target's UE, not used in this interception'. Below the IMS elements, the 'ADMF' (Access and Management Function) is connected to the 'S-CSCF/AS' via interface 'X1\_1'. The 'ADMF' contains a 'Mediation Function' and connects to 'Delivery Function 2' via 'X1\_2' and to 'Delivery Function 3' via 'X1\_3'. 'Delivery Function 2' connects to 'LEMF' via 'HI2', and 'Delivery Function 3' connects to 'LEMF' via 'HI3'. The 'ADMF' also connects to 'LEMF' via 'HI1'. Interfaces 'X2' and 'X3' are shown between the IMS elements and the 'IM-MGW'. + +Figure E.9: VoIP lawful interception for an inter-CSP forwarded call to a CS Domain. The diagram shows the flow of a call from a Calling Party through various network elements including Voice Services, S-CSCF/AS, P-CSCF, IMS-AGW, PDN-GW/GGSN, Target's UE, MGCF, IM-MGW, ADMF, Delivery Functions, and LEMF. It highlights interception points X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3, X2, X3, HI1, HI2, and HI3. + +**Figure E.9: VoIP lawful interception for an inter-CSP forwarded call to a CS Domain** + +The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate that the target is receiving an incoming voice call and the calling party can be within the same CSP's network or in another CSP's network. The network nodes such as I-CSCF, HSS involved in the handling of an incoming call to the target are not shown for simplification of the drawing. + +Figure E.9 shows that the IRI interception is done at S-CSCF or AS. In this scenario, the IRI interception cannot occur in the P-CSCF since the P-CSCF that provides the proxy functions to the target is not on the signalling path. The CC interception is done at the IM-MGW. The MGCF sends the CC intercept trigger to the IM-MGW. + +The activation of intercept is done by the ADMF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI or TEL URI). + +## E.10 Inter-CSP Forwarded Call to an IMS Domain + +Figure E.10 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC, when a target receives an incoming call and the call is forwarded to a subscriber on the IMS domain of another CSP's + +network. + +![Figure E.10: VoIP lawful interception for an inter-CSP forwarded call to an IMS Domain. The diagram illustrates the signaling and media paths for a call from a Calling Party through Voice Services, S-CSCF/AS, IBCF, TrGW, and Delivery Functions to the LEMF. It shows various interfaces like X1_1, X1_2, X1_3, X2, X3, HI1, HI2, and HI3. A note indicates that P-CSCF, PCRF, PDN-GW/GGSN, or IMS-AGW associated with the Target's UE are not used in this interception scenario.](10781f43062bf3e9601a1e086710556c_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows the following components and paths: + +- Calling Party** sends **SIP** to **Voice Services**. +- Voice Services** sends **SIP** to **S-CSCF/AS**. +- S-CSCF/AS** sends **SIP** to **IBCF**. +- IBCF** sends **SIP (Ici)** to **Voice Services (another IMS CSP)**, which then forwards to **Forwarded-to-Party**. +- IBCF** also sends **Voice Media (Izi)** to **TrGW**. +- TrGW** sends **Voice Media (Izi)** to **Delivery Function 3**. +- ADMF** (with **Mediation Function**) connects to **Delivery Function 2** (with **Mediation Function**) and **Delivery Function 3** (with **Mediation Function**). +- Delivery Function 2** and **Delivery Function 3** both send data to **LEMF**. +- Interfaces are labeled: **X1\_1** (between Voice Services and ADMF), **X1\_2** (between ADMF and Delivery Function 2), **X1\_3** (between S-CSCF/AS and ADMF), **X2** (between S-CSCF/AS and Delivery Function 2), **X3** (between TrGW and Delivery Function 3), **HI1** (between ADMF and LEMF), **HI2** (between Delivery Function 2 and LEMF), and **HI3** (between Delivery Function 3 and LEMF). +- A box contains **P-CSCF**, **PCRF**, **IMS-AGW**, **PDN-GW/GGSN**, and **Target's UE**. A note states: "P-CSCF, PCRF, PDN-GW/GGSN or IMS-AGW associated with the Target's UE, not used in this interception". + +Figure E.10: VoIP lawful interception for an inter-CSP forwarded call to an IMS Domain. The diagram illustrates the signaling and media paths for a call from a Calling Party through Voice Services, S-CSCF/AS, IBCF, TrGW, and Delivery Functions to the LEMF. It shows various interfaces like X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3, X2, X3, HI1, HI2, and HI3. A note indicates that P-CSCF, PCRF, PDN-GW/GGSN, or IMS-AGW associated with the Target's UE are not used in this interception scenario. + +**Figure E.10: VoIP lawful interception for an inter-CSP forwarded call to an IMS Domain** + +The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate that the target is receiving an incoming voice call and the calling party can be within the same CSP's network or in another CSP's network. The network nodes such as I-CSCF, HSS involved in the handling of an incoming call to the target are not shown for simplification of the drawing. + +Figure E.10 shows that the IRI interception is done at S-CSCF or AS. In this scenario, the IRI interception cannot occur in the P-CSCF since the P-CSCF that provides the proxy functions to the target is not on the signalling path. The CC interception is done at the TrGW. IBCF sends the CC intercept trigger to the TrGW. + +The activation of intercept is done by the ADMF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI or TEL URI). + +## E.11 Originating Call from the Target with IMS Roaming + +Figure E.11 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC, when + +a target originates a call with IMS roaming. + +![Figure E.11: VoIP lawful interception for an originating call with IMS Roaming. The diagram shows the network architecture for IMS Roaming, including the IMS Roaming Target's UE, P-CSCF, PCRF, PDN-GW/GGSN, IMS-AGW, IBCF, TrGW, S-CSCF/AS, Voice Services, Called Party, Delivery Functions (1, 2, 3), ADMF, and LEMF. SIP and Voice Media flows are indicated between these components, with specific interception points (X1_1, X1_2, X1_3, X2, X3, H1.1, H1.2, H1.3) shown for lawful interception.](523ab7b925beb555f88b2e1e1336974f_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the VoIP lawful interception architecture for an originating call with IMS Roaming. On the left, an 'IMS Roaming' oval contains the 'IMS Roaming Target's UE', 'P-CSCF', 'PCRF', 'PDN-GW/GGSN', and 'IMS-AGW'. SIP signals flow from the UE through the P-CSCF to the 'IBCF', then to the 'S-CSCF/AS'. Voice media flows from the UE through the PDN-GW/GGSN and IMS-AGW to the 'TrGW'. The 'S-CSCF/AS' connects to 'Voice Services' (represented by a cloud) and the 'Called Party'. Below the TrGW, three 'Delivery Function' blocks (labeled 1, 2, and 3) are shown, each containing a 'Mediation Function'. These functions receive data from the TrGW (X3), S-CSCF/AS (X2), and ADMF (X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3). The 'ADMF' block also contains a 'Mediation Function' and connects to the 'LEMF'. The 'LEMF' receives data from the Delivery Functions (H1.1, H1.2, H1.3) and the ADMF (H1.1). + +Figure E.11: VoIP lawful interception for an originating call with IMS Roaming. The diagram shows the network architecture for IMS Roaming, including the IMS Roaming Target's UE, P-CSCF, PCRF, PDN-GW/GGSN, IMS-AGW, IBCF, TrGW, S-CSCF/AS, Voice Services, Called Party, Delivery Functions (1, 2, 3), ADMF, and LEMF. SIP and Voice Media flows are indicated between these components, with specific interception points (X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3, X2, X3, H1.1, H1.2, H1.3) shown for lawful interception. + +**Figure E.11: VoIP lawful interception for an originating call with IMS Roaming** + +The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate that the target is making a voice call and the called party can be within the same CSP's network or in another CSP's network. + +Figure E.11 shows that the IRI interception is done at S-CSCF or AS. The IRI interception at the P-CSCF does not apply to this configuration due to the fact that the P-CSCF resides at the visited CSP as a result of IMS roaming. The CC interception is done at the TrGW. The I-BCF sends the CC intercept trigger to the TrGW. + +The activation of intercept is done by the ADMF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI, TEL URI or IMEI). + +NOTE: The above is the case where optimal media routing is not employed. In the case where the optimal media routing is employed, the CC does not come to the TrGW. + +## E.12 Terminating Call to the Target with IMS Roaming + +Figure E.12 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC, when + +a target with IMS roaming receives an incoming call. + +![Figure E.12: VoIP lawful interception for a terminating call with IMS Roaming. The diagram shows the flow of SIP and Voice Media signals from a Calling Party through various network elements including S-CSCF/AS, I-BCF, TrGW, ADMF, and Delivery Functions (2 and 3) to a LEMF. The IMS Roaming section shows the call reaching the IMS Roaming Target's UE via P-CSCF, PCRF, PDN-GW/GGSN, and IMS-AGW. Interception points are marked at X1_1, X1_2, X1_3, X2, X3, H1, H2, and H3.](a3472689858b068ef469213682965325_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the network architecture for VoIP lawful interception during an incoming call to an IMS roaming target. On the left, a 'Calling Party' initiates a call through 'Voice Services' to an 'S-CSCF/AS'. The 'S-CSCF/AS' sends SIP signals to an 'I-BCF' and Voice Media to a 'TrGW'. The 'I-BCF' also sends SIP signals to a 'P-CSCF' within the 'IMS Roaming' circle. The 'TrGW' sends Voice Media to the 'P-CSCF' and also to 'Delivery Function 3'. Below the 'TrGW', an 'ADMF' (containing a 'Mediation Function') is connected to 'Delivery Function 2' (also containing a 'Mediation Function') and 'Delivery Function 3' (containing a 'Mediation Function'). The 'ADMF' sends signals to the 'LEMF' via interface H1. 'Delivery Function 2' sends signals to the 'LEMF' via interface H2. 'Delivery Function 3' sends signals to the 'LEMF' via interface H3. Inside the 'IMS Roaming' circle, the 'P-CSCF' is connected to a 'PCRF', which is connected to a 'PDN-GW/GGSN', which is connected to an 'IMS-AGW', which in turn is connected to the 'IMS Roaming Target's UE'. The 'IMS Roaming Target's UE' receives Voice Media from the 'PDN-GW/GGSN'. Various interception points are indicated: X1\_1 (between S-CSCF/AS and I-BCF), X1\_2 (between ADMF and Delivery Function 2), X1\_3 (between ADMF and Delivery Function 3), X2 (between TrGW and Delivery Function 3), and X3 (between TrGW and Delivery Function 3). + +Figure E.12: VoIP lawful interception for a terminating call with IMS Roaming. The diagram shows the flow of SIP and Voice Media signals from a Calling Party through various network elements including S-CSCF/AS, I-BCF, TrGW, ADMF, and Delivery Functions (2 and 3) to a LEMF. The IMS Roaming section shows the call reaching the IMS Roaming Target's UE via P-CSCF, PCRF, PDN-GW/GGSN, and IMS-AGW. Interception points are marked at X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3, X2, X3, H1, H2, and H3. + +**Figure E.12: VoIP lawful interception for a terminating call with IMS Roaming** + +The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate that the target is receiving an incoming voice call and the calling party can be within the same CSP's network or in another CSP's network. The network nodes such as I-CSCF, HSS involved in the handling of an incoming call to the target are not shown for simplification of the drawing. + +Figure E.12 shows that the IRI interception is done at S-CSCF or AS. The IRI interception at the P-CSCF does not apply to this configuration due to the fact that the P-CSCF resides at the visited CSP as a result of IMS roaming. The CC interception is done at the TrGW. The I-BCF sends the CC intercept trigger to the TrGW. + +The activation of intercept is done by the ADMF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI, or TEL URI or IMEI). + +## E.13 Intra-CSP Forwarded Call with IMS Roaming + +Figure E.13 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC, when an incoming call to a target gets forwarded to another subscriber who is IMS roaming. The target may or may not be + +IMS roaming. + +![Figure E.13: VoIP lawful interception for an intra-CSP forwarded call with IMS Roaming. The diagram shows the signaling and media paths for a call from a Calling Party through Voice Services, S-CSCF/AS, IBCF, and TrGW to a target UE in an IMS Roaming area. It includes various network functions like ADMF, Delivery Functions, and LEMF for lawful interception. A callout box indicates that P-CSCF, PCRF, PDN-GW/GGSN, or IMS-AGW associated with the Target's UE are not used in this interception scenario.](09955ff8214ffb6947951fc0f60eb6ab_img.jpg) + +Figure E.13: VoIP lawful interception for an intra-CSP forwarded call with IMS Roaming. The diagram shows the signaling and media paths for a call from a Calling Party through Voice Services, S-CSCF/AS, IBCF, and TrGW to a target UE in an IMS Roaming area. It includes various network functions like ADMF, Delivery Functions, and LEMF for lawful interception. A callout box indicates that P-CSCF, PCRF, PDN-GW/GGSN, or IMS-AGW associated with the Target's UE are not used in this interception scenario. + +**Figure E.13: VoIP lawful interception for an intra-CSP forwarded call with IMS Roaming** + +The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate that the target is receiving an incoming voice call and the calling party can be within the same CSP's network or in another CSP's network. The network nodes such as I-CSCF, HSS involved in the handling of an incoming call to the target are not shown for simplification of the drawing. + +Figure E.13 shows that the IRI interception is done at S-CSCF or AS of the target. In this scenario, the IRI interception cannot occur in the P-CSCF since the P-CSCF that provides the proxy functions to the target is not on the signalling path. Since the forwarded-to-party is IMS roaming, the CC interception is done at the TrGW. IBCF sends the CC intercept trigger to the TrGW. + +The activation of intercept is done by the ADMF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI or TEL URI). + +NOTE 5: Void. + +If the target is IMS roaming, but not the forwarded-to-party, then the CC interception for an intra-CSP forwarded call is done at the PDN-GW/GGSN (as illustrated in Z.9) or IMS-AGW (as illustrated in Z.8). + +## E.14 Lawful interception in the VPLMN with IMS roaming + +### E.14.1 Local Breakout (LBO) with P-CSCF in VPLMN + +#### E.14.1.1 General + +This clause illustrates a few scenarios of lawful interception functions in the VPLMN for inbound roaming targets. The LI functions described address the IMS roaming scenarios. Local Breakout (LBO), roaming architecture used for VoLTE, is an example of IMS roaming. + +#### E.14.1.2 Originating call from an Inbound Roaming Target with CC Interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN + +Figure E.14 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC in the + +VPLMN, when an inbound roaming target originates a call with PDN-GW (or GGSN) providing the CC interception. + +![Figure E.14: VoIP lawful interception in VPLMN for an originating call with IMS Roaming with CC interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN. The diagram shows the call flow from an Inbound Roaming Target's UE through various network elements including P-CSCF, PCRF, PDN-GW/GGSN, IBCF, TrGW, and Voice Services to a Called Party. It also illustrates the interception points for IRI (X1_1, X1_2, X1_3) and CC (X2, X3) at the PDN-GW/GGSN, and the delivery of intercepted data to the LEMF via HI1, HI2, and HI3 interfaces through the ADMF and Delivery Functions.](844077b3034f0030b404207db0ad76b4_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + UE[Inbound Roaming Target's UE] -- SIP --> P-CSCF[P-CSCF] + UE -- Voice Media --> PDN-GW[PDN-GW/GGSN] + P-CSCF -- SIP --> IBCF[IBCF] + P-CSCF -- SIP --> PCRF[PCRF] + P-CSCF -- SIP --> TrGW[TrGW] + IBCF -- SIP --> VS(Voice Services) + VS --> CP((Called Party)) + TrGW -- Voice Media --> VS + PDN-GW -- Voice Media --> TrGW + PDN-GW -- X2 --> DF2[Delivery Function 2] + PDN-GW -- X3 --> DF3[Delivery Function 3] + ADMF[ADMF] -- X1_2 --> DF3 + ADMF -- X1_3 --> DF3 + LEMF[LEMF] -- HI1 --> ADMF + LEMF -- HI3 --> DF3 + LEMF -- HI2 --> DF2 + subgraph ADMF + MF1[Mediation Function] + end + subgraph DF3 + MF3[Mediation Function] + end + subgraph DF2 + MF2[Mediation Function] + end + style UE stroke-width:2px + style VS fill:none,stroke:none + style CP fill:none,stroke:none + +``` + +Figure E.14: VoIP lawful interception in VPLMN for an originating call with IMS Roaming with CC interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN. The diagram shows the call flow from an Inbound Roaming Target's UE through various network elements including P-CSCF, PCRF, PDN-GW/GGSN, IBCF, TrGW, and Voice Services to a Called Party. It also illustrates the interception points for IRI (X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3) and CC (X2, X3) at the PDN-GW/GGSN, and the delivery of intercepted data to the LEMF via HI1, HI2, and HI3 interfaces through the ADMF and Delivery Functions. + +**Figure E.14:VoIP lawful interception in VPLMN for an originating call with IMS Roaming with CC interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN** + +The routing of call to the called party can vary based on the CSP policy and the network that serves the called party. The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate that the inbound roaming target is making a voice call and the called party can be within the same VPLMN, or at the HPLMN or served by another CSP's network. At the Egress point, an IBCF/TrGW is shown. There can be other scenarios where different network nodes (e.g., TRF, MGCF, IM-MGW) can be present. However, lawful interception of an inbound roaming target in the VPLMN is independent of topology that involves such network nodes. + +Figure E.14 shows that the IRI interception is done at P-CSCF. The CC interception is done at the PDN-GW/GGSN. The P-CSCF sends the CC intercept trigger to the PDN-GW/GGSN. + +The activation of intercept is done by the ADMF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI or TEL URI). + +Local Breakout (LBO) as a roaming architecture used for VoLTE is one of the examples of IMS roaming. Several call routing scenarios can happen with LBO. However, the lawful interception in the VPLMN is independent of all those call scenarios. + +#### E.14.1.3 Originating Call from an Inbound Roaming Target with CC Interception at the IMS-AGW + +Figure E.15 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC in the VPLMN, when an inbound roaming target originates a call with IMS-AGW providing the CC interception. + +![Figure E.15: VoIP lawful interception in VPLMN for an originating call with IMS Roaming with CC interception at the IMS-AGW. The diagram shows the flow of SIP and Voice Media signals from an Inbound Roaming Target's UE through various network elements including P-CSCF, IMS-AGW, IBCF, TrGW, and Voice Services to a Called Party. It also illustrates the interception points (X1_1, X1_2, X1_3, X2, X3) and the delivery of intercepted data to the LEMF via ADMF and Delivery Functions.](ae53f90bb87d6d09e2d6b5278d7c338f_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the network architecture for VoIP lawful interception. At the top, an 'Inbound Roaming Target's UE' sends 'SIP' signals to a 'P-CSCF' and 'Voice Media' to an 'IMS-AGW'. The 'P-CSCF' routes 'SIP' signals to an 'IBCF', which then connects to 'Voice Services' (represented by a cloud) and finally to the 'Called Party' (represented by an oval). The 'IMS-AGW' also routes 'Voice Media' to a 'TrGW', which connects to 'Voice Services'. Below the IMS-AGW, there are three 'Delivery Function' blocks: 'Delivery Function 3', 'Delivery Function 2', and 'LEMF'. The 'P-CSCF' sends a trigger (X3) to 'Delivery Function 3'. The 'IMS-AGW' sends 'Voice Media' (X2) to 'Delivery Function 2'. The 'ADMf' (Admission and Management Function) sends triggers (X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3) to the delivery functions. The 'LEMF' (Lawful Enforcement Management Function) receives data (HI1, HI2, HI3) from the delivery functions. + +Figure E.15: VoIP lawful interception in VPLMN for an originating call with IMS Roaming with CC interception at the IMS-AGW. The diagram shows the flow of SIP and Voice Media signals from an Inbound Roaming Target's UE through various network elements including P-CSCF, IMS-AGW, IBCF, TrGW, and Voice Services to a Called Party. It also illustrates the interception points (X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3, X2, X3) and the delivery of intercepted data to the LEMF via ADMF and Delivery Functions. + +**Figure E.15: VoIP lawful interception in VPLMN for an originating call with IMS Roaming with CC interception at the IMS-AGW** + +The routing of call to the called party can vary based on the CSP policy and the network that serves the called party. The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate that the inbound roaming target is making a voice call and the called party can be within the same VPLMN, or at the HPLMN or served by another CSP's network. At the Egress point, an IBCF/TrGW is shown. There can be other scenarios where different network nodes (e.g., TRF, MGCF, IM-MGW) can be present. However, lawful interception of an inbound roaming target in the VPLMN is independent of topology that involves such network nodes. + +Figure E.15 shows that the IRI interception is done at P-CSCF. The CC interception is done at the IMS-AGW. The P-CSCF sends the CC intercept trigger to the IMS-AGW. + +The activation of intercept is done by the ADMF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI or TEL URI). + +Local Breakout (LBO) as a roaming architecture used for VoLTE is one of the examples of IMS roaming. Several call routing scenarios can happen with LBO. However, the lawful interception in the VPLMN is independent of all those call scenarios. + +#### E.14.1.4 Terminating Call to an Inbound Roaming Target with the CC Interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN + +Figure E.16 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC in the VPLMN, when an inbound target receives an incoming call with PDN-GW (or GGSN) providing the CC interception. + +![Diagram of VoIP lawful interception in the VPLMN for a terminating call with IMS Roaming. The diagram shows the flow of SIP and Voice Media from a Called Party through Voice Services, IBCF, TrGW, P-CSCF, PCRF, and PDN-GW/GGSN to an Inbound Roaming Target's UE. It also illustrates the interception points (X1_1, X1_2, X1_3, X2, X3) and the delivery functions (Delivery Function 2, Delivery Function 3) that send data to the LEMF via HI1, HI2, and HI3 interfaces. The ADMF is shown interacting with the delivery functions.](26d664119ad25250780f554633444e54_img.jpg) + +Diagram of VoIP lawful interception in the VPLMN for a terminating call with IMS Roaming. The diagram shows the flow of SIP and Voice Media from a Called Party through Voice Services, IBCF, TrGW, P-CSCF, PCRF, and PDN-GW/GGSN to an Inbound Roaming Target's UE. It also illustrates the interception points (X1\_1, X1\_2, X1\_3, X2, X3) and the delivery functions (Delivery Function 2, Delivery Function 3) that send data to the LEMF via HI1, HI2, and HI3 interfaces. The ADMF is shown interacting with the delivery functions. + +**Figure E.16: VoIP lawful interception in the VPLMN for a terminating call with IMS Roaming with CC interception at the PDN-GW/GGSN** + +A terminating call is always routed to the VPLMN via the HPLMN of the target. The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate the calling party can be within the same VPLMN, or in the HPLMN of the target, or in another CSP's network. At the Ingress point, an IBCF/TrGW is shown. Independent of where the call has originated from, a terminating call always enters the VPLMN through the IBCF/TrGW from the HPLMN. + +Figure E.16-1 shows that the IRI interception is done at P-CSCF. The CC interception is done at the PDN-GW/GGSN. The P-CSCF sends the CC intercept trigger to the PDN-GW/GGSN. + +The activation of intercept is done by the ADMF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI or TEL URI). + +Local Breakout (LBO) as a roaming architecture used for VoLTE is one of the examples of IMS roaming. + +#### E.14.1.5 Terminating Call to an Inbound Roaming Target with CC Interception at the IMS-AGW + +Figure E.17 provides the lawful interception architecture to illustrate the interception and delivery of IRI and CC in the + +VPLMN, when an inbound target receives an incoming call with IMS-AGW providing the CC interception. + +![Diagram of VoIP lawful interception in the VPLMN for a terminating call with IMS Roaming and CC interception at the IMS-AGW.](58f4167687de8d7339594e5f6fbe0bc6_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the network architecture for VoIP lawful interception. At the top left, a 'Called Party' is connected to a cloud labeled 'Voice Services'. This cloud connects via 'SIP' to an 'IBCF' and via 'Voice Media' to a 'TrGW'. The 'IBCF' connects via 'SIP' to a 'P-CSCF'. The 'TrGW' connects via 'Voice Media' to an 'IMS-AGW'. The 'P-CSCF' connects via 'SIP' to the 'IMS-AGW' and also to an 'Inbound Roaming Target's UE'. The 'IMS-AGW' connects via 'Voice Media' to the 'Inbound Roaming Target's UE' and also to three 'Delivery Function' blocks: 'Delivery Function 3', 'Delivery Function 2', and 'ADMF'. Each 'Delivery Function' block contains a 'Mediation Function'. Below these functions is a 'LEMF' block. Arrows labeled 'HI3', 'HI2', and 'HI1' point from the 'Mediation Functions' in 'Delivery Function 3', 'Delivery Function 2', and 'ADMF' respectively to the 'LEMF'. Dashed lines labeled 'X1\_1', 'X1\_2', 'X1\_3', 'X2', and 'X3' indicate various signaling and media paths between the components. + +Diagram of VoIP lawful interception in the VPLMN for a terminating call with IMS Roaming and CC interception at the IMS-AGW. + +**Figure E.17: VoIP lawful interception in the VPLMN for a terminating call with IMS Roaming with CC interception at the IMS-AGW** + +A terminating call is always routed to the VPLMN via the HPLMN of the target. The cloud shown with the label "voice services" is to indicate the calling party can be within the same VPLMN, or in the HPLMN of the target, or in another CSP's network. At the Ingress point, an IBCF/TrGW is shown. Independent of where the call has originated from, a terminating call always enters the VPLMN through the IBCF/TrGW from the HPLMN. + +Figure E.17 shows that the IRI interception is done at P-CSCF. The CC interception is done at the IMS-AGW. The P-CSCF sends the CC intercept trigger to the IMS-AGW. + +The activation of intercept is done by the ADMF for IRI interception and CC interception using the same target identity (SIP URI or TEL URI). + +Local Breakout (LBO) as a roaming architecture used for VoLTE is one of the examples of IMS roaming. + +# --- Annex F (informative): Examples of IMS-based VoIP Lawful Interception (LI) call flows + +## F.1 General remarks + +All the call flows illustrate that the CC delivery begins once the SDP offer and answer is completed (i.e., when the media bearer is setup). In all the call flows, the first reliable response is SIP 200 OK. + +In all the call flows, the originating end of the call sends the SDP offer and terminating end gives the SDP answer. Since, the first reliable response is SIP 200 OK, the SDP answer is always given in the SIP 200 OK message. + +The call flows assume that per clause 7.A, the IRI for VoIP is nothing but the delivery encapsulated SIP messages. The call flows do not show the method used for correlating the IRI with IRI and IRI with CC. It is presumed that those are stage 3 details. + +All the call flows assume the presence of a Voice Application Server (shown as AS) that provides the voice services like digit translation, invoking the call forwarding, etc. + +IRI in the visited CSP is intercepted by the P-CSCF and IRI in the home CSP is intercepted by the S-CSCF. + +The call flows show that CC interception is done at the IP-CAN (and it should be interpreted to mean that the interception is done in the PDN-GW or GGSN depending on the packet core network), or at the TrGW or at the IM-MGW. The other possible CC interception options (e.g., IMS-AGW) are not shown. + +Not all the functional elements are shown in the call flows. For example, the call flows do not show I-CSCF, HSS, PCRF. + +All the call flows show a summary of SIP messages that are delivered to the LEA (not all SIP messages are shown). The term LEMF, used in some call flows, means it is an equivalent of LEA. + +For each call flow, references are required to identify MMTEL service that it illustrates (for further study). + +## --- F.2 Call Originations from Target in Home CSP + +### F.2.0 Introduction + +This clause gives 2 call flows to illustrate the call origination scenarios. + +Figure F.1 illustrates the case where the Party\_A (target) calls Party\_B. + +Figure F.2 illustrates the case where the Party\_A (target) dials a special number (e.g., a speed call number or an 800-number), which is translated to Party\_B by the AS. + +### F.2.1 Target Originated Call - Target (Party\_A) Calls Party\_B + +![Sequence diagram for Target Originated Call - Target (Party_A) Calls Party_B. The diagram shows the interaction between various network elements including Party_A [Target], IP-CAN, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS, Party_B, DF2, DF3, and LEA. It details the signaling flow for INVITE, 180 Ringing, 200 OK, and ACK messages, as well as media and CC flows.](eb5677b570ab2a3e9d8f5d35ca5b8a4d_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the call setup process for a target originated call. The participants are grouped into two domains: 'Home CSP [Target Domain]' (Party\_A [Target], IP-CAN, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS) and 'MF/DF' (DF2, DF3, LEA), with Party\_B as an external participant. + +- INVITE Phase:** Party\_A [Target] sends an INVITE Party\_B [SDP] to IP-CAN. IP-CAN performs AAR/RAR and AAA/RAA with P-CSCF. P-CSCF forwards the INVITE to S-CSCF. S-CSCF sends an INVITE Party\_B [SDP] to AS. AS then sends the INVITE to Party\_B. Simultaneously, AS sends a red '{INVITE Party-B}' message to DF2, which is then forwarded by DF3 to LEA. +- 180 Ringing Phase:** Party\_B responds with 180 Ringing to AS. AS sends 180 Ringing to S-CSCF. S-CSCF forwards it to P-CSCF, which then reaches IP-CAN and finally Party\_A [Target]. AS also sends a red '{180 Ringing}' message to DF2, forwarded by DF3 to LEA. +- 200 OK Phase:** Party\_B sends 200 OK [SDP] to AS. AS sends 200 OK [SDP] to S-CSCF. S-CSCF forwards it to P-CSCF, which reaches IP-CAN and Party\_A [Target]. AS sends a red '{200 OK}' message to DF2, forwarded by DF3 to LEA. +- Media and CC:** A green 'Media' flow is established between IP-CAN and Party\_B. A green 'CC' (Call Control) flow is sent from DF3 to LEA. +- ACK Phase:** Party\_A [Target] sends an ACK to IP-CAN. IP-CAN forwards it to P-CSCF, which reaches S-CSCF. S-CSCF sends ACK to AS. AS sends a red '{ACK}' message to DF2, forwarded by DF3 to LEA. Finally, S-CSCF sends an ACK to Party\_B. + +Sequence diagram for Target Originated Call - Target (Party\_A) Calls Party\_B. The diagram shows the interaction between various network elements including Party\_A [Target], IP-CAN, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS, Party\_B, DF2, DF3, and LEA. It details the signaling flow for INVITE, 180 Ringing, 200 OK, and ACK messages, as well as media and CC flows. + +Figure F.1: Target originated call - target calls Party\_B + +### F.2.2 Target Originated Call - Target (Party\_A) dials a Special Number + +![Sequence diagram for Target Originated Call - Target (Party_A) dials a Special Number. The diagram shows the interaction between Party_A (Target), IP-CAN, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS, Party_B, DF2, DF3, and LEA. The call flow starts with Party_A sending an INVITE SP.NO. [SDP] to IP-CAN, which is then processed through the Target Domain (P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS) and the MF/DF domain (DF2, DF3) to LEA. The response includes 180 Ringing and 200 OK messages, with media established between Party_A and Party_B.](474a819357587e34949a3e110ff19b30_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the call flow for a target originated call where Party\_A dials a special number. The participants are Party\_A (Target), IP-CAN, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS, Party\_B, DF2, DF3, and LEA. The process begins with Party\_A sending an INVITE SP.NO. [SDP] to IP-CAN. IP-CAN sends AAR/RAR and AAA/RAA to P-CSCF. P-CSCF sends INVITE SP.NO. [SDP] to S-CSCF. S-CSCF sends INVITE SP.NO. [SDP] to AS. AS sends INVITE SP.NO. [SDP] to DF2. DF2 sends {INVITE SP.NO.} to LEA. S-CSCF also sends INVITE Party\_B [SDP] to AS. AS sends INVITE Party\_B [SDP] to Party\_B. Party\_B sends 180 Ringing to AS. AS sends 180 Ringing to S-CSCF. S-CSCF sends 180 Ringing to P-CSCF. P-CSCF sends 180 Ringing to IP-CAN. IP-CAN sends 180 Ringing to Party\_A. S-CSCF also sends 180 Ringing to DF2. DF2 sends {180 Ringing} to LEA. Party\_B sends 200 OK [SDP] to AS. AS sends 200 OK [SDP] to S-CSCF. S-CSCF sends 200 OK [SDP] to P-CSCF. P-CSCF sends 200 OK [SDP] to IP-CAN. IP-CAN sends 200 OK [SDP] to Party\_A. S-CSCF also sends 200 OK [SDP] to DF2. DF2 sends {200 OK} to LEA. Party\_A sends ACK to IP-CAN. IP-CAN sends ACK to P-CSCF. P-CSCF sends ACK to S-CSCF. S-CSCF sends ACK to AS. AS sends ACK to Party\_B. S-CSCF also sends ACK to DF2. DF2 sends {ACK} to LEA. Media is established between Party\_A and Party\_B via IP-CAN and S-CSCF. A green dashed line labeled 'Media' connects Party\_A to IP-CAN, and a green solid line labeled 'Media' connects IP-CAN to S-CSCF. A green dashed line labeled 'Media' connects S-CSCF to Party\_B. A green solid line labeled 'cc' connects S-CSCF to DF3, and a green solid line labeled 'cc' connects DF3 to LEA. + +Sequence diagram for Target Originated Call - Target (Party\_A) dials a Special Number. The diagram shows the interaction between Party\_A (Target), IP-CAN, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS, Party\_B, DF2, DF3, and LEA. The call flow starts with Party\_A sending an INVITE SP.NO. [SDP] to IP-CAN, which is then processed through the Target Domain (P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS) and the MF/DF domain (DF2, DF3) to LEA. The response includes 180 Ringing and 200 OK messages, with media established between Party\_A and Party\_B. + +Figure F.2: Target originated call - target dials a special number + +## F.3 Call Terminations to Target - Home CSP + +### F.3.0 Introduction + +This clause gives 1 call flow to illustrate the call termination scenario. + +Figure F.3 illustrates the case where the Party\_A calls target (Party\_B). + +![Sequence diagram for Figure F.3: Target receives an incoming call. The diagram shows the interaction between Party_A, AS, S-CSCF, P-CSCF, IP-CAN, Party_B Target, DF2, DF3, and LEA. The call flow starts with Party_A sending an INVITE to the AS, which is then routed through the S-CSCF and P-CSCF to the IP-CAN and finally to the Target. The Target responds with 180 Ringing and 200 OK messages, which are then forwarded back through the S-CSCF and AS to Party_A. The diagram also shows the exchange of AAR/RAR and AAA/RAA messages between the P-CSCF and IP-CAN. The LEA is shown receiving the call information via the DF2 and DF3 nodes.](dd5771673aececa53d42ece89218299d_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant Party_A + subgraph Target Domain + participant AS + participant S-CSCF + participant P-CSCF + participant IP-CAN + participant Party_B_Target as Party_B Target + end + subgraph MF/DF + participant DF2 + participant DF3 + end + participant LEA + + Note left of Party_A: D1 + Party_A->>AS: INVITE Party_B [SDP] + AS->>S-CSCF: INVITE Party_B [SDP] + Note left of S-CSCF: D10 + S-CSCF->>P-CSCF: INVITE Party_B [SDP] + P-CSCF->>IP-CAN: AAR/RAR + IP-CAN->>P-CSCF: AAA/RAA + P-CSCF->>IP-CAN: INVITE Party_B [SDP] + IP-CAN->>Party_B_Target: INVITE Party_B [SDP] + Party_B_Target->>IP-CAN: 180 Ringing + IP-CAN->>P-CSCF: 180 Ringing + P-CSCF->>S-CSCF: 180 Ringing + S-CSCF->>AS: 180 Ringing + AS->>Party_A: 180 Ringing + Party_B_Target->>IP-CAN: 200 OK [SDP] + IP-CAN->>P-CSCF: 200 OK [SDP] + P-CSCF->>IP-CAN: AAR/RAR + IP-CAN->>P-CSCF: AAA/RAA + P-CSCF->>S-CSCF: 200 OK [SDP] + S-CSCF->>AS: 200 OK [SDP] + AS->>Party_A: 200 OK [SDP] + Note left of Party_A: Media + IP-CAN->>Party_B_Target: Media + Party_B_Target->>IP-CAN: CC + IP-CAN->>DF3: CC + DF3->>LEA: CC + Party_A->>AS: ACK + AS->>S-CSCF: ACK + S-CSCF->>P-CSCF: ACK + P-CSCF->>IP-CAN: ACK + IP-CAN->>Party_B_Target: ACK + Party_B_Target->>DF3: {ACK} + DF3->>LEA: {ACK} + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure F.3: Target receives an incoming call. The diagram shows the interaction between Party\_A, AS, S-CSCF, P-CSCF, IP-CAN, Party\_B Target, DF2, DF3, and LEA. The call flow starts with Party\_A sending an INVITE to the AS, which is then routed through the S-CSCF and P-CSCF to the IP-CAN and finally to the Target. The Target responds with 180 Ringing and 200 OK messages, which are then forwarded back through the S-CSCF and AS to Party\_A. The diagram also shows the exchange of AAR/RAR and AAA/RAA messages between the P-CSCF and IP-CAN. The LEA is shown receiving the call information via the DF2 and DF3 nodes. + +Figure F.3: Target receives an incoming call + +## F.4 Call Forwarding - Non Roaming + +### F.4.0 Introduction + +This clause gives 4 call flows to illustrate call forwarding scenarios. + +Figure F.4 illustrates the case of an intra-CSP call forwarding unconditional. Here, the Party\_A calls target (Party\_B). The AS determines that all incoming calls to the target have to be forwarded to Party\_C served by the same CSP. + +Figure F.5 illustrates the case first part of an intra-CSP call forwarding no answer. Figure F.6 illustrate the second part of an intra-CSP call forwarding no answer. Here, the Party\_A calls target (Party\_B). . The target does not answer and the AS determines that target has a call forwarding no answer enabled to Party\_C served by the same CSP. + +Figure F.7 illustrates the case of inter-CSP call forwarding unconditional. Here, the Party\_A calls target (Party\_B). The AS determines that all incoming calls to the target have to be forwarded to Party\_C served by a different CSP. + +### F.4.1 Intra-CSP Call Forwarding Unconditional + +![Sequence diagram for Intra-CSP Call Forwarding Unconditional](4f148853ae68fdcf5e43f7604cab457d_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the signaling flow for Intra-CSP Call Forwarding Unconditional. It is divided into three main domains: Target Domain, Forwarded-to-Party's Domain, and MF/DF. + +- Target Domain:** Includes Party\_A, AS, and S-CSCF. Party\_A sends an INVITE Party\_B [SDP] to the AS. The AS responds with 181 Call Is Being Forwarded and then forwards the INVITE to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF checks for forwarding rules (P-CSCF, IP-CAN, Party\_B Target) and then forwards the INVITE Party\_C [History Info: Party\_B] [SDP] to the Forwarded-to-Party's Domain. +- Forwarded-to-Party's Domain:** Includes S-CSCF/P-CSCF, IP-CAN, and Party\_C. The S-CSCF/P-CSCF receives the INVITE and sends AAR/RAR to the IP-CAN. The IP-CAN responds with AAA/RAA. The S-CSCF/P-CSCF then sends a 180 Ringing response back to the AS. The AS forwards this to Party\_A. The S-CSCF/P-CSCF also receives a 200 OK [SDP] from Party\_C and forwards it back to the AS, which then forwards it to Party\_A. +- MF/DF:** Includes DF2, DF3, and LEA. These elements receive forwarded messages from the S-CSCF in the Target Domain: {INVITE Party-B}, {Call Is Being Forwarded}, {INVITE Party-C}, {180 Ringing}, {200 OK}, and {ACK}. + +Key signaling messages include: INVITE Party\_B [SDP], 181 Call Is Being Forwarded, INVITE Party\_C [History Info: Party\_B] [SDP], AAR/RAR, AAA/RAA, 180 Ringing, 200 OK [SDP], ACK, Media (dashed green line), and CC (solid green line). + +Sequence diagram for Intra-CSP Call Forwarding Unconditional + +Figure F.4: Incoming call to target is forwarded within the CSP + +### F.4.2 Intra-CSP Call Forwarding No Answer + +![Sequence diagram for Intra-CSP Call Forwarding No Answer showing SIP signaling between Party_A, AS, S-CSCF, P-CSCF, IP-CAN, Party_B Target, MF/DF, and LEA.](9f9386d5b3d6cbeb1ed104a799320ebf_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant Party_A + participant AS + participant S-CSCF + participant P-CSCF + participant IP-CAN + participant Party_B_Target + participant MF_DF as MF/DF (DF2, DF3) + participant LEA + + Note over Party_A, S-CSCF: D1 + Party_A->>S-CSCF: INVITE Party_B [SDP] + S-CSCF->>MF_DF: {INVITE Party-B} + MF_DF->>LEA: {INVITE Party-B} + S-CSCF->>AS: INVITE Party_B [SDP] + Note over AS, S-CSCF: D10 + AS->>S-CSCF: INVITE Party_B [SDP] + S-CSCF->>P-CSCF: INVITE Party_B [SDP] + P-CSCF->>IP-CAN: INVITE Party_B [SDP] + IP-CAN->>Party_B_Target: INVITE Party_B [SDP] + + P-CSCF->>IP-CAN: AAR/RAR + IP-CAN-->>P-CSCF: AAA/RAA + + Party_B_Target-->>IP-CAN: 180 Ringing + IP-CAN-->>P-CSCF: 180 Ringing + P-CSCF-->>S-CSCF: 180 Ringing + S-CSCF-->>MF_DF: {180 Ringing} + MF_DF-->>LEA: {180 Ringing} + S-CSCF-->>AS: 180 Ringing + AS-->>Party_A: 180 Ringing + + Note over AS: Call Forwarding No Answer +Timer Expires + + AS->>S-CSCF: CANCEL + S-CSCF->>P-CSCF: CANCEL + P-CSCF->>IP-CAN: CANCEL + IP-CAN->>Party_B_Target: CANCEL + S-CSCF->>MF_DF: {CANCEL} + MF_DF->>LEA: {CANCEL} + + Party_B_Target-->>IP-CAN: 487 Terminated + IP-CAN-->>P-CSCF: 487 Terminated + P-CSCF-->>S-CSCF: 487 Terminated + S-CSCF-->>MF_DF: {487 TERMINATED} + MF_DF-->>LEA: {487 TERMINATED} + + IP-CAN->>Party_B_Target: ACK + + P-CSCF->>IP-CAN: SAR/RAR + IP-CAN-->>P-CSCF: SAA/RAA + + S-CSCF-->>AS: ACK + AS-->>Party_A: ACK + S-CSCF-->>MF_DF: {ACK} + MF_DF-->>LEA: {ACK} + + Note over Party_A, LEA: The flow continues...... + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Intra-CSP Call Forwarding No Answer showing SIP signaling between Party\_A, AS, S-CSCF, P-CSCF, IP-CAN, Party\_B Target, MF/DF, and LEA. + +**Figure F.5: Incoming call to target is forwarded due to call forwarding no answer within the CSP (flow 1 of 2)** + +![Sequence diagram showing call forwarding logic. Lifelines: Party_A, AS, S-CSCF (with P-CSCF, IP-CAN, Party_B Target), S-CSCF/P-CSCF, IP-CAN, Party_C, DF2, DF3, LEA. The diagram shows the flow of SIP messages (INVITE, 180, 200 OK, ACK) and media/CC paths between these entities across Target Domain, Forward-to-Party Domain, and MF/DF domains.](b5335262987c819d7f71ce40f99cb71b_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the interaction for call forwarding when the target does not answer. + 1. **Target Domain:** Party\_A sends an INVITE to AS. AS triggers 'Call Forwarding No Answer Timer Expires'. AS sends a 181 'Call Is Being Forwarded' to Party\_A and an INVITE to S-CSCF. + 2. **Forward-to-Party Domain:** S-CSCF (containing P-CSCF, IP-CAN, and Party\_B Target) receives the INVITE. It sends an INVITE to S-CSCF/P-CSCF. S-CSCF/P-CSCF sends an AAR/RAR to IP-CAN, which responds with AAA/RAA. + 3. **MF/DF Domain:** S-CSCF/P-CSCF sends an INVITE to Party\_C. Party\_C sends a 180 Ringing response back to S-CSCF/P-CSCF, which is then forwarded by S-CSCF to AS, and finally to Party\_A. + 4. **Timeout & Forwarding:** When the timer expires, AS sends a 181 'Call Is Being Forwarded' to Party\_A. S-CSCF/P-CSCF sends an INVITE to DF2. DF2 forwards it to DF3, which sends it to LEA. + 5. **Media Path:** A dashed green line labeled 'Media' connects Party\_A to IP-CAN. A solid green line labeled 'CC' connects IP-CAN to DF3. + 6. **Finalization:** Party\_C eventually sends a 200 OK [SDP] to S-CSCF/P-CSCF, which is forwarded by S-CSCF to AS, and then to Party\_A. Party\_A sends an ACK to AS, which is forwarded by S-CSCF to S-CSCF/P-CSCF, then to IP-CAN, and finally to Party\_C. DF3 also sends an {ACK} to LEA. + +Sequence diagram showing call forwarding logic. Lifelines: Party\_A, AS, S-CSCF (with P-CSCF, IP-CAN, Party\_B Target), S-CSCF/P-CSCF, IP-CAN, Party\_C, DF2, DF3, LEA. The diagram shows the flow of SIP messages (INVITE, 180, 200 OK, ACK) and media/CC paths between these entities across Target Domain, Forward-to-Party Domain, and MF/DF domains. + +Figure F.6: Incoming call to target is forwarded due to call forwarding no answer within the CSP (flow 2 of 2) + +### F.4.3 Inter-CSP Call Forwarding Unconditional + +![Sequence diagram for Inter-CSP Call Forwarding Unconditional (Figure F.7).](b51423b6c049f5b5fcde42e50b58f18b_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows a call flow between Party\_A, AS, S-CSCF, IBCF/MGCF, TrGW/IM-MGW, Party\_C, DF2, DF3, and LEA. The S-CSCF and AS are within the Target Domain. DF2, DF3, and LEA are part of the MF/DF (Monitoring Function/Delivery Function) and Law Enforcement Agency. + +- Party\_A sends **INVITE Party\_B [SDP]** to S-CSCF (marked with D1). +- S-CSCF forwards **INVITE Party\_B [SDP]** to AS. +- AS sends **181 Call Is Being Forwarded** back to S-CSCF, which forwards it to Party\_A. +- AS sends **INVITE Party\_C [History Info: Party\_B] [SDP]** to S-CSCF (marked with D10). +- S-CSCF forwards **INVITE Party\_C [History Info: Party\_B] [SDP]** to IBCF/MGCF. +- IBCF/MGCF forwards **INVITE Party\_C [History Info: Party\_B] [SDP]** to Party\_C. +- Party\_C sends **180 Ringing** back through the chain to Party\_A. +- Party\_C sends **200 OK [SDP]** back through the chain to Party\_A. +- Context management occurs between IBCF/MGCF and TrGW/IM-MGW (Add Context, Modify Context). +- Media flow is established between Party\_A and Party\_C via TrGW/IM-MGW. +- Content of Communication (CC) is delivered to DF3 and then to LEA. +- ACK messages are exchanged to finalize the call setup. +- Red text on the right indicates intercepted events: {INVITE Party-B}, {Call Is Being Forwarded}, {INVITE Party-C}, {180 Ringing}, {200 OK}, and {ACK}. + +Sequence diagram for Inter-CSP Call Forwarding Unconditional (Figure F.7). + +**Figure F.7: Incoming call to target is forwarded outside the CSP** + +## F.5 IMS Roaming + +### F.5.0 General + +This clause gives 3 call flows to illustrate the case of IMS roaming. + +Figure F.8 illustrate the case where the roaming target originates a call. Here, roaming target (Party\_A) calls Party\_B who is served by the same CSP as that of target. Party\_B is not roaming. + +Figure F.8A illustrates the case where a roaming target originates a call with local breakout approach is used for roaming. In this case, home CSP of Party-B happens to be visited CSP where the target is roaming and hence, the media does not enter the HPLMN of target (i.e., Home CSP of target). A Home CSP reports the CC unavailability to the LEMF with "roaming" as the reason for CC unavailability. + +Figure F.9 illustrates the case where a roaming target receives an incoming call. Here, non-roaming Party\_A, who is served by the same CSP as that of target, calls the target (Party\_B). + +### F.5.1 Roaming Target Originates a Call + +![Sequence diagram for Roaming Target Originates a Call. Lifelines: Visited CSP (Party_A [Target], D1), Home CSP [Target Domain] (TrGW, IBCF, S-CSCF, AS), Party_B, MF/DF (DF2, DF2), LEA. The diagram shows the call setup process from Party_A to Party_B, including INVITE, 180 Ringing, 200 OK, and ACK messages, with media and context handling.](9870bf462aa0d916a16d14b5a100c60a_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant Visited_CSP as Visited CSP + participant Home_CSP as Home CSP [Target Domain] + participant Party_B as Party_B + participant MF_DF as MF/DF + participant LEA as LEA + + Note left of Visited_CSP: Party_A [Target] (D1) + Visited_CSP->>Home_CSP: INVITE Party_B [SDP] + Home_CSP->>Visited_CSP: Add Context + Visited_CSP->>Home_CSP: Add Context Ack + Home_CSP->>Home_CSP: INVITE Party_B [SDP] + Note right of Home_CSP: AS (D10) + Home_CSP->>AS: INVITE Party_B [SDP] + AS->>Party_B: INVITE Party_B [SDP] + Party_B->>AS: 180 Ringing + AS->>Home_CSP: 180 Ringing + Home_CSP->>Party_B: 180 Ringing + Visited_CSP->>Home_CSP: 180 Ringing + Home_CSP->>MF_DF: {180 Ringing} + MF_DF->>LEA: {180 Ringing} + AS->>Party_B: 200 OK [SDP] + Party_B->>AS: 200 OK [SDP] + AS->>Home_CSP: 200 OK [SDP] + Home_CSP->>Party_B: 200 OK [SDP] + Visited_CSP->>Home_CSP: 200 OK [SDP] + Home_CSP->>MF_DF: {200 OK} + MF_DF->>LEA: {200 OK} + Visited_CSP->>TrGW: Modify Context + TrGW->>Visisted_CSP: Modify Context Ack + Note left of TrGW: Media + Note right of Party_B: Media + TrGW->>Party_B: Media + MF_DF->>LEA: cc + Visited_CSP->>Home_CSP: ACK + Home_CSP->>Party_B: ACK + Visited_CSP->>Home_CSP: ACK + Home_CSP->>MF_DF: {ACK} + MF_DF->>LEA: {ACK} + Home_CSP->>AS: ACK + AS->>Party_B: ACK + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Roaming Target Originates a Call. Lifelines: Visited CSP (Party\_A [Target], D1), Home CSP [Target Domain] (TrGW, IBCF, S-CSCF, AS), Party\_B, MF/DF (DF2, DF2), LEA. The diagram shows the call setup process from Party\_A to Party\_B, including INVITE, 180 Ringing, 200 OK, and ACK messages, with media and context handling. + +Figure F.8: Roaming target originates a call + +NOTE: The above call flow is the case where optimal media routing is not employed. In the case where the optimal media routing is employed, the CC does not come to the TrGW. + +#### F.5.1A CC Unavailable in Home CSP due to Optimal Media Routing + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the call flow for CC Unavailable in Home CSP due to Optimal Media Routing. The diagram shows interactions between Party_A (Subject), IBCF/TRF, Party_B, TrGW, IBCF, S-CSCF, AS, DF3, DF2, and LEMF across Visited CSP and Home CSP domains.](1cac1845cf99a3f64ae00cd2bb4f9ed7_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the following call flow: + +- Party\_A (Subject)** sends an **INVITE Party\_B [SDP]** to **IBCF/TRF** in the **Visited CSP**. +- IBCF/TRF** forwards the **INVITE Party\_B [SDP]** to **Party\_B**. +- Party\_B** sends an **INVITE Party\_B [SDP]** to **TrGW** in the **Home CSP**. +- TrGW** sends an **Add Context** message to **IBCF**, which responds with **Add Context Ack**. +- IBCF** forwards the **INVITE Party\_B [SDP]** to **S-CSCF**. +- S-CSCF** forwards the **INVITE Party\_B [SDP]** to **AS**. +- AS** sends a **Del Context** message to **TrGW**, which responds with **Del Context Ack**. +- AS** sends a **200 OK [SDP]** to **S-CSCF**. +- S-CSCF** forwards the **200 OK [SDP]** to **IBCF**. +- IBCF** forwards the **200 OK [SDP]** to **TrGW**. +- TrGW** forwards the **200 OK [SDP]** to **Party\_B**. +- Party\_B** sends an **ACK** to **TrGW**. +- TrGW** forwards the **ACK** to **IBCF**. +- IBCF** forwards the **ACK** to **Party\_A (Subject)**. +- Simultaneously, **AS** sends a **180 Ringing** message to **S-CSCF**. +- S-CSCF** forwards the **180 Ringing** message to **IBCF**. +- IBCF** forwards the **180 Ringing** message to **TrGW**. +- TrGW** forwards the **180 Ringing** message to **Party\_B**. +- Party\_B** sends a **180 Ringing** message to **IBCF/TRF**. +- IBCF/TRF** forwards the **180 Ringing** message to **Party\_A (Subject)**. +- AS** also sends a **200 OK [SDP]** message to **S-CSCF**. +- S-CSCF** forwards the **200 OK [SDP]** message to **IBCF**. +- IBCF** forwards the **200 OK [SDP]** message to **TrGW**. +- TrGW** forwards the **200 OK [SDP]** message to **Party\_B**. +- Party\_B** sends an **ACK** to **TrGW**. +- TrGW** forwards the **ACK** to **IBCF**. +- IBCF** forwards the **ACK** to **Party\_A (Subject)**. +- Finally, **DF2** in the **MF/DF** domain sends a **{CCUnavailable - roaming}** message to **LEMF**. + +Sequence diagram illustrating the call flow for CC Unavailable in Home CSP due to Optimal Media Routing. The diagram shows interactions between Party\_A (Subject), IBCF/TRF, Party\_B, TrGW, IBCF, S-CSCF, AS, DF3, DF2, and LEMF across Visited CSP and Home CSP domains. + +**Figure F.8A: Roaming target originates a call and optimal media routing is applied** + +**NOTE:** Many different call scenarios exist that employ optimal media routing. In this particular example, the called party (Party\_B) happens to be served by the same CSP where the target is currently roaming (i.e., HPLMN of Party\_B is the visited CSP of Party\_A). + +### F.5.2 Call Termination to a Roaming Target + +![Sequence diagram illustrating call termination to a roaming target. The diagram shows the interaction between Party_A, Home CSP (AS, S-CSCF, IBCF, TrGW), Visited CSP (Party_B Target), MF/DF (DF2, DF3), and LEA. The sequence starts with an INVITE from Party_A to S-CSCF, which is then forwarded through AS, IBCF, and TrGW to Party_B Target. The response (180 Ringing, 200 OK, ACK) follows the same path back. Red arrows indicate the flow of messages to the LEA for interception.](08c7a76a7786bd08b99dd4cb41583ef4_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the call termination process to a roaming target. The participants are Party\_A, Home CSP (containing AS, S-CSCF, IBCF, and TrGW), Visited CSP (containing Party\_B Target), MF/DF (containing DF2 and DF3), and LEA. The sequence of messages is as follows: + +- Party\_A sends an INVITE Party\_B [SDP] to the S-CSCF (labeled D1). +- The S-CSCF forwards the INVITE Party\_B [SDP] to the AS (labeled D10). +- The AS forwards the INVITE Party\_B [SDP] to the IBCF. +- The IBCF forwards the INVITE Party\_B [SDP] to the TrGW. +- The TrGW forwards the INVITE Party\_B [SDP] to the Party\_B Target. +- The Party\_B Target sends a 180 Ringing response back to the TrGW. +- The TrGW forwards the 180 Ringing response to the IBCF. +- The IBCF forwards the 180 Ringing response to the AS. +- The AS forwards the 180 Ringing response to the S-CSCF. +- The S-CSCF forwards the 180 Ringing response to the Party\_A. +- The Party\_B Target sends a 200 OK [SDP] response back to the TrGW. +- The TrGW forwards the 200 OK [SDP] response to the IBCF. +- The IBCF forwards the 200 OK [SDP] response to the AS. +- The AS forwards the 200 OK [SDP] response to the S-CSCF. +- The S-CSCF forwards the 200 OK [SDP] response to the Party\_A. +- The Party\_A sends an ACK response to the S-CSCF. +- The S-CSCF forwards the ACK response to the AS. +- The AS forwards the ACK response to the IBCF. +- The IBCF forwards the ACK response to the TrGW. +- The TrGW forwards the ACK response to the Party\_B Target. + +Red arrows indicate the flow of messages to the LEA for interception at various points in the sequence. + +Sequence diagram illustrating call termination to a roaming target. The diagram shows the interaction between Party\_A, Home CSP (AS, S-CSCF, IBCF, TrGW), Visited CSP (Party\_B Target), MF/DF (DF2, DF3), and LEA. The sequence starts with an INVITE from Party\_A to S-CSCF, which is then forwarded through AS, IBCF, and TrGW to Party\_B Target. The response (180 Ringing, 200 OK, ACK) follows the same path back. Red arrows indicate the flow of messages to the LEA for interception. + +Figure F.9: Roaming target receives an incoming call + +## F.6 Interception in Visited CSP + +### F.6.0 General + +This clause gives 3 call flows to illustrate the case of interception in the visited CSP. In all these flows, the IRI interception happens at the P-CSCF. Both IRI and CC interception happen in the visited CSP. + +Figure F.10 illustrates the case where the target (Party\_A) in the visited CSP originates a call dialing a special number. The special number is translated into Party\_B in the home CSP. The flow also assumes that the interception is done only in the visited CSP. + +Figure F.11 illustrates the case where the target (Party\_B) in the visited CSP receives an incoming call from Party\_A served by the same Home CSP. The flow assumes that the interception is done only in the visited CSP. + +Figure F.12 illustrates the case where an incoming call to the target (Party\_B) gets forwarded in the Home CSP due to call forwarding no answer. The flow also assumes that the interception is done only in the visited CSP. + +#### F.6.1 Interception in Visited CSP - Target Originated Call + +![Sequence diagram showing call interception in a visited CSP for a target originated call. The diagram involves two main domains: Visited CSP and Home CSP, with additional MF/DF and LEMF entities. The sequence starts with Party_A (Target) sending an INVITE SP.NO. [SDP] to the IP-CAN. The IP-CAN sends AAR/RAR and AAA/RAA to the P-CSCF. The P-CSCF sends an INVITE SP.NO. [SDP] to the IBCF, which then sends it to the TRGW. The TRGW sends an INVITE SP.NO. [SDP] to the S-CSCF, which sends it to the AS. The AS sends an INVITE Party_B [SDP] to Party_B. Party_B responds with 180 Ringing, which is passed back through the AS, S-CSCF, TRGW, IBCF, and P-CSCF to the IP-CAN, which then sends it to Party_A. The AS also sends a 200 OK [SDP] to Party_B, which is passed back through the S-CSCF, TRGW, IBCF, and P-CSCF to the IP-CAN, which then sends it to Party_A. The AS sends an ACK to Party_B, which is passed back through the S-CSCF, TRGW, IBCF, and P-CSCF to the IP-CAN, which then sends it to Party_A. Red lines indicate interception points at the P-CSCF, TRGW, and IBCF, with labels {INVITE SP.NO.}, {180 Ringing}, {200 OK}, and {ACK} being sent to the MF/DF and LEMF entities. Green dashed lines represent media paths between the IP-CAN and the TRGW, and between the TRGW and the S-CSCF.](04cfca33e3fc26513abe649d7474f733_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram showing call interception in a visited CSP for a target originated call. The diagram involves two main domains: Visited CSP and Home CSP, with additional MF/DF and LEMF entities. The sequence starts with Party\_A (Target) sending an INVITE SP.NO. [SDP] to the IP-CAN. The IP-CAN sends AAR/RAR and AAA/RAA to the P-CSCF. The P-CSCF sends an INVITE SP.NO. [SDP] to the IBCF, which then sends it to the TRGW. The TRGW sends an INVITE SP.NO. [SDP] to the S-CSCF, which sends it to the AS. The AS sends an INVITE Party\_B [SDP] to Party\_B. Party\_B responds with 180 Ringing, which is passed back through the AS, S-CSCF, TRGW, IBCF, and P-CSCF to the IP-CAN, which then sends it to Party\_A. The AS also sends a 200 OK [SDP] to Party\_B, which is passed back through the S-CSCF, TRGW, IBCF, and P-CSCF to the IP-CAN, which then sends it to Party\_A. The AS sends an ACK to Party\_B, which is passed back through the S-CSCF, TRGW, IBCF, and P-CSCF to the IP-CAN, which then sends it to Party\_A. Red lines indicate interception points at the P-CSCF, TRGW, and IBCF, with labels {INVITE SP.NO.}, {180 Ringing}, {200 OK}, and {ACK} being sent to the MF/DF and LEMF entities. Green dashed lines represent media paths between the IP-CAN and the TRGW, and between the TRGW and the S-CSCF. + +Figure F.10: Roaming target originates a call - interception in the visited CSP + +#### F.6.2 Interception in Visited CSP - Target Terminating Calls. + +![Sequence diagram showing call interception in a visited CSP. Lifelines include Party_A, AS, S-CSCF, IBCF, TRGW, P-CSCF, IP-CAN, Party_B [Target], DF2, DF3, and LEMF. The diagram is divided into Home CSP, Visited CSP, and MF/DF sections. Red arrows indicate interception points towards LEMF.](b58cedaf15ad4f0edee5621820865ccc_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the interaction for a terminating call to a roaming target (Party\_B) with interception in the visited CSP. The lifelines are: Party\_A (User Agent), AS (Access Server), S-CSCF (Serving CSCF), IBCF (Interconnect Border Control Function), TRGW (Trusted Relay Gateway), P-CSCF (PDN Gateway), IP-CAN (IP Connectivity Access Network), Party\_B [Target] (Target User Agent), DF2 (Data Function 2), DF3 (Data Function 3), and LEMF (Lawful Interception Management Function). The diagram is organized into three domains: Home CSP (containing Party\_A, AS, S-CSCF, IBCF, TRGW), Visited CSP (containing TRGW, IBCF, P-CSCF, IP-CAN, Party\_B), and MF/DF (containing DF2, DF3, LEMF). The sequence starts with Party\_A sending an INVITE to AS, which is routed through S-CSCF, IBCF, and TRGW. In the Visited CSP, the call is intercepted at the P-CSCF. Red arrows show the interception of INVITE, 180 Ringing, 200 OK, and ACK messages towards the LEMF via DF2 and DF3. Green dashed lines represent the media path from Party\_A to Party\_B via the TRGW and IP-CAN. The diagram also shows the return path for responses and the final ACK from Party\_B back to Party\_A. + +Sequence diagram showing call interception in a visited CSP. Lifelines include Party\_A, AS, S-CSCF, IBCF, TRGW, P-CSCF, IP-CAN, Party\_B [Target], DF2, DF3, and LEMF. The diagram is divided into Home CSP, Visited CSP, and MF/DF sections. Red arrows indicate interception points towards LEMF. + +Figure F.11: Roaming target receives a call - interception in the visited CSP + +#### F.6.3 Incoming Call to Roaming Target is forwarded due to Call Forwarding No Answer + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the call flow for an incoming call to a roaming target that is forwarded due to Call Forwarding No Answer. The diagram shows interactions between Party_A, AS, S-CSCF, IBCF, TRGW, P-CSCF, IP-CAN, Party_B [Target], DF2, DF3, and LEMF across Home CSP, Visited CSP, and MF/DF domains. The call is initiated by Party_A, routed through the Home CSP, and then forwarded to the Visited CSP where it is intercepted and forwarded back to the Home CSP. The call is then terminated by the AS due to a CFNR timer expiration.](f5deee2f3301ee351c4008283ffafbb3_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the following call flow: + +- Party\_A** sends an **INVITE Party\_B [SDP]** to the **AS**. +- The **AS** sends an **INVITE Party\_B [SDP]** to the **S-CSCF**. +- The **S-CSCF** sends an **INVITE Party\_B [SDP]** to the **IBCF**. +- The **IBCF** sends an **INVITE Party\_B [SDP]** to the **TRGW**. +- The **TRGW** sends an **INVITE Party\_B [SDP]** to the **IBCF**. +- The **IBCF** sends an **INVITE Party\_B [SDP]** to the **P-CSCF**. +- The **P-CSCF** sends an **INVITE Party\_B [SDP]** to the **IP-CAN**. +- The **IP-CAN** sends an **INVITE Party\_B [SDP]** to **Party\_B [Target]**. +- Party\_B [Target]** does not answer, and the **IP-CAN** sends a **180 Ringing** response to the **P-CSCF**. +- The **P-CSCF** sends a **180 Ringing** response to the **IBCF**. +- The **IBCF** sends a **180 Ringing** response to the **TRGW**. +- The **TRGW** sends a **180 Ringing** response to the **IBCF**. +- The **IBCF** sends a **180 Ringing** response to the **S-CSCF**. +- The **S-CSCF** sends a **180 Ringing** response to the **AS**. +- The **AS** sends a **180 Ringing** response to **Party\_A**. +- The **CFNR Timer Expires** at the **AS**. +- The **AS** sends a **CANCEL** message to the **S-CSCF**. +- The **S-CSCF** sends a **CANCEL** message to the **IBCF**. +- The **IBCF** sends a **CANCEL** message to the **TRGW**. +- The **TRGW** sends a **CANCEL** message to the **IBCF**. +- The **IBCF** sends a **CANCEL** message to the **P-CSCF**. +- The **P-CSCF** sends a **CANCEL** message to the **IP-CAN**. +- The **IP-CAN** sends a **CANCEL** message to **Party\_B [Target]**. +- The **AS** sends a **487 Terminated** response to the **S-CSCF**. +- The **S-CSCF** sends a **487 Terminated** response to the **IBCF**. +- The **IBCF** sends a **487 Terminated** response to the **TRGW**. +- The **TRGW** sends a **487 Terminated** response to the **IBCF**. +- The **IBCF** sends a **487 Terminated** response to the **P-CSCF**. +- The **P-CSCF** sends a **487 Terminated** response to the **IP-CAN**. +- The **IP-CAN** sends a **487 Terminated** response to **Party\_B [Target]**. +- The **AS** sends an **ACK** message to the **S-CSCF**. +- The **S-CSCF** sends an **ACK** message to the **IBCF**. +- The **IBCF** sends an **ACK** message to the **TRGW**. +- The **TRGW** sends an **ACK** message to the **IBCF**. +- The **IBCF** sends an **ACK** message to the **P-CSCF**. +- The **P-CSCF** sends an **ACK** message to the **IP-CAN**. +- The **IP-CAN** sends an **ACK** message to **Party\_B [Target]**. +- The **AS** sends a **181 Call Is Being Forwarded** message to **Party\_A**. +- A note indicates: "Call Forwarding occurs (steps not shown) as those messages are not intercepted. CC is not intercepted." + +Sequence diagram illustrating the call flow for an incoming call to a roaming target that is forwarded due to Call Forwarding No Answer. The diagram shows interactions between Party\_A, AS, S-CSCF, IBCF, TRGW, P-CSCF, IP-CAN, Party\_B [Target], DF2, DF3, and LEMF across Home CSP, Visited CSP, and MF/DF domains. The call is initiated by Party\_A, routed through the Home CSP, and then forwarded to the Visited CSP where it is intercepted and forwarded back to the Home CSP. The call is then terminated by the AS due to a CFNR timer expiration. + +**Figure F.12: Incoming call to target is forwarded in the home CSP due to Call Forwarding No Answer - interception in visited CSP** + +## F.7 Ad-Hoc Conference Calls established by the Target + +### F.7.0 Introduction + +This clause gives 9 call flows to illustrate the steps related to ad-hoc conference calling established by the target. The flows assume that the Party\_A (target) has already made two calls, one to Party\_B and one to Party\_C, and placed both calls on hold so as to merge the two calls into a conference. + +Figure F.7.1 illustrates the case where the Party\_A (target) creates the conference. + +Figure F.7.2 and Figure F.7.3 illustrate the case where the Party\_A (target) brings the Party\_C into the conference. + +Figure F.7.4 and F.7.5 illustrate the case where the Party\_A (target) brings the Party\_B into the conference. + +Figure F.7.6 illustrates the case where Party\_C drops out of the conference call. + +Figure F.7.7 illustrates the case where the call between two parties (Party\_A (target) and Party\_B) is converted back to a normal 2-party call. + +Figure F.7.8 illustrates the case where Party\_A (target) places the conference on hold. + +Figure F.7.9 illustrates the case where Party\_A (target) retrieves the held conference from hold. + +Some of the steps may be executed by the target's UE automatically (in other words, no action is required by the target). For example, when the target tries to merge the call, the target's UE may execute the steps shown in Figure F.7.1, Figure F.7.2, Figure F.7.3, Figure F.7.4, Figure F.7.5 automatically in a serial fashion. The same way, the steps shown in Figure F.7.7 may be executed automatically after the steps shown in Figure F.7.6 when one of the conferees drop out of the conference. + +The Figure F.7.8 and Figure F.7.9 are not really part of the conferencing steps, however, included here to show how the content of a held conference call (a requirement in some countries) is delivered to the LEAs. + +### F.7.1 Party\_A (target) creates the conference + +![Sequence diagram titled 'Figure F.7.1: Party_A (target) creates the conference'. The diagram shows the interaction between Party_A (target), IP-CAN, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS/MRFC, MRFP, Party_B, Party_C, DF2, DF3, and LEA. The process involves INVITE Conf (SDP) messages, 200 OK responses, and ACK messages. Media flows are shown between Party_A and the conference, and between the conference and the LEA. The diagram is divided into Target Domain and MF/DF sections.](52e112d1ba42a3c660bf62a0fea927d3_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the process of Party\_A (target) creating a conference. The participants are Party\_A (target), IP-CAN, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS/MRFC, MRFP, Party\_B, Party\_C, DF2, DF3, and LEA. The diagram is divided into two main sections: Target Domain and MF/DF. The process starts with Party\_A sending an INVITE Conf (SDP) message to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF then sends an INVITE Conf (SDP) message to the AS/MRFC. The AS/MRFC sends an Add (Conf Resource 1) message to the MRFP. The MRFP sends a 200 OK [Contact: Conf Id; isfocus] (SDP) message to the AS/MRFC. The AS/MRFC sends a 200 OK [Contact: Conf Id; isfocus] (SDP) message to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends a 200 OK [Contact: Conf Id; isfocus] (SDP) message to the IP-CAN. The IP-CAN sends a 200 OK [Contact: Conf Id; isfocus] (SDP) message to Party\_A. Party\_A sends an ACK message to the IP-CAN. The IP-CAN sends an ACK message to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends an ACK message to the AS/MRFC. The AS/MRFC sends an ACK message to the MRFP. The MRFP sends an ACK message to the AS/MRFC. The AS/MRFC sends an ACK message to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF sends an ACK message to the IP-CAN. The IP-CAN sends an ACK message to Party\_A. The diagram also shows media flows between Party\_A and the conference, and between the conference and the LEA. The LEA receives CC [1], CC [2], and CC [3] messages from the conference. The conference receives D1, D2, and D3 messages from Party\_A. The conference sends D10, D20, and D3 messages to Party\_B, Party\_C, and the LEA respectively. The conference also sends HOLD messages to Party\_B and Party\_C. The conference sends (INVITE Conf, 3), (200 OK, 3), and (ACK, 3) messages to the LEA. The conference sends Start of Conference [3] message to the LEA. + +Sequence diagram titled 'Figure F.7.1: Party\_A (target) creates the conference'. The diagram shows the interaction between Party\_A (target), IP-CAN, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS/MRFC, MRFP, Party\_B, Party\_C, DF2, DF3, and LEA. The process involves INVITE Conf (SDP) messages, 200 OK responses, and ACK messages. Media flows are shown between Party\_A and the conference, and between the conference and the LEA. The diagram is divided into Target Domain and MF/DF sections. + +Figure F.7.1: Party\_A (target) creates the conference + +D1 and D10 represent the dialogue of the original call between the Party\_A (target) and the Party\_B. D2 and D20 represent the original the dialogue of the original call between Party\_A (target) and the Party\_C. D3 represents the new dialogue of call between Party\_A and the conference. + +The IRI/CC delivered for D1 and D10 use the Correlation Number 1. The IRI/CC delivered for D2 and D20 use the Correlation Number 2. The IRI/CC delivered for the conferencing (i.e., D3) uses the Correlation Number 3. + +### F.7.2 Party\_C joins the conference + +This flow is illustrated in two figures: Figure F.7.2 and Figure F.7.3. + +![Sequence diagram Figure F.7.2: Party_C joins the conference (flow 1 of 2)](9252ccfbbe9e34cb108f0060f2b563f1_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram shows the signaling and media flow for a conference call setup. The entities involved are Party\_A [target], IP-CAN, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS/MRFC, MRFP (within the Target Domain), Party\_B, Party\_C, DF2, DF3 (within MF/DF), and LEA. + +- Media Flows:** + - D1/D10: Media between Party\_A and Party\_B (placed on HOLD). Intercepted as CC [1] to LEA. + - D2/D20: Media between Party\_A and Party\_C (placed on HOLD). Intercepted as CC [2] to LEA. + - D3: Media between Party\_A and the conference (AS/MRFC/MRFP). Intercepted as CC [3] to LEA. +- Signaling (D4):** + - Party\_A sends 'REFER Conf (Refer To: Party\_C, Replaces: D2)' through IP-CAN, P-CSCF, S-CSCF to AS/MRFC. This is intercepted as {REFER, 4} by DF2/DF3 and sent to LEA. + - AS/MRFC responds with '202 Accepted', which flows back to Party\_A and is intercepted as {202 Accepted, 4}. + - AS/MRFC sends 'NOTIFY Party\_A', intercepted as {NOTIFY Party\_A, 4}. + - Party\_A responds with '200 OK', intercepted as {200 OK, 4}. + +Sequence diagram Figure F.7.2: Party\_C joins the conference (flow 1 of 2) + +**Figure F.7.2: Party\_C joins the conference (flow 1 of 2)** + +D1 and D10 represent the dialogue of the original call between the Party\_A (target) and the Party\_B. D2 and D20 represent the original the dialogue of the original call between Party\_A (target) and the Party\_C. D3 represents the dialogue of the call between Party\_A and the conference. D4 represents the dialogue that the Party\_A (target) uses to refer Party\_C to the conference. + +NOTE: Here, REFER is sent by Party\_A outside of any existing dialogues. Sending of REFER inside a dialogue is also possible. + +The IRI/CC delivered for D1 and D10 use the Correlation Number 1. The IRI/CC delivered for D2 and D20 use the Correlation Number 2. The IRI/CC delivered for the conferencing (i.e., D3) uses the Correlation Number 3. The IRI for D4 uses the Correlation Number 4. + +![Sequence diagram Figure F.7.3: Party_C joins the conference (flow 2 of 2)](8269648391c59363ea61243864a2adf7_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates a SIP call flow involving the following entities: Party\_A [target], IP-CAN, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS/MRFC, MRFP, Party\_B, Party\_C, DF2, DF3, and LEA. + +**Sequence of Events:** + +- re-INVITE:** S-CSCF sends a re-INVITE [Contact: Conf Id; isfocus] (SDP) to AS/MRFC. AS/MRFC adds [Conf Resource 2] (D20) and sends a re-INVITE to Party\_B and Party\_C. +- Response:** Party\_B and Party\_C respond with 200 OK (SDP). AS/MRFC sends 200 OK (SDP) to S-CSCF, which forwards it to Party\_A. +- ACK:** Party\_A sends ACK to S-CSCF, which forwards it to AS/MRFC. AS/MRFC sends ACK to Party\_B and Party\_C. A 'Party Join [3]' event is sent to LEA. +- NOTIFY:** S-CSCF sends NOTIFY Party\_A to P-CSCF and Party\_A. AS/MRFC sends {NOTIFY Party\_A, 4} to LEA. +- BYE:** Party\_A sends BYE Party\_A. S-CSCF sends BYE Party\_A to AS/MRFC. AS/MRFC sends a response (D2) to S-CSCF. MRFP sends {BYE, 2} to LEA. +- Media:** Media flows D3 and D1 are established. Media flow D20 and D10 are established with a HOLD status. Intercepted media CC [3] and CC [1] are sent to LEA. + +Sequence diagram Figure F.7.3: Party\_C joins the conference (flow 2 of 2) + +**Figure F.7.3: Party\_C joins the conference (flow 2 of 2)** + +At the end of this flow, the Party\_A (target) and Party\_C are connected via the conference. Party\_C is still on hold. Part of the original call between Party\_A (target) and Party\_C (D2) is released with D20 now representing the call between the Party\_C and the conference. + +### F.7.3 Party\_B joins the conference + +This flow is illustrated in two figures: Figure F.7.4 and Figure F.7.5. + +![Sequence diagram Figure F.7.4: Party_B joins the conference (flow 1 of 2)](bc9d0c0b02cbe628b1b6548cc1107734_img.jpg) + +This sequence diagram illustrates the first part of Party\_B joining the conference. The participants are Party\_A [target], IP-CAN, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS/MRFC, MRFP, Party\_B, Party\_C, DF2, DF3, and LEA. + +**Sequence of Events:** + +- Media State:** Initial media flows D3/D20 and D1/D10 are active, with D10 on HOLD. Intercepted media CC [3] and CC [1] are being sent to LEA. +- REFER:** Party\_A sends a REFER Conf (Refer To: Party\_B, Replaces: D1) to P-CSCF, which forwards it to S-CSCF, then to AS/MRFC. A {REFER, 5} event is reported to LEA. +- 202 Accepted:** AS/MRFC responds with 202 Accepted, which is forwarded back to Party\_A. A {202 Accepted, 5} event is reported to LEA. +- NOTIFY:** AS/MRFC sends NOTIFY Party\_A, which is forwarded to Party\_A. A {NOTIFY Party\_A, 5} event is reported to LEA. +- 200 OK:** Party\_A responds to the NOTIFY with 200 OK. A {200 OK, 5} event is reported to LEA. + +Sequence diagram Figure F.7.4: Party\_B joins the conference (flow 1 of 2) + +**Figure F.7.4: Party\_B joins the conference (flow 1 of 2)** + +D3 represents the dialogue of the call between the Party\_A (target) and the conference. D20 represents the dialogue between the Party\_C and the conference. D1 and D10 represent the original the dialogue of the original call between Party\_A (target) and the Party\_B. D5 represents the dialogue that the Party\_A (target) uses to refer Party\_B to the conference. + +NOTE: Here, REFER is sent by Party\_A outside of any existing dialogues. Sending of REFER inside a dialogue is also possible. + +The IRI/CC delivered for D1 and D10 use the Correlation Number 1. The IRI/CC delivered for the conferencing (i.e., D3) uses the Correlation Number 3. The IRI for D5 uses the Correlation Number 5. + +![Sequence diagram Figure F.7.5: Party_B joins the conference (flow 2 of 2)](a5184899f915014fa38608754efcc9c7_img.jpg) + +This sequence diagram illustrates the interaction between various network elements for conference call management. The lifelines are: Party\_A [target], IP-CAN, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS/MRCF, MRFP, Party\_B, Party\_C, DF2, DF3, and LEA. The diagram is split into two main sections: Target Domain (left) and MF/DF (right). + +**Sequence of Events:** + +- Party\_A [target]** sends a **re-INVITE** (with Contact: Conf Id; isfocus; [SDP]) to **S-CSCF**. +- S-CSCF** forwards the **re-INVITE** to **AS/MRCF**. +- AS/MRCF** sends an **Add [Conf Resource 2]** message to **MRFP**. +- AS/MRCF** sends a **re-INVITE** (with Contact: Conf Id; isfocus; [SDP]) through **S-CSCF** to **Party\_B**. A yellow diamond labeled **D10** is shown at the AS/MRCF. +- Party\_B** responds with **200 OK [SDP]** to **S-CSCF**, which forwards it to **AS/MRCF**. +- AS/MRCF** sends a **200 OK [SDP]** to **S-CSCF**, which forwards it to **Party\_A [target]**. +- AS/MRCF** sends a **Party Join [3]** message to **DF2**, which is then sent to **LEA**. +- S-CSCF** sends an **ACK** to **Party\_B**. +- AS/MRCF** sends a **NOTIFY Party\_A** message through **S-CSCF**, **P-CSCF**, and **IP-CAN** to **Party\_A [target]**. +- AS/MRCF** sends a **{NOTIFY Party\_A, 5}** message to **DF2**, which is then sent to **LEA**. +- Party\_A [target]** sends a **200 OK** response back through **IP-CAN**, **P-CSCF**, and **S-CSCF** to **AS/MRCF**. +- AS/MRCF** sends a **{200 OK, 5}** message to **DF2**, which is then sent to **LEA**. +- Party\_A [target]** sends a **BYE Party\_A** message through **IP-CAN**, **P-CSCF**, and **S-CSCF** to **AS/MRCF**. A yellow diamond labeled **D1** is shown at the AS/MRCF. +- AS/MRCF** sends a **{BYE, 1}** message to **DF2**, which is then sent to **LEA**. +- Party\_A [target]** and **IP-CAN** exchange **SAR/RAR** and **SAA/RAA** messages. +- AS/MRCF** sends a **200 OK** response through **S-CSCF**, **P-CSCF**, and **IP-CAN** to **Party\_A [target]**. +- AS/MRCF** sends a **{200 OK, 1}** message to **DF2**, which is then sent to **LEA**. +- Dialogue **D3** is established between **Party\_A [target]** and **AS/MRCF**. Dialogues **D10** and **D20** are established between **AS/MRCF** and **Party\_B** and **Party\_C** respectively. +- Media** flows are established between **Party\_A [target]**, **IP-CAN**, **MRFP** (via a summation node Σ), **Party\_B**, and **Party\_C**. +- CC [3]** (Content of Communication) messages are sent from **DF2** and **DF3** to **LEA**. + +Sequence diagram Figure F.7.5: Party\_B joins the conference (flow 2 of 2) + +**Figure F.7.5: Party\_B joins the conference (flow 2 of 2)** + +At the end of this flow, the Party\_A (target), Party\_B and Party\_C are connected via the conference. Part of the original call between Party\_A (target) and Party\_B (D1) is released with D10 now representing the call between the Party\_B and the conference. + +### F.7.4 Party\_C drops out of the conference + +![Sequence diagram showing Party_C dropping out of a conference. The diagram is divided into Target Domain and MF/DF domains. Lifelines include Party_A (target), IP-CAN, P-GSCF, S-CSCF, AS/MRFC, MRFP, Party_B, Party_C, DF2, DF3, and LEA. The sequence shows Party_C sending a BYE Conf to S-CSCF, which triggers a Drop [Conf Resource 2] to AS/MRFC. AS/MRFC responds with 200 OK to S-CSCF, which then forwards it to Party_C. Party_C sends a Party Leave [3] to DF3, which then sends CC [3] messages to LEA. The diagram also shows media flows and dialogues D3, D10, and D20.](f142b022cfc716cd967297f027efe647_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the interaction for Party\_C dropping out of a conference. It starts with Party\_A (target) and IP-CAN establishing a dialogue D3. Media flows from IP-CAN to MRFP. Party\_B and Party\_C join the conference via dialogues D10 and D20 respectively. Media flows from MRFP to Party\_B and Party\_C. Party\_C sends a BYE Conf message to S-CSCF. S-CSCF sends a Drop [Conf Resource 2] message to AS/MRFC. AS/MRFC responds with 200 OK to S-CSCF, which then forwards it to Party\_C. Party\_C sends a Party Leave [3] message to DF3. DF3 sends CC [3] messages to LEA. The diagram also shows media flows from IP-CAN to LEA and from MRFP to LEA. + +Sequence diagram showing Party\_C dropping out of a conference. The diagram is divided into Target Domain and MF/DF domains. Lifelines include Party\_A (target), IP-CAN, P-GSCF, S-CSCF, AS/MRFC, MRFP, Party\_B, Party\_C, DF2, DF3, and LEA. The sequence shows Party\_C sending a BYE Conf to S-CSCF, which triggers a Drop [Conf Resource 2] to AS/MRFC. AS/MRFC responds with 200 OK to S-CSCF, which then forwards it to Party\_C. Party\_C sends a Party Leave [3] to DF3, which then sends CC [3] messages to LEA. The diagram also shows media flows and dialogues D3, D10, and D20. + +Figure F.7.6: Party\_C drops out of the conference + +D3 represents the dialogue of the call between the Party\_A (target) and the conference. D20 represents the dialogue between the Party\_C and the conference. D10 represents the dialogue between the Party\_B and the conference. + +The IRI/CC delivered for the conferencing (i.e., D3) uses the Correlation Number 3. + +At the end of this flow, Party\_A (target) and Party\_B are connected through the conference. + +### F.7.5 Reconfiguration from Conference to two-party call + +![Sequence diagram showing the reconfiguration from a conference to a two-party call. The diagram is divided into two domains: Target Domain and MF/DF. The Target Domain includes Party_A (target), IP-CAN, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS/MRFC, and MRFP. The MF/DF domain includes Party_B, Party_C, DF2, DF3, and LEA. The sequence starts with Party_A sending a re-INVITE to S-CSCF, which is forwarded to AS/MRFC. AS/MRFC sends a re-INVITE to S-CSCF, which is forwarded to P-CSCF and then to Party_A. AS/MRFC also sends a re-INVITE to MRFP, which is forwarded to Party_B. AS/MRFC sends a 200 OK (SDP) to S-CSCF, which is forwarded to P-CSCF and then to Party_A. AS/MRFC also sends a 200 OK (SDP) to MRFP, which is forwarded to Party_B. AS/MRFC sends a re-INVITE (SDP) to S-CSCF, which is forwarded to P-CSCF and then to Party_A. AS/MRFC also sends a re-INVITE (SDP) to MRFP, which is forwarded to Party_B. AS/MRFC sends a 200 OK (SDP) to S-CSCF, which is forwarded to P-CSCF and then to Party_A. AS/MRFC also sends a 200 OK (SDP) to MRFP, which is forwarded to Party_B. AS/MRFC sends an ACK (SDP) to S-CSCF, which is forwarded to P-CSCF and then to Party_A. AS/MRFC also sends an ACK (SDP) to MRFP, which is forwarded to Party_B. AS/MRFC sends a Drop [Conf Resources] message to MRFP. AS/MRFC sends an ACK to S-CSCF, which is forwarded to P-CSCF and then to Party_A. AS/MRFC also sends an ACK to MRFP, which is forwarded to Party_B. AS/MRFC sends a Conference End [3] message to DF2, which is forwarded to LEA. AS/MRFC sends an ACK (3) to DF2, which is forwarded to LEA. AS/MRFC sends an ACK to MRFP, which is forwarded to Party_B. The diagram ends with Party_A and Party_B connected directly via D3 and D10 dialogues, with media flowing between them. Correlation Number 3 is used for the IRI/CC messages.](a161a2bbb4d830e847ccb4f44b7e41a9_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram showing the reconfiguration from a conference to a two-party call. The diagram is divided into two domains: Target Domain and MF/DF. The Target Domain includes Party\_A (target), IP-CAN, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, AS/MRFC, and MRFP. The MF/DF domain includes Party\_B, Party\_C, DF2, DF3, and LEA. The sequence starts with Party\_A sending a re-INVITE to S-CSCF, which is forwarded to AS/MRFC. AS/MRFC sends a re-INVITE to S-CSCF, which is forwarded to P-CSCF and then to Party\_A. AS/MRFC also sends a re-INVITE to MRFP, which is forwarded to Party\_B. AS/MRFC sends a 200 OK (SDP) to S-CSCF, which is forwarded to P-CSCF and then to Party\_A. AS/MRFC also sends a 200 OK (SDP) to MRFP, which is forwarded to Party\_B. AS/MRFC sends a re-INVITE (SDP) to S-CSCF, which is forwarded to P-CSCF and then to Party\_A. AS/MRFC also sends a re-INVITE (SDP) to MRFP, which is forwarded to Party\_B. AS/MRFC sends a 200 OK (SDP) to S-CSCF, which is forwarded to P-CSCF and then to Party\_A. AS/MRFC also sends a 200 OK (SDP) to MRFP, which is forwarded to Party\_B. AS/MRFC sends an ACK (SDP) to S-CSCF, which is forwarded to P-CSCF and then to Party\_A. AS/MRFC also sends an ACK (SDP) to MRFP, which is forwarded to Party\_B. AS/MRFC sends a Drop [Conf Resources] message to MRFP. AS/MRFC sends an ACK to S-CSCF, which is forwarded to P-CSCF and then to Party\_A. AS/MRFC also sends an ACK to MRFP, which is forwarded to Party\_B. AS/MRFC sends a Conference End [3] message to DF2, which is forwarded to LEA. AS/MRFC sends an ACK (3) to DF2, which is forwarded to LEA. AS/MRFC sends an ACK to MRFP, which is forwarded to Party\_B. The diagram ends with Party\_A and Party\_B connected directly via D3 and D10 dialogues, with media flowing between them. Correlation Number 3 is used for the IRI/CC messages. + +Figure F.7.7: Conference is reconfigured to a two-party call + +D3 represents the dialogue of the call between the Party\_A (target) and the conference. D10 represents the dialogue between the Party\_B and the conference. + +The IRI/CC delivered for the conferencing (i.e., D3) uses the Correlation Number 3. + +At the end of this flow, Party\_A (target) and Party\_B are connected directly (without the conference). The IRI/CC delivered for this call between Party\_A (target) and Party\_B (D3 and D10) uses the Correlation Number 3. + +NOTE: Reconfiguration may done using other ways (e.g., AS/MRFC sending a REFER to Party\_A (target) to invite Party\_C). The sequence of steps and the Correlation Number used can be different with such a flow. + +### F.7.6 Party\_A (target) places Conference on hold + +![Sequence diagram showing the interaction between Party_A (target), IP-CAN, P-GSCF, S-CSCF, AS/MRFC, MRFP, Party_B, Party_C, DF2, DF3, and LEA. The diagram illustrates the process of placing a conference on hold and then retrieving it. The 'Target Domain' includes Party_A (target), IP-CAN, P-GSCF, S-CSCF, AS/MRFC, and MRFP. The 'MF/DF' includes DF2 and DF3. The 'LEA' is also shown. The sequence starts with Party_A (target) sending a re-INVITE [SDP: send only] to IP-CAN, which is forwarded through P-GSCF, S-CSCF, and AS/MRFC to MRFP. MRFP sends a MOD [Conference Resources] to AS/MRFC, which responds with 200 OK [SDP: receive only]. AS/MRFC then sends a re-INVITE [SDP: send only] to S-CSCF, which is forwarded through P-GSCF to IP-CAN. IP-CAN responds with 200 OK [SDP: receive only] to Party_A (target). Party_A (target) sends an ACK to IP-CAN, which is forwarded through P-GSCF, S-CSCF, and AS/MRFC to MRFP. MRFP sends a HOLD to AS/MRFC, which responds with 200 OK [SDP: receive only]. AS/MRFC then sends a re-INVITE [SDP: send only] to S-CSCF, which is forwarded through P-GSCF to IP-CAN. IP-CAN responds with 200 OK [SDP: receive only] to Party_A (target). Party_A (target) sends an ACK to IP-CAN, which is forwarded through P-GSCF, S-CSCF, and AS/MRFC to MRFP. MRFP sends a ConferenceBearerModification [3] to DF2, which is forwarded to DF3 and then to LEA. MRFP also sends an (INVITE, 3) to DF2, which is forwarded to DF3 and then to LEA. MRFP sends a (200 OK, 3) to DF2, which is forwarded to DF3 and then to LEA. MRFP sends an (ACK, 3) to DF2, which is forwarded to DF3 and then to LEa. The diagram also shows media paths (green dashed lines) and dialogue identifiers (D3, D10, D20).](036ceaf207a7b289ca76e160892eb724_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram showing the interaction between Party\_A (target), IP-CAN, P-GSCF, S-CSCF, AS/MRFC, MRFP, Party\_B, Party\_C, DF2, DF3, and LEA. The diagram illustrates the process of placing a conference on hold and then retrieving it. The 'Target Domain' includes Party\_A (target), IP-CAN, P-GSCF, S-CSCF, AS/MRFC, and MRFP. The 'MF/DF' includes DF2 and DF3. The 'LEA' is also shown. The sequence starts with Party\_A (target) sending a re-INVITE [SDP: send only] to IP-CAN, which is forwarded through P-GSCF, S-CSCF, and AS/MRFC to MRFP. MRFP sends a MOD [Conference Resources] to AS/MRFC, which responds with 200 OK [SDP: receive only]. AS/MRFC then sends a re-INVITE [SDP: send only] to S-CSCF, which is forwarded through P-GSCF to IP-CAN. IP-CAN responds with 200 OK [SDP: receive only] to Party\_A (target). Party\_A (target) sends an ACK to IP-CAN, which is forwarded through P-GSCF, S-CSCF, and AS/MRFC to MRFP. MRFP sends a HOLD to AS/MRFC, which responds with 200 OK [SDP: receive only]. AS/MRFC then sends a re-INVITE [SDP: send only] to S-CSCF, which is forwarded through P-GSCF to IP-CAN. IP-CAN responds with 200 OK [SDP: receive only] to Party\_A (target). Party\_A (target) sends an ACK to IP-CAN, which is forwarded through P-GSCF, S-CSCF, and AS/MRFC to MRFP. MRFP sends a ConferenceBearerModification [3] to DF2, which is forwarded to DF3 and then to LEA. MRFP also sends an (INVITE, 3) to DF2, which is forwarded to DF3 and then to LEA. MRFP sends a (200 OK, 3) to DF2, which is forwarded to DF3 and then to LEA. MRFP sends an (ACK, 3) to DF2, which is forwarded to DF3 and then to LEa. The diagram also shows media paths (green dashed lines) and dialogue identifiers (D3, D10, D20). + +Figure F.7.8: Party\_A (target) retrieves conference on hold + +D3 represents the dialogue of the call between the Party\_A (target) and the conference. D20 represents the dialogue between the Party\_C and the conference. D10 represents the dialogue between the Party\_B and the conference. + +The IRI/CC delivered for the conferencing (i.e., D3) uses the Correlation Number 3. + +At the end of this flow, Party\_B and Party\_C can still communicate via the conference, but without the Party\_A. The CC delivered from the MRFP contains the communication content of that conversation. + +NOTE: Similar steps as shown here are used when Party\_A (target) retrieves a two-party call from hold. + +### F.7.7 Party\_A (target) retrieves Conference from hold + +![Sequence diagram showing the retrieval of a conference call from hold by Party_A (target).](7fe5741e83bc9702d1b1d7585ddf66bd_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the interaction for retrieving a conference call from hold. It is divided into two main sections: 'Target Domain' and 'MF/DF'. + +- Target Domain:** Includes Party\_A (target), IP-CAN, P-GSCF, S-CSCF, AS/MRFC, and MRFP. +- MF/DF:** Includes Party\_B, Party\_C, DF2, DF3, and LEA. + +**Sequence of events:** + +- Party\_A (target) sends a **D3** message to IP-CAN. +- IP-CAN sends a **HOLD** message to AS/MRFC. +- AS/MRFC sends **D10** and **D20** messages to Party\_B and Party\_C respectively. +- Party\_A (target) sends a **re-INVITE [SDP: Send Receive]** message to P-GSCF. +- P-GSCF sends a **re-INVITE [SDP: Send Receive]** message to S-CSCF. +- S-CSCF sends a **re-INVITE [SDP: Send Receive]** message to AS/MRFC. +- AS/MRFC sends a **MOD [Conference Resources]** message to MRFP. +- MRFP sends **Media** messages to Party\_B and Party\_C. +- AS/MRFC sends a **200 OK [SDP: Send Receive]** message to S-CSCF. +- S-CSCF sends a **200 OK [SDP: Send Receive]** message to P-GSCF. +- P-GSCF sends a **200 OK [SDP: Send Receive]** message to Party\_A (target). +- Party\_A (target) sends an **ACK** message to P-GSCF. +- P-GSCF sends an **ACK** message to S-CSCF. +- S-CSCF sends an **ACK** message to AS/MRFC. +- AS/MRFC sends **Media** messages to Party\_B and Party\_C. +- Party\_A (target) sends a **D3** message to IP-CAN. +- IP-CAN sends **Media** messages to Party\_B and Party\_C. +- MRFP sends **Media** messages to Party\_B and Party\_C. +- Party\_A (target) sends **cc [3]** messages to DF2 and DF3. +- DF2 and DF3 send **cc [3]** messages to LEA. + +Additional messages shown in the diagram include **(INVITE, 3)**, **ConferenceBearerModification [3]**, **(200 OK, 3)**, and **(ACK, 3)** sent from DF2 and DF3 to LEA. + +Sequence diagram showing the retrieval of a conference call from hold by Party\_A (target). + +**Figure F.7.9: Party\_A (target) retrieves conference from hold** + +D3 represents the dialogue of the call between the Party\_A (target) and the conference. D20 represents the dialogue between the Party\_C and the conference. D10 represents the dialogue between the Party\_B and the conference. + +The IRI/CC delivered for the conferencing (i.e., D3) uses the Correlation Number 3. + +At the end of this flow, Party\_A (target), Party\_B and Party\_C are communicating via the conference. + +NOTE: Similar steps as shown here are used when Party\_A (target) retrieves a two-party call from hold. + +# Annex G (informative): Examples of CC interception for transcoded media + +## G.1 Introduction + +This annex provides some illustrative examples of media transcoding scenarios and its implication on the CC interception. + +In some situations, the media information known to the S-CSCF can be different from the media information associated with the CC delivered to the LEMF. For example, when transcoding is involved in the media path, the media information (e.g., codec used) can change at the time transcoding is done and the S-CSCF that normally provides the media information to the DF2 may not have the knowledge of media information associated with the CC delivered to the LEMF. + +In a particular implementation, the CC interception point may be chosen in such a way that information associated with the intercepted CC always matches to the information known to the IRI ICE (e.g., S-CSCF). But, there may some deployment situations and/or regulations that may require having a need to perform the CC interception at the other points with the information known to S-CSCF not being aligned with the information associated with the intercepted CC. + +## G.2 CC Interception of transcoded media + +The Figure G.2-1 illustrates a case where the media is transcoded at the IMS-AGW. In this example, the media is not encrypted. + +![Diagram of CC interception for transcoded media showing SIP signaling and media paths between Target, P-GW, IMS-AGW, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, DF3, DF2, and LEMF.](1174e0fd3f2c73de8e5c6ce8ea6bdda1_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the flow of SIP signaling and media for a call from a Target to an Other Party, involving transcoding at the IMS-AGW. + **SIP Signaling Path:** The Target sends a SIP X [SDP: Codec 1] to the P-CSCF. The P-CSCF interacts with the PCRF and P-GW. It then forwards a SIP X [SDP: Codec 2] to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF provides IRI {SDP: Codec 2} to the DF2. The DF2 generates IRI {SDP: Codec x} for the LEMF. + **Media Path:** Media from the Target (Codec 1) goes to the P-GW, then to the IMS-AGW (Ingress). At the IMS-AGW, it is transcoded to Codec 2 and sent to the Other Party (Egress). + **CC Interception Cases:** + +- Case 1:** Interception at the P-GW (before IMS-AGW Ingress) results in CC {Codec 1} being sent to the LEMF. +- Case 2:** Interception at the IMS-AGW Ingress point results in CC {Codec 1} being sent to the LEMF. +- Case 3:** Interception at the IMS-AGW Egress point results in CC {Codec 2} being sent to the LEMF. + + A note indicates: 'Codec x = Codec 1 for Case 1 and Case 2' and 'Codec x = Codec 2 for Case 3'. + +Diagram of CC interception for transcoded media showing SIP signaling and media paths between Target, P-GW, IMS-AGW, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, DF3, DF2, and LEMF. + +**Figure G.2-1: Transcoded Media** + +The Figure G.2-1 shows three different cases of CC interception points. In the illustrated example, Codec 1 is associated with the media from the Target to the Ingress point of IMS-AGW and Codec 2 is used from the Egress point of IMS-AGW and beyond. Therefore, Codec 1 is associated with the CC delivered to the LEMF when that CC is intercepted at the PDN-GW or at the Ingress point of IMS-AGW, and Codec 2 is associated with the media delivered to the LEMF when that CC is intercepted at the Egress point of IMS-AGW. + +The Codec 2 is included within the SDP of SIP messages handled at the S-CSCF and therefore, if S-CSCF provides the codec information to the DF2 in all cases, then there would be a misalignment with the codec information delivered over the HI2 and codec information associated with the CC delivered over HI3 for Case 1 and Case 2. + +Depending on which case is used for the CC interception, the P-CSCF can send either Codec 1 or Codec 2 to the DF2. With the DF2 using the codec information received from the P-CSCF for reporting purposes, the codec information reported in the HI2 and HI3 are now aligned. For case 3, the codec information would be aligned irrespective of who sends that information to the DF2. Therefore, for Case 3, P-CSCF sending the codec 2 information to the DF2 can be an implementation alternative. + +In a scenario like this, an implementation can also be such that the CC interception is always done at the Egress point of IMS-AGW (i.e., only Case 3), but because of some deployment situations and regulations, there may also be a need to perform the CC interception at the Ingress point of IMS-AGW (Case 2) or at the PDN-GW (Case 1). + +## G.3 CC Interception of transcoded media with e2ae encryption + +The Figure G.3-1 illustrates a case where the media is transcoded at IMS-AGW with e2ae encryption. In this example, media is encrypted e2ae (i.e. between the Target and the Ingress point of IMS-AGW). The CC is delivered to the LEMF in a decrypted form. + +![Figure G.3-1: Transcoded Media with e2ae encryption. A network diagram showing the flow of SIP signaling and media between a Target and an Other Party, with Lawful Interception components. Entities include Target, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, PCRF, P-GW, IMS-AGW, DF3, DF2, and LEMF. SIP signaling (SIP X) carries SDP with SDES Keys and Codec 1 from Target to P-CSCF, then SDP with Codec 2 to S-CSCF. Media (Codec 1) flows from Target through P-GW to IMS-AGW, where it is transcoded to Codec 2 before reaching the Other Party. Three interception cases are shown: Case 1 at P-GW, Case 2 at IMS-AGW Ingress, and Case 3 at IMS-AGW Egress. Intercepted CC (Codec 1 or 2) is sent via DF3 to LEMF. IRI and SDP information are sent via DF2 to LEMF. Annotations specify: Codec x = Codec 1 for Case 1 and Case 2; Codec x = Codec 2 for Case 3 and no SDES Keys for Case 3.](5c3dd31372f59e15250f0ab1613ca485_img.jpg) + +Diagram Details: + +- Signaling:** SIP X [SDP: SDES Keys, Codec 1] from Target to P-CSCF. SIP X [SDP: Codec 2] from P-CSCF to S-CSCF. +- Media Path:** Target (Codec 1) → P-GW → IMS-AGW (Transcoding) → Other Party (Codec 2). +- Interception Points:** + - Case 1: At P-GW (Codec 1). + - Case 2: At IMS-AGW Ingress (Codec 1). + - Case 3: At IMS-AGW Egress (Codec 2). +- Delivery to LEMF:** + - CC {Codec 1} or {Codec 2} delivered via DF3. + - IRI {SDP: Codec 2} from S-CSCF to DF2. + - {SDES Keys, Codec 1, Codec 2} from P-CSCF to DF2. + - IRI {SDP: Codec x} and SDP (without SDES Keys) from DF2 to LEMF. +- Legend/Notes:** + - Codec x = Codec 1 for Case 1 and Case 2 + - Codec x = Codec 2 for Case 3 and no SDES Keys for Case 3 + +Figure G.3-1: Transcoded Media with e2ae encryption. A network diagram showing the flow of SIP signaling and media between a Target and an Other Party, with Lawful Interception components. Entities include Target, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, PCRF, P-GW, IMS-AGW, DF3, DF2, and LEMF. SIP signaling (SIP X) carries SDP with SDES Keys and Codec 1 from Target to P-CSCF, then SDP with Codec 2 to S-CSCF. Media (Codec 1) flows from Target through P-GW to IMS-AGW, where it is transcoded to Codec 2 before reaching the Other Party. Three interception cases are shown: Case 1 at P-GW, Case 2 at IMS-AGW Ingress, and Case 3 at IMS-AGW Egress. Intercepted CC (Codec 1 or 2) is sent via DF3 to LEMF. IRI and SDP information are sent via DF2 to LEMF. Annotations specify: Codec x = Codec 1 for Case 1 and Case 2; Codec x = Codec 2 for Case 3 and no SDES Keys for Case 3. + +**Figure G.3-1: Transcoded Media with e2ae encryption** + +The Figure G.3-1 shows three different cases of CC interception points. In this example, Codec 1 is associated with the media from the Target to the Ingress point of IMS-AGW and Codec 2 is used from the Egress point of IMS-AGW and beyond. Therefore, Codec 1 is associated with the CC delivered to the LEMF when that CC is intercepted at the PDN-GW or at the Ingress point of IMS-AGW, and Codec 2 is associated with the media delivered to the LEMF when that CC is intercepted at the Egress point of IMS-AGW. The Codec 2 is included within the SDP of SIP messages handled at the S-CSCF and therefore, if S-CSCF provides the codec information to the DF2 in all cases, then there would be a misalignment with the codec information delivered over the HI2 and codec information associated with the CC delivered over HI3 for Case 1 and Case 2. + +Depending on which case is used for the CC interception, the P-CSCF can send either Codec 1 or Codec 2 to the DF2. With the DF2 using the codec information received from the P-CSCF for reporting purposes, the codec information reported in the HI2 and HI3 are now aligned. For case 3, the codec information would be aligned irrespective of who sends that information to the DF2. Therefore, for Case 3, P-CSCF sending the codec 2 information to the DF2 can be an implementation alternative. + +sends that information to the DF2. Therefore, for Case 3, P-CSCF sending the codec 2 information to the DF2 can be an implementation alternative. + +In this example, media is encrypted (with SDES keys in SDP) from Target to the Ingress point of IMS-AGW and not encrypted from the Egress point of IMS-AGW and beyond. Therefore, for Case 1 and Case 2, the DF2 has to provide the SDES keys to the DF3 (see clause 7A.1.A) to perform the decryption. The S-CSCF does not receive the SDES keys within the SDP of SIP messages. Therefore, P-CSCF shall send the SDES Keys to the DF2 and the DF2 shall use that for its handling (i.e., sending to the DF3). P-CSCF does not send any SDES Keys to the DF2 for Case 3 since the CC is intercepted in the Egress point of IMS-AGW in a decrypted form. + +In a scenario like this, an implementation can also be such that the CC interception is always done at the Egress point of IMS-AGW (i.e., only Case 3), but because of some deployment situations and regulations, there may also be a need to perform the CC interception at the Ingress point of IMS-AGW (Case 2) or at the PDN-GW (Case 1). + +## G.4 CC Interception of transcoded media with e2e hop-by-hop encryption + +The Figure G.4-1 illustrates a case where the media is transcoded at IMS-AGW with e2e hop-by-hop encryption. Different SDES keys are for the encryption. + +![Figure G.4-1: Transcoded Media with e2e encryption. This diagram illustrates the network architecture and signaling for CC interception of transcoded media. It shows the flow of SIP messages and media streams between a Target, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, PCRF, P-GW, IMS-AGW, DF3, DF2, and LEMF. Three cases of interception are shown: Case 1 at the P-GW, Case 2 at the Ingress of IMS-AGW, and Case 3 at the Egress of IMS-AGW. The diagram details the exchange of SDP messages containing SDES keys and codec information, and how the DF2 and DF3 interact with the LEMF for reporting purposes.](78e846f2858d131dc5a4dcbabcca1e4d_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows the following components and interactions: + +- Target**: Initiates media and SIP X messages. +- P-CSCF**: Receives SIP X from Target [SDP: SDES Keys-1, Codec 1] and sends SIP X to S-CSCF [SDP: SDES Keys-2, Codec 2]. It also exchanges {SDES Keys-1, SDES Keys-2, Codec1, Codec 2} with DF3. +- S-CSCF**: Receives SIP X from P-CSCF and sends IRI to DF2 [SDP: SDES Keys-2, Codec 2]. +- PCRF**: Connected to P-CSCF and P-GW. +- P-GW**: Site of Case 1 interception. Media flows from Target to IMS-AGW. +- IMS-AGW**: Site of Case 2 (Ingress) and Case 3 (Egress) interception. Media is transcoded here. +- Other Party**: Receives media from IMS-AGW. +- DF3**: Receives CC information from interception points and sends {SDES Keys x} to DF2. +- DF2**: Receives SDP from S-CSCF and {SDES Keys x} from DF3. It sends IRI to LEMF. +- LEMF**: Receives CC information from DF3 and IRI from DF2. + +Media encryption details: + +- From Target to Ingress of IMS-AGW: {Codec 1, SDES Keys-1} +- From Ingress to Egress of IMS-AGW: {Codec 1, SDES Keys-1} +- From Egress of IMS-AGW to Other Party: {Codec 2, SDES Keys-2} + +Interception cases: + +- Case 1**: At P-GW. CC {Codec 1} sent to LEMF. +- Case 2**: At Ingress of IMS-AGW. CC {Codec 1} sent to LEMF. +- Case 3**: At Egress of IMS-AGW. CC {Codec 2} sent to LEMF. + +Codec and SDES key mapping for DF2: + +- Codec x = Codec 1 for Case 1 and Case 2 +- Codec x = Codec 2 for Case 3 +- SDES Keys x = SDES Keys-1 for Case 1 and Case 2 and SDES Keys-2 for Case 3 + +Figure G.4-1: Transcoded Media with e2e encryption. This diagram illustrates the network architecture and signaling for CC interception of transcoded media. It shows the flow of SIP messages and media streams between a Target, P-CSCF, S-CSCF, PCRF, P-GW, IMS-AGW, DF3, DF2, and LEMF. Three cases of interception are shown: Case 1 at the P-GW, Case 2 at the Ingress of IMS-AGW, and Case 3 at the Egress of IMS-AGW. The diagram details the exchange of SDP messages containing SDES keys and codec information, and how the DF2 and DF3 interact with the LEMF for reporting purposes. + +**Figure G.4-1: Transcoded Media with e2e encryption** + +The Figure G.4-1 shows three different cases of CC interception points. In this example, Codec 1 is associated with the media from the Target to the Ingress point of IMS-AGW and Codec 2 is used from Egress point of IMS-AGW and beyond. Therefore, Codec 1 is associated with the CC delivered to the LEMF when that CC is intercepted at the PDN-GW or at the Ingress point of IMS-AGW, and Codec 2 is associated with the media delivered to the LEMF when that CC is intercepted at the Egress point of IMS-AGW. The Codec 2 is included within the SDP of SIP messages handled at the S-CSCF and therefore, if S-CSCF provides the codec information to the DF2 in all cases, then there would be a misalignment with the codec information delivered over the HI2 and codec information associated with the CC delivered over HI3 for Case 1 and Case 2. + +Depending on which case is used for the CC interception, the P-CSCF can send either Codec 1 or Codec 2 to the DF2. With the DF2 using the codec information received from the P-CSCF for reporting purposes, the codec information reported in the HI2 and HI3 are now aligned. For case 3, the codec information would be aligned irrespective of who sends that information to the DF2. Therefore, for Case 3, P-CSCF sending the codec 2 information to the DF2 can be an + +implementation alternative. + +The media is encrypted (with SDES keys in SDP) from Target to the Ingress point of IMS-AGW with SDES keyes-1 as the encryption keys and encrypted from Egress point of IMS-AGW to the other end using SDES keys-2 as the encryption keys. The S-CSCF is aware of only the SDES keys-2 as it sees that in the SDP of the SIP messages. For Case 1 and Case 2, the P-CSCF shall provide the SDES keys to the DF2. For Case 3, either of the two, S-CSCF or the P-CSCF, can send the SDES keys to the DF2. DF2 has to use the SDES keys received from the P-CSCF for its handling (i.e., sending it to DF3) to perform the decryption. For Case 3, if the P-CSCF does not send the SDES Keys to the DF2, then the DF2 will use the SDES keys received from the S-CSCF for its handling. + +In a scenario like this, an implementation can also be such that the CC interception is always done at the Egress point of IMS-AGW (i.e., only Case 3), but because of some deployment situations and regulations, there may also be a need to perform the CC interception at the Ingress point of IMS-AGW (Case 2) or at the PDN-GW (Case 1). + +## G.5 CC Interception of transcoded media at the TrGW + +The Figure G.5-1 illustrates a case where the media is transcoded at TrGW. In this example, the TrGW provides the transcoding. This scenario can be see when an incoming call to the Target is forwarded (illustration assumes) or when Target is IMS roaming. + +![Figure G.5-1: TrGW Transcoded Media. This diagram illustrates the flow of media and signaling for CC interception at a TrGW. On the left, an S-CSCF sends an IRI (SDP: Codec 1) to a DF2. The DF2 sends an IRI (SDP: Codec x) to a LEMF. A SIP X (SDP: Codec 1) is sent from the S-CSCF to an IBCF. The IBCF sends {Codec x} to a TrGW. The TrGW receives Codec 1 from an 'Other Party' and Codec 2 from another 'Other Party'. It transcodes between them. Two cases are shown: Case 1 (Ingress point) where the TrGW sends CC {Codec 1} to a DF3, which then sends it to the LEMF; and Case 2 (Egress point) where the TrGW sends CC {Codec 2} to the DF3, which then sends it to the LEMF. A legend indicates: 'Codec x = Codec 1 for Case 1' and 'Codec x = Codec 2 for Case 3'. A dashed box contains P-CSCF, IMS-AGW, P-GW, and Target.](58bbc570572758132ea39938e4f03b5b_img.jpg) + +Figure G.5-1: TrGW Transcoded Media. This diagram illustrates the flow of media and signaling for CC interception at a TrGW. On the left, an S-CSCF sends an IRI (SDP: Codec 1) to a DF2. The DF2 sends an IRI (SDP: Codec x) to a LEMF. A SIP X (SDP: Codec 1) is sent from the S-CSCF to an IBCF. The IBCF sends {Codec x} to a TrGW. The TrGW receives Codec 1 from an 'Other Party' and Codec 2 from another 'Other Party'. It transcodes between them. Two cases are shown: Case 1 (Ingress point) where the TrGW sends CC {Codec 1} to a DF3, which then sends it to the LEMF; and Case 2 (Egress point) where the TrGW sends CC {Codec 2} to the DF3, which then sends it to the LEMF. A legend indicates: 'Codec x = Codec 1 for Case 1' and 'Codec x = Codec 2 for Case 3'. A dashed box contains P-CSCF, IMS-AGW, P-GW, and Target. + +**Figure G.5-1: TrGW Transcoded Media** + +The Figure G.5-1 shows two different cases of CC interception points. In this example, Codec 1 is associated with the media from the first Other Party (e.g., calling party) to the Ingress point of TrGW and Codec 2 is used from Egress point of TrGW to the second Other Party (e.g., forwarded-to-party). Therefore, Codec 1 is associated with the CC delivered to the LEMF when that CC is intercepted at Ingress point of TrGW and Codec 2 is associated with the media delivered to the LEMF when that CC is intercepted at the Egress point of TrGW. The Codec 1 is included within the SDP of SIP messages handled at the S-CSCF and therefore, if S-CSCF provides that to the DF2 in both cases, there would be a misalignment with the codec information delivered over the HI2 and codec information associated with the CC delivered over HI3 for Case 2. + +Depending on which case is used for the CC interception, the IBCF can send either Codec 1 or Codec 2 to the DF2. With the DF2 using the codec information received from the IBCF for reporting purposes, the codec information reported in the HI2 and HI3 are now aligned. For Case 1 the codec information would be aligned irrespective of who sends that information to the DF2. Therefore, for Case 1, IBCF sending the codec 1 information to the DF2 can be an + +implementation alternative. + +In a scenario like this, an implementation can also be such that the CC interception is always done at the Ingress point of TrGW (i.e., only Case 1), but because of some deployment situations and/or regulations, there may also be a need to perform the CC interception at the Egress point of TrGW as well. + +# --- Annex H (informative): Location only warrant + +## H.1 General + +The following describes the information that is delivered for authorization in those countries that allow authorized Lawful Interception (LI) for location scenarios. + +## --- H.2 Location only warrant + +The ADMF provides the network and/ or LI LCS Client to collect location IRI against a target with a specified periodicity. The target may have several interception invocations with multiple LEAs. For an Authorization for location reporting, all other IRI's not associated with Location is filtered. For example if a target places a voice call, new location information is now available to be sent to the LEA with a location authorization, that location data, and only the location value can be sent to the LEA, any record of the event (call start and other associated event information) is not be sent. Other LEAs may have a warrant for the Voice Services, and they will get the associated IRI. The invocations of elements to be captured can be sent to the DF and/ or the MF can filter events not required for the Location Authorization + +## --- H.3 Immediate Location warrant + +The ADMF provides the network and/ or LI LCS Client to collect the immediate location of a target. The target may have several interception invocations with multiple LEAs. For an Authorization for Immediate location, all other IRI's not associated with Location is filtered. + +--- + +# Annex I (informative): Interception of Targets with Non-Local IDs + +## I.1 Introduction + +This annex provides some informative illustrations on the interception of targets with Non-Local IDs. A target with a Non-Local ID means that the identity used for the target may not belong to the network that is providing the interception. However, in a roaming scenario, that subscriber with a Non-Local ID could as well be in the network where the interception is provided. For the lawful interception purpose, a target with a Non-Local ID is distinctly identified as a Non-Local target along with the nature of the interception that is required to be performed on that target. + +This clause covers only the IRI aspects of interception capabilities since the capabilities to perform the CC interception do not change. + +## I.2 Interception of outgoing calls + +### I.2.1 General + +In order to perform the interception of outgoing calls to a particular destination (identified as target with Non-Local ID for outgoing calls), called party information of the outgoing message is checked. + +In the CS domain, this could be the Called Party Information present in the IAM message (as an example) that is sent from the switch that performs the interception. + +In the case of IMS-based VoIP calls, this can be any of the SIP headers used to identify the called party information present in the outgoing SIP message. The examples are: Request URI and To headers. The interception functions may be provided by the S-CSCF or P-CSCF (optional in a non-roaming case, and mandatory in the roaming case when LBO approach is used as the roaming architecture). Alternatively, in another implementation, the interception functions may also be provided by the Egress IBCF or Egress MGCF for a non-roaming case. Of the two approaches S-CSCF/P-CSCF Vs IBCF/MGCF used for non-roaming case, only one approach is required to be supported within a CSP's network. + +### I.2.2 Interception at S-CSCF or P-CSCF + +The Figure I.1 shows an example where the interception is done at the S-CSCF. The Figure I.2 shows an example where the interception is done at the P-CSCF in a roaming case with LBO as the roaming architecture. In both illustrations, Party-B is the target with Non-Local ID and the nature of the interception to be performed is for outgoing calls. In the call, the Request URI and To headers point to Party-B. + +![Diagram illustrating the IRI ICE at S-CSCF for interception of a target with Non-Local ID for outgoing calls. The diagram shows a call flow from Party A to Party B through a CSP with LI Order Non-Local ID target. The call path includes P-CSCF, S-CSCF, and IBCF/MGCF. The S-CSCF is shown intercepting the call by checking the Request URI (Party-B) and To (Party-B) headers. The intercepted information is then sent to the LEMF via HI2 and X2 interfaces.](df65c22a46ec3e7285e44de67d3a59cf_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the call flow and interception point. On the left, Party A initiates a call through a P-CSCF. The call then proceeds to an S-CSCF, which is part of a 'CSP with LI Order Non-Local ID target'. At the S-CSCF, an interception function is triggered, indicated by a dashed box labeled 'Target with Non-Local ID: Party-B, Outgoing'. Another dashed box shows the S-CSCF checking 'Req-URI (Party-B), To (Party-B) (Outgoing SIP)'. Below the S-CSCF, a dashed box contains 'Req-URI: Party-B To: Party-B'. The call then passes through an IBCF/MGCF to reach Party B on the right. Above the S-CSCF, a vertical path shows the interception data flow: X2 to DF2, HI2 to LEMF. + +Diagram illustrating the IRI ICE at S-CSCF for interception of a target with Non-Local ID for outgoing calls. The diagram shows a call flow from Party A to Party B through a CSP with LI Order Non-Local ID target. The call path includes P-CSCF, S-CSCF, and IBCF/MGCF. The S-CSCF is shown intercepting the call by checking the Request URI (Party-B) and To (Party-B) headers. The intercepted information is then sent to the LEMF via HI2 and X2 interfaces. + +Figure I.1: IRI ICE at S-CSCF - interception of a target with Non-Local ID for outgoing calls + +Figure I.1 shows the case where S-CSCF is the IRI ICE and hence, the S-CSCF checks the Request URI and To headers of SIP message that it sends out toward IBCF/MGCF. Since a match is found, S-CSCF would perform the interception. + +In the event, multiple S-CSCF are involved in the signalling path (due to call forwarding case), all S-CSCF are expected to do the same check and the S-CSCF closer to the Egress IBCF/MGCF will find a match. It is important to note that the S-CSCF checks the headers from the SIP message it sends out because the Request URI of the SIP message it receives will be pointing to the local ID (which may have the call forwarding activated). + +As in the case of interception of target with Local ID, a P-CSCF may optionally provide the IRI ICE functions in a non-roaming case. However, in a roaming case with LBO as the roaming architecture, P-CSCF provides the IRI ICE functions. + +![Figure I.2: IRI ICE at P-CSCF (roaming) - interception of a target with Non-Local ID for outgoing calls. The diagram shows a call flow from Party A to Party B. Party A is connected to a P-CSCF within a VPLMN. The P-CSCF is configured with a 'Target with Non-Local ID: Party-B, Outgoing'. It checks the 'Req-URI (Party-B)' and 'To (Party-B)' in the outgoing SIP message. If a match is found, it triggers interception via the X2 interface to the DF2, which then connects via HI2 to the LEMF. The call then proceeds from the P-CSCF through an IBCF to Party B.](408c4798ea60469e0728a7cbbd598668_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the interception process at the P-CSCF in a roaming scenario. A call originates from Party A and is routed through a P-CSCF in the VPLMN. The P-CSCF is configured with a target having a non-local ID (Party-B) for outgoing calls. It inspects the outgoing SIP message's Request URI and To header. Upon finding a match, it triggers an interception signal through the X2 interface to the DF2, which then connects via HI2 to the LEMF. The call continues from the P-CSCF through an IBCF to reach Party B. + +Figure I.2: IRI ICE at P-CSCF (roaming) - interception of a target with Non-Local ID for outgoing calls. The diagram shows a call flow from Party A to Party B. Party A is connected to a P-CSCF within a VPLMN. The P-CSCF is configured with a 'Target with Non-Local ID: Party-B, Outgoing'. It checks the 'Req-URI (Party-B)' and 'To (Party-B)' in the outgoing SIP message. If a match is found, it triggers interception via the X2 interface to the DF2, which then connects via HI2 to the LEMF. The call then proceeds from the P-CSCF through an IBCF to Party B. + +**Figure I.2: IRI ICE at P-CSCF (roaming) - interception of a target with Non-Local ID for outgoing calls** + +In Figure I.2, the P-CSCF in the VPLMN checks the Request URI and To headers of SIP message that it sends out toward IBCF. Since a match is found, P-CSCF would perform the interception. + +### 1.2.3 Interception at the IBCF/MGCF + +The Figure I.3 shows an example where the interception is done at the IBCF or MGCF in a non-roaming case. In the illustration, Party-B is the target with Non-Local ID and the nature of the interception to be performed is for outgoing calls. In the call, the Request URI and To headers point to Party-B. + +![Figure I.3: IRI ICE at BCF - interception of a target with Non-Local ID for outgoing calls. The diagram shows a call flow from Party A to Party B. Party A is connected to a P-CSCF, which is connected to an S-CSCF. The S-CSCF is connected to an IBCF/MGCF. The IBCF/MGCF is configured with a 'Target with Non-Local ID: Party-B, Outgoing'. It checks the 'Req-URI (Party-B)' and 'To (Party-B)' in the outgoing SIP message. Upon finding a match, it triggers interception via the X2 interface to the DF2, which then connects via HI2 to the LEMF. The call then proceeds from the IBCF/MGCF to Party B. The diagram also indicates that for the MGCF case, the SIP message is outgoing, while for the IBCF case, it is incoming.](b7fd98a4fcc4990a613abfc31c5bdb5e_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the interception process at the IBCF/MGCF in a non-roaming scenario. A call originates from Party A and is routed through a P-CSCF and an S-CSCF to an IBCF/MGCF. The IBCF/MGCF is configured with a target having a non-local ID (Party-B) for outgoing calls. It inspects the outgoing SIP message's Request URI and To header. Upon finding a match, it triggers an interception signal through the X2 interface to the DF2, which then connects via HI2 to the LEMF. The call continues from the IBCF/MGCF to reach Party B. The diagram also notes that for the MGCF case, the SIP message is outgoing, while for the IBCF case, it is incoming. + +Figure I.3: IRI ICE at BCF - interception of a target with Non-Local ID for outgoing calls. The diagram shows a call flow from Party A to Party B. Party A is connected to a P-CSCF, which is connected to an S-CSCF. The S-CSCF is connected to an IBCF/MGCF. The IBCF/MGCF is configured with a 'Target with Non-Local ID: Party-B, Outgoing'. It checks the 'Req-URI (Party-B)' and 'To (Party-B)' in the outgoing SIP message. Upon finding a match, it triggers interception via the X2 interface to the DF2, which then connects via HI2 to the LEMF. The call then proceeds from the IBCF/MGCF to Party B. The diagram also indicates that for the MGCF case, the SIP message is outgoing, while for the IBCF case, it is incoming. + +**Figure I.3: IRI ICE at BCF - interception of a target with Non-Local ID for outgoing calls** + +Figure I.3 shows the case where the Egress IBCF or MGCF is the IRI ICE for intercepting when the target is identified + +with a Non-Local ID. Accordingly, the IBCF or MGCF checks the Request URI and To headers of SIP message. Since MGCF is providing signalling conversion (e.g., SIP to ISUP and Vice-Versa), the MGCF checks the headers of the SIP message it receives. IBCF could check the headers from either of the SIP messages (they have to be the same anyway). Alternatively, the MGCF could also check the Called Party Information present in the IAM it sends out. + +## 1.3 Interception of incoming calls + +### 1.3.1 General + +In order to perform the interception of incoming calls from a particular origination point (identified as target with Non-Local ID for incoming calls), calling party information and redirecting party information of the incoming message are checked. The redirecting information is checked because the call may have encountered a call forwarding before arriving at the CSP where the interception for Non-Local ID is performed. + +In the CS domain, this could be the Calling Party Information and Redirecting Party Information present in the IAM message (as an example) that is received at the switch where the interception is performed. + +In the case of IMS-based VoIP calls, this can be any of the SIP headers used to identify the calling party information and redirecting party information present in the incoming SIP message. The examples are: P-Asserted Id, From headers and History-Info, Diversion headers. The interception functions may be provided by the S-CSCF or P-CSCF (optional in a non-roaming case and mandatory in the roaming case when LBO approach is used as the roaming architecture). Alternatively, in another implementation, the interception functions may also be provided by the Ingress IBCF or Ingress MGCF for non-roaming case. Of the two approaches S-CSCF/P-CSCF Vs IBCF/MGCF used for non-roaming case, only one approach is required to be supported within a CSP's network. + +### 1.3.2 Interception at S-CSCF or P-CSCF + +The Figure I.4 shows an example where the interception is done at the S-CSCF. The Figure I.5 shows an example where the interception is done at the P-CSCF in a roaming case with LBO as the roaming architecture. In both illustrations, Party-A is the target with Non-Local ID and the nature of the interception to be performed is for incoming calls. In the call, the P-Asserted-Id, From headers point to Party-A. There are no History-Info or Diversion headers in the examples. + +![Diagram illustrating the interception of incoming calls at the S-CSCF. The diagram shows a call flow from Party A (outside the CSP) through an IBCF/MGCF and an I-CSCF to an S-CSCF. The S-CSCF is configured to intercept calls to Party A (Non-Local ID). It checks the P-Asserted-Id and From headers (PAI: Party-A) and also checks for History-Info and Diversion headers. Upon finding a match, it sends a signal to the LEMF via HI2 and X2 interfaces. The call is then forwarded to the P-CSCF and finally to Party B. The S-CSCF is labeled as the 'CSP with LI Order Non-Local ID target'.](a78db21022e0687c18d97ed547dd7ecb_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the interception process at the S-CSCF. On the left, an external circle represents 'Party-A'. An arrow points from 'Party-A' to a box labeled 'IBCF/MGCF', which then points to a box labeled 'I-CSCF'. From 'I-CSCF', an arrow points to a box labeled 'S-CSCF'. Above the 'S-CSCF' box, there are two dashed boxes: one labeled 'Target with Non-Local ID: Party-A, Incoming' and another labeled 'Check PAI (Party-A), From (Party-A) Check History-Info, Diversion (Incoming SIP)'. Below the 'S-CSCF' box, there is a dashed box labeled 'PAI: Party-A From: Party-A'. To the right of the 'S-CSCF' box, an arrow points to a box labeled 'P-CSCF', which then points to a telephone icon labeled 'Party B'. Above the 'S-CSCF' box, a vertical sequence of boxes shows the signaling path: 'S-CSCF' to 'DF2' (via X2), 'DF2' to 'HI2' (via HI2), and 'HI2' to 'LEMF' (via HI2). At the bottom right, a label reads 'CSP with LI Order Non-Local ID target'. + +Diagram illustrating the interception of incoming calls at the S-CSCF. The diagram shows a call flow from Party A (outside the CSP) through an IBCF/MGCF and an I-CSCF to an S-CSCF. The S-CSCF is configured to intercept calls to Party A (Non-Local ID). It checks the P-Asserted-Id and From headers (PAI: Party-A) and also checks for History-Info and Diversion headers. Upon finding a match, it sends a signal to the LEMF via HI2 and X2 interfaces. The call is then forwarded to the P-CSCF and finally to Party B. The S-CSCF is labeled as the 'CSP with LI Order Non-Local ID target'. + +**Figure I.4: IRI ICE at S-CSCF - interception of a target with Non-Local ID for incoming calls** + +Figure I.4 shows the case where S-CSCF is the IRI ICE and hence, the S-CSCF checks the P-Asserted-Id and From headers of SIP message that it receives from the I-CSCF. Since a match is found, S-CSCF would perform the interception. In the event, multiple S-CSCF are involved in the signalling path (due to call forwarding case), all S-CSCFs may do the same check and all S-CSCFs may end up finding a match to the target's Non-Local ID. Special care will have to be taken to suppress the duplicate interception of one LI request. When a call forwarding is involved, the subsequent S-CSCF may see History-Info or Diversion headers present, however, none of those are expected to match the Non-Local ID of the target. As in the case of interception of target with Local ID, a P-CSCF may optionally provide the IRI ICE functions in a non-roaming case. However, in a roaming case with LBO as the roaming architecture, P-CSCF provides the IRI ICE functions. + +![Figure I.5: IRI ICE at P-CSCF (roaming) - interception of a target with Non-Local ID for incoming calls.](3337af75dfee8af7687b4f49914d6c93_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows a call flow from Party-A (represented by a telephone icon in a circle) to Party-B (represented by a telephone icon). The call passes through an IBCF and then a P-CSCF within a large oval representing the VPLMN. The P-CSCF is the Intercepting Control Element (ICE). Above the P-CSCF, there are boxes for LEMF, DF2, and X2, connected by vertical arrows labeled HI2 and X2. Several callout boxes provide details: one points to the P-CSCF stating 'Check PAI (Party-A), From (Party-A), Check History-Info, Diversion (Incoming SIP)'; another points to the incoming call path stating 'Target with Non-Local ID: Party-A, Incoming'; a third box at the bottom of the VPLMN oval states 'PAI: Party-A, From: Party-A' and 'VPLMN with LI order for Non-Local ID target'. + +Figure I.5: IRI ICE at P-CSCF (roaming) - interception of a target with Non-Local ID for incoming calls. + +**Figure I.5: IRI ICE at P-CSCF (roaming) - interception of a target with Non-Local ID for incoming calls** + +In Figure I.5, the P-CSCF in the VPLMN checks the P-Asserted-Id, From headers and History-Info and Diversion headers of the SIP message that it receives. Since a match is found for P-Asserted-Id and From header values, P-CSCF would perform the interception. + +### 1.3.3 Interception at the IBCF/MGCF + +The Figure I.6 shows an example where the interception is done at the IBCF or MGCF in a non-roaming case. In the illustration, Party-A is the target with Non-Local ID and the nature of the interception to be performed is for incoming calls. In the call, the P-Asserted-Id and From headers point to Party-A. There are no History-Info or Diversion headers in the example. + +![Figure I.6: IRI ICE at BCF - interception of a target with Non-Local ID for incoming calls.](39536a630fa74c3bcfd1670ee2152809_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows a call flow from Party-A to Party-B. The call enters a network (large oval) through an IBCF/MGCF, which acts as the ICE. From there, it flows through I-CSCF, S-CSCF, and P-CSCF before reaching Party-B. Above the IBCF/MGCF, there are boxes for LEMF, DF2, and X2, connected by vertical arrows labeled HI2 and X2. Callout boxes specify: 'Target with Non-Local ID: Party-A, Incoming'; 'Check PAI (Party-A), From (Party-A), Check History-Info, Diversion For IBCF, it is incoming SIP For MGCF, it is outgoing SIP'; and at the bottom 'PAI: Party-A, From: Party-A' and 'CSP with LI Order Non-Local ID target'. Dotted arrows point to the IBCF/MGCF labeled 'For IBCF case' and 'For MGCF case'. + +Figure I.6: IRI ICE at BCF - interception of a target with Non-Local ID for incoming calls. + +**Figure I.6: IRI ICE at BCF - interception of a target with Non-Local ID for incoming calls** + +Figure I.6 shows the case where the Ingress IBCF or MGCF is the IRI ICE for intercepting when the target is identified with a Non-Local ID. Accordingly, the IBCF or MGCF checks the P-Asserted-Id, From headers, and History-Info, Diversion headers of SIP message. Since MGCF is providing signalling conversion (e.g., ISUP to SIP and Vice-Versa), the MGCF checks the headers of the SIP message it sends out. IBCF could check the headers from either of the SIP messages (they have to be the same anyway). Alternatively, the MGCF could also check the Calling Party Information and Redirecting Information present in the IAM message that it receives. + +# Annex J (informative): Lawful Interception Illustrations in VPLMN with S8HR + +## J.1 Overview + +This informative annex illustrates the process of performing lawful interception in the VPLMN for voice services involving the inbound roaming targets when S8HR approach is used as the roaming architecture. + +When S8HR approach is used as the roaming architecture for VoLTE, all of the IMS nodes reside in the HPLMN. Even the PDN-GW resides in the HPLMN. In this case, the lawful interception of voice services involving the inbound roaming targets requires new capabilities in the VPLMN since the VPLMN does not have any IMS nodes. New LI-specific functions are introduced to examine the packets that flow through the VPLMN packet core network nodes to generate IRI and CC when the communication involves an inbound roaming target. The LI architecture diagram shown in figure 1j is expanded in figure J.1 that shows an overview of S8HR roaming architecture as well. + +![Figure J.1: Lawful interception of voice services in VPLMN for S8HR. The diagram shows the network architecture for lawful interception in a VPLMN with S8HR. It is divided into VPLMN and HPLMN by a vertical dashed line. In the VPLMN, an UE (Inbound Roaming Target) connects to an EUTRAN, which connects to an MME via S1-U. The MME connects to a Serving Gateway/BBIFF via S11. The Serving Gateway/BBIFF connects to an LMISF via Xia and Xib. The LMISF connects to an ADMF via X1_1, and to two Delivery Functions (2 and 3) via X2 and X3. The ADMF connects to a LEMF via H11. The Delivery Functions connect to the LEMF via H12 and H13. The Serving Gateway/BBIFF also connects to the PDN-GW in the HPLMN via S8. In the HPLMN, the PDN-GW connects to a PCRF via Gx, and to an S-CSCF via Mb over SGi. The PCRF connects to a P-CSCF via Rx. The P-CSCF connects to the S-CSCF via Mw. The S-CSCF connects to an AS via ISC. The AS connects to the HSS via Sh. The HSS connects to the MME via S6a. The S-CSCF also connects to 'Other signaling and media nodes in HPLMN and other networks' via Mw/Mg/Mi. These nodes connect to an 'Other Party' via IP/TDM. A legend indicates that pink lines represent Signaling/Media, red lines represent Signaling, and blue lines represent Media.](b774dfc5023e15e9c352b97ca25a56d4_img.jpg) + +Figure J.1: Lawful interception of voice services in VPLMN for S8HR. The diagram shows the network architecture for lawful interception in a VPLMN with S8HR. It is divided into VPLMN and HPLMN by a vertical dashed line. In the VPLMN, an UE (Inbound Roaming Target) connects to an EUTRAN, which connects to an MME via S1-U. The MME connects to a Serving Gateway/BBIFF via S11. The Serving Gateway/BBIFF connects to an LMISF via Xia and Xib. The LMISF connects to an ADMF via X1\_1, and to two Delivery Functions (2 and 3) via X2 and X3. The ADMF connects to a LEMF via H11. The Delivery Functions connect to the LEMF via H12 and H13. The Serving Gateway/BBIFF also connects to the PDN-GW in the HPLMN via S8. In the HPLMN, the PDN-GW connects to a PCRF via Gx, and to an S-CSCF via Mb over SGi. The PCRF connects to a P-CSCF via Rx. The P-CSCF connects to the S-CSCF via Mw. The S-CSCF connects to an AS via ISC. The AS connects to the HSS via Sh. The HSS connects to the MME via S6a. The S-CSCF also connects to 'Other signaling and media nodes in HPLMN and other networks' via Mw/Mg/Mi. These nodes connect to an 'Other Party' via IP/TDM. A legend indicates that pink lines represent Signaling/Media, red lines represent Signaling, and blue lines represent Media. + +**Figure J.1 Lawful interception of voice services in VPLMN for S8HR** + +As shown in figure J.1, the SIP signalling messages are exchanged between the UE and P-CSCF over the Gm reference point. Within the VPLMN with S8HR, the IMS signalling messages are carried over the GTP tunnel that corresponds to the IMS Signalling Bearer and the media packets are carried over the GTP tunnel that corresponds to the Media Bearer (i.e., dedicated EPS Bearer used to carry the media packets). The present document assumes that the EPS Bearer ID of the IMS Signalling Bearer is always linked to the dedicated EPS Bearer used as a Media Bearer. + +## J.2 Process Flow + +The basic concept is LMISF instructs the S-GW/BBIFF over the Xib reference point to deliver packets from the GTP + +tunnels associated with IMS signalling bearer of all inbound roamers with S8HR as the roaming architecture. S-GW/BBIFF extracts the packets from those GTP tunnels and delivers the same to the LMISF. The LMISF extracts the SIP messages from those packets and provides an IMS call state function similar to the way P-CSCF provides the IMS call state function. In addition, the LMISF provisioned with the target identity by ADMF examines the SIP messages to determine whether the IMS session needs to be intercepted. When the IMS session needs to be intercepted, the LMISF generates IRI from the SIP messages and deliver the same to the Delivery Function 2 over X2 reference point. In addition to the generation and delivery of IRI, when CC interception is required, the LMISF also informs the S-GW/BBIFF over Xib reference point to start delivering the packets from the Media Bearer I associated with the intercepted IMS Signalling Bearer. The S-GW/BBIFF extracts the packets from that GTP tunnel used for Media Bearer associated with the intercepted IMS Signalling Bearer and delivers the same to the LMISF. The LMISF constructs the CC from those packets and delivers the same to the Delivery Function 3 over X3 reference point. + +Figure J.2 shows the steps to illustrate the process flow: + +![Figure J.2: Process Flow of S8HR LI. This sequence diagram illustrates the interaction between various network elements for lawful interception (LI) of IMS sessions. The diagram is split into two domains: VPLMN (left) and HPLMN (right). In the HPLMN, a VoLTE UE (target) connects to a Serving Gateway/BBIFF, which is connected to a P-GW and an IMS-AGW. The P-GW connects to a P-CSCF. In the VPLMN, the Serving Gateway/BBIFF connects to an LMISF. The LMISF connects to three external entities: LEMF (via HI2 and HI3), DF2 (via X2), and DF3 (via X3). The LMISF also connects to the ADMF (via X1_1) and the Serving Gateway/BBIFF (via Xia and Xib). The diagram shows the flow of information for interception, including the provision of target information from ADMF to LMISF, the detection of IMS bearers by the Serving Gateway/BBIFF, and the delivery of intercepted data to the LEMF and DFs.](848073118eebfdbfdb9a60e3923fe0b3_img.jpg) + +Figure J.2: Process Flow of S8HR LI. This sequence diagram illustrates the interaction between various network elements for lawful interception (LI) of IMS sessions. The diagram is split into two domains: VPLMN (left) and HPLMN (right). In the HPLMN, a VoLTE UE (target) connects to a Serving Gateway/BBIFF, which is connected to a P-GW and an IMS-AGW. The P-GW connects to a P-CSCF. In the VPLMN, the Serving Gateway/BBIFF connects to an LMISF. The LMISF connects to three external entities: LEMF (via HI2 and HI3), DF2 (via X2), and DF3 (via X3). The LMISF also connects to the ADMF (via X1\_1) and the Serving Gateway/BBIFF (via Xia and Xib). The diagram shows the flow of information for interception, including the provision of target information from ADMF to LMISF, the detection of IMS bearers by the Serving Gateway/BBIFF, and the delivery of intercepted data to the LEMF and DFs. + +**Figure J.2: Process Flow of S8HR LI** + +1. LMISF is provisioned with target information (for Voice Services, it can be SIP URI, TEL URI or IMEI) from the ADMF. +2. LMISF instructs the S-GW/BBIFF to notify (to LMISF), based on the GTP-C event, whenever an IMS Signalling Bearer or the Media Bearer for S8HR APN is created, modified, or deleted, and to deliver the packets (to LMISF) of all IMS Signalling Bearers established for S8HR APNs (Access Point Names). Here, the LMISF may supply the S8HR APNs to the S-GW/BBIFF. + +NOTE1: This step is independent of target specific LI service operation such as Step 1. + +- 3 S-GW/BBIFF to notifies the LMISF, based on the GTP-C event, whenever the IMS Signalling Bearer for S8HR APN is created, modified, or deleted. S-GW/BBIFF also notifies the LMISF, based on the GTP-C event, whenever the IMS Media Bearer is created, modified, or deleted. + +NOTE2: The S-GW/BBIFF includes the IMSI value associated with the inbound roamer's UE when notifies (to the LMISF) creation, modification or deletion of IMS Signalling Bearer and IMS Media Bearer for S8HR APN. In such notifications, the S-GW/BBIFF also includes the UE location that it receives from the MME. This step is also independent of target specific LI service operation such as Step 1. + +4. S-GW/BBIFF delivers the packets of those IMS Signalling Bearers to the LMISF. As such, S-GW/BBIFF has no idea whether the packets of an IMS Signalling Bearer are related to a target or not. It simply delivers all packets. +5. The LMISF looks for the SIP message within those packets delivered by the S-GW/BBIFF and examines the SIP headers that carry the calling party identity or called party identity (depending on the call direction) to verify whether any of those match with the target identity stored locally. If the SIP message corresponds to a target, then the LMISF delivers the SIP message to the DF2 over the X2 reference point. If required, the LMISF includes the UE location previously received from the S-GW/BBIFF while delivering the SIP messages to the DF2. +6. The DF2 will generate and deliver the IRI to the LEMF as per TS 33.108 [11]. + +The following steps are performed only if CC interception is required. + +7. The LMISF then informs the S--GW/BBIFF about the IMS Signalling Bearer that corresponds to intercepted IMS session and instructs the S-GW/BBIFF to start delivering (to LMISF) the packets of the Media Bearers associated with that IMS Signalling Bearer. + +NOTE 3: Step 7 is executed in parallel to step 5. + +8. S-GW/BBIFF delivers the media packets to the LMISF. The S-GW/BBIFF knows that the media packets are related to an IMS Signalling Bearer, but does not know which media packet is related to which IMS session in the event target is involved in multiple sessions. The S-GW/BBIFF need not know that association. +9. LMISF looks at the media packets that it receives and examines the IP address and the port number associated with the RTP stream. Then LMISF will determine the associated IMS session comparing the IP address/port number of the RTP stream with the similar information from the IMS session. LMISF delivers the media packets to DF3 along with the Correlation Number it has used while delivering the SIP messages to DF2. +10. DF3 generates and delivers the CC as per TS 33.108 [11] to the LEMF. + +Figure J.3 below illustrates the above steps in a flow diagram format. + +![Flow diagram illustrating the process steps for S8HR LI. The diagram shows interactions between BBIFF, LMISF, ADMF, DF2, DF3, and LEMF. Steps include: 1. X1_1: Activate Interception [Tel URI/SIP URI/IMEI as Target] from ADMF to LMISF; 2. Deliver packets of IMS Signalling Bearer related to S8HR APNs to LMISF; 3. IMS Signaling Bearer (S8HR)/Media Bearer (S8HR) is created, modified or deleted; 4. Packets (IMS Signalling Bearer (S8HR APN)) to LMISF; 5. X2: (SIP Message) with Correlation Number from LMISF to DF2; 6. HI2: (SIP Message) with the Correlation Number from DF2 to DF3; 7. Deliver packets of Media Bearer related to the identified intercepted IMS Signalling Bearer to LMISF; 8. Packets (Media Bearer (associated with the intercepted IMS Signalling Bearer)) to LMISF; 9. X3: {Media Packets} with the Correlation Number from DF2 to DF3; 10. HI3: {Media Packets} with the Correlation Number from DF3 to LEMF. LMISF logic includes 'SIP Message ∈ Target?' and 'Correlate the CC with IRI'.](56a5265d174ce056c1dbe5e7a60839fc_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ADMF + participant LMISF + participant BBIFF + participant DF2 + participant DF3 + participant LEMF + + Note right of ADMF: ① X1_1: Activate Interception [Tel URI/SIP URI/IMEI as Target] + ADMF->>LMISF: + Note right of LMISF: Target Id Stored + Note right of LMISF: S8HR APNs + Note right of LMISF: ② Deliver packets of IMS Signalling Bearer related to S8HR APNs to LMISF + BBIFF->>LMISF: + Note right of LMISF: ③ IMS Signaling Bearer (S8HR)/Media Bearer (S8HR) is created, modified or deleted + Note right of BBIFF: Packets (IMS Signalling Bearer (S8HR APN)) + Note right of LMISF: ④ Examine the SIP message from the packets + Note right of LMISF: SIP Message ∈ Target? + Note right of LMISF: NO -> Store the SIP message for later use + Note right of LMISF: YES + Note right of LMISF: ⑤ X2: (SIP Message) with Correlation Number + LMISF->>DF2: + Note right of DF2: ⑥ HI2: (SIP Message) with the Correlation Number + DF2->>DF3: + Note right of DF3: Correlated + Note right of DF3: ⑩ HI3: {Media Packets} with the Correlation Number + Note right of DF2: ⑨ X3: {Media Packets} with the Correlation Number + DF2->>DF3: + Note right of LMISF: ⑦ Deliver packets of Media Bearer related to the identified intercepted IMS Signalling Bearer to LMISF + BBIFF->>LMISF: + Note right of LMISF: ⑧ Packets (Media Bearer (associated with the intercepted IMS Signalling Bearer)) + Note right of LMISF: Remember the intercepted IMS Signalling Bearer + Note right of LMISF: Correlate the CC with IRI + +``` + +Flow diagram illustrating the process steps for S8HR LI. The diagram shows interactions between BBIFF, LMISF, ADMF, DF2, DF3, and LEMF. Steps include: 1. X1\_1: Activate Interception [Tel URI/SIP URI/IMEI as Target] from ADMF to LMISF; 2. Deliver packets of IMS Signalling Bearer related to S8HR APNs to LMISF; 3. IMS Signaling Bearer (S8HR)/Media Bearer (S8HR) is created, modified or deleted; 4. Packets (IMS Signalling Bearer (S8HR APN)) to LMISF; 5. X2: (SIP Message) with Correlation Number from LMISF to DF2; 6. HI2: (SIP Message) with the Correlation Number from DF2 to DF3; 7. Deliver packets of Media Bearer related to the identified intercepted IMS Signalling Bearer to LMISF; 8. Packets (Media Bearer (associated with the intercepted IMS Signalling Bearer)) to LMISF; 9. X3: {Media Packets} with the Correlation Number from DF2 to DF3; 10. HI3: {Media Packets} with the Correlation Number from DF3 to LEMF. LMISF logic includes 'SIP Message ∈ Target?' and 'Correlate the CC with IRI'. + +**Figure J.3: Flow diagram illustrating the process steps for S8HR LI** + +The LMISF will be able to correlate the CC with the IRI since it receives both media packets and the IMS signalling packets. + +Figure J.4 shows the steps when an intercept is deactivated during a VoLTE session. + +![Flow diagram illustrating the process steps during intercept stop procedures for S8HR LI. The diagram shows interactions between BBIFF, LMISF, ADMF, DF2, DF3, and LEA. Steps include: 1. X1: Deactivate Interception [Tel URI/SIP URI/IMEI] from ADMF to LMISF; 2. Stop delivering packets of Media Bearer related to identified intercepted IMS Signaling Bearer from LMISF to BBIFF. LMISF logic includes 'Target Id removed', 'IRI generation for the target is stopped', 'CC generation for the target is stopped', and 'Stop interception on the related IMS Bearer'. BBIFF logic includes 'Delivering of corresponding Media Bearer packets to LMISF is stopped'.](6d2057d7e401741861ca63545a5d7d3b_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ADMF + participant LMISF + participant BBIFF + participant DF2 + participant DF3 + participant LEA + + Note right of ADMF: ① X1: Deactivate Interception [Tel URI/SIP URI/IMEI] + ADMF->>LMISF: + Note right of LMISF: Target Id removed + Note right of LMISF: IRI generation for the target is stopped + Note right of LMISF: CC generation for the target is stopped + Note right of LMISF: ② Stop delivering packets of Media Bearer related to identified intercepted IMS Signaling Bearer + LMISF->>BBIFF: + Note right of BBIFF: Delivering of corresponding Media Bearer packets to LMISF is stopped + Note right of LMISF: Stop interception on the related IMS Bearer + +``` + +Flow diagram illustrating the process steps during intercept stop procedures for S8HR LI. The diagram shows interactions between BBIFF, LMISF, ADMF, DF2, DF3, and LEA. Steps include: 1. X1: Deactivate Interception [Tel URI/SIP URI/IMEI] from ADMF to LMISF; 2. Stop delivering packets of Media Bearer related to identified intercepted IMS Signaling Bearer from LMISF to BBIFF. LMISF logic includes 'Target Id removed', 'IRI generation for the target is stopped', 'CC generation for the target is stopped', and 'Stop interception on the related IMS Bearer'. BBIFF logic includes 'Delivering of corresponding Media Bearer packets to LMISF is stopped'. + +**Figure J.4: Flow diagram illustrating the process steps during intercept stop procedures for S8HR LI** + +1. LMISF is provisioned to deactivate the lawful interception on the target (for Voice Services, it can be SIP URI, TEL URI or IMEI from the ADMF). + +The LMISF will stop generation of IRI and CC immediately after it detects that the interception is deactivated. + +The following steps may be required if CC interception is applicable. + +2. The LMISF informs the S-GW/BBIFF about the identity of the IMS Signalling Bearer on which the interception is stopped and instructs the S-GW/BBIFF to stop delivering the packets of the Media Bearers associated to that IMS Signalling Bearer to LMISF. + +The S-GW/BBIFF will stop delivering the media packets associated with the intercepted IMS Signalling Bearer to the LMISF. + +## --- J.3 Call Flows + +### J.3.1 General + +Four call flows are presented in this clause: + +- Inbound roaming target originates a voice call. The CC interception is required. +- A voice call is terminated to an inbound roaming target. The CC interception is required. +- An interception is activated while an inbound roaming user is active on a call. +- An inbound roaming user originates a voice call. The CC interception is not required. + +In all the call flows, the target identity is the SIP URL or TEL URL. All the call flows assume that the SIP messages and the media are not encrypted at S-GW/BBIFF (one of the requirements for performing the lawful interception in the VPLMN for S8HR). + +Independently of the active intercept on a target, the S-GW/BBIFF notifies the LMISF whenever an IMS Signalling Bearer or Media Bearer for S8HR APNs is created, modified or deleted. Such notifications include the up-to-date UE location information that S-GW receives from the MME. The LMISF includes the latest UE location information in the SIP messages that it reports to the DF2 for active intercepts. + +### J.3.2 Originating call + +Figure J.5 below illustrates a call flow where an inbound roaming target originates a voice call. In the flow, Party\_A (target) calls Party\_B. The flow shows that Party\_B is also an IMS user (SIP messages are shown), however, Party\_B can also be a non-IMS user served by CS domain. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating Call Origination from an inbound roaming target with S8HR. The diagram shows interactions between Visited CSP (Party_A (target), S-GW/BBIFF, LMISF), MF/DF (DF2, DF3, LEMF), and Home CSP (P-GW, P-CSCF/S-CSCF) leading to Party_B. The process involves INVITE, 180 Ringing, 200 OK, and ACK messages, with corresponding IMS Signalling Packets and Media Bearers being established and modified.](575d7d345b3ec04393bb2ec720ebabca_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the call origination process from an inbound roaming target (Party\_A) to another party (Party\_B). The entities involved are: + + +- Visited CSP:** Includes Party\_A (target), S-GW/BBIFF, and LMISF. +- MF/DF:** Includes DF2, DF3, and LEMF. +- Home CSP:** Includes P-GW and P-CSCF/S-CSCF. + + The sequence of events is as follows: + + +- Call Origination:** Party\_A sends an INVITE message to P-CSCF/S-CSCF. +- IMS Signalling Packet:** S-GW/BBIFF delivers the IMS Signalling Packet to LMISF. +- X2 and HI2 Messages:** LMISF sends X2: {INVITE, D1} to DF2, which in turn sends HI2: {INVITE, D1} to LEMF. +- Media Bearer Creation:** A message 'Media Bearer is created' is sent from DF2 to P-GW. P-GW responds with AAR/RAR and AAA/RAA. +- 180 Ringing:** P-CSCF/S-CSCF sends 180 Ringing to Party\_B, which is then forwarded back through the chain to LMISF. +- IMS Signalling Packet (180 Ringing):** LMISF sends X2: {180 Ringing, D1} to DF2, which sends HI2: {180 Ringing, D1} to LEMF. +- 200 OK:** P-CSCF/S-CSCF sends 200 OK to Party\_B, which is forwarded back to LMISF. +- IMS Signalling Packet (200 OK):** LMISF sends X2: {200 OK, D1} to DF2, which sends HI2: {200 OK, D1} to LEMF. +- Media Bearer Modification:** A message 'Media Bearer is modified' is sent from DF2 to P-GW. P-GW responds with AAR/RAR and AAA/RAA. +- Media Packet:** Media packets are sent from P-GW to LMISF, which then forwards them to DF3 (X3: CC [D1]) and finally to LEMF (HI3: CC [D1]). +- ACK:** P-CSCF/S-CSCF sends ACK to Party\_B, which is forwarded back to LMISF. +- IMS Signalling Packet (ACK):** LMISF sends X2: {ACK, D1} to DF2, which sends HI2: {ACK, D1} to LEMF. + +Sequence diagram illustrating Call Origination from an inbound roaming target with S8HR. The diagram shows interactions between Visited CSP (Party\_A (target), S-GW/BBIFF, LMISF), MF/DF (DF2, DF3, LEMF), and Home CSP (P-GW, P-CSCF/S-CSCF) leading to Party\_B. The process involves INVITE, 180 Ringing, 200 OK, and ACK messages, with corresponding IMS Signalling Packets and Media Bearers being established and modified. + +**Figure J.5: Call Origination from an inbound roaming target with S8HR** + +The S-GW/BBIFF delivers the IMS signalling packets to the LMISF. The LMISF examines the SIP message to verify whether the SIP headers pointing to the calling party (e.g. P-preferred-Identity, From) is a target. In this illustration, that is the case, and therefore, the LMISF forwards the IRI message containing the SIP INVITE to the DF2 with correlation number D1. The DF2 forwards the IRI to the LEMF. + +Since CC interception is required, the LMISF notifies S-GW/BBIFF with the IMS Signalling Bearer information associated with the intercepted IMS session. Once the dedicated EPS Bearer to be used as the Media Bearer linked to the EPS Bearer ID of the IMS Signalling Bearer is created, S-GW/BBIFF delivers the media packets flowing through the GTP tunnel used for that Media Bearer to the LMISF. The LMISF delivers the media packets as the CC along with the correlation number D1 to the DF3. The DF3 delivers the CC to the LEMF. + +The LMISF delivers the subsequent SIP messages (in the call flow: 180 Ringing, 200 OK and ACK) received from the S-GW/BBIFF as IRI to the DF2 which in turn deliver the same to the LEMF. + +### J.3.3 Terminating call + +Figure J.6 below illustrates a call flow where an inbound roaming target receives a voice call. In the flow, Party\_A calls Party\_B (target). The flow shows that Party\_A is also an IMS user (SIP messages are shown), however, Party\_A can also be a non-IMS user served by CS domain. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating Call Termination to an inbound roaming target with S8HR. The diagram shows the interaction between Party_A (Call Origination), Home CSP (P-CSCF/S-CSCF, P-GW), Visited CSP (S-GW/BBIFF, LMISF), Party_B (target), and MF/DF (DF2, DF3, LEMF). The sequence includes INVITE, 180 Ringing, 200 OK, and ACK messages, with corresponding IMS Signalling Packets and Media Bearers being established and modified.](61a7f401eb46fe99a71f27bc37493f04_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the call termination process for an inbound roaming target. The sequence of events is as follows: + +- Call Origination:** Party\_A sends an INVITE (Req URI: Party-B) to the P-CSCF/S-CSCF. +- IMS Signalling Packet:** The P-CSCF/S-CSCF sends an IMS Signalling Packet to the S-GW/BBIFF. +- LMISF Processing:** The S-GW/BBIFF delivers the packet to the LMISF. The LMISF examines the SIP message and forwards the IRI message containing the SIP INVITE to the DF2 with correlation number D1. The DF2 then forwards it to the LEMF. +- Media Bearer Creation:** The LMISF sends a message to the S-GW/BBIFF to deliver packets from the Media Bearer associated with the IMS Signalling Bearer. The S-GW/BBIFF then sends an AAR/RAR to the P-GW, which responds with AAA/RAA. The S-GW/BBIFF also sends a message to the LMISF indicating that the Media Bearer is created. +- 180 Ringing:** The LMISF sends a 180 Ringing message to the S-GW/BBIFF. The S-GW/BBIFF then sends an IMS Signalling Packet to the LMISF, which forwards it to the DF2 (X2: {180 Ringing, D1}) and then to the LEMF (HI2: {180 Ringing, D1}). +- 200 OK:** The LMISF sends a 200 OK message to the S-GW/BBIFF. The S-GW/BBIFF then sends an IMS Signalling Packet to the LMISF, which forwards it to the DF2 (X2: {200 OK, D1}) and then to the LEMF (HI2: {200 OK, D1}). +- Media Bearer Modification:** The LMISF sends a message to the S-GW/BBIFF to modify the Media Bearer. The S-GW/BBIFF then sends an AAR/RAR to the P-GW, which responds with AAA/RAA. The S-GW/BBIFF also sends a message to the LMISF indicating that the Media Bearer is modified. +- Media Flow:** Media packets are sent from the P-GW to the S-GW/BBIFF, then to the LMISF, then to the DF3 (X3: CC [D1]), and finally to the LEMF (HI3: CC [D1]). +- ACK:** The LMISF sends an ACK message to the S-GW/BBIFF. The S-GW/BBIFF then sends an IMS Signalling Packet to the LMISF, which forwards it to the DF2 (X2: {ACK, D1}) and then to the LEMF (HI2: {ACK, D1}). + +Sequence diagram illustrating Call Termination to an inbound roaming target with S8HR. The diagram shows the interaction between Party\_A (Call Origination), Home CSP (P-CSCF/S-CSCF, P-GW), Visited CSP (S-GW/BBIFF, LMISF), Party\_B (target), and MF/DF (DF2, DF3, LEMF). The sequence includes INVITE, 180 Ringing, 200 OK, and ACK messages, with corresponding IMS Signalling Packets and Media Bearers being established and modified. + +**Figure J.6: Call Termination to an inbound roaming target with S8HR** + +The S-GW/BBIFF delivers the IMS signalling packets to the LMISF. The LMISF examines the SIP message to verify whether the SIP headers pointing to the called party (e.g. Request URI, P-Called-Party-Id, To) is a target. In this illustration, that is the case, and therefore, the LMISF forwards the IRI message containing the SIP INVITE to the DF2 with correlation number D1. The DF2 forwards the IRI to the LEMF. + +Since CC interception is required, the LMISF notifies S-GW/BBIFF with the IMS Signalling Bearer information associated with the intercepted IMS session. + +Once the EPS Bearer to be used as the Media Bearer linked to the EPS Bearer ID of the IMS Signalling Bearer is created, S-GW/BBIFF delivers the media packets flowing through the GTP tunnel used for that Media Bearer to the LMISF. The LMISF delivers the media packets as the CC along with the correlation number D1 to the DF3. The DF3 delivers the CC to the LEMF. + +The LMISF delivers the subsequent SIP messages (in the call flow: 180 Ringing, 200 OK and ACK) received from the S-GW/BBIFF as IRI to the DF2 which in turn deliver the same to the LEMF. + +### J.3.4 Mid-Call Interception + +Figure J.7 below illustrates a call flow where a lawful interception is activated while an inbound roaming user is active on a voice call. In the flow, Party\_A (target) calls Party\_B. The flow shows that Party\_B is also an IMS user (SIP messages are shown), however, Party\_B can also be a non-IMS user served by CS domain. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating Mid Call Interception. The diagram shows the interaction between Visited CSP (Party A (target), S-GW/BBIFF, LMISF), MF/DF (DF2, DF3, LEMF), Home CSP (P-GW, P-CSCF/S-CSCF), and Party B. The call flow includes INVITE, 180 Ringing, 200 OK, and ACK messages. Lawful interception is activated on the target (Party A) after the call is answered by Party B. The LMISF sends a 'Start Interception for established IMS session' (D1) to DF2, which is forwarded to LEMF over HI2. The LMISF also notifies S-GW/BBIFF with IMS Signalling Bearer information. Media packets are delivered from the GTP tunnel to the LMISF and then forwarded to DF3, which delivers them to LEMF over HI3. Subsequent SIP messages (ACK) are delivered from S-GW/BBIFF to LMISF as IRI to DF2, which in turn deliver them to LEMF.](fcc757566216206ceddbd6c775e8db02_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram illustrating Mid Call Interception. The diagram shows the interaction between Visited CSP (Party A (target), S-GW/BBIFF, LMISF), MF/DF (DF2, DF3, LEMF), Home CSP (P-GW, P-CSCF/S-CSCF), and Party B. The call flow includes INVITE, 180 Ringing, 200 OK, and ACK messages. Lawful interception is activated on the target (Party A) after the call is answered by Party B. The LMISF sends a 'Start Interception for established IMS session' (D1) to DF2, which is forwarded to LEMF over HI2. The LMISF also notifies S-GW/BBIFF with IMS Signalling Bearer information. Media packets are delivered from the GTP tunnel to the LMISF and then forwarded to DF3, which delivers them to LEMF over HI3. Subsequent SIP messages (ACK) are delivered from S-GW/BBIFF to LMISF as IRI to DF2, which in turn deliver them to LEMF. + +**Figure J.7: Mid Call Interception** + +The S-GW/BBIFF delivers the IMS signalling packets to the LMISF. The LMISF examines the SIP message to verify whether the SIP headers pointing to the calling party (e.g. P-preferred-Identity, From) is a target. In this illustration, that is not the case, and therefore, the LMISF does not generate any IRI messages. However, the LMISF stores this SIP message and the subsequent SIP messages. The LMISF also maintains the IMS call state for the inbound roaming user. + +In this illustration, a lawful interception is activated on the inbound roaming user right after the called party (Party B) answers the call, but before the Party A (target) has a chance to send the ACK message. Since the SDP offer and SDP answer are already completed, the LMISF generates the *Start Interception for established IMS session* with the Correlation Number D1 to the DF2 over X2 reference point. The DF2 forwards the same to the LEMF over the HI2 reference point. + +NOTE: This flow assumes that there was no other lawful intercepts active on the target. + +Since the just activated lawful interception requires CC interception, the LMISF notifies S-GW/BBIFF with the IMS Signalling Bearer information associated with the IMS session on which the lawful interception is activated. + +The S-GW/BBIFF delivers the media packets from the GTP tunnel used for the Media Bearer linked to the EPS Bearer ID of the IMS Signalling Bearer to the LMISF. The LMISF delivers the media packets as the CC along with the correlation number D1 to the DF3. The DF3 delivers the CC to the LEMF over HI3 reference point. + +The LMISF delivers the subsequent SIP messages (in the call flow: ACK) received from the S-GW/BBIFF as IRI to the DF2 which in turn deliver the same to the LEMF. + +### J.3.5 Lawful Interception without CC + +Figure J.8 below illustrates a call flow where an inbound roaming target originates a voice call. The lawful interception + +does not require CC interception. In the flow, Party\_A (target) calls Party\_B. The flow shows that Party\_B is also an IMS user (SIP messages are shown), however, Party\_B can also be a non-IMS user served by CS domain. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating call origination from an inbound roaming target with S8HR, where CC is not required. The diagram shows interactions between Party A (target), S-GW/BBIFF, LMISF, DF2, DF3, LEMF, P-GW, P-CSCF/S-CSCF, and Party B across Visited CSP, MF/DF, and Home CSP domains.](dfafe39c233a62ec8ebd71e42992c14d_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the call flow for call origination from an inbound roaming target (Party A) to another party (Party B) via S8HR. The diagram is divided into three main domains: Visited CSP, MF/DF, and Home CSP. + +- Visited CSP:** Contains Party A (target), S-GW/BBIFF, and LMISF. +- MF/DF:** Contains DF2, DF3, and LEMF. +- Home CSP:** Contains P-GW and P-CSCF/S-CSCF. + +The sequence of messages is as follows: + +- Call Origination:** Party A sends a call origination request to S-GW/BBIFF. +- IMS Signalling Packet:** S-GW/BBIFF sends an IMS signalling packet to LMISF. +- X2: (INVITE, D1):** LMISF sends an X2 message containing the INVITE SIP message with correlation number D1 to DF2. +- HI2: (INVITE, D1):** DF2 forwards the message to LEMF. +- Media Bearer is created:** LEMF indicates that the media bearer is created to P-GW. +- AAR/RAR and AAA/RAA:** P-GW sends AAR/RAR and AAA/RAA messages to P-CSCF/S-CSCF. +- INVITE (PAI: Party-A):** P-CSCF/S-CSCF sends the INVITE message to Party B. +- 180 Ringing:** Party B responds with 180 Ringing, which is forwarded back through the chain to S-GW/BBIFF. +- IMS Signalling Packet:** S-GW/BBIFF sends another IMS signalling packet to LMISF. +- X2: (180 Ringing, D1):** LMISF sends X2: (180 Ringing, D1) to DF2. +- HI2: (180 Ringing, D1):** DF2 forwards it to LEMF. +- 200 OK:** Party B sends 200 OK, which is forwarded back through the chain to S-GW/BBIFF. +- IMS Signalling Packet:** S-GW/BBIFF sends IMS signalling packet to LMISF. +- X2: (200 OK, D1):** LMISF sends X2: (200 OK, D1) to DF2. +- HI2: (200 OK, D1):** DF2 forwards it to LEMF. +- Media Bearer is modified:** LEMF indicates that the media bearer is modified to P-GW. +- AAR/RAR and AAA/RAA:** P-GW sends AAR/RAR and AAA/RAA messages to P-CSCF/S-CSCF. +- ACK:** Party B sends ACK, which is forwarded back through the chain to S-GW/BBIFF. +- IMS Signalling Packet:** S-GW/BBIFF sends IMS signalling packet to LMISF. +- X2: (ACK, D1):** LMISF sends X2: (ACK, D1) to DF2. +- HI2: (ACK, D1):** DF2 forwards it to LEMF. + +Media flow is indicated by a dashed line between P-GW and Party B. + +Sequence diagram illustrating call origination from an inbound roaming target with S8HR, where CC is not required. The diagram shows interactions between Party A (target), S-GW/BBIFF, LMISF, DF2, DF3, LEMF, P-GW, P-CSCF/S-CSCF, and Party B across Visited CSP, MF/DF, and Home CSP domains. + +**Figure J.8: Call Origination from an inbound roaming target with S8HR; CC is not required** + +The S-GW/BBIFF delivers the IMS signalling packets to the LMISF. The LMISF examines the SIP message to verify whether the SIP headers pointing to the calling party (e.g. P-preferred-Identity, From) is a target. In this illustration, that is the case, and therefore, the LMISF forwards the IRI message containing the SIP INVITE to the DF2 with correlation number D1. The DF2 forwards the IRI to the LEMF. + +Since CC interception is not required, the LMISF does not notify the S-GW/BBIFF with the IMS Signalling Bearer information associated with the intercepted IMS session. + +S-GW/BBIFF does not deliver the media packets flowing through the GTP tunnel of Media Bearer to the LMISF. As a matter of fact, the S-GW/BBIFF does not know that the call involves a target. + +The LMISF delivers the subsequent SIP messages (in the call flow: 180 Ringing, 200 OK and ACK) received from the S-GW/BBIFF as IRI to the DF2 which in turn deliver the same to the LEMF. + +### J.3.6 S-GW Relocation + +Figure J.9 below illustrates a call flow where a S-GW relocation occurs while an inbound roaming user is active on a voice call. In the flow, Party\_A (target) calls Party\_B. The flow shows that Party\_B is also an IMS user (SIP messages are shown), however, Party\_B can also be a non-IMS user served by CS domain. + +![Sequence diagram for S8HR LI with S-GW Relocation. The diagram shows the interaction between Visited CSP (Party_A (target), Old S-GW/BBIFF, New S-GW/BBIFF, LMISF), MF/DF (DF2, DF3, LEMF), and Home CSP (P-GW, P-CSCF/S-CSCF, Party_B). The process involves call origination, INVITE signaling, media bearer creation, 180 Ringing, 200 OK, and subsequent media packet delivery. A relocation occurs between the Old and New S-GW/BBIFF, requiring updates to the IMS Signaling and Media Bearers. The LMISF intercepts signaling and media packets, forwarding them to the LEMF via DF2 and DF3.](db39acbd11df5eb7e79ab84562fb8f74_img.jpg) + +The sequence diagram illustrates the signaling and media flow for an intercepted IMS call during an S-GW relocation. + **Visitors CSP:** Contains Party\_A (target), Old S-GW/BBIFF, New S-GW/BBIFF, and LMISF. + **MF/DF:** Contains DF2, DF3, and LEMF. + **Home CSP:** Contains P-GW, P-CSCF/S-CSCF, and Party\_B. + **Call Flow:** + 1. Call Origination from Party\_A. + 2. IMS Signalling Packet from Old S-GW/BBIFF to LMISF. + 3. LMISF sends X2: {INVITE, D1} to DF2, which sends HI2: {INVITE, D1} to LEMF. + 4. LMISF notifies Old S-GW/BBIFF to deliver media packets. + 5. Media Bearer is created in Old S-GW/BBIFF. + 6. INVITE (PAI: Party-A) from P-CSCF/S-CSCF to Party\_B. + 7. AAR/RAR and AAA/RAA between P-GW and P-CSCF/S-CSCF. + 8. 180 Ringing from Party\_B to P-CSCF/S-CSCF, then to P-GW, then to LMISF. + 9. LMISF sends X2: {180 Ringing, D1} to DF2, which sends HI2: {180 Ringing, D1} to LEMF. + 10. 200 OK from Party\_B to P-CSCF/S-CSCF, then to P-GW, then to LMISF. + 11. LMISF sends X2: {200 OK, D1} to DF2, which sends HI2: {200 OK, D1} to LEMF. + 12. Media flow established between Old S-GW/BBIFF and DF3. + 13. S-GW relocation occurs. + 14. IMS Signaling Bearer created (S-GW relocation) and Media Bearer created (S-GW relocation) in New S-GW/BBIFF. + 15. Old S-GW/BBIFF delivers packets to LMISF. + 16. Media flow established between New S-GW/BBIFF and DF3. + 17. ACK from P-CSCF/S-CSCF to Party\_B. + 18. IMS Signalling Packet from New S-GW/BBIFF to LMISF. + 19. LMISF sends X2: {ACK, D1} to DF2, which sends HI2: {ACK, D1} to LEMF. + +Sequence diagram for S8HR LI with S-GW Relocation. The diagram shows the interaction between Visited CSP (Party\_A (target), Old S-GW/BBIFF, New S-GW/BBIFF, LMISF), MF/DF (DF2, DF3, LEMF), and Home CSP (P-GW, P-CSCF/S-CSCF, Party\_B). The process involves call origination, INVITE signaling, media bearer creation, 180 Ringing, 200 OK, and subsequent media packet delivery. A relocation occurs between the Old and New S-GW/BBIFF, requiring updates to the IMS Signaling and Media Bearers. The LMISF intercepts signaling and media packets, forwarding them to the LEMF via DF2 and DF3. + +**Figure J.9: S8HR LI with S-GW Relocation** + +The old S-GW/BBIFF delivers the IMS signalling packets to the LMISF. The LMISF examines the SIP message to verify whether the SIP headers pointing to the calling party (e.g. P-preferred-Identity, From) is a target. In this illustration, that is the case, and therefore, the LMISF forwards the IRI message containing the SIP INVITE to the DF2 with correlation number D1. The DF2 forwards the IRI to the LEMF. + +Since CC interception is required, the LMISF notifies old S-GW/BBIFF with the IMS Signalling Bearer information associated with the intercepted IMS session. + +Once the dedicated EPS Bearer to be used as the Media Bearer linked to the EPS Bearer ID of the IMS Signalling Bearer is created, old S-GW/BBIFF delivers the media packets flowing through the GTP tunnel used for that Media Bearer to the LMISF. The LMISF delivers the media packets as the CC along with the correlation number D1 to the DF3. The DF3 delivers the CC to the LEMF. + +The LMISF delivers the subsequent SIP messages (in the call flow: 180 Ringing, 200 OK) received from the old S-GW/BBIFF as IRI to the DF2 which in turn deliver the same to the LEMF. + +In this illustration, a S-GW relocation happens right after the called party (Party\_B) answers the call, but before the Party\_A (target) has a chance to send the ACK message. When the IMS Signalling Bearer is created, the new S-GW/BBIFF notifies the LMISF along with the IMSI value with an indication that a S-GW relocation has occurred. The LMISF examines to see whether the IMS Signalling Bearer is associated with an intercepted IMS session. In this illustration since the CC interception is required, the LMISF notifies the S-GW/BBIFF with the IMS Signalling Bearer information associated with the intercepted IMS session. + +Once the dedicated EPS Bearer to be used as the Media Bearer linked to the EPS Bearer ID of the IMS Signalling Bearer is created, new S-GW/BBIFF delivers the media packets flowing through the GTP tunnel used for that Media Bearer to the LMISF. The LMISF delivers the media packets as the CC along with the correlation number D1 to the DF3. The DF3 delivers the CC to the LEMF. + +The LMISF delivers the subsequent SIP messages (in the call flow: ACK) received from the new S-GW/BBIFF as IRI to the DF2 which in turn deliver the same to the LEMF. + +## --- J.4 Correlation of CC and IRI + +A target is identified using SIP URI, TEL URI or IMEI. Not all SIP messages carry these identities. The LMISF by maintaining the IMS call state is able to determine the subsequent SIP messages that correspond to the same target. When a target is involved in multiple IMS sessions, the LMISF will have the logic to associate and correlate the SIP messages that are related to an IMS session. For example, the SIP messages that have the same Call Identity value can be treated as the SIP messages of a particular IMS session and hence, when reported to the LEMF (via DF2) can have the same Correlation Number. + +LMISF will also examine the SIP messages that carry the SDP offer and SDP answer to determine the media information related to an IMS session. + +When an IMS session is established, the media information is exchanged between the two end points of the media stream (e.g. target's UE and IMS-AGW in HPLMN) through the SDP offer and answer process. The combination of IP address of the end point (e.g. UE and IMS AGW) and UDP port numbers used to transport the RTP and RTCP are part of this SDP offer and answer along with other things like Codec information. The media packets (i.e. RTP streams) exchanged between the two end points of the media use those IP addresses and the port numbers (assigned for RTP). + +One method that can be used to establish the correlation is to use the IP addresses and the UDP port numbers exchanged within the SDP offer and answer process and compare them with the IP addresses and UDP port numbers of the media packets to establish an association between the IMS session and the media. + +In other words, the IP address and UDP port numbers associated with a media packet when compared with the IP address and UDP port numbers exchanged in the SDP offer and answer, one can determine to which IMS session a media packet corresponds to. Once that determination is made, these parameters may be used to establish a correlation. + +When S-GW/BBIFF is asked to deliver the packets from the IMS Signalling Bearers to LMISF, it delivers everything above the GTP-U layer. S-GW/BBIFF does not look into the IMS packets above the GTP-U layer. Similarly, when the S-GW/BBIFF is asked to deliver the packets from the Media Bearer to the LMISF, it delivers everything above the GTP-U layer. It does not look into the Media packets above the GTP-U layer. However, the BBIFF knows that the Media Bearer and the IMS Signalling Bearer are related through the GTP protocol concepts defined in TS 29.274 [38]. + +The LMISF will generate a Correlation Number and include that Correlation Number while delivering the SIP messages to the DF2. When the media packets are received, LMISF will examine the Media packets to determine which IMS session, the Media packets are related to. Once determined, the LMISF will deliver the Media packets to the DF3 along with the Correlation Number previously stored against the IMS session. + +## --- J.5 UE Location Reporting + +Within the EPC, the MME sends the UE location to the S-GW within the Create Session Request and Create Bearer Response messages that it sends to the S-GW. The Create Session Request is sent from the MME to the S-GW when the default bearer is created. The Create Bearer Response is sent from the MME to the S-GW when a dedicated bearer used as Media Bearer is created. + +In addition, the MME sends the UE location to the S-GW when a Bearer is modified (Modify Bearer Request and Update Bearer Response) or deleted (Delete Session Request and Delete Bearer Response). + +The details of the above messages (i.e. Create Session Request etc.) are specified in 3GPP TS 29.274 [38]. + +For the S8HR LI, the S-GW/BBIFF notifies the LMISF whenever the IMS signalling bearer (i.e. default bearer) or Media Bearer (i.e. dedicated bearer linked to the IMS Signalling Bearer) is created, modified, or deleted. The S-GW/BBIFF includes the UE Location that it receives from the MME when it notifies the IMS signalling bearer creation and Media Bearer creation events to the LMISF. + +The LMISF should store the UE location as it stores the IMSI value (currently specified in TS 33.107), and include the same in the appropriate IRI events sent to the DF2 over the X2 reference point. + +The DF2 delivers the UE Location to the LEMF (when required) as it is done for the non-roaming scenario or in a roaming with LBO scenario. + +# Annex L (informative): IP-based Handover Interface for CC of CS Intercepts + +## L.1 Background + +Figure L.1 shows an overview of the architecture that shows using IP-based handover interface for CC of CS intercepts: + +![Diagram of the General Concepts of IP-based Handover Interface using an ASN.1 module for HI3. The diagram shows a flow from 'Other Party' to 'MSS/CS-MGW' to 'MF/DF3' to 'LEMF' via 'HI3 (IP based)'. The 'MSS/CS-MGW' is also connected to 'Target' and 'MF/DF3' via 'X3'.](de98d4c97665a29427651680af184ff4_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph LR + OP[Other Party] --- MSS[MSS/CS-MGW] + MSS --- T[Target] + MSS -- X3 --> MF[MF/DF3] + MF -- "HI3 (IP based) +New TS 33.108 ASN.1 Module" --> LEMF[LEMF] + +``` + +Diagram of the General Concepts of IP-based Handover Interface using an ASN.1 module for HI3. The diagram shows a flow from 'Other Party' to 'MSS/CS-MGW' to 'MF/DF3' to 'LEMF' via 'HI3 (IP based)'. The 'MSS/CS-MGW' is also connected to 'Target' and 'MF/DF3' via 'X3'. + +**Figure L.1: General Concepts of IP-based Handover Interface using an ASN.1 module for HI3** + +The call content (CC) from CS-MGW is delivered to the MF/DF3 over X3 reference point. In some implementations, the MSS may also have to be part of the CC interception to provide the signalling aspects of the CC-related call setup. The X3 reference point is not standardized in the present document. + +## L.2 Options for X3 + +This sub-clause provides a few options for realizing the X3 reference to support an IP-based handover interface. Figure L.2 shows three different possible options: + +![Figure L.2: Three options for X3 reference point. The diagram shows three horizontal panels representing different network architectures. The top panel (green) shows CS-based X3 (CS-signaling and Media: CS circuits) and HI3 (IP-based) interfaces. The middle panel (orange) shows IP-based X3 (SIP-signaling and Media: RTP) and HI3 (IP-based) interfaces. The bottom panel (purple) shows an integrated MSS/CS-MGW with MF/DF3 and HI3 (IP-based) interface.](5e9af8986a5845504f251d3079da8078_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates three architectural options for the X3 reference point, each enclosed in a colored box. + +- Top Box (Green):** On the left, an MSS and a CS-MGW are shown. The MSS connects to a dashed box labeled "CS-signaling", which in turn connects to an MF/DF3 block. The CS-MGW connects to a dashed box labeled "Media: CS circuits", which also connects to the MF/DF3. A third dashed box labeled "Media via direct CS links" connects the CS-MGW directly to the MF/DF3. Above the MSS and CS-MGW is an arrow labeled "X3 (CS-based)". To the right of the MF/DF3 is an arrow labeled "HI3 (IP-based)" pointing to a dashed box labeled "New TS 33.108 Module". +- Middle Box (Orange):** On the left, an MSS and a CS-MGW are shown. The MSS connects to a dashed box labeled "SIP-signaling", which connects to an MF/DF3 block. The CS-MGW connects to a dashed box labeled "Media: RTP", which also connects to the MF/DF3. Above the MSS and CS-MGW is an arrow labeled "X3 (IP-based)". To the right of the MF/DF3 is an arrow labeled "HI3 (IP-based)" pointing to a dashed box labeled "New TS 33.108 Module". +- Bottom Box (Purple):** On the left, a combined block labeled "MSS/CS-MGW" contains an "MF/DF3" sub-block. An arrow labeled "HI3 (IP-based)" points from this sub-block to a dashed box labeled "New TS 33.108 Module". + +Figure L.2: Three options for X3 reference point. The diagram shows three horizontal panels representing different network architectures. The top panel (green) shows CS-based X3 (CS-signaling and Media: CS circuits) and HI3 (IP-based) interfaces. The middle panel (orange) shows IP-based X3 (SIP-signaling and Media: RTP) and HI3 (IP-based) interfaces. The bottom panel (purple) shows an integrated MSS/CS-MGW with MF/DF3 and HI3 (IP-based) interface. + +**Figure L.2: Three options for X3 reference point** + +The X3 reference point can be CS based in which case the MF/DF3 will have to convert the CS-based CC into RTP (RFC 3550 [86]) streams and then deliver the same over the HI3 reference point using the new ASN.1 object module (see TS 33.108 [11]) to the LEMF. The CS circuits that carry the content of intercepted call can be based on the dedicated direct links between the CS-MGW and the MF/DF3, or dynamic links setup via CS-based signalling (e.g. ISUP or ISDN). + +The X3 reference point can also be a SIP-based in which case MSS will have to set up the SIP session and CS-MGW will have to deliver the CC in the form of RTP. The SIP-based signalling may use either SIP (RFC 3261 [88]) or SIP-I (RFC 3998 [87]). The MF/DF3 would have to deliver the received RTP streams to the LEMF using the the new ASN.1 object module (see TS 33.108 [11]) to the LEMF. + +In another option, the MF/DF3 function can be integrated into the MSS/CS-MGW and in this case, that integrated MF/DF3 will have to deliver the CC using the new ASN.1 object module (see TS 33.108 [11]) to the LEMF. However, realization of this approach can be complex since it will require the MSS/CS-MGW to have the capability to support the generation of RTP streams and then ASN.1 module based handover interface. + +## L.3 Information delivered along with the CC + +The CC delivered using the IP-based delivery interface should carry the following information at the minimum: + +- Correlation information: to correlate the CC with the IRI messages +- Payload description: to decode the RTP streams +- Media direction: to indicate whether the payload belongs to target transmit or target receive or in a combined form. + +The method used by the MF/DF3 in determining the above information is outside the scope of the present document. For example, the DF2 may pass the correlation information to the MF/DF3 or MSS may pass the correlation information to the MF/DF3. Since the RTP payload is constructed at the MF/DF3, the MF/DF3 may be able to derive the payload description on its own. The intercepted voice media stream may be delivered to the LEAs in a combined form (i.e. target transmit and receive as one stream) or in separated form (target transmit and target receive). The media direction may be provided by the MSS to the MF/DF3 or the MF/DF3 may derive the media direction using the other means. + +# --- Annex M (Normative): Virtualised Implementations + +## M.1 General + +The present document does not define functionality or architecture extensions to support virtualised implementation scenarios, equivalent to those provided by TS 33.127 [90]. + +Where implementation scenarios require virtualisation of functions defined in the present document, the extensions defined in TS 33.127 clause 5.6 shall be applied. Where the architectural terminology (e.g. reference point names) of TS 33.127 differs from the present document, equivalent functionality and reference points in this specification shall be mapped to those in TS 33.127 (e.g. X2 interface in the present document shall be used in equivalence to LI\_X2 defined in TS 33.127 and MF/DF used in equivalence to MDF in TS 33.127). + +For all virtualised implementations based on the present document, the ADMF architectural decomposition extensions defined in TS 33.127 shall be used. + +The general security and audit principles in TS 33.127 clause 8 shall be applied. + +# --- Annex N (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|-----------------------|----------------|-------------|-----------|------------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| | SA_03 | | | - | | Approved at SA#6 and placed under TSG SA Change Control | 3.0.0 | +| | SA_10 | SP-000625 | 0001 | - | | Addition of parameters to the X3-Interface | 3.1.0 | +| 2000-03 | SP-11 | SP-010137 | 0002 | - | | Correction of Location information parameters in interception event records | 3.2.0 | +| 2000-03 | SP-11 | SP-010146 | 0003 | - | | Update of TS 33.107 for Release 4 - Inclusion of PS LI requirements | 4.0.0 | +| 2000-06 | SP-12 | SP-010374 | 0004 | 1 | B | Update of TS 33.107 for Release 5 | 5.0.0 | +| 2001-12 | SP-14 | SP-010612 | 0010 | - | A | Start of secondary interception of an active PDP context | 5.1.0 | +| 2001-12 | SP-14 | SP-010613 | 0011 | - | C | Alignment of TS 33.107 for Release 5 Network Architecture | 5.1.0 | +| 2001-12 | SP-14 | SP-010614 | 0014 | - | A | Correct the MO-SMS and MT-SMS events | 5.1.0 | +| 2001-12 | SP-14 | SP-010615 | 0016 | - | A | Source of PDP context initiation | 5.1.0 | +| 2002-03 | SP-15 | SP-020109 | 0017 | - | B | PDP context Deactivation cause | 5.2.0 | +| 2002-03 | SP-15 | SP-020110 | 0018 | - | B | The use of H.248 in setting up a bearer intercept point at the MGW | 5.2.0 | +| 2002-03 | SP-15 | SP-020111 | 0021 | - | B | Inter-SGSN RA update with active PDP context | 5.2.0 | +| 2002-03 | SP-15 | SP-020112 | 0022 | - | B | Addition of PDP context modification Event and Transferring the QoS information element across the X2 interface | 5.2.0 | +| | - | - | - | - | - | Change History new version corrected for SP-15 CRs | 5.2.1 | +| 2002-06 | SP-16 | SP-020345 | 0023 | - | B | Changes to 33.107 to support interception at a GGSN | 5.3.0 | +| 2002-06 | SP-16 | SP-020345 | 0024 | - | B | Addition of SMS type information | 5.3.0 | +| 2002-06 | SP-16 | SP-020345 | 0025 | - | C | Inclusion of Serving System IRI in TS 33.107 | 5.3.0 | +| 2002-09 | SP-17 | SP-020511 | 0026 | - | F | Essential clarification to the Timestamp IE | 5.4.0 | +| 2002-09 | SP-17 | SP-020511 | 0027 | - | F | Additional X3-interface parameters | 5.4.0 | +| 2002-12 | SP-18 | SP-020702 | 0028 | - | F | Event Time | 5.5.0 | +| 2002-12 | SP-18 | SP-020704 | 0029 | - | F | Essential correction to the LI events generated during inter-SGSN RAU, when PDP context is active | 5.5.0 | +| 2002-12 | SP-18 | SP-020703 | 0030 | - | F | Essential correction to the LI events generated during inter-SGSN RAU, when PDP context is active | 5.5.0 | +| 2002-12 | SP-18 | SP-030478 | 0031 | - | F | Missing QoS Parameter in IRI | 5.6.0 | +| 2003-09 | SP-21 | SP-030479 | 0032 | - | B | TEL URL for IMS interception identity (Release 6) | 6.0.0 | +| 2003-09 | SP-21 | SP-030479 | 0032 | - | D | Stereo delivery to LEMF | 6.0.0 | +| 2003-12 | SP-22 | SP-030590 | 0034 | - | F | MSISDN/IMEI clarification for GPRS interception | 6.1.0 | +| 2003-12 | SP-22 | SP-030591 | 0035 | - | F | Reporting TEL URL | 6.1.0 | +| 2004-06 | SP-24 | SP-040397 | 0036 | - | F | Correction on Network initiated Mobile Station Detach signalling flow | 6.2.0 | +| 2004-06 | SP-24 | SP-040398 | 0037 | - | F | TEL-URL missing in activation of LI in the CSCFs | 6.2.0 | +| 2004-06 | SP-24 | SP-040399 | 0038 | - | F | Correction on the use of session initiator parameter | 6.2.0 | +| 2004-06 | SP-24 | SP-040400 | 0039 | - | F | Correction to HLR interception event name | 6.2.0 | +| 2004-06 | SP-24 | SP-040401 | 0040 | - | B | Clarification for Push to talk over Cellular | 6.2.0 | +| 2004-06 | SP-24 | SP-040402 | 0041 | - | F | Adding an encryption parameter to IRI across X2 interface | 6.2.0 | +| 2004-06 | SP-24 | SP-040403 | 0042 | - | F | References | 6.2.0 | +| 2004-06 | SP-24 | SP-040404 | 0043 | - | F | Enhancements for the Functional Architecture chapter | 6.2.0 | +| 2004-09 | SP-25 | SP-040693 | 0044 | - | F | Correction on the use of session initiator parameter | 6.3.0 | +| 2004-09 | SP-25 | SP-040693 | 0045 | - | F | ICE (Intercepting Control Elements), INE (Intercepting Network Elements) definition | 6.3.0 | +| 2004-09 | SP-25 | SP-040693 | 0046 | - | F | Clarification to SMS interception | 6.3.0 | +| 2004-09 | SP-25 | SP-040693 | 0047 | - | F | Replace SIP URL with SIP URI | 6.3.0 | +| 2004-12 | SP-26 | SP-040850 | 0048 | - | B | Lawful Interception for WLAN Interworking | 6.4.0 | +| 2004-12 | SP-26 | SP-040850 | 0049 | - | F | 33.107 Cleanup | 6.4.0 | +| 2004-12 | SP-26 | SP-040850 | 0050 | - | B | Clarification on MMS interception | 6.4.0 | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050256 | 0052 | - | F | Correction on the use of identities for I-WLAN lawful interception | 6.5.0 | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050257 | 0051 | 1 | F | Clarifications for the usage of the notion of a service in distributed IP networks | 7.0.0 | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050257 | 0053 | - | C | Correlation for IMS interception | 7.0.0 | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050570 | 0054 | - | F | Clarifications to the RAU event | 7.1.0 | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050570 | 0055 | - | C | Simplifications to LDI handling | 7.1.0 | +| 2005-12 | SP-30 | SP-050779 | 0054 | - | B | Start of interception for already attached UE | 7.2.0 | +| 2005-12 | SP-30 | SP-050763 | 0056 | - | A | Availability of IMSI at PDG | 7.2.0 | +| 2006-03 | SP-31 | SP-060064 | 0057 | - | F | WLAN Interworking - Additional Details for TS 33.107 | 7.3.0 | +| 2006-09 | SP-33 | SP-060659 | 0058 | 1 | F | Editorial Update by Rapporteur | 7.4.0 | +| 2007-03 | SP-35 | | 0060 | - | B | Stage 2 MBMS Interception | 7.5.0 | +| 2007-03 | SP-35 | SP-070156 | 0061 | 1 | F | SMS IRI Reporting for WLAN Interworking | 7.5.0 | +| 2007-06 | SP-36 | SP-070331 | 0063 | - | B | Direct Tunnel LI | 7.6.0 | +| 2007-06 | SP-36 | SP-070332 | 0062 | - | B | NSAPI (Network layer Service Access Point Identifier) optional in IRI | 8.0.0 | +| 2007-09 | SP-37 | SP-070601 | 0065 | - | B | WLAN IRI at AAA for re-authentication | 8.1.0 | +| 2007-09 | SP-37 | SP-070599 | 0064 | - | A | Stage 2 MBMS Interception | 8.1.0 | +| 2007-12 | SP-38 | SP-070788 | 0066 | - | C | P-CSCF IMS LI Optional | 8.2.0 | +| 2007-12 | SP-38 | SP-070788 | 0067 | - | C | MBMS IRI Registration | 8.2.0 | +| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080172 | 0068 | 1 | D | CR on P-CSCF IMS LI Optional | 8.3.0 | + +| | | | | | | | | +|---------|-------|------------|------|----|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080172 | 0069 | 1 | D | Removing "P" suffix from references | 8.3.0 | +| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080172 | 0070 | 1 | B | Changes for Interception of IRI and CC at a WAG | 8.3.0 | +| 2008-06 | SP-40 | SP-080262 | 0071 | - | F | CSCF SIP Event reporting | 8.4.0 | +| 2008-06 | SP-40 | SP-080262 | 0072 | - | B | Conference Event Reporting | 8.4.0 | +| 2008-06 | SP-40 | SP-080262 | 0073 | - | D | Editorial corrections | 8.4.0 | +| 2008-09 | SP-41 | SP-080514 | 0074 | - | B | Updates to TS 33.107 to support LI for EPSs | 8.5.0 | +| 2008-12 | SP-42 | SP-080762 | 0077 | - | F | Editorial corrections to 33.107 | 8.6.0 | +| 2008-12 | SP-42 | SP-080762 | 0075 | - | F | Corrections and clarifications of LI for EPS and alignment with latest version of SAE stage 2 specs. | 8.6.0 | +| 2008-12 | SP-42 | SP-080762 | 0076 | - | F | Clarification on 3G DT with the GGSN | 8.6.0 | +| 2009-03 | SP-43 | SP-090133 | 0078 | - | F | Alignment with SAE stage 2 specifications approved by TSG SA#42 | 8.7.0 | +| 2009-04 | | | | | | Editorial correction to cover page | 8.7.1 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090272 | 0079 | - | F | Correction on UE requested bearer resource modification - Alignment with SAE stage 2 specification | 8.8.0 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090272 | 0080 | - | F | Clarification on parameter APN | 8.8.0 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090272 | 0081 | - | F | Clarification on the handover between 2G/3G access and E-UTRAN with Gn/Gp | 8.8.0 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090272 | 0082 | - | F | Clarification on parameter PDN type | 8.8.0 | +| 2009-09 | SP-45 | SP-090522 | 0083 | - | F | Correction on identities and parameters for LI in case of E-UTRAN access and PMIP based S5/S8 | 8.9.0 | +| 2009-09 | SP-45 | SP-090522 | 0084 | - | F | Correction on Serving Evolved Packet System event | 8.9.0 | +| 2009-10 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | Correction of misimplementation of CR0084 | 8.9.1 | +| 2009-12 | SP-46 | SP-090817 | 86 | - | F | Correction on events names | 8.10.0 | +| 2009-12 | SP-46 | SP-090817 | 87 | - | F | Restoring section header 9.4.5 | 8.10.0 | +| 2009-12 | SP-46 | SP-090817 | 88 | - | F | Correction on PDP context modification event | 8.10.0 | +| 2009-12 | SP-46 | SP-090817 | 85 | - | F | Correction on LI correlation for S4-SGSN | 8.10.0 | +| 2009-12 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-9 version (MCC) | 9.0.0 | +| 2010-06 | SP-48 | SP-100364 | 89 | - | F | Correction in IMS Conference text | 9.1.0 | +| 2010-06 | SP-48 | SP-100253 | 90 | - | F | Reporting of Dual Stack PDP address from the SGSN | 10.0.0 | +| 2010-10 | SP-49 | SP-100570 | 92 | - | A | Correction in IMS Conference Service X2 interface | 10.1.0 | +| 2010-10 | SP-49 | SP-100570 | 93 | - | A | IMS Conference Service configuration for CC interception | 10.1.0 | +| 2010-10 | SP-49 | SP-100481 | 91 | - | F | Unsuccessful bearer modification | 10.1.0 | +| 2010-10 | SP-49 | SP-100481 | 94 | - | B | LI architecture and functions for KMS based IMS Media Security | 10.1.0 | +| 2010-10 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | ToC update | 10.1.1 | +| 2010-12 | SP-50 | SP-100845 | 97 | 1 | A | IMSI based activation | 10.2.0 | +| 2010-12 | SP-50 | SP-100865 | 98 | 1 | B | MME start of interception with bearer active | 10.2.0 | +| 2010-12 | SP-50 | SP-100865 | 103 | 1 | C | Corrections and Alignment for IMS Conferencing | 10.2.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110023 | 104 | - | B | Location information from trusted non-3GPP access | 10.3.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110023 | 106 | - | C | Security requirements for LI in KMS based IMS media security | 10.3.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110023 | 111 | - | F | Initiator parameter definition | 10.3.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110021 | 109 | - | A | IMS Conf LI 33.107 | 10.3.0 | +| 2011-06 | SP-52 | SP-110260 | 112 | - | C | TLS and IPsec profiling for Xk interface | 10.4.0 | +| 2011-09 | SP-53 | SP-110511 | 113 | - | B | Reporting of PMIP and DSMIP session modification | 11.0.0 | +| 2012-03 | SP-55 | SP-12-0034 | 114 | | F | Correction on MIP specific parameters provided over the X2 interface. | 11.1.0 | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120336 | 114a | 1 | C | IMSI in untrusted non-3GPP access | 11.2.0 | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120336 | 115 | 1 | C | SGs received location transfer over the X2 interface | 11.2.0 | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120336 | 116 | 2 | F | UE IP Address at X2 interface | 11.2.0 | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120336 | 117 | 1 | F | Handover indication at X2 interface | 11.2.0 | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120336 | 118 | 1 | F | IMS Conference Services | 11.2.0 | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120336 | 119 | 1 | F | IMS Provision of CC | 11.2.0 | +| 2012-09 | SP-57 | SP-120627 | 120 | 1 | F | Reference list correction to align with the corrected TS 29.212 title | 11.3.0 | +| 2012-09 | SP-57 | SP-120600 | 121 | - | B | H(e)NB Support in TS 33.107 | 12.0.0 | +| 2012-12 | SP-58 | SP-120854 | 122 | - | B | LI events for trusted non-3GPP access on GTP S2a, Rel12 | 12.1.0 | +| 2012-12 | SP-58 | SP-120854 | 123 | - | F | Removal of LTE | 12.1.0 | +| 2013-03 | SP-59 | SP-130034 | 124 | - | B | Start of interception for an already established IMS media secured session | 12.2.0 | +| | | | 125 | - | F | Correcting 33.107 and 33.108 differences - TFT is applicable only to dedicated bearer | | +| 2013-06 | SP-60 | SP-130248 | 126 | - | C | Provision on Unencrypted CC | 12.3.0 | +| | | | 127 | - | B | Mid Session Interception for IMS | | +| 2013-09 | SP-61 | SP-130401 | 128 | - | B | Addition of LI to GBA | 12.4.0 | +| | | | 129 | - | F | Adding version to non 3GPP references | | +| | | | 130 | - | F | Updating Tel URI to Tel URI | | +| 2013-12 | SP-62 | SP-130661 | 131 | - | B | ULI timestamp reporting | 12.5.0 | +| | | | 132 | - | D | Editorial Correction on header | | +| | | | 133 | - | B | 107 UMTS IRI Packet Header Information Reporting | | +| | | | 134 | - | B | 107 WLAN IRI Packet Header Information Reporting | | +| | | | 135 | - | B | 107 LTE IRI Packet Header Information Reporting | | +| | | | 136 | - | F | Correction to I-WLAN LI location information reporting | | +| | | | 137 | - | D | Editorial Fix of implementation of SA3LI13_073r3 | | + +| | | | | | | | | +|---------|-------|-----------|------|---|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| +| 2014-03 | SP-63 | SP-140020 | 138 | - | C | Handling of unsuccessful LI procedures in getting encryption keys from the KMS | 12.6.0 | +| | | | 139 | - | B | Basic architecture to deliver location information based Civic Addresses | | +| | | | 140 | - | F | Clarification to EPS Interception for Trusted Non-3GPP IP Access | | +| | | | 141 | - | B | Addition of VoIP LI Functions | | +| 2014-06 | SP-64 | SP-140310 | 142 | - | F | Editorial clean-up of target & monitored subscriber | 12.7.0 | +| | | | 143 | - | F | Editorial clean-up of incorrect paragraph numbering | | +| | | | 144 | - | A | IMS IMEI Interception | | +| | | | 145 | - | B | LI for GCSE Group Communications | | +| | | | 147 | - | C | IMS-Based VoIP LI Enhancements | | +| | | | 148 | - | B | Adding the interception of ProSe Direct Discovery | | +| | | | 149 | - | B | IMS-based VoIP Stage 2 Call Flows | | +| 2014-09 | SP-65 | SP-140586 | 150 | - | B | LI functionalities for GTP based s2b interfaces | 12.8.0 | +| | | | 151 | - | D | Editorial Corrections | | +| | | | 152 | - | F | Clarification on interception of VoIP CC for targeted calls | | +| | | | 153 | - | C | Change of 'Decryption for IMS Media Plane Security' clause: making it more specific regarding E2E/E2AE modes | | +| | | | 154 | - | F | Intercept trigger and X3 alignment for IMS based VOIP stage 2 | | +| | | | 155 | - | A | IMEI-based LI stage 2 description | | +| | | | 157 | - | C | Clarifications to IMS Interception relative to CC | | +| | | | 158 | - | D | Hanging paragraph repair | | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140821 | 159 | - | B | Adding the interception feature of any XCAP usages | 12.9.0 | +| | | | 160 | - | F | Editorial Correction to Stage 2 call flows (VoIP) | | +| | | | 161 | - | C | Group Communications LI with GSC AS outside the intercepting CSP's network | | +| | | | 162 | - | B | Adding the Mask parameter to the interception of ProSe direct discovery | | +| | | | 163 | - | C | Alignment of LI for GCSE with HI2 & HI3 | | +| | | | 164 | - | B | LI for ProSe One to Many Communications - In Network Coverage | | +| 2015-03 | SP-67 | SP-150075 | 165 | - | F | Correction to referenced in-house clauses | 12.10.0 | +| | | | 166 | - | F | Adding a minor note on how to understand the architecture that support the annex M of TS 33.108 on Hi1 over Hi2 | | +| | | | 167 | - | F | Clarification on X interfaces | | +| | | | 168 | - | F | Adding logical function information | | +| | | | 169 | - | F | Uniform use of "target" | | +| | | | 170 | - | B | Adding the details of ProSe one-to-many communication interception | | +| | | | 171 | - | B | WebRTC Interworking LI Stage 2 | | +| 2015-06 | SP-68 | SP-150296 | 172 | - | F | Clarification on the delivery of encryption keys and the CC delivery | 12.11.0 | +| | | | 173 | - | F | Delivery of media information to LEAs when transcoding is involved | | +| 2015-09 | SP-69 | SP-150469 | 174 | 4 | F | Adding WLAN interworking maintenance statement | 12.12.0 | +| | | SP-150470 | 175 | 3 | B | New events related to some messages to and from HSS/HLR | 13.0.0 | +| | | | 176 | 2 | B | Addition of Multiple Delivery Addresses for Resilience and Failover Mechanism | | +| | | | 177 | 1 | D | Introduce a clause for a hanging paragraph in clause 15.2. | | +| | | | 178 | 4 | F | Media Information Reporting | | +| | | | 179 | 2 | F | CC Interception in HPLMN in some roaming scenarios | | +| | | | 180 | 2 | B | Separate Delivery of Messaging Services - ICE-DF | | +| | | | 181 | 1 | F | Correcting the drawing errors in two figures of Annex F | | +| 2015-12 | SP-70 | SP-150724 | 182 | 1 | B | LI features and events with HLR for CS domain | 13.1.0 | +| | | | 183 | - | B | Reporting of UE local IP address and port | | +| | | | 184 | 5 | B | New LI events related to HSS in IMS, non 3GPP access network | | +| | | | 185 | 3 | F | Correction to have consistent event name Packet Data Header Information | | +| | | | 186 | 1 | B | Call flow to illustrate the CC Unavailable case | | +| | | | 187 | 1 | F | Insertion of call flow that was accidentally deleted | | +| | | SP-150728 | 192 | 1 | A | LTE Location Information: Cell Based IRI Reporting (MME) | | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160050 | 193 | 1 | F | Editorial clean up | 13.2.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160050 | 194 | 1 | F | Removing requirements from NOTEs | 13.2.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160050 | 195 | 3 | F | Stage 2 Description of LI Functions in the VPLMN for IMS Roaming | 13.2.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160050 | 196 | 2 | B | User Location Information reporting extensions over s2b | 13.2.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160050 | 197 | 1 | B | Interception of ProSe Remote UE | 13.2.0 | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160384 | 0198 | 1 | F | Stage 2: TWAN Location for default bearer as well | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160384 | 0215 | 2 | B | Mega changes to allow Location Services (LCS) | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0216 | 3 | B | Lawful Access Location Services - Stage 2 | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0217 | 3 | B | Non-Local ID interception CS domain and GSN/SGSN issue about SMS | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0218 | 4 | B | Non-Local ID interception with VoIP/IMS services and cleaning up of the security clause | 13.4.0 | + +| | | | | | | | | +|---------|-------|-----------|------|---|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0219 | 3 | B | Non-Local ID interception with VoIP/IMS services with IBCF | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0222 | - | D | Correcting the editorial errors | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0223 | - | F | Acting on an Editor's Note in clause 7A.2.1 | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0225 | 1 | C | Informative Stage 2 Call Flows to illustrate the IMS Conferencing Steps | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0226 | 1 | B | Informative Annex on the interception of Target with Non-Local ID | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0227 | 2 | B | Separate Delivery of Messaging Services | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0228 | 1 | B | Toggle for Roaming | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0230 | 2 | B | LI for ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160797 | 0232 | 2 | F | Targeting of Non-Local ID in case of SMS usages: correction of existing texts | 13.5.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160797 | 0233 | - | F | Corrections on deregistrations events | 13.5.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160798 | 0231 | 1 | B | Proposes Stage 2 description for S8HR LI | 14.0.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160798 | 0234 | 1 | B | Separate Delivery of MMS | 14.0.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160798 | 0235 | 1 | C | VPLMN ID for IMS VoIP Events | 14.0.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160798 | 0236 | 1 | F | Adding Missing Parameters for HLR Events to Common Table | 14.0.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA#75 | SP-170037 | 0237 | 1 | B | Stage 2 description for CUPS LI | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA#75 | SP-170037 | 0238 | 1 | C | Phase 2 of LALS development - Stage 2 description | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA#75 | SP-170036 | 0240 | 2 | A | Location information for ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA#75 | SP-170037 | 0242 | 1 | C | Separate Delivery of MMS | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA#75 | SP-170036 | 0243 | - | A | SDP info at DF3 | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170342 | 0244 | 1 | C | Changes to S8HR LI Stage 2 description to address the agreed simplifications | 14.2.0 | +| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170342 | 0245 | 1 | C | S8HR LI with CUPS for S-GW | 14.2.0 | +| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170342 | 0248 | 1 | C | S8HR LI - stage 2 descriptions addressing SGW Relocation with one LMISF | 14.2.0 | +| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170342 | 0249 | 1 | B | Non-local ID target at the MMS level | 14.2.0 | +| 2017-09 | SA#77 | SP-170706 | 0251 | 1 | A | Incorrect usage of interception type in a ProSe Direct Discovery clause | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-09 | SA#77 | SP-170707 | 0252 | 1 | B | SMS over NAS | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-09 | SA#77 | SP-170707 | 0255 | 1 | B | Push to Talk over Cellular Service adding of functional architecture, references, definitions, and abbreviations | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-09 | SA#77 | SP-170707 | 0256 | 1 | B | Push to Talk over Cellular service addition feature Part A | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-09 | SA#77 | SP-170707 | 0258 | 1 | B | Requirement to Toggle interception for an outbound international roaming target | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-09 | SA#77 | SP-170707 | 0259 | 1 | F | CUPS to support LI | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-12 | SA#78 | SP-170841 | 0265 | - | F | S8HR LI - replacing the erroneous call flow | 14.4.0 | +| 2017-12 | SA#78 | SP-170841 | 0266 | 1 | F | Push to Talk over Cellular Service corrections of the functional architecture | 14.4.0 | +| 2017-12 | SA#78 | SP-170841 | 0267 | 2 | F | Push to Talk over Cellular corrections and additional events | 14.4.0 | +| 2017-12 | SA#78 | SP-170840 | 0268 | 1 | A | IP-based CC handover interface for CS intercepts (stage 2) | 14.4.0 | +| 2017-12 | SA#78 | SP-170841 | 0269 | 1 | F | Include DF3 based approach for packet data header reporting with CUPS LI | 14.4.0 | +| 2017-12 | SA#78 | SP-170840 | 0271 | 1 | A | Corrections on LI for HSS in IMS | 14.4.0 | +| 2017-12 | SA#78 | SP-170841 | 0273 | - | F | Move IMS VoIP text from clause 7A to clause 15 | 14.4.0 | +| 2017-12 | SA#78 | SP-170841 | 0274 | 1 | F | Administrative changes | 14.4.0 | +| 2017-12 | SA#78 | SP-170842 | 0272 | 2 | B | Support for Standardised X Interfaces | 15.0.0 | +| 2018-03 | SA#79 | SP-180035 | 0276 | 1 | B | Adding of the abbreviations and Network Function Architecture for Cell site Information reporting plus Handover details | 15.1.0 | +| 2018-03 | SA#79 | SP-180034 | 0283 | - | A | Stage 2 Corrections to the Serving System event reported by HSS for EPS | 15.1.0 | +| 2018-03 | SA#79 | SP-180034 | 0284 | - | A | Stage 2 Corrections HSS Subscriber Record Change in EPS | 15.1.0 | +| 2018-03 | SA#79 | SP-180034 | 0285 | - | A | Stage 2 Corrections Cancel Location, Registration Termination HSS events, EPS | 15.1.0 | +| 2018-03 | SA#79 | SP-180034 | 0286 | - | A | Stage 2 Corrections for the Register Location event reported by for EPS | 15.1.0 | +| 2018-03 | SA#79 | SP-180034 | 0287 | - | A | Stage 2 Corrections Location Information Request event from HSS in EPS | 15.1.0 | +| 2018-06 | SA#80 | SP-180290 | 0288 | 1 | F | Stage 2 Corrections to the Subscriber Record Change event by HLR for CS | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-06 | SA#80 | SP-180290 | 0289 | 1 | F | Stage 2 Corrections to the Subscriber Record Change event by HLR for PS | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-06 | SA#80 | SP-180290 | 0290 | 1 | F | Stage 2 Corrections to the Subscriber Record Change event by HSS for EPS | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-06 | SA#80 | SP-180290 | 0291 | 1 | F | Errors in stage 2 text related to EPS | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-06 | SA#80 | SP-180290 | 0292 | 1 | F | Incorrect references to HSS triggered events in the SMS, MMS clauses | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-06 | SA#80 | SP-180289 | 0294 | 1 | A | Critical fix for location reporting with S8HR LI (stage 2 text) | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-06 | SA#80 | SP-180290 | 0295 | 1 | B | Interception of terminating CS calls when outbound roaming | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-06 | SA#80 | SP-180290 | 0297 | 1 | B | PTC Encryption information delivery | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-06 | SA#80 | SP-180290 | 0298 | 1 | F | PTC corrections | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-09 | SA#81 | SP-180790 | 0300 | 1 | C | Reporting Media Bearer information for S8HR | 15.3.0 | +| 2018-09 | SA#81 | SP-180790 | 0301 | 1 | C | S8HR LI: Location reporting corrections in Annex J | 15.3.0 | + +| | | | | | | | | +|---------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|--------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| 2018-12 | SA#82 | SP-180990 | 0302 | 3 | C | Time of Location Stage 2 | 15.4.0 | +| 2018-12 | SA#82 | SP-180990 | 0304 | 1 | F | PTC Stage 2 Text: Fixing few errors in the PTC clause | 15.4.0 | +| 2019-03 | SA#83 | SP-190042 | 0305 | 2 | F | Virtualised EPC Clarification 107 | 15.5.0 | +| 2019-03 | SA#83 | SP-190043 | 0306 | 5 | B | Lawful Interception for Non-IP Data Delivery with SCEF | 15.5.0 | +| 2019-03 | SA#83 | SP-190042 | 0307 | - | F | Secondary RAT Information Stage 2 | 15.5.0 | +| 2019-06 | SA#84 | SP-190343 | 0308 | 1 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109281 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33108/ef41234b5258296a8ca8056f05de0fa6_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33108/ef41234b5258296a8ca8056f05de0fa6_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cad02292ffab0d832953ed159197a6d8bfdb73cb --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33108/ef41234b5258296a8ca8056f05de0fa6_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:34f437ce1d952620bed23aa23e075e8489a287b2d495150000bef5f5930d5b10 +size 47204 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33108/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33108/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c70c7c193d2292b68f0cf0037e8d480ef3a058aa --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33108/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,18093 @@ + + +# 3GPP TS 33.108 V16.5.0 (2023-06) --- + +*Technical Specification* + +## **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G security; Handover interface for Lawful Interception (LI) (Release 16)** --- + +Keywords +LTE, UMTS, Security, LI, Architecture + +## **3GPP** + +Postal address + +3GPP support office address +650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis +Valbonne - FRANCE +Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 + +Internet + + +## ***Copyright Notification*** + +No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. +The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. + +© 2023, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC). +All rights reserved. + +UMTS™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members +3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association + +# Contents + +| | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword..... | 13 | +| Introduction..... | 13 | +| 1 Scope..... | 14 | +| 2 References..... | 14 | +| 3 Definitions and abbreviations..... | 18 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 18 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations..... | 20 | +| 4 General..... | 22 | +| 4.0 Introduction..... | 22 | +| 4.1 Basic principles for the handover interface..... | 22 | +| 4.2 Legal requirements..... | 23 | +| 4.3 Functional requirements..... | 23 | +| 4.4 Overview of handover interface..... | 23 | +| 4.4.0 Introduction..... | 23 | +| 4.4.1 Handover interface port 2 (HI2)..... | 24 | +| 4.4.2 Handover interface port 3 (HI3)..... | 25 | +| 4.5 HI2: Interface port for intercept related information..... | 25 | +| 4.5.0 General..... | 25 | +| 4.5.1 Data transmission protocols..... | 25 | +| 4.5.2 Application for IRI (HI2 information)..... | 26 | +| 4.5.3 Types of IRI records..... | 26 | +| 4.6 Reliability..... | 27 | +| 5 Circuit-switch domain..... | 27 | +| 5.0 General..... | 27 | +| 5.1 Specific identifiers for LI..... | 27 | +| 5.1.0 Introduction..... | 27 | +| 5.1.1 Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID)..... | 27 | +| 5.1.2 Communication Identifier (CID)..... | 28 | +| 5.1.2.0 General..... | 28 | +| 5.1.2.1 Network Identifier (NID)..... | 28 | +| 5.1.2.2 Communication Identity Number (CIN) - optional..... | 28 | +| 5.1.3 CC link identifier (CCLID)..... | 29 | +| 5.1.4 Correlation of CC and IRI..... | 29 | +| 5.1.5 Usage of Identifiers..... | 29 | +| 5.2 HI2: interface port for IRI..... | 30 | +| 5.2.1 Definition of Intercept Related Information..... | 30 | +| 5.2.2 Structure of IRI records..... | 30 | +| 5.2.2.0 General..... | 30 | +| 5.2.2.1 Control Information for HI2..... | 31 | +| 5.2.2.2 Basic call information..... | 31 | +| 5.2.2.3 Information on supplementary services, related to a call in progress..... | 32 | +| 5.2.2.4 Information on non-call related supplementary services..... | 32 | +| 5.2.3 Delivery of IRI..... | 32 | +| 5.3 HI3: interface port for Content of Communication..... | 37 | +| 5.3.0 General..... | 37 | +| 5.3.1 CS-based Delivery of Content of Communication..... | 37 | +| 5.3.2 Control information for Content of Communication..... | 38 | +| 5.3.3 Security requirements at the interface port of HI3..... | 39 | +| 5.3.3.0 General..... | 39 | +| 5.3.3.1 LI access verification..... | 39 | +| 5.3.3.2 Access protection..... | 40 | +| 5.3.3.3 Authentication..... | 40 | +| 5.4 LI procedures for supplementary services..... | 40 | +| 5.4.1 General..... | 40 | + +| | | | +|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| 5.4.2 | CC link Impact..... | 43 | +| 5.4.3 | IRI Impact, General Principle for Sending IRI records..... | 43 | +| 5.4.4 | Multi party calls - general principles, options A, B..... | 43 | +| 5.4.4.0 | General..... | 43 | +| 5.4.4.1 | CC links for active and non-active calls (option A)..... | 43 | +| 5.4.4.2 | Reuse of CC links for active calls (option B)..... | 44 | +| 5.4.5 | Subscriber Controlled Input (SCI): Activation / Deactivation / Interrogation of Services..... | 45 | +| 5.5 | Detailed procedures for supplementary services..... | 45 | +| 5.5.1 | Advice of Charge services (AOC)..... | 45 | +| 5.5.2 | Call Waiting (CW)..... | 45 | +| 5.5.2.1 | Call Waiting at target: CC links..... | 45 | +| 5.5.2.2 | Call Waiting: IRI records..... | 45 | +| 5.5.2.2.1 | Target is served user..... | 45 | +| 5.5.2.2.2 | Other party is served user..... | 45 | +| 5.5.3 | Call Hold/Retrieve..... | 45 | +| 5.5.3.1 | CC links for active and non-active calls (option A)..... | 45 | +| 5.5.3.2 | Reuse of CC links for active calls (option B)..... | 45 | +| 5.5.3.3 | IRI records..... | 46 | +| 5.5.3.3.1 | Invocation of Call Hold or Retrieve by target..... | 46 | +| 5.5.3.3.2 | Invocation of Call Hold or Retrieve by other parties..... | 46 | +| 5.5.4 | Explicit Call Transfer (ECT)..... | 46 | +| 5.5.4.1 | Explicit Call Transfer, CC link..... | 46 | +| 5.5.4.2 | Explicit Call Transfer, IRI records..... | 46 | +| 5.5.5 | Calling Line Identification Presentation (CLIP) (IRI Records)..... | 46 | +| 5.5.5.1 | Call originated by target (target is served user)..... | 46 | +| 5.5.5.2 | Call terminated at target (other party is served user)..... | 46 | +| 5.5.6 | Calling Line Identification Restriction (CLIR)..... | 46 | +| 5.5.7 | Connected Line identification Presentation (COLP)..... | 47 | +| 5.5.7.1 | Call terminated at target (target is served user)..... | 47 | +| 5.5.7.2 | Call originated by target (other party is served user)..... | 47 | +| 5.5.8 | Connected Line identification Restriction (COLR)..... | 47 | +| 5.5.9 | Closed User Group (CUG)..... | 47 | +| 5.5.10 | Completion of Call to Busy Subscriber (CCBS)..... | 47 | +| 5.5.11 | Multi ParTY call (MPTY)..... | 47 | +| 5.5.11.1 | General..... | 47 | +| 5.5.11.2 | IRI records..... | 47 | +| 5.5.12 | DIVersion Services (DIV)..... | 47 | +| 5.5.12.0 | General..... | 47 | +| 5.5.12.1 | Call Diversion by Target..... | 48 | +| 5.5.12.1.1 | Call Diversion by Target, CC links..... | 48 | +| 5.5.12.1.2 | Call Diversion by Target, IRI records..... | 48 | +| 5.5.12.2 | Forwarded Call Terminated at Target..... | 48 | +| 5.5.12.3 | Call from Target Forwarded..... | 48 | +| 5.5.13 | Variants of call diversion services..... | 48 | +| 5.5.14 | SUBaddressing (SUB)..... | 49 | +| 5.5.15 | User-to-User Signalling (UUS)..... | 49 | +| 5.5.16 | Incoming Call Barring (ICB)..... | 49 | +| 5.5.17 | Outgoing Call Barring (OCB)..... | 49 | +| 5.5.18 | Tones, Announcements..... | 49 | +| 5.6 | Functional architecture..... | 49 | +| 5.7 | IP-based handover interface for CC..... | 50 | +| 5.7.1 | General..... | 50 | +| 5.7.2 | Identifiers..... | 51 | +| 5.7.3 | Voice Content Direction..... | 52 | +| 5.7.4 | Payload Description..... | 52 | +| 5.7.5 | Sequence Number..... | 52 | +| 6 | Packet data domain..... | 53 | +| 6.1 | Identifiers..... | 53 | +| 6.1.0 | Introduction..... | 53 | +| 6.1.1 | Lawful interception identifier..... | 53 | +| 6.1.2 | Network identifier..... | 53 | + +| | | | +|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 6.1.3 | Correlation number..... | 53 | +| 6.2 | Timing and quality..... | 54 | +| 6.2.1 | Timing..... | 54 | +| 6.2.2 | Quality..... | 54 | +| 6.2.3 | Void..... | 54 | +| 6.3 | Security aspects..... | 54 | +| 6.4 | Quantitative aspects..... | 54 | +| 6.5 | IRI for packet domain..... | 55 | +| 6.5.0 | Introduction..... | 55 | +| 6.5.1 | Events and information..... | 60 | +| 6.5.1.0 | General..... | 60 | +| 6.5.1.1 | REPORT record information..... | 60 | +| 6.5.1.2 | BEGIN record information..... | 69 | +| 6.5.1.3 | CONTINUE record information..... | 71 | +| 6.5.1.4 | END record information..... | 73 | +| 6.6 | IRI reporting for packet domain at GGSN..... | 74 | +| 6.7 | Content of communication interception for packet domain at GGSN..... | 74 | +| 7 | Multi-media domain..... | 75 | +| 7.0 | Introduction..... | 75 | +| 7.1 | Identifiers..... | 76 | +| 7.1.0 | General..... | 76 | +| 7.1.1 | Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID)..... | 76 | +| 7.1.2 | Network identifier..... | 77 | +| 7.1.3 | Correlation number..... | 77 | +| 7.2 | Timing and quality..... | 78 | +| 7.2.1 | Timing..... | 78 | +| 7.2.2 | Quality..... | 78 | +| 7.2.3 | Void..... | 78 | +| 7.3 | Security aspects..... | 78 | +| 7.4 | Quantitative aspects..... | 78 | +| 7.5 | IRI for IMS..... | 79 | +| 7.5.0 | Introduction..... | 79 | +| 7.5.1 | Events and information..... | 82 | +| 7.6 | Correlation indications of IMS IRI with GSN CC at the LEMF..... | 87 | +| 7.7 | Void..... | 87 | +| 8 | 3GPP WLAN Interworking..... | 87 | +| 8.0 | General..... | 87 | +| 8.1 | Identifiers..... | 87 | +| 8.1.1 | Overview..... | 87 | +| 8.1.2 | Lawful interception identifier..... | 87 | +| 8.1.3 | Network identifier..... | 88 | +| 8.1.4 | Correlation number..... | 88 | +| 8.2 | Timing and quality..... | 88 | +| 8.2.1 | Timing..... | 88 | +| 8.2.2 | Quality..... | 88 | +| 8.2.3 | Void..... | 89 | +| 8.3 | Security aspects..... | 89 | +| 8.4 | Quantitative aspects..... | 89 | +| 8.5 | IRI for I-WLAN..... | 89 | +| 8.5.0 | Introduction..... | 89 | +| 8.5.1 | Events and information..... | 92 | +| 8.5.1.1 | Overview..... | 92 | +| 8.5.1.2 | REPORT record information..... | 93 | +| 8.5.1.3 | BEGIN record information..... | 97 | +| 8.5.1.4 | END record information..... | 99 | +| 8.6 | CC for I-WLAN..... | 100 | +| 9 | Interception of Multimedia Broadcast/MultiCast Service (MBMS)..... | 100 | +| 9.1 | Identifiers..... | 100 | +| 9.1.1 | Overview..... | 100 | +| 9.1.2 | Lawful interception identifier..... | 100 | + +| | | | +|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 9.1.3 | Network identifier..... | 101 | +| 9.1.4 | Correlation number..... | 101 | +| 9.2 | Timing and quality..... | 101 | +| 9.2.1 | Timing..... | 101 | +| 9.2.2 | Quality..... | 101 | +| 9.2.3 | Void..... | 101 | +| 9.3 | Security aspects..... | 101 | +| 9.4 | Quantitative aspects..... | 102 | +| 9.5 | IRI for MBMS..... | 102 | +| 9.5.0 | General..... | 102 | +| 9.5.1 | Events and information..... | 104 | +| 9.5.1.1 | Overview..... | 104 | +| 9.5.1.2 | REPORT record information..... | 104 | +| 9.5.1.3 | BEGIN record information..... | 105 | +| 9.5.1.4 | END record information..... | 106 | +| 9.6 | CC for MBMS..... | 107 | +| 10 | Evolved Packet System (EPS)..... | 107 | +| 10.0 | Introduction..... | 107 | +| 10.1 | Identifiers..... | 108 | +| 10.1.0 | Introduction..... | 108 | +| 10.1.1 | Lawful interception identifier..... | 108 | +| 10.1.2 | Network identifier..... | 108 | +| 10.1.3 | Correlation number..... | 109 | +| 10.2 | Timing and quality..... | 109 | +| 10.2.1 | Timing..... | 109 | +| 10.2.2 | Quality..... | 109 | +| 10.2.3 | Void..... | 109 | +| 10.3 | Security aspects..... | 109 | +| 10.4 | Quantitative aspects..... | 110 | +| 10.5 | IRI for evolved packet domain..... | 110 | +| 10.5.0 | Introduction..... | 110 | +| 10.5.1 | Events and information..... | 115 | +| 10.5.1.0 | Introduction..... | 115 | +| 10.5.1.1 | REPORT record information..... | 116 | +| 10.5.1.2 | BEGIN record information..... | 129 | +| 10.5.1.3 | CONTINUE record information..... | 132 | +| 10.5.1.4 | END record information..... | 136 | +| 10.6 | IRI reporting for evolved packet domain at PDN-GW..... | 139 | +| 10.7 | Content of communication interception for evolved packet domain at PDN-GW..... | 139 | +| 11 | 3GPP IMS Conference Services..... | 140 | +| 11.1 | Identifiers..... | 140 | +| 11.1.1 | Overview..... | 140 | +| 11.1.2 | Lawful interception identifier..... | 140 | +| 11.1.3 | Network identifier..... | 140 | +| 11.1.4 | Correlation number..... | 141 | +| 11.2 | Timing and quality..... | 141 | +| 11.2.1 | Timing..... | 141 | +| 11.2.2 | Quality..... | 141 | +| 11.2.3 | Void..... | 141 | +| 11.3 | Security aspects..... | 141 | +| 11.4 | Quantitative aspects..... | 141 | +| 11.5 | IRI for IMS Conference Services..... | 142 | +| 11.5.0 | Introduction..... | 142 | +| 11.5.1 | Events and information..... | 144 | +| 11.5.1.1 | Overview..... | 144 | +| 11.5.1.2 | BEGIN record information..... | 144 | +| 11.5.1.3 | CONTINUE record information..... | 145 | +| 11.5.1.4 | END record information..... | 148 | +| 11.5.1.5 | REPORT record information..... | 149 | +| 11.6 | CC for IMS Conference Services..... | 150 | + +| | | | +|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 12 | 3GPP IMS-based VoIP Services..... | 151 | +| 12.1 | Identifiers..... | 151 | +| 12.1.1 | Overview..... | 151 | +| 12.1.2 | Lawful Interception Identifier..... | 151 | +| 12.1.3 | Network Identifier..... | 151 | +| 12.1.4 | Correlation Number..... | 151 | +| 12.2 | Timing and quality..... | 152 | +| 12.3 | Security aspects..... | 152 | +| 12.4 | Quantitative aspects..... | 152 | +| 12.5 | IRI for IMS-based VoIP..... | 152 | +| 12.6 | CC for IMS-based VoIP..... | 152 | +| 12.7 | VoLTE Roaming..... | 153 | +| 12.7.1 | General..... | 153 | +| 12.7.2 | LI in HPLMN..... | 153 | +| 12.7.2.1 | With S8HR..... | 153 | +| 12.7.2.2 | With LBO..... | 153 | +| 12.7.3 | LI in VPLMN with S8HR..... | 153 | +| 12.7.4 | LI in VPLMN with LBO..... | 154 | +| 12.8 | Roaming Constraints to IMS VoIP/VoLTE LI..... | 155 | +| 13 | Interception of Proximity Services (ProSe)..... | 155 | +| 13.1 | General..... | 155 | +| 13.1.1 | Identifiers..... | 155 | +| 13.1.1.1 | Overview..... | 155 | +| 13.1.1.2 | Lawful interception identifier..... | 155 | +| 13.1.1.3 | Network identifier..... | 155 | +| 13.1.2 | Timing and quality..... | 156 | +| 13.1.2.1 | Timing..... | 156 | +| 13.1.2.2 | Quality..... | 156 | +| 13.1.3 | Security aspects..... | 156 | +| 13.1.4 | Quantitative aspects..... | 156 | +| 13.2 | ProSe Direct Discovery..... | 156 | +| 13.2.1 | General..... | 156 | +| 13.2.2 | Events and information..... | 158 | +| 13.2.2.1 | Overview..... | 158 | +| 13.2.2.2 | REPORT record information..... | 158 | +| 13.3 | ProSe Remote UE communications..... | 159 | +| 13.3.1 | General..... | 159 | +| 13.3.2 | Events and information..... | 161 | +| 13.3.2.1 | Overview..... | 161 | +| 13.3.2.2 | REPORT record information..... | 161 | +| 13.3.2.3 | BEGIN record information..... | 163 | +| 13.3.2.4 | CONTINUE record information..... | 164 | +| 13.3.2.5 | END record information..... | 165 | +| 14 | Invocation of Lawful Interception (LI) for Group Communications System Enablers (GCSE)..... | 166 | +| 14.1 | Background..... | 166 | +| 14.1.1 | Interception at GCS AS versus other nodes..... | 166 | +| 14.2 | GCS AS in Intercepting Operator's Network..... | 166 | +| 14.2.1 | General..... | 166 | +| 14.2.2 | Identifiers..... | 166 | +| 14.2.2.1 | Overview..... | 166 | +| 14.2.2.2 | Lawful Interception Identifier..... | 166 | +| 14.2.2.3 | Network Identifier..... | 167 | +| 14.2.2.3 | Correlation Number..... | 167 | +| 14.2.3 | Timing and quality..... | 167 | +| 14.2.3.1 | Timing..... | 167 | +| 14.2.3.2 | Quality..... | 167 | +| 14.2.4 | Security Aspects..... | 167 | +| 14.2.4.1 | General..... | 167 | +| 14.2.5 | Quantitative Aspects..... | 168 | +| 14.2.5.1 | General..... | 168 | + +| | | | +|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| 14.2.6 | IRI for GCSE based Communications..... | 168 | +| 14.2.6.1 | General..... | 168 | +| 14.2.6.2 | Events and Event Information..... | 170 | +| 14.2.6.2.1 | Overview..... | 170 | +| 14.2.6.2.2 | BEGIN record information..... | 170 | +| 14.2.6.2.3 | CONTINUE record information..... | 172 | +| 14.2.6.2.4 | END record information..... | 174 | +| 14.2.7 | CC for GCSE based Communications..... | 175 | +| 14.2.7.1 | General..... | 175 | +| 14.3 | GCS AS Outside Intercepting Operator Network..... | 175 | +| 14.3.1 | General..... | 175 | +| 15 | Interception of Messaging Services..... | 176 | +| 15.1 | Overview..... | 176 | +| 15.2 | SMS..... | 176 | +| 15.2.1 | Introduction..... | 176 | +| 15.2.2 | SMS over GPRS/UMTS..... | 176 | +| 15.2.3 | SMS over IMS..... | 176 | +| 15.3 | MMS..... | 177 | +| 15.3.1 | Introduction..... | 177 | +| 15.3.2 | Identifiers..... | 177 | +| 15.3.2.1 | Overview..... | 177 | +| 15.3.2.2 | Lawful Interception Identifier..... | 177 | +| 15.3.2.3 | Correlation Number..... | 178 | +| 15.3.6 | IRI for MMS..... | 178 | +| 15.3.6.1 | General..... | 178 | +| 15.3.6.2 | Events and Event Information..... | 181 | +| 15.3.6.2.1 | Overview..... | 181 | +| 15.3.6.2.2 | REPORT record information..... | 182 | +| 15.3.7 | CC for MMS..... | 194 | +| 15.3.7.1 | General..... | 194 | +| 16 | Cell Site Reporting..... | 195 | +| 16.1 | Overview..... | 195 | +| 16.2 | LI_CELL_INFO Interface..... | 196 | +| 16.3 | Cell Site Reporting in IRI event..... | 196 | +| 16.4 | Cell Site Report..... | 197 | +| 17 | Interception of PTC..... | 197 | +| 17.1 | Capabilities when the PTC service is supported by a CSP..... | 197 | +| 17.1.0 | Introduction..... | 197 | +| 17.1.1 | Lawful interception identifier..... | 197 | +| 17.1.2 | Network identifier..... | 198 | +| 17.1.3 | PTC IRI Events..... | 198 | +| 17.1.4 | CC for PTC-based VoIP..... | 198 | +| 17.1.5 | IRI for PTC based Communications..... | 199 | +| 17.2 | PTC Event Records..... | 202 | +| 17.2.0 | Introduction..... | 202 | +| 17.2.1 | PTC Registration..... | 202 | +| 17.2.2 | PTC Start of Interception..... | 203 | +| 17.2.3 | PTC Serving System..... | 204 | +| 17.2.4 | PTC Session Initiation..... | 205 | +| 17.2.5 | PTC Session Abandon End Record..... | 206 | +| 17.2.6 | PTC Session Start Continue Record..... | 207 | +| 17.2.7 | PTC Session End Record..... | 208 | +| 17.2.8 | PTC Instant Personal Alert..... | 208 | +| 17.2.9 | PTC Party Join..... | 209 | +| 17.2.10 | PTC Party Drop..... | 210 | +| 17.2.11 | PTC Party Hold-Retrieve Record..... | 211 | +| 17.2.12 | PTC Media Modification..... | 212 | +| 17.2.13 | PTC Group Advertisement..... | 213 | +| 17.2.14 | PTC Floor Control..... | 213 | +| 17.2.15 | PTC Target Presence..... | 216 | + +| | | | +|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| 17.2.16 | PTC Associate Presence..... | 216 | +| 17.2.17 | PTC List Management Events..... | 217 | +| 17.2.18 | PTC Access Policy..... | 218 | +| 17.2.19 | PTC Media Type Notification..... | 219 | +| 17.2.20 | PTC Pre-established Session Record..... | 220 | +| 17.3 | PTC Group Calls..... | 221 | +| 17.3.1 | Introduction..... | 221 | +| 17.3.2 | Group Call Request..... | 221 | +| 17.3.3 | Group Call Cancel..... | 222 | +| 17.3.4 | Group Call Response..... | 223 | +| 17.3.5 | PTC Group Interrogate..... | 224 | +| 17.3.6 | MCPTT Imminent Peril Group Call..... | 225 | +| 18 | PTC Encryption..... | 226 | +| Annex A (normative): | HI2 delivery mechanisms and procedures..... | 228 | +| A.0 | Introduction..... | 228 | +| A.1 | Void..... | 228 | +| A.2 | FTP..... | 228 | +| A.2.1 | Introduction..... | 228 | +| A.2.2 | Usage of the FTP..... | 228 | +| A.2.3 | Profiles (informative)..... | 230 | +| A.2.4 | File content..... | 231 | +| A.2.5 | Exceptional procedures..... | 231 | +| A.2.6 | Other considerations..... | 232 | +| A.3 | ETSI TS 102 232-1 and ETSI TS 102 232-7..... | 233 | +| A.3.1 | General..... | 233 | +| A.3.2 | Usage for realising HI2..... | 233 | +| Annex B (normative): | Structure of data at the handover interface..... | 234 | +| B.0 | Introduction..... | 234 | +| B.1 | Syntax definitions..... | 234 | +| B.2 | 3GPP object tree..... | 235 | +| B.3 | Intercept related information (HI2 PS and IMS)..... | 236 | +| B.3a | Interception related information (HI2 CS)..... | 252 | +| B.4 | Contents of communication (HI3 PS)..... | 255 | +| B.5 | Void..... | 257 | +| B.6 | User data packet transfer (HI3 CS)..... | 257 | +| B.7 | Intercept related information (and I-WLAN)..... | 258 | +| B.8 | Intercept related information (MBMS)..... | 262 | +| B.9 | Intercept related information (HI2 SAE/EPS and IMS)..... | 265 | +| B.10 | Contents of communication (HI3 EPS)..... | 284 | +| B.11 | IMS Conference Services ASN.1..... | 285 | +| B.11.1 | Intercept related information (Conference Services)..... | 285 | +| B.11.2 | Contents of communication (HI3 IMS Conferencing)..... | 288 | +| B.12 | Contents of Communication (HI3 IMS-based VoIP)..... | 289 | +| B.13 | Intercept related information for ProSe..... | 291 | +| B.14 | GCSE Services ASN.1..... | 293 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| B.14.1 | Intercept related information (GCSE Services)..... | 293 | +| B.14.2 | Contents of communication (HI3 GCSE Group Communications)..... | 296 | +| B.15 | Intercept related information (HI2 MMS)..... | 297 | +| B.16 | Content information (HI3 MMS)..... | 304 | +| B.17 | IP based handover (HI3) for CS voice content..... | 305 | +| Annex C (normative): | UMTS and EPS HI3 interfaces..... | 307 | +| C.0 | Introduction..... | 307 | +| C.1 | UMTS LI correlation header..... | 307 | +| C.1.1 | Introduction..... | 307 | +| C.1.2 | Definition of ULIC header version 0..... | 307 | +| C.1.3 | Definition of ULIC header version 1..... | 309 | +| C.1.4 | Exceptional procedure..... | 310 | +| C.1.5 | Other considerations..... | 310 | +| C.2 | FTP..... | 310 | +| C.2.1 | Introduction..... | 310 | +| C.2.2 | Usage of the FTP..... | 310 | +| C.2.3 | Exceptional procedures..... | 312 | +| C.2.4 | CC contents for FTP..... | 312 | +| C.2.4.1 | Fields..... | 312 | +| C.2.4.2 | Information element syntax..... | 314 | +| C.2.5 | Other considerations..... | 316 | +| C.2.6 | Profiles (informative)..... | 317 | +| C.3 | ETSI TS 102 232-1 and ETSI TS 102 232-7..... | 318 | +| C.3.1 | General..... | 318 | +| Annex D (informative): | LEMF requirements - handling of unrecognised fields and parameters..... | 320 | +| Annex E (informative): | Bibliography..... | 321 | +| Annex F (informative): | Correlation indications of IMS IRI with GSN CC at the LEMF..... | 323 | +| Annex G (informative): | United States lawful interception..... | 324 | +| G.1 | Delivery methods preferences..... | 324 | +| G.2 | HI2 delivery methods..... | 324 | +| G.2.1 | TPKT/TCP/IP..... | 324 | +| G.2.1.1 | Introduction..... | 324 | +| G.2.1.2 | Normal Procedures..... | 324 | +| G.2.1.2.0 | General..... | 324 | +| G.2.1.2.1 | Usage of TCP/IP when MF initiates TCP Connections..... | 324 | +| G.2.1.2.2 | Use of TPKT..... | 324 | +| G.2.1.2.3 | Sending of LI messages..... | 325 | +| G.2.1.3 | ASN.1 for HI2 Mediation Function Messages..... | 325 | +| G.2.1.4 | Error Procedures..... | 325 | +| G.2.1.5 | Security Considerations..... | 326 | +| G.3 | HI3 delivery methods..... | 326 | +| G.3.1 | Use of TCP/IP..... | 326 | +| G.3.1.1 | Normal Procedures..... | 326 | +| G.3.1.1.0 | Introduction..... | 326 | +| G.3.1.1.1 | Usage of TCP/IP when MF/DF initiates TCP Connections..... | 326 | +| G.3.1.1.2 | Use of TPKT..... | 326 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| G.3.1.1.3 | Sending of Content of Communication Messages..... | 327 | +| G.3.1.2 | ASN.1 for HI3 Mediation Function Messages..... | 327 | +| G.3.1.3 | Error Procedures..... | 327 | +| G.3.1.4 | Security Considerations..... | 327 | +| G.4 | Cross reference of terms between J-STD-025-A and 3GPP..... | 328 | +| Annex H (normative): | United States lawful interception..... | 329 | +| Annex I (informative): | Void..... | 331 | +| Annex J (normative): | Definition of the UUS1 content associated and sub-addressing to the CC link..... | 332 | +| J.0 | Introduction..... | 332 | +| J.1 | Definition of the UUS1 content associated to the CC link..... | 332 | +| J.2 | Use of sub-address and calling party number to carry correlation information..... | 333 | +| J.2.1 | Introduction..... | 333 | +| J.2.2 | Subaddress options..... | 333 | +| J.2.3 | Subaddress coding..... | 333 | +| J.2.3.0 | General..... | 333 | +| J.2.3.1 | BCD Values..... | 333 | +| J.2.3.2 | Field order and layout..... | 334 | +| J.2.4 | Field coding..... | 337 | +| J.2.4.0 | Introduction..... | 337 | +| J.2.4.1 | Direction..... | 338 | +| J.2.4.2 | Coding of the Calling Party Number..... | 338 | +| J.2.5 | Length of fields..... | 338 | +| Annex K (normative): | VoIP HI3 Interface..... | 339 | +| K.1 | VoIP CC Protocol Data Unit..... | 339 | +| K.2 | Definition of VoIP LI Correlation header..... | 339 | +| K.3 | Definition of Payload..... | 340 | +| K.4 | LEMF Considerations..... | 340 | +| Annex L (normative): | Conference HI3 Interface..... | 340 | +| L.1 | Conf CC Protocol Data Unit..... | 340 | +| L.2 | Definition of Conference LI Correlation header..... | 340 | +| L.3 | Definition of Payload..... | 341 | +| L.4 | LEMF Considerations..... | 341 | +| Annex M (informative): | Generic LI notification (HI1 notification using HI2 method)..... | 342 | +| M.1 | HI.1 delivery methods preferences:..... | 342 | +| M.2 | ASN.1 description of LI management notification operation (HI1 interface)..... | 343 | +| Annex N (informative): | Guidelines on IMS VoIP Correlation Information..... | 346 | +| N.1 | Introduction..... | 346 | +| N.2 | IMS VoIP..... | 346 | +| N.2.0 | General..... | 346 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| N.2.1 | One Correlation Number Value..... | 347 | +| N.2.2 | Multiple Correlation Number Values..... | 347 | +| N.2.2.0 | General..... | 347 | +| N.2.2.1 | Method 1..... | 347 | +| N.2.2.2 | Method 2..... | 348 | +| N.2.2.3 | Method 3..... | 348 | +| N.2.3 | Complex Example - Use of one Correlation Number..... | 349 | +| N.2.4 | Complex Example - Use of Multiple Correlation Numbers..... | 349 | +| N.2.4.0 | General..... | 349 | +| N.2.4.1 | Method 1..... | 349 | +| N.2.4.2 | Method 2..... | 350 | +| N.2.4.3 | Method 3..... | 350 | +| N.3 | IMS Conferencing..... | 351 | +| N.3.1 | General..... | 351 | +| N.3.2 | Target Initiated AdHoc Conference Call..... | 351 | +| N.3.3 | Independent Lawful Interception of IMS-Conferencing..... | 351 | +| N.3.3.1 | General..... | 351 | +| N.3.3.2 | Use of correlationNumber (OCTET STRING)..... | 351 | +| N.3.3.3 | Use of imsVoIP (IMS-VoIP-Correlation)..... | 352 | +| N.3.3.3.1 | One Correlation Number Value..... | 352 | +| N.3.3.3.2 | Multiple Correlation Number Values..... | 352 | +| Annex O (informative): | Selection of ASN.1 HI2 sub-domain for LALS Reporting..... | 353 | +| Annex P (informative): | Change history..... | 355 | + +## Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +## Introduction + +This Technical Specification has been produced by 3GPP TSG SA to allow for the standardization in the area of lawful interception of telecommunications. This document addresses the handover interfaces for lawful interception of Packet-Data Services, Circuit Switched Services, Multimedia Services within the Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) and Evolved Packet System (EPS). The specification defines the handover interfaces for delivery of lawful interception Intercept Related Information (IRI) and Content of Communication (CC) to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility. + +Laws of individual nations and regional institutions (e.g. European Union), and sometimes licensing and operating conditions define a need to intercept telecommunications traffic and related information in modern telecommunications systems. It has to be noted that lawful interception shall always be done in accordance with the applicable national or regional laws and technical regulations. Nothing in this specification, including the definitions, is intended to supplant national law. + +This specification should be used in conjunction with TS 33.106 [18] and TS 33.107 [19] in the same release. This specification may also be used with earlier releases of TS 33.106 [18] and TS 33.107 [19], as well as for earlier releases of UMTS and GPRS. + +# 1 Scope + +The present document specifies the handover interfaces for Lawful Interception (LI) of Packet-Data Services, Circuit Switched Services, Multimedia Services within the UMTS network and Evolved Packet System (EPS). The handover interface in this context includes the delivery of Intercept Related Information (IRI) through the Handover Interface 2 (HI2) and Content of Communication (CC) through the Handover Interface 3 (HI3) to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF). + +# 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] ETSI TS 101 331: "Lawful Interception (LI); Requirements of Law Enforcement Agencies". +- [2] ETSI ES 201 158: "Telecommunications security; Lawful Interception (LI); Requirements for network functions". +- [3] ETSI ETR 330: "Security Techniques Advisory Group (STAG); A guide to legislative and regulatory environment". +- [4] 3GPP TS 29.002: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Mobile Application Part (MAP) specification". +- [5A] ITU-T Recommendation X.680: "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of Basic Notation". +- [5B] ITU-T Recommendation X.681: "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Information Object Specification". +- [5C] ITU-T Recommendation X.681: "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Constraint Specification". +- [5D] ITU-T Recommendation X.681: "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications". +- [6] ITU-T Recommendation X.690: "ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)". + +NOTE 1: It is recommended that for [5A], [5B], [5C], [5D] and [6] the 2002 specific versions should be used. + +- [7] ITU-T Recommendation X.880: "Information technology - Remote Operations: Concepts, model and notation". +- [8] Void. +- [9] 3GPP TS 24.008: "3GPP Technical Specification Group Core Network; Mobile radio interface Layer 3 specification, Core network protocol; Stage 3". +- [10] - [12] Void. +- [13] IETF STD 9 (RFC 0959): "File Transfer Protocol (FTP)". + +- [14] 3GPP TS 32.215: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Telecommunication Management; Charging Management; Charging data description for the Packet Switched (PS) domain". +- [15] IETF STD0005 (RFC 0791): "Internet Protocol". +- [16] IETF STD0007 (RFC 0793): "Transmission Control Protocol". +- [17] 3GPP TS 29.060: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) across the Gn and Gp interface". +- [18] 3GPP TS 33.106: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Lawful Interception Requirements". +- [19] 3GPP TS 33.107: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Lawful interception architecture and functions". +- [20] 3GPP TS 23.107: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Quality of Service QoS concepts and architecture". +- [21] - [22] Void. +- [23] ANSI/J-STD-025-A: "Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance". +- [24] ETSI TS 101 671: "Handover Interface for the lawful interception of telecommunications traffic". +- [25] 3GPP TS 23.003: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Numbering, addressing, and identification". +- [26] IETF RFC 3261: "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol". +- [27] IETF RFC 1006: "ISO Transport Service on top of the TCP". +- [28] IETF RFC 2126: "ISO Transport Service on top of TCP (ITOT)". +- [29] ITU-T Recommendation Q.763: "Signalling System No. 7 - ISDN User Part formats and codes". +- [30] ETSI EN 300 356 (all parts): "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Signalling System No.7; ISDN User Part (ISUP) version 3 for the international interface". +- [31] ETSI EN 300 403-1 (V1.3.2): "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. one (DSS1) protocol; Signalling network layer for circuit-mode basic call control; Part 1: Protocol specification [ITU-T Recommendation Q.931 (1993), modified]". + +NOTE 3: Reference [31] is specific, because ASN.1 parameter "release-Reason-Of-Intercepted-Call" has the following comment: "Release cause coded in [31] format". In case later version than the given one indicated for ISDN specification ETSI EN 300 403-1 has modified format of the "release cause", keeping the reference version specific allows to take proper actions in later versions of this specification. + +- [32] - [33] Void +- [34] ITU-T Recommendation Q.931: "ISDN user-network interface layer 3 specification for basic call control". +- [35] Void. +- [36] Void. +- [37] 3GPP TS 23.032: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Universal Geographical Area Description (GAD)". +- [38] 3GPP TR 21.905: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [39] ISO 3166-1: "Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions - Part 1: Country codes". + +- [40] 3GPP TS 23.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2". +- [41] 3GPP TS 29.234: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals: 3GPP System to Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking; Stage 3". +- [42] 3GPP TS 23.060: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service description". +- [43] 3GPP TS 23.234: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3GPP system to Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Interworking; System Description". +- [44] 3GPP TS 23.401: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access". +- [45] 3GPP TS 23.402: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Architecture enhancements for non-3GPP accesses". +- [46] 3GPP TS 29.274: "3GPP Evolved Packet System (EPS); Evolved General Packet Radio Access (GPRS) Tunneling Protocol for Control Plane (GTPv2-C); Stage 3". +- [47] 3GPP TS 24.301: "Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for Evolved Packet System (EPS); Stage 3". +- [48] 3GPP TS 29.275: "Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) based Mobility and Tunneling protocols; Stage 3". +- [49] 3GPP TS 24.303: "Mobility management based on Dual-Stack Mobile IPv6; Stage 3". +- [50] (void) +- [51] (void) +- [52] 3GPP TS 24.147: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Conferencing Using the IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem 3GPP Stage 3". +- [53] 3GPP TS 29.273: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Evolved Packet System (EPS); 3GPP EPS AAA interfaces". +- [54] 3GPP TS 33.328: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) media plane security". +- [55] ATIS-0700005 "Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance (LAES) for 3GPP IMS-based VoIP and other Multimedia Services". +- [56] 3GPP TS 29.212: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Policy and Charging Control(PCC); Reference points". +- [57] Void. +- [58] IETF RFC 4217: "Securing FTP with TLS". +- [59] 3GPP TS 29.272: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Evolved Packet System (EPS); Mobility Management Entity (MME) and Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) related interfaces based on Diameter protocol". +- [60] 3GPP TS 33.310: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)". +- [61] IETF RFC 6043: "MIKEY-TICKET: Ticket-Based Modes of Key Distribution in Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)", available at [www.ietf.org](http://www.ietf.org) + +- [62] 3GPP TS 25.413: "UTRAN Iu interface Radio Access Network Application Part (RANAP) signalling". +- [63] 3GPP TS 29.279: "Mobile IPv4 (MIPv4) based mobility protocols; Stage 3". +- [64] 3GPP TS 29.118: "Mobility Management Entity (MME) -Visitor Location Register (VLR) SGs interface specification" +- [65] ANSI/J-STD-025-B: "Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance", July 17, 2006. +- [66] 3GPP TS 24.007: "Mobile Radio Interface Signalling Layer 3; General Aspects". +- [67] IETF RFC 3966: "The Tel URIs for Telephone Numbers", December, 2004. +- [68] IETF RFC 791: "Internet Protocol" +- [69] IETF RFC 2460: "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification". +- [70] IETF RFC 3697: "IPv6 Flow Label Specification". +- [71] IETF RFC 4776: "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4 and DHCPv6) Option for Civic Addresses Configuration Information". +- [72] IETF RFC 5139: "Revised Civic Location Format for Presence Information Data Format Location Object (PIDF-LO)". +- [73] ISO.3166-2: International Organization for Standardization, "Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions - Part 2: Country subdivision code". +- [74] UPS SB42-4: Universal Postal Union (UPU), "International Postal Address Components and Templates". +- [75] ISO 639-1:2002: "Codes for the representation of names of languages -- Part 1: Alpha-2 code". +- [76] 3GPP TS 24.229: "IP multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); Stage 3". +- [77] 3GPP TS 24.623: "Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Extensible Markup Language (XML) Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP) over the Ut interface for Manipulating Supplementary Services". +- [78] 3GPP TS 22.173: "IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem (IMS) Multimedia Telephony Service and supplementary services; Stage 1". +- [79] 3GPP TS 24.109: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Bootstrapping interface (Ub) and network application function interface (Ua); Protocol details". +- [80] IETF RFC 4825:"The Extensible Markup Language (XML) Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)". +- [81] IETF RFC 7254: "A Uniform Resource Name Namespace for the Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA) and the International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI)" +- [82] IETF RFC 7255: "Using the International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) Uniform Resource Name (URN) as an Instance ID". +- [83] 3GPP TS 22.468: "Group Communication System Enablers for LTE (GCSE\_LTE)". +- [84] 3GPP TS 23.468: "Group Communication System Enablers for LTE (GCSE\_LTE); Stage 2". +- [85] 3GPP TS 25.321: "Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol specification". +- [86] 3GPP TS 24.371: " Web Real-Time Communications (WebRTC) access to the IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem (IMS); Stage 3". + +- [87] ITU-T Recommendation E.212: "The international identification plan for public networks and subscriptions". +- [88] OMA MLP TS: "Mobile Location Protocol", OMA-TS-MLP-V3\_5-20181211-C. +- [89] MMS Architecture OMA-AD-MMS-V1\_3-20110913-A. +- [90] Multimedia Messaging Service Encapsulation Protocol OMA-TS-MMS\_ENC-V1\_3-20110913-A. +- [91] 3GPP TS 22.140: "Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS); Stage 1". +- [92] IETF RFC 2822: "Internet Message Format". +- [93] IETF RFC 3551: "RTP Profile for Audio and Video Conferences with Minimal Control". +- [94] IETF RFC 4566: "Session Description Protocol". +- [95] IETF RFC 3550: "Realtime Transport Protocol". +- [96] 3GPP TS 29.229: "Cx and Dx interfaces based on the Diameter protocol; Protocol details". +- [97] OMA-AD-PoC-V2\_1-20110802-A, Architecture Document. +- [98] OMA-TS-PoC\_User Plane-V2\_1-20110802-A. +- [99] 3GPP TS 37.340: "Evolved Universal Radio Access (E-UTRA) and NR-Multi-connectivity; Stage 2". +- [100] 3GPP TS 36.413: "E-UTRAN – S1 Application Protocol (S1AP)". +- [101] 3GPP TS 29.336: "Home Subscriber Server (HSS) diameter interfaces for interworking with packet data networks and applications". +- [102] IETF RFC 3588: "Diameter Base Protocol". +- [103] IETF RFC 4282: "The Network Access Identifier". +- [104] ETSI TS 102 232-1: "Lawful Interception (LI); Handover Interface and Service-Specific Details (SSD) for IP delivery; Part 1: Handover specification for IP delivery". +- [105] ETSI TS 102 232-7: "Lawful Interception (LI); Handover Interface and Service-Specific Details (SSD) for IP delivery; Part 7: Service-specific details for Mobile Services". +- [106] 3GPP TS 33.126: " Lawful interception requirements ". + +--- + +## 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +### 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [38] and the following apply. + +**access provider:** access provider provides a user of some network with access from the user's terminal to that network. + +NOTE 1: This definition applies specifically for the present document. In a particular case, the access provider and network operator may be a common commercial entity. + +**(to) buffer:** temporary storing of information in case the necessary telecommunication connection to transport information to the LEMF is temporarily unavailable. + +**communication:** Information transfer according to agreed conventions. + +**content of communication:** information exchanged between two or more users of a telecommunications service, excluding intercept related information. This includes information which may, as part of some telecommunications service, be stored by one user for subsequent retrieval by another. + +**handover interface:** physical and logical interface across which the interception measures are requested from network operator / access provider / service provider, and the results of interception are delivered from a network operator / access provider / service provider to a law enforcement monitoring facility. + +**identity:** technical label which may represent the origin or destination of any telecommunications traffic, as a rule clearly identified by a physical telecommunications identity number (such as a telephone number) or the logical or virtual telecommunications identity number (such as a personal number) which the subscriber can assign to a physical access on a case-by-case basis. + +**interception:** action (based on the law), performed by a network operator / access provider / service provider, of making available certain information and providing that information to a law enforcement monitoring facility. + +NOTE 2: In the present document the term interception is not used to describe the action of observing communications by a law enforcement agency. + +**interception configuration information:** information related to the configuration of interception. + +**interception interface:** physical and logical locations within the network operator's / access provider's / service provider's telecommunications facilities where access to the content of communication and intercept related information is provided. The interception interface is not necessarily a single, fixed point. + +**interception measure:** technical measure which facilitates the interception of telecommunications traffic pursuant to the relevant national laws and regulations. + +**intercept related information:** collection of information or data associated with telecommunication services involving the target identity, specifically communication associated information or data (e.g. unsuccessful communication attempts), service associated information or data and location information. + +**internal intercepting function:** point within a network or network element at which the content of communication and the intercept related information are made available. + +**internal network interface:** network's internal interface between the Internal Intercepting Function and a mediation device. + +**invocation and operation:** describes the action and conditions under which the service is brought into operation; in the case of a lawful interception this may only be on a particular communication. It should be noted that when lawful interception is activated, it shall be invoked on all communications (Invocation takes place either subsequent to or simultaneously with activation.). Operation is the procedure which occurs once a service has been invoked. + +NOTE 3: The definition is based on ITU-T Recommendation X.882 [8], but has been adapted for the special application of lawful interception, instead of supplementary services. + +**law enforcement agency:** organization authorized by a lawful authorization based on a national law to request interception measures and to receive the results of telecommunications interceptions. + +**law enforcement monitoring facility:** law enforcement facility designated as the transmission destination for the results of interception relating to a particular target. + +**lawful authorization:** permission granted to a LEA under certain conditions to intercept specified telecommunications and requiring co-operation from a network operator / access provider / service provider. Typically this refers to a warrant or order issued by a lawfully authorized body. + +**lawful interception:** see interception. + +**lawful interception identifier:** identifier for a particular interception. + +**Location Dependent Interception:** is interception of a target mobile within a network service area that is restricted to one or several Interception Areas (IA). + +**location information:** information relating to the geographic, physical or logical location of an identity relating to an target. + +**mediation device:** equipment, which realizes the mediation function. + +**mediation function:** mechanism which passes information between a network operator, an access provider or service provider and a handover interface, and information between the internal network interface and the handover interface. + +**network element:** component of the network structure, such as a local exchange, higher order switch or service control processor. + +**network element identifier:** uniquely identifies the relevant network element carrying out the lawful interception. + +**network identifier:** internationally unique identifier that includes a unique identification of the network operator, access provider, or service provider and, optionally, the network element identifier. + +**network operator:** operator of a public telecommunications infrastructure which permits the conveyance of signals between defined network termination points by wire, by microwave, by optical means or by other electromagnetic means. + +**precision:** the number of digits with which a numerical value is expressed, e.g. the number of decimal digits or bits. Note: precision should not be confused with accuracy, which is a difference between a measured/recorded numerical value and the respective value in the standard reference system. + +**quality of service:** quality specification of a telecommunications channel, system, virtual channel, computer-telecommunications session, etc. Quality of service may be measured, for example, in terms of signal-to-noise ratio, bit error rate, message throughput rate or call blocking probability. + +**reliability:** probability that a system or service will perform in a satisfactory manner for a given period of time when used under specific operating conditions. + +**result of interception:** information relating to a target service, including the content of communication and intercept related information, which is passed by a network operator, an access provider or a service provider to a law enforcement agency. Intercept related information shall be provided whether or not call activity is taking place. + +**service information:** information used by the telecommunications infrastructure in the establishment and operation of a network related service or services. The information may be established by a network operator, an access provider, a service provider or a network user. + +**service provider:** natural or legal person providing one or more public telecommunications services whose provision consists wholly or partly in the transmission and routing of signals on a telecommunications network. A service provider needs not necessarily run his own network. + +**SMS:** Short Message Service gives the ability to send character messages to phones. SMS messages can be MO (mobile originate) or MT (mobile terminate). + +**target identity:** technical identity (e.g. the interception's target directory number), which uniquely identifies a target. One target may have one or several target identities. + +**target service:** telecommunications service associated with an target and usually specified in a lawful authorization for interception. + +NOTE 4: There may be more than one target service associated with a single target. + +**telecommunications:** any transfer of signs, signals, writing images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo-optical system. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [38] and the following apply: + +| | | +|----------|-------------------------------------| +| A-MSISDN | Additional MSISDN | +| AN | Access Network | +| ASE | Application Service Element | +| ASN.1 | Abstract Syntax Notation, Version 1 | +| BER | Basic Encoding Rules | +| CC | Content of Communication | +| CSCF | Call Session Control Function | +| DF | Delivery Function | +| DSMIP | Dual Stack MIP | +| e-PDG | Evolved PDG | +| EPS | Evolved Packet System | + +| | | +|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------| +| E-UTRAN | Evolved UTRAN | +| FTP | File Transfer Protocol | +| GGSN | Gateway GPRS Support Node | +| GPRS | General Packet Radio Service | +| GSM | Global System for Mobile communications | +| GSN | GPRS Support Node (SGSN or GGSN) | +| GTP | GPRS Tunnelling Protocol | +| HA | Home Agent | +| HI | Handover Interface | +| HI1 | Handover Interface Port 1 (for Administrative Information) | +| HI2 | Handover Interface Port 2 (for Intercept Related Information) | +| HI3 | Handover Interface Port 3 (for Content of Communication) | +| HLC | High Layer Compatibility | +| HSS | Home Subscriber Server | +| IA | Interception Area | +| IA5 | International Alphabet No. 5 | +| IAP | Interception Access Point | +| IBCF | Interconnecting Border Control Function | +| ICI | Interception Configuration Information | +| IE | Information Element | +| IIF | Internal Interception Function | +| IMEI | International Mobile station Equipment Identity | +| IM-MGW | IMS Media Gateway | +| IMS | IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem | +| IMS-AGW | IMS Access Gateway | +| IMSI | International Mobile Subscriber Identity | +| INI | Internal network interface | +| IP | Internet Protocol | +| IP-CAN | IP-Connectivity Access Network | +| IPS | Internet Protocol Stack | +| IRI | Intercept Related Information | +| ITOT | ISO Transport Service on top of TCP | +| LALS | Lawful Access Location Services | +| LCS | Location Services | +| LEA | Law Enforcement Agency | +| LEMF | Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility | +| LI | Lawful Interception | +| LIID | Lawful Interception Identifier | +| LLC | Lower layer compatibility | +| LSB | Least significant bit | +| MAP | Mobile Application Part | +| MCPTT | Mission Critical Push To Talk | +| ME | Mobile Entity | +| MF | Mediation Function | +| MGCF | Media Gateway Control Function | +| MIP | Mobile IP | +| MME | Mobility Management Entity | +| MS | Mobile Station | +| MSB | Most significant bit | +| MSISDN | Mobile Subscriber ISDN Number | +| MSN | Multiple Subscriber Number | +| NEID | Network Element Identifier | +| NID | Network Identifier | +| NIDD | Non-IP Data Delivery | +| NO | Network Operator | +| OA&M | Operation, Administration & Maintenance | +| P-CSCF | Proxy Call Session Control Function | +| PDG | Packet Data Gateway | +| PDN | Packet Data Network | +| PDN-GW | PDN Gateway | +| PDP | Packet Data Protocol | + +| | | +|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------| +| PLMN | Public land mobile network | +| PMIP | Proxy Mobile IP | +| POC | Push to talk Over Cellular | +| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network | +| PTC | Push to Talk over Cellular (Encompasses POC and MCPTT services) | +| Rx | Receive direction | +| S-CSCF | Serving Call Session Control Function | +| SCEF | Service Capability Exposure Function | +| SDP | Session Description Protocol | +| SGSN | Serving GPRS Support Node | +| S-GW | Serving Gateway | +| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol | +| SMAF | Service Management Agent Function | +| SMF | Service Management Function | +| SMS | Short Message Service | +| SP | Service Provider | +| TAU | Tracking Area Update | +| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol | +| TI | Target identity | +| TLS | Transport Layer Security | +| TP | Terminal Portability | +| T-PDU | tunneled PDU | +| TPKT | Transport Packet | +| TrGW | Transit Gateway | +| TWAN | Trusted WLAN Access Network | +| Tx | Transmit direction | +| UI | User Interaction | +| ULIC | UMTS LI Correlation | +| UMTS | Universal Mobile Telecommunication System | +| URI | Universal Resource Identifier | +| URL | Universal Resource Locator | +| UTRAN | Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network | +| VPN | Virtual Private Network | +| WAF | WebRTC Authorisation Function | +| WebRTC | Web Real Time Communications | +| WIC | WebRTC IMS Client | +| WWSF | WebRTC Web Server Function | + +--- + +## 4 General + +### 4.0 Introduction + +The present document focuses on the handover interface related to the provision of information related to LI between a network operator, access provider and/or service provider and a Law Enforcement Agency (LEA). + +### 4.1 Basic principles for the handover interface + +The network requirements mentioned in the present document are derived, in part, from the requirements defined in ETSI ES 201 158 [2]. + +Lawful interception may require functions to be provided in the switching or routing nodes of a telecommunications network. + +The specification of the handover interface is subdivided into three logical ports each optimised to the different purposes and types of information being exchanged. + +The interface is extensible. (i.e. the interface may be modified in the future as necessary). + +## 4.2 Legal requirements + +It shall be possible to select elements from the handover interface specification to conform with: + +- national requirements; +- national law; +- any law applicable to a specific LEA. + +As a consequence, the present document shall define, in addition to mandatory requirements, which are always applicable, supplementary options, in order to take into account the various influences listed above. See also ETSI TS 101 331 [1] and ETSI ETR 330 [3]. + +## 4.3 Functional requirements + +A lawful authorization shall describe the kind of information IRI only, or IRI with CC that is required by an LEA, the identifiers for the target, the start and stop time of LI, and the addresses of the LEAs for delivery of CC and/or IRI and further information. + +A single target may be the target by different LEAs. It shall be possible strictly to separate these interception measures. + +If two targets are communicating with each other, each target is dealt with separately. + +## 4.4 Overview of handover interface + +### 4.4.0 Introduction + +The generic handover interface adopts a three port structure such that administrative information (HI1), intercept related information (HI2), and the content of communication (HI3) are logically separated. + +Figure 4.1 shows a block diagram with the relevant entities for Lawful Interception. + +The outer circle represents the operator's (NO/AN/SP) domain with respect to lawful interception. It contains the network internal functions, the internal network interface (INI), the administration function and the mediation functions for IRI and CC. The inner circle contains the internal functions of the network (e.g. switching, routing, handling of the communication process). Within the network internal function the results of interception (i.e. IRI and CC) are generated in the Internal Interception Function (IIF). + +The IIF provides the CC and the IRI, respectively, at the Internal Network Interface (INI). For both kinds of information, mediation functions may be used, which provide the final representation of the standardized handover interfaces at the operator's (NO/AN/SP) domain boundary. + +![Functional block diagram showing handover interface HI. The diagram illustrates the flow of information from Network Internal Functions (IIF) in the NWO/AP/SvP's domain to the LEA domain via the LEMF. The IIF provides intercept related information (IRI) and content of communication (CC) to mediation functions (IRI mediation and CC mediation). These functions then deliver the information to the LEMF via handover interfaces HI1 (administrative information), HI2 (intercept related information), and HI3 (content of communication). The diagram also shows the internal network interface (INI) and the internal interception function (IIF).](ae53f90bb87d6d09e2d6b5278d7c338f_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows the functional architecture for lawful interception handover. On the left, the 'NWO/AP/SvP's domain' contains 'Network Internal Functions' which include an 'IIF' (internal interception function). The IIF sends 'intercept related information (IRI)' (purple arrow) and 'content of communication (CC)' (red arrow) to mediation functions. The IRI is processed by the 'IRI mediation function' and the CC by the 'CC mediation function'. Both mediation functions are connected to the 'NWO/AP/SvP's administration function'. The administration function connects to the 'LEA domain' via 'HI1' (administrative information). The mediation functions connect to the 'LEMF' (Law Enforcement Management Function) via 'HI2' (intercept related information) and 'HI3' (content of communication). A dashed green line labeled 'INI' (internal network interface) separates the internal functions from the mediation functions. A legend at the bottom defines the interfaces: HI1: administrative information, HI2: intercept related information, HI3: content of communication. Other labels include IIF: internal interception function and INI: internal network interface. + +Functional block diagram showing handover interface HI. The diagram illustrates the flow of information from Network Internal Functions (IIF) in the NWO/AP/SvP's domain to the LEA domain via the LEMF. The IIF provides intercept related information (IRI) and content of communication (CC) to mediation functions (IRI mediation and CC mediation). These functions then deliver the information to the LEMF via handover interfaces HI1 (administrative information), HI2 (intercept related information), and HI3 (content of communication). The diagram also shows the internal network interface (INI) and the internal interception function (IIF). + +**Figure 4.1: Functional block diagram showing handover interface HI** + +NOTE 1: Figure 4.1 shows only a reference configuration, with a logical representation of the entities involved in lawful interception and does not mandate separate physical entities. + +NOTE 2: The mediation functions may be transparent. + +NOTE 3: The LEMF is responsible for collecting and analyzing IRI and CC information. The LEMF is the responsibility of the LEA. + +NOTE 4: In case MIKEY ticket based solution is used for IMS media security as specified in TS 33.328 [54], upon reception of the IRI related to an encrypted session the IRI mediation function queries the network key management server and retrieves the media decryption keys; the IRI mediation function then delivers the keys to the LEMF. + +#### 4.4.1 Handover interface port 2 (HI2) + +The handover interface port 2 shall transport the IRI from the operator's (NO/AN/SP) IIF to the LEMF. + +The delivery of the handover interface port 2 shall be performed via data communication methods which are suitable for the network infrastructure and for the kind and volume of data to be transmitted. From the operator (NO/AN/SP) to LEMF delivery is subject to the facilities that may be procured by the government. + +The delivery can in principle be made via different types of lower communication layers, which should be standard or widely used data communication protocols. + +The individual IRI parameters shall be coded using ASN.1 and the basic encoding rules (BER). The format of the parameter's information content shall be based on existing telecommunication standards, where possible. + +The individual IRI parameters have to be sent to the LEMF at least once (if available). + +The IRI records are transmitted individually. As an option, IRI records can be aggregated for delivery to the same LEA (i.e. in a single delivery interaction). As there are time constraints associated with the delivery of IRI, the use of this optional feature is subject to national or regional requirements. As a general principle, IRI records shall be sent immediately and shall not be withheld in the MF/DF in order to use the IRI record aggregation option. + +The IRI records shall contain information available from normal provider (NO/AN/SP) operating procedures. In addition the IRI records shall include information for identification and control purposes as specifically required by the HI2 port. + +The IIF is not required to make any attempt to request explicitly extra information which has not already been supplied by a signalling system. + +#### 4.4.2 Handover interface port 3 (HI3) + +The port HI3 shall transport the CC of the intercepted telecommunication service to the LEMF. The CC shall be presented as a transparent en-clair copy of the information flow during an established, frequently bi-directional, communication of the target. However, in case MIKEY ticket based solution is used for IMS media security as specified in TS 33.328 [54] and CC is presented in encrypted format, the decryption keys and the associated information shall be delivered to the LEMF via appropriate IRI over the HI2. + +NOTE 1: Additional information needed for decryption, e.g. roll-over counter, will be available as part of intercepted CC. + +NOTE 2: In this version of the standard, in case of interception starting on ongoing encrypted communication, some information needed for decryption might not be available. + +NOTE 3: In this version of the standard, immediate rekeying is not supported from the LI perspective. + +As the appropriate form of HI3 depends upon the service being intercepted, HI3 is described in relevant annexes. + +The HI2 and HI3 are logically different interfaces, even though in some installations the HI2 and HI3 packet streams might also be delivered via a common transmission path from a MF to a LEMF. It is possible to correlate HI2 and HI3 packet streams by having common (referencing) data fields embedded in the IRI and the CC packet streams. + +### 4.5 HI2: Interface port for intercept related information + +#### 4.5.0 General + +The HI2 interface port shall be used to transport all IRI, i.e. the information or data associated with the communication services of the target identity apparent to the network. It includes signalling information used to establish the telecommunication service and to control its progress, time stamps, and, if available, further information such as location information. Only information which is part of standard network signalling procedures shall be used within communication related IRI. + +For all UE locations obtained, generated or reported to the LEMF, the MF/DF shall report the time at which the location was established by the location source (e.g. MME or HSS) and provide this to the MF/DF along with the location information. If this information cannot be provided to the MF/DF, then the MF/DF shall indicate that the time is not available. If the information in the MME received over S1 (TS 36.413 [100]) includes one or more cell IDs, then all cell IDs shall be reported to the LEMF whenever location reporting is triggered at the MME. + +Sending of the IRI to the LEMF shall in general take place as soon as possible, after the relevant information is available. + +In exceptional cases (e.g. data link failure), the IRI may be buffered for later transmission for a specified period of time. + +Within this clause only, definitions are made which apply in general for all network technologies. Additional technology specific HI2 definitions are specified in related Annexes. + +#### 4.5.1 Data transmission protocols + +The protocol used by the "LI application" for the encoding and the sending of data between the MF and the LEMF is based on already standardized data transmission protocols. + +The specified data communication methods provide a general means of data communication between the LEA and the operator's (NO/AN/SP) mediation function. They are used for the delivery of: + +- HI2 type of information (IRI records); +- Certain types of content of communication (e.g. SMS). + +The present document specifies the use of the several possible methods for delivery: FTP or TPKT/TCP/IP (specifications for this specific protocol are in Clause G.2 - "HI2 delivery methods". This protocol is defined by IETF RFC 2126: "ISO Transport Service on top of TCP (ITOT)" [28] on the application layer and the BER on the presentation layer. The lower layers for data communication may be chosen in agreement with the operator (NO/AN/SP) and the LEA. + +As an alternative, ETSI TS 102 232-1 [104] and ETSI TS 102 232-7 [105] may be used for the encoding and the sending of data between the MF and the LEMF. + +The delivery to the LEMF should use the internet protocol stack. + +NOTE: TPKT/TCP/IP is recommended in the case of IRI only with the option of IRI Packet Header Information reporting. + +## 4.5.2 Application for IRI (HI2 information) + +The handover interface port 2 shall transport the IRI from the operator's (NO/AN/SP) MF to the LEMF. + +The individual IRI parameters shall be coded using ASN.1 and the basic encoding rules (BER). Where possible, the format of the information content shall be taken over from existing telecommunication standards, which are used for these parameters with the network already (e.g. IP). Within the ASN.1 coding for IRI, such standard parameters are typically defined as octet strings. + +## 4.5.3 Types of IRI records + +Intercept related information shall be conveyed to the LEMF in messages, or IRI data records, respectively. Four types of IRI records are defined: + +- 1) IRI-BEGIN record at the first event of a communication attempt, opening the IRI transaction. +- 2) IRI-END record at the end of a communication attempt, closing the IRI transaction. +- 3) IRI-CONTINUE record at any time during a communication attempt within the IRI transaction. +- 4) IRI-REPORT record used in general for non-communication related events. + +For information related to an existing communication case, the record types 1 to 3 shall be used. They form an IRI transaction for each communication case or communication attempt, which corresponds directly to the communication phase (set-up, active or release). + +For packet oriented data services, the first event of a communication attempt shall be the PDP context activation or a similar event and an IRI-BEGIN record shall be issued. The end of the communication attempt shall be the PDP context deactivation and an IRI-END record shall be issued. While a PDP context is active, IRI-CONTINUE records shall be used for CC relevant IRI data records, IRI-REPORT records otherwise. + +Record type 4 is used for non-communication related subscriber action, like subscriber controlled input (SCI) for service activation. For simple cases, it can also be applicable for reporting unsuccessful communication attempts. It can also be applicable to report some subscriber actions which may trigger communication attempts or modifications of an existing communication, when the communication attempt or the change of the existing communication itself is reported separately. + +Record type 4 is also used to convey the LALS reports. + +For the IMS domain the IRI record types are used in a different way than described in this clause. Details on the IRI type usage in the IMS domain are defined in clause 7.5. + +The record type is an explicit part of the record. The 4 record types are defined independently of target communication events. The actual indication of one or several communication events, which caused the generation of an IRI record, is part of further parameters within the record's information content. Consequently, the record types of the IRI transactions are not related to specific messages of the signalling protocols of a communication case, and are therefore independent of future enhancements of the intercepted services, of network specific features, etc. Any transport level information + +(i.e. higher-level services) on the target communication-state or other target communication related information is contained within the information content of the IRI records. + +For packet oriented data services, if LI is being activated during an already established PDP context or similar, an IRI-BEGIN record will mark the start of the interception. If LI is being deactivated during an established PDP context or similar, no IRI-END record will be transmitted. The end of interception can be communicated to the LEA by other means (e.g. HI1). + +NOTE: In some situation (e.g. during activation of second, third, etc, intercepts on the target), the MF/DF may have to detect on its own that an interception is activated on an already established PDP context or similar. + +The DF2 shall not send the BEGIN with Start of Interception to the LEMFs that were already intercepting the target communication due to a previous LI activation on the same target. + +## 4.6 Reliability + +The reliability associated with the result of the interception of the content of communication should be (at least) equal to the reliability of the original content of communication. For intercepted packet data communications, this may be derived from the QoS class used for the original intercepted session, TS 23.107 [20]. + +The reliability associated with the result of interception of signalling should be (at least) equal to the the reliability of the original signalling. + +Reliability from the operator (NO/AN/SP) to the LEMF is determined by what operators (NO/AN/SP) and law enforcement agree upon. + +--- + +## 5 Circuit-switch domain + +### 5.0 General + +For North America, the use of J-STD-025-A [23] is recommended. + +### 5.1 Specific identifiers for LI + +#### 5.1.0 Introduction + +Specific identifiers are necessary to identify a target for interception uniquely and to correlate between the data, which is conveyed over the different Handover Interfaces (HI1, HI2 and HI3). The identifiers, which apply to all communication technologies, are defined in the clauses below. + +#### 5.1.1 Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID) + +For each target identity related to an interception measure, the authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) shall assign a special Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID), which has been agreed between the LEA and the operator (NO/AN/SP). It is used within parameters of all HI interface ports. + +Using an indirect identification, pointing to a target identity makes it easier to keep the knowledge about a specific target limited within the authorized operators (NO/AN/SP) and the handling agents at the LEA. + +The Lawful Interception Identifier LIID is a component of the CC delivery procedure and of the IRI records. It shall be used within any information exchanged at the Handover Interfaces HI2 and HI3 for identification and correlation purposes. + +The LIID format shall consist of alphanumeric characters (or digit string for sub-address option, see annex J). It might for example, among other information, contain a lawful authorization reference number, and the date, when the lawful authorization was issued. + +The authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) shall enter for each target identity of the target a unique LIID. + +If more than one LEA intercepts the same target identity, there shall be unique LIIDs assigned, relating to each LEA. + +## 5.1.2 Communication Identifier (CID) + +### 5.1.2.0 General + +For each activity relating to a target identity, a CID is generated by the relevant network element. The CID consists of the following two identifiers: + +- Network Identifier (NID); +- Communication Identity Number (CIN) - optional. + +NOTE 1: For all non CC related records like SMS, SCI etc. no correlation to a CC could be made. + +The CID distinguishes between the different activities of the target identity. It is also used for correlation between IRI records and CC connections, as well as for correlation between LALS reports and IRI records of the triggering events. It is used at the interface ports HI2 and HI3. + +The Communication Identifier is specified in the subsequent subclauses of 5.1.2. For ASN.1 coding details, see annex B. + +### 5.1.2.1 Network Identifier (NID) + +The Network Identifier is a mandatory parameter; it should be internationally unique. It consists of one or both of the following two identifiers. + +- Operator - (NO/AN/SP) identifier (mandatory): +Unique identification of network operator, access network provider or service provider. +- Network element identifier NEID (optional): +The purpose of the network element identifier is to uniquely identify the relevant network element carrying out the LI operations, such as LI activation, IRI record sending, etc. + +A network element identifier may be: + +- an E.164 international node number +- an X.25 address; +- an IP address. + +National regulations may mandate the sending of the NEID. + +### 5.1.2.2 Communication Identity Number (CIN) - optional + +This parameter is mandatory for IRI in case of reporting events for connection-oriented types of communication (e.g. circuit switched calls). + +The communication identity number is a temporary identifier of an intercepted communication, relating to a specific target identity. + +The Communication Identity Number (CIN) identifies uniquely an intercepted communications session within the relevant network element. All the results of interception within a single communications session has to have the same CIN. If a single target has two or more communications sessions through the same operator, and through the same network element then the CIN for each session shall be different. + +NOTE: If two or more target identities, related either to an unique target or to different targets, are involved in the same communication the same CIN value may be assigned by the relevant network element to the communication sessions of the different target identities. + +### 5.1.3 CC link identifier (CCLID) + +This identifier is only used at the interface ports HI2 and HI3 in case of the reuse of CC links (option B, see clause 5.4.4.2). + +For each CC link, which is set up by the mediation function towards the LEMF, a CC link identifier (CCLID) is transmitted in the HI2 records and HI3 setup message in addition to CIN and NID. For the correct correlation of multiparty calls this identity number indicates in the IRI records of each multiparty call, which CC link is used for the transmission of the CC. + +The CCLID may use the same format as the CIN; in this case, it need not be transmitted explicitly during set up of the CC links, as part of HI3. The CIN may also implicitly represent the CCLID. + +### 5.1.4 Correlation of CC and IRI + +To assure correlation between the independently transmitted Content of Communication (CC) and Intercept Related Information (IRI) of an intercepted call the following parameters are used: + +- Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID), see clause 5.1.1; +- Communication Identifier (CID), see clause 5.1.2; +- CC Link Identifier (CCLID), see clause 5.1.3. + +These parameters are transferred from the MF to the LEMF in: + +- HI2: see clause 5.2.2.1; +- HI3: see clause 5.3.2. + +Correlation of the present document ID's to TS 33.107 [19] ID's. + +The ID Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID) out of the present document is supported at the IIF with warrant reference number. + +Parameters out of the present document, see clause 5.1.2: + +*Communication Identifier (CID)* + +For each call or other activity relating to a target identity a CID is generated by the relevant network element. The CID consists of the following two identifiers: + +- Network Identifier (NID); +- Communication Identity Number (CIN). + +Intercepting Node ID is used for the NID in the UMTS system. + +The correlation number is used for the CIN. + +For the Communication Identifier (CID) in the UMTS system we use the combination of Intercepting Node ID and the correlation number. + +### 5.1.5 Usage of Identifiers + +The identifiers are exchanged between the mediation function and the LEMF via the interfaces HI1, HI2 and HI3. There exist several interface options for the exchange of information. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 define the usage of numbers and identifiers depending on these options. + +NOTE: X in tables 5.1 and 5.2: Identifier used within parameters of the interface. + +**Table 5.1: Usage of identifiers, IRI and CC transmitted; options A, B (see clause 5.4.4)** + +| Identifier | IRI and CC transmitted (option A) | | | IRI and CC transmitted (option B) | | | +|------------|-----------------------------------|-----|-----|-----------------------------------|-----|----------------| +| | HI1 | HI2 | HI3 | HI1 | HI2 | HI3 | +| LIID | X | X | X | X | X | X | +| NID | | X | X | | X | X | +| CIN | | X | X | | X | X (see note 1) | +| CCLID | | | | | X | X (see note 2) | + +NOTE 1: The CIN of the 1st call for which this CC link has been set-up. +NOTE 2: The CCLID may be omitted, see clause 5.1.3. + +**Table 5.2: Usage of identifiers, only IRI transmitted** + +| Identifier | Only IRI transmitted | | +|------------|----------------------|-----| +| | HI1 | HI2 | +| LIID | X | X | +| NID | | X | +| CIN | | X | +| CCLID | | | + +## 5.2 HI2: interface port for IRI + +### 5.2.1 Definition of Intercept Related Information + +Intercept Related Information will in principle be available in the following phases of a call (successful or not): + +- 1) At call initiation when the target identity becomes active, at which time call destination information may or may not be available (set up phase of a call, target may be the originating or terminating party, or be involved indirectly by a supplementary service). +- 2) At the end of a call, when the target identity becomes inactive (release phase of call). +- 3) At certain times between the above phases, when relevant information becomes available (active phase of call). + +In addition, information on non-call related actions of a target constitutes IRI and is sent via HI2, e.g. information on subscriber controlled input. + +The Intercept Related Information (IRI) may be subdivided into the following categories: + +- 1) Control information for HI2 (e.g. correlation information). +- 2) Basic call information, for standard calls between two parties. +- 3) Information related to supplementary services, which have been invoked during a call. +- 4) Information on non-call related target actions. + +### 5.2.2 Structure of IRI records + +#### 5.2.2.0 General + +Each IRI-record contains several parameters. In the subsequent subclauses of 5.2.2, the usage of these parameters is explained in more detail. + +Mandatory parameters are indicated as HI2 control information. Optional parameters are provided depending on the availability at the MF. For the internal structure of the IRI records, the ASN.1 description, with the application of the basic encoding rules (BER) is used. This ASN.1 specification is enclosed in annex B. + +### 5.2.2.1 Control Information for HI2 + +The main purpose of this information is the unique identification of records related to a target identity, including their unique mapping to the links carrying the Content of Communication. In general, parameters of this category are mandatory, i.e. they have to be provided in any record. + +The following items are identified (in brackets: ASN.1 name and reference to the ASN.1 definition or clause B.3a): + +- 1) Record type (*IRIContent*, see clause B.3a) +IRI-BEGIN, IRI-CONTINUE, IRI-END, IRI-REPORT-record types. +- 2) Version indication (*iRIversion*, see clause B.3a) +Identification of the particular version of the HI2 interface specification. +- 3) Communication Identifier (*CommunicationIdentifier*, see clauses 5.1.2 and B.3a). +- 4) Lawful Interception Identifier (*LawfulInterceptionIdentifier*, see clauses 5.1.1 and B.3a). +- 5) Date & time (*TimeStamp*, see clause B.3a) +Date & time of record trigger condition. +The parameter shall have the capability to indicate whether the time information is given as Local time without time zone, or as UTC. Normally, the operator (NO/AN/SP) shall define these options. +- 6) CC Link Identifier (*CC-Link-Identifier*, see clause 5.1.3 for definition and clause B.3a for ASN.1 definition). + +Table 5.3 summarizes the items of HI2 control information. It is mandatory information, except the CID - it may be omitted for non-call related IRI records - and the CCLID. Their format and coding definition is LI specific, i.e. not based on other signalling standards. + +**Table 5.3: Parameters for LI control information in IRI records (HI2 interface port)** + +| IRI parameters: LI control information | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------| +| IRI parameter name | ASN.1 name (used in annex B) | +| Type of record | IRIContent | +| Version indication | iRIversion | +| Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID) | LawfulInterceptionIdentifier | +| Communication Identifier (CID)
- Communication Identity Number (CIN)
- Network Identifier (NID) | CommunicationIdentifier | +| Date & time | TimeStamp | +| CC Link Identifier (CCLID) (only used in case of option B) | CC-Link-Identifier | + +### 5.2.2.2 Basic call information + +This clause defines parameters within IRI records for basic calls, i.e. calls, for which during their progress no supplementary services have been invoked. In general, the parameters are related to either the originating or terminating party of a call; consequently, ASN.1 containers are defined for the originating/terminating types of parties, which allow to include the relevant, party-related information. The structure of these containers and the representation of individual items are defined in clause B.3a. + +NOTE: A third type of party information is defined for the forwarded-to-party (see clause 5.2.2.3 on calls with supplementary services being invoked). + +The items below are to be included, when they become available for the first time during a call in progress. If the same item appears identically several times during a call, it needs only to be transmitted once, e.g. in an IRI-BEGIN record. The ASN.1 name of the respective parameters, as defined in clause B.3a, is indicated in brackets. + +- 1) Direction of call (*intercepted-Call-Direct*) +Indication, whether the target identity is originating or terminating Party. +- 2) Address of originating and terminating parties (*CallingPartyNumber* or *CalledPartyNumber*) +If e.g. in case of call originated by the target at transmission of the IRI-BEGIN record only a partial terminating address is available, it shall be transmitted, the complete address shall follow, when available. + +- 3) Basic Service, LLC (*Services-Information*) +Parameters as received from signalling protocol (e.g. BC, HLC, TMR, LLC). +- 4) Cause (*ISUP-parameters* or *DSSI-parameters-codeset-0*) +Reason for release of intercepted call. Cause value as received from signalling protocol. It is transmitted with the ASN.1 container of the party, which initiated the release; in case of a network-initiated release, it may be either one. +- 5) Additional network parameters +e.g. location information (*Location*). + +Parameters defined within table 5.5 shall be used for existing services, in the given 3GPP format. National extensions may be possible using the ASN.1 parameter *National-Parameters*. + +### 5.2.2.3 Information on supplementary services, related to a call in progress + +The general principle is to transmit service related information within IRI records, when the corresponding event/information, which needs to be conveyed to the LEMF, is received from the signalling protocol. Where possible, the coding of the related information shall use the same formats as defined by standard signalling protocols. + +The selection, which types of events or information elements are relevant for transmission to the LEAs is conforming to the requirements defined in ETSI TS 101 331 [1] and ETSI ES 201 158 [2]. + +A dedicated ASN.1 parameter is defined for supplementary services related to forwarding or re-routing calls (*forwarded-to-Party* information), due to the major relevance of these kinds of services with respect to LI. For the various cases of forwarded calls, the information related to forwarding is included in the *originatingParty/terminatingParty/forwarded-to-Party* information: + +- 1) If a call to the target has been previously forwarded, available parameters relating to the redirecting party(ies) are encapsulated within the *originatingPartyInformation* parameter. +- 2) If the call is forwarded at the target's access (conditional or unconditional forwarding towards the *forwarded-to-party*), the parameters which are related to the redirecting party (target) are encapsulated within the *terminatingPartyInformation* parameter. +- 3) All parameters related to the *forwarded-to-party* or beyond the *forwarded-to-party* are encapsulated within the *forwarded-to-Party* ASN.1 coded parameter. In addition, this parameter includes the *supplementary-Services-Information*, containing the *forwarded-to* address, and the redirection information parameter, with the reason of the call forwarding, the number of redirection, etc.). + +For the detailed specification of supplementary services related procedures see clause 5.4. + +Parameters defined within table 5.4 shall be used for existing services, in the given format. National extensions may be possible using the ASN.1 parameter *National-Parameters*. + +### 5.2.2.4 Information on non-call related supplementary services + +The general principle is to transmit non-call related service information as received from the signalling protocol. + +A typical user action to be reported is Subscriber Controlled Input (SCI). + +For the detailed specification of the related procedures see clause 5.4. + +## 5.2.3 Delivery of IRI + +The events defined in TS 33.107 [19] are used to generate Records for the delivery via HI2. The LALS reports defined in TS 33.107 [19] are delivered via HI2, as well. + +There are thirteen different events type received at DF2 level. According to each event, a Record is sent to the LEMF if this is required. In the case of LALS reports, which are not associated with an event, a Record is sent to the LEMF without the event parameter. + +The following table gives the mapping between event type received at DF2 level and record type sent to the LEMF. + +It is an implementation option if the redundant information will be sent for each further event. + +**Table 5.4: Structure of the records for UMTS (CS)** + +| Event | IRI Record Type | +|------------------------------|-----------------| +| Call establishment | BEGIN | +| Answer | CONTINUE | +| Supplementary service | CONTINUE | +| Handover | CONTINUE | +| Release | END | +| Location update | REPORT | +| Subscriber controlled input | REPORT | +| SMS | REPORT | +| Serving system | REPORT | +| HLR subscriber record change | REPORT | +| Cancel location | REPORT | +| Register location | REPORT | +| Location information request | REPORT | + +The LALS report records are sent to the LEMF with the REPORT IRI Record Type. + +NOTE 1: Void. + +A set of information is used to generate the records. The records used transmit the information from mediation function to LEMF. This set of information can be extended in 3G MSC server or 3G GMSC server or DF2/MF, if this is necessary in a specific country. The following table gives the mapping between information received per event or report and information sent in records. + +**Table 5.5: Description of parameters** + +| Parameter | Definition | ASN.1 parameter | +|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | Target Identifier with the MSISDN of the target | PartyInformation/msISDN | +| Observed IMSI | Target Identifier with the IMSI of the target | PartyInformation/imsi | +| Observed IMEI | Target Identifier with the IMEI of the target, it has to be checked for each call over the radio interface | PartyInformation/imei | +| Observed Non-Local ID | Target Identifier with the E.164 number of Non-Local ID target | PartyInformation/e164-Format | +| New observed MSISDN | New target identifier with MSISDN of the target, when available | PartyInformation/msISDN | +| New observed IMSI | New target identifier with IMSI of the target, when available | PartyInformation/imsi | +| New observed IMEI | New target identifier with IMEI of the target, when available | PartyInformation/imei | +| Event type | Description of which type of event is delivered: Establishment, Answer, Supplementary service, Handover, Release, SMS, Location update, Subscriber controlled input, HLR subscriber record change, Serving system, Cancel location, Register location, Location information request | umts-CS-Event. In case this parameter is not sent over the HI2 interface, the presence of other parameters on HI2 indicates the event type (e.g. sMS or sciData parameter presence) | +| Event date | Date of the event generation in the 3G MSC server or 3G GMSC server or in the HLR | timeStamp | +| Event time | Time of the event generation in the 3G MSC server or 3G GMSC server or in the HLR | | +| Dialled number | Dialled number before digit modification, IN-modification, etc. | PartyInformation (= originating)/DSS1-parameters/calledpartynumber | +| Connected number | Number of the answering party | PartyInformation/supplementary-Services-Info | +| Other party address | Directory number of the other party for originating calls
Calling party for terminating calls | PartyInformation (= terminating)/calledpartynumber
PartyInformation/callingpartynumber | +| Call direction | Information if the target is calling or called e.g. MOC/MTC or originating/terminating in or/out | intercepted-Call-Direct | + +| Parameter | Definition | ASN.1 parameter | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| CID | Unique number for each call sent to the DF, to help the LEA, to have a correlation between each call and the IRI (combination of Interception Node ID and the correlation number) | communicationIdentifier | +| Lawful interception identifier | Unique number for each surveillance lawful authorization | lawfulInterceptionIdentifier | +| CGI/SAI | CGI or SAI of the target; for the location information | locationOfTheTarget | +| Location area code | Location-area-code of the target defines the Location Area in a PLMN | | +| Location Information | LALS location information | | +| Time of Location | Date/Time of location. The time when location was obtained by the location source node. | | +| Serving system identifier | VPLMN ID of the serving system or of the third party network interworking with the HLR | serving-System-Identifier | +| Basic service | Information about Tele service or bearer service | PartyInformation/DSS1-parameters-codeset-0 | +| Supplementary service | Supplementary services used by the target e.g. Call forwarding, CW, ECT | PartyInformation/Supplementary-Services | +| Forwarded to number | Forwarded to number at call forwarding | PartyInformation/calledPartyNumber (party-Qualifier indicating forwarded-to-party) | +| Call release reason | Call release reason of the target call | release-Reason-Of-intercepted-Call | +| SMS | The SMS content with header which is sent with the SMS-service | sMS | +| SCI | Non-call related Subscriber Controlled Input (SCI) which the 3G MSC server receives from the ME | PartyInformation/sciData | +| Other update | Carrier specific information related to its implementation or subscription process on its HLR | carrierSpecificData | +| Changed (old/new) IMSI or MSISDN or IMEI | Provides the identity changes in Subscriber Record Change Event. | change-Of-Target-Identity | +| Previous serving system identifier | Previous VPLMN Id of the target | current-Previous-Systems/previous-Serving-System-Identifier | +| Previous serving MSC-number | An E.164 number of the previous serving MSC included in the intercepted MAP message | current-Previous-Systems/previous-Serving-MSC-Number | +| Previous serving MSC-address | An IP address of the previous serving MSC, included in the intercepted MAP message | current-Previous-Systems/previous-Serving-MSC- Address | +| NOTE: LIID parameter has to be present in each record sent to the LEMF. | | | + +Table 5.5A: Serving System REPORT Record + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event type | C | Provide Serving System event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the HLR reporting the event (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| serving system identifier | C | Provide the VPLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, E. 212 number [87]). | + +**Table 5.5B: HLR subscriber record change REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| new observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| new observed IMSI | | | +| New observed IMEI | | | +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event type | C | Provide HLR subscriber record change event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the HLR reporting the event (Network element identifier included). | +| changed (old/new) IMSI or MSISDN or IMEI | M | Shall provide what was changed (old/new MSISDN, old/new IMSI or old/new IMEI) | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| carrier specific data | C | Provide to raw data of this specific update related to HLR. | + +**Table 5.5C: Cancel location REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide cancel Location change event type. (purge from HLR sent to SGSN included). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the HLR reporting the event (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| previous serving system identifier | C | Provide the previous VPLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, defined in E212 [87]). | +| previous serving MSC-number | C | Provide to identify the E.164 number of the previous serving MSC. | +| previous serving MSC-address | C | Provide to identify the IP address of the previous serving MSC. | + +**Table 5.5D: Register location REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide register location event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the HLR reporting the event (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| previous serving system identifier | C | Provide the previous VPLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country; defined in E212 [87]). | +| previous serving MSC number | C | Provide to identify the E.164 number of the previous serving MSC. | +| previous serving MSC address | C | Provide to identify the IP address of the previous serving MSC. | +| current serving system identifier | C | Provide the previous VPLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, defined in E212 [87]). | +| current serving MSC number | C | Provide to identify the E.164 number of the current serving MSC. | +| current serving MSC address | C | Provide to identify the IP address of the current serving MSC. | + +**Table 5.5E: Location information request REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide location information request event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the HLR reporting the event (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| requesting network identifier | C | Provide the requesting network identifier PLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, defined in E212 [87]). | +| requesting node type | C | Provide the requesting node type (GMSC; SMS Centre; GMLC, MME, SGSN). | + +**Table 5.5F: LALS Target Positioning REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMSI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the LCS Report is available at LI LCS Client. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the LI LCS Client (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide the LALS location information, if the positioning is successful | +| extended location parameters | O | If available, additional location information and associated QoS information. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | +| LALS error code | C | Provide the error identification code if the positioning is not successful. | + +**Table 5.5G: LALS Enhanced Location for IRI REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMSI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the LCS Report is available at LI LCS Client. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the LI LCS Client (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| communication identity number | C | Provided for correlation with the IRI records of the call, if available in the corresponding LALS triggering event. | +| location information | C | Provide the LALS location information, if the positioning is successful. | +| extended location parameters | O | If available, additional location information and associated QoS information. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | +| LALS error code | C | Provide the error identification code if the positioning is not successful. | + +NOTE 2: See the TS 33.107 [19] for a detailed description of LALS. See Annex O for information on using of the CS ASN.1 information object for the LALS reporting. + +NOTE 3: In some specific scenarios the amount of Enhanced Location for IRI reports data may overload the X2 and/or HI2 interfaces. To prevent the overload, a flow control for Enhanced Location for IRI Reports may be implemented, e.g. by limiting the frequency of the reports for individual target. + +## 5.3 HI3: interface port for Content of Communication + +### 5.3.0 General + +The port HI3 shall transport the Content of the Communication (CC) of the intercepted telecommunication service to the LEMF. The Content of Communication shall be presented as a transparent en-clair copy of the information flow during an established, frequently bi-directional, communication of the target. It may contain voice or data. + +A target call has two directions of transmission associated with it, to the target, and from the target. Two communication channels to the LEMF are needed for transmission of the Content of Communication (stereo transmission). + +The network does not record or store the Content of Communication. + +### 5.3.1 CS-based Delivery of Content of Communication + +CC will be delivered as described in annex J. + +Exceptionally, SMS will be delivered via HI2. + +The transmission media used to support the HI3 port shall be standard ISDN calls, based on 64 kbit/s circuit switched bearer connections. The CC links are set up on demand to the LEMF. The LEMF constitutes an ISDN DSS1 user function, with an ISDN DSS1 basic or primary rate access. It may be locally connected to the target switching node, or it may be located somewhere in the target network or in another network, with or without a transit network in between. + +For network signalling, the standard ISDN user part shall be used. No modifications of the existing ISDN protocols shall be required. Any information needed for LI, like to enable correlation with the IRI records of a call, can be inserted in the existing messages and parameters, without the need to extend the ETSI standard protocols for the LI application. + +For each LI activation, a fixed LEMF address is assigned; this address is, within the present document, not used for any identification purposes; identification and correlation of the CC links is performed by separate, LI specific information, see clause 5.1. + +The functions defined in the ISDN user part standard, Version 1 (ETSI ISUP V1) are required as a minimum within the target network and, if applicable, the destination and transit networks, especially for the support of: + +- Correlation of HI3 information to the other HI port's information, using the supplementary service user-to-user signalling 1 implicit (UUS1). +- Access verification of the delivery call (see clause 5.3.3). + +The bearer capability used for the CC links is 64 kbit/s unrestricted digital information; this type guarantees that the information is passed transparently to the LEMF. No specific HLC parameter value is required. + +The CC communication channel is a one-way connection, from the operator's (NO/AN/SP) IIF to the LEMF, the opposite direction is not switched through in the switching node of the target. + +The scenario for delivery of the Content of Communication is as follows: + +- 1) At call attempt initiation, for one 64 kbit/s bi-directional target call, two ISDN delivery calls are established from the MF to the LEMF. One call offers the Content of Communication towards the target identity (CC Rx call/channel), the other call offers the Content of Communication from the target identity (CC Tx call/channel). See figure 5.1. +- 2) During the establishment of each of these calls, appropriate checks are made (see clause 5.3.3). +- 3) The MF passes during call set up, within the signalling protocol elements of the CC link the LIID and the CID to the LEMF. The LEMF uses this information to identify the target identity and to correlate between the IRI and CC. +- 4) At the end of a call attempt, each delivery call associated with that call attempt shall be released by the MF. + +![Diagram illustrating the content of communication transmission from MF to LEMF. A thick black line representing the communication path starts at 'Target T' on the left, passes through a box containing 'IIF' and 'MF' layers, and ends at 'other party P' on the right. Below the 'MF' layer, two arrows point down to a box labeled 'LEMF'. The left arrow is labeled 'Tx bearer channel, signalling channel' and the right arrow is labeled 'Rx bearer channel, signalling channel'.](6629e8a87e7552e2454b7c3e9f6d73a0_img.jpg) + +Diagram illustrating the content of communication transmission from MF to LEMF. A thick black line representing the communication path starts at 'Target T' on the left, passes through a box containing 'IIF' and 'MF' layers, and ends at 'other party P' on the right. Below the 'MF' layer, two arrows point down to a box labeled 'LEMF'. The left arrow is labeled 'Tx bearer channel, signalling channel' and the right arrow is labeled 'Rx bearer channel, signalling channel'. + +Figure 5.1: Content of Communication transmission from MF to LEMF + +### 5.3.2 Control information for Content of Communication + +The delivery calls shall use unmodified standard ISDN protocols (DSS1, ISDN user part). Table 5.6 summarizes specific settings of parameters for the CC links. The User-to-User service 1 parameter is used during call set up (within the ISUP Initial Address Message [29] or DSS1 Set Up Message [30], respectively) to transmit LI-specific control information. This information is carried transparently and delivered to the specific LEMF remote user. + +To identify the delivered information, including correlating the delivery calls with the IRI records, parameters 1 to 3 and 5 shall be included in the call set up. Parameters 6 to 9 specify settings of further relevant information. Other parameters of the ISDN protocols shall correspond to normal basic calls. + +Table 5.6: Definition of HI3 specific signalling information; UUS1 coding details (see clause J.1) + +| No. | Used information element of CC link signalling protocol | Information | Purpose | +|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1 | CLI-Parameter with attribute "network provided" | See clause 5.3.3 | LEMF can check identity of origin of call. | +| 2 | UUS1-parameter | Lawful Interception IDeNtifier (LIID); see clause 5.1 | Identifier, identifying target identity | +| 3 | UUS1-parameter | Communication IDeNtifier (CID), see clause 5.1 | Identifier, identifying specific call of target identity | +| 4 | UUS1-parameter | CC Link IDeNtifier (CCLID), if required; see clause 5.1 | Identifier, used for correlation CC link-IRI records | +| 5 | UUS1-parameter | Direction indication (communication from/towards target/combined (mono)) | Signal from (Tx)/towards (Rx) target identity or combined | +| 6 | UUS1-parameter | Bearer capability of target call | Indication to the LEMF of the basic service in use by the target | +| 7 | Closed user group interlock code | Closed user group interlock code | Supplementary Service CUG Security measure at set up of the CC link | +| 8 | Basic Service (BS) | Basic Service (BS) of CC link: 64 kbit/s unrestricted | Guarantee transparent transmission of CC copy from MF to LEMF | +| 9 | ISDN user part forward call indicators parameter | ISDN user part preference indicator: "ISDN user part required all the way" | Guarantee transparent transmission of UUS1 and other supplementary services information | +| 10 | ISDN user part optional forward call indicators parameter | Connected line identity request parameter: requested | Sending of the connected number by the destination network | + +Parameters 2, 3 and 4 are also present in the IRI records, for correlation with the CC links. Parameter 5 indicates in case of separate transmission of each communication direction, which part is carried by a CC link. Parameter 6, the basic service of the target call, can be used by the LEMF for processing of the CC signal, e.g. to apply compression methods for speech signals, in order to save storage space. Parameter 7 contains the CUG of the LEA. It is optionally used at set up the CC link to the LEA. Parameter 8, the basic service of the CC link, is set to "64 kbit/s unrestricted": All information of the Rx, Tx channels can be transmitted fully transparently to the LEA. The setting of the ISDN user part indicator guarantees, that the services supporting the LI CC link delivery are available for the complete CC link connection. + +The MF uses en-bloc dialling, i.e. there exists only one message in forward direction to the LEA. + +**NOTE:** The LEMF should at reception of the set up message not use the alerting state, it should connect immediately, to minimize time delay until switching through the CC links. Not all networks will support such a transition. Exceptionally, it may be necessary to send an alerting message before the connected message. + +The maximum length of the user information parameter can be more than the minimum length of 35 octets (national option, see ITU-T Recommendation Q.763 [29]), i.e. the network transmitting the CC links shall support the standard maximum size of 131 octets for the UUS1 parameter. + +The User-to-User service 1 parameter cannot be discarded by the ETSI ISUP procedures: the only reason, which would allow the ISUP procedures to discard it would be, if the maximum length of the message carrying UUS1 would be exceeded. With the specified amount of services used for the CC links, this cannot happen. + +The signalling messages of the two CC channels (stereo mode) carry the same parameter values, except for the direction indication. + +See clause J.1 for the ASN.1 definition of the UUS1 LI specific content of the UUS1 parameter. + +### 5.3.3 Security requirements at the interface port of HI3 + +#### 5.3.3.0 General + +The process of access verification and additional (optional) authentication between the MF and the LEMF shall not delay the set up of the CC. + +For the protection and access verification of the Content of Communication delivery call the ISDN supplementary services CLIP, COLP and CUG shall be used when available in the network involved. + +Generally any authentication shall be processed before the set-up of the CC links between the MF and the LEMF is completed. If this is technically not feasible the authentication may be processed after completion of the CC connection in parallel to the existing connection. + +#### 5.3.3.1 LI access verification + +The supplementary service CLIP shall be used to check for the correct origin of the delivery call. + +**NOTE:** When using CLIP, the supplementary service CLIR has to not be used. + +The supplementary service COLP shall be used to ensure that only the intended terminal on the LEA's side accepts incoming calls from the Handover Interface (HI). + +To ensure access verification the following two checks shall be performed: + +- check of Calling-Line Identification Presentation (CLIP) at the LEMF; and +- check of COnnected-Line identification Presentation (COLP) at the Handover Interface (HI) (due to the fact that the connected number will not always be transported by the networks involved, there shall be the possibility for deactivating the COLP check for a given interception measure. In addition, the COLP check shall accept two different numbers as correct numbers, i.e. the user provided number and the network provided number. Usually, the user provided number contains a DDI extension). + +### 5.3.3.2 Access protection + +In order to prevent faulty connections to the LEA, the CC links may be set up as CUG calls. + +In this case, the following settings of the CUG parameters should be used: + +- Incoming Access: not allowed; +- Outgoing Access: not allowed; +- Incoming calls barred within a CUG: no; +- Outgoing calls barred within a CUG: yes. + +### 5.3.3.3 Authentication + +In addition to the minimum access verification mechanisms described above, optional authentication mechanisms according to the standard series ISO 9798 "Information technology - Entity authentication - parts 1 to 5" may be used. + +These mechanisms shall only be used in addition to the access verification and protection mechanisms. + +## 5.4 LI procedures for supplementary services + +### 5.4.1 General + +In general, LI shall be possible for all connections and activities in which the target is involved. The target shall not be able to distinguish alterations in the offered service. It shall also not be possible to prevent interception by invoking supplementary services. Consequently, from a supplementary services viewpoint, the status of interactions with LI is "no impact", i.e. the behaviour of supplementary services shall not be influenced by interception. + +Depending on the type of supplementary service, additional CC links to the LEA may be required, in addition to already existing CC links. + +Within the IRI records, the transmission of additional, supplementary service specific data may be required. + +Supplementary services, which have an impact on LI, with respect to CC links or IRI record content, are shown in table 5.7. The table is based on UMTS services, it considers the services which have been standardized at the time of finalizing the present document. Future services should be treated following the same principles. + +NOTE 1: Co-ordination of handling of new services should be performed via 3GPP SA WG3-LI. If required, additions will be included in a subsequent version of the present document. + +The question of Lawful Interception with Intelligent Networks is not covered in this version (see note 2). + +NOTE 2: The general principle is, that LI takes place on the basis of a technical identity, i.e. a directory number. Only numbers which are known to the operators (NO/AN/SP), and for which LI has been activated in the standard way, can be intercepted. No standardized functions are available yet which would enable an SCF to request from the SSF the invocation of LI for a call. + +Additional CC links are only required, if the target is the served user. IRI Records may also carry data from other parties being served users. + +Clause 5.5 specifies details for relevant services: + +- The procedures for CC links, depending on the call scenario of the target. +- Related to the IRI records, the point in time of sending and supplementary service specific information. +- Additional remarks for services with "no impact" on LI. + +The specifications for supplementary services interactions are kept as far as possible independent of the details of the used signalling protocols; service related events are therefore described in more general terms, rather than using protocol dependent messages or parameters. + +Interactions with services of the same family, like call diversion services, are commonly specified, if the individual services behaviour is identical, with respect to LI. + +With respect to the IRI records, clause 5.5 specifies typical cases; the general rules for data which shall be included in IRI records are defined in clause 5.2, specifically in clause 5.4.3. + +Services, which are not part of table 5.7, do not require the generation of LI information: No CC links are generated or modified, and no specific information on the service is present in the IRI records. That is, these services have "no impact" on LI, no special functions for LI are required. However, within the IIF, functions may be required to realize the principle, that the service behaviour shall not be influenced by LI. + +"No impact" is not automatically applicable for new services. Each new service has to be checked for its impact on LI. + +The present document does not intend to give a complete description of all possible cases and access types of interactions with supplementary services. + +**Table 5.7: Supplementary Services with impact on LI CC links or IRI records content; +see also clause 5.5** + +| Suppl. Service | Abbr. | CC links: additional calls, impact | IRI items related to service | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Call Waiting | CW | CC links for active or all calls (option A/B) | Target: call waiting indication, calling party address
other party: generic notification indicator | +| Call Hold | HOLD | CC links for active or all calls (option A/B) | Target: call hold indication
other party: generic notification indicator | +| Call Retrieve | RETRIEVE | CC links for active or all calls (option A/B) | Target: call retrieve indication
other party: generic notification indicator | +| Explicit Call Transfer | ECT | Before transfer: see HOLD
After transfer: LI may or may not be stopped | Target: components of Facility IE
other party: generic notification indicator | +| Subaddressing | SUB | No impact on CC links | Subaddress IE, as available (calling, called, ...) | +| Calling Line Identification Presentation | CLIP | No impact on CC links | CLI parameter: part of originating-Party information | +| Calling Line Identification Restriction | CLIR | No impact on CC links | Restriction indicator is part of CLI parameter | +| Connected Line Identification Presentation | COLP | No impact on CC links | COL parameter: part of terminating-Party information | +| Connected Line Identification Restriction | COLR | No impact on CC links | Restriction indicator is part of COL parameter | +| Closed User Group | CUG | No impact on CC links | CUG interlock code | +| Multi Party Conference | MPTY | Initially: held and active calls see HOLD
Conf.: Tx: signal from target; Rx call sum signal
CC links depending on option A/B | Target: components of Facility IE
other party: generic notification indicator | +| Call Forwarding Unconditional; see note | CFU | One CC link for each call, which is forwarded by the target
Forwarding by other parties: no impact | Target: see clause 5.2.2.3, point 2, 3.; if redirecting no. = target DN: not included
Other party (call to target is a forwarded call): See clause 5.2.2.3, point 1
Other party (call from target gets forwarded): See clause 5.2.2.3, point 3 | +| Call Forwarding No Reply; see note | CFNRy | 1) basic call with standards CC links, released after time-out (incl. CC links)
2) forwarding: same as CFU | 1) basic call, released after time-out, standard IRI
2) forwarding: same parameters as for CFU | +| Call Forwarding Not Reachable; see note | CFNRc | See CFU | See CFU | +| Call Forwarding Busy; see note | CFB | Network determined user busy: see CFU
User determined user busy: see CFNR | Network determined user busy: see CFU
user determined user busy: see CFNR | +| Call Deflection | CD | See CFNR | See CFNR | +| User-to-User Signalling 1, 2, 3 | UUS | No impact on CC links | User-to-user information, more data IE (part of HI2 information, see clause B.3a). In ETSI HI3 was used. Optionally, ETSI's HI3 interface for UUS may be maintained for backwards compatibility reasons. | +| Fallback procedure (not a supplementary service) | FB | No impact on CC links | Target or other party: new basic service IE | +| NOTE: Other variants of Call Forwarding, like Forwarding to fixed numbers, to information services, etc. are assumed to be covered by the listed services. | | | | + +## 5.4.2 CC link Impact + +The column "CC links: additional calls, impact" (see table 5.7) defines, whether: + +- for the related service CC links shall be set up, in addition to the CC links for a basic call; +- already existing calls are impacted, for example by disconnecting their information flow. + +The CC link impact relates always to actions of a target being the served user. Services invoked by other parties have no CC link impact. + +## 5.4.3 IRI Impact, General Principle for Sending IRI records + +The column "IRI items related to service" (see table 5.7) specifies, which parameters may be transmitted to the LEA within the IRI records. For several services, it is differentiated, whether the target or the other party is the served user. + +The table specifies, which parameters are applicable in principle. That is, these parameters are normally sent to the LEA, immediately when they are available from the protocol procedures of the service. In many cases, additional IRI-CONTINUE records, compared to a basic call, will be generated. However, not each service related signalling event needs to be sent immediately within an individual record. Exceptions may exist, where several events are included in one record, even if this would result in some delay of reporting an event (this may be implementation dependent). Each record shall contain all information, which is required by the LEA to enable the interpretation of an action; example: the indication of call forwarding by the target shall include the forwarded-to number and the indication of the type of forwarding within the same record. + +The complete set of parameters, which are applicable for IRI, is specified in clause 5.2.3 (see table 5.5). + +If during procedures involving supplementary services protocol parameters, which are listed in table 5.5 become available, they shall be included in IRI Records. + +IRI data are not stored by the IIF or MF for the purpose of keeping information on call context or call configuration, including complex multiparty calls. The LEMF (electronically) or the LEA's agent (manually) shall always be able, to find out the relevant history on the call configuration, to the extent, which is given by the available signalling protocol based information, within the telecommunication network. + +Service invocations, which result in invoke and return result components (as defined in table 5.5) need only be reported in case of successful invocations. One IRI record, containing the invoke component, possibly including additional parameters from the return result component, is sufficient. + +With respect to the inclusion of LI specific parameters, see also the parameter specifications and example scenarios in clause J.2.3 for more details. + +Details of e.g. the definition of the used record type, their content, the exact points in time of sending etc. follow from the according service specifications; in some cases, they are specified explicitly in clauses 5.5 and J.2.3. + +## 5.4.4 Multi party calls - general principles, options A, B + +### 5.4.4.0 General + +Each network has to adopt option A or B according to local circumstances. + +With respect to IRI, each call or call leg owns a separate IRI transaction sequence, independent of whether it is actually active or not. + +With respect to the CC links, two options (A, B) exist, which depend on laws and regulations, see below. Active call or call leg means in this context, that the target is actually in communication with the other party of that call or call leg; this definition differs from the definition in ETSI EN 300 356 [30]. + +### 5.4.4.1 CC links for active and non-active calls (option A) + +For each call, active or not, separate CC links shall be provided. This guarantees that: + +- changes in the call configuration of the target are reflected immediately, with no delay, at the LEMF; +- the signal from held parties can still be intercepted. + +It is a network option, whether the communication direction of a non-active call, which still carries a signal from the other party, is switched through to the LEMF, or switched off. + +![Diagram of CC link option A for call hold supplementary service.](0c80c383f76034e117adf5e5eaadaaf3_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the communication paths for three parties (P1, P2, P3) through an IIF/MF interface to a LEMF. A 'Target T' is shown on the left. The 'IIF' (Interfacial Function) and 'MF' (Media Function) are stacked vertically. The 'LEMF' (Location Management Function) is at the bottom. The 'on hold' label is placed above P1 and P2. The 'other parties' label is at the top right. The 'active' label is next to P3. The 'Target T' label is on the left, with a 'T' below it. The 'IIF' and 'MF' labels are inside the interface box. The 'LEMF' label is inside the LEMF box. The 'on hold' label is inside the IIF box. The 'other parties' label is outside the IIF box. The 'active' label is outside the IIF box. The 'Target T' label is outside the IIF box. The 'T' label is outside the IIF box. The 'IIF' label is inside the IIF box. The 'MF' label is inside the MF box. The 'LEMF' label is inside the LEMF box. The 'on hold' label is inside the IIF box. The 'other parties' label is outside the IIF box. The 'active' label is outside the IIF box. The 'Target T' label is outside the IIF box. The 'T' label is outside the IIF box. The 'IIF' label is inside the IIF box. The 'MF' label is inside the MF box. The 'LEMF' label is inside the LEMF box. + +Diagram of CC link option A for call hold supplementary service. + +Figure 5.2: CC link option A (example for call hold supplementary service) + +#### 5.4.4.2 Reuse of CC links for active calls (option B) + +CC links are only used for calls active in their communication phase. Changes in the call configuration may not be reflected at the LEMF immediately, because switching in the IIF/MF is required, and the signal from the held party is not available. + +Each time, another target call leg uses an existing CC link, an IRI-CONTINUE record with the correct CID and CCLID shall be sent. + +NOTE: Even when option B is used, more than one CC link may be required simultaneously. + +![Diagram of CC link option B for call hold supplementary service. A 'Target T' is shown on the left. A central box contains 'on hold', 'IIF', and 'MF' sections. To the right, 'other parties' are listed: 'P1 on hold', 'P2 on hold', and 'P3 active'. Arrows show communication flow from the target through the 'on hold' section, then branching to P1 and P2 (on hold) and P3 (active). A vertical line descends from the 'MF' section to a 'LEMF' box at the bottom.](8e80de0cac529b2c3775d677c5203133_img.jpg) + +Diagram of CC link option B for call hold supplementary service. A 'Target T' is shown on the left. A central box contains 'on hold', 'IIF', and 'MF' sections. To the right, 'other parties' are listed: 'P1 on hold', 'P2 on hold', and 'P3 active'. Arrows show communication flow from the target through the 'on hold' section, then branching to P1 and P2 (on hold) and P3 (active). A vertical line descends from the 'MF' section to a 'LEMF' box at the bottom. + +Figure 5.3: CC link option B (example for call hold supplementary service) + +#### 5.4.5 Subscriber Controlled Input (SCI): Activation / Deactivation / Interrogation of Services + +For user procedures for control of Supplementary Services (Activation/Deactivation/Interrogation), a special IRI record type (IRI-REPORT record) is defined to transmit the required information. + +The IRI-REPORT record shall contain an indicator, whether the request of the target has been processed successfully or not. + +### 5.5 Detailed procedures for supplementary services + +#### 5.5.1 Advice of Charge services (AOC) + +No impact. + +Advice of Charge information is not included in IRI records. + +#### 5.5.2 Call Waiting (CW) + +##### 5.5.2.1 Call Waiting at target: CC links + +In case of option A "CC links for all calls", a CC link is set up for the waiting call, using the standard procedures for terminating calls. In case of option B "CC links for active calls", no CC link is set up for the waiting call, it is treated like a held call. + +With respect to CC links, the same configurations as for Call Hold apply. + +Procedure, when the target accepts the waiting call: see retrieve of a held call (see clause 5.5.3). + +##### 5.5.2.2 Call Waiting: IRI records + +###### 5.5.2.2.1 Target is served user + +If Call Waiting is invoked at the target access by another (calling) party: the IRI-BEGIN record or a following IRI-CONTINUE record for the waiting call shall contain the LI specific parameter *call waiting indication*. + +#### 5.5.2.2.2 Other party is served user + +If Call Waiting is invoked at the other (called) party's access: if a *CW notification* is received by the target's switching node, it shall be included in an IRI-CONTINUE record; it may be a separate record, or the next record of the basic call sequence. + +### 5.5.3 Call Hold/Retrieve + +#### 5.5.3.1 CC links for active and non-active calls (option A) + +If an active call is put on hold, its CC links shall stay intact; as an option, the signal from the held party is not switched through to the LEMF. + +If the target sets up a new call, while one call is on hold, this call is treated like a normal originating call, i.e. a new LI configuration (CC links, IRI records) is established. + +#### 5.5.3.2 Reuse of CC links for active calls (option B) + +If an active call is put on hold, its CC links shall not immediately be disconnected; as an option, the signal from the held party is not switched through to the LEMF. + +If the target sets up a new call, or retrieves a previously held call, while one target call, which still owns CC links, is on hold, these CC links shall be used for the signals of the new active call. + +#### 5.5.3.3 IRI records + +##### 5.5.3.3.1 Invocation of Call Hold or Retrieve by target + +An IRI-CONTINUE record with the LI specific parameter hold indication or retrieve indication, respectively, shall be sent. + +##### 5.5.3.3.2 Invocation of Call Hold or Retrieve by other parties + +An IRI-CONTINUE record with a call hold or retrieve notification shall be sent if it has been received by the signalling protocol entity of the target call. + +### 5.5.4 Explicit Call Transfer (ECT) + +#### 5.5.4.1 Explicit Call Transfer, CC link + +During the preparation phase of a transfer, the procedures for Call Hold/Retrieve are applicable. + +If the served (transferring) user is the target, its original call is released. This terminates also the CC link, and causes an IRI-END record to be sent. + +After transfer, two options exist: + +- 1) For the transferred call, CC links (and IRI records) shall be generated, in principle like for a forwarded call (similar to procedures in clause 5.5.12.1.1, case b)); +- 2) The transferred call shall not be intercepted. + +#### 5.5.4.2 Explicit Call Transfer, IRI records + +In addition to the basic or hold/retrieve/waiting call related records and parameters, during the reconfiguration of the call, ECT-specific information at the target's access is sent to the LEMF within IRI-CONTINUE records. + +When the target leaves the call after transfer, an IRI-END record is sent, and the LI transaction is terminated. Options for the new call, after transfer: see clause 5.5.4.1. + +## 5.5.5 Calling Line Identification Presentation (CLIP) (IRI Records) + +### 5.5.5.1 Call originated by target (target is served user) + +The standard CLI parameter of an originating target is included as a supplementary service parameter in the IRI records. + +### 5.5.5.2 Call terminated at target (other party is served user) + +The CLI sent from the other party is included in the IRI-BEGIN record (*originating-Party* information), irrespective of a restriction indication. An eventually received second number (case two number delivery option) is included in the IRI record as supplementary services information (Generic Number parameter). + +## 5.5.6 Calling Line Identification Restriction (CLIR) + +For use by LI, the restriction is ignored, but copied within the CLI parameter to the IRI record. + +## 5.5.7 Connected Line identification Presentation (COLP) + +### 5.5.7.1 Call terminated at target (target is served user) + +A connected number parameter received from the target shall be included in an IRI record (*terminating-Party* information). + +### 5.5.7.2 Call originated by target (other party is served user) + +If available, a connected number parameter as received from the other (*terminating*) party shall be included in an IRI record (*terminating-Party* information). Any additional number, e.g. a Generic Number, shall also be included in the IRI record. + +## 5.5.8 Connected Line identification Restriction (COLR) + +For use by LI, the restriction is ignored, but copied within the COL parameter to the IRI record. + +## 5.5.9 Closed User Group (CUG) + +In case of a CUG call, the closed user group interlock code shall be included in an IRI. + +## 5.5.10 Completion of Call to Busy Subscriber (CCBS) + +No impact. + +The first call, which meets a (*terminating*) busy subscriber, and is released subsequently, is treated like a standard busy call, with no CCBS related IRI information. + +The procedures for CCBS, until starting a new call attempt from the served user to the terminating user, including the CCBS recall, are not subject of LI. + +## 5.5.11 Multi ParTY call (MPTY) + +### 5.5.11.1 General + +#### a) Target is conference controller: + +The MPTY conference originates from a configuration with two single calls (one active, one held). When joining the calls to a conference, the CC links, which have carried the signals of the active target call are used to transmit the conference signals; that is, the Rx call contains the sum signal of the conference, the Tx call contains the signal from the target. + +The second CC link set, for the previously held call stays intact. If the conference is released, and the initial state (1 held, 1 active call) is re-established, the required CC links are still available. + +- b) Target is passive party of conference: +No impact on CC links. + +### 5.5.11.2 IRI records + +For the events indicating the start and the end of the MPTY conference, IRI records are generated. + +## 5.5.12 DIVersion Services (DIV) + +### 5.5.12.0 General + +Calls to a target, with a called party number equal to the intercepted target DN(s), but forwarded, are intercepted, i.e. CC links are set up, and IRI records are sent to the LEA. This applies for all kinds of call forwarding. + +For calls forwarded by the other party (calling or called), the available diversion-related information is sent to the LEA. + +### 5.5.12.1 Call Diversion by Target + +#### 5.5.12.1.1 Call Diversion by Target, CC links + +In order to handle call diversion services by applying, as far as possible, common procedures, the following two cases are differentiated: + +- a) Call Forwarding Unconditional (CFU), Call Forwarding Busy (NDUB): +In these cases, forwarding is determined, before seizing the target access. CC links are set up, immediately, for the forwarded call. + +Other variants of Call Forwarding with immediate forwarding, i.e. without first seizing the target access, are handled in the same way (e.g. unconditional Selective Call Forwarding). + +- b) Call Forwarding No Reply, Call Forwarding Busy (UDUB), Call Deflection: +Initially, the target call is set up, and the call is intercepted like a basic call. + +When forwarding takes place (e.g. after expiry of the CFNR timer), the original call is released; this may cause also a release of the CC links. In such case two optional IRI record handling may apply: + +- 1) For the original call an IRI-END record is sent. For the forwarded call a new set up procedure, including new LI transaction may take place with new set of IRI records (starting with IRI-BEGIN record sent to the LEA). +- 2) For the forwarded call the IRI-CONTINUE record is generated and sent to a LEA, indicating the CFNR invocation. + +Other variants of Call Forwarding with forwarding after first seizing the target access, are handled in the same way. + +In case of multiple forwarding, one call may be intercepted several times, if several parties are targets. Considering the maximum number of diversions for one call of 5 (3GPP recommended limit), one call can be intercepted 7 times, from the same or different LEAs. In principle, these procedures are independent of each other. + +#### 5.5.12.1.2 Call Diversion by Target, IRI records + +See clause 5.2.2.3, case 2, related to the target's information, and case 3, related to the forwarded-to-party information. + +As above for the CC links, the diversion types a) and b1, 2) are differentiated: For case a) and b2) diversions, the IRI is part of one transaction, IRI-BEGIN, -CONTINUE, -END, for case b1) diversions, a first transaction informs about the call section, until diversion is invoked (corresponding to a basic, prematurely released call), a second transaction informs about the call section, when diversion is invoked (corresponding to case a). + +### 5.5.12.2 Forwarded Call Terminated at Target + +The CC link is handled in the standard way. The IRI-BEGIN record contains the available call diversion information, see clause 5.2.2.3 case 1. + +### 5.5.12.3 Call from Target Forwarded + +The CC link is handled in the standard way. The IRI-BEGIN and possibly IRI-CONTINUE records contain the available call diversion related information, see clause 5.2.2.3 case 3. + +## 5.5.13 Variants of call diversion services + +Variants of the above "standard" diversion services are treated in the same way as the corresponding "standard" diversion service. + +### 5.5.14 SUBaddressing (SUB) + +The different types of subaddress information elements are part of the IRI records, in all basic and supplementary services cases, where they are present. + +### 5.5.15 User-to-User Signalling (UUS) + +User-to-User parameters of services UUS1, UUS2 and UUS3 shall be reported as HI2, see clause 5.4. + +If User-User information is not delivered from a target to the other party (e.g. due to overload in the SS No.7 network), no notification is sent to the LEA. + +### 5.5.16 Incoming Call Barring (ICB) + +No impact. + +**a) Case terminating call to a target with ICB active:** + +In general, the barring condition of a target is detected before the target access is determined, consequently, an IRI-REPORT records is generated. + +If the access would be determined, a standard IRI-END record is generated, with the applicable cause value. + +**b) Case target calls a party with ICB active:** + +In general, an IRI-BEGIN record has been sent already, and CC links have been set up. Consequently, a standard IRI-END record is generated, with the applicable cause value. + +### 5.5.17 Outgoing Call Barring (OCB) + +No impact. + +For a barred call, a standard record may be generated; its type and content are depending on the point in the call, where the call was released due to OCB restrictions. + +### 5.5.18 Tones, Announcements + +No impact. + +If the normal procedures, depending on the call state, result in sending the tone or announcement signal on the Rx CC link channel, this shall be transmitted as CC. + +## 5.6 Functional architecture + +The following picture contains the reference configuration for the lawful interception (see TS 33.107 [19]). + +There is one Administration Function (ADMF) in the network. Together with the delivery functions it is used to hide from the 3G MSC server and 3G GMSC server that there might be multiple activations by different Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) on the same target. + +![Figure 5.4: Reference configuration for Circuit switched. The diagram shows the logical architecture for lawful interception. On the left, multiple LEA (Law Enforcement Agency) boxes are shown. Arrows HI1, HI2, and HI3 point from the LEAs to a central block. HI1 points to the 'NWO/AP/SvP's administration center'. HI2 points to the 'IRI MF' (Intercepting Function). HI3 points to the 'CC MF' (Call Control Function). The central block contains 'NWO/AP/SvP's administration center', 'ADMF' (Administration Function), 'IRI MF', 'DF2' (Delivery Function 2), 'CC MF', and 'DF3' (Delivery Function 3). Arrows connect the administration center to IRI MF and CC MF. Arrows also connect ADMF to IRI MF and CC MF. Arrows connect IRI MF to DF2 and CC MF to DF3. On the right, a dashed box labeled 'IIF' (Intercepting Interface) contains 'MSC/VLR' (Mobile Switching Center/Visitor Location Register) and 'GMSC' (Gateway MSC). Arrows X1 interface, X2 interface, and X3 interface point from the IIF to the ADMF, DF2, and DF3 respectively.](7e61b2e2506cc7e5d6e16ce9c9df25bb_img.jpg) + +Figure 5.4: Reference configuration for Circuit switched. The diagram shows the logical architecture for lawful interception. On the left, multiple LEA (Law Enforcement Agency) boxes are shown. Arrows HI1, HI2, and HI3 point from the LEAs to a central block. HI1 points to the 'NWO/AP/SvP's administration center'. HI2 points to the 'IRI MF' (Intercepting Function). HI3 points to the 'CC MF' (Call Control Function). The central block contains 'NWO/AP/SvP's administration center', 'ADMF' (Administration Function), 'IRI MF', 'DF2' (Delivery Function 2), 'CC MF', and 'DF3' (Delivery Function 3). Arrows connect the administration center to IRI MF and CC MF. Arrows also connect ADMF to IRI MF and CC MF. Arrows connect IRI MF to DF2 and CC MF to DF3. On the right, a dashed box labeled 'IIF' (Intercepting Interface) contains 'MSC/VLR' (Mobile Switching Center/Visitor Location Register) and 'GMSC' (Gateway MSC). Arrows X1 interface, X2 interface, and X3 interface point from the IIF to the ADMF, DF2, and DF3 respectively. + +**Figure 5.4: Reference configuration for Circuit switched** + +The reference configuration is only a logical representation of the entities involved in lawful interception and does not mandate separate physical entities. This allows for higher levels of integration. + +A call could be intercepted based on several identities (MSISDN, IMSI, IMEI, Non-Local ID) of the same target. + +Interception based on IMEI could lead to a delay in start of interception at the beginning of a call and interception of non-call related events is not possible. + +For the delivery of the CC and IRI the 3G MSC server or the 3G GMSC server provides correlation number and target identity to the DF2 and DF3 which is used there in order to select the different LEAs where the product shall be delivered to. + +## 5.7 IP-based handover interface for CC + +### 5.7.1 General + +When IP-based delivery interface is used for HI3, the CC of intercepted Circuit Switched (CS) voice calls shall be delivered to the LEMF using the ASN.1 module defined in Annex B.17. + +As illustrated in figure 5.5, the communication between target and the other party will still be over circuit-switched network connections. + +![Diagram of IP based handover interface for the CC of a CS intercepts. The diagram shows a 'Target' box on the left and an 'Other Party' box on the right, both connected to a 'CS-based network' cloud. Inside the CS-based network cloud, there are two green squares representing intercept points. Below the CS-based network cloud is a 'DF3' box, connected to the intercept points via green arrows labeled 'X3'. Below the DF3 box is an 'IP-based network' cloud, connected to the DF3 box via red arrows labeled 'HI3'. Below the IP-based network cloud is a 'LEMF' box, connected to the IP-based network cloud via red arrows labeled 'HI3'.](187d05bf7ead21e1394b61320d8b3632_img.jpg) + +Diagram of IP based handover interface for the CC of a CS intercepts. The diagram shows a 'Target' box on the left and an 'Other Party' box on the right, both connected to a 'CS-based network' cloud. Inside the CS-based network cloud, there are two green squares representing intercept points. Below the CS-based network cloud is a 'DF3' box, connected to the intercept points via green arrows labeled 'X3'. Below the DF3 box is an 'IP-based network' cloud, connected to the DF3 box via red arrows labeled 'HI3'. Below the IP-based network cloud is a 'LEMF' box, connected to the IP-based network cloud via red arrows labeled 'HI3'. + +**Figure 5.5: IP based handover interface for the CC of a CS intercepts** + +The method used to deliver the CS-voice contents from ICE to DF3 (i.e. the details of X3 reference point, see TS 33.107 [19]) can be implementation specific and therefore, related details are outside the scope of the present document. Some examples are illustrated in TS 33.107 [19]. + +## 5.7.2 Identifiers + +The identifiers are used to establish a correlation between the CC and the IRI messages. The following identifiers are used to correlate the CC with the associated IRI messages: + +Lawful Interception Identifier (see sub-clause 5.1.1) + +Communication Identifier (see sub-clause 5.1.2) + +CC-Link-Identifier (see sub-clause 5.1.3). + +The Communication Identifier includes two identifiers: + +Network Identifier (see sub-clause 5.1.2.1) + +Communication Identity Number (see sub-clause 5.1.2.2). + +When a target is involved in multi-party calls, each call-leg will have a separate Communication Identity Number. The Lawful Interception Identifier, Network Identifier can be the same for multiple legs of the call. The CC-Link-Identifier is used when single circuit-link is used to deliver the CC of all call-legs of multi-party calls. The details of this are described in sub-clause 5.1.5. + +With IP-based handover interface option for CC, the use of CC-Link-Identifier may not be applicable for HI3. However, to avoid any backward compatibility issues, the inclusion of CC-Link-Identifier in the HI3 even for IP-based handover interface is encouraged if the same is sent over the HI2. + +### 5.7.3 Voice Content Direction + +Voice content direction shall be included within the CC delivered to the LEMF and it allows the LEMF to distinguish between multiple voice media streams received. Within the ASN.1 module, this is identified as TPDU-direction and can have the following values: + +- From the target: indicates that the voice content is sent from the target. +- To the target: indicates that the voice content is sent to the target. +- Combined: indicates that the voice content sent to, and received from, the target is delivered to the LEMF in a combined form. +- Unknown: indicates that the direction cannot be determined. + +Basically, this information helps the LEMF to identify whether the voice content is delivered in a stereo form or mono-form. In the former case, it further helps the LEMF to distinguish the voice content sent to the target from the voice content received from the target. + +### 5.7.4 Payload Description + +The intercepted voice-content delivered over HI3 is identified within the ASN.1 module as payload. The information necessary for the LEMF to decode the payload shall be included within the CC. Within the ASN.1, this is identified as payload description that contains the media format (RFC 3551 [93]) and media attributes (RFC 4566 [94]) using the SDP (RFC 4566 [94]). + +NOTE: When IP-based handover interface is used to deliver the CC, the payload can be in the RTP (RFC 3550 [95]) form. The codec information associated with that RTP can be delivered over HI2 or HI3. However, former approach will require changes to the IRI messages and hence, causing a backward compatibility issue. + +In support of backward compatibility, the delivery of payload description (i.e. media format and media attributes when the payload is in RTP form) over HI2 shall be discouraged. In other words, the payload description shall be delivered over HI3. + +Table 5.8 below describes the usage of Media Format and Media Attributes. + +**Table 5.8: usage of media format and media attributes** + +| Field name | Status | ASN.1 field | Information | +|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Media Format | Mandatory | mediaFormat | This field signals the codec used, as defined in RFC 3551 [93]. | +| Media Attributes | Conditional (i.e. mandatory under the conditions listed) | mediaAttributes | If any extra information (beyond the Media Format) is needed to understand the delivered CC then it shall be sent here, in the format defined in the a= field of SDP (see RFC 4566 [94]). Typically, media attributes shall be present if and only if the media format is 32 or above. | + +### 5.7.5 Sequence Number + +Sequence Number is an integer incremented each time a T-PDU is delivered. Handling of sequence number is done according to national requirements. + +## 6 Packet data domain + +### 6.1 Identifiers + +#### 6.1.0 Introduction + +Specific identifiers are necessary to identify a target for interception uniquely and to correlate between the data, which is conveyed over the different handover interfaces (HI2 and HI3). The identifiers are defined in the subsequent subclauses of 6.1. + +For the delivery of CC and IRI the SGSN or GGSN provide correlation numbers and target identities to the HI2 and HI3. The correlation number is unique per PDP context and is used to correlate CC with IRI and the different IRI's of one PDP context. When the SGSN connects an UE to a S-GW through the S4 interface (TS 23.060 [42], see also NOTE) for a specific communication, the SGSN is not required to provide CC, IRIs for the PDP context associated with CC and correlation for that communication. + +NOTE: The S4 is an intra-PLMN reference point between the SGSN and the S-GW. + +#### 6.1.1 Lawful interception identifier + +For each target identity related to an interception measure, the authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) shall assign a special Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID), which has been agreed between the LEA and the operator (NO/AN/SP). + +Using an indirect identification, pointing to a target identity makes it easier to keep the knowledge about a specific target limited within the authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) and the handling agents at the LEA. + +The LIID is a component of the CC delivery procedure and of the IRI records. It shall be used within any information exchanged at the handover interfaces HI2 and HI3 for identification and correlation purposes. + +The LIID format shall consist of alphanumeric characters. It might for example, among other information, contain a lawful authorization reference number, and the date, when the lawful authorization was issued. + +The authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) shall either enter a unique LIID for each target identity of the target or a single LIID for multiple target identities all pertaining to the same target. + +If more than one LEA intercepts the same target identity, there shall be unique LIIDs assigned relating to each LEA. + +#### 6.1.2 Network identifier + +The network identifier (NID) is a mandatory parameter; it should be internationally unique. It consists of the following two identifiers. + +- 1) Operator- (NO/AN/SP) identifier (mandatory): +Unique identification of network operator, access network provider or service provider. +- 2) Network element identifier NEID (optional): +The purpose of the network element identifier is to uniquely identify the relevant network element carrying out the LI operations, such as LI activation, IRI record sending, etc. + +A network element identifier may be an IP address or other identifier. For GSM and UMTS systems deployed in the U.S., the network element identifier is required. + +A network element identifier may be an IP address or other identifier. National regulations may mandate the sending of the NEID. + +#### 6.1.3 Correlation number + +The Correlation Number is unique per PDP context and used for the following purposes: + +- correlate CC with IRI; + +- correlate different IRI records within one PDP context; +- correlate LALS reports with the IRI records of the triggering events. + +As an example, in the UMTS system, the Correlation Number may be the combination of GGSN address and charging ID. + +NOTE: The Correlation Number is at a minimum unique for each concurrent communication (e.g. PDP context) of a target within a lawful authorization. + +## 6.2 Timing and quality + +### 6.2.1 Timing + +As a general principle, within a telecommunication system, IRI, if buffered, should be buffered for as short a time as possible. + +NOTE: If the transmission of IRI fails, it may be buffered or lost. + +Subject to national requirements, the following timing requirements shall be supported: + +- Each IRI data record shall be sent by the delivery function to the LEMF over the HI2 within seconds of the detection of the triggering event by the IAP at least 95% of the time; +- Each IRI data record shall contain a time-stamp, based on the intercepting nodes clock that is generated following the detection of the IRI triggering event. The timestamp precision should be at least 1 second (ETSI TS 101 671 [24]). Defining the required precision of an IRI timestamp however is subject to national requirements. + +### 6.2.2 Quality + +The quality of service associated with the result of interception should be (at least) equal to the quality of service of the original content of communication. This may be derived from the QoS class used for the original intercepted session, TS 23.107 [20]. However, when TCP is used as an OSI layer 4 protocol across the HI3, real time delivery of the result of the interception cannot be guaranteed. The QoS used from the operator (NO/AN/SP) to the LEMF is determined by what operators (NO?AN?SP) and law enforcement agree upon. + +### 6.2.3 Void + +(Void) + +## 6.3 Security aspects + +Security is defined by national requirements. + +## 6.4 Quantitative aspects + +The number of target interceptions supported is a national requirement. + +The area of Quantitative Aspects addresses the ability to perform multiple, simultaneous interceptions within a provider's network and at each of the relevant intercept access points within the network. Specifics related to this topic include: + +- The ability to access and monitor all simultaneous communications originated, received, or redirected by the target; +- The ability for multiple LEAs (up to five) to monitor, simultaneously, the same target while maintaining unobtrusiveness, including between agencies; + +- The ability of the network to simultaneously support a number of separate (i.e. multiple targets) legally authorized interceptions within its service area(s), including different levels of authorization for each interception, including between agencies (i.e. IRI only, or IRI and communication content). + +## 6.5 IRI for packet domain + +### 6.5.0 Introduction + +The IRI will in principle be available in the following phases of a data transmission: + +1. At connection attempt when the target identity becomes active, at which time packet transmission may or may not occur (set up of a data context, target may be the originating or terminating party); +2. At the end of a connection, when the target identity becomes inactive (removal of a data context); +3. At certain times when relevant information are available. + +In addition, information on non-transmission related actions of a target constitute IRI and is sent via HI2, e.g. information on subscriber controlled input. + +The IRI may be subdivided into the following categories: + +1. Control information for HI2 (e.g. correlation information); +2. Basic data context information, for standard data transmission between two parties. + +The events defined in TS 33.107 [19] are used to generate records for the delivery via HI2. + +Unless otherwise noted, the following terminology applies to both GPRS and 3G GSN nodes: + +- GPRS attach - also applies to Mobile Station attach +- GPRS detach - also applies to Mobile Station detach +- gPRSEvent - also applies to PDP Context events and Mobile Station events +- gPRSCorrelationNumber - also applies to PDP Context Correlation +- gPRSOperationErrorCode - also applies to PDP Context Operation Error Codes + +There are several different event types received at DF2 level. According to each event, a Record is sent to the LEMF if this is required. In the case of LALS reports, which are not associated with an event, a Record is sent to the LEMF without the event parameter. + +The following table gives the mapping between event type received at DF2 level and record type sent to the LEMF. + +**Table 6.1: Mapping between UMTS Data Events and HI2 records type** + +| Event | IRI Record Type | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------| +| GPRS attach | REPORT | +| GPRS detach | REPORT | +| PDP context activation (successful) | BEGIN | +| PDP context modification | CONTINUE | +| PDP context activation (unsuccessful) | REPORT | +| Start of interception with mobile station attached (national option) | REPORT | +| Start of interception with PDP context active | BEGIN or optionally CONTINUE | +| PDP context deactivation | END | +| Location update | REPORT | +| SMS | REPORT | +| ServingSystem | REPORT | +| Packet Data Header Information | REPORT | +| HLR subscriber record change | REPORT | +| Cancel location | REPORT | +| Register location | REPORT | +| Location information request | REPORT | + +The UMTS PS LALS reports are sent to the LEMF in the REPORT IRI records. + +A set of information is used to generate the records. The records used transmit the information from mediation function to LEMF. This set of information can be extended in the GSN or DF2 MF, if this is necessary in a specific country. The following table gives the mapping between information received per event and information sent in records. + +**Table 6.2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information** + +| parameter | description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | Target Identifier with the MSISDN of the target. | partyInformation
(partyIdentity/msISDN) | +| Observed IMSI | Target Identifier with the IMSI of the target. | partyInformation (partyIdentity/imsi) | +| Observed Non-Local ID | Target Identifier with the E.164 number of the target | partyInformation (partyIdentity/e164-Format) | +| Observed IMEI | Target Identifier with the IMEI of the target. | partyInformation (partyIdentity/imei) | +| Observed PDP address | PDP address(es) used by the target. In case of IPv4v6 two addresses may be carried. | partyInformation
(services-Data-Information) | +| New observed MSISDN | New target identifier with MSISDN of the target, when available | partyInformation/(partyIdentity/msISDN) | +| New observed IMSI | New target identifier with IMSI of the target, when available | partyInformation/(partyIdentity/imsi) | +| New observed IMEI | New target identifier with IMEI of the target, when available | partyInformation/(partyIdentity/imei) | +| Event type | Description which type of event is delivered: PDP Context Activation, PDP Context Deactivation, GPRS Attach, HLR subscriber record change, Cancel location, Register location, Location information request, etc. | gPRSevent (when using Annex B.3) or ePSevent (when using Annex B.9) | +| Event date | Date of the event generation in the xGSN or in the HLR | timeStamp | +| Event time | Time of the event generation in the xGSN or in the HLR | | +| Access point name | The Access Point Name contains a logical name (see TS 23.060 [42]) | partyInformation
(services-Data-Information) | +| PDP type | This field describes the PDP type as defined in 3GPP TS 29.060 [17], TS 24.008 [9], TS 29.002 [4] | partyInformation
(services-Data-Information) | +| Initiator | This field indicates whether the PDP context activation, deactivation, or modification is MS directed or network initiated. | initiator | +| Correlation number | Unique number for each PDP context delivered to the LEMF, to help the LEA, to have a correlation between each PDP Context and the IRI. | gPRSCorrelationNumber | +| Lawful interception identifier | Unique number for each lawful authorization. | lawfulInterceptionIdentifier | +| Location information | When authorized, this field provides the location information of the target that is present at the SGSN or LI LCS Client at the time of event or LALS report record production. | locationOfTheTarget | +| Time of Location | Date/Time of location. The time when location was obtained by the location source node. | locationOfTheTarget | +| Extended location parameters | Additional location information and QoS information | extendedLocParameters | +| LALS error code | Positioning error identification code | locationErrorCode | +| SMS | The SMS content with header which is sent with the SMS-service | sMS | +| Failed context activation reason | This field gives information about the reason for a failed context activation of the target. | gPRSOOperationErrorCode | +| Failed attach reason | This field gives information about the reason for a failed attach attempt of the target. | gPRSOOperationErrorCode | +| Service center address | This field identifies the address of the relevant server within the calling (if server is originating) or called (if server is terminating) party address parameters for SMS-MO or SMS-MT. | serviceCenterAddress | +| UMTS QOS | This field indicates the Quality of Service associated with the PDP Context procedure. | qOS | +| Context deactivation reason | This field gives information about the reason for context deactivation of the target. | gPRSOOperationErrorCode | +| Network identifier | Operator ID plus SGSN, GGSN, or HLR address. | networkIdentifier | +| Serving system identifier | VPLMN ID of the serving system or of the third party network interworking with the HLR | serving-System-Identifier | +| iP assignment | Observed PDP address is statically or dynamically assigned. | iP-assignment | +| SMS originating address | Identifies the originator of the SMS message. | DataNodeAddress | +| SMS terminating address | Identifies the intended recipient of the SMS message. | DataNodeAddress | +| SMS initiator | Indicates whether the SMS is MO, MT, or Undefined | sms-initiator | + +| parameter | description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| Serving SGSN number | An E.164 number of the serving SGSN. | servingSGSN-Number | +| Serving SGSN address | An IP address of the serving SGSN.
In case of S4-SGSN, this may be provided as Diameter id and realm of the serving S4-SGSN connected via S6d interface to the HSS. | servingSGSN-Address
servingS4-SGSN-address | +| NSAPI | Network layer Service Access Point Identifier information element contains an NSAPI identifying a PDP Context in a mobility management context specified by the Tunnel Endpoint Identifier Control Plane This is an optional parameter to help DF/MF and LEA's to distinguish between the sending mobile access networks when the GGSN is used as element of the PDG according TS 23.234 [43]. | nSAPI | +| ULI Timestamp | Indicates the time when the User Location Information was acquired. | uLITimestamp | +| Destination IP address | Identifies the destination IP address of a packet. | destinationIPAddress | +| Destination port number | Identifies the destination port number of a packet | destinationPortNumber | +| Source IP address | Identifies the source IP address of a packet. | sourceIPAddress | +| Source port number | Identifies the source port number of a packet. | sourcePortNumber | +| Transport protocol | Identifies the transport protocol (i.e., Protocol Field in IPv4 or Next Header Field in IPv6). | transportProtocol | +| Flow label | The field in the IPv6 header that is used by a source to label packets of a flow (see RFC 3697 [70]) | flowLabel | +| Packet count | The number of packets detected and reported in a particular packet data summary report. | packetCount | +| Packet size | The size of a packet (i.e., Total Length Field in IPv4 [68] or Payload Length Field in IPv6 [69]) | packetsize | +| Packet direction | Identifies the direction of the intercepted packet (from target or to target) | packetDirection | +| Packet data Header copy | Provides a copy of the packet headers including IP layer and next layer, and extensions, but excluding content. | packetDataHeaderCopy | +| Summary period | Provides the period of time during which the packets of the summary report were sent or received by the target. | summaryPeriod | +| Sum of packet sizes | Sum of values in Total Length Fields in IPv4 packets or Payload Length Field in IPv6 packets. | sumOfPacketSizes | +| Packet data summary reason | Provides the reason for a summary report. | packetDataSummaryReason | +| Packet data summary | For each particular packet flow, identifies pertinent reporting information (e.g. source IP address, destination IP address, source port, destination port, transport protocol, packet count, time interval, sum of packet sizes) associated with the particular packet flow. | packetDataSummary | +| Current serving system identifier | Current VPLMN id of the target | current-Previous-Systems/current-Serving-System-Identifier | +| Current serving SGSN-Number | An E.164 number of the current serving SGSN, that comes from the intercepted MAP message | current-Previous-Systems/current-Serving-SGSN-Number | +| Current serving SGSN-Address | An IP address of the current serving SGSN, that comes from the intercepted MAP message | current-Previous-Systems/current-Serving-SGSN- Address | +| Current serving S4-SGSN-address | In case of S4-SGSN, this may be provided as Diameter id and realm of the serving S4-SGSN connected via S6d interface to the HSS. It is in the intercepted Diameter message. | current-Previous-Systems/current-Serving-SGSN- Address | +| Previous serving system identifier | Previous VPLMN id of the target | current-Previous-Systems/previous-Serving-System-Identifier | +| Previous serving SGSN-Number | An E.164 number of the previous serving SGSN, included in the intercepted MAP message. | current-Previous-Systems/previous-Serving-SGSN-Number | +| Previous serving SGSN-Address | An IP address of the previous serving SGSN, included in the intercepted MAP message. | current-Previous-Systems/previous-Serving-SGSN- Address | +| Previous Serving S4-SGSN-address | In case of S4-SGSN, this may be provided as Diameter id and realm of the serving S4-SGSN connected via S6d | current-Previous-Systems/previous-Serving-SGSN- Address | + +| parameter | description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------| +| | interface to the HSS. | | +| Changed (old/new) IMSI or MSISDN or IMEI | Provides the identity changes in Subscriber Record Change Event. | change-Of-Target-Identity | +| Requesting network identifier | The requesting network identifier PLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, -- defined in E.212 [87]). | requesting-Network-Identifier | +| Requesting node type | Type of requesting node such as MSC, SMS Centre, GMLC, MME, SGSN. | requesting-Node-Type | +| Other update | Carrier specific information related to its implementation or subscription process on its HLR that will be transmit to LEMF in raw format. CSP will provide to LEMF elements to understand such data. | carrierSpecificData | + +NOTE: LIID parameter has to be present in each record sent to the LEMF. + +## 6.5.1 Events and information + +### 6.5.1.0 General + +This clause describes the information sent from the Delivery Function (DF) to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF) to support Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance (LAES). The information is described as records and information carried by a record. This focus is on describing the information being transferred to the LEMF. + +The IRI events and data are encoded into records as defined in the Table 6.1 Mapping between GPRS Events and HI2 records type and Annexes B.3 and B.9 Intercept related information (HI2) (see Note). IRI is described in terms of a 'causing event' and information associated with that event. Within each IRI Record there is a set of events and associated information elements to support the particular service. + +NOTE: IRI events and data intercepted by the GPRS and 3G PS nodes may be delivered to the LEMF by using either the HI2 specified in Annex B.3 or the HI2 specified in Annex B.9. The latter option may be preferred when the GPRS and 3G PS nodes are interworking with SAE/EPS nodes, in order to deliver all the IRI events and data intercepted in the Packet based network by using the same HI2. + +The communication events described in Table 6.1: Mapping between GPRS Events and HI2 record type and Table 6.2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information convey the basic information for reporting the disposition of a communication. This clause describes those events and supporting information. + +Each record described in this clause consists of a set of parameters. Each parameter is either: + +- mandatory (M) - required for the record, +- conditional (C) - required in situations where a condition is met (the condition is given in the Description), or +- optional (O) - provided at the discretion of the implementation. + +The information to be carried by each parameter is identified. Both optional and conditional parameters are considered to be OPTIONAL syntactically in ASN.1 Stage 3 descriptions. The Stage 2 inclusion takes precedence over Stage 3 syntax. + +### 6.5.1.1 REPORT record information + +The REPORT record is used to report non-communication related subscriber actions (events) and for reporting unsuccessful packet-mode communication attempts. + +The REPORT record is also used for the PS LALS reports. + +The REPORT record shall be triggered when: + +- the target's mobile station performs a GPRS attach procedure (successful or unsuccessful); +- the target's mobile station performs a GPRS detach procedure; + +- the target's mobile station is unsuccessful at performing a PDP context activation procedure; +- the target's mobile station performs a cell, routing area, or combined cell and routing area update; +- the interception is activated after target's mobile station has successfully performed GPRS attach procedure; +- optionally when the target's mobile station leaves the old SGSN; +- optionally when the target's mobile station enters or leaves IA; +- the target's mobile station sends an SMS-Mobile Originated (MO) communication. Dependent on national requirements, the triggering for the REPORT record event shall occur either when the 3G SGSN receives the SMS from the target MS or, when the 3G SGSN receives notification that the SMS-Centre successfully received the SMS; + +a mobile station sends an SMS-Mobile Originated (MO) communication to a Non-Local ID target. Dependent on national requirements, the triggering event for the REPORT record shall occur either when the 3G SGSN receives the SMS from a MS for a Non-Local ID target or, when the 3G SGSN receives notification that the SMS-Centre successfully received the SMS for the Non-Local ID target; + +- the target's mobile station receives a SMS Mobile-Terminated (MT) communication. Dependent on national requirements, the triggering event for the REPORT record shall occur either when the 3G SGSN receives the SMS from the SMS-Centre or, when the 3G SGSN receives notification that the target MS successfully received the SMS; + +a mobile station receives a SMS Mobile-Terminated (MT) communication from a Non-Local ID target. Dependent on national requirements, the triggering event for the REPORT record shall occur either when the 3G SGSN receives the SMS from the SMS-Centre originating from a Non-Local ID target or, when the 3G SGSN receives notification that the MS successfully received the SMS originating from a Non-Local ID target; + +- as a national option, a mobile terminal is authorized for service with another network operator or service provider; in that case, other related events are required as cancel location, register location, location information request from a third party's node; +- as a national option, a REPORT record have to be generated when there is a HLR subscriber record change of IMSI or of MSISDN triggered by a messages to or from the HLR; +- packet data header reporting is performed on an individual intercepted packet basis and a packet is detected as it is sent or received by the target for a packet-data communication PDP Context.; +- when packet data summary reporting is performed on a summary basis for a packet-data communication PDP Context.associated with a particular packet flow (defined as the combination of source IP address, destination IP address, source port, destination port, and protocol and for IPv6 also include the flow label) and: + - the packet flow starts, + - an interim packet summary report is to be provided, or + - packet flow ends including the case where PDP Context is deactivated. + +An interim packet data summary report is triggered if: + +- the expiration of a configurable Summary Timer per intercept occurs. The Summary Timer is configurable in units of seconds. Or +- a per-intercept configurable count threshold is reached. +- when a LALS report information is received from the LI LCS Client. + +Packet Data Header Information is reported either on a per-packet (i.e. non-summarised) basis or in a summary report. These reports provide IRI associated with the packets detected. The packet data header information related REPORT record is used to convey packet data header information during an active packet-data communication PDP Context. + +NOTE: In the case of IP Fragments, Packet Data Header Information on a 6-tuple basis may only be available on the first packet and subsequent packets may not include such information and therefore may not be reported. + +**Table 6.3: GPRS Attach REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event type | M | Shall provide GPRS Attach event type. | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's MS. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | +| failed attach reason | C | For failed attach attempts of the target, provide information about the reason for the failed attach attempt. | + +**Table 6.4: GPRS Detach REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event type | M | Shall provide GPRS Detach event type. | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's MS. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | + +**Table 6.5: PDP Context Activation (unsuccessful) REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| observed PDP address | C | When a:
- static address requested by the target's MS in association with a target-initiated PDP context activation request is unsuccessful; or
- address offered by the network in association with a network-initiated PDP context activation request and the target's MS rejects the network-initiated PDP context activation,
The address requested or offered shall be reported. | +| iP assignment | C | When an observed PDP address is reported, shall provide to indicate observed PDP address is statically or dynamically assigned. | +| event type | M | Shall provide PDP Context Activation event type. | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| access point name | C | If available (i.e., provided by the UE) shall identify either the:
- packet data network to which the target requested to be connected when the target's mobile station is unsuccessful at performing a PDP context activation procedure (MS to Network); or
- access point of the packet data network that requested to be connected to the MS when the target's mobile station rejects a network-initiated PDP context activation (Network to MS). | +| PDP type | C | When an observed PDP address is reported, provide to describe the PDP type of the observed PDP address. The PDP Type defines the end user protocol to be used between the external packet data network and the MS. | +| initiator | M | Shall be provided to indicate whether the PDP context activation is network-initiated, target-initiated, or not available. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's MS. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | +| failed context activation reason | M | Information about the reason for failed context activation attempts of the target shall be provided. | +| umts QOS | C | Provide to identify the QOS parameters. | + +**Table 6.6: Location Information Update REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event type | M | Shall provide Location Information Update event type. | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's MS. This parameter, in case of inter-SGSN RAU, will be sent only by the new SGSN. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | +| old location information | O | Provide (only by the old SGSN), when authorized and if available, to identify the old location information for the target's MS. | +| ldi event | O | Provide, when authorized, to indicate whether the target is entering or leaving the interception area (only applicable for location dependant interception). | + +Location Information Update REPORT Record shall be sent in the following cases: + +- when the target's mobile station moves to the new SGSN; +- optionally when the target's mobile station leaves the old SGSN. + +**Table 6.7: SMS-MO and SMS-MT Communication REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| observed Non-Local ID | | | +| event type | M | Shall provide SMS event type. | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| SMS originating address | O | Provide to identify the originating and destination address of the SMS message | +| SMS destination address | | | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's MS. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | +| SMS | C | Provide, when authorized, to deliver SMS content, including header which is sent with the SMS-service. | +| service centre address | C | If SMS content is not provided, shall be provided to identify the address of the relevant SMS-C server. If SMS content is provided, this parameter is optional. | +| SMS initiator | M | Shall be provided to indicate whether the SMS is MO, MT, or Undefined. | + +**Table 6.8: Serving System REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event type | M | Shall provide Serving System event type. | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the HLR reporting the event (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| serving system identifier | M | Shall provide the VPLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, E. 212 number [87]). | + +**Table 6.9: Start Of Interception with mobile station attached REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event type | M | Shall provide Start Of Interception with mobile station attached event type. | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's MS. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | + +Start Of Interception with mobile station attached REPORT Record shall be sent in the following case: + +- the interception is activated any time after target's mobile station has successfully performed GPRS attach procedure. + +When the ICE (i.e. SGSN, GGSN) is not aware of the activation of multiple lawfully authorized intercepts when the mobile station has already completed the GPRS attach procedures, the MF/DF shall generate the Start of Interception with mobile station attached REPORT record on its own using information that it has retained. + +When the REPORT-record is used to convey the start of interception with mobile station attached, the DF2 shall not send the Start of Interception with mobile station attached REPORT record to the LEMFs that were already intercepting the target due previous LI activation on the same target. + +**Table 6.9A: Packet Data Header Information REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMSI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMEI | | | +| observed PDP address | C | If available, shall be provided in the following cases to identify the:
  • - static address requested by the target's MS, and allocated by the Network for a successful PDP context activation.
  • - address allocated dynamically by the network to the target MS in association with a PDP context activation (i.e. address is sent by the Network in an Activate PDP Context Accept) for a successful PDP context activation procedure when the PDP Context activation request does not contain a static PDP address.
  • - address offered by the network in association with a network-initiated PDP context activation request when the target's MS accepts the network-initiated PDP context activation request.
| +| event type | M | Shall provide the Packet Data Header Information event type. | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| access point name | C | If available, shall be provided to identify the packet data network to which the target is connected. | +| PDP type | C | When a PDP address is provided, shall provide the PDP type of the observed PDP address. The PDP Type defines the end user protocol to be used between the external packet data network and the MS. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Shall provide to uniquely identify the PDP context delivered to the LEMF used to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| packet data header information | M | Shall be provided to identify the packet header information to be reported on a per-packet basis as defined in Table 6.9B or on a summary basis. For summary reporting includes one or more packet flow summaries where each packet flow summary is associated with a particular packet flow as defined in Table 6.9C. | +| NSAPI | O | Provided for additional information. | + +**Table 6.9B: Contents of per-packet, packet data header information parameter** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| source IP address | C | Provide when mapping packet header information to identify the source IP address for a particular packet flow. | +| source port number | C | Provide when mapping packet header information to report the source port number for a particular packet flow when the transport protocol supports port numbers. | +| destination IP address | C | Provide when mapping packet header information to identify the destination IP address for a particular packet flow. | +| destination port number | C | Provide when mapping packet header information to report the destination port number for a particular packet flow when the transport protocol supports port numbers. | +| transport protocol | C | Provide when mapping packet header information to identify the transport protocol (e.g. TCP) for a particular packet flow. | +| flow label | C | Provide when mapping packet header information for IPv6 only for a particular packet flow. | +| direction | M | Shall be provided. Identifies the direction of the packet (from target or to target). | +| packet size | O | Provide when mapping packet header information to convey the value contained in Total Length Fields of the IPv4 packets or the value contained in the Payload Length fields of the IPv6 packets. | +| packet data header copy | C | Provide when reporting a copy of the entire packet header information rather than mapping individual information and so it is alternative to the individual information. | + +**Table 6.9C: Contents of a single summary flow packet data header information parameter** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| source IP address | M | Shall be provided. Identifies the source IP address for a particular packet flow. | +| source port number | C | Provide to report the source port number for a particular packet flow when the transport protocol supports port numbers. | +| destination IP address | M | Shall be provided. Identifies the destination IP address for a particular packet flow. | +| destination port number | C | Provide to report the destination port number for a particular packet flow when the transport protocol supports port numbers. | +| transport protocol | M | Identifies the transport protocol (e.g. TCP) for a particular packet flow. | +| flow label | C | Provide for IPv6 only for a particular packet flow. | +| summary period | M | Shall provide the period of time during which the packets of a particular packet flow of the summary report were sent or received by the target and defined by specifying the time when the first packet and the last packet of the reporting period were detected. | +| packet count | M | Shall provide the number of packets detected for a particular packet flow. | +| sum of packet sizes | O | Provides the sum of values contained in Total Length Fields of the IPv4 packets or the sum of the values contained in the Payload Length fields of the IPv6 packets. | +| packet data summary reason | M | Shall provide the reason for the report being delivered to the LEMF (i.e. timeout, count limit, end of session). | + +**Table 6.9D: HLR subscriber record change REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| new observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| new observed IMSI | | | +| new Observed IMEI | | | +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event type | M | Shall provide HLR subscriber record change event type. | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall provide the network identifier of the HLR reporting the event (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| changed (old/new) IMSI or MSISDN or IMEI | M | Shall provide what was changed (old/new MSISDN, old/new IMSI or old/new IMEI) | +| carrier Specific Data | O | Provide raw data of this specific update. | + +**Table 6.9E: Cancel location REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | M | Shall provide cancel Location change event type. (purge from HLR sent to SGSN included). | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall provide the network identifier of the HLR reporting the event (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| previous serving system identifier | C | If available, shall provide the previous VPLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, defined in E.212 [87]). | +| previous serving SGSN-Number | C | Provide the E.164 number of the previous serving SGSN, if available. | +| previous serving SGSN-Address | C | Provide the IP address of the previous serving SGSN, if available. | +| previous serving S4-SGSN-address | C | Provide the Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm of the previous serving S4-SGSN, if available. | + +**Table 6.9F: Register location REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | M | Shall provide register location event type. | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall provide the network identifier of the HLR reporting the event (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| previous serving system identifier | C | If available, shall provide the previous VPLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country; defined in E.212 [87]). | +| previous serving SGSN-Number | C | Provide the E.164 number of the previous serving SGSN, if available. | +| previous serving SGSN-Address | C | Provide the IP address of the previous serving SGSN, if available. | +| previous serving S4-SGSN-address | C | Provide the Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm of the previous serving S4-SGSN, if available. | +| current serving system identifier | M | Shall provide the current VPLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, defined in E.212 [87]). | +| current serving SGSN-Number | C | Provide the E.164 number of the current serving SGSN, if available. | +| current serving SGSN-Address | C | Provide the IP address of the current serving SGSN, if available. | +| current serving S4-SGSN-address | C | Provide the Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm of the current serving S4-SGSN, if available. | + +**Table 6.9G: Location information request REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | M | Shall provide location information request event type. | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall provide the network identifier of the HLR reporting the event (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| requesting network identifier | C | Provide the requesting network identifier PLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, defined in E.212 [87]).
Editor's Note: The specific condition for this parameter needs clarification and consideration can be given to reporting whatever requesting network identifier is observed regardless of whether that identifier is a PLMN id in accordance with E212. | +| requesting node type | C | For GMSC; SMS Centre; GMLC, MME, SGSN, shall provide the requesting node type (GMSC; SMS Centre; GMLC, MME, SGSN) | + +**Table 6.9H: LALS Target Positioning REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMSI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the report is created. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the LI LCS Client (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide the LALS location information, if the positioning is successful. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | +| extended location parameters | O | If available, additional location information and associated QoS information. | +| LALS error code | C | Provide the error identification code, if the positioning is not successful. | + +**Table 6.9I: LALS Enhanced Location for IRI REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the LCS Report is available at LI LCS Client. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the LI LCS Client (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | C | Provided for correlation with the IRI records of the call, if available in the corresponding LALS triggering event. | +| location information | C | Provide the LALS location information, if the positioning is successful. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | +| extended location parameters | O | If available, additional location information and associated QoS information. | +| LALS error code | C | Provide the error identification code if the positioning is not successful. | + +In the present document, the LALS Target Positioning reports are only sent when the target is successfully located. If the location information is not available, e.g. when the target is not attached to the network, no record is sent to the LEMF. + +NOTE 1: See the TS 33.107 [19] for a detailed description of LALS. See Annex O for information on using of the PS ASN.1 information object for the LALS reporting. + +NOTE 2: In some specific scenarios the amount of Enhanced Location for IRI reports data may overload the X2 and/or HI2 interfaces. To prevent the overload, a flow control for Enhanced Location for IRI Reports may be implemented, e.g. by limiting the frequency of the reports for individual target. + +#### 6.5.1.2 BEGIN record information + +The BEGIN record is used to convey the first event of packet-data communication interception. + +The BEGIN record shall be triggered when: + +- successful PDP context activation; +- the interception of a target's communications is started and at least one PDP context is active. If more than one PDP context is active, a BEGIN record shall be generated for each PDP context that is active; +- during the inter-SGSN RAU, when the target has at least one PDP context active and the PLNM has changed; +- the target entered an interception area and has at least one PDP context active. + +**Table 6.10: PDP Context Activation (successful) BEGIN Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| observed PDP address | M | Shall provide one of the following:
- static address requested by the target's MS, and allocated by the Network for a successful PDP context activation;
- address allocated dynamically by the network to the target MS in association with a PDP context activation (i.e. address is sent by the Network in an Activate PDP Context Accept) for a successful PDP context activation procedure when the PDP Context activation request does not contain a static PDP address; or
- address offered by the network in association with a network-initiated PDP context activation request when the target's MS accepts the network-initiated PDP context activation request. | +| iP assignment | M | Shall provide to indicate observed PDP address is statically or dynamically assigned. | +| event type | M | Shall provide PDP Context Activation event type. | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| access point name | M | Shall provide to identify the:
- packet data network to which the target requested to be connected when the target's MS is successful at performing a PDP context activation procedure (MS to Network).
- access point of the packet data network that requested to be connected to the MS when the target's MS accepts a network-initiated PDP context activation (Network to MS). | +| PDP type | M | Shall provide to describe the PDP type of the observed PDP address. The PDP Type defines the end user protocol to be used between the external packet data network and the MS. | +| initiator | M | Shall provide to indicate whether the PDP context activation is network-initiated, target-initiated, or not available. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Shall provide to uniquely identify the PDP context delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's MS. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | +| umts QOS | C | If available, shall provide to identify the QOS parameters. | +| NSAPI | O | Provided for additional information. | + +**Table 6.11: Start Of Interception (with PDP Context Active) BEGIN Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| observed PDP address | M | Shall provide the:
  • - static address requested by the target's MS, and allocated by the Network for a successful PDP context activation.
  • - address allocated dynamically by the network to the target MS in association with a PDP context activation (i.e. address is sent by the Network in an Activate PDP Context Accept) for a successful PDP context activation procedure when the PDP Context activation request does not contain a static PDP address.
  • - address offered by the network in association with a network-initiated PDP context activation request when the target's MS accepts the network-initiated PDP context activation request.
| +| event type | M | Shall provide Start Of Interception With PDP Context Active event type. | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| access point name | M | Shall provide to identify the:
  • - packet data network to which the target requested to be connected when the target's MS is successful at performing a PDP context activation procedure (MS to Network).
  • - access point of the packet data network that requested to be connected to the MS when the target's MS accepts a network-initiated PDP context activation (Network to MS).
| +| PDP type | M | Shall provide to describe the PDP type of the observed PDP address. The PDP Type defines the end user protocol to be used between the external packet data network and the MS. | +| initiator | C | If available, shall provide to indicate whether the PDP context activation is network-initiated, target-initiated, or not available. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Shall provide to uniquely identify the PDP context delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's MS. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | +| umts QOS | C | If available, shall provide to identify the QOS parameters. | +| NSAPI | O | Provided for additional information. | + +When the ICE (i.e. SGSN, GGSN) is not aware of the activation of multiple lawfully authorized intercepts when at least one PDP context is already active, the MF/DF shall generate the Start of Interception (with PDP Context Active) BEGIN record on its own using information that it has retained. + +When the BEGIN-record is used to convey the start of interception with at least one PDP context active, the DF2 shall not send the Start of Interception (with PDP Context Active) BEGIN record to the LEMFs that were already intercepting the target due previous LI activation on the same target. + +### 6.5.1.3 CONTINUE record information + +The CONTINUE record is used to convey events during an active packet-data communication PDP Context. + +The CONTINUE record shall be triggered when: + +- an active PDP context is modified; +- during the inter-SGSN RAU, when target has got at least one PDP context active, the PLMN does not change and the triggering event information is available at the DF/MF. + +In order to enable the LEMF to correlate the information on HI3, a new correlation number shall not be generated within a CONTINUE record. + +**Table 6.12: PDP Context Modification CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMSI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMEI | | | +| observed PDP address | C | If the PDP address is modified, shall provide the observed address after modification to identify the:
  • - static address requested by the target's MS, and allocated by the Network for a successful PDP context activation.
  • - address allocated dynamically by the network to the target MS in association with a PDP context activation (i.e. address is sent by the Network in an Activate PDP Context Accept) for a successful PDP context activation procedure when the PDP Context activation request does not contain a static PDP address.
  • - address offered by the network in association with a network-initiated PDP context activation request when the target's MS accepts the network-initiated PDP context activation request.
Otherwise, it is optional to send it. | +| event type | M | Shall provide the PDP Context Modification event type. | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| access point name | M | Shall provide to identify the:
  • - packet data network to which the target requested to be connected when the target's MS is successful at performing a PDP context activation procedure (MS to Network).
  • - access point of the packet data network that requested to be connected to the MS when the target's MS accepts a network-initiated PDP context activation (Network to MS).
| +| PDP type | C | When reporting the PDP address, shall provide the PDP type of the observed PDP address. The PDP Type defines the end user protocol to be used between the external packet data network and the MS. | +| initiator | C | If available shall provide to indicate whether the PDP context modification is network-initiated, target-initiated, or not available. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Shall provide to uniquely identify the PDP context delivered to the LEMF used to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's MS. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | +| umts QOS | C | If available and changed, shall provide to identify the QOS parameters. If umts QOS is not changed, it is optional to be reported. | +| NSAPI | O | Provided for additional information. | + +**Table 6.13: Start Of Interception (with PDP Context Active) CONTINUE Record (optional)** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMSI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMEI | | | +| observed PDP address | M | Shall provide to identify the:
- static address requested by the target's MS, and allocated by the Network for a successful PDP context activation.
- address allocated dynamically by the network to the target MS in association with a PDP context activation (i.e. address is sent by the Network in an Activate PDP Context Accept) for a successful PDP context activation procedure when the PDP Context activation request does not contain a static PDP address.
- address offered by the network in association with a network-initiated PDP context activation request when the target's MS accepts the network-initiated PDP context activation request. | +| event type | M | Shall provide the Continue interception with active PDP event type. | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| access point name | M | Shall provide to identify the:
- packet data network to which the target requested to be connected when the target's MS is successful at performing a PDP context activation procedure (MS to Network).
- access point of the packet data network that requested to be connected to the MS when the target's MS accepts a network-initiated PDP context activation (Network to MS). | +| PDP type | M | Shall provide to describe the PDP type of the observed PDP address. The PDP Type defines the end user protocol to be used between the external packet data network and the MS. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | C | If available shall provide to uniquely identify the PDP context delivered to the LEMF used to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's MS. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | +| umts QOS | C | If available shall provide to identify the QOS parameters. | +| NSAPI | O | Provided for additional information. | + +#### 6.5.1.4 END record information + +The END record is used to convey the last event of packet-data communication. + +The END record shall be triggered when: + +- PDP context deactivation. + +**Table 6.14: PDP Context Deactivation END Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| observed PDP address | C | Provide to identify the PDP address assigned to the target, if available. | +| event type | M | Shall provide PDP Context Deactivation event type. | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| access point name | M | Shall provide to identify the packet data network to which the target was connected. | +| PDP type | C | When the PDP address is reported, shall provide to describe the PDP type of the observed PDP address. The PDP Type defines the end user protocol to be used between the external packet data network and the MS. | +| initiator | M | Shall provide to indicate whether the PDP context deactivation was network-initiated, target-initiated, or not available. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Shall provide to uniquely identify the PDP context delivered to the LEM and to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's MS. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | +| context deactivation reason | M | Shall provide to indicate reason for deactivation. | +| NSAPI | O | Provided for additional information. | +| ULI Timestamp | O | Indicates the time when the User Location Information was acquired. | + +## 6.6 IRI reporting for packet domain at GGSN + +Interception in the GGSN is a national option. However, if 3G direct tunnel functionality with the GGSN (as defined in TS 23.060 [42]) is used in the network, then the GGSN shall perform the interception of IRI. + +As a national option, in the case where the GGSN is reporting IRI for a target, the target is handed off to another SGSN and the same GGSN continues to handle the content of communications subject to roaming agreements, the GGSN shall continue to report the following IRI of the content of communication: + +- PDP context activation; +- PDP context deactivation; +- Start of interception with PDP context active; +- PDP context modification; +- Packet Data Header Information. + +NOTE: In some situation (e.g. during activation of second, third, etc, intercepts on the target), the MF/DF may have to detect on its own that an interception is activated on a target with PDP context active. + +## 6.7 Content of communication interception for packet domain at GGSN + +Interception in the GGSN is a national option. However, if 3G direct tunnel functionality with the GGSN (as defined in TS 23.060 [42]) is used in the network, then the GGSN shall perform the interception of content of communication. + +As a national option, in the case where the GGSN is performing interception of the content of communications, the target is handed off to another SGSN and the same GGSN continues to handle the content of communications subject to roaming agreements, the GGSN shall continue to perform the interception of the content of communication. + +## 7 Multi-media domain + +### 7.0 Introduction + +Clause 7 deals with IRI reporting in the IMS. IRI reporting in the multi-media domain specified in this clause does not depend on the IP-Connectivity Access Network (IP-CAN), defined in TS 23.228 [40], used to transport the CC. When the IP-CAN is the UMTS PS domain, annexes C and G apply for CC interception at the SGSN/GGSN. However, such CC interception may intercept more than just the CC associated with an IMS based voice service. Hence, for separated VoIP CC intercept and reporting, refer to clause 12. + +In addition, this clause also specifies IRI reporting from the HSS handling subscriber data for IMS network. Target identities to be used for interception of IRIs at the HSS are specified in TS 33.107 [19]. + +According to TS 33.107 [19], interception in the CSCFs shall be supported in the S-CSCF and optionally in the P-CSCF where the S-CSCF and the P-CSCF are in the same network. For roaming scenarios where the P-CSCF is in the Visited Network, interception at the P-CSCF is mandatory. The target identities for the intercept of traffic at the CSCFs are only the SIP-URI, TEL-URI and IMEI (described in TS 23.003 [25], obtained from the Instance IDs, described also in TS 23.003 [25] as requested in clause 7A.8 of TS 33.107 [19]. In the intercepting nodes (CSCF's) the relevant SIP-Messages are duplicated and forwarded to the MF HI2. + +The enhanced P-CSCF (eP-CSCF) shall adhere to all the LI requirements pertaining to a P-CSCF. Any additional LI requirements pertaining to the support of Web Real Time Communications (WebRTC) Interworking as specified in TS 23.228 [40] that only apply to the eP-CSCF are described distinctly. + +In case of target manipulation of IMS supplementary service setting, the interception shall be made by XCAP servers maintaining XCAP resources related to the supplementary service settings defined in TS 22.173 [78] made on the interface Ut as described in TS 24.623 [77]. Any other points related to attempts to access to Target's XCAP servers or, XCAP change/transaction in services setting related to the target, are for further studies. + +Ut based XCAP manipulation messages for the IMS services for the target is reported. Any copy "en clair" of the XCAP exchanges (aggregated or not), between the UE and the AS, will be transmitted to the LEMF in the HI2 interface through the DF 2, that will encapsulate the XCAP Ut transactions in ASN.1. Such XCAP transactions on the Ut interface have to include any exchange of data, which are contained in the XCAP payload (e.g. the get, put, and delete operations on the XCAP resources). + +NOTE: Interception of the target's supplementary service setting management or modifications that are made outside the Ut interface is for further studies. + +For clarification, see Figure 7.1. If the P-CSCF and S-CSCF are in the same network and LI is provided at both P-CSCF and S-CSCF, the events are sent twice to the LEMF. + +![Diagram illustrating IRI Interception at a CSCF. The diagram shows a 'Visited /Home Network' containing SGSN, GGSN, P-CSCF, and S-CSCF. Below the network boundary are DF3 (MF HB) and DF2 (MF HD2). Arrows labeled 'CC' (blue) and 'IRI' (orange) point from the network elements to DF3 and DF2 respectively. Below DF3 and DF2 is the LEMF. Arrows labeled 'HI3' (grey) and 'HI2' (yellow) point from DF3 and DF2 to the LEMF.](0931f3e098bd4539041de11c50cec2d2_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + subgraph VHN [Visited /Home Network] + SGSN[SGSN] + GGSN[GGSN] + PCSCF[P-CSCF] + SCSCF[S-CSCF] + end + DF3[DF3 +MF HB] + DF2[DF2 +MF HD2] + LEMF[LEMF] + + SGSN -- CC --> DF3 + GGSN -.-> DF3 + GGSN -.-> DF2 + PCSCF -- IRI --> DF2 + SCSCF -- IRI --> DF2 + DF3 -- HI3 --> LEMF + DF2 -- HI2 --> LEMF + +``` + +Diagram illustrating IRI Interception at a CSCF. The diagram shows a 'Visited /Home Network' containing SGSN, GGSN, P-CSCF, and S-CSCF. Below the network boundary are DF3 (MF HB) and DF2 (MF HD2). Arrows labeled 'CC' (blue) and 'IRI' (orange) point from the network elements to DF3 and DF2 respectively. Below DF3 and DF2 is the LEMF. Arrows labeled 'HI3' (grey) and 'HI2' (yellow) point from DF3 and DF2 to the LEMF. + +Figure 7.1: IRI Interception at a CSCF + +## 7.1 Identifiers + +### 7.1.0 General + +Specific identifiers are necessary to identify a target for interception uniquely and to correlate between the data, which is conveyed over the different handover interfaces (HI2 and HI3). The identifiers are defined in the subsequent subclauses of clause 7.1. + +For the delivery of CC and IRI the SGSN, GGSN and CSCF's provide correlation numbers and target identities to the HI2 and HI3. The correlation number provided in the PS domain (SGSN, GGSN) is unique per PDP context and is used to correlate CC with IRI and the different IRI's of one PDP context. However, where separated delivery of IMS based VoIP is required, to ensure that the CC related to an IMS based VoIP call is intercepted and reported separately from other PS domain services while being correlated to the IMS based VoIP IRI, refer to clause 12. + +Interception is performed on an IMS identifier(s) associated with the target including identifiers such as IMEI, SIP-URI and Tel-URI, ETSI EN 300 356 [30]. + +In addition, in case of interception at the HSS, IMSI shall be supported as target identity if it is available in the subscription data stored in the HSS and the association with IMS identities can be done. + +IMEI and MSISDN shall be supported as target identities if the HSS is shared with access services (e.g. PS, EPS) and the association with IMS identities can be done. + +Non-Local ID interception is based on SIP-URI or Tel URI. Non-Local Id may be present in any of the SIP headers used to identify either the calling party information and redirecting party information present in the incoming SIP message for incoming calls from target Non-Local ID, or the called party information present in the outgoing SIP message for outgoing calls to target Non-Local ID. + +For Non-Local ID target interception, the CSP is not responsible for the deduplication of events. + +### 7.1.1 Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID) + +For each target identity related to an interception measure, the authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) shall assign a special Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID), which has been agreed between the LEA and the operator (NO/AN/SP). + +Using an indirect identification, pointing to a target identity makes it easier to keep the knowledge about a specific target limited within the authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) and the handling agents at the LEA. + +The LIID is a component of the CC delivery procedure and of the IRI records. It shall be used within any information exchanged at the handover interfaces HI2 and HI3 for identification and correlation purposes. + +The LIID format shall consist of alphanumeric characters. It might for example, among other information, contain a lawful authorization reference number, and the date, when the lawful authorization was issued. + +The authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) shall either enter, based on an agreement with each LEA: a unique LIID for each target identity of the target; or a single LIID for multiple target identities all pertaining to the same target. + +Note that, in order to simplify the use of the LIID at the LEMF for the purpose of correlating IMS signalling with GSN CC, the use of a single LIID in association with potentially numerous IMS identities (IMEI, SIP and TEL URIs) is recommended. + +If more than one LEA intercepts the same target identity, there shall be unique LIIDs assigned relating to each LEA. + +In case the LIID of a given target has different values in the GSN and in the CSCF, it is up to the LEMF to recover the association between the two LIIDs. + +### 7.1.2 Network identifier + +The network identifier (NID) is a mandatory parameter; it should be internationally unique. It consists of the following two identifiers. + +- 1) Operator- (NO/AN/SP) identifier (mandatory): +Unique identification of network operator, access network provider or service provider. +- 2) Network element identifier NEID (optional): +The purpose of the network element identifier is to uniquely identify the relevant network element carrying out the LI operations, such as LI activation, IRI record sending, etc. + +A network element identifier may be an IP address or other identifier. National regulations may mandate the sending of the NEID. + +### 7.1.3 Correlation number + +Two parameters are defined to enable further correlation than can be accomplished via a LIID alone. The first is called a Correlation number while the second is simply called Correlation. The Correlation Number was initially defined to carry a GPRS/EPS Correlation Number and is limited to those access types that support a PDP Context/EPS Bearer. Subsequently, the Correlation parameter was defined to enable a more general correlation. The value used in the Correlation number parameter or the Correlation parameter may be generated by the CSCF. + +When clause 12 is used to provide separated IMS VoIP intercept and delivery, imsVoIP (as defined in clause 12) may be used to provide the correlation between the IRI and CC of an IMS VoIP session and also between IRI messages of the same IMS VoIP session. + +See clause 6.1.3 for a definition of the GPRS Correlation Number. See clause 10.5.0 for EPS Correlation Number. + +NOTE 1: Void. + +It is an implementation matter how the CSCF generates a correlation number parameter value. The CSCF should use the gPRSCorrelationNumber/ePSCorrelationNumber ASN.1 parameter as a container. + +For a GPRS/UMTS access or LTE access, if two PDP contexts or two EPS Bearers are used for the communication (one for signalling and one for bearer) two correlation numbers may be delivered via the CSCFs. Different identifiers may be used for correlating a target's various SIP messages such as: + +- LIID; +- implementation dependent number. + +NOTE 2: The implementation dependent number may be e.g. a 'Call-id'. However, when a CSCF acts as a back-to-back user agent a CSCF can have different 'Call-id' values for different legs of signalling. Therefore some other number would be needed in such a case. + +NOTE 3: The LIID may be used to associate SIP messages with respective GSN IRI records. In case the target is only permitted to have a single SIP session with a single CC bearer active at any time, the LIID is sufficient to correlate IMS IRI records with GSN IRI records. In all other cases, e.g. the target is permitted to have multiple SIP sessions active concurrently, a combination of the LIID and an implementation dependent number may be used to correlate the IMS IRI records with the GSN IRI records. + +In case the LIID of a given target has different values in the GSN and in the CSCF, it is up to the LEMF to recover the association between the two LIIDs. + +SIP correlation number is used to correlate events of one specific SIP session. + +Correlation number is not applicable to interception at the HSS. + +## 7.2 Timing and quality + +### 7.2.1 Timing + +As a general principle, within a telecommunication system, IRI, if buffered, should be buffered for as short a time as possible. + +NOTE: If the transmission of IRI fails, it may be buffered or lost. + +Subject to national requirements, the following timing requirements shall be supported: + +- Each IRI data record shall be sent by the delivery function to the LEMF over the HI2 within seconds of the detection of the triggering event by the IAP at least 95% of the time. +- Each IRI data record shall contain a time-stamp, based on the intercepting nodes clock that is generated following the detection of the IRI triggering event. Subject to national requirements, IMS specific IRI timestamp should have higher precision than 1 second. + +### 7.2.2 Quality + +QoS is not applicable to SIP signalling and hence not to IMS specific IRI records. + +NOTE: The QoS class in PS domain is defined only for user plane data (CC); refer to subclause 6.2.2. + +### 7.2.3 Void + +(Void) + +## 7.3 Security aspects + +When KMS based IMS media security TS 33.328 [54] is adopted in the network, the HI2 shall have strong integrity and confidentiality protection. In this case, the HI2 should be protected by TLS. FTP delivery should be done over TLS as specified by IETF RFC 4217 [58]. TLS and certificate profiling shall be according to TS 33.310 [60]. + +Additional security is defined by national requirements. + +## 7.4 Quantitative aspects + +The number of target interceptions supported is a national requirement. + +The area of Quantitative Aspects addresses the ability to perform multiple, simultaneous interceptions within a provider's network and at each of the relevant intercept access points within the network. Specifics related to this topic include: + +- The ability to access and monitor all simultaneous communications originated, received, or redirected by the target; +- The ability for multiple LEAs (up to five) to monitor, simultaneously, the same target while maintaining unobtrusiveness, including between agencies; +- The ability of the network to simultaneously support a number of separate (i.e. multiple targets) legally authorized interceptions within its service area(s), including different levels of authorization for each interception, including between agencies (i.e. IRI only, or IRI and communication content when SIP message also contains content). + +## 7.5 IRI for IMS + +### 7.5.0 Introduction + +In addition, information on non-transmission related actions of a target constitute IRI and is sent via HI2, e.g. information on SIP message with call forwarding configuration information. + +The IRI may be subdivided into the following categories: + +1. Control information for HI2 (e.g. correlation information). +2. Basic data context information, for standard data transmission between two parties (e.g. SIP- or XCAP-message). +3. Information needed to decrypt media traffic between the parties. + +For each event, a Record is sent to the LEMF, if this is required. The following table gives the mapping between event type received at DF2 level and record type sent to the LEMF. + +**Table 7.1: Mapping between IMS Events and HI2 Records Type** + +| Event | IRI Record Type | +|-----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| +| SIP-message | REPORT | +| XCAP-request | REPORT | +| XCAP response | REPORT | +| Media decryption keys available | REPORT | +| Start of interception for already established IMS session | REPORT | +| Serving System | REPORT | +| Subscriber record change | REPORT | +| Registration Termination | REPORT | +| Location Information Request | REPORT | + +A set of information is used to generate the record. The records used transmit the information from mediation function to LEMF. This set of information can be extended in the CSCF or DF2 MF, if new IEs are available and if this is necessary in a specific country. The following table gives the mapping between information received per event and information sent in records. + +Once IRI only interception is underway, LEMF receives IMS specific IRI only (SIP IRI) from CSCF or IRI only (XCAP Message IRI) from the XCAP server managing the XCAP resource associated with the IMS supplementary service setting, or IRI only from the HSS. LEMF does not receive CC, and therefore it is not possible to correlate IMS specific IRI with CC. + +Once IRI and CC interception is underway, LEMF receives IMS specific IRI both from a GSN and from a CSCF. LEMF receives SIP messages also from a GSN within CC. LEMF receives IRI of XCAP events from functions such as XCAP authentication and resource management function. In certain cases, however, SIP messages may be encrypted between UE and CSCF. XCAP message between the UE and the AS managing the target's IMS supplementary service + +settings may be encrypted. In these cases LEMF needs to receive unencrypted SIP or XCAP messages in IMS specific IRI provided from CSCF, or from the XCAP server managing the target's IMS supplementary service settings. The LI service delivery of XCAP events related to XCAP authentication process is for further study. + +In some cases the CC is encrypted according to one of the IMS media security solutions specified in TS 33.328 [54]. In these cases the LEMF receives encrypted CC and decrypts it based on the decryption information received over the HI2 interface. + +NOTE 0: CC interception is not applicable at the HSS. + +When the InstanceID is present in IMS signalling TS 24.229 [76], and contains an IMEI URN [81], [82], the IMEI shall be extracted and converted to the reporting format defined for partyInformation (imei). + +NOTE 1: Delivery of decrypted CC in the above scenario is FFS. + +NOTE 1a: GSN has no possibility to decrypt SIP messages based on the IMS security architecture. + +NOTE 2: Security mechanisms for protecting delivery of key material over the HI2 in line with TS 33.328 [54] are FFS. + +NOTE 2a: When the CSCF is not aware of the activation of multiple lawfully authorized intercepts on a single target, the MF/DF needs to generate the REPORT with *Start of Interception on an already established IMS session* on its own using information that it has retained. + +The DF2 shall not send the REPORT with Start of Interception with an already established IMS session to the LEMFs that were already intercepting the session due to a previous LI activation on the same target. + +**Table 7.2: Mapping between IMS Events Information and IRI Information** + +| Parameter | Description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------| +| Observed SIP URI | Observed SIP URI | partyInformation (partyIdentity(sip-uri)) | +| Observed TEL URI | Observed TEL URI | partyInformation (partyIdentity(tel-uri)) | +| Observed IMEI | Observed IMEI | partyInformation (partyIdentity(imei)) | +| Observed IMPI | Observed IMPI (NOTE 12) | partyInformation (partyIdentity(impi)) | +| Observed IMSI | Observed IMSI (NOTE 12) | partyInformation partyIdentity( imsi) | +| Observed MSISDN | Observed MSISDN (NOTE 12) | partyInformation (partyIdentity(msISDN)) | +| Event type | IMS Event
It indicates whether the IRI contains a CC unfiltered SIP message, a CC filtered SIP message, an XCAP request, an XCAP response, or the media decryption keys. For interception at the HSS, it indicates whether the IRI contains a Serving system, a Subscriber Record Change, a Registration Termination or a Location Information Request. | iMSevent | +| Event date | Date of the event generation in the CSCF or in the XCAP server managing the target's IMS supplementary service setting(s). | timeStamp | +| Event time | Time of the event generation in the CSCF or in the XCAP server managing the target's IMS supplementary service setting(s). | | +| Network identifier | Unique number of the intercepting CSCF or the XCAP server managing the target's IMS supplementary service setting(s). | networkIdentifier | +| Correlation number | Unique number for each PDP context/Bearer delivered to the LEMF, to help the LEA, to have a correlation between each PDP Context/Bearer and the IRI. | gPRSCorrelationNumber | +| Correlation | Correlation number; unique number for each PDP context/Bearer delivered to the LEMF, to help the LEA, to have a correlation between each PDP Context/Bearer and the IRI.
ASN.1 as: iri-to-CC

Signalling PDP context/Bearer correlation number; | correlation | + +| Parameter | Description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|---------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | unique number for signalling PDP context/Bearer delivered to the LEMF, to help the LEA, to have a correlation between each PDP Context/Bearer and the IRI.
Used in the case two PDP contexts/Bearers are used.
ASN.1 as: iri-to-CC

SIP correlation number; either Call-id or some implementation dependent number that uniquely identify SIP messages of the same SIP session.
ASN.1 as: iri-to-iri

XCAP transaction correlation number: It correlates the XCAP request and reponse. | | +| Lawful interception identifier | Unique number for each lawful authorization. | lawfulInterceptionIdentifier | +| SIP message | Either whole SIP message, or SIP message header (plus SDP body, if any). SIP message header (plus SIP message body part conveying IRI such as SDP) is used if warrant requires only IRI. In such cases, specific content in the SIP Message (e.g. 'Message', etc.) has to be deleted; unknown headers shall not be deleted. For intercepts requiring IRI only delivery, depending on national regulations, SMS content may be excluded while SMS headers (which convey information including originating and destination addresses, SMS centre address) are included, if available. Location information that the service provider is aware of (e.g. location in PANI header) is removed when delivery of such information is not lawfully authorized. | sIPMessage | +| Media-decryption-info | Session keys and additional info for the decryption of the CC streams belonging to the intercepted session.

This field is present if available at the DF/MF | mediaDecryption-info
Contain for each key the follow triplet:
cCCSID,
cCDecKey,
cCSalt (optionally) | +| SIP message header offer | Header of the SIP message carrying the SDP offer (NOTE 10). | sipMessageHeaderOffer | +| SIP message header answer | Header of the SIP message carrying the SDP answer (NOTE 10). | sipMessageHeaderAnswer | +| SDP offer | SDP offer used for the establishment of the IMS session (NOTE 10). | sdpOffer | +| SDP answer | SDP answer used for the establishment of the IMS session (NOTE 10). | sdpAnswer | +| MediaSec key retrieval failure indication | Provides the information that the procedure to get encryption keys from the KMS failed. | mediaSecFailureIndication | +| PANI header information | Elements of P-Access-Network-Info headers in SIP message; defined in TS 24.229 [76] §7.2A.4. | pANI-Header-Info | +| XCAP message | XCAP message (i.e. to report separately the XCAP request and XCAP response between the UE and the XCAP server managing the XCAP resources of the target's IMS supplementary service setting(s); based on TS 24.623 [77]). | xCAPMessage | +| VoIP Roaming Indication | Applicable to IMS events related to VoLTE only. Indicates the roaming architecture in the VPLMN: Local Breakout (LBO) or S8HR (S8-reference point based home routing). | roamingIndication | +| Changed (old/new) IMSI or MSISDN/TEL URI/SIP URI/IMPI or IMEI | Provides the identity changes in Subscriber Record Change Event. | change-Of-Target-Identity | +| Other User Identities | Provides other IMPU or IMPI that was allocated to the Target being deregistered in HSS. | otherIdentities | +| Deregistration Reason | Provides the reason of de-registration in HSS Coded according to 3GPP TS 29.229 [96], values would be coded according to Reason-Code AVP when | deregistrationReason | + +| Parameter | Description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------| +| | deregistration is initiated by HSS, and to Server-Assignment-Type AVP when indicated by SCSF. | | +| Previous serving system identifier | Provides an identifier as defined in 3GPP TS 29.229 [96] that allows the home network to identify the previous visited network when deregistration is done. | visitedNetworkId | +| Current Serving System Identifier | Provides an identifier as defined in 3GPP TS 29.229 [96] that allows the home network to identify the current visited network. | visitedNetworkId | +| Other update | Carrier specific information related to implementation or subscription process on HSS. Raw data will be provided. CSP will provide to LEMF elements to understand such data. | carrierSpecificData | +| Requesting network identifier | The requesting network identifier PLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Code, defined in E.212 [87]). | requesting-Network-Identifier | +| Requesting node identifier | The requesting node identifier | requesting-Node-Identifier | +| Requesting node type | Type of requesting node such as MSC, SMS Centre, GMLC, MME, SGSN. | requesting-Node-Type | +| Location information | In case of S8HR, this parameter carries the UE location information that the LMISF receives from the MME through the S-GW/BBIFF. | ePSlocationOfTheTarget | +| Time of Location | Date/Time of location. The time when location was obtained by the location source node. | ePSlocationOfTheTarget | + +NOTE 3: Void. + +NOTE 4: Void. + +NOTE 5: Void. + +NOTE 6: Void. + +NOTE 7: LIID parameter has to be present in each record sent to the LEMF. + +NOTE 8: Details for the parameter SIP message. If the warrant requires only signaling information, specific content in the parameter 'SIP message' like IMS (Immediate Messaging) has to be deleted/filtered. It should be noted that SDP content within SIP messages is reported even for warrants requiring only IRI. + +NOTE 9: In case of IMS event reporting involving the correlation number parameter, the gPRSCorrelationNumber HI2 ASN.1 parameter, which is also used in the IRIs coming from UMTS PS nodes, is used as container. + +NOTE 10: This parameter is applicable only in case of start of interception for an already established IMS session. + +NOTE 11: For separated IMS VoIP, the imsVoIP (as defined in clause 12) may be used instead of Correlation Number or Correlation shown in table 7.2. + +NOTE 12: Applicable to HSS only. + +pANI-header-info parameter includes elements present in the P-Access-Network-Info (PANI) header in intercepted SIP messages originated by the target's UE and handled by the CSCFs. The mediation function shall parse these intercepted SIP messages and copy from the PANI header the type/class of access and, if required by the warrant, location information in the related parameters specified in Annexes B.3 and B.9. In such case, the SIP messages carrying the PANI header shall also be sent to the LEMF unmodified. + +In case the warrant does not require providing target's location information, any location information shall be filtered from the intercepted raw SIP messages, prior that these are delivered to the LEMF. In such case, as an implementation option, location information may be masked (e.g. filled with blanks or other characters) instead of filtered. + +## 7.5.1 Events and information + +This clause describes the information sent from the Delivery Function (DF) to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF) to support Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance (LAES). The information is described as records and information carried by a record. This focus is on describing the information being transferred to the LEMF. + +The IRI events and data are encoded into records as defined in the Table 7.1: Mapping between IMS Events and HI2 Records Type and Annexes B.3 and B.9 Intercept related information (HI2). IRI is described in terms of a 'causing event' and information associated with that event. Within each IRI Record there is a set of events and associated information elements to support the particular service. + +The communication events described in Table 7-1: Mapping between the IMS Event and HI2 Record Type and Table 7.2: Mapping between IMS Events Information and IRI Information convey the basic information for reporting the disposition of a communication. This clause describes those events and supporting information. + +Each record described in this clause consists of a set of parameters. Each parameter is either: + +- mandatory (M): required for the record, +- conditional (C): required in situations where a condition is met (the condition is given in the Description), or +- optional (O): provided at the discretion of the implementation. + +The information to be carried by each parameter is identified. Both optional and conditional parameters are considered to be OPTIONAL syntactically in ASN.1 Stage 3 descriptions. The Stage 2 inclusion takes precedence over Stage 3 syntax. + +**Table 7.3: SIP-Message REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed SIP-URI | C | SIP URI of the target (if available). | +| observed TEL-URI | C | TEL URI of the target (if available). | +| observed IMEI | C | IMEI of the target (if available). | +| event type | M | Provide IMS event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | C | If available and not included in the SIP-message. NOTE 1 | +| correlation | C | If applicable for this communication. NOTE 1 | +| SIP message | M | The relevant SIP message or SIP message header. | +| PANI header information | O | P-Access-Network-Access-Info header information in SIP messages; described in TS 24.229 [76] §7.2A.4. Provided if available and applicable. | +| VoIP Roaming Indication | C | Shall be provided when SIP messages are sent by the VPLMN. | +| Location information | C | In case of S8HR, when authorized, provides the UE location information that the LMISF receives from the MME through the S-GW/BBIFF. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | + +If transfer of ticket related information, as specified in TS 33.328 [54], is detected by the MF/DF via an intercepted SIP messages analysis during an IMS session, the DF/MF, after extracting and collecting the exchanged tickets and getting the corresponding decryption keys info from the KMS, as specified in TS 33.107 [19], shall send a Media Decryption key available IRI REPORT to the LEMF containing the information needed to decrypt the media: + +**Table 7.4: Media Decryption key available REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed SIP-URI | C | SIP URI of the target (if available). | +| observed TEL-URI | C | TEL URI of the target (if available). | +| observed IMEI | C | IMEI of the target (if available). | +| event type | M | Decryption Keys Available | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | C | Provided if available. NOTE 1 | +| correlation | C | Provided if available. NOTE 1 | +| mediaDecryption-info.CCKeyInfo.cCCSID | C | Uniquely map the session key to the SRTP streams to decrypt.
There could be several SRTP streams (audio, video, etc.) with different decryption keys and salt for a media session. The field reports the value from the CS_ID field in the ticket exchange headers as defined in the IETF RFC 6043 [61] provided if available. | +| mediaDecryption-info.CCKeyInfo.cCDecKey | C | Decryption key in both media directions. Provided if available. | +| mediaDecryption-info.CCKeyInfo.cCSalt | C | Provided if available. | +| mediaSecFailureIndication | O | May be provided in case of failure | + +NOTE 1: For separated IMS VoIP, the imsVoIP (as defined in clause 12) may be used instead of Correlation Number or Correlation shown in table 7.3, table 7.4 and table 7.5. + +If Start of interception for an already established IMS session event is detected by the MF/DF, the DF/MF shall send a Start of Interception for already established IMS Session IRI REPORT to the affected LEMF containing the parameters listed in table 7.5: + +NOTE 2: In some situation (e.g. during activation of second, third, etc, intercepts on the target), the MF/DF may have to detect on its own that an interception is activated on an already established IMS Session. + +**Table 7.5: Start of interception for already established IMS session REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed SIP-URI | C | SIP URI of the target (if available). | +| observed TEL-URI | C | TEL URI of the target (if available). | +| observed IMEI | C | IMEI of the target (if available). | +| event type | M | Start of interception for already established IMS session | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | C | Provided if available. NOTE 1 | +| correlation | C | Provided if available. NOTE 1 | +| Sip message header offer | C | Provided if available | +| Sip message header answer | C | Provided if available | +| SDP offer | C | Provided if available | +| SDP answer | C | Provided if available | +| PANI header information | O | Provided if available and applicable. | +| VoIP Roaming Indication | C | Shall be provided when SIP messages are sent by the VPLMN. | +| Location information | C | In case of S8HR, when authorized, provides the UE location information that the LMISF receives from the MME through the S-GW/BBIFF. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location. (if target location provided). | + +**Table 7.6: XCAP REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed SIP-URI | C | SIP URI of the target (if available). It may come from the X 3GPP Asserted Identity Header or the X-3GPP-Intended-Identity of the target described in TS 24.623 [77] and TS 24.109 [79] or from the XUI which is described in IETF RFC 4825 [80] (if available). It is part of the URI determined by the path selector results | +| observed Tel URI | C | Tel URI of the target (if available). It may come from the X 3GPP Asserted Identity Header or the X-3GPP-Intended-Identity of the target described in TS 24.623 [77] and TS 24.109 [79] or from the XUI which is described in IETF RFC 4825 [80] (if available). It is part of the URI determined by the path selector results | +| event type | M | Shall be provided. Provide XCAP event type (to be defined by further studies). | +| event date | M | Shall be provided. Provide the date the event is detected. | +| event time | M | Shall be provided. Provide the time the event is detected. | +| IMS event | M | Shall be provided. Provide the event information than an event related to XCAP transaction or server. | +| Network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| X 3GPP asserted identity | C | Information to complement the observed SIP URI or Tel URI (if available) as slight formal differences do happen due to XCAP usage. | +| XUI | C | Information to complement the observed SIP URI or Tel URI (if available) as slight formal differences do happen due to XCAP usage. | +| Correlation | C | Provided if available. It correlates the XCAP request to the XCAP response. | +| XCAP message | M | Shall be provided with either the related XCAP request with the XCAP content, either XCAP response, with the XCAP content. | + +The following IRI records are applicable to HSS interception: Serving System, Subscriber Record Change, Registration Termination, Location Information Request. + +**Table 7.7: Serving System REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed SIP-URI | C | SIP URI of the target; provided if available | +| observed Tel URI | C | Tel URI of the target; provided if available | +| observed MSISDN | C | MSISDN of the target; provided if available | +| observed IMSI | C | IMSI of the target; provided if available | +| observed IMEI | C | IMEI of the target; provided if available | +| observed IMPI | C | IMPI of the target; provided if available | +| observed IMPU(s) | C | Additional IMPU(s) of the target; provided if available | +| event type | M | Shall be provided. Provides Serving System | +| event date | M | Shall be provided. Provides the date the event is detected | +| event time | M | Shall be provided. Provides the time the event is detected | +| Network identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| Lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| Current Serving System Identifier | C | Provides information about the Visited PLMN Id in case of roaming. | + +**Table 7.8: Subscriber Record Change REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|---------------------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed SIP-URI | C | SIP URI of the target; provided if available | +| observed Tel URI | C | Tel URI of the target; provided if available | +| observed MSISDN | C | MSISDN of the target; provided if available | +| observed IMSI | C | IMSI of the target; provided if available | +| observed IMEI | C | IMEI of the target; provided if available | +| observed IMPI | C | IMPI of the target; provided if available | +| old observed SIP-URI | C | Previous SIP URI of the target; provided if available | +| old observed Tel URI | C | Previous Tel URI of the target; provided if available | +| old observed MSISDN | C | Previous MSISDN of the target; provided if available | +| old observed IMSI | C | IMSI of the target; provided if available | +| old observed IMEI | C | IMEI of the target; provided if available | +| old observed IMPI | C | IMPI of the target; provided if available | +| IMSI or MSISDN/TEL URI/SIP URI/IMPI or IMEI change type | M | Provides information about which identity was changed | +| event type | M | Shall be provided. Provides Subscriber Record Change. | +| event date | M | Shall be provided. Provide the date the event is detected. | +| event time | M | Shall be provided. Provide the time the event is detected. | +| Network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Other update | O | Provides carrier specific information | + +**Table 7.9: Registration Termination REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed SIP-URI | C | SIP URI of the target; provided if available | +| observed Tel URI | C | Tel URI of the target; provided if available | +| observed MSISDN | C | MSISDN of the target; provided if available | +| observed IMSI | C | IMSI of the target; provided if available | +| observed IMEI | C | IMEI of the target; provided if available | +| observed IMPI | C | IMPI of the target; provided if available | +| event type | M | Shall be provided. Provides Registration Termination | +| event date | M | Shall be provided. Provide the date the event is detected. | +| event time | M | Shall be provided. Provide the time the event is detected. | +| deregistration reason | C | Provided if available. Provides the reason for deregistration | +| Network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Previous serving system identifier | C | Provided if available. Provides the identity of the previous VPLMN. | +| Other User Identities | C | Provided if available. Includes other IMPUs or IMPIs that were allocated to the target and will be deregistered. | + +**Table 7.10: Location Information Request REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed SIP-URI | C | SIP URI of the target; provided if available | +| observed Tel URI | C | Tel URI of the target; provided if available | +| observed MSISDN | C | MSISDN of the target; provided if available | +| observed IMSI | C | IMSI of the target; provided if available | +| observed IMEI | C | IMEI of the target; provided if available | +| observed IMPI | C | IMPI of the target; provided if available | +| event type | M | Shall be provided. Provides Location Information Request | +| event date | M | Shall be provided. Provide the date the event is detected. | +| event time | M | Shall be provided. Provide the time the event is detected. | +| Lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Requesting network identifier | C | Provided if available. Provides the requesting network identifier PLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Code, defined in E212 [87]). | +| Requesting node identifier | M | Shall be provided. Provides the requesting node identifier. | +| Requesting node type | C | Provides the requesting node type (GMLC); provided if available. | + +## 7.6 Correlation indications of IMS IRI with GSN CC at the LEMF + +See Annex F. + +## 7.7 Void + +--- + +# 8 3GPP WLAN Interworking + +## 8.0 General + +NOTE: WLAN Interworking specification (TS 29.234 [41]) is no longer maintained Release 12 and onwards. Therefore, the entire clause 8 is not maintained Release 12 and onwards. + +## 8.1 Identifiers + +### 8.1.1 Overview + +Specific identifiers are necessary to identify a target for interception uniquely and to correlate between the data, which is conveyed over the different handover interfaces (HI2 and HI3). The identifiers are defined in the subsections below. + +For the delivery of CC and IRI the PDG or AAA server provide correlation numbers and target identities to the HI2 and HI3. The correlation number is unique per I-WLAN tunnel and is used to correlate CC with IRI and the different IRI's of one I-WLAN tunnel. + +### 8.1.2 Lawful interception identifier + +For each target identity related to an interception measure, the authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) shall assign a special Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID), which has been agreed between the LEA and the operator (NO/AN/SP). + +Using an indirect identification to point to a target identity makes it easier to keep the knowledge about a specific target limited within the authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) and the handling agents at the LEA. + +The LIID is a component of the CC delivery procedure and of the IRI records. It shall be used within any information exchanged at the handover interfaces HI2 and HI3 for identification and correlation purposes. + +The LIID format shall consist of alphanumeric characters. It might for example, among other information, contain a lawful authorization reference number, and the date, when the lawful authorization was issued. + +The authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) shall either enter a unique LIID for each target identity of the target or a single LIID for multiple target identities all pertaining to the same target. + +If more than one LEA intercepts the same target identity, there shall be unique LIIDs assigned relating to each LEA. + +### 8.1.3 Network identifier + +The network identifier (NID) is a mandatory parameter; it should be internationally unique. It consists of the following two identifiers. + +- 1) Operator- (NO/AN/SP) identifier (mandatory): + +Unique identification of network operator, access network provider or service provider. + +- 2) Network element identifier NEID (optional): + +The purpose of the network element identifier is to uniquely identify the relevant network element carrying out the LI operations, such as LI activation, IRI record sending, etc. + +A network element identifier may be an IP address or other identifier. National regulations may mandate the sending of the NEID. + +### 8.1.4 Correlation number + +The Correlation Number is unique per I-WLAN tunnel and used for the following purposes: + +- correlate CC with IRI (in the PDG), +- correlate different IRI records within one I-WLAN tunnel (for both PDG and AAA server). + +NOTE: The Correlation Number is at a minimum unique for each concurrent communication (e.g. I-WLAN tunnel) in a specific node (e.g. AAA server or PDG) of an target within a lawful authorization. + +## 8.2 Timing and quality + +### 8.2.1 Timing + +As a general principle, within a telecommunication system, IRI, if buffered, should be buffered for as short a time as possible. + +NOTE: If the transmission of IRI fails, it may be buffered or lost. + +Subject to national requirements, the following timing requirements shall be supported: + +- Each IRI data record shall be sent by the delivery function to the LEMF over the HI2 within seconds of the detection of the triggering event by the IAP at least 95% of the time. +- Each IRI data record shall contain a time-stamp, based on the intercepting node's clock that is generated following the detection of the IRI triggering event. + +### 8.2.2 Quality + +The quality of service associated with the result of interception should be (at least) equal to the quality of service of the original content of communication. This may be derived from the QoS class used for the original intercepted session, TS 23.107 [20]. However, when TCP is used as an OSI layer 4 protocol across the HI3, real time delivery of the result of the interception cannot be guaranteed. The QoS used from the operator (NO/AN/SP) to the LEMF is determined by what operators (NO/AN/SP) and law enforcement agree upon. + +### 8.2.3 Void + +(Void). + +## 8.3 Security aspects + +Security is defined by national requirements. + +## 8.4 Quantitative aspects + +The number of target interceptions supported is a national requirement. + +The area of Quantitative Aspects addresses the ability to perform multiple, simultaneous interceptions within a provider's network and at each of the relevant intercept access points within the network. Specifics related to this topic include: + +- The ability to access and monitor all simultaneous communications originated, received, or redirected by the target; + +- The ability for multiple LEAs (up to five) to monitor, simultaneously, the same target while maintaining unobtrusiveness, including between agencies; +- The ability of the network to simultaneously support a number of separate (i.e. multiple targets) legally authorized interceptions within its service area(s), including different levels of authorization for each interception, including between agencies (i.e. IRI only, or IRI and communication content). + +## 8.5 IRI for I-WLAN + +### 8.5.0 Introduction + +The IRI will in principle be available in the following phases of a data transmission: + +1. At I-WLAN access initiation attempt, when the target identity becomes active, at which time packet transmission may or may not occur (at the set up of a I-WLAN tunnel, the target may be the originating or terminating party); +2. At the end of a connection, when the target identity becomes inactive (removal of a I-WLAN tunnel); +3. At certain times when relevant information are available. + +In addition, information on non-transmission related actions of a target constitute IRI and is sent via HI2, e.g. information on subscriber controlled input. + +The IRI may be subdivided into the following categories: + +1. Control information for HI2 (e.g. correlation information); +2. Basic data communication information, for standard data transmission between two parties. + +The events defined in TS 33.107 [19] are used to generate records for the delivery via HI2. + +There are multiple different event types received at DF2 level. According to each event, a Record is sent to the LEMF if this is required. The following table gives the mapping between event type received at DF2 level and record type sent to the LEMF. + +**Table 8.1: Mapping between I-WLAN Events and HI2 records type** + +| Event | IRI Record Type | +|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------| +| I-WLAN Access Initiation | REPORT | +| I-WLAN Access Termination | REPORT | +| I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment (successful) | BEGIN | +| I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment (unsuccessful) | REPORT | +| I-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect | END | +| Start of intercept with I-WLAN Communication Active | BEGIN or REPORT | +| Packet Data Header Information | REPORT | + +A set of information is used to generate the records. The records used transmit the information from mediation function to LEMF. This set of information can be extended in the ICE or DF2 MF, if this is necessary in a specific country. The following table gives the mapping between information received per event and information sent in records. + +For the event "Start of intercept with I-WLAN Communication Active" reported from a AAA server, this event is reported using a: + +- REPORT record to provide an indication that I-WLAN Access Initiation event has already occurred, but there are no tunnels established yet. +- BEGIN record to provide an indication that one or more I-WLAN Tunnels are already established. + +**Table 8.2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information** + +| parameter | description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | Target Identifier with the MSISDN of the target. | partyInformation (partyIdentity) | +| observed IMSI | Target Identifier with the IMSI of the target. | partyInformation (partyIdentity) | +| observed NAI | Target Identifier with the NAI of the target. | partyInformation (partyIdentity) | +| event type | Description which type of event is delivered: I-WLAN Access Initiation, I-WLAN Access Termination, I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment, I-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect, Start of Intercept with I-WLAN Communication Active, Packet Data Header Information, etc. | i-WLANEvent | +| event date | Date of the event generation in the PDG or AAA server. | timestamp | +| event time | Time of the event generation in the PDG or AAA server. | | +| WLAN access point name | The WLAN Access Point Name contains a logical name of the access point (see TS 23.060 [42]) | partyInformation (services-Data-Information) | +| initiator | This field indicates whether the event being reported is the result of an MS directed action or network initiated action when either one can initiate the action. | initiator | +| correlation number | Unique number for each I-WLAN tunnel delivered to the LEMF, to help the LEA, to have a correlation between each I-WLAN tunnel and the IRI. | correlationNumber | +| lawful interception identifier | Unique number for each lawful authorization. | lawfulInterceptionIdentifier | +| WLAN UE Local IP address | The Local IP address used by the target in a WLAN AN. | partyInformation (services-data-information) | +| WLAN UE MAC address | MAC Address of WLAN UE on the WLAN | i-WLANInformation (wLANMACAddress) | +| WLAN Remote IP address | It is the IP address of the WLAN UE in the network being accessed by the WLAN UE and is used in the data packet encapsulated by the WLAN UE-initiated tunnel. In addition, it is the source address used by applications in the WLAN UE. | partyInformation (services-data-information) | +| network identifier | Operator ID plus PDG or AAA server address. | networkIdentifier | +| WLAN Operator name | This field identifies the WLAN Operator serving the target. | i-WLANInformation (wLANOperatorName) | +| WLAN Location Data | This field identifies the location of the WLAN serving the target. | i-WLANInformation (wLANLocationData) | +| WLAN Location Information | This field provides detailed location information about the WLAN serving the target. | i-WLANInformation (wLANLocationInformation) | +| NAS IP/IPv6 address | An IP address of the serving Network Access Server. | i-WLANInformation (nasIPIpv6Address) | +| visited PLMN ID | This field identifies the visited PLMN that will either terminate or tunnel the target's communications to the Home PLMN. | visitedPLMNID | +| session alive timer | This field identifies the expected maximum duration of the I-WLAN access being initiated. | i-WLANInformation (sessionAliveTimer) | +| failed access reason | This field gives information about the reason for a failed access initiation attempt of the target. | i-WLANOperationErrorCode | +| session termination reason | This field identifies the reason for the termination of the I-WLAN access. | i-WLANOperationErrorCode | +| failed tunnel establishment reason | This field gives information ("Authentication failed" or "Authorization failed") about the reason for a failed tunnel establishment of the target. | i-WLANOperationErrorCode | +| tunnel disconnect reason | This field gives information about the reason for tunnel disconnect of the target. (For Further Study). | i-WLANOperationErrorCode | +| NSAPI | Network layer Service Access Point Identifier. Information element contains an NSAPI identifying a PDP Context in a mobility management context specified by the Tunnel Endpoint Identifier Control Plane.
This is an optional parameter to help DF/MF and LEA's to distinguish between the sending mobile access networks when the GGSN is used as element of the PDG according TS 23.234 [43]. | nSAPI | +| destination IP address | Identifies the destination IP address of a packet. | destinationIPAddress | +| destination port number | Identifies the destination port number of a packet | destinationPortNumber | +| source IP address | Identifies the source IP address of a packet. | sourceIPAddress | + +| parameter | description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------| +| source port number | Identifies the source port number of a packet. | sourcePortNumber | +| transport protocol | Identifies the transport protocol (i.e., Protocol Field in IPv4 or Next Header Field in IPv6). | transportProtocol | +| flow label | The field in the IPv6 header that is used by a source to label packets of a flow (see RFC 3697 [c]) | flowLabel | +| packet count | The number of packets detected and reported in a particular packet data summary report. | packetCount | +| packet size | The size of a packet (i.e., Total Length Field in IPv4 [a] or Payload Length Field in IPv6 [b]) | packetSize | +| packet direction | Identifies the direction of the intercepted packet (from target or to target) | packetDirection | +| packet data header copy | Provides a copy of the packet headers including IP layer and next layer, and extensions, but excluding content. | packetDataHeaderCopy | +| summary period | Provides the period of time during which the packets of the summary report were sent or received by the target. | summaryPeriod | +| sum of packet sizes | Sum of values in Total Length Fields in IPv4 packets or Payload Length Field in IPv6 packets. | sumOfPacketSizes | +| packet data summary reason | Provides the reason for a summary report. | packetDataSummaryReason | +| packet data summary | For each particular packet flow, identifies pertinent reporting information (e.g. source IP address, destination IP address, source port, destination port, transport protocol, packet count, time interval, sum of packet sizes) associated with the particular packet flow. | packetDataSummary | + +NOTE: LIID parameter has to be present in each record sent to the LEMF. + +## 8.5.1 Events and information + +### 8.5.1.1 Overview + +This clause describes the information sent from the Delivery Function (DF) to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF) to support Lawful Interception (LI). The information is described as records and information carried by a record. This focus is on describing the information being transferred to the LEMF. + +The IRI events and data are encoded into records as defined in the Table 8.1 Mapping between I-WLAN Events and HI2 records type and Annex B.7 Intercept related information (HI2). IRI is described in terms of a 'causing event' and information associated with that event. Within each IRI record there is a set of events and associated information elements to support the particular service. + +The communication events described in Table 8.1: Mapping between I-WLAN Events and HI2 record type and Table 8.2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information convey the basic information for reporting the disposition of a communication. This clause describes those events and supporting information. + +Each record described in this clause consists of a set of parameters. Each parameter is either: + +- mandatory (M) - required for the record, +- conditional (C) - required in situations where a condition is met (the condition is given in the Description), or +- optional (O) - provided at the discretion of the implementation. + +The information to be carried by each parameter is identified. Both optional and conditional parameters are considered to be OPTIONAL syntactically in ASN.1 Stage 3 descriptions. The Stage 2 inclusion takes precedence over Stage 3 syntax. + +### 8.5.1.2 REPORT record information + +The REPORT record is used to report non-communication related target actions (events) and for reporting unsuccessful packet-mode communication attempts. + +The REPORT record shall be triggered when: + +- the target's WLAN UE performs a (successful or unsuccessful) I-WLAN access initiation procedure (triggered by AAA server); +- the target's WLAN UE performs a (successful or unsuccessful) re-authentication (triggered by AAA server); +- the target's WLAN UE performs a I-WLAN access termination detach procedure (triggered by AAA server); +- the target's WLAN UE is unsuccessful at performing a I-WLAN tunnel establishment procedure (triggered by AAA server or PDG); +- the interception of a target's communications is started and the WLAN UE has already successfully performed a I-WLAN access initiation procedure (triggered by AAA server), but there are no tunnels established; +- packet data header reporting is performed on an individual intercepted packet basis and a packet is detected as it is sent or received by the target for I-WLAN communications; +- when packet data summary reporting is performed on an summary basis for I-WLAN communications associated with a particular packet flow (defined as the combination of source IP address, destination IP address, source port, destination port, and protocol and for IPv6 also include the flow label) and: + - the packet flow starts, + - an interim packet summary report is to be provided, or + - packet flow ends including the case where the I-WLAN interworking tunnel is deactivated. + +An interim packet summary report is triggered if: + +- the expiration of a configurable Summary Timer per intercept occurs. The Summary Timer is configurable in units of seconds. Or +- a per-intercept configurable count threshold is reached. + +Packet Data Header Information is reported either on a per-packet (i.e., non-summarised) basis or in a summary report. These reports provide IRI associated with the packets detected. The packet data header information related REPORT record is used to convey packet data header information during active I-WLAN communications. + +NOTE: in the case of IP Fragments, Packet Data Header Information on a 6-tuple basis may only be available on the first packet and subsequent packets may not include such information and therefore may not be reported. + +**Table 8.3: I-WLAN Access Initiation REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed NAI | | | +| event type | C | Provide I-WLAN Initiation event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| WLAN Operator Name | C | Provide, when available, to identify the WLAN operator serving the target. | +| WLAN Location Data | C | Provide, when available, to identify the WLAN location serving the target. | +| WLAN Location Information | C | Provide, when available, to identify the location information of the WLAN serving the target. | +| NAS IP/IPv6 address | C | Provide, when available, to identify the address of the NAS serving the target. | +| WLAN UE MAC address | C | Provide, when available, to identify the MAC address of the target in the WLAN serving the target. | +| visited PLMN ID | C | Provide, when available, to identify the visited PLMN that will either terminate or tunnel the target's communications to the Home PLMN. | +| session alive time | C | Provide, when available, to identify the expected maximum duration of the I-WLAN Access being initiated. | +| failed access reason | C | Provide information about the reason for failed access initiation attempts of the target. | + +**Table 8.4: I-WLAN Access Termination REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed NAI | | | +| event type | C | Provide I-WLAN Access Termination event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| WLAN Operator Name | C | Provide, when available, to identify the WLAN operator serving the target. | +| WLAN Location Data | C | Provide, when available, to identify the WLAN location serving the target. | +| WLAN Location Information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify the location information of the WLAN serving the target. | +| NAS IP/IPv6 address | C | Provide, when available, to identify the address of the NAS serving the target. | +| WLAN UE MAC address | C | Provide, when available, to identify the MAC address of the target in the WLAN serving the target. | +| session termination reason | C | Provide information about the reason for termination of I-WLAN access of the target. | + +**Table 8.5: I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment (unsuccessful) REPORT Record - PDG** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed NAI | | | +| event type | C | Provide I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| WLAN access point name | C | Provide to identify the packet data network to which the target requested to be connected when the target's WLAN UE is unsuccessful at performing a I-WLAN tunnel establishment procedure (MS to Network). | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| WLAN UE Local IP address | C | Provide, when available, to identify the IP address associated with the target in the WLAN. | +| WLAN UE Remote IP address | C | Provide, when available, to identify the IP address associated with the target in the network being accessed by the target. | +| failed I-WLAN tunnel establishment reason | C | Provide information about the reason for failed I-WLAN tunnel establishment attempts of the target. | + +**Table 8.6: I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment (unsuccessful) REPORT Record - AAA Server** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed NAI | | | +| event type | C | Provide I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| WLAN access point name | C | Provide to identify the packet data network to which the target requested to be connected when the target's WLAN UE is unsuccessful at performing a I-WLAN tunnel establishment procedure (MS to Network). | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| failed I-WLAN tunnel establishment reason | C | Provide information about the reason for failed I-WLAN tunnel establishment attempts of the target. | +| visited PLMN ID | C | Provide, when available, to identify the visited PLMN that will either terminate or tunnel the target's communications to the Home PLMN. | + +**Table 8.7: Start of Intercept With I-WLAN Communication Active REPORT Record - AAA Server** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed NAI | | | +| event type | C | Provide Start of Intercept With I-WLAN Communication Active event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| WLAN Operator Name | C | Provide, when available, to identify the WLAN operator serving the target. | +| WLAN Location Data | C | Provide, when available, to identify the WLAN location serving the target. | +| WLAN Location Information | C | Provide, when available, to identify the location information of the WLAN serving the target. | +| NAS IP/IPv6 address | C | Provide, when available, to identify the address of the NAS serving the target. | +| WLAN UE MAC address | C | Provide, when available, to identify the MAC address of the target in the WLAN serving the target. | +| visited PLMN ID | C | Provide, when available, to identify the visited PLMN that will either terminate or tunnel the target's communications to the Home PLMN. | +| session alive time | C | Provide, when available, to identify the expected maximum duration of the I-WLAN Access being initiated. | + +**Table 8.8: Packet Data Header Information REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event type | M | Provide the Packet Data Header Information event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| WLAN access point name | C | Provide to identify the packet data network to which the target is connected. | +| WLAN local IP address | C | Provide to identify the IP address associated with the target in the WLAN. | +| WLAN remote IP address | C | Provide to identify the IP address associated with the target in the network being accessed by the target for the I-WLAN tunnel. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to uniquely identify the I-WLAN interworking communications delivered to the LEMF used to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| packet data header information | M | Shall be provided to identify the packet header information to be reported on a per-packet basis as defined in Table 8.9 or on a summary basis. For summary reporting includes one or more packet flow summaries where each packet flow summary is associated with a particular packet flow as defined in Table 8.10. | +| NSAPI | O | Provided for additional information. | + +**Table 8.9: Contents of per-packet, packet data header information parameter** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| source IP address | C | Provide when mapping packet header information to identify the source IP address for a particular packet flow. | +| source port number | C | Provide when mapping packet header information to report the source port number for a particular packet flow when the transport protocol supports port numbers. | +| destination IP address | C | Provide when mapping packet header information to identify the destination IP address for a particular packet flow. | +| destination port number | C | Provide when mapping packet header information to report the destination port number for a particular packet flow when the transport protocol supports port numbers. | +| transport protocol | C | Provide when mapping packet header information to identify the transport protocol (e.g. TCP) for a particular packet flow. | +| flow label | C | Provide when mapping packet header information for IPv6 only for a particular packet flow. | +| direction | M | Shall be provided. Identifies the direction of the packet (from target or to target). | +| packet size | O | Provide when mapping packet header information to convey the value contained in Total Length Fields of the IPv4 packets or the value contained in the Payload Length fields of the IPv6 packets. | +| packet data header copy | C | Provide when reporting a copy of the entire packet header information rather than mapping individual information and so it is alternative to the individual information. | + +**Table 8.10: Contents of a single summary flow packet data header information parameter** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| source IP address | M | Shall be provided. Identifies the source IP address for a particular packet flow. | +| source port number | C | Provide to report the source port number for a particular packet flow when the transport protocol supports port numbers. | +| destination IP address | M | Shall be provided. Identifies the destination IP address for a particular packet flow. | +| destination port number | C | Provide to report the destination port number for a particular packet flow when the transport protocol supports port numbers. | +| transport protocol | M | Identifies the transport protocol (e.g. TCP) for a particular packet flow. | +| flow label | C | Provide for IPv6 only for a particular packet flow. | +| summary period | M | Provides the period of time during which the packets of a particular packet flow of the summary report were sent or received by the subject and defined by specifying the time when the first packet and the last packet of the reporting period were detected. | +| packet count | M | Provides the number of packets detected for a particular packet flow. | +| sum of packet sizes | O | Provides the sum of values contained in Total Length Fields of the IPv4 packets or the sum of the values contained in the Payload Length fields of the IPv6 packets. | +| packet data summary reason | M | Provides the reason for the report being delivered to the LEMF (i.e., timeout, count limit, end of session). | + +### 8.5.1.3 BEGIN record information + +The BEGIN record is used to convey the first event of I-WLAN interworking communication interception. + +The BEGIN record shall be triggered when: + +- there is a successful establishment of an I-WLAN tunnel (triggered by AAA server or PDG); +- the interception of a target's communications is started and at least one I-WLAN tunnel is established. If more than one I-WLAN tunnel is established, a BEGIN record shall be generated for each I-WLAN tunnel that is established (triggered by AAA server or PDG). + +**Table 8.8: I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment (successful) BEGIN Record - PDG** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed NAI | | | +| event type | C | Provide I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| WLAN access point name | C | Provide to identify the packet data network to which the target requested to be connected when the target's WLAN UE is successful at performing a I-WLAN tunnel establishment procedure. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| WLAN local IP address | M | Provide to identify the IP address associated with the target in the WLAN. | +| WLAN remote IP address | M | Provide to identify the IP address associated with the target in the network being accessed by the target for the I-WLAN tunnel. | +| correlation number | C | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and the correlation of IRI records. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| NSAPI | O | Provided for additional information. | + +**Table 8.9: I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment (successful) BEGIN Record - AAA Server** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed NAI | | | +| event type | C | Provide I-WLAN Tunnel Establishment event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| WLAN access point name | C | Provide to identify the packet data network to which the target requested to be connected when the target's WLAN UE is successful at performing a I-WLAN tunnel establishment procedure. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | C | Provide to allow correlation of IRI records. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| visited PLMN ID | C | Provide to identify the visited PLMN, if available. | + +**Table 8.10: Start Of Interception (with I-WLAN Tunnel Established) BEGIN Record - PDG** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event type | C | Provide Start Of Interception With I-WLAN Communication Active event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| WLAN access point name | C | Provide to identify the packet data network to which the target requested to be connected when the target's WLAN UE is successful at performing a I-WLAN tunnel establishment procedure. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| WLAN local IP address | M | Provide to identify the IP address associated with the target in the WLAN. | +| WLAN remote IP address | M | Provide to identify the IP address associated with the target in the network being accessed by the target for the I-WLAN tunnel. | +| correlation number | C | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and the correlation of IRI records. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| NSAPI | O | Provided for additional information. | + +**Table 8.11: Start Of Interception (with I-WLAN Tunnel Established) BEGIN Record - AAA Server** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event type | C | Provide Start Of Interception With I-WLAN Communication Active event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| WLAN access point name | C | Provide to identify the packet data network to which the target requested to be connected when the target's WLAN UE is successful at performing a I-WLAN tunnel establishment procedure. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | C | Provide to allow correlation of IRI records. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| visited PLMN ID | C | Provide to identify the visited PLMN, if available. | +| WLAN Operator Name | C | Provide, when available (at the time of event generation), to identify the WLAN operator serving the target. | +| WLAN Location Data | C | Provide, when available (at the time of event generation), to identify the WLAN location serving the target. | +| WLAN Location Information | C | Provide, when available (at the time of event generation), to identify the location information of the WLAN serving the target. | +| NAS IP/IPv6 address | C | Provide, when available (at the time of event generation), to identify the address of the NAS serving the target. | +| WLAN UE MAC address | C | Provide, when available (at the time of event generation), to identify the MAC address of the target in the WLAN serving the target. | +| session alive time | C | Provide, when available (at the time of event generation), to identify the expected maximum duration of the I-WLAN Access being initiated. | + +#### 8.5.1.4 END record information + +The END record is used to convey the last event of packet-data communication. + +The END record shall be triggered when: + +- I-WLAN tunnel disconnect occurs (triggered by the AAA server or the PDG). + +**Table 8.12: I-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect END Record - PDG** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed NAI | | | +| event type | C | Provide I-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| WLAN access point name | C | Provide to identify the packet data network to which the target is connected. | +| initiator | C | Provide to indicate whether the I-WLAN tunnel disconnection is network-initiated, target-initiated, or not available. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| WLAN local IP address | M | Provide to identify the IP address associated with the target in the WLAN. | +| WLAN remote IP address | M | Provide to identify the IP address associated with the target in the network being accessed by the target for the I-WLAN tunnel. | +| correlation number | C | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and the correlation of IRI records. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| NSAPI | O | Provided for additional information. | + +**Table 8.13: I-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect END Record - AAA Server** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed NAI | | | +| event type | C | Provide I-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| WLAN access point name | C | Provide to identify the packet data network to which the target is connected. | +| initiator | C | Provide to indicate whether the I-WLAN tunnel disconnection is network-initiated, target-initiated, or not available. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | C | Provide to allow correlation of IRI records. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | + +## 8.6 CC for I-WLAN + +The interface protocols and data structures defined in Annex B.4, Annex C, and Annex G of this specification are applicable to the delivery of the intercepted CC for I-WLAN over the HI3 PS interface. The mandatory or optionality of the parameters is not changed for I-WLAN. However the availability of relevant intercepted information will affect the population of the parameters. + +--- + +# 9 Interception of Multimedia Broadcast/MultiCast Service (MBMS) + +## 9.1 Identifiers + +### 9.1.1 Overview + +Specific identifiers are necessary to identify a target for interception uniquely and to correlate between the data, which is conveyed over the different handover interface (HI2). The identifiers are defined in the subsections below. + +The MBMS LI solution in this section provides an IRI solution for MBMS only. CC interception is provided by transport bearer level interception functionality e.g. GSNs. The Correlation Number is unique per target MBMS service and MBMS session and is used to correlate different IRI records within one MBMS service and MBMS session. + +### 9.1.2 Lawful interception identifier + +For each target identity related to an interception measure, the authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) shall assign a special Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID), which has been agreed between the LEA and the operator (NO/AN/SP). + +Using an indirect identification to point to a target identity makes it easier to keep the knowledge about a specific target limited within the authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) and the handling agents at the LEA. + +The LIID is a component of the IRI records. It shall be used within any information exchanged at the handover interfaces HI2 for identification and correlation purposes. + +The LIID format shall consist of alphanumeric characters. It might for example, among other information, contain a lawful authorization reference number, and the date, when the lawful authorization was issued. + +The authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) shall either enter a unique LIID for each target identity of the target or a single LIID for multiple target identities all pertaining to the same target. + +If more than one LEA intercepts the same target identity, there shall be unique LIIDs assigned relating to each LEA. + +### 9.1.3 Network identifier + +The network identifier (NID) is a mandatory parameter; it should be internationally unique. It consists of the following two identifiers. + +- 1) Operator- (NO/AN/SP) identifier (mandatory): +Unique identification of network operator, access network provider or service provider. +- 2) Network element identifier NEID (optional): +The purpose of the network element identifier is to uniquely identify the relevant network element carrying out the LI operations, such as LI activation, IRI record sending, etc. + +A network element identifier may be an IP address or other identifier. National regulations may mandate the sending of the NEID. + +### 9.1.4 Correlation number + +The Correlation Number is unique per target MBMS service and MBMS session. The correlation number is used for the following purposes: + +- Correlate different IRI records within one MBMS service and MBMS session. + +NOTE: Correlation only applies to MBMS service usage. Correlation of subscription management events is not required and the ASN.1 subscription event records in Annex B.8 do not provide support for correlation numbers. Such Subscription management report record events are asynchronous, can occur at any time and are likely to occur infrequently. + +## 9.2 Timing and quality + +### 9.2.1 Timing + +As a general principle, within a telecommunication system, IRI, if buffered, should be buffered for as short a time as possible. + +NOTE: If the transmission of IRI fails, it may be buffered or lost. + +Subject to national requirements, the following timing requirements shall be supported: + +- Each IRI data record shall be sent by the delivery function to the LEMF over the HI2 within seconds of the detection of the triggering event by the IAP at least 95% of the time. +- Each IRI data record shall contain a time-stamp, based on the intercepting node's clock that is generated following the detection of the IRI triggering event. + +### 9.2.2 Quality + +The quality of service associated with the result of interception should be (at least) equal to the quality of service of the original MBMS service. + +### 9.2.3 Void + +(Void). + +## 9.3 Security aspects + +Security is defined by national requirements. + +## 9.4 Quantitative aspects + +The number of target interceptions supported is a national requirement. + +The area of Quantitative Aspects addresses the ability to perform multiple, simultaneous interceptions within a provider's network and at each of the relevant intercept access points within the network. Specifics related to this topic include: + +- The ability to access and monitor all simultaneous communications originated, received, or redirected by the target; +- The ability for multiple LEAs (up to five) to monitor, simultaneously, the same target while maintaining unobtrusiveness, including between agencies; +- The ability of the network to simultaneously support a number of separate (i.e. multiple targets) legally authorized interceptions within its service area(s), including different levels of authorization for each interception, including between agencies (i.e. IRI only, or IRI and communication content). + +## 9.5 IRI for MBMS + +### 9.5.0 General + +The IRI will in principle be available in the following phases of a data transmission: + +1. At MBMS Service Joining or Leaving. +2. At MBMS Subscription Activation, Modification and Termination. +3. At certain times when relevant information are available. + +The IRI may be subdivided into the following categories: + +1. Control information for HI2 (e.g. correlation information); +2. Basic data communication information, for standard data transmission between two parties. + +The events defined in TS 33.107 [19] are used to generate records for the delivery via HI2. + +There are multiple different event types received at DF2 level. According to each event, a Record is sent to the LEMF if this is required. The following table gives the mapping between event type received at DF2 level and record type sent to the LEMF. + +**Table 9.1: Mapping between MBMS Events and HI2 records type** + +| Event | IRI Record Type | +|---------------------------------------------|-----------------| +| MBMS Service Joining | BEGIN | +| MBMS Service Leaving | END | +| MBMS Subscription Activation | REPORT | +| MBMS Subscription Modification | REPORT | +| MBMS Subscription Termination | REPORT | +| Start of intercept with MBMS Service Active | BEGIN | + +A set of information is used to generate the records. The records used transmit the information from mediation function to LEMF. This set of information can be extended in the ICE or DF2 MF, if this is necessary in a specific country. The following table gives the mapping between information received per event and information sent in records. + +NOTE: Support for MBMS over IMS is For Further Study. As a minimum, IMPU and IMPI reporting support will be required. + +**Table 9.2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information** + +| parameter | Description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------| +| observed IMSI | Target Identifier with the IMSI of the target. | partyInformation (partyIdentity) | +| event type | Description which type of event is delivered MBMS Service Joining, MBMS Service Leaving, MBMS Subscription Activation, MBMS Subscription Modification, MBMS Subscription Termination, Start of intercept with MBMS Service Active etc. | mbms-Event | +| event date | Date of the event generation in the BM-SC server. | Timestamp | +| event time | Time of the event generation in the BM-SC server. | Timestamp | +| BM-SC Identifier | Name or Identifier of BM-SC | mbmsInformation ( mBMSNODELIST) | +| initiator | This field indicates whether the event being reported is the result of an UE directed action or network initiated/ off-online action when either one can initiate the action. | Initiator | +| correlation number | Unique correlation number for each target MBMS service and MBMS session. It is used for correlating different IRI records. However the correlation number is not used to correlate subscription related events. | correlationNumber | +| lawful interception identifier | Unique number for each lawful authorization. | lawfulInterceptionIdentifier | +| MBMS Subscribed Service | Name or Identifier of the MBMS Service to which the target has subscribed. Must provide explicit identification of service subscribed from all other services (e.g. TV Channel name and name of content to be viewed) | mbmsInformation (mbmsServiceName) | +| MBMS Service Joining Time | MBMS Service Joining Time | mbmsInformation (mbms-join-time) | +| MBMS Service Subscription List | List of all users subscribed to MBMS Service to which target has requested Joining.
NOTE:- This list may be very long for some services. | mbmsInformation (MbmsSerSubscriberList) | +| Visited PLMN ID | Identity of the visited PLMN to which the user is registered | visitedPLMNID | +| APN | The Access Point Name contains a logical name on which IP multicast address is defined (see TS 23.060 [42]) | mbmsInformation (MBMSapn) | +| Multicast/Broadcast Mode | MBMS bearer service in broadcast or multicast mode | mbmsInformation (mbms-Mode) | +| IP IP/IPv6 multicast address(multicast mode only) | IP or IPv6 multicast address identifying the MBMS bearer described by this MBMS Bearer Context. | mbmsInformation (mbmsIPIPv6Address) | +| List of Downstream Nodes | List of downstream nodes that have requested the MBMS bearer service and to which notifications and MBMS data have to be forwarded. | mbmsInformation (mbmsNodeList) | +| MBMS Service Leaving Reason | Indicates whether the UE initiated/requested leaving, or whether BM-SC/network terminated the Service to the UE (e.g. GSN session dropped or BM-SC subscription expired etc.).
Logically if leaving reason is subscription expiry then subscription terminated report record will also be generated. | mbmsInformation (mbmsLeavingReason) | +| MBMS Service Subscription Terminated Reason | Indicates whether the service subscription termination was requested initiated/requested by the user (including via customer services or other off-line means) or whether subscription expired. | mbmsInformation (mbmsSubsTermReason) | +| network identifier | Operator ID plus ICE address. | networkIdentifier | + +NOTE: LIID parameter has to be present in each record sent to the LEMF. + +## 9.5.1 Events and information + +### 9.5.1.1 Overview + +This clause describes the information sent from the Delivery Function (DF) to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF) to support Lawful Interception (LI). The information is described as records and information carried by a record. This focus is on describing the information being transferred to the LEMF. + +The IRI events and data are encoded into records as defined in the Table 9.1 Mapping between MBMS Events and HI2 records type and Annex B.8 Intercept related information (HI2). IRI is described in terms of a 'causing event' and information associated with that event. Within each IRI record there is a set of events and associated information elements to support the particular service. + +The communication events described in Table 9.1: Mapping between MBMS Events and HI2 record type and Table 9.2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information convey the basic information for reporting the disposition of a communication. This clause describes those events and supporting information. + +Each record described in this clause consists of a set of parameters. Each parameter is either: + +- mandatory (M) - required for the record, +- conditional (C) - required in situations where a condition is met (the condition is given in the Description), or +- optional (O) - provided at the discretion of the implementation. + +The information to be carried by each parameter is identified. Both optional and conditional parameters are considered to be OPTIONAL syntactically in ASN.1 Stage 3 descriptions. The Stage 2 inclusion takes precedence over Stage 3 syntax. + +### 9.5.1.2 REPORT record information + +The REPORT record is used to report non-communication related target actions (events) and for reporting unsuccessful packet-mode communication attempts. + +The REPORT record shall be triggered when: + +- the target's MBMS UE or target via an off-line means (e.g. via internet or customer service centre) performs MBMS Subscription Activation. See Table 9.3 +- the target's MBMS UE or target via an off-line means (e.g. via internet or customer service centre) performs MBMS Subscription Modification. See Table 9.4 +- the target's MBMS UE or target via an off-line means (e.g. via internet or customer service centre) performs MBMS Subscription Termination. See Table 9.5 + +**Table 9.3 MBMS Subscription Activation REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | M | Shall be provided. | +| Event Type | M | Provide MBMS Service Joining event type | +| Event Time | M | Provide the time the event is detected. | +| Event Date | M | Provide the date the event is detected. | +| Lawful Interception Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| MBMS Subscribed Service | M | Shall be provided. | +| Network Identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Initiator | M | Shall be provided. | +| IP/IPv6 Address | C | Provide IP or IPv6 address of the target if available where target has directly accessed the BM-SC Server to Activate their subscription and not via offline method (e.g. customer services). | +| Visited PLMN ID | C | Provide PLMN ID of a visited network used by the target in the case of non Home network access to BM-SC server. | +| MBMS Service Subscription List | O | Provided for additional information | + +**Table 9.4: MBMS Subscription Modification REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | M | Shall be provided. | +| Event Type | M | Provide MBMS Service Joining event type | +| Event Time | M | Provide the time the event is detected. | +| Event Date | M | Provide the date the event is detected. | +| Lawful Interception Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| MBMS Subscribed Service | M | Shall be provided. | +| Network Identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Initiator | M | Shall be provided. | +| IP/IPv6 Address | C | Provide IP or IPv6 address of the target if available where target has directly accessed the BM-SC Server to Activate their subscription and not via offline method (e.g. customer services). | +| Visited PLMN ID | C | Provide PLMN ID of a visited network used by the target in the case of non Home network access to BM-SC server. | +| MBMS Service Subscription List | O | Provided for additional information | + +**Table 9.5: MBMS Subscription Termination REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|---------------------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | M | Shall be provided. | +| Event Type | M | Provide MBMS Service Joining event type | +| Event Time | M | Provide the time the event is detected. | +| Event Date | M | Provide the date the event is detected. | +| Lawful Interception Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| MBMS Subscribed Service | M | Shall be provided. | +| Network Identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Initiator | M | Shall be provided. | +| IP/IPv6 Address | C | Provide IP or IPv6 address of the target if available where target has directly accessed the BM-SC Server to Activate their subscription and not via offline method (e.g. customer services). | +| Visited PLMN ID | C | Provide PLMN ID of a visited network used by the target in the case of non Home network access to BM-SC server. | +| MBMS Service Subscription List | O | Provided for additional information | +| MBMS Service Subscription Terminated Reason | M | Shall be provided. | + +### 9.5.1.3 BEGIN record information + +The BEGIN record is used to convey the first event of MBMS service interception. + +The BEGIN record shall be triggered when: + +- the target's MBMS UE successfully joins an MBMS service (MBMS Service Joining). See Table 9.6 +- interception is activated for the target but the MBMS UE has successfully joined an MBMS service prior to the start of interception (Start of intercept with MBMS Service Active). See Table 9.7 + +**Table 9.6: MBMS Service Joining BEGIN Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | M | Shall be provided. | +| Event Type | M | Provide MBMS Service Joining event type | +| Event Time | M | Provide the time the event is detected. | +| Event Date | M | Provide the date the event is detected. | +| Correlation Number | M | Shall be provided. | +| Lawful Interception Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| MBMS Subscribed Service | M | Shall be provided. | +| MBMS Service Joining Time | M | Provide time at which target joined the MBMS service, or will join the service. | +| Network Identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Initiator | M | Shall be provided. | +| IP/IPv6 Multicast Address | C | Provide IP or IPv6 address of the target if available for multicast services only. | +| Visited PLMN ID | C | Provide PLMN ID of a visited network used by the target in the case of non Home network access to MBMS service. | +| Multicast/Broadcast Mode | M | Shall be provided. | +| APN | C | Provide for PS domain access to MBMS. | +| List of Downstream Nodes | C | Provide in the case of a multicast service, if available. | +| MBMS Service Subscription List | O | Provided for additional information | + +**Table 9.7: Start of intercept with MBMS Service Active BEGIN Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | M | Shall be provided. | +| Event Type | M | Provide MBMS Service Joining event type | +| Event Time | M | Provide the time the event is detected. | +| Event Date | M | Provide the date the event is detected. | +| Correlation Number | M | Shall be provided. | +| Lawful Interception Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| MBMS Subscribed Service | M | Shall be provided. | +| MBMS Service Joining Time | M | Provide time at which target joined the MBMS service. | +| Network Identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Initiator | M | Shall be provided. | +| IP/IPv6 Multicast Address | C | Provide IP or IPv6 address of the target if available for multicast services only. | +| Visited PLMN ID | C | Provide PLMN ID of a visited network used by the target in the case of non Home network access to MBMS service. | +| Multicast/Broadcast Mode | M | Shall be provided. | +| APN | C | Provide for PS domain access to MBMS. | +| List of Downstream Nodes | C | Provide in the case of a multicast service, if available. | +| MBMS Service Subscription List | O | Provided for additional information | + +When the ICE (i.e. BM-SC) is not aware of the activation of multiple lawfully authorized intercepts on a target that is already in an MBMS service, the MF/DF shall generate the Start of Intercept with MBMS Service Active BEGIN record on its own using information that it has retained. + +The DF2 shall not send the Start of Intercept with MBMS Service Active BEGIN record to the LEMFs that were already intercepting the MBMS UE (i.e. target) due previous LI activation on the same MBMS UE (i.e. target). + +#### 9.5.1.4 END record information + +The END record is used to convey the last event of packet-data communication. + +The END record shall be triggered when: + +- the target's MBMS UE successfully leaves an MBMS service or the MBMS service is terminated by the BM\_SC (MBMS Service Leaving). See Table 9.8 + +**Table 9.8: MBMS Service Leaving END Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | M | Shall be provided. | +| Event Type | M | Provide MBMS Service Joining event type | +| Event Time | M | Provide the time the event is detected. | +| Event Date | M | Provide the date the event is detected. | +| Correlation Number | M | Shall be provided. | +| Lawful Interception Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| MBMS Subscribed Service | M | Shall be provided. | +| Network Identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Initiator | M | Shall be provided. | +| IP/IPv6 Multicast Address | C | Shall be provided. | +| Visited PLMN ID | C | Provide PLMN ID of a visited network used by the target in the case of non Home network access to MBMS service. | +| MBMS Service Subscription List | O | Provided for additional information | +| MBMS Service Leaving Reason | M | Shall be provided. | + +## 9.6 CC for MBMS + +The MBMS LI solution specified in this version of this specification does not specifically provide a CC interception solution. Only IRI generated by the BM-SC is specifically supported. + +CC interception of MBMS services is provided by the underlying transport bearer LI functionality eg GSNs for GPRS. Only MBMS Multicast service CC interception is supported. However, in many MBMS scenarios, the MBMS content stream is routed to the UE using multicast streams, rather than BM-SC to UE point to point bearers. In the case of multicast stream routing to the serving basestations/NodeB, the GSNs may not be able to intercept the MBMS stream as no IP address or other target related identities may be associated with the stream at the GSN. In this case, since no target identity is available for interception in the CC stream, the LEA will not receive MBMS CC. + +No MBMS CC capability is provided by this specification for MBMS broadcast services, as the UE will receive such services in IDLE mode without an active network connection. + +NOTE: Provision of MBMS CC decryption keys is for further study. + +--- + +# 10 Evolved Packet System (EPS) + +## 10.0 Introduction + +Clause 10 specifies requirements for the handover interface in the Evolved Packet System (TS 23.060 [42], TS 23.401 [44], TS 23.402 [45]). + +In case the SGSN is used in the EPS and interworks with a S-GW by using S4/S12 interfaces, the SGSN and the HSS are subjected to the requirements applicable to these nodes for PS interception, as specified throughout this document. + +In case of untrusted non-3GPP IP access, the e-PDG not using a GTP based protocol over the s2b interface and AAA server are subjected to all the requirements specified in this document for PDG and AAA server for the case of WLAN interworking. + +NOTE: WLAN Interworking specification (TS 29.234 [41]) is not maintained in Release 12 and onwards. + +When a PDN-GW provides a Gn/Gp interface for interworking with a SGSN, from LI perspective the PDN-GW acts as a GGSN towards the involved SGSN. In this case, in addition to the requirements specified in this chapter, all the requirements specified in this document for PS interception applicable to the GGSN are applicable also to the PDN-GW. PDP contexts/EPS bearer modification signalling detected by the PDN-GW during a handover between different accesses involving a Gn/Gp interface (i.e. from E-UTRAN to 2G/3G and vice versa) is reported inside the IRI BEGIN-END transaction. The same correlation number shall be used before and after the handover during the same IRI transaction. After the handover, the events sent by the PDN-GW shall be mapped into IRIs according to the requirements for the new access. + +In case the target is related to a ProSe Remote UE or to a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay, additional requirements specified in clause 13 are applicable. + +## 10.1 Identifiers + +### 10.1.0 Introduction + +Specific identifiers are necessary to identify a target for interception uniquely and to correlate between the data, which is conveyed over the different handover interfaces (HI2 and HI3). The identifiers are defined in the subsequent subclauses of 10.1. + +For the delivery of CC and IRI the S-GW or PDN-GW provide correlation numbers and target identities to the HI2 and HI3. The correlation number is unique per EPS bearer/tunnel and is used to correlate CC with IRI and the different IRI's of one EPS bearer/tunnel. + +NOTE: When different protocols (i.e. GTP and PMIP) are used in the networks, different values for the correlation number can be generated by different nodes for the same communication. + +### 10.1.1 Lawful interception identifier + +For each target identity related to an interception measure, the authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) shall assign a special Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID), which has been agreed between the LEA and the operator (NO/AN/SP). + +Using an indirect identification, pointing to a target identity makes it easier to keep the knowledge about a specific target limited within the authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) and the handling agents at the LEA. + +The LIID is a component of the CC delivery procedure and of the IRI records. It shall be used within any information exchanged at the handover interfaces HI2 and HI3 for identification and correlation purposes. + +The LIID format shall consist of alphanumeric characters. It might for example, among other information, contain a lawful authorization reference number, and the date, when the lawful authorization was issued. + +The authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) shall either enter a unique LIID for each target identity of the target or a single LIID for multiple target identities all pertaining to the same target. + +If more than one LEA intercepts the same target identity, there shall be unique LIIDs assigned relating to each LEA. + +### 10.1.2 Network identifier + +The network identifier (NID) is a mandatory parameter; it should be internationally unique. It consists of the following two identifiers. + +- 1) Operator- (NO/AN/SP) identifier (mandatory): + +Unique identification of network operator, access network provider or service provider. + +- 2) Network element identifier NEID (optional): + +The purpose of the network element identifier is to uniquely identify the relevant network element carrying out the LI operations, such as LI activation, IRI record sending, etc. + +A network element identifier may be an IP address or other identifier. National regulations may mandate the sending of the NEID. + +### 10.1.3 Correlation number + +The Correlation Number is unique per EPS bearer/tunnel and is used for the following purposes: + +- correlate CC with IRI; +- correlate different IRI records within one EPS bearer/tunnel; +- correlate LALS reports with the IRI records of the triggering events. + +NOTE: The Correlation Number is at a minimum unique for each concurrent communication (e.g. EPS bearer/tunnel) of a target within a lawful authorization. However when different protocols (i.e. GTP and PMIP) are used in the networks, different values for the correlation number can be generated by different nodes for the same communication. + +In case of handover between different accesses involving a Gn/Gp interface (i.e. from E-UTRAN to 2G/3G and vice versa), the same correlation number for the PDP context/bearer shall be used before and after the handover during the same IRI transaction. + +## 10.2 Timing and quality + +### 10.2.1 Timing + +As a general principle, within a telecommunication system, IRI, if buffered, should be buffered for as short a time as possible. + +NOTE: If the transmission of IRI fails, it may be buffered or lost. + +Subject to national requirements, the following timing requirements shall be supported: + +- Each IRI data record shall be sent by the delivery function to the LEMF over the HI2 within seconds of the detection of the triggering event by the IAP at least 95% of the time; +- Each IRI data record shall contain a time-stamp, based on the intercepting nodes clock that is generated following the detection of the IRI triggering event. The timestamp precision should be at least 1 second (ETSI TS 101 671 [24]). Defining the required precision of an IRI timestamp however is subject to national requirements. + +### 10.2.2 Quality + +The quality of service associated with the result of interception should be (at least) equal to the quality of service of the original content of communication. This may be derived from the QoS class used for the original intercepted session. However, when TCP is used as an OSI layer 4 protocol across the HI3, real time delivery of the result of the interception cannot be guaranteed. The QoS used from the operator (NO/AN/SP) to the LEMF is determined by what operators (NO/AN/SP) and law enforcement agree upon. + +### 10.2.3 Void + +Void. + +## 10.3 Security aspects + +Security is defined by national requirements. + +## 10.4 Quantitative aspects + +The number of target interceptions supported is a national requirement. + +The area of Quantitative Aspects addresses the ability to perform multiple, simultaneous interceptions within a provider's network and at each of the relevant intercept access points within the network. Specifics related to this topic include: + +- The ability to access and monitor all simultaneous communications originated, received, or redirected by the target; +- The ability for multiple LEAs (up to five) to monitor, simultaneously, the same target while maintaining unobtrusiveness, including between agencies; +- The ability of the network to simultaneously support a number of separate (i.e. multiple targets) legally authorized interceptions within its service area(s), including different levels of authorization for each interception, including between agencies (i.e. IRI only, or IRI and communication content). + +## 10.5 IRI for evolved packet domain + +### 10.5.0 Introduction + +The IRI will in principle be available in the following phases of a data transmission: + +1. At connection attempt when the target identity becomes active, at which time packet transmission may or may not occur (set up of a bearer/tunnel, target may be the originating or terminating party); +2. At the end of a connection, when the target identity becomes inactive (removal of a bearer/tunnel); +3. At certain times when relevant information are available. + +In addition, information on non-transmission related actions of a target constitute IRI and is sent via HI2. Also, the EPS LALS reports convey via HI2 as IRI. + +The IRI may be subdivided into the following categories: + +1. Control information for HI2 (e.g. correlation information); +2. Basic data context information, for standard data transmission between two parties. + +The events defined in TS 33.107 [19] are used to generate records for the delivery via HI2. + +There are several different event types received at DF2 level. According to each event, a Record is sent to the LEMF if this is required. In the case of LALS reports which are not associated with an event, a Record is sent to the LEMF without the event parameter. + +The following table gives the mapping between event type received at DF2 level and record type sent to the LEMF. The applicability of the events to specific access (E-UTRAN, trusted non-3GPP access, untrusted non-3GPP access) and network protocols (GTP/PMIP S5/S8 interface) is specified in TS 33.107 [19]. Additional events and mapping with IRI Record type are applicable to EPS in case of interworking between SGSN and PDN-GW over Gn/Gp interface, as specified in this document for PS interception. + +**Table 10.5.1: Mapping between EPS Events and HI2 records type** + +| Event | IRI Record Type | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------| +| E-UTRAN attach, NOTE 2 | REPORT | +| E-UTRAN detach, NOTE 2 | REPORT | +| Bearer activation (successful) | BEGIN | +| Bearer modification | CONTINUE | +| UE Requested bearer resource modification | REPORT | +| Bearer activation (unsuccessful) | REPORT | +| Start of interception with active bearer, NOTE 1 | BEGIN or optionally CONTINUE | +| Bearer deactivation | END | +| UE requested PDN connectivity, NOTE 2 | REPORT | +| UE requested PDN disconnection, NOTE 2 | REPORT | +| Tracking Area/EPS location update, NOTE 2 | REPORT | +| Serving Evolved Packet System, NOTE 2 | REPORT | +| PMIP attach/tunnel activation (successful) | BEGIN | +| PMIP attach/tunnel activation (unsuccessful) | REPORT | +| PMIP session modification | CONTINUE | +| PMIP detach/tunnel deactivation | END | +| Start of interception with active PMIP tunnel, NOTE 1 | BEGIN (or optionally CONTINUE) | +| PMIP PDN-GW initiated PDN disconnection | END | +| MIP registration/tunnel activation (successful) | BEGIN | +| MIP registration/tunnel activation (unsuccessful) | REPORT | +| MIP deregistration/tunnel deactivation | END | +| Start of interception with active MIP tunnel, NOTE 1 | BEGIN | +| DSMIP registration/tunnel activation (successful) | BEGIN | +| DSMIP registration/tunnel activation (unsuccessful) | REPORT | +| DSMIP session modification | CONTINUE | +| DSMIP deregistration/tunnel deactivation | END | +| Start of interception with active DSMIP tunnel, NOTE 1 | BEGIN | +| DSMIP HA Switch | REPORT | +| PMIP Resource Allocation Deactivation | END | +| MIP Resource Allocation Deactivation | END | +| Start of interception with E-UTRAN attached UE, NOTE 1, NOTE 2 | REPORT | +| Packet Data Header Information | REPORT | +| HSS subscriber record change, NOTE 2 | REPORT | +| Cancel location, NOTE 2 | REPORT | +| Register location | REPORT | +| Location information request | REPORT | +| ProSe Remote UE Report | REPORT | +| ProSe Remote UE start of communication | BEGIN | +| ProSe Remote UE end of communication | END | +| Start of interception with ProSe Remote UE ongoing communication, NOTE 1 | BEGIN | +| Start of interception for ProSe UE-to-NW Relay, NOTE 1 | REPORT | +| SCEF requested non-IP PDN disconnection | REPORT | + +NOTE 1: In some situation (e.g. during activation of second, third, etc, intercepts on the target), the MF/DF may have to detect on its own that an interception is activated on a target. + +NOTE 2: These events are also used for IoT UE's NIDD communications using SCEF. + +The EPS LALS records are sent to the LEMF as the REPORT IRI Records. + +A set of information is used to generate the records. The records used transmit the information from mediation function to LEMF. This set of information can be extended in the network nodes or DF2 MF, if this is necessary in a specific country. The following table gives the mapping between information received per event and information sent in records. + +**Table 10.5.2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information** + +| parameter | description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | Target Identifier with the MSISDN of the target. | partyInformation (partyIdentity/msISDN) | +| Observed A-MSISDN | Target Identifier with A-MSISDN of the target | partyInformation (partyIdentity/msISDN) | +| Observed IMSI | Target Identifier with the IMSI of the target. | partyInformation (partyIdentity/imsi) | +| Observed ME Id | Target Identifier with the ME Id of the target. | partyInformation (partyIdentity/imei) | +| Observed MN NAI | Target Identifier with the NAI of the target. | partyInformation (partyIdentity/nai) | +| Observed IMEI | Target Identifier with IMEI of the target | partyInformation (partyIdentity/imei) | +| Observed External Identifier | Target Identifier with External Identifier of the target used for IoT UE | partyInformation (partyIdentity/extId) | +| New observed MSISDN | New target identifier with MSISDN of the target, when available | partyInformation (partyIdentity/msISDN) | +| New observed IMSI | New target identifier with IMSI of the target, when available | partyInformation (partyIdentity/imsi) | +| New observed IMEI | New target identifier with IMEI of the target, when available | partyInformation (partyIdentity/imei) | +| Event type | Description which type of event is delivered | ePSevent | +| Event date | Date of the event generation in the node | timestamp | +| Event time | Time of the event generation in the node | | +| Access point name | When provided by the MME, the parameter carries the Access Point Name provided by the UE. When provided by the S-GW/PDN-GW, it is the APN used for the PDN connection | aPN | +| APN-AMBR | Contains the Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate for the APN | aPN-AMBR | +| PDN type | Indicated the used IP version (IPv4, IPv6, IPv4/IPv6) | pDNTType | +| PDN address allocation | Provides the IP version (IPv4, IPv6, IPv4/IPv6) and the IP address(es) allocated for the UE. | pDNAAddressAllocation | +| Protocol Configuration Options | Are used to transfer parameters between the UE and the PDN-GW (e.g. address allocation preference by DHCP) | protConfigOptions | +| Attach type | Indicates the type of attach and may carry indication of handover in case of mobility with non-3GPP access. | attachType | +| RAT type | Radio Access Type | rATTType | +| Initiator | This field indicates whether the procedure is UE or network initiated. | Initiator | +| Handover indication | Provides information that the procedure is triggered as part of a handover | handoverIndication, extendedHandoverIndication | +| Procedure Transaction Identifier | Identifies a set of messages belonging to the same procedure; the parameter is dynamically allocated by the UE | procedureTransactionId | +| EPS bearer identity | Identifies an EPS bearer for one UE accessing via E-UTRAN. It is allocated by the MME. | ePSBearerIdentity | +| Bearer activation/deactivation type | Indicates the type of bearer being activated/deactivated, i.e. default or dedicated. | bearerActivationType, bearerDeactivationType | +| Linked EPS bearer identity | Indicates, in case of dedicated bearer, the EPS bearer identity of the default bearer. | linkedEPSBearerId | +| Switch off indicator | Indicates whether a detach procedure is due to a switch off situation or not. | detachType | +| Detach type | Parameter sent by the network to the UE to indicate the type of detach. | detachType | +| Traffic Flow Template (TFT) | Collection of all packet filters associated with the EPS bearer. | tFT | +| Traffic Aggregate Description (TAD) | Consists of the description of the packet filter(s) for the traffic flow aggregate. | trafficAggregateDescription | +| Correlation number | Unique number for each target connection delivered to the LEMF, to help the LEA, to have a correlation between each target connection and the IRI. | ePSCorrelationNumber | +| Lawful interception identifier | Unique number for each lawful authorization. | lawfulInterceptionIdentifier | +| Location information | When authorized, this field provides the location information of the target that is present at the node at the time of event record production. | ePSLocationOfTheTarget | +| Time of Location | Date/Time of location. The time when location was obtained by the location source node. | ePSLocationOfTheTarget | +| Additional Cell IDs | The Secondary Cell (PSCell) groups of the target, if available. | additionalCellIDs | + +| parameter | description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Old location information | Location information of the target before Tracking Area Update. | ePSLocationOfTheTarget | +| Failure reason | The reason for the failure or rejection of the Tracking Area Update | failedTAUReason | +| Failed bearer activation reason | This field gives information about the reason for a failed bearer activation of the target. | failedBearerActivationReason | +| Failed attach reason | This field gives information about the reason for a failed attach attempt of the target. | failedEUTRANAttachreason, status, code (depending on the protocol) | +| Session modification failure reason | This field gives information about the reason for a failed session modification attempt of the target | status | +| EPS bearer QOS | This field indicates the Quality of Service associated with the EPS bearer procedure. | ePSBearerqOS | +| Bearer deactivation reason | This field gives information about the reason for bearer deactivation of the target. | bearerDeactivationCause | +| Network identifier | Operator ID plus node address. | networkIdentifier | +| LogicalFunctionInformation | Event source logical function identifier. | logicalFunctionInformation | +| Failed Bearer Modification reason | The reason for failure of Bearer Modification | failedBearerModReason | +| ULI Timestamp | Indicates the time when the User Location Information was acquired. | uLITimestamp | +| Lifetime | Lifetime of the tunnel; it is set to a nonzero value in case of registration or lifetime extension; is set to zero in case of deregistration. | Lifetime | +| Access technology type | Indicates the Radio Access Type | accessTechnologyType | +| UE address info | Includes one or more IP addresses allocated to the UE. | iPv6HomeNetworkPrefix, IPv4HomeAddress, IPv6careOfAddress, IPv4careOfAddress | +| Additional parameters | Additional information provided by the UE, such as protocol configuration options | protConfigurationOption | +| Serving MME address | Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm of the serving MME or its IP address. | servingMME-Address | +| Revocation trigger | Contains the reason which triggered a PDN-GW initiated PDN-disconnection (revocation) procedure. | revocationTrigger | +| Home Address | Contains the UE Home IP address | homeAddress | +| Home Agent Address | Contains the IP address of the Home Agent | homeAgentAddress | +| Requested IPv6 Home Prefix | The IPv6 Home Prefix requested by the UE. | requestedIPv6HomePrefix | +| Care of Address | The local IP address assigned to the UE by the Access Network. | careOfAddress | +| HSS/AAA address | The address of the HSS/AAA triggering a pDN-GW reallocation. | hSS-AAA-address | +| Target PDN-GW address | The address of the PDN-GW which the UE will be reallocated to. | targetPDN-GW-Address | +| Foreign domain address | The relevant IP address in the foreign domain. | foreignDomainAddress | +| Visited network identifier | An identifier that allows the home network to identify the visited network inside the EPS Serving System Update for non 3GPP access, coded according to TS 29.273 [53] | visitedNetworkId | +| DHCP v4 Address Allocation Indication | Indicates that DHCPv4 is to be used to allocate the IPv4 address to the UE | dHCPv4AddressAllocationInd | +| Serving Network | Identifies, for E-UTRAN access, the serving network the UE is attached to | servingNetwork | +| Request type | Provides the type of UE requested PDN connectivity | requestType | +| Failed reason | Provides the failure cause for UE requested PDN connectivity | uEReqPDNConnFailReason | +| Destination IP address | Identifies the destination IP address of a packet. | destinationIPAddress | +| Destination port number | Identifies the destination port number of a packet | destinationPortNumber | +| Source IP address | Identifies the source IP address of a packet. | sourceIPAddress | +| Source port number | Identifies the source port number of a packet. | sourcePortNumber | + +| parameter | description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| Transport protocol | Identifies the transport protocol (i.e., Protocol Field in Ipv4 or Next Header Field in Ipv6). | transportProtocol | +| Flow label | The field in the Ipv6 header that is used by a source to label packets of a flow (see RFC 3697 [c]). | flowLabel | +| Packet count | The number of packets detected and reported in a particular packet data summary report. | packetCount | +| Packet size | The size of a packet (i.e., Total Length Field in Ipv4 [a] or Payload Length Field in Ipv6 [b]). | packetsize | +| Packet direction | Identifies the direction of the intercepted packet (from target or to target). | packetDirection | +| Packet data header copy | Provides a copy of the packet headers including IP layer and next layer, and extensions, but excluding content. | packetDataHeaderCopy | +| Summary period | Provides the period of time during which the packets of the summary report were sent or received by the target. | summaryPeriod | +| Sum of packet sizes | Sum of values in Total Length Fields in Ipv4 packets or Payload Length Field in Ipv6 packets. | sumOfPacketSizes | +| Packet data summary reason | Provides the reason for a summary report. | packetDataSummaryReason | +| Packet data summary | For each particular packet flow, identifies pertinent reporting information (e.g. source IP address, destination IP address, source port, destination port, transport protocol, packet count, time interval, sum of packet sizes) associated with the particular packet flow. | packetDataSummary | +| CSG Identity | Uniquely identifies a CSG within a PLMN. | csgIdentity | +| HeNB Identity | Identifies the HeNB providing access to a target UE. | heNBIdentity | +| HeNB IP address | Identifies the IP Address associated with an HeNB providing access to a target UE. | heNBIPAddress | +| HeNB Location | Identifies the location of an HeNB providing access to a target UE. | heNBLocation | +| Tunnel Protocol | Identifies the tunnel protocol used to transport the signalling and communications between the HeNB and the EPC. | tunnelProtocol | +| UE Local IP address | Identifies the UE local IP address (IP SEC terminal Point) observed by the ePDG and PDN-GW, based on local policy for Fixed Broadband access network interworking, in case the GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46] is used. | uELocalIPAddress | +| UE UDP Port | Identifies the UE UDP port (IP SEC terminal Point) reported on GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46] if NAT is detected and local IP address is present for Fixed Broadband access network interworking. | uEUdpPort | +| Serving system identifier | VPLMN ID of the serving system or of the third party network interworking, included in the Diameter AVP message with the HSS | serving-System-Identifier | +| Previous serving system identifier | Previous VPLMN id of the target (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country; defined in E212 [87]). | Current-Previous-Systems/previous-Serving-System-Identifier | +| Previous serving MME address | Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm of the previous serving MME. | Current-Previous-Systems/previous-Serving-MME-Address | +| Current visited Network Identifier | An identifier that allows the home network to identify the current visited network (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country defined in E212 [87] are included in this identifier) TS 29.273 [53]. | Current-Previous-Systems/current-Serving-System-Identifier | +| Current serving MME address | Provide the previous Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm of the previous current MME | current-Previous-Systems/current-Serving-MME-Address | +| Requesting network identifier | The requesting network identifier PLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, -- defined in E212 [87]). | Requesting-Network-Identifier | +| Requesting node type | Type of requesting node such as MSC, SMS Centre, GMLC, MME, SGSN. | Requesting-Node-Type | +| Other update | Carrier specific information related to its implementation or subscription process on its HSS. Raw data will be provided. CSP will provide to LEMF elements to understand such data. | carrierSpecificData | +| WLAN location information | Provides location information in form of TWAN identifier, if available at ePDG/PDN-GW, in case the GTP based s2b interface TS 29.274 [46] is used. | tWANIdentifier | + +| parameter | description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|-------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------| +| WLAN location timestamp | Provides location information timestamp in form of TWAN identifier timestamp, if available at ePDG/PDN-GW, in case the GTP based s2b interface TS 29.274 [46] is used. | tWANIdentifierTimestamp | +| ProSe Remote UE Ids | The identities of the connected ProSe remote Ues when the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay performs a Tracking Area/EPS Location Update. | proSeRemoteUEContextConnected, | +| ProSe Remote UE IP info | The IP address(es) of the connected ProSe Remote UE(s) when the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay performs a Tracking Area/EPS Location Update. | proSeRemoteUEContextConnected | +| LALS location information | Location information provided by LALS. | locationOfTheTarget | +| Extended location parameters | Additional location information and QoS information. | extendedLocParameters | +| LALS error code | Positioning error identification code. | locationErrorCode | +| Changed (old/new) IMSI or MSISDN/ or IMEI | Provides the identity changes in Subscriber Record Change Event. | Change-Of-Target-Identity | +| Secondary RAT Usage Indication | Provides an indication that the SGW has received the Secondary RAT Usage Report (see 3GPP TS 37.340 [99]) from the MME. If such information is not available, it doesn't mean that Secondary RAT was not used. | secondaryRATUsageIndication | +| SCEF-ID | Identifies the SCEF to which the UE has connected. | scefID | + +NOTE: The Additional Cell IDs parameter is used to report a primary cell of a secondary cell group. The Location Information parameter is used to report the primary cell of a primary cell group. Within the event message tables in this clause, for short hand, the Location Information parameter indicates that the primary cell id of the primary cell group and if available the primary cell id of the secondary cell group is reported meaning that both of the aforementioned parameters are reported assuming the conditions for including them have been met. + +NOTE 2: LIID parameter has to be present in each record sent to the LEMF. + +## 10.5.1 Events and information + +### 10.5.1.0 Introduction + +This clause describes the information sent from the Delivery Function (DF) to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF) to support Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance (LAES). The information is described as records and information carried by a record. This focus is on describing the information being transferred to the LEMF. + +The IRI events and data are encoded into records as defined in the Table 10.5.1 Mapping between EPS Events and HI2 records type and Annex B.9 Intercept related information (HI2). IRI is described in terms of a 'causing event' and information associated with that event. Within each IRI Record there is a set of events and associated information elements to support the particular service. + +The communication events described in Table 10.5.1: Mapping between EPS Events and HI2 record type and Table 10.5.2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information convey the basic information for reporting the disposition of a communication. This clause describes those events and supporting information. + +Each record described in this clause consists of a set of parameters. Each parameter is either: + +- mandatory (M) - required for the record, +- conditional (C) - required in situations where a condition is met (the condition is given in the Description), or +- optional (O) - provided at the discretion of the implementation. + +The information to be carried by each parameter is identified. Both optional and conditional parameters are considered to be OPTIONAL syntactically in ASN.1 Stage 3 descriptions. The Stage 2 inclusion takes precedence over Stage 3 syntax. + +### 10.5.1.1 REPORT record information + +The REPORT record is used to report non-communication related target actions (events) and for reporting unsuccessful packet-mode communication attempts. In addition, this record is also used to report some target actions which may trigger communication attempts or modifications of an existing communication, when the communication attempt or the change of the existing communication itself is reported separately. The REPORT records are also used to deliver the LALS reports. + +The REPORT record shall be triggered when: + +- the target's UE performs an E-UTRAN attach procedure (successful or unsuccessful) including via a HeNB; +- the target's UE performs an E-UTRAN detach procedure including via a HeNB; +- the target's UE is unsuccessful at performing an EPS bearer activation procedure; +- the target's UE performs an UE requested bearer resource modification; +- the target's UE performs a tracking area/EPS location update; +- optionally when the target's UE leaves the old MME; +- the target's UE performs an UE requested PDN connectivity procedure; +- the target's UE performs an UE requested PDN disconnection procedure; +- the target's UE is unsuccessful at performing a PMIP attach/tunnel activation procedure; +- the target's UE is unsuccessful at performing a MIP registration/tunnel activation procedure; +- the target's UE is unsuccessful at performing a DSMIP registration/tunnel activation procedure; +- optionally when the target's UE enters or leaves IA (FFS); +- the target's UE is ordered by the network to perform an home agent switch; +- as a national option, a mobile terminal is authorized for service with another network operator or service provider; in that case, other related events are required as cancel location, register location, location information request from a third party's node; +- as a national option, a REPORT record have to be generated when there is a HSS subscriber record change of IMSI or of MSISDN or IMEI triggered by a messages to or from the HSS; +- the interception of a target is started with E-UTRAN attached target. If there are more than one PDN connections then a REPORT record is generated per PDN connection.; +- packet data header reporting is performed on an individual intercepted packet basis and a packet is detected as it is sent or received by the target for an EPS bearer/session.; +- when packet data summary reporting is performed on an summary basis for an EPS bearer/session associated with a particular packet flow (defined as the combination of source IP address, destination IP address, source port, destination port, and protocol and for Ipv6 also include the flow label) and: + - the packet flow starts, + - an interim packet summary report is to be provided, or + - packet flow ends including the case where the EPS bearer/session is deactivated. + +An interim packet summary report is triggered if: + +- the expiration of a configurable Summary Timer per intercept occurs. The Summary Timer is configurable in units of seconds, or +- a per-intercept configurable count threshold is reached; +- when a LALS report is received from the LI LCS Client. + +Packet Data Header Information is reported either on a per-packet (i.e., non-summarised) basis or in a summary report. These reports provide IRI associated with the packets detected. The packet data header information related REPORT record is used to convey packet header information during an active EPS bearer/session. + +NOTE: In the case of IP Fragments, Packet Data Header Information on a 6-tuple basis may only be available on the first packet and subsequent packets may not include such information and therefore may not be reported. + +**Table 10.5.1.1.1: E-UTRAN Attach REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed External Identifier | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| event type | C | Provide E-UTRAN Attach event type. | +| Event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| Event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE, including the primary cell ID from each of the Master Cell (Pcell) and Secondary Cell (PSCell) groups of the target, if available. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | +| Failed attach reason | C | Provide information about the reason for failed attach attempt of the target. | +| PDN Type | C | Indicated the used IP version (Ipv4, Ipv6, Ipv4/Ipv6), including possible reason for modification by the network | +| APN | C | Provides the Access Point Name | +| Protocol Configuration Options | C | Provides information sent from the UE to the network | +| Attach type | C | Provides the type of attach | +| EPS bearer identity | C | When the attach is successful, provides the allocated EPS bearer identity. | +| CSG Identity | C | Provide if closed/hybrid HeNB is used in the UE attachment to the network | +| HeNB Identity | C | Provide information to identify the HeNB serving the target's UE. | +| HeNB IP address | C | Provide the IP Address of the HeNB serving the target's UE used during location verification. | +| HeNB Location | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the HeNB serving the target's UE. | +| Tunnel Protocol | C | Provide to identify the tunnel protocol used to transport the signalling and communications between the HeNB and the EPC. | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.2: E-UTRAN Detach REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed External Identifier | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| event type | C | Provide E-UTRAN Detach event type. | +| Event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| Event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's MS, including the primary cell ID from each of the Master Cell (Pcell) and Secondary Cell (PSCell) groups of the target, if available. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | +| Initiator | C | Provided to indicate whether the detach is UE or network initiated | +| Switch off indicator | C | Provided to indicate whether the detach is due to a switch off | +| Detach type | C | Sent by the network to the UE to indicate the type of detach | +| CSG Identity | C | Provide if closed/hybrid HeNB is used in the UE detachment from the network | +| HeNB Identity | C | Provide information to identify the HeNB serving the target's UE. | +| HeNB IP address | C | Provide the IP Address of the HeNB serving the target's UE. | +| HeNB Location | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the HeNB serving the target's UE. | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.3: Bearer Activation (unsuccessful) REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| Observed ME Id | | | +| PDN address allocation | C | Provides the PDN type and PDN address(es) used by the network. | +| Event type | C | Provide EPS Bearer Activation event type. | +| Event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| Event time | | | +| access point name | C | Provide to identify the packet data network to which the attempt to connect was made; this information may be provided by the UE; the parameter is applicable only for default bearer activation. | +| RAT type | C | Provide the Radio Access Type used by the target. | +| Initiator | C | Provide to indicate whether the EPS bearer activation is network-initiated, target-initiated, or not available. | +| Network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE, including the primary cell ID from each of the Master Cell (Pcell) and Secondary Cell (PSCell) groups of the target, if available. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | +| Failed bearer activation reason | C | Provide information about the reason for failed bearer activation attempts of the target. | +| EPS bearer QOS | C | Provide to identify the QOS parameters. The parameter carries the requested EPS bearer QOS. | +| Bearer activation type | C | Provides information on default or dedicated bearer failed activation | +| APN-AMBR | C | The Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate foreseen for the APN. The parameter carries the subscribed APN-AMBR. | +| Protocol configuration options | C | Provide information about the protocol configuration options requested by the UE | +| Procedure transaction identifier | C | Used to associate the EPS bearer activation attempt to other messages triggering the procedure. | +| Linked EPS bearer identity | C | Provides, in case of failed dedicated bearer activation attempt, the EPS bearer id of the associated default bearer; not applicable in case of default bearer activation attempt. | +| Traffic Flow Template TFT | C | The TFT associated to the dedicated bearer activation attempt; not applicable in case of default bearer activation attempt | +| Handover indication | C | Provide information that the procedure is triggered as part of a handover | +| UE Local IP Address | C | The UE local IP address reported over GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46]. | +| UE UDP Port | C | The UE UDP Port number provided in case of GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46]. | +| WLAN location information | C | The TWAN identifier provided in case of GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46]. | +| WLAN location timestamp | C | The TWAN identifier timestamp provided in case of GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46]. | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.4: UE requested bearer resource modification REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| Observed ME Id | | | +| event type | C | Provide UE requested bearer resource modification event type. | +| Event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| Event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE, including the primary cell ID from each of the Master Cell (Pcell) and Secondary Cell (PSCell) groups of the target, if available. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | +| Failed bearer modification reason | C | Provide information about the reason for failed UE requested bearer resource modification. | +| EPS bearer QOS | C | Provide to identify the QOS parameters. | +| Procedure transaction identifier | C | Used to associate the UE requested bearer resource modification to other messages related to the procedure. | +| Linked EPS bearer identity | C | Provides the EPS bearer id of the associated default bearer. | +| EPS Bearer identity | C | Provides the EPS bearer id of the bearer which the request refers to. | +| Traffic Aggregate Description | C | Description of the packet filter(s) for the traffic flow aggregate | +| Protocol Configuration Options | C | Provide information about the protocol configuration options requested by the UE. | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.5: Tracking Area/EPS Location Update REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed External Identifier | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| event type | C | Provide Tracking Area/EPS Location Update event type. | +| Event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| Event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's MS, including the primary cell ID from each of the Master Cell (Pcell) and Secondary Cell (PSCell) groups of the target, if available. This parameter, in case of inter-MME TAU, will be sent only by the new MME. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | +| Old location information | O | Provide (only by the old MME), when authorized and if available, to identify the old location information for the target's MS, including the primary cell ID from each of the Master Cell (Pcell) and Secondary Cell (PSCell) groups of the target, if available. | +| ProSe Remote UE(s) IDs | C | Applicable in case the target UE is a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. Provided if available. | +| ProSe Remote UE(s) IP info | C | Applicable in case the target UE is a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. Provided if available. | +| Failure reason | C | Provide, in unsuccessful case, the reason for the failure or rejection of the network procedure. | + +In case of inter-MME TAU, Tracking Area/EPS Location Update REPORT Record shall be sent in the following cases: + +- when the target's UE moves to the new MME. +- optionally when the target's UE leaves the old MME. + +In addition to the case of Tracking Area Update, a Tracking Area/EPS Location Update REPORT Record shall also be sent in the following cases: + +- the target's UE performs an UE triggered service request. +- the target's UE is involved in an X2-based handover. +- the target's UE is involved in a S1-based handover. +- an S1AP E-RAB MODIFICATION INDICATION message is received as a result of Dual Connectivity activation/release for the target's UE (see TS 37.340 [99], clause 10). + +**Table 10.5.1.1.6: UE requested PDN connectivity REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed External Identifier | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| event type | C | Provide UE requested PDN connectivity event type. | +| Event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| Event time | | | +| access point name | C | Provide to identify the packet data network to which the attempt to connect was made; this information may be provided by the UE (valid only for default bearer activation). | +| Request type | C | Indicates the type of request, i.e. initial request or handover | +| PDN type | C | Provide to describe the IP version requested by the target UE. | +| Network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE, including the primary cell ID from each of the Master Cell (Pcell) and Secondary Cell (PSCell) groups of the target, if available. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | +| Failed reason | C | Provide information about the reason for failed procedure. | +| Protocol configuration options | C | Provide information about the protocol configuration options requested by the UE | +| EPS bearer identity | C | The identity of the allocated EPS bearer | +| HeNB Identity | C | Provide information to identify the HeNB serving the target's UE. | +| HeNB IP address | C | Provide the IP Address of the HeNB serving the target's UE. | +| HeNB Location | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the HeNB serving the target's UE. | +| SCEF ID | C | Identifies the SCEF to which the UE has connected. | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.7: UE requested PDN disconnection REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed External Identifier | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| event type | C | Provide UE requested PDN disconnection event type. | +| Event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| Event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE, including the primary cell ID from each of the Master Cell (Pcell) and Secondary Cell (PSCell) groups of the target, if available. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | +| Linked EPS bearer identity | C | The identity of the default EPS bearer associated with the PDN connection being disconnected. | +| HeNB Identity | C | Provide information to identify the HeNB serving the target's UE. | +| HeNB IP address | C | Provide the IP Address of the HeNB serving the target's UE. | +| HeNB Location | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the HeNB serving the target's UE. | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.7A: SCEF requested non-IP PDN disconnection REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed External Identifier | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| event type | C | Provide UE requested PDN disconnection event type. | +| Event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| Event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE, including the primary cell ID from each of the Master Cell (Pcell) and Secondary Cell (PSCell) groups of the target, if available. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | +| Linked EPS bearer identity | C | The identity of the default EPS bearer associated with the PDN connection being disconnected. | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.8: PMIP Attach/tunnel activation (unsuccessful) REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MN NAI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide PMIP Attach/tunnel activation event type. | +| Event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| Event time | | | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lifetime | C | The requested lifetime for the tunnel | +| Access technology type | C | Provide the radio access type | +| failed attach reason | C | Provide information about the reason for failed attach/tunnel activation attempt of the target. | +| Handover indicator | C | Provide information that the procedure is triggered as part of the handover | +| APN | C | Provide the Access Point Name | +| UE address info | C | Includes one or more addresses allocated to the UE | +| Additional parameters | C | Provide additional parameters sent by the UE. | +| Serving Network | C | Provide to identify the serving network the UE is attached to in case of E-UTRAN access and PMIP based S5/S8 interfaces. | +| DHCPv4 Address Allocation Indication | C | Indicates that DHCPv4 is to be used to allocate the IPv4 address to the UE in case of E-UTRAN access and PMIP based S5/S8 interfaces | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.9: MIP registration/tunnel activation (unsuccessful) REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MN NAI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide MIP registration/tunnel activation event type. | +| Event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| Event time | | | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lifetime | C | The requested lifetime for the tunnel | +| failed attach reason | C | Provide information about the reason for failed registration/tunnel activation attempt of the target. | +| Home Address | C | Provide the UE Home IP Address | +| Care of Address | C | The local IP address provided by the access network | +| Home Agent Address | C | Provide the Home Agent address | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.10: DSMIP registration/tunnel activation (unsuccessful) REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MN NAI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| Observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide DSMIP registration/tunnel activation event type. | +| Event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| Event time | | | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lifetime | C | The requested lifetime for the tunnel. | +| Failed attach reason | C | Provide information about the reason for failed registration/tunnel activation attempt of the target. | +| Requested Ipv6 Home Prefix | C | Provide the UE Ipv6 Home Prefix. | +| Home address | C | Provide the assigned home address. | +| APN | C | Provides the Access Point Name. | +| Care of address | C | The local IP address provided by the access network. | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.11: DSMIP Home Agent Switch REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MN NAI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide DSMIP Home Agent Switch event type. | +| Event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| Event time | | | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| HSS/AAA address | C | Provide the address of the HSS/AAA triggering the procedure | +| Target PDN-GW address | M | Provide the address of the new PDN-GW | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.12: Serving Evolved Packet System REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| Observed IMSI | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| observed External Identifier | | | +| event type | C | Provide Serving Evolved Packet System event type. | +| Event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| Event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the HSS reporting the event (Network element identifier included). | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Serving MME address | C | Provide the Diameter Origin-Host and the Diameter Origin-Realm of the serving MME (in case of E-UTRAN access), or IP address of the serving MME | +| Visited Network Identifier | C | An identifier that allows the home network to identify the visited network (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country defined in E.212 [87] are included in this identifier) TS 29.273 [53] | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.13: Start of interception with E-UTRAN attached UE REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed External Identifier | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| event type | C | Provide start of interception with PDN connection active | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE, including the primary cell ID from each of the Master Cell (PCell) and Secondary Cell (PSCell) groups of the target, if available. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | +| access point name | C | Provide to identify the packet data network to which the attempt to connect was made; this information may be provided by the UE (valid only for default bearer activation). | +| PDN type | C | Provide to describe the IP version requested by the target UE. | +| EPS bearer identity | C | The identity of the default EPS bearer | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| CSG Identity | C | Provide if closed/hybrid HeNB is used in the UE attachment to the network | +| HeNB Identity | C | Provide information to identify the HeNB serving the target's UE. | +| HeNB IP address | C | Provide the IP Address of the HeNB serving the target's UE. | +| HeNB Location | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the HeNB serving the target's UE. | +| Tunnel Protocol | C | Provide to identify the tunnel protocol used to transport the signalling and communications between the HeNB and the EPC. | +| SCEF ID | C | Identifies the SCEF to which the UE has connected. | + +When the ICE (i.e. S-GW, PDN-GW) is not aware of the activation of multiple lawfully authorized intercepts when UE is already attached to the E-UTRAN, the MF/DF shall generate the Start of Interception with E-UTRAN attached UE REPORT record on its own using information that it has retained. + +The DF2 shall not send the Start of Interception with E-UTRAN attached UE REPORT record to the LEMFs that were already intercepting the target due previous LI activation on the same target. + +**Table 10.5.1.1.14: Packet Data Header Information REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| event type | C | Provide Packet Data Header Information event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| initiator | C | Provide to indicate whether the EPS bearer modification is network-initiated, target-initiated, or not available. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | +| EPS bearer id | C | Provides the EPS bearer id allocated by the network. | +| Handover indication | C | Provide information that the procedure is triggered as part of a handover. | +| Correlation number | M | Provide to uniquely identify the EPS bearer/tunnel delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| lifetime | C | The lifetime for the tunnel | +| Requested IPv6 Home Prefix | C | Provide the UE IPv6 Home Prefix | +| Home address | C | Provide the assigned home address | +| APN | C | Provides the Access Point Name | +| Care of address | C | The IP address provided by the access network | +| packet data header information | M | Shall be provided to identify the packet header information to be reported on a per-packet basis as defined in Table 10.5.1.1.15 or on a summary basis. For summary reporting includes one or more packet flow summaries where each packet flow summary is associated with a particular packet flow as defined in Table 10.5.1.1.16. | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.15: Contents of a per-packet packet data header information parameter** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Source IP address | C | Provide when mapping packet header information to identify the source IP address for a particular packet flow. | +| Source port number | C | Provide when mapping packet header information to report the source port number for a particular packet flow when the transport protocol supports port numbers. | +| Destination IP address | C | Provide when mapping packet header information to identify the destination IP address for a particular packet flow. | +| Destination port number | C | Provide when mapping packet header information to report the destination port number for a particular packet flow when the transport protocol supports port numbers. | +| Transport protocol | C | Provide when mapping packet header information to identify the transport protocol (e.g. TCP) for a particular packet flow. | +| Flow label | C | Provide when mapping packet header information for IPv6 only for a particular packet flow. | +| Direction | M | Shall be provided. Identifies the direction of the packet (from target or to target). | +| Packet size | C | Provide when mapping packet header information to convey the value contained in Total Length Fields of the IPv4 packets or the value contained in the Payload Length fields of the IPv6 packets. | +| Packet data header copy | C | Provide when reporting a copy of the entire packet header information rather than mapping individual information and so it is alternative to the individual information. | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.16: Contents of a single summary flow packet data header information parameter** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Source IP address | M | Shall be provided. Identifies the source IP address for a particular packet flow. | +| Source port number | C | Provide to report the source port number for a particular packet flow when the transport protocol supports port numbers. | +| Destination IP address | M | Shall be provided. Identifies the destination IP address for a particular packet flow. | +| Destination port number | C | Provide to report the destination port number for a particular packet flow when the transport protocol supports port numbers. | +| Transport protocol | M | Identifies the transport protocol (e.g. TCP) for a particular packet flow. | +| Flow label | C | Provide for Ipv6 only for a particular packet flow. | +| Summary period | M | Provides the period of time during which the packets of a particular packet flow of the summary report were sent or received by the target and defined by specifying the time when the first packet and the last packet of the reporting period were detected. | +| Packet count | M | Provides the number of packets detected for a particular packet flow. | +| Sum of packet sizes | M | Provides the sum of values contained in Total Length Fields of the Ipv4 packets or the sum of the values contained in the Payload Length fields of the Ipv6 packets. | +| Packet data summary reason | M | Provides the reason for the report being delivered to the LEMF (i.e. timeout, count limit, end of session). | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.17: HSS subscriber record change REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| new observed MSISDN or A-MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| new observed IMSI | | | +| new observed External Identifier | | | +| new observed IMEI | | | +| observed MSISDN or A-MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed External Identifier | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event type | C | Provide HSS subscriber record change event type. | +| Event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| Event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the HSS reporting the event (Network element identifier included). | +| Lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| changed (old/new) IMSI or MSISDN or IMEI or External Identifier) | M | Indicates what was changed (old/new MSISDN, old/new A-MSISDN, old/new IMSI or old/new IMEI) | +| carrier Specific Data | C | Provide to raw data of this specific update. | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.18: Cancel location REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed External Identifier | | | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide cancel Location change event type. (purge from HLR sent to SGSN included). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the HSS reporting the event (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| previous serving system identifier | C | Provide the previous VPLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, defined in E.212 [87]). | +| previous serving MME Identifier | C | An identifier that allows the home network to identify the previous visited MME, such as its IP address or its Diameter Origin Host and Origin Realm. | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.19: Register location REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|---------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide register location event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the HSS reporting the event (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| previous serving MME identifier | C | An identifier that qualify the serving MME, such as its IP address or its Diameter Origin Host and Origin Realm. | +| current serving MME Identifier | C | An identifier that qualify the serving MME, such as its IP address or its Diameter Origin Host and Origin Realm. | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.20: Location information request REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide location information request event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the HSS reporting the event (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| requesting network identifier | C | Provide the requesting network identifier PLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, defined in E.212 [87], TS 23.003 [25] included in the Diameter routing AVPs Origin-Realm and Origin-Host from the requesting node or proxy) | +| requesting node type | C | Provide the requesting node type that may be based from the Diameter routing AVPs Origin-Realm and Origin-Host from the requesting node or proxy, such as Diameter Name and Realm Identifier of a MSC Server; a SMS Centre; a GMLC, a MME, a SGSN. | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.21: LALS Target Positioning REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed ME id | | | +| event date | M | Shall provide the date and time the report is created. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the LI LCS Client (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide the LALS location information, if the positioning is successful | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | +| extended location parameters | O | If available, additional location information and associated QoS information. | +| LALS error code | C | Provide the error identification code if the positioning is not successful. | + +**Table 10.5.1.1.22: LALS Enhanced Location for IRI REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the LCS Report is available at LI LCS Client. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Network identifier of the LI LCS Client (Network element identifier included). | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | C | Provided for correlation with the IRI records of the call, if available in the corresponding LALS triggering event. | +| location information | C | Provide the LALS location information, if the positioning is successful. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | +| extended location parameters | O | If available, additional location information and associated QoS information. | +| LALS error code | C | Provide the error identification code if the positioning is not successful. | + +NOTE 1: See the TS 33.107 [19] for a detailed description of LALS. See Annex O for information on using of the EPS ASN.1 information object for the LALS reporting. + +NOTE 2: In some specific scenarios the amount of Enhanced Location for IRI reports data may overload the X2 and/or HI2 interfaces. To prevent the overload, a flow control for Enhanced Location for IRI Reports may be implemented, e.g. by limiting the frequency of the reports for individual target. + +## 10.5.1.2 BEGIN record information + +The BEGIN record is used to convey the first event of EPS communication interception. + +The BEGIN record shall be triggered in the following cases: + +- successful EPS bearer activation or tunnel establishment; +- the interception of a target's communications is started and at least one EPS bearer or tunnel is active. In this case, some of the parameters, available at EPS bearer or tunnel activation may be not available any longer at the node. It is not required to store these parameters at the node to be used just in case of LI activation at later stage. If more than one EPS bearer or tunnel is active, a BEGIN record shall be generated for each EPS bearer or tunnel that is active; +- during the S-GW relocation, when there is a change in the PLMN or when the information about the change in the PLMN is not available at the DF/MF; + +- the target entered an interception area and has at least one EPS bearer/tunnel active (FFS). + +**Table 10.5.1.2.1: Bearer Activation (successful) and Start of Interception with active bearer BEGIN Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| event type | C | Provide, depending on the reported event, Bearer activation or Start of interception with active bearer event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| access point name | C | Provide to identify the packet data network to which the connection is made (valid only for default bearer activation). | +| PDN address allocation | C | Provides the PDN type and PDN address(es) used by the network. | +| initiator | C | Provide to indicate whether the EPS bearer activation is network-initiated, target-initiated, or not available. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | +| EPS bearer QOS | C | Provide to identify the QOS parameters. It carries the EPS bearer QOS associated to the established bearer. | +| Bearer activation type | C | Provides information on default or dedicated bearer activation. | +| APN-AMBR | C | The Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate foreseen for the APN. The parameter carries the APN-AMBR used for the established bearer | +| Protocol configuration options | C | Provide information about the protocol configuration options requested by the UE. | +| Procedure transaction identifier | C | Used to associate the EPS bearer activation to other messages triggering the procedure. | +| EPS bearer id | C | Provides the EPS bearer id allocated by the network. | +| Linked EPS bearer identity | C | Provides, in case of dedicated bearer activation, the EPS bearer id of the associated default bearer; not applicable in case of default bearer activation. | +| Traffic Flow Template(s) TFT | C | The TFT associated to the dedicated bearer activation; not applicable in case of default bearer activation. | +| Handover indication | C | Provide information that the procedure is triggered as part of a handover. | +| RAT type | C | The Radio Access Type used by the target subscriber (only applicable to default bearer activation). | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided to uniquely identify the EPS bearer delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| UE Local IP Address | C | The UE local IP address reported over GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46]. | +| UE UDP Port | C | The UE UDP Port provided in case of GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46]. | +| WLAN location information | C | The TWAN identifier provided in case of GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46]. | +| WLAN location timestamp | C | The TWAN identifier timestamp provided in case of GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46]. | + +**Table 10.5.1.2.2: PMIP Attach/tunnel activation (successful) and Start of Interception with active PMIP tunnel BEGIN Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MN NAI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| Observed ME Id | | | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide, depending on the reported event, PMIP Attach/tunnel activation
or
Start of interception with active PMIP tunnel event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lifetime | C | The lifetime for the tunnel | +| Access technology type | C | Provide the radio access type | +| Handover indicator | C | Provide information that the procedure is triggered as part of the handover | +| APN | C | Provides the Access Point Name | +| UE address info | C | Includes one or more addresses allocated to the UE | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided to uniquely identify tunnel delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| Serving Network | C | Provide to identify the serving network the UE is attached to in case of E-UTRAN access and PMIP based S5/S8 interfaces. | +| DHCPv5 Address Allocation Indication | C | Indicates that DHCPv5 is to be used to allocate the IPv4 address to the UE in case of E-UTRAN access and PMIP based S5/S8 interfaces. | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | + +**Table 10.5.1.2.3: MIP registration/tunnel activation (successful) and Start of Interception with active MIP tunnel BEGIN Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MN NAI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide, depending on the reported event, MIP registration/tunnel activation
or
Start of interception with active MIP tunnel event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lifetime | C | The lifetime for the tunnel. | +| Home Address | C | Provide the UE Home IP Address. | +| Care of address | C | The IP address provided by the access network. | +| Home Agent Address | C | Provide the Home Agent address | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided to uniquely identify tunnel delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| APN | C | Provides the Access Point Name | + +**Table 10.5.1.2.4: DSMIP registration/tunnel activation (successful) and +Start of Interception with active DSMIP tunnel BEGIN Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MN NAI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide, depending on the reported event, DSMIP registration/tunnel activation
or
Start of interception with active DSMIP tunnel event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| lifetime | C | The lifetime for the tunnel | +| Requested IPv6 Home Prefix | C | Provide the UE IPv6 Home Prefix | +| Home address | C | Provide the assigned home address | +| APN | C | Provides the Access Point Name | +| Care of address | C | The IP address provided by the access network | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided to uniquely identify tunnel delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | + +When the ICE (e.g. S-GW, PDN-GW) is not aware of the activation of multiple lawfully authorized interception a target with active bearer or with active PMIP/MIP/DSMIP tunnel, the MF/DF shall generate the BEGIN record on its own using information that it has retained. + +When the BEGIN-record is used to convey the start of interception with active bearer, or active PMIP tunnel, or active MIP tunnel, or active DSMIP tunnel, the DF2 shall not send the BEGIN record to the LEMFs that were already intercepting the target due previous LI activation on the same target. + +### 10.5.1.3 CONTINUE record information + +The CONTINUE record is used to convey events during an active EPS bearer/tunnel. + +The CONTINUE record shall be triggered in the following cases: + +- An active EPS bearer/session is modified. +- During the S-GW relocation, when target has got at least one EPS bearer/tunnel active, the PLMN does not change and the triggering event information is available at the DF/MF. + +NOTE: This scenario does not apply to DSMIP and MIP protocol cases. + +- In case of handover between different accesses when GTP based messages are intercepted. In this case, the RAT type indicates the new access after the handover. + +In order to enable the LEMF to correlate the information on HI3, a new correlation number shall not be generated within a CONTINUE record. + +**Table 10.5.1.3.1: Bearer Modification CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| event type | C | Provide Bearer modification event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| initiator | C | Provide to indicate whether the EPS bearer modification is network-initiated, target-initiated, or not available. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | +| EPS bearer QOS | C | Provide to identify the QOS parameters. | +| APN-AMBR | C | The Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate for the APN. | +| Procedure transaction identifier | C | Used to associate the EPS bearer modification to other messages triggering the procedure. | +| EPS bearer id | C | Provides the EPS bearer id allocated by the network. | +| Traffic Flow Template(s) TFT | C | The TFT associated to the EPS bearer modification; | +| RAT type | C | The Radio Access Type used by the target. | +| APN-AMBR | C | The Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate foreseen for the APN. | +| Handover indication | C | Provide information that the procedure is triggered as part of a handover. | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided to uniquely identify the EPS bearer delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| Failed bearer modification reason | C | Provide information about the reason for failed bearer modification | +| UE Local IP Address | C | The UE local IP address reported over GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46]. | +| UE UDP Port | C | The UE UDP Port provided in case of GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46]. | +| WLAN location information | C | The TWAN identifier provided in case of GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46]. | +| WLAN location timestamp | C | The TWAN identifier timestamp provided in case of GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46]. | +| Secondary RAT Usage Indication | O | The Secondary RAT Usage Indication (see TS 37.340 [99]). | + +**Table 10.5.1.3.2: Start of Interception with active bearer CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| event type | C | Provide Start of interception with active bearer event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| access point name | C | Provide to identify the packet data network to which the connection is made (valid only for default bearer). | +| PDN address allocation | C | Provides the PDN type and PDN address(es) used by the network. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | +| EPS bearer QOS | C | Provide to identify the QOS parameters. | +| Bearer activation type | C | Provides information on default or dedicated bearer. | +| APN-AMBR | C | The Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate foreseen for the APN. | +| Protocol configuration options | C | Provide, if available, information about the protocol configuration options requested by the UE (valid only for default bearer). | +| Procedure transaction identifier | C | Used, if available, to associate the EPS bearer to other messages triggering the previous bearer activation. | +| EPS bearer id | C | Provides the EPS bearer id allocated by the network. | +| Linked EPS bearer identity | C | Provides, in case of dedicated bearer, the EPS bearer id of the associated default bearer; not applicable in case of default bearer. | +| Traffic Flow Template(s) TFT | C | The TFT associated to the dedicated bearer; not applicable in case of default bearer. | +| Handover indication | C | Provide information that the procedure is triggered as part of a handover. | +| RAT type | C | The Radio Access Type used by the target (only applicable to default bearer). | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided to uniquely identify the EPS bearer delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | + +**Table 10.5.1.3.3: Start of Interception with active PMIP tunnel CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MN NAI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide Start of interception with active PMIP tunnel event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lifetime | C | The lifetime for the tunnel | +| Access technology type | C | Provide the radio access type | +| Handover indicator | C | Provide information that the procedure is triggered as part of the handover | +| APN | C | Provides the Access Point Name | +| UE address info | C | Includes one or more addresses allocated to the UE | +| Additional parameters | C | Provide additional parameters sent by the UE. | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided to uniquely identify tunnel delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| Serving Network | C | Provide to identify the serving network the UE is attached to in case of E-UTRAN access and PMIP based S5/S8 interfaces. | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | + +**Table 10.5.1.3.4: PMIP session modification CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MN NAI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide PMIP session modification. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Lifetime | C | The lifetime for the tunnel | +| Access technology type | C | Provide the radio access type | +| Handover indicator | C | Provide information that the procedure is triggered as part of the handover | +| APN | C | Provides the Access Point Name | +| UE address info | C | Includes one or more addresses allocated to the UE | +| Additional parameters | C | Provide additional parameters sent by the UE. | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided to uniquely identify tunnel delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| Serving Network | C | Provide to identify the serving network the UE is attached to | +| DHCPv4 Address Allocation Indication | C | Indicates that DHCPv4 is to be used to allocate the IPv4 address to the UE | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | + +**Table 10.5.1.3.5: DSMIP session modification CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MN NAI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide DSMIP session modification. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| lifetime | C | The lifetime for the tunnel | +| Requested IPv6 Home Prefix | C | Provide the UE IPv6 Home Prefix | +| Home address | C | Provide the assigned home address | +| APN | C | Provides the Access Point Name | +| Care of address | C | The IP address provided by the access network | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided to uniquely identify tunnel delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| Session modification failure reason | C | Provides the reason for failure | + +#### 10.5.1.4 END record information + +The END record is used to convey the last event of EPS communication. + +The END record shall be triggered in the following cases: + +- EPS bearer deactivation; +- Tunnel deactivation; +- Resource allocation deactivation. + +**Table 10.5.1.4.1: Bearer Deactivation END Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| event type | C | Provide Bearer Deactivation event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| initiator | C | Provide to indicate whether the EPS deactivation is network-initiated, target-initiated, or not available. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| correlation number | M | Shall be provided to uniquely identify the PDP context delivered to the LEM and to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's MS. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | +| Bearer deactivation type | C | Provides information on default or dedicated bearer deactivation. | +| Bearer deactivation cause | C | Provide to indicate reason for deactivation. | +| EPS bearer id | O | Provides the identity of the deactivated bearer. | +| Procedure Transaction Identifier | C | Used to associate the EPS bearer deactivation to other messages triggering the procedure. | +| ULI Timestamp | O | Indicates the time when the User Location Information was acquired. | +| UE Local IP Address | C | The UE local IP address reported over GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46]. | +| UE UDP Port | C | The UE UDP Port provided in case of GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46]. | +| WLAN location information | C | The TWAN identifier provided in case of GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46]. | +| WLAN location timestamp | C | The TWAN identifier timestamp provided in case of GTP based S2b interface TS 29.274 [46]. | +| Secondary RAT Usage Information | O | Secondary RAT Usage Information (see TS 37.340 [99]). | + +**Table 10.5.1.4.2: PMIP Detach/tunnel deactivation END Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MN NAI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide PMIP Detach/tunnel deactivation event type | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| APN | C | The access point name | +| Initiator | C | Provide to indicate whether the tunnel deactivation is network-initiated, target-initiated | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided to uniquely identify tunnel delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | + +**Table 10.5.1.4.3: MIP deregistration/tunnel deactivation END Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MN NAI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide MIP deregistration/tunnel deactivation. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Home Agent address | C | Provide the Home Agent address | +| Home Address | C | Provide the UE Home IP Address | +| Care of address | C | The local IP address provided by the access network. | +| Initiator | C | Provide to indicate whether the tunnel deactivation is network-initiated, target-initiated | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided to uniquely identify tunnel delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | + +**Table 10.5.1.4.4: DSMIP deregistration/tunnel deactivation END Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MN NAI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide DSMIP deregistration/tunnel deactivation. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Home address | C | Provide the IPv6 home address | +| Care of Address | C | The IP address provided by the access network | +| Initiator | C | Provide to indicate whether the tunnel deactivation is network-initiated, target-initiated | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided to uniquely identify tunnel delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | + +**Table 10.5.1.4.5: PMIP Resource Allocation Deactivation END Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MN NAI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide PMIP Resource Allocation Deactivation event type | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Revocation trigger | C | Provide the cause for the revocation procedure | +| UE Address Info | C | Includes one or more addresses allocated to the UE (i.e. UE PMIP tunnel information) | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided to uniquely identify tunnel delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | + +**Table 10.5.1.4.6: PMIP PDN-GW initiated PDN disconnection END Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MN NAI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed ME Id | | | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide PMIP PDN-GW initiated PDN disconnection event type | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Revocation trigger | C | Provide the cause for the revocation procedure | +| PDN address(es) | C | Provide the PDN address(es) for which the disconnection is done | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided to uniquely identify tunnel delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of Location (if target location provided). | + +**Table 10.5.1.4.7: MIP Resource Allocation Deactivation END Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MN NAI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| observed IMSI | | | +| event type | C | Provide MIP deregistration/tunnel deactivation. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| logicalFunctionInformation | O | Used to distinguish between multiple logical functions operating in a single physical network element. | +| Revocation trigger | C | Provide the cause for the revocation procedure | +| Home Address | C | Provide the UE Home IP Address | +| Foreign domain address | C | The relevant IP address in the foreign domain. | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided to uniquely identify tunnel delivered to the LEMF and to correlate IRI records with CC. | + +## 10.6 IRI reporting for evolved packet domain at PDN-GW + +Interception in the PDN-GW is a national option. However, in certain scenarios the PDN-GW is the only ICE in the 3GPP network where interception in the PLMN accessed by the target can be performed (i.e., for trusted non-3GPP access, the HPLMN in case of non roaming and the VPLMN in case of roaming with local breakout). + +As a national option, in the case where the PDN-GW is reporting IRI for a target, the target is handed off to another S-GW and the same PDN-GW continues to handle the content of communications subject to roaming agreements, the PDN-GW shall continue to report the IRIs. + +NOTE: In some situation (e.g. during activation of second, third, etc, intercepts on the target), the MF/DF may have to detect on its own that an interception is activated on a target with active bearer or with active PMIP/MIP/DSMIP tunnel. + +## 10.7 Content of communication interception for evolved packet domain at PDN-GW + +Interception in the PDN-GW is a national option. However, in certain scenarios the PDN-GW is the only ICE in the 3GPP network where interception in the PLMN accessed by the target can be performed (i.e., for trusted non-3GPP access, the HPLMN in case of non roaming and the VPLMN in case of roaming with local breakout). + +As a national option, in the case where the PDN-GW is performing interception of the content of communications, the target is handed off to another S-GW and the same PDN-GW continues to handle the content of communications subject to roaming agreements, the PDN-GW shall continue to perform the interception of the content of communication. + +--- + +## 11 3GPP IMS Conference Services + +### 11.1 Identifiers + +#### 11.1.1 Overview + +Specific identifiers are necessary to identify a target for interception uniquely and to correlate between the data, which is conveyed over the different handover interfaces (HI2 and HI3). The identifiers are defined in the subsections below. + +For the delivery of CC, the MRFP provides correlation numbers and target identities to the HI3. The AS/MRFC reports the IRI associated with the conference services. + +For the delivery of CC and IRI, the AS/MRFC/MRFP provides correlation numbers and target identities to the HI2 and HI3. For a given target the correlation number is unique per conference session. + +NOTE: If two or more target identities are involved in the same conference session the same Correlation Number may be assigned by the relevant network element to the communication sessions of the different target identities. + +#### 11.1.2 Lawful interception identifier + +For each target identity related to an interception measure, the authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) shall assign a special Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID), which has been agreed between the LEA and the operator (NO/AN/SP). + +Using an indirect identification, pointing to a target identity makes it easier to keep the knowledge about a specific target limited within the authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) and the handling agents at the LEA. + +The LIID is a component of the CC delivery procedure and of the IRI records. It shall be used within any information exchanged at the handover interfaces HI2 and HI3 for identification and correlation purposes. + +The LIID format shall consist of alphanumeric characters. It might for example, among other information, contain a lawful authorization reference number, and the date, when the lawful authorization was issued. + +The authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) shall either enter, based on an agreement with each LEA, a unique LIID for each target identity of the target or a single LIID for multiple target identities all pertaining to the same target. + +If more than one LEA intercepts the same target identity, there shall be unique LIIDs assigned relating to each LEA. + +Note that, in order to simplify the use of the LIID at LEMF for the purpose of correlating IMS signalling with GSN CC, the use of a single LIID in association with potentially numerous IMS identities (SIP and TEL URIs) is recommended. + +In case the LIID of a given target has different values in the GSN and in the CSCF, it is up to the LEMF to recover the association between the two LIIDs. + +#### 11.1.3 Network identifier + +The network identifier (NID) is a mandatory parameter; it should be internationally unique. It consists of the following two identifiers. + +- 1) Operator- (NO/AN/SP) identifier (mandatory): +Unique identification of network operator, access network provider or service provider. + +2) Network element identifier NEID (optional): + +The purpose of the network element identifier is to uniquely identify the relevant network element carrying out the LI operations, such as LI activation, IRI record sending, etc. + +A network element identifier may be an IP address or other identifier. National regulations may mandate the sending of the NEID. + +### 11.1.4 Correlation number + +For a given target the Correlation Number is unique per conference session and used for the following purposes: + +- correlate CC with IRI, +- correlate different IRI records within one conference session. + +NOTE: The Correlation Number is at a minimum unique for each concurrent communication of a target within a lawful authorization. + +## 11.2 Timing and quality + +### 11.2.1 Timing + +As a general principle, within a telecommunication system, IRI, if buffered, should be buffered for as short a time as possible. + +NOTE: If the transmission of IRI fails, it may be buffered or lost. + +Subject to national requirements, the following timing requirements shall be supported: + +- Each IRI data record shall be sent by the delivery function to the LEMF over the HI2 within seconds of the detection of the triggering event by the IAP at least 95% of the time. +- Each IRI data record shall contain a time-stamp, based on the intercepting node's clock that is generated following the detection of the IRI triggering event. + +### 11.2.2 Quality + +The quality of service associated with the result of interception should be (at least) equal to the highest quality of service of the original content of communication for all participants. This may be derived from the QoS class used for the original intercepted session, TS 23.107 [20]. However, when TCP is used as an OSI layer 4 protocol across the HI3, real time delivery of the result of the interception cannot be guaranteed. The QoS used from the operator (NO/AN/SP) to the LEMF is determined by what operators (NO/AN/SP) and law enforcement agree upon. + +### 11.2.3 Void + +(Void) + +## 11.3 Security aspects + +Security is defined by national requirements. + +## 11.4 Quantitative aspects + +The number of target interceptions supported is a national requirement. + +The area of Quantitative Aspects addresses the ability to perform multiple, simultaneous interceptions within a provider's network and at each of the relevant intercept access points within the network. Specifics related to this topic include: + +- The ability to access and monitor all simultaneous communications originated, received, or redirected by the target; +- The ability for multiple LEAs (up to five) to monitor, simultaneously, the same target while maintaining unobtrusiveness, including between agencies; +- The ability of the network to simultaneously support a number of separate (i.e. multiple targets) legally authorized interceptions within its service area(s), including different levels of authorization for each interception (i.e. IRI only, or IRI and communication content), including between agencies. + +## 11.5 IRI for IMS Conference Services + +### 11.5.0 Introduction + +The IRI will in principle be available in the following phases of a conference service transmission: + +- 1) At a conference creation, when the target successfully provisions or requests that a conference is created; +- 2) At the start of a conference, when the first party is joined to the conference; the conference may be provisioned or requested by the target or the conference is the target of interception; +- 3) At the end of a conference, when the last party on the conference leaves or the conference is terminated by the conference server; the conference may be provisioned or requested by the target or the conference is the target; +- 4) At certain times when relevant information are available. + +The IRI may be subdivided into the following categories: + +1. Control information for HI2 (e.g. correlation information); +2. Basic data communication information, for standard data transmission between two parties. + +The events defined in TS 33.107 [19] are used to generate records for the delivery via HI2. + +There are multiple different event types received at DF2 level. According to each event, a Record is sent to the LEMF if this is required. The following table gives the mapping between event type received at DF2 level and record type sent to the LEMF. + +**Table 11.1: Mapping between IMS Conference Service Events and HI2 records type** + +| Event | IRI Record Type | +|-------------------------------------------|-----------------| +| Start of Conference (successful) | BEGIN | +| Start of Intercept with Conference Active | BEGIN | +| Conference Service Party Join | CONTINUE | +| Conference Service Party Leave | CONTINUE | +| Conference Service Bearer Modify | CONTINUE | +| Conference Service End (unsuccessful) | CONTINUE | +| Conference Service End (successful) | END | +| Start of Conference (unsuccessful) | REPORT | +| Conference Service Creation | REPORT | +| Conference Service Update | REPORT | + +A set of information is used to generate the records. The records used transmit the information from mediation function to LEMF. This set of information can be extended in the ICE or DF2 MF, if this is necessary in a specific country. The following table gives the mapping between information received per event and information sent in records. + +**Table 11.2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information** + +| Parameter | description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------| +| Bearer Modify ID | Identity of the party modifying or attempting to modify a media bearer | bearerModifyPartyID (partyIdentity) | +| Conference End Reason | Provides a reason for why the conference ended. | confEndReason | +| Conference URI | A URI associated with the conference being monitored. | confID | +| Correlation Number | The correlation number is used to correlate CC and IRI. The correlation number is also used to allow the correlation of IRI records. | confCorrelation | +| Event Date | Date of the event generation in the AS/MRFC. | timestamp | + +| Parameter | description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------| +| Event Time | Time of the event generation in the AS/MRFC server. Timestamp shall be based on the AS/MRFC internal clock. | | +| Event Type | Description which type of event is delivered: Start of Conference, Party Join, Party Leave, Bearer Modify, Start of Intercept on an Active Conference, Conference End | confEvent | +| Failed Bearer Modify Reason | Provides a reason for why a bearer modification attempt failed | confEventFailureReason | +| Failed Conference End Reason | Provides a reason for why a conference end attempt failed | confEventFailureReason | +| Failed Conference Start Reason | Provides a reason for why a conference start attempt failed. | confEventFailureReason | +| Failed Party Join Reason | Provides a reason for why a party join attempt failed. | confEventFailureReason | +| Failed Party Leave Reason | Provides a reason for why a party leave attempt failed. | confEventFailureReason | +| Identity(ies) of Conference Controller | Identifies the parties that have control privileges on the conference, if such information is configured in the system. | confControllerID (partyIdentity) | +| Initiator | The initiator of a request, for example, the target, the network, a conferee. | confEventInitiator | +| Join Party ID | Identity of the party successfully joining or attempting to join the conference. | joinPartyID (partyIdentity) | +| Join Party Supported Bearers | Identity of bearer types supported by the party successfully joining the conference | confPartyInformation (supportedmedia) | +| Leave Party ID | Identity of the party leaving or being requested to leave the conference. | leavePartyID (partyIdentity) | +| List of Conferees | Identifies each of the conferees currently on a conference (e.g. via SIP URI or TEL URI). | confPartyInformation (partyIdentity) | +| List of Potential Conferees | Identifies each of the parties to be invited to a conference or permitted to join the conference (if available). | listOfPotConferees (partyIdentity) | +| List of Waiting Conferees | Identifies each of the conferees waiting to join a conference (e.g. called in to a conference that has not yet started) | listOfWaitConferees (partyIdentity) | +| Media Modification | Identifies how the media was modified (i.e., added, removed, or changed) and the value for the media | mediaModification | +| Network Identifier | Operator ID plus ICE address. This is an unique identifier for the element reporting the ICE. | networkIdentifier | +| Lawful Interception identifier | Unique number for each lawful authorization. | lawfulInterceptionIdentifier | +| Observed IMPU | IMS Public User identity (IMPU) of the target. In some cases, this identity may not be observed by the MRFC. Also see Note 1. | partyInformation (partyIdentity) | +| Observed IMPI | IMS Private User identity (IMPI) of the target. In some cases, this identity may not be observed by the MRFC. Also see Note 1. | partyInformation (partyIdentity) | +| Observed Other Identity | Target identifier with the NAI of the target. | partyInformation (partyIdentity) | +| Party Leave Reason | Provides a reason for why a party left the conference | reason | +| Party(ies) Affected by Bearer Modification | The list of parties affected by a media bearer modification | confPartyInformation (partyIdentity) | +| Potential Conference End Time | The expected end time of the conference, if such end information is configured in the system. | potConfEndInfo (timestamp) | +| Potential Conference Start Time | The expected start time of the conference, if start time information is configured in the system. | potConfStartInfo (timestamp) | +| Recurrence Information | Information indicating the recurrence pattern for the event as configured for the created conference. | RecurrenceInfo | +| Supported Bearers | Provides all bearer types supported by a conferee in a conference | confPartyInformation (supportedmedia) | +| Temporary Conference URI | A temporarily allocated URI associated with a conference being monitored. | tempConfID | + +NOTE 1: In most cases, either the IMPU or IMPI may be available, but not necessarily both. + +NOTE 2: LIID parameter has to be present in each record sent to the LEMF. + +## 11.5.1 Events and information + +### 11.5.1.1 Overview + +This clause describes the information sent from the Delivery Function (DF) to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF) to support Lawful Interception (LI). The information is described as records and information carried by a record. This focus is on describing the information being transferred to the LEMF. + +The IRI events and data are encoded into records as defined in the Table 11.1 Mapping between Conference Service Events and HI2 records type and Annex B.11 Intercept related information (HI2). IRI is described in terms of a 'causing event' and information associated with that event. Within each IRI record there is a set of events and associated information elements to support the particular service. + +The communication events described in Table 11.1: Mapping between Conference Service Events and HI2 record type and Table 11.2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information convey the basic information for reporting the disposition of a communication. This clause describes those events and supporting information. + +Each record described in this clause consists of a set of parameters. Each parameter is either: + +- mandatory (M) - required for the record, +- conditional (C) - required in situations where a condition is met (the condition is given in the Description), or +- optional (O) - provided at the discretion of the implementation. + +The information to be carried by each parameter is identified. Both optional and conditional parameters are considered to be OPTIONAL syntactically in ASN.1 Stage 3 descriptions. The Stage 2 inclusion takes precedence over Stage 3 syntax. + +### 11.5.1.2 BEGIN record information + +The BEGIN record is used to convey the first event of conference service communication interception. + +The BEGIN record shall be triggered when: + +- a target provisioned or requested conference is started (i.e., when the first party is joined to the conference, or when the first party accesses the conference but has to wait for a conference host/owner/chairman to join); +- a conference that is the target is started (i.e., when the first party is joined to the conference, or when the first party accesses the conference but has to wait for a conference host/owner/chairman to join); +- an interception is activated during an on-going conference call. + +**Table 11.3: Conference Service Start (Successful) BEGIN Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IMPI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| event type | M | Provide Conference event type (i.e., Conference Start). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful interception identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| list of potential conferees | C | Provide, when available, the party identities that are invited or permitted to join the conference. | +| list of conferees | | | +| list of waiting conferees | C | Provide at least one when available; provide the party identities on the current conference and/or party identities of those who have accessed the conference. See Note | +| supported bearers | C | For each conferee, provide all bearers that are actively supported in this conference | +| conference URI | C | Provide at least one and others when available; provide the URI | +| temporary conference URI | | associated with the conference under surveillance | + +NOTE: List of Waiting Conferees is only reported if the conference service allows party members to access a conference but they do not receive conference media. + +**Table 11.4: Start of Intercept with Conference Active BEGIN Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IMPI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| event type | M | Provide Conference event type (i.e., Intercept Start with Active Conference). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful interception identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| list of conferees | M | Provide the party identities on the current conference. | +| supported bearers | M | For each conferee, provide all bearers that are actively supported in this conference | +| conference URI | C | Provide at least one and others when available; provide the URI | +| temporary conference URI | | associated with the conference under surveillance | + +When the AS/MRFC is not aware of the activation of multiple lawfully authorized intercepts on an on-going conference call of a single target, the MF/DF shall generate the BEGIN record with *Start of Intercept with Conference Active* on its own using information that it has retained. + +When the BEGIN-record is used to convey the start of interception on an on-going conference, the DF2 shall not send the *Start of Intercept with Conference Active* BEGIN record to the LEMFs that were already intercepting the conference due previous LI activation on the same target or conference. + +### 11.5.1.3 CONTINUE record information + +The CONTINUE record is used to convey the events during an active conference. + +The CONTINUE record shall be triggered when: + +- a party successfully joins the target's conference or a conference that is the target; +- a party unsuccessfully attempts to join the target's conference or a conference that is the target; +- a party successfully leaves (e.g. normal disconnection or involuntary termination/removal) a target's conference or a conference that is a target; + +- a party unsuccessfully attempts to drop another party from the target's conference or a conference that is the target; +- a party successfully modifies (e.g. adds, removes, changes) media in the conference; +- a party unsuccessfully manages modifies (e.g. adds, removes, changes) media in the conference; +- there was an unsuccessful attempt to terminate a target provisioned or requested conference; +- there was an unsuccessful attempt to terminate a conference that is the target. + +In order to enable the LEMF to correlate the information on HI3, a new correlation number shall not be generated within a CONTINUE record. + +NOTE: Reporting of participant signalling to manage conference features (e.g. (un)mute) is for further study. + +**Table 11.5: Conference Service Party Join (successful) CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IMPI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| event type | M | Provide conference event type (i.e., Party Join). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful interception identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| join party ID | M | Provide the identity of the party joining the conference. | +| initiator (of party join request) | C | Provide if different from join party ID. | +| conference URI | C | Provide at least one and others when available; provide the URI associated with the conference under surveillance. | +| temporary conference URI | | | +| join party supported bearers | M | Provide all bearers that the party joining the conference supports. | + +**Table 11.6: Conference Service Party Join (unsuccessful) CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IMPI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| event type | M | Provide conference event type (i.e., Party Join). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful interception identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| join party ID | M | Provide the identity of the party attempting to join the conference. | +| initiator (of party join request) | C | Provide if different from join party ID. | +| conference URI | C | Provide at least one and others when available; provide the URI associated with the conference under surveillance | +| temporary conference URI | | | +| failed party join reason | M | Provide information about the reason the attempted party join failed. | + +**Table 11.7: Conference Service Party Leave (successful) CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IMPI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| event type | M | Provide conference event type (i.e., Party Leave). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful interception identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| leave party ID | M | Provide the identity of the party leaving the conference or the identity of the party dropped from the conference | +| initiator (of party leave request) | C | Provide if different from leave party ID | +| conference URI | C | Provide at least one and others when available; provide the URI | +| temporary conference URI | | associated with the conference under surveillance | +| party leave reason | M | Provide information about the cause of the party leave (e.g. party hang up, party drop, or removed by conference controller) | +| supported bearers | M | Provide all bearers that the party leaving the conference supported. | + +**Table 11.8: Conference Service Party Leave (unsuccessful) CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IMPI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| event type | M | Provide conference event type (i.e., Party Leave). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful interception identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| leave party ID | M | Provide the identity of the party attempting to leave the conference or the identity of the party that was requested to be dropped from the conference. | +| initiator (of party leave request) | C | Provide if different from leave party ID. | +| conference URI | C | Provide at least one and others when available; provide the URI | +| temporary conference URI | | associated with the conference under surveillance | +| failed party leave reason | M | Provide information about the reason the conference party leave or dropped failed. | + +**Table 11.9: Conference Service Bearer Modify (successful) CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IMPI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| event type | M | Provide conference event type (i.e., Bearer Modify). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful interception identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| bearer modify ID | M | Provide the identity of the party modifying a bearer. | +| conference URI | C | Provide at least one and others when available; provide the URI | +| temporary conference URI | | associated with the conference under surveillance | +| media modification | M | Provide information about bearer modification (i.e., add, remove, change) and value of media. | +| Parties affected by bearer modification | M | Provide the party identities of those conferees affected by the bearer modification. | + +**Table 11.10: Conference Service Bearer Modify (unsuccessful) CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IMPI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| event type | M | Provide conference event type (i.e., Bearer Modify). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful interception identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| bearer modify ID | M | Provide the identity of the party who attempted the action | +| conference URI | C | Provide at least one and others when available; provide the URI associated with the conference under surveillance | +| temporary conference URI | | | +| media modification | M | Provide information about the attempt to modify a bearer (i.e., add, remove, change) and value of media. | +| failed bearer modify reason | M | Provide information about the reason for failed bearer modification. | + +**Table 11.11: Conference Service End (unsuccessful) CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|---------------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IMPI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| event type | M | Provide Conference event type (i.e., Conference End). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful interception identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| initiator (of conference end request) | M | Provide information on the initiator of the conference end (e.g., target, network, conferee). | +| conference URI | C | Provide at least one and others when available; provide the URI associated with the conference under surveillance. | +| temporary conference URI | | | +| failed conference end reason | M | Provide information about the reason for the failed conference end. | + +#### 11.5.1.4 END record information + +The END record is used to convey the last event of a conference service communication. + +The END record shall be triggered when: + +- a target provisioned or requested conference is terminated; +- a conference that is the target is terminated; + +**Table 11.12: Conference Service End (successful) END Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IMPI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| event type | M | Provide Conference event type (i.e., Conference End). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful interception identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| initiator (of a conference end request) | M | Provide information on the initiator of the conference end (e.g., target, network, conferee). | +| conference URI | C | Provide at least one and others when available; provide the URI associated with the conference under surveillance. | +| temporary conference URI | | | +| conference end reason | M | Provide information about the reason for the conference end (e.g. expiration of time limit; party termination command, last user left conference). | + +### 11.5.1.5 REPORT record information + +The REPORT record is used to report non-communication related subscriber actions (events) and for reporting creations and updates of provisioned (e.g. future) conferences. + +The REPORT record shall be triggered when: + +- a target successfully provisions or requests that a conference be created; +- a target successfully provisions or requests that a conference be updated (e.g. modify or delete); +- a target provisioned or requested conference fails to start (e.g. no parties join the conference); +- a conference that is the target fails to start (e.g. no parties join the conference). + +**Table 11.13: Conference Service Start (Unsuccessful) REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IMPI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| event type | M | Provide Conference event type (i.e., Conference Start). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful interception identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | C | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| list of potential conferees | C | Provide, when available, the party identities that are invited or permitted to join the conference. | +| list of waiting conferees | C | Provide, when available, the known party identities of those parties awaiting to join the conference. | +| conference URI | C | Provide at least one and others when available; provide the URI associated with the conference under surveillance | +| temporary conference URI | | | +| failed conference start reason | M | Provide information about the reason for a failure of a conference start. | + +**Table 11.14: Conference Service Creation REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPU | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPI | | | +| observed other identity | | | +| event type | M | Provide Conference event type (i.e., Creation). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful interception identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| list of potential conferees | C | Provide, when available, the identities to be invited to or allowed to join the provisioned (i.e., future) conference. | +| conference URI | C | Provide at least one and others when available; provide the URI associated with the conference under surveillance | +| temporary conference URI | | | +| potential conference start date and time | C | Provide, when available, the date and start time of the conference that is being created. This is statically provisioned information and is not correlated to the timestamp requirements for LI | +| potential conference end date and time | C | Provide, when available, the date and end time of the conference that is being created. This is statically provisioned information and is not correlated to the timestamp requirements for LI | +| recurrence information | C | Provide, when available, information concerning the frequency or pattern of recurrence of the created conference. Will be NULL if a single instance of a conference is created. | +| identity(ies) of conference controller | C | Provide, when available, identity(ies) of parties that have control privileges on the conference. | + +**Table 11.15: Conference Service Update REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPU | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPI | | | +| observed other identity | | | +| event type | M | Provide Conference event type (i.e., Conference Update). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful interception identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| list of potential conferees | C | Provide, when available, the identities to be invited to or allowed to join the provisioned (i.e., future) conference. | +| conference URI | C | Provide at least one and others when available; provide the URI associated with the conference under surveillance. | +| temporary conference URI | | | +| potential conference start date and time | C | Provide, when available, the date and/or start time of the conference that is being created. This is statically provisioned information and is not correlated to the timestamp requirements for LI. | +| potential conference end date and time | C | Provide, when available, the date and/or end time of the conference that is being created. This is statically provisioned information and is not correlated to the timestamp requirements for LI. | +| recurrence information | C | Provide, when available, information concerning the frequency or pattern of recurrence of the created conference. Will be NULL if a single instance of a conference is created. | +| identity(ies) of conference controller | C | Provide, when available, identity(ies) of parties that have control privileges on the conference. | + +## 11.6 CC for IMS Conference Services + +The interface protocols and data structures defined in Annex B.11.2 have been enhanced to cater for the requirements of IMS Conferencing services. In particular, media types (bearers) that require multicasting at the MRFP, a party identifier is needed to identify the source of that bearer stream. The enhanced data structure also allows for the reporting of separate media streams for each user on the conference. + +## 12 3GPP IMS-based VoIP Services + +### 12.1 Identifiers + +#### 12.1.1 Overview + +Specific identifiers are necessary to identify a target for interception uniquely and to correlate between the communication information, which is conveyed over the different handover interfaces (HI2 and HI3). The identifiers are defined in the subsections below. The eP-CSCF and enhanced IMS-AGW (eIMS-AGW) shall adhere to all the LI requirements pertaining to a P-CSCF and IMS-AGW, respectively. Any additional LI requirements pertaining to the support of WebRTC Interworking as specified in TS 23.228 [40] that only apply to the eP-CSCF or eIMS-AGW are described distinctly. + +Based on the WebRTC Interworking as described in TS 23.228 [40], an individual Public User Identity is used as the target of interception in a WebRTC interworking system. Some additional considerations are included below. + +- 1) When a Public User Identity may be temporarily assigned to a WebRTC IMS Client (WIC) from a pool of Public User Identities, an underlying identity for the WIC used during authentication (called a web identity in TS 24.371 [86], e.g. NAI) will need to be correlated to the temporary Public User Identity assigned to the WIC. This is needed to ensure that target identified in the lawful authorization is associated with the Public User Identity assigned to the user. +- 2) When a lawful authorization is targeting an entire pool of Public User Identities, the target should still be each individual Public User Identity associated with the pool of Public User Identities. + +NOTE: As U.2.1.4 of TS 23.228 [40] indicates that WebRTC Web Server Function (WWSF) may be located in a third party network and have a business arrangement with the IMS operator, this third party network will have its own LI functions according to national regulation. This point and the definition of a target or parties in the annex B9 is FFS. Also, some national regulations may prohibit the WWSF or WebRTC Authorisation Function (WAF) from using the option of not authenticating the user, especially as unauthenticated users are anonymous to the third party but may still be authorized for IMS service. + +#### 12.1.2 Lawful Interception Identifier + +See clause 7.1.1. + +#### 12.1.3 Network Identifier + +See clause 7.1.2. + +#### 12.1.4 Correlation Number + +For a given target, the Correlation Number is unique per VoIP session and used for the following purposes: + +- Correlate CC with IRI, +- Correlate different IRI records and different CC data within one VoIP session. + +For IMS-based VoIP, the S-CSCF and optionally, the P-CSCF provide the IRI events. For IMS-based VoIP, the functional element that provides the CC interception depends on the call scenario and network configuration. + +As described in TS 33.107 [19], CC interception is done by one of the following functional elements (referred to as CC Intercept Function): + +- PDN-GW/GGSN +- IMS-AGW +- TrGW + +- IM-MGW +- MRF. + +And, the trigger to perform the CC interception at the above functional elements may be provided by the following functional elements (referred to as CC Interception Triggering Function): + +- P-CSCF for PDN-GW/GGSN +- P-CSCF for IMS-AGW +- IBCF for TrGW +- MGCF for IM-MGW +- S-CSCF or AS for MRF. + +For the delivery of CC, the CC Intercept Triggering Function provides the Correlation Number to the CC Intercept Function. This Correlation Number is delivered to the LEMF on the handover interface HI3 and is also delivered to the LEMF on the handover interface HI2. + +The IMS-VoIP-Correlation delivered to the LEMF on the HI2, contains the Correlation Number (s) used for the IRI messages as ims-iri (IRI-to-IRI-Correlation) and Correlation Number (s) used for the CC data as ims-cc (IRI-to-CC-Correlation). The LEMF shall interpret that the IRI messages and the CC data containing those Correlation Number values belong to the one single IMS VoIP session. + +## 12.2 Timing and quality + +Refer to clause 7.2 for the details. + +## 12.3 Security aspects + +Refer to clause 7.3 for the details. + +## 12.4 Quantitative aspects + +Refer to clause 7.4 for the details. + +## 12.5 IRI for IMS-based VoIP + +IRI for VoIP shall be based on the procedures defined in 7.5 IRI for IMS with the following change specific to IMS-based VoIP: + +- According to TS 33.107 [19], national option may require a CSP to report the LEMF about the situation where the CC delivery is required for an intercept order but the media does not enter the CSP's network, and hence, not available for interception. +- To support this case, a CC-Unavailable event is added to the IMS events with a parameter added to the list of IRI parameters that gives the reason for CC unavailability. The CC-Unavailable is reported only when the media interception is required according to the intercept order but the media is not available for interception. + +## 12.6 CC for IMS-based VoIP + +Annex B.12 provides the definitions of the data structures to be used for the delivery of CC for IMS-based VoIP (see Annex K for the detailed description). The Correlation Number received from the CC Intercept Triggering Function shall be used in the CC Data sent over the HI3. + +For PDN-GW based interception of CC for IMS-based VoIP, optionally, the data structures defined in B.10 can be used if the combined delivery option is not required. In the same way, for GGSN based interception of CC for IMS-based VoIP, optionally, the data structures defined in B.10 or B.4 can be used if the combined delivery option is not required. + +The Correlation Number received from the P-CSCF shall be used in the CC data sent over the handover interface (HI3). + +## 12.7 VoLTE Roaming + +### 12.7.1 General + +Two roaming architectures are defined for VoLTE: + +- S8HR. +- LBO. + +As described in TS 33.107 [19], with S8HR as the roaming architecture, the PDN-GW and the P-CSCF reside in the HPLMN and therefore, the UE IMS signalling and media are directly routed to the HPLMN. In the alternate roaming architecture (Local Breakout), the PDN-GW and P-CSCF reside in the VPLMN. + +In VoLTE roaming scenario, the lawful interceptions performed in the HPLMN and in the VPLMN are independent of each other. As such, the HPLMN is not aware of, if, any LI activities are performed in the VPLMN. Likewise, the VPLMN is not aware of, if, any LI activities are performed in the HPLMN. + +### 12.7.2 LI in HPLMN + +The interception of voice services in the HPLMN is done according to clause 15 of TS 33.107 [19] and the reporting of IRI messages over HI2 and CC over HI3 are done according to the sub-clause 12.5 (IRI) and the sub-clause 12.6 (CC) of this document. + +#### 12.7.2.1 With S8HR + +With S8HR, as described in TS 33.107 [19], the IRI messages are generated by the S-CSCF and, optionally, by the P-CSCF. + +As described in TS 33.107 [19], the CC is generated by the PDN-GW or by the IMS-AGW and, for redirecting scenarios, by the IM-MGW or by the TrGW. + +#### 12.7.2.2 With LBO + +With LBO, as described in TS 33.107 [19], the IRI messages are generated by the S-CSCF. + +As described in TS 33.107 [19], the CC is generated by the TrGW and, for redirecting scenarios, by the IM-MGW or by the TrGW. In some variations of LBO, the CC may not be available in the HPLMN in which case, HPLMN shall send the CC-Unavailable message to the LEMF as described in sub-clause 12.5. + +### 12.7.3 LI in VPLMN with S8HR + +See clause 20 and Annex J of TS 33.107 [19] for a detailed description of S8HR LI architectural aspects. A condensed view of the same is presented in figure 12.1 below. + +![Diagram of Lawful Interception in the VPLMN with S8HR as the roaming architecture. The diagram shows a VPLMN containing an Inbound Roaming Target, a Serving Gateway/BBIFF, an LMISF, Delivery Function 2, Delivery Function 3, and a LEMF. The Serving Gateway/BBIFF is connected to an HPLMN via the S8 interface, which is then connected to an Other Party. Inside the VPLMN, the Serving Gateway/BBIFF connects to the LMISF via Xia and Xib interfaces. The LMISF connects to Delivery Function 2 via the X2 interface and to Delivery Function 3 via the X3 interface. Both Delivery Function 2 and Delivery Function 3 connect to the LEMF via the HI3 interface.](86986d4dfd54f298d7b9fa9f82ab3009_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + subgraph VPLMN + IRT[Inbound Roaming Target] <--> SGW[ Serving Gateway/ BBIFF ] + SGW -- Xia --> LMISF[ LMISF ] + SGW -- Xib --> LMISF + LMISF -- X2 --> DF2[ Delivery Function 2 ] + LMISF -- X3 --> DF3[ Delivery Function 3 ] + DF2 -- HI3 --> LEMF[ LEMF ] + DF3 -- HI3 --> LEMF + end + SGW -- S8 --> HPLMN[ HPLMN ] + HPLMN --> OP[ Other Party ] + +``` + +Diagram of Lawful Interception in the VPLMN with S8HR as the roaming architecture. The diagram shows a VPLMN containing an Inbound Roaming Target, a Serving Gateway/BBIFF, an LMISF, Delivery Function 2, Delivery Function 3, and a LEMF. The Serving Gateway/BBIFF is connected to an HPLMN via the S8 interface, which is then connected to an Other Party. Inside the VPLMN, the Serving Gateway/BBIFF connects to the LMISF via Xia and Xib interfaces. The LMISF connects to Delivery Function 2 via the X2 interface and to Delivery Function 3 via the X3 interface. Both Delivery Function 2 and Delivery Function 3 connect to the LEMF via the HI3 interface. + +**Figure 12.1: Lawful Interception in the VPLMN with S8HR as the roaming architecture** + +The Serving Gateway/BBIFF extracts the data from the IMS signalling bearer of S8HR APNs and delivers the same to the LMISF. When the IMS signalling messages are related to a target communication, the LMISF generates the IMS events and sends the same to the Delivery Function 2 over the X2 reference point. + +In addition, the Serving Gateway/BBIFF provides the LMISF with Media Bearer information of S8HR APNs over Xib reference point. + +Based on the instruction received over the Xib reference point, the Serving Gateway/BBIFF extracts the the packets from associated media bearer and delivers the same to the LMISF. From those media packets, the LMISF delivers the CC along with the correlation information to the Delivery Function 3 over the X3 reference point. + +NOTE 1: The confidentiality protection is disabled for roaming targets with S8HR as the roaming architecture, and therefore, the SIP messages and the voice-media content are always visible in clear form (i.e. no encryption) at the Serving Gateway/BBIFF. + +NOTE 2: Like X2 and X3, the Xia and Xib reference points are not standardized in the present document. + +The reporting of IRI messages over HI2 and CC over HI3 are done according to the sub-clause 12.5 (IRI) and the sub-clause 12.6 (CC) with the following additions: + +- Include the VoIP roaming indication with the choice value of "roamingS8HR" indicating that the IMS events are generated in the VPLMN with S8HR as the roaming architecture. See annex B.9 for ASN.1 definition. +- Include the ICE-type with the value "lmISF" or "sGW" in the CC. See annex B.12 for ASN.1 definition. + +## 12.7.4 LI in VPLMN with LBO + +The interception of voice services in the VPLMN is done according to clause 15 of TS 33.107 [19] and the reporting of IRI messages over HI2 and the CC over HI3 are done according to the sub-clause 12.5 (IRI) and the sub-clause 12.6 (CC) with the following addition: + +- Include the VoIP roaming indication with the choice value of "roamingLBO" indicating that the IMS events are generated in the VPLMN with LBO as the roaming architecture. See annex B.9 for ASN.1 definition. + +As described in TS 33.107 [19], the IRI messages are generated by the P-CSCF and the CC is generated by the by PDN-GW or by the IMS-AGW. + +## 12.8 Roaming Constraints to IMS VoIP/VoLTE LI + +National regulations may limit delivery of communications (CC and communications-associated IRI) of an outbound international roaming target by the HPLMN as described in Clause 5.1.4 of [7]. + +If roaming interception is allowed, IMS VoIP (including VoLTE) interception and delivery to the LEMF by the HPLMN shall proceed normally as described elsewhere in this specification when the target is roaming outside the country as well as when the target is within the country. + +If roaming interception is not allowed and the HPLMN determines that the target is outside the country, the HPLMN shall act as described in Clause 15.5 of TS 33.107 [19]. For scenarios where the invocation of a supplementary service causes the status of the target to change from participating to not participating, the HPLMN starts intercepting and reporting events to the LEMF. The HPLMN shall utilize: + +- the Start of interception for already established IMS session REPORT Record as described in Clause 7.5 for non-conference calls; +- the Start of Intercept with Conference Active REPORT Record as described in Clause 11.5.1.2 for target provisioned or requested conference calls hosted by the HPLMN. + +--- + +## 13 Interception of Proximity Services (ProSe) + +### 13.1 General + +#### 13.1.1 Identifiers + +##### 13.1.1.1 Overview + +Specific identifiers are necessary to uniquely identify a target for interception, and to correlate between the data, which is conveyed over the handover interface (HI2). The identifiers are defined in the subsequent subclauses of 13.1.1. + +##### 13.1.1.2 Lawful interception identifier + +For each target identity related to an interception warrant, the authorized CSP shall assign a Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID). + +Using an indirect identification to point to a target identity makes it easier to keep the knowledge about a specific target limited within the authorized CSP and the LEA. + +The LIID is a component of the IRI records. It shall be used within any information exchanged at the handover interfaces HI2 for identification and correlation purposes. + +The LIID format shall consist of alphanumeric characters. It might for example, among other information, contain a lawful authorization reference number, and the date when the lawful authorization was issued. + +The authorized CSP shall either enter a LIID for each target identity of the target or a single LIID for multiple target identities all pertaining to the same target. + +If more than one LEA intercepts the same target identity, there shall be LIIDs assigned relating to each LEA. + +##### 13.1.1.3 Network identifier + +The network identifier (NID) is a mandatory parameter; it should be internationally unique. It consists of the following two identifiers. + +- 1) Operator- (NO/AN/SP) identifier (mandatory): +Unique identification of network operator, access network provider or service provider. + +2) Network element identifier NEID (optional): + +The purpose of the network element identifier is to uniquely identify the relevant network element carrying out the LI operations, such as LI activation, IRI record sending, etc. + +A network element identifier may be an IP address or other identifier. National regulations may mandate the sending of the NEID. + +## 13.1.2 Timing and quality + +### 13.1.2.1 Timing + +As a general principle, within a telecommunication system, IRI, if buffered, should be buffered for as short a time as possible. + +NOTE: If the transmission of IRI fails, it may be buffered or lost. + +Subject to national requirements, the following timing requirements shall be supported: + +- Each IRI data record shall be sent by the delivery function to the LEMF over the HI2 within seconds of the detection of the triggering event by the IAP at least 95% of the time. +- Each IRI data record shall contain a time-stamp, based on the intercepting node's clock that is generated following the detection of the IRI triggering event. + +### 13.1.2.2 Quality + +The QoS used from the CSP to the LEMF is determined by what operators (NO/AN/SP) and law enforcement agree upon. + +## 13.1.3 Security aspects + +Security is defined by national requirements. + +## 13.1.4 Quantitative aspects + +The number of target interceptions supported is a national requirement. + +The area of Quantitative Aspects addresses the ability to perform multiple, simultaneous interceptions within a CSP's network and at each of the relevant intercept access points within the network. Specifics related to this topic include: + +- The ability to access and monitor all simultaneous communications originated, received, or redirected by the target; +- The ability for multiple LEAs (up to five) to monitor, simultaneously, the same target while maintaining unobtrusiveness, including between agencies; +- The ability of the network to simultaneously support a number of separate (i.e. multiple targets) legally authorized interceptions within its service area(s), including different levels of authorization for each interception, including between agencies (i.e. IRI only, or IRI and communication content). + +## 13.2 ProSe Direct Discovery + +### 13.2.1 General + +For ProSe Direct Discovery, the LI solution in this subclause provides an IRI solution only as there is no CC. + +The IRI will in principle be available in the following phases of ProSe Direct Discovery: + +1. At Discovery Request; + +2. At Match Report. + +The IRI may be subdivided into the following categories: + +1. Control information for HI2 (e.g. correlation information); +2. Prose Direct Discovery information. + +The events defined in TS 33.107 [19] are used to generate records for the delivery via HI2. + +There are multiple different event types received at DF2 level. According to each event, a Record is sent to the LEMF if this is required. The following table gives the mapping between event type received at DF2 level and record type sent to the LEMF. + +**Table 13.2.1-1: Mapping between Direct Discovery Events and HI2 records type** + +| Event | IRI Record Type | +|-------------------------|-----------------| +| ProSe Discovery Request | REPORT | +| ProSe Match Report | REPORT | + +A set of information is used to generate the records. The records are used to transmit the information from the mediation function to LEMF. This set of information can be extended in the ICE or DF2 MF, if this is necessary in a specific country. The following table gives the mapping between information received per event and information sent in records. + +**Table 13.2.1-2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information** + +| parameter | Description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------| +| observed IMSI | Target Identifier with the IMSI of the target. | posedirectdiscovery(targetimsi) | +| event type | Description which type of event is delivered ProSe direct discovery: Discovery Request, Match Report | posedirectdiscovery(posedirectdiscoveryevent) | +| event date | Date of the event generation in the ProSe Function. | Timestamp | +| event time | Time of the event generation in the ProSe Function. | Timestamp | +| Network Identifier | Operator ID plus unique identifier for the ProSe Function | network-identifier | +| lawful interception identifier | Unique number for each lawful authorization | lawfullInterceptionIdentifier | +| Role of target | Whether the target is an announcing or monitoring UE | posedirectdiscovery(targetrole) | +| Discovery PLMN ID | PLMN where the discovery process takes place. | posedirectdiscovery(discoveryPLMN ID) | +| ProSe Application ID Name | Identity of a user within the context of a specific application | posedirectdiscovery(proseappidname) | +| Metadata | Metadata relating to a ProSe Application Identity | posedirectdiscovery(metadata) | +| Timer | The 'Validity Timer' or 'Time to Live' value assigned by the network to a specific ProSe Application Code or Discovery filter that controls how long the UE can announce/monitor for it | posedirectdiscovery(timer) | +| Identity of the other UE | In Match reports, there is a second UE involved | posedirectdiscovery(otherueimsi) | +| ProSe Application Code | Bitstring that is actually announced over the air, or included in a discovery filter applied by UE | posedirectdiscovery(proseappcode) | +| Prose App Mask | Bitmask that allows the monitoring UE to perform full or partial matching. Multiple Masks may be included in a Discovery Filter. The length of the mask is the same as the length of ProSe Application Code | posedirectdiscovery(proseappmask) | + +NOTE: LIID parameter needs to be present in each record sent to the LEMF. + +## 13.2.2 Events and information + +### 13.2.2.1 Overview + +This clause describes the information sent from the Delivery Function (DF) to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF) to support Lawful Interception (LI). The information is described as records and information carried by a record. This focus is on describing the information being transferred to the LEMF. + +The IRI events and data are encoded into records as defined in the Table 13.2.1-1: Mapping between Direct Discovery Events and HI2 records type and Annex B.13 Intercept related information for ProSe. IRI is described in terms of a 'causing event' and information associated with that event. Within each IRI record there is a set of events and associated information elements to support the particular service. + +The direct discovery events described in Table 13.2.1-1: Mapping between Direct Discovery Events and HI2 records type and Table 13.2.1-2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information convey the basic information for reporting direct discovery. This clause describes those events and supporting information. + +Each record described in this clause consists of a set of parameters. Each parameter is either: + +- mandatory (M) - required for the record, +- conditional (C) - required in situations where a condition is met (the condition is given in the Description), or +- optional (O) - provided at the discretion of the implementation. + +The information to be carried by each parameter is identified. Both optional and conditional parameters are considered to be OPTIONAL syntactically in ASN.1 Stage 3 descriptions. The Stage 2 inclusion takes precedence over Stage 3 syntax. + +### 13.2.2.2 REPORT record information + +The REPORT record is used to report non-communication related target actions (events). + +The REPORT record shall be triggered when: + +- The ProSe Function receives a Discovery Request from the UE. See Table 13.2.2.2-1. +- The ProSe Function receives a Match Report from the UE. See Table 13.2.2.2-2. + +**Table 13.2.2.2-1: ProSe Discovery Request REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | M | Shall be provided. | +| Event Type | M | Provide ProSe Discovery Request event type | +| Event Time | M | Provide the time the event is detected. | +| Event Date | M | Provide the date the event is detected. | +| Lawful Interception Identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Role of target | M | Shall be provided. | +| Network Identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Discovery PLMN ID | M | Shall be provided. More than one may be reported if target has monitoring role. | +| ProSe Application ID Name | M | Shall be provided. More than one may be reported if target has monitoring role. | +| Timer | M | Shall be provided. More than one may be reported if target has monitoring role. | +| ProSe Application Code | M | Shall be provided. More than one may be reported if target has monitoring role. | +| ProSe App Mask | C | Provided if available and applicable (only applicable if target has monitoring role). More than one may be reported if target has monitoring role. | +| Metadata | C | Provided if available and applicable (only applicable if target has announcing role) | + +**Table 13.2.2.2-2: ProSe Match Report REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | M | Shall be provided. | +| Event Type | M | Provide ProSe Match Report event type. | +| Event Time | M | Provide the time the event is detected. | +| Event Date | M | Provide the date the event is detected. | +| Lawful Interception Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| Role of target | M | Shall be provided. | +| Network Identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| Discovery PLMN ID | M | Shall be provided. | +| ProSe Application ID Name | M | Shall be provided. | +| Timer | M | Shall be provided. | +| ProSe Application Code | M | Shall be provided. | +| Metadata | C | Provided if available. | +| Identity of other UE | C | Provided if available. | + +## 13.3 ProSe Remote UE communications + +### 13.3.1 General + +The provisions in this clause specify the LI handover interface to report IRIs in case a ProSe Remote UE communicates through a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. + +TS 33.107 [19] specifies, see clause 17.3.3, in case the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay is a target, the conditions under which CC is required to be intercepted. + +CC interception, when required, shall be reported according to annex B.10. + +The IRIs will in principle be available in the following phases of ProSe Remote UE communications: + +1. When a target ProSe Remote UE connects to or disconnects from a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay; +2. When a ProSe Remote UE connects to or disconnects from a target ProSe UE-to-NW Relay; +3. When a target ProSe Remote UE starts communication by using a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay; +4. When a target ProSe Remote UE ends communication by using a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay; +5. When interception is started for a target ProSe Remote UE with ongoing communication; +6. When interception is started for a Prose UE-to-NW Relay with connected ProSe Remote UE(s). + +In addition, requirements specified in clause 10 are also applicable: + +1. When a Tracking Area/EPS Location Update occurs for a target ProSe UE-to-NW Relay; +2. When a target ProSe UE-to-NW Relay uses one or more PDN connections for any activity/communication which is not related to relaying; +3. To IRI and CC interception related to a target ProSe UE-to-NW Relay, when national regulations require to intercept all the CC handled by a target ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. + +The IRI may be subdivided into the following categories: + +1. Control information for HI2 (e.g. correlation information); +2. Prose Remote UE communications information. + +The events defined in TS 33.107 [19] are used to generate records for the delivery via HI2. + +There are multiple different event types received at DF2 level. According to each event, a Record is sent to the LEMF if this is required. The following table gives the mapping between event type received at DF2 level and record type sent to the LEMF. + +**Table 13.3.1-1: Mapping between ProSe Remote UE communications Events and HI2 records type** + +| Event | IRI Record Type | +|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| +| ProSe Remote UE Report | REPORT | +| ProSe Remote UE Start of Communication | BEGIN | +| ProSe Remote UE End of Communication | END | +| Start of interception with ProSe Remote UE ongoing communication | BEGIN or CONTINUE | +| Start of interception for ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | REPORT | + +A set of information is used to generate the records. The records are used to transmit the information from the mediation function to LEMF. This set of information can be extended in the ICE or DF2 MF, if this is necessary in a specific country. The following table gives the mapping between information received per event and information sent in records. + +The ASN.1 specified in Annex B.9 shall be used to provide HI2 to LEMF. + +**Table 13.3.1-2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information** + +| parameter | Description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | Target Identifier with the IMSI of the target. | partyInformation (party-identity) | +| Observed MSISDN | Target Identifier with the MSISDN of the target. | partyInformation (party-identity) | +| Observed IMEI | Target Identifier with the IMEI of the target. | partyInformation (party-identity) | +| Event type | Description which type of event is delivered: ProSe Remote UE Report, ProSe Remote UE start of communication, ProSe Remote UE end of communication, Start of interception with ProSe Remote UE ongoing communication, Start of interception for ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. | ePSevent | +| Event date | Date of the event generation in the ProSe Function. | timestamp | +| Event time | Time of the event generation in the ProSe Function. | timestamp | +| Network Identifier | | | +| Lawful interception identifier | Unique number for each lawful authorization. It shall be present in each record sent to the LEMF. | lawfulInterceptionIdentifier | +| Target type | Indicates whether the target is a ProSe Remote UE or a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | proSeTargetType | +| ProSe Remote UE IDs | The identities of the connected or disconnected ProSe remote UEs. | proSeRemoteUeContextConnected, proSeRemoteUeContextDisconnected | +| ProSe Remote UE IP info | The IP address(es) of the connected to the ProSe Remote UE(s) provided by the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. | proSeRemoteUeContextConnected | +| APN | The Access Point Name used by the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay for the connection | aPN | +| MSISDN of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay | MSISDN of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay (only applicable when the ProSe Remote UE is the target) | proSeRelayMSISDN | +| IMSI of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay | IMSI of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay (only applicable when the ProSe Remote UE is the target) | proSeRelayIMSI | +| IMEI of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay | IMEI of the Prose UE-to-NW Relay (only applicable when the ProSe Remote UE is the target) | proSeRelayIMEI | +| PDN address(es) | The ProSe UE-to-NW Relay IP address(es) for the PDN connection | pDNTYPE, pDNAddressAllocation | +| Correlation number | The correlation number is used to correlate CC and IRI (in case the target is a ProSe remote UE).. | ePSCorrelationNumber | +| Location information | When authorized, this field provides the location of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay.
National regulations may require to provide the E-CGI of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay when the target is the ProSe Remote UE | ePSlocationOfTheTarget | +| Additional Cell IDs | The Secondary Cell (PSCell) groups of the target, if available | additionalCellIDs | + +Note: The Additional Cell IDs parameter is used to report a primary cell of a secondary cell group. The Location Information parameter is used to report the primary cell of a primary cell group. Within the event message tables in this clause, for short hand, the Location Information parameter indicates that the primary cell id of the primary cell group and if available the primary cell id of the secondary cell group is reported meaning that both of the aforementioned parameters are reported assuming the conditions for including them have been met. + +## 13.3.2 Events and information + +### 13.3.2.1 Overview + +This clause specifies the information sent from the Delivery Function (DF) to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF) to support Lawful Interception (LI). The information is described as records and parameters carried by a record. The focus is on describing the information being transferred to the LEMF. + +The IRI events and data are encoded into records as specified in the Table 13.3.1-1: Mapping between ProSe Remote UE communication Events and HI2 records type and Annex B.9 Intercept related information (HI2 SAE/EPS and IMS). IRI is specified in terms of a 'causing event' and parameters associated with that event. Within each IRI record there is a set of events and associated information elements to support the particular service. + +The ProSe Remote UE communication events specified in Table 13.3.1-1: Mapping between Direct Discovery Events and HI2 records type and Table 13.3.1-2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information convey the basic information for reporting the ProSe Remote UE communication. This clause describes those events and supporting information. + +Each record described in this clause consists of a set of parameters. Each parameter is either: + +- mandatory (M) - required for the record, +- conditional (C) - required in situations where a condition is met (the condition is given in the Description), or +- optional (O) - provided at the discretion of the implementation. + +The information to be carried by each parameter is identified. Both optional and conditional parameters are considered to be OPTIONAL syntactically in ASN.1 Stage 3 descriptions. The Stage 2 inclusion takes precedence over Stage 3 syntax. + +### 13.3.2.2 REPORT record information + +The REPORT record is used to report non-communication related target actions (events). + +The REPORT record shall be triggered when: + +- The target ProSe Remote UE connects to or disconnects from a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. See Table 13.3.2.2-1. +- One or several UEs connect to or disconnect from a target ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. See Table 13.3.2.2-1. +- LI is activated on a target ProSe UE-to-NW Relay with already connected ProSe Remote UEs. See Table 13.3.2.2-2. +- A failure occurs when the target ProSe Remote UE attempts to start communication by connecting to a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. See Table 13.3.2.2-3. + +**Table 13.3.2.2-1: ProSe Remote UE Report REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| Observed MSISDN | | | +| Observed IMEI | | | +| Event Type | M | Provide ProSe Remote UE Report event type | +| Event Time | M | Provide the time the event is detected | +| Event Date | M | Provide the date the event is detected | +| Lawful Interception Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| Target type | M | Shall be provided | +| Network Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| ProSe Remote UE(s) connected IDs | C | Provided if the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay is the target | +| ProSe Remote UE(s) connected IP info | C | Provided if the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay is the target | +| ProSe Remote UE(s) disconnected IDs | C | Provided if the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay is the target | +| MSISDN of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | Provided if available and if the ProSe Remote UE is the target | +| IMSI of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | Provided if available and if the ProSe Remote UE is the target | +| IMEI of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | Provided if available and if the ProSe Remote UE is the target | +| APN | C | Provided if available | +| PDN Address(es) | C | Provided if available | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target UE, including the primary cell ID from each of the Master Cell (PCell) and Secondary Cell (PSCell) groups of the target, if available | + +**Table 13.3.2.2-2: Start of interception for ProSe UE-to-NW Relay** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|--------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| Observed MSISDN | | | +| Observed IMEI | | | +| Event Type | M | Provide Start of interception for ProSe UE-to-NW Relay event type | +| Event Time | M | Provide the time the event is detected | +| Event Date | M | Provide the date the event is detected | +| Lawful Interception Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| Target type | M | Shall be provided | +| Network Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| ProSe Remote UE(s) connected IDs | C | Provided if available | +| ProSe Remote UE(s) connected IP info | C | Provided if available | +| APN | C | Provided if available | +| PDN Address(es) | C | Provided if available | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target UE | + +When the ICE (i.e. S-GW, PDN-GW) is not aware of the activation of multiple lawfully authorized intercepts on a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay with already attached ProSe Remote UE, the MF/DF shall generate the Start of Intercept ProSe UE-to-NW Relay REPORT record on its own using information that it has retained. + +The DF2 shall not send the Start of Interception for ProSe UE to NW Relay REPORT record to the LEMFs that were already intercepting the ProSe UE to NW Relay (i.e. target) due previous LI activation on the same ProSe UE to NW Relay (i.e. target). + +**Table 13.3.2.2-3: ProSe Remote UE Start of Communication REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| Observed MSISDN | | | +| Observed IMEI | | | +| Event Type | M | Provide ProSe Remote UE Start of Communication event type | +| Event Time | M | Provide the time the event is detected | +| Event Date | M | Provide the date the event is detected | +| Lawful Interception Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| Target type | M | Shall be provided | +| Network Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| MSISDN of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| IMSI of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | | +| IMEI of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | | +| APN | C | Provided if available | +| PDN Address(es) | C | Provided if available | +| ProSe Cause | C | Provided if available | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target UE | + +### 13.3.2.3 BEGIN record information + +The BEGIN record is used to report the first event of a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay communication. + +The BEGIN record shall be triggered when: + +- The target ProSe Remote UE starts communication by connecting to a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. See Table 13.3.2.3-1. +- Interception is started on a target Remote UE which has an already established communication being connected to a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. This includes also the case where the ProSe UE-to-NW Relays undergoes a S-GW relocation with an already connected target ProSe Remote UE, if there is a change in the PLMN or when the information about the change in the PLMN is not available at the DF/MF. See Table 13.3.2.3-2. + +**Table 13.3.2.3-1: ProSe Remote UE Start of Communication BEGIN Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| Observed MSISDN | | | +| Observed IMEI | | | +| Event Type | M | Provide ProSe Remote UE Start of Communication event type | +| Event Time | M | Provide the time the event is detected | +| Event Date | M | Provide the date the event is detected | +| Lawful Interception Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| Target type | M | Shall be provided | +| Network Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided | +| MSISDN of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| IMSI of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | | +| IMEI of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | | +| APN | C | Provided if available | +| PDN Address(es) | C | Provided if available | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target UE | + +**Table 13.3.2.3-2: Start of interception with ProSe Remote UE ongoing communication BEGIN Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| Observed MSISDN | | | +| Observed IMEI | | | +| Event Type | M | Provide ProSe Remote UE Start of Communication event type | +| Event Time | M | Provide the time the event is detected | +| Event Date | M | Provide the date the event is detected | +| Lawful Interception Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| Target type | M | Shall be provided | +| Network Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided | +| MSISDN of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| IMSI of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | | +| IMEI of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | | +| APN | C | Provided if available | +| PDN Address(es) | C | Provided if available | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target UE | + +When the ICE (i.e. S-GW, PDN-GW) is not aware of the activation of multiple lawfully authorized intercepts on a ProSe Remote UE that has an already established communication being connected to a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay, the MF/DF shall generate the Start of Interception with ProSe Remote UE ongoing communication BEGIN record on its own using information that it has retained. + +The DF2 shall not send the Start of Interception with ProSe Remote UE ongoing communication BEGIN record to the LEMFs that were already intercepting the ProSe Remote UE (i.e. target) due previous LI activation on the same ProSe Remote UE (i.e. target). + +### 13.3.2.4 CONTINUE record information + +The CONTINUE record is used to report events during an ongoing ProSe UE-to-NW Relay communication. + +The CONTINUE record shall be triggered when: + +- Interception is started on a target Remote UE which has an already established communication being connected to a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay UE and the DF/MF is aware that there has been no change in the PLMN. See Table 13.3.2.3-3. + +**Table 13.3.2.4-1: ProSe Remote UE Start of Communication CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| Observed MSISDN | | | +| Observed IMEI | | | +| Event Type | M | Provide ProSe Remote UE Start of Communication event type | +| Event Time | M | Provide the time the event is detected | +| Event Date | M | Provide the date the event is detected | +| Lawful Interception Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| Target type | M | Shall be provided | +| Network Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided | +| MSISDN of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| IMSI of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | | +| IMEI of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target UE | + +### 13.3.2.5 END record information + +The END record is used to report the last event of a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay communication. + +The END record shall be triggered when: + +- The target ProSe Remote UE ends communication by disconnecting from a ProSe UE-to-NW Relay. See Table 13.3.2.5-1. + +**Table 13.3.2.5-1: ProSe Remote UE End of Communication END Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed IMSI | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| Observed MSISDN | | | +| Observed IMEI | | | +| Event Type | M | Provide ProSe Remote UE End of Communication event type | +| Event Time | M | Provide the time the event is detected | +| Event Date | M | Provide the date the event is detected | +| Lawful Interception Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| Target type | M | Shall be provided | +| Network Identifier | M | Shall be provided | +| Correlation number | M | Shall be provided | +| MSISDN of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | Provide at least one and others when available | +| IMSI of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | | +| IMEI of the ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | C | | +| Location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target UE | + +## 14 Invocation of Lawful Interception (LI) for Group Communications System Enablers (GCSE) + +### 14.1 Background + +#### 14.1.1 Interception at GCS AS versus other nodes + +There are several scenarios possible for the interception of group communications involving GCSE (see TS 22.468 [83] and TS 23.468 [84]). First is where the GCS AS is part of the intercepting operator's network. Second is where the GCS AS is outside of the intercepting operator's network. This clause specifies LI solutions for both cases. + +### 14.2 GCS AS in Intercepting Operator's Network + +#### 14.2.1 General + +In the case where the GCS AS is in the intercepting operator's network, the ICE solution is very similar to the conferencing solution specified in Clause 11, where the main difference is that a single functional entity (the GCS AS) is utilized for GCSE, rather than two functional entities. + +#### 14.2.2 Identifiers + +##### 14.2.2.1 Overview + +Specific identifiers are necessary to identify a target for interception uniquely and to correlate between the data, which is conveyed over the different handover interfaces (HI2 and HI3). The identifiers are defined in the subsections below. + +For the delivery of CC, the GCS AS provides correlation numbers and target identities to the HI3. The GCS AS reports the IRI associated with the GCSE group communication services. + +For the delivery of CC and IRI, the GCS AS provides correlation numbers and target identities to the HI2 and HI3. For a given target the correlation number is unique per group communications session in which the target is a member. + +NOTE: If two or more target identities are involved in the same group communications session the same Correlation Number may be assigned by the relevant network element to the communication sessions of the different target identities. + +##### 14.2.2.2 Lawful Interception Identifier + +For each target identity related to an interception measure, the authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) shall assign a special Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID), which has been agreed between the LEA and the operator (NO/AN/SP). + +Using an indirect identification, pointing to a target identity makes it easier to keep the knowledge about a specific target limited within the authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) and the handling agents at the LEA. + +The LIID is a component of the CC delivery procedure and of the IRI records. It shall be used within any information exchanged at the handover interfaces HI2 and HI3 for identification and correlation purposes. + +The LIID format shall consist of alphanumeric characters. It might for example, among other information, contain a lawful authorization reference number, and the date, when the lawful authorization was issued. + +The authorized operator (NO/AN/SP) shall either enter, based on an agreement with each LEA, a unique LIID for each target identity of the target or a single LIID for multiple target identities all pertaining to the same target. + +If more than one LEA intercepts the same target identity, there shall be unique LIIDs assigned relating to each LEA. + +### 14.2.2.3 Network Identifier + +The network identifier (NID) is a mandatory parameter; it should be internationally unique. It consists of the following two identifiers. + +- 1) Operator- (NO/AN/SP) identifier (mandatory): +Unique identification of network operator, access network provider or service provider. +- 2) Network element identifier NEID (optional): +The purpose of the network element identifier is to uniquely identify the relevant network element carrying out the LI operations, such as LI activation, IRI record sending, etc. + +A network element identifier may be an IP address or other identifier. National regulations may mandate the sending of the NEID. + +### 14.2.2.3 Correlation Number + +For a given target the Correlation Number is unique per group communications session and used for the following purposes: + +- correlate CC with IRI, +- correlate different IRI records within one group communications session. + +NOTE: The Correlation Number is at a minimum unique for each concurrent communication of a target within a lawful authorization. + +## 14.2.3 Timing and quality + +### 14.2.3.1 Timing + +As a general principle, within a telecommunication system, IRI, if buffered, should be buffered for as short a time as possible. + +NOTE: If the transmission of IRI fails, it may be buffered or lost. + +Subject to national requirements, the following timing requirements shall be supported: + +- Each IRI data record shall be sent by the delivery function to the LEMF over the HI2 within seconds of the detection of the triggering event by the IAP at least 95% of the time. +- Each IRI data record shall contain a time-stamp, based on the intercepting node's clock that is generated following the detection of the IRI triggering event. + +### 14.2.3.2 Quality + +The quality of service associated with the result of interception should be (at least) equal to the highest quality of service of the original content of communication for all participants. This may be derived from the QoS class used for the original intercepted session, TS 23.107 [20]. However, when TCP is used as an OSI layer 4 protocol across the HI3, real time delivery of the result of the interception cannot be guaranteed. The QoS used from the operator (NO/AN/SP) to the LEMF is determined by what operators (NO/AN/SP) and law enforcement agree upon. + +## 14.2.4 Security Aspects + +### 14.2.4.1 General + +Security is defined by national requirements. + +## 14.2.5 Quantitative Aspects + +### 14.2.5.1 General + +The number of target interceptions supported is a national requirement. + +The area of Quantitative Aspects addresses the ability to perform multiple, simultaneous interceptions within a provider's network and at each of the relevant intercept access points within the network. Specifics related to this topic include: + +- The ability to access and monitor all simultaneous communications originated, received, or redirected by the target; +- The ability for multiple LEAs (up to five) to monitor, simultaneously, the same target while maintaining unobtrusiveness, including between agencies; +- The ability of the network to simultaneously support a number of separate (i.e. multiple targets) legally authorized interceptions within its service area(s), including different levels of authorization for each interception (i.e. IRI only, or IRI and communication content), including between agencies. + +## 14.2.6 IRI for GCSE based Communications + +### 14.2.6.1 General + +The IRI will in principle be available in the following phases of a group communications service transmission: + +- 1) At a communications group creation, when a GCS AS communications group is created that includes the target or when the target is added to an existing communications group; +- 2) At the start of a group communications session to which the target is connected; +- 3) At the point when the target joins an active group communications session; +- 4) When the target leaves an active group communications session; +- 5) At the end of a group communications session, when the GCS AS terminates a group communications session; +- 6) At certain times when relevant information are available. + +The IRI may be subdivided into the following categories: + +1. Control information for HI2 (e.g. correlation information); +2. Basic data communication information, for standard data transmission between two parties. + +The events defined in TS 33.107 [19] are used to generate records for the delivery via HI2. + +There are multiple different event types received at DF2 level. According to each event, a Record is sent to the LEMF if this is required. The following table gives the mapping between event type received at DF2 level and record type sent to the LEMF. + +**Table 14.1: Mapping between GCS AS Service Events and HI2 records type** + +| Event | IRI Record Type | +|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| +| Activation of GCSE Communications Group (successful) | BEGIN | +| Start of Intercept with Active GCSE Communications Group | BEGIN | +| User Added | CONTINUE | +| User Dropped | CONTINUE | +| Modification of Target Connection to GCS AS | CONTINUE | +| Deactivation of GCSE Communications Group | END | + +A set of information is used to generate the records. The records used transmit the information from mediation function to LEMF. This set of information can be extended in the ICE or DF2 MF, if this is necessary in a specific country. The following table gives the mapping between information received per event and information sent in records. + +**Table 14.2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information** + +| Parameter | description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------| +| Added user id | Identifies the user added to an active GCSE Group Communications | addedUserID | +| Correlation Number | The correlation number is used to correlate CC and IRI. The correlation number is also used to allow the correlation of IRI records. | gcseCorrelation | +| Dropped user id | Identifies the user dropped from an active GCSE Group Communications | droppedUserID | +| Event Date | Date of the event generation in the GCS AS. | timestamp | +| Event Time | Time of the event generation in the GCS AS. Timestamp shall be based on the GCS AS internal clock. | | +| Event Type | Description which type of event is delivered: Activation of GCSE GC, User Added to Active GCSE GC, User Dropped from Active GCSE GC, Target Connection Modification, Start of Intercept on an Active GCSE GC, GCSE GC End | gcseEvent | +| GCSE group communications members | Identifies the members of a GCSE communications group who could potentially participate in an active GCSE communications group | gcseGroupMembers | +| GCSE group communications participants | Identifies the participants of an active GCSE communications group | gcseGroupParticipants | +| GCSE Group ID | Identity of the GCSE Communications Group | gcseGroupID | +| Group Communications Characteristics | Identifies the characteristics of the group communications (e.g. voice, video) | gcseGroupCharacteristics | +| Identity of Visited Network | Identifies the PLMN serving the UE. | visitedNetworkID | +| Lawful interception identifier | Unique number for each lawful authorization. | lawfulInterceptionIdentifier | +| Length of TMGI reservation | Identifies the duration of the TMGI reservation as allocated by the BM-SC to the GCS AS. | tMGIReservationDuration | +| Location information | When authorized, this field provides the location information of the target that is present at the GCS AS at the time of event record production. | gcseLocationOfTheTarget | +| Time of Location | Date/Time of location. The time when location was obtained by the location source node. | gcseLocationOfTheTarget | +| Modified Target Connection Method | Identifies the modified target's connection to the GCS AS to send and receive communications. | targetConnectionMethod | +| Network Identifier | Operator ID plus unique identifier for the GCS AS. | networkIdentifier | +| Observed Communications Group ID | Identity of the GCSE Communications Group | gcseGroupID | +| Observed IMEI | Target Identifier with the IMEI of the target. | partyInformation (GcsePartyIdentity) | +| Observed IMSI | Target Identifier with the IMSI of the target. | partyInformation (GcsePartyIdentity) | +| Observed Other Identity | Target identifier with the NAI of the target. | partyInformation (GcsePartyIdentity) | +| Reason for GCSE Group Comms End | Provides a reason for why the GCSE Group Communications Ended. | reasonForCommsEnd | +| Reserved TMGI | Identifies the TMGI assigned for downstream, multicast delivery of communications to the target. | reservedTMGI | +| Target Connection Method | Identifies the target's connection to the GCS AS to send and receive communications. | targetConnectionMethod | + +NOTE 1: LIID parameter has to be present in each record sent to the LEMF. + +## 14.2.6.2 Events and Event Information + +### 14.2.6.2.1 Overview + +This clause describes the information sent from the Delivery Function (DF) to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF) to support Lawful Interception (LI). The information is described as records and information carried by a record. This focus is on describing the information being transferred to the LEMF. + +The IRI events and data are encoded into records as defined in the Table 14.1 Mapping between GCS AS Service Events and HI2 records type and Annex B.14 Intercept related information (HI2). IRI is described in terms of a 'causing event' and information associated with that event. Within each IRI record there is a set of events and associated information elements to support the particular service. + +The communication events described in Table 14.1: Mapping between GCS AS Service Events and HI2 record type and Table 14.2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information convey the basic information for reporting the disposition of a communication. This clause describes those events and supporting information. + +Each record described in this clause consists of a set of parameters. Each parameter is either: + +- mandatory (M) - required for the record, +- conditional (C) - required in situations where a condition is met (the condition is given in the Description), or +- optional (O) - provided at the discretion of the implementation. + +The information to be carried by each parameter is identified. Both optional and conditional parameters are considered to be OPTIONAL syntactically in ASN.1 Stage 3 descriptions. The Stage 2 inclusion takes precedence over Stage 3 syntax. + +### 14.2.6.2.2 BEGIN record information + +The BEGIN record is used to convey the first event of GCSE group communications service interception. + +The BEGIN record shall be triggered when: + +- a GCSE communications group that includes the target is activated; +- the target of a interception is successfully added to an active GCSE communications group; +- interception is activated for a target who is already a member of an active GCSE communications group. + +**Table 14.3: Activation of GCSE Communications Group (Successful) BEGIN Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed ProSe UE ID | | | +| observed other identity | | | +| event type | M | Provide GCSE group communications event type (i.e., Activation of GCSE Communications Group). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| target connection method | C | Provide, when available, the target connection method to the GCS AS. | +| GCSE communications group membership list | M | Shall be provided. | +| Group communications characteristics | M | Shall be provided. | +| observed communications group id | M | Shall be provided. | +| GCSE group communications participants | C | Provide, if any members of the group are participating in the active group communications. | +| reserved TMGI | C | Provide, when known, the TMGI via which the target is receiving downstream communications. | +| length of TMGI reservation | C | Provide, when a TMGI is reserved/renewed and known to be the TMGI via which the target is receiving downstream communications, the validity time of the TMGI. | +| Identity of visited network | C | Provide, when available, the identity of the visited network through which the target connection is established. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of UE Location (if target location provided). | + +**Table 14.4: Start of Intercept with an Active GCSE Communications Group BEGIN Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed ProSe UE ID | | | +| observed other identity | | | +| event type | M | Provide GCSE group communications event type (i.e., Activation of GCSE Communications Group). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| target connection method | C | Provide, when available, the target connection method to the GCS AS. | +| GCSE communications group membership list | M | Shall be provided. | +| Group communications characteristics | M | Shall be provided. | +| observed communications group id | M | Shall be provided. | +| GCSE group communications participants | M | Shall be provided. | +| reserved TMGI | C | Provide, when known, the TMGI via which the target is receiving downstream communications. | +| length of TMGI reservation | C | Provide, when a TMGI is reserved/renewed and known to be the TMGI via which the target is receiving downstream communications, the validity time of the TMGI. | +| Identity of visited network | C | Provide, when available, the identity of the visited network through which the target connection is established. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of UE Location (if target location provided). | + +When the ICE (i.e. GCSE AS) is not aware of the activation of multiple lawfully authorized intercepts on a target that is already in a GCSE communication group, the MF/DF shall generate the Start of Intercept with Active GCSE Communication Group BEGIN record on its own using information that it has retained. + +The DF2 shall not send the Start of Intercept with Active GCSE Communication Group BEGIN record to the LEMFs that were already intercepting the target due previous LI activation on the same target. + +#### 14.2.6.2.3 CONTINUE record information + +The CONTINUE record is used to convey the events of during a GCSE group communications service interception. + +The CONTINUE record shall be triggered when: + +- a user is added as a participant to an active GCSE communications group; +- a user is dropped from an active GCSE communications group and is no longer a participant; +- a user is added to the membership list of the GCSE communications group; +- a user is removed from the membership list of the GCSE communications group; +- target connection to the GCSE communications group is modified. + +**Table 14.5: User Added to an Active GCSE Communications Group CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed ProSe UE ID | | | +| observed other identity | | | +| event type | M | Provide GCSE group communications event type (i.e., Activation of GCSE Communications Group). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| Added user id | M | Shall be provided. | +| GCSE communications group membership list | M | Shall be provided. | +| observed communications group id | M | Shall be provided. | +| GCSE group communications participants | M | Shall be provided. | +| reserved TMGI | C | Provide, when known, the TMGI via which the target is receiving downstream communications. | +| Identity of visited network | C | Provide, when available, the identity of the visited network through which the target connection is established. | + +**Table 14.6: User Dropped from an Active GCSE Communications Group CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed ProSe UE ID | | | +| observed other identity | | | +| event type | M | Provide GCSE group communications event type (i.e., Activation of GCSE Communications Group). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| Dropped user id | M | Shall be provided. | +| GCSE communications group membership list | M | Shall be provided. | +| observed communications group id | M | Shall be provided. | +| GCSE group communications participants | M | Shall be provided. | +| reserved TMGI | C | Provide, when known, the TMGI via which the target is receiving downstream communications. | +| Identity of visited network | C | Provide, when available, the identity of the visited network through which the target connection is established. | + +**Table 14.7: Modification of Target Connection to the GCS AS CONTINUE Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed ProSe UE ID | | | +| observed other identity | | | +| event type | M | Provide GCSE group communications event type (i.e., Activation of GCSE Communications Group). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| Modified target connection method | M | Shall be provided. | +| GCSE communications group membership list | M | Shall be provided. | +| Group communications characteristics | M | Shall be provided. | +| observed communications group id | M | Shall be provided. | +| GCSE group communications participants | M | Shall be provided. | +| reserved TMGI | C | Provide, when known, the TMGI via which the target is receiving downstream communications. | +| length of TMGI reservation | C | Provide, when a TMGI is reserved/renewed and known to be the TMGI via which the target is receiving downstream communications, the validity time of the TMGI. | +| Identity of visited network | C | Provide, when available, the identity of the visited network through which the target connection is established. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of UE Location (if target location provided). | + +#### 14.2.6.2.4 END record information + +The END record is used to convey the end of interception of a GCSE group communications service. + +The END record shall be triggered when: + +- the target of a interception is successfully dropped/removed from an active GCSE communications group; +- interception is deactivated for a target who is already a member of an active GCSE communications group. + +**Table 14.8: GCSE Communications Group END Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed ProSe UE ID | | | +| observed other identity | | | +| event type | M | Provide GCSE group communications event type (i.e., Activation of GCSE Communications Group). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI and correlation of IRI records. | +| target connection method | C | Provide, when available, the target connection method to the GCS AS. | +| GCSE communications group membership list | M | Shall be provided. | +| Group communications characteristics | M | Shall be provided. | +| observed communications group id | M | Shall be provided. | +| GCSE group communications participants | M | Shall be provided. | +| reserved TMGI | C | Provide, when known, the TMGI via which the target is receiving downstream communications. | +| length of TMGI reservation | C | Provide, when a TMGI is reserved/renewed and known to be the TMGI via which the target is receiving downstream communications, the validity time of the TMGI. | +| Identity of visited network | C | Provide, when available, the identity of the visited network through which the target connection is established. | +| Reason for GCSE Group Comms End | C | Provide, when available, the reason for the end of the GCSE Communications Group End (e.g. target dropped from GCSE Communications group). | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's UE. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of UE Location (if target location provided). | + +## 14.2.7 CC for GCSE based Communications + +### 14.2.7.1 General + +The interface protocols and data structures defined in Annex B.14.2 contain the ASN.1 for CC for GCSE. The data structure also allows for the reporting of separate media streams for each user in the group communications. + +## 14.3 GCS AS Outside Intercepting Operator Network + +### 14.3.1 General + +In the case where the GCS AS is outside the intercepting operator's network, packet data interception capabilities can be used to intercept and report a target's communication. Such interception is dependent on the network's ability to identify the target. In general, for a target accessing the network via LTE based unicast bearer as defined in TS 23.468 [84], the interception at a S-GW and PDN-GW as defined in Clause 10 shall apply. This covers all upstream communications from the target as well as any downstream communications received in unicast mode. For a target that is receiving downstream communications via the BM-SC in multicast mode, a solution is for further study. + +# 15 Interception of Messaging Services + +## 15.1 Overview + +The capabilities defined in this clause apply when the interception of messaging services shall be separated from the interception of all other services. This clause applies to the messaging services identified in Clause 5.13 of TS 33.106 [18]. + +For messaging services, separated delivery when SMS events are detected, the CSP shall be able to use existing intercept capabilities defined in this specification, but isolatable to only deliver messaging services when specified by a lawful authorisation. TS 33.107 [19] defines the SMS events to be reported. This clause will identify the set of event reports that are to be sent from the DF to the LEMF to achieve this separated delivery based on capabilities that already exist in the rest of this specification. + +The network nodes, involved in providing the interception of messaging services, shall be determined based on the deployment configuration and the messaging scenario. + +When lawfully authorized, Law Enforcement requires access to CC and IRI for the events pertaining to the target's authorization, access to, and use of message services, independent of the deployed service architecture. This includes where the communications between the target and associates are sent and received over separate channels, or may be accessed at different ICEs at different geographical locations in the service provider's network. + +## 15.2 SMS + +### 15.2.1 Introduction + +LI for SMS over a GPRS and UMTS access is specified in Clause 6. LI for SMS over IMS (using IMS SIP signalling handled by the core network) which can be used in conjunction with LTE access as well as other non-3GPP IP based access is defined in Clause 7. + +### 15.2.2 SMS over GPRS/UMTS + +For separate delivery of SMS when SMS is used in conjunction with GPRS or UMTS access, the following records shall be sent by DF2 to the LEMF: + +- 1) SMS MO and SMS MT Communication REPORT Records (Clause 6.5.1.1). +- 2) HLR Related REPORT Records: + - a. Serving System REPORT Record (6.5.1.1); + - b. Cancel location REPORT Record (6.5.1.1); + - c. Register location REPORT Record (6.5.1.1); + - d. Location information request REPORT Record (6.5.1.1). + +The above REPORT Records shall be reported from DF2 to the LEMF independent of any other services that may or may not be intercepted. + +### 15.2.3 SMS over IMS + +For separate delivery of SMS when SMS over IMS (using IMS SIP signalling handled by the core network) is used, the following REPORT Records shall be reported by DF2 to the LEMF: + +- 1) SMS over IP REPORT Record (see Table 15.2.3.1). +- 2) HSS related REPORT Records: + - a. Serving System (6.5.1.1) or Serving Evolved Packet System (10.5.1.1) for use when roaming + +- b. Registration termination or Cancel Location (6.1.1.1 or 10.5.1.1); +- c. Register location REPORT Record (6.5.1.1 or 10.5.1.1); +- d. Location information request REPORT Record (6.5.1.1. or 10.5.1.1). + +The above REPORT Records shall be able to be reported from DF2 to the LEMF independent of any other services that may or may not be intercepted. + +**Table 15.2.3.1: SMS over IMS REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed SIP-URI | C | SIP URI of the target (if available). | +| observed TEL-URI | C | TEL URI of the target (if available). | +| observed IMEI | C | IMEI of the target (if available). | +| event type | M | Provide SMS over IP event type. | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| PANI header information | C | Elements of P-Access-Network-Info header information in SIP messages; described in TS 24.229 [76] §7.2A.4. Provided if available and applicable. | +| SMS originating address | M | Shall be provided to identify the origination address for the SMS. | +| SMS destination address | M | Shall be provided to identify the destination address for the SMS. | +| SMS | C | Provided if the delivery of SMS Content is lawfully authorized | +| service centre address | M | Shall be provided. | +| SMS Initiator | M | Shall be provided to indicate whether the SMS is MO, MT, or Undefined. | +| location information | C | Provide, when authorized, to identify location information for the target's MS. | +| Time of Location | C | Date/Time of UE Location (if target location provided). | + +## 15.3 MMS + +### 15.3.1 Introduction + +LI for Separated Delivery of MMS (see Clause 18.3 of [19]), the events of Clause 18.3 need to be reported to the LEMF from DF2 and for CC from DF3, respectively. A Report record shall be utilized to report the IRI events while a CC shall be reported as described in this clause using a ULIC header. + +The CC PDU contains the content of an MMS. + +### 15.3.2 Identifiers + +#### 15.3.2.1 Overview + +Specific identifiers are necessary to identify a target for interception uniquely and to correlate IRI and CC, which is conveyed over the different handover interfaces (HI2 and HI3). The identifiers are defined in the clauses below. + +For the delivery of CC, the MMS Proxy-Relay provides correlation numbers and target identities to DF3. The MMS Proxy-Relay reports the IRI associated with the MMS services. + +For the delivery of CC and IRI, the MMS Proxy-Relay provides correlation numbers and target identities to the DF2 and DF3. For a given target the correlation number for a given MMS is unique across all MMS involving the target. + +### 15.3.2.2 Lawful Interception Identifier + +For each target identity related to an interception measure, the authorized operator (CSP) shall assign a Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID), which has been agreed between the LEA and the operator (CSP). This shall be a LIID specific to MMS interception, per national regulation. + +Using an indirect identification, pointing to a target identity makes it easier to keep the knowledge about a specific target limited within the authorized operator (CSP) and the handling agents at the LEA. + +The LIID is a component of the CC delivery procedure and of the IRI records. It shall be used within any information exchanged at the handover interfaces HI2 and HI3 for identification and correlation purposes. + +The LIID format shall consist of alphanumeric characters. It might for example, among other information, contain a lawful authorization reference number, and the date, when the lawful authorization was issued. + +The authorized operator (CSP) shall either enter, based on an agreement with each LEA, a unique LIID for each target identity of the target or a single LIID for multiple target identities all pertaining to the same target. + +If more than one LEA intercepts the same target identity, there shall be unique LIIDs assigned relating to each LEA. + +### 15.3.2.3 Correlation Number + +For a given target the Correlation Number is for a given MMS is unique across all MMS involving the target and used for the following purpose: + +- correlate CC with IRI. + +NOTE: The Correlation Number is at a minimum unique for each concurrent communication of a target within a lawful authorization. + +## 15.3.6 IRI for MMS + +### 15.3.6.1 General + +The events defined in TS 33.107 [19] are used to generate records for the delivery via HI2. + +There are multiple different event types received at DF2 level. According to each event, a Record is sent to the LEMF if this is required. The following table gives the mapping between event type received at DF2 level and record type sent to the LEMF. + +**Table 15.3.6.1.1: Mapping between MMS Events and HI2 records type** + +| Event | IRI Record Type | +|---------------------------------|-----------------| +| MMS Send | REPORT | +| MMS Notification & Confirmation | REPORT | +| MMS Retrieval Confirmation | REPORT | +| MMS Retrieval Acknowledgement | REPORT | +| MMS Forwarding | REPORT | +| MMS Store Request | REPORT | +| MMS Viewing Request | REPORT | +| MMS Viewing Response | REPORT | +| MMS Deletion Request | REPORT | +| MMS Cancel Request | REPORT | +| MMS Read Report | REPORT | + +The Serving System and Serving Evolved Packet System events are reported as per Clause 6.5.1.1 and 10.5.1.1, respectively, of the present document. + +A set of information is used to generate the records. The records used transmit the information from mediation function to LEMF. This set of information can be extended in the ICE or DF2 MF, if this is necessary in a specific country. The following table gives the mapping between information received per event and information sent in records. + +**Table 15.3.6.1.2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information** + +| Parameter | Description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | MSISDN: the coding may be based on the global-phone-number, defined in Multimedia Messaging Service Encapsulation Protocol OMA-TS-MMS_ENC-V1_3-20110913-A {90}. | partyInformation | +| Observed IMSI | IMSI of the target | partyInformation | +| Observed MMD Address | An address in a format as specified in [90]. This is where a SIP URI would be included. | partyInformation | +| Observed MMS Address for Non-Local ID | An address in a format as specified in [90]. National regulation requires Non-Local ID as target. In that case, It may be E164 number [29], or alphanumeric or numeric short code, or e-mail described in section 3.4 of IETF RFC 2822 [92], but excluding the obsolete definitions as indicated by the "obs-"prefix.(see clause 8 of Multimedia Messaging Service Encapsulation Protocol OMA-TS-MMS_ENC-V1_3-20110913-A {90}). | partyInformation | +| Observed shortcode | Alphanumeric or numeric short code as defined in Multimedia Messaging Service Encapsulation Protocol OMA-TS-MMS_ENC-V1_3-20110913-A {90}. | partyInformation | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | An IPv4 or IPv6 address of the target. | partyInformation | +| Event Type | Description which type of event is delivered: Send, Notification, Notification Response, Retrieval, Retrieval Acknowledgement, Forwarding, Store, Upload, Delete, Delivery, Read Reply From Target, Read Reply To Target, Cancel, View Request, View Confirm. | mMSEvent | +| Event Date | Date of the event generation in the MMS Proxy/Server. | timestamp | +| Event Time | Time of the event generation in the MMS Proxy/Server. Timestamp shall be based on the MMS Proxy/Server internal clock. | | +| Correlation Number | The correlation number is used to correlate CC and IRI. | mMSCorrelationNumber | +| Applic-ID | Identification of the originating application of the original MM. | applicID | +| Aux Applic Info | Auxiliary application addressing information as indicated in the original MM. | auxApplicInfo | +| BCC Recipients | Address of a recipient; the "BCC" field may include addresses of multiple recipients. When address translation occurs, both the pre and post translated addresses (with appropriate correlation) are included. | mMSParties/bCCAddresses | +| Cancel id | This field includes the Message ID identifying the message to be cancelled. | cancelID | +| Cancel Status | Provides the status of the cancel request. | cancelStatus | +| CC Recipients | Address of a recipient; the "CC" field may include addresses of multiple recipients. When address translation occurs, both the pre and post translated addresses (with appropriate correlation) are included. | mMSParties/CCAddresses | +| Content Class | Classifies the content of the MM to the smallest content class to which the message belongs. | contentClass | +| Content Location | This field defines the location of the content to be retrieved. | contentLocation | +| Content Type | The content type of the MM. | contentType | +| Delivery report | Specifies whether the originator MMS UE requests a delivery report from each recipient. | deliveryReport | +| Desired Delivery Time | Date and Time of desired delivery. Indicates the earliest possible delivery of the MM to the recipient. | desiredDeliveryTime | +| Distribution indicator | Identifies whether the originator (e.g. a Value Added Service Provider) allows the MM to be further distributed. A "No" value indicates to the user that the originator requested the content of the MM is not supposed to be distributed further. | distributionIndicator | +| DRM Content | Indicates if the MM contains any DRM-protected element. | dRMContent | +| Element descriptor | Contains the Content-Reference associated with the corresponding top level message content of the MM waiting for retrieval and MAY additionally contain the type/format of the message content. | elementDescriptor | + +| Parameter | Description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------| +| Expiry | Length of time the MM will be stored in MMS Proxy- Relay or time to delete the MM. The field has two formats, either absolute or relative. | expiry | +| From address | Address of the sender of the MM or read reply. The sender may be the originator or a forwarding user. When address translation occurs (in the case of a token sent by the client and replaced with a proper address by the MMS Proxy/Relay), both the pre and post translated addresses (with appropriate correlation) are included. | mMSParties/from | +| Lawful interception identifier | Unique number for each lawful authorization. | lawfulInterceptionIdentifier | +| Message Class | Class of the MM. For example, a value of "auto" is automatically generated by the UE. If the field is not present, the class should be interpreted as "personal". | messageClass | +| Message ID | An ID assigned by the MMS Proxy-Relay to uniquely identify an MMS message. | messageID | +| MM State | Identifies the value of the MM State associated with a to be stored or stored MM. | mMState | +| MM State Flags | Identifies a keyword to add or remove from the list of keywords associated with a stored MM. | mMStateFlags | +| MMS Attributes | A list of information elements that should appear in the view for each selected message. | mMSAttributes | +| MMS Date/Time | Date and Time when the MM was last handled (either originated or forwarded). For origination, included by the sending MMS client or the originating MMS Proxy-Relay. | mMSDateTime | +| MMS Limit | A number indicating the maximum number of selected MMs whose information are to be returned in the response. If this is absent, information elements from all remaining MMs are to be returned. If this is zero then no MM-related information are to be returned. | mMSLimit | +| MMS Message Count | Identifies the number of messages in the content part of the PDU. | mMSMessageCount | +| MMS Quotas | Indicates a request for or the actual quotas for the user's MMBox in messages or bytes. | mMSQuotas | +| MMS Start | A number, indicating the index of the first MM of those selected to have information returned in the response. | mMSStart | +| MMS Status | Provides a MMS status. A status of "retrieved" is only signalled by the retrieving UE after retrieval of the MM. | mMSStatus | +| MMS Status Text | Text that qualifies the MMS Status. | mMSStatusText | +| MMS Totals | Indicates a request for or the actual count of messages currently stored in the MMBox. | | +| MMS Version | The version of MMS used by the target. | | +| Network Identifier | Operator ID plus unique identifier for the MMS Server. | networkIdentifier | +| Previously sent by | Address of the MMS Client that forwarded or originally sent the message and a sequence number. A higher sequence number indicates a forwarding event at a later point in time. This header field MAY appear multiple times. | previouslySentBy | +| Previously sent by Date/Time | Date and time of a forwarding or original send transaction of the message and a sequence number. The sequence number indicates the correspondence to the MMS Client's address in the "X-Mms-Previously- Sent-By" header field with the same sequence number. This header field MAY appear multiple times. | reviouslySentByDateTime | +| Priority | Priority of the MM assigned by the originator MMS Client. | priority | +| Read report | Specifies whether the originator MMS UE requests a read report from each recipient. | readReport | +| Read Status | Text explanation corresponding to the Read Status. | readStatus | +| Replace ID | This field indicates the reference (i.e. Message-ID) of the previous MM that is replaced by the current MM. | replaceID | +| Reply Applic ID | Identification of an application to which replies, delivery reports, and read reports are addressed. | replyApplicID | +| Report Allowed | Indication whether or not the sending of delivery report is allowed by the recipient MMS Client. | reportAllowed | +| Response Status | MMS specific status. | responseStatus | +| Response Status Text | Text that qualifies the Response Status. | responseStatusText | + +| Parameter | Description | HI2 ASN.1 parameter | +|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------| +| Retrieval Mode | Indicates whether manual retrieval mode is recommended for the MM. | retrievalMode | +| Retrieval Mode Text | Explains why manual retrieval mode is recommended for the MM. | retrievalModeText | +| Retrieve Status | MMS specific status. | retrieveStatus | +| Retrieve Status Text | Text that qualifies the Retrieve Status. | retrieveStatusText | +| Sender visibility | An indication that the sender's address should not be delivered to the recipient. | senderVisibility | +| Store | Specifies whether the originator MMS UE wants the submitted MM to be saved in the user's MMBox, in addition to sending it. | store | +| Store Status | Indicates if the MM was successfully stored in the MMBox. | storeStatus | +| Store Status Text | Text that qualifies the Store Status. | storeStatusText | +| To Recipients | Address of a recipient; the "To" field may include addresses of multiple recipients. When address translation occurs, both the pre and post translated addresses (with appropriate correlation) are included. | mMSParties/toAddresses | +| Transaction ID | An ID used to correlate an MMS request and response between the target and the MMS Proxy-Relay. | transactionID | + +NOTE: LIID parameter has to be present in each record sent to the LEMF. + +## 15.3.6.2 Events and Event Information + +### 15.3.6.2.1 Overview + +This clause describes the information sent from the Delivery Function (DF) to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF) to support Lawful Interception (LI). The information is described as records and information carried by a record. This focus is on describing the information being transferred to the LEMF. + +The IRI events and data are encoded into records as defined in the Table 15.3.6.1.1 Mapping between MMS Events and HI2 records type and Annex B.15 Intercept related information (HI2). IRI is described in terms of a 'causing event' and information associated with that event. Within each IRI record there is a set of events and associated information elements to support the particular service. + +The communication events described in Table 15.3.6.1.1: Mapping between MMS Events and HI2 record type and Table 15.3.6.1.2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information convey the basic information for reporting the disposition of a communication. This clause describes those events and supporting information. + +Each record described in this clause consists of a set of parameters. Each parameter is either: + +- mandatory (M) required for the record, +- conditional (C) required in situations where a condition is met (the condition is given in the Description), or +- optional (O) provided at the discretion of the implementation. + +The information to be carried by each parameter is identified. Both optional and conditional parameters are considered to be OPTIONAL syntactically in ASN.1 Stage 3 descriptions. The Stage 2 inclusion takes precedence over Stage 3 syntax. + +### 15.3.6.2.2 REPORT record information + +The REPORT record is used to convey the events of MMS service interception. + +The REPORT record shall be triggered when: + +- the target sends a MMS; +- the target receives a notification of an incoming MMS; +- the target responds to the notification of an incoming MMS; +- an MMS is retrieved by the target; +- the target acknowledges to the retrieved MMS; +- the target forwards an MMS; +- the target stores an MMS in the Mmbox; +- the target uploads an MMS to the Mmbox; +- the target deletes a MMS stored in the Mmbox; +- the target receives a MMS Delivery report; +- the target sends a MMS Read Reply; +- the target receives a MMS Read Reply; +- the target receives a MMS cancel request; +- the target sends a MMbox view request; +- the target receives a confirmation of a sent MMbox View request. + +Table 15.3.6.2.2.1: MMS Send REPORT Record + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| Observed IMPU/IMPI | | | +| Observed E.164 number | | | +| observed MMS Address/MMbox ID | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| event type | M | Provide MMS event type (i.e., MMS Send). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided including the network element identifier. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | C | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI when CC is authorized. | +| To Recipients | M | Shall be provided and shall include untranslated and translated addresses. | +| CC Recipients | C | Provide if available to identify CC recipients. When included, shall provide untranslated and translated addresses. | +| BCC Recipients | C | Provide if available to identify BCC recipients. When included, shall provide untranslated and translated addresses. | +| From address | M | Shall be provided (includes both target provided address and if translation occurs, network substituted post-translation address). | +| MMS Version | M | Shall be provided. | +| Transaction ID | M | Shall be provided. | +| Message ID | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS Date/Time | M | Shall be provided. | +| Message Class | C | Provide if available to identify the message class. | +| Expiry | M | Shall be provided (either the signalled expiry or the default, whichever applies). | +| Desired Delivery Time | C | Provide when sent by the target to indicate the desired MMS delivery time. | +| Priority | C | Provide when sent by the target to indicate the desired MMS priority. | +| Sender visibility | C | Provide when sent by the target to indicate the target's visibility to the other party or if not signalled by the target and the default is to not make target visible to the other party. | +| Delivery report | C | Provide when sent by the target to indicate the desired delivery report. | +| Read report | C | Provide when sent by the target to indicate the desired read report. | +| Store | C | Provide when sent by the target to indicate the MMS is to be stored. | +| Applic ID | C | Provide when sent by the target to identify the destination application. | +| Reply Applic ID | C | Provide when sent by the target to identify the application to which replies, delivery reports, and read reports are addressed. | +| Content Class | C | Provide when sent by the target to identify the class of the content. | +| DRM Content | C | Provide when sent by the target to indicate if the MM contains any DRM-protected element. | +| Adaptation Allowed | C | Provide when sent by the target to identify whether the target wishes the MM to be adapted or not. If overridden, an indication shall be included in the parameter. | +| Content Type | M | Shall be provided. | +| Content Location | C | Provide if signalled to the target in response to the target sending an MMS. | +| Response Status | C | Provide if signalled to the target in response to the target sending an MMS. | +| Response Status Text | C | Provide if signalled to the target in response to the target sending an MMS. | +| Store Status | C | Provide if signalled to the target in response to the target sending an MMS. | +| Store Status Text | C | Provide if signalled to the target in response to the target sending an MMS. | + +**Table 15.3.6.2.2.2: MMS Notification REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMPU/IMPI | | | +| observed E.164 number | | | +| observed MMS Address/MMbox ID | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| event type | M | Provide MMS event type (i.e., MMS Notification). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided including the network element identifier. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | C | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI when delivery of CC is authorized. | +| To Recipients | M | Shall be provided and shall include untranslated and translated addresses. | +| CC Recipients | C | Provide if available to identify CC recipients. When included, shall provide untranslated and translated addresses. | +| BCC Recipients | C | Provide if available to identify BCC recipients. When included, shall provide untranslated and translated addresses. | +| From address | M | Shall be provided regardless of anonymity (includes both target provided address and if translation occurs, network substituted post-translation address). | +| MMS Version | M | Shall be provided. | +| Transaction ID | M | Shall be provided. | +| Message ID | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS Date/Time | M | Shall be provided. | +| Message Class | M | Shall be provided. | +| Expiry | M | Shall be provided | +| Distribution indicator | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Element descriptor | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Retrieval Mode | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Retrieval Mode Text | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Sender visibility | C | If the originator indicated a desire to withhold their address from the MM recipient, then this parameter shall be included. | +| Delivery report | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Read report | C | Provide when sent by the target to indicate the desired read report. | +| Applic ID | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Reply Applic ID | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Aux Applic Info | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Content Class | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| DRM Content | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Replace ID | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Content Location | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | + +**Table 15.3.6.2.2.3: MMS Notification Response REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMPU/IMPI | | | +| observed E.164 number | | | +| observed MMS Address/MMbox ID | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| event type | | | +| event date | M | Provide MMS event type (i.e., MMS Notification Response). | +| event time | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided including the network element identifier. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS Version | M | Shall be provided. | +| Transaction ID | M | Shall be provided. | +| Message ID | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS Status | M | Shall be provided. | +| Report Allowed | C | If sent by the target, shall be included. | + +**Table 15.3.6.2.2.4: MMS Retrieval REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMPU/IMPI | | | +| observed E.164 number | | | +| observed MMS Address/MMbox ID | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| event type | M | Provide MMS event type (i.e., MMS Retrieval). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided including the network element identifier. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | C | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI when delivery of CC is authorized. | +| To Recipients | M | Shall be provided and shall include untranslated and translated addresses. | +| CC Recipients | C | Provide if available to identify CC recipients. When included, shall provide untranslated and translated addresses. | +| BCC Recipients | C | Provide if available to identify BCC recipients. When included, shall provide untranslated and translated addresses. | +| From address | M | Shall be provided regardless of anonymity (includes both target provided address and if translation occurs, network substituted post-translation address). | +| MMS Version | M | Shall be provided. | +| Transaction ID | M | Shall be provided. | +| Message ID | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS Date/Time | M | Shall be provided. | +| Previously sent by | C | If available, shall be provided. | +| Previously sent by Date/Time | C | If available, shall be provided. | +| MM State | C | Provide if sent to the target. | +| Message Class | C | Provide if available to identify the message class. | +| Priority | M | Shall be provided (either the signalled priority or the default, whichever applies). | +| Delivery report | C | Provide when sent by the target to indicate the desired delivery report. | +| Read report | C | Provide when sent by the target to indicate the desired read report. | +| Sender visibility | C | If the originator indicated a desire to withhold their address from the MM recipient, then this parameter shall be included. | +| Retrieve Status | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Retrieve Status Text | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Distribution indicator | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Applic ID | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Reply Applic ID | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Aux Applic Info | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Content Class | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| DRM Content | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Replace ID | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Content Type | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | + +**Table 15.3.6.2.2.5: MMS Retrieval Acknowledgement REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMPU/IMPI | | | +| observed E.164 number | | | +| observed MMS Address/MMboxID | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| event type | | | +| event date | M | Provide MMS event type (i.e., MMS Retrieval Acknowledgement). | +| event time | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided including the network element identifier. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS Version | M | Shall be provided. | +| Transaction ID | M | Shall be provided. | +| Message ID | M | Shall be provided. | +| Report Allowed | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | + +**Table 15.3.6.2.2.6: MMS Forwarding REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMPU/IMPI | | | +| observed E.164 number | | | +| observed MMS Address/MMbox ID | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| event type | M | Provide MMS event type (i.e., MMS Forwarding). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided including the network element identifier. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | C | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI when delivery of CC is authorized. | +| To Recipients | M | Shall be provided and shall include untranslated and translated addresses. | +| CC Recipients | C | Provide if available to identify CC recipients. When included, shall provide untranslated and translated addresses. | +| BCC Recipients | C | Provide if available to identify BCC recipients. When included, shall provide untranslated and translated addresses. | +| From address | M | Shall be provided (includes both target provided address and if translation occurs, network substituted post-translation address). | +| MMS Version | M | Shall be provided. | +| Transaction ID | M | Shall be provided. | +| Message ID | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS Forward Req Date/Time | M | Shall be provided. | +| Message Class | C | Provide if available to identify the message class. | +| Expiry | M | Shall be provided (either the signalled expiry or the default, whichever applies). | +| Desired Delivery Time | C | Provide when sent by the target to indicate the desired MMS delivery time. | +| Priority | C | Provide when sent by the target to indicate the desired MMS priority. | +| Sender visibility | C | Provide when sent by the target to indicate the target's visibility to the other party or if not signalled by the target and the default is to not make target visible to the other party. | +| Delivery report allowed | M | Shall be provided to report the target requested reporting to the original sender or the default, whichever applies. | +| Delivery report | C | Provide when sent by the target to indicate the desired delivery report. | +| Read report | C | Provide when sent by the target to indicate the desired read report. | +| Store | C | Provide when sent by the target to have the forwarded MM stored. | +| MM State | C | Provide when sent by the target to set the state for the forwarded MM when it is stored. | +| Content Location | M | Shall be provided. | +| Response Status | M | Shall be provided. | +| Response Status Text | C | If provided to the target, shall be included. | +| Store Status | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| Store Status Text | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | + +Table 15.3.6.2.2.7: MMS Store REPORT Record + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMPU/IMPI | | | +| observed E.164 number | | | +| observed MMS Address/MMbox ID | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| event type | | | +| event date | M | Provide MMS event type (i.e., MMS Forwarding). | +| event time | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided including the network element identifier. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS Version | M | Shall be provided. | +| Transaction ID | M | Shall be provided. | +| MM State | C | If provided by the target, shall be included. | +| MM Flags | C | If provided by the target, shall be included. | +| Content Location | M | Shall be provided. | +| Store Status | M | Shall be provided. | +| Store Status Text | C | If sent to the target, shall be provided. | + +Table 15.3.6.2.2.8: MMS Upload REPORT Record + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMPU/IMPI | | | +| observed E.164 | | | +| observed MMS Address/MMbox ID | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| event type | | | +| event date | M | Provide MMS event type (i.e., MMS Upload). | +| event time | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided including the network element identifier. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS Version | M | Shall be provided. | +| Transaction ID | M | Shall be provided. | +| MM State | C | If sent by the target, shall be included. | +| MM Flags | C | If sent by the target, shall be included. | +| Content Type | M | Shall be provided. | +| Content Location | C | If available, shall be included. | +| Store Status | M | Shall be provided. | +| Store Status Text | C | If sent to the target, shall be included. | +| MMBox Description pdu | M | Shall be provided. The MMBox description PDU (as described in Table 15.3.6.2.2.16) corresponds to the particular MM being uploaded. | + +**Table 15.3.6.2.2.9: MMS Delete REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMPU/IMPI | | | +| observed E.164 number | | | +| observed MMS Address/MMbox ID | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| event type | | | +| event date | M | Provide MMS event type (i.e., MMS Delete). | +| event time | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided including the network element identifier. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS Version | M | Shall be provided. | +| Transaction ID | M | Shall be provided. | +| Content Location | M | Shall be provided. | +| Response Status | M | Shall be provided. | +| Response Status Text | C | If available, shall be provided. | + +**Table 15.3.6.2.2.10: MMS Delivery REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMPU/IMPI | | | +| observed E.164 | | | +| observed MMS Address/MMbox ID | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| event type | | | +| event date | M | Provide MMS event type (i.e., MMS Delivery). | +| event time | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided including the network element identifier. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| To Recipients | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS date/time | M | Shall be provided. | +| Message id | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS Status | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS Status Text | C | If available, shall be included. | +| Applic-ID | C | If available, shall be provided. | +| Reply-Applic-id | C | If available, shall be provided. | +| Aux-Applic-Info | C | If available, shall be provided. | + +**Table 15.3.6.2.2.11: MMS Read Reply From Target REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMPU/IMPI | | | +| observed E.164 number | | | +| observed MMS Address/MMbox ID | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| event type | | | +| event date | M | Provide MMS event type (i.e., MMS Read Reply From Target). | +| event time | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided including the network element identifier. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| To Recipients | M | Shall be provided. Identifies the recipient of the read report. | +| From address | M | Shall be provided and include target's MMS address. | +| Message id | M | Shall be provided. | +| Read Status | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS date time | M | Shall be provided. | +| Applic-ID | C | If available, shall be provided. | +| Reply-Applic-id | C | If available, shall be provided. | +| Aux-Applic-Info | C | If available, shall be provided. | + +**Table 15.3.6.2.2.12: MMS Read Reply To Target REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMPU/IMPI | | | +| observed E.164 number | | | +| observed MMS Address/MMbox ID | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| event type | | | +| event date | M | Provide MMS event type (i.e., MMS Read Reply To Target). | +| event time | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided including the network element identifier. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| To Recipients | M | Shall be provided and include the address of the read recipient (i.e., the target). | +| From address | M | Shall be provided and include the address of read reply source. | +| Message id | M | Shall be provided. | +| Read Status | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS date time | C | If available, shall be provided. | +| Applic-ID | C | If available, shall be provided. | +| Reply-Applic-id | C | If available, shall be provided. | +| Aux-Applic-Info | C | If available, shall be provided. | + +**Table 15.3.6.2.2.13: MMS Cancel REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMPU/IMPI | | | +| observed E.164 | | | +| observed MMS Address/MMbox ID | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| event type | | | +| event type | M | Provide MMS event type (i.e., MMS Cancel). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided including the network element identifier. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS Version | M | Shall be provided. | +| Cancel id | M | Shall be provided. | +| Cancel Status | C | If available, shall be provided. | + +**Table 15.3.6.2.2.14: MMS View Request REPORT Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMPU/IMPI | | | +| observed E.164 number | | | +| observed MMS Address/MMbox ID | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| event type | | | +| event type | M | Provide MMS event type (i.e., MMS View Request). | +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided including the network element identifier. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS Version | M | Shall be provided. | +| Transaction id | M | Shall be provided. | +| MM State | C | If provided by the target, shall be included. | +| MM Flags | C | If provided by the target, shall be included. | +| Content Location | C | If provided by the target, shall be included. | +| MMS Start | C | If provided by the target, shall be included. | +| MMS Limit | C | If provided by the target, shall be included. | +| MMS Attributes | C | If provided by the target, shall be included. | +| MMS Totals | C | If provided by the target, shall be included. | +| MMS Quotas | C | If provided by the target, shall be included. | + +Table 15.3.6.2.2.15: MMS View Confirm REPORT Record + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMEI | C | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed MSISDN | | | +| observed IMPU/IMPI | | | +| observed E.164 | | | +| observed MMS Address/MMbox ID | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| event type | | | +| event date | M | Provide MMS event type (i.e., MMS View Confirm). | +| event time | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided including the network element identifier. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMS Version | M | Shall be provided. | +| Transaction id | M | Shall be provided. | +| MM State | C | Provide if sent to the target. | +| MM Flags | C | Provide if sent to the target. | +| Content Location | C | Provide if sent to the target. | +| MMS Start | C | Provide if sent to the target. | +| MMS Limit | C | Provide if sent to the target. | +| MMS Attributes | C | Provide if sent to the target. | +| MMS Totals | C | Provide if sent to the target. | +| MMS Quotas | C | Provide if sent to the target. | +| Response Status | M | Shall be provided. | +| Response Status Text | C | Provide if sent to the target. | +| MMS Message Count | C | Provide if sent to the target. | +| Content type | M | Shall be provided. | +| MMBox Description pdu | M | Shall provide one or more MMBox description PDUs where each MMBox description PDU (as described in Table 15.3.6.2.2.16) corresponds to a particular MM. | + +**Table 15.3.6.2.2.16: MMS Description PDU** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| correlation number | C | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI when delivery of CC is authorized. | +| To Recipients | M | Shall be included. | +| CC Recipients | C | Provide if available. | +| BCC Recipients | C | Provide if available. | +| From address | M | Shall be provided regardless of anonymity | +| Message ID | C | Shall be provided unconditionally for the MMS View Confirm report record and shall be included for the MMS Upload report record if a Message ID was previously assigned to the MM. In this latter case, if a Message ID was not previously assigned, this parameter is excluded. | +| MMS Date Time | C | If available for the MM, shall be provided. | +| Previously Sent by | C | If available for the MM, shall be provided. | +| Previously Sent by Date Time | C | If available for the MM, shall be provided. | +| MM State | C | Shall be included for the MMS View Confirm report record and shall be included in the MMS Upload report record if provided by the target. | +| MM Flags | C | If at least one keyword is associated with the MM, then this parameter shall be included. This parameter may convey all the keywords associated with the MM. If no keywords are associated with the MM, then this parameter may be excluded. | +| Message Class | C | If available, shall be included. | +| Priority | C | If available, shall be provided. | +| Delivery Time | C | If available, shall be provided. | +| Expiry | C | If available, shall be provided. | +| Delivery report | C | If available, shall be provided. | +| Read report | C | If available, shall be provided. | +| Message size | C | If available, shall be provided. | +| Content Location | C | Shall only be used in conjunction with the MMS View Confirm report record | +| Content type | M | Shall be provided. | + +## 15.3.7 CC for MMS + +### 15.3.7.1 General + +The CC for an MMS shall be provided by the ICE to DF3 which will then handle delivery over HI3 to the LEMF. + +Correlation information shall be included in the CC to allow for correlation of the CC to the IRI to which it pertains. Table 15.3.7.1 shows the contents of the MMS CC PDU to be sent to the LEMF when CC is reported. + +**Table 15.3.7.1: MMS CC PDU** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|-----------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| event date | M | Provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| event time | | | +| network identifier | M | Shall be provided including the network element identifier. | +| lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| correlation number | M | Provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI | +| MMS Version | M | Shall be provided, if available. | +| Transaction id | M | Shall be provided, if available. | +| MMS Content | M | Shall be provided. | + +--- + +## 16 Cell Site Reporting + +### 16.1 Overview + +When a Cell Site Identity is provided in an IRI event, the CSP may provide the specific Cell Site Supplemental Information records from their Cell Site database. This information should be placed in the events location parameter if the IRI message is still available in the MF before its delivery or use a separate Cell Site Report (CSR) capability as described in TS 33.107 [19] Clause 22 Cell Site Supplemental Information Reporting. If the Cell Site Supplemental information for a Cell Site Identity has already been sent for an intercept and it has not changed, the CSP is not required to send the record again. + +## 16.2 LI\_CELL\_INFO Interface + +The LI\_CELL\_INFO interface, as identified in its configuration in [19] clause 4 figure 1m, is used by the MF to access a CSP cell site database(s) that have additional Cell Site Supplemental Information. The MF will query or the MF will be provided from/to the CSP database any supplemental information for a Cell Site Identity across this LI\_CELL\_INFO interface and shall place this information into the Location parameter of the IRI event, however, if this IRI event is not available in the MF, the MF shall have the ability to create a CSR to be delivered to the LEMF. + +## 16.3 Cell Site Reporting in IRI event + +If an IRI event Record from the network contains a Cell Site Identity (e.g. Cell Global Identifier), the MF should enrich the IRI Record with Cell Site Supplemental Information retrieved from the CSP's Cell Site Database prior to delivery of the IRI to the LEMF. The parameters as shown in Table 16.1 shall be included within the location parameter. However, if the MF cannot insert this information without undue delay into the IRI event Record, the MF should create and deliver a separate CSR as shown in 16.4 Table 16.2. + +**Table 16.1: Cell Site Supplemental information Parameters** + +| Parameter | Description | ASN.1 parameter | +|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| azimuth | If known, the median of the Cell antenna sector accessed in degrees. | locationOfTheTarget/Location/gsmLocation/GSMLocation/geoCoordinates/azimuth (for 2G/3G)
or
ePSLocationOfTheTarget/EPSLocation/gsmLocation/GSMLocation/geoCoordinates/azimuth (for 4G) | +| latitude
longitude | If known, the geoCoordinates of the cell site (latitude and longitude). | locationOfTheTarget/Location/gsmLocation/GSMLocation/geoCoordinates/latitude (for 2G/3G)
or
ePSLocationOfTheTarget/EPSLocation/gsmLocation/GSMLocation/geoCoordinates/latitude (for 4G)
and
locationOfTheTarget/Location/gsmLocation/GSMLocation/geoCoordinates/longitude (for 2G/3G)
or
ePSLocationOfTheTarget/EPSLocation/gsmLocation/GSMLocation/geoCoordinates/longitude (for 4G) | +| civicAddress | If known, the civic address of the cell site. | locationOfTheTarget/Location/civicAddress (for 2G/3G)
or
ePSLocationOfTheTarget/EPSLocation/civicAddress (for 4G) | +| operatorSpecificInfo | If provided, other Carrier-specific information whose format is not standardized inserted here. | locationOfTheTarget/Location/operatorSpecificInfo (for 2G/3G)
or
ePSLocationOfTheTarget/EPSLocation/operatorSpecificInfo (for 4G) | + +## 16.4 Cell Site Report + +A dedicated Cell Site Report Record shall be created when the MF could not enrich an IRI event message as described in clause 16.3. + +If the Cell Site Supplemental information for a Cell Identity has already been sent for an intercept and it has not changed, the CSP is not required to send the record again. + +- The type of this IRI report shall use the IRI-Report-record + +**Table 16.2: Cell Site Report Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Event Type | M | Shall indicate a CSR report. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall provide the date and time the event is detected. | +| Network-Identifier | M | Shall be provided. | +| LawfulInterceptionIdentifier | M | The Lawful Interception Identifier. | +| Location | C |

Shall provide the reported Cell Supplemental Information for the Cell Identity as define in Table 16.1 when reporting a 2G/3G location

The Location parameter shall also include the identity of the cell location (in globalCellID for instance).

Either Location or EPSLocation shall be used.

| +| EPSLocation | C |

Shall provide the reported Cell Supplemental Information for the Cell Identity as define in Table 16.1 when reporting a 4G location.

The EPSLocation parameter shall also include the identity of the cell location (in userLocationInfo for instance).

| + +## 17 Interception of PTC + +### 17.1 Capabilities when the PTC service is supported by a CSP + +#### 17.1.0 Introduction + +The capabilities defined in this clause apply when the Push to Talk over Cellular (PTC) service is supported by a CSP. The term PTC, when used in the present document, represents either a Push to talk Over Cellular (PoC) or Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) type service. PoC and MCPTT, which use similar architectures for service delivery, shall be intercepted and delivered separated from the interception of all other services for LI purposes. + +This clause applies to the PTC services identified in Clause 21 of TS 33.107 [19]. + +When PTC events are detected the CSP shall be able to use existing intercept capabilities defined in this specification but isolatable to only deliver PTC events when specified by a lawful authorization. TS 33.107 [19] defines the PTC events to be reported. This clause will identify the set of event Records that are to be sent from the DF to the LEMF based on capabilities that already exist in this specification. + +The network nodes, involved in providing the interception of PTC services, shall be determined based on the deployment configuration and the particular PTC type service scenarios. + +When lawfully authorized, Law Enforcement requires access to CC and IRI for the events pertaining to the target's authorization, access to, and use of PTC services, independent of the deployed service architecture. This includes where the communications between the target and associates are sent and received over separate channels, or may be accessed at different Intercept Control Elements (ICE) at different geographical locations in the service provider's network. + +#### 17.1.1 Lawful interception identifier + +For each target identity related to an interception measure, the authorized CSP shall assign a special Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID), which has been agreed between the LEA and the CSP. + +Using an indirect identification, pointing to a target identity makes it easier to keep the knowledge about a specific target limited within the authorized CSP and the handling agents at the LEA. + +The LIID is a component of the CC delivery procedure and of the IRI records. It shall be used within any information exchanged at the handover interfaces HI2 and HI3 for identification and correlation purposes. + +The LIID format shall consist of alphanumeric characters. It might for example, among other information, contain a lawful authorization reference number, and the date, when the lawful authorization was issued. + +The authorized CSP shall either enter a unique LIID for each target identity of the target or a single LIID for multiple target identities all pertaining to the same target. + +If more than one LEA intercepts the same target identity, there shall be unique LIIDs assigned relating to each LEA. + +## 17.1.2 Network identifier + +The network identifier (NID) is a mandatory parameter; it should be internationally unique. It consists of the following two identifiers. + +- 1) CSP identifier (mandatory): +Unique identification of the CSP. +- 2) Network Element Identifier NEID (mandatory): +The purpose of the network element identifier is to uniquely identify the relevant network element carrying out the LI operations, such as LI activation, IRI record sending, etc. + +A network element identifier may be an IP address or other identifier. + +## 17.1.3 PTC IRI Events + +Intercept Related Information (IRI) events are necessary at the PTC Mobile Station Attach, PTC Mobile Station Detach, PTC session Activation, Start of intercept with PTC context active, PTC Context Deactivation, PTC Serving System, and other PTC events that are defined in this clause. + +TS 33.107 [19] Figure 21.1.1 shows the transfer of intercept related information to the DF2. If an event for / from a PTC MS occurs, the Shared XDMS/PTC common core servers or the Home Subscriber Service (HSS) sends the relevant data to the DF2 for delivery to the LEA. + +The following report records shall be mapped to appropriate records that are sent by DF2 to the LEMF: + +- PTC IRI defined events as applicable to both PoC and MCPTT service as defined in [19] (21.3.3.1). +- In addition, this clause also specifies IRI reporting from the HSS handling subscriber data. Target identities to be used for interception of IRI at the HSS are specified in TS 33.107 [19]: + - Serving System; + - Cancel location; + - Register location; + - Location information request. +- The following events are applicable to the SIP Core: + - Service Registration + +The above REPORT Records and those in clause 17.2 shall be reported from DF2 to the LEMF independent of any other services that may or may not be intercepted. + +## 17.1.4 CC for PTC-based VoIP + +The CSP shall report Communication Content (CC) for all talk burst in a target's PTC session, when authorized. The CC ICE has to intercept all PTC session content (i.e., talk burst) between the PTC LI target and associate(s) and deliver + +the PTC session content to the LEMF. The CSP shall deliver CC for the duration of all of the different types of PTC sessions (e.g. Pre-arranged PTC group, PTC Chat group, One-to-One, and other type group calls) that are originated by or terminated at the PTC target's MS, facilities, or service when authorized. PTC communications are based on SIP/IP signalling within the CSP core and PTC client as per [97]. The PTC CC shall use the provisions in B.12 Contents of Communication (HI3 IMS-based VoIP) to provide PTC CC to the LEMF. + +Annex B.12 provides the definitions of the data structures to be used for the delivery of CC for IMS-based VoIP (see Annex K for the detailed description). The Correlation Number received from the CC Intercept Triggering Function shall be used in the CC Data sent over the HI3. + +### 17.1.5 IRI for PTC based Communications + +The IRI event information sent to the DF2/DF3 is triggered by different PTC session related and non-call related events/reports. A set of information is used to generate the IRI records. The records used transmit the information from mediation function to LEMF. The following table gives the mapping between information received per event or report and information sent in records. + +**Table 17.1.5: Mapping between Events information and IRI information** + +| Parameter | Definition | ASN.1 parameter | +|---------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------| +| Abandon Cause | Identifies the reason for the abandoned PTC Session. | abandonCause | +| Access Policy Failure | Reports the error code or reason for failure when Access Policy Request is unsuccessful. | accessPolicyFailure | +| Access Policy Type | Identifies the type of access policy list being managed or queried by the PTC Intercept target. | accessPolicyType | +| Alert indicator | Indicates an emergency alert condition was sent, received or cancelled. | alertIndicator | +| Associate Presence Status | Shall provide the Associate Presence Status, which is a list of:
  • - PresenceID: Identity of PTC Client(s) or PTC group, when known.
  • - PresenceType: Identifies type of ID [PTC Client(s) or PTC group].
  • - PresenceStatus: Presence state of each ID.
Report when the Presence functionality is supported by the PTC Server and the PTC Server assumes the role of the Watcher on behalf of PTC target. | associatePresenceStatus | +| Bearer Capability | Provide when known the media characteristics information Elements of the PTC session, e.g. SDP information, media format, vocoder type. | bearer-capability | +| Broadcast Indicator | Indicates that this was a broadcast destined for the group | broadcastIndicator | +| Contact Identity | Identity of the contact in the list, one contact per Contact List or Group List | contactID | +| Correlation | Uniquely identifies the PTC Session, and correlates related CII as well as related CII and CC. | correlation | +| Event Type | Description of which PTC type of event is delivered: Session Initiation, Session Abandon, Session Start, session end, Registration, Serving system, Start of Interception, Pre-Established Session, Instant Personal Alert, Party Join Party Drop, Party Hold, Party Retrieve, Media Modification, Group Advertisement, Floor Control, Target Presence, Associate Presence, List Management Events, Access Policy event, Media Type Notification, Encryption Parameters, Group Call Request, Group Call Cancel, Group Call Response, Group Call Interrogate, MCPTT Imminent Peril Group Call, Communication Content. | eventType | + +| Parameter | Definition | ASN.1 parameter | +|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| +| Failure Code | The reason or code for the failure or closing of the session. | failureCode | +| Floor Activity | The type of request granted e.g. TBCP request, TBCP deny, TBCP release etc. | floorActivity | + +| Parameter | Definition | ASN.1 parameter | +|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------| +| Floor Speaker Identity | Identification of the PTC Client that has been given the floor.] | floorSpeakerID | +| GroupAuthRule | Identifies the action requested by the PTC Target to the PTC Group Authorization Rules:
  • - Report when action requested to the PTC Group Authorization Rules by the target
  • - Report when the PTC Target attempts a change or queries the Access Control List(s).
| groupAuthRule | +| Group Ad Sender | Identifies the group administrator who was the originator of the group call. | groupAdSender | +| Group Characteristics | PTC group identifying feature or any identifying specific characteristics for the group e.g. MCPTT specific. | groupCharacteristics | +| Hold Retrieve Indication | Shall indicate the PTC Session is put on hold ((deactivate Media Bursts) a PTC Session is locked for talking/listening)) or released from hold. True indication equals placed on hold, false indication was retrieved from hold. | holdRetrieveInd | +| Imminent Peril Indicator | Indicates that the PTC call is an imminent peril notification and indicates what the imminent peril level is set to. | imminentPerilInd | +| Implicit Floor Request | Indicates the client who has request the floor. | implicitFloorReq | +| Initiation Cause | Shall identify the originator of the PTC Session Initiation. If an associate was the originator, the associate's id shall be included, if known. | initiationCause | +| IPA Party Identity | Identifies the PTC associate that receives or has sent the Instant Personal Alert to the target. | iPAPartyID | +| Lawful Interception Identifier | Unique number for each lawful authorization. | lawfulInterceptionIdentifier (LIID) | +| List Management Action - | Identifies the action requested by the target to the Contact Lists (i.e., individuals) or Group Lists. | listManagementAction | +| List Management Failure | Reports the error code or reason for failure. | listManagementFailure | +| List Management Type | Identifies the specific PTC Group lists accessed by the target or the Intercept target's PTC Client of changes made to their PTC-specific documents stored in the network:
ContactListManagementAttempt or GroupListManagementAttempt, and
ContactListManagementResult or GroupListManagementResult and
Whether the request was a success or failure. | listManagementType | + +| Parameter | Definition | ASN.1 parameter | +|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------| +| Location | Identifies the location of the target. Shall include when reporting of the PTC Intercept Target's location information is authorized. | location | +| MCPTT Group Identity | Identifies the Mission Critical Push To Talk group Identity | mCPTTGroupID | +| MCPTT ID | MCPTT Identity, if available. | mCPTTID | +| MCPTT indicator | Indicates direction of the emergency state, or condition, as either from the MCPTT target or from a MCPTT group to the target. | mCPTTInd | +| MCPTT Organization Name | Include the name of the organization that the MCPTT device belongs to, if known. | mCPTTOrganizationName | +| MediaStream Availability | Indicates if the PTC intercept target's PTC Client is not able/willing to receive media streams immediately. Provide when Pre-established session is established. | mediaStreamAvail | +| Network Identifier | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event | network-Identifier | +| Observed IMPU | Observed IMS Public User identity (IMPU) of the target. | partyInformation/partyIdentity | +| Observed IMPI | Observed IMS Private User identity (IMPI) of the target. | partyInformation/partyIdentity | +| Pre Established Session ID | Identifies PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | preEstSessionID | +| Pre Established Status | Indicates if the Pre Established Session is established (setup completed), modified, or released. | preEstStatus | + +| Parameter | Definition | ASN.1 parameter | +|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------| +| Priority Level | If more than one level of priority is supported, indicates the Talk Burst priority level of the PTC Client (OMA-PoC-AD [97]). | priority_Level | +| PTC CC Payload | Includes the intercepted TALK Burst communication encapsulated in the RTP packets with media specific RTP payload formats. The PTC Payload shall contain the media at the network layer (i.e., the RTP/UDP/IP datagrams for a PTC service). | pTCPayload | +| PTC Group ID | Identifies the PTC Group Identity, Nick Name, and characteristics. | pTCGroupID | +| PTC Host | Identifies the PTC participant who has the authority to initiate and administrate an PTC Session, provide if known. | pTCHost | +| PTC ID List | Identifies each participant from the PTC Target's contact list (i.e., individuals) and PTC Group list (i.e., list of pre-identified individuals using a group identification) for a group call. | pTCIDList | +| PTC Media Capability | Identify the type of codec(s) and Media Parameters selected by the PTC Server from those contained in the original SDP offer from the PTC Target's PTC Client. | pTCMediaCapability | +| PTC Originating Identity | Shall include to Identify the originating party, when known. | pTCOriginatingId | +| PTC Other | Other information that is required to decrypt the data. | pTCOther | +| PTC Participants | Shall Identify all known individual PTC participants. | pTCParticipants | + +| Parameter | Definition | ASN.1 parameter | +|---------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------| +| PTC Party | The identity of the PTC associate who Joined a session, Dropped from a session, placed on hold, retrieved from hold, to include the identity of an MCPPT type emergency/imminent group/peril PTC associate of the Target. | pTCParty | +| PTC Party Drop | Shall provide the identity of the associate that leaves the PTC Session | pTCPartyDrop | +| PTC Server URI | Shall include the identity of the PTC server serving the target or the server the target is a participant of, if known. | pTCServerURI | +| PTC Session Info | Shall provide PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | pTCSessionInfo | +| PTC User Access Policy | Identifies the action requested by the PTC Target to the PTC user or group access policy. | pTCUserAccessPolicy | +| Registration Request | Identifies the type of registration request (e.g. register, re register, de register). | registrationRequest | +| Registration Outcome | Identifies success or failure of registration and the failure reason. | registrationOutcome | +| Retrieve Identity | Identifies the PTC Subscriber that retrieved from hold an on-going PTC Session. | retrieveID | +| RTP Setting | The IP address and port number at the PTC Server for the RTP Session. | rTPSetting | +| Serving system identifier | VPLMN ID of the serving system or of the third party network interworking, included in the Diameter AVP message with the HSS. | serving-System-Identifier | +| SDP | Identifies the SDP media format and any extra information that is needed for a SDP Answer, SDP offer and SDP parameter negotiations. | sdpOffer
sdpAnswer | +| Target Presence Status | Shall identify any PTC related presence information of the PTC target, if changed. | targetPresenceStatus | + +NOTE: LIID parameter has to be present in each record sent to the LEMF. + +## 17.2 PTC Event Records + +### 17.2.0 Introduction + +PTC event records defined below are applicable for both types of service that may be provided by the CSP e.g. PoC or MCPTT. + +### 17.2.1 PTC Registration + +The PTC Registration Report Record shall be reported by the MF/DF to the LEMF when the target registers, re-registers, or deregisters for a PTC service, regardless of whether it is successful or unsuccessful. + +**Table 17.2.1: PTC Registration Report Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate registration event. | +| LIID | M | Unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| PTCServerURI | C | Shall include the identity of the PTC server serving the target or the server the target is a participant of, if known. | +| RegistrationRequest | M | Identifies the type of registration request (register, re-register, or de-register). | +| RegistrationOutcome | M | Identifies success or failure of registration and the failure reason. | + +### 17.2.2 PTC Start of Interception + +The PTC Start of Interception Begin Record shall be reported by the MF/DF to the LEMF for two separate conditions. The first reporting of a PTC Start of Interception Begin Record is for a PTC session that has been initiated but has not been established, either from/to the target. The second conditional reporting of a PTC Start of Interception Begin Record shall be reported when LI is first started and the PTC target has at least one PTC Session active in progress. If multiple PTC Sessions are active at the start of the interception, a PTC Start of Interception Record is generated for each active PTC Session and sent to the LEMF. The PTC Start of Interception Begin Record is not reported for an Instant Personal Alert type of PTC Session. + +**Table 17.2.2: PTC Start of Interception Begin Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | | Shall indicate a Start of Interception Begin Record event. | +| LIID | | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Network Identifier | | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| Correlation | | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| PreEstSessionID | C | For a PTC Pre-Established Session, shall provide PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | +| PTCOriginatingId | C | Shall include to Identify the originating party, when known. | +| PTCSessionInfo | C | When not associated with a Pre-Established session, shall provide PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | +| PTCHost | C | Shall identify the PTC participant who has the authority to initiate and administrate a PTC Session, if known. | +| PTCParticipants | M | Shall Identify all known individual PTC participants. | +| MediaStreamAvail | C | Shall include for a Pre-established session to indicate if the PTC intercept target's PTC Client is not able/willing to receive media streams immediately, when the Pre-established session is established. | +| Bearer-Capability | C | Shall provide when known the media characteristics information Elements of the PTC session, e.g. SDP information, media format, vocoder type. | + +### 17.2.3 PTC Serving System + +A PTC Serving System Report Record shall be reported by the MF/DF to the LEMF when there is a change to the CSP serving the PTC target access network (i.e. for mobility). + +**Table 17.2.3: PTC Serving System Report Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Serving System Report Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| serving-System-Identifier | M | Shall include the identity of the serving system currently serving the Target. | + +## 17.2.4 PTC Session Initiation + +A PTC Session Initiation Begin Record shall be reported by the MF/DF to the LEMF when the target initiates a session or the target receives an invitation to join a session regardless of the success or the final disposition of the invitation. + +**Table 17.2.4: PTC Session Initiation Begin Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Session Initiation Begin Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| PTCServerURI | C | Shall include the identity of the PTC server serving the target or the server the target is a participant of, if known. | +| PTCSessionInfo | M | Shall provide PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | +| PTCOriginatingID | C | Shall identify the originating party. Provided when known. | +| PTCParticipants | C | Shall identify the individual PTC participants, when known. | +| AssociatePresenceStatus | C | Shall provide the Associate Presence Status, which is a list of:
  • - PresenceID: Identity of PTC Client(s) or PTC group, when known.
  • - PresenceType: Identifies type of ID [PTC Client(s) or PTC group].
  • - PresenceStatus: Presence state of each ID.
Report when the Presence functionality is supported by the PTC Server and the PTC Server assumes the role of the Watcher on behalf of PTC target. | +| Location | C | Shall include when reporting of the PTC Intercept Target's location information is authorized | +| InitiationCause | M | Shall identify the originator of the PTC Session Initiation. If an associate was the originator, the associate's id shall be included, if known. | +| Bearer-Capability | C | Shall provide when known the media characteristics information Elements of the PTC session, e.g. SDP information, media format, vocoder type. | +| PTCHost | C | Shall identify the PTC participant who has the authority to initiate and administrate a PTC Session, if known. | + +## 17.2.5 PTC Session Abandon End Record + +The PTC Session Abandon End Record shall be reported by the MF/DF to the LEMF when the PTC Session is not established and the request is abandoned before the PTC Session established end to end connectivity. + +**Table 17.2.5: PTC Session Abandon End Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Session Abandon End Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| PTCSessionInfo | M | Shall provide PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | +| Location | C | Shall include when reporting of the PTC Intercept Target's location information is authorized | +| AbandonCause | M | Shall identify the reason for the abandoned PTC Session. | + +## 17.2.6 PTC Session Start Continue Record + +A PTC Session (e.g. One-to-One, One-to-Many, or One-to-Many-to-One) Start Continue Record shall be reported by the MF/DF to the LEMF when a PTC Session is established, and communication begins. + +**Table 17.2.6: PTC Session Start Continue Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Session Start Continue Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| PTCServerURI | C | Shall include the identity of the PTC server serving the target or the server the target is a participant of, if known. | +| PTCSessionInfo | M | Shall provide PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | +| PTCOriginatingID | C | Shall identify the originating party. Provide when known. | +| PTCParticipants | C | Shall identify the individual PTC participants, when known. | +| AssociatePresenceStatus | C | Shall provide the Associate Presence Status, which is a list of:
  • - PresenceID: Identity of PTC Client(s) or PTC group, when known.
  • - PresenceType: Identifies type of ID [PTC Client(s) or PTC group].
  • - PresenceStatus: Presence state of each ID.
Report when the Presence functionality is supported by the PTC Server and the PTC Server assumes the role of the Watcher on behalf of PTC target. | +| Location | C | Shall include when reporting of the PTC Intercept Target's location information is authorized | +| initiationCause | C | Shall identify the originator of the PTC Session Initiation. If an associate was the originator, the associate's id shall be included, if known. | +| PTCHost | C | Shall identify the PTC participant who has the authority to initiate and administrate a PTC Session, if known. | +| Bearer-Capability | C | Shall provide when known the media characteristics information Elements of the PTC session, e.g. SDP information, media format, vocoder type. | + +## 17.2.7 PTC Session End Record + +The PTC Session End Report Record shall be reported by the MF/DF to the LEMF when the PTC Session is released for any reason (i.e. normal or abnormal release) and voice communications ends. + +**Table 17.2.7: PTC Session End Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Session End Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| PTCServerURI | C | Shall include the identity of the PTC server serving the target or the server the target is a participant of, if known. | +| PTCSessionInfo | M | Shall provide PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | +| PreEstStatus | C | When a Pre-Established Session is used for a PTC session being released, shall indicate a Pre-Established Session remains established or released. | +| PTCOriginatingID | C | Shall identify the originating party. Provide when known. | +| PTCParticipants | C | Shall identify the individual PTC participants, when known. | +| Location | C | Shall include when reporting of the PTC Intercept Target's location information is authorized | +| AbandonCause | M | Shall identify the reason for the abandoned PTC Session. | + +## 17.2.8 PTC Instant Personal Alert + +The PTC Instant Personal Alert Report Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF when an Instant Personal Alert (IPA) (i.e. a request for one PTC subscriber to initiate a one-to-one PTC Session) is initiated or sent to the PTC target. + +**Table 17.2.8: PTC Instant Personal Alert Report Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate an Instant Personal Alert Report Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| PTCSessionInfo | M | Shall provide PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | +| IPAPartyID | M | Identifies the PTC associate that receives or has sent the Instant Personal Alert to the target. | +| IPADirection | M | Identifies the direction (TO PTC Target or FROM a PTC Target) of the Instant Personal Alert. | + +## 17.2.9 PTC Party Join + +The Party Join Continue Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF when a request to join (or re-joins) a PTC Group Session (i.e. Chat Group) that is already in progress is received from the PTC target. + +**Table 17.2.9: PTC Party Join Continue Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Party Join Continue Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| IPAPartyID | M | Identifies the PTC associate that receives or has sent the Instant Personal Alert to the target. | +| PTCSessionInfo | M | Shall provide PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | +| PTCParticipants | C | Shall Identify all known individual PTC participants, if known. | +| AssociatePresenceStatus | C | Shall provide the Associate Presence Status, which is a list of:
  • - PresenceID: Identity of PTC Client(s) or PTC group, when known.
  • - PresenceType: Identifies type of ID [PTC Client(s) or PTC group].
  • - PresenceStatus: Presence state of each ID.
Report when the Presence functionality is supported by the PTC Server and the PTC Server assumes the role of the Watcher on behalf of PTC target. | +| MediaStreamAvail | C | Shall include for a session to indicate if the PTC intercept target's PTC Client is not able/willing to receive media streams immediately, when the session is established. | +| Bearer-Capability | C | Shall provide when known the media characteristics information Elements of the PTC session, e.g. SDP information, media format, vocoder type. | + +## 17.2.10 PTC Party Drop + +The Party Join Continue Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF when an associate leaves the PTC Group Session in which the PTC target is also participating. + +**Table 17.2.10: PTC Party Drop Continue Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Party Drop Continue Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| PTCSessionInfo | M | Shall provide PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | +| PTCPartyDrop | M | Shall provide the identity of the associate that leaves the PTC Session. | +| AssociatePresenceStatus | C | Shall provide the Associate Presence Status, which is a list of:
  • - PresenceID: Identity of PTC Client(s) or PTC group, when known.
  • - PresenceType: Identifies type of ID [PTC Client(s) or PTC group].
  • PresenceStatus: Presence state of each ID.
Report when the Presence functionality is supported by the PTC Server and the PTC Server assumes the role of the Watcher on behalf of PTC target. | + +## 17.2.11 PTC Party Hold-Retrieve Record + +A PTC Party Hold Continue Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF when an on-going PTC Session with the target is placed on hold or retrieved from hold. + +**Table 17.2.11: PTC Party Hold Continue Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Party Hold Continue Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| PTCSessionInfo | M | Shall provide PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | +| PTCParticipants | C | Shall Identify all known individual PTC participants, if known. | +| PTCParty | M | The identity of the PTC associate that placed the PTC session on hold. | +| RetrieveID | M | Identifies the PTC associate that retrieved from hold an on-going PTC Session. | +| HoldRetrieveInd | M | Shall indicate the PTC Session is put on hold ((deactivate Media Bursts) a PTC Session is locked for talking/listening)) or released from hold. True indication equals placed on hold, false indication was retrieved from hold. | + +## 17.2.12 PTC Media Modification + +During the PTC Session, a PTC Client may modify the voice frame packetization or voice codec mode by Out-of-band signalling using SDP payload within SIP messages. The Media Modification Continue Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF when a re-negotiation of the media parameters occurs during a PTC Session involving the target MS. + +**Table 17.2.12: PTC Media Modification Continue Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Media Modification Continue Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| PTCSessionInfo | M | Shall provide PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | +| MediaStreamAvail | C | Shall include to indicate if the PTC target's PTC Client is not able/willing to receive media streams immediately. | +| Bearer-Capability | M | Shall provide when known the media characteristics information Elements of the PTC session, e.g. SDP information, media format, vocoder type. | + +## 17.2.13 PTC Group Advertisement + +The PTC Group Advertisement Report Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF is generated when a PTC Intercept Target sends Group Advertisement information to a single PTC user, a list of PTC users or to all members of the Group using the Group Identity. + +**Table 17.2.13: PTC Group Advertisement Report Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Group Advertisement Report Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| PTCIDList | C | Identifies each participant from the PTC Target's contact list (i.e., individuals) and PTC Group list (i.e., list of pre-identified individuals using a group identification) for a group call. | +| PTCGroupID | C | Identifies the PTC Group Identity, Nick Name, and characteristics. | +| GroupAuthRule | C | Identifies the action requested by the PTC Target to the PTC Group Authorization Rules:
  • - Report when action requested to the PTC Group Authorization Rules by the target.
  • - Report when the PTC Target attempts a change or queries the Access Control List(s).
| +| GroupAdSender | M | Identifies the group administrator who was the originator of the group call. | +| PTCHost | C | Identifies the PTC participant who has authority to initiate and administrate an active PTC Group Session. Provide when known. | +| GroupCharacteristics | C | PTC group identifying feature or any identifying specific characteristics for the group e.g. MCPTT specific. | + +## 17.2.14 PTC Floor Control + +Floor Control arbitrates requests from the PTC Clients for the right to send media (i.e. the right to speak). Note, the term "Floor Control" is used to mean the same as the term "Talk Burst Control". Talk Burst Control Protocol [TBCP] is a protocol for performing floor control and these aspects are defined in (OMA-PoC-AD [97]) and [OMA-PoC-UP [98]). When the PTC target is participating in a PTC Session, a Floor Control event Continue Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF when the target requests to speak (e.g. presses the PTC mechanism) or the target is given permission to speak in response to a request (e.g. the network responds positively to the PTC Subscriber's request) or is refused the request to speak and when the target is finished speaking (e.g. the PTC Intercept target releases the PTC mechanism). + +When the PTC target is participating in a PTC Session, a Floor Control Continue Record is triggered when: + +- The PTC target request to speak is received (e.g. when the PTC Intercept target presses the Push To Talk (PTT)). +- The PTC target is given permission to speak in response to a request (e.g. the network responds positively to the PTC Subscriber's request). + +- The PTC target who initiates a PTC session is given permission to speak automatically when the PTC session starts (i.e., if the service allows the initiating PTC participant the floor automatically and there is no request). +- The PTC target's request to speak is refused (e.g. the network responds negatively to the PTC Subscriber's request). +- The PTC target request to release the floor control is received (e.g. when the PTC target releases the PTT). +- The service revokes the PTC target's permission to speak (e.g. network response, possibly to time out or host's instructions). +- The floor becomes idle (i.e., no one has requested nor has permission to speak). +- An associate (i.e., another member of the PTC Session other than the PTC target) is given permission to speak and the PTC target's service is aware of the request. +- The PTC target cancels the request to speak. +- The PTC target's request to speak is queued. +- The PTC target's query to determine their position in the floor-control-request queue is received. +- The position of the PTC target's request in the queue is changed due to differing priority levels in the queue (OMA-PoC-AD [97]). +- The PTC target's request to speak is de-queued and permission to speak is granted (i.e., when the request for permission to speak was previously queued). +- When the PTC associate's request permission to speak is queued or de-queued (i.e., permission to speak is granted) and the PTC target's service is aware of the event. + +Table 17.2.14: PTC Floor Control Continue Record + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Floor Control Continue Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| PTCSessionInfo | M | Shall provide PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | +| FloorActivity | M | Choice of:
a) TBCP_Request: Used by the PTC Client to request permission from the PTC Server to send a Talk Burst.
b) TBCP_Granted: Used by the PTC Server to notify the PTC Client that it has been granted permission to send a Talk Burst.
c) TBCP_Deny: Used by the PTC Server to notify a PTC Client that it has been denied permission to send a Talk Burst.
d) TBCP_Idle: Used by the PTC Server to notify all PTC Clients that no one has the permission to send a Talk Burst at the moment and that it may accept the TBCP Talk Burst Request message.
e) TBCP_Taken: Used by the PTC Server to notify all PTC Clients, except the PTC Client that has been given permission to send a Talk Burst, that another PTC Client has been given permission to send a Talk Burst.
f) TBCP_Revoke: Used by the PTC Server to revoke the media resource from a PTC Client and can be used for pre-emption functionality but is also used by the system to prevent overly long use of the media resource.
g) TBCP_Queued: Indicates the request to talk is queued, if queued floor control is supported. Include identification of the PTC Client that has the queued Talk Burst, if known.
h) TBCP_Release: Indicates the request to talk has completed. | +| FloorSpeakerID | C | Include identification of the PTC Client that has the Talk Burst, if known. Do not include if TBCP Idle parameter is present. | +| MaxTBTime | C | Include the maximum duration value for the Talk Burst before the permission is revoked. Provide when known | +| QueuedFloorControl | C | Indicates if queuing is supported by the PTC Server and the PTC Intercept Subject's PTC Client. | +| QueuedPosition | C | If queued floor control is supported, indicates the queue position. | +| TalkBurstPriority | C | If more than one level of priority is supported, indicates the Talk Burst priority level of the PTC Client (OMA-PoC-AD [97]). | +| Talkburstreason | C | The reason code for the denial or revoke of a Talk Burst. Provide if known. | + +## 17.2.15 PTC Target Presence + +If the Presence functionality is supported by the PTC Server and the PTC Server assumes the role of a Presence Source, the PTC Target Presence Report Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF when the PTC Server publishes network presence information to the Presence server on behalf of PTC target. + +**Table 17.2.15: PTC Target Presence Report Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Target Presence Report Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| TargetPresenceStatus | C | Shall identify any PTC related presence information of the PTC target, if changed. | + +## 17.2.16 PTC Associate Presence + +The PTC Associate Presence Report Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF when the PTC Server receives presence status notifications from the Presence Servers after having subscribed to the PTC presence status of other PTC Clients (i.e. Associates of the PTC Intercept target). + +**Table 17.2.16: PTC Associate Presence Report Record** + +| Parameter | O/C/M | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Associate Presence Report Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| AssociatePresenceStatus | C | Shall provide the Associate Presence Status, which is a list of:
  • - PresenceID: Identity of PTC Client(s) or PTC group, when known.
  • - PresenceType: Identifies type of ID [PTC Client(s) or PTC group].
  • - PresenceStatus: Presence state of each ID.
Report when the Presence functionality is supported by the PTC Server and the PTC Server assumes the role of the Watcher on behalf of PTC target. | + +## 17.2.17 PTC List Management Events + +When the targets PTC Client attempts to change their own contact list or their own PTC Group list(s), the PTC List Management Events Report Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF. Also when the network notifies the Intercept target's PTC Client of changes made to their PTC-specific documents stored in the network (i.e. contact lists or PTC Group lists), the PTC List Management Events Report Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF. + +The PTC List Management Events Report Record is triggered when: + +- The PTC Target's PTC Client attempts to change his contact list (e.g. create, modify, retrieve, delete); +- The PTC Target's PTC Client attempts to change his PTC Group list (e.g. create, modify, retrieve, delete; or add or delete a contact from a PTC Group); +- The network notifies the PTC Target's PTC Client of changes made to his contact list, or his PTC Group list; or +- If the PTC Target is a member of a PTC Group and the network notifies the PTC Target's PTC Client of changes made to that PTC Group List. + +The PTC List Management Events Report Record is triggered if the event is *successful* or *unsuccessful*. + +**Table 17.2.17: PTC List Management Events Report Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a List Management Events Report Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | + +| | | | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TargetPresenceStatus | C | Shall identify any PTC related presence information of the PTC target, if changed. | +| ListManagementType
Choice of:
a) ContactListManagementAttempt
b) GroupListManagementAttempt
c) ContactListManagementResult
d) GroupListManagementResult
e) Request unsuccessful | C |

The "List Management Attempts" identify the type of list being managed by the PTC Target. For example, a) and b) are reported when PTC Target's Client attempt changes to his Contact List and his PTC Group List(s).

The "List Management Results" identify the network response to a modification by the PTC Target. For example, c), d), or e) is reported when the network notifies the PTC Target of changes to his Contact List or his PTC Group List(s).

| +| ListManagementAction
Choice of:
a) Create
b) Modify
c) Retrieve
d) Delete
e) Notify | C |

Identifies the action requested by the PTC Intercept Subject to the Contact Lists or PTC Group List(s). Report when PTC Intercept Subject attempts changes to his Contact List or PTC Group List(s).

Also report when a notification is sent to the PTC Intercept Subject due to changes occurring to his Contact List or PTC Group List(s).

| +| ListManagementFailure | C | Reports the error code or reason for failure. Report when List Management request is unsuccessful. | +| ContactID | C | Identity of the contact in the list. One contact per Contact List or PTC Group List. Report if known. | +| PTCGroupID | C | Identifies the PTC Group Identity, Nick Name, and characteristics. | +| PTCIDList | C | Identifies each participant from the PTC Target's contact list (i.e., individuals) and PTC Group list (i.e., list of pre-identified individuals using a group identification) for a group call. | +| PTCHost | C | Identifies the PTC participant who has authority to initiate and administrate an active PTC Group Session. Provide when known. | + +## 17.2.18 PTC Access Policy + +The PTC Access Policy Report Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF when the PTC Intercept target attempts to change the access control lists (e.g. PTC user access policy and PTC Group authorization rules) located in the PTC XML Document Management Server (XDMS) see ref (OMA-PoC-AD [97]). In addition the PTC Access Policy Report Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF when the network responds to a modification or query by the PTC Intercept target to the access control lists (e.g. PTC user access policy and PTC Group authorization rules). + +The PTC Access policy message is triggered when: + +- The PTC Target requests changes to the access control lists. +- The PTC Target is the PTC Group owner and modifies the PTC User permissions to access a PTC Group. +- The PTC Target attempts a change or queries the access control lists (e.g. PTC User access policy and PTC Group authorization rules) regardless if the change or query to the access control list was successful or unsuccessful. +- The PTC Target is the owner of a PTC Group (i.e., the creator of the Chat PTC Group or Pre-Arranged PTC Group) and attempts a change or queries to the PTC Group authorization rules regardless if the request was successful or unsuccessful. +- The network responds to a change to the PTC Group authorization rules by the PTC Target when the PTC Target is the owner of a PTC Group (i.e., the creator of the Chat PTC Group or Pre-Arranged PTC Group), or the network responds to a query by the PTC Target for his PTC user access policy and PTC group authorization rules. +- The network notifies the PTC Target of changes to his access control lists (e.g. PTC User access policy and PTC Group authorization rules) regardless if the change to the access control list was *successful* or *unsuccessful*. + +Table 17.2.18: PTC Access Policy event Record + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate an Access Policy event Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| TargetPresenceStatus | M | Shall identify any PTC related presence information of the PTC target, if changed. | +| AccessPolicyType
Choice of:
a) PTCUserAccessPolicyAttempt
b) GroupAuthorizationRulesAttempt
c) PTCUserAccessPolicyQuery
d) GroupAuthorizationRulesQuery
e) PTCUserAccessPolicyResult
f) GroupAuthorizationRulesResult
g) Request unsuccessful | C | Identifies the type of Access Policy list being managed or queried by the PTC Target:
  • - Report a), b), c), or d) when the PTC Target attempts a change or queries the Access Control list(s).
  • - Report e), f), or g) when the network notifies the PTC Target of changes to the Access Control list(s) or the request was unsuccessful.
| +| PTCUserAccessPolicy
Choice of:
a) Allow Incoming PTC Session request
b) Block Incoming PTC Session request
c) Allow Auto Answer Mode
d) Allow Override Manual Answer Mode | C | Identifies the action requested by the PTC Intercept Target to the PTC user or group access policy:
  • - Report when action requested to the PTC User Access Policy.
  • - Report when the PTC Intercept Subject attempts a change or queries the Access Control list(s).
| +| GroupAuthRule
Choice of:
a) Allow Initiating PTC Session
b) Block Initiating PTC Session
c) Allow Joining PTC Session
d) Block Joining PTC Session
e) Allow Add Participants
f) Block Add Participants
g) Allow Subscription PTC Session State
h) Block Subscription PTC Session State
i) Allow Anonymity
j) Forbid Anonymity | C | Identifies the action requested by the PTC Target to the PTC Group Authorization Rules:
  • - Report when action requested to the PTC Group Authorization Rules by the target.
  • - Report when the PTC Target attempts a change or queries the Access Control List(s).
| +| ContactID | C | Identity of the contact in any of the lists. One contact per Access Control list. Required for all contact requests. Report if known. | +| PTCGroupID | C | Identifies the PTC Group Identity, Nick Name, and characteristics. | +| AccessPolicyFailure | C | Reports the error code or reason for failure when Access Policy Request is unsuccessful. | + +## 17.2.19 PTC Media Type Notification + +The PTC Media Type Notification Continue Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF when media is detected at the ICE for media types other than PTC speech (e.g. video, images, text, and files) directed to/from the target's PTC client. Media Types are either real-time or non-real time, i.e., Audio (e.g. music), Video, Discrete Media (e.g. still image, formatted and non-formatted text, file), or Real Time Streaming Media (RTSP). Media parameters are SIP/SDP based information exchanged between the PTC server and the targets PTC client, between the PTC server and the PoC Box and between PTC servers that specify the characteristics of the Media for a PTC session being established or that already exists. + +**Table 17.2.19: PTC Media Type Notification Continue Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Media Type Notification Continue Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| MediaStreamAvail | C | Shall include for a Pre-established session to indicate if the PTC intercept target's PTC Client is not able/willing to receive media streams immediately, when the Pre-established session is established. | +| PTCSessionInfo | M | Shall provide PTC Session information such as PTC Session URI, PTC Session type, and Nickname. | + +## 17.2.20 PTC Pre-established Session Record + +The PTC Pre-Established Session Record shall be reported when a pre-established session is setup/modified/released between the client present within the target's UE and the PTC server associated with the PTC client. + +**Table 17.2.20: PTC Pre-Established Session Record** + +| Parameter | MOC | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed IMPI | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a PTC Pre-Established Session event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| PTCServerURI | M | The participating PTC Server URI associated with the PTC client originating the PTC Pre-Established Session request. | +| RTPSetting | M | The IP address and the port number of the target at the PTC Server for the RTP Session | +| PTCMediaCapability | M | The codec(s) and Media Parameters selected by the PTC Server from those contained in the original SDP offer from the targets PTC Client. | +| PreEstSessionID | M | Identifies the PTC Pre-established Session identity. | +| PreEstStatus | M | Indicates if the Pre-Established Session is established (setup completed), modified, or released. | +| MediaStreamAvail | C | Indicates if the target's PTC Client is not able/willing to receive media streams immediately. Provide when Pre-established session is established | +| Location | C | When authorized, reports when a PTC Pre-Established Session is first established or terminated by the intercept target. | +| FailureCode | C | Provide when the Pre-Established Session cannot be established or modified. | + +## 17.3 PTC Group Calls + +### 17.3.1 Introduction + +A PTC Group Session supports a One-to-One, One-to-Many, or One-to-Many-to-One with the following events; Session initiation request/response, Session modification, joining/leaving, termination, voice communication begins, ends, or forced disconnected. When detected at the ICE, these events can originate from the target's PTC Client to the PTC Server or from the PTC Server to the target's PTC Client or PTC server to PTC Server on the behalf of the target. + +### 17.3.2 Group Call Request + +The Group Call Request Begin Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF when the PTC server serving the target receives a request for a group session or sends to the target's PTC client for a PTC Group Call request to join, rejoin, or release of the group call. This can be a Group Call Request event received at the PTC Server serving the target from a separate PTC server (outside the SP architecture) to the target. + +**Table 17.3.2: Group Call Request Begin Record** + +| Parameter | O/C/M | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-------|---------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| observed SIP URI | | | +| observed TEL URI | | | +| observed IMPI | | | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Group Call Request Begin Record event. | + +| | | | +|-----------------------|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| PTCGroupID | M | Identifies the PTC Group Identity, Nick Name, and characteristics. | +| PTCParticipants | C | Shall Identify all known individual PTC participants, if known. | +| PTCIDList | M | Identifies each participant from the PTC Target's contact list (i.e., individuals) and PTC Group list (i.e., list of pre-identified individuals using a group identification) for a group call. | +| PTCHost | C | Identifies the PTC participant who has authority to initiate and administrate an active PTC Group Session. Provide when known. | +| GroupCharacteristics | C | PTC group identifying feature or any identifying specific characteristics for the group e.g. MCPTT specific. | +| BroadcastIndicator | C | Shall indicates that this was a broadcast destined for the group | +| Emergency | C | Shall indicate emergency type, if this is a peril or an imminent peril condition alert. | +| EmergencyGroupState | C | Shall indicate the emergency state or condition of an MCPTT emergency call, if an emergency is indicated. | +| AlertIndicator | C | Indicates an emergency alert condition was indicated. | +| MCPTTInd | C | Indicates direction of the emergency state, or condition, as either from the MCPPT target or from a MCPTT group to the target. | +| MCPTTOrganizationName | C | Include the name of the organization that the MCPTT device belongs to, if known. | +| Location | C | Shall include when reporting of the PTC Intercept Target's location information is authorized | + +### 17.3.3 Group Call Cancel + +When a Group Call Cancel is detected it can originate from the target's client or from the Group. In either case, a Group Call Cancel End Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF. This event is generated when received at the PTC server serving the target or sent to the targets PTC client for a PTC Group Call request to release of the group call. This Group Call Cancel can be received at the PTC Server serving the target from a separate PTC server (outside the SP architecture) to the target. + +**Table 17.3.3: Group Call Cancel End Record** + +| Parameter | O/C/M | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-------|----------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| observed SIP URI | | | +| observed TEL URI | | | +| observed IMPI | | | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Session Abandon End Record event. | + +| | | | +|-----------------------------|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| Lawful intercept identifier | M | Shall be delivered. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| PTCGroupID | M | Identifies the PTC Group Identity, Nick Name, and characteristics. | +| PTCParty | M | The identity of the associate that cancelled the session. | +| PTCIDList | C | Identifies each participant from the PTC Target's contact list (i.e., individuals) and PTC Group list (i.e., list of pre-identified individuals using a group identification) for a group call. | +| GroupCharacteristics | C | PTC group identifying feature or any identifying specific characteristics for the group e.g. MCPTT specific. | +| BroadcastIndicator | C | Shall indicate that this was a broadcast destined for the group | +| Emergency | C | Shall indicate emergency type, if this is a peril or an imminent peril condition alert cancel. | +| EmergencyGroupState | C | Shall indicate the emergency state for the group was cancelled. | +| AlertIndicator | C | Indicates an emergency alert signalling was cancelled. | +| MCPTTInd | C | Indicates direction of the received cancel as either from the MCPPT target or from a MCPTT group to the target. | +| MCPTTOrganizationName | C | Include the name of the organization that the MCPTT device belongs to, if known. | +| Location | C | Shall include when reporting of the PTC Intercept Target's location information is authorized | + +### 17.3.4 Group Call Response + +A Group Call Response Continue Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF upon sending a group call response to the target or receiving a group call response at the PTC Server from the target or on behalf of the target sends a group call response to a separate PTC server (outside the SP architecture). + +**Table 17.3.4: Group Call Response End Record** + +| Parameter | O/C/M | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| observed SIP URI | | | +| observed TEL URI | | | +| observed IMPI | | | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Group Call Response End Record event. | + +| | | | +|-----------------------|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | +| PTCGroupID | M | Identifies the PTC Group Identity, Nick Name, and characteristics. | +| PTCParty | C | The identity of the associate that requested the session, if requested by the associate. | +| PTCParticipants | M | Shall Identify all known individual PTC participants. | +| GroupCharacteristics | C | PTC group identifying feature or any identifying specific characteristics for the group e.g. MCPTT specific. | +| BroadcastIndicator | C | Shall indicates that this was a broadcast destined for the group | +| AlertIndicator | C | Indicates an emergency alert condition was indicated. | +| Emergency | C | Shall indicate emergency type, if this is a peril or an imminent peril condition alert. | +| EmergencyGroupState | C | Shall indicate the emergency state or condition of an MCPTT emergency call, if an emergency is indicated. | +| MCPTTInd | C | Indicates direction of the emergency state, or condition, as either from the MCPTT target or from a MCPTT group to the target. | +| MCPTTOrganizationName | C | Include the name of the organization that the MCPTT device belongs to, if known. | + +### 17.3.5 PTC Group Interrogate + +A PTC Group Interrogate Continue Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF when a group interrogate request or a response is received at the PTC Server serving the target. + +**Table 17.3.5: Group Interrogate Continue Record** + +| Parameter | O/C/M | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| observed SIP URI | | | +| observed TEL URI | | | +| observed IMPI | | | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Group Interrogate Continue Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | + +| | | | +|-----------------------|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| PTCGroupID | M | Identifies the PTC Group Identity, Nick Name, and characteristics. | +| PTCParty | C | The identity of the associate that generated the request to the target, if initiated by the associate. | +| PTCParticipants | M | Shall Identify all known individual PTC participants. | +| GroupCharacteristics | C | PTC group identifying feature or any identifying specific characteristics for the group e.g. MCPTT specific. | +| Emergency | C | Shall indicate emergency type, if this is a peril or an imminent peril condition alert. | +| EmergencyGroupState | C | Shall indicate the emergency state or condition of an MCPTT emergency call, if an emergency is indicated. | +| MCPTTInd | C | Indicates direction of the emergency state, or condition, as either from the MCPTT target or from a MCPTT group to the target. | +| MCPTTOrganizationName | C | Include the name of the organization that the MCPTT device belongs to, if known. | +| PTCIDList | C | Identifies each participant from the PTC Target's contact list (i.e., individuals) and PTC Group list (i.e., list of pre-identified individuals using a group identification) for a group call. | + +### 17.3.6 MCPTT Imminent Peril Group Call + +When the MCPTT Imminent Peril Group Call Request, Response or Cancel is detected at the MCPTT Server, a MCPTT Imminent Peril Group Call Report Record shall be sent from the MF/DF to the LEMF it can originate from the targets MCPTT client or to the targets MCPTT client from a MCPTT Group. + +**Table 17.3.6: Imminent Peril Group Call Report Record** + +| Parameter | O/C/M | Description/Conditions | +|----------------------------|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| observed MSISDN | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| observed IMSI | | | +| observed IMEI | | | +| observed SIP URI | | | +| observed TEL URI | | | +| observed IMPI | | | +| observed IMPU | | | +| observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| observed MCPPTID | | | +| EventType | M | Shall indicate a Imminent Peril Group Call Report Record event. | +| LIID | M | Shall include a unique number for each lawful authorization. | +| TimeStamp | M | Shall include the Time and date of the event generation. | +| Correlation | M | Shall provide to allow correlation of CC and IRI records as well as related IRI records. | +| Network Identifier | M | Unique identifier for the network element reporting the event. | + +| | | | +|----------------------|---|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| MCPTTGroupID | M | Identifies the Mission Critical Push To Talk group Identity | +| PTCParticipants | M | Shall Identify all known individual PTC participants. | +| GroupCharacteristics | C | PTC group identifying feature or any identifying specific characteristics for the group e.g. MCPTT specific. | +| ImminentPerilInd | M | Shall indicate that the PTC call is an imminent peril notification, the specific notification to/from the target (i.e., call request to target, response from the target, or cancel). | +| PTCParty | M | The identity of the MCPTT associate that initiated the session to the target. | +| MCPTTInd | M | Indicates direction of the emergency state, or condition, as either from the MCPPT target or from a MCPTT group to the target. | +| Location | C | Shall include when reporting of the PTC Intercept Target's location information is authorized | + +## 18 PTC Encryption + +When a CSP has PTC services with Security options the CSP shall provide the encryption method, specific parameters, and the Security to decrypt to LEA when a service uses encryption that is provided or managed by the CSP. + +**Table 18.1: Encryption Parameters** + +| | | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | M | Provide at least one and others when available. | +| Observed IMSI | | | +| Observed IMEI | | | +| Observed SIP URI | | | +| Observed TEL URI | | | +| Observed IPv4/IPv6 Address | | | +| Observed MCPPTID | | | +| PTCType | M | Shall indicate PTC Encryption event | +| LawfullInterceptionIdentifier | M | Unique number for each surveillance lawful authorization. | +| Event Date | M | Date of the event generation. | +| Event Time | | Time of the event generation. | +| CryptoContext | C | If further information is needed to associate the encryption information with a specific session or stream, this parameter shall identify the context to which this encryption message applies. | +| Cipher | M | Shall include the name of the cipher. | +| Key | M | Shall include the key needed to decipher. | +| Salt | C | Shall include the initial salt value, if the cipher requires a salt value. | +| KeyEncoding | C | Shall include the encoding of the key if the encoding is other than binary. | +| PTCOther | C | Shall be included if other information is required to decrypt the data. | +| NOTE 1: LIID parameter shall be present in each record sent to the LEMF | | | + +The PTCEncryptionInfo Encryption message can be sent when there is a need to pass the decryption information associated with intercepted content. If rekeying is deployed, one or more new Encryption messages are sent coincident with the change in keys. + +**Table 18.2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information** + +| Parameter | Definition | ASN.1 parameter | +|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------| +| Observed MSISDN | Target Identifier with the MSISDN of the target. | partyInformation (partyIdentity) | +| Observed IMSI | Target Identifier with the IMSI of the target. | partyInformation (partyIdentity) | +| Observed IMEI | Target Identifier with the IMEI of the target. | partyInformation (partyIdentity) | +| Observed SIP URI | Observed SIP URI. | partyInformation (partyIdentity) | +| Observed TEL URI | Observed TEL URI. | partyInformation (partyIdentity) | +| Observed MCPTT ID | Observed MCPTT Identity, if available. | mCPTTID | +| Event Type | Description of which type of event is delivered: PTC Encryption Parameters. | pTCEvent | +| Event TIME | Time and date of the event generation in the PTC Server or Client. | timeStamp | +| Crypto Context | If further information is needed to associate the encryption information with a specific session or stream, this parameter shall be included to identify the context to which this encryption message applies. | (PTCEncryptionInfo) cryptoContext | +| Cipher | The name of the cipher used | (PTCEncryptionInfo) cipher | +| Key | The key needed to decipher. | (PTCEncryptionInfo) key | +| KeyEncoding | Shall be included to provide the encoding of the key if the encoding is other than binary. | (PTCEncryptionInfo) keyEncoding | +| Salt | Include to provide the initial salt value if the cipher requires a salt value. | (PTCEncryptionInfo) salt | +| PTCOther | Other information that is required to decrypt the data. | (PTCEncryptionInfo) pTCOther | + +--- + +# Annex A (normative): HI2 delivery mechanisms and procedures + +## A.0 Introduction + +There are two possible methods for delivery of IRI to the LEMF standardized in this document: + +- a) FTP. +- b) ETSI TS 102 232-1 [104] and ETSI TS 102 232-7 [105]. + +The present document recommends that option b) is used. + +--- + +## A.1 Void + +## A.2 FTP + +### A.2.1 Introduction + +At HI2 interface FTP is used over internet protocol stack for the delivery of the IRI. The FTP is defined in IETF STD 9 [13]. The IP is defined in IETF STD0005 [15]. The TCP is defined in IETF STD0007 [16]. + +FTP supports reliable delivery of data. The data may be temporarily buffered in the mediation function (MF) in case of link failure. FTP is independent of the payload data it carries. + +### A.2.2 Usage of the FTP + +The MF acts as the FTP client and the LEMF acts as the FTP server . The client pushes the data to the server. + +The receiving node LEMF stores the received data as files. The MF may buffer files. + +Several records may be gathered into bigger packages prior to sending, to increase bandwidth efficiency. + +The following configurable intercept data collection (= transfer package closing / file change) threshold parameters should be supported: + +- frequency of transfer, based on send timeout, e.g. X ms; +- frequency of transfer, based on volume trigger, e.g. X octets. + +Every file shall contain only complete IRI records. The single IRI record shall not be divided into several files. + +There are two possible ways as to how the interception data may be sent from the MF to the LEMF. One way is to produce files that contain interception data only for one observed target (see: "File naming method A)"). The other way is to multiplex all the intercepted data that MF receives to the same sequence of general purpose interception files sent by the MF (see: "File naming method B"). + +#### **File naming:** + +The names for the files transferred to a LEA are formed according to one of the 2 available formats, depending on the delivery file strategy chosen (e.g. due to national convention or operator preference). + +Either each file contains data of only one observed target (as in method A) or several targets' data is put to files common to all observed target traffic through MF (as in method B). + +The maximum set of allowed characters in interception file names are "a"..."z", "A"..."Z", "-", " ", ".", and decimals "0"..."9". + +**File naming method A):** + +\_. + +**LIID =** See clause 7.1. +**seq =** integer ranging between [0..264-1], in ASCII form (not exceeding 20 ASCII digits), identifying the sequence number for file transfer from this node per a specific target. +**ext =** ASCII integer ranging between ["1".."8"] (in hex: 31H...38H), identifying the file type. The possible file types are shown in table A.1. Type "1" is reserved for IRI data files and type "8" is reserved for data files according to a national requirement by using the same file naming concept. + +**Table A.1: Possible file types** + +| File types that the LEA may get | Intercepted data types | +|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------| +| "1" (in binary: 0011 0001) | IRI / as option HI1 notifications | +| "2" (in binary: 0011 0010) | CC (MO) (see clause C.2.2) | +| "4" (in binary: 0011 0100) | CC (MT) (see clause C.2.2) | +| "6" (in binary: 0011 0110) | CC (MO&MT) (see clause C.2.2) | +| "7" (in binary: 0011 0111) | IRI + CC (MO&MT) (see clause C.2.2) | +| "8" (in binary: 0011 1000) | for national use | + +This alternative A is used when each target's IRI is gathered per observed target to dedicated delivery files. This method provides the result of interception in a very refined form to the LEAs, but requires somewhat more resources in the MF than alternative B. With this method, the data sorting and interpretation tasks of the LEMF are considerably easier to facilitate in near real time than in alternative B. + +**File naming method B):** + +The other choice is to use monolithic fixed format file names (with no trailing file type part in the file name): + + (e.g. ABXY00041014084400001) + +where: + +**ABXY =** Source node identifier part, used for all files by the mobile network operator "AB" from this MF node named "XY". + +**00 =** year 2000 + +**04 =** month April + +**10=** day 10 + +**14 =** hour + +**08 =** minutes + +**44 =** seconds + +**0000 =** extension + +**ext =** file type. The type "1" is reserved for IRI data files and type "8" is reserved for national use. (Codings "2" = CC(MO), "4" = CC(MT), "6" = CC(MO&MT) are reserved for HI3). + +This alternative B is used when several targets' intercepted data is gathered to common delivery files. This method does not provide the result of interception in as refined form to the LEAs as the alternative A, but it is faster in performance for the MF point of view. With this method, the MF does not need to keep many files open like in alternative A. + +## A.2.3 Profiles (informative) + +As there are several ways (usage profiles) how data transfer can be arranged by using the FTP, this chapter contains practical considerations how the communications can be set up. Guidance is given for client-server arrangements, + +session establishments, time outs, the handling of the files (in RAM or disk). Example batch file is described for the case that the sending FTP client uses files. If instead (logical) files are sent directly from the client's RAM memory, then the procedure can be in principle similar though no script file would then be needed. + +At the LEMF side, FTP server process is run, and at MF, FTP client. No FTP server (which could be accessed from outside the operator network) shall run in the MF. The FTP client can be implemented in many ways, and here the FTP usage is presented with an example only. The FTP client can be implemented by a batch file or a file sender program that uses FTP via an API. The login needs to occur only once per e.g. & -pair. Once the login is done, the files can then be transferred just by repeating 'mput' command and checking the transfer status (e.g. from the API routine return value). To prevent inactivity timer triggering, a dummy command (e.g. 'pwd') can be sent every T seconds (T should be less than L, the actual idle time limit). If the number of FTP connections is wanted to be as minimised as possible, the FTP file transfer method "B" is to be preferred to the method A (though the method A helps more the LEMF by pre-sorting the data sent). + +*Simple example of a batch file extract:* + +FTP commands usage scenario for transferring a list of files: + +To prevent FTP cmd line buffer overflow the best way is to use wild-carded file names, and let the FTP implementation do the file name expansion (instead of shell). The number of files for one mput is not limited this way: + +``` +ftp + user + cd + lcd + bin + mput + nlist + close +EOF +``` + +This set of commands opens an FTP connection to a LEA site, logs in with a given account (auto-login is disabled), transfers a list of files in binary mode, and checks the transfer status in a simplified way. + +Brief descriptions for the FTP commands used in the example: + +| | | +|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| user | Identify the client to the remote FTP server. | +| cd | Change the working directory on the remote machine to remote-directory. | +| lcd | Change the working directory on the local machine. | +| bin | Set the file transfer type to support binary image transfer. | +| mput | Expand wild cards in the list of local files given as arguments and do a put for each file in the resulting list. Store each local file on the remote machine. | +| nlist | Print a list of the files in a directory on the remote machine. Send the output to local-file. | +| close | Terminate the FTP session with the remote server, and return to the command interpreter. Any defined macros are erased. | + +The parameters are as follows: + +| | | +|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | contains the FTP command options, e.g. "-i -n -V -p" which equals to 'interactive prompting off', 'auto-login disabled', 'verbose mode disabled', and 'passive mode enabled'. (These are dependent on the used ftp- version.) | +| | contains the IP address or DNS address of the destination (LEA). | +| | contains the receiving (LEA) username. | +| | contains the receiving (LEA) user's password. | +| | contains the destination path. | +| | contains the source path. | + +-            wildcarded file specification (matching the files to be transferred). +-        the name of the last file to be transferred. +-      is a (local) file to be checked upon transfer completion; if it exists then the transfer is considered successful. + +The FTP application should do the following things if the checkfile is not found: + +- keep the failed files. +- raise 'file transfer failure' error condition (i.e. send alarm to the corresponding LEA). +- the data can be buffered for a time that the buffer size allows. If that would finally be exhausted, DF would start dropping the corresponding target's data until the transfer failure is fixed. +- the transmission of the failed files is retried until the transfer eventually succeeds. Then the DF would again start collecting the data. +- upon successful file transfer the sent files are deleted from the DF. + +The FTP server at LEMF shall not allow anonymous login of an FTP client. + +It is required that FTP implementation guarantees that LEMF will start processing data only after data transfer is complete. + +The following implementation example addresses a particular issue of FTP implementation. It is important however to highlight that there are multiple ways of addressing the problem in question, and therefore the given example does not in any way suggest being the default one. + +MF sends data with a filename, which indicates that the file is temporary. Once data transfer is complete, MF renames temporary file into ordinary one (as defined in C.2.2). + +The procedure for renaming filename should be as follow: + +- 1) open FTP channel (if not already open) from MF to LEMF; +- 2) sends data to LEMF using command "put" with temporary filename; +- 3) after MF finished to send the file, renaming it as ordinary one with command "ren". + +Brief descriptions for the FTP commands used in the example: + +ren    renaming filename from-name to to-name. + +If the ftp-client want to send file to LEMF using the command "mput" (e.g. MF stored many IRI files and want to send all together with one command), every filename transferred successfully has to be renamed each after command "mput" ended. + +## A.2.4 File content + +The file content is in method A relating to only one target. + +In the file transfer method B, the file content may relate to any targets whose intercept records are sent to the particular LEMF address. + +Individual IRI records shall not be fragmented into separate files at the FTP layer. + +## A.2.5 Exceptional procedures + +Overflow at the receiving end (LEMF) is avoided due to the nature of the protocol. + +In case the transit network or receiving end system (LEMF) is down for a reasonably short time period, the local buffering at the MF will be sufficient as a delivery reliability backup procedure. + +In case the transit network or receiving end system (LEMF) is down for a very long period, the local buffering at the MF may have to be terminated. Then the following intercepted data coming from the intercepting nodes to the MF would be discarded, until the transit network or LEMF is up and running again. + +## A.2.6 Other considerations + +The FTP protocol mode parameters used: + +Transmission Mode: stream + Format: non-print + Structure: file-structure + Type: binary + +The FTP client (=user -FTP process at the MF) uses e.g. the default standard FTP ports 20 (for data connection) and 21 (for control connection), 'passive' mode is supported. The data transfer process listens to the data port for a connection from a server-FTP process. + +For the file transfer from the MF to the LEMF(s) e.g. the following data transfer parameters are provided for the FTP client (at the MF): + +- transfer destination (IP) address, e.g. "194.89.205.4"; +- transfer destination username, e.g. "LEA1"; +- transfer destination directory path, e.g. "/usr/local/LEA1/1234-8291"; +- transfer destination password; +- interception file type, "1" (this is needed only if the file naming method A is used). + +LEMF may use various kind directory structures for the reception of interception files. It is strongly recommended that at the LEMF machine the structure and access and modification rights of the storage directories are adjusted to prevent unwanted directory operations by a FTP client. + +### Timing considerations for the HI2 FTP transmission + +The MF and LEMF sides control the timers to ensure reliable, near-real time data transfer. The transmission related timers are defined within the lower layers of the used protocol and are out of scope of this document. + +The following timers may be used within the LI application: + +**Table A.2: Timing considerations** + +| Name | Controlled by | Units | Description | +|-----------------------------|---------------|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| T1 inactivity timer | LEMF | Seconds | Triggered by no activity within the FTP session (no new files). The FTP session is torn down when the T1 expires. To send another file the new connection will be established. The timer avoids the FTP session overflow at the LEMF side. | +| T2 send file trigger | MF | Milliseconds | Forces the file to be transmitted to the LEMF (even if the size limit has not been reached yet in case of volume trigger active). If the timer is set to 0 the only trigger to send the file is the file size parameter (See C.2.2). | + +--- + +## A.3 ETSI TS 102 232-1 and ETSI TS 102 232-7 + +### A.3.1 General + +Functions having an HI2 interface may support the use of ETSI TS 102 232-1 [104] and ETSI TS 102 232-7 [105] to realise the interface. + +In the event of a conflict between either specification and the present document, the terms of the present document shall apply. + +### A.3.2 Usage for realising HI2 + +The IRI messages sent over HI2 are structured as a header and a payload. The header contains general information like LIID, timestamp, correlation information (as for example defined in ETSI TS 102 232-1 [104]). The payload contains intercept related information based on information that the MF has received from sources in the network. Messages defined as passing over the HI2 interface shall be passed as described in ETSI TS 102 232-7 [105] clauses 5 and 6. + +--- + +## Annex B (normative): Structure of data at the handover interface + +### B.0 Introduction + +This annex specifies the coding details at the handover interface HI for all data, which may be sent from the operator's (NO/AN/SP) equipment to the LEMF, across HI. + +At the HI2 and HI3 handover interface ports, the following data may be present: + +- interface port HI2: IRI; +- interface port HI3: records containing CC. + +The detailed coding specification for these types of information is contained in this annex, including sufficient details for a consistent implementation in the operator's (NO/AN/SP) equipment and the LEMF. + +--- + +### B.1 Syntax definitions + +The transferred information and messages are encoded to be binary compatible with [5] (Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)) and [6] (Basic Encoding Rules (BER)). + +These recommendations use precise definitions of the words *type*, *class*, *value*, and *parameter*. Those definitions are paraphrased below for clarity. + +A *type*, in the context of the abstract syntax or transfer syntax, is a set of all possible values. For example, an INTEGER is a type for all negative and positive integers. + +A *class*, in the context of the abstract syntax or transfer syntax, is a one of four possible domains for uniquely defining a type. The classes defined by ASN.1 and BER are: UNIVERSAL, APPLICATION, CONTEXT, and PRIVATE. + +The UNIVERSAL class is reserved for international standards such as [5] and [6]. Users of the protocol may extend the syntax with PRIVATE class parameters without conflict with the present document, but risk conflict with other users' extensions. APPLICATION class parameters are reserved for future extensions. + +A *value* is a particular instance of a type. For example, five (5) is a possible value of the type INTEGER. + +A *parameter* in the present document is a particular instance of the transfer syntax to transport a value consisting of a tag to identify the parameter type, a length to specify the number of octets in the value, and the value. + +In the BER a *tag* (a particular type and class identifier) may either be a primitive or a constructor. A *primitive* is a pre-defined type (of class UNIVERSAL) and a *constructor* consists of other types (primitives or other constructors). A constructor type may either be IMPLICIT or EXPLICIT. An IMPLICIT type is encoded with the constructor identifier alone. Both ends of a communication have to understand the underlying structure of the IMPLICIT types. EXPLICIT types are encoded with the identifiers of all the contained types. For example, an IMPLICIT Number of type INTEGER would be tagged only with the *Number* tag, where an EXPLICIT number of type INTEGER would have the *INTEGER* tag within the *Number* tag. The present document uses IMPLICIT tagging for more compact message encoding. + +For the coding of the value part of each parameter the general rule is to use a widely used standardized format when it exists (ISUP, DSS1, MAP, etc.). + +As a large part of the information exchanged between the user's may be transmitted within ISUP/DSS1 signalling, the using of the coding defined for this signalling guarantee the integrity of the information provided to the LEMF and the evolution of the interface. For example if new values are used within existing ISUP parameters, this new values shall be transmitted transparently toward the LEMF. + +For the ASN.1 parameters of the type 'OCTET STRING', the ordering of the individual halfoctets of each octet shall be such that the most significant nibble is put into bitposition 5 - 8 and the least significant nibble into bitposition 1 - 4. This general rule shall not apply when parameter formats are imported from other standards, e.g. an E.164 number coded according to ISUP, ITU-T Recommendation Q.763 [29]. In this case the ordering of the nibbles shall be according to that standard and not be changed. + +## B.2 3GPP object tree + +![3GPP object tree diagram showing the hierarchy of object identifiers starting from Itu-t (0) down to hi2CSvoice(18).](1eab323450a82831cf78035658284a51_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + Itu-t["Itu-t (0)"] --> identified-organization["identified-organization (4)"] + identified-organization --> etsi["etsi (0)"] + etsi --> securityDomain["securityDomain (2)"] + securityDomain --> lawfulIntercept["lawfullIntercept (2)"] + lawfulIntercept --> three3GPP["three3GPP (4)"] + three3GPP --> hi1_3["hi1(0) hi2(1) hi3(2) him(3)"] + three3GPP --> hi1_5["hi1(0) hi2(1) hi3(2) hi2CS(3) hi3CS(4) him(5)"] + three3GPP --> hi2_11["hi2wlan(6) hi2mbms(7) hi2eps(8) hi3eps(9) hi2conf(10) hi3conf(11)"] + three3GPP --> hi3_17["hi3voip(12) hi2gcse(13) hi3gcse(14) hi2prose(15) hi2mmms(16) hi3mmms(17)"] + three3GPP --> hi2CSvoice["hi2CSvoice(18)"] + +``` + +The diagram illustrates the 3GPP object tree hierarchy. It begins with 'Itu-t (0)' at the top, which branches into 'identified-organization (4)'. This further branches into 'etsi (0)', which then branches into 'securityDomain (2)'. 'securityDomain (2)' branches into 'lawfullIntercept (2)', which in turn branches into 'three3GPP (4)'. From 'three3GPP (4)', the tree branches into several levels of identifiers: + + +- Level 1: 'hi1(0)', 'hi2(1)', 'hi3(2)', 'him(3)' (shown in grey boxes) +- Level 2: 'hi1(0)', 'hi2(1)', 'hi3(2)', 'hi2CS(3)', 'hi3CS(4)', 'him(5)' +- Level 3: 'hi2wlan(6)', 'hi2mbms(7)', 'hi2eps(8)', 'hi3eps(9)', 'hi2conf(10)', 'hi3conf(11)' +- Level 4: 'hi3voip(12)', 'hi2gcse(13)', 'hi3gcse(14)', 'hi2prose(15)', 'hi2mmms(16)', 'hi3mmms(17)' +- Level 5: 'hi2CSvoice(18)' + + Additionally, there are three black dots on the left side of the tree, indicating other branches from 'Itu-t (0)', 'etsi (0)', and 'securityDomain (2)'. A dashed line also connects 'fraud(1)' to 'lawfullIntercept (2)'. + +3GPP object tree diagram showing the hierarchy of object identifiers starting from Itu-t (0) down to hi2CSvoice(18). + +Figure B.1: 3GPP object tree + +## B.3 Intercept related information (HI2 PS and IMS) + +### ASN1 description of IRI (HI2 interface) + +``` +UmtsHI2Operations {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulintercept(2) +threeGPP(4) hi2(1) r16 (16) version-1 (1)} +``` + +``` +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= +``` + +``` +BEGIN +``` + +``` +IMPORTS +``` + +``` + LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + TimeStamp, + Network-Identifier, + National-Parameters, + National-HI2-ASN1parameters, + DataNodeAddress, + IPAddress, + IP-value, + X25Address +``` + +``` + FROM HI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) + lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) version18(18)}; -- Imported from TS 101 671 v3.14.1 +``` + +``` +-- Object Identifier Definitions +``` + +``` +-- Security DomainId +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} +``` + +``` +-- Security Subdomains +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +hi2DomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi2(1) r16 (16) version-1 (1)} +``` + +``` +UmtsIRIsContent ::= CHOICE +``` + +``` +{ + umtsIRIContent UmtsIRIContent, + umtsIRISequence UmtsIRISequence +} +``` + +``` +UmtsIRISequence ::= SEQUENCE OF UmtsIRIContent +``` + +``` +-- Aggregation of UmtsIRIContent is an optional feature. +-- It may be applied in cases when at a given point in time +-- several IRI records are available for delivery to the same LEA destination. +-- As a general rule, records created at any event shall be sent +-- immediately and not withheld in the DF or MF in order to +-- apply aggregation. +-- When aggregation is not to be applied, +-- UmtsIRIContent needs to be chosen. +``` + +``` +UmtsIRIContent ::= CHOICE +``` + +``` +{ + iRI-Begin-record [1] IRI-Parameters, -- include at least one optional parameter + iRI-End-record [2] IRI-Parameters, + iRI-Continue-record [3] IRI-Parameters, -- include at least one optional parameter + iRI-Report-record [4] IRI-Parameters -- include at least one optional parameter +} +``` + +``` +-- Parameters having the same tag numbers have to be identical in Rel-5 and onwards modules. +IRI-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + hi2DomainId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- 3GPP HI2 domain + iRiversion [23] ENUMERATED + { + version2 (2), + ..., + version3 (3), + } +} +``` + +``` + + version4 (4), + -- note that version5 (5) cannot be used as it was missed in the version 5 of this + -- ASN.1 module. + version6 (6), + -- vesion7(7) was ommited to align with ETSI TS 101 671. + lastVersion (8) } OPTIONAL, + -- Optional parameter "iRIVersion" (tag 23) was always redundant in 33.108, because + -- the object identifier "hi2DomainId" was introduced into "IRI Parameters" in the + -- initial version of 33.108v5.0.0. In order to keep backward compatibility, even when + -- the version of the "hi2DomainId" parameter will be incremented it is recommended + -- to always send to LEMF the same: enumeration value "lastVersion(8)". + -- if not present, it means version 1 is handled + lawfulInterceptionIdentifier [1] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + -- This identifier is associated to the target. + timeStamp [3] TimeStamp, + -- date and time of the event triggering the report.) + initiator [4] ENUMERATED + { + not-Available (0), + originating-Target (1), + -- in case of GPRS, this indicates that the PDP context activation, modification + -- or deactivation is MS requested + terminating-Target (2), + -- in case of GPRS, this indicates that the PDP context activation, modification or + -- deactivation is network initiated + ... + } OPTIONAL, + + locationOfTheTarget [8] Location OPTIONAL, + -- location of the target + -- or cell site location + partyInformation [9] SET SIZE (1..10) OF PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- This parameter provides the concerned party, the identiy(ies) of the party + --)and all the information provided by the party. + + serviceCenterAddress [13] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- e.g. in case of SMS message this parameter provides the address of the relevant + -- server + sMS [14] SMS-report OPTIONAL, + -- this parameter provides the SMS content and associated information + + national-Parameters [16] National-Parameters OPTIONAL, + gPRSCorrelationNumber [18] GPRSCorrelationNumber OPTIONAL, + gPRSEvent [20] GPRSEvent OPTIONAL, + -- This information is used to provide particular action of the target + -- such as attach/detach + sgsnAddress [21] DataNodeAddress OPTIONAL, + gPRSOperationErrorCode [22] GPRSOperationErrorCode OPTIONAL, + ggsnAddress [24] DataNodeAddress OPTIONAL, + qOS [25] UmtsQoS OPTIONAL, + networkIdentifier [26] Network-Identifier OPTIONAL, + sMSOriginatingAddress [27] DataNodeAddress OPTIONAL, + sMSTerminatingAddress [28] DataNodeAddress OPTIONAL, + iMSEvent [29] IMSEvent OPTIONAL, + sipMessage [30] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + servingSGSN-number [31] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..20)) OPTIONAL, + -- Coded according to 3GPP TS 29.002 [4] and 3GPP TS 23.003 25]. + servingSGSN-address [32] OCTET STRING (SIZE (5..17)) OPTIONAL, + -- Octets are coded according to 3GPP TS 23.003 [25] + ..., + -- Tag [33] was taken into use by ETSI module in TS 101 671v2.13.1 + ldiEvent [34] LDIEvent OPTIONAL, + correlation [35] CorrelationValues OPTIONAL, + mediaDecryption-info [36] MediaDecryption-info OPTIONAL, + servingS4-SGSN-address [37] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm of the S4-SGSN based on the TS 29.272 [59]. + -- Only the data fields from the Diameter AVPs are provided concatenated + -- with a semicolon to populate this field. + sipMessageHeaderOffer [38] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + sipMessageHeaderAnswer [39] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + sdpOffer [40] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + sdpAnswer [41] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + uLITimestamp [42] OCTET STRING (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL, + -- Coded according to 3GPP TS 29.060 [17]; The upper 4 octets shall carry the ULI Timestamp + -- value; The lower 4 octets are undefined and shall be ignored by the receiver + + packetDataHeaderInformation [43] PacketDataHeaderInformation OPTIONAL, + mediaSecFailureIndication [44] MediaSecFailureIndication OPTIONAL, + +``` + +``` + +pANI-Header-Info [45] SEQUENCE OF PANI-Header-Info OPTIONAL, +-- information extracted from P-Access-Network-Info headers of SIP message; +-- described in TS 24.229 §7.2A.4 [76] +imsVoIP [46] IMS-VoIP-Correlation OPTIONAL, +xCAPmessage [47] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +-- The entire HTTP contents of any of the target's IMS supplementary service setting +-- management or manipulation XCAP messages, mainly made through the Ut +-- interface defined in the 3GPP TS 24 623 [77]. +ccUnavailableReason [48] PrintableString OPTIONAL, +carrierSpecificData [49] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +-- Copy of raw data specified by the CSP or his vendor related to HSS. +current-Previous-Systems [50] Current-Previous-Systems OPTIONAL, +change-Of-Target-Identity [51] Change-Of-Target-Identity OPTIONAL, +requesting-Network-Identifier [52] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +-- the requesting network identifier PLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, +-- defined in E212 [87]). +requesting-Node-Type [53] Requesting-Node-Type OPTIONAL, +serving-System-Identifier [54] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +-- the requesting network identifier (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, +-- defined in E212 [87]). +extendedLocParameters [55] ExtendedLocParameters OPTIONAL, -- LALS extended parameters +locationErrorCode [56] LocationErrorCode OPTIONAL, -- LALS error code +csREvent [57] CSREvent OPTIONAL, +ptc [58] PTC OPTIONAL, -- PTC Events +ptcEncryption [59] PTCEncryptionInfo OPTIONAL, +-- PTC Security Information + +national-HI2-ASN1parameters [255] National-HI2-ASN1parameters OPTIONAL +} +-- Parameters having the same tag numbers have to be identical in Rel-5 and onwards modules + +``` + +--- + +-- PARAMETERS FORMATS + +--- + +``` + +PANI-Header-Info ::= SEQUENCE +{ + access-Type [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- ASCII chain '3GPP-GERAN',... : see TS 24.229 §7.2A.4 [76] + access-Class [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- ASCII chain '3GPP-GERAN',... : see TS 24.229 §7.2A.4 [76] + network-Provided [3] NULL OPTIONAL, + -- present if provided by the network + pANI-Location [4] PANI-Location OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PANI-Location ::= SEQUENCE +{ + raw-Location [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- raw copy of the location string from the P-Access-Network-Info header + location [2] Location OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PartyInformation ::= SEQUENCE +{ + party-Qualifier [0] ENUMERATED + { + gPRS-Target(3), + ... + }, + partyIdentity [1] SEQUENCE + { + imei [1] OCTET STRING (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] + + imsi [3] OCTET STRING (SIZE (3..8)) OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Station Identity E.212 number beginning with Mobile Country Code + + msISDN [6] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..9)) OPTIONAL, + -- MSISDN of the target, encoded in the same format as the AddressString + -- parameters defined in MAP format document TS 29.002 [4] + + e164-Format [7] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1 .. 25)) OPTIONAL, + -- E164 address of the node in international format. Coded in the same format as + } +} + +``` + +``` + + -- the calling party number parameter of the ISUP (parameter part:[29]) + + sip-uri [8] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- See [26] + + ... + tel-uri [9] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- See [67] + x-3GPP-Asserted-Identity [10] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- X-3GPP-Asserted-Identity header (3GPP TS 24.109 [79]) of the target, used in + -- some XCAP transactions. This information complement SIP URI or Tel URI of the target. + xUI [11] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + -- XCAP User Identifier (XUI) is a string, valid as a path element in an XCAP URI, that + -- may be associated with each user served by a XCAP resource server. Defined in IETF + -- RFC 4825[80]. This information may complement SIP URI or Tel URI of the target. + + }, + services-Data-Information [4] Services-Data-Information OPTIONAL, + -- This parameter is used to transmit all the information concerning the + -- complementary information associated to the basic data call + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +Location ::= SEQUENCE +{ + e164-Number [1] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..25)) OPTIONAL, + -- Coded in the same format as the ISUP location number (parameter + -- field) of the ISUP (see EN 300 356 [30]). + globalCellID [2] GlobalCellID OPTIONAL, + --see MAP format (see [4]) + rai [4] Rai OPTIONAL, + -- the Routeing Area Identifier in the current SGSN is coded in accordance with the + -- § 10.5.5.15 of document [9] without the Routing Area Identification IEI + -- (only the last 6 octets are used) + gsmLocation [5] GSMLocation OPTIONAL, + umtsLocation [6] UMTSLocation OPTIONAL, + sai [7] Sai OPTIONAL, + -- format: PLMN-ID 3 octets (no. 1 - 3) + -- LAC 2 octets (no. 4 - 5) + -- SAC 2 octets (no. 6 - 7) + -- (according to 3GPP TS 25.413 [62]) + ... + oldRAI [8] Rai OPTIONAL, + -- the Routeing Area Identifier in the old SGSN is coded in accordance with the + -- § 10.5.5.15 of document [9] without the Routing Area Identification IEI + -- (only the last 6 octets are used). + tAI [9] OCTET STRING (SIZE (6)) OPTIONAL, + -- The TAI is coded according to the TS 29.118 [64] without the TAI IEI. + -- The tAI parameter is applicable only to the CS traffic cases where + -- the available location information is the one received from the the MME. + eCGI [10] OCTET STRING (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL, + -- the ECGI is coded according to the TS 29.118 [64] without the ECGI IEI. + -- The eCGI parameter is applicable only to the CS traffic cases where + -- the available location information is the one received from the the MME. + civicAddress [11] CivicAddress OPTIONAL, + -- Every elements that describe civicAddress are based on IETF RFC 4776 or IETF + -- 5139, ISO.3166-1 and -2, ISO 639-1, UPU SB42-4 ([71]to [75]) Such element is to + -- enrich IRI + -- Messages to LEMF by civic elements on the location of a H(e)NodeB or a WLAN hotspot, + -- instead of geographical location of the target or any geo-coordinates. Please, look + -- at the §5.11 location information of TS 33.106 and §4 functional architecture of TS + -- 33.107 on how such element can be used. + operatorSpecificInfo [12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- other CSP specific information. + uELocationTimestamp [13] CHOICE + { + timestamp [0] TimeStamp, + timestampUnknown [1] NULL, + ... + } OPTIONAL + -- Date/time of the UE location +} + +``` + +``` + +GlobalCellID ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (5..7)) +Rai ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (6)) +Sai ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (7)) + +``` + +``` + +GSMLocation := CHOICE +{ + geoCoordinates [1] SEQUENCE + { + latitude [1] PrintableString (SIZE(7..10)), + -- format : XDDMMSS.SS + longitude [2] PrintableString (SIZE(8..11)), + -- format : XDDMMSS.SS + mapDatum [3] MapDatum DEFAULT wGS84, + ... + azimuth [4] INTEGER (0..359) OPTIONAL + -- The azimuth is the bearing, relative to true north. + }, + -- format : XDDMMSS.SS + -- X : N(orth), S(outh), E(ast), W(est) + -- DD or DDD : degrees (numeric characters) + -- MM : minutes (numeric characters) + -- SS.SS : seconds, the second part (.SS) is optional + -- Example : + -- latitude short form N502312 + -- longitude long form E1122312.18 + + utmCoordinates [2] SEQUENCE + { + utm-East [1] PrintableString (SIZE(10)), + utm-North [2] PrintableString (SIZE(7)), + -- example utm-East 32U0439955 + -- utm-North 5540736 + mapDatum [3] MapDatum DEFAULT wGS84, + ... + azimuth [4] INTEGER (0..359) OPTIONAL + -- The azimuth is the bearing, relative to true north. + }, + + utmRefCoordinates [3] SEQUENCE + { + utmref-string PrintableString (SIZE(13)), + mapDatum MapDatum DEFAULT wGS84, + ... + }, + -- example 32UPU91294045 + + wGS84Coordinates [4] OCTET STRING + -- format is as defined in [37]. +} + +MapDatum := ENUMERATED +{ + wGS84, + wGS72, + eD50, -- European Datum 50 + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +UMTSLocation := CHOICE { + point [1] GA-Point, + pointWithUnCertainty [2] GA-PointWithUnCertainty, + polygon [3] GA-Polygon +} + +``` + +``` + +GeographicalCoordinates := SEQUENCE { + latitudeSign ENUMERATED { north, south }, + latitude INTEGER (0..8388607), + longitude INTEGER (-8388608..8388607), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +GA-Point := SEQUENCE { + geographicalCoordinates GeographicalCoordinates, + ... +} + +``` + +``` +GA-PointWithUncertainty ::=SEQUENCE { + geographicalCoordinates GeographicalCoordinates, + uncertaintyCode INTEGER (0..127) +} +``` + +``` +maxNrOfPoints INTEGER ::= 15 +``` + +``` +GA-Polygon ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE (1..maxNrOfPoints)) OF + SEQUENCE { + geographicalCoordinates GeographicalCoordinates, + ... + } +``` + +``` +CivicAddress ::= CHOICE { + detailedCivicAddress SET OF DetailedCivicAddress, + xmlCivicAddress XmlCivicAddress, + ... +} +``` + +``` +XmlCivicAddress ::= UTF8String + -- Must conform to the February 2008 version of the XML format on the representation of + -- civic location described in IETF RFC 5139[72]. +``` + +``` +DetailedCivicAddress ::= SEQUENCE { + building [1] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Building (structure), for example Hope Theatre + room [2] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Unit (apartment, suite), for example 12a + placeType [3] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Place-type, for example office + postalCommunityName [4] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Postal Community Name, for example Leonia + additionalCode [5] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Additional Code, for example 13203000003 + seat [6] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Seat, desk, or cubicle, workstation, for example WS 181 + primaryRoad [7] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- RD is the primary road name, for example Broadway + primaryRoadDirection [8] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- PRD is the leading road direction, for example N or North + trailingStreetSuffix [9] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- POD or trailing street suffix, for example SW or South West + streetSuffix [10] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Street suffix or type, for example Avenue or Platz or Road + houseNumber [11] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- House number, for example 123 + houseNumberSuffix [12] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- House number suffix, for example A or Ter + landmarkAddress [13] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Landmark or vanity address, for example Columbia University + additionalLocation [14] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Additional location, for example South Wing + name [15] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Residence and office occupant, for example Joe's Barbershop + floor [16] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Floor, for example 4th floor + primaryStreet [17] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Primary street name, for example Broadway + primaryStreetDirection [18] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- PSD is the leading street direction, for example N or North + roadSection [19] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Road section, for example 14 + roadBranch [20] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Road branch, for example Lane 7 + roadSubBranch [21] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Road sub-branch, for example Alley 8 + roadPreModifier [22] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Road pre-modifier, for example Old + roadPostModifier [23] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Road post-modifier, for example Extended + postalCode [24] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Postal/zip code, for example 10027-1234 + town [25] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + county [26] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- An administrative sub-section, often defined in ISO.3166-2[74] International + -- Organization for Standardization, "Codes for the representation of names of + -- countries and their subdivisions - Part 2: Country subdivision code" +``` + +``` + +country [27] UTF8String, +-- Defined in ISO.3166-1 [39] International Organization for Standardization, "Codes for +-- the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions - Part 1: Country +-- codes". Such definition is not optional in case of civic address. It is the +-- minimum information needed to qualify and describe a civic address, when a +-- regulation of a specific country requires such information +language [28] UTF8String, +-- Language defined in the IANA registry according to the assignments found +-- in the standard ISO 639 Part 1, "ISO 639-1:2002[75], Codes for the representation of +-- names of languages - Part 1: Alpha-2 code" or using assignments subsequently made +-- by the ISO 639 Part 1 maintenance agency +... +} + +``` + +``` + +SMS-report ::= SEQUENCE +{ + sMS-Contents [3] SEQUENCE + { + sms-initiator [1] ENUMERATED -- party which sent the SMS + { + target (0), + server (1), + undefined-party (2), + ... + }, + transfer-status [2] ENUMERATED + { + succeed-transfer (0), -- the transfer of the SMS message succeeds + not-succeed-transfer(1), + undefined (2), + ... + } OPTIONAL, + other-message [3] ENUMERATED -- in case of terminating call, indicates if + -- the server will send other SMS + { + yes (0), + no (1), + undefined (2), + ... + } OPTIONAL, + content [4] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1 .. 270)) OPTIONAL, + -- Encoded in the format defined for the SMS mobile + ... + } +} + +``` + +``` + +GPRSCorrelationNumber ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8..20)) +CorrelationValues ::= CHOICE { + + iri-to-CC [0] IRI-to-CC-Correlation, -- correlates IRI to Content(s) + iri-to-iri [1] IRI-to-IRI-Correlation, -- correlates IRI to IRI + both-IRI-CC [2] SEQUENCE { -- correlates IRI to IRI and IRI to Content(s) + iri-CC [0] IRI-to-CC-Correlation, + iri-IRI [1] IRI-to-IRI-Correlation} +} + +``` + +``` + +IMS-VoIP-Correlation ::= SET OF SEQUENCE { + ims-iri [0] IRI-to-IRI-Correlation, + ims-cc [1] IRI-to-CC-Correlation OPTIONAL +} + +``` + +``` + +IRI-to-CC-Correlation ::= SEQUENCE { -- correlates IRI to Content + cc [0] SET OF OCTET STRING, -- correlates IRI to multiple CCs + iri [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + -- correlates IRI to CC with signaling +} +IRI-to-IRI-Correlation ::= OCTET STRING -- correlates IRI to IRI + +``` + +``` + +GPRSEvent ::= ENUMERATED +{ + pDPContextActivation (1), + startOfInterceptionWithPDPContextActive (2), + pDPContextDeactivation (4), + gPRSAattach (5), + gPRSDetach (6), + locationInfoUpdate (10), + SMS (11), + pDPContextModification (13), + servingSystem (14), + ... , + startOfInterceptionWithMSAttached (15), + packetDataHeaderInformation (16) , hSS-Subscriber-Record-Change (17), + registration-Termination (18), + -- FFS + location-Up-Date (19), + -- FFS + cancel-Location (20), + register-Location (21), + location-Information-Request (22) +} +-- see [19] + +``` + +``` + +CSREvent ::= ENUMERATED +{ + CSREventMessage (1), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +IMSEvent ::= ENUMERATED +{ + unfilteredSIPmessage (1), + -- This value indicates to LEMF that the whole SIP message is sent , i.e. without filtering + -- CC; location information is removed by the DF2/MF if not required to be sent. + + ... , + SIPheaderOnly (2), + -- If warrant requires only IRI then specific content in a 'sIPMessage' + -- (e.g. 'Message', etc.) has been deleted before sending it to LEMF. + + decryptionKeysAvailable (3) , + -- This value indicates to LEMF that the IRI carries CC decryption keys for the session + -- under interception. + + startOfInterceptionForIMSEstablishedSession (4) , + -- This value indicates to LEMF that the IRI carries information related to + -- interception started on an already established IMS session. + + xCAPRequest (5), + -- This value indicates to LEMF that the XCAP request is sent. + + xCAPResponse (6) , + -- This value indicates to LEMF that the XCAP response is sent. + + ccUnavailable (7) + -- This value indicates to LEMF that the media is not available for interception for intercept + -- orders that requires media interception. +} + +``` + +``` + +Current-Previous-Systems ::= SEQUENCE +{ + serving-System-Identifier [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- VPLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, E. 212 number [87]). + current-Serving-SGSN-Number [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- E.164 number of the current serving SGSN. + current-Serving-SGSN-Address [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- The IP address of the current serving SGSN or its Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm. + current-Serving-S4-SGSN-Address [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- The Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm of the current serving S4 SGSN. + previous-Serving-System-Identifier [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- VPLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, defined in E212 [87]). + previous-Serving-SGSN-Number [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- The E.164 number of the previous serving SGSN. + previous-Serving-SGSN-Address [7] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- The IP address of the previous serving SGSN or its Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm. + previous-Serving-S4-SGSN-Address [8] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- The Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm of the previous serving S4 SGSN. + ... +} + +``` + +``` +} + +``` + +``` +Change-Of-Target-Identity ::= SEQUENCE +{ + new-MSISDN [1] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- new MSISDN of the target, encoded in the same format as the AddressString + -- parameters defined in MAP format document TS 29.002 [4] + old-MSISDN [2] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- new MSISDN of the target, encoded in the same format as the AddressString + -- parameters defined in MAP format document TS 29.002 [4] + new-IMSI [3] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Station Identity E.212 number beginning with Mobile Country Code + old-IMSI [4] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Station Identity E.212 number beginning with Mobile Country Code + new-IMEI [5] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Equipment Identity defined in MAP format document TS 29.002 [4] + old-IMEI [6] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Equipment Identity defined in MAP format document TS 29.002 [4] + ..., + new-IMPI [7] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + old-IMPI [8] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + new-SIP-URI [9] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + old-SIP-URI [10] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + new-TEL-URI [11] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + old-TEL-URI [12] PartyInformation OPTIONAL +} + +``` + +``` +Requesting-Node-Type ::= ENUMERATED +{ + mSC (1), + sMS-Centre (2), + gMLC (3), + mME (4), + sGSN (5), + ... +} + +``` + +``` +Services-Data-Information ::= SEQUENCE +{ + gPRS-parameters [1] GPRS-parameters OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +``` +GPRS-parameters ::= SEQUENCE +{ + pDP-address-allocated-to-the-target [1] DataNodeAddress OPTIONAL, + aPN [2] OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..100)) OPTIONAL, + -- The Access Point Name (APN) is coded in accordance with + -- 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] without the APN IEI (only the last 100 octets are used). + -- Octets are coded according to 3GPP TS 23.003 [25]. + pDP-type [3] OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) OPTIONAL, + -- Include either Octets 3 and 4 of the Packet Data Protocol Address information element of + -- 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] or Octets 4 and 5 of the End User Address IE of 3GPP TS 29.060 [17]. + + -- when PDP-type is IPv4 or IPv6, the IP address is carried by parameter + -- pDP-address-allocated-to-the-target + -- when PDP-type is IPv4v6, the additional IP address is carried by parameter + -- additionalIPaddress + ..., + nSAPI [4] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1)) OPTIONAL, + -- Include either Octet 2 of the NSAPI IE of 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] or Octet 2 of the NSAPI IE of + -- 3GPP TS 29.060 [17]. + additionalIPaddress [5] DataNodeAddress OPTIONAL +} + +``` + +``` +GPRSOperationErrorCode ::= OCTET STRING +-- The parameter shall carry the GMM cause value or the SM cause value, as defined in the +-- standard [9], without the IEI. + +``` + +``` +LDIEvent ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` +{ + targetEntersIA (1), + targetLeavesIA (2), + ... +} +``` + +``` +UmtsQos ::= CHOICE +``` + +``` +{ + qosMobileRadio [1] OCTET STRING, + -- The qosMobileRadio parameter shall be coded in accordance with the § 10.5.6.5 of + -- document [9] without the Quality of service IEI and Length of + -- quality of service IE (. That is, first + -- two octets carrying 'Quality of service IEI' and 'Length of quality of service + -- IE' shall be excluded). + qosGn [2] OCTET STRING + -- qosGn parameter shall be coded in accordance with § 7.7.34 of document [17] +} +``` + +``` +MediaDecryption-info ::= SEQUENCE OF CCKeyInfo +``` + +``` +-- One or more key can be available for decryption, one for each media streams of the +-- intercepted session. +``` + +``` +CCKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + cCCSID [1] OCTET STRING, + -- the parameter uniquely mapping the key to the encrypted stream. + cCDecKey [2] OCTET STRING, + cCSalt [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- The field reports the value from the CS_ID field in the ticket exchange headers as + -- defined in IETF RFC 6043 [61]. + ... +} +``` + +``` +MediaSecFailureIndication ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` +{ + genericFailure (0), + ... +} +``` + +``` +PacketDataHeaderInformation ::= CHOICE +``` + +``` +{ + packetDataHeader [1] PacketDataHeaderReport, + packetDataSummary [2] PacketDataSummaryReport, + ... +} +``` + +``` +PacketDataHeaderReport ::= CHOICE +``` + +``` +{ + packetDataHeaderMapped [1] PacketDataHeaderMapped, + packetDataHeaderCopy [2] PacketDataHeaderCopy, + ... +} +``` + +``` +PacketDataHeaderMapped ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + sourceIPAddress [1] IPAddress, + sourcePortNumber [2] INTEGER (0..65535) OPTIONAL, + destinationIPAddress [3] IPAddress, + destinationPortNumber [4] INTEGER (0..65535) OPTIONAL, + transportProtocol [5] INTEGER, + -- For IPv4, report the "Protocol" field and for IPv6 report "Next Header" field. + -- Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers can be found at + -- http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/protocol-numbers.xml + packetsize [6] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + flowLabel [7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + packetCount [8] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + direction [9] TPDU-direction, + ... +} +``` + +``` +TPDU-direction ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` +{ +} +``` + +``` + + from-target (1), + to-target (2), + unknown (3) +} + +``` + +``` + +PacketDataHeaderCopy ::= SEQUENCE +{ + direction [1] TPDU-direction, + headerCopy [2] OCTET STRING, -- includes a copy of the packet header at the IP + -- network layer and above including extension headers, but excluding contents. + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PacketDataSummaryReport ::= SEQUENCE OF PacketFlowSummary + +PacketFlowSummary ::= SEQUENCE +{ + sourceIPAddress [1] IPAddress, + sourcePortNumber [2] INTEGER (0..65535) OPTIONAL, + destinationIPAddress [3] IPAddress, + destinationPortNumber [4] INTEGER (0..65535) OPTIONAL, + transportProtocol [5] INTEGER, + -- For IPv4, report the "Protocol" field and for IPv6 report "Next Header" field. + -- Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers can be found at + -- http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/protocol-numbers.xml + flowLabel [6] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + summaryPeriod [7] ReportInterval, + packetCount [8] INTEGER, + sumOfPacketSizes [9] INTEGER, + packetDataSummaryReason [10] ReportReason, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +ReportReason ::= ENUMERATED +{ + timerExpired (0), + countThresholdHit (1), + pDPContextDeactivated (2), + pDPContextModification (3), + otherOrUnknown (4), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +ReportInterval ::= SEQUENCE +{ + firstPacketTimeStamp [0] Timestamp, + lastPacketTimeStamp [1] Timestamp, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +-- LALS extended location parameters are mapped from the MLP pos element parameters +-- and attributes defined in [88]. For details see specific [88] clauses referred below. +ExtendedLocParameters ::= SEQUENCE +{ + posMethod [0] PrintableString OPTIONAL, -- clause 5.3.93.1 + mapData [1] -- clause 5.2.2.3 + CHOICE {base64Map [0] PrintableString, -- clause 5.3.12 + url [1] PrintableString -- clause 5.3.138 + } OPTIONAL, + altitude [2] + SEQUENCE {alt PrintableString, -- clause 5.3.5 + alt-uncertainty PrintableString OPTIONAL -- clause 5.3.7 + } OPTIONAL, + speed [3] PrintableString OPTIONAL, -- clause 5.3.119 + direction [4] PrintableString OPTIONAL, -- clause 5.3.26 + level-conf [5] PrintableString OPTIONAL, -- clause 5.3.24 + qoS-not-met [6] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, -- clause 5.3.97 + motionStateList [7] -- clause 5.2.2.3 + SEQUENCE {primaryMotionState [0] PrintableString, -- clause 5.3.69 + secondaryMotionState [1] SEQUENCE OF PrintableString OPTIONAL, + confidence [2] PrintableString -- clause 5.3.24 + } OPTIONAL, + floor [8] + SEQUENCE {floor-number PrintableString, -- clause 5.3.39 + +``` + +``` + + floor-number-uncertainty PrintableString OPTIONAL + -- clause 5.3.40 + } OPTIONAL, + additional-info [9] PrintableString OPTIONAL, -- clause 5.3.1 + +-- The following parameter contains a copy of the unparsed XML code of +-- MLP response message, i.e. the entire XML document containing +-- a (described in [88], clause 5.2.3.2.2) or +-- a (described in [88], clause 5.2.3.2.3) MLP message. +-- This parameter is present when the LI-LCS client cannot fully map +-- the MLP response message into an ASN.1 Location object. + + lALS-rawMLPPosData [10] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +LocationErrorCode ::= INTEGER (1..699) +-- LALS location error codes are the OMA MLP result identifiers defined in [88], Clause 5.4 + +``` + +``` + +PTCEncryptionInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + + cipher [1] UTF8String, + cryptoContext [2] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + key [3] UTF8String, + keyEncoding [4] UTF8String, + salt [5] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + pTCOther [6] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PTC ::= SEQUENCE { + + abandonCause [1] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + accessPolicyFailure [2] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + accessPolicyType [3] AccessPolicyType OPTIONAL, + alertIndicator [5] AlertIndicator OPTIONAL, + associatePresenceStatus [6] AssociatePresenceStatus OPTIONAL, + bearer-capability [7] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- identifies the Bearer capability information element (value part) + broadcastIndicator [8] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + -- default False, true indicates this is a broadcast to a group + contactID [9] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + emergency [10] Emergency OPTIONAL, + emergencyGroupState [11] EmergencyGroupState OPTIONAL, + timeStamp [12] Timestamp, + pTCType [13] PTCType OPTIONAL, + failureCode [14] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + floorActivity [15] FloorActivity OPTIONAL, + floorSpeakerID [16] PTCAddress OPTIONAL, + groupAdSender [17] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Identifies the group administrator who was the originator of the group call. + -- tag [18] was used in r15 (15) version-4 (4) + groupAuthRule [19] GroupAuthRule OPTIONAL, + groupCharacteristics [20] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + holdRetrieveInd [21] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + -- true indicates target is placed on hold, false indicates target was retrieved from hold. + -- tag [22] was used in r15 (15) version-4 (4) + imminentPerilInd [23] ImminentPerilInd OPTIONAL, + implicitFloorReq [24] ImplicitFloorReq OPTIONAL, + initiationCause [25] InitiationCause OPTIONAL, + invitationCause [26] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + iPAPartyID [27] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + iPADirection [28] IPADirection OPTIONAL, + listManagementAction [29] ListManagementAction OPTIONAL, + listManagementFailure [30] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + listManagementType [31] ListManagementType OPTIONAL, + maxTBTime [32] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- defined in seconds. + mCPTTGroupID [33] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + mCPTTID [34] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + mCPTTInd [35] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + -- default False indicates to associate from target, true indicates to the target. + location [36] Location OPTIONAL, + mCPTTOrganizationName [37] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + mediaStreamAvail [38] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + -- True indicates available for media, false indicates not able to accept media. + priority-Level [40] Priority-Level OPTIONAL, + preEstSessionID [41] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +} + +``` + +``` + +preEstStatus [42] PreEstStatus OPTIONAL, +pTCGroupID [43] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCIDList [44] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCMediaCapability [45] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCOriginatingId [46] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCOther [47] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCParticipants [48] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCParty [49] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCPartyDrop [50] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCSessionInfo [51] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCServerURI [52] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCUserAccessPolicy [53] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCAddress [54] PTCAddress OPTIONAL, +queuedFloorControl [55] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, +--Default FALSE,send TRUE if Queued floor control is used. +queuedPosition [56] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +-- indicates the queued position of the Speaker (Target or associate) who has the +-- right to speak. +registrationRequest [57] RegistrationRequest OPTIONAL, +registrationOutcome [58] RegistrationOutcome OPTIONAL, +retrieveID [59] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +rTPSetting [60] RTPSetting OPTIONAL, +talkBurstPriority [61] Priority-Level OPTIONAL, +talkBurstReason [62] Talk-burst-reason-code OPTIONAL, +-- Talk-burst-reason-code Defined according to the rules and procedures +-- in (OMA-PoC-AD [97]) +talkburstControlSetting [63] TalkburstControlSetting OPTIONAL, +targetPresenceStatus [64] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +port-Number [65] INTEGER (0..65535) OPTIONAL, +... +} + +``` + +``` + +AccessPolicyType ::= SEQUENCE +{ + userAccessPolicyAttempt [1] BOOLEAN, + -- default False, true indicates Target has accessed. + groupAuthorizationRulesAttempt [2] BOOLEAN, + -- default False, true indicates Target has accessed. + userAccessPolicyQuery [3] BOOLEAN, + -- default False, true indicates Target has accessed. + groupAuthorizationRulesQuery [4] BOOLEAN, + -- default False, true indicates Target has accessed. + userAccessPolicyResult [5] UTF8String, + groupAuthorizationRulesResult [6] UTF8String, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +AlertIndicator ::= ENUMERATED +{ + -- indicates the group call alert condition. + sent (1), + received (2), + cancelled (3), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +AssociatePresenceStatus ::= SEQUENCE +{ + presenceID [1] UTF8String, + -- identity of PTC Client(s)or the PTC group + presenceType [2] PresenceType, + presenceStatus [3] BOOLEAN, + -- default false, true indicates connected. + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PresenceType ::= ENUMERATED +{ + pTCClient (1), + pTCGroup (2), + -- identifies the type of presenceID given [PTC Client(s) or PTC group]. + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +Emergency ::= ENUMERATED +{ + +``` + +``` + + -- MCPTT services indication of peril condition. + imminent (1), + peril (2), + cancel (3), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +EmergencyGroupState ::= SEQUENCE +{ + -- indicates the state of the call, at least one of these information + -- elements shall be present. + clientEmergencyState [1] ENUMERATED + { + -- in case of MCPTT call, indicates the response for the client + inform (1), + response (2), + cancelInform (3), + cancelResponse (4), + ... + } OPTIONAL, + groupEmergencyState [2] ENUMERATED + { + -- in case of MCPTT group call, indicates if there is a group emergency or + -- a response from the Target to indicate current Client state of emergency. + inForm (1), + reSponse (2), + cancelInform (3), + cancelResponse (4), + ... + }, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PTCType ::= ENUMERATED +{ + pTCStartOfInterception (1), + pTCServinSystem (2), + pTCSessionInitiation (3), + pTCSessionAbandonEndRecord (4), + pTCSessionStartContinueRecord (5), + pTCSessionEndRecord (6), + pTCPre-EstablishedSessionSessionRecord (7), + pTCInstantPersonalAlert (8), + pTCPartyJoin (9), + pTCPartyDrop (10), + pTCPartyHold-RetrieveRecord (11), + pTCMediaModification (12), + pTCGroupAdvertizement (13), + pTCFloorControl (14), + pTCTargetPressence (15), + pTCAssociatePressence (16), + pTCListManagementEvents (17), + pTCAccessPolicyEvents (18), + pTCMediaTypeNotification (19), + pTCGroupCallRequest (20), + pTCGroupCallCancel (21), + pTCGroupCallResponse (22), + pTCGroupCallInterrogate (23), + pTCMCPTTImminentGroupCall (24), + pTCCC (25), + pTCRegistration (26), + pTCEncryption (27), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +FloorActivity ::= SEQUENCE +{ + tBCP-Request [1] BOOLEAN, + -- default False, true indicates Granted. + tBCP-Granted [2] BOOLEAN, + -- default False, true indicates Granted permission to talk. + tBCP-Deny [3] BOOLEAN, + -- default True, False indicates permission granted. + tBCP-Queued [4] BOOLEAN, + -- default False, true indicates the request to talk is in queue. + tBCP-Release [5] BOOLEAN, +} + +``` + +``` + + -- default True, true indicates the Request to talk is completed, + -- False indicates PTC Client has the request to talk. + tBCP-Revoke [6] BOOLEAN, + -- default False, true indicates the privilege to talk is canceled from the + -- PTC server. + tBCP-Taken [7] BOOLEAN, + -- default True, false indicates another PTC Client has the permission to talk. + tBCP-Idle [8] BOOLEAN, + -- default True, False indicates the Talk Burst Protocol is taken. + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +GroupAuthRule ::= ENUMERATED +{ + allow-Initiating-PtcSession (0), + block-Initiating-PtcSession (1), + allow-Joining-PtcSession (2), + block-Joining-PtcSession (3), + allow-Add-Participants (4), + block-Add-Participants (5), + allow-Subscription-PtcSession-State (6), + block-Subscription-PtcSession-State (7), + allow-Anonymity (8), + forbid-Anonymity (9), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +ImminentPerilInd ::= ENUMERATED +{ + request (1), + response (2), + cancel (3), + -- when the MCPTT Imminent Peril Group Call Request, Response or Cancel is detected + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +ImplicitFloorReq ::= ENUMERATED +{ + join (1), + rejoin (2), + release (3), + -- group Call request to join, rejoin, or release of the group call + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +InitiationCause ::= ENUMERATED +{ + requests (1), + received (2), + pTCOriginatingId (3), + -- requests or receives a session initiation from the network or another + -- party to initiate a PTC session. Identify the originating PTC party, if known. + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +IPADirection ::= ENUMERATED +{ + toTarget (0), + fromTarget (1), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +ListManagementAction ::= ENUMERATED +{ + create (1), + modify (2), + retrieve (3), + delete (4), + notify (5), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +ListManagementType ::= ENUMERATED +{ + contactListManagementAttempt (1), +} + +``` + +``` + +groupListManagementAttempt (2), +contactListManagementResult (3), +groupListManagementResult (4), +requestSuccessful (5), +... +} + +``` + +``` + +Priority-Level ::= ENUMERATED +{ + pre-emptive (0), + high-priority (1), + normal-priority (2), + listen-only (3), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PreEstStatus ::= ENUMERATED +{ + established (1), + modify (2), + released (3), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PTCAddress ::= SEQUENCE +{ + uri [0] UTF8String, + -- The set of URIs defined in [RFC3261] and related SIP RFCs. + privacy-setting [1] BOOLEAN, + -- Default FALSE, send TRUE if privacy is used. + privacy-alias [2] VisibleString OPTIONAL, + -- if privacy is used, the PTC Server creates an anonymous PTC Address of the form + -- . In addition to anonymity, the anonymous PTC + -- Addresses SHALL be unique within a PTC Session. In case more than one anonymous + -- PTC Addresses are used in the same PTC Session, for the second Anonymous PTC + -- Session and thereafter, the PTC Server SHOULD use the form + -- sip:anonymous-n@anonymous.invalid where n is an integer number. + nickname [3] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +RegistrationRequest ::= ENUMERATED +{ + register (1), + re-register (2), + de-register (3), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +RegistrationOutcome ::= ENUMERATED +{ + success (0), + failure (1), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +RTPSetting ::= SEQUENCE +{ + ip-address [0] IPAddress, + port-number [1] Port-Number, + -- the IP address and port number at the PTC Server for the RTP Session + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +Port-Number ::= INTEGER (0..65535) + +``` + +``` + +TalkburstControlSetting ::= SEQUENCE +{ + talk-BurstControlProtocol [1] UTF8String, + talk-Burst-parameters [2] SET OF VisibleString, + -- selected by the PTC Server from those contained in the original SDP offer in the + -- incoming SIP INVITE request from the PTC Client + tBCP-PortNumber [3] INTEGER (0..65535), + -- PTC Server's port number to be used for the Talk Burst Control Protocol +} + +``` + +``` + + ... +} + +Talk-burst-reason-code ::= VisibleString + +``` + +END -- OF UmtsHI2Operations + +## B.3a Interception related information (HI2 CS) + +For North America, the use of **J-STD-25 A [23]** is recommended. + +### ASN1 description of IRI (HI2 CS interface) + +``` + +UmtsCS-HI2Operations +{itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) securityDomain (2) lawfulIntercept (2) threeGPP(4) +hi2CS (3) r16 (16) version-0 (0)} + +``` + +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + +BEGIN + +IMPORTS + +``` + + LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + TimeStamp, + Intercepted-Call-State, + PartyInformation, + CallContentLinkCharacteristics, + CommunicationIdentifier, + CC-Link-Identifier, + National-Parameters, + National-HI2-ASN1parameters + + FROM HI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) + lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) version9(9)} -- Imported from TS 101 671 v2.13.1 + + Location, + SMS-report, + ExtendedLocParameters, + LocationErrorCode + + FROM UmtsHI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) + lawfulIntercept(2) threeGPP(4) hi2(1) r16(16) version-0(0)}; + +-- Object Identifier Definitions + +-- Security DomainId +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} + +-- Security Subdomains +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +hi2CSDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi2CS(3) r16(16) version-0(0)} + +``` + +``` + +UmtsCS-IRIsContent ::= CHOICE +{ + iRIContent UmtsCS-IRIContent, + iRISequence UmtsCS-IRISequence +} + +``` + +``` + +UmtsCS-IRISequence ::= SEQUENCE OF UmtsCS-IRIContent +-- Aggregation of UmtsCS-IRIContent is an optional feature. +-- It may be applied in cases when at a given point in time several IRI records are +-- available for delivery to the same LEA destination. +-- As a general rule, records created at any event shall be sent immediately and shall +-- not held in the DF or MF in order to apply aggregation. +-- When aggregation is not to be applied, UmtsCS-IRIContent needs to be chosen. + +``` + +``` + +UmtsCS-IRIContent ::= CHOICE +{ + iRI-Begin-record [1] IRI-Parameters, + --at least one optional parameter has to be included within the iRI-Begin-Record + iRI-End-record [2] IRI-Parameters, + iRI-Continue-record [3] IRI-Parameters, + --at least one optional parameter has to be included within the iRI-Continue-Record + iRI-Report-record [4] IRI-Parameters, + --at least one optional parameter has to be included within the iRI-Report-Record + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +IRI-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE +{ + hi2CSDomainId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- 3GPP HI2 CS domain + + iRIVersion [23] ENUMERATED + { + version1(1), + ..., + version2(2), + version3(3), + -- versions 4-7 were omitted to align with UmtsHI2Operations. + lastVersion(8) + } OPTIONAL, + -- Optional parameter "iRIVersion" (tag 23) was always redundant in 33.108, because + -- the object identifier "hi2CSDomainId" was introduced into "IRI Parameters" with the + -- initial HI2 CS domain module in 33.108v6.1.0. In order to keep backward compatibility, + -- even when the version of the "hi2CSDomainId" parameter will be incremented it is + -- recommended to always send to LEMF the same: enumeration value "lastVersion(8)". + -- if not present, it means version 1 is handled + lawfulInterceptionIdentifier [1] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + -- This identifier is associated to the target. + communicationIdentifier [2] CommunicationIdentifier, + -- used to uniquely identify an intercepted call. + + timeStamp [3] Timestamp, + -- date and time of the event triggering the report. + intercepted-Call-Direct [4] ENUMERATED + { + not-Available(0), + originating-Target(1), + terminating-Target(2), + ... + } OPTIONAL, + intercepted-Call-State [5] Intercepted-Call-State OPTIONAL, + -- Not required for UMTS. May be included for backwards compatibility to GSM + ringingDuration [6] OCTET STRING (SIZE (3)) OPTIONAL, + -- Duration in seconds. BCD coded : HHMMSS + -- Not required for UMTS. May be included for backwards compatibility to GSM + conversationDuration [7] OCTET STRING (SIZE (3)) OPTIONAL, + -- Duration in seconds. BCD coded : HHMMSS + -- Not required for UMTS. May be included for backwards compatibility to GSM + locationOfTheTarget [8] Location OPTIONAL, + -- location of the target + partyInformation [9] SET SIZE (1..10) OF PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- This parameter provides the concerned party (Originating, Terminating or forwarded + -- party), the identity(ies) of the party and all the information provided by the party. + callContentLinkInformation [10] SEQUENCE + { + cClink1Characteristics [1] CallContentLinkCharacteristics OPTIONAL, + -- information concerning the Content of Communication Link Tx channel established + -- toward the LEMF (or the sum signal channel, in case of mono mode). + cClink2Characteristics [2] CallContentLinkCharacteristics OPTIONAL, + -- information concerning the Content of Communication Link Rx channel established + -- toward the LEMF. + ... + } OPTIONAL, + release-Reason-Of-Intercepted-Call [11] OCTET STRING (SIZE (2)) OPTIONAL, + -- Release cause coded in [31] format. +} + +``` + +``` + +-- This parameter indicates the reason why the +-- intercepted call cannot be established or why the intercepted call has been +-- released after the active phase. +nature-Of-The-intercepted-call [12] ENUMERATED +{ + --Not required for UMTS. May be included for backwards compatibility to GSM + --Nature of the intercepted "call": + gSM-ISDN-PSTN-circuit-call(0), + -- the possible UUS content is sent through the HI2 or HI3 "data" interface + -- the possible call content call is established through the HI3 „circuit„ interface + gSM-SMS-Message(1), + -- the SMS content is sent through the HI2 or HI3 "data" interface + uUS4-Messages(2), + -- the UUS content is sent through the HI2 or HI3 "data" interface + tETRA-circuit-call(3), + -- the possible call content call is established through the HI3 "circuit" interface + -- the possible data are sent through the HI3 "data" interface + teTRA-Packet-Data(4), + -- the data are sent through the HI3 "data" interface + gPRS-Packet-Data(5), + -- the data are sent through the HI3 "data" interface + ... +} OPTIONAL, +serviceCenterAddress [13] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, +-- e.g. in case of SMS message this parameter provides the address of the relevant +-- server within the calling (if server is originating) or called +-- (if server is terminating) party address parameters +sMS [14] SMS-report OPTIONAL, +-- this parameter provides the SMS content and associated information +cC-Link-Identifier [15] CC-Link-Identifier OPTIONAL, +-- Depending on a network option, this parameter may be used to identify a CC link +-- in case of multiparty calls. +national-Parameters [16] National-Parameters OPTIONAL, +... +umts-Cs-Event [33] Umts-Cs-Event OPTIONAL, +-- Care should be taken to ensure additional parameter numbering does not conflict with +-- ETSI TS 101 671 or Annex B.3 of this document (PS HI2). +serving-System-Identifier [34] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +-- the serving network identifier PLMN id (MNC, Mobile Country Code and MNC, Mobile Network +-- Country, defined in E212 [87]) and 3GPP TR 21.905 [38]. +carrierSpecificData [35] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +-- Copy of raw data specified by the CSP or his vendor related to HLR. +current-Previous-Systems [36] Current-Previous-Systems OPTIONAL, +change-Of-Target-Identity [37] Change-Of-Target-Identity OPTIONAL, +requesting-Network-Identifier [38] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +-- the requesting network identifier PLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, +-- defined in E212 [87]). +requesting-Node-Type [39] Requesting-Node-Type OPTIONAL, +extendedLocParameters [40] ExtendedLocParameters OPTIONAL, -- LALS extended parameters +locationErrorCode [41] LocationErrorCode OPTIONAL, -- LALS error code +national-HI2-ASN1parameters [255] National-HI2-ASN1parameters OPTIONAL +} + +``` + +## Umts-Cs-Event ::= ENUMERATED + +``` + +{ + call-establishment (1), + answer (2), + supplementary-Service (3), + handover (4), + release (5), + sMS (6), + location-update (7), + subscriber-Controlled-Input (8), + ... + hLR-Subscriber-Record-Change (9), + serving-System (10), + cancel-Location (11), + register-Location (12), + location-Information-Request (13) +} + +``` + +## Requesting-Node-Type ::= ENUMERATED + +``` + +{ + mSC (1), + sMS-Centre (2), +} + +``` + +``` + + gMLC (3), + mME (4), + sGSN (5), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +Change-Of-Target-Identity ::= SEQUENCE +{ + new-MSISDN [1] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- new MSISDN of the target, encoded in the same format as the AddressString + -- parameters defined in MAP format document TS 29.002 [4] + old-MSISDN [2] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- new MSISDN of the target, encoded in the same format as the AddressString + -- parameters defined in MAP format document TS 29.002 [4] + new-IMSI [3] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Station Identity E.212 number beginning with Mobile Country Code + old-IMSI [4] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Station Identity E.212 number beginning with Mobile Country Code + ..., + new-IMEI [5] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Equipement Identity defined in MAP format document TS 29.002 [4] + old-IMEI [6] PartyInformation OPTIONAL + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Equipement Identity defined in MAP format document TS 29.002 [4] +} + +``` + +``` + +Current-Previous-Systems ::= SEQUENCE +{ + current-Serving-System-Identifier [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- VPLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, E. 212 number [87]). + current-Serving-MSC-Number [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- E.164 number of the serving MSC. + current-Serving-MSC-Address [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- The IP address of the serving MSC or its Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm. previous- + previous-Serving-System-Identifier [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- VPLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, defined in E212 [87]). + previous-Serving-MSC-Number [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- The E.164 number of the previous serving MSC. + previous-Serving-MSC-Address [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- The IP address of the previous serving MSC or its Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm. + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +END -- OF UmtsCS-HI2Operations + +``` + +# B.4 Contents of communication (HI3 PS) + +Umts-HI3-PS {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulintercept(2) threeGPP(4) hi3(2) r7(7) version-0(0)} + +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + +BEGIN + +``` + +IMPORTS + +GPRSCorrelationNumber + FROM UmtsHI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulintercept(2) threeGPP(4) + hi2(1) r7(7) version-2(2)} -- Imported from TS 33.108v7.2.0 + +LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + +TimeStamp + FROM HI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulintercept(2) hi2(1) + version9(9)}; -- from ETSI HI2Operations TS 101 671v2.13.1 + +``` + +-- Object Identifier Definitions + +``` + +-- Security DomainId +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} + +-- Security Subdomains +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +hi3DomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi3(2) r7(7) version-0(0)} + +``` + +``` + +CC-PDU ::= SEQUENCE +{ + uLIC-header [1] ULIC-header, + payload [2] OCTET STRING +} + +ULIC-header ::= SEQUENCE +{ + hi3DomainId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- 3GPP HI3 Domain + version [1] Version, + lIID [2] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier OPTIONAL, + correlation-Number [3] GPRSCorrelationNumber, + timeStamp [4] TimeStamp OPTIONAL, + sequence-number [5] INTEGER (0..65535), + t-PDU-direction [6] TPDU-direction, + ... + national-HI3-ASN1parameters [7] National-HI3-ASN1parameters OPTIONAL, + -- encoded per national requirements + ice-type [8] ICE-type OPTIONAL + -- The ICE-type indicates the applicable Intercepting Control Element(see ref [19]) in which + -- the T-PDU is intercepted. +} + +``` + +``` + +Version ::= ENUMERATED +{ + version1(1), + ..., + version3(3), + -- versions 4-7 were omitted to align with UmtsHI2Operations. + lastVersion(8) + -- Mandatory parameter "version" (tag 1) was always redundant in 33.108, because + -- the object identifier "hi3DomainId" was introduced into "ULIC-headerV" in the initial + -- version of 33.108v5.0.0 In order to keep backward compatibility, even when the + -- version of the "hi3DomainId" parameter will be incremented it is recommended to + -- always send to LEMF the same: enumeration value "lastVersion(8)". +} + +``` + +``` + +TPDU-direction ::= ENUMERATED +{ + from-target (1), + to-target (2), + unknown (3) +} + +``` + +``` + +National-HI3-ASN1parameters ::= SEQUENCE +{ + countryCode [1] PrintableString (SIZE (2)), + -- Country Code according to ISO 3166-1 [39], + -- the country to which the parameters inserted after the extension marker apply + ... + -- In case a given country wants to use additional national parameters according to its law, + -- these national parameters should be defined using the ASN.1 syntax and added after the + -- extension marker (...). + -- It is recommended that "version parameter" and "vendor identification parameter" are + -- included in the national parameters definition. Vendor identifications can be + -- retrieved from IANA web site. It is recommended to avoid + -- using tags from 240 to 255 in a formal type definition. +} + +``` + +``` + +ICE-type ::= ENUMERATED +{ + sgsn (1), + ggsn (2), + ... +} + +``` + +END -- OF Umts-HI3-PS + +## B.5 Void + +## B.6 User data packet transfer (HI3 CS) + +### ASN.1 description of circuit data transfer operation (HI3 interface) + +``` +UMTS-HI3CircuitLIOperations +{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulintercept(2) threeGPP(4) +hi3CS(4) r16(16) version0(0)} + +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + +-- The following operations are used to transmit user data, which can be exchanged via the DSS1, +-- ISUP or MAP signalling (e.g. UUS). + +BEGIN + +IMPORTS + + LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + CommunicationIdentifier, + TimeStamp, + OperationErrors, + Supplementary-Services + + FROM HI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) +lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) version18(18)} -- Imported from TS 101 671 v3.12.1 + +SMS-report + FROM UmtsHI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulintercept(2) +threeGPP(4) hi2(1) r16(16) version-0(0)}; + +-- Object Identifier Definitions + +-- Security DomainId + +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} + +-- Security Subdomains +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +hi3CSDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi3CS(4) r16(16) version-0(0)} +``` + +``` + +UMTS-Content-Report ::= SEQUENCE +{ + hi3CSDomainId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, -- 3GPP HI3 CS Domain. + -- When FTP is used this parameter shall be sent to LEMF. + version [23] ENUMERATED + { + version1(1), + ... , + -- versions 2-7 were omitted to align with UmtsHI2Operations. + version8(8) + } OPTIONAL, + -- Optional parameter "version" (tag 23) became redundant starting from + -- 33.108v6.8.0, where the object identifier "hi3CSDomainId" was introduced into + -- "UMTS-Content-Report". In order to keep backward compatibility, even when the + -- version of the "hi3CSDomainId" parameter will be incremented it is recommended to + -- always send to LEMF the same: enumeration value "lastVersion(8)". + lawfulInterceptionIdentifier [6] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier OPTIONAL, + communicationIdentifier [1] CommunicationIdentifier, + -- Used to uniquely identify an intercepted call: the same as used for the relevant IRI. + -- Called "callIdentifier" in edition 1 ES 201 671. + timeStamp [2] TimeStamp, + initiator [3] ENUMERATED + { + originating-party(0), + terminating-party(1), + forwarded-to-party(2), + undefined-party(3), + ... + } OPTIONAL, + content [4] Supplementary-Services OPTIONAL, + -- UUI are encoded in the format defined for the User-to-user information parameter + -- of the ISUP protocol (see EN 300 356 [30]). Only one UUI parameter is sent per message. + sMS-report [5] SMS-report OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +END -- UMTS-HI3CircuitLIOperations + +## B.7 Intercept related information (and I-WLAN) + +**NOTE:** WLAN Interworking specification (TS 29.234 [41]) is no longer maintained in Release 12 and onwards. Therefore, this clause is not maintained Release 12 and onwards. + +### ASN1 description of IRI (HI2 interface) + +``` + +I-WLANUmtsHI2Operations {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) +lawfulintercept(2) threeGPP(4) hi2wlan(6) r16 (16) version-0 (0)} + +``` + +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + +BEGIN + +IMPORTS + +``` + + LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + TimeStamp, + Network-Identifier, + National-Parameters, + National-HI2-ASN1parameters, + DataNodeAddress, + IPAddress + + FROM HI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) + lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) version18 (18)} -- Imported from TS 101 671 v.12.1 + + GeographicalCoordinates, + CivicAddress + + FROM UmtsHI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) + lawfulintercept(2) threeGPP(4) hi2(1) r16 (16) version-0 (0)}; + +``` + +``` +-- Imported from 3GPP TS 33.108, UMTS PS HI2 +``` + +``` +-- Object Identifier Definitions +``` + +``` +-- Security DomainId +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} + +-- Security Subdomains +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +hi2wlanDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi2wlan(6) r16(16) version-1(1)} +``` + +``` +IWLANUmtsIRIsContent ::= CHOICE +{ + iWLANumtsIRIContent IWLANUmtsIRIContent, + iWLANumtsIRISequence IWLANUmtsIRISequence +} + +IWLANUmtsIRISequence ::= SEQUENCE OF IWLANUmtsIRIContent +``` + +``` +-- Aggregation of IWLANUmtsIRIContent is an optional feature. +-- It may be applied in cases when at a given point in time +-- several IRI records are available for delivery to the same LEA destination. +-- As a general rule, records created at any event shall be sent +-- immediately and not withheld in the DF or MF in order to +-- apply aggregation. +-- When aggregation is not to be applied, +-- IWLANUmtsIRIContent needs to be chosen. +``` + +``` +IWLANUmtsIRIContent ::= CHOICE +{ + iRI-Begin-record [1] IRI-Parameters, + iRI-End-record [2] IRI-Parameters, + iRI-Report-record [3] IRI-Parameters, + ... +} +``` + +``` +IRI-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE +{ + hi2iWlanDomainId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- 3GPP HI2 WLAN domain + lawfulInterceptionIdentifier [2] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + -- This identifier is associated to the target. + timeStamp [3] Timestamp, + -- date and time of the event triggering the report. + initiator [4] ENUMERATED + { + not-Available (0), + originating-Target (1), + -- in case of I-WLAN, this indicates that the I-WLAN tunnel disconnect is WLAN UE + -- requested. + terminating-Target (2), + -- in case of I-WLAN, this indicates that the I-WLAN tunnel disconnect is network + -- initiated. + ... + } OPTIONAL, + + partyInformation [5] SET SIZE (1..10) OF PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- This parameter provides the concerned party, the identity(ies) of the party + -- and all the information provided by the party. + + national-Parameters [6] National-Parameters OPTIONAL, + networkIdentifier [7] Network-Identifier OPTIONAL, + i-WLANEvent [8] I-WLANEvent OPTIONAL, + correlationNumber [9] CorrelationNumber OPTIONAL, + i-WLANOperationErrorCode [10] I-WLANOperationErrorCode OPTIONAL, + + i-wLANinformation [11] I-WLANinformation OPTIONAL, + visitedPLMNID [12] VisitedPLMNID OPTIONAL, + national-HI2-ASN1parameters [255] National-HI2-ASN1parameters OPTIONAL, + + ... + nSAPI [13] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1)) OPTIONAL, + -- Include either Octet 2 of the NSAPI IE of 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] + -- or Octet 2 of the NSAPI IE of 3GPP TS 29.060 [17]. + packetDataHeaderInformation [14] PacketDataHeaderInformation OPTIONAL +} +``` + +## -- PARAMETERS FORMATS + +``` + +PartyInformation ::= SEQUENCE +{ + party-Qualifier [0] ENUMERATED + { + iWLAN-Target(1), + ... + }, + partyIdentity [1] SEQUENCE + { + imsi [2] OCTET STRING (SIZE (3..8)) OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Station Identity E.212 number beginning with Mobile Country Code + + msISDN [3] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..9)) OPTIONAL, + -- MSISDN of the target, encoded in the same format as the AddressString + -- parameters defined in MAP format document TS 29.002 [4] + + nai [7] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- NAI of the target, encoded in the same format as + -- defined in 3GPP TS 29.234 [41]. + ... + }, + + services-Data-Information [2] Services-Data-Information OPTIONAL, + -- This parameter is used to transmit all the information concerning the + -- complementary information associated to the basic data call + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +CorrelationNumber ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8..20)) + +``` + +``` + +I-WLANEvent ::= ENUMERATED +{ + i-WLANAccessInitiation (1), + i-WLANAccessTermination (2), + i-WLAN Tunnel Establishment (3), + i-WLAN Tunnel Disconnect (4), + startOfInterceptionCommunicationActive (5), + ..., + packetDataHeaderInformation (6) +} +-- see [19] + +``` + +``` + +Services-Data-Information ::= SEQUENCE +{ + i-WLAN-parameters [1] I-WLAN-parameters OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +I-WLAN-parameters ::= SEQUENCE +{ + wlan-local-IP-address-of-the-target [1] DataNodeAddress OPTIONAL, + w-APN [2] OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..100)) OPTIONAL, + -- The Access Point Name (APN) is coded in accordance with + -- 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] without the APN IEI (only the last 100 octets are used). + -- Octets are coded according to 3GPP TS 23.003 [25]. + wlan-remote-IP-address-of-the-target [3] DataNodeAddress OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +I-WLANOperationErrorCode ::= OCTET STRING +-- The parameter shall carry the I-WLAN failed tunnel establishment reason, the I-WLAN Failed +-- Access +-- Initiation reason or the I-WLAN session termination reason. + +``` + +``` + +I-WLANinformation ::= SEQUENCE +{ + WLANOperatorName [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + WLANLocationData [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +} + +``` + +``` + + wlanLocationInformation [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + nASIPIPv6Address [4] IPAddress OPTIONAL, + wlanMACAddress [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + sessionAliveTimer [6] SessionAliveTime OPTIONAL, + ..., +--These parameters are defined in 3GPP TS 29.234. + geographicalCoordinates [7] GeographicalCoordinates OPTIONAL, + civicAddress [8] CivicAddress OPTIONAL +} + +``` + +``` + +VisitedPLMNID ::= OCTET STRING +-- The parameter shall carry the VisitedPLMNID as defined in 3GPP TS 29.234. + +``` + +``` + +SessionAliveTime ::= OCTET STRING +--The parameter shall carry the SessionAliveTime as defined in 3GPP TS 29.234. + +``` + +``` + +PacketDataHeaderInformation ::= CHOICE +{ + packetDataHeader [1] PacketDataHeaderReport, + packetDataSummary [2] PacketDataSummaryReport, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PacketDataHeaderReport ::= CHOICE +{ + packetDataHeaderMapped [1] PacketDataHeaderMapped, + packetDataHeaderCopy [2] PacketDataHeaderCopy, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PacketDataHeaderMapped ::= SEQUENCE +{ + sourceIPAddress [1] IPAddress OPTIONAL, + sourcePortNumber [2] INTEGER (0..65535) OPTIONAL, + destinationIPAddress [3] IPAddress OPTIONAL, + destinationPortNumber [4] INTEGER (0..65535) OPTIONAL, + transportProtocol [5] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + -- For IPv4, report the "Protocol" field and for IPv6 report "Next Header" field. + -- Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers can be found at + -- http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/protocol-numbers.xml + packetsize [6] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + flowLabel [7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + packetCount [8] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + direction [9] TPDU-direction, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +TPDU-direction ::= ENUMERATED +{ + from-target (1), + to-target (2), + unknown (3) +} + +``` + +``` + +PacketDataHeaderCopy ::= SEQUENCE +{ + direction [1] TPDU-direction, + headerCopy [2] OCTET STRING, -- includes a copy of the packet header at the IP + -- network layer and above including extension headers, but excluding contents. + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PacketDataSummaryReport ::= SEQUENCE OF PacketFlowSummary + +``` + +``` + +PacketFlowSummary ::= SEQUENCE +{ + sourceIPAddress [1] IPAddress, + sourcePortNumber [2] INTEGER (0..65535) OPTIONAL, + destinationIPAddress [3] IPAddress, +} + +``` + +``` + + destinationPortNumber [4] INTEGER (0..65535) OPTIONAL, + transportProtocol [5] INTEGER, + -- For IPv4, report the "Protocol" field and for IPv6 report "Next Header" field. + -- Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers can be found at + -- http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/protocol-numbers.xml + flowLabel [6] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + summaryPeriod [7] ReportInterval, + packetCount [8] INTEGER, + sumOfPacketSizes [9] INTEGER, + packetDataSummaryReason [10] ReportReason, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +ReportReason ::= ENUMERATED +{ + timerExpired (0), + countThresholdHit (1), + pDPContextDeactivated (2), + pDPContextModification (3), + otherOrUnknown (4), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +ReportInterval ::= SEQUENCE +{ + firstPacketTimeStamp [0] TimeStamp, + lastPacketTimeStamp [1] TimeStamp, + ... +} + +``` + +END -- OF IWLANUmtsHI2Operations + +## B.8 Intercept related information (MBMS) + +### ASN1 description of IRI (HI2 interface) + +``` + +MBMSUmtsHI2Operations {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) +lawfulintercept(2) threeGPP(4) hi2mbms(7) r16 (16) version0 (0)} + +``` + +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + +BEGIN + +IMPORTS + +``` + + LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + TimeStamp, + Network-Identifier, + National-Parameters, + National-HI2-ASN1parameters, + IPAddress + +``` + +``` + + FROM HI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) + lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) version18 (18)}; + -- Imported from TS 101 671 V3.12.1 + +``` + +-- Object Identifier Definitions + +``` + +-- Security DomainId +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} + +``` + +``` + +-- Security Subdomains +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +hi2mbmsDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi2mbms(7) r16 (16) version0 (0)} + +``` + +``` + +MBMSUmtsIRIContent ::= CHOICE +{ + mBMSumtsiRIContent [1] MBMSUmtsIRIContent, +} + +``` + +``` + + mBMSumtsIRISequence [2] MBMSumtsIRISequence + } + + MBMSumtsIRISequence ::= SEQUENCE OF MBMSumtsIRIContent + + -- Aggregation of MBMSumtsIRIContent is an optional feature. + -- It may be applied in cases when at a given point in time + -- several IRI records are available for delivery to the same LEA destination. + -- As a general rule, records created at any event shall be sent + -- immediately and not withheld in the DF or MF in order to + -- apply aggregation. + -- When aggregation is not to be applied, + -- MBMSumtsIRIContent needs to be chosen. + +``` + +``` + + MBMSumtsIRIContent ::= CHOICE + { + iRI-Begin-record [1] IRI-Parameters, + iRI-End-record [2] IRI-Parameters, + iRI-Report-record [3] IRI-Parameters, + ... + } + +``` + +``` + + IRI-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE + { + hi2mbmsDomainId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- 3GPP HI2 MBMS domain + lawfulInterceptionIdentifier [2] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + -- This identifier is associated to the target. + timeStamp [3] Timestamp, + -- date and time of the event triggering the report. + initiator [4] ENUMERATED + { + not-Available (0), + originating-Target (1), + -- in case of MBMS, this indicates that the MBMS UE has initiated the MBMS session + -- or initiated the subscription management event. + network-initiated (2), + -- in case of MBMS, this indicates that the MBMS has initiated the MBMS session. + off-online-action (3), + -- in case of MBMS, this indicates a subscription management event has occurred as the + -- result of an MBMS operator customer services function or other subscription updates + -- not initiated by the MBMS UE. + ... + } OPTIONAL, + + partyInformation [5] SET SIZE (1..10) OF PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- This parameter provides the concerned party, the identity(ies) of the party + -- and all the information provided by the party. + + national-Parameters [6] National-Parameters OPTIONAL, + networkIdentifier [7] Network-Identifier OPTIONAL, + mBMSEvent [8] MBMSEvent OPTIONAL, + correlationNumber [9] CorrelationNumber OPTIONAL, + mbmsInformation [10] MBMSinformation OPTIONAL, + visitedPLMNID [11] VisitedPLMNID OPTIONAL, + national-HI2-ASN1parameters [12] National-HI2-ASN1parameters OPTIONAL, + ... + } + +``` + +#### -- PARAMETERS FORMATS + +``` + + PartyInformation ::= SEQUENCE + { + party-Qualifier [0] ENUMERATED + { + mBMS-Target(1), + ... + }, + partyIdentity [1] SEQUENCE + { + imsi [1] OCTET STRING (SIZE (3..8)) OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Station Identity E.212 number beginning with Mobile Country Code + ... + } + } + +``` + +``` + + }, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +CorrelationNumber ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8..20)) + +``` + +``` + +MBMSEvent ::= ENUMERATED +{ + mBMSServiceJoining (1), + mBMSServiceLeaving (2), + mBMSSubscriptionActivation (3), + mBMSSubscriptionModification (4), + mBMSSubscriptionTermination (5), + startOfInterceptWithMBMSServiceActive (6), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +Services-Data-Information ::= SEQUENCE +{ + mBMSparameters [1] MBMSparameters OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +MBMSparameters ::= SEQUENCE +{ + aPN [1] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- The Access Point Name (APN) is coded in accordance with + -- 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] without the APN IEI (only the last 100 octets are used). + -- Octets are coded according to 3GPP TS 23.003 [25]. + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +MBMSinformation ::= SEQUENCE +{ + mbmsServiceName [1] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + mbms-join-time [2] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + mbms-Mode [3] ENUMERATED + { + multicast (0), + broadcast (1), + ... + } OPTIONAL, + mbmsIPIPv6Address [4] IPAddress OPTIONAL, + mbmsLeavingReason [5] ENUMERATED + { + uInitiatedRequested (0), + bMSCorNetworkTerminated (1), + ... + } OPTIONAL, + mbmsSubsTermReason [6] ENUMERATED + { + userInitiated (0), + subscriptionExpired (1), + ... + } OPTIONAL, + mBMSapn [7] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- The Access Point Name (APN) is coded in accordance with + -- 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] without the APN IEI (only the last 100 octets are used). + -- Octets are coded according to 3GPP TS 23.003 [25]. + mbmsSerSubscriberList [8] MBMSSerSubscriberList OPTIONAL, + mbmsNodeList [9] MBMSNodeList OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +MBMSSerSubscriberList ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE +{ + mBMSSERSUBSCRIBERLIST [1] UTF8String, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +MBMSNodeList ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE +{ + mBMSNodeList [1] SEQUENCE + { + mbmsnodeIPAddress [1] IPAddress OPTIONAL, + mbmsnodeName [2] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + ... + }, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +VisitedPLMNID ::= UTF8String + +``` + +``` + +END -- OF MBMSUmshI2Operations + +``` + +## B.9 Intercept related information (HI2 SAE/EPS and IMS) + +### ASN1 description of IRI (HI2 interface) + +``` + +EpsHI2Operations {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulintercept(2) +threeGPP(4) hi2eps(8) r16 (16) version-1 (1)} + +``` + +``` + +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + +``` + +``` + +BEGIN + +``` + +``` + +IMPORTS + + LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + TimeStamp, + Network-Identifier, + National-Parameters, + National-HI2-ASN1parameters, + DataNodeAddress, + IPAddress, + IP-value, + X25Address + + FROM HI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) + lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) version18(18)} -- Imported from TS 101 671 v3.14.1 + + CivicAddress, + ExtendedLocParameters, + LocationErrorCode + + FROM UmshI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) + lawfulintercept(2) threeGPP(4) hi2(1) r16 (16) version-0 (0)}; + -- Imported from 3GPP TS 33.108, UMTS PS HI2 + +``` + +``` + +-- Object Identifier Definitions + +-- Security DomainId +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} + +-- Security Subdomains +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +hi2epsDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi2eps(8) r16(16) version-1 (1)} + +``` + +``` + +EpsIRIsContent ::= CHOICE +{ + epsiRIContent EpsIRIContent, + epsiRISequence EpsIRISequence +} + +EpsIRISequence ::= SEQUENCE OF EpsIRIContent + +``` + +``` + +-- Aggregation of EpsIRIContent is an optional feature. +-- It may be applied in cases when at a given point in time +-- several IRI records are available for delivery to the same LEA destination. +-- As a general rule, records created at any event shall be sent +-- immediately and not withheld in the DF or MF in order to +-- apply aggregation. +-- When aggregation is not to be applied, +-- EpsIRIContent needs to be chosen. +-- EpsIRIContent includes events that correspond to EPS and UMTS/GPRS. + +``` + +``` + +EpsIRIContent ::= CHOICE +{ + iRI-Begin-record [1] IRI-Parameters, -- include at least one optional parameter + iRI-End-record [2] IRI-Parameters, + iRI-Continue-record [3] IRI-Parameters, -- include at least one optional parameter + iRI-Report-record [4] IRI-Parameters -- include at least one optional parameter +} +-- the EpsIRIContent may provide events that correspond to UMTS/GPRS as well. + +``` + +``` + +-- Parameters having the same tag numbers have to be identical in Rel-5 and onwards modules. +IRI-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE +{ + hi2epsDomainId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- 3GPP HI2 EPS domain + lawfulInterceptionIdentifier [1] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + -- This identifier is associated to the target. + timeStamp [3] Timestamp, + -- date and time of the event triggering the report.) + initiator [4] ENUMERATED + { + not-Available (0), + originating-Target (1), + -- in case of GPRS, this indicates that the PDP context activation, modification + -- or deactivation is MS requested + -- in case of EPS, this indicated that the EPS detach, bearer activation, modification + -- or deactivation is UE requested + terminating-Target (2), + -- in case of GPRS, this indicates that the PDP context activation, modification or + -- deactivation is network initiated + -- in case of EPS, this indicated that the EPS detach, bearer activation, modification + -- or deactivation is network initiated + ... + } OPTIONAL, + + locationOfTheTarget [8] Location OPTIONAL, + -- location of the target + -- or cell site location + partyInformation [9] SET SIZE (1..10) OF PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- This parameter provides the concerned party, the identi(ies) of the party + --)and all the information provided by the party. + + serviceCenterAddress [13] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- e.g. in case of SMS message this parameter provides the address of the relevant + -- server + sMS [14] SMS-report OPTIONAL, + -- this parameter provides the SMS content and associated information + + national-Parameters [16] National-Parameters OPTIONAL, + ePSCorrelationNumber [18] EPSCorrelationNumber OPTIONAL, + -- this parameter provides GPRS Correlation number when the event corresponds to UMTS/GPRS. + ePSEvent [20] EPSEvent OPTIONAL, + -- This information is used to provide particular action of the target + -- such as attach/detach + sgsnAddress [21] DataNodeAddress OPTIONAL, + gPRSOOperationErrorCode [22] GPRSOOperationErrorCode OPTIONAL, + ggsnAddress [24] DataNodeAddress OPTIONAL, + qoS [25] UmtsQoS OPTIONAL, + networkIdentifier [26] Network-Identifier OPTIONAL, + sMSOriginatingAddress [27] DataNodeAddress OPTIONAL, + sMSTerminatingAddress [28] DataNodeAddress OPTIONAL, + iMSEvent [29] IMSEvent OPTIONAL, + sIPMessage [30] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + servingSGSN-number [31] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..20)) OPTIONAL, + servingSGSN-address [32] OCTET STRING (SIZE (5..17)) OPTIONAL, + -- Octets are coded according to 3GPP TS 23.003 [25] + ..., + -- Tag [33] was taken into use by ETSI module in TS 101 671v2.13.1 +} + +``` + +``` + +ldiEvent [34] LDIEvent OPTIONAL, +correlation [35] CorrelationValues OPTIONAL, +ePS-GTPV2-specificParameters [36] EPS-GTPV2-SpecificParameters OPTIONAL, +-- contains parameters to be used in case of GTPV2 based intercepted messages +ePS-PMIP-specificParameters [37] EPS-PMIP-SpecificParameters OPTIONAL, +-- contains parameters to be used in case of PMIP based intercepted messages +ePS-DSMIP-SpecificParameters [38] EPS-DSMIP-SpecificParameters OPTIONAL, +-- contains parameters to be used in case of DSMIP based intercepted messages +ePS-MIP-SpecificParameters [39] EPS-MIP-SpecificParameters OPTIONAL, +-- contains parameters to be used in case of MIP based intercepted messages +servingNodeAddress [40] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +-- this parameter is kept for backward compatibility only and should not be used +-- as it has been superseded by parameter visitedNetworkId +visitedNetworkId [41] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +-- contains the visited network identifier inside the Serving System Update for +-- non 3GPP access and IMS, coded according to [53] and 3GPP TS 29.229 [96] + +mediaDecryption-info [42] MediaDecryption-info OPTIONAL, +servingS4-SGSN-address [43] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +-- Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm of the S4-SGSN based on the TS 29.272 [59]. +-- Only the data fields from the Diameter AVPs are provided concatenated +-- with a semicolon to populate this field. + +sipMessageHeaderOffer [44] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +sipMessageHeaderAnswer [45] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +sdpOffer [46] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +sdpAnswer [47] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +uliTimestamp [48] OCTET STRING (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL, +-- Coded according to 3GPP TS 29.060 [17]; The upper 4 octets shall carry the ULI Timestamp +-- value; The lower 4 octets are undefined and shall be ignored by the receiver + +packetDataHeaderInformation [49] PacketDataHeaderInformation OPTIONAL, +mediaSecFailureIndication [50] MediaSecFailureIndication OPTIONAL, +csgIdentity [51] OCTET STRING (SIZE (4)) OPTIONAL, -- Octets are coded +-- according to 3GPP TS 23.003 [25]. The 27 bits specified in TS 23.003 shall be encoded as. +-- follows The most significant bit of the CSG Identity shall be encoded in the most +-- significant bit of the first octet of the octet string and the least significant bit coded +-- in bit 6 of octet 4. +heNBIdentity [52] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +-- 4 or 6 octets are coded with the HNBUnique Identity +-- as specified in 3GPP TS 23.003 [25], Clause 4.10. +heNBIPAddress [53] IPAddress OPTIONAL, +heNBLocation [54] HeNBLocation OPTIONAL, +tunnelProtocol [55] TunnelProtocol OPTIONAL, +pANI-Header-Info [56] SEQUENCE OF PANI-Header-Info OPTIONAL, +-- information extracted from P-Access-Network-Info headers of SIP message; +-- described in TS 24.229 §7.2A.4 [76] +imsVoIP [57] IMS-VoIP-Correlation OPTIONAL, +xCAPmessage [58] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +-- The HTTP message (HTTP header and any XCAP body) of any of the target's IMS supplementary +-- service setting management or manipulation XCAP messages occurring through the Ut interface +-- defined in the 3GPP TS 24 623 [77]. +logicalFunctionInformation [59] DataNodeIdentifier OPTIONAL, +ccUnavailableReason [60] PrintableString OPTIONAL, +carrierSpecificData [61] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +-- Copy of raw data specified by the CSP or his vendor related to HSS. +current-previous-systems [62] Current-Previous-Systems OPTIONAL, +change-Of-Target-Identity [63] Change-Of-Target-Identity OPTIONAL, +requesting-Network-Identifier [64] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +-- the requesting network identifier PLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, +-- defined in E212 [87]). +requesting-Node-Type [65] Requesting-Node-Type OPTIONAL, +serving-System-Identifier [66] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +-- the serving network identifier PLMN id (MNC, Mobile Country Code and MNC, Mobile Network +-- Country, defined in E212 [87]) and 3GPP TR 21.905 [38], that may be included in the Diameter +-- AVP to and from the HSS. + +proSeTargetType [67] ProSeTargetType OPTIONAL, +proSeRelayMSISDN [68] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..9)) OPTIONAL, +-- coded according to 3GPP TS 29.274 [46] + +proSeRelayIMSI [69] OCTET STRING (SIZE (3..8)) OPTIONAL, +-- coded according to 3GPP TS 29.274 [46] + +proSeRelayIMEI [70] OCTET STRING (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL, +-- coded according to 3GPP TS 29.274 [46] + +extendedLocParameters [71] ExtendedLocParameters OPTIONAL, -- LALS extended parameters + +``` + +``` + + locationErrorCode [72] LocationErrorCode OPTIONAL, -- LALS error code + + otherIdentities [73] SEQUENCE OF PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + deregistrationReason [74] DeregistrationReason OPTIONAL, + requesting-Node-Identifier [75] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + roamingIndication [76] VoIPRoamingIndication OPTIONAL, + -- used for IMS events in the VPLMN. + csREvent [77] CSREvent OPTIONAL, + ptc [78] PTC OPTIONAL, -- PTC Events + ptcEncryption [79] PTCEncryptionInfo OPTIONAL, + -- PTC Encryption Information + additionalCellIDs [80] SEQUENCE OF AdditionalCellID OPTIONAL, + scefID [81] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- SCEF-ID FQDN as defined by TS 29.336 [101], clause 8.4.5 and RFC 3588 [102] section 4.3 + national-HI2-ASN1parameters [255] National-HI2-ASN1parameters OPTIONAL +} + +-- Parameters having the same tag numbers have to be identical in Rel-5 and onwards modules + +``` + +-- PARAMETERS FORMATS + +``` + +DataNodeIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE +{ + dataNodeAddress [1] DataNodeAddress OPTIONAL, + logicalFunctionType [2] LogicalFunctionType OPTIONAL, + dataNodeName [3] PrintableString(SIZE(7..25)) OPTIONAL, + --Unique identifier of a Data Node within the CSP domain. Could be a name/number combination. + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +LogicalFunctionType ::= ENUMERATED +{ + pDNGW (0), + mME (1), + sGW (2), + ePDG (3), + hSS (4), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PANI-Header-Info ::= SEQUENCE +{ + access-Type [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- ASCII chain '3GPP-UTRAN-TDD', '3GPP-E-UTRAN-TDD',... : see TS 24.229 §7.2A.4 [76] + access-Class [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- ASCII chain '3GPP-UTRAN', '3GPP-E-UTRAN',... : see TS 24.229 §7.2A.4 [76] + network-Provided [3] NULL OPTIONAL, + -- present if provided by the network + pANI-Location [4] PANI-Location OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PANI-Location ::= SEQUENCE +{ + raw-Location [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- raw copy of the location string from the P-Access-Network-Info header + location [2] Location OPTIONAL, + ePSLocation [3] EPSLocation OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PartyInformation ::= SEQUENCE +{ + party-Qualifier [0] ENUMERATED + { + gPRSorEPS-Target(3), + ... + }, + partyIdentity [1] SEQUENCE + { + imei [1] OCTET STRING (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] + + imsi [3] OCTET STRING (SIZE (3..8)) OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Station Identity E.212 number beginning with Mobile Country Code + + msISDN [6] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..9)) OPTIONAL, + } +} + +``` + +``` + + -- MSISDN of the target, encoded in the same format as the AddressString + -- parameters defined in MAP format document TS 29.002 [4] + + e164-Format [7] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1 .. 25)) OPTIONAL, + -- E164 address of the node in international format. Coded in the same format as + -- the calling party number parameter of the ISUP (parameter part:[29]) + + sip-uri [8] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- See [26] + + ..., + tel-uri [9] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- See [67] + + nai [10] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- NAI of the target, encoded in the same format as defined by [EPS stage 3 specs] + + x-3GPP-Asserted-Identity [11] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- X-3GPP-Asserted-Identity header (3GPP TS 24.109 [79]) of the target, used in + -- some XCAP transactions as a complement information to SIP URI or Tel URI. + + xUI [12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- XCAP User Identifier (XUI) is a string, valid as a path element in an XCAP URI, that is + -- may be associated with each user served by a XCAP resource server. Defined in IETF RFC + -- 4825[80] as a complement information to SIP URI or Tel URI + + iMPI [13] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- Private User Identity as defined in 3GPP TS 23.003 [25] + + extID [14] UTF8String OPTIONAL + -- RFC 4282 [102] compliant string as per TS 23.003 [25], clause 19.7.2 + + }, + + services-Data-Information [4] Services-Data-Information OPTIONAL, + -- This parameter is used to transmit all the information concerning the + -- complementary information associated to the basic data call + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +Location ::= SEQUENCE +{ + e164-Number [1] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..25)) OPTIONAL, + -- Coded in the same format as the ISUP location number (parameter + -- field) of the ISUP (see EN 300 356 [30]). + + globalCellID [2] GlobalCellID OPTIONAL, + --see MAP format (see [4]) + + rAI [4] Rai OPTIONAL, + -- the Routeing Area Identifier in the current SGSN is coded in accordance with the + -- § 10.5.5.15 of document [9] without the Routing Area Identification IEI + -- (only the last 6 octets are used) + + gsmLocation [5] GSMLocation OPTIONAL, + umtsLocation [6] UMTSLocation OPTIONAL, + sAI [7] Sai OPTIONAL, + -- format: PLMN-ID 3 octets (no. 1 - 3) + -- LAC 2 octets (no. 4 - 5) + -- SAC 2 octets (no. 6 - 7) + -- (according to 3GPP TS 25.413 [62]) + + ..., + oldRAI [8] Rai OPTIONAL, + -- the Routeing Area Identifier in the old SGSN is coded in accordance with the + -- § 10.5.5.15 of document [9] without the Routing Area Identification IEI + -- (only the last 6 octets are used). + + civicAddress [9] CivicAddress OPTIONAL, + operatorSpecificInfo [10] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- other CSP specific information. + + uELocationTimestamp [11] CHOICE + { + timestamp [0] TimeStamp, + timestampUnknown [1] NULL, + ... + } OPTIONAL + -- Date/time of the UE location +} + +``` + +``` + +GlobalCellID ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (5..7)) +Rai ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (6)) +Sai ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (7)) + +``` + +``` + +AdditionalCellID ::= SEQUENCE +{ + +``` + +``` + + nCGI [1] NCGI, + gsmLocation [2] GSMLocation OPTIONAL, + umtsLocation [3] UMTSLocation OPTIONAL, + timeOfLocation [4] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +MCC ::= NumericString (SIZE(3)) + +MNC ::= NumericString (SIZE(2..3)) + +PLMNID ::= SEQUENCE +{ + mCC [1] MCC, + mNC [2] MNC, + ... +} + +-- TS 36.413 [100], clause 9.2.1.142 +NRCellID ::= BIT STRING (SIZE(36)) + +NCGI ::= SEQUENCE +{ + pLMNID [1] PLMNID, + nRCellID [2] NRCellID, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +GSMLocation ::= CHOICE +{ + geoCoordinates [1] SEQUENCE + { + latitude [1] PrintableString (SIZE(7..10)), + -- format : XDDMMSS.SS + longitude [2] PrintableString (SIZE(8..11)), + -- format : XDDMMSS.SS + mapDatum [3] MapDatum DEFAULT wGS84, + ... + azimuth [4] INTEGER (0..359) OPTIONAL + -- The azimuth is the bearing, relative to true north. + }, + + -- format : XDDMMSS.SS + -- X : N(orth), S(outh), E(ast), W(est) + -- DD or DDD : degrees (numeric characters) + -- MM : minutes (numeric characters) + -- SS.SS : seconds, the second part (.SS) is optional + -- Example : + -- latitude short form N502312 + -- longitude long form E1122312.18 + + utmCoordinates [2] SEQUENCE + { + utm-East [1] PrintableString (SIZE(10)), + utm-North [2] PrintableString (SIZE(7)), + -- example utm-East 32U0439955 + -- utm-North 5540736 + mapDatum [3] MapDatum DEFAULT wGS84, + ... + azimuth [4] INTEGER (0..359) OPTIONAL + -- The azimuth is the bearing, relative to true north. + }, + + utmRefCoordinates [3] SEQUENCE + { + utmref-string PrintableString (SIZE(13)), + mapDatum MapDatum DEFAULT wGS84, + ... + }, + -- example 32UPU91294045 + + wGS84Coordinates [4] OCTET STRING + -- format is as defined in [37]. +} + +MapDatum ::= ENUMERATED +{ + wGS84, + +``` + +``` + + wGS72, + eD50, -- European Datum 50 + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +UMTSLocation ::= CHOICE { + point [1] GA-Point, + pointWithUnCertainty [2] GA-PointWithUnCertainty, + polygon [3] GA-Polygon +} + +``` + +``` + +GeographicalCoordinates ::= SEQUENCE { + latitudeSign ENUMERATED { north, south }, + latitude INTEGER (0..8388607), + longitude INTEGER (-8388608..8388607), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +GA-Point ::= SEQUENCE { + geographicalCoordinates GeographicalCoordinates, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +GA-PointWithUnCertainty ::= SEQUENCE { + geographicalCoordinates GeographicalCoordinates, + uncertaintyCode INTEGER (0..127) +} + +``` + +``` + +maxNrOfPoints INTEGER ::= 15 + +``` + +``` + +GA-Polygon ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE (1..maxNrOfPoints)) OF + SEQUENCE { + geographicalCoordinates GeographicalCoordinates, + ... + } +} + +``` + +``` + +SMS-report ::= SEQUENCE +{ + sMS-Contents [3] SEQUENCE + { + sms-initiator [1] ENUMERATED -- party which sent the SMS + { + target (0), + server (1), + undefined-party (2), + ... + }, + transfer-status [2] ENUMERATED + { + succeed-transfer (0), -- the transfer of the SMS message succeeds + not-succeed-transfer (1), + undefined (2), + ... + } OPTIONAL, + other-message [3] ENUMERATED -- in case of terminating call, indicates if + -- the server will send other SMS + { + yes (0), + no (1), + undefined (2), + ... + } OPTIONAL, + content [4] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1 .. 270)) OPTIONAL, + -- Encoded in the format defined for the SMS mobile + ... + } +} + +``` + +``` + +EPSCorrelationNumber ::= OCTET STRING +-- In case of PS interception, the size will be in the range (8..20) +CorrelationValues ::= CHOICE { + iri-to-CC [0] IRI-to-CC-Correlation, -- correlates IRI to Content(s) + iri-to-iri [1] IRI-to-IRI-Correlation, -- correlates IRI to IRI + both-IRI-CC [2] SEQUENCE { -- correlates IRI to IRI and IRI to Content(s) + +``` + +``` + + iri-CC [0] IRI-to-CC-Correlation, + iri-IRI [1] IRI-to-IRI-Correlation} +} + +``` + +``` + +IMS-VoIP-Correlation ::= SET OF SEQUENCE { + ims-iri [0] IRI-to-IRI-Correlation, + ims-cc [1] IRI-to-CC-Correlation OPTIONAL +} + +``` + +``` + +IRI-to-CC-Correlation ::= SEQUENCE { -- correlates IRI to Content + cc [0] SET OF OCTET STRING, -- correlates IRI to multiple CCs + iri [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + -- correlates IRI to CC with signaling +} +IRI-to-IRI-Correlation ::= OCTET STRING -- correlates IRI to IRI + +``` + +``` + +EPSEvent ::= ENUMERATED +{ + pDPContextActivation (1), + startOfInterceptionWithDPContextActive (2), + pDPContextDeactivation (4), + gPRSAttach (5), + gPRSDetach (6), + locationInfoUpdate (10), + SMS (11), + pDPContextModification (13), + servingSystem (14), + ... , + startOfInterceptionWithMSAttached (15), + e-UTRANAttach (16), + e-UTRANDetach (17), + bearerActivation (18), + startOfInterceptionWithActiveBearer (19), + bearerModification (20), + bearerDeactivation (21), + uERequestedBearerResourceModification (22), + uERequestedPDNConnectivity (23), + uERequestedPDNDisconnection (24), + trackingAreaEpsLocationUpdate (25), + servingEvolvedPacketSystem (26), + pMIPAttachTunnelActivation (27), + pMIPDetachTunnelDeactivation (28), + startOfInterceptWithActivePMTunnel (29), + pMIPPDnGwInitiatedPdnDisconnection (30), + mIPRegistrationTunnelActivation (31), + mIPDeregistrationTunnelDeactivation (32), + startOfInterceptWithActiveMIP Tunnel (33), + dSMIPRegistrationTunnelActivation (34), + dSMIPDeregistrationTunnelDeactivation (35), + startOfInterceptWithActiveDsmipTunnel (36), + dSMipHaSwitch (37), + pMIPResourceAllocationDeactivation (38), + mIPResourceAllocationDeactivation (39), + pMIPsessionModification (40), + startOfInterceptWithEUTRANAttachedUE (41), + dSMIPSessionModification (42), + packetDataHeaderInformation (43), + hSS-Subscriber-Record-Change (44), + registration-Termination (45), + -- FFS + location-Up-Date (46), + -- FFS + cancel-Location (47), + register-Location (48), + location-Information-Request (49), + proSeRemoteUEReport (50), + proSeRemoteUEStartOfCommunication (51), + proSeRemoteUEEndOfCommunication (52), + startOfLIwithProSeRemoteUEOngoingComm (53), + startOfLIforProSeUETonWRelay (54), + scefRequestednonIPPDNDisconnection (55) +} +-- see [19] + +``` + +``` +CSREvent ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` +{ + cSREventMessage (1), + ... +} +``` + +``` +IMSEvent ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` +{ + unfilteredSIPmessage (1), + -- This value indicates to LEMF that the whole SIP message is sent , i.e. without filtering + -- CC; location information is removed by the DF2/MF if not required to be sent. + + ..., + sIPheaderOnly (2), + -- If warrant requires only IRI then specific content in a 'sIPMessage' + -- (e.g. 'Message', etc.) has been deleted before sending it to LEMF. + + decryptionKeysAvailable (3), + -- This value indicates to LEMF that the IRI carries CC decryption keys for the session + -- under interception. + + startOfInterceptionForIMSEstablishedSession (4), + -- This value indicates to LEMF that the IRI carries information related to + -- interception started on an already established IMS session. + xCAPRequest (5), + -- This value indicates to LEMF that the XCAP request is sent. + xCAPResponse (6) , + -- This value indicates to LEMF that the XCAP response is sent. + ccUnavailable (7), + -- This value indicates to LEMF that the media is not available for interception for intercept + -- orders that require media interception. + sMSOverIMS (8), + -- This value indicates to LEMF that the SMS utilized by SMS over IP (using IMS) is + -- being reported. + servingSystem(9), + -- Applicable to HSS interception + subscriberRecordChange(10), + -- Applicable to HSS interception + registrationTermination(11), + -- Applicable to HSS interception + locationInformationRequest(12) + -- Applicable to HSS interception +} +``` + +``` +Services-Data-Information ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + gPRS-parameters [1] GPRS-parameters OPTIONAL, + ... +} +``` + +``` +GPRS-parameters ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + pDP-address-allocated-to-the-target [1] DataNodeAddress OPTIONAL, + aPN [2] OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..100)) OPTIONAL, + -- The Access Point Name (APN) is coded in accordance with + -- 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] without the APN IEI (only the last 100 octets are used). + -- Octets are coded according to 3GPP TS 23.003 [25]. + + pDP-type [3] OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) OPTIONAL, + -- Include either Octets 3 and 4 of the Packet Data Protocol Address information element + -- of 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] or Octets 4 and 5 of the End User Address IE of 3GPP TS 29.060 [17]. + -- when PDP-type is IPv4 or IPv6, the IP address is carried by parameter + -- pDP-address-allocated-to-the-target + -- when PDP-type is IPv4v6, the additional IP address is carried by parameter + -- additionalIPaddress + ..., + nSAPI [4] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1)) OPTIONAL, + -- Include either Octet 2 of the NSAPI IE of 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] + -- or Octet 2 of the NSAPI IE of 3GPP TS 29.060 [17]. + additionalIPaddress [5] DataNodeAddress OPTIONAL +} +``` + +``` +GPRSOperationErrorCode ::= OCTET STRING +``` + +``` +-- The parameter shall carry the GMM cause value or the SM cause value, as defined in the +-- standard [9], without the IEI. +``` + +``` +LDIEvent ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` +{ + targetEntersIA (1), + targetLeavesIA (2), + ... +} +``` + +``` +UmtsQos ::= CHOICE +``` + +``` +{ + qosMobileRadio [1] OCTET STRING, + -- The qosMobileRadio parameter shall be coded in accordance with the § 10.5.6.5 of + -- document [9] without the Quality of service IEI and Length of + -- quality of service IE (. That is, first + -- two octets carrying 'Quality of service IEI' and 'Length of quality of service + -- IE' shall be excluded). + qosGn [2] OCTET STRING + -- qosGn parameter shall be coded in accordance with § 7.7.34 of document [17] +} +``` + +``` +EPS-GTPV2-SpecificParameters ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + pDNAddressAllocation [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + aPN [2] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..100)) OPTIONAL, + protConfigOptions [3] ProtConfigOptions OPTIONAL, + attachType [4] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1)) OPTIONAL, + -- coded according to TS 24.301 [47] + ePSBearerIdentity [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + detachType [6] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1)) OPTIONAL, + -- coded according to TS 24.301 [47], includes switch off indicator + rATType [7] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1)) OPTIONAL, + failedBearerActivationReason [8] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1)) OPTIONAL, + ePSBearerQoS [9] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + bearerActivationType [10] TypeOfBearer OPTIONAL, + aPN-AMBR [11] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- see 3GPP TS 29.274 [46] parameters coding rules defined for EPS-GTPV2-SpecificParameters. + procedureTransactionId [12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + linkedEPSBearerId [13] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + --The Linked EPS Bearer Identity shall be included and coded according to 3GPP TS 29.274 [46]. + tFT [14] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- Only octets 3 onwards of TFT IE from 3GPP TS 24.008 [9] shall be included. + handoverIndication [15] NULL OPTIONAL, + failedBearerModReason [16] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1)) OPTIONAL, + trafficAggregateDescription [17] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + failedTAUReason [18] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1)) OPTIONAL, + -- coded according to TS 24.301 [47] + failedEUTRANAttachReason [19] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1)) OPTIONAL, + -- coded according to TS 24.301 [47] + servingMMEaddress [20] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- Contains the data fields from the Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm AVPs + -- as received in the HSS from the MME according to the TS 29.272 [59]. + -- Only the data fields from the Diameter AVPs are provided concatenated + -- with a semicolon to populate this field. + bearerDeactivationType [21] TypeOfBearer OPTIONAL, + bearerDeactivationCause [22] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1)) OPTIONAL, + ePSlocationOfTheTarget [23] EPSLocation OPTIONAL, + -- the use of ePSLocationOfTheTarget is mutually exclusive with the use of locationOfTheTarget + -- ePSlocationOfTheTarget allows using the coding of the parameter according to SAE stage 3. + -- location of the target + -- or cell site location + ..., + pDNType [24] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1)) OPTIONAL, + -- coded according to TS 24.301 [47] + + requestType [25] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1)) OPTIONAL, + -- coded according to TS 24.301 [47] + uEReqPDNConnFailReason [26] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1)) OPTIONAL, + -- coded according to TS 24.301 [47] + extendedHandoverIndication [27] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1)) OPTIONAL, + -- This parameter with value 1 indicates handover based on the flags in the TS 29.274 [46]. + -- Otherwise set to the value 0. + -- The use of extendedHandoverIndication and handoverIndication parameters is + -- mutually exclusive and depends on the actual ASN.1 encoding method. + + uLITimestamp [28] OCTET STRING (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL, + -- The upper 4 octets shall carry the ULI Timestamp value; The lower 4 octets are undefined + -- and shall be ignored by the receiver +} +``` + +``` + +uELocalIPAddress [29] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +uEUdpPort [30] OCTET STRING (SIZE (2)) OPTIONAL, +tWANIdentifier [31] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +tWANIdentifierTimestamp [32] OCTET STRING (SIZE (4)) OPTIONAL, +proSeRemoteUeContextConnected [33] RemoteUeContextConnected OPTIONAL, +proSeRemoteUeContextDisconnected [34] RemoteUeContextDisconnected OPTIONAL, +secondaryRATUsageIndication [35] NULL OPTIONAL +} + +``` + +``` + +-- All the parameters within EPS-GTPV2-SpecificParameters are coded as the corresponding IEs +-- without the octets containing type and length. Unless differently stated, they are coded +-- according to 3GPP TS 29.274 [46]; in this case the octet containing the instance +-- shall also be not included. + +``` + +``` + +TypeOfBearer ::= ENUMERATED +{ + defaultBearer (1), + dedicatedBearer (2), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +EPSLocation ::= SEQUENCE +{ + userLocationInfo [1] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..39)) OPTIONAL, + -- see 3GPP TS 29.274 [46] parameters coding rules defined for EPS-GTPV2-SpecificParameters. + gsmLocation [2] GSMLocation OPTIONAL, + umtsLocation [3] UMTSLocation OPTIONAL, + olduserLocationInfo [4] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..39)) OPTIONAL, + -- coded in the same way as userLocationInfo + lastVisitedTAI [5] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..5)) OPTIONAL, + -- the Tracking Area Identity is coded in accordance with the TAI field in 3GPP TS 29.274 + -- [46]. + tAIList [6] OCTET STRING (SIZE (7..97)) OPTIONAL, + -- the TAI List is coded according to 3GPP TS 24.301 [47], without the TAI list IEI + ..., + threeGPP2Bsid [7] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..12)) OPTIONAL, + -- contains only the payload from the 3GPP2-BSID AVP described in the 3GPP TS 29.212 [56]. + civicAddress [8] CivicAddress OPTIONAL, + operatorSpecificInfo [9] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- other CSP specific information. + uELocationTimestamp [10] CHOICE + { + timestamp [0] TimeStamp, + timestampUnknown [1] NULL, + ... + } OPTIONAL + -- Date/time of the UE location +} + +``` + +``` + +ProtConfigOptions ::= SEQUENCE +{ + ueToNetwork [1] OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..251)) OPTIONAL, + -- This shall be coded with octet 3 onwards of the Protocol Configuration Options IE in + -- accordance with 3GPP TS 24.008 [9]. + networkToUe [2] OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..251)) OPTIONAL, + -- This shall be coded with octet 3 onwards of the Protocol Configuration Options IE in + -- accordance with 3GPP TS 24.008 [9]. + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +RemoteUeContextConnected ::= SEQUENCE OF RemoteUeContext + +``` + +``` + +RemoteUeContext ::= SEQUENCE +{ + remoteUserID [1] RemoteUserID, + remoteUEIPInformation [2] RemoteUEIPInformation, + ... +} + +``` + +``` +RemoteUserID ::= OCTET STRING +``` + +``` +RemoteUEIPInformation ::= OCTET STRING +``` + +``` +RemoteUeContextDisconnected ::= RemoteUserID +``` + +``` +EPS-PMIP-SpecificParameters ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + lifetime [1] INTEGER (0..65535) OPTIONAL, + accessTechnologyType [2] OCTET STRING (SIZE (4)) OPTIONAL, + aPN [3] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..100)) OPTIONAL, + iIPv6HomeNetworkPrefix [4] OCTET STRING (SIZE (20)) OPTIONAL, + protConfigurationOption [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + handoverIndication [6] OCTET STRING (SIZE (4)) OPTIONAL, + status [7] INTEGER (0..255) OPTIONAL, + revocationTrigger [8] INTEGER (0..255) OPTIONAL, + iIPv4HomeAddress [9] OCTET STRING (SIZE (4)) OPTIONAL, + iIPv6careOfAddress [10] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + iIPv4careOfAddress [11] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + ..., + servingNetwork [12] OCTET STRING (SIZE (3)) OPTIONAL, + dHCPv4AddressAllocationInd [13] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1)) OPTIONAL, + ePSlocationOfTheTarget [14] EPSLocation OPTIONAL + + -- parameters coded according to 3GPP TS 29.275 [48] and RFCs specifically + -- referenced in it. +} +``` + +``` +EPS-DSMIP-SpecificParameters ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + lifetime [1] INTEGER (0..65535) OPTIONAL, + requestedIPv6HomePrefix [2] OCTET STRING (SIZE (25)) OPTIONAL, + -- coded according to RFC 5026 + homeAddress [3] OCTET STRING (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL, + iIPv4careOfAddress [4] OCTET STRING (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL, + iIPv6careOfAddress [5] OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)) OPTIONAL, + aPN [6] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..100)) OPTIONAL, + status [7] INTEGER (0..255) OPTIONAL, + hSS-AAA-address [8] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + targetPDN-GW-Address [9] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + ... + -- parameters coded according to 3GPP TS 24.303 [49] and RFCs specifically + -- referenced in it. +} +``` + +``` +EPS-MIP-SpecificParameters ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + lifetime [1] INTEGER (0.. 65535) OPTIONAL, + homeAddress [2] OCTET STRING (SIZE (4)) OPTIONAL, + careOfAddress [3] OCTET STRING (SIZE (4)) OPTIONAL, + homeAgentAddress [4] OCTET STRING (SIZE (4)) OPTIONAL, + code [5] INTEGER (0..255) OPTIONAL, + foreignDomainAddress [7] OCTET STRING (SIZE (4)) OPTIONAL, + ... + -- parameters coded according to 3GPP TS 29.279 [63] and RFCs specifically + -- referenced in it. +} +``` + +``` +MediaDecryption-info ::= SEQUENCE OF CCKeyInfo +``` + +``` +-- One or more key can be available for decryption, one for each media streams of the +-- intercepted session. +``` + +``` +CCKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + cCCSID [1] OCTET STRING, + -- the parameter uniquely mapping the key to the encrypted stream. + cCDecKey [2] OCTET STRING, + cCSalt [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- The field reports the value from the CS_ID field in the ticket exchange headers as + -- defined in IETF RFC 6043 [61]. + ... +} +``` + +``` +MediaSecFailureIndication ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` +{ +``` + +``` + +genericFailure (0), +... +} + +``` + +``` + +PacketDataHeaderInformation ::= CHOICE +{ + packetDataHeader [1] PacketDataHeaderReport, + packetDataSummary [2] PacketDataSummaryReport, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PacketDataHeaderReport ::= CHOICE +{ + packetDataHeaderMapped [1] PacketDataHeaderMapped, + packetDataHeaderCopy [2] PacketDataHeaderCopy, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PacketDataHeaderMapped ::= SEQUENCE +{ + sourceIPAddress [1] IPAddress, + sourcePortNumber [2] INTEGER (0..65535) OPTIONAL, + destinationIPAddress [3] IPAddress, + destinationPortNumber [4] INTEGER (0..65535) OPTIONAL, + transportProtocol [5] INTEGER, + -- For IPv4, report the "Protocol" field and for IPv6 report "Next Header" field. + -- Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers can be found at + -- http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/protocol-numbers.xml + packetSize [6] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + flowLabel [7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + packetCount [8] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + direction [9] TPDU-direction, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +TPDU-direction ::= ENUMERATED +{ + from-target (1), + to-target (2), + unknown (3) +} + +``` + +``` + +PacketDataHeaderCopy ::= SEQUENCE +{ + direction [1] TPDU-direction, + headerCopy [2] OCTET STRING, -- includes a copy of the packet header at the IP + -- network layer and above including extension headers, but excluding contents. + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PacketDataSummaryReport ::= SEQUENCE OF PacketFlowSummary + +``` + +``` + +PacketFlowSummary ::= SEQUENCE +{ + sourceIPAddress [1] IPAddress, + sourcePortNumber [2] INTEGER (0..65535) OPTIONAL, + destinationIPAddress [3] IPAddress, + destinationPortNumber [4] INTEGER (0..65535) OPTIONAL, + transportProtocol [5] INTEGER, + -- For IPv4, report the "Protocol" field and for IPv6 report "Next Header" field. + -- Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers can be found at + -- http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/protocol-numbers.xml + flowLabel [6] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + summaryPeriod [7] ReportInterval, + packetCount [8] INTEGER, + sumOfPacketSizes [9] INTEGER, + packetDataSummaryReason [10] ReportReason, + ... +} + +``` + +``` +ReportReason ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` +{ + timerExpired (0), + countThresholdHit (1), + pDPContextDeactivated (2), + pDPContextModification (3), + otherOrUnknown (4), + ... +} +``` + +``` +ReportInterval ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + firstPacketTimeStamp [0] TimeStamp, + lastPacketTimeStamp [1] TimeStamp, + ... +} +``` + +``` +TunnelProtocol ::= CHOICE +``` + +``` +{ + rfc2868ValueField [0] OCTET STRING, -- coded to indicate the type of tunnel established between + -- the HeNB and the SeGW as specified in TS 33.320. The actual coding is provided in 3 octets + -- with the Value field of the Tunnel Type RADIUS attribute as specified in IETF RFC 2868. + -- This corresponds to the outer layer tunnel between the HeNB and the SeGW as viewed by the + -- SeGW + nativeIPSec [1] NULL, -- if native IPSec is required by TS 33.320 between HeNB and SeGW + ... +} +``` + +``` +HeNBLocation ::= EPSLocation +``` + +``` +Requesting-Node-Type ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` +{ + mSC (1), + sMS-Centre (2), + gMLC (3), + mME (4), + sGSN (5), + ... +} +``` + +``` +Change-Of-Target-Identity ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + new-MSISDN [1] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- new MSISDN of the target, encoded in the same format as the AddressString + -- parameters defined in MAP format document TS 29.002 [4] + new-A-MSISDN [2] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- new A-MSISDN of the target, encoded in the same format as the AddressString + -- parameters defined in TS 23.003 [25] + old-MSISDN [3] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- old MSISDN of the target, encoded in the same format as the AddressString + -- parameters defined in MAP format document TS 29.002 [4] + old-A-MSISDN [4] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- old A-MSISDN of the target, encoded in the same format as the AddressString + -- parameters defined in TS 23.003 [25] + new-IMSI [5] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Station Identity E.212 number beginning with Mobile Country Code + old-IMSI [6] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Station Identity E.212 number beginning with Mobile Country Code + new-IMEI [7] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Equipment Identity defined in MAP format document TS 29.002 [4] + old-IMEI [8] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Equipment Identity defined in MAP format document TS 29.002 [4] + ..., + new-IMPI [9] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + old-IMPI [10] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + new-SIP-URI [11] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + old-SIP-URI [12] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + new-TEL-URI [13] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + old-TEL-URI [14] PartyInformation OPTIONAL +} +``` + +``` + +Current-Previous-Systems ::= SEQUENCE +{ + serving-System-Identifier [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- VPLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, E. 212 number [87]). + current-Serving-MME-Address [2] DataNodeIdentifier OPTIONAL, + -- The IP address of the current serving MME or its the Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm. + previous-Serving-System-Identifier [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- VPLMN id (Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Country, defined in E212 [87]). + previous-Serving-MME-Address [4] DataNodeIdentifier OPTIONAL, + -- The IP address of the previous serving MME or its Diameter Origin-Host and Origin-Realm. + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +ProSeTargetType ::= ENUMERATED +{ + pRoSeRemoteUE (1), + pRoSeUEtoNWRelay (2), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +VoIPRoamingIndication ::= ENUMERATED { + roamingLBO (1), -- used in IMS events sent by VPLMN with LBO as roaming + roamingS8HR (2), -- used in IMS events sent by VPLMN with S8HR as roaming + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +DeregistrationReason ::= CHOICE +{ + reason-CodeAVP [1] INTEGER, + server-AssignmentType [2] INTEGER, + -- Coded according to 3GPP TS 29.229 [96] + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PTCEncryptionInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + cipher [1] UTF8String, + cryptoContext [2] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + key [3] UTF8String, + keyEncoding [4] UTF8String, + salt [5] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + pTCOther [6] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PTC ::= SEQUENCE { + abandonCause [1] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + accessPolicyFailure [2] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + accessPolicyType [3] AccessPolicyType OPTIONAL, + alertIndicator [5] AlertIndicator OPTIONAL, + associatePresenceStatus [6] AssociatePresenceStatus OPTIONAL, + bearer-capability [7] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- identifies the Bearer capability information element (value part) + broadcastIndicator [8] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + -- default False, true indicates this is a broadcast to a group + contactID [9] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + emergency [10] Emergency OPTIONAL, + emergencyGroupState [11] EmergencyGroupState OPTIONAL, + timeStamp [12] Timestamp, + pTCType [13] PTCType OPTIONAL, + failureCode [14] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + floorActivity [15] FloorActivity OPTIONAL, + floorSpeakerID [16] PTCAddress OPTIONAL, + groupAdSender [17] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- Identifies the group administrator who was the originator of the group call. + -- tag [18] was used in r15 (15) version-4 (4) + groupAuthRule [19] GroupAuthRule OPTIONAL, + groupCharacteristics [20] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + holdRetrieveInd [21] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + -- true indicates target is placed on hold, false indicates target was retrieved from hold. + -- tag [22] was used in r15 (15) version-4 (4) + imminentPerilInd [23] ImminentPerilInd OPTIONAL, + implicitFloorReq [24] ImplicitFloorReq OPTIONAL, + initiationCause [25] InitiationCause OPTIONAL, + invitationCause [26] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + iPAPartyID [27] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +} + +``` + +``` + +iPADirection [28] IPADirection OPTIONAL, +listManagementAction [29] ListManagementAction OPTIONAL, +listManagementFailure [30] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +listManagementType [31] ListManagementType OPTIONAL, +maxTBTime [32] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- defined in seconds. +mCPTTGroupID [33] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +mCPTTID [34] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +mCPTTInd [35] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, +-- default False indicates to associate from target, true indicates to the target. +location [36] Location OPTIONAL, +mCPTTOrganizationName [37] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +mediaStreamAvail [38] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, +-- True indicates available for media, false indicates not able to accept media. +priority-Level [40] Priority-Level OPTIONAL, +preEstSessionID [41] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +preEstStatus [42] PreEstStatus OPTIONAL, +pTCGroupID [43] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCIDList [44] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCMediaCapability [45] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCOriginatingId [46] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCOther [47] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCParticipants [48] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCParty [49] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCPartyDrop [50] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCSessionInfo [51] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCServerURI [52] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCUserAccessPolicy [53] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +pTCAddress [54] PTCAddress OPTIONAL, +queuedFloorControl [55] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, +--Default FALSE, send TRUE if Queued floor control is used. +queuedPosition [56] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +-- indicates the queued position of the Speaker (Target or associate) who has the +-- right to speak. +registrationRequest [57] RegistrationRequest OPTIONAL, +registrationOutcome [58] RegistrationOutcome OPTIONAL, +retrieveID [59] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +rTPSetting [60] RTPSetting OPTIONAL, +talkBurstPriority [61] Priority-Level OPTIONAL, +talkBurstReason [62] Talk-burst-reason-code OPTIONAL, +-- Talk-burst-reason-code Defined according to the rules and procedures +-- in (OMA-PoC-AD [97]) +talkburstControlSetting [63] TalkburstControlSetting OPTIONAL, +targetPresenceStatus [64] UTF8String OPTIONAL, +port-Number [65] INTEGER (0..65535) OPTIONAL, +... +} + +``` + +## AccessPolicyType ::= SEQUENCE + +``` + +{ + userAccessPolicyAttempt [1] BOOLEAN, + -- default False, true indicates Target has accessed. + groupAuthorizationRulesAttempt [2] BOOLEAN, + -- default False, true indicates Target has accessed. + userAccessPolicyQuery [3] BOOLEAN, + -- default False, true indicates Target has accessed. + groupAuthorizationRulesQuery [4] BOOLEAN, + -- default False, true indicates Target has accessed. + userAccessPolicyResult [5] UTF8String, + groupAuthorizationRulesResult [6] UTF8String, + ... +} + +``` + +## AlertIndicator ::= ENUMERATED + +``` + +{ + -- indicates the group call alert condition. + sent (1), + received (2), + cancelled (3), + ... +} + +``` + +## AssociatePresenceStatus ::= SEQUENCE + +``` + +{ + presenceID [1] UTF8String, + -- identity of PTC Client(s) or the PTC group + presenceType [2] PresenceType, + presenceStatus [3] BOOLEAN, +} + +``` + +``` + + -- default false, true indicates connected. + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PresenceType ::= ENUMERATED +{ + pTCClient (1), + pTCGroup (2), + -- identifies the type of presenceID given [PTC Client(s) or PTC group]. + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +Emergency ::= ENUMERATED +{ + -- MCPTT services indication of peril condition. + imminent (1), + peril (2), + cancel (3), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +EmergencyGroupState ::= SEQUENCE +{ + -- indicates the state of the call, at least one of these information + -- elements shall be present. + clientEmergencyState [1] ENUMERATED + { + -- in case of MCPTT call, indicates the response for the client + inform (1), + response (2), + cancelInform (3), + cancelResponse (4), + ... + } OPTIONAL, + groupEmergencyState [2] ENUMERATED + { + -- in case of MCPTT group call, indicates if there is a group emergency or + -- a response from the Target to indicate current Client state of emergency. + inForm (1), + reSponse (2), + cancelInform (3), + cancelResponse (4), + ... + }, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PTCType ::= ENUMERATED +{ + pTCStartOfInterception (1), + pTCServinSystem (2), + pTCSessionInitiation (3), + pTCSessionAbandonEndRecord (4), + pTCSessionStartContinueRecord (5), + pTCSessionEndRecord (6), + pTCPre-EstablishedSessionSessionRecord (7), + pTCInstantPersonalAlert (8), + pTCPartyJoin (9), + pTCPartyDrop (10), + pTCPartyHold-RetrieveRecord (11), + pTCMediaModification (12), + pTCGroupAdvertizement (13), + pTCFloorControl (14), + pTCTargetPressence (15), + pTCAssociatePressence (16), + pTCListManagementEvents (17), + pTCAccessPolicyEvents (18), + pTCMediaTypeNotification (19), + pTCGroupCallRequest (20), + pTCGroupCallCancel (21), + pTCGroupCallResponse (22), + pTCGroupCallInterrogate (23), + pTCMCPTTImminentGroupCall (24), + pTCCC (25), + pTCRegistration (26), + pTCEncryption (27), +} + +``` + +``` +... +} +``` + +``` +FloorActivity := SEQUENCE +{ + tBCP-Request [1] BOOLEAN, + -- default False, true indicates Granted. + tBCP-Granted [2] BOOLEAN, + -- default False, true indicates Granted permission to talk. + tBCP-Deny [3] BOOLEAN, + -- default True, False indicates permission granted. + tBCP-Queued [4] BOOLEAN, + -- default False, true indicates the request to talk is in queue. + tBCP-Release [5] BOOLEAN, + -- default True, true indicates the Request to talk is completed, + -- False indicates PTC Client has the request to talk. + tBCP-Revoke [6] BOOLEAN, + -- default False, true indicates the privilege to talk is canceled from the + -- PTC server. + tBCP-Taken [7] BOOLEAN, + -- default True, false indicates another PTC Client has the permission to talk. + tBCP-Idle [8] BOOLEAN, + -- default True, False indicates the Talk Burst Protocol is taken. + ... +} +``` + +``` +GroupAuthRule := ENUMERATED +{ + allow-Initiating-PtcSession (0), + block-Initiating-PtcSession (1), + allow-Joining-PtcSession (2), + block-Joining-PtcSession (3), + allow-Add-Participants (4), + block-Add-Participants (5), + allow-Subscription-PtcSession-State (6), + block-Subscription-PtcSession-State (7), + allow-Anonymity (8), + forbid-Anonymity (9), + ... +} +``` + +``` +ImminentPerilInd := ENUMERATED +{ + request (1), + response (2), + cancel (3), + -- when the MCPTT Imminent Peril Group Call Request, Response or Cancel is detected + ... +} +``` + +``` +ImplicitFloorReq := ENUMERATED +{ + join (1), + rejoin (2), + release (3), + -- group Call request to join, rejoin, or release of the group call + ... +} +``` + +``` +InitiationCause := ENUMERATED +{ + requests (1), + received (2), + pTCOriginatingId (3), + -- requests or receives a session initiation from the network or another + -- party to initiate a PTC session. Identify the originating PTC party, if known. + ... +} +``` + +``` +IPADirection := ENUMERATED +{ + toTarget (0), + fromTarget (1), + ... +} +``` + +``` + +ListManagementAction ::= ENUMERATED +{ + create (1), + modify (2), + retrieve (3), + delete (4), + notify (5), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +ListManagementType ::= ENUMERATED +{ + contactListManagementAttempt (1), + groupListManagementAttempt (2), + contactListManagementResult (3), + groupListManagementResult (4), + requestSuccessful (5), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +Priority-Level ::= ENUMERATED +{ + pre-emptive (0), + high-priority (1), + normal-priority (2), + listen-only (3), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PreEstStatus ::= ENUMERATED +{ + established (1), + modify (2), + released (3), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +PTCAddress ::= SEQUENCE +{ + uri [0] UTF8String, + -- The set of URIs defined in [RFC3261] and related SIP RFCs. + privacy-setting [1] BOOLEAN, + -- Default FALSE, send TRUE if privacy is used. + privacy-alias [2] VisibleString OPTIONAL, + -- if privacy is used, the PTC Server creates an anonymous PTC Address of the form + -- . In addition to anonymity, the anonymous PTC + -- Addresses SHALL be unique within a PTC Session. In case more than one anonymous + -- PTC Addresses are used in the same PTC Session, for the second Anonymous PTC + -- Session and thereafter, the PTC Server SHOULD use the form + -- sip:anonymous-n@anonymous.invalid where n is an integer number. + nickname [3] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +RegistrationRequest ::= ENUMERATED +{ + register (1), + re-register (2), + de-register (3), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +RegistrationOutcome ::= ENUMERATED +{ + success (0), + failure (1), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +RTPSetting ::= SEQUENCE +{ + ip-address [0] IPAddress, + port-number [1] Port-Number, + -- the IP address and port number at the PTC Server for the RTP Session +} + +``` + +``` +... +} +``` + +``` +Port-Number ::= INTEGER (0..65535) +``` + +``` +TalkburstControlSetting ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + talk-BurstControlProtocol [1] UTF8String, + talk-Burst-parameters [2] SET OF VisibleString, + -- selected by the PTC Server from those contained in the original SDP offer in the + -- incoming SIP INVITE request from the PTC Client + tBCP-PortNumber [3] INTEGER (0..65535), + -- PTC Server's port number to be used for the Talk Burst Control Protocol + ... +} +``` + +``` +Talk-burst-reason-code ::= VisibleString +``` + +``` +END -- OF EpsHI2Operations +``` + +## B.10 Contents of communication (HI3 EPS) + +``` +Eps-HI3-PS {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulintercept(2) +threeGPP(4) hi3eps(9) r16(16) version-0(0)} +``` + +``` +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= +``` + +``` +BEGIN +``` + +``` +IMPORTS +``` + +``` +EPSCorrelationNumber + FROM EpsHI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulintercept(2) threeGPP(4) + hi2eps(8) r16(16) version-1(1)} -- Imported from TS 33.108 v.16.4.0 +``` + +``` +LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, +``` + +``` +TimeStamp + FROM HI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) + version18(18)}; -- from ETSI HI2Operations TS 101 671 v3.12.1 +``` + +``` +-- Object Identifier Definitions +``` + +``` +-- Security DomainId +``` + +``` +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} +``` + +``` +-- Security Subdomains +``` + +``` +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +hi3DomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi3eps(9) r16(16) version-0(0)} +``` + +``` +CC-PDU ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + uLIC-header [1] ULIC-header, + payload [2] OCTET STRING +} +``` + +``` +ULIC-header ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + hi3DomainId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- 3GPP HI3 Domain + lIID [2] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier OPTIONAL, + correlation-Number [3] EPSCorrelationNumber, + timeStamp [4] Timestamp OPTIONAL, + sequence-number [5] INTEGER (0..65535), + t-PDU-direction [6] TPDU-direction, + ..., + national-HI3-ASN1parameters [7] National-HI3-ASN1parameters OPTIONAL, + -- encoded per national requirements + ice-type [8] ICE-type OPTIONAL + -- The ICE-type indicates the applicable Intercepting Control Element(see ref [19]) in which +``` + +``` +-- the T-PDU is intercepted. +} +``` + +``` +TPDU-direction ::= ENUMERATED +{ + from-target (1), + to-target (2), + unknown (3) +} +``` + +``` +National-HI3-ASN1parameters ::= SEQUENCE +{ + countryCode [1] PrintableString (SIZE (2)), + -- Country Code according to ISO 3166-1 [39], + -- the country to which the parameters inserted after the extension marker apply + ... + -- In case a given country wants to use additional national parameters according to its law, + -- these national parameters should be defined using the ASN.1 syntax and added after the + -- extension marker (...). + -- It is recommended that "version parameter" and "vendor identification parameter" are + -- included in the national parameters definition. Vendor identifications can be + -- retrieved from IANA web site. It is recommended to avoid + -- using tags from 240 to 255 in a formal type definition. +} +``` + +``` +ICE-type ::= ENUMERATED +{ + sgsn (1), + ggsn (2), + ..., + s-GW (3), + pDN-GW (4), + colocated-SAE-GWs (5) , + ePDG (6) +} +``` + +``` +END -- OF Eps-HI3-PS +``` + +## B.11 IMS Conference Services ASN.1 + +### B.11.1 Intercept related information (Conference Services) + +#### ASN.1 description of IRI (HI2 interface) + +``` +CONFHI2Operations {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulintercept(2) +threeGPP(4) hi2conf(10) r16 (16) version-0 (0)} +``` + +``` +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= +``` + +``` +BEGIN +``` + +``` +IMPORTS +``` + +``` + LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + TimeStamp, + Network-Identifier, + National-Parameters, + National-HI2-ASN1parameters +``` + +``` + FROM HI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) + lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) version18 (18)} -- Imported from TS 101 671, version +``` + +``` +3.12.1 +``` + +``` + CorrelationValues, + IMS-VoIP-Correlation +``` + +``` + FROM UmtsHI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) + lawfulIntercept(2) threeGPP(4) hi2(1) r16 (16) version-1(1)}; -- Imported from PS + -- ASN.1 Portion of this standard +``` + +``` +-- Object Identifier Definitions +``` + +``` +-- Security DomainId +``` + +``` +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} +``` + +``` +-- Security Subdomains +``` + +``` +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +``` + +``` +hi2confDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi2conf(10) r16 (16) version-0 (0)} +``` + +``` +ConfIRIsContent ::= CHOICE +``` + +``` +{ + confIRIContent ConfIRIContent, + confIRISequence ConfIRISequence +} +``` + +``` +ConfIRISequence ::= SEQUENCE OF ConfIRIContent +``` + +``` +-- Aggregation of ConfIRIContent is an optional feature. +``` + +``` +-- It may be applied in cases when at a given point in time +``` + +``` +-- several IRI records are available for delivery to the same LEA destination. +``` + +``` +-- As a general rule, records created at any event shall be sent +``` + +``` +-- immediately and not withheld in the DF or MF in order to +``` + +``` +-- apply aggregation. +``` + +``` +-- When aggregation is not to be applied, +``` + +``` +-- ConfIRIContent needs to be chosen. +``` + +``` +ConfIRIContent ::= CHOICE +``` + +``` +{ + iRI-Begin-record [1] IRI-Parameters, -- include at least one optional parameter + iRI-End-record [2] IRI-Parameters, + iRI-Continue-record [3] IRI-Parameters, -- include at least one optional parameter + iRI-Report-record [4] IRI-Parameters, -- include at least one optional parameter + ... +} +``` + +``` + +IRI-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE +{ + hi2confDomainId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- 3GPP HI2 Conf domain + lawfulInterceptionIdentifier [1] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + -- This identifier is associated to the target. + timeStamp [2] Timestamp, + -- date and time of the event triggering the report. + + partyInformation [3] SET SIZE (1..10) OF PartyIdentity OPTIONAL, + -- This is the identity of the target. + -- The sender shall only use one instance of PartyIdentity, the "SET SIZE" structure is + -- kept for ASN.1 backward compatibility reasons only. + + national-Parameters [4] National-Parameters OPTIONAL, + networkIdentifier [5] Network-Identifier OPTIONAL, + confEvent [6] ConfEvent, + correlation [7] ConfCorrelation OPTIONAL, + confID [8] IMSIdentity OPTIONAL, + tempConfID [9] IMSIdentity OPTIONAL, + listOfPotConferees [10] SET OF PartyIdentity OPTIONAL, + listOfConferees [11] SET OF ConfPartyInformation OPTIONAL, + joinPartyID [12] ConfPartyInformation OPTIONAL, + leavePartyID [13] ConfPartyInformation OPTIONAL, + listOfBearerAffectedParties [14] SET OF ConfPartyInformation OPTIONAL, + confEventInitiator [15] ConfEventInitiator OPTIONAL, + confEventFailureReason [16] ConfEventFailureReason OPTIONAL, + confEndReason [17] Reason OPTIONAL, + potConfStartInfo [18] Timestamp OPTIONAL, + potConfEndInfo [19] Timestamp OPTIONAL, + recurrenceInfo [20] RecurrenceInfo OPTIONAL, + confControllerIDs [21] SET OF PartyIdentity OPTIONAL, + mediamodification [23] MediaModification OPTIONAL, + bearerModifyPartyID [24] ConfPartyInformation OPTIONAL, + listOfWaitConferees [25] SET OF ConfPartyInformation OPTIONAL, + + ... +} + +``` + +#### -- PARAMETERS FORMATS + +``` + +ConfEvent ::= ENUMERATED +{ + confStartSuccessfull (1), + confStartUnsuccessfull (2), + startOfInterceptionConferenceActive (3), + confPartyJoinSuccessfull (4), + confPartyJoinUnsuccessfull (5), + confPartyLeaveSuccessfull (6), + confPartyLeaveUnsuccessfull (7), + confPartyBearerModifySuccessfull (8), + confPartyBearerModifyUnsuccessfull (9), + confEndSuccessfull (10), + confEndUnsuccessfull (11), + confServCreation (12), + confServUpdate (13), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +ConfPartyInformation ::= SEQUENCE +{ + partyIdentity [1] PartyIdentity OPTIONAL, + + supportedmedia [2] SupportedMedia OPTIONAL, + + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +ConfCorrelation ::= CHOICE +{ + correlationValues [1] CorrelationValues, + correlationNumber [2] OCTET STRING, + imsVoIP [3] IMS-VoIP-Correlation, + ... +} + +``` + +``` +PartyIdentity ::= SEQUENCE +{ + iMPU [3] SET OF IMSIdentity OPTIONAL, + iMPI [4] SET OF IMSIdentity OPTIONAL, + ... +} +``` + +``` +IMSIdentity ::= SEQUENCE +{ + sip-uri [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- See [REF 26 of 33.108] + tel-uri [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- See [REF 67 of 33.108] + ... +} +``` + +``` +SupportedMedia ::= SEQUENCE +{ + confServerSideSDP [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- include SDP information + -- describing Conf Server Side characteristics. + + confUserSideSDP [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- include SDP information + -- describing Conf User Side characteristics + + ... +} +``` + +``` +MediaModification ::= ENUMERATED +{ + add (1), + remove (2), + change (3), + unknown (4), + ... +} +``` + +``` +ConfEventFailureReason ::= CHOICE +{ + failedConfStartReason [1] Reason, + failedPartyJoinReason [2] Reason, + failedPartyLeaveReason [3] Reason, + failedBearerModifyReason [4] Reason, + failedConfEndReason [5] Reason, + ... +} +``` + +``` +ConfEventInitiator ::= CHOICE +{ + confServer [1] NULL, + confTargetID [2] PartyIdentity, + confPartyID [3] PartyIdentity, + ... +} +``` + +``` +RecurrenceInfo ::= SEQUENCE +{ + recurrenceStartDateAndTime [1] Timestamp OPTIONAL, + recurrenceEndDateAndTime [2] Timestamp OPTIONAL, + recurrencePattern [3] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- includes a description of + -- the recurrence pattern, for example, "Yearly, on Jan 23" or "Weekly, on Monday" + + ... +} +``` + +``` +Reason ::= OCTET STRING +``` + +``` +END -- OF ConfHI2Operations +``` + +## B.11.2 Contents of communication (HI3 IMS Conferencing) + +``` +CONF-HI3-IMS {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) +threeGPP(4) hi3conf(11) r16 (16) version-0 (0)} +``` + +``` +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= +``` + +``` +BEGIN +``` + +``` + +IMPORTS + +LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + +TimeStamp + FROM HI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) + version18(18)}-- from ETSI HI2Operations TS 101 671, version 3.12.1 + +ConfCorrelation, + +ConfPartyInformation + + FROM CONFHI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) + threeGPP(4) hi2conf(10) r16 (16) version-0 (0)} + -- Imported from Conf HI2 Operations part of this standard + +National-HI3-ASN1parameters + FROM Eps-HI3-PS + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) threeGPP(4) + hi3eps(9) r16(16) version-0 (0)}; + -- Imported form EPS HI3 part of this standard +``` + +``` + +-- Object Identifier Definitions + +-- Security DomainId +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} + +-- Security Subdomains +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +hi3confDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi3conf(11) r16 (16) version-0 (0)} +``` + +``` + +Conf-CC-PDU ::= SEQUENCE +{ + confLIC-header [1] ConfLIC-header, + payload [2] OCTET STRING +} + +ConfLIC-header ::= SEQUENCE +{ + hi3DomainId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- 3GPP HI3 Domain + LIID [2] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier OPTIONAL, + correlation [3] ConfCorrelation, + timeStamp [4] TimeStamp OPTIONAL, + sequence-number [5] INTEGER (0..65535), + t-PDU-direction [6] TPDU-direction, + national-HI3-ASN1parameters [7] National-HI3-ASN1parameters OPTIONAL, + -- encoded per national requirements + mediaID [9] MediaID OPTIONAL, + -- Identifies the media being exchanged by parties on the conference. + ... +} +``` + +``` +MediaID ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` + +{ + sourceUserID [1] ConfPartyInformation OPTIONAL, -- include SDP information + -- describing Conf Server Side characteristics. + + streamID [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- include streamID from SDP information. + + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +TPDU-direction ::= ENUMERATED +{ + from-target (1), + to-target (2), + unknown (3), + conftarget (4), + -- When the conference is the target (4) is used to denote there is no + -- directionality. + from-mixer (5), + -- Indicates the stream sent from the conference server towards the conference party. + to-mixer (6), + -- Indicates the stream sent from the conference party towards the conference party server. + combined (7) + -- Indicates that combined CC delivery is used. +} + +``` + +END -- OF conf-HI3-IMS + +# B.12 Contents of Communication (HI3 IMS-based VoIP) + +``` + +VoIP-HI3-IMS {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) +threeGPP(4) hi3voip(12) r16 (16) version-0 (0)} + +``` + +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + +BEGIN + +IMPORTS + +``` + +LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, +TimeStamp, +Network-Identifier + FROM HI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) +version18(18)}-- from ETSI HI2Operations TS 101 671, version 3.12.1 + + +National-HI3-ASN1parameters + +FROM Eps-HI3-PS {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) +threeGPP(4) hi3eps(9) r16 (16) version-0 (0)}; + +``` + +``` + +-- Object Identifier Definitions + +-- Security DomainId +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} + +-- Security Subdomains +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +hi3voipDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi3voip(12) r16 (16) version-0 (0)} + +``` + +Voip-CC-PDU ::= SEQUENCE + +``` + +{ + voipLIC-header [1] VoipLIC-header, + payload [2] OCTET STRING +} + +``` + +VoipLIC-header ::= SEQUENCE + +``` + +{ + hi3voipDomainId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- 3GPP VoIP HI3 Domain +} + +``` + +``` + + liID [2] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier OPTIONAL, + voipCorrelationNumber [3] VoipCorrelationNumber, + -- For VoIP, contains the same contents as the + -- cc parameter contained within an IRI-to-CC-Correlation parameter + -- which is contained in the IMS-VoIP-Correlation parameter in the + -- IRI [HI2]; For PTC, contains the same contents as the cc parameter + -- contained within an IRI-to-CC-Correlation parameter which is + -- contained in the CorrelationValues parameter in the IRI [HI2] + + timeStamp [4] TimeStamp OPTIONAL, + sequence-number [5] INTEGER (0..65535), + t-PDU-direction [6] TPDU-direction, + national-HI3-ASN1parameters [7] National-HI3-ASN1parameters OPTIONAL, + -- encoded per national requirements + ice-type [8] ICE-type OPTIONAL, + -- The ICE-type indicates the applicable Intercepting Control Element in which + -- the VoIP CC is intercepted. + ..., + payload-description [9] Payload-description OPTIONAL, + -- When this option is implemented, shall be used to provide the RTP payload description + -- as soon as it is available at DF3 (initial one or each time the DF3 is notified of a + -- change) + networkIdentifier [10] Network-Identifier OPTIONAL, + -- Mandatory when used for PTC + -- Identifies the network element that is reporting the CC + pTCSessionInfo [11] UTF8String OPTIONAL + -- Mandatory when used for PTC + -- Identifies the PTC Session. Together with the 'voipCorrelationNumber', uniquely + -- identifies a specific PTC talk burst. +} + +``` + +``` +VoipCorrelationNumber ::= OCTET STRING +``` + +``` + +TPDU-direction ::= ENUMERATED +{ + from-target (1), + to-target (2), + combined (3), -- Indicates that combined CC (i.e., from/to-target)delivery is used. + unknown (4) +} + +``` + +``` + +ICE-type ::= ENUMERATED { + ggsn (1), + pDN-GW (2), + aGW (3), + trGW (4), + mGW (5), + other (6), + unknown (7), + ..., + mRF (8), + lmISF (9), + SCW (10) +} + +``` + +``` + +Payload-description ::= SEQUENCE +{ + copyOfSDPdescription [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- Copy of the SDP. Format as per RFC 4566 [94]. + -- used for VoIP + ..., + mediaFormat [2] INTEGER (0..127) OPTIONAL, + -- as defined in RFC 3551 [93] + -- used with IP-based delivery for CS + mediaAttributes [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + -- as defined in RFC 4566 [94] + -- used with IP-based delivery for CS +} + +``` + +``` +END -- OF VoIP-HI3-IMS +``` + +## B.13 Intercept related information for ProSe + +### ASN1 description of IRI (HI2 interface) + +``` +ProSeHI2Operations {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulintercept(2) +threeGPP(4) hi2prose(15) r16 (16) version0(0)} +``` + +``` +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= +``` + +``` +BEGIN +``` + +``` +IMPORTS +``` + +``` + LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + Timestamp, + Network-Identifier, + National-Parameters, + National-HI2-ASN1parameters, + IPAddress +``` + +``` + FROM HI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) + lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) version18(18)}; -- Imported from TS 101 671 +``` + +``` +-- Object Identifier Definitions +``` + +``` +-- Security DomainId +``` + +``` +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} +``` + +``` +-- Security Subdomains +``` + +``` +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +``` + +``` +hi2ProSeDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi2prose(15) r16 (16) version0(0)} +``` + +``` +ProSeIRIContent ::= CHOICE +``` + +``` +{ + proseIRIContent [1] ProSeIRIContent, + proseIRISequence [2] ProSeIRISequence +} +``` + +``` +ProSeIRISequence ::= SEQUENCE OF ProSeIRIContent +``` + +``` +-- Aggregation of ProSeIRIContent is an optional feature. +``` + +``` +-- It may be applied in cases when at a given point in time +``` + +``` +-- several IRI records are available for delivery to the same LEA destination. +``` + +``` +-- As a general rule, records created at any event shall be sent +``` + +``` +-- immediately and not withheld in the DF or MF in order to +``` + +``` +-- apply aggregation. +``` + +``` +-- When aggregation is not to be applied, +``` + +``` +-- ProSeIRIContent needs to be chosen. +``` + +``` +ProSeIRIContent ::= CHOICE +``` + +``` +{ + iRI-Report-record [1] IRI-Parameters, + ... +} +``` + +``` +IRI-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + hi2ProSeDomainId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- 3GPP HI2 ProSe domain + lawfulInterceptionIdentifier [1] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + -- This identifier is associated with the target. + timeStamp [2] Timestamp, + -- date and time of the event triggering the report. + networkIdentifier [3] Network-Identifier, + proseEventData [4] ProSeEventData, + national-Parameters [5] National-Parameters OPTIONAL, + national-HI2-ASN1parameters [6] National-HI2-ASN1parameters OPTIONAL, + ... +} +``` + +``` +-- PARAMETERS FORMATS +``` + +``` +ProSeEventData ::= CHOICE +``` + +``` +{ + proseDirectDiscovery [0] ProSeDirectDiscovery, +``` + +``` + + ... + } + +``` + +``` + +ProSeDirectDiscovery ::= SEQUENCE +{ + proseDirectDiscoveryEvent [0] ProSeDirectDiscoveryEvent, + targetImsi [1] OCTET STRING (SIZE (3..8)), + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Station Identity E.212 number beginning with Mobile Country Code + targetRole [2] TargetRole, + directDiscoveryData [3] DirectDiscoveryData, + metadata [4] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + otherUeImsi [5] OCTET STRING (SIZE (3..8)) OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Station Identity E.212 number beginning with Mobile Country Code + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +ProSeDirectDiscoveryEvent ::= ENUMERATED +{ + proseDiscoveryRequest (1), + proseMatchReport (2), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +TargetRole ::= ENUMERATED +{ + announcingUE (1), + monitoringUE (2), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +DirectDiscoveryData ::= SEQUENCE +{ + discoveryPLMNID [1] UTF8String, + proseAppIdName [2] UTF8String, + proseAppCode [3] OCTET STRING (SIZE (23)), + -- See format in TS 23.003 [25] + proseAppMask [4] ProSeAppMask OPTIONAL, + timer [5] INTEGER, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +ProSeAppMask ::= CHOICE +{ + proseMask [1] OCTET STRING (SIZE (23)), + -- formatted like the proseappcode; used in conjunction with the corresponding + -- proseappcode bitstring to form a filter. + proseMaskSequence [2] ProSeMaskSequence +} + +``` + +``` + +ProSeMaskSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING (SIZE (23)) +-- There can be multiple masks for a ProSe App code at the monitoring UE +END -- OF ProSeHI2Operations + +``` + +## B.14 GCSE Services ASN.1 + +### B.14.1 Intercept related information (GCSE Services) + +#### ASN.1 description of IRI (HI2 interface) + +``` +GCSEHI2Operations {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) +threeGPP(4) hi2gcse(13) r16 (16) version-0 (0)} +``` + +``` +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= +``` + +``` +BEGIN +``` + +``` +IMPORTS +``` + +``` + LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + Timestamp, + Network-Identifier, + National-Parameters, + National-HI2-ASN1parameters, + IPAddress +``` + +``` + FROM HI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) + lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) version18 (18)} -- Imported from TS 101 671 +``` + +``` + EPSLocation +``` + +``` + FROM EpsHI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) + lawfulIntercept(2) threeGPP(4) hi2eps(8) r16 (16) version-0(0)}; + -- Imported from EPS ASN.1 Portion of this standard +``` + +``` +-- Object Identifier Definitions +``` + +``` +-- Security DomainId +``` + +``` +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} +``` + +``` +-- Security Subdomains +``` + +``` +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +``` + +``` +hi2gcseDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi2gcse(13) r16 (16) version-0(0)} +``` + +``` +GcseIRIsContent ::= CHOICE +``` + +``` +{ + gcseIRIContent GcseIRIContent, + gcseIRISequence GcseIRISequence +} +``` + +``` +GcseIRISequence ::= SEQUENCE OF GcseIRIContent +``` + +``` +-- Aggregation of GCSEIRIContent is an optional feature. +``` + +``` +-- It may be applied in cases when at a given point in time +``` + +``` +-- several IRI records are available for delivery to the same LEA destination. +``` + +``` +-- As a general rule, records created at any event shall be sent +``` + +``` +-- immediately and not withheld in the DF or MF in order to +``` + +``` +-- apply aggregation. +``` + +``` +-- When aggregation is not to be applied, +``` + +``` +-- GCSEIRIContent needs to be chosen. +``` + +``` +GcseIRIContent ::= CHOICE +``` + +``` +{ + iRI-Begin-record [1] IRI-Parameters, -- include at least one optional parameter + iRI-End-record [2] IRI-Parameters, + iRI-Continue-record [3] IRI-Parameters, -- include at least one optional parameter + iRI-Report-record [4] IRI-Parameters, -- include at least one optional parameter + ... +} +``` + +``` + +IRI-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE +{ + hi2gcseDomainId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- 3GPP HI2 GCSE domain + lawfulInterceptionIdentifier [1] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + -- This identifier is associated with the target. + timeStamp [2] Timestamp, + -- date and time of the event triggering the report. + + partyInformation [3] SET OF GcsePartyIdentity, + -- This is the identity of the target. + + national-Parameters [4] National-Parameters OPTIONAL, + networkIdentifier [5] Network-Identifier, + gcseEvent [6] GcseEvent, + correlation [7] GcseCorrelation OPTIONAL, + targetConnectionMethod [8] TargetConnectionMethod OPTIONAL, + gcseGroupMembers [9] GcseGroup OPTIONAL, + gcseGroupParticipants [10] GcseGroup OPTIONAL, + gcseGroupID [11] GcseGroupID OPTIONAL, + gcseGroupCharacteristics [12] GcseGroupCharacteristics OPTIONAL, + reservedTMGI [13] ReservedTMGI OPTIONAL, + tMGIReservationDuration [14] TMGIReservationDuration OPTIONAL, + visitedNetworkID [15] VisitedNetworkID OPTIONAL, + addedUserID [16] GcsePartyIdentity OPTIONAL, + droppedUserID [17] GcsePartyIdentity OPTIONAL, + reasonForCommsEnd [18] Reason OPTIONAL, + gcseLocationOfTheTarget [19] EPSLocation OPTIONAL, + + ... +} + +``` + +-- PARAMETERS FORMATS + +``` + +GcseEvent ::= ENUMERATED +{ + activationOfGcseGroupComms (1), + startOfInterceptionGcseGroupComms (2), + userAdded (3), + userDropped (4), + targetConnectionModification (5), + targetdropped (6), + deactivationOfGcseGroupComms (7), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +GcseCorrelation ::= OCTET STRING + +``` + +``` + +GcsePartyIdentity ::= SEQUENCE +{ + imei [1] OCTET STRING (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] + + imsi [2] OCTET STRING (SIZE (3..8)) OPTIONAL, + -- See MAP format [4] International Mobile + -- Station Identity E.212 number beginning with Mobile Country Code + + iMPU [3] SET OF IMSIdentity OPTIONAL, + + iMPI [4] SET OF IMSIdentity OPTIONAL, + + proseUEID [6] SET OF ProSeUEID OPTIONAL, + + otherID [7] OtherIdentity OPTIONAL, + + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +IMSIdentity ::= SEQUENCE +{ + sip-uri [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +} + +``` + +``` + + -- See [REF 26 of 33.108] + + tel-uri [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- See [REF 67 of 33.108] + + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +OtherIdentity ::= SEQUENCE +{ + otherIdentityEncoding [1] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- Specifies the encoding format of + -- the contents included within the parameter otherIDInfo. + + otherIDInfo [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +GcseGroup ::= SEQUENCE OF GcsePartyIdentity + +``` + +``` + +GcseGroupID ::= GcsePartyIdentity + +``` + +``` + +ProSeUEID ::= OCTET STRING --coded with the 3 octets corresponding to the Source L2 ID of the MAC +--PDU in TS 25.321[85]. + +``` + +``` + +GcseGroupCharacteristics ::= SEQUENCE +{ + characteristicsEncoding [1] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- Specifies the encoding format of + -- the contents included within the parameter characteristics. + + characteristics [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +TargetConnectionMethod ::= SEQUENCE +{ + connectionStatus [1] BOOLEAN, -- True indicates connected, false indicates not connected. + upstream [2] Upstream OPTIONAL, -- Specifies the encoding format of + downstream [3] Downstream OPTIONAL, -- Specifies the encoding format of + -- upstream and downstream parameters are omitted if connectionStatus indicates false. + + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +Upstream ::= SEQUENCE +{ + accessType [1] AccessType, + accessId [2] AccessID, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +Downstream ::= SEQUENCE +{ + accessType [1] AccessType, + accessId [2] AccessID, + ... +} -- it may be possible for the UE to receive in multiple ways (e.g. via normal EPS as well +-- as multicast. + +``` + +``` + +AccessType ::= ENUMERATED +{ + ePS-Unicast (1), + ePS-Multicast (2), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +AccessID ::= CHOICE +{ + tMGI [1] ReservedTMGI, + uEIPAddress [2] IPAddress, + ... +} + +``` + +``` +} -- it may be possible for the UE to receive in multiple ways (e.g. via normal EPS as well +-- as multicast. +``` + +``` +VisitedNetworkID ::= UTF8String -- contains the PLMN ID of the PLMN serving the UE, coded +-- according to [53] +``` + +``` +ReservedTMGI ::= OCTET STRING -- Shall be coded with the MBMS-Session-Duration attribute +-- specified in TS 29.468. +``` + +``` +TMGIReservationDuration ::= OCTET STRING -- Shall be coded with the TMGI attribute specified +-- in TS 29.468. +``` + +``` +Reason ::= UTF8String +``` + +``` +END -- OF GCSEHI2Operations +``` + +## B.14.2 Contents of communication (HI3 GCSE Group Communications) + +``` +GCSE-HI3 {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) +threeGPP(4) hi3gcse(14) r16(16) version-0(0)} +``` + +``` +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= +``` + +``` +BEGIN +``` + +``` +IMPORTS +``` + +``` +LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, +``` + +``` +TimeStamp +``` + +``` +FROM HI2Operations +{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) +version18(18)}-- from ETSI HI2Operations TS 101 671, version 3.12.1 +``` + +``` +GcseCorrelation, +``` + +``` +GcsePartyIdentity +``` + +``` +FROM GCSEHI2Operations +{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) +threeGPP(4) hi2gcse(13) r16(16) version-0(0)} +-- Imported from Gcse HI2 Operations part of this standard +``` + +``` +National-HI3-ASN1parameters +``` + +``` +FROM Eps-HI3-PS +{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) threeGPP(4) +hi3eps(9) r16(16) version-0(0)}; +``` + +``` +-- Object Identifier Definitions +``` + +``` +-- Security DomainId +``` + +``` +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} +``` + +``` +-- Security Subdomains +``` + +``` +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +hi3gcseDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi3gcse(14) r16(16) version-0(0)} +``` + +``` +Gcse-CC-PDU ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + gcseLIC-header [1] GcseLIC-header, + payload [2] OCTET STRING +} +``` + +``` +GcseLIC-header ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + hi3gcseDomainId [1] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- 3GPP HI3 gcse Domain ID + LIID [2] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier OPTIONAL, + correlation [3] GcseCorrelation, + timeStamp [4] Timestamp OPTIONAL, +} +``` + +``` + +sequence-number [5] INTEGER (0..65535), +t-PDU-direction [6] TPDu-direction, +national-HI3-ASN1parameters [7] National-HI3-ASN1parameters OPTIONAL, +-- encoded per national requirements +mediaID [8] MediaID OPTIONAL, +-- Identifies the media being exchanged by parties on the GCSE group communications. +... +} + +``` + +``` + +MediaID ::= SEQUENCE +{ + sourceUserID [1] GcsePartyIdentity OPTIONAL, -- include SDP information + -- describing GCSE Server Side characteristics. + + streamID [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- include streamID from SDP information. + + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +TPDu-direction ::= ENUMERATED +{ + from-target (1), + to-target (2), + unknown (3), + ... +} + +``` + +END -- OF GCSE-HI3 + +## B.15 Intercept related information (HI2 MMS) + +### ASN1 description of IRI (HI2 interface) + +``` + +MmsHI2Operations {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulintercept(2) +threeGPP(4) hi2mms(16) r16 (16) version-0 (0)} + +``` + +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + +BEGIN + +IMPORTS + +``` + + LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + TimeStamp, + Network-Identifier, + National-Parameters, + National-HI2-ASN1parameters, + DataNodeAddress, + IPAddress, + IP-value + +``` + +``` + + FROM HI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) + lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) version18(18)} -- Imported from TS 101 671 v3.14.1 + +``` + +Location + +``` + + FROM UmtsHI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) + lawfulintercept(2) threeGPP(4) hi2(1) r16 (16) version-0 (0)}; + -- Imported from 3GPP TS 33.108, UMTS PS HI2 + +``` + +-- Object Identifier Definitions + +-- Security DomainId + +``` + +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) + +``` + +``` + +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} + +``` + +-- Security Subdomains + +``` + +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} + +``` + +``` + +hi2mmsDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi2mms(16) r16(16) version-0 (0)} + +MmsIRIsContent ::= CHOICE +{ + mmsIRIContent MmsIRIContent, + mmsIRISequence MmsIRISequence +} + +MmsIRISequence ::= SEQUENCE OF MmsIRIContent + +-- Aggregation of MmsIRIContent is an optional feature. +-- It may be applied in cases when at a given point in time +-- several IRI records are available for delivery to the same LEA destination. +-- As a general rule, records created at any event shall be sent +-- immediately and not withheld in the DF or MF in order to +-- apply aggregation. +-- When aggregation is not to be applied, +-- MmsIRIContent needs to be chosen. +-- MmsIRIContent includes events that correspond to MMS. + +MmsIRIContent ::= CHOICE +{ + iRI-Begin-record [1] IRI-Parameters, -- not applicable for the present document + iRI-End-record [2] IRI-Parameters, -- not applicable for the present document + iRI-Continue-record [3] IRI-Parameters, -- not applicable for the present document + + iRI-Report-record [4] IRI-Parameters -- include at least one optional parameter +} + +-- the MmsIRIContent may provide events that correspond to UMTS/GPRS as well as EPS. + +-- Parameters having the same tag numbers have to be identical in Rel-14 and onwards modules. +IRI-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE +{ + hi2mmsDomainId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- 3GPP HI2 MMS domain + lawfulInterceptionIdentifier [1] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + -- This identifier is associated to the target. + timeStamp [3] TimeStamp, + -- date and time of the event triggering the report. + locationOfTheTarget [4] Location OPTIONAL, + -- location of the target + partyInformation [5] SET SIZE (1..10) OF PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- This parameter provides the concerned party, the identity(ies) of the party + -- and all the information provided by the party. + mMSEvent [7] MMSEvent OPTIONAL, + + serviceCenterAddress [8] PartyInformation OPTIONAL, + -- this parameter provides the address of the relevant MMS server + mMSParties [9] MMSParties OPTIONAL, + -- this parameter provides the MMS parties (To, CC, BCC, and From) in the communication. + mMSSVersion [10] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + transactionID [11] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + + messageID [12] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + -- In accordance with [90] it is encoded as in email address as per RFC2822 [92]. + -- The characters "<" and ">" are not included. + mMSSDateTime [13] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, + messageClass [14] MessageClass OPTIONAL, + expiry [15] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, + distributionIndicator [16] YesNo OPTIONAL, + elementDescriptor [17] ElementDescriptor OPTIONAL, + retrievalMode [18] YesNo OPTIONAL, + -- if retrievalMode is included, it has to be coded to Yes indicating Manual retrieval mode + -- recommended. + retrievalModeText [19] EncodedString OPTIONAL, + senderVisibility [20] YesNo OPTIONAL, + -- Yes indicates Show and No indicates Do Not Show. + deliveryReport [21] YesNo OPTIONAL, + readReport [22] YesNo OPTIONAL, + applicID [23] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + replyApplicID [24] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + auxApplicInfo [25] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + contentClass [26] ContentClass OPTIONAL, + dRMContent [27] YesNo OPTIONAL, + replaceID [28] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + contentLocation [29] ContentLocation OPTIONAL, + mMSSStatus [30] MMSStatus OPTIONAL, + reportAllowed [31] YesNo OPTIONAL, + previouslySentBy [32] PreviouslySentBy OPTIONAL, +} + +``` + +``` + +previouslySentByDateTime [33] PreviouslySentByDateTime OPTIONAL, +mMState [34] mMState OPTIONAL, +desiredDeliveryTime [35] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, +deliveryReportAllowed [36] YesNo OPTIONAL, +store [37] YesNo OPTIONAL, +responseStatus [38] ResponseStatus OPTIONAL, +responseStatusText [39] ResponseStatusText OPTIONAL, +storeStatus [40] StoreStatus OPTIONAL, +storeStatusText [41] EncodedString OPTIONAL, +-- mMState [42] mMState OPTIONAL, +mMFlags [43] MMFlags OPTIONAL, +mMBoxDescriptionPdu [44] SEQUENCE OF MMBoxDescriptionPdu OPTIONAL, +cancelID [45] UTF8String OPTIONAL, + +cancelStatus [46] YesNo OPTIONAL, +-- Yes indicates cancel successfully received and No indicates cancel request corrupted. +mMSStart [47] INTEGER OPTIONAL, +mMSLimit [48] INTEGER OPTIONAL, +mMSAttributes [49] MMSAttributes OPTIONAL, +mMSTotals [50] YesNo OPTIONAL, +mMSQuotas [51] YesNo OPTIONAL, +mMSMessageCount [52] INTEGER OPTIONAL, +messageSize [53] INTEGER OPTIONAL, +mMSForwardReqDateTime [54] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, +adaptationAllowed [55] YesNo OPTIONAL, +priority [56] Priority OPTIONAL, +mMSCorrelationNumber [57] MSCorrelationNumber OPTIONAL, +-- this parameter provides MMS Correlation number when the event will also provide CC. +contentType [58] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +national-Parameters [59] National-Parameters OPTIONAL +} +-- Parameters having the same tag numbers have to be identical in Rel-14 and onwards modules + +``` + +-- PARAMETERS FORMATS + +``` + +PartyInformation ::= SEQUENCE +{ + party-Qualifier [0] ENUMERATED + { + mMSTarget(1), + ... + }, + partyIdentity [1] SEQUENCE + { + mSISDN [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- MSISDN, based on the value of + -- global-phone-number found in the MMS (see OMA Multimedia Messaging + -- Service Encapsulation Protocol [90]). + mMSSAddress [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- See clause 8 of OMA Multimedia Messaging Service Encapsulation Protocol [90]. It + -- may be each value of a user defined identifier, that will be an external + -- representation of an address processed by the MMS Proxy Relay. + mMSSAddressNonLocalID [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- see table 15.3.6.1.2: Mapping between Events information and IRI information + e-Mail [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- it is described in section 3.4 of IETF RFC 2822 [92], but excluding the obsolete + -- definitions as indicated by the "obs-" prefix. (see clause 8 of Multimedia Messaging + -- Service Encapsulation Protocol OMA-TS-MMS_ENC-V1_3-20110913-A [90].) + e164-Format [5] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1 .. 25)) OPTIONAL, + -- E164 address but based on value of global-phone-number the found in the MMS. + iPAddress [6] IPAddress OPTIONAL, + -- IP Address may be an IPv4 or IPv6. + alphanum-Shortcode [8] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- see clause 8 of OMA Multimedia Messaging Service Encapsulation Protocol [90]. + num-Shortcode [9] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- see clause 8 of OMA Multimedia Messaging Service Encapsulation Protocol [90]. + iMSI [10] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + ... + }, + ... +} + +Address ::= EncodedString + +Addresses ::= SEQUENCE OF Address + +ClassIdentifier ::= ENUMERATED +{ + personal (0), + +``` + +``` + +advertisement (1), +informational (2), +auto (3), +... +} + +ContentClass ::= ENUMERATED +{ + text (0), + image-basic (1), + image-rich (2), + + video-basic (3), + video-rich (4), + megapixel (5), + content-basic (6), + content-rich (7), + ... +} + +ContentLocation ::= SEQUENCE +{ + contentLocationURI [1] OCTET STRING, + -- See Clause 7.3.10 of [90] for the coding of the contentLocationURI. + statusCount [2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + -- the statusCount is included only for the MMS Delete event. + ... +} + +ElementDescriptor ::= SEQUENCE +{ + contentReferenceValue [1] UTF8String, + parameterName [2] ParameterName, + parameterValue [3] ParameterValue, + ... +} + +EncodedString ::= CHOICE +{ + text [1] UTF8String, + encodedTextString [2] EncodedTextString, + ... +} + +EncodedTextString ::= SEQUENCE +{ + stringType [1] OCTET STRING, + -- stringType shall be encoded with MIBEnum values as registered with IANA as defined in [90]. + actualString [2] OCTET STRING, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +From ::= SEQUENCE OF FromAddresses + +FromAddresses ::= CHOICE +{ + actualAddress [1] EncodedString, + insertToken [2] NULL, + ... +} + +MessageClass ::= CHOICE +{ + classIdentifier [1] ClassIdentifier, + tokenText [2] OCTET STRING, + ... +} + +MMBoxDescriptionPdus ::= SEQUENCE +{ + mMScorrelation [1] mMScorrelationNumber OPTIONAL, + toAddresses [2] Addresses, + cCAddresses [3] Addresses OPTIONAL, + bCCAddresses [4] Addresses OPTIONAL, + fromAddress [5] From, + messageID [6] UTF8String, + mMSDatetime [7] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, + previouslySentBy [8] PreviouslySentBy OPTIONAL, +} + +``` + +``` + +previouslySentByDateTime [9] PreviouslySentByDateTime OPTIONAL, +mMState [10] MMState OPTIONAL, +mMFlags [11] MMFlags OPTIONAL, +messageClass [12] MessageClass OPTIONAL, +priority [13] Priority OPTIONAL, +deliveryTime [14] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, +expiry [15] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, +deliveryReport [16] YesNo OPTIONAL, +readReport [17] YesNo OPTIONAL, +messageSize [18] INTEGER OPTIONAL, +contentLocation [19] ContentLocation OPTIONAL, +contentType [20] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, +... +} + +``` + +``` + +MMFlags ::= SEQUENCE +{ + tokenAction [1] TokenAction, + mmFlagKeywords [2] EncodedString +} + +``` + +``` + +MMSAttributes ::= CHOICE +{ + attributeApplicID [1] UTF8String, + attributeAuxApplicInfo [2] UTF8String, + attributeBCC [3] Address, + attributeCC [4] Address, + attributeContent [5] OCTET STRING, + attributeContentType [6] OCTET STRING, + attributeDate [7] GeneralizedTime, + attributeDeliveryReport [8] YesNo, + attributeDeliveryTime [9] GeneralizedTime, + attributeExpiry [10] GeneralizedTime, + attributeFrom [11] From, + attributeMessageClass [12] MessageClass, + attributeMessageID [13] UTF8String, + attributeMessageSize [14] INTEGER, + attributePriority [15] Priority, + attributeReadReport [16] YesNo, + attributeTo [17] Address, + attributeReplyApplicID [18] UTF8String, + attributePreviouslySentBy [19] PreviouslySentBy, + attributePreviouslySentByDateTime [20] PreviouslySentByDateTime, + attributeAdditionalHeaders [21] OCTET STRING, + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +MMSCorrelationNumber ::= OCTET STRING + +``` + +``` + +MMSEvent ::= ENUMERATED +{ + send (0), + notification (1), + notificationResponse (2), + retrieval (3), + retrievalAcknowledgement (4), + forwarding (5), + store (6), + upload (7), + delete (8), + delivery (9), + readReplyFromTarget (10), + readReplyToTarget (11), + cancel (12), + viewRequest (13), + viewConfirm (14), + ... +} + +``` + +``` + +MMSParties ::= SEQUENCE +{ + toAddresses [1] Addresses OPTIONAL, + cCAddresses [2] Addresses OPTIONAL, + bCCAddresses [3] Addresses OPTIONAL, + fromAddresses [4] From OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +``` + +``` +} + +MMSState ::= ENUMERATED +{ + draft (0), + sent (1), + new (2), + retrieved (3), + forwarded (4), + ... +} + +MMSStatus ::= ENUMERATED +{ + expired (0), + retrieved (1), + rejected (2), + deferred (3), + unrecognised (4), + indeterminate (5), + forwarded (6), + unreachable (7), + ... +} + +ParameterName ::= CHOICE +{ + integerName [1] INTEGER, + textName [2] UTF8String, + ... +} + +ParameterValue ::= CHOICE +{ + intValue [1] OCTET STRING, + textValue [2] UTF8String, + ... +} + +PreviouslySentBy ::= SEQUENCE +{ + forwardedCount [1] INTEGER, + forwardedPartyID [2] EncodedString, + ... +} +``` + +``` +PreviouslySentByDateTime ::= SEQUENCE +{ + forwardedCount [1] INTEGER, + forwardedDateTime [2] GeneralizedTime, + ... +} + +Priority ::= ENUMERATED +{ + low (0), + normal (1), + high (2), + ... +} + +ResponseStatus ::= SEQUENCE +{ + statusCount [1] EncodedString OPTIONAL, + -- the statusCount shall only be included for the Delete event. + actualResponseStatus [2] ActualResponseStatus, + ... +} + +ResponseStatusText ::= SEQUENCE +{ + statusCount [1] EncodedString OPTIONAL, + -- the statusCount shall only be included for the Delete event. + actualResponseStatusText [2] EncodedString, + ... +} +``` + +``` +ActualResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` +{ + ok (0), + errorUnspecified (1), + errorServiceDenied (2), + errorMessageFormatCorrupt (3), + + errorSendingAddressUnresolved (4), + errorMessageNotFound (5), + errorNetworkProblem (6), + errorContentNotAccepted (7), + errorUnsupportedMessage (8), + errorTransientFailure (9), + errorTransientSendingAddressUnresolved (10), + errorTransientMessageNotFound (11), + errorTransientNetworkProblem (12), + errorTransientPartialSucess (13), + errorPermanentFailure (14), + errorPermanentServiceDenied (15), + errorPermanentMessageFormatCorrupt (16), + errorPermanentSendingAddressUnresolved (17), + errorPermanentMessageNotFound (18), + errorPermanentContentNotAccepted (19), + errorPermanentReplyChargingLimitationsNotMet (20), + errorPermanentReplyChargingRequestNotAccepted (21), + errorPermanentReplyChargingForwardingDenied (22), + errorPermanentReplyChargingNotSupported (23), + errorPermanentAddressHidingNotSupported (24), + errorPermanentLackOfPrepaid (25), + + ... +} +``` + +``` +StoreStatus ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` +{ + success (0), + errorTransient (1), + high (2), + + ... +} +``` + +``` +TokenAction ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` +{ + addToken (0), + removeToken (1), + filterToken (2), + + ... +} +``` + +``` +YesNo ::= BOOLEAN +``` + +``` +-- TRUE indicates Yes and FALSE indicates No. +``` + +``` +END -- OF MmsHI2Operations +``` + +## B.16 Content information (HI3 MMS) + +``` +Mms-HI3-PS { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulintercept(2) +threeGPP(4) hi3mms(17) r16 (16) version-0(0) } +``` + +``` +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= +``` + +``` +BEGIN +``` + +``` +IMPORTS +``` + +``` +MMSCorrelationNumber, MMSEvent + FROM MmsHI2Operations + { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulintercept(2) threeGPP(4) + hi2mms(16) r16 (16) version-0(0) } -- Imported from TS 33.108 v.14.0.0 +``` + +``` +LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, Timestamp + FROM HI2Operations +``` + +``` +{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) +version18(18)}; -- from ETSI HI2Operations TS 101 671 v3.12.1 +``` + +``` +-- Object Identifier Definitions +``` + +``` +-- Security DomainId +``` + +``` +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} +``` + +``` +-- Security Subdomains +``` + +``` +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +hi3DomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi3mms(17) r16(16) version-0(0)} +``` + +``` +CC-PDU ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + mmSLIC-header [1] MMSLIC-header, + payload [2] OCTET STRING +} +``` + +``` +MMSLIC-header ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + hi3MmsDomainId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- 3GPP HI3 Domain + IID [1] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier OPTIONAL, + mMScorrelationNNumber [2] mMScorrelationNumber, + timeStamp [3] timeStamp, + t-PDU-direction [4] TPDU-direction, + mMSSVersion [5] INTEGER, + transactionID [6] UTF8String, + national-HI3-ASN1parameters [7] National-HI3-ASN1parameters OPTIONAL, + -- encoded per national requirements + ice-type [8] ICE-type OPTIONAL, + -- The ICE-type indicates the applicable Intercepting Control Element(see ref [19]) in which + -- the T-PDU is intercepted. + ... +} +``` + +``` +TPDU-direction ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` +{ + from-target (1), + to-target (2), + unknown (3) +} +``` + +``` +National-HI3-ASN1parameters ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + countryCode [1] PrintableString (SIZE (2)), + -- Country Code according to ISO 3166-1 [39], + -- the country to which the parameters inserted after the extension marker apply + -- In case a given country wants to use additional national parameters according to its law, + -- these national parameters should be defined using the ASN.1 syntax and added after the + -- extension marker (...). +``` + +``` +-- It is recommended that "version parameter" and "vendor identification parameter" are +-- included in the national parameters definition. Vendor identifications can be +-- retrieved from IANA web site. It is recommended to avoid +-- using tags from 240 to 255 in a formal type definition. +``` + +``` +... +} +``` + +``` +ICE-type ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` +{ + mMSc (1), + mMSPProxyRelay (2), + ... +} +``` + +``` +END -- OF Mms-HI3 +``` + +## B.17 IP based handover (HI3) for CS voice content + +``` +CSvoice-HI3-IP {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) +threeGPP(4) hi3CSvoice(18) r16 (16) version-0 (0)} +``` + +``` +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= +``` + +``` +BEGIN +``` + +### IMPORTS + +``` +-- from ETSI HI2Operations TS 101 671, version 3.12.1 +CC-Link-Identifier, +CommunicationIdentifier, +LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, +TimeStamp + FROM HI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) +version18(18)} + +-- from 3GPP Eps-HI3-PS TS 33.108 +National-HI3-ASN1parameters + FROM Eps-HI3-PS {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) +lawfulIntercept(2) threeGPP(4) hi3eps(9) r16 (16) version-0 (0)} + +-- from VoIP-HI3-IMS TS 33.108 +Payload-description, +TPDU-direction + FROM VoIP-HI3-IMS {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) +lawfulIntercept(2) threeGPP(4) hi3voip(12) r16(16) version-0(0)}; +``` + +### -- Object Identifier Definitions + +``` +-- Security DomainId +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} + +-- Security Subdomains +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +hi3CSvoiceDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi3CSvoice(18) r16(16) version-0 (0)} +``` + +### CSvoice-CC-PDU ::= SEQUENCE + +``` +{ + cSvoiceLIC-header [0] CSvoiceLIC-header, + payload [1] OCTET STRING, + ... +} +``` + +### CSvoiceLIC-header ::= SEQUENCE + +``` +{ + hi3CSvoiceDomainId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- 3GPP IP-based delivery for CS HI3 Domain + lIID [1] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier OPTIONAL, + communicationIdentifier [2] CommunicationIdentifier, + -- contents same as the contents of similar field sent in the linked IRI messages + ccLID [3] CC-Link-Identifier OPTIONAL, + -- Included only if the linked IRI messages have the similar field. When included, + -- the content is same as the content of similar field sent in the linked IRI messages. + timeStamp [4] TimeStamp OPTIONAL, + sequence-number [5] INTEGER (0..65535), + t-PDU-direction [6] TPDU-direction, + national-HI3-ASN1parameters [7] National-HI3-ASN1parameters OPTIONAL, + -- encoded per national requirements + payload-description [8] Payload-description, + -- used to provide the codec information of the CC (as RTP payload) delivered over HI3 + ... +} +``` + +``` +END -- OF CSvoice-HI3-IP +``` + +--- + +## Annex C (normative): UMTS and EPS HI3 interfaces + +### C.0 Introduction + +There are three possible methods for delivery of content of communication to the LEMF standardized in this document: + +- a) UMTS/EPS LI Correlation Header (ULIC) and UDP/TCP +- b) FTP +- c) ETSI TS 102 232-1 [104] and ETSI TS 102 232-7 [105] + +The present document recommends that option c) is used. + +Two versions of ULIC are defined for UMTS PS interception: version 0 and version 1. + +ULICv1 shall be supported by the network and, optionally, ULICv0 may be supported by the network. When both are supported, ULICv1 is the default value. + +ULIC version 0 is not specified for EPS. + +--- + +### C.1 UMTS LI correlation header + +#### C.1.1 Introduction + +The header and the payload of the communication between the target and the other party (later called: Payload Information Element) is duplicated. A new header (later called: ULIC-Header) is added before it is sent to LEMF. + +Data packets with the ULIC header shall be sent to the LEA via UDP/IP or TCP/IP. + +#### C.1.2 Definition of ULIC header version 0 + +ULIC header contains the following attributes: + +- Correlation Number. +- Message Type (a value of 255 is used for HI3-PDUs). +- Direction. +- Sequence Number. +- Length. +- Intercepting Control Element (ICE) type. + +T-PDU contains the intercepted information. + +![](ef41234b5258296a8ca8056f05de0fa6_img.jpg) + +| Octets | Bits | | | | | | | | +|--------|--------------------------|---|-----|-----------|----------|-----|-----|---| +| | 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | +| 1 | Version ('0 0 0') | | '1' | Spare '1' | ICE type | DIR | '0' | | +| 2 | Message Type (value 255) | | | | | | | | +| 3-4 | Length | | | | | | | | +| 5-6 | Sequence Number | | | | | | | | +| 7-8 | not used (value 0) | | | | | | | | +| 9 | not used (value 255) | | | | | | | | +| 10 | not used (value 255) | | | | | | | | +| 11 | not used (value 255) | | | | | | | | +| 12 | not used (value 255) | | | | | | | | +| 13-20 | correlation number | | | | | | | | + +Figure C.1: Outline of ULIC header + +For interception tunneling the ULIC header shall be used as follows: + +- Version shall be set to 0 to indicate the first version of ULIC header. +- DIR indicates the direction of the T-PDU: + - "1" indicating uplink (from observed mobile user); and + - "0" indicating downlink (to observed mobile user). +- Message Type shall be set to 255 (the unique value that is used for T-PDU within GTP TS 29.060 [17]). +- Length shall be the length, in octets, of the signalling message excluding the ULIC header. Bit 8 of octet 3 is the most significant bit and bit 1 of octet 4 is the least significant bit of the length field. +- Sequence Number is an increasing sequence number for tunneled T-PDUs. Bit 8 of octet 5 is the most significant bit and bit 1 of octet 6 is the least significant bit of the sequence number field. + +NOTE: When a handoff occurs between SGSNs, the DF3 serving the LEA may change. If the DF3 serving an LEA changes as a result of an handoff between SGSNs, contiguous sequencing may not occur as new sequencing may be initiated at the new DF3. Accordingly, the LEA should not assume that sequencing shall be contiguous when handoff occurs between SGSNs and the DF3 serving the LEA changes. + +- Correlation Number consists of two parts: GGSN-ID identifies the GGSN which creates the Charging-ID. + +Charging-ID is defined in TS 29.060 [17] and assigned uniquely to each PDP context activation on that GGSN (4 octets). + +The correlation number consist of 8 octets. The requirements for this correlation number are similar to that defined for charging in TS 29.060 [17]. Therefore it is proposed to use the Charging-ID, defined in TS 29.060 [17] as part of correlation number. The Charging-ID is signalled to the new SGSN in case of SGSN-change so the tunnel identifier could be used "seamlessly" for the HI3 interface. + +![](051b9af4f47e27e8b07695e4da99ce35_img.jpg) + +| 0 | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|-------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| +| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 0 | 1 | | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | +| Charging -ID
Octet 1 | | | | | | | | Charging -ID
Octet 2 | | | | | | | | Charging -ID
Octet 3 | | | | | | | | Charging -ID
Octet 4 | | | | | | | | Octet 13-16 | | | | | | | | +| GGSN-ID | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Octet 17-20 | | | | | | | | + +Figure C.2: Outline of correlation number + +- Intercepting Control Element (ICE, see TS 33.107 [19]) type. Indicates whether the T-PDU was intercepted in the GGSN or in the SGSN: + +"0" indicating GGSN; and + +"1" indicating SGSN. + +This parameter is needed only in case the GGSN and the SGSN use the same Delivery Function/Mediation Function for the delivery of Content of Communication. + +The ULIC header is followed by a subsequent payload information element. Only one payload information element is allowed in a single ULIC message. + +| Octets | Bits | | | | | | | | +|--------|-----------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| +| | 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | +| 1 - 20 | ULIC-Header | | | | | | | | +| 21 -n | Payload Information Element | | | | | | | | + +**Figure C.3: ULIC header followed by the subsequent payload Information Element** + +The payload information element contains the header and the payload of the communication between the target and the other party. + +### C.1.3 Definition of ULIC header version 1 + +ULIC-header version 1 is defined in ASN.1 [5] (see annex B.4 for UMTS PS interception and annex B.10 for EPS interception) and is encoded according to BER [6]. It contains the following attributes: + +- Object Identifier (hi3DomainId) +- ULIC header ASN.1 version (version). + +NOTE: ULIC header ASN.1 version (version) is not used for EPS interception. + +- lawful interception identifier (IIID, optional) +sending of lawful interception identifier is application dependant; it is done according to national requirements. +- correlation number (correlation-Number). As defined in clause 6.1.3 for UMTS PS and clause 10.1.3 for EPS. +- time stamp (timeStamp, optional), +sending of time stamp is application dependant; it is done according to national requirements. +- sequence number (sequence-number). Sequence Number is an increasing sequence number for tunneled T-PDUs. Handling of sequence number is application dependent; it is done according to national requirements (e.g. unique sequence number per PDP-context). + +NOTE: When a handoff occurs between SGSNs or other Core Network nodes, the DF3 serving the LEA may change. If the DF3 serving an LEA changes as a result of an handoff between SGSNs or other Core Network nodes, contiguous sequencing may not occur as new sequencing may be initiated at the new DF3. Accordingly, the LEA should not assume that sequencing shall be contiguous when handoff occurs between SGSNs or other Core Network nodes and the DF3 serving the LEA changes. + +- TPDU direction (t-PDU-direction) +indicates the direction of the T-PDU (from the target or to the target). +- National parameters (nationalParameters, optional) +this parameter is encoded according to national requirements +- ICE type (ice-type, optional) +indicates in which node the T-PDU was intercepted. This parameter is needed only in case several Core Network nodes use the same Delivery Function/Mediation Function for the delivery of Content of Communication. + +The ULIC header is followed by a subsequent payload information element. Only one payload information element is allowed in a single ULIC message (see annex B.4 for UMTS PS interception and annex B.10 for EPS interception). + +The payload information element contains the header and the payload of the communication between the target and the other party. + +## C.1.4 Exceptional procedure + +With ULIC over UDP: the delivering node doesn't take care about any problems at LEMF. + +With ULIC over TCP: TCP tries to establish a connection to LEMF and resending (buffering in the sending node) of packets is also supported by TCP. + +In both cases it might happen that content of communication gets lost (in case the LEMF or the transit network between MF and LEMF is down for a long time). + +## C.1.5 Other considerations + +The use of IPsec for this interface is recommended. + +The required functions in LEMF are: + +- Collecting and storing of the incoming packets inline with the sequence numbers. +- Correlating of CC to IRI with the use of the correlation number in the ULIC header. + +--- + +## C.2 FTP + +### C.2.1 Introduction + +At HI3 interface FTP is used over the internet protocol stack for the delivery of the result of interception. FTP is defined in IETF STD 9 [13]. The IP is defined in IETF STD0005 [15]. The TCP is defined in IETF STD0007 [16]. + +FTP supports reliable delivery of data. The data may be temporarily buffered in the sending node (MF) in case of link failure. FTP is independent of the payload data it carries. + +### C.2.2 Usage of the FTP + +In the packet data LI the MF acts as the FTP client and the receiving node (LEMF) acts as the FTP server . The client pushes the data to the server. + +The receiving node LEMF stores the received data as files. The sending entity (MF) may buffer files. + +Several smaller intercepted data units may be gathered to bigger packages prior to sending, to increase bandwidth efficiency. + +The following configurable intercept data collection (= transfer package closing / file change) threshold parameters should be supported: + +- frequency of transfer, based on send timeout, e.g. X ms. +- frequency of transfer, based on volume trigger, e.g. X octets. + +There are two possible ways how the interception data may be sent from the MF to the LEMF. One way is to produce files that contain interception data only for one observed target (see: "File naming method A"). The other way is to multiplex all the intercepted data that MF receives to the same sequence of general purpose interception files sent by the MF (see: "File naming method B"). + +The HI2 and HI3 are logically different interfaces, even though in some installations the HI2 and HI3 packet streams might also be delivered via a common transmission path from a MF to a LEMF. It is possible to correlate HI2 and HI3 packet streams by having common (referencing) data fields embedded in the IRI and the CC packet streams. + +**File naming:** + +The names for the files transferred to a LEA are formed according to one of the 2 available formats, depending on the delivery file strategy chosen (e.g. due to national convention or operator preference). + +Either each file contains data of only one observed target (as in method A) or several targets' data is put to files common to all observed target traffic through a particular MF node (as in method B). + +The maximum set of allowed characters in interception file names are "a"..."z", "A"..."Z", "-", " ", ".", and decimals "0"..."9". + +**File naming method A):** + +\_. + +**LIID =** See clause 7.1. + +**seq =** integer ranging between [0..264-1], in ASCII form (not exceeding 20 ASCII digits), identifying the sequence number for file transfer from this node per a specific target. + +**ext =** ASCII integer ranging between ["1".."8"] (in hex: 31H..38H), identifying the file type. The possible file type codings for intercepted data are shown in table C.1. The types "2", "4", and "6" are reserved for the HI3 interface and type "8" is reserved for data files according to a national requirement by using the same file naming concept. + +**Table C.1: Possible file types** + +| File types that the LEA may get | Intercepted data types | +|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------| +| "1" (in binary: 0011 0001) | IRI / as option HI1 notifications (see annex A.2.2) | +| "2" (in binary: 0011 0010) | CC(MO) | +| "4" (in binary: 0011 0100) | CC(MT) | +| "6" (in binary: 0011 0110) | CC(MO&MT) | +| "7" (in binary 0011 0111) | IRI + CC(MO&MT) | +| "8" (in binary: 0011 1000) | for national use | + +The least significant bit that is '1' in file type 1, is reserved for indicating IRI data and may be used for indicating that the HI2 and HI3 packet streams are delivered via a common transmission path from a MF to a LEMF. + +The bit 2 of the **ext** tells whether the CC(MO) is included in the intercepted data. + +The bit 3 of the **ext** tells whether the CC(MT) is included in the intercepted data. + +The bit 4 of the **ext** tells whether the intercepted data is according to a national requirement. + +Thus, for CC(MO) data, the file type is "2", for CC(MT) data "4", for CC(MO&MT) data "6" and for "national use" data the file type is "8". + +When HI2 and HI3 packet streams are delivered via a common transmission path from a MF to a LEMF, then the file type is "7", that indicates the presence of both the IRI and the CC(MO&MT) data. + +This alternative A is used when each target's intercepted data is gathered per observed target to dedicated delivery files. This method provides the result of interception in a very refined form to the LEAs, but requires somewhat more resources in the sending node than alternative B. With this method, the data sorting and interpretation tasks of the LEMF are considerably easier to facilitate in near real time than in alternative B. + +**File naming method B):** + +The other choice is to use monolithic fixed format file names (with no trailing file type part in the file name): + + (e.g. ABXY00041014084400006) + +where: + +ABXY = Source node identifier part, used for all files by the mobile network operator "AB" from this MF node named "XY". + +00 = year 2000 + 04= month April + 10= day 10 + 14 = hour + 08 = minutes + 44= seconds + 0000 = extension + ext = file type. Coding: "2" = CC(MO), "4" = CC(MT), "6" = CC(MO&MT), "8" = national use. The type "1" is reserved for IRI data files and may be used for indicating that the HI2 and HI3 packet streams are delivered via a common transmission path from a MF to a LEMF. In such a case, the file type is "7", that indicates the presence of both the IRI and the CC(MO&MT) data. + +This alternative B is used when several targets' intercepted data is gathered to common delivery files. This method does not provide the result of interception in as refined form to the LEAs as the alternative A, but it is faster in performance for the MF point of view. With this method, the MF does not need to keep many files open like in alternative A. + +## C.2.3 Exceptional procedures + +Overflow at the receiving end (LEMF) is avoided due to the nature of the protocol. + +In case the transit network or receiving end system (LEMF) is down for a reasonably short time period, the local buffering at the MF will be sufficient as a delivery reliability backup procedure. + +In case the transit network or receiving end system (LEMF) is down for a very long period, the local buffering at the MF may have to be terminated. Then the following intercepted data coming from the intercepting nodes towards the MF would be discarded, until the transit network or LEMF is up and running again. + +## C.2.4 CC contents for FTP + +### C.2.4.1 Fields + +The logical contents of the CC-header is described here. + +**CC-header** = (Version, HeaderLength, PayloadLength, PayloadType, PayloadTimeStamp, PayloadDirection, CCSeqNumber, CorrelationNumber, LIID, PrivateExtension). + +The Information Element CorrelationNumber forms the means to correlate the IRI and CC of the communication session intercepted. + +The first column indicates whether the Information Element referred is Mandatory, Conditional or Optional. + +The second column is the Type in decimal. + +The third column is the length of the Value in octets. + +(Notation used in table C.2: M = Mandatory, O = Optional, C= Conditional). + +**Table C.2: Information elements in the first version of the CC header** + +| Mode | Type | Length | Value | +|------|------|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| M | 130 | 2 | Version = the version number of the format version to be used. This field has a decimal value, this enables version changes to the format version. The values are allocated according to national conventions. | +| O | 131 | 2 | HeaderLength = Length of the CC-header up to the start of the payload in octets.
(This field is optional since it is useful only in such cases that these information elements would be transferred without a dynamic length encapsulation that contains all the length information anyway. This field could be needed in case of e.g. adapting to a local encapsulation convention.) | +| O | 132 | 2 | PayloadLength = Length of the payload following the CC-header in octets.
(This field is optional since it is useful only in such cases that these information elements would be transferred without a dynamic length encapsulation that contains all the length information anyway. This field could be needed in case of e.g. adapting to a local encapsulation convention.) | +| M | 133 | 1 | PayloadType = Type of the payload, indicating the type of the CC. Type of the payload. This field has a decimal value. The possible PDP Type values can be found in the standards (e.g. TS 29.060 [17]). The value 255 is reserved for future PDP Types and means: "Other".
The PDP Type values defined in TS 29.060 [17] are used for the GTPv2 and for the PMIP protocols as well. The PDN Type (GTPv2) or the IPv6 Home network prefix option/IPv4 home address option (PMIP) are mapped to the PDP Type values based on the IP version information. | +| O | 134 | 4 | PayloadTimeStamp = Payload timestamp according to intercepting node.
(Precision: 1 second, timezone: UTC). Format: Seconds since 1970-01-01 as in e.g. Unix (length: 4 octets). | +| C | 137 | 1 | PayloadDirection = Direction of the payload data. This field has a decimal value 0 if the payload data is going towards the target (ie. downstream), or 1 if the payload data is being sent from the target (ie. upstream). If this information is transferred otherwise, e.g. in the protocol header, this field is not required as mandatory. If the direction information is not available otherwise, it is mandatory to include it here in the CC header. | +| O | 141 | 4 | CCSeqNumber = Identifies the sequence number of each CC packet during interception of the target. This field has a 32-bit value. | +| M | 144 | 8 or 20 | CorrelationNumber = Identifies an intercepted session of the observed target. This can be implemented by using e.g. the Charging Id (4 octets, see TS 32.215 [14]) with the (4-octet/16-octet) IPv4/IPv6 address of the PDP context maintaining GGSN node attached after the first 4 octets.
| +| O | 254 | 1-25 | LIID = Field indicating the LIID as defined in this document. This field has a character string value, e.g. "ABCD123456". | +| O | 255 | 1-N | PrivateExtension = An optional field. The optional Private Extension contains vendor or LEA or operator specific information. It is described in the document TS 29.060 [17]. | + +**Table C.3: Information elements in the second version of the CC header** + +| Mode | Type | Length | Value | +|------|------|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| M | 130 | 2 | Version = the version number of the format version to be used. This field has a decimal value, this enables version changes to the format version. The values are allocated according to national conventions. | +| O | 131 | 2 | HeaderLength = Length of the CC-header up to the start of the payload in octets.
(This field is optional since it is useful only in such cases that these information elements would be transferred without a dynamic length encapsulation that contains all the length information anyway. This field could be needed in case of e.g. adapting to a local encapsulation convention). | +| O | 132 | 2 | PayloadLength = Length of the payload following the CC-header in octets.
(This field is optional since it is useful only in such cases that these information elements would be transferred without a dynamic length encapsulation that contains all the length information anyway. This field could be needed in case of e.g. adapting to a local encapsulation convention.) | +| M | 133 | 1 | PayloadType = Type of the payload, indicating the type of the CC. Type of the payload. This field has a decimal value. The possible PDP Type values can be found in the standards (e.g. TS 29.060 [17]). The value 255 is reserved for future PDP Types and means: "Other".
The PDP Type values defined in TS 29.060 [17] are used for the GTPv2 and for the PMIP protocols as well. The PDN Type (GTPv2) or the IPv6 Home network prefix option/IPv4 home address option (PMIP) are mapped to the PDP Type values based on the IP version information. | +| O | 134 | 4 | PayloadTimeStamp = Payload timestamp according to intercepting node. (Precision: 1 second, timezone: UTC). Format: Seconds since 1970-01-01 as in e.g. Unix (length: 4 octets). | +| C | 137 | 1 | PayloadDirection = Direction of the payload data. This field has a decimal value 0 if the payload data is going towards the target (ie. downstream), or 1 if the payload data is being sent from the target (ie. upstream). If this information is transferred otherwise, e.g. in the protocol header, this field is not required as mandatory. If the direction information is not available otherwise, it is mandatory to include it here in the CC header. | +| O | 141 | 4 | CCSeqNumber = Identifies the sequence number of each CC packet during interception of the target. This field has a 32-bit value. | +| M | 144 | 8 or 20 | CorrelationNumber = Identifies an intercepted session of the observed target. This can be implemented by using e.g. the Charging Id (4 octets, see TS 32.215 [14]) with the (4-octet/16-octet) IPv4/IPv6 address of the PDP context maintaining GGSN node attached after the first 4 octets.
| +| M | 251 | 2 | MainElementID = Identifier for the TLV element that encompasses one or more HeaderElement-PayloadElement pairs for intercepted packets. | +| M | 252 | 2 | HeaderElementID = Identifier for the TLV element that encompasses the CC-header of a PayloadElement. | +| M | 253 | 2 | PayloadElementID = Identifier for the TLV element that encompasses one intercepted Payload packet. | +| O | 254 | 1-25 | LIID = Field indicating the LIID as defined in this document. This field has a character string value, e.g. "ABCD123456". | +| O | 255 | 1-N | PrivateExtension = An optional field. The optional Private Extension contains vendor or LEA or operator specific information. It is described in the document TS 29.060 [17]. | + +## C.2.4.2 Information element syntax + +The dynamic TypeLengthValue (TLV) format is used for its ease of implementation and good encoding and decoding performance. Subfield sizes: Type = 2 octets, Length = 2 octets and Value = 0...N octets. From Length the T and L subfields are excluded. The Type is different for every different field standardized. + +The octets in the Type and Length subfields are ordered in the little-endian order, (i.e. least significant octet first). Any multi-octet Value subfield is also to be interpreted as being little-endian ordered (word/double word/long word) when it has a (hexadecimal 2/4/8-octet) numeric value, instead of being specified to have an ASCII character string value. This means that the least significant octet/word/double word is then sent before the more significant octet/word/double word. + +TLV encoding: + +![](15be56665b11258de01ed9f11b85ac3b_img.jpg) + +| | | | +|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------| +| Type (2 octets) | Length (2 octets) | Value (0-N octets) | +|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------| + +**Figure C.4: Information elements in the CC header** + +TLV encoding can always be applied in a nested fashion for structured values. + +![](3e719a8e608ad16194d4878e2d4fe35b_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | | | +|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----|-----|-----|-----| +| T | L | V | T | L | V | TLV | TLV | TLV | TLV | +|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----|-----|-----|-----| + +(The small "v" refers to the start of a Value field that has inside it a nested structure). + +**Figure C.5: Information elements in the CC header** + +In figure C.6, the TLV structure for UMTS HI3 transfer is presented for the case that there is just one intercepted packet inside the CC message. (There can be more CC Header IEs and CC Payload IEs in the CC, if there are more intercepted packets in the same CC message). + +![Figure C.6: IE structure of a CC message that contains one intercepted packet. The diagram shows three levels of TLV structures. The top level is the 'CC Information Element' containing 'MainElementID' (2 octets), 'CC Length' (2 octets), and 'CC' (N octets). The 'CC' field is expanded into 'CC Header IE' and 'CC Payload IE'. The 'CC Header IE' contains 'HeaderElem.ID' (2 octets), 'HeaderLength' (2 octets), and 'Header Value' (N octets). The 'CC Payload IE' contains 'PayloadElem.ID' (2 octets), 'PayloadLength' (2 octets), and 'Payload Value' (N octets). The 'Payload Value' is identified as an 'Intercepted data packet'. Below the 'Header Value' and 'Payload Value' fields, there are 'Version IE' and 'PrivateExtension IE'. The 'Version IE' contains 'VersionID' (2 octets), 'Length' (2 octets), and 'Version' (2 octets). The 'PrivateExtension IE' contains 'PrivateExt.ID' (2 octets), 'Length' (2 octets), and 'PrivateExtension' (N octets). A note indicates that '(The other IEs inside the CC Header Value field are here between)' the Version IE and PrivateExtension IE.](c376951433e1938b4119852493d06554_img.jpg) + +Figure C.6: IE structure of a CC message that contains one intercepted packet. The diagram shows three levels of TLV structures. The top level is the 'CC Information Element' containing 'MainElementID' (2 octets), 'CC Length' (2 octets), and 'CC' (N octets). The 'CC' field is expanded into 'CC Header IE' and 'CC Payload IE'. The 'CC Header IE' contains 'HeaderElem.ID' (2 octets), 'HeaderLength' (2 octets), and 'Header Value' (N octets). The 'CC Payload IE' contains 'PayloadElem.ID' (2 octets), 'PayloadLength' (2 octets), and 'Payload Value' (N octets). The 'Payload Value' is identified as an 'Intercepted data packet'. Below the 'Header Value' and 'Payload Value' fields, there are 'Version IE' and 'PrivateExtension IE'. The 'Version IE' contains 'VersionID' (2 octets), 'Length' (2 octets), and 'Version' (2 octets). The 'PrivateExtension IE' contains 'PrivateExt.ID' (2 octets), 'Length' (2 octets), and 'PrivateExtension' (N octets). A note indicates that '(The other IEs inside the CC Header Value field are here between)' the Version IE and PrivateExtension IE. + +**Figure C.6: IE structure of a CC message that contains one intercepted packet** + +The first octet of the first TLV element will start right after the last octet of the header of the protocol that is being used to carry the CC information. + +The first TLV element (i.e. the main TLV IE) comprises the whole dynamic length CC information, i.e. the dynamic length CC header and the dynamic length CC payload. + +Inside the main TLV IE there are at least 2 TLV elements: the Header of the payload and the Payload itself. The Header contains all the ancillary IEs related to the intercepted CC packet. The Payload contains the actual intercepted packet. + +There may be more than one intercepted packet in one UMTS HI3 delivery protocol message. If the Value of the main TLV IE is longer than the 2 (first) TLV Information Elements inside it, then it is an indication that there are more than one intercepted packets inside the main TLV IE (i.e. 4 or more TLV IEs in total). The number of TLV IEs in the main TLV IE is always even, since for every intercepted packet there is one TLV IE for header and one TLV IE for payload. + +## C.2.5 Other considerations + +The FTP protocol mode parameters used: + +Transmission Mode: stream + Format: non-print + Structure: file-structure + Type: binary + +The FTP service command to define the file system function at the server side: STORE mode for data transmission. + +The FTP client- (=user -FTP process at the MF) uses e.g. the default standard FTP ports 20 (for data connection) and 21 (for control connection), 'passive' mode is supported. The data transfer process listens to the data port for a connection from a server-FTP process. + +For the file transfer from the MF to the LEMF(s) e.g. the following data transfer parameters are provided for the FTP client (at the MF): + +- transfer destination (IP) address, e.g. "194.89.205.4"; +- transfer destination username, e.g. "LEA1"; +- transfer destination directory path, e.g. "/usr/local/LEA1/1234-8291"; +- transfer destination password; +- interception file type, e.g. "2" (this is needed only if the file naming method A is used). + +LEMF may use various kind directory structures for the reception of interception files. It is strongly recommended that at the LEMF machine the structure and access and modification rights of the storage directories are adjusted to prevent unwanted directory operations by a FTP client. + +The use of IPSec services for this interface is recommended. + +### Timing considerations for the FTP transmission + +The MF and LEMF sides control the timers to ensure reliable, near-real time data transfer. The transmission related timers are defined within the lower layers of the used protocol and are out of scope of this document. + +The following timers may be used within the LI application: + +**Table C.4: Timing considerations** + +| Name | Controlled by | Units | Description | +|-----------------------------|---------------|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| T1 inactivity timer | LEMF | Seconds | Triggered by no activity within the FTP session (no new files). The FTP session is torn down when the T1 expires. To send another file the new connection will be established. The timer avoids the FTP session overflow at the LEMF side. | +| T2 send file trigger | MF | Milliseconds | Forces the file to be transmitted to the LEMF (even if the size limit has not been reached yet in case of volume trigger active). If the timer is set to 0 the only trigger to send the file is the file size parameter (see C.2.2). | + +## C.2.6 Profiles (informative) + +As there are several ways (usage profiles) how data transfer can be arranged by using the FTP, this clause contains practical considerations how the communications can be set up. Guidance is given for client-server arrangements, session establishments, time outs, the handling of the files (in RAM or disk). Example batch file is described for the case that the sending FTP client uses files. If instead (logical) files are sent directly from the client's RAM memory, then the procedure can be in principle similar though no script file would then be needed. + +At the LEMF side, FTP server process is run, and at MF, FTP client. No FTP server (which could be accessed from outside the operator network) shall run in the MF. The FTP client can be implemented in many ways, and here the FTP usage is presented with an example only. The FTP client can be implemented by a batch file or a file sender program that uses FTP via an API. The login needs to occur only once per e.g. and - pair. Once the login is done, the files can then be transferred just by repeating "mput" command and checking the transfer status (e.g. from the API routine return value). To prevent inactivity timer triggering, a dummy command (e.g. "pwd") can be sent every T seconds (T should be less than L, the actual idle time limit). If the number of FTP connections is wanted to be as minimized as possible, the FTP file transfer method "B" is to be preferred to the method A (though the method A helps more the LEMF by pre-sorting the data sent). + +Simple example of a batch file extract: + +FTP commands usage scenario for transferring a list of files: + +To prevent FTP cmd line buffer overflow the best way is to use wildcarded file names, and let the FTP implementation do the file name expansion (instead of shell). The number of files for one mput is not limited this way: + +``` +ftp +user +cd +lcd +bin +mput +nlist +close +EOF +``` + +This set of commands opens an FTP connection to a LEA site, logs in with a given account (auto-login is disabled), transfers a list of files in binary mode, and checks the transfer status in a simplified way. + +Brief descriptions for the FTP commands used in the example: + +| | | +|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| user | Identify the client to the remote FTP server. | +| cd | Change the working directory on the remote machine to remote-directory. | +| lcd | Change the working directory on the local machine. | +| bin | Set the file transfer type to support binary image transfer | +| mput | Expand wild cards in the list of local files given as arguments and do a put for each file in the resulting list. Store each local file on the remote machine. | +| nlist | Print a list of the files in a directory on the remote machine. Send the output to local-file. | +| close | Terminate the FTP session with the remote server, and return to the command interpreter. Any defined macros are erased. | + +The parameters are as follows: + +**** contains the FTP command options, e.g. "-i -n -V -p" which equals to "interactive prompting off", "auto-login disabled", "verbose mode disabled", and "passive mode enabled". (These are dependent on the used ftp-version.) + +**** contains the IP address or DNS address of the destination (LEA). + +**** contains the receiving (LEA) username. + +**** contains the receiving (LEA) user's password. + +**** contains the destination path. + +**** contains the source path. + + wild carded file specification (matching the files to be transferred). + + the name of the last file to be transferred. + + is a (local) file to be checked upon transfer completion; if it exists then the transfer is considered successful. + +The FTP application should do the following things if the check file is not found: + +- keep the failed files; +- raise "file transfer failure" error condition (i.e. send alarm to the corresponding LEA); +- the data can be buffered for a time that the buffer size allows. If that would finally be exhausted, DF would start dropping the corresponding target's data until the transfer failure is fixed; +- the transmission of the failed files is retried until the transfer eventually succeeds. Then the DF would again start collecting the data; +- upon successful file transfer the sent files are deleted from the DF. + +The FTP server at LEMF shall not allow anonymous login of an FTP client. + +It is required that FTP implementation guarantees that LEMF will start processing data only after data transfer is complete. + +The following implementation example addresses a particular issue of FTP implementation. It is important however to highlight that there are multiple ways of addressing the problem in question, and therefore the given example does not in any way suggest being the default one. + +MF sends data with a filename, which indicates that the file is temporary. Once data transfer is complete, MF renames temporary file into ordinary one (as defined in F.3.2.2). + +The procedure for renaming filename should be as follow: + +- 1) open FTP channel (if not already open) from MF to LEMF; +- 2) sends data to LEMF using command "put" with temporary filename; +- 3) after MF finished to send the file, renaming it as ordinary one with command "ren". + +Brief descriptions for the FTP commands used in the example: + +ren renaming filename from-name to to-name. + +If the ftp-client want to send file to LEMF using the command "mput" (e.g. MF stored many IRI files and want to send all together with one command), every filename transferred successfully has to be renamed each after command "mput" ended. + +--- + +## C.3 ETSI TS 102 232-1 and ETSI TS 102 232-7 + +### C.3.1 General + +Functions having an HI3 interface may support the use of ETSI TS 102 232-1 [104] and ETSI TS 102 232-7 [105] to realise the interface. + +In the event of a conflict between either specification and the present document, the terms of the present document shall apply. + +C.3.2 Usage for realising HI3 The CC sent over HI3 is structured as a header and a payload. The header contains general information like LIID, timestamp, correlation information (as for example defined in ETSI TS 102 232-1 [104]). The payload contains content of communication based on information that the MF has received from sources in + +the network. CC defined as passing over the HI3 interface shall be passed as described in ETSI TS 102 232-7 [105] clauses 5 and 6. + +NOTE: ETSI TS 102 232-1 [104] specifies in clause 6.4 a transport layer based on TCP. However, based on agreement between network operator and LEA, in scenarios where it may not be possible to achieve the necessary LI data rates based on the transport layer based on single TCP connection, alternative profiles may be considered (e.g. based on UDP, multi path TCP or other protocols). Any alternative profile needs to ensure that LI reliability, security and completeness requirements as specified in TS 33.126 [106] are met. + +--- + +## Annex D (informative): LEMF requirements - handling of unrecognised fields and parameters + +During decoding of a record at the LEA, the following exceptional situations may occur: + +- 1) Unrecognized parameter: The parameter layout can be recognized, but its name is not recognized: +The parameter shall be ignored, the processing of the record proceeds. +- 2) The parameter content or value is not recognized or not allowed: +The parameter shall be ignored, the processing of the record proceeds. +- 3) The record cannot be decoded (e.g. it seems to be corrupted): +The whole record shall be rejected ignored. + +NOTE: In cases 2 and 3, the LEMF may wish to raise an alarm to the operator (NO/AN/SP) administration centre. For case 1, no special error or alarm procedures need be started at the LEA, because the reason may be the introduction of a new version of the specification in the network, not be an error as such security aspects. + +## Annex E (informative): Bibliography + +The following material, though not specifically referenced in the body of the present document (or not publicly available), gives supporting information. + +1. ITU-T Recommendation X.25: "Interface between Data Terminal Equipment (DTE) and Data Circuit-terminating Equipment (DCE) for terminals operating in the packet mode and connected to public data networks by dedicated circuit". +2. Void. +3. Void. +4. EN 300 061-1: "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Subaddressing (SUB) supplementary service; Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. one (DSS1) protocol; Part 1: Protocol specification". +5. EN 300 097-1 including Amendment 1: "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Connected Line Identification Presentation (COLP) supplementary service; Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. one (DSS1) protocol; Part 1: Protocol specification". +6. EN 300 098-1: "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Connected Line Identification Restriction (COLR) supplementary service; Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. one (DSS1) protocol; Part 1: Protocol specification". +7. EN 300 130-1: "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Malicious Call Identification (MCID) supplementary service; Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. one (DSS1) protocol; Part 1: Protocol specification". +8. EN 300 138-1 including Amendment 1: "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Closed User Group (CUG) supplementary service; Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. one (DSS1) protocol; Part 1: Protocol specification". +9. EN 300 185-1: "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Conference call, add-on (CONF) supplementary service; Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. one (DSS1) protocol; Part 1: Protocol specification". +10. ETS 300 188-1: "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Three-Party (3PTY) supplementary service; Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. one (DSS1) protocol; Part 1: Protocol specification". +11. EN 300 207-1 (V1.2): "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Diversion supplementary services; Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. one (DSS1) protocol; Part 1: Protocol specification". +12. EN 300 286-1: "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); User-to-User Signalling (UUS) supplementary service; Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. one (DSS1) protocol; Part 1: Protocol specification". +13. EN 300 369-1 (V1.2): "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Explicit Call Transfer (ECT) supplementary service; Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. one (DSS1) protocol; Part 1: Protocol specification". +14. EN 300 196-1 (V1.2): "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Generic functional protocol for the support of supplementary services; Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. one (DSS1) protocol; Part 1: Protocol specification". +15. ITU-T Recommendation Q.850: "Usage of cause and location in the Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. 1 and the Signalling System No. 7 ISDN User Part". +16. Void. + +17. Void. +18. EN 300 122-1: "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Generic keypad protocol for the support of supplementary services; Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. one (DSS1) protocol; Part 1: Protocol specification". +19. ETS 300 392-1: "Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Voice plus Data (V+D); Part 1: General network design". +20. EN 301 344, GSM 03.60: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); GPRS Service description stage 2". +21. RFC-2228: "FTP Security Extensions", October 1997. +22. Void. +23. ETSI TR 101 876 "Telecommunications security; Lawful Interception (LI); Description of GPRS HI3". +24. ETSI ES 201 671: "Handover Interface for the lawful interception of telecommunications traffic". + +## Annex F (informative): Correlation indications of IMS IRI with GSN CC at the LEMF + +This annex is informative and provides some guidelines pertaining to correlating IMS IRI with GSN CC at the LEMF. + +For IMS-enabled multimedia communication scenarios involving a target, it will be necessary for the LEMF to be able to correlate the media streams (as provided in the CC intercepted by the GSN) with the specific SIP signaling (as provided in the IRI intercepted by the CSCFs) used to establish those media streams. The principal reason for this is that the SDP content within the SIP signaling may provide the information required to even be able to decode the media streams. In certain cases, for example, the information in the RTP header within the media stream packets may not be sufficient to be able to determine the specific encoding used. The SDP portion of the SIP signaling would need to provide this information. Another important reason is that the SIP signaling provides information about the participants in a SIP session (other than the target) sending and receiving the associated media streams. The LIID parameter in the IMS IRI and GSN CC can be used to correlating all of the IMS IRI and all of the GSN CC associated with a particular target. If a single LIID is used in association all of the target's IMS identities (as per a NO/AN/SP agreement with the LEA), the process of associating the IMS IRI and GSN CC information is fairly straightforward. If, however, multiple LIIDs are used (e.g. one per IMS identity) then the LEMF needs to be able to associate each of the LIIDs that may be used for the IMS IRI with the LIID used for the CC. + +The SIP messages provided to the LEMF would contain a number of additional items of information that could be relevant with respect to supporting correlations of various types. Their potential role in correlating IMS IRI and GSN CC (or, more specifically, correlating SIP dialogs with media streams) is discussed below: + +- **Call-ID, From tag, To tag** : These SIP headers would identify different SIP messages belonging to the same SIP dialog (a call leg between the target user and a peer SIP user). It should be noted that the Call-ID alone is not sufficient to identify a dialog. Correlating specific SIP dialogs with specific media streams is the principal objective of this discussion. +- **P-Charging-Vector (IMS Charging ID)**: The principal purpose of the IMS Charging ID (ICID) in IMS is to correlate charging information provided by different network entities for the same call. The ICID could be useful in correlating SIP messages belonging to the same call, even if their SIP dialog identifiers are modified (e.g. by a B2BUA application server). It should be noted, however, that the use of the ICID is not necessary for the purpose of correlating SIP dialogs and the corresponding media streams. +- **P-Charging-Vector (GPRS Charging ID, GGSN address)**: GCIDs, along with the GGSN address, may be used as identifiers of the PDP contexts. These identifiers (one for each PDP context used by the SIP session) are made available to the P-CSCF and subsequently to the S-CSCF. They could be used to correlate SIP messages with the PDP context(s) used. For the purpose of correlating SIP dialogs with media streams, this type of correlation would be useful, although not essential. + +**SDP Connection addresses and ports:** The address and port information within the SDP of the SIP messages need to be matched with the addresses and ports corresponding to the media streams as provided in the CC reports. This implies a need to look both at the SDP content of the SIP messages as well as in the packets provided by the GSN. The set of PDP context identifiers included in the P-Charging-Vector could be used to simplify the search for a match. It should also be noted that the SDP contained in the SIP message may also include essential information about the encoding of each of the media streams, without which it may not be possible to decode. + +--- + +## Annex G (informative): United States lawful interception + +### G.1 Delivery methods preferences + +Law enforcement agencies want reliable delivery of intercepted communications to the LEMF: + +- U.S. Law enforcement prefers that the capability to deliver IRI to the LEMF be provided over the HI2 directly over TCP (at the transport layer) and the Internet Protocol (IP) (at the network layer). +- U.S. Law enforcement prefers that the capability to deliver content of communication to the LEMF be provided using the UMTS LI Correlation (ULIC) v1 Header over TCP/IP method for delivery. + +--- + +### G.2 HI2 delivery methods + +#### G.2.1 TPKT/TCP/IP + +##### G.2.1.1 Introduction + +The protocol used by the "LI application" for the encoding of IRI data and the sending of IRI data between the MF and the LEMF is based on already standardized data transmission protocols. At the HI2 interface, the "LI application" protocol is used directly over the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), which uses the Internet Protocol (IP) for the delivery of the IRI. IP is defined in IETF STD0005 [15]. TCP is defined in IETF STD0007 [16]. + +TCP/IP supports reliable delivery of data. TCP is independent of the payload data it carries. + +##### G.2.1.2 Normal Procedures + +###### G.2.1.2.0 General + +The MF/DF initiates the TCP connection as detailed in G.2.1.2.1. + +###### G.2.1.2.1 Usage of TCP/IP when MF initiates TCP Connections + +The MF shall initiate TCP connections to the LEMF for LI purposes. Once a TCP connection is established, the MF shall send the LI application messages defined in clause G.2.1.3. The MF shall not receive TCP data. + +The "LI application" messages may be sent over a single TCP connection per LEMF. A TCP/IP connection shall be capable of transporting "LI application" messages for multiple surveillance cases to a single LEA. The MF initiates the establishment of TCP connections to the LEMF equipment designated by the LEA. Optionally, the MF may use more than one TCP connection per LEMF for the purpose of delivering "LI application" messages to minimize the effects of congestion or facility failures. For example, if more than one TCP connection was used "LI application" messages may be uniformly distributed across the connections. If delays are detected on one TCP connection, the MF could begin to transmit more messages on the other TCP connections. The number of TCP connections supported to the LEMF shall be less than or equal to the provisioned maximum number of such connections. + +###### G.2.1.2.2 Use of TPKT + +The individual IRI parameters are coded using ASN.1 and the basic encoding rules (BER). The individual IRI parameters are conveyed to the LEMF in "LI application" messages or IRI data records. + +TCP is a stream-based protocol and has no inherent message delineation capability. + +Since the upper-layer protocols are not self-describing, ISO Transport Service on top of TCP (ITOT), also referred to as TPKT, as defined in RFC 1006 [27] and later updated by RFC 2126 [28] is used to encapsulate the "LI application" messages before handing them off to TCP. + +Therefore, TPKT shall be required and used in the transport stack of the IRI delivery interface (i.e. "LI application" messages/TPKT/TCP/IP). Only protocol class 0 defined in RFC 2126 [28] shall be supported. However, the TPKT connection establishment and negotiation mechanisms shall not be used. The maximum TPDU size to be supported is the default maximum TPDU size specified in [28] and is not negotiated. Consequently, the segmentation and reassembly procedures associated with TPKT will not be used. + +In case the TPKT connection establishment is not provided, based on agreement between the Operator and LEA, the TPDU header included in the TPKT payload (TPDU field defined in RFC 2126 [28]) may be omitted. + +### G.2.1.2.3 Sending of LI messages + +After the TCP connection has been established, the MF shall send the "LI application" messages defined in clause G.2.1.3 to the LEMF, when applicable events have been detected and such messages are formulated. + +The basic "LI application" message is called LawfulIntercept message. When sending IRI, a LawfulIntercept message shall be used and the IRI shall be encoded within the IRIContent parameter. Multiple IRIContent parameters may be included within a single LawfulIntercept message. When sending the optional keep-Alive indication, the LawfulIntercept shall be coded with the keep-Alive parameter. + +In all cases, LawfulIntercept messages are only sent from the MF to the LEMF. All transfer of packets other than those operationally required to maintain the connection has to be from the MF to the LEMF only. At no time may the LEMF equipment send unsolicited packets from the LEMF equipment to the MF. + +If supported, a LawfulIntercept message including a keep-Alive parameter shall be sent when no LawfulIntercept message has been sent for a configurable amount of time in minutes (e.g. 5 minutes), indicating to the LEMF that the LI connection is still up. The keep-alive-time parameter shall be settable in increments of 1 minute, from 1 minute up to a maximum of 5 minutes, with a default value of 5 minutes. + +The "LI application" messages shall be encapsulated using TPKT, as defined in clause G.2.1.2.2, before sending them from the MF to the LEMF using TCP/IP. + +### G.2.1.3 ASN.1 for HI2 Mediation Function Messages + +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + +``` + +LawfulIntercept ::= CHOICE +{ + keep-Alive [0] NULL, + envelopedIRIContent [1] EnvelopedIRIContent, + ... +} +EnvelopedIRIContent ::= SEQUENCE OF UmtsIRIContent +-- The above format for EnvelopedIRIContent can be used with UmtsIRIContent, EpsIRIContent or any +-- other IRI content from any of the ASN.1 of Annex B. The object identifier embedded within the +-- IRI-Parameters allows for unique identification of the specific IRI being sent (e.g. UMTS or +-- EPS). + +``` + +### G.2.1.4 Error Procedures + +Upon detection of the "User Timeout" condition, as defined in IETF STD0007 [16], if the surveillance is still active, the MF shall take action to re-establish the TCP connection with the LEMF. Due to this condition, any information that TCP was not able to deliver is lost unless it is buffered. + +Therefore, the MF should be able to buffer any information that is to be delivered to the LEMF during a period of User Timeout detection until the re-establishment of the TCP connection. If the MF is not able to establish the TCP connection, the MF may discard the buffered information. If the connection is re-established, the MF shall hand off (transmit) the information stored in its buffer to TCP before sending any new information. + +## G.2.1.5 Security Considerations + +Security considerations shall be taken into account in designing the interface between the MF and the LEMF. At a minimum, the MF shall use a source IP address known to the LEMF. To protect against address spoofing and other security concerns, it is recommended that the MF and the LEMF utilize IPSec. + +--- + +## G.3 HI3 delivery methods + +### G.3.1 Use of TCP/IP + +At the HI3 interface, the user data packets with the ULIC header, version 1, shall be sent to the LEMF over Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), which uses the Internet Protocol (IP). + +TCP/IP supports reliable delivery of data. TCP is independent of the payload data it carries. + +#### G.3.1.1 Normal Procedures + +##### G.3.1.1.0 Introduction + +The MF/DF initiates the TCP connection as detailed in G.3.1.1.1. + +##### G.3.1.1.1 Usage of TCP/IP when MF/DF initiates TCP Connections + +The MF/DF shall initiate TCP connections to the LEMF for the purpose of delivering CC. Once a TCP connection is established, the MF/DF will send CC messages to the LEMF via TCP. + +CC messages shall be sent over TCP connections established specifically to deliver CC. A minimum of one TCP connection shall be established per LEMF to deliver CC associated with one or more targets. The MF/DF initiates the establishment of TCP connections to the LEMF equipment designated by the LEA. Optionally, the MF/DF may use more than one TCP connection per LEMF for the purpose of delivering CC associated with the target to minimize the effects of congestion or facility failures. For example, if more than one TCP connection is used, CC messages may be uniformly distributed across the connections. If delays are detected on one TCP connection, the MF/DF could begin to transmit more messages on the other TCP connections. The number of TCP connections supported to the LEMF shall be less than or equal to the provisioned maximum number of such connections. + +If delivery of CC for only a single target is supported per TCP connection, then after the TCP connection establishment procedure, the MF/DF shall send the connectionStatus message including the lawfulInterceptionIdentifier parameter to the LEMF. The delivery of the lawful interception identifier to the LEMF after the TCP connection establishment procedure will assist the LEMF in correlating the TCP connection, established for delivering content of communication, with a particular surveillance and the target. + +If delivery of CC for multiple targets is supported per TCP connection, then the connectionStatus message including a lawfulInterceptionIdentifier parameter is not sent to the LEMF. Moreover, in this case, the ULIC v1 parameter shall include the lawful interception identifier (LIID). + +##### G.3.1.1.2 Use of TPKT + +TCP is a stream-based protocol and has no inherent message delineation capability. + +Since the upper-layer protocols are not self-describing, ITOT, also referred to as TPKT, as defined in RFC 1006 [27] and later updated by RFC 2126 [28] is used to encapsulate the CC and connectionStatus messages before handing them off to TCP. + +Therefore, TPKT shall be required and used in the transport stack of the CC delivery interface (e.g. CC messages/TPKT/TCP/IP). Only protocol class 0 defined in RFC 2126 [28] shall be supported. + +However, the TPKT connection establishment and negotiation mechanisms shall not be used. The maximum TPDU size to be supported is the default maximum TPDU size specified in [28] and is not negotiated. Consequently, the segmentation and reassembly procedures associated with TPKT will not be used. + +In case the TPKT connection establishment is not provided, based on agreement between the Operator and LEA, the TPDU header included in the TPKT payload (TPDU field defined in RFC 2126 [28]) may be omitted. + +### G.3.1.1.3 Sending of Content of Communication Messages + +After the TCP connection has been established and the connectionStatus message has been sent, the MF shall send the CC messages (including the ULIC header, v1) defined in clause C.1 using TPKT to the LEMF. + +In all cases, CC messages are only sent from the MF to the LEMF. All transfer of packets other than those operationally required to maintain the connection has to be from the MF to the LEMF only. At no time may the LEMF equipment send unsolicited packets from the LEMF equipment to the MF. + +If supported, a connectionStatus message including the keep-Alive parameter shall be sent from the MF to the LEMF when no CC message has been sent for a configurable amount of time in minutes (e.g. 5 minutes), indicating to the LEMF that the TCP connection is still up. If a keep-alive capability is supported, a keep-Alive parameter shall be settable in increments of 1 minute, from 1 minute up to a maximum of 5 minutes, with a default value of 5 minutes. + +The CC messages and the connectionStatus message shall be encapsulated using TPKT, as defined in clause G.3.1.1.2, before sending them from the MF to the LEMF using TCP/IP. + +### G.3.1.2 ASN.1 for HI3 Mediation Function Messages + +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + +| | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 
 ConnectionStatus ::= CHOICE {     keep-Alive          [0] Null,     lawfulInterceptionIdentifier [1] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier,     ... }
| +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| + +### G.3.1.3 Error Procedures + +Upon detection of the "User Timeout" condition, as defined in IETF STD0007 [16], if the surveillance is still active and user data packets with the ULIC header, v1 are available for delivery to the LEMF, the MF shall take action to re-establish the TCP connection with the LEMF. Due to this condition, any information that TCP was not able to deliver is lost unless it is buffered. + +Therefore, the MF should be able to buffer any information that is to be delivered to the LEMF during a period of User Timeout detection until the re-establishment of the TCP connection. If the MF is not able to establish the TCP connection, the MF may discard the buffered information. If the connection is re-established, the MF shall hand off (transmit) the information stored in its buffer to TCP before sending any new information. + +### G.3.1.4 Security Considerations + +Security considerations shall be taken into account in designing the interface between the MF and the LEMF. At a minimum, the MF shall use a source IP address known to the LEMF. To protect against address spoofing and other security concerns, it is recommended that the MF and the LEMF utilize IPSec. + +## G.4 Cross reference of terms between J-STD-025-A and 3GPP + +Table G-1: Cross Reference of Terms between J-STD-025-A and 3GPP + +| J-STD-025-A | | 3GPP LI Specifications TS 33.106 [18], TS 33.107 [19] | | +|-------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| - | Call Content | CC | Content of Communication | +| CCC | Call Content Channel | - | Handover Interface port 3 | +| CDC | Call Data Channel | - | Handover Interface port 2 | +| CF | Collection Function | LEMF | Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility | +| - | Call-identifying Information | IRI | Intercept Related Information | +| - | Call-identifying message | - | IRI record | +| DF | Delivery Function | - | Delivery Function / Mediation Function | +| - | a-interface | - | X1_1 interface | +| - | b-interface | - | HI1 interface | +| - | c-interface | - | X1_2 and X1_3 interfaces | +| - | d-interface | - | X2 and X3 interfaces | +| - | e-interface | HI | Handover Interface (HI2 and HI3) | +| IAP | Intercept Access Point | ICE+INE | Intercepting Control Element + Intercepting Network Element | +| - | Intercept subject | - | Target | +| LAES | Lawful Authorized Electronic Surveillance | LI | Lawful Intercept | +| - | CasIdentity | LIID | Lawful Interception IDentifier | +| LEAF | Law Enforcement Administration Function | ADMF | Administration Function | +| SPAF | Service Provider Administration Function | ADMF | Administration Function | +| - | SystemIdentity | NID | Network IDentifier | +| TSP | Telecommunication Service Provider | NO/AN/SP | Network Operator, Access Network Provider, Service Provider | + +## Annex H (normative): United States lawful interception + +This annex shall apply equally to all 3GPP and non-3GPP access types which are connected to EPC, excluding CS domain (which is not covered by this document). + +With respect to the handover interfaces they have to be capable of delivering intercepted communications and IRI information to the government in a format such that they may be transmitted by means of equipment, facilities, or services procured by the government to a location other than the premises of the carrier. + +With respect to location information 'when authorized' means the ability to provide location information on a per-surveillance basis. + +The delivery methods described in this document are optional methods and no specific method is required in the United States. For systems deployed in the U.S., only ULIC version 1, including the timestamp attribute, shall be used. + +The specification of lawful intercept capabilities in this document does not imply that those services supported by these lawful intercept capabilities are covered by CALEA. Inclusion of a capability in this document does not imply that capability is required by CALEA. This document is intended to satisfy the requirements of section 107 (a) (2) of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. 103-414 such that a telecommunications carrier, manufacturer, or support service provider that is in compliance with this document shall have "Safe Harbor". + +In the United States, for a broadband access intercept pertaining to: + +1) 3GPP GPRS/UMTS access, + +- a) The SGSN and the HSS shall perform interception. GGSN may optionally support interception, however, it has to support interception in the cases outlined below. +- b) The GGSN shall support interception in the following cases: + - If direct tunnel functionality as defined in TS 23.060 [42] is used in the network, + - If the network supports roaming and the communications comes into the GGSN from a SGSN (in the visited network) over a Gp interface. +- c) For any other scenario where the traffic does not pass the SGSN, the GGSN shall support interception. + +2) 3GPP I-WLAN access, + +- a) the PDG, WAG, and AAA server shall perform interception. + +NOTE: WLAN Interworking specification (TS 29.234 [41]) is no longer maintained in Release 12 and onwards. + +3) Access Via 3GPP EPC + +- a) The S-GW, MME and the HSS shall perform interception. +- b) The PDN Gateway shall support interception in the following cases: + - The network supports roaming and the communications comes into the PDN Gateway from an S-GW (in the visited network) over an S8 interface. + - Non-3GPP access is used to access the EPC via the PDN Gateway + +A TSP shall not be responsible for decrypting or decompressing, or ensuring the government's ability to decrypt or decompress, any communication encrypted or compressed by a subscriber or customer, unless the encryption or compression was provided by the TSP and the TSP possesses the information necessary to decrypt or decompress the communication. A TSP that provides the government with information about how to decrypt or decompress a communication (e.g. identifying the type of compression software used to compress the communication, directing the government to the appropriate vendor that can provide decryption or decompression equipment, or providing the encryption key used to encrypt the communication) fully satisfies its obligation under the preceding sentence. + +For systems deployed in the U.S, use ATIS-0700005 [55] for the reporting of IRI and CC interception for IMS VoIP and other Multimedia Services. + +For IMS-based VoIP Dialled Digits Reporting (DDR) message definition, see ATIS-0700005 [55]. + +NOTE 1: The term, Dialed Digit Extraction (DDE), used in [55] is the same as Dialed Digit Reporting (DDR) in this specification. + +NOTE 2: Dialled Digits are keypad digits 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, \*, and # entered by the target. + +NOTE 3: DDR does not apply to PS domain and IMS-based multi-media services other than voice. + +For systems deployed in the U.S., the network element identifier is required. + +For systems deployed in the U.S., the following two records are also required for the packet domain: + +1. a REPORT record shall be triggered when the 3G SGSN receives an SMS-MO communication from the target's mobile station; +2. a REPORT record shall be triggered when the 3G SGSN receives an SMS-MT communication from the SMS-Centre destined for the target's mobile station. + +For systems deployed in the U.S., when a mobile terminal is authorized for service with another network operator or service provider, or within another service area as defined in J-STD-025- B [65], a Serving System REPORT record or a Serving Evolved Packet System REPORT Record shall be triggered. + +For systems deployed in the U.S., the timestamp reported shall be coded as generalized time and provide either coordinated universal time or local time with the local time differential from coordinated universal time. + +For systems deployed in the U.S., Packet Data Header Information REPORT Records shall be delivered to Law Enforcement for IRI only authorizations where the timestamps shall be coded as specified above. + +--- + +Annex I (informative): +Void + +## Annex J (normative): Definition of the UUS1 content associated and sub-addressing to the CC link + +### J.0 Introduction + +For North America, the use of J-STD-25 A [23] is recommended. + +For the transport of the correlation information and the identifiers accompanying the CC-links, there are two options: + +- Use of the User-to-User Signalling (UUS1) (see clause J.1); +- Use of the sub-address (SUB) and calling party number (see clause J.2). + +### J.1 Definition of the UUS1 content associated to the CC link + +#### ASN.1 description of the UUS1 content associated to the CC link + +``` +HI3CCLinkData +{ itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) securityDomain (2) lawfulIntercept (2) hi3 (2) + cclinkLI (4) version2 (2) } +``` + +``` +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= +``` + +``` +BEGIN +``` + +``` +IMPORTS +``` + +``` + LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + CommunicationIdentifier, + CC-Link-Identifier +``` + +``` + FROM +``` + +``` + HI2Operations +``` + +``` + { itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) securityDomain (2) lawfulIntercept (2) hi2 + (1) version2 (2) }; +``` + +``` +UUS1-Content ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` +{ + lawfullInterceptionIdentifier [1] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + communicationIdentifier [2] CommunicationIdentifier, + cC-Link-Identifier [3] CC-Link-Identifier OPTIONAL, + direction-Indication [4] Direction-Indication, + bearer-capability [5] OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..12)) OPTIONAL, + -- transport the Bearer capability information element (value part) + -- Protocol: ETS [6] + service-Information [7] Service-Information OPTIONAL, + ... +} +``` + +``` +Direction-Indication ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` +{ + mono-mode(0), + cc-from-target(1), + cc-from-other-party(2), + ... +} +``` + +``` + +Service-Information ::= SET +{ + high-layer-capability [0] OCTET STRING (SIZE(1)) OPTIONAL, + -- HLC (octet 4 only) + -- Protocol: ETS [6] + tMR [1] OCTET STRING (SIZE(1)) OPTIONAL, + -- Transmission Medium Required + -- Protocol: ISUP [5] + bearerServiceCode [2] OCTET STRING (SIZE(1)) OPTIONAL, + teleServiceCode [3] OCTET STRING (SIZE(1)) OPTIONAL + -- from MAP, ETS 300 974, clause 14.7.9 and clause 14.7.10 +} + +``` + +END -- HI3CCLinkData + +## J.2 Use of sub-address and calling party number to carry correlation information + +### J.2.1 Introduction + +Not all ISDN networks fully support the use of the UUS1 service ETSI EN 300 403-1 [31]. Some networks may be limited to the transfer of only 32 octets of UUS1 user information rather than the 128 required for full support of the UUS1 service. Some networks may not support UUS1 at all. + +This annex describes a procedure to provide correlation information which is appropriate: + +- 1) if a network does not support the delivery of UUS1; or +- 2) if a network does not support the delivery of 128 octets for UUS1. + +If all network involved support the delivery of 128 octets for UUS1 then the procedure (described in this annex) is not appropriate. + +The calling party number, the calling party subaddress (CgP Sub) and the called party subaddress (CdP Sub) are used to carry correlation information. + +### J.2.2 Subaddress options + +The coding of a subaddress information element is given in ETSI EN 300 403-1 [31]. The following options shall be chosen: + +**Table J.2.1: Subaddress options** + +| Option | Value | +|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Type of subaddress | user specified | +| Odd/even indicator | employed for called party subaddress when no national parameters are used | + +### J.2.3 Subaddress coding + +#### J.2.3.0 General + +The coding of subaddress information shall be in accordance with ETSI EN 300 403-1 [31]. + +#### J.2.3.1 BCD Values + +The values 0-9 shall be BCD coded according to their natural binary values. The hexadecimal value F shall be used as a field separator. This coding is indicated in table J.2.2. + +**Table J.2.2: Coding BCD values** + +| Item | BCD representation | | | | +|-----------------|--------------------|-------|-------|-------| +| | Bit 4 | Bit 3 | Bit 2 | Bit 1 | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | +| 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | +| 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | +| 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | +| 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | +| 6 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | +| 7 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +| 8 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | +| 9 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | +| Field separator | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | + +When items are packed two to an octet, the least significant item shall be coded by mapping bit 4 to bit 8, bit 3 to bit 7, etc. + +### J.2.3.2 Field order and layout + +Fields shall be presented into the subaddress in the following order: + +**Table J.2.3: Fields in the Called Party Subaddress** + +| Order | Field | +|-------|---------------------| +| 1 | Operator-ID | +| 2 | CIN | +| 3 | CCLID | +| 4 | National Parameters | + +**Table J.2.4: Fields in the Calling Party Subaddress** + +| Order | Field | +|-------|---------------------------------------| +| 1 | Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID) | +| 2 | Direction | +| 3 | Service Octets | + +Apart from National Parameters, inclusion and format of which is determined by national regulations, each field noted above shall be included, whether empty or not. Each of the Operator-ID, CIN, CCLID, LIID and Direction fields shall end by a field separator. + +When sending entity does not have a valid value for either of Operator-ID, CIN, CCLID, LIID or Direction fields, then the field is considered empty and it shall be represented only by its field separator. + +**Table J.2.4A: Example of how field separator should be used when field is empty** + +| Bits | | | | | | | Octets | | | | | | +|---------------------------------------------------------|---|-----------------|---|---|---|---|--------|--|--|--|--|--| +| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | | | | | | | +| Called party subaddress identifier | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | +| Length of called party subaddress contents | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | | +| Type of subaddress = user specified, odd/even indicator | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | +| Operator-ID ② | | Operator-ID ① | | | | | 4 | | | | | | +| Operator-ID ④ | | Operator-ID ③ | | | | | 5 | | | | | | +| Field separator | | Operator-ID ⑤ | | | | | 6 | | | | | | +| CCLID ① | | Field separator | | | | | 7 | | | | | | +| CCLID ③ | | CCLID ② | | | | | 8 | | | | | | +| CCLID ⑤ | | CCLID ④ | | | | | 9 | | | | | | +| CCLID ⑦ | | CCLID ⑥ | | | | | 10 | | | | | | +| Field separator | | CCLID ⑧ | | | | | 11 | | | | | | +| (see note) | | | | | | | 12 | | | | | | +| | | | | | | | 13 | | | | | | +| | | | | | | | 14 | | | | | | +| | | | | | | | 15 | | | | | | +| | | | | | | | 16 | | | | | | +| | | | | | | | 17 | | | | | | +| | | | | | | | 18 | | | | | | +| | | | | | | | 19 | | | | | | +| | | | | | | | 20 | | | | | | +| | | | | | | | 21 | | | | | | +| | | | | | | | 22 | | | | | | +| | | | | | | | 23 | | | | | | + +NOTE: The Octets after the final field (CCLID) of the Called Party Subaddress are reserved for national use, e.g. for authentication purposes. + +The parameters within the Information Elements "Called Party Subaddress" and "Calling Party Subaddress" are variable. Because of this variable length the parameters may start in different octets in the related Information Element. i.e. in the Calling Party Subaddress the Direction can be found in octet 17 when the LIID is 25 digits long (table J.2.6). + +When the LIID is composed of less than 25 digits, the field separator and direction indicator "moves up" and the rest of the octets is spare till octet 19. Between the last digit of the LIID and the Direction is always a Field separator (value F). Also after the "Direction" one Field Separator is given. The last Field separator separates the relevant data from the spare part. So the location of the TMR and the other service Octets below are fixed within the Subaddress. The total length of the Calling Party Subaddress is fixed to 23 octets (including the two Mobile service octets) or 21 octets (without the two Mobile service octets). + +The Service Octets as available shall always be mapped into octets 19 to 23 of the Calling Party Subaddress, as appropriate. If one of the parameters TMR, BC or HLC is not available, the octet shall be filled with "FF" hex. + +In relation to Mobile Bearer Service Code and Mobile Teleservice Code, the mapping of the values into octets 22 and 23, respectively, shall be done as follows: + +- i. if both, Mobile Bearer Service Code and Mobile Teleservice Code are provided by signalling, octets 22 and 23, shall be present, each containing the mapped value; +- ii. if Mobile Bearer Service Code is provided by signalling, and Mobile Teleservice Code is NOT provided by signalling, octet 22 shall be present containing the mapped value, and octet 23 shall be omitted; +- iii. if Mobile Teleservice Code is provided by signalling, and Mobile Bearer Service Code is NOT provided by signalling, there are two implementation options: + - 1) neither octet 22 nor octet 23 shall be present; + - 2) octet 22 shall be filled with "FF" hex and octet 23 shall be present containing the mapped value; +- iv. if neither Mobile Teleservice Code nor Mobile Bearer Service Code is provided by signalling, neither octet 22 nor octet 23 shall be present. + +As an option the Calling Party Subaddress and Called Party Subaddress may have a variable length. The length is given in octet 2. + +When the LIID is composed of less than 25 digits in the Calling Party Subaddress, the Field separator, Direction indicator, Field separator and all the Service Octets "moves up". + +National Parameters in a variable length Called Party Subaddress may have variable length. + +Table J.2.5 represent called party subaddress and table J.2.6 calling party subaddress with the maximum length of the identifiers. + +**Table J.2.5: Called Party Subaddress** + +| Bits | | | | | | | | Octets | +|---------------------------------------------------------|---|---|---|-----------------|---|---|---|--------| +| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | | +| Called party subaddress identifier | | | | | | | | 1 | +| Length of called party subaddress contents | | | | | | | | 2 | +| Type of subaddress = user specified, odd/even indicator | | | | | | | | 3 | +| Operator-ID ② | | | | Operator-ID ① | | | | 4 | +| Operator-ID ④ | | | | Operator-ID ③ | | | | 5 | +| Field separator | | | | Operator-ID ⑤ | | | | 6 | +| CIN ② | | | | CIN ① | | | | 7 | +| CIN ④ | | | | CIN ③ | | | | 8 | +| CIN ⑥ | | | | CIN ⑤ | | | | 9 | +| CIN ⑧ | | | | CIN ⑦ | | | | 10 | +| CCLID ① | | | | Field separator | | | | 11 | +| CCLID ③ | | | | CCLID ② | | | | 12 | +| CCLID ⑤ | | | | CCLID ④ | | | | 13 | +| CCLID ⑦ | | | | CCLID ⑥ | | | | 14 | +| Field separator | | | | CCLID ⑧ | | | | 15 | +| see note | | | | | | | | 16 | +| | | | | | | | | 17 | +| | | | | | | | | 18 | +| | | | | | | | | 19 | +| | | | | | | | | 20 | +| | | | | | | | | 21 | +| | | | | | | | | 22 | +| | | | | | | | | 23 | + +NOTE: The Octets after the final field (CCLID) of the Called Party Subaddress are reserved for national use, e.g. for authentication purposes. + +**Table J.2.6: Calling Party Subaddress** + +| Bits | | | | | | | | Octets | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|-----------|---|---|---|--------| +| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | | +| Calling party subaddress identifier | | | | | | | | 1 | +| Length of calling party subaddress contents | | | | | | | | 2 | +| Type of subaddress = user specified,
odd/even indicator according to the amount
of BCD-digits | | | | | | | | 3 | +| LIID ② | | | | LIID ① | | | | 4 | +| LIID ④ | | | | LIID ③ | | | | 5 | +| LIID ⑥ | | | | LIID ⑤ | | | | 6 | +| LIID ⑧ | | | | LIID ⑦ | | | | 7 | +| LIID ⑩ | | | | LIID ⑨ | | | | 8 | +| LIID ⑫ | | | | LIID ⑪ | | | | 9 | +| LIID ⑭ | | | | LIID ⑬ | | | | 10 | +| LIID ⑯ | | | | LIID ⑮ | | | | 11 | +| LIID ⑱ | | | | LIID ⑰ | | | | 12 | +| LIID ⑳ | | | | LIID ⑲ | | | | 13 | +| LIID ⑳ | | | | LIID ⑳ | | | | 14 | +| LIID ⑳ | | | | LIID ⑳ | | | | 15 | +| Field separator | | | | LIID ⑳ | | | | 16 | +| Field separator | | | | Direction | | | | 17 | +| spare | | | | spare | | | | 18 | +| ITU-T Recommendation Q.763 [29] TMR
(see note 1) | | | | | | | | 19 | +| ITU-T Recommendation Q.931 BC [34]
octet 3 (see note 2) | | | | | | | | 20 | +| ITU-T Recommendation Q.931 HLC [34]
octet 4 (see note 3) | | | | | | | | 21 | +| Mobile Bearer Service Code
(see note 4) | | | | | | | | 22 | +| Mobile Teleservice Code (see note 5) | | | | | | | | 23 | +| NOTE 1: | If available, the Transmission Medium Requirement according to EN 300 356 [30]. If not available, the value is "FF" hex. | | | | | | | | +| NOTE 2: | If available, only octet 3 of the Bearer Capability I.E. according to EN 300 403 [31] If not available, the value is "FF" hex. | | | | | | | | +| NOTE 3: | If available, only octet 4 of the High Layer Compatibility I.E. according to EN 300 403 [31]. If not available, the value is "FF" hex. | | | | | | | | +| NOTE 4: | If available, the Mobile Bearer Service Code according to TS 29.002 [4], clause 17.7.10. If not available, the octets 22 and 23 (even if the mobile teleservice code is available) shall not be transmitted.
If the mobile teleservice code is available optionally octet 22 could be filled with "FF" hex and be transmitted. | | | | | | | | +| NOTE 5: | If available, the Mobile Teleservice Code according to TS 29.002 [4], clause 17.7.9. If not available, the octet 23 shall not be transmitted. | | | | | | | | + +## J.2.4 Field coding + +### J.2.4.0 Introduction + +Each field shall employ decimal coding, except for the Service Octets (octets 19-23 of the CgP Sub) and the octets reserved for national use (octets 16-23 of the CdP Sub). Other values are not permitted. + +### J.2.4.1 Direction + +The direction field shall be coded as follows: + +**Table J.2.7: Direction coding** + +| Indication | Value | +|----------------------------------------|-------| +| Mono mode (combined signal) (historic) | 0 | +| CC from target | 1 | +| CC to target | 2 | + +### J.2.4.2 Coding of the Calling Party Number + +The Network Element Identifier (NEID) shall be carried by the calling party number information element. The coding shall be as follows, depending on the type of network access (see note 1): + +- Numbering plan identification: ISDN/telephony numbering plan (Recommendation E.164) +- Nature of address: As specified in ITU-T Recommendation Q.731.3 (see note 1) (e.g. national (significant) number or international number) (in case of ISUP signalling) +- Type of number: As specified in ITU-T Q.951, EN 300 092 (e.g. unknown, subscriber number, national number or international number), and Network Operator specific type of access (BRA or PRA) (in case of DSS1 signalling, see note 2 and 3) +- Screening indicator: Network provided (in case ISUP signalling) +- Screening indicator: User-provided, not screened (in case of DSS1 signalling, see note 3) +- Presentation indicator: Presentation allowed + +NOTE 1: The relevant national specification of the Signalling System Number 7 may also specify requirements on the Nature of address for national specific use in national variants of ISUP. + +NOTE 2: Usually, the IIF respectively the Mediation Function is connected to the network by links using Signalling System Number 7 and ISDN User Part (ISUP), whereby the parameters are coded according to ITU-T Recommendation Q.763 [29]. But in some cases, the IIF respectively the Mediation Function may be connected via a Basic Rate Access or a Primary Rate Access using D-Channel signalling, whereby the parameters are coded according to ETSI EN 300 356 [30]. + +NOTE 3: The network will perform screening, i.e. the number will arrive at the LEMF as "user-provided, verified and passed" with the appropriate "type of number" indicator. A network provided number shall also be accepted at the LEMF. + +### J.2.5 Length of fields + +The length of the identifiers is variable. The maximum and recommended minimum length of each field is given in table J.2.8: + +**Table J.2.8: Field length** + +| Field | Minimum length (decimal digits) | Maximum length (decimal digits) | Maximum length (Half-Octets) | I.E. | +|----------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|---------| +| Operator ID | 2 | 5 | 5 + 1 | CdP Sub | +| CIN | 6 | 8 | 8 + 1 | CdP Sub | +| CCLID | 1 | 8 | 8 + 1 | CdP Sub | +| LIID | 2 | 25 | 25 + 1 | CgP Sub | +| Direction | 1 | 1 | 1 + 1 | CgP Sub | +| Service Octets | | | 10 | CgP Sub | + +--- + +## Annex K (normative): VoIP HI3 Interface + +### K.1 VoIP CC Protocol Data Unit + +The VoIP CC Protocol Data Unit (VoIP-CC-PDU) is delivered to the LEMF using UDP or TCP as the transport protocol. The use of UDP or TCP is done according to the national regulations. + +The VoIP-CC-PDU consists of the following two: + +- VoIP LI Correlation header (VoipLIC-header); +- Payload. + +The general principles of VoIP-CC-PDU delivery are described in clause 12.6. + +--- + +### K.2 Definition of VoIP LI Correlation header + +The VoipLIC-header is defined in ASN.1 [5] (see annex B.12) and is encoded according to BER [6]. It contains the following attributes: + +- Object Identifier (hi3voipDomainId) +- Lawful Interception Identifier (IIID, optional). The handling of Lawful Interception Identifier is done according to national requirements. +- VoIP Correlation Number (voipCorrelationNumber). The handling of VoIP Correlation Number is to be done according to clause 12.1.4. +- Time Stamp (timeStamp, optional). The handling of time-stamp is done according to national requirements. + +Editor's Note: The time-stamp may have to be made mandatory for VoIP CC. It is for further study. + +- Sequence Number (sequence-number). Sequence Number is an integer incremented each time a T-PDU is delivered. Handling of sequence number is done according to national requirements. + +Editor's Note: The need for sending the sequence-number with TCP as the transport protocol is for further study. + +- TPDU direction (t-PDU-direction) indicates the direction of the T-PDU and has the following values: + - From the Target. (from-target). The VoIP-CC-PDU is coming from the target. + - To the Target (to-target). The VoIP-CC-PDU is sent to the target. + - Combined (combined). The VoIP-CC-PDU includes both from the target and to the target. + - Not Known (unknown). The direction of VoIP-CC-PDU cannot be determined. +- National parameters (national-HI3-ASN1Parameters, optional). This parameter is encoded according to national requirements. +- ICE type (ice-type, optional). This indicates in which node the T-PDU was intercepted. This parameter is provided if available at the Delivery Function/Mediation Function. The following are the possible ICE Type values: + - GGSN (ggsn). The VoIP CC was intercepted at the GGSN. + - PDN Gateway (pDN-GW). The VoIP CC was intercepted at the PDN-GW. + - IMS AGW (aGW). The VoIP CC was intercepted at the IMS AGW. + +- Transit Gateway (trGW). The VoIP CC was intercepted at the TrGW. +- IM-MGW (mGW). The VoIP CC was intercepted at the IM-MGW. +- MRF (mRF). The VoIP CC was intercepted at the MRF. +- Other nodes (other). The VoIP CC was intercepted at a media node not mentioned above. +- Not known (unknown). The media that intercepts the VoIP CC is not known. +- Payload Description (payload-description, optional): +As an optional implementation this parameter describes the content of the Payload parameter in order to ease the LEMF to process the HI3 autonomously (meaning without waiting for media info from HI2). + +--- + +## K.3 Definition of Payload + +Within the VoIP-CC-PDU, the Payload (payload as seen in ASN.1) follows the VoipLIC header and contains the user-plane packets exchanged between the participants of an intercepted call. + +The payload information for the intercepted VoIP call contains the packets that includes the IP layer and above (e.g. IP/UDP/RTP). + +--- + +## K.4 LEMF Considerations + +The use of IPsec for the delivery of VoIP-CC-PDU is recommended. + +The required functions in the LEMF are: + +- Collecting and storing of the incoming packets with the sequence numbers and time-stamp. +- Correlating of CC to IRI with the use of the Voip-Correlation Number in the VoipLIC-header. + +--- + +## Annex L (normative): Conference HI3 Interface + +### L.1 Conf CC Protocol Data Unit + +The Conference CC Protocol Data Unit (Conf-CC-PDU) is delivered to the LEMF using UDP or TCP as the transport protocol. The use of UDP or TCP is done according to the national regulations. + +The Conf-CC-PDU consists of the following two: + +- Conference LI Correlation header (ConfLIC-header) +- Payload + +The general principles of Conf-CC-PDU delivery is described in clause 11.6. + +--- + +### L.2 Definition of Conference LI Correlation header + +ConfLIC-header is defined in ASN.1 [5] (see annex B.11.2) and is encoded according to BER [6]. It contains the following attributes: + +- Object Identifier (hi3DomainId) + +- Lawful Interception Identifier (IIID, optional). The handling of Lawful Interception Identifier is done according to national requirements. +- Conference Correlation (confCorrelation). This is defined in B.11.1 and the handling of the same is described in clause 11. +- Time Stamp (timeStamp, optional). The handling of time-stamp is done according to national requirements. +- Sequence Number (sequence-number). Sequence Number is an integer incremented each time a T-PDU is delivered. Handling of sequence number is done according to national requirements. +- TPDU direction (t-PDU-direction) indicates the direction of the T-PDU and it accommodates the following possibilities: + - From the target (from-target). The Conf-CC-PDU is coming from the target to the conference mixer. + - To the target (to-target). The Conf-CC-PDU is sent towards the target from the conference mixer. + - Not known (not known). This is used when the TPDU direction cannot be determined. + - Conference target (conftarget). This value is to be used when conference itself is the target. + - From the Mixer (from-mixer). The Conf-CC-PDU is coming from the conference mixer. + - To the Mixer (to-mixer). The Conf-CC-PDU is sent towards the conference mixer. + - Combined (combined). The Conf-CC-PDU is combined consists to and from the conference mixer or to and from the target. +- National parameters (national-HI3-ASN1Parameters, optional) +This parameter is encoded according to national requirements. +- Media ID (mediaID, optional) +This indicates media information being exchanged by parties on the conference. This includes the following two: + - ConfPartyInformation (sourceUserID, optional). This includes the conference side of the SDP information. + - Stream ID (streamID, optional). This includes the stream ID from the SDP. + +--- + +## L.3 Definition of Payload + +Within the Conf-CC-PDU, the Payload (payload as seen in ASN.1) follows the ConfLIC header and contains the user-plane packets of a conference call and the source of the packets is determined as per the TPDU direction. + +The payload information for the intercepted conference contains the packets that includes the IP layer and above (e.g. IP/UDP/RTP). + +--- + +## L.4 LEMF Considerations + +The use of IPsec for the delivery of Conf-CC-PDU is recommended. + +The required functions in the LEMF are: + +- Collecting and storing of the incoming packets with the sequence numbers and time-stamp. +- Correlating the CC to IRI with the use of ConfCorrelation. + +## Annex M (informative): Generic LI notification (HI1 notification using HI2 method) + +### M.1 HI.1 delivery methods preferences: + +Based on clause 4.4 of this TS 33.108, this annex defines a system of management notification of LI system with the Handover interface port 1 (HI1). + +The handover interface port 1 (HI1) have to transport specific LI service O&M information from the operator's (NO/AN/SP) administration function to the LEMF. The individual notification parameters should be coded using ASN.1 and the basic encoding rules (BER). The delivery of HI1 has to be performed directly using the HI2 mechanism, in order to limit and to protect the LI MF and DF in terms of the number of interface to any other CSP's O&M. + +NOTE 1: The different O&M models, specially the 3GPP TMF that may apply are for further studies. + +NOTE 2: This annex may be applied to LI HI1 solutions framework described in ETSI TS 101 671. + +The notification of some actions performed by the operator on the LI system is requested, only to notify the different elements of the LEA warrant, except the target's IDs. For security reason, any flow including such value may have to be limited. It is recommended to have a manual input in the LI system by the accredited staff of the operator. + +If the HI1 is used for notification, it may be used for LI management to send electronic notification to the LEMF in the following cases: + +- 1) after the activation of lawful interception, +- 2) after the deactivation of lawful interception, +- 3) after the modification of an active lawful interception. + +NOTE: The detailed following points are for further studies: + +- broadcast status system, +- alarm, especially support for reporting alarm conditions (O&M alarm NNI) ,,- an applicative keep-alive system. + +The IRI of HI 1 may include: + +- the OID, +- Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID) that may be provided by the LEA or by default by the CSP, +- Network-Identifier, to identify the operator or part of the network of the operator, sending such IRI. The value may be determined by national regulation, +- BroadcastArea ID, to identify to which geographical area apply the interception. A Broadcast Area is used to select the group of NEs (network elements) which an interception applies to. This group may be built on the basis of network type, technology type or geographic details to fit national regulation and jurisdiction. The pre-defined values may be decided by national regulation or the CSP to determinate the specific part of the network or platform on which the target identity (ies) has to be activated or deactivated, +- deliveryInformation which has been decided by the LEA in terms of delivery numbers, IP addresses for HI2 and HI3, +- liActivatedTime, in Generalized time with UTC format, unless defined by national regulation. The day and time either given by the warrant, or of the actual LI activation by the operator, may be used as a value of this field., +- liDeactivatedTime,in Generalized time with UTC format, unless defined by national regulation. The day and time either given by the warrant, or of the time of the actual LI deactivation by the operator, may be used as a value of this field, + +- liSetUpTime the date and time when the warrant is entered into the ADMF. Format to be decided by national regulation. It is recommended to use Generalized time with UTC format, +- type of interception (voice IRI and CC, voice IRI only, data IRI and CC, data IRI only, voice and data IRI and CC, voice and data IRI only ), +- specific threeGPP National-HI1 parameters, if requested by national regulation. + +It is recommended to have no direct control over the NO/AP/SP's equipment by the LEA/LEMF. + +As other IRIs, the individual notifications parameters may have to be sent to the LEMF as soon as possible with the lowest latency at least once (if available) + +The DF 2 may have to deliver the HI1 notification operation to LEMF. + +## M.2 ASN.1 description of LI management notification operation (HI1 interface) + +NOTE: This annex does not describe an electronic Handover Interface, but HI1 information, which is sent to the LEMF across the HI2 port. + +### ASN.1 description of LI management notification operation (HI1 interface) + +``` +ThreeGPP-HI1NotificationOperations +{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) threeGPP(4) hi1(0) +notificationOperations(1) r16 (16) version-1(1)} +``` + +``` +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= +``` + +``` +BEGIN +``` + +``` +IMPORTS +``` + +``` + LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + Timestamp, + CommunicationIdentifier, + Network-Identifier, + CalledPartyNumber, + IPAddress +``` + +``` + FROM HI2Operations + {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) + lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) version18(18)}; -- Imported from TS 101 671v3.12.1 +``` + +``` +-- ===== +-- Object Identifier Definitions +-- ===== +``` + +``` +-- LawfulIntercept DomainId +lawfulInterceptDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) +securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2)} +-- Security Subdomains +threeGPPSUBDomainId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {lawfulInterceptDomainId threeGPP(4)} +-- hi1 Domain +threeGPP-hi1NotificationOperationsId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPPSUBDomainId hi1(0) +notificationOperations(1)} +threeGPP-hi1OperationId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {threeGPP-hi1NotificationOperationsId r16 (16) +version-1(1)} +``` + +``` +ThreeGPP-HI1-Operation ::= CHOICE +{ + liActivated [1] Notification, + liDeactivated [2] Notification, + liModified [3] Notification, + alarms-indicator [4] Alarm-Indicator, + threeGPP-National-HI1-ASN1parameters [5] ThreeGPP-National-HI1-ASN1parameters, +...} +``` + +``` +-- ===== +-- PARAMETERS FORMATS +-- ===== +``` + +``` +Notification ::= SEQUENCE +{ + domainID [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, + -- Once using FTP delivery mechanism + lawfulInterceptionIdentifier [1] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier, + -- This identifier is the LIID identity provided with the lawful authorization for each + -- target. + communicationIdentifier [2] CommunicationIdentifier OPTIONAL, + -- Only the NO/AP/SP Identifier is provided (the one provided with the Lawful + -- authorization) in CS domain. + timeStamp [3] TimeStamp, + -- date and time of the report. + threeGPP-National-HI1-ASN1parameters [5] ThreeGPP-National-HI1-ASN1parameters OPTIONAL, + target-Information [6] Target-Information OPTIONAL, + network-Identifier [7] Network-Identifier OPTIONAL, + -- Same definition of annexes B3, B8, B9, B.11.1. It is recommended to use the same value + -- than those decided by the CSP and the LEA as the NWO/PA/SvPIdentifier of + -- communicationIdentifier used in CS domain. + broadcastStatus [8] BroadcastStatus OPTIONAL, + ...} +``` + +``` +Alarm-Indicator ::= SEQUENCE +{ + domainID [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, + -- Once using FTP delivery mechanism + communicationIdentifier [1] CommunicationIdentifier OPTIONAL, + -- Only the NO/AP/SP Identifier is provided (the one provided with the + -- Lawful authorization) + timeStamp [2] TimeStamp, + -- date and time of the report. + alarm-information [3] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..256)), + -- Provides information about alarms (free format). + -- Until ASN.1 Release 16 version 0 (document version v16.3.0) the octet string + -- was limited to a size of 25. + lawfulInterceptionIdentifier [4] LawfulInterceptionIdentifier OPTIONAL, + -- This identifier is the LIID identity provided with the lawful authorization + -- for each target in according to national law + threeGPP-National-HI1-ASN1parameters [5] ThreeGPP-National-HI1-ASN1parameters OPTIONAL, + target-Information [6] Target-Information OPTIONAL, + network-Identifier [7] Network-Identifier OPTIONAL, + -- the NO/AP/SP Identifier, + -- Same definition as annexes B3, B8, B9, B.11.1 + network-Element-Information [8] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..256)) OPTIONAL, + -- This identifier may be a network element identifier such an IP address with its IP value, + -- that may not work properly. To be defined between the CSP and the LEA. + ...} +``` + +``` +ThreeGPP-National-HI1-ASN1parameters ::= SEQUENCE +{ + domainID [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, + -- Once using FTP delivery mechanism. + countryCode [1] PrintableString (SIZE (2)), + -- Country Code according to ISO 3166-1 [39], + -- the country to which the parameters inserted after the extension marker apply. + -- In case a given country wants to use additional national parameters according to its law, + -- these national parameters should be defined using the ASN.1 syntax and added after the + -- extension marker (...). + -- It is recommended that "version parameter" and "vendor identification parameter" are + -- included in the national parameters definition. Vendor identifications can be + -- retrieved from IANA web site. Besides, it is recommended to avoid + -- using tags from 240 to 255 in a formal type definition. + ...} +``` + +``` +Target-Information ::= SEQUENCE +{ + communicationIdentifier [0] CommunicationIdentifier OPTIONAL, + -- Only the NO/AP/SP Identifier is provided (the one provided with the + -- Lawful authorization) + network-Identifier [1] Network-Identifier OPTIONAL, + -- the NO/PA/SPIdentifier, + -- Same definition of annexes B3, B8, B9, B.11.1 + broadcastArea [2] OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..256)) OPTIONAL, + -- A Broadcast Area is used to select the group of NEs (network elements) which an +``` + +``` + +-- interception applies to. This group may be built on the basis of network type, technology +-- type or geographic details to fit national regulation and jurisdiction. The pre-defined +-- values may be decided by the CSP and the LEA to determinate the specific part of the +-- network or platform on which the target identity(ies) has to be activated or +-- deactivated. +targetType [3] TargetType OPTIONAL, +deliveryInformation [4] DeliveryInformation OPTIONAL, +liActivatedTime [5] TimeStamp OPTIONAL, +liDeactivatedTime [6] TimeStamp OPTIONAL, +liModificationTime [7] TimeStamp OPTIONAL, +interceptionType [8] InterceptionType OPTIONAL, +... +liSetUpTime [9] TimeStamp OPTIONAL +-- date and time when the warrant is entered into the ADMF +} + +``` + +``` +TargetType ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` + +{ + mSISDN(0), + IMSI(1), + IMEI(2), + e164-Format(3), + nAI(4), + sip-URI(5), + tel-URI(6), + IMPU(7), + IMPI(8), + ... +} + +``` + +``` +DeliveryInformation ::= SEQUENCE +``` + +``` + +{ + hi2DeliveryNumber [0] CalledPartyNumber OPTIONAL, + -- Circuit switch IRI delivery E164 number + hi3DeliveryNumber [1] CalledPartyNumber OPTIONAL, + -- Circuit switch voice content delivery E164 number + hi2DeliveryIpAddress [2] IPAddress OPTIONAL, + -- HI2 address of the LEMF. + hi3DeliveryIpAddress [3] IPAddress OPTIONAL, + -- HI3 address of the LEMF. + ... +} + +``` + +``` +InterceptionType ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` + +{ + voiceIriCc(0), + voiceIriOnly(1), + dataIriCc(2), + dataIriOnly(3), + voiceAndDataIriCc(4), + voiceAndDataIriOnly(5), + ... +} + +``` + +``` +BroadcastStatus ::= ENUMERATED +``` + +``` + +{ + successfull(0), + -- Example of usage: following a broadcasted command at least the target list of one node with a + LI function has + -- been modified or confirm to include the target id requested by the LEA. + unsuccesfull(1), + -- case of usage: such information could be provided to the LEMF following the impossibility to + get a positive confirmation from at least one node with an LI function on the broadcasted command + made by the operator's mediation or the management of mediation. + ... +} + +``` + +``` +END -- end of ThreeGPP-HI1NotificationOperations +``` + +## Annex N (informative): Guidelines on IMS VoIP Correlation Information + +### N.1 Introduction + +It is commonly understood that all IRI messages delivered over the HI2 and, when applicable, the associated CC delivered over the HI3 shall be correlated. To accomplish this, ASN.1 modules defined in TS 33.108 define the parameters under different names. In all cases, except the case of VoIP, it is straight forward. The ASN.1 module for HI2 defines the parameter which is imported and used in the ASN.1 module of HI3. In some cases, both HI2 and HI3 modules import the parameter from somewhere else. + +This annex focuses on the correlation numbers used in IMS VoIP and IMS Conferencing. + +### N.2 IMS VoIP + +#### N.2.0 General + +IMS-VoIP-Correlation used to carry the correlation information for IMS VoIP may consist of one or more set of the following: + +IRI-to-IRI-Correlation + +IRI-to-CC-Correlation (optional). + +IRI-to-IRI-Correlation contains the correlation number related to the IRI messages and the IRI-to-CC-Correlation contains correlation numbers related to the CC. Since not all intercepts may have the associated CC, the presence of IRI-to-CC-Correlation is optional. With being a SET, the above structure allows to have multiple ICE points for the IRI and multiple CC Intercept Functions for the CC. The IRI-to-CC-Correlation is defined as a combination of the following two: + +One or more Correlation Number used for the CC + +Present only when more than one Correlation Numbers are used for CC. + +The ASN.1 defined in B.3 and B.9 show the following: + +``` +IMS-VoIP-Correlation ::= SET OF SEQUENCE { + ims-iri [0] IRI-to-IRI-Correlation, + ims-cc [1] IRI-to-CC-Correlation OPTIONAL +} + +IRI-to-CC-Correlation ::= SEQUENCE { -- correlates IRI to Content + cc [0] SET OF OCTET STRING, -- correlates IRI to multiple CCs + iri [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + -- correlates IRI to CC with signaling +} + +IRI-to-IRI-Correlation ::= OCTET STRING -- correlates IRI to IRI +``` + +Some of the fields present in the above definition may not be used at all and their presence is only for historical reasons (in other words, they were present in the early versions of the TS 33.108 and retained to avoid an impacts on to early implementations). + +For easy understanding, the above definition is shown in a tabular form in Table N-1 below: + +**Table N-1: Structure of IMS-VoIP-Correlation** + +| IMS-VoIP-Correlation | | | | | +|----------------------|--------|-----|---------|--------| +| SET 1 | | ... | SET m | | +| ims-iri | ims-cc | ... | ims-iri | ims-cc | + +| | cc | | | iri | ... | | cc | | | iri | +|--|-------|-----|-------|-----|-----|--|-------|-----|-------|-----| +| | SET 1 | ... | SET n | | ... | | SET 1 | ... | SET p | | + +It may be difficult to grasp the structure of the IRI-to-CC-Correlation correlation number. The idea is perhaps to allow the possibility of a change in the CC Intercept Function during a call. This annex assumes that for a VoIP call, only one instance of cc within the ims-cc (i.e. IRI-to-CC-Correlation) is required. + +## N.2.1 One Correlation Number Value + +The IMS nodes involved in the setting up of a session, exchange the correlation number values used for an IMS session and the same correlation number is used for the CC as well. In this case, the usage of the correlation information in IRI and CC can be as shown in Table N-2 below: + +**Table N-2: An example to show the use of IMS-VoIP-Correlation with single value** + +| IMS-VoIP-Correlation | | | | | | | | | | | +|----------------------|--------|-----|-------|-----|-----|---------|--------|-----|-------|-----| +| SET 1 | | | | | ... | SET m | | | | | +| ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | ... | ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | +| | cc | | | iri | ... | | cc | | | iri | +| | SET 1 | ... | SET n | | ... | | SET 1 | ... | SET p | | +| 100 | 100 | | | -- | | | | | | | + +In Table N-2, a value of 100 is used as the correlation number. All IRI messages will have the correlation number value of 100 and the associated CC will have use the same correlation number value of 100. In this example, there is only one set of {ims-iri, ims-cc} and there is only one set of {cc} within the ims-cc and {iri} in ims-cc is not used. + +A typical example use-case for the usage of Table N-2 could be: P-CSCF is the CC Intercept Triggering Function, IMS-AGW as the CC Intercept Function and S-CSCF as the IRI ICE. P-CSCF and S-CSCF coordinate to use the value 100 and P-CSCF supplies the value 100 to the IMS-AGW. + +## N.2.2 Multiple Correlation Number Values + +### N.2.2.0 General + +Here, the IMS nodes do not exchange the correlation number values. In this case, correlation numbers may be delivered in multiple ways. The Table N-3, Table N-4 and Table N-5 illustrate the usages. + +#### N.2.2.1 Method 1 + +**Table N-3: An example to show the use of IMS-VoIP-Correlation with multiple values (method 1)** + +| IMS-VoIP-Correlation | | | | | | | | | | | +|----------------------|--------|-----|-------|-----|-----|---------|--------|-----|-------|-----| +| SET 1 | | | | | ... | SET m | | | | | +| ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | ... | ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | +| | cc | | | iri | ... | | cc | | | iri | +| | SET 1 | ... | SET n | | ... | | SET 1 | ... | SET p | | +| 100 | 250 | | | -- | | | | | | | + +In Table N-3, the values of 100 and 250 are used as the correlation number values. All IRI messages will have the correlation number value of 100 and the associated CC will have use the correlation number value of 250. In this + +example, there is only one set of {ims-iri, ims-cc} and there is only one set of {cc} within the ims-cc. The {iri} in ims-cc is not used. + +A typical example use-case for the usage of Table N-3 could be: P-CSCF is the CC Intercept Triggering Function, IMS-AGW as the CC Intercept Function and S-CSCF as the IRI ICE. P-CSCF tells the IMS-AGW to use the correlation number value of 250 and S-CSCF uses the value of 100 for IRI. + +## N.2.2.2 Method 2 + +**Table N-4: An example to show the use of IMS-VoIP-Correlation with multiple IRI ICEs (method 2)** + +| IMS-VoIP-Correlation | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----------------------|--------|-----|-------|-----|-----|---------|--------|-----|-------|-----|--|--| +| SET 1 | | | | | ... | SET m | | | | | | | +| ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | ... | ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | | | +| | cc | | | iri | | | cc | | | iri | | | +| | SET 1 | ... | SET n | | | | SET 1 | ... | SET p | | | | +| 100 | 250 | | | 200 | | | | | | | | | + +In Table N-4, the values of 100, 200 and 250 are used as the correlation number values. The IRI messages will have the correlation number values of 100 and 200 and the associated CC will have use the correlation number value of 250. In this example, there is only one set of {ims-iri, ims-cc} and there is only one set of {cc} within the ims-cc. The {iri} in ims-cc is used. + +A typical example use-case for the usage of Table N-4 could be: P-CSCF is the CC Intercept Triggering Function, IMS-AGW as the CC Intercept Function and S-CSCF as the IRI ICE. P-CSCF tells the IMS-AGW to use the correlation number value of 250 and S-CSCF uses the value of 100 for IRI. P-CSCF may additionally provide the IRI ICE functions and when it does, the related IRI messages use the correlation number 200. + +As an alternative example, the iri (in ims-cc) and cc (in ims-cc) may use the same value (e.g. 200) instead of two values 200 and 250. + +## N.2.2.3 Method 3 + +**Table N-5: An example to show the use of IMS-VoIP-Correlation with multiple values (method 3)** + +| IMS-VoIP-Correlation (# of SETs = 2) | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|--------------------------------------|--------|-----|-------|-----|-----|---------|--------|-----|-------|-----|--|--| +| SET 1 | | | | | ... | SET 2 | | | | | | | +| ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | ... | ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | | | +| | cc | | | iri | | | cc | | | iri | | | +| | SET 1 | ... | SET n | | | | SET 1 | ... | SET p | | | | +| 100 | - | | | - | | 200 | 250 | | | - | | | + +In Table N-3, the values of 100, 200 and 250 are used as the correlation number values. The IRI messages will have the correlation number value of 100, 200 and the associated CC will have use the correlation number value of 250. In this example, there are two sets of {ims-iri, ims-cc} and there is only one set of {cc} within each of the ims-cc and {iri} in ims-cc is not used. + +A typical example use-case for the usage of Table N-5 could be: P-CSCF is the CC Intercept Triggering Function, IMS-AGW as the CC Intercept Function and S-CSCF as the IRI ICE. P-CSCF tells the IMS-AGW to use the correlation number value of 250 and S-CSCF uses the value of 100 for IRI. P-CSCF may additionally provide the IRI ICE functions and when it does, the related IRI messages use the correlation number 200. + +As an alternative example, in SET2, the ims-iri (in ims-cc) and cc (in ims-cc) may use the same value (e.g. 200) instead of two values 200 and 250. + +## N.2.3 Complex Example - Use of one Correlation Number + +Multiple IMS nodes are providing the IRI functions (e.g. S-CSCF and AS/MRFC) and two media streams (IMS-AGW and MRFP) are delivered to the LEMF as separate CC. When IMS nodes exchange the correlation numbers used, it is possible to use the same correlation number for all IRI messages and the CC. This is illustrated in Figure N-6. + +**Table N-6: Complex Example, but one value for the correlation number** + +| IMS-VoIP-Correlation (# of SETs = 2) | | | | | | | | | | | +|--------------------------------------|--------|-----|-------|-----|-----|---------|--------|-----|-------|-----| +| SET 1 | | | | | ... | SET 2 | | | | | +| ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | ... | ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | +| | cc | | | iri | ... | | cc | | | iri | +| | SET 1 | ... | SET n | | ... | | SET 1 | ... | SET p | | +| 100 | 100 | | | - | | 100 | 100 | | | - | + +In Table N-6, correlation number value 100 is used. In the example, two sets of {ims-iri, ims-cc} and only one set of {cc} within each of the ims-cc is used. The {iri} in ims-cc is not used. + +A typical example use-case for the usage of Table N-6 could be: S-CSCF provides the IRI ICE functions and the P-CSCF provides the CC Intercept Triggering Function, IMS-AGW as the CC Intercept Function. For the conference side of the call, AS provides the IRI ICE functions, MRFC provides the CC Intercept Trigger Function and the MRFP is the CC Intercept Function. In set 1, the P-CSCF tells the IMS-AGW to use the correlation number 100 for the CC and S-CSCF uses the correlation number 100. In set 2, the MRFC tells the MRFP to use the correlation number 100 and AS uses the correlation number 100 for the IRI. + +## N.2.4 Complex Example - Use of Multiple Correlation Numbers + +### N.2.4.0 General + +Multiple IMS nodes are providing the IRI functions (e.g. S-CSCF and AS/MRFC) and two media streams (IMS-AGW and MRFP) are delivered to the LEMF as separate CC. Here, the IMS nodes do not exchange the correlation number information. + +In this case, correlation numbers may be delivered in multiple ways. The Table N-7, Table N-8 and Table N-9 illustrate the usages. + +### N.2.4.1 Method 1 + +**Table N-7: Complex example to show the use of IMS-VoIP-Correlation with multiple values (method 1)** + +| IMS-VoIP-Correlation | | | | | | | | | | | +|----------------------|--------|-----|-------|-----|-----|---------|--------|-----|-------|-----| +| SET 1 | | | | | ... | SET m | | | | | +| ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | ... | ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | +| | cc | | | iri | ... | | cc | | | iri | +| | SET 1 | ... | SET n | | ... | | SET 1 | ... | SET p | | +| 100 | 250 | | | -- | | 1000 | 2500 | | | | + +In Table N-7, the values of 100, 250, 1000 and 2500 are used as the correlation number values. The IRI messages will have the correlation number value of 100 and 1000. The associated CC will have the correlation number values 250 and 2500. In this example, there are two sets of {ims-iri, ims-cc} and there is only one set of {cc} within the ims-cc. The {iri} in ims-cc is not used. + +A typical example use-case for the usage of Table N-7 could be: S-CSCF provides the IRI ICE functions and the P-CSCF provides the CC Intercept Triggering Function, IMS-AGW as the CC Intercept Function. For the conference side of the call, AS provides the IRI ICE functions, MRFC provides the CC Intercept Trigger Function and the MRFP is the CC Intercept Function. In set 1, the P-CSCF tells the IMS-AGW to use the correlation number 250 for the CC and S-CSCF uses the correlation number 100. In set 2, the MRFC tells the MRFP to use the correlation number 2500 and AS uses the correlation number 1000 for the IRI. + +As an alternative example, in SET2, the ims-iri and cc (in ims-cc) may use the same value (e.g. 1000) instead of two values 1000 and 2500. + +## N.2.4.2 Method 2 + +**Table N-8: Complex Example to show the use of IMS-VoIP-Correlation with multiple IRI ICEs (method 2)** + +| IMS-VoIP-Correlation | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----------------------|--------|-----|-------|-----|-----|---------|--------|-----|-------|-----|--|--| +| SET 1 | | | | | ... | SET m | | | | | | | +| ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | ... | ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | | | +| | cc | | | iri | | | cc | | | iri | | | +| | SET 1 | ... | SET n | | | | SET 1 | ... | SET p | | | | +| 100 | 250 | | | 200 | | 1000 | 2500 | | | | | | + +In Table N-8, the values of 100, 200, 250, 1000 and 2500 are used as the correlation number values. The IRI messages will have the correlation number values of 100, 200 and 1000, and the associated CC will have to use the correlation number value of 250 and 2500. In this example, there are two sets of {ims-iri, ims-cc} and there is only one set of {cc} within the ims-cc. The {iri} in ims-cc is used in one set. + +A typical example use-case for the usage of Table N-8 could be: S-CSCF provides the IRI ICE functions and the P-CSCF provides the CC Intercept Triggering Function, IMS-AGW as the CC Intercept Function. For the conference side of the call, AS provides the IRI ICE functions, MRFC provides the CC Intercept Trigger Function and the MRFP is the CC Intercept Function. In set 1, the P-CSCF tells the IMS-AGW to use the correlation number 250 for the CC and S-CSCF uses the correlation number 100. P-CSCF may additionally provide the IRI ICE functions, and when it does, it uses the correlation number 200. In set 2, the MRFC tells the MRFP to use the correlation number 2500 and AS uses the correlation number 1000 for the IRI. + +As an alternative example, in SET2, the ims-iri and cc (in ims-cc) may use the same value (e.g. 1000) instead of two values 1000 and 2500. Also, in SET 1, the iri and cc (in ims-cc) may use the same value (e.g. 200) instead of two values 200 and 250. + +## N.2.4.3 Method 3 + +**Table N-9: Complex example to show the use of IMS-VoIP-Correlation with multiple values (method 3)** + +| IMS-VoIP-Correlation | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +|----------------------|--------|----|-------|-----|---------|--------|-----|-------|-----|---------|--------|-----|-------|-----|--|--| +| SET 1 | | | | | SET 2 | | | | | SET 3 | | | | | | | +| ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | | | +| | cc | | | iri | | cc | | | iri | | cc | | | iri | | | +| | SET 1 | .. | SET n | | | SET 1 | ... | SET p | | | SET 1 | ... | SET q | | | | +| 100 | | | | | 200 | 250 | | | | 1000 | 2500 | | | | | | + +In Table N-9, the values of 100, 200, 250, 1000 and 2500 are used as the correlation number values. The IRI messages will have the correlation number values of 100, 200 and 1000 and the associated CC will have to use the correlation number value of 250 and 2500. In this example, there is one set of {ims-iri}, two sets of {ims-iri, ims-cc} with one set of {cc} in each of the {ims-cc} and {iri} in {ims-cc} is not used. + +A typical example use-case for the usage of Table N-9 could be: S-CSCF provides the IRI ICE functions and the P-CSCF provides the CC Intercept Triggering Function, IMS-AGW as the CC Intercept Function. For the conference side of the call, AS provides the IRI ICE functions, MRFC provides the CC Intercept Trigger Function and the MRFP is the CC Intercept Function. In set 1, S-CSCF uses the correlation number 100. In set 2, the P-CSCF tells the IMS-AGW to use the correlation number 250 for the CC and P-CSCF may provide the IRI ICE functions with the correlation number 200. In set 3, the MRFC tells the MRFP to use the correlation number 2500 and AS uses the correlation number 1000 for the IRI. + +As an alternative example, in SET3, the ims-iri and cc (in ims-cc) may use the same value (e.g. 1000) instead of two values 1000 and 2500. Also, in SET 2, the ims-iri and cc (in ims-cc) may use the same value (e.g. 200) instead of two values 200 and 250. + +## N.3 IMS Conferencing + +### N.3.1 General + +The ConfCorrelation is used to carry the correlation information for IMS conferencing. The ASN.1 B.11.1 shows the following: + +``` +ConfCorrelation ::= CHOICE { + correlationValues [0] CorrelationValues, + correlationNumber [1] OCTET STRING, + imsVoIP [2] IMS-VoIP-Correlation, + ... +} +``` + +Even though the above ASN.1 definition shows 3 different choices, only last two choices are used. The other value is present only for historical reasons (in other words, it was present in the early versions of the TS 33.108 and retained to avoid impacts to early implementations). The details of IMS-VoIP-Correlation are described in clause N.2.0. + +### N.3.2 Target Initiated AdHoc Conference Call + +When a lawful interception is to be done for a target-initiated conference call, the IRI and CC sent for conference part of the call may have to be correlated with the IRI and CC sent for the basic part of VoIP call. The clause N.2.3 and clause N.2.4 illustrate different examples of IMS-VoIP-Correlation usage for this case. + +### N.3.3 Independent Lawful Interception of IMS-Conferencing, + +#### N.3.3.1 General + +An example of independent lawful interception of IMS conferencing is the case when a lawful interception is activated on a conference-ID. In this case, the lawful interception is applicable just for IMS conferencing (i.e. not to be correlated with the basic VoIP call). For this, either the choice of correlationNumber or the choice of imsVoIP can be used. + +#### N.3.3.2 Use of correlationNumber (OCTET STRING) + +As shown in clause N.3.1, the conferenceNumber is an OCTET STRING. That means it can have only one value and that value is used as correlation number in IRI and CC. + +For example, if 100 is used as the correlationNumber, then AS providing the IRI ICE functions for IMS conferencing and MRFC triggering the CC interception at MRFP exchange the value 100 and the MRFC supplies that value to the MRFP. + +### N.3.3.3 Use of imsVoIP (IMS-VoIP-Correlation) + +#### N.3.3.3.1 One Correlation Number Value + +In this case, the same correlation number is used for IRI and CC as shown in Table N-10 below: + +**Table N-10: An example to show the use of IMS-VoIP-Correlation for IMS Conferencing with single value** + +| IMS-VoIP-Correlation | | | | | | | | | | | +|----------------------|--------|-------|-----|-----|-----|---------|--------|-------|-----|-----| +| SET 1 | | | | | ... | SET m | | | | | +| ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | ... | ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | +| | cc | | iri | | ... | | cc | | iri | | +| SET 1 | ... | SET n | ... | ... | ... | SET 1 | ... | SET p | ... | ... | +| 100 | 100 | | | -- | | | | | | | + +In Table N-10, a value of 100 is used as the correlation number. All IRI messages will have the correlation number value of 100 and the associated CC will have use the same correlation number value of 100. In this example, there is only one set of {ims-iri, ims-cc} and there is only one set of {cc} within the ims-cc and {iri} in ims-cc is not used. + +A typical example use-case for the usage of Table N-10 could be: AS providing the IRI ICE functions, MRFP, triggered by MRFC, providing the CC Intercept Function. The AS and MRFC coordinate to use the value 100 and MRFC supplies the value 100 to the MRFP. + +#### N.3.3.3.2 Multiple Correlation Number Values + +Here, the conferencing handling nodes do not exchange the correlation number values. In this case, correlation numbers may be delivered as illustrated in Table N-11. + +**Table N-11: An example to show the use of IMS-VoIP-Correlation for IMS Conferencing with multiple values** + +| IMS-VoIP-Correlation | | | | | | | | | | | +|----------------------|--------|-------|-----|-----|-----|---------|--------|-------|-----|-----| +| SET 1 | | | | | ... | SET m | | | | | +| ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | ... | ims-iri | ims-cc | | | | +| | cc | | iri | | ... | | cc | | iri | | +| SET 1 | ... | SET n | ... | ... | ... | SET 1 | ... | SET p | ... | ... | +| 100 | 250 | | | -- | | | | | | | + +In Table N-11, the values of 100 and 250 are used as the correlation number values. All IRI messages will have the correlation number value of 100 and the associated CC will have use the correlation number value of 250. In this example, there is only one set of {ims-iri, ims-cc} and there is only one set of {cc} within the ims-cc. The {iri} in ims-cc is not used. + +A typical example use-case for the usage of Table N-11 could be: AS providing the IRI ICE functions and MRFP, triggered by MRFC, providing the CC Intercept Function. MRFC tells the MRFP to use the correlation number value of 250 and AS uses the value of 100 for IRI. + +In the event MRFC also provides some IRI events, additional cases as illustrated in Table N-4 and N-5 for basic calls may apply (with AS, MRFC and MRFP replacing S-CSCF, P-CSCF and IMS-AGW within the typical example of clause N.2.22 and clause N.2.2.3). + +--- + +## Annex O (informative): Selection of ASN.1 HI2 sub-domain for LALS Reporting + +The LALS Target Positioning reports may be encoded in any of the following HI2 ASN.1 sub-domains: + +- hi2CS (for CS), specified in Annex B.3; +- hi2 (for PS), specified in Annex B.3a; +- hi2eps (for EPS), specified in Annex B.9. + +The LALS Target Positioning report records and their ASN.1 parameters for each sub-domain are presented in the following Tables: + +- 5.5F (for CS); +- 6.9H (for PS); +- 10.5.1.1.21 (for EPS). + +The selection of a particular ASN.1 sub-domain for LALS Target Positioning reporting is implementation-specific and out of scope of the present document. It may depend on the ability of the LI LCS Client to identify the network domain serving the UE, e.g. from the domain specific parameters in the LCS Server response, like the RAI for PS. It is also possible that a default sub-domain is used, e.g. by the operators that have a single network domain deployed. + +For the LALS Enhanced Location for IRI reporting the ASN.1 HI2 sub-domain is the same one that is used for reporting of the corresponding triggering event, when the triggering event is reported in either hi2CS, or hi2, or hi2eps sub-domains. + +For the triggering events reported using the dedicated ASN.1 sub-domains, e.g. MBMS, MMS, GCSE, etc., the LALS reports are encoded in either hi2 (PS) or hi2eps (EPS) sub-domains. + +--- + +## Annex P (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|-----|-----|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 06-2002 | SP-16 | SP-020357 | - | - | - | Release 5 draft Approved at TSG SA #16. | 5.0.0 | +| 09-2002 | SP-17 | SP-020512 | 001 | | F | Corrections to TS 33.108 | 5.1.0 | +| 12-2002 | SP-18 | SP-020705 | 002 | | F | Essential corrections to the Annex C.1 (ULIC) | 5.2.0 | +| 12-2002 | SP-18 | SP-020706 | 003 | | F | Missing PDP Context Modification event | 5.2.0 | +| 12-2002 | SP-18 | SP-020706 | 005 | | F | Essential correction to the LI events generated during RAU, when PDP context is active | 5.2.0 | +| 12-2002 | SP-18 | SP-020706 | 006 | | F | Changes to TS 33.108 for U.S. LI Requirements | 5.2.0 | +| 12-2002 | SP-18 | SP-020707 | 004 | | B | Aggregation of IRI Records | 6.0.0 | +| 03-2003 | SP-19 | SP-030096 | 008 | | A | Coding of ASN.1 parameters of the type OCTET STRING | 6.1.0 | +| 03-2003 | SP-19 | SP-030099 | 012 | | A | Incorrect ASN.1 object tree. Note: This CR is overridden by CR009 which again replaces figure B.1. Provided for completeness of CRs only. | 6.1.0 | +| 03-2003 | SP-19 | SP-030097 | 009 | | B | CS Section for 33.108 | 6.1.0 | +| 03-2003 | SP-19 | SP-030098 | 010 | | F | Adjustments to the requirements on the delivery of the intercepted RT data over TCP | 6.1.0 | +| 03-2003 | SP-19 | SP-030149 | 014 | | A | Correction to implementation of CR 005 | 6.1.0 | +| 06-2003 | SP-20 | SP-030221 | 016 | 1 | A | Changes to meet international LI Requirements | 6.2.0 | +| 09-2003 | SP-21 | SP-030508 | 017 | 1 | D | Correct Abbreviations in TS 33.108 | 6.3.0 | +| 09-2003 | SP-21 | SP-030509 | 019 | 1 | A | Syntax error in Annex B.3 | 6.3.0 | +| 09-2003 | SP-21 | SP-030508 | 020 | 1 | F | Inconsistency in Annex B.3 | 6.3.0 | +| 09-2003 | SP-21 | SP-030508 | 021 | 1 | F | Data Link Establishment and Sending part for ROSE operation | 6.3.0 | +| 09-2003 | SP-21 | SP-030508 | 022 | 1 | F | Correction on the usage of Lawful Interception identifiers | 6.3.0 | +| 09-2003 | SP-21 | SP-030508 | 023 | 1 | F | Subscriber controlled input clarification | 6.3.0 | +| 09-2003 | SP-21 | SP-030508 | 024 | 1 | F | Field separator in subaddress | 6.3.0 | +| 09-2003 | SP-21 | SP-030482 | 026 | - | A | Reference errors in Annex G | 6.3.0 | +| 12-2003 | SP-22 | SP-030592 | 028 | - | A | Correction to Annex G on TCP based transport | 6.4.0 | +| 12-2003 | SP-22 | SP-030593 | 029 | - | B | LI Reporting of Dialed Digits | 6.4.0 | +| 12-2003 | SP-22 | SP-030594 | 030 | - | F | CS Section for 33.108 - LI Management Operation | 6.4.0 | +| 12-2003 | SP-22 | SP-030594 | 031 | - | F | CS Section for 33.108 - User data packet transfer | 6.4.0 | +| 12-2003 | SP-22 | SP-030591 | 032 | - | B | Reporting TEL URL | 6.4.0 | +| 12-2003 | SP-22 | SP-030595 | 033 | - | F | Alignment of Lawful Interception identifiers length to ETSI TS 101 671 | 6.4.0 | +| 03-2004 | SP-23 | SP-040155 | 034 | - | F | Corrections to Tables 6.2, 6.7 | 6.5.0 | +| 03-2004 | SP-23 | SP-040156 | 035 | - | D | Corrections to Correlation Number | 6.5.0 | +| 03-2004 | SP-23 | SP-040157 | 036 | - | B | Correction to Identifiers | 6.5.0 | +| 03-2004 | SP-23 | SP-040158 | 038 | - | A | Correction on the description of "initiator" in "PDP Context Modification CONTINUE Record" | 6.5.0 | +| 03-2004 | SP-23 | SP-040159 | 039 | - | D | Editorial Corrections | 6.5.0 | +| 03-2004 | SP-23 | SP-040160 | 041 | - | A | Implications of R5 onwards QoS parameters on ASN.1 module in 33.108. | 6.5.0 | +| 03-2004 | SP-23 | SP-040161 | 043 | - | A | Syntax error in Annex B.4 | 6.5.0 | +| 03-2004 | SP-23 | SP-040162 | 044 | - | F | Clarification on the use of IRI-END record in PS interception | 6.5.0 | +| 06-2004 | SP-24 | SP-040405 | 045 | - | F | Correction on interception identities in multi-media domain | 6.6.0 | +| 06-2004 | SP-24 | SP-040406 | 047 | - | A | WGS 84 coordinates length correction | 6.6.0 | +| 06-2004 | SP-24 | SP-040407 | 048 | - | F | CR offering alignment to ETSI TS 101 671 | 6.6.0 | +| 06-2004 | SP-24 | SP-040408 | 049 | - | F | Additional text for Definition and Acronym section | 6.6.0 | +| 09-2004 | SP-25 | SP-040616 | 050 | - | F | Explanation concerning the Sequence Number | 6.7.0 | +| 09-2004 | SP-25 | SP-040616 | 051 | - | B | National ASN.1 parameter | 6.7.0 | +| 09-2004 | SP-25 | SP-040616 | 052 | - | D | Clarifying clause titles | 6.7.0 | +| 09-2004 | SP-25 | SP-040616 | 053 | - | B | Adding azimuth in location | 6.7.0 | +| 09-2004 | SP-25 | SP-040616 | 054 | - | C | Correction of the Subaddressing definitions | 6.7.0 | +| 09-2004 | SP-25 | SP-040685 | 055 | 1 | F | Correction to hi3DomainId definition | 6.7.0 | +| 09-2004 | SP-25 | SP-040616 | 056 | - | D | Correction of wrong use of abbreviations | 6.7.0 | +| 09-2004 | SP-25 | SP-040616 | 057 | - | C | Differences between subaddress sections in 33.108 and ETSI TS 101 671 | 6.7.0 | +| 09-2004 | SP-25 | SP-040616 | 058 | - | F | Replace SIP URL with SIP URI | 6.7.0 | +| 09-2004 | SP-25 | SP-040616 | 059 | - | F | Corrections to References | 6.7.0 | +| 12-2004 | SP-26 | SP-040851 | 061 | - | A | Correction to ULIC header | 6.8.0 | +| 12-2004 | SP-26 | SP-040851 | 062 | - | F | Correction on parameter GprsOperationErrorCode | 6.8.0 | +| 12-2004 | SP-26 | SP-040851 | 063 | - | F | Correction to the IMPORTS statements | 6.8.0 | +| 12-2004 | SP-26 | SP-040851 | 064 | - | F | Syntax Error in Annex B.3 | 6.8.0 | +| 12-2004 | SP-26 | SP-040851 | 065 | - | B | Deleting CC from SIP message | 6.8.0 | +| 12-2004 | SP-26 | SP-040851 | 066 | - | B | Adding domain ID to HI3 CS domain module | 6.8.0 | +| 12-2004 | SP-26 | SP-040851 | 067 | - | F | Syntax Error in Annex B.3a | 6.8.0 | +| 12-2004 | SP-26 | SP-040851 | 068 | - | C | HI2 SIP Content clarification | 6.8.0 | +| 01-2005 | - | - | - | - | - | Correction of syntax error in B.3 (Version6 -> version6 in ASN.1 code) | 6.8.1 | +| 01-2005 | - | - | - | - | - | Correction of syntax error in B.4 (Version6 -> version6 and addition of missing comma in ASN.1 code) | 6.8.2 | + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 03-2005 | SP-27 | SP-050125 | 069 | - | D | Aligning comments in National-HI3-ASN1parameters with comments in National-HI2-ASN1parameters | 7.0.0 | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050259 | 070 | 1 | B | Clarifications to the timing issue | 7.1.0 | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050259 | 071 | - | B | Clarification pertaining to the filtering of SDP for IRI-only cases | 7.1.0 | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050383 | 073 | 1 | A | Correlation for IMS interception | 7.1.0 | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050260 | 075 | - | A | Inconsistency in Annex B.5 | 7.1.0 | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050259 | 076 | - | D | Obsolete Import Statement in Annex B.6 | 7.1.0 | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050571 | 0077 | - | F | Clarifications to the RAU event | 7.2.0 | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050571 | 0078 | - | B | New event for LDI | 7.2.0 | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050571 | 0079 | - | C | Correlation for IMS interception | 7.2.0 | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050571 | 0080 | - | F | Clarification on IMS bearer independence | 7.2.0 | +| 2005-12 | SP-30 | SP-050778 | 0077 | - | F | ASN.1 module cleanup. | 7.3.0 | +| 2005-12 | SP-30 | SP-050778 | 0078 | - | D | Adding definition for 'Precision'. | 7.3.0 | +| 2005-12 | SP-30 | SP-050779 | 0079 | - | B | Start of interception for already attached UE | 7.3.0 | +| 2005-12 | SP-30 | SP-050762 | 0081 | - | A | Wrong references to tables for subaddress | 7.3.0 | +| 2005-12 | SP-30 | SP-050778 | 0082 | - | F | Alignment with ETSI TS 101 671 - Clarification on CIN | 7.3.0 | +| 2006-03 | SP-31 | SP-060065 | 0083 | - | F | Informative example of FTP implementation across HI2/HI3. | 7.4.0 | +| 2006-03 | SP-31 | SP-060065 | 0084 | - | F | Correction on description of parameter "event type" for CS interception | 7.4.0 | +| 2006-03 | SP-31 | SP-060065 | 0085 | - | F | Handling of unknown SIP headers | 7.4.0 | +| 2006-03 | SP-31 | SP-060065 | 0086 | - | F | Correction on polygon type of shape | 7.4.0 | +| 2006-03 | SP-31 | SP-060065 | 0087 | - | B | Extending section A.2.2 and C.2.2 for national use | 7.4.0 | +| 2006-06 | SP-32 | SP-060384 | 0083 | - | F | Missing ETSI parameter on HI2 | 7.5.0 | +| 2006-09 | SP-33 | SP-060660 | 0088 | 1 | B | TS 33.108 - WLAN Interworking Interception Details (v7.0) | 7.6.0 | +| 2007-03 | SP-35 | SP-070157 | 0089 | 1 | F | SMS IRI Reporting for WLAN Interworking (33.108) | 7.7.0 | +| 2007-06 | SP-36 | SP-070331 | 0091 | - | B | Direct Tunnel LI | 7.8.0 | +| 2007-06 | SP-36 | SP-070332 | 0090 | - | B | NSAPI (Network layer Service Access Point Identifier) optional in IRI. ASN.1 version update Rel-8 | 8.8.0 | +| 2007-06 | SP-36 | SP-070332 | 0092 | - | F | Clarification of Usage of GPRS Terminology and umtsQOS | 8.8.0 | +| 2007-09 | SP-37 | SP-070601 | 0093 | - | B | WLAN IRI at AAA for re-authentication | 8.1.0 | +| 2007-09 | SP-37 | SP-070601 | 0094 | - | D | Missing reference to TS 23.234 | 8.1.0 | +| 2007-12 | SP-38 | SP-070788 | 0095 | - | F | Clarifications to FTP filename conventions | 8.2.0 | +| 2007-12 | SP-38 | SP-070789 | 0096 | - | A | Wrong reference | 8.2.0 | +| 2007-12 | SP-38 | SP-070788 | 0097 | - | C | P-CSCF IMS LI Optional | 8.2.0 | +| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080173 | 0099 | 1 | D | Editorial update | 8.3.0 | +| 2008-06 | SP-40 | SP-080263 | 0100 | - | B | MBMS LI 33.108 | 8.4.0 | +| 2008-12 | SP-42 | SP-080763 | 101 | - | F | Clarification of encoding of Access Point Name (APN) | 8.5.0 | +| 2008-12 | SP-42 | SP-080763 | 102 | - | B | LI Handover Interface for SAE/EPS | 8.5.0 | +| 2008-12 | SP-42 | SP-080763 | 103 | - | B | Clarification on 3G DT with the GGSN | 8.5.0 | +| 2009-03 | SP-43 | SP-090133 | 104 | - | F | Clarification in TS33.108 on decryption place in IMS | 8.6.0 | +| 2009-03 | SP-43 | SP-090133 | 105 | - | F | Update of IMS specific non-transmission action example | 8.6.0 | +| 2009-03 | SP-43 | SP-090133 | 106 | - | F | Alignment with SAE stage 2 specifications approved by TSG SA#42 | 8.6.0 | +| 2009-03 | SP-43 | SP-090133 | 107 | - | F | TS 33.108 Alignment with SAE stage 2 specifications approved by TSG SA#42 | 8.6.0 | +| 2009-03 | SP-43 | SP-090133 | 108 | - | B | ASN.1 coding for the SAE/EPS HI2 interface | 8.6.0 | +| 2009-03 | SP-43 | SP-090133 | 109 | - | B | Introduction of HI3 for SAE/EPS | 8.6.0 | +| 2009-03 | SP-43 | SP-090133 | 110 | - | B | TS 33.108 - Conference Event Reporting | 8.6.0 | +| 2009-03 | SP-43 | SP-090133 | 111 | - | F | TS 33.108 - US Editorial Clean up | 8.6.0 | +| 2009-03 | --- | -- | --- | -- | -- | Editorial modifications | 8.6.1 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090272 | 112 | - | F | Correction on UE requested bearer resource modification - Alignment with SAE stage 2 specification | 8.7.0 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090272 | 113 | - | F | Clarification on parameter APN for EPS | 8.7.0 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090272 | 114 | - | F | Clarification on the handover between 2G/3G access and E-UTRAN with Gn/Gp | 8.7.0 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090272 | 115 | - | F | Clarification on parameter PDN type | 8.7.0 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090272 | 116 | - | F | Correction on GTPv2 instance in ASN.1 module for EPS | 8.7.0 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090272 | 117 | - | F | Correction on the coding of Protocol Configuration Options coding in ASN.1 for EPS | 8.7.0 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090272 | 118 | - | F | Correction on references in ASN.1 for EPS | 8.7.0 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090272 | 119 | - | F | 33.108 Conference Typo | 8.7.0 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090272 | 120 | - | F | 33.108 Annex H CR | 8.7.0 | + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|-----|-----|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2009-09 | SP-45 | SP-090522 | 121 | - | F | Correction on identities and parameters for LI in case of E-UTRAN access and PMIP based S5/S8 | 8.8.0 | +| 2009-09 | SP-45 | SP-090522 | 122 | - | F | Correction on Serving Evolved Packet System event. | 8.8.0 | +| 2009-09 | SP-45 | SP-090522 | 123 | - | F | Correction on the use of initiator in ASN.1 | 8.8.0 | +| 2009-09 | SP-45 | SP-090522 | 124 | - | F | Missing parameters for MME interception in the ASN.1 module | 8.8.0 | +| 2009-09 | SP-45 | SP-090559 | 125 | - | F | FTP table details | 9.0.0 | +| 2009-12 | SP-46 | SP-090817 | 128 | - | A | Correction of misalignments for values of "initiator" parameter for EPS | 9.1.0 | +| 2009-12 | SP-46 | SP-090818 | 127 | - | A | Missing TAU Failure Reason parameter mapping for MME interception | 9.1.0 | +| 2009-12 | SP-46 | SP-090817 | 132 | - | A | Correction on LI correlation for S4-SGSN | 9.1.0 | +| 2009-12 | SP-46 | SP-090817 | 133 | - | A | Correction on the length of RAI parameter in ASN.1 module for HI2 EPS | 9.1.0 | +| 2010-04 | SP-47 | SP-100104 | 134 | - | A | EPSLocation ULI length correction | 9.2.0 | +| 2010-04 | SP-47 | SP-100104 | 136 | - | A | Correction on RAI coding inside "old user location information" parameter | 9.2.0 | +| 2010-06 | SP-48 | SP-100363 | 138 | - | A | ASN.1 Description of eps-sending-of-IRI Subdomain ID | 9.3.0 | +| 2010-06 | SP-48 | SP-100253 | 140 | - | F | Reporting of Dual Stack PDP address from the SGSN | 10.0.0 | +| 2010-10 | SP-49 | SP-100570 | 141 | - | A | SCI correction | 10.1.0 | +| 2010-10 | SP-49 | SP-100570 | 143 | - | A | IMS Conference Overview text modification | 10.1.0 | +| 2010-10 | SP-49 | SP-100481 | 142 | - | F | Unsuccessful bearer modification | 10.1.0 | +| 2010-12 | SP-50 | SP-100854 | 146 | 1 | A | IMSI in event records | 10.2.0 | +| 2010-12 | SP-50 | SP-100729 | 147 | - | B | start of interception event at the EPS HI2 | 10.2.0 | +| 2010-12 | SP-50 | SP-100729 | 148 | - | B | LI Handover Interface for KMS based IMS Media Security | 10.2.0 | +| 2010-12 | SP-50 | SP-100726 | 152 | - | A | Corrections to Serving System Report Message Required to meet US regulatory requirements | 10.2.0 | +| 2010-12 | SP-50 | SP-100728 | 156 | - | F | Add a Reference to the ATIS LI VoIP specification for US regulatory requirements | 10.2.0 | +| 2010-12 | SP-50 | SP-100726 | 160 | - | A | Clarification added in the US Annex H on the requirement for UMTS LI Correlation Header (ULIC) version | 10.2.0 | +| 2010-12 | SP-50 | SP-100854 | 163 | 1 | A | Corrections and Alignment for IMS Conferencing | 10.2.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110021 | 167 | - | A | S4-SGSN address in the Serving System Report | 10.3.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110023 | 170 | - | F | Propagation of mistake in the implementation of CR 0139 (rel-9) on rel-10 | 10.3.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110021 | 173 | - | A | MME address in Serving System report | 10.3.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110023 | 178 | - | B | Location information for PMIP events | 10.3.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110023 | 180 | - | C | Security requirements for the LI Handover Interface in KMS based IMS media security | 10.3.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110023 | 181 | - | F | Revocation trigger | 10.3.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110021 | 176 | - | A | PMIP parameters condition | 10.3.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110023 | 182 | - | B | Mixed delivery indication for IMS Conference HI3 | 10.3.0 | +| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110023 | 177 | - | F | IMS Conf LI 33.108 | 10.3.0 | +| 2011-06 | SP-52 | SP-110260 | 186 | - | C | TLS profiling for HI2 interface for KMS based IMS media security | 10.4.0 | +| 2011-06 | SP-52 | SP-110425 | 187 | - | C | OID (ASN.1 of Object Identifier in CS domain) | 11.0.0 | +| 2011-09 | SP-53 | SP-110511 | 188 | - | B | Reporting of DSMIP session modification | 11.1.0 | +| 2012-03 | SP-55 | SP-120034 | 189 | - | F | Correction on reference for MIKEY-TICKET | 11.2.0 | +| | | | 190 | - | F | SAI Reference correction | | +| | | | 191 | - | F | Correction on reference for MIP specific parameters for the HI2 interface and alignment of reported information. | | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120336 | 189 | 2 | C | CSFB Location transfer over the HI2 interface | 11.3.0 | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120336 | 190 | 1 | F | PayloadType in CC header | 11.3.0 | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120336 | 191 | 1 | F | UE Address Info in HI2 | 11.3.0 | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120336 | 192 | 3 | C | Handover indication at HI2 interface | 11.3.0 | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120336 | 194 | - | F | Correction on parameter name pMIPAttachTunnelDeactivation | 11.3.0 | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120336 | 195 | - | F | Correction on delivery of encrypted CC in case of IMS media security | 11.3.0 | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120336 | 196 | 2 | C | IMS Conference Services | 11.3.0 | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120336 | 197 | 3 | F | Clarification for Serving Evolved Packet System Message Reporting | 11.3.0 | +| 2012-09 | SP-57 | SP-120627 | 198 | 1 | F | Reference list correction to align with the corrected TS 29.212 title | 11.4.0 | +| 2012-09 | SP-57 | SP-120619 | 201 | - | A | ePSlocationOfTheTarget in EPS-PMIP-SpecificParameters | 11.4.0 | +| 2012-09 | SP-57 | SP-120617 | 202 | - | A | EPS Location ASN.1 Parameter Correction | 11.4.0 | +| 2013-03 | SP-59 | SP-130034 | 205 | - | F | Correction on EPS userLocationInfo and olduserLocationInfo parameters length | 12.0.0 | +| | | | 206 | - | F | Clarification on the use of EPS Correlation Number for GPRS events in EPS Events | | +| | | | 207 | - | C | Timestamp Requirement for US Networks | | + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2013-06 | SP-60 | SP-130248 | 208 | - | F | Name correction of reference [1] | 12.1.0 | +| | | | 209 | - | F | Potential Compatibility Issues with use of OCTET STRING Encoding | | +| | | | 210 | - | B | Start of interception for an already established IMS session | | +| | | | 211 | - | F | Missing references to annex B.9 for PS and IMS interception | | +| 2013-09 | SP-61 | SP-130401 | 212 | - | B | Annex H Changes for Gateway Interception at Inter-PLMN Interface | 12.2.0 | +| | | | 213 | - | F | Updating Tel URL to Tel URI | | +| 2013-12 | SP-62 | SP-130661 | 214 | - | F | Clarification on the applicability of annex B.9 to PS interception | 12.3.0 | +| | | | 215 | - | B | ULI timestamp reporting | | +| | | | 216 | - | F | Correction to I-WLAN LI location information reporting | | +| | | | 217 | - | B | 108 UMTS IRI Packet Header Information Reporting | | +| | | | 218 | - | B | 108 WLAN IRI Packet Header Information Reporting | | +| | | | 219 | - | B | 108 LTE IRI Packet Header Information Reporting | | +| | | | 220 | - | B | 108 CR new delivery mechanism of IRI,TPKT/TCP/IP | | +| | | | 221 | - | B | 108 CR on Annex H Changes for Packet Header Information Reporting | | +| 2014-03 | SP-63 | SP-140020 | 222 | - | C | Handling of unsuccessful LI procedures in getting encryption keys from the KMS. | 12.4.0 | +| 2014-06 | SP-64 | SP-140310 | 223 | - | F | Editorial clean-up of target & monitored subscriber | 12.5.0 | +| | | | 224 | - | B | Civic Address usages as a new location information | | +| | | | 225 | - | B | IMS-based VoIP CC HI3 Definition | | +| | | | 226 | - | C | Timestamp Requirement for US | | +| | | | 227 | - | B | LI for HeNB | | +| 2014-09 | SP-65 | SP-140586 | 228 | 1 | F | Editorial Correction to the insertion of VoIP HI3 Text | 12.6.0 | +| | | | 229 | - | B | PANI Header information | | +| | | | 230 | - | A | Addition of IMEI trigger ID for IMS | | +| | | | 232 | - | D | Editorial Correction to the insertion of VoIP HI3 Text | | +| | | | 233 | - | B | LI Support for GTP based s2b interfaces. | | +| | | | 234 | - | C | Addition of MRF ICE Type for HI3 IMS-based VoIP | | +| | | | 235 | - | F | Error in the description of UMTS LI Correlation Version 1 Header | | +| | | | 236 | - | C | Normative Annex to provide the description of VoIPLIC-header | | +| | | | 237 | - | C | Correction to ConfULIC-header and new Annex with description | | +| | | | 238 | - | C | Updates to support VoIP/VoLTE | | +| | | | 239 | - | F | HeNB ASN.1 Fixes | | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140821 | 240 | - | B | Optional definition of HI1 for notification and alarms of some countries (based on a new informative annex) | 12.7.0 | +| | | | 241 | - | B | Adding the interception feature of usages of target's XCAP data | | +| | | | 242 | - | F | Clean up of the ASN.1 of the Annexes B.3 and B.9 | | +| | | | 243 | - | D | Repair of hanging paragraphs | | +| | | | 244 | - | F | Correction to ASN.1 definition of VoIP HI3 | | +| | | | 245 | - | F | Clarification to the definition of CC for IMS VoIP in clause 12.6 | | +| | | | 246 | - | B | Addition of IMS-VoIP-Correlation to HI2 definition | | +| | | | 247 | - | F | Aligning clause 12.1.4 with 33.107 clause 12 | | +| | | | 248 | - | F | Common description of reliability in clause 4, General | | +| | | | 249 | - | B | Adding the interception of ProSe direct discovery | | +| | | SP-140820 | 251 | - | A | Reporting extracted IMEI from IMEI URN | | +| | | SP-140821 | 252 | - | B | HI2/HI3 for LI of GCSE | | +| | | SP-140819 | 256 | - | A | Network ID Fix for HI2 & HI3 | | +| | | SP-140821 | 257 | - | F | Lawful Interception Identifier Fix for HI2 & HI3 | | +| | | | 258 | - | C | Updates for 3GPP Object Tree in Handover Interface | | +| 2015-03 | SP-67 | SP-150075 | 259 | - | F | Correction of ASN.1 of GCSEHI2Operations | 12.8.0 | +| | | | 260 | - | F | Remove EPSLocation in UmtsHI2Operations B.3 | | +| | | | 261 | - | F | Addition of LI set-up time in the HI1 notification | | +| | | | 262 | - | F | Adding functional element information | | +| | | | 263 | - | F | Corrections on annex M (Informative) Generic LI notification (HI1 notification using HI2 method). | | +| | | | 264 | - | F | Uniform use of "target" | | +| | | | 265 | - | F | Packet Data Header Reporting Correction in IWLAN ASN.1 | | +| | | | 266 | - | F | HI2_HI3 Updates for WebRTC Interworking | | +| 2015-06 | SP-68 | SP-150297 | 267 | - | F | Double definition for National-HI3-ASN1parameters in HI3 for IMS based VoIP | 12.9.0 | +| | | SP-150296 | 268 | - | F | Missing IMPORT statement for National-HI3-ASN1parameters in HI3 for IMS conferencing | | +| | | | 269 | - | F | EpsHI2Operations ASN.1 syntax corrections | | +| | | | 270 | - | F | A small correction in ASN.1 of M.2 annex | | + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| | | | 271 | - | F | Clarifications on the handling of PANI header | | +| | | | 272 | - | F | ASN.1 correction in HI2 modules in annexes B.3 and B.9. | | +| | | | 273 | - | F | Corrections to the table numbers | | +| 2015-09 | SP-69 | SP-150469 | 274 | 1 | F | LI consequence of ending the maintenance for WLAN Interworking specifications | 12.10.0 | +| | | | 275 | 2 | F | Correction to address incorrect reference to WLAN | | +| | | | 277 | - | F | Corrections on parameters included in Packet Data Header Information REPORT record | | +| 2015-12 | SP-70 | SP-150723 | 279 | 2 | F | Modification related to ASN.1 field on "x 3GPP Asserted Identity" | 12.11.0 | +| | | | 280 | 3 | F | Fixing ASN.1 field | | +| | | | 282 | 4 | F | ASN.1 corrections of errors in annexes B.9 and M.2 | | +| | | | 283 | 1 | F | Correlation Number parameter required for LTE | | +| | | | 285 | 1 | F | Aligning Per-Packet and Summary Reporting ASN.1 | | +| | | | 288 | 2 | F | Coding for Octet String Contents related to aPN | | +| | | SP-150728 | 293 | 1 | A | LTE Location Information: Cell Based IRI Reporting (MME) | | +| | | SP-150724 | 281 | 2 | B | Reporting of UE local IP address and UDP port number | 13.0.0 | +| | | | 284 | 5 | B | New LI events related to HLR for CS/PS domain Stage 3 | | +| | | | 286 | 1 | F | Correction to have consistent event name Packet Data Header Information (stage 3) | | +| | | | 287 | 2 | B | Stage 3 definition for CC Unavailable Indication | | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160050 | 294 | 2 | F | ASN.1 Correction to have PacketDataSummaryReport in clause B.9 | 13.1.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160050 | 296 | 2 | B | User Location Information reporting extensions over s2b | 13.1.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160049 | 299 | 2 | A | TPKT - Connection Establishment Simplification | 13.1.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160049 | 300 | 1 | A | Correction of GLIC to ULIC | 13.1.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160050 | 301 | 1 | F | Inclusion Conditions for the Stage 2 in Clause 6 | 13.1.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160050 | 302 | 2 | F | Alignment of HI2 and HI3 ASN.1 Correlation parameters for VoIP | 13.1.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160050 | 303 | - | F | Location of the target 2G/3G CS clarifications | 13.1.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160050 | 304 | 1 | F | User Location Information clarification | 13.1.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160050 | 305 | - | F | Editorial correction and clarifications for serviceCenterAddress and XmlCivicAddress | 13.1.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160050 | 307 | - | F | Editorial clean up of SGN | 13.1.0 | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160384 | 0308 | 1 | F | ProSe ASN.1 Amendments and corrections | 13.2.0 | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160384 | 0309 | - | F | GCSE ASN.1 Amendments and corrections | 13.2.0 | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160384 | 0310 | 1 | F | Correction to remove the compilation error in ASN.1 module of B.3 (UMTS HI2) | 13.2.0 | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160384 | 0311 | 1 | F | Correction to remove the compilation error in ASN.1 module of B.5 (HI-Management) | 13.2.0 | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160384 | 0312 | - | F | Correction to remove the compilation error in ASN.1 module of B6 (HI3 CS) | 13.2.0 | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160384 | 0313 | 1 | F | Correction to remove the compilation error in ASN.1 module of B.7 (HI2 WLAN) | 13.2.0 | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160384 | 0314 | - | F | Correction to remove the compilation error in ASN.1 module of B.9 (HI2 EPS) | 13.2.0 | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160384 | 0315 | - | F | Correction to remove the compilation error in ASN.1 module of M.2 (LI Management) | 13.2.0 | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160384 | 0316 | - | C | Stage 3: TWAN Location for default bearer as well | 13.2.0 | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160384 | 0321 | - | F | Wrong reference for parameters UE Local IP address and UE UDP port | 13.2.0 | +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0323 | - | D | Editorial Correction to ASN.1 module in B.3 | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0324 | - | D | Editorial correction to ASN.1 module of B6 (HI3 CS) | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0325 | - | D | Editorial correction to ASN.1 module of M2 (LI Mod notification) | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0326 | - | D | Editorial correction to ASN.1 module of B9 (HI2 EPS) | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0327 | 1 | C | Informative Annex on IMS-VoIP-Correlation | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-09 | SA#73 | SP-160564 | 0328 | 3 | B | CR IMS-based VoIP HI3 autonomous decoding | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160797 | 0329 | - | B | LI handover interface additions for ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160797 | 0330 | 1 | B | Lawful Access Location Services - Stage 3 | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160797 | 0331 | 1 | C | IMS-VoIP-Correlation to IMS Conferencing | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160797 | 0332 | 1 | F | Editorial updates to Annex N | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160797 | 0333 | 1 | C | Addition to Annex N - IMS Conference | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160797 | 0334 | 2 | F | Editorial correction to ASN.1 module of M.2 annex (Generic LI Hi1 notification) | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160797 | 0336 | 1 | B | Non-Local ID targeting in CS and Packet data domains | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160797 | 0338 | 1 | B | Non-Local ID target in IMS domain | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160797 | 0340 | 1 | C | Addition of EPS Correlation Information into multimedia domain | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160797 | 0341 | 2 | A | ASN.1 tag number correction | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160797 | 0343 | 1 | B | Separate Delivery of SMS - Handover Details | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160797 | 0344 | 1 | B | Roaming Constraints on IMS VoIP Reporting | 13.4.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA#75 | SP-170037 | 0345 | 1 | C | Phase 2 of the LALS development - Stage 3 description | 14.0.0 | + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2017-03 | SA#75 | SP-170036 | 0346 | 1 | F | Location information for ProSe UE-to-NW Relay | 13.5.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA#75 | SP-170037 | 0347 | 3 | B | Separate Delivery of MMS - Handover Details | 14.0.0 | +| 2017-03 | SA#75 | SP-170037 | 0348 | 1 | F | TPKT Enhancements for EPS | 14.0.0 | +| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170342 | 0349 | 1 | F | Clarifying stage 3 text on Start of Interception for established IMS session | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170342 | 0351 | 1 | D | Editorial correction to deleted NOTE | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170341 | 0355 | - | A | Missing location information in ProSe Remote UE Start of Communication REPORT Record | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170342 | 0356 | 1 | B | Email Address as a Non local ID target at the MMS level | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170342 | 0357 | 1 | F | Correction of IALS-rawMLPPosData parameter description and clarifications on LALS delivery | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170342 | 0359 | 1 | F | MMS Correlation Correction | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170340 | 0362 | 1 | A | TPDU Size Restriction Removal for TPKT Delivery | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-09 | SA#77 | SP-170707 | 0364 | 1 | F | Clarifying Stage 3 text on Start of Intercept with Active Conference | 14.2.0 | +| 2017-09 | SA#77 | SP-170707 | 0365 | 1 | F | Clarifying Stage 3 text on Start of Intercept cases for GPRS/UMTS | 14.2.0 | +| 2017-09 | SA#77 | SP-170707 | 0366 | 1 | F | Clarifying Stage 3 text on Start of Intercept cases for EPS | 14.2.0 | +| 2017-09 | SA#77 | SP-170707 | 0367 | 1 | F | Clarifying Stage 3 text on Start of Intercept with MBMS Service Active | 14.2.0 | +| 2017-09 | SA#77 | SP-170707 | 0368 | 1 | F | Clarifying Stage 3 text on Start of Interception with active GCSE communication group | 14.2.0 | +| 2017-09 | SA#77 | SP-170707 | 0369 | 1 | F | Clarifying Stage 3 text on Start of Intercept cases for ProSe UE to NW Relay and ProSe Remote UE | 14.2.0 | +| 2017-12 | SA#78 | SP-170841 | 0372 | 1 | F | IP-based CC handover interface (HI3) for CS intercepts | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-12 | SA#78 | SP-170841 | 0374 | 1 | B | S8HR LI: Stage 3 changes | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-12 | SA#78 | SP-170841 | 0375 | 1 | F | Move IMS VoIP/VoLTE text from clause 7 to clause 12 | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-12 | SA#78 | SP-170841 | 0377 | 1 | F | Missing specification text for the HI for LI in HSS in IMS | 14.3.0 | +| 2017-12 | SA#78 | SP-170841 | 0378 | 1 | F | Administrative changes | 14.3.0 | +| 2018-03 | SA#79 | SP-180034 | 0381 | 1 | F | Object tree diagram in a new form | 14.4.0 | +| 2018-03 | SA#79 | SP-180034 | 0382 | 1 | F | A-MSISDN correction | 14.4.0 | +| 2018-03 | SA#79 | SP-180034 | 0386 | - | F | Stage 3 Corrections for the Register Location event reported by for EPS | 14.4.0 | +| 2018-03 | SA#79 | SP-180035 | 0384 | 1 | F | Missing Abbreviations added | 15.0.0 | +| 2018-03 | SA#79 | SP-180035 | 0387 | 1 | F | Missing IRI events fields | 15.0.0 | +| 2018-06 | SA#80 | SP-180290 | 0389 | 1 | F | Errors in stage 3 descriptions of CS related IRI details | 15.1.0 | +| 2018-06 | SA#80 | SP-180290 | 0390 | 1 | F | Stage 3 Corrections to the HLR triggered IRI messages for PS | 15.1.0 | +| 2018-06 | SA#80 | SP-180290 | 0391 | 1 | F | Stage 3 Corrections to the HSS triggered IRI messages for EPS | 15.1.0 | +| 2018-06 | SA#80 | SP-180289 | 0393 | 1 | A | Stage 3 Corrections to the HSS triggered IRI messages for IMS | 15.1.0 | +| 2018-09 | SA#81 | SP-180790 | 0395 | 3 | B | Cell Site Supplemental Information Reporting-Handover Details | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-09 | SA#81 | SP-180790 | 0396 | 1 | B | Addition of Push to Talk over Cellular (PTC) with ASN.1 modifications | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-09 | SA#81 | SP-180790 | 0398 | 2 | F | ASN.1 errors - missing newline at two places | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-09 | SA#81 | SP-180790 | 0400 | 1 | B | Delivery of PTC Encryption information | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-09 | SA#81 | SP-180790 | 0401 | 1 | F | Addition of PTC References and new abbreviations | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-09 | SA#81 | SP-180790 | 0402 | - | C | Reporting Media Bearer information for S8HR | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-09 | SA#81 | SP-180790 | 0403 | - | F | Correction of the Network Identifier parameter referenced server in clause 15.3 MMS within Table 15.3.6.1.2 | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-12 | SA#82 | SP-180990 | 0404 | 2 | C | Time of Location Stage 3 | 15.3.0 | +| 2018-12 | SA#82 | SP-180990 | 0406 | 1 | F | PTC Stage 3 Text: An error in the PTC clause | 15.3.0 | +| 2019-03 | SA#83 | SP-190042 | 0408 | 2 | F | Addition of Pre-Established Session Record for PTC in 33.108 | 15.4.0 | +| 2019-03 | SA#83 | SP-190042 | 0409 | 2 | F | Corrections for ASN for PTC in 33.108 | 15.4.0 | +| 2019-03 | SA#83 | SP-190042 | 0410 | 1 | F | Secondary Rat information Stage 3 in annex B9 (case of EN-DC: E-UTRAN and NR Dual Connectivity) | 15.4.0 | +| 2019-06 | SA#84 | SP-190343 | 0411 | 1 | F | Missing PTCRegistration ASN.1 enumeration | 15.5.0 | +| 2019-06 | SA#84 | SP-190345 | 0413 | 3 | B | Add additional location details | 15.5.0 | +| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190634 | 0414 | 2 | F | PTC ASN.1 Corrections | 15.6.0 | +| 2019-12 | SA#86 | SP-190984 | 0415 | 2 | F | Correction of reference | 15.7.0 | +| 2019-12 | SA#86 | SP-190984 | 0417 | 1 | F | GCSE CC correct module in Annex B.14.2 | 15.7.0 | +| 2019-12 | SA#86 | SP-190985 | 0416 | 1 | B | IoT UE NIDD LI stage 3 (EPS) | 16.0.0 | +| 2019-12 | SA#86 | SP-190985 | 0418 | 1 | B | Transport Harmonization (align 33.108 to 33.128) | 16.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | SA#88e | SP-200407 | 0419 | - | C | Enhanced EPS Location Update Reporting with Dual Connectivity | 16.1.0 | +| 2020-09 | SA#89e | SP-200806 | 0421 | 1 | A | Correction on uLITimestamp parameter length | 16.2.0 | +| 2021-03 | SA#91e | SP-210031 | 0422 | 1 | F | Annex B.3 reference clauses correction of OMA MLP TS | 16.3.0 | +| 2021-06 | SA#92e | SP-210302 | 0425 | 1 | F | Extension of alarm-information OCTET String Size | 16.4.0 | +| 2023-06 | SA#100 | SP-230441 | 0429 | - | F | Corrections on ASN.1 import statements | 16.5.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33163/04f51626e2e10a16e3eb2c4b33cb2742_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33163/04f51626e2e10a16e3eb2c4b33cb2742_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..343e63f333a581b0a790ff44602ef4994a72009b --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33163/04f51626e2e10a16e3eb2c4b33cb2742_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:60b65c14e6fcf45e4cadcc7cd89ec5197ce3863feabd2cbc989e59161c8c8c44 +size 67629 diff --git 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No text of specified style in +document. + +# Contents + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 5 | +| Introduction ..... | 5 | +| 1 Scope..... | 6 | +| 2 References..... | 6 | +| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 7 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 7 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 7 | +| 4 Security Procedures for Battery Efficient Security for Very Low Throughput MTC Devices (BEST) ..... | 7 | +| 4.1 Introduction ..... | 7 | +| 4.2 BEST Framework Service Description..... | 8 | +| 4.2.1 Architecture ..... | 8 | +| 4.3 Procedures between the UE and the HSE ..... | 10 | +| 4.3.1 Overview of BEST procedures..... | 10 | +| 4.3.2 BEST Session Initiation and Key Agreement ..... | 10 | +| 4.3.3 BEST Session Key Management..... | 11 | +| 4.3.4 BEST Session Termination ..... | 11 | +| 4.3.5 BEST Message Reject..... | 11 | +| 4.4 Procedures between the HSE and the EAS ..... | 11 | +| 4.4.1 Message Exchange Overview..... | 11 | +| 4.4.2 EAS Registration for BEST Service..... | 12 | +| 4.4.3 Key Request..... | 12 | +| 4.4.4 Key Refresh..... | 13 | +| 4.4.5 Session Termination ..... | 13 | +| 4.4.6 Message Reject..... | 13 | +| 4.5 BEST Data Service..... | 13 | +| 4.6 Key Management ..... | 14 | +| 4.6.1 Key Agreement and Refresh..... | 14 | +| 4.6.1.1 Key setup messaging between HSE and UE ..... | 14 | +| 4.6.1.2 Usage of Keys..... | 16 | +| 4.6.1.3 Key Setup for BEST session end point modification ..... | 17 | +| 4.6.1.4 BEST Key Handling ..... | 17 | +| 4.6.2 BEST Key Hierarchy..... | 17 | +| 4.6.2.1 Introduction..... | 17 | +| 4.6.2.2 BEST Key Hierarchy for Separate BEST Domain..... | 18 | +| 5 Derivation of BEST Keys ..... | 18 | +| 5.1 BEST key derivation ..... | 18 | +| 5.1.0 Key derivation function ..... | 18 | +| 5.1.1 Derivation of UE-to-HSE keys and Intermediate Key ..... | 18 | +| 5.1.2 Derivation of EAS specific pre-shared key ( $K_{EAS\_PSK}$ )..... | 19 | +| 5.1.3 Derivation of UE-to-EAS keys..... | 19 | +| 6 End to Middle Secured Data Protocol (EMSDP)..... | 20 | +| 6.1 Introduction ..... | 20 | +| 6.2 EMSDP Protocol Description ..... | 20 | +| 6.2.1 Data Stack..... | 20 | +| 6.2.2 EMSDP general structure ..... | 22 | +| 6.2.3 EMSDP Counter and Session ID Schemes ..... | 23 | +| 6.2.3.1 Optimised EMSDP counter scheme ..... | 23 | +| 6.2.3.2 Optimised EMSDP Session ID scheme ..... | 23 | +| 6.2.4 EMSDP Integrity protection..... | 23 | +| 6.2.5 EMSDP Encryption ..... | 25 | +| 6.2.6 EMSDP Control Plane Commands ..... | 26 | +| 6.2.6.1 Overview..... | 26 | +| 6.2.6.1.1 EMSDP Session Request ..... | 26 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| 6.2.6.1.2 | EMSDP Session Start..... | 29 | +| 6.2.6.1.3 | EMSDP Session Start Confirmation message..... | 32 | +| 6.2.6.1.4 | EMSDP Session Terminate Request and Response..... | 33 | +| 6.2.6.1.5 | EMSDP Manage Keys Request..... | 33 | +| 6.2.6.1.6 | EMSDP Manage Keys Response..... | 33 | +| 6.2.6.1.7 | EMSDP Message Reject command..... | 34 | +| 6.2.7 | Procedures for BEST when using EMSDP ..... | 35 | +| 6.2.7.1 | Introduction..... | 35 | +| 6.2.7.2 | Procedures for BEST Key Agreement Only Service using EMSDP ..... | 35 | +| 6.2.7.3 | Procedures for BEST User Plane Integrity Protected Service using EMSDP ..... | 37 | +| 6.2.7.4 | Procedures for BEST User Plane Confidential Service using EMSDP ..... | 38 | +| 7 | BEST Service Management..... | 38 | +| 7.1 | Ability to enable and disable the BEST service..... | 38 | +| Annex A (informative): | Structure of APN names for BEST..... | 39 | +| Annex B (informative): | HSE to EAS interface based on Restful HTTP..... | 39 | +| B.1 | Introduction..... | 39 | +| B.2 | Restful HTTP interface ..... | 40 | +| B.2.1 | Overview ..... | 40 | +| B.2.2 | Procedures over the RESTful HTTP reference point..... | 40 | +| B.2.2.1 | Overview of the procedures..... | 40 | +| B.2.2.2 | Initial registration by EAS ..... | 41 | +| B.2.2.3 | Obtaining UE specific pre-shared key from the EAS..... | 41 | +| B.2.2.4 | Obtaining UE specific pre-shared key during BEST Session Setup ..... | 41 | +| B.2.2.5 | Deregistration by EAS..... | 41 | +| Annex C (informative): | Change history..... | 41 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- Introduction + +This document describes communication security and key agreement processes that are optimised for battery constrained, very low throughput Machine Type Communication (MTC) devices. + +Specifically: + +- N-PDU data tampering and eavesdropping +- Efficient user data protection challenges +- VPLMN Specific Needs +- End-to-end security + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document defines communication security processes designed for very low throughput Machine Type Communication (MTC) devices that are battery constrained. + +These processes consist of: + +- A Key agreement service for End to Middle and End to End security use +- An End to Middle secure transport service that includes the ability to verify and confidentiality protect low throughput data. +- An End to End secure transport service that includes the ability to verify and confidentiality protect low throughput data. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. + - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. + - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TR 33.863: "Study on battery efficient security for very low throughput Machine Type Communication (MTC) devices". +- [3] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3G security; Security architecture". +- [4] 3GPP TS 23.401: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access". +- [5] 3GPP TS 24.008: "Mobile radio interface Layer 3 specification; Core network protocols; Stage 3". +- [6] 3GPP TS 55.241: "Specification of the GIA4 integrity algorithm for GPRS; GIA4 specification" +- [7] 3GPP TS 55.251: "Specification of the GEA5 encryption and GIA5 integrity algorithms for GPRS; GEA5 and GIA5 algorithm specification" +- [8] 3GPP TS 35.201: " Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms; Document 1: f8 and f9 specification". +- [9] 3GPP TS 35.215: "Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 1: UEA2 and UIA2 specifications" +- [10] 3GPP TS 35.221: "Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms EEA3 & EIA3; Document 1: EEA3 and EIA3 specifications". +- [11] 3GPP TS 33.310: "Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)". +- [12] 3GPP TS 33.401: "3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security architecture". +- [13] 3GPP TS 33.220: " Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA)". + +- [14] 3GPP TS 23.682: "Architecture enhancements to facilitate communications with packet data networks and applications". +- [15] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) application". + +# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1]. + +**BEST:** Battery Efficient Security for very low Throughput Machine Type Communication (MTC) devices + +**BEST Capable UE:** A UE that is enabled for the BEST service + +**Enterprise Key:** A secret key shared by the Enterprise Application Server and the UE for application in the BEST service + +**EAS PSK:** An Enterprise Application Service specific key derived by the HSE and the UE from the Intermediate key and meant to be forwarded to a specific EAS by the HSE. + +**Intermediate Key:** A key derived by the HSE and the UE from CK and IK to be used to derive the EAS PSK + +**Intermediate Key Identifier:** A key identifier that identifies an Intermediate Key + +**UE-to-HSE keys:** Keys derived by the HSE and the UE from CK and IK to be used on control and/or user plane between the UE and HSE. + +**UE-to-EAS keys:** Keys derived by the EAS and the UE from EAS PSK and an Enterprise Key to be used for user plane between UE and EAS. + +**UE-to-HSE:** UE to Home PLMN Security Endpoint + +**UE-to-EAS:** UE to Enterprise Application Server + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1]. + +| | | +|-----|-------------------------------| +| EAS | Enterprise Application Server | +| HSE | HPLMN Security Endpoint | + +# --- 4 Security Procedures for Battery Efficient Security for Very Low Throughput MTC Devices (BEST) + +## 4.1 Introduction + +This specification defines elements, protocols and procedures that enable battery efficient security for low throughput devices such as MTC devices. The BEST service is a secure channel between a UE and a HSE, optimised for low throughput and high latency devices that are battery constrained. The security is between the UE and either an element in the service provider home network (the HSE) or an element in the enterprise domain (the EAS). The design is modular and extensible so that it can be used to satisfy a wide range of use cases. + +The following services are defined: + +- BEST key agreement only service – This service is a battery efficient service for key agreement between a BEST compliant UE and the HSE or the EAS. The user plane for this service is provided by the application layer between the UE and the EAS and is out of scope of this specification. +- BEST user plane integrity protected service – This service is a battery efficient integrity protected user plane service for low throughput devices. This service includes the key agreement and includes integrity protected security over small data over NAS User Plane. The user plane for this service can be either terminated in the HSE (so called UE-to-HSE mode) or in the EAS (so called UE-to-EAS mode). Control messages are always terminated in the HSE. +- BEST user plane confidential service – This service is a battery efficient integrity and confidentiality protected user plane service for low throughput devices. The user plane for this service can be either terminated in the HSE (so called UE-to-HSE mode) or in the EAS (so called UE-to-EAS mode). Control messages are always terminated in the HSE. + +It may be possible for the UE to have concurrent BEST sessions. + +## 4.2 BEST Framework Service Description + +### 4.2.1 Architecture + +Figure 4.2.1-1 shows the architecture of the extended user plane protection service for the case where the UE's PDN connection terminates at the P-GW. Figure 4.2.1-2 shows the architecture of the extended user plane protection service for the case where the UE's PDN connection terminates at the SCEF. + +![Figure 4.2.1-1: Architecture diagram for extended user plane protection service (P-GW Terminated PDN Connection Option).](731f533b0599c8e42a063f06e4332045_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the network architecture for BEST services. Key components include: + +- UE:** Connected via LTE-Uu to E-UTRAN. +- E-UTRAN:** Connected to MME (S1-MME) and Serving Gateway (S1-U). +- UTRAN/GERAN:** Connected to SGSN. +- SGSN:** Connected to MME (S3), HSS (S6a), and Serving Gateway (S4). +- MME:** Connected to HSS (S6a), Serving Gateway (S11), and SGSN (S3). +- HSS:** Connected to MME, SGSN, and EMKS via S6a interfaces. +- Serving Gateway:** Connected to MME (S11), SGSN (S4), E-UTRAN (S1-U), and PDN Gateway (S5/S8). It also has an S12 interface. +- PDN Gateway:** Connected to Serving Gateway (S5/S8) and HSE via SGi. It also has an S6a connection towards the HSS/EMKS path. +- HSE (Enterprise Host):** Connected to PDN Gateway (SGi), EMKS (S6a), and Enterprise Application Server (EAS-C and EAS-U). +- EMKS:** Connected to HSS and HSE via S6a interfaces. +- Enterprise Application Server:** Connected to HSE. + +Logical paths for **BEST-C and BEST-U** are shown extending from the UE through the network to the HSE and Enterprise Application Server. + +Figure 4.2.1-1: Architecture diagram for extended user plane protection service (P-GW Terminated PDN Connection Option). + +**Figure 4.2.1-1: The architecture of the extended user plane protection service (P-GW Terminated PDN Connection Option)** + +![Figure 4.2.1-2: The architecture of the extended user plane protection service (SCEF Terminated PDN Connection Option).](b3baf3a29b67c7425d2562ddbc52f0cc_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the network architecture for the extended user plane protection service. On the left, a UE (User Equipment) is connected to an E-UTRAN (Evolved UTRAN). The E-UTRAN is connected to an MME (Mobility Management Entity) via the S1-MME interface. The MME is connected to an HSS (Home Subscriber Server) via the S6a interface and to an SCEF (Service Capability Exposure Function) via the T5 interface. The SCEF is connected to an HSE (Home Security Endpoint) via the T8 interface. The HSE is connected to an SGi interface, which leads to an Enterprise Application Server (EAS). The HSE also has a direct connection to the UE labeled BEST-C and BEST-U. The HSE has an interface labeled EAS-C and EAS-U with the EAS. The HSS is connected to an EMKS (End to Middle Key Server) via the S6a interface. The EMKS is connected to the HSE via the S6a interface. The HSS is also connected to the SCEF via the S6a interface. The MME is also connected to the HSS via the S10 interface. + +Figure 4.2.1-2: The architecture of the extended user plane protection service (SCEF Terminated PDN Connection Option). + +**Figure 4.2.1-2: The architecture of the extended user plane protection service (SCEF Terminated PDN Connection Option)** + +The BEST service requires the following components: + +- Home Security Endpoint (HSE) – This is the termination point in the home network that performs the following functions: + - Terminating the control plane for BEST between the UE and the HSE + - Terminating the secure communication for BEST between the UE and the HSE and forwarding to and from the Data Network via the SGi if UE-to-HSE security is selected. + - Routing the user plane traffic for BEST between the UE and the Enterprise Application Server (EAS) via the SGi if UE-to-EAS security is selected. + - Anchor for BEST Key agreement only service. Exposes an interface for EAS to obtain MNO provided pre-shared key. +- End to Middle Key Server (EMKS) – This is an optional key server element that manages the key communication with the HSS (for quintets) and stores keys to reduce loading on the HSE and HSS. The EMKS has interfaces to the HSS (S6a) and the HSE (S6a). + +The BEST service uses the following interfaces: + +- S6a between the HSS and the HSE +- S6a between the HSS and EMKS +- S6a between the EMKS and the HSE +- BEST-C and BEST-U between the UE and the HSE +- EAS-C and EAS-U between the HSE and the EAS. Definition of this interface is out of scope. Annex B describes a candidate interface based on Restful HTTP for the communication between the HSE and the EAS. + +When the UE's PDN connection terminates at the SCEF as shown in Figure 4.2.1-2: + +- The HSE may be implemented as part of the SCEF. + +- The EAS may be an SCS/AS and use a T8 interface to access exposed network capabilities as described in TS 23.682 [14]. +- EMSDP via the SCEF only supports non-IP PDU Type communication. + +## 4.3 Procedures between the UE and the HSE + +### 4.3.1 Overview of BEST procedures + +To use the BEST service, the UE shall setup a PDN connection to connect to the HSE. The UE may either use a locally stored IP address to locate the HSE or use a "BEST APN" where the traffic is directed by the PDN Gateway to the correct HSE for that UE. Once a connection to the HSE exists, the UE may initiate the BEST service. It is up to the UE as to when it establishes the PDU session that is used for BEST control plane and user plane messages. + +The BEST service consists of 5 general processes between the UE and the HSE: session initiation and key agreement, key management, data transfer, session termination, and message rejection. The details of the End to Middle Secure Data Protocol (EMSDP) used for the BEST control plane service and optionally for user plane security service, is detailed in clause 6. + +When BEST user plane (UP) security services are used, UP data plane messages are between the UE and the HSE in UE to HSE security mode, and between the UE and the EAS in UE to EAS security mode. + +![Figure 4.3.1-1: Generalised BEST service flow diagram showing the protocol stack and data flow between UE, E-UTRAN, Serving GW, PDN GW, and HSE.](1eadbbe42cfcac5c0023577110aec5e3_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the protocol stack and data flow for the BEST service across the network elements: UE, E-UTRAN, Serving GW, PDN GW, and HSE. The interfaces are labeled LTE-Uu, S1-U, S5, and SGi. + +- UE Protocol Stack:** EMSDP, UDP, IP, PDCP, RLC, MAC, L1. +- E-UTRAN (Relay):** The relay splits traffic into two paths: + - Control Plane Path:** PDCP → IP → PDN GW. + - User Plane Path:** RLC → UDP/IP → GTP-U → IP → PDN GW. +- Serving GW (Relay):** The relay splits traffic into two paths: + - Control Plane Path:** GTP-U → IP → PDN GW. + - User Plane Path:** UDP/IP → GTP-U → IP → PDN GW. +- PDN GW:** + - Control Plane Path:** IP → HSE. + - User Plane Path:** GTP-U → UDP/IP → L2 → L1 → HSE. +- HSE Protocol Stack:** + - Control Plane Path:** EMSDP, UDP, IP. + - User Plane Path:** L2, L1. + +The diagram shows that the EMSDP control plane traffic is tunneled through the IP layer and relayed by the E-UTRAN and Serving GW to the PDN GW, which then delivers it to the HSE. The user plane traffic is tunneled through GTP-U and relayed similarly. + +Figure 4.3.1-1: Generalised BEST service flow diagram showing the protocol stack and data flow between UE, E-UTRAN, Serving GW, PDN GW, and HSE. + +Figure 4.3.1-1: Generalised BEST service flow + +### 4.3.2 BEST Session Initiation and Key Agreement + +The UE shall initiate a BEST session using the EMSDP Session Request message following the establishment of the PDN connection. To optimise the message flow for battery constrained devices, the EMSDP Session Response is combined with Session Key Agreement. + +The EMSDP Session Request message shall include the UE Identity, BEST capabilities of the UE, the UE serving network (conditionally, cf. clause 6.2.6.1.5) and details of the enterprise service including the Enterprise server Id (EAS Id) that the BEST service is being used for. + +The EMSDP Session Start message shall include the RAND and AUTN needed for a key agreement of the BEST keys, the BEST service parameters and a checksum validating the previous EMSDP Session Request message. + +The HSE shall determine the parameters for the BEST service. The HSE may use the location information provided by the UE to determine whether aspects of the BEST service, such as cyphering, can be used in that location. + +As a result of the key agreement exchange the UE and HSE shall derive the UE-to-HSE keys. In case of UE-to-EAS security mode and in case of Key agreement only service, the UE and HSE shall also derive the intermediate key and the EAS PSK. + +To optimise the BEST service for battery constrained devices, confirmation of the BEST session start is not required. The UE sending a UP message to the HSE or EAS is by itself an implied confirmation. However, if the BEST service is being used for key agreement only, the HSE shall require the UE to send EMSDP Session Start Confirmation by setting the indicator in the EMSDP Session Start message. + +### 4.3.3 BEST Session Key Management + +At any time during the BEST session, either the UE or the HSE may trigger a re-negotiation of the keys being used for the BEST service using the EMSDP Manage Keys Request and Response exchange. To avoid overloading of the HSE and the HSS, the HSE may throttle or not support UE triggered key renegotiation. + +The newly generated keys take effect immediately for EMSDP based BEST UP services. For procedures when BEST Key management service is used to provide a pre-shared key to the application layer protocol, refer clause 4.4.4 for additional details. + +### 4.3.4 BEST Session Termination + +At any time, either the UE or the HSE may terminate the current BEST session using the EMSDP Session Termination Request and Response message exchange. Once terminated, all relevant keys and IDs shall be discarded and both the UE and HSE shall ignore further messages using that session ID, unless a session with that ID is re-established using the session initiation process. + +### 4.3.5 BEST Message Reject + +Either the UE or the HSE may at any time respond with a EMSDP Message Reject message, upon which the recipient shall discard all relevant keys and IDs of the session, and both the UE and HSE shall ignore further messages using that session ID. + +The EMSDP Message Reject is also used when the HSE needs to prompt a UE to initiate a new session using the Session Start message. For example, if it receives a UP packet from the UE on a BEST session for which it aged out the context. + +## 4.4 Procedures between the HSE and the EAS + +### 4.4.1 Message Exchange Overview + +The message exchanges between the HSE and the EAS are essentially a mirror of the ones between the UE and the HSE. All BEST control plane messages are terminated or initiated by the HSE. When BEST user plane security services are used in UE-to-EAS mode, the user plane security is end-to-end between the UE and the EAS. + +NOTE: The actual details and standardization of the HSE to EAS interfaces is out of scope of this document. + +![Figure 4.4.1-1: Generalised BEST EAS service flow diagram showing data flow from UE through E-UTRAN, Serving GW, PDN GW, and HSE. It details protocol layers like EMSDP, UDP, IP, PDCP, RLC, MAC, and L1, and includes relay and session start mechanisms.](27b06ec9f42b5d727a2630f61a5f1861_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the Generalised BEST EAS service flow across several network entities: UE, E-UTRAN, Serving GW, PDN GW, and HSE. The data flow is shown from left to right, with protocol layers stacked vertically on the left side of the UE. The layers are EMSDP, UDP, IP, PDCP, RLC, MAC, and L1. In the E-UTRAN, a 'Relay' box indicates that PDCP and GTP-U are processed. In the Serving GW, an 'EAS Session Start' box indicates that GTP-U is processed. The PDN GW contains IP, GTP-U, UDP/IP, L2, and L1 layers. The HSE contains L2 and L1 layers. The interfaces between entities are labeled: LTE - Uu (between UE and E-UTRAN), S1-U (between E-UTRAN and Serving GW), S5 (between Serving GW and PDN GW), and SGi (between PDN GW and HSE). On the right side of the HSE, a 'Relay/Trans' box shows the final processing of EMSDP, Payload, UDP, and IP layers. + +Figure 4.4.1-1: Generalised BEST EAS service flow diagram showing data flow from UE through E-UTRAN, Serving GW, PDN GW, and HSE. It details protocol layers like EMSDP, UDP, IP, PDCP, RLC, MAC, and L1, and includes relay and session start mechanisms. + +Figure 4.4.1-1: Generalised BEST EAS service flow + +### 4.4.2 EAS Registration for BEST Service + +As a prerequisite to using BEST service, the EAS shall register with the HSE over a secure connection by providing its identity (Enterprise server Id). This results in a session context to be established in the HSE for the registered EAS. + +A secure connection is established between the HSE and the EAS as part of the management of the BEST service between the Enterprise and the HSE, cf clause 7.1. + +NOTE: The procedures for establishing up a secure connection and EAS registration with the HSE are out of scope of this TS. + +### 4.4.3 Key Request + +During the Key agreement procedure, described in clause 4.3.2, HSE may forward the derived key to the EAS in the EAS Session Request message. + +When BEST is used for Key agreement only or when BEST UP service is used in UE-to-EAS mode, the HSE shall forward the pre-shared key (KEAS\_PSK) that is specifically derived for the enterprise as defined by key definition rules in clause 5.1.2. It also includes the Intermediate Key Id in this message. The EAS shall respond with the EAS Session Start message. + +When BEST is used for Key agreement only, the EAS may initiate a Key Request by sending the EAS Session Request message. The UE includes Intermediate Key Id needed to identify the UE-specific Intermediate key and the associated EAS specific pre-shared key in the HSE. The EAS obtains the key identifier from the UE during application layer session establishment. The HSE shall respond with the pre-shared key (KEAS\_PSK).. + +### 4.4.4 Key Refresh + +At any time during the BEST session, either the UE or the HSE or the EAS may trigger a re-negotiation of the keys being used for the BEST service. It is optional for the HSE to support UE initiated key refresh, which it signals to the UE in the Session Start message. If not supporting it, an HSE will ignore UE triggered key refresh messages. The UE and the HSE triggered re-negotiation is described in clause 4.3.3. For UE-to-EAS mode BEST UP service and BEST Key agreement only service, the newly derived pre-shared key (EAS PSK) may be sent by the HSE to the EAS. This is further described in clause 6.2.7.2. + +The EAS-triggered re-negotiation of keys applies to BEST UP Service in UE-to-EAS mode. The trigger for generating new keys is appropriately propagated to the UE using EMSDP Manage Keys Request. The EAS is provided with newly derived EAS PSK from the HSE. + +For BEST key-agreement only service, there is no provision for the application layer to trigger generation of the new EAS PSK. The application layer continues to use the existing pre-shared key to generate fresh session keys for consecutive instances of the protocol. When a new EAS PSK is generated in the HSE, the application layer obtains it either via an update from the HSE or when the EAS contacts the HSE again when a new application layer session is set up. + +### 4.4.5 Session Termination + +At any time, any of the BEST functions, the UE or the EAS or the HSE may terminate the current BEST session using the BEST or EAS Session Termination Request and Response message exchange. The session terminate request shall be applied to all the involved functions for a given session. Once terminated, all relevant keys and IDs shall be discarded and the UE, the EAS and HSE shall ignore further messages using that session ID, unless a session with that ID is re-established using the session initiation process. + +### 4.4.6 Message Reject + +The UE or the EAS or the HSE may at any time trigger a EAS Message Reject message, upon which the recipient shall discard all relevant keys and IDs of the session, and the UE, the EAS and HSE shall ignore further messages using that session ID. + +## 4.5 BEST Data Service + +Once the BEST session is successfully initiated, the UE or the HSE or EAS may send UP data using the negotiated keys. + +If the BEST UP session is set up between the UE and the HSE, then the UP packets are initiated or terminated by the HSE. In this case, the low power optimized EMSDP protocol, as detailed in clause 6, is used. + +If the BEST UP session is setup between the UE and the EAS, then the HSE passes the UP messages to the EAS after checking the message is formatted correctly and that it is a UP message. The key used by the UE and EAS to encrypt and decrypt data messages (when required) is $KE2E_{enc}$ and to integrity protect the message is $KE2E_{int}$ . Verification of any Key ID, counter, message integrity and deciphering is the responsibility of the EAS. + +If the BEST key agreement service is used to set up a data session between the UE and EAS, the UE and EAS need to use a security protocol with the EAS PSK other than EMSDP, e.g., IKE/IPsec or (D)TLS for user plane data transmission. In this case, the HSE does not handle the UP. + +## 4.6 Key Management + +### 4.6.1 Key Agreement and Refresh + +#### 4.6.1.1 Key setup messaging between HSE and UE + +New keys are agreed either at the start of a BEST session or as required due to key aging or counter thresholds being met. Key agreement is based on the 3GPP AKA mechanism detailed in TS 33.102 [3] and the AKA challenge is transported between the HSE and the UE as part of the BEST service detailed in clause X.3.2. The key hierarchy is shown in clause 4.6.2.2. + +The EMDSP protocol has 7 Key IDs for each session ID. Each Key ID has a separate keyset consisting of an integrity Key ( $K_{E2Mint}$ ), an encryption key ( $K_{E2Menc}$ ), optionally an Intermediate Key ( $K_{Intermediate}$ ) and optionally an EAS PSK ( $K_{EAS\_PSK}$ ). The Key IDs shall be set during the derivations of the keys as specified in clause 5.1. + +The Intermediate Key ( $K_{Intermediate}$ ) is used together with a separate enterprise server identifier (EAS Id) to calculate the EAS PSK ( $K_{EAS\_PSK}$ ). There can be many $K_{EAS\_PSK}$ derived from one $K_{Intermediate}$ . + +The EAS PSK ( $K_{EAS\_PSK}$ ) is used together with the Enterprise Key to calculate $K_{E2Eint}$ and $K_{E2Eenc}$ when BEST User plane security services are used in UE-to-EAS mode. + +Figure 4.6.1.1-1 shows the generic key agreement process: + +![Sequence diagram of the generic key agreement process between UE, HSE, EAS, EMKS, and HSS. The process includes steps for session requests, key calculations, and authentication information exchange, with conditional branches for EMKS involvement.](16c1175b5f05a4b55e6d396fc51b15b3_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant HSE + participant EAS + participant EMKS + participant HSS + + Note right of HSE: 2. Keys required? + Note right of EMKS: Authentication vectors needed? + + UE->>HSE: 1. EMSDP Session Request + HSE->>EAS: 3. Authentication-Information-Request + EAS->>HSS: 4. Authentication-Information-Answer + Note right of HSS: Without EMKS + Note right of EMKS: With EMKS + EAS->>EMKS: a. Authentication-Information-Request + EMKS->>HSS: b. Authentication-Information-Request (to request authentication vectors - if required) + HSS->>EMKS: c. Authentication-Information-Answer (to deliver authentication vectors - if required) + EMKS->>EAS: d. Authentication-Information-Answer + HSE->>EAS: 5. Calculate HSE Keys + EAS->>HSE: 6. EAS Session Request + HSE->>EAS: 7. EAS Session Start + EAS->>UE: 8. EMSDP Session Start + UE->>HSE: 9. EMSDP Session Start Confirmation (conditional) + EAS->>HSS: 10. EAS Session Start Confirmation + Note right of UE: 11. Calculate UE Keys + Note right of EAS: 12. Calculate E2E Keys + +``` + +Sequence diagram of the generic key agreement process between UE, HSE, EAS, EMKS, and HSS. The process includes steps for session requests, key calculations, and authentication information exchange, with conditional branches for EMKS involvement. + +###### Figure 4.6.1.1-1 Generic BEST key agreement process + +The Key agreement steps are: + +1. **EMSDP Session Request (UE ID, BEST capabilities, Enterprise information (opt), location ID).** The UE shall send the EMSDP Session Request (UE ID, BEST capabilities, Enterprise information (opt)) to set up a new BEST session. +2. **Keys required?** - the HSE shall check to see if there are valid keys with valid counter values available in the HSE for that UE then the following is checked: + - If the HSE has a valid set of keys for the indicated session and the UE ID is valid for that session then the HSE may start the BEST session without re-negotiating the keys (step 8). + - If the UE ID is valid for that HSE and the HSE does not have a valid set of keys for the indicated session or the HSE wishes to update the keys, then it shall first renegotiate the keys (steps 2 to 7) and then start the BEST session (step 8). + - If the UE ID is not valid for that session ID or the UE does not support the level of service required by the HSE or the enterprise information is not valid for the HSE, then the HSE may reject the command. +3. **Authentication-Information-Request over S6a interface** – The HSE shall use the S6a interface to the HSS to request one or more authentication vectors using the UE IMSI. +4. **Authentication-Information-Answer over S6a interface** – The HSS uses the S6a interface to the HSE to return the requested authentication vectors. + - a. **Authentication-Information-Request over the S6a interface between HSE and EMKS** – Where an EMKS is used, the HSE shall use the S6a interface to the EMKS to request an authentication vector using the UE IMSI. + - b. **Authentication-Information-Request over the S6a interface between EMKS and HSE** – The EMKS shall use the S6a interface to the HSS to request one or more authentication vectors using the UE IMSI. + - c. **Authentication-Information-Answer over the S6a interface between EMKS and HSE** – The HSS shall use the S6a interface to the EMKS to return the requested authentication vectors. These vectors may be stored on the EMKS for later use. + - d. **Authentication-Information-Answer over the S6a interface between HSE and EMKS** – The EMKS uses the S6a interface to the HSE to return the requested authentication vector. +5. **Calculate UE-to-HSE Keys** - See key derivation details in clause 5. +6. **The HSE may optionally send "EAS Session Request" to the EAS**– In case BEST UP service is used in UE-to-EAS mode, the HSE shall use the HSE interface to the EAS to inform the EAS of the new UE-to-EAS session request and shall forward the EAS PSK ( $K_{EAS\_PSK}$ ) to the EAS. In case the BEST key agreement service is used, the HSE shall forward to the EAS, the EAS PSK ( $K_{EAS\_PSK}$ ) and the key identifier for the Intermediate Pre Shared Key ( $K_{Intermediate}$ ). +7. **The Enterprise Server sends a "EAS Session Start" to the HSE** – The Enterprise Server shall respond by sending the "UE-to-EAS Session Start" message. In case BEST UP service is used, this message may contain an EAS container that includes an identifier for the Enterprise Key. +8. **EMSDP Session Start message** - The HSE shall send a EMSDP Session Start (Key Agreement, Session Parameters, Request Validation, HSE ID(opt) , EAS container (opt)). +9. **EMSDP Session Start Confirmation** - UE optionally, if requested in the Session Start Confirmation, responds with an EMSDP Session Start Confirmation message. +10. **EAS Session Start Confirmation** - The HSE may optionally send EAS Session Start Confirmation. +11. **Calculate UE Keys** – See key derivation details in clause 5. +12. **Calculate UE-to-EAS Keys** – In case of the UE-to-EAS BEST UP service, the Enterprise server generates UE-to-EAS keys as per the key derivation details in clause 5. + +#### 4.6.1.2 Usage of Keys + +For UE-to-HSE BEST UP sessions, the following keys shall be used: + +- The $K_{E2Menc}$ shall be used by the UE and the HSE for the encryption of the user plane and the control plane, according to the agreed encryption algorithm. +- The $K_{E2Mint}$ shall be used by the UE and the HSE for the integrity protection of the user plane and the control plane according to the agreed integrity protection algorithm. + +For UE-to-EAS BEST UP sessions, the following keys shall be used: + +- The $K_{E2Menc}$ shall be used by the UE and the HSE for the encryption of the control plane, according to the agreed encryption algorithm. +- The $K_{E2Mint}$ shall be used by the UE and the HSE for the integrity protection of the control plane according to the agreed integrity protection algorithm. +- The $K_{E2Enc}$ shall be used by the UE and the EAS for the encryption of the user plane, according to the agreed encryption algorithm. +- The $K_{E2Int}$ shall be used by the UE and the EAS for the integrity protection of the user plane according to the agreed integrity protection algorithm. + +For key-agreement only BEST service, the following key shall be used: + +- The EAS PSK ( $K_{EAS\_PSK}$ ) shall be used by the EAS and UE for protection of the user plane between the EAS and UE. The protocol to be used between the UE and EAS is out of scope of this specification. Optionally, further keys may be derived from the EAS PSK. + +NOTE: As the $K_{EAS\_PSK}$ is known to the HSE, the EAS and the UE will have to transform the key further to achieve end to end security. This transformation is out of scope of this specification. + +- The $K_{E2Menc}$ shall be used by the UE and the HSE for the encryption of the control plane, according to the agreed encryption algorithm. +- The $K_{E2Mint}$ shall be used by the UE and the HSE for the integrity protection of the control plane according to the agreed integrity protection algorithm. + +#### 4.6.1.3 Key Setup for BEST session end point modification + +The modification of a BEST UE-to-EAS UP session to a BEST UE-to-HSE UP session does not require any new calculations of keys. + +The modification of a BEST UE-to-HSE UP session to a BEST UE-to-EAS UP session requires new keys to be calculated when no UE-to-EAS keys are available in the EAS. Before sending the EMSDP Modification command the HSE does the following: + +- Checks with the EAS whether it has UE-to-EAS keys in storage +- If not, obtains a EAS container that may contain a key identifier for the Enterprise Key from the EAS and forwards this to the UE in the EMSDP Modification command. + +#### 4.6.1.4 BEST Key Handling + +The aging of keys and any counter window used are out of scope of this specification. + +### 4.6.2 BEST Key Hierarchy + +#### 4.6.2.1 Introduction + +This clause describes the key hierarchy for BEST for both the BEST user plane services and the key agreement service: + +#### 4.6.2.2 BEST Key Hierarchy for Separate BEST Domain + +![Figure 4.6.2.2-1: Key Hierarchy diagram showing protocol stacks for EMKS and EMSE connected by RESTful HTTP.](36117e9cb27c58484cd8d3e5f9dc7ac3_img.jpg) + +| | | | | +|-------------------------|------|--------------|------| +| Specific datastructures | XML | RESTful HTTP | XML | +| Application delivery | HTTP | | HTTP | +| Security layer | TLS | | TLS | +| Transport layer | TCP | | TCP | +| Network layer | IP | | IP | +| Data link layer | L2 | | L2 | +| Physical layer | L1 | | L1 | +| | EMKS | | EMSE | + +Figure 4.6.2.2-1: Key Hierarchy diagram showing protocol stacks for EMKS and EMSE connected by RESTful HTTP. + +Figure 4.6.2.2-1: Key Hierarchy + +The $K_{\text{Intermediate}}$ , $K_{\text{EAS\_PSK}}$ and all of the keys derived from them are generated when indicated to do so in the BEST CP messaging. + +# --- 5 Derivation of BEST Keys + +## 5.1 BEST key derivation + +### 5.1.0 Key derivation function + +BEST key derivation shall use the key derivation function (KDF) defined in 3GPP TS 33.220 [13], with input parameters as defined in clause 5 of the present document. + +### 5.1.1 Derivation of UE-to-HSE keys and Intermediate Key + +The HSE and UE shall derive the BEST UE-to-HSE keys and the Intermediate key which are derived from CK and IK. The following input string shall be used when the UE and the HSE derive the BEST UE-to-HSE user plane service keys $K_{\text{E2Menc}}$ and/or $K_{\text{E2Mint}}$ or the Intermediate BEST key for usage in further key derivations for the UE-to-EAS user plane services or the key agreement services: + +- FC = 0x60, +- P0 = HSE id if supplied else NULL, + +- L0 = length of HSE id (i.e. 0x00 0x03 if HSE id supplied or 0x00 0x00 if not), +- P1 = SQN $\oplus$ AK +- L1 = length of SQN $\oplus$ AK (i.e. 0x00 0x06) +- P2 = algorithm type distinguisher +- L2 = length of algorithm type distinguisher (i.e. 0x00 0x01) + +**Table 5.1.1-1: Algorithm type distinguishers** + +| Algorithm type distinguisher | Value | +|----------------------------------------------|-------| +| BEST encryption key ( $K_{E2Menc}$ ) | 0x01 | +| BEST integrity Key ( $K_{E2Mint}$ ) | 0x02 | +| BEST Intermediate Key ( $K_{Intermediate}$ ) | 0x03 | + +The input key shall be equal to the concatenation CK || IK of CK and IK. + +The Intermediate Key ID shall be set equal to SQN $\oplus$ AK. + +### 5.1.2 Derivation of EAS specific pre-shared key ( $K_{EAS\_PSK}$ ) + +The following input string shall be used when the UE and the HSE derive the enterprise specific pre-shared key $K_{EAS\_PSK}$ from $K_{Intermediate}$ + +- FC = 0x61, +- P0 = Enterprise Application Server id, +- L0 = length of Enterprise Application Server id (i.e. 0x00 0x03) + +The input key shall be $K_{Intermediate}$ , as derived in clause 5.1.1. + +### 5.1.3 Derivation of UE-to-EAS keys + +The following input string shall be used when the UE and the EAS derive the BEST User plane keys $K_{E2Enc}$ or $K_{E2Int}$ from $K_{EAS\_PSK}$ : + +- FC = 0x62, +- P0 = algorithm type distinguisher +- L0 = length of algorithm type distinguisher (i.e. 0x00 0x01) + +**Table 5.1.3-1: Algorithm type distinguishers** + +| Algorithm type distinguisher | Value | +|-----------------------------------------|-------| +| BEST e2e encryption key ( $K_{E2Enc}$ ) | 0x01 | +| BEST e2e integrity Key ( $K_{E2Int}$ ) | 0x02 | + +The input key shall be equal to the concatenation $K_{EAS\_E2E}$ || $K_{Enterprise}$ of $K_{EAS\_PSK}$ and $K_{Enterprise}$ . + +NOTE: The Enterprise Key provisioning is outside the scope of 3GPP. + +# 6 End to Middle Secured Data Protocol (EMSDP) + +## 6.1 Introduction + +The EMSDP protocol is used for the BEST service. This protocol runs between the UE and the HSE and has been optimised for efficient, secure transfer of both BEST user plane and control plane data. + +## 6.2 EMSDP Protocol Description + +### 6.2.1 Data Stack + +Figures 6.2.1-1, 6.2.1-2, 6.2.1-3, and 6.2.1-4 show examples with the LTE network of the data stacks for the EMSDP transfers (based on 3GPP TS 23.401 [4]) between the HSE and the UE. + +![Figure 6.2.1-1: Non-IP PDU Type data stack for the EMSDP transfers over UP. This diagram illustrates the protocol stack for data transfer between a User Equipment (UE) and a Host Security Environment (HSE) via an LTE network. The stack layers are shown for each component: UE (EMSDP, UDP, IP, PDCP, RLC, MAC, L1), E-UTRAN (Relay: PDCP, RLC, MAC, L1 on the UE side; GTP-U, UDP/IP, L2, L1 on the network side), Serving GW (Relay: GTP-U, UDP/IP, L2, L1), PDN GW (GTP-U, UDP/IP, IP, L2, L1), and HSE (EMSDP, UDP, IP, L2, L1). The interfaces are labeled LTE-Uu, S1-U, S5, and SGi.](04f51626e2e10a16e3eb2c4b33cb2742_img.jpg) + +Figure 6.2.1-1: Non-IP PDU Type data stack for the EMSDP transfers over UP. This diagram illustrates the protocol stack for data transfer between a User Equipment (UE) and a Host Security Environment (HSE) via an LTE network. The stack layers are shown for each component: UE (EMSDP, UDP, IP, PDCP, RLC, MAC, L1), E-UTRAN (Relay: PDCP, RLC, MAC, L1 on the UE side; GTP-U, UDP/IP, L2, L1 on the network side), Serving GW (Relay: GTP-U, UDP/IP, L2, L1), PDN GW (GTP-U, UDP/IP, IP, L2, L1), and HSE (EMSDP, UDP, IP, L2, L1). The interfaces are labeled LTE-Uu, S1-U, S5, and SGi. + +Figure 6.2.1-1: Non-IP PDU Type data stack for the EMSDP transfers over UP + +![Figure 6.2.1-2: Non-IP PDU Type data stack for the EMSDP transfers over NAS via the PDN GW. This diagram is similar to Figure 6.2.1-1 but shows a different path for the EMSDP data. The data from the UE's EMSDP layer is encapsulated in the NAS (Non-Access Stratum) and sent through the PDN GW's IP layer, rather than being tunneled via GTP-U in the Serving GW. The HSE side remains the same as in Figure 6.2.1-1.](cdd4dfacab004e9979caed3fffea69e5_img.jpg) + +Figure 6.2.1-2: Non-IP PDU Type data stack for the EMSDP transfers over NAS via the PDN GW. This diagram is similar to Figure 6.2.1-1 but shows a different path for the EMSDP data. The data from the UE's EMSDP layer is encapsulated in the NAS (Non-Access Stratum) and sent through the PDN GW's IP layer, rather than being tunneled via GTP-U in the Serving GW. The HSE side remains the same as in Figure 6.2.1-1. + +Figure 6.2.1-2: Non-IP PDU Type data stack for the EMSDP transfers over NAS via the PDN GW + +![Figure 6.2.1-3: Non-IP PDU Type data stack for the EMSDP transfers over NAS via the SCEF. This diagram illustrates the protocol stack for data transfer from a User Equipment (UE) to a Home Server/Edge (HSE) via an E-UTRAN, Serving GW, and PDN GW. The UE stack includes EMSDP, UDP, IP, PDCP, RLC, MAC, and L1. At the E-UTRAN (Relay), the PDCP layer is split into two paths: one for PDCP and another for GTP-U. The GTP-U path continues through the Serving GW (Relay) and PDN GW (GTP-U, UDP/IP, L2, L1) to the HSE. The HSE stack includes EMSDP, UDP, IP, L2, and L1. The diagram shows that the EMSDP payload is encapsulated in UDP and IP at the UE, then relayed through the network elements to the HSE.](81a4cbf0b3c4cbc065efdf8f800dadde_img.jpg) + +Figure 6.2.1-3: Non-IP PDU Type data stack for the EMSDP transfers over NAS via the SCEF. This diagram illustrates the protocol stack for data transfer from a User Equipment (UE) to a Home Server/Edge (HSE) via an E-UTRAN, Serving GW, and PDN GW. The UE stack includes EMSDP, UDP, IP, PDCP, RLC, MAC, and L1. At the E-UTRAN (Relay), the PDCP layer is split into two paths: one for PDCP and another for GTP-U. The GTP-U path continues through the Serving GW (Relay) and PDN GW (GTP-U, UDP/IP, L2, L1) to the HSE. The HSE stack includes EMSDP, UDP, IP, L2, and L1. The diagram shows that the EMSDP payload is encapsulated in UDP and IP at the UE, then relayed through the network elements to the HSE. + +Figure 6.2.1-3: Non-IP PDU Type data stack for the EMSDP transfers over NAS via the SCEF + +If the UE selects the non-IP PDU data type as defined in clause 4.3.17.8 of 3GPP TS 23.401[2], the PDN GW encapsulates the non-IP EMSDP payload in PtP (IP and UDP as detailed in clause 4.3.17.8.3.3.2 of 3GPP TS 23.401[4]) for the communication with the HSE. In case of the EMSDP is in IP PDU Type, the PtP encapsulation is unnecessary, and the UE's IP packet is directly forwarded to the HSE. This is shown on Figure 6.2.1-2. + +![Figure 6.2.1-4: IP PDU Type data stack for the EMSDP transfers. This diagram illustrates the protocol stack for data transfer from a User Equipment (UE) to a Home Server/Edge (HSE) via an E-UTRAN, Serving GW, and PDN GW. The UE stack includes EMSDP, UDP, IP, PDCP, RLC, MAC, and L1. At the E-UTRAN (Relay), the PDCP layer is split into two paths: one for PDCP and another for GTP-U. The GTP-U path continues through the Serving GW (Relay) and PDN GW (GTP-U, UDP/IP, L2, L1) to the HSE. The HSE stack includes EMSDP, UDP, IP, L2, and L1. The diagram shows that the EMSDP payload is encapsulated in UDP and IP at the UE, then relayed through the network elements to the HSE.](2eb23c2210154279f8013a1594fbcc5a_img.jpg) + +Figure 6.2.1-4: IP PDU Type data stack for the EMSDP transfers. This diagram illustrates the protocol stack for data transfer from a User Equipment (UE) to a Home Server/Edge (HSE) via an E-UTRAN, Serving GW, and PDN GW. The UE stack includes EMSDP, UDP, IP, PDCP, RLC, MAC, and L1. At the E-UTRAN (Relay), the PDCP layer is split into two paths: one for PDCP and another for GTP-U. The GTP-U path continues through the Serving GW (Relay) and PDN GW (GTP-U, UDP/IP, L2, L1) to the HSE. The HSE stack includes EMSDP, UDP, IP, L2, and L1. The diagram shows that the EMSDP payload is encapsulated in UDP and IP at the UE, then relayed through the network elements to the HSE. + +Figure 6.2.1-4: IP PDU Type data stack for the EMSDP transfers + +In all four scenarios for UE-to-EAS BEST sessions, the HSE may forward the EMSDP user plane unmodified to the EAS. When the session uses a non-IP PDU Type connection that terminates at the SCEF, SCEF API's are used to forward the EMSDP user plane unmodified to the HSE. The signalling plane always terminates in the HSE. + +- Note 1: It is up to the operator to decide the protocol between the HSE and the EAS. For example, an operator may agree to use the optional Annex B protocol. In that case, the HSE will have to encapsulate the user data in an agreed message format. +- Note 2: The method by which the UE discovers the IP address of the HSE is an operational matter, out of scope. +- Note 3: The SCEF does not support IP routing towards the EAS. + +Note 4: The EMSPD Payload may carry a non-IP or an IP message. If the message in the EMSPD Payload is already IP, after decapsulating the payload the HSE just forwards it onto the SGi. If the message in EMSPD Payload is non-IP, then the HSE needs to encapsulate it, for example in IP/UDP, which shown on the above diagrams with dashed boxes. Handling of the EMSPD Payload is controlled by operator policy and is out of scope. + +### 6.2.2 EMSPD general structure + +This clause details a type 01 control plane EMSPD message and a type 01 user plane EMSPD message. + +Figure 6.2.2-1 shows the general structure of the EMSPD type 01 message: + +Control Plane type 01 message: + +| UP / CP Flag | RFU | Key ID | CP COUNTER | Session ID | EMSPD Command | Cmd Options | MAC | +|--------------|-------|--------|------------|------------------|----------------------------|------------------|------------------| +| 1 bit | 1 bit | 3 bits | Note 4 | Note 1
Note 2 | Note 1
Note 2
Note 3 | Note 2
Note 3 | Note 1
Note 3 | + +User Plane type 01 message: + +| UP / CP Flag | RFU | Key ID | UP COUNTER | Session ID | Data Length | Data | MAC | +|--------------|-------|--------|------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------|------------------| +| 1 bit | 1 bit | 3 bits | Note 4 | Note 1
Note 2 | Note 1
Note 2
Note 3 | Note 2
Note 3 | Note 1
Note 3 | + +Note 1: The length of these fields is indicated in the BEST HSE configuration TLV from the HSE. + +Note 2: These fields are included in the integrity protection calculation. + +Note 3: These fields are encrypted when encryption is used. When encrypted these fields are replaced by the encrypted output. + +Note 4: The length of this field is as defined in the BEST Counter Scheme being used. + +**Figure 6.2.2-1: data stack for the EMSPD transfers** + +**UP / CP Flag:** This is a 1 bit field that when set to '1' means that the data packet is a User Plane message and when set to '0' means that the message is a control plane message. + +**RFU:** This is a 1 bit field that is reserved for future use. Set to '0'. + +**Key ID:** This is a 3 bit field that indicates the key being used for encryption and Integrity protection. If no keys have been agreed between the HSE and the UE then this shall be '000'. The Key ID is associated to a specific Session ID. + +**CP COUNTER:** This is a counter, used for control plane data messages, that is incremented every control plane message. It is used to protect control plane data messages against replay attacks and its length is set based on the counter scheme indicated in the BEST HSE configuration TLV (minimum length is 3 bits). There are separate counter values for UE to HSE and HSE to UE. This counter value is associated to a specific Session ID. There are two independent CP counter values, one for messages from the UE and one for messages to the UE. The HSE shall not check the CP counter value if the incoming message is "EMSPD Session Request" and the Session ID is 0. + +**UP COUNTER:** This is a counter, used for user plain data messages, that is incremented every user plain data message. It is used to protect user plain data message against replay and its length is set based on the counter scheme indicated in the BEST HSE configuration TLV (minimum length is 3 bits). There are separate counter values for UE to HSE and HSE to UE. This counter value is + +associated to a specific Session ID. There are two independent UP counter values, one for messages from the UE and one for messages to the UE. + +- Session ID:** This indicates the identifier for the current session. The value is assigned by the HSE. Its length is determined according to the Session ID scheme that is agreed. For signalling messages sent from the UE, outside of a BEST session, the Session ID length shall be 1 octet and the Session ID value shall be all 0's. +- EMSDP Command:** This is a 1 byte field that contains the signalling command. The defined commands are detailed below. +- Cmd Options:** This is a TLV container that contains TLV elements that detail the options for the EMSDP command. The defined options TLVs are detailed below. +- MAC:** This contains the truncated integrity result for this data packet calculated using the agreed integrity algorithm. Its length is set in the BEST HSE configuration TLV. For an EMSDP session request command the MAC shall not be present. +- Data length:** This holds the length of the following data in this data packet. Its length is set in the EMSDP Session Request message. This is not present if the data length is set to 0 in the BEST HSE configuration TLV. +- Data:** This is the data being transferred. + +Note: The content and processing of the BEST UP EMSDP data payload is out of scope. + +### 6.2.3 EMSDP Counter and Session ID Schemes + +#### 6.2.3.1 Optimised EMSDP counter scheme + +The optimised EMSDP counter scheme has a 3 bit counter length followed by the counter value. This allows the counter length to be changed on a per message basis. The 3 bits are used to indicate the number of octets the counter is on, the value "000" is reserved for future use. So for instance: + +Counter value "1" is represented as "001 00000001" + +Counter value "257" is represented as "010 00000001 00000001" + +Counter values are rejected if the counter value is less than or equal to a valid counter value already received. The HSE and the UE may also reject a message with a counter higher than a specific offset from the last valid counter value received. The HSE shall not check the counter value if the message is EMSDP Session Request and the Session ID is 0. + +The optimised EMSDP counter scheme is defined as scheme 01. + +#### 6.2.3.2 Optimised EMSDP Session ID scheme + +The Optimised EMSDP session ID scheme enables the EMSDP session ID to have a known length that can be as long as the application requires it. + +In this scheme the highest bit of every session ID byte is an indication that the following byte is also part of the session ID. + +For example the following session IDs are valid under this scheme: '01', 'F469', '82A57F' + +This is the default session ID scheme for EMSDP messages and is defined as scheme 01. + +### 6.2.4 EMSDP Integrity protection + +The integrity protection algorithm to be used and the length of the MAC is selected by the HSE with the EMSDP Session Start message. + +Integrity protection is mandatory for all control plane and user plane messages except for the following control plane commands when no valid keyset is agreed between the UE and HSE: + +- an EMSDP session request command originating from the UE or the HSE. For this command the MAC shall not be present. + +For an EMSDP start session command, originating from the HSE, if the Key Id for the message is the same as the Key Id indicated in the Key agreement TLV then the MAC shall be calculated using the new keys resulting from the authentication vectors in the Key agreement TLV. + +For all other signalling plane and user plane data packets the MAC shall be computed as follows: + +First the following fields are calculated (where needed for the chosen algorithm): + +- INPUT-I set to the message Counter Value expanded and right padded with 0's to a fixed size of 4 bytes. +- COUNT-C set to the message Counter Value expanded and right padded with 0's to a fixed size of 4 bytes +- M (GSM) set to the length of message in bytes. It is coded on 2 bytes. +- LENGTH set to the length of message in bytes. It is coded on 2 bytes. +- MESSAGE the fields marked for integrity protection in figure 6.8.2.4.3.1: "data stack for the EMSDP transfers" concatenated in the order they appear in the data packet. +- M (LTE) the fields marked for integrity protection in figure 6.8.2.4.3.1: "data stack for the EMSDP transfers" concatenated in the order they appear in the data packet. +- DIRECTION The DIRECTION bit shall be "0" for UE to HSE data packets and set to "1" for HSE to UE data packets. +- BEARER For control plane messages this shall be set to "00000" and for user plane messages this shall be set to "10101" +- FRAMETYPE For control plane messages this shall be set to "00" and for user plane messages this shall be set to "AA". +- KI128 This is the agreed integrity key value truncated to the lowest 128 bits. +- IK This is the agreed integrity key value truncated to the lowest 128 bits. + +If GIA4 is indicated in the HSE BEST protocol ID element, then the algorithm specified in 3GPP TS 55.241 [6] shall be used to generate the MAC value. If the MAC length selected by the HSE with the EMSDP Session Start message is less than the length of the MAC produced by the GIA4 function, then the MAC shall be truncated to the correct size from the right. + +If GIA5 is indicated in the HSE BEST protocol ID element, then the algorithm specified in 3GPP TS 55.251 [7] shall be used to generate the MAC value. If the MAC length selected by the HSE with the EMSDP Session Start message is less than the length of the MAC produced by the GIA5 function, then the MAC shall be truncated to the correct size from the right. + +If UIA1 is indicated in the HSE BEST protocol ID element, then the algorithm specified in 3GPP TS 35.201 [8] shall be used to generate the MAC-I value. The MAC shall be set to the MAC-I truncated to the correct size from the right. + +If UIA2 is indicated in the HSE BEST protocol ID element, then the algorithm specified in 3GPP TS 35.215 [9] shall be used to generate the MAC-I value. The MAC shall be set to the MAC-I truncated to the correct size from the right. + +If 128-EIA1 is indicated in the HSE BEST protocol ID element, then the algorithm specified in 3GPP TS 33.401[12] Annex B.2.2 shall be used to generate the MAC-I value. The MAC shall be set to the MAC-I truncated to the correct size from the right. + +If 128-EIA2 is indicated in the HSE BEST protocol ID element, then the algorithm specified in 3GPP TS 33.401[12] annex B.2.3 shall be used to generate the MAC-I value. The MAC shall be set to the MAC-I truncated to the correct size from the right. + +If 128-EIA3 is indicated in the HSE BEST protocol ID element, then the algorithm specified in 3GPP TS 35.221 [10] shall be used to generate the MAC-I value. The MAC shall be set to the calculated MAC-I value truncated to the correct size from the right. + +### 6.2.5 EMSDP Encryption + +The encryption protection algorithm to be used is selected by the HSE with the EMSDP Session Start message. If EEA0 is indicated then the message shall not be encrypted. + +Encryption is mandatory for all control plane and user plane messages when an encryption algorithm other than EEA0 is selected by the HSE with the EMSDP Session Start message, except for the following control plane commands when no valid keyset is agreed between the UE and HSE: + +- an EMSDP session request command originating from the UE or the HSE +- an EMSDP start session command originating from the HSE + +For all other messages the following encryption shall be applied the fields indicated in figure 6.2.1-1: "data stack for the EMSDP transfers" to be encrypted. + +First the following are computed (where relevant for the algorithm being used): + +INPUT-I set to the message Counter Value expanded and right padded with 0's to a fixed size of 4 bytes. + +COUNT-C set to the message Counter Value expanded and right padded with 0's to a fixed size of 4 bytes + +M (GSM) set to the length of message in bytes. It is coded on 2 bytes. + +LENGTH set to the length of message in bytes. It is coded on 2 bytes. + +MESSAGE the fields marked for encryption protection in figure 6.8.2.4.3.1: "data stack for the EMSDP transfers" concatenated in the order they appear in the data packet. + +M (LTE) the fields marked for encryption protection in figure 6.8.2.4.3.1: "data stack for the EMSDP transfers" concatenated in the order they appear in the data packet. + +DIRECTION The DIRECTION bit shall be "0" for UE to HSE data packets and set to "1" for HSE to UE data packets. + +BEARER For signalling data packets this shall be set to "00000" and for user plane data packets this shall be set to "10101" + +FRAMETYPE For control plane messages this shall be set to "00" and for user plane messages this shall be set to "AA". + +KI128 This is the agreed encryption key value truncated to the lowest 128 bits. + +CK This is the agreed encryption key value truncated to the lowest 128 bits. + +If GEA4 is indicated in the HSE BEST protocol ID element, then the algorithm specified in 3GPP TS 55.241 [6] shall be used to generate the OUTPUT value. The OUTPUT value replaces the fields that are encrypted in the data packet. + +If GEA5 is indicated in the HSE BEST protocol ID element, then the algorithm specified in 3GPP TS 55.251 [7] shall be used to generate the OUTPUT value. The OUTPUT value replaces the fields that are encrypted in the data packet. + +If UEA1 is indicated in the HSE BEST protocol ID element, then the algorithm specified in 3GPP TS 35.201 [8] shall be used to generate the OBS value. The OBS value replaces the fields that are encrypted in the data packet. + +If UEA2 is indicated in the HSE BEST protocol ID element, then the algorithm specified in 3GPP TS 35.215 [9] shall be used to generate the OBS value. The OBS value replaces the fields that are encrypted in the data packet. + +If 128-EEA0 is indicated in the HSE BEST protocol ID element, then the NULL algorithm as specified in 3GPP TS 33.401 [12] Annex B.0 shall be used to generate the OBS value. The OBS value replaces the fields that are encrypted in the data packet. + +If 128-EEA1 is indicated in the HSE BEST protocol ID element, then the algorithm specified in 3GPP TS 33.401 [12] Annex B.1.2 shall be used to generate the OBS value. The OBS value replaces the fields that are encrypted in the data packet. + +If 128-EEA2 is indicated in the HSE BEST protocol ID element, then the algorithm specified in 3GPP TS 33.401 [12] Annex B.1.3 shall be used to generate the OBS value. The OBS value replaces the fields that are encrypted in the data packet. + +If 128-EEA3 is indicated in the HSE BEST protocol ID element, then the algorithm specified in 3GPP TS 35.221 [10] shall be used to generate the OBS value. The OBS value replaces the fields that are encrypted in the data packet. + +### 6.2.6 EMSDP Control Plane Commands + +#### 6.2.6.1 Overview + +The following EMSDP commands are proposed Table 6.2.6.1-1: + +**Table 6.2.6.1-1: EMSDP commands** + +| Code (Hex) | Command | +|------------|----------------------------------| +| 10 | EMSDP Session Request | +| 11 | EMSDP Session Start | +| 12 | EMSDP Session Start Confirmation | +| 20 | EMSDP Session Terminate Request | +| 21 | EMSDP Session Terminate Response | +| 30 | EMSDP Manage Keys Request | +| 31 | EMSDP Manage Keys Response | +| 80 | EMSDP Message Reject | + +In defining the EMSDP commands the following convention is used for categorising parameters: + +- M the inclusion of the parameter is mandatory. +- O the inclusion of the parameter is optional. +- C the inclusion of the parameter is conditional. + +##### 6.2.6.1.1 EMSDP Session Request + +The EMSDP Session Request command shall be used by the UE to trigger a new BEST session from the HSE. This message shall include an identification of the UE, an indication of its BEST support. Optionally, the EMSDP Session Request command may include information on the end enterprise service that this data is a part of. If the UE is requesting a 'BEST user plane confidential service' then the Serving network information shall be present, else this information is optional. + +This message may be sent after a PDP context has been setup. + +Note: the content of this message is used in the following EMSDP start session. + +The cmd options for the EMSDP session request command are as follows: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.1-1: EMSDP session request command options** + +| Name | M / C / O | +|------------------------------------------|-----------| +| IMSI TLV | M | +| BEST UE configuration TLV | M | +| Enterprise Setup Information Element TLV | M | +| Serving Network TLV | C | + +IMSI TLV: This is a TLV that contains the IMSI as follows: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.1-2: IMSI TLV** + +| Name | Size | M / C / O | Value | +|--------------|---------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------| +| IMSI TLV Tag | 1 byte | M | 01 | +| Length | 1 byte | M | Length of IMSI value (X) | +| IMSI value | X bytes | M | according to TS 31.102 [15] clause 4.2.2 bytes 2 to 9.. | + +BEST configuration TLV: This is a TLV that contains the BEST configuration details for the UE as follows: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.1-3: BEST UE configuration TLV** + +| Bit 8 | Bit 7 | Bit 6 | Bit 5 | Bit 4 | Bit 3 | Bit 2 | Bit 1 | +|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------| +| BEST UE configuration TLV Tag = '02' | | | | | | | | +| Length of Best protocol ID contents = x bytes | | | | | | | | +| BEST release supported by the UE | | | | BEST counter schemes supported by the UE | Reserved for future use (set to 000) | | | +| BEST protocols supported for control plane messages | Reserved for future use (set to 000) | | | BEST protocols supported for user plane messages | Reserved for future use (set to 000) | | | +| User data push to UE Supported | BEST encryption algorithm GEA4 supported | BEST encryption algorithm GEA5 supported | BEST encryption algorithm UEA1 supported | BEST encryption algorithm UEA2 supported | BEST encryption algorithm EEA0 supported | BEST encryption algorithm 128-EEA1 supported | BEST encryption algorithm 128-EEA2 supported | +| BEST encryption algorithm 128-EEA3 supported | BEST integrity algorithm GIA4 supported | BEST integrity algorithm GIA5 supported | BEST integrity algorithm UIA1 supported | BEST integrity algorithm UIA2 supported | BEST integrity algorithm 128-EIA1 supported | BEST integrity algorithm 128-EIA2 supported | BEST integrity algorithm 128-EIA3 supported | + +Where: + +- BEST release supported by the UE – an indicator the release of the BEST solution that the UE has been designed to. If no release is indicated this means that the BEST service is not supported. +- Value: This shall be a 4 bit field where "0000" = Rel.14 and "0001" to "1111" are RFU, +- BEST counter schemes supported by the UE – a flag for each supported scheme. At least one scheme must be supported and indicated. +- Value: '1' – Optimised EMSDP counter scheme. +- BEST protocols supported for control plane messages – a flag for each BEST control plane protocol that is supported by the UE. At least one scheme must be supported and indicated. +- Value: '1' – EMSDP. +- BEST protocols supported for user plane messages – a flag for each BEST control plane protocol that is supported by the UE. At least one scheme must be supported and indicated. + +- Value: '1' – EMSDP. +- This flag is set to 0 if BEST Key agreement service is used +- User data push to UE Supported – a flag to indicate whether the UE supports user data pushed to the UE without a request for user data from the UE. + - Values: + - '1' = User data push to UE supported, + - '0' = User data push to UE not supported. +- BEST encryption algorithms supported by the UE – a flag for each supported algorithm: GEA4, GEA5, UEA1, UEA2, EEA0, 128-EEA1, 128-EEA2 and 128-EEA3. EEA0 shall always be supported and means no encryption. + - Values: + - '1' = Algorithm supported, + - '0' = Algorithm not supported. +- BEST integrity algorithms supported by the UE – a flag for each supported algorithm: GIA4, GIA5, UIA1, UIA2, 128-EIA1, 128-EIA2 and 128-EIA3. + - Values: + - '1' = Algorithm supported, + - '0' = Algorithm not supported. + +Enterprise Setup Information Element TLV: This is a TLV element that contains information from the UE that is used by the HSE to setup the HSE to enterprise connection as follows: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.1-4: Enterprise Setup Information Element TLV** + +| Name | Size | M / C / O | Value | +|----------------------------------------------|---------|-----------|--------------------------------| +| Enterprise Setup Information Element TLV Tag | 1 byte | M | 03 | +| Length | 1 byte | M | Length of Enterprise URL (X+1) | +| UE-to-EAS flag | 1 byte | M | | +| Enterprise Id | X bytes | O | | + +UE-to-EAS flag: If set to 0 it indicates that the UE requests a UE-to-HSE BEST secure session. If set to 1, it means that the UE requests a UE-to-EAS BEST secure session. This flag is not used if BEST User plane security services are not used. + +Enterprise Id: The enterprise Id is used by the HSE to identify the enterprise and the service that the data belongs to. These services are out of scope of this specification. As an example, a URL may be used to identify the enterprise. + +Serving network TLV: This is a TLV that contains information on the serving network. + +**Table 6.2.6.1.1-5: Serving Network TLV** + +| Name | Size | M / C / O | Value | +|---------------------------------|---------|-----------|------------------------------------------| +| Serving Network Element TLV Tag | 1 byte | M | 0B | +| Length | 1 byte | M | Length of MCC/MNC value (3) | +| MCC/MNC | 3 bytes | M | MCC/MNC as defined in 3GPP TS 24.008 [5] | + +Response: + +If the HSE agrees to setup the session, it shall respond with an EMSDP Session Start command. + +If the HSE does not agree to setup a BEST session, it may respond with a EMSDP Message Reject command. This command may include the reason that the request has been rejected. + +##### 6.2.6.1.2 EMSDP Session Start + +The EMSDP Session Start command is used by the HSE to setup a new BEST session. This message shall contain information on the BEST service setup, key agreement details, a hash of the information sent by the UE in the prior EMSDP Session Request command and optionally, the HSE identity. + +On receipt of this command the UE shall: + +- Perform a 3G security context authentication with the USIM using the RAND and AUTN combination from the Key Agreement TLV. If the USIM returns IK and CK values, the UE uses these keys and the HSE identity supplied (if the HSE Identity TLV is present) to generate the session keys for the EMSDP messages as detailed in clause 5. If the USIM determines re-synchronisation is required and returns an AUTS then the UE sends a EMSDP Message Reject command containing the AUTS to the HSE. +- Verify that the UE supports the BEST service indicated in the BEST Service configuration TLV. +- Verify the received message format, the CP COUNTER value and the message MAC value. +- Verify that the MAC supplied in the MAC TLV matches the MAC that would be produced for the previous EMSDP Session Request message if the BEST configuration in the BEST Service configuration TLV had been applied using the integrity key calculated from the Key agreement TLV. + +The EMSDP Session Start command has the following cmd options: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.2-1: EMSDP Session Start command options** + +| Name | M / C / O | +|--------------------------------|-----------| +| BEST Service configuration TLV | M | +| Key agreement TLV | M | +| EMSDP session request MAC TLV | C | +| HSE Identity TLV | O | +| EAS Container | O | + +BEST Service configuration TLV: The BEST Service configuration TLV sets the BEST service parameters to be used in this session as follows: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.2-2: BEST Service configuration TLV** + +| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | +|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------| +| BEST HSE configuration TLV Tag = '04' | | | | | | | | +| Length of Best protocol ID contents = x bytes | | | | | | | | +| BEST Service Activated | BEST encryption algorithm GEA4 to be used | BEST encryption algorithm GEA5 to be used | BEST encryption algorithm UEA1 to be used | BEST encryption algorithm UEA2 to be used | BEST encryption algorithm EEA0 to be used | BEST encryption algorithm 128-EEA1 to be used | BEST encryption algorithm 128-EEA2 to be used | +| BEST signalling plane protocol identifier | | | | | | | | +| BEST user plane protocol identifier | | | | | | | | +| BEST encryption algorithm 128-EEA3 to be used | BEST integrity algorithm GIA4 to be used | BEST integrity algorithm GIA5 to be used | BEST integrity algorithm UIA1 to be used | BEST integrity algorithm UIA2 to be used | BEST integrity algorithm 128-EIA1 to be used | BEST integrity algorithm 128-EIA2 to be used | BEST integrity algorithm 128-EIA3 to be used | +| Reserved for future use (set to 00) | | UE triggered key refresh supported | Local BEST configuration management allowed | Reserved for future use (set to 0000) | | | | +| New Session Required | Use EAS UP Keys | EMSDP MAC length | | Size of EMSDP Data Length | | | | + +- BEST Service Activated – a bit flag that when set instructs the UE to use the BEST service and when clear instructs the UE not to use the BEST service, +- BEST signalling plane protocol identifier – 1 octet that is used to determine the BEST signalling protocol to be used from the following list (only one shall be indicated): 01 = type 01 signalling plane EMSDP message. All other values are reserved for future use. +- BEST user plane protocol identifier – 1 octet that is used to determine the BEST signalling protocol to be used from the following list (only one shall be indicated): 01 = type 01 user plane EMSDP message. All other values are reserved for future use. +- BEST encryption algorithm to be used – 1 octet that is used to define which of the following algorithms to use for encryption: GEA0, GEA4, GEA5, UEA0, UEA1, UEA2, EEA0, 128-EEA1, 128-EEA2 and 128-EEA3. Only one algorithm from this list shall be indicated. If the Visited network indicated that BEST encryption is restricted, then the HSE shall indicate EEA0. +- BEST integrity algorithm to be used – 1 octet that is used to define which one of the following algorithms to use for integrity: GIA4, GIA5, UIA1, UIA2, 128-EIA1, 128-EIA2 and 128-EIA3). Only one algorithm from this list shall be indicated. +- Local BEST configuration management allowed – a flag to indicate that the software connected to the UE is allowed to manage the BEST service. +- UE triggered key refresh supported – The HSE indicating to the UE whether key refresh requests will be ignored or responded. +- New Session Required – 1 bit that indicates if a new session is required. If this bit is set to 0 then the details agreed for the last session can be used and a new session is not required to be setup. +- Use EAS UP keys – If set to 0 it indicates that the UE should not derive the UE-to-EAS keys. If set to 1 it means that the UE shall derive UE-to-EAS keys to be used in a UE-to-EAS BEST secure session. + +- EMSDP MAC length – 2 bits that indicates how many octets in the EMSDP data packet the integrity checksum (MAC) will be on, as follows: "00"=4 octets, "01"=8 octets, "10"=12 octets and "11"= 16 octets. This value shall not be set to a size that is greater than MAC size produced by the chosen algorithm. +- Size of EMSDP Data Length – 4 bits that indicate how many octets are used for the EMSDP Data Length. "0000" is reserved for future use. + +Any remaining bits are reserved for future use and are set to "0..0". + +Key agreement TLV: this contains the RAND IE and AUTN IE specified in 3GPP TS 24.008 [5] as follows: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.2-3: Key Agreement TLV** + +| Name | Size | M / C / O | Value | +|------------------------|----------|-----------|--------------------------------------| +| Key Agreement TLV | 1 byte | M | 05 | +| Length | 1 byte | M | 1 or 36 | +| Additional Information | 1 Byte | M | Additional Keys to be generated | +| RAND IE | 17 bytes | C | See 10.5.3.1 in 3GPP TS 24.008 [5] | +| AUTN IE | 18 bytes | C | See 10.5.3.1.1 in 3GPP TS 24.008 [5] | + +If the 'Length of the Key agreement' is set to 1 then this means use current keyset agreed for this KEY ID. In this case the RAND IE and AUTN IE shall not be present. + +The Additional information are as follows: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.2-4: Additional information** + +| | | | | | | | | +|-----------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|--------|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| Confirm Authentication flag | RFU | RFU | RFU | RFU | Key ID | | | + +b8: Confirm Authentication flag: + +1 = Confirmation message required. + +0 = Confirmation message not required. + +b7 to b4: RFU (set to 0) + +b3 to b1: Key ID + +Key ID to be used for this keyset. + +EMSDP Session Request MAC TLV: The EMSDP session request MAC TLV shall be present if the previous command was an EMSDP session request message. Its contents are as follows: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.2-5: EMSDP session request MAC TLV** + +| Name | Size | M / C / O | Value | +|-------------------------------|---------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| EMSDP session request MAC Tag | 1 byte | M | 06 | +| Length | 1 byte | M | Length of MAC (X) | +| EMSDP session request MAC | X bytes | M | Result of MAC calculation on previous EMSDP session request message using current keys and BEST configuration in this message. | + +HSE Identity TLV: this contains a 4 octet numeric identifier for the HSE. This should be unique to the HSE being used within the home network. It is formatted as follows: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.2-6: HSE Identity TLV** + +| Name | Size | M / C / O | Value | +|------------------|---------|-----------|----------------------------------------| +| HSE Identity Tag | 1 byte | M | 07 | +| Length | 1 byte | M | Length of HSE Identity (04) | +| HSE Identity | 4 bytes | M | 4 octet numeric identifier for the HSE | + +The EAS Container TLV: this contains a 4 octet numeric identifier for the Enterprise Key ID. + +**Table X.2.6.1.2-7: EAS Container TLV** + +| Name | Size | M / C / O | Value | +|-------------------|---------|-----------|-------------------------------------------| +| EAS Container Tag | 1 byte | M | 08 | +| Length | 1 byte | M | Length of Enterprise Key ID | +| Enterprise Key ID | 4 bytes | M | numeric identifier for the Enterprise Key | + +Response: + +If the Confirmation message required flag in the Key agreement TLV is set and the message verifies, then the UE shall send an EMSPD start session confirmation message. + +If the Confirmation message required flag in the Key agreement TLV is set and the message verifies, then the UE may send an EMSPD start session confirmation message. + +If the message does not verify, then the UE shall respond with a Request Rejected command. This command may include the reason that the request has been rejected. + +If the USIM returns a AUTS as a result of the authentication, the UE shall respond with a Request Rejected command with the reason "Authentication ReSync required" and including the AUTS. + +##### 6.2.6.1.3 EMSPD Session Start Confirmation message + +The EMSPD Session Start confirmation message is sent by the UE to confirm a previous EMSPD Session Start command. + +This message is optional for the UE to send unless the "Confirmation message required" flag is set in the EMSPD start Session Start command in which case this message shall be sent. + +This command has the following cmd options: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.3-1: EMSPD start session confirmation command options** + +| Name | M / C / O | +|-----------------------------|-----------| +| AUTHENTICATION RESPONSE TLV | M | + +AUTHENTICATION RESPONSE TLV: This TLV contains the authentication response for a successful authentication as follows: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.3-2: AUTHENTICATION RESPONSE TLV** + +| Name | Size | M / C / O | Value | +|-----------------------------|---------|-----------|------------------------------| +| AUTHENTICATION RESPONSE Tag | 1 byte | M | 0C | +| Length | 1 byte | M | Length of HSE Identity (X+1) | +| Key Information | 1 byte | M | Key identifier | +| RES | X bytes | M | As returned by the USIM. | + +Where: + +Key Information is coded: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.3-3: Key Information** + +| | | | | | | | | +|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|--------|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| RFU | RFU | RFU | RFU | RFU | Key ID | | | + +b8 to b4: RFU (set to 0) + +b3 to b1: Key ID + +Key ID to be used for this keyset. + +##### 6.2.6.1.4 EMSDP Session Terminate Request and Response + +The EMSDP Session Terminate Request may be sent by either the UE or the HSE to terminate an existing EMSDP session. + +The sending party shall close their session on sending this command and the receiving party shall close the session upon reception of this command. All future BEST User Plane messages and BEST control plane messages for the session indicated in the session ID shall be either refused or ignored. + +This command has no cmd options. + +##### 6.2.6.1.5 EMSDP Manage Keys Request + +The EMSDP Manage Keys request command shall be sent by the UE to request the HSE to negotiate new key material. + +If the BEST session requested includes cyphering then the UE shall send a Serving Network TLV (as defined in clause 6.2.6.1.1). + +##### 6.2.6.1.6 EMSDP Manage Keys Response + +The EMSDP Manage Keys command is used by the HSE to agree new keys, replace a key and delete existing keys. + +When the HSE indicates "Add new key" and the key ID indicated in the Key Agreement TLV is not currently used in the UE, then the UE shall use the information in the Key Agreement TLV to create a new key that can be used in this EMSDP session. If the Key ID is already in use then the UE shall send a EMSDP Message Reject command. + +When the HSE indicates "Update key" and the Key ID in the Key Agreement TLV is the same as the Key ID in the in the Key Management TLV, then the UE shall delete the key indicated in the Key Management TLV and then create a new key use the information in the Key Agreement TLV that can be used in this EMSDP session. If the Key ID of the key to be deleted is no longer valid then the UE shall silently ignore this request. + +When the HSE indicates " Update key" and the Key ID in the Key Agreement TLV is different to the Key ID in the in the Key Management TLV, then the UE shall create a new key using the information in the Key Agreement TLV that can be used in this EMSDP session. The key indicated in the Key Management TLV shall be deleted when the UE receives the first EMSDP message using the new key ID. If the Key ID of the key to be created is already in use then the UE shall send a EMSDP Message Reject command. If the Key ID of the key to be deleted is no longer valid then the UE shall silently ignore this request. + +When the HSE indicates "delete key" then the UE shall delete the key indicated in the Key Management TLV. If the Key ID of the key to be deleted is no longer valid then the UE shall silently ignore this request. + +The EMSDP Manage Keys command has the following cmd options: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.6-1: EMSDP Manage Keys command options** + +| Name | M / C / O | +|--------------------|-----------| +| Key Management TLV | M | +| Key agreement TLV | C | + +Key management TLV: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.6-2: Key Management TLV** + +| Name | Size | M / C / O | Value | +|----------------------------|--------|-----------|----------------------------| +| Key Management Tag | 1 byte | M | 0D | +| Length | 1 byte | M | 01 | +| Key Management Information | 1 byte | M | Key Management Information | + +Where: + +Key Management Information is coded: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.6-3: Key Information** + +| | | | | | | | | +|------------|-----|-----|-----|--------|----|----|----| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| Key Action | RFU | RFU | RFU | Key ID | | | | + +b8 and b7: Action to be performed + +'00' – RFU + +'01' – add new key or update existing key (Key ID set in Key agreement TLV) + +'11' – Update Key (Key to be added is Key ID set in Key agreement TLV, key to be deleted is indicated in b3 to b1). + +'10' – Delete key (key to be deleted is indicated in b3 to b1). + +b6 to b4: RFU (set to 0) + +b3 to b1: Key ID + +Key ID for this operation. + +Key agreement TLV: As detailed in clause 6.2.6.1.2. + +##### 6.2.6.1.7 EMSDP Message Reject command + +The EMSDP Message Reject command may be used by either the UE or the HSE to reject messages, data or control plane. + +The EMSDP Message Reject command has the following cmd options: + +**Table 6.2.6.1.7-1: Request Rejected command options** + +| Name | M / C / O | +|-----------------------|-----------| +| Rejection details TLV | C | +| AUTS TLV | C | + +Where: + +Rejection details TLV: Contains the rejection reason. If the rejection reason is "Authentication ReSync required" then the Rejection details TLV and the AUTS TLV shall be present. For all other reasons the rejection details TLV may be present. + +**Table 6.2.6.1.7-2: Rejection details TLV** + +| Name | Size | M / C / O | Value | +|-----------------------|--------|-----------|------------------------------| +| Rejection details Tag | 1 byte | M | 09 | +| Length | 1 byte | M | Length of HSE Identity (X+1) | +| Rejection reason | 1 byte | M | See below | + +Rejection reason: + +- '00' = "Best session refused by the HSE" +- '01' = "HSE not compatible with configuration request" +- '02' = "UE not compatible with configuration request" +- '03' = "HSE temporary error – try again later" +- '04' = "Command Message error" +- '05' = "Command message counter error" +- '06' = "Authentication ReSync required" +- '07' = "EMSDP session request MAC incorrect" +- '08' = "Session ID not valid" +- '09' = "Command not allowed" + +**Table 6.2.6.1.7-3: AUTS TLV** + +| Name | Size | M / C / O | Value | +|----------|--------|-----------|------------------------------| +| AUTS Tag | 1 byte | M | 0A | +| Length | 1 byte | M | Length of HSE Identity (X) | +| AUTS | 1 byte | M | AUTS as returned by the USIM | + +### 6.2.7 Procedures for BEST when using EMSDP + +#### 6.2.7.1 Introduction + +This clause contains the procedures between the UE, HSE, HSS and EAS for the following BEST Services when using EMSDP: + +- BEST key agreement only service in clause 6.2.7.2 +- BEST user plane integrity protected service in clause 6.2.7.3 +- BEST user plane confidential service in clause 6.2.7.4 + +#### 6.2.7.2 Procedures for BEST Key Agreement Only Service using EMSDP + +Figure 6.2.7.2-1 shows the messages exchanged between the UE, HSE, HSS/EMKS and EAS in order to setup a BEST Session when using EMSDP. In this figure, the EMKS and HSS are collapsed into one. + +![Sequence diagram of BEST Session Setup Procedure for BEST Key Agreement Only Service using EMSDP. Lifelines: UE, P-GW, HSE, HSS / EMKS, EAS. The process involves 11 steps: 1. EMSDP Session Request (UE to HSE), 2. Authentication Information Request (HSE to HSS/EMKS), 3. Authentication Information Answer (HSS/EMKS to HSE), 4. Key derivation (HSE), 5. EAS Session Request [KEAS_psk] (HSE to EAS), 6. EAS application layer Key derivation (EAS), 7. EAS Session Start (EAS to HSE), 8. EMSDP Session Start (HSE to UE), 9. Key derivation (UE), 10. EMSDP Session Start Confirmation Message (UE to HSE), 11. EAS Session Start Confirmation Message (HSE to EAS).](6e15fc9ea763541c5913d26f85072ae1_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant P-GW + participant HSE + participant HSS/EMKS + participant EAS + + Note right of HSE: 4. Key derivation + + UE->>HSE: 1. EMSDP Session Request + HSE->>HSS/EMKS: 2. Authentication Information Request + HSS/EMKS-->>HSE: 3. Authentication Information Answer + Note right of HSE: 4. Key derivation + HSE->>EAS: 5. EAS Session Request [KEAS_psk] + Note right of EAS: 6. EAS application layer Key derivation + EAS->>HSE: 7. EAS Session Start + HSE->>UE: 8. EMSDP Session Start + Note left of UE: 9. Key derivation + UE-->>HSE: 10. EMSDP Session Start Confirmation Message + HSE-->>EAS: 11. EAS Session Start Confirmation Message +``` + +Sequence diagram of BEST Session Setup Procedure for BEST Key Agreement Only Service using EMSDP. Lifelines: UE, P-GW, HSE, HSS / EMKS, EAS. The process involves 11 steps: 1. EMSDP Session Request (UE to HSE), 2. Authentication Information Request (HSE to HSS/EMKS), 3. Authentication Information Answer (HSS/EMKS to HSE), 4. Key derivation (HSE), 5. EAS Session Request [KEAS\_psk] (HSE to EAS), 6. EAS application layer Key derivation (EAS), 7. EAS Session Start (EAS to HSE), 8. EMSDP Session Start (HSE to UE), 9. Key derivation (UE), 10. EMSDP Session Start Confirmation Message (UE to HSE), 11. EAS Session Start Confirmation Message (HSE to EAS). + +**Figure 6.2.7.2-1: BEST Session Setup Procedure for BEST Key Agreement Only Service using EMSDP** + +The above figure depicts BEST Session setup procedure for Key Agreement Only service. The EAS PSK is provided by the HSE to the EAS in step 5. The UE derives all the required keys in Step 9. + +The EAS shall also be able to obtain the EAS PSK anytime after the BEST Session is setup by the UE. The EAS initiates a EAS Session Request message with the required Key Id (specific to the UE). The HSE derives EAS PSK and provides it in the EAS Session Start message. + +NOTE1: The Key Id refers to the Intermediate Key Identifier that uniquely identifies the UE-specific Intermediate key. The mechanism by which UE provides Key Id to the EAS is out of scope of this specification. + +NOTE 2: The EAS application layer key derivation in step 6 when using key agreement only service is out of scope of this specification. + +Figure 6.2.7.2-2 shows the messages exchanged between the UE, HSE, HSS/EMKS and EAS in order to refresh the keys when using EMSDP. In this figure, the EMKS and HSS are collapsed into one. + +![Sequence diagram for BEST Procedure for Key Refresh using EMSDP. Lifelines: UE, P-GW, HSE, HSS/EMKS, EAS. The process involves a request from UE to HSE, authentication with HSS/EMKS, key derivation at HSE, a request from HSE to EAS, an optional application layer key derivation at EAS, a response from EAS to HSE, a response from HSE to UE, key derivation at UE, and optional confirmation messages from HSE to UE and EAS.](2837ffdadcdb1e5bababa56b564e56ed_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant P-GW + participant HSE + participant HSS/EMKS + participant EAS + + Note left of HSE: 4. Key derivation + Note right of EAS: 6. EAS application layer key derivation + Note left of UE: 9. Key derivation + + UE->>HSE: 1. EMSDP Manage Keys Request + HSE->>HSS/EMKS: 2. Authentication Information Request + HSS/EMKS-->>HSE: 3. Authentication Information Answer + HSE->>EAS: 5. EAS Manage Keys Request + EAS-->>HSE: 7. EAS Manage Keys Response + HSE->>UE: 8. EMSDP Manage Keys Response + HSE-->>UE: 10. EMSDP Start Confirmation Message + HSE-->>EAS: 11. EAS Session Start Confirmation Message + +``` + +Sequence diagram for BEST Procedure for Key Refresh using EMSDP. Lifelines: UE, P-GW, HSE, HSS/EMKS, EAS. The process involves a request from UE to HSE, authentication with HSS/EMKS, key derivation at HSE, a request from HSE to EAS, an optional application layer key derivation at EAS, a response from EAS to HSE, a response from HSE to UE, key derivation at UE, and optional confirmation messages from HSE to UE and EAS. + +**Figure 6.2.7.2-2: BEST Procedure for Key Refresh using EMSDP** + +In the above figure, steps 1-5 and 7-9 are mandatory. Steps 10 and 11 are optional depending on whether the HSE has set the 'Confirm Authentication' flag in the 'EMSDP Session Response' message. The contents of the respective commands are given in the respective clauses that detail the commands. Step 6 is optional and out of scope. + +#### 6.2.7.3 Procedures for BEST User Plane Integrity Protected Service using EMSDP + +Figure 6.2.7.3-1 shows the messages exchanged between the UE, HSE, HSS/EMKS and EAS in order to setup a BEST Session when using EMSDP. In this figure, the EMKS and HSS are collapsed into one. + +![Sequence diagram for BEST User Plane Integrity Protected Service using EMSDP. Lifelines: UE, P-GW, HSE, HSS/EMKS, EAS. The process involves a session request from UE to HSE, authentication with HSS/EMKS, key derivation at HSE, a session request from HSE to EAS, an optional key derivation at EAS, a response from EAS to HSE, a response from HSE to UE, key derivation at UE, and a session start message from HSE to EAS.](409498e57b1f988b2b604d12cd997002_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant P-GW + participant HSE + participant HSS/EMKS + participant EAS + + Note left of HSE: 4. Key derivation + Note right of EAS: 6. EAS Key derivation + Note left of UE: 9. Key derivation + + UE->>HSE: 1. EMSDP Session Request + HSE->>HSS/EMKS: 2. Authentication Information Request + HSS/EMKS-->>HSE: 3. Authentication Information Answer + HSE->>EAS: 5. EAS Session Request + EAS-->>HSE: 7. EAS Session Start + HSE->>UE: 8. EMSDP Session Start + HSE-->>EAS: 11. EAS Session Start Confirmation Message + +``` + +Sequence diagram for BEST User Plane Integrity Protected Service using EMSDP. Lifelines: UE, P-GW, HSE, HSS/EMKS, EAS. The process involves a session request from UE to HSE, authentication with HSS/EMKS, key derivation at HSE, a session request from HSE to EAS, an optional key derivation at EAS, a response from EAS to HSE, a response from HSE to UE, key derivation at UE, and a session start message from HSE to EAS. + +**Figure 6.2.7.3-1: BEST Session Setup Procedure for BEST User Plane Integrity Only Service using EMSDP** + +In the above figure, steps 1-8 are mandatory. The contents of the respective commands are given in the respective clauses that detail the commands. Step 6 is only performed when a BEST UE-to-EAS UP session is setup. + +Figure 6.2.7.3-2 shows the messages exchanged between the UE, HSE, HSS/EMKS and EAS in order to refresh the keys when using EMSDP. In this figure, the EMKS and HSS are collapsed into one. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 6.2.7.3-2 showing key refresh procedure. Lifelines: UE, P-GW, HSE, HSS/EMKS, EAS. The diagram shows 9 steps: 1. EMSDP Manage Keys Request (UE to HSE), 2. Authentication Information (HSE to HSS/EMKS), 3. Authentication Information (HSS/EMKS to HSE), 4. Key derivation (HSE internal), 5. EAS Manage Keys Request (HSE to EAS), 6. EAS Key derivation (EAS internal, dashed box), 7. EAS Manage Keys Response (EAS to HSE), 8. EMSDP Manage Keys Response (HSE to UE), 9. Key derivation (UE internal).](fb18a83d10ebdad8e3e5ea2e86b36136_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for Figure 6.2.7.3-2 showing key refresh procedure. Lifelines: UE, P-GW, HSE, HSS/EMKS, EAS. The diagram shows 9 steps: 1. EMSDP Manage Keys Request (UE to HSE), 2. Authentication Information (HSE to HSS/EMKS), 3. Authentication Information (HSS/EMKS to HSE), 4. Key derivation (HSE internal), 5. EAS Manage Keys Request (HSE to EAS), 6. EAS Key derivation (EAS internal, dashed box), 7. EAS Manage Keys Response (EAS to HSE), 8. EMSDP Manage Keys Response (HSE to UE), 9. Key derivation (UE internal). + +**Figure 6.2.7.3-2: Best Session for Key Refresh Procedure for BEST User Plane Integrity Only Service using EMSDP** + +In the above figure, steps 1-8 are mandatory. The contents of the respective commands are given in the respective clauses that detail the commands. Step 6 is only performed when a BEST UE-to-EAS UP session is setup. + +#### 6.2.7.4 Procedures for BEST User Plane Confidential Service using EMSDP + +The procedures for the BEST User Plane Confidentiality Service are the same as the one detailed in clause 6.7.4.3. + +# 7 BEST Service Management + +## 7.1 Ability to enable and disable the BEST service + +The HSE may allow the enterprise to manage the BEST service. The service shall allow enable / disable of the BEST service down to an individual UE level. The interface for the management of the BEST service between the enterprise and the HSE is out of scope of this document. However it is expected that such an interface would have the following abilities: + +- a mechanism that allows the service to be removed for a specific subscriber at the network end (probably re-using a service provisioning service). +- the ability for the enterprise to enable / disable the E2M security service for one or many of their endpoints through communication with the operators CIoT interface. (This may be because other security mechanisms are being used). + +- The ability for the home network to disable the BEST service due to non-payment or security concerns. + +If the BEST service parameters in the HSE change as a result of the management of the BEST service for a specific UE and the BEST service is not currently active with that UE then the changes shall take effect the next BEST session. + +If the BEST service parameters in the HSE change as a result of the management of the BEST service for a specific UE and the BEST service is currently active with that UE then the HSE shall end the current BEST session and where appropriate start a new BEST session using the new BEST service parameters. + +The UE may allow the application connected to it to manage the BEST service if the Local BEST configuration management flag within the protocol configuration options of a ACTIVATE DEDICATED EPS BEARER CONTEXT REQUEST indicates this is allowed. + +If the BEST service parameters in the UE change as a result of the management of the BEST service and the BEST service is not currently active then the changes shall take effect the next BEST session. + +If the BEST service parameters in the UE change as a result of the management of the BEST service and the BEST service is currently active in that UE then the UE shall end the current BEST session and where appropriate start a new BEST session using the new BEST service parameters. + +The UE may choose not to accept data that does not meet the defined security requirements. + +When the BEST service is disabled the HSE and UE shall act as though the BEST service is not supported. + +# --- Annex A (informative): Structure of APN names for BEST + +Due to regulatory requirements, operators may have to disable the best service for UEs roaming in their network. A simple, but effective method relies on the MME capability to filter specific APNs. For that reason, a BEST APN structure is proposed in this section. Operators may agree on a different method in bilateral requirements. + +APNs that are used for the BEST service may reside in a specific subdomain of the operator. It is proposed to use the subdomain 'best' for this specific service. + +Note: For example, if the operator uses operator.cc as a domain for APNs, the best servers should be in the domain 'best.operator.cc'. So 'apn.best.operator.cc' would be an APN that is best capable. + +# --- Annex B (informative): HSE to EAS interface based on Restful HTTP + +## B.1 Introduction + +This annex contains example of a RESTful HTTP interface between the HSE and the EAS. + +## --- B.2 Restful HTTP interface + +### B.2.1 Overview + +It is described as follows: + +- TCP provides communication service at the transport layer +- TLS provides security to the communication +- HTTP based transport of XML data + +- XML documents used to embed specific data structures, such as keys etc. + +Figure B.2.1-1 illustrates the protocol stack of this reference point. + +![Figure B.2.1-1: Protocol stack diagram for RESTful HTTPS between EMKS(HSE) and EMSE(EAS). The diagram shows two stacks of layers separated by a vertical line labeled 'RESTful HTTP'. The left stack is for EMKS(HSE) and the right stack is for EMSE(EAS). Both stacks have seven layers: Specific datastructures (XML), Application delivery (HTTP), Security layer (TLS), Transport layer (TCP), Network layer (IP), Data link layer (L2), and Physical layer (L1).](4ff00a489baaa34a0c01070de1d613db_img.jpg) + +| | | | | +|-------------------------|------|--------------|------| +| Specific datastructures | XML | RESTful HTTP | XML | +| Application delivery | HTTP | | HTTP | +| Security layer | TLS | | TLS | +| Transport layer | TCP | | TCP | +| Network layer | IP | | IP | +| Data link layer | L2 | | L2 | +| Physical layer | L1 | | L1 | +| | EMKS | | EMSE | + +Figure B.2.1-1: Protocol stack diagram for RESTful HTTPS between EMKS(HSE) and EMSE(EAS). The diagram shows two stacks of layers separated by a vertical line labeled 'RESTful HTTP'. The left stack is for EMKS(HSE) and the right stack is for EMSE(EAS). Both stacks have seven layers: Specific datastructures (XML), Application delivery (HTTP), Security layer (TLS), Transport layer (TCP), Network layer (IP), Data link layer (L2), and Physical layer (L1). + +**Figure: B.2.1-1 RESTful HTTPS between EMKS(HSE) and EMSE(EAS)** + +The HSE and the EAS act as both HTTP client and server. The underlying TCP connection permits bidirectional communication between the EAS and the HSE. + +RESTful HTTP is used at the application delivery layer. The content type of the RESTful HTTP is XML. + +The unsecured HTTP protocol shall be combined with TLS, as HTTPS, to provide confidentiality and integrity protection. Mutual authentication shall be enabled in TLS for authenticating and allowing only an authorized third party EAS to access the HSE. The profile for TLS implementation and usage shall follow the provisions given in 3GPP TS 33.310 [11], Annex E. + +### B.2.2 Procedures over the RESTful HTTP reference point + +#### B.2.2.1 Overview of the procedures + +Following procedures are supported over the RESTful HTTP reference point: + +- Initial registration by the EAS +- Obtaining UE specific pre-shared key from the HSE +- Obtaining UE specific pre-shared key during BEST Session Setup +- Deregistration by EAS + +#### B.2.2.2 Initial registration by EAS + +The EAS registers with the HSE by sending an HTTP POST “EAS Session Register” message to the HSE including its identifier (EAS\_Id). The HSE establishes a session context for this EAS and returns session id in HTTP 201 CREATED. + +#### B.2.2.3 Obtaining UE specific pre-shared key from the EAS + +The EAS obtains UE specific pre-shared key ( $K_{\text{Int\_EAS\_PSK}}$ ) from the HSE by sending an EAS Session Request message including an identity of the UE and the key identifier received from the UE. The HSE derives EAS specific pre-shared key and provides it in the EAS Session Start message. + +#### B.2.2.4 Obtaining UE specific pre-shared key during BEST Session Setup + +During BEST Session setup, the HSE forwards the EAS specific pre-shared key ( $K_{\text{Int\_EAS\_PSK}}$ ) in the EAS Session Request message. The EAS responds with a EAS Session Start message. + +#### B.2.2.5 Deregistration by EAS + +When the session needs to be terminated, EAS may send an HTTP DELETE message including the session ID to the HSE. + +# Annex C (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2017-09 | SA#77 | SP-170644 | 0001 | 1 | F | Collection of changes to BEST TS as a result of implementations | 15.1.0 | +| 2018-01 | SA#78 | SP-170875 | 0002 | 1 | F | Collection of editorial changes to BEST | 15.2.0 | +| 2018-03 | SA#79 | SP-180045 | 0003 | 2 | F | Collection of clarifications and editorial changes | 15.3.0 | +| 2018-09 | SA#81 | SP-180700 | 0005 | - | F | Correction of Tag Values and Names | 15.4.0 | +| 2018-09 | SA#81 | SP-180700 | 0007 | - | F | Clarification as to when the Serving Network TLV is required | 15.4.0 | +| 2018-09 | SA#81 | SP-180700 | 0004 | 1 | B | Adding BEST Support for non-IP PDN Connections that Terminate at the SCEF | 16.0.0 | +| 2019-06 | SA#84 | SP-190353 | 0010 | 1 | A | Interface and protocol stack clarifications and corrections to TS 33.163 | 16.1.0 | +| 2019-06 | SA#84 | | 0011 | 1 | C | Making UE initiated key refresh optional in TS33.163 | 16.1.0 | +| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190679 | 0013 | 1 | A | Corrections to EAS and IMSI TLVs in 33163 | 16.2.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33222/11edb7fcedf09ac6a817f8d7b8c61eec_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33222/11edb7fcedf09ac6a817f8d7b8c61eec_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..aa593e4fe3edebc42c2c84cfb1d2b0b9b67b7796 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33222/11edb7fcedf09ac6a817f8d7b8c61eec_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid 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+1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:7c015996614ffb886d561bb784d79f03940b137383bdd27a96ef5246c8e95eb3 +size 14555 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33222/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33222/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..28164e6adb48dc1669571b64e7e9d310d6b513be --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33222/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,1060 @@ + + + + + + +# --- Contents + +| | | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 7 | +| Introduction ..... | 7 | +| 1 Scope..... | 8 | +| 2 References..... | 8 | +| 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations..... | 9 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 9 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 10 | +| 4 Overview of the Security Architecture ..... | 10 | +| 5 Authentication schemes ..... | 11 | +| 5.1 Reference model..... | 11 | +| 5.2 General requirements and principles..... | 11 | +| 5.2.1 Requirements on the UE..... | 11 | +| 5.2.2 Requirements on the NAF ..... | 11 | +| 5.3 Shared key-based UE authentication with certificate-based NAF authentication ..... | 12 | +| 5.3.0 Procedures ..... | 12 | +| 5.3.1 TLS profile ..... | 13 | +| 5.3.1.0 General..... | 13 | +| 5.3.1.1 Protection mechanisms ..... | 14 | +| 5.3.1.2 Void ..... | 14 | +| 5.3.1.3 Authentication of the AP/AS ..... | 14 | +| 5.3.1.4 Authentication Failures..... | 14 | +| 5.3.1.5 Set-up of Security parameters..... | 14 | +| 5.3.1.6 Error cases..... | 14 | +| 5.4 Shared key-based mutual authentication between UE and NAF ..... | 15 | +| 5.4.0 Procedures ..... | 15 | +| 5.4.1 TLS Profile ..... | 16 | +| 5.4.1.0 General..... | 16 | +| 5.4.1.1 Protection mechanisms ..... | 16 | +| 5.4.1.2 Authentication of the AP/AS ..... | 17 | +| 5.4.1.3 Authentication Failures..... | 17 | +| 5.4.1.4 Set-up of Security parameters..... | 17 | +| 5.5 Certificate based mutual authentication between UE and application server ..... | 17 | +| 5.5.1 General ..... | 17 | + +| | | | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| 5.5.2 | TLS Profile ..... | 17 | +| 5.5.2.1 | General ..... | 17 | +| 5.5.2.2 | Protection mechanisms ..... | 18 | +| 5.5.2.3 | void ..... | 18 | +| 6 | Use of Authentication Proxy ..... | 19 | +| 6.1 | Architectural view ..... | 19 | +| 6.2 | Requirements and principles ..... | 20 | +| 6.4 | Reference points ..... | 21 | +| 6.4.1 | Ua reference point ..... | 21 | +| 6.4.2 | AP-AS reference point ..... | 21 | +| 6.5 | Management of UE identity ..... | 21 | +| 6.5.1 | Granularity of Authentication and Access Control by AP ..... | 21 | +| 6.5.1.1 | Authorised Participant of GBA ..... | 21 | +| 6.5.1.2 | Authorised User of Application ..... | 22 | +| 6.5.2 | Transfer of Asserted Identity from AP to AS ..... | 22 | +| 6.5.2.1 | Authorised Participant of GBA ..... | 22 | +| 6.5.2.2 | Authorised User of Application Anonymous to AS ..... | 22 | +| 6.5.2.3 | Authorised User of Application with Transferred Identity asserted to AS ..... | 22 | +| 6.5.2.4 | Authorised User of Application with Transferred Identity asserted to AS and Check of User
Inserted Identity ..... | 23 | +| Annex A (informative): Technical Solutions for Access to Application Servers via Authentication
Proxy and HTTPS ..... | | 24 | +| Annex B (informative): Guidance on Certificate-based mutual authentication between UE and
application server ..... | | 25 | +| Annex C (informative): Considerations for GBA security using a web browser and Javascript ..... | | 26 | +| C.1 | Usage Scenario ..... | 26 | +| C.2 | Threats ..... | 26 | +| C.3 | Control of GBA Credentials and GBA Module in the UE ..... | 27 | +| C.3.1 | General ..... | 27 | +| C.3.2 | Control Mechanism 1– Same Origin Authentication Tokens ..... | 27 | +| C.3.3 | Control Mechanism 2 – Server Authenticated TLS ..... | 27 | +| C.3.4 | Control Mechanism 3 - Channel Binding ..... | 27 | +| C.3.5 | Control Mechanism 4 – Key Usage ..... | 27 | +| C.4 | Security Considerations ..... | 28 | +| C.4.1 | General Scripting Security Considerations ..... | 28 | +| C.4.2 | GBA key control ..... | 28 | + +| | | | +|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| C.4.3 | User grants..... | 28 | +| C.4.4 | Root CAs in Browser ..... | 28 | +| Annex D (normative): | Security measures for usage of GBA with a web browser ..... | 30 | +| D.1 | Extension of Protocol Mechanism used on Ua Reference Point ..... | 30 | +| D.1.1 | General ..... | 30 | +| D.1.2 | Key derivation ..... | 30 | +| D.1.3 | Channel binding ..... | 30 | +| D.1.3.1 | Background..... | 30 | +| D.1.3.2 | Channel binding using RFC 5705 and RFC 5929 ..... | 31 | +| D.2 | Sequence flow ..... | 31 | +| D.2.1 | Sequence flow with channel binding ..... | 31 | +| D.3 | Javascript GBA API description ..... | 35 | +| D.3.1 | GBA API Description ..... | 35 | +| D.3.2 | API usage ..... | 36 | +| Annex -E (informative): | Change history..... | 38 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- Introduction + +A number of services might be accessed over HTTP. For the Presence Service, it shall be possible to manage the data on the Presence Server over the Ut reference point, which is based on HTTP. Other services like conferencing, messaging, push, etc. might be accessed using HTTP. + +Access to services over HTTP can be done in a secure manner. The present document describes how the access over HTTP can be secured using TLS in the Generic Authentication Architecture. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document specifies secure access methods to Network Application Functions (NAF) using HTTP over TLS in the Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA), and provides Stage 2 security requirements, principles and procedures for the access. The present document describes both direct access to an Application Server (AS) and access to an Application Server through an Authentication Proxy (AP). + +NOTE: Any application specific details for access to Applications Servers are not in scope of this specification and are covered in separate documents. An example of such a document is TS 33.141 [5], which specifies the security for presence services. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TS 23.002: "Network architecture". +- [2] 3GPP TS 22.250: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) group management"; Stage 1". +- [3] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture". +- [4] 3GPP TR 33.919: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); System description". +- [5] 3GPP TS 33.141: "Presence Service; Security". +- [6] Void. +- [7] Void. +- [8] Void. +- [9] IETF RFC 2818 (2000): "HTTP Over TLS". +- [10] IETF RFC 2617 (1999): "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication". +- [11] IETF RFC 3310 (2002): "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Digest Authentication Using Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)". +- [12] IETF RFC 2616 (1999): "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) – HTTP/1.1". +- [13] 3GPP TS 33.210: "3G Security; Network Domain Security; IP network layer security". +- [14] Void. +- [15] Void. +- [16] 3GPP TS 33.221: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Support for subscriber certificates". +- [17] Void. +- [18] 3GPP TS 24.109: "Bootstrapping interface (Ub) and network application function interface (Ua); Protocol details". + +- [19] 3GPP TS 29.109: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA), Zh and Zn Interface based on the Diameter protocol; Stage 3". +- [20] 3GPP TS 33.310: "Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)". +- [21] Void. +- [22] Void. +- [23] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [24] W3C Working Draft (Jan 22, 2013): "HTML5.1 Nightly – A vocabulary and associated APIs for HTML and XHTML", work in progress, . +- [25] IETF RFC 5929 (2010): "Channel Bindings for TLS". +- [26] W3C Working Draft (Oct 20, 2011): "File API", work in progress, . +- [27] W3C Candidate Recommendation (Dec 8, 2011): "Web Storage", work in progress, +- [28] 3GPP TS 33.203: "3G security; Access security for IP-based services". +- [29] IETF RFC 5705 (2010): "Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)". +- [30] IETF RFC 8446 (2018): "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3". + +# 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [23] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [23]. + +**GBA web session:** A GBA web session consists of a sequence of related HTTP request/response transactions together with some associated server-side state with the following additional requirement: During a GBA web session, a NAF can identify that the messages relate to the same individual GBA enabled terminal and a particular browser instance running in that terminal. The lifetime of the session is the lifetime of the Ks\_js\_NAF which is equal or shorter than the Ks\_NAF lifetime and it is also equal or shorter than the lifetime of the TLS session, which was used to derive the Ks\_js\_NAF. + +NOTE: The NAF and the UE may have to recalculate the key, when the TLS session is re-established. + +**HTML5:** HTML5 is a W3C specification [24] that defines the fifth major revision of the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), the standard language for describing the contents and appearance of Web pages. + +**HTML FORM:** A HTML form is a section of a HTML document containing normal content, markup, special elements called controls (checkboxes, radio buttons, text fields, password fields, etc.) and labels on those controls. End users generally "complete" a form on a web page by modifying its controls (entering text, selecting radio buttons, etc.), before submitting the form to an agent for processing (e.g., to a web server). **HTTPS:** For the purpose of this document, HTTPS refers to the general concept securing the HTTP protocol using TLS. In some contexts, like in the IETF, the term HTTPS is used to refer to the reserved port number (443) for HTTP/TLS traffic. + +**JavaScript:** JavaScript is a prototype-based scripting language that was formalized in the ECMAScript language standard. JavaScript is primarily used in the form of client-side JavaScript, implemented as part of a Web browser in order to provide enhanced user interfaces and dynamic websites. + +**Reverse Proxy:** A reverse proxy is a web server system that is capable of serving web pages sourced from other web servers (AS), making these pages look like they originated at the reverse proxy. + +**Same origin policy:** Same origin policy is a security mechanism in a client browser that permits webpage scripts to access their associated website's data and methods but restricts its access to scripts and data stored by other websites. + +**Session management mechanism:** A mechanism for creating stateful sessions when using the HTTP protocol. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: + +| | | +|--------|--------------------------------------| +| AP | Authentication Proxy | +| API | Application Programming Interface | +| AS | Application Server | +| B-TID | Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier | +| BSF | Bootstrapping Server Functionality | +| CA | Certification Authority | +| DNS | Domain Name System | +| FQDN | Fully Qualified Domain Name | +| GBA | Generic Bootstrapping Architecture | +| HSS | Home Subscriber System | +| HTML | HyperText Markup Language | +| HTTP | Hypertext Transfer Protocol | +| HTTPS | HTTP over TLS | +| IMPI | IP Multimedia Private Identity | +| IMPU | IP Multimedia Public Identity | +| ME | Mobile Equipment | +| NAF | Network Application Function | +| NAF_ID | NAF identifier | +| TLS | Transport Layer Security | +| UE | User Equipment | +| URL | Uniform Resource Locator | + +# --- 4 Overview of the Security Architecture + +The overall security architecture conforms to the architecture defined in TS 33.220 [3]. Details of the solution with an authentication proxy are given in clause 6. + +# 5 Authentication schemes + +## 5.1 Reference model + +Figure 1 shows a network model of the entities that utilize the bootstrapped secrets, and the reference points used between them. + +![Figure 1: High level reference model for NAF using a bootstrapping service. The diagram shows three main entities: HSS (Home Subscriber Server), BSF (Bootstrap Server Function), and NAF (AP) (Network Application Function). The HSS is connected to the BSF via a vertical line labeled Zh. The BSF is connected to the NAF (AP) via a horizontal line labeled Zn. The BSF is also connected to the UE (User Equipment) via a vertical line labeled Ub. The UE is connected to the NAF (AP) via a horizontal line labeled Ua.](e6df2733626a85205c1db682e6259c46_img.jpg) + +``` +graph TD; HSS[HSS] ---|Zh| BSF[BSF]; BSF ---|Zn| NAF[NAF (AP)]; BSF ---|Ub| UE[UE]; UE ---|Ua| NAF; +``` + +Figure 1: High level reference model for NAF using a bootstrapping service. The diagram shows three main entities: HSS (Home Subscriber Server), BSF (Bootstrap Server Function), and NAF (AP) (Network Application Function). The HSS is connected to the BSF via a vertical line labeled Zh. The BSF is connected to the NAF (AP) via a horizontal line labeled Zn. The BSF is also connected to the UE (User Equipment) via a vertical line labeled Ub. The UE is connected to the NAF (AP) via a horizontal line labeled Ua. + +Figure 1: High level reference model for NAF using a bootstrapping service + +## 5.2 General requirements and principles + +This document is based on the architecture specified in TS 33.220 [3]. All notions not explained here can be found in TS 33.220 [3]. For the purposes of the present document $Ks\_ext\_NAF$ refers to the key shared between the UE and a NAF. In the case of GBA\_U, $Ks\_ext\_NAF$ refers to $Ks\_ext\_NAF$ , and in the case of GBA\_ME, $Ks\_ext\_NAF$ refers to $Ks\_NAF$ . $Ks\_int\_NAF$ refers to the key shared between the UICC and a NAF. + +The UE shall be able to indicate to the NAF which key ( $Ks\_ext\_NAF$ or $Ks\_int\_NAF$ ) the UE intends to use to secure the HTTPS Ua reference point. + +The subscriber's home operator shall be able to require that a certain key (i.e., $Ks\_ext\_NAF$ or $Ks\_int\_NAF$ ) shall be used to secure the HTTPS access between the UE and the NAF. This home operator control is exercised using USS. + +### 5.2.1 Requirements on the UE + +To utilise GBA as described in this document the UE shall be equipped with a HTTPS capable client (e.g. browser) implementing the particular features of GBA as specified in TS 33.220 [3]. + +The UE hosts the HTTPS client (i.e. both the HTTP client and the TLS client). The HTTP client and TLS client either resides both in the ME or in the UICC. The HTTPS client may reside in the ME or in the UICC or both might host an HTTPS client independently of each other. When the HTTPS capable client to be used is in the ME, $Ks\_ext\_NAF$ shall be used as the shared key between the UE and the NAF. When the HTTPS capable client to be used is located in the UICC, $Ks\_int\_NAF$ shall be used as the shared key between the UE and the NAF. + +### 5.2.2 Requirements on the NAF + +To utilise GBA as described in this document the NAF shall support the features of GBA as specified in TS 33.220 [3]. + +It shall be possible that the NAF is configured to restrict the access to the service based on which key is used, (e.g., access is allowed only for those HTTPS capable clients that reside in the UICC and use $Ks\_int\_NAF$ ). The key selection indication given in the USS shall overrule the local policy of the NAF. + +NOTE: The support of GBA\_U is optional for the NAF. However, as indicated in TS 33.220 [3], the use of Ks\_ext\_NAF is supported by NAFs, which are GBA\_U unaware. + +Additionally in the scope of this specification, HTTP and TLS shall be supported by the NAF for the UE-NAF reference point (Ua). + +## 5.3 Shared key-based UE authentication with certificate-based NAF authentication + +### 5.3.0 Procedures + +The authentication mechanism described in this section for ME-based application is mandatory to implement in ME and optional to implement in NAF. + +The authentication mechanism described in this section for UICC-based application is mandatory to implement in the UICC and optional to implement in the NAF. + +This section explains how the procedures specified in TS 33.220 [3] have to be enhanced when HTTPS is used between a ME and a NAF or between the UICC and the NAF. The following gives the complementary description with respect to the procedure specified in clauses 4.5.3, 5.3.3, 1.5.3 and M.6.4 of TS 33.220 [3]. This document specifies the logical information carried in some header fields. The exact definition of header fields is part of TS 29.109 [19] and TS 24.109 [18]. In the text below, the HTTPS client can reside in the ME or in the UICC. + +NOTE 0: It should be noted that the term "GBA mode" does not refer to used bootstrapping mechanism, but it refers to NAF keys in the following way: + +- "3GPP-bootstrapping" and "3gpp-gba" refer to Ks\_NAF from GBA\_ME, Ks\_ext\_NAF from GBA\_U or Ks\_NAF from 2G GBA; +- "3GPP-bootstrapping-uicc" and "3gpp-gba-uicc" refer to Ks\_int\_NAF from GBA\_U; +- "3GPP-bootstrapping-digest" and "3gpp-gba-digest" refer to Ks\_NAF from GBA\_Digest. + +- 1) When the HTTPS client starts communication via Ua reference point with the NAF, it shall establish a TLS tunnel with the NAF. The NAF is authenticated to the HTTPS client by means of a public key certificate. The HTTPS client shall verify that the server certificate corresponds to the FQDN of the NAF it established the tunnel with. No client authentication is performed as part of TLS (no client certificate necessary). +- 2) The HTTPS client sends an HTTP request to the NAF inside the TLS tunnel (HTTPS, i.e. HTTP over TLS). The HTTPS client shall indicate to the NAF that GBA-based authentication is supported by adding one or more constant string(s) to the "User-Agent" HTTP header as product tokens as specified in IETF RFC 2616 [12]. If the client supports AKA-based authentication the constant string added shall be either "3gpp-gba" for ME-based applications or "3gpp-gba-uicc" for UICC based applications. Or, if the client supports GBA\_Digest it shall add the constant string "3gpp-gba-digest". The UE shall send the hostname of the NAF in "Host" HTTP header. + +NOTE 1: The ability to send the hostname of the NAF is particularly necessary if a NAF can be addressed using different hostnames, and the NAF cannot otherwise discover what is the hostname that the HTTPS client used to contact the NAF. The hostname is needed by the BSF during key derivation + +NOTE 1a: Sending the product tokens in the HTTP request enables the optimisation that the NAF can reject the request right away based on a mismatch of GBA mode in the client and the NAF, cf. next step. + +- 3) In response to the HTTP request received from HTTPS client over the Ua reference point, the NAF shall invoke HTTP digest as specified in RFC 2617 [10] with the HTTPS client in order to perform client authentication using the shared key as specified in clauses 4.5.3 and 5.3.3 of TS 33.220 [3]. + +The NAF first verifies that the product tokens received in the HTTP request in step 2, if any, indicates a GBA mode acceptable to the NAF. If so, the NAF selects one acceptable GBA mode and includes the corresponding realm attribute within the WWW-Authenticate header field i.e. the realm attribute shall contain the constant string "3GPP-bootstrapping" (in case "3gpp-gba" is the selected GBA mode ), or "3GPP-bootstrapping-uicc" (in case "3gpp-gba-uicc" is the selected GBA mode ), or "3GPP-bootstrapping-digest" (in case "3gpp-gba-digest" is the selected GBA mode), and the FQDN of the NAF (for all cases) ., In the selection of the GBA mode by the NAF, AKA-based modes shall take priority over GBA\_Digest. + +If the NAF has been configured to forbid the access to the service for all indicated GBA modes (e.g. the HTTP request contains "3gpp-gba" whilst the NAF configuration for this service requires that Ks\_int\_NAF shall be used) or if the NAF does not support any of the indicated GBA modes (e.g. when a NAF, which is GBA\_U unaware receives an HTTP request with "3gpp-gba-uicc" in "User-Agent" HTTP header) then the NAF shall respond with the appropriate error code and terminate the TLS connection with the UE. + +- 4) On receipt of the response from the NAF, the HTTPS client shall verify that the FQDN in the realm attribute corresponds to the FQDN of the NAF it established the TLS connection with. On failure the HTTPS client shall terminate the TLS connection with the NAF. Furthermore, if no key Ks corresponding to the GBA mode indicated by the NAF in step 3 is available in the UE the UE shall perform a run of the Ub protocol with the BSF for the corresponding GBA mode. If no such key Ks can be obtained the UE shall abandon the GBA-based authentication. +- 5) In the following request to NAF the HTTPS client sends a response with an Authorization header field where Digest is inserted using the B-TID as username. The NAF-specific key (Ks\_(ext)\_NAF in the case of ME-based application (including GBA\_Digest) or Ks\_int\_NAF in the case of UICC-based application) is used as password in the Digest calculation. +- 6) On receipt of this request the NAF shall verify the value of the password attribute by means of the NAF-specific key (Ks\_(ext)\_NAF or Ks\_int\_NAF) retrieved from BSF over Zn using the B-TID received as user name attribute in the query. + +If the NAF has requested a USS, and the USS indicates to the NAF that the Ks\_int\_NAF shall be used for HTTPS, then the NAF shall only accept the use of Ks\_int\_NAF as the NAF specific key. Therefore, if the Ks\_(ext)\_NAF was used as the NAF specific key with the HTTPS client, then the NAF shall respond with the appropriate error code and terminate the TLS connection with the UE. For information on usage of USS see Annex J in TS 33.220 [3]. + +If the NAF is not able to obtain any NAF-specific key from the BSF the NAF shall respond with an appropriate error message not containing the realm attributes from step 3. + +NOTE 1b: The last sentence in step 6 captures a failure case where both the ME and NAF support GBA, but the NAF cannot communicate with the BSF, e.g. for lack of commercial agreements. This allows UE and NAF to proceed with a different authentication scheme, if available. + +- 7) After the completion of step 6), UE and NAF are mutually authenticated as the TLS tunnel endpoints. + +NOTE 2: RFC 2617 [10] mandates in section 3.3 that all further HTTP requests to the same realm must contain the Authorization request header field, otherwise the server has to send a new "401 Unauthorized" with a new WWW-Authenticate header. In principle it is not necessary to send an Authorization header in each new HTTP request for security reasons as long as the TLS tunnel exists, but this would not conform to RFC 2617 [10]. + +In addition, there may be problems with the lifetime of a TLS session, as the TLS session may time-out at unpredictable (at least for the UE) times, so any request sent by UE can be the first request inside a newly established TLS tunnel requiring the NAF to re-check user credentials. + +It shall be possible for the AP/AS to request a re-authentication of an active UE using a bootstrapping renegotiation request, see clauses 4.5.3, 5.3.3, I.5.3 and M.6.4 of TS 33.220 [11]. + +### 5.3.1 TLS profile + +#### 5.3.1.0 General + +The UE and the NAF shall support TLS and TLS Extensions according to the TLS profile given in TS 33.310 [20], Annex E. + +Support of certificate revocation and of the related fields in certificates is optional. If supported, the certificate and CRL profiles in clause 6.1 and 6.1a of TS 33.310 [20] should be followed. + +NOTE 1: The management of Root Certificates is out of scope of this Technical Specification. + +The UE and the NAF shall support the server\_name TLS extension. All other TLS extensions are optional for implementation. + +NOTE 2: If the NAF is doing virtual name based hosting (e.g. in the case of authentication proxy, see Annex A), the NAF needs to either have a TLS server certificate that contains all the hostnames that the NAF can be addressed with (i.e. virtual hostnames), or have one TLS server certificate for each of the hostnames mentioned above. In the latter case, the server\_name extension is needed because the NAF needs to be able to select the correct TLS server certificate. + +#### 5.3.1.1 Protection mechanisms + +The rules on allowed and mandatory ciphersuites are given in TS 33.310 [20], Annex E . + +#### 5.3.1.2 Void + +#### 5.3.1.3 Authentication of the AP/AS + +The AP/AS is authenticated by the Client by use of a server certificate. The client shall match the server name as specified in RFC 2818 [9] section 3.1. + +The AP/AS certificate profile shall comply with the requirements for TLS certificates in clause 6.1 of TS 33.310 [20]. + +#### 5.3.1.4 Authentication Failures + +If the UE receives a Server Hello Message from the AP/AS that requests a Certificate then the UE shall respond with a Certificate Message containing no Certificate if it does not have a certificate. The AP/AS upon receiving this message may respond with a failure alert, however if the AP/AS shall authenticate the UE as configured by the policy of the operator the AP/AS should continue the dialogue and assume that the UE will be authenticated as specified in TS 33.220 [11]. + +If there is no response within a given time limit from a network initiated re-authentication request an authentication failure has occurred after that the request has been attempted for a limited number of times. This failure can be due to several reasons, e.g. that the UE has powered off or due to that the message was lost due to a bad radio channel. The AP/AS shall then still assume that if a TLS session is still valid that it can be re-used by the UE at a later time. Should then the UE re-use an existing session then the AP/AS shall re-authenticate the UE and not give access to the AP/AS unless the authentication was successful. + +#### 5.3.1.5 Set-up of Security parameters + +In TLS 1.2, the TLS Handshake Protocol negotiates a session, which is identified by a Session ID. The Client and the AP/AS shall allow for resuming a session. This facilitates that a Client and Server may resume a previous session or duplicate an existing session. The lifetime of a Session ID is maximum 24 hours. The Session ID shall only be used under its lifetime and shall be considered by both the Client and the Server as obsolete when the Lifetime has expired. + +In TLS 1.3, the Client can only initiate resumption if the Server has sent a NewSessionTicket Post-Handshake message. Each received ticket has a lifetime, and the client may attempt resumption as long as it has a valid ticket. + +#### 5.3.1.6 Error cases + +The AP/AS shall consider the following cases as a fatal error: + +- if the received ciphersuites do not comply with the TLS profile. + +## 5.4 Shared key-based mutual authentication between UE and NAF + +### 5.4.0 Procedures + +The authentication mechanism described in this section for ME-based application is optional to implement in ME and NAF. + +The authentication mechanism described in this section for UICC-based application is optional to implement in UICC and NAF. + +The HTTP client and server may authenticate each other based on the shared key generated during the bootstrapping procedure. The shared key shall be used as a master key to generate TLS session keys, and also be used as the proof of secret key possession as part of the authentication function. The usage of Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) is specified in the TLS profile given in TS 33.310 [20], Annex E. + +This section explains how a GBA-based shared secret that is established between the UE and the BSF as specified in TS 33.220 [3] is used with Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Ciphersuites for TLS according to the TLS profile given in TS 33.310 [20], Annex E. The HTTPS client may reside in the ME or in the UICC. In former case, $Ks\_(\text{ext})\_NAF$ shall be used to establish the TLS session keys. In latter case, $Ks\_int\_NAF$ shall be used to establish the TLS session keys. + +NOTE 0: It should be noted that the term "GBA mode" does not refer to used bootstrapping mechanism, but it refers to NAF keys in the following way: + +- "3GPP-bootstrapping" and "3gpp-gba" refer to $Ks\_NAF$ from GBA\_ME, $Ks\_ext\_NAF$ from GBA\_U or $Ks\_NAF$ from 2G GBA; +- "3GPP-bootstrapping-uicc" and "3gpp-gba-uicc" refer to $Ks\_int\_NAF$ from GBA\_U; +- "3GPP-bootstrapping-digest" and "3gpp-gba-digest" refer to $Ks\_NAF$ from GBA\_Digest. + +1. When an UE contacts a NAF, it may indicate to the NAF that it supports PSK-based TLS by adding one or more PSK-based ciphersuites to the ClientHello message. The UE shall include ciphersuites other than PSK-based ciphersuites in the ClientHello message. The UE shall send the hostname of the NAF using the server\_name extension to the ClientHello message according to TLS extensions. + +NOTE 1: The ability to send the hostname of the NAF is particularly necessary if a NAF can be addressed using different hostnames, and the NAF cannot otherwise discover what is the hostname that the UE used to contact the NAF. The hostname is needed by the BSF during key derivation. + +NOTE 2: When the UE adds one or more PSK-based ciphersuites to the ClientHello message, this can be seen as an indication that the UE supports PSK-based TLS. If the UE supports PSK-based ciphersuites but not GBA-based authentication, the TLS handshake will fail if the NAF selected the PSK-based ciphersuite and suggested to use GBA (as described in step 2). In this case, the UE should attempt to establish the TLS tunnel with the NAF without including PSK-based ciphersuites to the ClientHello message, according to the procedure specified in clause 5.3. This note does not limit the use of PSK TLS to HTTP-based services. + +2. If the NAF is willing to establish a TLS tunnel using a PSK-based ciphersuite, it shall select one of the PSK-based ciphersuites offered by the UE, and send the selected ciphersuite to the UE in the ServerHello message. + +The NAF shall send the ServerKeyExchange message with a list of PSK-identity hints. A constant string "3GPP-bootstrapping" is used as PSK-identity hint to indicate the local configuration in the NAF i.e. that the NAF accepts that AKA-based $Ks\_(\text{ext})\_NAF$ is used establish the TLS session keys. A constant string "3GPP-bootstrapping-uicc" is used as PSK-identity hint to indicate that the local configuration in the NAF accepts that $Ks\_int\_NAF$ is used to establish the TLS sessions keys. A constant string "3GPP-bootstrapping-digest" is used as PSK-identity hint to indicate that the local configuration in the NAF accepts that GBA\_Digest-based $Ks\_NAF$ is used to establish the TLS sessions keys. One of these PSK-identity hints shall be present in the ServerKeyExchange message, and it shall indicate the GBA as the required authentication method. If the local configuration in the NAF allows several authentication methods to be used to access its service then the ServerKeyExchange message shall include the PSK-identity hints for all allowed authentication methods. Also other PSK-identity hints may be supported, however, they are out of the scope of this specification. The NAF finishes the reply to the UE by sending a ServerHelloDone message. + +NOTE 3: If the NAF does not wish to establish a TLS tunnel using a PSK-based ciphersuite, it shall select a non-PSK-based ciphersuite and continue TLS tunnel establishment based on the procedure described either in clause 5.3 or clause 5.5. + +3. The UE shall use a GBA-based shared secret for PSK TLS, if the NAF has sent a ServerHello message containing a PSK-based ciphersuite, and a ServerKeyExchange message containing at least one of the constant strings "3GPP-bootstrapping", "3GPP-bootstrapping-uicc", or "3GPP-bootstrapping-digest" as the PSK identity hint. If the UE does not have a valid GBA-based shared secret it shall obtain one by running the bootstrapping procedure with the BSF over the Ub reference point as specified in TS 33.220 [3]. + +If the HTTPS client resides in the ME, $Ks\_(\text{ext})\_NAF$ shall be used as the GBA shared key. If the HTTPS client resides in the UICC, $Ks\_int\_NAF$ shall be used as the GBA shared key. In the selection of the GBA mode by the UE, AKA-based modes shall take priority over GBA\_Digest. + +The UE derives the TLS premaster secret from the NAF specific key (Ks\_(ext)\_NAF if the initiating HTTPS client resides on the ME or Ks\_int\_NAF if the initiating HTTP client resides on the UICC). + +The UE shall send a ClientKeyExchange message. The PSK identity in the ClientKeyExchange message shall include a prefix indicating the PSK-identity name space that was selected (i.e. "3GPP-bootstrapping-uicc", "3GPP-bootstrapping", or "3GPP-bootstrapping-digest"), and the B-TID. The prefix shall match one of the PSK-identity hints that NAF offered in ServerKeyExchange message. The precise format of the PSK identity is specified in TS 24.109 [18]. The UE concludes the TLS handshake by sending the ChangeCipherSuite and Finished messages to the NAF. + +4. If the NAF receives the "3GPP-bootstrapping" prefix and the B-TID in the ClientKeyExchange messages it fetches the NAF specific shared secret (Ks\_(ext)\_NAF) from the BSF using the B-TID, else if the NAF receives the "3GPP-bootstrapping-uicc" prefix and the B-TID in the ClientKeyExchange messages it fetches the NAF specific shared secret (Ks\_int\_NAF) from the BSF using the B-TID. If the NAF receives the "3GPP-bootstrapping-digest" prefix and the B-TID in the ClientKeyExchange messages it shall indicate to the BSF that GBA\_Digest is acceptable. + +If the NAF has requested a USS, and the USS indicates to the NAF that only the Ks\_int\_NAF shall be allowed, then the NAF shall only accept the Ks\_int\_NAF as the NAF specific key. If the Ks\_(ext)\_NAF was used as the NAF specific key, the NAF shall respond with the appropriate error code and terminate the TLS connection with the UE. + +The NAF derives the TLS premaster secret from the NAF specific key (Ks\_(ext)\_NAF or Ks\_int\_NAF). + +The NAF concludes the TLS handshake by sending the ChangeCipherSuite and Finished messages to the UE. + +The UE and the NAF have established a TLS tunnel using GBA-based shared secret, and then may start to use the application level communication through this tunnel. + +### 5.4.1 TLS Profile + +#### 5.4.1.0 General + +If the PSK TLS based authentication mechanism is supported, the HTTPS client in the UE or the NAF shall support the TLS version, PSK Ciphersuites and TLS Extensions as specified in the TLS profile given in TS 33.310 [20], Annex E. + +The HTTPS client in the UE and the NAF shall support the server\_name TLS extension. All other TLS extensions are optional for implementation. + +NOTE: If the NAF is doing virtual name based hosting (e.g. in the case of authentication proxy, see Annex A), the NAF needs to be able to discover the correct server name to indicate the correct NAF\_ID to the BSF. Otherwise the BSF is not able to derive the correct NAF specific keys. + +#### 5.4.1.1 Protection mechanisms + +The same requirements as in clause 5.3.1.1 of the present document shall apply. + +#### 5.4.1.2 Authentication of the AP/AS + +The AP/AS is authenticated by the Client according to PSK TLS as specified in Annex E of TS 33.310 [20]. + +#### 5.4.1.3 Authentication Failures + +If there is no response within a given time limit from a network initiated re-authentication request an authentication failure has occurred after that the request has been attempted for a limited number of times. This failure can be due to several reasons, e.g. that the UE has powered off or due to that the message was lost due to a bad radio channel. The AP/AS shall then still assume that if a TLS session is still valid that it can be re-used by the UE at a later time. Should then the UE re-use an existing session then the AP/AS shall re-authenticate the UE and not give access to the AP/AS unless the authentication was successful. + +If the AP/AS, acting as NAF, has requested a USS, and the USS indicates to the NAF that only the Ks\_int\_NAF shall be allowed, then the NAF shall only accept the Ks\_int\_NAF as the NAF specific key therefore if the + +Ks\_(ext)\_NAF was used as the NAF specific key, then the NAF shall respond with the appropriate error code and terminate the TLS connection with the UE. + +#### 5.4.1.4 Set-up of Security parameters + +The TLS Handshake Protocol negotiates a session, which is identified by a Session ID. The Client and the AP/AS shall allow for resuming a session. This facilitates that a Client and Server may resume a previous session or duplicate an existing session. The lifetime of a Session ID is the lifetime of the GAA shared secret or maximum of 24 hours. The Session ID shall only be used under its lifetime and shall be considered by both the Client and the Server as obsolete when the Lifetime has expired. + +## 5.5 Certificate based mutual authentication between UE and application server + +### 5.5.1 General + +The authentication mechanism described in this section is optional to implement in UE and AS. + +The certificate based mutual authentication between an UE and an application server shall be based on TLS and TLS Extensions as specified in the TLS profile given in TS 33.310 [20], Annex E. + +Annex B of this specification provides guidance on certificate mutual authentication between UE and application server. + +### 5.5.2 TLS Profile + +#### 5.5.2.1 General + +The UE and the AS shall support TLS and TLS Extensions according to the TLS profile given in TS 33.310 [20], Annex E. + +Support of certificate revocation and of the related fields in certificates is optional. If supported, the certificate and CRL profiles in clause 6.1 and 6.1a of TS 33.310 [20] should be followed. + +NOTE 1: The management of Root Certificates is out of scope of this Technical Specification. + +The UE and the AS shall support the server\_name TLS extension. All other TLS extensions are optional for implementation. + +NOTE 2: If the AS is doing virtual name base hosting (e.g. in the case of authentication proxy, see Annex A) the AS needs to either have a TLS server certificate that contains all the host names that the AS can be addressed with (i.e. virtual hostnames), or have one TLS server certificate for each of the hostnames mentioned above. In the latter case, the server\_name extension is needed because the AS needs to be able to select the correct TLS server certificate. + +#### 5.5.2.2 Protection mechanisms + +The same requirements as in clause 5.3.1.1 of the present document apply. + +#### 5.5.2.3 void + +# 6 Use of Authentication Proxy + +An Authentication Proxy (AP) is an HTTP proxy which takes the role of a NAF for the UE. It handles the TLS security relation with the UE and relieves the application server (AS) of this task. Based on GBA the AP can assure the ASs that the request is coming from an authorized subscriber of the MNO. + +## 6.1 Architectural view + +![Figure 2: Environment and reference points of AP. This diagram shows the architectural environment of an Authentication Proxy (AP). On the left, a BSF (Bootstrap Server) is connected to the AP via the Zn reference point. Below the AP, a UE (User Equipment) is connected via the Ua reference point, with a dashed line indicating a TLS tunnel between them. To the right of the AP, multiple application servers (AS1, AS2, ..., ASn) are connected via AP-AS reference points.](8307f6b04df072c9332f9987e034272c_img.jpg) + +Figure 2: Environment and reference points of AP. This diagram shows the architectural environment of an Authentication Proxy (AP). On the left, a BSF (Bootstrap Server) is connected to the AP via the Zn reference point. Below the AP, a UE (User Equipment) is connected via the Ua reference point, with a dashed line indicating a TLS tunnel between them. To the right of the AP, multiple application servers (AS1, AS2, ..., ASn) are connected via AP-AS reference points. + +Figure 2: Environment and reference points of AP + +The use of an authentication proxy (AP) is fully compatible with the architecture specified in TS 33.220 [3] and in clauses 4 and 5 of this specification. When an AP is used in this architecture, the AP takes the role of a NAF. When an HTTPS request is destined towards an application server (AS) behind an AP, the AP terminates the TLS tunnel and performs UE authentication. The AP proxies the HTTP requests received from UE to one or many application servers. The AP may add an assertion of identity of the subscriber for use by the AS, when the AP forwards the request from the UE to the AS. + +NOTE: As an example, the following condition allows accessing multiple application servers AS(s) through one shared TLS tunnel (over the Ua interface) $AS_n\ hostname = AP\ hostname = NAF\_ID$ (e.g.: *services.operator.com*). There might be alternative ways to access multiple ASs behind an AP. + +Figure 3 presents an architectural view of using Authentication Proxy, for example, for IMS SIP based services. The UE shall manipulate own data such as groups, through the Ua/Ut reference point. The reference point Ut specified in TS 23.002 [1] shall be applicable to data manipulation of IMS based SIP services, such as Presence, Messaging and Conferencing services. The stage 1 requirements are specified in TS 22.250 [2]. + +![Figure 3: The architectural view using Authentication Proxy for IMS SIP based services. This diagram shows the UE connected to the AP via the Ua reference point. The UE also has a dashed connection to the AP via the Ut reference point. The AP is connected to four application servers: Presence, Messaging, Conferencing, and New services, via the Zb/Za reference point.](43837b056625d3d6ce615e4c02f163bb_img.jpg) + +Figure 3: The architectural view using Authentication Proxy for IMS SIP based services. This diagram shows the UE connected to the AP via the Ua reference point. The UE also has a dashed connection to the AP via the Ut reference point. The AP is connected to four application servers: Presence, Messaging, Conferencing, and New services, via the Zb/Za reference point. + +Figure 3: The architectural view using Authentication Proxy for IMS SIP based services + +Management of UE identities is described in clause 6.5. + +Annex A contains further guidance on technical solutions for authentication proxies. + +## 6.2 Requirements and principles + +The authentication proxy may reside between the UE and the AS as depicted in figure 2. The usefulness of an Authentication Proxy may be to reduce the consumption of authentication vectors and/or to minimize SQN synchronization failures. Also the AP relieves the AS of security tasks. + +The following requirements apply for the use of an Authentication Proxy: + +- authentication proxy shall be able to authenticate the UE using the means of Generic Bootstrapping Architecture, as specified in TS 33.220 [3]; +- if the application server requires an authenticated identity of the UE the authentication proxy shall send it to the application server belonging to the trust domain with every HTTP request; +- if required, the authentication proxy may not reveal the authenticated identity of the UE to the application server not belonging to the trust domain; +- the authenticated identity management mechanism shall not prevent the application server to use an appropriate session management mechanisms with the client; +- the UE shall be able to create multiple parallel HTTP sessions via the authentication proxy towards different application servers; + +NOTE 1: The used session management mechanism is out of the scope of 3GPP specifications. + +NOTE 2: One motivation for having AP between UE and AS's is to minimize the number of TLS connections. However, there are situations when UE and AP may end-up having parallel TLS connections, e.g. if two applications in the UE are not able to share the same TLS connection. + +- implementation of check of asserted user identity in the AS is optional; +- activation of transfer of asserted user identity shall be configurable in the AP on a per AS basis. + +The use of an authentication proxy should be such that there is no need to manage the authentication proxy configuration in the UE. + +NOTE 3: This requirement implies that the authentication proxy should be a reverse proxy in the following sense: A reverse proxy is a web server system that is capable of serving web pages sourced from other web servers - in addition to web pages on disk or generated dynamically by CGI - making these pages look like they originated at the reverse proxy. + +## 6.4 Reference points + +### 6.4.1 Ua reference point + +The Ua reference point is standardised in specification TS 33.220 [3] and in clauses 4 and 5 of this specification. + +NOTE: The optional introduction of an AP has advantages which are stated elsewhere. However, the following consequences should be taken into account to decide whether an AP is to be used: + +- The AP terminates TLS and HTTP digest. This relieves the AS of the burden to handle TLS and HTTP digest, but it should be noted that then the UE is not able to establish an additional end-to-end TLS tunnel to the AS, nor can the UE additionally authenticates itself to AS by use of client authentication within TLS. Furthermore, if GBA authentication uses HTTP Digest Authentication, then the UE cannot use Basic or Digest Authentication directly with AS. + +### 6.4.2 AP-AS reference point + +The HTTP protocol is run over the AP-AS reference point. + +Confidentiality and integrity protection can be provided for the reference point between the AP and the AS using NDS/IP mechanisms as specified in TS 33.210 [13]. For traffic between different security domains, the Za reference point shall be operated. For traffic inside a security domain, it is up to the operator to decide whether to deploy the Zb reference point. As AP terminates the TLS tunnel from UE, also a TLS tunnel is possible. + +The AP may support the transfer of an identity of the UE authenticated by the AP from AP to AS in a standardised format. The format of this information element in the HTTP request header is left to stage 3 specifications. + +## 6.5 Management of UE identity + +Different ASs need different kinds of authentication information. To support the requirements of different servers, the AP needs to perform authentication with varying granularity and with varying degree of assertion to the AS. The authentication and the corresponding assertion is therefore AS specific and has to be configured in the AP per AS. + +### 6.5.1 Granularity of Authentication and Access Control by AP + +The AP is configured per AS if the particular application or applications served by the AS is in need of an application specific user security setting, see definitions in TS 33.220 [3]. This user security setting may contain the public user identities in the authentication part of the USS. The authorisation part of the USS may contain indications, which of the applications residing on the AP, and the Application Servers behind the AP, a user is allowed to access. + +**NOTE:** There are two ways of implementing application specific user security settings (USS). One can either assign a GSID (GAA Service Identifier) to each application and store multiple USS in the BSF/HSS or one can assign a GSID to the AP and store a single USS in the BSF/HSS. In the latter case the USS contains identity and authorization information for all the ASs/applications served by the AP. Unless indicated otherwise, the term "application specific user security settings" refers to both implementation options. + +#### 6.5.1.1 Authorised Participant of GBA + +The AP checks that the UE is an authorised participant of GBA. Access is granted on success of the basic GBA mechanism, i.e. the HTTPS client in the UE sends a valid B-TID and performs digest authentication with the NAF specific keys received from BSF. + +The AP is configured not to request an application specific user security setting from BSF for the AS named in the request. Depending on configuration of BSF the AP may receive the private user identity (IMPI) from BSF. + +This case shall be supported by AP. + +**NOTE:** This case may apply when all subscribers of an operator, but no other users, are allowed access to operator defined services. The BSF may not send the IMPI out of privacy considerations or because the AP does not need it. If the BSF does not send the IMPI to the AP, the user remains anonymous towards the AP; or more precisely, the B-TID functions as a temporary user pseudonym. + +#### 6.5.1.2 Authorised User of Application + +The AP is configured to request an application specific user security setting from the BSF. Depending on the policy of the BSF, the AP receives the application specific user security setting and the private user identity (IMPI) from the BSF. Access is granted if allowed according to the application specific user security setting received from BSF. + +The AP may do further checks on user inserted identities in the HTTP request if required according to clause 6.5.2.4. + +This case shall be supported by AP. + +**NOTE:** If there is no application specific user security setting configured for an application, this case reduces to authentication according to clause 6.5.1.1. + +### 6.5.2 Transfer of Asserted Identity from AP to AS + +The AP is configured per AS to perform authentication and access control according to one of the following subclauses: if required in the subclause, the user identity is transferred to AS in every HTTP request proxied to AS. + +#### 6.5.2.1 Authorised Participant of GBA + +The AP checks that the UE is an authorised participant of GBA. If the authentication of the UE by the AP fails, the AP does not forward the request of the UE to the AS. + +This case shall be supported by AP. + +NOTE: This case simply implies that the NAF checks that the user is known to, and has established a valid key, with the BSF, according to the GBA procedures described in TS 33.220 [3]. + +#### 6.5.2.2 Authorised User of Application Anonymous to AS + +The AP checks that the UE is an authorised user of the application according to application specific user security setting received from BSF. No user identity shall be transferred to AS. + +This case shall be supported by AP. + +#### 6.5.2.3 Authorised User of Application with Transferred Identity asserted to AS + +The AP checks that the UE is an authorised user of the application. The user identity (or user identities) received from the BSF shall be transferred to AS. Based on AS-specific configuration of the AP, any authorization flags existing in application-specific user security settings shall also be transferred to AS. + +Depending on the application specific user security setting and the AS-specific configuration of the AP, the transferred user identity (or identities) may be the private user identity (IMPI), or may be taken from the application specific user security setting (e.g. an IMPU), or may be a pseudonym chosen by AP (e.g. Random, B-TID). + +This case may be supported by AP. + +NOTE 1: If the AP is configured to transfer a pseudonym to AS, any binding of this pseudonym to the user identity (e.g. for charging purposes by AS) is out of scope of this specification. + +NOTE 2: If the AP is configured not to request an application specific user security setting from BSF, only the private user identity (IMPI) or a pseudonym may be transferred to AS. In this case any authorised participant of GBA is supposed to be an authorised user of the application. + +#### 6.5.2.4 Authorised User of Application with Transferred Identity asserted to AS and Check of User Inserted Identity + +This case resembles clause 6.5.2.3 with the following extension: + +Based on the user identity received from BSF, the AP authenticates user related identity information elements as sent from UE. These "user inserted identities" may occur within header fields or within the body of the HTTP request. + +Depending on application specific user security setting and AS-specific configuration of AP, all user-inserted identities (or a subset thereof) are authenticated by checking against the private user identity (IMPI) or the application specific user security setting. + +Depending on the application specific user security setting and the AS-specific configuration of AP, the transferred user identity (or identities) may also be selected from the authenticated user inserted identities. + +This case may be supported by AP. + +NOTE 1: If AP authenticates certain or all user related identity information elements of a request, and the AS shall rely on the check of these elements, then a corresponding policy between the AP and the AS needs to be in place between the AP and the AS. + +NOTE 2: Any application specific details are beyond the scope of this document and may be specified within the application, e.g. for Presence in TS 33.141 [5]. This specification does not preclude that any other application specific specifications (e.g. Presence) declare this feature as mandatory in their scope. + +# --- Annex A (informative): Technical Solutions for Access to Application Servers via Authentication Proxy and HTTPS + +This annex gives some guidance on the technical solution for authentication proxies so as to help avoid misconfigurations. An authentication proxy acts as reverse proxy which serves web pages (and other content) sourced from other web servers (AS) making these pages look like they originated at the proxy. + +To access different hosts with different DNS names on one server (in this case the proxy) the concept of virtual hosts was created. + +One solution when running HTTPS is to associate each host name with a different IP address (IP based virtual hosts). This can be achieved by the machine having several physical network connections, or by use of virtual interfaces which are supported by most modern operating systems (frequently called "*ip aliases*"). This solution uses up one IP address per AS and it does not allow the notion of "one TLS tunnel from UE to AP-NAF" for all applications behind a NAF together. + +If it is desired to use one IP address only or if "one TLS tunnel for all" is required, only the concept of name-based virtual hosts is applicable. Together with HTTPS, however, this creates problems, necessitating workarounds which may deviate from standard behaviour of proxies and/or browsers. Workarounds, which affect the UE and are not generally supported by browsers, may cause interoperability problems. Other workarounds may impose restrictions on the attached application servers. + +To access virtual hosts where different servers with different DNS names are co-located on AP, either of the solutions could be used to identify the host during the handshaking phase: + +- TLS Extensions are specified in IETF, cf. Annex E of TS 33.310 [20]. TLS Extensions support the UE to indicate a virtual host that it intends to connect in the very initial TLS handshaking message (see clause 5.3.1); +- The other alternative is to issue a multiple-identities certificate for the AP. The certificate will contain identities of AP as well as each server that rely on AP's proxy function. The verification of this type of certificate is specified in RFC 2818 [9]. + +Either approach may be chosen by the operator who operates the authentication proxy. + +# --- Annex B (informative): Guidance on Certificate-based mutual authentication between UE and application server + +This section explains how subscriber certificates (see TS 33.221 [16]) are used in certificate-based mutual authentication between a UE and an application server. The certificate-based mutual authentication between a UE and an application server shall be based on TLS as specified in the TLS and TLS Extensions profile given in TS 33.310 [20], Annex E. + +When a UE and an application server (AS) want to mutually authenticate each other based on certificates, the UE has previously enrolled a subscriber certificate as specified in TS 33.221 [16]. After UE is in the possession of the subscriber certificate it may establish a TLS tunnel with the AS as specified in the TLS and TLS Extensions profile given in TS 33.310 [20], Annex E. + +The AS may indicate to the UE, that it supports client certificate-based authentication by sending a CertificateRequest message during the TLS handshake. This message includes a list of certificate types and a list of acceptable certificate authorities. The AS may indicate to the UE that it supports subscriber certificate-based authentication if the list of acceptable certificate authorities includes the certification authority of the subscriber certificate (i.e. the operator's CA certificate). + +The UE may continue with the subscriber certificate-based authentication if the list of acceptable certificate authorities includes the certification authority of the subscriber certificate. This is done by sending the subscriber certificate as the Certificate message during the TLS handshake. If the list of acceptable certificate authorities does not include the certification authority of the subscriber certificate, then UE shall send a Certificate message that does not contain any certificates. + +NOTE 1: Due to the short lifetime of the subscriber certificate, the usage of the subscriber certificate does not require on-line interaction between the AS and the PKI portal that issued the certificate. + +If the AS receives a Certificate message that does not contain any certificates, it can continue the TLS handshake in two ways: + +- if subscriber certificate-based authentication is mandatory according to the AS's security policy, it shall response with a fatal handshake failure alert, or +- if subscriber certificate-based authentication is optional according to AS's security policy, AS shall continue with TLS handshake. + +In the latter case, if the AS has NAF functionality, the NAF may authenticate the UE as specified in clause 5.3 of the present specification, where after establishing the server-authenticated TLS tunnel, the procedure continues from step 4. + +NOTE 2: In order to successfully establish a TLS tunnel between the UE and the AS using certificates for mutual authentication, the UE must have the root certificate of the AS's certificate in the UE's certificate store, and the AS must have the root certificate of the UE's subscriber certificate (i.e. operator's CA certificate) in the AS's certificate store. The root certificate is the root of the certification path, and should be marked trusted in the UE and the AS. + +NOTE 3: In order to enable access to an AS in a visited network with subscriber certificates requires that the AS has the CA certificate of subscriber's home operator and it is marked trusted in the visited AS. The procedure to do this is outside the scope of this specification. + +# --- Annex C (informative): Considerations for GBA security using a web browser and Javascript + +## C.1 Usage Scenario + +End user wants to use some service provider's services (e.g., an operator), and the service provider wants to use GBA to authenticate the user. + +- 1) End user opens web browser application in the ME, and instructs it to go the service provider's web page. The web page redirects the web browser to a login page if end user has not yet authenticated. +- 2) Service provider's login page has logic to discover whether Javascript access to GBA is enabled in the browser or not (can be done with Javascript). If this GBA access is not supported, the web page reverts to other means of authentication, e.g., legacy username/password. If it is supported, proceed to step 3. +- 3) The web page has code implemented in Javascript that obtains a NAF specific token (Ks\_js\_NAF) and the B-TID from the GBA function in the UE. In simplest case, the browser uses these variables as username and password in an HTML FORM, and the web browser to send this information back to the web server. +- 4) The web server extracts the NAF specific token (Ks\_js\_NAF) and the B-TID, and uses the B-TID to fetch the NAF specific key Ks\_NAF from the BSF over Zn interface. The NAF generates then the NAF specific authentication token and compares it with the one received from the UE. If they are equal, the user is authenticated, and the requested service is provided to the ME and the user. + +## --- C.2 Threats + +The usage scenarios described in clause A.1 are susceptible to five serious threats: + +Threat 1: ME downloads a web page from an attacker that has Javascript which requests all NAF specific keys that the attacker is interested in. + +Threat 2: ME uses a public access point that is controlled by the attacker, i.e., a classic man-in-the-middle attack. When the ME requests the login page from the service provider, the attacker sends back a rogue login web page as it controls the DNS. This rogue login page has Javascript that is able to extract any NAF specific authentication token of the service provider, and sends it back to the attacker. + +Threat 3: It is possible for any third party on the internet connection to eavesdrop on the B-TID and the NAF specific authentication token, and impersonate the user as long as the B-TID has not expired. + +Threat 4: If an attacker gets hold of the authentication token Ks\_js\_NAF, then he can utilize it to attack the communication between the web browser and the NAF. + +Threat 5: ME downloads a web page from an attacker that has JavaScript which repeatedly triggers GBA re-bootstrapping to be performed. This can have the effect that the malicious web page can coordinate a distributed DoS attack against the BSF/HSS. + +## --- C.3 Control of GBA Credentials and GBA Module in the UE + +### C.3.1 General + +The threats identified in clause C.2 are countered using a set of control mechanisms as defined in this clause. Using only a subset of the control mechanisms leaves some threats open. Therefore all control mechanisms need to be applied to mitigate the outlined threats. + +### C.3.2 Control Mechanism 1– Same Origin Authentication Tokens + +To mitigate threat 1 in clause A.2, the web browser should limit a web page to access only to those NAF specific authentication tokens that belong to the origin web server. This way Javascript has access only to NAF's authentication tokens, which is the NAF identified by the origin of the web page. This implies that the browser can authenticate the server, cf. control mechanism 2. Web browsers observing good security practices implement a single-origin policy where the Javascript is able to send HTTP requests only to the server from where the original web page came from. + +### C.3.3 Control Mechanism 2 – Server Authenticated TLS + +To mitigate threats 1, 2 and 3 of C.2, HTTPS, i.e., server authenticated TLS, should be used with integrity and confidentiality protection. This way attacking DNS does not help the attacker as the origin of the web page is authenticated using TLS, and the web page content, and B-TID and Ks\_js\_NAF are confidentially protected against eavesdropping and the Ks\_(ext)\_NAF is not used directly here. + +### C.3.4 Control Mechanism 3 - Channel Binding + +The usage of server authenticated TLS as described in clause C.3.3 is not sufficient on its own if one were to consider the threat of a compromised TLS server certificate a likely event. Given that in commonly used browsers there are 100+ root certificates from certification authorities (CAs) that have different levels of security protection when issuing and managing certificates, A second line of defense for the case that a TLS server certificate is compromised seems useful. If one CA is compromised the attacker can use a compromised certificate to lure the user into believing that the attacker's server is the genuine NAF the user wants to communicate with. The attacker can exploit this to realize the following two threats: + +- Threat A: If the Javascript used the Ks\_NAF directly and an attacker obtained the Ks\_NAF from the user, then it could use this Ks\_NAF to impersonate the user towards the genuine NAF, obtain the services and let the user foot the bill. +- Threat B: The attacker makes the user reveal information valuable for the attacker that the user would want to reveal only to the genuine NAF. + +Even though TLS with server certificates can generally be trusted, it improves the security of usage of GBA from a web browser if the authentication token derivation process of GBA and the TLS tunnel are bound together. This shall however not be taken as a general clue that TLS with server side certificate authentication is insecure. As the key derivation of Ks\_(ext)\_NAF is already defined with a fixed set of input parameters, and backward compatibility by not changing this key derivation should be ensured, a new Javascript specific authentication token (Ks\_js\_NAF) should be derived from Ks\_(ext)\_NAF using a channel binding mechanism. This channel binding mechanism is based on RFC 5929 (Channel Bindings for TLS) [25]. + +This mechanism does not help against threat B. The mitigation of threat B is further discussed in clause C.4. + +### C.3.5 Control Mechanism 4 – Key Usage + +In Threat 4 in clause C.2, the attacker may get hold of the Ks\_js\_NAF by one of the following means: + +- One of the endpoints can be considered as compromised i.e. NAF or web browser are compromised. +- Ks\_(ext)\_NAF and authentication token derivation parameters are compromised. + +The compromise of an endpoint might be made more difficult by usage of additional hardware functionalities, but those would require that all communication for usage of such keys would be routed over the secure hardware. This would still leave the challenge, how to ensure that no fake traffic is routed over the secure hardware. The handle used to authorize the usage of the Ks\_js\_NAF authentication token inside the secure module need to be secured to avoid unauthorized usage, but that would require a trustworthy browser, which then negates the effect of using a handle for authentication tokens. The usage of the Ks\_js\_NAF should be done in the TLS session that was used to create the token. This makes usage in another TLS session impossible, as long as the end points check that the TLS tunnel used to receive the information is the same as was used to derive the token. + +If the compromised token has been derived, by usage of the compromised Ks\_(ext)\_NAF key and corresponding parameters, then usage of additional secure hardware would not gain any significant security improvement for the usage from the token of the originating terminal, since the source of the Ks\_js\_NAF token is compromised. + +--- + +## C.4 Security Considerations + +### C.4.1 General Scripting Security Considerations + +JavaScript has been designed as an open scripting language, and it has its own security model. This model has not been designed to protect the server administrator or the data that is passed between the browser and the external application server. The scripting language security model is designed to protect the user from malicious servers, and as a result, capabilities of Javascript have been restricted. For example, there are deployed Javascript implementations that cannot read or write files on users' computers, or interact between different web pages that are open at the same time in the browser. W3C has been extending Javascript APIs to include functionality, including File API [26] enabling reading and writing files, and HTML5 Web Messaging enabling communication between the web pages in the browser. + +### C.4.2 GBA key control + +When the Javascript specific authentication token (Ks\_js\_NAF) is requested by a web page, its creation is controlled by the web browser as specified in Annex D. The Ks\_js\_NAF is bound to the web server, to the javascript context, and to the specific of TLS tunnel used by using NAF\_ID as described in Annex D. The Ks\_js\_NAF should not be used outside the designed web page context. + +### C.4.3 User grants + +When Javascript in a web page is trying to access the Javascript specific authentication token via the Javascript GBA API, the browser executing the Javascript may prompt the end user with a permission dialog asking the end user to grant access to the token. The end user can then decide whether to allow access or deny it, and also additionally have the browser remember the decision. This mimics the functionality of the browsers today that support geolocation Javascript API. There Javascript notifies the end user, that the current page is requesting location information. The end user has then the possibility to either grant access or deny it. Additionally, the end user may have the browser remember that decision, so that the next time the same page is requesting access to the location information, the answer from the previous query from the end users is used without disturbing the end user. + +### C.4.4 Root CAs in Browser + +Clause C.3.4 describes the threats related to a compromised CA where either the CA certificate itself or the certificate of some root CA above the compromised CA is present in browsers' root CA list. For threat B it is assumed that it is possible to issue certificates containing any DNS name, and therefore pretend to be any server. If the attacker can spoof or for instance, he can easily trick users into entering their username and password to attacker's webpages by just mimicking the look-n-feel of the attacked webpages. Additionally, with the introduction of HTML5 there are additional things to consider as HTML5 introduces features like WebStorage API [27], where a web site can use "localStorage" function to store name-value pairs to the browser, which can be later accessed only by those web pages that have been downloaded from same server identified by protocol/site/port tuple. With this threat, the attacker can fully read from and write to the localStorage of the attacked site. + +There is no way to mitigate this threat if a compromised CA is listed in browsers' root CA list except strongly recommend that the browser vendors should carefully consider which CAs they include to their browser offering as trust roots by default, and that the browser implementation should show proper warnings to the end user, if the user (or some service on behalf of the user) tries to add a new CA as trust root. In addition, root CA stores managed online by some external instance, e.g., browser vendors updating root CA stores of their browsers online, should also be kept up-to-date. + +# --- Annex D (normative): Security measures for usage of GBA with a web browser + +## D.1 Extension of Protocol Mechanism used on Ua Reference Point + +### D.1.1 General + +The Annex D is compatible with the chapters and sections up to and including clause 5.2. The clauses 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 can be seen as different alternatives, since the client authentication mechanism in Annex D is different from those in 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5. + +### D.1.2 Key derivation + +#### FQDN + +When the web browser in the ME downloads a web page using HTTPS, the web browser verifies that the FQDN in the URL matches the FQDN used in the TLS certificate used by the server (NAF). It is common good security practice for web browsers to perform this check. Any web browser that does not perform this check is not secure enough to be used for security sensitive applications with or without GBA, and therefore should not be considered for the purpose of this specification. + +Once the web browser has verified that the FQDN in the URL matches the FQDN in the server (NAF) certificate, the browser makes this verified FQDN available to the GBA API. + +The GBA API uses the verified FQDN to derive the authentication token $Ks\_js\_NAF$ . + +NOTE1: Security associated with the use of the FQDN in Javascript in the manner described above is dependent upon the implementation of the web browser, which is out-of-scope for 3GPP. + +The Ua security protocol identifier to be used is (0x01,0x00,0x02,yy,zz) as specified in Annex H of 3GPP TS 33.220 [3], where yy and zz are the protection mechanism CipherSuite as specified in relevant TLS specifications by IETF. + +NOTE2: HTML FORM is tunneled through TLS, therefore the first consideration might be to use the Ua security protocol identifier for Ua security protocols that are based on TLS (HTTP Digest with HTTPS and Pre-shared key TLS) that is already specified in Annex H of 3GPP TS 33.220 [3] (0x01,0x00,0x01,yy,zz). This protocol id is used when the NAF specific key is used as a password in the TLS tunneled HTTP Digest case. This is substantially different, for example, from the case where HTML FORM based authentication within TLS tunnel is used, therefore a different Ua protocol id is used. + +### D.1.3 Channel binding + +#### D.1.3.1 Background + +To mitigate the threats described in Annex C, a second level of key derivation is introduced. When Javascript code that is downloaded from the web server via the server authenticated TLS tunnel requests for a GBA based key, the request is first handled by the web browser and more specifically the GBA API module in the web browser. The GBA API module will request the $Ks\_ext\_NAF$ key from the GBA Function in the ME using the Javascript specific NAF\_ID as specified in clause D.1.2. After receiving the $Ks\_ext\_NAF$ key from the GBA Function, the GBA API will derive a Javascript specific authentication token $Ks\_js\_NAF$ that is bound to the server authenticated TLS tunnel. + +The channel binding is performed using RFC 5705 [29] and RFC 5929 [25], as is described below. An example sequence flow is in clause D.2.1. + +#### D.1.3.2 Channel binding using RFC 5705 and RFC 5929 + +After receiving the Ks\_(ext)\_NAF key from the GBA Function the GBA API obtains the TLS\_MK\_Extr, which is extracted from the TLS master key using the exporter function. For TLS 1.2, the exporter specified in RFC 5705 [29] shall be used. For TLS 1.3, the exporter described in section 7.5 of RFC 8446 [30] shall be used. as specified in RFC 5705 [29]. The label for the exporter function shall be "TLS\_MK\_Extr". The GBA API obtains the tls-server-endpoint as specified in RFC 5929 [25]. The Ks\_js\_NAF shall be derived from Ks\_(ext)\_NAF as follows: + +$$Ks\_js\_NAF = KDF(Ks\_ext\_NAF, TLS\_MK\_Extr, tls-server-endpoint).$$ + +A sequence flow is in clause D.2.1. + +## --- D.2 Sequence flow + +### D.2.1 Sequence flow with channel binding + +In this message flow with channel binding the following architecture is assumed: + +- **GBA Function:** The GBA Function handles establishment of GBA-specific keys. In particular, the establishment of the key Ks can use any of the methods defined by TS 33.220 [3] (e.g., based on AKA or GBA\_Digest). The GBA Function is not part of the web browser. + +NOTE: In the case of GBA\_Digest, the GBA Function treats SIP Digest credentials as specified in Annex N of TS 33.203 [28]. + +- **Web Browser:** The web browser is either native or downloaded and contains some functions which support usage of GBA. In particular we have in the architecture: + - **GBA\_API:** Part of the browser that communicates with the GBA Function and receives GBA authentication token material requests from the Javascript code. + - **Javascript:** Downloaded Javascript code. + - **Engine:** Sets up communication with the NAF. + +![Architecture diagram showing NAF at the top, a Terminal containing a Browser (with GBA API, Javascript, and Engine), a GBA Function, and Credentials. Arrows show bidirectional relationships between NAF and Javascript/Engine, and between the components within the Terminal.](69b7bd65e85cdef6fdd7fb0a8194257c_img.jpg) + +``` +graph TD; NAF[NAF] <--> JS[Javascript]; NAF <--> Engine[Engine]; subgraph Terminal; subgraph Browser; GBA_API[GBA API] <--> JS; JS <--> Engine; end; GBA_Function[GBA Function] <--> GBA_API; GBA_Function <--> Credentials[Credentials]; end; +``` + +The diagram illustrates the architecture of a system. At the top is a box labeled **NAF**. Below it is a large box labeled **Terminal**. Inside the **Terminal** box, there is a sub-box labeled **Browser** containing three components: **GBA API**, **Javascript**, and **Engine**. These three components are interconnected with double-headed arrows: **GBA API** to **Javascript**, and **Javascript** to **Engine**. Below the **Browser** box is a box labeled **GBA Function**, which is connected to the **GBA API** by a double-headed arrow. At the bottom of the **Terminal** box is a box labeled **Credentials**, which is connected to the **GBA Function** by a double-headed arrow. Outside the **Terminal** box, there are two arrows pointing from **NAF** to **Javascript** and **Engine** respectively. + +Architecture diagram showing NAF at the top, a Terminal containing a Browser (with GBA API, Javascript, and Engine), a GBA Function, and Credentials. Arrows show bidirectional relationships between NAF and Javascript/Engine, and between the components within the Terminal. + +**Figure D.2-1. Architecture** + +Below is a sequence flow diagram of GBA usage in Web context, i.e., within Javascript. + +![Sequence flow diagram showing interactions between GBA Function, Web browser (Ua application) with sub-blocks GBA API, javascript, and engine, and Web server (NAF). The sequence includes steps for TLS tunnel establishment, downloading gba.js, key derivation, and subsequent validation requests.](11edb7fcedf09ac6a817f8d7b8c61eec_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant GBA Function + participant Web browser (Ua application) + subgraph Web browser (Ua application) + GBA API + javascript + engine + end + participant Web server (NAF) + + Note right of Web server: 1. Establish TLS Tunnel. + engine->>Web server: 2. GET /gba.js HTTP/1.1 + Note right of Web server: 3. javascript code (gba.js) that contains javascript GBA API usage can now be used. + Web server-->>engine: 4. HTTP 200 OK (gba.js) + Note right of engine: 5. Downloaded gba.js is executed in javascript engine. + Note right of engine: 6. Javascript execution comes to the point where javascript GBA API is called. + Note right of GBA API: 7. Javascript GBA API generates a request with normal Ks_(ext)_NAF key derivation input parameters. + GBA API->>GBA Function: 8. Request for Ks_(ext)_NAF with FQDN of the NAF and Ua security protocol identifier. + Note left of GBA Function: 9. Bootstrap with BSF if cached Ks is not available. Generate Ks_(ext)_NAF. + GBA Function-->>GBA API: 10. Return Ks_(ext)_NAF and B-TID. + Note right of GBA API: 11. Obtain Ks_js_NAF by binding Ks_(ext)_NAF to the server authenticated TLS endpoint + GBA API-->>javascript: 12. Return Ks_js_NAF with B-TID and token expiration time. + Note right of javascript: 13. Continue javascript execution and use Ks_js_NAF. Then make XMLHttpRequest call to web server with Ks_js_NAF and B-TID. + javascript->>Web server: 14. POST /validate HTTP/1.1 + Note right of Web server: 15. Web server request Ks_(ext)_NAF from the BSF using the B-TID, and then generates Ks_js_NAF as in step 11. It then validates the incoming request with Ks_js_NAF. + Web server-->>javascript: 16. HTTP 200 OK + +``` + +Sequence flow diagram showing interactions between GBA Function, Web browser (Ua application) with sub-blocks GBA API, javascript, and engine, and Web server (NAF). The sequence includes steps for TLS tunnel establishment, downloading gba.js, key derivation, and subsequent validation requests. + +**Figure D.2-2. Sequence flow.** + +The web browser is considered to be a trusted application in the sense that the user trusts it to handle security related functions properly, i.e., setting TLS sessions with servers, sandboxing the Javascript code that is downloaded from the web servers, and not leaking sensitive information like a password to third parties. In the sequence flow diagram, the web browser is divided into three functional blocks: + +- engine module handles the basic functionalities for the web browser like setting up TLS with web servers, downloading web resources from network, and providing the user interface with the end user. + +- GBA API module offers the API towards any Javascript executing in the web browser. As Javascript should not be explicitly trusted, the web browser and the GBA API should not reveal any sensitive information to the Javascript, nor should they accept any sensitive information from the Javascript more than necessary. +- Javascript module executes the downloaded Javascript. Any Javascript executing in web browser should be considered not trusted and should not be granted access to sensitive resources or the access to those resources should be controlled. + +The communication between web browser and web server in the depicted sequence flow diagram is executed inside a server authenticated TLS tunnel. Also, the web browser is in the process of downloading an html page where one of the linked Javascript resources is "gba.js". + +- 1) The web browser and the web server establish a server authenticated TLS session. The use of TLS message integrity is mandatory, while the use of TLS encryption is optional. All further messages between the web server and the UE shall be sent through this tunnel. +- 2) The web browser engine makes a HTTP GET request to the server to download gba.js resource from the server. +- 3) The web server now knows that it can use the gba.js file that contains the Javascript GBA API call on the browser. The gba.js can also contain additional logical elements that make use of the Javascript specific authentication token Ks\_js\_NAF. + +**Editor's note:** The definition of the GBA API details needs to be done, ffs if this happens in W3C or 3GPP SA3, depending on communication with them. + +The GBA API is: + +``` +document.gba.getGBAToken(successCallback, + errorCallback); +``` + +4. As a HTTP response to the HTTP request made in step 2, the web server returns the gba.js to the web browser. +5. The engine in the web browser starts to execute the Javascript in gba.js in Javascript sandbox. +6. The Javascript comes to a point where a call to GBA API is made. +7. Browser's Javascript GBA API locates the relevant information about the Javascript, i.e., in what html page it is executing, from what url was the html page downloaded from, and which TLS ciphersuite is used in the TLS tunnel. The FQDN of the NAF can be extracted from the url of the web page, and the Ua security protocol identifier can be derived from the used TLS ciphersuite. FQDN of the NAF and the Ua security protocol identifier form the NAF\_ID. +8. Browser's Javascript GBA API makes a call to ME's GBA Function with the NAF\_ID derived in step 7. +9. The GBA Function bootstraps with the BSF if there is no valid GBA master key Ks. From the Ks, Ks\_(ext)\_NAF, the NAF specific key is derived using the NAF\_ID. +10. The GBA Function returns the Ks\_(ext)\_NAF key to browser's Javascript GBA API with the bootstrapping transaction identifier (B-TID). +11. Upon receiving the Ks\_(ext)\_NAF key, browser's javascript GBA API will derive the Javascript specific authentication token Ks\_js\_NAF that is bound to the server authenticated TLS session as follows: + +The valuse of the bindingType in GBAOptions are "tls-key-extractor" (i.e. RFC 5705 is used with the label "TLS\_MK\_Extr") and tls-server-endpoint (i.e. RFC 5929 [25]). The Ks\_js\_NAF is derived as: + +$$Ks\_js\_NAF = KDF(Ks\_ext\_NAF, TLS\_MK\_Extr, tls-server-endpoint)$$ + +The tls-server-endpoint value and TLS\_MK\_Extr are all related to the TLS connection that established the TLS session in step 1. + +12. Browser's Javascript GBA API returns Javascript specific Ks\_js\_NAF authentication token, B-TID and authentication token lifetime to the executing javascript. +13. The Javascript continues to execute and it uses the Ks\_js\_NAF authentication token the way the web server has instructed (via Javascript). + +Javascript can extract parameters from result object in Javascript (continued from step 2). + +``` +function successCallback(result) { + var token = result.token; + var btid = result.btid; + var lifetime = result.expiryTime; +} +``` + +14. After executing the client side logic, the Javascript makes a XMLHttpRequest (ajax call, HTTP request) to the web server. This request contains at least Ks\_js\_NAF or hash of it, and B-TID. +15. The web server fetches the Ks\_(ext)\_NAF key from the BSF, and it then derives the Ks\_js\_NAF the same way it was done in step 11. The web server will then compare the received Ks\_js\_NAF with the locally derived one and validate that the TLS session is the same as was used for the request that established the TLS session in step 1. +16. If the received Ks\_js\_NAF is valid, the web server will continue to process the request made in step 14 and return the result to the web browser (to the Javascript). + +## --- D.3 Javascript GBA API description + +### D.3.1 GBA API Description + +Below is a description how Javascript based GBA API is specified: + +``` +[NoInterfaceObject] + +interface DocumentGBA { + readonly attribute GBA gba; +}; + +Document implements DocumentGBA; + +[NoInterfaceObject] + +interface GBA { + void getGBAToken(in GBACallback successCallback, + in optional GBAErrorCallback errorCallback, + in optional GBAOptions options); +}; + +[Callback=FunctionOnly, NoInterfaceObject] + +interface GBACallback { + void handleEvent(in GBATokenInfo keyinfo); +}; + +[Callback=FunctionOnly, NoInterfaceObject] + +interface GBAErrorCallback { + void handleEvent(in GBAError error); +}; +``` + +``` + +}; + +[Callback, NoInterfaceObject] + +interface GBAOptions { + + attribute boolean forceBootstrap; // force bootstrapping; default false + + attribute DOMString bindingTypeExtr; // TLS channel binding tls-key- + extractor; + attribute DOMString bindingTypeEndPoint // TLS channel binding + tls-server-endpoint + +}; + +// The NAF_ID is determined by the web browser. The FQDN is taken from the origin URL +// of the web page that has the javascript. The Ua security protocol identifier is +// (0x01,0x00,0x02,yy,zz) where the yy,zz is CipherSuite in the used TLS tunnel (HTTPS). +// If TLS tunnel was not used, (0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF) is used as Ua security +// protocol identifier. The latter case is not specified in 3GPP and it should only be +// used for testing purposes. + +interface GBATokenInfo { + + readonly attribute DOMString key; // base64 encoded GBA key: Ks_(ext)_NAF + readonly attribute DOMString btid; // B-TID + readonly attribute long bootstrapTime; // Bootstrap time; millisecs since 1.1.1970 + readonly attribute long expiryTime; // Token expiry: millisecs since 1.1.1970 + readonly attribute DOMString fqdn; // used FQDN + readonly attribute DOMString uaSecProtId; // base64 encoded Ua security prot. id; + +}; + +interface GBAError { + + readonly attribute unsigned short code; // error code (to be specified) + readonly attribute DOMString message; // textual description of the error + +}; + +``` + +### D.3.2 API usage + +Below is a description how to use javascript based GBA API: + +``` + +// Basic example of requesting GBA token +document.gba.getGBAToken(gbaSuccess,gbaError); + +function gbaSuccess(tokeninfo) { + + // gba token was successfully created, and for example use + +``` + +``` + + // tokeninfo.btid as username and tokeninfo.token as password + } + + function gbaError(error) { + // an error occured during gba token creation + } + +``` + +# Annex -E (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | | | +|----------------|-------|-----------|----------|-----|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|---------------------| +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | Old | New | WI | +| 05-2004 | SP-24 | SP-040368 | - | - | | Presentation to TSG SA for Approval | 1.1.1 | | | +| 06-2004 | SP-24 | - | - | - | | Approved at TSG SA #24 (Release 6) | 2.0.0 | 2.0.0 | | +| 09-2004 | SP-25 | SP-040621 | 000
1 | - | | GBA User Security Settings | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | SEC1-SC | +| 09-2004 | SP-25 | SP-040621 | 000
2 | - | | GBA supported indication and NAF hostname transfer in HTTP and in PSK TLS | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | SEC1-SC | +| 09-2004 | SP-25 | SP-040621 | 000
3 | - | | Editorial clean-up of TS 33.222 | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 09-2004 | SP-25 | SP-040621 | 000
4 | - | | Further modifications to TLS profile related text in 33.222 | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | SEC1-SC | +| 12-2004 | SP-26 | SP-040889 | 000
5 | - | | GBA supported indication in PSK TLS | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | GBA-SSC | +| 12-2004 | SP-26 | SP-040889 | 000
7 | 1 | | Adding Support for AES in the TLS Profile | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | GBA-SSC | +| 12-2004 | SP-26 | SP-040889 | 001
0 | 1 | | Authorization flag transfer between AP and AS | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | GBA-SSC | +| 12-2004 | SP-26 | SP-040889 | 001
2 | - | | Correction of inconsistencies within AP specification | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | GBA-SSC | +| 12-2004 | SP-26 | SP-040889 | 001
3 | 1 | | TLS extensions support | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | SEC1-SC | +| 12-2004 | SP-26 | SP-040889 | 001
4 | - | | Visited AS using subscriber certificates | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | SEC1-SC | +| 03-2005 | SP-27 | SP-050141 | 001
5 | 3 | | Keeping PSK TLS in 3GPP Rel-6 | 6.2.0 | 6.3.0 | SEC1-SC | +| 03-2005 | SP-27 | SP-050141 | 001
6 | 1 | | Clarification to TS 33.222 | 6.2.0 | 6.3.0 | SEC1-SC | +| 03-2005 | SP-27 | SP-050166 | 001
7 | 3 | | Clarify the GBA requirements for https supporting applications at Ua reference point | 6.2.0 | 6.3.0 | GBA-SSC | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050264 | 001
9 | - | F | Removal of editor's note | 6.3.0 | 6.4.0 | SEC1-SC | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050558 | 002
0 | - | F | Adding additional mandatory CipherSuites for PSK TLS | 6.4.0 | 6.5.0 | SEC1-SC | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050568 | 002
1 | - | F | Removing an inconsistency within TS 33.222 (Section 6.2) | 6.4.0 | 6.5.0 | GBA-SSC | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050568 | 002
3 | - | F | Adding a clarification to TS 33.222 (Section 6.1) | 6.4.0 | 6.5.0 | GBA-SSC | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050575 | 002
2 | - | B | Usage of Ks_int_NAF for HTTPS connection between a UICC and a NAF | 6.4.0 | 7.0.0 | GBA-SSC | +| 2006-03 | SP-31 | SP-060054 | 002
5 | - | A | Update PSK TLS Reference | 7.0.0 | 7.1.0 | SEC7-GAA2 (GAA Ext) | +| 2006-09 | SP-33 | SP-060501 | 002
6 | - | F | Clarification of using HTTP digest with HTTPS | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | SEC1-SC | +| 2007-12 | SP-38 | SP-070787 | 002
7 | - | F | Usage of OMA References – Update of References | 7.2.0 | 7.3.0 | GAA2 | +| 2007-12 | SP-38 | SP-070793 | 002
8 | - | F | Certificate based mutual authentication: TLS profile | 7.2.0 | 7.3.0 | GAA2 | + +| | | | | | | | | | | +|---------|-------|-----------|----------|----|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|---------| +| 2008-06 | SP-40 | SP-080265 | 002
9 | - | F | Clarification of usage of NULL encryption and TLS | 7.3.0 | 8.0.0 | TEI8 | +| 2009-12 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-9 version (MCC) | 8.0.0 | 9.0.0 | - | +| 2010-06 | SP-48 | SP-100361 | 003
0 | 1 | F | Deprecation of SHA-1 | 9.0.0 | 9.1.0 | TEI9 | +| 2010-10 | SP-49 | SP-110482 | 003
1 | 1 | C | Unification of TLS and certificate references in TS 33.222 with TS 33.310 | 9.1.0 | 10.0.0 | TEI10 | +| 2011-12 | SP-54 | -- | -- | -- | -- | Editorial correction of change history | 10.0.0 | 10.0.1 | -- | +| 2012-03 | SP-55 | SP-120039 | 003
2 | 1 | F | Correction of Reference | 10.0.1 | | Sec11 | +| | | | 003
3 | - | F | Clarification of Mandatory Implementation | | | | +| | | | 003
4 | - | F | Update of TLS extensions version | | 11.0.0 | | +| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120341 | 003
5 | - | F | Correction of TLS Extensions References to point to TS 33.310 | 11.0.0 | 11.1.0 | SEC11 | +| 2012-09 | SP-57 | SP-120604 | 003
6 | - | F | Taking into account GBA_Digest for HTTPS-based Ua interface | 11.1.0 | 11.2.0 | GBA-ext | +| 2012-09 | SP-57 | SP-120605 | 003
7 | - | F | Correction of psk-TLS references and NULL cipher profiles to point to TS 33.310 | 11.1.0 | 11.2.0 | SEC11 | +| 2012-10 | | | | | | Correction of History Table | 11.2.0 | 11.2.1 | | +| 2012-10 | | | | | | Editorial corrections | 11.2.1 | 11.2.2 | | +| 2012-12 | SP-58 | SP-120856 | 003
8 | 1 | D | Clarification of the term application specific user security settings | 11.2.2 | 12.0.0 | SEC12 | +| 2013-03 | SP-59 | SP-130035 | 003
9 | 1 | B | Addition of definitions, abbreviations and references for web GBA | 12.0.0 | 12.1.0 | Web_GBA | +| | | | 004
0 | 2 | B | Addition of informative Annex on usage scenarios, threats and control of GBA credentials to guide developers | | | | +| | | | 004
1 | 2 | B | Addition to the new informative Annex on security considerations | | | | +| | | | 004
2 | 1 | B | Addition of new normative Annex on channel binding, key derivation and message flow | | | | +| 2013-06 | SP-60 | SP-130301 | 004
4 | 1 | C | Correction of Ua security protocol identifier text | 12.1.0 | 12.2.0 | Web_GBA | +| | | | 004
5 | 1 | F | Missing reference added | | | | +| | | | 004
6 | - | C | Clarification on usage of confidentiality and integrity for TLS tunnel | | | | +| | | | 004
7 | - | F | Removal of editor's note | | | | +| | | | 004
8 | 1 | C | Combination of Channel Binding Methods | | | | +| | | | 004
9 | 1 | B | Addition of details on API | | | | +| 2013-12 | SP-62 | SP-130684 | 005
1 | 1 | A | Clarification of NAF key negotiation on Ua | 12.2.0 | 12.3.0 | GBA-ext | +| 2016-01 | SP-70 | | | | | Upgrade to Rel-13 (MCC) | 12.3.0 | 13.0.0 | | + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|----|-----|-----|----------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2017-03 | SA#75 | | | | | Promotion to Release 14 without technical change | 14.0.0 | +| 2018-06 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-15 version (MCC) | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 16.0.0 | +| 2020-12 | SA#90e | SP-201010 | | | | Aligning TLS in 33.222 with the current 3GPP TLS profile | 16.1.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33223/79e1709a7317ead45379cbb8ff3ba802_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33223/79e1709a7317ead45379cbb8ff3ba802_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 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7 | +| 4.1 Introduction ..... | 7 | +| 4.1.1 General ..... | 7 | +| 4.1.2 GBA-Push system overview..... | 7 | +| 4.2 GBA Push Architecture..... | 8 | +| 4.2.1 Description and Rationale ..... | 8 | +| 4.2.2 GBA-Push keying model..... | 9 | +| 4.3 GBA Push Requirements ..... | 9 | +| 4.3.1 General GBA Push Requirements ..... | 9 | +| 4.3.2 Requirements on HSS and HLR..... | 10 | +| 4.3.3 Requirements on BSF..... | 10 | +| 4.3.4 Requirements on UE..... | 10 | +| 4.3.5 Requirements on Reference Point Upa..... | 10 | +| 4.3.6 Requirements on Reference Point Zh..... | 10 | +| 4.3.7 Requirements on Reference Point Zpn and Zpn' ..... | 10 | +| 4.3.8 Requirements on Zn-Proxy..... | 12 | +| 4.3.9 Requirements on Reference Point Ua..... | 12 | +| 4.3.10 Requirements on NAF SA identifiers..... | 12 | +| 4.3.11 Requirements on Reference Point Dz..... | 12 | +| 5 GBA Push Function ..... | 12 | +| 5.1 GBA Push Message Flow and Processing ..... | 12 | +| 5.1.1 GBA Push Message Flow..... | 12 | +| 5.1.2 NAF processing before issuing GPI request ..... | 14 | +| 5.1.3 BSF processing of NAF GPI request..... | 14 | +| 5.1.4 UE processing of GPI..... | 15 | +| 5.2 Data objects..... | 17 | +| 5.2.1 GBA Push Information (GPI)..... | 17 | +| 5.2.2 NAF SA identities ..... | 17 | +| 5.2.3 NAF SA..... | 17 | +| 5.3 GPI Integrity and Confidentiality Protection ..... | 18 | +| 5.3.1 General considerations ..... | 18 | +| 5.3.2 Key material generation..... | 18 | +| 5.3.3 GPI Integrity protection..... | 19 | +| 5.3.4 GPI Confidentiality protection ..... | 19 | +| 5.3.5 GPI message format and coding..... | 19 | +| 5.4 Procedures using the NAF SA ..... | 20 | +| Annex A (informative): Rationale behind choice of the Disposable-Ks model ..... | 21 | +| Annex B (normative): GBA-Push UE registration procedure ..... | 22 | +| Annex Z (informative): Change history..... | 23 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- Introduction + +3GPP defined the Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA). The adoption of GAA by other standardization bodies showed that some services can not make the assumption that the User Equipment (UE) has always the possibility to connect to the Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF) or that the UE for different reasons has not performed a bootstrapping procedure directly with the BSF. Hence, this specification introduces and specifies a GBA Push Function. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document specifies a Push Function as a functional add-on for the Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) [1]. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic bootstrapping architecture". +- [2] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [3] 3GPP TS 33.210: "3G Security; Network Domain Security; IP network layer security". +- [4] IETF RFC 2246 (1999): "The TLS Protocol Version 1". +- [5] Void. +- [6] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3G Security; Security architecture". +- [7] FIPS PUB 180-2 (2002): "Secure Hash Standard". +- [8] IETF RFC 2104 (1997): "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication". +- [9] ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004: "Information Technology – Security techniques – Hash-functions – Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions". +- [10] NIST Special Publication 800-38A: "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation" +- [11] FIPS PUB 197: "Advanced Encryption Standard" +- [12] Void +- [13] 3GPP TS 33.222 "Access to network application functions using Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security (HTTPS)". +- [14] 3GPP TS 29.109 "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Zh and Zn Interfaces based on the Diameter protocol; Stage 3". +- [15] 3GPP TS 33.224 "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) Push Layer". +- [15] 3GPP TS 31.101 "UICC-terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics". +- [16] IETF RFC 4330: "Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) Version 4 for IPv4, IPv6 and OSI". + +# 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [2], TS 33.220 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [2]. + +**AUTN(\*)**: In GBA context, GBA\_ME relies on AUTN value to verify that the authentication vector is from an authorised network, while GBA\_U relies on AUTN\* to perform network authentication as described in [1]. AUTN(\*) is used to refer both to AUTN and AUTN\*. + +**AUTS**: Defined in TS 33.102 [6]. + +**Disposable-Ks model**: The keying model used in GBA-push. Only one NAF-key is generated per Ks and the Ks cannot be reused. + +**GBA\_U aware UICC**: A UICC which supports GBA\_U which means that the Ks will never leave the UICC. + +**GBA-Push-Info**: GBA-Push-Info contains data relevant for key derivation in GBA Push. GBA-Push\_Info is sent via the Upa-reference point from the NAF to the UE. + +**NAF\_Id**: The FQDN of the NAF, concatenated with the Ua security protocol identifier, + +**NAF-key**: A NAF-key derived from Ks. It can be used to refer to Ks\_(int/ext)\_NAF or Ks\_NAF. + +**NAF SA**: A security association between a NAF and a UE based on a NAF-key. + +**Push-message**: This is a message that is sent on a Ua-reference point from the NAF to the UE and has applied GBA keys that were bootstrapped via the Upa-reference point. + +**Push-NAF**: A NAF authorized for using GBA-Push. + +**UE\_Trp**: The transport address used for delivery of GPI to the UE. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [2] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [2]. + +| | | +|------------|--------------------------------------| +| BSF | Bootstrapping Server Function | +| B-TID | Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier | +| FQDN | Fully Qualified Domain Name | +| GAA | Generic Authentication Architecture | +| GBA | Generic Bootstrapping Architecture | +| GBA_ME | ME-based GBA | +| GBA_U | GBA with UICC-based enhancements | +| GPI | GBA Push Info | +| GUSS | GBA User Security Settings | +| HLR | Home Location Register | +| HSS | Home Subscriber Server | +| Ks_NAF | NAF-key in GBA_ME mode | +| Ks_int_NAF | UICC internal NAF-key in GBA_U | +| Ks_ext_NAF | UICC external NAF-key in GBA_U | +| ME | Mobile Equipment | +| NAF | Network Application Function | +| P-TID | Push Temporary Identifier | +| SA | Security Association | +| UE | User Equipment | +| USS | User Security Setting | + +# 4 GBA Push Architecture + +## 4.1 Introduction + +### 4.1.1 General + +GBA-push is a mechanism to bootstrap the security between a NAF and a UE, without forcing the UE to contact the BSF to initiate the bootstrapping. GBA-Push is closely related to and builds upon GBA as specified in TS 33.220 [1]. GBA-Push is aimed for both GBA\_U and GBA\_ME environments. + +### 4.1.2 GBA-Push system overview + +The system overview in this clause gives a high level description of the general ideas behind the GBA-Push system solution and the features it offers. + +The generic use case considered is that a NAF initiate's establishment of a shared Security Association (SA), a NAF SA, between itself and a UE. This is done by the NAF pushing all information, the so called GBA-Push-Info (GPI), needed for the UE to set-up the SA. The key in this SA is a NAF-key and the GPI is requested from the BSF. The NAF-key is generated as defined in GBA, TS 33.220 [1]. + +After the NAF SA establishment, the NAF can send protected Push-messages to the UE. If a return channel exists and if defined by the Ua application, the UE can also use the established SA to protect response messages to the initiating NAF. How the NAF SA is used is out of scope for this specification. The NAF SA is identified by downlink and uplink SA identifiers. + +GBA-Push is aimed for both GBA\_U and GBA\_ME environments. To only establish an external NAF-key with GBA-Push, the ME-based functionality, GBA\_ME, should be used. GBA-Push based on GBA\_U will establish both an internal and external NAF-key. + +GBA-Push utilizes a so called Disposable-Ks model. In the Disposable-Ks model, a Ks is only used once to derive a single set of NAF-keys (and other keying material used to protect the GPI during transport). After the NAF-key derivation, the Ks is erased or its further usage is denied. A new GBA-Push operation will be needed whenever a new set of NAF-keys for the same or another NAF is needed. + +NOTE 1: A generated NAF-key can be used to protect multiple Push-messages from the NAF to the UE. NAF-keys from different NAFs can coexist. + +With the Disposable-Ks model, existing NAF-keys established as specified in TS 33.220 [1] or by GBA-Push will be unaffected. GBA\_ME based GBA-Push will not interact with GBA\_U but a GBA\_U based GBA Push will invalidate an existing Ks on the UICC. + +NOTE 2: TS 33.220 [1] specifies that an existing Ks on the UICC will be overwritten when a new GBA\_U Ks-generation procedure is executed. The ME may of course trigger a new bootstrap procedure immediately after the GBA-Push operation to avoid delays and certain synch problems when the UE operates GBA according to TS33.220 [1]. + +The transport method of GPI from a NAF to a UE is not standardized. + +NOTE 3: Examples of possible transport methods are SMS, MMS, SIP MESSAGE, UDP or broadcast. For the transport of GPI to UEs, a NAF needs to know the message transport addresses to use for the chosen transport method. For SMS and MMS the transport address is the MSISDN, for SIP MESSAGE it is an IMPU and for UDP an UDP port - IP-address pair. For broadcast delivery the UE transport addresses could be any public identity associated with a UE or an identity agreed between the NAF and the UE. + +Resending of messages is a standard method to get "reliability" for delivery over unreliable channels like e.g. SMS or broadcast. Hence the GBA-Push shall allow that GPI is retransmitted several times including cases when it is sent every time a payload is pushed to the UE. Thus the system shall handle retransmissions of GPI efficiently. + +The NAF SA defined by the GPI, is based on the use of a particular UICC (USIM/ISIM) application. Sometimes the transport method / address indicate to the UE which UICC application to use but in other cases it has to be explicitly signaled. If MSISDN is used as delivery address, then the USIM associated with that MSISDN should be used. This is so because a SMS will only reach the UE when the USIM corresponding to the MSISDN is active in the UE. When an + +IMPU is used as destination address, the corresponding ISIM should be used. For UDP and broadcast the USIM/ISIM application to use has to be indicated in the GPI or be agreed upon out of band. + +To protect user privacy, parts of the GPI shall be confidentiality protected, in particular the identity of the initiating NAF when broadcast transport is used. For unlinkability between NAF to UE and UE to NAF messages, a separate SA identity for UE to NAF security shall be assigned by the NAF and be included in the confidentiality protected part of the GPI. To help prevent serious effects of DoS attacks and thwart some NAF misuse of GBA-Push, the GPI also needs to be integrity protected. The integrity protection of GPI will also prevent that incorrect GBA Push security associations are accepted by the UE as it will detect transmission errors. The keys for confidentiality and integrity protection are derived from the Ks defined by the GPI. + +## 4.2 GBA Push Architecture + +### 4.2.1 Description and Rationale + +The GBA Push functionality builds on the architecture and functionality provided by TS 33.220 [1]. The main difference from TS 33.220 [1] is the definition of new reference points between the BSF and the NAF and between the NAF and the UE, as indicated in figure 4.2-1, which is a modified version of figure 4.1 in TS 33.220 [1]. + +![Figure 4.2-1: Simple network model for pushed bootstrapping via NAF. The diagram shows a network architecture with HSS at the top connected to BSF. BSF is connected to SLF (dashed box) via Dz and to NAF via Zpn. NAF is connected to UE via Upa and Ua. There are break symbols on the Zh, Zpn, Upa, and Ua lines.](e1a0d046fbe7f28f5e93a47091851747_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + HSS[HSS] --- Zh((Zh)) + Zh --- BSF[BSF] + BSF -.- Dz((Dz)) -.- SLF[SLF] + BSF --- Zpn((Zpn)) + Zpn --- NAF[NAF] + NAF --- Upa((Upa)) + Upa --- UE[UE] + NAF --- Ua((Ua)) + Ua --- UE + +``` + +Figure 4.2-1: Simple network model for pushed bootstrapping via NAF. The diagram shows a network architecture with HSS at the top connected to BSF. BSF is connected to SLF (dashed box) via Dz and to NAF via Zpn. NAF is connected to UE via Upa and Ua. There are break symbols on the Zh, Zpn, Upa, and Ua lines. + +**Figure 4.2-1: Simple network model for pushed bootstrapping via NAF** + +The GBA Push architecture outlined in figure 4.2-1 is based on the following rationales: + +- The Ua reference point protection shall be unaffected i.e. it should not make any difference for Ua-protocols whether the GBA-keys used for protection are UE-initiated or push-initiated. +- In viewpoint of the BSF, the NAF is still the initiating entity of a key retrieval, but now in situations where the NAF has no B-TID (but the UE may have a valid GBA session). A Zpn reference point is introduced, based on the Zn-reference point protocols defined by TS 33.220 [1]. +- A new reference point Upa is introduced between the NAF and the UE. All messages over Upa are network initiated. Upa defines the GBA-Push-Info. +- The NAF receives the GBA-Push-Info intended for the UE from the BSF over the Zpn reference point and forwards it over Upa. + +### 4.2.2 GBA-Push keying model + +The Disposable-Ks model is the keying model used in GBA-Push. In the Disposable-Ks model, a Ks is only used once to derive a single set of NAF-keys (and other keying material used to protect the GPI during transport, see clause 5.3). After the NAF-key derivation, the Ks is erased or its further use is denied implicitly, which means that there will be no generally usable Ks established. + +To only establish an external NAF-key with GBA-Push, GBA\_ME can and should always be used. This functionality does not require a GBA\_U aware UICC. GBA-Push based on GBA\_U will establish both an internal and an external NAF-key. NAF-keys are derived as specified in TS 33.220 [1]. + +In GBA\_ME based GBA-Push bootstrapping, a Ks, generated by a bootstrapping according to TS 33.220 [1], will be unaffected. + +In GBA\_U based GBA Push bootstrapping, a GBA\_U Ks generated by bootstrapping according to TS 33.220 [1] will be invalidated. A new GBA\_U Ks needs to be established using normal GBA if an application requires GBA\_U NAF-keys after GBA\_U based GBA-Push bootstrapping. Applications can continue using NAF-keys derived from such an invalidated Ks, i.e. applications already using NAF-keys are unaffected of the GBA-Push bootstrapping run. + +GBA-Push only supports generation of so called NAF SAs, shared by a UE and a NAF. A NAF SA contains a NAF-key, key life-time and other information as defined in clause 5.2.3. + +## 4.3 GBA Push Requirements + +### 4.3.1 General GBA Push Requirements + +The following general requirements are applicable to enable GBA Push: + +- A network entity, a so called Push NAF, shall be able to securely trigger the generation of a NAF SA between itself and a UE. +- A Push-NAF shall be able to use channels with deferred delivery of messages when triggering the generation of a NAF SA. +- A Push-NAF shall be able to use public identities when referencing a UE in a request towards the BSF. +- When a public identifier is used for GBA push it shall correspond uniquely to a single private identity. +- ME based GBA Push shall be used when only ME based NAF keys are needed, i.e. Ks is established in the ME. UICC based GBA Push shall be used only when UE contains a GBA aware UICC (GBA\_U), and when UICC and ME based NAF keys are needed or when only UICC based NAF keys are needed, i.e. Ks is established in the UICC. +- The generation of the NAF SA in the UE is triggered by the reception of a message pushed to the UE from the Push-NAF. +- The UE should not have to contact any network entity to be able to correctly generate the NAF SA. +- The UE and the NAF shall be able to use bootstrapped NAF-keys on Ua reference point independent on whether the bootstrapping has been performed via Ub or Upa reference point. + +NOTE: When a GBA-push mechanism is used to create a NAF SA between the UE and the NAF, the NAF is not restricted to use the derived security association for network initiated protocols only. Analogously, the fact that UE initiated GBA was used does not restrict a NAF to use the derived security association for UE-initiated protocols only (Ua reference point). + +- The mechanism to generate keys for confidentiality and integrity protection of GPI shall be based on GBA-principles in order to avoid pre-configuration of keys. +- The NAF shall be unable to obtain or generate the keys that protect GPI. + +### 4.3.2 Requirements on HSS and HLR + +The requirements for HSS and HLR are in TS 33.220 [1]. + +### 4.3.3 Requirements on BSF + +In addition to the BSF requirements in clause 4.2.1 of TS 33.220 [1] following requirements apply: + +- The BSF shall be able to find the private identity corresponding to a public identity. +- The BSF shall index existing Ks's based on private user identity. + +- The BSF shall generate GPI based on a fresh Ks. +- The BSF shall integrity protect the GPI. +- The BSF shall confidentiality protect certain fields in the GPI. The fields that shall be confidentially protected are given in clause 5.2.1. + +### 4.3.4 Requirements on UE + +In addition to the UE requirements in clause 4.2.4 of TS 33.220 [1] the following requirements apply: + +- The UE shall be able to store and handle NAF SAs. +- An ME implementing this specification shall also implement GBA\_U and GBA-ME as specified in TS 33.220 [1]. +- The UE may implement an authorization mechanism to authorize incoming GBA Push messages. + +NOTE: The GBA Push message authorization mechanism can be based on white or black lists of FQDN names of the Push-NAFs. + +### 4.3.5 Requirements on Reference Point Upa + +The requirements for reference point Upa are: + +- The UE shall be able to validate that the GPI comes from an authorized source (BSF) based on AKA + +NOTE 1: The Push-NAF is indirectly authenticated by its knowledge of Ks(\_ext/int)\_NAF (i.e. BSF has authenticated the NAF). + +- The UE shall be able to determine the UICC (USIM/ISIM) application used for bootstrapping. +- The NAF and the UE shall be able to establish a shared NAF SA. +- The NAF shall be able to send NAF SA identifier information. +- the BSF shall be able to indicate to the UE the lifetime of the key material. The key lifetime sent by the BSF over Upa shall indicate the expiry time of the key. + +NOTE 2: The requirements for the Upa reference point are based on the requirements of the Ub reference point c.f. TS 33.220 [1]. + +### 4.3.6 Requirements on Reference Point Zh + +The requirements for reference point Zh are in TS 33.220 [1]. + +### 4.3.7 Requirements on Reference Point Zpn and Zpn' + +The requirements for reference point Zpn are: + +- Mutual authentication, confidentiality and integrity shall be provided. +- If the BSF and the NAF are located within the same operator's network, the DIAMETER based Zpn reference point shall be secured according to NDS/IP, TS 33.210 [3]. +- If the BSF and the NAF are located in different operators' networks, the DIAMETER based Zpn' reference point between the Zn-Proxy and the BSF shall be secured using TLS as specified in RFC 2246 [4]. + +NOTE 1: Annex E of TS 33.220 [1] specifies the TLS profile that shall be applied. + +- A Web Services based Zpn/Zpn' reference point shall be secured using TLS as specified in RFC 2246 [4]; + +NOTE 2: Annex E of TS 33.220 [1] specifies the TLS profile that shall be applied. + +- The BSF shall verify that the requesting NAF is authorised to obtain the key material or the key material and the requested USS. + +- The NAF shall be able to send a key material request to the BSF, containing NAF's public hostname corresponding to the use over Upa reference point. The BSF shall be able to verify that a NAF is authorized to use this hostname, i.e. the FQDN seen by UE on Upa reference point. + +NOTE 3: This requirement is a modified requirement from [1] that has been adapted for the GBA Push purpose. + +NOTE 3a: Due to the fact that the UE may be unable to verify the pNAF FQDN, it is important to strictly check the pNAF FQDN-name in the network in the Zpn-proxy. A too loose checking of the pNAF FQDN name e.g. by verification of only part of the FQDN, may give rise to misuse by pNAFs. + +- The BSF shall be able to send the requested key material to the NAF. +- The NAF shall be able to get a selected set of application-specific USSs from the BSF, depending on the policy of the BSF and the application indicated in the request from the NAF over Zpn. +- The NAF shall be able to indicate to the BSF the single application or several applications it requires USSs for. + +NOTE 4: If some application needs only a subset of an application-specific USS, e.g. only one IMPU, the NAF selects this subset from the complete set of USS sent from BSF. + +- The BSF shall be able to be configured on a per NAF or per application basis. +- Whether private subscriber identity, i.e. IMPI, may be sent to the NAF. +- Whether a particular USS may be sent to a NAF. +- If a NAF requests USSs from the BSF and they are not present in subscriber's GUSS, it shall not cause an error, provided the conditions of the local policy of the BSF are fulfilled. The BSF shall then send only the requested and found USSs to the NAF. +- It shall be possible to configure a local policy as follows: BSF may require one or more application-specific USS to be present in a particular subscriber's GUSS for a particular requesting NAF, and to reject the request from the NAF in case the conditions are not fulfilled. In order to satisfy this local policy, it is not required that the NAF requests the USSs over the Zpn reference point, which the BSF requires to be present in the GUSS, rather it is sufficient that the BSF checks the presence of the USSs locally. It shall also be possible to configure the BSF in such a way that no USS is required for the requesting NAF. + +NOTE 5: For more information on the local policy usage, see Annex J of TS 33.220 [1]. + +- The NAF shall be able to request the life-time that a NAF SA should have. The key lifetime sent by the BSF over Zpn shall indicate the expiry time of the key. + +NOTE 6: This does not preclude a NAF to refresh the NAF SA before the expiry time according to the NAF's local policy. + +NOTE 7: If one or more of the USSs that have been delivered to the NAF has been updated in subscriber's GUSS in the HSS, this change is propagated to the NAF the next time it fetches the USS from the BSF over Zpn reference point (provided that the BSF has updated subscriber's GUSS from the HSS over Zh reference point). + +- NAF shall be able to indicate to BSF the protocol identifier of Ua security protocol for which it requires the key material (cf. Annex H of TS 33.220 [1]). +- The NAF shall be able to indicate the user identity to the BSF. Both public and private identities shall be allowed. + +NOTE 8: The requirements for reference point Zpn are based on the Zn-reference point requirements as described in TS 33.220 [1]. + +- The NAF shall be able to indicate whether GBA\_ME or GBA\_U shall be used. + +### 4.3.8 Requirements on Zn-Proxy + +In the case that push NAF is operated in a network other than the home network, this visited NAF shall use a Zn-proxy of the NAF's network to communicate with the subscriber's BSF (i.e. home BSF). The requirements for the Zn proxy are described in TS 33.220 [1]. + +### 4.3.9 Requirements on Reference Point Ua + +The requirements for reference point Ua are as in TS 33.220 [1] with the following addition: + +- It shall be possible to use SA identifiers in the uplink that are unlinkable with the push message establishing the used NAF SA. + +### 4.3.10 Requirements on NAF SA identifiers + +- The downlink NAF SA identifier shall be unique within the UE and uniquely identify that it references a NAF SA for a particular NAF\_Id. +- The uplink NAF SA identifier shall be unique within the NAF and uniquely identify that it references a NAF SA for a particular UE and Ua security protocol identity. + +### 4.3.11 Requirements on Reference Point Dz + +This interface between BSF and SLF is used to retrieve the address of the HSS and the requirements are the same as described in TS 33.220 [1]. This interface is not required in a single HSS environment. + +# --- 5 GBA Push Function + +## 5.1 GBA Push Message Flow and Processing + +### 5.1.1 GBA Push Message Flow + +Figure 5.1-1 outlines the message flow for the case, where the NAF wants to send data to the UE, but has no valid NAF-key available i.e. no Ks(\_int/ext)\_NAF available The reason that the NAF has to initiate NAF SA establishment can be that the UE may be unable to perform a bootstrapping procedure directly with the BSF or that the UE should not perform a bootstrapping procedure directly with the BSF + +NOTE 1: An example use case when the UE is unable to perform a bootstrapping procedure is in a broadcast scenario. + +If the subscriber is managed in an HLR instead of the HSS then GUSS functionality and SLF functionality are not available otherwise the functional flow is the same when substituting the word HSS by HLR in the text and the message flow below. + +![Sequence diagram showing the high level message flow description for bootstrapping through the NAF. Lifelines: UE, NAF, BSF, HSS. The process involves generating a GPI request, sending it to the BSF, processing it through the HSS, generating the GPI, and then pushing it to the UE via the NAF.](ff0952ef692c9d960ce5f6708bcc9711_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant NAF + participant BSF + participant HSS + + Note right of NAF: 1. Generate GPI Request +(See 5.1.2) + NAF->>BSF: 2. GPI request: UE_ Id,... + Note right of BSF: 3. Initial processing of GPI Request. + BSF-->>HSS: 4. AV Request: IMPI,... + HSS-->>BSF: 5. AV Response: AV, USS,... + Note right of BSF: 6. GPI generation. +(See steps 6 – 9 in 5.1.3 ) + BSF->>NAF: 7. GPI Response: GPI, ... + Note right of NAF: 8. NAF SA Storage + NAF->>UE: 9. GPI Push + Note left of UE: 10. NAF SA Storage + + Note right of NAF: Push message + NAF->>UE: Push message +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the high level message flow description for bootstrapping through the NAF. Lifelines: UE, NAF, BSF, HSS. The process involves generating a GPI request, sending it to the BSF, processing it through the HSS, generating the GPI, and then pushing it to the UE via the NAF. + +**Figure 5.1.1-1: High level message flow description for bootstrapping through the NAF** + +A precondition for use of GBA-Push is that the UE is registered with the Push-NAF for the intended service. Annex B describes information that the Push-NAF must register to be able to deliver the push service and the information that has to be agreed between the UE and the Push-NAF. + +Processing and message flow: + +1. A NAF needs to establish a shared NAF SA with a UE which is registered for Push services. It knows the identity of the subscriber. The Push-NAF performs the processing described in clause 5.1.2 and generates the GPI Request. +2. The NAF sends the GPI Request to the BSF. +3. Upon receiving the request from the NAF, the BSF performs the processing steps 1 to 5 described in clause 5.1.3. + +4. The BSF fetches a new AV and subscriber's GUSS from the HSS. The GUSS contains subscriber security related information e.g. UICC GBA awareness and USS elements. +- 5 The HSS sends the AV and the GUSS to the BSF. +6. When the BSF receives the AV Response from the HSS, it performs the processing steps 6 to 9 described in clause 5.1.3. +7. The BSF sends the GPI Response to the NAF. +8. The NAF stores the received information together with other user information in a NAF SA, see clause 5.2.3. +9. The NAF then forwards the GPI to the UE over Upa using the selected transport mechanism and the given transport address. +10. When the UE receives the message containing the GPI, it processes the GPI as defined in clause 5.1.4 and stores the corresponding NAF SA(s) + +The UE and NAF are now ready to use the established NAF SA. + +### 5.1.2 NAF processing before issuing GPI request + +The NAF reads its available data associated with the user and the application for which the NAF SA shall be established. The NAF then determines the Ua security protocol identifier to use in the request to the BSF. It also determines the required life-time of the NAF SA. The NAF then generates the GPI request containing the parameters as given in table 5.1.2. . + +If the NAF has received an AUTS parameter and a RAND from the UE indicating that a synchronisation failure has occurred on the USIM when the UE processed the previous GPI, then the NAF shall use the RAND to identify the corresponding NAF SA for this particular UE and include the AUTS and the RAND in the new NAF GPI request to the BSF. If the NAF has received the RAND and AUTS protected via the Ua interface, the NAF may invalidate the NAF SA until it has received a new GPI response from the BSF . + +NOTE : Allowing the NAF to invalidate the NAF SA is Ua protocol specific. If the NAF invalidates the NAF SA when it receives the AUTS and the RAND unprotected on the Ua interface, then it would open up for an attack where an attacker could invalidate the NAF SA's. + +**Table 5.1.2.1: Parameters in NAF GPI request** + +| Parameter name | Description | Notes | +|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| UE_Id | UE identifier | This may be a private or a public identifier. | +| UE_Id_Type | Indicator if UE_Id is a public or private identity | This information is needed by the BSF to correctly trigger the Public to Private Id resolution towards a HSS/HLR | +| App_Lbl | Identifier for UICC application to use | This variable may be left empty if the UICC application to use is evident from context or agreement. | +| NAF_Id | Concatenation of NAF FQDN and Ua security protocol Id | Defined in TS 33.220 [1] | +| P-TID | NAF SA identifier | To be used by UE when responding to NAF. The identifier is included only to enable that it is confidentiality protected in the GPI. See also clause 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. | +| U/M | Indicator for use of GBA_ME or GBA_U | | +| Key_LT | Requested NAF-Key life time | | +| Priv_Id | Indicates request for private user identity | Private user identity is IMSI/IMPI for the selected UICC application (USIM/ISIM) | +| GSID_List | GSIDs of USS request information | | +| AUTS | AUTS in UMTS AKA | Defined in TS 33.102[6]. | +| RAND | RAND in UMTS AKA | Defined in TS 33.102[6]. | + +### 5.1.3 BSF processing of NAF GPI request + +When the BSF receives the GPI request from the NAF it performs the following processing steps: + +1. The BSF checks that the NAF is authorized to use the NAF\_Id provided in the GPI request. If it is not, an error message is generated and the processing is terminated. + +The BSF checks that the requested Key\_LT in the GPI request is less than the allowed max value in the system. If the value is greater than the max value an error message is generated and the processing is terminated. + +2. If the UE\_Id is a public identity, the BSF resolves the corresponding private identity (i.e. IMPI or IMSI) as specified in TS 29.109 [14]. +3. If needed, the BSF retrieves the HSS address for the given UE using the SLF. +4. The BSF requests an AV, and subscriber's GUSS from the HSS. + +NOTE 1: If the network utilizes an HLR, then no SLF is used. + +NOTE 2: If the network utilizes an HLR, then GUSS can be realized using an external database as defined in TS 33.220 [1]. + +If the BSF receives an indication of synchronization failure in the GPI request from the NAF, i.e. when an AUTS and a RAND are included in the GPI request, then the BSF shall include these AUTS and RAND parameters within the AV request to the HSS (TS 29.109 [14]). + +5. The BSF checks if GBA\_ME or GBA\_U is requested by the NAF. If GBA\_U is requested the BSF checks that this is compatible with the GBA awareness of the UICC according to the GUSS information. If it is not, an error message is generated and the processing is terminated. + +The BSF may use USS for policy management and key selection indication as described in TS 33.220 [1]. +If GBA\_U is requested the BSF queries its database to find out if the private UE\_Id is registered and if a valid Ks already exists. If a valid Ks exists the BSF shall invalidate this Ks. + +If the network utilizes an HLR instead of an HSS, then the BSF request only the AV from the HLR. + +NOTE 3: If the network utilizes an HLR, then GUSS can be realized using an external database as defined in TS 33.220 [1] + +6. The BSF generates the requested NAF-key(s) according to provided NAF\_Id. +7. The BSF generates the GPI. The parameters of the GPI are defined in clause 5.2.1. The generation of the GPI includes calculation of the GPI MAC and performing confidentiality protection on parts of the GPI. GPI protection is described in clause 5.3. +8. The BSF sends its response to the NAF, and deletes the Ks used. The GPI response is defined in table 5.1.3.1. + +**Table 5.1.3.1: Parameters in GPI response** + +| Parameter name | Description | Notes | +|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| GPI | GPI | GPI information is defined clause 5.2.1 | +| Ks_NAF /
Ks_ext_NAF | External NAF-key | Ks_NAF is generated in GBA_ME based GBA-Push
Ks_ext_NAF is generated in GBA_U based GBA_Push | +| Ks_int_NAF | UICC internal NAF-key | Ks_int_NAF is generated in GBA_U based GBA_Push | +| Key_LT | NAF-Key life time | | +| UE_Priv_Id | Private user identity (IMSI/IMPI) for used UE_Id | Only returned if requested and public user identity was used in GPI request and the NAF is authorized by the BSF to receive the private user identity. | +| USS | USS information | If available | + +### 5.1.4 UE processing of GPI + +When the UE receives a GPI it performs the following steps. + +1. UE receives GPI. The parameters of the GPI are defined in clauses 5.2.1 and 5.3.5. +2. If the App\_Lbl in the GPI is included, then if the App\_Lbl: + - a. indicates a USIM or ISIM application which is already active then the UE continues processing from step 4. + - b. indicates a USIM application different from the currently active USIM application, then the ME shall reject the request, as there at most, only can be one USIM active at one time. + - c. indicates a ISIM application different from the currently active ISIM application(s), then the ME shall not terminate the currently active ISIM application(s), but instead the ME shall activate the ISIM application as defined in TS 31.101 [15], as the UE is allowed to have several ISIM applications active simultaneously. +3. If the App\_Lbl in the GPI is undefined, the UE determines the UICC application to use from used delivery channel of the GPI (e.g. SMS, MMS, SIP Message, etc) or from other context information. +4. UE checks if it has received the same GPI earlier. + - a. If the GPI corresponds to an already existing NAF SA (this can be achieved by comparing the RAND value in the new GPI with the RAND value in an existing NAF SA), then the GPI is silently dropped and the GPI processing terminated. + - b. If the GPI corresponds to an incomplete NAF SA, the Ks indicated by GPI is activated and processing continues from step 7 (step 8 describes how an incomplete SA may appear). + +NOTE 1: To handle retransmissions efficiently the UE benefits from only invoking a UICC application after checking that the GPI does not correspond to an already existing NAF SA. The check can be done by comparing the received (RAND, AUTN(\*), App\_Lbl) triplet with the corresponding triplets associated with existing NAF SAs. + +5. The UE reads the GPI version number and selects the corresponding GPI integrity and ciphering algorithms. If the UE does not support this GPI version, the GPI is silently dropped and the GPI processing is terminated. +6. If the UICC application is active or can be activated the UE initiates derivation of the Ks by issuing an Authenticate command to the UICC. The type of Authenticate command is determined by the indicated U/M-mode in the GPI, i.e. if GBA\_ME or GBA\_U should be used. + +If the Authenticate command on the USIM returns a MAC failure then the GPI processing ends. + +If the Authenticate command on the USIM returns a synchronisation failure including the AUTS back to the ME, then the ME may forward the the AUTS and the corresponding RAND to the NAF , if the UE has an uplink channel to the NAF. If the UE has no uplink channel to the NAF then the GPI processing ends in the UE. + +NOTE A: How the AUTS and the RAND are transmitted from the UE to the NAF is Ua application specific. + +If U/M indicates use of GBA\_U, the generated Ks will effectively be generated on the UICC and not deleted until next GBA\_U Ks is established using Authenticate command. The ME shall restrict NAF-key generation procedures using the generated Ks on the UICC to only be allowed for the NAF SA generation associated with the ongoing GBA-Push procedure. + +7. The ME initiates the derivation of the GPI protection keys and other parameters needed for GPI integrity checking and deciphering of the confidentiality protected parts. This processing is defined in clause 5.3 +8. The ME checks the integrity of the GPI message. If the integrity check fails, the following procedure is followed: + - a. With GBA\_ME, the derived Ks is stored and marked as incomplete and the GPI processing ends. + - b. With GBA\_U, the Ks was stored by the authenticate command. The Ks identity, which normally would be B-TID (see TS 33.220 [1]) is set to RAND@'undefined'. The GPI processing ends. +9. The ME decipheres the confidentiality protected parts of the GPI using the algorithms defined by the GPI version number and the GPI confidentiality protection keys. +10. The UE initiates the derivation of the NAF-Key (s), Ks( \_int/ext) \_NAF, using the NAF\_ Id received in the GPI. The key derivation is defined as specified in TS 33.220 [1]. For GBA\_ME, the ME deletes the Ks after the derivation of the NAF-Key is completed. + +NOTE 1A: In the case of common implementation of GBA and GBA Push, care should be taken that this deletion rule only applies to GBA Push-based Ks. + +11. The NAF SA consisting of the NAF-key(s) and associated parameters is stored. + +NOTE 2: When GBA\_U is used, two NAF-keys will be generated i.e. a Ks\_ext\_NAF will be stored in the ME and a Ks\_int\_NAF will be stored on the UICC. Both keys will be part of the NAF SA. + +## 5.2 Data objects + +### 5.2.1 GBA Push Information (GPI) + +The definition of GPI information is given in table 5.2.1.1 Note that GPI does not contain any user identity or transport address as these entities are not needed by the GBA processing in the UE. They are only relevant for the transport of the GPI. + +**Table 5.2.1.1: GPI information** + +| Parameter name | Description | Notes | +|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Ver | Version of GPI | The version number is introduced to allow changes of GPI format and protection algorithms. | +| RAND | RAND in UMTS AKA | Defined in TS 33.102 [6] | +| AUTN(*) | AUTN or AUTN* | Defined in TS 33.220 [1] | +| App_Lbl | Identifier for UICC application to use | This variable may be left empty if the UICC application to use is evident from context or agreement. The Application Label is defined in TS 31.101 [15] | +| U/M | Indicator for use of GBA_ME or GBA_U | | +| NAF_Id | Concatenation of NAF FQDN and Ua security protocol Id | Defined in TS 33.220 [1];
Confidentiality protected | +| Key_LT | Requested NAF-Key life time | Confidentiality protected | +| P-TID | NAF SA Identifier | To be used by UE when responding to NAF. The identifier is included only to enable that it is confidentiality protected in the GPI. See also clause 5.2.2. Confidentiality protected | +| MAC | Message authentication code over GPI | The integrity protection covers the complete GPI | + +This specification only defines a single version of GPI, i.e. version 1. In version 1, the MAC field is 32 bits. + +### 5.2.2 NAF SA identities + +A NAF SA holds NAF-key(s) and can have unique identities for uplink and downlink references, this to support unlinkability between uplink and downlink protection measures. + +P-TID is assigned by the NAF and should be unique within the NAF. + +NAF SA identifiers are: + +DL\_SA\_Id = RAND@'naf': Identifies NAF SA in the UE (used by both NAF and UE for downlink traffic). + +UL\_SA\_Id = Value of P-TID: Identifies NAF SA in the NAF (used by both NAF and UE for uplink traffic). + +NOTE: 'naf' indicates a string of the characters naf. + +### 5.2.3 NAF SA + +The NAF needs to keep some additional information in its NAF SA compared with the UE. The UE identity used in the BSF request for GPI must be stored to allow the NAF to determine from which UE a response is coming and also to link sequences of SA's for the same UE. The NAF also needs to store the transport address to which the GPI should be directed. If the NAF uses retransmission to achieve better delivery reliability, it also needs to store the encrypted version of the part of the GPI, which is confidentiality protected. It also has to store the GPI MAC. + +**Table 5.2.3-1: NAF SA definition** + +| Parameter name | NAF | UE | Description | Notes | +|------------------------|-----|----|-------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| UE_Id | m | o | The user identity used in NAF request. | | +| UE_Priv_Id | o | - | Private user identity (IMSI/IMPI) for used UE_Id | | +| UE_Trp | m | - | Transport address to which GPI should be delivered | The transport address used by the NAF when pushing GPI to the UE | +| RAND | m | m | RAND in UMTS AKA | From GPI | +| AUTN(*) | m | m | AUTN or AUTN* | From GPI | +| App_Lbl | m | m | UICC application identifier | From GPI or other implicit agreement or information. | +| NAF_Id | m | m | Concatenation of NAF FQDN and Ua security protocol Id | | +| Enc_GPI | m | - | Encrypted part of GPI plus MAC | | +| Mac_GPI | m | - | BSF generated MAC over GPI | | +| UL_SA_Id | m | m | Uplink NAF SA identity | The identity is defined in section 5.2.2. | +| DL_SA_Id | m | m | Downlink NAF SA identity | The identity is defined in section 5.2.2. | +| Ks_NAF /
Ks_ext_NAF | m | m | External NAF-key | Ks_NAF is generated in GBA_ME based GBA-Push
Ks_ext_NAF is generated in GBA_U based GBA_Push | +| Ks_int_NAF | o | o | UICC internal NAF-key | Ks_int_NAF is generated in GBA_U based GBA_Push | +| Key_LT | m | m | Received NAF-Key life time | | + +## 5.3 GPI Integrity and Confidentiality Protection + +### 5.3.1 General considerations + +Integrity and confidentiality protection of the GPI is between the BSF and the UE. The keying material used for the protection must not leave the BSF and the UE, which implies that the NAF in particular and all other parties different from the UE and the BSF will not be able to modify the GPI (due to the integrity protection) or read its confidentiality protected parts. + +NOTE: Transferring the NAF\_Id in the clear together with a long term user identity/transport address may give rise to a privacy problem in a broadcast network or in an access network that does not apply confidentiality protection + +### 5.3.2 Key material generation + +The key material for confidentiality and integrity protection of GPI is derived from the Ks, which the GPI defines. The key derivations in version 1 of the GPI use the KDF defined in Annex B3 of TS 33.220 [1] with the below defined modifications of the NAF\_ID (variable P3). The used NAF\_ID as defined below shall be UTF- 8 encoded. All keys are 128 bits. The 128 least significant bits of the KDF output are used as key bits. The following keys are defined: + +**GPI\_INT\_Key:** The NAF\_ID shall equal 'GPI\_integrity'. + +**GPI\_ENC\_Key:** The NAF\_ID shall equal 'GPI\_confidentiality' + +**GPI\_IV:** The NAF\_ID shall equal 'GPI\_IV' + +NOTE: It is appropriate to generate the IV this way as the keys will only be used to protect a single message. + +### 5.3.3 GPI Integrity protection + +GPI integrity protection is mandatory. The integrity protection is calculated after GPI has been confidentiality protected as defined in clause 5.3.4. + +The GPI integrity protection in version 1 of the GPI uses algorithm HMAC-SHA256-32 with a 128-bit key as defined in [7], [8] and [9]. The MAC is computed over the complete GPI as defined in clause 5.2.1. During the computation of the MAC, the MAC field shall be treated as containing all zeros. + +### 5.3.4 GPI Confidentiality protection + +GPI confidentiality protection is mandatory. + +The confidentiality protection shall be applied on GPI elements as indicated in table 5.2.1.1. + +The GPI confidentiality algorithm in version 1 of the GPI is CTR-AES128 [10], [11]. The key to be used is GPI\_ENC\_Key and the start value $T_1$ for the counter is GPI\_IV. The standard incrementing function is used with $m=16$ , according to appendix B in [10], i.e. the 16 least significant bits in T behave like a counter while the 112 most significant bits are static and equal the 112 most significant bits of the GPI\_IV. + +### 5.3.5 GPI message format and coding + +The GPI message is laid out as shown in Figure 5.3.5-1. Each field is encoded in network byte order (i.e., big endian) and with the most significant bit being bit number zero. The fields of the message are the following. + +**Ver (4 bits):** The version of the GPI message encoded as a 4 bit binary number. The version of any message conforming to this specification shall use the value 1, i.e., the first nibble of the message is 0x1. + +**Reserved (3 bits):** These bits are reserved for future versions of this specification. Implementations conforming to this specification shall set these bits to zero before transmitting a message, and the receiver of the message shall ignore these bits. + +**U/M (1 bit):** 0 = GBA\_ME, 1 = GBA\_U + +**RAND:** 16 octets. + +**AUTN:** 16 octets. + +**Length App\_Lbl:** 1 octet containing length of App\_Lbl in number of octets. + +**App\_Lbl (variable length):** UTF-8 encoded character string. + +**Length NAF\_Id:** 1 octet containing length of NAF\_Id in number of octets. + +**NAF\_Id (variable length):** UTF-8 encoded FQDN of NAF concatenated with the 5 octets of the Ua security protocol identifier. + +**Key\_LT:** 4 octets. Key expiry time in the same format as the first four bytes in the NTP timestamp format [16]. This represents the number of seconds since 0h on 1 January 1900. On 7 February 2036 the time value will overflow. In [16] a procedure is described to extend the time to 2104. This procedure shall be supported. + +**Length PTID:** 1 octet containing length of PTID in number of octets. + +**PTID (variable length):** UTF-8 encoded character strings + +**MAC:** 4 octets. + +![](79e1709a7317ead45379cbb8ff3ba802_img.jpg) + +| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | | +|--------------------|---|---|----------|---|---|-----|---|---------| +| Ver | | | Reserved | | | U/M | | Octet 1 | +| RAND octets 1 - 16 | | | | | | | | Octet 2 | +| AUTN octets 1 - 16 | | | | | | | | | +| Length App_Lbl | | | | | | | | | +| App_Lbl | | | | | | | | | +| Length NAF_Id | | | | | | | | | +| NAF_Id | | | | | | | | | +| Key_LT | | | | | | | | | +| Length PTID | | | | | | | | | +| PTID | | | | | | | | | +| MAC octets 1 - 4 | | | | | | | | | + +Figure 5.3.5-1. GPI message layout + +## 5.4 Procedures using the NAF SA + +The established NAF SA can be used by the terminal to set up communication over Ua. + +If the terminal want to initiate a Ua connection as specified by TS 33.222 [13] based on a NAF SA established via TS 33.223 then the procedures for the terminal shall follow the principles defined in clause 4.5.3 in TS 33.220 [1] and clauses 5.3 and 5.4 in TS 33.222 [13] with the following change: + +- Instead of referencing the SA (NAF-Key) to be used by a B-TID as described in TS 33.220, clause 4.5.3, the UE uses P-TID. P-TID was sent in the GPI coming from NAF and it will uniquely identify the SA and the user identity to the NAF +- Instead of supplying the B-TID as user name as described in TS 33.222, clause 5.3, the UE uses P-TID. The NAF will then know the user identity and can retrieve the key from the NAF SA. +- Instead of using the B-TID as PSK identity as described in TS 33.222 clause 5.4 the UE uses P-TID. The NAF will then know the user identity and can retrieve the key from the NAF SA. + +# --- Annex A (informative): Rationale behind choice of the Disposable-Ks model + +GBA-Push utilizes the Disposable-Ks model in which a Ks is only used once to derive a single set of NAF-keys. This means that after a NAF-key derivation, the used Ks is erased or its further usage is blocked. Furthermore, a Single Ks model is adopted for GBA\_U based GBA-Push. This means that only a single GBA\_U Ks can exist at a given time. The rationale behind the Single-Ks model for GBA\_U based GBA-Push is to make it possible to reuse Rel-6 UICC's supporting GBA\_U for GBA\_U based GBA-Push. + +For GBA\_ME based GBA-Push the specification assumes that the ME can perform the necessary operations without having to erase a Ks generated by a normal GBA\_ME bootstrapping. + +The rationale behind the adoption of the Disposable-Ks model is to avoid synchronization problems as the GBA-Push may be over unreliable channels with non-delivery or undefined delay in delivery time, which may render the UE and the BSF unsynchronized with respect to the existence of a single valid GBA-Push Ks. Another situation when the UE and the BSF may become unsynchronized is when the BSF performs a normal bootstrapping and a NAF initiates a GBA-Push more or less simultaneously with the NAF requesting GPI before the UE performs the bootstrap and the GBA-Push message is delivered after the normal bootstrap. The Disposable-Ks model solves most of these out-of synch problems. + +One situation when an out-of-synch problem will appear even with the adoption of the Disposable-Ks model is when the BSF may erase a valid Ks while the UE keeps it due to that the GBA-Push message can not be validated at the UE. This will lead to an error situation if the UE tries to use such a Ks. However, the error situation will easily be corrected as the NAF will get an error message from the BSF telling that the Ks (indicated by B-TID) is not available. The NAF would then return this error message and the terminal would perform a new bootstrap. + +Alternatives to the chosen key handling model discussed were all based on allowing one or more GBA-Push generated Ks's and thus keeping a set of security contexts in the UE or on the UICC. Keeping one or more GBA-Push generated Ks's may make the out-of-synch problem go away or at least become much smaller. The downside is of course that as GBA\_U based GBA-Push is essential from a security point of view, adoption of those models would have required new functionality on the UICC which was deemed making the introduction and adoption of GBA-Push more difficult. When also taking the minor functional drawbacks of the chosen key handling model into account the extra cost and complexity introduced by the other models were not judged to be a sufficient motivation to introduce new UICCs. + +# --- Annex B (normative): GBA-Push UE registration procedure + +To be able to use GBA Push based services the user and the service provider need to share information. This is done in a registration procedure. The registration procedure could be explicit and involve the user or it could be automatic relying on user information provided by the user's operator. If the registration is initiated by the operator, the operator will have access to all needed registration information. + +NOTE: When a user registers with a public identity this might not be the case, especially if the NAF is a third party service provider. One way of alleviating the problem would be to have users perform the registration over an authenticated/secured connection established with normal GBA. Then the BSF could provide the NAF with all needed information. Note however that this functionality is not standardized and that all needed information might not be available over the currently standardized interfaces. + +At the registration the Push NAF shall record the user identity (UE\_Id), a push delivery method and the associated transport address (UE\_Trp). The user identity may be either a public identity or a private identity. + +A public IMS user identity (IMPU) may only be used if it maps to a unique private identity (IMPI). This shall be checked in the registration procedure as the service will fail if the condition is not fulfilled. + +When the UE identity is an MSISDN this public identity will map uniquely to an IMSI but with number portability, being active information about the associated operator will be needed in any case to identify to which BSF the user belongs (i.e. to which operator the user has a contract). Knowing the operator will enable the NAF to derive the FQDN of the BSF in the operator's network. + +If the UE to be registered is equipped with a UICC holding more than one UICC application capable of running AKA, the registration process should, if the UICC application to use is not uniquely determined by the UE transport method and/or UE\_Id, determine which UICC application to use and how the NAF contacts the corresponding the BSF (needs to know the FQDN of the BSF). If explicit signalling is needed to identify the used USIM / ISIM, the App\_Lbl to use should be agreed and recorded. + +At registration, a Push NAF intending to use GPL [15] shall record whether the ME is capable of GPL or not. If the ME is capable of GPL, then the supported GPL version in the ME, the supported Cipher Suits in the ME and any other service specific information required for the Push NAF to deliver the service to the ME, shall be registered in the Push NAF as well. If the the Push NAF intends to use GPL\_U, then it shall also record the delivery channels to the UICC that the ME supports. + +NOTE: The GPL capabilities of the UICC do not need to be registered since this information is available via the GUSS (see clause 4.2 of TS 33.224 [15]). + +# Annex Z (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|-------|-----------|------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|---------------| +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | Old | New | +| 2006-05 | | | | | Creation of document on the basis of SA3#43 discussion | 0.0.0 | 0.0.1 | +| 2006-08 | | | | | Integration of S3-060498, addition of editors' notes (SA3#44 meeting) and editorials. | 0.0.1 | 0.1.0 | +| 2006-11 | | | | | Integration of S3-060630, S3-060631, S3-060634, and S3-060676. | 0.1.0 | 0.2.0 | +| 2007-02 | | | | | Integration of S3-070041, S3-070049, S3-070051 and S3-070068 and their modifications as discussed in the meeting | 0.2.0 | 0.3.0 | +| 2007-05 | | | | | Integration of S3-070332, S3-070360, S3-070361 and S3-070372 and their modifications as discussed in the SA3#47 meeting | 0.3.0 | 0.4.0 | +| 2007-07 | | | | | Integration of S3-070510, S3-070538, S3-070557, S3-070652 and S3-070563 and their modifications as discussed in SA3#48 meeting | 0.4.0 | 0.5.0 | +| 2007-10 | | | | | Integration of S3-070710, S3-070711, S3-070773 and related decisions, presentation of TS 33.223 to SA Plenary for information | 0.5.0 | 0.6.0 | +| 2007-11 | 38 | SP-070834 | | | Clean-up from MCC for presentation for information to TSG#38 | 0.6.0 | 1.0.0 | +| 2008-02 | | | | | This version is against the proposed split of TS 33.223 v1.0.0. as proposed in S3-080070. Integration of S3-080051 and S3-080117 and their modifications as discussed in SA3#50 meeting | 1.0.0 | 1.1.0 | +| 2008-03 | | | | | Integration of S3-080133 and comments from email review | 1.1.0 | 1.2.0 | +| 2008-05 | | | | | Integration of GBA-Push principles agreed at SA3#51 and relevant parts of pCR's S3-080304, S3-080305 and S3-080385 | 1.2.0 | 1.3.0 | +| 2008-05 | | | | | SA3 agreement and clean up for presentation to SA#40 | 1.3.0 | 2.0.0 | +| 2008-06 | SP-40 | SP-080259 | | | Approval at SA#40 | 2.0.0 | 8.0.0 | +| 2008-09 | SP-41 | SP-080483 | 0004 | 1 | CR 33.223: UE registration at Push NAF | 8.0.0 | 8.1.0 | +| 2008-09 | SP-41 | SP-080483 | 0002 | 1 | CR 33.223: GPI Protection | 8.0.0 | 8.1.0 | +| 2008-12 | SP-42 | SP-080741 | 0005 | 1 | GBA-Push resolution of editors notes and corrections | 8.1.0 | 8.2.0 | +| 2008-12 | SP-42 | SP-080741 | 0006 | - | Introduction of UE-Id type indicator | 8.1.0 | 8.2.0 | +| 2008-12 | SP-42 | SP-080741 | 0007 | - | Push NAF authorization | 8.1.0 | 8.2.0 | +| 2009-03 | SP-43 | SP-090141 | 0008 | - | Editorial corrections on 33.223 | 8.2.0 | 8.3.0 | +| 2009-03 | SP-43 | SP-090141 | 0009 | - | Alignment of TS 33.223 with TS 33.220 | 8.2.0 | 8.3.0 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090277 | 0012 | - | Editorial corrections on 33.223 | 8.3.0 | 8.4.0 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090277 | 0010 | 1 | Clarification of GUSS usage in case of HLR | 8.3.0 | 8.4.0 | +| 2009-09 | SP-45 | SP-090523 | 0013 | - | Remove replay window | 8.4.0 | 8.5.0 | +| 2009-09 | SP-45 | SP-090523 | 0014 | - | Clarifications to GBApush | 8.4.0 | 8.5.0 | +| 2009-09 | SP-45 | SP-090523 | 0016 | - | Changing GBA push registration annex to be normative | 8.4.0 | 8.5.0 | +| 2009-12 | SP-46 | SP-090820 | 0017 | - | Registration of GPL capabilities | 8.5.0 | 9.0.0 | +| 2010-03 | SP-47 | | | | Correction of incorrect requirement for mandatory support of GBA Push for GBA aware MEs | 9.0.0 | 9.1.0 | +| | | SP-100100 | 0021 | - | | | | +| 2010-03 | SP-47 | | | | Correction of private identity exposure and delivery of GPI to USIM/ISIM | 9.0.0 | 9.1.0 | +| | | SP-100218 | 0019 | 2 | | | | +| 2011-03 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-10 version (MCC) | 9.1.0 | 10.0.0 | +| 2012-09 | SP-57 | SP-120605 | 0022 | 1 | Clarification of UE registration procedure in Push-NAF | 10.0.0 | 11.0.0 | +| 2013-12 | SP-62 | SP-130667 | 0023 | 1 | Deletion of Ks in ME in GBA ME | 11.0.0 | 12.0.0 | +| 2015-06 | SP-68 | SP-150301 | 0024 | - | Change to AUTN length | 12.0.0 | 12.1.0 | +| 2016-01 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-13 version (MCC) | 12.1.0 | 13.0.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160051 | 0029 | 1 | Resynchronisation mechanism in GBA push | 13.0.0 | 13.1.0 | +| 2017-03 | - | - | - | - | Promotion to Release 14 without technical change | 13.1.0 | 14.0.0 | +| 2018-10 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-15 version (MCC) | 14.0.0 | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 15.0.0 | 16.0.0 | + diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33224/5a4e62bead259c258d069fd3663ea670_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33224/5a4e62bead259c258d069fd3663ea670_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9da5a763840fe9b26ae3f306bdb0392dc238efb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33224/5a4e62bead259c258d069fd3663ea670_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:2504bed64f5954f318f955841de0ab16b6fe724e00442a07b318570e9a536ff7 +size 78817 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33224/997233d405f0d4b89ddeb7683e047f66_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33224/997233d405f0d4b89ddeb7683e047f66_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0f863363826ae52ce398f94f3505071cdf8457e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33224/997233d405f0d4b89ddeb7683e047f66_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:6b8c6cd28c685c4fe25dc75fbdba18e5d507184361dd0abaf22e95e0500ff0cf +size 50857 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33224/b3baf3a29b67c7425d2562ddbc52f0cc_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33224/b3baf3a29b67c7425d2562ddbc52f0cc_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c18426797b0ddd5064cdbb3384652b3e2700d693 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33224/b3baf3a29b67c7425d2562ddbc52f0cc_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:9fe3d18510392709d3f0606b52ebe02ae49e070dcca599725bdd0576149851cd +size 75199 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33224/df1d0e45191302de72176e4390224c16_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33224/df1d0e45191302de72176e4390224c16_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..49c8138949b1a8e816159ccd1949bfabfd44a1b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33224/df1d0e45191302de72176e4390224c16_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:7ac978b737158370c47062bd99d1ec5702a60ef045be64ea13ba2196c415be57 +size 50072 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33224/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33224/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7e38d6ff66c309b602d41a192f12143b76c58c74 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33224/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,610 @@ + + + + + + +# Contents + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| Foreword ..... | 4 | +| Introduction ..... | 4 | +| 1 Scope..... | 5 | +| 2 References..... | 5 | +| 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations..... | 6 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 6 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 6 | +| 4 GPL requirements ..... | 6 | +| 4.1 Session concept..... | 6 | +| 4.2 Requirements..... | 7 | +| 5 GPL Processing..... | 8 | +| 5.1 Processing model..... | 8 | +| 5.2 Session start..... | 9 | +| 5.3 Session termination ..... | 10 | +| 5.4 GPL security association..... | 10 | +| 5.5 Combined delivery ..... | 10 | +| 5.6 Message format ..... | 10 | +| 5.6.1 Data unit transfer format ..... | 10 | +| 5.7 Inbound processing ..... | 12 | +| 5.8 Outbound processing..... | 13 | +| 5.9 Initialization of GPL-SA ..... | 13 | +| 5.9.1 General ..... | 13 | +| 5.9.2 Initialization of downlink GPL-SA from a NAF SA..... | 13 | +| 5.9.3 Initialization of uplink GPL-SA from a NAF SA ..... | 14 | +| 5.10 Cipher suites..... | 14 | +| Annex A (informative): Use cases..... | 16 | +| A.0 General..... | 16 | +| A.1 Generic Push Layer - use case for terminals without a return channel..... | 16 | +| A.2 Specific use cases..... | 17 | +| A.2.1 Network initiated NAF-key refesh and distribution of keys ..... | 17 | +| A.2.2 Distribution of tokens..... | 17 | +| A.2.3 MBMS GBA_U use case ..... | 18 | +| A.2.4 OMA related use cases..... | 18 | +| A.2.5 Network initiated services..... | 18 | +| A.2.6 BSF and HSS load balancing for broadcast ..... | 19 | +| A.2.7 Download of vouchers / tickets..... | 19 | +| A.2.8 Distribution of news / information / commands..... | 19 | +| A.2.9 Set-top box use-case..... | 20 | +| A.2.10 Summary ..... | 20 | +| Annex B (informative): Change history..... | 21 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- Introduction + +3GPP defined the Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA). The adoption of GAA by other standardization bodies showed that some services can not make the assumption that the User Equipment (UE) has always the possibility to connect to the Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF). This specification introduces a generic push layer that makes use of the GBA Push Function as specified in TS 33.223 [2]. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document specifies a generic push layer that makes use of the GBA Push Function as specified in TS 33.223 [3]. The GPL specification includes a message format, cipher suites and processing model. GPL assumes that keys and other SA parameters have been preinstalled in the Push-NAF and UE in the form of a NAF SA. GPL is a protection protocol that can be applied in a unidirectional fashion. + +The rationale for GPL is that having each application specify its own security mechanisms would for obvious reasons lead to duplication of work, specifications and implementations. Using a generic secure push layer avoids these problems. A generic secure push layer may also relieve the applications using the service of having to be aware of inner working of the security layer. As an analogy, TS 33.222 [4] can be mentioned, which provides a generic security layer for HTTP based applications. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. + - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. + - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. +- [1] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic bootstrapping architecture". +- [2] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [3] 3GPP TS 33.223: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic bootstrapping architecture: Push Function" +- [4] 3GPP TS 33.222: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Access to network application functions using Hypertext; Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security (HTTPS)". +- [5] FIPS PUB 180-2 (2002): "Secure Hash Standard". +- [6] IETF RFC 2104 (1997): "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication". +- [7] ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004: "Information Technology – Security techniques – Hash-functions – Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions". +- [8] NIST Special Publication 800-38 A (2001): "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation - Methods and Techniques " +- [9] FIPS PUB 197 (2001): "Advanced Encryption Standard" +- [10] OMA-WAP-TS-WSP-V1\_0-20020920-C: "Wireless Session Protocol 1.0" +- [11] 3GPP TS 31.111: "Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) Application Toolkit (USAT)" +- [12] ETSI TS 102 600: "UICC-Terminal interface; Characteristics of the USB interface" +- [13] ETSI TS 102 483: "UICC-Terminal interface; Internet Protocol connectivity between UICC and terminal" + +# --- 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [2], TS 33.220 [1] and the following apply. + +| | | +|------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| SN_h | The highest sequence number received in a GPL message with validated MAC. SN_h is used for replay protection. | +| SN_s | A counter used to generate sequence numbers for outgoing messages. | + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [2] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [2]. + +| | | +|--------|------------------------------------| +| GBA | Generic Bootstrapping Architecture | +| GPI | GBA Push Information | +| GPL | Generic Push Layer | +| GPL_ME | GPL hosted in the ME | +| GPL_U | GPL hosted in the UICC | +| HSP | High Speed Protocol | +| NAF | Network Application Function | +| KDF | Key Derivation Function | +| MAC | Message Authentication Code | +| SA | Security Association | +| SAID | Security Association Identifier | +| SN | Sequence Number | + +# --- 4 GPL requirements + +## 4.1 Session concept + +It is reasonable to expect that there will exist Push-NAF based services that rely on some form of per device session concept, and which would benefit from pushing more than one message based on the same security association. An example could be a virus signature update server. It is possible that the virus signatures are delivered in multiple pushed messages (for size limitation reasons of the underlying push transport mechanism), and it would then be inefficient to establish a new security association for each message. + +This requires that GPL provides replay protection in addition to integrity protection (and possibly confidentiality protection). Figure 4.1-1 depicts the usage scenario, where three push messages are delivered from the Push-NAF to the UE using a single security association. Note that steps 1 and 2 in Figure 4.1-1 are out of scope for this specification. One way to achieve steps 1 and 2 is to use TS 33.223 [3]. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the establishment of a secure session between UE, NAF, and BSF. The diagram shows two main steps: (1) Establishment of Ks (between UE and BSF) and (2) Establishment of Ks_NAF or Ks_int_NAF. Following these steps, Security Associations are established on the UE and NAF. The NAF then sends three push messages (Push message 1, Push message 2, and Push message 3) to the UE.](997233d405f0d4b89ddeb7683e047f66_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant NAF + participant BSF + Note over UE, BSF: (1) Establishment of Ks (between UE and BSF) + Note over UE, NAF: (2) Establishment of Ks_NAF or Ks_int_NAF + Note left of UE: Security Association with keys derived from Ks_NAF or Ks_int_NAF + Note right of NAF: Security Association with keys derived from Ks_NAF or Ks_int_nAF + NAF->>UE: Push message 1 + NAF->>UE: Push message 2 + NAF->>UE: Push message 3 + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the establishment of a secure session between UE, NAF, and BSF. The diagram shows two main steps: (1) Establishment of Ks (between UE and BSF) and (2) Establishment of Ks\_NAF or Ks\_int\_NAF. Following these steps, Security Associations are established on the UE and NAF. The NAF then sends three push messages (Push message 1, Push message 2, and Push message 3) to the UE. + +**Figure 4.1-1: Example of a secure session** + +If GPL was to provide a complete session concept including reliability of delivered messages using timeouts/acknowledgments and re-transmissions, re-establishments of sessions, re-ordering of messages etc., GPL would be unnecessarily complex and the size of the GPL messages would be too large for many applications (e.g., when the underlying transport is SMS). Therefore GPL shall only provide sufficient session state to ensure that the security of multiple GPL messages is not compromised. GPL shall hence provide the security services confidentiality, integrity protection and replay protection for a GPL session. + +If a more complex session concept is required by the application, where the session concept includes services other than security services, then, e.g., WSP [10] could be applied on top of GPL, but this is out of scope for this specification. + +Even though it sometimes is sufficient with a secure downlink channel from the Push-NAF to the UE (for broadcast only UEs) a uplink channel may be present. An example of this is OMA's location based services, where a server requests location information from a terminal, which responds with its location information. This request/response exchange may be repeated every ten minutes. It is prudent to require that it shall be possible to secure also such an uplink channel. The security of the uplink channel can conveniently be based on the same NAF SA as the downlink channel. + +To send a GPL message to the UICC, the Push-NAF selects a delivery channel that targets a UICC and that is supported by the GPL-capable ME (e.g. SMS class 2). The protocols that the GPL-capable ME shall support to receive the GPL\_U messages depend on the type of interface between the ME and the UICC (ISO or HSP). + +GBA Push as specified by TS 33.223 [3] is capable of establishing a $Ks\_int\_NAF$ and a $Ks\_ext\_NAF$ using one GPL. However, GPL is not designed to make full use of this. It is not possible to establish GPL SAs for both GPL\_U and GPL\_ME from a single GPL. + +## 4.2 Requirements + +The following requirements shall be posed for the generic secure push layer: + +- R1: It shall perform encapsulation of generic application layer messages from the Push-NAF to the UE. +- R2: It shall allow sending multiple messages based on the same security association. +- R3: Integrity protection and confidentiality protection shall be possible to provide for the messages. Integrity protection is mandatory to apply, while confidentiality protection is optional to apply. +- R4: Detection of replayed messages within the same session shall be possible. +- R5: If uplink messages are present in the application protocol, it shall be possible to apply the same level of protection to these messages, based on keys derived from the $Ks\_NAF$ or $Ks\_int\_NAF$ . + +- R6: The Push-NAF shall select the target of the GPL message, UICC or ME, by choosing the type of delivery channel. To send a GPL message to the UICC, the Push-NAF shall select a delivery channel that targets a UICC and that is supported by the GPL-capable ME (e.g. SMS class 2). +- R7: The protocols that the GPL-capable ME shall support to receive the GPL\_U message depend on the type of interface between the ME and the UICC: +- In case of ISO interface between the ME and the UICC, the ME shall support "ENVELOPE SMS-PP data download" and "Bearer Independent Protocol in client mode" ( class e in client mode) as specified in 3GPP TS 31.111 [11] + - In case of HSP interface between the ME and the UICC as specified in TS 102 600 [12], the ME shall support "ENVELOPE SMS-PP data download" over HSP and ETSI TS 102 483 [13] + +NOTE: There is no need to specify new interface between the ME and the UICC. + +To utilise GPL as described in this document the ME and/or UICC shall be equipped with a GPL protocol entity implementing the processing of the protocol. In addition, to be able to use GPL it is necessary to implement the GPI processing described in TS 33.223 [3]. + +The GPL protocol entity resides in the ME (called GPL\_ME) or in the UICC (called GPL\_U). When the GPL protocol entity to be used is in the ME, Ks\_NAF shall be used as the shared master key between the ME and the Push-NAF. When the GPL protocol entity to be used resides in the UICC, Ks\_int\_NAF shall be used as the shared master key between the UICC and the Push-NAF. + +The Push-NAF must have knowledge of ME's capabilities to support GPL\_ME and/or the USIM/ISIMs capabilities to support GPL\_U (depending on which GPL protocol entity is targeted). Otherwise the Push-NAF cannot know if it can send GPL messages to the UE or which type of GPL messages the UE understands. Therefore the GPL capabilities of the ME shall be indicated to the Push-NAF during GBA-Push UE registration procedure which is specified in Annex B in TS 33.223 [3]. The GPL\_U capabilities of the USIM/ISIM shall be stored in the GUSS in the HSS. + +# --- 5 GPL Processing + +## 5.1 Processing model + +In case of GPL\_ME, the GPL protocol entity is conceptually located either between the transport mechanism (which could e.g. be SMS, IP, IP/UDP) and the application, or included in the application. + +In case of GPL\_U, the GPL\_U protocol entity is located within the targeted USIM or ISIM. + +When receiving a GPL protected message, the recipient transfers the message to the GPL protocol entity How the recipient knows that the message is a GPL message is up to each transport mechanism to define. It could be through, e.g., a special application ID that is tagged onto the message, in which case a GPL application ID needs to be defined. + +In GPL\_ME, the message is delivered to the transport mechanism again after GPL processing is complete. This time around the GPL application ID and GPL related data has been removed, and what remains is a regular application data message (which is routed to the intended application using the transport layers normal dispatching mechanism). The processing model for GPL\_ME is depicted in Figure 5.1-1. + +In case of GPL\_U, the GPL protected message is delivered to the targeted USIM or ISIM that will process the GPL message. The application data remain in the USIM or ISIM for use by the application defined therein. + +![Figure 5.1-1: The processing model for GPL_ME agnostic applications. The diagram shows a vertical stack of layers: Application, Transport mechanism, GPL protocol entity, and Transport mechanism. Arrows indicate data flow: 'Application message' from Application to the first Transport mechanism (outbound, left), 'Application message' from the first Transport mechanism to the GPL protocol entity (outbound, left), 'GPL hdr' + 'Application message' from the GPL protocol entity to the second Transport mechanism (outbound, left), and 'GPL hdr' + 'Application message' from the second Transport mechanism downwards (outbound, left). Return arrows show 'Application message' from the second Transport mechanism to the GPL protocol entity (inbound, right), 'Application message' from the GPL protocol entity to the first Transport mechanism (inbound, right), and 'Application message' from the first Transport mechanism to the Application (inbound, right).](b3baf3a29b67c7425d2562ddbc52f0cc_img.jpg) + +Figure 5.1-1: The processing model for GPL\_ME agnostic applications. The diagram shows a vertical stack of layers: Application, Transport mechanism, GPL protocol entity, and Transport mechanism. Arrows indicate data flow: 'Application message' from Application to the first Transport mechanism (outbound, left), 'Application message' from the first Transport mechanism to the GPL protocol entity (outbound, left), 'GPL hdr' + 'Application message' from the GPL protocol entity to the second Transport mechanism (outbound, left), and 'GPL hdr' + 'Application message' from the second Transport mechanism downwards (outbound, left). Return arrows show 'Application message' from the second Transport mechanism to the GPL protocol entity (inbound, right), 'Application message' from the GPL protocol entity to the first Transport mechanism (inbound, right), and 'Application message' from the first Transport mechanism to the Application (inbound, right). + +**Figure 5.1-1: The processing model for GPL\_ME agnostic applications. Inbound processing to the right and outbound processing to the left.** + +The case when the GPL\_ME protocol entity is logically located between the transport mechanism and the application is illustrated in Figure 5.1-1. In this case the application does not need to be aware of GPL, and any legacy application can use GPL without modifications. The other case is that the application is aware of GPL. The reason for this may be that the application needs to inform the GPL protocol entity about which security association to use (i.e., the application calls the GPL protocol entity directly, and the GPL protocol entity may either pass the GPL encapsulated message to the transport mechanism, or return it to the application). + +## 5.2 Session start + +A GPL session is considered started in a GPL protocol entity when the corresponding GPL Security Association (GPL-SA) is initialised, see clause 5.9 For the Push-NAF, this means that the session shall be considered initiated as soon as it has received the GPI from the BSF and configured the NAF SA (see [3]) and corresponding GPL-SA. For the UE, the session shall be considered started when it has received the GPI and configured the GPL-SA. + +In addition to the GPI, the GPL protocol entity needs to get GPL policy information for the session, e.g., which encryption and integrity algorithms to use etc. The policy information may be decided by the application itself or by some other management entity. + +The Push-NAF shall choose the policy to use for the downlink messages and it shall be included in the GPL message. The Push-NAF shall choose a cipher suite for downlink GPL messages, and the UE shall (in case an uplink is present) choose the cipher suite for the uplink. It is recommended that the UE chooses the same cipher suite for the uplink as the Push-NAF chose for the downlink. + +## 5.3 Session termination + +Sessions are not explicitly terminated, i.e., there is no specific GPL message for closing a session. The NAF-key life time is kept by each peer and when that time is reached, the GPL-session is over and the NAF SA, corresponding downlink GPL-SA and corresponding uplink GPL-SA (if it exists) shall be deleted. + +## 5.4 GPL security association + +A GPL Security Association (GPL-SA) is the data required for processing of either inbound or outbound GPL messages. That is, in case there is a bi-directional communication link, each peer shall keep two GPL-SAs, one for the inbound traffic, and one for the outbound traffic. + +A GPL-SA shall be derived from a NAF SA with which it shares life time and ID (see TS 33.223 [3] for further information on NAF SAs). A GPL-SA shall be deleted if the corresponding NAF SA is deleted and vice versa. + +A GPL-SA shall be associated with an identifier, the SAID, to allow indexing of GPL-SA's within a Push-NAF and a UE respectively. An uplink/downlink GPL-SA can always be identified via the SAID, NAF\_ID of the Push-NAF and the direction. + +The GPL-SA shall contain at least the following items: + +**SAID:** An identity which helps identify GPL-SAs within a Push-NAF or a UE. The uplink/downlink SAID is identical to the corresponding uplink/downlink NAF SA identity. + +**Master key:** A 256-bit key used as master key for the key derivations of integrity and encryption keys. The master key is derived from the corresponding NAF-key. + +**SN\_h:** The highest sequence number received in a GPL message with validated MAC. SN\_h is used for replay protection. This state-variable is only used in an inbound GPL-SA. + +**SN\_s:** A counter used to generate sequence numbers for outgoing messages. The counter shall be increased after each message is output. This state-variable is only used in an outbound GPL-SA. + +**Cipher suite:** The cipher suite used for protection of messages. A cipher suite shall consist of one integrity protection algorithm, one encryption algorithm, and one key derivation algorithm. + +**GPL-SA life time:** This is the expiry time of the GPL-SA. The GPL-SA life time and its format shall be the same as the life time of the corresponding NAF-key. + +## 5.5 Combined delivery + +It is possible to send the GPI message either within the GPL message or separately. When the GPI message is sent within the GPL message this is called combined delivery. + +NOTE 1: GBA-Push TS 33.223 [3] allows that GPI messages are retransmitted several times including cases when it is sent every time a payload is pushed to the UE. To handle retransmissions efficiently TS 33.223 [3] defines a mechanism how the UE is able to only invoke the USIM/ISIM after checking that the GPI does not correspond to an already existing NAF SA. + +## 5.6 Message format + +### 5.6.1 Data unit transfer format + +A GPL message is laid out as shown in Figure 5.6.1-1. The GPL message encapsulates and protects an application message in the GPL payload. + +![](5a4e62bead259c258d069fd3663ea670_img.jpg) + +| | | | | | | | | +|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| +| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | +| | | | | | | | | + + + +| | | | | +|--------------------|----------------|----------|---------| +| Ver | GPI indication | Reserved | Octet 1 | +| GPI length | | | Octet 2 | +| GPI length (cont.) | | | Octet 3 | +| GPI message | | | ⋮ | +| SN | | | | +| SN (cont.) | | | | +| Cipher suite | | | | +| SAID length | | | | +| SAID | | | | +| MAC | | | | +| GPL Payload | | | | +| Padding | | | | + +**Figure 5.6.1-1: GPL message format** + +Each field is encoded in network byte order (i.e., big endian) with the most significant bit being bit number zero. The fields of the message are the following. + +**Ver (4 bits):** The version of the GPL protocol encoded as an integer. The version of any message conforming to this specification shall use the value 1, i.e., the first nibble of the message shall be 0x1. + +**GPI Indication (1 bit):** Indicates if combined delivery is used, i.e. if a GPI message is present in the GPL message or not. When GPI Indication equals 0, fields for GPI length and GPI message are not present. When GPI Indication equals 1, fields for GPI length and GPI message are present. + +**Reserved (3 bits):** These bits are reserved for future versions of this specification. Implementations conforming to this specification shall set these bits to zero before transmitting a message, and the receiver of the message shall ignore these bits. + +**GPI length (16 bits):** The length of the GPI message in number of octets. This field is present only when GPI Indication is set to 1. + +**GPI message (variable length):** The GPI message. This field is present only when GPI Indication is set to 1. + +**SN (16 bits):** The sequence number used for synchronizing the encryption and providing replay-protection. + +**Cipher suite (8 bits):** The cipher suite used for protection of the message. The cipher suite consists of one integrity protection algorithm, one encryption algorithm, and one key derivation algorithm. + +**SAID length (8 bits):** The length of the SAID in number of octets. + +**SAID (variable length):** The identity of the GPL security association used for protection of the message. + +**MAC (variable length):** The message authentication code providing integrity protection of the GPL message. The length of this field is determined by the output size of the integrity protection algorithm used, but shall be a multiple of 8 bits. + +**GPL Payload (variable length):** The actual application message that is protected. The length of the message shall be a multiple of 8 bits, and must be padded by the application unless this condition is met. Any such padding is up to the application and is out of scope for this specification. This field is encrypted. + +**Padding (variable length):** Padding as required by the encryption transform. Exactly how the padding is generated, verified and removed is defined by each encryption transform. In case the encryption transform does not require padding, this field is not present. This field is encrypted. + +The fields Ver, GPI length, GPI message, Cipher suite, SAID length and SAID are fixed during the GPL-SA life time and shall not change between messages. The fields GPI length and GPI message may however be present in some messages and absent in some messages depending on the GPI Indication field. + +## 5.7 Inbound processing + +Before processing of any inbound GPL message, the GPL protocol entity initiates the GPL-SA as described in clause 5.9. In case of combined delivery, this step shall be performed after GPI message processing (step 2) below. + +When a GPL message arrives at the receiver's GPL protocol entity, the following processing steps shall be taken: + +1. Verify that the Ver field is equal to 1. If this is not the case the GPL message shall be discarded and the processing shall stop. +2. In case of GPI indication does not indicate combined delivery goto step 4, Else process the GPI message as follows: + +In case of GPL message sent to the ME, the GPL\_ME processes the GPI message as defined in TS 33.223 [3]. + +In case of GPL message sent to the UICC, the GPL\_U protocol entity checks if the GPI corresponds to an already existing NAF SA. If not, the GPL\_U protocol entity derives Ks\_ext/int\_NAF from GPI information as described in TS 33.223 [3], creates a NAF SA according to TS 33.223 [3] and stores the NAF SA associated to Ks\_int\_NAF. The key Ks\_ext\_NAF key is not sent outside the UICC. + +NOTE: GBA-Push TS 33.223 [3] allows that a GPI message is retransmitted several times including cases when it is sent every time a payload is pushed to the UE. To handle retransmissions efficiently TS 33.223 [3] defines a mechanism how the UE is able to only invoke the USIM/ISIM after checking that the GPI does not correspond to an already existing NAF SA. + +3. Retrieve the GPL-SA which corresponds to the SAID in the GPL header. If no GPL-SA matching the SAID is found, the message shall be discarded and the processing shall stop. +4. If the Cipher suite variable in the GPL-SA has not been set, verify that the cipher suite indicated in the GPL message is supported and set the Cipher suite variable equal to the Cipher suite field in the GPL message. If the variable has been set, verify that the variable and field are equal. If the cipher suite is not supported or the field does not equal the variable, then the GPL message shall be discarded and the processing shall stop. +5. Verify that the sequence number carried in the SN field has not yet been received. One way of accomplishing this is to verify that the sequence number in the SN field is larger than the currently highest received sequence number SN\_h. If this is not the case, the message shall be discarded and the processing shall stop. When SN\_h is equal to 0xffff, all messages with the given SAID shall be discarded and the processing shall stop. It is not mandatory to implement this particular replay mechanism (which is not robust against message reordering), but the receiver's GPL protocol entity shall verify that the sequence number in the SN field has not been received before in a valid message. +6. Compute the MAC using the integrity algorithm indicated by the cipher suite. The MAC is computed over the entire GPL-message, and during the computation, the MAC field shall be treated as containing all zeros. After the MAC is computed, it shall be compared to the MAC carried in the MAC field. If the two MACs differ, the message shall be discarded and the processing shall stop. +7. Update the replay protection state. In case the mechanism described in step 5 is used, the state-variable SN\_h is set equal to the SN field. + +8. Decrypt the application message using the decryption algorithm defined by the GPL-SA. The decryption transform is applied to GPL payload and padding fields in the GPL message. +9. In case of GPL\_ME, return the application message of the GPL message (i.e., what remains after removing the GPL header and possible padding field) to the transport mechanism the message was received from. + +In case of GPL\_U, the payload of the GPL message remains within the application. + +If the processing is stopped by the GPL protocol entity before the full processing is complete an error indication may be returned from the GPL protocol entity. + +## 5.8 Outbound processing + +Before processing of any outbound GPL message, the GPL protocol entity initiates the GPL-SA as described in clause 5.9. When an application message arrives at the sender's GPL protocol entity, the following processing steps shall be taken: + +1. If the state-variable SN\_s is equal to 0xffff, the processing shall stop and an error indication shall be returned from the GPL protocol entity. +2. In case of combined delivery, include GPI in the GPI message field and set the GPI Indication and GPI Length fields accordingly. +3. Retrieve the GPL-SA which corresponds to the SAID as indicated by the caller of the GPL protocol entity. If no GPL-SA is found, the processing shall stop. In case of combined delivery, the GPL-SA needs to be the one derived from the NAF SA of the corresponding GPI. +4. Set the Ver field to 1. Set the Cipher suite, SAID and SAID length fields according to the GPL-SA. Set the SN field to the value of the state-variable SN\_s. +5. Encrypt the application message using the encryption algorithm defined by the GPL-SA. If needed by the encryption algorithm, the message shall be padded before encryption. +6. Set the MAC field of the GPL header to zero and compute a MAC over the entire GPL message using the integrity protection algorithm defined by the GPL-SA. Copy the resulting MAC to the MAC field of the GPL header. +7. Increase the state-variable SN\_s by one. +8. Deliver the GPL protected message to the next step in the processing chain. + +If the processing is stopped by the GPL protocol entity before the full processing is complete an error indication may be returned from the GPL protocol entity. + +## 5.9 Initialization of GPL-SA + +### 5.9.1 General + +The GPL-SA is initiated from a corresponding NAF SA. A NAF SA (used for GPL) shall be associated with one downlink GPL-SA and may be associated with an uplink GPL-SA. It is only allowed to initialize one GPL-SA per direction from a NAF SA. The reason for this is that the same key otherwise could be reused with the same sequence number. The NAF SA is defined in TS 33.223 [3]. The fields of the GPL-SA copied from the NAF SA keep their definitions. + +### 5.9.2 Initialization of downlink GPL-SA from a NAF SA + +The Push-NAF shall initialize the downlink GPL-SA from the corresponding NAF SA before sending the first GPL message to the UE. The Push-NAF shall: + +- Set the GPL-SA SAID equal to the NAF SA's DL\_SA\_Id value, which is defined in section 5.2.2 in TS 33.223[3]. +- Set the GPL-SA master key equal to Ks\_NAF or Ks\_int\_NAF according to the NAF SA. + +- Set the GPL-SA SN\_s equal to 1. +- Set the life-time of the GPL-SA equal to the life-time of the NAF SA. +- Set the cipher suite and key indication ID according to the application's policy. + +The UE shall initialize the downlink GPL-SA from the corresponding NAF SA when the NAF SA has been established (e.g., after processing a GPI). The UE shall: + +- Set the GPL-SA SAID equal to the NAF SA's DL\_SA\_Id value, which is defined in section 5.2.2 in TS 33.223[3]. +- Set the GPL-SA master key equal to Ks\_NAF or Ks\_int\_NAF according to the NAF SA. +- Set the GPL-SA SN\_h equal to 0. +- Set the life-time of the GPL-SA equal to the life-time of the NAF SA. + +### 5.9.3 Initialization of uplink GPL-SA from a NAF SA + +If the application requires an uplink GPL-SA, the Push-NAF shall initialize the uplink GPL-SA from the corresponding NAF SA before processing the first uplink GPL message from the UE. The Push-NAF shall: + +- Set the GPL-SA SAID equal to the NAF SA's UL\_SA\_Id value, which is defined in section 5.2.2 in TS 33.223[3]. +- Set the GPL-SA master key equal to Ks\_NAF or Ks\_int\_NAF according to the NAF SA. +- Set the GPL-SA SN\_h equal to 0. +- Set the life-time of the GPL-SA equal to the life-time of the NAF SA. + +The UE shall initialize the uplink GPL-SA from the corresponding NAF SA after the NAF SA has been established (e.g., after processing a GPI) and before sending the first uplink GPL message to the Push-NAF. The UE shall: + +- Set the GPL-SA SAID equal to the NAF SA's UL\_SA\_Id value, which is defined in section 5.2.2 in TS 33.223[3]. +- Set the GPL-SA master key equal to Ks\_NAF or Ks\_int\_NAF according to the NAF SA. +- Set the GPL-SA SN\_s equal to 1. +- Set the life-time of the GPL-SA equal to the life-time of the NAF SA. +- Set the cipher suite and key indication ID according to the application's policy. + +## 5.10 Cipher suites + +The following cipher suites are defined for use with GPL: + +### Cipher suite 1: + +**ID:** 0x01 + +**Encryption algorithm:** CTR-AES128 as specified in NIST Special Publication 800-38 A (2001) [8] and FIPS PUB 197 (2001) [9]. The standard incrementing function is used with m=16, according to appendix B in NIST Special Publication 800-38 A (2001) [8], i.e. the 16 least significant bits in T behave like a counter while the 112 most significant bits are static. The 128-bit initial counter block T1 shall be the 96 least significant bits of the RAND (from NAF SA) concatenated with the 16-bit sequence number SN and right padded with 16 zeroes bits: + +$$T_1 = \text{RAND} \parallel \text{SN} \parallel 0\text{x}0000$$ + +**Integrity protection algorithm:** HMAC-SHA256-32 as specified in FIPS PUB 180-2 (2002) [5], IETF RFC 2104 (1997) [6] and ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 [7]. The MAC field is hence 32 bits long. + +**Key derivation function:** As specified in TS 33.220 [1] Annex B. The input to the KDF is the 256-bit master key and the string S defined by: + +- FC = 0x40 +- P0 = key-purpose string +- L0 = length of the key-purpose string as a 16-bit integer. +- P1 = direction indicator +- L1 = length of direction indicator (i.e., 0x00 0x01) +- P2 = cipher suite ID +- L2 = length of cipher suite ID (i.e., 0x00 0x01) + +The FC number space is used controlled by TS 33.220 [1] . + +The key-purpose string shall be "gba-push-enc" for encryption keys and "gba-push-int" for integrity keys. The 128 least significant bits of the KDF output are used as key bits. + +In case of bi-directional usage of GPL there is a need for two pairs of GPL-SAs, one for each direction. The direction indicator shall be set accordingly for the pair. The direction indicator shall be 0x00 for the GPL-SA protecting messages from the Push-NAF to the UE and 0x01 for messages sent from the UE to the Push-NAF (if such an SA is required by the application). + +### **Cipher suite 2:** + +**ID:** 0x02 + +Cipher suite 2 shall be exactly as cipher suite 1 with the only difference that the integrity protection algorithm shall be defined as: + +**Integrity protection algorithm:** HMAC-SHA256-64 as specified in FIPS PUB 180-2 (2002) [5], IETF RFC 2104 (1997) [6] and ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 [7]. The MAC field is hence 64 bits long. + +### **Cipher suite 3:** + +**ID:** 0x03 + +Cipher suite 3 shall be exactly as cipher suite 1 with the only difference that the integrity protection algorithm and the encryption algorithm shall be defined as: + +**Encryption algorithm:** NULL encryption. This means that no encryption is applied. Using this ciphersuite provides no confidentiality protection. + +**Integrity protection algorithm:** HMAC-SHA256-32 as specified in FIPS PUB 180-2 (2002) [5], IETF RFC 2104 (1997) [6] and ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 [7]. The MAC field is hence 32 bits long. + +### **Cipher suite 4:** + +**ID:** 0x04 + +Cipher suite 4 shall be exactly as cipher suite 1 with the only difference that the integrity protection algorithm and the encryption algorithm shall be defined as: + +**Encryption algorithm:** NULL encryption This means that no encryption is applied. Using this ciphersuite provides no confidentiality protection + +**Integrity protection algorithm:** HMAC-SHA256-128 as specified in FIPS PUB 180-2 (2002) [5], IETF RFC 2104 (1997) [6] and ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 [7]. The MAC field is hence 128 bits long. + +# Annex A (informative): Use cases + +## A.0 General + +This annex describes use cases for the combination of GBA Push as specified by TS 33.223 [3] and GPL as specified by this document. Some of the information is hence not applicable to this specification, but rather describes features of GBA Push as it is used to establish security associations for GPL. + +## A.1 Generic Push Layer - use case for terminals without a return channel + +This clause describes a use case, how an application could make use of GBA Push and GPL. + +The goal of the application is to be able to securely push a message from an application server (implemented in a Push-NAF) to a UE. For example, the Push-NAF pushes a message to a UE, including the latest virus signatures. This is a case which can be of interest for terminals without a return channel, e.g., pure broadcast terminals. + +This functionality can be separated into two distinct phases: establishment of the security association between the Push-NAF and the UE, and the protection of the message. The security association contains keys derived from the $Ks(\_ext/int)\_NAF$ . The two phases are depicted in Figure A-1, where the first phase includes steps (1) and (2), and the second phase includes step (3). The security associations are established between the Push-NAF and the UE as a result of phase 1 using GBA Push as specified in TS 33.223[3]. The second phase can use GPL as specified in this document. + +The establishment of the security association boils down to establishment of the $Ks$ , followed by establishment of the $Ks(\_ext/int)\_NAF$ . + +When it comes to the protection of the actual message that is to be pushed there are two options, either the push is a one-time occurrence, or the concept of a session can be introduced. A session would here mean that a secure one-way communication channel is established between the Push-NAF and the UE. The first phase is out of scope for this specification, which only deals with the second phase. + +![Sequence diagram showing the two phases involved in securely pushing a message to a UE from an application server. The diagram involves three entities: UE, NAF, and BSF. Phase 1 consists of (1) Establishment of Ks (between UE and BSF) and (2) Establishment of Ks(_ext/int)_NAF. Phase 2 consists of (3) Secure push of application message based on the SAs above. Security Associations are established between the UE and NAF after step (2).](df1d0e45191302de72176e4390224c16_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant NAF + participant BSF + Note right of BSF: (1) Establishment of Ks (between UE and BSF) + Note right of BSF: (2) Establishment of Ks(_ext/int)_NAF + Note left of UE: Security Association with keys derived from Ks(_ext/int)_NAF + Note right of NAF: Security Association with keys derived from Ks(_ext/int)_NAF + Note right of NAF: (3) Secure push of application message based on the SAs above. +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the two phases involved in securely pushing a message to a UE from an application server. The diagram involves three entities: UE, NAF, and BSF. Phase 1 consists of (1) Establishment of Ks (between UE and BSF) and (2) Establishment of Ks(\_ext/int)\_NAF. Phase 2 consists of (3) Secure push of application message based on the SAs above. Security Associations are established between the UE and NAF after step (2). + +Figure A.1-1: The two phases involved in securely pushing a message to a UE from an application server + +## A.2 Specific use cases + +### A.2.1 Network initiated NAF-key refresh and distribution of keys + +This use case is related to key distribution to terminals that receive broadcasted content and need a key to be able to render the content and to key refresh for an existing security association. Keys could be pushed to the terminal at regular intervals to avoid having long-lived keys in the system. As the push message could be sent out over the broadcast system a back channel cannot be assumed to be available in all cases. + +Services that have not their own inbuilt key refresh mechanism (e.g. like MBMS) may want to push a new security association to a user. The reasons for that might be continuous user service experience (e.g. keys expire during some critical time period), to spread load evenly on the network side or there is some maintenance in the network at the time of expiry (e.g. on the Push-NAF to BSF connection which causes reduced bandwidth). The maximum Ks lifetime is known by the BSF and the Push-NAF, if the Push-NAF desires a fresh key (because it expires or for Push-NAF policy reasons) it can proactively push a new security association to the UE. + +Characteristics: + +- Some UE's require the security association to be established at a predefined time before the old key expires +- There exists already a Ua security association, for the case where the keys are refreshed. +- The service consumption may occur much later than the security provisioning. +- The old NAF-keys might be NAF-keys generated in a GBA run according to TS 33.220 or in a GBA Push run. +- GBA\_ME must be supported and GBA\_U support might be needed, but not for OMA BCAST and MBMS, since those have their own inbuilt refresh solution. Nevertheless, GBA Push might be useful for MBMS. + +### A.2.2 Distribution of tokens + +This use case is very similar to the key distribution case except for one important difference and that is that the token should be presented to the service provider over an IP connection. Thus, it can be assumed that a back-channel exists and that this back channel could be used to report the success of a GBA Push. On the other hand, the usefulness of the solution would be diminished if delivery of the tokens only was allowed to take place to terminals that are on-line, which would be required to get a timely success report and exclude use of deferred delivery channels. + +### A.2.3 MBMS GBA\_U use case + +GBA Push could be useful for MBMS. + +GBA was created to secure MBMS and to allow UICC-based solution by means of GBA\_U. In case of use of GBA Push for MBMS, it should be possible to send GBA Push messages protected by means of keys stored on the UICC, i.e. Ks\_int\_NAF-related keys. GBA Push solution shall support GBA\_U. + +### A.2.4 OMA related use cases + +OMA BCAST provided use-cases for GBA Push. One of this use-case is OMA BCAST smart card profile, which requires GBA Push solution with endpoint in the UICC. Consequently, GBA Push solution shall support GBA\_U. In particular, OMA provided the following information: + +"The smart card based service protection profile uses MBMS GBA mechanisms for registration and long term key delivery. It would be advantageous to also for this profile have network initiated registration and delivery of long term keys. A secure GBA Push mechanism would enable such a solution. " + +Others OMA use-cases could rely on GBA\_U-based GBA Push solution. E.g. OMA SEC group identified GBA Push-based key management as a good enhancement for future device management and client provisioning releases. This GBA Push solution could rely on Ks\_ext\_NAF/Ks\_int\_NAF keys to reinforce the security. But, for those use-cases, there is no OMA requirement mandating that GBA Push solution shall address the case of endpoint in the UICC. + +### A.2.5 Network initiated services + +There are quite a number of services that are initiated from the network, which require that the terminal connects to a server in the network. Examples of OMA defined enablers having this modus operandi are e.g. Device Management (DM), Download DRM (DLDRM), DRM, and Secure User Plane Location (SUPL). In all these cases it is assumed that the triggering push message can be sent over SMS. + +Having an efficient secure push system would allow greater flexibility as trusted parameters and keys could be sent in the trigger and provisioned parameters like server and sender white-lists could be avoided. Furthermore, a secure push would also allow protection against replay and DoS attacks. + +As the services require that the terminal connects to the network there is a back-channel in these use cases. When the terminal connects to the server, the initiating Push-NAF will implicitly receive a confirmation that a GBA Push has succeeded. The success could then be reported by the server to the BSF via the Push-NAF. + +A special case of a network initiated service is the case, where the operator may want to update securely information on the terminal e.g. device management or client provisioning. The UE has not contacted the operator before and hence can not be securely triggered to bootstrap (i.e. usage of SMS or WAP Push). The device management information should be pushed in a secure manner to the UE and the pushing may occur at a fixed point of time or during a pre-defined period. It must be ensured that the originator of the management message is authorized and that only the correct terminal can utilize the data. + +Characteristics: + +- The usage of the transferred information (called management message) to the UE may occur directly after the provisioning. +- Source of the management message must be identifiable i.e. the Push-NAF +- Only authorized recipients of the management message should be able to utilize it. +- Security association establishment (Upa) and delivery of the management message (Ua) might not occur together. Operator may want to send several messages secured by the same SA. +- Management information is targeted for the terminal, hence Ks\_NAF support is sufficient. + +### A.2.6 BSF and HSS load balancing for broadcast + +GBA is used for MBMS and OMA BCAST. The main advantage of broadcast is that many devices can be served with content at the same time. Typical broadcast scenarios include soccer games, olympics, eurovision contest and other events of general interest. If a majority of the UEs make the GBA bootstrapping run just before the event starts, then the BSF server and the HSS have to deal with a large load. Therefore it seems desirable, that the network can trigger the registration and delivery of the long term keys and many UEs can be provisioned with GBA credentials (NAF-keys) at times, where the BSF is having a low load e.g. the night before the event. The receiving terminal also supports GBA and in case, that it receives a broadcast message, for which no security association is available, then it start a GBA run according to TS 33.220. + +Characteristics: + +- Many UE's that require a security association at a specific time for service consumption. +- If GBA Push and GBA sessions according to TS 33.220 are managed together, then BSF can re-use Ks that was created for GBA Push for the GBA run according to TS 33.220. This also may work the other way around, that the Ks that has been established according to TS 33.220 could be used for GBA Push. If there is no uplink channel then this re-usage can not take place. +- It may be possible that there is no uplink channel available or it is undesired (due to network load) that many UE's make an uplink access at almost the same time (in the same area). +- The service consumption may occur much later than the security provisioning. +- Terminal should also support GBA according to TS 33.220 to allow service usage for the case that the SA via GBA Push did not arrive. +- GBA according to TS 33.220 is used (if supported) only for the case that no SA was received. + +- The service that needs load balancing may require GBA (TS 33.220) or GBA\_U support from the UE. + +#### A.2.7 Download of vouchers / tickets + +One use that has been discussed is to distribute vouchers/tickets for different types of public events or collection of physical goods by pushing a corresponding vouchers/ticket to the customers' mobile phone. The distribution could be scheduled to take place close in time to when the event starts to minimize the risk that the voucher/ticket is erased, lost in some other way or duplicated or it could be distributed well in advance to distribute the load on the network. + +Vouchers/tickets need to be securely delivered to the legitimate receiver as they usually are not personalized. + +If the distribution mechanism is reliable there is no need to report the reception of the voucher back to the issuer. Even with unreliable delivery channels reporting back is probably not needed as the user would note that the ticket has not been delivered and the user could then contact the issuer and ask for a retransmission. + +The consumption of the voucher/ticket can not be used as a reliable means for reporting the success of the download. There are two reasons for this. The first one is that the vouchers may be consumed via off-line devices. The second reason is that the consumption may take place a long time after delivery. + +Note also that this type of use case should work with deferred delivery of the message containing the voucher/ticket. If the receiver has turned off his phone, he should receive the message a soon as he turns the phone on again. + +#### A.2.8 Distribution of news / information / commands + +Distribution of news/information/commands, like stock prices or work orders, to employees need protection, especially integrity protection and source authentication, but in many cases also confidentiality protection. Such information should preferably be distributed over a system supporting deferred delivery to relieve the service provider of having to keep track of the user status and to make the information available as soon as the user switches on his terminal. + +#### A.2.9 Set-top box use-case + +It also exists the use-case of set-top box equipped with UICC reader and without return channel to the network. This use case implies that the GBA Push messages would be protected by means of the UICC. + +#### A.2.10 Summary + +The use cases and their characteristics above give rise to the following requirements: + +- (1) There are use cases, where the Ua protocol may terminate in the UICC and use cases, where it terminates in ME. +- (2) GBA Push should support both GBA\_ME and GBA\_U. +- (3) Separate delivery of Ua and Upa messages should be supported. +- (4) The Upa bootstrapping should be able to support unidirectional message delivery (e.g. Upa over broadcast). + +# Annex B (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|-------|-----------|-----|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------|--------|---------------| +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | Old | New | +| Mar 2009 | SA-43 | SP-090135 | -- | -- | Presentation to SA for information | --- | 1.0.0 | +| Sep 2009 | SA-45 | SP-090528 | -- | -- | Presentation to SA for approval | 2.0.0 | 9.0.0 | +| Dec 2009 | SA-46 | SP-090820 | 001 | 2 | Description of GPL_U solution | 9.0.0 | 9.1.0 | +| Mar 2010 | SA-47 | SP-100098 | 002 | 1 | General corrections | 9.1.0 | 9.2.0 | +| 2011-03 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-10 version (MCC) | 9.2.0 | 10.0.0 | +| 2012-09 | SA-57 | SP-120605 | 003 | 1 | Addition of missing cipher suites with NULL encryption for GPL | 10.0.0 | 11.0.0 | +| 2013-03 | SA-59 | SP-130039 | 005 | 1 | Update S3-130020 corrections to TS 33 224 | 11.0.0 | 11.1.0 | +| 2014-09 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-12 version (MCC) | 11.1.0 | 12.0.0 | +| 2016-01 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-13 version (MCC) | 12.0.0 | 13.0.0 | + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 06-2016 | SA#72 | S3-160740 | 0007 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0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9abeb121e5e56ab49b6b895e1a9714835f799bbc --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33246/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,2395 @@ + + + + + + +# Contents + +| | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 7 | +| Introduction ..... | 7 | +| 1 Scope..... | 8 | +| 2 References..... | 8 | +| 3 Definitions, abbreviations, symbols and conventions..... | 10 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 10 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 10 | +| 3.3 Symbols..... | 11 | +| 3.4 Conventions..... | 11 | +| 4 MBMS security overview ..... | 11 | +| 4.1 MBMS security architecture ..... | 11 | +| 4.1.1 General ..... | 11 | +| 4.1.2 BM-SC sub-functions..... | 13 | +| 4.1.3 UE security architecture ..... | 14 | +| 4.1A Granularity of MBMS security ..... | 15 | +| 4.2 Key management overview..... | 15 | +| 5 MBMS security functions ..... | 16 | +| 5.1 Authenticating and authorizing the user..... | 16 | +| 5.2 Key derivation, management and distribution ..... | 17 | +| 5.3 Protection of the transmitted traffic ..... | 17 | +| 6 Security mechanisms..... | 18 | +| 6.1 Using GBA for MBMS ..... | 18 | +| 6.2 Authentication and authorisation of a user..... | 19 | +| 6.2.1 Authentication and authorisation in HTTP procedures ..... | 19 | +| 6.2.1.1 General..... | 19 | +| 6.2.1.2 Bootstrapping..... | 19 | +| 6.2.1.3 HTTP digest authentication ..... | 19 | +| 6.2.2 Authentication and authorisation in MBMS bearer establishment..... | 20 | +| 6.2.3 Void..... | 20 | +| 6.2.4 Void..... | 20 | +| 6.3 Key management procedures ..... | 20 | +| 6.3.1 General ..... | 20 | +| 6.3.2 MSK procedures..... | 20 | +| 6.3.2.1 MSK identification ..... | 20 | +| 6.3.2.1A MBMS User Service Registration procedure ..... | 21 | +| 6.3.2.1B MBMS User Service Deregistration procedure ..... | 24 | +| 6.3.2.2 MSK request procedures..... | 25 | +| 6.3.2.2.1 Basic MSK request procedure..... | 25 | +| 6.3.2.2.2 Void..... | 26 | +| 6.3.2.2.3 Missed key update procedure..... | 26 | +| 6.3.2.2.4 BM-SC solicited pull procedure..... | 26 | +| 6.3.2.3 MSK delivery procedures ..... | 27 | +| 6.3.2.3.1 Pushing the MSK to the UE ..... | 27 | +| 6.3.2.3.2 Void..... | 27 | +| 6.3.2.4 Handling of multiple status codes within one response message ..... | 27 | +| 6.3.3 MTK procedures..... | 28 | +| 6.3.3.1 MTK identification ..... | 28 | +| 6.3.3.2 MTK update procedure..... | 29 | +| 6.3.3.2.1 MTK delivery in download..... | 29 | +| 6.3.3.2.2 MTK delivery in streaming..... | 29 | +| 6.3.4 Multiple BM-SC deployments ..... | 29 | +| 6.3.4.1 General ..... | 29 | +| 6.3.4.2 Service announcement coordination..... | 29 | +| 6.3.X.3 MSK key management anchor point ..... | 29 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| 6.3.4.4 | MSK coordination..... | 29 | +| 6.3.4.5 | MTK coordination ..... | 30 | +| 6.3.4.6 | MIKEY MTK timestamp coordination..... | 30 | +| 6.4 | MIKEY message creation and processing in the ME ..... | 30 | +| 6.4.1 | General ..... | 30 | +| 6.4.2 | MIKEY common header ..... | 31 | +| 6.4.3 | Replay protection..... | 31 | +| 6.4.4 | General extension payload ..... | 31 | +| 6.4.5 | MIKEY message structure ..... | 32 | +| 6.4.5.1 | MSK message structure ..... | 32 | +| 6.4.5.2 | MSK Verification message structure..... | 34 | +| 6.4.5.3 | MTK message structure ..... | 34 | +| 6.4.6 | Processing of received messages in the ME..... | 35 | +| 6.4.6.1 | MSK MIKEY Message Reception ..... | 35 | +| 6.4.6.2 | MTK MIKEY Message Reception ..... | 35 | +| 6.5 | Validation and key derivation functions in MGV-F ..... | 36 | +| 6.5.1 | General ..... | 36 | +| 6.5.2 | Usage of MUK ..... | 36 | +| 6.5.3 | MSK processing ..... | 36 | +| 6.5.4 | MTK processing ..... | 36 | +| 6.6 | Protection of the transmitted traffic ..... | 37 | +| 6.6.1 | General ..... | 37 | +| 6.6.2 | Protection of streaming data ..... | 38 | +| 6.6.2.1 | Usage of SRTP..... | 38 | +| 6.6.2.1A | Usage of SRTCP..... | 38 | +| 6.6.2.2 | Packet processing in the UE ..... | 39 | +| 6.6.3 | Protection of download data ..... | 39 | +| 6.6.3.1 | General ..... | 39 | +| 6.6.3.2 | Usage of OMA DRM DCF ..... | 39 | +| 6.7 | Confidentiality protection of associated delivery procedures ..... | 40 | +| 6.7.1 | General ..... | 40 | +| 6.7.2 | TLS Profile ..... | 40 | +| 6.7.3 | HTTP server authentication..... | 41 | +| 6.7.4 | Authentication of the UE..... | 41 | +| Annex A (informative): | Trust model..... | 42 | +| Annex B (informative): | Security threats..... | 43 | +| B.1 | Threats associated with attacks on the radio interface..... | 43 | +| B.1.1 | Unauthorised access to MBMS User Service data..... | 43 | +| B.1.2 | Threats to integrity ..... | 43 | +| B.1.3 | Denial of service attacks ..... | 43 | +| B.1.4 | Unauthorised access to MBMS User Services..... | 43 | +| B.1.5 | Privacy violation ..... | 44 | +| B.2 | Threats associated with attacks on other parts of the system..... | 44 | +| B.2.1 | Unauthorised access to data ..... | 44 | +| B.2.2 | Threats to integrity ..... | 44 | +| B.2.3 | Denial of service..... | 44 | +| B.2.4 | A malicious UE generating MTKs for malicious use later on ..... | 44 | +| B.2.5 | Unauthorised insertion of MBMS user data and key management data ..... | 45 | +| Annex C (normative): | MBMS security requirements ..... | 46 | +| C.1 | Requirements on security service access ..... | 46 | +| C.1.1 | Requirements on secure service access..... | 46 | +| C.1.2 | Requirements on secure service provision..... | 46 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| C.2 | Requirements on MBMS Transport Service signalling protection ..... | 46 | +| C.3 | Requirements on Privacy ..... | 46 | +| C.4 | Requirements on MBMS Key Management..... | 47 | +| C.5 | Requirements on integrity protection of MBMS User Service data ..... | 47 | +| C.6 | Requirements on confidentiality protection of MBMS User Service data ..... | 48 | +| C.7 | Requirements on content provider to BM-SC reference point ..... | 48 | +| Annex D (normative): | UICC-ME interface..... | 49 | +| D.1 | MSK Update Procedure ..... | 49 | +| D.2 | Void..... | 49 | +| D.3 | MTK generation and validation ..... | 49 | +| D.4 | MSK deletion procedure ..... | 50 | +| D.5 | MUK deletion procedure ..... | 50 | +| Annex E (Informative): | MIKEY features not used in MBMS ..... | 51 | +| Annex F (normative): | MRK key derivation for ME based MBMS key management..... | 52 | +| Annex G (normative): | HTTP based key management messages..... | 53 | +| G.1 | Introduction..... | 53 | +| G.2 | Key management procedures ..... | 53 | +| G.2.1 | MBMS User Service Registration..... | 53 | +| G.2.2 | MBMS User Service Deregistration ..... | 54 | +| G.2.3 | MSK request..... | 54 | +| G.2.4 | Error situations ..... | 55 | +| Annex H (informative): | Signalling flows for MSK procedures..... | 57 | +| H.1 | Scope of signalling flows..... | 57 | +| H.2 | Signalling flows demonstrating a successful MSK request procedure ..... | 57 | +| H.2.1 | Successful MSK request procedure..... | 57 | +| Annex I (informative): | Example of using MSKs and MTKs in MBMS ..... | 61 | +| Annex J (informative): | Mapping the MBMS security requirements into security functions
and mechanism ..... | 62 | +| J.1 | Consistency check..... | 62 | +| J.1.1 | Requirements on secure service access ..... | 62 | +| J.1.2 | Requirements on MBMS transport Service signalling protection..... | 62 | +| J.1.3 | Requirements on Privacy..... | 63 | +| J.1.4 | Requirements on MBMS Key Management ..... | 63 | +| J.1.5 | Requirements on integrity protection of MBMS User Service data..... | 64 | +| J.1.6 | Requirements on confidentiality protection of MBMS User Service data..... | 64 | +| J.1.7 | Requirements on content provider to BM-SC reference point..... | 65 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| J.2 | Conclusions..... | 65 | +| Annex K (Informative): | SRTP features not used in MBMS..... | 66 | +| Annex L (Normative): | Multicasting MBMS user data on Iub..... | 67 | +| Annex M (informative): | Relation to IMS based MBMS user services..... | 68 | +| Annex N (normative): | GCSE security aspects ..... | 69 | +| N.0 | GCSE architecture and requirements..... | 69 | +| N.1 | GCSE security requirements..... | 69 | +| N.1.1 | General ..... | 69 | +| N.1.2 | GCSE Broadcast Delivery specific security requirements..... | 69 | +| N.2 | Security solution for MB2-C interface..... | 69 | +| N.3 | Security solution for MB2-U interface ..... | 70 | +| Annex O (normative): | Security aspects of xMB reference point between Content Provider and BM-SC..... | 71 | +| O.1 | General..... | 71 | +| O.2 | Protection of the xMB reference point..... | 71 | +| Annex P (informative): | Change history..... | 72 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- Introduction + +The security of MBMS provides different challenges compared to the security of services delivered over point-to-point services. In addition to the normal threat of eavesdropping, there is also the threat that it may not be assumed that valid subscribers have any interest in maintaining the privacy and confidentiality of the communications, and they may therefore conspire to circumvent the security solution (for example one subscriber may publish the decryption keys enabling non-subscribers to view broadcast content). Countering this threat requires the decryption keys to be updated frequently in a manner that may not be predicted by subscribers while making efficient use of the radio network. The stage 1 requirements for MBMS are specified in TS 22.146 [2]. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The Technical Specification covers the security procedures of the Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS) for 3GPP systems (UTRAN, GERAN and E-UTRAN). MBMS is a 3GPP system network bearer service over which many different applications could be carried. The actual method of protection may vary depending on the type of MBMS application. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions, which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. + +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TS 22.146: "Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service; Stage 1". +- [3] 3GPP TS 23.246: "Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS); Architecture and Functional Description". +- [4] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3G Security; Security Architecture". +- [5] 3GPP TS 22.246: "MBMS User Services". +- [6] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture". +- [7] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the USIM application". +- [8] IETF RFC 2617 "HTTP Digest Authentication". +- [9] IETF RFC 3830 "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing" +- [10] IETF RFC 1982 "Serial Number Arithmetic". +- [11] IETF RFC 3711 "Secure Real-time Transport Protocol". +- [12] 3GPP TS 43.020: "Security related network functions". +- [13] 3GPP TS 26.346: "Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service; Protocols and Codecs". +- [14] 3GPP TS 33.210: "Network domain security; IP network layer security". +- [15] OMA-DRM-DCF-v2\_0: "OMA DRM Content Format", [www.openmobilealliance.org](http://www.openmobilealliance.org) +- [16] IETF RFC 4563 "The Key ID Information Type for the General Extension Payload in Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)". +- [17] Port numbers at IANA, . +- [18] 3GPP TS 24.109: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Bootstrapping interface (Ub) and network application function interface (Ua); Protocol details". +- [19] IETF RFC 2616 " Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1". + +- [20] 3GPP TS 29.109: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Zh and Zn Interfaces based on the Diameter protocol; Stage 3". +- [21] IETF RFC 3629 "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646". +- [22] IETF RFC 4771 "Integrity Transform Carrying Roll-Over Counter for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)". +- [23] 3GPP TS 23.107: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Quality of Service (QoS) concept and architecture". +- [24] OMA DRM v2.0 Extensions for Broadcast Support, Candidate Version 1.0 – 29 May 2007" (OMA-TS-DRM\_XBS-V1\_0-20070529-C). +- [25] IETF RFC 3376 "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 3". +- [26] IETF RFC 3810 "Multicast Listener Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6". +- [27] 3GPP TS 25.434, "UTRAN Iub Interface Data Transport and Transport Signalling for Common Transport Channel Data Streams". +- [28] IETF RFC 4303: "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)". +- [29] 3GPP TS 26.237: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) based Packet Switch Streaming (PSS) and Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS) User Service; Protocols". +- [30] 3GPP TS 23.203: "Policy and charging control architecture". +- [31] 3GPP TS 33.310: "Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)". +- [32] IETF RFC 2818: "HTTP over TLS". +- [33] 3GPP TS 23.468: "Group Communication System Enablers for LTE (GCSE\_LTE); Stage 2". +- [34] 3GPP TS 22.468: "Group Communication System Enablers for LTE (GCSE\_LTE)". +- [35] IETF RFC 3588: "Diameter Base Protocol". +- [36] IETF RFC 6733: "Diameter Base Protocol". +- [37] 3GPP TS 29.368: "Tsp interface protocol between the MTC Interworking Function (MTC-IWF) and Service Capability Server (SCS); Stage 3". +- [38] IETF RFC 5246: "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2". +- [39] IETF RFC 6347: "Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2". +- [40] IETF RFC 5996: "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)". +- [41] 3GPP TS 29.468: "Group Communication System Enablers for LTE (GCSE\_LTE); MB2 Reference Point; Stage 3". +- [42] IETF RFC 768: "User Datagram Protocol (UDP)". +- [43] IETF RFC 3947 (2005): "Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE". +- [44] IETF RFC 3948 "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets". +- [45] IETF RFC 6347: "Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2". +- [46] IETF RFC 4303: "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)". +- [47] 3GPP TS 23.179: " Functional architecture and information flows to support mission critical communication services; Stage 2". +- [48] 3GPP TS 23.285: "Architecture enhancements for V2X services." + +# 3 Definitions, abbreviations, symbols and conventions + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. + +For the definitions of MBMS User Service refer to TS 22.246 [5]. + +**HDR** = the general MIKEY HeaDeR. + +**IMPI** = In the context of current specification IMSI is used in the format of IMPI as specified in GBA, cf. TS 33.220 [6]. + +**KEMAC** = A payload included in the MIKEY message, which contains a set of encrypted sub-payloads and a MAC. + +**Key Group**= A group of MSKs that are identified by the same Key Group part of the MSK ID. Key Group part is used to group keys together in order to allow redundant MSKs to be deleted. + +**MBMS download session**: See TS 26.346 [13]. + +**MBMS streaming session**: See TS 26.346 [13]. + +**MRK** = MBMS Request Key: This key is to authenticate the UE to the BM-SC when performing key requests etc. + +**MSK** = MBMS Service Key: The MBMS Service key that is securely transferred (using the key MUK) from the BM-SC towards the UE. The MSK is not used directly to protect the MBMS User Service data (see MTK). + +**MTK** = MBMS Traffic Key: A key that is obtained by the UICC or ME by calling a decryption function MGV-F with the MSK. The key MTK is used to decrypt the received MBMS data on the ME. + +**MUK** = MBMS User Key: The MBMS user individual key that is used by the BM-SC to protect the point to point transfer of MSK's to the UE. + +NOTE: When a UICC is used, the keys MSK and MUK may be stored within the UICC or the ME depending on the UICC capabilities. When a SIM card is used, the keys MSK and MUK are stored within the ME. + +**Salt key** = a random or pseudo-random string used to protect against some off-line pre-computation attacks on the underlying security protocol. + +**SEQI** = Lower limit of the MTK ID sequence number interval: Last accepted MTK ID sequence number interval stored within MGV-S. The original value of SEQI is delivered in the key validity data field of MSK messages. + +**SEQp** = The MTK ID, which is received in a MIKEY packet. + +**SEQu** = Upper limit of the MTK ID sequence number interval, which is delivered in the key validity data field of MSK messages. + +**(S)RTP Session**: The (S)RTP and (S)RTCP traffic sent to a specific IP multicast address and port pair (one port each for (S)RTP and (S)RTCP) during the time period the session is specified to exist. An (S)RTP session is used to transport a single media type (e.g. audio, video, or text). An (S)RTP session may contain several different streams of (S)RTP packets using different SSRCs. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: + +| | | +|-------|--------------------------------------| +| B-TID | Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier | +| BM-SC | Broadcast-Multicast Service Centre | +| BSF | Bootstrapping Server Function | +| DCF | DRM Content Format | +| DRM | Digital Rights Management | +| EXT | Extension payload | + +| | | +|------------|----------------------------------------------| +| FDT | FLUTE File Delivery Table | +| FLUTE | File delivery over Unidirectional Transport | +| GBA | Generic Bootstrapping Architecture | +| GBA_ME | ME-based GBA | +| GBA_U | GBA with UICC-based enhancements | +| IDi | Identity of the initiator | +| IDr | Identity of the responder | +| Ks_ext_NAF | Derived key in GBA_U | +| Ks_int_NAF | Derived key in GBA_U, which remains on UICC | +| Ks_NAF | Derived key in GBA_ME of 3G GBA or in 2G GBA | +| MAC | Message authentication code | +| MBMS | Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service | +| MGV-F | MBMS key Generation and Validation Function | +| MGV-S | MBMS key Generation and Validation Storage | +| MIKEY | Multimedia Internet Keying | +| MKI | Master Key identifier | +| MRK | MBMS Request Key | +| MSK | MBMS Service Key | +| MTK | MBMS Traffic Key | +| MUK | MBMS User Key | +| NAF | Network Application Function | +| OMA | Open Mobile Alliance | +| ROC | Roll-Over Counter | +| SP | Security Policy | +| SRTCP | Secure RTCP | +| SRTP | Secure RTP | + +## 3.3 Symbols + +For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: + +| | | +|--|---------------| +| | Concatenation | +|--|---------------| + +## 3.4 Conventions + +All data variables in this specification are presented with the most significant substring on the left hand side and the least significant substring on the right hand side. A substring may be a bit, byte or other arbitrary length bitstring. Where a variable is broken down into a number of substrings, the leftmost (most significant) substring is numbered 0, the next most significant is numbered 1, and so on through to the least significant. + +# 4 MBMS security overview + +## 4.1 MBMS security architecture + +### 4.1.1 General + +MBMS introduces the concept of a point-to-multipoint service into a 3GPP system. A requirement of a MBMS User Service is to be able to securely transmit data to a given set of users. In order to achieve this, there needs to be a method of authentication, key distribution and data protection for a MBMS User Service. + +This means that MBMS security is specified to protect MBMS User Services, and it is independent on whether multicast or broadcast mode is used. + +NOTE: There are two cases when multicast and broadcast mode are handled differently: usage of Membership function in authorization (see e.g. clause 4.1.1) and authorization of user related MBMS bearers (see e.g. clause 6.2.2) are only defined for multicast mode. MBMS in EPS supports only broadcast mode and functionality related to multicast mode does not apply to EPS. + +![Figure 4.1: MBMS security architecture diagram showing the interaction between UE, BSF, HSS, and BM-SC.](27b06ec9f42b5d727a2630f61a5f1861_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the MBMS security architecture involving the User Equipment (UE), Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF), Home Subscriber Server (HSS), and Broadcast Multicast Service Centre (BM-SC). + +- UE (User Equipment):** Contains a Mobile Gateway/Service Function (MGV-S/F). It establishes $K_s$ via **HTTP Digest AKA** with the BSF. Inside the MGV-S/F, $K_s$ undergoes **Derivation** to produce $Ks\_xx\_NAF$ . This is followed by **MRK Derivation 3)** to produce **MRK**, which is used for **HTTP Digest Authentication (MRK)** with the BM-SC. Further derivation leads to **MUK**, used for **MSK message decryption**. The resulting **MSK** is used for **MTK message decryption**. Finally, **MTK** is used for **Traffic decryption** of **Data**. +- BSF:** Receives **HTTP Digest AKA (Establish Ks)**. It performs **Derivation** to produce $Z_h$ (sent to HSS) and $Z_n$ (sent to BM-SC). +- HSS:** Connected to BSF via the $Z_h$ interface. +- BM-SC:** Contains several functional blocks: + - Membership Function:** Interacts with the Key Management Function. + - Key Management Function:** Includes a **Key Request Function** (handling MRK and $Ks\_xx\_NAF$ derivation) and a **Key Distribution Function** (generating MSK and MTK messages). + - Session & Transmission Function:** Performs **Traffic encryption** on **Data** from the **Content provider** using **MTK**. + +Communication flows include **MIKEY MSK delivery** (protected with MUK) and **MIKEY MTK delivery** (protected with MSK) over **Point-To-Point** and **Point-To-MultiPoint** interfaces respectively. + +Figure 4.1: MBMS security architecture diagram showing the interaction between UE, BSF, HSS, and BM-SC. + +Note 1) SRTP is used for streaming and modified DCF format for download + +Note 2) $Ks\_xx\_NAF$ stands for $GBA\_ME$ or $GBA\_U$ based NAF keys + +Note 3) Not applicable for $GBA\_U$ , since $MRK = Ks\_ext\_NAF$ + +**Figure 4.1: MBMS security architecture** + +Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the network elements involved in MBMS from a security perspective. Nearly all the security functionality for MBMS, except for the normal network bearer security, resides in either the BM-SC or the UE. The BSF is a part of GBA (TS 33.220 [6]). The UE and the BM-SC use GBA to establish shared keys that are used to protect the point-to-point communication between the UE and the BM-SC. + +The BM-SC is a source for MBMS data. It could also be responsible for scheduling data and receiving data from third parties (this is beyond the scope of the standardisation work) for transmission. The BM-SC is responsible for establishing shared secrets with the UE using GBA, authenticating the UE with HTTP digest authentication mechanism, registering and de-registering UEs for MBMS User Services, generating and distributing the keys necessary for MBMS security to the UEs with MIKEY protocol and for applying the appropriate protection to data that is transmitted as part of a MBMS User Service. The BM-SC also provides the MBMS bearer authorisation for UEs attempting to establish MBMS bearer. + +The BM-SC also verifies whether a user is authorized to register and receive keys for a MBMS User Service. For MBMS Multicast Mode this authorization is done with the help of Membership function in the BM-SC. For MBMS + +Broadcast Mode this authorization is done without the help of Membership function because the Membership function is only defined in the context of MBMS Multicast Mode in TS 23.246 [3]. + +The UE is responsible for establishing shared secrets with the BM-SC using GBA, registering to and de-registering from MBMS User Services, requesting and receiving keys for the MBMS User Service from the BM-SC and also using those keys to decrypt the MBMS data that is received. + +MBMS imposes the following requirements on the MBMS capable elements: + +- a UICC that contains MBMS key management functions shall implement GBA\_U; +- a ME that supports MBMS shall implement GBA\_U and GBA\_ME, and shall be capable of utilising the MBMS key management functions on the UICC as well as providing MBMS key management functions itself; +- a BM-SC shall support using both GBA\_ME and GBA\_U keys to enable both ME based and UICC based MBMS key management, respectively. + +### 4.1.2 BM-SC sub-functions + +The BM-SC has the following sub-functions related to MBMS security, see figure 4.1. + +- **Key Management function:** The Key Management function includes two sub-functions: Key Request function and Key Distribution function. +- **Key Request function:** The sub-function is responsible for retrieving GBA keys from the BSF, deriving MUK and MRK from GBA keys, performing MBMS User Service Registration, Deregistration and MSK request procedures and related user authentication using MRK, providing MUK to Key Distribution function, performing authorization check. The sub-function implements the following functions and procedures: + - Bootstrapping initiation + - Bootstrapping re-negotiation + - HTTP digest authentication + - MRK derivation + - MBMS User Service Registration procedure + - MBMS User Service Deregistration procedure + - MSK request procedure +- **Key Distribution function:** The sub-function is responsible for retrieving MUK from Registration function, generating and distributing MSKs and MTKs to the UE, providing MTK to Session and Transmission function. The sub-function implements the following security procedures: + - MSK delivery procedure + - MTK delivery procedure + - BM-SC solicited pull procedure +- **Session and Transmission function:** The sub-function is responsible for session and transmission functions cf. TS 26.346 [13]. As part of these session and transmission functions, this function performs protection of data with MTK (encryption and/or integrity protection). The sub-function implements the following security procedures: + - Protection of streaming data + - Protection of download data +- **Membership function:** The Membership function is used to verify if a user is authorized to register, receive keys or to establish a MBMS bearer for MBMS Multicast Mode. The Membership function is defined only for MBMS Multicast Mode in TS 23.246 [3]. + +### 4.1.3 UE security architecture + +It is assumed that the UE includes a secure storage (MGV-S). This MGV-S may be realized on the ME or on the UICC. The MGV-F is implemented in a protected execution environment to prevent leakage of security sensitive information such as MBMS keys. MGV-S stores the MBMS keys and MGV-F performs the functions that should not be exposed to unprotected parts of the ME. An overview of ME based key management and UICC based key management in UE is described in figures 4.2a and 4.2b. + +In particular in ME based key management it shall be ensured that the keys are not exposed to unprotected parts of the ME when they are transmitted from the UICC to the MGV-S or during the key derivations. + +**Figure 4.2: ME and UICC based key management in UE** + +![Figure 4.2a: ME based key management in UE. The diagram shows two flowcharts for key management within a UE. The left flowchart, 'ME based key management based on GBA_ME', shows keys (CK, IK or SRES, Kc) being derived into Ks within a UICC or SIM card. Ks is then derived into Ks_NAF within an MGV-S/F. Ks_NAF is used to derive MRK via MUK and MRK derivation. MSK msg and MTK msg are received and decrypted to produce MSK and MTK respectively. The right flowchart, 'ME based key management based on GBA_U', shows keys (CK, IK) being derived into Ks within a UICC. Ks is derived into Ks_ext_NAF and Ks_int_NAF within an MGV-S/F. Ks_ext_NAF is used to derive MRK via MUK and MRK derivation. MSK msg and MTK msg are received and decrypted to produce MSK and MTK respectively.](16c1175b5f05a4b55e6d396fc51b15b3_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates two key management processes within a User Equipment (UE). Both processes start with input keys (CK, IK or SRES, Kc) being processed through a 'Key derivation' function to produce Ks. In the left process (GBA\_ME), Ks is derived into Ks\_NAF, which is then used to derive MRK via MUK and MRK derivation. MSK msg and MTK msg are received and decrypted to produce MSK and MTK. In the right process (GBA\_U), Ks is derived into Ks\_ext\_NAF and Ks\_int\_NAF. Ks\_ext\_NAF is used to derive MRK via MUK and MRK derivation. MSK msg and MTK msg are received and decrypted to produce MSK and MTK. The diagrams show the flow of keys between the UICC or SIM card, the MGV-S/F, and the UE. + +Figure 4.2a: ME based key management in UE. The diagram shows two flowcharts for key management within a UE. The left flowchart, 'ME based key management based on GBA\_ME', shows keys (CK, IK or SRES, Kc) being derived into Ks within a UICC or SIM card. Ks is then derived into Ks\_NAF within an MGV-S/F. Ks\_NAF is used to derive MRK via MUK and MRK derivation. MSK msg and MTK msg are received and decrypted to produce MSK and MTK respectively. The right flowchart, 'ME based key management based on GBA\_U', shows keys (CK, IK) being derived into Ks within a UICC. Ks is derived into Ks\_ext\_NAF and Ks\_int\_NAF within an MGV-S/F. Ks\_ext\_NAF is used to derive MRK via MUK and MRK derivation. MSK msg and MTK msg are received and decrypted to produce MSK and MTK respectively. + +**Figure 4.2a: ME based key management in UE** + +![Diagram of UICC based key management in UE. The diagram shows a nested structure: UE contains UICC, which contains MGV-S/F. Inside UICC, CK and IK lead to Ks, which is input to a 'Key derivation' block. This block outputs Ks_ext_NAF (which leads to MRK) and Ks_int_NAF. Ks_int_NAF is input to the MGV-S/F block, which outputs MUK. MUK is input to a 'Decryption' block, which receives 'MSK msg' and outputs MSK. MSK is input to another 'Decryption' block, which receives 'MTK msg' and outputs MTK.](7efae06af3af43ffe5d4b956a679cf54_img.jpg) + +UICC based key management + +``` + +graph TD + subgraph UE + subgraph UICC + CK_IK[CK, IK] --> Ks + Ks --> KD[Key derivation] + KD --> Ks_ext_NAF + Ks_ext_NAF --> MRK + KD --> Ks_int_NAF + subgraph MGV_S_F [MGV-S/F] + Ks_int_NAF --> MUK + MUK --> D1[Decryption] + D1 --> MSK + MSK --> D2[Decryption] + D2 --> MTK + end + MSK_msg[MSK msg] --> D1 + MTK_msg[MTK msg] --> D2 + end + end + +``` + +Diagram of UICC based key management in UE. The diagram shows a nested structure: UE contains UICC, which contains MGV-S/F. Inside UICC, CK and IK lead to Ks, which is input to a 'Key derivation' block. This block outputs Ks\_ext\_NAF (which leads to MRK) and Ks\_int\_NAF. Ks\_int\_NAF is input to the MGV-S/F block, which outputs MUK. MUK is input to a 'Decryption' block, which receives 'MSK msg' and outputs MSK. MSK is input to another 'Decryption' block, which receives 'MTK msg' and outputs MTK. + +Figure 4.2b: UICC based key management in UE + +## 4.1A Granularity of MBMS security + +An MBMS User Service is composed of one or more MBMS Streaming Sessions and/or MBMS Download Sessions. An MBMS Streaming Session is composed of one or more RTP sessions, and an MBMS Download Session is composed of one or more FLUTE channels as defined in TS 26.346 [13]. MBMS streaming/download sessions may be transported over one or more MBMS Transport Services. Transport Services are defined in TS 22.246 [3]. MBMS security is used to protect RTP sessions and FLUTE channels. As such MBMS User Service protection is Transport Service independent, in particular, it is independent on whether it is carried over point-to-point bearer or MBMS bearer (in multicast mode or in broadcast mode). + +## 4.2 Key management overview + +The BM-SC controls the use of the MBMS Service Keys (MSKs) to secure the different RTP sessions and FLUTE channels. The MSKs are used to protect the delivery of MBMS Transport Keys (MTKs), which are used to secure the RTP sessions and FLUTE channels as specified within clauses 6.5 and 6.6. The delivery of MSKs is secured with user specific MBMS User Key (MUK), which is received from GBA, cf. clause 6.1. MSKs and MTKs are managed at the MBMS User Service Level. + +The following rules apply for MBMS key management: + +The use of the same MTK within two different RTP sessions is not allowed according to RFC3711 [11] section 9.1. + +It shall be possible to update the MTKs during an RTP session or FLUTE channel to enhance the security. + +MSKs shall be used to protect MTKs of only one RTP session or FLUTE channel. It shall be possible to update the MSKs during an RTP session or FLUTE channel to enhance the security. + +MSKs within one Key Group shall be used to protect MTKs of only one RTP session or FLUTE channel. To allow smooth transition from "current" MSK to the "next", the MGV-S shall be capable of storing two MSKs within the same Key Group as specified in clause 6.3.2.1 of TS 33.246. + +Some of the rules are illustrated in figures 4.3 and 4.4. + +The usage of MSKs and MTKs applied to a RTP session or FLUTE channel (i.e. usage of MSKs and MTKs for one Key group) is depicted in figure 4.3. Figure 4.4 shows an example of the usage of MSKs and MTKs for three RTP sessions. In particular it shows that MSKs and MTKs of one Key Group are used to protect exactly one RTP session. + +![Figure 4.3: MBMS key hierarchy diagram showing the usage of MSKs and MTKs within one RTP session or FLUTE channel. The hierarchy starts with 'Establish MUK (GBA)' pointing to 'MUK'. 'MUK' points to multiple 'MSK' boxes (MSK1, MSK2, ..., MSKn). Each 'MSK' box points to multiple 'MTK' boxes (e.g., MTK11, MTK12, ..., MTK1x for MSK1). Each 'MTK' box points to a 'Data' box. A horizontal dashed line connects all 'Data' boxes, labeled 'Data packets for RTP session or FLUTE channel'. A legend at the top left indicates 'Arrow means "protected by"'.](16152cf1d84aea10848758f51a91ff6a_img.jpg) + +Figure 4.3: MBMS key hierarchy diagram showing the usage of MSKs and MTKs within one RTP session or FLUTE channel. The hierarchy starts with 'Establish MUK (GBA)' pointing to 'MUK'. 'MUK' points to multiple 'MSK' boxes (MSK1, MSK2, ..., MSKn). Each 'MSK' box points to multiple 'MTK' boxes (e.g., MTK11, MTK12, ..., MTK1x for MSK1). Each 'MTK' box points to a 'Data' box. A horizontal dashed line connects all 'Data' boxes, labeled 'Data packets for RTP session or FLUTE channel'. A legend at the top left indicates 'Arrow means "protected by"'. + +**Figure 4.3: MBMS key hierarchy: usage of MSKs and MTKs within one RTP session or FLUTE channel** + +![Figure 4.4: MBMS key hierarchy diagram showing the usage of MSKs and MTKs for three separate RTP sessions. The hierarchy starts with 'Establish MUK (GBA)' pointing to 'MUK'. 'MUK' points to three 'MSKs Key Group' boxes (A, B, and C). Each 'MSKs Key Group' box points to an 'MTKs' box, which in turn points to an 'RTP session' box (RTP session1, RTP session2, and RTP session3). A legend at the top left indicates 'Arrow means "protected by"'.](41a438d7e4adc17c3a4005e7c9500091_img.jpg) + +Figure 4.4: MBMS key hierarchy diagram showing the usage of MSKs and MTKs for three separate RTP sessions. The hierarchy starts with 'Establish MUK (GBA)' pointing to 'MUK'. 'MUK' points to three 'MSKs Key Group' boxes (A, B, and C). Each 'MSKs Key Group' box points to an 'MTKs' box, which in turn points to an 'RTP session' box (RTP session1, RTP session2, and RTP session3). A legend at the top left indicates 'Arrow means "protected by"'. + +**Figure 4.4: MBMS key hierarchy: usage of MSKs and MTKs for three separate RTP sessions** + +According to TS 22.246 [5] there exist MBMS User Services with shared and non-shared Transport Services. In case two MBMS User Services share an MBMS Transport Service, they also share one or more RTP sessions or FLUTE channels carried in the Transport Service. In this case, it shall be possible for the MBMS User Services to share one or more MSKs and MTKs of the Key Groups that are used to protect the MBMS data. + +An example showing how key management is used with MBMS User and Transport Services is depicted in Annex I. + +As described in clause 6.6, the MTK is used as master key for SRTP (and for corresponding SRTCP) and to protect DCF in case of download. According to RFC 3711 [11] it is mandatory to support master key lengths of 128, 192 and 256 bits for SRTP. The length of the MSK does not need to exceed the length of the MTK, but should be at least as long. + +# 5 MBMS security functions + +## 5.1 Authenticating and authorizing the user + +A UE is authenticated and authorised such that only legitimate users are able to participate in an MBMS User Service. + +When the UE uses HTTP protocol towards the BM-SC, the UE is authenticated with HTTP digest as described in clause 6.2.1. The Membership function within the BM-SC is used to verify the subscription information in MBMS Multicast Mode. + +The following procedures use HTTP digest authentication: + +- MBMS User Service Registration procedure (clause 6.3.2); +- MBMS User Service Deregistration procedure (clause 6.3.2); +- MSK request procedure. This can have many triggers (clause 6.3.2); +- Associated delivery procedures (specified in TS 26.346 [13]). + +When the UE establishes (or releases) the MBMS bearer(s) to receive an MBMS User Service, it is authenticated and authorized as defined in clause 6.2.2. + +## 5.2 Key derivation, management and distribution + +Like any service, the keys that are used to protect the transmitted data in a MBMS User Service should be regularly changed to ensure that they are fresh. This ensures that only legitimate users can get access to the data in the MBMS User Service. In particular frequent re-keying acts as a deterrent for an attacker to pass the MBMS keys to others users to allow those other users to access the data in an MBMS User Service. + +The BM-SC is responsible for the generation and distribution of the MBMS keys to the UE. A UE has the ability to request a key when it does not have the relevant key to decrypt the data. This request may also be initiated by a message from the BM-SC to indicate that a new key is available. + +The following function is used by the procedures listed below: + +- MRK derivation (clause 6.1); + +The following procedures are involved in Key management and distribution: + +- MBMS User Service Registration procedure (clause 6.3.2); +- MBMS User Service Deregistration procedure (clause 6.3.2); +- MSK request procedure (clause 6.3.2); +- MSK delivery procedure (clause 6.3.2); +- MTK delivery procedure (clause 6.3.3); +- BM-SC solicited pull procedure (clause 6.3.2). + +## 5.3 Protection of the transmitted traffic + +The traffic for a particular MBMS User Service may require some protection depending on the sensitivity of the data being transmitted (e.g. it is possible that the data being transmitted by the MBMS User Service is actually protected by the DRM security method and hence might not require additional protection. However, MBMS protection is independent of DRM protection). If this protection is required, it will be either confidentiality and integrity or confidentiality only, or integrity only. The protection is applied end-to-end between the BM-SC and the UEs and will be based on a symmetric key shared between the BM-SC and the UEs that are currently accessing the service. The actual method of protection specified may vary depending on the type of data being transmitted, e.g. media streaming application or file download. + +**NOTE:** When MBMS data is received over a point-to-point MBMS radio bearer, it would be ciphered between the BM-SC and UE and may also ciphered over the radio interface. This "double ciphering" is unnecessary from a security point of view and hence the decision of whether or not to apply radio interface ciphering to a point-to-point MBMS radio bearer is outside the scope of this specification. + +The following traffic protection functions can be distinguished: + +- Protection of streaming data (clause 6.6.2); +- Protection of download data (clause 6.6.3). + +# 6 Security mechanisms + +## 6.1 Using GBA for MBMS + +TS 33.220 [6] GBA (Generic Bootstrapping Architecture) is used to agree keys that are needed to run an MBMS User Service. The Ua security protocol identifier that shall be used for MBMS is defined in TS 33.220 [6]. + +The use of 2G GBA, as specified in Annex I of TS 33.220 [6], for MBMS may be supported as an implementation option to allow the use of SIM cards or SIMs on UICCs. + +According to TS 33.220 [6], it is possible for operators to explicitly prohibit the use of SIMs for MBMS access based on policy configuration at the BSF. + +If the Service Announcement indicates that protection of the MBMS User Service is applied, then the UE needs to share GBA-keys with the BM-SC. If no valid GBA-keys are available at the UE, the UE shall perform a GBA run with the BSF of the home network as described within TS 33.220 [6]. The BM-SC will act as a NAF (Network Application Function) according to TS 33.220 [6]. + +Along with the GBA-keys the BSF shall send the IMPI of the user to the BM-SC. When the UE has bootstrapped, it will use a new B-TID over the Ua reference point. The IMPI is used in the BM-SC to bind the old and the new B-TID together. + +The MSKs for an MBMS User Service shall be stored on either the UICC, if the UICC is capable of MBMS key management, or the ME, if the UICC is not capable of MBMS key management or a SIM card is used. + +Storing the MSKs on the UICC requires a UICC that contains the MBMS management functions. + +As a result of a GBA\_U run, the BM-SC will share a key Ks\_ext\_NAF with the ME and share a key Ks\_int\_NAF with the UICC. In case the UICC supports MBMS then this key Ks\_int\_NAF is used by the BM-SC and the UICC as the key MUK (MBMS User Key) to protect MSK (MBMS Service Key) deliveries to the UICC as described within clause 6.3. The key Ks\_ext\_NAF is used as the key MRK (MBMS Request Key) within the protocols as described within clause 6.2. In case the UICC does not support MBMS then the key Ks\_int\_NAF can not be used for ME based key management, but the key Ks\_ext\_NAF shall be used as MUK and the key MRK is derived from the key Ks\_ext\_NAF by the BM-SC and the ME as specified in Annex F of this specification. + +A run of GBA\_ME or 2G GBA results in the BM-SC sharing a key Ks\_NAF with the ME. Both the BM-SC and the ME use the key Ks\_NAF as MUK. The key MRK is derived from the key Ks\_NAF by the BM-SC and the ME as specified in Annex F of this specification. The key MUK is used to protect MSK deliveries to the ME as described within clause 6.3. The key MRK is used to authenticate the UE towards the BM-SC within the protocols as described within clause 6.2. + +The MUK and MRK are identified by the combination of B-TID and NAF-ID (without the Ua security protocol identifier) in the UE and by B-TID in the BM-SC, where B-TID and NAF-ID are defined as specified in TS 33.220 [6]. + +In the UE two different MUKs, i.e. the last generated and the last successfully used, are used to guarantee that the UE and the BM-SC share always one MUK. The last generated MUK is replaced immediately after when a new MUK is generated and the last successfully used MUK is updated after the successful reception of the MIKEY message, which is protected using the last generated MUK. The usage of MUKs is described within clause 6.3. + +For ME based key management: + +- All MBMS keys (MUK, MRK, MSK and MTK) shall be deleted from the ME when a different UICC or SIM is inserted. Therefore the ME needs to store in non-volatile memory the last inserted UICC or SIM identity to be able to compare that with the used UICC or SIM identity at card insertion and power on. +- All MBMS keys (MRK, MSK and MTK) may be deleted from the ME when the ME is powered down. If the ME does not delete the MBMS keys at power down then the MBMS keys need to be stored in non-volatile memory. The ME should store the MUKs in non-volatile memory in order to be able to authenticate the first MIKEY message of a BM-SC solicited pull procedure (see clause 6.3.2.2.4). + +NOTE: If the ME deletes the MSK at power down, then the MBMS client would need to request MSK to the BM-SC and may need to run GBA to reconvene an MBMS session. + +For UICC-based key management: + +- When a MSK delivery procedure has to be performed and the corresponding Ks\_int\_NAF (GBA NAF key) is no longer available in the UICC, the UE shall re-generate a Ks\_int\_NAF key. If the received MSK delivery procedure refers to a Ks\_int\_NAF key no longer available and if the bootstrapped key Ks is associated to the same B-TID, then the ME should re-generate Ks\_int\_NAF with a GBA NAF derivation procedure. In case that the bootstrapped key Ks has been updated, the ME should take the new B-TID into use and run the MSK request procedure towards the BM-SC which retrieves the latest Ks\_int\_NAF from the BSF. +- The ME shall control the deletion of MUKs stored on the UICC. When the ME wants to free up storage in the UICC for new MUK, the ME selects the MUK no longer needed to be deleted. If a MUK is deleted then the corresponding GBA NAF Keys (i.e. GBA NAF Keys with same NAF-ID) shall be deleted; the bootstrapped key Ks shall also be deleted if Ks is present and associated to the same B-TID. + +## 6.2 Authentication and authorisation of a user + +### 6.2.1 Authentication and authorisation in HTTP procedures + +#### 6.2.1.1 General + +This clause describes authentication of the user to the BM-SC when using HTTP digest with bootstrapped security associations. + +#### 6.2.1.2 Bootstrapping + +The BM-SC shall implement initiation of bootstrapping and bootstrapping renegotiation procedures over Ua as specified in TS 33.220 [6] and in TS 24.109 [18]. The Ua interface procedures shall use MRK. + +#### 6.2.1.3 HTTP digest authentication + +When the UE initiates an HTTP procedure towards the BM-SC, HTTP digest authentication as defined in RFC 2617 [8] shall be used for mutual authentication. HTTP digest is run between BM-SC and ME. The MBMS authentication procedure is based on the general user authentication procedure over Ua interface that is specified in clause "Procedures using the bootstrapped Security Association" in TS 33.220 [6]. The BM-SC will act as a NAF according to TS 33.220 [6]. Along with the GBA-keys the BSF shall send the IMPI of the user to the BM-SC. The details of HTTP digest authentication are specified in clause 5.2 of TS 24.109 [18] + +The following adaptations apply to HTTP digest: + +- the B-TID as specified in TS 33.220 [6] is used as username; +- MRK (MBMS Request Key) is used as password. + +All HTTP procedures within this specification including the associated delivery procedures in TS 26.346 [13] shall be integrity protected with HTTP digest as specified in this clause. In addition, the associated delivery procedures may be confidentiality protected as specified in clause 6.7 of this document. + +### 6.2.2 Authentication and authorisation in MBMS bearer establishment + +As defined in TS 23.246 [3] MBMS bearer establishment applies only to multicast mode. The authentication of the UE during MBMS bearer establishment relies on the authenticated point-to-point connection with the network, which was set up using network security described in TS 33.102 [4] or TS 43.020 [12]. Authorisation for the MBMS bearer establishment happens by the network making an authorisation request to the BM-SC to ensure that the UE is allowed to establish the MBMS bearer(s) corresponding to an MBMS User Service (see TS 23.246 [3] for the details). As MBMS bearer establishment authorisation lies outside the control of the MBMS bearer network (i.e. it is controlled by the BM-SC), there is an additional procedure to remove the MBMS bearer(s) related to a UE that is no longer authorised to access an MBMS User Service. + +NOTE: MBMS in EPS supports only broadcast mode and functionality described in this clause applies only to multicast mode. + +### 6.2.3 Void + +### 6.2.4 Void + +## 6.3 Key management procedures + +### 6.3.1 General + +In order to protect an MBMS User Service, it is necessary to deliver both MSKs and MTKs from the BM-SC to the UE. + +MSK procedures are further divided to MSK request procedures, described in clause 6.3.2.2, and MSK delivery procedure, described in clause 6.3.2.3. MSK procedures use a point-to-point bearer. MSK procedures are similar for both streaming and download services. + +MBMS key management messages shall use a non-real time PDP context of QoS class "background" or "interactive" as defined by TS 23.107 [23] or PDN connection with similar QoS properties as defined TS 23.203 [30]. + +**NOTE:** In UTRAN the PS radio resources for a PDP context of QoS class "background" and "interactive" can be released and re-established on request of the network, while the IP address remains assigned to the PDP context. If the radio resources were released and the BM-SC wants to deliver an MSK (see clause 6.3.2.3) the network will page the UE. Similar functionality applies to PDN connections in E-UTRAN. + +The BM-SC shall store the IP-address which was assigned for the PDP context for further key management usage. The BM-SC receives the IP address of the UE from the source IP address field of the MBMS User Service Registration message. It shall be ensured by the network that the original source UE IP address is visible to the BM-SC. + +The operator may configure the BM-SC to refrain from pushing the MSK update message to the UE and let the UE request for the MSK. This may be needed in some download services where the UE fetches the MSK after receiving encrypted download object. In this case the back-off mode as described in clause 6.3.2.2.1 shall be used if present within the Service Announcement. + +MTK delivery procedures use the same bearer as the MBMS User Service. MTK delivery procedures are different for streaming and download services and they are described in clause 6.3.3. + +The details of the HTTP procedures and HTTP error situations are specified in Annex G. An example of detailed MSK request procedure is described in Annex H. The XML schemas of the HTTP payloads are specified in TS 26.346 [13]. + +### 6.3.2 MSK procedures + +#### 6.3.2.1 MSK identification + +Every MSK is uniquely identifiable by its Key Domain ID and MSK ID + +where + +Key Domain ID = MCC || MNC and is 3 bytes long. + +**NOTE 1:** When MCC || MNC is used as key identifier, the UE should not try to use it in another context, e.g. the UE should not compare the received MCC || MNC to parameters in radio level. + +MSK ID is 4 bytes long and with byte 0 and 1 containing the Key Group part, and byte 2 and 3 containing the Key Number part. The Key Number part is used to distinguish MSKs that have the same Key Domain ID and Key Group part. The Key Number part value zero (0x0) is reserved for special use to denote the current MSK. Key Group part is used to group keys together in order to allow redundant MSKs to be deleted. The Key Group part value zero (0x0) is not allowed as it is reserved for future use. The MSK ID is carried in the extension payload of MIKEY extension payload. + +**NOTE 2:** If the Key Domain ID does not uniquely identify the BM-SC, it needs to be ensured that the Key Group parts are unique within an operator, i.e. two BM-SCs within an operator shall not use the same Key Group value. unless multiple BM-SC deployment is used as is defined in clause 6.3.4 + +#### 6.3.2.1A MBMS User Service Registration procedure + +When a UE has received MBMS User Service information, which indicates that the service is protected, via User Service Discovery / Announcement procedures describing a MBMS User Service, and the user wants to receive that MBMS User Service, the UE shall register to the MBMS User Service. Registration is required to ensure that the UE receives the necessary MSK updates. + +MBMS User Service Registration shall be performed by the UE irrespective of the type of MBMS Transport Service i.e. in multicast mode or broadcast mode, as soon as the user first indicates that he wants to receive the MBMS User Service. In addition, it shall be performed at subsequent power on, unless the user has previously indicated that he/she no longer wants to receive the MBMS User Service, or unless the USIM or SIM has changed. + +NOTE 1: The User Service Discovery / Announcement procedures are specified in TS 26.346 [13]. It is out of the scope of the present specification how the UE receives the User Service information and how the User Service is triggered in the UE. + +NOTE 2: The MBMS User Service announcements are not protected when sent over MBMS bearer. + +The UE shall not release the PDP context used by the MBMS User Service Registration until an MBMS User Service De-registration has been performed. This is to ensure that the BM-SC is aware of the correct UE IP address for the purpose of performing MSK deliveries from the BM-SC as specified in clause 6.3.2.2.4 and clause 6.3.2.3.1. + +If the UE detects that a PDP context, which is used for MBMS key management, is released by the network, the UE should try to re-run MBMS User Service Registration for those MBMS User Services which were using the released PDP context for MBMS key management. For performing these re-registrations the UE may establish a new PDP context or the UE may use some other existing appropriate PDP context as defined in clause 6.3.1, if available. This is to ensure that the BM-SC becomes aware of the new UE IP address for the purpose of performing MSK deliveries from the BM-SC. Any new registrations should override any existing registrations of the UE to the same MBMS User Services. + +If the MBMS User Service does not require any protection (i.e. if a service protection description is not present in the Service Announcement), the UE shall not perform User Service Registration for key management purposes, which means that the UE needs no shared secret with the BM-SC and should therefore not perform a GBA-run with BSF for MBMS (e.g. if no shared secret for MBMS is available in the UE). + +The UE shall receive the following information via the User Service Discovery / Announcement procedures if protection of the MBMS User Service is applied: + +- One or more fully qualified domain names (FQDN) of the key management servers (i.e. the BM-SC). This is for the UE to know to which IP address to send within the MBMS User Service Registration/Deregistration and MSK request Procedures. One or more FQDNs may be indicated in the Service Announcement for load balancing purposes. The UE shall choose the FQDN at the registration phase with the same mechanism as the File Repair Server is selected in TS 26.346 [13]. The UE shall keep the same FQDN for subsequent key management procedures. +- UICC key management required: yes/ no. +- 2G GBA allowed: yes/no + +If the flag 2G GBA is not present then 2G GBA is not allowed. + +- MIKEY FEC-protection, as defined in TS 26.346 [13], may be specified in the service protection description if MIKEY is FEC protected and encapsulated in FEC source packets. +- Identifiers of the MSKs needed for the User Service. + +For each MSK, the identifiers that shall be included are Key Domain ID and MSK ID. The Key Number part of each MSK ID shall be set to 0x0 to denote the current MSK. The Key Number values in the Service Announcement shall be ignored by the UE, since they may change over time and Key Group part of MSK ID is sufficient to identify the MSKs, see clause 6.3.2.1. + +- Mapping information how the MSKs are used to protect the different RTP sessions or FLUTE channels. + +NOTE 3: Void + +###### NOTE 4: Void + +- Back off mode parameters, as defined in TS 26.346 [13], may be specified for MSK requests, if wanted by the service provider. These parameters are then valid for all MSKs in the user service. The Back off mode is used to avoid congestion in MSK requests. In the rare cases that more than one User Service share the same MSK, but have different back off parameters, the UE is allowed to choose which ones to use. The Back off mode is optional to implement in the BM-SC and mandatory to implement in the UE. The UE shall use Back off mode if it is requested by the BM-SC in the Service Announcement. + +The UE shall not register for an MBMS user service if it does not have enough storage available for any additional MSKs and MTKs required for that service. The UE should delete MSKs and MTKs that are no longer needed in order to free up storage for new MSKs and MTKs. For UICC-based key management, the ME shall control the deletion of MSKs stored on the UICC. + +NOTE 4a: It is up to the ME implementation as to which keys are not needed any longer. + +In case the service protection description indicates that the UICC key management is required, the UE should only try to access the MBMS User Service if the selected UICC application is capable of MBMS key management. + +In case the service protection description indicates that UICC key management is not required, the use of either UICC key management or ME key management for a particular UE, depends on if the used UICC application is capable of MBMS key management or not, i.e. if the used UICC application is capable of MBMS key management, then UICC key management shall be used. + +In case the service protection description indicates that UICC key management is not required and 2G GBA is not allowed, the UE should only try to access the MBMS User Service if a USIM is present in the UE as the use of SIM is not allowed for this MBMS User Service. + +In case the service protection description indicates that UICC key management is not required and 2G GBA is allowed, the use of either 2G or 3G GBA for a particular UE depends on whether a UICC with a USIM is present in the UE or not as defined in TS 33.220 [6]. I.e., if a UICC with a USIM is present then 3G GBA shall be used, and if no UICC with a USIM is present then a SIM together with 2G GBA shall be used. The service protection description shall not allow 2G GBA and require UICC key management at the same time. + +![Sequence diagram of MBMS User Service Registration procedure between UE and BM-SC.](2834bdd6eb8540277e609decbb924003_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant BM-SC + Note right of BM-SC: [Authentication Exchange] + UE->>BM-SC: HTTP POST (Registration indication, MBMS User Service IDs) + BM-SC-->>UE: HTTP 401 WWW-Authenticate + Note right of BM-SC: [Authorization Exchange] + UE->>BM-SC: HTTP POST Authorization request (Registration indication, MBMS User Service IDs) + BM-SC-->>UE: HTTP 200 OK Authentication-Info (Status codes) +``` + +The diagram illustrates the MBMS User Service Registration procedure between a User Equipment (UE) and a Broadcast Management System Controller (BM-SC). The sequence of messages is as follows: 1. The UE sends an HTTP POST message to the BM-SC containing a registration indication and MBMS User Service IDs. 2. The BM-SC responds with an HTTP 401 WWW-Authenticate message. 3. The UE then sends an HTTP POST Authorization request, also containing a registration indication and MBMS User Service IDs. 4. Finally, the BM-SC responds with an HTTP 200 OK Authentication-Info message, which includes status codes. The authentication and authorization exchange (steps 2 and 3) is enclosed in a dashed box, indicating a logical grouping of these messages. + +Sequence diagram of MBMS User Service Registration procedure between UE and BM-SC. + +Figure 6.0A: MBMS User Service Registration procedure + +The communication between the UE and the BM-SC is authenticated and integrity protected with HTTP Digest using bootstrapped security association as described in clause 6.2.1 of this specification. + +The UE sends a registration request for the MBMS User Service using the HTTP POST message to the BM-SC Key Request function. The following information shall be included in the HTTP message. + +- Indication that the UE requests to register to the MBMS User Service; +- A list of one or more MBMS User Service IDs. + +The BM-SC Key Request function authenticates the UE with HTTP Digest using MRK key as described in clause 6.2.1. + +If the authentication is successful, the BM-SC Key Request function shall verify whether the UE is authorized to register to the MBMS User Service(s) specified in the request. If the UE is authorized, the BM-SC Key Request function registers the UE to the MBMS User Service(s), which means that the UE is registered to receive the MSKs used in these MBMS User Service(s). The BM-SC Key Request function sends a HTTP 200 OK message with Authentication-Info header to the UE. The following information shall be included in the payload of the HTTP response message: + +- A list including one status code for each MBMS User Service ID that was present in the Registration request. + +The handling of multiple status codes in one response message is specified in clause 6.3.2.4. + +NOTE 5: The BM-SC may not need to challenge the UE (dashed box in figure 6.0A), if the UE has used WWW Authorization request headers in the first message in figure 6.0A and BM-SC is able to authenticate the UE. + +If the authentication fails, the BM-SC Key Request function resends HTTP 401 Authorization required message with the WWW-Authenticate header. + +The UE checks the validity of the HTTP response message. If the message indicated failure in the HTTP status line, the UE may retry to send the request message. + +The UE shall check the status codes in the payload and act accordingly. For example, the UE may retry to register to the MBMS User Service(s) that were indicated to have failed. Further error cases are described in clause G.2.4. + +The BM-SC Key Distribution function initiates MSK delivery procedure(s) as specified in clause 6.3.2.3 for those MBMS User Services for which the response message indicated success. The BM-SC may decide to not initiate MSK key delivery procedures, if the combination of services is such that it only makes sense to use all of them simultaneously. + +NOTE 6: The time between the MBMS User Service Registration procedure and MSK delivery procedures may vary, i.e. the UE should not expect the MSK delivery procedures to start immediately. + +##### 6.3.2.1B MBMS User Service Deregistration procedure + +When the user desires to deregister from one or more MBMS User Services, the UE shall perform an MBMS User Service De-registration. This shall be done irrespective of the type of MBMS Transport Service i.e. in multicast mode or in broadcast mode. + +The UE shall also perform an MBMS User Service De-registration, at UE power down, for all ongoing MBMS User Services to ensure that the BM-SC is made aware that the user is no longer contactable. + +It may happen that the UE is unable to perform a MBMS User Service De-registration for all ongoing MBMS User Services e.g. due to uncontrolled power down or loss of coverage. This could lead to situations where the BM-SC wants to initiate an MSK delivery procedure (see clause 6.3.2.3) towards an unreachable UE. + +![Sequence diagram of MBMS User Service Deregistration procedure between UE and BM-SC.](ae53f90bb87d6d09e2d6b5278d7c338f_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant BM-SC + UE->>BM-SC: HTTP POST (Deregistration indication, MBMS User Service IDs) + rect rgb(255, 255, 255) + Note right of UE: Optional Authentication Challenge + BM-SC-->>UE: HTTP 401 WWW-Authenticate + UE->>BM-SC: HTTP POST Authorization request (Deregistration indication, MBMS User Service IDs) + end + BM-SC-->>UE: HTTP 200 OK Authentication-Info (Status codes) + +``` + +The diagram illustrates the interaction between a User Equipment (UE) and a Broadcast Management System Controller (BM-SC) for MBMS User Service Deregistration. The process begins with the UE sending an HTTP POST message to the BM-SC, containing a deregistration indication and MBMS User Service IDs. The BM-SC may respond with an HTTP 401 WWW-Authenticate message. A dashed box encloses the next two steps: the UE sends an HTTP POST Authorization request (also containing deregistration indication and MBMS User Service IDs) to the BM-SC. Finally, the BM-SC responds with an HTTP 200 OK Authentication-Info message containing status codes. The dashed box indicates that the BM-SC may not need to challenge the UE if the UE has already included the necessary authorization headers in the first message. + +Sequence diagram of MBMS User Service Deregistration procedure between UE and BM-SC. + +**Figure 6.0B: MBMS User Service Deregistration procedure** + +The communication between the UE and the BM-SC is authenticated and integrity protected with HTTP Digest using bootstrapped security association as described in clause 6.2.1 of this specification. + +The UE sends a deregistration request for the MBMS User Service using the HTTP POST message to the BM-SC Key Request function. The following information shall be included in the HTTP message. + +- Indication that the UE requests to deregister from the MBMS User Service; +- A list of one or more MBMS User Service IDs. + +The BM-SC Key Request function authenticates the UE with HTTP Digest using MRK key as described in clause 6.2.1. + +If the authentication is successful, the BM-SC Key Request function deregisters the UE from the MBMS User Service(s), which means that the UE will no longer receive the MSKs used in these MBMS User Service(s). The BM-SC Key Request function sends a HTTP 200 OK message with Authentication-Info header to the UE. The following information shall be included in the payload of the HTTP response message: + +- A list including one status code for each MBMS User Service ID that was present in the De-Registration request. + +The handling of multiple status codes in one response message is specified in clause 6.3.2.4. + +**NOTE:** The BM-SC may not need to challenge the UE (dashed box in figure 6.0B), if the UE has used WWW Authorization request headers in the first message in figure 6.0B and BM-SC is able to authenticate the UE. + +If the authentication fails then the BM-SC Key Request function resends HTTP 401 Authorization required message with the WWW-Authenticate header. + +The UE checks the validity of the HTTP response message. If the message indicated failure in the HTTP status line, the UE may retry to send the request message. The UE shall check the status codes in the payload and act accordingly. Error cases are described in clause G.2.4. + +The BM-SC should invalidate those MSKs from the UE, which are not used by any other MBMS User Services where the UE is registered. The BM-SC Key Distribution function performs this by running MSK delivery procedure for each MSK, where the Key Validity data is set to invalid value (see clause 6.3.2.3), i.e. SEQ1 is greater than SEQn. + +#### 6.3.2.2 MSK request procedures + +##### 6.3.2.2.1 Basic MSK request procedure + +When a UE detects that it needs the MSK(s) for a specific MBMS User Service, the UE should try to get the MSKs that will be used to protect the data transmitted as part of this MBMS User Service. In the MSK request procedure the UE shall list the Key Domain ID - MSK ID pairs for which the UE needs the MSK(s). The UE shall always (except in the case of a BM-SC solicited pull) wait a period of time as specified by the back-off parameters in the User Service Description (if they are present) before making a request. + +The basic MSK request procedure is a part of different other procedures, e.g.: + +- request of MSK(s) when the UE has missed a key update procedure e.g. due to being out of coverage. +- BM-SC solicited pull procedure. + +![Sequence diagram of the Basic MSK request procedure between UE and BM-SC.](e7c6a6e4c3047dac05a3b92e396e9794_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant BM-SC + Note right of BM-SC: Dashed box indicates optional challenge + UE->>BM-SC: HTTP POST (List of Key Domain ID - MSK ID pairs) + Note right of BM-SC: HTTP 401 WWW-Authenticate + Note right of BM-SC: HTTP POST Authorization request (List of Key Domain ID - MSK ID pairs) + BM-SC->>UE: HTTP 200 OK Authentication-Info (Status codes) +``` + +The diagram illustrates the Basic MSK request procedure between a User Equipment (UE) and a Broadcast Management System Controller (BM-SC). The sequence of messages is as follows: 1. The UE sends an HTTP POST message containing a list of Key Domain ID - MSK ID pairs to the BM-SC. 2. The BM-SC responds with an HTTP 401 WWW-Authenticate message. This step, along with the subsequent UE response, is enclosed in a dashed box, indicating it is an optional challenge. 3. The UE replies with an HTTP POST Authorization request, also containing the list of Key Domain ID - MSK ID pairs. 4. Finally, the BM-SC sends an HTTP 200 OK Authentication-Info message containing status codes back to the UE. + +Sequence diagram of the Basic MSK request procedure between UE and BM-SC. + +**Figure 6.1: Basic MSK request procedure** + +The communication between the UE and the BM-SC is authenticated and integrity protected with HTTP Digest using bootstrapped security association as described in clause 6.2.1 of this specification. + +The UE requests for one or several MSKs using the HTTP POST message. The following information is included in the HTTP message. + +- key identification information: a list of one or several Key Domain ID - MSK ID pairs. + +UEs may request specific MSK(s) by setting the Key Number part of the MSK ID to the requested value. When the Key Number part of the MSK ID is set to 0x0, this means the current MSK, see clause 6.3.2.1. The UE may request MSK(s) associated to more than one MBMS User Service in the same MSK request procedure. + +The BM-SC Key Request function authenticates the UE with HTTP Digest using the keys received from GBA as described in clause 6.2.1. + +If the authentication is successful, the BM-SC Key Request function shall verify whether the UE is registered to any MBMS User Service that uses the MSKs specified in the request. If the UE is authorized, the BM-SC Key Distribution function shall deliver requested MSKs to the UE (see clause 6.3.2.3). The BM-SC sends a HTTP 200 OK message with Authentication-Info header. The following information shall be included in the payload of the HTTP response message: + +- A list including one status code for each Key Domain ID - MSK ID pair that was present in the Registration request. + +The handling of multiple status codes in one response message is specified in clause 6.3.2.4. + +NOTE 1: The BM-SC may not need to challenge the UE (dashed box in figure 6.1), if the UE has used WWW Authorization request headers in the first message in figure 6.1 and BM-SC is able to authenticate the UE. + +If the authentication fails then the BM-SC Key Request function resends HTTP 401 Authorization required message with the WWW-Authenticate header. + +The UE checks the validity of the HTTP response message. If the message indicated failure in the HTTP status line, the UE may retry to send the request message. + +The UE shall check the status codes in the payload and act accordingly. For example, the UE may retry to request those MSKs that were indicated to have failed or leave the MBMS User Service. + +If the HTTP procedure above resulted to success, the BM-SC Key Distribution function initiates MSK delivery procedure as specified in clause 6.3.2.3. + +##### 6.3.2.2.2 Void + +##### 6.3.2.2.3 Missed key update procedure + +When the UE has missed an MSK update and it detects that it has not got the current MSK, e.g. from the received traffic, it may trigger the retrieval of the current MSK from the BM-SC. The procedure is the same as the Basic MSK request procedure in clause 6.3.2.2.1. + +##### 6.3.2.2.4 BM-SC solicited pull procedure + +While the push is the regular way of updating the MSK to the UE, there may be situations where the BM-SC Key Distribution function solicits the UE to contact the BM-SC and request for new MSK. An example of such a situation is when the BM-SC Key Distribution function wants to trigger the UE that it needs to update the MSK. + +![Sequence diagram for BM-SC solicited pull procedure. The diagram shows two entities: UE and BM-SC. A MIKEY message (Key Number part of MSK ID = 0x0) with the last MUK known by the BM-SC is sent from the BM-SC to the UE. The UE then validates the message based on the last MUK known by the BM-SC. If the MUK was expired and no valid GBA-key is present, the UE sends an HTTP POST (Key Domain ID - MSK ID pair) to the BM-SC.](e05c1a13b44ab41505609d82b00cf4df_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant BM-SC + Note right of BM-SC: MIKEY (Key Number part of MSK ID = 0x0) with last MUK known by the BM-SC + BM-SC->>UE: MIKEY message + Note left of UE: Validate message based on last MUK known by BM-SC. Run GBA if that MUK was expired and no valid GBA-key is present + UE->>BM-SC: HTTP POST (Key Domain ID - MSK ID pair) + +``` + +Sequence diagram for BM-SC solicited pull procedure. The diagram shows two entities: UE and BM-SC. A MIKEY message (Key Number part of MSK ID = 0x0) with the last MUK known by the BM-SC is sent from the BM-SC to the UE. The UE then validates the message based on the last MUK known by the BM-SC. If the MUK was expired and no valid GBA-key is present, the UE sends an HTTP POST (Key Domain ID - MSK ID pair) to the BM-SC. + +**Figure 6.2b: BM-SC solicited pull** + +The BM-SC Key Distribution function sends a MIKEY message over UDP to the UE. The MIKEY message shall be protected by the last MUK known by the BM-SC. The Key Number part of the MSK ID in the extension payload of the MIKEY message shall be set to 0x0 to indicate that the UE should request for current MSK from the BM-SC. + +If the received MUK\_ID (i.e. the last MUK known by the BM-SC) does not correspond to the last MUK known by the UE, then the UE checks the solicited pull MIKEY message with the last MUK successfully used by the BM-SC. + +The BM-SC shall not set the V-bit in the common header when initiating the BM-SC solicited pull procedure. + +NOTE 1: A MUK may be used by the BM-SC Key Distribution function beyond the GBA key lifetime of the corresponding Ks\_xx\_NAF for the purpose of using the MUK within the first MIKEY message of a push solicited pull procedure. + +NOTE 2: Since the integrity of the MIKEY message still needs to be assured, a KEMAC payload shall be included in the MIKEY message from the BM-SC Key Distribution function. There is however no key present in the message. Thus by setting the Encr data len field to zero, only the MAC of the message will be included. + +When receiving the message, the UE shall request for the current MSK for the specified Key Group as specified in clause 6.3.2.2.1. + +A situation where the use of the solicited pull procedure is needed for the BM-SC to be able to update successfully MSK's to a UE is when the BM-SC has chosen the MUK lifetime less than the GBA key lifetime of the corresponding + +Ks\_xx\_NAF, and the MUK lifetime has expired in the BM-SC. In that case the BM-SC should initiate the BM-SC solicited pull procedure and answer to the HTTP POST of Figure 6.2b with a Bootstrapping Renegotiation Request according to TS 33.220 [6]. + +#### 6.3.2.3 MSK delivery procedures + +##### 6.3.2.3.1 Pushing the MSK to the UE + +The BM-SC Key Distribution function controls when the MSKs used in a MBMS User Service are to be changed. The below flow describes how MSK changes are performed. This procedure can be initiated after the UE has requested for MSK(s) as described in clause 6.3.2.2. + +![Sequence diagram showing the push of MSKs from BM-SC to UE. The UE sends a MIKEY (MSK) / UDP message to the BM-SC, and the BM-SC responds with a MIKEY ACK / UDP message.](e29665b8abcea967ef289c6aff07ae4c_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant BM-SC + Note right of BM-SC: MIKEY (MSK) / UDP + BM-SC->>UE: MIKEY (MSK) / UDP + Note left of UE: MIKEY ACK / UDP + UE->>BM-SC: MIKEY ACK / UDP + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the push of MSKs from BM-SC to UE. The UE sends a MIKEY (MSK) / UDP message to the BM-SC, and the BM-SC responds with a MIKEY ACK / UDP message. + +**Figure 6.3: Pushing the MSKs to the UE** + +When the BM-SC Key Distribution function decides that it is time to update the MSK, the BM-SC Key Distribution function sends MIKEY message over UDP transporting the requested MSK to the UE. + +If requested by the BM-SC Key Distribution function, the UE sends a MIKEY acknowledgement message to the BM-SC. + +**NOTE:** The MSK is not necessarily updated in the message, since a MSK transport message can be sent e.g. to update the Key Validity data. + +When an MSK push MIKEY message is not directly preceded by an MSK key request, then it may happen that the BM-SC uses a still valid MUK that is not the last generated MUK at the UE. The UE shall handle such a MIKEY push message in a similar way as the push solicited pull MIKEY message (i.e. upon a successful integrity check the UE shall initiate an MSK request with the specified Key Group). Additionally, in this case, the UE shall not create a MIKEY acknowledgement message. + +**NOTE:** This procedure guarantees that the UE contacts the BM-SC with the last B-TID, such that the UE now receives a MIKEY push message with the last generated MUK. The integrity of the initial pushed MIKEY message can be verified at the UE with the MUK-ID that is known as the last successfully used BM-SC MUK-ID. + +##### 6.3.2.3.2 Void + +#### 6.3.2.4 Handling of multiple status codes within one response message + +The UE shall include a list of one or more MBMS User Service IDs (in MBMS User Service registration and de-registration procedures) or MSK ID-Key Domain ID -pairs (in MSK request procedure) in the payload of one HTTP request message. + +When the BM-SC has processed the request message, it shall include a list of corresponding status codes in the HTTP response message, i.e. a status code for each MBMS User Service ID or MSK ID-Key Domain ID -pair. The status codes are carried in the payload of the HTTP response message and they use the values as specified in RFC 2616 [19]. A successful code, e.g. 200 OK, means that the (de-) registration or MSK request for that specific MBMS User Service ID or MSK was successful. The MBMS specific error codes are described in clause G.2.4. + +There is also a status code in the status line of the HTTP response message, which has a successful value if the BM-SC was able to successfully process the corresponding request message. Otherwise the status code in the HTTP status line shall indicate the appropriate error. + +**NOTE 1:** This means that there are two levels of status codes in the response message: the status code in the HTTP status line that is specific to the HTTP message and processed by the HTTP application and the one or more status codes in the payload that are specific to and processed by the MBMS application. + +In case the response message does not include all the same status codes in the payload that were in the request message, the UE may still process the status codes that it is able to process. + +The list of status codes is also used in case only one MSK or registration is requested. Figure 6.4 below illustrates an example of a UE trying to register to two MBMS User Services. The registration is successful for the first but fails for the second MBMS User service. The example procedure shows only parameters that are relevant for the functionality in question. + +![Sequence diagram showing the registration procedure between a UE and a BM-SC. The UE sends an HTTP POST (Registration) with a payload containing serviceID: AAA and serviceID: BBB. The BM-SC responds with an HTTP 200 OK Authentication-Info with a payload containing serviceID: AAA, code: 200 and serviceID: BBB, code: 403.](759c7d62402f0b4651ddce292be5bdef_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant BM-SC + Note right of UE: HTTP POST (Registration) +Payload: +(serviceID: AAA) +(serviceID: BBB) + UE->>BM-SC: Request + Note left of BM-SC: HTTP 200 OK Authentication-Info +Payload: +(serviceID: AAA, code: 200) +(serviceID: BBB, code: 403) + BM-SC-->>UE: Response + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the registration procedure between a UE and a BM-SC. The UE sends an HTTP POST (Registration) with a payload containing serviceID: AAA and serviceID: BBB. The BM-SC responds with an HTTP 200 OK Authentication-Info with a payload containing serviceID: AAA, code: 200 and serviceID: BBB, code: 403. + +**Figure 6.4: Example registration procedure** + +### 6.3.3 MTK procedures + +#### 6.3.3.1 MTK identification + +Every MTK is uniquely identifiable by its Key Domain ID, MSK ID and MTK ID + +where + +Key Domain ID and MSK ID are as defined in clause 6.3.2.1. + +MTK ID is 2 bytes long sequence number and is used to distinguish MTKs that have the same Key Domain ID and MSK ID. It is carried in the MTK ID field of MIKEY extension payload. Every time a MSK with a new MSK ID is taken into use by the BM-SC, the MTK ID of the first MTK sent by the BM-SC protected by that MSK shall be set to an initial value greater than zero chosen by the BM-SC. + +NOTE 1: In most situations the practical choice for the initial MTK ID will be one, but this does not prevent the BM-SC to choose a value different for each service and greater than one. + +The MTK ID that will be used in a next MTK update needs to be greater than the previously used MTK-ID. + +NOTE 2: The practical choice to increment is 1 but also other increments are allowed. + +NOTE 3: As the MTK ID is 2 bytes long, this allows to use $2^{16} - 2$ MTKs protected by one MSK if the MTK-ID is always incremented by one and the initial MTK ID starts at 1. The maximum value for MTK ID is disallowed (see clause 6.4.5.1). + +#### 6.3.3.2 MTK update procedure + +The MTK is delivered to the UE using MIKEY over UDP, but the V-bit in the common header shall not be set. + +The UE shall not send an error message to the BM-SC as a result of receiving an MTK message. + +##### 6.3.3.2.1 MTK delivery in download + +In the download case the MIKEY message carrying the MTK shall be delivered over the same FLUTE stream as the object to be downloaded to the UE (see TS 26.346 [13]). This means that the message is specified as a separate object in + +the FLUTE File Delivery Table (FDT), having its own identifier. This means the MTK delivery inherits the reliability features of FLUTE. The mime-type of the object carrying the MIKEY message shall be the IANA-registered type for MIKEY. + +##### 6.3.3.2.2 MTK delivery in streaming + +MIKEY messages transporting MTKs shall be sent using the same IP destination address as the RTP traffic. MIKEY messages shall be transported to UDP port number 2269 specified for MIKEY. Reliability of MTK delivery is reached by re-sending MTK messages periodically. + +NOTE: Re-sending of MTK message will also allow the UE to faster switch between SRTP streams. + +In order to increase the possibility that UEs receive a new MTK in time, MTK messages may be sent before the RTP traffic changes over to a new MTK. + +### 6.3.4 Multiple BM-SC deployments + +#### 6.3.4.1 General + +The requirements in the following sub-clauses apply when one and the same MBMS User Service is transmitted via multiple BM-SCs, as this case requires some coordination between the BM-SCs regarding MBMS key management. + +#### 6.3.4.2 Service announcement coordination + +When one and the same MBMS User Service is transmitted via multiple BM-SCs the service shall be announced with one Service Announcement indicating common security protection description for the involved BM-SCs. + +#### 6.3.X.3 MSK key management anchor point + +The UE shall register to one BM-SC indicated in the Service Announcement and shall keep the same BM-SC for all subsequent MSK management procedures as defined in clause 6.3.2.1A. + +NOTE: The MSK key management can be kept on the original BM-SC even though the UE could move under a new BM-SC. This is because the MSK key management uses the PDP/PDN connection. + +#### 6.3.4.4 MSK coordination + +The BM-SCs shall use MSKs in a synchronized way. At a certain point in time the same MSK (identified by the Key Domain ID, MSK Key Group and Key Number part) shall be used in all BM-SCs per a streaming or download session. When the MSK needs to be updated, the BM-SCs shall take the new MSK (identified by the Key Number part) into use at the same time. This is to ensure that the BM-SCs are able to use the MTKs in a synchronized way. For MSK key management anchor point see clause 6.3.X.3. + +#### 6.3.4.5 MTK coordination + +The BM-SCs shall use MTKs in a synchronized way. At a certain point in time the same MTK (identified by the MTK ID as defined in clause 6.3.3.1) shall be used in all BM-SCs per a streaming or download session. When the MTK needs to be updated, the BM-SCs shall take the new MTK into use at the same point in time. This is to ensure that a UE that moves under a new BM-SC, which is transmitting the same MBMS User Service as the old BM-SC, is able to decrypt the service without interruption. The BM-SCs transmitting the same MBMS User Service may transmit identical content or slightly different content, e.g. local news. Especially in the latter case it is important that the update of the MTK happens at the same point in time and is not based on the amount of content (packets or files) sent in the streaming or download session since the amount of content may vary between the BM-SCs. This is to ensure that the BM-SCs keep synchronized in their use of MTKs regardless of the amount of content sent. + +#### 6.3.4.6 MIKEY MTK timestamp coordination + +MBMS uses counter-based MIKEY timestamps as specified in clause 6.4.3. The BM-SCs shall use MIKEY timestamps in MTK delivery messages in a synchronized way. At a certain point in time the same MIKEY MTK timestamp shall be used in all BM-SCs for a streaming or download session. + +NOTE: There is no need to synchronize the MIKEY timestamp for MSK delivery messages as the MSK messages are sent from one BM-SC, see also clause 6.3.X.3. + +When the same MBMS User Service is transmitted via multiple BM-SCs it may happen that the BM-SCs send different amount of MTK delivery messages within a streaming or download session. This will result to that the MIKEY MTK timestamps are not in synchronization between the BM-SCs, and that a UE that moves under a new BM-SC is not able to decrypt the service without interruption due to replay protection. + +The BM-SCs may keep synchronization for the use of MIKEY MTK timestamps by sending the same amount of MIKEY MTK delivery messages at the same pace. However, this may not always be possible e.g. due to different amount of content transmitted by the BM-SCs. Another possibility is that the BM-SCs increase the MIKEY MTK timestamp based on NTP UTC time regardless of how many MIKEY MTK delivery messages are sent, and add the first 32 most significant bits (i.e. the integral part) of NTP UTC time to the counter-based timestamp payload field of MIKEY MTK messages. This ensures that the BM-SCs are synchronized and the UE will treat the timestamp as a counter. + +## 6.4 MIKEY message creation and processing in the ME + +### 6.4.1 General + +MIKEY is used to transport the MSKs and MTKs from the BM-SC to the UE. Clauses 6.4.2, 6.4.3, 6.4.4 and 6.4.5 describe how to create the MIKEY messages, while clause 6.4.6 describes the initial processing by the ME on these messages. The final processing is done by the MBMS key Generation and Validation Function (MGV-F) and is described in clause 6.5. + +MIKEY shall be used with pre-shared keys as described in RFC 3830 [9]. The UDP port number for MIKEY is 2269 (see Port Numbers at IANA [17]). + +To keep track of MSKs and MTKs, a new Extension Payload (EXT) as defined in RFC 4563 [16] is added to MIKEY. The Extension Payload can contain the key types and identities of MSK and the MTK and Key Domain ID (see clauses 6.3.2 and 6.3.3). + +Some MIKEY payloads contain text strings, e.g., the IDi and IDr payloads. These strings shall be encoded according to UTF-8 as defined in RFC 3629 [21]. + +In case MIKEY packets are FEC-protected (see TS 26.346 [13]), this is signalled within the MBMS User Service Description. + +As MIKEY is used in a key transport mode, the key derivation function as defined in section 4.1.4 of RFC 3830 [9] shall be used for MIKEY internal keys and MIKEY internal salt. The preshared key used for transmission of MSK is the MUK, and the pre-shared key used for transmission of MTK is the MSK. + +The size of the authentication key to be used to verify the MAC field of a MIKEY message shall be 160 bits. + +### 6.4.2 MIKEY common header + +MSKs shall be carried in MIKEY messages. The messages are sent point-to-point between the BM-SC and each UE. The messages use the MUK shared between the BM-SC and the UE as the pre-shared secret in MIKEY. + +Once the MSK is in place in the UE, the UE can make use of the MTK messages sent by the BM-SC over MBMS bearer. The MTK is carried in messages conforming to the structure defined by MIKEY and use the MSK as the pre-shared secret. + +If the BM-SC requires an ACK for an MSK key update message this is indicated by setting the V-bit in the MIKEY common header. The UE shall then respond with a MIKEY message containing the verification payload. In the case the server does not receive an ACK, normal reliability constructions can be used, e.g., start a timer when the message is sent and then resend the message if no ACK is received before the timer expires. + +The CSB ID field of MIKEY common header is not used for identification purposes but shall be present in both MSK messages and MTK messages. + +NOTE: As the CSB ID field has no meaning within the context of MBMS, the BM-SC is free to assign any value to CSB ID. Assigning random values to CSB ID enhances security as CSB ID is taken into account for MIKEY key derivations (section 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 of RFC 3830 [9]). + +### 6.4.3 Replay protection + +Each MIKEY message contains the timestamp field (TS) of type 2. This means that the contents of the timestamp field is a 32-bit counter. The counter shall be increased by one for each MSK message sent from the BM-SC to the UE even in case BM-SC retransmits a previously sent MSK message. The counter shall be increased by one for each new MTK message created in the BM-SC. + +NOTE: The BM-SC is allowed to retransmit a previously sent MTK message for streaming in order to provide a higher reliability of MTK delivery (cfr section 6.3.3.2.2) without having to increment the TS field for each sent MTK message. As specified in step 2 of clause 6.4.6.2, the ME will discard duplicate MTK messages based on the last received TS. + +There is one counter per UE for MSK delivery, and one counter common to all UEs for MTK delivery. The counter is used for replay protection; messages with a counter less than or equal to the current counter are discarded. Less than or equal is to be taken in the meaning of RFC1982 [10]. If the less than or equal relation is undefined in the sense of RFC1982 [10], the message should be considered as being replayed and shall be discarded. The counter in the TS field shall be reset for MSK transport messages when the MUK is updated. The counter in the TS field shall be reset for MTK transport messages when the MSK is updated. + +### 6.4.4 General extension payload + +The MSK and MTK shall be delivered in messages that conform to the structure defined in RFC 3830 [9] (MIKEY). To be able to keep track of the key that is derived in the message, a general Extension Payload (EXT) is used that conforms to the structure defined in reference RFC 4563 [16]. + +The EXT includes a Key Domain ID and one or two Key Type ID sub-payloads depending on the message. These are used as follows. + +For MSK delivery the EXT includes the Key Domain ID and a Key Type ID sub-payload. The Key Domain ID has the value as specified in clause 6.3.2.1. The Key Type ID sub-payload includes the type and ID of the key that is delivered in the message, i.e. the MSK ID, see figure 6.4a. The key that is used to protect the message, i.e. MUK, is identified as specified in clause 6.1. + +For MTK delivery the EXT includes the Key Domain ID and two Key Type ID sub-payloads. The Key Domain ID has the value as specified in clause 6.3.2.1. The first Key Type ID sub-payload includes the type and ID of the key that is used to protect the message, i.e. the MSK ID, and the second Key Type ID sub-payload includes the type and ID of the key that is delivered in the message, i.e. the MTK ID, see figure 6.4b. + +See clauses 6.3.2.1 and 6.3.3.1 for definition of MSK ID and MTK ID. The MTK ID is increased every time the corresponding key is updated. It is possible that the same MTK is delivered several times over MBMS bearer, and the ME can then discard messages related to a key it already has instead of passing them to the MGV-F. + +The MGV-F (see clause 6.5) protects itself from a possibly malicious ME by checking the integrity and freshness of the MIKEY message. + +The format of the key IDs shall be represented by unsigned integers. + +![](00c1e69f3f99d3499b03d2463d6d2fd2_img.jpg) + +| | +|----------------------------------| +| Key Domain ID sub-payload | +| Key Type ID sub-payload (MSK ID) | + +**Figure 6.4a: Extension payload used with MIKEY MSK message** + +![](e05b36c0d46549e681ce6581422c66b2_img.jpg) + +| | +|----------------------------------| +| Key Domain ID sub-payload | +| Key Type ID sub-payload (MSK ID) | +| Key Type ID sub-payload (MTK ID) | + +**Figure 6. 4b: Extension payload used with MIKEY MTK message** + +### 6.4.5 MIKEY message structure + +#### 6.4.5.1 MSK message structure + +The following applies for both streaming services and download services: + +- The structure of the MIKEY message carrying a MSK key shall be according to Figure 6.5. (For handling of unknown MIKEY extension payloads in MGV-F, cf. clause 6.5.3.). +- The actual MSK key that is delivered is kept in the KEMAC payload. Only one MSK key shall be transported in the KEMAC payload. +- The format of the EXT payload is as described in chapter 6.4.4. +- The MIKEY-RAND is used to derive e.g. encryption and authentication keys from the received keys. It is sent in all the MSK delivery messages. A UE and BM-SC shall support a MIKEY-RAND of 128-bit. For a specific MSK (identified by the MSK ID including the Key Number part) within an MBMS streaming or download session, the same MIKEY-RAND shall be used in MSK delivery messages for all UEs. This ensures that all UEs will use the same MIKEY-RAND for MTK message processing, cf. clause 6.5.4. +- The identity payloads of the initiator's and responder's IDs shall be included in the MSK transport messages. IDi is the ID (i.e. FQDN) of the BM-SC (i.e. NAF-ID without the Ua security protocol identifier) and IDr is the ID of the UE's username (i.e. B-TID). The ID Type field of IDi and IDr payloads shall be set to value 0 (=NAI). As the content of the IDi field is not a NAI, but a FQDN of the BM-SC, the ID Type field of the IDi payload shall be ignored by the receiver and the ID data field shall be handled as a text string. + +NOTE: NAF-ID without the Ua security protocol identifier (i.e. FQDN of BM-SC) is used to identify a server while a NAI identifies a user, + +- The Type subfield shall be set to value 2 (=TEK) in the KEMAC payload in all MSK delivery messages. +- The KV (Key validity period) subfield shall be set to value 2 (=Interval) in the KEMAC payload in all MSK delivery messages. +- The Key Validity Data subfield is present in the KEMAC payload when MSK is transported. The field defines the validity time for MSK in terms of sequence number interval (i.e. lower limit of MTK ID and upper limit of MTK ID). The lower limit of the interval defines the original value of SEQI to be used by the MGV-F (see clause 6.5) and the upper limit of the interval defines the SEQu. The BM-SC shall never set SEQu to its maximum possible value. +- The use of NULL algorithm in the MAC alg field is not allowed. +- The use of NULL algorithm in the Encr alg field is not allowed. + +The following applies only for streaming services: + +- Only one CryptoSession can be transported in the field CS ID map info for streaming. +- The #CS field shall be set to one, and CS ID map info shall be present in the MSK message. +- The CS ID map type subfield shall be set to "SRTP-ID" as defined in RFC 4563 [16]. +- The SP payload shall be used only with streaming services. + +- Security Policy (SP) payload shall include information for the security protocol such as algorithms to use, key lengths, initial values for algorithms etc. +- The BM-SC shall ensure that the UE has received the SP payload before the SP payload needs to be applied in the streaming service. +- The BM-SC is not allowed to change the SP payload anymore once the streaming service using that SP has started for the first time. +- The BM-SC shall include the SP payload when the MSK delivery was triggered by the UE using the MSK request procedure or the MBMS User Service Registration procedure, otherwise it is optional for the BM-SC to include the SP payload into MSK delivery messages. +- An SRTP key derivation rate of zero shall be used. The BM-SC can achieve this either by explicitly signalling a key derivation rate of zero via MIKEY SRTP policy (RFC 3830 [9]) or by omitting this parameter in MIKEY SRTP policy as the default key derivation rate of SRTP is zero. + +The following applies only for download services: + +- The #CS field shall be set to zero, and no CS ID map info shall be present in the MSK message. +- The CS ID map type subfield shall be set to “Empty map” as defined in RFC 4563 [16]. +- The SP payload shall not be included in the MSK messages. + +![](dbbc0baac7341cda76cc4f8355dce23f_img.jpg) + +| | +|------------| +| Common HDR | +| EXT | +| TS | +| MIKEY RAND | +| IDi | +| IDr | +| {SP} | +| KEMAC | + +**Figure 6.5: The logical structure of the MIKEY message used to deliver MSK. +For use of brackets, cf. section 1.3 of RFC 3830 [9] (MIKEY)** + +#### 6.4.5.2 MSK Verification message structure + +If the BM-SC expects a response to the MSK-transport message (i.e., the V-bit in the MIKEY common header is equal to 1), the UE shall send a verification message as a response. The verification message shall be constructed according to section 3.1 of MIKEY, and shall consist of the following fields: HDR || TS || IDr || V, where IDr is the ID of the UE. The ID Type field of IDr payload shall be set to value 0 (=NAI). The CS ID map type subfield shall be set to “Empty map” as defined in RFC 4563 [16]. The #CS field shall be set to zero, and no CS ID map info shall be present in the MSK verification message. The use of the NULL algorithm in the MAC alg field is not allowed. Note that the MAC included in the verification payload, shall be computed over both the initiator's and the responder's ID as well as the timestamp in addition to be computed over the response message as defined in RFC 3830 [9]. + +The UE shall use the same CSB ID in the verification messages as received in the MSK delivery message. + +![](f324fbc5d5af1e4da9cd932389f0064c_img.jpg) + +| | +|------------| +| Common HDR | +| TS | +| IDr | +| V | + +**Figure 6.6: The logical structure of the MIKEY Verification message** + +The verification message shall not be sent as a response to MIKEY messages delivering MTK. + +The ME shall send the verification message, when received as result from the MGV-F, to the BM-SC. + +#### 6.4.5.3 MTK message structure + +Following requirements apply for both streaming and download services: + +- The structure of the MIKEY message carrying a MTK key shall be according to Figure 6.7. (For handling of unknown MIKEY extension payloads in MGV-F, cf. clause 6.5.4) +- The actual MTK key that is delivered is kept in the KEMAC payload. Only one MTK key can be transported in the KEMAC payload. +- The EXT payload has format as described in clause 6.4.4. +- The #CS field shall be set to zero, and no CS ID map info shall be present in the MTK message. +- The CS ID type map type subfield shall be set to “Empty map” as defined in RFC 4563 [16]. +- Neither shall the SP payload be included in MTK messages. +- The KV (Key validity period) subfield shall be set to NULL in the KEMAC payload when MTK is transported. +- The Key Validity Data subfield shall not be present in the KEMAC payload when MTK is transported. +- The use of NULL algorithm in the MAC alg field in the KEMAC payload is not allowed. +- The use of NULL algorithm in the Encr alg field in the KEMAC payload is not allowed. + +NOTE: MIKEY-RAND is not included in MTK messages since the MIKEY-RAND sent within MSK delivery messages is used for MTK message processing, cf. clause 6.4.5.1 and 6.5.4. + +Following requirement applies for streaming services only: + +- The Type subfield shall be set to value 3 (=TEK + salt) in the KEMAC payload in all MTK delivery messages for streaming services. +- A 112 bit salt shall be added to the KEMAC payload in addition to the MTK. + +Following requirement applies for download services only: + +- The Type subfield shall be set to value 0 (=TGK) in the KEMAC payload in all MTK delivery messages for download services. +- No salt shall be added to the KEMAC payload. + +![](8be52e8ae172cee527c14d299d386f3c_img.jpg) + +| | +|------------| +| Common HDR | +| EXT | +| TS | +| KEMAC | + +**Figure 6.7: The logical structure of the MIKEY message used to deliver MTK** + +### 6.4.6 Processing of received messages in the ME + +#### 6.4.6.1 MSK MIKEY Message Reception + +When the MIKEY message arrives at the ME, the processing proceeds following the steps below (basically following section 5.3 of RFC 3830 [9]). + +1. The Extension Payload (EXT) is examined, and if it indicates an MSK delivery protected with MUK, the MUK ID is received by combining IDi and IDr. + +2. The Timestamp Payload is checked, and the message is discarded if the counter in the Timestamp Payload is smaller or equal to the stored replay counter associated with the given MUK (the stored replay counter value is retrieved from MGV-S). +3. The Security Policy payload is stored temporarily in the ME if it was present. +4. The message is transported to MGV-F for further processing, cf. clause 6.5.3. +5. The MGV-F replies success or failure. In case of success the temporarily stored Security Policy payload is taken into use. Otherwise it is deleted. +6. The ME shall check if the MIKEY message indicates a BM-SC solicited pull procedure and behave as described in clause 6.3.2.2.4. + +#### 6.4.6.2 MTK MIKEY Message Reception + +When the MIKEY message arrives at the ME, the processing proceeds following the steps below (basically following section 5.3 of RFC 3830 [9]). + +1. The Extension Payload (EXT) is examined, and if it indicates an MTK delivery protected with MSK, the MSK ID is extracted from the Extension Payload. +2. The Timestamp Payload is checked, and the message is discarded if the counter in the Timestamp Payload is smaller or equal to the stored replay counter associated with the given MSK (the stored replay counter value is retrieved from MGV-S). +3. If the MTK ID extracted from the Extension payload is less than or equal to the current MTK ID (kept in the ME), the message shall be discarded. +4. The message is transported to MGV-F for further processing, cf. 6.5.4. +5. The MGV-F replies success (i.e. sending the MTK and salt if available) or failure. + +## 6.5 Validation and key derivation functions in MGV-F + +### 6.5.1 General + +When an MSK or MTK message is received in the UE, it is processed in protected environment MGV-S. + +### 6.5.2 Usage of MUK + +When a MUK has been installed in the MGV-S, i.e. as a result of a GBA run, it is used as pre-shared secret used to verify the integrity of the MSK transport message and decrypt the MSK carried in the KEMAC payload as described in RFC 3830 [9]. + +### 6.5.3 MSK processing + +When the MGV-F receives the MIKEY message, the MGV-F first determines the type of message by reading the EXT. If the EXT indicates MSK delivery (clause 6.4.4) then the text in this clause applies. + +The MGV-F shall not abort processing of a MIKEY message when encountered with an extension payload with unknown type. The content of an unknown extension payload (except for the next payload, type and length fields) shall be treated as an opaque object. The MAC computation required for the KEMAC payload shall include any unknown extension payloads preceding it. + +NOTE: This is because an unknown extension payload may be specified for ME use only and it is therefore "unknown" to the MGV-F. Skipping unknown payloads during the payload parsing is a deviation from recommended receiver behavior in section 5.3 of RFC 3830 [9]. + +The MGV-F retrieves the MUK identified as specified in clause 6.1. If the Key Number part of the MSK ID in the EXT equals 0x0 then this indicates a solicited pull procedure (clause 6.3.2.2.4) for which the MIKEY message does not contain an MSK and for which the MUK shall be applied according to clause 6.3.2.2.4. + +The integrity of the message is validated and if valid then the MSK, if present, shall be extracted from the KEMAC payload as described in section 5 of RFC 3830 [9], and the Key Validity data, shall be extracted from the message and stored (in the form of MTK ID interval). + +If integrity validation is successful, then the MGV-F shall update the stored Time Stamp value associated with the corresponding MUK ID in MGV-S with the counter value in the Time Stamp payload. + +If the MGV-F receives an MSK and already contains two other MSKs under the same Key Domain ID and Key Group part, then the UE shall keep the newer and delete the older of these two MSKs. The newer MSK (i.e. the MSK to be kept) of the two stored MSKs under the same Key Domain ID and Key Group part is determined by the UE from the combination of MUK ID and Time Stamp value in the following way. The MSK that was protected with the newer MUK is the newer MSK regardless of the value of the Time Stamp. In case the MUK IDs are equal, the MSK with higher Time Stamp value is the newer MSK. Updating an existing MSK (e.g. by updating the Key Validity Data) or resending an MSK means then also that the updated MSK becomes the newer MSK since the Time Stamp value is increased in these cases. In case the MUK ID values are not equal, the newer MUK is the last MUK successfully used by the BM-SC as specified in clause 6.3.2.2.4. + +If the MGV-F receives an MSK, which has the same MSK ID as a stored MSK, the received MSK shall replace the stored MSK and update the Key Validity data. In case the MSK message does not include any key in KEMAC payload, then the Key Validity data shall be updated for the specified MSK except if the MSK ID is 0x0. + +### 6.5.4 MTK processing + +When the MGV-F receives the MIKEY message, it first determines the type of message by reading the EXT. If the key inside the message is an MTK protected by MSK, MGV-F retrieves the MSK with the ID given by the Extension payload. + +The MGV-F shall not abort processing of a MIKEY message when encountered with an extension payload with unknown type. The content of an unknown extension payload (except for the next payload, type and length fields) shall be treated as an opaque object. The MAC computation required for the KEMAC payload shall include any unknown extension payloads preceding it. + +NOTE: This is because an unknown extension payload may be specified for ME use only and it is therefore "unknown" to the MGV-F. Skipping unknown payloads during the payload parsing is a deviation from recommended receiver behavior in section 5.3 of RFC 3830. + +It is assumed that the MBMS service specific data, MSK, MIKEY-RAND and the sequence numbers SEQ1 and SEQn, have been stored within a secure storage (MGV-S). MSK, MIKEY-RAND, SEQ1 and SEQn were transferred to the MGV-S with the execution of the MSK update procedures. The initial values of SEQ1 and SEQn are determined by the service provider. + +The MGV-F shall only calculate and deliver the MBMS Traffic Keys (MTK) to the ME if the ptm-key information is deemed to be fresh. + +The MGV-F shall compare the received SEQp, i.e. MTK ID from the MIKEY message with the stored SEQ1 and SEQn. If SEQp is equal to or lower than SEQ1 or SEQp is greater than SEQn, then the MGV-F shall indicate a failure to the ME. Otherwise, the MGV-F shall verify the integrity of the MIKEY message according to RFC 3830 [9]. The random value to use as input to the PRF function (section 4.1.4 of RFC3830 [9]) is the MIKEY-RAND stored together with the MSK. If the verification is unsuccessful, then the MGV-F will indicate a failure to the ME. If the verification is successful, then the MGV-F shall update SEQ1 with SEQp value and extract the MTK from the message. The MGV-F then provides the MTK to the ME. + +If MAC verification is successful, the MGV-F shall update in MGV-S the counter value in the Time Stamp payload associated with the corresponding MSK ID. + +NOTE 2: It is advised for the implementers of MGV-S (either on the UICC or ME) to exercise caution when implementing memory management for the MTK parameters (e.g. MTK ID field). E.g. on the UICC, the file EFMSK containing the MSK\_IDs and related timestamps is marked as a high update activity file, but that might not be sufficient to avoid potential wear-out of the non-volatile memory, if the network uses a very short MTK lifetime (e.g. 5 seconds). The approach chosen by implementers needs also to take into account the fact that users may roam and use the service in other networks than their home network. Those networks may have a different configuration. + +The ME shall store the two most recent MTKs used per MBMS streaming or download session. In particular, if the ME receives an MTK and already stores two other MTKs for that MBMS streaming or download session, then the UE shall + +keep the newer and delete the older of the two stored MTKs before storing the received MTK. Any MTKs stored in association with a particular MBMS streaming or download session should be deleted at the end of that session. + +In the case of streaming, SRTP and SRTCP require a master key and a master salt. The MTK is used as a common master key for both SRTP and SRTCP, and the salt in the KEMAC payload is used as master salt. + +In case of download service, key derivation as defined in section 4.1.3 of RFC 3820 [9] shall be used to derive authentication and encryption keys from MTK in the ME using the constants for authentication and encryption keys defined in table 4.1.3 of RFC 3830 [9]. As there shall be no CS field present for download services as specified in clause 6.4.5.3, cs\_id shall be set to 0x00000000 within the key derivation of section 4.1.3 of RFC 3830 [9]. The derived authentication and encryption keys shall be provided to the download protection protocol. + +## 6.6 Protection of the transmitted traffic + +### 6.6.1 General + +The data transmitted to the UEs is protected by a symmetric key (an MTK) that is shared by the BM-SC and UEs that are accessing the MBMS User Service. The protection of the data is applied by the BM-SC Session and Transmission Function. In order to determine which MTK was used to protect the data key identification information is included with the protected data. The key identification information will uniquely identify the MSK and MTK. The MTK is processed according to the methods described in clauses 6.4 and 6.5. Whenever data from an MBMS User Service has been decrypted, if it is to be stored on the UE it will be stored decrypted. + +NOTE: Including the key identification information with the protected data stops the UE trying to decrypt and render content for which it does not have the MSK. + +### 6.6.2 Protection of streaming data + +#### 6.6.2.1 Usage of SRTP + +When it is required to protect MBMS streaming data SRTP (Secure Real-time Transport Protocol) as defined in RFC 3711 [11] shall be used. The MTK is carried to the UEs from the BM-SC using RFC 3830 [9] (MIKEY) with extensions defined according to this specification. MTK shall be used as the master key in SRTP key derivation to derive the SRTP session keys as defined in section 4.3 of RFC 3711 [11]. A key derivation rate as defined in clause 6.4.5 shall be used. + +The correct MTK to use to decrypt the data is indicated using the MKI (Master Key identifier) field, which is included in the SRTP packets as defined in RFC 3711 [11]. The form of MKI shall be a concatenation of MSK ID and MTK ID, i.e. MKI = (MSK ID || MTK ID). + +NOTE 1: The UE knows the Key Domain ID related to this MKI from the User Service Description which includes mapping between IP address and port of the traffic and the corresponding Key Domain ID and MSK ID. + +The SRTP authentication tag shall be appended to the packets as defined in RFC 4771 [22]. + +NOTE 2: In RFC 4771 [22] it is specified that the ROC is transferred in every Rth SRTP packet. The specification furthermore defines how the constant R and the integrity transform is negotiated using MIKEY. + +The parameter, constant R, shall be included in the MSK delivery messages. + +NOTE 3: In RFC 4771 [22] it is specified that if the constant R is not signalled then the default value 1 is to be used. However explicit signalling of R is here required in each MSK delivery message in order to require the operator of choosing the most optimal value for the SRTP stream. The default value of R=1 causes to add a ROC to each SRTP packet implying that a MAC of 10 octets (proposed by RFC 4771 [22]) and a ROC of 4 octets will be added to each SRTP packet in both mode RCCm1 and RCCm2. Also a ROC of 4 octets will be added to each SRTP packet in mode RCCm3 (but no MAC). + +SRTP security policy parameters, such as encryption algorithm, are transported in MIKEY Security Policy payload as defined in section 6.10.1 in RFC 3830 [9]. + +FEC shall be applied beneath the SRTP layer as described within TS 26.346 [13] + +NOTE 4: This deviates from the default FEC order as described within RFC3711 [11] clause 10. The reversed order is not signalled within the service protection description of the MBMS User Service Announcement. + +#### 6.6.2.1A Usage of SRTCP + +Secure RTCP (SRTCP) provides the same security services to RTCP as SRTP does to RTP. As defined in TS 26.346 [13] only RTCP sender reports are allowed in MBMS. + +As defined in RFC 3711[11] SRTCP shall be applied to RTCP control packets when SRTP is applied to RTP with the following profiling: + +- Encryption of SRTCP packets is optional; +- SRTCP packets shall be integrity protected as defined in RFC 3711 [11]; +- SRTCP shall share master key and master salt with the corresponding SRTP stream; +- SRTCP packets shall carry the same MKI field value as the corresponding SRTP stream; + +NOTE 1: This is a consequence of sharing the same master key. + +- SRTCP shall use the same encryption algorithm as corresponding SRTP session + +NOTE 2: SRTCP does not need additional mechanisms, e.g. RFC 4771 [22], to synchronize the ROC as SRTCP header explicitly carries the SRTCP packet index. + +#### 6.6.2.2 Packet processing in the UE + +When the SRTP module receives a packet, it will retrieve the correct cryptographic context identified by destination transport address, destination port and SSRC (according to RFC 3711 [11] and RFC 4771 [22]), check if it has the MTK corresponding to the value in the MKI field in the SRTP cryptographic context. + +NOTE 1: The cryptographic context needs to be unique for each SRTP stream. + +NOTE 2: The SRTP module does not need to interpret the MKI field semantics. It only checks whether it has the MTK corresponding to the MKI value. + +If the check is successful, the SRTP module processes the packet according to the security policy. + +If the SRTP module does not have the MTK, it will request the MTK corresponding to the MKI from the key management module. When the key management module returns a new MTK, the SRTP module will derive new session keys from the MTK and process the packet. However, if the key management module does not have the MSK indicated by MKI, then it should fetch the MSK using the methods discussed in the clause 6.3. + +If the correct MTK is not present in the UE when RTP traffic arrives, the UE shall wait for the next MTK update procedure from the BM-SC as described in clause 6.3.3.2. + +NOTE 3: It is implementation specific issue whether the UE spools encrypted packets or discards all packets before the UE has received the correct MTK. + +The below flow shows how the protected content is delivered to the UE. + +![Diagram showing the delivery of protected streaming content from the BM-SC to the UE. A horizontal line with an arrow pointing left represents the flow. Above the line, the text 'SRTP packet (MKI, auth tag)' is centered. The label 'UE' is on the left and 'BM-SC' is on the right.](5addeb78101c342bb315dc3d703eec27_img.jpg) + +``` + + UE BM-SC + SRTP packet (MKI, auth tag) + <------------------------------------------- + +``` + +Diagram showing the delivery of protected streaming content from the BM-SC to the UE. A horizontal line with an arrow pointing left represents the flow. Above the line, the text 'SRTP packet (MKI, auth tag)' is centered. The label 'UE' is on the left and 'BM-SC' is on the right. + +**Figure 6.8: Delivery of protected streaming content to the UE** + +### 6.6.3 Protection of download data + +#### 6.6.3.1 General + +Data that belongs to a download MBMS User Service is decrypted as soon as possible by the UE, if the MSK needed to provide the relevant MTK is already available on the UE. + +#### 6.6.3.2 Usage of OMA DRM DCF + +NOTE: If the OMA DRM V2.0 DCF [15] specification is upgraded, these upgrades do not apply for the present document. + +When it is required to protect MBMS download data, OMA DRM V2.0 DCF as defined in OMA DRM V2.0 DCF [15] shall be used. MBMS download data are therefore indicated by minor version 0x00000002 in a DCF. OMA DRM Rights Objects are not utilized. Instead, encryption and authentication keys are generated from MTK. For integrity protection, an OMADRMSignature as specified below is attached inside the optional Mutable DRM information box ('mdri') of the DCF. + +The OMADRMSignature Box is an extension to OMA DRM V2.0 DCF for use by MBMS, and is defined as follows: + +``` +aligned(8) class OMADRMSignature extends Fullbox('odfs', version, flags) { + Unsigned int(8) SignatureMethod; // Signature Method + Char Signature[]; // Actual Signature +} +``` + +``` +SignatureMethod Field: +NULL 0x00 +HMAC-SHA1 0x01 +``` + +The range of data for the HMAC calculation shall be according to section 5.3 of OMA DRM V2.0 DCF [15]. + +The correct MTK for decrypting and verifying the integrity of the download data is indicated by the KeyID in the OMABCASTKeyInfoBox 'obki' included in the ExtendedHeadersfield in the OMADRMCommonHeaders box (cf. OMA DRM XBS [24]). The use of the 'obki' box by MBMS is as follows: + +- KeyIssuerPresent set to 1 if KeyIssuerURL is provided (the DCF RightsIssuerURL field is not used) +- STKMPresent set to 0 (no STKM stored in file) +- TBKPresent set to 0 (no TerminalBindingKey used) +- TBKIssuerURLPresent set to 0 (no TBKIssuerURL present) +- KeyIDType set to 0x02 (reserved by OMA BCAST for 3GPP MBMS, identifies the KeyID for MBMS usage. + +KeyID is the base64 encoded concatenation (Key Domain ID || MSK ID || MTK ID). + +If the MBMS download data requires protection, see 6.3.2.1A, then the FDT of the FLUTE protocol shall be integrity protected by wrapping the FDT in a DCF of its own. The correct MTK for verifying the integrity of the FDT shall be indicated by the KeyID in the OMABCASTKeyInfoBox 'obki' included in the ExtendedHeaders field in the OMADRMCommonHeaders box. + +The MBMS DCF implementation shall support the following boxes specified in OMA DRM V2.0 DCF [15]: + +- Fixed DCF header; +- Mutable DRM information Box; +- OMA DRM Container Box. + +## 6.7 Confidentiality protection of associated delivery procedures + +### 6.7.1 General + +The MBMS associated delivery procedures specified in clause 9 of TS 26.346 [13] require the UE to use HTTP protocol to transmit data associated with the MBMS user service for reception reporting and file repair purposes to a HTTP server in the network (i.e., the Reception Report server and File Repair server as defined in TS 26.346 [13]). The information transmitted by the UE using associated delivery procedures may be user privacy (e.g., MBMS service the user is listening to, location) and network privacy (e.g., network topology information) sensitive. Therefore, support for confidentiality protection in HTTP is required. + +In order to protect the confidentiality of the privacy sensitive data transmitted by the UE using associated delivery procedures, the UE shall support using HTTP over TLS as specified in RFC 2818 [32]. TLS shall be used with server certificates, but the HTTP server shall not request client certificates. + +The support of HTTP over TLS (i.e., HTTPS) for associated delivery procedures is optional in the network. If supported by the network, its use for an associated delivery procedure (i.e., Reception Reporting or File Repair) is determined by the UE either based on the UE preconfiguration (e.g., based on explicit configuration or on the presence of preconfigured list of trusted root certificates in the UE for the validation of HTTP servers used for associated delivery procedures or based on the reception over an integrity protected channel of an indication to the UE to use HTTP or HTTPS (e.g., User Service Description and/or FLUTE File Delivery Table contains this indication and is delivered individually as, or part of, an integrity protected MBMS Download Service). If the integrity of this indication to use HTTP or HTTPS can be verified by the UE, then this indication shall take precedence over the UE preconfiguration. If the integrity of this indication cannot be verified by the UE, then the UE preconfiguration shall take precedence). The procedures to preconfigure this information on the UE are outside the scope of the present specification. + +### 6.7.2 TLS Profile + +The UE shall support TLS according to the TLS profile given in TS 33.310 [31], Annex E. + +The certificates shall comply with the requirements for TLS certificates in clause 6.1 of TS 33.310 [31]. + +When the UE decides to use TLS, the use of TLS ciphersuite without NULL encryption is mandatory. + +NOTE 1: Without the use of TLS encryption, the use of TLS is not needed as authentication and integrity protection for HTTP procedures is provided using HTTP Digest, cf. clause 6.2. + +Support of certificate revocation and of the related fields in certificates is optional. If supported, the certificate and CRL profiles in clauses 6.1 and 6.1a of TS 33.310 [31] should be followed. + +NOTE 2: The management of Root Certificates is out of scope of the present document. + +### 6.7.3 HTTP server authentication + +The UE shall authenticate the HTTP server by use of a server certificate. The UE shall match the server name as specified in RFC 2818 [32], section 3.1. + +The UE shall use a preconfigured list of trusted root certificates for TLS server certificate validation. It is recommended that a separate preconfigured list of trusted root certificates is used with associated delivery procedures. The server certificate validation shall not require manual user interaction. + +### 6.7.4 Authentication of the UE + +The HTTP server shall not request a certificate in a Server Hello Message from the UE. The HTTP server relies on the HTTP Digest for UE authentication as specified in clause 6.2. + +# --- Annex A (informative): Trust model + +The following trust relationship between the roles that are participating in MBMS services are proposed: + +- the user trusts the home network operator to provide the MBMS service according to the service level agreement; +- the user trusts the network operator after mutual authentication; +- the network trusts an authenticated user using integrity protection and encryption at RAN level; +- the network may have trust or no trust in a content provider. + +The home network and visited network trust each other when a roaming agreement is defined, in the case the user is roaming in a VPLMN. + +# --- Annex B (informative): Security threats + +## B.1 Threats associated with attacks on the radio interface + +The threats associated with attacks on the radio interface are split into the following categories, which are described in the following clauses: + +- unauthorized access to MBMS User Service data; +- threats to integrity; +- denial of service; +- unauthorized access to MBMS User Services; +- privacy violation. + +The attacks on the MBMS service announcements to the users on the radio interface are not discussed here because in case these are transferred on a point-to-point connection (e.g. PS signalling connection), they are already secured. In case the service announcement is transferred over HTTP, it is protected by HTTP Digest as defined in the current specification and/or it may be integrity protected and optionally encrypted at the RAN level. In case the service announcements are sent over MBMS bearer, it is impractical to protect them. + +### B.1.1 Unauthorised access to MBMS User Service data + +- A1: Intruders may eavesdrop MBMS User Service data on the air-interface. +- A2: Users that have not joined and activated a MBMS User Service receiving that service without being charged. +- A3: Users that have joined and then left a MBMS User Service continuing to receive the MBMS User Service without being charged. +- A4: Valid subscribers may derive decryption keys (MTK) and distribute them to unauthorized parties. + +NOTE: It is assumed that the legitimate end user has a motivation to defeat the system and distribute the shared keys (MSK, MTK) that are a necessary feature of any broadcast security scheme. + +### B.1.2 Threats to integrity + +- B1: Modifications and replay of messages in a way to fool the user of the content from the actual source, e.g. replace the actual content with a fake one. + +### B.1.3 Denial of service attacks + +- C1: Jamming of radio resources. Deliberate manipulation of the data to disturb the communication. + +### B.1.4 Unauthorised access to MBMS User Services + +- D1: An attacker using the 3GPP network to gain "free access" of MBMS User Services and other services on another user's bill. +- D2: An attacker using MBMS shared keys (MSK, MTK) to gain free access to content without any knowledge of the service provider. + +NOTE: It cannot be assumed that keys held in a terminal are secure. No matter how the shared keys (MSK, MTK) are delivered to the terminal, we have to assume they can be derived in an attack. For example, the shared keys, while secure in the UICC, may be passed over an insecure UICC-ME interface. + +### B.1.5 Privacy violation + +- E1:** The user identity could be exposed to the content provider, in the case the content provider is located in the 3GPP network, and then linked to the content. + +## --- B.2 Threats associated with attacks on other parts of the system + +The threats associated with attacks on other parts of the system are split into the following categories, which are described in the following clauses: + +- unauthorized access to data; +- threats to integrity; +- denial of service; +- a malicious UE generating MTKs for malicious use later on; +- unauthorized insertion of MBMS user data and key management data. + +### B.2.1 Unauthorised access to data + +- F1:** It is assumed that the BM-SC and the GGSN are located in the same network. The BM-SC can though be located in a different place than the GGSN, and therefore can open up for intruders who may eavesdrop the interface Gi and Gmb between the BM-SC and GGSN. +- F2:** Intruders may eavesdrop the interface between the content provider and the BM-SC. + +### B.2.2 Threats to integrity + +- G1:** It is assumed that the BM-SC and the GGSN are located in the same network. The BM-SC can though be located in a different place than the GGSN, and therefore can open up for new attacks on the interfaces Gi and Gmb between the BM-SC and GGSN. +- G2:** The interface between the content provider and the BM-SC may open up for attacks as modifications of multimedia content. + +### B.2.3 Denial of service + +- H1:** Deliberated manipulation of the data between the BM-SC <-> Content Provider to disturb the communication. +- H2:** Deliberated manipulation of the data between the BM-SC <-> GGSN to disturb the communication. + +### B.2.4 A malicious UE generating MTKs for malicious use later on + +- I1:** A malicious ME querying the MTK generation function for MTK's to use them later on in an attack (e.g. in order to use the retrieved MTKs within an unauthorized data insertion attacks (See B.2.5)). + +### B.2.5 Unauthorised insertion of MBMS user data and key management data + +- J1:** An ME, which deliberately inserts key management and malicious data, encrypted with valid (previously retrieved) MTK from the MTK generation function, within the MBMS User Service stream. +- J2:** An ME, which deliberately inserts key management and malicious data, encrypted with old (using replayed key management messages) MTK, within the MBMS User Service stream. + +- J3:** An attacker, which deliberately inserts incorrect key management information within the MBMS User Service stream to cause Denial of Service attacks. + +# --- Annex C (normative): MBMS security requirements + +## C.1 Requirements on security service access + +### C.1.1 Requirements on secure service access + +- R1a: A valid USIM or SIM shall be required to access MBMS User Services. +- R1b: It shall be possible to prevent intruders from obtaining unauthorized access of MBMS User Services by masquerading as authorized users. + +### C.1.2 Requirements on secure service provision + +- R2a: It shall be possible for the network (i.e. BM-SC) to authenticate users at the start of, and during, service delivery to prevent intruders from obtaining unauthorized access to MBMS User Services. +- R2b: It shall be possible to prevent the use of a particular USIM or SIM to access MBMS User Services. +- NOTE: No security requirements shall be placed on the UE that requires UE to be customised to a particular customer prior to the point of sale. + +## --- C.2 Requirements on MBMS Transport Service signalling protection + +- R3a: It shall be possible to protect against unauthorized modification, insertion, replay or deletion of MBMS transport service signalling on the Gmb reference point. +- NOTE 1: This requirement may be fulfilled by physical or proprietary security measures if the Gmb protocol endpoints (i.e. GGSN, Gmb-Proxy and BM-SC) are located within the same security domain of the operator's network. Otherwise the security mechanisms as specified within TS 33.210 [14] shall be applied. +- R3b: Unauthorized modification, insertion, replay or deletion of all MBMS Transport Service signalling, on the RAN shall be prevented when the RAN selects a point-to-multipoint (ptm) link for the distribution of MBMS data to the UE. +- NOTE 2: UTRAN/E-UTRAN bearer signalling integrity protection will not be provided for point to multipoint MBMS signalling and GERAN has no bearer signalling integrity protection, even for point to point signalling. + +## --- C.3 Requirements on Privacy + +- R4a: The User identity should not be exposed to the content provider or linked to the content in the case the Content Provider is located outside the 3GPP operator's network. +- R4b: MBMS identity and control information shall not be exposed when the RAN selects a point-to-multipoint link for the distribution of MBMS data to the UE. +- NOTE: UTRAN, E-UTRAN and GERAN bearer confidentiality protection will be not be provided for point to multipoint MBMS sessions. + +## --- C.4 Requirements on MBMS Key Management + +- R5a: The transfer of the MBMS keys between the MBMS key generator and the UE shall be confidentiality protected. + +- R5b: The transfer of the MBMS keys between the MBMS key generator and the UE shall be integrity protected. +- R5c: The UE and MBMS key generator shall support the operator to perform re-keying as frequently as it believes necessary to ensure that: +- users that have joined an MBMS User Service, but then left, shall not gain further access to the MBMS User Service without being charged appropriately + - users joining an MBMS User Service shall not gain access to data from previous transmissions in the MBMS User Service without having been charged appropriately + - the effect of subscribed users distributing decryption keys to non-subscribed users shall be controllable. +- R5d: Only authorized users that have joined an MBMS User Service shall be able to receive MBMS keys delivered from the MBMS key generator. +- R5e: The MBMS keys shall not allow the BM-SC to infer any information about used UE-keys at radio level (i.e. if they would be derived from it). +- R5f: All keys used for the MBMS User Service shall be uniquely identifiable. The identity may be used by the UE to retrieve the actual key (based on identity match, and mismatch recognition) when an update was missed or was erroneous/incomplete. +- R5g: The BM-SC shall be aware of where all MBMS specific keys are stored in the UE (i.e. ME or UICC). +- R5h: The function of providing MTK to the ME shall only deliver a MTK to the ME if the input values used for obtaining the MTK were fresh (have not been replayed) and came from a trusted source. + +## --- C.5 Requirements on integrity protection of MBMS User Service data + +- R6a: It shall be possible to protect against unauthorized modification, insertion, replay or deletion of MBMS User Service data sent to the UE on the radio interface. The use of integrity shall be optional. + +NOTE 1: It may be possible to detect the deletion of MBMS data packets, but it is impossible to prevent the deletion. Packets may be lost because of bad radio conditions, providing integrity protection will not help to detect or recover from this situation. + +NOTE 2: The use of shared keys (integrity and confidentiality) to a group of untrusted users only prevents attacks of lower levels of sophistication, such as preventing eavesdroppers from simply listening in + +- R6b: The MBMS User Service data may be integrity protected with a common integrity key, which shall be available to all users that have joined the MBMS User Service. +- R6c: It may be required to integrity protect the "BM-SC - GGSN" interface i.e. reference point Gi. + +## --- C.6 Requirements on confidentiality protection of MBMS User Service data + +- R7a: It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of MBMS User Service data on the radio interface. +- R7b: The MBMS User Service data may be encrypted with common encryption keys, which shall be available to all users that have joined the MBMS User Service. +- R7c: It may be required to encrypt the MBMS User Service data on the "BM-SC - GGSN" interface, i.e. the reference points Gi. +- R7d: It shall be infeasible for a man-in-the-middle to bid down the confidentiality protection used on protect the MBMS User Service from the BM-SC to the UE. + +- R7e: It shall be infeasible for an eavesdropper to break the confidentiality protection of the MBMS User Service when it is applied. + +## --- C.7 Requirements on content provider to BM-SC reference point + +- R8a: The BM-SC shall be able to authenticate and authorize a 3rd party content provider that wishes to transmit data to the BM-SC. +- R8b: It shall be possible to integrity and confidentiality protect data sent from a 3rd party content provider to the BM-SC. + +NOTE: This reference point will not be standardised. + +# Annex D (normative): UICC-ME interface + +## D.1 MSK Update Procedure + +This procedure is part of the MSK update procedure as described in clause 6.5 (Validation and key derivation functions in MGV-F). For details, see TS 31.102 [7]. + +The ME has previously performed a GBA\_U bootstrapping procedure and a subsequent GBA\_U NAF Derivation procedure as described in TS 33.220 [6]. The UICC stores the corresponding Ks\_int\_NAF and associated B-TID together with the NAF\_Id without the Ua security protocol identifier, associated with this particular bootstrapping procedure. + +The ME receives a MIKEY message containing an MSK update. After performing some validity checks, the ME sends the whole message to the UICC. The UICC uses the MUK ID (included in the MIKEY message, see clause 6.1) to identify the stored Ks\_int\_NAF. + +The UICC then uses Ks\_int\_NAF as the MUK value for MUK derivation and MSK validation and derivation (as described in clause 6.5.3). + +After successful MSK Update procedure the UICC stores the Key Domain ID, MSK ID, MSK and MSK Validity Time (in the form of MTK ID interval). + +![Sequence diagram of the MSK Update Procedure between UICC and ME.](f943b07ab747bfd85e302e5a31c20ba8_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UICC + participant ME + Note over UICC, ME: MBMS Procedure (MSK Update Mode) + ME->>UICC: MIKEY + UICC-->>ME: Success/Failure, optional verification message +``` + +The diagram illustrates the interaction between the UICC and the ME during the MSK Update Procedure. It starts with a note 'MBMS Procedure (MSK Update Mode)' above the interaction. The ME sends a 'MIKEY' message to the UICC, represented by a solid arrow pointing from ME to UICC. The UICC responds with a 'Success/Failure, optional verification message', represented by a solid arrow pointing from UICC to ME. + +Sequence diagram of the MSK Update Procedure between UICC and ME. + +**Figure D.1: MSK Update Procedure** + +In case the MSK update MIKEY message is acceptable (i.e. the received MSK ID corresponds to the last generated MUK in the UE, and the MSK Update procedure has been performed successfully) and the V-bit was set in the HDR, then a MSK Verification Message as described in clause 6.4.5.2 (MSK Verification message) shall be produced. The UICC uses the same MUK ID and TS, which were received from the MSK MIKEY Message (see clause 6.1), for the MSK Verification Message Generation. + +## D.2 Void + +## D.3 MTK generation and validation + +This procedure is part of the MTK generation and validation function as described in clause 6.5.4 (MTK processing). For details, see TS 31.102 [7]. + +The ME receives the MIKEY message (containing Header, Time stamp, Key Domain ID, MSK ID, MTK ID = SEQp, an encrypted MTK||Salt (if salt is available) and MAC). After performing some validity checks, the ME sends the whole message to the UICC. The UICC computes the MGV-F function as described in clause 6.5. (Validation and key derivation functions in MGV-F). After successful MGV-F procedure the UICC returns the MTK. + +![Sequence diagram for MTK Generation and Validation](8d66c9c295023a1380f9986d3663bb1e_img.jpg) + +A sequence diagram showing the interaction between a UICC and an ME. The UICC sends a message labeled "MBMS Procedure (MTK traffic Mode) MIKEY" to the ME. The ME responds with a message labeled "MBMS Procedure response MTK || Salt (if available)/ Failure". + +Sequence diagram for MTK Generation and Validation + +Figure D.3: MTK Generation and Validation + +## D.4 MSK deletion procedure + +This procedure enables the ME to control the deletion of MSKs stored on the UICC as described in clause 6.3.2.1A. For details, see TS 31.102 [7]. + +The ME sends to the UICC the Key Domain ID and Key Group part of the MSK ID to delete. The UICC deletes all corresponding MSKs. + +![Sequence diagram for MSK Deletion](772cc583a60eeb058cc19de48269ad22_img.jpg) + +A sequence diagram showing the interaction between a UICC and an ME. The ME sends a message labeled "Key Domain ID || Key Group" to the UICC. The UICC responds with a message labeled "Success/Failure". + +Sequence diagram for MSK Deletion + +Figure D.4: MSK Deletion + +## D.5 MUK deletion procedure + +This procedure enables the ME to control the deletion of MUKs stored on the UICC. For details, see TS 31.102 [7]. + +The ME sends the MUK ID to the UICC to delete. The UICC deletes the targeted MUK, the corresponding GBA NAF Key (Ks\_int\_NAF associated to the same NAF\_ID) shall be deleted; the bootstrapped key Ks shall also be deleted if Ks is present and associated to the same B-TID. + +![Sequence diagram for MUK Deletion](3f09464f0a8ac9446981a53f9b78df2c_img.jpg) + +A sequence diagram showing the interaction between a UICC and an ME. The ME sends a message labeled "MUK IK" to the UICC. The UICC responds with a message labeled "Success/Failure". + +Sequence diagram for MUK Deletion + +Figure D.5: MUK Deletion + +# --- Annex E (Informative): MIKEY features not used in MBMS + +- An MBMS capable ME/UICC and BM-SC do not need to implement the public key encryption method of MIKEY (section 3.2 of RFC 3830 [9]) and related payloads, although mentioned in RFC 3830 [9] as mandatory for implementation. +- An MBMS capable ME/UICC and BM-SC do not need to implement the Time Stamp payload types NTP-UTC and NTP of MIKEY (section 6.6 of RFC 3830 [9]) although mentioned in RFC 3830 [9] as mandatory for implementation. +- An MBMS capable ME/UICC and BM-SC do not need to implement the AES Key Wrap algorithm of MIKEY (section 4.2.3 and 6.2 of RFC 3830 [9]). + +# --- Annex F (normative):MRK key derivation for ME based MBMS key management + +The MRK shall be derived from the key Ks\_NAF or Ks\_ext\_NAF using the GBA key derivation function (see Annex B of TS 33.220 [6]) as follows (see notation style is explained in Annex B of TS 33.220 [6]): + +- FC = 0x01, +- P0 = "mbms-mrk" (i.e. 0x6d 0x62 0x6d 0x73 0x2d 0x6d 0x72 0x6b), and +- L0 = length of P0 is 8 octets (i.e. 0x00 0x08). + +The Key to be used in key derivation shall be: + +- Ks\_NAF or Ks\_ext\_NAF (i.e. NAF specific key) as specified in TS 33.220 [6]. + +In summary, the MRK shall be derived from the Ks\_NAF or Ks\_ext\_NAF, and static string "mbms-mrk" as follows: + +- MRK = KDF (Ks\_NAF, "mbms-mrk") in case of GBA\_ME run; +- MRK = KDF (Ks\_ext\_NAF, "mbms-mrk") in case of GBA\_U run. + +# --- Annex G (normative): HTTP based key management messages + +## G.1 Introduction + +Clause 6 specifies the HTTP based key management procedures between the BM-SC and the UE. It specifies that the authentication of these procedures is based on GBA and more specifically on the HTTP Digest authentication as described in clause 6.2 of the present document. + +--- + +## G.2 Key management procedures + +This clause contains the following HTTP based procedures: + +- MBMS User Service Registration; +- MBMS User Service Deregistration; +- MSK request. + +### G.2.1 MBMS User Service Registration + +The UE shall generate a request for MBMS User Service Registration according to clause 6.3.2.1A. The UE shall send the Registration request for one or more MBMS User Services to the BM-SC in the HTTP payload in a HTTP POST request. The Request-URI shall indicate the type of the message, i.e. Registration request. Upon successful request, BM-SC shall return indication of success. + +The UE populates the HTTP POST request as follows: + +- the HTTP version shall be 1.1 which is specified in RFC 2616 [19]; +- the base of the Request-URI shall contain the full BM-SC key management URI (e.g. ); +- the Request-URI shall contain an URI parameter "requesttype" that shall be set to "register", i.e. Request-URI takes the form of "/keymanagement?requesttype= register"; +- the UE may add additional URI parameters to the Request-URI; +- the HTTP header Content-Type shall be the MIME type of the payload, i.e. "application/mbms-register+xml". The XML schema of the payload is specified in TS 26.346 [13]; +- the HTTP payload shall contain request including a list of one or more userServiceIds of MBMS User Services to which the UE wants to register; +- the UE may add additional HTTP headers to the HTTP POST request. + +The UE sends the HTTP POST to the BM-SC. The BM-SC checks that the HTTP POST is valid, and extracts the request for further processing. The BM-SC Key Management function shall verify that the subscriber is authorized to register to the particular MBMS User Service. + +Upon successful authorization verification, the BM-SC shall return the HTTP 200 OK to the UE. + +The BM-SC shall populate HTTP response as follows: + +- the HTTP status code in the HTTP status line shall be 200; +- the HTTP header Content-Type shall be the MIME type of the payload, i.e. "application/mbms-register-response+xml ". The XML schema of the payload is specified in TS 26.346 [13]; +- the HTTP payload shall contain a list including one status code for each MBMS User Service. + +The BM-SC shall send the HTTP response to the UE. The UE shall check that the HTTP response is valid. + +### G.2.2 MBMS User Service Deregistration + +The UE shall generate a request for MBMS User Service Deregistration according to clause 6.3.2.1B. The UE shall send the Deregistration request for one or more MBMS User Services to the BM-SC in the HTTP payload in a HTTP POST request. The Request-URI shall indicate the type of the message, i.e. Deregistration request. Upon successful request, BM-SC shall return indication of success. + +The UE populates the HTTP POST request as follows: + +- the HTTP version shall be 1.1 which is specified in RFC 2616 [19]; +- the base of the Request-URI shall contain the full BM-SC key management URI (e.g. ); +- the Request-URI shall contain an URI parameter "requesttype" that shall be set to "deregister", i.e. Request-URI takes the form of "keymanagement?requesttype= deregister"; +- the UE may add additional URI parameters to the Request-URI; +- the HTTP header Content-Type shall be the MIME type of the payload, i.e. "application/mbms-deregister+xml". The XML schema of the payload is specified in TS 26.346 [13]; +- the HTTP payload shall contain the request including a list of one or more userServiceIds of MBMS User Services from which the UE wants to deregister; +- the UE may add additional HTTP headers to the HTTP POST request. + +The UE sends the HTTP POST to the BM-SC. The BM-SC checks that the HTTP POST is valid, and extracts the request for further processing. + +Upon successful authentication verification, the BM-SC shall return the HTTP 200 OK to the UE. + +The BM-SC shall populate HTTP response as follows: + +- the HTTP status code in the HTTP status line shall be 200; +- the HTTP header Content-Type shall be the MIME type of the payload, i.e. "application/mbms-register-response+xml". The XML schema of the payload is specified in TS 26.346 [13]; +- the HTTP payload shall contain a list including one status code for each MBMS User Service. + +The BM-SC shall send the HTTP response to the UE. The UE shall check that the HTTP response is valid. + +### G.2.3 MSK request + +The UE shall generate a MSK request according to clause 6.3.2.2. The UE shall send the MSK request for one or more MSKs to the BM-SC in the HTTP payload in a HTTP POST request. The Request-URI shall indicate the type of the message, i.e.. MSK request. Upon successful request, BM-SC shall return indication of success. + +The UE populates the HTTP POST request as follows: + +- the HTTP version shall be 1.1 which is specified in RFC 2616 [19]; +- the base of the Request-URI shall contain the full BM-SC key management URI (e.g. ); +- the Request-URI shall contain an URI parameter "requesttype" that shall be set to "msk-request", i.e. Request-URI takes the form of "/keymanagement?requesttype= msk-request"; +- the UE may add additional URI parameters to the Request-URI; +- the HTTP header Content-Type shall be the MIME type of the payload, i.e.. "application/mbms-msk+xml". The XML schema of the payload is specified in TS 26.346 [13]; +- the HTTP payload shall contain a list of one or more Key Domain ID - MSK ID pair(s) of the MSKs that the UE wants to receive; + +- the UE may add additional HTTP headers to the HTTP POST request. + +The UE sends the HTTP POST to the BM-SC. The BM-SC checks that the HTTP POST is valid, and extracts the MSK request for further processing. The BM-SC Key Management function shall verify that the subscriber is authorized to receive the particular MSKs. + +Upon successful authorization verification, the BM-SC shall return the HTTP 200 OK to the UE. + +The BM-SC shall populate HTTP response as follows: + +- the HTTP status code in the HTTP status line shall be 200; +- the HTTP header Content-Type shall be the MIME type of the payload, i.e.. " application/mbms-msk-response+xml". The XML schema of the payload is specified in TS 26.346 [13]; +- the HTTP payload shall contain a list including one status code for each MSK. + +The BM-SC shall send the HTTP response to the UE. The UE shall check that the HTTP response is valid. + +An example flow of a successful MSK request procedure can be found in Annex H. + +### G.2.4 Error situations + +The key management procedures may not be successful for multiple reasons. The error cases are indicated by using 4xx and 5xx HTTP Status Codes as defined in RFC 2616 [19]. The 4xx status code indicates that the UE seems to have erred, and the 5xx status code indicates that the BM-SC is aware that it has erred. Possible error situations during key management and their mappings to HTTP Status Codes are described in table G.2.4-1. The handling of multiple status codes within one response message is specified in clause 6.3.2.4. + +NOTE: In table G.2.4-1, the "Description" column describes the error situation in BM-SC. The "BM-SC error" column describes the typical reason for the error. + +**Table G.2.4-1: HTTP Status Codes used for key management errors** + +| HTTP Status Code | HTTP Error | UE should repeat the request | Description | BM-SC error | +|-------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 400 | Bad Request | No | Request could not be understood | Request was missing, or malformed | +| 401 | Unauthorized | Yes | Request requires authentication (cf. clause 6.2) | Authentication pending, (cf. clause 6.2) | +| 402 | Payment Required | No | Reserved for future use | - | +| 403 | Forbidden | No | BM-SC understood the request, but is refusing to fulfil it | The request was valid, but subscriber is not allowed to register to this particular MBMS User Service or UE requested MSK for a MBMS User Service where it was not registered or request contained unacceptable parameters | +| 404 | Not Found | No | BM-SC has not found anything matching the Request-URI | The Request-URI was malformed and BM-SC cannot fulfil the request | +| 405 | Method not allowed | No | The method specified in the Request-Line is not allowed for the resource identified by the Request-URI. | | +| 406 to 417 | * | No | Not used by BM-SC | - | +| 500 | Internal Server Error | No | Not used by BM-SC | - | +| 501 | Not Implemented | No | BM-SC does not support the requested functionality | The server does not contain particular BM-SC service requested | +| 502 | Bad Gateway | No | Not used by BM-SC | - | +| 503 | Service Unavailable | Yes | BM-SC service is currently unavailable | BM-SC is temporarily unavailable, UE may repeat the request after delay indicated by "Retry-After" header | +| 504 | Gateway Timeout | No | The server, while acting as a gateway or proxy, did not receive a timely response from the upstream server | The BM-SC did not get response over Zn interface. | +| 505 | HTTP Version Not Supported | No | BM-SC does not support the HTTP protocol version that was used in the request line | UE should use HTTP/1.1 version with BM-SC | + +# Annex H (informative): Signalling flows for MSK procedures + +## H.1 Scope of signalling flows + +This annex gives examples of signalling flows for the key management procedures. + +## H.2 Signalling flows demonstrating a successful MSK request procedure + +### H.2.1 Successful MSK request procedure + +The signalling flow in figure H.2.1-1 describes the message exchange between UE and BM-SC when UE wants to request MSK. + +![Sequence diagram of the Successful MSK request procedure. Lifelines: UE, BM-SC, BSF. The sequence starts with the UE sending an 'Initial MSK request' to the BM-SC. The BM-SC responds with '401 Unauthorized'. The UE then performs 'Generation of NAF specific key material' and sends an 'Authenticated MSK request' to the BM-SC. The BM-SC uses the 'Zn interface' to send a request to the BSF. The BSF performs an 'Authentication and Membership Function check' and returns a 'Response indicating success' to the BM-SC. Finally, the UE performs 'Authentication'.](90df9788d66ecf65abf861caf76be5ca_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant BM-SC + participant BSF + Note left of UE: 3. Generation of NAF specific key material + UE->>BM-SC: 1. Initial MSK request + BM-SC-->>UE: 2. 401 Unauthorized + Note left of UE: 3. Generation of NAF specific key material + UE->>BM-SC: 4. Authenticated MSK request + BM-SC->>BSF: 5. Zn interface + Note right of BM-SC: 6. Authentication and Membership Function check + BM-SC-->>UE: 7. Response indicating success + Note left of UE: 8. Authentication +``` + +Sequence diagram of the Successful MSK request procedure. Lifelines: UE, BM-SC, BSF. The sequence starts with the UE sending an 'Initial MSK request' to the BM-SC. The BM-SC responds with '401 Unauthorized'. The UE then performs 'Generation of NAF specific key material' and sends an 'Authenticated MSK request' to the BM-SC. The BM-SC uses the 'Zn interface' to send a request to the BSF. The BSF performs an 'Authentication and Membership Function check' and returns a 'Response indicating success' to the BM-SC. Finally, the UE performs 'Authentication'. + +Figure H.2.1-1: Successful MSK request procedure. + +1. **Initial MSK request (UE to BM-SC)** - see example in table H.2.1-1 + +The UE sends an HTTP request to the BM-SC containing a MSK request. + +**Table H.2.1-1: MSK request (UE to BM-SC)** + +``` + +POST /keymanagement?requesttype=msk-request HTTP/1.1 +Host: bmsc.home1.net:1234 +Content-Type: application/mbms-msk+xml +Content-Length: (...) +User-Agent: MBMSAgent; Release-6 3gpp-gba +Date: Thu, 08 Jan 2004 10:50:35 GMT +Accept: */* +Referrer: http://bmsc.home1.net:1234/service + +``` + + + +- Request-URI:** The Request-URI (the URI that follows the method name, "POST", in the first line) indicates the resource of this POST request. The Request-URI contains the parameter "requesttype" which is set to "msk-request" to indicate to the BM-SC the desired request type, i.e. UE requests for one or several MSKs. +- Host:** Specifies the Internet host and port number of the BM-SC, obtained from the original URI given by referring resource. +- Content-Type:** Contains the media type "application/mbms-msk+xml", i.e. MSK request. +- Content-Length:** Indicates the size of the entity-body, in decimal number of OCTETs, sent to the recipient. +- User-Agent:** Contains information about the user agent originating the request and it shall include the static string "3gpp-gba" to indicate to the application server (i.e. NAF) that the UE supports 3GPP-bootstrapping based authentication. +- Date:** Represents the date and time at which the message was originated. +- Accept:** Media types which are acceptable for the response. +- Referrer:** Allows the user agent to specify the address (URI) of the resource from which the URI for the BM-SC was obtained. + +NOTE 1: This step is used to trigger the GBA-based authentication between the UE and the BM-SC. + +#### 2. 401 Unauthorized response (BM-SC to UE) - see example in table H.2.1-2 + +Upon receiving an HTTP request that contains static string "3gpp-gba" in the User-Agent header the BM-SC responds with HTTP response code 401 "Unauthorized" which contains a WWW Authenticate header. The header instructs the UE to use HTTP Digest Authentication with a bootstrapped security association. + +**Table H.2.1-2: 401 Unauthorized response (BM-SC to UE)** + +``` + +HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized +Server: Apache/1.3.22 (Unix) mod_perl/1.27 +Date: Thu, 08 Jan 2004 10:50:35 GMT +WWW-Authenticate: Digest realm="3GPP-bootstrapping@bmsc.home1.net", +nonce="6629fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1", algorithm=MD5, qop="auth,auth-int", +opaque="5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f30e41" + +``` + +- Server:** Contains information about the software used by the origin server (BM-SC). +- Date:** Represents the date and time at which the message was originated. +- WWW-Authenticate:** The BM-SC challenges the user. The header instructs the UE to use HTTP Digest Authentication with a bootstrapped security association. + +The options for the quality of protection (qop) attribute is by default "auth-int" meaning that the payload of the following HTTP requests and responses should be integrity protected. + +The realm attribute contains two parts delimited by "@" sign. The first part is a constant string "3GPP-bootstrapping" instructing the UE to use a bootstrapped security association. The second part is the hostname of the server (i.e. FQDN of the BM-SC). + +#### 3. Generation of NAF specific keys at UE + +The UE verifies that the second part of the realm attribute does correspond to the server it is talking to. + +UE derives the NAF specific key material as specified in TS 33.220 [6]. UE further derives MBMS specific key material MRK and MUK as specified in clause 6.1. + +NOTE 2: If UE does not have a bootstrapped security association available, it will obtain one by running bootstrapping procedure over Ub interface. + +#### 4. Authenticated MSK request (UE to BM-SC) - see example in table H.2.1-3 + +UE generates the HTTP request by calculating the Authorization header values using the bootstrapping transaction identifier B-TID it received from the BSF as the username and the MRK (base64 encoded) as the password, and sends the request to BM-SC. + +**Table H.2.1-3: Authenticated MSK request (UE to BM-SC)** + +``` +POST /keymanagement?requesttype=msk-request HTTP/1.1 +Host: bmsc.home1.net:1234 +Content-Type: application/mbms-msk+xml +Content-Length: (...) +User-Agent: MBMSAgent; Release-6 3gpp-gba +Date: Thu, 08 Jan 2004 10:50:35 GMT +Accept: */* +Referer: http://bmsc.home1.net:1234/service +Authorization: Digest username="(B-TID)", realm="3GPP-bootstrapping@bmsc.home1.net", +nonce="a6332ffd2d234==", uri="/bmsc.home1.net/keymanagement?requesttype=msk-request", qop=auth-int, +nc=00000001, cnonce="6629fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1", response="6629fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1", +opaque="5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f30e41", algorithm=MD5 + + +``` + +**Authorization:** This carries the response to the authentication challenge received in step 2 along with the username, the realm, the nonce, the URI, the qop, the NC, the cnonce, the response, the opaque, and the algorithm. + +The qop attribute is set to "auth-int" by default. + +NOTE 3: If step 1 was a POST request then this request would also be a POST request and contain the same client payload in the HTTP request as was carried in step 1. + +#### 5. Zn: NAF specific key procedure + +BM-SC retrieves the NAF specific key material and IMPI of the user. BM-SC further derives MBMS specific key material MRK and MUK as specified in clause 6.1. + +For detailed signalling flows see TS 29.109 [20]. + +**Table H.2.1-4: Bootstrapping authentication information procedure (BM-SC to BSF)** + +| Message source and destination | Zn Information element name | Information Source in GET | Description | +|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| NAF to BSF | B-TID | Authorization | The bootstrapping transaction identifier is encoded in the username field according to the Authorization protocol. | + +#### 6. Authentication at BM-SC + +BM-SC verifies the Authorization header by using the bootstrapping transaction identifier B-TID and the key MRK. BM-SC calculates the corresponding digest values using MRK, and compares the calculated values with the received values in the Authorization header. + +The BM-SC also verifies that the hostname (i.e. its FQDN) in the realm attribute matches its own. + +If the verification succeeds, the incoming client-payload request is taken in for further processing. The BM-SC continues processing of the MSK request according to its internal policies. The BM-SC verifies that the subscriber is allowed to receive the particular MSK(s) indicated in the MSK request. + +#### **7. Response indicating success (BM-SC to UE)** - see example in table H.2.1-5 + +The BM-SC sends 200 OK response to the UE to indicate the success of the authentication and the MSK request. The BM-SC generates a HTTP response. The BM-SC can use key MRK derived from NAF key material to integrity protect and authenticate the response. + +NOTE 5: The requested MSK keys are not delivered within the MSK request procedure. They are delivered with a separate MIKEY procedure, see clause 6.3.2.3. + +**Table H.2.1-5: Successful HTTP response (BM-SC to UE)** + +``` +HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Server: Apache/1.3.22 (Unix) mod_perl/1.27 +Content-Type: application/mbms-msk+xml +Content-Length: (...) +Authentication-Info: qop=auth-int, rspauth="6629fae49394a05397450978507c4ef1", +cnonce="6629fae49394a05397450978507c4ef1", nc=00000001 +Date: Thu, 08 Jan 2004 10:50:35 GMT +Expires: Fri, 09 Jan 2004 10:50:36 GMT + +``` + +**Authentication-Info:** This carries the protection. + +**Expires:** Gives the date/time after which the response is considered stale. + +#### **8. Authentication at UE** + +The UE receives the response and verifies the Authentication-Info header. If the verification succeeds, the UE can regard the MSK request procedure as successful. + +# Annex I (informative): Example of using MSKs and MTKs in MBMS + +The following table shows an example of two MBMS User Services, sports Mobile TV channel and news Mobile TV channel. Both of the MBMS User Services include an MBMS User Service Session that downloads a joke per day. The table shows how the MBMS User Services are broken down into RTP sessions (each including the data stream with related RTCP) and FLUTE channels. + +The table shows how MSKs and MTKs belonging to different Key Groups are used to protect the RTP sessions and FLUTE channels. It should be noted that the MBMS download session is shared with User Services 1 and 2 so these MBMS User Services need to be able to share MSKs in Key Group C. + +Furthermore the table shows how traffic could be carried over MBMS bearers, but this is not a security issue and is only shown here for completeness. + +**Table I.1: Example of using MSKs and MTKs in MBMS** + +| User Service level | User Service 1 | Sport channel with joke of the day | | | | | | +|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--| +| | User Service 2 | News channel with joke of the day | | | | | | +| User Service Session level | User Service Session | MBMS Streaming Session (Sport) | | MBMS Download Session (Joke / day) | | MBMS Streaming Session (News) | | +| | RTP session/ FLUTE channel | streaming audio (RTP session) | streaming video (RTP session) | file object download (FLUTE channel) | streaming audio (RTP session) | streaming video (RTP session) | | +| Key management level | Key Domain | MCC/MNC | | MCC/MNC | | MCC/MNC | | +| | Key Group | Key Group A | | Key Group B | | Key Group C | | +| | MSK Note 1 | MSK A1 (current) | MSK A2 (next) | MSK B1 | MSK B2 | MSK C1 | | +| | MTK Note 1 | MTK .. | MTK .. | MTK .. | MTK .. | MTK .. | | +| Transport Service level | Transport Service | MBMS Bearer N | | MBMS Bearer N+1 | | MBMS Bearer N+2 | | + +Note 1: This row has a time dimension to illustrate that MSKs and MTKs can be updated. + +# Annex J (informative): Mapping the MBMS security requirements into security functions and mechanism + +## J.1 Consistency check + +### J.1.1 Requirements on secure service access + +| Security requirement | Check result | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| R1a: A valid USIM or SIM shall be required to access MBMS User Services. | This is provided by GBA.
Ks_(ext/int)_NAF generation requires a valid USIM or SIM. | +| R1b: It shall be possible to prevent intruders from obtaining unauthorized access of MBMS User Services by masquerading as authorized users. | GBA and HTTP digest authentication provide this. | +| R2a: It shall be possible for the network (i.e. BM-SC) to authenticate users at the start of, and during, service delivery to prevent intruders from obtaining unauthorized access to MBMS User Services. | A user is authenticated during the MBMS user service registration and MSK re-keying. | +| R2b: It shall be possible to prevent the use of a particular USIM or SIM to access MBMS User Services. | GAA user security settings provide this. | + +### J.1.2 Requirements on MBMS transport Service signalling protection + +| Security requirement | Check result | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| R3a: It shall be possible to protect against unauthorized modification, insertion, replay or deletion of MBMS transport service signalling on the Gmb reference point. | NDS/IP covers this. | +| R3b: Unauthorized modification, insertion, replay or deletion of all transport service signalling, on the RAN shall be prevented when the RAN selects a point-to-multipoint (ptm) link for the distribution of MBMS data to the UE. | Examples of the attacks could be:
  • - Changing the source address of the content e.g. from indicating company A to company B.
  • - Changing data indicating the type of content from type A to Type B
  • - Changing data indicating type of protection required etc
  • - Appending content to the end of the original content
Analysis has shown that there is not any transport service signalling sent over PTM that would need protection. | + +### J.1.3 Requirements on Privacy + +| Security requirement | Check result | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| R4a: The User identity should not be exposed to the content provider or linked to the content in the case the Content Provider is located outside the 3GPP operator's network. | The content provider knows only the BM-SC. | +| R4b: MBMS identity and control information shall not be exposed when the RAN selects a point-to-multipoint link for the distribution of MBMS data to the UE. |

Such identity and control information could be:

  • - The identities of the content providers
  • - Information on which content providers have the most customers
  • - The identities of the content recipients in the case of multicast services to small groups of users

Information which could be used to identify specific users is not exposed on the point-to-multipoint channel. However, it may still be possible to identify whether a particular user is subscribed to a particular MBMS service. This could be done by following the physical movement of a particular subscriber and the changes between the use of point-to-point and point-to-multipoint bearers for particular MBMS services in the cells that serve the target subscriber. It is seen unnecessary to protect against this kind of an attack.

The only control information exposed on the point-to-multipoint channel is the unprotected fields in the MIKEY MTK transport message. However, revealing this information does not seem to pose a significant security risk.

| + +### J.1.4 Requirements on MBMS Key Management + +| Security requirement | Check result | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| R5a: The transfer of the MBMS keys between the MBMS key generator and the UE shall be confidentiality protected.. | The MSK and MTK update messages are encrypted. | +| R5b: The transfer of the MBMS keys between the MBMS key generator and the UE shall be integrity protected. | The MSK and MTK deliveries can be integrity protected. | +| R5c: The UE and MBMS key generator shall support the operator to perform re-keying as frequently as it believes necessary to ensure that:
users that have joined an MBMS User Service, but then left, shall not gain further access to the MBMS User Service without being charged appropriately
users joining an MBMS User Service shall not gain access to data from previous transmissions in the MBMS User Service without having been charged appropriately
the effect of subscribed users distributing decryption keys to non-subscribed users shall be controllable. | Supported by re-keying functionality. | +| R5d: Only authorized users that have joined an MBMS User Service shall be able to receive MBMS keys delivered from the MBMS key generator. | MSKs are delivered only to authorized users and the delivery is protected using MUK level keys. | + +| | | | +|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| R5e: | The MBMS keys shall not allow the BM-SC to infer any information about used UE-keys at radio level (i.e. if they would be derived from it). | The same CK and IK are not used in GBA and radio level. In addition, Ks_(ext/int)_NAF generation uses a one-way function. | +| R5f: | All keys used for the MBMS User Service shall be uniquely identifiable. The identity may be used by the UE to retrieve the actual key (based on identity match, and mismatch recognition) when an update was missed or was erroneous/incomplete | MUK is identified by the combination of B-TID and NAF-ID without the Ua security protocol identifier, and the MRK is defined by B-TID
MSK is uniquely identifiable by its Key Domain ID and MSK ID
MTK is uniquely identifiable by its Key Domain ID, MSK ID and MTK ID | +| R5g: | The BM-SC shall be aware of where all MBMS specific keys are stored in the UE (i.e. ME or UICC). | The BM-SC knows whether Ks_int_NAF + Ks_ext_NAF or Ks_NAF was generated. | +| R5h: | The function of providing MTK to the ME shall only deliver a MTK to the ME if the input values used for obtaining the MTK were fresh (have not been replayed) and came from a trusted source. | Freshness is checked by MGV-F. | + +### J.1.5 Requirements on integrity protection of MBMS User Service data + +| Security requirement | Check result | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------| +| R6a: It shall be possible to protect against unauthorized modification, insertion, replay or deletion of MBMS User Service data sent to the UE on the radio interface. The use of integrity shall be optional. | This is provided at the application layer using SRTP or OMA DRM DCF. | +| R6b: The MBMS User Service data may be integrity protected with a common integrity key, which shall be available to all users that have joined the MBMS User Service. | This is provided at the application layer using SRTP or OMA DRM DCF. | +| R6c: It may be required to integrity protect the "BM-SC - GGSN" interface i.e. reference point Gi. | This can be provided by NDS/IP. | + +### J.1.6 Requirements on confidentiality protection of MBMS User Service data + +| Security requirement | Check result | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| R7a: It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of MBMS User Service data on the radio interface. | This is provided at the application layer using SRTP or OMA DRM DCF. | +| R7b: The MBMS User Service data may be encrypted with common encryption keys, which shall be available to all users that have joined the MBMS User Service | This is provided at the application layer using SRTP or OMA DRM DCF. | +| R7c: It may be required to encrypt the MBMS User Service data on the "BM-SC - GGSN" interface, i.e. the reference points Gi. | This can be provided by NDS/IP. | +| R7d: It shall be infeasible for a man-in-the-middle to bid down the confidentiality protection used on protect the MBMS User Service from the BM-SC to the UE. | The BM-SC decides about the security level. There is no security association negotiation between the UE and the BM-SC. | +| R7e: It shall be infeasible for an eavesdropper to break the confidentiality protection of the MBMS User Service when it is applied. | This is provided at the application layer using SRTP or OMA DRM DCF. | + +### J.1.7 Requirements on content provider to BM-SC reference point + +| Security requirement | Check result | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| R8a: The BM-SC shall be able to authenticate and authorize a 3 rd party content provider that wishes to transmit data to the BM-SC. | The mechanism to meet the requirement is left to be implemented between the BM-SC and a 3 rd party. | +| R8b: It shall be possible to integrity and confidentiality protect data sent from a 3 rd party content provider to the BM-SC. | The mechanism to meet the requirement is left to be implemented between the BM-SC and a 3 rd party. | + +## --- J.2 Conclusions + +Based on the above results of the consistency check between the security requirements and security functions/mechanisms the MBMS security requirements have been adequately met. + +# --- Annex K (Informative): SRTP features not used in MBMS + +- An MBMS capable ME and BM-SC do not need to implement an SRTP key derivation rate different from zero. + +# --- Annex L (Normative): Multicasting MBMS user data on Iub + +TS 25.434 [27] specifies the possibility to use IP multicast as defined in RFC 3376 [25] and RFC 3810 [26] for FACH data streams on Iub Interface. In order to protect the transfer of MBMS user plane data multicast between the RNC and NodeBs on the Iub interface over unprotected IP network segments, it is required to use IPsec ESP with shared secrets according to RFC 4303 [28] as profiled by TS 33.210 [14] section 5.3 with integrity protection. The use of confidentiality protection is optional. + +NOTE: In case the Iub interfaces are physically protected, the above IPsec based protection is not needed and this is regarded as a closed IP based RAN. + +# --- Annex M (informative): Relation to IMS based MBMS user services + +Security procedures for IMS based MBMS User Services are specified in TS 26.237 [29]. + +# --- Annex N (normative): GCSE security aspects + +## N.0 GCSE architecture and requirements + +GCSE architecture is specified in TS 23.468 [33] and based on the requirements specified in TS 22.468 [34]. + +NOTE 1: The MCPTT AS as specified in 3GPP TS 23.179 [47] is an instantiation of a GCS AS. + +NOTE 2: The V2X AS as specified in 3GPP TS 23.285 [48] is an instantiation of a GCS AS. + +## --- N.1 GCSE security requirements + +### N.1.1 General + +The security requirements specified in 3GPP TS 22.468 apply. + +Note it is assumed that LTE access security mechanisms at the air interface are used. + +Note no requirements are given on Rx and SGi, which are generic interfaces and therefore not specified in the scope of GCSE. + +### N.1.2 GCSE Broadcast Delivery specific security requirements + +- Mutual authentication between a node in the security domain, in which the BM-SC resides, and a node in the security domain, in which the GCS AS resides, shall be performed. + +NOTE 0: The present document covers only security procedures for deployments where a Diameter message on the MB2-C interface between BM-SC and GCS AS passes through at most one Diameter agent in the security domain, in which the BM-SC resides and at most one Diameter agent in the security domain, in which the GCS AS resides. Other deployments are possible, but they are not recommended for the purposes of the MB2-C interface. + +- The signalling messages on MB2-C between the BM-SC and the GCS AS shall be integrity and confidentiality protected. +- The signalling messages on MB2-C between the BM-SC and the GCS AS shall be replay protected. +- The user plane messages on MB2-U between the BM-SC and the GCS AS shall be integrity protected. +- The BM-SC may apply access control on the messages initiated by the GCS AS. +- The GCS AS may apply access control on the messages initiated by the BM-SC. + +NOTE 1: MBMS security may or may not be used independent of GCSE. + +## --- N.2 Security solution for MB2-C interface + +The Diameter mechanisms as specified in IETF RFC 3588 [35] shall apply to MB2-C reference point unless explicitly stated otherwise. + +TLS (IETF RFC 5246 [38]) shall be mandatory for implementation on MB2-C. If SCTP is supported then DTLS shall be supported (IETF RFC 6347 [39]). IKE/IPsec (IETF RFC 5996 [40]) is optional for implementation on MB2-C. + +NOTE: The use of Diameter in the present specification is based on RFC 3588 [35]. Nevertheless, the security mechanism defined for MB2-C reference point rather aligns with the security mechanism in RFC 6733 [36]. The only difference to the security in RFC 6733 is that the support for DTLS is made conditional on the support of SCTP. + +The security profiles for TLS and IKE/IPsec are identical to the ones defined in 3GPP TS 29.368 [37], clause 6.3.3, for the Tsp interface. The security profile of DTLS is defined in 33.310 [31], annex E. + +Mutual authentication for the MB2-C interface shall be performed as defined in 3GPP TS 29.368 [37], clause 6.3.2 for the Tsp interface with MTC-IWF and SCS replaced by BM-SC and GCS AS respectively. In particular, the rules for Diameter deployments defined in TS 29.368 [37], clause 6.3.2, shall also apply to the MB2-C interface. + +(D) TLS or IKE/IPsec should be used to protect MB2-C. + +If the operator does not use the mechanisms described in this clause, then other adequate security measures shall be taken to ensure security on that interface. It is up to the operator, i.e. the owner of the BM-SC, to decide whether the MB2-C interface is trusted or physically protected, or whether it needs protection by a cryptographic protocol as specified above. + +## --- N.3 Security solution for MB2-U interface + +The assumption is that security in the sense of end-to-end security between UE and UE or UE and GCS AS is supported at application layer. Thus, confidentiality protection of MB2-U is out of scope of 3GPP specifications. + +Integrity protection is required in order to mitigate the following DoS attacks: Once ports have been assigned for transferring user data via MB2-U, i.e. by setting up the connection on MB2-C, these ports may be used by an intruder to flood the system and UEs with unwanted messages. + +3GPP TS 29.468 [41], Figure 7.1-1 depicts the MB2-U protocol stack, in which user plane data, for instance an IP layer and UDP layer (IETF RFC 768 [42]) are sent over MB2-U interface. + +For integrity protection of MB2-U interface, DTLS (IETF RFC 6347 [45]) should be used. IKE/IPsec/ESP (IETF RFC 4303 [46]) may be used. If NATs are present on this interface, UDP encapsulating IKE/IPsec/ESP for negotiation of NAT-Traversal (IETF RFC 3948 [44] and IETF RFCs 3947 [43]) may be used. If the operator does not use the mechanisms described in this clause, then other adequate security measures shall be taken to ensure security on that interface. It is up to the operator, i.e. the owner of the BM-SC, to decide whether the MB2-U interface is trusted or physically protected, or whether it needs protection by a cryptographic protocol as specified above. + +Traffic on MB2-U is unidirectional from the GCS AS to the BM-SC, and the BM-SC does not get the user plane address of the GCS AS when the MB2-U connection is established. Therefore it shall be possible for the BM-SC to request GCS AS over MB2-C to establish a security association for the user plane. The security protocol (DTLS or IKE/IPsec) to be used over MB2-U needs to be configured in the GCS AS, possibly dependent on BM-SC and/or target network. It shall also be possible for the BM-SC to receive a request from GCS AS for the establishment of a security association for the user plane. The target IP address and possible UDP port for this security association can be provided in the MB2-C signalling protected by MB2-C security. + +# --- Annex O (normative): Security aspects of xMB reference point between Content Provider and BM-SC + +## O.1 General + +The xMB reference point and related stage 2 protocol procedures are defined in TS 26.346 [13]. The present Annex specifies the security aspects of the xMB reference point. + +## --- O.2 Protection of the xMB reference point + +The control plane (xMB-C) shall use TLS and the user plane (xMB-U) shall use TLS for TCP-based transport and DTLS for UDP-based transport as is specified in the following: + +The profile for TLS and DTLS implementation and usage shall follow the provisions given in TS 33.310 [31], Annex E. Certificate based mutual authentication using TLS or DTLS between a BM-SC and a Content Provider shall be based on certificate profiles in clauses 6.1.3a and 6.1.4a in TS 33.310 [31]. The structure of the PKI used for these certificates is out of scope of the present document, thus the provisions in these clauses on issuers of the certificates do not apply. + +After the successful mutual D(TLS) authentication, the BM-SC shall perform authorization checks based on the subject field of the Content Provider certificate. For domain based authorization, the subject field shall identify the domain of the Content Provider and shall be used by the BM-SC for domain level authorization checks. The BM-SC may additionally perform user-based authorization. For an additional user-based authorization, after performing successful domain based authorization, the BM-SC shall authenticate the user using HTTP digest as specified in RFC 2617 [8] and username/password. The username shall identify the user (a human user or a machine) and shall be used by the BM-SC to perform user level authorization checks. The management of the username and password are out of the scope of the present document. + +# --- Annex P (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | | | +|----------------|-------|-----------|-----|-----|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|----| +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | Old | New | WI | +| 2003-11 | SP-22 | | | | | Updated with some editorial modification and presented to the SA plenary for information | 0.3.0 | 1.0.0 | | +| 2004-02 | | | | | | Updated to reflect changes agreed at SA3#32 | 1.0.0 | 1.1.0 | | +| 2004-04 | | | | | | Minor corrections agreed by e-mail discussion | 1.1.0 | 1.1.1 | | +| 2004-05 | | | | | | Updated to reflect the decisions taken at SA3#33 | 1.1.1 | 1.2.0 | | +| 2004-06 | | | | | | Small editorial corrections | 1.2.0 | 1.2.1 | | +| 2004-07 | | | | | | Updated to reflect the decisions taken at SA3#34
S3-040470, S3-040469, S3-040553, S3-040535, S3-040489, S3-040565, S3-04573, S3-040620 (update of S3-040582), S3-040676 (update of S3-040497 via S3-040618) and S3-040677 (update of S3-040582 via S3-040619) | 1.2.1 | 1.3.0 | | +| 2004-09 | | | | | | Editorial updates after SA3#34 and some changes proposed by joint SA3/SA4 meeting | 1.3.0 | 1.3.1 | | +| 2004-09 | SP_25 | SP-040624 | | | | Editorially updated for presentation to TSG SA #25 for approval | 1.3.1 | 2.0.0 | | +| 2004-09 | - | - | - | - | | Updated to v6.0.0 after approval by TSG SA | 2.0.0 | 6.0.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 001 | 4 | | Deletion of MBMS keys stored in the ME | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 002 | - | | Clarification on key management | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 005 | 3 | | Clean up of MBMS TS | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 006 | 1 | | Traffic protection combinations | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 007 | 3 | | Clarifying ME and BM-SC capabilities | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 009 | 1 | | MBMS MTK Download transport | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 010 | 3 | | MBMS Transport of salt | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 011 | 1 | | SRTP index synchronisation within ME | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 012 | 2 | | Clarify the use of mandatory MIKEY features for MBMS | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 014 | - | | Protection of the Gmb reference point | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 015 | 1 | | Use of parallel MSKs and MTKs | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 016 | 3 | | Scope of MBMS security | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 018 | 4 | | Clarification of the format of MTK ID and MSK ID | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 020 | 3 | | MTK update procedure for streaming services | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 021 | 8 | | Clarification of MSK key management | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 022 | 1 | | Modification of delivery of MIKEY RAND field in MSK updates | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 023 | 2 | | OMA DRM DCF for protection of download services | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 028 | 1 | | Shorter MKI | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2004-12 | SP_26 | SP-040859 | 033 | 1 | | Handling of MBMS identities and definition completion/modification | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 034 | 2 | | Handling of MBMS identities and definition completion/modification | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 035 | 1 | | ME based MBMS key derivation for ME based MBMS key management | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 037 | 1 | | Correct the MSK verification message handling | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 038 | 2 | | Clarify MUK key synchronisation for MSK push procedure | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 039 | - | | Add missing parts of CR33 (SA3#36) | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 042 | - | | Annex D.1: correction of the description of the GBA run | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 043 | 1 | | Alignment according to MIKEY related IETF work | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | + +| | | | | | | | | | | +|---------|-------|-----------|------|---|---|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|---------| +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 044 | 1 | | Clarification of HTTP procedures | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 045 | 1 | | Usage of security policy payload | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 047 | 1 | | Clarification of MSK and MTK procedures | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 049 | 2 | | MGV-F functionality related to MTK-ID upper limit | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 051 | 1 | | Using the term "MBMS User Service" instead of "multicast" | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 052 | 1 | | Introduction of BM-SC subfunctions | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 053 | - | | Removing IDI from MTK message | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 054 | 2 | | MBMS download protection details | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 055 | 1 | | Removal of Editors notes | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 056 | - | | Protection of MBMS Service Announcement sent over MBMS bearer | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-03 | SP_27 | SP-050143 | 057 | - | | Introduction of missing abbreviations, symbols and definitions | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050266 | 058 | 1 | C | MKI and authentication tag length in User Service Description | 6.2.0 | 6.3.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050266 | 059 | 1 | C | Clarification of Key domain ID in service announcement | 6.2.0 | 6.3.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050266 | 060 | 1 | F | Key usage clarification | 6.2.0 | 6.3.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050266 | 061 | 1 | C | Omitted MTK Update Error Message | 6.2.0 | 6.3.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050266 | 062 | 1 | D | Editorial corrections to TS 33.246 | 6.2.0 | 6.3.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050266 | 063 | 1 | C | Clarifications on MBMS key management | 6.2.0 | 6.3.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050266 | 064 | 1 | F | Use of IMPI in MBMS | 6.2.0 | 6.3.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050266 | 065 | - | F | Clarification on CSB ID and SP payload use | 6.2.0 | 6.3.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050266 | 066 | - | F | MIME type adjustments according to LS S3-050192 | 6.2.0 | 6.3.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-06 | SP-28 | SP-050266 | 067 | - | F | Results of mapping the MBMS security requirements into security functions and mechanisms | 6.2.0 | 6.3.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050548 | 0068 | - | F | Clarify FEC handling | 6.3.0 | 6.4.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050548 | 0069 | - | F | Clarification to UE handling at reception of service announcement description | 6.3.0 | 6.4.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050548 | 0070 | - | F | Back-off parameter binding scope | 6.3.0 | 6.4.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050548 | 0071 | - | F | IDs and encoding of MIKEY messages | 6.3.0 | 6.4.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050548 | 0072 | - | F | Moving the EXT payload | 6.3.0 | 6.4.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050548 | 0073 | - | F | Handling of re-sent MSK messages | 6.3.0 | 6.4.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050548 | 0074 | - | F | Clarification of MSK ID in service announcement | 6.3.0 | 6.4.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050548 | 0075 | - | F | More than one FQDN for key management | 6.3.0 | 6.4.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050559 | 0076 | - | F | NAF Id alignment with TS 33.220 | 6.3.0 | 6.4.0 | SEC1-SC | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050548 | 0077 | - | F | Key Domain ID in MSK request | 6.3.0 | 6.4.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-09 | SP-29 | SP-050548 | 0078 | - | F | Identifying correct MIME types, correcting various editorials and wrong references | 6.3.0 | 6.4.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-12 | SP-30 | SP-050766 | 0079 | - | F | ROC synchronization | 6.4.0 | 6.5.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-12 | SP-30 | SP-050766 | 0080 | - | F | Correction on MSK processing in case of solicited pull procedure | 6.4.0 | 6.5.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-12 | SP-30 | SP-050766 | 0081 | - | F | Handling several status codes in one response message | 6.4.0 | 6.5.0 | MBMS | +| 2005-12 | SP-30 | SP-050766 | 0082 | - | F | Definition of newer MSK | 6.4.0 | 6.5.0 | MBMS | + +| | | | | | | | | | | +|---------|-------|-----------|------|---|---|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------| +| 2006-03 | SP-31 | SP-060048 | 0083 | - | F | Handling unknown MIKEY payloads in MGV-F | 6.5.0 | 6.6.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-03 | SP-31 | SP-060048 | 0084 | - | F | Clarification of MTK ID reset in MSK update | 6.5.0 | 6.6.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-06 | SP-32 | SP-060381 | 0086 | - | F | SIM access to MBMS | 6.6.0 | 7.0.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-09 | SP-33 | SP-060497 | 0087 | - | F | BM-SC chooses MUK lifetime less than corresponding GBA Key lifetime | 7.0.0 | 7.1.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-09 | SP-33 | SP-060490 | 0089 | - | A | Correcting http syntax of key management procedures | 7.0.0 | 7.1.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-09 | SP-33 | SP-060497 | 0090 | - | F | Correction of incorrect description of BM-SC | 7.0.0 | 7.1.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-09 | SP-33 | SP-060497 | 0091 | - | F | Correction of possible key ID values | 7.0.0 | 7.1.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-09 | SP-33 | SP-060497 | 0092 | - | F | Removal of MIKEY internal keys | 7.0.0 | 7.1.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-09 | SP-33 | SP-060491 | 0094 | - | A | Removing TAG and MKI length from Service Announcement | 7.0.0 | 7.1.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-09 | SP-33 | SP-060649 | 0095 | 1 | B | Addition of a "2G GBA allowed" flag in MBMS user service announcement | 7.0.0 | 7.1.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-12 | SP-34 | SP-060803 | 0096 | - | F | Keys derived from MTK | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-12 | SP-34 | SP-060803 | 0097 | - | F | SRTP key derivation rate shall be zero | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-12 | SP-34 | SP-060794 | 0098 | 1 | A | Clarify the use of MBMS User Service Registration/Deregistration for protected MBMS User Services. | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-12 | SP-34 | SP-060795 | 0101 | 1 | A | Correction on the use of key derivation functions | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-12 | SP-34 | SP-060898 | 0103 | 2 | A | Correction of the MIKEY Extension payload coding | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-12 | SP-34 | SP-060803 | 0105 | 1 | F | AES Key Wrap not required for MBMS | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-12 | SP-34 | SP-060797 | 0107 | 1 | A | Correction to the Processing of received messages in the ME | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-12 | SP-34 | SP-060798 | 0109 | 1 | F | Specify the authentication key length of MIKEY | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-12 | SP-34 | SP-060803 | 0111 | 1 | F | Typical MSK and MTK key size | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | MBMS | +| 2006-12 | SP-34 | SP-060799 | 0113 | 1 | A | MTK storage rules on UEs | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | MBMS | +| 2007-03 | SP-35 | SP-070148 | 0116 | 1 | C | Allow the BM-SC to resend MTK messages without TS incrementation | 7.2.0 | 7.3.0 | MBMSE | +| 2007-03 | SP-35 | SP-070148 | 0117 | 1 | F | Clarification on the use of the constant R | 7.2.0 | 7.3.0 | MBMSE | +| 2007-03 | SP-35 | SP-070148 | 0118 | 1 | F | Clarification of MSK message structure | 7.2.0 | 7.3.0 | MBMSE | +| 2007-03 | SP-35 | SP-070148 | 0119 | 1 | F | Clarification of MTK message structure | 7.2.0 | 7.3.0 | MBMSE | +| 2007-03 | SP-35 | SP-070142 | 0121 | 1 | A | Modification to rules for MSK and MTK management on the UE | 7.2.0 | 7.3.0 | MBMS | +| 2007-03 | SP-35 | SP-070143 | 0122 | 1 | A | FDT protection | 7.2.0 | 7.3.0 | MBMS | +| 2007-06 | SP-36 | SP-070334 | 0126 | - | A | Mandating the support of MIKEY-RAND length of 128 bit | 7.3.0 | 7.4.0 | MBMS | +| 2007-06 | SP-36 | SP-070334 | 0128 | - | A | Adding missing requirements about PDP context and IP address handling for ptp key management | 7.3.0 | 7.4.0 | MBMS | +| 2007-06 | SP-36 | SP-070334 | 0130 | - | A | Adding a missing interworking scenario | 7.3.0 | 7.4.0 | MBMS | +| 2007-06 | SP-36 | SP-070334 | 0132 | - | A | Fixed cs_id for MIKEY PRF in case of download key derivation | 7.3.0 | 7.4.0 | MBMS | +| 2007-06 | SP-36 | SP-070334 | 0133 | 1 | F | Correct the SALT key generation during MSK processing | 7.3.0 | 7.4.0 | MBMS | +| 2007-06 | SP-36 | SP-070334 | 0137 | 1 | A | GBA NAF Key availability in the UICC | 7.3.0 | 7.4.0 | MBMS | +| 2007-09 | SP-37 | SP-070579 | 0141 | 1 | A | Correct the encoding of MBMS key management procedures | 7.4.0 | 7.5.0 | MBMS | +| 2007-09 | SP-37 | SP-070579 | 0143 | - | A | Correction of DRM Content Format usage | 7.4.0 | 7.5.0 | MBMS | +| 2007-12 | SP-38 | SP-070791 | 0144 | - | F | Usage of TEK and TGK in MBMS | 7.5.0 | 7.6.0 | MBMS | +| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080149 | 0147 | 1 | F | Clarification of usage of SRTCP in MBMS | 7.6.0 | 8.0.0 | MBMS | + +| | | | | | | | | | | +|---------|-------|-----------|------|----|---|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|----------| +| 2008-06 | SP-40 | SP-080266 | 0146 | 2 | B | Protection of Iub when multicasting MBMS user data | 8.0.0 | 8.1.0 | MBMS | +| 2008-06 | SP-40 | SP-080266 | 0148 | 1 | F | Clarification of UE IP address in MBMS | 8.0.0 | 8.1.0 | MBMS | +| 2008-06 | SP-40 | SP-080266 | 0149 | 1 | F | IP connectivity of the UE in MBMS | 8.0.0 | 8.1.0 | MBMS | +| 2008-12 | SP-42 | SP-080748 | 0151 | 1 | F | Clarification of MBMS authorization | 8.1.0 | 8.2.0 | TEI8 | +| 2009-03 | SP-43 | SP-090139 | 0150 | 2 | F | Encoding of identities as NAIs | 8.2.0 | 8.3.0 | TEI8 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090275 | 0152 | - | F | Add reference to IMS based MBMS TS | 8.3.0 | 8.4.0 | TEI8 | +| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090275 | 0153 | - | F | Clarification of Service Protection Description | 8.3.0 | 8.4.0 | TEI8 | +| 2009-12 | SP-46 | SP-090860 | 0154 | 1 | | Impacts of EPS to MBMS security | 8.4.0 | 9.0.0 | MBMS_EPS | +| 2010-12 | SP-50 | SP-100715 | 0155 | -- | F | Correction of references | 9.0.0 | 10.0.0 | TEI10 | +| 2012-09 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-11 version (MCC) | 10.0.0 | 11.0.0 | - | +| 2012-12 | SP-58 | SP-120858 | 0164 | 2 | F | Fixing the lack of confidentiality protection for Associated Delivery Procedures | 11.0.0 | 11.1.0 | SEC11 | +| 2012-12 | SP-58 | SP-120858 | 0167 | 2 | A | Support for multiple BM-SCs | 11.0.0 | 11.1.0 | SEC11 | +| 2012-12 | SP-58 | SP-120858 | 0168 | 1 | A | MIKEY-RAND in MTK messages | 11.0.0 | 11.1.0 | TEI9 | +| 2013-06 | SP-60 | SP-130251 | 0171 | 2 | F | Confidentiality Protection of Associated Delivery Procedure Messages | 11.1.0 | 11.2.0 | SEC11 | +| 2014-06 | SP-64 | SP-140313 | 0172 | 1 | B | Add new normative annex on GCSE security | 11.2.0 | 12.0.0 | GCSE_LTE | +| | | | 0173 | 1 | B | Adding references needed for new GCSE security normative annex | | | | +| | | | 0174 | 1 | B | Requirements section for normative annex GCSE security | | | | +| | | | 0176 | 1 | B | MBMS Delivery requirements for normative annex GCSE security | | | | +| | | | 0177 | 1 | B | Solution for MB2-C interface for normative annex GCSE security | | | | +| 2014-09 | SP-65 | SP-140589 | 0178 | - | F | Resolving of editor's note under N.1 | 12.0.0 | 12.1.0 | GCSE_LTE | +| | | | 0179 | 1 | B | Integrity protection on MB2-U | | | | +| | | | 0180 | 1 | F | Solving editor's note on Diameter security mechanism | | | | +| | | | 0181 | 1 | B | GCSE MB2-U interface solution | | | | +| | | | 0182 | - | D | Clarification of key issue MB2 interface | | | | +| | | | 0184 | 1 | F | Solving editor's note on mutual authentication between GCS AS and BM-SC | | | | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140826 | 0188 | 1 | F | Clarification to MB2-U solution | 12.1.0 | 12.2.0 | | +| | | | 0187 | - | D | Formatting corrections to Annex N | 12.2.0 | 13.0.0 | | +| 2015-12 | SP-70 | SP-150729 | 0189 | 1 | F | Annex N alignment to 23.179 | 13.0.0 | 13.1.0 | MCPTT | + +| Change history | | | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|---------------------------------------------|--|--|---------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | | | New version | +| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160788 | 0190 | - | F | Including V2X AS as instantiation of GCS AS | | | 14.0.0 | +| 2017-06 | SA#76 | SP-170427 | 0191 | - | B | Security aspects of xMB reference point | | | 14.1.0 | +| 2017-09 | SA#77 | SP-170646 | 0193 | 1 | F | User-based authorization for xMB | | | 14.2.0 | +| 2018-06 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-15 version (MCC) | | | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | | | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33303/05eb72d372e4bf78e3d6a64949d77bcc_img.jpg 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Abbreviations ..... | 10 | +| 4 Overview of ProSe security ..... | 12 | +| 4.1 General ..... | 12 | +| 4.2 Reference points and Functional Entities..... | 12 | +| 5 Common security procedures..... | 12 | +| 5.1 General ..... | 12 | +| 5.2 Network domain security ..... | 12 | +| 5.2.1 General ..... | 12 | +| 5.2.2 Security requirements..... | 12 | +| 5.2.3 Security procedures ..... | 12 | +| 5.3 Security of UE to ProSe Function interface ..... | 13 | +| 5.3.1 General ..... | 13 | +| 5.3.2 Security requirements..... | 13 | +| 5.3.3 Security procedures ..... | 13 | +| 5.3.3.1 Security procedures for configuration transfer to the UICC..... | 13 | +| 5.3.3.2 Security procedures for data transfer to the UE..... | 13 | +| 5.4 Security of the PC2 reference point ..... | 14 | +| 5.4.1 Requirements on PC2 reference point..... | 14 | +| 5.4.2 Security procedures for PC2 reference point..... | 14 | +| 6 Security for ProSe features ..... | 15 | +| 6.1 ProSe direct discovery..... | 15 | +| 6.1.1 Overview of ProSe direct discovery in network coverage ..... | 15 | +| 6.1.2 Security requirements..... | 15 | +| 6.1.3 Security procedures ..... | 16 | +| 6.1.3.1 Interface between the UE and ProSe Function ..... | 16 | +| 6.1.3.2 Interfaces between network elements..... | 16 | +| 6.1.3.3 Integrity protection and validation of the transmitted code for open discovery ..... | 16 | +| 6.1.3.3.1 Open discovery security flows ..... | 16 | +| 6.1.3.4 Restricted discovery..... | 19 | +| 6.1.3.4.1 General ..... | 19 | +| 6.1.3.4.2 Security flows..... | 19 | +| 6.1.3.4.2.1 Model A security flows ..... | 19 | +| 6.1.3.4.2.2 Model B security flows ..... | 22 | +| 6.1.3.4.3 Protection of the discovery messages over the PC5 interface..... | 25 | +| 6.1.3.4.3.1 General ..... | 25 | +| 6.1.3.4.3.2 Message Processing in the sending UE..... | 26 | +| 6.1.3.4.3.3 Protected message processing in the receiving UE ..... | 26 | +| 6.1.3.4.3.4 Integrity protection description ..... | 27 | +| 6.1.3.4.3.5 Scrambling description..... | 27 | +| 6.1.3.4.3.6 Message-specific confidentiality description ..... | 27 | +| 6.2 Security for One-to-many ProSe direct communication..... | 28 | +| 6.2.1 Overview of One-to-many ProSe direct communication ..... | 28 | +| 6.2.2 Security requirements..... | 28 | +| 6.2.3 Bearer layer security mechanism..... | 29 | +| 6.2.3.1 Security keys and their lifetimes..... | 29 | +| 6.2.3.2 Identities..... | 29 | +| 6.2.3.3 Security flows ..... | 31 | +| 6.2.3.3.1 Overview ..... | 31 | +| 6.2.3.3.2 Messages between UE and ProSe Key Management Function..... | 33 | +| 6.2.3.3.2.1 General ..... | 33 | + +| | | | +|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| 6.2.3.3.2.2 | Key Request and Key Response messages..... | 33 | +| 6.2.3.3.2.3 | MIKEY messages..... | 35 | +| 6.2.3.3.2.3.1 | General..... | 35 | +| 6.2.3.3.2.3.2 | Creation of the MIKEY key delivery message..... | 35 | +| 6.2.3.3.2.3.3 | Processing the MIKEY key delivery message..... | 35 | +| 6.2.3.3.2.3.4 | MIKEY Verification message ..... | 36 | +| 6.2.3.4 | Protection of traffic between UE and ProSe Function..... | 36 | +| 6.2.3.5 | Protection of traffic between UE and ProSe Key Management Function ..... | 36 | +| 6.2.3.6 | Protection of traffic between UEs..... | 36 | +| 6.2.3.6.1 | Protection of data ..... | 36 | +| 6.2.3.6.2 | Key derivation data in PDCP header..... | 37 | +| 6.2.4 | Solution description for media security of one-to-many communications..... | 38 | +| 6.3 | EPC-level discovery of ProSe-enabled UEs ..... | 39 | +| 6.3.1 | Security for proximity request authentication and authorization ..... | 39 | +| 6.3.1.1 | General..... | 39 | +| 6.3.1.2 | Application Server-signed proximity request..... | 39 | +| 6.3.1.3 | Proximity request digital signature algorithms and key strength ..... | 40 | +| 6.3.1.4 | Proximity request hash input format..... | 42 | +| 6.3.1.5 | Verification key format..... | 42 | +| 6.3.1.6 | Profile for Application Server certificate..... | 42 | +| 6.3.2 | Protection of traffic between UE and ProSe Function ..... | 42 | +| 6.4 | Security for EPC support WLAN direct discovery and communication ..... | 43 | +| 6.5 | Security for One-to-one ProSe Direct communication ..... | 43 | +| 6.5.1 | General ..... | 43 | +| 6.5.2 | Security Requirements..... | 43 | +| 6.5.3 | Overview of One-to-one ProSe Direct communication ..... | 43 | +| 6.5.3.1 | Description of differet layers of keys and their identities..... | 43 | +| 6.5.3.2 | Security states ..... | 44 | +| 6.5.3.3 | High level overview of security establishment..... | 44 | +| 6.5.4 | Direct Authentication and Key Establishment ..... | 45 | +| 6.5.4.1 | General..... | 45 | +| 6.5.5 | Security Establishment procedures..... | 45 | +| 6.5.5.1 | General..... | 45 | +| 6.5.5.2 | Security establishment during connection set-up ..... | 45 | +| 6.5.5.3 | Rekeying security ..... | 46 | +| 6.5.6 | Protection of the one-to-one traffic ..... | 47 | +| 6.5.6.1 | General..... | 47 | +| 6.5.6.2 | Integrity protection ..... | 48 | +| 6.5.6.3 | Confidentiality protection..... | 48 | +| 6.5.6.4 | Security contents in the PCDP header ..... | 48 | +| 6.5.7 | ProSe one-to-one communication security using ECCSI and SAKKE..... | 49 | +| 6.5.7.1 | General..... | 49 | +| 6.5.7.2 | Key and their identities ..... | 49 | +| 6.5.7.3 | Security flows..... | 49 | +| 6.5.7.3.1 | Direct Connection Request ..... | 49 | +| 6.5.7.3.2 | Direct Rekeying Request..... | 50 | +| 6.6 | Security for ProSe Public Safety Discovery ..... | 51 | +| 6.6.1 | General ..... | 51 | +| 6.6.2 | Security Requirements..... | 51 | +| 6.6.3 | Overview of ProSe Public Safety Discovery..... | 51 | +| 6.6.3.1 | General..... | 51 | +| 6.6.3.2 | Key and their identities..... | 52 | +| 6.6.4 | Security flows..... | 52 | +| 6.6.4.1 | Overview..... | 52 | +| 6.6.4.2 | Messages between UE and ProSe Key Management Function ..... | 54 | +| 6.6.4.2.1 | General ..... | 54 | +| 6.6.4.2.2 | Key Request and Key Response messages ..... | 54 | +| 6.6.4.2.3 | MIKEY messages..... | 55 | +| 6.6.4.2.3.1 | General ..... | 55 | +| 6.6.5 | Protection of traffic between UE and ProSe Function ..... | 55 | +| 6.6.6 | Protection of traffic between UE and ProSe Key Management Function..... | 55 | +| 6.6.7 | Protection of discovery messages between the UEs..... | 56 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| 6.7 | Security for ProSe UE-to-network relays..... | 56 | +| 6.7.1 | General ..... | 56 | +| 6.7.2 | Security Requirements..... | 56 | +| 6.7.3 | Overview of ProSe UE-to-network relay security..... | 57 | +| 6.7.3.1 | General..... | 57 | +| 6.7.3.2 | Security flows ..... | 57 | +| 6.7.3.2.1 | Overview ..... | 57 | +| 6.7.3.2.1.1 | Remote UE attaching to a ProSe UE-to-network relay ..... | 57 | +| 6.7.3.2.1.2 | Re-synchronisation in GBA Push authentication..... | 59 | +| 6.7.3.2.1.3 | Rekeying procedures ..... | 60 | +| 6.7.3.2.2 | Messages between the Remote UE and ProSe Key Management Function ..... | 61 | +| 6.7.3.2.2.1 | General ..... | 61 | +| 6.7.3.2.2.2 | Key Request and Key Response messages..... | 61 | +| 6.7.3.2.3 | Messages between the Relay and ProSe Key Management Function..... | 62 | +| 6.7.3.2.3.1 | General ..... | 62 | +| 6.7.3.2.3.2 | Key Request and Key Response messages..... | 62 | +| 6.7.3.3 | Protection of traffic between Remote UE or Relay and ProSe Function..... | 63 | +| 6.7.3.4 | Protection of traffic between Remote UE or Relay and ProSe Key Management Function ..... | 63 | +| 6.7.3.5 | Protection of traffic between Remote UE and Relay..... | 64 | +| Annex A (normative): | Key derivation functions..... | 65 | +| A.1 | KDF interface and input parameter construction..... | 65 | +| A.1.1 | General ..... | 65 | +| A.1.2 | FC value allocations..... | 65 | +| A.2 | Calculation of the MIC value..... | 65 | +| A.3 | Calculation of PTK ..... | 65 | +| A.4 | Calculation of keys from PTK and $K_{D-sess}$ ..... | 66 | +| A.5 | Calculation of scrambling bits for discovery ..... | 66 | +| A.6 | Calculation of message-specific confidentiality keystream for discovery..... | 66 | +| A.7 | Calculation of $K_D$ for UE-to-network relays..... | 67 | +| A.8 | Calculation of discovery keys from PSDK..... | 67 | +| Annex B (informative): | Void..... | 69 | +| Annex C (informative): | Void..... | 70 | +| Annex D (informative): | Void..... | 71 | +| Annex E (Normative): | Key Request and Response messages ..... | 72 | +| E.1 | Introduction..... | 72 | +| E.2 | Transport protocol for messages between UE and ProSe Key Management Function ..... | 72 | +| E.3 | XML Schema ..... | 72 | +| E.4 | Semantics ..... | 75 | +| E.4.1 | General ..... | 75 | +| E.4.2 | Semantics of ..... | 76 | +| E.4.3 | Semantics of ..... | 77 | +| E.5 | General message format and information elements coding ..... | 79 | +| E.5.2.2 | Parameters in ProSe key management messages ..... | 79 | +| E.5.2.2.1 | Transaction ID ..... | 79 | +| E.5.2.2.2 | Supported Algorithm ..... | 79 | +| E.5.2.2.3 | Group ID ..... | 80 | +| E.5.2.2.4 | PGK ID ..... | 80 | +| E.5.2.2.5 | Error Code..... | 80 | +| E.5.2.2.6 | Group Member ID ..... | 81 | + +E.5.2.2.7 Algorithm Info ..... 81 + +E.5.2.2.8 PMK ID..... 81 + +E.5.2.2.9 PMK..... 81 + +E.5.2.2.10 PRUK ID..... 81 + +E.5.2.2.11 PRUK..... 81 + +E.5.2.2.12 IMSI..... 81 + +E.5.2.2.13 Relay Service Code..... 81 + +E.5.2.2.14 MSISDN ..... 82 + +E.5.2.2.15 Nonce 1 ..... 82 + +E.5.2.2.16 RAND ..... 82 + +E.5.2.2.17 AUTS..... 82 + +E.5.2.2.18 Key KD..... 82 + +E.5.2.2.19 KD Freshness parameter..... 82 + +E.5.2.2.20 GPI..... 82 + +E.5.2.2.21 Remote UE other identity ..... 82 + +E.5.2.2.22 Public Safety Discovery Security Capabilities ..... 82 + +E.5.2.2.23 Relay Service Code..... 82 + +E.5.2.2.24 PSDK ID ..... 83 + +E.5.2.2.25 Discovery Group ID..... 83 + +E.5.2.2.26 Protection Profile ..... 83 + +E.5.2.2.27 Encrypted bit mask ..... 83 + +E.5.2.2.28 Key Type ID ..... 83 + +E.5.2.2.29 Current time ..... 83 + +E.5.2.2.30 Max Offset..... 83 + +**Annex F (Informative): Network options for PC3 security..... 84** + +F.1 General..... 84 + +F.2 Prose Function using standalone BSF..... 84 + +F.3 BSF - Prose Function/NAF colocation ..... 84 + +F.4 Prose Function with bootstrapping entity ..... 85 + +**Annex G (Informative): Protection of Restricted Discovery and Public Safety Discovery messages ..... 86** + +G.1 General..... 86 + +G.2 Different combinations of security mechanisms..... 87 + +Annex H (informative): Change history..... 88 + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document specifies the security aspects of the Proximity Services (ProSe) features in EPS. Based on the common security procedures (clause 5) for + +- interfaces between network entities (using NDS), +- configuration of ProSe-enabled UEs, and +- data transfer between the ProSe Function and a ProSe enabled UE (PC3 interface) + +security for the following ProSe features is covered: + +- Open ProSe Direct Discovery in network coverage (clause 6.1); +- One-to-many ProSe direct communication for ProSe-enabled Public Safety UEs (clause 6.2); +- EPC-level Discovery of ProSe-enabled UEs (clause 6.3); +- EPC support for WLAN Direct Discovery and Communication (clause 6.4) ; +- One-to-one ProSe direct communication for ProSe-enabled Public Safety UEs (clause 6.5); +- Prose Public Safety Discovery (clause 6.6); +- Prose UE-to-network relays (clause 6.7); + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TS 23.303: "Proximity-based services (ProSe); Stage 2". +- [3] 3GPP TS 33.210: "3G security; Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security". +- [4] 3GPP TS 33.310: "Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)". +- [5] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA)". +- [6] ETSI TS 102 225: "Smart Cards; Secured packet structure for UICC based applications". +- [7] ETSI TS 102 226: "Smart cards; Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications". +- [8] 3GPP TS 31.115: "Secured packet structure for (Universal) Subscriber Identity Module (U)SIM Toolkit applications". +- [9] 3GPP TS 31.116: "Remote APDU Structure for (U)SIM Toolkit applications ". +- [10] Void. +- [11] Void. + +- [12] IETF RFC 6509: "MIKEY-SAKKE: Sakai-Kasahara Key Encryption in Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)". +- [13] IETF RFC 3830: "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing". +- [14] IETF RFC 6507: "Elliptic Curve-Based Certificateless Signatures for Identity-Based Encryption (ECCSI)". +- [15] NIST FIPS 186-4: "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)". +- [16] BSI TR-03111: "Technical Guideline TR-03111; Elliptic Curve Cryptography". +- [17] IETF RFC 5639: "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard; Curves and Curve Generation". +- [18] IETF RFC 3339: "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps". +- [19] IETF RFC 5280: "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile". +- [20] NIST FIPS 180-4: "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)". +- [21] 3GPP TS 33.401: "3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security architecture". +- [22] 3GPP TS 33.222: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Access to network application functions using Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security (HTTPS)". +- [23] Void. +- [24] IETF RFC 6508: "Sakai-Kasahara Key Encryption (SAKKE)". +- [25] Void. +- [26] Void. +- [27] Void. +- [28] Void. +- [29] Void. +- [30] Void. +- [31] IETF RFC 5116: "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption". +- [32] Void. +- [33] Void. +- [34] Void. +- [35] IETF RFC 4563: "The Key ID Information Type for the General Extension Payload in Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)". +- [36] W3C REC-xmlschema-2-20041028: "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes". +- [37] IETF RFC 2616: "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1". +- [38] 3GPP TS 33.223: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) Push function". +- [39] 3GPP TS 23.003: "Numbering, addressing and identification". +- [40] 3GPP TS 36.331: "Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Radio Resource Control (RRC); Protocol specification". +- [41] 3GPP TS 29.368: "Tsp interface protocol between the MTC Interworking Function (MTC-IWF) and Service Capability Server (SCS)". + +- [42] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3G Security; Security architecture". +- [43] 3GPP TS 33.179: "Security of Mission Critical Push-To-Talk (MCPTT)". + +# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]. + +**Application Level Container:** See 3GPP TS 23.303 [2] + +**Discovery Filter:** See [2] + +**Discovery Group ID:** See [2] + +**ProSe Application ID:** See [2] + +**ProSe Application Code:** See [2] + +**ProSe Application Mask:** See [2] + +**ProSe Direct Communication:** See [2] + +**ProSe Direct Discovery:** See [2] + +**ProSe-enabled non-Public Safety UE:** See [2] + +**ProSe-enabled Public Safety UE:** See [2] + +**ProSe-enabled UE:** See [2] + +**ProSe Query Code:** See [2] + +**ProSe Response Code:** See [2] + +**ProSe Restricted Code:** See [2] + +**Relay Service Code:** See [2] + +**Restricted ProSe Application User ID:** See [2] + +**Validity Timer:** See [2] + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]. + +| | | +|-------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| ADF | Accounting Data Forwarding | +| ALUID | Application Layer User ID | +| AS | Application Server | +| BSF | Bootstrapping Server Function | +| CA | Certificate Authority | +| CTF | Charging Trigger Function | +| DSA | Digital Signature Algorithm | +| ECCSI | Elliptic Curve-based Certificateless Signatures for Identity-based Encryption | +| ECDSA | Elliptic Curve DSA | +| EPUID | EPC Level User ID | + +| | | +|--------|--------------------------------------| +| GBA | Generic Bootstrapping Architecture | +| GMK | Group Master Key | +| GPS | Global Positioning System | +| GSK | Group Session Key | +| ID | Identity | +| KMS | Key Management System | +| LCID | Logical Channel Identifier | +| MIC | Message Integrity Code | +| MIKEY | Multimedia Internet Keying | +| NAF | Network Application Function | +| NITZ | Network Identity and Time Zone | +| NTP | Network Time Protocol | +| OTA | Over The Air | +| PEK | ProSe Encryption Key | +| PIK | ProSe Integrity Key | +| PFID | ProSe Function ID | +| PGK | ProSe Group Key | +| ProSe | Proximity-based Services | +| PSDK | Public Safety Discovery Key | +| PTK | ProSe Traffic Key | +| RPAUID | Restricted ProSe Application User ID | +| RSC | Relay Service Code | +| RTP | Real-Time Transport Protocol | +| RTCP | RTP Control Protocol | +| SAKKE | Sakai-Kasahara Key Encryption | +| SDP | Session Description Protocol | +| SEG | Security Gateway | +| SRTP | Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol | +| UID | User ID | +| UTC | Universal Time Coordinated | + +# 4 Overview of ProSe security + +## 4.1 General + +The overall architecture for ProSe is given in TS 23.303 [2]. ProSe includes several features that may be deployed independently of each other. For this reason, no overall security architecture is provided and each feature describes its own architecture. + +Although made of several different features, those features share many procedures, for example, both ProSe Direct Discovery and ProSe Direct Communication utilize the same procedure for service authorization (see TS 23.303 [2]). Security for these common procedures are described in clause 5 of the present document, while the overall security of the ProSe features is described in clause 6 of the present document (which refers back to clause 5 as necessary). + +## 4.2 Reference points and Functional Entities + +**PC8:** The reference point between the UE and the ProSe Key Management Function. PC8 relies on EPC user plane for transport (i.e. an "over IP" reference point). It is used to transport security material to UEs for ProSe one-to-many communications. + +# 5 Common security procedures + +## 5.1 General + +This clause contains a description of the security procedures that are used by more than one ProSe feature. + +## 5.2 Network domain security + +### 5.2.1 General + +ProSe uses several interfaces between network entities, e.g. PC4a between the ProSe Function and the HSS (see TS 23.303 [2]). This subclause describes the security for those interfaces. + +### 5.2.2 Security requirements + +The ProSe network entities shall be able to authenticate the source of the received data communications. + +The transmission of data between ProSe network entities shall be integrity protected. + +The transmission of data between ProSe network entities shall be confidentiality protected. + +The transmission of data between ProSe network entities shall be protected from replays. + +### 5.2.3 Security procedures + +For all interfaces between network elements, + +TS 33.210 [3] shall be applied to secure signalling messages on the reference points unless specified otherwise, and + +TS 33.310 [4] may be applied regarding the use of certificates with the security mechanisms of TS 33.210 [3] unless specified otherwise in the present document. + +**NOTE:** For the case of an interface between two entities in the same security domain, TS 33.210 [3] does not mandate the protection of the interface by means of IPsec. + +## 5.3 Security of UE to ProSe Function interface + +### 5.3.1 General + +The ProSe-enabled UEs have many interactions with the ProSe Function over the PC3 in the ProSe features described in TS 23.303 [2]. + +### 5.3.2 Security requirements + +Only the ProSe Function may provide configuration data impacting the ProSe-related network operations to the ProSe-enabled UE. 3rd parties shall not be allowed to provide such parameters. + +The ProSe-enabled UE and the ProSe Function shall mutually authenticate each other. + +The transmission of configuration data between the ProSe Function and the ProSe-enabled UE shall be integrity protected. + +The transmission of configuration data between the ProSe Function and the ProSe-enabled UE shall be confidentiality protected. + +The transmission of configuration data between the ProSe Function and the ProSe-enabled UE shall be protected from replays. + +The configuration data shall be stored in the UE in a protected way to prevent modification. + +Some configuration data may require to be stored in the UE in a protected way to prevent eavesdropping. + +The transmission of UE identity should be confidentiality protected on PC3 interface. + +### 5.3.3 Security procedures + +#### 5.3.3.1 Security procedures for configuration transfer to the UICC + +After deployment of the ProSe-enabled UE the configuration parameters stored in the UICC may need to be updated to reflect the changes in the configuration applied. + +In case that configuration data of ProSe-enabled UE are stored in the UICC, the UICC OTA mechanism (as specified in ETSI TS 102 225 [6] / TS 102 226 [7] and 3GPP TS 31.115 [8] / TS 31.116 [9]) shall be used to secure the transfer of the configuration data to be updated in the UICC. + +#### 5.3.3.2 Security procedures for data transfer to the UE + +This subclause describes procedures for protecting data transfer between UE and ProSe Function (called the network function in the below procedures). Between the UE and network function, + +for UE initiated messages, the procedures specified by clause 5.4 of TS 33.222 [22] shall be used with the following addition. The network function may optionally include an indication in the PSK-identity hint in the ServerKeyExchange message over the Ua interface to inform the UE of the FQDN of the BSF with which the UE shall run the bootstrapping procedure over the Ub interface as specified in TS 33.220[5] to provide the key material for establishment of the TLS tunnel. When performing such bootstrapping with the indicated BSF, the UE and BSF shall use the provided FQDN as the BSF Identity in all places, e.g. forming the B-TID. If there is no such indication, the UE shall perform the bootstrapping with the BSF at the address given in TS 23.003 [39]. + +The UE may also hold a B-TID, Ks and other associated material from bootstrapping runs with different BSFs simultaneously. + +A network function that implements the NAF functionality (cf Annex F.2 or Annex F.3) shall request USSs from the BSF when requesting the Ks\_(ext/int)\_NAF key and the network function shall check in the USS if the USIM is authorized to be used for ProSe services. If the authorization in the network function fails then the network function shall release the PSK-TLS connection with the UE. Otherwise (cf Annex F.4) the retrieval of authentication vectors and authorization of the ProSe UE shall be performed using the PC4a interface instead of the Zh interface. If the ProSe Function does not have a unused Authentication vector associated with the ProSe UE, the ProSe Function shall request one Authentication Vector from the HSS over the PC4a interface. ProSe Function shall always indicate to the UE, in the Ua message carrying the ServerKeyExchange of the PSK-TLS + +handshake, that the Ks\_NAF key shall be used to bootstrap the PSK-TLS security on the PC3 interface, by setting the psk\_identity\_hint field to a static string "3GPP-bootstrap". + +NOTE 1: Annex F describes the possible network options for PC3 security. The UE behaviour remains the same regardless of the network option used. + +NOTE 2: When the termination points of both the Ua and Ub interfaces reside in the network function then the implementation of the Zn interface is an operator decision. However, if the operator considers deploying a stand-alone BSF for use by the network function, then the operator should use the canonical BSF name from TS 23.003 and the Zn interface should be available in the network function already from the start although it would only be used internally to the network function until a stand-alone BSF was deployed. Otherwise, implementation changes to the network function will become necessary at the time of introducing the stand-alone BSF. + +For network initiated messages one of the following mechanisms shall be used: + +- If a PSK TLS connection has been established as a part of a pull message and is still available, the available PSK TLS session shall be used. +- Otherwise, PSK TLS with GBA push based shared key-based mutual authentication between the UE and the network function shall be used. GBA push is specified in TS 33.223 [38]. The network function (pushNAF) shall request USSs from the BSF when requesting a GPI, and the network function shall check in the USS if the USIM is authorized to be used for ProSe services. If the authorization in the network function fails then the network function shall refrain from establish PSK TLS with GBA push. + +NOTE 3: If a TLS connection is released, it can only be re-established by the client, i.e. UE, even though the TLS session including security association would be alive on both sides. TLS connection, in turn, is dependent on the underlying TCP connection. + +## 5.4 Security of the PC2 reference point + +### 5.4.1 Requirements on PC2 reference point + +When the the ProSe Application Server is controlled by a 3rd party, then the PC2 reference point shall fulfil the following requirements: + +Integrity protection, replay protection, confidentiality protection and privacy protection for communication between the ProSe Function and ProSe Application Server shall be supported; + +- mutual authentication between ProSe Function and ProSe Application Server shall be supported; +- integrity protection and replay protection shall be used; +- confidentiality protection should be used; +- privacy of the 3GPP user shall be provided (e.g. IMSI shall not be sent outside the 3GPP operator's domain); + +the ProSe Function in the 3GPP network shall be able to determine whether the ProSe Application Server is authorized to send request messages to the ProSe Function in the 3GPP network; + +### 5.4.2 Security procedures for PC2 reference point + +The security procedure defined for the Tsp interface in TS 29.368 [41] shall be supported and used for the PC2 reference point, where the ProSe Function takes the role as the MTC-IWF and the ProSe Application Server takes the role as the SCS. + +# 6 Security for ProSe features + +## 6.1 ProSe direct discovery + +### 6.1.1 Overview of ProSe direct discovery in network coverage + +The Direct Discovery in network coverage feature in clause 5.2 and 5.3 of TS 23.303 [2] describes several procedures applicable for open discovery, model A. + +They are the following: + +1. The **Service Authorization** procedure: The UE contacts the ProSe Function(s) in the HPLMN in order to obtain authorization to use direct discovery in the various PLMNs. This step also includes the ability of the HPLMN to revoke authorization via a push message. +2. The **Discovery Request** procedure: This allows an announcing or a monitoring UE to obtain the necessary configuration information to be able to announce a code or monitor for codes in a particular PLMN. Among other things, the configuration information includes the ProSe Application Codes to be announced or Discovery Filters to be monitored for. +3. The **Discovery** procedure: The ProSe App Code is announced by the announcing UE and received by the monitoring UE. +4. The **Match Report** procedure: This allows a ProSe App Code received by the monitoring UE to be checked and confirmed by the network. As part of this procedure the network provides the UE with the ProSe Application Id Name of that code and possibly the meta-data corresponding to that ProSe Application ID Name. + +The same procedures are also used for model A and B restricted discovery (see TS 23.303 [2] for more details). + +### 6.1.2 Security requirements + +Procedures 1, 2, and 4 include traffic between the UE and ProSe Function, between other network entities and over the PC2 reference point, therefore the requirements in clause 5.3.2, 5.2.2 and 5.4.1 apply to this case. + +In addition, for the overall open discovery procedure, the following security requirement applies: + +The system shall support a method to mitigate the replay and impersonation attacks for ProSe open discovery. + +For Restricted Discovery, the following requirements apply: + +ProSe Restricted discovery shall allow a UE to discover only other UEs which it is currently authorized to discover. That is, the identities announced on the air interface shall be able to be protected from being understood by currently unauthorized UEs. + +The possibility of tracking of UEs based on the content of their discovery messages over time should be minimized. + +The possibility of replay attacks on discovery messages sent over the air interface should be minimized. + +The system shall support the prevention of impersonation attacks. + +The system shall support integrity protection and confidentiality protection of Restricted Discovery ProSe Codes. + +NOTE 1: Any structure present in the ProSe Code before any security processing should be preserved to enable checking for matches. Preserving the structure needs to be done in a way that does not affect the security. + +NOTE 2: These requirements apply to both model A and model B restricted discovery. + +NOTE 3: The restricted discovery system requirements above indicate mandatory support of the various protection mechanisms. The Prose Function decides which of these mechanisms are applied to a specific discovery (i.e. it is not mandatory to apply all the protection mechanisms to each discovery). + +### 6.1.3 Security procedures + +#### 6.1.3.1 Interface between the UE and ProSe Function + +In order to protect the messages between the UE and ProSe Function over PC3, the UE shall support the procedures for the UE given in subclause 5.3.3.2 and the ProSe Function shall support the procedures for the network function given in subclause 5.3.3.2. In order to protect the messages between the UE and ProSe Function CTF (ADF) (Accounting Data Forwarding function block of the Charging Trigger Function) over PC3ch, the same communication security shall apply for PC3ch as is used for PC3. + +#### 6.1.3.2 Interfaces between network elements + +This uses the procedures described in clause 5.2.3 of the present document, except the PC2 interface which uses the procedures in clause 5.4.2. + +#### 6.1.3.3 Integrity protection and validation of the transmitted code for open discovery + +##### 6.1.3.3.1 Open discovery security flows + +The message flows apply when both the UEs are roaming or when one or both are in their HPLMN. + +Note that integrity protection via this Message Integrity Check (MIC) furthermore enables the ProSe Function to verify that the announcing UE was indeed authorized to announce this ProSe App Code at that time instance. A UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot is used to calculate the MIC and verify the MIC. To help ensure that the announcing and monitoring UEs end up with the same value of the UTC-based counter, the announcing UE includes the 4 least significant bits of its counter value in the discovery message, which the monitoring UE uses when setting the value of the UTC-based counter that is passed to the ProSe Function. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the integrity protection of the transmitted code. Lifelines: Announcing UE (A-UE), HPMLN of A-UE ProSe Function, VPMLN of A-UE ProSe Function, Monitoring UE (M-UE), HPMLN of M-UE ProSe Function. The sequence involves Discovery Request, Announce Auth, Discovery Response, Start announcing, Discovery Request, Monitor Req, Monitor Resp, Discovery Response, Receive announced code, Match Report, Check MIC, Match Report Ack, and Match Response messages.](8307f6b04df072c9332f9987e034272c_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant A-UE as Announcing UE (A-UE) + participant HPMLN_A as HPMLN of A-UE ProSe Function + participant VPMLN_A as VPMLN of A-UE ProSe Function + participant M-UE as Monitoring UE (M-UE) + participant HPMLN_M as HPMLN of M-UE ProSe Function + + Note left of A-UE: 5. Start announcing + A-UE->>HPMLN_A: 1. Discovery Request() + HPMLN_A->>VPMLN_A: 2. Announce Auth.() + VPMLN_A-->>HPMLN_A: 3. Announce Auth. Ack () + HPMLN_A-->>A-UE: 4. Discovery Response (Discovery Key, ProSe App Code, Current Time, Max Offset, Validity Timer) + Note right of A-UE: 10. Receive announced code + M-UE->>HPMLN_M: 6. Discovery Request() + HPMLN_M->>HPMLN_A: 7. Monitor Req. () + HPMLN_A-->>HPMLN_M: 8. Monitor Resp. () + HPMLN_M-->>M-UE: 9. Discovery Response (Current Time, Max Offset) + Note left of M-UE: 10. Receive announced code + M-UE->>HPMLN_M: 11. Match Report (Time, MIC) + HPMLN_M->>HPMLN_A: 12. Match Report (Time, MIC) + Note right of HPMLN_A: 13. Check MIC + HPMLN_A-->>HPMLN_M: 14. Match Report Ack. (Match Report refresh timer) + HPMLN_M-->>M-UE: 15. Match Response (Current Time, Match Report refresh timer) + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the integrity protection of the transmitted code. Lifelines: Announcing UE (A-UE), HPMLN of A-UE ProSe Function, VPMLN of A-UE ProSe Function, Monitoring UE (M-UE), HPMLN of M-UE ProSe Function. The sequence involves Discovery Request, Announce Auth, Discovery Response, Start announcing, Discovery Request, Monitor Req, Monitor Resp, Discovery Response, Receive announced code, Match Report, Check MIC, Match Report Ack, and Match Response messages. + +**Figure: 6.1.3.3.1-1: Integrity protection of the transmitted code** + +1. The Announcing UE sends a Discovery Request message containing the ProSe Application ID to the ProSe Function in its HPLMN in order to be allowed to announce a code on its serving PLMN (either VPLMN or HPLMN). +- 2./3. If the announcing UE wants to send announcements while in the VPLMN, it needs to be authorised from the VPLMN ProSe Function: The ProSe Function in the HPLMN requests authorization for sending announcements from the VPLMN ProSe Function by sending Announce Auth.() message. VPLMN ProSe Function responds with an Announce Auth. Ack () message, if authorization is granted. There are no changes to these messages for the purpose of protecting the transmitted code for open discovery. If the Announcing UE is not roaming, these steps do not take place. +4. The ProSe Function in HPLMN of the announcing UE returns the ProSe App Code that the announcing UE can announce and a 128-bit Discovery Key associated with it. The ProSe Function stores the Discovery Key with the ProSe App Code. In addition, the ProSe Function provides the UE with a CURRENT\_TIME parameter, which contains the current UTC-based time at the ProSe Function, a MAX\_OFFSET parameter, and a Validity Timer (see TS 23.303 [2]). The UE sets a clock which is used for ProSe authentication (i.e. ProSe clock) to the value of CURRENT\_TIME and the UE stores the MAX\_OFFSET parameter, overwriting any previous values. The announcing UE obtains a value for a UTC-based counter associated with a discovery slot based on UTC time. The counter is set to a value of UTC time in a granularity of seconds. The UE may obtain UTC time from any sources available, e.g. the RAN via SIB16, NITZ, NTP, GPS, via Ub interface (in GBA) (depending on which is available). + +NOTE 1: The UE may use unprotected time to obtain the UTC-based counter associated with a discovery slot. This means that the discovery message could be successfully replayed if a UE is fooled into using a time different to the current time. The MAX\_OFFSET parameter is used to limit the ability of an attacker to successfully replay discovery messages or obtain correctly MICed discovery message for later use. This is achieved by using MAX\_OFFSET as a maximum difference between the UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot and the ProSe clock held by the UE. + +NOTE 2: A discovery slot is the time at which an announcing UE sends the announcement. + +5. The UE starts announcing, if the difference between UTC-based counter provided by the system associated with the discovery slot and the UE's ProSe clock is not greater than the MAX\_OFFSET and if the Validity Timer has not expired (see TS 23.303 [2]). For each discovery slot it uses to announce, the announcing UE calculates a 32-bit Message Integrity Check (MIC) to include with the ProSe App Code in the discovery message. Four least significant bits of UTC-based counter are transmitted along with the discovery message. The MIC is calculated as described in sub clause A.2 using the Discovery Key and the UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot. +6. The Monitoring UE sends a Discovery Request message containing the ProSe Application ID to the ProSe Function in its HPLMN in order to get the Discovery Filters that it wants to listen for. +- 7/8. The ProSe Functions in the HPLMN of the monitoring UE and HPLMN of the announcing UEs exchange Monitor Req./Resp. messages. There are no changes to these messages for the purpose of protecting the transmitted code for open discovery. +9. The ProSe Function returns the Discovery Filter containing either the ProSe App Code(s), the ProSe App Mask(s) or both along with the CURRENT\_TIME and the MAX\_OFFSET parameters. The UE sets its ProSe clock to CURRENT\_TIME and stores the MAX\_OFFSET parameter, overwriting any previous values. The monitoring UE obtains a value for a UTC-based counter associated with a discovery slot based on UTC time. The counter is set to a value of UTC time in a granularity of seconds. The UE may obtain UTC time from any sources available, e.g. the RAN via SIB16, NITZ, NTP, GPS (depending on which is available). +10. The Monitoring UE listens for a discovery message that satisfies its Discovery Filter, if the difference between UTC-based counter associated with that discovery slot and UE's ProSe clock is not greater than the MAX\_OFFSET of the monitoring UE's ProSe clock. +11. On hearing such a discovery message, and if the UE has either not checked the MIC for the discovered ProSe App Code previously or has checked a MIC for the ProSe App Code and the associated Match Report refresh timer (see steps 14 and 15 for details of this timer) has expired, or as required based on the procedures specified in TS 23.303 [2], the Monitoring UE sends a Match Report message to the ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the monitoring UE. The Match Report contains the UTC-based counter value with four least significant bits equal to four least significant bits received along with discovery message and nearest to the monitoring UE's UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot where it heard the announcement, and other discovery message parameters including the ProSe App Code and MIC. +12. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the monitoring UE passes the discovery message parameters including the ProSe App Code and MIC and associated counter parameter to the ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the announcing UE in the Match Report message. +13. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the announcing UE shall check the MIC is valid. The relevant Discovery Key is found using the ProSe App Code. +14. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the announcing UE shall acknowledge a successful check of the MIC to the ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the monitoring UE in the Match Report Ack message. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the announcing UE shall include a Match Report refresh timer in the Match Report Ack message. The Match Report refresh timer indicates how long the UE will wait before sending a new Match Report for the ProSe App Code. +15. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the monitoring UE returns an acknowledgement that the integrity checked passed to the Monitoring UE. The ProSe Function returns the parameter ProSe Application ID to the UE. It also provides the CURRENT\_TIME parameter, by which the UE (re)sets its ProSe clock. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the monitoring UE may optionally modify the received Match Report refresh timer based on local policy and then shall include the Match Report refresh timer in the message to the Monitoring UE.. + +#### 6.1.3.4 Restricted discovery + +##### 6.1.3.4.1 General + +The security for both models of restricted discovery is similar to that of open discovery described in subclause 6.1.3.3. Both models also use a UTC-based counter (see step 9 in clause 6.1.3.3) to provide freshness for the protection of the restricted discovery message on the PC5 interface. The parameters CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET are also provided to the UE from the ProSe Function in its HPLMN to ensure that the obtained UTC-based counter is sufficiently close to real time to protect against replays. + +The major differences are that restricted discovery requires confidentiality protection of the discovery messages (e.g. to ensure a UE is not discovered by unauthorized parties or tracked due to constantly sending the same ProSe Restricted/Response Code in the clear) and that the MIC checking may be performed by the receiving UE (if allowed by the ProSe Function). + +The security parameter needed by a sending UE to protect a discovery message (i.e., in model A the announcing UE and in model B the Discoverer UE sending the ProSe Query Code and the Discoveree UE sending the ProSe Response Code) are provided in the Code-Sending Security Parameters. Similarly the security parameters needed by a UE receiving a discovery message (i.e., in model A the monitoring UE and in model B the Discoverer UE receiving a ProSe Response Code and the Discoveree receiving a ProSe Query Code) are provided in the Code-Receiving Security Parameters. + +##### 6.1.3.4.2 Security flows + +###### 6.1.3.4.2.1 Model A security flows + +This subclause contains the message flows for the protection of a model A restricted discovery. The flows show how a particular discovery is protected. The exact details of the actual protection to be applied to a discovery message are given in subclause 6.1.3.4.3. The message flows apply when both the UEs are roaming or when one or both are in their HPLMN. If either of the UEs is not roaming some steps in the flows are omitted as detailed in the flows. + +The flows are broken down into 4 boxed stages to better relate to the procedures given in TS 23.303 [2]. The first, second and fourth stage correspond to subclause 5.3.3.4A, 5.3.3.5A and 5.3.4.2A of TS 23.303 [2] respectively. The interaction between the ProSe Function(s) and HSS is omitted for simplicity. + +![Sequence diagram for securing model A restricted discovery. Lifelines: Monitoring UE (M-UE), Announcing UE (A-UE), HPLMN of M-UE ProSe Function, VPLMN of A-UE ProSe Function, HPLMN of A-UE ProSe Function, ProSe App Server. The diagram shows four main procedures: 1. Announcing UE performs Discovery Request (steps 1-4); 2. Monitoring UE performs Discovery Request (steps 5-10); 3. Sending and receiving code on the PC5 interface (steps 11-12); 4. Monitoring UE performs Match Report procedure for MIC checking if required (steps 13-16).](81a4cbf0b3c4cbc065efdf8f800dadde_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant Monitoring UE (M-UE) + participant Announcing UE (A-UE) + participant HPLMN of M-UE ProSe Function + participant VPLMN of A-UE ProSe Function + participant HPLMN of A-UE ProSe Function + participant ProSe App Server + + Note right of Announcing UE: Announcing UE performs Discovery Request procedure + Announcing UE->>HPLMN of A-UE ProSe Function: 1. Discovery Req () + HPLMN of A-UE ProSe Function->>ProSe App Server: 2. Auth Req / Resp () + ProSe App Server->>VPLMN of A-UE ProSe Function: 3. Announce Auth / Auth Ack () + VPLMN of A-UE ProSe Function->>Announcing UE: 4. Discovery Rsp (Code-Send-SecParams, CURRENT_TIME, MAX_OFFSET) + + Note right of Monitoring UE: Monitoring UE performs Discovery Request procedure + Monitoring UE->>HPLMN of M-UE ProSe Function: 5. Discovery Req () + HPLMN of M-UE ProSe Function->>ProSe App Server: 6. Auth Req / Resp () + ProSe App Server->>HPLMN of A-UE ProSe Function: 7. Monitor Req () + HPLMN of A-UE ProSe Function->>ProSe App Server: 8. Auth Req / Resp () + ProSe App Server->>HPLMN of M-UE ProSe Function: 9. Monitor Rsp (Code-Rcv-SecParams, DUK) + HPLMN of M-UE ProSe Function->>Monitoring UE: 10. Discovery Rsp (Code-Rcv-SecParams, CURRENT_TIME, MAX_OFFSET) + + Note right of Announcing UE: Sending and receiving code on the PC5 interface + Announcing UE->>Announcing UE: 11. Announce Code + Monitoring UE->>Monitoring UE: 12. Receive code + + Note right of Monitoring UE: Monitoring UE performs Match Report procedure for MIC checking if required + Monitoring UE->>HPLMN of M-UE ProSe Function: 13. Match Report (Time, MIC) + HPLMN of M-UE ProSe Function->>ProSe App Server: 14. Optional Auth Request / Response () + ProSe App Server->>Monitoring UE: 15. Match Report Ack (Match Report refresh timer) + Monitoring UE->>HPLMN of A-UE ProSe Function: 16. Optional Monitor Report Info () + +``` + +Sequence diagram for securing model A restricted discovery. Lifelines: Monitoring UE (M-UE), Announcing UE (A-UE), HPLMN of M-UE ProSe Function, VPLMN of A-UE ProSe Function, HPLMN of A-UE ProSe Function, ProSe App Server. The diagram shows four main procedures: 1. Announcing UE performs Discovery Request (steps 1-4); 2. Monitoring UE performs Discovery Request (steps 5-10); 3. Sending and receiving code on the PC5 interface (steps 11-12); 4. Monitoring UE performs Match Report procedure for MIC checking if required (steps 13-16). + +**Figure 6.1.3.4.2.1-1: Flows for securing model A restricted discovery** + +Steps 1-4 refer to an Announcing UE. + +1. Announcing UE sends a Discovery Request message containing the RPAUID to the ProSe Function in its HPLMN in order to get the ProSe Code to announce and to get the associated security material. The command indicates that this is for announce (Model A) operation, i.e. for an Announcing UE. +2. The ProSe Function may check for the announce authorization with the ProSe Application Server depending on ProSe Function configuration. +3. The ProSe Functions in the HPLMN and VPLMN of the Announcing UE exchange Announce Auth. messages. If the Announcing UE is not roaming, these steps do not take place. + +4. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE returns the ProSe Code and the corresponding Code-Sending Security Parameters, along with the CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET parameters. The Code-Sending Security Parameters provide the necessary information for the Announcing UE to protect the transmission of the ProSe Code (see subclause 6.1.3.4.3.2) and are stored with the ProSe Code. The Announcing UE takes the same actions with CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET as described for the Announcing UE in step 4 of subclause 6.1.3.3.1 of the current specification. + +Steps 5-10 refer to a Monitoring UE + +5. The Monitoring UE sends a Discovery Request message containing the RPAUID to the ProSe Function in its HPLMN in order to be allowed to monitor for one or more Restricted ProSe Application IDs. +6. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE sends an authorization request to the ProSe Application Server. If, based on the permission settings, the RPAUID is allowed to discover at least one of the Target RPAUIDs contained in the Application Level Container, the ProSe Application Server returns an authorization response. +7. If the Discovery Request is authorized, and the PLMN ID in the Target RPAUID indicates a different PLMN, the ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE contacts the indicated PLMN's ProSe Function i.e. the ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE, by sending a Monitor Request message. +8. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE may exchange authorization messages with the ProSe Application Server. +9. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE responds to the ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE with a Monitor Response message including the ProSe Code, the corresponding Code-Receiving Security Parameters (see subclause 6.1.3.4.3.3) and an optional Discovery User Integrity Key (DUIK). The Code-Receiving Security Parameters provide the information needed by the Monitoring UE to undo the protection applied by the announcing UE. The DUIK shall be included as a separate parameter if the Code-Receiving Security Parameters indicate that the Monitoring UE shall use Match Reports for MIC checking. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE stores the ProSe Code and the Discovery User Integrity Key (if it received one outside of the Code-Receiving Security Parameters). + +NOTE 1: There are two configurations possible for integrity checking, namely, MIC checked by the ProSe Function, and MIC checked at the UE side. Which of the configuration is used is decided by the ProSe Function that assigned the ProSe Code being monitored, and signalled to the Monitoring UE in the Code-Receiving Security Parameters. + +10. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE returns the Discovery Filter and the Code-Receiving Security Parameters, along with the CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET parameters. The Monitoring UE takes the same actions with CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET as described for the Monitoring UE in step 9 of subclause 6.1.3.3.1 of the current specification. The UE stores the Discovery Filter and Code-Receiving Security Parameters. + +Steps 11 and 12 occur over PC5. + +11. The UE starts announcing, if the UTC-based counter provided by the system associated with the discovery slot is within the MAX\_OFFSET of the announcing UE's ProSe clock and if the Validity Timer has not expired. The UE forms the discovery message and protects it as described in 6.1.3.4.3.2. The four least significant bits of UTC-based counter are transmitted along with the protected discovery message. + +12. The Monitoring UE listens for a discovery message that satisfies its Discovery Filter, if the UTC-based counter associated with that discovery slot is within the MAX\_OFFSET of the monitoring UE's ProSe clock. In order to find such a matching message, it processes the message as described in 6.1.3.4.3.3. If the Monitoring UE was not asked to send Match Reports for MIC checking, it stops at this step from a security perspective. Otherwise it proceeds to step 13. + +NOTE 2: The UE checking the integrity of the discovery message on its own does not prevent the UE from sending a Match Report due to requirements in TS 23. 303 [2]. If such a Match Report is sent, then there is no security functionality involved. + +Steps 13-16 refer to a Monitoring UE that has encountered a match. + +13. If the UE has either not had the ProSe Function check the MIC for the discovered ProSe Code previously or the ProSe Function has checked a MIC for the ProSe Code and the associated Match Report refresh timer (see step 15 for details of this timer) has expired, then the Monitoring UE sends a Match Report message to the ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the monitoring UE. The Match Report contains the UTC-based counter value with four least significant bits equal to four least significant bits received along with discovery message and nearest to the monitoring UE's UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot where it heard the announcement, and other discovery message parameters including the ProSe Code and MIC. The ProSe Function checks the MIC. +14. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE may exchange an Auth Req/Auth Resp with the ProSe App Server to ensure that Monitoring UE is authorised to discover the Announcing UE. +15. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the monitoring UE returns to the Monitoring UE an acknowledgement that the integrity check passed. It also provides the CURRENT\_TIME parameter, by which the UE (re)sets its ProSe clock. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE shall include the Match Report refresh timer in the message to the Monitoring UE. The Match Report refresh timer indicates how long the UE will wait before sending a new Match Report for the ProSe Code. +16. The Prose Function in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE may send a Match Report Info message to the ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE. + +###### 6.1.3.4.2.2 Model B security flows + +This subclause contains the message flows for the protection of a model B restricted discovery. The flows show how a particular discovery is protected. The exact details of the actual protection to be applied to a discovery message are given in subclause 6.1.3.4.3. The message flows apply when both the UEs are roaming or when one or both are in their HPLMN. If either of the UEs is not roaming some steps in the flows are omitted as detailed in the flows. + +The flows are broken down into 4 boxed stages to better to relate to the procedures given in TS 23.303 [2]. The first, second and fourth stage correspond to subclause 5.3.3A.3, 5.3.3A.5 and 5.3.4A.2 of TS 23.303 [2] respectively. The interaction between the ProSe Function(s) and HSS is omitted for simplicity. + +![Sequence diagram for securing model B restricted discovery. Lifelines: Discoverer UE, Discoveree UE, HPLMN of Discoverer ProSe Function, VPLMN of Discoveree ProSe Function, HPLMN of Discoveree ProSe Function, ProSe App Server. The diagram shows four procedures: 1. Discoveree UE performs Discovery Request procedure (steps 1-4); 2. Discoverer UE performs Discovery Request procedure (steps 5-11); 3. Sending and receiving code on the PC5 interface (steps 12-14); 4. Discoverer UE performs Match Report procedure for MIC checking if required (steps 15-18).](eb03559a4d92ea9ebd63ea9be663c50a_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant Discoverer UE + participant Discoveree UE + participant HPLMN of Discoverer ProSe Function + participant VPLMN of Discoveree ProSe Function + participant HPLMN of Discoveree ProSe Function + participant ProSe App Server + + Note right of Discoveree UE: Discoveree UE performs Discovery Request procedure + Discoveree UE->>HPLMN of Discoveree ProSe Function: 1. Discovery Req () + HPLMN of Discoveree ProSe Function->>ProSe App Server: 2. Auth Req / Resp () + ProSe App Server->>HPLMN of Discoveree ProSe Function: 3. Announce Auth / Auth Ack () + HPLMN of Discoveree ProSe Function->>Discoveree UE: 4. Discovery Rsp (Code-Send-SecParams, Code-Rcv-SecParams, CURRENT_TIME, MAX_OFFSET) + + Note right of Discoverer UE: Discoverer UE performs Discovery Request procedure + Discoverer UE->>HPLMN of Discoverer ProSe Function: 5. Discovery Req () + HPLMN of Discoverer ProSe Function->>ProSe App Server: 6. Auth Req / Resp () + ProSe App Server->>HPLMN of Discoverer ProSe Function: 7. Discovery Req () + HPLMN of Discoverer ProSe Function->>HPLMN of Discoveree ProSe Function: 8. Auth Req / Resp () + HPLMN of Discoveree ProSe Function->>HPLMN of Discoverer ProSe Function: 9. Discovery Rsp (Code-Send-SecParams, Code-Rcv-SecParams, DUIK) + HPLMN of Discoverer ProSe Function->>VPLMN of Discoveree ProSe Function: 10. Announce Auth / Auth Ack () + VPLMN of Discoveree ProSe Function->>Discoverer UE: 11. Discovery Rsp (Code-Send-SecParams, Code-Rcv-SecParams, CURRENT_TIME, MAX_OFFSET) + + Note right of Discoverer UE: Sending and receiving code on the PC5 interface + Discoverer UE->>Discoveree UE: 12. Send Query Code + Discoveree UE->>Discoverer UE: 13a. Process Query code + Discoverer UE->>Discoveree UE: 13b. Send Response Code + Discoveree UE->>Discoverer UE: 14. Process Response code + + Note right of Discoverer UE: Discoverer UE performs Match Report procedure for MIC checking if required + Discoverer UE->>HPLMN of Discoverer ProSe Function: 15. Match Report (Time, MIC) + HPLMN of Discoverer ProSe Function->>ProSe App Server: 16. Optional Auth Request / Response () + ProSe App Server->>Discoverer UE: 17. Match Report Ack (Match Report refresh timer) + Discoverer UE->>HPLMN of Discoverer ProSe Function: 18. Optional Monitor Report Info () + +``` + +Sequence diagram for securing model B restricted discovery. Lifelines: Discoverer UE, Discoveree UE, HPLMN of Discoverer ProSe Function, VPLMN of Discoveree ProSe Function, HPLMN of Discoveree ProSe Function, ProSe App Server. The diagram shows four procedures: 1. Discoveree UE performs Discovery Request procedure (steps 1-4); 2. Discoverer UE performs Discovery Request procedure (steps 5-11); 3. Sending and receiving code on the PC5 interface (steps 12-14); 4. Discoverer UE performs Match Report procedure for MIC checking if required (steps 15-18). + +**Figure 6.1.3.4.2.2-1: Flows for securing model B restricted discovery** + +Steps 1-4 refer to a Discoveree UE. + +1. Discoveree UE sends a Discovery Request message containing the RPAUID to the ProSe Function in its HPLMN in order to get the ProSe Code to announce and associated security material. The command indicates that this is for ProSe Response (Model B) operation, i.e. for a Discoveree UE. +2. The ProSe Function may check for the announce authorization with the ProSe Application Server depending on ProSe Function configuration. +3. The ProSe Functions in the HPLMN and VPLMN of the Discoveree UE exchange Announce Auth. messages. If the Discoveree UE is not roaming, these steps do not take place. + +4. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Discoveree UE returns the ProSe Response Code and the Code-Sending Security Parameters, Discovery Query Filter(s) and their Code-Receiving Security Parameters corresponding to each discovery filter along with the CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET parameters. The Code-Sending Security Parameters provide the necessary information for the Discoveree UE to protect the transmission of the ProSe Response Code (see subclause 6.1.3.4.3.2) and are stored with the ProSe Response Code. The Code-Receiving Security Parameters provide the information needed by the Discoveree UE to undo the protection applied to the ProSe Query Code by the Discoverer UE (see subclause 6.1.3.4.3.3). The Code-Receiving Security Parameters shall indicate a Match Report will not be used for MIC checking. The UE stores each Discovery Filter with its associated Code-Receiving Security Parameters. The Discoveree UE takes the same actions with CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET as described for the Announcing UE in step 4 of subclause 6.1.3.3.1 of the current specification. + +Steps 5-10 refer to a Discoverer UE + +5. The Discoverer UE sends a Discovery Request message containing the RPAUID to the ProSe Function in its HPLMN in order to be allowed to discover one or more Restricted ProSe Application IDs. +6. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE sends an authorization request to the ProSe Application Server. If, based on the permission settings, the RPAUID is allowed to discover at least one of the Target RPAUIDs contained in the Application Level Container, the ProSe Application Server returns an authorization response. +7. If the Discovery Request is authorized, and the PLMN ID in the Target RPAUID indicates a different PLMN, the ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE contacts the indicated PLMN's ProSe Function i.e. the ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Discoveree UE, by sending a Discovery Request message. +8. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Discoveree UE may exchange authorization messages with the ProSe Application Server. +9. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Discoveree UE responds to the ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE with a Discovery Response message including the ProSe Query Code(s) and their associated Code-Sending Security Parameters, ProSe Response Code and its associated Code-Receiving Security Parameters (see subclause 6.1.3.4.3.3), and an optional Discovery User Integrity Key (DUIK) for the ProSe Response Code. The Code-Receiving Security Parameters provide the information needed by the Discoverer UE to undo the protection applied by the Discoveree UE. The DUIK shall be included as a separate parameter if the Code-Receiving Security Parameters indicate that the Discoverer UE shall use Match Reports for MIC checking. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE stores the ProSe Response Code and the Discovery User Integrity Key (if it received one outside of the Code-Receiving Security Parameters). The Code-Sending Security Parameters provide the information needed by the Discoverer UE to protect the ProSe Query Code (see subclause 6.1.3.4.3.2) + +NOTE 1: There are two configurations possible for integrity checking, namely, MIC checked by the ProSe Function, and MIC checked at the UE side; this is decided by the ProSe Function that assigned the ProSe Code being monitored, and signalled to the Monitoring UE in the Code-Receiving Security Parameters. + +10. The ProSe Functions in the HPLMN and VPLMN of the Discoverer UE exchange Announce Auth. messages. If the Discoverer UE is not roaming, these steps do not take place. +11. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE returns the Discovery Response Filter and the Code-Receiving Security Parameters, the ProSe Query Code and the Code-Sending Security Parameters along with the CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET parameters. The Discoverer UE takes the same actions with CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET as described for the Monitoring UE in step 9 of subclause 6.1.3.3.1 of the current specification. The UE stores the Discovery Response Filter and its Code-Receiving Security Parameters and the ProSe Query Code and its Code-Sending Security Parameters. + +Steps 12 to 14 occur over PC5. + +12. The Discoverer UE sends the ProSe Query Code and also listens for a response message, if the UTC-based counter provided by the system associated with the discovery slot is within the MAX\_OFFSET of the announcing UE's ProSe clock and if the Validity Timer has not expired. The Discoverer UE forms the discovery + +message and protects it as described in 6.1.3.4.3.2. The four least significant bits of UTC-based counter are transmitted along with the protected discovery message. + +- 13a. The Discoveree UE listens for a discovery message that satisfies its Discovery Filter, if the UTC-based counter associated with that discovery slot is within the MAX\_OFFSET of the Discoverer UE's ProSe clock. In order to find such a matching message, it processes the message as described in 6.1.3.4.3.3. + +NOTE 1a: Match Reports are not used for the MIC checking of ProSe Query Codes. + +- 13b. The Discoveree sends the ProSe Response Code associated with the discovered ProSe Query Code. The Discoveree UE forms the discovery message and protects it as described in 6.1.3.4.3.2. The four least significant bits of UTC-based counter are transmitted along with the protected discovery message. + +14. The Discoverer UE listens for a discovery message that satisfies its Discovery Filter. In order to find such a matching message, it processes the message as described in 6.1.3.4.3.3. If the Discoverer UE was not asked to send Match Reports for MIC checking, it stops at this step from a security perspective. Otherwise it proceeds to step 15. + +NOTE 2: The UE checking the integrity of the discovery message on its own does not prevent the UE from sending a Match Report due to requirements in TS 23. 303 [2]. If such a Match Report is sent, then there is no security functionality involved. + +Steps 15-18 refer to a Discoverer UE that has encountered a match. + +15. If the Discoverer UE has either not had the ProSe Function check the MIC for the discovered ProSe Response Code previously or the ProSe Function has checked a MIC for the ProSe Response Code and the associated Match Report refresh timer (see step 17 for details of this timer) has expired, then the Discoverer UE sends a Match Report message to the ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE. The Match Report contains the UTC-based counter value with four least significant bits equal to four least significant bits received along with discovery message and nearest to the monitoring UE's UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot where it heard the announcement, and other discovery message parameters including the ProSe Response Code and MIC. The ProSe Function checks the MIC. +16. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE may exchange an Auth Req/Auth Resp with the ProSe App Server to ensure that Discoverer UE is authorised to discover the Discoveree UE. +17. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE returns to the Discoverer UE an acknowledgement that the integrity check passed. It also provides the CURRENT\_TIME parameter, by which the UE (re)sets its ProSe clock. The ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE shall include the Match Report refresh timer in the message to the Discoverer UE. The Match Report refresh timer indicates how long the UE will wait before sending a new Match Report for the ProSe Response Code. +18. The Prose Function in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE may send a Match Report Info message to the ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Discoveree UE. + +##### 6.1.3.4.3 Protection of the discovery messages over the PC5 interface + +###### 6.1.3.4.3.1 General + +There are three general types of security that are used to protect the restricted discovery messages as they are transferred over the PC5 interface between the UEs. + +Firstly, integrity protection is provided by appending a MIC as in Open Discovery (see subclauses 6.1.3.3.1). The MIC is calculated in the sending UE using a received Discovery User Integrity Key (DUIK) and may either be checked at the receiving UE using the supplied DUIK or at the ProSe Function using the DUIK. + +Secondly, scrambling protection, which ensures that there is no relationship between the discovery messages sent by a particular UE, i.e. to prevent tracking of a UE over time. A scrambling keystream is calculated from the Discovery User Scrambling Key (DUSK) and the UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot (see 6.1.3.4.3.5 for more details on the calculation). + +Finally, message-specific confidentiality, which provides confidentiality protection for part of the discovery message. This is used either when several UEs use the same DUSK or if it is desired to obfuscate part of the discovery message + +from some of the UEs that are allowed to discover the UE. A keystream is calculated from the Discovery User Confidentiality Key (DUCK), the content of the message and the UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot (see 6.1.3.4.3.6 for more details on the calculation). + +The security procedures that are applied at the sending and receiving UE are controlled by the ProSe Function by sending the Code-Sending Security Parameters and/or Code-Receiving Security Parameters to the appropriate UE (i.e. the UE shall support all of integrity protection, scrambling and message specific confidentiality) To achieve integrity protection for a ProSe restricted discovery message, either a DUSK or a DUIK needs to be provided. When a DUCK is used to apply message specific confidentiality, a DUIK is required for integrity protection as more than one message is being protected. Examples of combinations of Discovery User Keys according to use case type is provided in Annex G.. + +At the receiving side, the scrambling protection must be undone before any matching can be attempted. Given that the operation of undoing message-specific confidentiality is computationally intense, the matching operation that precedes it should have a very minimal chance of a false positive. To this end, the ProSe Function should ensure the number of bits in a discovery message that can be matched after any scrambling has been undone is at least 16 (leading to a false positive chance of 1 in 65,536 or less). + +###### 6.1.3.4.3.2 Message Processing in the sending UE + +The UE sending a discovery message receives the Code-Sending Security Parameters from the ProSe Function (as described in the security flows) to indicate how to protect the message. The Code-Sending Security Parameters may contain a DUSK and may contain a DUIK. The Code-Sending Security Parameters may contain both, a DUCK and an Encrypted\_bits\_mask. + +The UE sending a discovery message does the following steps: + +1. Form Discovery Message (e.g. add Suffix if only Prefix was allocated). +2. Calculate MIC if a DUIK was provided, otherwise set MIC to all zeros +3. Add message-specific confidentiality to the message if DUCK was received +4. Append MIC to the output of step 3. +5. Add scrambling over the output of step 4 if the DUSK was received. + +###### 6.1.3.4.3.3 Protected message processing in the receiving UE + +The Code-Receiving Security Parameters received from the ProSe Function (as described in the security flows) are used to indicate to a UE how a received discovery message is protected. The Code-Receiving Security Parameters may contain a DUSK, may contain either a DUIK or an indication whether to use Match Reports for MIC checking. The Match Reports option is not allowed for ProSe Query Codes. The Code-Receiving Security Parameters may also contain both a DUCK and a corresponding Encrypted\_bits\_mask. + +The UE receiving a Discovery Message does the following steps: + +1. Undo scrambling (as in step 5 of sending UE) if a DUSK was received. +2. Check for match on the bits of the message that are not encrypted using message specific confidentiality. If no match, then abort. + +NOTE 1: Some bits that the discovery filter indicates to be matched, may be encrypted by message-specific confidentiality at this stage. The UE can look for a match on the other bits after this step to minimise the amount of processing performed before finding a match. + +3. Undo message-specific confidentiality if a DUCK was received (as in step 3 of sending UE) +4. Check for full match if only a match on non-encrypted bits was found in 3. If no match then abort +5. If a MIC check is required, check MIC directly (if a DUIK was given in the Discovery Filter Security Parameters) or via Match Report if indicated in the Discovery Filter Security Parameters. + +NOTE 2: Requiring a checking of the MIC (at either the UE or via Match Reports) may only be omitted when the scrambling protection provides integrity protection of the bits of the message that are of interest to the receiving UE. Such integrity protection is only provided when (1) a given DUSK protects exactly one ProSe Code that the receiver matches, or (2) when message-specific confidentiality is applied to a ProSe Code but the receiving UE is not provided with the DUSK to remove the message-specific confidentiality and all the non-encrypted bits take a fixed value that the receiver matches. In the first case, if an attacker changes any bit of the message, the match will fail. In the second case, if an attacker changes a non-encrypted bit the match will fail and changing an encrypted does nothing as the receiving UE ignores these bits anyway. In latter case, the receiving UE could not successfully check the MIC. + +###### 6.1.3.4.3.4 Integrity protection description + +The sending UE does the following + +1. Compute output bitsequence from DUIK, Message, and UTC-based counter passed through a MIC calculation function in Annex A.2. +2. Take the 4 bytes of the output of the function and set that as the value of the MIC for this Message. + +The receiving UE or ProSe Function does the exact same steps but also does a comparison between the computed MIC and the received MIC. + +###### 6.1.3.4.3.5 Scrambling description + +The sending UE does the following: + +1. Set the 4 LSBs of the UTC-based counter equal zero, for the purpose of this scrambling calculation only. +2. Compute the time-hash-bitsequence from DUSK and the UTC-based counter(modified as in step 1), passed through a keyed hash function. +3. XOR the time-hash-bitsequence with the entire Discovery Message (including MIC) being processed. + +The receiving UE does the exact same steps except applied to the received message being processed. + +###### 6.1.3.4.3.6 Message-specific confidentiality description + +The sending UE does the following: + +1. Compute $Key\_calc\_mask = (Encrypted\_bits\_mask \text{ XOR } 0xFF..FF) \parallel 0xFFFFFFFF$ +2. Calculate $Keystream = \text{KDF}(\text{DUCK}, \text{UTC-based counter}, (Key\_calc\_mask \text{ AND } (\text{Message} \parallel \text{MIC})))$ . +3. XOR ( $Keystream$ AND $Encrypted\_bits\_mask$ ) into the Message. + +The receiving UE does the exact same steps except applied to the received Discovery Message being processed. + +## 6.2 Security for One-to-many ProSe direct communication + +### 6.2.1 Overview of One-to-many ProSe direct communication + +The One-to-many ProSe direct communication consists of the following procedures based on TS 23.303 [2]: + +1. One-to-many ProSe Direct communication transmission; +2. One-to-many ProSe Direct communication reception. + +The functionality in this clause may only be supported by ProSe-enabled Public Safety UEs. + +Security for one-to-many ProSe direct communication consists of bearer level security mechanism (specified in subclause 6.2.3). + +### 6.2.2 Security requirements + +The requirements in clause 5.3.2 apply for the signalling between the UE and ProSe Function. + +For the distribution of the keys, the following requirements apply: + +- The shared keys and session keys shall be protected in integrity and confidentiality during their distribution. +- Only authorized Public Safety ProSe-enabled UEs shall receive the shared keys. +- It shall be possible for the Public Safety ProSe-enabled UE to authenticate the network entity distributing the shared keys. +- The Public Safety ProSe-enabled UE should support authentication of the group member distributing the session keys. +- It shall be possible for the Public Safety ProSe-enabled UE to store shared keys for past and future cryptoperiods. +- The mechanism for distributing session keys shall support late entry to group communications. +- Authorized Public Safety ProSe-enabled UEs shall securely store the shared keys. + +For the protection of the data transmission between the UEs, the following requirements apply + +- The system shall support providing the Public Safety ProSe-enabled UEs with all the necessary keying material and chosen algorithms that are used to protect the data sent between the Public Safety ProSe-enabled UE(s). This material shall be provided without requiring signalling between the Public Safety ProSe-enabled UEs. +- Confidentiality of one-to-many communications should be supported. Its use would be a configuration option related to network operations and should hence be under control of the network operator. +- Security mechanisms shall scale effectively to large groups, and be compatible with rapid setup of group communications. +- Security mechanism shall support multiple logical channels between the same source/destination pair. Security mechanism shall avoid key stream repetition (COUNTs is about to be re-used with the same key), when multiple PDCP entities exist in the Public Safety ProSe-enabled UE. + +### 6.2.3 Bearer layer security mechanism + +#### 6.2.3.1 Security keys and their lifetimes + +As part of the TLS protected signalling between the UE and ProSe Key Management Function, a ProSe MIKEY Key (PMK) may be sent from the ProSe Key Management Function to the UE. This key is used to protect the MIKEY messages that are used to carry the PGKs to the UE. The usage of PMK to protect the MIKEY messages is described in clause 6.2.3.3.2.3. The UE keeps the PMK until it receives a new one from the ProSe Key Management Function. + +A UE needs to have an algorithm identity and a PGK (ProSe Group Key) provisioned for each group that they belong to. From this key, a UE that wishes to broadcast data shall first generate a PTK (ProSe Traffic Key). The parameters used in this generation ensure that PTKs are unique for each UE and need to be transferred in the header of the user data packet (see below for more information). The PTK is derived when the first PDCP entity for a group is created and then PDCP entities created further for the same group shall use the PTK derived for the group. + +From the PTK, a UE derives the needed ProSe Encryption Key (PEK) to be able to encrypt the data. The UE can protect the data to be sent with the relevant keys and algorithms at the bearer level (see clause 6.2.3.3 for more details). A receiving UE would need to derive the PTK using the information in the bearer header and then the PEK used to decrypt the data. + +When the PGKs are provided to the UE, they shall be provided with an Expiry Time. The Expiry Time of the PGK needs to be set such that the keys for later periods have a longer expiration period. Each PGK for each group shall be associated with a different Expiry Time value. + +When protecting data that is to be sent, the UE uses the PGK that has not expired and with the earliest expiration time to derive the PTK etc, for that group. When receiving protected data the UE shall only use a PGK that has not expired or the PGK that has most recently expired. All other expired PGK(s) should be deleted. + +When a PGK key is deleted in the sending UE and receiving UE, all related keys as PTK and PEK derived from the expired PGK shall be deleted as well as the related PGK Identity, PTK Identity and Counter. After releasing all the PDCP entities of a group, the PTK and PEK derived for the group is deleted. + +#### 6.2.3.2 Identities + +The ProSe Key Management Function sends to the UE a PMK along with a 64 bit PMK identity. The UE uses both the PMK identity and the FQDN of the ProSe Key Management Function to identify the PMKs locally (e.g., PMK\_id@FQDN). The ProSe Key Management Function shall only allocate currently (and locally) unused PMK identities. + +The PGKs are specific to a particular group and hence have a Group Identity associated with that group. This Group Identity is referred to as "ProSe Layer-2 Group ID" in TS 23.303 [2] and is 24 bits long. In addition, each PGK associated with a group has 8-bit PGK Identity to identify it. This allows several PGKs for a group to be held simultaneously as each can be uniquely identified. When allocating PGK ID, the ProSe Key Management Function shall ensure that all allocated PGKs that have not expired shall be uniquely identifiable by the 5 least significant bits of the PGK ID. This means that the combination of Group Identity and PGK Identity uniquely identifies a PGK. The Group Identity is the destination Layer 2 identity of the group. An all zero PGK Identity is used to signal special cases between the UE and ProSe Key Management Function, and hence is never used to identify a PGK. + +Each member of a group has a unique 24-bit Group Members Identity, identifying a UE within a group and referred to as "ProSe UE ID" in TS 23.303 [2]. This is used a part of the PTK derivation to ensure each user generates unique PTKs for protecting the data that they send. The Group Members Identity is the source Layer 2 identity when the UE sends data. + +The PTK identity shall be a 16-bit counter set to a unique value in the sending UE that has not been previously used together with the same PGK and PGK identity in the UE. Every time a new PTK needs to be derived, the PTK Identity counter is incremented. + +A PTK is uniquely identified by the combination of Group Identity, PGK Identity, Group Member Identity of the sending UE and a 16-bit PTK identity. The PTK Identity is used as part of the derivation of PTK to ensure that all PTKs are unique. Under a particular PGK, the PTK identities are used in order starting with 1. + +A Logical Channel ID (LCID) associated with the PDCP/RLC entity is used as an input for ciphering in order to avoid key stream repetition (i.e., to avoid counter being re-used with the same PEK by one or more PDCP entities corresponding to a group). + +A 16 bit counter is maintained per PDCP entity. Counter and LCID ensures key stream freshness across the transmission by multiple PDCP entities of the same group. The counter is same as the PDCP SN in regular LTE. + +For each group that the UE is a member of, the ME shall store a value of PTK ID and counter in either the USIM or non-volatile memory on the ME to prevent the re-use of the same values with a LCID under a PGK in case the UE unexpectedly powers down. These stored values shall be associated with the PGK that is being used to send the data. + +After power on but before sending any one-to-many data for a group, the ME shall handle the PTK ID and counter from the USIM or non-volatile memory of the ME as follows. The ME shall copy the values PTK ID and counter into volatile memory. + +NOTE 1: The values stored in volatile memory represent the smallest values of PTK ID and Counter that the UE knows have not been used with currently unused LCIDs. + +For USIM storage of PTK ID and counter, the ME shall also increase the PTK ID in the USIM by 3 if it is less than $2^{16}-4$ or to $2^{16}-1$ otherwise, and set the value of counter to $2^{16}-1$ (its maximum value). If storage in non-volatile memory of the ME is used, the ME shall keep the value of PTK ID in the non-volatile memory of the ME the same, and set the counter to $2^{16}-1$ . + +NOTE 2: The PTK ID on the USIM is set higher than if it was held in non-volatile memory of the ME to reduce the number of writes to the USIM. It is not set to the maximal value in both cases as this would invalidate a PGK for a possibly out of coverage UE. + +When a new PDCP entity is created for sending traffic, the UE shall select a currently unused LCID. If a previously unused PGK is to be used to provide the keys for protecting this PDCP entity, then the UE acts as below. Otherwise the ME selects a PTK Identity and counter values to use with the new PDCP entity, such that no larger PTK ID has been used for this PGK and LCID and no larger counter values have been used with this PGK, PTK ID and LCID. + +NOTE 3: It is enough for the ME to use the values stored in the volatile memory of the ME to ensure keystream freshness, but more sophisticated methods may allow more efficient use of PTK ID and counters. + +If a previously unused PGK is to be used with the PDCP entity, then for a PGK already stored on the USIM, the ME sets the PTK identity and counter on the USIM to 3 and $2^{16}-1$ respectively and associates them with this PGK. For a new PGK stored in non-volatile memory in the ME, the ME shall set the PTK identity and counter in the non-volatile memory of the ME to one and $2^{16}-1$ respectively and associates them with this PGK. The ME shall set both the PTK ID and counter in volatile memory to one. The ME shall use the new PGK, a PTK ID of one and a counter of one to protect the traffic on the PDCP entity. + +To encrypt the data for a PDCP entity, the ME shall calculate PTK (as described in Annex A.3) and then PEK from PTK (as described in Annex A.4). The ME then uses the PEK, LCID, PTK ID and counter to encrypt the next data packet as described in subclause 6.2.3.6.1. Immediately after encrypting the data packet, the ME shall increase the counter associated with the PDCP entity by one. If this causes the counter to wrap, then the ME shall behave as follows: + +- If $PTK\ ID < 2^{16}-1$ , then the ME shall increase the PTK ID associated with the PDCP entity by one and set the counter associated with this PDCP entity to one. Furthermore for USIM storage of PTK ID, the ME shall increase the PTK ID stored on the USIM by 3 if it is less than $2^{16}-4$ or to $2^{16}-1$ otherwise if the stored PTK ID in USIM would be less than the one about to be used in ME. If non-volatile memory on the ME is used to store the PTK ID, the ME shall increase the PTK ID in non-volatile memory by one. +- If $PTK\ ID = 2^{16}-1$ (i.e. PTK ID would wrap) and if the next PGK is previously unused (i.e. does not have the PTK ID and Counter in either the USIM or non-volatile memory of the ME associated with it), the ME shall act as though it just created a new PDCP entity with a previously unused PGK. +- Otherwise (i.e. $PTK\ ID = 2^{16}-1$ and the next PGK has already been used in some other PDCP entity), the ME shall use the next PGK to generate keys for this PDCP entity and set the PTK ID and counter associated with this PDCP entity to one. + +In all case of counter wrap, new PTK shall be derived from the PGK taking the new PTK Identity into use. A new PEK shall be derived from the new PTK as well. The old PTK associated with this PDCP entity shall be deleted together with the corresponding old PEK derived from the old PTK key. + +When closing a PDCP entity, if the PGK being used by that PDCP context is the most recently used one, the ME shall update the PTK ID and counter values stored in the volatile memory of the ME as follows: + +- If the PTK ID in the PDCP entity is greater than the stored one, the ME shall update the PTK ID and counter stored in volatile memory of the ME to be the values from the PDCP entity; +- If the PTK ID in the PDCP entity is equal to the stored one and the counter values in the PDCP entity is greater than the stored one, the ME shall update the counter in the volatile memory of the ME to the value from the PDCP entity; +- Otherwise, no changes are made to the values stored in the volatile memory of the ME. + +At power down, the UE first closes all its PDCP entities. Then for USIM storage of the PTK ID, the ME shall set the PTK ID and counter values in the USIM equal to those held in the volatile memory of the ME (i.e. the values that would be used to protect the next packet). Otherwise the ME shall set the PTK ID and counter values in the non-volatile memory equal to those held in the volatile memory of the ME. + +If the receiving UE receives a PDCP packet on a PDCP entity with a new PTK Identity that has not been previously used with the same PGK and PGK identity in the receiving UE, then the receiving UE shall delete any old PTK for this PDCP entity and also delete the corresponding old PEK derived from the old PTK. + +#### 6.2.3.3 Security flows + +##### 6.2.3.3.1 Overview + +The protection of one-to-many communication proceeds as shown in the figure below. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating One-to-many security flows between UE1, UE2, ProSe Function, and ProSe Key Management Function.](e05b36c0d46549e681ce6581422c66b2_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE1 + participant UE2 + participant ProSeFunction as ProSe Function + participant ProSeKeyManagementFunction as ProSe Key Management Function + + Note left of UE1: 0a. Configure + Note right of ProSeFunction: 0c. Configure + Note right of ProSeKeyManagementFunction: 0d. Configure + + UE1->>ProSeFunction: 1a. Service authorisation + ProSeFunction-->>UE1: 2a.i Key Request (Group ID, UE EPS security capabilities) + UE1->>ProSeKeyManagementFunction: + Note right of ProSeKeyManagementFunction: 2a.ii Check algorithms + ProSeKeyManagementFunction-->>UE1: 2a.iii Key Response (Group Member ID, PMK ID, PMK, algorithm) + ProSeKeyManagementFunction-->>UE1: 2a.iv MIKEY messages (PGK ID, PGK, Expiry Time) + + Note left of UE2: 0b. Configure + UE2->>ProSeFunction: 1b. Service authorisation + ProSeFunction-->>UE2: 2b.i Key Request (Group ID, UE EPS security capabilities) + UE2->>ProSeKeyManagementFunction: + Note right of ProSeKeyManagementFunction: 2b.ii Check algorithms + ProSeKeyManagementFunction-->>UE2: 2b.iii Key Response (Group Member ID, PMK ID, PMK, algorithm) + ProSeKeyManagementFunction-->>UE2: 2b.iv MIKEY messages (PGK ID, PGK, Expiry Time) + + UE1->>UE2: 3a. Send protected user plane + UE2->>UE1: 3b. Send protected user plane + + Note left of UE1: 4a. Process received data + Note left of UE2: 4b. Process received data + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating One-to-many security flows between UE1, UE2, ProSe Function, and ProSe Key Management Function. + +**Figure 6.2.3.3-1: One-to-many security flows** + +0a or 0b: If needed the UE could be configured with any private keys, associated certificates or root certificate that they may need for contacting the ProSe Key Management Function to allow the keys to be kept secret from the operator. If none are provided, then the USIM credentials are used to protect that interface. The UE may also be pre-configured with the address of the ProSe Key Management Function. + +NOTE 1: The ProSe Key Management Function is shown as a separate logical entity to allow the network operator to provision the radio level parameters and a 3rd party, e.g. public safety service, to have control over provisioning the keys. If such a separation is not needed then the ProSe Key Management Function may be deployed as part of the ProSe Function + +0c and 0d: The ProSe Function and ProSe Key Management Function need to be configured with which subscriptions (either mobile subscriptions or identities in certificates) are member of which groups. The ProSe Key Management Function needs to pre-select an encryption algorithm for each group based on a local policy. + +1a or 1b: The UE fetches the one-to-many communication parameters from the ProSe Function. As part of this procedure the UE gets its Group Identity (see TS 23.303 [2]) and is informed whether bearer layer security is needed for this group. In addition the UE may be provided with the address of the ProSe Key Management Function that it uses for obtaining keys for this group. + +2a.i or 2b.i: The UE sends the Key Request message to the ProSe Key Management Function including the Group Identity of the group for which it wants to fetch keys and UE EPS security capabilities (including the set of EPS encryption algorithms the UE supports). + +2a.ii or 2b.ii: The ProSe Key Management Function checks whether the group encryption algorithm is supported by the UE according to the UE EPS security capabilities, i.e. whether the group encryption algorithm is included in the set of EPS encryption algorithms the UE supports. + +2a.iii or 2b.iii: The ProSe Key Management Function responds with the Key Response message. If the check of step 2a.ii or 2b.ii is successful for a particular group, this message contains the Group Member Identity and the EPS encryption algorithm identifier that the UE should use when sending or receiving protected data for this group. Otherwise, this message contains an indicator of algorithm support failure as the UE does not support the required algorithm. This message may also contain a PMK and associated PMK ID if the ProSe Key Management Function decides to use a new PMK. + +2a.iv or 2b.iv: The ProSe Key Management Function sends the relevant PGKs, PGK IDs and expiry time to the UE using MIKEY. + +3a or 3b: The UE calculates the PTK and PEK to protect the traffic it sends to the group. It does this by selecting the PGK as described in subclause 6.2.3.1 and uses the next unused combination of PTK Identity and Counter. It then protects the data using the algorithm given in step 2x.ii. + +4a or 4b: A receiving UE gets the LC ID, Group Identity and Group Member Identity from the layer 2 header. It then uses the received bits of the PGK Identity to identify which PGK was used by the sender. The UE first checks that the PGK is valid (see subclause 6.2.3.1) and if so calculates the PTK and PEK to process the received message. + +##### 6.2.3.3.2 Messages between UE and ProSe Key Management Function + +###### 6.2.3.3.2.1 General + +There are two types of messages that flow between the UE and ProSe Key Management Function. Firstly, there are the Key Request and Response messages. The UE uses these messages to request keys for particular groups, while the ProSe Key Management Function uses these messages to provide the UE with its group member identifier(s) and the security algorithms to use with the various groups. Secondly, there are the MIKEY messages, which the ProSe Key Management Function uses to send the PGKs to the UE. These messages are detailed in the following subclauses. + +###### 6.2.3.3.2.2 Key Request and Key Response messages + +The purpose of these messages is for the UE to inform the ProSe Key Management Function of the groups that the UE wishes to receive keys for and the groups for which the UE no longer wishes to receive keys. The UE knows which ProSe Key Management Function to contact for each group as it is either pre-provisioned or provided by the ProSe Function. This is the FQDN of the ProSe Key Management Function. + +The UE shall not release the PDN connection used to receive MIKEY messages containing PGKs until the UE has informed the ProSe Key Management Function that it no longer requires PGKs. This is to ensure that the ProSe Key Management Function is aware of the correct UE IP address for the purpose of performing PGK deliveries as specified in clause 6.2.3.3.2.3. + +If the UE detects that a PDN connection, which is used for receiving PGKs is released by the network, the UE should try to send a new Key Request to inform the ProSe Key Management Function of its new IP address. This is to ensure that the ProSe Key Management Function becomes aware of the new UE IP address for the purpose of performing PGK deliveries. Any new IP address should override any existing ones of the UE at the ProSe Key Management Function. + +![Sequence diagram showing Key Request/Key Response transaction between UE and ProSe Key Mgmt Function.](05eb72d372e4bf78e3d6a64949d77bcc_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant ProSe Key Mgmt Function + Note right of UE: Key Request + UE->>ProSe Key Mgmt Function: Key Request + Note left of ProSe Key Mgmt Function: Key Response (success) + ProSe Key Mgmt Function-->>UE: Key Response (success) + Note right of UE: OR + Note right of UE: Key Request + UE->>ProSe Key Mgmt Function: Key Request + Note left of ProSe Key Mgmt Function: Key Response (failure) + ProSe Key Mgmt Function-->>UE: Key Response (failure) +``` + +The diagram illustrates a sequence of messages between a User Equipment (UE) and a ProSe Key Management Function. It is divided into two parts by a dashed line labeled 'OR'. In the first part, the UE sends a 'Key Request' to the ProSe Key Management Function, which responds with a 'Key Response (success)'. In the second part, the UE sends a 'Key Request' to the ProSe Key Management Function, which responds with a 'Key Response (failure)'. + +Sequence diagram showing Key Request/Key Response transaction between UE and ProSe Key Mgmt Function. + +**Figure 6.2.3.3.2.2-1: Key Request/Key Response transaction** + +The protection for the Key Request and Key Response message is described in subclause 6.2.3.5. + +When sending a Key Request message to request the ProSe Key Management Function to send PGKs or to change the groups for which it wants to receive keys, the UE shall include the following information; + +- The indication of security algorithms that the UE supports for one-to-many communications; +- List of Group Identities for which the UE would like to receive keys; +- For each Group Identity, the PGK IDs of any keys for that group. If the UE holds no keys for this group, then it sends an all zero PGK ID; +- List of Group Identities for which the UE would like to stop receiving keys. + +The ProSe Key Management Function shall check that the UE is authorised to receive keys for the requested groups. This is done by using the UE identity that is bound to the keys that established the TLS tunnel in which the message is sent. It also checks that the UE supports the confidentiality algorithm required for each group. If the UE doesn't then the ProSe Key Management Function responds with the appropriate error for that group. The ProSe Key Management Function shall update the stored set of the groups for which the UE will be sent keys. + +The ProSe Key Management Function responds to the UE with a Key Response message that includes the following parameters: + +- List of the Group Identities that were included in the Key Request message; +- For each group that keys will be supplied for, the group member identity and the security algorithm that should be used to protect the data; and +- For each of the other groups, a status code to indicate why keys will not be supplied for that group. +- An optional PMK and PMK Identity. + +For the groups that the UE will get keys for, the UE shall store the received information associated with that group identity. If a PMK and PMK identity are included, the UE shall store these and delete any previously stored ones for this ProSe Key Management Function. + +The ProSe Key Management Function shall initiate the PGK delivery procedures for the keys that are needed by the UE. + +###### 6.2.3.3.2.3 MIKEY messages + +###### 6.2.3.3.2.3.1 General + +MIKEY is used to transport the PGKs from the ProSe Key Management Function to the UE. MIKEY shall be used with pre-shared keys as described in RFC 3830 [13]. The PMK shared by the ProSe Key Management Function and the UE shall be used as the pre-shared secret. The UDP port for MIKEY is 2269. + +The ProSe Key Management Function may use the initial message to send the PGK to the UE. Alternatively the ProSe Key Management Function may use the initial MIKEY message (by setting the PGK\_ID to all zeros) to trigger a Key Request message from the UE. As part of this Key Request Message, the ProSe Key Management Function may refresh the PMK used between the UE and ProSe Key Management Function. + +The response message is optional and only used if explicitly requested in an initial message containing a PGK. + +The replay protection of the MIKEY messages is provided by a 32-bit counter that is associated with each PMK. It is initially set to zero and is increased by one for every message sent. A received message is discarded if the counter value is not greater than the largest successfully received message. + +###### 6.2.3.3.2.3.2 Creation of the MIKEY key delivery message + +The initial MIKEY message is formed of the payloads which are filled as follows: + +- **MIKEY common header:** The CSB ID field of the MIKEY common header id shall be set to a random number. If the ProSe Key Management Function requires an acknowledgement of the PGK delivery message, then, it sets the V-Bit to 1. The #CS field shall be set to zero. The CS ID map type subfield shall be set to "Empty map" as defined in RFC 4563 [35]. +- **Timestamp payload:** The timestamp field shall be of type 2 and contain the value of the replay counter that is associated with this message. +- **MIKEY-RAND field:** The MIKEY-RAND field shall contain a 128-bit random number that is chosen by the ProSe Key Management Function. +- **IDi payload:** The ID Type shall be set to the value 0 to indicate an NAI with the identity formed from the Group Identity || PGK ID @ FQDN of the ProSe Key Management Function. +- **IDr payload:** The ID Type shall be set to the value 0 to indicate an NAI with the identity formed of the PMK identity of the PMK used to protect the MIKEY message @ the FQDN of the ProSe Key Management Function. +- **KEMAC Payload:** The Type Subfield shall be set to value 2. The use of the NULL algorithm in MAC field is not allowed. The use of the NULL alg in the Encr field is not allowed. The KV (Key Validity) subfield shall be set to the value 2. The lower and upper limits of the validity period of the PGK are expressed in unit of seconds and coded in binary format as the 40 least significant bits of the Coordinated Universal Time as defined in 3GPP TS 36.331 [40]. . In order to get the UE to delete a PGK, the ProSe Management Function shall set the lower and upper limits to be the same. + +###### 6.2.3.3.2.3.3 Processing the MIKEY key delivery message + +When a MIKEY message arrives at the ME, the processing process as follows: + +- The UE shall extract PMK @ FQDN of the ProSe Key Management Function for the IDr payload to establish which PMK was used to protect the MIKEY message. +- The Timestamp Payload is checked and compared against the stored Counter for the PMK, and the message is rejected if that counter is not larger then the current Counter. +- The integrity of the message is checked. If this fails, the message is discarded, otherwise the processing continues as follows. +- The counter associated with the PMK shall be set to the values conveyed in the Timestamp payload. + +- If the PMK used to protect the message is not the last successfully used one, then it becomes the last successfully used one and any other PMK related to this ProSe Key Management Function is deleted. +- The UE shall extract the Group ID and PGK ID from the received IDi Payload. If PGK ID is all zeros, then the UE shall stop processing the message and send a Key Request message (as described in subclause 6.3.2.2.3.3). +- The UE shall extract the PGK and Key Validity data from the KEMAC payload as described in section 5 of RFC 3830 [5]. If the lower and upper limits are the same, then the UE shall delete any key with the Group ID and PGK ID contained in the MIKEY messages. Otherwise the UE shall store the PGK along PGK ID and the validity limits. + +###### 6.2.3.3.2.3.4 MIKEY Verification message + +If the ProSe Key Management Function is expecting a response (i.e. set the V-bit in the MIKEY common header to 1), then the UE shall respond with a verification message. The verification message is made up of the payloads which are filled as described: + +- **MIKEY common header:** The CS ID is the same as in the MIKEY message carrying the PGK. The #CS field shall be set to zero. The CS ID map type subfield shall be set to "Empty map" as defined in RFC 4563 [35]. +- **Timestamp payload:** The timestamp field shall be of type 2 and contain the value of the replay counter that is associated with this message. +- **IDr payload:** The ID Type shall be set to the value 0 to indicate an NAI with the identity formed of the PMK identity of the PMK used to protect the MIKEY message @ the FQDN of the ProSe Key Management Function. +- **Verification payload:** The use of the NULL algorithm in the MAC field is not allowed. The MAC included in the verification payload shall be calculated over both the initiator's and the responder's identities as well as the timestamp in addition to over the response message as defined in RFC 3830 [13]. + +#### 6.2.3.4 Protection of traffic between UE and ProSe Function + +In order to protect the messages between the UE and ProSe Function, the UE shall support the procedures for the UE given in subclause 5.3.3.2 and the ProSe Function shall support the procedures for the network function given in subclause 5.3.3. + +#### 6.2.3.5 Protection of traffic between UE and ProSe Key Management Function + +In order to protect the UE-initiated messages between the UE and ProSe Key Management Function, the UE shall support the procedures for the UE given in subclause 5.3.3.2 and the ProSe Key Management Function shall support the procedures for the network function given in subclause 5.3.3.2. + +The MIKEY messages are protected as described in subclause 6.2.3.3.2.3. + +#### 6.2.3.6 Protection of traffic between UEs + +##### 6.2.3.6.1 Protection of data + +ProSe enabled Public Safety UEs shall implement EEA0, 128-EEA1 and 128-EEA2 and may implement 128-EEA3 for ciphering one-to-many traffic. + +The LTE ciphering algorithms (see TS 33.401 [21]) are used with the following modifications; + +- Direction is always set to 0; +- Bearer[0] to Bearer[4] are set to LCID; +- COUNT[0] to COUNT[15] are set to PTK ID; +- Counter is input into COUNT[16] to COUNT[31]. + +##### 6.2.3.6.2 Key derivation data in PDCP header + +In terms of signalling between the UEs to transfer the relevant security information, e.g. to indicate the correct PTK to use to calculate PEK, the header of the PDCP packet for user plane data shall contain the 5 least significant bits of the PGK Identity, PTK Identity and Counter. This is illustrated in figure 6.2.3.6.2-1. + +| | | | | +|---------------------|--------|---------|-------------------| +| 5 LSBs of
PGK Id | PTK Id | Counter | Encrypted Payload | +|---------------------|--------|---------|-------------------| + +**Figure 6.2.3.6.2-1: Security aspects of the PDCP packet for user plane data** + +NOTE: The Group Identity and Group Member Identity are carried in layers below the PDCP layer. + +If the network configuration is not to use confidentiality protection, then the transmitting UE shall set the values of the security information (PGK Identity, PTK Identity and Counter) to zero in the header of the PDCP packet. + +### 6.2.4 Solution description for media security of one-to-many communications + +Media security for Mission Critical Push-To-Talk (MCPTT) is defined in TS 33.179 [43]. The defined media security solution is designed to support public-safety users when operating either on-network or off-network (e.g. when using Proximity-based Services). + +NOTE: The media security solution defined in TS 33.179 [43] is not back compatible with the ProSe media security solution defined in Rel-12 in this clause. + +## 6.3 EPC-level discovery of ProSe-enabled UEs + +### 6.3.1 Security for proximity request authentication and authorization + +#### 6.3.1.1 General + +The ProSe Function of two UEs may belong to different PLMNs and, according to the current version of TS 23.303 [2], the application server is the entity which discloses the EPUID of a particular target UE to a ProSe Function so that it can request to the Prose Function managing that target UE the sending of its location information for a particular period of time. + +The risk is that it would take just one Proximity Request from the UE for the ProSe Function to actually keep a record of [ALUID\_B, EPUID\_B, PFID\_B] mapping and have the capability to later send a proximity request (step 4 of Proximity Request procedure in clause 5.5.5 of TS 23.303 [2]) although the UE didn't actually send a proximity request at all (step 4 of Proximity Request procedure in clause 5.5.5 of TS 23.303 [2]). This could lead to massive surveillance of users by other PLMNs that may be very difficult to detect by the PLMN which serves particular ProSe UEs. + +![Sequence diagram of the Proximity request procedure (clause 5.5.5) involving UE A, UE B, SLP A, SLP B, ProSe Function A, App Server, ProSe Function B, and HSS.](f1091147d93cee4dfa88498610e395a7_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant UE B + participant SLP A + participant SLP B + participant ProSe Function A + participant App Server + participant ProSe Function B + participant HSS + + Note left of UE A: 1. Proximity Request +(EPUID_A, Application ID, ALUID_A, ALUID_B, +window, Range, A's loc, [WLAN ind.]) + UE A->>ProSe Function A: 1. Proximity Request + ProSe Function A->>App Server: 2. MAP Request (ALUID_A, ALUID_B) + App Server-->>ProSe Function A: 3. MAP Response (EPUID_B, PFID_B) + ProSe Function A->>ProSe Function B: 4. Proximity Request (EPUID_B, EPUID_A, Application ID, window, A's loc, [WLAN ind.], SUPL Config) + ProSe Function B->>HSS: 5a. Location Request (B) + HSS-->>ProSe Function B: 5b. Proximity Request Reject (Cause) + ProSe Function B-->>UE A: 5c. Proximity Request Reject (Cause) + ProSe Function B-->>UE B: 6. Proximity Request Validation () + ProSe Function B->>SLP B: 7a. LCS Location Reporting Request (B) + SLP B-->>ProSe Function B: 7b. Proximity Request Ack ([WLLID_B], B's loc) + ProSe Function B->>SLP A: 8a. LCS Location Reporting Request (A) + SLP A-->>ProSe Function A: 8b. Proximity Request Ack + +``` + +Sequence diagram of the Proximity request procedure (clause 5.5.5) involving UE A, UE B, SLP A, SLP B, ProSe Function A, App Server, ProSe Function B, and HSS. + +Figure 6.3.1.1-1: extract from 3GPP TS 23.303 [2], Proximity request procedure (clause 5.5.5) + +#### 6.3.1.2 Application Server-signed proximity request + +UE A doesn't sign the proximity request sent to its ProSe Function A, but trusts the Application Server to control the authorization of the proximity request sent on its behalf. + +The authorization criteria can be based on detection mechanisms of very high volume of incoming proximity requests from a ProSe Function that doesn't match with the frequency usage of the ProSe Application by the users, or it can be based on a presence detection mechanism over the PC1 interface. + +ProSe Function A requests an authorization to the Application Server for each proximity request it shall transmit over the PC2 interface. The Application Server returns parameters which specify which operations are authorized (e.g. authorized to send only one request, authorized to send X requests until particular date, etc...). + +ProSe Function B is assured of the authenticity of the proximity request received from ProSe Function A by verifying the signature with a verification key from the Application Server. + +The token verification key is fetched over the PC2 interface between the ProSe Function B and the Application Server. + +The procedure below further defines the Proximity Request procedure in clause 5.5.5 of TS 23.303 [2] to support authenticity of the request. + +![Sequence diagram for Application Server-signed Proximity Request. Lifelines: UE A, ProSe Function A, App Server, ProSe Function B. The sequence shows: 1. UE A sends a Proximity Request to ProSe Function A; 2. ProSe Function A sends a Map Request to App Server; 3. App Server returns a Map Response with AS_signature, timestamp, and authorized operations; 4. ProSe Function A sends a Proximity Request to ProSe Function B including the AS_signature and other data; 4a. ProSe Function B sends a VerifKey Request to App Server; 4b. App Server returns a VerifKey Response; 4c. ProSe Function B verifies the signature.](329c96049bb432e9c2cbda4e224a0c9c_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE A + participant ProSe Function A + participant App Server + participant ProSe Function B + + Note left of UE A: 1. Proximity Request +(EPUID_A, Application ID, ALUID_A, ALUID_B, Window, Range, A' S loc, [WLLAN ind.]) + UE A->>ProSe Function A: 1. Proximity Request + Note right of ProSe Function A: 2. Map Request +(ALUID_A, ALUID_B) + ProSe Function A->>App Server: 2. Map Request + Note right of App Server: 3. Map Response +(EPU ID_B, PFID_B, AS_signature(timestamp, EPUID_A, ALUID_A, ALUID_B, Authorized_operations), Timestamp, Authorized_operations, [Cer Key_AS]) + App Server-->>ProSe Function A: 3. Map Response + Note right of ProSe Function A: 4. Proximity Request +(EPUID_B, EPUID_A, window, A' s loc, [WLAN ind.], ALUID_A, ALUID_B, Application ID, timestamp, AS_signature(timestamp, EPUID_A, ALUID_A, ALUID_B, Authorized_operations), authorized_operations, [CerKey_AS]) + ProSe Function A->>ProSe Function B: 4. Proximity Request + Note right of ProSe Function B: 4a. VerifKey Request +(Application ID) + ProSe Function B-->>App Server: 4a. VerifKey Request + Note right of App Server: 4b. VerifKey Response +(VerifKey_Application ID) + App Server-->>ProSe Function B: 4b. VerifKey Response + Note right of ProSe Function B: 4c. Verify the signature + ProSe Function B->>ProSe Function B: 4c. Verify the signature + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Application Server-signed Proximity Request. Lifelines: UE A, ProSe Function A, App Server, ProSe Function B. The sequence shows: 1. UE A sends a Proximity Request to ProSe Function A; 2. ProSe Function A sends a Map Request to App Server; 3. App Server returns a Map Response with AS\_signature, timestamp, and authorized operations; 4. ProSe Function A sends a Proximity Request to ProSe Function B including the AS\_signature and other data; 4a. ProSe Function B sends a VerifKey Request to App Server; 4b. App Server returns a VerifKey Response; 4c. ProSe Function B verifies the signature. + +**Figure 6.3.1.2-1: Application Server-signed Proximity Request** + +1. Same as Step 1 of procedure in clause 5.5.5 of TS 23.303 [2] +2. Same as Step 2 of procedure in clause 5.5.5 of TS 23.303 [2] +3. The Application Server returns as part of the Map Response the following additional data: the authorized operations (e.g. authorized to send only one request, authorized to send X requests until particular date, etc...), a timestamp, the signature AS\_signature of the cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the EPUID\_A, the ALUID\_A, the ALUID\_B, the authorized operations and the timestamp value, and optionally the associated certificate CertKey\_AS of Application Server's verification key. +4. ProSe Function A sends as part of the Proximity Request to ProSe Function B the following additional data: the AS\_signature, ALUID\_A, ALUID\_B, the timestamp, the authorized operations, the Application ID and optionally the CertKey\_AS's certificate. + - 4a. If the CertKey\_AS's certificate wasn't part of the Proximity request, or that either the CertKey\_AS's certificate or verification key wasn't stored in internal memory, then ProSe Function B sends a Verification Key fetching requests to Application Server's verification key (identifiable with the Application ID). + - 4b. The Application Server returns the verification key. + - 4c. If the verification of signature from the Application Server is successful then the procedure continues the procedure from step 5 in clause 5.5.5 of TS 23.303 [2]. + +#### 6.3.1.3 Proximity request digital signature algorithms and key strength + +The cryptographic length of the signing asymmetric keys shall have at least a key strength equivalent to a 128-bits symmetric key. The following digital signature algorithms may be used: + +RSA as specified in FIPS 186-4 [15]: the minimum key length shall be 3072 bits. The minimal size for the hash function shall at least be SHA-256 which shall be used as specified by NIST [20]. + +DSA as specified in FIPS 186-4 [15]: the minimum key length shall be 256 bits. + +ECDSA as specified in BSI TR-03111 [16]: the minimum key length shall be 256 bits, the elliptic curve domain parameters shall be selected among those available in RFC 5639 [17]. The corresponding hash function shall be chosen depending on the previously selected elliptic curve domain parameters (cf. clause 5 in RFC 5639 [17]). + +#### 6.3.1.4 Proximity request hash input format + +The input to the hash function shall be encoded as specified in Annex B.1 of TS 33.220 [5] and shall consist of the concatenation of proximity request parameters and their respective lengths: + +FC = 0x00 + +P0 = EPUID\_A + +L0 = Length of P0 value + +P1 = ALUID\_A + +L1 = Length of P1 value + +P2 = ALUID\_B + +L2 = Length of P2 value + +P3 = Timestamp. It shall use the date-time format as defined in clause 5.6 of RFC 3339 [18] and shall be encoded according to Annex B.2.1.2 of TS 33.220 [5] + +L3 = Length of P3 value + +P4 = Authorized operations + +L4 = Length of P4 value + +NOTE: The key derivation function defined in Annex B.1 of TS 33.220 [5] is not used, therefore the FC value should only be considered as a dummy value. + +#### 6.3.1.5 Verification key format + +The following shall be supported by the Application Server and the ProSe Function: + +The verification key shall be formatted like the "Subject Public Key Info" element of a X.509 certificate. + +The "Subject Public Key Info" is specified in clause 4.1.2.7 of RFC 5280 [19]. + +RFC 5639 [17] shall also be supported in order to include ECDSA with Brainpool elliptic curve domain parameters. + +#### 6.3.1.6 Profile for Application Server certificate + +The following may be supported by the Application Server and the ProSe Function: + +Certificates used for authentication of the Proximity Request shall meet the certificate profiles given in TS 33.310 [4] as follows: + +- clause 6.1.3, for SEG certificates, shall apply to ALUID-associated certificates, and +- clause 6.1.4, for SEG CA certificates, shall apply to any CA certificates used in a chain to validate the certificates, with the following additions and exceptions: + - Mandatory critical key usage: only digitalSignature shall be set. + +### 6.3.2 Protection of traffic between UE and ProSe Function + +In order to protect the messages between the UE and ProSe Function, the UE shall support the procedures for the UE given in subclause 5.3.3.2 and the ProSe Function shall support the procedures for the network function given in subclause 5.3.3.2. + +## 6.4 Security for EPC support WLAN direct discovery and communication + +For EPC support for WLAN Direct Discovery, the security mechanisms as defined for EPC-level ProSe Discovery (clause 6.3) apply. + +For EPC support for WLAN Direct communication, based on the UEs WLAN security capabilities the ProSe Function may provide only such WLAN security parameters to the ProSe-enabled UEs that ensure confidentiality and integrity of the ProSe-assisted WLAN direct communication path to a level comparable with that provided by the existing 3GPP system. + +NOTE: Release 12 does not provide stage 3 specification. + +## 6.5 Security for One-to-one ProSe Direct communication + +### 6.5.1 General + +The one-to-one ProSe Direct communication procedures are described in TS 23.303 [2]. One-to-one ProSe Direct Communication is used by two UEs that want to directly exchange traffic or when a remote UE attaches to a ProSe UE-to-network relay. + +Security requirements are summarised in section 6.5.2. An overview of one-to-one ProSe Direct Communication is given in section 6.5.3. The authentication and key establishment procedures for the basic one-to-one communications are described in section 6.5.4. In section 6.5.5 the general security establishment that is used in all use cases is described. + +The functionality in this clause may only be supported by ProSe-enabled Public Safety UEs. + +### 6.5.2 Security Requirements + +The following are the security requirements for ProSe Direct One-to-one Communication: + +A ProSe-enabled UE shall use different security contexts for ProSe one-to-one communication with different ProSe-enabled UEs. + +Direct link signalling ciphering shall be supported and may be used. Direct link signalling ciphering is a configuration option. + +Direct link user plane ciphering shall be supported and may be used. + +Direct link signalling integrity protection and replay protection shall be supported and used. + +Direct link user plane packets between UEs shall not be integrity protected. + +Establishment of the security between the UEs shall be protected from man-in-the-middle attacks. + +The system should support mutual authentication of public safety UEs out of network coverage. + +Compromise of a single UE should not affect the security of the others. + +Authentication credentials should be securely stored in UE. + +### 6.5.3 Overview of One-to-one ProSe Direct communication + +#### 6.5.3.1 Description of different layers of keys and their identities + +ProSe Direct One-to-one communication uses 4 different layers of keys. These are the following: + +**Long term key:** This is the key that is provisioned (see the individual cases in 6.5.4 for more information on the provisioning) into the UE and is the root of the security for one-to-one communications. It may be a symmetric key or public/private key pair depending on the particular use case. Authentication signalling (denoted as “Direct Authentication and Key Establishment” - see subclause 6.5.4) is exchanged between the UEs and possibly some entities in the network, for example in the ProSe UE-to-network relay case to derive the $K_D$ . The long term key is identified by the Long term ID. + +**$K_D$ :** This is a 256-bit root key that is shared between the two entities communicating using ProSe Direct one-to-one communications. It may be refreshed by re-running the authentication signalling using the Long term key. In order to generate a $K_{D-sess}$ (the next layer of keys), nonces are exchanged between the communicating entities. $K_D$ + +may be kept even when the UEs have no active one-to-one communication session between them. The $K_D$ ID is used to identify $K_D$ . + +$K_{D-sess}$ : This is the 256-bit key that is the root of the actual security context that is being used (or at least in the process of being established) to protect the transfer of data between the UEs. During a communication between the UEs, the $K_{D-sess}$ may be refreshed by running the rekeying procedure (see subclause 6.X.5.3). The actual keys (see next bullet) that are used in the confidentiality and integrity algorithms are derived directly from $K_{D-sess}$ . The 16 bit $K_{D-sess}$ ID identifies the $K_{D-sess}$ . + +A $K_{D-sess}$ ID with a zero value indicates no security is used and hence the UEs shall not assign an all zero value of $K_{D-sess}$ ID when creating a security context. + +PEK and PIK: The ProSe Encryption Key (PEK) and ProSe Integrity Key (PIK) are used in the chosen confidentiality and integrity algorithms respectively. They are derived from $K_{D-sess}$ and are refreshed automatically every time $K_{D-sess}$ is changed. + +#### 6.5.3.2 Security states + +A UE may be in one of the three different security states with respect to another UE as follows: + +- Provisioned-security: This is where a UE just has its own long term keys. +- Partial-security: This is where a UE has recently communicated with another UE and still has the $K_D$ that it used with the other UE, but no other derived keys. +- Full-security: This is where a UE is actually communicating with another UE and has $K_D$ , $K_{D-sess}$ , PEK and PIK, the chosen confidentiality and integrity algorithms and PDCP counters used with each bearer. + +Once a UE ends its communication session with another UE, it shall delete $K_{D-sess}$ , PEK and PIK, the choice of algorithms and the counters. It may also delete $K_D$ . + +#### 6.5.3.3 High level overview of security establishment + +![Sequence diagram showing security establishment between UE_1 and UE_2. Step 1: UE_1 sends Direct Communication Request/Direct Rekey Request to UE_2. Step 2: Bidirectional Direct Auth and Key Establish. Step 3: UE_2 sends Direct Security Mode Command () to UE_1. Step 4: UE_1 sends Direct Security Mode Complete () to UE_2.](ceb967656aa87e9c8a39e8fe063f8f4c_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE_1 + participant UE_2 + UE_1->>UE_2: 1. Direct Communication Request/ Direct Rekey Request + Note over UE_1, UE_2: 2. Direct Auth and Key Establish + UE_2->>UE_1: 3. Direct Security Mode Command () + UE_1->>UE_2: 4. Direct Security Mode Complete () + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing security establishment between UE\_1 and UE\_2. Step 1: UE\_1 sends Direct Communication Request/Direct Rekey Request to UE\_2. Step 2: Bidirectional Direct Auth and Key Establish. Step 3: UE\_2 sends Direct Security Mode Command () to UE\_1. Step 4: UE\_1 sends Direct Security Mode Complete () to UE\_2. + +**Figure 6.5.3.3-1: Overview of security establishment of ProSe Direct One-to-one communications** + +Figure 6.5.3.3-1 provides a high level overview of security establishment. In this flow, authentication and key establishment happens during steps 1 to 3 with the requirement that UE\_2 must know $K_D$ at the end of step 2. Step 2 may involve several messages, and these messages depend on the type of Long term key(s). More details on this are provided in subclause 6.5.4. The actual establishment of a security context happens during steps 1, 3 and 4. More details on this are provided in subclause 6.5.5. + +The integrity and confidentiality protection is applied at the PDCP layer. The details of this are given in subclause 6.5.6. + +## 6. 5.4 Direct Authentication and Key Establishment + +#### 6.5.4.1 General + +There are various methods that ProSe Direct one-to-one communications may use to provide authentication and establishment of $K_D$ . These methods may vary from case to case and the description of any necessary Direct Authentication and Key Establishment signalling that is needed in addition to the Direct Security Mode Command and Complete message will be covered with each specific case. + +NOTE: None of the cases included in this release require any Direct Authentication and Key Establishment signalling. + +### 6.5.5 Security Establishment procedures + +#### 6.5.5.1 General + +There are two different cases when a security context may be established; to set up a new connection and to re-key an ongoing connection. These cases are described in the following subclauses. + +#### 6.5.5.2 Security establishment during connection set-up + +The subclause describes how security is established during connection set-up. The signalling flow is shown in figure 6.5.5.2-1. + +![Sequence diagram showing security establishment between UE_1 and UE_2. UE_1 sends a Direct Communication Request. UE_2 responds with Direct Auth and Key Establish. UE_1 sends Direct Security Mode Command. UE_2 responds with Direct Security Mode Complete. Both UEs then activate the new security context for user plane and signalling traffic.](822e033872d5ab16e861571f47b81ba7_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE_1 + participant UE_2 + Note over UE_1, UE_2: 1. Direct Communication Request (Long Term ID, Parameters related to long term negotiation, K_D ID, UE_1 security capabilities, Nonce_1, MSB of K_D-sess ID) + UE_1->>UE_2: + Note over UE_1, UE_2: 2. Direct Auth and Key Establish + UE_2-->>UE_1: + Note over UE_1, UE_2: 3a. Direct Security Mode Command (UE_1 security capabilities, Nonce_2, LSB of K_D-sess ID, MSB of K_D ID, Chosen_algs) + UE_1->>UE_2: + Note right of UE_2: 3b. Ready to receive signalling and user plane traffic with new security context + Note over UE_1, UE_2: Integrity Protected at bearer layer with new security context + Note left of UE_1: 4a. Ready to send and receive user plane and signalling data with new security context + Note over UE_1, UE_2: 4b. Direct Security Mode Complete (LSB of K_D ID) + UE_2-->>UE_1: + Note over UE_1, UE_2: Integrity and confidentiality protected at bearer layer with new security context + Note right of UE_2: 5. Send signalling and user plane traffic with new security context – delete any old security context + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing security establishment between UE\_1 and UE\_2. UE\_1 sends a Direct Communication Request. UE\_2 responds with Direct Auth and Key Establish. UE\_1 sends Direct Security Mode Command. UE\_2 responds with Direct Security Mode Complete. Both UEs then activate the new security context for user plane and signalling traffic. + +**Figure 6.5.5.2-1: Security establishment at connection set-up** + +1. UE\_1 has sent a Direct Communication Request to UE\_2. This message shall include Nonce\_1 (for session key generation), UE\_1 security capabilities (the list of algorithms that UE\_1 will accept for this connection) and the most significant 8-bits of the $K_{D-sess}$ ID. These bits shall be chosen such that UE\_1 will be able to locally identify a security context that is created by this procedure. The message may also include a $K_D$ ID if the UE\_1 has an existing $K_D$ with the UE that it trying to communicate with. The absence of the $K_D$ ID parameter indicates that UE\_1 does not have a $K_D$ for UE\_2. The message shall also contain the necessary information to establish a $K_D$ from the revelvant long terms keys held on the UE (see subclause 6.X.4). Long term ID is the info needed by the UE\_2 in order to retrieve the right Long term Key. +2. UE\_2 may initiate a Direct Auth and Key Establish procedure with UE\_1. This is mandatory if the UE\_2 does not have the $K_D$ and $K_D$ ID pair indicated in step 1, and signalling is needed to establish the keys for the particular use case. + +3. UE\_2 sends the Direct Security Mode Command to UE\_1. It shall include the most significant bits of $K_D$ ID if a fresh $K_D$ is generated, $Nonce\_2$ to allow a session key to be calculated and the $Chosen\_algs$ parameter to indicate which security algorithms the UEs will use to protect the data. The included bits of $K_D$ ID shall uniquely identify the $K_D$ at UE\_2. UE\_2 shall also return the UE\_1 security capabilities to provide protection against bidding down attacks. UE\_2 also includes the least significant 8-bits of $K_{D-sess}$ ID in the messages. These bits are chosen so that UE\_2 will be able to locally identify a security context that is created by this procedure. UE\_2 calculates $K_{D-sess}$ from $K_D$ and $Nonce\_1$ and $Nonce\_2$ (see Annex A.9) and then derives the confidentiality and integrity keys based on the chosen algorithms (Annex A.4). + +UE\_2 then integrity protects the Direct Security Mode Command before sending it to UE\_1. UE\_2 is then ready to receive both signalling and user plane traffic protected with the new security context. UE\_2 shall form the $K_{D-sess}$ ID from the most significant bits it received in message 1 and least significant bits it sent in message 3. + +4. On receiving the Direct Security Mode Command, UE\_1 shall calculate $K_{D-sess}$ and the confidentiality and integrity keys in the same way as UE\_2. UE\_1 shall check that the returned UE\_1 security capabilities are the same as those it sent in step 1. UE\_1 shall also check the integrity protection on the message. If both these checks pass, then UE\_1 is ready to send and receive signalling and user traffic with the new security context. If most significant bits of $K_D$ ID were included in the Direct Security Mode Command, UE\_1 shall generate the least significant bits of $K_D$ ID such that these bits uniquely identify $K_D$ at UE\_1 and shall store the complete $K_D$ ID with $K_D$ . UE\_1 shall send an integrity protected and confidentiality protected (with the chosen algorithm which may be the null algorithm) Direct Security Mode Complete message to UE\_2. UE\_1 shall include the least significant bits of $K_D$ ID in this message. UE\_1 shall form the $K_{D-sess}$ ID from the most significant bits it sent in message 1 and least significant bits it received in message 3. +5. UE\_2 checks the integrity protection on the received Direct Security Mode Complete. If this passes, UE\_2 is now ready to send user plane data and control signalling protected with the new security context. UE\_2 deletes any old security context it has for UE\_1. UE\_2 shall form the $K_D$ ID from the most significant bits it sent in step 3 and least significant bits it received in the Direct Security Mode Complete. UE\_2 shall store the complete $K_D$ ID with $K_D$ . + +#### 6.5.5.3 Rekeying security + +By rekeying, the UEs ensure fresh session keys $K_{D-sess}$ are used. Optionally the rekeying can also enforce refresh of $K_D$ . Either UE may rekey the connection at any time. This shall be done before the counter for a particular LCID repeats with the current keys. A rekeying operation shall refresh the $K_{D-sess}$ and PEK and PIK, and may refresh $K_D$ . A rekeying operation follows the flows given in figure 6.5.5.3-1. + +NOTE 1: The UE that initiates a rekeying does not need to be the same one that initiated the connection set-up. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating Security establishment during rekeying between UE_1 and UE_2.](be3e5fe8be7cc5a74f67a4b8ac93193d_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE_1 + participant UE_2 + Note left of UE_1: 4a. Ready to send and receive user and signalling data with new security + UE_1->>UE_2: 1. Direct Rekey Request (Long Term ID, Parameters related to long term negotiation, Re-auth flag, UE_1 security capabilities, Nonce_1, MSB of K_D-sess ID) + UE_1<->UE_2: 2. Direct Auth and Key Establish + UE_2->>UE_1: 3a. Direct Security Mode Command (UE_1 security capabilities, Nonce_2, LSB of K_D-sess ID, MSB of K_D ID, Chosen_algs) + Note right of UE_2: 3b. Ready to receive signalling and user plane with new security context + Note over UE_1,UE_2: Integrity Protected at bearer layer with new security context + UE_1->>UE_2: 4b. Direct Security Mode Complete (LSB of K_D ID) + Note over UE_1,UE_2: Integrity and confidentiality protected at bearer layer with new security context + Note right of UE_2: 5. Send signalling and user plane traffic with new security context – delete any old security context + Note left of UE_1: 6. Delete old security context when signalling message protected with new security context is received + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating Security establishment during rekeying between UE\_1 and UE\_2. + +**Figure 6.5.5.3-1: Security establishment during rekeying** + +1. UE\_1 sends a Direct Rekey Request to UE\_2. This message shall include Nonce\_1 (for session key generation), UE\_1 security capabilities (the list of algorithms that UE\_1 will accept for this connection) and the most significant 8-bits of the KD-sess ID. These bits are chosen such that UE\_1 will be able to locally identify a security context that is created by this procedure. The message may also include a Re-auth Flag, if UE\_1 wants to rekey KD. The message shall also contain the necessary information to establish a KD from the relevant long terms keys held on the UE (see subclause 6.5.4). +2. UE\_2 may initiate a Direct Auth Key Establish procedure with UE\_1. This is mandatory if UE\_1 included the Re-auth Flag and signalling is needed to establish KD. +3. This step is the same as step 3 in 6.5.5.2 except the most significant bits of KD ID are included if a fresh KD is generated during this rekeying. +4. This step is the same as step 4 in 6.5.5.2. +5. This step is the same as step 5 in 6.5.5.2. +6. When UE\_1 receives a message integrity protected with the new security context, it shall delete any old security context is has still stored for UE\_2. + +### 6.5.6 Protection of the one-to-one traffic + +#### 6.5.6.1 General + +Protection for the signalling and user plane databetween the UEs is provided at the PDCP layer. As the security is not preserved through a drop of the connection, all signalling messages that need to be sent before security is established, may be sent with no protection. + +**Editor's note: This exact message that may be sent without protection are FFS.** + +All other signalling messages shall be integrity protected and may be confidentiality protected except the Direct Security Mode Command which is sent integrity protected only. + +The bearer with LCID = 28 shall be used to carry signalling messages that are not protected. + +The bearer with LCID = 29 shall be used for Direct Security Mode Command and Direct Security Mode Complete. + +The bearer with LCID = 30 shall be used for other signalling messages that are confidentiality and integrity protected. + +The bearer with LCID = 1 to 10 may be used for user plane traffic with confidentiality protection. + +#### 6.5.6.2 Integrity protection + +ProSe enabled Public Safety UEs shall implement 128-EIA1 and 128-EIA2 and may implement 128-EIA3 for integrity protection of one-to-one direct link signalling. + +The LTE integrity algorithms (see TS 33.401 [21]) are used with the following modifications; + +- The key used is PIK; +- Direction is set to 1 for direct link signalling transmitted by the UE that sent the Direct Security Mode Command for this security context and 0 otherwise; +- Bearer[0] to Bearer[4] are set to LCID; +- COUNT[0] to COUNT[15] are set to $K_{D-sess}$ ID; +- Counter is input into COUNT[16] to COUNT[31]. + +The receiving UE shall ensure that received messages are not replayed. + +#### 6.5.6.3 Confidentiality protection + +ProSe enabled Public Safety UEs shall implement EEA0, 128-EEA1 and 128-EEA2 and may implement 128-EEA3 for ciphering of one-to-one traffic. + +The LTE ciphering algorithms (see TS 33.401 [21]) are used with the following modifications; + +- The key used in PEK; +- Direction is set as for integrity protection (see 6.5.6.2); +- Bearer[0] to Bearer[4] are set to LCID; +- COUNT[0] to COUNT[15] are set to $K_{D-sess}$ ID; +- Counter is input into COUNT[16] to COUNT[31]. + +#### 6.5.6.4 Security contents in the PDCP header + +The 16-bit $K_{D-sess}$ ID and 16-bit Counter parameters are carried in the PDCP header, along with any MAC that is needed for integrity protection. This is illustrated in the Figure 6.5.6.4-1. + +| | | | | +|-----------------|---------|--------------------|-------------------| +| $K_{D-sess}$ ID | Counter | (Ciphered) Payload | MAC when required | +|-----------------|---------|--------------------|-------------------| + +**Figure 6.5.6.4-1: Security contexts of the PDCP header for one-to-one communications** + +If the configuration is not to use confidentiality protection for one-to-one communication user plane, then the UE shall set the values of the security information ( $K_{D-sess}$ ID and Counter) to zero in the header of the user plane PDCP packets. + +For the signalling messages that are not protected, the $K_{D-sess}$ and Counter in PDCP format are set to zeros in the header of the PDCP packet. + +### 6.5.7 ProSe one-to-one communication security using ECCSI and SAKKE + +#### 6.5.7.1 General + +The solution uses the "Elliptic Curve-based Certificateless Signatures for Identity-based Encryption" (ECCSI) signature scheme, as defined in RFC 6507 [14]. And, Sakai-Kasahara Key Encryption (SAKKE), as defined in RFC 6508 [24] to generate a shared secret that is used as a $K_D$ (root key) for establishing a secure connection between the two UEs. + +#### 6.5.7.2 Key and their identities + +The UEs are provisioned with the required credentials (as defined in RFC 6507 [14] and RFC 6508[24]) in advance, when the UEs have a secure access to their Key ManagementServer (KMS). + +The KMS, common root of trust for the UEs, provisions the UEs with a set of credentials for ECCSI and SAKKE schemes. + +Upon successful provisioning for ECCSI, each UE will be configured with the public key of the KMS, and a set of credentials associated with the UE's identity, which are: Secret Signing Key (SSK) and Public Validation Token (PVT). The UE must act as "signer" and "verifier". As a signer, the UE uses its SSK to sign a message, and when acting as a verifier, the UE uses the public key of the KMS and the signer's PVT to verify the signature. + +Upon successful provisioning for SAKKE, each UE will be configured with the public key of the KMS, and a Receiver Secret Key (RSK) which is associated with the UE's identity. The sender UE uses the receiver's UE identity (receiving entity for SAKKE payload) and the public key of the KMS to create an encrypted SAKKE payload. The receiving UE uses its identity, its Receiver Secret Key and the public key of the KMS to decrypt SAKKE payload. + +The public identity of a UE may be encoded in any format that is compatible with the guidelines provided in RFC 6509 [12]. For example, the public identity of a UE may be a concatenation of a fixed part (in the form of IMSI, SIP URI, TEL URI, other user@domain types of URI, etc.) and a varying part (in the form of a timestamp). + +#### 6.5.7.3 Security flows + +##### 6.5.7.3.1 Direct Connection Request + +Figure 6.5.7.3.1-1 illustrates the establishment of a secure one-to-one ProSe Direct communication. It relies on the generic signalling set that is described in subclause 6.5.5. The figure only includes the additional information in the messages. + +![Sequence diagram showing the security establishment at connection setup between UE-1 and UE-2. UE-1 sends a Direct Communication Request (User of UE-1 Info, SIGN) to UE-2. UE-2 responds with a Direct Security Mode Command (User of UE-2 Info, SIGN, SAKKE). UE-1 completes the process with a Direct Security Mode Complete () message.](da434ee158d8bd56122f990b91dc17ba_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE-1 + participant UE-2 + Note left of UE-1: UE-1 wishes to engage in one-to-one ProSe Direct Communication with UE-2 + UE-1->>UE-2: 1. Direct Communication Request (User of UE-1 Info, SIGN) + UE-2-->>UE-1: 2. Direct Security Mode Command (User of UE-2 Info, SIGN, SAKKE) + UE-1->>UE-2: 3. Direct Security Mode Complete () + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the security establishment at connection setup between UE-1 and UE-2. UE-1 sends a Direct Communication Request (User of UE-1 Info, SIGN) to UE-2. UE-2 responds with a Direct Security Mode Command (User of UE-2 Info, SIGN, SAKKE). UE-1 completes the process with a Direct Security Mode Complete () message. + +**Figure 6.5.7.3.1-1: Security establishment at connection setup** + +- UE-1 wishing to engage in one-to-one ProSe Direct Communication with UE-2 sends a Direct Communication Request message including the following parameters: + +- User of UE-1 Info = upper layer information identifying the user of UE-1. This information is used to derive the Signer's identifier (used by ECCSI). +- SIGN – an ECCSI signature (as defined in RFC 6507 [14]) of the Direct Communication Request message. The signature is computed over the User of UE-1 Info parameters and the Nonce 1 (see subclause 6.5.5). + +Editor's note: The exact format of input parameters to calculation of the signature is FFS + +- Upon reception of the Direct Communication Request message, UE-2 verifies the signature payload SIGN. If the verification test is successful, UE-2 presents the authenticated identity ("User of UE-1 Info") to the user of UE-2. If user of UE-2 decides to accept the request, UE-2 sends a Direct Security Mode Command message including the following parameters: + +- User of UE-2 Info = upper layer information identifying the user of UE-2. This information is used to derive the Signer's identifier (used by ECCSI). +- SIGN – an ECCSI signature (as defined in RFC 6507 [14]) of the Direct Communication Response message. The signature is computed over the User of UE-2 Info, Nonce 1 and the SAKKE parameters. + +*Editor's note: The exact parameters of input parameters to calculation of the signature is FFS* + +SAKKE – UE-2 generates a 256-bit key Shared Secret Value (SSV), which is used as KD (root key), and encodes SSV value into a SAKKE payload according to the algorithm described in RFC 6508 [24], using the KMS Public Key and the public identity of the user of UE-1. + +Upon receipt of the Direct Security Mode message, the UE-1 verifies the signature payload SIGN. If the verification test is successful, it decrypts SAKKE payload to extract the SSV which is used as a KD (root key) from which other keys can be derived. + +3. Upon successful processing of the Direct Security Mode Command message, UE-1 responds with a Direct Security Mode Complete. + +Both UEs shall store their own and the other UE's User Info with the KD. + +##### 6.5.7.3.2 Direct Rekeying Request + +Figure 6.5.7.3.2-1 illustrates rekeying of an existing secure connection when KD is changed. It relies on the generic signalling set that is described in subclauses 6.5.5 over an existing secure connection. The figure only includes the additional information in the messages. When KD is not changed the rekeying proceeds exactly as described in subclause 6.5.5.3. + +![Sequence diagram showing the security establishment when rekeying an existing connection between UE-1 and UE-2. 1. Direct Rekeying Request () from UE-1 to UE-2. 2. Direct Security Mode Command (SIGN, SAKKE) from UE-2 to UE-1. 3. Direct Security Mode Complete () from UE-1 to UE-2.](215165a27ad7d72bd39fdf55a3cb7486_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE-1 + participant UE-2 + UE-1->>UE-2: 1. Direct Rekeying Request () + UE-2->>UE-1: 2. Direct Security Mode Command (SIGN, SAKKE) + UE-1->>UE-2: 3. Direct Security Mode Complete () + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the security establishment when rekeying an existing connection between UE-1 and UE-2. 1. Direct Rekeying Request () from UE-1 to UE-2. 2. Direct Security Mode Command (SIGN, SAKKE) from UE-2 to UE-1. 3. Direct Security Mode Complete () from UE-1 to UE-2. + +**Figure 6.5.7.3.2-1: Security establishment when rekeying an existing connection** + +1. UE-1 send a Direct Rekeying Request to UE-2. +2. UE-2 responds with a Direct Security Mode Command message including the following parameters: + - SIGN – an ECCSI signature (as defined in RFC 6507 [14]) of the Direct Communication Response message. The signature is computed over the User of UE-2 Info, Nonce 1 and the SAKKE parameters. + +*Editor's note: The exact parameters of input parameters to calculation of the signature is FFS* + +SAKKE – UE-2 generates a 256-bit key Shared Secret Value (SSV), which is used as KD (root key), and encodes SSV value into a SAKKE payload according to the algorithm described in RFC 6508 [24], using the KMS Public Key and the public identity of the user of UE-1. + +Upon receipt of the Direct Security Mode message, the UE-1 verifies the signature payload SIGN. If the verification test is successful, it decrypts SAKKE payload to extract the SSV which is used as a KD (root key) from which other keys can be derived. + +3. Upon successful processing of the Direct Security Mode Command message, UE-1 responds with a Direct Security Mode Complete. + +Both UEs shall store their own and the other UE's User Info with the KD. + +## 6.6 Security for ProSe Public Safety Discovery + +### 6.6.1 General + +The ProSe Public Safety Discovery procedures are described in TS 23.303 [2]. This clause details the security procedures for ProSe Public Safety Discovery. + +The functionality in this clause may only be supported by ProSe-enabled Public Safety UEs. + +### 6.6.2 Security Requirements + +The requirements in clause 5.3.2 apply for the signalling between the UE and ProSe Function. + +For the distribution of the keys used to protect the discovery message, the following requirements apply: + +- The keys shall be protected in integrity and confidentiality during their distribution. +- Only authorized Public Safety ProSe-enabled UEs shall receive the keys. +- It shall be possible for the Public Safety ProSe-enabled UE to authenticate the network entity distributing the keys. +- It shall be possible for the Public Safety ProSe-enabled UE to store shared keys for past and future cryptoperiods. +- Authorized Public Safety Prose-enabled UEs shall securely store the shared keys. For the discovery messages over the PC5 interface, the following security requirements apply: +- The system shall support a method to mitigate the replay attack, source authenticity verification and integrity protection of public safety discovery messages. +- The system should provide a means of minimising the possibility of tracking of UEs based on the content of their discovery messages over time. +- The system shall support the confidentiality of information added to the messages. + +### 6.6.3 Overview of ProSe Public Safety Discovery + +#### 6.6.3.1 General + +There are two types of ProSe Public Safety Discovery described in TS 23.303 [2]: Relay Discovery (including the additional Discovery messages) and Group Member Discovery. The security measures for both of these are identical and are reusing the following aspects: + +- the key provisioning mechanism that ProSe one-to-many communication uses, whereby a root key is fetched (the PGK – see subclause 6.2.3.1 of the present specification) along with associated security information; and +- the mechanisms defined for restricted discovery in terms of protecting the discovery messages over the air (see subclause 6.1.3.4.3 of the present specification with the needed DUIK, DUCK and DUSKs derived from the root key). It is optional to support scrambling for Public Safety Discovery. + +Like open and restricted discovery, ProSe Public Safety Discovery also uses a UTC-based counter (see step 9 in clause 6.1.3.3) to provide freshness for the protection of the restricted discovery message on the PC5 interface. The parameters CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET are also provided to the UE from the PKMF to ensure that the obtained UTC-based counter is sufficiently close to real time to protect against replays. + +#### 6.6.3.2 Key and their identities + +The Public Safety Discovery Key (PSDK) is the root key that is used for the protection of the Public Safety Discovery messages. It is identified by an 8-bit PSDK ID and each PSDK is associated with one or more Relay Service Codes and/or Discovery Group IDs. This association is achieved by allocating a 24-bit Key Type ID to the Relay Service Codes (RSCs) and Discovery Group IDs during the Key Request/Key Response procedure. The Key Type ID is also + +included in the MIKEY message, so a delivered PSDK can be associated with the correct RSCs and/or Discovery Group IDs. + +NOTE: The allocation of RSC and/or Discovery Group ID to a particular Key Type ID is specific to a UE and does not need to be common across all UEs. + +When the PSDKs are provided to the UE, they shall be provided with an Expiry Time. The Expiry Time of the PSDK needs to be set such that the keys for later periods have a longer expiration period. Each PSDKs for each Key Type ID shall be associated with a different Expiry Time value. + +All expired PSDK, except the most recently expired of the PSDK(s), should be deleted. + +Public Safety discovery also uses the PMK and PMK ID for the MIKEY messages as described in subclauses 6.2.3.1 and 6.2.3.2 of the present specification. + +### 6.6.4 Security flows + +#### 6.6.4.1 Overview + +The configuration of the security material for the protection of direct discovery messages is shown in the figure 6.6.4.1-1: + +![Sequence diagram showing the configuration of parameters for public safety discovery between UE, ProSe Function(s), and PKMF.](a548c5381cebd2650c5edb725b19f795_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant ProSeFunction as ProSe Function(s) + participant PKMF + + Note over UE: 0. Configure + UE<->ProSeFunction: 1. UE get provisioned discovery parameters plus PKMF address + UE->>PKMF: 2.i. Key Request (Relay Service Code or Discovery Group ID) + Note over PKMF: 2.ii. Check authorisation + PKMF->>UE: 2.iii. Key Response (Key Type ID, Security metadata) + PKMF->>UE: 2.iv. MIKEY (Key Type ID, PSDK ID, PSDK) + UE->>PKMF: 2.v. MIKEY Verification message () + Note over UE: 3. Ready to send/receive discovery message + +``` + +The diagram illustrates the sequence of interactions for configuring parameters for public safety discovery. It involves three main entities: UE (User Equipment), ProSe Function(s), and PKMF (ProSe Key Management Function). The sequence starts with a '0. Configure' step on the UE side. The first message is '1. UE get provisioned discovery parameters plus PKMF address' which is a bidirectional exchange between the UE and the ProSe Function(s). The second part of the sequence involves a 'Key Request' (2.i) from the UE to the PKMF, which triggers a 'Check authorisation' (2.ii) on the PKMF side. The PKMF then sends a 'Key Response' (2.iii) with 'Key Type ID, Security metadata' back to the UE. This is followed by a 'MIKEY' message (2.iv) from the PKMF to the UE containing 'Key Type ID, PSDK ID, PSDK'. The UE then sends a 'MIKEY Verification message' (2.v) back to the PKMF. Finally, the UE reaches a state of being 'Ready to send/receive discovery message' (3). + +Sequence diagram showing the configuration of parameters for public safety discovery between UE, ProSe Function(s), and PKMF. + +**Figure 6.6.4.1-1: Configuration of parameters for public safety discovery** + +0: If needed the UE could be configured with any private keys, associated certificates or root certificate that may be needed for contacting the ProSe Key Management Function to allow the keys to be kept secret from the operator. If none are provided, then the USIM credentials are used to protect that interface. + +- 1: The UE fetches the Relay Service Codes and Discovery Group IDs from its HPLMN ProSe Function. Each one of these is associated with the ProSe Key Management Function address that shall be used to fetch security parameters for these types of discovery. These parameters may also be pre-configured into the UE. +- 2.i: The Key Request and Response message are protected as described in subclause 6.Y.6. The UE sends the Key Request message to the ProSe Key Management Function including the relevant Relay Service Codes or the Discovery Group ID that it wishes to get security material for. +- 2.ii: The ProSe Key Management Function checks the authorization for the requested discoveries, and what types of protection to apply to it. The authorisation check performed by PKMF will be successful only if the Remote UE has subscribed to the relay service, the UE-to-Network relay is authorised to act as a relay, or if the requesting UE is in the group identified by the Discovery Group ID. +- 2.iii: The ProSe Key Management Function responds with the Key Response message. If the check of step 2.ii is successful, this message contains the *security metadata* associated with the discovery. Such *security metadata* include information on how to protect the discovery and the Key Type for that discovery. +- 2.iv: The ProSe Key Management Function sends the relevant PSDKs to the UE using MIKEY. +- 2.v: The UE responds with a MIKEY Verification message if requested by the PKMF +- 3: The UE is now ready to send or receive protected discovery messages. + +#### 6.6.4.2 Messages between UE and ProSe Key Management Function + +##### 6.6.4.2.1 General + +There are two types of messages that are exchanged between the UE and ProSe Key Management Function. Firstly, there are the Key Request and Response messages. The UE uses these messages to request and receive the relevant PSDK and associated security material for the Public Safety Discoveries it wishes to protect. Secondly, there are the MIKEY messages, which the ProSe Key Management Function uses to send the PSDKs to the UE. These messages are detailed in the following subclauses. + +##### 6.6.4.2.2 Key Request and Key Response messages + +The purpose of these messages is for the UE to request the PSDK from the ProSe Key Management Function. The UE knows from which ProSe Key Management Function(s) to get the needed PSDK(S), as the FQDN of the PKMF are either pre-provisioned or provided by the ProSe Function. + +The UE shall not release the PDN connection used to receive MIKEY messages containing PSDKs until the UE has informed each ProSe Key Management Function that it no longer requires PSDK(s). This is to ensure that the ProSe Key Management Function is aware of the correct UE IP address for the purpose of performing PSDK deliveries as specified in clause 6.6.4.2.3. + +If the UE detects that a PDN connection, which is used for receiving PSDKs is released by the network, the UE should try to send a new Key Request to inform the ProSe Key Management Function of its new IP address. This is to ensure that the ProSe Key Management Function becomes aware of the new UE IP address for the purpose of performing PSDK deliveries. Any new IP address should override any existing ones of the UE at the ProSe Key Management Function. + +When sending a Key Request for a PSDK, the UE shall include all the relevant details of all types of keys that the UE is expecting to receive from the PKMF, e.g. any PGKs for one-to-many ProSe communication. + +![Sequence diagram showing the interaction between UE and PKMF for Key Request and Key Response messages.](f0eaca8e167a863864b4ad9adb7ef16f_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant PKMF + Note right of UE: Key Request + UE->>PKMF: Key Request + Note left of PKMF: Key Response (Success/Failure) + PKMF-->>UE: Key Response (Success/Failure) +``` + +The diagram illustrates a sequence of two messages between a User Equipment (UE) and a ProSe Key Management Function (PKMF). The UE sends a 'Key Request' message to the PKMF, and the PKMF responds with a 'Key Response (Success/Failure)' message back to the UE. + +Sequence diagram showing the interaction between UE and PKMF for Key Request and Key Response messages. + +Figure 6.6.4.2.2-1: Key Request/Response message + +The protection for the Key Request and Key Response message is described in subclause 6.6.6. + +When sending a Key Request message to request the ProSe Key Management Function to send PSDKs or to change the Relay Service Codes or Group Discovery IDs for which it wants to receive keys, the UE shall include the following information; + +- The UE's public safety discovery security capabilities, which indicate whether the UE supports scrambling or not; +- List of Relay Service Codes and Discovery Group IDs for which the UE would like to receive keys; +- For each Relay Service Code or Discovery Group ID, the PSDK ID of any keys for those discovery that the UE holds. If the UE holds no keys for this discovery, then it sends an all zero PSDK ID; +- List of Relay Service Codes and Discovery Group IDs for which the UE would like to stop receiving keys. + +The ProSe Key Management Function shall check that the UE is authorised to receive keys for the requested discoveries. This is done by using the UE identity that is bound to the keys that established the TLS tunnel in which the message is sent. If the UE isn't then the ProSe Key Management Function responds with the appropriate error. The ProSe Key Management Function shall also check UE's public safety discovery security capabilities to find out whether UE supports scrambling or not, and responds with an appropriate error if not. The ProSe Key Management Function shall update the stored set of the discoveries for which the UE will be sent keys. + +The ProSe Key Management Function responds to the UE with a Key Response message that includes the following parameters: + +- List of the Relay Service Codes and Discovery Group IDs that were included in the Key Request message; +- For each discovery (relay or group member) that keys will be supplied for, the security meta-data that should be used to indicate how to protect the discovery message and the Key Type ID for the discovery; and +- for each of the other groups, a status code to indicate why keys will not be supplied for that group. +- An optional PMK and PMK Identity. +- CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET. + +For the groups that the UE will get keys for, the UE shall store the received information associated with that discovery. If a PMK and PMK identity are included, the UE shall store these and delete any previously stored ones for this ProSe Key Management Function. The security meta-data inform the UE whether it needs to apply scrambling, message specific confidentiality and/or MIC checking (see subclause 6.1.3.4.3). If message-specific confidentiality is needed, then the security meta-data includes the Encrypted\_bit\_mask. + +The UE uses CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET in the same way as from Open Discovery: the UE may start announcing only if the UTC-based counter provided by the system associated with the discovery slot is within the MAX\_OFFSET of the announcing UE's ProSe clock. The UE's ProSe clock is (re)set based on the provided CURRENT\_TIME. + +The ProSe Key Management Function shall initiate the PGK delivery procedures for the keys that are needed by the UE. + +##### 6.6.4.2.3 MIKEY messages + +###### 6.6.4.2.3.1 General + +MIKEY is used to transport the PSDKs from the ProSe Key Management Function to the UE. MIKEY is used exactly as in subclause 6.2.3.3.2.3 (which is for carrying PGKs), except as follows: + +- IDi payload is formed from the Key Type ID || PSDK ID @ FQDN of the ProSe Key Management Function at the PKMF. +- The UE recognises that it is receiving a PSDK rather than PGK based on the Key Type ID in the IDi payload. +- An all zero PSDK ID is used to trigger the UE to send a Key Request message. + +### 6.6.5 Protection of traffic between UE and ProSe Function + +In order to protect the messages between the UE and ProSe Function, the UE shall support the procedures for the UE given in subclause 5.3.3.2 and the ProSe Function shall support the procedures for the network function given in subclause 5.3.3. + +### 6.6.6 Protection of traffic between UE and ProSe Key Management Function + +In order to protect the UE-initiated messages between the UE and ProSe Key Management Function, the UE shall support the procedures for the UE given in subclause 5.3.3.2 and the ProSe Key Management Function shall support the procedures for the network function given in subclause 5.3.3.2. + +The MIKEY messages are protected as described in subclause 6.6.4.2.3.1. + +### 6.6.7 Protection of discovery messages between the UEs + +The protection of ProSe Public Safety Discovery Message over PC5 is very similar to that of Restricted Discovery. When sending and receiving a discovery message, the UE uses the PSDK that has not expired (using the time in the UTC based counter associated with the discovery slot to check expiry) and has the earliest expiration time to derive the needed subkeys for the security of that message. + +In order to protect the discovery messages over PC5, the UE first calculates the necessary (as indicated in the security meta-data) DUSK, DUCK and DUIK for the particular discovery using the appropriate PSDK. To this end, a KDF is used to derive each of the keys indicated in the security meta-data, as follows: + +- If the security meta-data indicates a DUSK should be used, then the UE derives the DUSK from the PSDK using a KDF as in Annex A.8. +- If the security meta-data indicates a DUCK should be used, and an Encrypted\_bits\_mask is included, then the UE derives the DUCK from the PSDK using a KDF as in Annex A.8 + +If the security meta-data indicates a DUIK should be used, then the UE derives the DUIK from the PSDK using a KDF as in Annex A.8. + +A sending UE then follows subclause 6.1.3.4.3.2, while a receiving UE follows subclause 6.1.3.4.3.3 except that it never sends the discovery message to the ProSe Function for MIC checking. + +## 6.7 Security for ProSe UE-to-network relays + +### 6.7.1 General + +The ProSe UE-to-network relays procedures are described in TS 23.303 [2]. This clause details the security procedures for ProSe UE-to-network relays. + +The functionality in this clause may only be supported by ProSe-enabled Public Safety UEs. + +### 6.7.2 Security Requirements + +The requirements in clause 5.3.2 apply for the signalling between the UE and ProSe Function. + +For the discovery, the security requirement in subclause 6.6.2 apply. + +For the distribution of the keys used to protect the relay signalling, the following requirements apply: + +- The keys shall be protected in integrity and confidentiality during their distribution. +- Only authorized Public Safety ProSe-enabled UEs shall receive the keys. + +- It shall be possible for the Public Safety ProSe-enabled UE to authenticate the network entity distributing the keys. +- Authorized Public Safety ProSe-enabled UEs shall securely store the shared keys. For the non-discovery communication between the Remote UE and relay, the requirements on one-to-one communication in subclause 6.5.2 apply except the one on mutual authentication of out of coverage UEs. + +The system shall support mutual authentication between Remote UE and UE-to-Network Relay. + +Both Remote UE and UE-to-Network Relay shall be authorised by the ProSe Function. + +### 6.7.3 Overview of ProSe UE-to-network relay security + +#### 6.7.3.1 General + +The ProSe UE-to-network relay procedures consist of two distinct phases, i.e. the discovery of the UE-to-network relay and the communication between the Remote UE and UE-to-network relay. + +The security of the discovery messages uses the procedures provided in the current specification. The security of the communication between the Remote UE and UE-to-network relay uses the procedures described in clause 6.5 to establish the security context and protect the actual communication. The part of the security establishment that is specific to the UE-to-network relay use case is the establishment of the shared key $K_D$ . The procedures for this operation are described in the next subclause. + +Following the general sequence of flows for public safety one to one communication, a shared key $K_D$ needs to be established. This key serves to derive session keys between the Remote UE and the UE-to-network relay. + +In order to generate $K_D$ , the Remote UE needs a ProSe Relay User Key (PRUK) and an associated 64-bit PRUK ID from a PKMF. The PRUK ID is used to identify the PRUK to the PKMF of the UE-to-network relay. The PRUK can be used to generate $K_D$ for any of the relays under a particular PKMF and hence only one PRUK for each Remote UE is needed from a particular PKMF. This PRUK needs to be fetched by the Remote UE while it is still in coverage. This implies that the Remote UE must contact all the PKMFs of any potential relays it wants to be able to use. + +The Remote UE fetches its PRUK from the PKMF using the Key Request/Response messages or may receive one through GBA PUSH as part of establishing the communication with the relay. The UE-to-network relay fetches the $K_D$ that will be used to secure the communication by sending to its PKMF the PRUK ID or IMSI if the Remote UE does not have a PRUK for the relay or the supplied PRUK has been rejected. At the PKMF side, the corresponding PRUK is retrieved. The $K_D$ is then derived from the PRUK using a $K_D$ Freshness Parameter (a locally generated random number), which the PKMF then passes to the Remote UE via the UE-to-network Relay, a nonce sent by the Remote UE via the UE-to-network Relay and the Relay Service Code the Remote UE wishes to access. The UE-to-network Relay receives the $K_D$ and the $K_D$ Freshness Parameter, and stores the $K_D$ . Having obtained the $K_D$ Freshness Parameter enables the Remote UE to derive the same $K_D$ as the PKMF did. + +If the Remote UE receives a new PRUK in a Key Response message, it deletes any previous one for that PKMF. If it receives a new one through a GBA PUSH message, it shall overwrite any PRUK received through a GBA PUSH message that has not been successfully used to establish a relay connection. Once a PRUK received through a GBA PUSH Message has been used to calculate a $K_D$ for a successful relay connection establishment, the Remote UE shall delete any previous PRUKs for this PKMF. + +#### 6.7.3.2 Security flows + +##### 6.7.3.2.1 Overview + +This subclause describes the overall security flows for UE-to-network relays. These include the basic attach flows, dealing with re-synchronisation errors in GPI and the rekeying flows. + +###### 6.7.3.2.1.1 Remote UE attaching to a ProSe UE-to-network relay + +There are several possible ways that the parameters needed for UE-to-network relay can be provisioned onto the Remote UE and UE-to-network relay. The flow described in Figure 6.7.3.2.1.1-1 is for the case when the general parameters are fetched from the ProSe Function(s). In other cases some of the steps can be omitted if the relevant parameters are already in place. The figure shows only the parameters that are relevant to the UE-to-network relay security and not all the parameters carried by each message. + +![Sequence diagram showing UE-to-network relay security flows between Remote UE, ProSe Function(s), PKMF of Relay, and HSS/BSF of UE.](7ed5d5770331f31ade15439a21c31425_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant Remote UE + participant ProSe Function(s) + participant PKMF of Relay + participant HSS/BSF of UE + Note right of Remote UE: UE-to-network relay + + Remote UE->>ProSe Function(s): 0a. Remote UE get provisioned relay discovery parameters plus PKMF address + Remote UE->>PKMF of Relay: 0b. Get Discovery security material + Remote UE->>PKMF of Relay: 1a. Key Request (Relay Key Required, PRUK ID) + PKMF of Relay->>Remote UE: 1b. Key Response (PRUK, PRUK ID) + + Note right of Remote UE: UE-to-network relay + Remote UE->>ProSe Function(s): 0c. Relay get provisioned relay discovery parameters plus PKMF address + Remote UE->>PKMF of Relay: 0d. Get Discovery security material + + Remote UE->>PKMF of Relay: 2. Model A or B Relay Discovery + Remote UE->>PKMF of Relay: 3. Direct Communication Request (PRUK ID or IMSI, Relay Service Code) + PKMF of Relay->>PKMF of Relay: 4a. Key Request (PRUK ID or IMSI, Relay Service Code, Nonce_1) + PKMF of Relay->>HSS/BSF of UE: 4b. Fetch GPI or AV for user + HSS/BSF of UE->>PKMF of Relay: 4c. Key Response (KD, KD Freshness Parameter, GPI, Remote UE Identity) + PKMF of Relay->>Remote UE: 5a. Direct Security Mode Command (KD Freshness Parameter, GPI) + Remote UE->>PKMF of Relay: 5b. Direct Security Mode Complete () + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing UE-to-network relay security flows between Remote UE, ProSe Function(s), PKMF of Relay, and HSS/BSF of UE. + +**Figure 6.7.3.2.1.1-1: UE-to-network relay security flows** + +0. The Remote UE and the UE-to-network relay fetch the parameters necessary to act as a Remote UE and UE-to-network relay respectively (see TS 23.303[2]), the PKMF address for accessing the relay and the security parameters required to protect the relay discovery messages (see subclause 6.6). + +NOTE: Part of step 0b may be performed at the same time as step 1a to 1b as the same messages are used to initiate fetching the keys for protecting relay discovery. + +1a. The Remote UE sends a Key Request message to the PKMF of the UE-to-network relay. The message indicates that the Remote UE is requesting a ProSe Relay User Key (PRUK) from the PKMF. If the Remote UE already has a PRUK from this PKMF, the message shall also contain the PRUK ID of the PRUK. + +- 1b. The ProSe Key Management Function shall check that the Remote UE is authorised to receive UE-to-network Relay service from one of its relays. This is done by using the Remote UE identity that is bound to the keys that established the TLS tunnel in which the message is sent. If the Remote UE is successfully authorised, the PKMF sends a Key Response message to the Remote UE that may contain a PRUK and PRUK ID. If a PRUK and PRUK ID are included, the Remote UE shall store these and delete any previously stored ones for this ProSe Key Management Function. +2. The Remote UE discovers the UE-to-network Relay using either model A or model B discovery. +3. The Remote UE sends a Direct Communication Request. The Long Term ID shall contain the PRUK ID of the PRUK that the Remote UE want to use to get relay connectivity if the Remote UE has a PRUK for this relay and an attempt to connect to this relay has not been rejected due to the PRUK ID not being recognised. Otherwise the Remote UE shall use its IMSI in the Long Term ID. The Direct Communication Request contains the Relay Service Code that the Remote UE would like to access. +- 4a. The UE-to-network relay sends a Key Request message to the PKMF. The message shall contain the PRUK ID or IMSI, the Relay Service Code and Nonce\_1 (see subclause 6.5.5.2) provided by the Remote UE. The PKMF identifies the UE by the PRUK ID or IMSI. The PKMF checks the context of the Remote UE to confirm whether it can connect to the network via the selected ProSe UE-to-network Relay for the given Relay Service Code. +- 4b. If the PKMF confirms the Remote UE can connect to the network via the selected ProSe UE-to- network Relay, the PKMF decides if it requires a new PRUK for this UE, i.e. policy in the PKMF decides that PRUK ID needs refreshing or the relay provided the IMSI of the UE. If so the PKMF proceeds as follows: + + +If the PKMF supports the Zpn interface to the BSF of the UE, the PKMF shall request a GBA Push Info (GPI – see TS 33.223[38]) for the Remote UE from the BSF. When requesting the GPI, it includes a non-zero 64-bit PRUK ID in the P-TID field. On reception of the GPI, the PKMF uses Ks(\_ext)\_NAF as the PRUK. + +If the PKMF support the PC4a interface to the HSS of the UE, then the PKMF shall request an Authentication Vector (AV) for the UE. On receiving the AV, the PKMF locally forms the GPI including a non-zero 64-bit PRUK ID in the P-TID field and sets PRUK as above. +- 4c. The PKMF generate a random number as the $K_D$ Freshness Parameter. The PKMF uses the PRUK to calculate $K_D$ with the Relay Service Code, Nonce\_1 and $K_D$ Freshness Parameter as inputs. The PKMF shall send the Remote UE Identity, $K_D$ , $K_D$ Freshness Parameter and the GPI if used to calculate a fresh PRUK to the UE-to-network relay. +- 5a. Using the supplied $K_D$ to protect the message, the UE-to-network relay sends a Direct Security Mode Command message to the Remote UE (see 6.5.2.2). This message shall contain the $K_D$ Freshness Parameter and the GPI if it received them from the PKMF. +- 5b. If the Remote UE receives a GPI, it calculates a new PRUK and associated PRUK ID (see step 4b above). The Remote UE derives $K_D$ from its PRUK and the received $K_D$ Freshness Parameter, Nonce\_1 and the Relay Service Code (as described in Annex A.Y). It then processes the Direct Security Mode Command as described in 6.5.2.2. If this is successful, the Remote UE responds with a Direct Security Mode Complete message and the Remote UE and UE-to-network relay may start to exchange user data. + +###### 6.7.3.2.1.2 Re-synchronisation in GBA Push authentication + +This subclause provides the flows when the UE discovers a synchronisation failure when processing the authentication challenge that was sent to it as part of the GPI (for details of synchronisation failures – see TS 33.102[42]). Synchronisation failures can happen in both the attachment flow (described in subclause 6.7.3.2.1.1) and the rekeying flow (described in subclause 6.7.3.1.3). The re-synchronisation flow is shown in figure 6.7.3.2.1.2-1, which only shows the contents of messages that are different for the synchronisation case. + +![Sequence diagram for Re-synchronisation flows. Lifelines: Remote UE, UE-to-network relay, PKMF of Relay, HSS/BSF of UE. The sequence starts with step 0: Attach or rekeying flows before the Direct Security Mode Command. Step 1a: Direct Security Mode Command() from relay to Remote UE. Step 1b: Direct Security Mode Fail (RAND, AUTS) from Remote UE to relay. Step 2a: Key Request (RAND, AUTS) from relay to PKMF. Step 2b: Fetch GPI or AV for user (RAND, AUTS) from PKMF to HSS/BSF. Step 2c: Key Response() from HSS/BSF to PKMF. Step 3a: Direct Security Mode Command() from PKMF to Remote UE. Step 3b: Direct Security Mode Complete() from Remote UE to PKMF.](9b1ec0090070bdf52ea28763b8d52477_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant Remote UE + participant UE-to-network relay + participant PKMF of Relay + participant HSS/BSF of UE + + Note over all: 0. Attach or rekeying flows before the Direct Security Mode Command + Note over all: 1a. Direct Security Mode Command() + Remote UE->>UE-to-network relay: 1b. Direct Security Mode Fail (RAND, AUTS) + UE-to-network relay->>PKMF of Relay: 2a. Key Request (RAND, AUTS) + PKMF of Relay->>HSS/BSF of UE: 2b. Fetch GPI or AV for user (RAND, AUTS) + HSS/BSF of UE->>PKMF of Relay: 2c. Key Response() + PKMF of Relay->>Remote UE: 3a. Direct Security Mode Command() + Remote UE->>PKMF of Relay: 3b. Direct Security Mode Complete() + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Re-synchronisation flows. Lifelines: Remote UE, UE-to-network relay, PKMF of Relay, HSS/BSF of UE. The sequence starts with step 0: Attach or rekeying flows before the Direct Security Mode Command. Step 1a: Direct Security Mode Command() from relay to Remote UE. Step 1b: Direct Security Mode Fail (RAND, AUTS) from Remote UE to relay. Step 2a: Key Request (RAND, AUTS) from relay to PKMF. Step 2b: Fetch GPI or AV for user (RAND, AUTS) from PKMF to HSS/BSF. Step 2c: Key Response() from HSS/BSF to PKMF. Step 3a: Direct Security Mode Command() from PKMF to Remote UE. Step 3b: Direct Security Mode Complete() from Remote UE to PKMF. + +**Figure 6. 7.3.2.1.2-1: Re-synchronisation flows** + +This steps are the identical to the Attach and rekeying flows up to the Direct Security Mode Command in these flows + +- 1a. The Direct Security Mode Command contains the same parameters as the Direct Security Mode Command in the Attach or rekeying flows. On processing the GPI parameter contained in this message, the ME receives a synchronisation failure response for the USIM. +- 1b. The Remote UE send a Direct Security Mode Failure to the relay that contains the RAND and AUTS parameters +- 2a. The relay send a Key Request message to the PKMF of the Relay and includes the RAND and AUTS received from the Remote UE. +- 2b. If the PKMF supports the Zpn interface to the BSF of the UE, the PKMF shall request a GBA Push Info (GPI – see TS 33.223[38]) for the Remote UE from the BSF and include the RAND and AUTS parameters. When requesting the GPI, it includes the 64-bit PRUK ID in the P-TID field. On reception of the GPI, the PKMF uses Ks(\_ext)\_NAF as the PRUK. + +If the PKMF support the PC4a interface to the HSS of the UE, then the PKMF shall request an Authentication Vector (AV) for the UE and include the RAND and AUTS parameters. On receiving the AV, the PKMF locally forms the GPI including the 64-bit PRUK ID in the P-TID field and sets PRUK as above. + +- 2c, 3a and 3b. These messages are identical to the corresponding messages in the Attach and rekeying flows. + +###### 6.7.3.2.1.3 Rekeying procedures + +Due to the asymmetric nature of the keying for relays, there are three rekeying cases that need to be considered. Firstly there is the rekeying that only changes $K_{D\_sess}$ but not $K_D$ . Secondly there is the rekeying that is initiated by the Remote UE that changes $K_D$ and finally rekeying that is initiated by the relay that changes $K_D$ . Each of these is described in turn. + +Rekeying without changing $K_D$ happens exactly as described in subclause 6.5.5.3. The Remote UE includes its PRUK ID as the Long Term ID in the Direct Rekey Request messages, whereas the relay does not include a Long Term Key ID. + +A rekeying that changes $K_D$ that is triggered by the Remote UE is shown in figure 6.7.3.2.1.3-1. The steps follow subclause 6.5.5.3 and only message contents that are specific to this use are included + +![Sequence diagram for Rekeying K_D when initiated by the Remote UE. Lifelines: Remote UE, UE-to-network relay, PKMF of Relay, HSS/BSF of UE. The sequence shows: 1. Direct Rekey Request (PRUK ID) from Remote UE to relay; 2a. Key Request (PRUK ID) from relay to PKMF; 2b. Fetch GPI or AV for user () from PKMF to HSS/BSF; 2c. Key Response () from HSS/BSF to PKMF; 3a. Direct Security Mode Command () from relay to Remote UE; 3b. Direct Security Mode Complete () from Remote UE to relay.](b34c69e1ec326b01c3a485b27b1df5f6_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant Remote UE + participant UE-to-network relay + participant PKMF of Relay + participant HSS/BSF of UE + + Remote UE->>UE-to-network relay: 1. Direct Rekey Request (PRUK ID) + UE-to-network relay->>PKMF of Relay: 2a. Key Request (PRUK ID) + PKMF of Relay<->>HSS/BSF of UE: 2b. Fetch GPI or AV for user () + PKMF of Relay->>UE-to-network relay: 2c. Key Response () + UE-to-network relay->>Remote UE: 3a. Direct Security Mode Command () + Remote UE->>UE-to-network relay: 3b. Direct Security Mode Complete () + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Rekeying K\_D when initiated by the Remote UE. Lifelines: Remote UE, UE-to-network relay, PKMF of Relay, HSS/BSF of UE. The sequence shows: 1. Direct Rekey Request (PRUK ID) from Remote UE to relay; 2a. Key Request (PRUK ID) from relay to PKMF; 2b. Fetch GPI or AV for user () from PKMF to HSS/BSF; 2c. Key Response () from HSS/BSF to PKMF; 3a. Direct Security Mode Command () from relay to Remote UE; 3b. Direct Security Mode Complete () from Remote UE to relay. + +**Figure 6.7.3.2.1.3-1: Rekeying $K_D$ when rekeying was initiated by the Remote UE** + +1; The Remote UE send a Direct Rekey Request including its PRUK ID to the Relay. + +2a, 2b, 2c, 3a and 3b. The content and handling of these messages are the same as messages in the Attach flow (subclause 6.7.3.2.1.1) except the security contexts are handled as in subclause 6.5.5.3. + +A rekeying that changes $K_D$ that is initiated by the relay proceeds as follows. The relay sends a Direct Key Request that does not contain a Long Term ID. Instead of responding to this message, the Remote UE sends its own Direct Rekey Request and the procedure continues as for the rekeying that changes $K_D$ that is triggered by the Remote UE. + +##### 6.7.3.2.2 Messages between the Remote UE and ProSe Key Management Function + +###### 6.7.3.2.2.1 General + +Key Request and Response messages are exchanged between the Remote UE and ProSe Key Management Function. The Remote UE uses these messages to request a PRUK to use with relays. These messages are detailed in the following subclauses. + +###### 6.7.3.2.2.2 Key Request and Key Response messages + +The purpose of these messages is for the Remote UE to request the PRUK from the ProSe Key Management Function. The Remote UE knows from which ProSe Key Management Function(s) to get the needed PRUK(s) as the FQDN(s) of the PKMF(s) are either pre-provisioned or provided by the ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the Remote UE. + +When sending a Key Request for a PRUK, the Remote UE shall include all the relevant details of all types of keys that the Remote UE is expecting to receive from the PKMF, e.g. any PGKs for one-to-many ProSe communication. + +![Sequence diagram showing Key Request and Key Response between Remote UE and PKMF of Relay.](65e8c0628536d6d4245e9ab46ba070c3_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant Remote UE + participant PKMF of Relay + Remote UE->>PKMF of Relay: Key Request + PKMF of Relay-->>Remote UE: Key Response (Success/Failure) + +``` + +A sequence diagram illustrating the interaction between a Remote UE and the PKMF of a Relay. The Remote UE sends a 'Key Request' message to the PKMF of Relay. The PKMF of Relay responds with a 'Key Response (Success/Failure)' message. + +Sequence diagram showing Key Request and Key Response between Remote UE and PKMF of Relay. + +**Figure 6.7.3. 2.2.2-1: Key Request/Response for Remote UE** + +The protection for the Key Request and Key Response message is described in subclause 6.7.3.4. + +When sending a Key Request message to request the ProSe Key Management Function to send to either get a PRUK or ensure its PRUK is upto date, the Remote UE shall include the following information; + +- An indication of whether the Remote UE wants to receive PRUKs from this PKMF. +- PRUK ID (if any) that the Remote UE has for this PKMF. If it has none it send an all zero PRUK ID. + +The ProSe Key Management Function shall check that the Remote UE is authorised to receive PRUKs. This is done by using the Remote UE identity that is bound to the keys that established the TLS tunnel in which the message is sent. If the Remote UE is not authorised, then the ProSe Key Management Function responds with the appropriate error. + +The ProSe Key Management Function responds to the Remote UE with a Key Response message that includes the following parameters: + +- If the Remote UE is authorised to receive PRUKs, then the message may include a PRUK and PRUK ID +- Otherwise, a status code to indicate why PRUKs will not be supplied. + +If a PRUK and PRUK ID are included, the Remote UE shall store these and delete any previously stored ones that were obtained from this ProSe Key Management Function. + +#### 6.7.3. 2.3 Messages between the Relay and ProSe Key Management Function + +#### 6.7.3. 2.3.1 General + +There are only Key Request/Response messages exchanged between the UE-to-network Relay and ProSe Key Management Function. + +### 6.7.3. 2.3.2 Key Request and Key Response messages + +The purpose of these messages is for the Relay to request the KD from the ProSe Key Management Function. + +![Sequence diagram showing Key Request and Key Response between Relay and PKMF of Relay.](2759a666ac2539719a824808eb2c1638_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant Relay + participant PKMF of Relay + Relay->>PKMF of Relay: Key Request + PKMF of Relay-->>Relay: Key Response (Success/Failure) + +``` + +A sequence diagram illustrating the interaction between a Relay and the PKMF of a Relay. The Relay sends a 'Key Request' message to the PKMF of Relay. The PKMF of Relay responds with a 'Key Response (Success/Failure)' message. + +Sequence diagram showing Key Request and Key Response between Relay and PKMF of Relay. + +**Figure 6.7.3. 2.3.2-1: Key Request/Response for Relay** + +The protection for the Key Request and Key Response message is described in subclause 6. 7.3.4. + +When sending a Key Request message to request the ProSe Key Management Function to request a KD, the UE-to-network relay shall include the following information; + +- Either the PRUK ID or the IMSI that was provided in the Direct Communication Request message or Direct Rekey Request; +- Relay Service Code that the Remote UE requested to use; +- Nonce\_1 that was sent from the Remote UE to the UE-to-network relay in either the Direct Commuications Request or Direct Rekey Request that triggered this Key Request; and +- RAND and AUTS, in the case of a synchronisation failure of the AV in the GPI. + +The ProSe Key Management Function shall check that the Relay is authorised to serve the identified Remote UE for the supplied Relay Service Code. This is done by using the Relay's identity that is bound to the keys that established the TLS tunnel in which the message is sent. If the Relay is not authorised or the Remote UE can not be identified, then the ProSe Key Management Function responds with the appropriate error. + +If the ProSe Key Management Function decides to provide a $K_D$ to the UE-to-network relay, then it generates a random number that it sends as the $K_D$ Freshness parameter to the UE-to-network relay. The ProSe Key Management Function also calculates the $K_D$ (as described in Annex A.Y) from either the PRUK related to the supplied PRUK ID or the new PRUK if this is to be updated (see subclause 6.X.3.2.1.1). In addition to these parameter, the ProSe Key Management Function also provides a Remote UE Identity that the UE-to-network relay provides to the MME. The Remote UE Identity is either the IMSI, MSISDN or a 128-bit string. + +NOTE: In general, IMSI should not be sent outside of the operator network in order to protect user privacy. The UE-to-Network Relay cannot be regarded as a network entity in the traditional sense e.g. as an eNB. On the other hand, the PKMF may have a sufficient level of trust in a UE-to-Network Relays to provide the IMSI. Instead of sending the IMSI, the PKMF can send a 128-bit string to the UE-to-Network Relay instead of the IMSI. The string should be such that the MME map the character string to a wanted Remote UE identity (e.g. IMSI) but that the UE-to-Network Relay cannot deduce the Remote UE identity. How this mapping is done in the MME has not been specified by SA3. The mapping information needs to be provisioned into the MME. + +The ProSe Key Management Function responds to the Relay with a Key Response message that includes the following parameters: + +- For a successful case, + - a $K_D$ ; + - $K_D$ Freshness parameter; + - an optional GPI; and + - Remote UE Identity. +- Otherwise, a status code to indicate why $K_D$ will not be supplied. + +#### 6.7.3.3 Protection of traffic between Remote UE or Relay and ProSe Function + +In order to protect the messages between the Remote UE/UE-to-network Relay and ProSe Function, the Remote UE/UE-to-network relay shall support the procedures for the UE given in subclause 5.3.3.2 and the ProSe Function shall support the procedures for the network function given in subclause 5.3.3.2. + +#### 6.7.3.4 Protection of traffic between Remote UE or Relay and ProSe Key Management Function + +In order to protect the messages between the Remote UE/ UE-to-network Relay and ProSe Key Management Function, the Remote UE/UE-to-network Relay shall support the procedures for the UE given in subclause 5.3.3.2 and the ProSe Key Management Function shall support the procedures for the network function given in subclause 5.3.3.2. + +#### 6.7.3.5 Protection of traffic between Remote UE and Relay + +The signalling and user plane traffic sent between the Remote UE and UE-to-network relay are protected as described in subclause 6.5.6 + +# --- Annex A (normative): Key derivation functions + +## A.1 KDF interface and input parameter construction + +### A.1.1 General + +This annex specifies the use of the Key Derivation Function (KDF) specified in TS 33.220 [5] for the current specification. This annex specifies how to construct the input string, S, to the KDF (which is input together with the relevant key). For each of the distinct usages of the KDF, the input parameters S are specified below. + +### A.1.2 FC value allocations + +The FC number space used is controlled by TS 33.220 [5]. + +## --- A.2 Calculation of the MIC value + +When calculating a MIC using the Discovery Key for open discovery or the DUIK for restricted discovery, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF that is specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [5]: + +- FC = 0x49. +- P0 = Message Type (see TS 24.334). +- L0 = length of above (i.e. 0x00 0x01). +- P1 = ProSe Application Code for open discovery or ProSe Restricted Code for restricted discovery. +- L1 = length of above (i.e. 0x00 0x17). +- P2 = UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot. +- L2 = length of above (i.e. 0x00 0x04). + +The MIC is set to the 32 least significant bits of the output of the KDF. + +The Discovery Key, DUIK, Time parameter and discovery message follow the encoding also specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [5]. + +## --- A.3 Calculation of PTK + +When calculating a PTK from PGK, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF that is specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [5]: + +- FC = 0x4A. +- P0 = Group Member Identity (i.e. the Layer 2 source address of the sending UE). +- L0 = length of Group Member Identity ( i.e. 0x00 0x03). +- P1 = PTK Identity. +- L1 = length of PTK Identity (i.e. 0x00 0x02). +- P2 = Group Identity. +- L2 = length of Group Identity (i.e. 0x00 0x03). + +The input key shall be the 256-bit PGK. + +## A.4 Calculation of keys from PTK and KD-sess + +When calculating a PIK or PEK from PTK or KD-sess, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF that is specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [5]: + +- FC = 0x4B +- P0 = 0x00 if PEK is being derived or 0x01 if PIK is being derived +- L0 = length of P0 (i.e. 0x00 0x01) +- P1 = algorithm identity +- L1 = length of algorithm identity (i.e. 0x00 0x01) + +NOTE: Void. + +The algorithm identity shall be set as described in TS 33.401 [21]. + +The input key shall be the 256-bit PTK or the 256-bit KD-sess. + +For an algorithm key of length n bits, where n is less or equal to 256, the n least significant bits of the 256 bits of the KDF output shall be used as the algorithm key. + +## A.5 Calculation of scrambling bits for discovery + +When calculating the time-hash-bitsequence for discovery, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF that is specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [5]: + +- FC = 0x4C +- P0 = UTC-based counter for scrambling associated with the discovery slot – see subclause 6.1.3.4.3.5. +- L2 = length of above (i.e. 0x00 0x04). + +The input key shall be the 256-bit DUSK. + +The time-hash-bitsequence keystream is set to the 216 least significant bits of the output of the KDF. + +## A.6 Calculation of message-specific confidentiality keystream for discovery + +When calculating the message-specific confidentiality keystream for discovery, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF that is specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [5]: + +- FC = 0x4D +- P0 = UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot – see subclause 6.1.3.4.3.6. +- L2 = length of above (i.e. 0x00 0x04). +- P1 = (Key\_calc\_mask AND (Message || MIC)) – see subclause 6.1.3.4.3.6 +- L2 = length of above (i.e. 0x00 0x1B). + +The input key shall be the 256-bit DUCK. + +The message-specific confidentiality keystream is set to the 184 least significant bits of the output of the KDF. + +## A.7 Calculation of $K_D$ for UE-to-network relays + +When calculating $K_D$ from PRUK, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF that is specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [5]: + +- FC = 0x48 +- P0 = Relay Service Code +- L0 = length of Relay Service Code (i.e. 0x00 0x03) +- P1 = Nonce\_1 +- L1 = length of Nonce\_1 (i.e. 0x00 0x10) +- P2 = $K_D$ Freshness Parameter +- L2 = length of Nonce\_2 (i.e. 0x00 0x10) + +The input key shall be the 256-bit PRUK. + +## A.8 Calculation of discovery keys from PSDK + +When calculating a DUSK, DUCK or DUIK from the PSDK, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF that is specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [5]: + +- FC = 0x4F +- P0 = 0x00 if DUSK is being derived, 0x01 if DUCK is being derived, or 0x02 if DUIK is being derived +- L0 = length of P0 (i.e. 0x00 0x01) +- P1 = algorithm identity +- L1 = length of algorithm identity (i.e. 0x00 0x01) + +The algorithm identity shall be set to 0x00. Later releases may define other values. + +The input key shall be the 256-bit PSDK. + +For an algorithm key of length n bits, where n is less or equal to 256, the n least significant bits of the 256 bits of the KDF output shall be used as the algorithm key. + +## A.9 Calculation of $K_{D-sess}$ from $K_D$ + +When calculating $K_{D-sess}$ from $K_D$ , the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF that is specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [5]: + +- FC = 0x4E +- P0 = Nonce\_1 +- L0 = length of Nonce\_1 (i.e. 0x00 0x10) +- P1 = Nonce\_2 +- L1 = length of Nonce\_2 (i.e. 0x00 0x10) + +The input key shall be the 256-bit $K_D$ . + +# --- Annex B (informative): Void + +# --- Annex C (informative): Void + +# Annex D (informative): Void + +# Annex E (Normative): Key Request and Response messages + +## E.1 Introduction + +This annex defines the Key Request and Key Response procedures between the UE and the ProSe Key Management Function for ProSe one-to-many communications. + +## E.2 Transport protocol for messages between UE and ProSe Key Management Function + +The UE and ProSe Key Management Function shall use HTTP 1.1 as specified in IETF RFC 2616 [37] as the transport protocol for the messages between the UE and ProSe Key Management Function. The ProSe messages described here shall be included in the body of either an HTTP request message or an HTTP response message. The following rules apply: + +- The UE initiates the transactions with an HTTP request message; +- The ProSe Key Management Function responds to the requests with an HTTP response message; and +- HTTP POST methods are used for the procedures. + +## E.3 XML Schema + +Implementations in compliance with the present document shall implement the XML schema defined below for messages used in ProSe key management procedures. + +``` + + + + + Info for ProSe Key Management Messages Syntax + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +``` + +``` + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +``` + +``` + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +``` + +``` + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +``` + +An entity receiving the XML body ignores any unknown XML element and any unknown XML attribute. + +## E.4 Semantics + +### E.4.1 General + +The `` element is the root element of this XML document and it can be one of the following elements: + +- ``; +- ``; + +- element containing other ProSe key management message defined in future releases; or +- an element from other namespaces defined in future releases. + +### E.4.2 Semantics of + +The element consists of: + +- 1) element which contains the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.1; +- 2) zero or one element contains the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.2. +- 3) zero or more element, each of which consists of: + - a) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.3; + - b) one or more element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.4; + - c) zero or one element containing elements defined in future releases; + - d) zero, one or more elements from other namespaces defined in future releases; and + - e) zero, one or more attributes defined in future releases; +- 4) zero or one element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.10; +- 5) zero or one element, each of which consists of: + - a) zero or one element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.10; + - b) zero or one element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.12; + - c) one element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.13; + - d) one element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.15; + - e) zero or one element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.16; + - f) zero or one element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.17; + - g) zero or one element containing elements defined in future releases; + - h) zero, one or more elements from other namespaces defined in future releases; and + - i) zero, one or more attributes defined in future releases; +- 6) zero or more element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.5 +- 7) zero or one element contains the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.22. +- 8) zero or more element, each of which consists of: + - a) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.23; + - b) one or more element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.24; + - c) zero, one or more elements defined in future releases; and + - d) zero, one or more attributes defined in future releases; +- 9) zero or more element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.23. +- 10)zero or more element, each of which consists of: + - a) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.25; + - b) one or more element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.26; + - c) zero, one or more elements defined in future releases; and + +- d) zero, one or more attributes defined in future releases; +- 11) zero or more element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.25. 10. + - 12) zero or one element containing elements defined in future releases; + - 13) zero, one or more elements from other namespaces defined in future releases; and + - 14) zero, one or more attributes defined in future releases. + +### E.4.3 Semantics of + +The element consists of: + +- 1) a element which contains the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.1; and +- 2) zero or more element, each of which consists of : + - a) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.3; + - b) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.5; + - c) zero, one or more elements defined in future releases; and + - d) zero, one or more attributes defined in future releases; +- 3) zero or more element, each of which consists of: + - a) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.3; + - b) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.6; + - c) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.7; + - d) zero, one or more elements defined in future releases; and + - e) zero, one or more attributes defined in future releases; +- 4) zero or one element, each of which consists of: + - a) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.8; + - b) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.9; + - c) zero, one or more elements defined in future releases; and + - d) zero, one or more attributes defined in future releases; +- 5) zero or one element, each of which consists of: + - a) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.10; + - b) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.11; + - c) zero, one or more elements defined in future releases; and + - d) zero, one or more attributes defined in future releases; +- 6) zero or one element element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.5; +- 7) zero or one element, each of which consists of: + - a) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.18; + - b) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.19; + - c) zero or one element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.20; + +- d) zero or one element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.12; + - e) zero or one element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.14; + - f) zero or one element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.21; + - g) zero, one or more elements defined in future releases; and + - h) zero, one or more attributes defined in future releases; +- 8) zero or one element element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.5; +- 9) zero or more element, each of which consists of : + - a) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.23; + - b) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.5; + - c) zero, one or more elements defined in future releases; and + - d) zero, one or more attributes defined in future releases; +- 10)zero or more element, each of which consists of: + - a) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.23; + - b) a element containing a parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.28. + - c) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.26; + - d) zero or one element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.27; + - e) zero or one element containing elements defined in future releases; + - f) zero, one or more elements from other namespaces defined in future releases; and + - g) zero, one or more attributes defined in future releases; +- 11)zero or more element, each of which consists of : + - a) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.25; + - b) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.5; + - c) zero, one or more elements defined in future releases; and + - d) zero, one or more attributes defined in future releases; +- 12)zero or more element, each of which consists of: + - a) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.25; + - b) a element containing a parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.28. + - c) a element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.26; + - d) zero or one element containing the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.27; + - e) zero or one element containing elements defined in future releases; + - f) zero, one or more elements from other namespaces defined in future releases; and + - g) zero, one or more attributes defined in future releases; +- 13)zero or one element contains the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.29. +- 14)zero or one element contains the parameter defined in subclause E.5.2.2.30. +- 15)zero or one element containing elements defined in future releases; + +- 16)zero, one or more elements from other namespaces defined in future releases; and +- 17)zero, one or more attributes defined in future releases. + +## E.5 General message format and information elements coding + +### E.5.1 Overview + +This clause contains general message format and information elements coding for the messages used in the procedures described in the present document. + +### E.5.2 ProSe direct discovery message formats + +#### E.5.2.1 Data types format in XML schema + +To exchange structured information over the transport protocol, XML text format/notation is introduced. + +The corresponding XML data types for the data types used in Key Management messages are provided in table E.5.5.1-1. + +**Table E.2.5.1-1: Primitive or derived types for ProSe Parameter Type** + +| ProSe Parameter Type | Type in XML Schema | +|----------------------|--------------------| +| Integer | decimal | +| String | string | +| Boolean | boolean | +| Binary | hexBinary | +| Date and Time | dateTime | + +For complex data types described in subclause E.5.2.2, an XML "complexType" can be used. + +Message construction shall be compliant with W3C REC-xmlschema-2-20041028: "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes" [36] + +#### E.5.2.2 Parameters in ProSe key management messages + +##### E.5.2.2.1 Transaction ID + +This parameter is used to uniquely identify a ProSe Key management transaction. The UE shall set this parameter to a new number for each outgoing new discovery request. The transaction ID is an integer in the 0-255 range. + +##### E.5.2.2.2 Supported Algorithm + +This parameter is used to indicate which encryption algorithm the UE supports for one-to-many communications. It is a 1 octet long binary parameter encoded as shown in table E.5.2.2.2-1: + +**Table E.5.2.2.2-1: UE encryption algorithm capability information element** + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------| +| EPS encryption algorithms supported (octet 1) | | +| EPS encryption algorithm EEA0 supported (octet 1, bit 8) | | +| 0 | EPS encryption algorithm EEA0 not supported | +| 1 | EPS encryption algorithm EEA0 supported | +| EPS encryption algorithm 128-EEA1 supported (octet 1, bit 7) | | +| 0 | EPS encryption algorithm 128-EEA1 not supported | +| 1 | EPS encryption algorithm 128-EEA1 supported | +| EPS encryption algorithm 128-EEA2 supported (octet 1, bit 6) | | +| 0 | EPS encryption algorithm 128-EEA2 not supported | +| 1 | EPS encryption algorithm 128-EEA2 supported | +| EPS encryption algorithm 128-EEA3 supported (octet 1, bit 5) | | +| 0 | EPS encryption algorithm 128-EEA3 not supported | +| 1 | EPS encryption algorithm 128-EEA3 supported | +| EPS encryption algorithm EEA4 supported (octet 1, bit 4) | | +| 0 | EPS encryption algorithm EEA4 not supported | +| 1 | EPS encryption algorithm EEA4 supported | +| EPS encryption algorithm EEA5 supported (octet 1, bit 3) | | +| 0 | EPS encryption algorithm EEA5 not supported | +| 1 | EPS encryption algorithm EEA5 supported | +| EPS encryption algorithm EEA6 supported (octet 1, bit 2) | | +| 0 | EPS encryption algorithm EEA6 not supported | +| 1 | EPS encryption algorithm EEA6 supported | +| EPS encryption algorithm EEA7 supported (octet 1, bit 1) | | +| 0 | EPS encryption algorithm EEA7 not supported | +| 1 | EPS encryption algorithm EEA7 supported | + +##### E.5.2.2.3 Group ID + +This parameter is used to indicate the Group that the UE is requesting keys for. It is an integer in the 0-167777215 range. + +##### E.5.2.2.4 PGK ID + +This parameter is used to indicate the PGK IDs for a particular group. It is an integer in the 0-255 range. + +##### E.5.2.2.5 Error Code + +This parameter is used to indicate the particular reason why the UE will not be receiving keys for a requested group. It is an integer in the 0-255 range encoded as follows: + +- 0 Reserved +- 1 UE does not support the required security algorithms for this one-to-many communication group or discovery (relay or group member). +- 2 The ProSe Key Management Function does not supply keys for this one-to-many communication group or discovery (relay or group member). +- 3 UE is not authorised to receive keys for this one-to-many communication group or discovery (relay or group member). +- 4 UE requested to stop receiving PGKs for this group or PSDKs for this discovery (relay or group member). +- 5 UE not authorised to receive PRUKs from this PKMF. +- 6 PRUK ID or IMSI not recognised. + +7 UE-to-network relay not authorised to serve this UE. + +8-255 Unused + +##### E.5.2.2.6 Group Member ID + +This parameter is used as the identity of the UE within a Group. It is an integer in the 0-167777215 range. + +##### E.5.2.2.7 Algorithm Info + +The purpose of the Algorithm info is to indicate the confidentiality algorithms to be used for ciphering protection of the particular group traffic. It is a binary parameter of length 1 octet that is encoded as shown in table E.5.2.2.7-1. + +**Table E.5.2.2.7-1: Selected security algorithm information element** + +| Type of ciphering algorithm (octet 1, bit 5 to 7) | | | | +|---------------------------------------------------|---|---|----------------------------------------------------------| +| Bits | | | | +| 7 | 6 | 5 | | +| 0 | 0 | 0 | EPS encryption algorithm EEA0 (null ciphering algorithm) | +| 0 | 0 | 1 | EPS encryption algorithm 128-EEA1 | +| 0 | 1 | 0 | EPS encryption algorithm 128-EEA2 | +| 0 | 1 | 1 | EPS encryption algorithm 128-EEA3 | +| 1 | 0 | 0 | EPS encryption algorithm EEA4 | +| 1 | 0 | 1 | EPS encryption algorithm EEA5 | +| 1 | 1 | 0 | EPS encryption algorithm EEA6 | +| 1 | 1 | 1 | EPS encryption algorithm EEA7 | + +Bits 1- 4 and bit 8 of octet 1 are spare and shall be coded as zero. + +##### E.5.2.2.8 PMK ID + +This parameter is used to identify a PMK. It is an 8 octet long binary parameter. + +##### E.5.2.2.9 PMK + +This parameter is a key that is used to protect MIKEY messages. It is a 32 octet long binary parameter. + +##### E.5.2.2.10 PRUK ID + +This parameter is used to identify a PRUK. It is an 8 octet long binary parameter. + +##### E.5.2.2.11 PRUK + +This parameter is a key that is shared by the Remote UE and PKMF and is used to generate keys for protecting Remote UE to UE-to-network relay connections. It is a 32 octet long binary parameter. + +##### E.5.2.2.12 IMSI + +This parameter is used to carry the Remote UE's IMSI. The coding of IMSI is defined in 3GPP TS 23.003 [39]. + +##### E.5.2.2.13 Relay Service Code + +This parameter is used to indicate the Relay Service Code for which the UE is requesting service. It is a 24-bit long string. + +##### E.5.2.2.14 MSISDN + +This parameter is used to carry the Remote UE's MSISDN. The coding of MSISDN is defined in 3GPP TS 23.003 [39]. + +##### E.5.2.2.15 Nonce 1 + +This random number is generated by the Remote UE to ensure fresh keys. It is a 16 octet long binary parameter. + +##### E.5.2.2.16 RAND + +This parameter is the RAND from the authentication challenge used in the GBA PUSH authentication. It is a 16 octet long binary parameter. + +##### E.5.2.2.17 AUTS + +This parameter is the AUTS that is generated in a synchronisation failure. It is a 14 octet long binary parameter. + +##### E.5.2.2.18 Key $K_D$ + +This parameter is a key that is shared by the Remote UE and UE-to-network relay and is used to generate keys for protecting Remote UE to UE-to-network relay connections. It is a 32 octet long binary parameter. + +##### E.5.2.2.19 $K_D$ Freshness parameter + +This random number is generated by the PKMF to ensure the $K_D$ that it derives is fresh. It is a 16 octet long binary parameter. + +##### E.5.2.2.20 GPI + +This is the GPI parameter that is sent to the UE as part of GBA PUSH procedures (see TS 33.223[38]). It is a binary parameter. + +##### E.5.2.2.21 Remote UE other identity + +This parameter is a permanent identity of the Remote UE and is used when the KMF does not supply an IMSI of the Remote UE (e.g. the PKMF considers it a privacy issue sending IMSI to non-network elements). It is a 16 octet long binary parameter. + +##### E.5.2.2.22 Public Safety Discovery Security Capabilities + +This parameter is used to indicate the UE's security capabilities for protecting Public Safety Discovery messages. It is a binary parameter of length 1 octet that is encoded as shown in table E.5.2.2.22-1. + +**Table E.5.2.2.22-1: Public Safety Discovery Security Capabilities IE** + +| | +|------------------------------------------------------------| +| Scrambling protection bit (octet 1, bit 8) | +| 0            Scrambling is not supported | +| 1            Scrambling is supported | +| Bits 1- 7 of octet 1 are spare and shall be coded as zero. | + +##### E.5.2.2.23 Relay Service Code + +This parameter is used to indicate the Relay Service Code for which the UE is requesting keys. It is a 24-bit long string. + +##### E.5.2.2.24 PSDK ID + +This parameter is used to indicate the PSDK IDs for a particular Relay Service Code or Discovery Group ID. It is an integer in the 0-255 range. + +##### E.5.2.2.25 Discovery Group ID + +This parameter is used to indicate the Discovery Group ID for which the UE is requesting keys. It is a 24-bit long string. + +##### E.5.2.2.26 Protection Profile + +This parameter is used to indicate which out of scrambling, integrity protection and message-specific confidentiality will be applied to protect the discovery. It is a binary parameter of length 1 octet that is encoded as shown in table E.5.2.2.26-1. + +**Table E.5.2.2.26-1: Selected security algorithm information element** + +| | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------| +| Scrambling protection bit (octet 1, bit 8) | | +| 0 | Scrambling is not used for this discovery | +| 1 | Scrambling is used for this discovery | +| Integrity protection bit (octet 1, bit 7) | | +| 0 | Integrity protection is not used for this discovery | +| 1 | Integrity protection is used for this discovery | +| Message specific confidentiality bit (octet 1, bit 6) | | +| 0 | Message specific confidentiality is not used for this discovery | +| 1 | Message specific confidentiality is used for this discovery | +| Bits 1-5 of octet 1 are spare and shall be coded as zero. | | + +##### E.5.2.2.27 Encrypted bit mask + +This parameter is included if message-specific confidentiality is to be used for the discovery. It is used to indicate which bits of the message have message specific confidentiality applied to them. It is a binary parameter of length 23 octets. + +##### E.5.2.2.28 Key Type ID + +This parameter is used to indicate which discovery (relay or group member) the key belongs to when it arrives in a MIKEY message. It is a 24-bit long string parameter. + +##### E.5.2.2.29 Current time + +This parameter provides the UE with the time at the PKMF, and along with the Max Offset parameter, is used to ensure that the time the UE associates with the discovery slot is reasonably close to the real time. It is of type Date and Time. + +##### E.5.2.2.30 Max Offset + +This parameter indicates how close the time associated with the discovery slot needs to be to the time provided by the PKMF. Max Offset is measured in seconds. It is an integer in the 1-32 range. + +# Annex F (Informative): Network options for PC3 security + +## F.1 General + +The present annex describes the network options for securing PC3 and PC8 interfaces. + +## F.2 Prose Function using standalone BSF + +The network option for Prose Function using standalone BSF is described below: + +![Diagram of ProSe Function using standalone BSF architecture.](2f587210e4f97c32758c5972e2e83d20_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the network architecture for ProSe Function using a standalone BSF. The components and interfaces are as follows: + + +- UE A** and **UE B**: User Equipments. +- E-UTRAN**: Connected to UE A and UE B via **LTE Uu** interfaces. +- MME** and **S/PGW**: Contained within a circle, connected to E-UTRAN via **S1**. +- HSS**: Connected to MME/S-PGW via **S6a**, to **BSF** via **Zh**, and to **SLP**. +- BSF** (Bootstrapping Server Function): Connected to **ProSe Key Management Function** via **PC4a** and to **ProSe Function acting as NAF** via **Zn**. +- SLP**: Connected to ProSe Key Management Function via **PC4b**. +- ProSe Function acting as NAF**: Connected to UE A via **PC3/Ua** and **PC1**, and to **ProSe Application Server** via **PC2**. +- ProSe Key Management Function**: Connected to UE A via **PC8/Ua** and **Ub**. +- ProSe Application**: Associated with UE A and UE B, with a **PC5** interface between them. +- ProSe Application Server**: Connected via **PC1** to the ProSe Application. + +Diagram of ProSe Function using standalone BSF architecture. + +**Figure F.2-1: ProSe Function using standalone BSF.** + +This architecture follows the GBA architecture, where the ProSe Function and the ProSe Key Management Function are acting as a NAF. + +## F.3 BSF - ProSe Function/NAF colocation + +The network option for ProSe Function using colocated BSF is described below: + +![A network architecture diagram showing the colocation of BSF, ProSe Function, and ProSe Key Management Function acting as NAF. It includes components like UE A, UE B, E-UTRAN, MME, S/PGW, HSS, SLP, and ProSe Application Server with various interfaces labeled such as PC1, PC2, PC3/Ua, PC4a, PC4b, PC5, PC8/Ua, S1, S6a, LTE Uu, LTEUu, Ub, Zh, and Zn.](e7010c66da16316c2935dfbbef5056b3_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates a network architecture for ProSe (Proximity Services) with the BSF (BSF) collocated with the ProSe Function and the ProSe Key Management Function acting as a NAF (Network Application Function). The architecture includes the following components and interfaces: + +- UE B** (User Equipment B) is connected to **E-UTRAN** via **LTEUu** and **LTE Uu** interfaces. UE B also has a **ProSe application** connected via **PC5**. +- E-UTRAN** is connected to **MME** via **S1**. +- MME** is connected to **S/PGW** (PDN Gateway) via **S6a**. +- S/PGW** is connected to **HSS** (Home Subscriber Server) via **Zh**. +- HSS** is connected to **BSF** via **PC4a**. +- BSF** is collocated with **ProSe Function** and **ProSe Key Management Function acting as NAF** within a single network element. The BSF is connected to the ProSe Function via **Zn** and to the ProSe Key Management Function acting as NAF via **Zn**. +- UE A** (User Equipment A) is connected to **ProSe Function** via **PC3/Ua** and **Ub** interfaces. UE A also has a **ProSe application** connected via **PC8/Ua**. +- ProSe Function** is connected to **SLP** (SLP) via **PC2**. +- SLP** is connected to **ProSe Application Server** via **PC4b**. +- ProSe Application Server** is connected to **ProSe Function** via **PC1**. + +A network architecture diagram showing the colocation of BSF, ProSe Function, and ProSe Key Management Function acting as NAF. It includes components like UE A, UE B, E-UTRAN, MME, S/PGW, HSS, SLP, and ProSe Application Server with various interfaces labeled such as PC1, PC2, PC3/Ua, PC4a, PC4b, PC5, PC8/Ua, S1, S6a, LTE Uu, LTEUu, Ub, Zh, and Zn. + +Figure F.3-1: BSF – Prose Function colocation + +In this architecture the BSF is collocated with the ProSe Function and the ProSe Key Management Function acting as a NAF. Zn interface is present between BSF and ProSe Function and also between BSF and ProSe Key Management Function. + +## F.4 Prose Function with bootstrapping entity + +The network option for Prose Function with bootstrapping entity is described below: + +![Figure F.4-1: Prose Function with bootstrapping entity. This architectural diagram shows the interaction between various network elements. At the top, a circle contains 'MME' and 'S/PGW'. Below them is 'HSS', and to the right is 'SLP'. In the center is a large box containing 'ProSe Key Management Function' and 'ProSe Function'. On the left, 'E-UTRAN' is connected to 'UE B' and 'UE A'. 'UE B' has a 'ProSe application' and connects to 'E-UTRAN' via 'LTEUu'. 'UE A' also has a 'ProSe application' and connects to 'E-UTRAN' via 'LTEUu'. 'UE A' has multiple interfaces to the ProSe functions: 'PC5' (to ProSe application), 'PC8/Ua' (to ProSe Key Management Function), 'Ub' (to ProSe Key Management Function), and 'PC3/Ua' (to ProSe Function). 'E-UTRAN' connects to 'MME/S/PGW' via 'S1' and to 'UE A' via 'LTEUu'. 'MME/S/PGW' connects to 'HSS' via 'S6a'. 'HSS' connects to 'ProSe Key Management Function' via 'PC4a*' and to 'ProSe Function' via 'PC4a'. 'SLP' connects to 'ProSe Function' via 'PC4b'. A 'ProSe Application Server' is connected to 'ProSe Function' via 'PC2'. Reference points 'PC1' are shown at the top and bottom of the diagram frame.](dbd4bab54b57e8d1abf80e3de6471130_img.jpg) + +Figure F.4-1: Prose Function with bootstrapping entity. This architectural diagram shows the interaction between various network elements. At the top, a circle contains 'MME' and 'S/PGW'. Below them is 'HSS', and to the right is 'SLP'. In the center is a large box containing 'ProSe Key Management Function' and 'ProSe Function'. On the left, 'E-UTRAN' is connected to 'UE B' and 'UE A'. 'UE B' has a 'ProSe application' and connects to 'E-UTRAN' via 'LTEUu'. 'UE A' also has a 'ProSe application' and connects to 'E-UTRAN' via 'LTEUu'. 'UE A' has multiple interfaces to the ProSe functions: 'PC5' (to ProSe application), 'PC8/Ua' (to ProSe Key Management Function), 'Ub' (to ProSe Key Management Function), and 'PC3/Ua' (to ProSe Function). 'E-UTRAN' connects to 'MME/S/PGW' via 'S1' and to 'UE A' via 'LTEUu'. 'MME/S/PGW' connects to 'HSS' via 'S6a'. 'HSS' connects to 'ProSe Key Management Function' via 'PC4a\*' and to 'ProSe Function' via 'PC4a'. 'SLP' connects to 'ProSe Function' via 'PC4b'. A 'ProSe Application Server' is connected to 'ProSe Function' via 'PC2'. Reference points 'PC1' are shown at the top and bottom of the diagram frame. + +**Figure F.4-1: Prose Function with bootstrapping entity** + +In this architecture the ProSe Function and the ProSe Key Management Function are enhanced in the way that the subset of BSF and NAF functionality towards the UE is reused, specifically the protocols defined for Ub and Ua reference points. Interfaces Zn and Zh are not used. Functionality of retrieving the authentication vector in order to support the mutually authenticated key exchange is the responsibility of the PC4a interface between the ProSe Function and the HSS, or the PC4a\* interface between ProSe Key Management Function and HSS. + +# Annex G (Informative): Protection of Restricted Discovery and Public Safety Discovery messages + +## G.1 General + +Both Restricted Discovery messages and Public Safety Discovery message are to be protected by some combination of scrambling, message-specific confidentiality and integrity protection (see subclause 6.1.3.4.3). The particular combinations that may be applied to each of these cases are not restricted by the standard, but are controlled by the ProSe Function(s) (in the case of Restricted Discovery) and the PKMF (in the case of Public Safety Discovery). This control is applied by the ProSe Function or PKMF signalling the chosen security measures for a particular discovery to the UE. The UE then applies the requested security to discovery messages that it sends or receives. This Annex provides information on the security provided by the combinations of security mechanisms. + +## G.2 Different combinations of security mechanisms + +Table G.2-1 provides details of the security provided and sample use case(s) for the various combinations of security mechanisms that are possible for Restricted Discovery and Public Safety Discovery. This table is provided to help with the configuration in the ProSe Function or PKMF of the appropriate security mechanisms for a particular discovery and does not restrict the combination of security mechanisms that the UE supports for either Restricted or Public Safety Discovery (for details on UE processing of discovery messages, see subclauses 6.1.3.4.3.2 and 6.1.3.4.3.3). + +**Table G.2-1: Impact and example use case for the various combinations of security mechanisms** + +| Sending UE | Receiving Side | Security provided | Comments and/or example use case | +|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| DUIK | DUIK | Discovery message is only integrity protected. | Relay Discovery where the Relay has no requirement for tracking or confidentiality protection. | +| DUSK | DUSK | Hiding of the parts of the message that identify the user (e.g. ProSe Code) to prevent the user being discovered or tracked by unauthorised users. Note: only works if there is exactly one message to be protected with the DUSK (as then the scrambling provides integrity protection). | Restricted discovery where exactly one ProSe code is protected by this DUSK. | +| DUSK | DUSK | As above | As above | +| DUSK and DUIK | DUSK and DUIK | Hiding of the parts of the message that identify the user (e.g. ProSe Code) to prevent the user being discovered or tracked by unauthorised users. When only one user uses the DUSK, it prevents tracking of the user. When multiple users are using the same DUSK, the XOR difference between the unprotected discovery messages will be preserved and would enable some tracking of a user. Integrity protection of the whole message. Confidentiality protection of the whole message when only one user uses the DUSK | Restricted Discovery when one user uses DUSK to send Code with Application Controlled Extension bits

Restricted Discovery with several users sending unique codes and no Application Controlled Extension bits. | +| DUSK, DUIK and DUCK | DUSK | Hiding of the parts of the message that identify the user (e.g. ProSe Code) to prevent the user being discovered or tracked by unauthorised users. Note: only works if there is exactly one message to be protected with the DUSK (as then the scrambling provides integrity protection) | DUSK applies to exactly one full code and ciphered Application Controlled Extension bits included in the message but are not decryptable by a receiver that only gets DUSK, as it was not given DUCK. | +| | DUSK, DUIK and DUCK | Hiding of the parts of the message that identify the user (e.g. ProSe Code) to prevent the user being discovered or tracked by unauthorised users. When only one user uses the DUSK, it prevents tracking of the user. When multiple users are using the same DUSK, the XOR difference between the unprotected discovery messages will be preserved and would enable some tracking of a user. Integrity protection of the whole message, plus confidentiality protection of part of the message. | Restricted Discovery with more than one sender using the same DUSK and there are Application Controlled Extensions bits that are encrypted/decryptable using DUCK. | +| DUCK and DUIK | DUCK and DUIK | Integrity protection of the whole message and confidentiality protection of part of the message. | Group Member Discovery where the Discovery Group ID is sent in the clear and the rest of the message is protected by message-specific confidentiality. | + +The "Sending UE" column describes what keys need to be known to the sending UE in the case of Restricted Discovery or signalled for use by the PKMF in the case of Public Safety Discovery. The "Receiving side" column shows what keys need to be sent to the receiving UE for Restricted Discovery, except if ProSe Function MIC checking is required (when the DUIK is kept at the ProSe Function in the HPLMN of the receiving UE), or signalled for use by the PKMF. The "Security provided" column details the security that this combination of security mechanisms provide. The final column provides example use case(s) where this combination of security mechanisms can be used. + +# --- Annex H (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|-------|-----------|-----|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------| +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | Old | New | +| 2014-09 | SP-65 | SP-140591 | 001 | 1 | Correction of key on Ua interface | 12.0.0 | 12.1.0 | +| | | | 002 | 1 | Addition of abbreviations | | | +| | | | 003 | 2 | Modification of Open Discovery Security Flows | | | +| | | | 004 | 1 | ProSe PTK Calculation | | | +| | | | 005 | 1 | ProSe PTK ID | | | +| | | | 006 | 1 | ProSe Group Key Clarification | | | +| | | | 007 | - | ProSe PEK clarification | | | +| | | | 008 | 1 | Protection of UE identity on PC3 interface | | | +| | | | 009 | 1 | Fix the procedure of Application Server-signed Proximity Request | | | +| | | | 011 | 1 | Discovery Filter using ProSe Application Mask | | | +| | | | 012 | 2 | EPS encryption algorithm in ProSe Direct Communication | | | +| | | | 014 | 1 | Deletion of parameters related to PGK key | | | +| | | | 016 | 1 | Correct the conditions for sending of Match Report in ProSe Direct Discovery | | | +| | | | 017 | 2 | Alignment of identifier definitions for ProSe one-to-many communications | | | +| | | | 018 | 1 | Sending only the LSB of PGK Id in the PDCP header | | | +| | | | 022 | 1 | Defining for the time parameter used in ProSe discovery | | | +| | | | 024 | 1 | Support for multiple PDCP entities for a Group | | | +| 2014-12 | SP-66 | SP-140828 | 027 | 1 | KMS Provisioning Message Formats for media security | 12.1.0 | 12.2.0 | +| | | | 028 | 1 | SRTP/SRTCP Profile for ProSe Media Security | | | +| | | | 029 | 1 | MIKEY message formats for media security | | | +| | | | 030 | 1 | Clarification on link between Group UIDs and GMKs | | | +| | | | 019 | 2 | Adding the details of the PGK delivery | | | +| | | | 020 | 3 | Adding details of the PC3 message security | | | +| | | | 023 | 2 | Clarifying PTK handling for one-to-many communications | | | +| | | | 035 | 1 | Considerations on security for EPC supported WLAN direct discovery and communication | | | +| | | | 037 | 1 | Algorithms for ProSe communication | | | +| | | | 038 | 1 | Clarification of service authorization | | | +| | | | 039 | 1 | PGK Usage clarification | | | +| | | | 040 | - | Add Missing Acronym | | | +| | | | 041 | 1 | Including PTK ID into the encryption algorithm input | | | +| | | | 042 | 1 | Removing editors notes from one-to-many security requirements | | | +| 2015-03 | SP-67 | SP-150150 | 043 | 1 | Alignment of Group Identity and Group Member Identity with RAN specifications | 12.2.0 | 12.3.0 | +| | | | 045 | 1 | Correction and Clarification on ProSe UE behaviour | | | +| | | | 048 | 1 | Calculation of the MIC value | | | +| | | | 049 | - | Algorithm distinguisher | | | +| | | | 050 | - | Correction of missing figure | | | +| 2015-06 | SP-68 | SP-150300 | 052 | 1 | Discovery Slot Clarification | 12.3.0 | 12.4.0 | +| | | | 053 | - | Clarifying PTK Identity description in TS 33.303 | | | +| | | | 054 | 1 | Clarification of one-to-many requirements | | | +| | | | 055 | 1 | Security information in PDCP Header | | | +| | | | 056 | 1 | Adding a MIC Check timer to direct discovery procedures | | | +| 2015-09 | SP-69 | SP-150472 | 057 | 1 | ProSe NAF Key Indication | 12.4.0 | 13.0.0 | +| | | | 060 | 1 | Annex F correction to show ProSe Key Management Function KMS and PC8 | | | +| | | | 062 | 1 | Correction of the hash input parameters for proximity request | | | +| | | | 063 | 1 | Correction on PTK ID handling | | | +| | | | 064 | 1 | PGK expiration | | | +| | | | 065 | - | Clarifying MIC Calculation is based on parameters, not the discovery message itself | | | +| | | | 067 | - | Clarification on PC3ch (charging interface) security | | | +| | | | 068 | - | Correction of standalone BSF term | | | +| | SP-69 | SP-150299 | 058 | 1 | VPLMN clarification | 12.4.0 | 13.0.0 | +| 2015-09 | SP-69 | SP-150472 | 066 | - | UE obtaining the current time UTC from the BSF | 13.0.0 | 13.1.0 | +| | | | 074 | 1 | Matching scope section with content of spec - ProSe Rel-13 | | | +| | | | 076 | - | Correction to terminology - ProSe Rel-13 | | | +| | | | 081 | - | Correction of the MIKEY message details for one-to-many comms | | | +| | | SP-150471 | 083 | 1 | Correction of the XML for Key Requests and Response | | | +| | | | 085 | 2 | Security requirements and security procedures for reference point PC2 | | | +| | | | 086 | 2 | Security flows for restricted discovery | | | +| 2015-12 | SP-70 | SP-150725 | 088 | 1 | Details of one-to-one communication security | 13.1.0 | 13.2.0 | +| | | | 092 | - | Modification on Model A security flows | | | +| | | SP-150726 | 093 | 1 | Modification on Model B security flows | | | +| | | SP-150725 | 097 | 1 | Annex A update of MIC computation for discovery messages | | | +| | | | 098 | 1 | Corrections to ProSe one-to-one communication | | | +| | | | 100 | 1 | Miscellaneous editorials in 33.303 | | | + +| | | | | | | | | +|---------|-------|-----------|------|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------| +| | | | 101 | 1 | Details of the scrambling and message specific confidentiality calculations for restricted discovery | | | +| | | | 102 | 1 | Details of the security provided for restricted discovery and public safety discovery | | | +| | | | 103 | 1 | Align LCID allocation with RAN specification | | | +| | | | 104 | 1 | Protecting Public Safety Discovery messages | | | +| | | SP-150726 | 106 | 2 | Usage of AEAD_AES_128_GCM_12 in ProSe | | | +| | | | 108 | - | Alignment with 23.303 | | | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160051 | 0089 | 4 | Security for UE-to-network relay communications | 13.2.0 | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160051 | 0099 | 2 | Protection for restricted discovery to reduce processing at the monitoring UE-side | 13.2.0 | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160051 | 0109 | 1 | Clarification on authorisation check in the Public Safety Discovery and correction to Figure 6.6.4.1-1 | 13.2.0 | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160051 | 0110 | 1 | Corrections to 6.1.3.4.2.2 | 13.2.0 | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160051 | 0114 | 1 | Configuration of not applying confidentiality protection in one-to-one communication | 13.2.0 | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160051 | 0115 | 1 | Security Key Agreement for ProSe UE-2-UE Direct Communication | 13.2.0 | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160051 | 0117 | 1 | Clarification in 6.1.3.3.1 | 13.2.0 | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160051 | 0118 | - | Modifications on the figure of flows for securing model B restricted discovery | 13.2.0 | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160051 | 0119 | 1 | Security requirements of ProSe direct discovery | 13.2.0 | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160051 | 0121 | - | Correction to fig F.4-1 | 13.2.0 | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160051 | 0123 | 1 | Protection of public safety restricted discovery | 13.2.0 | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160051 | 0124 | - | Providing details of the replay protection and XML signalling for public safety discovery | 13.2.0 | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160051 | 0126 | 1 | Specifying the derivation of KD-sess for ProSe one-to-one communications | 13.2.0 | 13.3.0 | +| 2016-03 | SP-71 | SP-160051 | 0127 | 1 | Removal of public safety media security from TS 33.303 | 13.2.0 | 13.3.0 | + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160451 | 0128 | 2 | F | Corrections to TS33.303 | 13.4.0 | +| 2016-06 | SA#72 | SP-160451 | 0129 | 2 | F | 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bold, black, sans-serif font. Above the "5G" text are three green curved lines representing signal waves. + +5G logo + +![3GPP logo](5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg) + +The 3GPP logo, featuring the letters "3GPP" in a stylized, bold, black font. Below the "3GPP" text is a red signal icon consisting of three curved lines. Below the icon, the text "A GLOBAL INITIATIVE" is written in a smaller, black, sans-serif font. + +3GPP logo + +The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP. The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organizational Partners and shall not be implemented. This Specification is provided for future development work within 3GPP only. The Organizational Partners accept no liability for any use of this Specification. Specifications and Reports for implementation of the 3GPP™ system should be obtained via the 3GPP Organizational Partners' Publications Offices. + +## **3GPP** + +--- + +Postal address + +--- + +3GPP support office address + +--- + +650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis +Valbonne - FRANCE +Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 + +--- + +Internet + +--- + + + +## --- **Copyright Notification** --- + +No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. +The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. + +© 2022, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC). +All rights reserved. + +UMTS™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members +3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association + +# Contents + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 4 | +| 1 Scope..... | 6 | +| 2 References..... | 6 | +| 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations..... | 6 | +| 3.1 Terms..... | 6 | +| 3.2 Symbols..... | 6 | +| 3.3 Abbreviations ..... | 7 | +| 4 Overview of advanced V2X security architecture ..... | 7 | +| 4.1 General ..... | 7 | +| 5 Security for V2X over NR based PC5 reference point..... | 7 | +| 5.1 General ..... | 7 | +| 5.2 Common security ..... | 7 | +| 5.2.1 General ..... | 7 | +| 5.2.2 Requirements..... | 7 | +| 5.2.2.1 Requirements for Cross-RAT control authorization indication..... | 7 | +| 5.2.3 Procedures ..... | 7 | +| 5.2.3.1 Cross-RAT PC5 control authorization indication..... | 7 | +| 5.3 Security for unicast mode..... | 8 | +| 5.3.1 General ..... | 8 | +| 5.3.2 Requirements..... | 8 | +| 5.3.2.1 Requirements for securing the PC5 unicast link..... | 8 | +| 5.3.2.2 Identity privacy requirements for the PC5 unicast link ..... | 8 | +| 5.3.3 Procedures ..... | 8 | +| 5.3.3.1 Securing the PC5 unicast link..... | 8 | +| 5.3.3.1.1 General ..... | 8 | +| 5.3.3.1.2 Overview ..... | 8 | +| 5.3.3.1.3 Key establishment procedures..... | 11 | +| 5.3.3.1.4 Security establishment procedures ..... | 12 | +| 5.3.3.1.5 Protection of the PC5 unicast link..... | 17 | +| 5.3.3.2 Identity privacy for the PC5 unicast link..... | 18 | +| 5.3.3.2.1 General ..... | 18 | +| 5.3.3.2.2 Procedures ..... | 18 | +| 5.4 Security for groupcast mode ..... | 20 | +| 5.4.1 General ..... | 20 | +| 5.4.2 Requirements..... | 20 | +| 5.4.2.1 Requirements for securing the NR based PC5 groupcast mode ..... | 20 | +| 5.4.2.2 Identity privacy requirements for the NR based PC5 groupcast mode..... | 20 | +| 5.4.3 Procedures ..... | 20 | +| 5.4.3.1 Securing the NR based PC5 groupcast mode ..... | 20 | +| 5.4.3.2 Identity privacy procedures for the PC5 groupcast mode..... | 20 | +| 5.5 Security for broadcast mode..... | 21 | +| 5.5.1 General ..... | 21 | +| 5.5.2 Requirements..... | 21 | +| 5.5.2.1 Requirements for securing the NR based PC5 broadcast mode ..... | 21 | +| 5.5.2.2 Identity privacy requirements for the NR based PC5 broadcast mode..... | 21 | +| 5.5.3 Procedures ..... | 21 | +| 5.5.3.1 Securing the NR based PC5 broadcast mode..... | 21 | +| 5.5.3.2 Identity privacy procedures for the NR based PC5 broadcast mode ..... | 21 | +| 6 Security for V2X over Uu reference point..... | 21 | +| 6.1 General ..... | 21 | +| 6.2 Requirements..... | 21 | +| 6.3 Procedures ..... | 22 | + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| Annex A (normative): Key derivation functions ........................................................................................ | 23 | +| A.1 KDF interface and input parameter construction .................................................................................... | 23 | +| A.1.1 General ............................................................................................................................................. | 23 | +| A.1.2 FC value allocations ........................................................................................................................ | 23 | +| A.2 Calculation of NRPEK and NRPIK ........................................................................................................ | 23 | +| A.3 Calculation of $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ from $K_{\text{NRP}}$ ................................................................................................... | 23 | +| Annex B (informative): Change history .......................................................................................................... | 24 | + +# Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, *i.e.* technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings: + +- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something +- shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something + +The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports. + +The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document. + +- should** indicates a recommendation to do something +- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something +- may** indicates permission to do something +- need not** indicates permission not to do something + +The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended. + +- can** indicates that something is possible +- cannot** indicates that something is impossible + +The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not". + +- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +In addition: + +- is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact +- is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document provides the security aspects for the 5G system to facilitate vehicular communications for Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services. The architecture for these V2X services is described in TS 23.287 [2], which is based on the service requirements defined in TS 22.185 [3] and TS 22.186 [4]. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TS 23.287: "Architecture enhancements for 5G System (5GS) to support Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services". +- [3] 3GPP TS 22.185: "Service requirements for V2X services; Stage 1". +- [4] 3GPP TS 22.186: "Service requirements for enhanced V2X scenarios". +- [5] 3GPP TS 33.185: "Security aspect for LTE support of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services". +- [6] 3GPP TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system". +- [7] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA)". +- [8] 3GPP TS 24.587: "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services in 5G System (5GS); Stage 3". +- [9] 3GPP TS 38.323: "NR; Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) specification". + +# --- 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Terms + +Void + +## 3.2 Symbols + +Void + +## 3.3 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]. + +| | | +|-------|-----------------------| +| 5GC | 5G Core | +| NR | New Radio (5G) | +| NRPEK | NR PC5 Encryption Key | +| NRPIK | NR PC5 Integrity Key | +| V2X | Vehicle-to-Everything | + +# --- 4 Overview of advanced V2X security architecture + +## 4.1 General + +The V2X architecture is described in TS 23.287 [2] which describes V2X communication over both the Uu reference point supported by E-UTRA connected to 5GC and/or NR connected to 5GC and PC5 reference point supported by E-UTRA and/or NR. The NR based PC5 reference point supports unicast, groupcast and broadcast modes (see TS 23.287 [2]). + +The security for PC5 reference point supported by E-UTRA is given in TS 33.185 [5]. The security for the other cases is given in the present document. + +# --- 5 Security for V2X over NR based PC5 reference point + +## 5.1 General + +This clause contains the security and privacy requirements and specifies procedures that can achieve the requirements for V2X over NR based PC5 reference point except those for PC5 over E-UTRA which are given in TS 33.185 [5]. + +## 5.2 Common security + +### 5.2.1 General + +This clause describes the security requirements and the procedures that are commonly applied for the all kinds of communication modes, i.e. unicast mode, groupcast mode and broadcast mode, which the NR based PC5 reference point supports. + +### 5.2.2 Requirements + +#### 5.2.2.1 Requirements for Cross-RAT control authorization indication + +The 5G System shall provide means to manage the cross-RAT PC5 control authorization. + +### 5.2.3 Procedures + +#### 5.2.3.1 Cross-RAT PC5 control authorization indication + +The procedures for the cross-RAT PC5 control authorization indication are specified in TS 23.287 [2] clause 6.5. + +## 5.3 Security for unicast mode + +### 5.3.1 General + +This clause describes the security requirements and the procedures that can be specifically applied for the NR based PC5 unicast mode. + +### 5.3.2 Requirements + +#### 5.3.2.1 Requirements for securing the PC5 unicast link + +The initiating UE shall establish a different security context for each receiving UE during the PC5 unicast link establishment if the security is activated. + +PC5 unicast link security establishment between the initiating UE and each receiving UE shall be protected from man-in-the-middle attacks. + +The system shall support confidentiality protection, integrity protection and replay protection of the user plane data of PC5 unicast. + +The system shall support confidentiality protection, integrity protection and replay protection of signalling for PC5 unicast link. + +The system shall support means of configuring the signalling and user plane security policies to UEs for a particular PC5 unicast link. + +Signalling plane protection of the PC5 unicast link for a V2X service shall align with the PC5 signalling security policies of the communicating UEs. + +User plane protection of the PC5 unicast link for a V2X service shall align with the PC5 user plane security policies of the communicating UEs. + +#### 5.3.2.2 Identity privacy requirements for the PC5 unicast link + +The 5G System should provide means for mitigating trackability attacks on a UE during PC5 unicast communications. + +The 5G System should provide means for mitigating link ability attacks on a UE during PC5 unicast communications. + +NOTE: The 5G system provides means for mitigating trackability and link ability if security of the connection is activated. + +### 5.3.3 Procedures + +#### 5.3.3.1 Securing the PC5 unicast link + +##### 5.3.3.1.1 General + +The NR based PC5 unicast communication procedures are described in TS 23.287 [2]. Clause 5.3.3.1 details how the security for this communication is established and used. + +##### 5.3.3.1.2 Overview + +###### 5.3.3.1.2.0 Security Context + +The UE establishes a security context for each unicast link. The security context includes $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ , NRPEK (if applicable), NRPIK, the chosen confidentiality (if applicable) and integrity algorithms, and PDCP counters used with each bearer. The UE updates the security context associated to the unicast link when the unicast link is rekeyed. The UE deletes the security context associated to a unicast link once the unicast link is released. + +###### 5.3.3.1.2.1 Key hierarchy + +PC5 unicast link uses 4 different layers of keying material as shown in figure 5.3.3.1.2.1-1. + +![Figure 5.3.3.1.2.1-1: Key Hierarchy for PC5 unicast link. The diagram shows a hierarchical derivation of keys. At the top is 'Long term credentials', which points down to a box labeled K_NRP. This box is inside a larger box labeled 'UEs'. Below K_NRP is a box labeled K_NRP-sess. Below K_NRP-sess, two arrows point down to boxes labeled 'NRPEK' and 'NRPIK'. These two boxes are inside a dashed box labeled 'PC5-S signalling/PC5 RRC signalling/PC5 UP'.](367926125450c2bc3f4bdca9d59a62ba_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + LTC[Long term credentials] --> KNRP[K_NRP] + subgraph UEs + KNRP --> KNRPsess[K_NRP-sess] + KNRPsess --> NRPEK[NRPEK] + KNRPsess --> NRPIK[NRPIK] + subgraph PC5_Signalling [PC5-S signalling/PC5 RRC signalling/PC5 UP] + NRPEK + NRPIK + end + end + +``` + +Figure 5.3.3.1.2.1-1: Key Hierarchy for PC5 unicast link. The diagram shows a hierarchical derivation of keys. At the top is 'Long term credentials', which points down to a box labeled K\_NRP. This box is inside a larger box labeled 'UEs'. Below K\_NRP is a box labeled K\_NRP-sess. Below K\_NRP-sess, two arrows point down to boxes labeled 'NRPEK' and 'NRPIK'. These two boxes are inside a dashed box labeled 'PC5-S signalling/PC5 RRC signalling/PC5 UP'. + +Figure 5.3.3.1.2.1-1: Key Hierarchy for PC5 unicast link + +The different layers of keys are the following: + +- Long term credentials: These are the credentials that are provisioned into the UE(s) and form the root of the security of the PC5 unicast link. The credentials may include symmetric key(s) or public/private key pair depending on the particular use case. Authentication signalling (see clause 5.3.3.1.3.2) is exchanged between the UEs to derive the $K_{\text{NRP}}$ . +- $K_{\text{NRP}}$ : This is a 256-bit root key that is shared between the two entities that communicating using NR PC5 unicast link. It may be refreshed by re-running the authentication signalling using the long-term credentials. Nonces are exchanged between the UEs and used with the $K_{\text{NRP}}$ to generate a $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ (the next layer of keys). $K_{\text{NRP}}$ may be kept even when the UEs have no active unicast communication session between them. The 32-bit $K_{\text{NRP}}$ ID is used to identify $K_{\text{NRP}}$ . +- $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ : This is the 256-bit key that is derived by UE from $K_{\text{NRP}}$ and is used derive keys that to protect the transfer of data between the UEs. The $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ is derived per unicast link. During activated unicast communication session between the UEs, the $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ may be refreshed by running the rekeying procedure. The actual keys (see next bullet) that are used in the confidentiality and integrity algorithms are derived directly from $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ . The 16-bit $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID identifies the $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ . + +NOTE 1: A $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID with a zero value indicates that no security is used and hence the UEs do not assign an all zero value of $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID when creating a security context. + +- NRPEK and NRPIK: The NR PC5 Encryption Key (NRPEK) and NR PC5 Integrity Key (NRPIK) are used in the chosen confidentiality and integrity algorithms respectively for protecting PC5-S signalling, PC5 RRC signalling, and PC5 user plane data. They are derived from $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ and are refreshed automatically every time $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ is changed. + +NOTE 2: Whether the above keys (i.e. $K_{\text{NRP}}$ , $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ , NRPEK and NRPIK) are derived is based on the result of the security activation for the signalling security. + +NOTE 3: $K_{\text{NRP}}$ is used to derive the keys for a security context for a unicast link established between a pair of UEs and could be used to derive keys for additional links established between a certain pair of UEs. The $K_{\text{NRP}}$ and its accompanying $K_{\text{NRP}}$ ID values are not part of the security context for a unicast link and do not have to be deleted after unicast link release. + +###### 5.3.3.1.2.2 Security states + +A UE may be in one of the three different security states with respect to another UE as follows: + +- Provisioned-security: This is where a UE just has its own long term keys. +- Partial-security: This is where a UE has recently communicated with another UE and still has the $K_{\text{NRP}}$ that it used with the other UE, but no other derived keys. +- Full-security: This is where a UE is actually communicating with another UE and has $K_{\text{NRP}}$ , and a security context per unicast link (see clause 5.3.3.1.2.0). Within a security context, the NRPEK and the chosen confidentiality algorithm may not exist if both signalling and user plane confidentiality are inactivated. + +Once a UE ends its unicast communication session with another UE in Full-security state, it shall delete $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ , NRPEK, and NRPIK, the choice of algorithms and the counters, and may also delete $K_{\text{NRP}}$ . + +###### 5.3.3.1.2.3 High level flows for the security establishment + +Figure 5.3.3.1.2.3-1 provides a high-level flow of a UE establishing a connection with other UE(s). + +![Sequence diagram showing the high-level flow of connection establishment between UE_1 and multiple UEs (UE_2a, UE_2b, UE_2c). UE_1 broadcasts a request. UE_2a and UE_2c respond with authentication, security mode, and acceptance procedures. UE_2b chooses not to respond.](1eadbbe42cfcac5c0023577110aec5e3_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE_1 + participant UE_2a + participant UE_2b + participant UE_2c + + UE_1->>UE_2a: 1. Direct Communication Request + UE_1->>UE_2b: 1. Direct Communication Request + UE_1->>UE_2c: 1. Direct Communication Request + + UE_2a<-->UE_1: 2a. Direct Auth and Key Establishment Procedure + UE_2a->>UE_1: 3a. Direct Security Mode Command proecdure + UE_2a->>UE_1: 4a. Direct Communication Accept + + Note over UE_2b: 2b. UE_2b chooses not to respond + + UE_2c<-->UE_1: 2c. Direct Auth and Key Establishment Procedure + UE_2c->>UE_1: 3c. Direct Security Mode Command proecdure + UE_2c->>UE_1: 4c. Direct Communication Accept + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the high-level flow of connection establishment between UE\_1 and multiple UEs (UE\_2a, UE\_2b, UE\_2c). UE\_1 broadcasts a request. UE\_2a and UE\_2c respond with authentication, security mode, and acceptance procedures. UE\_2b chooses not to respond. + +**Figure 5.3.3.1.2.3-1: High-level flow of connection establishment** + +The flow proceeds as follow: + +1. UE\_1 sends a Direct Communication Request. This message may be received by multiple UEs. +- 2a/3a/4a. UE\_2a chooses to respond to the message and may initiate the Direct Auth and Key Establishment procedure (if needed based clause 5.3.3.1.3) to generate the key $K_{\text{NRP}}$ . UE\_2a then runs the Direct Security Mode Command procedure with UE\_1 to continue the connection establishment procedures. If this is successful, UE\_2a sends the Direct Communication Accept message. +- 2b. UE\_2b chooses not to respond the UE\_1 +- 2c/3c/4c. UE\_2c responds to UE\_1 using the same sequence of messages as UE\_2a. + +When each responder decides to activate signalling integrity protection and/or signalling confidentiality protection, each responder establishes a different security context with UE\_1 that is not known to the other UEs, i.e. the security context used between UE\_1 and UE\_2a is not known to UE\_2b and UE\_2c. + +The Direct Communication Request is always sent unprotected and only contains enough information for a secure connection to be established with the other UE. Any information UE\_1 needs to send to the other UEs in order to establish the connection is included in the Direct Security Mode Complete message (sent as part of the Direct Security Mode procedure, see TS 23.287 [2]) from UE\_1 as this message is both confidentiality and integrity protected under the condition of activated non-NULL signalling confidentiality protection of the link. + +##### 5.3.3.1.3 Key establishment procedures + +###### 5.3.3.1.3.1 General + +Clause 5.3.3.1.3 provides the details on the establishment of $K_{\text{NRP}}$ . The key establishment procedures in clause 5.3.3.1.3.1 and 5.3.3.1.3.2 shall be skipped if the receiving UE decides to not activate the signalling integrity protection of this PC5 unicast link. The long-term credentials and associated authentication method that are used to establish the keys used to protect the PC5 unicast link may either be specified in 3GPP specification or be a method described outside of 3GPP specifications. In the latter case, it is not practical for all cases to specify the signalling in individual IEs on the NR PC5 interface for all these applications, hence all the authentication is specified to be carried in a generic container (called Key\_Est\_Info in the following clause) on the NR PC5 interface. This allows, for example, an application to change the authentication method without affecting the NR PC5 interface. + +###### 5.3.3.1.3.2 Key establishment + +At each step of the flow (and the possible multiple times that step 2 can be run), the Key\_Est\_Info contains the different data that is required for key establishment. Such data is transparent to the PC5 layer, i.e. the PC5 layer does not need to understand the content of Key\_Est\_Info. + +NOTE: The endpoint in the UEs that understands the contents of Key\_Est\_Info may be an application on the UEs. Between the PC5 layer and the application layer on the vehicles, the information contained in Key\_Est\_Info can be passed in an implementation-specific manner, e.g. as one block or several IEs. + +Figure 5.3.3.1.3.2-1 shows the message flows for establishing security at PC5 using the key established at the layer above PC5. The need for both steps 2a and 2b (and the number of times both steps 2a and step 2b are run) depends on the authentication method being used. + +![Sequence diagram showing the message flow for the establishment of PC5 security key between UE_1 and UE_2. The flow consists of four steps: 1. Direct Communication Request or Direct Re-keying Request (Key_Est_Info) from UE_1 to UE_2; 2a. Direct Auth and Key Establishment Request (Key_Est_Info) from UE_2 to UE_1; 2b. Direct Auth and Key Establishment Response (Key_Est_Info) from UE_1 to UE_2; 3. Direct Security Mode Command([Key_Est_Info], MSB of K_NRP ID) from UE_1 to UE_2; 4. Direct Security Mode Complete (LSB of K_NRP ID) from UE_2 to UE_1.](ca7c7526ec57cd5a2f278c194c0a6a00_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE_1 + participant UE_2 + Note left of UE_1: UE_1 + Note right of UE_2: UE_2 + UE_1->>UE_2: 1. Direct Communication Request or Direct Re-keying Request (Key_Est_Info) + UE_2-->>UE_1: 2a. Direct Auth and Key Establishment Request (Key_Est_Info) + UE_1-->>UE_2: 2b. Direct Auth and Key Establishment Response (Key_Est_Info) + UE_1->>UE_2: 3. Direct Security Mode Command([Key_Est_Info], MSB of K_NRP ID) + UE_2-->>UE_1: 4. Direct Security Mode Complete (LSB of K_NRP ID) + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the message flow for the establishment of PC5 security key between UE\_1 and UE\_2. The flow consists of four steps: 1. Direct Communication Request or Direct Re-keying Request (Key\_Est\_Info) from UE\_1 to UE\_2; 2a. Direct Auth and Key Establishment Request (Key\_Est\_Info) from UE\_2 to UE\_1; 2b. Direct Auth and Key Establishment Response (Key\_Est\_Info) from UE\_1 to UE\_2; 3. Direct Security Mode Command([Key\_Est\_Info], MSB of K\_NRP ID) from UE\_1 to UE\_2; 4. Direct Security Mode Complete (LSB of K\_NRP ID) from UE\_2 to UE\_1. + +**Figure 5.3.3.1.3.2-1: Message flow for the establishment of PC5 security key using a generic container** + +The steps are as follows and apply to establishment of the initial key or rekeying: + +1. In the case, UE\_1 determines it needs to establish a PC5 connection with another UE, UE\_1 sends the Direct Communication Request message and this message is received by UE\_2. In case of rekeying an existing connection with UE\_2, UE\_1 shall send a Direct Rekeying Request message to UE\_2 instead of Direct Communication Request. The Direct Communication Request message shall include the Key\_Est\_Info unless UE\_1's signalling integrity security policy is NOT NEEDED. In the former case, the message may include Key\_Est\_Info. The Direct Rekeying Request message shall include Key\_Est\_Info unless the Null integrity algorithm is currently in use. +2. This step is optional and may be run multiple times depending on the authentication method used. + - a. UE\_2 shall send a Direct Auth and Key Establish message including the Key\_Est\_Info to UE\_1. + - b. UE\_1 shall send respond with a Direct Auth and Key Establish Response message including the Key\_Est\_Info to UE\_2. +3. In case the UE\_2 decides to activate the signalling integrity protection, UE\_2 shall calculate (if not already done) $K_{NRP}$ . UE\_2 shall send a Direct Security Mode Command messages to UE\_1. These messages may include Key\_Est\_Info if need by the authentication method being used and shall contain MSB of $K_{NRP}$ ID unless the Null integrity algorithm is selected by UE\_2. The MSB of $K_{NRP}$ ID are chosen so that they uniquely identify $K_{NRP}$ at UE\_2. +4. On receiving the Direct Security Mode Command, UE\_1 shall calculate (if not already done) $K_{NRP}$ based on Key\_Est\_Info (if provided). UE\_1 shall execute the following procedures unless the Null integrity algorithm is selected by UE\_2: UE\_1 shall choose the LSB of $K_{NRP}$ ID so that they uniquely identify $K_{NRP}$ at UE\_1. UE\_1 shall form $K_{NRP}$ ID from the received MSB of $K_{NRP}$ ID and its chosen LSB of $K_{NRP}$ ID and shall store the complete $K_{NRP}$ ID with $K_{NRP}$ . + +UE\_1 shall send a Direct Security Mode Complete message to UE\_2 which shall contain the LSB of $K_{NRP}$ ID. +UE\_2 shall form $K_{NRP}$ ID from its chosen MSB of $K_{NRP}$ ID and the received LSB of $K_{NRP}$ ID and shall store the complete $K_{NRP}$ ID with $K_{NRP}$ . + +##### 5.3.3.1.4 Security establishment procedures + +###### 5.3.3.1.4.1 General + +Clause 5.3.3.1.4.2 describes the security policy and how the UEs handle the policy. There are two different cases when an overall security context may be established; to set up a new connection and to re-key an ongoing connection. These cases are described in clauses 5.3.3.1.4.3 and 5.3.3.1.4.4 respectively. Clause 5.3.3.1.4.5 describes the establishment of security for a user plane bearer. + +###### 5.3.3.1.4.2 Security policy + +###### 5.3.3.1.4.2.1 General + +The PC5 unicast link shall support activation or deactivation of security based on the security policy similar to Uu, as defined in TS 33.501[6]. The security policy shall be provisioned for PC5 unicast link as well, as detailed in clause 5.3.3.1.4.2.2 of the present document and handled as detailed in clause 5.3.3.1.4.2.3 of the present document. + +###### 5.3.3.1.4.2.2 Procedure for security policy provisioning for PC5 unicast link + +For selectively activating or deactivation the security of the PC5 unicast link, the PCF may provision the security policy per V2X service, during service authorization and information provisioning procedure as defined in TS 23.287 [2]. + +###### 5.3.3.1.4.2.3 Security policy handling + +For a NR PC5 unicast link, the UE shall be provisioned with the following: + +- The list of V2X services, e.g. PSIDs or ITS-AIDs of the V2X applications, with Geographical Area(s) and their security policy which indicates the following: + - Signalling integrity protection: REQUIRED/PREFERRED/NOT NEEDED + - Signalling confidentiality protection: REQUIRED/PREFERRED/NOT NEEDED + +- User plane integrity protection: REQUIRED/PREFERRED/NOT NEEDED +- User plane confidentiality protection: REQUIRED/PREFERRED/NOT NEEDED + +NOTE 1: No integrity protection on signalling traffic enables services that do not require security. + +NOTE 2: Ensuring that only a connection with security is used for a V2X service is guaranteed if the signalling integrity security policy of at least one of the UEs for that V2X service is set to REQUIRED. It is recommended to set this security policy to REQUIRED in order to guarantee security protection. + +NOTE 3: While some V2X applications are similar to Emergency Services and may require similar security policies handling, such V2X applications are outside of the scope of 3GPP. + +REQUIRED means the UE shall only accept the connection if a non-NULL confidentiality or integrity algorithm is used for protection of the traffic. + +NOT NEEDED means that the UE shall only establish a connection with no security. + +PREFERRED means that the UE may try to establish security but may will accept the connection with no security. One use of PREFERRED is to enable a security policy to be changed without updating all UEs at once. + +The handling of signalling security policy proceeds as follows: + +- At initial connection, the initiating UE includes its signalling security policy in the Direct Communication Request message. The receiving UE(s) takes this into account when deciding whether to accept or reject the request and when deciding the agreed security policy to be sent back in the Direct Security Mode Command message. The initiating UE can reject the Direct Security Mode Command if the algorithm choice does not match its policy (see clause 5.3.3.1.4.3 for full details of the handling). + +All the UP data of PC5 unicast link shall have the same security. + +The handling of the user plane security policy proceeds with the following sequence: + +- At initial connection, the UE that sent the Direct Communications Request shall include the user plane security policy for the service in the Direct Security Mode Complete message. +- If the signalling confidentiality protection is not activated, then UEs shall treat their user plane confidentiality policy for the V2X service for this connection as NOT NEEDED and the receiving UE shall set confidentiality for the user plane to off. The receiving UE may accept the Direct Communication Request and the response message (i.e. Direct Communication Accept) shall include the configuration of not activating (i.e. set to off) the user plane confidentiality protection. +- The receiving UE shall reject the Direct Communication Request when the following cases occur: 1) if the received user plane security policy had either confidentiality/integrity set to NOT NEEDED and its own corresponding policy is set to REQUIRED or, 2) if the received user plane security policy had either confidentiality/integrity set to REQUIRED and its own corresponding policy is set to NOT NEEDED. +- Otherwise, the receiving UE may accept the Direct Communication Request and the response message (i.e. Direct Communication Accept) shall include the configuration of user plane confidentiality protection based on the agreed user plane security policy, set as follows: + - 1) User plane confidentiality protection set to off if the received user plane security policy had either confidentiality set to NOT NEEDED and/or its own user plane security policy for the service is set to NOT NEEDED; or + - 2) User plane confidentiality protection set to on if the received user plane security policy had either confidentiality set to REQUIRED and/or its own user plane security policy for the service its own corresponding policy is set to REQUIRED; or + - 3) User plane confidentiality protection set to off or on otherwise (i.e. when both the received user plane security policy and its own user plane security policy for the service had the confidentiality set to PREFERRED). + +User plane integrity protection set following the same rules as confidentiality protection but based on the received and its own user plane integrity protection policy for the service. + +NOTE: When both UE's signalling and the user plane security policies are PREFERRED, the receiving UE sets the confidentiality and/or integrity protection to on. There might be UE constraints limiting the enablement of confidentiality and/or integrity protection, e.g. UE hardware platform resource constraints/limitations. + +Due to the purpose of adding a new V2X service to an existing PC5 unicast link, if the signalling and user plane security policies of the new V2X service are satisfied by the security in use for the PC5 unicast link, the initiating UE shall send the Link Modification Request to the receiving UE. The receiving UE shall reject the Link Modification Request if the security in use for the PC5 unicast link does not match the signalling and user plane security policies of the new V2X service. + +The V2X layer of the UE shall pass the security configurations to its AS layer. The security configurations are mutually agreed by both sides' UEs, including the configuration of confidentiality and integrity protection. + +###### 5.3.3.1.4.3 Security establishment during connection set-up + +The clause describes how security is established during connection set-up. The signalling flow is shown in figure 5.3.3.1.4.3-1. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the security establishment during connection set-up between UE_1 and UE_2. The steps are: 1. UE_1 sends a Direct Communication Request to UE_2. 2. UE_2 responds with Direct Auth and Key Establishment. 3a. UE_2 sends a Direct Security Mode Command to UE_1. 3b. UE_2 becomes ready to receive user plane and signalling with new context. 4a. UE_1 becomes ready to send and receive user plane and signalling with new context. 4b. UE_1 sends a Direct Security Mode Complete message to UE_2. 5. UE_2 sends user plane and signalling with new context and deletes old context.](f6e8acf9f931452d01688d311b5c0364_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE_1 + participant UE_2 + Note left of UE_1: 4a. Ready to send and receive user plane and signalling with new context + UE_1->>UE_2: 1. Direct Communication Request ([K_NRP ID], UE_1 security capabilities, [Nonce_1], [MSB of K_NRP-sess ID], UE_1's signalling security policy) + UE_2-->>UE_1: 2. Direct Auth and Key Establishment + UE_2->>UE_1: 3a. Direct Security Mode Command(UE_1 security capabilities, [Nonce_2], [LSB of K_NRP-sess ID], Chosen_algs, UE_1's signalling security policy) + Note right of UE_2: 3b. Ready to receive user plane and signalling with new context + UE_1-->>UE_2: 4b. Direct Security Mode Complete () + Note right of UE_2: 5. Send user plane and signalling with new context and delete old context + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the security establishment during connection set-up between UE\_1 and UE\_2. The steps are: 1. UE\_1 sends a Direct Communication Request to UE\_2. 2. UE\_2 responds with Direct Auth and Key Establishment. 3a. UE\_2 sends a Direct Security Mode Command to UE\_1. 3b. UE\_2 becomes ready to receive user plane and signalling with new context. 4a. UE\_1 becomes ready to send and receive user plane and signalling with new context. 4b. UE\_1 sends a Direct Security Mode Complete message to UE\_2. 5. UE\_2 sends user plane and signalling with new context and deletes old context. + +Figure 5.3.3.1.4.3-1: Security establishment at connection set-up + +- UE\_1 has sent a Direct Communication Request to UE\_2. This message shall include UE\_1's security capabilities (the list of algorithms that UE\_1 will accept for this connection) and UE\_1's signalling security policy. The UE\_1 shall also include Nonce\_1 (for session key $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ generation), and the most significant 8-bits of the $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID in this message if UE\_1's signalling integrity protection policy is either "REQUIRED" or "PREFERRED". The most significant 8-bits of the $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID shall be chosen such that UE\_1 will be able to locally identify a security context that is created by this procedure using the $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID. The message may also include a $K_{\text{NRP}}$ ID if the UE\_1 has an existing $K_{\text{NRP}}$ for the UE that it is trying to communicate with. The absence of the $K_{\text{NRP}}$ ID parameter indicates that UE\_1 does not have a $K_{\text{NRP}}$ for UE\_2. The message also contains Key\_Est\_Info (see clause 5.3.3.1.3.2). +- UE\_2 shall reject the Direct Communication Request if UE\_1's signalling security policy is "NOT NEEDED" while UE\_2's security policy is "REQUIRED". UE\_2 shall also reject the Direct Communication Request if UE\_1's signalling security policy is "REQUIRED" while UE\_2's security policy is "NOT NEEDED". UE\_2 may initiate a Direct Authentication and Key Establishment procedure with UE\_1. This is mandatory if the UE\_2 does not have the $K_{\text{NRP}}$ and $K_{\text{NRP}}$ ID pair indicated in step 1, and signalling is needed to establish the keys for the particular use case. If the Direct Authentication and Key Establishment procedure is initiated, the two UEs authenticate each other using the information exchanged in Key\_Est\_Info, where the used authentication method is application-specific. (See clause 5.3.3.1.3.2). During Direct Authentication and Key Establishment procedure, either of the UE's may reject the authentication procedure. +- UE\_2 shall send the Direct Security Mode Command message to UE\_1. This message shall only contain the MSB of $K_{\text{NRP}}$ ID unless the Null integrity algorithm is selected by UE\_2 and optionally Key\_Est\_Info if a fresh $K_{\text{NRP}}$ is to be generated (see clause 5.3.3.1.3). UE\_2 shall include the Chosen\_algs parameter to include the selected integrity and confidentiality algorithm. Non-Null security algorithm in the Chosen\_algs indicates the corresponding security protection is activated and the security algorithm the UEs will use to protect the data in + +the message. Null security algorithm in the Chosen\_algs indicates the corresponding security protection is unprotected. The Chosen\_algs may only indicate the use of the NULL integrity algorithm if UE\_2's signalling integrity security policy is either NOT NEEDED or PREFERRED. UE\_2 shall also return the UE\_1's security capabilities and UE\_1's signalling security policy to provide protection against bidding down attacks. In the case that the NULL integrity algorithm is chosen, the NULL confidentiality algorithm shall also be chosen and UE\_2 shall set the $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID of this security context to the all zero value. + +The following procedures in step 3 shall only be executed if the UE\_2 decides to at least activate the integrity security protection for this connection: UE\_2 shall also include Nonce\_2 to allow a session key to be calculated, as well as the least significant 8-bits of $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID in the messages. These bits are chosen so that UE\_2 will be able to locally identify a security context that is created by this procedure. UE\_2 shall calculate $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ from $K_{\text{NRP}}$ and both Nonce\_1 and Nonce\_2 (see clause A.3) and then derive the confidentiality (if applicable) and integrity keys based on the chosen algorithms (clause A.2). The lower layer shall be provided with the new security context and indication(s) to signal that the Direct Security Mode Command message needs integrity protection with the new security context and the signalling messages can be received using the new security context. The confidentiality key, NRPEK, shall be derived in this step if and only if signalling confidentiality protection is activated for this connection. The integrity protection key, NRPIK, shall be derived in this step if and only if signalling integrity protection is activated for this connection. UE\_2 shall integrity protect the Direct Security Mode Command before sending it to UE\_1. UE\_2 is then ready to receive signalling and messages protected with the new security context. UE\_2 shall form the $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID from the most significant bits it received in step1 and least significant bits it sent in step3. + +4. On receiving the Direct Security Mode Command, the UE\_1 shall first check the Chosen\_algs and shall accept the NULL integrity algorithm only if its security policy for signalling integrity protection is either NOT NEEDED or PREFERRED. Then UE\_1 shall check the returned UE\_1's security capabilities and UE\_1's signalling security to avoid bidding down attacks if the NULL integrity algorithm is selected for signalling integrity protection. If the above check passes, UE\_1 shall send an unprotected Direct Security Mode Complete message to UE\_2. UE\_1 shall set the $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID of this security context to the all zero value. + +Under the condition of non-NULL integrity algorithm indicated in the Chosen\_algs, UE\_1 shall first check that the received LSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID is unique by checking that it has not been sent by another UE responding to this Direct Communication Request i.e. such that resulting $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID is not already being used for another link. If the LSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID is not unique, then UE\_1 shall respond with a Direct Security Mode Reject message including a cause value to specify that the LSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID is not unique. The peer UE-2 receiving a Direct Security Mode Reject message shall inspect the cause value and, if the cause is related to the session identifier uniqueness then, the UE-2 shall generate a new LSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID and reply to UE-1 again (i.e., UE-2 shall send a Direct Security Mode Command message with the new LSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID). UE\_2 shall associate the new LSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID with the security context that is created in step 3. UE-2 shall erase the former LSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID from its memory. On receiving this new Direct Security Mode Command, UE\_1 shall process the message from the start of step 4. + +If the LSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID is unique, UE\_1 shall calculate $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ and the confidentiality key (if applicable) and integrity key in the same way as UE\_2. The confidentiality key, NRPEK, shall be derived in this step if and only if the Chosen\_algs includes non-NULL confidentiality algorithm. The integrity protection key, NRPIK, shall be derived in this step if and only if signalling integrity protection is activated for this connection. UE\_1 shall check that the returned UE\_1 security capabilities and UE\_1's signalling security policy are the same as those it sent in step 1. UE\_1 shall also check the integrity protection on the message. If both these checks pass, then UE\_1 creates a security context to be associated with the $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID. UE\_1 is ready to send and receive signalling and message with the new security context. The lower layer shall be provided with the new security context and indication to signal that signalling starting with the Direct Security Mode Complete needs protection with new security context and the signalling messages can be received using the new security context. UE\_1 shall send integrity protected and confidentiality protected (if applicable) Direct Security Mode Complete message to UE\_2. UE\_1 shall form the $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID from the most significant bits it sent in step1 and least significant bits it received in step3. $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID is used to locally identify the security context that is created by this procedure. + +5. If the Chosen\_algs in step 3 includes non-NULL integrity algorithm, UE\_2 checks the integrity protection on the received Direct Security Mode Complete. If this passes, UE\_2 is now ready to send signalling message and send and receive user plane traffic protected with the new security context. UE\_2 shall send integrity protected and confidentiality (if applicable) protected Direct Communication Accept message to UE\_1 with the new security context. The lower layer shall be provided with an indication before sending Direct Communication Accept message to indicate that the signalling message starting with the Direct Communication Accept is protected with the new security context and an indication after sending Direct Communication Accept message to indicate that + +the user plane traffic is protected with the new security context. UE\_2 deletes any old security context it has for UE\_1. + +6. After receiving the Direct Communication Accept message, the lower layer of UE\_1 shall be provided with an indication of activation of the PC5 unicast user plane security protection for the PC5 unicast link (if applicable). UE\_1 is now ready to send and receive user plane traffic protected with the new security context. UE\_1 deletes any old security context it has for UE\_2. + +###### 5.3.3.1.4.4 Security establishment during re-keying + +By rekeying, the UEs ensure fresh session keys $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ are used. Optionally the rekeying can also enforce refresh of $K_{\text{NRP}}$ . Either UE may rekey the connection at any time. This shall be done before the counter for a PDCP bearer repeats with the current keys. A rekeying operation shall refresh the $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ and NRPEK and NRPIK, and may refresh $K_{\text{NRP}}$ . There is no benefit in running the rekeying procedure if the NULL integrity algorithm is in use, hence it is recommended not to trigger it when using the NULL integrity algorithm. A rekeying operation follows the flows given in figure 5.3.3.1.4.4-1. + +NOTE: The rekeying procedure is not required from security point of view if the connection is unprotected. + +![Sequence diagram of security establishment during re-keying between UE_1 and UE_2. It shows a 6-step process including Direct Re-keying Request, Auth and Key Establishment, Security Mode Command, Security Mode Complete, and Link Re-keying Response, along with internal state changes for both UEs.](b90144cfbb81a2d610d920240fda689d_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE_1 + participant UE_2 + Note over UE_1, UE_2: 1. Direct Re-keying Request (Re-auth flag, UE_1 security capabilities, [Nonce_1], [MSB of K_NRP-sess ID]) + UE_1->>UE_2: + Note over UE_1, UE_2: 2. Direct Auth and Key Establishment + UE_1<->UE_2: + Note over UE_1, UE_2: 3a. Direct Security Mode Command(UE_1 security capabilities, [Nonce_2], [LSB of K_NRP-sess ID], Chosen_algs) + UE_2->>UE_1: + Note right of UE_2: 3b. Ready to receive user plane and signalling with new context + Note left of UE_1: 4a. Ready to send and receive user plane and signalling with new context + Note over UE_1, UE_2: 4b. Direct Security Mode Complete () + UE_1->>UE_2: + Note right of UE_2: 5a. Send user plane and signalling with new context and delete old context + Note over UE_1, UE_2: 5b. Direct Link Re-keying Response () + UE_2->>UE_1: + Note left of UE_1: 6. Delete old security when signalling message protected with new security context is received + +``` + +Sequence diagram of security establishment during re-keying between UE\_1 and UE\_2. It shows a 6-step process including Direct Re-keying Request, Auth and Key Establishment, Security Mode Command, Security Mode Complete, and Link Re-keying Response, along with internal state changes for both UEs. + +Figure 5.3.3.1.4.4-1: Security establishment during rekeying + +1. UE\_1 sends a Direct Rekey Request to UE\_2. This message shall include UE\_1 security capabilities (the list of algorithms that UE\_1 will accept for this connection). In addition, if a non-Null integrity algorithm is in use, the message shall include Nonce\_1 (for session key generation) and the most significant 8-bits of the $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID. These bits are chosen such that UE\_1 will be able to locally identify a security context that is created by this procedure. The message may also include a Re-auth Flag if UE\_1 wants to rekey $K_{\text{NRP}}$ . The message also contains Key\_Est\_Info (see clause 5.3.3.1.3.2). +2. UE\_2 may initiate a Direct Auth Key Establish procedure with UE\_1. This is mandatory if UE\_1 included the Re-auth Flag and signalling is needed to establish $K_{\text{NRP}}$ . +3. This step is the same as step 3 in clause 5.3.3.1.4.3 except the following differences: the chosen integrity algorithm shall only be NULL if and only if the NULL integrity algorithm is currently in use, the chosen confidentiality algorithm shall only be NULL if and only if the NULL confidentiality algorithm is currently in use and UE\_1's signalling security policy is not included in this message. UE\_2 is then ready to receive both signalling and user plane traffic protected with the new security context. The lower layer shall be provided with an indication that the new security context can be used to receive protected user plane traffic in addition to the indication(s) from step 3 in clause 5.3.3.1.4.3. +4. This step is the same as step 4 in clause 5.3.3.1.4.3 except the following differences: the UE\_1 shall only accept the NULL integrity algorithm if and only if the NULL integrity algorithm is currently in use, UE\_1 shall only accept the NULL confidentiality algorithm if and only if the NULL confidentiality algorithm is currently in use, and UE\_1 does not check the returned signalling security policy (as it is not sent in this case). UE\_2 is then ready to both send and receive both signalling and user plane traffic protected with the new security context. The + +lower layer shall receive an indication that the new security context shall be used to send and can be used to receive protected user plane traffic after the Direct Security Mode Complete message has been sent in addition to the indications given in step 4. + +5. This step is the same as step 5 in clause 5.3.3.1.4.3 except the following changes: the Direct Communication Accept message is replaced by Direct Link Rekeying Response message. There is no need for the indication to be ready to receive user plane with the new context as this indication was received at step 3 but the rest of the indication from step 5 of clause 5.3.3.1.4.3 are needed. +6. This step is the same as step 6 in clause 5.3.3.1.4.3 except the following: the Direct Communication Accept message is replaced by Direct Link Rekeying Response message. No indication to the AS layer is needed at this step. + +###### 5.3.3.1.4.5 Security establishment for user plane bearers + +The UEs handle the user plane security policies as described in clauses 5.3.3.1.4.2.3. + +The UE initiating the establishment of a user plane bearer shall select an LCID whose associated value of Bearer for input to the security algorithms (see clauses 5.3.3.1.5.2 and 5.3.3.1.5.3) has not been used with the current keys, NRPEK and NRPIK. If this is not possible the UE shall initiate a re-keying (see clause 5.3.3.1.4.4) before establishing the user plane bearer. + +When establishing or re-configuring the user plane bearers, the UEs shall activate the user plane security for the bearers according to the configuration of confidentiality and integrity protection received from its V2X layer. The confidentiality and/or integrity protection algorithms are same as those selected for protecting the signalling bearers if confidentiality and/or integrity protection are required for both signalling and user plane. The user plane confidentiality protection algorithm is the same as the selected signalling confidentiality algorithm if signalling confidentiality protection is not activated. + +Both UEs shall ensure that the user plane for each V2X service is only sent or received (e.g. dropped if received on a bearer with incorrect security) on user plane bearers with the necessary security if security protection of this link is activated. + +##### 5.3.3.1.5 Protection of the PC5 unicast link + +###### 5.3.3.1.5.1 General + +Protection for the signalling and user plane data between the UEs is provided at the PDCP layer. As the security is not preserved through a drop of the connection, all signalling messages that need to be sent before security is established for a connection may be sent with no protection. The PC5-S signalling messages that can be sent and processed unprotected are given in TS 24.587 [8]. Once security is established for a connection all signalling messages for that connection are sent integrity protected and confidentiality protected with the chosen algorithms except the Direct Security Mode Command which is sent integrity protected only. + +###### 5.3.3.1.5.2 Integrity protection + +UEs shall implement NIA0, 128-NIA1 and 128-NIA2 and may implement 128-NIA3 for integrity protection of the unicast link. The algorithm identifiers from clause 5.11.1.2 of TS 33.501 [6] are reused for PC5-S, PC5-RRC, and PC5-U. + +These integrity algorithms are as specified in TS 33.501 [6] and are reused with the following modifications: + +- The key used is NRPIK; +- Direction is set to 1 for direct link signalling transmitted by the UE that sent the Direct Security Mode Command for this security context and 0 otherwise; +- Bearer[0] to Bearer[4] are set to 5 LSB of LCID; +- COUNT[0] to COUNT[31] are filled with counter value (see clause 6.3.5 of TS 38.323 [9]). + +NOTE: The above input parameters do not apply to NIA0 as specified in Annex D.1 of TS 33.501 [6]. + +The receiving UE ensures that received protected signalling messages and user plane data that is integrity protected are not replayed. + +###### 5.3.3.1.5.3 Confidentiality protection + +UEs shall implement NEA0, 128-NEA1 and 128-NEA2 and may implement 128-NEA3 for ciphering of the unicast link. The algorithm identifiers from clause 5.11.1.1 of TS 33.501 [6] are reused for PC5-S, PC5-RRC, and PC5-U. + +These ciphering algorithms are as specified in TS 33.501 [6] and are used with the following modifications: + +- The key used in NRPEK; +- Direction is set as for integrity protection (see 5.3.3.1.5.2); +- Bearer[0] to Bearer[4] are set to 5 LSB of LCID; +- COUNT[0] to COUNT[31] are filled with counter value. + +NOTE: The above input parameters do not apply to NEA0 as specified in Annex D.1 of TS 33.501 [6]. + +###### 5.3.3.1.5.4 Content of the PDCP packet + +The Key ID and least significant bits of the counter are carried in the PDCP header, along with any MAC that is needed for integrity protection if integrity protection is activated. The key ID is used to signal which security context is being used and shall be set to $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID. The payload field and MAC (if required) fields are ciphered if confidentiality protection is activated. + +This is illustrated in Figure 5.3.3.1.5.4-1. + +| | | | | +|--------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------| +| $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ ID | LSBs of counter | Payload (ciphered if confidentiality protection is activated) | Ciphered MAC (if required, ciphered if | +|--------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------| + +**Figure 5.3.3.1.5.4-1: Security parameters in the PDCP header for NR based PC5 unicast mode** + +#### 5.3.3.2 Identity privacy for the PC5 unicast link + +##### 5.3.3.2.1 General + +The link identifier update procedure given in TS 23.287 [2] is used to provide privacy for the identities in the unicast link. This procedure only provides privacy if a non-NULL confidentiality algorithm is selected. This means the messages in this procedure are sent confidentiality protected (i.e. using a non-NULL confidentiality algorithm) and hence the new identities agreed by the UEs are only known to the involved UEs. A three-way message exchange procedure is required with this procedure since both UEs need to change their identifiers during the same procedure and to allow these new values to be acknowledged before them being used. This procedure is used to preserve the privacy for the identities that are seen in the clear for an ongoing unicast connection. + +NOTE: From a security point of view, it is assumed that the link identifier update procedure is used with a protected connection. + +A separate privacy threat that allows to link two subsequent connections is caused by either the same $K_{\text{NRP}}$ ID or same partial $K_{\text{NRP}}$ ID value being sent in the Direct Communication Request message for subsequent connections. The Layer-2 link release procedure given in TS 23.287 [2] is used to provide privacy for the $K_{\text{NRP}}$ ID. The messages in the Layer-2 link release procedure are always sent protected and hence the new $K_{\text{NRP}}$ ID agreed by the UEs is only known to the involved UEs. + +##### 5.3.3.2.2 Procedures + +###### 5.3.3.2.2.1 Link identifier update + +Figure 5.3.3.2.2.1-1 shows the flows for changing the identities of the UEs involved in PC5 unicast link. The figure only displays the security parameters ( $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ ) that are changed and the Layer-2 IDs but not the other parameters described in TS 23.287 [2]. + +![Sequence diagram showing the Link identifier update procedure between UE_1 and UE_2.](a734898ce18e972938949637c32a34f4_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE_1 + participant UE_2 + Note over UE_1, UE_2: 0. Secured unicast link + UE_1->>UE_2: 1. Link Identifier Update Request (UE-1's new Layer-2 ID, MSB of K_NRP-sess ID) + UE_2->>UE_1: 2. Link Identifier Update Response (UE-1's new Layer-2 ID, MSB of K_NRP-sess ID, UE-2's new Layer-2 ID, LSB of K_NRP-sess ID) + UE_1->>UE_2: 3. Link Identifier Update Ack (UE-2's new Layer-2 ID, LSB of K_NRP-sess ID) + +``` + +The diagram illustrates a four-step process between UE\_1 and UE\_2. Step 0 is an established secured unicast link. In step 1, UE\_1 sends a Link Identifier Update Request to UE\_2 containing its new Layer-2 ID and the MSB of the new $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ . In step 2, UE\_2 responds with a Link Identifier Update Response containing UE\_1's new Layer-2 ID, the MSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ , UE\_2's own new Layer-2 ID, and the LSB of the new $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ . In step 3, UE\_1 sends a Link Identifier Update Ack to UE\_2 containing UE\_2's new Layer-2 ID and the LSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ . + +Sequence diagram showing the Link identifier update procedure between UE\_1 and UE\_2. + +**Figure 5.3.3.2.2.1-1: Link identifier update procedure** + +The procedure proceeds with the following steps and provides additional handling on top of what is provided in TS 23.287 [2]. + +0. UE\_1 and UE\_2 are communicating via a unicast link and have established the security for the link. +1. UE\_1 decides to change its identifiers and sends a Link Identifier Update Request message to UE\_2 (see TS 23.287 [2]). In addition to the changed identifiers, UE\_1 shall include the new MSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ in the Link Identifier Update Request message. These bits shall be chosen so that they uniquely identify $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ at UE\_1. The new MSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ shall be selected randomly. +2. UE\_2 shall choose the new LSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ so that they uniquely identify $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ at UE\_2. The new LSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ shall be selected randomly. UE\_2 shall form the new $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ from the MSB received from UE\_1 and the LSB that UE\_2 chose. UE\_2 shall associate the new $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ with the updated Layer-2 IDs (see TS 23.287 [2]) and shall use this new $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ when it uses the updated Layer-2 IDs. In addition to its updated identifiers, UE\_2 shall send the LSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ to UE\_1 along with the received MSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ and other identifiers received from UE\_1 in the Link Identifier Update Response message. UE\_1 shall check that the returned MSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ is identical to the one sent in step 1. +3. UE\_1 shall form the new $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ from the LSB received from UE\_2 and the MSB chosen by UE\_1 (in step 1). UE\_1 shall associate the new $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ with the updated Layer-2 IDs (see TS 23.287 [2]) and shall use this new $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ when it uses the updated Layer-2 IDs. UE\_1 shall send the Link Identifier Update Ack message to UE\_2 including the LSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ and other identifiers received from UE\_2. UE\_2 shall check that the returned LSB of $K_{\text{NRP-sess ID}}$ are identical to the one sent in step 2. + +###### 5.3.3.2.2.2 Layer-2 link release + +Figure 5.3.3.2.2.2-2 shows the message flows for changing the $K_{\text{NRP ID}}$ of the UEs involved in PC5 unicast link to remediate the privacy threat for the $K_{\text{NRP ID}}$ . This message flow is based on the Layer-2 link release procedure provided in clause 6.3.3.3 of TS 23.287 [2]. The messages in the Layer-2 link release procedure are always sent protected and hence the new $K_{\text{NRP ID}}$ agreed by the UEs is only known to the involved UEs. The new $K_{\text{NRP ID}}$ is used on a subsequent unicast link establishment procedure (see clause 5.3.3.1.4.3). + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the Layer-2 link release procedure between UE_1 and UE_2.](81a4cbf0b3c4cbc065efdf8f800dadde_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE_1 + participant UE_2 + Note over UE_1, UE_2: 0. Unicast link + UE_1->>UE_2: 1. Disconnect Request + UE_2->>UE_1: 2. Disconnect Response + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the Layer-2 link release procedure between UE\_1 and UE\_2. + +**Figure 5.3.3.2.2.2-2: Layer-2 link release procedure** + +0. UE\_1 and UE\_2 have a unicast link established as described in TS 23.287 [2]. +1. UE\_1 sends a Disconnect Request message to UE\_2 in order to release the layer-2 link (see TS 23.287 [2]). UE\_1 shall include the new MSB of $K_{NRP}$ ID in the Disconnect Request message. These bits shall be chosen so that they uniquely identify $K_{NRP}$ at UE\_1. The new MSB of $K_{NRP}$ ID shall be selected randomly. +2. UE\_2 shall choose the new LSB of $K_{NRP}$ ID so that they uniquely identify $K_{NRP}$ at UE\_2. The new LSB of $K_{NRP}$ ID shall be selected randomly. UE\_2 shall form the new $K_{NRP}$ ID from the MSB received from UE\_1 and the LSB that UE\_2 chose. UE\_2 may use this new $K_{NRP}$ ID when it reconnects with UE\_1. UE\_2 shall send the LSB of $K_{NRP}$ ID to UE\_1 in the Disconnect Response message. Upon reception of the Disconnect Response message, UE\_1 shall form the new $K_{NRP}$ ID from the LSB received from UE\_2 and the MSB that was chosen by UE\_1 (in step 1). UE\_1 may use this new $K_{NRP}$ ID when it reconnects with UE\_2. + +## 5.4 Security for groupcast mode + +### 5.4.1 General + +This clause describes the security requirements and the procedures that can be specifically applied for the groupcast mode over the NR PC5 interface. + +### 5.4.2 Requirements + +#### 5.4.2.1 Requirements for securing the NR based PC5 groupcast mode + +There are no requirements for securing the NR based PC5 reference point for groupcast mode. + +#### 5.4.2.2 Identity privacy requirements for the NR based PC5 groupcast mode + +The 5G System shall protect against link ability attacks on Layer-2 ID and IP address for groupcast mode. + +The 5G System shall protect against trackability attacks on Layer-2 ID and IP address for groupcast mode. + +### 5.4.3 Procedures + +#### 5.4.3.1 Securing the NR based PC5 groupcast mode + +There are no particular procedures defined for securing the NR based PC5 groupcast mode. + +#### 5.4.3.2 Identity privacy procedures for the PC5 groupcast mode + +The below privacy procedures follow the privacy mechanism defined in TS 33.185 [5] for V2X LTE which is intended to mitigate against the threat of tracking the UE by an attacker based on its used source identities. + +The UE shall change and randomize its source Layer-2 ID and source IP address including IP prefix (if used) when the V2X application indicates that the Application Layer ID has changed. The UE may change and randomize its source Layer-2 ID and source IP address including IP prefix (if used) at other times (e.g. see clause 5.6.1.1 in TS 23.287 [2]). The UE shall provide an indication to the V2X application layer whenever the source Layer-2 ID and/or source IP address are changed. + +NOTE: There are no additional procedures defined for privacy of destination Layer-2 ID in this release. + +## 5.5 Security for broadcast mode + +### 5.5.1 General + +This clause describes the security requirements and the procedures that can be specifically applied for the broadcast mode over the NR PC5 interface. + +### 5.5.2 Requirements + +#### 5.5.2.1 Requirements for securing the NR based PC5 broadcast mode + +There are no requirements for securing the NR based PC5 reference point for broadcast mode. + +#### 5.5.2.2 Identity privacy requirements for the NR based PC5 broadcast mode + +The 5G System shall protect against link ability attacks on Layer-2 ID and IP address for broadcast mode. + +The 5G System shall protect against trackability attacks on Layer-2 ID and IP address for broadcast mode. + +### 5.5.3 Procedures + +#### 5.5.3.1 Securing the NR based PC5 broadcast mode + +There are no particular procedures defined for securing the NR based PC5 broadcast mode. + +#### 5.5.3.2 Identity privacy procedures for the NR based PC5 broadcast mode + +These procedures for the privacy of source Layer-2 ID and source IP address are the same as that given in clause 5.4.3.2 for the source identities in the UE. + +# --- 6 Security for V2X over Uu reference point + +## 6.1 General + +This clause contains the security and privacy requirements and procedures that meet the requirements over Uu connectivity with 5G core network. + +## 6.2 Requirements + +There are no additional security or privacy requirements for V2X beyond those given in TS 33.501 [6] for Uu connectivity with 5G core network. + +## 6.3 Procedures + +There are no additional security or privacy procedures of V2X beyond those given in TS 33.501 [6] for Uu connectivity with 5G core network. + +NOTE: The present document does not provide technical solutions to address any privacy concerns specific to V2X service that require privacy for a UE being attached to the network, or that due to the data traversing the network in Uu mode. However, there are general privacy principles applicable outside of 3GPP scope; data minimization and user consent if privacy impacting data collection is unavoidable for providing the V2X service. + +# --- Annex A (normative): Key derivation functions + +## A.1 KDF interface and input parameter construction + +### A.1.1 General + +This annex specifies the use of the Key Derivation Function (KDF) specified in TS 33.220 [7] for the current specification. This annex specifies how to construct the input string, S, to the KDF (which is input together with the relevant key). For each of the distinct usages of the KDF, the input parameters S are specified below. + +### A.1.2 FC value allocations + +The FC number space used is controlled by TS 33.220 [7]. + +## --- A.2 Calculation of NRPEK and NRPIK + +When calculating an NRPIK or NRPEK from $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ , the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF that is specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [7]: + +- FC = 0x7E +- P0 = 0x00 if NRPEK is being derived or 0x01 if NRPIK is being derived +- L0 = length of P0 (i.e. 0x00 0x01) +- P1 = algorithm identity +- L1 = length of algorithm identity (i.e. 0x00 0x01) + +The algorithm identity shall be set as described in TS 33.501 [6]. + +The input key shall be the 256-bit $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ . + +For an algorithm key of length n bits, where n is less or equal to 256, the n least significant bits of the 256 bits of the KDF output shall be used as the algorithm key. + +## --- A.3 Calculation of $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ from $K_{\text{NRP}}$ + +When calculating $K_{\text{NRP-sess}}$ from $K_{\text{NRP}}$ , the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF that is specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [7]: + +- FC = 0x7F +- P0 = Nonce\_1 +- L0 = length of Nonce\_1 (i.e. 0x00 0x10) +- P1 = Nonce\_2 +- L1 = length of Nonce\_2 (i.e. 0x00 0x10) + +The input key shall be the 256-bit $K_{\text{NRP}}$ . + +# Annex B (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2020-07 | SA#88-e | | | | | Upgrade to change control version | 16.0.0 | +| 2020-09 | SA#89E | SP-200705 | 0001 | - | F | Clarification on the definition of KNRP-sess | 16.1.0 | +| 2020-09 | SA#89E | SP-200705 | 0006 | - | F | Update the clause 5.3.3.2.2 | 16.1.0 | +| 2020-09 | SA#89E | SP-200705 | 0007 | 1 | F | Editorial changes about eV2X | 16.1.0 | +| 2020-09 | SA#89E | SP-200705 | 0009 | 1 | F | Clarification on security policy handling | 16.1.0 | +| 2020-09 | SA#89E | SP-200705 | 0010 | 1 | F | Clarification on algorithm selection and key derivation | 16.1.0 | +| 2020-09 | SA#89E | SP-200705 | 0011 | 1 | F | Clarification on processing NULL algorithms | 16.1.0 | +| 2020-09 | SA#89E | SP-200705 | 0013 | 1 | F | Propose to complete security algorithm selection for UP | 16.1.0 | +| 2020-09 | SA#89E | SP-200705 | 0014 | 1 | F | Clarification on the UP security configuration checking | 16.1.0 | +| 2020-12 | SA#90e | SP-201014 | 0017 | - | F | Corrections on security establishment | 16.2.0 | +| 2020-12 | SA#90e | SP-201014 | 0019 | 1 | F | Clarification on cross-layer indication triggered by updating the security context | 16.2.0 | +| 2020-12 | SA#90e | SP-201014 | 0020 | 1 | F | Proposal for improvement of the user plane security policy handling logic | 16.2.0 | +| 2020-12 | SA#90e | SP-201014 | 0021 | 1 | F | Clarification on the security policy handling | 16.2.0 | +| 2021-03 | SA#91e | SP-210119 | 0022 | 1 | F | Clarification on cross-layer indication triggered by updating the security context | 16.3.0 | +| 2021-03 | SA#91e | SP-210119 | 0023 | 1 | F | Clarifications regarding Authentication procedure for V2X PC5 unicast link | 16.3.0 | +| 2021-03 | SA#91e | SP-210119 | 0024 | 1 | F | Clarification on key derivation | 16.3.0 | +| 2021-06 | SA#92e | SP-210442 | 0025 | 2 | F | Clarification on a figure and the key activation | 16.4.0 | +| 2022-06 | SA#96 | SP-220548 | 0027 | - | F | Rel-16 Add clarification to unicast procedures | 16.5.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33813/00504fc688ebcf131ccbeff94dfc9939_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33813/00504fc688ebcf131ccbeff94dfc9939_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..af9f416cd5104e2fb81a045e18a8e1901f2e3949 --- /dev/null +++ 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b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33813/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4f2dede9d01143d4ab57d293f0038ac9ba22fba6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33813/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,1214 @@ + + +# 3GPP TR 33.813 V16.0.0 (2020-07) + +*Technical Report* + +**3rd Generation Partnership Project; +Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; +Security aspects; +Study on security aspects of network slicing enhancement +(Release 16)** + +![5G logo](64662465bba247703fdec49c8f3309f9_img.jpg) + +The 5G logo, featuring the text "5G" in a bold, black, sans-serif font. Above the "5G" text are three green curved lines representing signal waves. + +5G logo + +![3GPP logo](5fb340ad68b0c71df0b56698b137e35b_img.jpg) + +The 3GPP logo, featuring the text "3GPP" in a stylized, bold, black font. The "3" and "G" are connected at the top, and the "P" and "P" are connected at the top. Below the "G" is a red signal wave icon. + +3GPP logo + +A GLOBAL INITIATIVE + +The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP. The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organizational Partners and shall not be implemented. This Specification is provided for future development work within 3GPP only. The Organizational Partners accept no liability for any use of this Specification. Specifications and Reports for implementation of the 3GPP™ system should be obtained via the 3GPP Organizational Partners' Publications Offices. + +# **3GPP** + +--- + +Postal address + +--- + +3GPP support office address + +--- + +650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis +Valbonne - FRANCE +Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 + +Internet + +--- + + + +## --- **Copyright Notification** --- + +No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. +The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. + +© 2020, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC). +All rights reserved. + +UMTS™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members +3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association + +# Contents + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 5 | +| Introduction ..... | 7 | +| 1 Scope..... | 8 | +| 2 References..... | 8 | +| 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations..... | 9 | +| 3.1 Terms..... | 9 | +| 3.2 Symbols..... | 9 | +| 3.3 Abbreviations ..... | 9 | +| 4 Background..... | 9 | +| 5 Requirements, assumptions and constraints..... | 9 | +| 6 Key Issues ..... | 9 | +| 6.1 Introduction ..... | 9 | +| 6.2 Key Issue #1 Authentication for access to specific Network Slices ..... | 9 | +| 6.2.1 Key issue detail..... | 9 | +| 6.2.2 Security threats ..... | 10 | +| 6.2.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 10 | +| 6.3 Key Issue #2: AMF Key separation..... | 10 | +| 6.3.1 Key issue details ..... | 10 | +| 6.3.2 Security threats ..... | 11 | +| 6.3.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 11 | +| 6.4 Key Issue #3: Security features for NSaaS ..... | 11 | +| 6.4.1 Key issue details ..... | 11 | +| 6.4.2 Security threats or disadvantages ..... | 11 | +| 6.4.3 Potential Security requirements..... | 11 | +| 6.5 Key Issue #4: Security and privacy aspects related to the solution for Network Slice specific access authentication and authorization ..... | 11 | +| 6.5.1 Description ..... | 11 | +| 6.5.2 Security threats ..... | 12 | +| 6.5.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 12 | +| 6.6 Key issue #5: Access token handling between Network Slices..... | 12 | +| 6.6.1 Key issue detail..... | 12 | +| 6.6.2 Security threats ..... | 13 | +| 6.6.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 13 | +| 6.7 Key Issue #6: Confidentiality protection of NSSAI and home control ..... | 13 | +| 6.7.1 Key issue details ..... | 13 | +| 6.7.2 Security and privacy threats ..... | 13 | +| 6.7.3 Potential Security requirements..... | 13 | +| 6.7 Key Issue #7 Cancellation of rejected S-NSSAIs ..... | 13 | +| 6.7.1 Key issue detail..... | 13 | +| 6.7.2 Security threats ..... | 14 | +| 6.7.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 14 | +| 7 Solutions..... | 14 | +| 7.1 Solution #1 Slice Specific Authentication and Authorization ..... | 14 | +| 7.1.1 Introduction ..... | 14 | +| 7.1.2 Solution details ..... | 16 | +| 7.1.3 Evaluation..... | 17 | +| 7.2 Solution #2 Slice Authentication..... | 17 | +| 7.2.1 Introduction ..... | 17 | +| 7.2.2 Solution details ..... | 17 | +| 7.2.3 Evaluation..... | 19 | +| 7.3 Solution #3 Security features for NSaaS..... | 19 | +| 7.3.1 Introduction ..... | 19 | +| 7.3.2 Solution details ..... | 19 | + +| | | | +|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| 7.3.3 | Evaluation..... | 19 | +| 7.4 | Solution #4 Solution for Slice Specific Authentication and Authorization with multiple registrations in the same PLMN..... | 19 | +| 7.5 | Solution #5 Privacy for Slice Authentication..... | 21 | +| 7.5.1 | Introduction ..... | 21 | +| 7.5.2 | Solution details ..... | 22 | +| 7.5.3 | Evaluation..... | 23 | +| 7.6 | Solution #6 Slice Authentication with user ID privacy but network aware..... | 23 | +| 7.6.1 | Introduction ..... | 23 | +| 7.6.2 | Solution details ..... | 23 | +| 7.6.3 | Evaluation..... | 24 | +| 7.7 | Solution #7: Solution to protect user ID..... | 25 | +| 7.7.1 | Introduction ..... | 25 | +| 7.8 | Solution #8 Protecting NSSAI for transmission on the AS layer ..... | 25 | +| 7.8.1 | Introduction ..... | 25 | +| 7.8.2 | Solution details ..... | 25 | +| 7.8.3 | Evaluation..... | 27 | +| 7.9 | Solution #9: Slice specific authorization..... | 27 | +| 7.9.1 | Introduction ..... | 27 | +| 7.9.2 | Solution details ..... | 28 | +| 7.9.3 | Evaluation..... | 28 | +| 7.12 | Solution #12 Privacy protection of NSSAI ..... | 32 | +| 8 | Conclusions..... | 34 | +| 8.1 | Key issue-solution mapping..... | 34 | +| 8.2 | General conclusions ..... | 35 | +| 8.2.1 | Conclusions for key issues ..... | 35 | +| 9 | Recommendations..... | 35 | +| Annex A: | Change history ..... | 36 | + +# Foreword + +This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings: + +- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something +- shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something + +The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports. + +The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document. + +- should** indicates a recommendation to do something +- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something +- may** indicates permission to do something +- need not** indicates permission not to do something + +The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended. + +- can** indicates that something is possible +- cannot** indicates that something is impossible + +The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not". + +- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +In addition: + +**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements. + +--- + +## Scope + +The scope of the present document is: + +- To address the network slicing open security issues which are left over from Rel-15, specifically: + - Study security and privacy aspects related to the solution for Network Slice specific access authentication and authorization using a User ID and credentials, different from the 3GPP subscription credentials (e.g. SUPI and credentials used for PLMN access) and that takes place after the primary authentication which is still required between the UE and the 5GS for PLMN access authorization and authentication, developed in the FS-eNS study led by SA2. +- Identify and study the open security issues from R15 Network Slices particularly the aspects such as: + - Inter-slice security isolation. + - Slice-specific security in the roaming scenarios. + - Slice-specific security features that can be offered as part of Network Slice as a Service (NSaaS) (Slice management). + - Slice-specific security features that can be made visible or monitored in the slice management (Slice management). +- Study the security aspects of architectural solutions in SA2 for the enhanced Network Slicing in R16. +- Study the possible security aspects of the Network Slicing interworking with EPC for Connected and Idle modes. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system". +- [3] 3GPP TS 23.501: "System Architecture for the 5G System; Stage 2". +- [4] 3GPP TS 23.502: "Procedures for the 5G System; Stage 2". +- [5] 3GPP TR 23.740: "Study on Enhancement of Network Slicing". +- [6] IETF RFC 748: "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)" +- [7] 3GPP TS 28.531: " Management and orchestration Provisioning". +- [8] IETF RFC 4282: " The Network Access Identifier". +- [9] 3GPP TS 24.501: "Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for 5G System (5GS); Stage 3". + +# --- 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Terms + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]. + +## 3.2 Symbols + +Void. + +## 3.3 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]. + +# --- 4 Void + +# 5 Void + +# 6 Key Issues + +## 6.1 Introduction + +This clause details the key issues identified for security aspects related to the enhanced Network Slices. Each key issue defines the background to the issue, defines the threats related to the issue and proposes requirements that resolve the key issue. + +## 6.2 Key Issue #1 Authentication for access to specific Network Slices + +### 6.2.1 Key issue detail + +This key issue will study how to perform Network Slice Access authentication and authorization specific for the Network Slice Access authentication that uses User Identities and Credentials different from the 3GPP SUPI and that takes place after the primary authentication which is still required between the UE and the 5GS for PLMN access authorization and authentication. + +In particular, the key issue will address: Access control to Network Slices that require additional authorization and authentication: + +- How do the UE and the Network know that additional authorization and authentication is required for a Network Slice? +- How is the additional authorization and authentication triggered and performed? E.g. which procedures are used and when. + +### 6.2.2 Security threats + +If Slice specific authentication is not performed, unauthorized UEs may access the Slice which those UEs are not entitled to access. The unauthorized UEs may consume resources of the Network Slice and they may cause DoS to legitimate UEs. + +The unauthorized UEs may be any regular UE, which may have successfully completed the primary authentication using 3GPP credentials, but do not have credentials for access the specific Network Slice. Hence such UEs need to be prevented from accessing the Network Slice. + +Without slice authentication, operators may not meet the service demands from industry efficiently. Without standardized slice-authentication mechanisms, it will be costly for operators to develop proprietary workarounds or subject to potential security risks when interacting with third party networks. + +### 6.2.3 Potential security requirements + +It should be possible to perform Network Slice Access authentication and authorization specific Network Slice, in addition to primary authentication if the Slice is configured for such additional authentication. + +It should be possible to perform the additional authentication after primary authentication using credentials other than credentials used for primary authentication used for 3GPP access. + +## 6.3 Key Issue #2: AMF Key separation + +### 6.3.1 Key issue details + +The TR 23.740 [5] contains a key issue on the support of Mutually Exclusive Access to Network Slices (MEANS) in clause 5.1. The use cases include, but are not limited to, UEs being restricted to one of two modes of operations. For example, a Public Safety UE being either in an off-duty or an on-duty mode but not simultaneously in both modes. So that the said UE, when on-duty, can be directed to a dedicated Public Safety slice while when in off-duty mode, it is directed to the mainstream one. Whilst this is certainly a beneficial feature for performance and resource optimization, there might be deployment aspects related to tenancy and ownership that require further strengthening the access restriction to prevent access to the signalling and user data communicated between the UE and such mutually exclusive slices. + +The TS 33.501 [2] already supports features for backward and forward security during AMF change. When AMF relocation takes place, and based on a local operator policy, the source AMF may derive a new AMF key for the target and the target AMF may trigger a new authentication run. A new authentication run refreshes the whole key hierarchy and totally shield the communication between the UE and the network from the source AMF. It is worth mentioning that in TR 23.740 [5], another key issue in clause 5.3 addresses the support of an additional slice-specific authentication. This additional authentication is expected to take place after the primary authentication when UE is redirected to another slice. + +In the current solution, assuming that a new authentication procedure is endorsed for slice authentication, realizing forward security requires yet another run of the primary authentication following or preceding the new slice authentication procedure run. Observe that a primary authentication run always involves the HPLMN. This might be acceptable, but it is not very efficient. Therefore, it is worth investigating how to improve the existing mechanism to meet the forward security requirements in 5G Systems. + +### 6.3.2 Security threats + +Without key separation between mutually exclusive slices controlled by different AMFs, a potential key leakage in one slice would expose the signalling and the user data between the UE and the next slice the UE is redirected to, which could be a restricted slice owned and managed by a different party, e.g. Public Safety or government organization. + +### 6.3.3 Potential security requirements + +The system shall support forward security between mutually exclusive slices. + +## 6.4 Key Issue #3: Security features for NSaaS + +### 6.4.1 Key issue details + +Operators may offer customised services through management services to the service consumers based on the Network Slice as a Service (NSaaS) model, as described in TS 28.530 [x1, x2]. The services offered are characterized by the network slice's properties, e.g. radio access technology, bandwidth, latency, reliability, guaranteed/non-guaranteed QoS, and security level etc. However, the security related properties are not identified. This KI will address: offering slice-specific security features as NSaaS including: + +- Which security features can be offered as a service to be exposed and managed? +- How to expose and manage the security features and specify the related network functions? + +In addition, some of security properties in TS 33.501 are optional, but network resources need to be allocated if provided. It is beneficial for the operators to know, in terms of resource optimization, which optional features are not necessary for every slice. + +### 6.4.2 Security threats or disadvantages + +N.A. + +### 6.4.3 Potential Security requirements + +N.A. + +## 6.5 Key Issue #4: Security and privacy aspects related to the solution for Network Slice specific access authentication and authorization + +### 6.5.1 Description + +In Rel-16, after mandatory primary authentication performed by MNO which is to control the access to MNO's network, slice authentication may be needed to control the access to the specific slice service and to support User centric identifier and authentication: + +- Access control on slice service or slice resource: TR 23.740 [2] on enhancement of Network Slicing includes studies on how to provide additional Network Slice Access authentication and authorization specific for the Network Slice. Network Slice Access may need to be controlled by entities besides MNO. +- User centric identifier and authentication: TR 22.904 [1] aims to study the introduction of an optional, user-centric authentication layer on top of the existing subscription authentication, supporting various authentication mechanisms and interactions with external authentication systems as well as a degree of confidence. It gives some use cases including: Slice authentication by 3rd party. It mentions slice authentication can support user centric identifier and authentication apart from the MNO credential and authentication and thus allows users to have access to the specific slice service (e.g., different tiers of gaming services) regardless of device used based on the user's subscription to the slice service. + +The access control to Network Slices requires additional authorization and authentication uses a User ID and credentials, different from the 3GPP subscription credentials (e.g. SUPI and credentials used for PLMN access) and that takes place after the primary authentication which is still required between the UE and the 5GS for PLMN access authorization and authentication. + +This KI will address: Security and privacy aspects related to access control to Network Slices that require additional authorization and authentication including: + +- How to protect the security of the User ID and credentials in UE storage, transition and network storage? + +- As the Network Slice Access may be controlled by entities besides MNO, how to protect the security of the interaction between the 3rd party entities and the network functions performing slice authorization and authentication. As well as the interaction between the network functions performing slice authorization and authentication and the related MNO NFs such as AMF, SMF or NSSF? + +### 6.5.2 Security threats + +Without confidentiality or integrity protection of the User ID and corresponding credentials, sensitive information may leak, and user data may be obtained by attackers. + +### 6.5.3 Potential security requirements + +- User ID shall be privacy protected. + +**Editor's Note:** clarification on who shall not have access to User ID information or from whom to protect. + +## 6.6 Key issue #5: Access token handling between Network Slices + +### 6.6.1 Key issue detail + +As described in TS 23.501 [3], an NRF which takes the role of OAuth 2.0 Authorization server can be deployed at different levels: + +- PLMN level (the NRF is configured with information for the whole PLMN); +- shared-slice level (the NRF is configured with information belonging to a set of Network Slices); +- slice-specific level (the NRF is configured with information belonging to an S-NSSAI). + +Hence, an NRF deployed at the PLMN level or the shared-slice level can manage the access of NF service producers belong to different Network Slices. + +Furthermore, according to TS 33.501 [2], upon receiving the access token request, an NRF can generate an access token with appropriate claims included for the NF service consumer. The claims in the token include the NF Instance Id of NRF (issuer), NF Instance Id of the NF Service consumer (subject), NF type of the NF Service producer (audience), expected service name(s) (scope) and expiration time (expiration). + +Consequently, with the same access token authorized by the NRF deployed at the PLMN level or the shared-slice level, an NF service consumer may access the services provided by the same type of NF service producers belong to different Network Slices. + +However, network slices may differ for supported features and have different access rights. The access tokens for these network slices should be different (separated). In the cases where a group of network slices have similar access rights sharing the same access token, the access token should be restricted to a specific list of network slices, not for all network slices. + +### 6.6.2 Security threats + +Without access token separation between slices, an access token may be used to access all Network Slices managed by the same NRF which means a compromised NF service consumer can maliciously access services provided by NF service producers belong to all Network Slices. + +### 6.6.3 Potential security requirements + +It should be possible to perform access token authorization for a specific Network Slice or a list of Network Slices. + +## 6.7 Key Issue #6: Confidentiality protection of NSSAI and home control + +### 6.7.1 Key issue details + +NSSAI may contain sensitive information that causes privacy concerns when transmitted in clear. For example, a particular NSSAI may be linked to a slice instance exclusively for UEs serving police officers. It has been concluded in Rel-15 that S-NSSAI is not transmitted in initial NAS messages, until security context is established. Besides S-NSSAI is by default not transmitted in AS messages, unless a serving PLMN instructs the UE to do so. These tentative decisions leave following open issues needed to be addressed. + +- 1) Fulfil the requirement to send protected S-NSSAI. + +The objective of this key issue is to investigate complete solutions, to address above issues, in the meantime to address potential backward compatibility issue, if any, to R15. + +### 6.7.2 Security and privacy threats + +If an S-NSSAI is sent in the cleartext during the RRC connection establishment procedure, then the user privacy is lost. In case the S-NSSAI is related to the critical services (e.g. MCPTT) then the man in the middle may disrupt the services by targeting the user using these services. + +In addition, A non-compliant serving PLMN may transmit NSSAI in clear, leading to a leak of NSSAI. + +### 6.7.3 Potential Security requirements + +5G system shall provide confidentiality protection for NSSAI transmission. This key issue will only study solutions where: + +- Cryptographic key material is available from an earlier authentication run. +- Existing NAS or AS security contexts can be used. + +## 6.7 Key Issue #7 Cancellation of rejected S-NSSAIs + +### 6.7.1 Key issue detail + +This key issue deals with how to perform the revocation of an already rejected S-NSSAI, else there will not be a possibility for the UE to use the S-NSSAI even with a renewed valid. + +There is no policy defined in the UE for re-attempt to request a rejected S-NSSAI and allowing the UE to delete Rejected S-NSSAI(s) internally may result in undesirable and non-deterministic behaviour, i.e. the UE can directly renew it is subscription on application layer with the service provider but the NAS layer removed the rejected S-NSSAI. Since in Rel-15 and Rel-16 the UE can autonomously remove a Rejected S-NSSAI for a whole PLMN or a registration area, there would be no chance to re-register to the S-NSSAI even the UE re-newed the subscription on application layer. + +Another problem is that the context is stored in the AMF, i.e. a rejected S-NSSAI will be directly rejected by the AMF even without performing any slice authentication with the AAA. + +**Editor's Note:** It is FFS how the AMF updates the UE context for a rejected S-NSSAI. + +### 6.7.2 Security threats + +TBD + +### 6.7.3 Potential security requirements + +TBD + +# --- 7 Solutions + +## 7.1 Solution #1 Slice Specific Authentication and Authorization + +### 7.1.1 Introduction + +The solution described in this clause addresses key issue#1 Authentication for access to specific Network Slices and key issue#4 Security and privacy aspects related to the solution for Network Slice specific access authentication and authorization. + +This solution is based on the agreed Solution #3.2 in the SA2 TR 23.740. The architecture assumes Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting Server (AAA-S) deployed in a PLMN or in a third-party network that allows Slice-Specific authentication and authorisation of users who have the right of access to certain slices. A AAA proxy function (AAA-F) is also defined to provide a single point of interaction from the PLMN with the third parties. Slice specific User IDs and credentials, separate from those used for the primary authentication, are used in the Slice specific authentication. + +During the primary authentication, whether the UE requires a slice specific authentication is detected by the UDM by checking a flag for this extra authentication against the NSSAI corresponding to the Slice. The IP address or FQDN/realm of the AAA Server that would perform the authentication and authorisation may be stored in the AAA-F per S-NSSAI. Alternately, the User ID in the third party could be defined as a NAI (see IETF RFC 4282 [8]), i.e. the User ID is in the form user@domain. + +When a UE performs a registration request which includes S-NSSAI(s) in the Requested NSSAI which needs Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorisation, after the successful completion of the primary authentication, the AMF and SMF triggers, an Authentication with the AAA of specific S-NSSAI(s). If multiple Slices need slice specific authentication, one such authentication is needed for each S-NSSAI. + +The UE needs to be provisioned with the credentials necessary to authenticate itself with the Slice AAA Server corresponding to the NSSAI of the Slice. The UE includes a Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorisation indicator in the 'UE security capabilities' in the registration request message, for the AMF to determine whether it can execute Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorisation or not. If the Slice specific Authentication security capability is not included in the registration request, the AMF does not allow the UE to access to any Network Slice for which Slice-specific authentication is required. + +The assumption is that the Slice specific authentication is performed after primary authentication using one of the EAP authentication methods. + +Once the slice specific authentication is executed, authentication status is kept by the AMF in the UE context, so extra authentication is not repeated at subsequent registrations until a re-authentication is required by the AAA Server or the PLMN, based on policy. + +The Slice AAA server may re-authenticate the UE or decide to revoke the authorization, in this case the AAA proxy routes to the serving AMF, based on the binding between the User id and the GPSI of the UE established when the UE was authorized for the Slice. + +Once the slice specific authentication is complete, SM procedures to the authorised slices takes place for the UE. + +### 7.1.2 Solution details + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the Slice Specific Authentication procedure. The diagram shows interactions between UE, AMF, AUSF, and Slice Specific AAA. Steps 1-4 are standard registration. Steps 5-10 are the slice-specific authentication loop. Step 11 is an internal AMF action. Step 12 is the final NAS message.](75f0cb39f1cd165dfe4a6aa6c4d9388d_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant AMF + participant AUSF + participant AAA as Slice Specific AAA + + Note right of AMF: Slice Specific Authentication + UE->>AMF: 1. Registration Request + AMF->>AUSF: 2. Primary Authentication of UE + AUSF-->>AMF: + AMF->>UE: 3. Registration Accept (STMSI, Allowed NSSAI) + UE->>AMF: 4. Registration Complete + Note right of AMF: Slice Specific Authentication + AMF->>UE: 5. NAS Message ( EAP Identity Request, NSSAI) + UE->>AMF: 6. NAS Message ( EAP Identity Response, NSSAI) + AMF->>AAA: 7. Authentication Request ( EAP Identity Response, GPSI etc) + AAA-->>AMF: + AMF->>UE: 8. EAP Request-Response messages + AAA-->>AMF: 9. EAP Success + AMF->>UE: 10. NAS Message ( EAP Success) + Note right of AMF: 11. AMF completes the Slice specific SAuthentication of NSSAIs. Stores list of NSSAIs which passed Authentication as Allowed NSSAIs. + AMF->>UE: 12. NAS Message (List of Allowed NSSAIs) + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the Slice Specific Authentication procedure. The diagram shows interactions between UE, AMF, AUSF, and Slice Specific AAA. Steps 1-4 are standard registration. Steps 5-10 are the slice-specific authentication loop. Step 11 is an internal AMF action. Step 12 is the final NAS message. + +Figure 7.1.2-1 + +Step 1: UE sends Registration Request to the network. UE will include the list of NSSAIs corresponding to the network slices it is interested in to get authenticated for access. + +Step 2: UE and network completes Primary authentication of the UE, either using the 5G AKA procedure or EAP-AKA' procedure. At the end of a successful primary authentication, the AMF will have a list of allowed NSSAIs for the UE in the AMF form the AUSF, based on the subscription information available in the UDM. + +Step 3: At the end of a successful primary authentication procedure, AMF sends Registration Accept message to the UE. Based on the subscription information received from the UDM/AUSF, the message will contain all the allowed NSSAIs except the ones which require Slice specific authentication. + +Step 4: UE sends Registration Accept message, indicating the successful completion of primary authentication. + +Steps 5-10: If the UE had indicated its support for Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization Procedure in the UE MM Core Network Capability in Registration Request, based on the subscription information received from AUSF/UDM, the AMF initiates slice specific authentication, for all the slices which require slice specific authentication. + +Step 5: AMF sends EAP Identity Request to the UE corresponding to the NSSAI of the network slice, to initiate slice specific authentication. + +Step 6: UE responds with EAP Identity Response message for the requested NSSAI. + +Step 7: AMF sends Authentication Request to the AAA server of the network slice to authenticate the UE. The message will contain the EAP Identity received from the UE. + +Step 8: UE and AAA exchanges EAP Request/Response messages for the authentication via AMF. There may be multiple exchanges based on the particular configuration of the AAA. + +Step 9: AAA sends EAP success for the EAP user identity, if the verification succeeds. + +Step 10: AMF records the success of the EAP authentication for the Slice represented by the NSSAI, and forwards the EAP Success to the UE. + +Step 11: AMF completes the Slice specific authentication for all network slices for which there is subscription indication that a slice specific authentication is required for the UE to access these slices. + +Step 12: Once the Slice-Specific Authentication is completed for all S-NSSAIs, depending on the result of Slice-Specific Authentication, the AMF may trigger a UE Configuration Update procedure to deliver a new list of Allowed NSSAIs. + +### 7.1.3 Evaluation + +This solution addresses key issue#1 Authentication for access to specific Network Slices. Slice specific authentication is enabled based on the UEs subscription information received from the AUSF/UDM upon successful primary authentication. Slice specific authentication is initiated only if the UE also indicated its capability for the procedure in the UE capability indication. Since the AMF is initiating the EAP procedure for the slice specific authentication one by one, there are no timing issues associated with the procedure. Also, since the primary authentication has been completed before initiating the slice specific authentication, it is possible to set up AS security and protect the NSSAI in the RRC message if the UE initiates a Service Request related to an allowed NSSAI, before it goes to Idle state. Since NAS and AS security is established by the primary authentication procedure, the EAP identity used for the Slice specific authentication is protected at these layers. Hence this solution provides protection of User ID for the slice authentication between UE and serving network. + +## 7.2 Solution #2 Slice Authentication + +### 7.2.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses the Key Issue #1 Authentication for access to specific Network Slices. + +The slice authentication is performed between a UE and an AAA server, which may reside in the PLMN domain or outside the PLMN domain. It is based on subscription identifiers that are different from SUPI, e.g. DN subscription identifiers or user ID registered at DN. + +The slice authentication is performed after Primary Authentication and based on the EAP framework, where SEAF/AMF takes the role of the Authenticator. Various EAP methods are supported and can be negotiated between the UE and the AAA server, following the EAP framework as described in IETF RFC 3748 [6]. + +### 7.2.2 Solution details + +This solution presents the registration procedure between UE and the network when slice authentication is performed. A general overview is shown in figure 7.2.2-1. The procedure is based on the registration procedure in TS 23.502. + +![Sequence diagram showing the registration overview when slice authentication is performed. The diagram involves six lifelines: UE, (R)AN, AMF/SEAF, AUSF/UDM, AAA-P, and AAA. The process starts with a Registration Request from UE to (R)AN to AMF/SEAF. A dashed box labeled '2. Primary Authentication' shows a message from AMF/SEAF to AUSF/UDM. A box labeled '3. Obtain subscription information' shows a message from AMF/SEAF to AUSF/UDM. Step 4 is a Registration Accept (allowed NSSAI) from AMF/SEAF to UE. Step 5 is a Registration Complete from UE to (R)AN to AMF/SEAF. A dashed box labeled '6. Slice Authentication' contains: 6a. User ID Request from AMF/SEAF to UE; 6b. User ID Response from UE to AMF/SEAF; 6c. Slice Registration Request from AMF/SEAF to AAA-P; 6d. Message exchanges between AMF/SEAF and AAA; 6e. Slice Registration Response from AAA to AMF/SEAF. Step 7 is a UE Configuration Update (allowed NSSAI) from AMF/SEAF to (R)AN to UE.](8307f6b04df072c9332f9987e034272c_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant RAN as (R)AN + participant AMF as AMF/SEAF + participant AUSF as AUSF/UDM + participant AAA_P as AAA-P + participant AAA + + Note right of AUSF: 2. Primary Authentication + Note right of AMF: 3. Obtain subscription information + + UE->>RAN: 1. Registration Request + RAN->>AMF: 1. Registration Request + AMF->>AUSF: 2. Primary Authentication + AMF->>AUSF: 3. Obtain subscription information + AUSF-->>AMF: + AMF->>UE: 4. Registration Accept (allowed NSSAI) + UE->>RAN: 5. Registration Complete + RAN->>AMF: 5. Registration Complete + + Note right of AAA_P: 6. Slice Authentication + + AMF->>UE: 6a. User ID Request + UE-->>AMF: 6b. User ID Response + AMF->>AAA_P: 6c. Slice Registration Request + AMF->>AAA: 6d. Message exchanges + AAA-->>AAA_P: + AAA_P->>AMF: 6e. Slice Registration Response + + AMF->>RAN: 7. UE Configuration Update (allowed NSSAI) + RAN->>UE: 7. UE Configuration Update (allowed NSSAI) + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the registration overview when slice authentication is performed. The diagram involves six lifelines: UE, (R)AN, AMF/SEAF, AUSF/UDM, AAA-P, and AAA. The process starts with a Registration Request from UE to (R)AN to AMF/SEAF. A dashed box labeled '2. Primary Authentication' shows a message from AMF/SEAF to AUSF/UDM. A box labeled '3. Obtain subscription information' shows a message from AMF/SEAF to AUSF/UDM. Step 4 is a Registration Accept (allowed NSSAI) from AMF/SEAF to UE. Step 5 is a Registration Complete from UE to (R)AN to AMF/SEAF. A dashed box labeled '6. Slice Authentication' contains: 6a. User ID Request from AMF/SEAF to UE; 6b. User ID Response from UE to AMF/SEAF; 6c. Slice Registration Request from AMF/SEAF to AAA-P; 6d. Message exchanges between AMF/SEAF and AAA; 6e. Slice Registration Response from AAA to AMF/SEAF. Step 7 is a UE Configuration Update (allowed NSSAI) from AMF/SEAF to (R)AN to UE. + +**Figure 7.2.2-1: Registration overview when slice authentication is performed** + +Steps 1 indicates the registration steps the same as 1-7 as in TS 23.502 [4]. + +Steps 2 indicates the same Primary Authentication procedure as in TS 33.501 [2], where the UE and the PLMN are mutual authenticated. The user subscription ID for slice authentication can be included in the N2 messages exchanged with the AMF. In case the UE has valid security context, the primary authentication is skipped. + +Step 3: AMF obtains the subscription information of the user from UDM, which provides necessary information to AMF whether slice authentication is required. + +Step 4: Registration accept is sent to UE, including allowed NSSAI as in TS 23.502 [4], after Primary Authentication is successful. The S-NSSAI in the Requested NSSAI that require slice authentication, e.g. authenticated previously, can also be included. + +Step 5: UE sends Registration Complete corresponding to the allowed S-NSSAI in step 4. + +Step 6: EAP based Slice authentication is performed, and AMF should make sure the link between AMF and AAA server is established. The link can be routed through a Proxy of Slice Authentication Server (AAA Proxy), as illustrated in the figure. + +The slice authentication is based on the EAP framework, where AMF/SEAF takes the role of Authenticator. Various EAP methods can be supported and UE can negotiate with AAA server on the EAP method based on IETF RFC 3748 [6]. The steps 6a and 6b and the number of messages exchanged in step 6d are dependent on the EAP method used. + +Step 7: The UE Configuration Update is sent with allowed NSSAI after slice authentication is completed. + +### 7.2.3 Evaluation + +In this solution, slice authentication is performed after Primary authentication. The well-established EAP mechanism is chosen for the Slice Authentication and can accommodate various authentication methods and credentials, chosen between AAA and UE. + +It addresses KI#1 Authentication for access to specific Network Slices and meet both security requirements of KI#1. + +## 7.3 Solution #3 Security features for NSaaS + +### 7.3.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses the Key Issue #3 Security features for NSaaS. + +### 7.3.2 Solution details + +Whether a network slice requires slice-specific authentication can be configured for a slice during network slice provisioning. UP security policy (i.e. confidentiality protection and integrity protection) can also be configured for a slice for NSaaS, however PLMN ignores that request (e.g. if it goes against its policy on UP protection). + +Note: the management services and procedure for network slice provisioning are specified in clauses 6 and 7 of TS 28.531 [7] respectively. + +### 7.3.3 Evaluation + +This solution addresses the key issue #3. It has identified two security features for NSaaS that can be addressed through configuration. + +## 7.4 Solution #4 Solution for Slice Specific Authentication and Authorization with multiple registrations in the same PLMN + +### 7.4.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses KI#1, Authentication for access to specific Network Slices. + +This solution is based on the normative solution for Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization (SSAA) in TS 23.502 [4]. SSAA is performed with a AAA Server (AAA-S) which may be hosted by the H-PLMN operator or a trusted third party. A AAA proxy (AAA-P) may be involved in the serving PLMN. The SSAA is performed between the UE and the AAA-S based on the EAP framework where the AMF/SEAF acts as the EAP authenticator. The EAP authentication messaging for SSAA is performed after the Registration procedure. After the SSAA procedure is completed successfully for an S-NSSAI, the Allowed NSSAI is updated to include that S-NSSAI in the AMF and in the UE. + +The scenario described here is for a UE that aims to register over 3GPP and over non-3GPP in the same serving PLMN. The UE registers over a first RAT (e.g., 3GPP) and then over another RAT (e.g., non-3GPP). RAT#1 is the name used for the first RAT that the UE uses to Register for an S-NSSAI subject to SSAA, and RAT#2 is used for the other access (e.g., RAT#1 may be 3GPP and RAT#2 non-3GPP, or vice-versa). The UE sends over RAT#1 a Registration Request which includes in the Requested NSSAI an S-NSSAI subject to SSA. The UE waits for the completion of the SSAA procedure for the S-NSSAI over RAT#1 before performing the Registration over RAT#2. Since the UE is registered over RAT#1 and UE context exists with allowed NSSAIs for the UE, the AMF decides to skip a new SSAA run during Registration over RAT#2 + +### 7.4.2 Solution details + +The solution shown in figure 7.4.2-1 illustrates a UE performing multiple registrations with the same serving PLMN while requesting the same S-NSSAI subject to SSAA in the Registration Request. The Registration and SSAA procedural steps over 3GPP are as specified in TS 23.502 [4]. Note that the solution below can apply regardless of the RAT order used by the UE to register (i.e. 3GPP or non-3GPP first). Upon receiving a Registration Accept over a first access indicating a pending SSAA run, the UE refrains from Registering over the other access until the completion of SSAA over the first access (i.e. perform associated UE Configuration Update procedure). + +![Sequence diagram illustrating Multiple Registration with the same PLMN with same S-NSSAI subject to SSAA. The diagram shows interactions between UE, AMF, AUSF, AAA-P, and AAA-S across two radio accesses (RAT#1 and RAT#2).](898fb89a50d9ec1dfb4e425c816976a7_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant AMF + participant AUSF + participant AAA-P + participant AAA-S + + Note over UE, AMF: 1. Registration over RAT#1 with S-NSSAI subject to SSAA included in Requested NSSAI + Note over UE, AMF, AUSF, AAA-P, AAA-S: 2. SSAA procedure over RAT#1 for S-NSSAI (EAP based authentication) + Note over UE, AMF: 3. Update Allowed NSSAI with UCU + Note over UE, AMF: 4. Check for successful authentication for S-NSSAI via RAT#1 + Note over UE, AMF: 5. Register Request over RAT#2 (Requested NSSAI includes S-NSSAI) + Note over UE, AMF, AUSF: 6. Primary authentication over RAT#2 access + Note over AMF, AUSF: 7. Determine whether or not to skip SSAA for S-NSSAI over RAT#2 + Note over AMF, UE: 8. Register Accept over RAT#2 (Allowed NSSAI includes S-NSSAI) + Note over UE: 9. Start to use S-NSSAI over RAT#2 e.g. establish PDU Session with S-NSSAI + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating Multiple Registration with the same PLMN with same S-NSSAI subject to SSAA. The diagram shows interactions between UE, AMF, AUSF, AAA-P, and AAA-S across two radio accesses (RAT#1 and RAT#2). + +**Figure 7.4.2-1: Multiple Registration with the same PLMN with same S-NSSAI subject to SSAA** + +Step 1: UE and network performs a standard Registration procedure over RAT#1 including primary authentication and establishment of the NAS security context. The AMF determines from the subscription data that the S-NSSAI included in the Requested NSSAI is subject to SSAA which is to be performed after sending the Registration Accept message to the UE. The Allowed NSSAI returned in the Registration Accept message does not include the S-NSSAI. The Rejected NSSAI in the Registration Accept message includes the S-NSSAI with a cause value indicating a pending SSAA for the S-NSSAI. + +Step 2: UE and network perform a standard SSAA procedure over RAT#1. The EAP based authentication run is performed over secure NAS transport messages. + +Step 3: Following the successful authentication of the UE for the S-NSSAI, the Allowed NSSAI is updated to include S-NSSAI using a UE Configuration Update procedure. + +Step 4: UE checks that SSAA is completed over RAT#1 before starting the Registration procedure over RAT#2 + +Step 5-6: UE sends a Registration Request over RAT#2 protected using the available common NAS security context. AMF decides to skip a new Primary authentication over the RAT#2 access. + +Step 7: AMF determines that S-NSSAI is already authorized by SSAA and that the UE is already authenticated for S-NSSAI following the previous Registration over RAT#1. The S-NSSAI authentication result (e.g. success/failure) from previous SSAA run over RAT#1 may be included in the common NAS security context. AMF may decide to skip SSAA run over RAT#2 for the S-NSSAI. + +Step 8: AMF sends a Registration Accept to the UE including S-NSSAI in the Allowed NSSAI for RAT#2 + +Step 9: UE may start using the S-NSSAI over any access, e.g. it may establish a PDU Session using S-NSSAI over RAT#2 access. + +The AAA-S may decide to re-authenticate and re-authorize the UE at any time. The re-authentication and re-authorization procedure is based on the solution specified in TS 23.502 [4]. In that procedure, the AAA-S sends a request to re-authenticate and re-authorize the UE for a given S-NSSAI to the serving AMF via the AAA-F. Then the AMF triggers an SSAA over the access used to register for that S-NSSAI. The difference in this solution, is that AMF needs to select one of the accesses used to register for that S-NSSAI and trigger an SSAA over that selected access e.g. SSAA may be run on an access where UE may be CM-Connected while being CM-Idle on the other. + +The AAA-S may decide to revoke the authorization of the UE at any time. The revocation procedure is based on the solution specified in TS 23.502 [4]. In that procedure, the AAA-S sends a request to revoke the authorization of the UE for a given S-NSSAI to the serving AMF via the AAA-F. Then the AMF updates the UE configuration to remove the S-NSSAI from the Allowed NSSAI for the access used to register for that S-NSSAI. The difference in this solution is that AMF needs to update the UE configuration to remove the S-NSSAI from the Allowed NSSAI for both accesses i.e. trigger a UE Configuration Update procedure for each access. + +### 7.4.3 Evaluation + +Key Issue #1 in the present document is about enabling Slice Specific Authentication and Authorization (SSAA). This solution addresses KI#1 in the context of a UE performing multiple registrations in the same PLMN over different access types. + +The solution builds on top of the adopted solution in TS 23.501 [2] and TS 23.502 [3] for a single registration over a single access type where the SSAA is performed after the primary authentication (i.e. after the Registration procedure) and EAP messages exchanged during the SSAA procedure are transported over secure NAS messages. + +When the UE registers with a PLMN over a given access type for a network slice that is subject to SSAA, it postpones registration with that PLMN for that same network slice over another access type until the completion of the SSAA procedure. This avoids potential race conditions and unnecessary signalling as a new SSAA procedure may be triggered over the second access type while such a procedure is already ongoing over the first access type. + +This solution is complimentary to either solution #1 or solution #2 as they deal with a single registration scenario. + +The proposed solution meets the requirement of key issue #1. + +## 7.5 Solution #5 Privacy for Slice Authentication + +### 7.5.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses the Key Issue #4: "Security and privacy aspects related to the solution for Network Slice specific access authentication and authorization". + +A public key is provisioned from the service provider to the UDM and bound with the corresponding NSSAI. If a UE requests service for a NSSAI, then the UDM provisions the public key to the AMF and further to the UE in order to use it for concealing the User ID in the EAP Identification response. + +### 7.5.2 Solution details + +The following figure shows the procedure for public key provisioning and User ID concealment in the UE. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the procedure for public key provisioning and User ID concealment. The diagram shows interactions between the UE, AMF, UDM/AUSF, NEF, and AAA server across three domains: Serving Network, HPLMN, and 3rd Party/Internet. The process involves registration, primary authentication, subscription data checking, NAS message exchange for EAP Identity Request/Response, and final authentication success messages.](79e1709a7317ead45379cbb8ff3ba802_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant AMF + participant UDM/AUSF + participant NEF + participant AAA + + Note right of AMF: 0.a AAA Registration (Pub Key) + Note right of AMF: 0.b AAA Registration ACK + + UE->>AMF: 1. Registration Req. (NSSAI) + AMF->>UDM/AUSF: 2. Primary Authentication using 3GPP credentials + Note right of AMF: 3. AMF checks subscription data (including Pub Key) and security context for slice specific authentication for each NSSAI + AMF->>UE: 4a. NAS Message (EAP Identity Request, S-NSSAI, Pub Key) + Note left of UE: 4b. UE uses Pub Key to conceal the User ID + UE->>AMF: 4c. NAS Message (EAP Identity Response with concealed User ID) + AMF->>AAA: 4d. Authentication Request (EAP Identity Response with concealed User ID, -, GPSI) + AAA->>UE: 4e. EAP Request-Response Messages + AAA->>AMF: 4f. EAP-SUCCESS + AMF->>UE: 4g. NAS Message (EAP SUCCESS, -) + Note left of AMF: 5. UE and AMF knows the list of authorized and subscribed NSSAIs + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the procedure for public key provisioning and User ID concealment. The diagram shows interactions between the UE, AMF, UDM/AUSF, NEF, and AAA server across three domains: Serving Network, HPLMN, and 3rd Party/Internet. The process involves registration, primary authentication, subscription data checking, NAS message exchange for EAP Identity Request/Response, and final authentication success messages. + +**Figure 7.5.2-1: Procedure for public key provisioning and User ID concealment** + +Step 0 is not further described here but it is assumed that the normal interface with external service provider via the NEF is utilized in order to provision the NSSAI and public key binding to the UDM. + +The procedure is in general the same as described in solution#1, clause 7.1.2 with the following differences: + +Step 3: The AMF retrieves the subscription data from the UDM, including the public key for each NSSAI where slice authentication is required. Based on operator policy the UDM provides the public key at any request or only when requested by the UE or the key is changed in the UDM. + +Step 4a: The AMF initiates the slice authentication and sends an EAP Identity Request to the UE including the S-NSSAI and the corresponding public key. + +Step 4b: The UE stores the public key and binds it with the S-NSSAI. It uses the Public Key to encrypt the User ID for the S-NSSAI. + +Step 4c: The UE sends the NAS message with the EAP Identity Response with the concealed User ID. + +Step 4d: the AMF sends an Authentication Request with the concealed User ID to the AAA server, which has the corresponding private key and is able to de-conceal the User ID. + +Step 4e - 5: The normal related EAP message exchange for authentication of this User ID is performed now and slice authentication is carried out. + +**Editor's Note #1: Whether user ids used for slice authentication is within the scope of 3GPP is FFS;** + +**Editor's Note #2: EAP framework assumes that privacy is handled by the EAP methods. It is FFS whether this creates any issues;** + +**Editor's Note #3: It is FFS whether using a public key of an external entity to encrypt the user id is appropriate;** + +### 7.5.3 Evaluation + +TBD. + +## 7.6 Solution #6 Slice Authentication with user ID privacy but network aware + +### 7.6.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses the Key Issue #4: "Security and privacy aspects related to the solution for Network Slice specific access authentication and authorization". + +This solution is to provide privacy protection to the user identify used during slice authentication. In the meantime, the network should be aware of the user in order to support multiple users using one device to access DN services. The use cases have been described in TR 22.904, which motivates the current study. + +### 7.6.2 Solution details + +If user ID privacy is required, it is protected by the EAP method. + +The following figure shows the procedure for the UE to register to the network where slice authentication is required. The User ID concealment is provided by the EAP method itself. In order for the network to be aware of the user, AMF will store the user's ID. The steps of the procedure are as follows: + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the Slice Authentication procedure. The diagram shows interactions between UE, AMF, AUSF/UDM, and AAA. The process starts with a Registration Request from UE to AMF, followed by Primary Authentication. Then, AMF checks if slice authentication is required. A Slice Authentication phase (enclosed in a dashed box) involves an ID request from AMF to UE, an ID response from UE to AMF, AMF storing the ID, a Slice authentication request from AMF to AAA, and continuing remaining steps of Slice Authentication, resulting in Slice Authentication success from AAA to AMF. Finally, the UE continues with other steps.](421fc75480c21e7ebb25756826652367_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant AMF + participant AUSF/UDM + participant AAA + + Note right of AUSF/UDM: Slice Authentication + + UE->>AMF: 1. Registration Request + Note over UE, AUSF/UDM: 2. Primary Authentication + Note right of AMF: 3. AMF checks whether slice authentication required + Note right of AMF: Slice Authentication + AMF->>UE: 4. ID request + UE->>AMF: 5. ID response + Note right of AMF: 6. AMF stores ID + AMF->>AAA: 7. Slice authentication request + Note over UE, AAA: 8. Continue remaining steps of Slice Authentication + AAA->>AMF: 9. Slice Authentication success + Note right of AMF: Slice Authentication + AMF->>UE: 10. Continue with other steps ... +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the Slice Authentication procedure. The diagram shows interactions between UE, AMF, AUSF/UDM, and AAA. The process starts with a Registration Request from UE to AMF, followed by Primary Authentication. Then, AMF checks if slice authentication is required. A Slice Authentication phase (enclosed in a dashed box) involves an ID request from AMF to UE, an ID response from UE to AMF, AMF storing the ID, a Slice authentication request from AMF to AAA, and continuing remaining steps of Slice Authentication, resulting in Slice Authentication success from AAA to AMF. Finally, the UE continues with other steps. + +Figure 7.6.2-1 + +Steps 1-3: AMF starts EAP based slice authentication procedure after Primary Authentication. + +Step 4: AMF, as Authenticator, sends ID Request to UE. + +Step 5: UE responses with ID requested. The ID will be concealed depending on the EAP method used. + +Step 6: AMF stores the user ID. + +Step 7: AMF sends slice authentication request to AAA server and the message may be routed by AAA prox8. + +Step 8: EAP based Slice authentication continues with message exchange between AAA and UE via AMF. + +Step 9: AAA informs AMF Slice authentication successful. + +Step 10: AMF continues with other steps of slice authentication. + +### 7.6.3 Evaluation + +This solution addresses the KI #4. + +This solution relies on ID privacy protection mechanism provided by EAP methods and does not introduce a new mechanism. + +This solution can provide the user ID protection between UE and the AAA server. + +## 7.7 Solution #7: Solution to protect user ID + +### 7.7.1 Introduction + +This security solution is related to the Key Issue #4: Security and privacy aspects related to the solution for Network Slice specific access authentication and authorization. + +According to the agreed solution present in clause 6.3.2 of TR 23.740 [5] the slice specific authentication takes place after the UE has been authenticated by the 3GPP system for PLMN access. Therefore, the necessary key material needed for the network to configure AS security with the UE using AS Security Mode Command is available. Key material needed for setting up NAS security with NAS Security Mode Command is also available. + +### 7.7.2 Solution details + +This solution proposes that any message exchange after the primary authentication will be confidentiality protected after successful activation of AS and NAS security. + +### 7.7.3 Evaluation + +This solution addresses Key Issue #4 and protects the User ID over the air interface between UE and serving network relying on the activation of AS and NAS security. The solution combines NDS IP and EAP methods in tunnel mode to protect the user ID between the AAA server and serving network. + +## 7.8 Solution #8 Protecting NSSAI for transmission on the AS layer + +### 7.8.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses the Key Issue #6 Confidentiality protection of NSSAI and home control. + +This solution aims to provide a method of protecting the S-NSSAIs that will be transmitted on the AS layer in a way that is compatible with Rel-15 UEs. In this solution, UE and RAN are offered a temporary NSSAIs (T-S-NSSAIs) instead of cleartext S-NSSAIs in registration procedure. After that, the T-S-NSSAIs will be used in the AS layer. + +This temporary NSSAI needs to be updated frequently to preserve the privacy. + +### 7.8.2 Solution details + +Figure 7.8.2-1 illustrates this solution. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating NSSAI protection during RRC connection establishment. The diagram shows interactions between UE, NG-RAN, and CN, divided into 'Provisioning' and 'Utilizing' phases.](171115f072e42b379238ed0dd438e9d7_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant NG-RAN + participant CN + + Note left of UE: Provisioning + Note right of CN: 0. Registration has been performed successfully and 5G NAS has been established. + Note right of CN: 1. Generate RAND, calculate the T-S-NSSAIs for allowed S-NSSAIs. Store {T-S-NSSAIs, allowed S-NSSAIs} tuple. + Note right of CN: 2. Registration Accept ({T-S-NSSAIs, allowed S-NSSAIs} tuple ...) + Note right of CN: 3. N2 message (k_gnb, RAND, ...) + Note left of UE: Utilizing + Note right of UE: 4. Registration Request (T-S-NSSAIs, ...) + Note right of NG-RAN: 5. Restore the Allowed S-NSSAIs from T-S-NSSAIs and RAND. + +``` + +The diagram illustrates the sequence of messages for NSSAI protection during RRC connection establishment. It is divided into two phases: 'Provisioning' and 'Utilizing'. In the 'Provisioning' phase, the UE has already registered successfully (step 0). The CN generates a RAND and calculates T-S-NSSAIs for allowed S-NSSAIs (step 1). The CN sends a Registration Accept message containing the {T-S-NSSAIs, allowed S-NSSAIs} tuple to the UE (step 2). The CN also sends an N2 message (k\_gnb, RAND, ...) to the NG-RAN (step 3). In the 'Utilizing' phase, the UE sends a Registration Request (T-S-NSSAIs, ...) to the NG-RAN (step 4). The NG-RAN then restores the Allowed S-NSSAIs from the T-S-NSSAIs and RAND (step 5). + +Sequence diagram illustrating NSSAI protection during RRC connection establishment. The diagram shows interactions between UE, NG-RAN, and CN, divided into 'Provisioning' and 'Utilizing' phases. + +**Figure 7.8.2-1: NSSAI protection during the RRC connection establishment** + +0. The UE has registered successfully to a PLMN and 5G NAS security context has been created. +1. In the registration procedure, core network first generates a fresh number RAND, and then calculates UE-specific T-S-NSSAIs according to allowed S-NSSAIs and RAND using a 128-NEA as in Annex D 2.1.2 [2]. At last, CN stores the {allowed S-NSSAIs, T-S-NSSAIs} tuple. +2. In the registration/service accept message, {allowed S-NSSAIs, T-S-NSSAIs} tuple will be sent to UE instead of cleartext S-NSSAIs. +3. CN sends RAND to NG-RAN with N2 message. +4. In a registration request message, UE transmits T-S-NSSAIs in RRC message. +5. RAN is able to restore allowed S-NSSAIs according to T-S-NSSAIs and RAND using 128-NEA1 as in step 1. + +The T-S-NSSAIs are generated and assigned by the AMF during the initial and subsequent registration procedures. The T-S-NSSAIs are sent to UE and the serving gNB. Whether the T-S-NSSAIs are sent to additional gNBs, e.g. under the same TA, are implementation dependent and based on the operator's policy (e.g. AMF configuration). + +For example, AMF may be configured to send to the serving gNB only. + +In another example, AMF is configured to send to the serving gNB and adjacent gNBs within the same TA. + +The UE and the receiving gNBs will store these T-S-NSSAIs to be used later in the subsequent registration process. T-S-NSSAIs are updated periodically based on the operator's policy. + +When UE moves to a new cell (different gNB) while in an idle mode, whether a T-S-NSSAI is available in the target cell depending on whether the T-S-NSSAI has been stored. In case T-S-NSSAI is not available, the UE will be routed to an AMF the same way as that S-NSSAI is not present. This is reasonable since the presumption of this key issue is that the security context is available (Security context is released when UE is in an idle mode). In general, the more gNBs storing a T-S-NSSAI, the less likely that S-NSSAI is not present. The trade-off is that more T-S-NSSAI storage is needed at gNBs. As to congestion control, only the serving gNB is storing T-S-NSSAIs. + +Different UEs have different T-S-NSSAIs. For a specific UE, the T-S-NSSAI is the same across Ng-RAN under the same AMF. + +### 7.8.3 Evaluation + +This solution addresses the key issue #6, the solution is able to protect the privacy of NSSAI in air interface. Besides, the solution introduces no extra message exchanges to the existing procedures, and there is no extra computation in UE. Instead, it increases complexity at gNB. A new IE in the service accept message is needed when T-S-NSSAI is transmitted at RRC in the service registration procedure. + +The key proposal is to use temporary NSSAIs in the RRC signaling. These T-S-NSSAIs are generated and assigned by the AMF during the initial and subsequent registration procedures, as part of Initial context set up in the base station. The UE and the gNB need to store these T-S-NSSAI values to be used later in the subsequent registration process. If these values remain static, then based on the characteristic of communication, these values could be mapped to their real slice types and thereby to the NSSAI. Also, the T-S-NSSAIs need to be individually different, otherwise mapping to the Slice becomes very easy. + +## 7.9 Solution #9: Slice specific authorization + +### 7.9.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses Key Issue#5 by identifying how to handle the access token between network slices. This solution is based on the following authorization procedures (see TS 33.501, V15.3.1, clause 13.4.1): + +![Sequence diagram showing the NF service consumer obtaining an access token from the NRF. The diagram involves two main participants: NF Service Consumer and Authorization Server (NRF). The sequence of messages is: 0. NF Service Consumer registers with the NRF; 1. Nnrf_AccessToken_Get Request (Expected NF Service name(s) and NF type, Consumer NF type, client id, ...); 2. Authorize the client, generate an access token; 3. Nnrf_AccessToken_Get Response (access_token).](b6b53a74ad203c01b81e5427e9d6a898_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant NF Service Consumer + participant NRF as Authorization Server (NRF) + Note right of NRF: 2. Authorize the client, generate an access token. + NF Service Consumer->>NRF: 0. NF Service Consumer registers with the NRF. + NF Service Consumer->>NRF: 1. Nnrf_AccessToken_Get Request (Expected NF Service name(s) and NF type, Consumer NF type, client id, ...) + NRF-->>NF Service Consumer: 3. Nnrf_AccessToken_Get Response (access_token) + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the NF service consumer obtaining an access token from the NRF. The diagram involves two main participants: NF Service Consumer and Authorization Server (NRF). The sequence of messages is: 0. NF Service Consumer registers with the NRF; 1. Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get Request (Expected NF Service name(s) and NF type, Consumer NF type, client id, ...); 2. Authorize the client, generate an access token; 3. Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get Response (access\_token). + +Figure 7.9.1-1: NF service consumer obtaining access token before NF service access + +The following figure and procedure describe service access request based on token verification. + +![Sequence diagram showing NF Service Consumer requesting service access with an access token from an NF Service Producer.](90ddb84c323b956e2d50a54d3f870566_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant Consumer as NF Service Consumer + participant Producer as NF Service Producer + Note right of Producer: 2. Verify integrity and claims in the access token. If successful, execute the requested service + Consumer->>Producer: 1. NF Service request (access token) + Note right of Producer + Producer->>Consumer: 3. NF Service response +``` + +The diagram illustrates a sequence of interactions between an NF Service Consumer and an NF Service Producer. The Consumer sends a request (1. NF Service request (access token)) to the Producer. The Producer then performs an internal verification step (2. Verify integrity and claims in the access token. If successful, execute the requested service) and finally sends a response (3. NF Service response) back to the Consumer. + +Sequence diagram showing NF Service Consumer requesting service access with an access token from an NF Service Producer. + +**Figure 7.9.1-2: NF service consumer requesting service access with an access token** + +According to the figure above, if the slice specific authorization is needed, the access token authorization and verification considers the slice information. + +### 7.9.2 Solution details + +All the procedures described in TS 33.501 [2], clause 13.4.1 are applied in the proposed solution with some additional description as follows: + +In the first step, if the NF service consumer is limited to access NF service producers belonging to specific slice, it requests an access token from the NRF using the Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get request operation with additional slice information compared to the existing IEs, e.g., S-NSSAI and NSI ID(s) defined in TS 23.501 [3]. + +In the second step, the NRF then generates an access token with additional slice information included in the claim e.g., S-NSSAI and NSI ID(s). + +During the verification procedure, the NF service producer additionally checks that the slice information claim in the access token matches its own slice information. + +### 7.9.3 Evaluation + +Key Issue #5 in the present document is about malicious service access between network slices, resulting from malicious NFs with access token authorized by the NRF deployed at the PLMN level or the shared-slice level. The solution addresses the key issue by introducing slice specific information for the expected NF producer in token requests, token claims and token verification. + +The proposed solution meets the requirement of key issue #5 . + +## 7.10 Solution #10 Protecting S-NSSAI for transmission on the AS layer + +### 7.10.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses the Key Issue #6 Confidentiality protection of NSSAI and home control. + +This solution aims to provide a method of protecting the S-NSSAIs that will be transmitted on the AS layer in a way that is compatible with Rel-15 UEs. + +### 7.10.2 Solution details + +#### 7.10.2.1 General + +This configuration of S-NSSAIs in the serving network follows the SA2 procedures, i.e. HPLMN allocates some S-NSSAIs to the UE which uses these S-NSSAIs initially to request access to a slice in a serving PLMN. The serving PLMN may allocate its own local S-NSSAI (as a configured S-NSSAI) for each requested S-NSSAI. The UE will use the configured S-NSSAIs to indicate its interest in the particular slices in the serving PLMN. + +Hence an S-NSSAI value that the UE sends on the AS layer may be allocated by the serving network as part of the existing procedures. This means that the serving network can assign different S-NSSAIs that are mapped (or resolved) to the same S-NSSAI, to different UEs. Therefore, for S-NSSAI privacy, the AMF provides "encrypted S-NSSAI" to a UE that would be sent on the AS layer, where the encryption incorporates a UE specific parameter such as 5G-GUTI. The UE can directly return this 'encrypted S-NSSAI' to the network. The AMFs and NG-RAN nodes across the whole network will need to be co-ordinated on which actual S-NSSAI each 'encrypted S-NSSAI' will resolve to. If these 'encrypted S-NSSAI' further depend on the part of the 5G-GUTI supplied by the UE to the NG-RAN node at RRC set-up, it would mean that the same 'encrypted S-NSSAI' value that is used by different UEs would not necessarily indicate the same actual S-NSSAI. + +#### 7.10.2.2 Format and content of the 'encrypted S-NSSAI' + +The format for the 'encrypted S-NSSAI' is as follows: + +- Key ID | Random number | S-NSSAI Identifier XOR E(Key, Random Number, S-TMSI) + +where + +- E(Key, Random Number, S-TMSI) is an encryption function to produce key stream with Key as the key and Random Number and S-TMSI as input; +- Key ID identifies the key and the algorithm used in E(Key, Random Number, S-TMSI); +- Random Number is just a random number so that different 'encrypted S-NSSAI' can be used for the same actual S-NSSAI; and +- S-NSSAI Identifier allows the NG\_RAN and AMF to understand which S-NSSAI the UE is requesting + +Each Key ID is associated with a key, choice of algorithm and any other information (e.g. MSB of counter input for AES in counter mode) needed by the AMF or NG-RAN node to create or parse an 'encrypted S-NSSAI'. Each AMF in a serving network needs to be provisioned with the current Key ID and associated information. The NG-RAN nodes can either be provisioned with this information or could request it from the AMF when they receive a Key ID that is currently unknown to them. + +Since the 'encrypted S-NSSAI' carries a Key ID and a random number, it is not possible to send a complete S-NSSAI in an 'encrypted S-NSSAI'. Hence, an instead of the S-NSSAI, an S-NSSAI identifier, which can be mapped to the corresponding S-NSSAI, is used to construct 'encrypted S-NSSAI'. A mapping between S-NSSAI identifiers and S-NSSAI is configured by AMF to NG-RAN nodes. + +#### 7.10.2.3 Creating an 'encrypted S-NSSAI' + +When the AMF creates a new 'encrypted S-NSSAI' to send as a configured S-NSSAI, it calculates the 'encrypted S-NSSAI' using the Key ID, the S-NSSAI identifier of the slice that is to be configured, the UE's S-TMSI and a random number. The AMF can use any key and method that is provisioned locally. Those key and method are also made available in the NG-RAN nodes. When calculating each 'encrypted S-NSSAI', a fresh random number is chosen and this together with the S-TMSI provides the freshness for the input to the ciphering algorithm. + +#### 7.10.2.4 Resolving an 'encrypted S-NSSAI' + +When the UE sends such an 'encrypted S-NSSAI' to the NG-RAN, the NG-RAN calculates the S-NSSAI Identifier and from this the NG-RAN gets the S-NSSAI the UE is requesting. This is done by using the Key ID in the 'encrypted S-NSSAI' to know the key and encryption method. This allows the S-NSSAI identifier to be decrypted and the mapping to the actual S-NSSAI requested by the UE to be resolved. If this procedure fails, i.e. the NG-RAN does not get a S-NSSAI Identifier it recognises, then the AMF can be selected based on the UE identity supplied at the AS layer or the default AMF can be selected. + +#### 7.10.2.5 Updating the 'encrypted S-NSSAI' + +The 'encrypted S-NSSAI's sent to a UE will need to change when the S-TMSI changes in order not to provide a longer-term identifier of the UE than the S-TMSI. This can already be done with the specified procedures. Since when a GUTI (including the S-TMSI) is allocated to the UE using the Registration Accept or the UE Configuration Update message, there is space in each of these messages to update the configured S-NSSAI at the same time. This means that it is not easier to track the UE based on the values in the S-NSSAI IE sent on the AS layer than to do it based on the S-TMSI. A new 'encrypted S-NSSAI' has to be calculated for each S-NSSAI that the UE is allowed to access when the update is performed. + +**Editor's note: Clarification for supporting idle mode mobility is needed.** + +### 7.10.3 Evaluation + +The solution satisfies the key issue as it encrypts the data that identifies the S-NSSAI over the air (in effect the data is encrypted in the AMF and decrypted in the RAN node with the UE just passing the received information on without changing it). + +The NG-RAN nodes need to have the mapping of S-NSSAI Identifiers of S-NSSAIs and also the Key\_ID, Key and encryption method used by the AMF when creating the 'encrypted S-NSSAI'. + +The 'encrypted S-NSSAI' need to be updated every time the GUTI changes which is more frequent than normal S-NSSAI would be updated, although no new message is needed to perform the update. + +The solution reduces the possible number of S-NSSAIs. With a 4-bit Key ID and 16-bit Random Number, there are still 12 bits available for S-NSSAI (i.e. 4096 different S-NSSAIs can be used) in the 4-bytes used to carry an S-NSSAI in the NAS protocol (see clause 9.11.2.28 of TS 24.501 [9]). + +The solution works with Rel-15 UEs as the UE does not need to process the 'encrypted S-NSSAI'. + +The solution protects against UEs who may access the same slice from knowing what slice is being requested. The solution does not require every S-NSSAI to be protected if so desired by the operator. + +**Editor's Note: Further evaluation is FFS.** + +## 7.11 Solution #11: Protection of S-NSSAI transmitted in the AS layer using T-S-NSSAI + +### 7.11.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses Key Issue #6: Confidentiality protection of NSSAI and home control. + +The following solution builds on a similar notion of temporary S-NSSAI (T-S-NSSAI) as in solution #8. The UE obtains the T-S-NSSAI from the AMF over NAS in a Registration accept message during the registration procedure similar to solution #8. The NG-RAN obtains a list of T-S-NSSAI and associated S-NSSAI tuples supported by the PLMN from the AMF in a NG Setup Response during an NG Setup procedure. In this solution, the T-S-NSSAI are generated/maintained per PLMN. The UE transmits requested T-S-NSSAIs as hash values (instead of cleartext T-S-NSSAI) in the AS layer during AS connection establishment. The T-S-NSSAI hash values are computed using the S-TMSI as one of the hash function arguments. The NG-RAN identifies the corresponding slices requested by the UE (indicated by S-NSSAIs) by matching each hashed T-S-NSSAI requested by the UE and received in the AS layer with + +the hash value computed from the T-S-NSSAI and the associated S-NSSAI from the tuple provided to the NG-RAN by the 5GC. + +One of the weakness of any pseudonym-based solution is the need to manage pseudonyms and change them frequently to protect entities from trackability and linkability attacks. The addition of hashing of temporary identifiers allows to minimize the overhead and reduce the complexity of pseudonym changes. + +### 7.11.2 Solution details + +The solution shown in figure 7.11.2-1 illustrates a UE performing an AS connection establishment while transmitting T-S-NSSAIs as hash values in the AS layer. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the hashed T-S-NSSAI transmission during AS connection establishment between UE, NG-RAN, and AMF.](55136bc716146672fc680fa05989f1d2_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant NG-RAN + participant AMF + + Note right of NG-RAN: 1. NG SETUP REQUEST +(List of S-NSSAI(s) supported per TA, +[List of T-S-NSSAI(s) supported per TA]) + NG-RAN->>AMF: 1. NG SETUP REQUEST + Note right of AMF: 2. NG SETUP RESPONSE +(List of S-NSSAI(s) supported per PLMN, +List of T-S-NSSAI(s) supported per PLMN) + AMF->>NG-RAN: 2. NG SETUP RESPONSE + Note over UE, AMF: 3. Registration procedure - UE receives a list of Allowed T-S-NSSAI, [RAND] + UE->>AMF: 3. Registration procedure + Note right of UE: 4. RRCConnectionSetupComplete +(List of HASH(T-S-NSSAI, S-TMSI, RAND)) + UE->>NG-RAN: 4. RRCConnectionSetupComplete + Note right of UE: 5. +a. compute a hash using S-TMSI,RAND for each +supported T-S-NSSAI received from AMF +b. select AMF based on matching of UE provided +hashed T-S-NSSAI with hashed supported T-S-NSSAI + Note right of NG-RAN: 6. INITIAL NAS MESSAGE + NG-RAN->>AMF: 6. INITIAL NAS MESSAGE + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the hashed T-S-NSSAI transmission during AS connection establishment between UE, NG-RAN, and AMF. + +**Figure 7.11.2-1: Hashed T-S-NSSAI transmission during AS connection establishment** + +1. The NG-RAN sends to the AMF in a NG\_SETUP\_REQUEST a list of supported S-NSSAI per TA (as per TS 38.300 [1]) and, additionally, T-S-NSSAI. +2. The NG-RAN obtains in a NG\_SETUP\_RESPONSE the list of supported NSSAIs from the AMF (as per TS 38.300 [1]), and additionally a corresponding list of supported T-S-NSSAIs. +3. The UE performs an initial Registration procedure with the network. The UE obtains a list of Allowed T-S-NSSAIs in the Registration Accept message over NAS. Optionally, the UE can obtain a RAND. If a RAND is not provided by the AMF the UE generates a RAND itself in the following step. +4. The UE computes the hash values of its requested T-S-NSSAIs using its S-TMSI and RAND. The UE transmits the T-S-NSSAIs hash values (instead of cleartext T-S-NSSAIs) in the AS layer in the RRCConnectionSetupComplete message. The UE may also include an indication about the nature of the slice assistance information in the AS layer (i.e. hashed T-S-NSSAI) to assist the NG-RAN in distinguishing the UEs capable of NSSAI privacy protection according to Rel-15. + +By using its S-TMSI and a RAND in computations of T-S-NSSAI hashes, UEs requesting the same T-S-NSSAI will transmit different T-S-NSSAI hash values. It is assumed that the likelihood of the same S-TMSI being eventually re-allocated to a new UE using the same slice over time is negligible for any practical linkability attack. In addition, the UE will automatically transmit fresh T-S-NSSAI hash values during AS connection establishment after a new S-TMSI has been allocated as per existing procedures. By including RAND as a salt in the T-S-NSSAI hash computation, this solution supports the resistance to offline dictionary attacks that mounted with the knowledge of S-TMSI. + +5. The NG-RAN does not "learn" but rather computes the hash using S-TMSI and RAND for each of the supported T-S-NSSAI received from the AMF. The NG-RAN has obtains T-S-NSSAI, S-NSSAI tuples from step 1 and by matching the T-S-NSSAI hash value received from the UE in step 4 to the hash value of a supported T-S-NSSAI from the AMF, NG-RAN is able to obtain the associated S-NSSAI directly from the tuple. When the complete list of requested S-NSSAIs from the UE is determined, the NG-RAN selects the appropriate AMF based on the list of requested S-NSSAIs as per current mechanisms. Matching hash values of T-S-NSSAI from the UE to the hash values of supported T-S-NSSAI from AMF adds moderate complexity to NG-RAN. + +Note that in the idle mobility scenario, the new gNB computes the T-S-NSSAI hash values in a manner that is consistent with the gNB handling of T-S-NSSAI hash values during the Initial Registration procedure. + +6. The NG-RAN routes the UE initial NAS message to the selected AMF. + +NOTE: The NG-RAN may receive at any time an AMF Configuration Update message including an updated list of T-S-NSSAIs (e.g., following an update of the list of S-NSSAIs supported by the PLMN). In this solution, the network needs only to maintain one set of T-S-NSSAI per PLMN, i.e. with direct one-to-one mapping of S-NSSAI to T-S-NSSAI. + +### 7.11.3 Evaluation + +The Solution #11 addresses Key Issue #6: Confidentiality protection of NSSAI and home control. + +It builds on a similar notion of temporary T-S-NSSAIs as introduced in existing Solution #8. The UE transmits hashed T-S-NSSAI in the AS layer instead of cleartext T-S-NSSAI while alleviating UE privacy/linkability attacks in addition to providing confidentiality protection for NSSAI transmission. + +Solution 11 is an hybrid approach where actions for S-NSSAI privacy protection are performed in both the UE and the network. As such, it can also complement existing Solutions #8 and #10 as it would minimize the need for the network to provision the UE with new S-NSSAI pseudonyms every time an update is required. + +Since T-S-NSSAI and random salt are provisioned and maintained on a per PLMN basis, the solution supports the case where the UE connects with a new gNB (under the same AMF). In an idle mobility scenario, the new gNB computes the T-S-NSSAI hash values the same way as the old gNB that handled the initial registration connection. + +Solution 11 does not prevent passive attacks from UEs that have the same T-S-NSSAI and are using their knowledge of T-S-NSSAI. + +## 7.12 Solution #12 Privacy protection of NSSAI + +### 7.12.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses the Key Issue #6 Confidentiality protection of NSSAI and home control. + +This solution is based on the notion of temporary S-NSSAI (T-S-NSSAI) as in solution #8. In this solution, the AMF generates the T-S-NSSAIs based on the S-NSSAIs supported by the PLMN and stores the list of mapping between the S-NSSAIs and the T-S-NSSAI in the AMF. The NG-RAN gets and stores a list of mapping of S-NSSAI and T-S-NSSAI supported by the PLMN from the AMF in a NG Setup Response during an NG Setup procedure. UE are offered a temporary NSSAIs (T-S-NSSAIs) instead of cleartext S-NSSAIs in registration procedure. After that, to preserve the privacy, when UE use the T-S-NSSAI to access the slice, AMF will generate a new T-S-NSSAI for the allowed S-NSSAI and allocate for the UE. + +The T-S-NSSAI needs to be updated based on predefined policies when it is used to ensure the privacy. + +### 7.12.2 Solution details + +Figure 7.12.2-1 illustrates this solution. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the privacy protection of NSSAI. The diagram is divided into two phases: 'Provisioning' and 'Utilizing and Re-Provisioning'. It shows interactions between UE, NG-RAN, and AMF. In the Provisioning phase, the AMF generates T-S-NSSAIs, the NG-RAN stores mapping information, and the AMF identifies allowed S-NSSAIs. A Registration Accept message is sent to the UE. In the Utilizing and Re-Provisioning phase, the NG-RAN sends a Slice Registration Request, the AMF generates a new T-S-NSSAI, and a Slice Registration Accept message is sent to the UE. Finally, the AMF indicates the NG-RAN to update the mapping.](00504fc688ebcf131ccbeff94dfc9939_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant NG-RAN + participant AMF + + Note left of UE: Provisioning + Note right of AMF: 0. Generates the T-S-NSSAIs + Note right of NG-RAN: 1. Registration has been performed successfully and 5G NAS established. NG-RAN gets and Stores a list of mapping of S-NSSAI and T-S-NSSAI supported by the PLMN + Note right of AMF: 2. Identify the T-S-NSSAIs for allowed S-NSSAIs for the UE. Obtains the {allowed S-NSSAIs, T-S-NSSAIs} tuple + AMF->>UE: 3. Registration Accept({allowed S-NSSAIs, T-S-NSSAIs} tuple ...) + + Note left of UE: Utilizing and Re-Provisioning + NG-RAN->>AMF: 4. Slice Registration Request (T-S-NSSAI). NG-RAN identify the allowed S-NSSAI from the T-S-NSSAI and select the target AMF + Note right of AMF: 5. Generate and allocate the new T-S-NSSAI for the allowed S-NSSAI for the UE based on predefined policies. Cancel the old T-S-NSSAI. Store the {allowed S-NSSAI, new T-S-NSSAI} tuple + AMF->>UE: 6. Slice Registration Accept({allowed S-NSSAI, T-S-NSSAI} tuple...) + AMF->>NG-RAN: 7. Indicate NG-RAN to update the mapping of NSSAI and old T-NSSAI with the new mapping of NSSAI and new T-NSSAI. + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the privacy protection of NSSAI. The diagram is divided into two phases: 'Provisioning' and 'Utilizing and Re-Provisioning'. It shows interactions between UE, NG-RAN, and AMF. In the Provisioning phase, the AMF generates T-S-NSSAIs, the NG-RAN stores mapping information, and the AMF identifies allowed S-NSSAIs. A Registration Accept message is sent to the UE. In the Utilizing and Re-Provisioning phase, the NG-RAN sends a Slice Registration Request, the AMF generates a new T-S-NSSAI, and a Slice Registration Accept message is sent to the UE. Finally, the AMF indicates the NG-RAN to update the mapping. + +**Figure 7.12.2-1: Privacy protection of NSSAI** + +The AMF generates the T-S-NSSAIs based on the S-NSSAIs supported by the PLMN and stores the list of mapping of the S-NSSAIs and the T-S-NSSAI in the AMF. + +1. The UE has registered successfully to a PLMN and 5G NAS security context has been created, and NG-RAN gets and stores a list of mapping of S-NSSAI and T-S-NSSAI supported by the PLMN from the AMF in a NG Setup Response during an NG Setup procedure. +2. In the registration procedure, AMF identifies T-S-NSSAIs according to allowed S-NSSAIs based on the mapping of S-NSSAIs and T-S-NSSAIs. Then, AMF obtains the {allowed S-NSSAIs, T-S-NSSAIs} tuple. +3. In the registration/service accept message, {allowed S-NSSAIs, T-S-NSSAIs} tuple will be sent to UE instead of cleartext S-NSSAIs. +4. In a slice registration request message, UE transmits T-S-NSSAI to NG-RAN, NG-RAN identify the allowed S-NSSAI from the T-S-NSSAI based on the mapping of the NSSAI and T-NSSAI in the NG-RAN, and select the target AMF. +5. AMF calculates a new T-S-NSSAI according to the allowed S-NSSAI based on the predefined policies. Then AMF cancel the old T-S-NSSAI, and stores the {allowed S-NSSAI, new T-S-NSSAI} tuple. +6. In the Slice registration Accept message, the new T-S-NSSAI will be sent to UE. +7. AMF indicate NG-RAN to update the stored mapping of NSSAI and old T-NSSAI with the new mapping of NSSAI and new T-NSSAI. + +**Editor's Note: Idle mode mobility need to be addressed and solved.** + +### 7.12.3 Evaluation + +The solution #12 addresses the key issue #6, the solution introduce a notion of temporary T-S-NSSAI similar as introduced in existing Solution #8. The AMF generates the T-S-NSSAIs based on the S-NSSAIs supported by the PLMN and stores the list of mapping between the S-NSSAIs and the T-S-NSSAI in the AMF. The NG-RAN gets and stores a list of mapping of S-NSSAI and T-S-NSSAI supported by the PLMN from the AMF. The UE gets and maintains a list of mapping between allowed S-NSSAIs and T-S-NSSAIs. The T-S-NSSAI will be updated based on the predefined policies when it is used, and accordingly the allowed S-NSSAI and T-S-NSSAI mapping relationship will also be updated. This solution will allow UE to use the updated T-S-NSSAI based on the predefined policies, thus achieving enhanced privacy protection. + +# --- 8 Conclusions + +## 8.1 Key issue-solution mapping + +The present document contains six key issues and six solution proposals to solve them. A comparison of solution proposals against the key issues which they address is shown here below. Solutions address only some of the key issues. + +**Table 8.1: Solution mapping** + +| Key issue | Solution1 | Solution2 | Solution3 | Solution4 | Solution5 | Solution6 | Solution7 | Solution8 | Solution 9 | Solution 10 | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------| +| #1 Authentication for access to specific Network Slices | Yes | Yes | NA | Evaluation pending | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | +| #2: AMF Key separation | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | +| #3: Security features for NSaaS | NA | NA | Evaluation pending | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | +| #4: Security and privacy aspects related to the solution for Network Slice specific access authentication and authorization | Evaluation pending | NA | NA | NA | Evaluation pending | Evaluation pending | Evaluation pending | NA | NA | NA | +| #5: Access token handling between Network Slices | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | Evaluation pending | NA | +| #6: Confidentiality protection of NSSAI and home control | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | Evaluation pending | NA | Evaluation pending | +| NA: Not Applicable | | | | | | | | | | | + +## 8.2 Conclusions + +### 8.2.0 General conclusions + +- Slice specific authentication is optional to use. +- Slice specific authentication uses a User ID and credentials, different from the 3GPP subscription credentials (e.g. SUPI and credentials used for PLMN access) and takes place after the primary authentication. +- AMF confirms, locally or based on ARPF/UDM, whether slice authentication is required for each S-NSSAI. +- Slice specific authentication is based on EAP framework where AMF takes the role of the passing through Authenticator. + +### 8.2.1 Conclusions for key issues + +For Key Issue #1 Authentication for access to specific Network Slices, a merge of Solution#1, solution#2 and Solution#4 are recommended as the basis for the normative work. + +For Key Issue#2, AMF key separation, it is concluded not to consider in the present document, since the use case that this key issue is addressing, is not concluded in TR 23.740 [5]. + +For Key Issue #4, it is recommended that no normative work is required. + +For Key Issue #5, it is recommended that Solution #9 is used as the basis for normative work. + +For Key issue#7, it is concluded that no normative work is needed. + +# --- 9 Recommendations + +For Key Issue #1 Authentication for access to specific Network Slices, a merge of Solution#1, solution#2 and Solution#4 are recommended as the basis for the normative work. + +# Annex A: Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------------|------------|----|-----|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 16/11/18 | SA3#93 | S3-183333, | | | | TR Skeleton | | +| 16/11/18 | SA3#93 | S3-183807 | | | | Tdocs S3-183808, S3-183802, S3-183810, S3-183531 | V0.1.0 | +| 01/02/19 | SA3#94 | S3-190539 | | | | Tdocs S3-190533, S3-190534, S3-190535, S3-190536, S3-190537, S3-190538 | V0.2.0 | +| 15/03/19 | SA3#94-adhoc | S3-190948 | | | | Tdoc S3-191002, S3-191007, S3-191034 | V0.3.0 | +| 05/09/19 | SA3#95 | S3-191731 | | | | Tdocs S3-191730, S3-191732, S3-191733, S3-191734, S3-191735, S3-191736, S3-191737, S3-191738, S3-191739, S3-191008, S3-191009 | 0.4.0 | +| 06/27/19 | SA3#95Bis | S3-192346 | | | | Tdocs S3-192363, S3-192260, S3-192367, S3-192369, S3-192370, S3-192371, S3-192372, S3-192374, S3-192375, S3-192376, S3-192373, S3-192366. | 0.5.0 | +| 08/30/19 | SA3#96 | S3-193119 | | | | Tdocs S3-182852, S3-193121, S3-193122, S3-193123, S3-192124, S3-193125, S3-193201 | 0.6.0 | +| 10/18/210 | SA3#96 ad-hoc | S3-193732 | | | | Tdocs S3-193301, S3-193354, S3-193731, S3-193734, S3-193735, S3-193736, S3-193819, S3-193820, S3-193821, S3-193822, S3-193823, S3-193824, S3-193825. | 0.7.0 | +| 22/11/19 | SA3#97 | S3-194543 | | | | Tdocs S3-193964, S3-194542, S3-194547, S3-194544, S3-194545, S3-194546, | 0.8.0 | +| 18/05/2020 | SA3#99-e0 | S3-201360 | | | | Tdoc S3-201261, S3-201978, S3-201061, S3-201159 | 0.9.0 | +| 2020-06 | SA#88-e | SP-200382 | | | | EditHelp/MCC review
Presented for information and approval | 1.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | SA#88-e | | | | | Upgrade to change control version | 16.0.0 | + diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33814/a83ba9e3e2c1e21dd69953a7b09e45b4_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33814/a83ba9e3e2c1e21dd69953a7b09e45b4_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..32fb38c5b0e4923ee938ed9180d653f6ddc57924 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33814/a83ba9e3e2c1e21dd69953a7b09e45b4_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:b1bba08e7ada2e480d609705a1f1da0c1c791622bc5d8a55df3e39a4f946ef94 +size 175095 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33814/fe61ee8618403cf584b2e28c4bada03a_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33814/fe61ee8618403cf584b2e28c4bada03a_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..903f79908e4d76cfee3a7e04f80eb76dd6c5eb76 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33814/fe61ee8618403cf584b2e28c4bada03a_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:27ebda096422f5ecf7cb3db1a483e27823bc47154323c4130affb0037dca1be5 +size 32884 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33814/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33814/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d591202296c7fe05aa60fb0f27b625fc1621e476 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33814/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,619 @@ + + + + + + +# Contents + +| | | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 5 | +| Introduction ..... | 6 | +| 1 Scope..... | 7 | +| 2 References..... | 7 | +| 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations..... | 7 | +| 3.1 Terms..... | 7 | +| 3.2 Symbols..... | 8 | +| 3.3 Abbreviations ..... | 8 | +| 4 Security aspects of eLCS in the 5G System..... | 8 | +| 4.1 Introduction ..... | 8 | +| 5 Key issues ..... | 9 | +| 5.1 Key Issue #1: Security and privacy in Bluetooth positioning..... | 9 | +| 5.1.1 Key issue details..... | 9 | +| 5.1.2 Security threats ..... | 9 | +| 5.1.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 9 | +| 5.2 Key Issue #2: Security and privacy in TBS positioning ..... | 9 | +| 5.2.1 Key issue details..... | 9 | +| 5.2.2 Security threats ..... | 10 | +| 5.2.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 10 | +| 5.3 Key Issue #3: Security and privacy in WLAN positioning..... | 10 | +| 5.3.1 Key issue details..... | 10 | +| 5.3.2 Security threats ..... | 10 | +| 5.3.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 10 | +| 5.4 Key Issue #4: Privacy control in LCS..... | 10 | +| 5.4.1 Key issue details..... | 10 | +| 5.4.2 Security threats ..... | 11 | +| 5.4.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 11 | +| 5.5 Key Issue #5: UE faking/altering location estimate or measurements..... | 11 | +| 5.5.1 Key issue details..... | 11 | +| 5.5.2 Security threats ..... | 12 | +| 5.5.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 12 | +| 5.6 Key Issue #6: Positioning data confidentiality between UE and network ..... | 12 | +| 5.6.1 Key issue details..... | 12 | +| 5.6.2 Security threats ..... | 12 | +| 5.6.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 12 | +| 5.X Key Issue #X: ..... | 13 | +| 5.X.1 Key issue details..... | 13 | +| 5.X.2 Security threats ..... | 13 | +| 5.X.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 13 | +| 6 Solutions..... | 13 | +| 6.1 Solution #1: Supervised Bluetooth measurements from UEs ..... | 13 | +| 6.1.1 Introduction ..... | 13 | +| 6.1.2 Solution details ..... | 13 | +| 6.1.3 Evaluation..... | 14 | +| 6.2 Solution #2: Solution for TBS measurements from UEs ..... | 14 | +| 6.2.1 Introduction ..... | 14 | +| 6.2.2 Solution details ..... | 14 | +| 6.2.3 Evaluation..... | 14 | +| 6.3 Solution #3: Supervised WLAN measurements from UEs..... | 15 | +| 6.3.1 Introduction ..... | 15 | +| 6.3.2 Solution details ..... | 15 | +| 6.3.3 Evaluation..... | 16 | +| 6.4 Solution #4: Enhanced privacy control in LCS..... | 16 | +| 6.4.1 Introduction ..... | 16 | + +6.4.2 Solution details .....16 +6.4.3 Evaluation.....18 +7 Conclusions.....18 +7.1 General conclusions .....18 +7.2 Conclusions on Key Issue #1 .....18 +7.3 Conclusions on Key Issue #2 .....18 +7.4 Conclusions on Key Issue #3 .....18 +7.5 Conclusions on Key Issue #4 .....18 +**Annex A: Change history .....19** + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings: + +- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something +- shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something + +The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports. + +The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document. + +- should** indicates a recommendation to do something +- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something +- may** indicates permission to do something +- need not** indicates permission not to do something + +The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended. + +- can** indicates that something is possible +- cannot** indicates that something is impossible + +The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not". + +- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +In addition: + +**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements. + +# --- Introduction + +3GPP TS 23.273 [6] specifies enhanced Location Services (eLCS) in the 5G System. The enhanced location services may bring new security issues such as authorization, privacy protection. The present document studies the security aspects of the eLCS and provides potential solutions. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The scope of the present document is to analyse the security aspects of location service in 5G system and ensure the security solutions are aligned with the work in SA1 (i.e. in TS 22.261 [2] and TR 22.872 [3]) and SA2 (i.e. in TR 23.731 [4]). The work is comprised of the following parts: + +- Study the security key issues, threats and requirements of location service in 5G system. +- Elaborate on the potential security solutions to cover these requirements. + +Both non-roaming and roaming scenarios will be considered. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TS 22.261: "Service requirements for next generation new services and markets; Stage 1". +- [3] 3GPP TR 22.872: "Study on positioning use cases". +- [4] 3GPP TR 23.731: "Study on Enhancement to the 5GC LoCation Services". +- [5] 3GPP TS 38.305: "NG Radio Access Network (NG-RAN); Stage 2 functional specification of User Equipment (UE) positioning in NG-RAN". +- [6] 3GPP TS 23.273: "5G System Location Services". +- [7] 3GPP TS 36.331: "Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Radio Resource Control (RRC); Protocol specification". + +# --- 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Terms + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1]. + +**LCS Client:** Defined in 3GPP TS 23.271 [2]. + +**LCS (LoCation Services):** Defined in 3GPP TS 23.271 [2]. + +**Target UE:** Defined in 3GPP TS 23.271 [2]. + +**Location Estimate:** Defined in 3GPP TS 23.271 [2]. + +## 3.2 Symbols + +Void. + +## 3.3 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1]. + +| | | +|-------|---------------------------------------| +| 5GC | 5G Core Network | +| 5GS | 5G System | +| CID | Cell-ID (positioning method) | +| E-CID | Enhanced Cell-ID (positioning method) | +| GMLC | Gateway Mobile Location Centre | +| LCS | LoCation Services | +| LMF | Location Management Function | +| LPP | LTE Positioning Protocol | +| MAC | Master Auxiliary Concept | +| OTDOA | Observed Time Difference Of Arrival | +| RSSI | Received Signal Strength Indicator | +| SSID | Service Set Identifier | +| TBS | Terrestrial Beacon System | +| VGMLC | Visited GMLC | +| WLAN | Wireless Local Area Network | + +# --- 4 Security aspects of eLCS in the 5G System + +## 4.1 Introduction + +TR 23.731 [4] describes an enhanced Location Service (eLCS) architecture. The normative work of eLCS is specified in TS 23.273 [6]. + +The eLCS proposes to use NAS signalling to transmit positioning messages between UE and 5GC. The location services may be exposed to the third parties through the Le and N33 interfaces. + +In 5G Rel-15, location services provided by the home operator are restricted to location services required by regulation. In 5G Rel-16, location services will support the commercial use of location by third parties via the home operator. It is assumed that the requests from regulatory agencies are always authorized to use location services. However, in commercial use cases, the user is able to choose and change their privacy settings for location. In order to support commercial services, the location service architecture is extended to support roaming scenario, the location service exposure and Mobile Originating Location Request scenario. + +The LCS subscription information, LCS privacy profile and routing information are proposed to be stored in the UDM. The UDM is accessible from an AMF, GMLC or NEF via the Nudm interface. + +eLCS may raise a series of security issues, such as positioning data eavesdropping, UE location tracking, privacy information leak. The present document studies the security aspects of LCS in the 5G System. + +# --- 5 Key issues + +## 5.1 Key Issue #1: Security and privacy in Bluetooth positioning + +### 5.1.1 Key issue details + +Location services in 3GPP include the Bluetooth positioning method in which the UE position is estimated with the knowledge of geographical coordinate of "reference" Bluetooth beacons. + +The Bluetooth positioning mode could be: (a) "standalone" where the UE performs Bluetooth position measurements and location computation; or (b) "UE-assisted" where the UE provides Bluetooth position measurements without assistance from the network to the location management function for computation of a location estimate by the network. The 3GPP TS 38.305 [5] and the 3GPP TR 23.731 [4] are referred for further details. + +In Bluetooth positioning, information that may be transferred over-the-air include Bluetooth location information (such as media address control (MAC) address, received signal strength (RSSI), and time stamp) as well as UE location information (such as UE position estimate and position time stamp). + +This key issue is about investigating if and how any new security and privacy mechanism need to be added in Bluetooth positioning, in addition to currently existing mechanisms. + +### 5.1.2 Security threats + +Lack of secure and privacy preserving mechanism to transfer location-related information over-the-air could potentially have undesirable effects like position poisoning or subscriber traceability. + +### 5.1.3 Potential security requirements + +The system shall support secure and privacy preserving mechanism for Bluetooth positioning. + +## 5.2 Key Issue #2: Security and privacy in TBS positioning + +### 5.2.1 Key issue details + +Location services in 3GPP include the TBS (terrestrial beacon systems) positioning method in which the UE position is estimated with the knowledge of geographical coordinate of "reference" ground-based transmitters broadcasting signals for geo-spatial positioning with wide-area or regional coverage. + +The TBS positioning mode could be: (a) "standalone" where the UE performs TBS measurements and calculates its own location, possibly using additional measurements from other (non-TBS) sources, without network assistance; or (b) "UE-assisted" where the UE performs TBS measurements with or without assistance from the network, and sends these measurements to the location management function where the position calculation takes place, possibly using additional measurements from other (non-TBS) sources; or (c) "UE-based" where the UE performs TBS measurements and calculates its own location, possibly using additional measurements from other (non-TBS) sources. The 3GPP TS 38.305 [5] and the 3GPP TR 23.731 [4] are referred for further details. + +In TBS positioning, information that may be transferred over-the-air include UE location information such as UE position estimate (which could be latitude, longitude, and altitude) and timestamp. + +The TBS positioning method consists of a network of ground-based transmitters that broadcast signals only for positioning purposes. A difference in TBS positioning method from WLAN and Bluetooth positioning methods is that these ground-based transmitters are not supposed to represent a human user. Nevertheless, it is prudent to investigate if and how any new security and privacy mechanism need to be added in TBS positioning, in addition to currently existing mechanisms. + +### 5.2.2 Security threats + +Lack of secure and privacy preserving mechanism to transfer location-related information over-the-air could potentially have undesirable effects like position poisoning or subscriber traceability. + +### 5.2.3 Potential security requirements + +The system shall support secure and privacy preserving mechanism for TBS positioning. + +## 5.3 Key Issue #3: Security and privacy in WLAN positioning + +### 5.3.1 Key issue details + +Location services in 3GPP include the WLAN positioning method in which the UE position is estimated with the knowledge of geographical coordinates of "reference" WLAN access points. + +The WLAN positioning mode could be: (a) "standalone" where the UE performs WLAN position measurements and location computation without network assistance; or (b) "UE-assisted" where the UE provides WLAN position measurements with or without assistance from the network to the location management function for computation of a location estimate by the network; or (c) "UE-based" where the UE performs WLAN position measurements and computation of a location estimate with network assistance. The 3GPP TS 38.305 [5] and the 3GPP TR 23.731 [4] are referred for further details. + +In WLAN positioning, information that may be transferred over-the-air includes WLAN location information (such as basic service set identifier (BSSID), service set identifier (SSID), received signal strength (RSSI), and time stamp) as well as UE location information (such as UE position estimate and position time stamp). + +This key issue is about investigating if and how any new security and privacy mechanism need to be added in WLAN positioning, in addition to currently existing mechanisms. + +### 5.3.2 Security threats + +Lack of secure and privacy preserving mechanism to transfer location-related information over-the-air could potentially have undesirable effects like position poisoning or subscriber traceability. + +### 5.3.3 Potential security requirements + +The system shall support secure and privacy preserving mechanism for WLAN positioning. + +## 5.4 Key Issue #4: Privacy control in LCS + +### 5.4.1 Key issue details + +In relation to 5G and service-based architecture, the LCS architecture in roaming scenario is shown in Figure 5.4.1-1. + +![Diagram of LCS architecture in roaming scenario. The diagram is split into two domains by a vertical dashed line: VPLMN (left) and HPLMN (right). In the VPLMN, a UE is connected to an (R)AN, which is connected to an AMF via an N2 interface. The AMF is connected to an LMF via an Nlmf interface, and to a VGMLC via an Nsmf interface. The VGMLC is connected to an LRF. In the HPLMN, the VGMLC is connected to an HGMLC via an Ngmlc interface. The HGMLC is connected to an LCS Client via an Le interface. Above the HGMLC, there is a Service Based Interface (SBI) connecting the HGMLC to the NEF (via Nnef), UDR (via Nudr), UDM (via Nudm), AF (via Naf), and CHF (via Nchf).](fe61ee8618403cf584b2e28c4bada03a_img.jpg) + +Diagram of LCS architecture in roaming scenario. The diagram is split into two domains by a vertical dashed line: VPLMN (left) and HPLMN (right). In the VPLMN, a UE is connected to an (R)AN, which is connected to an AMF via an N2 interface. The AMF is connected to an LMF via an Nlmf interface, and to a VGMLC via an Nsmf interface. The VGMLC is connected to an LRF. In the HPLMN, the VGMLC is connected to an HGMLC via an Ngmlc interface. The HGMLC is connected to an LCS Client via an Le interface. Above the HGMLC, there is a Service Based Interface (SBI) connecting the HGMLC to the NEF (via Nnef), UDR (via Nudr), UDM (via Nudm), AF (via Naf), and CHF (via Nchf). + +**Figure 5.4.1-1: LCS architecture in roaming scenario (Figure 4.2.2-2 in TS 23.273 [6])** + +Location services (LCS) in the 3GPP system already address privacy control of UE's user by providing mechanisms for the user's consent processing, and privacy settings update procedure. In the existing mechanisms, the UE's privacy settings are primarily distributed by the UDM, however, the UDM itself cannot enforce its use in other entities like the AMF in the VPLMN. + +Hence, it is important to analyse if the privacy controls are effective, especially taking into consideration that multiple entities are involved and trust relations between them vary. + +### 5.4.2 Security threats + +Lack of effective privacy control could potentially lead to undermining privacy preferences of UE's users. + +### 5.4.3 Potential security requirements + +The 5G system shall support privacy control in LCS. + +**Editor's Note: Who is enforcing the privacy control is FFS.** + +## 5.5 Key Issue #5: UE faking/altering location estimate or measurements + +### 5.5.1 Key issue details + +For UE based positioning procedure, the UE performs positioning measurement and computation. The location estimate will be reported to network from UE. + +For UE assisted positioning procedure, the UE of which the location is to be determined performs measurements itself and sends these measurements to the network so the network can determine its location. Examples are + +- OTDOA (Observed Time Difference Of Arrival), +- Enhanced cell ID - measurement of arrival times of specific messages, and +- Enhanced cell ID - measurement of received signal strength of specific messages. + +It may be advantageous for a UE to appear to be located somewhere else than it actually is. This can be done by the UE by faking/altering the above measurements or location estimate before sending these to the network. + +This key issue is about investigating how the network can detect that a UE has faked/altered location estimate or the measurements that are used for determining its location estimate. For this key issue it is assumed that the reports provided by the UE are not trusted. + +### 5.5.2 Security threats + +Not being able by the network to detect a UE faking/altering location estimate or the measurements that are used for determining the location of that UE may lead to + +- granting a UE a service that is based on the UE having to be in a particular location when the UE is actually not in that location, which may allow the user to defraud a monetized service, such as cheap calls when being close to one's home, +- a UE being able to provide a fake alibi for its user. + +### 5.5.3 Potential security requirements + +**Editor's Note: The potential security requirements are FFS.** + +## 5.6 Key Issue #6: Positioning data confidentiality between UE and network + +### 5.6.1 Key issue details + +The positioning messages exchanged between UE and 5GC is via NAS signalling. + +In TS 22.261 [2] there is following description: + +Subject to regional or national regulatory requirements, the 5G system shall be able to provide the 5G positioning services while ensuring the protection of the privacy of the UE's user or owner, including the respect of his consent to the positioning services. + +NOTE 1: This includes the ability for the 5G system to provide the positioning services on demand without having to track continuously the position of the involved UE. + +NOTE 2: The respect of the user's consent to some positioning services could abide by different rules in case of emergency (for example, rules that would also receive consent from the user, but well before the emergency occurs). + +This requirement requires that UE's positioning information shall not be eavesdropped or exposed to unauthorized parties. + +This key issue will study: + +- Confidentiality protection for the positioning information exchanged via NAS signalling. + +### 5.6.2 Security threats + +The positioning information exchanged via NAS signalling between the UE and the 5GC may be used by attackers to track the location of UE. + +### 5.6.3 Potential security requirements + +- It shall be possible to support confidentiality protection of positioning data exchanged between UE and network. + +NOTE 1: In case NAS confidentiality protection is disabled, positioning data carried in NAS cannot be protected. + +NOTE 2: The serving network is trusted with the location of the UE. + +## 5.X Key Issue #X: + +### 5.X.1 Key issue details + +### 5.X.2 Security threats + +### 5.X.3 Potential security requirements + +# --- 6 Solutions + +## 6.1 Solution #1: Supervised Bluetooth measurements from UEs + +### 6.1.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses following key issues: + +- 1) Key issue #1: Security and privacy in Bluetooth positioning. + +Location services (LCS) in 3GPP system include the Bluetooth positioning method in which the UE position is estimated with the knowledge of geographical coordinate of "reference" Bluetooth beacons in serving network. The 3GPP TS 38.305 [5] is referred for further details. They sufficiently address privacy of UE's user by providing mechanisms for the user's consent processing, and confidentiality/integrity protection of messages. However, there is no way instruct the UE to "not" report everything they see in the neighbourhood. Doing so is necessary to respect the privacy of neighbouring UE's users, and to avoid potential issues like "mass surveillance". Nevertheless, it should also be considered that one of the main use cases of LCS is locating UE during emergency and failure to locate the UE could prove fatal to the health or life of the UE's user. Depending upon regulations, privacy of neighbouring Bluetooth devices may be considered comparatively less important than saving life of the user. Depending upon regulations, it might even be the obligation of neighbouring Bluetooth devices to assist in locating the concerned UE. It could also be the case that there are some users who have opted-in so that their Bluetooth devices could be reported to the network. + +To strike a balance between "collect everything" and "collect nothing", this solution proposes a supervision mechanism so that the network can carefully limit the information reported by the UE and tweak the limit according to regulation or network policy. Mind that in MDT (minimization of drive tests) the network can configure the UE with a "whitelist" so that UE only measures the neighbouring Bluetooth devices whose "names" are included in the whitelist. See "BT-NameList" in 3GPP TS 36.331 [7]. + +There are 2 positioning modes that are supported in Bluetooth positioning method, namely (a) standalone, (b) UE-assisted. Among those, it is only in the UE-assisted positioning mode (b) that the UE sends measurements to the network and therefore it is the only mode that needs a supervision mechanism. A short summary follows: + +- in the standalone positioning mode (a), the UE itself does the computation of location estimate. Bluetooth measurements around the UE are not sent from UE to the network. +- in the UE-assisted positioning mode (b), the UE does not get assistance data from network and the network does the computation of location estimate. Bluetooth measurements around the UE are sent from UE to the network. + +### 6.1.2 Solution details + +For the positioning modes requiring the UE to send Bluetooth measurements to the network (i.e., UE-assisted), the following applies: + +- (1) The network should provide "Bluetooth supervision data" to UE. This Bluetooth supervision data shall contain a list of Bluetooth AP data that are to be measured by UE. Each Bluetooth AP data shall contain the Bluetooth public-address information and/or the Bluetooth device-name information. See details below for the values of Bluetooth public-address/device-name. +- (2) If the UE gets the Bluetooth supervision data from the network, the UE shall send only those Bluetooth measurements to the network whose Bluetooth public-addresses and/or Bluetooth device-names match the ones indicated in the provided Bluetooth supervision data. +- (3) If the UE does not get the Bluetooth supervision data from the network, the UE shall send only those Bluetooth measurements to the network whose Bluetooth public-addresses and/or Bluetooth device-names match the ones in "reference Bluetooth supervision data". This reference Bluetooth supervision data shall contain "reference Bluetooth public-address" information and "reference Bluetooth device-name" information. See details below for their values. + +The Bluetooth public-address/device-name information may be values, e.g., defined by 3GPP, or based on MCC, MNC, realm, or any PLMN specific identifiers. They could also be patterns instead of exact values, e.g., MCC\*. They could also be values, e.g., provided by network dynamically to UE as broadcast information or in other protocol messages like RRC, NAS, or LPP. It also means that the reference Bluetooth supervision data could be static or dynamic. + +### 6.1.3 Evaluation + +This solution enables the network to control the collection of Bluetooth measurements from UE. When used, the solution makes it possible for the network to avoid collecting unintended Bluetooth measurements around the UE. + +It should be noted that whilst it is easy to broadcast spoofed Bluetooth identifiers, it is relatively difficult to block Bluetooth identifiers being transmitted in the same location. Therefore, any solution that only listens for specific Bluetooth identifiers may be easier to get spoofed than solutions that listen to all Bluetooth identifiers in a specific location. + +For Bluetooth based positioning in general, it should be noted that because Bluetooth identifiers can be spoofed, there is low confidence in collected data. + +## 6.2 Solution #2: Solution for TBS measurements from UEs + +### 6.2.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses following key issues: + +- (1) Key issue #2: Security and privacy in TBS positioning. + +Location services (LCS) in 3GPP system sufficiently address privacy of the user of a UE by providing mechanisms for the user's consent processing, and confidentiality/integrity protection of messages. Further, there are two types of + +broadcasted signals in the TBS positioning, i.e., MBS (Metropolitan Beacon System) signals and Positioning Reference Signals (PRS). These signals are broadcasted by a network of ground-based transmitters "only" for positioning purposes, see TS 38.305 [5]. Thus, the neighbouring devices, whose measurements are collected by the UE, are not supposed to represent a human user. + +Therefore, no new security and privacy solution specific to TBS positioning method is deemed necessary for both regulatory and commercial positioning. + +### 6.2.2 Solution details + +Existing mechanisms in the LCS system sufficiently address security and privacy aspects for TBS positioning method and shall be re-used for both regulatory and commercial positioning. + +### 6.2.3 Evaluation + +Existing security and privacy solution sufficiently address TBS measurements from UE. + +It should be noted that whilst it easy to broadcast spoofed TBS signals, it is relatively difficult to block TBS signals being transmitted in the same location. Therefore, any solution that only listens for specific TBS signals may be easier to get spoofed than solutions that listen to all TBS signals in a specific location. + +## 6.3 Solution #3: Supervised WLAN measurements from UEs + +### 6.3.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses following key issues: + +- (1) Key issue #3: Security and privacy in WLAN positioning. + +Location services (LCS) in 3GPP system include the WLAN positioning method in which the UE position is estimated with the knowledge of geographical coordinates of "reference" WLAN access points in serving network. The 3GPP TS 38.305 [5] is referred for further details. They sufficiently address privacy of UE's user by providing mechanisms for the user's consent processing, and confidentiality/integrity protection of messages. However, there is no way instruct the UE to "not" report everything they see in the neighbourhood. Doing so is necessary to respect the privacy of neighbouring UE's users, and to avoid potential issues like "mass surveillance". Nevertheless, it should also be considered that one of the main use cases of LCS is locating UE during emergency and failure to locate the UE could prove fatal to the health or life of the UE's user. Depending upon regulations, privacy of neighbouring WLAN devices may be considered comparatively less important than saving life of the user. Depending upon regulations, it might even be the obligation of neighbouring WLAN devices to assist in locating the concerned UE. It could also be the case that there are some users who have opted-in so that their WLAN devices could be reported to the network. + +To strike a balance between "collect everything" and "collect nothing", this solution proposes a supervision mechanism so that the network can carefully limit the information reported by the UE and tweak the limit according to regulation or network policy. Mind that in MDT (minimization of drive tests) the network can configure the UE with a "whitelist" so that UE only measures the neighbouring WLAN devices whose "names" are included in the whitelist. See "WLAN-NameList" in 3GPP TS 36.331 [7]. + +There are 3 positioning modes that are supported in WLAN positioning method, namely (a) standalone, (b) UE-based, and (c) UE-assisted. Among those, it is only in the UE-assisted positioning mode (c) that the UE sends measurements to the network and therefore it is the only mode that needs a supervision mechanism. A short summary follows: + +- in the standalone positioning mode (a), the UE itself does the computation of location estimate. WLAN measurements around the UE are not sent from UE to the network. +- in the UE-based positioning mode (b), it is again the UE that itself does the computation of location estimate. Difference from the standalone positioning mode being that the UE uses assistance data from the network. Nevertheless, WLAN measurements around the UE are not sent from UE to the network. +- in the UE-assisted positioning mode (c), the UE optionally gets assistance data from network and the network does the computation of location estimate. WLAN measurements around the UE are sent from UE to the network. + +### 6.3.2 Solution details + +For the positioning modes requiring the UE to send WLAN measurements to the network (i.e., UE-assisted), the following applies: + +- (1) The network should provide "WLAN supervision data" to UE. This WLAN supervision data shall contain a list of WLAN AP data that are to be measured by UE. Each WLAN AP data shall contain the basic service set identifier (BSSID) information and/or the service set identifier (SSID) information. See details below for the values of BSSID and SSID. +- (2) If the UE gets the WLAN supervision data from the network, the UE shall send only those WLAN measurements to the network whose BSSIDs and/or SSIDs match the ones indicated in the provided WLAN supervision data. +- (3) If the UE does not get the WLAN supervision data from the network, the UE shall send only those WLAN measurements to the network whose BSSIDs and/or SSIDs match the ones in "reference WLAN supervision data". This reference WLAN supervision data shall contain "reference BSSID" information and "reference SSID" information. See details below for their values. + +The BSSID/SSID information and the reference BSSID/SSID information may be values, e.g., defined by 3GPP, or based on MCC, MNC, realm, or any PLMN specific identifiers. They could also be patterns instead of exact values, e.g., MCC\*. They could also be values, e.g., provided by network dynamically to UE as broadcast information or in other protocol messages like RRC, NAS, or LPP. It also means that the reference WLAN supervision data could be static or dynamic. + +### 6.3.3 Evaluation + +This solution enables the network to control the collection of WLAN measurements from UE. When used, the solution makes it possible for the network to avoid collecting unintended WLAN measurements around the UE. + +It should be noted that whilst it is easy to broadcast spoofed WLAN identifiers, it is relatively difficult to block WLAN identifiers being transmitted in the same location. Therefore, any solution that only listens for specific WLAN identifiers may be easier to get spoofed than solutions that listen to all WLAN identifiers in a specific location. + +For WLAN based positioning in general, it should be noted that because WLAN identifiers can be spoofed, there is low confidence in collected data. + +## 6.4 Solution #4: Enhanced privacy control in LCS + +### 6.4.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses following key issues: + +- 1) Key issue #4: Privacy control in LCS. + +In LCS, the UDM provides the UE privacy setting to GMLC and NEF. + +The H-GMLC checks UE privacy profile settings prior to delivering a location estimate. The H-GMLC also checks UE privacy profile settings to verify if an LCS client is authorized for 5GC\_MT\_LR. + +Further, the NEF uses the UE privacy settings to verify if AF is authorized for 5GC\_MT\_LR. + +It is also allowed that an authorized AF provisions the UE privacy setting for specific UE(s) via NEF. If the privacy setting provided by the UE and the AF conflict, NEF gives precedence to the one provided by UE. + +Most of these existing mechanisms of privacy control in LCS work well when the entities are in same trust domain and are behaving as expected. What is missing is that there is no assurance that the privacy control is effective when trust domain between the entities vary, and when all the entities might not be behaving as expected. + +The current solution caters that missing aspect. Further details are given below. + +### 6.4.2 Solution details + +The Figure 6.4.2-1 below shows an example of procedures and messages involved in LCS. In Step 7, if an indicator of privacy check related action indicates that the UE needs to either be notified or notified with privacy verification, a notification invoke message is sent to the target UE. In Step 8, the target UE notifies the UE user of the location request and, if privacy verification was requested, waits for the user to grant or withhold permission. The UE then returns a notification result to the AMF indicating whether permission is granted or denied for the current LCS request. See 3GPP TS 23.273 [6] for details. + +![Sequence diagram of the 5GC-MT-LR Procedure for commercial location services. Lifelines: UE, NG-RAN, AMF, LMF, V-GMLC, H-GMLC, UDM, External Client, NEF, AF. The diagram shows two parallel location request flows. The first flow (steps 1-15) involves the External Client sending an LCS Service Request to the H-GMLC, which then interacts with the UDM and V-GMLC to request positioning info from the AMF. The AMF sends a Network Triggered Service Request to the UE, which responds with a NAS Location Notification. The second flow (steps 16-24b-2) involves the AF sending an LCS Service Request to the NEF, which then follows a similar path through the H-GMLC and UDM to the AMF and UE. Both flows conclude with responses being returned through the chain of entities back to the requester. A 'Privacy Check' block is shown between steps 15 and 17. A 'UE Positioning' block is shown between steps 11 and 13.](a83ba9e3e2c1e21dd69953a7b09e45b4_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant NG-RAN + participant AMF + participant LMF + participant V-GMLC + participant H-GMLC + participant UDM + participant External Client + participant NEF + participant AF + + Note right of H-GMLC: 1a. LCS Service Request + External Client->>H-GMLC: 1a. LCS Service Request + Note right of H-GMLC: 1b-1. LCS Service Request + H-GMLC->>NEF: 1b-1. LCS Service Request + Note right of H-GMLC: 1b-2. Ngmlc_ProvideLocation Request + H-GMLC->>V-GMLC: 1b-2. Ngmlc_ProvideLocation Request + Note right of H-GMLC: 2. Nudm_SDM_Get + H-GMLC->>UDM: 2. Nudm_SDM_Get + Note right of H-GMLC: 3. Nudm_UECM_Get + H-GMLC->>UDM: 3. Nudm_UECM_Get + Note right of H-GMLC: 4. Ngmlc_ProvideLocation Request + H-GMLC->>V-GMLC: 4. Ngmlc_ProvideLocation Request + Note right of V-GMLC: 5. Namf_Location_ProvidePositioningInfo Request + V-GMLC->>AMF: 5. Namf_Location_ProvidePositioningInfo Request + Note right of AMF: 6. Network Triggered Service Request + AMF->>NG-RAN: 6. Network Triggered Service Request + Note right of NG-RAN: 7. NAS Location Notification Invoke Request + NG-RAN->>UE: 7. NAS Location Notification Invoke Request + Note right of UE: 8. NAS Location Notification Return Result + UE->>NG-RAN: 8. NAS Location Notification Return Result + Note right of NG-RAN: 9. Nudm_SDM_Update + NG-RAN->>AMF: 9. Nudm_SDM_Update + Note right of AMF: 10. LMF Selection + AMF->>LMF: 10. LMF Selection + Note right of LMF: 11. Nlmf_Location_DetermineLocation Request + LMF->>AMF: 11. Nlmf_Location_DetermineLocation Request + Note right of AMF: 12. UE Positioning + AMF->>LMF: 12. UE Positioning + Note right of LMF: 13. Nlmf_Location_DetermineLocation Response + LMF->>AMF: 13. Nlmf_Location_DetermineLocation Response + Note right of AMF: 14. Namf_Location_ProvidePositioningInfo Response + AMF->>V-GMLC: 14. Namf_Location_ProvidePositioningInfo Response + Note right of V-GMLC: 15. Ngmlc_ProvideLocation Response + V-GMLC->>H-GMLC: 15. Ngmlc_ProvideLocation Response + Note right of H-GMLC: 16. Privacy Check + Note right of H-GMLC: 17. Ngmlc_ProvideLocation Request + H-GMLC->>V-GMLC: 17. Ngmlc_ProvideLocation Request + Note right of V-GMLC: 18. Namf_Location_ProvidePositioningInfo Request + V-GMLC->>AMF: 18. Namf_Location_ProvidePositioningInfo Request + Note right of AMF: 19. Network Triggered Service Request + AMF->>NG-RAN: 19. Network Triggered Service Request + Note right of NG-RAN: 20. NAS Location Notification Invoke Request + NG-RAN->>UE: 20. NAS Location Notification Invoke Request + Note right of UE: 21. NAS Location Notification Return Result + UE->>NG-RAN: 21. NAS Location Notification Return Result + Note right of NG-RAN: 22. Namf_Location_ProvidePositioning Response + NG-RAN->>AMF: 22. Namf_Location_ProvidePositioning Response + Note right of AMF: 23. Ngmlc_ProvideLocation Response + AMF->>V-GMLC: 23. Ngmlc_ProvideLocation Response + Note right of V-GMLC: 24a. LCS Service Response + V-GMLC->>H-GMLC: 24a. LCS Service Response + Note right of H-GMLC: 24b-1. Ngmlc_ProvideLocation Response + H-GMLC->>NEF: 24b-1. Ngmlc_ProvideLocation Response + Note right of NEF: 24b-2. LCS Service Response + NEF->>AF: 24b-2. LCS Service Response + +``` + +Sequence diagram of the 5GC-MT-LR Procedure for commercial location services. Lifelines: UE, NG-RAN, AMF, LMF, V-GMLC, H-GMLC, UDM, External Client, NEF, AF. The diagram shows two parallel location request flows. The first flow (steps 1-15) involves the External Client sending an LCS Service Request to the H-GMLC, which then interacts with the UDM and V-GMLC to request positioning info from the AMF. The AMF sends a Network Triggered Service Request to the UE, which responds with a NAS Location Notification. The second flow (steps 16-24b-2) involves the AF sending an LCS Service Request to the NEF, which then follows a similar path through the H-GMLC and UDM to the AMF and UE. Both flows conclude with responses being returned through the chain of entities back to the requester. A 'Privacy Check' block is shown between steps 15 and 17. A 'UE Positioning' block is shown between steps 11 and 13. + +**Figure 6.4.2-1: 5GC-MT-LR Procedure for the commercial location services +(Figure 6.1.2-1 in TS 23.273 [6])** + +Steps 1-15 are in Figure 6.4.2-1 are described in TS 23.273 [6]. + +As described above, Figure 6.4.2-1's Step 7 and Step 8 are important procedure messages that enable the network to acquire verification from the UE's user, when required. However, there is no protocol level mechanism to ensure that those steps not simply skipped. In other words, Step 12 could happen without Step 7 and Step 8, meaning that the privacy control at Step 7 and Step 8 could be ineffective. To avoid such situation, this solution requires the following. + +When the UE is transferring measurements related to LCS positioning to the network, the UE shall verify the privacy settings before transferring those measurements to the network. + +In relation to Figure 6.4.2-1, it means that the UE shall perform privacy settings check during Step 12. The privacy settings check could for example be the following: whether positioning is allowed or disallowed by the UE (at that time), does the user of the UE need to be informed and asked for permission, whether other conditions are met, e.g., what type of positioning is being performed, etc. + +If steps 7 and 8 are skipped and privacy settings check is performed during Step 12, for synchronization of the privacy settings between the UE and the network, the UE needs to notify the AMF whether positioning is permitted or denied for the current LCS request or other privacy settings (e.g. time for disallowing the subsequent LCS requests) if updated. Then the AMF needs to invoke the Nudm\_SDM\_Update service operation, in the same way as Step 9, to store the updated UE privacy settings into the UDM, which then stores the updated UE privacy settings into the UDR. + +### 6.4.3 Evaluation + +The privacy check performed during Step 12 is at least used for synchronization of the privacy settings between the UE and the network. + +NOTE: The serving network is trusted with the location service. + +Solution #4 is proposed based on the assumption that the existing mechanisms for privacy control may be ineffective when trust domain between the entities vary, therefore the entities in serving network might not behave as expected. However, if the serving network is trusted with the location service as detailed in the note above, the assumption supporting solution #4 does not stand, therefore solution#4 is not required. + +The existing mechanisms of privacy control in TS 23.273 [6] work well when the involved entities all behave as expected. + +# --- 7 Conclusions + +## 7.1 General conclusions + +This study concludes that: + +- The location data is suitably protected by the NAS security mechanism. It is confidentiality protected if NAS confidentiality protection is enabled. +- The confidentiality protection of broadcast assistance data in R-16 reuses the confidentiality protection mechanism in R-15. Therefore no new confidentiality mechanisms to protect broadcast assistance data are required. + +## 7.2 Conclusions on Key Issue #1 + +For the key issue #1 (security and privacy in Bluetooth positioning) described in clause 5.1, it is concluded that the solution #1 (supervised Bluetooth measurements from UEs) described in clause 6.1 will be taken as a basis for normative work. + +## 7.3 Conclusions on Key Issue #2 + +For the key issue #2 (security and privacy in TBS positioning) described in clause 5.2, it is concluded that no new security and privacy mechanism will be introduced for TBS positioning, as motivated by solution #2 (solution for TBS measurements from UEs) described in clause 6.2. + +## 7.4 Conclusions on Key Issue #3 + +For the key issue #3 (security and privacy in WLAN positioning) described in clause 5.3, it is concluded that the solution #3 (supervised WLAN measurements from UEs) described in clause 6.3 will be taken as a basis for normative work. + +## 7.5 Conclusions on Key Issue #4 + +For the key issue #4 (privacy control in LCS) described in clause 5.4, it is concluded that privacy control mechanisms defined in TS 23.273 [6] clause 6.1.2 are sufficient and effective, hence no new privacy control mechanism is required for normative work. + +# --- Annex A: Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|----|-----|-----|------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190698 | | | | Presented for information and approval | 1.0.0 | +| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190895 | | | | Revised to introduced the right version of the spec` | 1.0.1 | +| 2019-09 | SA#85 | | | | | Change control version | 16.0.0 | +| 2019-10 | | | | | | EditHelp review | 16.0.1 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33815/1439cb942d9e363bbb3161b5540dd8c6_img.jpg 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b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33815/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8c849302e45d2f94a4cedc7dd977928f0fabcef6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33815/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,473 @@ + + + + + + +# Contents + +| | | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 4 | +| Introduction ..... | 5 | +| 1 Scope..... | 6 | +| 2 References..... | 6 | +| 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations..... | 6 | +| 3.1 Terms..... | 6 | +| 3.2 Symbols..... | 6 | +| 3.3 Abbreviations ..... | 6 | +| 4 Background ..... | 7 | +| 4.1 Summary ..... | 7 | +| 4.2 Manual roaming in operation ..... | 7 | +| 4.3 Manual roaming service..... | 7 | +| 4.4 Manual roaming implications for RLOS..... | 8 | +| 5 Key Issues ..... | 8 | +| 5.1 Introduction ..... | 8 | +| 5.2 Key issue #1: Establishing temporary security for PARLOS session..... | 8 | +| 5.2.0 Introduction ..... | 8 | +| 5.2.1 Potential security threat ..... | 8 | +| 5.2.2 Potential security requirements ..... | 9 | +| 5.3 Key Issue #2: Support for Unauthenticated UEs access to RLOS using EPC..... | 9 | +| 5.3.1 Key issue details ..... | 9 | +| 5.3.2 Potential Security threats ..... | 9 | +| 5.3.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 9 | +| 5.4 Key Issue #3: Authorization of use of PARLOS service..... | 9 | +| 5.4.1 Key issue details ..... | 9 | +| 5.4.2 Potential Security threats ..... | 9 | +| 5.4.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 9 | +| 5.5 Key Issue #4: User awareness of use of PARLOS service. .... | 10 | +| 5.5.1 Key issue details..... | 10 | +| 5.5.2 Potential Security threats ..... | 10 | +| 5.5.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 10 | +| 6 Solutions..... | 10 | +| 6.1 Solution #1 AS and NAS security for RLOS services ..... | 10 | +| 6.1.1 Introduction ..... | 10 | +| 6.1.2 Solution details ..... | 11 | +| 6.1.2.1 PARLOS Procedure ..... | 11 | +| 6.1.2.2 Key Hierarchy for PARLOS..... | 12 | +| 6.1.3 Evaluation..... | 12 | +| 6.2 Solution #2 AS and NAS security based on the emergency call procedures ..... | 13 | +| 6.2.1 Introduction ..... | 13 | +| 6.2.2 Solution details ..... | 13 | +| 6.2.3 Evaluation..... | 13 | +| 7 Conclusions..... | 15 | +| Annex A: Change history..... | 16 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings: + +- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something +- shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something + +The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports. + +The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document. + +- should** indicates a recommendation to do something +- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something +- may** indicates permission to do something +- need not** indicates permission not to do something + +The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended. + +- can** indicates that something is possible +- cannot** indicates that something is impossible + +The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not". + +- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +In addition: + +**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements. + +# --- Introduction + +3GPP TS 22.011 [2] defines a new service to provide Restricted Local Operator Services (RLOS) for unauthenticated UEs. The present document is a study of the security aspects of this service. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document will examine potential security and privacy threat scenarios enabled by PARLOS, evaluate whether solutions need to be found for these and, if required, identify security solutions and approaches which can mitigate the identified security and privacy threat scenarios while meeting the US regulatory obligations spelled out in the referenced regulations. The present document will make recommendations on the solutions considered. + +The present document will consider user notification regarding security and privacy risks when using PARLOS. + +The present document will consider the applicability of external security and privacy standards (e.g. Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard) to PARLOS. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TS 22.011: "Service accessibility". +- [3] 3GPP TS 22.101: "Service aspects; service principles". +- [4] 3GPP TR 22.820 "Study on Provision of Access to Restricted Local Operator Services by Unauthenticated UEs; Stage 1". +- [5] 3GPP TS 33.401: "3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security architecture". + +# --- 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Terms + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1]. + +## 3.2 Symbols + +Void. + +## 3.3 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1]. + +| | | +|------|-----------------------------------| +| RLOS | Restricted Local Operator Service | +|------|-----------------------------------| + +# --- 4 Background + +## 4.1 Summary + +Work on RLOS service definition and requirements for unauthenticated UEs (PARLOS) driven primarily by US regulatory obligations to support manual roaming has been completed in [2], [3] and [4]. Meeting this US regulatory obligation add security risks and potential vulnerabilities to devices and networks supporting RLOS. + +The ability to provide access to such local services has been available to U.S. operators on a proprietary basis on CS legacy networks. However, the wide deployment of LTE and corresponding introduction of VoLTE creates regulatory obligations on US operators for a standardized mechanism to allow a UE to access these services via LTE and NR (e.g., dialling a particular digit string, accessing a captive portal) without necessarily being successfully authenticated for access. + +## 4.2 Manual roaming in operation + +Manual roaming, an FCC obligation on US operators was first established in 1981, enhanced in 1994 and revisited without modification several times since. In summary, manual roaming is a requirement that US networks need to provide basic outbound only voice calling for users with a UE which is technically capable of connecting to a network's base stations (e.g. supporting the same bandclass), when there is no roaming agreement with the home network operator + +In terms of the usage of this service in the US, some measure of the scale is over 23 million call attempts/month (276 million/year). + +As a practical matter, while the US FCC regulations only applies to subscribers of US networks without domestic roaming agreements, it is currently not possible to distinguish other devices not covered by the regulation, manual roaming service is generally made available to all unauthenticated devices without distinction. + +This service is also provided in Canada but the Canadian manual roaming regulatory framework has not been identified. + +## 4.3 Manual roaming service + +The following high-level flow describes the typical manual roaming service for most US networks' support of manual roaming. + +- 1) The UE is unauthenticated and not registered in a US network, but is technically capable of connecting to the network's base station. +- 2) The user attempts to make a call. +- 3) The UE attempts to attach to a network as part of the call attempt but fails authentication. +- 4) The network verifies that the call is not an emergency call (911). +- 5) The network then forwards the call to the manual roaming service provider's IVR without further analysis of any signalling such as dialled digits. +- 6) The user interacts with the manual roaming service provider's IVR to provide financial payment information such as a prepaid account or a credit card. +- 7) After the financial information has been validated by the IVR, the call is placed to the desired number by the IVR (re-originated). +- 8) After the call is completed, the call is disconnected. If the user wants to make additional calls, the payment information needs to be re-entered. + +Manual roaming only supports outbound calls, not inbound calls. This is the major difference between manual roaming and operator provided or operator supported pre-paid service. + +## 4.4 Manual roaming implications for RLOS + +The following list are specific aspects of manual roaming which apply to RLOS: + +- 1) Only outbound initiated communication needs to be supported. +- 2) There is no need to send any 3GPP subscriber, user or device identities to the manual roaming service platform. +- 3) The service is on a per session or per call basis and needs to be re-established for subsequent sessions. +- 4) User interactions with manual roaming service IVR platform and manual roaming calling is outside the scope of RLOS. RLOS only provides the means to access the manual roaming service. In many cases the user interaction will be external to the 3GPP network. +- 5) Business or financial risks of providing manual roaming is outside the scope of RLOS. Rather these risks are handled by their manual roaming service platform. + +Since manual roaming is a separate business and financial transaction separate from and not based on the user's subscription status with any operator, issues of IMEI blacklisting is only applicable based on RLOS operator implementation and home network operator service restrictions is not applicable. It should be noted as well, that manual roaming only provides outbound calling, a limited subset of voice services. + +# --- 5 Key Issues + +## 5.1 Introduction + +This clause details the key issues identified for security aspects related to the PARLOS service. Each key issue defines the background to the issue, defines the threats related to the issue and proposes requirements that resolve the key issue. + +## 5.2 Key issue #1: Establishing temporary security for PARLOS session + +### 5.2.0 Introduction + +When a UE requests a PARLOS connection to a PLMN, the UE may be unauthenticated or in limited service state. When the UE is in unauthenticated or in limited service state, the serving PLMN will fail to obtain credentials for the UE from the HSS and establishing regular NAS and AS context may not be possible. Without establishing the NAS and AS security context, the PLMN may not be able to secure the NAS and AS communication. Hence for UEs connecting to PARLOS portal, normal procedure for establishing NAS and AS security is not possible. Please note that, if the UE is successfully authenticated and if the network has established NAS and AS security context, the UE will not get connected to the PARLOS portal for services. + +To enable services entered via PARLOS, the serving PLMN may request the user certain personal information like Name of the user, Address of the user or location of the user where service is required. For some services, the serving PLMN may request the user Credit card information to charge for the services also. Without adequate protection if these personal information is transferred, eavesdroppers will be able to overhear the communication and get hold of the personal data of the user. In many countries transfer of personal data over unprotected communication links are legally prohibited too. + +Hence transfer of this personal information over unprotected communication links is a security threat in offering PARLOS services. This needs to be addressed for UEs before providing PARLOS services. A temporary security context needs to be established for UEs connecting to the PARLOS portal before PARLOS services are enabled. + +### 5.2.1 Potential security threat + +If the PARLOS service session is not secured, with confidentiality and integrity protection it is possible that sensitive personal data of the user, such as name, address, credit card information may be stolen by eaves-droppers. + +### 5.2.2 Potential security requirements + +At the minimum it shall be possible for the network and the UE to establish end to end security at the application layer while providing PARLOS services. + +The UE and the MME shall integrity and confidentiality protect the NAS signalling for PARLOS services. + +The UE and the eNB shall integrity and confidentiality protect the AS signalling for PARLOS services. + +## 5.3 Key Issue #2: Support for Unauthenticated UEs access to RLOS using EPC + +### 5.3.1 Key issue details + +A large number of malicious and unauthenticated UEs with RLOS connection could deplete network resources in EPS network by incurring additional signalling and generating traffic. + +### 5.3.2 Potential Security threats + +The attacker can launch DoS attack on EPS network by simply introducing many malicious UEs to initiate RLOS access to the network. + +### 5.3.3 Potential security requirements + +## 5.4 Key Issue #3: Authorization of use of PARLOS service. + +### 5.4.1 Key issue details + +When a user currently attaches to a 4G or 5G network, it is clear that the serving network was authorized by the home network. However, if network authorization were to be skipped, it could enable unauthorized networks to provide service to the user. This enables the unauthorized network to become a man in the middle to any service that is being offered. + +Setting up an unauthorized network is as easy as setting up a fake base station with a network in a box that broadcasts the ability to perform RLOS, while at the same time ensuring that the victims cannot attach to a real network, e.g. by jamming the existing cells. This attack would not be limited to the regions that require manual roaming but could be performed anywhere. + +### 5.4.2 Potential Security threats + +An unauthorized network could exploit its man in the middle position: + +- The UE is required to obtain user consent for the use of PARLOS based services. If the security risks are not sufficiently explained to the user as part of this interaction, the user is likely to be unaware of the PARLOS based service security implications. The man in the middle could take advantage of this and accept the PDN session attempt and gain access to the complete communication. +- If the man in the middle is operating where the user expects to be making a manual roaming call, the man in the middle could collect payment information and other information from users. + +### 5.4.3 Potential security requirements + +UE shall set up RLOS sessions only with authorized networks. + +NOTE: User interaction is one possible solution to user awareness. + +## 5.5 Key Issue #4: User awareness of use of PARLOS service. + +### 5.5.1 Key issue details + +When a user currently attaches to a 4G or 5G network, the user or application on the UE can rely on the serving network to be authorized by the home network. However, if network authorization were to be skipped, it could enable unauthorized networks to provide service to the user. This enables the unauthorized network to become a man in the middle to any service that is being offered. + +The user needs to be aware that different security guarantees apply, e.g. the confidentiality and integrity of the communication are not given to the same degree as in regular service usage. Furthermore, not even the serving network name can be trusted. + +NOTE: Narrowband devices are not allowed to access RLOS services. + +### 5.5.2 Potential Security threats + +- The UE is required to obtain user consent for the use of PARLOS based services. However, the serving network name cannot be trusted. If users are not aware of existence of PARLOS services the user is likely to be unaware of the risks of using PARLOS based service. The man in the middle could take advantage of this and accept the PDN session attempt and gain access to the complete communication. +- RLOS service could be offered by a non-trustworthy network under a false name. This could damage the reputation of the network name. + +### 5.5.3 Potential security requirements + +UE shall not accept PARLOS service unless the service is offered by operators with a MCC present on a whitelist in the ME. + +UE shall not access PARLOS service unless either of the following conditions are true: + +- No USIM is present; or +- A USIM is present and the MCC of the IMSI configured in the USIM is present on a whitelist in the ME. + +NOTE: User interaction is one possible solution to user awareness. + +# 6 Solutions + +## 6.1 Solution #1 AS and NAS security for RLOS services + +### 6.1.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses the AS and NAS requirements of the key issue #1 "Establishing temporary security for PARLOS session". + +The ME sends an Attach request for RLOS service and then exchanges public keys with the MME in order to secure the NAS signalling. The MME generates a temporary $K_{ASME}$ for the ME and provides it securely to the ME. Both sides continue as with a normal setup, e.g. deriving the NAS keys and AS keys as in normal mode of operation based on the temporary $K_{ASME}$ . The MME needs the ability to generate a public/private key for securing the new NAS messages for the key exchange procedure and the MME needs to generate a temporary $K_{ASME}$ for the ME for normal key derivation. The ME is able to generate a public/private key for securing the NAS signalling messages. + +### 6.1.2 Solution details + +#### 6.1.2.1 PARLOS Procedure + +The ME may be preconfigured with certificates so that the MME is able to authenticate the ME in order to protect against active attacks. If the ME is not preconfigured with PARLOS credentials, then the ME generates a public key on its own, which is used together with the RLOS indication in the ATTACH request and to secure the new temporary root key $K_{ASMEtemp}$ . + +![Sequence diagram of PARLOS security call flow between ME, eNB, MME, and SGW.](5a4e62bead259c258d069fd3663ea670_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant ME + participant eNB + participant MME + participant SGW + + ME->>MME: 1. Attach Request (RLOS indication, ME Public Key K_MEpub) + Note right of MME: 2. MME generates symmetric key K_ASMEtemp as new master key for K_NAS and K_eNB + MME-->>ME: 3. NAS Security Mode Command ((K_ASMEtemp), encrypted with ME Public key K_MEpub) + Note left of ME: 4. ME derives K_NAS and K_eNB from K_ASMEtemp + Note right of MME: 4. MME derives K_NAS and K_eNB from K_ASMEtemp + ME->>MME: 5. NAS Security Mode Complete, encrypted with K_NAS + Note right of MME: 6. MME performs Bearer Setup for RLOS + MME->>eNB: 7. AS SMC with K_eNB + Note left of ME: 8. ME derives K_RRCi,e and K_UPe from K_eNB + Note right of eNB: 8. eNB derives K_RRCi,e and K_UPe from K_eNB + eNB->>MME: 9. AS SMC ACK + Note over ME,eNB: Start ciphering on LTE-Uu + MME-->>ME: 10. ATTACH Accept, encrypted with key K_NAS + Note left of ME: ME is RLOS attached + +``` + +Sequence diagram of PARLOS security call flow between ME, eNB, MME, and SGW. + +**Figure 6.1.2.1-1: PARLOS security call flow** + +1. The ME performs PLMN selection for RLOS and perform RLOS (i.e. unauthenticated) attach to this PLMN. The ME sends a NAS ATTACH request message to the MME including an RLOS indication and the ME's Public Key $K_{MEpub}$ . +2. Based on the RLOS indication, the MME generates then a temporary $K_{ASMEtemp}$ for the ME as the new master key for $K_{NAS}$ and $K_{eNB}$ . +3. The MME sends a NAS Security Mode Command to the ME with the $K_{ASMEtemp}$ , encrypted with the ME public key. +4. This new symmetric temporary $K_{ASME}$ is used to derive the other keys ( $K_{NAS}$ , $K_{eNB}$ , $K_{RRC}$ ) in the ME and MME for encryption and integrity protection as in normal operation. NAS encryption can be changed at this point to the newly generated $K_{NAS}$ . +5. The ME sends a NAS Security Mode Complete to the MME, encrypted with $K_{NAS}$ . +6. The MME performs a bearer setup procedure for RLOS towards SGW and PGW. +7. The MME sends a AS Security Mode Command with $K_{eNB}$ to the eNB. +8. ME and eNB derive the AS keys $K_{RRCenc}$ and $K_{RRCint}$ as well as $K_{UPenc}$ . +9. The eNB sends a AS Security Mode Complete to the MME. Now ciphering on the radio interface is enabled. +10. The MME sends an ATTACH accept to the ME (secured with $K_{NAS}$ ), the ME is now attached for RLOS. + +**Editor's Note:** It is ffs how to address active attacks if no credentials are pre-provisioned in the ME. The system impact, especially on the ME, for certificate based authentication is ffs. + +#### 6.1.2.2 Key Hierarchy for PARLOS + +![Figure 6.1.2.2-1: PARLOS key hierarchy diagram. The diagram is divided into two horizontal sections by a double line. The top section is labeled 'ME / MME' and contains a root key box labeled K_ASMEtemp. Below it are two boxes, K_NASint and K_NASenc, connected to K_ASMEtemp by lines. The bottom section is labeled 'ME / eNB' and contains a box labeled K_eNB, which is connected to K_ASMEtemp by a line. Below K_eNB are three boxes: K_UPenc, K_RRCint, and K_RRCenc, all connected to K_eNB by lines.](1439cb942d9e363bbb3161b5540dd8c6_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + subgraph ME_MME [ME / MME] + K_ASMEtemp[K_ASMEtemp] + K_NASint[K_NASint] + K_NASenc[K_NASenc] + end + subgraph ME_eNB [ME / eNB] + K_eNB[K_eNB] + K_UPenc[K_UPenc] + K_RRCint[K_RRCint] + K_RRCenc[K_RRCenc] + end + K_ASMEtemp --- K_NASint + K_ASMEtemp --- K_NASenc + K_ASMEtemp --- K_eNB + K_eNB --- K_UPenc + K_eNB --- K_RRCint + K_eNB --- K_RRCenc + +``` + +Figure 6.1.2.2-1: PARLOS key hierarchy diagram. The diagram is divided into two horizontal sections by a double line. The top section is labeled 'ME / MME' and contains a root key box labeled K\_ASMEtemp. Below it are two boxes, K\_NASint and K\_NASenc, connected to K\_ASMEtemp by lines. The bottom section is labeled 'ME / eNB' and contains a box labeled K\_eNB, which is connected to K\_ASMEtemp by a line. Below K\_eNB are three boxes: K\_UPenc, K\_RRCint, and K\_RRCenc, all connected to K\_eNB by lines. + +**Figure 6.1.2.2-1: PARLOS key hierarchy** + +The key hierarchy for PARLOS is the same as for normal operation, only the root key $K_{ASMEtemp}$ is generated by the MME and sent encrypted to the ME in the NAS SMC. + +### 6.1.3 Evaluation + +This contribution provides some proposed text from the evaluation of solution#1 of the PARLOS TR [1]. + +The solution relies on the UE providing a public key to the network which is used by the network to encrypt a $K_{ASME}$ that will be used in normal way to protect the traffic between the UE and network. + +The solution provides confidentiality and integrity protection for the NAS and AS signalling against passive attacks, but not against active attacks. + +The first observation to make is that the proposal protects against passive attacks, i.e. if the attacker is only eavesdropping on the data between the UE and network it will not be possible for the attacker to decrypt the traffic. + +Such a benefit could be gained by merely exchanging randomly generated $K_{AMF}$ in the clear in one of the initial messages if the attacker does not get these initial messages. + +An attacker cannot force the UE to accept a RLOS call as such a call needs to be initiated by the UE. + +The proposal is vulnerable to active attacks. The attacker may simply be a false base station and route RLOS call to the real network so that RLOS call setup completes successfully (note: this is necessary given that there is some authentication between the UE and RLOS server). The attacker continues to be a man-in-the-middle for the call. Alternatively, the attacker can act like a man-in-the-middle during call set-up and be aware of the $K_{ASME}$ that is agreed by the UE and network. This would be achieved by acting like a false base station to the UE and a UE to the network. The real network would then pass the key onto the attacker's UE which could then pass onto the real UE. The attacker could then allow the rest of the call to proceed between the real UE and network as it has the keys, e.g. by getting the UE handed over to a real cell. + +To minimize the time, an attacker needs to act like a false base station: an attacker passively monitors the initial messages in RLOS calls and then acts like a false base station to get the user to re-attach via the false base station after getting the call to drop. + +The impact of the UE and MME of this solution are quite high in terms of the need to support public key cryptography. The gain of such an overall impact is to force the attacker to use simple man-in-the-middle active attacks as opposed to just passive attacks. + +Application layer security is always possible but depends on the implementation of the service. The standardization of such application layer security for RLOS service is outside the scope of 3GPP. Due to the lack of such standardized mechanism, the security of RLOS service cannot be ensured. + +## 6.2 Solution #2 AS and NAS security based on the emergency call procedures + +### 6.2.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses the AS and NAS requirements of the key issue #1 "Establishing temporary security for PARLOS session" and key issue #2 "Support for Unauthenticated UEs access to RLOS using EPC". + +The solution uses the emergency call procedures to enable the ME to establish a connection to the RLOS server. + +### 6.2.2 Solution details + +The solution proposes that a RLOS call is treated similar to an unauthenticated emergency call with the following difference: + +- The UE initiates an RLOS call using an appropriate user interface, by which the user chooses or is aware of the country and network the call is made on. The UE may choose to warn or restrict the RLOS calls to only countries where it is permitted by law.- The UE indicates that it wishes to make a RLOS call rather than an emergency call in the NAS signalling to the network and will only accept a RLOS call when it has initiated the call. +- The network that supports an establishment of the RLOS session connects the UE to the RLOS server rather than making a connection to the emergency service infrastructure. + +Just like in an unauthenticated emergency call, the NULL ciphering and NULL integrity algorithms will be chosen as no keys are shared between the ME and network. This means that there is no protection of the user plane or signalling of the RLOS call with this solution. + +It is assumed that there will be some application layer security between the ME and RLOS server. + +In terms of protecting the network against DoS attack, the network could deploy similar mechanism as the one used to protect against DoS attacks with unauthenticated emergency calls, e.g. dedicated MMEs or limiting the number of simultaneous calls. + +### 6.2.3 Evaluation + +This solution addresses key issue #1 by establishing security contexts using the NULL algorithms and hence there is no protection of the traffic over the air at the network layer. This solution has little implementation impact as such a solution is already supported on UE and in the network (where regulatory requirements mandate the support of unauthenticated emergency calls). RLOS calls using this solution is already deployed in some countries, where it is mandated to support. + +The establishment of an RLOS call may be unauthenticated, and in such a case, it is not possible for the UE to authenticate the network. Even though the RLOS call is always initiated by the UE, an attacker may use application layer interactions to trick the user into initiating an RLOS call to a network under attacker's control. Note that such application layer attacks could be possible even if the UE is able to authenticate the network (e.g., an attacker can trick the user to make a call to the attacker and act as a man-in-the middle for the call). Such application layer attacks cannot be protected at the 3GPP network layer. + +Application layer security for RLOS is always possible but depends on the implementation of the service. The standardization of such application layer security for RLOS service is outside the scope of 3GPP. Due to the lack of such standardized mechanism, the security of RLOS service cannot be ensured. + +The solution addresses key issue #2 by using existing techniques on the network to prevent DoS attacks (such techniques needs to deal with cases of unprotected connections to the 3GPP network where the regulatory requirements mandate the support of unauthenticated emergency calls). + +## 6.3 Solution #3 Network Authorization in RLOS + +### 6.3.1 Introduction + +This solution provides enhancements needed for Solution #2 (AS and NAS security based on the emergency call procedures) to address key issue # 3 (Authorization of use of PARLOS service) and key issue #4 (User awareness of use of PARLOS service). + +### 6.3.2 Solution details + +In this solution, Solution #2 is enhanced with UE based mechanisms to protect against the fact that there is no authentication of the network for RLOS connection. A UE that supports RLOS shall implement the following mechanisms: + +- 1) Only certain applications (e.g., phone application) on the ME need to trigger establishment of RLOS connection. The ME shall enforce access control on applications that are authorized to trigger establishment of RLOS connection. Applications on the ME that are not explicitly authorized (e.g., messaging app) shall not be allowed to trigger establishment of RLOS connection. +- 2) A user confirmation shall be requested before the ME triggers RLOS connection establishment procedures. As part of the user confirmation, the user shall be warned of the security risk due to the lack of network authentication in solution #2. +- 3) An attacker may spoof the network name of an operator who is not required to provide RLOS service or advertise RLOS service. This attack is mitigated by requiring the ME to maintain a white list of MCCs where RLOS is supported. The ME shall check that the MCC of the network name that advertises RLOS service is present in the white list before initiating RLOS connection. +- 4) An operator who is not required to provide RLOS service may want to protect their subscribers (i.e., ones with a valid USIM) against a man-in-the middle attack, where the attacker forces the UE into limited service state and tricks the users into triggering an RLOS connection. This attack is mitigated by requiring that the ME check that the MCC of the IMSI configured in the USIM is in the whitelist. If a valid USIM is present, the ME shall check that the MCC part of the IMSI configured in the USIM is present in the whitelist before initiating RLOS connection. + +### 6.3.3 Evaluation + +Requiring the UE to enforce access control on applications (Enhancement #1) protects against the threat of an attacker using application layer interactions to trick the user into making an RLOS connection. + +Mandating user confirmation, along with the warning of security risk before establishment of each RLOS connection (Enhancement #2) ensures that the user is made aware of the security risks of using RLOS. + +Requiring the UE to maintain a white list of MCCs where RLOS is supported and verify that the MCC of the network that advertises RLOS is present in the white list (Enhancement #3) ensures that an attacker cannot use the network name of an operator from a country where RLOS is not used. + +Requiring that the ME check that the MCC of the IMSI configured on the USIM is present in the whitelist (Enhancement #4) protects an operator subscriber against a man-in-the middle attack where the attacker forces the UE into limited service state and tricks the user into triggering an RLOS connection. + +# --- 7 Conclusions + +It is clear that support of RLOS increases the security risks for the PLMNs which choose to support it as demonstrated by the limited strength of the solutions contained in this specification to address the various potential security threats identified in this specification. Some operators may have regulatory obligations to support RLOS which may limit the range of implementation choices that they are able to consider. Other operators who have the option not to support RLOS likewise have concerns of limiting RLOS in their networks, even limiting UE initiation of RLOS requests in their PLMN. + +This study has identified that an approach which identifies RLOS calls from unauthenticated UEs in a fashion similar to emergency call procedures (solution #2 described above) is the only practical approach available, allows for reuse of some emergency call procedures related to unauthenticated UEs. However, emergency calls for unauthenticated UEs only support a very limited set of capabilities to deal with security risks identified in this study. + +In the light of this, additional capabilities associated with RLOS have been identified in this study which allow further restrictions of the use of RLOS to PLMNs supporting RLOS while limiting even the initiation of PARLOS service requests in PLMNs not supporting RLOS as identified in solution #3. Therefore, it is concluded that solution #3 is chosen as the way forward for normative work as a new Annex in TS 33.401 [5]. + +# --- Annex A: Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|-----------------------|----------------|-------------|-----------|------------|------------|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190690 | | | | Presented for information and approval | 1.0.0 | +| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190887 | | | | Revised to include the right version of the draft | 1.0.1 | +| 2019-09 | SA#85 | | | | | Change control version | 16.0.0 | +| 2019-10 | | | | | | EditHelp review | 16.0.1 | + diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33825/12de9b926df0384ec07702671827c9cd_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33825/12de9b926df0384ec07702671827c9cd_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 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References..... | 7 | +| 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations ..... | 7 | +| 3.1 Terms..... | 7 | +| 3.2 Symbols..... | 7 | +| 3.3 Abbreviations ..... | 8 | +| 4 Security aspects of 5G URLLC ..... | 8 | +| 5 Key issues ..... | 8 | +| 5.1 Key Issue #1: Security for redundant transmission..... | 8 | +| 5.1.1 Key issue details ..... | 8 | +| 5.1.2 Security threats ..... | 9 | +| 5.1.3 Potential Security requirements..... | 9 | +| 5.2 Key issue #2: Support of security for high reliability by redundant data transmission in user plane..... | 9 | +| 5.2.1 Key issue details ..... | 9 | +| 5.2.2 Security threats ..... | 10 | +| 5.2.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 10 | +| 5.3 Key Issue #3: UP security policy handling for multiple PDU sessions established for redundant data transmission..... | 10 | +| 5.3.1 Key issue details ..... | 10 | +| 5.3.2 Security threats ..... | 11 | +| 5.3.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 11 | +| 5.4 Key Issue #4: Security policy for URLLC service ..... | 11 | +| 5.4.1 Key issue details ..... | 11 | +| 5.4.2 Security threats ..... | 11 | +| 5.4.3 Potential Security requirements..... | 12 | +| 5.5 Key Issue #5: Security aspect of low latency handover procedure..... | 12 | +| 5.5.1 Key issue details ..... | 12 | +| 5.5.2 Security threats ..... | 12 | +| 5.5.3 Potential Security requirements..... | 12 | +| 5.6 Key Issue #6: Retaining AS security keys for redundant data transmission in user plane ..... | 12 | +| 5.6.1 Key issue details ..... | 12 | +| 5.6.2 Security threats ..... | 13 | +| 5.6.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 13 | +| 5.7 Key Issue #7: QoS monitoring protection..... | 13 | +| 5.7.1 Key issue details ..... | 13 | +| 5.7.2 Security threats ..... | 13 | +| 5.7.3 Potential Security requirements..... | 13 | +| 5.8 Key Issue #8: Acceleration of authentication and key agreement procedure for low latency ..... | 13 | +| 5.8.1 Key issue details ..... | 13 | +| 5.8.2 Security threats ..... | 13 | +| 5.8.3 Potential Security requirements..... | 13 | +| 5.9 Key Issue #9: Security aspect of low latency Re-authentication procedure ..... | 14 | +| 5.9.1 Key issue details ..... | 14 | +| 5.9.2 Security threats ..... | 14 | +| 5.9.3 Potential security requirements ..... | 14 | +| 5.10 Key Issue #10: UP security performance for low latency..... | 14 | +| 5.10.1 Key issue details ..... | 14 | +| 5.10.2 Security threats ..... | 14 | +| 5.10.3 Potential Security requirements..... | 14 | +| 6 Candidate Solutions ..... | 15 | +| 6.1 Solution #1: Security solution for handling UP security policy for multiple PDU sessions for redundant data transmission..... | 15 | +| 6.1.1 Introduction ..... | 15 | +| 6.1.2 Solution details ..... | 15 | + +| | | | +|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| 6.1.3 | Evaluation..... | 16 | +| 6.2 | Solution #2: Retaining AS security keys for redundant data transmission in user plane..... | 16 | +| 6.2.1 | Introduction ..... | 16 | +| 6.2.2 | Solution details ..... | 16 | +| 6.2.3 | Evaluation..... | 16 | +| 6.3 | Solution #3: Security policy handling for redundant data transmission ..... | 16 | +| 6.3.1 | Introduction ..... | 16 | +| 6.3.2 | Solution details ..... | 17 | +| 6.3.3 | Evaluation..... | 18 | +| 6.4 | Solution #4: Security support for N3 tunnel redundancy..... | 18 | +| 6.4.1 | Introduction ..... | 18 | +| 6.4.2 | Solution details ..... | 18 | +| 6.4.3 | Evaluation..... | 19 | +| 6.5 | Solution #5: Security for redundant data transmission ..... | 19 | +| 6.5.1 | Introduction ..... | 19 | +| 6.5.2 | Solution details ..... | 19 | +| 6.5.3 | Evaluation..... | 20 | +| 6.7 | Solution #7: Security for redundant data transmission using Dual Connectivity ..... | 21 | +| 6.7.1 | Introduction ..... | 21 | +| 6.7.2 | Solution details ..... | 22 | +| 6.7.3 | Evaluation..... | 23 | +| 6.8 | Solution #8: Handling of UP security activation status and selection of SN in Dual Connectivity ..... | 24 | +| 6.8.1 | Introduction ..... | 24 | +| 6.8.2 | Solution details ..... | 24 | +| 6.8.3 | Evaluation..... | 26 | +| 7 | Conclusions..... | 26 | +| 7.1 | Key Issue #1: Security for redundant transmission..... | 27 | +| 7.2 | Key Issue #2: Support of security for high reliability by redundant data transmission in user plane..... | 27 | +| 7.3 | Key Issue #3: UP security policy handling for multiple PDU sessions established for redundant data transmission..... | 28 | +| 7.4 | Key Issue #4: Security policy for URLLC service ..... | 28 | +| 7.6 | Key Issue #6: Retaining AS security keys for redundant data transmission in user plane ..... | 28 | +| 7.8 | Key Issue #8: Acceleration of authentication and key agreement procedure for low latency ..... | 28 | +| Annex A: | Change history ..... | 29 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings: + +- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something +- shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something + +The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports. + +The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document. + +- should** indicates a recommendation to do something +- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something +- may** indicates permission to do something +- need not** indicates permission not to do something + +The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended. + +- can** indicates that something is possible +- cannot** indicates that something is impossible + +The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not". + +- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +In addition: + +**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document: + +- Investigates and identifies the security key issues for meeting the low latency requirement. +- Investigates and identifies the security key issues for meeting the ultra-high reliability requirement. +- Provides potential security requirements to address the identified security issues. +- Provides the potential security solutions to support URLLC services. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. + - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. + - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TR 23.725 "Study on enhancement of Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communication (URLLC) support in the 5G Core network". +- [3] 3GPP TS 33.501 "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system". +- [4] 3GPP TS 23.501: "System Architecture for the 5G System". +- [5] 3GPP TS 23.502: "Procedures for the 5G System". +- [6] 3GPP TS 33.210: "3G security; Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security". +- [7] 3GPP TS 33.310: "Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)". +- [8] IETF RFC 4303: "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)". +- [9] 3GPP TS 37.340: "NR; Multi-connectivity; Overall description; Stage-2". +- [10] 3GPP TS 23.503: "Policy and charging control framework for the 5G System (5GS); Stage 2". + +# --- 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Terms + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1]. + +## 3.2 Symbols + +Void. + +## 3.3 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1]. + +| | | +|--------|------------------------------------------| +| DC | Dual Connectivity | +| MCG | Master Cell Group | +| MgNB | Master gNB | +| MN | Master Node | +| NG-RAN | Next Generation-RAN | +| NR | New Radio | +| NR-DC | NR-NR Dual Connectivity | +| PDU | Packet Data Unit | +| PDCP | Packet Data Convergence Protocol | +| SCG | Secondary Cell Group | +| SgNB | Secondary gNB | +| S-RAN | Secondary RAN | +| SN | Secondary Node | +| UP | User Plane | +| URLLC | Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communication | + +# --- 4 Security aspects of 5G URLLC + +The 5GS defined in TS 23.501 [4] is used as the baseline network architecture for 5G URLLC. URLLC needs to support both high reliability and low latency. In order to ensure the high reliability, redundant transmission in 5GS is supported on multiple user plane data paths, something that can hardly be achieved by single path on user plane. Accordingly, the applicable security mechanisms for supporting redundant transmission cover all aspect of the communication, including PDU session establishment, handover etc. As for low latency aspect, the other important requirements for URLLC as described in TR 23.725 [2] include QoS Monitoring to assist URLLC service and optimization for handover procedure, both of which are addressed. The security considerations in this case are covered as well. Moreover, additional security aspects of control plane or user plane optimizations for ensuring the high reliability and reducing latency are also considered together during the whole study and are reflected in the present document. + +# --- 5 Key issues + +## 5.1 Key Issue #1: Security for redundant transmission + +### 5.1.1 Key issue details + +This key issue addresses the security aspects of key issue #1: Supporting high reliability by redundant transmission in user plane in TR 23.725 [2]. + +According to the TR 23.725 [2], in order to ensure the high reliability which can hardly be achieved by single path on user plane, redundant data transmission in 5GS may be supported. In this case it is important to study how to ensure that these redundant transmissions are secure enough. From security perspective, repeated user plane data transmission may introduce new security risks. Redundant transmission, where the data is duplicated at the source and sent to the destination over two different paths, may increase the security risk when the two received transmissions are not identical. Therefore, the receiver cannot know which of the transmissions is correct. + +TR 23.725 [2] recommends solution #1 "Redundant user plane paths based on dual connectivity" and solution #4 "Supporting redundant data transmission via single UPF and single RAN node" to resolve key issue #1 in TR 23.725 [2]. Solution #1 is based upon the Dual Connectivity (DC) feature. Two PDU sessions will be established in this solution for redundant data transmission, where one PDU session uses a MCG bearer via the Master gNB, and the second PDU session uses a SCG bearer via the Secondary gNB in the user plane. The architecture is as follows: + +![Figure 5.1.1-1: Architecture for redundant UP paths for URLLC using Dual Connectivity. The diagram shows a UE connected to two NG-RAN nodes: MgNB and SgNB. MgNB and SgNB are connected via an Xn interface. Both MgNB and SgNB connect to an AMF via N2 interfaces. The AMF connects to SMF1 and SMF2 via Namf/Nsmf service-based interfaces. SMF1 controls UPF1 via an N4 interface, and SMF2 controls UPF2 via an N4 interface. MgNB connects to UPF1 via an N3 interface, and SgNB connects to UPF2 via an N3 interface. Both UPF1 and UPF2 connect to the Data Network (DN) via N6 interfaces.](b3baf3a29b67c7425d2562ddbc52f0cc_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + UE[UE] --- MgNB[MgNB] + UE --- SgNB[SgNB] + MgNB --- Xn((Xn)) --- SgNB + MgNB --- N2((N2)) --- AMF[AMF] + SgNB --- N2((N2)) --- AMF + AMF --- Namf/Nsmf --- SMF1[SMF1] + AMF --- Namf/Nsmf --- SMF2[SMF2] + SMF1 --- N4((N4)) --- UPF1[UPF1] + SMF2 --- N4((N4)) --- UPF2[UPF2] + MgNB --- N3((N3)) --- UPF1 + SgNB --- N3((N3)) --- UPF2 + UPF1 --- N6((N6)) --- DN[DN] + UPF2 --- N6((N6)) --- DN + +``` + +Figure 5.1.1-1: Architecture for redundant UP paths for URLLC using Dual Connectivity. The diagram shows a UE connected to two NG-RAN nodes: MgNB and SgNB. MgNB and SgNB are connected via an Xn interface. Both MgNB and SgNB connect to an AMF via N2 interfaces. The AMF connects to SMF1 and SMF2 via Namf/Nsmf service-based interfaces. SMF1 controls UPF1 via an N4 interface, and SMF2 controls UPF2 via an N4 interface. MgNB connects to UPF1 via an N3 interface, and SgNB connects to UPF2 via an N3 interface. Both UPF1 and UPF2 connect to the Data Network (DN) via N6 interfaces. + +**Figure 5.1.1-1: Architecture for redundant UP paths for URLLC using Dual Connectivity** + +Solution #3 recommends that the redundant packets will be transferred via two independent N3 tunnels between a single NG-RAN node and the UPF, which are associated with a single PDU Session, over different transport layer path to enhance the reliability of service. The NG-RAN node and UPF support the packet replication and elimination function. + +![Figure 5.1.1-2: Architecture for Redundant transmission with two N3 tunnels between the UPF and a single NG-RAN node. The diagram shows a UE connected to an NG-RAN node. The NG-RAN node connects to an AMF via an N2 interface. The AMF connects to an SMF via an N11 interface. The SMF connects to a PCF via an N7 interface. The SMF controls the UPF via an N4 interface. There are two N3 tunnels (N3 Tunnel 1 and N3 Tunnel 2) between the NG-RAN node and the UPF. The UPF connects to the DN via an N6 interface.](dbe553cf16dd14073b89a8263a428664_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph LR + UE[UE] --- NG-RAN[NG-RAN] + NG-RAN -. N2 .- AMF[AMF] + AMF -. N11 .- SMF[SMF] + SMF -. N7 .- PCF[PCF] + SMF -. N4 .- UPF[UPF] + NG-RAN -- "N3 Tunnel 1" --> UPF + NG-RAN -- "N3 Tunnel 2" --> UPF + UPF --- N6 --- DN((DN)) + +``` + +Figure 5.1.1-2: Architecture for Redundant transmission with two N3 tunnels between the UPF and a single NG-RAN node. The diagram shows a UE connected to an NG-RAN node. The NG-RAN node connects to an AMF via an N2 interface. The AMF connects to an SMF via an N11 interface. The SMF connects to a PCF via an N7 interface. The SMF controls the UPF via an N4 interface. There are two N3 tunnels (N3 Tunnel 1 and N3 Tunnel 2) between the NG-RAN node and the UPF. The UPF connects to the DN via an N6 interface. + +**Figure 5.1.1-2: Architecture for Redundant transmission with two N3 tunnels between the UPF and a single NG-RAN node** + +### 5.1.2 Security threats + +The attacker can monitor the data streams and may identify if a data stream is re-used. It is possible for the attacker to link two data streams used for redundant data transmission. The attacker could use such information in its advantage to mount targeted attacks against radio bearers or N3 tunnels serving URLLC PDU sessions if the corresponding radio bears or N3 tunnels are not integrity, encryption and replay protected. + +### 5.1.3 Potential Security requirements + +The 5G system shall provide an appropriate security method to protect the redundant transmission. + +The system shall provide cryptographic separation for radio bearers serving redundant transmissions. + +The added paths for redundancy shall provide equal level of security compared to single path. + +## 5.2 Key issue #2: Support of security for high reliability by redundant data transmission in user plane + +### 5.2.1 Key issue details + +There have been discussions in SA2 on architectural aspect of the 5GS to support high reliability in the UP by introducing multiple redundant transmission paths, where the UP bearer is transferred over multiple paths via 2 different gNBs and UPFs (Solution #1, #2). For this redundant UP bearer transmission, security aspects such as confidentiality protection, integrity protection, and key handling, need to be considered in SA3. + +### 5.2.2 Security threats + +Having multiple paths for the UP, in effect, introduces additional threat surface for attackers to take advantage of. In order to realize high level of reliability in communication by using redundant UP paths, security of both UP paths need to be protected equally. Having one of the two UP paths compromised implies the whole proposition of URLLC collapses. Therefore, appropriate security solution for redundant transmission via multiple paths in the UP need to be in place. + +### 5.2.3 Potential security requirements + +Confidentiality protection over the air shall be supported for UP data via redundant multiple transmission paths. + +Integrity protection over the air shall be supported for UP data via redundant multiple transmission paths. + +## 5.3 Key Issue #3: UP security policy handling for multiple PDU sessions established for redundant data transmission + +### 5.3.1 Key issue details + +This key issue addresses the security aspects of key issue #1: Supporting high reliability by redundant transmission in user plane in SA2 TR 23.725 [2]. + +According to the SA2 TR 23.725 [2], in order to ensure the high reliability which can hardly be achieved by single path on user plane, redundant transmission in 5GS may be supported. Depending on the condition of network deployment, e.g., which NFs or segments cannot meet the requirements of reliability, the redundant transmission may be applied on the user plane path between the UE and the network. + +There are several potential solutions in SA2 TR 23.725 [2], where redundant data transmission in user plane takes different paths. + +During the PDU session establishment, the 5G Core Network should determine and provide the UP security policy for a PDU session to the gNB connected to 5GC according to TS 23.501 [4] and TS 23.502 [5]. + +The 5G Core Network may enforce different configurations of UP security (encryption and integrity protection) in the UP security policy for multiple PDU sessions established for redundant data transmission. + +The UPF or the DN has no knowledge of which UP security policy that has been applied between the UE and the gNB for the redundant user plane data transmission that has taken different paths. TR 23.725 [2] recommends solution #1 "Redundant user plane paths based on dual connectivity" to resolve key issue #1 in TR 23.725 [2]. This solution is based upon the Dual Connectivity (DC) feature. Two PDU sessions will be established in this solution for redundant data transmission, where one PDU session uses a MCG bearer via the Master gNB, and the second PDU session uses a SCG bearer via the Secondary gNB in the user plane. Based on these PDU sessions, two independent paths are setup. UPF1 and UPF 2 are connect to the same Data Network (DN). + +![Architecture diagram for redundant User Plane paths for URLLC using Dual Connectivity. The diagram shows a UE connected to two gNBs: MgNB (Master gNB) and SgNB (Secondary gNB). The MgNB is connected to an AMF via an N2 interface. The AMF is connected to SMF1 and SMF2 via Nsmf interfaces. The SgNB is connected to the MgNB via an Xn interface. Both the MgNB and SgNB are connected to UPF1 and UPF2 via N3 interfaces. The UPF1 and UPF2 are connected to a Data Network (DN) via N6 interfaces. The SMF1 and SMF2 are connected to the UPF1 and UPF2 via N4 interfaces.](55a593259a0749ce342bd5eac2ba6b58_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + UE[UE] -- Xn --- MgNB[MgNB] + UE --- SgNB[SgNB] + MgNB -- N2 --- AMF[AMF] + AMF -- Namf --- SMF1[SMF1] + AMF -- Namf --- SMF2[SMF2] + SMF1 -- Nsmf --- SMF2 + SgNB -- Xn --- MgNB + MgNB -- N3 --- UPF1[UPF1] + SgNB -- N3 --- UPF2[UPF2] + UPF1 -- N6 --- DN[DN] + UPF2 -- N6 --- DN + SMF1 -- N4 --- UPF1 + SMF2 -- N4 --- UPF2 + +``` + +Architecture diagram for redundant User Plane paths for URLLC using Dual Connectivity. The diagram shows a UE connected to two gNBs: MgNB (Master gNB) and SgNB (Secondary gNB). The MgNB is connected to an AMF via an N2 interface. The AMF is connected to SMF1 and SMF2 via Nsmf interfaces. The SgNB is connected to the MgNB via an Xn interface. Both the MgNB and SgNB are connected to UPF1 and UPF2 via N3 interfaces. The UPF1 and UPF2 are connected to a Data Network (DN) via N6 interfaces. The SMF1 and SMF2 are connected to the UPF1 and UPF2 via N4 interfaces. + +Figure 5.3.1-1: Architecture for redundant User Plane paths for URLLC using Dual Connectivity + +### 5.3.2 Security threats + +If the attacker knows that integrity protection is enabled on one path but not on a second path, then the attacker could perform jamming on the first path in order to prevent the user plane data to be forwarded from the gNB to the UPF, and at then modify user plane data sent over the second path. + +### 5.3.3 Potential security requirements + +If encryption of user plane data is enabled between the UE and the gNB on the first path for a first PDU session, then encryption shall be enabled for redundant user data transmission over a second path for a second PDU session as well. + +If integrity protection of user plane data is enabled between the UE and the gNB on the first path for a first PDU session, then integrity protection shall be enabled for redundant user data transmission over a second path for a second PDU session as well. + +When Dual Connectivity is used, the MgNB shall ensure that the UP security policy assigned to the MgNB is forwarded and used by the SgNB for the two PDU Sessions used for redundant data transmission. + +## 5.4 Key Issue #4: Security policy for URLLC service + +### 5.4.1 Key issue details + +The URLLC service scenarios include both the high reliability and low latency requirements. From security perspective, there is a tight coupling between ultra-reliable and low latency to maintain the same level of security and be efficient in doing so at the same time, the former implies need for stringent security checks, while the latter may imply extremely fast security checks. Hence, in the URLLC services there may be a need for various security policies, e.g., for length of key refreshment interval, the recommended length of keys, etc. + +One example of an area where policies may be needed is the User Plane Security. In 5GS, a new security feature was introduced: the User Plane Security Policy. The SMF will get User Plane Security Policy during PDU Session Establishment from UDM and PCF. The SMF generates User Plane Security Enforcement and transfers it to the RAN. The Release 15 RAN can only apply integrity protection in low speed (maximum of 64 kbps). For URLLC service with higher speed than 65 kbps, the RAN cannot fulfil the QoS requirement while enforcing user plane integrity protection. The confidentiality protection may additionally bring x ms (e.g. 0.1~2 ms depending on the implementation) delay. This delay may have negative impact on URLLC services. Having different policies for different services may help with these issues. + +### 5.4.2 Security threats + +If the URLLC service is not user plane integrity protected, the user data can be modified during the transmission. On the other hand, after adding integrity protection, the delay may be unacceptable for some URLLC services. If service-specific security policies are not applied, there may be a risk that many URLLC services have insufficient protection. + +### 5.4.3 Potential Security requirements + +The 5G system shall provide a user plane security policy mechanism applicable to URLLC services. + +The 5G system shall provide the mechanism for how to enforce User Plane Security Policy when there are URLLC services in the PDU Session. + +The selection of the security policy shall be under network control. + +## 5.5 Key Issue #5: Security aspect of low latency handover procedure + +### 5.5.1 Key issue details + +In order to guarantee low latency to the URLLC services, according to TR 23.725 [2], the optimization of handover procedure is needed. However, the security handling in handover, e.g. key derivation, security algorithm selection should be considered at the same time in order to support handover in URLLC. For URLLC services that require the + +low latency performance, security should not be reduced. Optimization of handover procedure in this case should maintain the same level of security as in other 5G services. + +### 5.5.2 Security threats + +If the interfaces e.g. N2 are not security protected, then an attacker could eavesdrop or insert or modify the security key and the security parameters transferred on the interface. + +If the target AMF is compromised and the UE security keys do not have the property of backward security, then an attacker would be able to decrypt the previous data exchanged between the UE and the network. If the source AMF is compromised and the UE security keys do not have the property of forward security, then an attacker would be able to decrypt the future data exchanged between the UE and the network. + +If the AMF is compromised, it may purposefully bid down the algorithm to a lower priority algorithm that is fairly easier to crack. This is also applicable when a MiTM masquerades the connection. + +### 5.5.3 Potential Security requirements + +The 5G system shall provide the proper security protection for the optimized URLLC handover procedure. + +## 5.6 Key Issue #6: Retaining AS security keys for redundant data transmission in user plane + +### 5.6.1 Key issue details + +This key issue addresses the security aspects of key issue #1: Supporting high reliability by redundant transmission in user plane in SA2 TR 23.725 [2] and key issue #2: Supporting high reliability by redundant transmission in user plane. + +The flexibility to retain or to change the AS security keys in the gNB in intra-gNB handover i.e. between cells belonging to the same gNB, was introduced in 5G system in TS 33.501 [3] Rel-15 clause 6.9.2.3.1. + +If AS keys are always refreshed even when not required, then performance in gNB could be degraded. Refreshing the AS keys have impact on performance as time delay. To support services with very strict performance requirements, e.g. low latency or high reliability, would clearly benefit from avoiding unnecessary AS keys to be refreshed. The gNB should only refresh the AS security keys when there are security reasons. + +URLLC services should be taken into considerations when performing the configuration of the policy for controlling when to retain or change AS keys in gNB. + +### 5.6.2 Security threats + +N/A + +### 5.6.3 Potential security requirements + +N/A + +## 5.7 Key Issue #7: QoS monitoring protection + +### 5.7.1 Key issue details + +Since the vertical applications may want to be aware of the real time latency, the 5G E2E QoS monitoring is used to monitor the real time packet delay in 5GC and 5G-AN. According to TR23.725 [2], it is possible to define the new procedures and functions on QoS monitoring activation and enforcement. In this case, these monitoring messages are required to be protected. Furthermore, whether the related interfaces need to be security protected is also necessary to be considered. + +### 5.7.2 Security threats + +In lack of a secure way of protecting the E2E QoS monitoring procedure, an attacker could perform to modify the packet or message to obtain the incorrect latency report. + +### 5.7.3 Potential Security requirements + +The 5G system shall be able to protect the 5G E2E QoS Enforcement procedure for a service. + +## 5.8 Key Issue #8: Acceleration of authentication and key agreement procedure for low latency + +### 5.8.1 Key issue details + +NOTE: The re-authentication enhancement is irrelevant to URLLC services which is for UP traffic. + +The R15 authentication and key agreement (AKA) procedure always involves HPLMN (i.e. AUSF and UDM) to query new AV from HPLMN and authenticate the UE by HPLMN. The NAS SMC procedure also is a part of the AKA procedure in R15, which is used to verify $K_{SEAF}$ is generated correctly both in UE and network. It is less efficient compared to AKA procedure in LTE, but increase security for home control and identifier privacy. + +It needs to be studied that how to enhance the AKA procedure to reduce the latency to authenticate the UE and setup new security context for the UE without downgrading the security level of R15 AKA procedure, and which node of the visited network can be the network endpoint of the enhanced AKA procedure. + +### 5.8.2 Security threats + +N/A. + +### 5.8.3 Potential Security requirements + +N/A. + +## 5.9 Key Issue #9: Security aspect of low latency Re-authentication procedure + +### 5.9.1 Key issue details + +NOTE: The re-authentication enhancement is irrelevant to URLLC services which is for UP traffic. + +In order to guarantee low latency to the URLLC services, according to TR 23.725 [2], a fast re-authentication procedure may be considered. Where the TS 33.501 [3] clause F.1 states that, the fast re-authentication is not supported in 5GS. In this case, a time consuming authentication procedure need to be invoked for every registration request from a UE irrespective of their previous authentication with a same network. This may have a significant impact over the URLLC services. + +Time consuming authentication procedure irrespective of a UE's previous authentication may lead to URLLC service failure. + +### 5.9.2 Security threats + +No security threat. + +### 5.9.3 Potential security requirements + +TBA. + +## 5.10 Key Issue #10: UP security performance for low latency + +### 5.10.1 Key issue details + +The low latency service has extreme requirements on UP data transmitting delay. Without security, data transmitting is very quick using nowadays technology. Introducing of security in UP data transmitting will delay the data transmitting, but it is a trade-off between performance and security. + +The UP path between UE and UPF includes radio interface and N3 interface, and may include F1 interface (DU-CU case) and Xn (handover case) interface. + +In current specification, IPsec protocol may be used to protect above interfaces. It has been identified that IPsec and TLS/DTLS will slow down the data forwarding performance significantly, which means UP data transmitting over above interfaces will be delayed significantly if IPsec is deployed. + +It has been identified that security performance on radio interface also is able to be improved, e.g. by using AES GCM mode. + +NOTE: The justification on low latency for UP traffic for URLLC services is needed. + +### 5.10.2 Security threats + +TBD. + +### 5.10.3 Potential Security requirements + +TBD. + +# --- 6 Candidate Solutions + +## 6.1 Solution #1: Security solution for handling UP security policy for multiple PDU sessions for redundant data transmission + +### 6.1.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses key issue #3: UP security policy handling for multiple PDU sessions established for redundant data transmission. + +According to TS 23.501 [4] and TS 23.502 [5], the SMF should determine and provide the UP security policy for a PDU session to the gNB connected to 5GC during the PDU session establishment procedure. + +The UP security policy should indicate whether UP confidentiality and/or UP integrity protection shall be activated or not for all DRBs belonging to that PDU session. The UP security policy should be used by gNB to activate UP confidentiality and/or UP integrity for all DRBs belonging to the PDU session. + +According to TS 23.501 [4], the User Plane Security Policy provides the same level of information than User Plane Security Enforcement information. Once the User Plane Security Enforcement information is determined at the establishment of the PDU Session, it is provided to the UE and applies for the life time of the PDU Session. The User Plane Security Enforcement information provides the NG-RAN with User Plane security policies for a PDU session. It indicates: + +- whether UP integrity protection is: + - Required: for all the traffic on the PDU Session UP integrity protection shall apply. + - Preferred: for all the traffic on the PDU Session UP integrity protection should apply. + - Not Needed: UP integrity protection shall not apply on the PDU Session. +- whether UP confidentiality protection is: + - Required: for all the traffic on the PDU Session UP confidentiality protection shall apply. + - Preferred: for all the traffic on the PDU Session UP confidentiality protection should apply. + - Not Needed: UP confidentiality shall not apply on the PDU Session. + +### 6.1.2 Solution details + +The User Plane Security Policy for multiple PDU Sessions used for redundant data transmission should have the same setting for encryption and for integrity protection. The gNB should not be allowed to override the UP Security Policy + +received from the 5G Core Network. The setting defined in clause 5.10.3 TS 23.501 [4] should apply with the following modifications: + +- Encryption: + - only "Required" or "Not Needed" is allowed; + - "Preferred" is not allowed; +- Integrity protection: + - only "Required" or "Not Needed" is allowed; + - "Preferred" is not allowed; + +In addition, if redundant data transmission is taking place over E-UTRA (connected to 5GC), then the setting of "Required" for Integrity protection is not allowed. + +When Dual Connectivity as described in Figure 5.3.1-1 of the KI #3 is used, both of the two redundant PDU sessions are initially established via the MgNB. The SMF shall provide two UP security policies for each of the two redundant PDU sessions to the MgNB during the PDU sessions establishment procedure, if SMF recognizes one of the UP security policies is not the same as the other one, the SMF shall modify the UP security policies to make sure them to be same. + +However, MgNB shall ensure that the two redundant PDU sessions have the same UP integrity and encryption activation after the MgNB receives UP security policy and proceeds according to TS 33.501 [3] clause 6.6.1. + +### 6.1.3 Evaluation + +The proposed solution needs to modify the existing UP security policy definition as specified in TS 23.501 [4] which is provided to the NG-RAN by SMF for a PDU session. The modification is specific for URLLC services. For DC architecture used for URLLC service, the solution is applicable if the UP security policies which are used by Master node and Secondary node for redundant PDU session transmissions are the same. + +Based on above analysis of the proposed solution, the solution is able to meet the potential security requirements of KI #3. + +## 6.2 Solution #2: Retaining AS security keys for redundant data transmission in user plane + +### 6.2.1 Introduction + +This solution address Key Issue #6: Retaining AS security keys for redundant data transmission in user plane + +### 6.2.2 Solution details + +The flexibility to retain or to change the AS security keys in the gNB in intra-gNB-CU handover i.e. between cells belonging to the same gNB, was introduced in 5G system in TS 33.501 [3] clause 6.9.2.3.1 Intra-gNB-CU handover. + +It is proposed to re-use the existing solution as specified in TS 33.501 [3] clause 6.9.2.3.1 Intra-gNB-CU handover (about the policy for controlling) when to retain or change AS keys in gNB when URLLC services are used. + +When the DC architecture as specified in KI#3 is used for redundant data transmission data, if the current $K_{gNB}$ in MgNB is changed because of intra-gNB-CU handover, the MgNB shall update the security key which are used to protect the two redundant PDU sessions as described in TS 33.501 [3]. + +### 6.2.3 Evaluation + +The proposed solution fulfils the potential security requirements of KI#6. + +## 6.3 Solution #3: Security policy handling for redundant data transmission + +### 6.3.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses Key Issue#3 and Key Issue#4 by identifying how to handle the security policy for redundant transmission. In this solution, it is assumed that the redundant transmissions are established by two independent paths which require two RAN nodes and two UPFs to a single UE. This solution is based on the following architecture (see TR 23.725 [2] v0.4.0 clause 6.1): + +![Figure 6.3.1-1: redundant transmission architecture diagram. The diagram shows a UE connected to two RAN nodes, MgNB and SgNB, via an Xn interface. MgNB is connected to an AMF via an N2 interface. SgNB is connected to an AMF via an N2 interface. AMF is connected to two SMFs, SMF1 and SMF2, via Nsmf interfaces. SMF1 is connected to UPF1 via an N4 interface. SMF2 is connected to UPF2 via an N4 interface. UPF1 is connected to a DN via an N6 interface. UPF2 is connected to a DN via an N6 interface. MgNB is connected to UPF1 via an N3 interface. SgNB is connected to UPF2 via an N3 interface.](41a438d7e4adc17c3a4005e7c9500091_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + UE[UE] --- MgNB[MgNB] + UE --- SgNB[SgNB] + MgNB --- Xn[Xn] --- SgNB + MgNB --- N2[N2] --- AMF[AMF] + SgNB --- N2[N2] --- AMF + AMF --- Nsmf[Nsmf] --- SMF1[SMF1] + AMF --- Nsmf[Nsmf] --- SMF2[SMF2] + SMF1 --- N4[N4] --- UPF1[UPF1] + SMF2 --- N4[N4] --- UPF2[UPF2] + UPF1 --- N6[N6] --- DN[DN] + UPF2 --- N6[N6] --- DN + MgNB --- N3[N3] --- UPF1 + SgNB --- N3[N3] --- UPF2 + +``` + +Figure 6.3.1-1: redundant transmission architecture diagram. The diagram shows a UE connected to two RAN nodes, MgNB and SgNB, via an Xn interface. MgNB is connected to an AMF via an N2 interface. SgNB is connected to an AMF via an N2 interface. AMF is connected to two SMFs, SMF1 and SMF2, via Nsmf interfaces. SMF1 is connected to UPF1 via an N4 interface. SMF2 is connected to UPF2 via an N4 interface. UPF1 is connected to a DN via an N6 interface. UPF2 is connected to a DN via an N6 interface. MgNB is connected to UPF1 via an N3 interface. SgNB is connected to UPF2 via an N3 interface. + +**Figure 6.3.1-1: redundant transmission architecture** + +This architecture is based on Dual Connectivity architecture, except that there are two UPFs. + +According to the figure above, if there are two PDU sessions that take two different user plane paths which are used to transfer the redundant data, the security policy for the redundant PDU sessions shall be ensured to be the same. + +### 6.3.2 Solution details + +If the high-reliability is fulfilled by redundant transmission based on NR-DC architecture, the following user plane security policy mechanism shall apply: + +In case where one of the redundant PDU Session data transmissions is terminated at the MgNB and the other one is terminated at the SgNB, these two redundant data transmissions shall have the same UP integrity protection and ciphering policy. In addition, the MgNB shall inform the SgNB with its UP integrity protection and encryption activation decision of the PDU Session which is terminated at MgNB but is redundant with the other PDU Session terminated at the SgNB. + +MgNB shall make the decision on UP encryption protection and integrity protection according to the UP security policy for these two redundant transmissions. The MgNB shall inform the SgNB the encryption protection and integrity protection indications of the transmission terminated at itself via SgNB Addition/Modification Request message during when the corresponding redundant transmission is moved to SgNB. At the reception of the indications, the SgNB shall attempt to comply with the request from MgNB to ensure these two UP ciphering protection indications are the same. + +If the UP security policy indicates UP integrity protection "Not needed", the UP integrity protection shall not be applied on the two redundant PDU sessions and the MgNB informs the decision to SgNB, in other words, UP integrity protection shall not be activated for the two redundant PDU sessions. If the UP security policy indicates UP encryption protection "Not needed", the MgNB shall have the encryption protection either "off", and inform the decision to SgNB. If the UP security policy indicates UP encryption protection "preferred", the MgNB shall have the encryption protection either "on" or "off", and inform the decision to SgNB. + +Particularly, in case of the MgNB cannot activate UP confidentiality and/or integrity when the received UP security policy is "Required" or "Preferred", the MgNB shall reject establishment of UP resources for the PDU Session and indicate the decision to the SgNB in order to make sure these two redundant transmissions have the same UP encryption protection and integrity protection. + +In all cases, the SgNB shall inform the UP integrity protection and encryption indications to the MgNB in the SgNB Addition/Modification Request Acknowledgement message. The MgNB shall forward the UP integrity protection and encryption indications to the UE in RRC Connection Reconfiguration message. + +In addition, if the UP integrity protection and encryption indications for the PDU session on MgNB is modified or refreshed, the MgNB shall inform SgNB the new UP integrity protection and encryption indications decision to SgNB in the SgNB Addition/Modification Request message. The SgNB shall update its handling of the UP integrity protection and encryption according to the new decisions received from MgNB. Similarly, if the SgNB is allowed to modify or refresh the UP integrity protection and encryption indications (e.g. UP integrity can no longer be supported due to maximum minimum data rate being exceeded), the SgNB shall also inform MgNB the modification in order to make the two PDU sessions transferred via MgNB and SgNB to have the same the UP security policy. In both cases, the MgNB shall inform the new decision to the UE to in RRC Connection Reconfiguration message to keep the UP security policy on UE and NG-RAN consistent. + +NOTE: In case there is a possibility that the UP integrity protection and encryption indication status is changed during the session lifetime, the latest URLLC Radio and System Architecture TR 23.725 [2] needs to be taken into account. + +### 6.3.3 Evaluation + +For URLLC PDU Sessions, the UP integrity protection and encryption protection indications are the same for the redundant PDU Sessions that carry the same user data is via MgNB and SgNB. This solution fulfils such fundamental security requirement. + +This solution provides comprehensive handling procedures in case that the UP integrity protection for one of redundant PDU Sessions is different from the other one which is adopted by the second PDU Session (e.g. UP protection in MgNB is on while SgNB is off or vice versa). The same procedure is also applied for encryption protection. + +The solution is applicable for the redundant data transmission of URLLC services based on Dual Connectivity architecture. The solution fulfils the potential security requirements of KI #3. + +## 6.4 Solution #4: Security support for N3 tunnel redundancy + +### 6.4.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses Key Issue#1. If the user data is redundant by means of two duplicated N3 tunnels to fulfil the high-reliability feature, as illustrated in figure 6.4.1-1 below, the NDS/IP framework which is used to secure the network domain interfaces should be reused with the following precautions. + +![Diagram of redundant transmission architecture showing a UE connected to an NG-RAN, which is connected to an AMF via N2. The AMF is connected to an SMF via N11. The SMF is connected to a PCF via N7 and to a UPF via N4. The NG-RAN is connected to the UPF via two N3 tunnels (N3 Tunnel 1 and N3 Tunnel 2). The UPF is connected to a DN via N6.](6f659142d4789aa889184459f884787e_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph LR + UE[UE] --- NG-RAN[NG-RAN] + NG-RAN -.-> AMF[AMF] + AMF -- N11 --> SMF[SMF] + SMF -- N7 --> PCF[PCF] + SMF -- N4 --> UPF[UPF] + NG-RAN -- "N3 Tunnel 1" --> UPF + NG-RAN -- "N3 Tunnel 2" --> UPF + UPF -- N6 --> DN((DN)) + +``` + +Diagram of redundant transmission architecture showing a UE connected to an NG-RAN, which is connected to an AMF via N2. The AMF is connected to an SMF via N11. The SMF is connected to a PCF via N7 and to a UPF via N4. The NG-RAN is connected to the UPF via two N3 tunnels (N3 Tunnel 1 and N3 Tunnel 2). The UPF is connected to a DN via N6. + +Figure 6.4.1-1: redundant transmission architecture + +This data redundancy architecture supports the redundant transmission based on two N3 tunnels between a single NG-RAN node and the UPF. In this architecture, it is assumed that the reliability of NG-RAN node, UPF and CP NFs are high enough to fulfil the reliability requirement of URLLC services served by these NFs. For example, due to the deployment environment of backhaul network, the redundant packets will be transferred between UPF and RAN via two independent N3 tunnels, which are associated with a single PDU Session, over different transport layer path to enhance the reliability of service. To be specific, the NG-RAN node, SMF or UPF provides different routing information in the tunnel information (e.g. different IP addresses or different Network Instances) to ensure the two N3 tunnels can be transferred via disjointed transport layer paths. In addition, these routing information is mapped to disjointed transport layer paths according to network deployment configuration. The RAN node and UPF support packet replication and elimination function as referring to TR 23.725 [2] clause 6.4. + +The RAN node and UPF support NDS/IP to ensure the security of the N3 interface. The transport of user data over N3 is integrity, confidentiality and replay-protected. + +### 6.4.2 Solution details + +If the IPsec tunnel is used to protect all N3 tunnels between NG-RAN and UPF, the current mechanism defined in TS 33.501 [3] clause 9.3 and clause 9.1 shall be reused. + +The N3 interface for 5GC and 5G-AN according to NDS/IP is specified in TS 33.210 [6]. Traffic on interfaces carrying control plane signalling can be both integrity and confidentiality protected according to NDS/IP. + +IPsec ESP implementation shall be done according to RFC 4303 [8] as profiled by TS 33.210 [6]. For IPsec implementation, tunnel mode is mandatory to support while transport mode is optional. + +IKEv2 certificate-based authentication implementation shall be done according to TS 33.310. The certificates shall be supported according to the profile described by TS 33.310 [7]. IKEv2 shall be supported conforming to the IKEv2 profile described in TS 33.310 [7]. + +In order to protect the traffic on the N3 reference point, it is required to implement IPsec ESP and IKEv2 certificate-based authentication. IPsec is mandatory to implement on the NG-RAN. On the core network side, a SEG may be used to terminate the IPsec tunnel. + +### 6.4.3 Evaluation + +This solution assumes to reuse NDS/IP mechanism as specified in TS 33.210 [6] to protect the redundant packets which are transferred via two independent N3 tunnels over the N3 interfaces. Due to the deployment environment of backhaul network, the reliability of single N3 tunnel may not be considered sufficiently or reliably to support URLLC services. If there is single N3 tunnel between a single NG-RAN mode and the UPF, NDS/IP is already supposed to be used to protect the N3 interface. Traffic on N3 interface carrying control plane signalling can be both integrity and confidentiality protected with NDS/IP. Similarly, NDS/IP is also used for the two redundant N3 tunnels for the same interface which fulfils the requirements of KI #1. + +The solution fulfils the potential security requirement of KI #1. + +## 6.5 Solution #5: Security for redundant data transmission + +### 6.5.1 Introduction + +The solution addresses the Key issues # 1 and #2 in the present document. This solution also addresses Key issue #1: Supporting high reliability by redundant transmission in user plane in TR 23.725 [2] and also complies with the related SA2 conclusions specified in TR 23.725 [2] clause 8.1. Adopting different security protection for the redundant user planes at the UE for two different gNBs will increase the computation complexity, drain battery life and impacts the low latency and reliability requirements of the URLLC services. However, the potential danger of applying separate security protection outweighs the convenience of using the same security contexts. For example, if the same security key is used for the two redundant user planes, then having one of the two UP paths compromised implies that both the two redundant user planes' security is compromised. To prevent this situation, it is proposed to use a scheme in which cryptographic separation is achieved while using the same key for both of the two redundant user planes, similar to the security procedures for dual connectivity specified in TS 33.501 [3]. This also results in minimal impact to the URLLC requirement specific changes. + +### 6.5.2 Solution details + +The solution proposes that both PDU sessions transferring via two user plane paths are using the same key based on the SgNB addition procedure of Dual Connectivity. In this case, the MgNB derives the security key ( $K_{UR}$ key) from the $K_{gNB}$ and provides it to the SgNB in the SgNB Addition request message over the Xn-C interface between MgNB and SgNB as specified in TS 33.501 [3]. To generate key streams, the MgNB and the SgNB use different input parameters (for example different bearer ID, PDU session ID) combined with the $K_{UR}$ . This way, the cryptographic separation between the MgNB and the SgNB is achieved. The SgNB derives its own security context using other input parameters such as the PDU session information specific to the redundant user plane path, URLLC identification information and any other required information along with $K_{UR}$ to the KDF to derive the security context for the redundant user plane protection. Other input parameters such as the PDU session information to the redundant user plane data protection will ensure cryptographic separation between the redundant user plane data. After that, the MgNB and the SgNB generate their own RRC and UP keys based on $K_{UR}$ and other parameters different from those used by MgNB (e.g. MgNB can send two sets of random values and data counter values to the UE for the purpose of generating different cipher keys and integrity keys in the MgNB and SgNB respectively) as well as UE side as described in Annex A.8 of TS 33.501 [3] + +except that the input key is $K_{UR}$ . This mechanism can prevent attackers from identifying the related redundant data stream. + +During RRC connection establishment between UE and MgNB the $K_{UR}$ is derived at MgNB, where $K_{gNB}$ , information on URLLC connection and PDU session such as their identifiers can be input to the KDF (Key Derivation Function) to derive the key. Random value and data counter value at MgNB, which are sent from MgNB to UE, can also be input to the KDF. Security is established between UE and MgNB, where integrity and confidentiality protection for uplink data (from UE to MgNB) is configured with security keys for URLLC communication. MgNB sends SgNB addition request for URLLC which includes security key, $K_{UR}$ , information indicating that this request is for URLLC, and security capabilities for integrity protection and ciphering used for the data from UE. The security capabilities are the same as the ones used in MgNB. + +When two redundant data is transmitting, it is necessary to make separation between multiple redundant PDU sessions handled between UE and gNB. The $K_{UR}$ key is introduced in this proposal for securing the redundant data transmission. $K_{UR}$ key gets refreshed for different PDCP counts when there is a redundant data transmission. + +NOTE: $K_{UR}$ key should be the specific key for the URLLC services based on Dual Connectivity architecture. Particularly, if there are only two redundant data transmission PDU sessions of multiple PDU sessions, the specific key $K_{UR}$ key should be used to identify the URLLC services. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the security context derivation procedure between MgNB and SgNB.](12de9b926df0384ec07702671827c9cd_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant MgNB + participant SgNB + Note left of MgNB: Derive K_UR + Note left of MgNB: Derive security context for itself + MgNB->>SgNB: SgNB addition request message (K_UR) + Note right of SgNB: Derive security context for itself (using K_UR and other input parameters) + +``` + +The diagram shows a sequence of operations between MgNB and SgNB. On the MgNB side, two steps are shown: 'Derive $K_{UR}$ ' followed by 'Derive security context for itself'. An arrow labeled 'SgNB addition request message ( $K_{UR}$ )' points from MgNB to SgNB. On the SgNB side, a step is shown: 'Derive security context for itself (using $K_{UR}$ and other input parameters)'. + +Sequence diagram illustrating the security context derivation procedure between MgNB and SgNB. + +Figure 6.5.2-1: Security context derivation procedure + +### 6.5.3 Evaluation + +The solution fulfils the cryptographic separation requirement of KI #1. Moreover, the solution fulfils the confidential protection and integrity protection for radio bears of redundant transmission requirement of KI #2. + +In the Dual connectivity architecture in TS 33.501 [3], MN terminated bearers are protected using the AS keys derived from $K_{gNB}$ and SN terminated bearers are protected using the AS keys derived from $K_{SN}$ . This means the cryptographic separation for radio bearers serving redundant data transmission is already satisfied by the dual connectivity architecture. + +The solution #5 attempts to achieve the same goal by deriving new keys from $K_{UR}$ which is derived from $K_{gNB}$ and PDU session parameters as additional input parameters to KDF. This apparently achieves the cryptographic key separation between MN terminated bearers and SN terminated bearers for the redundant data transmission. However, to address the issue of using the same AS root key at MN and SN ( $K_{UR}$ ), this solution introduces new random parameters in deriving AS keys both at the MN and SN. This, in effect, mimics the existing key separation scheme between MN and SN in DC at a different level of AS key hierarchy (i.e., algorithm key derivation as opposed to AS root key derivation). Therefore, this additional key handling does not introduce security gain over existing security solution for DC. + +This solution introduces a new key $K_{UR}$ that is common for MN and SN. When SN changes, the MN may keep using the same $K_{UR}$ and apply new random parameter to generate a new key stream for the SN. This maintains the cryptographic separation between the two bearers in the redundant data transmission. However, this new key stream derivation needs to be performed in addition to and independent of the existing key derivation in the DC security procedure. + +The solution can provide key separation between URLLC PDU sessions and non-URLLC PDU sessions. However, it incurs additional key management and key stream generation at the MN/SN and the UE, while the relative advantage over the existing DC security solution appears to be marginal. + +## 6.6 Solution #6: Dynamic UP security policy control for URLLC service + +### 6.6.1 Introduction + +This solution addresses Key Issue #4: Security policy for URLLC service. + +According to TS 23.501 [4] and TS 23.502 [5], the SMF shall provide the UP security policy to the NG-RAN during the PDU session establishment procedure. + +According to TS 23.503 [10], the PCF will authorize the PCC rule and PDU Session related information for dynamic session management policy control considering the QoS requirement of the application. + +### 6.6.2 Solution details + +The User Plane Security Policy should be authorized by PCF considering RAN Capability for UP Security Policy enforcement and QoS requirement from applications. The PCF may further optimize the UP Security Policy, e.g. changing "Required" to "Not Needed" or changing "preferred" to "Not needed". The PCF will send the optimized UP Security Policy to the SMF during SM Policy Association Establishment/ Modification as defined in clauses 4.16.4/4.16.5 of TS 23.502 [5]. The SMF determines a User Plane Security Enforcement information for the user plane of a PDU session based on the authorised UP Security Policy provided by PCF if dynamic PCC is deployed. + +In conclusion, the Session Management related policy control will be updated as following: + +- Add UP Security Policy information in the PDU Session related policy information. +- PCF need to aware the capability on the speed of integrity protection of the serving RAN node to make PCC decision. + +The enforcement of UP Security Policy will be updated as following: + +- SMF needs to report the UP Security Policy (received from subscription data) to the PCF. +- SMF determines a User Plane Security Enforcement information based on the authorised UP Security Policy provided by PCF. + +NOTE: The scenario that redundant PDU Sessions with the same user data transferred via MgNB and SgNB is based on specific deployment. It is assumed that in this scenario the MgNB and SgNB have the same capability. The PCC decision from the PCF(s) will be the same with the same input. + +### 6.6.3 Evaluation + +TBD + +## 6.7 Solution #7: Security for redundant data transmission using Dual Connectivity + +### 6.7.1 Introduction + +This security solution address Key Issue #1: 'Security for redundant transmission' and Key Issue #2: 'Support of security for high reliability by redundant data transmission in user plane' in the present document and the security solution for Dual Connectivity (DC) specified in TS 33.501 [3] in 5G Rel-15. + +In the recommended SA2 solution #1 in TR 23.725 [2], the UE establishes two PDU Sessions with the network, one PDU Session spans from the UE via MgNB to UPF1 acting as the PDU Session Anchor, and the other PDU Session spans from the UE via SgNB to UPF2 acting as the PDU Session Anchor. Based on these two PDU Sessions, two independent paths are set up. UPF1 and UPF2 connect to the same Data Network (DN), even though the traffic via UPF1 and UPF2 may be routed via different user plane nodes within the DN. + +![Figure 6.7.1-1: Architecture for redundant User Plane paths for URLLC using Dual Connectivity. The diagram shows a UE connected to two base stations, MgNB and SgNB, which are interconnected via an Xn interface. Both base stations are connected to an AMF via N2 interfaces. The AMF is connected to two SMFs, SMF1 and SMF2, via N4 interfaces. SMF1 is connected to UPF1 via an N3 interface, and SMF2 is connected to UPF2 via an N3 interface. Both UPF1 and UPF2 are connected to a DN (Data Network) via N6 interfaces. The UE is connected to both MgNB and SgNB, indicating dual connectivity.](79e1709a7317ead45379cbb8ff3ba802_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + UE[UE] --- MgNB[MgNB] + UE --- SgNB[SgNB] + MgNB ---|Xn| SgNB + MgNB ---|N2| AMF[AMF] + SgNB ---|N2| AMF + AMF ---|N4| SMF1[SMF1] + AMF ---|N4| SMF2[SMF2] + SMF1 ---|N3| UPF1[UPF1] + SMF2 ---|N3| UPF2[UPF2] + UPF1 ---|N6| DN[DN] + UPF2 ---|N6| DN + +``` + +Figure 6.7.1-1: Architecture for redundant User Plane paths for URLLC using Dual Connectivity. The diagram shows a UE connected to two base stations, MgNB and SgNB, which are interconnected via an Xn interface. Both base stations are connected to an AMF via N2 interfaces. The AMF is connected to two SMFs, SMF1 and SMF2, via N4 interfaces. SMF1 is connected to UPF1 via an N3 interface, and SMF2 is connected to UPF2 via an N3 interface. Both UPF1 and UPF2 are connected to a DN (Data Network) via N6 interfaces. The UE is connected to both MgNB and SgNB, indicating dual connectivity. + +**Figure 6.7.1-1: Architecture for redundant User Plane paths for URLLC using Dual Connectivity** + +For one PDU Session used for redundant data transmission it is explicitly requested by Core Network to MgNB that the user plane goes via the MgNB, and for the other (second) PDU Session used for redundant data transmission it is explicitly requested by Core Network to MgNB that the user plane goes via the SgNB using dual connectivity. The MgNB sets up dual connectivity as defined in TS 37.340 [9] so that the sessions have end to end redundant paths. This implies that all DRB(s) established for the second PDU Session which should go via the SgNB will be offloaded to the SgNB by the MgNB. It is important in this scenario that the same key is not used for the two redundant user planes (for the first and second PDU sessions). Otherwise if the same key is used for the two redundant user planes, then if one path is compromised then the second path is compromised as well. Also, if two different keys are used for the two redundant user planes (for the first and second PDU sessions) then the attacker cannot relate the two data streams. + +### 6.7.2 Solution details + +This solution is a combination of the following two solutions: + +- This solution proposes to re-use the security solution for Dual Connectivity (DC) specified in TS 33.501 [3] in 5G Rel-15, where the Master Node (MN) generates the $K_{SN}$ from the $K_{gNB}$ and a SN Counter, and sends the $K_{SN}$ to the SN over the Xn-C. The SN Counter is used as freshness input into $K_{SN}$ derivations as described in TS 33.501 [3]. The MN sends the value of the SN Counter to the UE over the RRC signalling path when it is required to generate a new $K_{SN}$ . The $K_{SN}$ is used to derive further RRC and UP keys that are used between the UE and SN. +- This solution proposes in addition, that the handling of the UP security policy could potentially be handled. + +NOTE: How to handle the UP security policy for URLLC services can refer to the solutions as described in the present document, e.g., solution #1, solution #3, solution #8. + +The dual connectivity procedure with activation of encryption/decryption and integrity protection follows the steps outlined in the Figure 6.7.2-1. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating security aspects in SN Addition/Modification procedures (MN initiated). The diagram shows interactions between UE, MN, and SN. The process starts with RRC Connection Established (1) from UE to MN. MN sends SN Addition/Modification Request (K_SN, UE security capabilities, UP security policy) (2) to SN. SN performs Capability negotiation and algorithm selection (3). SN sends SN Addition/Modification Request Acknowledge (Selected algorithms) (4) to MN. MN sends RRC Connection Reconfiguration (SN Counter, Selected algorithms) (5) to UE. UE sends RRC Connection Reconfiguration Complete () (6) to MN. MN sends SN Reconfiguration Complete () (7) to SN. Both UE and SN then perform Activation of ciphering and integrity protection. Finally, a Random Access Procedure is shown between UE and SN.](e180f2b5fcbe8001554a7c0677cd3f82_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant MN + participant SN + Note right of SN: 3. Capability negotiation and algorithm selection + Note left of UE: Activation of ciphering and integrity protection + Note right of SN: Activation of ciphering and integrity protection + + UE->>MN: 1. RRC Connection Established + MN->>SN: 2. SN Addition/Modification Request(KSN, UE security capabilities, UP security policy) + SN->>MN: 4. SN Addition/Modification Request Acknowledge(Selected algorithms) + MN->>UE: 5. RRC Connection Reconfiguration ( SN Counter, Selected algorithms) + UE->>MN: 6. RRC Connection Reconfiguration Complete () + MN->>SN: 7. SN Reconfiguration Complete () + UE->>SN: Random Access Procedure + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating security aspects in SN Addition/Modification procedures (MN initiated). The diagram shows interactions between UE, MN, and SN. The process starts with RRC Connection Established (1) from UE to MN. MN sends SN Addition/Modification Request (K\_SN, UE security capabilities, UP security policy) (2) to SN. SN performs Capability negotiation and algorithm selection (3). SN sends SN Addition/Modification Request Acknowledge (Selected algorithms) (4) to MN. MN sends RRC Connection Reconfiguration (SN Counter, Selected algorithms) (5) to UE. UE sends RRC Connection Reconfiguration Complete () (6) to MN. MN sends SN Reconfiguration Complete () (7) to SN. Both UE and SN then perform Activation of ciphering and integrity protection. Finally, a Random Access Procedure is shown between UE and SN. + +**Figure 6.7.2-1: Security aspects in SN Addition/Modification procedures (MN initiated)** + +- 1) As described in step 1 in clause 6.10.2.1 in TS 33.501 [3] for Dual Connectivity. +- 2) As described in step 2 in clause 6.10.2.1 in TS 33.501 [3] for Dual Connectivity with the following modifications: the handling of the UP security policy could potentially be handled. +- 3) As described in step 3 in clause 6.10.2.1 in TS 33.501 [3] for Dual Connectivity with the following modifications: the handling of the UP security policy could potentially be handled. +- 4) As described in step 4 in clause 6.10.2.1 in TS 33.501 [3] for Dual Connectivity. +- 5) As described in step 5 in clause 6.10.2.1 in TS 33.501 [3] for Dual Connectivity. +- 6) As described in step 6 in clause 6.10.2.1 in TS 33.501 [3] for Dual Connectivity. +- 7) As described in step 7 in clause 6.10.2.1 in TS 33.501 [3] for Dual Connectivity. + +### 6.7.3 Evaluation + +Solution #7 addresses Key Issue #1 and Key Issue #2. + +The solution proposes the use of the security solution for Dual Connectivity as a baseline and additionally the use of similar guidelines for the UP security policy of solution #1. + +The solution fulfils all the potential security requirements of KI#1 as (a) it provides a security method to protect the redundant transmissions by re-using the security solutions for dual connectivity, (b) it provides cryptographic separation if radio bearers since it proposes to use different keys for the protection of the two separate redundant PDU sessions and (c) the each path of two redundant paths consists of a PDU session with the same security level compared to a single path. The solution fulfils the potential security requirements for KI#2 as both confidentiality and integrity protection are provided for the two redundant PDU sessions. + +The advantage of the solution is that it re-uses the procedures for Dual Connectivity with minimal modifications and as a result it has minimal impact on the UE, MN and SN. + +## 6.8 Solution #8: Handling of UP security activation status and selection of SN in Dual Connectivity + +### 6.8.1 Introduction + +This security solution address Key Issue #3: UP security policy handling for multiple PDU sessions established for redundant data transmission in the present document and the security solution for Dual Connectivity (DC) specified in TS 33.501 [3] in 5G Rel-15. + +In the recommended SA2 solution #1 in TR 23.725 [2], for one PDU Session it is explicitly requested by Core Network to Master Node (MN) that the user plane path goes via the MN, and for the other (second) PDU Session it is explicitly requested by Core Network to MN that the user plane path goes via the SN using dual connectivity. + +The assumption is that the MN and the SN could be either a gNB or an ng-eNB. + +There are some potential issues with using this solution for URLLC services: + +#### Issue 1: + +If the indication for either UP integrity protection or UP encryption or both in the UP security policy enforcement information sent from SMF to the MN, **is set to the value "preferred"**, then one of the nodes (MN or SN) may choose a different security activation status compared to the other node. The result would be that the DRB's established for the first PDU session and the second PDU session will use different security activation status (for example: UP integrity protection could be activated for one PDU session but not for the second PDU session). + +#### Issue 2: + +In the case the UP security policy enforcement information sent from SMF to the MN, does not allow the value "preferred" as described in Solution #1 "Security solution for handling UP security policy for multiple PDU sessions for redundant data transmission", the MN may not know in advance if the selected SN can comply to the UP security policy enforcement information sent from the MN to the SN, when offloading the DRB's for the second PDU session to the SN. If the SN cannot comply, then the SN would reject the request from the MN to offload DRB(s) to the SN. In this case the MN may have already established and activated the DRB's with the UE for the first PDU session. + +### 6.8.2 Solution details + +This solution proposes to re-use the security solution for Dual Connectivity (DC) as specified in TS 33.501 [3] in 5G Rel-15, with the following enhancements for redundant data transmission: + +To resolve issue 1 in clause 6.8.1: + +- The MN shall store the applied UP security activation status used for the DRB's established for the first PDU session between the MN and the UE. This is to avoid that one of the nodes (MN or SN) chooses a different UP security activation status compared to the other node, for the first and second PDU sessions. The MN shall ensure that the DRB's established between the MN and the UE for the second PDU uses the same UP security activation status as for the DRB's established for the first PDU. The MN shall provide the same stored UP security activation status applied for the first PDU session to the SN, when offloading the DRB's for the second PDU session. The SN shall use the received UP security activation status received from the MN. This would ensure that the same UP security activation status is applied to all the DRB's established for the first and second PDU session. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the applied UP security activation status for two PDU sessions used for redundant data transmission using DC. The diagram shows interactions between UE, MgNB, SgNB, UPF1, UPF2, AMF, SMF1, and SMF2. Step 1: UE initiates PDU Session 1 establishment. Step 2: MgNB stores UP security activation status. Step 3: UE initiates PDU Session 2 establishment. Step 4: MgNB ensures DRB's for the second session have the same UP security activation status. Step 5: MgNB establishes DC in RAN, sending SN Addition Request to SgNB with security status, receiving acknowledgment, and sending RRC Reconfig/RA to UE. Data flows (User data, DL data forwarding, UL data) are shown between UE, MgNB, and SgNB.](ae53f90bb87d6d09e2d6b5278d7c338f_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant MgNB + participant SgNB + participant UPF1 + participant UPF2 + participant AMF + participant SMF1 + participant SMF2 + + Note right of AMF: Select UPF1 + Note right of SMF2: Select UPF2 + + Note left of MgNB: 2. Store UP security activation status for DRB's established between MgNB and UE + Note left of MgNB: 4. Ensure that DRB's to be established with the UE has the same UP security activation status as for previously DRB's established between MgNB and UE + Note right of MgNB: Apply UP security activation status received from MgNB + + UE->>AMF: 1. Establish PDU Session 1 + AMF->>SMF1: + SMF1->>UPF1: + UPF1-->>MgNB: User data + MgNB-->>UE: + UE->>AMF: 3. Establish PDU Session 2 + AMF->>SMF2: + SMF2->>UPF2: + UPF2-->>MgNB: User data + MgNB-->>UE: + MgNB->>SgNB: 5. Establish DC in RAN SN Addition Request (UP security activation status for DRB's established between MgNB and UE) + SgNB-->>MgNB: SN Addition Request Acknowledge(Selected algorithms) + MgNB->>UE: RRC Reconfig/RA + MgNB-->>SgNB: DL data forwarding + SgNB-->>UE: UL data + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the applied UP security activation status for two PDU sessions used for redundant data transmission using DC. The diagram shows interactions between UE, MgNB, SgNB, UPF1, UPF2, AMF, SMF1, and SMF2. Step 1: UE initiates PDU Session 1 establishment. Step 2: MgNB stores UP security activation status. Step 3: UE initiates PDU Session 2 establishment. Step 4: MgNB ensures DRB's for the second session have the same UP security activation status. Step 5: MgNB establishes DC in RAN, sending SN Addition Request to SgNB with security status, receiving acknowledgment, and sending RRC Reconfig/RA to UE. Data flows (User data, DL data forwarding, UL data) are shown between UE, MgNB, and SgNB. + +**Figure 6.8.2-1: Applied UP security activation status for two PDU sessions used for redundant data transmission using DC** + +1. The UE initiates a PDU establishment procedure with the network for a first PDU session. +2. The MgNB stores the UP security activation status used for DRB's established between the MgNB and the UE for the first PDU. +3. The UE initiates a PDU establishment procedure with the network for a second PDU session. +4. The MgNB ensures that the DRB's established between the MgNB and the UE for the second PDU uses the same UP security activation status as used for DRB's established for the first PDU with the same UE. +5. The MgNB establish Dual Connectivity in RAN. The MgNB sends SN Addition/Modification Request to the SgNB including the stored UP security activation status. The SgNB determines whether it can comply with the received UP security activation status for the DRB's established with the UE. The SgNB sends SN Addition/Modification Acknowledge to the MgNB indicating the UP integrity protection and encryption indications to the MgNB. The MgNB sends the RRC Connection Reconfiguration Request to the UE instructing it to configure the new DRBs and/or SRB for the SgNB. + +To resolve issue 2 in clause 6.8.1: + +- The MN shall be preconfigured or have access with/to information of the supported security in the available SN(s) (for example: whether UP integrity protection is supported in the SN or not). The MN shall take this information into account when selecting the SN. In case UP integrity is supported, then such configuration information is not needed. + +### 6.8.3 Evaluation + +The proposed solution address key issue #3: UP security policy handling for multiple PDU sessions established for redundant data transmission in the present document and the security solution for Dual Connectivity (DC) specified in TS 33.501 [3]. + +For solution resolving Issue #1: If the indication for either UP integrity protection or UP encryption or both in the UP security policy enforcement information sent from SMF to the MN, is set to the value "preferred", then this solution ensures that the two redundant paths have the same UP security policy setting. + +For solution resolving Issue #2: In the case the UP security policy enforcement information sent from SMF to the MN, does not allow the value "preferred" as described in Solution #1 "Security solution for handling UP security policy for multiple PDU sessions for redundant data transmission", this solution ensures that the MN knows in advance, even before it has established and activated the DRB's with the UE for the first PDU session, whether the selected SN can comply to the UP security policy enforcement information sent from the MN to the SN, when offloading the DRB's for the second PDU session to the SN. For example if UP integrity protection is "required" but SN does not support UP integrity protection. + +Based on above analysis of the proposed solutions for resolving Issue #1 and Issue#2, this solution is able to meet the potential security requirements of KI #3. + +# --- 7 Conclusions + +# Summary for Key issues and corresponding solutions + +The key issues and the corresponding solutions in the present document are listed in the following table. + +**Table 7.1** + +| | Key issue | Potential security requirements | Potential Solutions | +|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| #1 | Security for redundant transmission | 1) The 5G system shall provide an appropriate security method to protect the redundant transmission.

2) The system shall provide cryptographic separation for radio bearers serving redundant transmissions.

3) The added paths for redundancy shall provide equal level of security compared to single path. | Solution #4: Security support for N3 tunnel redundancy

Solution #5: Security for redundant data transmission

Solution #7: Security for redundant data transmission using Dual Connectivity | +| #2 | Support of security for high reliability by redundant data transmission in user plane | 1) Confidentiality protection over the air shall be supported for UP data via redundant multiple transmission paths.

2) Integrity protection over the air shall be supported for UP data via redundant multiple transmission paths. | Solution #5: Security for redundant data transmission

Solution #7: Security for redundant data transmission using Dual Connectivity | + +| Key issue | Potential security requirements | Potential Solutions | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| #3 UP security policy handling for multiple PDU sessions established for redundant data transmission | 1) If encryption of user plane data is enabled between the UE and the gNB on the first path for a first PDU session, then encryption shall be enabled for redundant user data transmission over a second path for a second PDU session as well.

2) If integrity protection of user plane data is enabled between the UE and the gNB on the first path for a first PDU session, then integrity protection shall be enabled for redundant user data transmission over a second path for a second PDU session as well.

3) When Dual Connectivity is used, the MgNB shall ensure that the UP security policy assigned to the MgNB is forwarded and used by the SgNB for the two PDU Sessions used for redundant data transmission. | Solution #1: Security solution for handling UP security policy for multiple PDU sessions for redundant data transmission.

Solution #3: Security policy handling for redundant transmission

Solution #8: Handling of UP security activation status and selection of SN in Dual Connectivity | +| #4 Security policy for URLLC service | 1) The 5G system shall provide a user plane security policy mechanism applicable to URLLC services.

2) The 5G system shall provide the mechanism for how to enforce User Plane Security Policy when there are URLLC services in the PDU Session.

3) The selection of the security policy shall be under network control. | Solution #3: Security policy handling for redundant transmission

Solution #6: Dynamic UP security policy control for URLLC service | +| #5 Security aspect of low latency handover procedure | The 5G system shall provide the proper security protection for the optimized URLLC handover procedure. | No solution is available yet in the present document. | +| #6 Retaining AS security keys for redundant data transmission in user plane | No potential security requirement is recommended. | Solution #2: Retaining AS security keys for redundant data transmission in user plane. | +| #7 QoS monitoring protection | The 5G system shall be able to protect the 5G E2E QoS Enforcement procedure for a service. | No solution is available yet in the present document. | +| #8 Acceleration of authentication and key agreement procedure for low latency | No potential security requirement is recommended. | No solution is available yet in the present document. | +| #9 Security aspect of low latency Re-authentication procedure | No potential security requirement is recommended. | No solution is available yet in the present document. | +| #10 UP security performance for low latency | No potential security requirement is recommended. | No solution is available yet in the present document. | + +## 7.1 Key Issue #1: Security for redundant transmission + +For Key Issue #1, it is recommended that the normative work proceed as follows: + +- Solution #4 is used as the baseline for ensuring that the security protection in case the redundant traffic is fulfilled by independent N3 tunnels. +- Solution #7 is used as the baseline to ensure security and cryptographic separation for the different radio bearers serving redundant transmissions based on Dual Connectivity architecture. It is agreed that the different UP integrity keys and UP encryption keys are used for the radio bearers serving those redundant transmissions. + +## 7.2 Key Issue #2: Support of security for high reliability by redundant data transmission in user plane + +For Key Issue #2, it is recommended that solution #7 is taken into account as the basis for normative work. + +## 7.3 Key Issue #3: UP security policy handling for multiple PDU sessions established for redundant data transmission + +For Key Issue #3, it is recommended that the solution #8 is used as the basis for the normative work to address the issue of UP security policy handling for multiple PDU sessions established for redundant data transmission. + +## 7.4 Key Issue #4: Security policy for URLLC service + +For Key Issue #4, the normative work shall proceed as follows: + +- Solution #1 is used as the basis for normative work to address how to modify the User Plane Security Policy to be specific for URLLC service. +- It is recommended to take the solution #8 as the basis to address the user plane security policy aspect of URLLC. (See also the conclusion of Key Issue #3.) + +## 7.6 Key Issue #6: Retaining AS security keys for redundant data transmission in user plane + +For Key Issue #6, it is recommended that solution #2 is used as the basis for normative work to address how to retain the AS security keys for URLLC services during the intra-gNB-CU (if the gNB is split into CU and DU) or intra-gNB handover. + +## 7.8 Key Issue #8: Acceleration of authentication and key agreement procedure for low latency + +Authentication and key agreement is essential for network access and shall not be sacrificed to support low latency communication. The AKA delay is only incurred during the very initial registration, while user plane key refresh is quickly performed (e.g., based on the intra-cell handover procedure). Furthermore, URLLC is for user plane traffic according to TR 23.725 [2], hence AKA procedure is irrelevant. Therefore, it is concluded that any AKA optimization is not pursued for URLLC services. + +# --- Annex A: Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|-----------|----|-----|-----|------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190699 | | | | Presented for approval | 2.0.0 | +| 2019-09 | SA#85 | SP-190896 | | | | Revised to introduced the right version of the draft | 2.0.1 | +| 2019-09 | SA#85 | | | | | Change control version | 16.0.0 | +| 2019-10 | | | | | | EditHelp review | 16.0.1 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33841/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33841/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..efb86bea9b8ee67a3136b031484f623cb32f0a40 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33841/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,743 @@ + + +# **3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and Systems Aspects; Security aspects; Study on the support of 256-bit algorithms for 5G (Release 16)** --- --- + +## --- **Keywords** + +--- + +5G,algorithms,security,256 + +## **3GPP** + +## --- **Postal address** + +## --- **3GPP support office address** + +--- + +650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis +Valbonne - FRANCE +Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 + +## --- **Internet** + +--- + + + +## --- **Copyright Notification** + +--- + +No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. +The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. + +© 2019, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC). +All rights reserved. + +UMTSTM is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members +3GPP™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +LTE™ is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners +GSM® and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association + +## Contents + +| | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 5 | +| Introduction ..... | 5 | +| 1 Scope..... | 7 | +| 2 References..... | 7 | +| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 9 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 9 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 9 | +| 4 Threats posed by quantum computing and potential countermeasures..... | 10 | +| 4.1 Introduction ..... | 10 | +| 4.2 Threats to asymmetric cryptography..... | 10 | +| 4.3 Threats to symmetric cryptography..... | 11 | +| 4.4 Threats to hash algorithms ..... | 11 | +| 5 Assessment of quantum computing impact timelines..... | 11 | +| 5.1 Predicted timescales and resources for quantum computing ..... | 11 | +| 5.2 Timelines for transitioning asymmetric algorithms ..... | 12 | +| 5.3 Timelines for transitioning symmetric algorithms ..... | 12 | +| 5.4 Considerations for assessing timelines..... | 12 | +| 6 Impacted NextGen areas ..... | 12 | +| 6.1 Impacted use of asymmetric cryptography ..... | 12 | +| 6.1.1 Introduction ..... | 12 | +| 6.1.2 TLS for service based interfaces ..... | 12 | +| 6.1.3 NDS/IP for non-service based interfaces..... | 13 | +| 6.1.4 SUPI protection ..... | 13 | +| 6.1.5 OAuth in SBA ..... | 13 | +| 6.1.6 N32 Application Layer Security..... | 13 | +| 6.1.7 Network product software package integrity..... | 13 | +| 6.1.8 EAP TLS ..... | 13 | +| 6.1.9 Ephemeral key agreement in primary authentication..... | 13 | +| 6.2 Impacted use of symmetric cryptography ..... | 14 | +| 6.2.1 Introduction ..... | 14 | +| 6.2.2 Ciphering algorithms ..... | 14 | +| 6.2.3 Integrity algorithms ..... | 14 | +| 6.2.4 OTA mechanism..... | 14 | +| 6.3 Impacted use of hash functions ..... | 15 | +| 6.3.1 Introduction ..... | 15 | +| 6.3.2 Key derivation function ..... | 15 | +| 6.3.3 Authentication and key agreement ..... | 15 | +| 7 Study of full entropy 256-bit keys in the 5G key hierarchy..... | 15 | +| 7.1 Risks and mitigations for quasi-random IVs in counter mode..... | 15 | +| 7.1.1 The attacks and their cost ..... | 15 | +| 7.1.2 Applicability to 3GPP use of counter mode ..... | 16 | +| 7.1.3 Mitigations..... | 16 | +| 8 Assessment of the requirement for and impact of a longer MAC ..... | 17 | +| 8.1 Introduction ..... | 17 | +| 8.2 Integrity protection for control and user planes ..... | 17 | +| 8.3 MAC tag length impact on security ..... | 18 | +| 8.4 Impact of a longer MAC tag on network ..... | 18 | +| 8.5 Minimal level of integrity protection ..... | 18 | +| 9 Study of coexistence of different size keys and key size negotiation..... | 18 | +| 9.1 Ensuring system parameters support variable length keys..... | 19 | +| 9.2 Ensuring system parameters support variable length MACs, AKA messages etc..... | 19 | + +| | | | +|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| 9.3 | Ensuring key derivation functions support variable length keys ..... | 19 | +| 9.4 | Using 256-bit keys in New RAN with legacy core ..... | 19 | +| 9.5 | Co-existence between 128-bit and 256-bit key lengths ..... | 20 | +| 9.6 | Co-existence between multiple or variable lengths MAC tags ..... | 20 | +| 9.7 | Reduced complexity of key derivation function negotiation ..... | 20 | +| 10 | Study of desired number of 256-bit algorithms ..... | 20 | +| 10.1 | Overview of existing GSMA/3GPP symmetric algorithms ..... | 20 | +| 10.1.1 | Algorithms for authentication and AKA key generation..... | 20 | +| 10.1.2 | Algorithms for encryption and integrity ..... | 21 | +| 11 | Study the desired performance aspects for the new 256-bit algorithms ..... | 21 | +| 11.1 | Peak data rates ..... | 21 | +| 11.2 | Latency ..... | 21 | +| 12 | Study of key management..... | 22 | +| 13 | Study of individual algorithm details..... | 22 | +| 13.1 | Radio interface encryption and integrity algorithms ..... | 22 | +| 13.1.1 | AES..... | 22 | +| 13.1.2 | SNOW 3G ..... | 22 | +| 13.1.3 | ZUC ..... | 22 | +| 13.2 | AKA algorithms ..... | 22 | +| 13.2.1 | MILENAGE ..... | 22 | +| 13.2.2 | TUAK..... | 22 | +| 13.3 | Key derivation algorithms ..... | 23 | +| 13.3.1 | HMAC-SHA-256 ..... | 23 | +| 14 | Potential requirements..... | 23 | +| 14.1 | Potential requirements for adoption of post-quantum algorithms..... | 23 | +| 14.2 | Potential requirements for longer MAC..... | 23 | +| 15 | Conclusions..... | 23 | +| Annex A: | Change history ..... | 25 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- Introduction + +Quantum computing poses a long-term threat to information security. This may apply to some of the current protection measures in 5G systems. These threats are studied in the present document so as to ensure that 5G systems remain secure also in the future. + +The threats will impact symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms in different ways. The present document focuses on symmetric cryptographic algorithms. In particular, it focuses on the implications of introducing 256 bit cryptographic keys and algorithms. + +The study allows informed decisions on why, when, where, and how symmetric cryptographic algorithms used in 3GPP systems could be strengthened to counter the identified threats. + +**WHY:** Commercial applications (e.g., critical infrastructure, financial, medical, and pharmaceutical) and government organizations may need enhanced protection for confidential information. + +**WHEN:** This study establishes a timeline for the introduction of enhanced protection measures. It is currently not clear when, e.g., quantum computers may pose a realistic threat. The timeline may take into account the following factors: + +- the number of years that data that are sent protected in 5G (over the various interfaces) need to remain secure; +- the number of years it will take to introduce 256-bit keys in the 5G system (standardization and deployment); +- the number of years it takes to decrypt data protected with 128-bit keys, taking into account technological progress. + +The study should also seek to align the security levels and timelines for introducing new asymmetric cryptographic algorithms with those for symmetric cryptographic algorithms in 5G. The reason is that the 5G system also makes use of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, e.g. in network domain security, in untrusted non-3GPP access, and in 5G identity privacy, and it does not make sense to have different security levels for different types of algorithms in the same release of a 5G system. + +**WHERE:** Not all parts of the 5G system may be affected in the same way. The study should therefore investigate the impacts on UE, gNB, and core network entities separately. As an example, the study may investigate whether encryption between the UE and a gNB in an operator network (where the cleartext is available to the operator in the gNB) and encryption between the UE and a core network entity in a slice are affected by the requirements in the same way. + +HOW: The focus of this proposed new work will include, but will not be limited to, supporting 256-bit keys and algorithms, bolstering integrity protection by increasing the size of MAC-I in 5G networks, key derivation, AKA key generation, key distribution, key refresh, negotiation of the key size, and processing of confidential CP/UP/MP information. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document details the following: + +- An assessment of threats and potential countermeasures posed due to quantum computing and a resulting assessment of relevant countermeasures in the 5G system. +- An assessment of the timelines for the introduction of any countermeasures, in particular the increase of key lengths to 256 bits. This includes an alignment with the timeline for strengthening asymmetric cryptographic algorithms used in 5G systems. +- An assessment of which parts of the 5G system will be affected and in which way. +- A Study of full entropy 256 bit keys in the 5G key hierarchy, beginning with the permanent pre-shared key. Including a study into modifying the derivation algorithms in order to derive child keys from the 256-bit master key instead of the 128-bit key. +- A study to determine whether a longer MAC is appropriate for 5G. +- A study of the coexistence of different size keys. In 3GPP networks, 256-bit keys in 5G will need to coexist with 128-bit keys in legacy networks or earlier 5G phases. This includes storage of keys and separate key derivation algorithms both on the UE and in the core network. +- A study into the desired number of 256-bit algorithms, e.g. if two 256-bit AKA key generation algorithm sets are needed. +- A study of the desired performance aspects for the new 256-bit algorithms taking into account software and hardware aspects. +- A study of key size negotiation. +- A study into whether the current methods for distribution and refresh of security keys are equally applicable to larger key sizes and can remain the same. +- A study into the Encryption and integrity algorithms that could be needed. This includes 256-bit session/intermediate keys in 5G, may, in some cases, simply entail using larger-key versions of current algorithms, while in other cases new algorithms may need to be chosen altogether. +- Recommendations for suitable requirements for the needed algorithms for use with 256-bit keys and ask ETSI SAGE to provide those algorithms. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. + - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. + - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] Markus Grassl, Brandon Langenberg, Martin Roettler, Rainer Steinwandt (2015): "Applying Grover's algorithm to AES: quantum resource estimates". + +- [3] Vlad Gheorghiu, Michele Mosca (2017): "GRI quantum risk assessment report: A resource estimation framework for quantum attacks against cryptographic functions". +- [4] Scott Fluhrer (2017): "Reassessing Grover's Algorithm". +- [5] Matthew Amy, Olivia Di Matteo, Vlad Gheorghiu, Michele Mosca, Alex Parent, John Schanck (2016): "Estimating the cost of generic quantum pre-image attacks on SHA-2 and SHA-3". +- [6] Daniel J. Bernstein (2009): "Cost analysis of hash collisions: Will quantum computers make SHARCS obsolete?" +- [7] NISTIR 8105 (2016): "Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography". +- [8] John M. Martinis (2015): "Qubit metrology for building a fault-tolerant quantum computer". +- [9] Martin Roetteler, Michael Naehrig, Krysta M. Svore, and Kristin Lauter: "Quantum Resource Estimates for Computing Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithms". In Proc. ASIACRYPT 2017. +- [10] Austin G. Fowler, Matteo Mariantoni, John M. Martinis, and Andrew N. Cleland: "Surface codes: Towards practical large-scale quantum computation". October 26, 2012. +- [11] Markus Grassl, Brandon Langenberg, Martin Roetteler, and Rainer Steinwandt: "Applying Grover's algorithm to AES: quantum resource estimates". +- [12] MIT Technology Review, Practical Quantum Computers. +- [13] Thomas Häner, Martin Roetteler, and Krysta M. Svore: "Factoring using $2n+2$ qubits with Toffoli based modular multiplication". Quantum Information and Computation, 18(7&8):673–684, 2017 +- [14] 3GPP TS 33.310: "Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)". +- [15] 3GPP TS 33.210: "3G security; Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security". +- [16] 3GPP TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system". +- [17] Void +- [18] Void +- [19] IETF RFC 7515: "JSON Web Signature (JWS)". +- [20] Void +- [21] Void +- [22] Void +- [23] IETF RFC 7519: "JSON Web Tokens (JWT)". +- [24] 3GPP TS 33.117: "Catalogue of general security assurance requirements". +- [25] NIST Special Publication 800-38B: "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication". +- [26] NIST project on Post-Quantum Cryptography. . + +- [27] SOG-IS Crypto Evaluation Scheme: "Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms". + +- [28] Dustin Moody (2018): "Let's Get Ready to Rumble - The NIST PQC 'Competition'". +- [29] NIST (2016): "Submission Requirements and Evaluation Criteria for the Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process". +- [30] Mihir Bellare, Björn Tackmann (2017): "The Multi-User Security of Authenticated Encryption: AES-GCM in TLS 1.3". +- [31] IETF Internet draft: draft-mcgrew-iv-gen: "Generation of Deterministic Initialization Vectors (IVs) and Nonces". +- [32] Report ITU-R M.2410-0: "Minimum requirements related to technical performance for IMT-2020 radio interface(s)", 2017. +- [33] IEEE 802.15.4-2011: "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks--Part 15.4: Low Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPANs)", 2011. +[https://standards.ieee.org/standard/802\\_15\\_4-2011.html](https://standards.ieee.org/standard/802_15_4-2011.html) +- [34] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA)". +- [35] IETF RFC 5689: "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)". +- [36] 3GPP TS 31.115: "Secured packet structure for (Universal) Subscriber Identity Module (U)SIM Toolkit applications". +- [37] ETSI TS 102 225: "Smart Cards; Secured packet structure for UICC based applications". +- [38] Improving the Biclique Cryptanalysis of AES, [http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-19962-7\\_3](http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-19962-7_3). +- [39] The ZUC-256 Stream Cipher, + +- [40] ETSI TS 102 226: "Smart Cards; Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications". +- [41] GlobalPlatform: "Card Specification, Amendment B". + +# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1]. + +**quantum computer:** a computer which makes use of quantum-mechanical effects + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1]. + +| | | +|-----|----------------------------------| +| AKA | Authentication and Key Agreement | +| CK | Ciphering Key | +| DHE | Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral | + +| | | +|-------|-------------------------------------------------------| +| EAP | Extensible Authentication Protocol | +| ECDHE | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral | +| ECIES | Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme | +| GKDF | Generic Key Derivation Function | +| HKDF | HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function | +| HN | Home Network | +| IKEv2 | Internet Key Exchange version 2 | +| IPX | IP Exchange | +| JSON | JavaScript Object Notation | +| KDF | Key Derivation Function | +| NAS | Non Access Stratum | +| NDS | Network Domain Security | +| OTA | Over The Air | +| RES | RESponse | +| RRC | Radio Resource Control | +| SBA | Service Based Architecture | +| SEAF | Security Anchor Function | +| SEPP | Security Edge Protection Proxy | +| SUCI | SUBscription Concealed Identifier | +| SUPI | SUBscription Permanent Identifier | +| TLS | Transport Layer Security | +| UE | User Equipment | + +# --- 4 Threats posed by quantum computing and potential countermeasures + +## 4.1 Introduction + +A quantum computer is a computer which makes use of quantum-mechanical effects. These effects include superposition, which allows quantum bits (qubits) to exist in a combination of several states at once, and entanglement, which allows connections between separate quantum systems such that they cannot be described independently. There exist quantum algorithms that use these effects to solve certain cryptographic problems more efficiently than they could be solved on a classical computer. However, due to the reliance on physical effects quantum computing is inherently error prone, meaning that circuits for quantum algorithms require extra qubits for error correction. This quantum error correction means that the complexity of the quantum computer required to carry out certain quantum algorithms is greater in practice than in theory. With the advances in quantum computing, the security community feels it is important to start preparing our information security systems to be resilient to this potential threat. + +Determining how to cost an attack with a quantum computer is difficult. The number of qubits needs be taken into account, along with the number of quantum gates in the circuit, and the number of sequential evaluations of the gates, called the depth of the circuit. Depth governs how long the calculation will take. With a gate-time of a few nano-seconds, a depth of around $2^{50}$ would take one year to evaluate. + +## 4.2 Threats to asymmetric cryptography + +Shor's quantum algorithm for integer factorization runs in polynomial time on a quantum computer. As the security of RSA relies on the hardness of factorizing large integers, the system's security is terminally undermined by quantum computation. A variant of Shor's algorithm enables a quantum computer to calculate discrete logarithms in polynomial time, both over finite fields and elliptic curves. This variant renders several other public-key cryptosystems insecure, including Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman. + +To counter the threat of quantum computing to asymmetric cryptography it is necessary to swap existing algorithms for new, quantum-resistant algorithms. However, it should be noted that all quantum-resistant key-exchange algorithms currently being considered are much less studied than traditional public key systems such as RSA and Diffie-Hellman. As such, a balance will need to be struck between countering the quantum threat and ensuring the use of stable and tested systems. + +## 4.3 Threats to symmetric cryptography + +Grover's search algorithm offers a theoretical quadratic speed-up on unstructured search problems. This is applicable to symmetric key cryptography as, with use of Grover's algorithm, the N-bit key for a cipher is recovered with $O(2^{N/2})$ serial quantum operations. + +The real speed up offered by Grover's algorithm is difficult to evaluate and depends on a variety of factors including the scheme being analysed, the precise functionality of a quantum computer and the necessity for error-correction codes. There has been limited analysis of the effect of Grover's algorithm on 128-bit block ciphers, but various papers [2] and [3] have calculated that, while the security of AES-128 would be reduced with the development of a quantum computer, it would not fall to 64 bits. However, there has not been any concrete study quantitatively examining the impact of quantum computing on stream ciphers. It should also be noted that Grover's algorithm does not parallelise efficiently, suggesting that the security assumptions to apply in this scenario may be different to those in classical computing. It may be more appropriate to consider attacks that run in bounded time, taking into account the likely capabilities of an attacker and the amount of likely parallelisation [4]. + +To counter this threat to symmetric cryptography from a quantum computer it would certainly suffice to double the key-size of an algorithm, thus doubling the number of bits of classical security. As discussed above there is an ongoing discussion as to whether this response is overly conservative, as the changes would have other business, interoperability and security consequences. + +## 4.4 Threats to hash algorithms + +Grover's algorithm also poses a threat to the security of hash algorithms. As for symmetric algorithms, the theoretical speed-up is quadratic, but it is difficult to evaluate this in a real world scenario. [5] estimates that a single pre-image attack on SHA-256 would take $\sim 2^{166}$ operations, rather than the theoretical $2^{128}$ . Looking at another measure of cryptographic hash security, there is no known quantum algorithm which finds collisions in general hash functions more efficiently than the most efficient classical algorithms [6]. + +# --- 5 Assessment of quantum computing impact timelines + +## 5.1 Predicted timescales and resources for quantum computing + +It is unclear when a quantum computer that threatens cryptography will become available. However, [7] cites an estimate that a quantum computer capable of breaking 2048-bit RSA may be built by 2030 for a cost of one billion US dollars. At the First Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Standardization Conference in 2018, NIST [28] cited another estimate that there is a 1 in 7 chance that some fundamental public-key cryptography will be broken using a quantum computer by 2026, and a 1 in 2 chance of the same by 2031. It is likely that the cost of building a quantum computer will fall rapidly in the years following this. The efficacy of a quantum computer is inherently connected to its fault-tolerance and the requirement for quantum error correcting codes. The estimated number of physical qubits per logical qubit varies by several orders of magnitude ( $10 - 10^4$ ) between different types of physical qubits. It is worth noting that for one type, current estimates for one logical qubit are 3600 physical qubits for quantum error correction [10]. Furthermore [8] describes improving fault tolerance in a scalable architecture as "a potential show stopper for the entire effort". + +NIST's submission requirements, [29], also discuss expected circuit depth restrictions in assessing quantum attacks. Their estimates for the expected number of quantum gate operations that can be done serially in one year is $2^{40}$ , based on predicted developments in quantum computers. + +Two research papers, [9], Table 2 and [13], have estimated the quantum resource needed to break ECC and RSA algorithms based on Shor's algorithm under certain assumptions. They estimate that for current asymmetric cryptographic algorithms $2^{12}$ logical qubits are required, and $2^{40}$ and $2^{50}$ quantum gates with a comparable depth. This implies that commonly used asymmetric cryptographic algorithms are at risk when a quantum computer with $2^{23}$ physical qubits can be built. + +Grassl et al. analysed the quantum resources required to carry out an exhaustive key search for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) by using Grover's algorithm, [11]. The paper suggests that a similar number of + +logical/physical qubits will be required to attack one AES key, but the number of gates required is significantly higher with a total of $2^{86}$ , of depth $2^{81}$ , for AES-128, rising to $2^{151}$ , depth $2^{145}$ , for AES-256. + +The report [12] states that it is conceivable that a $2^{20}$ physical qubit system will be available in 10 years, though it does not give an estimate of the cost. If so, a large-scale quantum computer with sufficient qubits for some cryptographic problems could be built in 10-20 years, which is within the lifecycle of 5G systems and would compromise its asymmetric cryptography. However, [11] also notes that with their estimate of the large circuit depth required to implement Grover's algorithm, "it seems challenging to implement this algorithm on an actual physical quantum computer". This is a conclusion shared by the call for proposals for the NIST PQC standardization [29]. + +## 5.2 Timelines for transitioning asymmetric algorithms + +In 2017 NIST launched a study [26] to evaluate and standardize one or more quantum-resistant public key cryptographic algorithms. Draft standards are expected between 2022 and 2024. Currently no quantum-resistant public key algorithms are standardized by NIST as it is assessed that not enough time has been spent analysing them. IETF is planning to introduce quantum-resistant public key algorithms in protocols (TLS, DTLS, IKEv2, X.509, JOSE, etc.) after NIST standardization + +## 5.3 Timelines for transitioning symmetric algorithms + +The threat to symmetric cryptography from quantum computing is lower than that for asymmetric cryptography. As such there is little benefit in transitioning symmetric algorithms without corresponding changes to the asymmetric algorithms that accompany them. + +## 5.4 Considerations for assessing timelines + +Some data may need to be protected for many years after transmission i.e. have a long security lifetime. Such applications require data to be protected for a given amount of time after transmission to ensure it remains protected throughout its security lifetime against anticipated threats. An attacker may be able to intercept, record and store encrypted traffic or encrypted session keys with the intention to decrypt when it becomes feasible, e.g. with the development of a cryptographically significant quantum computer. The security lifetime requirement should be taken into account when determining timelines for transitioning to quantum resistant algorithms. + +# --- 6 Impacted NextGen areas + +## 6.1 Impacted use of asymmetric cryptography + +### 6.1.1 Introduction + +In clause 6.1, the assumption is made that an attacker has access to a quantum computer with an implementation of Shor's algorithm for integer factorisation and/or the discrete log problem. The threats to cryptographic protocols and algorithms are considered in isolation, with no mitigating factors discussed. Certain attacks rely on the attacker having access to a network. The difficulty and likelihood of these attacks are not addressed in the present document. + +### 6.1.2 TLS for service based interfaces + +TLS is supported by all network functions in the 5G architecture, following the profile given in Annex E of TS 33.310 [14]. On the N32 interface it is recommended to use TLS between the SEPP and the next-hop IPX entity and where there are no IPX entities between two SEPPs TLS is used between them. All mandatory and recommended TLS cipher suites use ECDHE or DHE for key agreement. RSA may also be used as a key agreement algorithm. An attacker with access to the network interfaces where these TLS cipher suites are used may be able to collect these communications and decrypt them. This decryption would not need to take place in real time. + +All TLS cipher suites which are authenticated by a digital signature algorithm also rely on asymmetric cryptography. An attacker with appropriate access could sign communications as if they were a genuine network function and may be able to inject false messages into a network. Only pre-shared key cipher suites are free from this additional risk. + +### 6.1.3 NDS/IP for non-service based interfaces + +Interfaces based on DIAMETER or GTP are protected using NDS/IP as specified in TS 33.210 [15]. When confidentiality protection is required, IKEv2 is used to establish a shared secret. The cryptographic algorithm for this is Diffie-Hellman. Whenever IKEv2 certificate based authentication is used an attacker with appropriate access could sign communications in the same way as described for TLS in clause 6.1.2. + +### 6.1.4 SUPI protection + +In 5G AKA the UE generates a SUCI using a protection scheme based on a home network public key. If the public key encryption scheme used were broken a user could be deanonymized. In the case of ECIES, as specified in Annex C of TS 33.501 [16], an attacker in possession of a HN public key could calculate the private key in advance of a connection, allowing immediate calculation of the SUPI encryption key when the UE public key is seen. In this case, the encryption scheme would offer no privacy protection for the subscriber. + +### 6.1.5 OAuth in SBA + +In SBA the OAuth 2.0 framework is used for Network Function authorization. The observations on TLS in clause 6.1.2 apply to the OAuth framework, as credentials and access tokens should be sent between entities under TLS. + +In addition, there may be other uses of cryptography, for example if the system uses self-encoded access tokens created using JSON Web Tokens [23], which use JSON Web Signatures. If these were broken, an attacker with appropriate access could request resources from a compromised network node that that node should not be authorized to consume. + +### 6.1.6 N32 Application Layer Security + +Application Layer Security on the N32 interface may be used to secure the communications between a service-producing and a service-consuming network function in different PLMNs. The encryption and integrity protection keys for these communications are derived using TLS key export from an N32-c connection. An attacker with access to this connection would be able to collect the N32-c key agreement exchanges, decrypt them as described in 6.1.2 and use these to derive the encryption and integrity keys used to secure N32-f communications. + +When Application Layer Security is used on the N32 interface, any IPX modifications are cryptographically signed using ECDSA as part of the JWS protocol [19]. An attacker with appropriate access could pose as an IPX and sign modifications of N32 messages. + +### 6.1.7 Network product software package integrity + +TS 33.117 [24] sets out the requirement that "the network product shall support software package integrity validation via cryptographic means", e.g. digital signature. An attacker who knew an authorized software source's public key could calculate the corresponding private key and use this to sign a malicious software package to be delivered to devices. + +### 6.1.8 EAP TLS + +Private networks using the 5G system may use EAP TLS for authentication and key agreement, as specified in Annex B of [16]. EAP TLS uses public key algorithms for key agreement. An attacker could decrypt communications sent under keys derived from the calculated pre master secret and non-confidential values such as the client and server random. With appropriate access they could also perform injection attacks as described for TLS in clause 6.1.2. + +### 6.1.9 Ephemeral key agreement in primary authentication + +An ephemeral Diffie-Hellman or ECDH key exchange may be added to 5G-AKA in future releases of 5G. If this is adopted, then an attacker who could collect the public keys of the UE and the network would be able to recover their shared secret. If this attacker also had access to the long-term secret of the UE they would be able to derive the session key for the session and possibly for future sessions depending on implementation. + +## 6.2 Impacted use of symmetric cryptography + +### 6.2.1 Introduction + +In clause 6.2 the assumption is made that an attacker has access to a quantum computer with an implementation of Grover's algorithm. The threats to cryptographic protocols and algorithms are considered in isolation, with no mitigating factors discussed. Certain attacks rely on the attacker having access to a network. The difficulty and likelihood of these attacks are not addressed in the present document. + +The asymmetric methods discussed in clause 6.1 are often used to establish a key for a symmetric cipher. Clause 6.2 includes cases where symmetric algorithms are used with pre-shared keys, i.e. the cases which are not broken if the asymmetric key establishment or encapsulation process falls to Shor's algorithm. + +### 6.2.2 Ciphering algorithms + +128-NEA1, 128-NEA2 and 128-NEA3 use 128-bit keys $K_{UPenc}$ , $K_{RRCenc}$ and $K_{NASenc}$ for User Plane, RRC signalling and NAS signalling encryption respectively. If these algorithms were broken by a quantum computer an attacker could recover the relevant key and decrypt any data encrypted under that stream until the key is updated. + +A more resource intensive attack could recover a subscriber's long-term key. This would require an attacker to know or guess parameters related to both the home and serving network, to model the key derivation algorithm (e.g. MILENAGE) and the inputs to the KDF in the key hierarchy. It would also require a quantum circuit modelling the entire key derivation hierarchy. The complexity of this circuit is not well understood at this time. An attacker doing this would be able to decrypt all traffic belonging to that subscriber which was not encrypted at the application layer. Recovery of the subscriber's long-term key would also allow the attacker to pose as the subscriber to the network. + +### 6.2.3 Integrity algorithms + +128-NIA1, 128-NIA2 and 128-NIA3 use 128-bit keys $K_{UPint}$ , $K_{RRCint}$ and $K_{NASint}$ for User Plane, RRC signalling and NAS signalling integrity protection. If these algorithms were broken by a quantum computer an attacker may be able to recover one of these keys from the MAC-I or NAS-MAC. In the current 5G system the MAC-I and NAS-MAC are 32 bits long meaning that, with a classical attack, at least four messages would be required to recover the key. + +*Editor's Note: It is for further study how many protected messages would be required to recover the key with a quantum attack in this scenario.* + +In this scenario an attacker would be required to recover the integrity protection key quickly enough to use it before a key refresh took place. Having done this the recovered key could be used to verify the integrity of a spoofed message. If an attacker wanted to send an arbitrary message they may also need to recover the corresponding encryption key. + +### 6.2.4 OTA mechanism + +OTA mechanism relies on secured packet structure defined in 3GPP TS 33.115 [36], or Secure Channel Protocols (SCP '80' or SCP '81') to secure communication between a UICC and an OTA server thanks to symmetric cryptography. + +#### Secured packet and SCP '80' + +**Secured packet and SCP '80'** use security mechanism specified in ETSI TS 102 225 [37] and ETSI TS 102 226 [40]. The keys involved to secure communication are **KIc** and **KID**. The key lengths depend on the algorithms being used and are defined as being: + +- 128 bits for two key 3DES +- 192 bits for three key 3DES, +- 128 bits, 192 bits or 256 bits for AES. + +**The choice of secured packet or SCP '80' with AES 256-bit key enables OTA mechanism to resist to an attacker with a quantum computer.** + +#### SCP '81' + +Secure Channel Protocol '81' is specified in Amendment B of Global Platform Card Specification [41], which is based on PSK TLS and defines PSK TLS key set consisting of two kinds of keys: a PSK TLS key and a DEK (decryption/encryption) key. The list of cipher suites for SCP '81' is the following: + +- TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_3DES\_EDE\_CBC\_SHA +- TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA +- TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 +- TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_NULL\_SHA +- TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_NULL\_SHA256 + +If these algorithms were broken by a quantum computer an attacker could recover the relevant key and possibly decrypt/modify data sent over the PSK TLS-based secure channel. + +The DEK key may be used to decrypt or encrypt sensitive data in addition to PSK TLS. Consequently, in scenarios using the DEK key to protect sensitive data, the DEK key could protect against an attacker with a quantum computer. + +## 6.3 Impacted use of hash functions + +### 6.3.1 Introduction + +In 6.3 the same assumptions are made as in clause 6.2. + +### 6.3.2 Key derivation function + +There are two kinds of key derivation functions deployed in the 5G system. One is generic key derivation function (GKDF) defined in TS 33.220 [34], which is used for all key derivations in 5GC as shown in Figure 6.2.2-1 and figure 6.2.2-2 in TS 33.501[16]. The other one is the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) specified in RFC 5869 [35], which has been applied to IKEv2, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3, N32-f, and EAP-AKA' for the key derivation. + +The base of GKDF and HKDF is the keyed hash function HMAC-SHA-256. + +### 6.3.3 Authentication and key agreement + +During 5G AKA, RES\* is sent from the UE to the SEAF in the serving network. An attacker could recover the subscriber's long term key from RES\*, using a quantum circuit modelling the key derivation hierarchy. A similar attack could also be applied to RES in EAP-AKA'. This would require an attacker to know or guess parameters related to both the home and serving network, to model the key derivation algorithm (e.g. MILENAGE) and the inputs to the KDF in the key hierarchy. The complexity of the quantum circuit required for this attack is not well understood at this time. + +# --- 7 Study of full entropy 256-bit keys in the 5G key hierarchy + +## 7.1 Risks and mitigations for quasi-random IVs in counter mode + +### 7.1.1 The attacks and their cost + +When a block cipher is used in counter mode, reuse of the same counter block can in some cases compromise the confidentiality of the system. Three potential attacks are identified. + +**Attack 1:** If the same counter block is used twice with the same key, then there is an immediate and serious loss of security. This means that two different plaintext segments are encrypted by XORing with the same keystream block, + +and hence the attacker can recover the XOR of the two plaintext segments. Depending on the plaintext, this may be enough to recover both plaintext segments in their entirety. + +**Attack 2:** A computationally efficient attack is also possible if the same **predictable** counter block is likely to be used by many different users with different keys. (A simple example of this would be if the first counter block used with a newly computed key is always the zero block.) It may then be worthwhile for the attacker to precompute a large rainbow table, based on the mapping from a variable key and that fixed counter value to a variable keystream block. Whenever a known plaintext block is encrypted with that fixed counter value, the attacker can then use the rainbow table to look up the keystream block and (if successful) recover the key. The probability of success on each occasion depends on the number of keys covered by the rainbow table. Building the table may be computationally demanding, but only has to be done once; the time taken for an individual attack instance can then be much lower. (Note: rainbow tables are not the only possible construction for these look-up tables, but they are typically the most efficient.) + +**Attack 3:** Finally, a multi-target attack is possible if known plaintext is encrypted with the same counter block by many different keys, and if the attacker can collect $2^k$ of these cipher blocks, and thus $2^k$ blocks of keystream, then the attacker would expect to perform $2^{n-k}$ trial encryptions of the counter block to find one match with high probability. Note that the blocks may come from different users, and there is no control over which key is recovered. + +Attack 1 does not involve any kind of key search, and has very low computational complexity. For attacks 2 and 3, it is not clear that there is any impact of quantum computing through Grover's algorithm which is usually phrased in terms of finding as single input to a function that gives one specific output. However, classical computing may reach zetta-scale power by 2030 if Moore's law continues to hold. That means, it is plausible to expect that the most powerful supercomputer in 2030-40, will be able to perform $2^{70}$ FLOPS. A cryptographically significant computation is not equivalent to one floating-point operation (say on a Xeon), so this may equate to fewer cryptographic operations per second per super computer, perhaps around $2^{64}$ . Thus, for instance, Attack 3 with $n=128$ and $k=32$ may take hundreds, if not thousands, of years. For reference, over the previous 20 years, the leading super-computers of the day cost between 100 and 400 million dollars. + +### 7.1.2 Applicability to 3GPP use of counter mode + +3GPP NEA algorithms do not use a random field as an IV. The counter block is constructed as follows: + +- COUNT, 32 bits, increasing per-message sent under the same key to avoid repeated keystreams, different COUNTs are used for different security associations, initialised to 0. +- BEARER, 5 bits +- DIRECTION, 1 bit +- 0-padding, 26 bits +- COUNTER, 64-bit counter incremented per cipher block, initialised to 0 + +The use of COUNT protects effectively against Attack 1. + +For Attacks 2 or 3, an attacker would need to collect all messages with the same COUNT, BEARER, DIRECTION and COUNTER for the attack, as well as to reliably know the plain text. + +**Editor's Note:** it is FFS to what extent and where (NAS, RRC, UP) predictable plain texts will be repeatedly encrypted with any of the different keys and the same counter value in 3GPP systems. + +Either of Attacks 2 or 3 recovers one of the session confidentiality keys. + +### 7.1.3 Mitigations + +The counter block construction described in the previous clause means that counter blocks will indeed be quite predictable and repetitive. This makes both of Attacks 2 and 3 potentially applicable in theory. In practice, a key length of 128 bits means that both attacks are still very computationally intensive, but they are nevertheless more efficient than a straightforward exhaustive key search. + +If the risks are deemed sufficient, a simple mitigation for this threat is to include some random data in part of the counter block to ensure that the counter block is sufficiently unlikely to repeat across large numbers of different users. Alternatively, the key size could be made longer to render the attack impractical, though the attack still implies that the security is affected, and thus to maximise the security of the system, it could be advisable to randomise the IV regardless of the key size. + +In the simple solution case, for NEA1/2/3 the 26 bits of 0-padding could be replaced with a random value. For more security, some of the 64-bit counter could be given over to a random field. The random value need only change when the encryption key changes. It needs to be established if this is sufficient, how many bits should be randomised, and if it introduces any further issues. + +Sharing random bits consumes bandwidth; if it is preferable to avoid this, it may instead be possible to use some bits that would be known to both parties, but that would vary between instances. Some bits from a temporary subscriber identifier might be suitable, for instance – but the options would depend on the particular link being encrypted. + +Many recent security protocols such as TLS 1.3, DTLS 1.3, SRTP, Encrypted Content-Encoding for HTTP, and OSCORE use the unpredictable IV/Nonce Format described in Section 4.4 of [31]. For the 3GPP radio algorithms, a 128-bit randomizer could be used, which would be exclusive-oled (XOR) with the same counter block (COUNT, BEARER, DIRECTION, 0-padding, COUNTER) as the current 3GPP NEA algorithms. This simple solution allows a maximum number of bits to be randomized. In addition, the randomizer can be derived from the same shared secret as the key and kept secret in a similar way as (D)TLS 1.3 and OSCORE, which further strengthens the security, see [30]. + +# --- 8 Assessment of the requirement for and impact of a longer MAC + +**Editor's Note:** This section will contain the study on whether a longer MAC is appropriate for 5G. Note that the higher data rates achievable in 5G should be able to accommodate a reasonable MAC-I size increase without suffering significant performance degradation. It is also to be studied whether an integrity algorithm different from the ones standardized for 5G phase 1 needs to be developed. + +## 8.1 Introduction + +Within 3GPP networks, when a use case requires integrity protection for user plane traffic using a MAC longer than 32 bits, it can currently be achieved using over-the-top application layer integrity protection mechanisms. These require no changes to the 3GPP network. Currently 3GPP networks do not provide native support for a MAC longer than 32 bits, and this support would require changes to the network and protocols. + +**Editor's Note:** It is FFS whether there are security risks that compromise the integrity of the applications if a longer MAC is not supported by 3GPP networks natively and if so, what they are. It is also FFS how the use of longer MAC can be negotiated securely given that there might be legacy networks that do not support longer MAC. + +All (non-null) 5G integrity algorithms use a 128-bit key and result in a 32-bit MAC. If it is deemed that quantum computing requires modification of the confidentiality algorithms to use 256-bit keys, then the integrity algorithms may need to change accordingly. This change is independent of the security requirements on MAC length. + +## 8.2 Integrity protection for control and user planes + +Currently, 3GPP requires integrity protection only for Control Plane traffic for UMTS, EPS, and Rel-15 of 5GS. Integrity protection of User Plane traffic in Rel-15 of 5GS is optional to use. + +It is arguably more expensive to implement larger MAC size for User Plane integrity protection than for Control Plane integrity. However, one can envision a line of services that require levels of OTA integrity protection that are higher than established 32-bit MAC can provide. + +## 8.3 MAC tag length impact on security + +The MAC-I is fundamental for ensuring that messages sent within the 3GPP system have cryptographic integrity protection ensuring they cannot be forged or modified. Currently, 5G specifies the use of MAC algorithms with 128-bit key and a 32-bit MAC tag length. In the case of NIA1 and NIA2, the 32-bit tag length is obtained by truncating the output of the MAC algorithm; NIA1 natively produces a 64-bit tag, while NIA2 produces a 128-bit tag. + +Truncating MAC tags is a common practice, provided that the MAC key length is sufficient to meet the desired security strength of the scheme. However, the MAC tag length does have an impact on security, as it indicates the likelihood that an adversary with no knowledge of the MAC key can present a message and tag that would pass verification. That is, with a 32-bit MAC tag length, a trivial forgery attack would allow an attacker to forge a message after $2^{32}/2$ attempts on average. Short MAC tags could create an unacceptable security risk in systems that allow an attacker to attempt a large number of messages that would be verified by a given MAC key, depending on the system's tolerance for accepting a forged message. Some operator services (e.g., Ultra-Reliable Communications, Critical Communications, Government Communication) may require levels of integrity protection that are beyond the level achieved by a 32-bit MAC. + +While guidance from NIST allows MAC tags as short as 32-bits, it recommends tag lengths of at least 64-bits [25] to reduce the likelihood of accepting forged data. Use of shorter MAC tags may be appropriate in certain constrained use cases where the system is able to limit the number of messages failing verification under a given key. Protocols with high data throughput and long-lived keys should use a MAC tag of at least 64 bits. This guidance is not related to quantum computing. SOG-IS have also made recommendations on MAC length [27]. SOG-IS recommend at least 96 bits, with 64 bits reserved for legacy applications. + +**Editor's Note:** It is for future study and analysis the application of this attack to the specific 3GPP case, i.e. what an attacker can achieve in practice with an attempted forgery attack on 3GPP integrity protection. + +**NOTE:** There are other attacks against integrity algorithms discussed in [25], including replay attacks and collision attacks, but vulnerability to these attacks is affected by factors other than MAC tag length. While on average $2^{32}/2$ messages are required to find a collision between two MACs (for a MAC tag length of 32-bits), collision attacks typically rely on finding two MACs which have the same value before truncation. As such, the block size of the algorithm is more important than the MAC tag length for this attack. Replay attacks are prevented by adding COUNT, BEARER and DIRECTION values to a message before calculating the MAC, thus uniquely identifying that session. Therefore, integrity protected communications are not vulnerable to replay attacks, and this is not affected by MAC tag length. + +## 8.4 Impact of a longer MAC tag on network + +There is no cryptographic overhead in increasing the MAC tag length in the 3GPP integrity algorithms from 32 to 64 bits since the untruncated tag lengths for NIA1 and NIA2 are both at least 64 bits. + +**Editor's Note:** The impact of a longer MAC on the RAN, UE and existing hardware is FFS + +## 8.5 Minimal level of integrity protection + +The currently adopted 32-bit size of MAC-I and the corresponding level of protection should be minimally accepted when integrity protection is applied in 5GS Rel-16 and beyond. + +**Editor's Note:** It is for future study the appropriate length of MAC-I for messages with different risk levels + +# --- 9 Study of coexistence of different size keys and key size negotiation. + +**Editor's note:** This section needs to be reviewed once content in the clauses above has been added. + +**Editor's Note:** This section will contain study on key size negotiation: The security specification should be flexible so as to be easily adapted or upgraded in the future, particularly taking into consideration roaming situations. + +**Editor's Note:** This section will also contain study on coexistence of different size keys: In 3GPP networks, 256-bit keys in 5G will need to coexist with 128-bit keys in legacy networks or earlier 5G phases. This entails storage of keys and separate key derivation algorithms both on the UE and in the core network. + +## 9.1 Ensuring system parameters support variable length keys + +If the 5G system supports 128-bit as well as 256-bit keys, it cannot be assumed that any such key is of a fixed length. Accordingly, all messages, fields and other parameters communicating cipher keys and integrity keys in the 5G system should allow for the fact that the associated key has variable length. + +The entropy of other keys in the key hierarchy ( $K_{\text{SEAF}}$ , $K_{\text{AMF}}$ , $K_{\text{gNB}}$ etc.) is decided by the entropy of long term key. As a general principle, it would be desirable to preserve as much entropy as possible through the key hierarchy. Even if independent 256-bit ciphering and integrity keys derived from 256-bit $K$ is established between the UE and any node, entropy of the keys is 256 bits. Accordingly, messages, fields and other parameters communicating other keys in the hierarchy should allow for the fact that the associated key may have variable length. + +**Editor's Note:** Use of concept of entropy key to describe security parameters is FFS. + +The 5GC and 5GRAN are already required to support the transport of 256-bit symmetric keys as per requirement 5.1.3 in [16]. + +Any public keys in the 5G system may have to be of variable size to provide equivalent security to the different symmetric key lengths. Proposed quantum safe public key algorithms sometimes have very large key sizes (running into many thousands or millions of bits). Accordingly, messages, fields and other parameters communicating public keys should potentially allow for very long message sizes: up to millions of octets. + +To avoid making multiple changes in future specifications, it is proposed not to set upper bounds on key lengths in any key e.g. to use LV or TLV constructions rather than zero-padding keys up to a larger fixed length. + +## 9.2 Ensuring system parameters support variable length MACs, AKA messages etc. + +Using a 256-bit key with – for example – a 32-bit MAC or a 64-bit AUTN or RES looks unusual going forwards. While standardizing increased key lengths, 3GPP should take the opportunity to revise the maximum lengths of other input and output parameters, in order to facilitate a consistent security level. + +Accordingly, all messages, fields and other parameters communicating inputs and outputs to AKA, or output from any integrity algorithm in the 5G system, should allow for variable lengths. Again, to avoid making multiple changes in future specifications, it is proposed not to set upper bounds on lengths in any of these constructions e.g. to use LV or TLV constructions. + +## 9.3 Ensuring key derivation functions support variable length keys + +All key derivation functions should allow for variable length output. In some cases, a derivation function will generate 128-bit keys; in others it will generate 256-bit keys. As identified in point 9.1, intermediate keys in the hierarchy may have variable length as well. To ensure cryptographic separation, the desired output key length or lengths (if several keys are being derived at once) should be provided as an input parameter to the KDF. + +## 9.4 Using 256-bit keys in New RAN with legacy core + +A special concern arises in cases where a new 5G RAN is combined with a legacy LTE core. The gNB could attempt to negotiate 256-bit keys with the UE in such cases, but the core would not be aware of this. + +**Editor's Note:** It needs to be considered if this approach is workable, or introduces more security problems than it potentially solves. + +## 9.5 Co-existence between 128-bit and 256-bit key lengths + +If future releases support 256-bit key size, a secure negotiation protocol has to be established to ensure mitigation against bidding down attacks. + +*Editor's Note: This requires further investigation on how this can be achieved and on the key entropy.* + +## 9.6 Co-existence between multiple or variable lengths MAC tags + +Rel-15 5GS supports 32-bit MAC-I. If future releases support larger MAC-I size(s), a secure negotiation protocol has to be established to ensure mitigation against bidding down attacks. + +*Editors Note: Granularity of application for larger MAC-I is FFS.* + +*Editors Note: This requires further investigation on how this can be achieved.* + +## 9.7 Reduced complexity of key derivation function negotiation + +Support for both variable length keys and variable KDF algorithms would benefit from addressing negotiation of both the size of the keys to derive and the KDF used to derive the keys in the same procedures. Many existing security mechanisms already support KDF negotiation. + +KDF negotiation in the 5G system becomes quite complex because there are many Network Entities that need to negotiate KDFs with the UE, e.g., gNB, AMF, SEAF, AUSF, UDM and potentially introduce additional overhead in the signalling. + +If KDF negotiation is supported in the 5G system design consideration should be taken, for example, to reuse the existing signalling, combine two negotiations, etc. + +# 10 Study of desired number of 256-bit algorithms + +## 10.1 Overview of existing GSMA/3GPP symmetric algorithms + +This clause lists and analyses the existing symmetric GSMA/3GPP algorithms for authentication, AKA key generation, encryption and integrity. + +### 10.1.1 Algorithms for authentication and AKA key generation + +Figure 10.1.1-1 lists the GSMA and 3GPP algorithms for authentication and AKA key generation. Legacy algorithms with keys smaller than 128 bits are no longer recommended and should be phased out due to their short key length. + +**Table 10.1.1-1: Algorithms for authentication and AKA key generation** + +| Cipher | Proprietary | Proprietary | Proprietary | AES | Keccak | +|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------|------------------| +| Input Key Size | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128, 256 | +| Output Key Size | 54 | 54 | 64 | 128 | 128, 256 | +| RES Size | 32 | 32 | 32 | 64 | 32, 64, 128, 256 | +| Name | COMP-128-1 | COMP-128-2 | COMP-128-3 | MILENAGE | TUAK | + +3GPP systems has normally specified two cryptographically strong algorithms for each functionality. Together with algorithm negotiation, this means that the 3GPP systems are strong even if a weakness is found in one of the two algorithms. For AKA key generation with 256-bit keys, as well as RES sizes larger than 64 bits, only one algorithm is currently specified (TUAK based on the Keccak sponge function also used in SHA-3). + +To follow the principle of having two parallel algorithms (which has served cellular systems well), GSMA/3GPP need to standardize a second AKA key generation algorithm for 256-bit keys and longer RES. One possible option being MILENAGE extended with AES-256 in addition to AES-128. + +### 10.1.2 Algorithms for encryption and integrity + +Figure 10.1.2-1 lists the GSMA and 3GPP algorithms for encryption and integrity. Legacy algorithms with keys smaller than 128 bits are no longer recommended and should be phased out due to their short key length. + +**Table 10.1.2-1: Algorithms for encryption and integrity** + +| Cipher | Proprietary | Proprietary | KASUMI
MI | KASUMI
MI | KASUMI | SNOW
3G | SNOW
3G | AES | AES | ZUC | ZUC | +|----------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|---------|------------|------------|----------|----------|----------|----------| +| Key Size | 64 | 64 | 64 | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 | +| Mode | XOR | XOR | f8-mode | f8-mode | CBC-MAC | XOR | CW-MAC1 | CTR | CMAC | XOR | CW-MAC2 | +| Type | ENC | ENC | ENC | ENC | INT | ENC | INT | ENC | INT | ENC | INT | +| MAC Size | - | - | - | - | 32 | - | 32 | - | 32 | - | 32 | +| GSM | A5/1 | A5/2 | A5/3 | A5/4 | | | | | | | | +| GPRS | GEA1 | GEA2 | GEA3 | GEA4 | GIA4 | GEA5 | GIA5 | | | | | +| UMTS | | | | UEA1 | UIA1 | UEA2 | UIA2 | | | | | +| LTE | | | | | | 128-EEA1 | 128-EIA1 | 128-EEA2 | 128-EIA2 | 128-EEA3 | 128-EIA3 | +| NR | | | | | | 128-NEA1 | 128-NIA1 | 128-NEA2 | 128-NIA2 | 128-NEA3 | 128-NIA3 | + +All existing integrity algorithms uses a MAC length of 32 bits. In addition to the algorithms listed in Figure 10.1.2-1, the terms A5/0, GEA0, UEA0, UIA0, EEA0, EIA0, NEA0, NIA0 are used as different names for the NULL algorithm. + +# 11 Study the desired performance aspects for the new 256-bit algorithms + +## 11.1 Peak data rates + +An essential requirement for the new 256-bit algorithms is the ability to achieve the peak data rates of the radio access network they are protecting. If not, the ciphering algorithms may become a latency or throughput bottleneck. The minimum requirement for downlink peak data rates in 5G/IMT-2020 is 20 Gbps [33]. The 256-bit algorithms should be able to achieve such peak rates both when implemented in hardware or software on commodity CPUs. However, all previous 128-bit algorithms standardized for 3G and 4G have been used also in later generations. The 256-bit algorithms should therefore not only be able to achieve the peak data rates of 20 Gbps in 5G/IMT-2020, but preferably also the peak data rates of future generations of mobile networks. + +## 11.2 Latency + +One of the requirements of 5G/IMT-2020 [32] is ultra-low latency communication with only 1ms end-to-end latency. To achieve this, it is important that the 256-bit algorithms have as low latency as possible. As the traffic is typically encrypted and decrypted several times, the latency of the 256-bit algorithms will be added several times to the end-to-end latency. + +# --- 12 Study of key management + +**Editor's Note:** This section will study key management, key distribution and key refresh. It should include whether the current methods for distribution and refresh of security keys are equally applicable to larger key sizes and can remain the same. + +# --- 13 Study of individual algorithm details + +## 13.1 Radio interface encryption and integrity algorithms + +### 13.1.1 AES + +It would be natural to adapt the encryption and integrity algorithms based on 128-bit AES to use 256-bit AES instead. There are published attacks that are notionally very slightly better than exhaustive search on 256-bit AES [38], but in practice it remains a completely standard choice of strong algorithm. + +The AES-modes used in Rel-15 of the 5G system are 128-bit AES in CTR mode and 128-bit AES in CMAC mode. These modes were introduced in 3GPP in Rel-8 for LTE. If 256-bit AES is to be introduced, newer AES-modes, e.g. GCM, could be taken into consideration in a possible normative phase for possible performance improvements. + +### 13.1.2 SNOW 3G + +The internal state of the SNOW 3G keystream generator is more than 512 bits. Furthermore, SNOW 3G is adapted (strengthened) from SNOW 2.0, which was designed in the first place to support keys up to 256 bits. While more study is needed, it seems plausible that SNOW 3G (and the encryption and integrity algorithms based on it) may be able to support a 256-bit key without significant change. + +### 13.1.3 ZUC + +ZUC-256 [39], the successor to ZUC, supports 256-bit key length. The ZUC-256 is specifically designed for the 5G System that will support 256-bit algorithms. The internal state of ZUC is 560 bits. ZUC-256 uses the same key stream generation function as ZUC, so when ZUC-256 is implemented in hardware, it can reuse the circuit designed for ZUC. The MAC tag generation of ZUC/ZUC-256 is different from AES and SNOW. ZUC-256 supports 32/64/128-bit MAC tag. It is recommended that the evaluation of ZUC-256 should be started as soon as possible to determine if it can meet the security requirements of 5G systems. + +## 13.2 AKA algorithms + +### 13.2.1 MILENAGE + +MILENAGE is built around AES. The same observations apply as in clause 13.1.1. It should be reasonably straightforward to create a 256-bit version of MILENAGE (although some slight construction changes would be needed to produce 256-bit output values). + +### 13.2.2 TUAK + +TUAK is already designed to accommodate 256-bit keys, and produce 256-bit outputs, if required. + +## 13.3 Key derivation algorithms + +### 13.3.1 HMAC-SHA-256 + +The KDF used for many purposes in 3GPP is based on HMAC-SHA-256. Using HMAC-SHA-256 to derive (up to) 256-bit keys from 256-bit keys is in line with standard advice. + +# --- 14 Potential requirements + +## 14.1 Potential requirements for adoption of post-quantum algorithms + +There is an established long term threat to the asymmetric algorithms used in 5G. As there are currently no approved quantum safe replacements for existing asymmetric algorithms, methods which rely on these algorithms should be designed so that quantum safe mechanisms can be introduced later in a way that is protected from bid down attacks. + +Where non-3GPP protocols are used in the 5G system, software implementations should be kept up to date to ensure quantum safe algorithms can be adopted once they are available. The 3GPP profiles for these protocols in [15] should also be updated to include support for quantum safe algorithms. + +3GPP methods that use Diffie-Hellman or other asymmetric algorithms for key agreement, should be extensible to include new quantum safe key agreement mechanisms and tolerant of longer messages to deliver these key agreements. The SUPI privacy mechanism available in 5G is already extensible and when quantum safe key encapsulation mechanisms are approved an appropriate one should be chosen and added as a default SUPI encryption profile. + +It should be assumed that new applications of asymmetric algorithms to the 3GPP system will be required to transition to post-quantum alternatives in the lifetime of the system. Therefore, the impact of longer key sizes and cipher text sizes should be assessed when designing protocols using asymmetric cryptography. + +Once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer is believed to exist it should be possible for network products to validate software updates using quantum safe signature algorithms. + +Evaluation of 256-bit ciphering and integrity algorithms should begin, to ensure that such algorithms are available if they are required for the 5G system. + +A consistent level of security should be maintained in the 5GC and 5GRAN, taking into account encryption, physical security and respective threat models. + +## 14.2 Potential requirements for longer MAC + +Some 5G operator services may potentially require greater assurance of integrity than that provided by a 32-bit MAC. A bid-down protected mechanism to support a 64-bit MAC for integrity protection of the control and user plane in 5GS Rel-16 could be considered. + +# --- 15 Conclusions + +While timelines for quantum computing are difficult to estimate, it is possible that a cryptographically relevant quantum computer will be developed within the lifetime in the 5G system. Any such computer is likely to terminally undermine the security of all asymmetric algorithms in common use today. The effect of a quantum computer on symmetric algorithms is more difficult to assess, but the existence of a quantum computer will change the applicable security model. + +The majority of asymmetric algorithms in use in the 5G system are used as part of a non-3GPP protocol. For example, IPsec and TLS are used widely, while JWS is used in N32 Application Layer Security. The present document recommends that the 3GPP profiles for these protocols, defined in [15], are updated to include support for quantum-safe algorithms once these are available. + +All mandatory non-null SUPI encryption profiles rely on the security of elliptic curve cryptography, which is broken by Shor's algorithm. Therefore, to protect SUPI from an attacker with a quantum computer a new profile will be required. Currently there are no recommended quantum safe algorithms to replace existing asymmetric key agreement and key encapsulation mechanisms. Recommendations from NIST are expected between 2022 and 2024. Despite this, the 5G system needs to be prepared to transition to quantum safe algorithms. It is not yet clear what classes of algorithm will be favoured by NIST and as such it is difficult to predict what key sizes and ciphertext sizes the system will be required to support. However, these could be hundreds of thousands or even millions of bytes. Therefore, it is recommended that wherever the SUCI is included in a message, the field is suitably sized. + +Where new security features are introduced into the 5G system, it can be assumed that any asymmetric cryptography will be required to transition to quantum safe algorithms at some point in the future. These security features should be assessed to ensure that the large key and cipher text sizes do not introduce performance issues and should be designed to be extensible to new algorithms in a bid down protected manner. + +It should be noted that in many cases it is already possible to apply 256 bits of classical security to 5G User Plane traffic. In particular, 256-bit block ciphers can be used in IPsec and HTTPS traffic that is carried over the RAN. In addition, the 5GC and 5GRAN are already required to support the transport of 256-bit keys and a 256-bit long term key can be used as input to TUAK. + +Since the practical impact of Grover's algorithm is not yet well understood the post-quantum security of symmetric algorithms is difficult to evaluate at this time. However, based on current estimates for the requirements to implement Grover's algorithm, the present document has concluded that there is no immediate need to transition to 256-bit key lengths. + +Despite the above conclusion, the 5G system may be required to support 256-bit algorithms in future releases. As the evaluation of new algorithms takes time, it is proposed that this work should start now. + +# Annex A: Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|-----------|-----------|------|-----|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2017-11 | SA3#89 | S3-173462 | - | - | - | S3-173247, S3-173248, S3-3281, S3-173478 and S3-173385 as agreed at SA3#89 | 0.1.0 | +| 2018-03 | SA3#90bis | S3-180936 | - | - | - | Added S3-180937, S3-180938, S3-180171, S3-180939 and S3-180718 as agreed at SA3#90bis | 0.2.0 | +| 2018-04 | SA3#91 | S3-181559 | - | - | - | Added S3-181558, S3-181459, S3-181560, S3-181561, S3-181563 and S3-181278 | 0.3.0 | +| 2018-05 | SA3#91bis | S3-182074 | - | - | - | Added S3-182073 | 0.4.0 | +| 2018-08 | SA3#92 | S3-182676 | - | - | - | Added S3-182675 | 0.5.0 | +| 2018-09 | SA3#92bis | S3-183169 | - | - | - | Added S3-182980, S3-183165, S3-182961, S3-182978, S3-183014, S3-183166 and S3-183167 | 0.6.0 | +| 2018-11 | SA3#93 | S3-183758 | - | - | - | Added S3-183757, S3-183759, S3-183760, S3-183761, S3-183762, S3-183763, S3-183764, S3-183767, S3-183768 and S3-183765 | 0.7.0 | +| 2018-12 | SA#82 | SP-181034 | | | | EditHelp/MCC revision. Presented for approval | 1.0.0 | +| 2018-12 | SA#82 | | | | | Upgrade to change control version | 16.0.0 | +| 2018-09 | SA#83 | SP-190098 | 0001 | - | D | Editorial changes recommended by Edithelp | 16.1.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33905/1c953f32bd34345dfd68fddf8a3736d6_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33905/1c953f32bd34345dfd68fddf8a3736d6_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1c3fb8ebea7595d2318e29eae7d035c387e1e4c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33905/1c953f32bd34345dfd68fddf8a3736d6_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:6392fa4be5799cefac659d508b61f2fa66da434dee3e40fa6c830225623d9a46 +size 29791 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33905/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33905/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..30fe9fbcd1db669970639711373cb9f620944de3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33905/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,344 @@ + + + + + + +# Contents + +| | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 4 | +| Introduction ..... | 4 | +| 1 Scope..... | 5 | +| 2 References..... | 5 | +| 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations..... | 5 | +| 3.1 Definitions..... | 5 | +| 3.2 Abbreviations ..... | 6 | +| 4 Recommendations for trusted open platforms in 3GPP Release 7 ..... | 7 | +| 4.1 Recommendations from the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture ..... | 7 | +| 4.1.1 Study of GBA in open trusted platforms ..... | 7 | +| 4.1.2 Recommendation..... | 10 | +| 4.2 Recommendations from I-WLAN..... | 10 | +| 4.3 Generalized recommendations ..... | 12 | +| 4.3.1 Study of credential security in open trusted platforms ..... | 12 | +| 4.3.2 Recommendation..... | 14 | +| Annex A: Change history ..... | 15 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- Introduction + +Securing the storage, processing, and input and output of sensitive data on an open platform are of critical importance. Also, isolation of applications that are managing (U)SIMs and (U)SIM readers, EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA protocols, and SAP applications from untrusted applications is imperative. Protecting the interface between the trusted open platform and the UICC is also of critical importance. + +Therefore, it is very much desirable that the Open Platform must have secure authentication and authorization mechanisms to protect against eavesdropping, and malicious modification of sensitive data and operator applications residing on the Open Platform. + +Consequently, for the diverse 3GPP usage models of the Open Platform, such as the ones described in 3GPP TS 33.234, appropriate trust recommendations need to be outlined to counteract the threats. This document describes trust recommendations for the usage models described in 3GPP. + +# --- 1 Scope + +This technical report investigates relevant trust standards and technologies, both existing as well as the ones that are work-in-progress. It develops the recommendations for trusted open platforms for delivery of new applications and services to open platforms. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions, which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. + - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. + - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. +- [1] 3GPP TS 33.220: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture". +- [2] 3GPP TS 33.234: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Service and System Aspects; 3G Security; Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking security". +- [3] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". + +# --- 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 [3] and the following apply. + +**Application Specific Credentials:** These are credentials e.g. keys, identifiers and related data, that are application specific and need to be protected against malicious access and only to be released to authorized applications acting as a Orpheus client. The application specific credentials might be stored or generated in the UICC or in the Persephone server. The application specific credentials can be generated from a master secret, randomly or be set by the user. + +**Charon Fine Grained Access Control:** The access control policy in the terminal controls which authorized applications in the terminal have access to certain application specific application credentials, i.e., only certain application in the terminal is allowed to application specific credentials that can be used with certain applications. + +**Coarse-grained access control policy:** In GAA context, the access control policy in the terminal controls whether an application is authorized to have access to NAF specific GAA credentials. Therefore, the application has access to all possible NAF specific GAA credentials. The coarse-grained access control policy may be stored in the UICC or in the ME. + +**Credential Generator:** The credential generator generates the application specific credentials and the master secret. It might also generate directly the application specific credentials without a master secret. The Credential Generator might be part of an application or co-hosted together with an application. + +**Fine-grained access control policy:** In GAA context, the access control policy in the terminal controls which authorized applications in the terminal have access to certain NAF specific GAA credentials, i.e., only certain + +application in the terminal is allowed to GAA credentials that can be used with certain NAFs. The fine-grained access control policy may be stored in the UICC or in the ME. + +**GAA Client:** A software component in the terminal that communicates with a NAF in the network. The GAA client uses GAA credentials to authenticate and possibly otherwise secure the communication with the NAF in the network. GAA client uses the API provided by the GAA Server to gain access to the GAA credentials. + +**GAA Credentials:** Consists of a bootstrapping transaction identifier (B-TID), one or two NAF specific keys, and a lifetime of those keys. If the terminal is equipped with GBA\_U unaware UICC, then there is only one key (the GBA\_ME NAF specific key) that derived by the GAA Server from the GAA master secret and given to the GAA client for further usage with the NAF. If the terminal is equipped with GBA\_U aware UICC, then there are two keys that are derived from the GAA master secret in the UICC: one key ( $Ks\_int\_NAF$ ) that stays and is used in the UICC, and one that is given to the ME and is used in the ME ( $Ks\_ext\_NAF$ similar to the GBA\_U unaware key). + +**GAA Master Secret:** GAA master secret $Ks$ [1] is established during the bootstrapping session between the terminal (i.e., GAA Server for GBA\_ME and UICC for GBA\_U) and the BSF. The GAA master secret is used as a key to derive further NAF specific keys that can be used between the GAA clients and the NAFs. If the terminal is equipped with GBA\_U unaware UICC, then the GAA Master secret is stored in the GAA server and GBA\_ME is used. If the terminal is equipped with GBA\_U aware UICC and GBA\_U is used, then the GAA Master Secret is stored in the UICC. + +GAA Master Secret stored in the GAA server corresponds to GAA Master Secret established with a terminal equipped with GBA\_U unaware UICC (GBA\_ME procedure used). + +**GAA Server:** The software component in the terminal responsible for communicating with the SIM/USIM/ISIM application in the UICC, and with the BSF during bootstrapping procedure. The GAA server also functions as a public API towards the GAA clients in the terminal. + +**Master Secret:** The Master Secret is a master secret that serves as a basis for later key derivations. The Master Secret is established between the terminal (i.e., Persephone Server) and the network. The master secret is used as a key to derive further application specific credentials that can be used between the Orpheus clients and the application. Not every application derives its credentials from a master secret. + +**Orpheus Client:** A software component in the terminal that communicates with an application in the network. The Orpheus client application specific credentials to perform security functionalities. Orpheus Client uses the API provided by the Persephone Server to gain access to the Application Specific Credentials. + +**Persephone Server:** The software component in the terminal responsible for communicating with the SIM/USIM/ISIM application in the UICC, and with external entities for possible key generation processes. The Persephone server also functions as a public API towards the Orpheus Clients in the terminal. + +**Styx Coarse Grained Access Control:** The access control policy in the terminal controls whether an application is authorized to have access to application specific application credentials. Therefore, the application has access to all possible application specific credentials. + +NOTE: The Greek Mythology was used in this Technical Report to minimize conflicts with other existing security specifications. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +The abbreviations of TR 21.905 [3] apply, for the Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) specific abbreviations we refer to [1] and for the I-WLAN specific abbreviations see [2]. In case of conflict, [1] and [2] take precedence. + +# 4 Recommendations for trusted open platforms in 3GPP Release 7 + +## 4.1 Recommendations from the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture + +### 4.1.1 Study of GBA in open trusted platforms + +Figure 4-1 depicts the GAA related functionalities in the terminal. In relation to the GAA architecture, the GAA server communicates with the BSF server over Ub reference point, and with the UICC through the relevant device drivers, for example. The GAA client communicates over the network with a NAF server and the GAA server to obtain the NAF specific GAA credentials. When a NAF server requests a GAA client to authenticate itself with GAA credentials, the client communicates with the GAA server for GAA credentials specific to that NAF. + +![Diagram of GAA related modules in terminal. The diagram shows a 'Terminal' box containing 'UICC', 'Device drivers', 'GAA server', and 'GAA client'. The 'UICC' is connected to 'Device drivers'. 'Device drivers' are connected to 'GAA server'. 'GAA server' is connected to 'GAA client'. Below the 'Terminal' box, the 'GAA server' is connected to a 'BSF' box via a 'Ub' reference point. The 'GAA client' is connected to a 'NAF' box via a 'Ua' reference point. The 'BSF' box is connected to the 'NAF' box via a 'Zn' reference point.](1c953f32bd34345dfd68fddf8a3736d6_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + subgraph Terminal + UICC[UICC] <--> DD[Device drivers] + DD <--> GS[GAA server] + GS <--> GC[GAA client] + end + GS -- Ub --> BSF[BSF] + GC -- Ua --> NAF[NAF] + BSF -- Zn --> NAF + +``` + +Diagram of GAA related modules in terminal. The diagram shows a 'Terminal' box containing 'UICC', 'Device drivers', 'GAA server', and 'GAA client'. The 'UICC' is connected to 'Device drivers'. 'Device drivers' are connected to 'GAA server'. 'GAA server' is connected to 'GAA client'. Below the 'Terminal' box, the 'GAA server' is connected to a 'BSF' box via a 'Ub' reference point. The 'GAA client' is connected to a 'NAF' box via a 'Ua' reference point. The 'BSF' box is connected to the 'NAF' box via a 'Zn' reference point. + +Figure 4-1 GAA related modules in terminal + +The inherent feature of open platforms is that new applications can be installed to the terminal. In relation to GAA, this poses a security threat when a malicious application is installed in a type of terminal that does not protect GAA related functionalities. The GAA related security threats are as follows: + +- A malicious application can access the UICC directly and therefore can function as a GAA server, which can then communicate with both the UICC and the BSF, and hence, establish the GAA master secret. +- The malicious application can access the GAA server private data, and gain access to the GAA master secret stored in the GBA\_ME case, in the GAA server. +- The malicious application can access the GAA server API, and obtain NAF specific GAA credentials by requesting them from the GAA server.1 + +In all these cases, the malicious application can send either the GAA master secret that is stored in the GBA\_ME case in the GAA server, or one or more NAF specific GAA credentials to the network. In this case, two attacks can be imagined: an attacker can masquerade as a NAF towards the terminal, or an attacker can masquerade as a UE towards a NAF. In both cases the attack can result a loss of private data, or unauthorized usage of the service. Also, the malicious application can itself masquerade as a UE towards a NAF, and gain access to the service provided by the NAF. + +The first two threats can be mitigated by restricting access to the UICC, and the GAA server private data (see recommendations 1 and 2). + +The third threat can be mitigated by restricting the access to the GAA server API to authorized applications (see recommendation 3). The decision whether an application is authorized is done by the terminal manufacturer, the operator, or the user (see recommendations 4 and 5). This can be called the **coarse-grained** access control method, where an authorized application has access to all possible NAF specific GAA credentials. + +1 We don't explicitly consider the threat that a malicious application may steal NAF specific GAA credentials from another application, which has obtained them legitimately. We assume that the platform supports per-application protection of memory and storage. + +The coarse-grained access control method is enough for applications that have been authorized by the terminal manufacturer, or the operator. + +However, if the user grants the authorization to the application, there may be a need for a **fine-grained** access control method. Users are not considered to be careful security wise, e.g., a user may grant the authorization to an application simply because an application just requests it. Therefore it may be required that the certain NAF specific GAA credentials are limited only to certain applications and user installed applications, even with GAA access authorization, would not have access to them. For example such credentials might give access to operator's NAF servers. Recommendation 6 addresses this issue. + +To be useful, the fine-grained access control needs to be configured. First, the manufacturer or the operator may pre-configure the terminal (recommendation 7). Second, the operator may wish to update the configuration (recommendation 8). Finally, the user may add new policies to the configuration (recommendation 9). Note that a policy set by a user will not override a policy set by an operator or a manufacturer. However, the step two implies that an operator can override or modify a policy set by the manufacturer. + +These are the recommendations identified to achieve the GAA security in the open platform terminals: + +**Table 4-1: Recommendations** + +| ID | Recommendations | Commentas | +|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1 | It is possible for the platform to control access to the UICC. | Only authorized applications should have access to the UICC. Otherwise malicious application can perform the GAA server functionalities, establish the GAA master secret with the BSF server, send out the master secret (in case that the terminal is equipped with GBA_U unaware UICC), and thus generate all the GBA_ME NAF specific keys offline (outside the terminal), send out the received NAF specific key (Ks_ext_NAF) in case that the terminal is equipped with GBA_U aware UICC (online). | +| 2 | It is possible for the platform to restrict the access to GAA master secret of the GAA server. | If the GAA master secret in the GAA server in the case of GBA_ME is not protected, a malicious application can get access to it, send it out from the terminal, and the attacker can generate the GBA_ME NAF specific keys offline (outside the terminal). | +| 3 | It is possible for the platform to control general access in coarse-grained model to the GAA server so that an unauthorized application are not be able to get any NAF specific GAA credentials from the GAA server. | If a malicious application can gain access to the GAA server, it can generate all the NAF specific keys online (in the terminal) in case of GBA_ME and in the case of GBA_U it gains access to Ks_ext_NAF. | +| 4 | It is possible that an application is granted access to the GAA server by the manufacturer, or the operator. | The manufacturer or the operator must make sure that the application that is granted access to the GAA server is not malicious or have security flaws. | +| 5 | It is possible that an application is granted access to the GAA server by the user provided that such access is not prevented by manufacturer or operator policy. (See the next recommendation) | User may grant access to a malicious application simply because the application requests to have access. | +| 6 | In addition to recommendations 3, 4, and 5, it is possible to control the access to certain NAF specific GAA credentials in more fine-grained level, where access to certain NAF specific GAA credentials can be restricted to certain applications only. | This recommendation can protect against malicious applications that try to get access to certain NAF specific GAA credentials. | +| 7 | In addition to recommendation 6, the manufacturer can pre-configure the fine-grained access control policy on the terminal or the operator can pre-configure the fine-grained access control policy on the terminal or UICC. | | + +| | | | +|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 8 | In addition to recommendation 6, the operator can update all fine-grained access control policies on the terminal or the UICC. | | +| 9 | In addition to recommendation 6, the user can add new fine-grained access control policies to the terminal or the UICC. | The user may only add and modify user's own policies. The user cannot change policies set by the manufacturer or the operator. | + +The recommendations in Table 4-1 can be divided in to three groups the following way: + +- **Group 1:** To provide the basic GAA related security in the terminal, recommendations 1 to 4 must be enforced. The basic GAA security includes controlling access to UICC and to GAA master secret, controlling access to the GAA server, and only the manufacturer or the operator can grant access to the GAA functionality for the application. +- **Group 2:** If access to GAA functionality for applications can be granted by the user then the recommendation 5 must be enforced. +- **Group 3:** If more fine-grained access to the GAA functionality is wanted as described above, then recommendations 6 to 8 must be enforced. Recommendation 9 must be enforced if the user can grant access to GAA functionality for an application + +If there are applicable access control policies stored in the UICC and the terminal, then access control policies stored on the UICC should take precedence over access control policies stored in the terminal. If the user is not allowed to grant access to GAA functionality for an application, it is enough to enforce the recommendation group 1. In this case, only the manufacturer or the operator can have granted access to GAA functionality for an application, and therefore it should be assumed that the application is trusted. + +If the user is allowed to grant access to GAA functionality for an application, then naturally both recommendation groups 1 and 2 need to be enforced. In this case, the user is allowed to grant access to GAA functionality and user may do this for any application that requests this access. It should be assumed that a malicious application might thus gain access to GAA functionality in the terminal. + +If the user is allowed to grant access to GAA functionality for an application, then for added protection, the recommendation group 3 should be enforced as well. This would enable GAA functionality to protect certain NAF specific GAA credentials that have more value -- such as NAFs that belong to the operator. + +Another alternative is that the GAA server will show a dialog window to the user whenever an application (that does not have access to GAA functionality granted by the manufacturer or the operator) attempts to gain access to GAA functionality. The dialog would show the application name, the NAF name (i.e., the FQDN of the NAF server), and ask whether this application is allowed to gain access to the GAA credentials for this particular NAF. The user would have the choice of either granting or denying access. The dialog could also offer to remember the decision made by the user, and the GAA server would remember this decision for the next time the same application requests the same NAF specific GAA credentials. + +User interaction on security is a common source of misunderstandings, hence user interaction should be minimized to obtain a good usage experience and minimize security risks. The access to the GAA functionality and sensitive GAA material should only be granted by operators or manufacturers. Third parties could have contractual relationships with operators or manufactures and therefore could obtain access to the GAA functionality using this relationship using digital signatures. + +The trust an NAF or the terminal application can put into the NAF-specific credentials depends on the underlying security baseline used for the generation and storage of Ks\_(ext/int)\_NAF. In an open trusted platform, and also in a closed platform, the application in the terminal might not be aware what kind of security baseline has been used and therefore is not able to enforce an security level information in the client application in the terminal. In principle, the NAF can receive this information from the BSF and stop service delivery when the security level is not sufficient. But to be able to do this, first the UE contacts the NAF, the NAF contact the BSF, the BSF contacts the HSS and then returns the information to the NAF. This may result in the fact that the user pays for the contact to the NAF, without being able to obtain the service and generates network load, without any kind of revenue generation. The UE may have information on the required security level e.g. received in form of a flag or preconfigured. + +The GAA server in the UE has knowledge about the security baseline used for the generation and storage of Ks\_(int/ext)\_NAF, but if the GAA client application has information on the security requirements from the network, it + +can not enforce it without obtaining information from the GAA server on the actually used security method. The application in the terminal requests the GBA specific credentials from the GBA server. The response contains the credentials and the underlying security method used e.g. + +- USIM with GBA\_U aware UICC +- USIM without GBA\_U aware UICC +- ISIM with GBA\_U aware UICC +- ISIM without GBA\_U aware UICC +- Legacy GBA + +The application in the terminal can then process this information further, depending on the used Ua protocol, e.g. comparing the received information that may be received in form of a flag over the Ua reference point with configured security level information. + +### 4.1.2 Recommendation + +This technical report recommends that only recommendation group 1 in the previous clause is required. As user interaction on security is not desired and may cause breaches in GAA terminal security group 2 should be not be required. Recommendation group 3 is not needed as group 2 was excluded. + +## 4.2 Recommendations from I-WLAN + +The threats and recommendations described in 4.1 are also valid for I-WLAN. In I-WLAN there is a UE functionality split case, this case is also called split terminal. In this case the UICC/SIM card may reside in a 3GPP ME (acting as a (U)SIM "server") and be accessed by a WLAN-UE (acting as the (U)SIM "client") through local link (e.g. Bluetooth, Infrared or USB), and has the following additional requirements from [2]: + +- Whenever someone tries to remotely access a (U)SIM some sort of alert shall be sent, e.g. a message shall be displayed informing the user of the attempted access and guiding him to choose "Allow", or "Disallow". The user can then decide whether the access is authorized or not and can opt for allow or disallow the access. +- The UICC holding device shall be responsible for scheduling all (possibly concurrent) accesses to the UICC by itself, and by one additional device connected via the local interface. +- Applications/Data information could be retrieved from (U)SIM, provided that the UICC (or SIM card) is inserted in a 3GPP ME. When the (U)SIM is re-used over local interfaces, further access control on the Applications/Data information shall be applied by the 3GPP ME holding the (U)SIM. + +The new applications can be installed to the terminals (3GPP ME or WLAN-UE). This poses a security threat when a malicious application is installed in a type of terminal that does not protect I-WLAN related functionalities correctly. The related security threats are as follows: + +- A malicious application can trigger the UICC and get the (Kc, IK, CK, MSK) from the UICC. +- The malicious application can access the copy of the keys (Kc, IK, CK, MSK) stored in ME. + +In all these cases, the malicious application can send either the (Kc, IK, CK, MSK) secret, or one or more specific credentials to the network. In this case, two attacks can be imagined: an attacker can masquerade as a network element towards the terminal, or an attacker can masquerade as a UE towards the network. In both cases the attack can result a loss of private data, or unauthorized usage of the service. + +These threats can be mitigated by restricting access to the UICC, and the 3GPP ME private data (see recommendations 1 and 2). + +These are the recommendations identified to achieve the I-WLAN security in the open platform terminals: + +**Table 4-2: Recommendations** + +| ID | Recommendations | Comments | +|----|-----------------|----------| +|----|-----------------|----------| + +| | | | +|---|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1 | It is possible for the platform to control access to the UICC. | Only authorized applications should have access to the UICC. | +| 2 | It is possible for the platform to restrict the access to the keys stored in the 3GPP ME. | If the keys in the 3GPP ME is not protected, a malicious application can get access to it and send it out from the terminal. | +| 3 | It is possible that an application is granted access to the keys in 3GPP ME by the manufacturer, or the operator. | The manufacturer or the operator must make sure that the application that is granted access to the keys in the 3GPP ME is not malicious or have security flaws. | +| 4 | It is possible that an application is granted access to the keys in 3GPP ME by the user provided that such access is not prevented by manufacturer or operator policy. | User may grant access to a malicious application simply because the application requests to have access. The access to the keys stored in 3GPP ME can be restricted to certain applications only. | +| 5 | The manufacturer can pre-configure the access control policy on the terminal or the operator can pre-configure the access control policy on the terminal or UICC. | | +| 6 | The operator can update all access control policies on the terminal or the UICC. | | +| 7 | The user can add new access control policies to the terminal or the UICC. | The user may only add and modify user's own policies. The user cannot change policies set by the manufacturer or the operator. | + +The recommendations in Table 4-2 can be divided in to three groups the following way: + +- **Group 1:** To provide the basic security in the terminal, recommendations 1 to 4 must be enforced. The basic security includes controlling access to UICC and the (Kc, IK, CK, MSK) used in I-WLAN, controlling access to the derived secrets, and only the manufacturer or the operator can grant access to the secrets for the application. +- **Group 2:** If access to keys for applications can be granted by the user then the recommendation 4 must be enforced. +- **Group 3:** If more fine grained access control is wanted as described above, then recommendations 5 and 6 must be enforced. Recommendation 7 must be enforced if the user can grant access to keys for an application. + +If the user is not allowed to grant access to keys for an application, it is enough to enforce the recommendation group 1. In this case, only the manufacturer or the operator can have granted access to keys for an application, and therefore it should be assumed that the application is trusted. + +If the user is allowed to grant access to keys for an application, then naturally both recommendation groups 1 and 2 need to be enforced. In this case, the user is allowed to grant access to keys and user may do this for any application that requests this access. It should be assumed that a malicious application might thus gain access to keys in the terminal. + +If the user is allowed to grant access to keys for an application, then for added protection, the recommendation group 3 may be enforced as well. + +User interaction on security is a common source of misunderstandings, hence user interaction should be minimized to obtain a good usage experience and minimize security risks. The access to the UICC/ SIM and keys stored in the 3GPP ME should only be granted by operators or manufacturers. The user interaction on security is required is specified in TS 33.234 [2]. + +## 4.3 Generalized recommendations + +### 4.3.1 Study of credential security in open trusted platforms + +The inherent feature of open platforms is that new applications can be installed to the terminal. In relation to shared secret credential management, this poses a security threat when a malicious application is installed in a type of terminal that does not protect the shared secret properly. The security threats are as follows: + +- A malicious application can access the UICC directly and therefore can then communicate with both the UICC and a credential generator and hence establish master secrets and application specific credentials. +- The malicious application can access the Persephone server private data, and gain access to the master secret. +- The malicious application can access the Persephone server API, and obtain the application specific credentials by requesting them from the Persephone server. + +In all these cases, the malicious application can send either the master secret, or one or more application specific credentials to the network. + +NOTE1: If there are only application specific credentials e.g. password storage or just one application using a master secret, then the second threat can be neglected. + +The first two threats can be mitigated by restricting access to the UICC, and the Persephone Server private data (see recommendations 1 and 2). + +The third threat can be mitigated by restricting the access to the Persephone Server API to authorized applications (see recommendation 3). The decision whether an application is authorized is done by the terminal manufacturer, the operator, or the user (see recommendations 4 and 5). This can be called the **Styx Coarse Grained Access Control** access control method, where an authorized application has access to all possible application specific credentials. + +The **Styx Coarse Grained Access Control** access control method is a basic access control that is enough for applications that have been authorized by the terminal manufacturer, or the operator. + +However, if the user grants the authorization to the application, there may be a need for a more granulated access control method. i.e. **Charon Fine Grained Access Control**. It may be required that the certain application specific credentials are limited only to certain applications and user installed applications, even with credential access authorization, would not have access to them. For example such credentials might give access to operator's application servers. Recommendation 6 addresses this issue. + +To be useful, the Charon fine grained access control needs to be configured. First, the manufacturer or the operator may pre-configure the terminal (recommendation 7). Second, the operator may wish to update the configuration (recommendation 8). Finally, the user may add new policies to the configuration (recommendation 9). Note that a policy set by a user will not override a policy set by an operator or a manufacturer. However, the step two implies that an operator can override or modify a policy set by the manufacturer. + +These are the recommendations identified to achieve the credential security in the open platform terminals: + +**Table 4-5: Recommendations** + +| ID | Recommendations | Commentas | +|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1 | It is possible for the platform to control access to the UICC. | Only authorized applications should have access to the UICC. Otherwise malicious application can establish a master secret, depending on storage and access mechanisms having access to application specific credentials or, in case of master secret stored outside the UICC, being able to generate application specific credential offline (outside the terminal) . | +| 2 | It is possible for the platform to restrict the access to master secret of the Persephone server. | If the master secret of the Persephone server is not protected, a malicious application can get access to it, send it out from the terminal, and the attacker can generate all the application specific keys offline (outside the terminal). The attack does not apply in case of master secret stored in the UICC. | +| 3 | It is possible for the platform to control general access in coarse-grained model to the Persephone server so that an unauthorized application is not able to get any application specific credentials from the Persephone server. | If a malicious application can gain access to the Persephone server and the master secret is stored there, then it can generate all the application specific keys online (in the terminal). In case of master secret stored on the UICC the attacker cannot generate application keys derived from the master secret. | + +| | | | +|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 4 | It is possible that an application is granted access to the Persephone server by the manufacturer, or the operator. | The manufacturer or the operator must make sure that the application that is granted access to the Persephone server is not malicious or have security flaws. | +| 5 | It is possible that an application is granted access to the Persephone server by the user provided that such access is not prevented by manufacturer or operator policy. (See the next recommendation) | User may grant access to a malicious application simply because the application requests to have access. | +| 6 | In addition to recommendations 3, 4, and 5, it is possible to control the access to certain application specific credentials in more fine-grained level, where access to certain application specific credentials can be restricted to certain applications only. | This recommendation can protect against malicious applications that try to get access to certain application specific credentials. | +| 7 | In addition to recommendation 6, the manufacturer can pre-configure the fine-grained access control policy on the terminal or the operator can pre-configure the fine-grained access control policies on the UICC. | | +| 8 | In addition to recommendation 6, the operator can update all fine-grained access control policies on the terminal or UICC. | | +| 9 | In addition to recommendation 6, the user can add new fine-grained access control policies to the terminal or UICC. | The user may only add and modify user's own policies. The user cannot change policies set by the manufacturer or the operator. | + +The recommendations in Table 4-5 can be divided in to three groups the following way: + +- **Group 1:** To provide the basic application credential related security in the terminal, recommendations 1 to 4 must be enforced. The basic credential security includes controlling access to UICC and to the master secret, controlling access to the Persephone server, and only the manufacturer or the operator can grant access to the credential functionality for the application. +- **Group 2:** If access to credential functionality for applications can be granted by the user then the recommendation 5 must be enforced. +- **Group 3:** If more fine-grained access to the credential functionality is wanted as described above, then recommendations 6 to 8 must be enforced. Recommendation 9 must be enforced if the user can grant access to credential functionality for an application + +NOTE2: If there is only an application specific secret and no master secret, then the recommendations are not impacted. If there are only a master secret, that is used by several applications, then there can be no fine-grained access control. If some applications utilize a master secret for key derivation and other applications have their own non-master secret based credentials, then the same recommendations apply as outlined above. + +If there are applicable access control policies stored in the UICC and the terminal, then access control policies stored on the UICC should take precedence over access control policies stored in the terminal. If the user is not allowed to grant access to credential functionality for an application, it is enough to enforce the recommendation group 1. In this case, only the manufacturer or the operator can have granted access to credential functionality for an application, and therefore it should be assumed that the application is trusted. + +If the user is allowed to grant access to credential functionality for an application, then naturally both recommendation groups 1 and 2 need to be enforced. In this case, the user is allowed to grant access to credential functionality and user may do this for any application that requests this access. It should be assumed that a malicious application might thus gain access to credential functionality in the terminal. + +If the user is allowed to grant access to credential functionality for an application, then for added protection, the recommendation group 3 should be enforced as well. This would enable credential functionality to protect certain application specific credentials that have more value, such as application servers that belong to the operator. + +### 4.3.2 Recommendation + +This technical report recommends that only recommendation group 1 in the previous clause is required. As user interaction on security is not desired and may cause breaches in credential terminal security group 2 should be not be required. Recommendation group 3 is not needed as group 2 was excluded. + +# Annex A: Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|-------|-----------|----|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------| +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | Old | New | +| 2005-10 | | | | | Creation of document | | 0.0.0 | +| 2005-11 | | | | | Integration of pseudo-CR S3-050717 of SA3#41 Meeting | 0.0.0 | 0.1.0 | +| 2006-02 | | | | | Integration of pseudo-CR S3-060075, S3-060085 and S3-060086 of SA3#42 meeting (output number S3-060177) | 0.1.0 | 0.2.0 | +| 2006-04 | | | | | Integration of discussion results of SA3#42 meeting S3-060255 | 0.2.0 | 0.3.0 | +| 2006-04 | | | | | Integration of S3-060256 at SA3#43 | 0.3.0 | 0.4.0 | +| 2006-06 | SP-32 | SP-060433 | | | For information to SA#32 | 0.4.0 | 1.0.0 | +| 2006-08 | | | | | Integration of S3-060548 | 1.0.0 | 1.1.0 | +| 2006-11 | | | | | Integration of pseudo-CRs S3-060642 and S3-060643 from SA3#45 (output number for TR S3-060827) | 1.1.0 | 1.2.0 | +| 2007-02 | | | | | Integration of Pseudo-CR S3-070310 | 1.2.0 | 2.0.0 | +| 2007-03 | SP-35 | SP-070165 | | | Approved | 2.0.0 | 7.0.0 | +| 2008-12 | SP-42 | -- | -- | -- | Upgrade to Release 8 | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | +| 2009-12 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-9 version (MCC) | 8.0.0 | 9.0.0 | +| 2011-03 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-10 version (MCC) | 9.0.0 | 10.0.0 | +| 2012-09 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-11 version (MCC) | 10.0.0 | 11.0.0 | +| 2014-09 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-12 version (MCC) | 11.0.0 | 12.0.0 | +| 2016-01 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-13 version (MCC) | 12.0.0 | 13.0.0 | +| 2017-03 | - | - | - | - | Promotion to Release 14 without technical change | 13.0.0 | 14.0.0 | +| 2018-06 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-15 version (MCC) | 14.0.0 | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 15.0.0 | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33935/27b06ec9f42b5d727a2630f61a5f1861_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33935/27b06ec9f42b5d727a2630f61a5f1861_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c0b10ba80cbceac8f796b56b0d3bb9cdb59d182f --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33935/27b06ec9f42b5d727a2630f61a5f1861_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:43742eb6e8b403d1b564c30954b7a80067a63ac0688f59ece06df0a1537f7fb6 +size 100182 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33935/367926125450c2bc3f4bdca9d59a62ba_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33935/367926125450c2bc3f4bdca9d59a62ba_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..98a83f301e1d4a027127b5ce521d60674e500365 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33935/367926125450c2bc3f4bdca9d59a62ba_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:53f8603704314698bc78a472e5b7a6a3c971d7c5ffbbb88c6fc9a67cf1fbe737 +size 112168 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33935/78d5774278a3f4a614f8c0ae485ce8d9_img.jpg b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33935/78d5774278a3f4a614f8c0ae485ce8d9_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..791a9e0b796c067cf634db500b37ac38ac327559 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33935/78d5774278a3f4a614f8c0ae485ce8d9_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:0e5dfbd2488e404b859ddc04232bca86c5333e629cc96918f8a2168345059b13 +size 15465 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33935/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33935/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..76e0b8d98ea6d7975a16f838548d17bb0c982f5d --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33935/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,432 @@ + + + + + + +# --- Contents + +| | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 4 | +| 1 Scope..... | 6 | +| 2 References..... | 6 | +| 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations..... | 6 | +| 3.1 Terms..... | 6 | +| 3.2 Symbols..... | 6 | +| 3.3 Abbreviations ..... | 6 | +| 4 LTKUP solutions ..... | 7 | +| 4.1 Overview ..... | 7 | +| 4.2 Solution 4b - Diffe-Hellman based Key agreement over SIM OTA..... | 7 | +| 4.2.1 Solution overview..... | 7 | +| 4.2.2 Architecture overview ..... | 7 | +| 4.2.3 Implementation recommendations ..... | 7 | +| 4.2.4 Example implementation..... | 8 | +| 4.2.4.1 OTA Transport..... | 8 | +| 4.2.4.2 LTKUP Message Flow ..... | 9 | +| 4.3 Solution 5 - Multiple sets of parameters on the USIM ..... | 11 | +| 4.3.1 Solution Overview ..... | 11 | +| 4.3.2 Solution description..... | 11 | +| 4.3.2.0 Overview..... | 11 | +| 4.3.2.1 UICC in personalisation centre..... | 11 | +| 4.3.2.2 UICC in the field..... | 11 | +| Annex A: Change history..... | 14 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings: + +- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something +- shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something + +The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports. + +The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document. + +- should** indicates a recommendation to do something +- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something +- may** indicates permission to do something +- need not** indicates permission not to do something + +The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended. + +- can** indicates that something is possible +- cannot** indicates that something is impossible + +The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not". + +- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document +- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document + +In addition: + +**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact + +The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document describes LTKUP solution 4b and LTKUP solution 5 from 3GPP TR 33.834 [2] in implementable detail. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TR 33.834: "Security Aspects; Study on Long Term Key Update Procedures (LTKUP)". +- [3] 3GPP TS 31.115: "Secured packet structure for (Universal) Subscriber Identity Module (U)SIM Toolkit applications". +- [4] 3GPP TS 31.116: "Remote APDU Structure for (U)SIM Toolkit applications". +- [5] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA)". + +# --- 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Terms + +For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]. + +## 3.2 Symbols + +Void. + +## 3.3 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]. + +| | | +|-------|--------------------------------| +| LTKUP | Long Term Key Update Procedure | +|-------|--------------------------------| + +# --- 4 LTKUP solutions + +## 4.1 Overview + +TR 33.834 [2] recommends the production of detailed implementation for: + +- Solution 4b - Diffe-Hellman based key agreement over SIM OTA + +- Solution 5 - multiple sets of parameters on the USIM + +Both solutions meet all of the key issues identified in TR 33.834 [2]: + +- Key Issue 1: individual subscription - K exposed +- Key Issue 2: batch of subscriptions - K exposed +- Key Issue 3: LTK Derivation vs. LTK Transport +- Key Issue 4: Loss of synchronisation of long term keys +- Key Issue 5: undetected leakage of K + +Both solutions can be implemented in GSM, UMTS, LTE and 5G and both require SIM/USIM changes and Home network HSS/AuC/UDM changes. + +## 4.2 Solution 4b - Diffe-Hellman based Key agreement over SIM OTA + +### 4.2.1 Solution overview + +This solution involves a key exchange protocol being run between the USIM/ISIM and the home network HSS, in order to create a newly agreed Ki value to replace the existing one. This key agreement protocol is transported over USIM OTA (TS 31.115 [3] and TS 31.116 [4]). + +### 4.2.2 Architecture overview + +The Architecture consists of a HSS / UDM, and OTA server and the USIM/UICC. + +![Diagram showing the architecture overview for Solution 4b. It consists of three main components connected in a linear sequence: HSS with LTKUP service, OTA Server, and USIM/UICC. The HSS is connected to the OTA Server, and the OTA Server is connected to the USIM/UICC. All connections are bidirectional.](78d5774278a3f4a614f8c0ae485ce8d9_img.jpg) + +``` +graph LR; HSS[HSS with LTKUP service] <--> OTA[OTA Server]; OTA <--> USIM[USIM/UICC]; +``` + +Diagram showing the architecture overview for Solution 4b. It consists of three main components connected in a linear sequence: HSS with LTKUP service, OTA Server, and USIM/UICC. The HSS is connected to the OTA Server, and the OTA Server is connected to the USIM/UICC. All connections are bidirectional. + +Figure 4.2.2-1 + +The HSS to OTA interface is proprietary. + +The OTA server interface to the USIM/UICC is as specified in TS 31.115 [3] and TS 31.116 [4]. + +### 4.2.3 Implementation recommendations + +Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman is recommended as a suitable key exchange algorithm. + +Exposing the HSS to update introduces risks, and so should be handled with great care. It is possible to run the key exchange protocol with a proxy for the HSS rather than with the HSS directly. + +It is recommended that the update protocol take place over 3GPP-standardised signalling, rather than over the internet; and it is also recommended that the HSS, rather than the USIM/ISIM, be the entity to trigger the update protocol. With these two points in mind, it is recommended for simplicity that the update protocol be carried out by the HSS directly, rather than by a proxy. + +In this solution, the key exchange protocol is authenticated using the pre-existing shared secret, so that an attacker who does not already know the secret cannot act as man-in-the-middle at all. An attacker who does already know the secret is able to act as man-in-the-middle during the key exchange protocol; however, a good protocol design can ensure that this attacker will have to remain as an active man-in-the-middle, essentially forever, in order to exploit that. + +Using a key exchange protocol raises a risk that this protocol itself might be compromised over the lifetime of next generation systems (perhaps using quantum computers), and allow newly-exchanged keys to be recovered by an attacker. One counter-measure is that where parties to the protocol already have a shared secret (e.g. the USIM/ISIM + +and HSS already share Ki), then this existing shared secret is fed into the new key derivation function, together with the output from the key exchange protocol. That way, an attacker would have to know the existing shared secret and compromise the key exchange to learn the newly derived secret. A suitable key derivation algorithm can use HMAC-SHA256, as defined in TS 33.220 [5], as follows: + +$$\text{new Ki} = \text{KDF}(\text{key exchange protocol output}, \text{initial Ki})$$ + +where "key exchange protocol output" refers to the shared secret resulting from the key exchange protocol, and "initial Ki" refers to the Ki value that was shared between the USIM/ISIM and the HSS before the protocol was run, and that was used to authenticate the key exchange. + +### 4.2.4 Example implementation + +#### 4.2.4.1 OTA Transport + +The LTKUP messages are securely transported to and from the USIM using APDUs within SIM OTA messages (see TS 31.115 [3]). + +The APDUs are FFS. + +#### 4.2.4.2 LTKUP Message Flow + +The LTKUP service is delivered using a Diffie-Hellman key agreement process as follows: + +![Sequence diagram of the LTKUP key agreement process between LTKUP Service on HLR, OTA Service, and USIM.](367926125450c2bc3f4bdca9d59a62ba_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant HLR as LTKUP Service on HLR + participant OTA as OTA Service + participant USIM as USIM + + Note left of HLR: generate Diffie-Hellman exponents + HLR->>OTA: Initiate LTKUP (params: curve id, algorithm type (MILENAGE, TUAk, other), desired key length, key id, LSoH public exponent, known secrets to include (K, OPc/TOPc, Identifier for "initiate LTKUP message" etc), proprietary flags) + OTA->>USIM: OTA message (Initiate LTKUP (params: as above)) + Note right of USIM: Generate Diffie-Hellman exponents +Derive new Secrets + OTA->>USIM: OTA message ( LTKUP USIM Parameter Exchange ( params: USIM public exponent, Confirm shared secret ) ) + OTA->>HLR: LTKUP USIM Parameter Exchange (params:as above) + Note left of HLR: Derive new secrets +Verify confirm shared secret message +Derive keys (new K, encryption key, integrity key) +Calculate associated params (e.g. OPc) +Encrypt and MAC associated params (e.g. OPc) + Note left of HLR: New K known in HLR + HLR->>OTA: LTKUP HLR Parameter Exchange ( params: Encrypted and MACd associated params e.g. OPc) + OTA->>USIM: OTA Message( LTKUP HLR Parameter Exchange (params:as above)) + Note right of USIM: Decrypt and verify associated params (e.g. OPc) +Store alongside new K value + Note right of USIM: New K and all associated params (e.g. OPc) known in USIM + OTA->>USIM: OTA Message( LTKUP complete confirmation ( params: confirmation of associated params e.g. OPc) ) + OTA->>HLR: LTKUP complete confirmation + Note left of HLR: Update K in HLR + HLR->>USIM: AUTHENTICATE command using new keys + Note right of USIM: Check that new K was used + Note right of USIM: Update K and OPc / TOPc on card + USIM->>HLR: AUTHENTICATION RESPONSE + Note center: LTKUP process Complete + +``` + +The sequence diagram illustrates the LTKUP key agreement process. It begins with the LTKUP Service on the HLR generating Diffie-Hellman exponents and sending an 'Initiate LTKUP' message to the OTA Service. The OTA Service forwards this to the USIM. The USIM generates its own exponents and derives new secrets. It then responds with an 'OTA message ( LTKUP USIM Parameter Exchange )' containing its public exponent and a confirmation of the shared secret. The OTA Service relays this to the HLR. The HLR derives new secrets, verifies the confirmation, derives new keys (K, encryption, integrity), calculates associated parameters (e.g., OPc), and encrypts them. A note indicates 'New K known in HLR'. The HLR sends an 'LTKUP HLR Parameter Exchange' to the OTA Service. The OTA Service forwards this to the USIM. The USIM decrypts and verifies the parameters and stores them alongside the new K value. A note indicates 'New K and all associated params (e.g. OPc) known in USIM'. The OTA Service sends an 'OTA Message( LTKUP complete confirmation )' to the USIM and then to the HLR. The HLR updates K in the HLR. The HLR sends an 'AUTHENTICATE command using new keys' to the USIM. The USIM checks that the new K was used and updates K and OPc / TOPc on the card. The USIM sends an 'AUTHENTICATION RESPONSE' to the HLR. The process concludes with a note 'LTKUP process Complete'. + +Sequence diagram of the LTKUP key agreement process between LTKUP Service on HLR, OTA Service, and USIM. + +Figure 4.2.4.2-1: LTKUP key agreement process diagram + +##### Initiate LTKUP + +###### parameters: + +###### curve/ECIES profile id: + +- Length: 1 +- Values: 0 - 5 + proprietary/reserved + +###### algorithm type: + +- Length: 1 + +- Values: MILENAGE, TUAK, other + +###### **desired key length:** + +- Length: 1 +- Values: 16, 32 + +###### **key id:** + +- Length: 1 +- Values: 0 - 127 + +###### **LSoH public exponent:** + +- Length: 32, 48 (or 64) +- Values: Random + +###### **known secrets to include:** + +- Length: 4 +- Values: Identifiers for K, OPc/TOPc, "initiate LTKUP message", others + +###### **proprietary flags:** + +- Length: Any +- Values: Any + +##### **LTKUP USIM Parameter Exchange** + +###### **parameters:** + +###### **USIM public exponent** + +- Length: 32, 48 (or 64) +- Values: Random + +##### **Confirm shared secret** + +- Length: 8 +- Values: Random + +##### **LTKUP HLR Parameter Exchange** + +###### **parameters:** + +##### **Encrypted Associated Params** + +- Length: 16 for OPc, 32 for TOPc, Any for Other +- Values: Random + +##### **MAC-tag for Encrypted Associated Params** + +- Length: 8 +- Values: Random + +##### **LTKUP Complete Confirmation** + +###### **parameters:** + +##### **Confirm Associated Params** + +- Length: 8 +- Values:Random + +The "confirm" messages from the USIM are best done by MACing all the parameters to be confirmed, using an integrity key derived from the shared secret. TBC: whether it is acceptable to use the same integrity key that was already derived for use in the "HLR Parameter Exchange" message (with some additional flags like a message id included as part of the data to be MACed), or whether it is better to derive an additional key just for the USIM confirmation. + +## 4.3 Solution 5 - Multiple sets of parameters on the USIM + +### 4.3.1 Solution Overview + +This solution aims to update the long term key K stored on a USIM application on UICC. The solution relies on the presence of several sets of parameters (K/OPc or K/TOPc) stored in the USIM. Only one set of parameters is active at a time in the USIM. + +NOTE: the UICC application mentioned in this solution is the USIM. But the solution also applies to ISIM application. + +The decision to launch the procedure to replace the long term key K in the USIM is taken by the home network operator. + +### 4.3.2 Solution description + +#### 4.3.2.0 Overview + +The solution requires steps when the UICC is in the personalisation centre and then when the UICC is in the field. + +#### 4.3.2.1 UICC in personalisation centre + +For each UICC, several sets of parameters (K/OPc or K/TOPc) are generated and provisioned in a USIM. But, only one set of parameters is active at a time in this USIM. + +The personalisation centre sends to the network operator an output file, which contains only one single set of parameters (K and eventually OPc or TOPc). This set of parameters is provisioned in the network operator backend. The other sets of parameters generated may be retrieved on demand from the personalisation centre. + +The OTA command sent to the USIM/UICC is secured thanks to secured packet mechanism specified in TS 31.115 [3]. Optionally, a shared key called "replacement mechanism protection" key is provisioned in the UICC in order to protect in integrity the payload of the OTA command. This "replacement mechanism protection" key offers an additional level of security due to the sensitivity of the procedure. This "replacement mechanism protection" key, if present, is securely stored in the personalisation centre and never exits the personalisation center. + +#### 4.3.2.2 UICC in the field + +Once the UICC is in a User Equipment in the field, the network operator can launch when he wants the replacement procedure as follows: + +![Sequence diagram of the key replacement procedure involving UE, Home Network, and Personalisation Centre.](27b06ec9f42b5d727a2630f61a5f1861_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant Home Network + participant PC as Personalisation Centre + + Note right of PC: 2. Preparation of the output file + Home Network->>PC: Input file (e.g. IMSI) + PC-->>Home Network: 3. Output file (IMSI, new set of parameters, OTA payload) + Note left of Home Network: 4. OTA campaign to activate replacement mechanism + Home Network->>UE: 5. OTA msg + Note left of UE: 6. Activation of replacement mechanism + UE->>Home Network: 7. Optional OTA PoR + Note right of Home Network: 8. Provisioning of the set of parameters in the HLR/AuC + Note right of Home Network: 9. Issuance of new Authentication Vector + Home Network->>UE: 10. Authentication Request + Note left of UE: 11. Authentication procedure + UE-->>Home Network: 12. Authentication Response + Note right of Home Network: 13. Check the status of the key replacement procedure +``` + +The sequence diagram illustrates the key replacement procedure. It begins with the Home Network sending an 'Input file (e.g. IMSI)' to the Personalisation Centre. The Personalisation Centre performs '2. Preparation of the output file' and returns an 'Output file (IMSI, new set of parameters, OTA payload)' to the Home Network. The Home Network then initiates a '4. OTA campaign to activate replacement mechanism' and sends an 'OTA msg' to the UE. The UE performs '6. Activation of replacement mechanism' and sends an 'Optional OTA PoR' back to the Home Network. The Home Network then handles '8. Provisioning of the set of parameters in the HLR/AuC' and '9. Issuance of new Authentication Vector'. It sends an 'Authentication Request' to the UE, which performs an '11. Authentication procedure' and returns an 'Authentication Response'. Finally, the Home Network performs '13. Check the status of the key replacement procedure'. + +Sequence diagram of the key replacement procedure involving UE, Home Network, and Personalisation Centre. + +**Figure 4.3.2.2-1: Key replacement procedure** + +The procedure to replace the long term key K works as follows: + +- 1) When the network operator decides to update the long term key K of a given USIM within a UICC, the network operator sends an input file requesting the personalisation centre to deliver an output file containing a new set of parameters for a given USIM/UICC. The input file contains at least an identifier enabling the personalisation centre to retrieve new set of parameters (e.g. IMSI or ICCID). +2. The personalisation centre generates a new output file. This new output file contains the IMSI, a new set of parameters for this USIM (K and eventually OPc or TOPC), and the OTA payload that the network operator will have to send to the USIM. The OTA payload contains the request to activate the replacement mechanism, and an index identifying the corresponding set of parameters provisioned in the USIM. + +Optionally, in case that the "replacement mechanism protection" key was generated and stored in the personalisation centre, the personalisation centre protects the OTA payload in integrity. + +3. The personalisation centre sends securely the output file to the network operator. + +4. At reception of the output file, the network operator launches an OTA campaign targeting the corresponding USIM/UICC. The OTA campaign does not intend to immediately update the parameters in the USIM; the OTA campaign only activates the replacement mechanism for the targeted USIM. +5. The network operator sends to the USIM/UICC the OTA command activating the replacement mechanism in the USIM and providing the index of the new set of parameters. +6. The USIM/UICC in the UE receives the OTA command activating the replacement mechanism. + +If the USIM is provisioned with the "replacement mechanism protection" key, then the USIM verifies the protection in integrity of the OTA payload. The replacement mechanism remains inactive if the if the OTA payload verification is unsuccessful. + +If the OTA payload is not protected in integrity or if the OTA payload verification is successful, then the USIM activates the replacement mechanism and stores the index of the corresponding set of parameters. + +Once the replacement mechanism is active, the USIM is ready to proceed the change of parameters set, but waits for an event to do so. The change of key is not yet done. + +7. The USIM sends OTA Proof of Receipt to the network operator, if requested by the operator in step 4. +8. The network operator provisions the received set of parameters (K and eventually OPc or TOPc) in the backend using usual mechanism. Only one single set of parameters (K and eventually OPc or TOPc) is active at a time in the network operator for a given USIM. +9. The network operator issues an authentication vector with the new set of parameters. + +NOTE: Since the USIM has not yet replaced the set of parameters, the USIM will detect an authentication failure during the processing of AUTHENTICATE command with this authentication vector. The authentication failure aims to trigger the replacement mechanism in the USIM/UICC. + +10. The network operator sends an authentication procedure request. +11. The USIM receives an AUTHENTICATE command and performs the authentication procedure. If the USIM detects an authentication failure due to wrong key K and if the replacement mechanism has been activated in the USIM, then the USIM tries to perform the MAC verification of the AUTHENTICATE command with the new set of parameters (K/OPc or K/TOPc) provisioned identified by the index received in step 6. + +If the MAC verification with the new set of parameters is successful, then: + +- the new set of parameters becomes active and the previous set of parameters may be deleted, +- the USIM continues the authentication procedure with the new set of parameters, and +- the USIM deactivates the replacement mechanism. + +Otherwise: + +- the USIM increments a retry counter associated to the replacement mechanism, +- the USIM deactivates the replacement mechanism if the retry counter has reached its maximum value, and +- the USIM abandons the authentication procedure with MAC failure error. + +12. The UE sends the results of the authentication procedure. +13. The network operator knows the status of the key replacement procedure thanks to the results of the authentication procedure sent by the USIM. If the result of the authentication procedure sent by the USIM indicates a MAC failure, then the network operator knows that the replacement mechanism failed. + +If the replacement mechanism failed, the network operator can decide to perform a new replacement procedure starting from step 9, or to perform a full procedure starting from step 1, or to restore the existing set of parameters active in the USIM. + +# --- Annex A: Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | | +|----------------|----------|-----------|----|-----|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------|--|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | | New version | +| 2019-03 | SA3#94AH | S3-190956 | - | - | - | First Draft includes: S3-191024, S3-190953, S3-190954 and S3-190955. | | 0.1.0 | +| 2019-11 | SA3#97 | S3-194634 | - | - | - | Updated with S3-193988 | | 0.2.0 | +| 2020-05 | SA3#99e | S3-201451 | - | - | - | Added S3-201311 | | 0.3.0 | +| 2020-06 | SA#88-e | SP-200378 | | | | Edithelp review
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b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33969/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0ace398e9290862e1daff9efcb11cbad53ef76a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/33_series/33969/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,3401 @@ + + + + + + +# Contents + +| | | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Foreword ..... | 7 | +| 1 Scope..... | 8 | +| 2 References..... | 9 | +| 3 Abbreviations ..... | 10 | +| 4 Recommendations on security requirements of PWS..... | 12 | +| 5 System architecture of PWS ..... | 13 | +| 6 Security features of PWS ..... | 14 | +| 6.1 PWS threats and analysis ..... | 14 | +| 6.1.1 General ..... | 14 | +| 6.1.2 PWS Security circumvention attack ..... | 14 | +| 6.1.3 Spoofing, tampering, and suppressing..... | 15 | +| 6.1.4 Threats to the delivery of the public key ..... | 15 | +| 6.1.5 Location of node protecting the public key delivery in PWS..... | 16 | +| 6.2 Proposed security features of PWS ..... | 16 | +| 6.2.1 General ..... | 16 | +| 6.2.2 Restrictions on the PWS message signature length..... | 18 | +| 6.2.2.1 General..... | 18 | +| 6.2.2.2 Warning message format in CMAS, KPAS, and EU-Alert..... | 18 | +| 6.2.2.3 Warning message format in ETWS ..... | 18 | +| 6.2.2.4 Conclusion on signature length..... | 19 | +| 6.2.3 Algorithm agility of PWS..... | 20 | +| 6.2.3.1 General..... | 20 | +| 6.2.3.2 ECDSA domain parameters..... | 20 | +| 6.2.4 Security level and key length of signature algorithms proposed..... | 22 | +| 6.2.5 Verification of PWS Warning Notification message ..... | 24 | +| 6.2.5.1 General..... | 24 | +| 6.2.5.2 Handling of Warning Notifications without signature ..... | 24 | +| 6.2.6 Primary and secondary notifications ..... | 25 | +| 6.2.7 Network sharing impact to PWS Security ..... | 26 | +| 6.2.7.1 General..... | 26 | +| 6.2.7.2 GWCN configuration..... | 26 | +| 6.2.7.3 MOCN configuration..... | 27 | +| 6.2.8 Triggering condition for public key update ..... | 28 | +| 6.2.9 Roaming impact to PWS Security ..... | 29 | +| 6.2.10 Discussion on parameters to be sent when distributing public keys or broadcasting warning messages..... | 31 | +| 6.2.10.1 Public Key Identifier (PKID)..... | 31 | +| 6.2.10.2 Signing entity identifier ..... | 31 | +| 6.2.10.3 Signature Algorithm Identifier (SAI)..... | 32 | +| 6.2.10.4 Domain parameters ..... | 32 | +| 6.2.10.5 Domain set indicator..... | 32 | +| 6.2.10.6 Hash function indicator..... | 32 | +| 6.2.10.7 Network Security Use Counter (NSUC)..... | 32 | +| 6.2.10.8 Time stamp (Void)..... | 32 | +| 6.2.10.9 CA ID (Void)..... | 32 | +| 6.2.10.10 Conclusion ..... | 32 | +| 6.2.11 Considerations on networks in disaster areas ..... | 34 | +| 7 Possible Security solutions of PWS..... | 34 | +| 7.0 General ..... | 34 | +| 7.1 Void..... | 35 | +| 7.2 Void..... | 35 | +| 7.3 Solution 3: NAS based solution ..... | 35 | +| 7.3.1 General ..... | 35 | +| 7.3.2 PWS public key distribution..... | 35 | + +| | | | +|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| 7.3.2.1 | Initial PWS public key distribution ..... | 35 | +| 7.3.2.2 | Core network PWS public key configuration ..... | 37 | +| 7.3.2.3 | PWS public key update..... | 38 | +| 7.3.3 | PWS Warning Notification message..... | 40 | +| 7.3.4 | Solutions to security issues in GSM/GPRS and with 2G subscribers in UMTS..... | 43 | +| 7.3.4.1 | General..... | 43 | +| 7.3.4.2 | Re-use current GSM/GPRS security mechanism with initiating ciphering..... | 44 | +| 7.3.4.3 | Enhanced integrity protection mechanism for GSM /GPRS ..... | 46 | +| 7.3.4.4 | Limiting key updates in GSM/GPRS..... | 47 | +| 7.3.4.5 | Mechanisms of NAS solution for GSM/GPRS..... | 47 | +| 7.3.4.6 | Delaying public key update using a UE-controlled timer..... | 47 | +| 7.4 | Solution 4: GBA based protection ..... | 49 | +| 7.4.1 | General ..... | 49 | +| 7.4.2 | GBA based protection mechanism for public key distribution ..... | 49 | +| 7.4.2.1 | Key establishment..... | 49 | +| 7.4.2.2 | Security protocol..... | 51 | +| 7.4.3 | Transport mechanisms..... | 52 | +| 7.4.3.1 | Transport mechanisms for establishment of GBA keys ..... | 52 | +| 7.4.3.2 | Transport mechanisms for public key distribution ..... | 52 | +| 7.4.4 | Analysis ..... | 54 | +| 7.4.4.1 | Pros ..... | 54 | +| 7.4.4.2 | Cons ..... | 54 | +| 7.4.4.3 | Cost ..... | 54 | +| 7.4.4.4 | Comparison to other solutions ..... | 55 | +| 7.5 | Solution 5: using NAS layer security..... | 56 | +| 7.5.1 | High level solution discussion..... | 56 | +| 7.5.2 | Solution details ..... | 57 | +| 7.5.2.1 | General..... | 57 | +| 7.5.2.2 | Changes in the mobility messages from the UE ..... | 57 | +| 7.5.2.3 | Changes to the authentication procedure ..... | 57 | +| 7.5.2.4 | Changes to context transfers between core network nodes ..... | 57 | +| 7.5.3 | Comparison with other solutions..... | 58 | +| 7.6 | Solution 6: implicit certificate PKI based PWS solution ..... | 59 | +| 7.6.1 | General ..... | 59 | +| 7.6.1.1 | CA updating via PWS test messaging ..... | 60 | +| 7.6.1.2 | CA updating via (U)SIM ..... | 61 | +| 7.6.2 | Certificate authorities ..... | 62 | +| 7.6.2.1 | General..... | 62 | +| 7.6.2.2 | UE provisioning [public key] and [CA-ID] updating of home network..... | 63 | +| 7.6.2.3 | Roaming considerations..... | 64 | +| 7.6.3 | Implicit certificates ..... | 65 | +| 7.6.3.1 | High level view of an implicit certificate approach from the UE perspective..... | 65 | +| 7.6.3.2 | Generation of implicit certificate ..... | 66 | +| 7.6.3.3 | PWS Security contents..... | 67 | +| 7.6.4 | Properties of solution..... | 70 | +| 7.7 | Solution 7: generalized certificate-based approach for PWS..... | 71 | +| 7.7.1 | Introduction ..... | 71 | +| 7.7.2 | Structure of CAs ..... | 72 | +| 7.7.2.1 | Top-down approach to CAs..... | 72 | +| 7.7.2.2 | Bottom-up approach to CAs ..... | 72 | +| 7.7.2.3 | More complex CA structures..... | 72 | +| 7.7.2.4 | Comparison with server certificates in other 3GPP specifications..... | 73 | +| 7.7.3 | Distribution of public root keys..... | 74 | +| 7.7.3.1 | Pre-installation in terminals at manufacturing time..... | 74 | +| 7.7.3.2 | Configuration when terminal is first taken into use..... | 74 | +| 7.7.3.3 | Public key update and revocation ..... | 74 | +| 7.7.3.4 | Comparison with server certificates in other 3GPP specifications..... | 74 | +| 7.7.4 | Certificate format and distribution of certificates..... | 75 | +| 7.7.5 | Considerations on pre-provisioned CAs public keys shared by CBEs..... | 76 | +| 7.8 | Solution 8: national PWS solution based on UICC OTA ..... | 78 | +| 7.8.1 | Introduction ..... | 78 | +| 7.8.2 | Distribution of PWS public keys and parameters..... | 79 | + +| | | | +|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| 7.8.2.1 | USIM file organization for PWS Security ..... | 79 | +| 7.8.2.2 | UICC OTA message format ..... | 79 | +| 7.8.3 | Format and handling of PWS notification..... | 80 | +| 7.9 | Solutions to counter the PWS Security circumvention attack and to mitigate the risk of displaying false unprotected warning messages..... | 81 | +| 7.9.0 | General ..... | 81 | +| 7.9.1 | Solution A: No display of unauthenticated warning messages ..... | 81 | +| 7.9.2 | Solution B: Network-independent location verification..... | 82 | +| 7.9.3 | Solution C: Using a UE-controlled timer ..... | 84 | +| 7.9.4 | Recommendation..... | 84 | +| 7.10 | The use of signing proxies ..... | 85 | +| 8 | Evaluation of different solutions..... | 88 | +| 8.1 | Evaluation of solution 1 (Void)..... | 88 | +| 8.2 | Evaluation of solution 2 (Void)..... | 88 | +| 8.3 | Evaluation of solution 3 ..... | 88 | +| 8.3.1 | Public key length ..... | 88 | +| 8.3.2 | NAS message consumption for public key ..... | 88 | +| 8.3.3 | Frequency of NAS message carrying public key ..... | 91 | +| 8.3.4 | Number of CBEs / Signing proxy ..... | 92 | +| 8.3.5 | Evaluation of solutions to security issues in GSM/GPRS and with 2G subscribers in UMTS..... | 94 | +| 8.3.5.1 | General..... | 94 | +| 8.3.5.2 | Re-use current GSM/GPRS security mechanism with initiating ciphering..... | 94 | +| 8.3.5.3 | Enhanced integrity protection mechanism for GSM /GPRS ..... | 94 | +| 8.3.5.4 | Limiting key updates in GSM/GPRS..... | 95 | +| 8.3.5.5 | Mechanisms of NAS solution for GSM/GPRS..... | 95 | +| 8.3.5.6 | Delaying public key update using a UE-controlled timer..... | 95 | +| 8.4 | Evaluation of solution 4 (Void)..... | 97 | +| 8.5 | Evaluation of solution 5 (Void)..... | 97 | +| 8.6 | Evaluation of solution 6 and solution 7 ..... | 97 | +| 8.6.1 | Same points for both..... | 97 | +| 8.6.2 | Specific points for implicit certificate based ..... | 97 | +| 8.6.3 | Specific points for generalized certificate based ..... | 97 | +| 8.7 | Evaluation of solution 7 (Void)..... | 98 | +| 8.8 | Evaluation of solution 8 ..... | 98 | +| 8.9 | Evaluation of signature algorithms in PWS ..... | 98 | +| 8.9.1 | General ..... | 98 | +| 8.9.2 | Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) ..... | 98 | +| 8.9.3 | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)..... | 98 | +| 8.9.4 | ECQV based..... | 99 | +| 9 | Key issues for establishing service requirements and designing a PWS security system ..... | 100 | +| 10 | Conclusion ..... | 101 | +| Annex A: Archived solutions..... | | 102 | +| A.1 | Solution 1 ..... | 102 | +| A.1.1 | Public key distribution ..... | 102 | +| A.1.2 | Public key distribution in UMTS ..... | 104 | +| A.1.3 | Signature algorithm agility ..... | 105 | +| A.1.4 | Distribution of signature algorithm identifier in UMTS ..... | 106 | +| A.1.5 | Verification of PWS Warning Notification message ..... | 107 | +| A.2 | Solution 2 ..... | 108 | +| A.2.1 | General ..... | 108 | +| A.2.2 | Initial PWS key distribution ..... | 108 | +| A.2.3 | Network PWS key configuration ..... | 109 | +| A.2.4 | PWS key update ..... | 109 | +| A.2.5 | Delivery of PWS Warning Notification message ..... | 111 | + +**Annex B: Threat discussion depending on the PWS settings in the UE relating to roaming ..... 112** + +Annex C: Change history ..... 116 + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document studies security features and mechanisms for protection against false Base Stations broadcasting False Warning Notifications. + +The default terminal behaviour is to accept all Warning Notifications even if their authenticity is unknown (i.e. no security protection). The default terminal behaviour is therefore open to the presentation of false Warning Notifications issued by false BSs even in countries without a Public Warning System (PWS) deployed. + +Examples of false BS risks include, but are not limited to: + +- False Warning Notifications to induce panic; +- Abuse of warning system broadcast channel to send advertising / spam. + +# 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TS 22.268: "Public Warning System (PWS) requirements". +- [3] 3GPP TS 23.041: "Technical realization of Cell Broadcast Service (CBS)". +- [4] 3GPP TS 48.049: "Base Station Controller - Cell Broadcast Centre (BSC-CBC) interface specification; Cell Broadcast Service Protocol (CBSP)". +- [5] 3GPP TS 25.419: "UTRAN Iu-BC interface: Service Area Broadcast Protocol (SABP)". +- [6] 3GPP TS 23.251: "Network sharing; Architecture and functional description". +- [7] 3GPP TR 33.859: "Study on the Introduction of Key Hierarchy in Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN)". +- [8] 3GPP TS 33.102 "3G security; Security architecture". +- [9] 3GPP TS 35.206 "3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1\*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5\*; Document 2: Algorithm specification". +- [10] FIPS 186-3: "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)". +- [11] SP 800-57 Part 1: "Recommendation for Key Management – Part 1: General (Revision 3)". +- [12] SP 800-56A: "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography". +- [13] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway, "Random Oracles are Practical: A Paradigm for Designing Efficient Protocols", ACM CCS 1993. +- [14] V. Shoup, "Lower Bounds for Discrete Logarithms and Related Problems", EUROCRYPT 1997. +- [15] S. Vaudenay, "The Security of DSA and ECDSA", PKC 2003. +- [16] P. Paillier and D. Vergnaud, "Discrete-Log-Based Signature May Not Be Equivalent to Discrete Log", Asiacrypt 2005. +- [17] D. Brown, "The Exact Security of ECDSA". Technical Report CORR 2000–34, Certicom Research, 2000. +- [18] D. Brown, R. Gallant, and S. Vanstone, "Provably secure implicit certificate schemes", Financial Cryptography 2001. +- [19] D. Brown and D. Johnson, "Formal Security Proofs for a Signature Scheme with Partial Message Recovery", CT-RSA 2001. +- [20] D. Brown, M. Campagna, and S. Vanstone, "Security of ECQV-Certified ECDSA Against Passive Adversaries", IACR eprint Archive, . + +- [21] 3GPP TS 31.115: "Secured packet structure for (Universal) Subscriber Identity Module (U)SIM Toolkit applications". +- [22] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) application". +- [23] 3GPP TS 31.116: "Remote APDU Structure for (U)SIM Toolkit applications". +- [24] 3GPP TS 31.111: "Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) Application Toolkit (USAT)". +- [25] 3GPP TS 29.168: "Cell Broadcast Centre interfaces with the Evolved Packet Core; Stage 3". +- [26] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA)". +- [27] 3GPP TS 33.223: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) Push function". +- [28] 3GPP TS 33.224: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) push layer". +- [29] 3GPP TS 23.090: "Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD); Stage 2". +- [30] 3GPP TS 23.202: "Circuit switched data bearer services". +- [31] 3GPP TS 33.203: "3G security; Access security for IP-based services". +- [32] 3GPP TS 33.234: "3G security; Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking security". +- [33] 3GPP TS 24.301: "Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for Evolved Packet System (EPS); Stage 3". +- [34] Cornell University, "GPS receivers can be 'spoofed,' say researchers ", . +- [35] 3GPP TS 33.402: "3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security aspects of non-3GPP accesses". +- [36] 3GPP TS 43.318: "Generic Access Network (GAN); Stage 2". +- [37] 3GPP TS 23.228: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2". +- [38] 3GPP TS 23.234: "3GPP system to Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking; System description". +- [39] 3GPP TS 23.402: "Architecture enhancements for non-3GPP accesses". +- [40] 3GPP TS 33.310: "Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)". +- [41] 3GPP TS 44.060: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Mobile Station (MS) - Base Station System (BSS) interface; Radio Link Control / Medium Access Control (RLC/MAC) protocol". + +# --- 3 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1]. + +| | | +|-----|-----------------------| +| BS | Base Station | +| CA | Certificate Authority | +| CBC | Cell Broadcast Centre | +| CBE | Cell Broadcast Entity | + +| | | +|----------|-------------------------------------------| +| CMAS | Commercial Mobile Alert System | +| DSA | Digital Signature Algorithm | +| eBATS | ECRYPT Benchmarking of Asymmetric Systems | +| ECDSA | Elliptic Curve DSA | +| ECQV | Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone | +| EU-Alert | European Emergency Alert System | +| GWCN | Gateway Core Network | +| ETWS | Earthquake and Tsunami Warning System | +| KPAS | Korean Public Alert System | +| MOCN | Multi-Operator Core Network | +| NSUC | Network Security Use Counter | +| NDS | Network Domain Security | +| PWS | Public Warning System | +| RISC | Reduced Instruction Set Computing | +| TLS | Transport Layer Security | + +# 4 Recommendations on security requirements of PWS + +Requirements for PWS and PWS Security identified by SA1 are specified in 3GPP TS 22.268 [2]. +Of special interest for the PWS Security work are: + +- TS 22.268 [2], clause 4.6.4 on "Enabling and disabling of Warning Notifications" and +- TS 22.268 [2], clause 4.8 on "Security requirements". + +The requirements for PWS Security are optional since there are regions and countries that do not require this functionality. Additional **potential requirements** for PWS Security identified by SA3 are listed below. + +NOTE: When the "potential requirements" from the present document might be introduced into normative document (Technical Specifications - TSs), the word "**should**" may need to be changed into "**shall**" (with bold characters). + +- For UE that are enabled to receive Warning Notifications from the VPLMN in roaming areas, it "**should**" meet the security requirements listed above. + +**Editor's Note: The above requirement need further clarification.** + +- The authentication solution "**should**" be robust against errors in the key distribution and overload so that genuine messages do not get rejected due to some error or overload in the network or in the authentication mechanism itself. +- If the UE has not been configured for PWS message security, PWS warning messages "**should**" always be presented to the PWS application on the PWS-UE. +- The result in evaluating the authenticity/integrity of the Warning Notification "**should**" be provided to the receiving PWS application on a PWS-UE. Depending on the national regulation the user may have access to this information from the PWS application (the mechanism to specify this preference is out of scope of the present document). +- There "**should**" be a mechanism to indicate to the PWS-UE which credential is to be used for the verification of the integrity or the authenticity of the Warning Notification. +- The origin and integrity of the public key to verify signed warning messages "**should**" be ensured when the public key is made available to the UE. +- Solutions mitigating the PWS Security circumvention attack described in the threats clause of the present document "**should**" be provided. + +NOTE: SA3 has agreed on the working assumption that SIM subscribers are excluded from PWS Security. + +# 5 System architecture of PWS + +![Figure 5.1: PWS system architecture overview. A block diagram showing the connection between UE, access networks (GERAN, UTRAN, E-UTRAN), Core Network (SGSN/MSC, MME, CBC), and CBE. Vertical dashed lines divide the architecture into three zones: (I) UE/Access, (II) Core Network, and (III) CBE.](cab0834804fb031b43865554cc8d06ab_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph LR + subgraph Zone_I [I] + UE + end + + subgraph GERAN + BTS --- BSC + end + + subgraph UTRAN + NodeB[Node B] --- RNC + end + + subgraph E-UTRAN + eNB + end + + subgraph Zone_II [II - Core Network] + SGSN_MSC[SGSN/MSC] + MME + CBC + end + + subgraph Zone_III [III] + CBE + end + + UE --- BTS + UE --- NodeB + UE --- eNB + + BSC --- SGSN_MSC + BSC --- CBC + RNC --- CBC + eNB --- MME + MME --- CBC + SGSN_MSC --- CBC + CBC --- CBE + +``` + +( I ) +( II ) +( III ) + +Figure 5.1: PWS system architecture overview. A block diagram showing the connection between UE, access networks (GERAN, UTRAN, E-UTRAN), Core Network (SGSN/MSC, MME, CBC), and CBE. Vertical dashed lines divide the architecture into three zones: (I) UE/Access, (II) Core Network, and (III) CBE. + +**Figure 5.1: PWS system architecture overview** + +Figure 5.1 gives an overview of the system architecture. + +- Air interface between UE and access network needs security protection as PWS Warning Notification messages are broadcast to UE via SYSTEM INFORMATION. +- CBC is part of the core network and connects to the network entity. + - For GERAN, CBC connects with the access network entity BSC. + - For UTRAN, CBC connects with the access network entity RNC. + - For E-UTRAN, CBC connects with the core network entity MME. + The protocols between the CBC and these network entities are defined in 3GPP TS 48.049 [4], TS 25.419 [5], TS 23.041 [3] and TS 29.168 [25]. +- CBE is on a national level and outside of the scope of the 3GPP network. +It is assumed that the CBE is responsible for all aspects of formatting CBS, including the splitting of a CBS message into a number of pages and the actual signing. +- MSC/SGSN or MME can be used to deliver PWS keys to UEs. + +**Editor's Note:** The security solution should minimize the impact to the current mechanism + +**Editor's Note:** MSC/SGSN may receive PWS keys from CBC, or PWS keys are configured in MSC/SGSN directly. It is for FFS how MSC/SGSN gets the PWS keys in GERAN/UTRAN, and whether a new interface between MSC/SGSN and CBC should be added, e.g. for the synchronization of NSUC. + +# 6 Security features of PWS + +## 6.1 PWS threats and analysis + +### 6.1.1 General + +In the following potential threats and attacks are discussed. + +The solution ultimately needs to protect against attacks that are in the interface between PLMN and the Warning Notification provider. However, this is outside the scope of 3GPP. The attacks which are within the wired network can effectively be dealt with using NDS methods. So the most crucial threat is the one over the air interface. + +Furthermore, the operating conditions and liability that PWS Security can handle need to be clarified. One aspect to consider in particular is the size of the group that **"should"** be protected (individual user, small group of users, large crowd). Other aspects to consider are: the time frame needed by an attacker to prepare and execute an attack, the complexity of the attack (manpower and means), and the size of the geographical area the attacker is able to target. + +Finally, assessing the type and amount of damage that can be done by an attack is useful when weighing the potential damage against the cost of additional features introduced for PWS Security. + +**Editor's Note: It needs to be further clarified what are the relevant threats to PWS.** + +### 6.1.2 PWS Security circumvention attack + +The possibility to attack an unprotected PWS is the motivation for PWS Security. The attack consists in setting up a false BS and sending false warning messages in order to create panic. The means required for the circumvention attack are largely the same as the ones required for performing the attacks that motivated the need for PWS Security in the first place. Hence, if an attack on unprotected PWS is assumed to be possible then also the circumvention attack described here has to be assumed to be possible. Or, in other words, if it is believed that PWS Security is necessary then it should be accepted that there is a need to prevent the circumvention attack. + +First, the assumptions made for the attack are listed and then two attack variants are described. + +*Assumptions:* + +- (A1): All networks in country A implement PWS Security, as defined by 3GPP. All UEs that are capable of PWS Security, and whose home network is in country A, have PWS Security enabled. +- (A2): [The network may or may not implement PWS] There is a network VN in country B that does not implement PWS Security; and UEs with home network in country A are configured to display unprotected warning messages while roaming in network VN. VN has roaming agreements with the networks in country A. +- (A3): An attacker is capable of setting up one or more false BS, making a sufficiently large number of users camp on them and sending false warning messages through the false BS(s) to these users resulting in a large-scale panic or other significant damage. +- (A4): The attacker is, in addition to (A3), capable of setting the (MCC, MNC) broadcast by the false BS(s) to that of VN from (A2). +- (A5) (required only for one of the attack variants): UEs with home network in country A are configured to display unprotected warning messages while in Limited Service State (LSS). + +NOTE: (A1) can be enforced by a regulator of country A. (A2) and (A5) are compatible with the requirements in TS 22.268 [2] and in clause 4 of the present document. (A3) is the assumption that motivates the need for PWS Security in the first place. (A4) is seen as a trivial step, given (A3). + +*Attack description:* + +The attack is easiest over a GERAN access network, but possible for UTRAN and E-UTRAN as well. Note that, in order to circumvent PWS Security, it would be sufficient if the attack worked only for one of the attack variants. + +In all cases, the attacker looks for the weakest signal of a network in country A for the chosen access technology and makes his false BS broadcast with a very strong signal on the corresponding frequency. If necessary, the attacker could also jam all other frequencies to make sure that the UE cannot attach to a network broadcasting a weaker signal on another frequency (Note that operators and access technologies are separated by different frequency bands). If the (MCC, MNC) of the false BS is that of a network with which the UE's home network has a roaming agreement (which is true for the network VN in country B according to assumption (A2) ) the UE will try to attach to it. + +The cases are now described in turn. + +*Attack over a GERAN access network:* The false BS, emulating also the behaviour of an MSC/VLR or SGSN, will reply to the UE's LAU Request or RAU Request with an unencrypted LAU Accept or RAU Accept. The false BS will not send a Ciphering Mode Command, hence the communication will remain unencrypted. The UE + +will believe to have successfully registered to network VN. The false BS can then start to broadcast unprotected warning messages, which the UE will display to the user according to assumption (A2). + +*Attack over any access network technology using Limited Service State (LSS):* The false BS, emulating also the behaviour of an MSC/VLR or SGSN, will reply to the UE's LAU Request or RAU Request with an unencrypted LAU Reject or RAU Reject. As the UE does not find any other acceptable network around, the UE will be in LSS. The false BS can then start broadcasting unprotected warning messages, which the UE will display to the user according to assumption (A5). + +### 6.1.3 Spoofing, tampering, and suppressing + +For PWS Warning Notification messages, the security threats are similar with ETWS. There may be spoofing attacks, e.g. an attacker may forge and issue PWS Warning Notifications maliciously. The messages sent over the air may introduce spoofing attacks. Another threat may be tamper attacks, e.g. an attacker may record and tamper a PWS Warning Notification message over the air interface. + +RAN2 has decided to broadcast PWS Warning Notifications to user via SYSTEM INFORMATION over air interface. However, broadcasts of SYSTEM INFORMATION are not protected. If an attacker can imitate the BS behaviour maliciously and broadcast false PWS Warning Notifications or tamper PWS Warning Notifications coming from CBE, it will cause serious panic among the population. + +Suppressing the display of a genuine warning message is another possible attack. It should be noted that jamming the radio interface could help in suppressing warning messages, but not in forging them. The attack is geographically limited. + +NOTE: A more detailed risk analysis is missing in the present document and would need to answer at least the following questions: + +- Is it considered a relevant threat to PWS if an attacker can send a forged warning message to an individual user or a small group of users, or only if he can send it to a large crowd? +- Is it considered a relevant threat to PWS if an attacker can suppress the display of a warning message to an individual user or a small group of users, or only if he can suppress it for a large crowd? +- What would be the timeframe for preparing and executing these attacks? +- Would the attacks be geographically confined? + +**Editor's Note:** It is ffs where the attack is originating + +### 6.1.4 Threats to the delivery of the public key + +This clause assumes that a digital signature is used to protect a PWS Warning Notification, for details see clause 6.2. + +The key for verifying the signature of a PWS Warning Notification is public. However, there is potential to tamper with it if not delivered in a secure way. + +An attacker could modify a public key and/or distribute a false public key and is therefore able to send signed faked messages. The UE verifies the message with the false public key. It believes to have received a correct warning message because it has been correctly verified. Thus, the main threat in PWS Security can be seen in compromising a public key. + +The public key would be issued by the entity that creates the signature, i.e. the national regulator or the authority to broadcast warning messages. It **"should"** be made available in an authentic way either by the CBE or any entity that is trusted by the CBE. + +Options for public key delivery discussed in this study comprise a 3GPP network element, an application server, the distribution during manufacturing time or OTA to the USIM, or the distribution together with the warning message, if a root certificate has been made available to the UE beforehand. + +Thus, it needs to be answered who is responsible for the public key delivery and how does the terminal gain root key(s) (in case of certificate usage) or the public key (of a CBE or a signing proxy (in case of many CBEs))? + +### 6.1.5 Location of node protecting the public key delivery in PWS + +This clause assumes that a digital signature is used to protect a PWS Warning Notification, for details see clause 6.2. + +In case, a 3GPP network element delivers the public key, the operator takes responsibility in the public key delivery, the placement of the node that protects the delivery of the key is an important consideration in the security for PWS. For E-UTRAN and GERAN PS, it is possible to protect the PWS key delivery from the core network node to the UE using legacy security mechanism, while in UMTS and GERAN CS the protection can only be applied from RAN nodes. These RAN nodes (e.g. collapsed NodeBs or HNB in UMTS) may be deployed in location that are at the edge of the network and hence not be in the most secure locations. As a result of this they are significantly more vulnerable to attack than core network nodes. + +Suppose that the node is towards the edge of the network is used to protect the delivery of the PWS key to the mobile. Then the compromise of such a node would allow the attacker to send false keys to all the users that are attached to that node. It would be enough to break the secure tunnel between this node and the operator's network by getting the relevant key out of the compromised node. Then a man-in-the-middle could be inserted between the compromised node and the core network that modifies the signalling to send a known PWS key to the users. It would be then easy to fake a warning message that all the users under that node would believe is genuine. A more sophisticated attack would be to use a compromised network element, for example an open HNB, to get keying material in order to establish to establish a false BS from which to launch an attack. If such attacks are deployed at places where large crowds gather, then it could be possible to make a large number of people incorrectly receive a warning message simultaneously. + +In case the public key is delivered by an application server, the server needs to be protected such that no tampering can happen. Security protocols are needed for retrieving the public key. + +In case of distribution during manufacturing time, the manufacturer **"should"** make sure that there is no possibility to tamper the public key. + +In case the public key is broadcast, it should have a certificate attached in order to not tamper with. + +If the terminal wants to verify that the public key received is authentic, it **"should"** have the root key to verify the certificate. + +If a signing proxy is in place, the public key of the proxy needs to be securely delivered. + +## 6.2 Proposed security features of PWS + +### 6.2.1 General + +In order to guarantee the authenticity and integrity of the Warning Notifications, the security requirements specified in 3GPP TS 22.268 [2] are introduced. In order to meet these security requirements, it has been decided that PWS Warning Notifications **"should"** be protected with a signature that is included in the Warning-Security-Information IE in the WRITE-REPLACE Request message. Moreover, some PWS Security features should be considered and defined in details as to solve the remaining security issues listed. + +A UE that has the capability to receive PWS message **"should"** support the PWS interface as specified in TS 23.041 [3]. + +CBE sends Warning Notifications to the user via core network points and access network points. When receiving PWS Warning Notifications with security, the user verifies the signature with the corresponding key and the algorithm. So it is essential that the user **"should"** be notified which key and algorithm should be used for signature verification. Otherwise, it will cause verification failure. + +As mentioned above, it **"should"** ensure the synchronization of signature key and the signature algorithm between UE and the network. In the current specification, it only states PWS Warning Notifications **"should"** be protected. How to verify PWS Warning Notification messages that are integrity protected has not been specified yet. If PWS uses some popular signature algorithm, e.g. RSA (the length of the message signature is at least 1024 bits) the Warning-Security-Information field cannot meet possible length restrictions of the different radio access technologies. So the length of the signature in particular should be considered. + +In summary, there are several dimensions for choosing which digital signature algorithms can be used for PWS Warning Notifications protection. Thus several security features are considered for PWS Security as follows. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating PWS Security features between UE, eNB, MME, CBC, and CBE.](8307f6b04df072c9332f9987e034272c_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant eNB + participant MME + participant CBC + participant CBE + + Note right of CBE: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + CBE->>CBC: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note right of CBC: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC the signature) + CBC->>MME: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC the signature) + Note right of MME: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + MME->>CBC: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + Note right of CBC: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + CBC->>CBE: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + Note right of MME: 5. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + MME->>eNB: 5. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note right of eNB: 6. Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + eNB->>UE: 6. Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note left of UE: 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys + UE->>eNB: 8. Write-Replace Warning Response + Note left of UE: 9. UE Alert +``` + +The sequence diagram illustrates the interaction for PWS security features. It starts with the CBE sending an 'Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature)' to the CBC. The CBC then sends a 'Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC the signature)' to the MME. The MME responds with a 'Write-Replace Warning Confirm' to the CBC, which in turn sends an 'Emergency Broadcast Response' to the CBE. Next, the MME sends a 'Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature)' to the eNB. The eNB broadcasts this information to the UE. The UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys and sends a 'Write-Replace Warning Response' back to the eNB. Finally, the UE generates an alert, represented by a starburst icon. + +Sequence diagram illustrating PWS Security features between UE, eNB, MME, CBC, and CBE. + +Figure 6.2.1.1: PWS Security features + +### 6.2.2 Restrictions on the PWS message signature length + +#### 6.2.2.1 General + +PWS is a common system for the distribution of ETWS, CMAS, KPAS and EU-Alert warning messages. All of these warning systems except KPAS **"should"** be supported on GERAN, UTRAN and E-UTRAN radio access technologies. KPAS only needs to be supported in E-UTRAN. + +NOTE: TS 22.268 [2] contains no such statement for ETWS, while it explicitly mentions the RANs to be supported for the other three warning systems. However, TS 23.041 [3] and the corresponding RAN and GERAN specifications specify ETWS for all three radio access technologies. + +A PWS security solution should support all or a subset of the PWS warning systems. + +#### 6.2.2.2 Warning message format in CMAS, KPAS, and EU-Alert + +CMAS, KPAS, and EU-Alert warning systems share the same message format. This format is defined in TS 23.041 and differs slightly depending on the access technology but the main content remains the same. It is possible to extend this message with a signature field (and other necessary security parameters) without breaking the length restrictions that the different access technologies put on the message. However, care **"should"** be taken when extending the message so that UEs that support PWS but not PWS security will continue to be able to parse the message. + +#### 6.2.2.3 Warning message format in ETWS + +Caution is necessary when applying PWS security to ETWS. + +ETWS is different from the other warning systems in that it consists of two separate warning types with different delivery requirements. + +- The ETWS Primary Notification only contains the most urgent information such as warning type (e.g. Earthquake) and shall be delivered to the UE within 4 seconds (see TS 22.268 [2]). +- The ETWS Secondary Notification contains more detailed textual information such as seismic intensity, epicentre, etc. and does not have the same requirement on the delivery time; but obviously it should be reasonably short. + +The ETWS Secondary Notification uses the same message format and delivery mechanism as the other warning systems in GERAN and UTRAN. In E-UTRAN the only difference is that the ETWS Secondary Notification is distributed using SIB 11 while the other warning systems use SIB 12. However, these two SIBs are almost identical in format and have similar length restrictions. It is therefore possible to add a signature field to the ETWS Secondary Notification as well. + +The ETWS Primary Notification on the other hand differs significantly from the other warning messages. In order to meet the delivery time requirement, the ETWS Primary Notification uses both a shorter message format and a faster delivery mechanism. + +- In GERAN, the ETWS Primary Notification is broadcasted in a cell using one or more paging messages. Due to requirements in earlier versions of ETWS, the Primary Notification in GSM already contains a security information field but unfortunately it is too short for the type of signature and security parameters that are considered here. Increasing the length of the security information is problematic since there is a risk of exceeding the delay limit as more bytes get added to the message. According to the analysis in the GERAN2 LS reply GP-111304, the length of the security information field can be extended from today's 50 bytes to a maximum of 75 bytes within the maximum delay limit of 4 seconds. +- In UTRAN, the ETWS Primary Notification is delivered using the RRC message ETWS PRIMARY NOTIFICATION WITH SECURITY. This message contains an optional security information field with the same length and contents as the one in GERAN. According to the RAN2 LS reply R2-114814, the security information field can be extended to fit a longer signature without violating any size or delay requirements. The LS reply does not, however, provide any information on the maximum size of the security information. +- In E-UTRAN, the ETWS Primary Notification is broadcasted in a cell using SIB 10. This message also contains an optional security information field with the same length and contents as the one in GERAN. According to the RAN2 LS reply R2-114814, the security information field can be extended to fit a longer signature without + +violating any size or delay requirements. The maximum length of the security information field is estimated to be 210 bytes. + +NOTE: After that RAN2 sent their LS reply the ETWS with security feature has been invalidated in UTRAN and E-UTRAN (see RP-130228). The security information field in ETWS PRIMARY NOTIFICATION WITH SECURITY (UTRAN) and SIB10 (E-UTRAN) was removed and replaced with a dummy field of the same length. Furthermore, in UTRAN the procedure for delivering ETWS PRIMARY NOTIFICATION WITH SECURITY to UEs in idle mode and connected mode URA\_PCH, CELL\_PCH, and CELL\_FACH state was removed. To enable PWS security, both the UTRAN and E-UTRAN security information field and the UTRAN delivery procedure have to be re-introduced. + +#### 6.2.2.4 Conclusion on signature length + +It is desirable to have common security solution for all warnings systems (ETWS, CMAS, KPAS, and EU-Alert) and all access technologies (GERAN, UTRAN, and E-UTRAN). It is clear from the analysis above that the problematic case is ETWS Primary Notification over GERAN. + +If the security solution is going to support ETWS Primary Notifications over GERAN then the total length of the signature and related security parameters cannot exceed 75 bytes. This limit rules out the possibility of including a certificate with the signed warning message, even when the certificate is stripped down to a bare minimum and only includes the subject public key and the issuer signature. However, so called implicit certificates can meet this length restriction at the expense of limiting the security level to 112 bits. Furthermore, the length limit also implies that RSA cannot be used as signature algorithm. Recall that the length of an RSA signature is equal to the length of the RSA key, which at the 128 bit security level is $3072/8=384$ bytes long. + +If ETWS Primary Notifications only need to be supported in UTRAN and E-UTRAN or not supported at all, then there is significantly more space available for the signature. + +NOTE: The profiling of the signature algorithm should take the above limitations into account. Depending on the key distribution method chosen, the profiling may also need to pay attention to the size of the key (which otherwise may induce too much data sent over the air-interface). Further limits may also be identified. The intention is to later ask SAGE for the best algorithm profiling that fulfils these limitations. + +**Editor's Note: Whether a solution for PWS security is required to support protection of ETWS Primary Notification over GERAN is ffs.** + +### 6.2.3 Algorithm agility of PWS + +#### 6.2.3.1 General + +The network should indicate to UE which algorithm to be used. By this way, UE can obtain signature algorithm and know which signature key should be used to verify the signature of PWS Warning Notifications. + +**Editor's Note:** It should avoid negotiation of security information during PWS warning. + +An n-bit identifier is allocated to identify the signature algorithm with the following algorithm defined in table 6.2.3.1. + +**Table 6.2.3.1 Signature algorithms** + +| Value | Signature algorithm | +|---------|---------------------| +| 0 | 128-ECDsa | +| 1 | 128-DSA | +| $2-2^n$ | For further use | + +It has been agreed to limit the number of standardized algorithms to at most the two algorithms listed above. If companies or governments wants to use the "For further use"-range, the registration of new signature algorithms "**should**" be handled and approved by 3GPP. + +**Editor's Note:** The number of bits in the signature algorithm identifier is FFS. + +**Editor's Note:** It is FFS is the number of standardized algorithms should be narrowed down to only a single algorithm. + +#### 6.2.3.2 ECDSA domain parameters + +DSA and ECDSA private/public key pairs are generated with respect to a particular set of domain parameters. NIST [10] states that although domain parameters may be common to a group of users and may be public information, they "**should**" be managed so that the correct correspondence between a given key pair and its set of domain parameters is maintained for all parties that use the key pair. A set of domain parameters may remain fixed for an extended time period. The goal of this clause is to estimate the minimum number of bits needed to transfer domain parameters. ECDSA uses significantly smaller public key sizes compared to DSA. + +ECDSA is defined for two arithmetic fields: prime and binary field (representations). In the following only details of ECDSA domain parameters are investigated. + +NOTE 1: Similar calculations could be done for DSA and ECDSA over binary fields + +Domain parameters for ECDSA in the general case (see [10], clause 6.1)) are of the form $(q, FR, a, b, \{domain\_parameter\_seed\}, G, n, h)$ where $q$ is the field size; $FR$ is an indication of the representation used (prime or binary); $a$ and $b$ are two field elements that define the equation of the curve; $domain\_parameter\_seed$ is the domain parameter seed and is an optional bit string; $G$ is a base point of prime order on the curve (i.e., $\bar{G} = (G_x, G_y)$ ); $n$ is a prime number and the order of the point $G$ , and $h$ is the cofactor (which is equal to the order of the curve divided by $n$ ). + +The optional $domain\_parameter\_seed$ is needed to validate that the primes were generated correctly. For the purpose of public key distribution in PWS, it is assumed here that the UE does not need to validate these primes. Therefore, it is assumed that, in prime representation, for the verification of the signature the mandatory six domain parameters + +$$(q, a, b, G, n, h)$$ + +need to be known by the terminal. In the following, those are further analysed based on NIST recommended elliptic curves in [10], Annex D.1. + +NOTE 2: These are examples; the elliptic curves selected for PWS Security by SAGE may be different. + +$q$ is equal to the length of $p$ (prime number). NIST lists for each prime $p$ , a pseudo-random curve of prime order $n$ . For these curves, the cofactor is always $h = 1$ . NIST makes for reasons of efficiency the selection $a \equiv -3$ . Thus, if the same values are used, $h$ and $a$ can be fixed and do not need to be provisioned to the terminal. For the field $GF(p)$ , the security strength is dependent on the length of the binary expansion of $p$ , which is 256 as stated in [10, Table D-1]. $n$ can then have a length between 256 and 383, this is the range recommended for 128 bit security + +strength as specified in [10, Table 1]. For the purpose of calculating the minimal bit length necessary to provision to the terminal, the minimum for $n$ , i.e. 256 bit, is assumed. + +If $h$ and $a$ are fixed, only $q$ , $b$ , $G$ , and $n$ of the set $(q, a, b, G, n, h)$ need to be provisioned, i.e., 256 bits for $p$ , 256 bits for $b$ , 256 bits for $G_x$ and 1bit for $G_y$ (assuming that the terminal could calculate $y$ fast enough itself for determining $G = (G_x, G_y)$ ), and $n = 256$ bits. + +Thus, with the above assumptions a minimum 1025 bits would be needed to transfer domain parameters for a 128 bit strength valid set of ECDSA domain parameters. + +In summary, from a pure message size point of view it seems possible that a domain parameter set would be distributed with the public key. Even in 2G NAS messages (except CS) it should be possible to send one domain parameter set with the public key. However, pre-provisioning one or several domain parameter sets in the UE when new terminals are rolled out would be a more efficient approach for PWS. In particular, in a situation that needs a fast change of the public key this could be of advantage as, even without the distribution of domain parameters, the extra NAS signalling in case of a public key change could easily lead to an overload of the MME or the radio link. + +One could also think about an update mechanism for NAS similar to those for encryption algorithms. + +Newly standardized encryption algorithms are not downloaded to terminals but just implemented in new terminals. + +**Editor's Note:** It is FFS if additional parameters, e.g. the so-called domain parameters [10], are necessary to send or negotiate together with the distribution of the public keys in order to allow the UE to verify a signature, or whether these parameters are globally standardised, and, if so, how many sets of such parameters. + +**Editor's Note:** Domain parameter sets pre-provisioned in newly rolled-out terminals is clearly preferable from a protocol point of view. But this needs to be checked with regulators. It needs to be decided whether one or more domain parameter sets need to be provisioned. + +**Editor's Note:** It is for further study how feedback from regulators operating the PWS signing entities is gained and if the standardisation of a limited number of domain parameter sets by 3GPP is acceptable and if yes, how many sets would be needed. + +### 6.2.4 Security level and key length of signature algorithms proposed + +The following clause summarizes the recommendations from NIST ([10], [11] and [12]). + +The security level or security strength is presented by the number of bits of security, which relates to the number of operations required to break a cryptographic algorithm or system. The recommendations for parameter choices regarding a certain security level are shown in Table 6.2.4.1 (extract from [11], clause 5.6, Table 2) and are combined with information about the security strength time frame (extract from [11], clause 5.6.2, Table 4) and Table 1 of [12]. + +Column 2 (FFC) indicates the minimum size of the parameters associated with the standards that use finite-field cryptography (FFC). The largest key size approved in [10] is ( $L = 3072$ , $N = 256$ ). + +Column 3 (ECC) indicates the range of $f$ (the size of $n$ , where $n$ is the order of the base point $G$ ) for algorithms based on elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC). The value of $f$ is commonly considered to be the key size. + +**Table 6.2.4.1 Parameter choices for DSA and ECDSA of comparable security strength** + +| Bits of Security
(and security strength time frames) | FFC
(e.g. DSA)
(in bits) | ECC
(e.g. ECDSA)
(in bits) | Signature lengths
(in bits) | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------| +| 80
(applying is deprecated till 2013, afterwards disallowed;
processing for legacy use also in 2031 and beyond) | $L = 1024$
$N = 160$ | $f = 160-223$ | DSA: 320
ECDSA: 320-446 | +| 112
(applying is acceptable till 2030, disallowed in 2031 and beyond;
processing is acceptable till 2030, for legacy use also in 2031 and beyond) | $L = 2048$
$N = 224, 256$ | $f = 224-255$ | DSA: 448
ECDSA: 448-510 | +| 128
(Applying and processing acceptable up to, including and beyond 2031) | $L = 3072$
$N = 256$ | $f = 256-383$ | DSA: 512
ECDSA: 512-766 | + +Hash functions that **"should"** be used for providing 128 bit security strength for the generation of digital signatures for signature algorithms are SHA-256, SHA-512/256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (extracted from [11], clause 5.6.1, Table 3). + +#### DSA + +For DSA, the key size is considered to be the size of the modulus $p$ , where $L$ is the bit length of $p$ . The length of the digital signature ( $s, r$ ) is twice the size of $q$ , where $N$ be the bit length of $q$ . DSA will produce digital signatures of 320, 448, or 512 bits depending on the security level ([11], clause 4.2.4.1). Note, the largest key size approved in [10] is ( $L = 3072$ , $N = 256$ ) ([11], clause 5.6.1). + +NIST specifies choices for the pair $L$ and $N$ . According to the recommendation ([10], clause 4.2), a Federal Government entity other than a Certification Authority (CA) should use only the following ( $L, N$ ) pairs (1024, 160), (2048, 224) and (2048, 256). A CA **"should"** use an ( $L, N$ ) pair that is equal to or greater than the ( $L, N$ ) pairs used by its subscribers. + +The security strength associated with the DSA digital signature process is no greater than the minimum of the security strength of the ( $L, N$ ) pair and the security strength of the hash function that is employed ([10], clause 4.2). + +It is recommended for DSA that the security strength of the ( $L, N$ ) pair and the security strength of the hash function used for the generation of digital signatures be the same unless an agreement has been made between participating entities to use a stronger hash function ([10], clause 4.2). + +#### ECDSA + +ECDSA specifies a minimum key size of 160 bits and produces digital signatures that are twice the length of the key size ([11], clause 4.2.4.3). For elliptic curves, the key size is the length $f$ . + +NIST Recommended curves are provided in Appendix D of [10] ([10], clause 6.1.1) + +The security strength associated with the ECDSA digital signature process is no greater than the minimum of the security strength associated with the bit length of the key and the security strength of the hash function that is employed ([10], clause 6.4). + +It is recommended that the security strength associated with the bit length of $n$ and the security strength of the hash function be the same unless an agreement has been made between participating entities to use a stronger hash function ([10], clause 6.4). + +Editor's Note: It needs to be verified whether broadcast channels on all radio interfaces envisaged for PWS can cope with a signature length corresponding to this security strength, e.g. with a signature length of 512 bits if the security strength is 128 bits. + +### 6.2.5 Verification of PWS Warning Notification message + +#### 6.2.5.1 General + +The UE "**should**" support the verification of the signature attached to a PWS Warning Notification in case PWS security is applied in a regulatory domain. How to verify PWS Warning Notifications when integrity protected "**should**" be solved. By this way, UE can verify whether the message comes from an authenticated authorized source and whether the messages have been modified maliciously. + +The UE "**should**" support a USIM data file with two settings to disable the PWS functionality as specified in TS 22.268 (for requirements and detailed handling of the USIM data file see clause 4.6.4 on Enabling and disabling of Warning Notifications in TS 22.268 [2]). + +**Editor's Note: The impacts of sending more than one signature to the UE and if this solves the overload problem is FFS.** + +If UEs cannot receive public keys from the network through any form of signalling or user plane interaction, e.g. when the UE is in limited service state, the required information for verifying signed warning messages has to be provided by other means, e.g. through various forms of previous interactions between UE and network. The required information would be available at least for the implicit-certificate-based approach (solution 6 in the present document) where root CA public keys are installed in the UE at manufacturing time or when the UE is switched on for the first time, and the CBE public keys are implicitly distributed by broadcast as part of the warning message. + +**Editor's Note: For other solutions in clause 7 of the present TR, public key distribution in a situation where the UEs cannot receive public keys from the network through any form of signalling or user plane interaction is ffs.** + +#### 6.2.5.2 Handling of Warning Notifications without signature + +As PWS Security is an optional feature and several regions (US, Japan) have made clear that broadcast of signed Warning Notifications are unlikely, PWS Security may be deployed locally but not globally. + +A UE supporting PWS Security will likely encounter genuine Warning Notifications without signature from PWS. + +As current deployments of PWS (e.g.: CMAS, EU-ALERT and ETWS) do not have any integrity protection on the broadcast Warning Notifications, a UE cannot determine whether an unsigned Warning Notification is genuine or false. In regions where the Warning Notifications are broadcast without integrity protection, a false BS could be setup for all RATs (GERAN, UTRAN, EUTRAN). In addition, in regions where signed Warning Notifications are broadcast but a PWS Security enabled UE is allowed to display also unsigned Warning Notifications in the honest attempt to display possibly genuine Warning Notifications, the false BS scenario is also a threat to those regions. PWS circumvention attacks are possible. + +The trivial solution to discard all Warning Notifications without signature (irrespective whether they are genuine or false) is secure and robust, but it is not clear if this would be acceptable from a safety perspective. Other potential solutions include network-independent location verification and the usage of a UE-controlled timer. + +For details refer to clause 7.9. + +In summary, as the objective of PWS Security is to protect against false BSs, displaying unsigned Warning Notifications (i.e. without signature) irrespective whether they are genuine or false would make PWS Security worthless. + +A robust mechanism to securely distinguish between genuine and false Warning Notifications without signature could make PWS Security more acceptable from an availability and safety perspective. Proposed mechanisms are discussed and described in clause 7.9. + +### 6.2.6 Primary and secondary notifications + +To achieve immediate distribution of the highest priority information, ETWS specifies delivery of emergency information in two different notifications: + +- The primary notification only contains the most urgent information such as warning type (e.g. Earthquake). When receiving a primary notification the UE sounds an alarm sound and displays a pre-determined warning message on screen. +- The secondary notification contains more detailed textual information such as seismic intensity, epicentre, etc. When receiving a secondary notification, the UE simply displays the information on screen. + +In case of an earthquake, a UE will typically receive the primary notification several seconds before receiving the secondary notification. When receiving a primary notification, the user has no way of knowing the magnitude of the earthquake, as this information is only included in the secondary notification. And as the magnitude and epicentre is typically not known when sending out the primary notification, users receive primary notifications also for relatively non-serious earthquakes. + +An adversary wanting to cause panic might therefore start sending out false notifications. While a false primary notification might only signal "Tsunami", causing people to run to shelter, a false secondary notification might falsify the magnitude of a minor earthquake "Earthquake, Magnitude 9.7" or instruct people to take hazardous or even fatal actions "Drink chlorine bleach to prevent radiation damage". While the above could also be done by e-mail, the impact is likely to be much higher when received through a trusted warning system. + +It is therefore important that all notifications carrying warning information are equally protected. + +### 6.2.7 Network sharing impact to PWS Security + +#### 6.2.7.1 General + +In both GWCN and MOCN configuration for network sharing types, there is no impact to PWS Security in GSM, UMTS and EPS when using the current solutions, i.e. NAS messages to distribute public key and CBC to distribute the signature as long as there is no material in the signature specific to any of the operators. + +It **"should"** be ensured that the security constructs in PWS do not cause problems with network sharing, for example, key derivations and signatures should preferably not be dependent on areas, network identities and the like. + +#### 6.2.7.2 GWCN configuration + +GWCN applies for EPS and UMTS, not for GSM according to TS 23.251 [6] Network Sharing. In EPS and UMTS sharing network, a supporting UE decodes the shared network information and supplies the available core network operator PLMN-ids as candidates to the PLMN selection procedure. The UE performs network selection among available PLMNs. The UE sends an ATTACH REQUEST message to the network entity indicating the chosen core network operator. Then the shared MME/SGSN determines whether the UE is allowed to attach or not and sends the appropriate ACCEPT/REJECT message back to the UE. If successful, a supporting UE has attached to the selected shared network. + +![Diagram illustrating network selection in GWCN configuration for a supporting UE in a shared EPS network for PWS public key distribution. The diagram shows three radio access networks (GERAN, UTRAN, E-UTRAN) connected to a shared Operator Network. GERAN contains BTS and BSC; UTRAN contains NB and RNC; E-UTRAN contains eNB. All three are connected to a shared SGSN and MME within the Operator Network. A CBC (Core Network Controller) is also connected to the SGSN and MME. A UE (User Equipment) is shown connecting to the GERAN, UTRAN, and E-UTRAN, with arrows indicating the flow of information to the Operator Network.](bb3354f497635d15bef873577125c48d_img.jpg) + +Diagram illustrating network selection in GWCN configuration for a supporting UE in a shared EPS network for PWS public key distribution. The diagram shows three radio access networks (GERAN, UTRAN, E-UTRAN) connected to a shared Operator Network. GERAN contains BTS and BSC; UTRAN contains NB and RNC; E-UTRAN contains eNB. All three are connected to a shared SGSN and MME within the Operator Network. A CBC (Core Network Controller) is also connected to the SGSN and MME. A UE (User Equipment) is shown connecting to the GERAN, UTRAN, and E-UTRAN, with arrows indicating the flow of information to the Operator Network. + +**Figure 6.2.7.2.1: Example of network selection in GWCN configuration for a supporting UE in a shared EPS network for PWS public key distribution** + +Figure 6.2.7.2.1 shows that network selection procedure in GWCN configuration for network sharing has no impact to public key distribution in NAS SMC for PWS. Moreover, network sharing is an agreement between operators and **"should"** be transparent to the user. This implies that a supporting UE needs to be able to discriminate between core network operators available in a shared radio access network and that these operators can be handled in the same way as operators in non-shared networks. This also means that there is no impact for PWS public key distribution, provided there is no operator-specific material for PWS keys that differentiate the sharing operators. + +With regard to PWS signature distribution procedure for GWCN configuration, since the pre-condition defined for network sharing in CBS is using only one single common CBC, CBE always contacts this CBC to broadcast warning messages including signature etc. security information. This single common CBC will use "impacted area" information received from CBE to know which core network entity (EPS) or radio network entity (UMTS) to contact. The following procedure is the same as the normal one in non-shared network. So there is no impact for PWS signature distribution in GWCN configuration, provided there is no operator specific material in the signature. + +For GWCN configuration, UMTS have the same situation like EPS does. So there is also no impact of network sharing for UMTS PWS services. + +#### 6.2.7.3 MOCN configuration + +MOCN applies for all the system, i.e. GSM, UMTS and EPS. In sharing network, a supporting UE decodes the shared network information and supplies the available core network operator PLMN-ids as candidates to the PLMN selection procedure. The UE performs network selection among available PLMNs. The UE sends an ATTACH REQUEST message to the network. It also indicates to the radio access node the chosen core network operator. + +The eNB/RNC/BSC uses the routing information to determine which core network operator the message should be routed to and the ATTACH REQUEST message is sent to the core network operator chosen by the UE. + +The core network determines whether the UE is allowed to attach to the network. The shared core network node sends the appropriate ACCEPT/REJECT message back to the UE. If successful, a supporting UE has attached to the selected shared network. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the PWS public key distribution process between an MME/SGSN and a CBC in a MOCN configuration. The diagram shows the exchange of PWS Key Update and PWS Key Update Ack messages, with internal key updates occurring at both nodes.](e29665b8abcea967ef289c6aff07ae4c_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant MME/SGSN + participant CBC + Note right of MME/SGSN: Current key= K(i); +Next key= K(i+1) + Note right of CBC: Current key= K(i); +Next key= K(i+1) + Note right of CBC: Determine to update PWS key; +Current key= K(i+1); +Next key= K(i+2) + MME/SGSN->>CBC: PWS Key Update +(Current key ID; Next Key +and Next key ID) + Note left of MME/SGSN: Update PWS key; +Current key= K(i+1); +Next key= K(i+2) + CBC->>MME/SGSN: PWS Key Update Ack + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the PWS public key distribution process between an MME/SGSN and a CBC in a MOCN configuration. The diagram shows the exchange of PWS Key Update and PWS Key Update Ack messages, with internal key updates occurring at both nodes. + +**Figure 6.2.7.3.1: Example of network selection in MOCN configuration for a supporting UE in a shared EPS network for PWS public key distribution** + +Figure 6.2.7.2.1 shows that network selection procedure in MOCN configuration for network sharing has no impact to public key distribution in NAS SMC for PWS. Similar like the analysis for GWCN case, there is also no impact for PWS public key distribution in MOCN case as long as keying material is not specific to any of the sharing operators. + +With regard to PWS signature distribution procedure for MOCN configuration, since the pre-condition defined for network sharing in CBS is using only one single common CBC, CBE always contacts this CBC to broadcast warning messages including its signature which is out of operator control. This single common CBC will use "impacted area" information received from CBE to know which core network entity (EPS) or radio network entity (GSM and UMTS) to contact. The following procedure is the same as the normal one in non-shared network. So there is no impact for PWS signature distribution in MOCN configuration, provided there is no operator specific material in the signature. + +For MOCN configuration, GSM and UMTS have the same situation like EPS does. So there is also no impact of network sharing for GSM and UMTS PWS services. + +### 6.2.8 Triggering condition for public key update + +There are two scenarios for public key update, i.e. when the signing entity is changed or the signing entity provides new public key to the network. The scenario of triggering public key update could be infrequent. + +When the signing entity is changed, the public key is changed and it should be updated. It happens when UE roams to a new cell which belongs to another PLMN with a different CBE. The new PLMN can be associated to the same CBE that the old one is and it can also be the different CBE. If this new PLMN is associated with a different CBE, the UE should use the public key provided by the new CBE to verify PWS signature. In this public key updating scenario, both the PLMN serving the UE and the signing entity-CBE have been changed after UE HO to a new cell. + +There can be several reasons for signing entity providing new public key to the network, including end of public key lifetime, compromised public key and replay protection, etc. ECDSA/DSA with 128 bit security level is considered secure enough beyond year 2030 according to NIST recommendations. Furthermore, each government will be very careful to send such kind of public warning. So the public keys for PWS signature could be seen as safe for a considerable period of time. However, there remains requirement for PWS public key update for some reasons e.g. private key leakage, key management hole etc. + +There may also be policy reasons for changing the key. For example, the key lifetime of the key may expire. The lifetime of the key may be in the order of months or years. + +PWS keys should not be updated immediately after a Warning Notification has been sent. Otherwise there is a risk that secondary warning messages will be rejected either because the UE already has the new key while the warning messages are still signed with the old key, or the UE still has the old key while the warning messages are already signed with the new key. + +### 6.2.9 Roaming impact to PWS Security + +A roaming UE can attach to VPLMN network or perform TAU/RAU/LAU/handover from HPLMN to VPLMN network. Since different PLMN may connect to different CBE/CBC, a roaming UE need to initiate PWS key updating to get latest PWS key of the VPLMN. Then UE can use the latest PWS key to verify Warning Notifications broadcasted by the VPLMN. + +- Case1: UE attaches to VPLMN network, PWS key can be distributed to UE via SMC or attach accept message by VPLMN. +- Case 2: UE is in idle state and performs TAU/RAU/LAU to VPLMN network, PWS key can be distributed to UE via TAU/RAU/LAU accept message by VPLMN. +- Case 3: UE is in PS-Connected state and performs handover to VPLMN network: + - When UE handovers to LTE network, UE will initiate TAU just after handover procedure and PWS key can be distributed to UE via TAU accept message by LTE network. + - When UE handovers to UMTS PS domain, UE will initiate RAU just after handover procedure and PWS key can be distributed to UE via RAU accept message by UMTS network. + - When UE handovers to GERAN PS domain, UE will initiate RAU just after handover procedure and PWS key can be distributed to UE via RAU accept message by GERAN network. + - When UE SRVCC handovers to UMTS/GERAN CS domain, then UE has to wait for CS service terminated and then performs LAU at once. Thus UE cannot obtain PWS key in time via LAU accept message since the duration of CS service is uncertain. +- Case 4: UE is in CS-Connected state and performs handover to VPLMN network: + - When UE handovers to UMTS CS domain, then UE has to wait for CS service terminated and then performs LAU at once. Thus UE cannot obtain PWS key in time via LAU accept message since the duration of CS service is uncertain. + - When UE handovers to GERAN CS domain, then UE has to wait for CS service terminated and then performs LAU at once. Thus UE cannot obtain PWS key in time via LAU accept message since the duration of CS service is uncertain. + - When UE rSRVCC handovers to LTE/HSPA PS domain, UE will initiate RAU just after handover procedure and PWS key can be distributed to UE via RAU accept message by LTE/HSPA network. + +As mentioned above, UE cannot obtain PWS key in time in the following scenarios: + +- Scenario 1: If UE is in CS-Connected state and it handovers to UMTS CS domain, UE has to wait for CS service terminated and then performs LAU at once to update PWS key. +- Scenario 2: If UE is in CS-Connected state and it handovers to GERAN CS domain, UE has to wait for CS service terminated and then performs LAU at once to update PWS key. +- Scenario 3: If UE is in PS-Connected state and it SRVCC handovers to UMTS/GERAN CS domain, UE has to wait for CS service terminated and then performs LAU at once to update PWS key. + +In above three scenarios, UE cannot obtain PWS key via LAU accept message in time. Since the duration of CS service is uncertain, if UE receives CBS warning message from VPLMN during the duration, it cannot verify the warning message by using latest PWS key. + +But in TS 23.041 [3] clause 2, the following text and table is described. + +'Reception of CBS messages for an MS/UE is not a requirement if it is connected in the CS domain. It should be possible for an MS/UE to receive messages if it is connected in the PS domain and no data is currently transmitted.' + +| CS-Domain | CS-Connected | CS-Idle | CS-Idle | +|---------------------------------|--------------|----------|---------------------| +| PS-Domain | - | PS-Idle | PS-Connected | +| Reception of CBS Message | Not possible | Possible | Depends on RRC mode | + +In GSM system, when UE is in CS-Connected mode and CS service is on going, UE can only receive and decode messages on TCH channel. But CBS message is delivered on CBCH channel. It is not a requirement for UE to listen to both TCH and CBCH in CS-Connected state. So it is not a requirement for UE to receive CBS message in CS-Connected mode. + +In UMTS system, when UE is in CS-connected mode and CS service is on going, UE is in CELL-DCH state. In CELL-DCH state, UE can only receive and decode messages on physical channel DPDCH/DPCCH. But CBS message is delivered on CTCH channel which is mapped to physical channel S-CCPCH. It is not a requirement for UE to listen to both DPDCH/DPCCH and S-CCPCH in CELL-DCH state. So it is not a requirement for UE to receive CBS message in CS-Connected mode. + +In case the UE is in PS-Connected mode it depends on the Radio Resource Control State whether reception of CBS messages is possible. If UE is in PS-Connected mode and no data is currently transmitted, UE is in CELL\_PCH or URA\_PCH state. In CELL\_PCH or URA\_PCH state, UE can listen to physical channel S-CCPCH and receive CBS message. If UE is in PS-Connected mode and some data is currently transmitted, UE is in CELL\_DCH or CELL\_FACH state (depends on algorithm of network side). In CELL\_DCH state, UE can not listen to physical channel S-CCPCH and can not receive CBS message as described above. In CELL\_FACH state, UE can transfer data and receive CBS message. + +Based on above analysis, it is not possible for a CS-Connected UE to receive CBS warning message. Even if UE has to wait for CS service terminated and then performs LAU at once to update PWS key, there is no impact on PWS key updating and warning message verification. + +In conclusion, there is no new security requirement needed for PWS key distribution and warning message verification in roaming case on both PS domain and CS domain. + +### 6.2.10 Discussion on parameters to be sent when distributing public keys or broadcasting warning messages + +#### 6.2.10.1 Public Key Identifier (PKID) + +It was suggested in several solutions to send the public key and the next public key. The advantage of keeping two keys of one signing entity at the terminal are: to facilitate the verification of a signed warning message by the UE during the period of a key change and, particularly interesting for the network operator, to reduce overload as this mechanism allows extending the key change over a longer period. If a new public key needs to be distributed, it is not possible for e.g. the MME to do this at once, a longer period is needed in which step by step public keys can get renewed. Thus, if the terminal already holds two keys, an indicator would be sufficient to notify the terminal to use the next public key. If indicated, the terminal knows it needs to deactivate the old public key, to use the next public key as the active public key and to request within a certain timeframe a new "next public key". + +There are two dimensions, on which the number of public keys in the same MME/SGSN/MSC region depends: The signing entity could decide to supply one or two public keys (active and next) and/or there could be more than one signing entity which wants to broadcast in the same MME/SGSN/MSC region. The latter multiplies the number of public keys by the number of signing entities within one region. Thus, a public key identifier may be needed to indicate in a warning message which public key the terminal should use. However, if it is easier for the UE to figure out itself, which is the active public key, an identifier may not be needed at all in the warning message. + +The introduction of a Public Key Identifier (PKID) allows the UE to determine the active public key to be used for verifying a warning message very fast. If different public keys are used among several signing entities as described above, a public key identifier could be useful as well. Furthermore, if the UE wants to indicate at registration time which public keys it has available and which one is the active one, the PKID could be used in the warning message. + +Furthermore, for all NAS-based solutions the PKID is needed so that the MME/SGSN/MSC can tell from the PKID whether the UE already has the correct public key(s) or whether the public key(s) need to be distributed to the UE. In the former, only a short ACK to the UE is needed which saves a lot of bandwidth. + +What could be an acceptable identifier for a public key? Its usage purpose implies a worldwide unique identification. To achieve this, a structure is needed. A regulator may want to be able to act independently in assigning a part of the PKID within its authority. Thus, one could imagine a representation of a public key identifier that breaks it down to national level, e.g. a PKID could include "country + public key number" or "regulator ID + public key number" or "Region + public key number". E.g. a regulator ID could be worldwide, European, country, state, or region specific. At minimum one authority should be able to assign a public key number without conflicting with other authorities. Furthermore the current active and the next public key need to be identifiable as well. Thus, a PKID could have an additional bit which indicates "active" or "next". + +**Editor's Note:** It is for further study, how the structure of the PKID looks like. + +The consideration on PKID is similar for NAS-based and GBA-based solutions. For the IMPCERT solution no identification mechanism is needed since the public key can be reconstructed from the implicit certificate that is always broadcast together with the warning message. + +#### 6.2.10.2 Signing entity identifier + +A signing entity identifier is an identifier proposed in one of the NAS-based solutions. If the public key has been securely distributed to UEs, a PKID should be enough for authentication. No extra signing entity identifier is needed. + +However, in case there is still a need to identify the signing entity, a standardized generic structure how to present this identity should be in place. One could imagine a similar structure as done, e.g., for the PKID. + +The signing entity identifier would be used to identify a CBE. In case a signing proxy is in place, it needs to be identified accordingly. In this case, CBE identification would most likely not be needed. + +**Editor's Note:** It is for further study if a signing entity identifier is needed. + +#### 6.2.10.3 Signature Algorithm Identifier (SAI) + +If more than one signature algorithm is standardized, the Signature Algorithm Identifier (SAI) may be useful to ease the verification mechanism for the UE. An x-bit indicator could tell whether to use ECDSA or DSA or another algorithm, and which set of domain parameters (see 6.2.3.2). In general, the number of algorithms should be limited as much as + +possible. If domain parameters are pre-installed, this identifier is not needed since the indication of the set of domain parameters implies which algorithm is to use. + +#### 6.2.10.4 Domain parameters + +As discussed in clause 6.2.3.2 domain parameters are necessary to indicate the correct parameters, e.g., curve parameters for ECDSA. If not pre-installed, domain parameters would be sent and may be then combined with the indication for the signature algorithm identifier. + +#### 6.2.10.5 Domain set indicator + +If it was possible to standardize and pre-install a few sets of domain parameters, a domain set indicator should be used to signal with which set a distributed public key is associated, i.e., an x-bit indicator would be needed that would be sent together with the public key. + +**Editor's Note:** It is for further study if a domain set indicator would be acceptable as the most sufficient way of indicating pre-provisioned parameters for signature verification. + +#### 6.2.10.6 Hash function indicator + +Currently all NIST recommended ECDSA curves use SHA-1 as the hash algorithm. However, in future maybe also other hash algorithms may be in use to avoid collisions. Therefore an indicator for 'which hash function to use' should be available to the UE. If the hash function is known due to the algorithm used, this parameter is not needed as it would be considered to be included in the signature algorithm identity. + +#### 6.2.10.7 Network Security Use Counter (NSUC) + +The Network Security Use Counter (NSUC) was introduced as a countermeasure to replay attacks. The NSUC is used by three entities: CBE signs the warning message including the NSUC and monotonically increases the value of NSUC each time the public key is used, i.e. a fresh signed warning message is generated by the CBE. Whenever the CBE increases the NSUC the updated value of NSUC, together with the PKID, is communicated to the MME/SGSN/MSC. UE sends the NSUC to the network, such that the MME can decide whether it has to send an updated NSUC to the UE. + +This counter or another freshness indicator needs to be used in all proposed public key distribution solutions, but the solutions for the IMPCERT approach and the GBA approach are FFS. + +#### 6.2.10.8 Time stamp (Void) + +Void + +#### 6.2.10.9 CA ID (Void) + +Void + +#### 6.2.10.10 Conclusion + +Above, all parameters included in NAS-based, GBA-based and IMPCERT-based solutions have been discussed. The following can be concluded. + +#### NAS-based + +It is suggested that the following parameters are sent to the UE with the public key: + +- PKID and if used, next PKID +- NSUC +- Signature algorithm and/or domain set indicator as follows + - Domain set indicator or SAI, if domain parameters are pre-installed (uniquely associated with the algorithm) and there is more than one domain parameter sets, or + - Domain parameters or both Domain parameters and SAI, if domain parameters are not pre-installed in terminal + +It is suggested that the following parameters are sent with the broadcast message, i.e. the signed warning message: + +- NSUC +- PKID + +Parameters that need to be sent by the UE in a NAS message: + +- All relevant PKIDs it has available (it may make sense to keep old PKIDs stored while roaming) +- NSUC, if not always sent by the network + +GBA-based + +**Editor's Note: Parameters are FFS.** + +IMPCERT solution + +For the IMPCERT solution the public key can be reconstructed from the implicit certificate, which is sent together with the warning message. Therefore PKID are not needed. + +It is suggested that the following parameters are sent with the implicit certificate broadcast message: + +- Time stamp or another par. for replay protection should be included before signature generation +- Signature algorithm and/or domain set indicator as above if not limited to one with the implicit certificate approach +- CA-ID + +NOTE: In the implicit certificate approach, there is the broadcast channel only, i.e. the UE cannot indicate any parameters. + +### 6.2.11 Considerations on networks in disaster areas + +In disaster areas, sometimes 'networks in a box' are deployed to enable local or regional communication when the regular infrastructure does not function any more after serious damage through the disaster. In addition to communication, the networks in a box may broadcast vital information in disaster areas e.g. location of shelter, fresh water, refugee camps, and status of roads. The networks in a box may also provide further warning messages e.g. for flooding or provide "all clear" messages. + +It needs further study in how far such networks can support PWS and PWS Security at all. Here some considerations: + +- Case 1): The network in a disaster area has connection to a regular CBE. + - Then the normal PWS and PWS Security procedures could apply. +- Case 2): The network in a disaster area has no connection to a regular CBE. + - In case 2), some of the typical warning messages like earthquake warning would unlikely to be possible as these types of warnings have to rely on an extensive sensor and processing network for recognising imminent earthquake or tsunami threats. So, some of the warning messages most suitable for creating panic would not be sent in case 2). + - In order to further reduce the potential for creating panic by unprotected false warning message, the UEs could be configured to selectively display warning messages when it could not verify the PWS Security status of the network. +This selective display is supported already today by the requirements in clause 4.6.4 of TS 22.268 [2]: +*"It shall be possible for users to **disable** (e.g., opt-out) presentation of **some or all** of the Warning Notifications, subject to regulatory requirements and/or operator policy. The user shall be able to select PWS-UE enabling/disabling options via the User Interface to **disable, or later enable**, the PWS-UE behaviour in response to **some or all** Warning Notifications."* +- Case 2a): PWS Security can still be applied; and unprotected warning messages could be discarded by the UE, if the network in the disaster area contains a CBE function ('local CBE') able to sign warning messages that can be verified with a public key available to the UE. + +**Editor's Note:** In general, it is ffs how the distribution of the public key of the local CBE would work. + +- Case 2b): PWS Security cannot be applied if the network does not contain a 'local CBE' with a public key, or if that public key cannot be distributed. Then there is only the alternative to either discard all warning messages or accept the risk of an attack creating panic through false warning messages (defeating the purpose of PWS Security). + +**Editor's Note:** It needs further study how networks deployed in disaster areas can support PWS and PWS Security. + +**Editor's Note:** Requirements are ffs as it may be difficult to provide a perfect security solution in such cases. + +# 7 Possible Security solutions of PWS + +## 7.0 General + +The proposed solutions can be based in groups based on how they securely transfer - from the CBE to the UE - the public key that is needed for the signature verification of warning messages. + +- Solution 3 and 5 use NAS for secure transfer, where solution 5 suggests a special mechanism for using NAS over GERAN. +- Solution 4 uses GBA for secure transfer, where NAS based transport is one of several options. +- Solution 6 and 7 use certificate-based approach for secure transfer. Solution 7 discusses general aspects while solution 6 discusses specific aspects of an implicit certificate- based approach. +- Solution 8 uses UICC OTA for secure transfer to the UICC. +- Solution 9 describes a signing proxy solution. + +## 7.1 Void + +NOTE: Solution 1 has been archived in Annex A. + +## 7.2 Void + +NOTE: Solution 2 has been archived in Annex A. + +## 7.3 Solution 3: NAS based solution + +### 7.3.1 General + +**This solution is for GSM, UMTS and LTE.** + +With regard to public key distribution procedure, NAS messages, e.g. TAU/RAU/LAU accept can be used to distribute public key which is also in solution 1 and 2 in Annex A. From previous SA3 meeting discussions, public key update should also be considered. LTE and UMTS can use similar procedures for public key distribution and update. For GSM PWS Security solution, it may be different from previous two systems. The present document gives some solutions and it depends on the SA3 meeting discussions and operators' choice for it. + +NOTE: This solution is a merger of solution 1 and 2 which also includes some new improvements. + +### 7.3.2 PWS public key distribution + +#### 7.3.2.1 Initial PWS public key distribution + +For LTE system, NAS messages, i.e. NAS SMC/Attach accept/TAU accept are used to distribute public key. Specifically, NAS SMC message is used to distribute PWS public key when UE attaches to a PLMN for the first time. In addition, the Network Signature Use Counter (NSUC) which is a monotonic increasing value that can be increased every time the signing key is used. + +For UMTS system, NAS and AS messages, i.e. SMC/Attach accept/RAU accept are used to distribute public key. Specifically, SMC message is used to distribute PWS public key when UE attaches to a PLMN for the first time. In addition, NSUC is sent. When UE has inter-PLMN handover, TAU accept/RAU accept are used to distribute new PLMN PWS public key and NSUC. + +![Sequence diagram showing the initial distribution of PWS public key in LTE system. The diagram involves three entities: UE, RAN, and MME/SGSN. The process starts with the MME/SGSN sending a 'PWS Key Update' to the RAN. The RAN then sends a 'Cell Broadcast (Current key ID, Next key ID)' to the UE. The UE receives this and updates its keys: 'Current key=K(i+1); Next key=K(i+2)'. The UE then sends a 'TAU/RAU/LU Request' to the MME/SGSN. The MME/SGSN responds with a 'TAU/RAU/LU Accept' message containing '(Next key, Next key ID)'. The UE receives this and updates its keys again: 'Store Next key; Current key=K(i+1); Next key=K(i+2)'. The MME/SGSN also updates its keys: 'update PWS key; Current key=K(i+1); Next key=K(i+2)'.](2837ffdadcdb1e5bababa56b564e56ed_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant RAN + participant MME/SGSN + + Note right of MME/SGSN: update PWS key; +Current key= K(i+1); +Next key= K(i+2) + + MME/SGSN->>RAN: PWS Key Update + RAN->>UE: Cell Broadcast +(Current key ID, Next key ID) + Note left of UE: Current key= K(i); +Next key= K(i+1) + + Note left of UE: Current key=K(i+1); +Trigger PWS key update + + UE->>MME/SGSN: TAU/RAU/LU Request + MME/SGSN->>UE: TAU/RAU/LU Accept +(Next key, Next key ID) + + Note left of UE: Store Next key; +Current key= K(i+1); +Next key= K(i+2) + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the initial distribution of PWS public key in LTE system. The diagram involves three entities: UE, RAN, and MME/SGSN. The process starts with the MME/SGSN sending a 'PWS Key Update' to the RAN. The RAN then sends a 'Cell Broadcast (Current key ID, Next key ID)' to the UE. The UE receives this and updates its keys: 'Current key=K(i+1); Next key=K(i+2)'. The UE then sends a 'TAU/RAU/LU Request' to the MME/SGSN. The MME/SGSN responds with a 'TAU/RAU/LU Accept' message containing '(Next key, Next key ID)'. The UE receives this and updates its keys again: 'Store Next key; Current key=K(i+1); Next key=K(i+2)'. The MME/SGSN also updates its keys: 'update PWS key; Current key=K(i+1); Next key=K(i+2)'. + +**Figure 7.3.2.1.1 Initial distribution of PWS public key in LTE system** + +When MME receives the initial attach request, MME distributes public key(optional next key) and the corresponding public key ID(s), CBE ID, and NSUC for the current key in NAS SMC messages. UE receives and saves the public key(s), CBE ID(s), NSUC and public key ID(s). When UE receives warning messages, UE verifies the signature of PWS Warning Notification message with public key, NSUC and the signature algorithm. The signature covers emergency warning, and NSUC. UE verifies that NSUC received from the network in the notification is greater or equal to the NSUC stored on the UE. After receiving a warning message, the UE ceases to update its stored NSUC that is associated with this signing key. + +NOTE 1: If there are too few bits to actually send the NSUC over the air in the warning message, it could be left out. Then the UE would need to test the potential NSUCs starting from the stored NSUC to the stored NSUC plus a window size. The signature will always have to cover both the warning message and the NSUC. + +If UE has attached the network before, UE sends public key ID(s), NSUC, and CBE ID in the attach request/TAU request. When MME receives attach request or TAU request, MME checks whether public key ID(s) and NSUC is the same as the same as it has already saved. If not, MME sends the public key(s), public key ID(s), NSUC and CBE ID it saves. + +NOTE 2: [next key, next key ID] means that the next public key and ID is optional to send. It depends on operators' and public key issued entity's policy to use. The procedure of distributing two public keys is the same as distributing one public key. When a new key is put into use, NSUC for this key starts with 0. + +![Sequence diagram showing the initial distribution of PWS public key in UMTS system. The diagram involves three entities: UE, SRNC, and SGSN. The sequence of messages is: 1. Attach/RAU Request from UE to SGSN; 2. AKA procedure between UE and SGSN; 3. If UE sends a public key ID, SGSN checks it and sends public key ID, signing entity ID, and NSUC if not saved; 4. SMC (public key, public key ID, [next key, next key ID], CBE ID and NSUC) from SGSN to SRNC; 5. SMC (public key, public key ID, [next key, next key ID], CBE ID and NSUC) from SRNC to UE; 6. UE saves public key, key ID, signing entity ID and NSUC; 7. SMC complete from UE to SRNC; 8. SMC complete from SRNC to SGSN; 9. Attach/RAU ACCEPT from SGSN to UE.](78ff716475b2f65bf01c3a4d02d89fc4_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant SRNC + participant SGSN + Note right of SGSN: 3. If UE sends a public key ID included in the Attach/RAU Request, SGSN checks whether the public key ID is the same as it saves. If not, SGSN sends the public key ID, signing entity ID and NSUC it saves. + UE->>SGSN: 1. Attach/RAU Request + Note over UE, SGSN: 2. AKA procedure + Note right of SGSN: 3. If UE sends a public key ID included in the Attach/RAU Request, SGSN checks whether the public key ID is the same as it saves. If not, SGSN sends the public key ID, signing entity ID and NSUC it saves. + SGSN->>SRNC: 4. SMC (public key, public key ID, [next key, next key ID], CBE ID and NSUC) + SRNC->>UE: 5. SMC (public key, public key ID, [next key, next key ID], CBE ID and NSUC) + Note left of UE: 6. UE saves public key, key ID, signing entity ID and NSUC. + UE->>SRNC: 7. SMC complete + SRNC->>SGSN: 8. SMC complete + SGSN->>UE: 9. Attach/RAU ACCEPT + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the initial distribution of PWS public key in UMTS system. The diagram involves three entities: UE, SRNC, and SGSN. The sequence of messages is: 1. Attach/RAU Request from UE to SGSN; 2. AKA procedure between UE and SGSN; 3. If UE sends a public key ID, SGSN checks it and sends public key ID, signing entity ID, and NSUC if not saved; 4. SMC (public key, public key ID, [next key, next key ID], CBE ID and NSUC) from SGSN to SRNC; 5. SMC (public key, public key ID, [next key, next key ID], CBE ID and NSUC) from SRNC to UE; 6. UE saves public key, key ID, signing entity ID and NSUC; 7. SMC complete from UE to SRNC; 8. SMC complete from SRNC to SGSN; 9. Attach/RAU ACCEPT from SGSN to UE. + +**Figure 7.3.2.1.2 Initial distribution of PWS public key in UMTS system** + +When SGSN receives the initial attach request, SGSN distributes the latest public key (optional next key) and the corresponding public key ID(s), NSUC and CBE ID in SMC messages. UE receives and saves the public key(s), public key ID(s), NSUC and CBE ID and the relationship in all of them. When UE receives warning messages, UE verifies the signature of PWS Warning Notification message with public key and the signature algorithm. The signature covers emergency warning, SAI, and NSUC. UE verifies that NSUC received from the network in the notification is greater or equal to the NSUC stored on the UE. After receiving a warning message, the UE ceases to update its stored NSUC that is associated with this signing key. + +NOTE 3: If there are too few bits to actually send the NSUC over the air in the warning message, it could be left out. Then the UE would need to test the potential NSUCs starting from the stored NSUC to the stored NSUC plus a window size. The signature will always have to cover both the warning message and the NSUC. + +If UE has attached the network before, UE sends the saved public key ID(s), CBE ID, NSUC and the corresponding PLMN ID in the attach request/RAU request. When SGSN receives attach request or RAU request, SGSN checks whether public key ID(s) and NSUC is the same as it saves. If not, SGSN sends the public key(s), public key ID(s), NSUC and CBE ID it saves. + +#### 7.3.2.2 Core network PWS public key configuration + +Regarding how the core network elements get public key, NSUC and relative ID, for LTE MME can get public key and relative ID by pre-configuration and also can get them through SBc interface from CBC. For UMTS, SGSN can get public key and relative ID by pre-configuration. + +For LTE if MME gets public key(s) and the corresponding public key ID(s) through SBc interface from CBC, CBC uses Write-Replace Warning Request message to send current and next (optional) public key(s), the corresponding public key ID(s) and the signing entity ID to MME. After MME saves all the received public key context, it responds + +Write-Replace Warning Confirm message to CBC. This procedure is triggered when public keys on CBC are initially configured or updated. + +NOTE 1: [next key, next key ID] means that the next public key and ID is optional to send. It depends on operators' and public key issued entity's policy to use. The procedure of distributing two public keys is the same as distributing one public key. + +NOTE 2: NSUC distribution is safe, i.e. if an MME lags behind in being updated, here may be a window of opportunity for replay attacks, however warning messages can still be verified. + +![Diagram illustrating the MME PWS Key Configuration in LTE system. It shows the flow of PWS Message & Security from the PWS MessageSigner through the CBE to the CBC, and then to the UE via an Open Channel. The CBC also interacts with the Certificate Authority (CA) to obtain an Integer αG and an Implicit Certificate. The UE, which has a CA public key, verifies the Signature & Implicit Certificate received from the CBC.](5d782eeb9d1e5871d7f09e0ccdd4cdf1_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the MME PWS Key Configuration in an LTE system. On the left, a 'UE with CA publickey' is shown. In the center, an 'Operator Network' contains a 'CBC' (Cell Broadcast Center) and a 'PWS MessageSigner'. The 'PWS MessageSigner' sends a 'PWS Message & Security' to the 'CBC'. The 'CBC' sends this message to the 'UE' via an 'Open Channel'. Below the 'Open Channel', the message is labeled 'PWS Message & Security' and 'Signature & Implicit Certificate'. On the right, the 'CBC' interacts with a 'Certificate Authority (CA)'. The 'CBC' sends an 'Integer αG' to the 'CA' and receives an 'Implicit Certificate' from the 'CA'. The 'CA' is also connected to the 'PWS MessageSigner'. + +Diagram illustrating the MME PWS Key Configuration in LTE system. It shows the flow of PWS Message & Security from the PWS MessageSigner through the CBE to the CBC, and then to the UE via an Open Channel. The CBC also interacts with the Certificate Authority (CA) to obtain an Integer αG and an Implicit Certificate. The UE, which has a CA public key, verifies the Signature & Implicit Certificate received from the CBC. + +**Figure 7.3.2.2.1 MME PWS Key Configuration in LTE system** + +#### 7.3.2.3 PWS public key update + +When the network updates the public key or NSUC, it uses the very next TAU/RAU procedure to distribute the update public key for PWS Security. This TAU/RAU can be normal procedure that UE moves to trigger and also can be periodic TAU/RAU procedure. The network sends the latest public key, public key ID and CBE ID in TAU/RAU accept to UE. + +There are two cases for UE to get new public key or NSUC. + +1. CBE sends periodic warning message "test" which is signed by the latest public key. The warning type of this warning message is "test". Public key ID, NSUC and CBE-ID should also be included in the test warning message. When UE receives it, UE verifies the signature using the public key it saves. If successful, the public key UE saves is the latest. UE updates NSUC if greater than the NSUC stored on the UE. If signature verification is not successful, UE sends the public key ID and CBE ID in the next TAU/RAU request to the MME/SGSN. The MME/SGSN checks whether public key ID is what it has saved. If not, MME/SGSN sends the update public key, public key ID, NSUC and CBE ID it saves in TAU/RAU accept message. Especially, the CBE sends warning message "test" which is signed by the latest public key to let UE knows in time once the CBE updates the public key. +2. UE sends the public key ID and CBE ID and NSUC in the TAU/RAU request to the MME/SGSN. The MME/SGSN checks whether public key ID is what it has saved. If not, MME/SGSN sends the update public key, public key ID, NSUC and signing entity ID it saves in TAU/RAU accept message. + +NOTE 1: There can be some policy for UE to know when to send public key ID, CBE ID, NSUC and the corresponding PLMN-ID in the TAU/RAU request. For example, there can be some pre-configured periodical time for UE to use. + +NOTE 2: Next public key and ID is optional to send. It depends on operators' and public key issued entity's policy to use. The procedure of distributing two public keys is the same as distributing one public key. + +### 7.3.3 PWS Warning Notification message + +For LTE system, CBE can sign the PWS Warning Notification. + +![Sequence diagram of PWS Warning Notification procedure for LTE system. Lifelines: UE, eNB, MME, CBC, CBE. The sequence starts with CBE sending an Emergency Broadcast Request to CBC. CBC sends a Write-Replace Warning Request to MME. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Confirm to CBC. CBC sends an Emergency Broadcast Response to CBE. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Request to eNB. eNB broadcasts the information to UE. UE verifies the signature and checks NSUC. Finally, eNB sends a Write-Replace Warning Response to MME, and UE sends an alert.](4ff00a489baaa34a0c01070de1d613db_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant CBE + participant CBC + participant MME + participant eNB + participant UE + + Note right of CBE: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (signature, public key ID, SAI, NSUC and CBE-ID) + CBE->>CBC: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (signature, public key ID, SAI, NSUC and CBE-ID) + Note right of CBC: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (signature, public key ID, SAI, NSUC and CBE-ID) + CBC->>MME: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (signature, public key ID, SAI, NSUC and CBE-ID) + Note right of MME: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + MME->>CBC: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + Note right of CBC: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + CBC->>CBE: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + Note right of MME: 5. Write-Replace Warning Request (signature, public key ID, SAI, NSUC and CBE-ID) + MME->>eNB: 5. Write-Replace Warning Request (signature, public key ID, SAI, NSUC and CBE-ID) + Note right of eNB: 6. Broadcast information (signature, public key ID, SAI, NSUC and CBE-ID) + eNB->>UE: 6. Broadcast information (signature, public key ID, SAI, NSUC and CBE-ID) + Note left of UE: 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public key and checks NSUC. + UE->>eNB: 8. Write-Replace Warning Response + Note left of UE: 9. UE alert + UE-->>eNB: 9. UE alert + +``` + +Sequence diagram of PWS Warning Notification procedure for LTE system. Lifelines: UE, eNB, MME, CBC, CBE. The sequence starts with CBE sending an Emergency Broadcast Request to CBC. CBC sends a Write-Replace Warning Request to MME. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Confirm to CBC. CBC sends an Emergency Broadcast Response to CBE. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Request to eNB. eNB broadcasts the information to UE. UE verifies the signature and checks NSUC. Finally, eNB sends a Write-Replace Warning Response to MME, and UE sends an alert. + +Figure 7.3.3.1 PWS Warning Notification procedure for LTE system + +1. CBE sends public key ID, SAI, NSUC, CBE-ID and the signature included in Emergency Broadcast Request to CBC. See clause 6.2.10 for detailed description of the usage of these IDs. +2. CBC sends public key ID, SAI, NSUC, CBE-ID and the signature in Write-Replace Warning Request to MME. +3. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Confirm message that indicates to the CBC that MME has started to distribute the warning message to eNB. +4. Upon reception of the Write-Replace Confirm messages from MME, the CBC may confirm to the CBE that the PLMN has started to distribute the warning message. +5. When MME receives this request, it sends public key ID, SAI, NSUC, CBE-ID and the signature in the Write-Replace Warning Request to eNB. +6. eNB broadcasts public key ID, SAI, NSUC, CBE-ID and the signature for the network's coverage area to all UEs. +7. At receiving the broadcast information message, UE verifies the signature with the latest public key and signature algorithm. The signature covers emergency warning, SAI, and NSUC. UE verifies that NSUC received from the network in the notification is greater or equal to the NSUC stored on the UE. After receiving a warning message, the UE ceases to update its stored NSUC that is associated with this signing key. + +Note: if there are too few bits to actually send the NSUC over the air in the warning message, it could be left out. Then the UE would need to test the potential NSUCs starting from the stored NSUC to the stored NSUC plus a window size. The signature will always have to cover both the warning message and the NSUC. + +If UE failed to verify the signature with current public key, and UE has received the optional next public key and key ID, UE should try to verify the signature with next public key. + +8. eNB sends Write-Replace Warning Response message to MME to let MME know it has broadcast the warning messages. + +9. UE alerts the user what kind of warning will happen. + +For UMTS system, CBE can sign the PWS Warning Notification. + +![Sequence diagram for PWS Warning Notification procedure for UMTS system. Lifelines: UE, NodeB/RNC, CBC, CBE. The sequence starts with CBE sending an Emergency Broadcast Request to CBC. CBC sends a Write-Replace Warning Request to NodeB/RNC. NodeB/RNC sends a Write-Replace Warning Confirm to CBC. CBC sends an Emergency Broadcast Response to CBE. NodeB/RNC then sends 5a. PAGING TYPE 1 and 5b. SYSTEM INFORMATION CHANGE INDICATION to UE. Finally, NodeB/RNC sends 6. PRIMARY NOTIFICATION WITH SECURITY to UE.](26e334e61dd059cff029338a2a604d8d_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant CBE + participant CBC + participant NodeB/RNC + participant UE + Note right of CBE: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (signature, public key ID, SAI, NSUC and CBE-ID) + CBE->>CBC: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (signature, public key ID, SAI, NSUC and CBE-ID) + Note right of CBC: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (signature, public key ID, SAI, NSUC and CBE-ID) + CBC->>NodeB/RNC: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (signature, public key ID, SAI, NSUC and CBE-ID) + Note right of NodeB/RNC: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + NodeB/RNC->>CBC: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + Note right of CBC: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + CBC->>CBE: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + Note right of NodeB/RNC: 5a. PAGING TYPE 1 + NodeB/RNC-->>UE: 5a. PAGING TYPE 1 + Note right of NodeB/RNC: 5b. SYSTEM INFORMATION CHANGE INDICATION + NodeB/RNC-->>UE: 5b. SYSTEM INFORMATION CHANGE INDICATION + Note right of NodeB/RNC: 6. PRIMARY NOTIFICATION WITH SECURITY + NodeB/RNC->>UE: 6. PRIMARY NOTIFICATION WITH SECURITY + +``` + +Sequence diagram for PWS Warning Notification procedure for UMTS system. Lifelines: UE, NodeB/RNC, CBC, CBE. The sequence starts with CBE sending an Emergency Broadcast Request to CBC. CBC sends a Write-Replace Warning Request to NodeB/RNC. NodeB/RNC sends a Write-Replace Warning Confirm to CBC. CBC sends an Emergency Broadcast Response to CBE. NodeB/RNC then sends 5a. PAGING TYPE 1 and 5b. SYSTEM INFORMATION CHANGE INDICATION to UE. Finally, NodeB/RNC sends 6. PRIMARY NOTIFICATION WITH SECURITY to UE. + +**Figure 7.3.3.2 PWS Warning Notification procedure for UMTS system** + +1. In the Emergency Broadcast Request, CBE provides public key ID, SAI, NSUC, CBE-ID and the signature to CBC. +2. CBC transmits public key ID, SAI, NSUC, CBE-ID and the signature to UTRAN with Write-Replace Warning Request. See clause 6.2.10 for detailed description of the usage of these IDs. +3. UTRAN sends a Write-Replace Warning Confirm message that indicates to the CBC that it has started to distribute the warning message to service area. +4. Upon reception of the Write-Replace Confirm messages from UTRAN, the CBC may confirm to the CBE that the PLMN has started to distribute the warning message. +5. When UTRAN receives this request, it first sends a PAGING TYPE 1 message or a SYSTEM INFORMATION CHANGE INDICATION message, including the warning type. +6. After the reception of the warning type in either the PAGING TYPE 1 or the SYSTEM INFORMATION CHANGE INDICATION message. If RRC is configured from upper layers to receive primary notification with security, UTRAN **"should"** send public key ID included in PRIMARY NOTIFICATION WITH SECURITY and the signature to UEs. And UE verifies the signature of PWS Warning Notification message with the public key and signature algorithm. + +#### Test warning messages: + +According to the security requirement in clause 2 of this living document, + +"A serving network should periodically send test warning messages on the broadcast channel." + +CBE can send periodic warning message "test" which is signed by the latest public key. The warning type of this warning message is "test". Public key ID, NSUC and CBE ID should also be included in the test warning message. When UE receives it, UE verifies the signature using the public key indicated by the public key ID in the "test" message. If successful, the public key UE saves is the current. UE updates NSUC if greater than the NSUC stored on the UE. If signature verification is not successful, UE sends the saved public key ID, NSUC and CBE ID in the next TAU/RAU request to the MME/SGSN. The MME/SGSN checks whether the received public key ID is what it has saved. If not, MME/SGSN sends the public key (optional next key), public key ID, and CBE ID it saves in TAU/RAU accept message. Especially, the CBE sends warning message "test" which is signed by the latest public key to let UE knows in time once the CBE updates the public key. + +### 7.3.4 Solutions to security issues in GSM/GPRS and with 2G subscribers in UMTS + +#### 7.3.4.1 General + +Unlike LTE and UMTS, GSM/GPRS security mechanism does not provide integrity protection on the radio interface. So the proposed PWS public key distribution solution based on integrity protection in AS and NAS messages in UMTS and LTE is infeasible. + +The case of 2G subscribers with UTRAN access also needs consideration: Integrity in UMTS and LTE protects AS and NAS messages in transfer, but it also implies message origin authentication. The latter is essential in PWS public key distribution as it guarantees the authenticity of the public key to the UE (assuming a genuine network entity only distributes authentic public keys). However, for 2G subscribers with UTRAN access, UMTS integrity cannot guarantee that the UE is connected to a genuine network entity. This is so because it is possible for an attacker to obtain a valid GSM triplet (RAND, Kc and RES), while the 2G subscriber is connected over GERAN, through breaking one of the still widely used weak GSM or GPRS encryption algorithms. Note that there is no strong time constraint on the attacker as such triplets are valid for the lifetime of the SIM, due to the lack of replay protection for RAND. Once the attacker has obtained such a triplet he can feed RAND to the UE in an Authentication Request through a device that emulates a UTRAN BS system combined with an SGSN or VLR and compute the keys CK, IK converted from Kc according to TS 33.102 [8]. The attacker can then set up integrity-protected communication with the UE and send false public keys to the UE. + +This clause describes solutions on how to distribute the public key and other security information to the UE in GSM/GPRS and to 2G subscribers over UTRAN. Several possible approaches are suggested: + +There are 6 methods listed for GSM/GPRS solutions and with 2G subscribers in UMTS solutions. + +- Re-use current GSM/GPRS security mechanism with initiating ciphering with using a UE-controlled timer(clause 7.3.4.2 and clause 7.3.4.6 ) +- Only cipher LAU/ RAU ACCEPT with UP still remaining unencrypted with using a UE-controlled timer(clause 7.3.4.2 and clause 7.3.4.6 ) +- Not initiating ciphering in the whole GSM/GPRS system with using a UE-controlled timer(clause 7.3.4.2 and clause 7.3.4.6 ) +- Enhanced integrity protection mechanism for GSM /GPRS(clause 7.3.4.3) +- Limiting key updates in GSM/GPRS and use periodic PWS warning test message(clause 7.3.4.4 and clause 7.3.4.5) +- Using NAS layer security(clause 7.6) + +#### 7.3.4.2 Re-use current GSM/GPRS security mechanism with initiating ciphering + +In GSM/GPRS, PWS public key can be ciphered with the key Kc. The solution proposes a public key distribution based on NAS message. Figure 7.3.4.2.1 shows an example that distributes public key in GSM/GPRS. The RAU/LAU ACCEPT message can also be used. + +![Sequence diagram showing the distribution of public key information in GSM/GPRS. The diagram involves five entities: UE, eNB, MME, CBC, and CBE. The sequence of messages is: 1. CBE sends an Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) to CBC; 2. CBC sends a Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) to MME; 3. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Confirm to CBC; 4. CBC sends an Emergency Broadcast Response to CBE; 5. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) to eNB; 6. eNB sends Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) to UE; 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys (shown in a box); 8. eNB sends a Write-Replace Warning Response to MME; 9. UE Alert (shown in a starburst shape).](9a14684f8ae1345c6efea6f5994c730c_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant CBE + participant CBC + participant MME + participant eNB + participant UE + + Note right of CBE: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + CBE->>CBC: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note right of CBC: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + CBC->>MME: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note right of MME: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + MME->>CBC: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + Note right of CBC: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + CBC->>CBE: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + Note right of MME: 5. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + MME->>eNB: 5. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note right of eNB: 6. Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + eNB->>UE: 6. Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note right of UE: 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys + Note right of eNB: 8. Write-Replace Warning Response + eNB->>MME: 8. Write-Replace Warning Response + Note right of UE: 9. UE Alert + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the distribution of public key information in GSM/GPRS. The diagram involves five entities: UE, eNB, MME, CBC, and CBE. The sequence of messages is: 1. CBE sends an Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) to CBC; 2. CBC sends a Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) to MME; 3. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Confirm to CBC; 4. CBC sends an Emergency Broadcast Response to CBE; 5. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) to eNB; 6. eNB sends Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) to UE; 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys (shown in a box); 8. eNB sends a Write-Replace Warning Response to MME; 9. UE Alert (shown in a starburst shape). + +**Figure 7.3.4.2.1: Distribution of public key information in GSM/GPRS** + +In the initial LAU/RAU procedure, UE sends the LAU/RAU request. When MSC/SGSN receives the LAU/RAU request, MSC/SGSN sends LAU/RAU Accept message to UE. In the LAU/RAU Accept, the latest public key and PKID are included. BTS or SGSN encrypts the LAU/RAU Accept message with Kc. And the PWS public key and PKID are protected. When UE receives LAU/RAU Accept message, it decrypts the LAU/RAU Accept message to obtain the latest public key and PKID, saves the latest public key and PKID. + +If UE has attached to the network before, UE can send the public key identifier to the network entity in LAU/RAU. MSC/SGSN checks whether the PKID is the latest. Otherwise, it will distribute the latest public key and the corresponding PKID. When UE receives LAU/ RAU ACCEPT, it saves the latest public key and PKID. + +##### Only cipher LAU/ RAU ACCEPT with UP still remaining unencrypted: + +In common views, it cannot only mandate ciphering LAU/RAU one procedure and leave others and UP without ciphering since once ciphering is turned on, it is better not to be turned off for security reasons. If operator does not want to turn on ciphering according to local policy, a possible alternative can be that SGSN/MSC mandates ciphering when performing RAU/LAU procedure for distributing public key. If SGSN/MSC decided to carry PWS public in RAU/LAU accept message, the current GSM security context is used to cipher LAU/RAU accept message carrying with PWS public key. Normally, after that, UE will release RRC connection and be in idle mode. In the next session, UE connects to the network and MSC/SGSN sends cipher mode command with turning off ciphering in Cipher Mode Command setting to the UE when local policy is remaining UP unencrypted. Please note that above solution needs some changes in SGSN/MSC. In addition, there may be a possibility that cipher algorithms are disabled in BSS, i.e. BSS does not support any cipher algorithms, if cipher is not allowed by local policies. If it is the case, BSS should also be modified. + +##### Not initiating ciphering in the whole GSM/GPRS system: + +In case that operator will not initiate ciphering anyhow in GSM/GPRS, it is suggested to send PWS public key and identifier directly without ciphering in LAU/ RAU ACCEPT message. To some extent, it can also ensure that UE will get a genuine public key to verify the signature than without doing any security to PWS in GSM/GPRS. + +#### 7.3.4.3 Enhanced integrity protection mechanism for GSM /GPRS + +- Generate the integrity key based on the current GSM security. Kc is the encrypted key which generate from GSM AKA, Kmac is the integrity key used in PWS generated from Kc. Then Kmac can be used to protect PWS public key. Note that in this solution it is not restricted integrity mechanism only for PWS, it can be used in the whole system if operator want to enhance the security in the whole system. +- Key Derivation method directly: + - Kmac is derived from Kc. It can be generated as follows: + - $Kmac=KDF [Kc, S]$ , $S=Fc||P||L$ , $Fc=0x14$ , $P=UE\ id$ , $L=$ the length of UE id +- The configuration of the integrity algorithm. + - Pre- configured the integrity algorithm in MS and network node. + - Distribution the integrity algorithm to MS from network. When the integrity key is generated, the integrity algorithm or the algorithm identity indication can be distributed with protection. + +In GSM, integrity algorithm and PWS public key can be integrity protected with Cipher mode CMD message. The integrity key Kmac is generated with the method discussed above. The procedure is shown in Figure 7.3.4.3.1. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 7.3.4.3.1: Distribution of public key information in GSM. The diagram shows the flow of messages from CBE to CBC, CBC to MME, MME to eNB, and finally eNB to UE. Steps include Emergency Broadcast Request, Write-Replace Warning Request, Write-Replace Warning Confirm, Emergency Broadcast Response, Broadcast information, UE signature verification, Write-Replace Warning Response, and UE Alert.](1e8c50ad4fca7f315a407347dd5091cc_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant CBE + participant CBC + participant MME + participant eNB + participant UE + + CBE->>CBC: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + CBC->>MME: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + MME->>CBC: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + CBC->>CBE: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + MME->>eNB: 5. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + eNB->>UE: 6. Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note over UE: 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys + UE->>eNB: 8. Write-Replace Warning Response + Note over UE: 9. UE Alert + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure 7.3.4.3.1: Distribution of public key information in GSM. The diagram shows the flow of messages from CBE to CBC, CBC to MME, MME to eNB, and finally eNB to UE. Steps include Emergency Broadcast Request, Write-Replace Warning Request, Write-Replace Warning Confirm, Emergency Broadcast Response, Broadcast information, UE signature verification, Write-Replace Warning Response, and UE Alert. + +**Figure 7.3.4.3.1: Distribution of public key information in GSM** + +In GPRS, integrity algorithm and PWS public key can be integrity protected within Authentication and Ciphering Request message. The integrity key Kmac is generated with the method discussed above. The procedure is shown in Figure 7.3.4.3.2. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 7.3.4.3.2: Distribution of public key information in GPRS. The diagram follows the same sequence as Figure 7.3.4.3.1, showing the distribution of public key information from CBE through CBC, MME, and eNB to the UE, followed by verification and alert.](9edb407536d4d4d4a6ac391527af047c_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant CBE + participant CBC + participant MME + participant eNB + participant UE + + CBE->>CBC: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + CBC->>MME: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + MME->>CBC: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + CBC->>CBE: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + MME->>eNB: 5. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + eNB->>UE: 6. Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note over UE: 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys + UE->>eNB: 8. Write-Replace Warning Response + Note over UE: 9. UE Alert + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Figure 7.3.4.3.2: Distribution of public key information in GPRS. The diagram follows the same sequence as Figure 7.3.4.3.1, showing the distribution of public key information from CBE through CBC, MME, and eNB to the UE, followed by verification and alert. + +**Figure 7.3.4.3.2: Distribution of public key information in GPRS** + +#### 7.3.4.4 Limiting key updates in GSM/GPRS + +If the protection of the key distribution in GSM/GPRS has a lower security level (or no security) than the protection of the key distribution in the other accesses, this lower security level might spread to UMTS or LTE capable UEs if they listen for key distribution messages in GSM/GPRS. + +The reason being that an UMTS or LTE capable UEs might attach to a GSM network when there is no UMTS or LTE coverage. Even if the UE is configured to discard messages without a valid signature, an adversary could potentially inject false keys and false warning messages in an attempt to cause panic. + +- For GSM only UEs, the only solution is to introduce some kind of enhanced GSM/GPRS security context. Making such a large change to existing GSM/GPRS networks seems unjustified just for PWS. +- For UMTS or LTE capable UEs, the problem could be mitigated by only accept key distribution messages in GSM/GPRS if there is no valid key received from UMTS/LTE. If the same signature key is used in all accesses, improved robustness and coverage could still be achieved by listen for warning messages in GSM networks. + +As a subscriber with an UMTS or LTE capable UEs could have GSM only coverage for weeks (e.g. when going on vacation), this puts some extra requirements on the key distribution methods. The lifetime of the signature keys would need to be at least as long as the time an subscriber might have GSM only coverage. + +NOTE: Whether to accept key distribution messages in accesses where the user does not have a subscription depends on regulatory requirements. + +#### 7.3.4.5 Mechanisms of NAS solution for GSM/GPRS + +It is considered to mitigate this security issue through the NAS solution's mechanism. Two possible methods can be used to mitigate the security impacts caused by no integrity protection in GSM/GPRS. + +The first one is prior receiving PWS public key from UMTS/LTE network. Nowadays most UEs will support multi-mode and UE can receive PWS public key from different RATs. When the UE and network perform the initial distribution or update of PWS public key, UE receives and stores public keys independently from GERAN/UMTS/LTE. As the same signature key is used in all accesses in one PLMN for the same CBE, UE should prior use the public keys from UMTS/LTE to verify the PWS notification message received from GSM/GPRS network. This can avoid injecting a forge PWS public key to UEs by a fake BS. This method does not work for terminals that only have GSM coverage for an extended period of time or are only GSM capable. The second one is broadcasting periodic PWS testing warning messages by the network. As the PWS public key update procedure described in clause 7.3.1.2, the network periodically broadcasts PWS warning message "test" signed by the latest public key. UE verifies the signature using the public key it stores. If successful, UE determines that the public key it is storing is the latest, and discards the warning test silently. Otherwise, UE determines that the public key it is storing is not correct, and sends the public key ID and signing entity ID in the next RAU/LAU request to the SGSN/MSC. The SGSN/MSC checks whether public key ID is what it has saved. If not, SGSN/MSC sends the update public key, public key ID and signing entity ID it saves in RAU/LAU accept messages. In this way, if UE receives and stores a forge PWS public key from GSM/GPRS network, UE can always identify whether the public key is correct or not by periodic PWS testing warning message, and then UE could fetch a correct PWS public key from the network in time. The test message can be received when the terminal is in PS connected state. It depends on the RRC state. + +NOTE: If the time UEs perform next RAU/LAU is distributed in the interval, the risk of DDOS attack can be decreased to minimum. There is no solution can solve key forgery attack completely on account of the inherent security weakness of GSM/GPRS network. Solutions in clause 7.9 can be referred to solve the problem to some extent. + +#### 7.3.4.6 Delaying public key update using a UE-controlled timer + +This subclause contains a solution for enhancing the security of public key distribution over GERAN for subscribers with a SIM or USIM. The solution also applies to 2G subscribers with access over UTRAN, but it is only described here for GERAN. It is intended to counter attack scenarios, in which an attacker uses a false BS to first distribute a false public key, for which he knows the corresponding private key, over LAU/RAU Accept messages and then broadcast false warning messages to create a panic. + +Such a panic is most effectively created in a crowd. It is assumed that such crowds gather for some time and then disperse, or that the members of a crowd are changing over time. It is further assumed that the attacker cannot determine the members of a crowd, and communicate with them, in advance. Consequently, the attacker has to perform both tasks, distributing the false public key and broadcasting the false warning messages, on site in a relatively short + +period of time (hours say). The basic idea of this solution is to delay any public key update over GERAN so that the attacker can no longer perform both these tasks while the crowd is present on the site. + +The solution works as follows: + +When a UE of a subscriber with a SIM or USIM receives a LAU or RAU Accept message over GERAN that indicates a required public key change, or contains a new public key, then the UE does not accept this public key, but starts a timer T associated with this public key. Only when the timer T is up the UE will reach a state where it is ready to accept this public key. The UE will indicate in the next LAU or RAU Request message over GERAN that it is now ready to accept this particular public key and will store this key when receiving it in the response. When this key is not contained in the response the UE will delete any information about this particular public key. The value of T could be randomly selected by the UE e.g. from an interval between x hours and y hours where suitable values for x and y would have to be determined (e.g. x=12 and y= 24). It is important that the network is not allowed to influence the setting of the timer. + +When a LAU or RAU Accept message over GERAN is received while the timer is running, and this message confirms (one of) the currently stored public key(s), then the UE stops the timer and deletes any related information about the associated public key. When a LAU or RAU Accept message over GERAN is received while the timer is running, and this message indicates a change to a public key not stored in the UE and different from the one for which the timer is running, then the UE stops the timer, deletes any related information about the associated public key, and starts a timer for the newly received or indicated public key. + +**Editor's Note:** It is ffs whether the previous timer could be kept running in this case. This would help in the case when the previous timer was associated with a genuine new public key. + +When the UE moves to UTRAN or E-UTRAN and the subscriber has a USIM then the timer is stopped and any related information about the associated public key is deleted. + +**Editor's Note:** It is ffs whether the timer could be kept running in this case to speed up things when the UE moves back to GERAN. But, in any case, the timer would not apply to USIM subscriber while in UTRAN. + +In order to minimize the number of public keys sent by the network in a LAU or RAU Accept message over GERAN, if a timer is running for a particular public key the UE should indicate this fact in any LAU or RAU Request message over GERAN. This would keep the MSC or SGSN from sending this public key in the response to that request in vain. But it would not keep the MSC or SGSN from sending any other public key or key indicator. + +The network should continue signing warning messages with the old private key at least for a period as long as the maximum value of the timer. In this way, UEs can verify genuine warning messages using the old public key while a timer is running. + +**Editor's Note:** It is ffs whether this maximum value should be standardised, or guidelines for it should be given. + +## 7.4 Solution 4: GBA based protection + +### 7.4.1 General + +Since this is so far just a sketch of how a solution based on GBA could work, it is not comparable one-to-one with the solution based on NAS security. However, it gives a hint about how such a solution could work and some pros/cons can be identified. + +A main benefit of using a GBA based approach is that the PWS related problems with GSM access networks, with their lack of integrity protection and network authentication and security termination point far out in the access network, would no longer be a security weak point. A GBA based approach brings the security termination point to a server (NAF) in the core network and offers application layer integrity protection and network authentication. + +A second benefit of GBA is that it is not necessary to use the existing NAS messages as transport channels for the delivery of the public keys used to verify the warning messages. Based on the reply LSs from GERAN2 and CT1, the number of available bytes in the GERAN CS NAS and AS messages are limited. As CT1 states that "CT1 needs to have sufficient bytes available for this further protocol evolution" sending information in these messages might be problematic. + +A third benefit is that the same protection and transfer mechanism can be used for all RATs (i.e. GERAN, UTRAN, and EUTRAN). In other proposed solutions it has been suggested to use different messages in the three different RATs, add new protection mechanism for GERAN, or to do a lot of special handling in GERAN to minimize the security weaknesses there. By using the same protection and transfer mechanism can be used for all RATs, UE implementation is simplified. + +All solutions for PWS Security can be split in two main parts: + +- 1) A protection mechanism for the public keys distribution. +- 2) A transport mechanism for public keys distribution to the terminal. + +A GBA based approach uses GBA as part of the protection mechanism. + +### 7.4.2 GBA based protection mechanism for public key distribution + +#### 7.4.2.1 Key establishment + +The protection is based on the establishment of a shared symmetric key $Ks\_({int/ext})\_NAF$ between the UE and a NAF (defined in the GBA architecture, see TS 33.220 [26]). The NAF assumes the task of distributing the PWS public keys and will henceforth be called PWS Key Center. + +**Editor's note: it is ffs whether the PWS key center is part of CBC, or if it is a standalone entity.** + +Key establishment with GBA is flexible and can be done in several different ways. Either the UE can initiate the establishment (pull) or the NAF can initiate the establishment (push). GBA specified in TS 33.220 is defined for pull, while GBA-Push specified in TS 33.223 [27] is defined for push. GBA-Push can however be used in a pull like mode by adding a non-GBA message asking the NAF to push out the key establishment information. + +Note that GBA-Push requires the UE to hold a USIM or ISIM and is not defined for 2G subscribers. + +While the security level of the public keys (used in broadcast) need to be very high, the symmetric integrity protection of the public key distribution (used in unicast) does not require as high security. The lifetime of the key $Ks\_({int/ext})\_NAF$ can therefore be very long. Both GBA\_ME and GBA\_U could be used. + +GBA\_ME does not require UICC support. While GBA\_U provides enhanced security, it is not necessarily required. However, if the UICC needs to be changed anyway, to provide support for the PWS elementary file EFPWS, then consideration should be given to using UICC's supporting GBA\_U for additional security. + +**A. Key establishment using GBA:** This method (see Figure 7.4.2.1.1) uses the GBA procedures specified in TS 33.220 and on a high level it works as follows: + +- A1) After the UE has registered with the network, the UE performs a GBA bootstrap with the BSF and derives $Ks\_({int/ext})\_NAF$ . + +- A2) If the UE doesn't have the current public key, it requests the current public key from the PWS Key Center. +- A3) The PWS key center communicates with the BSF and derives $Ks\_({int/ext})\_NAF$ +- A4) The PWS key center distributes the current public key to the UE. + +The GBA procedures (A1 and A3) can be reused for several key distributions. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 7.4.2.1.1: Key establishment using GBA. The diagram shows four lifelines: UE, Access Network, Core Network, PWS Key Center (NAF), and BSF. The sequence of messages is: A1. GBA procedure (Bootstrap) between UE and BSF; A2. Request public key (B-TID) from UE to PWS Key Center (NAF); A3. GBA procedure (Authentication) between PWS Key Center (NAF) and BSF; A4. Distribute public key ([Public Key]_{Ks\_NAF}) from PWS Key Center (NAF) to UE. Intermediate boxes show the derivation of Ks\_({int/ext})\_NAF at the PWS Key Center (NAF) and the receipt of Public Key at the UE.](1ce027dfd26183da52137cf990213724_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for Figure 7.4.2.1.1: Key establishment using GBA. The diagram shows four lifelines: UE, Access Network, Core Network, PWS Key Center (NAF), and BSF. The sequence of messages is: A1. GBA procedure (Bootstrap) between UE and BSF; A2. Request public key (B-TID) from UE to PWS Key Center (NAF); A3. GBA procedure (Authentication) between PWS Key Center (NAF) and BSF; A4. Distribute public key ([Public Key]\_{Ks\\_NAF}) from PWS Key Center (NAF) to UE. Intermediate boxes show the derivation of Ks\\_({int/ext})\\_NAF at the PWS Key Center (NAF) and the receipt of Public Key at the UE. + +**Figure 7.4.2.1.1: Key establishment using GBA** + +**B. Key establishment using GBA-Push:** This method (see Figure 7.4.2.1.2) uses the GBA Push procedures specified in TS 33.223 [27] and on a high level it works as follows: + +- B1) If the UE doesn't have the current public key, it requests the current public key from the PWS Key Center. +- B2) The PWS key center communicates with the BSF and derives $Ks\_({int/ext})\_NAF$ +- B3) The PWS key center distributes the current public key to the UE. + +The GBA push procedure (B2) can be reused for several key distributions. + +![Sequence diagram for Figure 7.4.2.1.2: Key establishment using GBA-Push. The diagram shows four lifelines: UE, Access Network, Core Network, PWS Key Center (NAF), and BSF. The sequence of messages is: B1. Request public key (IMSI) from UE to PWS Key Center (NAF); B2. GBA push procedure (GPI req/resp) between PWS Key Center (NAF) and BSF; B3. Distribute public key ( GPI, [Public Key]_{Ks\_NAF} ) from PWS Key Center (NAF) to UE. Intermediate boxes show the derivation of Ks\_({int/ext})\_NAF at the PWS Key Center (NAF) and the receipt of Public Key at the UE.](1174e0fd3f2c73de8e5c6ce8ea6bdda1_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram for Figure 7.4.2.1.2: Key establishment using GBA-Push. The diagram shows four lifelines: UE, Access Network, Core Network, PWS Key Center (NAF), and BSF. The sequence of messages is: B1. Request public key (IMSI) from UE to PWS Key Center (NAF); B2. GBA push procedure (GPI req/resp) between PWS Key Center (NAF) and BSF; B3. Distribute public key ( GPI, [Public Key]\_{Ks\\_NAF} ) from PWS Key Center (NAF) to UE. Intermediate boxes show the derivation of Ks\\_({int/ext})\\_NAF at the PWS Key Center (NAF) and the receipt of Public Key at the UE. + +**Figure 7.4.2.1.2: Key establishment using GBA-Push** + +After the initial key establishment, the UE and PWS Key Center has a shared symmetric key ( $Ks\_({int/ext})\_NAF$ ) and public key updates can be distributed via either pull or push without any new GBA procedures. + +As can be seen, using GBA-Push has several advantages over GBA (TS 33.220 [26]): + +- Both Pull and Push can be supported. Pull can be under normal circumstances and push can be used for quick update of the public key. The advantage of push is that the PWS Key Center has control over how many public keys updates are done per second. Therefore there is no risk for overload. +- The amount of traffic over the access network is smaller than in TS 33.220 as the GBA procedures are sent only in the core network. + +#### 7.4.2.2 Security protocol + +The security protocol needs to provide integrity protection. The solution also needs some form of replay protection, but this does not necessarily need to be on the transport layer. + +If GBA (TS 33.220 [26]) is used for key establishment, HTTPS is the default standard for secure communication with a NAF. In HTTPS, TLS provides both integrity and replay protection, but requires handshake consisting of two roundtrips to set up. + +If GBA-Push (TS 33.223 [27]) is used for key establishment, the lightweight GBA Push Layer (GPL), see TS 33.224 [28], is a perfect candidate. GPL does not require any setup roundtrips, it is lightweight, it integrates with GBA-Push, and it provides integrity protection and replay protection. GPL can also be used with 33.220 [26]. + +### 7.4.3 Transport mechanisms + +#### 7.4.3.1 Transport mechanisms for establishment of GBA keys + +For UE-initiated GBA, as defined in TS 33.220 [26], the Ub interface is IP-based, hence a packet switched data bearer is required. One could, of course, think of tunnelling IP in some other protocol, but this would require some significant additional specification work and may be undesirable from a protocol point of view. + +For GBA push, as defined in TS 33.223 [27], the transport over the Upa interface could for example be over a packet switched data bearer, SMS, USSD, or even using NAS messages. + +#### 7.4.3.2 Transport mechanisms for public key distribution + +If the protection of the public keys is provided by an application layer mechanism such as GBA and GPL, there are several options for transporting the public keys to the terminals. + +- **Existing NAS procedure:** the integrity protected public keys might be included in existing NAS messages. This does not provide any savings in terms of NAS message space, but the integrity protection can be terminated in the core network. For example, the PWS key center can integrity protect the keys and deliver them to the SGSN/MSC/MME, or a separate protection function can be included in the SGSN/MSC/MME that is provided with the keys for the PWS key center. As sufficient bytes need to be available for protocol evolution, this approach cannot be used for GERAN CS. + - Can be used in all accesses. +- **New NAS procedure:** Instead of using the existing NAS procedure a new NAS procedure for PWS key distribution can be created. The NAS procedure can work similarly in GERAN, UTRAN, and EUTRAN as well as in CS and PS. Another benefit is that while the current NAS procedures are not logically associated to PWS Security at all, this new procedure would be. Having an independent NAS procedure would also make potential overload problems easier to handle as the whole message can be routed to a separate function or node. The overload problem for the signalling system would still exist in times of key change for all users. + +**Editor's note: New NAS procedure needs further study.** + +- **New NAS protocol:** Instead of creating a new procedure in the mobility management and session management protocols a new NAS protocol specifically for PWS Security can be created. The new protocol would be assigned a new protocol discriminator. The NAS procedure can work similarly in GERAN, UTRAN, and EUTRAN as well as in CS and PS. This has similar benefits as creating a new NAS procedure, it would require more specification work but routing and potential overload problems would be even easier to handle. The overload problem for the signalling system would still exist in times of key change for all users. + +**Editor's note: New NAS protocol needs further study.** + +- **PS bearer:** UE can set up a PS bearer and use IP to connect to the PWS key center. This work for all three RATs but does not work for terminals that only support the CS domain and would hence have to be combined with one of the other options below to cater for all types of terminals. + - Cannot be used in CS +- **Short Message Service (SMS):** Probably only practical for use in a push fashion. An SMS can carry 140 octets and if one or two 256-bit public ECDSA keys are sent that is plenty of space. Sending the corresponding security level DSA keys would not be possible in a single SMS. In that case chained SMSes would have to be used. + - Can be used in all accesses. +- **Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD); TS 23.090 [29]:** USSD is commonly implemented and provides data traffic in both uplink and downlink. A USSD message can carry 160 octets, and if one or two 256-bit public ECDSA keys are sent that is plenty of space. Sending the corresponding security level DSA keys would not be possible in a single SMS. In that case chained SMSes would have to be used. USSD support both pull and push. It is present in UTRAN, GERAN and over IMS, so it can be used for any of the 3GPP accesses. + - Can be used in all accesses. +- **Circuit switched data (CSD); TS 23.202 [30]:** CSD can be only be used over GERAN CS and UTRAN CS, but could be combined with a PS bearer in LTE. CSD however seems to be mainly intended for UE to UE + +communication and may hence not be appropriate to use as a bearer between a terminal and a server in the network. + +- Cannot be used in LTE. + +A robust solution may require the possibility for the UE to be able to pull keys from the network. Note that to support pull, all of the options except the NAS based, requires a separate CS or PS bearer to be set up. + +PS bearer and CSD also have limitations and cannot be used in all accesses. Of the suggested options only New NAS procedure, New NAS protocol, and USSD can be used in all accesses. There are therefore seen as the main transport mechanisms candidates. + +### 7.4.4 Analysis + +#### 7.4.4.1 Pros + +A GBA based solution would not suffer from the weaknesses related to false or hacked BSs (e.g., BSS in GERAN and home (e)NBs in UTRAN/E-UTRAN) that applies to the NAS based solution. The reason is that a GBA based solution protects the distribution of the key all the way from the PWS key center located in the core network. + +Most protocols for key establishment and protection of the public key delivery are actually in place already: GBA and/or GBA Push for key establishment, GPL and HTTPS to protect the key delivery to the terminal (push and pull respectively). + +The signing/verification, display of warning to the user and possible public key infrastructure are mainly application layer functions. Therefore it would be preferable from a design cleanness perspective to also do the key distribution on the application layer (compared to mixing application layer and the radio layer as is the case for the NAS based solution). Layer violations (or cross layer optimizations as they are sometimes called) usually lead to complexity. + +If a new NAS procedure or protocol is used as transfer protocol, the GBA approach would be more connected to the radio layer, but the termination point for the key distribution messages and key distribution protection point would be firmly on the application layer. + +#### 7.4.4.2 Cons + +If a new NAS procedure or protocol is used as transfer protocol, the GBA approach has some but not all of the cons as the NAS solution. + +For 2G subscribers, only (UE-initiated) 2G GBA, as defined in TS 33.220 [26], Annex I, is available. 2G GBA requires a TLS server certificate for the BSF and the installation of the corresponding public verification key in the UE. But if procedures for generating server certificates and for installing root keys in the UE are available anyhow then it may be easier to select solution 7 because, once a root key is installed in the terminal then, for warning messages in the home area, no further protocol steps would be required, and, even more importantly, no BSF and NAF entities would be required. For the roaming case, only a one-time cross-certification would be required instead of repeated interactions between a visited NAF and the BSF. + +For 2G GBA, the bandwidth requirements would be relatively high compared to GBA using a USIM or ISIM due to the need for TLS. On the other hand, the Ub run would not have to occur very often, and it would not have to happen at the same time as a PWS public key update. + +This PWS Security solution requires GBA support in the network and in the terminal. + +At the moment not many cons have been identified, but clearly cons to some degree would be discovered once more details would be examined. + +#### 7.4.4.3 Cost + +BSF and NAF can be achieved by deploying independent physical entities or be achieved on existing function node. NAF could also be achieved on other application servers. The deployment of GBA requires physical entities or addition of new function on the existing network elements for the purpose of PWS Security alone will increase the cost of deployment. + +The NAF needs to be dimensioned to handle a huge number of simultaneous requests for the current key in the same way the MSC/SGSN/MME would have to be dimensioned to handle the distribution of public keys in NAS messages. But the cost of dimensioning a single function is of course lower than the cost of dimensioning three separate functions. + +The home network needs to deploy a BSF and a PWS key center (NAF). There could be a cost to re-dimensioning the home BSF/HSS. + +GBA software needs to be set or upgraded in ME to support GBA function for PWS Security, if it is not available for other purposes. If GBA\_U is used, then it requires UICC support. + +#### 7.4.4.4 Comparison to other solutions + +**Editor's Note: Comparison to the other solutions is needed.** + +## 7.5 Solution 5: using NAS layer security + +### 7.5.1 High level solution discussion + +**This solution is for GSM and UMTS.** + +This solution is for both UTRAN and GERAN and is motivated by the desire to protect the delivery of PWS keys from the core network to reduce the risk of compromised RAN nodes. The proposed solution is designed to only require changes in the ME and core network node of the serving network. This ensures that if serving network wants to use secured PWS messages, then any roaming users with handsets that support the functionality will be able to receive the warning messages. + +The proposed solution uses part of solution 2 in the UTRAN KH (see TR 33.859 [7]) to generate a root key that remains in the core network (note: the rest of that solution, e.g. providing a fresh key at idle to active is not needed here). From the key and the COUNT values used to ensure a fresh key, the UE and core network node can generate a key when needed to protect the delivery of the PWS key. This is enhanced to allow the calculation of $K_{ASMEG}$ from $K_c$ after a run of GSM AKA which is used with COUNT to generate a fresh key to protect the delivery of the PWS key. + +In addition the solution for the USIM case provides a mechanism to ensure that the root key (or keys that could derive the root key) never leave the core network. This is provided by the following three bits of functionality. Firstly, the UE with a USIM will never accept a PWS key protected by a security context generated by a run of GSM AKA. In general, this could happen with a pre-Rel 99 VLR/SGSN or an ME that does not support the ME to USIM interface (see TS 33.102 [2]). Both these cases can be ruled out for PWS Security and hence there is no need to fall back to GSM AKA for the protection of PWS keys. This prevents an attacker forcing a UE to fall back to GSM AKA in order to be able to deliver a false PWS key. + +Secondly, in response to a challenge requesting it to establish the enhanced security context, the UE does not respond with RES but rather with an enhanced response derived from CK and IK. When the core network receives such a response, it will not release CK and IK to the RAN nodes. Similarly, the UE will only accept PWS keys when protected using a security context where it returned the enhanced response. This means that an attacker that breaks into a RAN node would not be able to get CK and IK unless RES can be provided to the core network. An attacker deploying a false GSM BS could get 32 bit of information about RES due to the way that the GSM response is calculated from the UMTS response (X) RES (see TS 33.102 [8]). Hence the level of security provided by this is 32 bits less the length of (X)RES. Milenage (see TS 35.206 [9]) uses a 64 bit (X)RES and hence a USIM using standard Milenage would get 32 bit of security from this. + +Thirdly, an AMF bit is assigned and when that bit is set a UE will **not** use the security context derived from such an AV to protect the delivery of PWS keys. A core network node that wishes to send PWS keys to a UE "**should**" inform the HSS that it intends to use the AV to generate a security context that will protect the delivery of PWS keys. This means that a HSS can control which core network can receive AVs that can be used to provide protection of PWS keys. If the HSS sends an AV with the AMF bit set to all other nodes, this means that it is not possible for an attacker to get CK and IK unless it breaks into a core network node. This functionality would be optional to implement in the HSS. It should be noted that by having the AMF bit set to mean that the AV can be used for PWS Security would require a change in the home network before a roaming UE could receive PWS keys and would be against the design principle of the solution. + +In summary the above solution for the USIM case provides a NAS level solution to protecting the delivery where the home operator has control over the level of security that is provided to each UE. + +For the SIM, case, only the second part of the above will be used, that is the modification of the authentication response. This ensures the UE and network agree that an enhanced authentication has been run. + +**Editor's note: Some analysis of the security in the SIM case is needed** + +### 7.5.2 Solution details + +#### 7.5.2.1 General + +The solution is made of three components: firstly changes to the mobility message, secondly enhancement to the authentication procedure and finally changes to the context transfer messages between core network nodes. Each of these changes will be detailed in turn. + +#### 7.5.2.2 Changes in the mobility messages from the UE + +In the Request mobility message (e.g. Attach, RAUs and LAUs), the UE needs to send the relevant information to the network that it is capability of receiving PWS keys and for the network to decide if the UE has the correct PWS key. The UE **"should"** also include the COUNT value (as described in solution 2 of TR 33.859 [7]) if it has an enhanced security context. + +In the Response message, if the UE needs a new key, the network needs to include the PWS key identity, PWS key and a MAC calculated over the transmitted key and its identity using the $K_{\text{PWS-int}}$ as the key and over the transmitted key. $K_{\text{PWS-int}}$ is calculated as follows: + +$$K_{\text{PWS-int}} = \text{KDF}(K_{\text{ASMEU}}/K_{\text{ASMEG}}, \text{COUNT})$$ + +#### 7.5.2.3 Changes to the authentication procedure + +The authentication procedures is enhanced to provide a key, $K_{\text{ASMEU}}$ that does not leave the core network as in solution 2 in the UTRAN KH specification (see clause 5.2 of TR 33.859 [7]). In order to achieve this, the core network node signals that it want to run an enhanced authentication to the UE in the message carrying the authentication challenge. This results in both the UE and core network node calculating $K_{\text{ASMEU}}/K_{\text{ASMEG}}$ depending on whether a UMTS or GSM AKA was run and setting the COUNT value associated with it to zero. On receiving an authentication challenge for an enhanced AKA, the UE checks that the relevant AMF bit is not set. It also calculates an enhanced authentication response (EAR) as follows: + +$$\text{EAR} = \text{KDF}(K_{\text{ASMEU}}/K_{\text{ASMEG}}, \text{other parameters})$$ + +**Editor's note: The other parameters in the above calculation need to be defined.** + +The core network node will check that the received EAR is correct. + +When requesting AVs in order to be able to send PWS keys, the core network node will inform the HSS that it wants AV for protecting PWS keys. If the subscription has a USIM, an HSS that support this feature will send AVs with the relevant AMF bit set to all core network nodes that do not require an AV for protecting PWS keys and AVs without the relevant bit set to core network nodes that require AVs to protect PWS keys. + +#### 7.5.2.4 Changes to context transfers between core network nodes + +When transferring the UE's context from one core network node to another, the old core network node **"should"** include $K_{\text{ASMEU}}/K_{\text{ASMEG}}$ as appropriate and COUNT. + +### 7.5.3 Comparison with other solutions + +In some ways solution 4 using GBA and solution 5 are similar in that they both use a run of the relevant 3GPP authentication algorithm to generate keying material to protect the delivery of PWS keys to the subscriber. The solutions differ in that solution 4 proposes to deliver the keys from an application outside the 3GPP access networks whereas solution 5 proposes that the PWS keys are delivered by the core network nodes in the 3GPP access networks. Solution 4 proposes to use one of the existing GBA mechanisms, whereas solution 5 proposes new changes to the AKA protocol in UTRAN/GERAN. When delivering the keys directly from the UTRAN/GERAN core network nodes, there seemed no value in replicating the full GBA architecture as this would require the relevant core network node to act as a BSF and support the Zn interface when keying material for the protection of PWS keys can easily be derived directly from the authentication between the UE and core network node. Furthermore a GBA based solution requires the home network to deploy a BSF whereas with solution 5 only the core network node in the serving network and the UE need to be changed. For 2G subscribers, the GBA based solution provides a higher level of security due to the certificate based network authentication. + +When comparing against solution 3, solution 5 provides a higher level of security for the delivery of PWS keys over UTRAN/GERAN due to the fact the PWS keys is protected from the core network by keys that do not leave the core network. This is particularly true for subscriptions with USIM where the authentication can not be replayed. The cost of this gain is some additional complexity in the NAS signalling. + +## 7.6 Solution 6: implicit certificate PKI based PWS solution + +### 7.6.1 General + +This solution is access independent. + +An overview of the implicit certificate based approach is shown in figure 7.6.1-1. UE firmware is provisioned with public keys of several CAs. The message signer periodically obtains an implicit certificate from a CA which can be included as part of the security portion of a PWS transmission. The implicit certificate combined with the CA's public key results in the message signer's public key allowing the UE to verify the signature. + +![Figure 7.6.1-1: Overview of implicit certificate approach. The diagram illustrates three steps: Step 1 (Built with CA-x) shows a UE with CA-x public key and an Operator Network (CBC) receiving a PWS Message & Security (CBE) from a Message Signer. Step 2 (Implicit Certificate) shows the Message Signer obtaining an Implicit Certificate from a Certificate Authority (CA)-x. Step 3 (Open Channel) shows the UE receiving a PWS Message* & Security with a Signature & Implicit Certificate.](d7948c38a18636aefecdd95388196460_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the implicit certificate approach for PWS. It consists of three main components: UE, Operator Network (CBC), and Message Signer (CBE). The UE is shown with a mobile phone icon and the text "UE with CA-x public key". The Operator Network is shown with a cell tower icon and the text "Operator Network" and "CBC". The Message Signer is shown with a cloud icon containing "PWS Message & Security" and "CBE". The Certificate Authority (CA)-x is shown with a cloud icon containing "Certificate Authority (CA)-x". + +Step 1: Built with CA-x. The UE is shown with a mobile phone icon and the text "UE with CA-x public key". The Operator Network (CBC) is shown with a cell tower icon and the text "Operator Network" and "CBC". The Message Signer (CBE) is shown with a cloud icon containing "PWS Message & Security" and "CBE". + +Step 2: Implicit Certificate. The Message Signer (CBE) is shown with a cloud icon containing "PWS Message & Security" and "CBE". The Certificate Authority (CA)-x is shown with a cloud icon containing "Certificate Authority (CA)-x". A double-headed arrow labeled "Step2: Implicit Certificate" connects the Message Signer and the Certificate Authority. + +Step 3: Open Channel. The UE is shown with a mobile phone icon and the text "UE with CA-x public key". The Operator Network (CBC) is shown with a cell tower icon and the text "Operator Network" and "CBC". The Message Signer (CBE) is shown with a cloud icon containing "PWS Message & Security" and "CBE". A box labeled "PWS Message\* & Security" contains a signature and an implicit certificate. A double-headed arrow labeled "Signature & Implicit Certificate" connects the Message Signer and the UE. + +Figure 7.6.1-1: Overview of implicit certificate approach. The diagram illustrates three steps: Step 1 (Built with CA-x) shows a UE with CA-x public key and an Operator Network (CBC) receiving a PWS Message & Security (CBE) from a Message Signer. Step 2 (Implicit Certificate) shows the Message Signer obtaining an Implicit Certificate from a Certificate Authority (CA)-x. Step 3 (Open Channel) shows the UE receiving a PWS Message\* & Security with a Signature & Implicit Certificate. + +Figure 7.6.1-1: Overview of implicit certificate approach + +An advantage of this system is its scalability. That is, multiple CBEs can share the same set of CAs. Simply put, if a national authority requires the addition of a new CBE, the CBE need only obtain an implicit certificate from one of the available CAs without the need of signalling new keying material to UEs or an operator's network except for testing purposes. + +Although CAs are assumed to be long lived entities (~20 years), allowance "should" be made for changing the set of CAs and their public keys. While this would most likely be a planned event, in the rare occurrence a CA or CBE is compromised or potentially a UE is reset, such an update might be necessary. + +Two potential approaches to updating the list of CA public keys can be considered, 1) Using periodic test messages to carry update information and 2) a push mechanism such as (U)SIM Application Toolkit. + +#### 7.6.1.1 CA updating via PWS test messaging + +Updates to the list of CAs and associated public keys stored by a UE could be achieved through a new PWS message type. This message can be signalled as a PWS CA update message by using the existing Message Identifier parameter [1] but could otherwise be transmitted to UEs in the same manner as warning related PWS messages. + +Figure 7.6.1.1-2 shows the contents of the PWS CA update message could contain the identifier of the CA (CA-ID), its new public key and an indicator to signal whether the update message is adding or revoking a CA. + +![Diagram of PWS CA update message format showing fields: CA-ID (1 byte), New CA Public Key (33 bytes), Update Message Type Indicator (UMTI) (1 byte), and PWS Security (75 bytes). The first three fields form the PWS CA Update Message (35 bytes). The PWS Security field is labeled as Signature & Implicit Cert. from existing CA.](237b76118be454462fc9b4e96adaa6c7_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the structure of a PWS CA update message. It consists of four main fields: + + +- CA-ID**: 1 byte (yellow box) +- New CA Public Key**: 33 bytes (orange box) +- Update Message Type Indicator (UMTI)**: 1 byte (blue box, indicated by an arrow from the title) +- PWS Security**: 75 bytes (yellow box) + + The first three fields (CA-ID, New CA Public Key, and UMTI) are grouped together as the **PWS CA Update Message** (35 bytes). The **PWS Security** field is described as **Signature & Implicit Cert. from existing CA**. + +Diagram of PWS CA update message format showing fields: CA-ID (1 byte), New CA Public Key (33 bytes), Update Message Type Indicator (UMTI) (1 byte), and PWS Security (75 bytes). The first three fields form the PWS CA Update Message (35 bytes). The PWS Security field is labeled as Signature & Implicit Cert. from existing CA. + +Figure 7.6.1.1-2: PWS CA update message format + +When an update message is received the Update Message Type Indicator (UMTI) is first checked. + +If the UMTI indicates the addition of a CA then the UE checks if the CA-ID is already stored. If it is not then the CA-ID and associated public key are added, otherwise the update message is discarded. + +If the UMTI indicates the removal of a CA then the UE checks if the CA-ID is already stored. If it is then the CA-ID and associated public key are removed, otherwise the update message is discarded. + +In addition to facilitating the update of the CA list, the UMTI could potentially also be used as the basis for revoking an individual PWS message signer. In this case the signalled public key is of the PWS message signer to be revoked. If the UMTI indicates the revocation of a PWS message signer, then the UE checks if the signalled public key has been stored previously. If so the update message is discarded, if not then the public key is added to a list of revoked PWS message signers. + +Since the contents of the PWS CA update message are critical to the functioning of the system, to ensure the UE can trust the message contents UEs should be required to receive at least two update messages containing where the implicit certificate used in each message is from a different existing CA. However without an additional safeguard a UE could be locked out of accepting further CA updates if the number of CAs in its list is reduced to one. This can be addressed by requiring there always be at least 2 CAs. This means if UEs have 2 CAs a third "should" be added before revoking one becomes possible. + +In the case more than one PWS message signer is supported in a region each message should also be from a different existing PWS message signer. + +The case of only one PWS message signer could also be accommodated for example by requiring Implicit Certificates to be obtained from a CA who issues short-lived implicit certificates for the purpose of PWS CA update messages. Procedural steps following this example could be: + +- Step 1: Receive and validate PWS CA update message; +- Step 2: Check previously validated PWS CA update messages; +- Step 3: If a PWS CA update message is stored in the ME and has been validated using a different existing CA and either the current or existing different CA is used for the purpose of PWS CA update messages then update the current CA list in the ME with the PWS CA update message contents; +- Step 4: If a CA update message stored in the ME according to Step 3 is not found then store the current CA update message in the ME with its validating CA but without updating the contents of the CA list. + +#### 7.6.1.2 CA updating via (U)SIM + +A UEs list of allowed CA list could also be updated by relying on the USIM application. This would require the addition of a file under the USIM containing the list of allowed CAs and that would be read by the ME during the initialisation or the refresh of the USIM (this would require therefore the addition of a new procedure in CT6 TS 31.102 [22] clause 5). The update of this new file would be made possible by using Remote File Management as defined in clause 5.2 of TS 31.116 [23]. + +However, as this updating mechanism is tied to the network, operators would bear greater responsibility and cost with this approach. + +### 7.6.2 Certificate authorities + +#### 7.6.2.1 General + +CAs act as the trust anchors for PKIs. It is essential for a functioning PKI to have at least one universally accepted CA. However, in systems like PWS that span multiple government and regulatory authorities, agreement on a sole trust anchor is encumbered. There are a few working models in similar fields that are worth consideration such as: + +- Advanced Access Content System used in Blu-ray; +- Zigbee Smart Energy uses a single commercial CA vendor that issues certificates to devices that are certified at an approved testing lab; +- CA Browser Forum (CAB) used in support of web browsers; +- WiMax uses two CAs, Verisign and Motorola that are approved to service the community. + +Most of these examples are focused on issuing certificates to a large number of devices so that they can securely operate in an ecosystem. However, the PWS situation requires a large number of devices to be able to authenticate messages from a relatively few entities, in this aspect it is perhaps most similar in use as example 3 (many browsers compared to TLS servers). + +Here UE firmware is provisioned with public keys of several CAs much in the same way as for CAs used with browsers today. + +As responsibility for security in the implicit certificate approach rests at the national level, creating requirements on CAs UE vendors "**should**" support as well as upkeep of these CAs rests at the national level and not with operators. Operator responsibility in this regard is simply to pass requirements necessitating support of CA public keys mandated by government agencies to UE vendors. + +As shown in Figure 7.6.2.1-1, CBEs from different regions need not necessarily share the same set of CAs. There may be some overlap and indeed agreement between CBEs from different countries to share the same CAs is possible; however no such requirement need be exist within 3GPP. Moreover the responsibility for root management concerns such as the provisioning of CAs, overlap in usage of CAs or indeed cross certification of CAs would be decided and enforced at the national level. + +As an example consider Figure 7.6.2.1-1. The government in region A may decide that UEs sold in its country should only be pre-provisioned with CA1 and CA2. In such cases, UEs from region A whether in their own region or visiting others, will not process PWS warning messages signed by CBE-B or CBE-C as these use untrusted CAs. + +However, UEs from region B visiting region C will receive PWS warning messages with implicit certificates from CA5 since the government in region B would mandate UEs sold in its region be pre-provisioned with CA5. The risk government B has taken is a compromised CBE in region C can be used to broadcast false PWS warning messages in government B's own region since it now shares at least one CA. + +![Sequence diagram showing the PWS Key Update process between MME/SGSN and CBC.](65e8c0628536d6d4245e9ab46ba070c3_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant MME/SGSN + participant CBC + Note left of MME/SGSN: Current key= K(i); +Next key= K(i+1) + Note right of CBC: Current key= K(i); +Next key= K(i+1) + Note right of CBC: Determine to update +PWS key; +Current key= K(i+1); +Next key= K(i+2) + MME/SGSN->>CBC: PWS Key Update +(Current key ID; Next Key +and Next key ID) + Note left of MME/SGSN: Update PWS key; +Current key= K(i+1); +Next key= K(i+2) + CBC->>MME/SGSN: PWS Key Update Ack + +``` + +The diagram illustrates a sequence of interactions between an MME/SGSN and a CBC. + 1. Both entities start with 'Current key= K(i); Next key= K(i+1)'. + 2. The CBC performs an internal step: 'Determine to update PWS key; Current key= K(i+1); Next key= K(i+2)'. + 3. The CBC sends a 'PWS Key Update' message to the MME/SGSN, containing '(Current key ID; Next Key and Next key ID)'. + 4. The MME/SGSN performs an internal step: 'Update PWS key; Current key= K(i+1); Next key= K(i+2)'. + 5. Finally, the MME/SGSN sends a 'PWS Key Update Ack' message back to the CBC. + +Sequence diagram showing the PWS Key Update process between MME/SGSN and CBC. + +**Figure 7.6.2.1-1: Certificate Authorities (CAs) mandated at the national level in various regions** + +A consequence of this approach is UEs using a CA's public key shared by CBEs outside its own region will accept any PWS message signed by those CBEs. Therefore it is the responsibility of the UE's national government to establish confidence in those CBEs outside its region before allowing public keys from such shared CAs to be pre-provisioned on UEs sold within its boundaries. + +#### 7.6.2.2 UE provisioning [public key] and [CA-ID] updating of home network + +To simplify the manufacturing process it can be assumed UEs are provisioned with public keys of all CAs globally. In this way UEs will be capable of displaying secured PWS messages even when in limited service state. + +However, just as CBEs in a particular region should be supported by one group of CAs similarly a UE in that region should only display warning messages verified by a public key from the same group of CAs once it enters service. + +Several approaches can be considered in identifying the relevant group of CAs. + +##### Approach 1: User controlled CA list + +An option is available for the user to select the location of his home network. This could be used to select CAs allowed by the user's home government from the current global list of CAs. CAs outside this selection can be marked as inactive. + +While the option of the user setting his home network location would always be available as an option, a user could be explicitly prompted for this information when a new UICC is used. + +##### Approach 2: PWS test message type + +As previously described a new type of PWS message can be used to modify available CA information. Shown in figure 7.6.2.2-1, this message could additionally contain a field indicating the set of CAs used in the home region of the PWS broadcast. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the PWS CA key update test message flow between UE, RAN, and MME/SGSN.](56a5265d174ce056c1dbe5e7a60839fc_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant RAN + participant MME/SGSN + Note right of MME/SGSN: Update PWS key: +Current key: K(1); +Next key: K(2); + MME/SGSN->>RAN: PWS key Update + Note left of RAN: Call Broadcast +{Current key ID, Next key ID} + RAN->>UE: TAU/RAU/LU Request + Note left of UE: Update PWS key: +Trigger PWS key Update + UE->>RAN: TAU/RAU/LU Accept +{Next key, Next key ID} + Note left of UE: Store Next key: +Current key: K(1); +Next key: K(2); + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the PWS CA key update test message flow between UE, RAN, and MME/SGSN. + +Figure 7.6.2.2-1: PWS CA key update test message + +Once a UE has received such a message it can use the CA Set-ID to select CAs allowed by the user's home government from the global list of CAs. CAs outside this selection can be marked as inactive. + +To allow for a change in a UE's home location, if a UE receives a test message with PWS Security but indicating an inactive CA-ID the UE could be allowed to verify the signature using the inactive CA's public key. While no-action on key updating would be taken unless verification occurs with active CAs, in the event several test messages are verified over an extended period of time using inactive CAs, the user could be prompted to confirm his home region based on the CA Set-ID via the user controlled CA list approach described in approach 1. + +##### Approach 3: USIM Reading + +While UEs can be provisioned at manufacturing with the CAs in use globally as a step in satisfying limited service state requirements, once a USIM is inserted into the UE the ME could read the list of allowed CAs mandated by the government of its home network from the UICC. + +This can be enabled by asking CT6 to create an additional file in TS 31.102 [22] containing the list of CAs and their public keys. Additionally, CT1 and CT6 could be requested to create an update mechanism along the lines of (U)SIM Toolkit to securely update this CA list. + +While offering a clear unambiguous solution to updating the CA list in case of change in the home network, this approach does place a clear responsibility on the operator in maintaining the active list of CAs mandated by the regional government that the other two approaches do not. + +##### Approach 4: USIM triggering + +Similar to approach 3, UEs are provisioned at manufacturing with the CAs in use globally as a step in satisfying limited service state requirements. However, in this case once an USIM is inserted, the regional CAs associated with the UE's home country are identified based on the UE's home network. + +#### 7.6.2.3 Roaming considerations + +Roaming is of concern to all approaches to PWS Security. That is when a UE whose home network supports PWS Security roams onto a network supporting PWS but without security and in particular one that does not authenticate itself to the UE, then the UE **"should"** reject all PWS messages or leave itself open to attack. + +Two niche cases more highlighting security arrangements at the national and operator level may however be worth discussing. + +In the first case two operators in different regions have no security arrangements between each other while the governments have agreed to obtain implicit certificates from the same set of CAs. In this case as governments bear the responsibility of bearing roaming agreements, PWS messages with security can be received in both regions by both roaming and non-roaming UEs. + +In the second case, governments' in two regions requiring PWS with security have decided to obtain implicit certificates from CAs not provisioned in UEs in each other's regions and operators in these regions do have security agreements in place between their networks. While not currently proposed in the implicit certificate approach it is possible in principle for the CAs a UE uses for verification to be dependent on the network it is authentically attached to while roaming. However to date this proposal wasn't made as in essence the home government now needs to trust security agreements operators in its region made with operators outside its region thereby placing greater liability on operators. + +### 7.6.3 Implicit certificates + +#### 7.6.3.1 High level view of an implicit certificate approach from the UE perspective + +Implicit certificates are a well-known approach used in cryptography and can be used to reduce the amount of storage and computation in public key systems. Instead of a CA generating a signed certificate in order to certify a signer's explicitly embedded public key, the signer's public key is computed by the UE using the certificate in combination with a CA's public key. + +![Sequence diagram showing the UE perspective of an implicit certificate approach in PWS. The diagram involves four entities: UE, eNB, MME, and CBC/CBE. The sequence of messages is: 1. MME to CBC/CBE: Write-Replace Warning Request (PKID, the signature); 2. CBC/CBE to MME: Write-Replace Warning Confirm; 3. MME to eNB: Write-Replace Warning Request (PKID, the signature); 4. eNB to UE: Broadcast information (PKID, the signature); 5. UE internal process: UE verifies the signature with the related public keys; 6. eNB to MME: Write-Replace Warning Response; 7. UE internal process: UE Alert.](a4bfa2343d75076b79f7e33d93915e00_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant eNB + participant MME + participant CBC/CBE + Note right of UE: 5. UE verifies the signature with the related public keys + Note right of UE: 7. UE Alert + MME->>CBC/CBE: 1. Write-Replace Warning Request (PKID, the signature) + CBC/CBE-->>MME: 2. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + MME->>eNB: 3. Write-Replace Warning Request (PKID, the signature) + eNB->>UE: 4. Broadcast information (PKID, the signature) + eNB->>MME: 6. Write-Replace Warning Response +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the UE perspective of an implicit certificate approach in PWS. The diagram involves four entities: UE, eNB, MME, and CBC/CBE. The sequence of messages is: 1. MME to CBC/CBE: Write-Replace Warning Request (PKID, the signature); 2. CBC/CBE to MME: Write-Replace Warning Confirm; 3. MME to eNB: Write-Replace Warning Request (PKID, the signature); 4. eNB to UE: Broadcast information (PKID, the signature); 5. UE internal process: UE verifies the signature with the related public keys; 6. eNB to MME: Write-Replace Warning Response; 7. UE internal process: UE Alert. + +**Figure 7.6.3.1-1: UE perspective of implicit certificate in PWS** + +A high level view of an implicit certificate approach from the UE perspective is shown in figure 7.6.3.1-1. + +The UE derives the signer's public key using the received implicit certificate and the CA's public key. + +The UE then verifies the signature using the derived signer's public key. The authenticity of the signer (and indeed the derived public key) is implied by proof of possession of the associated private key of the signed message. + +#### 7.6.3.2 Generation of implicit certificate + +As shown in figure 7.6.3.2-1, the PWS message signer contacts the CA with a random number " $\alpha$ " whenever a new implicit certificate is desired. This could be once a week, month or year; depending on how long the signer wants the public key derived from the implicit certificate to be valid for. However, long the implicit certificate is valid for, it is independent of the PWS message and can be used in regenerating the same PWS message signer's public key for multiple warning messages. + +![Diagram illustrating the generation of an implicit certificate in PWS. A UE with CA public key sends a PWS Message & Security via an Open Channel to the Operator Network (CBC). The PWS Message Signer (CBE) sends an Integer alpha G to the Certificate Authority (CA), which returns an Implicit Certificate. The PWS Message & Security is then signed and the implicit certificate is included.](977811d1c73b74f801be9f4c376694ca_img.jpg) + +The diagram shows the interaction between a UE (User Equipment) with a CA public key, an Operator Network (CBC), a PWS Message Signer (CBE), and a Certificate Authority (CA). The UE sends a 'PWS Message & Security' via an 'Open Channel' to the Operator Network. The PWS Message Signer (CBE) sends an 'Integer $\alpha G$ ' to the CA, which returns an 'Implicit Certificate'. The PWS Message & Security is then signed and the implicit certificate is included in the 'Signature & Implicit Certificate'. + +Diagram illustrating the generation of an implicit certificate in PWS. A UE with CA public key sends a PWS Message & Security via an Open Channel to the Operator Network (CBC). The PWS Message Signer (CBE) sends an Integer alpha G to the Certificate Authority (CA), which returns an Implicit Certificate. The PWS Message & Security is then signed and the implicit certificate is included. + +**Figure 7.6.3.2-1: Implicit certificate in PWS** + +On receiving the integer " $\alpha$ ", the CA then generates the implicit certificate and returns it to the PWS message signer. + +Formal steps in this process taken by the CA for the ECQV implicit process are as follows: + +Let $G$ be a generating point of order $n$ . + +Certificate Authority (CA) has private key $c$ and public key $Q_{CA} = cG$ . + +The PWS Message Signer requests the implicit certificate $IC_A$ from the CA. + +- 1) PWS Message Signer generates a random integer $\alpha$ , computes $\alpha G$ and sends that to the CA. +- 2) CA Select a random integer $k$ from $[1, n - 1]$ and computes $kG$ . +- 3) CA computes $P = \alpha G + kG$ . +- 4) CA forms the implicit certificate $IC_A = (ID_A, P)$ where $ID_A$ is NWMS's identifying information. +- 5) CA computes $e = H(IC_A)$ , where $H$ is a cryptographic hash function. +- 6) CA computes $s = ek + c \pmod{n}$ +- 7) CA sends $(s, IC_A)$ to the PWS Message signer + +The PWS Message Signer's private key is $a = e\alpha + s \pmod{n}$ + +The PWS Message Signer's public key is $Q_A = eP + Q_{CA}$ + +Given $IC_A$ and $Q_{CA}$ , UEs can generate $Q_A$ . + +#### 7.6.3.3 PWS Security contents + +Implicit certificates are versatile and can be used with a variety of signature approaches including DSA and ECDSA, however the approach considered here due to efficiency in size is a Keyed-MAC signature scheme. + +When operating at 112-bit security level, using a 112-bit MAC and assuming an ECQV certificate structure, 14-bytes, 28-bytes and 31-bytes are required to encode the values MAC, $s$ and $IC_A$ respectively. + +The 31-byte length for $IC_A$ assumes a certificate structure containing a 225 bit public key reconstruction value, a 15 bit certificate timestamp and an 8 bit CA\_ID value. The certificate timestamp can provide one approach to protection in case a key is compromised at the message signer. The validity period of the certificate and therefore the frequency at which a message signer obtains new certificates from the CA would be decided at the national level and need not be the responsibility of operators. + +In total the signature and implicit certificate occupy 73-bytes leaving 2 additional bytes that can be used for a PWS message timestamp. This timestamp would be provided and signed by the PWS message signer and indicates the validity period for the PWS warning message. + +![Diagram of PWS Security content structure showing four fields: MAC (14-Bytes), s (28-Bytes), Implicit Certificate (31-Bytes), and PWS Message Timestamp (2-Bytes). The first two fields are grouped under the label 'Keyed MAC'.](f23879f003c58b57f690e2dc6c95816a_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph LR + subgraph Keyed_MAC [Keyed MAC] + MAC[MAC +14-Bytes] + S[s +28-Bytes] + end + IC[Implicit Certificate +31-Bytes] + TS[PWS Message Timestamp +2-Bytes] + + MAC --- S --- IC --- TS + +``` + +The diagram illustrates the structure of PWS Security content. It consists of four contiguous fields: + +- MAC**: 14-Bytes (light blue box) +- s**: 28-Bytes (orange box) +- Implicit Certificate**: 31-Bytes (green box) +- PWS Message Timestamp**: 2-Bytes (yellow box) + +The first two fields, MAC and s, are grouped together under a bracket labeled **Keyed MAC**. The fourth field, PWS Message Timestamp, is indicated by a blue arrow pointing to it from the label above. Below the boxes, double-headed arrows indicate the byte lengths: 14-Bytes, 28-Bytes, 31-Bytes, and 2-Bytes. + +Diagram of PWS Security content structure showing four fields: MAC (14-Bytes), s (28-Bytes), Implicit Certificate (31-Bytes), and PWS Message Timestamp (2-Bytes). The first two fields are grouped under the label 'Keyed MAC'. + +**Figure 7.6.3.3-1: PWS Security content** + +The final two bytes of the security contents consist of a timestamp provided by the message signer and indicating the validity period for the PWS warning message for the purposes of replay protection. + +This can take the form of a traditional timestamp or as a message counter. + +##### Timestamp + +For the timestamp to function correctly, some degree of synchronization is necessary between the UE and the PWS message signer. + +Although an automatic network time such as NITZ would provide a means of time synchronization between the UE and network, whether such a mechanism is securely available is network dependent and is not assumed. + +In one approach, the UE could indicate the receipt of a PWS message with an expired certificate if one is received and present the user with the current time understood by the UE and the option of proceeding or discarding the message. + +Alternatively a PWS timer could be provisioned in UEs at manufacture with a conservative time. This time could then be adjusted in the normal course of operations either by a PWS timestamp update message similar in concept to the PWS CA update message, or by an additional timestamp field in the PWS CA update message itself. Such an update timestamp would detail the current time of the PWS message signer to all receiving UEs. + +##### Message counter + +In the case a message counter is used in order to avoid the need for co-ordination between message signers, a message signer identifier should be included as part of the implicit certificate. As shown in Figure 7.6.3.3-1 this can be accommodated by reducing the implicit certificate timestamp from 15 bits to 7 bits allowing an 1 byte field for a message signer identifier (PKID). + +In order to protect out of date UEs (e.g.: those who miss PWS warning messages and the resulting increments to a message signer's counter) from replay attack, a PWS counter update message similar in concept to the PWS CA + +update message could be used or alternatively if there are only a few PWS message signers, an extra field could be included in the PWS CA update message itself. Such a field could contain 3 bytes, the message signer's identity (PKID) of 1 byte and current counter value (NSUC) of 2 bytes, for each message signer signalled. + +Whether the PWS message timestamp takes the form of an actual timestamp or a message signer counter, the 2 bytes in the PWS Security content should be included in the computation of the keyed MAC signature. + +Using ECQV, the UE "**should**" compute the Message Signers Public key using the implicit certificate in addition to verifying the PWS signature. + +Considering available cryptographic signature benchmarks from eBATS and assuming the ARM EABI platform running at 1782MHz and 128-bit level security, the full implicit certificate based approach will takes roughly 6.5ms and not more than 7.4ms. This is compared with 3.7ms for ECDSA and 18ms for DSA signature verification indicating comparable complexity to other signature schemes. + +The complexity time estimates of the implicit certificate based approach are approximate and were made by considering the steps 3 and 4 of signature verification and comparing with similar steps in algorithms benchmarked in eBATS. + +Steps both in encoding (at the PWS message signer) and verification (at the UE) of the Keyed-MAC can be as follows: + +##### Keyed-MAC Signature Generation + +**INPUT:** PWS Message Signer's private key $d_A$ , and associated ECQV certificate structure $IC_A$ , and a message to be signed $M$ . + +**OUTPUT:** A signed message $M$ , with associated security information $MAC; s; IC_A$ . + +- 1) Generate ephemeral key pair $(d, Q)$ . +- 2) Construct MAC key $k = KDF(Q)$ , where $KDF$ is a key derivation function that takes as input a point, and possibly other information, and generates an encryption key. +- 3) Compute $MAC = MACAlgorithm(M, k)$ . +- 4) Compute $h = Hash(MAC || M)$ , where $Hash$ is a suitable hash function, that takes as input additional information including a possible identity string. +- 5) Convert $h$ to an integer $e$ . +- 6) Calculate $s = e - d_A + d \pmod{n}$ . + +Output $s, MAC$ , along with input value $IC_A$ as the associated security data for $M$ . + +##### Keyed-MAC Signature Verification + +**INPUT:** Signed message $M$ , with security information $s$ , $MAC$ , $IC_A$ , and the CA's public key $Q_{CA}$ . + +**OUTPUT:** VALID, or INVALID. + +- 1) Compute $h = Hash(MAC || M)$ , with the same hash function used in the signature generation scheme, and the additional input information. +- 2) Convert $h$ to an integer $e$ . +- 3) Recover the PWS message signer's public key from the certificate, $Q_A = ECQVPublicKeyReconstruction(Cert_A, Q_{CA})$ . +- 4) Compute $Q' = sG - eQ_A$ . +- 5) Compute $k' = KDF(Q')$ , using the same key derivation function used in the signature generation algorithm, including the same additional information. +- 6) Compute $MAC' = MACAlgorithm(M, k')$ . + +If $MAC' = MAC$ then return VALID, else return INVALID. + +During this process the UE combines information contained within the implicit certificate with the public key of the appropriate CA to produce the message signer's public key. As several CAs may and indeed should be supported, a means is needed to distinguish which public key is used. + +This can be achieved through use of the one byte CA-ID field described in clause 7.7.3.3. Each CA public key would be assigned a CA-ID value which the UE can read from the implicit certificate. Using the CA-ID the UE can look up the CA public key tied to that CA-ID in its provisioned list of CAs. + +##### List of provisioned CA public keys + +![](d7efe1d3c9fce95c7bacefb7e7d7faff_img.jpg) + +| CA-ID (1 byte) | Public Key (28 bytes) | +|----------------|------------------------------| +| 00001101 | 1001111010011110100111101001 | +| 00100101 | 0011011111010000110010100111 | +| • | • | +| • | • | +| • | • | + +**Figure 7.6.3.3-2: Example list provisioned CA public keys with associated CA-IDs** + +### 7.6.4 Properties of solution + +The implicit approach is the only proposed PKI approach for PWS public key distribution. Compared to other approaches it offers significant advantages in the areas of network resource consumption, CBE scalability, operator liability and operator cost. + +- **Network resource consumption:** Link and core network resource usage is less than with other approaches and is consumed only when a PWS message is sent. No additional resources are expended either for roaming UEs or during an update of a CBEs public key/implicit certificate. +- **CBE scalability:** If multiple CBEs share the same CA, the system is easily scalable to support the additional CBE. Simply put, if a national authority requires the addition of a new CBE, the CBE need only obtain an implicit certificate from one of the available CAs without the need of signalling new, per CBE, keying material to UEs or an operator's network except for testing purposes. +- **Several OEMs share same CAs:** Details are ffs +- **Operator liability:** Operator liability is kept to a minimum. Responsibility for key management issues such as setting up, functioning and upkeep of the CAs is at the national level and not the responsibility of the operator. However the operator may have to assist with UE provisioning. +- **Operator cost:** Compared to other approaches the implicit certificate approach has minimal impact on an operator's network. The only known impacts at this time are: + - 1) Upgrading the PWS Security field from 50 bytes to 75 bytes; + - 2) Installation of the CBC-CBE interface. + +On the other hand there are disadvantages to be considered with the implicit certificate approach, at least in the areas of CA setup/operation and overhead in the PWS Security field. + +- **CA setup/operation:** A major cost in any PKI system is setup and operation of the CA. However, since this is done at the national level, costs could be borne by the national government or alternatively by operators. +- **PWS Security field overhead:** While efficient in size, implicit certificates do occupy space and are a source of additional overhead in the PWS Security field resulting in a security level of 112-bits. + +As with all PWS Security proposals the implicit certificate approach has an impact on the UE. This includes, provisioning a list of CA public keys, enabling implicit certificate and signature algorithm and support of ancillary functionality necessary for PWS Security such as key update mechanisms. + +## 7.7 Solution 7: generalized certificate-based approach for PWS + +### 7.7.1 Introduction + +All three major schemes for PWS Security described in the present document, so far, NAS-based, GBA-based, and implicit-certificate-based, have shown serious problems. + +- The scheme laid out in most detail so far, the NAS-based scheme, suffers from the problems inherited from weak 2G security: it seems almost impossible to provide strong PWS Security to SIM users in this way, and, for USIM users, strong PWS Security over GERAN access could only be provided if significant changes were made to the 2G security architecture, which may be commercially unviable for this legacy technology. On the other hand, for the NAS-based scheme, strong PWS Security over GERAN seems essential as an attacker could always force users, even selectively per user, to camp on its false GSM BS by emitting a strong signal, bypassing strong PWS Security over UTRAN or E-UTRAN in this way. +- For the GBA-based scheme, there are also problems inherited from 2G security (cf. clause 7.4): there is no 2G variant for GBA push, and for (UE-initiated) 2G GBA, as in TS 33.220 [26], Annex I, a TLS server certificate with a corresponding public key in the UE is required. The latter fact begs the question what the advantage of 2G GBA over a purely certificate-based approach would be. Furthermore, the GBA-based scheme has not been investigated in much detail. While this disadvantage seems to go away with the working assumption that users with a 2G SIM need not be supported for PWS security, it is still true that the GBA-based scheme currently is the least developed of all and would require much further study. +- The scheme based on implicit certificates (called 'IMPCERT' henceforth) assumes a set of root CAs whose public keys are pre-installed in the terminal. One of these root CAs issues an implicit certificate to a particular signing entity. This implicit certificate is then sent together with the warning message to the ME over a broadcast channel. Concerns have been raised regarding the need for some sort of global coordination regarding the distribution of public root keys, cf. more on this below. + +This solution presents a certificate-based approach, which is more general than IMPCERT. This may help with the acceptability of a certificate-based approach and the gradual introduction of PWS Security around the globe. + +The PWS Security solution based on implicit certificates is generalized in the following respects: + +- Structure of Certificate Authorities (CAs); +- Distribution of public root keys; +- Certificate format. + +Public root key is used to authenticate CBE certificates. If it succeeds, UE can verify the warning message afterwards by using the public keys for PWS carried in CBE certificates. + +After terminal is configured with CBE certificates, it can verify warning messages sent from CBEs. Since UE may receive warning messages signed by different CBEs, which CBE certificate should be used is a problem. A parameter combined with the warning message is needed to indicate which CBE certificate to be used. This parameter is the CBE identifier, which suffices for this purpose, as the UE should have only one certificate for one CBE at a given point in time. + +### 7.7.2 Structure of CAs + +#### 7.7.2.1 Top-down approach to CAs + +This approach is similar to what is proposed in the IMPCERT scheme: + +- There is a number of top-level CAs; +- Each PWS signing entity obtains a certificate from one of these top-level CAs; +- The public root keys of all top-level CAs are available in all terminals. + +As shown in clause 7.6.2 of the present document, there are real-world examples following this kind of approach. One example is the collection of root keys in the key store of a browser. Of course, PWS is different in that the top-level CAs and the signing entities would be under the responsibility of regulators, and not an industry sector. + +It is not required for this approach that the top-level CAs mutually trust each other, or cross-certify each other, if it can be ensured that the usability of a root key of a CA is somehow limited to the jurisdiction of the regulator owning this CA. (This is still to be shown, cf. Editor's note in clause 7.6.3.3.). But, as a minimum, some sort of global repository for root keys, from where terminal manufacturers could obtain the collection of root keys in an authentic way before manufacturing a terminal, would be required. This global root key repository would not have to be a CA itself, or know any private keys, but it would have to have trust relationships, and communication channels guaranteeing integrity (not necessarily through cryptography), with all regulators owning the top-level CAs as well as with all terminal manufacturers. It is not clear who could play the role of providing such a trusted global root key repository. Without such a trusted global root key repository, the reliable provisioning to the terminals cannot be assured. + +#### 7.7.2.2 Bottom-up approach to CAs + +This approach starts from the observation that it is questionable whether PWS Security will be introduced in all, or even a large number of, countries within the same time frame as its introduction depends very much on national regulations. (Actually, not a single regulator is known to have set requirements mandating the introduction of PWS Security.) This is one reason why, at least in the initial phases of the global roll-out of PWS Security, the provision of a global root key repository may meet with difficulties. The bottom-up approach would, in contrast, allow one country - or one group of countries agreeing on a common regulation - to go ahead without being dependent on the rest of the world. + +The bottom-up approach for PWS is similar to the approach various 3GPP specifications have taken, cf. below, when they assume the use of 3GPP server certificates and corresponding public verification keys in terminals. The approach works as follows: + +A regulator who decides to introduce PWS Security sets up a CA that issues certificates for the signing entities responsible for signing warning messages in this regulator's area of responsibility. The public root key would be implemented in the terminal typically after manufacturing time, see clause 7.7.3.1. The terminals could then verify warning messages in the area of that regulator. For other areas, terminals could, in the initial phase, either accept unprotected warning messages, or not accept warning messages at all, according to the preferences set in the USIM, cf. TS 22.268 [2], cf. also clause 7.9 on circumvention attacks. + +Right from the start (or after some time when PWS Security has gained increased acceptance around the world) the regulator owning the CA could cross-certify the public root keys of CAs of other regulators responsible for areas that are most frequently visited by users in his own area. The cross-certificates could become part of roaming agreements. In order for the cross-certification to remain manageable, the number of partners, with which cross-certificates are exchanged, would have to be somehow limited. But it is believed, based on typical roaming patterns, that agreements with only a quite limited number of roaming partners would suffice to ensure that most users would be present in their home area or one of the partner areas most of their time. + +When the number of partners, with which cross-certificates would have to be exchanged, would grow too large to be manageable this would be an indication that PWS Security is gaining traction around the globe, and it would be time to set up a number of root CAs according to the top-down approach; but this may be quite some time from now. + +#### 7.7.2.3 More complex CA structures + +It may be desirable in certain situations to have intermediate CAs below a root CA where the intermediate CAs would provide the certificate for the PWS signing entity, e.g. when the root CA would be at a regional level (e.g. European Union) while the intermediate CA would be at a national level. Then not only would the public root key have to be available in the terminal, but also the certificate of the intermediate CA. This seems more easily compatible with the + +bottom-up approach and a distribution of certificates and root key via configuration, cf. clause 7.7.3.2, than with an approach, as in IMPCERT, where the certificate is distributed on the cell broadcast channel, together with a warning message. + +#### 7.7.2.4 Comparison with server certificates in other 3GPP specifications + +The following 3GPP network elements are assumed to have server certificates and the UEs are assumed to have the corresponding public root keys installed: + +- *IMS*: the P-CSCF has a TLS server certificate when the IMS access signalling is secured by means of TLS as in TS 33.203 [31]; +- *3G-WLAN interworking*: the PDG, acting as an IKEv2 responder in 3GPP IP access, has a certificate, cf. TS 33.234 [32]; +- *Non-3GPP access to the EPC*: the ePDG in untrusted access, and the PDN GW, acting as a Home Agent for DSMIPv6, both have certificates for their roles as IKEv2 responders, cf. TS 33.402 [35]; +- *GBA*: the BSF has a TLS server certificate for GBA\_Digest and 2G GBA, cf. TS 33.220 [26], Annexes I and M; +- *GAN*: the GANC-SEGW, acting as an IKEv2 responder in GAN access, has a certificate, cf. TS 43.318 [36] (which points to TS 33.234 [32] for security). + +Note that a P-CSCF, a PDN GW, a PDG, or an ePDG can reside in a visited network, according to TS 23.228 [37], TS 23.234 [38] and TS 23.402 [39]. If this is the case then a UE will need a cross-certificate for being able to verify the server certificate, or have the root key for the visited network stored. + +### 7.7.3 Distribution of public root keys + +#### 7.7.3.1 Pre-installation in terminals at manufacturing time + +This approach was already discussed in the context of the top-down approach to CAs above. The terminal manufacturers would obtain the public root keys from a trusted global root key repository. + +Open questions include how new root keys could be added to or removed from the key store during the lifetime of the terminal, e.g. due to lifetime expiry or revocation of keys, or due to new regions introducing PWS Security and setting up new CAs. An approach to a solution is outlined in clause 7.6.1 of the present document. + +#### 7.7.3.2 Configuration when terminal is first taken into use + +Clearly, pre-installation in terminals at manufacturing time is not well compatible with the bottom-up approach to CAs as this would involve producing country-specific versions of terminals, which is seen as quite problematic by terminal manufacturers. Therefore, a different approach is needed that would allow for incremental growth of PWS Security: + +A public root key valid in the home area of a UE (defined by its USIM) could be loaded into a terminal, when the terminal is first switched on, in a way similar to how the terminal is configured with other parameters today, e.g. email access points etc. This could be done e.g. via OMA DM, using SMS, etc. Alternatively, the public root key could be stored on the USIM when the USIM is issued, or securely downloaded to the USIM OTA. + +**Editor's Note:** It is ffs whether particular security measures would be needed for configuring the root key in the terminal when it is first switched on, or whether the highly distributed nature of this configuration process would be sufficient to prevent the relevant attacks against PWS. (This depends, of course, on the attack model, cf. clauses 6.1.1 and 8). + +When such a terminal, configured with a home root key, is roaming, and a cross-certificate is available for the visited area, this cross-certificate could be distributed to the terminal together with other information that is sent to the terminal by the visited operator anyhow. E.g., a roaming UE typically receives one or several welcome SMSs when first registering in the visited network; the cross-certificate could become part of such an SMS. + +#### 7.7.3.3 Public key update and revocation + +Regular public key update (due to key lifetime expiry) is to be handled on the basis of the solution outlined in clause 7.6.1 of the present document. If one takes into account that the standard certificate revocation mechanisms CRL and OCSP work only under the assumption that there is a signing key for the CRLs or OCSP responses that is not compromised, and in particular, that the root CA is not compromised, then the approach in clause 7.6.1 may also be usable for certificate revocation. + +#### 7.7.3.4 Comparison with server certificates in other 3GPP specifications + +The other 3GPP specifications mentioned in clause 7.7.2.4 of the present contribution do not tell how the public root keys would be installed in terminals; TS 33.220 [26] explicitly states that this is out of scope. + +Furthermore, none of these other 3GPP specifications explicitly mentions the need for cross-certificates, let alone makes explicit reference to TS 33.310 [40] where a 3GPP CA structure for cross-certificates is described. When these other specifications reference TS 33.310 [40], they do so only for IKE or TLS profiles. + +Regular public key updates (due to key lifetime expiry) are not addressed by these 3GPP specifications either. They do, however, specify mechanisms for certificate revocation, either CRLs (e.g. optional implementation and use of CRLs in TS 33.203 [31], 33.220 [26] and 33.234 [32]) or OCSP (e.g. optional use and mandatory client implementation in TS 33.234 [32]). + +### 7.7.4 Certificate format and distribution of certificates + +Implicit certificates are attractive because they are so short that they could be distributed together with the signed warning message. However, when root keys are distributed over a different channel anyhow, as in the configuration-approach using UICC OTA in clause 7.8.2.2, then it would also become possible to use different certificate formats, e.g. X.509 certificates, that would be longer (although they should, of course, not become arbitrarily long), assuming that also the certificate are distributed via that channel. + +Alternatively, certificates may be distributed over a broadcast channel. There are two possible options: + +- a) when no length restrictions on warning messages apply then the certificates can be distributed together with the signed warning message; +- b) otherwise, it is preferable to distribute certificates over test messages. Test messages are assumed to be sent regularly in PWS anyhow (cf. e.g. clauses 7.3.4.1, 7.6.1.1, 8.3.5.5) and do not suffer from any time constraints and length restrictions. (Note that it was the time constraints on ETWS primary notifications that led to the length restrictions summarised in clause 6.2.7.) + +When using approach b), it needs to be ensured that test messages including certificates need to be broadcast sufficiently often over an extended period of time so that a vast majority of UEs has the opportunity to pick them up from the broadcast channel. + +It is also possible to mix the two ways of distributing certificates: One can distribute certificates together with the root key OTA to the UE and distribute only certificate updates and revocations over a broadcast channel. + +### 7.7.5 Considerations on pre-provisioned CAs public keys shared by CBEs + +The approach of UEs pre-provisioning with a CAs public key shared by CBEs outside its own region, as described in the previous clauses, has two unwanted consequences: + +- 1) a national government has to establish confidence in CBEs outside its region, which may be difficult or impossible; +- 2) if a national government of a country cannot establish confidence in CBEs in some regions of another country, the UEs sold within that government's region cannot use PWS Security in those other regions. In other words, a global solution becomes impossible. + +To avoid that impacts of a compromise of a CBE or CA in one region spread around the world, or at least the region of mutually established confidence, the scope of a root CA public key or a CBE certificate to certain regulatory domains or geographical areas, e.g. one country or one larger region, e.g. European Union, or China, or USA, needs to be limited. The scope is the area or domain where the key is authorized to be used and it should be securely associated with CA and/or CBE. + +Depending on the regulatory structure of a country or region the useful definitions of 'scope' may vary considerably. E.g. in USA thousands of CBEs could exist, while in other countries the number of CBEs is very restricted. A CBE could be responsible for just one warning type or for several warning types covering one district (mapped to a small cell area of the mobile network operator) or many different districts (mapped to the complete network of the mobile operator) as illustrated in figure 7.7.5. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating regulatory structures of CAs and CBEs. The diagram shows interactions between UE, eNB, MME, CBC, and CBE.](45578bd3ed11d45af63ce00e28bab2f8_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant eNB + participant MME + participant CBC + participant CBE + + CBE->>CBC: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + CBC->>MME: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + MME->>CBC: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + CBC->>CBE: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + MME->>eNB: 5. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + eNB->>UE: 6. Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note left of UE: 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys + eNB->>MME: 8. Write-Replace Warning Response + Note left of UE: 9. UE Alert + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating regulatory structures of CAs and CBEs. The diagram shows interactions between UE, eNB, MME, CBC, and CBE. + +**Figure 7.7.5-1: Illustration of regulatory structures of CAs and CBEs** + +Limiting the scope of a root CA public key could be done by provisioning it together with the root CA public key to the UE. The scope could be the region for which a CA is responsible to issue CBE certificates. The UE, or the human user using the UE, would need to have means independent of information provided together with the warning message (e.g. GPS coordinates, human knowledge) to determine whether the UE or user is at a location within the scope of the public key. E.g. if the scope is 'USA' then the user would know whether he is in the USA or not. The scope, in this example 'USA' would be displayed or announced to the user, e.g. together with the warning message, and the UE or the user, depending on the settings, could ignore the warning message if there was a mismatch. + +When the UE receives a warning message the UE will accept the warning message only if it can verify the signature of the warning message with the help of a particular root CA public key and if it can verify that the UE is at a location within the scope of that root CA public key. + +Limiting the scope of a root CA public key mitigates the threat that the impacts of a compromise of a CBE or CA in one region spread beyond that region for which a CA is responsible. + +Limiting the scope of a CBE certificate could be done if the CA issuing the CBE certificate includes scoping information in the CBE certificate. In contrast to limiting the scope of a root CA public key by provisioning the scope with the root CA public key, the scope of a CBE public key need not be pre-provisioned in the UE if the CBE certificate is not pre-provisioned in the UE. But, as before, it is assumed that a UE, or the human user using the UE, have means independent of information provided by the network to determine whether the UE or user is at a location within the + +scope of the certificate. Thus, the UE will accept the warning message only if the UE is at a location within the scope of that CBE certificate. + +Clearly, scoping a CBE certificate provides finer granularity: e.g. a CBE may be scoped to act only in Upper Bavaria, and not all of Germany or even the European Union, but, on the other hand, it may become more difficult for the issuing authority to clearly describe the scope and for the UE or user to clearly determine whether the location is within the scope or not. And, furthermore, this finer granularity may not be required as one CA can be expected to be limited to a region governed by one regulation, of which the regulator can take responsibility for compromises. + +Note, limiting the scope of a CBE certificate mitigates the threat that the impacts of a compromise of a CBE in one region spread beyond that region, but it does not help in case of a CA compromise as an attacker could, with the help of the compromised CA, issue a forged CBE certificate with a false scope. But, on the other hand, a CA compromise is assumed to be more difficult than compromising one CBE, of which there may be many. + +In summary, limiting the scope of the CA or CBE can enhance means of combating compromised CAs or CBEs by limiting the area of such a breach and further serve to help national governments to establish confidence in CBEs outside their region. The above examples also show that the geographical scope of a root key or certificate "**should**" be sufficiently large, and easy to verify by a user, for it to be practical. So, using a country as the scope is likely to work fine, while using a small geographical region as the scope appears impractical. + +## 7.8 Solution 8: national PWS solution based on UICC OTA + +### 7.8.1 Introduction + +The solution presented here makes PWS Security optional for operators to deploy (based on local regulatory requirements) and has minimal impact on existing network nodes and protocols. + +In this solution, the public key and all associated parameters (e.g. PKID, SAI and NSUC) needed to verify PWS signatures are stored on the UICC. The terminal verifies the authenticity of a PWS warning message by extracting the PKID from the security part of the message and retrieving the corresponding public key and parameters from the UICC. If the signature verification is successful and if the message is not replayed (determined from the counter value NSUC) the message is displayed to the user. Otherwise the message is discarded. + +The local network operators will have the responsibility of distributing the required public keys and parameters in countries where PWS Security is mandated. The distribution itself will be done using UICC Over-The-Air (OTA) management TS 31.115 [21], which is a well-established technique for updating data on UICCs. Another option would be to pre-configure the public key(s) and associated parameters when the UICC is manufactured. + +Since the public key and the associated parameters are stored on the UICC instead of the terminal, the network operator can keep track of distributed keys and decide when an update is required without requiring any additional signalling. This is not possible when data is stored on the terminal since the information is lost whenever the UICC is moved to another terminal. Storing the files on the UICC also prevents the user from accidentally deleting or modifying the information. + +This solution provides security if the user is located in his home country. If the user is abroad and connected to a foreign PLMN, then a signature cannot be validated. There are the following possibilities: + +- The terminal rejects any PWS message in this case, but this may result in rejecting valid warning messages. +- The terminal displays the PWS message, but this could potentially allow an attacker to distribute false warning messages by setting up a false BS and announcing a foreign PLMN identity, which impacts the security of the PWS Security solution in the home country. + +One way to cope with the above limitation would be for PWS enabled countries to exchange keys and distribute these to their respective citizens. This would allow subscribers to receive PWS notifications in foreign countries as well. However, any such solution is considered out of scope at the moment. + +Operators in countries where PWS is not mandated will de-activate signature verification for their subscribers by setting the PWS Security disable field to true. This has the consequence that all PWS warning messages will be displayed and any signature included in a message will be ignored. The PWS Security disable field is also stored as a parameter on the UICC. + +### 7.8.2 Distribution of PWS public keys and parameters + +This solution uses UICC Over-The-Air (OTA) management TS 31.115 [21], TS 31.116 [23] to deliver the public key and associated parameters to the subscriber. UICC OTA is a 3GPP standard in which the network can manipulate data on the UICC by sending a series of APDU commands to the terminal. The commands are bundled together and protected using a special UICC OTA key before they are sent to the terminal for execution. The example in figure 7.8.2-1 uses SMS for transport but other types of transport are also possible, such as USSD or HTTP. Note that SMS is assumed to be available in LTE using SMS over SGs. + +![Diagram of UICC OTA delivery architecture showing UE/UICC connected to UTRAN/GERAN and E-UTRAN. UTRAN/GERAN connects to MSC. E-UTRAN connects to MME, which also connects to MSC. MSC connects to SMSC, then OTA Gateway, then CBE. A dashed arrow indicates PKID, PuK, SAI, NSUC flow from CBE to UE/UICC.](17f0cf80b9c38adb460d4ca836960da7_img.jpg) + +``` + + graph LR + UE["UE +UICC"] --- UTRAN["UTRAN/ +GERAN"] + UE --- EUTRAN["E-UTRAN"] + UTRAN --- MSC[MSC] + EUTRAN --- MME[MME] + MME --- MSC + MSC --- SMSC[SMSC] + SMSC --- OTA[OTA Gateway] + OTA --- CBE[CBE] + CBE -.->|PKID, PuK, SAI, NSUC| UE + +``` + +Diagram of UICC OTA delivery architecture showing UE/UICC connected to UTRAN/GERAN and E-UTRAN. UTRAN/GERAN connects to MSC. E-UTRAN connects to MME, which also connects to MSC. MSC connects to SMSC, then OTA Gateway, then CBE. A dashed arrow indicates PKID, PuK, SAI, NSUC flow from CBE to UE/UICC. + +Figure 7.8.2-1: UICC OTA delivery of PWS key using SMS as transport bearer + +3GPP needs to decide on the type of data items that should be present on the UICC and the content of the UICC OTA messages. However, the UICC OTA Gateway in itself can be left non-standardized. It is up to the regulators and operators in each country to decide on the implementation details and the interface towards the CBE(s). It is also possible to select a different distribution method, such as configuring the UICC at the time of manufacturing. + +#### 7.8.2.1 USIM file organization for PWS Security + +The USIM specification, TS 31.102 [22], defines the elementary file $EF_{PWS}$ since 3GPP Rel-11. This file contains configuration parameters for PWS and is present when Service n°97 (PWS configuration by USIM) is marked as available in the USIM service table. The public keys and all related parameters needed for PWS Security can either be stored in a new elementary file or in $EF_{PWS}$ (by extending its content with an optional field). + +Since the PWS service is defined only for the USIM application, terminals with a SIM inserted will not be able to retrieve the public keys and therefore cannot verify PWS signatures. To handle this case, terminals without access to a USIM should display all PWS notifications to the user. This behaviour is similar to the scenario where non-existing or empty USIM data files results in all Warning Notifications being presented to the PWS application. Optionally the terminal could inform the user that the origin of the message is unverified. + +NOTE: Defining a PWS service for the SIM application is not possible since the SIM specifications (GSM TS 11.11 and 11.14) are frozen since Rel-99. + Only editorial modifications are allowed and no new features can be added. + +Editor's Note: The information in this clause needs to be verified with CT6. + +#### 7.8.2.2 UICC OTA message format + +The format of the UICC OTA message is defined in TS 31.115 [21] and a list of file management commands that can be included in the message payload is available in TS 31.116 [23]. This means that it is possible to standardize the contents of the UICC OTA message(s) once the USIM files for PWS Security are agreed on. For example, defining a message that updates the service table and adds the file $EF_{PWS}$ is relatively straight forward. + +Using UICC OTA requires that the UICC supports USIM Application Toolkit (USAT) TS 31.111 [24]. A large majority of the UICCs support USAT but the ones that do not would need to be replaced. However, this is not as big of a problem as it may first seem since a pre Rel-11 UICC would anyway need to be replaced to support the PWS service mentioned above. + +Editor's Note: The information in this clause needs to be verified with CT6. + +### 7.8.3 Format and handling of PWS notification + +The distribution of PWS warning messages for GSM, UMTS and LTE is described in TS 23.041 [3]. In order to enable PWS Security, the following changes are introduced: + +- There already exists a parameter called Warning Security Information that the CBC can use to pass security information to the BSC/RNC and eNodeB and which contains a signature field. The format of this parameter should be updated to also include fields for PKID, NSUC, and, potentially, identifiers for the hash and signature algorithm. +- The Warning Security Information is currently only included in the ETWS Primary Notification. The format of the ETWS Secondary Notification and the other PWS warning messages (CMAS, KPAS, and EU-Alert) needs to be updated so that the parameter is included in these messages as well. +- The signature calculation needs to be defined. At a minimum the signature should cover the PWS message and NSUC value but other information might need to be covered as well. Below is a proposal for the values that should be included in the signature calculation. + +MESSAGE | NSUC | PKID | HASH ALG ID | SIGN ALG ID + +The MESSAGE parameter depends on the PWS message type. In case of a PWS Primary Notification it is constructed as: + +MESSAGE = Ser No | Msg ID | Warning Type + +And in case of a PWS Secondary Notification or any of the other PWS message types, it is constructed as: + +MESSAGE = Ser No | Msg ID | Data Coding Scheme | CBS msg page 1 | ... | CBS msg page n + +The parameters Ser No, Msg ID, etc are as defined in TS 23.041 [3]. + +The inclusion of the PKID in the broadcasted message allows the MS/UE to retrieve the correct public key from the UICC. If the signature is correct and the message is not replayed (as determined from the NSUC) the message is accepted and displayed to the user. + +Note that no special requirements are put on the signature scheme except that the signature should fit into the Warning Security Information parameter. As mentioned above, this parameter also includes PKID, NSUC and, potentially, identifiers for the hash and signature algorithm. + +## 7.9 Solutions to counter the PWS Security circumvention attack and to mitigate the risk of displaying false unprotected warning messages + +### 7.9.0 General + +This clause gives recommendations on how to counter the circumvention attack. It may be difficult to achieve PWS Security in all countries at the same time. Therefore the measures against the PWS Security circumvention attack need to be effective as the investment in PWS Security infrastructure and operation could be nullified otherwise. + +Solution A mandates that a PWS Security-enabled UE **"should"** only display verified warning messages, thus discarding all unsigned Warning Notifications and all signed messages that cannot be verified (irrespective whether they are genuine or false). + +Solution B provides means that a PWS Security-enabled UE can also display unsigned warning messages, but only if the terminal has network-independent proof that these messages were sent from a regulatory domain that does not use PWS Security. It aims to describe mechanisms to securely distinguish between genuine and false Warning Notifications without signature. Solution C suggests a UE configuration based on a timer that could protect against circumvention attacks on crowds that are limited in time and space. + +The mechanisms described in the following clauses are orthogonal and work with all the solution proposals in clause 7.3 to clause 7.8. + +### 7.9.1 Solution A: No display of unauthenticated warning messages + +A UE with PWS Security enabled is required to discard all unauthenticated warning messages. A PWS warning message is unauthenticated if it is not possible to verify a message with a signature or if it was sent without PWS Security. + +The PWS Security circumvention attack rests on the assumption that there is a network VN such that UEs roaming in VN are allowed to display unprotected warning messages. If, on the contrary, UEs are configured such that warning messages whose security cannot be verified are never displayed, the attack cannot happen. + +*Pros:* This configuration provides foolproof security. + +*Cons:* It implies that users roaming in countries without PWS Security cannot receive warning messages. + +It should be noted, though, that, depending on the public key distribution method, users in Limited Service State may be able to receive warning messages in countries with PWS Security. + +**NOTE:** This solution is recommended for regional or national regulators who have decided to mandate PWS Security and to mandate PWS Security-enabled UEs to ignore all unauthenticated Warning Notifications. + +### 7.9.2 Solution B: Network-independent location verification + +If Solution A is not accepted by a regulator, the following provides a non-exhaustive list of options to mitigate the threat of receiving false Warning Notifications. + +A UE with PWS Security enabled is required to discard all unprotected warning messages when it determined through a verification process other than through 3GPP-defined signalling that the network should support PWS Security. + +Hereby, the local verification process rests on the following three assumptions: + +- (i) Whether PWS Security is supported or not is not a property of an individual network, but of a regulatory domain, e.g. a country, and would then apply to all networks in that regulatory domain. + +**Editor's Note:** this assumption needs to be checked with SA1. + +- (ii) Information about the regulatory domains that support PWS Security has been securely provided to the UE. + +**Editor's Note:** Possible means for this secure provision include lists managed by the home operator in the USIM or the non-volatile part of the ME memory. Other means are ffs. + +- (iii) A UE, possibly with the support of the human user, is able to tell, in which regulatory domain it currently is, independent of any messages from the network. + +The local verification process then proceeds as follows: A UE determines by means of (iii), in which regulatory domain it currently is, then checks whether PWS Security should be supported by means of (ii). + +**NOTE:** (iii) may be needed even if an integrity-protected message from the visited network is available as this message could have been relayed from a network in a different country. This would be possible even for UMTS. + +If the UE, possibly with the help of the user, is able to verify, independently of any further information received from the network, that the MCC received from the network matches the country the UE is currently in then the circumvention attack can be foiled as well: + +As described in the threats clause of the present TR, the circumvention attack rests on the assumption that the (MCC, MNC) pertaining to a network VN in country B is broadcast by a false BS in country A. If now the UE, possibly with the help of the user, can verify in a network-independent way that it is indeed currently in country A when it receives an MCC corresponding to country B, the attack will be unsuccessful. + +*Why would the location verification have to be network-independent?* + +One could think of integrity-protected enhanced signalling telling the UE in a secure way about the country it is in. However, the two attack variants described for the circumvention attack either assume GERAN access or Limited Service State, where integrity-protected signalling is not available. Therefore, network signalling would not help. + +*How could network-independent location verification be realised?* + +- **GPS:** Many UEs have GPS receivers today that provide a network-independent means of location verification. + +*Pros and Cons:* The measure is effective if the GPS signal is genuine. But, unfortunately, research suggests that GPS spoofing is possible, cf. [34]. It is not clear to-date whether future implementations of GPS in UEs can prevent such spoofing. Furthermore, low end phones are less likely to feature GPS receivers. + +- **User involvement:** Users can be expected to know, in which country they currently are. Hence, when the UE receives a PWS warning message from a network with a particular MCC the UE can translate the MCC into a country name in a human-readable or -audible form and present this country name to the user together with the warning message. If this message says 'country B' while the user knows to be in country A the user should disregard the message. Note that when the user is involved only in case a warning message is actually received the user will not be bothered by repeated requests from the UE to confirm his or her location even when crossing borders frequently. + +*Pros and Cons:* User involvement is capable of providing network-independent location indeed, but it would have to be mandated. It would need to be checked with other 3GPP WGs whether such aspects of the human-to-terminal interface could be mandated and made part of test specs. + +Editor's Note: Methods of network-independent location verification are ffs. + +Editor's Note: It is ffs whether using MCC to detect the country in which the UE is located will be future proof. + +These measures would have to be mandated by the regional or local regulator. Leaving them optional could result in them not being applied. This is because it is possible users would opt out of such measures as the people making the choice about these options may have little understanding of the rationale and the consequences for PWS Security. + +### 7.9.3 Solution C: Using a UE-controlled timer + +This solution is inspired by clause 7.3.4.6 "Delaying public key update using a UE-controlled timer". + +It is based on the assumption that an attack against PWS attempting to create wide-spread panic in a crowd is most likely limited in space and time. + +The basic idea of this solution is the following: When a UE changes to a BS broadcasting an MCC different from the MCC broadcast by the previous BS the UE starts a PWS-related timer. While this timer is running (e.g. for a couple of hours) the UE does not display unverified warning messages even if the UE is configured to also display unprotected warning messages for this MCC. + +In this way, the attacker can no longer perform the attack by activating false BSs and immediately send warning messages to a crowd. And when the timers in the UEs that were present in the crowd at the start of the attack have expired the crowd will have dispersed. + +*Pros and Cons:* This configuration provides protection against attacks on crowds that are limited in time and space. But it does not provide protection for individuals or small groups that an attacker could follow around. Furthermore, when a UE enters a country, for which it is configured to display unprotected warning messages, there is a delay defined by the timer before the UE can receive warning messages. + +**Editor's Note:** Details of timer-handling are ffs, taking into account the discussion and Editor's notes in clause 7.3.4.6. + +**Editor's Note:** It is ffs whether using MCC to detect the country in which the UE is located will be future proof. + +### 7.9.4 Recommendation + +SA3 recommends the regional or national regulator, who has decided to mandate PWS Security, to mandate the PWS Security-enabled UEs to ignore all unauthenticated Warning Notifications according to Solution A as it leads to a foolproof PWS Security solution. It prevents e.g. panic attacks or advertisement spamming attacks. + +However, Solution A restricts the availability of Warning Notifications for users roaming internationally as it may prevent the reception of e.g. life-saving warning messages. If the concerned regulators decide otherwise, Solution B provides several options to mitigate the threat of receiving false Warning Notifications. To allow a UE to also receive unsigned warning messages when roaming, at least one of these means should be implemented to avoid circumvention attacks. In addition, Solution C provides a mean against circumvention attacks on crowds that are limited in time and space. + +**NOTE:** For considerations on the PWS and PWS Security settings in the UE to avoid the circumvention attack and, therefore, to mitigate the risk of displaying false unprotected warning messages, please refer to the Annex B. + +## 7.10 The use of signing proxies + +The possibility of the use of signing proxies is briefly mentioned in clauses 6.1, 6.2, and Annex B. It is described in some more detail when evaluating the NAS-based solution in clause 8.3.4, cf. in particular figure 8.3.4-1, but in terms particular to this root key distribution method. However, the use of signing proxies is by no means limited to a particular root key distribution solution. Signing proxies are therefore described in more detail, and in a way independent of the root key distribution solution, in this subclause. + +The concept of signing proxy is in the regulatory domain and outside the scope of 3GPP. + +### *Function of a PWS signing proxy* + +A PWS signing proxy (SP) is an entity in the domain of a PWS regulator that signs PWS warning messages on behalf of CBEs. I.e. when the CBE wants to send a warning message, and the regulator enables PWS security in his domain, the CBE sends the warning message to the SP, the SP applies a certificate and/or digital signature and forwards the signed message to the CBC for distribution to UEs. + +### *Number of PWS signing proxies per regulatory domain* + +In principle, there is no limitation from a conceptual point of view. But, for the concept to be useful, the number would have to be as small as the number of root keys that can be practically distributed to UEs in a regulatory domain and can be stored by UEs (including low-end phones). Here, a root key is a public key used by the UE to verify signatures applied by a signing proxy. As the limiting factor is the number of (public, private) key pairs, signing proxies that are physically separate entities, e.g. for redundancy or load balancing purposes, but share the same (public, private) key pair are counted as one for this consideration. + +**Editor's note: The risk associated with sharing private keys among entities is FFS.** + +### *Interfaces of a PWS signing proxy* + +The SP has interfaces with CBEs and CBCs. + +- The interface between SP and CBE needs to be integrity-protected and provide message origin authentication so as to prevent unauthorized entities from generating warning messages that the SP would sign and forward. This could result in a UE accepting false warning messages even if PWS security was enabled in the UE. + +**Editor's note: It is FFS whether these interfaces represent additional cost to the regulator.** + +- The interface between SP and CBC needs to be integrity-protected and provide message origin authentication so as to prevent unauthorized entities from sending warning messages through the operator network to the UEs. The risk of an attack on the SP-CBC interface is a DoS attack on the operator network, but would not result in a UE accepting false warning messages when PWS security was enabled in the UE. + +**Editor's note: It is FFS whether these interfaces represent additional cost to the regulator and operator.** + +Appropriate security measures on these interfaces could be e.g. IKE/IPsec with certificates or pre-shared keys, or physical security. The choice between certificates or pre-shared key would be up to the regulator and operator and may depend on the number of entities involved, which may greatly vary among regulatory domains. The certificates would be for use with IKE, i.e. be of type X.509. + +**NOTE:** The security requirements on any interface to a 3GPP network entity, e.g. the SP-CBC interface, is in scope of 3GPP specifications, and there are examples in 3GPP specs that even security mechanisms are in scope, cf. e.g. the Tsp interface in MTC. + +### *Signatures schemes that can be applied by a PWS signing proxy* + +The SP could use any signature scheme so that the resulting signature, together with further required security parameters, would fit to the maximum length available for security in a PWS message. + +Assume that 75 bytes is this maximum length. Then an ECDSA signature with a 128 bit security level would require a minimum of 512 bits (= 64 bytes) (cf. Table 6.2.4.1) and would fit into the maximum length. The remaining 11 (=75-64) bytes should suffice to accommodate further security parameters such as PKID, timestamp, identifier for domain parameters (cf. clause 6.2.3.2), etc. + +As can be seen from the next paragraph, the reason for security information becoming short when using signing proxies is that you do not need any certificates as you distribute the public key used for verifying signatures generated by a signing proxy to UEs beforehand in the same way, in which you distribute CA root keys to UEs in the implicit certificate case. + +#### *Keying material generation* + +The SP private key for signing would be generated in the regulator domain (for example the SP could generate a public-private key pair onboard). The corresponding public key for verifying the signatures would have to be distributed to the UE. Certificate authority may be used with SPs but are not necessarily required. + +The certificates potentially used for protecting the SP-CBC and SP-CBE interfaces are a different matter as they are standard technology used for IPsec VPNs. + +#### *Initial distribution of an SP public key to the UE* + +The problem of initial distribution of public keys to the UE is orthogonal to the question whether signing proxies are used. These methods include, but are not limited to: + +- pre-installation of SP public keys globally available at manufacturing time with selective activation of the keys relevant for the home region afterwards, as already described for solution 6, +- installation when the UE is first taken into use as described for solution 7, +- OTA to the UICC as described in solution 8. +- NAS-based scheme as described in solution 3. + +#### *Update and revocation of an SP public key* + +There are at least two ways of achieving this: + +- The same method as for initial public key distribution is used. +- A different method is used. Again, such a method could be identical to one described in the context of other solutions in clause 7 of the present TR, e.g. one could use a special type of warning messages like for the implicit certificate approach, cf. clause 7.6.2. + +### *Signing proxies and support for roaming* + +This depends on the key management distribution method. If this method allows support for roaming without the use of signing proxies, it also will when signing proxies are used. + +### *Architectural aspects from operator point of view* + +With the use of SPs, an operator network would have a reduced number of entry points from the regulatory domain that would need to be protected, namely the SP-CBC interfaces. Without a signing proxy, these entry points would consist in all CBE-CBC interfaces, of which there would be more + +NOTE: Of course, one could funnel all traffic from CBEs to CBCs through a hub in the regulator's domain. The hub would just forward all signed warning messages transparently. The CBC would have a protected interface only with such a hub. But, if such architecture was envisaged anyway, then there would be no good architectural reason why this hub could not also assume the role of a signing proxy. + +### *Architectural aspects from regulator point of view* + +In order to avoid signing proxies becoming bottlenecks or single points of failure, signing proxies could be made physically redundant while sharing the same (public, private) key pair. Sufficient performance of such distributed signing proxies would have to be ensured. The distributed signing proxies would have to be tightly secured. + +**Editor's note:** It is FFS whether sufficient performance of such a distributed system can be ensured under the constraint a low number of entry points to the operator are available. + +**Editor's note:** It is FFS whether availability of such a system with a low number of SPs would be feasible. + +### *Further security impact on the operator network* + +There is none, apart from protecting the entry points. Just like with the implicit certificate approach, the use of SPs with ECDSA is transparent to the network if a root key distribution method is chosen that is transparent to the network. + +**Editor's note: The case where an emergency response network with no access to a signing proxy is brought into a disaster area is FFS.** + +### *Further security impact on the regulator domain* + +CBEs need to be secured with the signing proxy approach so that it can be ensured that only authorised CBE entities can send warning messages to a signing proxy. + +### *Trust considerations* + +With the signing proxy approach, the CBEs, and associated agencies, in a regulatory domain all need to trust each other the signing proxies, the body operating them. + +### *Key management effort for the regulator* + +Key management is feasible if the regulators architecture requires a low number of signing proxies. + +# 8 Evaluation of different solutions + +## 8.1 Evaluation of solution 1 (Void) + +Void + +## 8.2 Evaluation of solution 2 (Void) + +Void + +## 8.3 Evaluation of solution 3 + +### 8.3.1 Public key length + +Clause 6.2.3 defines two algorithms, i.e. 128-DSA and 128-ECDSA. The public key size of these two algorithms is: + +Table 8.3.1-1 + +| Security level
(in bits) | Public key sizes
(in bits) | | +|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|------| +| | ECDSA | DSA | +| 112 ( $\leq 2030$ ) | 224 | 2048 | +| 128 ( $\sim 2040$ ) | 256 | 3072 | + +At the 128 bit security level, DSA use the longest size of public key, i.e. 3072 bits/384 bytes. If 112 level security is used, the longest size by DSA is 2048 bits/256 bytes. + +The NAS consumption is analysed using the two longest sizes. Then the small one can surely be used. + +NOTE : In clause 6.2.3, it also stated: + +"If companies or governments wants to use the "For further use"-range, the registration of new signature algorithms **"should"** be handled and approved by 3GPP." + +Here, additional signature algorithms are not discussed since the size of them should meet NAS consumption and the used algorithm should be approved by 3GPP. + +### 8.3.2 NAS message consumption for public key + +NAS message is used to carry public key. + +LTE : + +With regard to LTE system, there is no standard restriction on the length of NAS message in SA1, SA2, CT1 and RAN3's specifications. For implementation, the cache for sending NAS message in the MME side is allocated based on the actual length of NAS message. So there is no restriction for the MME to send public key in NAS. In the UE side, there is also no restriction on the length of NAS message. The UE NAS layer can handle NAS message as long as the message can be sent in air interface. Furthermore, there is no restriction in RAN3's specification on the length of NAS PDU IE in S1 DOWNLINK NAS TRANSPORT message transmitted from the MME to the eNB. + +For implementation, there may be some restriction for cache in eNB. But normally the 'quantity level bytes' of this restriction is much bigger than the actual message content. The capacity of network elements needs further evaluation when it is known which RAT will be used for PWS security. RAT decision depends on regulators' input. + +The NAS based solution in the present document requires only one public key distributed and at most two public keys in NAS for each CBE. If one uses the strongest 384 bytes public key (i.e. 128-DSA) and the most number of public keys, e.g. 2 public keys each CBE, 3 CBEs (one for earthquake and tsunami, one for nuclear explosion and one for some social emergency like fire or terrorist attack) in one PLMN, the total length of public keys is $2 \times 3 \times 384 = 2304$ bytes. More than 3 CBEs can be used but the increasing number of bytes is in the handling capability scope of network element. Based on the message definition in TS 24.301 [33], the current NAS SMC message content takes about 18-21 bytes. The current TAU ACCEPT message content (including optional IEs) takes about 66-246 bytes. If the NAS SMC message or TAU ACCEPT message carry such public keys, it still has much available length capacity to carry all these public keys. So there is no problem for LTE system to use NAS based solution. + +In CT1's LS C1-123453, it says that "Except for the NAS protocols via Gb interface, CT1's specifications do not specify restrictions on the size of NAS messages (including the NAS SMC message, AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REQUEST message and LAU/ATTACH/RAU/TAU ACCEPT messages)." + +For the lower layers, CT1 says "Note, however, that there may be a restriction from the lower layers" and would like to let other working groups to provide the exact length restrictions currently applicable. + +In RAN2 and RAN3's LS, they did not list any size restriction for LTE and LTE lower layers. RAN2 says that "According to current RAN2 specification on UMTS and LTE, there is no size limitation for the dedicated RRC messages transmitted over the radio interface." + +RAN3 says that "RAN3 does not see any constraint in size or in number of public keys sent in RANAP/SIAP message." + +In LTE, public key will be distributed in NAS SMC and TAU ACCEPT. CT1 gives the current sizes of the NAS messages: NAS SMC: 21 bytes, TAU ACCEPT: 246 bytes. Please note that CT1 says that current ATTACH ACCEPT is already 4629 bytes. It means the capability of LTE NAS at least can carry 4629 bytes. It can be assumed 4608bytes(4629-21) for NAS SMC and 4383bytes(4629-246) for TAU ACCEPT are the maximum sizes and calculate the maximum numbers of public keys in NAS SMC using 128-DSA : $4608/384=12$ , 128-ECDSA : $4608/32=144$ and in TAU ACCEPT using 128-DSA : $4383/384=11$ , $4383/32=136$ . + +CT1 also says that "According to the above NAS message size, the maximum LLC length value and the PWS public key sizes in SA3's LS, it is feasible from NAS protocol point of view to include 1 or 2 public keys in the NAS SMC and TAU ACCEPT messages in E-UTRAN and any of the above NAS messages in GERAN Gb mode." + +In RAN2's LS R2-125160, it says that "Since NAS message will be filled in PDCP in LTE but not in UMTS, so the size of a dedicated RRC message is actually limited by the maximum PDCP SDU size of 8188 bytes in LTE." + +So the maximum size over the radio interface is 8188 bytes. Obviously, this size can contain more than 20 128-DSA public keys and more than 200 128-ECDSA public keys. RAN2 also says that in some scenarios, delay and overload should be avoided by sending public keys. Two factors decide the happen of delay and overload, i.e. the ratio of NAS message capability vs. the normal number of public keys carrying in it, and the frequency of sending public key. + +Normally, number of transmitted public keys in one message will not be set to fill the entire capacity of the message. It depends on the number of CBEs in one area. It can be imagined that the number of CBEs will not be so many, for example, normally 3 (one for earthquake and tsunami, one for nuclear explosion and one for some social emergency like fire or terroristic attack). Obviously, the capability of NAS message is much more than the size of normal public keys carrying in it. Moreover, public key will be transmitted in every NAS message, but only in the very first NAS message. When public key update happens, the next key will be sent. The frequency of sending it is as much as public key update. So the case of delay and overload will not occur. + +Therefore, based on the above analysis, it is possible to distribute public keys in E-UTRAN using NAS messages. + +#### UMTS: + +With regard to UMTS system, there is no standard restriction for NAS message in SA1, SA2, CT1 and RAN's specifications. For implementation, RANAP and RRC message size for network side is allocated by the cache of the message. The quantity level bytes of RNC is much bigger than the actual message content. This size can also carry the most size ( $2^3 \cdot 384=2304$ bytes) for public keys. The current RANAP and RRC SMC message content takes about 64-65 bytes and more than 100 bytes to more than 200 bytes. The current RAU ACCEPT message content (including optional IEs) takes about 67-141 bytes. So there is no restriction for SGSN and RNC to send public key in SMC and RAU ACCEPT. Because NAS PDU can be divided into several segments as long as upper layer has the capability of sending NAS so there is no problem for lower layer to transport NAS. Similar to LTE, UE NAS layer can handle NAS message as long as the message can be sent in air interface. + +UMTS has similar analysis as LTE. CT1 also says that "Except for the NAS protocols via Gb interface, CT1's specifications do not specify restrictions on the size of NAS messages (including the NAS SMC message, AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REQUEST message and LAU/ATTACH/RAU/TAU ACCEPT messages)." + +CT1 also says that + +"- in GERAN/UTRAN: + +AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REQUEST: 49 bytes, LAU ACCEPT: 119 bytes, ATTACH ACCEPT: 160 bytes, and RAU ACCEPT: 191 bytes." + +For the lower layers, in RAN2 and RAN3's LS, they did not list any size restriction for LTE and LTE lower layers. RAN2 says that "According to current RAN2 specification on UMTS and LTE, there is no size limitation for the dedicated RRC messages transmitted over the radio interface". + +RAN3 says that "RAN3 does not see any constraint in size or in number of public keys sent in RANAP/SIAP message." + +Therefore, based on the above analysis, it is possible to distribute public keys in UTRAN using NAS messages. + +#### GSM/GPRS : + +With regard to GSM/GPRS system, there is no clear standard restriction for NAS message. For implementation, NAS message size for network side is also allocated by the cache of the message which is similar to UMTS. The quantity level bytes of BS is much bigger than the actual message content. This size can also carry the most size ( $2 \times 3 \times 384 = 2304$ bytes) for public keys. The current Cipher Mode Command message content takes about 3 bytes. The current LAU ACCEPT message content (including optional IEs) takes about 25-119 bytes. So there is no restriction for MSC/SGSN to send public key in GSM/GPRS. Similar to LTE and UMTS, UE NAS layer can handle NAS message as long as the message can be sent in air interface. + +From the above analysis, NAS message consumption for public key is suitable for GSM/UMTS/LTE system. Moreover, the capability and cache of AN and CN network elements are much more than the increasing bytes by the public keys so the consumer of network resources can be handled well. + +#### 2G CS/GSM: + +In GERAN2's LS, it says that "When NAS message like AUTHENTICATION REQUEST and LAU ACCEPT messages or AS message like Ciphering Mode Command message are sent in CS domain via radio interface, the size of these message **"should"** not exceed 251 octets as required in TS 44.006. + +The message sent on A interface **"should"** not exceed 272 octets according to the Signalling System No.7, which bears NAS message like AUTHENTICATION REQUEST and LAU ACCEPT messages or BSSMAP messages like Cipher Mode Command." + +GERAN2 also provide the current sizes of these messages. + +| | | +|----------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| "LAU ACCEPT (NAS message for CS domain) | 119 bytes | +| Ciphering Mode Command (AS message for CS domain) | 3 bytes | +| Cipher Mode Command (BSSMAP message for CS domain) | 35 bytes" | + +So there are 237 bytes (272-35) and 248 bytes (251-3) for BSSMAP messages like Cipher Mode Command and AS message like Ciphering Mode Command message. It is obvious public key using ECDSA is suitable for CS. The maximum number using 128-ECDSA is $237/32=7$ . + +There are 153 bytes (272-119) and 132bytes (251-119) for LAU ACCEPT. It is also obvious public key using ECDSA is suitable for CS. The maximum number using 128-ECDSA is $132/32=4$ . + +From the above, it is possible in GSM to distribute normally 1~3 public keys in NAS message using ECDSA. + +#### 2G PS/GPRS: + +In GERAN2's LS, it says that "When NAS message like AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REQUEST and RAU ACCEPT messages are sent in PS domain via radio interface, the size of such upper layer PDUs **"should"** not exceed 1560 octets as required in TS 44.060 [41]. + +There is no specific limitation of NAS messages sent via Gb interface. So it's GERAN2 understanding that the limitation in radio interface will be applied." + +GERAN2 also provide the current sizes of these messages. + +| | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REQUEST(NAS message for CS and PS domain) | 49 bytes | +| RAU ACCEPT(NAS message for PS domain) | 191 bytes | + +So there is 1511 bytes (1560-49) left for AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REQUEST. The maximum number using 128-DHA is $1511/384=3$ , 128-ECDSA is $1511/32=47$ . + +There is 1369 bytes (1560-191) left for RAU ACCEPT. The maximum number using 128-DHA is $1369/384=3$ , 128-ECDSA is $1369/32=42$ . + +From the above, it is possible in GPRS to distribute public keys in NAS message using 128-ECDSA and it is applicable to distribute normally 1~3 public keys in NAS message using 128-DSA. + +Summary : + +In summary, except GERAN CS domain, NAS message can carry public keys from protocol aspect according to the analysis of reply LSs from other working groups. The maximum numbers of public key which can be carried in NAS message in different systems are as follows: + +NOTE : Since there is no maximum size given by other groups' reply LSs for UMTS, no actual maximum number can be figured out for UMTS. However, according to the analysis it is possible to distribute public keys in UTRAN using NAS messages. + +Table 8.3.2-1 + +| | LTE | | UMTS | | | 2G | | | | +|-----------|---------|------------|-------------------|------------|------------|--------------|--------------|--------------------------------------|------------| +| | NAS SMC | TAU ACCEPT | RANAP SMC/RRC SMC | LAU ACCEPT | RAU ACCEPT | CS/GSM | | PS/GPRS | | +| | | | | | | CMC | LAU ACCEPT | AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REQUEST | RAU ACCEPT | +| 128-DSA | >12 | >11 | possible | possible | possible | Not possible | Not possible | 3 | 3 | +| 128-ECDSA | >144 | >136 | possible | possible | possible | 7 | 4 | 47 | 42 | + +### 8.3.3 Frequency of NAS message carrying public key + +Public key may be updated when the UE firstly initiates Attach/TAU/RAU/LAU procedure to a new PLMN. + +In addition, normally, the CBE rarely changes its public key. However, when this happens, there will be one key update per UE. + +### 8.3.4 Number of CBEs / Signing proxy + +Concerning the number of CBEs, this infrastructural issue is handled very differently from country to country. While in one country hundreds of governmental agencies could be connected via one CBE, other nations may want to keep the separation and would therefore need hundreds of CBEs attached to a CBC in the operator's network. However, while small numbers of public keys could be easily handled in a location/tracking/routing area, the distribution of large numbers of public keys would most likely raise infrastructural problems, overhead on the radio interface, and could exhaust terminal capacities. + +The solution on implicit certificates does not need to deal with this problem as the public keys do not need to be distributed in advance. The other solution candidates that are NAS-based and GBA-based need to be investigated. + +To minimize the impact of public key distribution in these solutions, the number of public keys per location/tracking/routing area needs to be minimized. + +Figure 8.3.4-1 visualizes the complexity of the situation. CBEs may be not only connected to one operator. An UE roaming into another operator's network does not need to receive the same public key again. In addition, if each CBE has its own public key, a MME/SGSN/MSC of one operator would need to distribute several public keys to each UE. This raises the question: How many public keys could be distributed in one MME/SGSN/MSC domain? + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the complexity of multiple CBEs vs. signing proxy. The diagram shows interactions between UE, eNB, MME, CBC, and CBE. The process involves multiple steps of requests and responses for emergency broadcasts and write-replace warnings, leading to a UE alert.](223c6f5bda05ffdd254a828a148b53f1_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant eNB + participant MME + participant CBC + participant CBE + + Note left of UE: 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys + + CBE->>CBC: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + CBC->>MME: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + MME->>CBC: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + CBC->>CBE: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + MME->>eNB: 5. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + eNB->>UE: 6. Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note left of UE: 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys + eNB->>MME: 8. Write-Replace Warning Response + Note left of UE: 9. UE Alert + +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the complexity of multiple CBEs vs. signing proxy. The diagram shows interactions between UE, eNB, MME, CBC, and CBE. The process involves multiple steps of requests and responses for emergency broadcasts and write-replace warnings, leading to a UE alert. + +**Figure 8.3.4-1: Complexity of Multiple CBEs vs. Signing proxy** + +If a public key was valid only in a very small area and a UE moved fast, renewing the public key very often would result in a high impact to the mobility management entities. Thus, it is proposed that at least within one MME/RNC/BSC area there should be only one public key valid. + +Two ways are foreseen to limit the problem mentioned above: + +- all CBEs in one MME/SGSN/MSC area are using the same signing key, i.e. once a public key is distributed to the UEs, it is valid for all CBEs. In this way, only one public key would have to be distributed in an MME/SGSN/MSC area. +- a signing proxy in the national regulator's authority assumes the task of signing or re-signing PWS messages sent by CBEs. Thus, only the public key of the signing proxy needs to be distributed to all UEs. + +The disadvantage of the first approach is that the identical signing key needs to be strongly protected in all CBEs. + +It seems usually easier to strongly (physically) protect one entity than many different entities to ensure that the signing key cannot leak. Furthermore, the first approach would presuppose certain coordination between CBE areas and MME/SGSN/MSC areas, which may be undesirable from a network planning point of view. + +Thus, the preferred solution for NAS-based PWS Security should be the signing proxy. Such a signing proxy "**should**" be under a national regulatory authority and is (like CBEs) outside of scope of the 3GPP network. + +The interface between CBE and signing proxy as well as the interface between signing proxy and CBC need to be protected as much as the CBE and signing proxy platforms. A signing proxy may need access to all MMEs/SGSNs/MSCs to distribute the public key for PWS message verification and the NSUC. In E-UTRAN the signing proxy could be connected to MME via CBC. In UTRAN/GERAN new interfaces may be needed as currently the PWS architecture does not include an interface from CBC to SGSN and/or MSC. + +Editor's note: Advice from SA1 and/or regulators is needed how to cope with a high number of CBEs in case of NAS-based or GBA-based solutions. The question whether a signing proxy to bundle CBEs that would operate with a single trust entity is feasible should be answered. + +Ed. Note: Security consequences of signing proxy vs. multiple CBEs are ffs. + +### 8.3.5 Evaluation of solutions to security issues in GSM/GPRS and with 2G subscribers in UMTS + +#### 8.3.5.1 General + +This clause first describes basic forms of attack and then evaluates how the solutions proposed in clause 7.3.4 are suited to mitigate these attacks. + +The basic attack an attacker can perform in GERAN access networks is first distributing a false public key, for which the attacker knows the corresponding private key, to victim UEs and then send false warning messages signed with this private key, e.g. in order to create a panic in a crowded place. The difficult part is feeding sufficiently many UEs the false public key; once this has been done the signing and broadcasting of false warning messages is straightforward. So, this clause concentrates on the distribution of false public keys. + +The main tool for the attacker is a false BS. Once the attacker has managed to make a UE camp on the false BS the attacker can enforce unciphered communication by simply not sending a Cipher Mode command or setting the algorithm to A5/0 or GEA0. The attacker has to also simulate a communication with the GSM/GPRS core network. This is the easiest form of the attack as the attacker can then feed the false public key unciphered. + +But even if the communication was ciphered the attacker could still feed a false public key to the UE if the attacker managed to play a Man in the middle (Mitm) between UE and BTS or UE and SGSN. In this variant of the attack, the attacker just forwards the communication between UE and network unchanged, with one exception: it modifies the ciphered public key sent from the MSC or SGSN in such way that the attacker's own public key is delivered to the UE in a ciphered way. The attacker can do this, if the attacker can play Mitm, because 2G uses stream ciphers, the public key is known, the position of the ciphered public key in a LAU/RAU message is known, and the error detecting code is linear; hence the public key can be modified by a Mitm even when the message is ciphered by XOR-ing the delta between the genuine and the false public key to the ciphered public key and adjusting the error detecting code. + +#### 8.3.5.2 Re-use current GSM/GPRS security mechanism with initiating ciphering + +This solution is described in clause 7.3.4.2. + +- a) The protection by the basic variant described at the start of clause 7.3.4.2 seems to consist in mandating the network to switch ciphering on. But this does not help if an attacker with a false BS attack, as described in clause 8.4.1, can enforce NULL encryption. Ciphering would only help if a UE rejected LAU/RAU messages without encryption. But this concept of rejection of unciphered calls has been discussed in 3GPP for at least ten years and not found feasible (e.g. because of problems with roaming). But even if rejection of unciphered communication by the UE could be mandated the Mitm attack from clause 8.4.1 would still apply. So, this basic variant offers at most marginally better protection than unciphered communication as far as PWS is concerned. +- b) A variant of this solution in clause 7.3.4.2 is entitled "Only cipher LAU/ RAU ACCEPT with UP still remaining unencrypted". The same arguments as against the basic variant, cf. a) above, apply. Furthermore, only ciphering LAU would be difficult as, in the CS domain, ciphering is done in the BTS, so the BTS would have to parse the signalling to identify LAU ACCEPT messages. The latter argument would also apply to other forms of partial ciphering, e.g. ciphering only the public key. I.e. all forms of partial ciphering would require changes to the BTS in GSM. This is considered unwelcome due to the involved cost. +- c) The final subheading in clause 7.3.4.2 "Not initiating ciphering in the whole GSM/GPRS system" somehow contradicts the overall heading of clause 7.3.4.2. This variant discusses the security when ciphering is not applied. + +The considerations have indeed some merit as the NAS-based solutions add a margin of security by the mere fact that (1) public keys are distributed over a separate channel from warning messages, (2) NAS messages provide a periodic check whether the public key is the correct one, (3) it may be difficult to set up powerful false BSs in crowded places without being noticed. Still, the added security margin may be insufficient to discourage a well-prepared attacker with considerable resources, so, variant c) on its own may not be good enough (but this is a matter of trade-off). + +#### 8.3.5.3 Enhanced integrity protection mechanism for GSM /GPRS + +This solution is described in clause 7.3.4.3. + +It is proposed there to derive an integrity key Kmac from the ciphering key Kc. But, for 2G subscribers, an attacker can use a false BS and enforce a weak encryption algorithm, to obtain a valid GSM triplet (RAND, RES, Kc). This triplet + +can then be used in the next attempt to communicate with the UE using a Kmac derived from Kc. Furthermore, it is not clear from the description whether the integrity protection would, in the CS domain, be applied in the BTS or in the MSC. Burdening the BTS with this task would be an unwelcome change due to the cost, and adding integrity to the MSC would be a significant architectural change as cryptographic protection would then be split over BS and core network entities. + +#### 8.3.5.4 Limiting key updates in GSM/GPRS + +This solution is described in clause 7.3.4.4. + +Clause 7.3.4.4 already contains a piece of evaluation: "...introduce some kind of enhanced GSM/GPRS security context. ... seems unjustified just for PWS". This seems in line with the findings in clause 8.4.3. + +The alternative solution presented in clause 7.3.4.4 is, for "UMTS or LTE capable UEs", to refuse accepting a key change while accessing the network over GERAN. This should rather read, 'for subscribers with a USIM', in view of the fact that 2G subscribers may also access UTRAN and are also vulnerable over UTRAN. Furthermore, as explained in clause 7.3.4.4, a user could have GERAN access for weeks, so it seems difficult to determine the right period after which the private key corresponding to a newly distributed public key can be taken into use for signing warning messages. If this period is up and the user is still in GERAN he may not be able to accept genuine warning messages. Finally, this proposal seems not well compatible with fast public key change, required e.g. in cases of a key compromise. But the solution has the merit of being simple and enhancing security for subscribers with a USIM in the absence of other countermeasures. + +#### 8.3.5.5 Mechanisms of NAS solution for GSM/GPRS + +This solution is described in clause 7.3.4.5. It contains two mechanisms. + +The first mechanism is quite similar to the solution clause 7.3.4.4, cf. evaluation there. + +The second mechanism consists in sending periodic test warning messages so that the UE can check whether it has the right public key by verifying these test messages. But this approach would not help against the false BS attack described in clause 8.4.1: an attacker would be able to distribute false public keys and broadcast false test warning messages because the attacker would also know the corresponding private key. And if the UE received test warning messages verifiable with the correct public key shortly before or after receiving the false public key it would still accept or keep the false key as a UE may keep, according to the concept of NAS-based public key distribution, two public keys, a current one and one for future use. Once the distribution of false public keys was complete the attacker could start sending false serious warning messages, and not only test messages. + +#### 8.3.5.6 Delaying public key update using a UE-controlled timer + +This solution is described in clause 7.3.4.6 + +The solution seems suitable to prevent attacks creating panic in crowds using false warning messages. The solution would also prevent attacks in other scenarios, e.g. against people in a large residential or office building who spend much of their time there every day, provided the attacker is unable to sustain a false BS attack over a period given by the timer T. (This is so because, when the UE no longer camps on the false BS, switches to a genuine BS, and sends another LAU/RAU request to the genuine network while T was running, the LAU/RAU Accept message would indicate the genuine public key, leading the UE to stop the timer). Sustaining the attack would be difficult as subscribers would be likely to notice a deviation from normal service. The solution does not prevent attacks against small sets of individuals that the attacker can track over an extended period of time. + +The obvious disadvantage of the solution is that UEs without a valid old public key will reject genuine warning messages received while a timer for a key update is running. The UE would e.g. not have a valid old public key when arriving in a new PLMN or CBE area. An example would be the arrival at an airport. But then airports are places vulnerable to attacks creating panic, so a trade-off has to be made. + +It should also be taken into account in the evaluation that events triggering genuine warning messages are quite rare events, which reduces the probability for a subscriber to reject such a genuine warning message due to the timer running. (This, of course, depends on the mobility pattern: somebody crossing borders every day would have a high probability of missing a genuine warning message. But this could be perhaps alleviated by keeping an old public key stored for some time, if it is from a PLMN that was visited recently. This is ffs.) + +**Editor's Note:** How effective this solution would be in cases of prolonged cellular service outage (e.g., due to a natural disaster and a subsequent power outage) and mobile application of a fake BS by the attacker (e.g., mounted on a car, helicopter, or other mobile platform) is ffs. + +An attacker could prevent legitimate key updates as long as it is able to force a location area update with his false BS during the delay time. In these location updates the attacker would claim the most current key is actually still the previous key. If the goal of the attacker was to prevent that the UE can receive genuine warning messages after arriving in a new CBE area then the mechanism described in clause 7.3.4.6 would not make the situation worse compared to a situation where the attacker could successfully distribute a false public key to the UE. + +The solution requires the addition of timer handling logic in the UE, and, possibly, an enhancement to LAU/RAU requests (for including the indication that a timer is running for a particular public key) and the ability of the MSC/VLR or SGSN to handle this indication. This seems much simpler than adding integrity protection or partial ciphering to 2G, which, at least in the CS domain, would impact even BS systems. + +Furthermore, when comparing the mechanism described in clause 7.3.4.6 with that in clause 7.3.4.4 where UEs could not receive any PWS public key update at all while roaming in GERAN, the mechanism in clause 7.3.4.6 seems preferable as it allows the UE to receive a new PWS public key after the timer has expired and not only after having moved away from GERAN. + +**Editor's Note:** Further study is needed on whether an acceptable trade-off can be reached between the ability to provide sufficient protection against attacks creating panic in crowds and the ability to reduce the situations in which a UE cannot receive genuine warnings when entering new PLMNs or new CBE areas to an acceptable level. These attacks include the generation of false warning and/ or warning cancellation messages, or the suppression of such genuine messages. + +## 8.4 Evaluation of solution 4 (Void) + +Void + +## 8.5 Evaluation of solution 5 (Void) + +Void + +## 8.6 Evaluation of solution 6 and solution 7 + +### 8.6.1 Same points for both + +All these two solutions are network unrelated. As is mentioned in clause 7.6 for implicit certificate based solution, "link and core network resource usage is less than with other approaches and is consumed only when a PWS message is sent. No additional resources are expended either for roaming UEs or during an update of a CBEs public key/implicit certificate", which is also suitable for the generalized certificate based solution. + +Operator liability is kept to a minimum. Responsibility for key management issues such as setting up, functioning and upkeep of the CAs is at the national level and not the responsibility of the operator, which is also mentioned in clause 7.6 and is also the same to generalized certificate based solution. + +CBE running organizations have to cooperate with CA organizations. But note that, for the NAS approach, the CBE needs to obtain a private / public key pair from somewhere as well. + +**Editor's note: National or regional roaming issues is for FFS.** + +### 8.6.2 Specific points for implicit certificate based + +- **PWS Security field is increased:** As mentioned in clause 7.6, "While efficient in size, implicit certificates do occupy space and are a source of additional overhead in the PWS Security field resulting in a security level of 112-bits". For each PWS notification message, an implicit certificate occupying 31 bytes has to be transferred within security field. +- **Multiple public root keys are needed:** As mentioned in clause 7.7, "The scheme based on implicit certificates (called 'IMPCERT' henceforth) assumes a set of root CAs whose public keys are pre-installed in the terminal. One of these root CAs issues an implicit certificate to a particular signing entity. This implicit certificate is then sent together with the warning message to the ME over a broadcast channel. + +More space in ME should be reserved to keep these public root keys. But it is ffs whether memory space in the ME really is an issue. + +- **The size is smaller:** The size of an implicit certificate is smaller than a conventional explicit certificate which is also called generalized certificate. Smaller certificates are useful in highly constrained environments where not a lot of memory is available. If the number of CAs for implicit certificate is restricted effectively, implicit certificate approach has advantage to be used in mobile phone. But note that not the certificates, only the public keys, would have to be stored. + +### 8.6.3 Specific points for generalized certificate based + +- **The size is larger:** Generalized certificate may be very large. For example, a standard X.509 certificate is on the order of 1KB in size (~8000 bits, while for example using an elliptic curve system at 160 bits would give us implicit certificates of size at least 41bytes. But note that the final choice for a certificate has not been made yet. +- **The usage of generalized certificate in mobile phone is not wide:** Generalized certificate is widely used in PC and network elements nowadays. But generalized certificate is seldom used in mobile phone. Even in clause 7.7, the UEs are assumed to have the corresponding public root keys installed including IMS UE etc, but all these has not been used widely. But the same argument would also apply to any PWS public keys in a UE. + +## 8.7 Evaluation of solution 7 (Void) + +Void + +## 8.8 Evaluation of solution 8 + +ME needs to support OTA/USAT. + +**Editor's note: Further details to be provided what to use from USAT** + +UICC needs to support OTA/USAT. + +## 8.9 Evaluation of signature algorithms in PWS + +### 8.9.1 General + +In the following, two models are used to analyze the signature schemes in PWS, namely Random Oracle (RO) model [13] and Generic Group (GG) model [14]. + +### 8.9.2 Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) + +Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is a well established standard for digital signature based on DL problem, which was issued by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 1994 for use in Digital Signature Standard (DSS) and ANSI X9.30 in 1997. It is specified in Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186, the latest version is FIPS 186-3. + +The security of DSA is based on several assumptions: hardness of DL problem, one-wayness of hash function, collision-resistance of hash function, and generator for randomness $k$ is unpredictable. + +The provable security has also been well investigated, such as in [15]. By now, there is strong evidence [16] that DSA may not be proven in the RO model based on the hardness of the DL problem without modifying the algorithm. There exists several ways to prove characteristics indicating the security of DSA, as follows: + +- One slightly modified version of DSA can be proven secure in RO model [15], by simply replacing the $\text{Hash}(M)$ by $\text{Hash}(r||M)$ , where "||" means concatenation. It has been included in ISO/IEC 14888. +- If besides the hash function, the $\text{mod } q$ (subgroup order) function is also assumed as a random oracle. Then DSA can be proven secure in RO model [15]. + +According to the above proof, it has been concluded that, if DSA and its variants can be broken by an existential forgery using an adaptively chosen-message attack, then either: + +- DL problem can be solved, or +- Hash function can be distinguished from ideal hash function, or +- Collisions can be found for " $\text{mod } q$ " function. + +However, the above are all hard problems and no efficient algorithm is known to solve them, thus conclude a contradiction indicating that DSA is secure. + +### 8.9.3 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) + +Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is a widely standardized signature scheme, which is a variant of DSA using elliptic curve cryptography. It is an ISO/IEC 14888 standard since 1998, an ANSI X9.62 standard since 1999 and an IEEE P1363 and NIST FIPS 186-3 standard since 2000, NSA Suite B Cryptography since 2005. + +The security of DSA is based on the almost same assumptions as DSA, where the DL problem is on Elliptic Curve, named ECDL. + +The provable security can be achieved in the following ways: + +- ECDSA can be proven secure in the GG model [17]. +- One slightly modified version of ECDSA can be proven secure in RO model [15], by simply replacing the $\text{Hash}(M)$ by $\text{Hash}(r||M)$ . + +- If besides the hash function, the EC point to subgroup mapping function is also assumed as a random oracle. Then ECDSA can be proven in RO model [15]. + +According to the above proof, it has been concluded that, if ECDSA and its variants can be broken by an existential forgery using an adaptively chosen-message attack, then either: + +- ECDL problem can be solved, or +- Hash function can be distinguished from ideal hash function, or +- Collisions can be found for the EC point to subgroup mapping function. + +Thus, lead to a contradiction showing that ECDSA is secure. + +In Advances in ECC, clause 2 (and an earlier presentation at ECC 2001), it has been proven that ECDSA is secure under other assumptions, such as RO model, and the hardness of the semi-logarithm problem (which can also be applied to DSA). + +**Editor's note: References for Advances in ECC and presentation at ECC2001 are ffs** + +### 8.9.4 ECQV based + +ECQV based approach makes use of ECQV implicit certificate with a Keyed MAC, to function as a signature scheme. ECQV is currently being standardized in ANSI, as draft ANSI X9.123, and ECPVS signature which is similar to Keyed MAC is standardized in IEEE, ISO and ANSI, as well. + +The security of ECQV has been proven by [18], and the Keyed MAC (signature scheme) may be viewed as a variant of the signature scheme ECPVS, which itself is a variant of the Schnorr signature scheme. The Schnorr signature scheme has a security proof in the RO model. A security proof [19] for ECPVS would likely apply to the Keyed MAC signature scheme. + +**Editor's Note: SAGE should confirm the security of the Keyed MAC signature scheme given the non universal composability of ECQV [20].** + +# --- 9 Key issues for establishing service requirements and designing a PWS security system + +It needs to be understood that there will be always a trade-off between security on the one hand and availability and complexity of PWS on the other hand that will influence the decision of regulators on whether to introduce PWS security in their jurisdiction. The impact on at least network operators, device manufacturers, and network entities needs to be considered when selecting a PWS security solution studied in the present document. + +## **Key issue: Distribution and management of PWS root keys to UEs** + +The PWS root key is the top level key that the UE needs to know for digital signature verification of signed PWS warning notifications. There can be several root keys. When selecting a mechanism for distributing PWS root keys to UEs then the impact on at least network operators, device manufacturers, and network entities need to be considered. + +## **Key issue: Security information and length restriction in warning messages** + +For PWS security, warning messages need to be extended with a security field (i.e. for signature and other necessary security parameters) without breaking the length restrictions that the different access technologies put on the message. Extending the length seems possible within all warning systems, except ETWS. Whether ETWS primary notifications need to be supported, leads to what length restrictions apply. + +Care "should" be taken when extending any message so that UEs that support PWS but not PWS security will continue to be able to parse the message. + +## **Key issue: Cryptosystem choice** + +Due to the length limitations described above, this will have an impact on the choice of cryptosystem and domain parameters. + +## **Key issue: Mitigation of PWS security circumvention attacks, in particular in the case of roaming and limited service state situation** + +If a UE attaches to a false base station of a visited network, or if a false base station brings the UE in a limited service state. PWS security circumvention attacks become possible. + +Some means of addressing circumvention attacks is necessary. Potential approaches to mitigating this attack and a description of scenarios in which they are applicable are considered in clause 7.9 of the present document. + +# --- 10 Conclusion + +The aim of the present document, as explained in the Scope, clause 1, is to study mechanisms for protection against false base stations broadcasting false warning messages. Seven candidate solutions have been developed and partially evaluated within the present document. + +Due to the lack of input from regulators on PWS security in general and on this technical report in particular, SA3 has decided to not continue with the normative specification of PWS security. Feedback from the regulators and governmental agencies with regard to the assumptions made to specify the digital signature schemes, and the implications of enabling PWS security, would be beneficial as all proposed solutions in the present document imply that subscribers may fail to receive warning notification while roaming in another country or region. If it turns out that regulators are not willing to accept this risk, then all standardization efforts will be in vain. This so called PWS circumvention attack is described further in clause 6.1.2 and potential countermeasures can be found in clause 7.9. + +Without further input from regulators, there is a risk that SA3 only considers digital signature schemes which comply with the most severe limitations, when in fact those limitations may never apply in practice. In particular, it is not known whether ETWS primary notifications, the main reason for the length restrictions, will ever be used with security over GERAN, see clause 6.2. + +Some key issues and security features for PWS security are described in clause 9 and clause 6. + +SA3 has also decided to not make any recommendation or selection between the possible solutions described in the present document. + +# --- Annex A: Archived solutions + +## A.1 Solution 1 + +Editor's Note: Solutions for GSM and UMTS are needed. + +### A.1.1 Public key distribution + +The solution describes the distribution of the public signature verification key information based on NAS messages. NAS SMC/Attach /TAU ACCEPT message can be used. + +1. In the initial attach procedure, UE sends the initial attach request to MME. + +NOTE A: If UE has attached the network before, UE sends the public key identifier to MME in Attach request or TAU request. + +NOTE B: In the roaming case or in case of network sharing, UE should send PLMN ID to the core network. + +2. EPS AKA procedure may take place. + +3. When MME receives the initial attach request, MME distributes the latest public key and the identifier of public key and the signing entity identifier in NAS SMC. In addition, MME distributes the "network signature use counter" (NSUC) which is a monotonic increasing value that can be increased every time the public key is used. + +NOTE C: In order to validate the PWS Warning Notification come from different signing entities, UE **"should"** be notified signing entity identifier, to know which signing entity the PWS warning message comes from. + +NOTE D: If UE has attached to the network before, when MME receives Attach or TAU request, it verifies whether the public key and NSUC that UE possesses is the latest. Otherwise, MME checks whether the PSKI and NSUC that UE send is latest. Otherwise, it will distribute the latest public key and the corresponding PKSI. + +NOTE E: In the roaming case or in case of network sharing, when core network receives the request message, it will check whether the PLMN ID is same as the PLMN ID that it located in. Otherwise, MME will send the new PLMN ID to UE to avoid the collision of the public key identifier, as the PKSI may not be global unique. + +4. At receiving the NAS message, UE receives and saves the public key, PKSI, and the signing entity identifier and the relationship between PWS key, PKSI and the signing entity identifier sent from MME via NAS SMC. UE verifies the signature of PWS Warning Notification message with the public key and signature algorithm. + +![Sequence diagram for Public key distribution showing interactions between UE, eNB, MME, CBC, and CBE.](e16bfa31d748f4d99ec4ae3d16656926_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant eNB + participant MME + participant CBC + participant CBE + + Note right of CBE: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + CBE->>CBC: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note right of CBC: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC the signature) + CBC->>MME: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC the signature) + Note right of MME: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + MME->>CBC: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + Note right of CBC: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + CBC->>CBE: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + Note right of CBE: 5. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + CBE->>MME: 5. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note right of MME: 6. Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + MME->>eNB: 6. Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note right of eNB: 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys + eNB->>UE: 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys + Note right of UE: 8. Write-Replace Warning Response + UE->>MME: 8. Write-Replace Warning Response + Note right of MME: 9. UE Alert + MME-->>eNB: 9. UE Alert + eNB-->>UE: 9. UE Alert +``` + +The sequence diagram illustrates the public key distribution process. It begins with the CBE sending an 'Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature)' to the CBC. The CBC then sends a 'Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC the signature)' to the MME. The MME responds with a 'Write-Replace Warning Confirm' to the CBC, which in turn sends an 'Emergency Broadcast Response' to the CBE. The CBE then sends a 'Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature)' to the MME. The MME sends 'Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature)' to the eNB. The eNB sends a message to the UE indicating that the UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys. The UE sends a 'Write-Replace Warning Response' to the MME. Finally, the MME sends a 'UE Alert' to the eNB, which then alerts the UE. A starburst icon labeled '9. UE Alert' is shown near the UE lifeline. + +Sequence diagram for Public key distribution showing interactions between UE, eNB, MME, CBC, and CBE. + +**Figure A.1.1.1 Public key distribution** + +NOTE F: Only happening in emergency case. + +NOTE G: If the UE has several active keys, the UE can send several PKSI in one NAS message and receive several public keys in one NAS message. + +NOTE H: The sizes of NAS messages need to be considered. Refer to clause 8.3.2 for NAS message consumption. + +The public key distribution mechanism can also be used for public key update in LTE. + +### A.1.2 Public key distribution in UMTS + +The solution describes the distribution of the public signature verification key information based on AS message or NAS messages. SMC /Attach /RAU/LAU ACCEPT message can be used. + +1. In the initial attach procedure, UE sends the initial attach request to SGSN. + +NOTE A: If UE has attached the network before, UE sends the public key identifier to SGSN in Attach/ RAU/LAU request. + +NOTE B: In the roaming case or in case of network sharing, UE should send PLMN ID to the core network. + +2. AKA procedure may take place. + +3. When SGSN receives the initial attach request, SGSN distributes the latest public key and the identifier of public key in Security Mode Command. In addition, SGSN distributes the "network signature use counter" (NSUC) which is a monotonic increasing value that can be increased every time the public key is sent. + +NOTE C: If UE has attached the network before, when SGSN receives Attach/RAU/LAU request, it verifies whether the public key that UE possesses is the latest. Otherwise, SGSN checks whether the PSKI that UE send is latest. Otherwise, it will distribute the latest public key and the corresponding PKSI. + +NOTE D: In the roaming case or in case of network sharing, when core network receives the request message, it will check whether the PLMN ID is same as the PLMN ID that it located in. Otherwise, SGSN will send the new PLMN ID to UE to avoid the collision of the public key identifier, as the PKSI may not be global unique. + +4. At receiving the Security Mode Command message, RNC transmits this message to UE. + +5. When receiving the Security Mode Command message, UE receives and saves the public key sent from RNC via Security Mode Command. UE verifies the signature of PWS Warning Notification message with the public key, NSUC and signature algorithm. + +![Sequence diagram showing the distribution of public key information in UMTS. The diagram involves five entities: UE, eNB, MME, CBC, and CBE. The sequence of messages is as follows: 1. CBE sends an Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) to CBC. 2. CBC sends a Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) to MME. 3. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Confirm to CBC. 4. CBC sends an Emergency Broadcast Response to CBE. 5. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) to eNB. 6. eNB sends Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) to UE. 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys. 8. eNB sends a Write-Replace Warning Response to MME. 9. UE Alert (indicated by a starburst icon).](ed99c577aacc48b3e3ef5060d0048041_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant eNB + participant MME + participant CBC + participant CBE + Note right of UE: 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys + CBE->>CBC: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + CBC->>MME: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + MME->>CBC: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + CBC->>CBE: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + MME->>eNB: 5. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + eNB->>UE: 6. Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note right of UE: 9. UE Alert + eNB->>MME: 8. Write-Replace Warning Response + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the distribution of public key information in UMTS. The diagram involves five entities: UE, eNB, MME, CBC, and CBE. The sequence of messages is as follows: 1. CBE sends an Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) to CBC. 2. CBC sends a Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) to MME. 3. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Confirm to CBC. 4. CBC sends an Emergency Broadcast Response to CBE. 5. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) to eNB. 6. eNB sends Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) to UE. 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys. 8. eNB sends a Write-Replace Warning Response to MME. 9. UE Alert (indicated by a starburst icon). + +**Figure A.1.2.1 Distribution of public key information in UMTS** + +The public key distribution mechanism can also be used for public key update in UMTS. + +### A.1.3 Signature algorithm agility + +This solution describes the distribution of the signature algorithm identifier based on Warning Notification messages and broadcast message. CBE signs the PWS Warning Notification. Figure A.1.311 gives an example. + +NOTE: SAI: Signature Algorithm Identifier + +1. In the Emergency Broadcast Request, CBE provides the signature algorithm identifier to CBC. +2. CBC transmits the signature algorithm identifier to MME with Write-Replace Warning Request. +3. The MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Confirm message that indicates to the CBC that MME has started to distribute the warning message to eNB. +4. Upon reception of the Write-Replace Confirm messages from MME, the CBC may confirm to the CBE that the PLMN has started to distribute the warning message. +5. When MME receives this request, it transmits the signature algorithm identifier with Write-Replace Warning Request to eNB. +6. eNB broadcasts the signature algorithm identifier for the network's coverage area to all UEs. And UE verifies the signature of PWS Warning Notification message with the public key and signature algorithm. + +![Sequence diagram showing the distribution of signature algorithm identifier between UE, eNB, MME, CBC, and CBE.](3922e505954d53f8864a44dc9ea664c6_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant eNB + participant MME + participant CBC + participant CBE + + CBE->>CBC: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + CBC->>MME: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC the signature) + MME->>CBC: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + CBC->>CBE: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + MME->>eNB: 5. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + eNB->>UE: 6. Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note over UE: 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys + eNB->>MME: 8. Write-Replace Warning Response + Note over UE: 9. UE Alert + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the distribution of signature algorithm identifier between UE, eNB, MME, CBC, and CBE. + +Figure A.1.3-1: Distribution of signature algorithm identifier + +PWS signature algorithm identifier is set in the IE: Warning-Security-Information of PWS Warning Notification. + +The signature algorithm identifier can be set in the Warning-Security-Information IE in WRITE-REPLACE Request/Indication. Then the corresponding message over air interface will have no impact. If this approach is introduced, it will not increase the overload for network entity, + +### A.1.4 Distribution of signature algorithm identifier in UMTS + +This solution describes the distribution of the signature algorithm identifier in the ETWS PRIMARY NOTIFICATION WITH SECURITY or in the Warning Security Information of WRITE-REPLACE Request message. + +NOTE: SAI: Signature Algorithm Identifier + +1. In the Emergency Broadcast Request, CBE provides the signature algorithm identifier to CBC. CBC transmits the signature algorithm identifier to UTRAN with Write-Replace Warning Request. +2. UTRAN sends a Write-Replace Warning Confirm message that indicates to the CBC that it has started to distribute the warning message to service area. +3. Upon reception of the Write-Replace Confirm messages from CBC, the CBC may confirm to the CBE that the PLMN has started to distribute the warning message. +4. When UTRAN receives this request, it first sends a PAGING TYPE 1 message or a SYSTEM INFORMATION CHANGE INDICATION message, including the IE "ETWS information". +5. After the reception of the IE "ETWS information" in either the PAGING TYPE 1 or the SYSTEM INFORMATION CHANGE INDICATION message. If RRC is configured from upper layers to receive the ETWS primary notification with security, UTRAN "**should**" send SAI included in ETWS PRIMARY NOTIFICATION WITH SECURITY to UEs. And UE verifies the signature of PWS Warning Notification message with the public key and signature algorithm. + +![Sequence diagram showing the distribution of signature algorithm identifier in UMTS. Lifelines: UE, eNB, MME, CBC, CBE. The sequence starts with CBE sending an Emergency Broadcast Request to CBC. CBC sends a Write-Replace Warning Request to MME. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Confirm to CBC. CBC sends an Emergency Broadcast Response to CBE. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Request to eNB. eNB broadcasts information to UE. UE verifies the signature. eNB sends a Write-Replace Warning Response to MME. Finally, UE alerts.](09ec8c855800290ecbc282cfef399c32_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant CBE + participant CBC + participant MME + participant eNB + participant UE + + Note right of UE: 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys + + CBE->>CBC: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + CBC->>MME: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + MME->>CBC: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + CBC->>CBE: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + MME->>eNB: 5. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + eNB->>UE: 6. Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note right of UE: 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys + eNB->>MME: 8. Write-Replace Warning Response + Note right of UE: 9. UE Alert +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the distribution of signature algorithm identifier in UMTS. Lifelines: UE, eNB, MME, CBC, CBE. The sequence starts with CBE sending an Emergency Broadcast Request to CBC. CBC sends a Write-Replace Warning Request to MME. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Confirm to CBC. CBC sends an Emergency Broadcast Response to CBE. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Request to eNB. eNB broadcasts information to UE. UE verifies the signature. eNB sends a Write-Replace Warning Response to MME. Finally, UE alerts. + +Figure A.1.4.1: Distribution of signature algorithm identifier in UMTS + +### A.1.5 Verification of PWS Warning Notification message + +This clause describes the solution that UE verifies the signature of PWS Warning Notification message with the saved public signature key and signature algorithm Figure A.1.5-1 gives an example to show the solution with CBE as the signature entity. + +1. CBE sends SAI, NSUC and the signature included in Emergency Broadcast Request to CBC. The signature also covers the NSUC. +2. CBC sends SAI, NSUC and the signature in Write-Replace Warning Request to MME. +3. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Confirm message that indicates to the CBC that MME has started to distribute the warning message to eNB. +4. Upon reception of the Write-Replace Confirm messages from MME, the CBC may confirm to the CBE that the PLMN has started to distribute the warning message. +5. When MME receives this request, it sends SAI, NSUC and the signature in the Write-Replace Warning Request to eNB. +6. eNB broadcasts SAI, NSUC and the signature for the network's coverage area to all UEs. +7. At receiving the broadcast information message, UE verifies the signature with the latest public key. The signature covers emergency warning, SAI, and NSUC. UE verifies that NSUC received from the network in the notification is greater or equal to the NSUC stored on the UE. After receiving a warning message, the UE ceases to update its stored NSUC that is associated with this signing key. + +NOTE: If there are too few bits to actually send the NSUC over the air in the warning message, it could be left out. Then the UE would need to test the potential NSUCs starting from the stored NSUC to the stored NSUC plus a window size. The signature will always have to cover both the warning message and the NSUC. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the verification of PWS message. Lifelines: UE, eNB, MME, CBC, CBE. The sequence shows the flow of messages from CBE to UE, with the UE verifying the signature and alerting.](c2f5e14ca0ed0f7944c7606451f67d85_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant CBE + participant CBC + participant MME + participant eNB + participant UE + + Note left of UE: 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys + + CBE->>CBC: 1. Emergency Broadcast Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + CBC->>MME: 2. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + MME->>CBC: 3. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + CBC->>CBE: 4. Emergency Broadcast Response + MME->>eNB: 5. Write-Replace Warning Request (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + eNB->>UE: 6. Broadcast information (SAI, NSUC, the signature) + Note left of UE: 7. UE verifies the signature with the latest public keys + eNB->>MME: 8. Write-Replace Warning Response + Note left of UE: 9. UE Alert +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the verification of PWS message. Lifelines: UE, eNB, MME, CBC, CBE. The sequence shows the flow of messages from CBE to UE, with the UE verifying the signature and alerting. + +Figure A.1.5-1: Verification of PWS message + +## A.2 Solution 2 + +### A.2.1 General + +In this solution, a secure point-to-point channel is used to distribute PWS keys to UE registered to the network. Two aspects are included: the one is the network entity (MME/SGSN) distribute PWS key to UE (the blue line as showed in figure A.2.1-1 below); the other is network entity (MME/SGSN) get PWS key from CBC/CBE (the red line as showed in figure A.2.1-1 below). + +![Diagram illustrating the PWS key distribution path. A User Equipment (UE) is shown on the left, connected to three radio access networks: GERAN (BTS/BSC), UTRAN (NB/RNC), and E-UTRAN (eNB). These networks are connected to a central Operator Network cloud. Inside the cloud, the GERAN path goes through a BSC to an SGSN, the UTRAN path goes through an RNC to an SGSN, and the E-UTRAN path goes through an eNB to an MME. Both the SGSN and the MME are connected to a CBC (Core Network Controller). Blue lines with lightning bolt icons represent the distribution of PWS keys from the SGSN and MME to the UE. Red lines represent the distribution of PWS keys from the CBC to the SGSN and MME.](d9d09655eb4282168769ac97178db50c_img.jpg) + +Diagram illustrating the PWS key distribution path. A User Equipment (UE) is shown on the left, connected to three radio access networks: GERAN (BTS/BSC), UTRAN (NB/RNC), and E-UTRAN (eNB). These networks are connected to a central Operator Network cloud. Inside the cloud, the GERAN path goes through a BSC to an SGSN, the UTRAN path goes through an RNC to an SGSN, and the E-UTRAN path goes through an eNB to an MME. Both the SGSN and the MME are connected to a CBC (Core Network Controller). Blue lines with lightning bolt icons represent the distribution of PWS keys from the SGSN and MME to the UE. Red lines represent the distribution of PWS keys from the CBC to the SGSN and MME. + +Figure A.2.1-1: PWS key distribution path + +### A.2.2 Initial PWS key distribution + +Initial PWS keys should be ready just after UE has registered to the network immediately. In this way by anytime there is a PWS warning message sent by the network, UE can verify it with the PWS key it has stored. So a solution is proposed that the initial PWS keys are distributed in attach procedure. + +- LTE: Two PWS keys and the corresponding public key identifiers (PKIDs) are sent to UE in Attach Accept message by MME, which is integrity protected. +- UMTS: Two PWS keys and the corresponding PKIDs are sent to UE in Attach Accept message by SGSN, which is integrity protected. +- GSM: Two PWS keys and the corresponding PKIDs are sent to UE in RAU Accept message during attach procedure by SGSN. + +NOTE: Whether security enhancement is needed for GSM/GPRS is FFS. + +The above two PWS keys are defined to be the current PWS key and the next PWS key. The current PWS key is the currently activated key which is used to sign the PWS notification message. The next PWS key is activated and becomes the current key after the old current one is deactivated. + +### A.2.3 Network PWS key configuration + +Since PWS keys are sent to UE in L3 signalling, the network entity (MME/SGSN) should be configured with the PWS keys when PWS service is determined to be provided to UE by the network. Thus there is a requirement that CBC and MME/SGSN **"should"** have an interface to distribute the PWS keys. + +When the network determines to provide PWS service to UEs, CBC **"should"** send PWS keys to MME/SGSN. After PWS keys are configured in MME/SGSN, once there is a UE registered to the network, MME/SGSN should distribute the PWS keys to the UE in the attach procedure. + +When CBC/CBE updates the PWS keys of a specified notification area, CBC **"should"** send the updated PWS keys to the network entities (MME/SGSN) which have connections with the affected RAN. + +**Editor's Note: It is FFS if the working assumption on a national root of trust determines CBC/CBE.** + +### A.2.4 PWS key update + +Even if the frequency of PWS key update is rather low, it should also provide a mechanism to permit PWS key to be updated. This solution uses a point-to-point secure channel to update PWS keys. + +The network activates and updates PWS keys as follows: + +- Two PWS keys are used: the current PWS key and the next PWS key. The current one is the activated one which is used to verify the current PWS notification; the next PWS key is used to verify the PWS notification after it has been activated when the current one is deactivated. +- When CBC determines to change the next PWS key to current PWS keys, it **"should"** also update the next PWS key with a new one. And CBC **"should"** send the updated next PWS key and its identifier to the network entities (MME/SGSN), together with the current PWS key identifier. + +![Sequence diagram showing PWS key activation and updates between MME/SGSN and CBC. The diagram shows state boxes for both entities and message exchanges for PWS Key Update and PWS Key Update Ack.](9251d933da20f30681f829b4c4e28987_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant MME/SGSN + participant CBC + Note over MME/SGSN: Current key= K(i); +Next key= K(i+1) + Note over CBC: Current key= K(i); +Next key= K(i+1) + Note over CBC: Determine to update +PWS key; +Current key= K(i+1); +Next key= K(i+2) + CBC->>MME/SGSN: PWS Key Update +(Current key ID; Next Key +and Next key ID) + Note over MME/SGSN: Update PWS key; +Current key= K(i+1); +Next key= K(i+2) + MME/SGSN->>CBC: PWS Key Update Ack + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing PWS key activation and updates between MME/SGSN and CBC. The diagram shows state boxes for both entities and message exchanges for PWS Key Update and PWS Key Update Ack. + +**Figure A.2.4-1: PWS key activates and updates by network side** + +UE activates and updates PWS keys as follows: + +- The serving network always broadcasts the current PWS key identifier and the next PWS key identifier. The network entities notify the corresponding RAN to broadcast the just activated current PWS key identifier and the updated next PWS key identifier. + +Editor's Note: the broadcast is not authenticated. Therefore, an attacker can do two things: 1. deny reception of legitimate PWS warning by broadcasting next key ID as current key ID; 2. induce UE key update by broadcasting different PWS key identifier. The severity of these attacks is for further study, as it constitutes a reflector attack with amplification. + +- UE activates the stored next PWS key to the current key as the serving network indicates. +- Once a UE notices that at least one of the broadcasting PWS key identifiers is different from the one it stores, UE will perform PWS key update till the next normal TA/RA/LA update procedure. +- In response to each successful tracking area, routing area or location area update, the network entity provides the PWS key requested by UE. +- UE stores the received new PWS key as the next one. + +![Sequence diagram showing PWS key activation and updates between UE, RAN, and MME/SGSN.](aed5b156b9b0fff9167baba88e5fdcfc_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant RAN + participant MME/SGSN + + Note right of MME/SGSN: update PWS key; +Current key= K(i+1); +Next key= K(i+2) + + MME/SGSN->>RAN: PWS Key Update + Note left of RAN: Current key= K(i); +Next key= K(i+1) + RAN->>UE: Cell Broadcast +(Current key ID, Next key ID) + Note left of UE: Current key=K(i+1); +Trigger PWS key update + UE->>MME/SGSN: TAU/RAU/LU Request + MME/SGSN->>UE: TAU/RAU/LU Accept +(Next key, Next key ID) + Note left of UE: Store Next key; +Current key= K(i+1); +Next key= K(i+2) +``` + +The diagram illustrates the interaction between a User Equipment (UE), a Radio Access Network (RAN), and a Mobility Management Entity/Serving Gateway (MME/SGSN) for PWS key updates. It starts with the MME/SGSN sending a 'PWS Key Update' message to the RAN. The RAN then sends a 'Cell Broadcast' containing the 'Current key ID' and 'Next key ID' to the UE. Upon receiving this, the UE triggers a PWS key update and sends a 'TAU/RAU/LU Request' to the MME/SGSN. The MME/SGSN responds with a 'TAU/RAU/LU Accept' message containing the 'Next key' and 'Next key ID'. Finally, the UE stores the new key as the current key and the next key as the one received. + +Sequence diagram showing PWS key activation and updates between UE, RAN, and MME/SGSN. + +Figure A.2.4-2: PWS key activates and updates by UE side + +Editor's Note: PWS Key Update in Figure A.2.4.2 needs more detail. + +Editor's Note: Lifetime of the key should be longer than the TAU/RAU/LU lifetime. + +### A.2.5 Delivery of PWS Warning Notification message + +When network nodes distribute PWS Warning Notification message to UE, the public key identifier (PKID) should be included in the message which is identified the public key used to sign the message. This method can avoid UEs trying each public key to verify the signature effectively. Figure A.2.5.1 gives an example to show the solution used in LTE network. + +1. CBC/CBE sends a Write-Replace Warning Request message to MME. The message **"should"** include a "PKID" to identify the public key used to sign the message, as well as the "the signature". +2. MME sends a Write-Replace Warning Confirm message to the CBC/CBE. +3. When MME receives this request, it sends a Write-Replace Warning Request message ("PKID", and "the signature") to eNB. +4. When eNB receives this request, it broadcasts PWS warning message ("PKID", and "the signature") to all UEs in the network's coverage area. +5. At receiving the broadcast information message, UE verifies the signature with the public key identified by PKID which is received in the broadcast message. +6. The eNB sends a Write-Replace Warning response message to MME to confirm the request. +7. The UE alerts the user. + +![Sequence diagram illustrating the verification of PWS message. Lifelines: UE, eNB, MME, CBC/CBE. The sequence shows the flow of Write-Replace Warning Request, Confirm, and Broadcast information messages, followed by UE verification and alerting.](0eb57eefa7cd45d30e68829ca8a03843_img.jpg) + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant UE + participant eNB + participant MME + participant CBC/CBE + Note right of CBC/CBE: 1. Write-Replace Warning Request (PKID, the signature) + CBC/CBE->>MME: 1. Write-Replace Warning Request (PKID, the signature) + Note right of MME: 2. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + MME->>CBC/CBE: 2. Write-Replace Warning Confirm + Note right of MME: 3. Write-Replace Warning Request (PKID, the signature) + MME->>eNB: 3. Write-Replace Warning Request (PKID, the signature) + Note right of eNB: 4. Broadcast information (PKID, the signature) + eNB->>UE: 4. Broadcast information (PKID, the signature) + Note left of UE: 5. UE verifies the signature with the related public keys + UE->>UE: 5. UE verifies the signature with the related public keys + Note right of eNB: 6. Write-Replace Warning Response + eNB->>MME: 6. Write-Replace Warning Response + Note left of UE: 7. UE Alert + UE->>UE: 7. UE Alert +``` + +Sequence diagram illustrating the verification of PWS message. Lifelines: UE, eNB, MME, CBC/CBE. The sequence shows the flow of Write-Replace Warning Request, Confirm, and Broadcast information messages, followed by UE verification and alerting. + +Figure A.2.5-1: Verification of PWS message + +NOTE: Step 6 happens after step 3, otherwise there are no other sequence requirements. + +# Annex B: + +## Threat discussion depending on the PWS settings in the UE relating to roaming + +Depending on SA3 decisions whether the option of displaying unverified messages in the users "PWS Security mandated home network" is considered (at all, in the first step, or later), this clause points out possible threats due to settings in the UE, i.e. a user staying in his home network may be the victim of a circumvention attack, in which case roaming inside its own country becomes true. + +Thus, roaming impact need to be considered if PWS Security "**should**" be effectively applied and the display of warning messages without security in another country that does NOT have deployed PWS Security is wanted by the home operator, i.e. setting the PWS USIM flag to "process PWS messages in VPLMNs". Otherwise PWS Security in the home country can be circumvented. (See clause 6.1.2 for a more detailed description of the circumvention attack). + +The following are different cases with respect to roamers and PWS Security settings in the UE: + +- roamers within a network that sends warning messages without PWS Security and whose home operator has also not implemented PWS Security: this is the starting point of discussion for introducing PWS Security, i.e. before Rel-12; +- roamers within a network that sends warning messages without PWS Security, but whose home operator has implemented PWS Security; +- roamers within a network that sends signed warning messages, but whose home operator has not implemented PWS Security; +- roamers within a network that sends signed warning messages and whose home operator has also implemented PWS Security. + +In Rel-11 a PWS USIM flag was introduced as a new UE setting regarding PWS (TS 31.102 [22], service 96), which allows the home operator to configure the UE behaviour to process or ignore PWS warning messages in the home and/or visited network. When introducing PWS Security, the setting of this PWS USIM flag to "process" is assumed to be the precondition for the usage of PWS Security. + +The introduction of PWS Security will most likely happen only step by step and on a national basis. + +Thus, operators could consider configuring the UE behaviour depending on the introduction of PWS Security in their own country and/or other countries in a similar way as the PWS USIM flag would need to be configured. E.g. a flag to enable or disable PWS Security could be additionally introduced as new USIM setting regarding PWS Security, called "PWS Security flag". It will reside on the USIM. + +Precondition for checking the PWS Security flag would be that the operator has set the PWS USIM flag to process PWS warning messages. Then, the UE settings regarding the PWS Security flag would tell the UE whether PWS warning messages "**should**" be always displayed or be displayed only after they could be verified. In the former case, the UE would NOT need to verify a signature even if a signed warning message was broadcast. + +Considerations on the different options for UE settings are summarized in the following tables. For completeness, table B-1 is included, which covers the PWS USIM flag to process or ignore warning messages that is supposed to be present in any Rel-11 UE. + +**Table B-1: Potential UE behaviour with regard to PWS in Rel-11** + +| PWS Security support | | Possible PWS USIM flag settings: ignore/process warning messages | | If PWS USIM flag is set to process, how does the UE behave wrt display of warning messages (could be called PWS Security flag) | | Comments on Rel-11 UEs | +|----------------------|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| in HN | in VN | process PWS in HN | process PWS in VN | Display in HN only if verified | Display in VN only if verified | | +| N | N | Y/N | Y/N | n/a | n/a | Rel-11 has no PWS Security. In order for the operator to be able to influence, whether a UE is allowed to receive warning messages, e.g. when roaming, a PWS USIM flag was introduced: Operator decides on behalf of its users whether warning messages are ignored (N) or processed (Y) in HPLMN (home network, HN) and/or VPLMN (visited network, VN), depending on the trust in other operator networks | + +The analysis in table B-2 covers Rel-12 and beyond. The following assumption is taken: if PWS Security is in use in the home network (HN), the UE processes warning messages by default (i.e. PWS USIM flag set to "Y") and displays only verified messages in its HN. Therefore, some Y/N combinations are not considered in the following table. + +For PWS Security in any visited network (VN), this assumption is not taken due to the fact that verification of a signed warning message in a visited network depends on the availability of the public key and may be less easy to provide as in the home network. + +**NOTE:** The verification of warning messages in visited networks also implies the obligation to the home network to provide the keys needed for verification, else the home operator or national authority may be held responsible for damage and loss of life caused by non-displayed messages. + +**Table B-2: Potential UE behaviour with regard to PWS and PWS Security in Rel-12** + +| PWS Security support | | Possible PWS USIM flag settings: ignore/process warning messages | | If PWS USIM flag is set to process, how does the UE behave wrt display of warning messages (a.k.a PWS Security flag) | | Comments on Rel-12 UEs | +|----------------------|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| in HN | in VN | process PWS in HN | process PWS in VN | Display in HN only if verified | Display in VN only if verified | | +| Y | N | Y | Y | Y | N
i.e. display all messages
(also without verification) | PWS Security is only in HN available, UE is supposed to process PWS everywhere. The operator restricts the UE to display only verified warning messages in the HN, but allows display of any warning message while roaming. However, in terms of security, this is not a PWS Security-sound UE configuration: if unsigned warning messages can be displayed, PWS is easy to attack (circumvention attack). | +| Y | N | Y | Y | Y | Y | PWS Security-sound UE configuration avoiding attacks: allow the display of verified messages only (in any network) | +| Y | N | Y | N | Y | n/a | PWS Security-sound: only process warning messages in HN but do not process (and display) while roaming | +| N | Y | Y | Y | N
i.e. display all messages | N
i.e. display all messages | PWS Security-sound: if in HN no PWS Security is implemented, then UE ignores any signature and displays warning messages unverified at home and visited networks without any considerations on PWS Security used in a VN | +| N | Y | Y | Y | N
i.e. display all messages | Y | This would be PWS Security-sound too: where PWS Security is available, use it. Note, root key / CBE key of the VN "should" be available | +| N | Y | Y | N | N
i.e. display all messages | n/a | It is possible to configure UEs like this but if the HN operator could distinguish VNs and would trust the security in one VN, why not to at least allow processing of warning messages in those cases, when the HN trusts a VN? | +| N | Y | N | Y/N | n/a | Y/N | This would be PWS Security-sound but there is no need to restrict HN in message processing. If HN is not using security, it should be able to display any message. | +| Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | N
i.e. display all messages | How to deal with signed warning messages, if no root key or CBE key of the roamed-in VN is available in the UE? This configuration could lead to the circumvention attack! | +| Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | PWS Security-sound: only display a warning message if it is verifiable. Possible in solutions that provide the public key of the roamed-in VN beforehand or together with the warning message, in case root key/CBE key are known. Note this may result in suppression of real warning messages and the responsible entity (e.g. the home operator or national authority) could be held responsible, e.g. if the flag is not set correctly/timely for this country or the keys are not provisioned correctly. | + +The following summarizes the conclusions from the table, starting with the case that a HN does not provide PWS Security: + +If the HN is not using PWS Security, i.e. UE displays warning messages without verification in HN, there are two possible UE behaviours for the roaming case: do not care how VN is configured with respect to PWS Security, i.e. display in VN what is broadcasted there as well, or: ignore warning messages in VNs, because HN operator wants to protect subscribers from fraud outside its own domain. According to TS 22.268 [2], this instruction to ignore warning messages in VNs can apply to all VNs, or only to selected VNs that may be known to the HN to have security problems. Both settings may be sensible. + +If the HN uses PWS Security and UE is allowed to display messages in visited networks without verifying the signature, circumvention attacks are possible. Thus, if operators do not want to nullify the usage of PWS Security at all, they either have to forbid receiving warning messages in case their UEs are roaming or to allow the display, but only after their UEs could verify the signature. Consequently, if the home network uses PWS Security, one valid configuration setup for a UE is to ignore warning messages in any VN that does not use PWS Security. From security point of view, this is a PWS Security-sound approach, but it may result in suppressing real warning messages, if the keys are not available (for whatever reason) or if the flag for this visited network is not set timely or correctly. This implies a great responsibility for the home operator. (Clause 7.9.1 provides more details on this type of counter-measure). + +Another valid set up for a UE, where the home network uses PWS Security, is to also accept warning messages in a VN that does not use PWS Security. However this works only in a PWS Security-sound way, if network-independent location verification is in place. Note that the home operator may have configured the UE with regard to PWS and PWS Security, but the user may want to have a different setting with his personal preference, i.e. depending on what is + +important to the user: risking that real warning messages may be suppressed or false warning messages may be received. (Clause 7.9.2 provides more details on this type of counter-measure). + +Note, current solution 8 would not allow any message display in VN if the message could not be verified. However, if a VN uses PWS Security and the UE would have the knowledge about this VN behaviour and even could verify signatures on warning messages in this VN, it should be preferred to display the message. Thus, a more subtle differentiation of VNs may be appropriate. + +Depending on the solution selected during this study phase, the UE would either receive the valid public key of the CBE or a signing proxy on the fly (while the HN operator may have already given the necessary root key) as in solution 6/7, receive it beforehand by OTA as in solution 8, or gains it via NAS or by GBA as in 3/4. If the roaming case should be supported and home and visited network support PWS Security, the home network operator needs to assure that the credentials for verifying a message while roaming are available. + +In summary, as long as not all operators introduce PWS Security (which is likely to happen as regulators of some countries do prefer warning message broadcast without security), on one hand circumvention attacks are possible and should be mitigated. On the other hand, the safety of the user while roaming may need to be considered, wherever he is. + +In addition to the ignore/process PWS USIM flag, additional PWS Security flags may be needed in the USIM indicating the security status (PWS Security on/off) of home or visited countries and/or networks. This could be introduced as part of the solution, together with e.g. network-independent location verification. + +**Editor's Note: It is ffs if several PWS Security flags are needed.** + +# Annex C: Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|-------|-----------|----|-----|----------------------------------------|--------|--------| +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | Old | New | +| 2014-09 | SP-65 | SP-140583 | | | Presented for information and approval | 0.8.0 | 1.0.0 | +| | | | | | Upgrade to Rel-12 version | 1.0.0 | 12.0.0 | +| 2016-01 | SP-70 | | | | Upgrade to Rel-13 (MCC) | 12.0.0 | 13.0.0 | + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|------|----|-----|-----|--------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2017-03 | SA#75 | | | | | Promotion to Release 14 without technical change | 14.0.0 | +| 2018-06 | - | - | - | - 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Trace activation and deactivation ..... | 12 | +| 5.1 General ..... | 12 | +| 5.2 Subscriber Tracing (Tracing of IMSI) ..... | 12 | +| 5.2.1 General ..... | 12 | +| 5.2.2 HPLMN Operator Traces Home Subscriber within the HPLMN ..... | 12 | +| 5.2.3 HPLMN Operator traces the HLR activities of own IMSI roaming in a VPLMN ..... | 13 | +| 5.2.4 PLMN Operator wishes to trace foreign subscribers (IMSI) in own PLMN ..... | 13 | +| 5.3 Equipment Tracing (Tracing of IMEI)..... | 15 | +| 5.3.1 General ..... | 15 | +| 5.3.2 Tracing of IMEI via VLR..... | 15 | +| 5.4 TMN Management Functions for Activation and Deactivation..... | 16 | +| 5.4.1 List of Functions ..... | 16 | +| 5.4.1.1 HLR ..... | 16 | +| 5.4.1.2 MSC/VLR..... | 16 | +| 5.4.2 Activate Home Subscriber Trace..... | 16 | +| 5.4.3 Deactivate Home Subscriber Trace ..... | 17 | +| 5.4.4 Activate Foreign Subscriber Trace..... | 17 | +| 5.4.5 Deactivate Foreign Subscriber Trace ..... | 18 | +| 5.4.6 Activate Equipment Trace..... | 18 | +| 5.4.7 Deactivate Equipment Trace ..... | 19 | +| 5.5 HLR Functional Entities..... | 20 | +| 5.5.1 Managed Object Classes in HLR ..... | 20 | +| 5.5.1.1 tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr ..... | 20 | +| 5.5.1.2 Attributes ..... | 20 | +| 5.5.1.2.1 tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr..... | 20 | +| 5.5.1.3 Notifications..... | 21 | +| 5.6 VLR Functional Entities..... | 22 | +| 5.6.1 Managed Object Classes in VLR ..... | 22 | +| 5.6.1.1 tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr ..... | 22 | +| 5.6.1.2 tracedEquipmentInVlr ..... | 22 | +| 5.6.1.3 Attributes ..... | 22 | +| 5.6.1.3.1 tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr ..... | 22 | +| 5.6.1.3.2 tracedEquipmentInVlr..... | 23 | +| 5.6.1.4 Notifications..... | 24 | +| 6 Trace Types..... | 25 | +| 6.1 MSC/BSS Trace Type..... | 25 | +| 6.2 HLR Trace Type..... | 26 | +| 7 Trace Record Contents..... | 27 | +| 7.1 General ..... | 27 | +| 7.2 MSC Trace Record Content ..... | 29 | +| 7.3 BSS Trace Record Content ..... | 31 | +| 7.4 HLR Trace Record Content..... | 33 | +| 7.5 Trace Record Fields ..... | 34 | +| 7.5.1 Radio Channel Information ..... | 34 | +| 7.5.2 OR information..... | 35 | + +| | | | +|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| 8 | Creation of Trace Records ..... | 36 | +| 8.1 | Trace Record Control ..... | 37 | +| 8.1.1 | General ..... | 37 | +| 8.1.2 | Attributes ..... | 38 | +| 8.1.3 | Other Trace Record Criteria ..... | 38 | +| 9 | Trace Record Transfer ..... | 39 | +| 9.1 | General ..... | 39 | +| 9.2 | Transfer of Records ..... | 40 | +| 9.2.1 | Bulk record transfer ..... | 40 | +| 9.2.2 | Log control ..... | 40 | +| 9.2.3 | Log access ..... | 40 | +| 9.2.4 | Event Reporting ..... | 41 | +| 9.2.4.1 | Event Forwarding Discriminators ..... | 41 | +| 9.2.4.2 | Direct Transfer by Trace Control Function ..... | 41 | +| 10 | Managed Object Model ..... | 42 | +| 10.1 | Naming Hierarchy ..... | 42 | +| 10.2 | Inheritance ..... | 42 | +| 10.3 | Object Classes ..... | 42 | +| | Object Classes ..... | 43 | +| 10.3.1 | tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr ..... | 43 | +| 10.3.2 | tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr ..... | 43 | +| 10.3.3 | tracedEquipmentInVlr ..... | 44 | +| 10.3.4 | Trace control ..... | 44 | +| 10.3.5 | Trace log record ..... | 45 | +| 10.3.6 | Log ..... | 46 | +| 10.3.7 | Event Forwarding Discriminators ..... | 46 | +| 10.4 | Attributes ..... | 46 | +| 10.4.1 | traceActivatedInVlr ..... | 46 | +| 10.4.2 | foreignSubscriberRegisteredInVlr ..... | 46 | +| 10.4.3 | equipmentRegisteredInVlr ..... | 46 | +| 10.4.4 | mapErrorOnTrace ..... | 47 | +| 10.4.5 | IMEI ..... | 47 | +| 10.4.6 | IMSI ..... | 47 | +| 10.4.7 | Trace record content ..... | 47 | +| 10.4.8 | Trace control id ..... | 47 | +| 10.4.9 | HLR Trace type ..... | 47 | +| 10.4.10 | Trace reference ..... | 48 | +| 10.4.11 | Trace type ..... | 48 | +| 10.4.12 | Record criteria ..... | 48 | +| 10.4.13 | Event types ..... | 48 | +| 10.4.14 | Operation system ID ..... | 48 | +| 10.4.15 | Operational State ..... | 48 | +| 10.4.16 | Administrative State ..... | 48 | +| 10.4.17 | MSC BSS trace type used ..... | 48 | +| 10.4.18 | HLR trace type used ..... | 49 | +| 10.4.19 | MSC BSS trace type ..... | 49 | +| 10.5 | Notifications ..... | 49 | +| 10.5.1 | General ..... | 49 | +| 10.5.2 | Trace report ..... | 49 | +| 10.6 | Name Bindings ..... | 49 | +| 10.6.1 | tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr-hlrFunction Name Binding ..... | 49 | +| 10.6.2 | tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr-vlrFunction Name Binding ..... | 50 | +| 10.6.3 | tracedEquipmentInVlr-vlrFunction Name Binding ..... | 50 | +| 10.6.4 | traceLogRecord-Log Name Binding ..... | 50 | +| 10.6.5 | traceControl-hlrFunction Name Binding ..... | 50 | +| 10.6.6 | traceControl-mscFunction Name Binding ..... | 50 | +| 10.6.7 | traceControl-bssFunction Name Binding ..... | 50 | + +11 Syntax..... 52 + +Annex A (informative): Change history..... 63 + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- Introduction + +The present document is part of a TS-family covering the 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Telecommunication management, as identified below: + +- 32.421: Subscriber and equipment trace: Trace concepts and requirements +- 32.422: Subscriber and equipment trace: Trace control and configuration management +- 32.423: Subscriber and equipment trace: Trace data definition and management +- 52.008: GSM subscriber and equipment trace** + +The trace facility enables customer administration and network management to trace the activities of various entities when specific events occur within the PLMN. This facility should also enable the tracing of all the information that is available to the PLMN concerning the call path used by the associated entity. Examples of information that could be in a trace record are: + +- the identity of the originating and terminating equipment of the mobile or fixed subscriber; +- the identity of the incoming and outgoing circuits of the nodes involved; +- supplementary Services invoked; +- all A-Interface messages. + +The trace facility is a useful maintenance aid and development tool, which can be used during system testing and proving. In particular it may be used in conjunction with test-MSs to ascertain the digital cell "footprint", the network integrity and also the network QOS as perceived by the PLMN customers. + +The facility may be used by subscriber administration and network management for subscriber observation, e.g. following a customer complaint or on suspicion of equipment malfunction by the operator or at the request of the police. + +As the amount of information that can be collected for a single call is very large, Network Elements can limit the number of simultaneous traces by either rejecting a trace request or by only producing a sub-set of the information required + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document specifies the Trace facility for GSM where it refers to: + +- subscriber tracing (tracing of International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)); +- equipment tracing (tracing of International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI)). + +It does not cover: + +- types of trace which relate more to network elements than to individual subscribers e.g. tracing events within a Base Station System (BSS), and so on; +- tracing of all possible parties in e.g. a multi-party call, (although multiple calls related to the IMSI specified in the trace type field are traceable). + +It also refers only to tracing activated from the OSF and not to that activated by means of local Man Machine Interface (MMI). + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions, which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. + +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] Void. +- [3] 3GPP TS 48.006: "Signalling transport mechanism specification for the Base Station System - Mobile-services Switching Centre (BSS - MSC) interface". +- [4] 3GPP TS 48.008: "Mobile Switching Centre - Base Station System (MSC-BSS) interface; Layer 3 specification". +- [5] 3GPP TS 48.058: "Base Station Controller - Base Transceiver Station (BSC - BTS) interface; Layer 3 specification". +- [6] 3GPP TS 29.002: "Mobile Application Part (MAP) specification". +- [7] GSM 12.00 (ETS 300 612-1): "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2); Objectives and structure of Network Management (NM)". +- [8] GSM 12.01 (ETS 300 612-2): "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2); Common Aspects of GSM Network Management (NM)". +- [9] Void. +- [10] 3GPP TS 32.250: "Circuit Switched (CS) domain charging". +- [11] GSM 12.20 (ETS 300 622): "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2); BSS Management Information". +- [12] CCITT Recommendation X.227 - ISO 8650: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection – Connection-oriented protocol for the association control service element: Protocol specification". + +- [13] CCITT Recommendation X.721 (ITU-T | ISO/IEC 10165-1): "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Structure of management information: Definition of management information". +- [14] CCITT Recommendation X.734 (ITU-T | ISO/IEC 10164-5): "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Systems Management: Event report management function". +- [15] CCITT Recommendation X.735 (ITU-T | ISO/IEC 10164-6): "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Systems Management: Log control function". +- [16] CCITT Recommendation X.731 (ITU-T | ISO/IEC 10164-2): "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Systems Management: State management function". +- [17] 3GPP TS 23.079: "Support of Optimal Routeing (SOR); Technical realization" +- [18] Void. +- [19] 3GPP TS 24.008: "Core network protocols; Stage 3". +- [20] 3GPP TS 44.018: "Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol". + +# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +For the purposes of the current TS, the following definitions apply: + +**activation of a trace:** An action taken at the OSF through MMI commands to allow a trace record to be produced for a particular IMSI or IMEI when an Invocation Event occurs. This equates to "activation of a trace" in TS 29.002 [6]. + +**active pending:** The state of an activated trace is called Active Pending in a particular NE when the subscriber or equipment being traced is not registered in that NE. + +**invocation of a trace:** An event relating to a particular IMSI or IMEI that occurs in the network that causes data to be collected in a trace record in circumstances where trace has been activated for that IMSI or IMEI. This equates to "tracing subscriber activity" in TS 29.002 [6] and "Trace Invocation" in TS 48.008 [4]. It is possible that an event relating to the IMSI/IMEI may still be active when another event or events relating to the same IMSI/IMEI occurs which requires additional information to be collected. These additional events are termed parallel events. This additional trace information for parallel events is collected in the same trace record as the first event. + +**trace record:** In the NEF a trace record is a set of traceable data collected as determined by the trace type. The trace record is collected under the trace record criteria specified by the OSF and transferred to the OSF. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For all abbreviations used in the current TS, refer to TS 21.905 [1]. + +# 4 Trace Overview + +Figure 1, together with explanations in the text below the figure, gives an outline of the subscriber and equipment tracing and shows the relationship between the inputs on activation and deactivation and the trace record outputs. + +![Figure 1: Subscriber and Equipment Trace diagram showing the flow of trace records from OMCs and HLR through MSCs and BSSs.](367926125450c2bc3f4bdca9d59a62ba_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the flow of trace records in a mobile network. At the top, OMC1 and OMCx are shown. Below them is the HLR. At the next level are two MSC/VLR units, labeled MSC 'A' and MSC 'B'. Below each MSC/VLR are two BSS units. Arrows indicate the flow of trace records: 1. From OMC1 and OMCx to the HLR. 2a and 2b. From OMC1 to MSC 'A'. 3a and 3b. From the HLR to MSC 'A'. 4. From MSC 'A' to MSC 'B'. 5. From each MSC/VLR to its respective BSS units. B. From each MSC/VLR to a common output line. C. From each BSS to the common output line. A. From the HLR to an external output line. Labels 'Home Subscriber', 'Foreign Subscriber', and 'Equipment' point to the HLR, MSC 'A', and BSS units respectively. + +Figure 1: Subscriber and Equipment Trace diagram showing the flow of trace records from OMCs and HLR through MSCs and BSSs. + +**Figure 1: Subscriber and Equipment Trace** + +The inputs on activation and deactivation in figure 1 are as follows: + +- 1) Trace Activation, specified in the present document, containing the following: + - a) IMSI; + - b) Trace Reference; + - c) OMC Destination; + - d) Trace Type; + - e) HLR Trace Type. +- 2a) Trace Activation, specified in the present document, containing the following: + - a) IMSI; + - b) Trace Reference; + - c) OMC Destination; + +- d) Trace Type. +- 2b) Trace Activation, specified in the present document, containing the following: + - a) IMEI; + - b) Trace Reference; + - c) OMC Destination; + - d) Trace Type. +- 3a) MAP-ACTIVATE-TRACE-MODE, specified in TS 29.002, containing the following: + - a) IMSI; + - b) Trace Reference; + - c) OMC Id; + - d) Trace Type. +- 3b) MAP-DEACTIVATE-TRACE-MODE, specified in TS 29.002, containing the following: + - a) IMSI; + - b) Trace Reference. +- 4) MAP-PREPARE-HANDOVER, specified in TS 29.002, containing the following: + - a) the MSC\_INVOKE\_TRACE\_MESSAGE. +- 5) MSC-INVOKE-TRACE, specified in TS 48.008, containing the following: + - a) Message Type; + - b) IMSI or IMEI; + - c) Trace Reference; + - d) Trigger Id; + - e) OMC Id; + - f) Trace Type; + - g) Transaction Id. + +The generated trace records in figure 1 are as follows: + +- A) Trace information from HLR containing + - a) Trace Record Header; + - b) HLR Trace Record. +- B) Trace information from MSC containing + - a) Trace Record Header; + - b) MSC Trace Record. +- C) Trace information from BSS containing + - a) Trace Record Header; + - b) BSS Trace Record. + +Trace Activation and Deactivation are described in clause 5. + +The Trace Types are defined in clause 6. + +The Trace Records are defined in clause 7. + +The following events may invoke a MSC or BSS trace: + +- Call set-up within MSC (MOC, MTC) (incl. attempts); +- SS-Action; +- Location Update (Normal and Periodic); +- SMS-MO; +- SMS-MT; +- IMSI attach and detach; +- PDS-MO; +- PDS-MT. + +Additionally, the following event may invoke a BSS trace: + +- Handover. + +An HLR Trace may be invoked by one of the following: + +- Location updates/cancellations; +- Insert/delete subscriber data; +- Routing enquiry (speech and SM); +- Provide roaming number; +- SS activity; +- SMS: Alert service centre/Ready for SM. + +Trace records are generated within the managed elements by the trace control function according to the trace type. Once a trace has been invoked and a trace record is being compiled, subsequent invoking events relating to that IMSI (parallel events) will not cause new records to be compiled simultaneously but will be contained in the same trace record as the first event. + +For operator defined trace types the events on which trace records are generated and their contents are defined within the trace record generation control. + +These records are then transferred to the OSF (as defined by OMC-Id of the Destination OMC or forwarded by the EFD) either as notifications (CMISE), or with bulk transfer (FTAM). + +# --- 5 Trace activation and deactivation + +## 5.1 General + +This document is only concerned with the activation of a trace from an OSF (OMC), and the OSF shall keep a log of all trace activations and their deactivations. All entries in the log shall be date and time stamped. + +In the case of an OSF (OMC) failure, it may be possible to activate and deactivate the trace at a particular network element by means of local MMI, but the procedures for doing this are not covered by the present document. + +Facilities shall exist to allow unsolicited trace data to be received by an OSF. This permits the collection of trace data if the triggering entity (i.e. OSF or network element) is different to the collecting OSF. + +## 5.2 Subscriber Tracing (Tracing of IMSI) + +### 5.2.1 General + +The tracing of both home and foreign roaming subscribers can be handled with this function. + +If implemented, then the way the trace facility is used and organized, including restrictions due to national laws and regulations, will be a matter for the PLMN Operator. + +All trace records created in the HLR, MSC "A", MSC "B" and BSS are forwarded to the OSF either as notifications and/or with bulk transfer, as defined in the trace parameters. + +The following scenarios are identified from the HPLMN operation viewpoint: + +- a) HPLMN Operator traces its own (home) IMSI within the HPLMN; +- b) HPLMN Operator traces the HLR activities of its own (home) IMSI while they are roaming in a VPLMN; +- c) HPLMN Operator wishes to trace foreign roaming subscribers (IMSI) within its own HPLMN. + +### 5.2.2 HPLMN Operator Traces Home Subscriber within the HPLMN + +The Operator may activate a trace for a home subscriber (IMSI) from any OSF by invoking the management function **Activate Home Subscriber Trace** in the HLR where the IMSI is contained. This request includes the trace parameters in the following list: + +- a) IMSI to be traced; +- b) Trace Reference; +- c) OMC-Id of the destination OMC; +- d) Trace Type; +- e) HLR Trace Type. + +For each IMSI, only one HPLMN subscriber trace can be active, subsequent requests being rejected. + +If the IMSI is roaming within its HPLMN, then the trace request is forwarded to the VLR where the subscriber is registered via a MAP message (MAP-ACTIVATE-TRACE-MODE). + +When the HPLMN subscriber trace is activated, a trace record will be created by MSC "A", MSC "B", HLR or BSS when certain invoking events occur i.e. MOC, MTC, SS-Action, SMS-MO, SMS-MT, Location Update, IMSI attach and detach. The trace action and record layout is defined by the trace type parameters. + +A trace may be invoked in the BSS when an Invoking Event, specified in the Invoking Event sub-field in the Trace Type, occurs and the BSS Record Type is set to a value other than "No BSS Trace". A Trace is invoked by sending a BSSMAP MSC\_INVOKE\_TRACE message from the MSC to the BSS. When the BSS receives this message it starts tracing the necessary fields as specified in the BSS Record associated with the specified BSS Record Type. + +If the subscriber is roaming in a foreign PLMN then the HPLMN subscriber trace request is stored in the HLR, but the trace is not active in the HPLMN VLRs. + +The trace is deactivated by using the management function **Deactivate Home Subscriber Trace** in the HLR. This request includes the trace parameters in the following list: + +- a) IMSI; +- b) Trace Reference. + +If the IMSI is roaming within its HPLMN then the trace deactivation request is forwarded to the VLR where the subscriber is registered via a MAP message (MAP-DEACTIVATE-TRACE-MODE). + +The trace shall be deactivated in the BSS by the MSC sending a BSSMAP MSC\_INVOKE\_TRACE message from the MSC to the BSS with the BSS Record Type set to "No BSS Trace". When the BSS receives this message it shall stop tracing activity related to that IMSI. + +The following TMN Management Functions are required for trace activation (in HLR): + +- **Activate Home Subscriber Trace;** +- **Deactivate Home Subscriber Trace.** + +### 5.2.3 HPLMN Operator traces the HLR activities of own IMSI roaming in a VPLMN + +This scenario is identical to the previous scenario with the exception that the only records generated come from the HLR. + +### 5.2.4 PLMN Operator wishes to trace foreign subscribers (IMSI) in own PLMN + +In order to trace the IMSIs of roaming subscribers in own PLMN, a list of those IMSIs plus the associated subscriber trace parameters must be stored in the VLR. No HLR trace records are produced for foreign subscriber traces. + +The operator may activate a trace for any foreign roaming IMSI from an OSF by invoking the management function **Activate Foreign Subscriber Trace** in one or more VLRs within their own PLMN. If the location of the subscriber is not known it is necessary to activate the trace in all VLRs where the subscriber may be located. + +The following trace parameters are sent with this request: + +- a) IMSI to be traced; +- b) Trace Reference; +- c) OMC-Id of the destination OMC; +- d) Trace Type. + +The trace request is stored in the VLR. If the subscriber subsequently roams into the VLR area the VPLMN subscriber trace will be activated. + +For each IMSI only one foreign subscriber trace can be active in a particular VLR, subsequent requests being rejected. + +A trace may be invoked in the BSS when an Invoking Event, specified in the Invoking Event sub-field in the Trace Type, occurs and the BSS Record Type is set to a value other than "No BSS Trace". A Trace is invoked by sending a BSSMAP MSC\_INVOKE\_TRACE message from the MSC to the BSS. When the BSS receives this message it starts tracing the necessary fields as specified in the BSS Record associated with the specified BSS Record Type. + +The VPLMN subscriber trace is deactivated by invoking **Deactivate Foreign Subscriber Trace** in the VLR. This request includes the trace parameters in the following list: + +- a) IMSI; +- b) Trace Reference. + +The trace shall be deactivated in the BSS by the MSC sending a BSSMAP MSC\_INVOKE\_TRACE message from the MSC to the BSS with the BSS Record Type set to "No BSS Trace". When the BSS receives this message it shall stop tracing activity related to that IMSI. + +The following TMN Management Functions are required for trace activation (in VLR): + +- **Activate Foreign Subscriber Trace;** +- **Deactivate Foreign Subscriber Trace.** + +## 5.3 Equipment Tracing (Tracing of IMEI) + +### 5.3.1 General + +If the tracing of IMEIs is implemented then the way the trace facility is used and organized, including restrictions due to national laws and regulations, will be a matter for the PLMN Operator. + +An IMEI may be traced in order to find out the current IMSI, or the location or behaviour of faulty or stolen equipment reported via the EIR. + +This TS describes one method of handling IMEI tracing i.e. tracing of IMEI via the VLR. + +### 5.3.2 Tracing of IMEI via VLR + +The operator may activate an equipment trace for any subscriber's equipment (IMEI) from an OSF by invoking the management function **Activate Equipment Trace** in one or more VLR in the HPLMN. The trace must be activated in all VLRs controlling areas where it is required to trace the target IMEI. The trace parameters are transmitted with the activation request. + +The following trace parameters are sent with this request: + +- a) IMEI to be traced; +- b) Trace reference; +- c) OMC-Id of the destination OMC; +- d) Trace Type. + +For GSM Phase 2 Mobile Stations the IMEI will be available to the Network as it can be included in the BSS-MAP message CIPHER-MODE-COMPLETE. If IMEI trace is required, it is the responsibility of the network operator to specify that CIPHER-MODE-COMPLETE contains IMEIs, or optionally the IMEI is called for in connection with MOC, location update etc. Alternatively the network can ask the MS for the IMEI by sending a TS 24.008 [19] IDENTITY REQUEST message to the MS, indicating that the IMEI is required. + +When a subscriber arrives at a VLR using equipment with an IMEI for which trace has been activated (but is in pending state) at that VLR then the IMEI trace will become. + +For each IMEI only one equipment trace can be active in a particular VLR at any one time, subsequent requests being rejected, although both the IMSI trace (home subscriber tracing and foreign subscriber tracing) and the IMEI trace can be active at the same time. + +This equipment trace is deactivated by invoking the management function **Deactivate Equipment Trace** in the VLR. This request includes the trace parameters in the following list: + +- a) IMEI; +- b) Trace Reference. + +The following TMN Management Functions are required for trace activation (in VLR): + +- **Activate Equipment Trace;** +- **Deactivate Equipment Trace.** + +## 5.4 TMN Management Functions for Activation and Deactivation + +### 5.4.1 List of Functions + +#### 5.4.1.1 HLR + +The following functions are used for activation and deactivation in the HLR: + +- Activate Home Subscriber Trace; + +- Deactivate Home Subscriber Trace. + +#### 5.4.1.2 MSC/VLR + +The following functions are used for activation and deactivation in the MSC/VLR: + +- Activate Foreign Subscriber Trace; +- Deactivate Foreign Subscriber Trace; +- Activate Equipment Trace; +- Deactivate Equipment Trace. + +### 5.4.2 Activate Home Subscriber Trace + +This function is equivalent to the OM\_Subscriber\_Tracing\_Activation\_req in TS 29.002 [6]. + +The subscriber tracing procedures are used for the management of the trace status and the type of trace. + +The subscriber tracing activation procedure operates as follows: + +- a) The OSF creates a *tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr* object instance in the HLR of the subscriber to be traced. +- b) If the subscriber is roaming outside of the HPLMN or not currently registered, then the trace is in active pending state. The home subscriber trace for the subscriber is activated in the HLR on a subsequent location update. This activation is shown as an attribute value change in the attribute *traceActivatedInVlr*. +- c) If the subscriber is already registered then the home subscriber trace becomes immediately active in the HLR (after positive confirmation from the VLR). + +When the trace is first activated then the status of the trace indicator attribute *traceActivatedInVlr* in the *tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr* object instance is set to **False**. + +If the subscriber is **registered and is roaming in the home PLMN area** then the HLR will initiate the request primitive MAP-ACTIVATE-TRACE-MODE and the trace indicator status will be set to **True** only in the case of a positive confirmation of the MAP-ACTIVATE-TRACE-MODE. In case of an error, the trace indicator status remains **False**. + +If the MAP-ACTIVATE-TRACE-MODE confirm primitive is received indicating an error situation then this is recorded in an error attribute in the *tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr* object instance. + +If the subscriber roams to an area outside that where tracing is possible then the status in the *tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr* object instance is updated to **False**. + +The trace records are sent from the recording NEF to the OSF by the deployed event reporting mechanism (see chapter Trace Record Transfer). The Trace Type attribute indicates the type of trace records to be produced and the way in which they will be reported i.e. each event record being either directly sent to the OSF in real-time, or being collected in a file for later transfer. + +All attribute value changes will be reported with a notification to the OSF. + +The required system management functions are: + +- Create *tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr*; +- Get Attribute. + +The required notifications are: + +- objectCreation; +- attributeValueChange. + +### 5.4.3 Deactivate Home Subscriber Trace + +This function is equivalent to the OM\_Subscriber\_Tracing\_Deactivation\_req in TS 29.002 [6]. + +The subscriber trace is deactivated by the OSF deleting the *tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr* object instance in the HLR. + +If the trace status is **True** then the HLR will send the MAP-DEACTIVATE-TRACE-MODE message to VLR. + +If the MAP-DEACTIVATE-TRACE-MODE confirm primitive is received indicating an error situation then this is indicated to the OSF via an error attribute in the *tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr* object instance and the object is not deleted. + +The home subscriber trace deactivation can be indicated with a notification to the initiating OSF. + +The required system management functions are: + +- Delete *tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr*; +- Get Attribute. + +The required notifications are: + +- objectDeletion; +- attributeValueChange. + +### 5.4.4 Activate Foreign Subscriber Trace + +This function is analogous to the OM\_Subscriber\_Tracing\_Activation\_req in TS 29.002 [6], but the trace activation is performed directly in the VLR. + +The foreign subscriber trace is activated by the OSF executing the system management function Create *tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr* in the VLR. + +THE OSF creates a *tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr* object instance in the VLR(s) in which the network operator wishes to trace the subscriber. + +The tracing continues as follows: + +- a) If the subscriber is not currently registered, then the foreign subscriber trace for the subscriber is active pending. It is activated (i.e. status attribute value is set to **True**) in the VLR on a subsequent location update. The activation is notified to the OSF as an attribute value change in the attribute *foreignSubscriberRegisteredInVlr*. +- b) If the subscriber is already registered then the foreign subscriber trace becomes immediately active in the VLR. + +When the trace is first activated then the status of the attribute *foreignSubscriberRegisteredInVlr* is set to **False**. When the traced subscriber registers in the VLR the attribute status of *foreignSubscriberRegisteredInVlr* is set to **True**. + +All attribute value changes will be reported with a notification to the OSF. + +The trace records are sent from the corresponding MSC to the OSF by the deployed event reporting mechanism (see chapter Trace Record Transfer). The Trace Type attribute indicates the type of trace records to be produced and the method by which they will be reported. + +The required system management functions are: + +- Create *tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr*; +- Get Attribute. + +The required notifications are: + +- objectCreation; +- attributeValueChange. + +### 5.4.5 Deactivate Foreign Subscriber Trace + +This function is analogous to the OM\_Subscriber\_Tracing\_Deactivation\_req in 29.002 [6], but the trace deactivation is performed. + +The OSF deactivates subscriber trace by deleting the *tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr* object instance in the VLR(s) in which the object instance had previously been created. + +The foreign subscriber trace is deactivated by the OSF executing the system management function Delete *tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr* in the VLR. + +The required system management functions are: + +- Delete *tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr*. + +The required notifications are: + +- objectDeletion; +- attributeValueChange. + +### 5.4.6 Activate Equipment Trace + +This function is analogous to the OM\_Subscriber\_Tracing\_Activation\_req in TS 29.002 [6], but the trace activation is performed directly in the VLR. + +The equipment trace is activated by the OSF executing the system management function Create *tracedEquipmentInVlr*. + +The OSF creates a *traceEquipmentInVlr* object instance in the VLR(s) for the areas to be monitored. + +The tracing continues as follows: + +- a) If the equipment is not currently registered, then the equipment trace for the equipment is active pending. It is activated (i.e. status attribute value is set to **True**) in the VLR on a subsequent location update or IMSI attach. The activation is notified to the OSF as an attribute value change in the attribute *equipmentRegisteredInVlr*. +- b) If the equipment is already registered then the equipment trace becomes immediately active in the VLR. + +When the trace is first activated then the status of the attribute *equipmentRegisteredInVlr* is set to **False**. When the equipment registers in the VLR the attribute status of *equipmentRegisteredInVlr* is set to **True**. + +All attribute value changes will be reported with a notification to the OSF. + +The trace records are sent from the corresponding MSC to the OSF by the deployed event reporting mechanism (see chapter Trace Record Transfer). The Trace Type attribute indicates the type of trace records to be produced and the method by which they will be reported. + +The required system management functions are: + +- Create *tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr*; +- Get Attribute. + +The required notifications are: + +- objectCreation; +- attributeValueChange. + +### 5.4.7 Deactivate Equipment Trace + +This function is analogous to the OM\_Subscriber\_Tracing\_Deactivation\_req in TS 29.002 [6], but the trace deactivation is performed in the VLR. + +The equipment trace is deactivated by the OSF executing the system management function Delete *tracedEquipmentInVlr*. + +The OSF deactivates equipment trace by deleting the *tracedEquipmentInVlr* object instance in the VLR(s) in which the object instance had previously been created. + +The required system management functions are: + +- Delete tracedEquipmentInVlr. + +The required notifications are: + +- objectDeletion; +- attributeValueChange. + +This function is analogous to the OM\_Subscriber\_Tracing\_Deactivation\_req in TS 29.002 [6], but the trace deactivation is performed in the VLR. + +## 5.5 HLR Functional Entities + +Figure 2 shows that part of the Subscriber Administration Containment Tree for the HLR relevant to Trace activation and deactivation. + +![Figure 2: Subscriber Trace Containment Tree for the HLR. The diagram shows a hierarchy with 'hlrFunction' at the top and 'tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr' below it, connected by a vertical line.](3da1a07cb87051bf616c9876db958cf0_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + hlrFunction[hlrFunction] --> tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr[tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr] + +``` + +Figure 2: Subscriber Trace Containment Tree for the HLR. The diagram shows a hierarchy with 'hlrFunction' at the top and 'tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr' below it, connected by a vertical line. + +Figure 2: Subscriber Trace Containment Tree for the HLR + +### 5.5.1 Managed Object Classes in HLR + +#### 5.5.1.1 tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr + +This object class controls the home subscriber trace facility. Each instance of this object represents an IMSI of a home subscriber to be traced i.e. if an instance for an IMSI exists then that means that the trace has been activated for that IMSI. + +| Name | M/O | Value-Set | +|---------------------|-----|-----------| +| IMSI | RDN | Single | +| traceActivatedInVlr | M | Single | +| traceReference | M | Single | +| traceType | M | Single | +| hlrTraceType | M | Single | +| operationSystemId | O | Single | +| mapErrorOnTrace | M | Single | + +#### 5.5.1.2 Attributes + +##### 5.5.1.2.1 tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr + +##### IMSI + +This attribute is the RDN of the object *tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr* and defines an IMSI to be traced. It will be an IMSI of a home subscriber for whom tracing is required. + +The syntax is defined in MAP-CommonDataTypes IMSI. + +##### traceActivatedInVlr + +This attribute is single valued and gives an indication of the status of the Trace. Possible values of this attribute are **True** and **False**. + +On creation this attribute is set to **False**. + +If the subscriber is registered and roaming within the HPLMN (see TS 29.002 [6]) then the attribute is set to **TRUE** (in case of positive confirmation from VLR). + +If the subscriber roams to an area which is outside that where tracing is possible the attribute is set to **FALSE**. + +Each status change triggers an attributeValueChange notification. + +###### traceReference + +This attribute is a unique reference for a particular trace associated with a particular IMSI and is allocated by the OSF. + +###### **traceType** + +This attribute describes the invoking events for which the operator wishes to collect a trace record for a particular IMSI in an MSC or BSS. It also describes the type of record to be collected and indicates whether or not this is a priority trace. + +###### **hlrTraceType** + +This attribute describes the type of trace record (if any) the operator wishes to be collected in the HLR for a particular IMSI. It is assumed for all invoking events. + +###### **operationSystemId** + +This attribute contains the address of the OSF to which the operator wishes the trace records associated with this particular IMSI to be sent. + +If EFDs are used then trace records are sent to OSFs defined in EFD. + +##### **mapErrorOnTrace** + +This attribute is single valued and read only. + +It is set by MAP and contains the MAP-Errors that may be returned in the confirm primitives of the ActivateTraceMode and DeactivateTraceMode Operations. + +If there are MAP-Errors in case of activation of trace, the traceActivatedInVlr parameter is set to **False**. + +If there are Map-Errors in case of deactivation of trace (deleting tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr), the deleting is not completed successfully. + +Possible error values are defined in MAP-OperationAndMaintenance Operations and in MAP-Errors. + +#### **5.5.1.3 Notifications** + +The notifications (for each object) are: + +- objectCreation; +- objectDeletion; +- AttributeValueChange. + +## 5.6 VLR Functional Entities + +Figure 3 shows that part of the Subscriber Administration Containment Tree for the VLR relevant to Trace. + +![Figure 3: Subscriber Trace Containment Tree for the VLR. The tree shows vlrFunction as the root, branching into tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr and tracedEquipmentInVlr.](7d3d5fb5d09c0cd35a9d637be241651e_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + vlrFunction[vlrFunction] --> tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr[tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr] + vlrFunction --> tracedEquipmentInVlr[tracedEquipmentInVlr] + +``` + +Figure 3: Subscriber Trace Containment Tree for the VLR. The tree shows vlrFunction as the root, branching into tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr and tracedEquipmentInVlr. + +**Figure 3: Subscriber Trace Containment Tree for the VLR** + +### 5.6.1 Managed Object Classes in VLR + +#### 5.6.1.1 tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr + +This object class controls the foreign subscriber trace facility. Each instance of this object represents an IMSI of a foreign subscriber to be traced i.e. if an instance for an IMSI exists then that means that the trace has been activated for that IMSI. + +| Name | M/O | Value-Set | +|----------------------------------|-----|-----------| +| IMSI | RDN | Single | +| foreignSubscriberRegisteredInVlr | M | Single | +| traceReference | M | Single | +| traceType | M | Single | +| operationSystemId | O | Single | + +#### 5.6.1.2 tracedEquipmentInVlr + +This object class controls the equipment trace facility. Each instance of this object represents an IMEI to be traced i.e. if an instance for an IMEI exists then that means that the trace has been activated for that IMEI. + +| Name | M/O | Value-Set | +|--------------------------|-----|-----------| +| IMEI | RDN | Single | +| equipmentRegisteredInVlr | M | Single | +| traceReference | M | Single | +| traceType | M | Single | +| operationSystemId | O | Single | + +#### 5.6.1.3 Attributes + +##### 5.6.1.3.1 tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr + +###### IMSI + +This attribute is the RDN of the object *tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr* and defines an IMSI to be traced. It will be an IMSI of a foreign subscriber for whom tracing is required. + +The syntax is defined in MAP-CommonDataTypes IMSI. + +###### foreignSubscriberRegisteredInVlr + +This attribute is single valued and gives an indication of the status of the Trace. Possible values of this attribute are **True** and **False**. + +On creation this attribute is set to **False**. + +If the foreign subscriber is currently registered in the VLR then the attribute is set to **TRUE**. + +If the foreign subscriber is not registered in the VLR then the attribute is set to **FALSE**. + +Each status change triggers an *attributeValueChange* notification. + +###### **traceReference** + +This attribute is a unique reference for a particular trace associated with a particular IMSI and is allocated by the OSF. + +###### **traceType** + +This attribute describes the invoking events that the operator wishes to collect a trace record for a particular IMSI in an MSC or BSS. It also describes the type of record to be collected and indicates whether or not this is a priority trace. + +###### **operationSystemId** + +This attribute contains the address of the OSF to which the operator wishes the trace records associated with this particular IMSI to be sent. + +If EFDs are used, then trace records are sent to OSFs defined in EFD. + +##### **5.6.1.3.2 tracedEquipmentInVlr** + +###### **IMEI** + +This attribute is the RDN of the object *tracedEquipmentInVlr* and defines an IMEI to be traced. It will be an IMEI for the equipment for which tracing is required. + +The syntax is defined in MAP-CommonDataTypes IMEI. + +###### **equipmentRegisteredInVlr** + +This attribute is single valued and gives an indication of the status of the Trace. Possible values of this attribute are **True** and **False**. + +On creation this attribute is set to **False**. + +If the equipment is registered in the VLR then the attribute is set to **TRUE**. + +If the equipment is not registered in the VLR then the attribute is set to **FALSE**. + +Each status change triggers an *attributeValueChange* notification. + +###### **traceReference** + +This attribute is a unique reference for a particular trace associated with a particular IMSI and is allocated by the OSF. + +###### **traceType** + +This attribute describes the invoking events for which the operator wishes to collect a trace record for a particular IMSI in an MSC or BSS. It also describes the type of record to be collected and indicates whether or not this is a priority trace. + +###### **operationSystemId** + +This attribute contains the address of the OSF to which the operator wishes the trace records associated with this particular IMSI to be sent. + +If EFDs are used, then trace records are sent to OSFs defined in EFD. + +#### 5.6.1.4 Notifications + +The notifications are: + +- objectCreation; +- objectDeletion; +- attributeValueChange. + +# 6 Trace Types + +## 6.1 MSC/BSS Trace Type + +The Trace Type field contains the type of trace activated in the MSC or BSS. The trace type consists of the following components. + +| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | +|---------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|---|-----------------|---|----------------|---| +| Priority Indication | For future expansion (Set to 0) | BSS Record Type | | MSC Record Type | | Invoking Event | | + +**Table 1: Invoking Events** + +| Bits | | Invoking Events | +|------|---|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 2 | 1 | | +| 0 | 0 | MOC, MTC, SMS MO, SMS MT, PDS MO, PDS MT, SS, Location Updates, IMSI attach, IMSI detach | +| 0 | 1 | MOC, MTC, SMS MO, SMS MT, PDS MO, PDS MT, SS only | +| 1 | 0 | Location updates, IMSI attach IMSI detach only | +| 1 | 1 | Operator definable | + +If the "operator definable" option is selected, all subsequent Trace Record Types are deemed to be "operator definable". In this case the significance of bits 3-6 are operator defined, however the significance of bit 8 remains "Priority Indication". In all cases, for GSM Phase 2 Network Elements the setting of the 7 shall not affect trace record generation. + +**Table 2: MSC Record Type** + +| Bits | | Record Type | +|------|---|---------------------| +| 4 | 3 | | +| 0 | 0 | Basic | +| 0 | 1 | Detailed (Optional) | +| 1 | 0 | Spare | +| 1 | 1 | No MSC Trace | + +**Table 3: BSS Record Type** + +| Bits | | Record Type | +|------|---|--------------| +| 6 | 5 | | +| 0 | 0 | Basic | +| 0 | 1 | Handover | +| 1 | 0 | Radio | +| 1 | 1 | No BSS Trace | + +## 6.2 HLR Trace Type + +The HLR Trace Type field contains the type of trace activated in the HLR. The trace type consists of the following components. + +| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | +|---------------------|---------------------------------|---|---|-----------------|---|----------------|---| +| Priority Indication | For future expansion (Set to 0) | | | HLR Record Type | | Invoking Event | | + +**Table 4: Invoking Events** + +| Bits | | Invoking Events | +|------|---|----------------------| +| 2 | 1 | | +| 0 | 0 | All HLR Interactions | +| 0 | 1 | Spare | +| 1 | 0 | Spare | +| 1 | 1 | Operator definable | + +If the "operator definable" option is selected, all subsequent Trace Record Types are deemed to be "operator definable". In this case the significance of bits 3 and 4 are operator defined, however the significance of bit 8 remains "Priority Indication". In all cases, for GSM Phase 2 Network Elements the setting of bits 5-7 shall not affect trace record generation. + +**Table 5: HLR Record Type** + +| Bits | | Record Type | +|------|---|--------------| +| 4 | 3 | | +| 0 | 0 | Basic | +| 0 | 1 | Detailed | +| 1 | 0 | Spare | +| 1 | 1 | No HLR Trace | + +**Table 6: Priority Indication** + +| Bit | Priority | +|-----|-------------| +| 8 | | +| 0 | No priority | +| 1 | Priority | + +This bitmap of the Trace Type is only required in the HLR and is not required to be mapped onto any TS 29.002 [6] or other Trace Types. + +**Table 7: Priority Indication** + +| Bit | Priority | +|-----|-------------| +| 8 | | +| 0 | No priority | +| 1 | Priority | + +This bitmap of the Trace Type is required to map onto the Trace Type as defined in TS 29.002 as an Integer with 256 possible values. This is achieved by a binary to decimal conversion of the bitmap, where bit 8 has weight 128 and bit 1 has weight 1. + +# 7 Trace Record Contents + +## 7.1 General + +Table 9, table 10 and table 11 illustrate the structure of a trace record. + +Table 8 illustrates the structure of the Trace Record header. This header is used at the start of all trace records. + +In the case where trace data is distributed over several records, linkage between the records is provided in the record header. If parallel events are also being traced, additional linkage for the traced data relating to each event is provided in the trace record content. Parallel events are not applicable to BSS trace records. + +The trace reference, trace type and operation system identification are all provided on trace activation. Each record may contain an MSC, BSS or HLR event record. A key is included in the table indicating whether or not the field is mandatory. In this table and throughout this document the key field has the following meaning: + +| | | +|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| M | This field must appear in at least one trace record associated with the invoking event. Any exceptions to this rule are explicitly described. | +| C | This field is only available under certain conditions. If available this field must be present in at least one trace record associated with the invoking event. The conditions under which this field is available are individually described. | +| O | This field is optional and its support is a matter for agreement between equipment manufacturer and network operator. Equipment manufacturers do not have to be capable of providing all these fields to claim conformance with the present document. | +| X | This field is not required in this instance. | + +**Table 8: Trace Record Header** + +| Field | Type | Description | +|-------------------------|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| IMSI or IMEI | M | IMSI or IMEI of subscriber/equipment being traced. See TS 32.250 for Served IMSI and Served IMEI. The BSS shall include this field in the reace record header only if available in the A-interface MSC INVOKE TRACE message. | +| Trace Reference | M | An identifier assigned by the OSF at Trace Activation which may be used by the OSF in conjunction with the IMSI/IMEI and the Transaction ID to uniquely identify a record or collection of records for one particular trace. This must always appear in every trace record. | +| Transaction id | C | An identifier of a particular transaction, described in TS 48.008. It shall be included if available in the A-Interface message MSC_INVOKE_TRACE . | +| Omc-Id | O | The address of the OS entity that the OSF activating the trace requires priority trace records to be sent to by the NE performing the trace (see also clause 9 Trace Record Transfer). | +| MSC/BSS Trace Type | C | This field contains the MSC/BSS trace type as provided in the trace activation message (see subclause 6.1 MSC/BSS Trace Type). It must always appear in the first record header. | +| HLR Trace Type | C | This field contains the HLR trace type as provided in the trace activation message (see subclause 6.2 HLR Trace Type). It must always appear in the first record header. | +| MSC/BSS Trace Type Used | O | This field contains the MCS/BSS trace type which has been applied. This trace type may be different to the one provided in the trace activation message due to manufacturer constraints. It must always appear in the first record header. | +| HLR Trace Type Used | O | This field contains the HLR trace type which has been applied. This trace type may be different to the one provided in the trace activation message due to manufacturer constraints. It must always appear in the first record header. | +| Start Time | M | The time the compilation of the Trace Record was started. It must always appear in the first record header. All timestamps used in the TraceEvent Record are relative to this time. | +| End Time | M | The time the compilation of the Trace Record was completed. It must always appear in the last record header. It may be used by the OSF as an indication that the trace in that particular Network Element is completed. | +| Recording Entity | M | For MSC/HLR - the E.164 number of the recording entity.
For BSS - the BSC_ID as given in GSM 12.20 [11].
Alternatively the recording entity may be expressed as a graphic string. | +| Trace Event Record | M | This field contains either an MSC, HLR or BSS trace record as described in subclauses 7.2 to 7.4 below. This must always appear in every trace record. | +| Sequence Number | C | This field is used to identify the sequence of records from a particular recording entity when more than one trace record is produced for the invoking event. | +| Reason For Record | C | This specifies why the record was generated by the NE (see subclause 8.2). In addition to these reasons, other manufacturer specific reasons may be specified (see subclause 8.2.3). | + +## 7.2 MSC Trace Record Content + +The following types of fields are supported in the 2 MSC trace types. + +**Table 9: MSC Trace Record Content** + +| Field | MSC Trace Type | | Description | +|---------------------------|----------------|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | Basic | Detailed | | +| Invoking Event | M | M | Event invoking trace (Not available at the non-anchor MSC on Inter-MSC Handover). | +| Served IMSI | C | C | IMSI of the calling party in the case of MOC or the called party in the event of MTC. Not available in case of emergency call without SIM. This field is only required for IMEI trace. | +| Served IMEI | C | C | IMEI of the calling ME in the case of MOC or the called party in the event of MTC. This field is only required for IMSI trace. | +| Served MSISDN | C | C | Primary MSISDN of the party being traced. | +| Calling/Called Number | C | C | The MSISDN of the calling party in case of MTC. The MSISDN of the called party in case of MOC. | +| Calling Subaddress | C | C | The subaddress of the calling party (for both MOC and MTC). | +| Called Subaddress | C | C | The subaddress of the called party (for both MOC and MTC). | +| Translated Number | C | C | The called number of the party not being traced after digit translation within the MSC (if applicable) (i.e. applies to MOC only). | +| Connected Number | C | C | The number of the party not being traced (applies to MOC only). | +| Forwarded-to Number | C | C | The number to which the call will be forwarded (applies to MTC only). | +| Forwarded-to Subaddress | C | C | The subaddress to which the call will be forwarded (applies to MTC only). | +| Redirecting Number | C | C | The number from which the call was last redirected (applies to MTC only). | +| Original Called Number | C | C | The number of the original called party (applies to MTC only). | +| Roaming Number | C | C | The MSRN of the traced subscriber in the case of MTC, or the MSRN of the called subscriber in case of MOC, if available. | +| Network Trunk Group Point | C | C | In case of a MOC the outgoing trunk on which the call leaves the MSC. In case of an MTC the incoming trunk on which the call originates as seen from the MSC. | +| Basic Service | C | C | The bearer- or teleservice employed. | +| Radio Channel types | O | C | A list of radio channel types used during the compilation of the trace record, each timestamped. | +| BSS Handover Trunk | O | C | A list of the incoming/outgoing trunk group and member used to connect the MSC to BSS (including the original and each intra-MSC BSS handover) each time-stamped. | +| MSC Handover Trunk | O | C | A list of the trunk group and member used to connect two MSCs (including the original and each inter-MSC handover) each time-stamped. | +| Location | C | C | A list of Location Area Codes / Cell Ids used during the compilation of the trace record starting with the identity of the cell in which the invoking event originated or terminated, each time stamped. | + +| Field | MSC Trace Type | | Description | +|------------------------------|----------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | Basic | Detailed | | +| SS Information | C | C | A list of information related to any SS actions carried out during the period of the trace.
The SS Information contains the SS Code for each SS Action, the Basic Services for which each SS action was carried out, the type of each SS action carried out, a list of SS parameters associated with each SS action, the result of each SS action and the Invoke Id allocated for each SS Action. | +| AOC Parameters | O | C | A list of the charge advice parameters sent to the MS (including on call set-up and on changes as a result of a tariff switch over), each timestamped. | +| MS Classmark 2 | C | C | A list of the mobile station classmark 2 information (starting with on call set-up), each timestamped. | +| Call Termination Diagnostics | C | C | A detailed reason for the release of the connection. See TS 32.250 - Diagnostics. | +| A-Interface Messages | X | C | A sequential list of all DTAP and BSSMAP messages passed on the A-Interface. | +| C-Interface Messages | X | C | A sequential list of all MAP messages passed between the Tracing MSC and the HLR/AUC. | +| D-Interface Messages | X | C | A sequential list of all MAP messages passed between the Tracing VLR and the HLR/AUC. | +| E-Interface Messages | X | C | A sequential list of all MAP messages passed between the Tracing MSC and the subsequent MSC. | +| F-Interface Messages | X | C | A sequential list of all MAP messages passed between the Tracing MSC and the EIR. | +| G-Interface Messages | X | C | A sequential list of all MAP messages passed between the Tracing VLR and another VLR. | +| Network Signalling Messages | X | C | A sequential list of all user part messages e.g. ISUP, TUP messages. | +| Event Start Time | C | C | The time the event was started.
It must always appear in case the trace record is already being compiled and the event belonging to this event record for this same subscriber occurs. | +| Event Stop Time | C | C | The time the event was finished.
It must always appear in case the trace record is still being compiled due to an ongoing event and the event belonging to this event record finishes. | +| Event Number | M | M | The Event Number is used to identify tracing data belonging to the same event. | +| Record extensions | O | O | A set of network/ manufacturer specific extensions to the record. | +| OR information | C | C | Information about the use of optimal routeing shall be present in the MSC Trace Record (applies to MTC only) if optimal routeing was tried otherwise it shall be absent. OR information contains: E.164 address of the GMSC, Call reference number used by the GMSC for Optimal Routeing of this call and reason for failure of optimisation. Error situations which lead to failure of the call, rather than non-optimal routeing, are not described here. | +| MS Classmark 3 | C | C | The MS Classmark 3 indicated during the period of the trace invocation, each timestamped. | + +## 7.3 BSS Trace Record Content + +The following types of fields are supported in the 3 BSS trace record types: + +**Table 10: BSS Trace Record Content** + +| Field | BSS Trace Type | | | Description | +|-----------------------------|----------------|-----------|-------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | Basic | Hand-over | Radio | | +| Invocation Message | M | M | M | TS 48.008 [4] invocation message which started the trace action. | +| BTS ID | M | M | M | The ids of all BTSs accessed by the traced party during the period of the trace invocation (as per GSM 12.20 [11]), each timestamped. | +| TRX ID | M | M | M | The ids of all TRXs accessed by the traced party during the period of the trace invocation (as per GSM 12.20 [11]), each timestamped. | +| TRAU ID | O | O | O | The ids of all TRAUs accessed by the traced party during the period of the trace invocation (as per GSM 12.20 [11]), each timestamped. | +| Radio Channel Info. | M | M | M | The radio channel types and descriptions used during the period of the trace invocation, each timestamped. If the trace record relates to a HSCSD call then the field Radio Channel Info 96 shall be used instead. | +| Request type | C | C | C | The reasons for channel seizure (originating, terminating, re-establishment, handover) (see TS 24.008 [19]), each timestamped. | +| End Indication | C | C | C | The reasons for channel release (see TS 24.008 [19]), each timestamped. | +| MS Power | X | C | C | The last MS power used before a channel is released (see GSM 12.20 [11]), each timestamped. | +| BS Power | X | C | C | The last BS power used before a channel is released (see GSM 12.20 [11]), each timestamped. | +| Timing advance | X | C | C | The last timing advance used before a channel is released (see GSM 12.20 [11]), each timestamped. | +| MS Classmark 1 | C | C | C | The MS Classmark 1 indicated during the period of the trace invocation, each timestamped. | +| MS Classmark 2 | C | C | C | The MS Classmark 2 indicated during the period of the trace invocation, each timestamped. | +| MS Classmark 3 | C | C | C | The MS Classmark 3 indicated during the period of the trace invocation, each timestamped. | +| BSIC | M | M | M | This field is the combination of Network Colour Code and Base station Colour Code (see GSM 12.20 [11]). | +| CIC | C | C | C | The terrestrial circuit identification codes used for the call on which the trace is being performed, each timestamped (see TS 48.008 [4]). | +| Handover result | O | C | C | The results of each handover occurring during the period of the trace invocation each timestamped. | +| Handover cause | O | C | C | The reasons for starting each handover attempt during the period of the trace invocation (see TS 48.008 [4]), each timestamped. | +| Handover duration | O | C | C | The times taken between sending the handover command and receiving the handover complete for each successful handover, each timestamped. | +| Target Cell list | X | C | C | The target cells at the start of each handover attempt, each timestamped. | +| Synchronization information | X | C | C | The synchronization values for each handover attempt, each timestamped. | +| SCCP connection event | X | O | O | Each SCCP connection event used during the period of the trace invocation (Connection Request, Confirm, Refuse, Released, Released Complete), each timestamped. | +| BSSMAP message | X | C | C | L3 Message contents, during the period of the trace invocation, each timestamped, see TS 48.008 [4]. | +| DTAP message | X | O | O | L3 Message contents, during the period of the trace invocation each timestamped, see TS 24.008 [19]. | +| RR message | X | C | C | L3 Message contents, during the period of the trace invocation, each timestamped, see TS 44.018 [20]. Only applies to those parts of the message between the BSC and the MS. | +| A-bis Messages | X | X | C | All Abis messages except measurement reports and power control, each timestamped, see TS 48.058 [5]. | +| Timed A-bis Messages | X | C | X | X Abis messages (except measurement reports and power control) received before and Y Abis messages received after a handover, each timestamped. X & Y are operator configurable parameters via MMI and are local to the BSS. | +| Measurement Reports | X | X | C | All uplink and downlink measurement reports, each timestamped, see TS 48.058 [5].
As a manufacturer option, the list of the ARFCN corresponding to frequency indexes indicated in MEASUREMENT REPORT message (see TS 44.018 [20]) can be included in order to ease interpretation of the measurements relating to neighbour cells. | + +| Field | BSS Trace Type | | | Description | +|-----------------------------|----------------|-----------|-------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | Basic | Hand-over | Radio | | +| Timed Measurement Reports | X | C | X | X uplink and downlink measurement reports received before and Y measurement reports received after a handover, each timestamped. X & Y are operator configurable parameters via MMI and are local to the BSS.
As a manufacturer option, the list of the ARFCN corresponding to frequency indexes indicated in MEASUREMENT REPORT message (see TS 44.018 [20]) can be included in order to ease interpretation of the measurements relating to neighbour cells. | +| Power Control Messages | X | X | C | All power control messages, each timestamped, see TS 48.058 [5]. | +| Timed Power Control Message | X | C | X | X power control messages received before and Y power control messages received after a handover, each timestamped. X & Y are operator configurable parameters via MMI and are local to the BSS. | +| Record extensions | O | O | O | A set of network/ manufacturer specific extensions to the record. | +| Radio Channel Info 96 | C | C | C | The radio channel types and descriptions used during multislot calls for the period of the trace invocation, each timestamped. If this field is present, the field Radio Channel Info shall be ignored. | + +## 7.4 HLR Trace Record Content + +The following types of fields are supported in the 2 HLR trace record types: + +**Table 11: HLR Trace Record Content** + +| Field | HLR Trace Type | | Description | +|------------------------|----------------|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | Basic | Detailed | | +| Invoking Event | M | M | Event invoking trace. | +| Served MSISDN | C | C | Primary MSISDN of the party being traced. | +| MSC Address | C | C | Entity number of the serving MSC (TS 32.250 [10]). | +| VLR number | C | C | Entity number of the serving VLR. | +| SS Information | C | C | A list of information related to any SS actions carried out during the period of the trace.
The SS Information contains the SS Code for each SS Action, the Basic Services for which each SS action was carried out, the type of each SS action carried out, a list of SS parameters associated with each SS action, the result of each SS action and the Invoke Id allocated for each SS Action. | +| Subscriber data | O | C | The subscriber data sent to the VLR after a location update. | +| Roaming number | C | C | The roaming number returned from the serving VLR. | +| SM Delivery outcome | C | C | The outcome of a MT SM delivery. | +| Alert reason | C | C | Indicates the reason why the SM service centre was alerted. | +| Service Centre address | C | C | The address of the SM service centre. | +| MAP interface messages | X | C | A sequential list of all MAP messages passed to and from the Tracing HLR. | +| Event Start Time | C | C | The time the event was started.
It must always appear in case the trace record is already being compiled and the event belonging to this event record for this same subscriber occurs. | +| Event Stop Time | C | C | The time the event was finished.
It must always appear in case the trace record is still being compiled due to an ongoing event and the event belonging to this event record finishes. | +| Event Number | M | M | The Event Number is used to identify tracing data belonging to the same event. | +| Record extensions | O | O | A set of network/ manufacturer specific extensions to the record. | +| OR information | C | C | Information about the use of optimal routeing shall be present in the HLR Trace Record if optimal routeing was tried, otherwise it shall be absent. OR information contains: E.164 address of the GMSC, Call reference number used by the GMSC for Optimal Routeing of this call and reason for failure of optimisation. Error situations which lead to failure of the call, rather than non-optimal routeing, are not described here. | + +## 7.5 Trace Record Fields + +Only those fields which are not defined in TS 32.250 [10] or are named differently from an identical field in TS 32.250 [10] are included here. Only supplementary information is included in this clause; where a description in tables 9 - 11 is sufficient, no additional information is provided. + +### 7.5.1 Radio Channel Information + +When instructing the mobile to move to a new channel during procedures like Assignment, Immediate Assignment and Handover, the BSS must give the mobile all the necessary information such as frequency (frequencies if hopping), timeslot number, channel type etc. This is done using the Channel Description or Channel Description 2 IE types defined in TS 44.018 [20]. The structure of the Channel Description or Channel Description 2 depends on whether or not frequency hopping is in use. These two cases are described below: + +#### No Frequency Hopping + +Channel Description (or Channel Description 2) IE type (TS 44.018 [20]), contains the following: + +- Channel Type (TCH, SDCCH etc.); +- Timeslot Number (0 to 7); +- TDMA Offset (0 to 7, used to identify SDCCH etc. within a timeslot); +- Training sequence number; +- Absolute Radio Carrier Frequency number. + +#### Frequency Hopping + +Channel Description (or Channel Description 2) IE type (TS 44.018 [20]), contains the following: + +- Channel Type (TCH, SDCCH etc.); +- Timeslot Number (0 to 7); +- TDMA Offset (0 to 7, used to identify SDCCH etc. within a timeslot); +- Training sequence number; +- Hopping Sequence Number; +- Mobile Allocation Index Offset. + +In this case, the channel description does not contain the list of frequencies to be used for hopping and an additional field indicating the mobile allocation is required. The mobile allocation is the set of frequencies to be used for hopping and is obtained from any of the following: + +- a) Cell Channel Description and Mobile Allocation; +- b) Frequency Channel sequence; +- c) Frequency List; +- d) Frequency Short List. + +In summary, to identify a GSM channel unambiguously the "Channel Description" field is sufficient on its own when frequency hopping is not used but mobile allocation is also required when hopping is in use. + +In case of multislot call (HSCSD), when a procedure like Assignment, Handover or Configuration Change occurs, the BSS provides the mobile with the description of the whole set of timeslots allocated to it. In some specific cases, this is done by using the Channel Description 2 defined in TS 44.018 [20]. In other cases this is done by using the Multislot Allocation defined in TS 44.018 [20]. For this reason, both of these IEs may be included in the trace record. + +### 7.5.2 OR information + +TS 23.079 [17] defines three logically distinct PLMNs, which are involved in the handling of an optimally routed call: + +- The Interrogating PLMN (IPLMN, which is also the VPLMN of the A subscriber) which interrogates the HPLMN of the B subscriber to obtain information to route the call to that subscriber or to the forwarded-to destination defined by the called mobile subscriber; +- the HPLMN of the called mobile subscriber (HPLMNB); +- the VPLMN of the called mobile subscriber (VPLMNB). + +For the communicating Network Elements in the IPLMN, HPLMNB and VPLMNB for an optimally routed call and for all the messages and call scenarios see TS 23.079 [17]. The Trace Record contents described below apply for all call cases described in TS 23.079 [17]. + +Information about the use of optimal routing shall be present in HLRB, if HLRB receives Send Routing Information message containing OR interrogation indicator. OR interrogation indicator is present when the interrogation is from a GMSC not in the same PLMN as the HLR. + +In this case the HLR trace record shall contain the following information: + +- the E.164 address of the interrogating GMSC; +- Call reference number used by the GMSC for Optimal Routing of the call; +- indication that OR was applied or the reason for failure of optimisation. + +The reasons for failure that can be stated in HLR are as follows: + +- OR was not allowed in HLRB; +- OR was not allowed for a subscriber; +- the charging requirements for OR are contravened; +- OR was not allowed in VLRB. + +Error situations which lead to failure of the call, rather than non-optimal routing, are not described in the OR information part of the Trace Record. + +Information about the use of optimal routing shall be present in VMSCB if VMSCB receives Provide Roaming Number including an indication that this is a request for an OR call. + +In this case the MSC trace record of VMSCB shall contain the following information: + +- the E.164 address of the interrogating GMSC; +- Call reference number used by the GMSC for Optimal Routing of the call; +- indication that OR was applied or the reason for failure of optimisation. + +The reasons for failure that can be stated in VMSCB are as follows: + +- (In late call forwarding) Resume Call Handling negative response was received from GMSCA and the call will be forwarded at VMSCB. +- OR was not allowed in VLRB. + +Error situations which lead to failure of the call, rather than non-optimal routing, are not described in the OR information part of the Trace Record. + +There is no tracing in GMSCA. OR information is not available in the MSC trace record produced in VMSCA. + +# --- 8 Creation of Trace Records + +As has already been stated, the sequence of events for the creation of a trace record is as follows: + +- 1) Trace is activated for a particular IMSI or IMEI. +- 2) The subscriber undertakes such action as to cause an invoking event to start. +- 3) The compilation of a trace record commences in the NEF as described in the Trace Type and under the control of the traceRecord attribute recordCriteria. This allows trace records to be produced at times other than when the invoking event ends, e.g. after a specific event has occurred. +- 4) If a further invoking event occurs trace data related to this event is collected in the same trace record. +- 5) All invoking events end or the recordCriteria attribute is satisfied, (see 3) above), or for the BSS only, an MSC INVOKE TRACE message is received with the BSS record type field set to "No BSS Trace" and the message relates to an ongoing trace. +- 6) The record is forwarded to the OSF or local filestore (depending on priority). + +In certain circumstances it may be undesirable for the invoking event to have to end before the record is forwarded to the OSF or local filestore. Examples of these circumstances may be: + +- 1) The operator requires to know a subscriber's whereabouts at the moment he starts making a call. +- 2) The operator requires to know when a handover occurs, as soon as it occurs. +- 3) The buffer in the NEF may be too full to contain any more trace record data. + +This is resolved through the use of the attribute recordCriteria in the traceControl object. When this attribute is set to anything other than noCriteria, records are forwarded to either the filestore or the OSF as soon as the specified criteria is satisfied. + +## 8.1 Trace Record Control + +### 8.1.1 General + +The trace record collection and generation processes are controlled by the **traceControl** managed object class. There shall be one, and only one, instance of this object class for each NEF that supports the trace function. This object carries out the following functions: + +- 1) to cause the data to be collected in the NEF as defined by the Trace Type; +- 2) to define the criteria by which records are generated; +- 3) to generate the trace record notifications. + +The system management functions are: + +- Create traceControl; +- Delete traceControl; +- Get Attribute; +- Set Attribute. + +The notifications are: + +- stateChange; +- objectCreation; +- objectDeletion; +- attributeValueChange; +- traceReport. + +### 8.1.2 Attributes + +There is one instance of this object class in each NEF that supports the trace function. It contains the following attributes: + +| Name | M/O | Value-Set | +|---------------------|-----|-----------| +| traceControlId | RDN | Single | +| administrativeState | M | Single | +| operationalState | M | Single | +| recordCriteria | M | Single | +| eventTypes | O | Single | + +#### traceControlId + +This attribute is a unique identifier for the traceControl MOI in the NEF and is used as an RDN. + +#### administrativeState + +This attribute defines the administrative state of the traceControl MOI in the NEF (Recommendation X.731 [16]). + +#### operationalState + +This attribute defines the operational status of the traceControl MOI in the NEF (Recommendation X.731 [16]). + +#### recordCriteria + +This attribute, if set, defines the criteria by which trace records are generated in the NEF. It may have one or more of the following values: + +| | | +|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| noCriteria | The NEF will not output trace records of the event type. | +| event | The NEF will output a trace record every time a particular recordable event occurs, the nature of that event being defined in the attribute eventTypes. | + +In all cases, a trace record will be produced at the end of the invoking event, or if other criteria are set by the manufacturer, when these criteria are met. + +#### eventTypes + +This attribute defines a set of recordable events, the appearance of any will trigger a trace record to be output, assuming the "event" value is set in the recordCriteria attribute. + +### 8.1.3 Other Trace Record Criteria + +Regardless of the trace record criteria set by the operator, there are circumstances under which a trace record may be generated, with the criteria being set by the manufacturer. These will usually be due to a lack of resources such as "Buffer Full" or "Processor Overload". + +# 9 Trace Record Transfer + +## 9.1 General + +This clause is concerned solely with the management of the trace record collection process. This service component controls the transfer of the trace records from the NEFs to the OSF. The conceptual model is illustrated in figure 5, which employs both the event report function (CCITT X.734 [14]) and the log control function (CCITT X.735 [15]). + +The trace control function collects traceable events within the NEF and formats them into trace records. These trace records may be stored locally within the NEF filestore or transferred to the OSF in the form of event reports. This is controlled by means of the "priority" indicator, which is a part of the trace type. If the "priority" indicator is not set then the trace records shall be stored within the local filestore and subsequently transferred to the OSF in bulk via FTAM. + +If a trace is activated with the "priority" indicator set then the trace records shall be sent to the OSF either direct by the trace control function or through Event Forwarding Discriminators (EFDs). + +If EFDs are used then all trace records are offered to the EFDs. The EFDs determine which of the records are to be transmitted to the OSF in the form of event reports and the Operation System Id field in the header is ignored. The EFDs have complex filter constructs, which allow the operator to define the criteria for destinations and filters. + +If EFDs are not used then all priority records are forwarded to the OSF whose address is given in the Operation System Id field. The NEF is required to supply additional information to provide the OS management application entity title. + +Finally, the trace records may also be stored in the form of log entries within the log of the NEF. It is up to the operator to decide if the log function is needed in parallel with the event reporting and file store. Once stored, the log records may be individually accessed by the OSF via the appropriate object management functions. Care should be taken of filter criteria for log records to avoid unnecessary overheads. + +![Figure 5: Data collection model. A diagram showing the flow of trace records from the NEF to the OSF. The NEF contains 'trace control', 'EFD', 'filestore', and 'log' components. 'trace events' enter the 'trace control'. 'event reporting (X.734)' feeds into the 'EFD'. 'log control (X.735)' feeds into the 'log'. Arrows show record flow: 'All Records' (solid line) from 'trace control' to 'EFD', 'filestore', and 'log'; 'Non Priority Records' (dashed line) from 'trace control' to 'filestore' and 'log'; 'Priority Records' (dotted line) from 'trace control' to 'EFD' and 'log'. From the 'EFD', 'Event Reports' go to the 'OSF'. From the 'filestore', 'FTAM' transfers go to the 'OSF'. From the 'log', 'Log Records' go to the 'OSF'. A note '(Not available if EFDs are implemented)' is near the 'EFD' to 'OSF' path. A legend box at the bottom left defines the line types: solid for 'All Records', dashed for 'Non Priority Records', and dotted for 'Priority Records'.](c468d53e877568cd7d8c5ba1632c2e65_img.jpg) + +Figure 5: Data collection model. A diagram showing the flow of trace records from the NEF to the OSF. The NEF contains 'trace control', 'EFD', 'filestore', and 'log' components. 'trace events' enter the 'trace control'. 'event reporting (X.734)' feeds into the 'EFD'. 'log control (X.735)' feeds into the 'log'. Arrows show record flow: 'All Records' (solid line) from 'trace control' to 'EFD', 'filestore', and 'log'; 'Non Priority Records' (dashed line) from 'trace control' to 'filestore' and 'log'; 'Priority Records' (dotted line) from 'trace control' to 'EFD' and 'log'. From the 'EFD', 'Event Reports' go to the 'OSF'. From the 'filestore', 'FTAM' transfers go to the 'OSF'. From the 'log', 'Log Records' go to the 'OSF'. A note '(Not available if EFDs are implemented)' is near the 'EFD' to 'OSF' path. A legend box at the bottom left defines the line types: solid for 'All Records', dashed for 'Non Priority Records', and dotted for 'Priority Records'. + +Figure 5: Data collection model + +This service component contains the following groups of TMN management functions: + +- bulk record transfer; +- event reporting; +- log control; + +- log access. + +## 9.2 Transfer of Records + +### 9.2.1 Bulk record transfer + +This group of TMN functions is concerned with the bulk transfer of trace records from the NEF record filestore to the OSF. + +The trace records shall be transferred from the NEF to the OSF by the use of FTAM services. For further details of the use of FTAM see GSM 12.01 [8]. + +In addition to the simple file transfer services provided by FTAM, peer-to-peer application process communication may also be supported. The use of CMIS services for the uploading of files from the NEF to the OSF is specified in the GSM 12.00 [7]. + +When the procedure defined in GSM 12.00 [7] and GSM 12.01 [8] are used to transfer the trace records, the file type shall be traceRecords and the format of the file is given by the type TraceFileFormat. + +### 9.2.2 Log control + +This function permits the trace record to be stored and retrieved from logs within the NEF. The logging of these records is performed in accordance with the log control function specified in CCITT X.735 [15] and no additional management functions are required. + +### 9.2.3 Log access + +This TMN function controls the access to the log described above. Each log defined may contain one or more log entries. Each log entry contains a single trace record. + +NOTE: The term log entry has been used instead of the term log record to avoid confusion between records contained within the local filestore and the records stored within logs. + +For further details concerning the use of logs, see CCITT X.735 [15]. + +The following system management functions are required: + +- Get/Delete traceLogEntry. + +### 9.2.4 Event Reporting + +#### 9.2.4.1 Event Forwarding Discriminators + +For short-term recording of tracing events and for more complicated filter conditions the event forwarding discriminator construct defined in CCITT X.734 [14] and CCITT X.721 [13] can be employed. The event forwarding discriminator construct is extremely flexible permitting the combination of a number of fields and logical operations with a wide variety of scheduling options. The EFD also controls the destinations to which the event reports are sent. Several such filters may be defined and scheduled for operation at different times and for different time periods. + +The following system management functions are required: + +- Create/Set/Get/Delete eventForwardingDiscriminator. + +#### 9.2.4.2 Direct Transfer by Trace Control Function + +This function permits the NEF to transmit trace records direct to the OSF. In general the trace record shall be sent on completion of the call or the traceable event. This function is controlled by means of the "priority" indicator, which is contained in the trace type. If the priority indicator is not set, then the trace records shall be stored on file within the NE filestore. These records may be subsequently collected via bulk record transfer as described in subclause 9.2.1. If the trace type specified on activation includes the "priority" indicator then all of the records shall be sent via trace reports to the OSF specified by the operation system id. + +NOTE: As the operations system id, provided is an AddressString (e.g. CCITT E.164 number) some form of translation or directory service may be required within the NE in order to provide the appropriate OS management application entity title. + +The following system management functions are required: + +- Notification traceReport. + +# 10 Managed Object Model + +## 10.1 Naming Hierarchy + +The naming (containment) tree for the objects defined within this clause is illustrated in figure 6. It should be noted that the GSM 12.08 object classes are shown relative to the "managedElement". The MO traceControl is contained in every NEF (mscFunction, hlrFunction and bssFunction from GSM 12.00 [7]) that supports trace functionality. For further details of the upper layers of the containment tree see GSM 12.00 [7]. For further details concerning the log class see CCITT X.721 [13]. + +![Figure 6: Trace Record Transfer Containment Tree](030c758fd425016b03290c8f11bef69d_img.jpg) + +``` +graph TD; ME["managed Element (*) +Defined in GSM 12.00"] --- MF["mscFunction +bssFunction +hlrFunction +Defined in GSM 12.00"]; ME --- L["log"]; ME --- EFD["event Forwarding Discriminator"]; MF --- TC["traceControl"]; L --- TL["trace LogRecord"]; +``` + +The diagram illustrates the containment hierarchy for trace records. At the top is 'managed Element (\*)' (Defined in GSM 12.00). It contains three main branches: 'mscFunction', 'bssFunction', and 'hlrFunction' (collectively Defined in GSM 12.00), which lead to 'traceControl'; 'event Forwarding Discriminator'; and 'log', which leads to 'trace LogRecord'. + +Figure 6: Trace Record Transfer Containment Tree + +Figure 6: Trace Record Transfer Containment Tree + +## 10.2 Inheritance + +The inheritance tree for the present document is illustrated in figure 7 below. The object classes "log", "logRecord", "eventLogRecord" and "eventForwardingDiscriminator" are defined in CCITT X.721 [13]. + +![Figure 7: Trace Record Transfer Inheritance Tree](9e5d66cdb5112ad5cab89552b126e4b9_img.jpg) + +``` +graph TD; TOP --- Log["Log"]; TOP --- LR["logRecord"]; TOP --- EFD["event Forwarding Discriminator"]; TOP --- TC["traceControl"]; LR --- ELR["event logRecord"]; ELR --- TLR["trace logRecord"]; +``` + +The diagram illustrates the inheritance hierarchy for trace records. At the top is 'TOP'. It branches into 'Log', 'logRecord', 'event Forwarding Discriminator', and 'traceControl'. 'logRecord' further branches into 'event logRecord', which in turn branches into 'trace logRecord'. + +Figure 7: Trace Record Transfer Inheritance Tree + +Figure 7: Trace Record Transfer Inheritance Tree + +## 10.3 + +### Object Classes + +### 10.3.1 tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr + +``` + +tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr MANAGED OBJECT CLASS + DERIVED FROM + "CCITT Rec. X.721: 1992":top; + CHARACTERIZED BY + tracedHomeSubscriberInHlrPackage, + "CCITT Rec. M.3100: 1992": createDeleteNotificationsPackage, + "CCITT Rec. M.3100: 1992": attributeValueChangeNotificationPackage; + + CONDITIONAL PACKAGES + operationSystemIdPackage PRESENT IF "an instance supports it"; + +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-objectClass 100}; + +tracedHomeSubscriberInHlrPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + tracedHomeSubscriberInHlrBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + imsi GET, + traceActivatedInVlr GET, + traceReference GET, + traceType GET, + hlrTraceType GET, + mapErrorOnTrace GET + ; + +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-package 100}; + +tracedHomeSubscriberInHlrBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "see TS 52.008 clause 5.5.1.1"; + operationSystemIdPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + operationSystemIdBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + operationSystemId GET + ; + +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-package 200}; + +operationSystemIdBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "This package provides the attribute to specify destination operation system. The use of this + attribute is described in chapter Trace record transfer. The package is conditional to allow + the attribute operationSystemId to be optional."; +``` + +### 10.3.2 tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr + +``` + +tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr MANAGED OBJECT CLASS + DERIVED FROM + "CCITT Rec. X.721: 1992":top; + CHARACTERIZED BY + tracedForeignSubscriberInVlrPackage, + "CCITT Rec. M.3100: 1992": createDeleteNotificationsPackage, + "CCITT Rec. M.3100: 1992": attributeValueChangeNotificationPackage; + + CONDITIONAL PACKAGES + operationSystemIdPackage PRESENT IF "an instance supports it"; + +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-objectClass 200}; + +tracedForeignSubscriberInVlrPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + tracedForeignSubscriberInVlrBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + imsi GET, + foreignSubscriberRegisteredInVlr GET, + traceReference GET, + traceType GET + ; + +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-package 300}; + +tracedForeignSubscriberInVlrBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "see TS 52.008 clause 5.6.1.1"; +``` + +### 10.3.3 tracedEquipmentInVlr + +``` + +tracedEquipmentInVlr MANAGED OBJECT CLASS + DERIVED FROM + "CCITT Rec. X.721: 1992":top; + CHARACTERIZED BY + tracedEquipmentInVlrPackage, + "CCITT Rec. M.3100: 1992": createDeleteNotificationsPackage, + "CCITT Rec. M.3100: 1992": attributeValueChangeNotificationPackage, + + CONDITIONAL PACKAGES + operationSystemIdPackage PRESENT IF "an instance supports it"; + + REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-objectClass 300}; + +tracedEquipmentInVlrPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + tracedEquipmentInVlrBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + imei GET, + equipmentRegisteredInVlr GET, + traceReference GET, + traceType GET + ; + REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-package 400}; + +tracedEquipmentInVlrBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "see TS 52.008 clause 5.6.1.2"; + +``` + +### 10.3.4 Trace control + +This managed object class represents the trace collection process and generates the trace report notifications. There shall be one, and only one, instance of this object class for each NEF that supports the trace function. + +``` + +traceControl MANAGED OBJECT CLASS + DERIVED FROM "CCITT Rec. X.721: 1992":top; + CHARACTERIZED BY + traceControlPackage, + "CCITT Rec. M.3100: 1992": attributeValueChangeNotificationPackage, + "CCITT Rec. M.3100: 1992": createDeleteNotificationsPackage, + "CCITT Rec. M.3100: 1992": stateChangeNotificationPackage; + + CONDITIONAL PACKAGES + eventTypeCriteriaPackage PRESENT IF "an instance supports it" + ; + REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-objectClass 400}; + +traceControlPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + traceControlBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "This managed object class is employed to generate trace report notifications. There can be only + one instance of this object class in each NEF that supports trace functionality. + For the administrativeState, the value LOCKED causes all tracing activity in the NEF to cease. + The value UNLOCKED allows tracing activity. The value SHUTTING-DOWN prevents any new invocation + of a trace. Current invocations will continue until they are finished. When all current + invocations finish, the state will automatically transit to LOCKED.";; + ATTRIBUTES + traceControlId GET, + "CCITT Rec. X.721: 1992": administrativeState GET-REPLACE, + "CCITT Rec. X.721: 1992": operationalState GET, + recordCriteria GET-REPLACE ADD-REMOVE; + NOTIFICATIONS + traceReport; + REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-package 500}; + +eventTypeCriteriaPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + eventTypeCriteriaBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "This package provides the attribute to specify eventType record generation criteria. The use of + this attribute is described in clause 8.2.2. The package is conditional to allow the attribute + to be optional.";; + ATTRIBUTES + eventTypes GET-REPLACE ADD-REMOVE; + +``` + +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-package 520}; + +### 10.3.5 Trace log record + +This managed object class is a subclass of the "eventLogRecord" class described in CCITT X.735 and defined in CCITT X.721 and therefore inherits all of the properties of both the "logRecord" and "eventLogRecord" classes. This includes the name binding "logRecord-log" defined in CCITT X.721. + +``` + +traceLogRecord MANAGED OBJECT CLASS + DERIVED FROM "CCITT Rec. X.721: 1992":eventLogRecord; + CHARACTERIZED BY + traceLogRecordPackage; + CONDITIONAL PACKAGES + traceReferenceLogPackage PRESENT IF "an instance supports it", + mscBssTraceTypeLogPackage PRESENT IF "an instance supports it", + hlrTraceTypeLogPackage PRESENT IF "an instance supports it", + mscBssTraceTypeUsedLogPackage PRESENT IF "an instance supports it", + hlrTraceTypeUsedLogPackage PRESENT IF "an instance supports it"; + REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-objectClass 500}; + +traceLogRecordPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + traceLogRecordBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS "This managed object is used to store a single trace record.";; + ATTRIBUTES + traceRecordContent GET; + REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-package 600}; + +traceReferenceLogPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + traceReferenceLogBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "This package provides the attribute to specify traceReference for trace report searching + criteria in the Log. Optional.";; + ATTRIBUTES + traceReference GET; + + REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-package 610}; + +mscBssTraceTypeLogPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + mscBssTraceTypeLogBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "This package provides the attribute to specify searching criteria to be mscBssTraceType of + trace report in the Log. Optional.";; + ATTRIBUTES + mscBssTraceType GET; + + REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-package 620}; + +hlrTraceTypeLogPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + hlrTraceTypeLogBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "This package provides the attribute to specify searching criteria to be hlrTraceType of trace + report in the Log. Optional.";; + ATTRIBUTES + hlrTraceType GET; + + REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-package 630}; + +mscBssTraceTypeUsedLogPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + mscBssTraceTypeUsedLogBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "This package provides the attribute to specify searching criteria to be mscBssTraceTypeUsed of + trace report in the Log. Optional.";; + ATTRIBUTES + mscBssTraceTypeUsed GET; + + REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-package 640}; + +hlrTraceTypeUsedLogPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + hlrTraceTypeUsedLogBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + +``` + +``` +DEFINED AS + "This package provides the attribute to specify searching criteria to be hlrTraceTypeUsed of + trace report in the Log. Optional.";; +ATTRIBUTES + hlrTraceTypeUsed GET; + +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-package 650}; +``` + +### 10.3.6 Log + +This managed object class is described in CCITT X.735 and defined in CCITT X.721. + +### 10.3.7 Event Forwarding Discriminators + +The use of event forwarding discriminators (EFDs) is described in detail in CCITT X.734. The object class itself is a subclass of the "discriminator" object class. Both discriminator and event forwarding discriminator classes are defined in CCITT X.721. + +## 10.4 Attributes + +### 10.4.1 traceActivatedInVlr + +``` +traceActivatedInVlr ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX + Trace-DataTypes.TraceStatus; + MATCHES FOR + EQUALITY; + BEHAVIOUR + traceActivatedInVlrBehaviour; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 10}; + +traceActivatedInVlrBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "see TS 52.008 clause 5.5.1.2.1"; +``` + +### 10.4.2 foreignSubscriberRegisteredInVlr + +``` +foreignSubscriberRegisteredInVlr ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX + Trace-DataTypes.TraceStatus; + MATCHES FOR + EQUALITY; + BEHAVIOUR + foreignSubscriberRegisteredInVlrBehaviour; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 20}; + +foreignSubscriberRegisteredInVlrBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "see TS 52.008 clause 5.6.1.3.1"; +``` + +### 10.4.3 equipmentRegisteredInVlr + +``` +equipmentRegisteredInVlr ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX + Trace-DataTypes.TraceStatus; + MATCHES FOR + EQUALITY; + BEHAVIOUR + equipmentRegisteredInVlrBehaviour; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 30}; + +equipmentRegisteredInVlrBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "see TS 52.008 clause 5.6.1.3.2"; +``` + +### 10.4.4 mapErrorOnTrace + +``` +mapErrorOnTrace ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX +``` + +``` + Trace-DataTypes.MapErrorOnTrace; + MATCHES FOR + EQUALITY, ORDERING; + BEHAVIOUR + mapErrorOnTraceBehaviour; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 40}; + +mapErrorOnTraceBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "see TS 52.008 clause 5.5.1.2.1"; +``` + +### 10.4.5 IMEI + +``` +imei ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX + MAP-CommonDataTypes.IMEI; + MATCHES FOR + EQUALITY, ORDERING; + BEHAVIOUR + imeiBehaviour; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 50}; + +imeiBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "see TS 52.008 clause 5.6.1.3.2"; +``` + +### 10.4.6 IMSI + +``` +imsi ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX + MAP-CommonDataTypes.IMSI; + MATCHES FOR + EQUALITY, ORDERING; + BEHAVIOUR + imsiBehaviour; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 60}; + +imsiBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "see TS 52.008 clause 5.6.1.3.1"; +``` + +### 10.4.7 Trace record content + +``` +traceRecordContent ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX Trace-DataTypes.TraceRecord; + BEHAVIOUR + traceRecordContentBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "This attribute contains the contents of a trace record.";; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 70}; +``` + +### 10.4.8 Trace control id. + +``` +traceControlId ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX Trace-DataTypes.TraceControlId; + MATCHES FOR EQUALITY; + BEHAVIOUR + traceControlIdBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "This attribute uniquely identifies a trace control object.";; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 80}; +``` + +### 10.4.9 HLR Trace type + +``` +hlrTraceType ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX Trace-DataTypes.TraceType; + MATCHES FOR EQUALITY; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 90}; +``` + +### 10.4.10 Trace reference + +``` +traceReference ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX Trace-DataTypes.TraceReference; + MATCHES FOR EQUALITY, ORDERING; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 100}; +``` + +### 10.4.11 Trace type + +``` +traceType ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX Trace-DataTypes.TraceType; + MATCHES FOR EQUALITY; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 110}; +``` + +### 10.4.12 Record criteria + +``` +recordCriteria ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX Trace-DataTypes.RecordCriteria; + MATCHES FOR EQUALITY; + BEHAVIOUR + recordCriteriaBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "This attribute specifies the criteria for the generation of a trace record by the network element."; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 120}; +``` + +### 10.4.13 Event types + +``` +eventTypes ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX Trace-DataTypes.EventTypes; + MATCHES FOR EQUALITY; + BEHAVIOUR + eventTypeBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "This attribute specifies the type of event triggering the generation of a trace record by the network element."; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 140}; +``` + +### 10.4.14 Operation system ID + +``` +operationSystemId ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX Trace-DataTypes.OmcId; + MATCHES FOR EQUALITY; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 160}; +``` + +### 10.4.15 Operational State + +This attribute is described in Recommendation X.731 and the syntax is defined in X.721. + +### 10.4.16 Administrative State + +This attribute is described in Recommendation X.731 and the syntax is defined in X.721. + +### 10.4.17 MSC BSS trace type used + +``` +mscBssTraceTypeUsed ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX Trace-DataTypes.TraceType; + MATCHES FOR EQUALITY; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 170}; +``` + +### 10.4.18 HLR trace type used + +``` +hlrTraceTypeUsed ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX Trace-DataTypes.TraceType; + MATCHES FOR EQUALITY; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 180}; +``` + +### 10.4.19 MSC BSS trace type + +``` +mscBssTraceType ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX Trace-DataTypes.TraceType; + MATCHES FOR EQUALITY; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-attribute 190}; +``` + +## 10.5 Notifications + +### 10.5.1 General + +All notifications listed below are defined in CCITT X.721: + +- attributeValueChange; +- objectCreation; +- objectDeletion; +- stateChange. + +### 10.5.2 Trace report + +``` +traceReport NOTIFICATION + BEHAVIOUR + traceReportBehaviour; + WITH INFORMATION SYNTAX Trace-DataTypes.TraceRecord + AND ATTRIBUTE IDS + traceReference traceReference, + mscBssTraceType mscBssTraceType, + hlrTraceType hlrTraceType, + mscBssTraceTypeUsed mscBssTraceTypeUsed, + hlrTraceTypeUsed hlrTraceTypeUsed; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-notification 100}; + +traceReportBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "This notification is issued by the trace control function to transmit a trace report to the OS. + The attribute Ids may be used by Event Forwarding Discriminators to specify additional filter + conditions."; +``` + +## 10.6 Name Bindings + +### 10.6.1 tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr-hlrFunction Name Binding + +``` +tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr-hlrFunction NAME BINDING + SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr; + NAMED BY + SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS "prETS 300 612-1:1995":hlrFunction; + WITH ATTRIBUTE imsi; + BEHAVIOUR tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr-hlrFunctionBhv; + CREATE; + DELETE; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-nameBinding 100}; + +tracedHomeSubscriberInHlr-hlrFunctionBhv BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "see TS 52.008 clause 5.5"; +``` + +### 10.6.2 tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr-vlrFunction Name Binding + +``` +tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr-vlrFunction NAME BINDING + SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr; + NAMED BY + SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS "prETS 300 612-1:1995":vlrFunction; + WITH ATTRIBUTE imsi; + BEHAVIOUR tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr-vlrFunctionBhv; +``` + +``` +CREATE; +DELETE; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-nameBinding 200}; + +tracedForeignSubscriberInVlr-vlrFunctionBhv BEHAVIOUR +DEFINED AS +"see TS 52.008 clause 5.6"; +``` + +### 10.6.3 tracedEquipmentInVlr-vlrFunction Name Binding + +``` +tracedEquipmentInVlr-vlrFunction NAME BINDING +SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS tracedEquipmentInVlr; +NAMED BY +SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS "prETS 300 612-1:1995":vlrFunction; +WITH ATTRIBUTE imei; +BEHAVIOUR tracedEquipmentInVlr-vlrFunctionBhv; +CREATE; +DELETE; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-nameBinding 300}; + +tracedEquipmentInVlr-vlrFunctionBhv BEHAVIOUR +DEFINED AS +"see TS 52.008 clause 5.6"; +``` + +### 10.6.4 traceLogRecord-Log Name Binding + +``` +traceLogRecord-Log NAME BINDING +SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS traceLogRecord; +NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS "CCITT Rec. X.721: 1992":log; +WITH ATTRIBUTE "CCITT Rec. X.721: 1992":logRecordId; +DELETE; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-nameBinding 400}; +``` + +### 10.6.5 traceControl-hlrFunction Name Binding + +``` +traceControl-hlrFunction NAME BINDING +SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS traceControl; +NAMED BY +SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS "prETS 300 612-1:1995":hlrFunction; +WITH ATTRIBUTE traceControlId; +CREATE; +DELETE; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-nameBinding 500}; +``` + +### 10.6.6 traceControl-mscFunction Name Binding + +``` +traceControl-mscFunction NAME BINDING +SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS traceControl; +NAMED BY +SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS "prETS 300 612-1:1995":mscFunction; +WITH ATTRIBUTE traceControlId; +CREATE; +DELETE; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-nameBinding 600}; +``` + +### 10.6.7 traceControl-bssFunction Name Binding + +``` +traceControl-bssFunction NAME BINDING +SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS traceControl; +NAMED BY +SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS "prETS 300 612-1:1995":bssFunction; +WITH ATTRIBUTE traceControlId; +CREATE; +DELETE; +REGISTERED AS {Trace-DataTypes.gsm-1208-nameBinding 700}; +``` + +# 11 Syntax + +Trace-DataTypes { ccitt (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0) gsm-Operation-Maintenance (3) gsm-12-08 (8) informationModel (0) asn1Module (2) } + +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + +BEGIN + +-- EXPORTS everything + +IMPORTS + +gsm-12-08 + +FROM GSM-DomainDefinitions { ccitt (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0) gsm-Operation-Maintenance (3) gsm-12-30 (30) informationModel (0) asn1Module (2) gsm-OM-DomainDefinitions (0) version (1) } + +SS-Info, + +InterrogateSS-Res, + +SS-UserData, + +Password, + +RegisterSS-Arg, + +SS-ForBS-Code, + +USSD-Arg, + +USSD-Res, + +GuidanceInfo + +FROM MAP-SS-DataTypes { ccitt (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0) gsm-Network (1) modules (3) map-SS-DataTypes (14) version2 (2) } + +AddressString, ISDN-AddressString, ISDN-SubaddressString, BasicServiceCode, IMSI, IMEI + +FROM MAP-CommonDataTypes { ccitt identified-organization (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0) gsm-Network (1) modules (3) map-CommonDataTypes (18) version2 (2) } + +BearerServiceCode + +FROM MAP-BS-Code { ccitt identified-organization (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0) gsm-Network (1) modules (3) map-BS-Code (20) version2 (2) } + +CallReferenceNumber + +FROM MAP-CH-DataTypes { ccitt identified-organization (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0) gsm-Network (1) modules (3) map-CH-DataTypes (13) version3 (3) } + +TeleserviceCode + +FROM MAP-TS-Code { ccitt identified-organization (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0) gsm-Network (1) modules (3) map-TS-Code (19) version2 (2) } + +SS-Code + +FROM MAP-SS-Code { ccitt identified-organization (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0) gsm-Network (1) modules (3) map-SS-Code (15) version2 (2) } + +SubscriberData + +FROM MAP-MS-DataTypes { ccitt identified-organization (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0) gsm-Network (1) modules (3) map-MS-DataTypes (11) version2 (2) } + +SM-DeliveryOutcome, + +AlertReason + +FROM MAP-SM-DataTypes { ccitt identified-organization (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0) gsm-Network (1) modules (3) map-SM-DataTypes (16) version2 (2) } + +ERROR + +FROM TCAPMessages { ccitt recommendation q 773 modules (2) messages (1) version2 (2) } + +ObjectInstance + +FROM CMIP-1 { joint-iso-ccitt ms (9) cmip (1) modules (0) protocol (3) } + +ManagementExtension + +FROM Attribute-ASN1Module { joint-iso-ccitt ms (9) smi (3) part2 (2) asn1Module (2) 1 } + +AOCParameters, Diagnostics, LocationAreaAndCell, IMSIorIMEI + +FROM GSM1205-DataTypes { ccitt (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0) gsm-Operation-Maintenance (3) gsm-12-05 (5) informationModel (0) asn1Module (2) 1 } + +AbsoluteRFChannelNo + +FROM GSM1220TypeModule { ccitt (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0) gsm-Operation-Maintenance (3) gsm-12-20 (20) informationModel (0) asn1Module (2) asn1TypeModule (0) }; + +``` + +----- +-- OBJECT IDENTIFIERS +----- +gsm-1208-informationModel OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {gsm-12-08 informationModel (0)} + +gsm-1208-objectClass OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {gsm-1208-informationModel + managedObjectClass (3)} + +gsm-1208-package OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {gsm-1208-informationModel + package (4)} + +gsm-1208-nameBinding OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {gsm-1208-informationModel + nameBinding (6)} + +gsm-1208-attribute OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {gsm-1208-informationModel + attribute (7)} + +gsm-1208-notification OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {gsm-1208-informationModel + notification (10)} + +--these values are based on ETR 128 June 1994 (GSM 12.30, ETSI object +--identifier tree; Common domain Mobile domain O&M managed object +--registration definition. +--Resulting values are e.g. {0 4 0 0 3 8 0 3 zzz} for gsm-1208-objectClass. + +----- +-- TRACE ACTIVATION +----- + +TraceStatus ::= BOOLEAN +-- TRUE = active +-- FALSE = active pending + +TraceType ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1)) +-- see TS 52.008 subclause 6.1 for encoding of mscBssTraceType +-- see TS 52.008 subclause 6.2 for encoding of hlrTraceType + +MapErrorOnTrace ::= ENUMERATED +{ + noError (0), + systemFailure (1), + dataMissing (2), + unexpectedDataValue (3), + facilityNotSupported (4), + unidentifiedSubscriber (5), + tracingBufferFull (6) +} + +----- +-- TRACE RECORD +----- + +TraceRecord ::= SET +{ + tracedParty [0] IMSIorIMEI, + traceReference [1] TraceReference, + transactionID [2] TransactionID OPTIONAL, + omcID [3] OmcId OPTIONAL, + mscBssTraceType [4] TraceType OPTIONAL, + hlrTraceType [5] TraceType OPTIONAL, + mscBsstraceTypeUsed [6] TraceType OPTIONAL, + hlrTraceTypeUsed [7] TraceType OPTIONAL, + startTime [8] StartTime OPTIONAL, + endTime [9] EndTime OPTIONAL, + recordingEntity [10] RecordingEntity, + traceEventRecords [11] SET OF TraceEventRecord, + sequenceNumber [12] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + recordReason [13] ReasonForRecord OPTIONAL +} + +ReasonForRecord ::= SEQUENCE +{ + recordCriteria [0] RecordCriterionUsed, OPTIONAL, + eventType [1] EventTypeUsed OPTIONAL +} + +``` + +``` + +RecordingEntity ::= CHOICE +{ + number [0] ISDN-AddressString, + name [1] GraphicString, + bssIdentifier [2] ObjectInstance +} + +EndTime ::= GeneralizedTime + +StartTime ::= GeneralizedTime + +TraceReference ::= OCTET STRING +-- see TS 48.008 + +TransactionID ::= OCTET STRING +-- see TS 48.008 + +OmcId ::= AddressString +-- see TS 48.008 + +TraceEventRecord ::= CHOICE +{ + mscEventRecord [0] MSCEventRecord, + bssEventRecord [1] BSSEventRecord, + hlrEventRecord [2] HLREventRecord +} + +----- +-- BSS TRACE RECORD CONTENTS +----- + +BSSEventRecord ::= SET +{ + invokingEvent [0] BSInvokingEvent OPTIONAL, + btsId [1] SEQUENCE OF BtsId OPTIONAL, + trxId [2] SEQUENCE OF TRXID OPTIONAL, + trauId [3] SEQUENCE OF TranscoderID OPTIONAL, + radioChannelInfo [4] SEQUENCE OF RadioChannelInfo OPTIONAL, + requestType [5] SEQUENCE OF TimedEstablishmentCause OPTIONAL, + endIndication [6] SEQUENCE OF EndIndication OPTIONAL, + msPower [7] SEQUENCE OF MsTxPower OPTIONAL, + bsPower [8] SEQUENCE OF BsTxPower OPTIONAL, + timingAdvance [9] SEQUENCE OF TimedTimingAdvance OPTIONAL, + msClassmark1 [10] SEQUENCE OF TimedMsClassmark1 OPTIONAL, + msClassmark2 [11] SEQUENCE OF TimedMsClassmark2 OPTIONAL, + msClassmark3 [12] SEQUENCE OF TimedMsClassmark3 OPTIONAL, + bsic [13] SEQUENCE OF BSIdentityCode OPTIONAL, + cic [14] SEQUENCE OF CIC OPTIONAL, + handoverResult [15] SEQUENCE OF TimedHandoverResult OPTIONAL, + handoverCause [16] SEQUENCE OF Cause OPTIONAL, + handoverDuration [17] SEQUENCE OF TimedHandoverDuration OPTIONAL, + targetCellList [18] SEQUENCE OF TimedTargetCellList OPTIONAL, + synchInfo [19] SEQUENCE OF SynchInfo OPTIONAL, + sccpConnectionEvent [20] SEQUENCE OF TimedTraceSCCPEvent OPTIONAL, + bssmapEvent [21] SEQUENCE OF TimedBSSMAPEvent OPTIONAL, + dtapEvent [22] SEQUENCE OF TimedDTAPEvent OPTIONAL, + rrEvent [23] SEQUENCE OF TimedRREvent OPTIONAL, + abisEvent [24] SEQUENCE OF TimedABISEvent OPTIONAL, + timedAbisEvent [25] SEQUENCE OF TimedABISEvent OPTIONAL, + measurementReport [26] SEQUENCE OF TimedMeasurementEvent OPTIONAL, + timedMeasurementReport [27] SEQUENCE OF TimedMeasurementEvent OPTIONAL, + powerControlEvent [28] SEQUENCE OF TimedPowerControlEvent OPTIONAL, + timedPowerControlEvent [29] SEQUENCE OF TimedPowerControlEvent OPTIONAL, + additionalExtensions [30] SET OF ManagementExtension OPTIONAL, + radioChannelInfo96 [31] SEQUENCE OF RadioChannelInfo96 OPTIONAL +} + +ABISEvent ::= OCTET STRING +-- this type contains an Abis message other than measurement +-- reports and power control +-- see TS 48.058 for encoding. + +``` + +``` +BcchChannelList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(0..6) OF AbsoluteRFChannelNo + -- the size of this list is equal to the number of measurements on neighbour cell + -- frequencies reported by the MS in the MEASUREMENT REPORT message + -- (see TS 44.018). + -- The first element of the list contains the ARFCN corresponding to the first reported + -- frequency index ("BCCH-FREQ-NCELL 1" field), the second element of the list contains + -- the ARFCN corresponding to the second reported frequency index ("BCCH-FREQ-NCELL 2" + -- field), etc. + +BSIdentityCode ::= SEQUENCE +{ + ncc [0] NetworkColourCode, + bcc [1] BTSColourCode +} + +BSSMAPEvent ::= OCTET STRING + -- This type contains a BSSMAP layer 3 message contents, + -- see TS 48.008 for encoding + +BsTxPower ::= SEQUENCE +{ + txPower [0] TxPower, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +BTSColourCode ::= INTEGER (0..7) + +BtsId ::= SEQUENCE +{ + relatedBts [0] ObjectInstance, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +BSCInvokingEvent ::= OCTET STRING + -- see TS 48.008 for encoding + +Cause ::= SEQUENCE +{ + cause [0] OCTET STRING, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + -- see TS 48.008 for encoding + +ChanDesc ::= CHOICE +{ + channelDescription [0] ChannelDescription, + channelDescription2 [1] ChannelDescription2 +} + +ChannelDescription ::= OCTET STRING + -- see TS 44.018 + +ChannelDescription2 ::= OCTET STRING + -- see TS 44.018 + +ChannelType ::= OCTET STRING + -- see TS 48.008 + +CIC ::= SEQUENCE +{ + circuitIdentityCode [0] CircuitIdentityCode, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +CircuitIdentityCode ::= OCTET STRING + -- see TS 48.008 for encoding + +DTAPEvent ::= OCTET STRING + -- This type contains a DTAP layer 3 message contents, + -- see TS 24.008 for encoding + +EndIndication ::= SEQUENCE +{ + rrCause [0] RRCause, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +EstablishmentCause ::= OCTET STRING +``` + +``` +-- see TS 44.018 for encoding + +FHSFrequencyList ::= SET OF AbsoluteRFChannelNo + +HandoverResult ::= ENUMERATED +{ + successful (0), + fail (1) +} + +HandoverDuration ::= INTEGER +-- in milliseconds + +MeasurementEvent ::= OCTET STRING +-- This type contains uplink and downlink measurement +-- reports, +-- see TS 48.058 for encoding + +MobileStationClassmark1 ::= OCTET STRING +-- see TS 24.008 for encoding + +MobileStationClassmark2 ::= OCTET STRING +-- see TS 24.008 for encoding + +MobileStationClassmark3 ::= OCTET STRING +-- see TS 24.008 for encoding + +MsTxPower ::= SEQUENCE +{ + txPower [0] TxPower, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +MultislotAllocation ::= OCTET STRING +-- see TS 44.018 for encoding + +NetworkColourCode ::= INTEGER (0..7) + +PowerControlEvent ::= OCTET STRING +-- This type contains power control messages, +-- see TS 48.058 for encoding + +RadioChannelInfo ::= SEQUENCE +{ + channelType [0] ChannelType, + channelDescription [1] ChannelDescription, + changeTime [2] TimerData, + fHSFrequencyList [3] FHSFrequencyList OPTIONAL +} + +RadioChannelInfo96 ::= SEQUENCE +{ + channelType [0] ChannelType OPTIONAL, + chanDesc [1] ChanDesc OPTIONAL, + multislotAllocation [2] MultislotAllocation OPTIONAL, + changeTime [3] TimerData +} + +RRCause ::= OCTET STRING +-- see TS 44.018 for encoding + +RREvent ::= OCTET STRING +-- see TS 44.018 for encoding + +SynchInfo ::= SEQUENCE +{ + syncChannelInfo [0] SynchronisationChannelInformation, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +SynchronisationChannelInformation ::= OCTET STRING +-- see TS 44.018 for encoding + +TargetCellList ::= OCTET STRING +-- see TS 48.008 for encoding +``` + +``` +TimedABISEvent ::= SEQUENCE +{ + abisEvent [0] ABISEvent, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +TimedBSSMAPEvent ::= SEQUENCE +{ + bssmapEvent [0] BSSMAPEvent, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +TimedDTAPEvent ::= SEQUENCE +{ + dtapEvent [0] DTAPEvent, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +TimedEstablishmentCause ::= SEQUENCE +{ + establishmentCause [0] EstablishmentCause, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +TimedHandoverDuration ::= SEQUENCE +{ + handoverDuration [0] HandoverDuration, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +TimedHandoverResult ::= SEQUENCE +{ + handoverResult [0] HandoverResult, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +TimedMeasurementEvent ::= SEQUENCE +{ + measurementEvent [0] MeasurementEvent, + changeTime [1] TimerData, + bcchChannelList [2] BcchChannelList OPTIONAL +} + +TimedMsClassmark1 ::= SEQUENCE +{ + mobileStationClassmark1 [0] MobileStationClassmark1, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +TimedMsClassmark2 ::= SEQUENCE +{ + mobileStationClassmark2 [0] MobileStationClassmark2, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +TimedMsClassmark3 ::= SEQUENCE +{ + mobileStationClassmark3 [0] MobileStationClassmark3, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +TimedPowerControlEvent ::= SEQUENCE +{ + powerControlEvent [0] PowerControlEvent, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +TimedRREvent ::= SEQUENCE +{ + rrEvent [0] RREvent, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +TimedTargetCellList ::= SEQUENCE +{ + targetCellList [0] TargetCellList, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} +``` + +``` + +TimedTimingAdvance ::= SEQUENCE +{ + timingAdvance [0] TimingAdvance, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +TimingAdvance ::= OCTET STRING +-- see TS 44.018 for encoding + +TraceSCCPEvent ::= OCTET STRING +-- This type contains an BSSMAP message, +-- see TS 48.006 for encoding + +TimedTraceSCCPEvent ::= SEQUENCE +{ + traceSCCPEvent [0] TraceSCCPEvent, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +TimerData ::= SEQUENCE +{ + timeUnit [0] TimeUnit, + timeValue [1] INTEGER +} + +TimeUnit ::= ENUMERATED +{ + mSec (0), + sec (1), + min (2), + noOfTDMAFrames (3), + noOfSlots (4), + factor (5) +} + +TranscoderID ::= SEQUENCE +{ + relatedTranscoderID [0] ObjectInstance, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +TRXID ::= SEQUENCE +{ + relatedBasebandTransceiverID [0] ObjectInstance, + relatedRadioCarrierID [1] ObjectInstance, + changeTime [2] TimerData +} + +TxPower ::= INTEGER + +----- +-- MSC TRACE RECORD CONTENTS +----- + +MSCEventRecord ::= SET +{ + invokingEvent [0] MSCInvokingEvent OPTIONAL, + servedIMSI [1] IMSI OPTIONAL, + servedIMEI [2] IMEI OPTIONAL, + servedMSISDN [3] ISDN-AddressString OPTIONAL, + callingcalledNumber [4] ISDN-AddressString OPTIONAL, + callingSubaddress [5] ISDN-SubaddressString OPTIONAL, + calledSubaddress [6] ISDN-SubaddressString OPTIONAL, + translatedNumber [7] ISDN-AddressString OPTIONAL, + connectedNumber [8] ISDN-AddressString OPTIONAL, + forwardedToNumber [9] ISDN-AddressString OPTIONAL, + forwardedToSubaddress [10] ISDN-SubaddressString OPTIONAL, + redirectingNumber [11] ISDN-AddressString OPTIONAL, + originalCalledNumber [12] ISDN-AdressString OPTIONAL, + roamingNumber [13] ISDN-AddressString OPTIONAL, + networkTKGP [14] TrunkGroup OPTIONAL, + basicService [15] BasicServiceCode OPTIONAL, + radioChannelTypes [16] SEQUENCE OF RadioChanneTypes OPTIONAL, + bssHandoverTrunk [17] SEQUENCE OF BSSTrunkInfo OPTIONAL, + mscHandoverTrunk [18] SEQUENCE OF MSCTrunkInfo OPTIONAL, + location [19] SEQUENCE OF TimedLocation OPTIONAL, +} + +``` + +``` + + ssInformation [20] SEQUENCE OF SSInformation OPTIONAL, + aocParameters [21] SEQUENCE OF AOCParameters OPTIONAL, + msClassmark2 [22] SEQUENCE OF TimedMsClassmark2 OPTIONAL, + callTermDiagnostics [23] Diagnostics OPTIONAL, + aIntMess [24] SEQUENCE OF AINTMess OPTIONAL, + cIntMess [25] SEQUENCE OF CINTMess OPTIONAL, + dIntMess [26] SEQUENCE OF DINTMess OPTIONAL, + eIntMess [27] SEQUENCE OF EINTMess OPTIONAL, + fIntMess [28] SEQUENCE OF FINTMess OPTIONAL, + gIntMess [29] SEQUENCE OF GINTMess OPTIONAL, + netSigMess [30] SEQUENCE OF NetSigMess OPTIONAL, + eventStartTime [31] TimerData OPTIONAL, + eventStopTime [32] TimerData OPTIONAL, + eventNumber [33] INTEGER, + recordExtensions [34] SET OF ManagementExtension OPTIONAL, + msClassmark3 [35] SEQUENCE OF TimedMsClassmark3 OPTIONAL, + orInformation [36] ORInformation OPTIONAL, + bearerCapability [37] SEQUENCE OF TimedBCIE OPTIONAL +} + +TimedBCIE ::= SEQUENCE +{ + bcie [0] OCTET STRING, + -- see TS 24.008 for encoding of bearer capability information element (BCIE) + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +BSSTrunkInfo ::= SEQUENCE +{ + changeTime [0] TimerData, + bssTrunkInfo [1] TrunkInfo +} + +ORInformation ::= SEQUENCE +{ + or-Info [0] OR-Info, + gmscAddress [1] AddressString OPTIONAL, + callReferenceNumber [2] CallReferenceNumber OPTIONAL +} + +OR-Info ::= INTEGER +{ + orUsed (0), -- Optimal Routeing was applied + orNotAllowedForSubs (1), -- Optimal Routeing not allowed for a subscriber + orNotAllowedInHLRB (2), -- HLRB does not support OR + orNotAllowedInVMSCB (3), -- VMSCB/VLRB does not support OR + chargingReqsContravened (4), -- OR charging requirements contravened + rchNackFromGMSA (5) -- Resume Call Handling negative response received + -- from GMSA and the call will be forwarded at VMSCB + -- values 6-20...are reserved for phase 1 of Optimal Routeing + -- values 21-...are reserved for phase 2 of Optimal Routeing +} + +TimedLocation ::= SEQUENCE +{ + locationAreaAndCell [0] LocationAreaAndCell, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +MSCInvokingEvent ::= ENUMERATED +{ + moc (0), + mtc (1), + ssAction (2), + locationUpdate (3), + sms-mo (4), + sms-mt (5), + imsiAttach (6), + imsiDetach (7), + pds-mo (8), + pds-mt (9) +} + +NetSigMess ::= SEQUENCE +{ + userPartMess [0] OCTET STRING, + changeTime [1] TimerData +} + +``` + +``` + +MSCTrunkInfo ::= SEQUENCE +{ + changeTime [0] TimerData, + interMSCTrunkInfo [1] TrunkInfo +} + +RadioChannelTypes ::= SEQUENCE +{ + channelType [0] ChannelType, + channelTime [1] TimerData +} + +SSInformation ::= SEQUENCE +{ + supplServicesUsed [1] SS-Code OPTIONAL, + basicServices [2] BasicServiceCode OPTIONAL, + ssAction [3] SSActionType OPTIONAL, + ssParameters [4] SSParameters OPTIONAL, + ssActionResult [5] SSActionResult OPTIONAL, + ssInvokeId [6] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + changeTime [7] TimerData +} + +TrunkInfo ::= SEQUENCE +{ + trunkGroup [0] TrunkGroup, + trunkMember [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + +TrunkGroup ::= CHOICE +{ + tkgpNumber [0] INTEGER, + tkgpName [1] GraphicString, + tkgpString [2] IA5STRING (SIZE(1..7)) +} + +SSActionType ::= ENUMERATED +{ + registration (0), + erasure (1), + activation (2), + deactivation (3), + interrogation (4), + invocation (5), + processUnstructuredSS-Data (6), + processUnstructuredSS-Request (7), + unstructuredSS-Request (8), + unstructuredNotifySS (9), + registerPassword (10), + getPassword (11) +} + +SSParameters ::= CHOICE +{ + registerSS-Arg [0] RegisterSS-Arg, + ss-ForBS [1] SS-ForBS-Code, + ss-UserData [2] SS-UserData, + ussd-Arg [3] USSD-Arg, + ss-Code [4] SS-Code, + guidanceInfo [5] GuidanceInfo +} + +SSActionResult ::= CHOICE +{ + ss-Info [0] SS-Info, + interrogateSS-Res [1] InterrogateSS-Res, + ss-UserData [2] SS-UserData, + ussd-Res [3] USSD-Res, + password [4] Password, + error [5] ERROR +} + +AINTMess ::= SEQUENCE +{ + changeTime TimerData, + aIntEvent AINTEvent +} + +``` + +``` + +AINTEvent ::= CHOICE +{ + bssMapEvent [0] BSSMAPEvent, + dtapEvent [1] DTAPEvent +} + +``` + +``` + +CINTMess ::= SEQUENCE +{ + changeTime TimerData, + cIntMess OCTET STRING +} + +``` + +``` + +DINTMess ::= SEQUENCE +{ + changeTime TimerData, + dIntMess OCTET STRING +} + +``` + +``` + +EINTMess ::= SEQUENCE +{ + changeTime TimerData, + eIntMess OCTET STRING +} + +``` + +``` + +FINTMess ::= SEQUENCE +{ + changeTime TimerData, + fIntMess OCTET STRING +} + +``` + +``` + +GINTMess ::= SEQUENCE +{ + changeTime TimerData, + gIntMess OCTET STRING +} + +``` + +``` + +----- +-- HLR TRACE RECORD CONTENTS +----- + +``` + +``` + +HLREventRecord ::= SET +{ + invokingEvent [0] HLRInvokingEvent OPTIONAL, + servedMSISDN [2] ISDN-AddressString OPTIONAL, + mscAddress [3] AddressString OPTIONAL, + vlrNumber [4] AddressString OPTIONAL, + ssInformation [5] SEQUENCE OF SSInformation OPTIONAL, + subscriberData [7] SEQUENCE OF SubscriberData OPTIONAL, + roamingNumber [8] ISDN-AddressString OPTIONAL, + smDeliveryOutcome [9] SEQUENCE OF SM-DeliveryOutcome OPTIONAL, + alertReason [10] SEQUENCE OF AlertReason OPTIONAL, + serviceCentreAddress [11] SEQUENCE OF AddressString OPTIONAL, + mapInterfaceMessages [12] SEQUENCE OF MAPIntMess OPTIONAL, + eventStartTime [13] TimerData OPTIONAL, + eventStopTime [14] TimerData OPTIONAL, + eventNumber [15] INTEGER, + recordExtensions [16] SET OF ManagementExtension OPTIONAL, + orInformation [17] ORInformation OPTIONAL +} + +``` + +``` + +HLRInvokingEvent ::= ENUMERATED +{ + locationChange (0), + subscriberDataChange (1), + routingEnquiry (2), + provideRoamingNumber (3), + ssActivity (4), + password (5), + sms (6) +} + +``` + +``` + +MAPIntMess ::= SEQUENCE +{ + changeTime TimerData, + mapIntMess OCTET STRING +} + +``` + +``` +----- +-- TRACE RECORD CONTROL +----- + +TraceControlId ::= INTEGER + +RecordCriteria ::= SET OF ENUMERATED +{ + noCriteria (0), + eventType (1) +} + +EventTypes ::= SET OF INTEGER +{ + handOver (0), + ss-action (1), + sms (2), + setup (3), + release (4), + -- values 5-100 are reserved + -- values 101-200 are manufacturer specific + -- values 201-... are reserved +} + +TraceFileFormat ::= SET OF TraceRecord + +----- +-- TRACE RECORD OUTPUT +----- + +RecordCriterionUsed ::= ENUMERATED +{ + noCriterion (0), + event (1), + manufSpecificCriterion (2), + deactivation (3) +} + +EventTypeUsed ::= INTEGER +{ + handOver (0), + ss-action (1), + sms (2), + setup (3), + release (4), + + -- values 5-100 are reserved + -- values 101-200 are manufacturer specific + -- values 201-... are reserved +} +``` + +# Annex A (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|-------|-----------|----|-----|--------------------------------------------------------|--------|---------------| +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | Old | New | +| Sep 2004 | SA 25 | SP-040545 | -- | -- | Submitted to TSG SA#25 for Information | 1.0.0 | | +| Dec 2004 | SA 26 | SP-040772 | -- | -- | Submitted to TSG SA#26 for Approval | 2.0.0 | 6.0.0 | +| Jun 2007 | SA_36 | -- | -- | -- | Automatic upgrade to Rel-7 (no CR) at freeze of Rel-7. | 6.0.0 | 7.0.0 | +| Dec 2008 | SA 42 | -- | -- | -- | Upgrade to Release 8 | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | +| Dec 2009 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-9 version | 8.0.0 | 9.0.0 | +| 2011-03 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-10 version (MCC) | 9.0.0 | 10.0.0 | +| 2012-09 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-11 version (MCC) | 10.0.0 | 11.0.0 | +| 2014-10 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-12 version (MCC) | 11.0.0 | 12.0.0 | +| 2016-01 | - | - | - | - | Update to 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+| 5.1 Managed Objects..... | 10 | +| 5.2 Addressing of Objects ..... | 13 | +| 5.3 State Management of Objects ..... | 13 | +| 5.3.1 Administrative State ..... | 13 | +| 5.3.2 Operational State and Availability Status..... | 14 | +| 6 Elementary Procedures ..... | 15 | +| 6.1 Definition of the Procedures ..... | 16 | +| 6.2 SW Download Management Procedures..... | 16 | +| 6.2.1 Load Data Initiate ..... | 16 | +| 6.2.2 Load Data Segment ..... | 16 | +| 6.2.3 Load Data Abort ..... | 17 | +| 6.2.4 Load Data End ..... | 17 | +| 6.2.5 SW Activate Request..... | 17 | +| 6.2.6 Activate SW..... | 18 | +| 6.2.7 SW Activated Report..... | 18 | +| 6.3 A-bis Interface Management Procedures ..... | 18 | +| 6.3.1 Establish TEI ..... | 18 | +| 6.3.2 Connect Terrestrial Signalling..... | 18 | +| 6.3.3 Disconnect Terrestrial Signalling ..... | 19 | +| 6.3.4 Connect Terrestrial Traffic ..... | 19 | +| 6.3.5 Disconnect Terrestrial Traffic ..... | 19 | +| 6.4 Transmission Management Procedures..... | 19 | +| 6.4.1 Connect Multi-drop Link..... | 19 | +| 6.4.2 Disconnect Multi-drop Link ..... | 20 | +| 6.5 Air Interface Management Procedures..... | 20 | +| 6.5.1 Set BTS Attributes..... | 20 | +| 6.5.2 Set Radio Carrier Attributes ..... | 20 | +| 6.5.3 Set Channel Attributes..... | 20 | +| 6.6 Test Management Procedures ..... | 21 | +| 6.6.1 Perform Test ..... | 21 | +| 6.6.2 Test Report ..... | 21 | +| 6.6.3 Send Test Report ..... | 21 | +| 6.6.4 Stop Test..... | 22 | +| 6.7 State Management and Event Report Procedures ..... | 22 | +| 6.7.1 State Changed Event Report..... | 22 | +| 6.7.2 Failure Event Report..... | 22 | +| 6.7.3 Stop Sending Event Reports ..... | 23 | +| 6.7.4 Restart Sending Event Reports ..... | 23 | +| 6.7.5 Change Administrative State..... | 23 | +| 6.7.6 Change Administrative State Request..... | 23 | +| 6.7.7 Report Outstanding Alarms..... | 24 | +| 6.8 Equipment Management Procedures..... | 24 | +| 6.8.1 Change-over ..... | 24 | +| 6.8.2 Opstart ..... | 24 | +| 6.8.3 Reinitialize..... | 24 | + +| | | | +|--------|--------------------------------------------------|----| +| 6.8.4 | Set Site Outputs ..... | 25 | +| 6.9 | Measurement Management Procedures ..... | 25 | +| 6.9.1 | Measurement Result Request ..... | 25 | +| 6.9.2 | Measurement Result Response ..... | 25 | +| 6.9.3 | Stop Measurement ..... | 25 | +| 6.9.4 | Start Measurement ..... | 26 | +| 6.10 | Miscellaneous Procedures ..... | 26 | +| 6.10.1 | Get Attributes ..... | 26 | +| 6.10.2 | Set Alarm Threshold ..... | 26 | +| 6.10.3 | Get Attributes Response ..... | 26 | +| 7 | Structured Procedures ..... | 26 | +| 8 | Message Details ..... | 27 | +| 8.1 | Message Categories ..... | 27 | +| 8.1.1 | Formatted O&M Messages ..... | 27 | +| 8.1.2 | MMI Transfer ..... | 27 | +| 8.1.3 | TRAU O&M Messages ..... | 28 | +| 8.1.4 | Manufacturer-Defined O&M messages ..... | 28 | +| 8.2 | Structure of Formatted O&M Messages ..... | 29 | +| 8.3 | SW Download Management Messages ..... | 30 | +| 8.3.1 | Load Data Initiate ..... | 30 | +| 8.3.2 | Load Data Segment ..... | 30 | +| 8.3.3 | Load Data Abort ..... | 30 | +| 8.3.4 | Load Data End ..... | 30 | +| 8.3.5 | SW Activate Request ..... | 31 | +| 8.3.6 | Activate SW ..... | 31 | +| 8.3.7 | SW Activated Report ..... | 31 | +| 8.4 | A-bis Interface Management Messages ..... | 31 | +| 8.4.1 | Establish TEI ..... | 31 | +| 8.4.2 | Connect Terrestrial Signalling ..... | 31 | +| 8.4.3 | Disconnect Terrestrial Signalling ..... | 32 | +| 8.4.4 | Connect Terrestrial Traffic ..... | 32 | +| 8.4.5 | Disconnect Terrestrial Traffic ..... | 32 | +| 8.5 | Transmission Management Messages ..... | 32 | +| 8.5.1 | Connect Multi-drop link ..... | 32 | +| 8.5.2 | Disconnect Multi-drop link ..... | 33 | +| 8.6 | Air Interface Management Messages ..... | 33 | +| 8.6.1 | Set BTS Attributes ..... | 33 | +| 8.6.2 | Set Radio Carrier Attributes ..... | 34 | +| 8.6.3 | Set Channel Attributes ..... | 34 | +| 8.7 | Test Management Messages ..... | 34 | +| 8.7.1 | Perform Test ..... | 34 | +| 8.7.2 | Test Report ..... | 35 | +| 8.7.3 | Send Test Report ..... | 35 | +| 8.7.4 | Stop Test ..... | 35 | +| 8.8 | State Management and Event Report Messages ..... | 35 | +| 8.8.1 | State Changed Event Report ..... | 35 | +| 8.8.2 | Failure Event Report ..... | 36 | +| 8.8.3 | Stop Sending Event Reports ..... | 36 | +| 8.8.4 | Restart Sending Event Reports ..... | 37 | +| 8.8.5 | Change Administrative State ..... | 37 | +| 8.8.6 | Change Administrative State Request ..... | 37 | +| 8.8.7 | Report Outstanding Alarms ..... | 37 | +| 8.9 | Equipment Management Messages ..... | 38 | +| 8.9.1 | Changeover ..... | 38 | +| 8.9.2 | Opstart ..... | 38 | +| 8.9.3 | Reinitialize ..... | 38 | +| 8.9.4 | Set Site Outputs ..... | 38 | +| 8.9.5 | Change HW Configuration ..... | 39 | +| 8.10 | Measurement Management Messages ..... | 39 | +| 8.10.1 | Measurement Result Request ..... | 39 | + +| | | | +|--------|----------------------------------------|----| +| 8.10.2 | Measurement Result Response..... | 39 | +| 8.10.3 | Start Measurement..... | 39 | +| 8.10.4 | Stop Measurement..... | 39 | +| 8.11 | Miscellaneous Messages..... | 40 | +| 8.11.1 | Get Attributes..... | 40 | +| 8.11.2 | Set Alarm Threshold..... | 40 | +| 8.11.3 | Get Attribute Response..... | 40 | +| 9 | Coding..... | 40 | +| 9.1 | Message Type..... | 41 | +| 9.2 | Object Class..... | 44 | +| 9.3 | Object Instance..... | 44 | +| 9.4 | Attributes and Parameters..... | 45 | +| 9.4.1 | Abis Channel..... | 47 | +| 9.4.2 | Additional Info..... | 48 | +| 9.4.3 | Additional Text..... | 48 | +| 9.4.4 | Administrative State..... | 48 | +| 9.4.5 | ARFCN List..... | 48 | +| 9.4.6 | Autonomously Report..... | 49 | +| 9.4.7 | Availability Status..... | 49 | +| 9.4.8 | BCCH ARFCN..... | 49 | +| 9.4.9 | BSIC..... | 49 | +| 9.4.10 | BTS Air Timer..... | 50 | +| 9.4.11 | CCCH Load Indication Period..... | 50 | +| 9.4.12 | CCCH Load Threshold..... | 50 | +| 9.4.13 | Channel Combination..... | 50 | +| 9.4.14 | Connection Failure Criterion..... | 51 | +| 9.4.15 | Destination..... | 51 | +| 9.4.16 | Event Type..... | 51 | +| 9.4.17 | File Data..... | 52 | +| 9.4.18 | File Id..... | 52 | +| 9.4.19 | File Version..... | 52 | +| 9.4.20 | GSM Time..... | 52 | +| 9.4.21 | HSN..... | 52 | +| 9.4.22 | HW Configuration..... | 53 | +| 9.4.23 | HW Description..... | 53 | +| 9.4.24 | Intave Parameter..... | 53 | +| 9.4.25 | Interference level Boundaries..... | 54 | +| 9.4.26 | List of Required Attributes..... | 54 | +| 9.4.27 | MAIO..... | 54 | +| 9.4.28 | Manufacturer Dependent State..... | 54 | +| 9.4.29 | Manufacturer Dependent Thresholds..... | 55 | +| 9.4.30 | Manufacturer Id..... | 55 | +| 9.4.31 | Max Timing Advance..... | 55 | +| 9.4.32 | Measurement Result..... | 55 | +| 9.4.33 | Measurement Type..... | 55 | +| 9.4.34 | Multi-drop BSC Link..... | 56 | +| 9.4.35 | Multi-drop next BTS Link..... | 56 | +| 9.4.36 | Nack Causes..... | 56 | +| 9.4.37 | Ny1..... | 58 | +| 9.4.38 | Operational State..... | 58 | +| 9.4.39 | Overload Period..... | 58 | +| 9.4.40 | Physical Config..... | 58 | +| 9.4.41 | Power Class..... | 58 | +| 9.4.42 | Power Output Thresholds..... | 59 | +| 9.4.43 | Probable Cause..... | 59 | +| 9.4.44 | RACH Busy Threshold..... | 59 | +| 9.4.45 | RACH Load Averaging Slots..... | 60 | +| 9.4.46 | Radio Sub Channel..... | 60 | +| 9.4.47 | RF Max Power Reduction..... | 60 | +| 9.4.48 | Site Inputs..... | 60 | +| 9.4.49 | Site Outputs..... | 61 | + +| | | | +|------------------------|-----------------------------------|----| +| 9.4.50 | Source ..... | 61 | +| 9.4.51 | Specific Problems ..... | 61 | +| 9.4.52 | Starting Time ..... | 61 | +| 9.4.53 | T200..... | 62 | +| 9.4.54 | TEI..... | 62 | +| 9.4.55 | Test Duration ..... | 62 | +| 9.4.56 | Test No ..... | 62 | +| 9.4.57 | Test Report Info..... | 63 | +| 9.4.58 | VSWR Thresholds..... | 63 | +| 9.4.59 | Window Size ..... | 63 | +| 9.4.60 | TSC..... | 63 | +| 9.4.61 | SW Configuration..... | 64 | +| 9.4.62 | SW Description ..... | 64 | +| 9.4.63 | Perceived Severity ..... | 64 | +| 9.4.64 | Get Attribute Response Info ..... | 64 | +| 9.4.65 | Outstanding Alarm Sequence ..... | 65 | +| 9.4.66 | HW Conf Change Info..... | 65 | +| Annex A (informative): | Change history..... | 66 | + +# --- Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +# --- Introduction + +## (Background) + +The use and general aspects of the A-bis interface are given in specification 3GPP TS 48.051. The split of telecommunications functions and management procedures between BSC and BTS are defined in specification 3GPP TS 48.052. Specification 3GPP TS 48.056 defines Layer 2 of the signalling messages. + +The general aspects of NM are defined in specification GSM 12.00. Qx interface and protocol stack are defined in specification GSM 12.01. GSM 12.06 provides the functional requirements supported by the present document. The NM procedures and messages to support these operations over the A-bis interface are specified here. Specification GSM 12.20 provides the information model as seen on the OMC-BSC interface. Interworking between this model and the NM messages and procedures provided here is specified in GSM 12.22. + +# --- 1 Scope + +The present document addresses the network management messages and procedures across the A-bis interface, which is defined as Qx in GSM. The information model included here defines the objects and how they are addressed for purposes of operations and maintenance activities. + +There is a requirement for the A-bis interface to be open to allow interoperation between BTSs of different manufacturers working to the same BSC. The present document addresses this requirement from O&M point of view, which allows this interworking to take place. It shows the split of NM functions between BSC and BTS. The procedures and coding of the messages are specified in detail. In practice, in addition to the present document it is necessary that the content of manufacturer-dependent information fields be specified to fulfill the functionality. + +It is essential for operation that a BSC can handle the functions used by all its BTSs. Therefore, all items in the present document are considered mandatory unless otherwise indicated in the present document. + +# --- 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. + - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. + - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". +- [2] 3GPP TS 44.006: "Mobile Station - Base Stations System (MS - BSS) Interface Data Link (DL) Layer Specification". +- [3] 3GPP TS 24.008: "Mobile radio interface Layer 3 specification; Core network protocols; Stage 3". +- [4] 3GPP TS 45.002: "Multiplexing and Multiple Access on the Radio Path". +- [5] 3GPP TS 45.005: "Radio transmission and reception". +- [6] 3GPP TS 45.008: "Radio subsystem link control". +- [7] 3GPP TS 48.051: "Base Station Controller - Base Transceiver Station (BSC-BTS) Interface General Aspects". +- [8] 3GPP TS 48.052: "Base Station Controller - Base Transceiver Station (BSC-BTS) Interface - Interface Principles". +- [9] 3GPP TS 48.056: "BSC-BTS Layer 2 Specification". +- [10] 3GPP TS 48.058: "Base Station Controller - Base Transceiver Station (BSC-BTS) Interface Layer 3 Specification". +- [11] GSM 12.00 (GSM Phase 2): "Objectives and structure of Network Management (NM)". +- [12] GSM 12.01 (GSM Phase 2): "Common aspects of GSM Network Management (NM)". +- [13] GSM 12.06 (GSM Phase 2): "GSM Network Configuration Management and Administration". +- [14] GSM 12.20 (GSM Phase 2): "Base Station System (BSS) Management Information". +- [15] GSM 12.22 (GSM Phase 2): "Interworking of GSM Network Management (NM) procedures and messages at the Base Station Controller (BSC)". + +[16] ITU-T Recommendation X.731: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Systems Management: State management function". + +# --- 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Definitions + +Definitions of terms used within the present document may be found mostly in clause 5 in text context. + +## 3.2 Abbreviations + +For the purpose of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: + +| | | +|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| ASN.1 | (CCITT) Abstract Syntax Notation One | +| BSC | Base Station Controller | +| BSS | Base Station System | +| BTS | Base Transceiver Station | +| cont. | continued | +| HW | Hardware | +| LSB | Least Significant Byte | +| man. dep. | manufacturer dependent (with upper and lower case adjusted as appropriate) | +| MMI | Man-machine Interface | +| MSB | Most Significant Byte | +| MSC | Mobile-services Switching Centre | +| NE | Network Element | +| NM | Network Management | +| O&M | Operations and Maintenance | +| OMC | Operations and Maintenance Centre | +| RF | Radio Frequency | +| SAPI | Service Access Point Indicator | +| SW | Software | +| TEI | Terminal End-point Identifier | +| TMN | Telecommunications Management Network | +| TSC | Training Sequence Code | + +Further GSM related abbreviations may be found in 3GPP TS 21.905 [1]. + +# --- 4 Functional Split between BSC and BTS + +Functional split of management functions between BSC and BTS is shown in table 1. + +**Table 1/GSM 12.2: Split of management functions between BSC and BTS** + +| | BSC | BTS | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------| +| Fault Management | | | +| BTS | | | +| test request | X | - | +| test execution | - | X | +| test analysis | NS | - | +| fault detection | - | X | +| fault localization | X (note) | X | +| fault reporting | X | X | +| Link | | | +| testing (req,ex,rpt) | NS | - | +| fault detection | X | X | +| fault localization | X | X | +| fault reporting | X | X | +| Configuration Management | | | +| Hardware | control/monitor | control | +| Software | control/monitor | monitor | +| State | control/monitor | control/monitor | +| Parameters | control/monitor | monitor | +| Performance Management | | | +| Collection | X | X (radio path only) | +| Reporting | X | X (radio path only) | +| Administration | X | - | +| Security Management (Access Control to BTS) | | | +| BTS | | | +| Control | - | X | +| Monitoring | - | X | +| NOTE: When fault localisation is not possible at the BTS it must be deduced at the BSC. | | | +| Legend: Abbreviations: | | | +| NS | = Not Specified; | | +| req | = request; | | +| X | = Function exists; | | +| ex | = execution | | +| - | = Function non-exists; | | +| rpt | = report | | + +# 5 Information Model + +## 5.1 Managed Objects + +The BCF mentioned in 3GPP TS 48.052 and 3GPP TS 48.056 is the agent at the BTS end of the A-bis O&M interface. It has four different descriptions depending on the object that is managed: Site Manager, BTS, Radio Carrier and Baseband Transceiver. + +This model describes how objects are managed across A-bis interface, but it doesn't specify how information is transferred inside the site. That is, the manner of communication between an object and objects under it is not specified in the present document. + +As shown in Figure 1, the Object Classes used on the A-bis interface are a subset of those found under Site Manager on the OMC-BSC interface. The Object Classes are listed below and the functionalities that describe them are found in table 2. + +**Site Manager:** manages common control functions of several BTSs and transceivers on one site. These can include managing external alarms, front-end switch, etc. This model describes logical sites. There can be multiple logical sites in one physical site. Communication between entities within a logical site is manufacturer dependent. + +**BTS:** is associated with one cell. BTSs are typically created at installation phase by connecting transceivers to antennas thus forming cells from the air interface point of view. The BTS can also contain control functions common to various transceivers. The way BTSs are formed from transceivers and how corresponding BTS numbers are determined is configuration dependent information, which is stored during installation. + +**Radio Carrier:** represents manageable properties pertaining to radio transmission and reception of one carrier. + +**Baseband Transceiver:** represents functions common to eight radio time slots. + +**Channel:** is a physical channel in air interface, which can contain several logical channels depending on channel combination. A Channel is described with radio time slot and frequency hopping attributes (see 3GPP TS 45.002). + +![UML Class Diagram showing the object model seen across the A-bis interface. The diagram illustrates the relationships between Site Manager, BTS, Baseband Transceiver, Radio carrier, and Channel. Site Manager is associated with BTS (1+). BTS is associated with Baseband Transceiver (1+) and Radio carrier (1+). Baseband Transceiver is associated with Channel (8).](8e14350b4b669119a3bdfca7869110ca_img.jpg) + +``` +classDiagram + class SiteManager["Site Manager"] + class BTS + class BasebandTransceiver["Baseband Transceiver"] + class RadioCarrier["Radio carrier"] + class Channel + + SiteManager "1+" --> BTS + BTS "1+" --> BasebandTransceiver + BTS "1+" --> RadioCarrier + BasebandTransceiver "8" --> Channel +``` + +■ containment + +Multiplicity of association: +1+ one or more +n numerically specified + +UML Class Diagram showing the object model seen across the A-bis interface. The diagram illustrates the relationships between Site Manager, BTS, Baseband Transceiver, Radio carrier, and Channel. Site Manager is associated with BTS (1+). BTS is associated with Baseband Transceiver (1+) and Radio carrier (1+). Baseband Transceiver is associated with Channel (8). + +NOTE: Site Manager and BTS don't necessarily require separate equipment. For example, the Site Manager and a Baseband Transceiver can be associated with the same physical equipment. + +**Figure 1/GSM 12.21: Object model seen across A-bis interface** + +**Table 2/GSM 12.21: Objects, attributes and procedures seen across A-bis interface** + +| Object class | Attributes | Procedures | +|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Site Manager | Abis Channel
Availability Status
HW Configuration
Manufacturer Dependent State
Manufacturer Id
Operational State
Site Inputs
Site Outputs
SW Configuration | Equipment Management
Establish TEI
Get Attributes
Measurement Management
Set Site Outputs
State Management and Event Report
SW Download Management
Test Management | +| BTS | Administrative State
Availability Status
BCCH ARFCN
BSIC
BTS Air Timer
CCCH Load Ind. Period
CCCH Load Threshold
Connection Failure Criterion
GSM Time
HW Configuration
Intave Parameter
Interference Level Boundaries
Manufacturer Dependent State
Max Timing Advance
Ny1
Operational State
Overload Period
RACH Busy Threshold
RACH Load Averaging Slots
SW Configuration
T200 | Equipment Management
Get Attributes
Measurement Management
Report Procedures
Set BTS Attributes
State Management and Event Report
SW Download Management
Test Management | +| Radio Carrier | Administrative State
ARFCN List
Availability Status
HW Configuration
Manufacturer Dependent State
Manufacturer Id
Operational State
Power Class
RF Max Power Reduction
SW Configuration | Equipment Management
Get Attributes
Measurement Management
Set RadioCarrier Attributes
State Management and Event Report
SW Download Management
Test Management | +| Baseband Transceiver | Abis Channel*
Administrative State
Availability Status
HW Configuration
Manufacturer Dependent State
Manufacturer Id
Operational State
SW Configuration | Connect Terrestrial Signalling
Disconnect Terrestrial Signalling
Equipment Management
Get Attributes
Measurement Management
State Management and Event Report
SW Download Management
Test Management | +| Channel | Abis Channel*
Administrative State
ARFCN List*
Availability Status
Channel Combination
HW Configuration
HSN*
MAIO*
Operational State
SW Configuration
TSC | Connect Terrestrial Traffic
Disconnect Terrestrial Traffic
Equipment Management
Get Attributes
Measurement Management
Set Channel Attributes
State Management and Event Report
SW Download Management
Test Management | + +NOTE: If more than one layer 2 link is defined to handle this information model, the actual implementation may affect on which layer 2 link attributes concerning frequency hopping and front-end switch are sent. Equipment used to implement frequency hopping can be common to several radio carriers or located inside one radio carrier. Front-end switch is handled by Site Manager, therefore all 'Abis Channel' attributes must be sent to it. Those attributes that need a link identifier in BSC data structures are marked with an asterisk (\*). + +## 5.2 Addressing of Objects + +It is a GSM requirement that the BSC is capable of operating with BTSs from different manufacturers. So, it is necessary that the differences between BTSs, as seen by the BSC, are minimised as much as possible. This is achieved by addressing NM messages by the Managed Object Class and Managed Object Instance. There must be in the BSC an object model with a complete layer 2 link description for each object instance in the BTS (e.g., Baseband Transceiver 1, Baseband Transceiver 2, Baseband Transceiver 3,...). When a message has to be sent to an object instance this mapping is used to find the correct link. + +The first connection shall be established from the BTS site by using a (semi-) permanently programmed default TEI. Subsequent to the establishment of the default connection to the site, further initial connections to other objects shall be established using TEIs provided by procedures in subclause 6.3.1. + +Possible additional TEIs to an object already having an initial TEI are assigned with a GSM 12.21 message found in subclause 6.3.1 through an already assigned signalling link. + +Object instances also have a layer 3 address. The instance number is used to address the object instance. Regardless of whether the layer 2 address uniquely identifies the object instance or not, the layer 3 address must also be provided so that it can be used by management agent to determine which object instance is being addressed. This combination of layer 2 and layer 3 addressing accommodates BTS sites with either single or multiple physical links. + +Specific equipment configuration information is manufacturer dependent. However, for interoperability, link configuration, default TEI assignment and instance numbering must be known by both manager and agent. This, as well as supported functions, is considered as Shared Management Knowledge. + +## 5.3 State Management of Objects + +State management in the present document is generally in line with ITU-T Recommendation X.731. How state values are applied is explained below. + +ITU-T Recommendation X.731 states that "the management state of a managed object represents the instantaneous condition of availability and operability of the associated resources from the point of view of management". + +In the present document there are two different factors (ITU-T Recommendation X.731 defines usage state in addition to these two) that are considered to affect the management state of a managed object. They are: + +- administration: permission to use or prohibition against using the resource, imposed through the management services; +- operability: whether or not the resource is physically installed and working. + +The present document defines the following three state management attributes to represent the management state of a managed object: + +- administrative state; +- operational state; +- availability status (this elaborates the operational state). + +### 5.3.1 Administrative State + +Administrative states of the managed objects can be controlled only by the BSC. In fact, the control of resource usage comes from the MSC). + +Setting the administrative state of a Channel to **locked** means that it has to discontinue all transmission and reception of information on Air interface and all telecommunication (traffic and signalling) information transmission on A-bis interface. + +Setting the administrative state of a Radio Carrier to **locked** means that it has to discontinue all RF emission on Air interface for the frequencies it is responsible. + +Setting the administrative state of a Baseband Transceiver to **locked** means that it has to discontinue all telecommunication transmissions and the Channels which are affected should indicate that they are Disabled or Degraded. + +Setting the administrative state of a BTS to locked means it has to discontinue all RF emission on all Radio Carriers and all telecommunication transmissions on all Channels of all Baseband Transceivers, i.e., Radio Carriers, Channels and Baseband Transceivers are in Disabled, Dependency state. + +The administrative state at the BTS site is also used to provide information e.g., for a local MMI user at a BTS site. + +The **locked** state of a 12.21 managed object means that BSC has disconnected all the calls that go through the resource that is represented by the managed object. No new traffic is connected through this resource any more. + +The **shutting down** state means that no new traffic is connected through this resource any more. The on-going calls remain. + +The **unlocked** state means that new traffic is allowed through the resource represented by the managed object. + +### 5.3.2 Operational State and Availability Status + +ITU-T Recommendation X.731 gives the following definitions for the values of the operational state attribute: + +- **disabled**: the resource is totally inoperable and unable to provide service to the user(s); +- **enabled**: the resource is partially or fully operable and available for use. + +In the present document the value Disabled represents the following conditions that the resources could have: + +- hardware or software is not installed; +- power is turned off; +- failure has occurred; +- radio parameters has not yet been set by elementary procedures, therefore, the resource is off line. + +The availability status elaborates the operational state attribute. In the present document the following values are used (availability status is a set value): + +**In test**: the resource is undergoing a test procedure. + +**Failed**: the resource has an internal fault that prevents it from operating. The operational state is *disabled*. + +**Power off**: the resource requires power to be applied and is not powered on. The operational state is *disabled*. + +**Off line**: the resource requires some manual and/or automatic operation(s) to be performed to make it available for the use. + +**Dependency**: the resource cannot operate because some other resource on which it depends is unavailable. The operational state is *disabled*. + +**Degraded**: the service available from the resource is degraded in some respect, such as in speed or operating capacity. The operational state is *enabled*. + +**Not installed**: the hardware or the software associated with the managed object has not been installed at the site. Operational state is *disabled*. + +Figure 2 illustrates the operational state and availability status behaviour of GSM 12.21 objects (i.e., Site Manager, BTS, Radio Carrier, and Baseband Transceiver) during initialization. The initial value of the administrative state is *locked*. + +![State transition diagram for GSM 12.21 objects showing the progression from 'Disabled, Not Installed' to 'Enabled' through various activation steps and state changes.](7efae06af3af43ffe5d4b956a679cf54_img.jpg) + +``` + +stateDiagram-v2 + [*] --> Disabled_Not_Installed : HW installed + state "Disabled, Not Installed" as Disabled_Not_Installed + state "Disabled, Off Line" as Disabled_Off_Line + state "Enabled" as Enabled + + Disabled_Not_Installed --> Disabled_Off_Line : SW Activate Request + Disabled_Off_Line --> Disabled_Not_Installed : SW Activation not required + Disabled_Off_Line --> Enabled : Attribute setting, Opstart, Changed State Event Report + +``` + +**State: Disabled, Not Installed** + +BTS related object (Site Manager, BTS, Radio Carrier, and Baseband Transceiver) requests downloading and activation of the running software version. + +Software downloading and activation takes place when object is in this state. +Operational state = Disabled +Availability status = Not installed + +The last file belonging to the running software version has been downloaded and activated. + +**State: Disabled, Off Line** + +Operational state = Disabled +Availability status = Off line + +Object doesn't have correct attribute values yet. They will be received when the unlock procedure is executed. +Operational state = Disabled +Availability status = Off line + +All needed attributes of the managed object are set. + +Opstart to attempt to put the managed object to enabled state. + +**State: Enabled** + +Operational state = Enabled +Availability status = { } + +State transition diagram for GSM 12.21 objects showing the progression from 'Disabled, Not Installed' to 'Enabled' through various activation steps and state changes. + +Figure 2/GSM 12.21: GSM 12.21 Objects' Operational state and availability status behaviour during initialization + +# 6 Elementary Procedures + +The operational procedures applicable to the BTS consist of bringing BTS equipment and software into (or taking them out of) service, initiation of tests at the BTS, collection of test results made at the BTS, reporting and clearing of any BTS faults, and reporting of any BTS external alarms. Bringing into service of equipment at the BTS will include manual operations, including turning the switch on, and performing local testing where relevant at the BTS, followed by an indication of the availability of the equipment to the BTS via some man-machine interface (MMI terminal, telephone). It is then a BSC function to ensure that relevant data on the existence of the equipment is resident at the BTS, and to activate (bring into service) the new equipment. Manual procedures may also be employed for software loading, at least initially. + +As far as software is concerned, all operational software used at the BTS shall also be kept at the BSC, and can be downloaded from the BSC. At the BTS there may be either single instance of the software, or there may also be back-up versions. + +## 6.1 Definition of the Procedures + +All the procedures covered in the present document are based on formatted O&M messages. Most formatted O&M messages initiated by the BSC (or by a BTS) will receive a response or acknowledgement at Layer 3. A pair of such messages, or single message if a response is not required, is referred to as an elementary procedure. All messages shall be sent using I frames at Layer 2. + +A number of procedures, referred to as structured procedures (see GSM 12.22), are based on a multiplicity of elementary procedures. Some structured procedures may also involve MMI messages, but these are not defined in the present document. For all elementary procedures described in Subclauses 6.2 through 6.10, the protocol scenarios are illustrated with no further explicit reference made from their corresponding subclauses because of their self-explanatory nature. + +Descriptions of the messages and the direction of transmission are given in the following subclauses. + +No elementary procedure shall be initiated to an object instance which has not yet replied to a previously initiated elementary procedure with a response, an ACK or a NACK within a layer 3 time-out. The layer 3 timeout for ACK, NACK and responses shall have a default value of 10 seconds. + +An ACK message is returned to inform the application which initialized the message that the command is performed or will be performed. + +The whole message must be rejected if there is something not understood/supported in the original message. + +A NACK may not be relevant for some elementary procedures. + +The most relevant Nack causes, not covered by the general causes (which are used for understanding of header fields), are given for each elementary procedure with reference to the coding of the Nack causes in subclause 9.4.36. + +The general Nack causes are relevant for any Nack message and are also found in subclause 9.4.36. + +## 6.2 SW Download Management Procedures + +### 6.2.1 Load Data Initiate + +This message shall be sent from the BSC to the BTS to initiate the loading of a file. It indicates the number of segments for which a Layer 3 acknowledgement is required (window size). When receiving data the BTS shall send an ACK after this number of segments, except for the last batch. + +![Sequence diagram for Load Data Initiate procedure. BSC sends 'Load Data Initiate' to BTS. BTS responds with 'ACK/NACK'. Below the diagram, text explains: 'Meaning of Ack message : Ready to receive the specified file. Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 23, 24.'](64fd8bd804acee34ea91bdde28997fe3_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + Note left of BSC: Load Data Initiate + BSC->>BTS: Load Data Initiate + Note right of BTS: ACK/NACK + BTS-->>BSC: ACK/NACK + Note right of BTS: Meaning of Ack message : Ready to receive the specified file. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 23, 24. + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Load Data Initiate procedure. BSC sends 'Load Data Initiate' to BTS. BTS responds with 'ACK/NACK'. Below the diagram, text explains: 'Meaning of Ack message : Ready to receive the specified file. Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 23, 24.' + +### 6.2.2 Load Data Segment + +These multi-segment messages shall be used to carry the files for the transfer initiated by the Load Data Initiate message. No other file transfer shall be allowed until the current transfer is finished. + +![Sequence diagram for Load Data Segment transfer with windowing and ACK.](8307f6b04df072c9332f9987e034272c_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + Note right of BTS: -+ + BSC->>BTS: Load Data Segment + Note right of BTS: | - Window Size + BSC->>BTS: Load Data Segment + Note right of BTS: | + Note right of BTS: -+ + BTS-->>BSC: ACK + Note left of BSC: | + BSC->>BTS: Load Data Segment + Note right of BTS: etc. + Note right of BTS: etc. + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Load Data Segment transfer with windowing and ACK. + +An ACK shall be sent from the BTS to the BSC every time when *Window Size* number of segments specified in the Load Data Initiate message are downloaded. A reception of an ACK must not reset the value of the *sequence number* of the subsequent message segments (see subclause 8.1.1). When all the expected blocks have been received, an ACK must be sent regardless of the window size. If the timer for a time-out for the Layer 3 acknowledgement expires, the BSC shall send a Load Data Abort message and the file transfer shall be aborted. + +Meaning of Ack message: A window of Load data segment messages or a complete file has been received. + +### 6.2.3 Load Data Abort + +This message shall be used by either end if the file transfer can no longer be supported. This message shall also be used by the BTS if the received amount of data exceeds the expected amount. + +![Sequence diagram for Load Data Abort message.](43837b056625d3d6ce615e4c02f163bb_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + BSC->>BTS: Load Data Abort + Note right of BTS: <-----> + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Load Data Abort message. + +### 6.2.4 Load Data End + +This message shall be sent by the BSC to the BTS. The BTS sends an ACK when the file has been received in the BTS. + +![Sequence diagram for Load Data End and ACK/NACK.](b0d4609bc46c2d88a8318706bb5321f7_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + BSC->>BTS: Load Data End + Note right of BTS: <-----> + BTS-->>BSC: ACK/NACK + Note left of BSC: <-----> + Note right of BTS: Meaning of Ack message : File download is successfully terminated. + Note right of BTS: Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 25. + +``` + +Sequence diagram for Load Data End and ACK/NACK. + +### 6.2.5 SW Activate Request + +This message shall be sent by the BTS when the resource represented by the object instance (Site Manager, BTS, Radio Carrier, or Baseband Transceiver) has started up. The initialization of mentioned object instance shall be started with software activation, which may include software download continuing with attribute setting. + +![Sequence diagram for SW Activate Request and ACK/NACK.](4aa740e8119817a3f9b9f72d06eaa53d_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + BTS->>BSC: SW Activate Request + Note left of BSC: <-----> + BSC-->>BTS: ACK/NACK + Note right of BTS: <-----> + Note right of BTS: Meaning of Ack message : The request is granted and software activation will be commenced. + Note right of BTS: Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): None. + +``` + +Sequence diagram for SW Activate Request and ACK/NACK. + +### 6.2.6 Activate SW + +This message from the BSC to the BTS shall be used to activate the loaded software, indicating which file (or files) is to be activated. The acknowledgement of the Activate SW indicates that the software can be activated. If the software cannot be activated, a NACK must be sent. The activation may include BTS internal software distribution. + +![](9cd90f495b95ad2116ff780248c26d95_img.jpg) + +| | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| BSC | BTS | +| Activate SW | | +| -----> | | +| ACK/NACK | | +| <----- | | +| Meaning of Ack message: File will be activated. | | +| Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 23, 26, 27. | | + +### 6.2.7 SW Activated Report + +This message from the BTS to the BSC shall be sent from the addressed object on the BTS at a successful completion of the software distribution to and activation on all indicated destinations in the BTS. + +![](51db757d054ce1ce83c436a3578b56ca_img.jpg) + +| | | +|---------------------|-----| +| BSC | BTS | +| SW Activated Report | | +| <----- | | + +## 6.3 A-bis Interface Management Procedures + +These procedures (excluding 'Establish TEI') are only relevant with BTSs having flexibility to configure A-bis channels to different Baseband Transceivers. This configuration flexibility is realized with equipment that can be called BTS front-end switch. In other words this switch allows an A-bis channel to be able to be connected in several possibilities. + +There must be a default connection to the Site Manager, which manages the front-end switch. The default connection information (AbisLink, TEI) must be (semi-)permanently programmable so that it is available at power up. Through the default connection other A-bis connections are established by configuring the front-end switch. + +It is optional for BTS equipment to have front-end switch features. + +### 6.3.1 Establish TEI + +When an initial/additional TEI is to be established (see 3GPP TS 48.056), this message shall be sent from the BSC on a previously established link giving initial/additional TEI number and the corresponding physical connection. For establishment of additional TEI the procedure specified in specification 3GPP TS 48.056 must be performed and the result shall be indicated in the ACK/NACK response message. If an initial TEI assignment fails, it can mean that TEIs cannot be assigned through the default link (e.g., physical implementation doesn't support transferring TEIs from Site Manager to Baseband Transceivers). In that case there must be subsequent preprogrammed TEIs to establish more links. + +![](1320668e9151c5144f7e3696ae57e07f_img.jpg) + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| BSC | BTS | +| Establish TEI | | +| -----> | | +| ACK/NACK | | +| <----- | | +| Meaning of Ack message: The TEI has been established as specified. | | +| Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 23. | | + +### 6.3.2 Connect Terrestrial Signalling + +This message shall be used to connect a particular terrestrial transmission circuit to a Baseband Transceiver. The procedure can be used only for a BTS that has the relevant flexibility. + +![](8fa679f79a1bb1f527cba9f29e784e89_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + Note over BSC: Connect Terrestrial Signalling + BSC->>BTS: + Note over BTS: ACK/NACK + BTS-->>BSC: + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: The specified signalling link has been connected. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 1E. + +### 6.3.3 Disconnect Terrestrial Signalling + +This message shall be used to disconnect a Baseband Transceiver from a terrestrial circuit. + +![](12de9b926df0384ec07702671827c9cd_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + Note over BSC: Disconnect Terrestrial Signalling + BSC->>BTS: + Note over BTS: ACK/NACK + BTS-->>BSC: + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: The specified signalling link has been disconnected. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 20. + +### 6.3.4 Connect Terrestrial Traffic + +This message shall be used to relate a terrestrial circuit to a radio time slot, if the BTS has the flexibility. If half rate coding is implemented, two *Connect Terrestrial Traffic* messages shall be sent for each radio timeslot. + +![](cdd4dfacab004e9979caed3fffea69e5_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + Note over BSC: Connect Terrestrial Traffic + BSC->>BTS: + Note over BTS: ACK/NACK + BTS-->>BSC: + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: The specified traffic link has been connected. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 1E. + +### 6.3.5 Disconnect Terrestrial Traffic + +This message shall be used to disconnect a terrestrial circuit from a radio timeslot. + +![](0d475a233dd118d11e7c7958dce3c1c2_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + Note over BSC: Disconnect Terrestrial Traffic + BSC->>BTS: + Note over BTS: ACK/NACK + BTS-->>BSC: + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: The specified traffic link has been disconnected. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 20. + +## 6.4 Transmission Management Procedures + +These procedures are used to configure on-site transmission equipment. They may not be sufficient and are subject to further standardization. + +### 6.4.1 Connect Multi-drop Link + +This message shall be used to relate two terrestrial circuits (64 kbps timeslot in a 2 Mbps system to a radio time slot), if the BTS has the flexibility of setting up multi-drop configuration. + +![Sequence diagram for Connect Multi-drop Link](81a4cbf0b3c4cbc065efdf8f800dadde_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram illustrating the Connect Multi-drop Link procedure between a BSC and a BTS: + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + Note left of BSC: Connect Multi-drop Link + BSC-->>BTS: Request + Note right of BTS: ACK/NACK + BTS-->>BSC: Response +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: The specified multi-drop link connection has been connected. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 1E. + +Sequence diagram for Connect Multi-drop Link + +### 6.4.2 Disconnect Multi-drop Link + +This message shall be used to disconnect a multi-drop configuration in the BTS. + +![Sequence diagram for Disconnect Multi-drop Link](2eb23c2210154279f8013a1594fbcc5a_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram illustrating the Disconnect Multi-drop Link procedure between a BSC and a BTS: + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + Note left of BSC: Disconnect Multi-drop Link + BSC-->>BTS: Request + Note right of BTS: ACK/NACK + BTS-->>BSC: Response +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: The specified multi-drop link connection has been disconnected. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 20. + +Sequence diagram for Disconnect Multi-drop Link + +## 6.5 Air Interface Management Procedures + +### 6.5.1 Set BTS Attributes + +This message shall be sent to provide an object instance on BTS with all the necessary attributes relating to that BTS object. This message does also include common information for all logical channels of one type, e.g., CCCH parameters. + +![Sequence diagram for Set BTS Attributes](552ca016af3d6240648ab5a2cad97f60_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram illustrating the Set BTS Attributes procedure between a BSC and a BTS: + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + Note left of BSC: Set BTS Attributes + BSC-->>BTS: Request + Note right of BTS: ACK/NACK + BTS-->>BSC: Response +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: All specified BTS attributes have been set. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 23. + +Sequence diagram for Set BTS Attributes + +### 6.5.2 Set Radio Carrier Attributes + +This message shall be used to set a Radio Carrier's RF-related attributes such as the frequencies and the power. + +![Sequence diagram for Set Radio Carrier Attributes](5c6787bac31274e2dc992efeca74b303_img.jpg) + +Sequence diagram illustrating the Set Radio Carrier Attributes procedure between a BSC and a BTS: + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + Note left of BSC: Set Radio Carrier Attributes + BSC-->>BTS: Request + Note right of BTS: ACK/NACK + BTS-->>BSC: Response +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: All specified Radio Carrier attributes have been set. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 1B, 23. + +Sequence diagram for Set Radio Carrier Attributes + +### 6.5.3 Set Channel Attributes + +This message shall be sent for each Channel instance to give the channel combination as defined in 3GPP TS 45.002 for that time slot. It shall be possible to send one message, if all 8 radio time slots need the same attribute value. This shall be done by not addressing one specific Channel instance in the *Instance* field in the header, but using a broadcast address. The message may include starting time. + +![](79e1709a7317ead45379cbb8ff3ba802_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + Note over BSC, BTS: Set Channel Attributes + BSC->>BTS: Set Channel Attributes + Note over BSC, BTS: ACK/NACK + BTS-->>BSC: ACK/NACK + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: All specified channel attributes have been set. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 23. + +## 6.6 Test Management Procedures + +### 6.6.1 Perform Test + +This message shall be used to tell the BTS to perform a test, if necessary to set a physical configuration for the BSC to carry out a test on the BTS, or to perform a test using a particular configuration. Any measurements may be performed as specific tests. Duration for the test can be given, after which the test report may be autonomously sent if so requested. + +Three tests are defined. + +- 1) A radio loop test via the antenna shall be used to test all equipment needed to provide service of one traffic channel. The loop starts and ends in the transceiver baseband parts and loops one traffic channel back in the air interface i.e., using actual antenna equipment. The baseband parts of the transceiver calculate the bit error rate to describe the quality of service that channel provides. +- 2) A radio loop test via the transceiver shall be used to test most of the equipment needed to provide service of one traffic channel. The loop starts and ends in the transceiver baseband parts and loops one traffic channel back inside the transceiver before the antenna combining equipment. The baseband parts of the transceiver calculate the bit error rate to describe the quality of service that channel provides. This test can be used in conjunction with the previous test to discriminate the location of a possible hardware failure. +- 3) A functional object self test shall be used to activate an internal self test procedure of a functional object on the BTS made to test equipment that provides the services of the functional object. By its nature this test and its results are proprietary. + +![](608f1b5ef8f3dc0723f2b4ea1fb72be2_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + Note over BSC, BTS: Perform Test + BSC->>BTS: Perform Test + Note over BSC, BTS: ACK/NACK + BTS-->>BSC: ACK/NACK + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: Test configuration has been set (if necessary) and the specified test has been started. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 1C, 1D, 1E. + +### 6.6.2 Test Report + +This message shall be sent by the BTS giving the result of a test ordered by the BSC and is sent autonomously as soon as the result is available. A *Test Report* shall also be sent after a specific request from the BSC by a *Send Test Report* message. The *Test Report* indicates what was tested, the test type, and the result. No Ack or Nack is returned to the BTS. + +![](35127fe87029df6f5f0b2ee85f6193f1_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + Note over BSC, BTS: Test Report + BTS->>BSC: Test Report + +``` + +### 6.6.3 Send Test Report + +This message shall be sent from the BSC to ask for the result/report of a test which was not to be sent autonomously now to be started being reported. If the test result was already made to be autonomously reported, this message can also be used to have the present result of the test be reported immediately. The message must include identification of the test. + +![](e180f2b5fcbe8001554a7c0677cd3f82_img.jpg) + +``` + + BSC BTS + Send Test Report +--------------------------------------> + ACK/NACK +<-------------------------------------- + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: The specified test report will be sent. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 1C, 1F. + +### 6.6.4 Stop Test + +This message shall be used by the BSC to stop a continuously recurring test at the BTS, to reset a physical test configuration to the normal configuration, or to stop the test and to restore to the normal physical configuration. The message must include identification of the test being performed. + +![](90ddf538ef276510e2b631f7b96654e6_img.jpg) + +``` + + BSC BTS + Stop Test +--------------------------------------> + ACK/NACK +<-------------------------------------- + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: The specified test has been stopped and test configuration reset to normal (if necessary). +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 20, 21, 22. + +## 6.7 State Management and Event Report Procedures + +### 6.7.1 State Changed Event Report + +An unsolicited report shall be sent from the BTS to the BSC whenever a change of the operational state or of the optional manufacturer dependent state of a managed object defined in the present document occurs. The message shall be also sent when any site input changes its state. + +A failure, causing change of operational state, shall generate two event reports: *State Changed Event Report* and *Failure Event Report*. + +No Ack or Nack is returned to the BTS. + +![](421fc75480c21e7ebb25756826652367_img.jpg) + +``` + + BSC BTS + State Changed Event Report +<-------------------------------------- + +``` + +### 6.7.2 Failure Event Report + +An unsolicited report shall be sent from the BTS to the BSC whenever failure events occur in the BTS. + +Such failure events are: + +- fault in a resource resulting from passing a threshold but not constituting a failure; +- failure of a resource. + +Pertaining to a failure, there shall be a report for its start and another for its cease. + +A failure causing change of operational state shall generate two event reports: *State Changed Event Report* and *Failure Event Report*. + +No Ack or Nack is returned to the BTS. + +![](6efcea66501271e9ea36cf33982f08d5_img.jpg) + +``` + + BSC BTS + Failure Event Report +<-------------------------------------- + +``` + +### 6.7.3 Stop Sending Event Reports + +This inhibition of sending of event reports shall be used by the BSC to prevent a flood of event reports which are of no benefit to the BSC. One example of this occurs at a BTS restart following a power failure. The operational capability of the BTS hardware is unlikely to be different from what it was before the failure, and a flood of reports, each stating that a piece of hardware is operating, will delay the software download. Another example concerns the case of a frequently occurring transient fault. + +![](d9c0a780cd22626253dab4aa41699e2f_img.jpg) + +``` + + BSC BTS + Stop Sending Events Reports + ------------------------------------------> + + ACK/NACK + <------------------------------------------ + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: Sending of specified Event Report has been stopped. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): None. + +### 6.7.4 Restart Sending Event Reports + +When the BTS is back in normal operation or if it is of interest to check whether the BTS still generates a flood of Event Reports, a Restart Sending Event Reports shall be sent. + +![](6f31cdb576d2f15c35c3f266e5f59211_img.jpg) + +``` + + BSC BTS + Restart Sending Events Reports + ------------------------------------------> + + ACK/NACK + <------------------------------------------ + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: Sending of specified Event Report has been restarted. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): None. + +### 6.7.5 Change Administrative State + +The Change Administrative State message shall be used by the BSC to change the administrative state (as specified by specification GSM 12.20) of a managed object. + +![](86d30a7d5a9cd4ee5456b5962ae3420a_img.jpg) + +``` + + BSC BTS + Change Administrative State + ------------------------------------------> + + ACK/NACK + <------------------------------------------ + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: The specified change of administrative state has been performed. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): None. + +### 6.7.6 Change Administrative State Request + +This request message shall be sent by the BTS when there is a need to change the administrative state of a managed object at the BTS site. This message can only be initiated as a result of a local MMI command. + +![](414cf5c0e2959c558de57a9fb5c2134a_img.jpg) + +``` + + BSC BTS + Change Administrative State Request + <------------------------------------------ + + ACK/NACK + ------------------------------------------> + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: The request is granted and a change administrative state message will be sent. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 28, 29. + +### 6.7.7 Report Outstanding Alarms + +This message shall be used by the BSC to ask BTS to report all outstanding alarms related to the object instance indicated in the message. The BTS shall report alarms by sending a series of *Failure Event Report* messages for all + +outstanding alarms. Only those alarms previously reported and still outstanding shall be re-reported through this procedure. Any new alarms not yet reported but about to be reported shall be excluded and they shall be reported through a separate *Failure Event Report* procedure spontaneously initiated by the BTS itself. If there is no outstanding alarm, the BTS shall reply with a NACK with that cause indicated. + +![](4b87467ad9642943235f48f7d4b59449_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + Note over BSC, BTS: Report Outstanding Alarms + BSC->>BTS: ----------------------------------------------------------------------> + Note over BSC, BTS: ACK/NACK + BTS-->>BSC: <---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: Sending of *Failure Event Report* will start. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 28, 29, 2A. + +## 6.8 Equipment Management Procedures + +### 6.8.1 Change-over + +This message shall be sent to change over between active and standby units of equipment. The action may be performed on any addressable BTS entity, manufacturer dependent HW units included. Which type of HW unit to address and how to identify certain units of this type of HW are manufacturer dependent. + +![](19a5f0db57a21a0e82a7f326083e96fd_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + Note over BSC, BTS: Changeover + BSC->>BTS: ----------------------------------------------------------------------> + Note over BSC, BTS: ACK/NACK + BTS-->>BSC: <---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: The specified change-over operation has been performed. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 19, 1A, 1E, 23. + +### 6.8.2 Opstart + +This message shall be sent by the BSC to tell the BTS to attempt to operate the identified object putting it to an initial normal operational state (i.e., "enabled", see subclause 5.3.2). This message does not affect the object's administrative state if there exists a value explicitly assigned by the BSC. If there is yet no administrative state value explicitly set by the BSC (e.g., at an initialization time), the object shall be presumed to be administratively locked by default. No BTS function is required to be responsible for testing the operability of the identified resource as a consequence of this message. Prior to this message being issued, all necessary physical and logical preparations (such as repair of equipment, software downloading, parameter setting, etc., as needed) are expected to have been completed. If the object is in fact not ready to be in an enabled state, the object will be in a fault condition as a consequence of this message, and the condition shall be handled by the object's normal fault handling function as the condition is detected. + +![](a3953dce8dbd7ef15d61a314dbef2cf9_img.jpg) + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + Note over BSC, BTS: Opstart + BSC->>BTS: ----------------------------------------------------------------------> + Note over BSC, BTS: ACK/NACK + BTS-->>BSC: <---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: The BTS has reset the operational state of the specified object to "enabled" state. +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 19, 1A, 23. + +### 6.8.3 Reinitialize + +This message shall be sent by the BSC to tell the BTS to have specified hardware resource of the indicated object start a re-initialization procedure as sketched in figure 2. The specifics of a re-initialization procedure, which typically takes place at the time of a cold start of the resource, is manufacturer-dependent. For a software reinitialization, *Activate SW* message shall be used. + +![](26d664119ad25250780f554633444e54_img.jpg) + +``` + + BSC BTS. + Reinitialize + ------------------------------------> + ACK/NACK + <------------------------------------ + +``` + +**Meaning of Ack message:** The BTS has received the message and is about to start a reinitialization of the specified resource. + +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 19, 1A, 23. + +### 6.8.4 Set Site Outputs + +This message shall be sent by the BSC to tell the BTS to set specified site outputs to the specified state. + +![](e7c6a6e4c3047dac05a3b92e396e9794_img.jpg) + +``` + + BSC BTS + Set Site Outputs + ------------------------------------> + ACK/NACK + <------------------------------------ + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: The outputs have been set. + +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): None. + +## 6.9 Measurement Management Procedures + +### 6.9.1 Measurement Result Request + +This message shall be used by the BSC to request the result of a certain measurement which is running in the BTS to be sent to the BSC. After having responded with the current result, the BTS initializes the measurement result buffer (e.g. setting to zero) and continues the measurement. + +![](f7d969388c4f7e30cd04a061314bfa0e_img.jpg) + +``` + + BSC BTS + Measurement Result Request + ------------------------------------> + Response/NACK + <------------------------------------ + +``` + +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 2A, 2B. + +### 6.9.2 Measurement Result Response + +This message shall be used by the BTS to successfully respond to the BSC on an associated *Measurement Result Request* completing a *Measurement Result Request* elementary procedure. By this message, the presently registered measurement result requested shall be reported. If it is not possible for any reason, a NACK message must be used instead of this. + +### 6.9.3 Stop Measurement + +This message shall be used by the BSC to stop a continuously running measurement at the BTS. The message must include identification of the measurement to be stopped. + +![](ddf1f9a87890faf15bf38af2732b7020_img.jpg) + +``` + + BSC BTS + Stop Measurement + ------------------------------------> + ACK/NACK + <------------------------------------ + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: The specified measurement has been stopped + +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 2A + +### 6.9.4 Start Measurement + +This message shall be used by the BSC to start a measurement continuously at the BTS. The message must include identification of the measurement to be started. + +![](e821c3d8a87ee2a9ff6b8644ffe6bdae_img.jpg) + +``` + + BSC BTS + Start Measurement + ---------------------------------------------> + + ACK/NACK + <--------------------------------------------- + +``` + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + BSC->>BTS: Start Measurement + BTS->>BSC: ACK/NACK + +``` + +Meaning of Ack message: The specified measurement has been started +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): 2A + +## 6.10 Miscellaneous Procedures + +### 6.10.1 Get Attributes + +This message shall be used by the BSC to tell the BTS to send attributes which have previously been set by the BTS. It may be used as a check on accuracy and be incorporated into normal procedures, or may be used by the BSC to recover information which it has lost. + +![](bb3354f497635d15bef873577125c48d_img.jpg) + +``` + + BSC BTS + Get Attributes + ---------------------------------------------> + + Response/NACK + <--------------------------------------------- + +``` + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + BSC->>BTS: Get Attributes + BTS->>BSC: Response/NACK + +``` + +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): None. + +### 6.10.2 Set Alarm Threshold + +This message shall be used by the BSC to tell the BTS some threshold parameters related to fault thresholds. + +![](e05c1a13b44ab41505609d82b00cf4df_img.jpg) + +``` + + BSC BTS + Set Alarm Threshold + ---------------------------------------------> + + ACK/NACK + <--------------------------------------------- + +``` + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant BSC + participant BTS + BSC->>BTS: Set Alarm Threshold + BTS->>BSC: ACK/NACK + +``` + +Message specific Nack causes (see subclause 9.4.36): None. + +### 6.10.3 Get Attributes Response + +This message shall be used by the BTS to successfully respond to the BSC on an associated *Get Attribute* elementary procedure. By this message, the presently set values of all requested attributes shall be reported. Otherwise, a NACK message shall be used instead of this. + +# 7 Structured Procedures + +Applicable structured A-bis procedures are described in GSM 12.22. + +# 8 Message Details + +The formats of all messages in subclauses 8.3 through 8.11 are described each by a table format illustration with no formal text description provided because of the self-explanatory nature of the illustration. + +## 8.1 Message Categories + +This subclause defines the transport format and coding of the four Network Management message categories sent over the Abis interface. The various message categories may be sent in either direction. In each message, the message discriminator identifies the category and is transmitted first. In a message the octets must be sent in the order shown in the description of the messages. In an octet, bit 1 must be transmitted first. + +In the following subclauses, M and O denote whether information elements are mandatory or optional. + +### 8.1.1 Formatted O&M Messages + +The message format and coding of these messages are as below. + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | M/O | LENGTH | CODING | | +|-----------------------|-----|--------|--------|-----------------| +| | | | 8 | 1 | +| Message Discriminator | M | 1 | 1 | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | +| Placement Indicator | M | 1 | 1 | 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 | +| Sequence Number | M | 1 | 1 | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 | +| Length Indicator | M | 1 | 1 | 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | +| O&M Data Field | M | V | 1 | 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | + +NOTE 1: The meanings and codings of the Placement Indicator are: + +- only: This message is contained within one segment      1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0; +- first: The first segment of a multi-segment message      0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0; +- middle: A middle segment of a multi-segment message      0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0; +- last: The last segment of a multi-segment message      0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0. + +NOTE 2: This is the sequence number of the segment in the message, modulo 256, starting with 00000000. Thus a single segment message is here coded 00000000. The number can be incremented unlimitedly being wrapped around the modulo to transport very long multi-segment messages. + +NOTE 3: The Length Indicator gives the length of the O&M data field in the message segment being transported which is less than or equal to 255 octets. This length indicator should not be confused with the actual length of the message at the logical level that may go over multiple segments. This length indicator should not be confused also with attribute value length indicator described in subclause 8.2. + +NOTE 4: Coding for O&M Data field is found in subclause 8.2 and the following subclauses. + +### 8.1.2 MMI Transfer + +The message format and coding of these messages are as below. + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | M/O | LENGTH | CODING | | +|-----------------------|-----|--------|--------|---------------------------| +| | | | 8 | 1 | +| Message Discriminator | M | 1 | 0 | 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | +| Placement Indicator | M | 1 | 1 | note 1 of subclause 8.1.1 | +| Sequence Number | M | 1 | 1 | note 2 of subclause 8.1.1 | +| Length Indicator | M | 1 | 1 | Binary, 1) | +| MMI Data Field | M | V | 1 | Proprietary | + +NOTE: The Length Indicator gives the length of the MMI data field in the message segment being transported which is less than or equal to 255 octets. See also note 3 of subclause 8.1.1. + +The protocol for MMI is not covered in the present document. + +### 8.1.3 TRAU O&M Messages + +These messages are required for option (ii) of subclause 4.10.1 of specification GSM 08.60. The message format is as below. + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | M/O | LENGTH | CODING | | +|-----------------------|-----|--------|--------|---------------| +| | | | 8 | 1 | +| Message Discriminator | M | 1 | 0 | 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 | +| Channel Number | M | 1 | 1) | | +| Repetition Indicator | M | 1 | 2) | | +| TRAU O&M Message | O | 33 | 3) | | + +NOTE 1: The channel number element shall be coded as defined for the octet of the channel number information element of specification 3GPP TS 48.058. + +NOTE 2: The meanings and codings of the Repetition Indicator are: + +- terminate sending of O&M TRAU frames: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1; +- repeat sending of O&M TRAU frames every 20 ms until a terminate order is received 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0; +- send O&M TRAU frame once: 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0. + +NOTE 3: The TRAU O&M message is not sent when the Repetition Indicator is set to 00000001, but sending of the TRAU O&M message is mandatory otherwise. All 264 bits of the TRAU O&M frame information field are sent unchanged in the 33 octets. + +### 8.1.4 Manufacturer-Defined O&M messages + +The message format and coding of these messages is as below. + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | M/O | LENGTH | CODING | | +|------------------------|-----|--------|---------------------------|---------------| +| | | | 8 | 1 | +| Message Discriminator | M | 1 | 0 | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | +| Placement Indicator | M | 1 | note 1 of subclause 8.1.1 | | +| Sequence Number | M | 1 | note 2 of subclause 8.1.1 | | +| Length Indicator | M | 1 | Binary, 1) | | +| ManId Length Indicator | M | 1 | Binary, 2) | | +| Manuf. Identifier | M | V | 3) | | +| Man-Def O&M Data Field | M | V | Proprietary | | + +NOTE 1: The Length Indicator gives the length of the Manufacturer-defined O&M data field in the message segment being transported which is less than or equal to 255 octets. See also note 3 of subclause 8.1.1 + +NOTE 2: The Length Indicator gives the length of the Manufacturer Identifier field which must be less than or equal to 255 octets. + +NOTE 3: The Manufacturer Identifier is an octet string of maximally 255 octets. This value, to be appropriately determined by an arrangement between the operator and the manufacturer, may or may not be related to the value of the attribute *Manufacturer Id* (Attribute Id: 1E) listed in subclause 9.4. + +Remarks: Since the Data Field of messages of this category is not subject to a GSM standardization, it should be noted that a compliance to messages of this category does not guarantee an interoperability between different manufacturers. + +## 8.2 Structure of Formatted O&M Messages + +This subclause provides details of all the formatted O&M messages. + +In every case when particular header octets provide no usable information at the receiver, they shall be coded all 1's. + +All fields in the messages are marked with M for Mandatory or O for Optional. This indicates whether the field is mandatory or optional to be contained in a message, and **not** whether it is mandatory or optional to be used or set for every BTS. This allows to change a single attribute without having to repeat all the attributes not to be changed. + +The header fields of formatted O&M messages (see below) are always mandatory. The attributes defined for a certain message supported by the BTS implementation are mandatory to be used if not stated otherwise in an explanatory note. + +The first octet of the formatted O&M messages shall identify the message types. Some messages are replied by an ACK or a NACK response. The replies shall be distinguished by different codings of the message type (the first octet of formatted O&M messages). See subclause 9.1. + +ACK messages shall return all the attributes in the original message. NACK messages shall add a *Nack cause* field (two octets) at the end of the message. + +None of the messages concerned requires all of the capacity available in a Layer 2 segment, so the NACK message will not need a second Layer 2 frame. + +An ACK to a number of *Load Data Segments* shall consist of only the header with the 'Load Data Segment Ack' message type. + +All attributes shall overwrite those defined in an earlier message since start-up or the last restart. Optional attributes provide new information if they have not been defined in an earlier message. + +The message type and managed object identification are given in the message header as is illustrated below: + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | + +The Object Class information element shall be filled in with the correct information in accordance with the present document. + +The Object Instance information element shall contain three fields: + +- 1) the BTS Number identifies one BTS in a multi cell site; +- 2) the Baseband Transceiver number or the Radio Carrier number identifies which Baseband Transceiver or Radio Carrier is concerned in the message; +- 3) the third element identifies a radio timeslot (0-7) of the Baseband Transceiver identified by 2). + +For further information see subclause 9.3. + +The FORMAT field describes the structure of each information element using T(Tag), L(Length) and V(Value) coding. *T* is the attribute identifier. *V* is the actual information presented. *L* must be indicated if the the information element is of variable length and its prediction is not possible in the context . *L* shall binary-represent in a two octet space the the number of octets in the remaining part of information element. Note that this Length code differs from the "Length Indicator" described in subclause 8.1. + +## 8.3 SW Download Management Messages + +### 8.3.1 Load Data Initiate + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| SW Description | 9.4.62 | M | TV | >=2 | +| Window Size | 9.4.59 | M | TV | 2 | + +### 8.3.2 Load Data Segment + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| File Data | 9.4.17 | M (note) | TLV | >=2 | + +NOTE: *File Data* is segments of the actual file to be transferred. + +### 8.3.3 Load Data Abort + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | + +### 8.3.4 Load Data End + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| SW Description | 9.4.62 | M (note) | TV | >=2 | + +NOTE: The same SW Description as in the corresponding Load Data Initiate message. + +### 8.3.5 SW Activate Request + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| HW Configuration | 9.4.62 | M | TLV | >=2 | +| SW Configuration | 9.4.61 | M | TLV | >=2 | + +### 8.3.6 Activate SW + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| SW Description | 9.4.62 | O (note) | TV | >=2 | + +NOTE: *SW Descriptions* may be repeated for multiple software activation. No SW Description entry implies all software for the object instance. + +### 8.3.7 SW Activated Report + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | + +## 8.4 A-bis Interface Management Messages + +### 8.4.1 Establish TEI + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| TEI | 9.4.54 | M | TV | 2 | +| Abis Channel | 9.4.1 | M | TV | 4 | + +### 8.4.2 Connect Terrestrial Signalling + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Abis Channel | 9.4.1 | M | TV | 4 | + +### 8.4.3 Disconnect Terrestrial Signalling + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Abis Channel | 9.4.1 | M | TV | 4 | + +### 8.4.4 Connect Terrestrial Traffic + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Abis Channel | 9.4.1 | M | TV | 4 | +| Radio Sub Channel | 9.4.46 | O | TV | 2 | + +### 8.4.5 Disconnect Terrestrial Traffic + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Abis Channel | 9.4.1 | M | TV | 4 | +| Radio Sub Channel | 9.4.46 | O | TV | 2 | + +## 8.5 Transmission Management Messages + +### 8.5.1 Connect Multi-drop link + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|--------------------------|-----------|------------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Multi-drop BSC Link | 9.4.34 | M (note 1) | TV | 3 | +| Multi-drop next BTS Link | 9.4.35 | M (note 2) | TV | 3 | + +NOTE 1: This attribute specifies the incoming (in BSC direction) 64 kbps timeslot to be set up to another BTS in a multi-drop configuration. + +NOTE 2: This attribute specifies the outgoing (to the next BTS direction) 64 kbps timeslot to be set up through the BTS in a multi-drop configuration. + +### 8.5.2 Disconnect Multi-drop link + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|--------------------------|-----------|------------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Multi-drop BSC Link | 9.4.34 | M (note 1) | TV | 3 | +| Multi-drop next BTS Link | 9.4.35 | M (note 2) | TV | 3 | + +NOTE 1: This attribute specifies the incoming (in BSC direction) 64 kbps timeslot to be taken down from another BTS in a multi-drop configuration. + +NOTE 2: This attribute specifies the outgoing (to the next BTS direction) 64 kbps timeslot to be taken down through the BTS in a multi-drop configuration. + +## 8.6 Air Interface Management Messages + +### 8.6.1 Set BTS Attributes + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|-------------------------------|-----------|-------------------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Interference Level Boundaries | 9.4.25 | O (note 1) | TV | 7 | +| Intave Parameter | 9.4.24 | O | TV | 2 | +| Connection Failure Criterion | 9.4.14 | O | TLV | >=4 | +| T200 | 9.4.53 | O (note 2) | TV | 8 | +| Max Timing Advance | 9.4.31 | O (note 3) | TV | 2 | +| Overload Period | 9.4.39 | O (note 5) | TLV | >=2 | +| CCCH Load Threshold | 9.4.12 | O (notes 4 and 5) | TV | 2 | +| CCCH Load Indication Period | 9.4.11 | O (note 5) | TV | 2 | +| RACH Busy Threshold | 9.4.44 | O (note 5) | TV | 2 | +| RACH Load Averaging Slots | 9.4.45 | O (note 5) | TV | 3 | +| BTS Air Timer | 9.4.10 | O | TV | 2 | +| NY1 | 9.4.37 | O | TV | 2 | +| BCCH ARFCN | 9.4.8 | O | TV | 3 | +| BSIC | 9.4.9 | O | TV | 2 | +| Starting Time | 9.4.52 | O (note 6) | TV | 3 | + +NOTE 1: Interference Level Boundaries Boundary 0 + (see 3GPP TS 45.008) Boundary x1 + | + | + Boundary x5 + +NOTE 2: For FACCH and SACCH. + +NOTE 3: Optional in BTS design and administration use. + +NOTE 4: Presentation of the load threshold in 1% steps. + +NOTE 5: These attributes are special CCCH Parameters + +NOTE 6: For synchronisation of when the specific action defined in the message shall be performed. Needed only to change BCCH ARFCN or BSIC while in operation. + +### 8.6.2 Set Radio Carrier Attributes + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|------------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| RF Max Power Reduction | 9.4.47 | O | TV | 2 | +| ARFCN list | 9.4.5 | O (note) | TLV | >=2 | + +NOTE: The structure of value will vary depending on the mode of frequency hopping supported. + +### 8.6.3 Set Channel Attributes + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|------------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Channel Combination | 9.4.13 | O | TV | 2 | +| HSN | 9.4.21 | O (note 1) | TV | 2 | +| MAIO | 9.4.27 | O (note 1) | TV | 2 | +| ARFCN list | 9.4.5 | O (note 2) | TLV | >=2 | +| Starting Time | 9.4.52 | O (note 3) | TV | 3 | +| TSC | 9.4.60 | O (note 4) | TV | 2 | + +NOTE 1: Used only in a hopping channel. + +NOTE 2: If frequency hopping is not in use, the only frequency of the Radio Carrier is set with the message Radio Carrier Attributes. + +NOTE 3: For synchronisation of when the specific action defined in the message shall be performed. + +NOTE 4: A NULL value signifies that the BCC shall be used as the TSC value for the channel. + +## 8.7 Test Management Messages + +### 8.7.1 Perform Test + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|------------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Test No | 9.4.56 | M | TV | 2 | +| Autonomously Report | 9.4.6 | M | TV | 2 | +| Test Duration | 9.4.55 | O | TV | 3 | +| Physical Configuration | 9.4.40 | O (note) | TLV | >=2 | + +NOTE: Use of *Physical Configuration* depends on the need on extra information in setting up specific test configurations. + +### 8.7.2 Test Report + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Test No | 9.4.56 | M | TV | 2 | +| Test Report Info | 9.4.57 | M (note) | TLV | >=2 | + +NOTE: The test report information may give a numerical result or an indication of the range into which the test report falls. + +### 8.7.3 Send Test Report + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Test No | 9.4.56 | M | TV | 2 | + +### 8.7.4 Stop Test + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Test No | 9.4.56 | M | TV | 2 | + +## 8.8 State Management and Event Report Messages + +### 8.8.1 State Changed Event Report + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Operational State | 9.4.38 | O | TV | 2 | +| Availability Status | 9.4.7 | O | TLV | >=2 | +| Man.dep. State | 9.4.28 | O | TV | 2 | +| Site Inputs | 9.4.48 | O | TLV | >=2 | + +### 8.8.2 Failure Event Report + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|----------------------------|-----------|-------------------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Event Type | 9.4.16 | M | TV | 2 | +| Perceived Severity | 9.4.63 | M | TV | 2 | +| Probable Cause | 9.4.43 | M | TV | 4 | +| Specific Problems | 9.4.51 | O (note 1) | TV | 2 | +| HW Description | 9.4.23 | O (notes 1 and 2) | TV | >=2 | +| SW Description | 9.4.62 | O (notes 1 and 2) | TV | >=2 | +| Additional Text | 9.4.3 | O (note 1) | TLV | >=2 | +| Additional Info | 9.4.2 | O (note 1) | TLV | >=2 | +| Outstanding Alarm Sequence | 9.4.65 | O (note 3) | TV | 2 | + +NOTE 1: Depending on the nature of the specific failure and the BTS implementation, only the needed and supported attributes shall be sent. + +NOTE 2: This field shall be included to identify the specific associated equipment or software in case the addressed functional object alone is not sufficient to localize the failure. + +NOTE 3: This field shall be included if and only if this report is a response to a *Report Outstanding Alarms* message. + +### 8.8.3 Stop Sending Event Reports + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|------------------------------|-----------|------------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Operational State | 9.4.38 | O (note 1) | TV | 2 | +| Availability Status | 9.4.7 | O (note 1) | TLV | >=2 | +| Manufacturer Dependant State | 9.4.28 | O (note 1) | TV | 2 | +| Probable Cause | 9.4.43 | O (note 1) | TV | 4 | +| Specific Problems | 9.4.51 | O (note 1) | TV | 2 | + +NOTE 1: Stop sending event reports concerning events with any of the parameter values in this attribute list. Depending on the type of event report that shall be stopped, one or some of the attributes shall be sent. The effect of multiple optional attributes in one message is that only those events that satisfy all the attributes simultaneously shall stop. The effect of repeated uses of this message with each different optional attribute is accumulative, thus, is different from the effect of putting all the optional attributes listed together at once in one message. If there occurs any inconsistency or confusion between the conditions for stopping and starting (see subclause 8.8.4), the event shall be reported instead of being stopped. + +NOTE 2: This message with no optional attributes means that all event reports shall be stopped from now. + +### 8.8.4 Restart Sending Event Reports + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|------------------------------|-----------|------------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Operational State | 9.4.38 | O (note 1) | TV | 2 | +| Availability Status | 9.4.7 | O (note 1) | TLV | >=2 | +| Manufacturer Dependent State | 9.4.28 | O (note 1) | TV | 2 | +| Probable Cause | 9.4.43 | O (note 1) | TV | 4 | +| Specific Problems | 9.4.51 | O (note 1) | TV | 2 | + +NOTE 1: Restart sending event reports concerning events with any of the parameter values in this attribute list. Depending on the type of event report that needs to be restarted, one or some of the attributes shall be sent. The effect of multiple optional attributes is just same as multiple messages repeated with each attribute one by one and events that satisfy any one of the attribute set shall be reported. Note the difference from the condition stated in note 1 of subclause 8.8.3. + +NOTE 2: This message with no optional attributes means that all event reports shall be started from now. + +### 8.8.5 Change Administrative State + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|----------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Administrative State | 9.4.4 | M (note) | TV | 2 | + +NOTE: Required new administrative state for the specified managed object. + +### 8.8.6 Change Administrative State Request + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|----------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Administrative State | 9.4.4 | M (note) | TV | 2 | + +NOTE: The requested administrative state for the specified managed object. + +### 8.8.7 Report Outstanding Alarms + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | + +## 8.9 Equipment Management Messages + +### 8.9.1 Changeover + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|------------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Source | 9.4.50 | M (note 1) | TLV | >=2 | +| Destination | 9.4.15 | M (note 2) | TLV | >=2 | + +NOTE 1: *Source* is the manufacturer dependent identity of piece of equipment that shall be taken out of active servicing (changed-over from) and replaced by the *Destination*. + +NOTE 2: *Destination* is the manufacturer dependent identity of piece of equipment that shall be put into active servicing (changed-over to) in place of the *Source*. + +### 8.9.2 Opstart + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | + +### 8.9.3 Reinitialize + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| HW Description | 9.4.23 | O (note) | TV | >=2 | + +NOTE: *HW Descriptions* may be repeated for multiple resources. If no *HW Description* is provided, all resource for the object is implied. For a software reinitialization, *Activate SW* message shall be used. + +### 8.9.4 Set Site Outputs + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Site Outputs | 9.4.49 | M | TLV | >=2 | + +### 8.9.5 Change HW Configuration + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|---------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Site Outputs | 9.4.49 | M | TLV | >=2 | + +## 8.10 Measurement Management Messages + +### 8.10.1 Measurement Result Request + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|------------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Measurement Identifier | 9.4.33 | M | TV | 2 | + +### 8.10.2 Measurement Result Response + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|------------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Measurement Identifier | 9.4.33 | M | TV | 2 | +| Measurement Result | 9.4.32 | M | TLV | >= 2 | + +### 8.10.3 Start Measurement + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|------------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Measurement Identifier | 9.4.33 | M | TV | 2 | + +### 8.10.4 Stop Measurement + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|------------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Measurement Identifier | 9.4.33 | M | TV | 2 | + +## 8.11 Miscellaneous Messages + +### 8.11.1 Get Attributes + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|-----------------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| List of Required Attributes | 9.4.26 | M (note) | TLV | >=2 | + +NOTE: Any of the attributes defined in subclause 9.4, including those **not** marked with an X in the GET column, can be requested by *Get Attributes* message. + +### 8.11.2 Set Alarm Threshold + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|-----------------------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Probable Cause | 9.4.43 | M | TV | 4 | +| Power Output Thresholds | 9.4.42 | O | TV | 4 | +| VSWR Thresholds | 9.4.58 | O | TV | 3 | +| Manufacturer Dependent Thresholds | 9.4.29 | O | TLV | >=2 | + +### 8.11.3 Get Attribute Response + +| INFORMATION ELEMENT | REFERENCE | PRESENCE | FORMAT | LENGTH | +|-----------------------------|-----------|----------|--------|--------| +| Message Type | 9.1 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Class | 9.2 | M | V | 1 | +| Object Instance | 9.3 | M | V | 3 | +| Get Attribute Response Info | 9.4.64 | M | TLV | >=4 | + +# 9 Coding + +This clause defines the coding of each field in the messages defined in earlier clauses. + +The following conventions are required: + +- the least significant bit shall be transmitted first, followed by bits 2, 3, 4, etc; +- in an element where octets are identified by an octet number, Octet 1 shall be transmitted first, then octet 2, etc; + +- when a field extends over more than one octet, the order of bit values shall progressively decrease as the octet number increases. The least significant bit of the field shall be represented by the lowest numbered bit of the highest numbered octet of the field; +- for unpredictable variable length elements, a length indication coding method defined in subclause 8.2 shall be used. Always the length information shall indicate the number of element units (which is octets) following the length indicator excluding the space for the length indicator itself; +- all defined values are indicated in the present document. Other values are reserved. + +## 9.1 Message Type + +The Message Type is coded with 1 octet as illustrated below. + +![](107da2e3495b2f24352c9e3b26ec4841_img.jpg) + +| | | +|---------------------|----------| +| Message Type | 1 | +|---------------------|----------| + +The following message types are used (all other values reserved). + +| Message Type | hexadecimal code | +|---------------------------------------------|------------------| +| SW Download Management Messages: | | +| Load Data Initiate | 01 | +| Load Data Initiate Ack | 02 | +| Load Data Initiate Nack | 03 | +| Load Data Segment | 04 | +| Load Data Segment Ack | 05 | +| Load Data Abort | 06 | +| Load Data End | 07 | +| Load Data End Ack | 08 | +| Load Data End Nack | 09 | +| SW Activate Request | 0A | +| SW Activate Request Ack | 0B | +| SW Activate Request Nack | 0C | +| Activate SW | 0D | +| Activate SW Ack | 0E | +| Activate SW Nack | 0F | +| SW Activated Report | 10 | +| A-bis Interface Management Messages: | | +| Establish TEI | 21 | +| Establish TEI Ack | 22 | +| Establish TEI Nack | 23 | +| Connect Terrestrial Signalling | 24 | +| Connect Terrestrial Signalling Ack | 25 | + +| | | +|----------------------------------------|----| +| Connect Terrestrial Signalling Nack | 26 | +| Disconnect Terrestrial Signalling | 27 | +| Disconnect Terrestrial Signalling Ack | 28 | +| Disconnect Terrestrial Signalling Nack | 29 | +| Connect Terrestrial Traffic | 2A | +| Connect Terrestrial Traffic Ack | 2B | +| Connect Terrestrial Traffic Nack | 2C | +| Disconnect Terrestrial Traffic | 2D | +| Disconnect Terrestrial Traffic Ack | 2E | +| Disconnect Terrestrial Traffic Nack | 2F | + +### **Transmission Management Messages:** + +| | | +|---------------------------------|----| +| Connect Multi-Drop Link | 31 | +| Connect Multi-Drop Link Ack | 32 | +| Connect Multi-Drop Link Nack | 33 | +| Disconnect Multi-Drop Link | 34 | +| Disconnect Multi-Drop Link Ack | 35 | +| Disconnect Multi-Drop Link Nack | 36 | + +### **Air Interface Management Messages:** + +| | | +|-----------------------------------|----| +| Set BTS Attributes | 41 | +| Set BTS Attributes Ack | 42 | +| Set BTS Attributes Nack | 43 | +| Set Radio Carrier Attributes | 44 | +| Set Radio Carrier Attributes Ack | 45 | +| Set Radio Carrier Attributes Nack | 46 | +| Set Channel Attributes | 47 | +| Set Channel Attributes Ack | 48 | +| Set Channel Attributes Nack | 49 | + +### **Test Management Messages:** + +| | | +|-----------------------|----| +| Perform Test | 51 | +| Perform Test Ack | 52 | +| Perform Test Nack | 53 | +| Test Report | 54 | +| Send Test Report | 55 | +| Send Test Report Ack | 56 | +| Send Test Report Nack | 57 | + +| | | +|----------------|----| +| Stop Test | 58 | +| Stop Test Ack | 59 | +| Stop Test Nack | 5A | + +### **State Management and Event Report Messages:** + +| | | +|------------------------------------------|----| +| State Changed Event Report | 61 | +| Failure Event Report | 62 | +| Stop Sending Event Reports | 63 | +| Stop Sending Event Reports Ack | 64 | +| Stop Sending Event Reports Nack | 65 | +| Restart Sending Event Reports | 66 | +| Restart Sending Event Reports Ack | 67 | +| Restart Sending Event Reports Nack | 68 | +| Change Administrative State | 69 | +| Change Administrative State Ack | 6A | +| Change Administrative State Nack | 6B | +| Change Administrative State Request | 6C | +| Change Administrative State Request Ack | 6D | +| Change Administrative State Request Nack | 6E | +| Report Outstanding Alarms | 93 | +| Report Outstanding Alarms Ack | 94 | +| Report Outstanding Alarms Nack | 95 | + +### **Equipment Management Messages:** + +| | | +|-------------------------|----| +| Changeover | 71 | +| Changeover Ack | 72 | +| Changeover Nack | 73 | +| Opstart | 74 | +| Opstart Ack | 75 | +| Opstart Nack | 76 | +| Reinitialize | 87 | +| Reinitialize Ack | 88 | +| Reinitialize Nack | 89 | +| Set Site Outputs | 77 | +| Set Site Outputs Ack | 78 | +| Set Site Outputs Nack | 79 | +| Change HW Configuration | 90 | + +| | | +|------------------------------|----| +| Change HW Configuration Ack | 91 | +| Change HW Configuration Nack | 92 | + +### Measurement Management Messages: + +| | | +|-----------------------------|----| +| Measurement Result Request | 8A | +| Measurement Result Response | 8B | +| Stop Measurement | 8C | +| Start Measurement | 8D | + +#### Other Messages: + +| | | +|--------------------------|----| +| Get Attributes | 81 | +| Get Attributes Response | 82 | +| Get Attributes Nack | 83 | +| Set Alarm Threshold | 84 | +| Set Alarm Threshold Ack | 85 | +| Set Alarm Threshold Nack | 86 | + +## 9.2 Object Class + +An Object Class shall be coded with 1 octet. The values of the object class code are as defined below. + +| Object Class | | 1 | +|---------------------------|------------------|---| +| Object Class | hexadecimal code | | +| Site Manager | 00 | | +| BTS | 01 | | +| Radio Carrier | 02 | | +| Baseband Transceiver | 04 | | +| Channel | 03 | | +| | <05-FE> | | +| NULL | FF | | + +## 9.3 Object Instance + +The Object Instance shall be coded with 3 octets, addressing the specific object of the given object class as illustrated below. + +| | | +|-----------------------------------------------------|---| +| BTS number | 1 | +| Baseband Transceiver or Radio Carrier number | 2 | +| Radio Timeslot number | 3 | + +All 3 octets are mandatory in the header of every message. + +The BTS number distinguishes BTSs which are unique for each cells at a site under the Site Manager. + +The Baseband Transceiver *or* Radio Carrier number distinguishes either Baseband Transceivers or Radio Carriers under the BTS. + +The Radio Timeslot number distinguishes channels under the Baseband Transceiver. + +When the object class is *Site Manager*, all three octets shall be NULLs, because there is only one Site Manager, which doesn't need an identifier. + +When the object class is *BTS*, octet 1 shall be a binary presentation of the identifier of the addressed BTS. Octets 2 and 3 shall be coded NULLs. If the BTS number is NULL, it shall be understood as referring to all BTSs under the Site Manager. + +When the object class is *Baseband Transceiver* *or* *Radio Carrier*, octet 2 shall be a binary presentation of the identifier of the addressed Baseband Transceiver or Radio Carrier object, and octet 1 is the identifier of the BTS above it. Octet 3 is coded NULL. If the Baseband Transceiver or Radio Carrier number is NULL, it shall be understood as referring to all instances of the class under the BTS. + +When the object class is *Channel*, octet 3 shall be a binary presentation of the identifier of the addressed radio timeslot, octet 2 shall be the identifier of the Baseband Transceiver, and octet 1 shall be the identifier of the BTS above the addressed Channel. If the radio timeslot number is NULL, it shall be understood as referring to all Channels under the Baseband Transceiver. + +To avoid unnecessary complexity of BTS implementation, it shall not be allowed to assign a NULL value to any object above the addressed object class. For example, if the addressed object class is the Baseband Transceiver, it is not allowed to assign a NULL value to both BTS and Baseband Transceiver instances (without this constraint, this could be understood as referring to all the Baseband Transceivers of all the BTSs). + +The value for NULL shall be in all the cases mentioned above in this subclause. + +## 9.4 Attributes and Parameters + +The Attribute Identifier is coded with 1 octet. The number of parameters within an attribute is at least one. The length of the parameters within an attribute will vary. The attributes used and the coding of their Attribute Identifier fields are listed below. The values are in hexadecimal. The attributes marked with an X in "Get" column are only *getable* by the BSC, and BSC is not permitted to alter their values. + +| Attribute Name | Attribute Id. | Get | +|------------------------------|---------------|-----| +| Abis Channel | 01 | X | +| Additional Info | 02 | | +| Additional Text | 03 | | +| Administrative State | 04 | X | +| ARFCN List | 05 | X | +| Autonomously Report | 06 | | +| Availability Status | 07 | X | +| BCCH ARFCN | 08 | X | +| BSIC | 09 | X | +| BTS Air Timer | 0A | X | +| CCCH Load Indication Period | 0B | X | +| CCCH Load Threshold | 0C | X | +| Channel Combination | 0D | X | +| Connection Failure Criterion | 0E | X | + +| | | | +|-----------------------------------|----|---| +| Destination | 0F | | +| Event Type | 11 | | +| File Data | 47 | | +| File Id | 12 | X | +| File Version | 13 | X | +| GSM Time | 14 | X | +| Get Attribute Response Info | 44 | | +| HSN | 15 | X | +| HW Configuration | 16 | X | +| HW Conf Change Info | 45 | | +| HW Description | 17 | X | +| Intave Parameter | 18 | X | +| Interference Level Boundaries | 19 | X | +| List of Required Attributes | 1A | | +| MAIO | 1B | X | +| Manufacturer Dependent State | 1C | X | +| Manufacturer Dependent Thresholds | 1D | X | +| Manufacturer Id | 1E | X | +| Max Timing Advance | 1F | X | +| Multi-drop BSC Link | 20 | | +| Multi-drop next BTS Link | 21 | | +| Nack Causes | 22 | | +| Ny1 | 23 | X | +| Operational State | 24 | X | +| Outstanding Alarm Sequence | 46 | | +| Overload Period | 25 | X | +| Physical Config | 26 | | +| Power Class | 27 | X | +| Power Output Thresholds | 28 | X | +| Probable Cause | 29 | | +| RACH Busy Threshold | 2A | X | +| RACH Load Averaging Slots | 2B | X | +| Radio Sub Channel | 2C | | +| RF Max Power Reduction | 2D | X | +| Site Inputs | 2E | X | + +| | | | +|--------------------|----|---| +| Site Outputs | 2F | X | +| Source | 30 | | +| Specific Problems | 31 | | +| Starting Time | 32 | | +| T200 | 33 | X | +| TEI | 34 | X | +| Test Duration | 35 | | +| Test No | 36 | | +| Test Report Info | 37 | | +| VSWR Thresholds | 38 | X | +| Window Size | 39 | | +| TSC | 40 | X | +| SW Configuration | 41 | X | +| SW Description | 42 | X | +| Perceived Severity | 43 | | +| Measurement Result | 48 | | +| Measurement Type | 49 | | + +All other values are reserved for future use. + +The data structures of the attributes and parameters are described in the remaining part of this subclause in tabular forms with no formal text description of the individual subclauses provided because of their self-explanatory nature. + +Henceforth "Attribute Identifier" in this subclause means the identifier for an *attribute* or a *parameter*. + +### 9.4.1 Abis Channel + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| BTS Port Number | 2 | +| Timeslot Number | 3 | +| Subslot Number | 4 | + +BTS Port Number <0-FF> + +Timeslot Number + +Time slot in 2 Mbps link <0-1F> + +Subslot Number + +a (bits 1,2) 00 + +b (bits 3,4) 01 + +c (bits 5,6) 02 + +d (bits 7,8) 03 + +64 kbps signalling FF + +### 9.4.2 Additional Info + +| | | +|----------------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| Additional Info | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +*Additional Info* is a manufacturer dependent field. + +### 9.4.3 Additional Text + +| | | +|----------------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| Additional Text | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +*Additional Text* is a manufacturer dependent field and shall be used to include fault localization information. + +### 9.4.4 Administrative State + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Administrative State | 2 | + +*Administrative State* shall be coded as follows: + +| | | +|---------------------------------|----| +| Locked | 01 | +| Unlocked | 02 | +| Shutting Down | 03 | +| NULL (Adm. state not supported) | FF | + +### 9.4.5 ARFCN List + +| | | +|----------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| ARFCN1 (MSB) | 4 | +| ARFCN1 (LSB) | 5 | +| | | +| ARFCNn (MSB) | N-1 | +| ARFCNn (LSB) | N | + +ARFCN (see 3GPP TS 45.005) <0-3FF> + +### 9.4.6 Autonomously Report + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Autonomously Report | 2 | + +The toggle switch for autonomous report shall be coded as follows: + +Autonomously Report 01; + +Not Autonomously Report 00. + +### 9.4.7 Availability Status + +| | | +|----------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| Availability Status | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +*Availability Status* may contain one or more octets. Each octet shall have a single status value, which shall be coded as follows: + +| | | +|---------------|---| +| In test | 0 | +| Failed | 1 | +| Power off | 2 | +| Off line | 3 | +| | 4 | +| Dependency | 5 | +| Degraded | 6 | +| Not installed | 7 | + +### 9.4.8 BCCH ARFCN + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| BCCH ARFCN (MSB) | 2 | +| BCCH ARFCN (LSB) | 3 | + +BCCH ARFCN (see 3GPP TS 45.005) <1-3FF> + +### 9.4.9 BSIC + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| BSIC | 2 | + +BSIC (see GSM 03.03) <0-3F> + +(BS colour code: bit 0-2) + +(PLMN colour code: bit 3-5) + +### 9.4.10 BTS Air Timer + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| T3105 | 2 | + +T3105 shall be coded as a binary presentation of 10 ms in the range of <0-FF>. + +### 9.4.11 CCCH Load Indication Period + +| | | +|-----------------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| CCCH Load Indication Period | 2 | + +*CCCH Load Indication Period* shall be coded as a binary presentation of seconds in the range of <0-FF>. + +### 9.4.12 CCCH Load Threshold + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| CCCH Load Threshold | 2 | + +*CCCH Load Threshold* shall be coded as a binary presentation of maximum (maximum is manufacturer dependent) percentage in the range of <0-64>. + +### 9.4.13 Channel Combination + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Channel Combination | 2 | + +*Channel Combination* shall be coded as follows: + +| | | | +|---------------|------------------------------------------------|-------| +| tCHFull | TCH/F + FACCH/F + SACCH/TF | 00 | +| tCHHalf | TCH/H(0,1) + FACCH/H(0,1) + SACCH/TH(0,1) | 01 | +| tCHHalf2 | TCH/H(0) + FACCH/H(0) + SACCH/TH(0) + TCH/H(1) | 02 | +| sDCCH | SDCCH/8 + SACCH/C8 | 03 | +| mainBCCH | FCCH + SCH + BCCH + CCCH | 04 | +| bCCHCombined | FCCH + SCH + BCCH + CCCH + SDCCH/4 + SACCH/C4 | 05 | +| bCH | BCCH + CCCH | 06 | +| bCCHwithCBCH | combination of 05 with CBCH as 3GPP TS 45.002 | 07 1) | +| sDCCHwithCBCH | combination of 03 with CBCH as 3GPP TS 45.002 | 08 1) | + +NOTE: These two channel combinations are created by replacing the SDCCH number 2 in channel combination 05 and channel combination 03 by the logical channel. + +See 3GPP TS 45.002 for meaning and usage of channel combinations. + +### 9.4.14 Connection Failure Criterion + +| | | +|------------------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| Connection Failure Criterion | 4 | +| Criteria Value | 5 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +*Connection Failure Criterion* shall be coded as follows: + +Based upon uplink SACCH error rate (RADIO\_LINK\_TIMEOUT) 01 + +Based upon RXLEV/RXQUAL measurements + +02 + +If connection failure criterion is based on SACCH error rate, the *Criteria Value* shall be one octet binary presentation of the number of SACCH multiframes used in the procedure. + +If connection failure criterion is based on RXLEV/RXQUAL measurements, coding of the *Criteria Value* field will be operator/manufacturer dependent. + +See 3GPP TS 45.008 subclauses 5.2 and 5.3 and 3GPP TS 24.008 subclause 3.5.2.2. + +### 9.4.15 Destination + +| | | +|----------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| Destination | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +*Destination* identifies a unit of equipment that shall be the destination to be "changed to" on a Change-over operation. How to identify a type of equipment and how to identify a specific unit of this type is manufacturer dependent. + +### 9.4.16 Event Type + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Event Type | 2 | + +*Event Type* shall be coded as follows: + +| | | +|----------------------------|---------| +| communication failure | 00 | +| quality of service failure | 01 | +| processing failure | 02 | +| equipment failure | 03 | +| environment failure | 04 | +| | <05-0F> | +| | <10-FF> | + +### 9.4.17 File Data + +| | | +|----------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| File Data | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +*File Data* is manufacturer dependent, but must be consistent with the associated GSM 12.20 attribute. + +### 9.4.18 File Id + +| | | +|----------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| File Id | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +*File Id* is manufacturer dependent, but must be consistent with the associated GSM 12.20 attribute. + +### 9.4.19 File Version + +| | | +|-------------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| File Version | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +*File Version* is manufacturer dependent, but must be consistent with the associated GSM 12.20 attribute. + +### 9.4.20 GSM Time + +| | | +|------------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Current Frame No (MSB) | 2 | +| Current Frame No (LSB) | 3 | + +*Current Frame No* shall be a binary presentation of FN in Modulus 42432. + +### 9.4.21 HSN + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| HSN | 2 | + +HSN (see 3GPP TS 45.002) <0-3F> + +### 9.4.22 HW Configuration + +| | | +|----------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| HW Description 1 | 4 | +| ... | | +| HW Description n | N | + +*HW Configuration* shall consist of a list of *HW Descriptions* related to a managed object. + +### 9.4.23 HW Description + +| | | +|--------------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Equipment Id Length | 2-3 | +| Equipment Id | | +| (cont.) | | +| Equipment Type Length | | +| Equipment Type | | +| (cont.) | | +| Equipment Version Length | | +| Equipment Version | | +| (cont.) | | +| Location Length | | +| Location | | +| (cont.) | | +| Man. Dep. Info Length | | +| Man. Dep. Info | | +| (cont.) | N | + +All fields are manufacturer dependent variable length character strings. They must be consistent with associated GSM 12.20 attributes. + +*Equipment Id* distinguishes a piece of equipment out of others of same type. + +*Equipment Type* codes the type of piece of equipment (e.g., Baseband Transceiver Unit). + +*Equipment Version* codes the version of the piece of equipment. + +*Location* codes the place where the piece of equipment is found (e.g., row - rack - shelf - slot). + +*Man. Dep. Info* shall codes additional manufacturer dependent information. + +### 9.4.24 Intave Parameter + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Intave Parameter | 2 | + +Intave Parameter (see 3GPP TS 45.008) <1-1F> + +### 9.4.25 Interference level Boundaries + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Interf Boundary 0 | 2 | +| Interf Boundary 1 | 3 | +| Interf Boundary 2 | 4 | +| Interf Boundary 3 | 5 | +| Interf Boundary 4 | 6 | +| Interf Boundary 5 | 7 | + +Interf Boundary 0 <0-FF> + +Interf Boundary X1 <0-FF> + +Interf Boundary X2 <0-FF> + +Interf Boundary X3 <0-FF> + +Interf Boundary X4 <0-FF> + +Interf Boundary X5 <0-FF> + +All boundaries shall be coded as a binary presentation of -x dBm (normal values are -115 to -85). For example, an interference boundary of -105 dBm will be represented as integer "105". + +### 9.4.26 List of Required Attributes + +| | | +|----------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| Attribute Id | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +Each *Attribute Id* is one octet. + +### 9.4.27 MAIO + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| MAIO | 2 | + +MAIO (see 3GPP TS 45.002) <0-3F> + +### 9.4.28 Manufacturer Dependent State + +| | | +|------------------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Manufacturer Dependent State | 2 | + +Manufacturer Dependent State <0-FF> + +This is optional to be used in addition to Operational State in accordance with GSM 12.20. + +### 9.4.29 Manufacturer Dependent Thresholds + +| | | +|-----------------------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| Manufacturer Dependent Thresholds | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +The content of *Manufacturer Dependent Thresholds* is manufacturer dependent. + +### 9.4.30 Manufacturer Id + +| | | +|----------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| Manufacturer Id | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +The content of *Manufacturer Id* is manufacturer dependent. + +### 9.4.31 Max Timing Advance + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Max Timing Advance | 2 | + +Max Timing Advance (see 3GPP TS 48.058) <0-7F> + +### 9.4.32 Measurement Result + +| | | +|----------------------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length of measurement result (N) | 2-3 | +| Result (MSB) | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| Result (LSB) | N+3 | + +### 9.4.33 Measurement Type + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Measurement Number | 2 | + +*Measurement Number* shall be coded as follows: + + <00-3F> + + <40-FF> + +### 9.4.34 Multi-drop BSC Link + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| BTS Port Number | 2 | +| Timeslot Number | 3 | + +BTS Port Number <0-FF> + +Timeslot Number + +Time slot in 2 Mbps link <0-1F> + +### 9.4.35 Multi-drop next BTS Link + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| BTS Port Number | 2 | +| Timeslot Number | 3 | + +BTS Port Number <0-FF> + +Timeslot Number + +Time slot in 2 Mbps link <0-1F> + +### 9.4.36 Nack Causes + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| NACK Cause | 2 | + +*Nack Causes* shall be coded as follows: + +General Nack Causes: + +| | | | +|-----------------------------------------|---------|----| +| Incorrect message structure | 01 | | +| Invalid message type value | 02 | | +| | 03 | | +| | 04 | | +| Invalid Object class value | 05 | | +| Object class not supported | 06 | | +| BTS no. unknown | 07 | | +| Baseband Transceiver no. unknown | 08 | | +| Object Instance unknown | 09 | | +| | <0A-0B> | | +| Invalid attribute identifier value | 0C | | +| Attribute identifier not supported | 0D | | +| Parameter value outside permitted range | 0E | | +| Inconsistency in attribute list | 0F | 1) | +| Specified implementation not supported | 10 | | +| Message cannot be performed | 11 | 2) | +| | <12-18> | | + +Specific Nack Causes: + +| | | | +|--------------------------------------------|----|----| +| Resource not implemented | 19 | | +| Resource not available | 1A | | +| Frequency not available | 1B | | +| Test not supported | 1C | | +| Capacity restrictions | 1D | | +| Physical configuration cannot be performed | 1E | | +| Test not initiated | 1F | | +| Physical configuration cannot be restored | 20 | | +| No such test | 21 | | +| Test cannot be stopped | 22 | | +| Message inconsistent with physical config. | 23 | 3) | + +| | | +|-----------------------------------|---------| +| Complete file not received | 25 | +| File not available at destination | 26 | +| File cannot be activated | 27 | +| Request not granted | 28 | +| Wait | 29 | +| Nothing reportable existing | 2A | +| Measurement not supported | 2B | +| Measurement not started | 2C | +| | <2D-7F> | +| | <80-FE> | +| NULL | FF | + +NOTE 1: This Nack cause shall apply to conflicting or incomplete data in the attribute list which prevents the BTS from performing the message. + +NOTE 2: This Nack cause shall apply when the message is valid and is supported by the BTS, but cannot be performed correctly for reasons not covered by other general or special Nack causes. + +NOTE 3: This Nack cause shall apply to the case where the data in attribute list is valid, but is beyond the capabilities of the particular BTS implementation. + +### 9.4.37 Ny1 + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Ny1 | 2 | + +Ny1 shall be a binary presentation of maximum number of repetitions of PHYSICAL INFORMATION (see 3GPP TS 24.008, subclause 3.4.4.2.2). + +### 9.4.38 Operational State + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Operational State | 2 | + +*Operational States* are in accordance with GSM 12.20 and shall be coded as follows: + +| | | +|-----------------------------------|---------| +| Disabled | 01 | +| Enabled | 02 | +| | <03-FE> | +| NULL(Operat. state not supported) | FF | + +### 9.4.39 Overload Period + +| | | +|----------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| Overload Period | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +### 9.4.40 Physical Config + +| | | +|---------------------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| Required Test Config | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +*Required Test Config* is manufacturer dependent. + +### 9.4.41 Power Class + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Power Class | 2 | + +*Power Class* is a binary presentation of transceiver power class as defined in 3GPP TS 45.005. + +### 9.4.42 Power Output Thresholds + +| | | +|----------------------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Output Power Fault Threshold | 2 | +| Reduced Output Power Threshold | 3 | +| Excessive Output Power Threshold | 4 | + +When the carrier output power of the transmitter, including power amplifier and transmitter combiner, is below or above a power level, a fault shall be generated. There are two thresholds below the output power to indicate two different levels of fault severity, and one for threshold above. The range of *Output Power Fault Threshold* and *Reduced Output Power Threshold* is from -10 to -1 dB . The values shall be coded in 1 dB steps such that -10 dB is expressed with 0 and -1 dB with 9. + +Output Power Threshold <00-09> + +Reduced Output Power Threshold <00-09> + +The range of *Excessive Output Power Threshold* is from 2 dB to 5 dB. The value shall be coded in 1 dB steps such that 2 dB is expressed with binary value 0 and 5 dB with binary value 3. + +Excessive Output Power Threshold <00-03> + +### 9.4.43 Probable Cause + +| | | +|------------------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Probable Cause Type | 2 | +| Probable Cause Value | 3 | +| Probable Cause Value (cont.) | 4 | + +*Probable Cause Type* shall be coded as follows: + +| | | +|------------------------------|---------| +| ISO/CCITT values (X.721) | 01 | +| GSM specific values | 02 | +| Manufacturer specific values | 03 | +| | <04-FF> | + +For *Probable Cause Value* coding, the last numeric value of the object identifier value specified in ASN.1 syntax coding shall be used if *Probable Cause Type* is either 01 or 02. + +### 9.4.44 RACH Busy Threshold + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| RACH Busy Threshold | 2 | + +*RACH Busy Threshold* shall be a binary presentation of -x dBm in the range <0-FF>. + +### 9.4.45 RACH Load Averaging Slots + +| | | +|---------------------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| RACH Load Averaging Slots (MSB) | 2 | +| RACH Load Averaging Slots (LSB) | 3 | + +*RACH Load Averaging Slots* shall be a binary presentation of number of RACH burst periods in the range <0-FFFF>. + +### 9.4.46 Radio Sub Channel + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Radio Sub Channel | 2 | + +*Radio Sub Channel* shall be coded as follows: + +| | | +|---------------------|----| +| Half rate channel 0 | 00 | +| Half rate channel 1 | 01 | + +### 9.4.47 RF Max Power Reduction + +| | | +|------------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| RF Max Power Reduction | 2 | + +*RF Max Power Reduction* shall be a binary presentation of the number of 2 dB power reduction steps as defined in 3GPP TS 45.005. + +This represents "Pn" as used in 3GPP TS 48.058. + +### 9.4.48 Site Inputs + +| | | +|----------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| Site Input | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +If *Site Inputs* are requested from Site Manager with message *Get Attributes*, all inputs shall be listed. Each octet from 4 to N controls one Site input. Each of these octets contain the input number and the state of the input and they shall be coded as follows. + +| | | | | | | | | +|-------|--------------|---|---|---|---|---|---| +| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | +| State | Input number | | | | | | | + +*State* shall be a binary presentation of the input state, 0 or 1. *Input number* shall be a binary presentation of input number. Note that maximally 128 binary inputs can be supported. + +### 9.4.49 Site Outputs + +| | | +|----------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| Site Output | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +If *Site Outputs* are sent to Site Manager with message *Set Site Outputs*, the site outputs shall be generated as indicated by the message. Coding of this information element shall be the same as for Site Inputs. Note that maximally 128 binary site outputs can be supported. + +### 9.4.50 Source + +| | | +|----------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| Source | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +*Source* identifies a unit of equipment that shall be "changed from" on a Change-over operation. How to identify a type of equipment and how to identify a specific unit of this type is manufacturer dependent. + +### 9.4.51 Specific Problems + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Specific Problems | 2 | + +Specific Problems + +| | | +|---------------------------|---------| +| | <00-0F> | +| | <10-FF> | + +### 9.4.52 Starting Time + +| | | +|------------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Current Frame No (MSB) | 2 | +| Current Frame No (LSB) | 3 | + +*Current Frame No* shall be a binary presentation FN Modulus 42432. + +### 9.4.53 T200 + +| | | +|------------------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| SDCCH ( 5 ms) | 2 | +| FACCH/Full rate ( 5 ms) | 3 | +| FACCH/Half rate ( 5 ms) | 4 | +| SACCH with TCH SAPI0 (10 ms) | 5 | +| SACCH with SDCCH (10 ms) | 6 | +| SDCCH SAPI3 ( 5 ms) | 7 | +| SACCH with TCH SAPI3 (10 ms) | 8 | + +Each field shall be a binary presentation of time units mentioned in brackets. + +NULL (FF) means the value is not specified (see 3GPP TS 44.006). + +### 9.4.54 TEI + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| TEI | 2 | + +TEI (see 3GPP TS 48.056): + +| | | +|----------------|---------| +| Initial TEI | <00-3F> | +| Additional TEI | <40-7E> | +| | <7F-FF> | + +### 9.4.55 Test Duration + +| | | +|----------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Test Duration | 2-3 | + +*Test Duration* shall be a binary presentation of seconds in range <01-FFFF>indicating the time the test should last. + +### 9.4.56 Test No + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Test Number | 2 | + +*Test Number* shall be coded as follows: + +| | | +|---------------------------------|----| +| Radio loop test via antenna | 00 | +| Radio loop test via transceiver | 01 | + +| | | +|---------------------------------|---------| +| BTS functional object self test | 02 | +| | <03-3F> | +| | <40-FF> | + +### 9.4.57 Test Report Info + +| | | +|----------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| Test Result Info | 4 | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +If the test was either radio loop test via antenna or radio loop test via transceiver, octets 3 and 4 are defined. Octet 3 shall include a binary presentation of RXLEV value in the range of 0-3F such that value 0 equals to -110 dBm or less and 3F equals to -48 dBm or more. Octet 4 shall express bit error rate (BER) of received bit stream in 0,1% steps in the range 0,0% - 12,8% such that 0 equals to 0,0% BER and 128(dec) equals to 12,8% BER or more. + +If the test was BTS functional object self test, octet 3 shall indicate pass or fail for the test of the functional object on the BTS by value 1 or 0 where 0 is the code for fail. + +In the defined test cases *Test Result Info* may also contain manufacturer dependent information in subsequent octets. In other tests, *Test Result Info* is manufacturer dependent. + +### 9.4.58 VSWR Thresholds + +| | | +|--------------------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Faulty Antenna Threshold | 2 | +| Antenna Not Adjusted Threshold | 3 | + +*VSWR Thresholds* shall be used in association with the "faulty receiver (transmitter) antenna" or "receiver (transmitter) antenna not adjusted" Probable Cause. The VSWR range for both thresholds is 1,2 - 3,0. The value shall be coded in 0,1 steps such that 1,2 is expressed with 0 and 3,0 with 12(hex). + +| | | +|--------------------------------|---------| +| Faulty Antenna Threshold | <00-12> | +| Antenna Not Adjusted Threshold | <00-12> | + +### 9.4.59 Window Size + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Window Size | 2 | + +*Window Size* shall be a binary presentation of the number of layer 3 *Load Data Segment messages* to be sent before a layer 3 acknowledgment needs to be issued. Value 0 is not used. + +### 9.4.60 TSC + +| | | +|------------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Training Sequence Code | 2 | + +For details of *Traing Sequence Codes*, see 3GPP TS 45.002. + +| | | +|------------|---------| +| TSC values | <00-07> | +| | <08-FE> | + +### 9.4.61 SW Configuration + +| | | +|----------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| SW Description 1 | 4 | +| ... | | +| SW Description n | N | + +*SW Configuration* shall contain a list of *SW Descriptions* related to the managed object. + +### 9.4.62 SW Description + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| File Id | 2 | +| File Version | N | + +### 9.4.63 Perceived Severity + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Severity Value | 2 | + +*Severity Value* shall be coded as follows: + +| | | +|-----------------------|---------| +| failure ceased | 00 | +| critical failure | 01 | +| major failure | 02 | +| minor failure | 03 | +| warning level failure | 04 | +| indeterminate failure | 05 | +| | <06-3F> | +| | <40-FF> | + +### 9.4.64 Get Attribute Response Info + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| Count of not-reported attributes | 4 | +| (Each not-reported attribute id) | | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | | +| ..... | | +| (Each reported attribute id and its value) | | +| (cont.) | | +| (cont.) | N | + +The BTS shall make a best effort to report on all the attributes requested by the associated *Get Attributes* message. The *Length* indicates the length of the entire *Get Attribute Response Info* which may possibly go over a single segment message and should not be confused with the length of the data put in one single message frame (see subclause 8.1.1). The *Count of not reported attributes* entry shall indicate the binary integer coded value of the count of the attributes requested but the BTS could not report on because the attributes are either not supported or not yet defined. In case of a non-zero value of the above counter, the *Each not- reported attribute id* entry shall list the Id of each attribute not reported and shall continue as many as indicated by the above counter. The *Each reported attribute id and its value* entry shall list each reported attribute id and its value pair coded and formatted for every applicable attribute or parameter as specified in this subclause (subclause 9.4) and shall continue until all reported attributes are included in the response. + +### 9.4.65 Outstanding Alarm Sequence + +| | | +|----------------------|---| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Pending Reports | 2 | + +The integer coded *Pending Reports* field indicates the number of pending *Failure Event Report* messages to follow the current message as a response to the associated *Report Outstanding Alarms* message. This value being 0 signals that it is the last message for the outstanding alarms. + +### 9.4.66 HW Conf Change Info + +| | | +|-----------------------------------------------|-----| +| Attribute Identifier | 1 | +| Length | 2-3 | +| HW Description Position Index 1 | 4 | +| Operation Code 1 | 5 | +| Modification Data 1 ( only if needed ) | | +| ..... | | +| HW Description Position Index K | | +| Operation Code K | | +| Modification Data K ( only if needed ) | N | + +*HW Description Position Index*, *Operation Code*, and *Modification Data* constitute an associated triplet for each HW Description change operation. The triplet may be repeated as many as needed. All the changes indicated in one *Change HW Configuration* message must be successfully conducted or the procedure must fail otherwise. The *HW Description Position Index*, an octet coded integer, indicates the HW Description's position in the HW Configuration attribute to which the change operation indicated by the associated *Operation Code* must be applied. In case of multiple entries, all the position indices shall be interpreted against the initial HW Configuration sequence. There are three possible operations as listed below: + +| | | +|--------------|----| +| deletion | 00 | +| insertion | 01 | +| modification | 02 | + +By a deletion operation, the indexed HW Description is deleted from the HW Configuration attribute. A deletion operation requires no associated Modification Data. An insertion or modification operation requires an associated *Modification Data* which specifies the new data for the operation. By a modification operation, the indexed HW Description in the HW Configuration attribute is replaced with the provided Modification Data. Deletion and modification operations are mutually exclusive at one position. By an insertion operation, the provided Modification Data is inserted immediately after the indexed HW Description in the HW Configuration attribute. An insertion at a position indexed zero (0) is interpreted as prepending to the very beginning. More than one insertion operation at one identically indexed position shall produce a HW Configuration sequence in which the inserted Descriptions are ordered the way as they appear in the *HW Conf Change Info* field. + +# Annex A (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|------------|-----------|----|-----|-------------------------------------------|--------|--------| +| Date | TSG GERAN# | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | Old | New | +| 2002-04 | 9 | GP-020564 | | | Provision of TS 12.21 release 97 version | 5.0.0 | 6.0.0 | +| 2002-04 | 9 | GP-020564 | | | Provision of TS 12.21 release 98 version | 6.0.0 | 7.0.0 | +| 2002-04 | 9 | GP-020564 | | | Provision of TS 12.21 release 99 version | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | +| 2002-04 | 9 | GP-020564 | | | Provision of TS 52.021 release 4 version | 8.0.0 | 4.0.0 | +| 2002-06 | 10 | | | | Provision of TS 52.021 release 5 version | 4.0.0 | 5.0.0 | +| 2005-01 | 23 | | | | Provision of TS 52.021 release 6 version | 5.0.0 | 6.0.0 | +| 2007-08 | 35 | | | | Provision of TS 52.021 release 7 version | 6.0.0 | 7.0.0 | +| 2008-12 | 40 | | | | Provision of TS 52.021 release 8 version | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | +| 2009-12 | 44 | | | | Provision of TS 52.021 release 9 version | 8.0.0 | 9.0.0 | +| 2011-03 | 49 | | | | Provision of TS 52.021 release 10 version | 9.0.0 | 10.0.0 | +| 2012-09 | 55 | | | | Provision of TS 52.021 release 11 version | 10.0.0 | 11.0.0 | +| 2014-09 | 63 | | | | Version for Release 12 (frozen at SP-65) | 11.0.0 | 12.0.0 | +| 2015-12 | 68 | | | | Version for Release 13 (frozen at SP-70) | 12.0.0 | 13.0.0 | + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|----------------|---------|------|----|-----|-----|----------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2017-03 | RP-75 | - | - | - | - | Version for Release 14 (frozen at TSG-75) | 14.0.0 | +| 2018-06 | RP-80 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-15 version 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/dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/52_series/52402/fc0735d325f0ebd9214171975c68a888_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:0859de03a19650b13b669d8dd4241d4ca92ee2471c98d6ad32fa50330aa0c46f +size 37901 diff --git a/marked/Rel-16/52_series/52402/raw.md b/marked/Rel-16/52_series/52402/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bdd63b49af09a1b81e014d4acadc16ffd2536fc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Rel-16/52_series/52402/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,9707 @@ + + + + +**Error:** + +**2** + +**Error: Reference source not** + +# Contents + +| | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| Foreword..... | 18 | +| Introduction..... | 18 | +| 1 Scope..... | 19 | +| 2 References..... | 19 | +| 3 Abbreviations..... | 21 | +| 4 Detailed description of the measurement system for a GSM PLMN..... | 23 | +| 4.1 Introduction..... | 23 | +| 4.1.1 Basic measurement system functions..... | 23 | +| 4.1.2 Measurement Object Administration..... | 23 | +| 4.2 Modelling of measurement jobs..... | 24 | +| 4.2.1 Measurement job characteristics..... | 24 | +| 4.2.1.1 Measurement Function..... | 24 | +| 4.2.1.2 Measurement schedule..... | 25 | +| 4.2.1.3 Granularity period..... | 25 | +| 4.2.1.4 Scan reports..... | 26 | +| 4.2.2 Scanner state and status attributes..... | 26 | +| 4.2.3 Scanner administration..... | 26 | +| 4.3 Modelling of measurement results..... | 27 | +| 4.3.1 Characteristics of the result report..... | 28 | +| 4.3.2 Result report transfer control..... | 28 | +| 4.4 Conformance requirements..... | 29 | +| 4.4.1 Simple scanner..... | 29 | +| 4.4.2 Scan report record..... | 30 | +| 4.4.3 Scan report notification..... | 30 | +| 4.4.4 Activate scan report action..... | 31 | +| 4.5 Application Context..... | 31 | +| Annex A (informative): Graphical examples..... | 32 | +| Annex B (normative): Performance Measurement Requirements Summary..... | 34 | +| B.1 Measurements Related to the BSC..... | 35 | +| B.1.1 BSC Measurement Function..... | 35 | +| B.1.1.1 Unsuccessful requests for service..... | 35 | +| B.1.1.2 Unsuccessful requests for service, per cause..... | 35 | +| B.1.1.3 Mean Inter-arrival Time (Circuit Switched)..... | 35 | +| B.1.1.4 Attempted Transmission of Paging Messages, per BSC..... | 36 | +| B.1.1.5 Unsuccessful Transmission of Paging Messages, per BSC..... | 36 | +| B.1.1.6 Attempted IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT Procedures, per BSC..... | 36 | +| B.1.1.7 Successful IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT Procedures, per BSC..... | 37 | +| B.1.1.8 Successful Internal Handovers, intra-CELL, per BSC..... | 37 | +| B.1.1.9 Unsuccessful Internal Handovers, intra-CELL, per BSC..... | 37 | +| B.1.1.10 Successful Internal Handovers per BSC..... | 38 | +| B.1.1.11 Successful Internal Handovers per cause..... | 38 | +| B.1.1.12 Unsuccessful Internal Handovers with reconnection to old channels, per BSC..... | 38 | +| B.1.1.13 Unsuccessful Internal Handovers with loss of connection, per BSC..... | 39 | +| B.1.1.14 Flush Requests Received..... | 39 | +| B.1.1.15 Paging Requests Received from SGSN..... | 39 | +| B.1.1.16 Mean Inter-arrival Time (Packet Switched)..... | 40 | +| B.1.1.17 Number of octets of uplink BSSGP PDUs..... | 40 | +| B.1.1.18 Number of octets of downlink BSSGP PDUs..... | 40 | +| B.1.1.19 Power, Energy and Environmental (PEE) measurements..... | 40 | +| B.1.1.19.0 Applicability of measurements..... | 40 | +| B.1.1.19.1 Power..... | 41 | +| B.1.1.19.1.1 Average Power..... | 41 | +| B.1.1.19.1.2 Minimum Power..... | 41 | + +| | | | +|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| B.1.1.19.1.3 | Maximum Power..... | 41 | +| B.1.1.19.2 | Energy..... | 41 | +| B.1.1.19.3 | Temperature..... | 42 | +| B.1.1.19.3.1 | Average Temperature..... | 42 | +| B.1.1.19.3.2 | Minimum Temperature..... | 42 | +| B.1.1.19.3.3 | Maximum Temperature..... | 42 | +| B.1.1.19.4 | Voltage..... | 42 | +| B.1.1.19.5 | Current..... | 43 | +| B.1.1.19.6 | Humidity..... | 43 | +| B.2 | Measurements related to the BTS..... | 44 | +| B.2.1 | CELL Measurement Function..... | 44 | +| B.2.1.1 | Mean PCH-AGCH queue length..... | 44 | +| B.2.1.2 | Attempted Transmission of Paging Messages (the PCH)..... | 44 | +| B.2.1.3 | Unsuccessful Transmission of Paging Messages (the PCH)..... | 44 | +| B.2.1.4 | Attempted IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT Procedures..... | 45 | +| B.2.1.5 | Successful IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT Procedures..... | 45 | +| B.2.1.6 | Attempted IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT Procedures, per cause..... | 45 | +| B.2.1.7 | Successful IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT Procedures, per cause..... | 46 | +| B.2.1.8 | Number of Pages Discarded from the PCH Queue..... | 46 | +| B.2.1.9 | Mean duration of a successful Paging Procedure..... | 46 | +| B.2.1.10 | Number of Time Slots Available for Traffic (Previously TCHs)..... | 47 | +| B.2.1.11 | Mean number of busy Time Slots Occupied by Circuit Traffic..... | 47 | +| B.2.1.12 | Maximum number of busy Time Slots Occupied by Circuit Traffic..... | 47 | +| B.2.1.13 | Mean number of idle Time Slots per interference band (Previously TCHs)..... | 48 | +| B.2.1.14 | Attempted Time Slots seizures (Previously TCHs)..... | 48 | +| B.2.1.15 | Successful TCH/PDTCH seizures (Previously TCHs)..... | 48 | +| B.2.1.16 | Attempted TCH Seizures meeting an TCH blocked state..... | 49 | +| B.2.1.17 | All Available TCH Allocated Time..... | 49 | +| B.2.1.18 | Mean busy time of allocated CS Time Slots..... | 49 | +| B.2.1.19 | Mean TCH queue length..... | 50 | +| B.2.1.20 | Number of lost Radio links while using a TCH..... | 50 | +| B.2.1.21 | Number of Available SDCCHs..... | 50 | +| B.2.1.22 | Mean number of busy SDCCHs..... | 51 | +| B.2.1.23 | Maximum number of busy SDCCHs..... | 51 | +| B.2.1.24 | Attempted SDCCH Seizures meeting an SDCCH blocked state..... | 51 | +| B.2.1.25 | All Available SDCCH Allocated Time..... | 52 | +| B.2.1.26 | Mean SDCCH queue length..... | 52 | +| B.2.1.27 | Number of lost Radio links while using an SDCCH..... | 52 | +| B.2.1.28 | Relative time downlink power control at maximum..... | 53 | +| B.2.1.29 | Relative time uplink power control at maximum..... | 53 | +| B.2.1.30 | Successful Internal Handovers, intra-CELL..... | 53 | +| B.2.1.31 | Unsuccessful Internal Handovers, intra-CELL..... | 54 | +| B.2.1.32 | Attempted incoming Internal inter CELL Handovers..... | 54 | +| B.2.1.33 | Successful incoming Internal inter CELL Handovers..... | 54 | +| B.2.1.34 | Attempted outgoing Internal inter CELL Handovers..... | 55 | +| B.2.1.35 | Successful outgoing Internal inter CELL Handovers..... | 55 | +| B.2.1.36 | Unsuccessful Internal Handovers with reconnection to old channels..... | 55 | +| B.2.1.37 | Unsuccessful Internal Handovers with loss of connection..... | 56 | +| B.2.1.38 | Number of Available PDCH..... | 56 | +| B.2.1.39 | Mean Number of Available PDCH..... | 56 | +| B.2.1.40 | Maximum Number of Available PDCH..... | 57 | +| B.2.1.41 | Minimum Number of Available PDCH..... | 57 | +| B.2.1.42 | Mean number of occupied PDCHs..... | 57 | +| B.2.1.43 | Maximum number of occupied PDCHs..... | 58 | +| B.2.1.44 | Minimum number of occupied PDCHs..... | 58 | +| B.2.1.45 | All available PDCH allocated time..... | 58 | +| B.2.1.46 | Transmission of Packet Paging Messages on the PCCCH..... | 59 | +| B.2.1.47 | Mean PPCH-PAGCH queue length on PCCCH..... | 59 | +| B.2.1.48 | Number of Packet Pages Discarded from the PPCH Queue on PCCCH..... | 59 | +| B.2.1.49 | Number of Packet Channel Assignment Requests, per cause..... | 60 | +| B.2.1.50 | Successful Packet Channel Assignment Procedures, per cause..... | 60 | + +| | | | +|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| B.2.1.51 | Successful PDTCH seizures..... | 60 | +| B.2.1.52 | Mean PDTCH queue length..... | 61 | +| B.2.1.53 | Number of service upgrades/downgrades..... | 61 | +| B.2.1.54 | Mean number of occupied PDCHs for GPRS..... | 61 | +| B.2.1.55 | Mean number of occupied PDCHs for EGPRS..... | 62 | +| B.2.1.56 | Mean number of simultaneous GPRS TBF for downlink..... | 62 | +| B.2.1.57 | Mean number of simultaneous EGPRS TBF for downlink..... | 62 | +| B.2.1.58 | Number of received acknowledged octets of EGPRS block on RLC layer..... | 63 | +| B.2.1.59 | Number of transmitted octets of EGPRS block on RLC layer acknowledged by mobile..... | 63 | +| B.2.2 | Internal HDO Measurement Function..... | 64 | +| B.2.2.1 | Attempted incoming Internal inter CELL Handovers per originating CELL..... | 64 | +| B.2.2.2 | Successful incoming Internal inter CELL Handovers per originating CELL..... | 64 | +| B.2.2.3 | Attempted outgoing Internal inter CELL Handovers per target CELL..... | 64 | +| B.2.2.4 | Successful outgoing Internal inter CELL Handovers per target CELL..... | 65 | +| B.2.3 | Power, Energy and Environmental (PEE) measurements..... | 65 | +| B.2.3.0 | Applicability of measurements..... | 65 | +| B.2.3.1 | Power..... | 65 | +| B.2.3.1.1 | Average Power..... | 65 | +| B.2.3.1.2 | Minimum Power..... | 65 | +| B.2.3.1.3 | Maximum Power..... | 65 | +| B.2.3.2 | Energy..... | 66 | +| B.2.3.3 | Temperature..... | 66 | +| B.2.3.3.1 | Average Temperature..... | 66 | +| B.2.3.3.2 | Minimum Temperature..... | 66 | +| B.2.3.3.3 | Maximum Temperature..... | 67 | +| B.2.3.4 | Voltage..... | 67 | +| B.2.3.5 | Current..... | 67 | +| B.2.3.6 | Humidity..... | 67 | +| B.3 | Measurements Related to the MSC..... | 69 | +| B.3.1 | MSC Measurement Function..... | 69 | +| B.3.1.1 | Number of class mark updates..... | 69 | +| B.3.1.2 | Attempted mobile originating calls..... | 69 | +| B.3.1.3 | Successful mobile originating calls..... | 69 | +| B.3.1.4 | Answered mobile originating calls..... | 70 | +| B.3.1.5 | Attempted mobile terminating calls..... | 70 | +| B.3.1.6 | Successful mobile terminating calls..... | 70 | +| B.3.1.7 | Answered mobile terminating calls..... | 71 | +| B.3.1.8 | Attempted Mobile Emergency calls..... | 71 | +| B.3.1.9 | Successful Mobile Emergency calls..... | 71 | +| B.3.1.10 | Answered Mobile Emergency calls..... | 72 | +| B.3.1.11 | Attempted ciphering mode control procedures..... | 72 | +| B.3.1.12 | Successful ciphering mode control procedures..... | 72 | +| B.3.1.13 | Attempted interrogations of HLRs for routing..... | 73 | +| B.3.1.14 | Successful interrogations of HLR (MSRN obtained)..... | 73 | +| B.3.1.15 | Successful interrogations of HLR (call Forwarding)..... | 73 | +| B.3.1.16 | Attempted operations for mobile originating point to point SMs..... | 74 | +| B.3.1.17 | Successful operations for mobile originating point to point SMs..... | 74 | +| B.3.1.18 | Attempted operations for mobile terminating point to point SMs..... | 74 | +| B.3.1.19 | Successful operations for mobile terminating point to point SMs..... | 75 | +| B.3.1.20 | Number of transmitted check IMEI request..... | 75 | +| B.3.1.21 | Number of white answers in MSC..... | 75 | +| B.3.1.22 | Number of grey answers in MSC..... | 76 | +| B.3.1.23 | Number of black answers in MSC..... | 76 | +| B.3.1.24 | Number of unknown IMEI answers..... | 76 | +| B.3.1.25 | Mean time to provide the CALL SETUP service..... | 77 | +| B.3.1.26 | Mean time to provide the LOCATION UPDATING service..... | 77 | +| B.3.1.27 | Transactions on the MM-layer where subscriber was identified with TMSI..... | 77 | +| B.3.1.28 | Transactions on the MM-layer where subscriber was identified with IMSI..... | 78 | +| B.3.1.29 | Attempted TMSI re-allocations..... | 78 | +| B.3.1.30 | Successful TMSI re-allocations..... | 78 | +| B.3.1.31 | IMSI detach procedures..... | 79 | + +| | | | +|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| B.3.1.32 | IMSI attach procedures..... | 79 | +| B.3.1.33 | Attempted incoming External intra-MSC Handovers..... | 79 | +| B.3.1.34 | Successful incoming External intra-MSC Handovers..... | 80 | +| B.3.1.35 | Attempted outgoing External intra-MSC Handovers..... | 80 | +| B.3.1.36 | Successful outgoing External intra-MSC Handovers..... | 80 | +| B.3.1.37 | Attempted incoming inter-MSC Handovers..... | 81 | +| B.3.1.38 | Successful incoming inter-MSC Handovers..... | 81 | +| B.3.1.39 | Attempted outgoing inter-MSC Handovers..... | 81 | +| B.3.1.40 | Successful outgoing inter-MSC Handovers..... | 82 | +| B.3.1.41 | Attempted subsequent inter-MSC Handovers (back to MSCa)..... | 82 | +| B.3.1.42 | Successful subsequent inter-MSC Handovers (back to MSCa)..... | 82 | +| B.3.1.43 | Attempted subsequent inter-MSC Handovers (to MSCc)..... | 83 | +| B.3.1.44 | Successful subsequent inter-MSC Handovers (to MSCc)..... | 83 | +| B.3.1.45 | External Handovers..... | 83 | +| B.3.1.46 | External Handovers per cause..... | 84 | +| B.3.1.47 | Unsuccessful External Handovers with reconnection to old channels, per MSC..... | 84 | +| B.3.1.48 | Unsuccessful External Handovers with loss of connection, per MSC..... | 84 | +| B.3.2 | External HDO Measurement Function..... | 85 | +| B.3.2.1 | Attempted incoming External intra-MSC Handovers per originating CELL..... | 85 | +| B.3.2.2 | Successful incoming External intra-MSC Handovers per originating CELL..... | 85 | +| B.3.2.3 | Attempted outgoing External intra-MSC Handovers per target CELL..... | 85 | +| B.3.2.4 | Successful outgoing External intra-MSC Handovers per target CELL..... | 86 | +| B.3.2.5 | Attempted incoming inter-MSC Handovers per originating CELL..... | 86 | +| B.3.2.6 | Successful incoming inter-MSC Handovers per originating CELL..... | 86 | +| B.3.2.7 | Attempted outgoing inter-MSC Handovers per target CELL..... | 87 | +| B.3.2.8 | Successful outgoing inter-MSC Handovers per target CELL..... | 87 | +| B.4 | Measurements Related to the HLR..... | 88 | +| B.4.1 | HLR Measurement Function..... | 88 | +| B.4.1.1 | Number of current MS's Roaming outside HPLMN..... | 88 | +| B.4.1.2 | Attempted requests for Authentication sets received by HLR..... | 88 | +| B.4.1.3 | Successful returned Authentication sets from HLR..... | 88 | +| B.4.1.4 | Empty responses to request for Authentication sets from HLR..... | 89 | +| B.4.1.5 | Attempted insert subscriber data service..... | 89 | +| B.4.1.6 | Successful insert subscriber data service..... | 89 | +| B.4.1.7 | Attempted Location Updates..... | 90 | +| B.4.1.8 | Successful Location Updates..... | 90 | +| B.4.1.9 | Attempted SS related operations in HLR..... | 90 | +| B.4.1.10 | Successful SS related operations in HLR..... | 91 | +| B.4.1.11 | Attempted request for SM routing information..... | 91 | +| B.4.1.12 | Successful request for SM routing information..... | 91 | +| B.4.1.13 | Attempted SM delivery status report procedures..... | 92 | +| B.4.1.14 | Successful SM delivery status report procedures..... | 92 | +| B.4.1.15 | Attempted number of send alerts..... | 92 | +| B.4.1.16 | Successful number of send alerts..... | 93 | +| B.4.1.17 | Attempted request for MSRN..... | 93 | +| B.4.1.18 | Successful request for MSRN..... | 93 | +| B.5 | Measurements Related to the VLR..... | 94 | +| B.5.1 | VLR Measurement Function..... | 94 | +| B.5.1.1 | Attempted MS memory available notifications..... | 94 | +| B.5.1.2 | Successful MS memory available notifications..... | 94 | +| B.5.1.3 | Attempted Identification requests to PVLRS..... | 94 | +| B.5.1.4 | Successful Identification requests to PVLRS..... | 95 | +| B.5.1.5 | Attempted page requests..... | 95 | +| B.5.1.6 | Successful page requests..... | 95 | +| B.5.1.7 | Attempted page requests per Location Area..... | 95 | +| B.5.1.8 | Successful page requests per Location Area..... | 96 | +| B.5.1.9 | Attempted requests for Authentication sets sent to HLR by VLRs..... | 96 | +| B.5.1.10 | Successful received Authentication sets from HLR to VLRs..... | 96 | +| B.5.1.11 | Empty responses to request for Authentication sets from HLR to VLRs..... | 97 | +| B.5.1.12 | Attempted authentication procedures in VLR..... | 97 | + +| | | | +|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| B.5.1.13 | Successful authentication procedures in the VLR..... | 97 | +| B.5.1.14 | Attempted intra-VLR Location Updates..... | 98 | +| B.5.1.15 | Successful intra-VLR Location Updates..... | 98 | +| B.5.1.16 | Attempted inter-VLR Location Updates..... | 98 | +| B.5.1.17 | Successful inter-VLR Location Updates..... | 99 | +| B.5.1.18 | Arrivals of Visitors from other PLMNs..... | 99 | +| B.6 | Measurements Related to the EIR..... | 100 | +| B.6.1 | EIR Measurement Function..... | 100 | +| B.6.1.1 | Number of received IMEI check requests..... | 100 | +| B.6.1.2 | Number of white answers in EIR..... | 100 | +| B.6.1.3 | Number of grey answers in EIR..... | 100 | +| B.6.1.4 | Number of black answers in EIR..... | 101 | +| B.6.1.5 | Number of unknown IMEI answers..... | 101 | +| B.7 | Measurements Related to the SMS IWMSC/GMSC..... | 102 | +| B.7.1 | SMS Measurement Function..... | 102 | +| B.7.1.1 | Attempted mobile originating SM Forwarding..... | 102 | +| B.7.1.2 | Successful mobile originating SM Forwarding..... | 102 | +| B.7.1.3 | Attempted Mobile Terminating SM Forwarding..... | 102 | +| B.7.1.4 | Successful Mobile Terminating SM Forwarding..... | 103 | +| B.8 | Measurements Related to the SGSN..... | 104 | +| B.8.1 | SGSN Measurement Function..... | 104 | +| B.8.1.1 | LLC Measurements..... | 104 | +| B.8.1.1.1 | Number of LLC frames sent..... | 104 | +| B.8.1.1.2 | Number of LLC frames Received..... | 104 | +| B.8.1.1.3 | Erroneously received LLC frames detected by SGSN..... | 104 | +| B.8.1.1.4 | Number of Retransmitted LLC frames in Acknowledge Mode..... | 105 | +| B.8.1.2 | SNDPCP Measurements..... | 105 | +| B.8.1.2.1 | Number of received SNDPCP N-PDUs..... | 105 | +| B.8.1.2.2 | Number of received SNDPCP N-PDU octets..... | 105 | +| B.8.1.2.3 | Number of sent SNDPCP N-PDUs..... | 106 | +| B.8.1.2.4 | Number of sent SNDPCP N-PDU octets..... | 106 | +| B.8.1.3 | BSSGP Measurements..... | 106 | +| B.8.1.4 | MM Measurements..... | 106 | +| B.8.1.4.1 | Attempted GPRS attach procedures..... | 106 | +| B.8.1.4.2 | Successful GPRS attach procedures..... | 107 | +| B.8.1.4.3 | Attempt of combined GPRS/IMSI attach procedures..... | 107 | +| B.8.1.4.4 | Successfully combined GPRS/IMSI attach procedures..... | 107 | +| B.8.1.4.5 | Attempted GPRS attach procedures with IMSI already attached..... | 108 | +| B.8.1.4.6 | Successful GPRS attach procedures with IMSI already attached..... | 108 | +| B.8.1.4.7 | Number of attached subscriber..... | 108 | +| B.8.1.4.8 | Mean number of attached subscriber..... | 109 | +| B.8.1.4.9 | Maximum number of attached subscriber..... | 109 | +| B.8.1.4.10 | Attempted GPRS detach procedures initiated by MS..... | 109 | +| B.8.1.4.11 | Attempt of Combined GPRS/IMSI detach procedures initiated by MS..... | 110 | +| B.8.1.4.12 | Attempt of IMSI detach procedures initiated by MS..... | 110 | +| B.8.1.4.13 | Attempted GPRS detach procedures initiated by SGSN..... | 110 | +| B.8.1.4.14 | Successful GPRS detach procedures initiated by SGSN..... | 111 | +| B.8.1.4.15 | Attempted intra-SGSN Routing Area Update procedures initiated in this SGSN..... | 111 | +| B.8.1.4.16 | Successful intra-SGSN Routing Area Update procedures initiated in this SGSN..... | 111 | +| B.8.1.4.17 | Attempted inter-SGSN Routing Area Update procedures initiated in this SGSN..... | 112 | +| B.8.1.4.18 | Successful inter-SGSN Routing Area Update procedures initiated in this SGSN..... | 112 | +| B.8.1.5 | Security..... | 113 | +| B.8.1.5.1 | Attempted P-TMSI reallocation procedures..... | 113 | +| B.8.1.5.2 | Successful P-TMSI reallocation procedures..... | 113 | +| B.8.1.5.3 | Attempted requests for authentication sets sent to HLR by SGSN..... | 113 | +| B.8.1.5.4 | Successful requests for authentication sets to HLR..... | 114 | +| B.8.1.5.5 | Empty responses to the request for authentication sets to the HLR..... | 114 | +| B.8.1.5.6 | Attempt of authentication procedures started by SGSN..... | 114 | +| B.8.1.5.7 | Successful authentication procedures started by the SGSN..... | 115 | +| B.8.1.5.8 | Attempted Identity Request procedures..... | 115 | + +| | | | +|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| B.8.1.5.9 | Successful Identity Request procedures..... | 115 | +| B.8.1.6 | State..... | 116 | +| B.8.1.6.1 | Number of subscribers in the SGSN in STANDBY state..... | 116 | +| B.8.1.6.2 | Mean number of subscribers in the SGSN in STANDBY state..... | 116 | +| B.8.1.6.3 | Maximum number of subscribers in the SGSN in STANDBY state..... | 116 | +| B.8.1.6.4 | Number of subscribers in the SGSN in READY state..... | 117 | +| B.8.1.6.5 | Mean number of subscribers in the SGSN in READY state..... | 117 | +| B.8.1.6.6 | Maximum number of subscribers in the SGSN in READY state..... | 117 | +| B.8.1.7 | Equipment..... | 118 | +| B.8.1.7.1 | Number of transmitted check IMEI requests..... | 118 | +| B.8.1.7.2 | Number of white answers in SGSN..... | 118 | +| B.8.1.7.3 | Number of grey answers in SGSN..... | 118 | +| B.8.1.7.4 | Number of black answers in SGSN..... | 119 | +| B.8.1.7.5 | Number of unknown IMEI answers..... | 119 | +| B.8.1.8 | RRM Measurements..... | 119 | +| B.8.1.8.1 | Attempt of packet switched paging procedures..... | 119 | +| B.8.1.8.2 | Unsuccessful packet switched paging procedures..... | 120 | +| B.8.1.8.3 | Attempt of packet switched paging procedures per Routing Area..... | 120 | +| B.8.1.8.4 | Unsuccessful packet switched paging procedures per Routing Area..... | 120 | +| B.8.1.9 | SM Measurements..... | 121 | +| B.8.1.9.1 | Attempted PDP context activation procedures initiated by MS..... | 121 | +| B.8.1.9.2 | Successful PDP context activation procedures initiated by MS..... | 121 | +| B.8.1.9.3 | Attempted dynamic PDP context activation procedures initiated by MS..... | 121 | +| B.8.1.9.4 | Successful dynamic PDP context activation procedures initiated by MS..... | 122 | +| B.8.1.9.5 | Attempted PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the MS..... | 122 | +| B.8.1.9.6 | Successful PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the MS..... | 122 | +| B.8.1.9.7 | Attempted PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the GGSN..... | 123 | +| B.8.1.9.8 | Successful PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the GGSN..... | 123 | +| B.8.1.9.9 | Number of subscribers with activated PDP context in SGSN..... | 123 | +| B.8.1.9.10 | Mean number of subscribers with activated PDP context in SGSN..... | 124 | +| B.8.1.9.11 | Maximum number of subscribers with activated PDP context in SGSN..... | 124 | +| B.9 | Measurements Related to the GGSN..... | 125 | +| B.9.1 | GGSN Measurement Function..... | 125 | +| B.9.1.1 | Number of PDP context activation procedures initiated by the MS Per APN..... | 125 | +| B.9.1.2 | Successful PDP context activation procedures initiated by the MS Per APN..... | 125 | +| B.9.1.3 | Number of dynamic PDP context activation procedures initiated by the MS Per APN..... | 125 | +| B.9.1.4 | Successful +dynamic PDP context activation procedures initiated by the MS Per APN..... | 126 | +| B.9.1.5 | Number of PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the MS Per APN..... | 126 | +| B.9.1.6 | Successful PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the MS Per APN..... | 126 | +| B.9.1.7 | Number of PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the GGSN Per APN..... | 127 | +| B.9.1.8 | Successful PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the GGSN Per APN..... | 127 | +| B.9.1.9 | Number of active PDP context in GGSN Per APN..... | 127 | +| B.9.1.10 | Mean number of active PDP context in GGSN Per APN..... | 128 | +| B.9.1.11 | Maximum number of PDP context in GGSN Per APN..... | 128 | +| B.10 | Monitoring of Power, Energy and Environmental (PEE) parameters..... | 128 | +| Annex C (normative): | Performance Measurement Object Model..... | 129 | +| C.1 | Measurement Managed Object Classes..... | 130 | +| C.1.1 | object class from ITU-T ISO..... | 130 | +| C.1.2 | bscMeasurementFunction..... | 130 | +| C.1.3 | cellMeasurementFunction..... | 130 | +| C.1.4 | internalHdoMeasurementFunction..... | 132 | +| C.1.5 | mscMeasurementFunction..... | 132 | +| C.1.6 | externalHdoMeasurementFunction..... | 134 | +| C.1.7 | hlrMeasurementFunction..... | 134 | +| C.1.8 | vlrMeasurementFunction..... | 135 | +| C.1.9 | eirMeasurementFunction..... | 135 | +| C.1.10 | smsMeasurementFunction..... | 136 | +| C.1.11 | sgsnMeasurementFunction..... | 136 | +| C.1.12 | ggsnMeasurementFunction..... | 137 | + +| | | | +|----------|---------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| C.2 | Measurement Package Definitions..... | 138 | +| C.2.1 | General Measurement Function Packages..... | 138 | +| C.2.1.1 | basicMeasurementFunctionPackage..... | 138 | +| C.2.2 | BSC Measurement Function Related Packages..... | 138 | +| C.2.2.1 | requestForServicePackage..... | 138 | +| C.2.2.2 | requestForServicePerCausePackage..... | 138 | +| C.2.2.3 | interArrivalTimePackage..... | 138 | +| C.2.2.4 | pagingMessagePerBSCPackage..... | 139 | +| C.2.2.5 | immediateAssignmentProceduresPerBSCPackage..... | 139 | +| C.2.2.6 | internalHandoversIntraCellPerBSCPackage..... | 139 | +| C.2.2.7 | internalHandoversPerBSCPackage..... | 139 | +| C.2.2.8 | internalHandoversPerCausePackage..... | 139 | +| C.2.2.9 | internalHandoverFailuresPerBSCPackage..... | 139 | +| C.2.2.10 | gprsPDULFlushReqPackage..... | 140 | +| C.2.2.11 | gprsPagingRequestPackage..... | 140 | +| C.2.2.12 | gprsInterArrivalPackage..... | 140 | +| C.2.3 | CELL Measurement Function Related Packages..... | 140 | +| C.2.3.1 | pchagchQueuePackage..... | 140 | +| C.2.3.2 | pagingMessagePackage..... | 140 | +| C.2.3.3 | immediateAssignmentProceduresPackage..... | 141 | +| C.2.3.4 | immediateAssignmentProceduresPerCausePackage..... | 141 | +| C.2.3.5 | pageDiscardPackage..... | 141 | +| C.2.3.6 | durationOfPagingProceduresPackage..... | 141 | +| C.2.3.7 | tchAvailablePackage..... | 141 | +| C.2.3.8 | tchBusyPackage..... | 141 | +| C.2.3.9 | idleTCHsPerInterferenceBandPackage..... | 142 | +| C.2.3.10 | tchSeizuresPackage..... | 142 | +| C.2.3.11 | tchAllocatedTimePackage..... | 142 | +| C.2.3.12 | tchBusyTimePackage..... | 142 | +| C.2.3.13 | tchQueuePackage..... | 142 | +| C.2.3.14 | lostRadioLinksPerTCHPackage..... | 143 | +| C.2.3.15 | sdcchAvailablePackage..... | 143 | +| C.2.3.16 | sdcchBusyPackage..... | 143 | +| C.2.3.17 | sdcchSeizuresPackage..... | 143 | +| C.2.3.18 | sdcchAllocatedTimePackage..... | 143 | +| C.2.3.19 | sdcchQueuePackage..... | 143 | +| C.2.3.20 | lostRadioLinksPerSDCCHPackage..... | 144 | +| C.2.3.21 | downlinkPowerControlPackage..... | 144 | +| C.2.3.22 | uplinkPowerControlPackage..... | 144 | +| C.2.3.23 | internalHandoversIntraCellPackage..... | 144 | +| C.2.3.24 | incomingInternalInterCellHandoversPackage..... | 144 | +| C.2.3.25 | outgoingInternalInterCellHandoversPackage..... | 145 | +| C.2.3.26 | internalHandoverFailurePackage..... | 145 | +| C.2.3.27 | gprsPDCHAvailablePackage..... | 145 | +| C.2.3.28 | gprsPDCHOccupiedPackage..... | 145 | +| C.2.3.29 | gprsPDCHAllocatedPackage..... | 145 | +| C.2.3.30 | gprsPCCCHPagingPackage..... | 146 | +| C.2.3.31 | gprsPPCHQueueOnPCCCHPackage..... | 146 | +| C.2.3.32 | gprsPDTCHAssignmentPackage..... | 146 | +| C.2.3.33 | gprsPDTCHQueuePackage..... | 146 | +| C.2.3.34 | gprsCSChangePackage..... | 146 | +| C.2.4 | internal HDO Measurement Function Related Packages..... | 147 | +| C.2.4.1 | incomingInternalInterCellPerCellHandoversPackage..... | 147 | +| C.2.4.2 | outgoingInternalInterCellPerCellHandoversPackage..... | 147 | +| C.2.5 | MSC Measurement Function Related Packages..... | 147 | +| C.2.5.1 | classMarkPackage..... | 147 | +| C.2.5.2 | mobileOriginatingCallsPackage..... | 147 | +| C.2.5.3 | mobileTerminatingCallsPackage..... | 147 | +| C.2.5.4 | mobileEmergencyCallsPackage..... | 148 | +| C.2.5.5 | cipheringModePackage..... | 148 | +| C.2.5.6 | interrogatingHLRPackage..... | 148 | + +| | | | +|----------|---------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| C.2.5.7 | mobileOriginatingPointToPointSMPackage..... | 148 | +| C.2.5.8 | mobileTerminatingPointToPointSMPackage..... | 148 | +| C.2.5.9 | imeiRequestPackage..... | 149 | +| C.2.5.10 | whiteAnswersInMSCPackage..... | 149 | +| C.2.5.11 | greyAnswersInMSCPackage..... | 149 | +| C.2.5.12 | blackAnswersInMSCPackage..... | 149 | +| C.2.5.13 | unknownIMEIAnswersInMSCPackage..... | 149 | +| C.2.5.14 | callSetupServicePackage..... | 149 | +| C.2.5.15 | locationUpdatingServicePackage..... | 150 | +| C.2.5.16 | subscriberIdentifiedWithTMSIPackage..... | 150 | +| C.2.5.17 | subscriberIdentifiedWithIMSIPackage..... | 150 | +| C.2.5.18 | tmsiReallocationsPackage..... | 150 | +| C.2.5.19 | imsiDetachProceduresPackage..... | 150 | +| C.2.5.20 | incomingExternalIntraMSCHandoversPackage..... | 151 | +| C.2.5.21 | outgoingExternalIntraMSCHandoversPackage..... | 151 | +| C.2.5.22 | incomingInterMSCHandoversPackage..... | 151 | +| C.2.5.23 | outgoingInterMSCHandoversPackage..... | 151 | +| C.2.5.24 | subsequentInterMSCHandoversToMACaPackage..... | 151 | +| C.2.5.25 | subsequentInterMSCHandoversToMACcPackage..... | 151 | +| C.2.5.26 | externalHandoversPackage..... | 152 | +| C.2.5.27 | externalHandoversPerCausePackage..... | 152 | +| C.2.5.28 | externalHandoverFailurePerMSCPackage..... | 152 | +| C.2.6 | external HDO Measurement Function Related Packages..... | 152 | +| C.2.6.1 | incomingExternalIntraMSCHandoversPerCellPackage..... | 152 | +| C.2.6.2 | outgoingExternalIntraMSCHandoversPerCellPackage..... | 152 | +| C.2.6.3 | incomingExternalInterMSCHandoversPerCellPackage..... | 153 | +| C.2.6.4 | outgoingExternalInterMSCHandoversPerCellPackage..... | 153 | +| C.2.7 | HLR Measurement Function Related Packages..... | 153 | +| C.2.7.1 | msRoamingOutsideHPLMNPackage..... | 153 | +| C.2.7.2 | authenticationSetsHLRToVLRPackage..... | 153 | +| C.2.7.3 | insertSubscriberDataServicePackage..... | 153 | +| C.2.7.4 | locationUpdatePackage..... | 154 | +| C.2.7.5 | ssRelatedOperationsInHLRPackage..... | 154 | +| C.2.7.6 | requestForSMRoutingPackage..... | 154 | +| C.2.7.7 | smDeliveryStatusReportProceduresPackage..... | 154 | +| C.2.7.8 | sendAlertsPackage..... | 154 | +| C.2.7.9 | requestForMSRNPackage..... | 155 | +| C.2.8 | VLR Measurement Function Related Packages..... | 155 | +| C.2.8.1 | msMemoryAvailableNotificationsPackage..... | 155 | +| C.2.8.2 | identificationRequestToPVLRRPackage..... | 155 | +| C.2.8.3 | pageRequestPackage..... | 155 | +| C.2.8.4 | pageRequestPerLocationAreaPackage..... | 155 | +| C.2.8.5 | authenticationSetsVLRTToHLRPackage..... | 156 | +| C.2.8.6 | authenticationInVLRRPackage..... | 156 | +| C.2.8.7 | intraVLRLocationUpdatePackage..... | 156 | +| C.2.8.8 | interVLRLocationUpdatePackage..... | 156 | +| C.2.8.9 | visitorsFromOtherPLMNPackage..... | 156 | +| C.2.9 | EIR Measurement Function Related Packages..... | 157 | +| C.2.9.1 | receivedIMEIcheckRequestPackage..... | 157 | +| C.2.9.2 | whiteAnswersInEIRPackage..... | 157 | +| C.2.9.3 | greyAnswersInEIRPackage..... | 157 | +| C.2.9.4 | blackAnswersInEIRPackage..... | 157 | +| C.2.9.5 | unknownIMEIAnswersInEIRPackage..... | 157 | +| C.2.10 | SMS Measurement Function Related Packages..... | 157 | +| C.2.10.1 | mobileOriginatingSMForwardingPackage..... | 157 | +| C.2.10.2 | mobileTerminatingSMForwardingPackage..... | 158 | +| C.2.11 | SGSN Measurement Function Related Packages..... | 158 | +| C.2.11.1 | sgsnLLCPackage..... | 158 | +| C.2.11.2 | sgsnSND CPPPackage..... | 158 | +| C.2.11.3 | gprsAttachPackage..... | 158 | +| C.2.11.4 | gprsIMSIAttachPackage..... | 159 | + +| | | | +|-----------|------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| C.2.11.5 | gprsIMSIAalreadyAttachedPackage..... | 159 | +| C.2.11.6 | gprsAttachedSubscribersPackage..... | 159 | +| C.2.11.7 | gprsMSDetachPackage..... | 159 | +| C.2.11.8 | gprsSGSNDetachPackage..... | 159 | +| C.2.11.9 | gprsRouting AreaUpdatePackage..... | 160 | +| C.2.11.10 | pTMSIReallocationPackage..... | 160 | +| C.2.11.11 | sgsnHLRAuthenticationPackage..... | 160 | +| C.2.11.12 | sgsnAuthenticationProcPackage..... | 160 | +| C.2.11.13 | sgsnIdentityRequestPackage..... | 160 | +| C.2.11.14 | sgsnCipheringModePackage..... | 161 | +| C.2.11.15 | gprsSubsStandbyStatePackage..... | 161 | +| C.2.11.16 | gprsSubsReadyStatePackage..... | 161 | +| C.2.11.17 | sgsnIMEICheckRequestsPackage..... | 161 | +| C.2.11.18 | whiteAnswersInSGSNPackage..... | 161 | +| C.2.11.19 | greyAnswersInSGSNPackage..... | 161 | +| C.2.11.20 | blackAnswersInSGSNPackage..... | 162 | +| C.2.11.21 | unknownIMEIAnswersInSGSNPackage..... | 162 | +| C.2.11.22 | sgsnPacketSwitched PagingPackage..... | 162 | +| C.2.11.23 | sgsnPacketSwitched PagingPerRAPackage..... | 162 | +| C.2.11.24 | sgsnPDPContextActivationByMSPackage..... | 162 | +| C.2.11.25 | sgsnDynamicPDPContextActivationByMSPackage..... | 163 | +| C.2.11.26 | sgsnPDPContextDeactivationByMSPackage..... | 163 | +| C.2.11.27 | sgsnPDPContextDeactivationByGGSNPackage..... | 163 | +| C.2.11.28 | subscriberPDPContextsAtSGSNPackage..... | 163 | +| C.2.12 | GGSN Measurement Function Related Packages..... | 163 | +| C.2.12.1 | ggsnPDPContextActivationByMSPackage..... | 163 | +| C.2.12.2 | ggsnDynamicPDPContextActivationByMSPackage..... | 164 | +| C.2.12.3 | ggsnPDPContextDeactivationByMSPackage..... | 164 | +| C.2.12.4 | ggsnPDPContextDeactivationByGGSNPackage..... | 164 | +| C.2.12.5 | ActivePDPContextsAtGGSNPackage..... | 164 | +| C.3 | Measurement Attribute Definitions..... | 165 | +| C.3.1 | General Measurement Function Related Attributes..... | 165 | +| C.3.1.1 | measurementFunctionId..... | 165 | +| C.3.1.2 | observedCell..... | 165 | +| C.3.1.3 | adjacentCell..... | 165 | +| C.3.2 | BSC Measurement Function Related Attributes..... | 165 | +| C.3.2.1 | unsuccReqsForService..... | 165 | +| C.3.2.2 | unsuccReqsForServicePerCause..... | 166 | +| C.3.2.3 | meanInterArrivalTime..... | 166 | +| C.3.2.4 | attTransOfPagingMessagesPerBSC..... | 166 | +| C.3.2.5 | unsuccTransOfPagingMessagesPerBSC..... | 166 | +| C.3.2.6 | attImmediateAssingProcsPerBSC..... | 166 | +| C.3.2.7 | succImmediateAssingProcsPerBSC..... | 166 | +| C.3.2.8 | succInternalHDOsIntraCellPerBSC..... | 167 | +| C.3.2.9 | unsuccInternalHDOsIntraCellPerBSC..... | 167 | +| C.3.2.10 | succInternalHDOsPerBSC..... | 167 | +| C.3.2.11 | succInternalHDOsPerCause..... | 167 | +| C.3.2.12 | unsuccInternalHDOsWithReconnectionPerBSC..... | 167 | +| C.3.2.13 | unsuccInternalHDOsWithLossOfConnectionPerBSC..... | 168 | +| C.3.2.14 | flushRequestReceived..... | 168 | +| C.3.2.15 | pagingReqReceivedfromSgsn..... | 168 | +| C.3.2.16 | meanPSInterArrivalTime..... | 168 | +| C.3.3 | CELL Measurement Function Related Attributes..... | 168 | +| C.3.3.1 | meanPCHAGCHQueueLength..... | 168 | +| C.3.3.2 | attTransOfPagingMessagesThePCH..... | 168 | +| C.3.3.3 | unsuccTransOfPagingMessagesThePCH..... | 169 | +| C.3.3.4 | attImmediateAssingProcs..... | 169 | +| C.3.3.5 | succImmediateAssingProcs..... | 169 | +| C.3.3.6 | attImmediateAssingProcsPerCause..... | 169 | +| C.3.3.7 | succImmediateAssingProcsPerCause..... | 169 | +| C.3.3.8 | nbrOfPagesDiscardedFromPCHQueue..... | 169 | + +| | | | +|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| C.3.3.9 | meanDurationOfSuccPagingProcs..... | 170 | +| C.3.3.10 | nbrOfAvailableTCHs..... | 170 | +| C.3.3.11 | meanNbrOfBusyTCHs..... | 170 | +| C.3.3.12 | maxNbrOfBusyTCHs..... | 170 | +| C.3.3.13 | meanNbrOfIdleTCHsPerInterferenceBand..... | 170 | +| C.3.3.14 | attTCHSeizures..... | 170 | +| C.3.3.15 | succTCHSeizures..... | 171 | +| C.3.3.16 | attTCHSeizuresMeetingTCHBlockedState..... | 171 | +| C.3.3.17 | allAvailableTCHAllocatedTime..... | 171 | +| C.3.3.18 | meanTCHBusyTime..... | 171 | +| C.3.3.19 | meanTCHQueueLength..... | 171 | +| C.3.3.20 | nbrOfLostRadioLinksTCH..... | 172 | +| C.3.3.21 | nbrOfAvailableSDCCHs..... | 172 | +| C.3.3.22 | meanNbrOfBusySDCCHs..... | 172 | +| C.3.3.23 | maxNbrOfBusySDCCHs..... | 172 | +| C.3.3.24 | attSDCCHSeizuresMeetingSDCCHBlockedState..... | 172 | +| C.3.3.25 | allAvailableSDCCHAllocatedTime..... | 172 | +| C.3.3.26 | meanSDCCHQueueLength..... | 173 | +| C.3.3.27 | nbrOfLostRadioLinksSDCCH..... | 173 | +| C.3.3.28 | relativeTimeDLPowerControlAtMax..... | 173 | +| C.3.3.29 | relativeTimeULPowerControlAtMax..... | 173 | +| C.3.3.30 | succInternalHDOsIntraCell..... | 173 | +| C.3.3.31 | unsuccInternalHDOsIntraCell..... | 173 | +| C.3.3.32 | attIncomingInternalInterCellHDOs..... | 174 | +| C.3.3.33 | succIncomingInternalInterCellHDOs..... | 174 | +| C.3.3.34 | attOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOs..... | 174 | +| C.3.3.35 | succOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOs..... | 174 | +| C.3.3.36 | unsuccHDOsWithReconnection..... | 174 | +| C.3.3.37 | unsuccHDOsWithLossOfConnection..... | 174 | +| C.3.3.38 | availablePDCH..... | 175 | +| C.3.3.39 | meanNbrAvailablePDCH..... | 175 | +| C.3.3.40 | maxNbrAvailablePDCH..... | 175 | +| C.3.3.41 | minNbrAvailablePDCH..... | 175 | +| C.3.3.42 | meanNbrOfOccPDCH..... | 175 | +| C.3.3.43 | maxNbrOfOccPDCH..... | 176 | +| C.3.3.44 | minNbrOfOccPDCH..... | 176 | +| C.3.3.45 | availablePDCHAllocatedTime..... | 176 | +| C.3.3.46 | nbrPacketPagingMessagesPCHOnPCCCH..... | 176 | +| C.3.3.47 | meanPPCHPAGCHQueueLengthOnPCCCH..... | 176 | +| C.3.3.48 | nbrOfPSPagesDiscardedFromPPCHQueueOnPCCCH..... | 176 | +| C.3.3.49 | attPCReqAssPerCause..... | 177 | +| C.3.3.50 | succPDTCHAssProcsPerCause..... | 177 | +| C.3.3.51 | succPDTCHSeizures..... | 177 | +| C.3.3.52 | meanPacketQueueLength..... | 177 | +| C.3.3.53 | nbrOfServiceChanges..... | 177 | +| C.3.4 | internal HDO Measurement Function Related Attributes..... | 178 | +| C.3.4.1 | attIncomingInternalInterCellHDOsPerOriginatingCell..... | 178 | +| C.3.4.2 | succIncomingInternalInterCellHDOsPerOriginatingCell..... | 178 | +| C.3.4.3 | attOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOsPerTargetCell..... | 178 | +| C.3.4.4 | succOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOsPerTargetCell..... | 178 | +| C.3.5 | MSC Measurement Function Related Attributes..... | 178 | +| C.3.5.1 | nbrOfClassMarkUpdates..... | 178 | +| C.3.5.2 | attMobileOriginatingCalls..... | 179 | +| C.3.5.3 | succMobileOriginatingCalls..... | 179 | +| C.3.5.4 | ansMobileOriginatingCalls..... | 179 | +| C.3.5.5 | attMobileTerminatingCalls..... | 179 | +| C.3.5.6 | succMobileTerminatingCalls..... | 179 | +| C.3.5.7 | ansMobileTerminatingCalls..... | 179 | +| C.3.5.8 | attMobileEmergencyCalls..... | 180 | +| C.3.5.9 | succMobileEmergencyCalls..... | 180 | +| C.3.5.10 | ansMobileEmergencyCalls..... | 180 | + +| | | | +|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------|-----| +| C.3.5.11 | attCipheringModeControlProcs..... | 180 | +| C.3.5.12 | succCipheringModeControlProcs..... | 180 | +| C.3.5.13 | attInterrogationOfHLRsForRouting..... | 180 | +| C.3.5.14 | succInterrogationOfHLRsMSRNObtained..... | 181 | +| C.3.5.15 | succInterrogationOfHLRsCallForwarding..... | 181 | +| C.3.5.16 | attOpForMobileOriginatingPointToPointSMs..... | 181 | +| C.3.5.17 | succOpForMobileOriginatingPointToPointSMs..... | 181 | +| C.3.5.18 | attOpForMobileTerminatingPointToPointSMs..... | 181 | +| C.3.5.19 | succOpForMobileTerminatingPointToPointSMs..... | 181 | +| C.3.5.20 | nbrOfTransCheckIMEIRequests..... | 182 | +| C.3.5.21 | nbrOfWhiteAnsInMSC..... | 182 | +| C.3.5.22 | nbrOfGreyAnsInMSC..... | 182 | +| C.3.5.23 | nbrOfBlackAnsInMSC..... | 182 | +| C.3.5.24 | nbrOfUnknownIMEIAnsInMSC..... | 182 | +| C.3.5.25 | meanTimeToCallSetupService..... | 183 | +| C.3.5.26 | meanTimeToLocationUpdateService..... | 183 | +| C.3.5.27 | transSubIdentifiedWithTMSI..... | 183 | +| C.3.5.28 | transSubIdentifiedWithIMSI..... | 183 | +| C.3.5.29 | attTMSIReallocations..... | 183 | +| C.3.5.30 | succTMSIReallocations..... | 183 | +| C.3.5.31 | imsiDetachProcs..... | 184 | +| C.3.5.32 | imsiAttachProcs..... | 184 | +| C.3.5.33 | attIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOs..... | 184 | +| C.3.5.34 | succIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOs..... | 184 | +| C.3.5.35 | attOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOs..... | 184 | +| C.3.5.36 | succOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOs..... | 184 | +| C.3.5.37 | attIncomingInterMSCHDOs..... | 185 | +| C.3.5.38 | succIncomingInterMSCHDOs..... | 185 | +| C.3.5.39 | attOutgoingInterMSCHDOs..... | 185 | +| C.3.5.40 | succOutgoingInterMSCHDOs..... | 185 | +| C.3.5.41 | attSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCa..... | 185 | +| C.3.5.42 | succSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCa..... | 185 | +| C.3.5.43 | attSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCc..... | 186 | +| C.3.5.44 | succSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCc..... | 186 | +| C.3.5.45 | externalHDOs..... | 186 | +| C.3.5.46 | externalHDOsPerCause..... | 186 | +| C.3.5.47 | unsuccExternHDOsWithReconnectionPerMSC..... | 186 | +| C.3.5.48 | unsuccExternHDOsWithLossOfConnectionPerMSC..... | 187 | +| C.3.6 | external HDO Measurement Function Related Attributes..... | 187 | +| C.3.6.1 | attIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell..... | 187 | +| C.3.6.2 | succIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell..... | 187 | +| C.3.6.3 | attOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerTargetCell..... | 187 | +| C.3.6.4 | succOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerTargetCell..... | 187 | +| C.3.6.5 | attIncomingInterMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell..... | 187 | +| C.3.6.6 | succIncomingInterMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell..... | 188 | +| C.3.6.7 | attOutgoingInterMSCHDOsPerTargetCell..... | 188 | +| C.3.6.8 | succOutgoingInterMSCHDOsPerTargetCell..... | 188 | +| C.3.7 | HLR Measurement Function Related Attributes..... | 188 | +| C.3.7.1 | nbrOfCurrentMSsRoamingOutsideHPLMN..... | 188 | +| C.3.7.2 | attReqForAuthSetsReceivedByHLRFromVLRs..... | 188 | +| C.3.7.3 | succReturnedAuthSetsFromHLRToVLRs..... | 189 | +| C.3.7.4 | emptyResponsesForAuthSetsFromHLRToVLRs..... | 189 | +| C.3.7.5 | attInsertSubDataService..... | 189 | +| C.3.7.6 | succInsertSubDataService..... | 189 | +| C.3.7.7 | attLocationUpdate..... | 189 | +| C.3.7.8 | succLocationUpdate..... | 189 | +| C.3.7.9 | attSSRelatedOperationsInHLR..... | 190 | +| C.3.7.10 | succSSRelatedOperationsInHLR..... | 190 | +| C.3.7.11 | attReqForSMRoutingInfo..... | 190 | +| C.3.7.12 | succReqForSMRoutingInfo..... | 190 | +| C.3.7.13 | attSMDeliveryStatusReportProcs..... | 190 | + +| | | | +|-----------|---------------------------------------------------|-----| +| C.3.7.14 | succSMDeliveryStatusReportProcs..... | 190 | +| C.3.7.15 | attNbrOfSendAlerts..... | 191 | +| C.3.7.16 | succNbrOfSendAlerts..... | 191 | +| C.3.7.17 | attReqForMSRN..... | 191 | +| C.3.7.18 | succReqForMSRN..... | 191 | +| C.3.8 | VLR Measurement Function Related Attributes..... | 191 | +| C.3.8.1 | attMSMemoryAvailableNotifications..... | 191 | +| C.3.8.2 | succMSMemoryAvailableNotifications..... | 191 | +| C.3.8.3 | attIdentificationReqToPVLRS..... | 192 | +| C.3.8.4 | succIdentificationReqToPVLRS..... | 192 | +| C.3.8.5 | attPageReqs..... | 192 | +| C.3.8.6 | succPageReqs..... | 192 | +| C.3.8.7 | attPageReqsPerLocationArea..... | 192 | +| C.3.8.8 | succPageReqsPerLocationArea..... | 193 | +| C.3.8.9 | attReqForAuthSetsSentToHLR..... | 193 | +| C.3.8.10 | succReceivedAuthSetsFromHLR..... | 193 | +| C.3.8.11 | emptyResponsesForAuthFromHLR..... | 193 | +| C.3.8.12 | attAuthProcsInVLR..... | 193 | +| C.3.8.13 | succAuthProcsInVLR..... | 193 | +| C.3.8.14 | attIntraVLRLocationUpdates..... | 194 | +| C.3.8.15 | succIntraVLRLocationUpdates..... | 194 | +| C.3.8.16 | attInterVLRLocationUpdates..... | 194 | +| C.3.8.17 | succInterVLRLocationUpdates..... | 194 | +| C.3.8.18 | arrivalOfVisitorsFromOtherPLMNs..... | 194 | +| C.3.9 | EIR Measurement Function Related Attributes..... | 194 | +| C.3.9.1 | nbrOfReceivedIMEICheckReqs..... | 194 | +| C.3.9.2 | nbrOfWhiteAnsInEIR..... | 195 | +| C.3.9.3 | nbrOfGreyAnsInEIR..... | 195 | +| C.3.9.4 | nbrOfBlackAnsInEIR..... | 195 | +| C.3.9.5 | nbrOfUnknownIMEIAnsInEIR..... | 195 | +| C.3.10 | SMS Measurement Function Related Attributes..... | 195 | +| C.3.10.1 | attMobileOriginatingSMForwardings..... | 195 | +| C.3.10.2 | succMobileOriginatingSMForwardings..... | 196 | +| C.3.10.3 | attMobileTerminatingSMForwardings..... | 196 | +| C.3.10.4 | succMobileTerminatingSMForwardings..... | 196 | +| C.3.10.5 | attMobileTerminatingSMForwardingsSgsn..... | 196 | +| C.3.10.6 | succMobileTerminatingSMForwardingsSgsn..... | 196 | +| C.3.11 | SGSN Measurement Function Related Attributes..... | 196 | +| C.3.11.1 | nbrLlcFramesSent..... | 196 | +| C.3.11.2 | nbrLlcFramesReceived..... | 197 | +| C.3.11.3 | errLlcFramesDetectedBySgsn..... | 197 | +| C.3.11.4 | retransmittedLlcFramestoMs..... | 197 | +| C.3.11.5 | uplinkSndcpNpduReceived..... | 197 | +| C.3.11.6 | uplinkSndcpOctetReceivedMode..... | 197 | +| C.3.11.7 | downlinkSndcpNpduSent..... | 197 | +| C.3.11.8 | downlinkSndcpOctetSent..... | 198 | +| C.3.11.9 | attGprsAttach..... | 198 | +| C.3.11.10 | succGprsAttach..... | 198 | +| C.3.11.11 | attCombiAttach..... | 198 | +| C.3.11.12 | succCombiAttach..... | 198 | +| C.3.11.13 | attImsiAttach..... | 199 | +| C.3.11.14 | succImsiAttach..... | 199 | +| C.3.11.15 | nbrOfAttachedSub..... | 199 | +| C.3.11.16 | meanNbrOfAttachedSub..... | 199 | +| C.3.11.17 | maxNbrOfAttachedSub..... | 199 | +| C.3.11.18 | attGprsDetachMs..... | 199 | +| C.3.11.19 | attCombiDetachMs..... | 200 | +| C.3.11.20 | attImsiDetachMs..... | 200 | +| C.3.11.21 | attGprsDetachSgsn..... | 200 | +| C.3.11.22 | succGprsDetachSgsn..... | 200 | +| C.3.11.23 | attItraSgsnRaUpdate..... | 200 | + +| | | | +|-----------|---------------------------------------------------|-----| +| C.3.11.24 | succIntraSgsnRaUpdate..... | 200 | +| C.3.11.25 | attInterSgsnRaUpdate..... | 201 | +| C.3.11.26 | succInterSgsnRaUpdate..... | 201 | +| C.3.11.27 | attPTMSIRealloc..... | 201 | +| C.3.11.28 | succPTMSIrealloc..... | 201 | +| C.3.11.29 | attreqAuthSetsSentToHlrBySgsn..... | 201 | +| C.3.11.30 | succReqAuthSetsHlr..... | 201 | +| C.3.11.31 | emptyResponsesForAuthSetsFromHlr..... | 202 | +| C.3.11.32 | attAuthInSgsn..... | 202 | +| C.3.11.33 | succAuthInSgsn..... | 202 | +| C.3.11.34 | attIdentityReq..... | 202 | +| C.3.11.35 | succIdentityReq..... | 202 | +| C.3.11.36 | attCipheringModeControlPerSgsn..... | 203 | +| C.3.11.37 | succCipheringModeControlPerSgsn..... | 203 | +| C.3.11.38 | nbrOfSubStandby..... | 203 | +| C.3.11.39 | meanNbrOfSubStandby..... | 203 | +| C.3.11.40 | maxNbrOfSubStandby..... | 203 | +| C.3.11.41 | nbrOfSubReady..... | 203 | +| C.3.11.42 | meanNbrOfSubReady..... | 204 | +| C.3.11.43 | maxNbrOfSubReady..... | 204 | +| C.3.11.44 | nbrOfCheckIMEIRequests..... | 204 | +| C.3.11.45 | nbrOfWhiteAnswerInSgsn..... | 204 | +| C.3.11.46 | nbrOfGreyAnswerInSgsn..... | 204 | +| C.3.11.47 | nbrOfBlackAnswerInSgsn..... | 204 | +| C.3.11.48 | nbrOfUnknownAnswerInSgsn..... | 205 | +| C.3.11.49 | attPacketSwitchedPaging..... | 205 | +| C.3.11.50 | unsuccPacketSwitchedPaging..... | 205 | +| C.3.11.51 | attPsPagingPerRoutingArea..... | 205 | +| C.3.11.52 | unsuccPsPagingPerRoutingArea..... | 205 | +| C.3.11.53 | attActPdpContextMSPerSgsn..... | 205 | +| C.3.11.54 | succActPdpContextMSPerSgsn..... | 206 | +| C.3.11.55 | attActPdpContextDynMSPerSgsn..... | 206 | +| C.3.11.56 | succActPdpContextDynMSPerSgsn..... | 206 | +| C.3.11.57 | attDeactPdpContextMsPerSgsn..... | 206 | +| C.3.11.58 | succDeactPdpContextMsPerSgsn..... | 206 | +| C.3.11.59 | attDeactPdpContextGgsnPerSgsn..... | 207 | +| C.3.11.60 | succDeactPdpContextGgsnPerSgsn..... | 207 | +| C.3.11.61 | nbrSubsWithActivePdpInSgsn..... | 207 | +| C.3.11.62 | meanSubsWithActivePdpInSgsn..... | 207 | +| C.3.11.63 | nmaxSubsWithActivePdpInSgsn..... | 207 | +| C.3.12 | GGSN Measurement Function Related Attributes..... | 207 | +| C.3.12.1 | attActPdpContextPerApnOfGgsn..... | 207 | +| C.3.12.2 | succActPdpContextPerApnOfGgsn..... | 208 | +| C.3.12.3 | attActPdpContextDnyPerApnOfGgsn..... | 208 | +| C.3.12.4 | succActPdpContextDnyPerApnOfGgsn..... | 208 | +| C.3.12.5 | attDeactPdpContextMsPerApnOfGgsn..... | 208 | +| C.3.12.6 | succDeactPdpContextMsPerApnOfGgsn..... | 208 | +| C.3.12.7 | attDeactPdpContextByGgsnPerApn..... | 208 | +| C.3.12.8 | succDeactPdpContextByGgsnMsPerApn..... | 209 | +| C.3.12.9 | nbrOfActivePdpContextsPerApnAtGgsn..... | 209 | +| C.3.12.10 | meanNbrOfActivePdpContextsPerApnAtGgsn..... | 209 | +| C.3.12.11 | maxNbrOfActivePdpContextsPerApnAtGgsn..... | 209 | +| C.4 | Name Bindings..... | 210 | +| C.4.1 | BSS Name Binding..... | 210 | +| C.4.1.1 | simpleScanner-bssFunction..... | 210 | +| C.4.2 | BSC Name Binding..... | 210 | +| C.4.2.1 | bscMeasurementFunction-bsc..... | 210 | +| C.4.3 | BTS Name Binding..... | 210 | +| C.4.3.1 | cellMeasurementFunction-bts..... | 210 | +| C.4.3.2 | internalHdoMeasurementFunction-bts..... | 210 | +| C.4.4 | MSC Name Binding..... | 211 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| C.4.4.1 | mscMeasurementFunction-mscFunction..... | 211 | +| C.4.4.2 | externalHdoMeasurementFunction-mscFunction..... | 211 | +| C.4.4.3 | simpleScanner-mscFunction..... | 211 | +| C.4.5 | HLR Name Binding..... | 211 | +| C.4.5.1 | hlrMeasurementFunction-hlrFunction..... | 211 | +| C.4.5.2 | simpleScanner-hlrFunction..... | 212 | +| C.4.6 | VLR Name Binding..... | 212 | +| C.4.6.1 | vlrMeasurementFunction-vlrFunction..... | 212 | +| C.4.6.2 | simpleScanner-vlrFunction..... | 212 | +| C.4.7 | EIR Name Binding..... | 212 | +| C.4.7.1 | eirMeasurementFunction-eirFunction..... | 212 | +| C.4.7.2 | simpleScanner-eirFunction..... | 212 | +| C.4.8 | SMS Name Binding..... | 213 | +| C.4.8.1 | smsMeasurementFunction-smsGIWFunction..... | 213 | +| C.4.8.2 | simpleScanner-smsGIWFunction..... | 213 | +| C.4.9 | SGSN Name Binding..... | 213 | +| C.4.9.1 | sgsnMeasurementFunction-sgsnFunction..... | 213 | +| C.4.9.2 | simpleScanner-sgsnFunction..... | 213 | +| C.4.10 | GGSN Name Binding..... | 214 | +| C.4.10.1 | ggsnMeasurementFunction-vlrFunction..... | 214 | +| C.4.10.2 | simpleScanner-ggsnFunction..... | 214 | +| C.5 | Behaviour Definitions..... | 215 | +| C.5.1 | simple scanner behaviour..... | 215 | +| C.5.2 | general measurement function behaviour..... | 215 | +| C.5.3 | general measurement package behaviour..... | 215 | +| C.5.4 | general measurement attribute behaviour..... | 215 | +| C.6 | Abstract syntax definitions..... | 216 | +| Annex D (normative): | Data Transfer Requirements..... | 219 | +| D.1 | Data Transfer Requirements..... | 219 | +| D.1.1 | General..... | 219 | +| D.2 | Object Model..... | 219 | +| D.2.1 | Managed Object Classes..... | 219 | +| D.2.1.1 | "Recommendation X.721: 1992": log..... | 219 | +| D.2.1.2 | "Recommendation X.738: 1993": scanReportRecord..... | 219 | +| D.2.2 | Name Bindings..... | 219 | +| D.2.2.1 | log-managedElement..... | 219 | +| D.2.2.2 | scanReportRecord-log..... | 220 | +| Annex E (informative): | Non Standardised Measurements of Interest to PLMN Management.... | 221 | +| E.1 | Measurement Related to the BSC..... | 221 | +| E.1.1 | BSC Measurement Function..... | 221 | +| E.2 | Measurement Related to the BTS..... | 221 | +| E.2.1 | BTS Measurement Function..... | 221 | +| E.2.2 | CELL Measurement Function..... | 221 | +| E.2.3 | Internal HDO Measurement Function..... | 222 | +| E.3 | Measurement Related to the MSC..... | 222 | +| E.3.1 | MSC Measurement Function..... | 222 | +| E.3.1.1 | Attempted Mobile to Mobile Calls..... | 222 | +| E.3.1.2 | Successful Mobile to Mobile Calls..... | 222 | +| E.3.1.3 | Answered Mobile to Mobile Calls..... | 222 | +| E.3.1.4 | Attempted Mobile to Land Calls..... | 222 | +| E.3.1.5 | Successful Mobile to Land Calls..... | 222 | +| E.3.1.6 | Answered Mobile to Land Calls..... | 222 | +| E.3.1.7 | Attempted Land to Mobile Calls..... | 222 | +| E.3.1.8 | Successful Land to Mobile Calls..... | 222 | +| E.3.1.9 | Answered Land to Mobile Calls..... | 223 | + +| | | | +|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| +| E.3.1.10 | Mean Holding Time of Calls..... | 223 | +| E.3.2 | External HDO Measurement Function..... | 223 | +| E.4 | Measurements related to the HLR..... | 223 | +| E.4.1 | HLR Measurement Function..... | 223 | +| E.4.1.1 | Instantaneous number of HLR subscribers..... | 223 | +| E.4.1.2 | Barred subscribers in the HLR..... | 223 | +| E.4.1.3 | Bearer service indication..... | 223 | +| E.4.1.4 | SS operation indication..... | 223 | +| E.4.1.5 | Attempted requests for Authentication sets from the AUC by the HLR..... | 223 | +| E.4.1.6 | Successful returned Authentication sets from the AUC to the HLR..... | 224 | +| E.5 | Measurements related to the VLR..... | 224 | +| E.5.1 | VLR Measurement Function..... | 224 | +| E.5.1.1 | Subscribers from other PLMNs registered in the VLR..... | 224 | +| E.5.1.2 | Number of roamers in the VLR..... | 224 | +| E.6 | Measurements related to the EIR..... | 224 | +| E.7 | Measurements related to the SMS-IWMSC/GMSC..... | 224 | +| E.8 | Performance Measurements on non-specific GSM Objects..... | 224 | +| E.8.1 | Measurements related to a PCM system..... | 224 | +| E.8.2 | Measurements related to MTP..... | 224 | +| E.8.3 | Measurements related to SCCP and TCAP..... | 224 | +| E.8.4 | Measurements related to ISUP..... | 224 | +| E.8.5 | Measurements related to Internet Protocols..... | 225 | +| Annex F (informative): | Index of Measurement Attribute Names..... | 226 | +| Annex G (informative): | Bibliography..... | 229 | +| Annex H (informative): | Change history..... | 230 | + +--- + +## Foreword + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Version x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit: + - 1 presented to TSG for information; + - 2 presented to TSG for approval; + - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. +- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. +- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. + +--- + +## Introduction + +The present document is part of a TS-family covering the 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Telecommunication Management; as identified below: + +- 32.401: Performance Management (PM); Concept and requirements +- 52.402: Performance Management (PM); Performance measurements - GSM** +- 32.404 Performance Management (PM); Performance measurements - Definitions and template +- 32.405 Performance Management (PM); Performance measurements Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN) +- 32.406 Performance Management (PM); Performance measurements Core Network (CN) Packet Switched (PS) domain +- 32.407 Performance Management (PM); Performance measurements Core Network (CN) Circuit Switched (CS) domain +- 32.408 Performance Management (PM); Performance measurements Teleservice +- 32.409 Performance Management (PM); Performance measurements IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) + +The present document is part of a set of specifications, which describe the requirements and information model necessary for the standardised Operation, Administration and Maintenance (OA&M) of a multi-vendor 3G-system GSM or UMTS PLMN. + +During the lifetime of a 3G network PLMN, its logical and physical configuration will undergo changes of varying degrees and frequencies in order to optimise the utilisation of the network resources. These changes will be executed through network configuration management activities and/or network engineering, see GSM TS 12.06 [10] and 3GPP TS 32.106 [3]. + +Many of the activities involved in the daily operation and future network planning of a 3G PLMN network require data on which to base decisions. This data refers to the load carried by the network and the grade of service offered. In order to produce this data performance measurements are executed in the NEs, which comprise the network. The data can then be transferred to an external system, e.g. an Operations System (OS) in TMN terminology, for further evaluation. The purpose of the present document and its companion parts 1 and 3 is to describe the mechanisms involved in the collection of the data and the definition of the data itself. + +# 1 Scope + +The present document describes the TMN model for the administration of measurements and the collection of measurement result data in a GSM system. It also includes the measurement definitions for GSM. The concept and functional requirements for performance management in wireless GSM and UMTS systems is set out in TS 32.401 [31]. + +# 2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. + - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. + - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*. +- [1] GSM 02.16: "Digital cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2+) (GSM); International Mobile Station Equipment Identities (IMEI)". +- [2] GSM 04.08: "Digital cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Mobile radio interface layer 3 specification". +- [3] GSM 04.11: "Digital cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Point-to-Point (PP) Short Message Service (SMS) Support on Mobile Radio Interface". +- [4] GSM 05.08: "Digital cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Radio Subsystem Link Control". +- [5] GSM 08.08: "Digital cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Mobile Switching Centre - Base Station system (MSC-BSS) Interface Layer 3 Specification". +- [6] GSM 08.58: "Digital cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Base Station Controller - Base Transceiver Station (BSC-BTS) Interface Layer 3 Specification". +- [7] GSM 09.02: "Digital cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Mobile Application Part (MAP) Specification". +- [8] GSM 12.00 (ETS 300 612-1): "Digital cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2); Network Management (NM); Part 1: Objectives and structure of network management". +- [9] GSM 12.01 (ETS 300 612-2): "Digital cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2) (GSM); Network Management (NM); Common aspects of GSM/DCS 1800 network management". +- [10] GSM 12.06 (ETS 300 617): "Digital cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2) (GSM); GSM network configuration management". +- [11] GSM 12.30 (ETR 128): "Digital cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2) (GSM); ETSI object identifier tree; Common domain; Mobile domain; Operation and Maintenance (O&M), managed object registration definition". +- [12] ITU-T Recommendation E.880: "Field data collection and evaluation on the performance of equipment, networks and services". +- [13] ITU-T Recommendation X.710: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Common Management Information Service". +- [14] ITU-T Recommendation X.721: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Structure of management information: Definition of management information". + +- [15] ITU-T Recommendation X.730: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Systems Management: Object management function". +- [16] ITU-T Recommendation X.731: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Systems Management: State management function". +- [17] ITU-T Recommendation X.734: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Systems Management: Event report management function". +- [18] ITU-T Recommendation X.735: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Systems Management: Log control function". +- [19] ITU-T Recommendation X.738: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Systems management: Summarization function". +- [20] ITU-T Recommendation X.739: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Systems Management: Metric objects and attributes". +- [21] ISO 8571: "Information processing systems - Open Systems Interconnection - File Transfer, Access and Management". +- [22] GSM 03.60: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) Service description; Stage 2". +- [23] 3GPP TS 44.060: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Mobile Station (MS) - Base Station System (BSS) interface; Radio Link Control / Medium Access Control (RLC/MAC) protocol". +- [24] GSM 04.64: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Mobile Station - Serving GPRS Support Node (MS-SGSN) Logical Link Control (LLC) Layer Specification". +- [25] GSM 04.65: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Mobile Station (MS) - Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN); Subnetwork Dependent Convergence Protocol (SNDPCP)". +- [26] GSM 08.16: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Base Station System (BSS) - Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) interface; Network Service". +- [27] GSM 09.60: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); GPRS Tunnelling Protocol GTP across the Gn and Gp Interface". +- [28] IETF RFC 959: "File Transfer Protocol". +- [29] IETF RFC 783: "TFTP Protocol (revision 2)". +- [30] IETF RFC 1157: "Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)". +- [31] 3GPP TS 32.401: "Telecommunication Management; Performance Management (PM); Concept and Requirements". +- [32] Void. + +- [33] 3GPP TS 32.404: "Telecommunication Management; Performance Management (PM); Performance measurements - Definitions and template". +- 3GPP TS 32.405: "Telecommunication Management; Performance Management (PM); Performance measurements Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN) ". +- 3GPP TS 32.406: "Telecommunication Management; Performance Management (PM); Performance measurements Core Network (CN) Packet Switched (PS) domain". +- 3GPP TS 32.407: "Telecommunication Management; Performance Management (PM); Performance measurements Core Network (CN) Circuit Switched (CS) domain". +- 3GPP TS 32.408: "Telecommunication Management; Performance Management (PM); Performance measurements Teleservice". +- 3GPP TS 32.409: "Telecommunication Management; Performance Management (PM); Performance measurements IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) ". +- [34] 3GPP TS 48.018: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Base Station System (BSS) - Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN); BSS GPRS protocol (BSSGP)". +- [35] ES 203 228 V1.0.0: "Environmental Engineering (EE); Assessment of mobile network energy efficiency". +- [36] ETSI ES 202 336-12 V1.1.1: "Environmental Engineering (EE); Monitoring and control interface for infrastructure equipment (power, cooling and building environment systems used in telecommunication networks); Part 12: ICT equipment power, energy and environmental parameters monitoring information model". + +--- + +## 3 Abbreviations + +For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: + +| | | +|-------|-------------------------------------------------| +| AGCH | Access Grant Channel | +| APN | Access Point Name | +| AuC | Authentication Centre | +| BSC | Base Station Controller | +| BSS | Base Station System | +| BSSAP | BSS Application Part | +| BTS | Base Transceiver Station | +| CBCH | Cell Broadcast Channel | +| CCCH | Common Control Channel | +| CMIS | Common Management Information Service | +| CMISE | Common Management Information Service Element | +| DCCH | Dedicated Control Channel | +| DCN | Data Communication Network | +| EE | Energy Efficiency | +| EIR | Equipment Identity Register | +| ETSI | European Telecommunications Standards Institute | +| FACCH | Fast Associated Control Channel | +| FTAM | File Transfer Access and Management | +| FTP | File Transfer Protocol | +| GGSN | Gateway GPRS Service Node | +| GMSC | Gateway Mobile Services Switching Centre | +| GPRS | General Packet Radio Service | +| GSN | GPRS Service Node | +| HLR | Home Location Register | +| HO | Handover | +| HPLMN | Home PLMN | +| IMEI | International Mobile Equipment Identity | +| IMSI | International Mobile Subscriber Identity | + +| | | +|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------| +| ISDN | Integrated Service Digital Network | +| ISO | International Standards Organisation | +| ITU-T | The International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee | +| LLC | Logical Link Control | +| LR | Location Register | +| MMI | Man-Machine Interface | +| MML | Man-Machine Language | +| MOC | Managed Object Class | +| MOI | Managed Object Instance | +| MS | Mobile Station | +| MSC | Mobile Services Switching Centre | +| MSRN | Mobile Subscriber Roaming Number | +| MTP | Message Transfer Part | +| NE | Network Element | +| NMC | Network Management Centre | +| NSS | Network Sub System (including EIR, HLR, SMS-IWMSC, MSC and VLR) | +| O&M | Operations and Maintenance | +| OA&M | Operation, Administration and Maintenance | +| OACSU | Off-Air Call Set Up | +| OMAP | (ITU-T) Operations, Maintenance and Administration Part | +| OMC | Operations and Maintenance Centre | +| OS | Operations System | +| OSI | Open System Interconnection | +| PCCCH | Packet Common Control Channel | +| PCCH | Packet Paging Channel | +| PCH | Paging Channel | +| PEE | Power, Energy and Environmental | +| PLMN | Public Land Mobile Network (including BSS and NSS) | +| PM | Performance Management | +| PTCH | Packet Traffic Channel | +| PVLR | Previous VLR | +| QoS | Quality of Service | +| RACH | Random Access Channel | +| Rec. | Recommendation | +| Ref. | Reference | +| RF | Radio Frequency | +| ROSE | Remote Operation Service Element | +| RR | Radio Resource | +| RXLEV | Reception Level | +| RXQUAL | Reception Quality | +| SACCH | Slow Associated Control Channel | +| SCCP | (ITU-T) Signalling Connection Control Part | +| SDCCH | Stand alone Dedicated Control Channel | +| SGSN | Serving GPRS Service Node | +| SMS-IWMSC | Short Message Service Inter Working MSC | +| SNDPCP | Sub Network Dependency Control Protocol | +| SNMP | Simple Network Management Protocol | +| Spec. | Specification | +| SS | Supplementary Service | +| TCAP | (ITU-T) Transaction Capabilities Application Part | +| TCH | Traffic Channel | +| TMN | Telecommunications Management Network | +| TMSI | Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity | +| TS | Technical Specification | +| VLR | Visitors Location Register | + +## 4 Detailed description of the measurement system for a GSM PLMN + +### 4.1 Introduction + +TS 32.401 [31] describes the required functions for the administration of performance measurements and the retrieval of their results. For this purpose, the characteristics of measurement jobs and measurement results have been defined. + +The present document explains how these requirements can be met in a GSM system using standard OSI systems management functions or SNMP management operations and, where necessary, tailoring them for GSM PLMN use. In the following, managed object classes and their properties (attributes, notifications, etc.) to be used on the object oriented interface between OS and NEs for the execution of performance management functions are specified. + +Note that the implementation of this object oriented approach defined in the following clauses is optional. As an alternative, vendors can also choose to implement their GSM systems or GSM parts of combined GSM/UMTS systems according to the interface definition and requirements specified in TS 32.401 [31], which implies that: + +- for measurement administration, the functional requirements are standardised, but technology and details of the implementation are vendor specific; +- for the retrieval of measurement results, only a file based mechanism for transfer of results to a Network Manager is standardised. + +#### 4.1.1 Basic measurement system functions + +Before measurement data from the NEs can be collected and the results be forwarded to the OS, the measurement jobs that generate the required data shall be activated in the system. In object oriented terms, this corresponds to the instantiation of managed objects which model the measurement process. In order to control the measurement process, appropriate attributes of these objects shall be defined and have to be set to the required/desired values, either when the objects are created or during the lifetime of the objects. The specific attributes and their values will determine the measurement schedule, the measured network resources, the measurement types and the generation of scheduled result reports as well as the layout of the reports. Scheduled results can be forwarded to the OS using a notification that is defined specifically for this purpose as a part of the measurement object class definitions. A dedicated action will be used for requesting current results of active measurements. + +#### 4.1.2 Measurement Object Administration + +The management of objects in an open system is performed utilising the internationally standardised "Common Management Information Service Element" (CMISE ITU-T Recommendation X.710 [13] or IETF RFC 1157 [30]). Managed objects for the execution of PLMN performance measurement functions can be instantiated and deleted using the M-CREATE and M-DELETE services or SNMP SET and GET operations. Reading and modifying attributes of these objects can be achieved employing the M-GET and M-SET services of CMISE or SET and GET operations of SNMP. The CMISE M-EVENT-REPORT service and SNMP TRAP is defined for the emission of notifications, while actions can be executed using the M-ACTION service. + +Specific notifications defined in the OSI object management function (see ITU-T Recommendation X.730 [15]) are used to notify the OS of the creation and deletion of managed objects and of the change of attribute values. For the formal definition of the PLMN performance management object model, refer to annex C. + +The measurement job can be ideally modelled by the managed object class "simpleScanner" as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]. The "simpleScanner" is derived from the "homogeneousScanner" object class (see ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]), which in turn is a specialisation of the "scanner" class of managed objects (see ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]). The "simpleScanner" object has attributes to determine: + +- the measurement types; +- the measured network resources; +- the recording periods; and +- the reporting requirements; + +of the measurement job. The "simpleScanner" generates measurement result reports in the form of notifications, according to the attributes that prescribe the reporting requirements. The measurement transfer requirements are not modelled in the scanner objects, since generic and general services are used (see clause 4.3.2 and annex D). + +## 4.2 Modelling of measurement jobs + +A measurement job is represented by a "simpleScanner" object. The following clauses define how the measurement job characteristics are mapped onto the properties of the "simpleScanner" managed object class, and how the measurement types of a measurement job are modelled in the PLMN performance measurement system. + +### 4.2.1 Measurement job characteristics + +#### 4.2.1.1 Measurement Function + +Every measurement job collects measurement data from selected measurement types across one or more network resources of the same type. The selected measurement types shall be identical throughout all network resources observed by a measurement job. For each network resource, the related measurement types have been grouped in one or more measurement functions. + +Measurement functions, are modelled by various "measurementFunction" object classes (see annex C). The measurement types for the PLMN performance measurement system are defined in annex B, and their result values are included as attributes in the appropriate "measurementFunction" object class. In case the measurement type is a counter, the attribute represents the counter value as is. In all other cases, the attribute delivers a calculated value (e.g. a mean), over the observed period. The "measurementFunction" objects are contained in the objects that represent the network resource to which the measurement types included in the "measurementFunction" refer. All measurement types that relate only to a network resource alone are grouped into one "measurementFunction" class which is unique for that network resource. Measurement types that are related to the network resource and the same type(s) of adjacent resource(s) (e.g. Handover neighbour cell) are also grouped into one unique type of measurement function which may exist once or more per instance or per set of that adjacent resource(s). The instances of the adjacent resources that are to be addressed by the measurement function are identified by the values of attributes which are part of that specific "measurementFunction" object class definition. + +Measurement types that belong together are grouped together in the same package (e.g. "immediateAssignmentProcedurePackage" has attributes "attemptedImmediateAssignmentProcedures" and "successfulImmediateAssignmentProcedures" - for details refer to annex C). Since all measurement types defined in annex B may or may not be supported by the system, all packages of a "measurementFunction" which contain measurement attributes are conditional. A "measurementFunction" needs to be created before a "simpleScanner" can scan its attributes, i.e. before actual measurements can be taken. The create request from the OS shall specify the values of attributes that identify adjacent resources (like Handover neighbour cell), if any, but it may not specify any measurement attributes of the "measurementFunction" object. Upon creation of a "measurementFunction" object, the system will determine the measurement packages that are included in the object according to the measurement types the system supports. If multiple instances of the same "measurementFunction" object class are created, the packages included in the various instances may be different from instance to instance since the system may have restrictions on how many measurement packages of the same type it supports. The OS can inquire the measurement types supported by a "measurementFunction" object from the system, by reading the "packages" attribute or the attribute list of the object (see ITU-T Recommendation X.721 [14]). Unlike the former operation, the latter, however, will also return values of the measurement attributes which are not expected to be meaningful at this time (see below). Deletion of the "measurementFunction" will render the measurement types that correspond to the "measurementFunction" attributes unavailable to the OS. Creation and deletion of a "measurementFunction" will be notified to the OS using the object creation and deletion notifications as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.730 [15]. + +Each measurement job may collect data from one or more measurement types across one or more network resources, i.e. a "simpleScanner" object may make a choice of one or more "measurementFunction" instances and scan the same set of attributes across all selected measurement functions. For this purpose, it can scope the set of measurement functions that are eligible for inclusion in the observation, and it may select measurement functions using filtering criteria (similar to the concept of scoping and filtering as described in ITU-T Recommendation X.710 [13]). Alternatively, it can use an explicit list of "measurementFunction" objects for scanning. The "simpleScanner" does not explicitly identify the network resource(s) it measures. Instead, this information is derived from the containment relationship between the selected "measurementFunction" instances and the objects that model the network resources, and, where necessary, through specific attributes of the "measurementFunction" objects that identify adjacent resources. In principle, a "simpleScanner" is able to scan attributes of any defined "measurementFunction", but for the purpose of the present document, each "simpleScanner" instance is only required to scan attributes of "measurementFunction" + +objects that are contained in the same "xxxFunction" object as the "simpleScanner" itself, where "xxx" stands for "bss", "msc", "hlr", "vlr", "eir" or "smsc", respectively (see figure C.1). + +All measurement attributes of any "measurementFunction" should only be read by a "simpleScanner" that has been instantiated for this purpose. By definition they can be read directly by systems management protocol, but their values are not expected to have any meaning apart from the scan. Therefore, the system will not return the "attribute list" in the create reply, and the "attributeList" will also not be included in the object creation notification. + +#### 4.2.1.2 Measurement schedule + +The measurement schedule specifies the time frame during which the measurement job will be active. The schedule consist of a measurement start- and stoptime and one or more recording intervals which may repeat on a daily or weekly basis. The semantics of the scheduling parameters are described in clause 3.2.1.2. + +All of the above parameters are formally defined as attributes of conditional packages of the "simpleScanner" managed object class. The starttime and stoptime are included in the "duration" package and indicate, if the package is present, the specific point in time at which the "simpleScanner" will become active or inactive, respectively. If the "simpleScanner" is instantiated after the specified starttime, this will have the same effect as if no starttime was specified (see clause 3.2.1.2). + +The optional recording intervals, if specified, further restrict the time during which the "simpleScanner" actively collects measurement data within the time frame determined by the duration package. The "dailyScheduling" package may be used to define one or more intervals during each day. Alternatively, the "weeklyScheduling" package can be used to define individual intervals for each day of the week. The recording interval should be a multiple of the granularity period (if non-zero) and the start- and endtimes shall be aligned with granularity period boundaries for the system to accept the values. + +It is possible to create several "simpleScanner" objects which scan the same attributes of the same "measurementFunction" instances according to different recording intervals. In this case it is, however, required that these intervals do not overlap. Consequently, if it is required to measure the same measurement type with overlapping schedules, it is necessary to have an appropriate number of instances of the same "measurementFunction" available which all support the required attributes (see clause 4.2.1.1). + +For the definition of the syntactical and additional behavioural aspects of the above parameters, refer to ITU-T Recommendation X.721 [14] and ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]. + +#### 4.2.1.3 Granularity period + +The granularity period defines the periodicity of the generation of results by a measurement job within the timeframe specified in the scheduling attributes. The granularity period of a measurement job is determined by the value of the "granularityPeriod" attribute of the "simpleScanner". The present document requires, as a minimum, the support of granularity periods of 5, 15, 30 and 60 minutes. + +The value of this attribute shall specify the required value in minutes. The underlying International Standards allow the modification of the "granularityPeriod" attribute, but for an implementation claiming conformance to the present document, it is not required that its value be changeable during the lifetime of the "simpleScanner" object. If this value is 60, measurement results will be generated every full hour. If the value is 30, results will be generated every 0 and 30 minutes past the full hour. If the value is 15, result output will occur every 0, 15, 30 and 45 minutes past the full hour, and finally, if the value is 5, the "simpleScanner" will generate output every 5 minutes, synchronised on the full hour. Again, measurement results are only reported at the end of each granularity period within the recording interval. Due to these definitions, synchronisation of granularity periods through the conditional "periodSynchronisationPackage" of the "simpleScanner" is not supported in the scope of the present document. + +If periodical generation of results is not required from a "simpleScanner" instance, this can be achieved by specifying the value 0 for the "granularityPeriod" attribute. In this case, it will only be possible to request current measurement results from the "simpleScanner" (see below). + +#### 4.2.1.4 Scan reports + +At the end of each granularity period within the measurement schedule, the "simpleScanner" will emit a "scanReport" notification, defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19], which contains the measurement results generated by the scanner at the end of that granularity period. The information in the notification shall comprise: + +- the managed object class and managed object instance of the "simpleScanner" that emitted the notification, plus the notification type (i.e. "scan report"); +- a time stamp that indicates the time at which the measurement results were taken, i.e. the end time of the respective granularity period; +- for each "measurementFunction" object from which measurements were taken by the scanner, a list of measurement attribute values and optional attribute identifiers, plus a suspect flag for each attribute that indicates the validity of the result value. Missing data is indicated in the list. The time stamp that indicates the time offset forward from scan initiation until the value of the measurement attribute was actually taken is not supported in the PLMN measurement system; +- for an incomplete scan the reason why the scan could not be completed. + +The definition of the "scanReport" notification in ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19] provides some flexibility with respect to the actual layout of the report. In the PLMN performance measurement system, the following options can be selected: + +- suppressing the reporting of the identification of the "measurementFunction" object from which the measurements reported in the notification were collected. This is only useful when the identification of the "measurementFunction" can be determined by other means, or if the identification is not required by the OS (e.g. when the statistics are to be calculated); +- omitting the attribute identifiers from the report. In this case, the attribute values are reported in an agreed order, which is defined by an attribute of the "simpleScanner"; +- measurement values that are identical throughout all "measurementFunction" instances from which the scanner takes measurements may be included in the report only once. + +ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19] defines in detail the attributes of the "simpleScanner" which are used to control the above features. Additional options of ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19] which are not listed here are not supported in the PLMN performance measurement system (see conformance requirements in clause 4.4). + +## 4.2.2 Scanner state and status attributes + +State and status indicators are defined for the measurement job in clause 3.2.2 of the present document. These are modelled through appropriate attributes which reflect the state and status of the "simpleScanner" object. These attributes are: administrativeState, operationalState and availabilityStatus. + +**administrativeState:** the administrativeState attribute is used to suspend and resume the scanning performed by the "simpleScanner". This attribute can be altered by means of CMISE M-SET service or SNMP SET operation for the applicable "simpleScanner" object instance. + +**operationalState:** the operationalState attribute represents the operational capability of the scanner to perform its functions. + +**availabilityStatus:** the availabilityStatus attribute reflects whether or not the simpleScanner object instance is active according to the measurement schedule. + +Any changes to the values of the administrativeState and the operationalState attributes will be reported to the OS using the "stateChange" notification, as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.731 [16]. + +Further details about these attributes can be found in ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]. + +## 4.2.3 Scanner administration + +The generic CMISE services M-CREATE, M-DELETE, M-GET and M-SET or SNMP SET and GET, applied to a simpleScanner managed object instance respectively represent creation, deletion, display and modification of a measurement job. A CMISE M-ACTION primitive or SNMP SET with a specific action type for activating a scan report is defined for the retrieval of the current values of measurement results. + +**Creating a "simpleScanner":** a "simpleScanner" can be created by issuing an appropriate M-CREATE request or SNMP SET request. On creation of the object, all attribute values have to be supplied that determine: + +- the selection of "measurementFunction" instances and their attributes which shall be measured; + +- the schedule of the "simpleScanner"; and +- the reporting requirements; + +as defined in previous clauses. The "measurementFunction" objects shall be created before the scanner can be instantiated, and the measurement attributes specified in the scanner shall be present in the selected "measurementFunction" instances, for the scan to return its results. For each object that does not exist, an empty report shall be returned and for each attribute that does not exist, an empty value shall be returned within the report. The relationship between the scan attributes and the scanner is explained in ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]. + +**Modifying "simpleScanner" attributes:** modification of "simpleScanner" attributes may be requested by the OS during the lifetime of a scanner, using the CMISE M-SET or SNMP SET operation. The conditions for modification of attributes of the "simpleScanner" are specified in ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19], but some additional restrictions, defined in the present document with respect to the changeability of "simpleScanner" attributes, apply in the PLMN performance measurement system. + +**Displaying scanner objects:** the system operator can get a list of all "simpleScanner" objects that currently exist in the system, together with all available information as stored in the NE. This information consists of the data that was supplied on creation/modification of the objects and the values of the state and status attributes of the "simpleScanner" objects. The CMISE M-GET or SNMP GET operation can be used to selectively retrieve the required information from the system. For details see ITU-T Recommendation X.710 [13]. + +**Deleting a "simpleScanner":** a "simpleScanner" instance is automatically deleted by the system when the scheduled endtime is reached and all result reports, either scheduled or on request have been generated. A "simpleScanner" object can also be deleted by manual intervention, utilising the CMISE M-DELETE or SNMP SET operation, at any time. When deleted, the measurement process associated with the scanner is stopped, and all allocated resources are released. + +**Suspending/resuming scanner operation:** on normal operation, the "simpleScanner" collects measurement data from the selected "measurementFunction" objects according to the values of the "simpleScanner" attributes. However, the system operator may decide for some reason to discard temporarily the collection of measurement data (e.g. in case of system overload or congestion, measurement results not used, ...). The system operator therefore is able to suspend scanner operation at any time, setting the administrativeState attribute to "locked". This implies that the "simpleScanner" instance remains in the system, but no measurement gathering and result reporting activities are performed for this scanner. When scanner operation is resumed, i.e. the administrativeState is "unlocked", measurement data collection and result reporting is started again at the next full granularity period within the measurement schedule. + +**Requesting current measurement result values:** the system operator may for some reason be interested in the current values of the measurement results of a particular measurement process, independently of the scheduled data collection and reporting of the respective scanner, e.g. for tracing the increment of some of the measurement attributes. To this aim, the "activateScanReport" CMISE M-ACTION or SNMP GET is used as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]. The action reply will return current results according to the attributes of the scanner that govern the generation of the "scanReport" notification, i.e. the format of the reply is identical to that of scheduled reports generated by the scanner. Any such request does not affect the underlying measurement process, and may only be issued when the scanner is operating according to its schedule and not suspended (i.e. "offduty" not present in the availability status, administrative state equals "unlocked"), otherwise an error will be returned. + +## 4.3 Modelling of measurement results + +Each measurement produces a result at the end of the granularity period or on request of the OS. Annex B provides for each measurement type a description of the expected measurement result. Annex C contains the formal definition of the attribute that represents the measurement type. + +### 4.3.1 Characteristics of the result report + +A scheduled result report is generated in the form of a "scanReport" notification. Current measurement results requested by the OS using the "activateScanReport" action will be supplied by the system in the reply to the request. All measurement attributes that are observed by a "simpleScanner" object are included in a single report or action reply, respectively. The layout of the two result reports - notification or action reply - is identical, as far as the contained measurement information is concerned. For details on the result report characteristics, please refer to the previous clauses. + +### 4.3.2 Result report transfer control + +Result reports from a "simpleScanner" object are either produced according to the measurement schedule (notification) or on receipt of an explicit request (action) from the OS. There are no mechanisms to control the forwarding of the reply to that request (action reply), or to store it in the NE. There are, however, functions to determine the forwarding, local storage in the NE and deferred retrieval of the "scanReport" notification. These functions are described in the following clauses. + +The forwarding of notifications can be controlled by the OS via "Event Forwarding Discriminator" (EFD) objects, as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.734 [17]. For each EFD, the OS can specify a discriminator construct which will be applied as a filter to any event report generated in the system. If an event report passes the filter, a notification will be forwarded to the OS accordingly. The following filter criteria are allowed in an EFD for the PLMN performance measurement system: + +- the event type, which allows to enable or disable completely the forwarding of scan report notifications; +- the "simpleScanner" managed object instance, which allows to restrict forwarding of result reports to those that are generated by specific scanner instances; +- the time stamp contained in the scan report ("scanInitiationTime"), which allows to selectively enable the forwarding of result reports that were generated at a specific time or during specific periods of time; +- any operation on the above attributes in any combination. + +Measurement result reports can be stored in the NE. This property is modelled through the managed object class "log", as specified in ITU-T Recommendation X.721 [14] and "log control function" as specified in ITU-T Recommendation X.735 [18]. The storage of event reports in the "log" can be controlled through a discriminator construct, similar to the event forwarding control. The present document requires for the "log" discriminator construct the same criteria as for the EFD discriminator construct. + +All scan report notifications that pass the discriminator construct of the "log" will create a "scanReportRecord" object which is contained in the log. These records can be retrieved by the OS at any time, as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.735 [18] and ITU-T Recommendation X.710 [13], using either CMISE, SNMP, FTP or using FTAM (see annex D). The use of FTAM or FTP services is especially suitable for bulk data transfer. From the common procedures defined in GSM TS 12.00 [8] for data transfer in a PLMN, only the method that provides logged information into file(s) can be used for the measurement system. The "resultType" requested in the action will identify the appropriate log instance(s) as the source of the measurement data, and optionally additional filter criteria which determines the actual records to be put into the file(s) can be supplied. The filter criteria that shall be supported are identical to those defined for the discriminator construct of the logs. On receipt of the action, the requested records will be put into one or more files, which will then be made available to the OS. The format of the records in the file shall be according to the definition of the "scanReportRecord" as given in ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]. + +Since all measurement attributes and the identification of the network resource observed by a "simpleScanner" are included in a single attribute of the result reports, it is not possible to filter on the measured resource or the measurement type. If the selective forwarding/logging/retrieval of measurement results referring to individual network resources or individual measurement types is required by the system operator, then "simpleScanner" objects shall be instantiated such that the scanner identity will implicitly identify the measured resource and measurement types, i.e. the scanner attributes should be set such that the scanner observes only the specific resources and/or the specific measurement attributes which shall be filtered, according to the system operator's requirements. + +## 4.4 Conformance requirements + +In the following clause, conformance requirements for object classes, notifications and actions defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19] are specified. In cases where requirements in the present document restrict options of ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19], like e.g. changeability of attribute values, the conditions of the present document shall apply. + +### 4.4.1 Simple scanner + +The following clause lists the attributes and packages of the "simpleScanner", as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19], and those inherited from the "scanner" as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]. It specifies which properties shall be supported to conform with the present document. + +**MANDATORY PACKAGES:****scannerPackage:** + +- scannerId: this attribute identifies a "simpleScanner" instance. It is a mandatory attribute of the "simpleScanner" managed object class and will be supported in the PLMN measurement system; +- granularityPeriod: this attribute specifies the granularity period of the scanner, as defined in clause 4.2.1.3. It is a mandatory attribute of the "simpleScanner" managed object class and will be supported in the PLMN measurement system; +- administrativeState and operationalState: (see clause 4.2.2) are mandatory attributes of the "simpleScanner" managed object class and will be supported in the PLMN measurement system. Their semantics are defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]. + +**homogeneousScannerPackage:** + +- scanAttributeIdList: this attribute is interrelated with the "numericAttributeIdArray" attribute of the "simpleScannerPackage". It is supported in the PLMN measurement system according to the definitions of clause 4.2.1.4 and ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]. + +**simpleScannerPackage:** + +- numericAttributeIdArray: this attribute is interrelated with the "scanAttributeIdList" attribute of the "homogeneousScannerPackage". It is supported in the PLMN measurement system according to the definitions of clause 4.2.1.4 and ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]; +- suppressObjectInstance: this attribute determines whether or not the object instance of the observed measurement function is included in the measurement results. It is supported in the PLMN measurement system according to the definitions of clause 4.2.1.4 and ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]; +- activateScanReport: this action is supported in the PLMN measurement system (see below); +- scanReport: this notification is supported in the PLMN measurement system (see below). + +**CONDITIONAL PACKAGES:****availabilityStatusPackage:** + +- availabilityStatus: this attribute is supported in the PLMN measurement system (see clause 4.2.2) according to the definition of ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]. + +**duration:** + +- startTime and stopTime: these attributes constitute the start- and stop time of the scanner. They are supported according to clause 4.2.1.2 and ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]. + +**dailyScheduling:** + +- intervalsOfDay: this attribute defines the periods within a day during which the scanner actively collects measurement data. It is supported according to clause 4.2.1.2 and ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]. + +**weeklyScheduling:** + +- weekMask: this attribute defines, for each day of the week, the periods during which the scanner actively collects measurement data. It is supported according to clause 4.2.1.2 and ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]. + +**externalScheduler:** + +- The support of this package is not required in the PLMN measurement system. + +**periodSynchronisationPackage:** + +- The support of this package is not required in the PLMN measurement system. Synchronisation of granularity periods is described in clause 4.2.1.3. + +**createDeleteNotificationsPackage:** + +- This package contains the object creation and object deletion notifications. Both are required in the PLMN measurement system. + +**attributeValueChangeNotificationPackage:** + +- This package contains the attribute value change notification. It is required in the PLMN measurement system. + +**stateChangeNotificationPackage:** + +- This package contains the state change notification. It is required in the PLMN measurement system. + +**timeStampReportPackage:** + +- timeStampReportMode: this attribute specifies the time stamping requirements for the measurement results. The value "1" ("globalTimeStampOnly") shall be used. + +**scopedSelectionPackage and managedObjectInstanceSelectionPackage:** + +- Either one of these packages is present in any scanner instance. The attributes contained in the packages determine the measurement functions selected for observation by the scanner. They are supported according to the definitions of ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]. + +**timingSelectionPackage:** + +- The support of this package is not applicable in the PLMN measurement system, since the observed "measurementFunction" managed objects do not contain any time attributes. + +**onceReportAttributeIdListPackage:** + +- onceReportAttributeIdList: this attribute contains a list of attribute identifiers. The values of these attributes shall be included in a result report only once if they are identical throughout all "measurementFunction" objects observed by the "simpleScanner". It may be supported in the PLMN measurement system as an option, see ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]. + +## 4.4.2 Scan report record + +The "scanReportRecord" managed object class will be supported in the PLMN measurement system as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19] and ITU-T Recommendation X.721 [14]. + +## 4.4.3 Scan report notification + +The "scanReport" notification will be supported in the PLMN measurement system as defined in clause 4.2.1.4 and ITU-T Recommendation X.738 [19]. + +## 4.4.4 Activate scan report action + +In the scope of the present document, there are no specific conformance requirements for the action request. The action reply will be supported according to the requirements for the scan report notification. + +## 4.5 Application Context + +The Application Context Name of the 12.04 application context shall have the following object identifier value: + +{gsm-OM-DomainId gsm-12-04 (4) protocolSupport (1) applicationContext (0) gsm-Management (0)}; + +and the following object description value: + +"gsm12.04 management application context". + +The object identifier gsm-OM-DomainId is defined in the GSM 12.30 [11]. + +## Annex A (informative): Graphical examples + +This annex gives some graphical examples to demonstrate how the measurements in annex B, can be combined to express a specific function. + +EXAMPLE 1: Authentication and Authentication Set requests. + +This diagram shows which measurements in the annex B need to be activated to collect the statistical information for Authentication of a subscriber. + +![Diagram showing network elements HLR, VLR, PVLR, MSC, and BSC with numbered arrows representing measurement points.](fc0735d325f0ebd9214171975c68a888_img.jpg) + +The diagram illustrates the flow of messages between network elements: HLR (Home Location Register), VLR (Visitor Location Register), PVLR (Permanent VLR), MSC (Mobile Switching Center), and BSC (Base Station Controller). Arrows indicate the direction of data flow, numbered 1 through 12, corresponding to the measurement points in the table below. + +- Arrow 1: VLR to HLR +- Arrow 2: HLR to VLR +- Arrow 3: HLR to VLR +- Arrow 4: VLR to HLR +- Arrow 5: VLR to HLR +- Arrow 6: VLR to HLR +- Arrow 7: VLR to PVLR +- Arrow 8: PVLR to VLR +- Arrow 9: MSC to BSC +- Arrow 10: BSC to MSC +- Arrow 11: MSC to VLR +- Arrow 12: VLR to MSC + +Diagram showing network elements HLR, VLR, PVLR, MSC, and BSC with numbered arrows representing measurement points. + +| Nbr. | Measurement Attribute Name | Measurement Name | +|------|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1 | attReqForAuthSetsReceivedByHLRFromVLRs | Attempted requests for Authentication sets received by HLR from VLRs | +| 2 | succReturnedAuthSetsFromHLRToVLRs | Successful returned Authentication sets from HLR to VLRs | +| 3 | emptyResponsesForAuthSetsFromHLRToVLRs | Empty responses to request for Authentication sets from HLR to VLRs | +| 4 | attReqForAuthSetsSentToHLR | Attempted requests for Authentication sets sent to HLR by the VLRs | +| 5 | succReceivedAuthSetsFromHLR | Successful received Authentication sets from the HLR to the VLRs | +| 6 | emptyResponsesForAuthFromHLR | Empty responses to request for Authentication sets from HLR to VLRs | +| 7 | attIdentificationReqToPVLRs | Attempted identification requests to PVLRs | +| 8 | succIdentificationReqToPVLRs | Successful identification requests to PVLRs | +| 9 | attCipheringModeControlProcs | Attempted ciphering mode controlled procedures | +| 10 | succCipheringModeControlProcs | Successful ciphering mode controlled procedures | +| 11 | attAuthProcsInVLR | Attempted authentication procedures in the VLR | +| 12 | succAuthProcsInVLR | Successful authentication procedures in the VLR | + +Example 1: Authentication and Authentication Set requests + +EXAMPLE 2: Interrogation of HLR for routing. + +This diagram shows which measurements in the annex B need to be activated to collect the statistical information for Routing. + +![Diagram for Example 2: Interrogation of HLR for routing. It shows three entities: HLR, VLR, and MSC. Arrows indicate the flow of messages: 1. MSC to HLR, 2. HLR to VLR, 3. VLR to HLR, 4. HLR to MSC, 5. HLR to MSC.](933ecd14c858bf3fc919222d8e357bc8_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + MSC[MSC] -- 1 --> HLR[HLR] + HLR -- 2 --> VLR[VLR] + VLR -- 3 --> HLR + HLR -- 4 --> MSC + HLR -- 5 --> MSC + +``` + +Diagram for Example 2: Interrogation of HLR for routing. It shows three entities: HLR, VLR, and MSC. Arrows indicate the flow of messages: 1. MSC to HLR, 2. HLR to VLR, 3. VLR to HLR, 4. HLR to MSC, 5. HLR to MSC. + +| Nbr. | Measurement Attribute Name | Measurement Name | +|------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------| +| 1 | attInterrogationOfHLRsForRouting | Attempted interrogations of HLRs for routing | +| 2 | attReqForMSRN | Attempted request for MSRN | +| 3 | succReqForMSRN | Successful request for MSRN | +| 4 | succInterrogationOfHLRsMSRNObtained | Successful interrogations of HLR (MSRN obtained) | +| 5 | succInterrogationOfHLRsCallForwarding | Successful interrogations of HLR (call forwarding) | + +#### Example 2: Interrogation of HLR for routing + +EXAMPLE 3: Location Updating. + +This diagram shows which measurements in the annex B need to be activated to collect the statistical information for Location Updating. + +![Diagram for Example 3: Location Updating. It shows three entities: HLR, VLR, and MSC. Arrows indicate the flow of messages: 1. MSC to VLR, 2. VLR to MSC, 3. VLR to HLR, 4. HLR to MSC, 5. HLR to VLR, 6. VLR to HLR.](80ec3bf791fd8eb41f73a420c2122529_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + MSC[MSC] -- 1 --> VLR[VLR] + VLR -- 2 --> MSC + VLR -- 3 --> HLR[HLR] + HLR -- 4 --> MSC + HLR -- 5 --> VLR + VLR -- 6 --> HLR + +``` + +Diagram for Example 3: Location Updating. It shows three entities: HLR, VLR, and MSC. Arrows indicate the flow of messages: 1. MSC to VLR, 2. VLR to MSC, 3. VLR to HLR, 4. HLR to MSC, 5. HLR to VLR, 6. VLR to HLR. + +| Nbr. | Measurement Attribute Name | Measurement Name | +|------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------| +| 1 | attIntraVLRLocationUpdates | Attempted intra-VLR location updates | +| 2 | succIntraVLRLocationUpdates | Successful intra-VLR location updates | +| 3 | attInterVLRLocationUpdates | Attempted inter-VLR location updates | +| 4 | succInterVLRLocationUpdates | Successful inter-VLR location updates | +| 5 | attLocationUpdate | Attempted location updates | +| 6 | succLocationUpdate | Successful location updates | + +#### Example 3: Location Updating + +--- + +## Annex B (normative): Performance Measurement Requirements Summary + +Following is the template used to describe the measurements contained in this annex. + +A. Description: + +- A short explanation of the measurement operation. + +B. Collection Method: + +- The form in which this measurement data is obtained: + - **CC** (Cumulative Counter); + - **GAUGE** (dynamic variable), used when data being measured can vary up or down during the period of measurement; + - **DER** (Discrete Event Registration), when data related to a particular event are captured every nth event is registered, where n can be 1 or larger; + - **SI** (Status Inspection). + +C. Condition: + +- The GSM condition which causes this measurement data to be updated. Where it is not possible to give a precise GSM condition, then the conditional circumstances leading to the update is stated. + +D. Measurement Attribute Name: + +- The Measurement Attribute Name which will be referenced by the Object Model. + +E. Measurement Result (measured value, Unit): + +- A short description of expected result value (e.g. A single integer value). + +F. Measurement Function Name: + +- Measurement Function Name for which this measurement is defined. + +G. Switching Technology: + +- The Switching product this Measurement is applicable to. Circuit Switched and/or Packet Switched (GPRS). When packet switching (GPRS) is identified for an MSC measurement function, this measurement type is related to a combined circuit/packet switched event. + +--- + +## B.1 Measurements Related to the BSC + +### B.1.1 BSC Measurement Function + +#### B.1.1.1 Unsuccessful requests for service + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unsuccessful mobile originated services for the BSC. + +NOTE: The "reject cause" indicates why the service request was rejected. Possible causes include, B-Subscriber busy, network out of order, protocol errors. + +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "CM-SERVICE REJECT" Message to MS requesting service (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. unsuccReqsForService. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +#### B.1.1.2 Unsuccessful requests for service, per cause + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unsuccessful mobile originated services for the BSC per cause. + +NOTE: The "reject cause" indicates why the service request was rejected. Possible causes include, B-Subscriber busy, network out of order, protocol errors. + +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "CM-SERVICE REJECT" Message to MS requesting service (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. unsuccReqsForServicePerCause. +- E. An integer value per cause. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +#### B.1.1.3 Mean Inter-arrival Time (Circuit Switched) + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean of the sum of time intervals between consecutive mobile originating call attempts. +- B. CC. +- C. This measurement is obtained by accumulating the time segments between receipt of consecutive access Message on the RACH with establishment cause "MOBILE ORIGINATING CALL" and then taking the arithmetic mean (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. meanInterArrivalTime +- E. A single real value. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.1.1.4 Attempted Transmission of Paging Messages, per BSC + +- A. This measurement provides the number of Paging messages transmitted, on a per BSC basis (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "PAGING REQUEST" (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attTransOfPagingMessagesPerBSC. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.1.1.5 Unsuccessful Transmission of Paging Messages, per BSC + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unsuccessful Paging requests, on a per BSC basis. +- B. CC. +- C. No "PAGING RESPONSE" received for the "PAGING REQUEST", expiry of timer T3113 (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. unsuccTransOfPagingMessagesPerBSC. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.1.1.6 Attempted IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT Procedures, per BSC + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted immediate assignment procedures, on a per BSC basis. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "CHANNEL REQUEST" Message. Note, the establishment causes are: "EMERGENCY CALL", "CALL RE-ESTABLISHMENT", "ANSWER TO PAGING", "ORIGINATING CALL", "LOCATION UPDATING", "ONE PHASE PACKET ACCESS", "SINGLE BLOCK PACKET ACCESS" and "OTHER PROCEDURES" as defined in (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attImmediateAssingProcsPerBSC. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.1.1.7 Successful IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT Procedures, per BSC + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful immediate assignment procedures, on a per BSC basis. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "IMMEDIATE ASSIGN COMMAND" Message. This Message contains either an "IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT" Message or an "IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT EXTENDED" Message. If an "IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT EXTENDED" Message is transmitted, the counter shall be incremented by two, because that Message contains assignment information for two mobiles (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. succImmediateAssingProcsPerBSC. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.1.1.8 Successful Internal Handovers, intra-CELL, per BSC + +- A. This measurement provides the number of times a call moves from the occupied channel of the CELL to another free channel of the same CELL, on a per BSC basis. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "HANDOVER PERFORMED" Message to the MSC (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. succInternalHDOsIntraCellPerBSC. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.1.1.9 Unsuccessful Internal Handovers, intra-CELL, per BSC + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unsuccessful intra CELL Handovers, i.e. an attempt was made to move a call from the occupied channel of the CELL to another free channel of the same CELL, on a per BSC basis. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "ASSIGNMENT FAILURE" Message for the attempted handover (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. unsuccInternalHDOsIntraCellPerBSC. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.1.1.10 Successful Internal Handovers per BSC + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful Handovers on a per BSC basis, it includes intra-CELL as well as inter-CELL Handovers. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "HANDOVER PERFORMED" Message to the MSC (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. succInternalHDOsPerBSC. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.1.1.11 Successful Internal Handovers per cause + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful Handovers per cause, it includes intra-CELL as well as inter-CELL Handovers. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "HANDOVER PERFORMED" Message to the MSC (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. succInternalHDOsPerCause. +- E. An integer value per Handover cause. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.1.1.12 Unsuccessful Internal Handovers with reconnection to old channels, per BSC + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unsuccessful Handovers, on a per BSC basis (with reconnection to the original channels). +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "HANDOVER FAILURE" Message for the attempted handover (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. unsuccInternalHDOsWithReconnectionPerBSC. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.1.1.13 Unsuccessful Internal Handovers with loss of connection, per BSC + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unsuccessful Handovers that end in loosing the call, on a per BSC basis. +- B. CC. +- C. Expiry of timer T3103 for Inter CELL Handovers and Expiry of timer T3107 for Intra CELL Handovers (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. unsuccInternalHDOsWithLossOfConnectionPerBSC. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.1.1.14 Flush Requests Received + +- A. This measurement provides the total number of flush request messages received from the SGSN to flush the PDUs for a given cell. +- B. CC. +- C. Update count for each receipt of a PDU flush request message from the SGSN. +- D. flushReqReceived. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.1.1.15 Paging Requests Received from SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the total number of "PAGING" messages received by the BSS from the SGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Update count for each receipt of a "PAGING" message by the BSS from the SGSN. +- D. pagingReqReceivedfromSGSN. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.1.1.16 Mean Inter-arrival Time (Packet Switched) + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean of the sum of time intervals between consecutive mobile originating packet channel access request. +- B. CC. +- C. This measurement is obtained by accumulating the time segments between receipt of consecutive 'PACKET CHANNEL REQUEST' message with the establishment cause being either one phase packet access or single block packet access, on the PRACH and then taking the arithmetic mean 3GPP TS 44.060 [23]. +- D. meanPSInterArrivalTime +- E. A single real value. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.1.1.17 Number of octets of uplink BSSGP PDUs + +- A. This measurement provides the number of octets of uplink BSSGP PDUs on Gb interface. +- B. CC. +- C. On transmission by the BSC of a PDU (type is UL-UNITDATA) on the BSSGP layer. The number of octets of BSSGP layer on Gb interface is calculated by sum of octets length in each BSSGP PDU header including BSSGP PDU header. See TS 48.018 [34]. +- D. NbrULBssgpOct. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. BSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switched traffic. + +### B.1.1.18 Number of octets of downlink BSSGP PDUs + +- a) This measurement provides the number of octets of downlink BSSGP PDUs on Gb interface. +- b) CC. +- c) On receipt by the BSC of a PDU (type is DL-UNITDATA) on the BSSGP layer. The number of octets of BSSGP layer on Gb interface is calculated by sum of octets length in each BSSGP PDU header including BSSGP PDU header. See TS 48.018 [34]. +- d) NbrDLBssgpOct. +- e) A single integer value. +- f) BSC Measurement Function. +- g) Valid for packet switched traffic + +### B.1.1.19 Power, Energy and Environmental (PEE) measurements + +#### B.1.1.19.0 Applicability of measurements + +The PEE related measurement definitions in the following clauses B.1.1.19.n are valid only for BSCs having built-in sensors (cf. ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36]). + +### B.1.1.19.1 Power + +#### B.1.1.19.1.1 Average Power + +- a) This measurement provides the average power consumed. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – clauses 4.4.3.1, 4.4.3.4, Annex A. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in Watt (W). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.AvgPower. +- f) bscMeasurementFunction. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.1.1.19.1.2 Minimum Power + +- a) This measurement provides the minimum power consumed. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – clauses 4.4.3.1, 4.4.3.4, Annex A. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in Watt (W). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.MinPower. +- f) bscMeasurementFunction. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.1.1.19.1.3 Maximum Power + +- a) This measurement provides the maximum power consumed. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – clauses 4.4.3.1, 4.4.3.4, Annex A. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in Watt (W). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.MaxPower. +- f) bscMeasurementFunction. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.1.1.19.2 Energy + +- a) This measurement provides the energy consumed. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – clauses 4.4.3.2, 4.4.3.4, Annex A. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in kilo Watt hour (kWh). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.Energy. +- f) bscMeasurementFunction. + +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.1.1.19.3 Temperature + +#### B.1.1.19.3.1 Average Temperature + +- a) This measurement provides the average temperature. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – clause 4.4.3.4, Annex A. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in Degree Celsius (C°). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.AvgTemperature. +- f) bscMeasurementFunction. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.1.1.19.3.2 Minimum Temperature + +- a) This measurement provides the minimum temperature. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – clause 4.4.3.4, Annex A. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in Degree Celsius (C°). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.MinTemperature. +- f) bscMeasurementFunction. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.1.1.19.3.3 Maximum Temperature + +- a) This measurement provides the maximum temperature. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – clause 4.4.3.4, Annex A. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in Degree Celsius (C°). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.MaxTemperature. +- f) bscMeasurementFunction. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.1.1.19.4 Voltage + +- a) This measurement provides the voltage. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – Clauses 4.4.3.3, 4.4.3.4, Annex B. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in Volt (V). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.Voltage. + +- f) bscMeasurementFunction. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.1.1.19.5 Current + +- a) This measurement provides the current. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – Clauses 4.4.3.3, 4.4.3.4, Annex B. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in Ampere (A). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.Current. +- f) bscMeasurementFunction. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.1.1.19.6 Humidity + +- a) This measurement provides the percentage of humidity. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – clause 4.4.3.3, Annex B. +- d) Each measurement is a single integer value from 0 to 100. +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.Humidity. +- f) bscMeasurementFunction. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +--- + +## B.2 Measurements related to the BTS + +### B.2.1 CELL Measurement Function + +#### B.2.1.1 Mean PCH-AGCH queue length + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean of the number of all messages waiting for transmission on the PCH-AGCH. Note: this is valid for circuit only when a PCCCH is provided. +- B. SI. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System designed), the PCH-AGCH queue length and then taking the arithmetic mean (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. meanPCHAGCHQueueLength. +- E. A single real value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.2.1.2 Attempted Transmission of Paging Messages (the PCH) + +- A. This measurement provides the number of Paging messages transmitted (these are counted as attempts). Note: this is valid for circuit only when a PCCCH is provided. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "PAGING REQUEST" (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attTransOfPagingMessagesThePCH. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.2.1.3 Unsuccessful Transmission of Paging Messages (the PCH) + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unsuccessful Paging requests. +- B. CC. +- C. No "PAGING RESPONSE" received for the "PAGING REQUEST", expiry of timer T3113 (GSM 04.08 [2]). Note: this is valid for circuit only when a PCCCH is provided. +- D. unsuccTransOfPagingMessagesThePCH. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.2.1.4 Attempted IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT Procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted immediate assignment procedures. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "CHANNEL REQUIRED" Message. Note, the establishment causes are: "EMERGENCY CALL", "CALL RE-ESTABLISHMENT", "ANSWER TO PAGING", "ORIGINATING CALL", "LOCATION UPDATING", "ONE PHASE PACKET ACCESS", "SINGLE BLOCK PACKET ACCESS" and "OTHER PROCEDURES" as defined in (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attImmediateAssingProcs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.2.1.5 Successful IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT Procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful immediate assignment procedures. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "IMMEDIATE ASSIGN COMMAND" Message. This message contains either an "IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT" Message or an "IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT EXTENDED" Message. If an "IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT EXTENDED" Message is transmitted, the counter shall be incremented by two, because that Message contains assignment information for two mobiles (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. succImmediateAssingProcs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.2.1.6 Attempted IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT Procedures, per cause + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted immediate assignment procedures, per cause. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "CHANNEL REQUIRED" Message. Note, the establishment causes are: "EMERGENCY CALL", "CALL RE-ESTABLISHMENT", "ANSWER TO PAGING", "ORIGINATING CALL", "LOCATION UPDATING" and "OTHER PROCEDURES" as defined in (GSM 04.08 [2]). + +NOTE: System implementation will allow the establishments causes of **PS \*\*\* Att IMM ASS Poc** can be incorporated in this measurement. + +- F. attImmediateAssingProcsPerCause. +- G. An integer value per cause. +- H. CELL Measurement Function. +- I. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.2.1.7 Successful IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT Procedures, per cause + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful immediate assignment procedures, per cause. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "IMMEDIATE ASSIGN COMMAND" Message. This Message contains either an "IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT" Message or an "IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT EXTENDED" Message, per cause. Note, the establishment causes are: "EMERGENCY CALL", "CALL RE-ESTABLISHMENT", "ANSWER TO PAGING", "ORIGINATING CALL", "LOCATION UPDATING" and "OTHER PROCEDURES". The "IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT EXTENDED" Message contains assignment information for two mobiles (GSM 04.08 [2]). If the establishment cause is identical for the two mobile stations, the counter shall be incremented by two. Otherwise the affected counters shall be incremented by one. + +NOTE: System implementation will allow the establishments causes of **PS \*\*\* Att IMM ASS Poc** can be incorporated in this measurement. + +- D. succImmediateAssingProcsPerCause. +- E. An integer value per cause. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.2.1.8 Number of Pages Discarded from the PCH Queue + +- A. This measurement provides the number of Paging messages which are discarded from the PCH queue before they could be transmitted. +- B. CC. +- C. Pages can be discarded from the queues (assuming queuing is in operation) for a number of reasons, including queue overflow, priority insertion in the queue causing an overflow and in-queue timer expiry (GSM 04.08 [2]). + +NOTE: This is valid for circuit only when a PCCCH is provided. + +- D. nbrOfPagesDiscardedFromPCHQueue. +- E. An integer value for the paging queue in the CELL. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.2.1.9 Mean duration of a successful Paging Procedure + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean duration of a successful Paging procedure, i.e. from transmission of the page request towards the MS and receipt of a positive response. +- B. CC. +- C. An accumulation is performed for the time taken by each Paging procedure during the granularity period and an arithmetic mean is taken from the observed values. The measured time will be between Transmission of a "PAGING REQUEST" service request to Receipt of "PAGING RESPONSE" service confirmation (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. meanDurationOfSuccPagingProcs. +- E. A single real value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.2.1.10 Number of Time Slots Available for Traffic (Previously TCHs) + +- A. This measurement provides the number of TS which are available for use by either CS or PS traffic (including those which are actually in use). +- B. GAUGE. +- C. The gauge will be incremented when the TS becomes available and decremented when it becomes unavailable. The TS is available when its administrative state is "unlocked" or "shuttingdown" and the operational state is "enabled", and is unavailable when its administrative state changes to "locked" or operational state changes to "disabled". The gauge value equals the number of TS with an administrative state of "unlocked" or "shuttingdown" and an operational state of "enabled", (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. nbrOfAvailableTCHs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.2.1.11 Mean number of busy Time Slots Occupied by Circuit Traffic + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean number of TS which are simultaneously in use for CS traffic (TCHs). +- B. SI. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System designed), the number of TS which are carrying circuit traffic (TCHs) and then taking the arithmetic mean (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. meanNbrOfBusyTCHs. +- E. A single real value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.12 Maximum number of busy Time Slots Occupied by Circuit Traffic + +- A. This measurement provides the highest recorded value for the number of TS simultaneously in use for Circuit switched traffic. +- B. GAUGE. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System designed), the number of TSs which are "busy", and then taking the maximum of all such values at the end of the granularity period. A TS is busy between an "ASSIGNMENT COMPLETE" Message and the complementary "RELEASE" Message, (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. maxNbrOfBusyTCHs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.13 Mean number of idle Time Slots per interference band (Previously TCHs) + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean of the number of idle TS per interference band. The TS is said to be idle if it can be allocated for a request. Idle TS are allocated in five classes (GSM 05.01) depending on the measured interference level. + +- B. SI. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System designed), the number of idle TS per interference band and then taking the arithmetic mean (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. meanNbrOfIdleTCHsPerInterferenceBand. +- E. A real value per interference band. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### **B.2.1.14 Attempted Time Slots seizures (Previously TCHs)** + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted TS seizures. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "ASSIGNMENT COMMAND" Message to the MS, (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attTCHSeizures. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### **B.2.1.15 Successful TCH/PDTCH seizures (Previously TCHs)** + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful TCH/PDTCH seizures. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "ASSIGNMENT COMPLETE" Message from the MS, (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. succTCHSeizures. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.2.1.16 Attempted TCH Seizures meeting an TCH blocked state + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted TCH seizures meeting all busy TCH state. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "SETUP" Message from the MS meeting all TCH busy state (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attTCHSeizuresMeetingTCHBlockedState. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.17 All Available TCH Allocated Time + +- A. This measurement provides the accumulated time during the granularity period when all available Time slots available for CS traffic were in use or otherwise unavailable to be allocated. +- B. CC. +- C. Each time segment represents the elapsed time from the last available TS being allocated to the next occurrence of a release of a TCH, so making it available for allocation. The allocation event can be for any reason e.g. new call, Handover and is represented by an "ASSIGNMENT COMPLETE" Message. These time segments are accumulated to give a single total (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. allAvailableTCHAllocatedTime. +- E. A single real value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.18 Mean busy time of allocated CS Time Slots + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean of the busy time of the maximum number of Time slots allocated for CS TCHs in a CELL. +- B. SI. +- C. This measurement is obtained by accumulating each Timeslots busy time. A TS is considered busy when it carries one or more TCHs, i.e. between an "ASSIGNMENT COMPLETE" Message and the complementary "RELEASE" Message for those TCHs. All values are added up and divided by the number of TS (maximum allocated for circuit on this Cell) at the end of the granularity period to obtain the arithmetic mean. (Further information can be found in GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. meanTCHBusyTime. +- E. A single real value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.19 Mean TCH queue length + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean of the number of queued TCH assignment procedures. +- B. SI. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System designed), the TCH queue length and then taking the arithmetic mean (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. meanTCHQueueLength. +- E. A single real value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.20 Number of lost Radio links while using a TCH + +- A. This measurement provides the number of calls terminated due to RF failure on the radio path. +- B. CC. +- C. A local end release due to a "RADIO LINK FAILURE" experienced by the BTS when using a TCH (GSM 05.08 [4]). +- D. nbrOfLostRadioLinksTCH. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.21 Number of Available SDCCHs + +- A. This measurement provides the number of SDCCHs which are available to be used (including those actually in use). +- B. GAUGE. +- C. The gauge will be incremented when the SDCCH becomes available and decremented when it becomes unavailable. The SDCCH is available when its administrative state is "unlocked" or "shuttingdown" and the operational state is "enabled", and is unavailable when its administrative state changes to "locked" or operational state changes to "disabled". The gauge value equals the number of SDCCHs with an administrative state of "unlocked" or "shuttingdown" and an operational state of "enabled", (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. nbrOfAvailableSDCCHs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.22 Mean number of busy SDCCHs + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean of the number of SDCCHs which are simultaneously in use. +- B. SI. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System designed), the SDCCHs which are busy and then taking the arithmetic mean (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. meanNbrOfBusySDCCHs. +- E. A single real value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.23 Maximum number of busy SDCCHs + +- A. This measurement provides the highest recorded value for the number of SDCCHs simultaneously in use. +- B. GAUGE. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System designed), the number of SDCCHs which are "busy", and then taking the maximum of all such values at the end of the granularity period, (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. maxNbrOfBusySDCCHs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.24 Attempted SDCCH Seizures meeting an SDCCH blocked state + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted SDCCH seizures meeting all busy SDCCH state. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "CHANNEL REQUEST" Message from the MS sent on the RACH meeting all SDCCH busy state (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attSDCCHSeizuresMeetingSDCCHBlockedState. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.25 All Available SDCCH Allocated Time + +- A. This measurement provides the accumulated time during the granularity period when all available SDCCHs are in use or otherwise unavailable to be allocated. +- B. CC. +- C. Each time segment represents the elapsed time from the last available SDCCH being allocated to the next occurrence of a release of a SDCCH, so making it available for allocation. The allocation event can be for any reason e.g. new call, Handover, and is represented by a SABM Message. These time segments are accumulated to give a single total (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. allAvailableSDCCHAllocatedTime. +- E. A single real value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.26 Mean SDCCH queue length + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean of the number of all messages waiting for transmission on the SDCCH. +- B. SI. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System designed), the SDCCH queue length and then taking the arithmetic mean (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. meanSDCCHQueueLength. +- E. A single real value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.27 Number of lost Radio links while using an SDCCH + +- A. This measurement provides the number of RF failure while using the SDCCH. +- B. CC. +- C. A local end release, due to a "RADIO LINK FAILURE", experienced by the BTS when using an SDCCH (GSM 08.58 [6]). +- D. nbrOfLostRadioLinksSDCCH. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.28 Relative time downlink power control at maximum + +- A. This measurement provides the time downlink power control was running at maximum level for the busy TCHs over the measured period, relative to the total TCH busy time. +- B. CC. +- C. Each time segment represents the elapsed time when BS\_TXPWR\_MAX is at maximum for each busy TCH. These time segments are accumulated to give a single total. From this information a value is derived such that it reflects a percentage of the total channel busy time, (GSM 05.08 [4]). +- D. relativeTimeDLPowerControlAtMax. +- E. A single real value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.29 Relative time uplink power control at maximum + +- A. This measurement provides the time uplink power control was running at maximum level for the seized TCHs over the measured period, relative to the total TCH busy time. +- B. CC. +- C. Each time segment represents the elapsed time when MS\_TXPWR\_MAX is at maximum for each busy TCH. These time segments are accumulated to give a single total. From this information a value is derived such that it reflects a percentage of the total channel busy time, (GSM 05.08 [4]). +- D. relativeTimeULPowerControlAtMax. +- E. A single real value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.30 Successful Internal Handovers, intra-CELL + +- A. This measurement provides the number of times a call moves from the occupied channel of the CELL to another free channel of the same CELL. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "HANDOVER PERFORMED" Message to the MSC (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. succInternalHDOsIntraCell. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.31 Unsuccessful Internal Handovers, intra-CELL + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unsuccessful intra CELL Handovers, i.e. an attempt was made to move a call from the occupied channel of the CELL to another free channel of the same CELL. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "ASSIGNMENT FAILURE" Message for the attempted handover (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. unsuccInternalHDOsIntraCell. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.32 Attempted incoming Internal inter CELL Handovers + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted incoming Handovers into the observed CELL from the related adjacent CELLs controlled by the same BSC, further information can be found in GSM 04.08 [2], GSM 08.08 [5] and GSM 08.58 [6]. +- B. CC. +- C. An occurrence of a BSC internal event, depending on Handover algorithm. +- D. attIncomingInternalInterCellHDOs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.33 Successful incoming Internal inter CELL Handovers + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful incoming Handovers into the observed CELL from the related adjacent CELLs controlled by the same BSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "HANDOVER PERFORMED" Message to the MSC (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. succIncomingInternalInterCellHDOs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.34 Attempted outgoing Internal inter CELL Handovers + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted outgoing Handovers from the observed CELL to the related adjacent CELLs controlled by the same BSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "HANDOVER COMMAND" Message (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. attOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.35 Successful outgoing Internal inter CELL Handovers + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful outgoing Handovers from the observed CELL to the related adjacent CELLs controlled by the same BSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "HANDOVER PERFORMED" Message to the MSC (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. succOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.36 Unsuccessful Internal Handovers with reconnection to old channels + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unsuccessful Handovers (with reconnection to the original channels), for the observed CELL. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "HANDOVER FAILURE" Message received for the attempted handover (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. unsuccHDOsWithReconnection. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.37 Unsuccessful Internal Handovers with loss of connection + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unsuccessful Handovers that end in losing the speech channel, for the observed CELL. +- B. CC. +- C. Expiry of timer T3103 for Inter CELL Handovers and Expiry of timer T3107 for Intra CELL Handovers (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. unsuccHDOsWithLossOfConnection. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.1.38 Number of Available PDCH + +- A. This measurement provides the current number of PDCHs which are available to be used (including those actually in use). +- B. GAUGE. +- C. The gauge will be incremented when the PDCH becomes available and decremented when it becomes unavailable. The PDCH is available when its administrative state is "unlocked" or "shuttingdown" and the operational state is "enabled", and is unavailable when its administrative state changes to "locked" or operational state changes to "disabled". The gauge value equals the number of PDCHs with an administrative state of "unlocked" or "shuttingdown" and an operational state of "enabled". +- D. availablePDCH. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.2.1.39 Mean Number of Available PDCH + +- A. This measurement provides the mean number of PDCHs which are available to be used (including those actually in use) over the measured period. +- B. GAUGE. +- C. The gauge will be incremented when the PDCH becomes available and decremented when it becomes unavailable. The PDCH is available when its administrative state is "unlocked" or "shuttingdown" and the operational state is "enabled", and is unavailable when its administrative state changes to "locked" or operational state changes to "disabled". The gauge value equals the number of PDCHs with an administrative state of "unlocked" or "shuttingdown" and an operational state of "enabled". +- D. meanNbrAvailablePDCH +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.2.1.40 Maximum Number of Available PDCH + +- A. This measurement provides the maximum number of PDCHs which are available to be used (including those actually in use) over the measured period. +- B. GAUGE. + +- C. The gauge will be incremented when the PDCH becomes available and decremented when it becomes unavailable. The PDCH is available when its administrative state is "unlocked" or "shuttingdown" and the operational state is "enabled", and is unavailable when its administrative state changes to "locked" or operational state changes to "disabled". The gauge value equals the number of PDCHs with an administrative state of "unlocked" or "shuttingdown" and an operational state of "enabled". +- D. maxNbrAvailablePDCH. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.2.1.41 Minimum Number of Available PDCH + +- A. This measurement provides the minimum number of PDCHs which are available to be used (including those actually in use) over the measured period. +- B. GAUGE. +- C. The gauge will be incremented when the PDCH becomes available and decremented when it becomes unavailable. The PDCH is available when its administrative state is "unlocked" or "shuttingdown" and the operational state is "enabled", and is unavailable when its administrative state changes to "locked" or operational state changes to "disabled". The gauge value equals the number of PDCHs with an administrative state of "unlocked" or "shuttingdown" and an operational state of "enabled". +- D. minNbrAvailablePDCH. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.2.1.42 Mean number of occupied PDCHs + +NOTE: This measurement is subject to the "2 out of 3 approach". + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean number of occupied PDCHs. +- B. SI. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System designed), the number of PDCHs which are carrying packet traffic and then taking the arithmetic mean (3GPP TS 44.060 [23]). +- D. meanNbrOfOccPDCHs. +- E. A single real value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.2.1.43 Maximum number of occupied PDCHs + +- A. This measurement provides the highest recorded value for the number occupied by PDCHs. +- B. GAUGE. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System designed), the maximum number of PDCHs which are carrying packet traffic. (3GPP TS 44.060 [23]). +- D. maxNbrOfOccPDCHss. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.2.1.44 Minimum number of occupied PDCHs + +- A. This measurement provides the lowest recorded value for the number of occupied PDCHs. +- B. GAUGE. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System designed), the maximum number of PDCHs which are carrying packet traffic. (3GPP TS 44.060 [23]). +- D. minNbrOfOccPDCHss. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.2.1.45 All available PDCH allocated time + +- A. This measurement gives the total amount of time in the granularity period, where all PDCHs were allocated. +- B. SI. +- C. This time is computed with starting time when the last PDCH is assigned and the end time when a PDCH is first released. +- D. availablePDCHAllocatedTime. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.2.1.46 Transmission of Packet Paging Messages on the PCCCH + +- A. This measurement provides the number of Packet Paging messages transmitted over PCCCH(these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "PACKET PAGING REQUEST" (3GPP TS 44.060 [23]). +- D. nbrPacketPagingMessagesPCHOnPCCCH. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.2.1.47 Mean PPCH-PAGCH queue length on PCCCH + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean of the number of all messages waiting for transmission on the PPCH-PAGCH sub channel on the PCCCH. +- B. SI. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System designed), the PPCH-PAGCH queue length and then taking the arithmetic mean (3GPP TS 44.060 [23]). +- D. meanPPCHPAGCHQueueLengthOnPCCCH. +- E. A single real value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.2.1.48 Number of Packet Pages Discarded from the PPCH Queue on PCCCH + +- A. This measurement provides the number of Packet Paging messages which are discarded from the PPCH queue before they could be transmitted on PCCCH. +- B. CC. +- C. Pages can be discarded from the queues (assuming queuing is in operation) for a number of reasons, including queue overflow, priority insertion in the queue causing an overflow and in-queue timer expiry (3GPP TS 44.060 [23]). +- D. nbrOfPSPagesDiscardedFromPPCHQueueOnPCCCH. +- E. An integer value for the paging queue in the CELL. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.2.1.49 Number of Packet Channel Assignment Requests, per cause + +- A. This measurement provides the number of packet channel assignment requests, per cause. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "PACKET CHANNEL REQUEST" message sent from the MS on the PRACH or by the "CHANNEL REQUEST" message sent on the RACH.. Note, the establishment causes are: defined in (GSM 04.08 [2]) for channel request message and (3GPP TS 44.060 [23] for the packet channel request message. +- D. attPCReqAssPerCause. +- E. An integer value per cause. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.2.1.50 Successful Packet Channel Assignment Procedures, per cause + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful packet channel assignment procedures, per cause. Note: A packet channel assignment is considered successful when either the "PACKET UPLINK ASSIGNMENT" message or the "IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT COMMAND" message is sent. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "IMMEDIATE ASSIGN COMMAND" message on the AGCH or the "PACKET UPLINK ASSIGNMENT" message on the PAGCH. Note, If the message contains assignment information for two mobiles (3GPP TS 44.060 [23]). If the establishment cause is identical for the two mobile stations, the counter shall be incremented by two. Otherwise the affected counters shall be incremented by one. + +NOTE: System implementation will allow these establishment causes to be incorporated into B 2.1.7. + +- D. succPDTCHAssProcsPerCause. +- E. An integer value per cause. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.2.1.51 Successful PDTCH seizures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful PDTCH seizures. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of the first RLC Block (PDU) on the PDTCH from the MS, (3GPP TS 44.060 [23]). +- D. succPDTCHSeizures. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for Packet switching. + +### B.2.1.52 Mean PDTCH queue length + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean of the number of all messages waiting for transmission on the PDTCH. +- B. CC. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a predefined interval (System design), the PDTCH queue length and then taking the arithmetic mean. +- D. meanPacketQueueLength. +- E. A single real value. +- F. CELL Measurement function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.2.1.53 Number of service upgrades/downgrades + +- A. With service upgrade and downgrade it is meant a switch from the used coding scheme (CS1, CS2, ...) to another one. This measurement counts the number of these upgrades/downgrades per cell. +- B. CC. +- C. The Trigger Event is a Service upgrade or downgrade for the observed object. +- D. nbrOfServiceChanges. +- E. A single integer value for Upgrades and a single integer value for downgrades. +- F. CELL Measurement function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.2.1.54 Mean number of occupied PDCHs for GPRS + +NOTE: This measurement is subject to the "2 out of 3 approach". + +- A. This measurement provides the mean number of occupied PDCHs for GPRS. +- B. SI. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval the number of PDCHs which are carrying packet traffic for GPRS and then taking the arithmetic mean (TS 44.060 [23]). +- D. A single real value. +- E. MeanNbrGprsOccPDCHs. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switched traffic. + +### B.2.1.55 Mean number of occupied PDCHs for EGPRS + +NOTE: This measurement is subject to the "2 out of 3 approach". + +- A. This measurement provides the mean number of occupied PDCHs for EGPRS. +- B. SI. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval the number of PDCHs which are carrying packet traffic for EGPRS and then taking the arithmetic mean (TS 44.060 [23]). +- D. A single real value. +- E. MeanNbrEgprsOccPDCHs. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switched traffic. + +### B.2.1.56 Mean number of simultaneous GPRS TBF for downlink + +- A. This measurement provides the mean number of simultaneous GPRS TBF for downlink. +- B. SI. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval the number of simultaneous GPRS TBF and then taking the arithmetic mean. +- D. MeanNbrDLGprsTBF. +- E. A single real value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switched traffic. + +### B.2.1.57 Mean number of simultaneous EGPRS TBF for downlink + +- A. This measurement provides the mean number of simultaneous EGPRS TBF for downlink. +- B. SI. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval the number of simultaneous EGPRS TBF and then taking the arithmetic mean. +- D. MeanNbrDLEgprsTBF. +- E. A single real value. +- F. CELL Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switched traffic. + +### B.2.1.58 Number of received acknowledged octets of EGPRS block on RLC layer + +- a) This measurement provides the number of octets of received by BSS acknowledged octets of EGPRS block on RLC layer. + +- b) CC. +- c) On receipt by the BSS of an EGPRS block acknowledged by message PACKET UPLINK ACK on the RLC layer. The number of octets of EGPRS block on RLC layer is calculated by sum of octets length in each EGPRS block. See TS 44.060 [23]. +- d) NbrReceivedAckOctEgprsOnRlc. +- e) A single integer value. +- f) CELL Measurement Function. +- g) Valid for packet switched traffic. +- h) GSM. +- i) One usage of this measurement is to support the performance indicator $DV_{MN}$ for EE evaluation in [35]. + +### B.2.1.59 Number of transmitted octets of EGPRS block on RLC layer acknowledged by mobile + +- a) This measurement provides the number of transmitted octets of EGPRS block on RLC layer acknowledged by mobile. +- b) CC. +- c) On receipt by the BSS of message PACKET DOWNLINK ACK for the transmitted an EGPRS block on the RLC layer. The number of octets of EGPRS block on RLC layer is calculated by sum of octets length in each EGPRS block. See TS 44.060 [23]. +- d) NbrTransAckOctEgprsOnRlc. +- e) A single integer value. +- f) CELL Measurement Function. +- g) Valid for packet switched traffic. +- h) GSM. +- i) One usage of this measurement is to support the performance indicator $DV_{MN}$ for EE evaluation in [35]. + +## B.2.2 Internal HDO Measurement Function + +This measurement function allows Internal Handover information per observed CELL to be collected on a per adjacent originating or target CELL basis. This is achieved by specifying the adjacent originating or target CELL identity as parameter when initiating the Measurement Function. + +### B.2.2.1 Attempted incoming Internal inter CELL Handovers per originating CELL + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted incoming Handovers into the observed CELL from the specified adjacent originating CELL, controlled by this BSC, further information can be found in GSM 04.08 [2], GSM 08.08 [5] and GSM 08.58 [6]. +- B. CC. +- C. An occurrence of a BSC internal event, depending on Handover algorithm. +- D. attIncomingInternalInterCellHDOsPerOriginatingCell. +- E. A single integer value for the observed CELL from the originating CELL. +- F. Internal HDO Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.2.2 Successful incoming Internal inter CELL Handovers per originating CELL + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful incoming Handovers into the observed CELL from the specified adjacent originating CELL controlled by this BSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "HANDOVER PERFORMED" Message to the MSC (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. succIncomingInternalInterCellHDOsPerOriginatingCell. +- E. A single integer value for the observed CELL from the originating CELL. +- F. Internal HDO Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.2.3 Attempted outgoing Internal inter CELL Handovers per target CELL + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted outgoing Handovers from the observed CELL to the specified adjacent target CELL controlled by this BSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "HANDOVER COMMAND" Message (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOsPerTargetCell. +- E. A single integer value for the observed CELL to the target CELL. +- F. Internal HDO Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.2.2.4 Successful outgoing Internal inter CELL Handovers per target CELL + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful outgoing Handovers from the observed CELL to the specified adjacent target CELL controlled by this BSC. + +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "HANDOVER PERFORMED" Message to the MSC (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. succOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOsPerTargetCell. +- E. A single integer value for the observed CELL to the target CELL. +- F. Internal HDO Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +## B.2.3 Power, Energy and Environmental (PEE) measurements + +### B.2.3.0 Applicability of measurements + +The energy efficiency related measurement definitions in the following clauses B.2.x.n are valid only for BTSs having built-in sensors (cf. ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36]). + +### B.2.3.1 Power + +#### B.2.3.1.1 Average Power + +- a) This measurement provides the average power consumed. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – clauses 4.4.3.1, 4.4.3.4, Annex A. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in Watt (W). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.AvgPower. +- f) BTS Measurement Function. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.2.3.1.2 Minimum Power + +- a) This measurement provides the minimum power consumed. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – clauses 4.4.3.1, 4.4.3.4, Annex A. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in Watt (W). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.MinPower. +- f) BTS Measurement Function. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.2.3.1.3 Maximum Power + +- a) This measurement provides the maximum power consumed. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – clauses 4.4.3.1, 4.4.3.4, Annex A. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in Watt (W). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.MaxPower. + +- f) BTS Measurement Function. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### **B.2.3.2 Energy** + +- a) This measurement provides the energy consumed. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – clauses 4.4.3.2, 4.4.3.4, Annex A. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in kilo Watt hour (kWh). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.Energy. +- f) BTS Measurement Function. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### **B.2.3.3 Temperature** + +#### **B.2.3.3.1 Average Temperature** + +- a) This measurement provides the average temperature. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – clause 4.4.3.4, Annex A. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in Degree Celsius (C°). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.AvgTemperature. +- f) BTS Measurement Function. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### **B.2.3.3.2 Minimum Temperature** + +- a) This measurement provides the minimum temperature. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – clause 4.4.3.4, Annex A. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in Degree Celsius (C°). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.MinTemperature. +- f) BTS Measurement Function. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### **B.2.3.3.3 Maximum Temperature** + +- a) This measurement provides the maximum temperature. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – clause 4.4.3.4, Annex A. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in Degree Celsius (C°). + +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.MaxTemperature. +- f) BTS Measurement Function. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.2.3.4 Voltage + +- a) This measurement provides the voltage. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – Clauses 4.4.3.3, 4.4.3.4, Annex B. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in Volt (V). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.Voltage. +- f) BTS Measurement Function. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.2.3.5 Current + +- a) This measurement provides the current. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – Clauses 4.4.3.3, 4.4.3.4, Annex B. +- d) Each measurement is a real value in Ampere (A). +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.Current. +- f) BTS Measurement Function. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.2.3.6 Humidity + +- a) This measurement provides the percentage of humidity. +- b) SI. +- c) This measurement is obtained according to the method defined in ETSI ES 202 336-12 [36] – clause 4.4.3.3, Annex B. +- d) Each measurement is a single integer value from 0 to 100. +- e) The measurement name has the form PEE.Humidity. +- f) BTS Measurement Function. +- g) Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +--- + +## B.3 Measurements Related to the MSC + +### B.3.1 MSC Measurement Function + +#### B.3.1.1 Number of class mark updates + +- A. This measurement provides the number of classmark updates received from the BSS at the MSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "CLASSMARK UPDATE" Message (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. nbrOfClassMarkUpdates. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +#### B.3.1.2 Attempted mobile originating calls + +- A. This measurement provides the number of call attempts for mobile originating traffic. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "CM\_SERV\_REQ" Message from the originating MS, with service type set to originating call establishment (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attMobileOriginatingCalls. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +#### B.3.1.3 Successful mobile originating calls + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful calls for mobile originating traffic. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "ASSIGNMENT COMPLETE" Message from the originating MS, for the requested mobile originating call (GSM 08.08 [5]). + +NOTE: The "ALERTING" Message from GSM 04.08 [2] is not used as the implementation of it is optional. + +- D. succMobileOriginatingCalls. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +#### B.3.1.4 Answered mobile originating calls + +- A. This measurement provides the number of answered calls for mobile originating traffic. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "CONNECT ACKNOWLEDGE" Message from the originating MS, for the requested mobile originating call (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. ansMobileOriginatingCalls. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +#### B.3.1.5 Attempted mobile terminating calls + +- A. This measurement provides the number of call attempts for mobile terminating traffic. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "SETUP" Message to the called MS, for the requested mobile terminating call (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attMobileTerminatingCalls. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +#### B.3.1.6 Successful mobile terminating calls + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful calls for mobile terminating traffic. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "ASSIGNMENT COMPLETE" Message from the called MS, for the requested mobile terminating call (GSM 08.08 [5]) + +NOTE: The "ALERTING" Message from GSM 04.08 [2] is not used as the implementation of it is optional. + +- D. succMobileTerminatingCalls. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.7 Answered mobile terminating calls + +- A. This measurement provides the number of answered calls for mobile terminating traffic. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "CONNECTION ACKNOWLEDGE" Message to the called MS, for the requested mobile terminating call (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. ansMobileTerminatingCalls. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.8 Attempted Mobile Emergency calls + +- A. This measurement provides the number of emergency call attempts. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "CM\_SERV\_REQ" Message from the originating MS, with service indicator set to emergency call (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attMobileEmergencyCalls. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.9 Successful Mobile Emergency calls + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful emergency calls. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "ASSIGNMENT COMPLETE" Message from the originating MS, for the requested emergency call (GSM 08.08 [5]). + +NOTE: The "ALERTING" Message from GSM 04.08 [2] is not used as the implementation of it is optional. + +- D. succMobileEmergencyCalls. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.10 Answered Mobile Emergency calls + +- A. This measurement provides the number of answered emergency calls. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "CONNECTION ACKNOWLEDGE" Message from the originating MS, for the requested emergency call (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. ansMobileEmergencyCalls. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.11 Attempted ciphering mode control procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of ciphering mode control procedures transmitted (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "CIPHER MODE COMMAND" (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. attCipheringModeControlProcs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.12 Successful ciphering mode control procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful ciphering mode control procedures. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "CIPHER MODE COMPLETE" Message (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. succCipheringModeControlProcs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.13 Attempted interrogations of HLRs for routing + +- A. This measurement provides the number of HLR interrogations by the GMSC with the purpose of routing incoming calls (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "MAP\_SEND\_ROUTING\_INFORMATION" service request (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attInterrogationOfHLRsForRouting. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.14 Successful interrogations of HLR (MSRN obtained) + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful HLR interrogations, where MSRN is obtained. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_SEND\_ROUTING\_INFORMATION" service confirmation containing a "MSRN" parameter value (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succInterrogationOfHLRsMSRNObtained. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.15 Successful interrogations of HLR (call Forwarding) + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful HLR interrogations, by the GMSC for call forwarding. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_SEND\_ROUTING\_INFORMATION" service confirmation containing a "Forwarding Data" parameter value (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succInterrogationOfHLRsCallForwarding. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.16 Attempted operations for mobile originating point to point SMs + +- A. This measurement provides the number of operations for mobile originating point to point short messages (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "RP-DATA" Message (GSM 04.11 [3]). +- D. attOpForMobileOriginatingPointToPointSMs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.17 Successful operations for mobile originating point to point SMs + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful operations for mobile originating point to point short messages. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "RP-ACK" Message (GSM 04.11 [3]). +- D. succOpForMobileOriginatingPointToPointSMs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.18 Attempted operations for mobile terminating point to point SMs + +- A. This measurement provides the number of operations for mobile terminating point to point short messages (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "RP-DATA" Message (GSM 04.11 [3]). +- D. attOpForMobileTerminatingPointToPointSMs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.19 Successful operations for mobile terminating point to point SMs + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful operations for mobile terminating point to point short messages. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "RP-ACK" Message (GSM 04.11 [3]). +- D. succOpForMobileTerminatingPointToPointSMs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.20 Number of transmitted check IMEI request + +- A. This measurement provides the number of check IMEI request sent from MSC to the EIR. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_CHECK\_IMEI" service request (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. nbrOfTransCheckIMEIRequests. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.21 Number of white answers in MSC + +- A. This measurement provides the number of white answers received from the EIR. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_CHECK\_IMEI" service confirmation containing an "equipment status" referring to white listed equipment (GSM 09.02 [7] and GSM 02.16 [1]). +- D. nbrOfWhiteAnsInMSC. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.22 Number of grey answers in MSC + +- A. This measurement provides the number of grey answers received from the EIR. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_CHECK\_IMEI" service confirmation containing an "equipment status" referring to grey listed equipment (GSM 09.02 [7] and GSM 02.16 [1]). +- D. nbrOfGreyAnsInMSC. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.23 Number of black answers in MSC + +- A. This measurement provides the number of black answers received from the EIR. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_CHECK\_IMEI" service confirmation containing an "equipment status" referring to black listed equipment (GSM 09.02 [7] and GSM 02.16 [1]). +- D. nbrOfBlackAnsInMSC. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.24 Number of unknown IMEI answers + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unknown IMEI answers received from the EIR. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_CHECK\_IMEI" service confirmation with a parameter "user error" referring to unknown equipment (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. nbrOfUnknownIMEIAnsInMSC. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.25 Mean time to provide the CALL SETUP service + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean of the time to provide the CALL SETUP service to a requesting MS. +- B. DER. +- C. This measurement is obtained by accumulating the time intervals between "SETUP" and the corresponding "ASSIGNMENT COMPLETE" messages over a granularity period using DER. This end value of the time will then be divided by the number of call set-ups observed in the granularity period to give the arithmetic mean (GSM 04.08 [2] and GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. meanTimeToCallSetupService. +- E. A single real value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.26 Mean time to provide the LOCATION UPDATING service + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean of the time to provide the LOCATION UPDATING service to an MS changing Location area. +- B. DER. +- C. This measurement is obtained by accumulating the time interval between "LOCATION UPDATING REQUEST" and the corresponding "LOCATION UPDATING ACCEPT" Message over a granularity period using DER. This end value of the time will then be divided by number of Location Updating requests observed in the granularity period to give the arithmetic mean (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. meanTimeToLocationUpdateService. +- E. A single real value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.3.1.27 Transactions on the MM-layer where subscriber was identified with TMSI + +- A. This measurement provides the number of transactions on the MM-layer where the mobile subscriber was identified with his TMSI. +- B. CC. +- C. Any MM-layer transaction which causes the MS to be identified with his TMSI (GSM 04.08 [2]) i.e. CM\_Re-establishment, CM\_Service request, Identity response, IMSI detach indication, Location updating accept, Location updating request, TMSI re-allocation command. +- D. transSubIdentifiedWithTMSI. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.28 Transactions on the MM-layer where subscriber was identified with IMSI + +- A. This measurement provides the number of transactions on the MM-layer where the mobile subscriber was identified with his IMSI. + +- B. CC. +- C. Any MM-layer transaction which causes the MS to be identified with his IMSI (GSM 04.08 [2]), i.e. CM\_Re-establishment, CM\_Service request, Identity response, IMSI detach indication, Location updating accept, Location updating request, TMSI re-allocation command. +- D. transSubIdentifiedWithIMSI. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.29 Attempted TMSI re-allocations + +- A. This measurement provides the number of TMSI re-allocation, invoked either explicitly as part of TMSI re-allocation procedure or implicitly as part of Location Update procedure. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "TMSI REALLOCATION COMMAND" Message, or a "LOCATION UPDATING ACCEPT" Message where the MS is identified with TMSI (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attTMSIReallocations. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.30 Successful TMSI re-allocations + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully performed TMSI re-allocations. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "TMSI REALLOCATION COMPLETE" Message (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. succTMSIReallocations. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.31 IMSI detach procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of IMSI procedures that involve a detach within one MSC area, (see BSC Measurement Function for IMSI attach procedures). +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "IMSI DETACH INDICATION" Message from the MS (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. imsiDetachProcs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.3.1.32 IMSI attach procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of IMSI procedures that involve an attach within one MSC area. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "LOCATION UPDATING REQUEST" Message from the MS, indicating an IMSI attach, (GSM 04.08 [2]) (see MSC Measurement Function for IMSI detach procedures). +- D. imsiAttachProcs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching and packet switched. + +### B.3.1.33 Attempted incoming External intra-MSC Handovers + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted incoming Handovers into the observed CELL from the related adjacent CELLs controlled by this MSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "HANDOVER REQUEST" Message to the BSC (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. attIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.34 Successful incoming External intra-MSC Handovers + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful incoming Handovers into the observed CELL from the related adjacent CELLs controlled by this MSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "HANDOVER COMPLETE" Message from the BSC (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. succIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.35 Attempted outgoing External intra-MSC Handovers + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted outgoing Handovers from the observed CELL to the related adjacent CELLs controlled by this MSC (only first attempt shall be counted). +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "HANDOVER REQUIRED" Message from the BSC (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. attOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.36 Successful outgoing External intra-MSC Handovers + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful outgoing Handovers from the observed CELL to the related adjacent CELLs controlled by this MSC, further information can be found in GSM 04.08 [2], 08.08 [5], and 08.58 [6]. +- B. CC. +- C. Completion of release procedure for the involved channel. +- D. succOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.37 Attempted incoming inter-MSC Handovers + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted incoming Handovers into the observed CELL from the related adjacent CELLs NOT controlled by this MSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "MAP\_PERFORM\_HANDOVER" service indication with target CELL identity equal to the observed CELL (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attIncomingInterMSCHDOs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.38 Successful incoming inter-MSC Handovers + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful incoming Handovers into the observed CELL from the related adjacent CELLs NOT controlled by this MSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "MAP\_SEND\_END\_SIGNAL" service confirmation (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succIncomingInterMSCHDOs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.39 Attempted outgoing inter-MSC Handovers + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted outgoing Handovers from the observed CELL to the related adjacent CELLs NOT controlled by this MSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "MAP\_PERFORM\_HANDOVER" service request (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attOutgoingInterMSCHDOs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.40 Successful outgoing inter-MSC Handovers + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful outgoing Handovers from the observed CELL to the related adjacent CELLs NOT controlled by this MSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_SEND\_END\_SIGNAL" service response (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succOutgoingInterMSCHDOs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.41 Attempted subsequent inter-MSC Handovers (back to MSCa) + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted subsequent inter-MSC Handovers, where the call is handed back to the anchor MSC (MSCa), i.e. the first hand over takes place from MSCa to MSCb then subsequently an attempt is made to hand back to MSCa. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_PERFORM\_SUBSEQUENT\_HANDOVER" service indication with target MSC identity equal to MSCa (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCa. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.42 Successful subsequent inter-MSC Handovers (back to MSCa) + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful subsequent inter-MSC Handovers, where the call is handed back to the anchor MSC (MSCa), i.e. the first hand over takes place from MSCa to MSCb then the call is subsequently successfully handed back to MSCa. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_SEND\_END\_SIGNAL" service response (Handover to MSCa) (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCa. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.43 Attempted subsequent inter-MSC Handovers (to MSCc) + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted subsequent inter-MSC Handovers, where the call is handed over to MSCc, i.e. the first hand over takes place from MSCa to MSCb then subsequently an attempt is made to hand over to MSCc. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_PERFORM\_SUBSEQUENT\_HANDOVER" service indication, with target MSC identity equal to MSCc (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCc. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.44 Successful subsequent inter-MSC Handovers (to MSCc) + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful subsequent inter-MSC Handovers, where the call is handed over to MSCc, i.e. the first hand over takes place from MSCa to MSCb then the call is subsequently successfully handed over to MSCc. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_SEND\_END\_SIGNAL" service response (Handover to MSCc) (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCc. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.45 External Handovers + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted MSC controlled Handovers. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "HANDOVER REQUIRED" Message (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. externalHDOs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.46 External Handovers per cause + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted MSC controlled Handovers, per cause. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "HANDOVER REQUIRED" Message (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. externalHDOsPerCause. +- E. An integer value per cause. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.47 Unsuccessful External Handovers with reconnection to old channels, per MSC + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unsuccessful Handovers with reconnection to the original channels (TCH & SDCCH), on a per MSC basis. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of: "HANDOVER FAILURE" Message for the attempted handover (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. unsuccExternHDOsWithReconnectionPerMSC. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.1.48 Unsuccessful External Handovers with loss of connection, per MSC + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unsuccessful Handovers, with loss of the call, on a per MSC basis. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "CLEAR REQUEST" Message for the requested Handover (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. unsuccExternHDOsWithLossOfConnectionPerMSC. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. MSC Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +## B.3.2 External HDO Measurement Function + +This measurement function allows external Handover information per observed CELL to be collected on a per adjacent originating or target CELL basis. For the external Handovers both the observed CELL and the adjacent originating or target CELL identity has to be specified as the parameter when initiating the Measurement Function. + +### B.3.2.1 Attempted incoming External intra-MSC Handovers per originating CELL + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted incoming Handovers into the observed CELL from the specified adjacent originating CELL, controlled by this MSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "HANDOVER REQUEST" Message to the BSC (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. attIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell. +- E. A single integer value for the observed CELL from the originating CELL. +- F. External HDO Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.2.2 Successful incoming External intra-MSC Handovers per originating CELL + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful incoming Handovers into the observed CELL from the specified adjacent originating CELL, controlled by this MSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "HANDOVER COMPLETE" Message from the BSC (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. succIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell. +- E. A single integer value for the observed CELL from the originating CELL. +- F. External HDO Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.2.3 Attempted outgoing External intra-MSC Handovers per target CELL + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted outgoing Handovers from the observed CELL to the specified adjacent target CELL, controlled by this MSC (only first attempt shall be counted). +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "HANDOVER REQUIRED" Message from the BSC (GSM 08.08 [5]). +- D. attOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerTargetCell. +- E. A single integer value for the observed CELL to the target CELL. +- F. External HDO Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.2.4 Successful outgoing External intra-MSC Handovers per target CELL + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful outgoing Handovers from the observed CELL to the specified adjacent target CELL, controlled by this MSC, further information can be found in GSM 04.08 [2], 08.08 [5], and 08.58 [6]. + +- B. CC. +- C. Completion of release procedure for the involved channel. +- D. succOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerTargetCell. +- E. A single integer value for the observed CELL to the target CELL. +- F. External HDO Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.2.5 Attempted incoming inter-MSC Handovers per originating CELL + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted incoming Handovers into the observed CELL from the specified adjacent originating CELL, NOT controlled by this MSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "MAP\_PERFORM\_HANDOVER" service indication with target CELL identity equal to the observed CELL (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attIncomingInterMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell. +- E. A single integer value for the observed CELL from the originating CELL. +- F. External HDO Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.2.6 Successful incoming inter-MSC Handovers per originating CELL + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful incoming Handovers into the observed CELL from the specified adjacent originating CELL, NOT controlled by this MSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "MAP\_SEND\_END\_SIGNAL" service confirmation (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succIncomingInterMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell. +- E. A single integer value for the observed CELL from the originating CELL. +- F. External HDO Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.2.7 Attempted outgoing inter-MSC Handovers per target CELL + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted outgoing Handovers from the observed CELL to the specified adjacent target CELL, NOT controlled by this MSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "MAP\_PERFORM\_HANDOVER" service request (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attOutgoingInterMSCHDOsPerTargetCell. +- E. A single integer value for the observed CELL to the target CELL. +- F. External HDO Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.3.2.8 Successful outgoing inter-MSC Handovers per target CELL + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful outgoing Handovers from the observed CELL to the specified adjacent target CELL, NOT controlled by this MSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_SEND\_END\_SIGNAL" service response (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succOutgoingInterMSCHDOsPerTargetCell. +- E. A single integer value for the observed CELL to the target CELL. +- F. External HDO Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +--- + +## B.4 Measurements Related to the HLR + +### B.4.1 HLR Measurement Function + +#### B.4.1.1 Number of current MS's Roaming outside HPLMN + +- A. This measurement provides the current number of home subscribers roaming outside HPLMN. +- B. GAUGE. +- C. The gauge is updated (increased or decreased) on receipt of a "MAP\_UPDATE\_LOCATION" service indication in the HLR(GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. nbrOfCurrentMSsRoamingOutsideHPLMN. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.4.1.2 Attempted requests for Authentication sets received by HLR + +- A. This measurement provides the number of requests for Authentication sets received by the HLR (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of an "MAP\_SEND\_AUTHENTICATION\_INFO" service indication requesting Authentication sets (parameter "AuthenticationSetKind" present GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attReqForAuthSetsReceivedByHLR. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.4.1.3 Successful returned Authentication sets from HLR + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful requests for Authentication sets from the HLR. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of an "MAP\_SEND\_AUTHENTICATION\_INFO" service response containing Authentication sets (parameter "AuthenticationSetList" present GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succReturnedAuthSetsFromHLR. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.4.1.4 Empty responses to request for Authentication sets from HLR + +- A. This measurement provides the number of empty responses sent in response to requests for Authentication sets (the implication is that the destination node will have to reuse old Authentication sets). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of an "MAP\_SEND\_AUTHENTICATION\_INFO" service response, no Authentication sets present (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. emptyResponsesForAuthSetsFromHLR. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.4.1.5 Attempted insert subscriber data service + +- A. This measurement provides the number of insert subscriber data services sent (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_INSERT\_SUBSCRIBER\_DATA" service request (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attInsertSubDataService. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.4.1.6 Successful insert subscriber data service + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful insert subscriber data services sent. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_INSERT\_SUBSCRIBER\_DATA" service indication without "user error" parameter value (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succInsertSubDataService. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.4.1.7 Attempted Location Updates + +- A. This measurement provides the number of Location Updates to be performed by the HLR (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_UPDATE\_LOCATION" service indication (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attLocationUpdate. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.4.1.8 Successful Location Updates + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully performed Location Updates in the HLR. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_UPDATE\_LOCATION" service response without "user error" parameter value (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succLocationUpdate. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.4.1.9 Attempted SS related operations in HLR + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted SS related operations. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a MAP service indication of: registerSS, eraseSS, activateSS, deactivateSS, registerPassword, interrogateSS, processSSrequest operations in the HLR, (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attSSRelatedOperationsInHLR. +- E. A single integer value per SS operation. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +#### B.4.1.10 Successful SS related operations in HLR + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful SS related operations. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of MAP service response to: registerSS, eraseSS, activateSS, deactivateSS, registerPassword, interrogateSS, processSSrequest operations in the HLR without "user error" parameter (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succSSRelatedOperationsInHLR. +- E. A single integer value per SS operation. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +#### B.4.1.11 Attempted request for SM routing information + +- A. This measurement provides the number of requests for short Message routing information (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_SEND\_ROUTING\_INFO\_FOR\_SM" service indication (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attReqForSMRoutingInfo. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.4.1.12 Successful request for SM routing information + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful requests for short Message routing information. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_SEND\_ROUTING\_INFO\_FOR\_SM" service response without "user error" parameter (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succReqForSMRoutingInfo. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.4.1.13 Attempted SM delivery status report procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of requests to set Message waiting data into HLR or to inform HLR of successful SM transfer after polling (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_REPORT\_SM\_DELIVERY\_STATUS" service indication (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attSMDeliveryStatusReportProcs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.4.1.14 Successful SM delivery status report procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful requests to set Message waiting data into HLR or to inform HLR of successful SM transfer after polling. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_REPORT\_SM\_DELIVERY\_STATUS" service response without "user error" parameter value (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succSMDeliveryStatusReportProcs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.4.1.15 Attempted number of send alerts + +- A. This measurement provides the number of transmissions of send alerts (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "MAP\_ALERT\_SERVICE\_CENTRE" service request (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attNbrOfSendAlerts. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.4.1.16 Successful number of send alerts + +- A. This measurement provides the successful transmissions of send alerts. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "MAP\_ALERT\_SERVICE\_CENTRE" service confirmation without "user error" parameter value (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succNbrOfSendAlerts. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.4.1.17 Attempted request for MSRN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of requests for MSRN from the VLR (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_PROVIDE\_ROAMING\_NUMBER" service request (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attReqForMSRN. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +#### B.4.1.18 Successful request for MSRN + +- A. This measurement provides the successful responses for allocations of MSRN received from the VLR. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_PROVIDE\_ROAMING\_NUMBER" service confirmation without "user error" parameter value (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succReqForMSRN. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. HLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +--- + +## B.5 Measurements Related to the VLR + +### B.5.1 VLR Measurement Function + +#### B.5.1.1 Attempted MS memory available notifications + +- A. This measurement provides the number of times a VLR informs the HLR that a MS is available for receiving short messages once again (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "MAP\_READY\_FOR\_SM" service request (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attMSMemoryAvailableNotifications. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +#### B.5.1.2 Successful MS memory available notifications + +- A. This measurement provides the number of times a VLR successfully informs the HLR that a MS is available for receiving short messages once again. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_READY\_FOR\_SM" service confirmation without "user error" parameter value (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succMSMemoryAvailableNotifications. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +#### B.5.1.3 Attempted Identification requests to PVLRS + +- A. This measurement provides the number of identification information requests to the PVLR for subscribers registering afresh in this VLR (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_SEND\_IDENTIFICATION" service request (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attIdentificationReqToPVLRS. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.5.1.4 Successful Identification requests to PVLRs + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful identification requests to the PVLR for subscriber registering afresh in this VLR. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_SEND\_IDENTIFICATION" service confirmation without "user error" parameter value (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succIdentificationReqToPVLRs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.5.1.5 Attempted page requests + +- A. This measurement provides the number of page requests (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_PAGE" service request (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attPageReqs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.5.1.6 Successful page requests + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful page requests. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_PAGE" service confirmation without a "user error" parameter value (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succPageReqs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.5.1.7 Attempted page requests per Location Area + +- A. This measurement provides the number of page requests per Location Area (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_PAGE" service request (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attPageReqsPerLocationArea. +- E. An integer value per Location Area. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.5.1.8 Successful page requests per Location Area + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful page requests per Location Area. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_PAGE" service confirmation without a "user error" parameter value (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succPageReqsPerLocationArea. +- E. An integer value per Location Area. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.5.1.9 Attempted requests for Authentication sets sent to HLR by VLRs + +- A. This measurement provides the number of requests to the HLR by the VLR for Authentication sets (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "MAP\_SEND\_AUTHENTICATION\_INFO" service request, requesting Authentication sets (parameter "AuthenticationSetKind" present GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attReqForAuthSetsSentToHLR. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.5.1.10 Successful received Authentication sets from HLR to VLRs + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful requests for Authentication sets from the HLR to the VLR. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "MAP\_SEND\_AUTHENTICATION\_INFO" service confirmation, containing requested Authentication sets parameter "AuthenticationSetList" present (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succReceivedAuthSetsFromHLR. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.5.1.11 Empty responses to request for Authentication sets from HLR to VLRs + +- A. This measurement provides the number of empty responses received by the VLR in response to requests for Authentication sets (the implication is that the VLR will have to reuse old Authentication sets). +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "MAP\_SEND\_AUTHENTICATION\_INFO" service confirmation, no Authentication sets present (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. emptyResponsesForAuthFromHLR. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.5.1.12 Attempted authentication procedures in VLR + +- A. This measurement provides the number of authentication requests which are sent to the MSC (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "MAP\_AUTHENTICATE" service request (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attAuthProcsInVLR. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.5.1.13 Successful authentication procedures in the VLR + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful authentication procedures in the VLR. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "MAP\_AUTHENTICATE" service confirmation, where the received SRES parameter value matches value stored in the Location register (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succAuthProcsInVLR. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.5.1.14 Attempted intra-VLR Location Updates + +- A. This measurement provides the number of Location Updates, between Location areas of the same VLR (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_UPDATE\_LOCATION\_AREA" service indication, with previous Location Area identification parameter referring to the Location Area identity of the same VLR (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attIntraVLRLocationUpdates. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.5.1.15 Successful intra-VLR Location Updates + +- A. This measurement provides the successful Location Updates between Location Areas of the same VLR. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_UPDATE\_LOCATION\_AREA" service response without "user error" parameter value, for attempted intra-VLR Location Update (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succIntraVLRLocationUpdates. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.5.1.16 Attempted inter-VLR Location Updates + +- A. This measurement provides the number of Location Updates between Location Areas of different VLR (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_UPDATE\_LOCATION\_AREA" service indication, with previous Location Area identification parameter referring to the Location Area identity of the different VLR, or no previous VLR identity (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attInterVLRLocationUpdates. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.5.1.17 Successful inter-VLR Location Updates + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful Location Updates between Location Areas of different VLRs. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_UPDATE\_LOCATION\_AREA" service response without "user error" parameter value, for attempted inter-VLR Location Update (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succInterVLRLocationUpdates. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +### B.5.1.18 Arrivals of Visitors from other PLMNs + +- A. This measurement provides the number of arrivals of visitors from other PLMNs i.e. exclude own MS's returning to HPLMN. This measurement has to be taken in each VLR of the HPLMN to get the total. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_UPDATE\_LOCATION\_AREA" service indication, the previous Location of the subscriber was another PLMN (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. arrivalOfVisitorsFromOtherPLMNs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. VLR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit switching. + +--- + +## B.6 Measurements Related to the EIR + +### B.6.1 EIR Measurement Function + +#### B.6.1.1 Number of received IMEI check requests + +- A. This measurement provides the number of IMEI check requests received by the EIR. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_CHECK\_IMEI" service indication (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. nbrOfReceivedIMEICheckReqs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. EIR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.6.1.2 Number of white answers in EIR + +- A. This measurement provides the number of white answers transmitted by the EIR. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_CHECK\_IMEI" service response containing an "equipment status" referring to a white listed equipment (GSM 09.02 [7] and GSM 02.16 [1]). +- D. nbrOfWhiteAnsInEIR. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. EIR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.6.1.3 Number of grey answers in EIR + +- A. This measurement provides the number of grey answers transmitted by the EIR. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_CHECK\_IMEI" service response containing an "equipment status" referring to a grey listed equipment (GSM 09.02 [7] and GSM 02.16 [1]). +- D. nbrOfGreyAnsInEIR. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. EIR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.6.1.4 Number of black answers in EIR + +- A. This measurement provides the number of black answers transmitted by the EIR. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_CHECK\_IMEI" service response containing an "equipment status" referring to a black listed equipment (GSM 09.02 [7] and GSM 02.16 [1]). +- D. nbrOfBlackAnsInEIR. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. EIR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.6.1.5 Number of unknown IMEI answers + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unknown IMEI answers transmitted by the EIR. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_CHECK\_IMEI" service response containing a parameter "user error" referring to a unknown equipment (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. nbrOfUnknownIMEIAnsInEIR. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. EIR Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +--- + +## B.7 Measurements Related to the SMS IWMSC/GMSC + +### B.7.1 SMS Measurement Function + +#### B.7.1.1 Attempted mobile originating SM Forwarding + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted short Message forwarding handled by the interworking MSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_FORWARD\_SHORT\_MESSAGE" service indication (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attMobileOriginatingSMForwardings. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SMS Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.7.1.2 Successful mobile originating SM Forwarding + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful short Message forwarding handled by the interworking MSC. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_FORWARD\_SHORT\_MESSAGE" service response without a "user error" parameter value (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succMobileOriginatingSMForwardings. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SMS Measurement Function +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +#### B.7.1.3 Attempted Mobile Terminating SM Forwarding + +- A. This measurement provides the number of short messages forwarding from SMS-GMSC to the service node, MSC or SGSN (these are counted as attempts). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "MAP\_FORWARD\_SHORT\_MESSAGE" service request (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. attMobileTerminatingSMForwardings. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SMS Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +### B.7.1.4 Successful Mobile Terminating SM Forwarding + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful short Message forwarding from SMS-GMSC to the service node, MSC or SGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "MAP\_FORWARD\_SHORT\_MESSAGE" service response without a "user error" parameter value (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succMobileTerminatingSMForwardings. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SMS Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for circuit and packet switching. + +--- + +## B.8 Measurements Related to the SGSN + +### B.8.1 SGSN Measurement Function + +#### B.8.1.1 LLC Measurements + +##### B.8.1.1.1 Number of LLC frames sent + +- A. This measurement provides the number of LLC frames sent by the SGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of LLC frame to a peer entity GSM TS 04.64 [24]. +- D. nbrLlcFramesSent. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +##### B.8.1.1.2 Number of LLC frames Received + +- A. This measurement provides the number of received LLC frames by the SGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a LLC frames from a peer entity and before any error checking(GSM TS 04.64). +- D. nbrLlcFramesReceived. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +##### B.8.1.1.3 Erroneously received LLC frames detected by SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of erroneously received LLC frames in case of error detection in the SGSN (uplink transmission, SGSN). +- B. CC. +- C. Discard of a received frame in the SGSN, GSM TS 04.64 [24]. +- D. errLlcFramesDetectedBySgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.1.4 Number of Retransmitted LLC frames in Acknowledge Mode + +- A. This measurement provides the number of retransmitted LLC frames in LLC acknowledge mode, detected in the MS and signalled to the SGSN (downlink transmission, MS). +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a NACK or SACK frame from the peer entity (MS), GSM TS 04.64 [24]. +- D. retransmittedLlcFramestoMs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.2 SNDCP Measurements + +##### B.8.1.2.1 Number of received SNDCP N-PDUs + +- A. This measurement provides the number of incoming N-PDUs received by the SNDCP protocol. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of the "SN-DATA.ind" or "SN-UNITDATA.ind" primitive, GSM TS 04.65 [25]. +- D. uplinkSndcpNpduReceived. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +##### B.8.1.2.2 Number of received SNDCP N-PDU octets + +- A. This measurement provides the number of octets in incoming N-PDUs received by the SNDCP protocol layer. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of the "SN-DATA.ind" or "SN-UNITDATA.ind" primitive, GSM TS 04.65 [25]. +- D. uplinkSndcpOctetReceivedMode. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.8.1.2.3 Number of sent SNDPC N-PDUs + +- A. This measurement provides the number of outgoing N-PDUs sent by the SNDPC protocol layer. +- B. CC. +- C. Sent of the "SN-DATA.req" and "SN-UNITDATA.req" primitive(GSM TS 04.65). +- D. downlinkSndcpNpduSent. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.8.1.2.4 Number of sent SNDPC N-PDU octets + +- A. This measurement provides the number of octets in outgoing N-PDUs sent by the SNDPC protocol layer. +- B. CC. +- C. Sent of the "SN-DATA.req" and "SN-UNITDATA.req" primitive(GSM TS 04.65). +- D. downlinkSndcpOctetSent. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.8.1.3 BSSGP Measurements. + +FFS, to be defined. + +### B.8.1.4 MM Measurements + +#### B.8.1.4.1 Attempted GPRS attach procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted GPRS attach procedures initiated within this SGSN area. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "ATTACH REQUEST" message from the MS, indicating a GPRS attach(GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attGprsAttach. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.2 Successful GPRS attach procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully performed GPRS attach procedures within this SGSN area. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "ATTACH ACCEPT" message to the MS, indicating a GPRS only attached (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. succGprsAttach. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.3 Attempt of combined GPRS/IMSI attach procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempt of combined GPRS/IMSI attach procedures initiated within this SGSN area. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "ATTACH REQUEST" message from the MS, indicating combined GPRS/IMSI attach (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attCombiAttach. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.4 Successfully combined GPRS/IMSI attach procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully completed of Combined GPRS/IMSI attach procedures initiated within this SGSN area. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "ATTACH ACCEPT" message to the MS, indicating combined GPRS/IMSI attach (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. succCombiAttach. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.5 Attempted GPRS attach procedures with IMSI already attached + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted GPRS attach procedures, while IMSI is already attached. The attempts initiated within this SGSN area are counted. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "ATTACH REQUEST" Message from the MS, indicating GPRS attach while IMSI attached (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attImsiAttach. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.6 Successful GPRS attach procedures with IMSI already attached + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully performed GPRS attach procedures, while IMSI is already attached. The attempts initiated within this SGSN area are counted. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "ATTACH ACCEPT" message to the MS, indicating a GPRS attach while IMSI attached (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. succImsiAttach. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.7 Number of attached subscriber + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attached subscriber within this SGSN area. +- B. GAUGE. +- C. The gauge will be incremented at transmission of a "ATTACH ACCEPT" message to the MS and will be decremented at transmission of a "DETACH ACCEPT" message to the MS (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. nbrOfAttachedSub. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.8 Mean number of attached subscriber + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean of the number of attached subscriber within this SGSN area. +- B. GAUGE. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System designed), the number of subscribers which are attached and then taking the arithmetic mean (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. meanNbrOfAttachedSub. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.9 Maximum number of attached subscriber + +- A. This measurement provides the highest recorded value for the number of attached subscriber within this SGSN area. +- B. GAUGE. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System designed), the number of subscriber which are "attached", and then taking the maximum of all such values at the end of the granularity period (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. maxNbrOfAttachedSub. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.10 Attempted GPRS detach procedures initiated by MS + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted GPRS detach procedures within this SGSN area. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "DETACH REQUEST" message from the MS, indicating a GPRS detach(GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attGprsDetachMs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.11 Attempt of Combined GPRS/IMSI detach procedures initiated by MS + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted Combined GPRS/IMSI detach procedures MS-initiated within this SGSN area. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "DETACH REQUEST" message from the MS, indicating a Combined GPRS/IMSI detach (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attCombiDetachMs. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.12 Attempt of IMSI detach procedures initiated by MS + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted IMSI detach procedures MS-initiated within this SGSN area. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "DETACH REQUEST" message from the MS, indicating a IMSI detach (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attImsiDetachMS. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.13 Attempted GPRS detach procedures initiated by SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted GPRS detach procedures initiated by SGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "DETACH REQUEST" message to the MS (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attGprsDetachSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.14 Successful GPRS detach procedures initiated by SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully completed GPRS detach procedures SGSN-initiated within this SGSN area. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "DETACH ACCEPT" message from the MS (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. succGprsDetachSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.15 Attempted intra-SGSN Routing Area Update procedures initiated in this SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted intra-SGSN Routing Area Update procedures initiated within this SGSN area. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "ROUTING AREA UPDATE REQUEST" message from the MS, where the old RA and the new RA are served by this SGSN (GSM 04.08 [2]). +- D. attIntraSgsnRaUpdate. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.16 Successful intra-SGSN Routing Area Update procedures initiated in this SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully performed intra-SGSN Routing Area Update procedures initiated in this SGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "ROUTING AREA UPDATE ACCEPT" message to the MS, GSM 04.08 [2]. +- D. succIntraSgsnRaUpdate. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.17 Attempted inter-SGSN Routing Area Update procedures initiated in this SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted inter-SGSN Routing Area Update procedures initiated in this SGSN, where the old RA is served by another SGSN, GSM 04.08 [2]. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of an "ROUTING AREA UPDATE REQUEST" message from the MS,GSM 04.08 [2]. +- D. attInterSgsnRaUpdate. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.4.18 Successful inter-SGSN Routing Area Update procedures initiated in this SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully completed inter-SGSN Routing Area Update procedures in this SGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "ROUTING AREA UPDATE COMPLETE" message from the MS, GSM 04.08 [2]. +- D. succInterSgsnRaUpdate. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +## B.8.1.5 Security + +### B.8.1.5.1 Attempted P-TMSI reallocation procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted P-TMSI reallocation, or implicitly as part of the Location Updating, procedures in this SGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "P-TMSI REALLOCATION COMMAND" message by the SGSN, GSM 04.08 [2]. +- D. attPTMSIRealloc. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.8.1.5.2 Successful P-TMSI reallocation procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully performed P-TMSI reallocation procedures in this SGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "P-TMSI REALLOCATION COMPLETE" message by the SGSN, GSM 04.08 [2]. +- D. succPTMSIRealloc. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.8.1.5.3 Attempted requests for authentication sets sent to HLR by SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of number of attempted requests for authentication sets, sent to the HLR by SGSN, these are counted as attempts. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "MAP SEND\_AUTHENTICATION\_INFO" service request, requesting authentication sets parameter "AuthenticationSetKind" present, GSM 09.02 [7]. +- D. attReqAuthSetsSentToHlrBySgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.5.4 Successful requests for authentication sets to HLR + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful requests for authentication sets that were sent from the HLR to the SGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "MAP SEND\_AUTHENTICATION\_INFO" service confirmation, containing requested authentication sets (parameter "AuthenticationSetList" present GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. succReqAuthSetsHlr. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.5.5 Empty responses to the request for authentication sets to the HLR + +- A. This measurement provides the number of empty responses to the request for authentication sets that were sent to the HLR. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "MAP\_SEND\_AUTHENTICATION\_INFO " service confirmation, no Authentication sets present, GSM 09.02 [7]. +- D. emptyResponsesForAuthSetsFromHlr. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.5.6 Attempt of authentication procedures started by SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of authentication procedures that are started within this SGSN area. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of an "AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING REQUEST" message to the MS (GSM 04.08). +- D. attAuthInSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.5.7 Successful authentication procedures started by the SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful authentication procedures within this SGSN area. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of an "AUTHENTICATION AND CIPHERING RESPONSE" message from the MS, where the receipt SRES parameter value matches the value stored in the SGSN (GSM 04.08). +- D. succAuthInSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.5.8 Attempted Identity Request procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted Identity Request procedures initiated by this SGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of an "IDENTITY REQUEST" message to the MS (GSM 04.08). +- D. attIdentityReq. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.5.9 Successful Identity Request procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully completed Identity Request procedures initiated by this SGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of an "IDENTITY RESPONSE" message with IMSI by the SGSN from the MS (GSM 04.08). +- D. succIdentityReq. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +## B.8.1.6 State + +### B.8.1.6.1 Number of subscribers in the SGSN in STANDBY state. + +- A. This measurement provides the number of subscribers in 'STANDBY' state within this SGSN area. +- B. GAUGE. +- C. Transition of a GPRS subscriber registered in the SGSN into/from the operational state 'STANDBY'. +- D. nbrOfSubStandby. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.8.1.6.2 Mean number of subscribers in the SGSN in STANDBY state + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean of the number of subscriber in 'STANDBY' state within this SGSN area. +- B. SI. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System designed), the number of subscribers in the STANDBY state, and then taking the arithmetic mean. +- D. meanNbrOfSubStandby. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.8.1.6.3 Maximum number of subscribers in the SGSN in STANDBY state. + +- A. This measurement provides the highest recorded value for number of subscribers in 'STANDBY' state within this SGSN area. +- B. GAUGE. +- C. This measurement is obtained by comparing on an update of the actual number of subscribers in the STANDBY state, this value with the currently maximal value within the actual granularity period. +- D. maxNbrOfSubStandby. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.6.4 Number of subscribers in the SGSN in READY state + +- A. This measurement provides the number of subscribers in 'READY' state within this SGSN area. +- B. GAUGE. +- C. Transition of a GPRS subscriber registered in the SGSN into/from the operational state 'READY'. +- D. nbrOfSubReady. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.6.5 Mean number of subscribers in the SGSN in READY state + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean of the number of subscriber in 'READY' state within this SGSN area. +- B. SI. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System design), the number of subscribers in the READY state, and then taking the arithmetic mean. +- D. meanNbrOfSubReady. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.6.6 Maximum number of subscribers in the SGSN in READY state + +- A. This measurement provides the highest recorded value for number of subscribers in 'READY' state within this SGSN area. +- B. GAUGE. +- C. This measurement is obtained by comparing on an update of the actual number of subscribers in the READY state, this value with the currently maximal value within the actual granularity period. +- D. maxNbrOfSubReady. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +## B.8.1.7 Equipment + +### B.8.1.7.1 Number of transmitted check IMEI requests + +- A. This measurement provides the number of check IMEI requests sent to the EIR. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "MAP\_IMEI\_CHECK" service request (GSM 09.02 [7]). +- D. nbrOfCheckIMEIRequest. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.8.1.7.2 Number of white answers in SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of white list answers received from the EIR. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_IMEI\_CHECK" service confirmation with parameter "equipment status" referring to the white listed equipment.(GSM 09.02 and GSM 02.16). +- D. nbrOfWhiteAnswerInSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.8.1.7.3 Number of grey answers in SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of grey list answers received from the EIR. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_IMEI\_CHECK" service confirmation with parameter "equipment status" referring to the grey listed equipment.(GSM 09.02 and GSM 02.16). +- D. nbrOfGreyAnswerInSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.7.4 Number of black answers in SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of black list answers received from the EIR. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_IMEI\_CHECK" service confirmation with parameter "equipment status" referring to the black listed equipment.(GSM 09.02 and GSM 02.16). +- D. nbrOfBlackAnswerInSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.7.5 Number of unknown IMEI answers + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unknown IMEI answers received from the EIR. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "MAP\_IMEI\_CHECK" service confirmation with parameter "equipment status" referring to unknown equipment.(GSM 09.02). +- D. nbrOfUnknownAnswerInSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.8.1.8 RRM Measurements + +#### B.8.1.8.1 Attempt of packet switched paging procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted packet switched paging procedures, for GPRS services, within this SGSN area. The initial paging procedures as well the repeated paging procedures are counted. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "GMM-PAGING.req" message (GSM 08.18). +- D. attPacketSwitchingPaging. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.8.1.8.2 Unsuccessful packet switched paging procedures + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unsuccessful packet switched paging (GPRS) procedures within this SGSN area, i.e. packet switching paging procedures that are re-started when the previous attempt has timed out. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of timeout for the "GMM-PAGING.req" message (GSM TS 08.18). +- D. unsuccPacketSwitchingPaging. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.8.1.8.3 Attempt of packet switched paging procedures per Routing Area + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted packet switched paging procedures, for GPRS services, within this Routing Area. The initial paging procedures as well the repeated paging procedures are counted. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "GMM-PAGING.req" message (GSM 08.18). +- D. attPsPagingPerRoutingArea. +- E. A single integer value per Routing Area. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.8.1.8.4 Unsuccessful packet switched paging procedures per Routing Area + +- A. This measurement provides the number of unsuccessful packet switched paging (GPRS) procedures within this Routing Area, i.e. packet switching paging procedures that are re-started when the previous attempt has timed out. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of timeout for the "GMM-PAGING.req" message (GSM 08.18). +- D. unsuccPsPagingPerRoutingArea. +- E. A single integer value per Routing Area. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +## B.8.1.9 SM Measurements + +### B.8.1.9.1 Attempted PDP context activation procedures initiated by MS + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted PDP context activation procedures. These include the static as well as the dynamic PDP addresses. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "Activate PDP Context Request" message from the MS (GSM 04.08). +- D. attActPdpContextMSPerSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.8.1.9.2 Successful PDP context activation procedures initiated by MS + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully completed PDP context activations. For these context activations, the GGSN is updated successfully. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "Activate PDP Context Accept" message to the MS (GSM 04.08). +- D. succActPdpContextMSPerSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.8.1.9.3 Attempted dynamic PDP context activation procedures initiated by MS + +- A. This measurement provides the number of attempted PDP context activation requests where a dynamic PDP address is required to be used. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "Activate PDP Context Request" message from the MS with an empty PDP address (GSM 04.08). +- D. attActPdpContextDynMSPerSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.9.4 Successful dynamic PDP context activation procedures initiated by MS + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully completed PDP context activations where a dynamic PDP address is used. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "Activate PDP Context Accept" message to the MS (GSM TS 04.08) when the PDP address has been dynamically assigned. +- D. succActPdpDynContextDynMsPerSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.9.5 Attempted PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the MS + +- A. This measurement provides the number of PDP context deactivation procedures. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "Deactivate PDP Context Request" message from the MS (GSM 04.08). +- D. attDeactPdpContextMsPerSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.9.6 Successful PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the MS + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully completed PDP context deactivations. For these context deactivations, the GGSN is updated successfully (i.e. deletion of the PDP context). +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "Deactivate PDP Context Accept" message to the MS (GSM 04.08). +- D. succDeactPdpContextMsPerSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.9.7 Attempted PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the GGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the GGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "Delete PDP Context Request" message from the GGSN (GSM 09.60). +- D. attDeactPdpContextGgsnPerSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.9.8 Successful PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the GGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully handled PDP context deactivations initiated by the GGSN. For these context deactivations, the MS has accepted the PDP context deactivation. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "Delete PDP Context Response" message to the GGSN (GSM 09.60). +- D. succDeactPdpContextGgsnPerSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.9.9 Number of subscribers with activated PDP context in SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of mobile subscribers with activated PDP context (i.e. subscribers that can send/receive GPRS packet data). +- B. GAUGE. +- C. Addition of first PDP context or removal of last PDP context in SGSN location register for a particular subscriber. +- D. nbrSubsWithActivePdpInSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.9.10 Mean number of subscribers with activated PDP context in SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the arithmetic mean number value of subscribers that have activated PDP context (i.e. subscribers that can send/receive GPRS packet data). +- B. SI. +- C. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System design), the number of subscribers with activated PDP context in SGSN, and then taking the arithmetic mean. +- D. meanSubsWithActivePdpInSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.8.1.9.11 Maximum number of subscribers with activated PDP context in SGSN + +- A. This measurement provides the highest recorded value for number of subscribers with activated PDP contexts (i.e. subscribers that can send/receive GPRS packet data). +- B. GAUGE. +- C. This measurement is obtained by comparing on an update of the actual number of subscribers with activated PDP context in SGSN, this value with the currently maximal value within the actual granularity period. +- D. maxSubsWithActivePdpInSgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. SGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +--- + +## B.9 Measurements Related to the GGSN + +### B.9.1 GGSN Measurement Function + +#### B.9.1.1 Number of PDP context activation procedures initiated by the MS Per APN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of PDP context activation procedures initiated by the MS on a per APN of the GGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "Create PDP Context Request" message from the SGSN (GSM 09.60). +- D. attActPdpContextPerApnOfGgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. GGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.9.1.2 Successful PDP context activation procedures initiated by the MS Per APN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully completed activation PDP context procedures initiated by the MS on a per APN of the GGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "Create PDP Context Response" from GGSN (GSM 09.60). +- D. succActPdpContextPerApnOfGgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. GGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.9.1.3 Number of dynamic PDP context activation procedures initiated by the MS Per APN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of dynamic PDP context activation procedures initiated by the MS where a dynamic PDP address is requested on a per APN of the GGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "Create PDP Context Request" message MS with an empty PDP address (GSM 09.60). +- D. attActPdpContextDynPerApnOfGgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. GGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.9.1.4 Successful +dynamic PDP context activation procedures initiated by the MS Per APN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully attempted dynamic PDP context activation procedures initiated by the MS where a dynamic PDP address is requested on a per APN of the GGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of "Create PDP Context Response" from GGSN (GSM 09.60), the PDP address has been dynamically assigned. +- D. succActPdpContextDynPerApnOfGgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. GGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.9.1.5 Number of PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the MS Per APN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the MS on a per APN of the GGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of a "Delete PDP Context Request" message from the SGSN (GSM 09.60). +- D. attDeactPdpContextPerApnOfGgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. GGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +#### B.9.1.6 Successful PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the MS Per APN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully completed PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the MS on a per APN of the GGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "Delete PDP Context Response" message to the SGSN (GSM TS 09.60). +- D. succDeactPdpContextPerApnOfGgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. GGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.9.1.7 Number of PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the GGSN Per APN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the GGSN, on a per APN of the GGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Transmission of a "Deactivate PDP Context Request" message to the SGSN (GSM 09.60). +- D. attDeactPdpContextByGgsnPerApn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. GGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.9.1.8 Successful PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the GGSN Per APN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successfully completed PDP context deactivation procedures initiated by the GGSN, on a per APN of the GGSN. +- B. CC. +- C. Receipt of "Delete PDP Context Response" message from the SGSN (GSM 09.60). +- D. succDeactPdpContextByGgsnPerApn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. GGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.9.1.9 Number of active PDP context in GGSN Per APN + +- A. This measurement provides the number of active PDP context in this GGSN. +- B. GAUGE. +- C. Addition or removal of a PDP context in GGSN. +- D. nbrOfActivePdpContextsPerApnAtGgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. GGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.9.1.10 Mean number of active PDP context in GGSN Per APN + +- A. This measurement is obtained by sampling at a pre-defined interval (System designed), the number of active PDP context in GGSN per APN, and then taking the arithmetic mean. +- B. SI. +- C. Addition or removal of a PDP context in GGSN. +- D. meanNbrOfActivePdpContextsPerApnAtGgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. GGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +### B.9.1.11 Maximum number of PDP context in GGSN Per APN + +- A. This measurement is obtained by comparing on an update of the actual number of active PDP context in GGSN per APN, this value with the currently maximal value within the actual granularity period. +- B. GAUGE. +- C. Addition a PDP context in GGSN. +- D. maxnbrOfActivePdpContextsPerApnAtGgsn. +- E. A single integer value. +- F. GGSN Measurement Function. +- G. Valid for packet switching. + +--- + +## B.10 Monitoring of Power, Energy and Environmental (PEE) parameters + +Power, Energy and Environmental (PEE) parameters, combined with data volume measurements, are valuable information for operators to measure the energy efficiency (EE) of their GSM network. Hence it is necessary to define performance measurements related to GERAN PEE parameters such as power, energy, temperature, voltage, current, humidity. + +## Annex C (normative): Performance Measurement Object Model + +This annex to GSM 12.04 comprises the Object Model for Performance Measurement to complement the high level Object Model in GSM 12.00 [8]. + +The whole management approach defined in GSM 12.00 [8] defines all entities of GSM network as managed functions. These are BSS, MSC, HLR etc. and one or more of these can be contained in managed element and each of these functions can contain it's own measurement function. + +The SGSN and GGSN detailed, are additional to GSM 12.00 [8] due to the introduction of GPRS. + +### Model Structure and Content + +The following measurement function model takes its basis from the proposed GSM 12.00 [8] high level model. Figure C.1 shows the containment tree of all the measurement Object Classes. The formal GDMO definitions of the Managed Object Classes concerning measurement functions are described in this clause, except the "log", which is described in annex D under data transfer requirements. + +![Figure C.1: GSM 12.04 Performance Measurement Object Class Containment. A hierarchical tree diagram showing the containment of measurement object classes. The root is 'managedElement', which contains 'log' and 'efd'. Below 'efd' are 'bsFunction', 'mscFunction', 'hlrFunction', 'vlrFunction', 'eirFunction', 'smscFunction', 'sgsnFunction', and 'ggsnFunction'. Each function has its own measurement function and may contain other elements like 'simpleScanner', 'btsSiteManager', 'bsc', 'bts', 'internalHdo measurement Function', 'cell measurement Function', 'externalHdo measurement Function', 'vlr measurement Function', 'smsc measurement Function', 'sgsn measurement Function', and 'ggsn measurement Function'.](a1530b77a339c01162a6181e83cbc906_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + managedElement[managedElement] --> log[log] + managedElement --> efd[efd] + efd --> bsFunction[bsFunction] + efd --> mscFunction[mscFunction] + efd --> hlrFunction[hlrFunction] + efd --> vlrFunction[vlrFunction] + efd --> eirFunction[eirFunction] + efd --> smscFunction[smscFunction] + efd --> sgsnFunction[sgsnFunction] + efd --> ggsnFunction[ggsnFunction] + + bsFunction --> bsSiteManager[btsSiteManager] + bsFunction --> bsc[bsc] + bsFunction --> simpleScanner1[simpleScanner] + bsSiteManager --> bts[bts] + bsc --> bscMeasurementFunction[bsc measurement Function] + bts --> internalHdo[internalHdo measurement Function] + bts --> cell[cell measurement Function] + + mscFunction --> mscMeasurementFunction[msc measurement Function] + mscFunction --> externalHdo[externalHdo measurement Function] + mscFunction --> simpleScanner2[simpleScanner] + + hlrFunction --> hlrMeasurementFunction[hlr measurement Function] + hlrFunction --> simpleScanner3[simpleScanner] + + vlrFunction --> vlrMeasurementFunction[vlr measurement Function] + vlrFunction --> simpleScanner4[simpleScanner] + + eirFunction --> eirMeasurementFunction[eir measurement Function] + eirFunction --> simpleScanner5[simpleScanner] + + smscFunction --> smscMeasurementFunction[smsc measurement Function] + smscFunction --> simpleScanner6[simpleScanner] + + sgsnFunction --> sgsnMeasurementFunction[sgsn measurement Function] + sgsnFunction --> simpleScanner7[simpleScanner] + + ggsnFunction --> ggsnMeasurementFunction[ggsn measurement Function] + ggsnFunction --> simpleScanner8[simpleScanner] + +``` + +Figure C.1: GSM 12.04 Performance Measurement Object Class Containment. A hierarchical tree diagram showing the containment of measurement object classes. The root is 'managedElement', which contains 'log' and 'efd'. Below 'efd' are 'bsFunction', 'mscFunction', 'hlrFunction', 'vlrFunction', 'eirFunction', 'smscFunction', 'sgsnFunction', and 'ggsnFunction'. Each function has its own measurement function and may contain other elements like 'simpleScanner', 'btsSiteManager', 'bsc', 'bts', 'internalHdo measurement Function', 'cell measurement Function', 'externalHdo measurement Function', 'vlr measurement Function', 'smsc measurement Function', 'sgsn measurement Function', and 'ggsn measurement Function'. + +Figure C.1: GSM 12.04 Performance Measurement Object Class Containment + +## C.1 Measurement Managed Object Classes + +### C.1.1 object class from ITU-T ISO + +The object class used by the present document is the simple scanner, as defined in ISO 10164-13 [34]. Within the realm of the present document, each "simpleScanner" instance is only required to scan attributes of "measurementFunction" objects that are contained in the same "xxxFunction" object as the "simpleScanner" itself, where "xxx" stands for "bss", "msc", "hlr", "vlr", "eir", "sgsn", "ggsn" or "smsc", respectively (see containment tree diagram on previous page). + +### C.1.2 bscMeasurementFunction + +bscMeasurementFunction **MANAGED OBJECT CLASS** + +**DERIVED FROM** + +"Recommendation X.721: 1992": top; + +**CHARACTERIZED BY** + +basicMeasurementFunctionPackage; + +**CONDITIONAL PACKAGES** + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------| +| requestForServicePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| requestForServicePerCausePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| interArrivalTimePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| pagingMessagePerBSCPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| immediateAssignmentProceduresPerBSCPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| internalHandoversIntraCellPerBSCPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| internalHandoversPerBSCPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| internalHandoversPerCausePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| internalHandoverFailuresPerBSCPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| gprsPDUFlushReqPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| gprsPagingRequestPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| gprsInterArrivalPackage
supports it"; | PRESENT IF "an instance | + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204managedobjectClass 121}; + +### C.1.3 cellMeasurementFunction + +cellMeasurementFunction **MANAGED OBJECT CLASS** + +**DERIVED FROM** + +"Recommendation X.721: 1992": top; + +**CHARACTERIZED BY** + +basicMeasurementFunctionPackage; + +**CONDITIONAL PACKAGES** + +| | | +|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------| +| pchagchQueuePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| pagingMessagePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | + +| | | +|---------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------| +| immediateAssignmentProceduresPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| immediateAssignmentProceduresPerCausePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| pageDiscardPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| durationOfPagingProceduresPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| tchAvailablePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| tchBusyPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| idleTCHsPerInterferenceBandPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| tchSeizuresPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| tchAllocatedTimePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| tchBusyTimePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| tchQueuePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| lostRadioLinksPerTCHPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| sdchAvailablePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| sdchBusyPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| sdchSeizuresPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| sdchAllocatedTimePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| sdchQueuePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| lostRadioLinksPerSDCHPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| downlinkPowerControlPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| uplinkPowerControlPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| internalHandoversIntraCellPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| incomingInternalInterCellHandoversPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| outgoingInternalInterCellHandoversPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| internalHandoverFailurePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| gprsPDCHAvailablePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| gprsPDCHOccupiedPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| gprsPDCHAllocatedPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| gprsPCCCHPagingPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| gprsPPCHQueueOnPCCCHPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | + +gprsPDTCHErrandAssignmentPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + gprsPDTCHEQueuePackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + gprsCSChangePackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it"; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204managedobjectClass 131}; + +## C.1.4 internalHdoMeasurementFunction + +internalHdoMeasurementFunction **MANAGED OBJECT CLASS** + +**DERIVED FROM** + +"Recommendation X.721: 1992": top; + +**CHARACTERIZED BY** + +basicMeasurementFunctionPackage, + internalHdoMeasurementFunctionPackage; + +**CONDITIONAL PACKAGES** + +incomingInternalInterCellPerCellHandoversPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + outgoingInternalInterCellPerCellHandoversPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it"; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204managedobjectClass 140}; + +internalHdoMeasurementFunctionPackage **PACKAGE** + +**BEHAVIOUR** + +internalHdoMeasurementFunctionBehaviour; + +**ATTRIBUTES** + +"gsm1220: 1993": adjacentCellId **GET**; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 140}; + +internalHdoMeasurementFunctionBehaviour **BEHAVIOUR** + +**DEFINED AS** + +"This object is defined to contain the various optional measurement packages and will exist in multiple instances. Creation is only allowed if the value of the adjacent cell attribute is identical to the value of the adjacent cell attribute in one of the objects. There can be one or more instance(s) of the HDO measurement function for each created instance of MOC. If the adjacent Cell Object is re-named or deleted during the lifetime of the internalHdoMeasurementFunction of its associated internalHdoMeasurementFunction then the corresponding internalHdoMeasurementFunction(s) is/are automatically deleted, as the adjacent Cell Attribute of the measurementFunction shall not be changeable. The scanner may scan attributes of the object class in various combinations and permutations of packages, and further may scan simultaneously as many times as necessary within the processing limits of the network." + +## C.1.5 mscMeasurementFunction + +mscMeasurementFunction **MANAGED OBJECT CLASS** + +**DERIVED FROM** + +"Recommendation X.721: 1992": top; + +**CHARACTERIZED BY** + +basicMeasurementFunctionPackage; + +**CONDITIONAL PACKAGES** + +classMarkPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + mobileOriginatingCallsPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + +mobileTerminatingCallsPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + mobileEmergencyCallsPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + cipheringModePackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + interrogatingHLRPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + mobileOriginatingPointToPointSMPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + mobileTerminatingPointToPointSMPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + imeiRequestPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + whiteAnswersInMSCPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + greyAnswersInMSCPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + blackAnswersInMSCPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + unknownIMEIAnswersInMSCPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + callSetupServicePackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + locationUpdatingServicePackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + subscriberIdentifiedWithTMSIPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + subscriberIdentifiedWithIMSIPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + tmsiReallocationsPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + imsiDetachAttachProceduresPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + incomingExternalIntraMSCHandoversPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + outgoingExternalIntraMSCHandoversPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + incomingInterMSCHandoversPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + outgoingInterMSCHandoversPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + subsequentInterMSCHandoversToMACaPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + subsequentInterMSCHandoversToMACcPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + externalHandoversPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + externalHandoversPerCausePackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + externalHandoverFailurePerMSCPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it"; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204managedobjectClass 150}; + +## C.1.6 externalHdoMeasurementFunction + +externalHdoMeasurementFunction **MANAGED OBJECT CLASS** + +**DERIVED FROM** + +"Recommendation X.721: 1992": top; + +**CHARACTERIZED BY** + +basicMeasurementFunctionPackage, +externalHdoMeasurementFunctionPackage; + +**CONDITIONAL PACKAGES** + +incomingExternalIntraMSCHandoversPerCellPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance +supports it", +outgoingExternalIntraMSCHandoversPerCellPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance +supports it", +incomingExternalInterMSCHandoversPerCellPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance +supports it", +outgoingExternalInterMSCHandoversPerCellPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance +supports it"; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204managedobjectClass 160}; + +externalHdoMeasurementFunctionPackage **PACKAGE** + +**BEHAVIOUR** + +externalHdoMeasurementFunctionBehaviour; + +**ATTRIBUTES** + +| | | +|--------------|-------------| +| observedCell | GET, | +| adjacentCell | GET; | + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 160} ; + +externalHdoMeasurementFunctionBehaviour **BEHAVIOUR** + +**DEFINED AS** + +"This object is defined to contain the various optional measurement packages and will exist in multiple instances. It can only be instantiated if the cell attribute belongs to the msc area which is served by the msc function that contain the external HDO measurement function. The scanner may scan attributes of the object class in various combinations and permutations of packages, and further may scan simultaneously as many times as necessary within the processing limits of the network."; + +## C.1.7 hlrMeasurementFunction + +hlrMeasurementFunction **MANAGED OBJECT CLASS** + +**DERIVED FROM** + +"Recommendation X.721: 1992": top; + +**CHARACTERIZED BY** + +basicMeasurementFunctionPackage; + +**CONDITIONAL PACKAGES** + +| | | +|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------| +| msRoamingOutsideHPLMNPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| authenticationSetsHLRToVLRPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| insertSubscriberDataServicePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| locationUpdatePackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| ssRelatedOperationsInHLRPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| requestForSMRoutingPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | +| smDeliveryStatusReportProceduresPackage
supports it", | PRESENT IF "an instance | + +sendAlertsPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + requestForMSRNPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it"; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204managedobjectClass 170}; + +## C.1.8 vlrMeasurementFunction + +vlrMeasurementFunction **MANAGED OBJECT CLASS** +**DERIVED FROM** + "Recommendation X.721: 1992": top; +**CHARACTERIZED BY** + basicMeasurementFunctionPackage; +**CONDITIONAL PACKAGES** + msMemoryAvailableNotificationsPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + identificationRequestToPVLRRPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + pageRequestPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + pageRequestPerLocationAreaPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + authenticationSetsVLRTToHLRRPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + authenticationInVLRPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + intraVLRLocationUpdatePackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + interVLRLocationUpdatePackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + visitorsFromOtherPLMNPackages **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it"; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204managedobjectClass 180}; + +## C.1.9 eirMeasurementFunction + +eirMeasurementFunction **MANAGED OBJECT CLASS** +**DERIVED FROM** + "Recommendation X.721: 1992": top; +**CHARACTERIZED BY** + basicMeasurementFunctionPackage; +**CONDITIONAL PACKAGES** + receivedIMEIcheckRequestPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance supports it", + whiteAnswersInEIRPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance supports it", + greyAnswersInEIRPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance supports it", + blackAnswersInEIRPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance supports it", + unknownIMEIAnswersInEIRPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance supports it"; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204managedobjectClass 190}; + +## C.1.10 smsMeasurementFunction + +smsMeasurementFunction **MANAGED OBJECT CLASS** +**DERIVED FROM** + "Recommendation X.721: 1992": top; + +**CHARACTERIZED BY** + +basicMeasurementFunctionPackage; + +**CONDITIONAL PACKAGES**mobileOriginatingSMForwardingPackage +supports it",**PRESENT IF** "an instancemobileTerminatingSMForwardingPackage +supports it";**PRESENT IF** "an instance**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204managedobjectClass 1101}; + +## C.1.11 sgsnMeasurementFunction + +sgsnMeasurementFunction **MANAGED OBJECT CLASS****DERIVED FROM** + +"Recommendation X.721: 1992": top; + +**CHARACTERIZED BY** + +basicMeasurementFunctionPackage; + +**CONDITIONAL PACKAGES** + +sgsnLLCPackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +sgsnSNDCPPackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +gprsAttachPackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +gprsIMSIAttachPackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +gprsIMSIAlreadyAttachedPackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +gprsAttachedSubscribersPackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +gprsMSDetachPackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +gprsSGSNDetachPackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +gprsRouting AreaUpdatePackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +pTMSIReallocationPackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +sgsnHLRAuthenticationPackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +sgsnAuthenticationProcPackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +sgsnIdentityRequestPackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +sgsnCipheringModePackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +gprsSubsStandbyStatePackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +gprsSubsReadyStatePackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +sgsnIMEICheckRequestsPackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +whiteAnswersInSGSNPackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +greyAnswersInSGSNPackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +blackAnswersInSGSNPackage + +**PRESENT IF** "an instance + +supports it", + +unknownIMEIAnswersInSGSNPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + sgsnPacketSwitched PagingPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + sgsnPacketSwitched PagingPerRAPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + sgsnPDPContextActivationByMSPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + sgsnDynamicPDPContextActivationByMSPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + sgsnPDPContextDeactivationByMSPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + sgsnPDPContextDeactivationByGGSNPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + subscriberPDPContextsInSGSNPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it"; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204managedobjectClass 1110}; + +## C.1.12 ggsnMeasurementFunction + +ggsnMeasurementFunction **MANAGED OBJECT CLASS** + +**DERIVED FROM** + +"Recommendation X.721: 1992": top; + +**CHARACTERIZED BY** + +basicMeasurementFunctionPackage; + +**CONDITIONAL PACKAGES** + +ggsnPDPContextActivationByMSPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + ggsnDynamicPDPContextActivationByMSPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + ggsnPDPContextDeactivationByMSPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + ggsnPDPContextDeactivationByGGSNPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it", + ActivePDPContextsAtGGSNPackage **PRESENT IF** "an instance + supports it"; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204managedobjectClass 1120} + +## C.2 Measurement Package Definitions + +The following describes the individual measurements defined in GSM 12.04, annex B, as packages of attributes to be referenced by the appropriate managed object class. + +### C.2.1 General Measurement Function Packages + +#### C.2.1.1 basicMeasurementFunctionPackage + +``` +basicMeasurementFunctionPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementFunctionBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + measurementFunctionId GET; + NOTIFICATIONS + "Recommendation X.721: 1992": objectCreation, + "Recommendation X.721: 1992": objectDeletion; + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 211}; +``` + +### C.2.2 BSC Measurement Function Related Packages + +#### C.2.2.1 requestForServicePackage + +``` +requestForServicePackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + unsuccReqsForService GET; + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 221}; +``` + +#### C.2.2.2 requestForServicePerCausePackage + +``` +requestForServicePerCausePackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + unsuccReqsForServicePerCause GET; + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 222}; +``` + +#### C.2.2.3 interArrivalTimePackage + +``` +interArrivalTimePackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + meanInterArrivalTime GET; + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 223}; +``` + +### C.2.2.4 pagingMessagePerBSCPackage + +pagingMessagePerBSCPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attTransOfPagingMessagesPerBSC **GET**, +unsuccTransOfPagingMessagesPerBSC **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 224}; + +### C.2.2.5 immediateAssignmentProceduresPerBSCPackage + +immediateAssignmentProceduresPerBSCPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attImmediateAssingProcsPerBSC **GET**, +succImmediateAssingProcsPerBSC **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 225}; + +### C.2.2.6 internalHandoversIntraCellPerBSCPackage + +internalHandoversIntraCellPerBSCPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +succInternalHDOsIntraCellPerBSC **GET**, +unsuccInternalHDOsIntraCellPerBSC **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 226}; + +### C.2.2.7 internalHandoversPerBSCPackage + +internalHandoversPerBSCPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +succInternalHDOsPerBSC **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 227}; + +### C.2.2.8 internalHandoversPerCausePackage + +internalHandoversPerCausePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +succInternalHDOsPerCause **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 228}; + +### C.2.2.9 internalHandoverFailuresPerBSCPackage + +internalHandoverFailuresPerBSCPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + +**ATTRIBUTES** +unsuccInternalHDOsWithReconnectionPerBSC **GET**, +unsuccInternalHDOsWithLossOfConnectionPerBSC **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 229}; + +### C.2.2.10 gprsPDUFushReqPackage + +gprsPDUFushReqPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +FushReqReceived **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2210}; + +### C.2.2.11 gprsPagingRequestPackage + +gprsPagingRequestPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +pagingReqReceivedfromSGSN **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2211}; + +### C.2.2.12 gprsInterArrivalPackage + +gprsInterArrivalPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +meanPSInterArrivalTime **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2212}; + +## C.2.3 CELL Measurement Function Related Packages + +### C.2.3.1 pchagchQueuePackage + +pchagchQueuePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +meanPCHAGCHQueueLength **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 231}; + +### C.2.3.2 pagingMessagePackage + +pagingMessagePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attTransOfPagingMessagesThePCH **GET**, +unsuccTransOfPagingMessagesThePCH **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 232}; + +### C.2.3.3 immediateAssignmentProceduresPackage + +immediateAssignmentProceduresPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +  generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +  attImmediateAssingProcs **GET,** +  succImmediateAssingProcs **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 233}; + +### C.2.3.4 immediateAssignmentProceduresPerCausePackage + +immediateAssignmentProceduresPerCausePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +  generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +  attImmediateAssingProcsPerCause **GET,** +  succImmediateAssingProcsPerCause **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 234}; + +### C.2.3.5 pageDiscardPackage + +pageDiscardPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +  generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +  nbrOfPagesDiscardedFromPCHQueue **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 235}; + +### C.2.3.6 durationOfPagingProceduresPackage + +durationOfPagingProceduresPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +  generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +  meanDurationOfSuccPagingProcs **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 236}; + +### C.2.3.7 tchAvailablePackage + +tchAvailablePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +  generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +  nbrOfAvailableTCHs **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 237}; + +### C.2.3.8 tchBusyPackage + +tchBusyPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +  generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + +**ATTRIBUTES** +meanNbrOfBusyTCHs **GET,** +maxNbrOfBusyTCHs **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 238}; + +### C.2.3.9 idleTCHsPerInterferenceBandPackage + +idleTCHPerInterferenceBandPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +meanNbrOfIdleTCHsPerInterferenceBand **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 239}; + +### C.2.3.10 tchSeizuresPackage + +tchSeizuresPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attTCHSeizures **GET,** +succTCHSeizures **GET,** +attTCHSeizuresMeetingTCHBlockedState **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2310}; + +### C.2.3.11 tchAllocatedTimePackage + +tchAllocatedTimePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +allAvailableTCHAllocatedTime **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2311}; + +### C.2.3.12 tchBusyTimePackage + +tchBusyTimePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +meanTCHBusyTime **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2312}; + +### C.2.3.13 tchQueuePackage + +tchQueuePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +meanTCHQueueLength **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2313}; + +### C.2.3.14 lostRadioLinksPerTCHPackage + +lostRadioLinksPerTCHPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    nbrOfLostRadioLinksTCH **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2314}; + +### C.2.3.15 sdcchAvailablePackage + +sdchAvailablePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    nbrOfAvailableSDCCHs **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2315}; + +### C.2.3.16 sdcchBusyPackage + +sdchBusyPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    meanNbrOfBusySDCCHs **GET,** +    maxNbrOfBusySDCCHs **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2316}; + +### C.2.3.17 sdcchSeizuresPackage + +sdchSeizuresPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    attSDCCHSeizuresMeetingSDCCHBlockedState **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2317}; + +### C.2.3.18 sdcchAllocatedTimePackage + +sdchAllocatedTimePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    allAvailableSDCCHAllocatedTime **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2318}; + +### C.2.3.19 sdcchQueuePackage + +sdchQueuePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    meanSDCCHQueueLength **GET;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2319}; + +### C.2.3.20 lostRadioLinksPerSDCCHPackage + +lostRadioLinksPerSDCCHPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +nbrOfLostRadioLinksSDCCH **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2320}; + +### C.2.3.21 downlinkPowerControlPackage + +downlinkPowerControlPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +relativeTimeDLPowerControlAtMax **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2321}; + +### C.2.3.22 uplinkPowerControlPackage + +uplinkPowerControlPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +relativeTimeULPowerControlAtMax **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2322}; + +### C.2.3.23 internalHandoversIntraCellPackage + +internalHandoversIntraCellPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +succInternalHDOsIntraCell **GET,** +unsuccInternalHDOsIntraCell **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2323}; + +### C.2.3.24 incomingInternalInterCellHandoversPackage + +incomingInternalInterCellHandoversPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attIncomingInternalInterCellHDOs **GET,** +succIncomingInternalInterCellHDOs **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2324}; + +### C.2.3.25 outgoingInternalInterCellHandoversPackage + +outgoingInternalInterCellHandoversPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + attOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOs **GET,** + succOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOs **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2325}; + +### C.2.3.26 internalHandoverFailurePackage + +internalHandoverFailurePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + unsuccHDOsWithReconnection **GET,** + unsuccHDOsWithLossOfConnection **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2326}; + +### C.2.3.27 gprsPDCHAvailablePackage + +gprsPDCHAvailablePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + availablePDCH **GET,** + meanNbrAvailablePDCH **GET,** + maxNbrAvailablePDCH **GET,** + minNbrAvailablePDCH **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2327}; + +### C.2.3.28 gprsPDCHOccupiedPackage + +gprsPDCHOccupiedPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + meanNbrOfOccPDCH **GET,** + maxNbrOfOccPDCH **GET,** + minNbrOfOccPDCH **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2328}; + +### C.2.3.29 gprsPDCHAllocatedPackage + +gprsPDCHAllocatedPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + availablePDCH AllocatedTime **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2329}; + +### C.2.3.30 gprsPCCCHPagingPackage + +gprsPCCCHPagingPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + +**ATTRIBUTES** + +nbrPacketPagingMessagesPCHOnPCCCH **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2330}; + +**C.2.3.31 gprsPPCHQueueOnPCCCHPackage** + +gprsPPCHQueueOnPCCCHPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + meanPPCHPAGCHQueueLengthOnPCCCH **GET,** + nbrOfPSPagesDiscardedFromPPCHQueueOnPCCCH **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2331}; + +**C.2.3.32 gprsPDTCHAssignmentPackage** + +gprsPDTCHAssignmentPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + attPCReqAssPerCause **GET,** + succPDTCHAssProcsPerCause **GET,** + succPDTCHSeizures **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2332}; + +**C.2.3.33 gprsPDTCHQueuePackage** + +gprsPDTCHQueuePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + meanPacketQueueLength **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2333}; + +**C.2.3.34 gprsCSChangePackage** + +gprsCSChangePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + nbrOfServiceChanges **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2334}; + +**C.2.4 internal HDO Measurement Function Related Packages****C.2.4.1 incomingInternalInterCellPerCellHandoversPackage** + +incomingInternalInterCellPerCellHandoversPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + attIncomingInternalInterCellHDOsPerOriginatingCell **GET,** + succIncomingInternalInterCellHDOsPerOriginatingCell **GET;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 241}; + +## C.2.4.2 outgoingInternalInterCellPerCellHandoversPackage + +outgoingInternalInterCellPerCellHandoversPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + attOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOsPerTargetCell **GET**, + succOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOsPerTargetCell **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 242}; + +## C.2.5 MSC Measurement Function Related Packages + +### C.2.5.1 classMarkPackage + +classMarkPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + nbrOfClassMarkUpdates **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 251}; + +### C.2.5.2 mobileOriginatingCallsPackage + +mobileOriginatingCallsPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + attMobileOriginatingCalls **GET**, + succMobileOriginatingCalls **GET**, + ansMobileOriginatingCalls **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 252}; + +### C.2.5.3 mobileTerminatingCallsPackage + +mobileTerminatingCallsPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + attMobileTerminatingCalls **GET**, + succMobileTerminatingCalls **GET**, + ansMobileTerminatingCalls **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 253}; + +### C.2.5.4 mobileEmergencyCallsPackage + +mobileEmergencyCallsPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + attMobileEmergencyCalls **GET**, + succMobileEmergencyCalls **GET**; + +ansMobileEmergencyCalls **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 254}; + +### C.2.5.5 cipheringModePackage + +cipheringModePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attCipheringModeControlProcs **GET,** +succCipheringModeControlProcs **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 255}; + +### C.2.5.6 interrogatingHLRPackage + +interrogatingHLRPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attInterrogationOfHLRsForRouting **GET,** +succInterrogationOfHLRsMSRNObtained **GET,** +succInterrogationOfHLRsCallForwarding **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 256}; + +### C.2.5.7 mobileOriginatingPointToPointSMPackage + +mobileOriginatingPointToPointSMPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attOpForMobileOriginatingPointToPointSMs **GET,** +succOpForMobileOriginatingPointToPointSMs **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 257}; + +### C.2.5.8 mobileTerminatingPointToPointSMPackage + +mobileTerminatingPointToPointSMPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attOpForMobileTerminatingPointToPointSMs **GET,** +succOpForMobileTerminatingPointToPointSMs **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 258}; + +### C.2.5.9 imeiRequestPackage + +imeiRequestPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +nbrOfTransCheckIMEIRequests **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 259}; + +### C.2.5.10 whiteAnswersInMSCPackage + +whiteAnswersInMSCPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    nbrOfWhiteAnsInMSC **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2510}; + +### C.2.5.11 greyAnswersInMSCPackage + +greyAnswersInMSCPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    nbrOfGreyAnsInMSC **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2511}; + +### C.2.5.12 blackAnswersInMSCPackage + +blackAnswersInMSCPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    nbrOfBlackAnsInMSC **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2512}; + +### C.2.5.13 unknownIMEIAnswersInMSCPackage + +unknownIMEIAnswersInMSCPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    nbrOfUnknownIMEIAnsInMSC **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2513}; + +### C.2.5.14 callSetupServicePackage + +callSetupServicePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    meanTimeToCallSetupService **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2514}; + +### C.2.5.15 locationUpdatingServicePackage + +locationUpdatingServicePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    meanTimeToLocationUpdateService **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2515}; + +### C.2.5.16 subscriberIdentifiedWithTMSIPackage + +``` +subscriberIdentifiedWithTMSIPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + transSubIdentifiedWithTMSI GET; + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 2516}; +``` + +### C.2.5.17 subscriberIdentifiedWithIMSIPackage + +``` +subscriberIdentifiedWithIMSIPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + transSubIdentifiedWithIMSIPackage GET; + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 2517}; +``` + +### C.2.5.18 tmsiReallocationsPackage + +``` +tmsiReallocationsPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + attTMSIReallocations GET, + succTMSIReallocations GET; + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 2518}; +``` + +### C.2.5.19 imsiDetachProceduresPackage + +``` +imsiDetachProceduresPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + imsiDetachProcs GET, + imsiAttachProcs GET; + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 2519}; +``` + +### C.2.5.20 incomingExternalIntraMSCHandoversPackage + +``` +incomingExternalIntraMSCHandoversPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + attIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOs GET, + succIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOs GET; + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 2520}; +``` + +### C.2.5.21 outgoingExternalIntraMSCHandoversPackage + +``` +outgoingExternalIntraMSCHandoversPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR +``` + +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOs GET, +succOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOs GET; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2521}; + +## C.2.5.22 incomingInterMSCHandoversPackage + +incomingInterMSCHandoversPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attIncomingInterMSCHDOs GET, +succIncomingInterMSCHDOs GET; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2522}; + +## C.2.5.23 outgoingInterMSCHandoversPackage + +outgoingInterMSCHandoversPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attOutgoingInterMSCHDOs GET, +succOutgoingInterMSCHDOs GET; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2523}; + +## C.2.5.24 subsequentInterMSCHandoversToMACaPackage + +subsequentInterMSCHandoversToMACaPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCa GET, +succSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCa GET; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2524}; + +## C.2.5.25 subsequentInterMSCHandoversToMACcPackage + +subsequentInterMSCHandoversToMACcPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCc GET, +succSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCc GET; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2525}; + +## C.2.5.26 externalHandoversPackage + +externalHandoversPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +externalHDOs GET; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2526}; + +### C.2.5.27 externalHandoversPerCausePackage + +externalHandoversPerCausePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    externalHDOsPerCause **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2527}; + +### C.2.5.28 externalHandoverFailurePerMSCPackage + +externalHandoverFailurePerMSCPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    unsuccExternHDOsWithReconnectionPerMSC **GET**, +    unsuccExternHDOsWithLossOfConnectionPerMSC **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2528}; + +## C.2.6 external HDO Measurement Function Related Packages + +### C.2.6.1 incomingExternalIntraMSCHandoversPerCellPackage + +incomingExternalIntraMSCHandoversPerCellPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    attIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell **GET**, +    succIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 261}; + +### C.2.6.2 outgoingExternalIntraMSCHandoversPerCellPackage + +outgoingExternalIntraMSCHandoversPerCellPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    attOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerTargetCell **GET**, +    succOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerTargetCell **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 262}; + +### C.2.6.3 incomingExternalInterMSCHandoversPerCellPackage + +incomingExternalInterMSCHandoversPerCellPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    attIncomingInterMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell **GET**, +    succIncomingInterMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell **GET**; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 263}; + +## C.2.6.4 outgoingExternalInterMSCHandoversPerCellPackage + +``` + +outgoingExternalInterMSCHandoversPerCellPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + attOutgoingInterMSCHDOsPerTargetCell GET, + succOutgoingInterMSCHDOsPerTargetCell GET; + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 264}; + +``` + +## C.2.7 HLR Measurement Function Related Packages + +### C.2.7.1 msRoamingOutsideHPLMNPackage + +``` + +msRoamingOutsideHPLMNPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + nbrOfCurrentMSsRoamingOutsideHPLMN GET; + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 271}; + +``` + +### C.2.7.2 authenticationSetsHLRToVLRPackage + +``` + +authenticationSetsHLRToVLRPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + attReqForAuthSetsReceivedByHLRFromVLRs GET, + succReturnedAuthSetsFromHLRToVLRs GET, + emptyResponsesForAuthSetsFromHLRToVLRs GET; + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 272}; + +``` + +### C.2.7.3 insertSubscriberDataServicePackage + +``` + +insertSubscriberDataServicePackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + attInsertSubDataService GET, + succInsertSubDataService GET; + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 273}; + +``` + +### C.2.7.4 locationUpdatePackage + +``` + +locationUpdatePackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + attLocationUpdate GET, + succLocationUpdate GET; + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 274}; + +``` + +### C.2.7.5 ssRelatedOperationsInHLRPackage + +ssRelatedOperationsInHLRPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attSSRelatedOperationsInHLR **GET,** +succSSRelatedOperationsInHLR **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 275}; + +### C.2.7.6 requestForSMRoutingPackage + +requestForSMRoutingPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attReqForSMRoutingInfo **GET,** +succReqForSMRoutingInfo **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 276}; + +### C.2.7.7 smDeliveryStatusReportProceduresPackage + +smDeliveryStatusReportProceduresPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attSMDeliveryStatusReportProcs **GET,** +succSMDeliveryStatusReportProcs **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 277}; + +### C.2.7.8 sendAlertsPackage + +sendAlertsPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attNbrOfSendAlerts **GET,** +succNbrOfSendAlerts **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 278}; + +### C.2.7.9 requestForMSRNPackage + +requestForMSRNPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attReqForMSRN **GET,** +succReqForMSRN **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 279}; + +## C.2.8 VLR Measurement Function Related Packages + +### C.2.8.1 msMemoryAvailableNotificationsPackage + +msMemoryAvailableNotificationsPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attMSMemoryAvailableNotifications **GET,** +succMSMemoryAvailableNotifications **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 281}; + +### C.2.8.2 identificationRequestToPVLRRPackage + +identificationRequestToPVLRRPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attIdentificationReqToPVLRRs **GET,** +succIdentificationReqToPVLRRs **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 282}; + +### C.2.8.3 pageRequestPackage + +pageRequestPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attPageReqs **GET,** +succPageReqs **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 283}; + +### C.2.8.4 pageRequestPerLocationAreaPackage + +pageRequestPerLocationAreaPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attPageReqsPerLocationArea **GET,** +succPageReqsPerLocationArea **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 284}; + +### C.2.8.5 authenticationSetsVLRTToHLRRPackage + +authenticationSetsVLRTToHLRRPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attReqForAuthSetsSentToHLR **GET,** +succReceivedAuthSetsFromHLR **GET,** +emptyResponsesForAuthFromHLR **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 285}; + +### C.2.8.6 authenticationInVLRPackage + +authenticationInVLRPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attAuthProcsInVLR **GET,** +succAuthProcsInVLR **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 286}; + +### C.2.8.7 intraVLRLocationUpdatePackage + +intraVLRLocationUpdatePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attIntraVLRLocationUpdates **GET,** +succIntraVLRLocationUpdates **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 287}; + +### C.2.8.8 interVLRLocationUpdatePackage + +interVLRLocationUpdatePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attInterVLRLocationUpdates **GET,** +succInterVLRLocationUpdates **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 288}; + +### C.2.8.9 visitorsFromOtherPLMNPackage + +visitorsFromOtherPLMNPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +arrivalOfVisitorsFromOtherPLMNs **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 289}; + +## C.2.9 EIR Measurement Function Related Packages + +### C.2.9.1 receivedIMEIcheckRequestPackage + +receivedIMEIcheckRequestPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +nbrOfReceivedIMEICheckReqs **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 291}; + +### C.2.9.2 whiteAnswersInEIRPackage + +whiteAnswersInEIRPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +nbrOfWhiteAnsInEIR **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 292}; + +### C.2.9.3 greyAnswersInEIRPackage + +greyAnswersInEIRPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +nbrOfGreyAnsInEIR **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 293}; + +### C.2.9.4 blackAnswersInEIRPackage + +blackAnswersInEIRPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +nbrOfBlackAnsInEIR **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 294}; + +### C.2.9.5 unknownIMEIAnswersInEIRPackage + +unknownIMEIAnswersInEIRPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +nbrOfUnknownIMEIAnsInEIR **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 295}; + +## C.2.10 SMS Measurement Function Related Packages + +### C.2.10.1 mobileOriginatingSMForwardingPackage + +mobileOriginatingSMForwardingPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attMobileOriginatingSMForwardings **GET,** +succMobileOriginatingSMForwardings **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2101}; + +### C.2.10.2 mobileTerminatingSMForwardingPackage + +mobileTerminatingSMForwardingPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attMobileTerminatingSMForwardings **GET,** +succMobileTerminatingSMForwardings **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2102}; + +## C.2.11 SGSN Measurement Function Related Packages + +### C.2.11.1 sgsnLLCPackage + +sgsnLLCPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    nbrLlcFramesSent                            **GET,** +    nbrLlcFramesReceived                        **GET,** +    errLlcFramesDetectedBySgsn                **GET,** +    retransmittedLlcFramestoMs                **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2111}; + +### C.2.11.2 sgsnSNDCPPackage + +sgsnSNDCPPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    uplinkSndcpNpduReceived                    **GET,** +    uplinkSndcpOctetReceivedMode            **GET,** +    downlinkSndcpNpduSent                    **GET,** +    downlinkSndcpOctetSent                    **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2112}; + +### C.2.11.3 gprsAttachPackage + +gprsAttachPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    attGprsAttach                                **GET,** +    succGprsAttach                            **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2113}; + +### C.2.11.4 gprsIMSIAttachPackage + +gprsIMSIAttachPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    attCombiAttach                            **GET,** +    succCombiAttach                        **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2114}; + +### C.2.11.5 gprsIMSIAlreadyAttachedPackage + +gprsIMSIAlreadyAttachedPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    attImSIAttach                            **GET,** + +succImSiAttach GET; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2115}; + +### C.2.11.6 gprsAttachedSubscribersPackage + +gprsAttachedSubscribersPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +nbrOfAttachedSub GET, +meanNbrOfAttachedSub GET, +maxNbrOfAttachedSub GET; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2116}; + +### C.2.11.7 gprsMSDetachPackage + +gprsMSDetachPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attGprsDetachMs GET, +attCombiDetachMs GET, +attImSiDetachMs GET; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2117}; + +### C.2.11.8 gprsSGSNDetachPackage + +gprsSGSNDetachPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attGprsdetachSgsn GET, +succGprsdetachSgsn GET; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2118}; + +### C.2.11.9 gprsRouting AreaUpdatePackage + +gprsRouting AreaUpdatePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attIntraSgsnRaUpdate GET, +succIntraSgsnRaUpdate GET, +attInterSgsnRaUpdate GET, +succInterSgsnRaUpdate GET; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2119}; + +### C.2.11.10 pTMSIReallocationPackage + +pTMSIReallocationPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + +attPTMSIRealloc **GET,** +succPTMSIrealloc **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21110}; + +### C.2.11.11 sgsnHLRAuthenticationPackage + +sgsnHLRAuthenticationPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attreqAuthSetsSentToHlrBySgsn **GET,** +succReqAuthSetsHlr **GET,** +emptyResponsesForAuthSetsFromHlr **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21111}; + +### C.2.11.12 sgsnAuthenticationProcPackage + +sgsnAuthenticationProcPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attAuthInSgsn **GET,** +succAuthInSgsn **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21112}; + +### C.2.11.13 sgsnIdentityRequestPackage + +sgsnIdentityRequestPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attIdentityReq **GET,** +succIdentityReq **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21113}; + +### C.2.11.14 sgsnCipheringModePackage + +sgsnCipheringModePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attCipheringModeControlPerSgsn **GET,** +succCipheringModeControlPerSgsn **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21114}; + +### C.2.11.15 gprsSubsStandbyStatePackage + +gprsSubsStandbyStatePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +nbrOfSubStandby **GET,** +meanNbrOfSubStandby **GET;** + +maxNbrOfSubStandby **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21115}; + +### C.2.11.16 gprsSubsReadyStatePackage + +gprsSubsReadyStatePackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +nbrOfSubReady **GET,** +meanNbrOfSubReady **GET,** +maxNbrOfSubReady **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21116}; + +### C.2.11.17 sgsnIMEICheckRequestsPackage + +sgsnIMEICheckRequestsPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +nbrOfCheckIMEIRequests **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21117}; + +### C.2.11.18 whiteAnswersInSGSNPackage + +whiteAnswersInSGSNPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +nbrOfWhiteAnswerInSgsn **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21118}; + +### C.2.11.19 greyAnswersInSGSNPackage + +greyAnswersInSGSNPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +nbrOfGreyAnswerInSgsn **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21119}; + +### C.2.11.20 blackAnswersInSGSNPackage + +blackAnswersInSGSNPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +nbrOfBlackAnswerInSgsn **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21120}; + +### C.2.11.21 unknownIMEIAnswersInSGSNPackage + +unknownIMEIAnswersInSGSNPackage **PACKAGE** + +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +nbrOfUnknownAnswerInSgsn GET; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21121}; + +## C.2.11.22 sgsnPacketSwitched PagingPackage + +sgsnPacketSwitched PagingPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attPacketSwitchedPaging GET; +unsuccPacketSwitchedPaging GET; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21122}; + +## C.2.11.23 sgsnPacketSwitched PagingPerRAPackage + +sgsnPacketSwitched PagingPerRAPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attPsPagingPerRoutingArea GET; +unsuccPsPagingPerRoutingArea GET; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21123}; + +## C.2.11.24 sgsnPDPContextActivationByMSPackage + +sgsnPDPContextActivationByMSPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attActPdpContextMSPerSgsn GET; +succActPdpContextMSPerSgsn GET; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21124}; + +## C.2.11.25 sgsnDynamicPDPContextActivationByMSPackage + +sgsnDynamicPDPContextActivationByMSPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attActPdpContextDynMSPerSgsn GET; +succActPdpContextDynMSPerSgsn GET; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21125}; + +## C.2.11.26 sgsnPDPContextDeactivationByMSPackage + +sgsnPDPContextDeactivationByMSPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +attDeactPdpContextMsPerSgsn GET; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21126}; + +## C.2.11.27 sgsnPDContextDeactivationByGGSNPackage + +sgsnPDPContextDeactivationByGGSNPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    attDeactPdpContextGgsnPerSgsn **GET,** +    succDeactPdpContextGgsnPerSgsn **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 21127}; + +C.2.11.28 subscriberPDPContextsAtSGSNPackage + +``` + +subscriberPDPContextsAtSGSNPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + nbrSubsWithActivePdplnSgsn GET, + 7meanSubsWithActivePdplnSgsn GET, + nmaxSubsWithActivePdplnSgsn GET; + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 21128}; + +``` + +## C.2.12 GGSN Measurement Function Related Packages + +### C.2.12.1 ggsnPDPContextActivationByMSPackage + +gsnPDPContextActivationByMSPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    attActPdpContextPerApnOfGsn **GET,** +    succActPdpContextPerApnOfGsn **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2121} + +### C.2.12.2 gqsnDynamicPDPContextActivationByMSPackage + +ggsnDynamicPDPContextActivationByMSPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** +    attActPdpContextDnyPerApnOfGgsn **GET,** +    succActPdpContextDnyPerApnOfGgsn **GET;** +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204package 2122}; + +### C.2.12.3 ggsnPDPContextDeactivationByMSPackage + +ggsnPDPContextDeactivationByMSPackage **PACKAGE** +**BEHAVIOUR** +    generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; +**ATTRIBUTES** + +``` + attDeactPdpContextMsPerApnOfGgsn GET, + succDeactPdpContextMsPerApnOfGgsn GET; +REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 2123}; +``` + +## C.2.12.4 ggsnPDPContextDeactivationByGGSNPackage + +``` +ggsnPDPContextDeactivationByGGSNPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + attDeactPdpContextByGgsnPerApn GET, + succDeactPdpContextByGgsnMsPerApn GET; +REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 2124}; +``` + +## C.2.12.5 ActivePDPContextsAtGGSNPackage + +``` +ActivePDPContextsAtGGSNPackage PACKAGE + BEHAVIOUR + generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour; + ATTRIBUTES + nbrOfActivePdpContextsPerApnAtGgsn GET, + meanNbrOfActivePdpContextsPerApnAtGgsn GET, + maxNbrOfActivePdpContextsPerApnAtGgsn GET; +REGISTERED AS {gsm1204package 2125}; +``` + +--- + +# C.3 Measurement Attribute Definitions + +## C.3.1 General Measurement Function Related Attributes + +### C.3.1.1 measurementFunctionId + +``` +measurementFunctionId ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX + GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementFunctionId; + BEHAVIOUR + measurementFunctionIdBehaviour; +REGISTERED AS {gsm1204attribute 311}; + +measurementFunctionIdBehaviour BEHAVIOUR + DEFINED AS + "This is the identity of the measurement function"; +``` + +### C.3.1.2 observedCell + +``` +observedCell ATTRIBUTE + WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX + GSM1204TypeModule.GSMCellName; + BEHAVIOUR + observedCellBehaviour; +REGISTERED AS {gsm1204attribute 312}; +``` + +observedCellBehaviour **BEHAVIOUR** +**DEFINED AS** +"This is the Cell that is to be observed for this measurement"; + +### C.3.1.3 adjacentCell + +adjacentCell **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMCellName; +**BEHAVIOUR** +adj7acentCellBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 313}; + +adjacentCellBehaviour **BEHAVIOUR** +**DEFINED AS** +"This is the Cell that is adjacent to the observed cell for this measurement"; + +## C.3.2 BSC Measurement Function Related Attributes + +### C.3.2.1 unsuccReqsForService + +unsuccReqsForService **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 321}; + +### C.3.2.2 unsuccReqsForServicePerCause + +unsuccReqsForServicePerCause **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType3; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 322}; + +### C.3.2.3 meanInterArrivalTime + +meanInterArrivalTime **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType2; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 323}; + +### C.3.2.4 attTransOfPagingMessagesPerBSC + +attTransOfPagingMessagesPerBSC **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 324}; +77 + +### C.3.2.5 unsuccTransOfPagingMessagesPerBSC + +unsuccTransOfPagingMessagesPerBSC **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 325}; + +### C.3.2.6 attImediateAssingProcsPerBSC + +attImediateAssingProcsPerBSC **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 326}; + +### C.3.2.7 succImediateAssingProcsPerBSC + +succImediateAssingProcsPerBSC **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 327}; + +### C.3.2.8 succInternalHDOsIntraCellPerBSC + +succInternalHDOsIntraCellPerBSC **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 328}; + +### C.3.2.9 unsuccInternalHDOsIntraCellPerBSC + +unsuccInternalHDOsIntraCellPerBSC **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 329}; + +### C.3.2.10 succInternalHDOsPerBSC + +succInternalHDOsPerBSC **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3210}; + +### C.3.2.11 succInternalHDOsPerCause + +succInternalHDOsPerCause **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType3; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3211}; + +### C.3.2.12 unsuccInternalHDOsWithReconnectionPerBSC + +unsuccInternalHDOsWithReconnectionPerBSC **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3212}; + +### C.3.2.13 unsuccInternalHDOsWithLossOfConnectionPerBSC + +unsuccInternalHDOsWithLossOfConnectionPerBSC **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3213}; + +### C.3.2.14 flushRequestReceived + +flushRequestReceived **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3214}; + +### C.3.2.15 pagingReqReceivedfromSgsn + +pagingReqReceivedfromSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3215}; + +### C.3.2.16 meanPSInterArrivalTime + +meanPSInterArrivalTime **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3216}; + +### C.3.3 CELL Measurement Function Related Attributes + +#### C.3.3.1 meanPCHAGCHQueueLength + +meanPCHAGCHQueueLength **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType2; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 331}; + +#### C.3.3.2 attTransOfPagingMessagesThePCH + +attTransOfPagingMessagesThePCH **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 332}; + +#### C.3.3.3 unsuccTransOfPagingMessagesThePCH + +unsuccTransOfPagingMessagesThePCH **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 333}; + +#### C.3.3.4 attImmediateAssingProcs + +attImmediateAssingProcs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 334}; + +#### C.3.3.5 succImmediateAssingProcs + +succImmediateAssingProcs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 335}; + +#### C.3.3.6 attImmediateAssingProcsPerCause + +attImmediateAssingProcsPerCause **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType3; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 336}; + +### C.3.3.7 succImediateAssingProcsPerCause + +succImediateAssingProcsPerCause **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType3; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 337}; + +### C.3.3.8 nbrOfPagesDiscardedFromPCHQueue + +nbrOfPagesDiscardedFromPCHQueue **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 338}; + +### C.3.3.9 meanDurationOfSuccPagingProcs + +meanDurationOfSuccPagingProcs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType2; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 339}; + +### C.3.3.10 nbrOfAvailableTCHs + +nbrOfAvailableTCHs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3310}; + +### C.3.3.11 meanNbrOfBusyTCHs + +meanNbrOfBusyTCHs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType2; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3311}; + +### C.3.3.12 maxNbrOfBusyTCHs + +maxNbrOfBusyTCHs **ATTRIBUTE** + +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3312}; + +### C.3.3.13 meanNbrOfIdleTCHsPerInterferenceBand + +meanNbrOfIdleTCHsPerInterferenceBand **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType4; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3313}; + +### C.3.3.14 attTCHSeizures + +attTCHSeizures **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3314}; + +### C.3.3.15 succTCHSeizures + +succTCHSeizures **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3315}; + +### C.3.3.16 attTCHSeizuresMeetingTCHBlockedState + +attTCHSeizuresMeetingTCHBlockedState **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3316}; + +### C.3.3.17 allAvailableTCHAllocatedTime + +allAvailableTCHAllocatedTime **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType2; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3317}; + +### C.3.3.18 meanTCHBusyTime + +meanTCHBusyTime **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType2; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3318}; + +### C.3.3.19 meanTCHQueueLength + +meanTCHQueueLength **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType2; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3319}; + +### C.3.3.20 nbrOfLostRadioLinksTCH + +nbrOfLostRadioLinksTCH **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3320}; + +### C.3.3.21 nbrOfAvailableSDCCHs + +nbrOfAvailableSDCCHs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3321}; + +### C.3.3.22 meanNbrOfBusySDCCHs + +meanNbrOfBusySDCCHs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType2; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3322}; + +### C.3.3.23 maxNbrOfBusySDCCHs + +maxNbrOfBusySDCCHs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3323}; + +### C.3.3.24 attSDCCHSeizuresMeetingSDCCHBlockedState + +attSDCCHSeizuresMeetingSDCCHBlockedState **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3324}; + +### C.3.3.25 allAvailableSDCCHAllocatedTime + +allAvailableSDCCHAllocatedTime **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType2; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3325}; + +### C.3.3.26 meanSDCCHQueueLength + +meanSDCCHQueueLength **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType2; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3326}; + +### C.3.3.27 nbrOfLostRadioLinksSDCCH + +nbrOfLostRadioLinksSDCCH **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3327}; + +### C.3.3.28 relativeTimeDLPowerControlAtMax + +relativeTimeDLPowerControlAtMax **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType2; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3328}; + +### C.3.3.29 relativeTimeULPowerControlAtMax + +relativeTimeULPowerControlAtMax **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType2; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3329}; + +### C.3.3.30 succInternalHDOsIntraCell + +succInternalHDOsIntraCell **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3330}; + +### C.3.3.31 unsuccInternalHDOsIntraCell + +unsuccInternalHDOsIntraCell **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3331}; + +### C.3.3.32 attIncomingInternalInterCellHDOs + +attIncomingInternalInterCellHDOs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3332}; + +### C.3.3.33 succIncomingInternalInterCellHDOs + +succIncomingInternalInterCellHDOs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3333}; + +### C.3.3.34 attOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOs + +attOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3334}; + +### C.3.3.35 succOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOs + +succOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3335}; + +### C.3.3.36 unsuccHDOsWithReconnection + +unsuccHDOsWithReconnection **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3336}; + +### C.3.3.37 unsuccHDOsWithLossOfConnection + +unsuccHDOsWithLossOfConnection **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3337}; + +### C.3.3.38 availablePDCH + +availablePDCH **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3338}; + +### C.3.3.39 meanNbrAvailablePDCH + +meanNbrAvailablePDCH **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3339}; + +### C.3.3.40 maxNbrAvailablePDCH + +maxNbrAvailablePDCH **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3340}; + +### C.3.3.41 minNbrAvailablePDCH + +minNbrAvailablePDCH **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; + +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3341}; + +### C.3.3.42 meanNbrOfOccPDCH + +meanNbrOfOccPDCH **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3342}; + +### C.3.3.43 maxNbrOfOccPDCH + +maxNbrOfOccPDCH **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3343}; + +### C.3.3.44 minNbrOfOccPDCH + +minNbrOfOccPDCH **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3344}; + +### C.3.3.45 availablePDCHAllocatedTime + +availablePDCHAllocatedTime **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3345}; + +### C.3.3.46 nbrPacketPagingMessagesPCHOnPCCCH + +nbrPacketPagingMessagesPCHOnPCCCH **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3346}; + +### C.3.3.47 meanPPCHPAGCHQueueLengthOnPCCCH + +meanPPCHPAGCHQueueLengthOnPCCCH **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3347}; + +### C.3.3.48 nbrOfPSPagesDiscardedFromPPCHQueueOnPCCCH + +nbrOfPSPagesDiscardedFromPPCHQueueOnPCCCH **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3348}; + +### C.3.3.49 attPCReqAssPerCause + +attPCReqAssPerCause **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3349}; + +### C.3.3.50 succPDTCHAssProcsPerCause + +succPDTCHAssProcsPerCause **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3350}; + +### C.3.3.51 succPDTCHSeizures + +succPDTCHSeizures **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3351}; + +### C.3.3.52 meanPacketQueueLength + +meanPacketQueueLength **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3352}; + +### C.3.3.53 nbrOfServiceChanges + +nbrOfServiceChanges **ATTRIBUTE** + +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; + +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS {gsm1204attribute 3353};** + +## C.3.4 internal HDO Measurement Function Related Attributes + +### C.3.4.1 attIncomingInternalInterCellHDOsPerOriginatingCell + +attIncomingInternalInterCellHDOsPerOriginatingCell **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 341}; + +### C.3.4.2 succIncomingInternalInterCellHDOsPerOriginatingCell + +succIncomingInternalInterCellHDOsPerOriginatingCell **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 342}; + +### C.3.4.3 attOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOsPerTargetCell + +attOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOsPerTargetCell **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 343}; + +### C.3.4.4 succOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOsPerTargetCell + +succOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOsPerTargetCell **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 344}; + +## C.3.5 MSC Measurement Function Related Attributes + +### C.3.5.1 nbrOfClassMarkUpdates + +nbrOfClassMarkUpdates **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 351}; + +### C.3.5.2 attMobileOriginatingCalls + +attMobileOriginatingCalls **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 352}; + +### C.3.5.3 succMobileOriginatingCalls + +succMobileOriginatingCalls **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 353}; + +### C.3.5.4 ansMobileOriginatingCalls + +ansMobileOriginatingCalls **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 354}; + +### C.3.5.5 attMobileTerminatingCalls + +attMobileTerminatingCalls **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 355}; + +### C.3.5.6 succMobileTerminatingCalls + +succMobileTerminatingCalls **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 356}; + +### C.3.5.7 ansMobileTerminatingCalls + +ansMobileTerminatingCalls **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 357}; + +### C.3.5.8 attMobileEmergencyCalls + +attMobileEmergencyCalls **ATTRIBUTE** + +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 358}; + +### C.3.5.9 succMobileEmergencyCalls + +succMobileEmergencyCalls **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 359}; + +### C.3.5.10 ansMobileEmergencyCalls + +ansMobileEmergencyCalls **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3510}; + +### C.3.5.11 attCipheringModeControlProcs + +attCipheringModeControlProcs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3511}; + +### C.3.5.12 succCipheringModeControlProcs + +succCipheringModeControlProcs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3512}; + +### C.3.5.13 attInterrogationOfHLRsForRouting + +attInterrogationOfHLRsForRouting **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3513}; + +### C.3.5.14 succInterrogationOfHLRsMSRNObtained + +succInterrogationOfHLRsMSRNObtained **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3514}; + +### C.3.5.15 succInterrogationOfHLRsCallForwarding + +succInterrogationOfHLRsCallForwarding **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3515}; + +### C.3.5.16 attOpForMobileOriginatingPointToPointSMs + +attOpForMobileOriginatingPointToPointSMs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3516}; + +### C.3.5.17 succOpForMobileOriginatingPointToPointSMs + +succOpForMobileOriginatingPointToPointSMs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3517}; + +### C.3.5.18 attOpForMobileTerminatingPointToPointSMs + +attOpForMobileTerminatingPointToPointSMs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3518}; + +### C.3.5.19 succOpForMobileTerminatingPointToPointSMs + +succOpForMobileTerminatingPointToPointSMs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3519}; + +### C.3.5.20 nbrOfTransCheckIMEIRequests + +nbrOfTransCheckIMEIRequests **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3520}; + +### C.3.5.21 nbrOfWhiteAnsInMSC + +nbrOfWhiteAnsInMSC **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3521}; + +### C.3.5.22 nbrOfGreyAnsInMSC + +nbrOfGreyAnsInMSC **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3522}; + +### C.3.5.23 nbrOfBlackAnsInMSC + +nbrOfBlackAnsInMSC **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3523}; + +### C.3.5.24 nbrOfUnknownIMEIAnsInMSC + +nbrOfUnknownIMEIAnsInMSC **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3524}; + +### C.3.5.25 meanTimeToCallSetupService + +meanTimeToCallSetupService **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType2; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3525}; + +### C.3.5.26 meanTimeToLocationUpdateService + +meanTimeToLocationUpdateService **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType2; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3526}; + +### C.3.5.27 transSubIdentifiedWithTMSI + +transSubIdentifiedWithTMSI **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3527}; + +### C.3.5.28 transSubIdentifiedWithIMSI + +transSubIdentifiedWithIMSI **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3528}; + +### C.3.5.29 attTMSIReallocations + +attTMSIReallocations **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3529}; + +### C.3.5.30 succTMSIReallocations + +succTMSIReallocations **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3530}; + +### C.3.5.31 imsiDetachProcs + +imsiDetachProcs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3531}; + +### C.3.5.32 imsiAttachProcs + +imsiAttachProcs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3532}; + +### C.3.5.33 attIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOs + +attIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3533}; + +### C.3.5.34 succIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOs + +succIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3534}; + +### C.3.5.35 attOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOs + +attOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3535}; + +### C.3.5.36 succOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOs + +succOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3536}; + +### C.3.5.37 attIncomingInterMSCHDOs + +attIncomingInterMSCHDOs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; + +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3537}; + +### C.3.5.38 succIncomingInterMSCHDOs + +succIncomingInterMSCHDOs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3538}; + +### C.3.5.39 attOutgoingInterMSCHDOs + +attOutgoingInterMSCHDOs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3539}; + +### C.3.5.40 succOutgoingInterMSCHDOs + +succOutgoingInterMSCHDOs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3540}; + +### C.3.5.41 attSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCa + +attSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCa **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3541}; + +### C.3.5.42 succSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCa + +succSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCa **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3542}; + +### C.3.5.43 attSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCc + +attSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCc **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3543}; + +#### C.3.5.44 succSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCc + +succSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCc **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3544}; + +#### C.3.5.45 externalHDOs + +externalHDOs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3545}; + +#### C.3.5.46 externalHDOsPerCause + +externalHDOsPerCause **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType3; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3546}; + +#### C.3.5.47 unsuccExternHDOsWithReconnectionPerMSC + +unsuccExternHDOsWithReconnectionPerMSC **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3547}; + +#### C.3.5.48 unsuccExternHDOsWithLossOfConnectionPerMSC + +unsuccExternHDOsWithLossOfConnectionPerMSC **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3548}; + +## C.3.6 external HDO Measurement Function Related Attributes + +### C.3.6.1 attIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell + +attIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 361}; + +### C.3.6.2 succIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell + +succIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 362}; + +### C.3.6.3 attOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerTargetCell + +attOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerTargetCell **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 363}; + +### C.3.6.4 succOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerTargetCell + +succOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerTargetCell **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 364}; + +### C.3.6.5 attIncomingInterMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell + +attIncomingInterMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 365}; + +### C.3.6.6 succIncomingInterMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell + +succIncomingInterMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 366}; + +### C.3.6.7 attOutgoingInterMSCHDOsPerTargetCell + +attOutgoingInterMSCHDOsPerTargetCell **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 367}; + +### C.3.6.8 succOutgoingInterMSCHDOsPerTargetCell + +succOutgoingInterMSCHDOsPerTargetCell **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 368}; + +## C.3.7 HLR Measurement Function Related Attributes + +### C.3.7.1 nbrOfCurrentMSsRoamingOutsideHPLMN + +nbrOfCurrentMSsRoamingOutsideHPLMN **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 371}; + +### C.3.7.2 attReqForAuthSetsReceivedByHLRFromVLRs + +attReqForAuthSetsReceivedByHLRFromVLRs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 372}; + +### C.3.7.3 succReturnedAuthSetsFromHLRToVLRs + +succReturnedAuthSetsFromHLRToVLRs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 373}; + +### C.3.7.4 emptyResponsesForAuthSetsFromHLRToVLRs + +emptyResponsesForAuthSetsFromHLRToVLRs **ATTRIBUTE** + +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; + +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 374};**C.3.7.5 attInsertSubDataService**attInsertSubDataService **ATTRIBUTE****WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; + +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 375};**C.3.7.6 succInsertSubDataService**succInsertSubDataService **ATTRIBUTE****WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; + +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 376};**C.3.7.7 attLocationUpdate**attLocationUpdate **ATTRIBUTE****WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; + +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 377};**C.3.7.8 succLocationUpdate**succLocationUpdate **ATTRIBUTE****WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; + +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 378};**C.3.7.9 attSSRelatedOperationsInHLR**attSSRelatedOperationsInHLR **ATTRIBUTE****WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType5; + +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 379};**C.3.7.10 succSSRelatedOperationsInHLR**succSSRelatedOperationsInHLR **ATTRIBUTE** + +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType5; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3710}; + +### C.3.7.11 attReqForSMRoutingInfo + +attReqForSMRoutingInfo **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3711}; + +### C.3.7.12 succReqForSMRoutingInfo + +succReqForSMRoutingInfo **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3712}; + +### C.3.7.13 attSMDeliveryStatusReportProcs + +attSMDeliveryStatusReportProcs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3713}; + +### C.3.7.14 succSMDeliveryStatusReportProcs + +succSMDeliveryStatusReportProcs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3714}; + +### C.3.7.15 attNbrOfSendAlerts + +attNbrOfSendAlerts **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3715}; + +### C.3.7.16 succNbrOfSendAlerts + +succNbrOfSendAlerts **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3716}; + +### C.3.7.17 attReqForMSRN + +attReqForMSRN **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3717}; + +### C.3.7.18 succReqForMSRN + +succReqForMSRN **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3718}; + +## C.3.8 VLR Measurement Function Related Attributes + +### C.3.8.1 attMSMemoryAvailableNotifications + +attMSMemoryAvailableNotifications **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 381}; + +### C.3.8.2 succMSMemoryAvailableNotifications + +succMSMemoryAvailableNotifications **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 382}; + +### C.3.8.3 attIdentificationReqToPVLRs + +attIdentificationReqToPVLRs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 383}; + +#### C.3.8.4 succIdentificationReqToPVLRs + +succIdentificationReqToPVLRs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 384}; + +#### C.3.8.5 attPageReqs + +attPageReqs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 385}; + +#### C.3.8.6 succPageReqs + +succPageReqs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 386}; + +#### C.3.8.7 attPageReqsPerLocationArea + +attPageReqsPerLocationArea **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType6; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 387}; + +#### C.3.8.8 succPageReqsPerLocationArea + +succPageReqsPerLocationArea **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType6; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 388}; + +#### C.3.8.9 attReqForAuthSetsSentToHLR + +attReqForAuthSetsSentToHLR **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; + +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 389}; + +### C.3.8.10 succReceivedAuthSetsFromHLR + +succReceivedAuthSetsFromHLR **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3810}; + +### C.3.8.11 emptyResponsesForAuthFromHLR + +emptyResponsesForAuthFromHLR **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3811}; + +### C.3.8.12 attAuthProcsInVLR + +attAuthProcsInVLR **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3812}; + +### C.3.8.13 succAuthProcsInVLR + +succAuthProcsInVLR **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3813}; + +### C.3.8.14 attIntraVLRLocationUpdates + +attIntraVLRLocationUpdates **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3814}; + +### C.3.8.15 succIntraVLRLocationUpdates + +succIntraVLRLocationUpdates **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3815}; + +### C.3.8.16 attInterVLRLocationUpdates + +attInterVLRLocationUpdates **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3816}; + +### C.3.8.17 succInterVLRLocationUpdates + +succInterVLRLocationUpdates **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3817}; + +### C.3.8.18 arrivalOfVisitorsFromOtherPLMNs + +arrivalOfVisitorsFromOtherPLMNs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3818}; + +## C.3.9 EIR Measurement Function Related Attributes + +### C.3.9.1 nbrOfReceivedIMEICheckReqs + +nbrOfReceivedIMEICheckReqs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 391}; + +### C.3.9.2 nbrOfWhiteAnsInEIR + +nbrOfWhiteAnsInEIR **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 392}; + +### C.3.9.3 nbrOfGreyAnsInEIR + +nbrOfGreyAnsInEIR **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 393}; + +### C.3.9.4 nbrOfBlackAnsInEIR + +nbrOfBlackAnsInEIR **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 394}; + +### C.3.9.5 nbrOfUnknownIMEIAnsInEIR + +nbrOfUnknownIMEIAnsInEIR **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 395}; + +## C.3.10 SMS Measurement Function Related Attributes + +### C.3.10.1 attMobileOriginatingSMForwardings + +attMobileOriginatingSMForwardings **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3101}; + +### C.3.10.2 succMobileOriginatingSMForwardings + +succMobileOriginatingSMForwardings **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3102}; + +### C.3.10.3 attMobileTerminatingSMForwardings + +attMobileTerminatingSMForwardings **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3103}; + +### C.3.10.4 succMobileTerminatingSMForwardings + +succMobileTerminatingSMForwardings **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3104}; + +### C.3.10.5 attMobileTerminatingSMForwardingsSgsn + +attMobileTerminatingSMForwardingsSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3104}; + +### C.3.10.6 succMobileTerminatingSMForwardingsSgsn + +succMobileTerminatingSMForwardingsSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3106}; + +## C.3.11 SGSN Measurement Function Related Attributes + +### C.3.11.1 nbrLlcFramesSent + +nbrLlcFramesSent **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3111}; + +### C.3.11.2 nbrLlcFramesReceived + +nbrLlcFramesReceived **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3112}; + +### C.3.11.3 errLlcFramesDetectedBySgsn + +errLlcFramesDetectedBySgsn **ATTRIBUTE** + +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; + +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3113};**C.3.11.4 retransmittedLlcFramestoMs**retransmittedLlcFramestoMs **ATTRIBUTE****WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; + +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3114};**C.3.11.5 uplinkSndcpNpduReceived**uplinkSndcpNpduReceived **ATTRIBUTE****WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; + +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3115};**C.3.11.6 uplinkSndcpOctetReceivedMode**uplinkSndcpOctetReceivedMode **ATTRIBUTE****WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; + +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3116};**C.3.11.7 downlinkSndcpNpdusent**downlinkSndcpNpdusent **ATTRIBUTE****WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; + +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3117};**C.3.11.8 downlinkSndcpOctetSent**downlinkSndcpOctetSent **ATTRIBUTE****WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; + +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3118}; + +### C.3.11.9 attGprsAttach + +attGprsAttach **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3119}; + +### C.3.11.10 succGprsAttach + +succGprsAttach **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31110}; + +### C.3.11.11 attCombiAttach + +attCombiAttach **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31111}; + +### C.3.11.12 succCombiAttach + +succCombiAttach **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31112}; + +### C.3.11.13 attImsiAttach + +attImsiAttach **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31113}; + +### C.3.11.14 succImsiAttach + +succImsiAttach **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31114}; + +### C.3.11.15 nbrOfAttachedSub + +nbrOfAttachedSub **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31115}; + +### C.3.11.16 meanNbrOfAttachedSub + +meanNbrOfAttachedSub **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31116}; + +### C.3.11.17 maxNbrOfAttachedSub + +maxNbrOfAttachedSub **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31117}; + +### C.3.11.18 attGprsDetachMs + +attGprsDetachMs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31118}; + +### C.3.11.19 attCombiDetachMs + +attCombiDetachMs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31119}; + +### C.3.11.20 attImsiDetachMs + +attImsiDetachMs **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31120}; + +### C.3.11.21 attGprsdetachSgsn + +attGprsdetachSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31121}; + +### C.3.11.22 succGprsdetachSgsn + +succGprsdetachSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31122}; + +### C.3.11.23 attIntraSgsnRaUpdate + +attIntraSgsnRaUpdate **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31123}; + +### C.3.11.24 succIntraSgsnRaUpdate + +succIntraSgsnRaUpdate **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31124}; + +### C.3.11.25 attInterSgsnRaUpdate + +attInterSgsnRaUpdate **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31125}; + +### C.3.11.26 succInterSgsnRaUpdate + +succInterSgsnRaUpdate **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31126}; + +#### C.3.11.27 attPTMSIRealloc + +attPTMSIRealloc **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31127}; + +#### C.3.11.28 succPTMSIrealloc + +succPTMSIrealloc **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31128}; + +#### C.3.11.29 attreqAuthSetsSentToHlrBySgsn + +attreqAuthSetsSentToHlrBySgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31129}; + +#### C.3.11.30 succReqAuthSetsHlr + +SuccReqAuthSetsHlr **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31130}; + +#### C.3.11.31 emptyResponsesForAuthSetsFromHlr + +emptyResponsesForAuthSetsFromHlr **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31131}; + +#### C.3.11.32 attAuthInSgsn + +attAuthInSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; + +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31132}; + +### C.3.11.33 succAuthInSgsn + +succAuthInSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31133}; + +### C.3.11.34 attIdentityReq + +attIdentityReq **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31134}; + +### C.3.11.35 succIdentityReq + +succIdentityReq **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31135}; + +### C.3.11.36 attCipheringModeControlPerSgsn + +attCipheringModeControlPerSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31136}; + +### C.3.11.37 succCipheringModeControlPerSgsn + +succCipheringModeControlPerSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31138}; + +### C.3.11.38 nbrOfSubStandby + +nbrOfSubStandby **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** + +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31138}; + +### C.3.11.39 meanNbrOfSubStandby + +meanNbrOfSubStandby **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31139}; + +### C.3.11.40 maxNbrOfSubStandby + +maxNbrOfSubStandby **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31140}; + +### C.3.11.41 nbrOfSubReady + +nbrOfSubReady **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31141}; + +### C.3.11.42 meanNbrOfSubReady + +meanNbrOfSubReady **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31142}; + +### C.3.11.43 maxNbrOfSubReady + +maxNbrOfSubReady **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31143}; + +### C.3.11.44 nbrOfCheckIMEIRequests + +nbrOfCheckIMEIRequests **ATTRIBUTE** + +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31144}; + +### C.3.11.45 nbrOfWhiteAnswerInSgsn + +nbrOfWhiteAnswerInSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31145}; + +### C.3.11.46 nbrOfGreyAnswerInSgsn + +nbrOfGreyAnswerInSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31146}; + +### C.3.11.47 nbrOfBlackAnswerInSgsn + +nbrOfBlackAnswerInSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31147}; + +### C.3.11.48 nbrOfUnknownAnswerInSgsn + +nbrOfUnknownAnswerInSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31148}; + +### C.3.11.49 attPacketSwitchedPaging + +attPacketSwitchedPaging **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31149}; + +### C.3.11.50 unsuccPacketSwitchedPaging + +unsuccPacketSwitchedPaging **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31150}; + +### C.3.11.51 attPsPagingPerRoutingArea + +attPsPagingPerRoutingArea **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType7; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31151}; + +### C.3.11.52 unsuccPsPagingPerRoutingArea + +unsuccPsPagingPerRoutingArea **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType7; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31152}; + +### C.3.11.53 attActPdpContextMSPerSgsn + +attActPdpContextMSPerSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31153}; + +### C.3.11.54 succActPdpContextMSPerSgsn + +succActPdpContextMSPerSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31154}; + +### C.3.11.55 attActPdpContextDynMSPerSgsn + +attActPdpContextDynMSPerSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31155}; + +### C.3.11.56 succActPdpContextDynMSPerSgsn + +succActPdpContextDynMSPerSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31156}; + +### C.3.11.57 attDeactPdpContextMsPerSgsn + +attDeactPdpContextMsPerSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31157}; + +### C.3.11.58 succDeactPdpContextMsPerSgsn + +succDeactPdpContextMsPerSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31158}; + +### C.3.11.59 attDeactPdpContextGgsnPerSgsn + +attDeactPdpContextGgsnPerSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31159}; + +### C.3.11.60 succDeactPdpContextGgsnPerSgsn + +succDeactPdpContextGgsnPerSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31160}; + +### C.3.11.61 nbrSubsWithActivePdpInSgsn + +nbrSubsWithActivePdpInSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31161}; + +### C.3.11.62 meanSubsWithActivePdplnSgsn + +meanSubsWithActivePdplnSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31162}; + +### C.3.11.63 nmaxSubsWithActivePdplnSgsn + +nmaxSubsWithActivePdplnSgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 31163}; + +## C.3.12 GGSN Measurement Function Related Attributes + +### C.3.12.1 attActPdpContextPerApnOfGgsn + +attActPdpContextPerApnOfGgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType8; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3121}; + +### C.3.12.2 succActPdpContextPerApnOfGgsn + +succActPdpContextPerApnOfGgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType8; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3122}; + +### C.3.12.3 attActPdpContextDnyPerApnOfGgsn + +attActPdpContextDnyPerApnOfGgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType8; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3123}; + +### C.3.12.4 succActPdpContextDnyPerApnOfGgsn + +succActPdpContextDnyPerApnOfGgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType8; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3124}; + +### C.3.12.5 attDeactPdpContextMsPerApnOfGgsn + +attDeactPdpContextMsPerApnOfGgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType8; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3125}; + +### C.3.12.6 succDeactPdpContextMsPerApnOfGgsn + +succDeactPdpContextMsPerApnOfGgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType8; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3126}; + +### C.3.12.7 attDeactPdpContextByGgsnPerApn + +attDeactPdpContextByGgsnPerApn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType8; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3127}; + +### C.3.12.8 succDeactPdpContextByGgsnMsPerApn + +succDeactPdpContextByGgsnMsPerApn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType8; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3128}; + +### C.3.12.9 nbrOfActivePdpContextsPerApnAtGgsn + +nbrOfActivePdpContextsPerApnAtGgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType1; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204attribute 3129}; + +### C.3.12.10 meanNbrOfActivePdpContextsPerApnAtGgsn + +meanNbrOfActivePdpContextsPerApnAtGgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType8; +**BEHAVIOUR** + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS {gsm1204attribute 31210};** + +### C.3.12.11 maxNbrOfActivePdpContextsPerApnAtGgsn + +maxNbrOfActivePdpContextsPerApnAtGgsn **ATTRIBUTE** +**WITH ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX** +GSM1204TypeModule.GSMMeasurementType8; +**BEHAVIOUR** +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour; +**REGISTERED AS {gsm1204attribute 31211};** + +## C.4 Name Bindings + +### C.4.1 BSS Name Binding + +#### C.4.1.1 simpleScanner-bssFunction + +simpleScanner-bssFunction **NAME BINDING** +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** "Recommendation X.738: 1993": simpleScanner; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1200: 1993": bssFunction; +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** scannerId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 411}; + +### C.4.2 BSC Name Binding + +#### C.4.2.1 bscMeasurementFunction-bsc + +bscMeasurementFunction-bsc **NAME BINDING** +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** bscMeasurementFunction; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1220: 1993": bsc; +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** measurementFunctionId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 421}; + +### C.4.3 BTS Name Binding + +#### C.4.3.1 cellMeasurementFunction-bts + +cellMeasurementFunction-bts **NAME BINDING** +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** cellMeasurementFunction; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1220: 1993": bts; +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** measurementFunctionId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 431}; + +#### C.4.3.2 internalHdoMeasurementFunction-bts + +internalHdoMeasurementFunction-bts **NAME BINDING** +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** internalHdoMeasurementFunction; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1220: 1993": bts; +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** measurementFunctionId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 432}; + +## C.4.4 MSC Name Binding + +### C.4.4.1 mscMeasurementFunction-mscFunction + +mscMeasurementFunction-mscFunction **NAME BINDING** +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** mscMeasurementFunction; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1200: 1993": mscFunction; +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** measurementFunctionId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 441}; + +### C.4.4.2 externalHdoMeasurementFunction-mscFunction + +externalHdoMeasurementFunction-mscFunction **NAME BINDING** +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** externalHdoMeasurementFunction; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1200: 1993": mscFunction; +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** measurementFunctionId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 442}; + +### C.4.4.3 simpleScanner-mscFunction + +simpleScanner mscFunction-**NAME BINDING** +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** "Recommendation X.738: 1993": simpleScanner; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1200: 1993": mscFunction; +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** scannerId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 443}; + +## C.4.5 HLR Name Binding + +### C.4.5.1 hlrMeasurementFunction-hlrFunction + +hlrMeasurementFunction-hlrFunction **NAME BINDING** +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** hlrMeasurementFunction; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1200: 1993": hlrFunction; +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** measurementFunctionId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 451}; + +### C.4.5.2 simpleScanner-hlrFunction + +simpleScanner-hlrFunction **NAME BINDING** +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** "Recommendation X.738: 1993": simpleScanner; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1200: 1993": hlrFunction; + +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** scannerId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 452}; + +## C.4.6 VLR Name Binding + +### C.4.6.1 vlrMeasurementFunction-vlrFunction + +vlrMeasurementFunction-vlrFunction **NAME BINDING** +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** vlrMeasurementFunction; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1200: 1993": vlrFunction; +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** measurementFunctionId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 461}; + +### C.4.6.2 simpleScanner-vlrFunction + +simpleScanner-vlrFunction **NAME BINDING** +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** "Recommendation X.738: 1993": simpleScanner; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1200: 1993": vlrFunction; +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** scannerId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 462}; + +## C.4.7 EIR Name Binding + +### C.4.7.1 eirMeasurementFunction-eirFunction + +eirMeasurementFunction-eirFunction **NAME BINDING** + +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** eirMeasurementFunction; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1200: 1993": eirFunction; +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** measurementFunctionId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 471}; + +### C.4.7.2 simpleScanner-eirFunction + +simpleScanner-eirFunction **NAME BINDING** +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** "Recommendation X.738: 1993": simpleScanner; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1200: 1993": eirFunction; +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** scannerId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 472}; + +## C.4.8 SMS Name Binding + +### C.4.8.1 smsMeasurementFunction-smsGIWFunction + +smsMeasurementFunction-smsGIWFunction **NAME BINDING** +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** smsMeasurementFunction; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1200: 1993": smsGIWFunction; +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** measurementFunctionId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 481}; + +### C.4.8.2 simpleScanner-smsGIWFunction + +simpleScanner-smsGIWFunction **NAME BINDING** +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** "Recommendation X.738: 1993": simpleScanner; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1200: 1993": smsGIWFunction; +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** scannerId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 482}; + +## C.4.9 SGSN Name Binding + +Enter sgsn Name binding to network element function + +### C.4.9.1 sgsnMeasurementFunction-sgsnFunction + +sgsnMeasurementFunction-sgsnFunction **NAME BINDING** +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** sgsnMeasurementFunction; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1200: 1993": sgsnFunction; +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** measurementFunctionId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 491}; + +### C.4.9.2 simpleScanner-sgsnFunction + +simpleScanner-sgsnFunction **NAME BINDING** +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** "Recommendation X.738: 1993": simpleScanner; +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "gsm1200: 1993": sgsnFunction; +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** scannerId; +**CREATE;** +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** {gsm1204nameBinding 492}; + +## C.4.10 GGSN Name Binding + +Enter ggsn Name binding to network element function + +### C.4.10.1 ggsnMeasurementFunction-vlrFunction + +``` +ggsnMeasurementFunction-ggsnFunction NAME BINDING + SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS ggsnMeasurementFunction; + NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS "gsm1200: 1993": vlrFunction; + WITH ATTRIBUTE measurementFunctionId; + CREATE; + DELETE; + + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204nameBinding 4101}; +``` + +### C.4.10.2 simpleScanner-ggsnFunction + +``` +simpleScanner-ggsnFunction NAME BINDING + SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS "Recommendation X.738: 1993": simpleScanner; + NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS "gsm1200: 1993": ggsnFunction; + WITH ATTRIBUTE scannerId; + CREATE; + DELETE; + + REGISTERED AS {gsm1204nameBinding 4102}; +``` + +## C.5 Behaviour Definitions + +### C.5.1 simple scanner behaviour + +The behaviour of the simple scanner is defined in [ISO 10164-13] clause 8.1.1.3. + +### C.5.2 general measurement function behaviour + +generalMeasurementFunctionBehaviour **BEHAVIOUR** + +**DEFINED AS** + +"This object is defined to contain the various optional measurement packages, and one or more instances of this class may exist in the scope of the containing object. The scanner may scan the attributes of the object class in various combinations and permutations of packages, and further may scan simultaneously as many times as necessary within the processing limits of the network." + +; + +### C.5.3 general measurement package behaviour + +generalMeasurementPackageBehaviour **BEHAVIOUR** + +**DEFINED AS** + +"Measurement packages are present in the Measurement Function Object (e.g. BSC Measurement Function), if the Network Element Function (e.g. BSC) containing the Measurement Function Object supports the required number of instances of the measurement included in the package according to the number of instances of the Measurement Function. The simple scanner has been designed to read the values of the attributes according to a given schedule." + +; + +### C.5.4 general measurement attribute behaviour + +generalMeasurementAttributeBehaviour **BEHAVIOUR** + +**DEFINED AS** + +"The measurement that corresponds to this attribute, is described in annex B. The name of this attribute is given in the description part (D) of each measurement definition contained in annex B." + +NOTE: To enable this attribute to be easily located, an index of these attributes is listed at the end of the present document. + +; + +## C.6 Abstract syntax definitions + +This clause contains the ASN.1 module defining the attribute, Action and notification syntax's referenced by the attribute, Action and notification templates. + +``` + +GSM1204TypeModule{ + ITU-T (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0) + gsm-Operation-Maintenance (3) + gsm-12-04 (4) informationModel (0) asn1Module (2) + asn1TypeModule (0) } + +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + +BEGIN + + IMPORTS + gsm-12-04 + FROM GSM-DomainDefinitions{ + ITU-T (0) identified-organisation (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0) + gsm-Operation-Maintenance (3) gsm-12-30 (30) informationModel (0) + asn1Module (2) gsm-OM-DomainDefinitions (0) version1 (1) + } + ; + + -- Object Identifiers. + + -- Abstract Syntax + + gsm1204abstractSyntax OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {gsm-12-04 protocolSupport (1) abstractSyntax (1)} + -- + + -- Information Model Related Identifiers + gsm1204informationModel OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {gsm-12-04 informationModel (0)} + gsm1204managedObjectClass OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {gsm1204informationModel managedObjectClass (3)} + gsm1204package OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {gsm1204informationModel package (4)} + gsm1204nameBinding OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {gsm1204informationModel nameBinding (6)} + gsm1204attribute OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {gsm1204informationModel attribute (7)} + + -- Application Contexts + gsm1204ApplicationContext OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {gsm-12-04 protocolSupport (1) applicationContext + (0) gsm-Management (0)} + + -- The following measurement types are defined. + + GSMMeasurementType1 ::= INTEGER + GSMMeasurementType2 ::= REAL + + GSMMeasurementType3 ::= SET OF SEQUENCE{ + cause Cause, + value INTEGER } + + Cause ::= INTEGER{ + + -- CM_SERVICE REJECT causes (GSM 04.08 [2]): + + imsiUnknownInHlr ( 1), + illegalMs ( 2), + imsiUnknownInVlr ( 3), + imeiNotAccepted ( 4), + illegalMe ( 5), + plmnNotAllowed ( 6), + locationAreaNotAllowed ( 7), + nationalRoamingNotAllowedInLocationArea ( 8), + networkFailure ( 9), + congestion (10), + serviceOptionNotSupported (11), + requestedServiceOptionNotSubscribed (12), + serviceOptionTemporarilyOutOfOrder (13), + callCannotBeIdentified (14), + semanticallyIncorrectMessage (15), + invalidMandatoryInformation (16), + messageTypeNonExistentOrNotImplemented (17), + messageTypeNotCompatibleWithProtocolState (18), + informationElementNonExistentOrNotImplemented (19), + conditionalError (20), + messageNotCompatibleWithProtocolState (21), + } + +``` + +``` + protocolError (22), + reservedRejectCause (23), + +-- Internal and external Handover causes (GSM 08.08 [5]): + + uplinkQuality (24), + uplinkStrength (25), + downlinkQuality (26), + downlinkStrenght (27), + distance (28), + betterCell (29), + operationAndMaintenanceIntervention (30), + directedRetry (31), + -- valid for external handovers only: + responseToMscInvocation (32), + +-- Immediate assignment procedure causes (GSM 04.08 [2]): + + emergencyCall (33), + callReEstablishment (34), + answerToPaging (35), + originatingCall (36), + locationUpdating (37), + otherProcedures (38), + reservedEstablishmentCause (39) } + +-- Interference band definitions (GSM 04.08 [2]): + +GSMMeasurementType4 ::= SEQUENCE{ + channelsPerInterferenceBand1 REAL, + channelsPerInterferenceBand2 REAL, + channelsPerInterferenceBand3 REAL, + channelsPerInterferenceBand4 REAL, + channelsPerInterferenceBand5 REAL } + +GSMMeasurementType5 ::= SET OF SEQUENCE{ + ssOperation SSOperation, + value INTEGER +} + +-- SS operation definitions(GSM 09.02 [7]): + + SSOperation ::= INTEGER{ + register (0), + erase (1), + activate (2), + deactivate (3), + registerPassword (4), + interrogateSSOperation (5), + processRequest (6) } + +GSMMeasurementType6 ::= SET OF SEQUENCE{ + locationAreaCode LAC, + value INTEGER } + +LAC ::= INTEGER (0..65535) +GSMMeasurementFunctionId ::= INTEGER + +GSMCellName ::= SEQUENCE{ + cellId INTEGER(0..65535), + locatioAreaCode LAC } + +GSMMeasurementType7 ::= SET OF SEQUENCE{ + routingAreaCode RAC, + value INTEGER } + +RAC ::= INTEGER (0..255) + +GSMMeasurementType8 ::= SET OF SEQUENCE{ + AccessPoint NameLogicalLinkID APNID, + value INTEGER } + +APNID ::= INTEGER (0..65535) +``` + +NOTE: The APN Logical Link ID, is a numeric value for the assigned to each APN link in the GGSN. The ID is only unique when presented together with the GGSN address. + +END + +--- + +## Annex D (normative): Data Transfer Requirements + +This annex defines the data transfer requirements from the NE to the OS for the present document. The present document makes use of the generic approach to EFD, Log and File transfer facility as defined in GSM 12.00 [8]. + +--- + +### D.1 Data Transfer Requirements + +#### D.1.1 General + +The GSM 12.04 defines how statistical information concerning various aspects of the NE's can be collected. Once this data is collected and available in the NE, it shall be possible to transfer it to the OS. The way in which this can be achieved is described in GSM 12.00 [8]. + +GSM 12.00 [8] describes the generic solutions to data transfer requirements which are used by GSM 12.04. This annex describes the additional information required to fully satisfy the data transfer requirements of GSM 12.04, containment of which is described in annex C. + +Of the data transfer functions described in GSM 12.00 [8], GSM 12.04 requires the upload function, i.e. OS controlled data transfer from NE to OS. + +--- + +### D.2 Object Model + +#### D.2.1 Managed Object Classes + +##### D.2.1.1 "Recommendation X.721: 1992": log + +Object instances of this class are used to store incoming event reports. An instance of this class can be created to store specifically scan report notifications (in form of "scanReportRecords" managed objects). This is achieved by using the discriminator construct and filtering on the event type information. + +##### D.2.1.2 "Recommendation X.738: 1993": scanReportRecord + +Objects of this class are used to represent logged information that resulted from Attribute Value Change Notifications and are contained in a 'log' instance. + +#### D.2.2 Name Bindings + +##### D.2.2.1 log-managedElement + +log-managedElement NAME BINDING + +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** "Recommendation X.721: 1992": log; + +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "Recommendation M.3100: 1992": managedElement; + +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** "Recommendation X.721: 1992": logId; + +**CREATE;** + +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** { gsm1204NameBinding 221 }; + +##### D.2.2.2 scanReportRecord-log + +scanReportRecord-log NAME BINDING + +**SUBORDINATE OBJECT CLASS** "Recommendation X.738: 1993": scanReportRecord; + +**NAMED BY SUPERIOR OBJECT CLASS** "Recommendation X.721: 1992": log; + +**WITH ATTRIBUTE** "Recommendation X.721: 1992": logRecordId; + +**DELETE;** + +**REGISTERED AS** { gsm1204NameBinding 222 }; + +--- + +## Annex E (informative): Non Standardised Measurements of Interest to PLMN Management + +Following is the template used to describe the measurements contained in this annex. + +A. Description + +- A short explanation of the measurement operation. + +B. Collection Method + +- The form in which this measurement data is obtained: + - **CC** (Cumulative Counter). + - **GAUGE** (dynamic variable), used when data being measured can vary up or down during the period of measurement. + - **DER** (Discrete Event Registration), when data related to a particular event are captured every nth event is registered, where n can be 1 or larger. + - **SI** (Status Inspection). + +### Inception of annex E + +The annex E has been created to contain all the measurements that are **NOT** candidates for standardisation, (indication that they have been considered). + +At the end of the annex there are also references to the Fixed Network measurements, which have been included for completeness. + +NOTE: The measurements in this annex are for information only and as a consequence are **NOT** included in the Object Model (annex C). + +--- + +## E.1 Measurement Related to the BSC + +### E.1.1 BSC Measurement Function + +None. + +--- + +## E.2 Measurement Related to the BTS + +### E.2.1 BTS Measurement Function + +None. + +### E.2.2 CELL Measurement Function + +None. + +### E.2.3 Internal HDO Measurement Function + +None. + +--- + +## E.3 Measurement Related to the MSC + +### E.3.1 MSC Measurement Function + +#### E.3.1.1 Attempted Mobile to Mobile Calls + +- A. This measurement provides the number of mobile to mobile call attempts received by the MSC. +- B. CC. + +#### E.3.1.2 Successful Mobile to Mobile Calls + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful mobile to mobile calls. +- B. CC. + +#### E.3.1.3 Answered Mobile to Mobile Calls + +- A. This measurement counts the number of answered mobile to mobile calls. +- B. CC. + +#### E.3.1.4 Attempted Mobile to Land Calls + +- A. This measurement provides the number of mobile to land call attempts received by the MSC. +- B. CC. + +#### E.3.1.5 Successful Mobile to Land Calls + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful mobile to land calls. +- B. CC. + +#### E.3.1.6 Answered Mobile to Land Calls + +- A. This measurement provides the number of answered mobile to land calls. +- B. CC. + +#### E.3.1.7 Attempted Land to Mobile Calls + +- A. This measurement provides the number of land to mobile call attempts received by the MSC. +- B. CC. + +#### E.3.1.8 Successful Land to Mobile Calls + +- A. This measurement provides the number of successful land to mobile calls. +- B. CC. + +#### E.3.1.9 Answered Land to Mobile Calls + +- A. This measurement indicates the number of answered land to mobile calls. +- B. CC. + +#### E.3.1.10 Mean Holding Time of Calls + +- A. This measurement provides the mean holding time of calls. + +B. CC. + +## E.3.2 External HDO Measurement Function + +None. + +--- + +## E.4 Measurements related to the HLR + +### E.4.1 HLR Measurement Function + +#### E.4.1.1 Instantaneous number of HLR subscribers + +- A. This measurement provides a running total of the number of subscribers for whom information is currently held the HLR. +- B. SI. + +#### E.4.1.2 Barred subscribers in the HLR + +- A. This measurement provides the number of barred subscribers in the HLR. +- B. SI. + +#### E.4.1.3 Bearer service indication + +- A. This measurement provides the number of subscribers with the specified bearer service. +- B. CC. + +#### E.4.1.4 SS operation indication + +- A. This measurement provides the number of subscribers with the specified SS operation. +- B. CC. + +#### E.4.1.5 Attempted requests for Authentication sets from the AUC by the HLR + +- A. This measurement counts the number of triplets requested from the AUC by the HLR. +- B. CC. + +#### E.4.1.6 Successful returned Authentication sets from the AUC to the HLR + +- A. This measurement counts the successfully returned triplets from the AUC to the HLR. +- B. CC. + +--- + +## E.5 Measurements related to the VLR + +### E.5.1 VLR Measurement Function + +#### E.5.1.1 Subscribers from other PLMNs registered in the VLR + +- A. This measurement provides the number of subscribers of other PLMNs registered in the VLR. +- B. SI. + +### E.5.1.2 Number of roamers in the VLR + +- A. This measurement provides the number of roamers which are registered in the VLR. +- B. SI. + +--- + +## E.6 Measurements related to the EIR + +None. + +--- + +## E.7 Measurements related to the SMS-IWMSC/GMSC + +None. + +--- + +## E.8 Performance Measurements on non-specific GSM Objects + +### E.8.1 Measurements related to a PCM system + +According to ITU-T Recommendation Q.79x. + +### E.8.2 Measurements related to MTP + +According to ITU-T Recommendation Q.79x. + +### E.8.3 Measurements related to SCCP and TCAP + +According to ITU-T Recommendation Q.79x. + +### E.8.4 Measurements related to ISUP + +According to ITU-T Recommendation Q.79x. + +### E.8.5 Measurements related to Internet Protocols + +According to IETF RFC Recommendations. + +## Annex F (informative): Index of Measurement Attribute Names + +The measurement description (part D of annex B) provides for each measurement the equivalent measurement attribute name. This clause provides an index of all the attribute names which are used in annex B. This index is provided to enable the reader to forward or backward reference, these attributes in annex C. + +### Measurement Attribute Name: Page + +| | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| allAvailableSDCCHAllocatedTime, ..... | 44 | +| allAvailableTCHAllocatedTime, ..... | 42 | +| ansMobileEmergencyCalls, ..... | 56 | +| ansMobileOriginatingCalls, ..... | 54 | +| ansMobileTerminatingCalls, ..... | 55 | +| arrivalOfVisitorsFromOtherPLMNs, ..... | 78 | +| attAuthProcsInVLR, ..... | 77 | +| attCipheringModeControlProcs, ..... | 56 | +| attIdentificationReqToPVLRS, ..... | 74 | +| attImmediateAssingProcs, ..... | 38 | +| attImmediateAssingProcsPerBSC, ..... | 34 | +| attImmediateAssingProcsPerCause, ..... | 38, 51 | +| attIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOs, ..... | 62 | +| attIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell, ..... | 67 | +| attIncomingInterMSCHDOs, ..... | 63 | +| attIncomingInterMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell, ..... | 68 | +| attIncomingInternalInterCellHDOs, ..... | 46 | +| attIncomingInternalInterCellHDOsPerOriginatingCell, ..... | 52 | +| attInsertSubDataService, ..... | 70 | +| attInterrogationOfHLRsForRouting, ..... | 57 | +| attInterVLRLocationUpdates, ..... | 78 | +| attIntraVLRLocationUpdates, ..... | 77 | +| attLocationUpdate, ..... | 71 | +| attMobileEmergencyCalls, ..... | 55 | +| attMobileOriginatingCalls, ..... | 54 | +| attMobileOriginatingSMForwards, ..... | 80 | +| attMobileTerminatingCalls, ..... | 55 | +| attMobileTerminatingSMForwards, ..... | 81 | +| attMSMemoryAvailableNotifications, ..... | 74 | +| attNbrOfSendAlerts, ..... | 73 | +| attOpForMobileOriginatingPointToPointSMs, ..... | 58 | +| attOpForMobileTerminatingPointToPointSMs, ..... | 58 | +| attOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOs, ..... | 63 | +| attOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerTargetCell, ..... | 67 | +| attOutgoingInterMSCHDOs, ..... | 64 | +| attOutgoingInterMSCHDOsPerTargetCell, ..... | 68 | +| attOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOs, ..... | 46 | +| attOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOsPerTargetCell, ..... | 53 | +| attPageReqs, ..... | 75 | +| attPageReqsPerLocationArea, ..... | 75 | +| attReqForAuthSetsReceivedByHLR, ..... | 69 | +| attReqForAuthSetsSentToHLR, ..... | 76 | +| attReqForMSRN, ..... | 73 | +| attReqForSMRoutingInfo, ..... | 72 | +| attSDCCHSeizuresMeetingSDCCHBlockedState, ..... | 44 | +| attSMDeliveryStatusReportProcs, ..... | 72 | +| attSSRelatedOperationsInHLR, ..... | 71 | +| attSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCa, ..... | 65 | +| attSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCc, ..... | 65 | +| attTCHSeizures, ..... | 41 | +| attTCHSeizuresMeetingTCHBlockedState, ..... | 41 | + +| | | +|------------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| attTransOfPagingMessagesPerBSC, ..... | 33 | +| attTransOfPagingMessagesThePCH, ..... | 37, 50 | +| emptyResponsesForAuthFromHLR, ..... | 77 | +| emptyResponsesForAuthSetsFromHLR, ..... | 70 | +| externalHDOs, ..... | 66 | +| externalHDOsPerCause, ..... | 66 | +| imsiAttachProcs, ..... | 62 | +| imsiDetachProcs, ..... | 62 | +| maxNbrOfBusySDCCHs, ..... | 43 | +| maxNbrOfBusyTCHs, ..... | 40, 49 | +| meanDurationOfSuccPagingProcs, ..... | 39 | +| meanInterArrivalTime, ..... | 33, 37 | +| meanNbrOfBusySDCCHs, ..... | 43 | +| meanNbrOfBusyTCHs, ..... | 40, 49 | +| meanNbrOfIdleTCHsPerInterferenceBand, ..... | 41 | +| meanPCHAGCHQueueLength, ..... | 37, 50 | +| meanSDCCHQueueLength, ..... | 44 | +| meanTCHBusyTime, ..... | 42 | +| meanTCHQueueLength, ..... | 42 | +| meanTimeToCallSetupService, ..... | 60 | +| meanTimeToLocationUpdateService, ..... | 60 | +| nbrOfAvailableSDCCHs, ..... | 43 | +| nbrOfAvailableTCHs, ..... | 40 | +| nbrOfBlackAnsInEIR, ..... | 80 | +| nbrOfBlackAnsInMSC, ..... | 59 | +| nbrOfClassMarkUpdates, ..... | 54 | +| nbrOfCurrentMSsRoamingOutsideHPLMN, ..... | 69 | +| nbrOfGreyAnsInEIR, ..... | 79 | +| nbrOfGreyAnsInMSC, ..... | 59 | +| nbrOfLostRadioLinksSDCCH, ..... | 45 | +| nbrOfLostRadioLinksTCH, ..... | 43 | +| nbrOfPagesDiscardedFromPCHQueue, ..... | 39, 50 | +| nbrOfReceivedIMEICheckReqs, ..... | 79 | +| nbrOfTransCheckIMEIRequests, ..... | 59 | +| nbrOfUnknownIMEIAnsInEIR, ..... | 80 | +| nbrOfUnknownIMEIAnsInMSC, ..... | 60 | +| nbrOfWhiteAnsInEIR, ..... | 79 | +| nbrOfWhiteAnsInMSC, ..... | 59 | +| relativeTimeDLPowerControlAtMax, ..... | 45 | +| relativeTimeULPowerControlAtMax, ..... | 45 | +| succAuthProcsInVLR, ..... | 77 | +| succCipheringModeControlProcs, ..... | 57 | +| succIdentificationReqToPVLRs, ..... | 75 | +| succImmediateAssingProcsPerBSC, ..... | 34 | +| succImmediateAssingProcsPerCause, ..... | 39, 51 | +| succIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOs, ..... | 63 | +| succIncomingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell, ..... | 67 | +| succIncomingInterMSCHDOs, ..... | 64 | +| succIncomingInterMSCHDOsPerOriginatingCell, ..... | 68 | +| succIncomingInternalInterCellHDOs, ..... | 46 | +| succIncomingInternalInterCellHDOsPerOriginatingCell, ..... | 53 | +| succInsertSubDataService, ..... | 70 | +| succInternalHDOsIntraCell, ..... | 45 | +| succInternalHDOsIntraCellPerBSC, ..... | 34 | +| succInternalHDOsPerBSC, ..... | 35 | +| succInternalHDOsPerCause, ..... | 35 | +| succInterrogationOfHLRsCallForwarding, ..... | 57 | +| succInterrogationOfHLRsMSRNObtained, ..... | 57 | +| succInterVLRLocationUpdates, ..... | 78 | +| succIntraVLRLocationUpdates, ..... | 78 | +| succLocationUpdate, ..... | 71 | + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------|--------| +| succMobileEmergencyCalls, ..... | 56 | +| succMobileOriginatingCalls, ..... | 54 | +| succMobileOriginatingSMForwardings, ..... | 81 | +| succMobileTerminatingCalls, ..... | 55 | +| succMobileTerminatingSMForwardings, ..... | 81 | +| succMSMemoryAvailableNotifications, ..... | 74 | +| succNbrOfSendAlerts, ..... | 73 | +| succOpForMobileOriginatingPointToPointSMs, ..... | 58 | +| succOpForMobileTerminatingPointToPointSMs, ..... | 58 | +| succOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOs, ..... | 63 | +| succOutgoingExternalIntraMSCHDOsPerTargetCell, ..... | 68 | +| succOutgoingInterMSCHDOs, ..... | 64 | +| succOutgoingInterMSCHDOsPerTargetCell, ..... | 69 | +| succOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOs, ..... | 47 | +| succOutgoingInternalInterCellHDOsPerTargetCell, ..... | 53 | +| succPageReqs, ..... | 75 | +| succPageReqsPerLocationArea, ..... | 76 | +| succReceivedAuthSetsFromHLR, ..... | 76 | +| succReqForMSRN, ..... | 74 | +| succReqForSMRoutingInfo, ..... | 72 | +| succReturnedAuthSetsFromHLR, ..... | 70 | +| succSMDeliveryStatusReportProcs, ..... | 73 | +| succSSRelatedOperationsInHLR, ..... | 71 | +| succSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCa, ..... | 65 | +| succSubsequentInterMSCHDOsMSCc, ..... | 65 | +| succTCHSeizures, ..... | 41, 51 | +| succTMSIReallocations, ..... | 62 | +| transSubIdentifiedWithIMSI, ..... | 61 | +| transSubIdentifiedWithTMSI, ..... | 61 | +| unsuccExternHDOsWithLossOfConnectionPerMSC, ..... | 66 | +| unsuccExternHDOsWithReconnectionPerMSC, ..... | 66 | +| unsuccHDOsWithLossOfConnection, ..... | 47 | +| unsuccHDOsWithReconnection, ..... | 47 | +| unsuccInternalHDOsIntraCell, ..... | 46 | +| unsuccInternalHDOsIntraCellPerBSC, ..... | 35 | +| unsuccInternalHDOsWithLossOfConnectionPerBSC, ..... | 36 | +| unsuccInternalHDOsWithReconnectionPerBSC, ..... | 36 | +| unsuccReqsForService, ..... | 33 | +| unsuccReqsForServicePerCause, ..... | 33 | +| unsuccTransOfPagingMessagesPerBSC, ..... | 34 | +| unsuccTransOfPagingMessagesThePCH, ..... | 38 | + +--- + +## Annex G (informative): Bibliography + +This clause provides references to documents which are not directly referenced by the present document, but nevertheless are useful for background information on this subject. + +- ITU-T Recommendations E.500: "Traffic intensity measurement principles". +- ITU-T Recommendation E.600: "Terms and definitions of traffic engineering". +- ITU-T Recommendation M.3010: "Principles for a Telecommunications management network". +- ITU-T Recommendation M.3200: "TMN management services and telecommunications managed areas: overview". +- ITU-T Recommendation M.3400: "TMN Management Functions". +- ITU-T Recommendation M.251: "Maintenance Functions to Be Implemented in ITU-T-MML - General Maintenance Principles - Maintenance of International Transmission Systems and Telephone Circuits (Study Group IV) 29 pp". +- ITU-T Recommendation Q.542: "Digital exchange design objectives - Operations and maintenance". +- ITU-T Recommendation Q.544: "Digital exchange measurements". +- ITU-T Recommendation Q.822: "Stage 1, stage 2 and stage 3 description for the Q3 interface – Performance management". +- ITU-T Recommendation Z.336: "Traffic measurement administration". + +## Annex H (informative): Change history + +| Change history | | | | | | | | | +|-----------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|--------|---------------| +| Date | TSG # | TSG Doc. | CR | Rev | Subject/Comment | Cat | Old | New | +| Jun 2001 | SA_1
2 | SP-010237 | -- | -- | Submitted as to TSG SA #12 for Information (this part maintains the relevant clauses of GSM 12.04 for the future in 3GP) | -- | 1.0.0 | | +| Sep 2001 | SA_1
3 | SP-010467 | -- | -- | Submitted to TSG SA #13 for Approval. TS# changed from 32.402 to 52.402 as being GSM-only. | -- | 2.0.0 | 4.0.0 | +| Jun 2002 | SA_1
6 | SP-020292 | 000
1 | -- | Correction of erroneous definitions of SGSN measurements | A | 4.0.0 | 4.1.0 | +| Jun 2002 | SA_1
6 | SP-020293 | 000
2 | -- | Remove irrelevant definitions for SGSN measurements related to Ciphering Mode | A | 4.0.0 | 4.1.0 | +| Mar 2003 | SA_1
9 | SP-030040 | -- | -- | Request approved for Automatic upgrade to Rel-5 (i.e. no CR) | -- | 4.1.0 | 5.0.0 | +| Sep 2004 | SA_2
5 | SP-040541 | -- | -- | Automatic upgrade to Rel- 6 (no CR) as per request in SP-040541 SA5_presentation_SA_25.ppt (slide 17) | -- | 5.0.0 | 6.0.0 | +| Dec 2005 | SA_3
0 | SP-050705 | 000
3 | -- | Correct counter name nbrOfGreyAnswerInSgsn | F | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | +| Jun 2007 | SA_3
6 | -- | -- | -- | Automatic upgrade to Rel-7 (no CR) at freeze of Rel-7. Reference [32] 3GPP TS 32.403 was "Voided". Reason: discontinued from Rel-6 onwards and the material was used in a set of new Rel-7 specifications - see [33]. Introduction updated accordingly. | -- | 6.1.0 | 7.0.0 | +| Dec 2007 | SA_3
8 | SP-070741 | 000
4 | -- | Add measurements related to number of octets of uplink and downlink BSSGP PDU | B | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | +| Dec 2007 | SA_3
8 | SP-070741 | 000
5 | -- | Add measurements related to mean number of PDCH for GPRS and EGPRS | B | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | +| Dec 2007 | SA_3
8 | SP-070741 | 000
6 | -- | Add measurements related to mean number of GPRS and EGPRS TBF for downlink | B | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | +| Dec 2007 | SA_3
8 | SP-070741 | 000
7 | -- | Add measurements related to throughput of EGPRS RLC layer | B | 7.0.0 | 8.0.0 | +| Dec 2009 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-9 version | -- | 8.0.0 | 9.0.0 | +| 2011-03 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-10 version (MCC) | -- | 9.0.0 | 10.0.0 | +| 2012-09 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-11 version (MCC) | | 10.0.0 | 11.0.0 | +| 2014-10 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-12 version (MCC) | | 11.0.0 | 12.0.0 | +| 2016-01 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-13 version (MCC) | | 12.0.0 | 13.0.0 | +| 2016-03 | SA_7
1 | SP-160060 | 000
8 | 2 | Add usage of measurements for EE | F | 13.0.0 | 13.1.0 | +| 2017-04 | SA#7
5 | - | - | - | Promotion to Release 14 without technical change | | 13.1.0 | 14.0.0 | + +| Change history | | | | | | | | +|-----------------------|---------|-----------|------|-----|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| Date | Meeting | TDoc | CR | Rev | Cat | Subject/Comment | New version | +| 2018-03 | SA#79 | SP-180060 | 0009 | - | B | Introduction of power, energy and environment related measurements and related use case description. | 15.0.0 | +| 2020-07 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-16 version (MCC) | 16.0.0 | \ No newline at end of file